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Since its 2016 MER, Austria undertook steps to better identify and assess ML/TF/PF risks [23] , including through its 2025 NRA. Austria finalised its first, second, and third NRA in April 2015, May 2021, and May 2025, respectively. A separate SRA on NPOs was published in 2024 and further updated for inclusion in the 2025 NRA. An SRA for the financial and VASP sectors was being finalised by the FMA at the time of the onsite visit to complement the third NRA. The second and third NRAs consider the findings of the European Commission (EC)’s SNRA updated in 2019 and 2022 and follow its methodology for assessing Austria’s domestic ML/TF risks. [24] With regards to domestic risks, the NRA is largely consistent with the SNRA and includes brief explanations of similarities and discrepancies. In contrast to the SNRA, the NRA does not include a thorough analysis of Austria’s cross-border risk. The NRAs are published on the BMF website and widely disseminated to OEs through AML/CFT supervisory authorities, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and via A-FIU’s GoAML tool that reaches all OEs registered with A-FIU. 134. Austria demonstrated some progress towards developing a more coordinated approach to the understanding of ML/TF/PF risks. The second and third NRAs were led by the AML/CFT NCC under the leadership of the BMF. The BMF played a vital role in coordinating the risk analyses and engaging with and gathering input from both public and private sector stakeholders at various stages. 135. Contributions by some key competent authorities remain insufficient, thereby significantly affecting the quality of the risk analyses. Some authorities, like A-FIU, BMI/DSN, the FMA and other sectoral supervisors participated very actively and demonstrated to a certain extent ownership of their quality outputs. In contrast, other key stakeholders such as the BMJ, including public prosecutors, did not contribute substantively to the risk analysis, which suffers from gaps in the use of criminal justice data related to IO.2, IO.6, IO.7, and IO.8. For instance, in the absence of substantive contributions from the BMJ and the judiciary, the risk analysis did not focus on structural shortcomings that appear to hinder effective ML/TF prosecutions and may result in relevant ML/TF vulnerabilities (IO.7). Similarly, input from LEAs was inconsistent with no input from BAK, leaving the ML threat from corruption under-assessed. Structural gaps in risk identification therefore remain considering these authorities’ key role in the AML/CFT regime and Austria’s risk and context. 136. Regarding ML/TF risk understanding, Austria made significant progress to better substantiate its risk analysis in some key sectors . This is reflected in a robust understanding of risks related to LPs and LAs (IO.5), NPOs (IO.10) and, to an overall sound extent, to the financial sector (IO.3). This is in line with risk and context, considering the materiality of the financial sector, role of LPs and LAs for ML and NPOs for TF (Introduction). The strong level of understanding of those sectoral risks is evident within the relevant competent authorities in these areas, as well as within DSN. However, most other authorities did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with those findings despite their impact on the national ML/TF risk landscape. 137. The level of risk understanding demonstrated in other sectors remains inconsistent, incomplete, and not in line with risk and context. Supervisory authorities for casinos, notaries, accountants, and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated a reasonable and nuanced understanding of the ML/TF risks in their sector. In contrast, other DNFBP supervisors (i.e., for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP services), and DPMS) failed to provide granularity in the analysis of their sector-specific vulnerabilities and did not demonstrate that they understand how the various ML/TF threats materialise in their sector. The lack of risk understanding is also observed at supervised entities level with real estate agents consistently stating that the sector is not at risk for ML/TF/PF. This is of particular concern considering that the NRA is clearly indicating that the sector continues to be attractive for both ML and PF. This was also confirmed through cases presented by LEAs. 138. Similarly, some LEAs did not show a nuanced understanding of the ML threats to which Austria is exposed. For instance, LEAs could not clearly articulate Austria’s exposure to domestic and transnational corruption threats, nor how proceeds from corruption are laundered in Austria. While the Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) showed a reasonable understanding of the drug-trafficking threat and the volume of generated proceeds, their level of understanding of associated ML risks did not seem proportionate. 139. The authorities did not demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of transnational threats and associated financial flows. With a few exceptions, they could not clearly and cohesively articulate which are the main national and transnational ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. The Beneficial Ownership Registry authority is one exception with a sound risk analysis of foreign Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements (LPLAs) (IO.5). The FMA is—to a slightly lesser extent—another one, with an SRA that would however benefit from additional granularity in relation to corruption risks in Austria and FIs’ exposure to cross-border crime proceeds (IO.3). Other authorities, including A-FIU, LEAs (except DSN), BMJ, and DNFBP supervisors, did not show a clear understanding of those risks and their activities are insufficiently targeting such threats. Those gaps are important considering Austria’s risk and context. 140. More broadly, the identification and substantiation of risks suffer from important limitations in data and other information sources. The main data sources for the ML threat analysis are STRs and police statistics on criminal investigations registered in the police logging system (PAD). However, the reliability of STR data for a comprehensive assessment of risk is affected by the very uneven reporting across sectors, the relative low number of reports (IO.3/IO.4) and the fact that STRs mainly focus on detected fraud cases. In addition, the PAD system does not allow to determine which are the specific ML predicates offences. Predicate crimes investigated by specialised authorities, [25] including but not limited to BAK were not included. Overall, the risk analysis did not consider the materiality of the ML and TF threats and the relative importance of identified sectoral risks (and their adequate prioritisation) based on the materiality of sectors. 141. Limitations in both the coordinated approach and the risk analysis continue to affect the authorities’ capacity to develop a whole-of-government understanding of ML/TF risks. The risk analysis approach evidenced inconsistent input and quality of analysis among individual authorities and did not result in a broader outlook beyond their specific area of expertise. In addition, the lack of identification of the national vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the threats identified in the risk analyses is an additional impediment to the development of an overarching and comprehensive risk understanding. 1.1.1. ML risks 142. Across the board, all authorities identified fraud as the main ML threat and most of them referred to methods/vulnerabilities such as the misuse of legal persons (i.e., fraudulent companies—IO.5), the real estate sector, and VAs, which aligns to some extent with the NRA findings. Other predicate offences such as tax offences, social benefit fraud, drug-related offences, corruption and smuggling offences were often not mentioned by authorities while both Austria’s Federal Criminal Police’s (BKA) crime reports and the NRA highlight the importance of these crimes in Austria. 143. Most authorities did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the linkages between proceeds of certain crimes, preferred ML methods and sectoral vulnerabilities. While lawyers, notaries, and some TCSPs (including tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) are involved in the creation and transfer of domestic LPs and offer nominee services, their supervisors (except for notaries, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and to some extent, lawyers) did not demonstrate an understanding of how their sectoral vulnerabilities may be exploited for ML (e.g., fraudulent companies—IO.5). Similarly, while A-FIU, LEAs, and prosecutors referred to the real estate sector as high risk for ML, real estate agents, and their supervisory authorities were unable to elaborate on the sector’s vulnerabilities and its specific exposure to ML threats. 144. Limited data and lack of comparability across time constrain the authorities’ capacity to identify evolving trends in ML risks, resulting in an absence of enhanced understanding of the evolving ML risk landscape. While the three NRA exercises offer some recurrent data analysis, such as the analysis of possible ML predicate offences related to STRs, and the most likely predicate offences in ML investigations, there is no dedicated analysis of how those threats and vulnerabilities evolve over time. During the onsite visit, the authorities mentioned new and increased risks emanating from VAs and digitalisation, particularly new forms of payment systems and online fraud schemes, as well as the interconnectivity of actors. However, most authorities did not show an understanding of the progression of these phenomena over recent years. 145. There is no country-wide understanding of ML/TF threats resulting from foreign predicate crimes. Some authorities referred to Austria’s transit role and the Financial Sector chapter of the NRA refers to Austria being an international banking centre traditionally attractive to foreign customers. However, the authorities were unable to provide encompassing views on Austria’s current standing in the international movement of criminal proceeds, or to identify specific risks associated with cross-border flows. Most authorities referred to a decreased exposure to CESEE financial flows, yet this was generally linked to the measures taken at the EU level in 2022, with regards to Russian sanctions related to the war in Ukraine, which do not relate to, nor affect, other parts of CESEE. They acknowledged challenges in the identification of proceeds of foreign crimes, limiting their understanding of how these foreign proceeds are being laundered in or through Austria. 1.1.2. TF Risks 146. Overall, competent authorities showed a relatively good understanding of TF risks, while DSN’s TF risk understanding is excellent. DSN provided concrete examples of TF threats and methods. Austria assesses its TF risk as high, linking it to the large and active communities from relevant countries living in Austria, that have strong social and financial connections to their home countries. The highest threats of TF are linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province, Muslim Brotherhood, and North Caucasian groupings. The Islamic State is considered a medium threat of TF. Al Qaeda and Takfirist (Western Balkans) are considered a low threat. Despite the limitations of the underlying data to substantiate the materiality of the TF threat level for each group and the fact that the third NRA confuses TF and terrorist threats, the DSN adequately elaborated on these threats and their materiality. In addition to the NRA, federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities also develop confidential TF situation reports. 147. The DSN demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of TF methods, identifying legal sources, such as donations, earned income, social welfare, and legitimate business activities. It also identified the misuse of NPOs as fronts for fundraising and crowdfunding to finance terrorism, especially through unregulated platforms. These findings from intelligence and TF investigations were integrated in the NPO risk assessment which considered NPOs exposure to various TF threat scenarios. In addition to the use of cash couriers and hawala to move funds discreetly across borders, the authorities highlighted that VAs are increasingly being used for TF purposes due to pseudonymity and ease of cross-border transfers. 148. The financial sector, particularly CIs, payment institutions (PIs), and the VASP sector and their supervisor, showed a robust understanding of TF risks, guiding them in the implementation of preventive measures. Footnotes [23] PF risk understanding is assessed as part of IO.11 (core issue 11.2). [24] The authorities reported following the EC’s 2017 SNRA staff working document (2017) 241 final, dated 26 June 2017, specifically Part 2. This document refers to assessing ML and TF risks affecting the internal market, including cross-border risks. 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Since its 2016 MER, Austria undertook steps to better identify and assess ML/TF/PF risks [23] , including through its 2025 NRA. Austria finalised its first, second, and third NRA in April 2015, May 2021, and May 2025, respectively. A separate SRA on NPOs was published in 2024 and further updated for inclusion in the 2025 NRA. An SRA for the financial and VASP sectors was being finalised by the FMA at the time of the onsite visit to complement the third NRA. The second and third NRAs consider the findings of the European Commission (EC)’s SNRA updated in 2019 and 2022 and follow its methodology for assessing Austria’s domestic ML/TF risks. [24] With regards to domestic risks, the NRA is largely consistent with the SNRA and includes brief explanations of similarities and discrepancies. In contrast to the SNRA, the NRA does not include a thorough analysis of Austria’s cross-border risk. The NRAs are published on the BMF website and widely disseminated to OEs through AML/CFT supervisory authorities, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and via A-FIU’s GoAML tool that reaches all OEs registered with A-FIU. 134. Austria demonstrated some progress towards developing a more coordinated approach to the understanding of ML/TF/PF risks. The second and third NRAs were led by the AML/CFT NCC under the leadership of the BMF. The BMF played a vital role in coordinating the risk analyses and engaging with and gathering input from both public and private sector stakeholders at various stages. 135. Contributions by some key competent authorities remain insufficient, thereby significantly affecting the quality of the risk analyses. Some authorities, like A-FIU, BMI/DSN, the FMA and other sectoral supervisors participated very actively and demonstrated to a certain extent ownership of their quality outputs. In contrast, other key stakeholders such as the BMJ, including public prosecutors, did not contribute substantively to the risk analysis, which suffers from gaps in the use of criminal justice data related to IO.2, IO.6, IO.7, and IO.8. For instance, in the absence of substantive contributions from the BMJ and the judiciary, the risk analysis did not focus on structural shortcomings that appear to hinder effective ML/TF prosecutions and may result in relevant ML/TF vulnerabilities (IO.7). Similarly, input from LEAs was inconsistent with no input from BAK, leaving the ML threat from corruption under-assessed. Structural gaps in risk identification therefore remain considering these authorities’ key role in the AML/CFT regime and Austria’s risk and context. 136. Regarding ML/TF risk understanding, Austria made significant progress to better substantiate its risk analysis in some key sectors . This is reflected in a robust understanding of risks related to LPs and LAs (IO.5), NPOs (IO.10) and, to an overall sound extent, to the financial sector (IO.3). This is in line with risk and context, considering the materiality of the financial sector, role of LPs and LAs for ML and NPOs for TF (Introduction). The strong level of understanding of those sectoral risks is evident within the relevant competent authorities in these areas, as well as within DSN. However, most other authorities did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with those findings despite their impact on the national ML/TF risk landscape. 137. The level of risk understanding demonstrated in other sectors remains inconsistent, incomplete, and not in line with risk and context. Supervisory authorities for casinos, notaries, accountants, and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated a reasonable and nuanced understanding of the ML/TF risks in their sector. In contrast, other DNFBP supervisors (i.e., for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP services), and DPMS) failed to provide granularity in the analysis of their sector-specific vulnerabilities and did not demonstrate that they understand how the various ML/TF threats materialise in their sector. The lack of risk understanding is also observed at supervised entities level with real estate agents consistently stating that the sector is not at risk for ML/TF/PF. This is of particular concern considering that the NRA is clearly indicating that the sector continues to be attractive for both ML and PF. This was also confirmed through cases presented by LEAs. 138. Similarly, some LEAs did not show a nuanced understanding of the ML threats to which Austria is exposed. For instance, LEAs could not clearly articulate Austria’s exposure to domestic and transnational corruption threats, nor how proceeds from corruption are laundered in Austria. While the Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) showed a reasonable understanding of the drug-trafficking threat and the volume of generated proceeds, their level of understanding of associated ML risks did not seem proportionate. 139. The authorities did not demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of transnational threats and associated financial flows. With a few exceptions, they could not clearly and cohesively articulate which are the main national and transnational ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. The Beneficial Ownership Registry authority is one exception with a sound risk analysis of foreign Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements (LPLAs) (IO.5). The FMA is—to a slightly lesser extent—another one, with an SRA that would however benefit from additional granularity in relation to corruption risks in Austria and FIs’ exposure to cross-border crime proceeds (IO.3). Other authorities, including A-FIU, LEAs (except DSN), BMJ, and DNFBP supervisors, did not show a clear understanding of those risks and their activities are insufficiently targeting such threats. Those gaps are important considering Austria’s risk and context. 140. More broadly, the identification and substantiation of risks suffer from important limitations in data and other information sources. The main data sources for the ML threat analysis are STRs and police statistics on criminal investigations registered in the police logging system (PAD). However, the reliability of STR data for a comprehensive assessment of risk is affected by the very uneven reporting across sectors, the relative low number of reports (IO.3/IO.4) and the fact that STRs mainly focus on detected fraud cases. In addition, the PAD system does not allow to determine which are the specific ML predicates offences. Predicate crimes investigated by specialised authorities, [25] including but not limited to BAK were not included. Overall, the risk analysis did not consider the materiality of the ML and TF threats and the relative importance of identified sectoral risks (and their adequate prioritisation) based on the materiality of sectors. 141. Limitations in both the coordinated approach and the risk analysis continue to affect the authorities’ capacity to develop a whole-of-government understanding of ML/TF risks. The risk analysis approach evidenced inconsistent input and quality of analysis among individual authorities and did not result in a broader outlook beyond their specific area of expertise. In addition, the lack of identification of the national vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the threats identified in the risk analyses is an additional impediment to the development of an overarching and comprehensive risk understanding. 1.1.1. ML risks 142. Across the board, all authorities identified fraud as the main ML threat and most of them referred to methods/vulnerabilities such as the misuse of legal persons (i.e., fraudulent companies—IO.5), the real estate sector, and VAs, which aligns to some extent with the NRA findings. Other predicate offences such as tax offences, social benefit fraud, drug-related offences, corruption and smuggling offences were often not mentioned by authorities while both Austria’s Federal Criminal Police’s (BKA) crime reports and the NRA highlight the importance of these crimes in Austria. 143. Most authorities did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the linkages between proceeds of certain crimes, preferred ML methods and sectoral vulnerabilities. While lawyers, notaries, and some TCSPs (including tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) are involved in the creation and transfer of domestic LPs and offer nominee services, their supervisors (except for notaries, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and to some extent, lawyers) did not demonstrate an understanding of how their sectoral vulnerabilities may be exploited for ML (e.g., fraudulent companies—IO.5). Similarly, while A-FIU, LEAs, and prosecutors referred to the real estate sector as high risk for ML, real estate agents, and their supervisory authorities were unable to elaborate on the sector’s vulnerabilities and its specific exposure to ML threats. 144. Limited data and lack of comparability across time constrain the authorities’ capacity to identify evolving trends in ML risks, resulting in an absence of enhanced understanding of the evolving ML risk landscape. While the three NRA exercises offer some recurrent data analysis, such as the analysis of possible ML predicate offences related to STRs, and the most likely predicate offences in ML investigations, there is no dedicated analysis of how those threats and vulnerabilities evolve over time. During the onsite visit, the authorities mentioned new and increased risks emanating from VAs and digitalisation, particularly new forms of payment systems and online fraud schemes, as well as the interconnectivity of actors. However, most authorities did not show an understanding of the progression of these phenomena over recent years. 145. There is no country-wide understanding of ML/TF threats resulting from foreign predicate crimes. Some authorities referred to Austria’s transit role and the Financial Sector chapter of the NRA refers to Austria being an international banking centre traditionally attractive to foreign customers. However, the authorities were unable to provide encompassing views on Austria’s current standing in the international movement of criminal proceeds, or to identify specific risks associated with cross-border flows. Most authorities referred to a decreased exposure to CESEE financial flows, yet this was generally linked to the measures taken at the EU level in 2022, with regards to Russian sanctions related to the war in Ukraine, which do not relate to, nor affect, other parts of CESEE. They acknowledged challenges in the identification of proceeds of foreign crimes, limiting their understanding of how these foreign proceeds are being laundered in or through Austria. 1.1.2. TF Risks 146. Overall, competent authorities showed a relatively good understanding of TF risks, while DSN’s TF risk understanding is excellent. DSN provided concrete examples of TF threats and methods. Austria assesses its TF risk as high, linking it to the large and active communities from relevant countries living in Austria, that have strong social and financial connections to their home countries. The highest threats of TF are linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province, Muslim Brotherhood, and North Caucasian groupings. The Islamic State is considered a medium threat of TF. Al Qaeda and Takfirist (Western Balkans) are considered a low threat. Despite the limitations of the underlying data to substantiate the materiality of the TF threat level for each group and the fact that the third NRA confuses TF and terrorist threats, the DSN adequately elaborated on these threats and their materiality. In addition to the NRA, federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities also develop confidential TF situation reports. 147. The DSN demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of TF methods, identifying legal sources, such as donations, earned income, social welfare, and legitimate business activities. It also identified the misuse of NPOs as fronts for fundraising and crowdfunding to finance terrorism, especially through unregulated platforms. These findings from intelligence and TF investigations were integrated in the NPO risk assessment which considered NPOs exposure to various TF threat scenarios. In addition to the use of cash couriers and hawala to move funds discreetly across borders, the authorities highlighted that VAs are increasingly being used for TF purposes due to pseudonymity and ease of cross-border transfers. 148. The financial sector, particularly CIs, payment institutions (PIs), and the VASP sector and their supervisor, showed a robust understanding of TF risks, guiding them in the implementation of preventive measures. Footnotes [23] PF risk understanding is assessed as part of IO.11 (core issue 11.2). [24] The authorities reported following the EC’s 2017 SNRA staff working document (2017) 241 final, dated 26 June 2017, specifically Part 2. This document refers to assessing ML and TF risks affecting the internal market, including cross-border risks. 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Providing evidence and locating criminals Volume and nature of MLA 181. Austrian judicial authorities routinely provide MLA in criminal matters, most often by providing account and other financial information, search and seizures, and telecom/internet provider information. Austria receives a total average of 5 000 MLA requests per year in criminal matters and refuses around 100 of them. During 2020–2024, Austria received 662 ML/TF-related foreign requests. Table 2.1. Statistics on incoming MLA requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Total MLA requests Incoming 1 250 5 554 5 429 5 285 5 655 23 173 ML-related MLA requests Incoming ML 112 128 100 151 138 629 TF-related MLA requests Incoming TF 17 4 2 6 4 33 182. Around 81% of incoming requests are European Investigation Orders (EIOs) from other EU member states. This means that an average of 20 ML/TF-related requests per year come from non-EU countries. Authorities explain the relatively low number of such requests by the fact that a lot of informal exchange of information is taking place at investigative level without the need to follow up with formal MLA requests. However, even if informal cooperation could to a certain extent replace formal MLA, the volume of international cooperation with non-EU countries is very low in consideration of its risk profile. Table 2.2. Top 10 countries for incoming requests for MLA in criminal matters MLA with EU countries MLA with non-EU countries Germany 7 225 Türkiye 1 951 Slovenia 2 325 Switzerland 772 Slovakia 1 555 Liechtenstein 483 Poland 1 511 Serbia 263 Hungary 1 417 Bosnia Herzegovina 211 Czech Republic 1 415 Russian Federation 117 Romania 744 Ukraine 116 Italy 397 USA 100 Bulgaria 353 North Macedonia 71 Croatia 348 Georgia 52 Note: Data relate to incoming requests 2020–2024 for MLA in all matters, extradition and transfer of proceedings. Source: BMJ 183. There are no available statistics on countries of origin in ML/TF matters, but the authorities consider that ML/TF cooperation follow the same geographical distribution as cooperation in other matters. 184. The breakdown of MLA per country in all criminal matters shows that MLA overall, reflects Austria’s close relations to Eastern European countries and Türkiye, and its very close economic, financial, and cultural/social links with Germany and Switzerland. There are no statistical data regarding ML/TF and/or predicate offences cited in requests received nor on the type of measures requested. This limits the ability to determine whether assistance provided is consistent with Austria’s risk profile in terms of the most relevant predicate offences with cross-border aspects, the type of assistance, including investigations (searches, hearing of witnesses, etc.) provided, or the volume of AR-related requests. 185. During the assessment period, the average time needed to respond to MLA requests has been steadily reduced, from 55.21 days in 2020 to 37.37 days in 2024. The average duration of one and a half month for the execution of MLA requests and EIOs is notable. Most of the MLA requests are EIOs, which are generally executed within short time frames due to the direct contacts among EU authorities and the time limits imposed by EU regulations. Almost all FATF/FSRB members which provided feedback reported that MLA requests were generally executed in a timely manner. The EU report on the implementation of the EIO [32] confirms that EIOs are executed by Austria within the established time limits. 186. Austria has an effective system in place to register and prioritise non-EU MLA requests. MLA requests may be sent by diplomatic channels or to the BMJ’s central authority. Once registered in the central electronic case management system, incoming requests are immediately sent to the competent PPO for processing, with an indication of the time limits for their execution. If the requesting country has marked its request as urgent, it is specifically mentioned in the transmission by the central authority. The electronic case management register allows the BMJ to monitor the execution of the request and send automatic reminders to the PPO. 187. Clear information on requirements and contact information for Austria is provided, within the EU, via the EJN Atlas. Outside the EU, the UN register of central authorities contains the contact details of the central authority within the BMJ. The authorities also cooperate through the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Co-operation in Criminal Matters. There is otherwise no information on requirements and contact details available for online consultation by requesting states. 188. Austria deals appropriately with confidentiality issues. In some instances, because of the coercive nature of the measure requested, prior notice must be given to the concerned person to allow them to exercise their rights. In such cases, Austrian authorities reach out to the requesting state to inform it of difficulties associated to such requirement with a view to find a solution. 189. Austria’s refusal rate is very low. The authorities indicated that out of the 662 MLA requests in ML/TF matters received during the period under review, only 6 requests were rejected, usually on the ground of lack of dual criminality or ne bis in idem . Feedback from the global network was more nuanced on the refusal rate, but there was an indication that Austria, when refusing, was always assisting in finding alternative solutions. 190. Feedback from the global network on MLA provided by Austria is generally very positive. There is unanimity among respondents in commending the quality of the assistance provided by Austria. Some issues were nevertheless raised, such as Austria’s inability to assist with encrypted data surveillance, to hear a suspect via videoconference during the trial phase, and the high thresholds for some advanced investigative techniques, such as listening devices or access to encrypted end-to-end communications. Two respondents to the feedback questionnaire indicated that Austria did not always accept the transfer of criminal proceedings. 2.1.2. Extradition 191. Austria receives an average of 50 extradition requests in all matters per year and, during the period under review, refused 28 of those requests. Between 2020–2024, Austria received 20 extradition requests and 19 European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) for ML offences, and one extradition request for TF (Art. 278d, StGB). Only one ML extradition was refused. The authorities could not provide any statistics regarding extradition for predicate offences. Table 2.3. Statistics of extraditions and EAWs Extradition requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML 4 2 6 7 1 20 TF 1 1 EAWs ML 4 6 4 2 7 19 TF 0 Source: BMJ 192. The extradition refusal rate is very low for ML/TF offences and feedback from the Global Network was broadly positive about how Austria handles extradition and EAWs. Authorities reported only one such extradition request and two EAWs refused. Generally, respondents to the questionnaire did not report about reasons for refusals other than those allowed by the conventions. Austria does not extradite its nationals, except within the framework of EAWs within the EU. Austrian authorities claim that in case such a refusal is made, it commits to prosecute the suspect within its own courts. 193. Extradition is provided in a timely manner and the average time needed to extradite has been steadily reduced during the period under review, from 66.25 days in 2020 to 41.75 days in 2024. [33] Feedback from the global network confirms that EAWs are timely executed. Regarding extradition, one country reported that there can be significant delays in granting extradition because of the possibility for multiple recourses. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 194. Austria’s legal framework allows for the provision of assistance to foreign countries in identifying, locating, seizing, or confiscating assets, subject to minor shortcomings in R.4. cascading on the ability to provide assistance in this matter. ARO facilitates the execution of both informal and formal MLA requests for seizure and execution of confiscation measures. Austria is a founding member of the Camden Asset Recovery Informal Network (CARIN). 195. Formal seizure and confiscation incoming requests are processed along the same modalities and procedures as general MLA requests, including for prioritisation. The central authority does not prioritise seizure/confiscation requests over other types of MLA requests, which may create a hazard in cases of risks of asset flight. However, the authorities indicate that prosecutors are aware of this risk and usually give special attention to such type of incoming requests. 196. The authorities have not demonstrated effectiveness in seizing or confiscating assets at the request of non-EU foreign authorities. No statistics exist about the volume and nature of AR requests received as part of criminal proceedings. The authorities could not provide information on the amounts seized or confiscated at the request of non-EU authorities. 197. Within the EU, Austria routinely provides assistance but could not provide details to determine how effective this assistance is. As part of the existing framework for mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders, between 2022 and 2024, it has received 43 seizing orders and 20 confiscation orders of which 3 were refused. The authorities could neither provide information as to the amounts seized and/or confiscated based on these orders nor statistics for 2020 and 2021 since such data collection was not mandatory under EU law prior to 2022. 198. FATF/FSRB members generally described Austria’s assistance in AR matters as efficient and timely but not always effective. Austria’s tracing of assets was described as solid and comprehensive, timely, efficient, and high-quality. However, the amounts seized/confiscated in Austria were extremely limited in terms of numbers and volumes of cases: Slovakia (EUR 33 000 and EUR 51 474) and Germany (EUR 1 500). [34] 199. International cooperation as part of tax fraud-specific procedures shows more effectiveness. The Anti-Fraud Department of the BMF, which is competent for tax offences including tax evasion, reported to have received, during the period under review, 5 571 requests for confiscations of assets. At the request of foreign countries, they confiscated a total amount of EUR 18 406 942. It is however unclear to what extent these assets had been secured regarding tax administrative claims, tax crimes, or general criminal offences. 200. Austria provides assistance in the execution of NCBCs, but only as part of criminal proceedings, when assets have been seized or secured but the offender cannot be prosecuted or convicted. NCBC decisions taken as part of foreign civil or administrative court proceedings have no equivalent in Austrian law. Austria nevertheless considers that it can execute them and provided a case example of MLA with Ireland where it granted an NCBC. [35] As part of the feedback from FATF/FSRB members, one country only mentioned that Austria refused MLA for the execution NCBC. 201. Austria has not concluded any asset-sharing agreement with non-EU members, except with the United States. Within the EU, it routinely shares assets in accordance with the EU-Regulation 2018-1805 provisions on asset-sharing, but outside the EU, it does not share assets except on a case-by-case basis. The authorities reported only one case in which Austria agreed to share assets, with Liechtenstein in 2020 in a drug trafficking case where EUR 165 000 had been seized at the request of that country. As part of the feedback from the global network, one country pointed out that Austria did not accept to repatriate assets to the requesting country and another one signalled difficulties in asset repatriation due to the absence of an Austrian law providing for the restoration of victims. Footnotes [32] Evaluation report on the tenth round of mutual evaluations on the Implementation of the European Investigative Order, Report on Austria, Council of the European Union 8494/1/24 REV 1 [33] Statistics do not breakdown between extradition and EAWs. EAWs have extremely constrained time limits. [34] For countries which provided information. [35] Decision 188 Ns7/11s Higher Court for criminal matters Vienna, 4 July 2012. The judgement does not state clearly what was the nature of the decision ordered by the High Court of Ireland." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals Volume and nature of MLA 181. Austrian judicial authorities routinely provide MLA in criminal matters, most often by providing account and other financial information, search and seizures, and telecom/internet provider information. Austria receives a total average of 5 000 MLA requests per year in criminal matters and refuses around 100 of them. During 2020–2024, Austria received 662 ML/TF-related foreign requests. Table 2.1. Statistics on incoming MLA requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Total MLA requests Incoming 1 250 5 554 5 429 5 285 5 655 23 173 ML-related MLA requests Incoming ML 112 128 100 151 138 629 TF-related MLA requests Incoming TF 17 4 2 6 4 33 182. Around 81% of incoming requests are European Investigation Orders (EIOs) from other EU member states. This means that an average of 20 ML/TF-related requests per year come from non-EU countries. Authorities explain the relatively low number of such requests by the fact that a lot of informal exchange of information is taking place at investigative level without the need to follow up with formal MLA requests. However, even if informal cooperation could to a certain extent replace formal MLA, the volume of international cooperation with non-EU countries is very low in consideration of its risk profile. Table 2.2. Top 10 countries for incoming requests for MLA in criminal matters MLA with EU countries MLA with non-EU countries Germany 7 225 Türkiye 1 951 Slovenia 2 325 Switzerland 772 Slovakia 1 555 Liechtenstein 483 Poland 1 511 Serbia 263 Hungary 1 417 Bosnia Herzegovina 211 Czech Republic 1 415 Russian Federation 117 Romania 744 Ukraine 116 Italy 397 USA 100 Bulgaria 353 North Macedonia 71 Croatia 348 Georgia 52 Note: Data relate to incoming requests 2020–2024 for MLA in all matters, extradition and transfer of proceedings. Source: BMJ 183. There are no available statistics on countries of origin in ML/TF matters, but the authorities consider that ML/TF cooperation follow the same geographical distribution as cooperation in other matters. 184. The breakdown of MLA per country in all criminal matters shows that MLA overall, reflects Austria’s close relations to Eastern European countries and Türkiye, and its very close economic, financial, and cultural/social links with Germany and Switzerland. There are no statistical data regarding ML/TF and/or predicate offences cited in requests received nor on the type of measures requested. This limits the ability to determine whether assistance provided is consistent with Austria’s risk profile in terms of the most relevant predicate offences with cross-border aspects, the type of assistance, including investigations (searches, hearing of witnesses, etc.) provided, or the volume of AR-related requests. 185. During the assessment period, the average time needed to respond to MLA requests has been steadily reduced, from 55.21 days in 2020 to 37.37 days in 2024. The average duration of one and a half month for the execution of MLA requests and EIOs is notable. Most of the MLA requests are EIOs, which are generally executed within short time frames due to the direct contacts among EU authorities and the time limits imposed by EU regulations. Almost all FATF/FSRB members which provided feedback reported that MLA requests were generally executed in a timely manner. The EU report on the implementation of the EIO [32] confirms that EIOs are executed by Austria within the established time limits. 186. Austria has an effective system in place to register and prioritise non-EU MLA requests. MLA requests may be sent by diplomatic channels or to the BMJ’s central authority. Once registered in the central electronic case management system, incoming requests are immediately sent to the competent PPO for processing, with an indication of the time limits for their execution. If the requesting country has marked its request as urgent, it is specifically mentioned in the transmission by the central authority. The electronic case management register allows the BMJ to monitor the execution of the request and send automatic reminders to the PPO. 187. Clear information on requirements and contact information for Austria is provided, within the EU, via the EJN Atlas. Outside the EU, the UN register of central authorities contains the contact details of the central authority within the BMJ. The authorities also cooperate through the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Co-operation in Criminal Matters. There is otherwise no information on requirements and contact details available for online consultation by requesting states. 188. Austria deals appropriately with confidentiality issues. In some instances, because of the coercive nature of the measure requested, prior notice must be given to the concerned person to allow them to exercise their rights. In such cases, Austrian authorities reach out to the requesting state to inform it of difficulties associated to such requirement with a view to find a solution. 189. Austria’s refusal rate is very low. The authorities indicated that out of the 662 MLA requests in ML/TF matters received during the period under review, only 6 requests were rejected, usually on the ground of lack of dual criminality or ne bis in idem . Feedback from the global network was more nuanced on the refusal rate, but there was an indication that Austria, when refusing, was always assisting in finding alternative solutions. 190. Feedback from the global network on MLA provided by Austria is generally very positive. There is unanimity among respondents in commending the quality of the assistance provided by Austria. Some issues were nevertheless raised, such as Austria’s inability to assist with encrypted data surveillance, to hear a suspect via videoconference during the trial phase, and the high thresholds for some advanced investigative techniques, such as listening devices or access to encrypted end-to-end communications. Two respondents to the feedback questionnaire indicated that Austria did not always accept the transfer of criminal proceedings. 2.1.2. Extradition 191. Austria receives an average of 50 extradition requests in all matters per year and, during the period under review, refused 28 of those requests. Between 2020–2024, Austria received 20 extradition requests and 19 European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) for ML offences, and one extradition request for TF (Art. 278d, StGB). Only one ML extradition was refused. The authorities could not provide any statistics regarding extradition for predicate offences. Table 2.3. Statistics of extraditions and EAWs Extradition requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML 4 2 6 7 1 20 TF 1 1 EAWs ML 4 6 4 2 7 19 TF 0 Source: BMJ 192. The extradition refusal rate is very low for ML/TF offences and feedback from the Global Network was broadly positive about how Austria handles extradition and EAWs. Authorities reported only one such extradition request and two EAWs refused. Generally, respondents to the questionnaire did not report about reasons for refusals other than those allowed by the conventions. Austria does not extradite its nationals, except within the framework of EAWs within the EU. Austrian authorities claim that in case such a refusal is made, it commits to prosecute the suspect within its own courts. 193. Extradition is provided in a timely manner and the average time needed to extradite has been steadily reduced during the period under review, from 66.25 days in 2020 to 41.75 days in 2024. [33] Feedback from the global network confirms that EAWs are timely executed. Regarding extradition, one country reported that there can be significant delays in granting extradition because of the possibility for multiple recourses. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 194. Austria’s legal framework allows for the provision of assistance to foreign countries in identifying, locating, seizing, or confiscating assets, subject to minor shortcomings in R.4. cascading on the ability to provide assistance in this matter. ARO facilitates the execution of both informal and formal MLA requests for seizure and execution of confiscation measures. Austria is a founding member of the Camden Asset Recovery Informal Network (CARIN). 195. Formal seizure and confiscation incoming requests are processed along the same modalities and procedures as general MLA requests, including for prioritisation. The central authority does not prioritise seizure/confiscation requests over other types of MLA requests, which may create a hazard in cases of risks of asset flight. However, the authorities indicate that prosecutors are aware of this risk and usually give special attention to such type of incoming requests. 196. The authorities have not demonstrated effectiveness in seizing or confiscating assets at the request of non-EU foreign authorities. No statistics exist about the volume and nature of AR requests received as part of criminal proceedings. The authorities could not provide information on the amounts seized or confiscated at the request of non-EU authorities. 197. Within the EU, Austria routinely provides assistance but could not provide details to determine how effective this assistance is. As part of the existing framework for mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders, between 2022 and 2024, it has received 43 seizing orders and 20 confiscation orders of which 3 were refused. The authorities could neither provide information as to the amounts seized and/or confiscated based on these orders nor statistics for 2020 and 2021 since such data collection was not mandatory under EU law prior to 2022. 198. FATF/FSRB members generally described Austria’s assistance in AR matters as efficient and timely but not always effective. Austria’s tracing of assets was described as solid and comprehensive, timely, efficient, and high-quality. However, the amounts seized/confiscated in Austria were extremely limited in terms of numbers and volumes of cases: Slovakia (EUR 33 000 and EUR 51 474) and Germany (EUR 1 500). [34] 199. International cooperation as part of tax fraud-specific procedures shows more effectiveness. The Anti-Fraud Department of the BMF, which is competent for tax offences including tax evasion, reported to have received, during the period under review, 5 571 requests for confiscations of assets. At the request of foreign countries, they confiscated a total amount of EUR 18 406 942. It is however unclear to what extent these assets had been secured regarding tax administrative claims, tax crimes, or general criminal offences. 200. Austria provides assistance in the execution of NCBCs, but only as part of criminal proceedings, when assets have been seized or secured but the offender cannot be prosecuted or convicted. NCBC decisions taken as part of foreign civil or administrative court proceedings have no equivalent in Austrian law. Austria nevertheless considers that it can execute them and provided a case example of MLA with Ireland where it granted an NCBC. [35] As part of the feedback from FATF/FSRB members, one country only mentioned that Austria refused MLA for the execution NCBC. 201. Austria has not concluded any asset-sharing agreement with non-EU members, except with the United States. Within the EU, it routinely shares assets in accordance with the EU-Regulation 2018-1805 provisions on asset-sharing, but outside the EU, it does not share assets except on a case-by-case basis. The authorities reported only one case in which Austria agreed to share assets, with Liechtenstein in 2020 in a drug trafficking case where EUR 165 000 had been seized at the request of that country. As part of the feedback from the global network, one country pointed out that Austria did not accept to repatriate assets to the requesting country and another one signalled difficulties in asset repatriation due to the absence of an Austrian law providing for the restoration of victims. Footnotes [32] Evaluation report on the tenth round of mutual evaluations on the Implementation of the European Investigative Order, Report on Austria, Council of the European Union 8494/1/24 REV 1 [33] Statistics do not breakdown between extradition and EAWs. EAWs have extremely constrained time limits. [34] For countries which provided information. [35] Decision 188 Ns7/11s Higher Court for criminal matters Vienna, 4 July 2012. The judgement does not state clearly what was the nature of the decision ordered by the High Court of Ireland." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 238. Assessments on the potential criminal background in FIs and VASPs are, to a large extent, effectively conducted. This includes potential licensees, acquirers of a qualifying holding (including the beneficial owners), and newly appointed senior managers. However, provided data on the number of negative outcomes and voluntary withdrawals is limited and does not directly reflect the adequacy of such assessments, since applications are withdrawn anticipating negative outcomes to avoid reputational damage. The checks on ownership and control of VASPs have been only implemented more recently in a more systematic manner. 239. The FMA cooperates on market entry controls with the ECB under the framework of the SSM. This mechanism pertains to the licensing, acquisition of qualifying holdings, and assessment of persons in management positions of CIs designated as significant institutions (SI) and less significant institutions (LSI). [44] While the FMA is responsible for fit and proper assessments of members of the management body and key function holders of LSIs, the ECB is directly competent for such persons in SIs. The FMA prepares the draft decisions for SIs, [45] which are aligned with the ECB before finalisation and issuance. 240. When a person intends to hold, acquire, or increase a qualifying holding [46] in a CI directly or indirectly the FMA is notified. [47] This person completes a self-declaration on potential involvement in judicial criminal proceedings or investigations, or administrative penal proceedings, and provides relevant information. This is corroborated by a criminal record certificate, or comparable proof from a foreign country. The FMA also reviews the source of funds and routinely requests additional information through in-house data verification, external sources, and information obtained by other competent authorities. 241. Since 2020, the authorities received one licensing request from a CI and four for CI branches in Austria—and approved all applications. The FMA denied two cases of proposed acquirers between 2020 and 2025, one leading to withdrawal of the application (Box 3.1) and in the other case it rejected the acquisition of a CI. The ECB has never issued a negative fit and proper decision concerning Austrian CIs as in cases for which a potential negative decision has been proposed, the CI decides to withdraw the application/notification to avoid reputational damage. The ECB reported one withdrawal. 242. The FMA also effectively monitors OEs to learn about reputational issues (i.e., from the OE, other competent authorities or negative news coverage), and to respond accordingly. That is despite the fact there is no requirement to notify the FMA about any changes in the reputation of the person holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a qualifying holding. Box 3.1. Qualifying Holding Procedure, 2024 In May 2024, the FMA received an application by a foreign company intending to acquire a qualified shareholding resulting in a total of 29.59% of the voting rights in an Austrian bank. This bank is part of a Vienna-based international group of CIs with subsidiaries in the CESEE region. At the time the application was submitted, the acquirer had already acquired 9.63% of the voting rights and the conditional share purchase agreements were concluded for the acquisition of a total of 19.96%. The FMA’s internal investigation included: · Eight (private) loan agreements totalling EUR 122.3 million tied to 7 individuals were identified as source of funds. A WorldCheck query linked one individual connected to the acquirer to several tax evasion investigations between 2009 and 2018. · A sub-loan agreement for EUR 120.5 million between a private lender and the acquirer raised concerns since part of this amount (EUR 79.9 million) served as collateral for a loan with a CI in Germany. In addition, the WorldCheck query revealed ties between the lender and a co-leader of a criminal organisation in the Balkans. · The FMA found information that the acquirer planned to partially transfer shares to another company under a conditional agreement, indicating coordinated actions between the two entities. · This structure was found economically unjustifiable by the FMA, obscuring the source of funds and potentially posing ML/TF risks to the Austrian bank. The beneficial owner of the acquirer was found to be personally unsuitable, and the acquisition was rejected due to the attempted exercising of influence on the business activities and staff members by the acquirer as well as due to the intransparency in relation to the source of funds, sub-loan agreements and the planned transfer of shares, as well as the serious concerns regarding the acquirer’s beneficial owner. The acquirer withdrew the application on 1 July 2024, and the ECB determined that any other voting rights of the involved companies were suspended. Source: FMA 243. As part of the personal requirements for members of CIs’ management boards, personal reliability is effectively assessed. This is primarily done based on submitted documents (e.g., criminal record certificate) and, where necessary, verified with foreign authorities and open-source checks. Fit and proper assessment of managers and key function holders in Austria is triggered by an ex-post notification by the FI [48] and all executive directors of locally operating banks within cooperative groups are also included. The FMA reported that it contacted its foreign counterparts in 13 EU member states and two non-EU countries—Switzerland and the United Kingdom—since 2020 for fit and proper assessment purposes. Such information is not systematically logged or documented. Table 3.1. Breakdown fit and proper procedures management functions SI/LSI per year Year Management Function Head of internal control function 2020 63 LSI 30 SI 11 LSI 18 SI 2021 77 LSI 11 SI 22 LSI 3 SI 2022 46 LSI 25 SI 5 LSI 13 SI 2023 63 LSI 17 SI 14 LSI 5 SI 2024 71 LSI 17 SI 8 LSI 5 SI 244. No fit and proper assessment of managers in a CI has led to a formal rejection, as applicants withdraw before a negative decision is issued. The FMA did not provide data on the number of such voluntary withdrawals, while the ECB reported five withdrawals for Austria due to supervisory concerns, but not necessarily AML/CFT related. The status as a PEP is considered from a broader ML/TF risk perspective when assessing potential conflict of interest risk. 245. The FMA effectively reassesses managers and removes them where necessary, following changes in reputation. The FMA reported 15 cases between 2020 and 2024 where new facts or other relevant information led to the reassessment of members of the management bodies. In seven cases, this led to removal of the person from their function, either through resignation before the formal removal decision was communicated or following such issuance. Cases were notified by the CI, uncovered in an onsite inspection, through an auditor’s report, a whistleblower, or other news. 246. The implementation of market entry controls for securities companies by the FMA (without involvement of ECB) follows the same approach and is considered equally effective. For insurance companies, an ex-ante assessment of the fitness and propriety of persons holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a qualifying interest or holding a management or key function follows a similar approach as described above. No data on voluntary withdrawals in these sectors was available. 247. The FMA recently started to more systematically target and subject persons owning or controlling VASPs to vetting. Before 2024, the FMA did not systematically establish the ownership and control structure and vetted the beneficial owner(s) (Box 3.2). This has since changed. The personal reliability of managers at VASPs is determined on a desk-based review like CIs. In the previously applied registration process of applicant VASPs, the FMA primarily focussed on the AML/CFT officer as a key function holder. In some cases, the AML/CFT officer was also part of the management body and/or (beneficial) owner, only therefore, the latter functions were covered. In other cases, the FMA acted upon reports from whistleblowers questioning registered VASPs’ ownership and control structure. With the EU Regulation 2023/114 (MiCAR) since 2024, all relevant natural persons, including the beneficial owners, are explicitly targeted and subject to vetting. Box 3.2. The FMA’s application of fit and proper assessment of the beneficial ownership of VASPs before 2024 In 2022, shortly after registration of a VASP, it notified the FMA that a large foreign (EU-based) entity intended to acquire full ownership. At the same time the FMA received a whistleblower report questioning the VASP’s ownership and operational transparency, alleging that the VASP was covertly controlled from its inception through a straw man acting as the official majority shareholder. The FMA immediately initiated formal investigative proceedings, assessed the ownership structure and the source of funds as well as personal reliability. The purported majority stakeholder failed to cooperate adequately, and the VASP’s legal representative applied for withdrawal of the registration and announced liquidation. Around the same time as the initial registration of the Austrian VASP, the foreign entity also intended to open operations in Austria and applied for a VASP registration. During the procedure, the FMA scrutinised (negative) media reports and requested clarifications from the applicant and cooperated closely with EU and non-EU competent authorities (including Germany, the Netherlands and the US). Based on the assessment the FMA informed the applicant it would issue a rejection, and the applicant subsequently withdrew the application in 2023. Source: FMA 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 248. The FMA identifies unauthorised business operations related to financial (including MVTS) and VA-related services. The FMA’s specialised division Combating against Unauthorised Business investigates suspicions of unlicensed operations based on information from whistleblowers, enquiries, complaints, media reports, market participants, supervisory monitoring, active observation of the market, or notifications from other authorities. The FMA demonstrated a large number of identified unauthorised business operations related to financial and VA-related services, predominantly concerning “trading for own account or for account of customers in securities,” (from 83 in 2020 to 193 in 2024) “taking deposits,” (from 46 in 2020 to 38 in 2024) and “investment advice” (from 10 in 2020 to 24 in 2024). 249. Unauthorised MVTS activities are identified and addressed, leading to investigation proceedings (on average 35 initiated per year since 2020), warning notices (on average one per year since 2020), procedural order (on average 1,4 annually), or administrative penal proceedings (just three concluded in 2021 and 2024). One monetary fine is considered more appropriate (EUR 10 000, in 2024) than the other two fines (EUR 200 and EUR 800), and the total number of penalties is limited to these three cases. 250. Unauthorised VASP activities are adequately detected. The FMA reported five MiCAR related cases in 2024 and 29 cases concerning unauthorised VASPs under the previous registration regime. Following identification of unauthorised business, the FMA remediates breaches through administrative penal proceedings, procedural orders, and issuing warning notices which, combined, are considered to have an enforcing effect. Footnotes [44] See EU Council Regulation 1024/2013 and https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/criteria/html/index.en.html [45] In such cases, the FMA applies the FMA Circular Letter for the Suitability Assessment of Heads of Business, Supervisory Board Members and Key Function Holders (03/2023) guided by the Joint European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on the Assessment of the Suitability of Members of the Management Body and Key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU (EBA GL 2021 06). [46] i.e. a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking which represents 10% or more of the capital or of the voting rights or which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of that undertaking (Art. 2 EKV 2016). [47] See Art. 20(1) BWG and the Regulation on Qualifying Holdings 2016 (EKV 2016). [48] The FMA has identified seven cases since 2020 in which a person was not notified following appointment in a managerial position while required, generally in very small banks. In all cases the FMA was informed either by the bank’s auditor or had identified the case through an onsite inspection, the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) or other sources. Banks are required to have internal fit-and-proper regimes which are regularly assessed within the SREP for each bank. The FMA’s responded through regular supervisory follow-up and assessed respective individuals." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 238. Assessments on the potential criminal background in FIs and VASPs are, to a large extent, effectively conducted. This includes potential licensees, acquirers of a qualifying holding (including the beneficial owners), and newly appointed senior managers. However, provided data on the number of negative outcomes and voluntary withdrawals is limited and does not directly reflect the adequacy of such assessments, since applications are withdrawn anticipating negative outcomes to avoid reputational damage. The checks on ownership and control of VASPs have been only implemented more recently in a more systematic manner. 239. The FMA cooperates on market entry controls with the ECB under the framework of the SSM. This mechanism pertains to the licensing, acquisition of qualifying holdings, and assessment of persons in management positions of CIs designated as significant institutions (SI) and less significant institutions (LSI). [44] While the FMA is responsible for fit and proper assessments of members of the management body and key function holders of LSIs, the ECB is directly competent for such persons in SIs. The FMA prepares the draft decisions for SIs, [45] which are aligned with the ECB before finalisation and issuance. 240. When a person intends to hold, acquire, or increase a qualifying holding [46] in a CI directly or indirectly the FMA is notified. [47] This person completes a self-declaration on potential involvement in judicial criminal proceedings or investigations, or administrative penal proceedings, and provides relevant information. This is corroborated by a criminal record certificate, or comparable proof from a foreign country. The FMA also reviews the source of funds and routinely requests additional information through in-house data verification, external sources, and information obtained by other competent authorities. 241. Since 2020, the authorities received one licensing request from a CI and four for CI branches in Austria—and approved all applications. The FMA denied two cases of proposed acquirers between 2020 and 2025, one leading to withdrawal of the application (Box 3.1) and in the other case it rejected the acquisition of a CI. The ECB has never issued a negative fit and proper decision concerning Austrian CIs as in cases for which a potential negative decision has been proposed, the CI decides to withdraw the application/notification to avoid reputational damage. The ECB reported one withdrawal. 242. The FMA also effectively monitors OEs to learn about reputational issues (i.e., from the OE, other competent authorities or negative news coverage), and to respond accordingly. That is despite the fact there is no requirement to notify the FMA about any changes in the reputation of the person holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a qualifying holding. Box 3.1. Qualifying Holding Procedure, 2024 In May 2024, the FMA received an application by a foreign company intending to acquire a qualified shareholding resulting in a total of 29.59% of the voting rights in an Austrian bank. This bank is part of a Vienna-based international group of CIs with subsidiaries in the CESEE region. At the time the application was submitted, the acquirer had already acquired 9.63% of the voting rights and the conditional share purchase agreements were concluded for the acquisition of a total of 19.96%. The FMA’s internal investigation included: · Eight (private) loan agreements totalling EUR 122.3 million tied to 7 individuals were identified as source of funds. A WorldCheck query linked one individual connected to the acquirer to several tax evasion investigations between 2009 and 2018. · A sub-loan agreement for EUR 120.5 million between a private lender and the acquirer raised concerns since part of this amount (EUR 79.9 million) served as collateral for a loan with a CI in Germany. In addition, the WorldCheck query revealed ties between the lender and a co-leader of a criminal organisation in the Balkans. · The FMA found information that the acquirer planned to partially transfer shares to another company under a conditional agreement, indicating coordinated actions between the two entities. · This structure was found economically unjustifiable by the FMA, obscuring the source of funds and potentially posing ML/TF risks to the Austrian bank. The beneficial owner of the acquirer was found to be personally unsuitable, and the acquisition was rejected due to the attempted exercising of influence on the business activities and staff members by the acquirer as well as due to the intransparency in relation to the source of funds, sub-loan agreements and the planned transfer of shares, as well as the serious concerns regarding the acquirer’s beneficial owner. The acquirer withdrew the application on 1 July 2024, and the ECB determined that any other voting rights of the involved companies were suspended. Source: FMA 243. As part of the personal requirements for members of CIs’ management boards, personal reliability is effectively assessed. This is primarily done based on submitted documents (e.g., criminal record certificate) and, where necessary, verified with foreign authorities and open-source checks. Fit and proper assessment of managers and key function holders in Austria is triggered by an ex-post notification by the FI [48] and all executive directors of locally operating banks within cooperative groups are also included. The FMA reported that it contacted its foreign counterparts in 13 EU member states and two non-EU countries—Switzerland and the United Kingdom—since 2020 for fit and proper assessment purposes. Such information is not systematically logged or documented. Table 3.1. Breakdown fit and proper procedures management functions SI/LSI per year Year Management Function Head of internal control function 2020 63 LSI 30 SI 11 LSI 18 SI 2021 77 LSI 11 SI 22 LSI 3 SI 2022 46 LSI 25 SI 5 LSI 13 SI 2023 63 LSI 17 SI 14 LSI 5 SI 2024 71 LSI 17 SI 8 LSI 5 SI 244. No fit and proper assessment of managers in a CI has led to a formal rejection, as applicants withdraw before a negative decision is issued. The FMA did not provide data on the number of such voluntary withdrawals, while the ECB reported five withdrawals for Austria due to supervisory concerns, but not necessarily AML/CFT related. The status as a PEP is considered from a broader ML/TF risk perspective when assessing potential conflict of interest risk. 245. The FMA effectively reassesses managers and removes them where necessary, following changes in reputation. The FMA reported 15 cases between 2020 and 2024 where new facts or other relevant information led to the reassessment of members of the management bodies. In seven cases, this led to removal of the person from their function, either through resignation before the formal removal decision was communicated or following such issuance. Cases were notified by the CI, uncovered in an onsite inspection, through an auditor’s report, a whistleblower, or other news. 246. The implementation of market entry controls for securities companies by the FMA (without involvement of ECB) follows the same approach and is considered equally effective. For insurance companies, an ex-ante assessment of the fitness and propriety of persons holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a qualifying interest or holding a management or key function follows a similar approach as described above. No data on voluntary withdrawals in these sectors was available. 247. The FMA recently started to more systematically target and subject persons owning or controlling VASPs to vetting. Before 2024, the FMA did not systematically establish the ownership and control structure and vetted the beneficial owner(s) (Box 3.2). This has since changed. The personal reliability of managers at VASPs is determined on a desk-based review like CIs. In the previously applied registration process of applicant VASPs, the FMA primarily focussed on the AML/CFT officer as a key function holder. In some cases, the AML/CFT officer was also part of the management body and/or (beneficial) owner, only therefore, the latter functions were covered. In other cases, the FMA acted upon reports from whistleblowers questioning registered VASPs’ ownership and control structure. With the EU Regulation 2023/114 (MiCAR) since 2024, all relevant natural persons, including the beneficial owners, are explicitly targeted and subject to vetting. Box 3.2. The FMA’s application of fit and proper assessment of the beneficial ownership of VASPs before 2024 In 2022, shortly after registration of a VASP, it notified the FMA that a large foreign (EU-based) entity intended to acquire full ownership. At the same time the FMA received a whistleblower report questioning the VASP’s ownership and operational transparency, alleging that the VASP was covertly controlled from its inception through a straw man acting as the official majority shareholder. The FMA immediately initiated formal investigative proceedings, assessed the ownership structure and the source of funds as well as personal reliability. The purported majority stakeholder failed to cooperate adequately, and the VASP’s legal representative applied for withdrawal of the registration and announced liquidation. Around the same time as the initial registration of the Austrian VASP, the foreign entity also intended to open operations in Austria and applied for a VASP registration. During the procedure, the FMA scrutinised (negative) media reports and requested clarifications from the applicant and cooperated closely with EU and non-EU competent authorities (including Germany, the Netherlands and the US). Based on the assessment the FMA informed the applicant it would issue a rejection, and the applicant subsequently withdrew the application in 2023. Source: FMA 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 248. The FMA identifies unauthorised business operations related to financial (including MVTS) and VA-related services. The FMA’s specialised division Combating against Unauthorised Business investigates suspicions of unlicensed operations based on information from whistleblowers, enquiries, complaints, media reports, market participants, supervisory monitoring, active observation of the market, or notifications from other authorities. The FMA demonstrated a large number of identified unauthorised business operations related to financial and VA-related services, predominantly concerning “trading for own account or for account of customers in securities,” (from 83 in 2020 to 193 in 2024) “taking deposits,” (from 46 in 2020 to 38 in 2024) and “investment advice” (from 10 in 2020 to 24 in 2024). 249. Unauthorised MVTS activities are identified and addressed, leading to investigation proceedings (on average 35 initiated per year since 2020), warning notices (on average one per year since 2020), procedural order (on average 1,4 annually), or administrative penal proceedings (just three concluded in 2021 and 2024). One monetary fine is considered more appropriate (EUR 10 000, in 2024) than the other two fines (EUR 200 and EUR 800), and the total number of penalties is limited to these three cases. 250. Unauthorised VASP activities are adequately detected. The FMA reported five MiCAR related cases in 2024 and 29 cases concerning unauthorised VASPs under the previous registration regime. Following identification of unauthorised business, the FMA remediates breaches through administrative penal proceedings, procedural orders, and issuing warning notices which, combined, are considered to have an enforcing effect. Footnotes [44] See EU Council Regulation 1024/2013 and https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/criteria/html/index.en.html [45] In such cases, the FMA applies the FMA Circular Letter for the Suitability Assessment of Heads of Business, Supervisory Board Members and Key Function Holders (03/2023) guided by the Joint European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on the Assessment of the Suitability of Members of the Management Body and Key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU (EBA GL 2021 06). [46] i.e. a direct or indirect holding in an undertaking which represents 10% or more of the capital or of the voting rights or which makes it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of that undertaking (Art. 2 EKV 2016). [47] See Art. 20(1) BWG and the Regulation on Qualifying Holdings 2016 (EKV 2016). [48] The FMA has identified seven cases since 2020 in which a person was not notified following appointment in a managerial position while required, generally in very small banks. In all cases the FMA was informed either by the bank’s auditor or had identified the case through an onsite inspection, the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) or other sources. Banks are required to have internal fit-and-proper regimes which are regularly assessed within the SREP for each bank. The FMA’s responded through regular supervisory follow-up and assessed respective individuals." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="318. Most DNFBP supervisors take a reactive approach to market entry controls and available data does not demonstrate the effectiveness of their control measures. The casino supervisors have controls in place for preventing criminals and their associates from entering the market and the Financial Police, an investigation and control unit of the Ministry of Finance(MoF) Anti-Fraud Office, is able to detect unlicenced activity, including online activity. Notaries and lawyers are subject to prior fit and proper assessments, which include AML/CFT-related checks. Other DNFBPs are subject to criminal conviction checks. However, except for casinos, DNFBP supervisory authorities do not actively monitor for market entry controls to detect and address possible breaches of licensing provisions, or unlicenced or unregistered activity. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 319. When registering real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, the grounds for exclusion from the trade profession are examined based on criminal convictions, financial penalties, and possible insolvency. Natural persons are prohibited from engaging in the professions of real estate agent, DPMS and TCSP if they have been convicted of offences involving a sentence of more than 3 months or a fine of more than 180 daily rates, different types of fraud, or narcotics trafficking. Regional authorities have access to information on criminal records and indicated that they review this information during onsite checks. Measures to prevent associates of criminals from being professionally accredited, or holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in the trade profession, are not systematically conducted. 320. The supervisory authorities for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of their control measures. During licensing and registration, checks of their applications as well as on persons holding senior management functions, holding a significant or controlling interest or on their beneficial owners are not systematically and effectively conducted. Data, including on applications received, approved, rejected or withdrawn by the applicant, did not demonstrate that refusals and withdrawals are connected to the punishable offences stipulated above. 321. Lawyers and notaries are subject to fit and proper assessments prior to and during their admission or appointment and may be debarred from exercising if found guilty of criminal offences. The authorities require the submission of an extract from the criminal record together with an affidavit. Data provided on applications rejected or withdrawn by the applicant during the period under review did not identify rejections or withdrawals for notaries. For lawyers, a total of seven applications for entry in the list of lawyers were withdrawn in 2020–2023. Reasons for withdrawal go beyond fit and proper assessments but included failed fitness checks. 322. Public accountants, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and private accountancy professionals are subject to a professional accreditation/licensing process, which requires criminal record certificates and insolvency register extracts. The applicants may be excluded from exercising the professions if found guilty of criminal offences. In the last five years, two accountants and one public accountant have been excluded from office due to being found guilty of criminal offences. The supervisory authorities do not have measures in place to prevent associates of criminals from being professionally accredited. 323. Previously fully state-owned, casinos in Austria are licensed by the state with only one license for land-based casinos (with several outlets) and one for internet casinos. The Tax Authority is responsible for granting such licences. The federal government holds a significant indirect stake in both license holders. 324. Regulatory measures prevent criminals or associates of criminals from owning or operating casinos, and recently also cover beneficial owners of a significant or controlling interest. The management of casinos must meet a set of criteria, including the absence of convictions for offences that involve a criminal sentence of more than three months. In addition, shareholders who can exercise a significant or controlling interest must meet fitness and propriety requirements related to their sound management and reliability. As a result of the adequate implementation of these measures, the federal government has never withdrawn a license to date. 325. In May 2025, the BMF published two new decrees related to beneficial owners. These decrees aim to ensure that no criminals or their associates, or persons otherwise known to be close to them, have a share in the license applicant/holder, have a controlling influence or are legally or actually involved in the management of the licensed applicant/holder of a casino. The decrees were only recently enacted, but casino supervisors demonstrated that they already considered the new requirements during the latest fit and proper checks carried out. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 326. Regarding ongoing monitoring of fit and proper requirements, and detection of individuals who may be operating without a licence, no specific procedures are in place to ensure periodic reviews of the maintenance of such requirements . Data on detection and sanctioning of unlicenced or unregistered activity is lacking. Apart from the casino supervisors, who maintain regular supervisory actions on the sector as a whole, which is also monitored by the MoF’s Financial Police to detect unlicenced activity, most DNFBP supervisory authorities take a reactive approach. They either only review the relevant information prior to onsite inspections or rely on information that might be provided by criminal investigation authorities or courts. The authorities lack data or case examples on withdrawals of licenses or removal of persons holding relevant functions related to situations of criminals and associates of criminals operating in the market, and regarding detecting unlicensed or unregistered activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="318. Most DNFBP supervisors take a reactive approach to market entry controls and available data does not demonstrate the effectiveness of their control measures. The casino supervisors have controls in place for preventing criminals and their associates from entering the market and the Financial Police, an investigation and control unit of the Ministry of Finance(MoF) Anti-Fraud Office, is able to detect unlicenced activity, including online activity. Notaries and lawyers are subject to prior fit and proper assessments, which include AML/CFT-related checks. Other DNFBPs are subject to criminal conviction checks. However, except for casinos, DNFBP supervisory authorities do not actively monitor for market entry controls to detect and address possible breaches of licensing provisions, or unlicenced or unregistered activity. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 319. When registering real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, the grounds for exclusion from the trade profession are examined based on criminal convictions, financial penalties, and possible insolvency. Natural persons are prohibited from engaging in the professions of real estate agent, DPMS and TCSP if they have been convicted of offences involving a sentence of more than 3 months or a fine of more than 180 daily rates, different types of fraud, or narcotics trafficking. Regional authorities have access to information on criminal records and indicated that they review this information during onsite checks. Measures to prevent associates of criminals from being professionally accredited, or holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in the trade profession, are not systematically conducted. 320. The supervisory authorities for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS failed to demonstrate the effectiveness of their control measures. During licensing and registration, checks of their applications as well as on persons holding senior management functions, holding a significant or controlling interest or on their beneficial owners are not systematically and effectively conducted. Data, including on applications received, approved, rejected or withdrawn by the applicant, did not demonstrate that refusals and withdrawals are connected to the punishable offences stipulated above. 321. Lawyers and notaries are subject to fit and proper assessments prior to and during their admission or appointment and may be debarred from exercising if found guilty of criminal offences. The authorities require the submission of an extract from the criminal record together with an affidavit. Data provided on applications rejected or withdrawn by the applicant during the period under review did not identify rejections or withdrawals for notaries. For lawyers, a total of seven applications for entry in the list of lawyers were withdrawn in 2020–2023. Reasons for withdrawal go beyond fit and proper assessments but included failed fitness checks. 322. Public accountants, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and private accountancy professionals are subject to a professional accreditation/licensing process, which requires criminal record certificates and insolvency register extracts. The applicants may be excluded from exercising the professions if found guilty of criminal offences. In the last five years, two accountants and one public accountant have been excluded from office due to being found guilty of criminal offences. The supervisory authorities do not have measures in place to prevent associates of criminals from being professionally accredited. 323. Previously fully state-owned, casinos in Austria are licensed by the state with only one license for land-based casinos (with several outlets) and one for internet casinos. The Tax Authority is responsible for granting such licences. The federal government holds a significant indirect stake in both license holders. 324. Regulatory measures prevent criminals or associates of criminals from owning or operating casinos, and recently also cover beneficial owners of a significant or controlling interest. The management of casinos must meet a set of criteria, including the absence of convictions for offences that involve a criminal sentence of more than three months. In addition, shareholders who can exercise a significant or controlling interest must meet fitness and propriety requirements related to their sound management and reliability. As a result of the adequate implementation of these measures, the federal government has never withdrawn a license to date. 325. In May 2025, the BMF published two new decrees related to beneficial owners. These decrees aim to ensure that no criminals or their associates, or persons otherwise known to be close to them, have a share in the license applicant/holder, have a controlling influence or are legally or actually involved in the management of the licensed applicant/holder of a casino. The decrees were only recently enacted, but casino supervisors demonstrated that they already considered the new requirements during the latest fit and proper checks carried out. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 326. Regarding ongoing monitoring of fit and proper requirements, and detection of individuals who may be operating without a licence, no specific procedures are in place to ensure periodic reviews of the maintenance of such requirements . Data on detection and sanctioning of unlicenced or unregistered activity is lacking. Apart from the casino supervisors, who maintain regular supervisory actions on the sector as a whole, which is also monitored by the MoF’s Financial Police to detect unlicenced activity, most DNFBP supervisory authorities take a reactive approach. They either only review the relevant information prior to onsite inspections or rely on information that might be provided by criminal investigation authorities or courts. The authorities lack data or case examples on withdrawals of licenses or removal of persons holding relevant functions related to situations of criminals and associates of criminals operating in the market, and regarding detecting unlicensed or unregistered activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="370. Austria demonstrates a high level of understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with LPs and LAs, either created domestically or foreign created with sufficient links to the country. This risk understanding is supported by a very comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment of LPs and LAs and several targeted ad hoc studies. The methodology, processes, procedures and conclusions of the risk assessment are rigorous, thereby underpinning a strong and robust understanding of ML/TF risks of LPs and LAs, as set out in more detail below. The risk identification and understanding are fully in line with Austria’s overall risk and context situation, considering the importance of the materiality of the sector in Austria (Introduction). 371. Austria conducted a comprehensive assessment of the ML/TF risks of domestic LPs in its 2021 NRA, which was further refined through the 2025 NRA and extended to foreign LPs and LAs with sufficient links to Austria and PF. The assessment involved a wide range of sources and competent authorities, including but not limited to LEAs, A-FIU and the tax authority, which all provided crucial input on the observed misuse of both domestic LPs and foreign LPs and LAs. For the assessment of foreign LPs and LAs, the following factors were used to establish a sufficient link: holder of a bank or custody account in Austria, ownership of aircrafts, ownership of ships, indirect ownership of domestic LPs, a branch office in Austria, trusts and similar LAs managed from Austria, and ownership of domestic property. The risk assessment identified 80 359 foreign legal entities which have a sufficient link with Austria. [69] 5.1.1. Domestic legal persons 372. Regarding domestic LPs, the NRA comprehensively considers various ML/TF/PF threat scenarios as well as vulnerabilities that are specific to each type of LP. The ML/TF/PF threat level for each type of legal person was assessed considering available statistical data, credible open-source information, the practical experience of public and private sector experts, and specific threat scenarios relevant for individual categories of legal persons. The vulnerabilities of the various types of legal persons were analysed by considering the following factors: the materiality, the type of business risk, the geographical and cross-border risk exposure, the risk of concealment through nominee agreements and bearer shares, the simplicity, speed and costs of founding/registering, the complexity of the ownership and control structure, and the risk awareness of relevant entities. 373. The assessment rates LPs’ overall level of inherent ML risks as medium. LLCs and private foundations are identified as being most at risk for ML. From a materiality perspective, LLCs are predominant and stand out as the preferred type of LP. This is because shares of LLCs can be transferred relatively easily and quickly. In ML schemes, LLCs are often misused to disguise the origin of illicit funds, especially in the construction and trade sectors, thereby becoming fraudulent companies with straw men as their directors and shareholders. [70] Private foundations are frequently used for investments in real estate, thereby increasing their inherent ML risks, including because of measures restricting the ownership of property by foreign investors (see below). 374. The authorities have also undertaken several targeted initiatives to identify meaningful typologies on the involvement of domestic LPs in ML schemes. Examples are A-FIU’s strategic analysis report of fraudulent companies ( scheinunternehmen ) and the comprehensive analysis of nominee arrangements, including treuhand arrangements, conducted jointly by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and the Predictive Analytics Competence Centre (PACC). 375. In terms of TF, the risk understanding is equally comprehensive, and the overall level of inherent TF risks of domestic LPs is also rated as medium. In contrast to the assessment of ML risks, none of the types of domestic LPs presents a high inherent TF risk. This finding is in line with the findings under IO.9 and TF typologies. While the 2021 NRA concluded that TF risks primarily arose from the misuse of associations (i.e., as potential vehicles for cross-border transfers of funds for TF purposes), the comprehensive 2024 and 2025 NPO risk assessments came to more nuanced findings (IO.10). 376. The findings on misuse of domestic LPs for PF-related sanctions evasion largely mirror the ones on ML and are reasonable in light of Austria’s large dual-use goods manufacturing industry, which is vulnerable for PF-related sanctions evasion . One of the most frequently observed PF typologies consists of the misuse of LPs by setting up a screen for sanctions evasion through the concealment of beneficial owners. Authorities are alert to this risk, and intelligence and findings from investigations by DSN and other LEAs reveal that LPs identified as being misused for PF-related sanctions evasion are predominantly foreign entities with complex ownership structures which operate as an intermediary between the Austrian supplier of dual use goods and the end user abroad (IO.11). Foreign legal persons and arrangements 377. As per foreign legal entities, the ML/TF/PF risk analysis is sound and comprehensive. The risk understanding adequately reflects on the results of an in-depth assessment of Austria’s attractiveness for foreign legal entities combined with a high level of detail on their materiality. Other factors underpinning the risk understanding are the type of business activities, the geographical risk exposure, and transparency measures in the country of origin. Foreign legal entities owning aircrafts were identified as presenting a high inherent ML and PF risk, but their materiality in the Austrian context is negligible and the authorities have already taken steps in view of addressing the risk. [71] The individual inherent ML and PF risk exposures of those legal entities holding a bank or custody account, having indirect ownership in domestic LPs, or owning land and/or real estate in Austria is assessed as medium to high. The overall TF risk exposure of foreign legal entities was assessed as low to medium. 378. The NRA and ad hoc studies significantly contributed to competent authorities’ and private sector entities’ development of a comprehensive ML/TF/PF risk understanding of LPs and LAs. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority has organised regular meetings and training events to assist competent authorities and OEs in building and further strengthening their understanding of the ML/TF/PF risks associated with (foreign) LPs and LAs, and to assist them in fulfilling their role in ensuring that the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date. Particular attention was given to those professionals who file beneficial ownership information on behalf of their clients (see below). Footnotes [69] 78.7% hold a bank or custody account, 11.6% appear in the chain of control of domestic LPs, 6.3% own land and/or real estate, 2.7% have a branch office in Austria and 0.7% own aircrafts registered in Austria. [70] In such instances, LLCs are being used as shelf or shell companies or are otherwise fraudulent or problematic. [71] There are 541 foreign LPs with ownership of aircrafts in Austria out of a total of 80 359 foreign legal entities with sufficient links with the country. The authorities clarified that a large proportion of the aircrafts are airliners, which are less vulnerable to abuse for ML/TF/PF purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="370. Austria demonstrates a high level of understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with LPs and LAs, either created domestically or foreign created with sufficient links to the country. This risk understanding is supported by a very comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment of LPs and LAs and several targeted ad hoc studies. The methodology, processes, procedures and conclusions of the risk assessment are rigorous, thereby underpinning a strong and robust understanding of ML/TF risks of LPs and LAs, as set out in more detail below. The risk identification and understanding are fully in line with Austria’s overall risk and context situation, considering the importance of the materiality of the sector in Austria (Introduction). 371. Austria conducted a comprehensive assessment of the ML/TF risks of domestic LPs in its 2021 NRA, which was further refined through the 2025 NRA and extended to foreign LPs and LAs with sufficient links to Austria and PF. The assessment involved a wide range of sources and competent authorities, including but not limited to LEAs, A-FIU and the tax authority, which all provided crucial input on the observed misuse of both domestic LPs and foreign LPs and LAs. For the assessment of foreign LPs and LAs, the following factors were used to establish a sufficient link: holder of a bank or custody account in Austria, ownership of aircrafts, ownership of ships, indirect ownership of domestic LPs, a branch office in Austria, trusts and similar LAs managed from Austria, and ownership of domestic property. The risk assessment identified 80 359 foreign legal entities which have a sufficient link with Austria. [69] 5.1.1. Domestic legal persons 372. Regarding domestic LPs, the NRA comprehensively considers various ML/TF/PF threat scenarios as well as vulnerabilities that are specific to each type of LP. The ML/TF/PF threat level for each type of legal person was assessed considering available statistical data, credible open-source information, the practical experience of public and private sector experts, and specific threat scenarios relevant for individual categories of legal persons. The vulnerabilities of the various types of legal persons were analysed by considering the following factors: the materiality, the type of business risk, the geographical and cross-border risk exposure, the risk of concealment through nominee agreements and bearer shares, the simplicity, speed and costs of founding/registering, the complexity of the ownership and control structure, and the risk awareness of relevant entities. 373. The assessment rates LPs’ overall level of inherent ML risks as medium. LLCs and private foundations are identified as being most at risk for ML. From a materiality perspective, LLCs are predominant and stand out as the preferred type of LP. This is because shares of LLCs can be transferred relatively easily and quickly. In ML schemes, LLCs are often misused to disguise the origin of illicit funds, especially in the construction and trade sectors, thereby becoming fraudulent companies with straw men as their directors and shareholders. [70] Private foundations are frequently used for investments in real estate, thereby increasing their inherent ML risks, including because of measures restricting the ownership of property by foreign investors (see below). 374. The authorities have also undertaken several targeted initiatives to identify meaningful typologies on the involvement of domestic LPs in ML schemes. Examples are A-FIU’s strategic analysis report of fraudulent companies ( scheinunternehmen ) and the comprehensive analysis of nominee arrangements, including treuhand arrangements, conducted jointly by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and the Predictive Analytics Competence Centre (PACC). 375. In terms of TF, the risk understanding is equally comprehensive, and the overall level of inherent TF risks of domestic LPs is also rated as medium. In contrast to the assessment of ML risks, none of the types of domestic LPs presents a high inherent TF risk. This finding is in line with the findings under IO.9 and TF typologies. While the 2021 NRA concluded that TF risks primarily arose from the misuse of associations (i.e., as potential vehicles for cross-border transfers of funds for TF purposes), the comprehensive 2024 and 2025 NPO risk assessments came to more nuanced findings (IO.10). 376. The findings on misuse of domestic LPs for PF-related sanctions evasion largely mirror the ones on ML and are reasonable in light of Austria’s large dual-use goods manufacturing industry, which is vulnerable for PF-related sanctions evasion . One of the most frequently observed PF typologies consists of the misuse of LPs by setting up a screen for sanctions evasion through the concealment of beneficial owners. Authorities are alert to this risk, and intelligence and findings from investigations by DSN and other LEAs reveal that LPs identified as being misused for PF-related sanctions evasion are predominantly foreign entities with complex ownership structures which operate as an intermediary between the Austrian supplier of dual use goods and the end user abroad (IO.11). Foreign legal persons and arrangements 377. As per foreign legal entities, the ML/TF/PF risk analysis is sound and comprehensive. The risk understanding adequately reflects on the results of an in-depth assessment of Austria’s attractiveness for foreign legal entities combined with a high level of detail on their materiality. Other factors underpinning the risk understanding are the type of business activities, the geographical risk exposure, and transparency measures in the country of origin. Foreign legal entities owning aircrafts were identified as presenting a high inherent ML and PF risk, but their materiality in the Austrian context is negligible and the authorities have already taken steps in view of addressing the risk. [71] The individual inherent ML and PF risk exposures of those legal entities holding a bank or custody account, having indirect ownership in domestic LPs, or owning land and/or real estate in Austria is assessed as medium to high. The overall TF risk exposure of foreign legal entities was assessed as low to medium. 378. The NRA and ad hoc studies significantly contributed to competent authorities’ and private sector entities’ development of a comprehensive ML/TF/PF risk understanding of LPs and LAs. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority has organised regular meetings and training events to assist competent authorities and OEs in building and further strengthening their understanding of the ML/TF/PF risks associated with (foreign) LPs and LAs, and to assist them in fulfilling their role in ensuring that the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date. Particular attention was given to those professionals who file beneficial ownership information on behalf of their clients (see below). Footnotes [69] 78.7% hold a bank or custody account, 11.6% appear in the chain of control of domestic LPs, 6.3% own land and/or real estate, 2.7% have a branch office in Austria and 0.7% own aircrafts registered in Austria. [70] In such instances, LLCs are being used as shelf or shell companies or are otherwise fraudulent or problematic. [71] There are 541 foreign LPs with ownership of aircrafts in Austria out of a total of 80 359 foreign legal entities with sufficient links with the country. The authorities clarified that a large proportion of the aircrafts are airliners, which are less vulnerable to abuse for ML/TF/PF purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="428. The A-FIU and LEAs have timely access to, and use, an extensive range of relevant, accurate, and up-to-date information sources to produce financial intelligence to advance their pursuit of ML, associated predicate offences, and TF. The information is either directly accessible or can be obtained quickly through both formal and informal channels. 6.1.1. By the FIU 429. The A-FIU receives a range of reports including STRs/SARs, cross-border cash declarations, as well as threshold-based declarations regarding CBRs and savings account transactions. The A-FIU has direct and timely access to law enforcement and administrative databases, [85] such as the Central Account Register, the Beneficial Ownership Register, and various commercial databases. Internationally, it is connected to the Egmont Secure Web (ESW) for all Egmont members and FIU.net for its European counterparts. It also has its own data application, goAML, and an associated in-house case management system interconnected with several databases allowing for automated cross-checks. The A-FIU also utilises open sources for its analysis. [86] Figure 6.1 below illustrates the frequency of A-FIU's use of the different databases. Figure 6.1. Overview of A-FIU’s access to different databases and frequency of their use by A-FIU staff when performing analytical work Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: A-FIU 430. During the analytical process, reports received are automatically cross-checked against all information within goAML and the directly accessible databases. This also extends to systematic cross-checks against the data included in the Beneficial Ownership Register using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass.” There is therefore no need for the A-FIU to conduct further stand-alone searches in the Beneficial Ownership Register, which explains why the consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register, as presented in the figure above, appear limited (IO.5). 431. The cross-checks against directly accessible databases highly facilitate the identification of linked transactions and patterns. In addition, all data, including the A-FIU's analysis products and information received upon request, are stored in the case management system and are available for data mining by the FIU’s analysts during the legal retention period of five years. 432. Since the 2016 MER, the STR reporting system has been significantly improved, including through the introduction of goAML as a new and sole reporting system in 2021. The system also allows for the exchange of information (sending and receiving reports, notices) with OEs and competent authorities, including follow-up on specific submissions. It has significantly simplified and standardised the reporting process, with automated checks for completeness and a consistent structure that facilitates report submission, analysis and data mining. Around 70% of reports filed are STRs/SARs (Table 6.1). At a minimum, STRs/SARs must be accompanied by transaction data for previous year, the account opening documents, and the CDD documents (including on beneficial owners). Table 6.1. Comparison of incoming data, reports by entities, and STRs/SARs Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total incoming reports 3 656 5 027 5 952 6 903 8 242 12 924 Reporting from OEs (12 types) 3 073 4 356 4 994 6 053 7 603 11 111 of which STRs/SARs (Proportion: ca. 90% STR and 10% SAR) 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 7 796 433. The A-FIU maintains frequent formal (written requests) and informal (verbal) exchanges with OEs, competent authorities, and other FIUs. It can and does request additional information from OEs or competent authorities, either in relation to a filed report or independently of whether a report has been submitted (Table 6.2). The A-FIU could not demonstrate the extent to which it is collecting financial intelligence and other information from competent authorities, and other FIUs. Table 6.2. Number of requests and informal contacts between A-FIU and OEs Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Official Requests N/A 630 606 424 423 Informal Contacts N/A 589 525 389 268 434. The number of STRs and SARs has risen steadily in recent years (Table 6.3) but remains overall low to very low across all sectors considering Austria’s risk and context (IO.3, IO.4). Within a period of five years, the figures have increased fourfold from an absolute low point, but the overall numbers are still relatively low. [87] Most reports are submitted by FIs (over 80% in 2023 and 2024). The top 10 STR filers were responsible for almost 90% of all STRs filed in 2019, and their contribution has gradually decreased to approximately 50% of all filings in 2024, meaning that there has been an increase in the number of other OEs over time. The finding that only a relatively small number of FIs (i.e., 59 FIs) is responsible for most of the reports does however remain valid (i.e., 59 FIs all STRs/SARs filed since 2019—IO.3). 435. While this may be partly explained by the concentration in the financial sector, it may also indicate that not all OEs are reporting in line with their risk profile. VASPs made up just over 10% of reports in 2023 and 2024. Compared to 2020, VASP reporting has increased twentyfold. DNFBPs have been reporting at consistently low levels during the entire review period. Their share was even less than 1% of STRs/SARs in the period under review. 436. The A-FIU initiated various initiatives to increase the level of reporting, with a particular focus on DNFBPs. For instance, the FIU organised several training events for the real estate sector, which it considers to be particularly vulnerable to ML. During those, the A-FIU discussed ML typologies and trends focusing on specific abuses of the real estate sector in ML schemes, which are often more complex cases. Overall, the still low level of reporting across the OEs impacts the A-FIU's access to relevant data that drives its analysis. Table 6.3. STR &amp; SAR by reporting entity Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All REs 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 11 111 FIs 264 1 992 2 976 3 450 5 419 9 139 VASPs - 60 279 1 393 699 1 228 Payment Service Providers - 180 558 509 513 565 Gambling and betting providers - 6 4 15 18 18 Lawyers - 2 6 13 8 19 Notaries - 3 9 13 13 33 Others/Other DNFBPs 3 6 14 17 25 86 Insurance companies - 9 10 14 9 23 437. In terms of content, STR reporting covers some of the main ML threats identified by Austria, in particular fraud and tax crimes (Figure 6.2). Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 6.2. Overview of the main offences identified by REs in STRs/SRAs [88] 438. Report completeness has improved steadily in recent years, particularly with the introduction of goAML and is deemed to be good by the A-FIU. Over 90% of reports are submitted via XML interface, which is mandatory for CIs, ensuring a basic level of completion. In general, reports are well-substantiated and accompanied by relevant background information (including CDD information with details on beneficial owners) and supporting documents. Currently, the A-FIU rejects only 7% of reports based on automated checks. In these cases, improvements are typically made promptly and reliably. 439. OEs are very responsive to A-FIU’s requests for additional information and respond to them swiftly. Formal requests (table 3.2) made between 2021 and 2024 were responded to on average in 3.5 days; with 25% of requests answered within 1.2 days. Between 2020 and 2024, there was only one case of non-compliance with a formal request for information, and the A-FIU referred the case to the respective supervisor. In 2022, the A-FIU introduced an automated system to provide instant feedback on the completeness of the STR/SAR received. In addition, this is complemented by an automated feedback system. The latter implies that, within one month of reporting, the system sends a feedback e-mail to the reporting entity informing them about the status of the analysis (ongoing, on hold, pending further information, or disseminated to a competent authority), which provides, to some extent, an initial indication of the usefulness of the report. The A-FIU, however, does not systematically provide feedback on the quality of content of the report or information on the outcome of any criminal proceedings, as it does not have the latter information (not even for its own functioning), as this data is neither collected, nor tracked (IO.7). 440. The A-FIU hosts or is a member of various PPPs focused on information sharing with the private sector on ML and predicate offences. The PPP Financial Intelligence Network Austria (FINA) is well-established and includes the most frequently reporting FIs and other competent authorities. It held 19 meetings since it was established in 2020, including three meetings in 2023, to discuss current phenomena and trends, such as the virtual IBAN and related risks, guidance on improving the quality of reporting. The A-FIU also launched a PPP covering the VASP sector (FINA-Crypto) in 2025, which is not operational yet, and it is also a member of a PPP with the legal professions, which was established in 2024 and held several meetings. There are no other PPPs with other DNFBPs. 441. The A-FIU also receives SARs from other authorities, including when they identify suspicions of ML/TF during their operational activities (Table 6.4). In addition to the identification of suspicions (e.g., by FMA or other supervisors during their supervisory activities), relevant reports also extend to the declarations of cross-border transportation of cash and BNI collected by the Customs. Table 6.4. Reports by domestic competent authorities [89] Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 FMA 34 22 18 11 4 Customs + MoF 67 35 64 27 24 Courts No Data No Data 10 2 1 Other Authorities No Data No Data 109 92 90 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 442. LEAs have direct and timely access to the same sources of information that are available to the A-FIU, except for A-FIU’s own database (goAML) with information on STRs, SARs, other reports received, requests from foreign counterparts, and the follow-up actions taken by A-FIU. In relation to TF-related STR/SARs, after the initial checks by A-FIU, DSN conducts in-depth reviews of STRs/SARs and produces comprehensive financial intelligence to establish whether suspicions filed are pertinent (IO.9 and below). DSN also has its own internal databases, including intelligence collected by its intelligence department. Footnotes [85] Police investigation files database, criminal records database, arrest warrant and tracing database, visa information system (European-wide), identity documents database (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.), weapons register, DNA and fingerprints database, vehicles database (cars, ships, aircrafts), and population address register, among others. [86] The A-FIU defines open-source research basically as the utilisation of the Internet using the standard search options available there. [87] A-FIU's statistics do not differentiate between CIs and FIs. [88] The small pie chart illustrate the offences referred as &quot;Others&quot; in the big pie chart. [89] Table 6.4 presents the total number of reports from other competent authorities, which also includes answers to some (but not all) requests sent by A-FIU to these authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="428. The A-FIU and LEAs have timely access to, and use, an extensive range of relevant, accurate, and up-to-date information sources to produce financial intelligence to advance their pursuit of ML, associated predicate offences, and TF. The information is either directly accessible or can be obtained quickly through both formal and informal channels. 6.1.1. By the FIU 429. The A-FIU receives a range of reports including STRs/SARs, cross-border cash declarations, as well as threshold-based declarations regarding CBRs and savings account transactions. The A-FIU has direct and timely access to law enforcement and administrative databases, [85] such as the Central Account Register, the Beneficial Ownership Register, and various commercial databases. Internationally, it is connected to the Egmont Secure Web (ESW) for all Egmont members and FIU.net for its European counterparts. It also has its own data application, goAML, and an associated in-house case management system interconnected with several databases allowing for automated cross-checks. The A-FIU also utilises open sources for its analysis. [86] Figure 6.1 below illustrates the frequency of A-FIU's use of the different databases. Figure 6.1. Overview of A-FIU’s access to different databases and frequency of their use by A-FIU staff when performing analytical work Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: A-FIU 430. During the analytical process, reports received are automatically cross-checked against all information within goAML and the directly accessible databases. This also extends to systematic cross-checks against the data included in the Beneficial Ownership Register using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass.” There is therefore no need for the A-FIU to conduct further stand-alone searches in the Beneficial Ownership Register, which explains why the consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register, as presented in the figure above, appear limited (IO.5). 431. The cross-checks against directly accessible databases highly facilitate the identification of linked transactions and patterns. In addition, all data, including the A-FIU's analysis products and information received upon request, are stored in the case management system and are available for data mining by the FIU’s analysts during the legal retention period of five years. 432. Since the 2016 MER, the STR reporting system has been significantly improved, including through the introduction of goAML as a new and sole reporting system in 2021. The system also allows for the exchange of information (sending and receiving reports, notices) with OEs and competent authorities, including follow-up on specific submissions. It has significantly simplified and standardised the reporting process, with automated checks for completeness and a consistent structure that facilitates report submission, analysis and data mining. Around 70% of reports filed are STRs/SARs (Table 6.1). At a minimum, STRs/SARs must be accompanied by transaction data for previous year, the account opening documents, and the CDD documents (including on beneficial owners). Table 6.1. Comparison of incoming data, reports by entities, and STRs/SARs Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total incoming reports 3 656 5 027 5 952 6 903 8 242 12 924 Reporting from OEs (12 types) 3 073 4 356 4 994 6 053 7 603 11 111 of which STRs/SARs (Proportion: ca. 90% STR and 10% SAR) 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 7 796 433. The A-FIU maintains frequent formal (written requests) and informal (verbal) exchanges with OEs, competent authorities, and other FIUs. It can and does request additional information from OEs or competent authorities, either in relation to a filed report or independently of whether a report has been submitted (Table 6.2). The A-FIU could not demonstrate the extent to which it is collecting financial intelligence and other information from competent authorities, and other FIUs. Table 6.2. Number of requests and informal contacts between A-FIU and OEs Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Official Requests N/A 630 606 424 423 Informal Contacts N/A 589 525 389 268 434. The number of STRs and SARs has risen steadily in recent years (Table 6.3) but remains overall low to very low across all sectors considering Austria’s risk and context (IO.3, IO.4). Within a period of five years, the figures have increased fourfold from an absolute low point, but the overall numbers are still relatively low. [87] Most reports are submitted by FIs (over 80% in 2023 and 2024). The top 10 STR filers were responsible for almost 90% of all STRs filed in 2019, and their contribution has gradually decreased to approximately 50% of all filings in 2024, meaning that there has been an increase in the number of other OEs over time. The finding that only a relatively small number of FIs (i.e., 59 FIs) is responsible for most of the reports does however remain valid (i.e., 59 FIs all STRs/SARs filed since 2019—IO.3). 435. While this may be partly explained by the concentration in the financial sector, it may also indicate that not all OEs are reporting in line with their risk profile. VASPs made up just over 10% of reports in 2023 and 2024. Compared to 2020, VASP reporting has increased twentyfold. DNFBPs have been reporting at consistently low levels during the entire review period. Their share was even less than 1% of STRs/SARs in the period under review. 436. The A-FIU initiated various initiatives to increase the level of reporting, with a particular focus on DNFBPs. For instance, the FIU organised several training events for the real estate sector, which it considers to be particularly vulnerable to ML. During those, the A-FIU discussed ML typologies and trends focusing on specific abuses of the real estate sector in ML schemes, which are often more complex cases. Overall, the still low level of reporting across the OEs impacts the A-FIU's access to relevant data that drives its analysis. Table 6.3. STR &amp; SAR by reporting entity Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All REs 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 11 111 FIs 264 1 992 2 976 3 450 5 419 9 139 VASPs - 60 279 1 393 699 1 228 Payment Service Providers - 180 558 509 513 565 Gambling and betting providers - 6 4 15 18 18 Lawyers - 2 6 13 8 19 Notaries - 3 9 13 13 33 Others/Other DNFBPs 3 6 14 17 25 86 Insurance companies - 9 10 14 9 23 437. In terms of content, STR reporting covers some of the main ML threats identified by Austria, in particular fraud and tax crimes (Figure 6.2). Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 6.2. Overview of the main offences identified by REs in STRs/SRAs [88] 438. Report completeness has improved steadily in recent years, particularly with the introduction of goAML and is deemed to be good by the A-FIU. Over 90% of reports are submitted via XML interface, which is mandatory for CIs, ensuring a basic level of completion. In general, reports are well-substantiated and accompanied by relevant background information (including CDD information with details on beneficial owners) and supporting documents. Currently, the A-FIU rejects only 7% of reports based on automated checks. In these cases, improvements are typically made promptly and reliably. 439. OEs are very responsive to A-FIU’s requests for additional information and respond to them swiftly. Formal requests (table 3.2) made between 2021 and 2024 were responded to on average in 3.5 days; with 25% of requests answered within 1.2 days. Between 2020 and 2024, there was only one case of non-compliance with a formal request for information, and the A-FIU referred the case to the respective supervisor. In 2022, the A-FIU introduced an automated system to provide instant feedback on the completeness of the STR/SAR received. In addition, this is complemented by an automated feedback system. The latter implies that, within one month of reporting, the system sends a feedback e-mail to the reporting entity informing them about the status of the analysis (ongoing, on hold, pending further information, or disseminated to a competent authority), which provides, to some extent, an initial indication of the usefulness of the report. The A-FIU, however, does not systematically provide feedback on the quality of content of the report or information on the outcome of any criminal proceedings, as it does not have the latter information (not even for its own functioning), as this data is neither collected, nor tracked (IO.7). 440. The A-FIU hosts or is a member of various PPPs focused on information sharing with the private sector on ML and predicate offences. The PPP Financial Intelligence Network Austria (FINA) is well-established and includes the most frequently reporting FIs and other competent authorities. It held 19 meetings since it was established in 2020, including three meetings in 2023, to discuss current phenomena and trends, such as the virtual IBAN and related risks, guidance on improving the quality of reporting. The A-FIU also launched a PPP covering the VASP sector (FINA-Crypto) in 2025, which is not operational yet, and it is also a member of a PPP with the legal professions, which was established in 2024 and held several meetings. There are no other PPPs with other DNFBPs. 441. The A-FIU also receives SARs from other authorities, including when they identify suspicions of ML/TF during their operational activities (Table 6.4). In addition to the identification of suspicions (e.g., by FMA or other supervisors during their supervisory activities), relevant reports also extend to the declarations of cross-border transportation of cash and BNI collected by the Customs. Table 6.4. Reports by domestic competent authorities [89] Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 FMA 34 22 18 11 4 Customs + MoF 67 35 64 27 24 Courts No Data No Data 10 2 1 Other Authorities No Data No Data 109 92 90 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 442. LEAs have direct and timely access to the same sources of information that are available to the A-FIU, except for A-FIU’s own database (goAML) with information on STRs, SARs, other reports received, requests from foreign counterparts, and the follow-up actions taken by A-FIU. In relation to TF-related STR/SARs, after the initial checks by A-FIU, DSN conducts in-depth reviews of STRs/SARs and produces comprehensive financial intelligence to establish whether suspicions filed are pertinent (IO.9 and below). DSN also has its own internal databases, including intelligence collected by its intelligence department. Footnotes [85] Police investigation files database, criminal records database, arrest warrant and tracing database, visa information system (European-wide), identity documents database (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.), weapons register, DNA and fingerprints database, vehicles database (cars, ships, aircrafts), and population address register, among others. [86] The A-FIU defines open-source research basically as the utilisation of the Internet using the standard search options available there. [87] A-FIU's statistics do not differentiate between CIs and FIs. [88] The small pie chart illustrate the offences referred as &quot;Others&quot; in the big pie chart. [89] Table 6.4 presents the total number of reports from other competent authorities, which also includes answers to some (but not all) requests sent by A-FIU to these authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. Austria investigates ML activities when linked to a predicate offence (commonly fraud), including some complex cases, but faces significant difficulties in detecting them in other instances, which appears to be linked in particular to the design of the ML offence . Moreover, the overall number of ML investigations appears overall low, which may also be attributed to difficulties to establish knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence (section 7.2). 470. LEAs are legally required to and in practice conduct parallel financial investigations to identify, trace and assess criminal assets when investigating criminal offences, including ML predicates, and those financial investigations are an integral part of the main investigation (IO.8). When LEAs develop initial suspicion of ML during predicate investigations, they also open formal ML investigations, although these are often similar or complementary to the financial investigations which are integrated into the predicate offence investigations. In addition, the requirements for establishing an initial suspicion are offence-specific, meaning that this threshold essentially reflects the ML offence design and the related challenges 471. Investigations into ML, as other offence investigations, are led by the public prosecutor’s office (PPO) and conducted by the criminal police under the PPO's direction (except for tax and some corruption related offences). Prosecutors make key decisions such as how to conclude the proceedings or filing motions in court, while the police carries out most of the investigative work independently. At the prosecutorial level, the Central PPO for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (WKStA) specialises in the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes, including corruption, and ML cases related to these crimes, provided certain damage thresholds are exceeded. In all other cases, the general PPOs are in charge. 472. At police level, the unit responsible for investigating the predicate offence usually also investigates associated ML while specialised units can take over complex or lead in standalone ML cases. Predicate and associated ML investigations are conducted or at least commenced at local level, unless they fall within the competence of state or federal authorities. Local police authorities are required to report (orally or in writing) every ML case to the respective state Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which then assesses whether the case should be taken over due to its complexity. [98] The state CID in all nine federal states can investigate more complex cases and ML cases without a concrete link to a predicate offence. No specific thresholds are established for determining complex cases that would go to CIDs, but in general that would include cases involving higher damage, exceptional public impact, or requiring special expertise). The CIDs have specially trained experts (EB-04 units) who also serve as central contact points for AR (IO.8). In international cases and certain cases linked to organised crime, the CIS's unit that specialises in the predicate offence investigation would also lead or support the ML investigation, while in cases without a concrete predicate offence, responsibility lies with the CIS unit responsible for fraud. 473. The institutional set-up translates in practice into ML being pursued as an adjunct to the predicate offence, as indicated by interviews with LEAs, cases, and ML judgments. Statistics on case reporting by the police to PPOs indicate that in 2020 approximately half of ML investigations were conducted by the local police, and this percentage has increased to two thirds from 2021 onwards. This indicates that such cases are less complex ML cases, as more complex cases would be dealt with CIDs or the CIS. 474. Overall, the number of ML investigations conducted across all LEAs is low. Whilst the number of recorded ML offences registered by the police has increased significantly over the period under review, they remain overall very low when considering the broad spectrum of registered offences (table 7.1). [99] The PPO statistics (table 7.2), drawn on the basis of number of investigations initiated, show only a temporary and overall less pronounced increase in ML investigations in comparison with the police statistics. [100] On average, broadly similar to the annual average of the 2016 MER, there were just over 1 200 ML investigations per year (and more than 500 000 crimes, including 100 000 economic crimes on average per year). Overall, it is unclear if the country is detecting and investigating third-party and standalone ML sufficiently, which may also be linked to difficulties in proving the knowledge and intention elements of the ML offence and fully establishing the necessary elements of the predicate offence (section 7.2). Table 7.1. Recorded Offences (Acts) in Selected Categories, Including ML—Police Crime Statistics (PKS) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total number of recorded offences 433 811 410 957 488 949 528 010 534 193 Economic crime (including fraudulent offences (§§ 146 StGB seq.) 72 736 75 472 91 844 103 330 103 500 of which Aggravated Fraud (§ 147 StGB) and Commercial Fraud (§ 148 StGB) 8 054 7 954 9 357 11 454 12 769 Drug-related offences under the Narcotic Substances Act 40 299 34 837 34 928 35 445 37 310 of which Felonies under the Narcotic Substances Act 3 194 3 214 2 862 2 908 3 212 Burglary 6 420 4 691 6 064 7 647 6 930 Human Smuggling 1 771 3 570 9 186 4 704 1 571 Human trafficking and cross-border prostitution trafficking 55 48 56 37 43 Money Laundering 527 742 755 877 881 Note: The PKS record criminal offences (acts), not individuals. Acts are counted separately if they relate to different legal provisions or distinct factual events. The same factual act may appear multiple times in the PKS if it fulfils several criminal offences (e.g. theft and property damage). Therefore, the PKS may include duplicate counts when a single incident involves multiple offences. Source: BMI Table 7.2. ML Investigations: Public Prosecutor's Office Statistics Year Investigations Non-initiating of proceedings due to lack of initial suspicion (§ 35c StAG / § 197a StPO) Total (incoming files) 2020 985 218 1 203 2021 1 304 222 1 526 2022 1 380 200 1 580 2023 1 309 276 1 585 2024 1 115 157 1 272 Total 6 093 1 073 7 166 Source: BMJ 475. The limited data available indicates that most investigations are likely to involve low values. Prior to the legal amendment in 2021, resulting in the ML offence always constituting a felony, some statistics were collected on ML cases involving felonies or misdemeanours. Most cases pursued were misdemeanours which involved low amounts (less than EUR 50 000) and were not found to be committed by a member of a criminal organisation. [101] The authorities could not clearly demonstrate the typical profile and level of complexity of these investigations, due to insufficient data collected. Nonetheless, case studies demonstrate that there were some complex cases where different types of ML were being pursued (see below). Table 7.3. ML Misdemeanours vs. Felonies (Acts) 2020–2021—PKS ML Misdemeanours ML Felonies Total 2020 430 97 527 2021 635 107 742 Source: Austrian authorities 476. Data is also lacking on how ML offences are being identified in practice, but inter views and cases show that many successful ML investigations result from investigations into predicate offences. Interviews and cases also confirmed that most ML investigations benefit from FIU disseminations related either to predicate offences or ML, particularly in fraud cases (IO.6). The country was able to present only a negligible number of cases in which ML investigations were triggered by cash controls at the border, which is relevant as per the risk and context. The authorities did not demonstrate sufficient detection and investigation of third-party and standalone ML. 477. At the same time, authorities have demonstrated in a few instances their capability and expertise to investigate complex international criminal cases involving sophisticated ML structures. In those, they used a range of investigative tools to trace financial flows and gather the necessary evidence. Overall, LEAs have impressive capabilities for detecting and combating fraud. The authorities live screen all newly registered fraud cases to immediately implement measures when patterns are detected. Cases below illustrate outstanding investigative work, where ML investigations resulted from predicate offence investigations. Those capabilities for detecting and combating fraud suggest that Austria could have the expertise to achieve success in ML enforcement, if it was appropriately prioritised and resourced. Additional human resources, training and guidance, and investigative tools may be required to substantially increase the focus on complex ML cases in a more systemic way, as well as a policy priority Box 7.1. WOLF of SOFIA Case [102] In 2017, Austrian LEAs investigated numerous victim complaints about fraudulent online trading platforms, establishing an investigation team involving the CID Lower Austria and CIS Austria. Investigations revealed a large-scale international investment fraud scheme operating through fake trading platforms run by call centres in Bulgaria and Serbia. Employees targeted German-speaking investors, encouraging deposits for fake investment opportunities with simulated profits. Proceeds —often over EUR 5 000 per investor and exceeding EUR 300 000 in total—were laundered through a network of offshore companies using fake invoices and sham contracts. Accounting records were deliberately manipulated to conceal the illicit financial flows. A JIT with Austrian and German authorities uncovered an organised criminal network of more than 500 individuals. Nine coordinated action days included searches at businesses (including four call centres) and residences, which led to the seizure of physical and digital evidence that was analysed with specialised software. Investigators analysed bank account flows, conducted witness interviews, and reconstructed communications. These efforts exposed the offshore network, associated financial flows, and the use of front persons and fraudulent documents. On 1 September 2020, the first offender was convicted by the Vienna Regional Criminal Court for aggravated commercial fraud and ML committed between September 2015 and February 2019 and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Box 7.2 CEO Fraud Case Starting in 2015, international investigative authorities—including CID Lower Austria, CIS Austria, and prosecutors—investigated a criminal organisation that defrauded companies worldwide of millions through CEO fraud. Using fake emails and fabricated takeovers, perpetrators directed the transfer of large sums to shell companies accounts. In Austria, the damage exceeded EUR 58 million. D.S. was accused of establishing shell companies using forged documents, opening bank accounts, and passing the details of which to accomplices to facilitate fraudulent transfers. He also provided translations, expertise, and established contact with banks. D.S. operated a forgery workshop in Israel, equipped with copy machines, printers, stamps, and seals to produce fake IDs, notarial deeds, and commercial register entries. Investigations involved international cooperation with Israeli and French authorities, MLA, and digital evidence. Austrian authorities reconstructed the organisational roles—from IT technicians and phone scammers to money launderers. A police-created graphic chart was used in court to illustrate the documents, the companies, and the related fraud cases. D.S.'s central role was proven through witness testimony, document analysis from his office in Israel (searched in February 2019 at Austria’s request), and his connections to over 59 shell companies in Europe, Asia, and Canada. Voice-matching experts linked the perpetrator voice to calls in Austria and Germany. Financial flows were reconstructed using account data obtained through MLA from Slovakia, Latvia, Canada, Poland, Bulgaria, France, and Israel, in addition to translated messages from seized devices. On 19 March 2025, Austria's Supreme Court (OGH) confirmed D.S.'s seven-year prison sentence (imposed 15 May 2024 by Graz Regional Criminal Court) for aggravated commercial fraud and criminal organisation membership, after a 2022 judgment was partially overturned. 478. The absence of prioritisation is also reflected by the lack of targeted AML investigative strategies or guidance documents focused on specific ML trends or methods for LEAs and PPOs. As ML investigation closely follows predicate offence investigation, often conducted at local level, guidance and strategies could assist LEAs in better detecting ML offences in their investigative work. 479. LEAs use investigative tools and information sources effectiv ely, but face limitations regarding financial investigative tools including for monitoring encrypted communications of suspects of committing ML or predicate offences . The authorities use their extensive databases and registers, in particular the central bank account and beneficial ownership registers, even though further linking some law enforcement/ administrative databases would be beneficial. However, remote real-time surveillance of encrypted end-to-end communications is not allowed in Austria, thereby limiting the LEAs’ ability to pursue some ML investigations further. The 2023 AML/CFT strategy [103] also recommended the acquisition of financial investigation tools to perform automated transaction flow analyses to handle the increasing volumes of data. This was not followed through. 480. Austria did not demonstrate that it is identifying and pursuing ML investigations fully in line with its risk profile. While ML cases related to fraud are pursued, ML related to drug trafficking, tax offences, and corruption, which are relevant in the country's risk and context, are not pursued in a significant way. No examples were brought on the country’s ability to use intelligence to dismantle professional ML networks outside the context of predicate offence investigations. 481. Statistical data on ML investigations (e.g. on triggers of investigations, types of predicate offences, ML methods, complexity of cases) is lacking at all stages of criminal proceedings (investigations, prosecutions, convictions). Austria neither collects this data when recording cases nor compiles it retrospectively through a targeted analysis of completed cases. This impacts the country's ability of monitoring the extent and type of ML activity that is being investigated and prosecuted, identify trends and better allocate resources. The police case management system, used for the PKS, provides an indication of the likely predicate offences involved in an ML case, [104] and Austria is currently evaluating mechanisms for improving statistical collection going forward. 482. Roughly half of the recorded cases involving ML also included fraud offences during the period under review. Drug trafficking, theft, and forgery each appeared in about 10% of ML-recorded offences. Fraud is by far the most frequently observed predicate in ML investigations and that has also been evidenced with cases and court judgments. Very few cases covered other predicate offences, such as drug offences, even if the authorities reported that significant cash transports have repeatedly been detected in connection to drug cases. However, these findings have rarely led to successful ML investigations. Overall, authorities face difficulties to evidence the knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence (section 7.2). 483. Austria has not provided evidence that ML related to tax predicates are pursued, while tax crimes are relevant considering its risk profile. Tax offences are investigated by the fiscal criminal authorities, but the associated ML offences are investigated by the police (CIS or CID), under the PPO's direction. No statistical data or case examples were provided, but the authorities confirmed that such proceedings are rare—even though according to the NRA 2025 tax crimes are important predicates, ranked just after fraud and forgery offences. According to the authorities, this may be due to the fact that a very narrow range of tax offences qualify as ML predicates (i.e., only the ones that result in a tax refund rather than a mere reduction of the tax burden, and only if the amount evaded is at least EUR 150 000 or EUR 75 000 in the case of customs offences—c. 3.2 and c.3.4). Those limitations significantly impact Austria’s ability to pursue ML offences in particular in relation to tax crimes. 484. The authorities have been able to identify and investigate ML cases in relation to corruption offences in a limited number of cases, not fully in line with risk and context. Corruption related offences are generally investigated by the BAK, which is also responsible for associated ML offence investigation, unless the case also involve other offences which carry a maximum sentence higher than the one for corruption/ML-related offences. In such cases, the BAK continues to be responsible for investigating most types of corruption offences, whereas all other offences, including ML, are investigated by LEAs (see above). Over the period, BAK has conducted 32 investigations involving links between corruption and ML, averaging a bit over 6 ML-related investigations per year. It is not known how many ML cases related to corruption were prosecuted, if any. Footnotes [98] As required by the Criminal Services Guidelines. [99] It should be noted that not all offences listed in the table qualify as ML predicate offences under Art 165 StGB. ML predicates include aggravated fraud (Art. 147 StGB), commercial fraud (Art. 148 StGB), felonies under the Narcotic Substances Act (SMG), and burglary. Overall, the statistics provide a general indication of the overall crime statistics, and the number of recorded ML offences. [100] The difference in figures likely relate to different methodologies: the police counts the number of ML acts or offences, whereas PPO statistics count the ML investigations opened. [101] While ML has, since 1 September 2021, always constituted a felony due to the increase in the sentencing range under Art. 165 StGB, this was previously only the case when the offence involved a value exceeding EUR 50 000 or was committed as a member of a criminal organisation. Such cases accounted for only a small share of suspected offences. [102] Source: Judgment of the Regional Criminal Court (OLG) of Vienna of 1 September 2020, case number 122 HV 4/20g. [103]Federal Ministry of Finance: Austrian Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2023), p.34: https://www.bmf.gv.at/dam/jcr:c4ba1dd0-718d-4d95-a055-a015409e7ba9/Nationale%20Strategie%20zur%20Verhinderung%20von%20Geldw%C3%A4scherei%20und20Terrorismusfinanzierung_2023.pdf [104] The system records an ML offence together with the potential predicate offences under a same file number, but other criminal offences identified during an investigation are also recorded under that file, making a clear assessment of ML predicates not possible. The authorities indicate that statistical data will soon be improved through the introduction of an additional field for linking the specific predicate offence to the ML offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. Austria investigates ML activities when linked to a predicate offence (commonly fraud), including some complex cases, but faces significant difficulties in detecting them in other instances, which appears to be linked in particular to the design of the ML offence . Moreover, the overall number of ML investigations appears overall low, which may also be attributed to difficulties to establish knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence (section 7.2). 470. LEAs are legally required to and in practice conduct parallel financial investigations to identify, trace and assess criminal assets when investigating criminal offences, including ML predicates, and those financial investigations are an integral part of the main investigation (IO.8). When LEAs develop initial suspicion of ML during predicate investigations, they also open formal ML investigations, although these are often similar or complementary to the financial investigations which are integrated into the predicate offence investigations. In addition, the requirements for establishing an initial suspicion are offence-specific, meaning that this threshold essentially reflects the ML offence design and the related challenges 471. Investigations into ML, as other offence investigations, are led by the public prosecutor’s office (PPO) and conducted by the criminal police under the PPO's direction (except for tax and some corruption related offences). Prosecutors make key decisions such as how to conclude the proceedings or filing motions in court, while the police carries out most of the investigative work independently. At the prosecutorial level, the Central PPO for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (WKStA) specialises in the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes, including corruption, and ML cases related to these crimes, provided certain damage thresholds are exceeded. In all other cases, the general PPOs are in charge. 472. At police level, the unit responsible for investigating the predicate offence usually also investigates associated ML while specialised units can take over complex or lead in standalone ML cases. Predicate and associated ML investigations are conducted or at least commenced at local level, unless they fall within the competence of state or federal authorities. Local police authorities are required to report (orally or in writing) every ML case to the respective state Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which then assesses whether the case should be taken over due to its complexity. [98] The state CID in all nine federal states can investigate more complex cases and ML cases without a concrete link to a predicate offence. No specific thresholds are established for determining complex cases that would go to CIDs, but in general that would include cases involving higher damage, exceptional public impact, or requiring special expertise). The CIDs have specially trained experts (EB-04 units) who also serve as central contact points for AR (IO.8). In international cases and certain cases linked to organised crime, the CIS's unit that specialises in the predicate offence investigation would also lead or support the ML investigation, while in cases without a concrete predicate offence, responsibility lies with the CIS unit responsible for fraud. 473. The institutional set-up translates in practice into ML being pursued as an adjunct to the predicate offence, as indicated by interviews with LEAs, cases, and ML judgments. Statistics on case reporting by the police to PPOs indicate that in 2020 approximately half of ML investigations were conducted by the local police, and this percentage has increased to two thirds from 2021 onwards. This indicates that such cases are less complex ML cases, as more complex cases would be dealt with CIDs or the CIS. 474. Overall, the number of ML investigations conducted across all LEAs is low. Whilst the number of recorded ML offences registered by the police has increased significantly over the period under review, they remain overall very low when considering the broad spectrum of registered offences (table 7.1). [99] The PPO statistics (table 7.2), drawn on the basis of number of investigations initiated, show only a temporary and overall less pronounced increase in ML investigations in comparison with the police statistics. [100] On average, broadly similar to the annual average of the 2016 MER, there were just over 1 200 ML investigations per year (and more than 500 000 crimes, including 100 000 economic crimes on average per year). Overall, it is unclear if the country is detecting and investigating third-party and standalone ML sufficiently, which may also be linked to difficulties in proving the knowledge and intention elements of the ML offence and fully establishing the necessary elements of the predicate offence (section 7.2). Table 7.1. Recorded Offences (Acts) in Selected Categories, Including ML—Police Crime Statistics (PKS) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total number of recorded offences 433 811 410 957 488 949 528 010 534 193 Economic crime (including fraudulent offences (§§ 146 StGB seq.) 72 736 75 472 91 844 103 330 103 500 of which Aggravated Fraud (§ 147 StGB) and Commercial Fraud (§ 148 StGB) 8 054 7 954 9 357 11 454 12 769 Drug-related offences under the Narcotic Substances Act 40 299 34 837 34 928 35 445 37 310 of which Felonies under the Narcotic Substances Act 3 194 3 214 2 862 2 908 3 212 Burglary 6 420 4 691 6 064 7 647 6 930 Human Smuggling 1 771 3 570 9 186 4 704 1 571 Human trafficking and cross-border prostitution trafficking 55 48 56 37 43 Money Laundering 527 742 755 877 881 Note: The PKS record criminal offences (acts), not individuals. Acts are counted separately if they relate to different legal provisions or distinct factual events. The same factual act may appear multiple times in the PKS if it fulfils several criminal offences (e.g. theft and property damage). Therefore, the PKS may include duplicate counts when a single incident involves multiple offences. Source: BMI Table 7.2. ML Investigations: Public Prosecutor's Office Statistics Year Investigations Non-initiating of proceedings due to lack of initial suspicion (§ 35c StAG / § 197a StPO) Total (incoming files) 2020 985 218 1 203 2021 1 304 222 1 526 2022 1 380 200 1 580 2023 1 309 276 1 585 2024 1 115 157 1 272 Total 6 093 1 073 7 166 Source: BMJ 475. The limited data available indicates that most investigations are likely to involve low values. Prior to the legal amendment in 2021, resulting in the ML offence always constituting a felony, some statistics were collected on ML cases involving felonies or misdemeanours. Most cases pursued were misdemeanours which involved low amounts (less than EUR 50 000) and were not found to be committed by a member of a criminal organisation. [101] The authorities could not clearly demonstrate the typical profile and level of complexity of these investigations, due to insufficient data collected. Nonetheless, case studies demonstrate that there were some complex cases where different types of ML were being pursued (see below). Table 7.3. ML Misdemeanours vs. Felonies (Acts) 2020–2021—PKS ML Misdemeanours ML Felonies Total 2020 430 97 527 2021 635 107 742 Source: Austrian authorities 476. Data is also lacking on how ML offences are being identified in practice, but inter views and cases show that many successful ML investigations result from investigations into predicate offences. Interviews and cases also confirmed that most ML investigations benefit from FIU disseminations related either to predicate offences or ML, particularly in fraud cases (IO.6). The country was able to present only a negligible number of cases in which ML investigations were triggered by cash controls at the border, which is relevant as per the risk and context. The authorities did not demonstrate sufficient detection and investigation of third-party and standalone ML. 477. At the same time, authorities have demonstrated in a few instances their capability and expertise to investigate complex international criminal cases involving sophisticated ML structures. In those, they used a range of investigative tools to trace financial flows and gather the necessary evidence. Overall, LEAs have impressive capabilities for detecting and combating fraud. The authorities live screen all newly registered fraud cases to immediately implement measures when patterns are detected. Cases below illustrate outstanding investigative work, where ML investigations resulted from predicate offence investigations. Those capabilities for detecting and combating fraud suggest that Austria could have the expertise to achieve success in ML enforcement, if it was appropriately prioritised and resourced. Additional human resources, training and guidance, and investigative tools may be required to substantially increase the focus on complex ML cases in a more systemic way, as well as a policy priority Box 7.1. WOLF of SOFIA Case [102] In 2017, Austrian LEAs investigated numerous victim complaints about fraudulent online trading platforms, establishing an investigation team involving the CID Lower Austria and CIS Austria. Investigations revealed a large-scale international investment fraud scheme operating through fake trading platforms run by call centres in Bulgaria and Serbia. Employees targeted German-speaking investors, encouraging deposits for fake investment opportunities with simulated profits. Proceeds —often over EUR 5 000 per investor and exceeding EUR 300 000 in total—were laundered through a network of offshore companies using fake invoices and sham contracts. Accounting records were deliberately manipulated to conceal the illicit financial flows. A JIT with Austrian and German authorities uncovered an organised criminal network of more than 500 individuals. Nine coordinated action days included searches at businesses (including four call centres) and residences, which led to the seizure of physical and digital evidence that was analysed with specialised software. Investigators analysed bank account flows, conducted witness interviews, and reconstructed communications. These efforts exposed the offshore network, associated financial flows, and the use of front persons and fraudulent documents. On 1 September 2020, the first offender was convicted by the Vienna Regional Criminal Court for aggravated commercial fraud and ML committed between September 2015 and February 2019 and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Box 7.2 CEO Fraud Case Starting in 2015, international investigative authorities—including CID Lower Austria, CIS Austria, and prosecutors—investigated a criminal organisation that defrauded companies worldwide of millions through CEO fraud. Using fake emails and fabricated takeovers, perpetrators directed the transfer of large sums to shell companies accounts. In Austria, the damage exceeded EUR 58 million. D.S. was accused of establishing shell companies using forged documents, opening bank accounts, and passing the details of which to accomplices to facilitate fraudulent transfers. He also provided translations, expertise, and established contact with banks. D.S. operated a forgery workshop in Israel, equipped with copy machines, printers, stamps, and seals to produce fake IDs, notarial deeds, and commercial register entries. Investigations involved international cooperation with Israeli and French authorities, MLA, and digital evidence. Austrian authorities reconstructed the organisational roles—from IT technicians and phone scammers to money launderers. A police-created graphic chart was used in court to illustrate the documents, the companies, and the related fraud cases. D.S.'s central role was proven through witness testimony, document analysis from his office in Israel (searched in February 2019 at Austria’s request), and his connections to over 59 shell companies in Europe, Asia, and Canada. Voice-matching experts linked the perpetrator voice to calls in Austria and Germany. Financial flows were reconstructed using account data obtained through MLA from Slovakia, Latvia, Canada, Poland, Bulgaria, France, and Israel, in addition to translated messages from seized devices. On 19 March 2025, Austria's Supreme Court (OGH) confirmed D.S.'s seven-year prison sentence (imposed 15 May 2024 by Graz Regional Criminal Court) for aggravated commercial fraud and criminal organisation membership, after a 2022 judgment was partially overturned. 478. The absence of prioritisation is also reflected by the lack of targeted AML investigative strategies or guidance documents focused on specific ML trends or methods for LEAs and PPOs. As ML investigation closely follows predicate offence investigation, often conducted at local level, guidance and strategies could assist LEAs in better detecting ML offences in their investigative work. 479. LEAs use investigative tools and information sources effectiv ely, but face limitations regarding financial investigative tools including for monitoring encrypted communications of suspects of committing ML or predicate offences . The authorities use their extensive databases and registers, in particular the central bank account and beneficial ownership registers, even though further linking some law enforcement/ administrative databases would be beneficial. However, remote real-time surveillance of encrypted end-to-end communications is not allowed in Austria, thereby limiting the LEAs’ ability to pursue some ML investigations further. The 2023 AML/CFT strategy [103] also recommended the acquisition of financial investigation tools to perform automated transaction flow analyses to handle the increasing volumes of data. This was not followed through. 480. Austria did not demonstrate that it is identifying and pursuing ML investigations fully in line with its risk profile. While ML cases related to fraud are pursued, ML related to drug trafficking, tax offences, and corruption, which are relevant in the country's risk and context, are not pursued in a significant way. No examples were brought on the country’s ability to use intelligence to dismantle professional ML networks outside the context of predicate offence investigations. 481. Statistical data on ML investigations (e.g. on triggers of investigations, types of predicate offences, ML methods, complexity of cases) is lacking at all stages of criminal proceedings (investigations, prosecutions, convictions). Austria neither collects this data when recording cases nor compiles it retrospectively through a targeted analysis of completed cases. This impacts the country's ability of monitoring the extent and type of ML activity that is being investigated and prosecuted, identify trends and better allocate resources. The police case management system, used for the PKS, provides an indication of the likely predicate offences involved in an ML case, [104] and Austria is currently evaluating mechanisms for improving statistical collection going forward. 482. Roughly half of the recorded cases involving ML also included fraud offences during the period under review. Drug trafficking, theft, and forgery each appeared in about 10% of ML-recorded offences. Fraud is by far the most frequently observed predicate in ML investigations and that has also been evidenced with cases and court judgments. Very few cases covered other predicate offences, such as drug offences, even if the authorities reported that significant cash transports have repeatedly been detected in connection to drug cases. However, these findings have rarely led to successful ML investigations. Overall, authorities face difficulties to evidence the knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence (section 7.2). 483. Austria has not provided evidence that ML related to tax predicates are pursued, while tax crimes are relevant considering its risk profile. Tax offences are investigated by the fiscal criminal authorities, but the associated ML offences are investigated by the police (CIS or CID), under the PPO's direction. No statistical data or case examples were provided, but the authorities confirmed that such proceedings are rare—even though according to the NRA 2025 tax crimes are important predicates, ranked just after fraud and forgery offences. According to the authorities, this may be due to the fact that a very narrow range of tax offences qualify as ML predicates (i.e., only the ones that result in a tax refund rather than a mere reduction of the tax burden, and only if the amount evaded is at least EUR 150 000 or EUR 75 000 in the case of customs offences—c. 3.2 and c.3.4). Those limitations significantly impact Austria’s ability to pursue ML offences in particular in relation to tax crimes. 484. The authorities have been able to identify and investigate ML cases in relation to corruption offences in a limited number of cases, not fully in line with risk and context. Corruption related offences are generally investigated by the BAK, which is also responsible for associated ML offence investigation, unless the case also involve other offences which carry a maximum sentence higher than the one for corruption/ML-related offences. In such cases, the BAK continues to be responsible for investigating most types of corruption offences, whereas all other offences, including ML, are investigated by LEAs (see above). Over the period, BAK has conducted 32 investigations involving links between corruption and ML, averaging a bit over 6 ML-related investigations per year. It is not known how many ML cases related to corruption were prosecuted, if any. Footnotes [98] As required by the Criminal Services Guidelines. [99] It should be noted that not all offences listed in the table qualify as ML predicate offences under Art 165 StGB. ML predicates include aggravated fraud (Art. 147 StGB), commercial fraud (Art. 148 StGB), felonies under the Narcotic Substances Act (SMG), and burglary. Overall, the statistics provide a general indication of the overall crime statistics, and the number of recorded ML offences. [100] The difference in figures likely relate to different methodologies: the police counts the number of ML acts or offences, whereas PPO statistics count the ML investigations opened. [101] While ML has, since 1 September 2021, always constituted a felony due to the increase in the sentencing range under Art. 165 StGB, this was previously only the case when the offence involved a value exceeding EUR 50 000 or was committed as a member of a criminal organisation. Such cases accounted for only a small share of suspected offences. [102] Source: Judgment of the Regional Criminal Court (OLG) of Vienna of 1 September 2020, case number 122 HV 4/20g. [103]Federal Ministry of Finance: Austrian Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2023), p.34: https://www.bmf.gv.at/dam/jcr:c4ba1dd0-718d-4d95-a055-a015409e7ba9/Nationale%20Strategie%20zur%20Verhinderung%20von%20Geldw%C3%A4scherei%20und20Terrorismusfinanzierung_2023.pdf [104] The system records an ML offence together with the potential predicate offences under a same file number, but other criminal offences identified during an investigation are also recorded under that file, making a clear assessment of ML predicates not possible. The authorities indicate that statistical data will soon be improved through the introduction of an additional field for linking the specific predicate offence to the ML offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 497. Austria prioritises AR as a policy objective to some extent and a comprehensive strategy that covers all stages of the AR process, and a corresponding holistic and systematic monitoring framework, are still lacking . The country has put in place a relatively sound legal framework that allows it to pursue AR to a large extent; however, practical guidance is still missing in some cases to allow a more effective use of the framework (see below)– and unbeknownst to the BMJ some of the newer legal provisions had been inconsistently applied by the courts. Strengthening AR is also one of the 2023 AML/CFT Strategy objectives, but the measures identified are still to be implemented in a significant way. 498. Austria’s legal framework largely allows it to pursue AR, including conviction and NCBC and extended confiscation, as well as provisional measures (R.4). The country has strengthened its legal framework from time to time. If the investigation reveals that the legal prerequisites for confiscation are likely to be met, prosecutors are required to apply to the court for confiscation. 499. Austria prioritises AR as an operational objective to some extent, mostly through the provision of guidance to LEAs and prosecutors on the use of the AR regime. To support AR at operational level, the BMJ and BMI issued guidelines that provide prosecutors and police support and guidance on legal interpretation and practical advice on implementation of different AR instruments. Those emphasise that financial investigations with the aim of AR are mandatory and should be carried out as early as possible. 500. Strengthening asset protection and AR is one of the 2023 ML/CFT Strategy objectives, and that Strategy is still to be implemented in a significant way. Six measures have been identified that range from increasing training and tools for LEAs, human resources of the ARO, cooperation, and knowledge exchange with national and international partners, to the creation of an asset management office, development of statistical tools at police and judiciary levels, and implementation of EU Directives. There has been some progress in implementing some of these measures, such as the allocation of additional tools and a small staff increase to ARO, as well as continued cooperation at national and international levels. However, no progress has been achieved in relation to crucial measures such as asset management and statistical tools. ARO resources remain largely insufficient, so as other resources at LEA and prosecutor’s level (see below). 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 501. Austria reviews and adjusts its AR legal and regulatory framework from time to time, and has strengthened its AR measures (introduction of NCBC and FIU suspension powers) since the 2016 MER. Those are important measures but have not yet generated results or led to a significant change in operational policies. 502. Operational guidance documents are generally updated from time to time but the guidelines for prosecutors have not been since 2020. They do not cover significant and most recent components of the updated AR regime, including NCBC introduced in 2021 and the 2024 amendments on seizure of VAs and victim compensation. Major legal amendments, such as the introduction of the NCBC, are accompanied by introductory decrees; however, these may not always provide a sufficient basis for practical case handling (e.g., possible application examples, best practices). Accompanying information sessions also do not appear to provide sufficient assistance for practical case handling, as became evident from discussions with practitioners. Those discussions showed that the new NCBC instrument was virtually unknown and had not been applied in practice, and that, with regard to the amendments on seizure of VAs, practitioners pointed to continued uncertainty about available options. 503. Review of the AR is mostly reactive and appears to be driven by external factors (adverse court decisions, international obligations) rather than effectiveness . For example, while LEAs stated that they had long pointed to legal uncertainty surrounding the seizure of VAs, legislative changes were only introduced after a Supreme Court decision made it inevitable. [112] Notwithstanding these legal amendments, the authorities attributed a decline in 2025 of the number of VAs seizures to ongoing uncertainty among investigators regarding the legal permissibility of such measures. 504. Overall, a comprehensive strategy that covers all stages of the AR process and a corresponding holistic and systematic monitoring framework are still lacking . Austria maintains very limited information to evaluate the results achieved in AR. As highlighted in the 2023 Strategy, a joint statistical system covering data from the police, prosecutors, and courts would assist with the monitoring of seized and confiscated assets and better inform the development of policy and legislation. Such work is yet to be carried out. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 505. Austria has established institutional structures that allow for good intra and inter-agency co-operation . At police level, those resemble those in ML investigations (IO.7). Financial investigations are generally carried out by units responsible for investigating the predicate offence. In more complex cases (e.g. with international elements, complex asset structures), these units may rely on specialised AR groups at the state level, which are responsible for investigating economic crime offences, including ML (state CIDs’ Investigation Units 04 (EB-04), IO.7). These CID groups support the financial investigations - e.g. through advice or by taking over certain tasks such as searches, seizures, or communication with prosecution - or, by mutual agreement, they can take over the investigations entirely. In many states, there is also a pool of financial investigators at local level appropriately trained and familiar with AR procedures. 506. At the federal police level, the ARO handles MLA or other international co-operation requests whose primary purpose is related to AR including seizures and supports complex investigations. ARO is the central contact point for coordinating incoming and outgoing MLA requests in AR matters, supporting the execution of foreign requests by the CIDs or carrying them out directly. The ARO also offers advice to police units and may, at its discretion, support complex investigations through individual operational measures, coordinate the involvement of several police units, or take over the investigations entirely. [113] ARO also enforces seizing or freezing measures in instances cases where A-FIU suspension powers would normally apply (instead of A-FIU performing the suspension of transactions directly). 507. The number of investigators supporting AR at local and state levels is insufficient, considering the overall number of criminal investigations (IO.7). There are approximately 150 investigators at local levels, in addition to 110 investigators at state levels dealing with economic crimes, including ML, and AR measures. Austria does not maintain statistics on the number of financial investigations carried out annually but they are likely to be many considering that the police recorded around 100 000 economic criminal acts on average over the past 3 years (IO.7). Between 2020 and 2024, there was no substantial increase in staff. 508. The personnel resources at the ARO also remain insufficient despite some limited increase recently. Whilst the 2016 MER recommending Austria to increase ARO’s resources, the Court of Audit in 2019/2020 and the AML/CFT Strategy in 2023 concluded that ARO staffing remained insufficient. Resources were increased from three to four staff to six investigators between 2020 and 2024 and the authorities plan to increase ARO staffing further, but no action has been taken nor has a precise timeline been adopted. 509. Most PPOs lack resources to deal with AR effectively, and the newer specialised AR units have not yet produced effective results. In general, the prosecutor leading the investigation into an offence is also responsible for the financial investigations and AR measures. If higher value assets are involved, [114] prosecutors must coordinate with the specialised AR units that were established in all major PPOs. The specialised AR unit can issue binding instructions on how to proceed or may take over the AR aspects of the case. [115] However, as confirmed by the Court of Audit, not all PPOs complied with the referral process, and only a small number of cases were referred to the AR units. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. AR work generally lacks resources, for instance, the AR unit in the Vienna PPO office comprise only two prosecutors, and the Central PPO Office for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (WKStA) has no fully dedicated AR staff. From 2020 to 2023, the caseload at the PPO services increased whereas resources available or added remain insufficient. The authorities indicated that there are no budgetary resources to further increase staff in this area, illustrating insufficient prioritisation given to the AR regime. 510. Prosecutors and the judiciary are not sufficiently trained on AR and lack targeted and updated guidelines (see above). There is generally adequate training at the police level—and the AR units at state and ARO at federal level possess solid expertise for complex AR investigations. However, this is not the case for prosecutors and the judiciary. The PPO training is basically “on the job,” with only one training on “Confiscation Orders and Financial Investigations” last offered in 2021. 511. Despite resource constraints, there are solid cooperation frameworks in place between the respective LEAs. Cooperation, information exchange, and coordination—between Police, Customs, A-FIU, and the PPO—work very well and are characterised by a culture of mutual support. This is supported by both case examples and discussions with practitioners and bodes well if AR is prioritised going forward. Box 8.1. Example of Domestic Co-operation in Seizure (Asset Freeze) [116] CEO Fraud Case (April-May 2025) Example of seizure (frozen assets) Unknown perpetrators committed fraud by impersonating the managing director of a Dutch company and a legal representative of its sole shareholder. Claiming a highly confidential corporate takeover, they convinced victims to make a total of 17 bank transfers totalling funds to accounts in Austria, Bulgaria, and the Slovak Republic. Detection and Response: A-FIU was alerted through multiple STRs from Austrian banks that flagged unusual transactions and chargebacks initiated by one of the victim’s bank in the Netherlands; Through rapid cooperation between A-FIU, the ARO, and the Vienna PPO, four Austrian bank accounts containing approximately EUR 1.5 million were frozen in May 2025. Footnotes [112] Supreme Court (OGH) of 28 March 2023, case number 14 Os 137/22m. [113] Ministry of Justice: Guidelines on AR 2020, p.56-57. [114] This applies to cases that meet any of the following criteria: the AR unit at state or federal level proposes AR measures; the value of a potential confiscation order exceeds EUR 10 000; the damage in offences with a value-based aggravation exceeds EUR 50 000; cross-border co-operation is required; or the competent prosecutor considers referral of the case necessary for other reasons. [115] Ministry of Justice: Decree of 16 December 2016 amending the Regulation for the Implementation of the Public Prosecutor’s Office Act https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erlaesse/ERL_BMJ_20161216_BMJ_S604_001_0003_IV_3_2016/ERL_BMJ_20161216_BMJ_S604_001_0003_IV_3_2016.pdf [116] https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/news.aspx?id=52746947385036784230513D" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 497. Austria prioritises AR as a policy objective to some extent and a comprehensive strategy that covers all stages of the AR process, and a corresponding holistic and systematic monitoring framework, are still lacking . The country has put in place a relatively sound legal framework that allows it to pursue AR to a large extent; however, practical guidance is still missing in some cases to allow a more effective use of the framework (see below)– and unbeknownst to the BMJ some of the newer legal provisions had been inconsistently applied by the courts. Strengthening AR is also one of the 2023 AML/CFT Strategy objectives, but the measures identified are still to be implemented in a significant way. 498. Austria’s legal framework largely allows it to pursue AR, including conviction and NCBC and extended confiscation, as well as provisional measures (R.4). The country has strengthened its legal framework from time to time. If the investigation reveals that the legal prerequisites for confiscation are likely to be met, prosecutors are required to apply to the court for confiscation. 499. Austria prioritises AR as an operational objective to some extent, mostly through the provision of guidance to LEAs and prosecutors on the use of the AR regime. To support AR at operational level, the BMJ and BMI issued guidelines that provide prosecutors and police support and guidance on legal interpretation and practical advice on implementation of different AR instruments. Those emphasise that financial investigations with the aim of AR are mandatory and should be carried out as early as possible. 500. Strengthening asset protection and AR is one of the 2023 ML/CFT Strategy objectives, and that Strategy is still to be implemented in a significant way. Six measures have been identified that range from increasing training and tools for LEAs, human resources of the ARO, cooperation, and knowledge exchange with national and international partners, to the creation of an asset management office, development of statistical tools at police and judiciary levels, and implementation of EU Directives. There has been some progress in implementing some of these measures, such as the allocation of additional tools and a small staff increase to ARO, as well as continued cooperation at national and international levels. However, no progress has been achieved in relation to crucial measures such as asset management and statistical tools. ARO resources remain largely insufficient, so as other resources at LEA and prosecutor’s level (see below). 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 501. Austria reviews and adjusts its AR legal and regulatory framework from time to time, and has strengthened its AR measures (introduction of NCBC and FIU suspension powers) since the 2016 MER. Those are important measures but have not yet generated results or led to a significant change in operational policies. 502. Operational guidance documents are generally updated from time to time but the guidelines for prosecutors have not been since 2020. They do not cover significant and most recent components of the updated AR regime, including NCBC introduced in 2021 and the 2024 amendments on seizure of VAs and victim compensation. Major legal amendments, such as the introduction of the NCBC, are accompanied by introductory decrees; however, these may not always provide a sufficient basis for practical case handling (e.g., possible application examples, best practices). Accompanying information sessions also do not appear to provide sufficient assistance for practical case handling, as became evident from discussions with practitioners. Those discussions showed that the new NCBC instrument was virtually unknown and had not been applied in practice, and that, with regard to the amendments on seizure of VAs, practitioners pointed to continued uncertainty about available options. 503. Review of the AR is mostly reactive and appears to be driven by external factors (adverse court decisions, international obligations) rather than effectiveness . For example, while LEAs stated that they had long pointed to legal uncertainty surrounding the seizure of VAs, legislative changes were only introduced after a Supreme Court decision made it inevitable. [112] Notwithstanding these legal amendments, the authorities attributed a decline in 2025 of the number of VAs seizures to ongoing uncertainty among investigators regarding the legal permissibility of such measures. 504. Overall, a comprehensive strategy that covers all stages of the AR process and a corresponding holistic and systematic monitoring framework are still lacking . Austria maintains very limited information to evaluate the results achieved in AR. As highlighted in the 2023 Strategy, a joint statistical system covering data from the police, prosecutors, and courts would assist with the monitoring of seized and confiscated assets and better inform the development of policy and legislation. Such work is yet to be carried out. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 505. Austria has established institutional structures that allow for good intra and inter-agency co-operation . At police level, those resemble those in ML investigations (IO.7). Financial investigations are generally carried out by units responsible for investigating the predicate offence. In more complex cases (e.g. with international elements, complex asset structures), these units may rely on specialised AR groups at the state level, which are responsible for investigating economic crime offences, including ML (state CIDs’ Investigation Units 04 (EB-04), IO.7). These CID groups support the financial investigations - e.g. through advice or by taking over certain tasks such as searches, seizures, or communication with prosecution - or, by mutual agreement, they can take over the investigations entirely. In many states, there is also a pool of financial investigators at local level appropriately trained and familiar with AR procedures. 506. At the federal police level, the ARO handles MLA or other international co-operation requests whose primary purpose is related to AR including seizures and supports complex investigations. ARO is the central contact point for coordinating incoming and outgoing MLA requests in AR matters, supporting the execution of foreign requests by the CIDs or carrying them out directly. The ARO also offers advice to police units and may, at its discretion, support complex investigations through individual operational measures, coordinate the involvement of several police units, or take over the investigations entirely. [113] ARO also enforces seizing or freezing measures in instances cases where A-FIU suspension powers would normally apply (instead of A-FIU performing the suspension of transactions directly). 507. The number of investigators supporting AR at local and state levels is insufficient, considering the overall number of criminal investigations (IO.7). There are approximately 150 investigators at local levels, in addition to 110 investigators at state levels dealing with economic crimes, including ML, and AR measures. Austria does not maintain statistics on the number of financial investigations carried out annually but they are likely to be many considering that the police recorded around 100 000 economic criminal acts on average over the past 3 years (IO.7). Between 2020 and 2024, there was no substantial increase in staff. 508. The personnel resources at the ARO also remain insufficient despite some limited increase recently. Whilst the 2016 MER recommending Austria to increase ARO’s resources, the Court of Audit in 2019/2020 and the AML/CFT Strategy in 2023 concluded that ARO staffing remained insufficient. Resources were increased from three to four staff to six investigators between 2020 and 2024 and the authorities plan to increase ARO staffing further, but no action has been taken nor has a precise timeline been adopted. 509. Most PPOs lack resources to deal with AR effectively, and the newer specialised AR units have not yet produced effective results. In general, the prosecutor leading the investigation into an offence is also responsible for the financial investigations and AR measures. If higher value assets are involved, [114] prosecutors must coordinate with the specialised AR units that were established in all major PPOs. The specialised AR unit can issue binding instructions on how to proceed or may take over the AR aspects of the case. [115] However, as confirmed by the Court of Audit, not all PPOs complied with the referral process, and only a small number of cases were referred to the AR units. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. AR work generally lacks resources, for instance, the AR unit in the Vienna PPO office comprise only two prosecutors, and the Central PPO Office for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (WKStA) has no fully dedicated AR staff. From 2020 to 2023, the caseload at the PPO services increased whereas resources available or added remain insufficient. The authorities indicated that there are no budgetary resources to further increase staff in this area, illustrating insufficient prioritisation given to the AR regime. 510. Prosecutors and the judiciary are not sufficiently trained on AR and lack targeted and updated guidelines (see above). There is generally adequate training at the police level—and the AR units at state and ARO at federal level possess solid expertise for complex AR investigations. However, this is not the case for prosecutors and the judiciary. The PPO training is basically “on the job,” with only one training on “Confiscation Orders and Financial Investigations” last offered in 2021. 511. Despite resource constraints, there are solid cooperation frameworks in place between the respective LEAs. Cooperation, information exchange, and coordination—between Police, Customs, A-FIU, and the PPO—work very well and are characterised by a culture of mutual support. This is supported by both case examples and discussions with practitioners and bodes well if AR is prioritised going forward. Box 8.1. Example of Domestic Co-operation in Seizure (Asset Freeze) [116] CEO Fraud Case (April-May 2025) Example of seizure (frozen assets) Unknown perpetrators committed fraud by impersonating the managing director of a Dutch company and a legal representative of its sole shareholder. Claiming a highly confidential corporate takeover, they convinced victims to make a total of 17 bank transfers totalling funds to accounts in Austria, Bulgaria, and the Slovak Republic. Detection and Response: A-FIU was alerted through multiple STRs from Austrian banks that flagged unusual transactions and chargebacks initiated by one of the victim’s bank in the Netherlands; Through rapid cooperation between A-FIU, the ARO, and the Vienna PPO, four Austrian bank accounts containing approximately EUR 1.5 million were frozen in May 2025. Footnotes [112] Supreme Court (OGH) of 28 March 2023, case number 14 Os 137/22m. [113] Ministry of Justice: Guidelines on AR 2020, p.56-57. [114] This applies to cases that meet any of the following criteria: the AR unit at state or federal level proposes AR measures; the value of a potential confiscation order exceeds EUR 10 000; the damage in offences with a value-based aggravation exceeds EUR 50 000; cross-border co-operation is required; or the competent prosecutor considers referral of the case necessary for other reasons. [115] Ministry of Justice: Decree of 16 December 2016 amending the Regulation for the Implementation of the Public Prosecutor’s Office Act https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erlaesse/ERL_BMJ_20161216_BMJ_S604_001_0003_IV_3_2016/ERL_BMJ_20161216_BMJ_S604_001_0003_IV_3_2016.pdf [116] https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/news.aspx?id=52746947385036784230513D" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 552. There is a solid institutional framework in place both to identify and investigate terrorism and TF. The Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN) comprises a central office responsible for the investigation of complex terrorism/TF cases, and nine State-level branches (LSEs) [129] responsible for most of the other investigations. The DSN is part of the Directorate General for Public Security within BMI and is both a LEA and a domestic intelligence service. DSN and LSEs are solely responsible for the investigation of terrorism and TF. When another LEA (e.g., BKA, Customs, tax authorities) suspect terrorism or TF, it informs the DSN which reviews the case, including through data checks in internal databases. 553. The authorities open financial investigations routinely as part of terrorism investigations and all aim at identifying the role of the terrorism financier . LSEs conducted 246 investigations and the DSN 5 investigations between 2022 and 2025, half of them were conducted in 2024. Most of the cases were charged under the offence of participation in a terrorist organisation even when they included a TF component. Cases under investigations and successful convictions that were provided demonstrate that the investigations always aimed at identifying the role of the financier, even if not always successfully. Out of the 251 such investigations, 275 offenders were identified and 32 only remained unknown. Nineteen of the offences were singled out as TF and 10 as TF and participation in a terrorist organisation. This demonstrates an overall good success ratio despite difficulties arising from the cross-border dimension of most cases and the layer of transactions using NPOs, legal entities, formal or informal MVTS (see above). 554. The volume of investigations compares very positively with other neighbouring jurisdictions of similar size and/or risk profile. DSN and LSEs investigated 29 pure TF cases between 2022 and 2024, an average of ten cases per year. Table 9.1. Participation in terrorist organisations and TF investigations by DSN and LSEs Year Number of cases LSE DSN Participation in terrorist organisations (278b.) Terrorism financing (278.d) Both 278.b + 278.d Perpetrators Unknown 2022 53 53 0 58 7 3 57 5 2023 79 76 3 100 8 4 97 9 2024 119 117 2 135 4 3 121 18 Total 251 246 5 293 19 10 275 32 Note: Some cases may count more than one of each of the offences above. The statistical system does not allow to display figures before 2022 and statistics could not be obtained for the first half of 2025. Source: DSN 555. Most cases are identified through financial intelligence work by DSN, on the basis of disseminations from A-FIU prompted by TF-related STR/SARs. After an initial internal analysis, TF-related STR/SARs are automatically transferred by A-FIU to DSN for further review. In those cases, DSN makes an in-depth analysis and produces financial intelligence in support of investigations and for intelligence purposes. Out of the 12 223 STRs/SARs filed with the FIU in the period 2021–2024, 671 were based on TF suspicions. This corresponds to 5.48% of the total, an average of 167 per year. Out of these, 574 were referred to DSN, which corresponds to almost all TF-related SARs/STRs received by A-FIU. A-FIU systematically transfers content of TF-related STRs with no substantive financial analysis and does not really add value to the intelligence it makes available to DSN. Table 9.2. Transmission of TF-related SARs/STRs to DSN 2022 2023 2024 TF STRS/SARs received by A-FIU 103 140 233 TF STRS/SARs sent to DSN 104 138 229 Note: DSN Statistics are available only for 2022-2024 Source: DSN/A-FIU 556. The DSN produces financial intelligence to identify TF activities as part of TF investigations with data support from A-FIU . They use several shared databases to analyse STR/SARs. A-FIU, as a police-type FIU, has access to databases which are available to all police departments, including DSN. However, some databases are specific to A-FIU and some DSN databases to which A-FIU does not have access. Upon receiving a report from A-FIU, DSN/LSE cross-check the information using shared databases and international databases. DSN/LSE also has direct access to, and routinely uses, the Central Account Registry, as well as the Beneficial Owner Register to substantiate suspicion. When additional information is needed on an STR/SAR, A-FIU reaches out to the OE to obtain that information at the request of the investigator. 557. Other sources also trigger identification of TF activities and lead to investigations. Those include foreign intelligence (between 2023–2025, 52 foreign requests received with intelligence on TF or participation in terrorist activities led to the opening of 12 related investigations). Out of the 251 cases of TF and participation in terrorist activities, 64 were opened based on domestic intelligence obtained by DSN, generally through other investigations including advanced investigation techniques (wiretapping, infiltration, etc.) revealing TF activities. Each terrorism investigation in Austria (20 were conducted between 2021–2025) or an investigation for participation in a terrorist organisation always includes a financial investigation component to identify the origin of the resources used to commit the terrorist offence. Whereas several of them do not reveal TF activities (terrorist attacks financed by the terrorist’s own means), authorities indicated that they sometimes successfully untie TF offences, although the DSN was not able to provide exact figures to substantiate this. 558. Typologies of TF investigations reveal that authorities identify and investigate cases broadly in line with Austria’s TF risk profile . The authorities demonstrated their ability to investigate cross-border schemes involving social networks, humanitarian-claimed NPOs, and online platforms to reach out and raise funds. DSN acknowledged that, like most LEAs, it was facing challenges in tracing TF transfers until the ultimate beneficiary, as the money trail disappears in regions/countries with weaker AML/CFT controls and limited international cooperation. In several investigations, groups operating within Austria and neighbouring countries were identified, using the same platforms or NPOs to collect funds for cross-border TF activity and channel these funds to third-party countries through bank transfers or money mules. A few investigations uncovered the use of cryptocurrency transactions. 559. The authorities have not neutralised any TF-related hawala-type networks to date. The DSN highlighted the difficulties to identify TF-related hawala activities, because of their underground nature, while recognising that several TF transfers use such channels. The lack of use of advanced investigative techniques to infiltrate hawala schemes could explain the difficulty to break through such schemes and the assessment team have not identified that specific efforts are being made to this effect, to ensure consistency with Austria’s TF risk profile. 560. Most of the TF cases investigated related to religiously motivated terrorism, and there was no TF component to the five cases of extreme right-wing terrorism that could be investigated, as they related to the publication on social medias of pro-Nazi language or threats against the Jewish community . 561. The authorities also demonstrated, in one of the few large-scale investigations carried out by DSN, their ability to investigate complex and far-reaching cases and their capacity to seize funds and other assets . Initiated in 2020 and still under investigation, this case allowed for the seizure at the initial stage of EUR 500 000 in cash, EUR 1,9 million on 137 different bank accounts, and 34 real estate properties for an estimated amount of EUR 25 million. Later measures allowed for the seizure of EUR 950 000 in cash or bank accounts. However, most cases do not result in such large seizures, which is in line with the low scale of TF patterns in Austria. TF investigations generally last more than one year, which is reasonable. 562. The DSN and LSE use all the investigation measures provided by the current Code of criminal procedure (StPO), but some legal powers are missing. The operational powers that the DSN has as part of its preventive role cannot be used proprio motu for criminal investigation purposes. The use of all coercive powers like wiretapping or access to bank accounts, must be authorised by an order of the prosecutor, which is standard practice. However, some advanced investigative techniques prove to be difficult to implement in Austria. In particular, the remote real-time monitoring of encrypted end-to-end communications is impossible due to the lack of a legal basis. [130] This issue was also raised by neighbouring countries within the feedback on international cooperation (IO.2). Also, infiltration of terrorist groups is impossible lacking an immunity system for infiltrated agents. Footnotes [129] Landesamt Staatsschutz und Extremismusbekämpfung , the nine state-level branches of DSN. [130] See c. 31.2 (b) and (c) in fine. A law was adopted by the National Council on 9 July 2025 with intention to give real-time remote access to DSN to encrypted communications, as part of terrorism and TF cases. This was after the end of the onsite visit and therefore has not been assessed by the assessment team." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 552. There is a solid institutional framework in place both to identify and investigate terrorism and TF. The Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN) comprises a central office responsible for the investigation of complex terrorism/TF cases, and nine State-level branches (LSEs) [129] responsible for most of the other investigations. The DSN is part of the Directorate General for Public Security within BMI and is both a LEA and a domestic intelligence service. DSN and LSEs are solely responsible for the investigation of terrorism and TF. When another LEA (e.g., BKA, Customs, tax authorities) suspect terrorism or TF, it informs the DSN which reviews the case, including through data checks in internal databases. 553. The authorities open financial investigations routinely as part of terrorism investigations and all aim at identifying the role of the terrorism financier . LSEs conducted 246 investigations and the DSN 5 investigations between 2022 and 2025, half of them were conducted in 2024. Most of the cases were charged under the offence of participation in a terrorist organisation even when they included a TF component. Cases under investigations and successful convictions that were provided demonstrate that the investigations always aimed at identifying the role of the financier, even if not always successfully. Out of the 251 such investigations, 275 offenders were identified and 32 only remained unknown. Nineteen of the offences were singled out as TF and 10 as TF and participation in a terrorist organisation. This demonstrates an overall good success ratio despite difficulties arising from the cross-border dimension of most cases and the layer of transactions using NPOs, legal entities, formal or informal MVTS (see above). 554. The volume of investigations compares very positively with other neighbouring jurisdictions of similar size and/or risk profile. DSN and LSEs investigated 29 pure TF cases between 2022 and 2024, an average of ten cases per year. Table 9.1. Participation in terrorist organisations and TF investigations by DSN and LSEs Year Number of cases LSE DSN Participation in terrorist organisations (278b.) Terrorism financing (278.d) Both 278.b + 278.d Perpetrators Unknown 2022 53 53 0 58 7 3 57 5 2023 79 76 3 100 8 4 97 9 2024 119 117 2 135 4 3 121 18 Total 251 246 5 293 19 10 275 32 Note: Some cases may count more than one of each of the offences above. The statistical system does not allow to display figures before 2022 and statistics could not be obtained for the first half of 2025. Source: DSN 555. Most cases are identified through financial intelligence work by DSN, on the basis of disseminations from A-FIU prompted by TF-related STR/SARs. After an initial internal analysis, TF-related STR/SARs are automatically transferred by A-FIU to DSN for further review. In those cases, DSN makes an in-depth analysis and produces financial intelligence in support of investigations and for intelligence purposes. Out of the 12 223 STRs/SARs filed with the FIU in the period 2021–2024, 671 were based on TF suspicions. This corresponds to 5.48% of the total, an average of 167 per year. Out of these, 574 were referred to DSN, which corresponds to almost all TF-related SARs/STRs received by A-FIU. A-FIU systematically transfers content of TF-related STRs with no substantive financial analysis and does not really add value to the intelligence it makes available to DSN. Table 9.2. Transmission of TF-related SARs/STRs to DSN 2022 2023 2024 TF STRS/SARs received by A-FIU 103 140 233 TF STRS/SARs sent to DSN 104 138 229 Note: DSN Statistics are available only for 2022-2024 Source: DSN/A-FIU 556. The DSN produces financial intelligence to identify TF activities as part of TF investigations with data support from A-FIU . They use several shared databases to analyse STR/SARs. A-FIU, as a police-type FIU, has access to databases which are available to all police departments, including DSN. However, some databases are specific to A-FIU and some DSN databases to which A-FIU does not have access. Upon receiving a report from A-FIU, DSN/LSE cross-check the information using shared databases and international databases. DSN/LSE also has direct access to, and routinely uses, the Central Account Registry, as well as the Beneficial Owner Register to substantiate suspicion. When additional information is needed on an STR/SAR, A-FIU reaches out to the OE to obtain that information at the request of the investigator. 557. Other sources also trigger identification of TF activities and lead to investigations. Those include foreign intelligence (between 2023–2025, 52 foreign requests received with intelligence on TF or participation in terrorist activities led to the opening of 12 related investigations). Out of the 251 cases of TF and participation in terrorist activities, 64 were opened based on domestic intelligence obtained by DSN, generally through other investigations including advanced investigation techniques (wiretapping, infiltration, etc.) revealing TF activities. Each terrorism investigation in Austria (20 were conducted between 2021–2025) or an investigation for participation in a terrorist organisation always includes a financial investigation component to identify the origin of the resources used to commit the terrorist offence. Whereas several of them do not reveal TF activities (terrorist attacks financed by the terrorist’s own means), authorities indicated that they sometimes successfully untie TF offences, although the DSN was not able to provide exact figures to substantiate this. 558. Typologies of TF investigations reveal that authorities identify and investigate cases broadly in line with Austria’s TF risk profile . The authorities demonstrated their ability to investigate cross-border schemes involving social networks, humanitarian-claimed NPOs, and online platforms to reach out and raise funds. DSN acknowledged that, like most LEAs, it was facing challenges in tracing TF transfers until the ultimate beneficiary, as the money trail disappears in regions/countries with weaker AML/CFT controls and limited international cooperation. In several investigations, groups operating within Austria and neighbouring countries were identified, using the same platforms or NPOs to collect funds for cross-border TF activity and channel these funds to third-party countries through bank transfers or money mules. A few investigations uncovered the use of cryptocurrency transactions. 559. The authorities have not neutralised any TF-related hawala-type networks to date. The DSN highlighted the difficulties to identify TF-related hawala activities, because of their underground nature, while recognising that several TF transfers use such channels. The lack of use of advanced investigative techniques to infiltrate hawala schemes could explain the difficulty to break through such schemes and the assessment team have not identified that specific efforts are being made to this effect, to ensure consistency with Austria’s TF risk profile. 560. Most of the TF cases investigated related to religiously motivated terrorism, and there was no TF component to the five cases of extreme right-wing terrorism that could be investigated, as they related to the publication on social medias of pro-Nazi language or threats against the Jewish community . 561. The authorities also demonstrated, in one of the few large-scale investigations carried out by DSN, their ability to investigate complex and far-reaching cases and their capacity to seize funds and other assets . Initiated in 2020 and still under investigation, this case allowed for the seizure at the initial stage of EUR 500 000 in cash, EUR 1,9 million on 137 different bank accounts, and 34 real estate properties for an estimated amount of EUR 25 million. Later measures allowed for the seizure of EUR 950 000 in cash or bank accounts. However, most cases do not result in such large seizures, which is in line with the low scale of TF patterns in Austria. TF investigations generally last more than one year, which is reasonable. 562. The DSN and LSE use all the investigation measures provided by the current Code of criminal procedure (StPO), but some legal powers are missing. The operational powers that the DSN has as part of its preventive role cannot be used proprio motu for criminal investigation purposes. The use of all coercive powers like wiretapping or access to bank accounts, must be authorised by an order of the prosecutor, which is standard practice. However, some advanced investigative techniques prove to be difficult to implement in Austria. In particular, the remote real-time monitoring of encrypted end-to-end communications is impossible due to the lack of a legal basis. [130] This issue was also raised by neighbouring countries within the feedback on international cooperation (IO.2). Also, infiltration of terrorist groups is impossible lacking an immunity system for infiltrated agents. Footnotes [129] Landesamt Staatsschutz und Extremismusbekämpfung , the nine state-level branches of DSN. [130] See c. 31.2 (b) and (c) in fine. A law was adopted by the National Council on 9 July 2025 with intention to give real-time remote access to DSN to encrypted communications, as part of terrorism and TF cases. This was after the end of the onsite visit and therefore has not been assessed by the assessment team." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Implementation of UNSCR 1267 and Relevant Successor Resolution 583. Until mid-June 2025, Austria relied exclusively on directly applicable EU Council Decisions and Regulations for implementation of UNSCR 1267 . On 11 February 2025, Austria adopted a new sanctions law (i.e., Sanktionengesetz 2024, hereafter SanktG 2024) which provides for a domestic bridging mechanism to mitigate delays in transposition of designations under UNSCR 1267 at EU level. The authorities established a process for implementation of the bridging mechanism, including an on-call duty of the BMEIA, the DSN and the BMF on weekends and holidays. This new mechanism was first used to implement without delay a UNSCR 1267 designation on 16 June 2025. 584. At the time of the onsite visit and in line with the SanktG 2024, FIs were required to report any assets frozen or actions taken to OeNB, and one FI reported an amount of EUR 250 . The SanktG 2024 does not specify that VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers and DNFBPs should report to DSN (criterion 6.5), nor had any other legal document or guidance clarifying the reporting obligation been issued. [134] These categories of OEs were generally unaware that DSN is their relevant competent authority, and it remains unclear whether they identified any assets under UNSCR 1267. [135] Implementation of UNSCR 1373 585. Austria’s new sanctions act also establishes a mechanism for domestic designations under UNSCR 1373. At the time of the onsite visit, Austria had not yet made use of domestic designations as a preventive or disruptive tool to fight TF. 586. Austria implements designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at EU level without delay. At the time of the onsite visit, the EU terrorism sanctions list (under CP 2001/931—CR 2580/2001) included 14 individuals and 22 entities, and the autonomous EU-regime for ISIL and Al-Qaida (under CD 2016/1693—CR 2016/1686) included 15 individuals and 7 entities. The obligation to freeze funds takes effect immediately upon the publication of the designations in the EU Official Journal. In 2019, one FI froze an amount of EUR 6 722 related to a directly applicable EU designation under UNSCR 1373. Designations 587. Since 2002, [136] Austria has neither proposed nor co-sponsored proposals for listings or de-listings under UNSCR 1267 or under the EU UNSCR 1373 regime. The SanktG 2024 assigns authority for formulating proposals for listing and de-listing (R.6), and at the time of the onsite visit, high-level procedures (entitled Disruption Strategy) guiding practical implementation to some extent, including the identification of targets for designation under UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1373, were just finalised. 588. Austria has not yet demonstrated that it uses TFS as a tool for mitigating TF risks domestically, which is not aligned with its TF risk exposure . It has not designated individuals and entities under UNSCR 1373 domestically, not on its own motion nor at the request of another country. The authority for domestic designation lies with both the Federal Minister of Finance and the Federal Minister for the Interior who act in agreement with the Federal Minister for European and International Affairs. While the high-level procedures also extend to the identification of targets and designations on Austria’s own motion under UNSCR 1373, more detailed documentation guiding the actions to be taken for each step in the domestic designation process were still being drafted. A formalised procedure under which Austria could ask another country to give effect to its own freezing measures under UNSCR 1373 or how Austria would deal with freezing or designation requests from other countries had yet to be developed too. 589. The NCC on Sanctions (hereafter NCC Sanctions) is Austria’s mechanism to coordinate implementation of financial sanctions, including TFS . The primary focus of the NCC Sanctions is on preventing the circumvention of other EU sanctions (e.g., against the Russian Federation) and PF-related TFS, rather than on TF-related TFS. The NCC Sanctions is chaired by DSN within the BMI and is comprised of representatives of all federal ministries and competent authorities involved in the implementation of financial sanctions. The activity of the NCC Sanctions significantly increased in 2022 following the introduction of EU sanctions not related to TFS. Communication of designations 590. Austria now informs all FIs and VASPs immediately upon designation. Up to early 2025, there was no dedicated communication mechanism for a majority of OEs following designations under UNSCR 1267 and EU designations under UNSCR 1373 beyond the publication of designations in the EU Official Journal and on the EC’s website. Since that time, following new designations, OeNB sends an e-mail with a short reference to the relevant designation to the Austrian Economic Chambers (WKÖ), which forwards the e-mail to both FIs and VASPs. The e-mails sent so far contained a short reference to the relevant designations but did not highlight any changes made (addition or removal of names) nor did they remind OEs of their obligations resulting from the changes. 591. The lack of a corresponding communication mechanism to ensure prompt transmission of information to insurance intermediaries and DNFBPs during quasi the entire review period constituted an impediment for their timely implementation of TFS. The BMJ informs the Austrian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries and the Austrian Bars following new designations, which in turn make the information available to their members, albeit not immediately. Other DNFBPs did not benefit from a dedicated communication mechanism, except on one occasion in June 2025 when they were informed about a new designation within one week following the designation. Footnotes [134] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance on implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its public website. [135] As of 1 January 2026, FIs (including VASPs, credit and financial institutions, insurance undertakings, ISPs, and asset managers) are required to report to the FMA. [136] In 2002, Austria co-sponsored the designation of Jemaah Islamiya pursuant to UNSCR 1267." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Implementation of UNSCR 1267 and Relevant Successor Resolution 583. Until mid-June 2025, Austria relied exclusively on directly applicable EU Council Decisions and Regulations for implementation of UNSCR 1267 . On 11 February 2025, Austria adopted a new sanctions law (i.e., Sanktionengesetz 2024, hereafter SanktG 2024) which provides for a domestic bridging mechanism to mitigate delays in transposition of designations under UNSCR 1267 at EU level. The authorities established a process for implementation of the bridging mechanism, including an on-call duty of the BMEIA, the DSN and the BMF on weekends and holidays. This new mechanism was first used to implement without delay a UNSCR 1267 designation on 16 June 2025. 584. At the time of the onsite visit and in line with the SanktG 2024, FIs were required to report any assets frozen or actions taken to OeNB, and one FI reported an amount of EUR 250 . The SanktG 2024 does not specify that VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers and DNFBPs should report to DSN (criterion 6.5), nor had any other legal document or guidance clarifying the reporting obligation been issued. [134] These categories of OEs were generally unaware that DSN is their relevant competent authority, and it remains unclear whether they identified any assets under UNSCR 1267. [135] Implementation of UNSCR 1373 585. Austria’s new sanctions act also establishes a mechanism for domestic designations under UNSCR 1373. At the time of the onsite visit, Austria had not yet made use of domestic designations as a preventive or disruptive tool to fight TF. 586. Austria implements designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at EU level without delay. At the time of the onsite visit, the EU terrorism sanctions list (under CP 2001/931—CR 2580/2001) included 14 individuals and 22 entities, and the autonomous EU-regime for ISIL and Al-Qaida (under CD 2016/1693—CR 2016/1686) included 15 individuals and 7 entities. The obligation to freeze funds takes effect immediately upon the publication of the designations in the EU Official Journal. In 2019, one FI froze an amount of EUR 6 722 related to a directly applicable EU designation under UNSCR 1373. Designations 587. Since 2002, [136] Austria has neither proposed nor co-sponsored proposals for listings or de-listings under UNSCR 1267 or under the EU UNSCR 1373 regime. The SanktG 2024 assigns authority for formulating proposals for listing and de-listing (R.6), and at the time of the onsite visit, high-level procedures (entitled Disruption Strategy) guiding practical implementation to some extent, including the identification of targets for designation under UNSCR 1267 and UNSCR 1373, were just finalised. 588. Austria has not yet demonstrated that it uses TFS as a tool for mitigating TF risks domestically, which is not aligned with its TF risk exposure . It has not designated individuals and entities under UNSCR 1373 domestically, not on its own motion nor at the request of another country. The authority for domestic designation lies with both the Federal Minister of Finance and the Federal Minister for the Interior who act in agreement with the Federal Minister for European and International Affairs. While the high-level procedures also extend to the identification of targets and designations on Austria’s own motion under UNSCR 1373, more detailed documentation guiding the actions to be taken for each step in the domestic designation process were still being drafted. A formalised procedure under which Austria could ask another country to give effect to its own freezing measures under UNSCR 1373 or how Austria would deal with freezing or designation requests from other countries had yet to be developed too. 589. The NCC on Sanctions (hereafter NCC Sanctions) is Austria’s mechanism to coordinate implementation of financial sanctions, including TFS . The primary focus of the NCC Sanctions is on preventing the circumvention of other EU sanctions (e.g., against the Russian Federation) and PF-related TFS, rather than on TF-related TFS. The NCC Sanctions is chaired by DSN within the BMI and is comprised of representatives of all federal ministries and competent authorities involved in the implementation of financial sanctions. The activity of the NCC Sanctions significantly increased in 2022 following the introduction of EU sanctions not related to TFS. Communication of designations 590. Austria now informs all FIs and VASPs immediately upon designation. Up to early 2025, there was no dedicated communication mechanism for a majority of OEs following designations under UNSCR 1267 and EU designations under UNSCR 1373 beyond the publication of designations in the EU Official Journal and on the EC’s website. Since that time, following new designations, OeNB sends an e-mail with a short reference to the relevant designation to the Austrian Economic Chambers (WKÖ), which forwards the e-mail to both FIs and VASPs. The e-mails sent so far contained a short reference to the relevant designations but did not highlight any changes made (addition or removal of names) nor did they remind OEs of their obligations resulting from the changes. 591. The lack of a corresponding communication mechanism to ensure prompt transmission of information to insurance intermediaries and DNFBPs during quasi the entire review period constituted an impediment for their timely implementation of TFS. The BMJ informs the Austrian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries and the Austrian Bars following new designations, which in turn make the information available to their members, albeit not immediately. Other DNFBPs did not benefit from a dedicated communication mechanism, except on one occasion in June 2025 when they were informed about a new designation within one week following the designation. Footnotes [134] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance on implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its public website. [135] As of 1 January 2026, FIs (including VASPs, credit and financial institutions, insurance undertakings, ISPs, and asset managers) are required to report to the FMA. [136] In 2002, Austria co-sponsored the designation of Jemaah Islamiya pursuant to UNSCR 1267." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 623. Austria follows a whole-of-government approach to CPF, non-proliferation, disarmament, and export control issues. The main formal body for CPF coordination and cooperation is the NCC Sanctions, which serves as a forum to discuss implementation and potential evasion of financial sanctions, including PF-related TFS and broader sanctions policy issues. [152] It is chaired by the DSN and includes representatives from the key competent authorities mentioned above, and members from the A-FIU; the Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology (BMIMI); the Telecommunications Office in BMF; and the Federal Chancellery. The activity of the NCC Sanctions significantly increased in 2022 after the introduction of EU sanctions against the Russian Federation. The NCC Sanctions generally meets every two months and, on an ad hoc basis. Between March 2022 and June 2025, the Committee convened 21 times and discussions were mostly focused on the autonomous EU sanctions. Sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1718 were discussed on three occasions. 624. Austria does not have a dedicated national CPF strategy or national CPF policy documents . DSN and export control and Customs authorities developed and implement targeted internal strategies to steer their operational CPF activities. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 625. In addition to the NCC Sanctions coordination mechanism, there is extensive operational coordination and cooperation between the DSN, the BMWET, and Customs on the export of dual use goods . This consists of regular meetings and extensive information exchanges. The DSN also holds regular and ad hoc coordination meetings with other national competent authorities, Europol, and international counterparts to exchange information on specific operational cases and general trends in PF-related sanctions evasion. There is very close cooperation between the BMI and the DSN and the Beneficial Ownership Registry authority and between the DSN and the A-FIU (IO.5). Concrete examples demonstrating effective operational cooperation to support (joint) complex financial investigations identifying PF sanctions evasion schemes, including but not limited to the DPRK, were presented. 626. The DSN coordinates inter-ministerial CPF workshops and the annual non-proliferation roundtable for competent authorities involved in CPF . These initiatives allow for the exchange of information on PF and PF sanctions evasion, [153] as well as their prevention and detection. Competent authorities also participate in various PPPs which facilitate the exchange of interdisciplinary insights with the private sector, including on the implementation of PF-related TFS (IO.1). Information on PF sanctions evasion schemes exchanged with OEs remains however high-level due to its sensitive nature. Footnotes [152] For instance, the NCC Sanctions coordinated the drafting of the SanctG 2024 and related practical changes in implementation, such as the designation of the FMA as the competent supervisor for TFS implementation by FIs and VASPs. These significant changes will enter into force on 1 January 2026. [153] Including but not limited to TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 623. Austria follows a whole-of-government approach to CPF, non-proliferation, disarmament, and export control issues. The main formal body for CPF coordination and cooperation is the NCC Sanctions, which serves as a forum to discuss implementation and potential evasion of financial sanctions, including PF-related TFS and broader sanctions policy issues. [152] It is chaired by the DSN and includes representatives from the key competent authorities mentioned above, and members from the A-FIU; the Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology (BMIMI); the Telecommunications Office in BMF; and the Federal Chancellery. The activity of the NCC Sanctions significantly increased in 2022 after the introduction of EU sanctions against the Russian Federation. The NCC Sanctions generally meets every two months and, on an ad hoc basis. Between March 2022 and June 2025, the Committee convened 21 times and discussions were mostly focused on the autonomous EU sanctions. Sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1718 were discussed on three occasions. 624. Austria does not have a dedicated national CPF strategy or national CPF policy documents . DSN and export control and Customs authorities developed and implement targeted internal strategies to steer their operational CPF activities. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 625. In addition to the NCC Sanctions coordination mechanism, there is extensive operational coordination and cooperation between the DSN, the BMWET, and Customs on the export of dual use goods . This consists of regular meetings and extensive information exchanges. The DSN also holds regular and ad hoc coordination meetings with other national competent authorities, Europol, and international counterparts to exchange information on specific operational cases and general trends in PF-related sanctions evasion. There is very close cooperation between the BMI and the DSN and the Beneficial Ownership Registry authority and between the DSN and the A-FIU (IO.5). Concrete examples demonstrating effective operational cooperation to support (joint) complex financial investigations identifying PF sanctions evasion schemes, including but not limited to the DPRK, were presented. 626. The DSN coordinates inter-ministerial CPF workshops and the annual non-proliferation roundtable for competent authorities involved in CPF . These initiatives allow for the exchange of information on PF and PF sanctions evasion, [153] as well as their prevention and detection. Competent authorities also participate in various PPPs which facilitate the exchange of interdisciplinary insights with the private sector, including on the implementation of PF-related TFS (IO.1). Information on PF sanctions evasion schemes exchanged with OEs remains however high-level due to its sensitive nature. Footnotes [152] For instance, the NCC Sanctions coordinated the drafting of the SanctG 2024 and related practical changes in implementation, such as the designation of the FMA as the competent supervisor for TFS implementation by FIs and VASPs. These significant changes will enter into force on 1 January 2026. [153] Including but not limited to TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="149. Following its 2016 MER, Austria adopted a national AML/CFT Strategy based on the 2021 NRA findings and made efforts to implement a national action plan. The National AML/CFT Strategy and related action plan were adopted by the NCC and the Office of the Minister of Finance in 2023. The authorities recognise the importance of further updating these documents to reflect the findings of the 2025 NRA and intend to do this starting in 2026. The 2023 Strategy describes 10 high-level strategic objectives and tracks more than 90 measures aimed at strengthening the national AML/CFT system. 150. The strategic objectives and action plan measures have not been prioritised based on the level of risks. As seen above, the risk analysis did not consider the materiality of the ML and TF threats and the relative importance of identified sectoral risks based on the materiality of sectors. The Strategy and related Action Plan’s focus is on strengthening the AML/CFT framework, with overarching measures such as enhancing coordination, improving STR reporting, strengthening supervision, among others. Some of the objectives, such as improving suspicious activity reporting or enhancing cooperation between authorities and the private sector, contribute to addressing risks but remain high level. For instance, a high-level objective aimed at improving STR reporting is not necessarily targeted to sectors that show less reporting. 151. The overarching objectives also reflect the shortcomings in the risk understanding and are incomplete. There are measures aimed at key predicate crimes identified like fraud; but no targeted actions for other predicate crimes, such as drug-trafficking, or organised crime. Cross-border risks or other risks such as trade-based ML, or trading of high-value goods also lack targeted actions. In addition, despite BMF efforts, engagement from the authorities has been uneven, as per in the NRA exercise, with limited substantive input from the BMJ and BAK. This is reflected in the lack of objectives related to strengthening vulnerabilities in the criminal justice domain and the fact that the BMJ is assigned with one of the lowest number of action plan items. Overall, the objectives do not focus on specific resource allocations, and resources and timelines for action plan items are determined by the implementing authority, in line with its mandate and based on its overall budget allocation. 152. The authorities have taken required actions to properly implement a majority of action plan items but with mixed results. Implementation against timelines is monitored and periodically discussed by the NCC and, so far, 70–80% of the action plan items have been successfully completed. One of the success stories is the NPO risk assessment with targeted risk mitigation measures already implemented (IO.10). In addition, FMA’s measures to improve its risk-based supervision (RBS) have also proven to be successful (IO.3). However, not all actions taken have yet produced sufficient results. For instance, while A-FIU has further improved its engagement with OEs (including through issuance of notices and PPPs), and STR reporting is steadily increasing, the number of STRs remains low to very low across all sectors (IO.3/IO.4/IO.6). DNFBP supervisors have taken initial steps towards RBS, but intensification of efforts is still required (IO.4). Measures to improve asset confiscation remain, to a large extent, unaddressed (IO.8). 153. The Strategic objectives focusing on strengthening the fundamentals of the AML/CFT framework to align them with AML/CFT Standards have been largely completed. For instance, additional measures to further increase the scope and quality of beneficial ownership information in the Beneficial Ownership Register have been adopted, and implementation is already ongoing (IO.5). Austria also strengthened its TFS legal framework (R.6/R.7). 154. Austria has adopted other domestic strategies and policy documents, which are generally successfully implemented. Examples are the overall national security strategy, DSN’s Strategy on prevention of radicalisation, the DSN’s Strategy for countering TF by associations, and policies and guidelines setting out cooperation and exchange of information between the DSN and A-FIU. There are relevant AML/CFT strategies at ministry level, such as the strategy of BMF’s AML/CFT coordination unit delineating its yearly objectives. Relevant strategies and policies are subject to monitoring of implementation and regular review" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="149. Following its 2016 MER, Austria adopted a national AML/CFT Strategy based on the 2021 NRA findings and made efforts to implement a national action plan. The National AML/CFT Strategy and related action plan were adopted by the NCC and the Office of the Minister of Finance in 2023. The authorities recognise the importance of further updating these documents to reflect the findings of the 2025 NRA and intend to do this starting in 2026. The 2023 Strategy describes 10 high-level strategic objectives and tracks more than 90 measures aimed at strengthening the national AML/CFT system. 150. The strategic objectives and action plan measures have not been prioritised based on the level of risks. As seen above, the risk analysis did not consider the materiality of the ML and TF threats and the relative importance of identified sectoral risks based on the materiality of sectors. The Strategy and related Action Plan’s focus is on strengthening the AML/CFT framework, with overarching measures such as enhancing coordination, improving STR reporting, strengthening supervision, among others. Some of the objectives, such as improving suspicious activity reporting or enhancing cooperation between authorities and the private sector, contribute to addressing risks but remain high level. For instance, a high-level objective aimed at improving STR reporting is not necessarily targeted to sectors that show less reporting. 151. The overarching objectives also reflect the shortcomings in the risk understanding and are incomplete. There are measures aimed at key predicate crimes identified like fraud; but no targeted actions for other predicate crimes, such as drug-trafficking, or organised crime. Cross-border risks or other risks such as trade-based ML, or trading of high-value goods also lack targeted actions. In addition, despite BMF efforts, engagement from the authorities has been uneven, as per in the NRA exercise, with limited substantive input from the BMJ and BAK. This is reflected in the lack of objectives related to strengthening vulnerabilities in the criminal justice domain and the fact that the BMJ is assigned with one of the lowest number of action plan items. Overall, the objectives do not focus on specific resource allocations, and resources and timelines for action plan items are determined by the implementing authority, in line with its mandate and based on its overall budget allocation. 152. The authorities have taken required actions to properly implement a majority of action plan items but with mixed results. Implementation against timelines is monitored and periodically discussed by the NCC and, so far, 70–80% of the action plan items have been successfully completed. One of the success stories is the NPO risk assessment with targeted risk mitigation measures already implemented (IO.10). In addition, FMA’s measures to improve its risk-based supervision (RBS) have also proven to be successful (IO.3). However, not all actions taken have yet produced sufficient results. For instance, while A-FIU has further improved its engagement with OEs (including through issuance of notices and PPPs), and STR reporting is steadily increasing, the number of STRs remains low to very low across all sectors (IO.3/IO.4/IO.6). DNFBP supervisors have taken initial steps towards RBS, but intensification of efforts is still required (IO.4). Measures to improve asset confiscation remain, to a large extent, unaddressed (IO.8). 153. The Strategic objectives focusing on strengthening the fundamentals of the AML/CFT framework to align them with AML/CFT Standards have been largely completed. For instance, additional measures to further increase the scope and quality of beneficial ownership information in the Beneficial Ownership Register have been adopted, and implementation is already ongoing (IO.5). Austria also strengthened its TFS legal framework (R.6/R.7). 154. Austria has adopted other domestic strategies and policy documents, which are generally successfully implemented. Examples are the overall national security strategy, DSN’s Strategy on prevention of radicalisation, the DSN’s Strategy for countering TF by associations, and policies and guidelines setting out cooperation and exchange of information between the DSN and A-FIU. There are relevant AML/CFT strategies at ministry level, such as the strategy of BMF’s AML/CFT coordination unit delineating its yearly objectives. Relevant strategies and policies are subject to monitoring of implementation and regular review" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 202. Available data suggests that Austria does not seek assistance in ML/TF matters outside the EU consistent with its risk profile. It issues around 5 000 MLA requests in criminal matters annually, which is equivalent to the number of requests received. During the period under review, prosecutors issued 662 MLA and EIO requests in relation to ML and 33 in relation to TF, mostly to EU countries. This represents a yearly average of 132.4 requests for ML and 6.6 requests for TF of which 26 MLA requests in ML and 1.3 requests in TF were issued to non-EU countries. [36] Such volumes are not in line with Austria’s risk profile with a substantive part of transnational criminal aspects and illicit financial flows with CESEE/CIS countries. 203. There is neither information on the countries to which requests were sent nor on the predicate offences to the ML offences for which assistance was sought or the type of assistance requested. There is therefore no evidence that assistance sought by Austria is consistent with its ML/TF risk profile. Table 2.4. Ratio of MLA requests made by Austria in ML/TF matters and in general matters 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total % of cases Total cases in criminal matters 407 162 390 363 462 223 500 128 504 425 2 264 301 Outgoing MLA requests 2 574 5 105 5 351 5 361 4 629 23 020 1,02% ML cases 1 203 1 526 1 580 1 585 1 272 7 166 Outgoing ML MLA requests 132 141 152 151 86 662 9,24% TF cases 111 118 99 118 60 506 Outgoing TF MLA requests 15 8 1 7 3 34 6.71% Source: BMJ 204. Statistics on MLA requested show that the volume of international cooperation in ML/TF matters is not consistent with the international nature of those offences. Out of 7 166 ML cases registered during the period under review at national level, [37] only 629 resulted in MLA requests issued by Austria, which is less than 1 out of 10 cases. These figures highlight that authorities do not investigate the international elements of ML investigations as they could, as a majority of ML cases generally include an international element that should be investigated. On the positive side, these statistics show that this ratio is much higher than the ratio of MLA requested in support of investigations and prosecutions into other offences, for which MLA is requested in just 1% of all cases registered in the BMJ’s case management system. Feedback from FATF/FSRB members, while very limited, described the quality of requests as very good. Box 2.1. Crypto Rip Deal &quot;BLOCKCHAIN&quot; In August 2023, an Austrian developer became the victim of a fraud scheme while seeking funding for real estate projects. A supposed businessmen requested a brokerage fee of EUR 400 000 in exchange for a multi-million-euro loan to fund the victim’s projects. The fee was to be verified through the victim's cryptocurrency wallet (Ethereum) on the platform Atomic Wallet. The victim was manipulated during video calls, and the suspects were able to transfer cryptocurrency worth EUR 265 000 from the victim’s Atomic Wallet. The use of Europol´s SIENA channel and SIS-channel resulted in the identification of the two suspects and international arrest warrants were issued. An EIO was sent to the Belgian authorities to ask for the transmission of extracted data from seized mobile phones and for the related analysis reports. The investigations successfully traced crypto assets in Seychelles for a total amount of EUR 233 000, and an MLA request to this country allowed the seizure of the entire wallet. Another MLA request was also issued to China, since the receiver of the funds is a Chinese citizen. The two main suspects, identified under aliases, are part of organised crime groups with prior convictions for similar scams and burglary-related offences. They were arrested in Brussels during another scam attempt. Investigators recovered EUR 233 000 of stolen cryptocurrency in the Seychelles, and these were frozen under the order of the Vienna prosecutor. Both suspects await extradition to Austria, facing charges of fraud, ML, and organised crime, with potential sentences of up to 15 years. 205. Austria makes appropriate use of informal cooperation to support MLA. Austria made most use of Eurojust for MLA within the EU, in support of EIOs sent to EU countries. Over the past 5 years, prosecutors sent an average of 190 requests annually, which is consistent with the size of Austria in the EU. Table 2.5. Eurojust and Austria EUROJUST 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total number of cases 3 809 4 808 5 227 5 710 Including Austria as: requesting State 139 157 202 248 requested State 178 198 208 225 Note: There is no specific statistic as to the number of ML/TF-related cases but according to EUROJUST annual reports, ML cases represent an average of 17% of total cases. Source: EUROJUST 206. Austria also uses the European Judicial network (EJN) which is composed of points of contact in each EU member state. EJN facilitates judicial cooperation in criminal matters between EU member states, particularly by establishing direct contacts between competent authorities and by providing legal and practical information necessary to prepare an effective request for judicial cooperation or to improve judicial cooperation in general. Austria has six contact points throughout the country and details regarding Austria’s reliance on the EJN are included in the table below. Table 2.6. EJN and Austria Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 Cases 320 198 215 187 Including ML 6 2 2 4 Source: EJN 207. Austria is routinely part of joint investigative teams (JIT), mostly within Europe. During the period under review, public prosecutors have participated in 18 newly set-up JITs, some of which were established on the initiative of the Austrian authorities in complex cross-border cases of corruption, ML, human trafficking, drug trafficking, trade in counterfeit medicines, fraud, embezzlement, cybercrime, and financial criminal proceedings. The authorities also continued to support other already ongoing initiatives. Table 2.7. Total JITs involving Austria 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Newly signed JITs 4 2 2 3 JITs ongoing from previous years 9 11 11 8 8 Total JITs supported 13 13 11 10 11 Source: Eurojust 2.2.2. Extradition 208. The authorities did not demonstrate effectiveness in seeking extradition in ML/TF matters. During the period under review, they requested five extraditions for ML (all were granted) and none for TF. No statistics were provided about EAWs issued by Austria. The authorities could neither provide information about predicate offences for extradition sought nor give an indication of the countries to which extradition requests were sent. 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 209. Austria did not demonstrate effectiveness in seeking MLA in AR matters, except for a few cases. The authorities did not provide any data on the number of MLA requests issued to seize or confiscate assets located abroad, and the nature of the assistance requested , including with regard to seizures and confiscation in equivalent value. The central authority estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued by Austria on a yearly basis, which is notably low given Austria’s risk profile. No information was provided on the amounts of assets seized or confiscated at Austria’s request. This situation also impacts Austria’s effectiveness in AR efforts (IO.8). 210. Within its area of responsibility, the Anti-Fraud Department of the BMF reported to have issued, during the period under review, 3 884 requests for confiscations of assets for tax crimes . At their request, a total amount of EUR 23 473 859 were confiscated in foreign countries, under tax procedures and not as part of criminal prosecutions. Footnotes [36] Based on the assessment by authorities that the ratio of incoming EIO/MLA requests of 81%/19%could apply mutatis mutandis to out-going requests. [37] See IO.7." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 202. Available data suggests that Austria does not seek assistance in ML/TF matters outside the EU consistent with its risk profile. It issues around 5 000 MLA requests in criminal matters annually, which is equivalent to the number of requests received. During the period under review, prosecutors issued 662 MLA and EIO requests in relation to ML and 33 in relation to TF, mostly to EU countries. This represents a yearly average of 132.4 requests for ML and 6.6 requests for TF of which 26 MLA requests in ML and 1.3 requests in TF were issued to non-EU countries. [36] Such volumes are not in line with Austria’s risk profile with a substantive part of transnational criminal aspects and illicit financial flows with CESEE/CIS countries. 203. There is neither information on the countries to which requests were sent nor on the predicate offences to the ML offences for which assistance was sought or the type of assistance requested. There is therefore no evidence that assistance sought by Austria is consistent with its ML/TF risk profile. Table 2.4. Ratio of MLA requests made by Austria in ML/TF matters and in general matters 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total % of cases Total cases in criminal matters 407 162 390 363 462 223 500 128 504 425 2 264 301 Outgoing MLA requests 2 574 5 105 5 351 5 361 4 629 23 020 1,02% ML cases 1 203 1 526 1 580 1 585 1 272 7 166 Outgoing ML MLA requests 132 141 152 151 86 662 9,24% TF cases 111 118 99 118 60 506 Outgoing TF MLA requests 15 8 1 7 3 34 6.71% Source: BMJ 204. Statistics on MLA requested show that the volume of international cooperation in ML/TF matters is not consistent with the international nature of those offences. Out of 7 166 ML cases registered during the period under review at national level, [37] only 629 resulted in MLA requests issued by Austria, which is less than 1 out of 10 cases. These figures highlight that authorities do not investigate the international elements of ML investigations as they could, as a majority of ML cases generally include an international element that should be investigated. On the positive side, these statistics show that this ratio is much higher than the ratio of MLA requested in support of investigations and prosecutions into other offences, for which MLA is requested in just 1% of all cases registered in the BMJ’s case management system. Feedback from FATF/FSRB members, while very limited, described the quality of requests as very good. Box 2.1. Crypto Rip Deal &quot;BLOCKCHAIN&quot; In August 2023, an Austrian developer became the victim of a fraud scheme while seeking funding for real estate projects. A supposed businessmen requested a brokerage fee of EUR 400 000 in exchange for a multi-million-euro loan to fund the victim’s projects. The fee was to be verified through the victim's cryptocurrency wallet (Ethereum) on the platform Atomic Wallet. The victim was manipulated during video calls, and the suspects were able to transfer cryptocurrency worth EUR 265 000 from the victim’s Atomic Wallet. The use of Europol´s SIENA channel and SIS-channel resulted in the identification of the two suspects and international arrest warrants were issued. An EIO was sent to the Belgian authorities to ask for the transmission of extracted data from seized mobile phones and for the related analysis reports. The investigations successfully traced crypto assets in Seychelles for a total amount of EUR 233 000, and an MLA request to this country allowed the seizure of the entire wallet. Another MLA request was also issued to China, since the receiver of the funds is a Chinese citizen. The two main suspects, identified under aliases, are part of organised crime groups with prior convictions for similar scams and burglary-related offences. They were arrested in Brussels during another scam attempt. Investigators recovered EUR 233 000 of stolen cryptocurrency in the Seychelles, and these were frozen under the order of the Vienna prosecutor. Both suspects await extradition to Austria, facing charges of fraud, ML, and organised crime, with potential sentences of up to 15 years. 205. Austria makes appropriate use of informal cooperation to support MLA. Austria made most use of Eurojust for MLA within the EU, in support of EIOs sent to EU countries. Over the past 5 years, prosecutors sent an average of 190 requests annually, which is consistent with the size of Austria in the EU. Table 2.5. Eurojust and Austria EUROJUST 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total number of cases 3 809 4 808 5 227 5 710 Including Austria as: requesting State 139 157 202 248 requested State 178 198 208 225 Note: There is no specific statistic as to the number of ML/TF-related cases but according to EUROJUST annual reports, ML cases represent an average of 17% of total cases. Source: EUROJUST 206. Austria also uses the European Judicial network (EJN) which is composed of points of contact in each EU member state. EJN facilitates judicial cooperation in criminal matters between EU member states, particularly by establishing direct contacts between competent authorities and by providing legal and practical information necessary to prepare an effective request for judicial cooperation or to improve judicial cooperation in general. Austria has six contact points throughout the country and details regarding Austria’s reliance on the EJN are included in the table below. Table 2.6. EJN and Austria Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 Cases 320 198 215 187 Including ML 6 2 2 4 Source: EJN 207. Austria is routinely part of joint investigative teams (JIT), mostly within Europe. During the period under review, public prosecutors have participated in 18 newly set-up JITs, some of which were established on the initiative of the Austrian authorities in complex cross-border cases of corruption, ML, human trafficking, drug trafficking, trade in counterfeit medicines, fraud, embezzlement, cybercrime, and financial criminal proceedings. The authorities also continued to support other already ongoing initiatives. Table 2.7. Total JITs involving Austria 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Newly signed JITs 4 2 2 3 JITs ongoing from previous years 9 11 11 8 8 Total JITs supported 13 13 11 10 11 Source: Eurojust 2.2.2. Extradition 208. The authorities did not demonstrate effectiveness in seeking extradition in ML/TF matters. During the period under review, they requested five extraditions for ML (all were granted) and none for TF. No statistics were provided about EAWs issued by Austria. The authorities could neither provide information about predicate offences for extradition sought nor give an indication of the countries to which extradition requests were sent. 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 209. Austria did not demonstrate effectiveness in seeking MLA in AR matters, except for a few cases. The authorities did not provide any data on the number of MLA requests issued to seize or confiscate assets located abroad, and the nature of the assistance requested , including with regard to seizures and confiscation in equivalent value. The central authority estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued by Austria on a yearly basis, which is notably low given Austria’s risk profile. No information was provided on the amounts of assets seized or confiscated at Austria’s request. This situation also impacts Austria’s effectiveness in AR efforts (IO.8). 210. Within its area of responsibility, the Anti-Fraud Department of the BMF reported to have issued, during the period under review, 3 884 requests for confiscations of assets for tax crimes . At their request, a total amount of EUR 23 473 859 were confiscated in foreign countries, under tax procedures and not as part of criminal prosecutions. Footnotes [36] Based on the assessment by authorities that the ratio of incoming EIO/MLA requests of 81%/19%could apply mutatis mutandis to out-going requests. [37] See IO.7." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 251. The FMA has a sound understanding of the ML/FT risks faced by its supervised sectors and entities. The FMA is largely able to consolidate its critical insights on ML/TF exposure of the different sectors through a combination of the NRA, its SRA and the implementation and use of its Risk Assessment Tool (RAT), as well as information gathered as part of the engagements with the OEs. In addition, the FMA makes use of ad hoc analysis in response to market shifts, emerging risks, or trends, leveraging data infrastructure for analyses including impact assessments, anomaly detection, and pattern evaluations across OEs. 252. The FMA has conducted an SRA of the financial and VASP sectors that provides a broadly adequate overview of the main threats, vulnerabilities and ML/TF risks. This SRA complements the 2025 NRA and further identifies key high-risk factors including the gatekeeper function of financial groups in the CESEE region, international payments, high-risk customers and jurisdictions, PEPs/HNWIs and beneficial ownership, VASPs, outsourced compliance function, offshore jurisdictions CBRs, and money service businesses. 253. The SRA however lacks depth on certain areas such as corruption risks and some refinement concerning the calibration of relevant (sub)-sectoral risk factors (e.g., those related to VASPs). The analysis of corruption risk is predominantly based on a single datapoint in the sectoral questionnaires reflecting the numbers of PEPs as customers, disregarding other potential relevant subfactors such as PEPs as beneficial owners, foreign versus domestic PEPs, residency and/or citizenship of foreign PEPs, et cetera. The approach as reflected in the SRA also needs some further refinement where it concerns the calibration of (sub)-sectoral residual risk. For example, the sectoral risk for a particular sector is set at high, while all risk factors but one are individually rated as less significant. The FMA reports this is already addressed in the new methodology (under development). 254. An important element of the FMA’s RBS is the systemic data collection through its RAT, which provides a holistic, periodically updated view of sectoral ML/TF risks. The tool gathers (i) quantitative information on inherent vulnerabilities through annual sectoral questionnaires to OEs, transaction data from the OeNB (per CI and country), and also (ii) qualitative information on OE’s risk mitigating measures from the FMA’s supervisory engagements and from OEs’ external auditor’s report (where available and sufficiently detailed). 255. The tool provides an appropriate inherent risk profile per individual OE but needs more granularity for elements such as geographical exposure and high-risk customers. The risk profile is based on a four-step risk scale reflecting the inherent risk dimensions (customer structure, products and services, distribution channels, and geographical exposure). A more granular approach is needed where data on geographical exposure per individual subsidiary, branch, or representative office (e.g., clients’ residency in higher-risk jurisdictions) is currently only collected for all entities of the OE combined. Such exposure per entity is relevant to identify and better understand intra-group geographic exposure. However, the FMA reported that such information will be systematically collected and analysed for internal risk assessment following changes expected by AMLA. Customer risk factors applied seem limited where the share of customers with higher-risk background, such as activities in more vulnerable sectors (e.g., cash intensive businesses or VASPs), or the distribution of high-, medium-, and low-risk customers following OE’s customer risk assessment, are not reflected. The FMA reported that such factors will be incorporated in the updated risk classification methodology, which will be applied in 2026 in preparation of the new AMLA framework. 256. The RAT however does not necessarily provide a systemic overview of OEs’ effective implementation of the full range of mitigating measures and lacks granularity where it concerns some of the covered measures and controls. Conducted engagements and findings do not systematically cover the full range of mitigating measures and controls and are limited in number. The FMA seeks to address this shortcoming in the foreseen adjustment of its risk assessment methodology to better align information gathered offsite and onsite. The assessment of the covered measures and controls lacks reflection on the methods applied to verify the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner, or the conducted EDD measures vis-à-vis PEPs. No EDD on other higher risk customers is explicitly reflected in the applied controls matrix. Therefore, the tool is (currently) providing residual risk profiles which are adequate to a somewhat limited extent. 257. To ensure ongoing refinement of (sub-) risk indicators and a reassessment of risk dimensions, the RAT is updated as needed, most recently in 2025, to reflect outcomes of the SNRA, NRA, and SRA. Examples relate to including new corridors regarding money remittance, and the complexity of the structure and products of VASPs as OE. 258. The FMA has steadily increased its capacity to understand and detect ML/TF risks specific to VAs. Due to the sector’s rapid developments, the FMA started to use tools to analyse transfers of VAs on the blockchain and of custodial wallets based on selected risk categories. In addition, risk in relation to self-hosted wallets, crypto transactions (including those related to ongoing business relationships and those taking place occasionally that have a converted fiat amount of at least EUR 1 000) are addressed through targeted questions in the annual risk assessment questionnaire. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 259. The FMA is to a large extent effectively promoting understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations in FIs and VASPs, which could benefit from more regular updates. The FMA has issued detailed, in-depth circulars to promote compliance with due diligence obligations, internal organisation, risk assessment, and on reporting obligations, [49] available on its website and considered very useful by the private sector. Regular updates to these circulars are necessary to ensure an effective promotion of current risks, and on amended or introduced obligations. For example, the circular on risk assessment promotes the outcomes of the NRA 2021 and could benefit from an update reflecting the recently adopted NRA 2025. Furthermore, the shortcomings in the FMA’s risk identification and understanding as identified above (e.g., corruption risks), impact the scope of risks promoted with OEs. 260. The FMA collaborates through sector-wide engagements, ad hoc meetings, and workshops. Those include the large annual FMA Supervisory Conference, which also addresses AML/CFT-relevant topics, and specific events updating on regulatory developments, related themes and practical guidance, such as a 2024 edition of the online “Let’s talk about supervision” series on online identification. The FMA also organises ad hoc meetings and workshops, such as the biennial workshop on Compliance and AML for Compliance and AML/CFT experts in CIs. 261. The FMA also holds bilateral consultations to address sector-specific issues, such as during the annual process of collecting information for the RAT questionnaire . Supervisory engagements such as onsite inspections and management talks also provide direct feedback and guidance on addressing deficiencies and individual OE’s risk understanding, particularly where it concerns the OE’s effective implementation of the business risk assessment. Finally, administrative proceedings also specifically instruct OEs taking corrective actions. Footnotes [49] Respectively: FMA Circular 01/2022, 23/02/2022, FMA Circular 02/2022, 23/02/2022, FMA Circular 03/2022, 23/02/2022 and FMA Circular 04/2022, 23/02/2022." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 251. The FMA has a sound understanding of the ML/FT risks faced by its supervised sectors and entities. The FMA is largely able to consolidate its critical insights on ML/TF exposure of the different sectors through a combination of the NRA, its SRA and the implementation and use of its Risk Assessment Tool (RAT), as well as information gathered as part of the engagements with the OEs. In addition, the FMA makes use of ad hoc analysis in response to market shifts, emerging risks, or trends, leveraging data infrastructure for analyses including impact assessments, anomaly detection, and pattern evaluations across OEs. 252. The FMA has conducted an SRA of the financial and VASP sectors that provides a broadly adequate overview of the main threats, vulnerabilities and ML/TF risks. This SRA complements the 2025 NRA and further identifies key high-risk factors including the gatekeeper function of financial groups in the CESEE region, international payments, high-risk customers and jurisdictions, PEPs/HNWIs and beneficial ownership, VASPs, outsourced compliance function, offshore jurisdictions CBRs, and money service businesses. 253. The SRA however lacks depth on certain areas such as corruption risks and some refinement concerning the calibration of relevant (sub)-sectoral risk factors (e.g., those related to VASPs). The analysis of corruption risk is predominantly based on a single datapoint in the sectoral questionnaires reflecting the numbers of PEPs as customers, disregarding other potential relevant subfactors such as PEPs as beneficial owners, foreign versus domestic PEPs, residency and/or citizenship of foreign PEPs, et cetera. The approach as reflected in the SRA also needs some further refinement where it concerns the calibration of (sub)-sectoral residual risk. For example, the sectoral risk for a particular sector is set at high, while all risk factors but one are individually rated as less significant. The FMA reports this is already addressed in the new methodology (under development). 254. An important element of the FMA’s RBS is the systemic data collection through its RAT, which provides a holistic, periodically updated view of sectoral ML/TF risks. The tool gathers (i) quantitative information on inherent vulnerabilities through annual sectoral questionnaires to OEs, transaction data from the OeNB (per CI and country), and also (ii) qualitative information on OE’s risk mitigating measures from the FMA’s supervisory engagements and from OEs’ external auditor’s report (where available and sufficiently detailed). 255. The tool provides an appropriate inherent risk profile per individual OE but needs more granularity for elements such as geographical exposure and high-risk customers. The risk profile is based on a four-step risk scale reflecting the inherent risk dimensions (customer structure, products and services, distribution channels, and geographical exposure). A more granular approach is needed where data on geographical exposure per individual subsidiary, branch, or representative office (e.g., clients’ residency in higher-risk jurisdictions) is currently only collected for all entities of the OE combined. Such exposure per entity is relevant to identify and better understand intra-group geographic exposure. However, the FMA reported that such information will be systematically collected and analysed for internal risk assessment following changes expected by AMLA. Customer risk factors applied seem limited where the share of customers with higher-risk background, such as activities in more vulnerable sectors (e.g., cash intensive businesses or VASPs), or the distribution of high-, medium-, and low-risk customers following OE’s customer risk assessment, are not reflected. The FMA reported that such factors will be incorporated in the updated risk classification methodology, which will be applied in 2026 in preparation of the new AMLA framework. 256. The RAT however does not necessarily provide a systemic overview of OEs’ effective implementation of the full range of mitigating measures and lacks granularity where it concerns some of the covered measures and controls. Conducted engagements and findings do not systematically cover the full range of mitigating measures and controls and are limited in number. The FMA seeks to address this shortcoming in the foreseen adjustment of its risk assessment methodology to better align information gathered offsite and onsite. The assessment of the covered measures and controls lacks reflection on the methods applied to verify the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner, or the conducted EDD measures vis-à-vis PEPs. No EDD on other higher risk customers is explicitly reflected in the applied controls matrix. Therefore, the tool is (currently) providing residual risk profiles which are adequate to a somewhat limited extent. 257. To ensure ongoing refinement of (sub-) risk indicators and a reassessment of risk dimensions, the RAT is updated as needed, most recently in 2025, to reflect outcomes of the SNRA, NRA, and SRA. Examples relate to including new corridors regarding money remittance, and the complexity of the structure and products of VASPs as OE. 258. The FMA has steadily increased its capacity to understand and detect ML/TF risks specific to VAs. Due to the sector’s rapid developments, the FMA started to use tools to analyse transfers of VAs on the blockchain and of custodial wallets based on selected risk categories. In addition, risk in relation to self-hosted wallets, crypto transactions (including those related to ongoing business relationships and those taking place occasionally that have a converted fiat amount of at least EUR 1 000) are addressed through targeted questions in the annual risk assessment questionnaire. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 259. The FMA is to a large extent effectively promoting understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations in FIs and VASPs, which could benefit from more regular updates. The FMA has issued detailed, in-depth circulars to promote compliance with due diligence obligations, internal organisation, risk assessment, and on reporting obligations, [49] available on its website and considered very useful by the private sector. Regular updates to these circulars are necessary to ensure an effective promotion of current risks, and on amended or introduced obligations. For example, the circular on risk assessment promotes the outcomes of the NRA 2021 and could benefit from an update reflecting the recently adopted NRA 2025. Furthermore, the shortcomings in the FMA’s risk identification and understanding as identified above (e.g., corruption risks), impact the scope of risks promoted with OEs. 260. The FMA collaborates through sector-wide engagements, ad hoc meetings, and workshops. Those include the large annual FMA Supervisory Conference, which also addresses AML/CFT-relevant topics, and specific events updating on regulatory developments, related themes and practical guidance, such as a 2024 edition of the online “Let’s talk about supervision” series on online identification. The FMA also organises ad hoc meetings and workshops, such as the biennial workshop on Compliance and AML for Compliance and AML/CFT experts in CIs. 261. The FMA also holds bilateral consultations to address sector-specific issues, such as during the annual process of collecting information for the RAT questionnaire . Supervisory engagements such as onsite inspections and management talks also provide direct feedback and guidance on addressing deficiencies and individual OE’s risk understanding, particularly where it concerns the OE’s effective implementation of the business risk assessment. Finally, administrative proceedings also specifically instruct OEs taking corrective actions. Footnotes [49] Respectively: FMA Circular 01/2022, 23/02/2022, FMA Circular 02/2022, 23/02/2022, FMA Circular 03/2022, 23/02/2022 and FMA Circular 04/2022, 23/02/2022." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="327. Except for casinos, notaries, lawyers, and accountants, DNFBP supervisors do not have a good understanding of the main threats, vulnerabilities, and ML/FT risks impacting their sectors. Additionally, all supervisors, except for casinos, still present major shortcomings in their ability to identify and understand ML/TF risks of individual DNFBPs. Supervisors have only very recently increased their engagement with DNFBPs to promote entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. 4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 328. All DNFPB supervisory authorities took part in the NRA process, however they demonstrated significant differences in risk understanding. While Austria made progress in its 2025 NRA to better substantiate its risk analysis in some key sectors, the 2025 NRA is lacking detailed analysis on specific DNFBP subsectors (IO.1). It includes individual sectoral risk assessments for lawyers, notaries, accountants, tax advisors including those undertaking TCSP activities, and auditors, casinos, and real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS. These however rely heavily on the threats identified in the EU SNRA and do not provide granular insights on the threats and vulnerabilities specific to the Austrian risk and context. The NRA does not provide comprehensive analyses for the high-risk sectors such as real estate agents, all TCSPs, and DPMS, as it relies heavily on general analysis from the EU SNRA and does not develop a specific threat picture in line with Austria’s risk and context. 329. Except for casinos, accountants (including tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and notaries and lawyers to some extent, DNFBP supervisors still lack an adequate understanding of the main general threats identified in the NRA, and the specific vulnerabilities and exposure to ML/FT risks impacting their sectors. Sectors that have risk-profile tools in place, such as real estate agents, other TCSPs, DPMS, and private accountants, were not able to demonstrate that these tools are mature enough to correctly identify sectoral ML/TF/PF risks. For example, for Austria’s high-risk real estate sector (IO.1), the TCSP sector (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and for lawyers and notaries (who lack risk assessments of individual entities), supervisors failed to identify specific vulnerabilities or acknowledge how their sector was exposed to certain relevant vulnerabilities, e.g. use of cash or misuse of company creation (so-called fraudulent companies). Regarding the TCSP sector, supervisory authorities are unable to distinguish between business consultants performing TCSP activities and business consultants that are not. 330. The ML/TF risk understanding of most DNFBP supervisors is also hampered by a lack of reliable data. Most data collection on inherent risk and existing AML/CFT controls started very recently between 2023 to 2024, and data collection from the notary sector will only start in 2025/2026. Regarding real estate agents, all TCSPs, DPMS, and accountants, the information collected is very high-level, based on dichotomous survey questionnaires and consequently over-reliant on the DNFBPs’ self-assessment. Supervisors do not have adequate procedures in place to systematically check information collected and assess data quality. Specifically for real estate agents, TCSPs, and DPMS, supervisors lacked reliable data on the different sectors under their supervision, e.g., the size and nature of the services provided by them. 331. Except for the casino supervisor, the authorities did not provide sufficient information to demonstrate their understanding of individual risk of DNFBPs. In some cases, the authorities were unable to correctly identify the existence of higher-risk entities or specific ML/TF risks connected to them, for example for real estate agents. 332. Austria’s different regional supervisory authorities for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS represent a very fragmented institutional framework. They have begun to implement coordinating mechanisms to promote consistency of supervisory risk assessments within each supervised sector. However, due to the recent nature of most of these initiatives, which have been implemented since 2023/2024, their impact on risk understanding has not yet been demonstrated. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 333. Supervisors have increased their engagement to promote entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, but this has not yet demonstrated an effective impact, except for casinos. For their exchanges with the DNFBP sector, supervisors mostly rely on three PPPs, i.e., for casinos (PPP gambling/betting), real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), DPMS, and other DNFBPs (PPP trading sector), and lawyers and notaries (PPP legal advisory sector). Through the PPPs, in collaboration with different authorities and the A-FIU, supervisors also issued several guidance documents between November 2023 and March 2025. Outside of the scope of PPPs, the A-FIU also initiated various initiatives to increase the level of suspicious transaction reporting among DNFBPs, including training events for the real estate sector, which the A-FIU considers particularly vulnerable to ML (IO.6). These measures reflect supervisors’ current focus on the DNBFP sector but have to date not markedly improved entities’ understanding of their specific ML/TF risks (particularly in high-risk sectors such as real estate) and obligations, such as implementation of adequate CDD measures. 334. Supervisors have also started to promote various AML/CFT awareness-raising initiatives and specific trainings. However, most of these took place between late 2023 and 2024 and focused on basic key AML/CFT issues, such as raising general awareness. These initiatives focused on sectors unfamiliar with their AML/CFT obligations, such as real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and DPMS, and explained e.g., the need to register with goAML. Except for notaries and casinos, where frequent interaction between supervisor and the OEs has led to the entities’ good understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, the impact on the understanding among other DNFBPs, in particular high-risk subsectors, has not yet been demonstrated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="327. Except for casinos, notaries, lawyers, and accountants, DNFBP supervisors do not have a good understanding of the main threats, vulnerabilities, and ML/FT risks impacting their sectors. Additionally, all supervisors, except for casinos, still present major shortcomings in their ability to identify and understand ML/TF risks of individual DNFBPs. Supervisors have only very recently increased their engagement with DNFBPs to promote entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. 4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 328. All DNFPB supervisory authorities took part in the NRA process, however they demonstrated significant differences in risk understanding. While Austria made progress in its 2025 NRA to better substantiate its risk analysis in some key sectors, the 2025 NRA is lacking detailed analysis on specific DNFBP subsectors (IO.1). It includes individual sectoral risk assessments for lawyers, notaries, accountants, tax advisors including those undertaking TCSP activities, and auditors, casinos, and real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS. These however rely heavily on the threats identified in the EU SNRA and do not provide granular insights on the threats and vulnerabilities specific to the Austrian risk and context. The NRA does not provide comprehensive analyses for the high-risk sectors such as real estate agents, all TCSPs, and DPMS, as it relies heavily on general analysis from the EU SNRA and does not develop a specific threat picture in line with Austria’s risk and context. 329. Except for casinos, accountants (including tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and notaries and lawyers to some extent, DNFBP supervisors still lack an adequate understanding of the main general threats identified in the NRA, and the specific vulnerabilities and exposure to ML/FT risks impacting their sectors. Sectors that have risk-profile tools in place, such as real estate agents, other TCSPs, DPMS, and private accountants, were not able to demonstrate that these tools are mature enough to correctly identify sectoral ML/TF/PF risks. For example, for Austria’s high-risk real estate sector (IO.1), the TCSP sector (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and for lawyers and notaries (who lack risk assessments of individual entities), supervisors failed to identify specific vulnerabilities or acknowledge how their sector was exposed to certain relevant vulnerabilities, e.g. use of cash or misuse of company creation (so-called fraudulent companies). Regarding the TCSP sector, supervisory authorities are unable to distinguish between business consultants performing TCSP activities and business consultants that are not. 330. The ML/TF risk understanding of most DNFBP supervisors is also hampered by a lack of reliable data. Most data collection on inherent risk and existing AML/CFT controls started very recently between 2023 to 2024, and data collection from the notary sector will only start in 2025/2026. Regarding real estate agents, all TCSPs, DPMS, and accountants, the information collected is very high-level, based on dichotomous survey questionnaires and consequently over-reliant on the DNFBPs’ self-assessment. Supervisors do not have adequate procedures in place to systematically check information collected and assess data quality. Specifically for real estate agents, TCSPs, and DPMS, supervisors lacked reliable data on the different sectors under their supervision, e.g., the size and nature of the services provided by them. 331. Except for the casino supervisor, the authorities did not provide sufficient information to demonstrate their understanding of individual risk of DNFBPs. In some cases, the authorities were unable to correctly identify the existence of higher-risk entities or specific ML/TF risks connected to them, for example for real estate agents. 332. Austria’s different regional supervisory authorities for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS represent a very fragmented institutional framework. They have begun to implement coordinating mechanisms to promote consistency of supervisory risk assessments within each supervised sector. However, due to the recent nature of most of these initiatives, which have been implemented since 2023/2024, their impact on risk understanding has not yet been demonstrated. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 333. Supervisors have increased their engagement to promote entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, but this has not yet demonstrated an effective impact, except for casinos. For their exchanges with the DNFBP sector, supervisors mostly rely on three PPPs, i.e., for casinos (PPP gambling/betting), real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), DPMS, and other DNFBPs (PPP trading sector), and lawyers and notaries (PPP legal advisory sector). Through the PPPs, in collaboration with different authorities and the A-FIU, supervisors also issued several guidance documents between November 2023 and March 2025. Outside of the scope of PPPs, the A-FIU also initiated various initiatives to increase the level of suspicious transaction reporting among DNFBPs, including training events for the real estate sector, which the A-FIU considers particularly vulnerable to ML (IO.6). These measures reflect supervisors’ current focus on the DNBFP sector but have to date not markedly improved entities’ understanding of their specific ML/TF risks (particularly in high-risk sectors such as real estate) and obligations, such as implementation of adequate CDD measures. 334. Supervisors have also started to promote various AML/CFT awareness-raising initiatives and specific trainings. However, most of these took place between late 2023 and 2024 and focused on basic key AML/CFT issues, such as raising general awareness. These initiatives focused on sectors unfamiliar with their AML/CFT obligations, such as real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and DPMS, and explained e.g., the need to register with goAML. Except for notaries and casinos, where frequent interaction between supervisor and the OEs has led to the entities’ good understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, the impact on the understanding among other DNFBPs, in particular high-risk subsectors, has not yet been demonstrated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="379. Austria has put in place a wide range of measures to enhance the transparency of domestic LPs and foreign LPs and LAs to prevent their misuse for ML/TF purposes. Austria uses a multi-pronged approach to ensure that competent authorities have access to adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information. The Beneficial Ownership Register plays a very prominent role in this regard, but competent authorities can also obtain basic and beneficial ownership information from OEs and directly from LPs and relevant foreign LAs. This approach is complemented by various other effective mitigation measures, including measures in response to specific identified risks, which are described below. 5.2.1. Mitigation measures applying to all legal entities, regardless of their level of risk 380. The first line of defence to prevent the exploitation of LPs for criminal purposes is the obligation to be registered upon creation in the Company Register, the Associations Register, or the Register of Foundations and Funds. A unique identifier is assigned to each registration. Companies, associations, and (charitable) foundations that do not comply with these requirements cannot acquire legal personality. Basic information (albeit with some very minor technical deficiencies regarding the register of shareholders—c.24.5) is publicly available. 381. In 2017, Austria established a central Beneficial Ownership Register, which is in place since 1 June 2018 and plays a very prominent role to prevent abuse of legal entities. It constitutes a crucial and directly accessible source of information to support competent authorities’ operational activities. The Beneficial Ownership Register includes both basic and beneficial ownership information on all types of LPs created in Austria and is supplemented with basic and beneficial ownership information on relevant foreign LPs and LAs. [72] These legal entities have an obligation to obtain, maintain, and keep up to date information on their beneficial ownership and provide it to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register (R.24). 382. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority within the BMF ensures that information in the Beneficial Ownership Register is adequate, accurate, and up to date. This is achieved by thorough verification of all beneficial ownership reports filed by legal entities at the time of their creation and subsequently, on a risk-sensitive basis, throughout the lifetime of the entity. This in-depth verification is complemented with the analysis of discrepancy reports filed by OEs and competent authorities, and by addressing identified breaches of the beneficial ownership reporting obligation. 383. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority is also responsible for conducting administrative proceedings and responding to requests from domestic and foreign competent authorities. When the Authority identifies suspicions that a legal entity is being misused as a fraudulent company, then it systematically refers the case to the Anti-Fraud Office in the tax administration, as demonstrated by the example in Box 5.2. In addition, when the Authority identifies indications of ML or TF, it files a report with A-FIU. The effectiveness of this mechanism which contributes to Austria’s financial intelligence chain was demonstrated through case studies showing how reports from the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority were the starting point for the development of comprehensive financial intelligence packages, which subsequently triggered or contributed to (complex) financial investigations. 384. At the end of 2024, Austria further significantly strengthened its existing requirements on nominees to bring them fully in line with the FATF Standards (c.24.13). [73] Implementation of the new additional requirements was at a nascent stage at the time of the on-site visit. Nominee shareholding arrangements are called “treuhand” in Austria, but these are legal person nominee arrangements, not to be confused with treuhand arrangements that are legal arrangements in other countries. Since 2018, LPs are required to disclose these nominee arrangements as part of their beneficial ownership reporting obligation and details on the nominator (treugeber) and nominee (treuhänder) are included in the Beneficial Ownership Register. [74] As a result, the number of such nominee arrangements declined from 2 093 in 2021 to 1 992 in 2024. Feedback from lawyers and tax advisors (i.e., professionals acting as nominees) revealed that nominee arrangements were increasingly dissolved and nominators were again reinstated as legal owners, as these nominee arrangements lost their purpose following the introduction of the transparency requirements. 385. Austria has also implemented effective measures by prohibiting bearer shares for non-listed companies. It set up a central securities depository where share certificates of listed stock companies are kept in custody. In addition, beneficial ownership disclosure requirements equally apply to listed stock corporations and information on these companies’ beneficial ownership is directly accessible by competent authorities. 386. OEs constitute another source of beneficial ownership information, and they make, upon request, this information available to competent authorities in a timely manner. CIs also include beneficial ownership information in Austria’s Central Register of Accounts and Safe Deposit Boxes, which is in place since 2016. Identification details included in the latter register are nevertheless limited (i.e., name and first name of the beneficial owner) and competent authorities generally use this register to identify assets held in Austria rather than as a primary source of beneficial ownership information. 387. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, lawyers and notaries frequently register, on behalf of their clients’, beneficial ownership information with the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, with these tax advisors counting for 80% of the registrations made by professionals on behalf of legal entities (Table 0.3). Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, lawyers and notaries conduct adequate checks on the identity of the beneficial owner. They demonstrated a good understanding of the beneficial ownership requirements, including of the concept of control, which can be explained by ongoing targeted training received from the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and their frequent engagement with that authority, including but not limited to a dedicated hotline. Implementation of beneficial ownership requirements by other types of OEs, mainly DNFBPs, (i.e., real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP services), and DPMS) remains uneven (IO.3, IO.4). Mitigation measures implemented in response to specific identified risks 388. Austria effectively implements measures to mitigate identified risks associated with fraudulent companies, which are mainly LLCs (5.1 above). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority in cooperation with the PACC, the Anti-Fraud Office within the tax administration and the A-FIU developed a model-based system that allows for early detection of fraudulent companies ( Scheinunternehmen ) based on the data from the Beneficial Ownership Register. 389. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority systematically refers identified suspicions of fraudulent companies to the Anti-Fraud Office within the tax administration for in-depth investigation and follow-up. This investigation process is guided by two written documents setting out the measures to be taken for each step of the investigation process. If the investigation confirms the suspicions, the fraudulent company is published on a dedicated list on the BMF’s public website. In addition, the company is listed as “Scheinunternehmen” in the Company Register and the Beneficial Ownership Register until it is dissolved and removed from the Company Register, and the tax authorities will restrict the fraudulent company’s VAT number. These measures effectively prevent the company from continued participation in economic activities and from being used as a vehicle for fraud and ML. In addition, the natural persons behind these fraudulent companies are prosecuted as the perpetrators of social security and fiscal fraud. 390. Competent authorities work closely together to identify fraudulent companies. For instance, the Tax Authority and the A-FIU developed a common initiative to detect fraudulent companies involved in tax and social security fraud schemes. This resulted in 11 tax-recovering orders for a total of EUR 5 million for suspected tax fraud and frozen bank accounts for a value of about EUR 2 million. In addition, a mechanism was developed to assist FIs in the identification of such companies as part of their transaction monitoring. For the implementation of this mechanism, the Tax Authority and the A-FIU cooperated closely with OEs to produce financial intelligence identifying tax and social security fraud schemes. In addition to Austrian fraudulent companies, this initiative also led to the identification of 266 foreign fictitious companies from 14 different countries. 391. More generally, Austria’s actions to tackle the risk associated to fraudulent companies has proven to be successful as illustrated by the official list of identified fraudulent companies on the BMF’s public website. As of mid-June 2025, a total number of 1 050 legal entities were included in this list. Suspected cases of fraudulent companies are also included in the social fraud database. Austria has various effective measures in place to mitigate the ML/TF/PF risks associated to investments in real estate by foreign legal entities. 392. A requirement for foreign legal entities owning real estate in Austria to report their beneficial owners for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register is already in place for many years. In addition, restrictions on property transfers to foreign legal entities domiciled outside the EEA limit their opportunities for real estate investments. In those instances where a foreign legal entity is still permitted to acquire domestic property, the intervention of a notary is mandatory, just like for any other transfer of real estate. Before the notarisation or preparation of a notarial deed, the notary is required to collect credible documents on beneficial owners for inclusion in the deed. They should also request proof of reporting of beneficial owners to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, and compare the information obtained from the customer with the information in the Beneficial Ownership Register. Other measures leading to mitigating ML/TF risks in the property sector consist of EDD implemented by CIs in case of real estate investments by foreign customers, including legal entities, in Austria. Implementation of such measures has substantially increased in response to other autonomous EU sanctions. 393. Austria’s CIs have also significantly strengthened their CDD requirements and apply EDD measures to both domestic and foreign legal entities with complex ownership and control structures (see above and IO.3). Austria has not yet implemented measures to mitigate the recently identified ML/TF risks of foreign legal entities owning aircrafts but drafting of amendments to the WiEReG was underway at the time of the onsite visit. The impact on effectiveness is very minor given the negligible materiality of this sub-set of legal entities (R.24). Footnotes [72] Foreign LPs with a registered office outside and which acquire/own land or real estate in Austria, and foreign express trusts and similar LA managed from within Austria or acquire/own land or real estate in Austria. [73] As of 1 October 2025, all nominee arrangements (including those that do not affect beneficial ownership) should be disclosed to the Registry Authority for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register. [74] In 2020, Austria introduced an obligation for LPs to disclose nominee arrangements that are relevant for the identification and verification of beneficial owners. Since that time, the definition of control in the WiEReG explicitly referred to nominee agreements as a form of control." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="379. Austria has put in place a wide range of measures to enhance the transparency of domestic LPs and foreign LPs and LAs to prevent their misuse for ML/TF purposes. Austria uses a multi-pronged approach to ensure that competent authorities have access to adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information. The Beneficial Ownership Register plays a very prominent role in this regard, but competent authorities can also obtain basic and beneficial ownership information from OEs and directly from LPs and relevant foreign LAs. This approach is complemented by various other effective mitigation measures, including measures in response to specific identified risks, which are described below. 5.2.1. Mitigation measures applying to all legal entities, regardless of their level of risk 380. The first line of defence to prevent the exploitation of LPs for criminal purposes is the obligation to be registered upon creation in the Company Register, the Associations Register, or the Register of Foundations and Funds. A unique identifier is assigned to each registration. Companies, associations, and (charitable) foundations that do not comply with these requirements cannot acquire legal personality. Basic information (albeit with some very minor technical deficiencies regarding the register of shareholders—c.24.5) is publicly available. 381. In 2017, Austria established a central Beneficial Ownership Register, which is in place since 1 June 2018 and plays a very prominent role to prevent abuse of legal entities. It constitutes a crucial and directly accessible source of information to support competent authorities’ operational activities. The Beneficial Ownership Register includes both basic and beneficial ownership information on all types of LPs created in Austria and is supplemented with basic and beneficial ownership information on relevant foreign LPs and LAs. [72] These legal entities have an obligation to obtain, maintain, and keep up to date information on their beneficial ownership and provide it to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register (R.24). 382. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority within the BMF ensures that information in the Beneficial Ownership Register is adequate, accurate, and up to date. This is achieved by thorough verification of all beneficial ownership reports filed by legal entities at the time of their creation and subsequently, on a risk-sensitive basis, throughout the lifetime of the entity. This in-depth verification is complemented with the analysis of discrepancy reports filed by OEs and competent authorities, and by addressing identified breaches of the beneficial ownership reporting obligation. 383. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority is also responsible for conducting administrative proceedings and responding to requests from domestic and foreign competent authorities. When the Authority identifies suspicions that a legal entity is being misused as a fraudulent company, then it systematically refers the case to the Anti-Fraud Office in the tax administration, as demonstrated by the example in Box 5.2. In addition, when the Authority identifies indications of ML or TF, it files a report with A-FIU. The effectiveness of this mechanism which contributes to Austria’s financial intelligence chain was demonstrated through case studies showing how reports from the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority were the starting point for the development of comprehensive financial intelligence packages, which subsequently triggered or contributed to (complex) financial investigations. 384. At the end of 2024, Austria further significantly strengthened its existing requirements on nominees to bring them fully in line with the FATF Standards (c.24.13). [73] Implementation of the new additional requirements was at a nascent stage at the time of the on-site visit. Nominee shareholding arrangements are called “treuhand” in Austria, but these are legal person nominee arrangements, not to be confused with treuhand arrangements that are legal arrangements in other countries. Since 2018, LPs are required to disclose these nominee arrangements as part of their beneficial ownership reporting obligation and details on the nominator (treugeber) and nominee (treuhänder) are included in the Beneficial Ownership Register. [74] As a result, the number of such nominee arrangements declined from 2 093 in 2021 to 1 992 in 2024. Feedback from lawyers and tax advisors (i.e., professionals acting as nominees) revealed that nominee arrangements were increasingly dissolved and nominators were again reinstated as legal owners, as these nominee arrangements lost their purpose following the introduction of the transparency requirements. 385. Austria has also implemented effective measures by prohibiting bearer shares for non-listed companies. It set up a central securities depository where share certificates of listed stock companies are kept in custody. In addition, beneficial ownership disclosure requirements equally apply to listed stock corporations and information on these companies’ beneficial ownership is directly accessible by competent authorities. 386. OEs constitute another source of beneficial ownership information, and they make, upon request, this information available to competent authorities in a timely manner. CIs also include beneficial ownership information in Austria’s Central Register of Accounts and Safe Deposit Boxes, which is in place since 2016. Identification details included in the latter register are nevertheless limited (i.e., name and first name of the beneficial owner) and competent authorities generally use this register to identify assets held in Austria rather than as a primary source of beneficial ownership information. 387. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, lawyers and notaries frequently register, on behalf of their clients’, beneficial ownership information with the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, with these tax advisors counting for 80% of the registrations made by professionals on behalf of legal entities (Table 0.3). Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, lawyers and notaries conduct adequate checks on the identity of the beneficial owner. They demonstrated a good understanding of the beneficial ownership requirements, including of the concept of control, which can be explained by ongoing targeted training received from the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and their frequent engagement with that authority, including but not limited to a dedicated hotline. Implementation of beneficial ownership requirements by other types of OEs, mainly DNFBPs, (i.e., real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP services), and DPMS) remains uneven (IO.3, IO.4). Mitigation measures implemented in response to specific identified risks 388. Austria effectively implements measures to mitigate identified risks associated with fraudulent companies, which are mainly LLCs (5.1 above). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority in cooperation with the PACC, the Anti-Fraud Office within the tax administration and the A-FIU developed a model-based system that allows for early detection of fraudulent companies ( Scheinunternehmen ) based on the data from the Beneficial Ownership Register. 389. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority systematically refers identified suspicions of fraudulent companies to the Anti-Fraud Office within the tax administration for in-depth investigation and follow-up. This investigation process is guided by two written documents setting out the measures to be taken for each step of the investigation process. If the investigation confirms the suspicions, the fraudulent company is published on a dedicated list on the BMF’s public website. In addition, the company is listed as “Scheinunternehmen” in the Company Register and the Beneficial Ownership Register until it is dissolved and removed from the Company Register, and the tax authorities will restrict the fraudulent company’s VAT number. These measures effectively prevent the company from continued participation in economic activities and from being used as a vehicle for fraud and ML. In addition, the natural persons behind these fraudulent companies are prosecuted as the perpetrators of social security and fiscal fraud. 390. Competent authorities work closely together to identify fraudulent companies. For instance, the Tax Authority and the A-FIU developed a common initiative to detect fraudulent companies involved in tax and social security fraud schemes. This resulted in 11 tax-recovering orders for a total of EUR 5 million for suspected tax fraud and frozen bank accounts for a value of about EUR 2 million. In addition, a mechanism was developed to assist FIs in the identification of such companies as part of their transaction monitoring. For the implementation of this mechanism, the Tax Authority and the A-FIU cooperated closely with OEs to produce financial intelligence identifying tax and social security fraud schemes. In addition to Austrian fraudulent companies, this initiative also led to the identification of 266 foreign fictitious companies from 14 different countries. 391. More generally, Austria’s actions to tackle the risk associated to fraudulent companies has proven to be successful as illustrated by the official list of identified fraudulent companies on the BMF’s public website. As of mid-June 2025, a total number of 1 050 legal entities were included in this list. Suspected cases of fraudulent companies are also included in the social fraud database. Austria has various effective measures in place to mitigate the ML/TF/PF risks associated to investments in real estate by foreign legal entities. 392. A requirement for foreign legal entities owning real estate in Austria to report their beneficial owners for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register is already in place for many years. In addition, restrictions on property transfers to foreign legal entities domiciled outside the EEA limit their opportunities for real estate investments. In those instances where a foreign legal entity is still permitted to acquire domestic property, the intervention of a notary is mandatory, just like for any other transfer of real estate. Before the notarisation or preparation of a notarial deed, the notary is required to collect credible documents on beneficial owners for inclusion in the deed. They should also request proof of reporting of beneficial owners to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, and compare the information obtained from the customer with the information in the Beneficial Ownership Register. Other measures leading to mitigating ML/TF risks in the property sector consist of EDD implemented by CIs in case of real estate investments by foreign customers, including legal entities, in Austria. Implementation of such measures has substantially increased in response to other autonomous EU sanctions. 393. Austria’s CIs have also significantly strengthened their CDD requirements and apply EDD measures to both domestic and foreign legal entities with complex ownership and control structures (see above and IO.3). Austria has not yet implemented measures to mitigate the recently identified ML/TF risks of foreign legal entities owning aircrafts but drafting of amendments to the WiEReG was underway at the time of the onsite visit. The impact on effectiveness is very minor given the negligible materiality of this sub-set of legal entities (R.24). Footnotes [72] Foreign LPs with a registered office outside and which acquire/own land or real estate in Austria, and foreign express trusts and similar LA managed from within Austria or acquire/own land or real estate in Austria. [73] As of 1 October 2025, all nominee arrangements (including those that do not affect beneficial ownership) should be disclosed to the Registry Authority for inclusion in the Beneficial Ownership Register. [74] In 2020, Austria introduced an obligation for LPs to disclose nominee arrangements that are relevant for the identification and verification of beneficial owners. Since that time, the definition of control in the WiEReG explicitly referred to nominee agreements as a form of control." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 443. A key finding of the 2016 MER was that the A-FIU functioned well as a predicate offence and associated ML investigation unit, rather than as a financial intelligence unit. The A-FIU approach regarding STR/SAR analysis was primarily investigative, since it sought to identify predicate offences that could trigger a criminal case, as opposed to gathering information and financial intelligence and analysing it. The A-FIU did not act as a filter, since more than 80% of the incoming information was merely transferred without further analysis to investigative authorities, instead of being analysed for possible ML/TF. 444. In 2020, the A-FIU underwent a fundamental restructuring. The A-FIU’s role was clearly established in legislation while its autonomy to conduct analysis and disseminate financial intelligence as well as its other specific tasks were clarified in the FIU General Federal Decree. The A-FIU was formally assigned with the task of analysing incoming information and relieved from investigative functions and duties. 445. The A-FIU recently developed a comprehensive analysis process that combines automated and manual cross-checks, risk-based and network analyses but this requires further calibration to have a substantive impact on effectiveness. The A-FIU uses a dashboard developed in-house to monitor and control its data and processes (Figure 6.2). Since January 2025, it implemented a rules-based scoring system aimed at capturing risks to prioritise reports for analysis, and there are already plans for dynamic reviews of the system and incremental improvements to make it more risk-based. Before 2025, A-FIU staff manually reviewed incoming reports to establish priority, classifying all reports into three categories. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 6.3. Graphical illustration of the analysis process 446. The 2025 semi-automated scoring system is calibrated with some consideration of the NRA results for prioritising cases for analysis. The rules-based scoring system considers several factors such as (i) person/entity risk (e.g., PEP, person already identified in a police database etc.); (ii) some transactional characteristics (e.g., type and amount of the transaction, suspected predicate offences); and (iii) some limited geographical risks (i.e., FATF-listed jurisdictions only). Based on set rules, the system automatically assigns scores depending on the occurrence and combination of these criteria: the higher the score, the higher the assumed risk, the higher the processing priority. Reports with the highest priority are processed immediately, while those with a medium score are second in line for processing, and those with a low score are not processed and are stored in the database for five years. The system also allows for manual intervention to “upgrade” or “downgrade” reports, and a sample of reports are also manually reviewed to ensure automated allocation is functioning well. 447. The scoring system and calibration of individual criteria for the processing rules do not favour the identification of ML cases, including as the scoring focuses too heavily on predicate offences, in particular fraud. [90] The system does not currently provide a sufficiently solid basis to effectively steer the FIU’s analytical activities. The criterion on geographical risks is not sufficiently granular and does not consider Austria's risk and context, including its exposure to transnational ML/TF threats and related cross-border financial flows. In addition, if the OE classifies transactions as ML (as opposed to a predicate offence to ML), this factor is given the minimal weight as the A-FIU considers this as insufficient to substantiate suspicions. More importantly, if there is no possibility to establish a strong link to a specific predicate offence in the first place, the STR will often be disregarded. This results in a prioritisation system which is rather rule-based instead of risk-based. On average, only between 5-10% of reports were assigned a high score and identified as priority cases, whereas the vast majority are classified as low priority or have scores that are too close to each other, making efficient prioritisation difficult. 448. The A-FIU has operational independence regarding its analytical and disseminations activities but lacks sufficient independence when it comes to budget and staffing. As a separate unit within the BKA, it does not have its own budget, and its staff is not permanently assigned to it. It cannot freely recruit personnel from outside the BKA and must rely instead on staff from the police force for some positions, including analytical ones. [91] Staff are therefore generally investigators recruited by the BKA while some of them are seconded from other government agencies. This curtails A-FIU's independence and has a negative impact on the A-FIU's ability to obtain and maintain expertise needed in some areas, particularly for its analytical functions. 449. The A-FIU's staffing levels are insufficient for it to fulfil its tasks and develop its operational and strategic analysis capabilities, but BKA management indicated during the onsite visit that it is planning to double the current A-FIU staff numbers. The announced increase in staffing levels is crucial to ensure that the A-FIU is able to deal with the increasing number of STRs and other reports received. Following the 2016 MER recommendations, the A-FIU's organisational structure has been optimised and the budget for number of staff increased from 20 FTEs in 2016 (consisting of one financial analyst and mostly investigators) to 24 FTEs in 2018. The 2025 budget allocation for the number of FTEs is still at the 2018 level which appears to be insufficient in relation to the size of the financial market and DNFBP sectors, the level of risks and the increasing number of incoming reports (including STRs) since 2020. Moreover, the full 24 FTEs positions have never been fully filled to date. [92] The operational analysis unit has therefore been understaffed for years, with total FTE positions not being adjusted following the strategic analysis unit establishment (four FTEs). 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 450. Following the A-FIU's restructuring and the increased focus on analytical functions, the STR dissemination ratio has declined in favour of more in-depth analysis in relation to certain predicate offences (Table 6.5). At the beginning of the period under review, the A-FIU disseminated an overwhelming majority of STRs/SARs received, with limited analysis (mainly just database checks). Disseminations decreased gradually over time and now tend to include more analysis encompassing multiple STRs, even though the focus remains on supporting predicate offence investigations (rather than developing ML intelligence). For TF, the A-FIU only performs some initial checks on TF suspicion-related STR/SARs and subsequently transfers them, without analysis, to DSN for full analytical review. Reports not disseminated are stored in the system for five years and may be included in future disseminations should new information or reports increase their usability. Incoming reports are automatically cross-checked with the existing data and checked for similarities—e.g. names, addresses, telephone numbers. Table 6.5. A-FIU Dissemination ratio to competent authorities Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Reports from OEs (mainly STRs/SARs but extending to other types of reports) 2 744 3 073 4 356 4 994 6 053 7 603 Reports not disseminated (and stored as ”passive follow-up analysis”) 2 162 2 453 2 416 3 969 5 078 2 162 Reports included in disseminations 2 312 1 494 1 903 2 578 2 084 2 525 Dissemination Ratio 84.3% 48.6% 43.7% 49.4% 34.4% 33.3% Table 6.6. Dissemination breakdown by receiving authority [93] Recipients of analysis reports 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Federal Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) (BK) (internal) 1 128 609 809 571 516 725 BMF 161 95 157 192 185 211 BVT/DSN 110 57 67 46 69 219 FMA 33 19 46 42 28 21 BAK 22 0 3 4 3 3 Other recipients 40 38 18 40 61 174 Total 1 494 1 903 2 578 2 084 2 525 1353 Table 6.7. Dissemination by suspected offence Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TF N/A 203 116 136 239 Fraud N/A 1 824 1 832 1 575 1 114 Drug Trafficking N/A 60 65 51 31 Document Forgery N/A 192 301 207 129 Organised Crime N/A 19 74 30 12 Human Trafficking N/A 80 33 29 31 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 451. The A-FIU’s financial intelligence supports the operational needs of competent authorities only to some extent as financial intelligence packages spontaneously disseminated generally do not target more complex ML schemes, third-party or professional ML. There is no formal mechanism in place for LEAs to provide feedback to the A-FIU. During the onsite visit, LEAs indicated that, overall, the comprehensiveness of A-FIU’s operational analysis was good. Most operational analysis reports focus on predicate offences, especially fraud and, to some extent also, tax fraud, and associated simple ML schemes. A-FIU disseminated an important number of financial intelligence reports to the Tax Authority (TA) (2021: 515; 2022: 673; 2023: 629; 2024: 324), which the TA considers as a crucial factor to select cases for tax audits. However, since 2024, the number of disseminations to the TA has dropped significantly, which is partly due to changes in A-FIU staffing with new staff having less experience in dealing with tax matters. This finding illustrates the resource issues that the A-FIU is facing, including recruitment limitations (section 6.2.1). In addition, and equally important, the recently introduced risk scoring system further assigns lower priority to tax as a predicate offence, resulting in a reduced focus on STRs/SARs potentially related to tax fraud (section 6.2.2). 452. A-FIU demonstrated that it is able to adequately support LEAs in their investigations upon request, including in some complex ML schemes. Competent authorities, especially LEAs, rely on the A-FIU as a valuable source of financial intelligence. In their investigations, they often request A-FIU’s assistance to identify new targets and trace criminal proceeds. During the onsite visit, competent authorities highlighted the added value of the A-FIU's analyses in criminal investigations or to trace criminal proceeds. 453. The A-FIU has commenced to conduct strategic analysis, but its products are not yet sufficiently developed to adequately identify predominant ML/TF modus operandi in line with risk and context. Among its most important products are the Warning Notices to OEs introduced in 2020. These notices are used to trigger STRs/SARs on specific phenomena and, more generally, to publish warnings and give a high-level description of phenomena and trends. The notices and other relevant information are made available in a straightforward manner to OEs and competent authorities via goAML. Since 2022, notices are color-coded depending on the topic. [94] The overall focus has been on fraud and related offences, while a few strategic analysis products related to topics such as virtual IBANs and fraudulent companies. Box 6.1. Example for Red Notice and targeted deployment of strategic analysis The A-FIU received a police “Situation Report Fraud” informing it about an emerging phishing phenomenon. Based on the modus operandi described in the report (transaction structure, average transaction amount, payment reference, etc.), the A-FIU issued a Red Notice via goAML to relevant reporting entities assisting them in identifying perpetrators and money mule accounts. CIs quickly adapted their transaction monitoring tools in response to the notice. As a result, the A-FIU received approximately 150 STRs from CIs and VASPs via goAML regarding fraudulent transactions (triggered by two indicators: amount and subject/payment reference). The A-FIU has conducted detailed analysis, including bank statements, IP addresses, and account holder information, and identified 16 suspects who had opened Austrian bank accounts online and did not have a permanent residence address in Austria. All information was disseminated to the responsible investigative unit and the AR office. FMA as well as BMF published the following articles: https://www.fma.gv.at/phising/, https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/Maerz/warnung-phishing.html 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 454. Other competent authorities also produce financial intelligence using FIU data and other information to support their needs. For TF, A-FIU and DSN closely cooperate to develop financial intelligence. After initial verification in directly accessible databases, the A-FIU systematically transfers TF-related STR/SARs to the DSN for further review. In those cases, the DSN conducts an in-depth analysis and produces financial intelligence, with A-FIU data support (IO.9). The DSN also presented cases, demonstrating that in complex financial investigations, it was able to identify, trace, and freeze funds and other assets for the benefit of individuals and entities engaged in circumvention of sanctions, including through extensive use of financial intelligence and financial flow analysis (IO.11). Tax authorities and the A-FIU also co-operate to produce financial intelligence in tax and social security fraud schemes with OEs’ support. This led to the identification of 266 foreign fictitious companies from 14 countries (IO.5). Footnotes [90] e.g. reports of suspicion of fraud offences of an amount over EUR 5 000 are given the same priority as reports of tax offences of over EUR 100 000. Those are the legal thresholds for these offences being considered ML predicate offences (see also IO.7). [91] More than 50% of the FIU's staffing budget cannot be freely recruited. [92] Number of staff: 2018: 9 FTE; 2019: 15 FTE; 2020: 19 FTE; 2021: 19 FTE; 2022: 19 FTE; 2023: 16 FTE; 2024: 22 FTE). [93] For years 2019–2023, data was collected retrospectively and is subject to errors. [94] Red Warning Notices are urgent warnings about current and specific modi operandi . The A-FIU expects OEs to react quickly and take appropriate countermeasures. Purple Notices provide information at an early stage about phenomena, trends, and patterns as well as patterns that go beyond a specific individual case. They offer the private sector a general input in the fight against fraud, ML and TF and for their risk assessment and can be used at their own discretion. Green Notices are used to inform OEs about new developments regarding goAML, technical updates, and successful investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 443. A key finding of the 2016 MER was that the A-FIU functioned well as a predicate offence and associated ML investigation unit, rather than as a financial intelligence unit. The A-FIU approach regarding STR/SAR analysis was primarily investigative, since it sought to identify predicate offences that could trigger a criminal case, as opposed to gathering information and financial intelligence and analysing it. The A-FIU did not act as a filter, since more than 80% of the incoming information was merely transferred without further analysis to investigative authorities, instead of being analysed for possible ML/TF. 444. In 2020, the A-FIU underwent a fundamental restructuring. The A-FIU’s role was clearly established in legislation while its autonomy to conduct analysis and disseminate financial intelligence as well as its other specific tasks were clarified in the FIU General Federal Decree. The A-FIU was formally assigned with the task of analysing incoming information and relieved from investigative functions and duties. 445. The A-FIU recently developed a comprehensive analysis process that combines automated and manual cross-checks, risk-based and network analyses but this requires further calibration to have a substantive impact on effectiveness. The A-FIU uses a dashboard developed in-house to monitor and control its data and processes (Figure 6.2). Since January 2025, it implemented a rules-based scoring system aimed at capturing risks to prioritise reports for analysis, and there are already plans for dynamic reviews of the system and incremental improvements to make it more risk-based. Before 2025, A-FIU staff manually reviewed incoming reports to establish priority, classifying all reports into three categories. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 6.3. Graphical illustration of the analysis process 446. The 2025 semi-automated scoring system is calibrated with some consideration of the NRA results for prioritising cases for analysis. The rules-based scoring system considers several factors such as (i) person/entity risk (e.g., PEP, person already identified in a police database etc.); (ii) some transactional characteristics (e.g., type and amount of the transaction, suspected predicate offences); and (iii) some limited geographical risks (i.e., FATF-listed jurisdictions only). Based on set rules, the system automatically assigns scores depending on the occurrence and combination of these criteria: the higher the score, the higher the assumed risk, the higher the processing priority. Reports with the highest priority are processed immediately, while those with a medium score are second in line for processing, and those with a low score are not processed and are stored in the database for five years. The system also allows for manual intervention to “upgrade” or “downgrade” reports, and a sample of reports are also manually reviewed to ensure automated allocation is functioning well. 447. The scoring system and calibration of individual criteria for the processing rules do not favour the identification of ML cases, including as the scoring focuses too heavily on predicate offences, in particular fraud. [90] The system does not currently provide a sufficiently solid basis to effectively steer the FIU’s analytical activities. The criterion on geographical risks is not sufficiently granular and does not consider Austria's risk and context, including its exposure to transnational ML/TF threats and related cross-border financial flows. In addition, if the OE classifies transactions as ML (as opposed to a predicate offence to ML), this factor is given the minimal weight as the A-FIU considers this as insufficient to substantiate suspicions. More importantly, if there is no possibility to establish a strong link to a specific predicate offence in the first place, the STR will often be disregarded. This results in a prioritisation system which is rather rule-based instead of risk-based. On average, only between 5-10% of reports were assigned a high score and identified as priority cases, whereas the vast majority are classified as low priority or have scores that are too close to each other, making efficient prioritisation difficult. 448. The A-FIU has operational independence regarding its analytical and disseminations activities but lacks sufficient independence when it comes to budget and staffing. As a separate unit within the BKA, it does not have its own budget, and its staff is not permanently assigned to it. It cannot freely recruit personnel from outside the BKA and must rely instead on staff from the police force for some positions, including analytical ones. [91] Staff are therefore generally investigators recruited by the BKA while some of them are seconded from other government agencies. This curtails A-FIU's independence and has a negative impact on the A-FIU's ability to obtain and maintain expertise needed in some areas, particularly for its analytical functions. 449. The A-FIU's staffing levels are insufficient for it to fulfil its tasks and develop its operational and strategic analysis capabilities, but BKA management indicated during the onsite visit that it is planning to double the current A-FIU staff numbers. The announced increase in staffing levels is crucial to ensure that the A-FIU is able to deal with the increasing number of STRs and other reports received. Following the 2016 MER recommendations, the A-FIU's organisational structure has been optimised and the budget for number of staff increased from 20 FTEs in 2016 (consisting of one financial analyst and mostly investigators) to 24 FTEs in 2018. The 2025 budget allocation for the number of FTEs is still at the 2018 level which appears to be insufficient in relation to the size of the financial market and DNFBP sectors, the level of risks and the increasing number of incoming reports (including STRs) since 2020. Moreover, the full 24 FTEs positions have never been fully filled to date. [92] The operational analysis unit has therefore been understaffed for years, with total FTE positions not being adjusted following the strategic analysis unit establishment (four FTEs). 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 450. Following the A-FIU's restructuring and the increased focus on analytical functions, the STR dissemination ratio has declined in favour of more in-depth analysis in relation to certain predicate offences (Table 6.5). At the beginning of the period under review, the A-FIU disseminated an overwhelming majority of STRs/SARs received, with limited analysis (mainly just database checks). Disseminations decreased gradually over time and now tend to include more analysis encompassing multiple STRs, even though the focus remains on supporting predicate offence investigations (rather than developing ML intelligence). For TF, the A-FIU only performs some initial checks on TF suspicion-related STR/SARs and subsequently transfers them, without analysis, to DSN for full analytical review. Reports not disseminated are stored in the system for five years and may be included in future disseminations should new information or reports increase their usability. Incoming reports are automatically cross-checked with the existing data and checked for similarities—e.g. names, addresses, telephone numbers. Table 6.5. A-FIU Dissemination ratio to competent authorities Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Reports from OEs (mainly STRs/SARs but extending to other types of reports) 2 744 3 073 4 356 4 994 6 053 7 603 Reports not disseminated (and stored as ”passive follow-up analysis”) 2 162 2 453 2 416 3 969 5 078 2 162 Reports included in disseminations 2 312 1 494 1 903 2 578 2 084 2 525 Dissemination Ratio 84.3% 48.6% 43.7% 49.4% 34.4% 33.3% Table 6.6. Dissemination breakdown by receiving authority [93] Recipients of analysis reports 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Federal Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) (BK) (internal) 1 128 609 809 571 516 725 BMF 161 95 157 192 185 211 BVT/DSN 110 57 67 46 69 219 FMA 33 19 46 42 28 21 BAK 22 0 3 4 3 3 Other recipients 40 38 18 40 61 174 Total 1 494 1 903 2 578 2 084 2 525 1353 Table 6.7. Dissemination by suspected offence Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TF N/A 203 116 136 239 Fraud N/A 1 824 1 832 1 575 1 114 Drug Trafficking N/A 60 65 51 31 Document Forgery N/A 192 301 207 129 Organised Crime N/A 19 74 30 12 Human Trafficking N/A 80 33 29 31 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 451. The A-FIU’s financial intelligence supports the operational needs of competent authorities only to some extent as financial intelligence packages spontaneously disseminated generally do not target more complex ML schemes, third-party or professional ML. There is no formal mechanism in place for LEAs to provide feedback to the A-FIU. During the onsite visit, LEAs indicated that, overall, the comprehensiveness of A-FIU’s operational analysis was good. Most operational analysis reports focus on predicate offences, especially fraud and, to some extent also, tax fraud, and associated simple ML schemes. A-FIU disseminated an important number of financial intelligence reports to the Tax Authority (TA) (2021: 515; 2022: 673; 2023: 629; 2024: 324), which the TA considers as a crucial factor to select cases for tax audits. However, since 2024, the number of disseminations to the TA has dropped significantly, which is partly due to changes in A-FIU staffing with new staff having less experience in dealing with tax matters. This finding illustrates the resource issues that the A-FIU is facing, including recruitment limitations (section 6.2.1). In addition, and equally important, the recently introduced risk scoring system further assigns lower priority to tax as a predicate offence, resulting in a reduced focus on STRs/SARs potentially related to tax fraud (section 6.2.2). 452. A-FIU demonstrated that it is able to adequately support LEAs in their investigations upon request, including in some complex ML schemes. Competent authorities, especially LEAs, rely on the A-FIU as a valuable source of financial intelligence. In their investigations, they often request A-FIU’s assistance to identify new targets and trace criminal proceeds. During the onsite visit, competent authorities highlighted the added value of the A-FIU's analyses in criminal investigations or to trace criminal proceeds. 453. The A-FIU has commenced to conduct strategic analysis, but its products are not yet sufficiently developed to adequately identify predominant ML/TF modus operandi in line with risk and context. Among its most important products are the Warning Notices to OEs introduced in 2020. These notices are used to trigger STRs/SARs on specific phenomena and, more generally, to publish warnings and give a high-level description of phenomena and trends. The notices and other relevant information are made available in a straightforward manner to OEs and competent authorities via goAML. Since 2022, notices are color-coded depending on the topic. [94] The overall focus has been on fraud and related offences, while a few strategic analysis products related to topics such as virtual IBANs and fraudulent companies. Box 6.1. Example for Red Notice and targeted deployment of strategic analysis The A-FIU received a police “Situation Report Fraud” informing it about an emerging phishing phenomenon. Based on the modus operandi described in the report (transaction structure, average transaction amount, payment reference, etc.), the A-FIU issued a Red Notice via goAML to relevant reporting entities assisting them in identifying perpetrators and money mule accounts. CIs quickly adapted their transaction monitoring tools in response to the notice. As a result, the A-FIU received approximately 150 STRs from CIs and VASPs via goAML regarding fraudulent transactions (triggered by two indicators: amount and subject/payment reference). The A-FIU has conducted detailed analysis, including bank statements, IP addresses, and account holder information, and identified 16 suspects who had opened Austrian bank accounts online and did not have a permanent residence address in Austria. All information was disseminated to the responsible investigative unit and the AR office. FMA as well as BMF published the following articles: https://www.fma.gv.at/phising/, https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/Maerz/warnung-phishing.html 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 454. Other competent authorities also produce financial intelligence using FIU data and other information to support their needs. For TF, A-FIU and DSN closely cooperate to develop financial intelligence. After initial verification in directly accessible databases, the A-FIU systematically transfers TF-related STR/SARs to the DSN for further review. In those cases, the DSN conducts an in-depth analysis and produces financial intelligence, with A-FIU data support (IO.9). The DSN also presented cases, demonstrating that in complex financial investigations, it was able to identify, trace, and freeze funds and other assets for the benefit of individuals and entities engaged in circumvention of sanctions, including through extensive use of financial intelligence and financial flow analysis (IO.11). Tax authorities and the A-FIU also co-operate to produce financial intelligence in tax and social security fraud schemes with OEs’ support. This led to the identification of 266 foreign fictitious companies from 14 countries (IO.5). Footnotes [90] e.g. reports of suspicion of fraud offences of an amount over EUR 5 000 are given the same priority as reports of tax offences of over EUR 100 000. Those are the legal thresholds for these offences being considered ML predicate offences (see also IO.7). [91] More than 50% of the FIU's staffing budget cannot be freely recruited. [92] Number of staff: 2018: 9 FTE; 2019: 15 FTE; 2020: 19 FTE; 2021: 19 FTE; 2022: 19 FTE; 2023: 16 FTE; 2024: 22 FTE). [93] For years 2019–2023, data was collected retrospectively and is subject to errors. [94] Red Warning Notices are urgent warnings about current and specific modi operandi . The A-FIU expects OEs to react quickly and take appropriate countermeasures. Purple Notices provide information at an early stage about phenomena, trends, and patterns as well as patterns that go beyond a specific individual case. They offer the private sector a general input in the fight against fraud, ML and TF and for their risk assessment and can be used at their own discretion. Green Notices are used to inform OEs about new developments regarding goAML, technical updates, and successful investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="485. The authorities have the capacity to prosecute and convict self-laundering but face significant challenges in pursing third-party ML or stand-alone cases. Overall, Austria faces important difficulties in prosecuting ML separately from a predicate offence. Austria was able to demonstrate, based on a selection of judgments, that it has prosecuted and convicted different types of ML cases (self-laundering, stand-alone ML, and third-party ML), including complex ML networks. However, different types of ML are not being pursued and prosecuted in a systematic manner due to issues in detecting and investigating third-party and stand-alone ML (section 7.1), as well as the high evidentiary standard of proof required for prosecution and conviction of the ML offence. 486. The number of ML convictions increased significantly in 2023 and 2024 but remains low overall considering Austria’s risk profile. Over the past 5 years, there were on annual average 104 ML convictions. The acquittal rate stood at approximately 23%, which corresponds quite closely to the overall acquittal rate for all criminal judgments in Austria in 2023. To explain the increase in convictions, the authorities alluded to the positive effects of the A-FIU reform and the increased quality of disseminations and the expansion of ML predicate offences under Art 165 StGB. Table 7.4. Number of convictions including ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 92 83 78 116 153 Source: Statistik Austria (Conviction statistics— all offences) 487. Data is also lacking on the profile of ML cases that triggered prosecutions and/or convictions, but cases reviewed indicate that they follow the same trend of ML investigations and are mostly related to fraud. From a review of the 18 most recent high court judgements, the vast majority of prosecutions and convictions related to fraud cases, followed by some drug trafficking and serious theft cases. There is also no evidence that Austria is prioritising high-value or complex ML cases for prosecution. 488. Prosecutors continue to face several significant challenges to evidence the knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence which also affect the pursuing of investigation by LEAs ( cases in Boxes 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate some of these challenges) . In addition, the requirement to sufficiently individualise a specific predicate offence constitutes an insurmountable hurdle in practice. In particular, prosecutors must: · Evidence that the predicate offence was committed in a manner fulfilling all legal elements and was unlawful. This means that prosecutors must establish the details of the predicate offence, e.g., that the conduct constituted a designated offence, who the perpetrator was, and which types of assets originated from the predicate offence. Although in line with R.3 (c.3.5), no prior—separate—conviction for the predicate offence is required, in practice, the very high standard of proof remains comparable to that of obtaining a conviction for the predicate offence. This significantly hinders the prosecution of the ML offence: even where the court is convinced of the unlawful origin of an asset, an ML conviction may fail due to an insufficiently established predicate offence. · Evidence that the offender's intention to conceal or disguise the illegal origin of the asset or to assist another person involved in the criminal activity to evade the legal consequences of their act. As per the EXW case below, if the offender just holds criminal assets, without the intent to conceal or disguise its illegal origin, there are no sufficient grounds for conviction (Art. 165, para 1 StGB); or · Evidence that the offender knew at the time of acquisition of the assets that they are criminal proceeds (Art. 165, para 2 StGB). Prosecutors must prove not only the offender's knowledge of the illicit origin of the assets at the time of acquisition but also that offender understood the specific predicate offence committed in its essential terms; or · Evidence that the criminal property has integrated the property of the offender. A circumstance that often precludes the prosecution of ML is that prosecutors must prove not only that the offender committed the offence, but the criminal property derived from the offence became part of his/her own assets before being laundered by the third party. 489. In addition, a judgment of the Higher Regional Court of Graz in 2024 required the Prosecutor´s Office Graz to evidence that a specific asset or part of an asset constituted proceeds where the offender held assets from both licit and illicit activity—for instance, in the same bank account (the co-mingling challenges). According to the authorities, prosecutors working in the other Prosecutor’s Offices in Austria were not affected by this jurisprudence. [105] Box 7.3. EXW Case [106] The Regional Court of Klagenfurt tried a case of particular significance of 11 defendants over 60 hearing days for a cryptocurrency investment fraud involving the EXW platform. Approximately 40 000 victims were allegedly defrauded of at least EUR 17.6 million. The platform promised over 200% annual returns through its EXW token, using lavish promotional events to attract investors. Funds were paid into changing foreign accounts, converted to cryptocurrency, and used to finance defendants' lifestyles. Verdict (23 October 2024): Several defendants were convicted of serious commercial fraud and criminal organisation participation, receiving 18 months to 5 years imprisonment. However, five defendants accused of ML were acquitted because it could not be established that they had the necessary knowledge elements. Where deposits, withdrawals, and onward transfers of tainted funds had occurred, these were considered standard business transactions which did not constitute concealment (or “disguising” under s. 165(1), StGB), and that there was insufficient evidence that the defendants acted with (at least conditional) intent to conceal or disguise the illegal origin of the assets, or to assist another person involved in such criminal activity. Where a defendant had received cash, the court considered that it could not be evidenced that the defendant knew at the time of receipt that the cash originated from a criminal activity of another person. The offender would need to understand, in a layperson’s terms, the elements of the offence in their social meaning, although knowledge of the details of the predicate offence or its legal classification, as well as the identity of the perpetrator, was not required. Regarding a specific transport of EUR 215 000 in cash from Italy (South Tyrol) to Austria, the court also based its acquittal on the fact that it remained unclear whether the funds were actually customer money connected to EXW, and therefore the money could not be considered as an object of the ML offence. Box 7.4 Fraud and Money Laundering Case (2021–2024) [107] Between November–December 2021, unknown fraudsters convinced victims in Austria and other EU countries to pay fake transaction fees or taxes for fictitious inheritances or loans. In connection with these unknown offenders, the defendant opened a bank account to receive victim payments, then quickly transferred the funds (totalling EUR 8 000) to foreign accounts. First Instance Verdict (27 September 2023): The court convicted the defendant of ML for receiving and transferring EUR 8 000 derived from aggravated and professional fraud. Appeal Outcome (5 June 2024): The Higher Regional Court of Graz overturned the conviction and ordered a retrial. The appellate court found the first instance court failed to establish: · Whether individual fraud acts exceeded the EUR 5 000 threshold (Art. 147(2) StGB) or were committed professionally, thus qualifying as money laundering predicate offences (Art. 165 StGB) · Whether the assets had actually been acquired by the predicate offence perpetrators before the alleged laundering actions occurred. 490. Those challenges also limit Austria's ability to pursue significantly some third-party ML cases, including “money mules” or “cash couriers” which are very common in the country's context and relevant to Austria's risk as a transit country. According to the 2021 and 2024 NRAs, “money mule” is a ML method commonly used in Austria. The share of money mules—already found to be very high in an academic analysis of all ML cases in 2020—was recently described by authorities as “alarming.” Often these cases will involve a large number of individuals and in such cases, prosecutors are unable to prove that each accused not only knew that the asset was not obtained legally but also understood the predicate offence in all its essential terms. The impossibility to conduct remote real-time surveillance of encrypted end-to-end communications (section 7.1), also limits the authorities’ ability to pursue cases even further. 491. The 2016 MER recommended Austria to ensure that the process of appealing an indictment is properly expedited in order to effectively combat crime and in particular ML and TF. During the current review period, in only 34 cases ML indictments triggered appeals by accusers and the average time for a decision on appeals by the Superior Regional Court was 54 days. Overall, the process for appealing an indictment did not trigger undue delays during the current review period. Footnotes [105] Austria reported that a recent Supreme Court decision (case number 14 Os 137/22, decision of 1 December 2025) clarified that an economic assessment based on the principle of free judicial evaluation of evidence should be considered for resolving comingling challenges. The decision was yet to be published as of December 2025. [106] FIU Money Laundering Report 2023, p. 52. [107] OLG Graz, Decision of 5 June 2024, case number 9 Bs 405/23m." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="485. The authorities have the capacity to prosecute and convict self-laundering but face significant challenges in pursing third-party ML or stand-alone cases. Overall, Austria faces important difficulties in prosecuting ML separately from a predicate offence. Austria was able to demonstrate, based on a selection of judgments, that it has prosecuted and convicted different types of ML cases (self-laundering, stand-alone ML, and third-party ML), including complex ML networks. However, different types of ML are not being pursued and prosecuted in a systematic manner due to issues in detecting and investigating third-party and stand-alone ML (section 7.1), as well as the high evidentiary standard of proof required for prosecution and conviction of the ML offence. 486. The number of ML convictions increased significantly in 2023 and 2024 but remains low overall considering Austria’s risk profile. Over the past 5 years, there were on annual average 104 ML convictions. The acquittal rate stood at approximately 23%, which corresponds quite closely to the overall acquittal rate for all criminal judgments in Austria in 2023. To explain the increase in convictions, the authorities alluded to the positive effects of the A-FIU reform and the increased quality of disseminations and the expansion of ML predicate offences under Art 165 StGB. Table 7.4. Number of convictions including ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 92 83 78 116 153 Source: Statistik Austria (Conviction statistics— all offences) 487. Data is also lacking on the profile of ML cases that triggered prosecutions and/or convictions, but cases reviewed indicate that they follow the same trend of ML investigations and are mostly related to fraud. From a review of the 18 most recent high court judgements, the vast majority of prosecutions and convictions related to fraud cases, followed by some drug trafficking and serious theft cases. There is also no evidence that Austria is prioritising high-value or complex ML cases for prosecution. 488. Prosecutors continue to face several significant challenges to evidence the knowledge and intent elements of the ML offence which also affect the pursuing of investigation by LEAs ( cases in Boxes 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate some of these challenges) . In addition, the requirement to sufficiently individualise a specific predicate offence constitutes an insurmountable hurdle in practice. In particular, prosecutors must: · Evidence that the predicate offence was committed in a manner fulfilling all legal elements and was unlawful. This means that prosecutors must establish the details of the predicate offence, e.g., that the conduct constituted a designated offence, who the perpetrator was, and which types of assets originated from the predicate offence. Although in line with R.3 (c.3.5), no prior—separate—conviction for the predicate offence is required, in practice, the very high standard of proof remains comparable to that of obtaining a conviction for the predicate offence. This significantly hinders the prosecution of the ML offence: even where the court is convinced of the unlawful origin of an asset, an ML conviction may fail due to an insufficiently established predicate offence. · Evidence that the offender's intention to conceal or disguise the illegal origin of the asset or to assist another person involved in the criminal activity to evade the legal consequences of their act. As per the EXW case below, if the offender just holds criminal assets, without the intent to conceal or disguise its illegal origin, there are no sufficient grounds for conviction (Art. 165, para 1 StGB); or · Evidence that the offender knew at the time of acquisition of the assets that they are criminal proceeds (Art. 165, para 2 StGB). Prosecutors must prove not only the offender's knowledge of the illicit origin of the assets at the time of acquisition but also that offender understood the specific predicate offence committed in its essential terms; or · Evidence that the criminal property has integrated the property of the offender. A circumstance that often precludes the prosecution of ML is that prosecutors must prove not only that the offender committed the offence, but the criminal property derived from the offence became part of his/her own assets before being laundered by the third party. 489. In addition, a judgment of the Higher Regional Court of Graz in 2024 required the Prosecutor´s Office Graz to evidence that a specific asset or part of an asset constituted proceeds where the offender held assets from both licit and illicit activity—for instance, in the same bank account (the co-mingling challenges). According to the authorities, prosecutors working in the other Prosecutor’s Offices in Austria were not affected by this jurisprudence. [105] Box 7.3. EXW Case [106] The Regional Court of Klagenfurt tried a case of particular significance of 11 defendants over 60 hearing days for a cryptocurrency investment fraud involving the EXW platform. Approximately 40 000 victims were allegedly defrauded of at least EUR 17.6 million. The platform promised over 200% annual returns through its EXW token, using lavish promotional events to attract investors. Funds were paid into changing foreign accounts, converted to cryptocurrency, and used to finance defendants' lifestyles. Verdict (23 October 2024): Several defendants were convicted of serious commercial fraud and criminal organisation participation, receiving 18 months to 5 years imprisonment. However, five defendants accused of ML were acquitted because it could not be established that they had the necessary knowledge elements. Where deposits, withdrawals, and onward transfers of tainted funds had occurred, these were considered standard business transactions which did not constitute concealment (or “disguising” under s. 165(1), StGB), and that there was insufficient evidence that the defendants acted with (at least conditional) intent to conceal or disguise the illegal origin of the assets, or to assist another person involved in such criminal activity. Where a defendant had received cash, the court considered that it could not be evidenced that the defendant knew at the time of receipt that the cash originated from a criminal activity of another person. The offender would need to understand, in a layperson’s terms, the elements of the offence in their social meaning, although knowledge of the details of the predicate offence or its legal classification, as well as the identity of the perpetrator, was not required. Regarding a specific transport of EUR 215 000 in cash from Italy (South Tyrol) to Austria, the court also based its acquittal on the fact that it remained unclear whether the funds were actually customer money connected to EXW, and therefore the money could not be considered as an object of the ML offence. Box 7.4 Fraud and Money Laundering Case (2021–2024) [107] Between November–December 2021, unknown fraudsters convinced victims in Austria and other EU countries to pay fake transaction fees or taxes for fictitious inheritances or loans. In connection with these unknown offenders, the defendant opened a bank account to receive victim payments, then quickly transferred the funds (totalling EUR 8 000) to foreign accounts. First Instance Verdict (27 September 2023): The court convicted the defendant of ML for receiving and transferring EUR 8 000 derived from aggravated and professional fraud. Appeal Outcome (5 June 2024): The Higher Regional Court of Graz overturned the conviction and ordered a retrial. The appellate court found the first instance court failed to establish: · Whether individual fraud acts exceeded the EUR 5 000 threshold (Art. 147(2) StGB) or were committed professionally, thus qualifying as money laundering predicate offences (Art. 165 StGB) · Whether the assets had actually been acquired by the predicate offence perpetrators before the alleged laundering actions occurred. 490. Those challenges also limit Austria's ability to pursue significantly some third-party ML cases, including “money mules” or “cash couriers” which are very common in the country's context and relevant to Austria's risk as a transit country. According to the 2021 and 2024 NRAs, “money mule” is a ML method commonly used in Austria. The share of money mules—already found to be very high in an academic analysis of all ML cases in 2020—was recently described by authorities as “alarming.” Often these cases will involve a large number of individuals and in such cases, prosecutors are unable to prove that each accused not only knew that the asset was not obtained legally but also understood the predicate offence in all its essential terms. The impossibility to conduct remote real-time surveillance of encrypted end-to-end communications (section 7.1), also limits the authorities’ ability to pursue cases even further. 491. The 2016 MER recommended Austria to ensure that the process of appealing an indictment is properly expedited in order to effectively combat crime and in particular ML and TF. During the current review period, in only 34 cases ML indictments triggered appeals by accusers and the average time for a decision on appeals by the Superior Regional Court was 54 days. Overall, the process for appealing an indictment did not trigger undue delays during the current review period. Footnotes [105] Austria reported that a recent Supreme Court decision (case number 14 Os 137/22, decision of 1 December 2025) clarified that an economic assessment based on the principle of free judicial evaluation of evidence should be considered for resolving comingling challenges. The decision was yet to be published as of December 2025. [106] FIU Money Laundering Report 2023, p. 52. [107] OLG Graz, Decision of 5 June 2024, case number 9 Bs 405/23m." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. LEAs routinely work to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value as part of their integrated financial investigations, although asset tracing is not always implemented consistently. Considering the mobility of criminal assets and Austria’s position as a transit country (e.g., criminal groups from the Western Balkan involved in drug trafficking smuggling bulk cash through Austria), LEAs also make use of international channels when assets are located abroad. However, discussions with authorities and statistical data suggest asset tracing is not always implemented consistently (IO.2). 513. LEAs generally possess the required capabilities to trace criminal property and property of corresponding value, as supported by cases and interviews (Boxes 8.2 and 8.3). They have access to the same tools as those for the detection of the predicate offence (IO.7). At operational level, the police uses a checklist for application of AR measures, record all measures taken in the PKS and in their report to the PPO. The authorities emphasise that easy and rapid access to data on the Land Register, Register of Beneficial Owners, and Central Account Register assist with the tracing of criminal property (IO.5). 514. LEAs are developing analytical tools and centres of expertise to support asset identification and tracing to handle evolving threats in relation to cybercrime. This follows a rise in cybercrime offences by 74% from 2020 to 2024 where dissipation of assets is faster. Austria has been focused on live screening of fraud cases by the relevant CIS unit. This unit plays an effective role in promptly detecting proceeds from fraud and securing them before dissipation. CIS is enhancing tools to assist LEAs in freezing fraudulently obtained VAs immediately when a police report is made. A project was also launched in 2023 in Upper Austria to improve cybercrime reporting and data connectivity between local and state police and to better detect serial offences. Cybercrime Training Centres provide IT forensics support. Box 8.2. LoopX Cryptocurrency Scam [117] An international group conducted a large-scale fraud (so-called exit scam), claiming to launch a new cryptocurrency called &quot;LoopX&quot; (LPX). They promoted 10 million LPX tokens as highly profitable investments, accepting only virtual asset payments. After hundreds of worldwide victims invested over EUR 5 750 000, the suspects deleted their social media channels and website and disappeared with the funds. From December 2022 to March 2024, investigators traced cryptocurrency transaction flows across Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Thailand, and Cyprus, secured and analysed evidence, under Austrian WKStA direction. The investigation revealed the fraud was primarily orchestrated from Austria. Working with Eurojust, prosecutors from involved countries issued European arrest warrants. Coordinated searches, seizures, and arrests occurred in the autumn of 2023 in Linz, Graz, Prague, and Cyprus with the assistance of Austria's special operations unit, Czech and Cypriot authorities, and Europol IT experts. A 29-year-old and 38-year-old Austrian citizens were arrested in Linz and Cyprus, and a 34-year-old Czech national was arrested in Prague. In the following months, three additional Austrian citizens were apprehended in Styria and Upper Austria. Several assets were seized in the course of the investigation. Convictions (6 August 2024) Linz Regional Court convicted five defendants of aggravated fraud and criminal association participation; one was additionally convicted of money laundering. Appeal Outcome (27 November 2024) Linz Higher Regional Court (OLG Linz) 67 dismissed appeals but corrected confiscation orders based partly on CIS blockchain analysis. Key rulings: · VAs valued at time of offence and not the seized assets should be considered for the purpose of calculating property of corresponding value (§ 20(3) StGB). On this basis, the court ordered the confiscation of property corresponding to the value of unrecovered virtual assets (EUR 684 000, EUR 768 600, and EUR 894 200 in three cases); · 17.6 Ethereum (valued at the time: EUR 10 014) seized in government wallet ordered converted to fiat currency, allowing authorities to benefit from market value increase · EUR 11 400 watch confiscated as one of the defendants had financed its purchase with proceeds from the fraud. Box 8.3. Tax Refund Phishing Fraud Scheme (Early 2023) (provisional measures only) [118] Perpetrators sent fake SMS messages impersonating the tax office, claiming recipients were entitled to three-digit euro refunds. Victims were directed to click a link and &quot;verify&quot; information on a fake website that captured their banking details. Detection and Response: · CIS Unit 7.2 &quot;Situation Report Fraud&quot; identified the phishing pattern early through live screening of new fraud cases. The unit's daily analysis includes approximately 300–400 fraud reports; · The Unit 7.2 immediately alerted the A-FIU, which issued red warning notices through goAML to reporting entities to identify perpetrator and money mule accounts. The pattern involved links to Lithuanian accounts, specific transaction amounts, and particular payment references. Results: · REs quickly adjusted transaction monitoring systems and A-FIU received approximately 150 STRs via goAML from Austrian CIs and VASPs; · With ARO support, investigators and prosecutors blocked 21 bank accounts and seized EUR 239 945,63; · Although approximately EUR 150 000 had already been transferred abroad, these measures immediately halted the fraud scheme. Victims and Suspects: · Approximately 1 700 victims identified—many only learned of the fraud through authority notification. · By end of October 2024: 42 accused persons (including 2 unknown perpetrators). · Most accused persons reside outside Austria; identities confirmed through Austrian police databases and Europol support. · Investigations were still ongoing at time of onsite visit. 515. LEAs and prosecutors did not demonstrate that they systematically seek to trace criminal property using MLA or other instruments when criminal assets flow abroad, except for a couple of on-going cases (IO.2). Austria estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued on a yearly basis, which is notably low given its risk profile. Within its area of responsibility, the Anti-Fraud Department of the MoF reported to have issued, during the period under review, 3 884 requests for confiscations of assets for tax crimes. 516. LEAs also successfully participate in international JITs that resulted in the application of AR measures. However, the authorities did not demonstrate their capacity to identify criminal assets originating abroad that transit through Austria without foreign intelligence. International cooperation remains is largely limited to EU members, and in most cases including with EU members, only a portion of the assets could eventually be recovered. Box 8.4. Encrypted Messenger Investigation—Task Force Achilles (Since 1 April 2021) (provisional measures only) [119] Austrian CIS received substantial data from encrypted crypto-messenger services through international cooperation, leading to investigations by Task Force &quot;Achilles&quot; (AG Achilles). Results to date: 122 suspects arrested, several kilos of drugs seized, EUR 835 000 in cash recovered and firearms and ammunition seized. Ongoing Investigation: Currently ~200 investigators from CIS, Task Force Achilles core team, regional CIDs, and DSN are working on what has become Austria's largest police investigation. They are analysing chats, photos, and videos from approximately 7 000 individuals with Austrian connections. Due to the enormous data volume, authorities estimate investigations will continue for years. October 2024 Action: Five Austrian citizens suspected of drug trafficking were targeted. Assets worth EUR 300 000 seized, including cash, crypto wallets, and vehicles. All five were remanded in custody. 517. Only a limited number of investigations trigger the application of AR provisional measures (Table 8.1). It is unclear to which extent this is due to challenges in identifying and tracing of criminal property and property of corresponding value, difficulties in the application of seizure/confiscation (section 3.4.3) or instances where assets are of de minimis value and procedural costs of confiscation would be disproportional. [120] It is noteworthy that, despite a 25% increase in the number of reported economic crimes (around 75 000 in 2020-2021 years to over 100 000 in 2023-2024), there is no commensurate increase in the use of provisional measures (the number has actually decreased). Table 8.1. Recorded Offences (Acts) in Selected Categories and Number of provisional measures—Police Crime Statistics (PKS) [121] 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average Total number of recorded offences (acts) 433 811 410 957 488 949 528 010 534 193 479 184 Economic crime (including fraudulent offences (§§ 146 StGB seq.) 72 736 75 472 91 844 103 330 103 500 89 376 Number of offences where provisional measures (seizure/ freezing order) were issued 1 953 1 878 2 055 1 876 1 815 1 915 Source: Austrian authorities Footnotes [117] https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/news.aspx?id=5244456B72723231614F673D [118] Case example 1 (FINLINK, 2023), discussed during the onsite visit. See also Federal Ministry of the Interior: Money Laundering Situation Report 2023, p.52 https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/308/files/Geldwaeschebericht_2023_webBF.pdf . [119] See as a basis for the case example: Case example 4 (ANOM-SKYECC, 2021) [120] Art. 20a(3) of the Criminal Code provides that confiscation should not be ordered if the asset to be confiscated or the prospect of its recovery is disproportionate to the procedural costs that confiscation or recovery would entail. It is possible that financial investigations are already being dispensed with in some cases on this basis. Austria did not have statistical information to indicate how often confiscation is dispensed. The BMJ takes the view in its Guidelines on AR that disproportionate procedural costs are generally only considered up to a de minimis threshold of around EUR 100. [121] The Police Crime Statistics (PKS) record criminal offences (acts), not individuals. Acts are counted separately if they relate to different legal provisions or distinct factual events. The same factual act may appear multiple times in the PKS if it fulfils several criminal offences (e.g. theft and property damage). Therefore, the PKS may include duplicate counts when a single incident involves multiple offences. In contrast, the authorities state that data on provisional measures always relate to a specific offence, which is why no multiple entries are recorded in that context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. LEAs routinely work to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value as part of their integrated financial investigations, although asset tracing is not always implemented consistently. Considering the mobility of criminal assets and Austria’s position as a transit country (e.g., criminal groups from the Western Balkan involved in drug trafficking smuggling bulk cash through Austria), LEAs also make use of international channels when assets are located abroad. However, discussions with authorities and statistical data suggest asset tracing is not always implemented consistently (IO.2). 513. LEAs generally possess the required capabilities to trace criminal property and property of corresponding value, as supported by cases and interviews (Boxes 8.2 and 8.3). They have access to the same tools as those for the detection of the predicate offence (IO.7). At operational level, the police uses a checklist for application of AR measures, record all measures taken in the PKS and in their report to the PPO. The authorities emphasise that easy and rapid access to data on the Land Register, Register of Beneficial Owners, and Central Account Register assist with the tracing of criminal property (IO.5). 514. LEAs are developing analytical tools and centres of expertise to support asset identification and tracing to handle evolving threats in relation to cybercrime. This follows a rise in cybercrime offences by 74% from 2020 to 2024 where dissipation of assets is faster. Austria has been focused on live screening of fraud cases by the relevant CIS unit. This unit plays an effective role in promptly detecting proceeds from fraud and securing them before dissipation. CIS is enhancing tools to assist LEAs in freezing fraudulently obtained VAs immediately when a police report is made. A project was also launched in 2023 in Upper Austria to improve cybercrime reporting and data connectivity between local and state police and to better detect serial offences. Cybercrime Training Centres provide IT forensics support. Box 8.2. LoopX Cryptocurrency Scam [117] An international group conducted a large-scale fraud (so-called exit scam), claiming to launch a new cryptocurrency called &quot;LoopX&quot; (LPX). They promoted 10 million LPX tokens as highly profitable investments, accepting only virtual asset payments. After hundreds of worldwide victims invested over EUR 5 750 000, the suspects deleted their social media channels and website and disappeared with the funds. From December 2022 to March 2024, investigators traced cryptocurrency transaction flows across Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Thailand, and Cyprus, secured and analysed evidence, under Austrian WKStA direction. The investigation revealed the fraud was primarily orchestrated from Austria. Working with Eurojust, prosecutors from involved countries issued European arrest warrants. Coordinated searches, seizures, and arrests occurred in the autumn of 2023 in Linz, Graz, Prague, and Cyprus with the assistance of Austria's special operations unit, Czech and Cypriot authorities, and Europol IT experts. A 29-year-old and 38-year-old Austrian citizens were arrested in Linz and Cyprus, and a 34-year-old Czech national was arrested in Prague. In the following months, three additional Austrian citizens were apprehended in Styria and Upper Austria. Several assets were seized in the course of the investigation. Convictions (6 August 2024) Linz Regional Court convicted five defendants of aggravated fraud and criminal association participation; one was additionally convicted of money laundering. Appeal Outcome (27 November 2024) Linz Higher Regional Court (OLG Linz) 67 dismissed appeals but corrected confiscation orders based partly on CIS blockchain analysis. Key rulings: · VAs valued at time of offence and not the seized assets should be considered for the purpose of calculating property of corresponding value (§ 20(3) StGB). On this basis, the court ordered the confiscation of property corresponding to the value of unrecovered virtual assets (EUR 684 000, EUR 768 600, and EUR 894 200 in three cases); · 17.6 Ethereum (valued at the time: EUR 10 014) seized in government wallet ordered converted to fiat currency, allowing authorities to benefit from market value increase · EUR 11 400 watch confiscated as one of the defendants had financed its purchase with proceeds from the fraud. Box 8.3. Tax Refund Phishing Fraud Scheme (Early 2023) (provisional measures only) [118] Perpetrators sent fake SMS messages impersonating the tax office, claiming recipients were entitled to three-digit euro refunds. Victims were directed to click a link and &quot;verify&quot; information on a fake website that captured their banking details. Detection and Response: · CIS Unit 7.2 &quot;Situation Report Fraud&quot; identified the phishing pattern early through live screening of new fraud cases. The unit's daily analysis includes approximately 300–400 fraud reports; · The Unit 7.2 immediately alerted the A-FIU, which issued red warning notices through goAML to reporting entities to identify perpetrator and money mule accounts. The pattern involved links to Lithuanian accounts, specific transaction amounts, and particular payment references. Results: · REs quickly adjusted transaction monitoring systems and A-FIU received approximately 150 STRs via goAML from Austrian CIs and VASPs; · With ARO support, investigators and prosecutors blocked 21 bank accounts and seized EUR 239 945,63; · Although approximately EUR 150 000 had already been transferred abroad, these measures immediately halted the fraud scheme. Victims and Suspects: · Approximately 1 700 victims identified—many only learned of the fraud through authority notification. · By end of October 2024: 42 accused persons (including 2 unknown perpetrators). · Most accused persons reside outside Austria; identities confirmed through Austrian police databases and Europol support. · Investigations were still ongoing at time of onsite visit. 515. LEAs and prosecutors did not demonstrate that they systematically seek to trace criminal property using MLA or other instruments when criminal assets flow abroad, except for a couple of on-going cases (IO.2). Austria estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued on a yearly basis, which is notably low given its risk profile. Within its area of responsibility, the Anti-Fraud Department of the MoF reported to have issued, during the period under review, 3 884 requests for confiscations of assets for tax crimes. 516. LEAs also successfully participate in international JITs that resulted in the application of AR measures. However, the authorities did not demonstrate their capacity to identify criminal assets originating abroad that transit through Austria without foreign intelligence. International cooperation remains is largely limited to EU members, and in most cases including with EU members, only a portion of the assets could eventually be recovered. Box 8.4. Encrypted Messenger Investigation—Task Force Achilles (Since 1 April 2021) (provisional measures only) [119] Austrian CIS received substantial data from encrypted crypto-messenger services through international cooperation, leading to investigations by Task Force &quot;Achilles&quot; (AG Achilles). Results to date: 122 suspects arrested, several kilos of drugs seized, EUR 835 000 in cash recovered and firearms and ammunition seized. Ongoing Investigation: Currently ~200 investigators from CIS, Task Force Achilles core team, regional CIDs, and DSN are working on what has become Austria's largest police investigation. They are analysing chats, photos, and videos from approximately 7 000 individuals with Austrian connections. Due to the enormous data volume, authorities estimate investigations will continue for years. October 2024 Action: Five Austrian citizens suspected of drug trafficking were targeted. Assets worth EUR 300 000 seized, including cash, crypto wallets, and vehicles. All five were remanded in custody. 517. Only a limited number of investigations trigger the application of AR provisional measures (Table 8.1). It is unclear to which extent this is due to challenges in identifying and tracing of criminal property and property of corresponding value, difficulties in the application of seizure/confiscation (section 3.4.3) or instances where assets are of de minimis value and procedural costs of confiscation would be disproportional. [120] It is noteworthy that, despite a 25% increase in the number of reported economic crimes (around 75 000 in 2020-2021 years to over 100 000 in 2023-2024), there is no commensurate increase in the use of provisional measures (the number has actually decreased). Table 8.1. Recorded Offences (Acts) in Selected Categories and Number of provisional measures—Police Crime Statistics (PKS) [121] 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average Total number of recorded offences (acts) 433 811 410 957 488 949 528 010 534 193 479 184 Economic crime (including fraudulent offences (§§ 146 StGB seq.) 72 736 75 472 91 844 103 330 103 500 89 376 Number of offences where provisional measures (seizure/ freezing order) were issued 1 953 1 878 2 055 1 876 1 815 1 915 Source: Austrian authorities Footnotes [117] https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/news.aspx?id=5244456B72723231614F673D [118] Case example 1 (FINLINK, 2023), discussed during the onsite visit. See also Federal Ministry of the Interior: Money Laundering Situation Report 2023, p.52 https://www.bundeskriminalamt.at/308/files/Geldwaeschebericht_2023_webBF.pdf . [119] See as a basis for the case example: Case example 4 (ANOM-SKYECC, 2021) [120] Art. 20a(3) of the Criminal Code provides that confiscation should not be ordered if the asset to be confiscated or the prospect of its recovery is disproportionate to the procedural costs that confiscation or recovery would entail. It is possible that financial investigations are already being dispensed with in some cases on this basis. Austria did not have statistical information to indicate how often confiscation is dispensed. The BMJ takes the view in its Guidelines on AR that disproportionate procedural costs are generally only considered up to a de minimis threshold of around EUR 100. [121] The Police Crime Statistics (PKS) record criminal offences (acts), not individuals. Acts are counted separately if they relate to different legal provisions or distinct factual events. The same factual act may appear multiple times in the PKS if it fulfils several criminal offences (e.g. theft and property damage). Therefore, the PKS may include duplicate counts when a single incident involves multiple offences. In contrast, the authorities state that data on provisional measures always relate to a specific offence, which is why no multiple entries are recorded in that context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="563. There is no specialised prosecution office for terrorism at the federal level, and prosecutors lack guidance and TF-specific training . Each prosecution office in each of the states has at least one specialised TF prosecutor, but PPOs like Vienna count seven specialised prosecutors, and Graz has four of them. The Central Public Prosecutor's Office for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (WKStA), competent for large-scale ML offences, does not undertake TF prosecutions. 564. There is no process for the coordination of all services involved in TF investigations beyond supervision by prosecutors of individual investigations by the DSN/LSEs . Prosecutors supervise the investigations carried out by the DSN/LSEs, provide for guidance and instructions and deliver investigation orders for coercive measures. PPOs do not ensure the coordination between LEAs, A-FIU, and intelligence services. Some general information meetings may take place, as well as coordination meetings in the case of important or large-scale investigations. There is no indication that prosecutors issue regular written instructions to clarify certain procedural provisions or to instruct about the implementation of the law. The authorities did not provide information about the existence of feedback processes in place to inform investigators of the outcome of the investigations carried out. 565. The DSN and the BMJ organise regular meetings to discuss procedural issues . In some cases, ad-hoc meetings are organised on a regular basis with the competent prosecutor to discuss important or large-scale operations. The “Guidelines on Crimes (KLF)” issued by the BMI is an online reference guide on the Ministry’s intranet covering various types of investigations or crimes, but it does not cover specifically TF. 566. PPOs have registered a total of 208 incoming files labelled as TF from 2020 to 2024 . This figure includes all files received by the DSN that did not result in an investigation because of the lack of sufficient suspicion, including STRs with no substance sent to the DSN for analysis, for which the decision to dismiss the case must be taken by the prosecutor. A total of 45 persons were indicted, and 31 convicted. Out of the 251 investigations, the TF offence was eventually retained for prosecution in 29 cases, out of which 10 together with participation in a terrorist offence. Table 9.3. Prosecution of terrorism, TF and participation in a terrorist organisation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total [278d] Terrorist financing 35 61 31 55 26 208 Investigations by DSN/LSEs - - 10 12 7 29 Persons indicted 14 15 7 4 5 45 Acquittal by court 1 2 0 0 2 5 Conviction by Court 6 11 4 5 5 31 [278b] Participation in a terrorist organisation 156 198 194 270 303 1 121 Indictment 60 60 73 49 88 330 Acquittal by court 9 15 15 12 11 62 Conviction by Court 24 44 40 35 61 204 Note: the difference between the number of persons convicted and acquitted and the number of persons indicted is due to the fact that a number of cases are still pending, or the person is absent and cannot be tried. Source: BMJ, DSN 567. Compared to other neighbouring jurisdictions with a similar risk profile and/or size, the number of convictions for terrorism, participation in a terrorist organisation [131] or TF is substantial . The ratio of successful prosecution is also very favourable (70% for participation in a terrorist organisation, 90% for TF, and 97% for terrorism), but it should be taken into account that the rate of dismissal before prosecution is important. Since the 2016 MER, the number of TF convictions has substantially improved (3 from 2012 to 2015 compared to 31 for the period under review). This increase can be analysed in the light of the peak in terrorist and radicalisation threats in the period 2013-2016 in Europe and the subsequent increase in awareness and prioritisation of terrorism/TF strategies. Law enforcement and judicial authorities can be considered as effective in bringing perpetrators of TF-related offences before courts. It is to be noted that even for small amounts (for ex. EUR 300), the authorities obtained convictions. 568. PPOs are facing the challenge of providing evidence of the mens rea element of the TF offence due to a stringent jurisprudence by the courts . As per this jurisprudence, prosecutors must prove without any possible doubt that the offender was aware that the funds would be used for terrorist purposes, a probatio diabolicum when funds are channelled through opaque intermediaries and tracing funds become impossible in certain regions of the world. Prosecution strategies therefore include not only the prosecution of TF under the participation in a terrorist organisation offence, for which the evidence threshold is lower, but also under the qualification of aiding and abetting terrorists and terrorist organisations, as the maximum sentence is 20 years, as opposed to 10 years for the TF offence. However, the authorities highlighted the difficulty to provide evidence that the terrorist financier was aware of the terrorist aims of the organisation, as those are usually located abroad making evidence collection difficult. 569. The number and the amount of assets confiscated are very low because of the very low scale of TF patterns and the difficulty to trace assets in the receiving countries . The analysis of all convictions pronounced in 2023 and 2024 show that convictions occur generally around three years after the commission of the offence, which, bearing in mind the complexity to trace funds in such cases, is a reasonable timeline. No legal entity (nor NPO) was prosecuted for TF or related offences to date or was subject to an administrative measure of dissolution. No specific instruction was given to enforcement agencies to give priority or increase focus on investigations and prosecution in these cases. 570. Close cooperation between prosecution, the DSN, and LSEs allows the usual challenge of turning intelligence into evidence to be overcome . This is true in particular, when it comes to opening an investigation based on classified intelligence. Such issues are dealt with in a very pragmatic way through the very close cooperation between the DSN and prosecutors of TF matters. When intelligence is obtained through international cooperation as “for intelligence purposes only,” the information must be de-classified, and a request must be sent to the issuing country for that purpose. In most cases, Austria then issues a formal request for MLA to receive the information. If this proves not to be possible, the evidence must be obtained from other sources. 571. Prosecutors and judges do not receive training on terrorism and TF, even when they are assigned as specialised prosecutors . The BMJ and Courts, responsible for the training of judges and prosecutors, have never organised any training seminar on TF. [132] In addition, the BMJ has not issued guidelines or manuals on this matter. However, each new relevant law is accompanied by a decree explaining its context and providing directions for its implementation. 572. Overall, some training efforts on TF were initiated in line with actions identified in the AML/CFT Strategy and implementing action plan (IO.1) but had to be discontinued for budgetary reasons. The DSN reported that it organised for the first time in 2024 a one-week workshop on “financial investigations, terrorist financing and AR” in which 22 investigators took part. This seminar is intended to become a regular annual event, even though the 2025 edition of the seminar was postponed because of budget issues. In addition to investigators, FMA staff and some prosecutors attended, allowing for the exchange of information and coordination. 573. International cooperation in TF matters functions smoothly . Austria is a member of the EU Network of Counter-terrorism Financial Investigators launched in 2022 and is part of the working group “Financing of Hamas” of the TF Tracking Programme (TFTP) hosted by Europol, which was set up following an agreement between the EU and the United States on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data. Austria is also a member of several security cooperation mechanisms but outside this scope, it does not organise or participate in meetings in TF matters with foreign counterparts. 574. Feedback received from FATF/ FSRB members shows that countries consider that Austria is giving adequate attention to the financial aspects of terrorism, and that it is implementing a professional and proactive policy to mitigate the TF risk . The quality of investigations made upon request of foreign countries is considered by those countries as efficient and qualitative and carried out quickly, purposefully and comprehensively. One FSRB member reported on a successful one-year JIT which was accompanied by several EIOs. Footnotes [131] The authorities indicated that, in several cases, TF activities were pursued under participation in a terrorist organisation as the evidence threshold is lower for this offence. There is no indication of the ratio of TF activities pursued under this offence and statistics in this regard are mentioned for information only. [132] After the onsite, the BMJ has elaborated a training strategy including a series of ML/TF expert training seminars in hybrid form for prosecutors, beginning in 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="563. There is no specialised prosecution office for terrorism at the federal level, and prosecutors lack guidance and TF-specific training . Each prosecution office in each of the states has at least one specialised TF prosecutor, but PPOs like Vienna count seven specialised prosecutors, and Graz has four of them. The Central Public Prosecutor's Office for Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (WKStA), competent for large-scale ML offences, does not undertake TF prosecutions. 564. There is no process for the coordination of all services involved in TF investigations beyond supervision by prosecutors of individual investigations by the DSN/LSEs . Prosecutors supervise the investigations carried out by the DSN/LSEs, provide for guidance and instructions and deliver investigation orders for coercive measures. PPOs do not ensure the coordination between LEAs, A-FIU, and intelligence services. Some general information meetings may take place, as well as coordination meetings in the case of important or large-scale investigations. There is no indication that prosecutors issue regular written instructions to clarify certain procedural provisions or to instruct about the implementation of the law. The authorities did not provide information about the existence of feedback processes in place to inform investigators of the outcome of the investigations carried out. 565. The DSN and the BMJ organise regular meetings to discuss procedural issues . In some cases, ad-hoc meetings are organised on a regular basis with the competent prosecutor to discuss important or large-scale operations. The “Guidelines on Crimes (KLF)” issued by the BMI is an online reference guide on the Ministry’s intranet covering various types of investigations or crimes, but it does not cover specifically TF. 566. PPOs have registered a total of 208 incoming files labelled as TF from 2020 to 2024 . This figure includes all files received by the DSN that did not result in an investigation because of the lack of sufficient suspicion, including STRs with no substance sent to the DSN for analysis, for which the decision to dismiss the case must be taken by the prosecutor. A total of 45 persons were indicted, and 31 convicted. Out of the 251 investigations, the TF offence was eventually retained for prosecution in 29 cases, out of which 10 together with participation in a terrorist offence. Table 9.3. Prosecution of terrorism, TF and participation in a terrorist organisation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total [278d] Terrorist financing 35 61 31 55 26 208 Investigations by DSN/LSEs - - 10 12 7 29 Persons indicted 14 15 7 4 5 45 Acquittal by court 1 2 0 0 2 5 Conviction by Court 6 11 4 5 5 31 [278b] Participation in a terrorist organisation 156 198 194 270 303 1 121 Indictment 60 60 73 49 88 330 Acquittal by court 9 15 15 12 11 62 Conviction by Court 24 44 40 35 61 204 Note: the difference between the number of persons convicted and acquitted and the number of persons indicted is due to the fact that a number of cases are still pending, or the person is absent and cannot be tried. Source: BMJ, DSN 567. Compared to other neighbouring jurisdictions with a similar risk profile and/or size, the number of convictions for terrorism, participation in a terrorist organisation [131] or TF is substantial . The ratio of successful prosecution is also very favourable (70% for participation in a terrorist organisation, 90% for TF, and 97% for terrorism), but it should be taken into account that the rate of dismissal before prosecution is important. Since the 2016 MER, the number of TF convictions has substantially improved (3 from 2012 to 2015 compared to 31 for the period under review). This increase can be analysed in the light of the peak in terrorist and radicalisation threats in the period 2013-2016 in Europe and the subsequent increase in awareness and prioritisation of terrorism/TF strategies. Law enforcement and judicial authorities can be considered as effective in bringing perpetrators of TF-related offences before courts. It is to be noted that even for small amounts (for ex. EUR 300), the authorities obtained convictions. 568. PPOs are facing the challenge of providing evidence of the mens rea element of the TF offence due to a stringent jurisprudence by the courts . As per this jurisprudence, prosecutors must prove without any possible doubt that the offender was aware that the funds would be used for terrorist purposes, a probatio diabolicum when funds are channelled through opaque intermediaries and tracing funds become impossible in certain regions of the world. Prosecution strategies therefore include not only the prosecution of TF under the participation in a terrorist organisation offence, for which the evidence threshold is lower, but also under the qualification of aiding and abetting terrorists and terrorist organisations, as the maximum sentence is 20 years, as opposed to 10 years for the TF offence. However, the authorities highlighted the difficulty to provide evidence that the terrorist financier was aware of the terrorist aims of the organisation, as those are usually located abroad making evidence collection difficult. 569. The number and the amount of assets confiscated are very low because of the very low scale of TF patterns and the difficulty to trace assets in the receiving countries . The analysis of all convictions pronounced in 2023 and 2024 show that convictions occur generally around three years after the commission of the offence, which, bearing in mind the complexity to trace funds in such cases, is a reasonable timeline. No legal entity (nor NPO) was prosecuted for TF or related offences to date or was subject to an administrative measure of dissolution. No specific instruction was given to enforcement agencies to give priority or increase focus on investigations and prosecution in these cases. 570. Close cooperation between prosecution, the DSN, and LSEs allows the usual challenge of turning intelligence into evidence to be overcome . This is true in particular, when it comes to opening an investigation based on classified intelligence. Such issues are dealt with in a very pragmatic way through the very close cooperation between the DSN and prosecutors of TF matters. When intelligence is obtained through international cooperation as “for intelligence purposes only,” the information must be de-classified, and a request must be sent to the issuing country for that purpose. In most cases, Austria then issues a formal request for MLA to receive the information. If this proves not to be possible, the evidence must be obtained from other sources. 571. Prosecutors and judges do not receive training on terrorism and TF, even when they are assigned as specialised prosecutors . The BMJ and Courts, responsible for the training of judges and prosecutors, have never organised any training seminar on TF. [132] In addition, the BMJ has not issued guidelines or manuals on this matter. However, each new relevant law is accompanied by a decree explaining its context and providing directions for its implementation. 572. Overall, some training efforts on TF were initiated in line with actions identified in the AML/CFT Strategy and implementing action plan (IO.1) but had to be discontinued for budgetary reasons. The DSN reported that it organised for the first time in 2024 a one-week workshop on “financial investigations, terrorist financing and AR” in which 22 investigators took part. This seminar is intended to become a regular annual event, even though the 2025 edition of the seminar was postponed because of budget issues. In addition to investigators, FMA staff and some prosecutors attended, allowing for the exchange of information and coordination. 573. International cooperation in TF matters functions smoothly . Austria is a member of the EU Network of Counter-terrorism Financial Investigators launched in 2022 and is part of the working group “Financing of Hamas” of the TF Tracking Programme (TFTP) hosted by Europol, which was set up following an agreement between the EU and the United States on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data. Austria is also a member of several security cooperation mechanisms but outside this scope, it does not organise or participate in meetings in TF matters with foreign counterparts. 574. Feedback received from FATF/ FSRB members shows that countries consider that Austria is giving adequate attention to the financial aspects of terrorism, and that it is implementing a professional and proactive policy to mitigate the TF risk . The quality of investigations made upon request of foreign countries is considered by those countries as efficient and qualitative and carried out quickly, purposefully and comprehensively. One FSRB member reported on a successful one-year JIT which was accompanied by several EIOs. Footnotes [131] The authorities indicated that, in several cases, TF activities were pursued under participation in a terrorist organisation as the evidence threshold is lower for this offence. There is no indication of the ratio of TF activities pursued under this offence and statistics in this regard are mentioned for information only. [132] After the onsite, the BMJ has elaborated a training strategy including a series of ML/TF expert training seminars in hybrid form for prosecutors, beginning in 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="592. Identification of assets has occurred to some extent as FIs froze funds on two occasions for a total amount of EUR 6 972 (EUR 250 under UNSCR 1267 in 2022 and EUR 6 722 related to a directly applicable EU designation under UNSCR 1373 in 2019). There are no statistics related to the number of false positives reported by FIs, neither with OeNB nor at the level of FIs themselves. FIs indicated that they would usually not report false positives to OeNB but rather conduct an extensive examination internally. The low amounts frozen are not entirely consistent with Austria’s TF risk and context, including the TF risk exposure of the financial and VASP sectors. 593. The authorities responsible for combating TF recognised that domestic designations under UNSCR 1373 would be an effective tool to manage TF risks in Austria. The new legal framework which allows for such designations and related freezing measures was in force for nearly six months at the end of the onsite visit, but it had not yet been implemented. As mentioned above, Austria is not using TFS as a tool for mitigating TF risks domestically. 594. Austria has seized assets and instrumentalities in TF investigations and used administrative measures (e.g., de-radicalisation measures) to deprive assets and instrumentalities in TF investigations . In addition to the significant results achieved in one complex TF case, Austrian authorities demonstrated that they systematically included a focus on tracing the assets and instrumentalities, which resulted in seizures and confiscations of small amounts, in line with TF patterns in Austria (IO.9)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="592. Identification of assets has occurred to some extent as FIs froze funds on two occasions for a total amount of EUR 6 972 (EUR 250 under UNSCR 1267 in 2022 and EUR 6 722 related to a directly applicable EU designation under UNSCR 1373 in 2019). There are no statistics related to the number of false positives reported by FIs, neither with OeNB nor at the level of FIs themselves. FIs indicated that they would usually not report false positives to OeNB but rather conduct an extensive examination internally. The low amounts frozen are not entirely consistent with Austria’s TF risk and context, including the TF risk exposure of the financial and VASP sectors. 593. The authorities responsible for combating TF recognised that domestic designations under UNSCR 1373 would be an effective tool to manage TF risks in Austria. The new legal framework which allows for such designations and related freezing measures was in force for nearly six months at the end of the onsite visit, but it had not yet been implemented. As mentioned above, Austria is not using TFS as a tool for mitigating TF risks domestically. 594. Austria has seized assets and instrumentalities in TF investigations and used administrative measures (e.g., de-radicalisation measures) to deprive assets and instrumentalities in TF investigations . In addition to the significant results achieved in one complex TF case, Austrian authorities demonstrated that they systematically included a focus on tracing the assets and instrumentalities, which resulted in seizures and confiscations of small amounts, in line with TF patterns in Austria (IO.9)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="627. The DSN and the authorities involved in export control demonstrated a sound understanding of PF-related TFS evasion . The DSN develops various confidential internal reports, including detailed assessments of Austria’s exposure to proliferation activities from high-risk countries and associated procurement methods. These documents, which are mainly based on intelligence and investigations, set out country profiles and contain details on country-specific PF risks, including the evasion of TFS and other financial sanctions. The DSN also publishes annual Reports on the Protection of the Constitution, which contain a dedicated chapter on proliferation. These reports summarise the development of global and regional proliferation threats, identify high-risk countries for sanctions evasion, and give a high-level description of typologies and cases related to dual-use goods supplied through Austria. 628. The 2025 NRA also addresses PF sanctions evasion, including but not limited to UNSCR 1718, but due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the description of relevant threats and methods is very short and high-level, and the analysis does not extend to key vulnerabilities that may allow these threats to materialise in Austria. In relation to the DPRK, the NRA identifies the following PF sanctions evasion threats: financing the purchase of luxury goods (see above), raising funds through foreign exchange, concealment of legal entities through front companies and straw men, [154] financing the purchase of dual-use goods, financing the acquisition of proliferation-sensitive goods. 629. The conclusions on inherent PF sanctions evasion risks faced by individual categories of FIs and DNFBPs are not fully consistent with the main sanctions evasion threats . In addition, in reaching conclusions on residual risks faced by the various types of OEs, the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures [155] is given too much weight considering the findings on implementation of PF-related TFS and related supervision below. This limits the usefulness of the NRA report for OEs to build a more comprehensive understanding of PF-related sanctions evasion. 630. To expand its understanding of PF-risks in the financial sector and in preparation of its TFS supervisory activities starting in 2026, the FMA assessed the risk of non-implementation of PF-related TFS by CIs. To inform this assessment, the FMA collected information from supervised CIs through a questionnaire, including questions specifically focusing on PF. [156] The collected information was supplemented with the FMA’s findings from on- and offsite supervision of CIs as well as external information obtained from the OeNB on transaction data. The FMA’s assessment is comprehensive and contains an overview of PF threats, considers a wide range of factors to assess vulnerabilities and gives a detailed description of mitigation measures in place. Each CI is subsequently placed in one of the four risk categories, i.e., high (1.17% of the 435 CIs), elevated (31.47% ), medium (65.73%), and low (1.63%). The risk matrix will be used to prioritise CIs for the FMA’s PF-related TFS supervision. 631. Austria has various mitigation measures in place to address the risks of PF-related sanctions evasion. A first example relates to the effective control measures to identify possible cases of circumvention of PF-related TFS, including licensing and an inspection regime for export of dual-use goods, as implemented by the export control and customs authorities. The DSN’s measures to prevent, detect, and investigate circumvention of PF-related sanctions evasion, including through the effective use of its wide range of intelligence gathering and investigative powers (see below), is another example. In addition, supervision of implementation of PF-related TFS also constitutes a mitigation measure, even though overall, major improvements in TFS supervision are required (see below). Footnotes [154] The authorities clarified that identified legal entities were foreign entities with complex ownership and control structures and the misuse of domestically created legal entities had not been observed. [155] Supervision of implementation of PF-related TFS and the recently introduced requirements for OEs to extend the scope of internal policies and procedures to CPF. [156] Questions included but are not limited to CIs’ exposure to PF risks through foreign trade and export financing activity, business relationships with customers active in PF sensitive sectors, business relationships with ties with DPRK and Iran, the volume of assets and transactions with these jurisdictions, the verification of customer data against PF sanctions lists (e.g., which lists are used, how monitoring takes place, the frequency of monitoring)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="627. The DSN and the authorities involved in export control demonstrated a sound understanding of PF-related TFS evasion . The DSN develops various confidential internal reports, including detailed assessments of Austria’s exposure to proliferation activities from high-risk countries and associated procurement methods. These documents, which are mainly based on intelligence and investigations, set out country profiles and contain details on country-specific PF risks, including the evasion of TFS and other financial sanctions. The DSN also publishes annual Reports on the Protection of the Constitution, which contain a dedicated chapter on proliferation. These reports summarise the development of global and regional proliferation threats, identify high-risk countries for sanctions evasion, and give a high-level description of typologies and cases related to dual-use goods supplied through Austria. 628. The 2025 NRA also addresses PF sanctions evasion, including but not limited to UNSCR 1718, but due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the description of relevant threats and methods is very short and high-level, and the analysis does not extend to key vulnerabilities that may allow these threats to materialise in Austria. In relation to the DPRK, the NRA identifies the following PF sanctions evasion threats: financing the purchase of luxury goods (see above), raising funds through foreign exchange, concealment of legal entities through front companies and straw men, [154] financing the purchase of dual-use goods, financing the acquisition of proliferation-sensitive goods. 629. The conclusions on inherent PF sanctions evasion risks faced by individual categories of FIs and DNFBPs are not fully consistent with the main sanctions evasion threats . In addition, in reaching conclusions on residual risks faced by the various types of OEs, the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures [155] is given too much weight considering the findings on implementation of PF-related TFS and related supervision below. This limits the usefulness of the NRA report for OEs to build a more comprehensive understanding of PF-related sanctions evasion. 630. To expand its understanding of PF-risks in the financial sector and in preparation of its TFS supervisory activities starting in 2026, the FMA assessed the risk of non-implementation of PF-related TFS by CIs. To inform this assessment, the FMA collected information from supervised CIs through a questionnaire, including questions specifically focusing on PF. [156] The collected information was supplemented with the FMA’s findings from on- and offsite supervision of CIs as well as external information obtained from the OeNB on transaction data. The FMA’s assessment is comprehensive and contains an overview of PF threats, considers a wide range of factors to assess vulnerabilities and gives a detailed description of mitigation measures in place. Each CI is subsequently placed in one of the four risk categories, i.e., high (1.17% of the 435 CIs), elevated (31.47% ), medium (65.73%), and low (1.63%). The risk matrix will be used to prioritise CIs for the FMA’s PF-related TFS supervision. 631. Austria has various mitigation measures in place to address the risks of PF-related sanctions evasion. A first example relates to the effective control measures to identify possible cases of circumvention of PF-related TFS, including licensing and an inspection regime for export of dual-use goods, as implemented by the export control and customs authorities. The DSN’s measures to prevent, detect, and investigate circumvention of PF-related sanctions evasion, including through the effective use of its wide range of intelligence gathering and investigative powers (see below), is another example. In addition, supervision of implementation of PF-related TFS also constitutes a mitigation measure, even though overall, major improvements in TFS supervision are required (see below). Footnotes [154] The authorities clarified that identified legal entities were foreign entities with complex ownership and control structures and the misuse of domestically created legal entities had not been observed. [155] Supervision of implementation of PF-related TFS and the recently introduced requirements for OEs to extend the scope of internal policies and procedures to CPF. [156] Questions included but are not limited to CIs’ exposure to PF risks through foreign trade and export financing activity, business relationships with customers active in PF sensitive sectors, business relationships with ties with DPRK and Iran, the volume of assets and transactions with these jurisdictions, the verification of customer data against PF sanctions lists (e.g., which lists are used, how monitoring takes place, the frequency of monitoring)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="155. All relevant FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs are required to implement AML/CFT measures, and Austria has not granted any wholesale exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs must apply enhanced and simplified measures in line with ML/TF risks (R.1/IO.3/IO.4). Austria draws enhanced and simplified measures from the EU AML Directive, EU SNRA, Austria’s NRAs, and sector-specific risk assessments. Austria has not applied enhanced measures that go beyond the FATF and EU requirements. The assessment team’s findings are based on: Austria’s AML/CFT regulatory framework; risk assessment products; and discussions with authorities and the private sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="155. All relevant FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs are required to implement AML/CFT measures, and Austria has not granted any wholesale exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs must apply enhanced and simplified measures in line with ML/TF risks (R.1/IO.3/IO.4). Austria draws enhanced and simplified measures from the EU AML Directive, EU SNRA, Austria’s NRAs, and sector-specific risk assessments. Austria has not applied enhanced measures that go beyond the FATF and EU requirements. The assessment team’s findings are based on: Austria’s AML/CFT regulatory framework; risk assessment products; and discussions with authorities and the private sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1. FIU 211. A-FIU has a dedicated international affairs unit, composed of three officers. It uses FIU.net for its information exchange with the FIUs of other EU members and, as a member of the Egmont group, it relies on the Egmont Secure Web for information exchange with non-EU Egmont Group members. It has signed MoUs with Canada, Ukraine, Holy See, and Japan because these FIUs required an MoU for information exchange, as well as with the European Commission and EUROPOL. 212. The number of outgoing requests by the A-FIU to foreign counterparts has shown a sharp and steady decrease from 945 requests in 2021 down to 40 requests in 2024 (table 2.8). The number of outgoing requests also include requests sent on behalf of other competent authorities. The authorities could not explain the reasons for the limited number of outgoing requests over recent years. It is however an indicator that the A-FIU does insufficiently use intelligence and information from its foreign counterparts to inform its analytical process and produce financial intelligence in cases with a transnational element. The number of spontaneous disseminations issued by A-FIU is, conversely, very high and reflects the very positive feedback received by FATF/FSRB members. Table 2.8. International cooperation sought and provided by A-FIU Type of request 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests sent by A-FIU 945 816 374 40 Requests received by A-FIU 222 254 250 156 Spontaneous disseminations from foreign counterparts received by A-FIU No data available No data available No data available No data available Spontaneous disseminations by A-FIU to foreign counterparts 430 1281 1267 833 213. The main flow of information exchange is taking place with European countries. Austria receives less information from foreign countries than it disseminates, in particular with regard to spontaneous disseminations. As is the case for formal MLA, Germany is the main partner of Austria in FIU informal cooperation. Figure 2.1.FIU co-operation by country Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Note: Incoming requests are in blue and outgoing requests are in red Source: A-FIU 214. The A-FIU could not provide details on predicate offences associated with requests sent, nor on the type of information requested from foreign counterparts as it does not maintain statistics reflecting this level of detail. It could not indicate either how many requests were initiated at its own initiative compared to the number of requests made on behalf of other competent authorities. More generally, FATF and FSRB members considered the cooperation with A-FIU as effective and active, and praised Austria for sending a substantial number of spontaneous disseminations, which were always accompanied by consent to use and further disseminate this information. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 215. LEAs cooperate quite actively with their foreign counterparts. CIS is the single point of contact (SPOC) on the exchange of information between LEAs of EU members and for non-EU international police cooperation, and all requests and related responses through channels such as Interpol, SIENA, and police liaison officers are routed through CIS Austria. In addition to the police attachés in its embassies, Austria established seven Police Cooperation Centres at its borders where Austrian and neighbouring police officers work together 24/7. Austria signed 10 bi- and trilateral agreements [38] to support police cooperation. 216. Financial intelligence is usually sought through A-FIU, which requests that information from its foreign counterparts on behalf of LEAs. There is no available data on the number of requests sent through the A-FIU, but LEAs consider this channel as particularly useful. Table 2.9. Exchange of information through the SIENA system in ML/TF matters Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Sent 798 872 939 1 247 1 445 Received 1 724 1 868 2 017 2 275 2 373 Total 2 522 2 740 2 956 3 522 3 818 Source: A-FIU and SIENA 217. In TF matters, DSN issued a total of 240 requests inside and outside Europe, using SIENA and other channels, including personal contacts, which DSN considers as playing a very important role given the extremely sensitive nature of its activities. By far, Germany is the country to which the highest number of requests are made (68 requests), followed by Israel (20), Spain (15) and France (13). Table 2.10. Exchange of information by DSN in TF matters Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests sent 35 55 82 68 218. Austria uses ARO to exchange information for the identification and tracing of assets abroad. As soon as there is a suspicion during an investigation that assets may be located abroad, ARO sends enquiries to the foreign AR agencies via the AR networks (i.e., EU ARO Platform (EU member states), and CARIN (all states)) to obtain information such as property, vehicles, companies, or accounts. In urgent cases, contact is also made by telephone. ARO also uses Interpol channels to exchange information. Thanks to the close collaboration between ARO and investigators, this information forms a useful basis to further target investigations, including expansion of the investigation abroad, as well as for the initiation of MLA requests by the police to the public prosecutor. During the period under review, ARO has made/received 1 351 requests through CARIN, EU ARO and Interpol channels. Table 2.11. Exchange of information by ARO 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Enquiries from CARIN-Members to Austria 7 9 7 4 14 41 Enquiries to CARIN-Members from Austria 10 13 5 18 41 87 Enquiries from EU ARO Platform Members 81 78 94 115 221 589 Enquiries to EU ARO Platform Members from Austria 40 23 20 82 166 331 Enquiries from INTERPOL to Austria 0 24 153 81 33 291 Enquiries to INTERPOL from Austria 0 0 0 2 10 12 TOTAL 1 351 219. Feedback from FATF/FSRB members indicates that Austria routinely exchanges information in AR matters, but its use of international cooperation shows limited effectiveness. The amounts seized/confiscated at its request were very limited according to respondents: Liechtenstein (EUR 390 000), Romania (EUR 24 440), Slovakia (EUR 252 000, EUR 17 950, and EUR 309 000), and Germany (EUR 25 491). 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs FMA 220. The FMA is actively involved in international cooperation within the EU and regularly coordinates at policy level with other EU member states within the EC’s Expert Group on ML/TF (EGMLTF). For its operational activities, the FMA is an active member in the EBA’s AML Standing Committee (AMLSC), which convenes several times a year. The AMLSC serves as a forum for both formal and informal exchange between EU members’ supervisors. In addition, under guidelines JC 20189/81 of the EC, the FMA has established several colleges for the supervision of Austrian FIs which hold establishments in at least two EU members. In 2023, the FMA set up eight colleges and participated in nine host colleges. However, there is no available data as to the number of requests for information issued by the FMA, in particular in the context of licensing and fit and proper testing, and there is a lack of adequate information to substantiate how effective FMA is in seeking information from its counterparts in support of its operational activities. DNFBPs 221. DNFBP supervisors exchange information at international level on a limited basis, mainly through participation in working groups and conferences at European level. Austrian regional bars may benefit from EU or international networks for the purpose of ML/TF prevention, but to date, have not engaged in exchange of operational information for this purpose. However, European bars operate an early warning and information exchange mechanism called “AML alert” which has been used several times to exchange information trends, typologies and other up-to-date information. 222. Notaries can also exchange information through a number of networks, but there is no indication that they have used these channels in individual ML/FT cases so far. The Austrian Chamber of Civil-Law Notaries is a member of the Council of the Notaries of the European Union (CNUE). Within the CNUE, a working group on AML/CFT provides a forum for identifying and analysing shared challenges and to exchange best practices in the prevention of ML and TF. 223. BMWET, the AML/CFT coordinator for DPMS, real estate, insurance intermediaries, and TCSPs, would engage in international cooperation when being aware of irregularities by an OE with establishments in foreign countries. In the absence of statistics or cases, it does not appear this has taken place. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 224. Customs and tax authorities cooperate effectively with their foreign counterparts. Since 2021, the Anti-Fraud Unit of the Tax Administration includes a dedicated central office for international cooperation. The Tax Administration (i.e. Tax Authority and Customs) only exchanges information with the tax and Customs authorities of other countries based on existing legal bases. Within the EU framework, the tax administration participates in Multilateral Controls (MLCs) or JITs. It is not directly involved in Interpol channels but routinely receives Interpol requests and information via the Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) for matters that fall within its competence. Table 2.12. Exchange of information in tax matters 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Incoming requests EU 1 307 991 910 980 4 188 Third countries 343 316 76 75 810 Outgoing requests EU 644 515 590 591 2 340 Third countries 227 308 362 320 1 217 225. Customs seek cooperation within the framework of agreements with third countries. Council Regulation 515/97/EEC of 13 March 1997 and the Naples II Convention for national legislation and criminal investigations serve as a basis for international cooperation. Customs also cooperates through the World Customs Organization (WCO). Table 2.13. Exchange of information in customs matters 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Incoming requests EU 152 154 185 305 796 Third countries 138 81 105 103 427 Outgoing requests EU 93 53 78 157 381 Third countries 39 17 20 29 105 Footnotes [38] Including with Czechia, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein/Switzerland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1. FIU 211. A-FIU has a dedicated international affairs unit, composed of three officers. It uses FIU.net for its information exchange with the FIUs of other EU members and, as a member of the Egmont group, it relies on the Egmont Secure Web for information exchange with non-EU Egmont Group members. It has signed MoUs with Canada, Ukraine, Holy See, and Japan because these FIUs required an MoU for information exchange, as well as with the European Commission and EUROPOL. 212. The number of outgoing requests by the A-FIU to foreign counterparts has shown a sharp and steady decrease from 945 requests in 2021 down to 40 requests in 2024 (table 2.8). The number of outgoing requests also include requests sent on behalf of other competent authorities. The authorities could not explain the reasons for the limited number of outgoing requests over recent years. It is however an indicator that the A-FIU does insufficiently use intelligence and information from its foreign counterparts to inform its analytical process and produce financial intelligence in cases with a transnational element. The number of spontaneous disseminations issued by A-FIU is, conversely, very high and reflects the very positive feedback received by FATF/FSRB members. Table 2.8. International cooperation sought and provided by A-FIU Type of request 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests sent by A-FIU 945 816 374 40 Requests received by A-FIU 222 254 250 156 Spontaneous disseminations from foreign counterparts received by A-FIU No data available No data available No data available No data available Spontaneous disseminations by A-FIU to foreign counterparts 430 1281 1267 833 213. The main flow of information exchange is taking place with European countries. Austria receives less information from foreign countries than it disseminates, in particular with regard to spontaneous disseminations. As is the case for formal MLA, Germany is the main partner of Austria in FIU informal cooperation. Figure 2.1.FIU co-operation by country Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Note: Incoming requests are in blue and outgoing requests are in red Source: A-FIU 214. The A-FIU could not provide details on predicate offences associated with requests sent, nor on the type of information requested from foreign counterparts as it does not maintain statistics reflecting this level of detail. It could not indicate either how many requests were initiated at its own initiative compared to the number of requests made on behalf of other competent authorities. More generally, FATF and FSRB members considered the cooperation with A-FIU as effective and active, and praised Austria for sending a substantial number of spontaneous disseminations, which were always accompanied by consent to use and further disseminate this information. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 215. LEAs cooperate quite actively with their foreign counterparts. CIS is the single point of contact (SPOC) on the exchange of information between LEAs of EU members and for non-EU international police cooperation, and all requests and related responses through channels such as Interpol, SIENA, and police liaison officers are routed through CIS Austria. In addition to the police attachés in its embassies, Austria established seven Police Cooperation Centres at its borders where Austrian and neighbouring police officers work together 24/7. Austria signed 10 bi- and trilateral agreements [38] to support police cooperation. 216. Financial intelligence is usually sought through A-FIU, which requests that information from its foreign counterparts on behalf of LEAs. There is no available data on the number of requests sent through the A-FIU, but LEAs consider this channel as particularly useful. Table 2.9. Exchange of information through the SIENA system in ML/TF matters Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Sent 798 872 939 1 247 1 445 Received 1 724 1 868 2 017 2 275 2 373 Total 2 522 2 740 2 956 3 522 3 818 Source: A-FIU and SIENA 217. In TF matters, DSN issued a total of 240 requests inside and outside Europe, using SIENA and other channels, including personal contacts, which DSN considers as playing a very important role given the extremely sensitive nature of its activities. By far, Germany is the country to which the highest number of requests are made (68 requests), followed by Israel (20), Spain (15) and France (13). Table 2.10. Exchange of information by DSN in TF matters Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests sent 35 55 82 68 218. Austria uses ARO to exchange information for the identification and tracing of assets abroad. As soon as there is a suspicion during an investigation that assets may be located abroad, ARO sends enquiries to the foreign AR agencies via the AR networks (i.e., EU ARO Platform (EU member states), and CARIN (all states)) to obtain information such as property, vehicles, companies, or accounts. In urgent cases, contact is also made by telephone. ARO also uses Interpol channels to exchange information. Thanks to the close collaboration between ARO and investigators, this information forms a useful basis to further target investigations, including expansion of the investigation abroad, as well as for the initiation of MLA requests by the police to the public prosecutor. During the period under review, ARO has made/received 1 351 requests through CARIN, EU ARO and Interpol channels. Table 2.11. Exchange of information by ARO 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Enquiries from CARIN-Members to Austria 7 9 7 4 14 41 Enquiries to CARIN-Members from Austria 10 13 5 18 41 87 Enquiries from EU ARO Platform Members 81 78 94 115 221 589 Enquiries to EU ARO Platform Members from Austria 40 23 20 82 166 331 Enquiries from INTERPOL to Austria 0 24 153 81 33 291 Enquiries to INTERPOL from Austria 0 0 0 2 10 12 TOTAL 1 351 219. Feedback from FATF/FSRB members indicates that Austria routinely exchanges information in AR matters, but its use of international cooperation shows limited effectiveness. The amounts seized/confiscated at its request were very limited according to respondents: Liechtenstein (EUR 390 000), Romania (EUR 24 440), Slovakia (EUR 252 000, EUR 17 950, and EUR 309 000), and Germany (EUR 25 491). 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs FMA 220. The FMA is actively involved in international cooperation within the EU and regularly coordinates at policy level with other EU member states within the EC’s Expert Group on ML/TF (EGMLTF). For its operational activities, the FMA is an active member in the EBA’s AML Standing Committee (AMLSC), which convenes several times a year. The AMLSC serves as a forum for both formal and informal exchange between EU members’ supervisors. In addition, under guidelines JC 20189/81 of the EC, the FMA has established several colleges for the supervision of Austrian FIs which hold establishments in at least two EU members. In 2023, the FMA set up eight colleges and participated in nine host colleges. However, there is no available data as to the number of requests for information issued by the FMA, in particular in the context of licensing and fit and proper testing, and there is a lack of adequate information to substantiate how effective FMA is in seeking information from its counterparts in support of its operational activities. DNFBPs 221. DNFBP supervisors exchange information at international level on a limited basis, mainly through participation in working groups and conferences at European level. Austrian regional bars may benefit from EU or international networks for the purpose of ML/TF prevention, but to date, have not engaged in exchange of operational information for this purpose. However, European bars operate an early warning and information exchange mechanism called “AML alert” which has been used several times to exchange information trends, typologies and other up-to-date information. 222. Notaries can also exchange information through a number of networks, but there is no indication that they have used these channels in individual ML/FT cases so far. The Austrian Chamber of Civil-Law Notaries is a member of the Council of the Notaries of the European Union (CNUE). Within the CNUE, a working group on AML/CFT provides a forum for identifying and analysing shared challenges and to exchange best practices in the prevention of ML and TF. 223. BMWET, the AML/CFT coordinator for DPMS, real estate, insurance intermediaries, and TCSPs, would engage in international cooperation when being aware of irregularities by an OE with establishments in foreign countries. In the absence of statistics or cases, it does not appear this has taken place. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 224. Customs and tax authorities cooperate effectively with their foreign counterparts. Since 2021, the Anti-Fraud Unit of the Tax Administration includes a dedicated central office for international cooperation. The Tax Administration (i.e. Tax Authority and Customs) only exchanges information with the tax and Customs authorities of other countries based on existing legal bases. Within the EU framework, the tax administration participates in Multilateral Controls (MLCs) or JITs. It is not directly involved in Interpol channels but routinely receives Interpol requests and information via the Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) for matters that fall within its competence. Table 2.12. Exchange of information in tax matters 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Incoming requests EU 1 307 991 910 980 4 188 Third countries 343 316 76 75 810 Outgoing requests EU 644 515 590 591 2 340 Third countries 227 308 362 320 1 217 225. Customs seek cooperation within the framework of agreements with third countries. Council Regulation 515/97/EEC of 13 March 1997 and the Naples II Convention for national legislation and criminal investigations serve as a basis for international cooperation. Customs also cooperates through the World Customs Organization (WCO). Table 2.13. Exchange of information in customs matters 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Incoming requests EU 152 154 185 305 796 Third countries 138 81 105 103 427 Outgoing requests EU 93 53 78 157 381 Third countries 39 17 20 29 105 Footnotes [38] Including with Czechia, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein/Switzerland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="262. FIs generally have a developed understanding of existing and developing ML risks related to relationships with offshore customers, listed higher-risk jurisdictions, complex structures, and the use of fraudulent companies (IO.5), but to a somewhat lesser extent risks from the use of cash, laundering the proceeds of crime through real estate, and corruption. ML risk related to corruption seems to be predominantly approached from a focus on PEP-list compliance instead of an inherent vulnerability perspective. CIs generally understand TF risk as related to NPOs, international payments to higher risk jurisdictions (including jurisdictions neighbouring conflict countries or regions), and TFS/TF compliance. 263. Most CIs demonstrate an improved ability to maintain an understanding of their exposure to ML risks, considering emerging risks, including at group-wide level (where applicable). They approach business risk assessment as a dynamic, data-driven process tailored to their business models. The FMA continues to identify shortcomings in relation to FIs’ risk assessments, but these are reported now of a less systemic nature, underlining the improved understanding of ML/TF risks over time. Most large FIs with an international presence seem to systematically include their foreign subsidiaries and branches in their group-wide risk assessments. 264. While the sector has undergone a steep learning curve since the introduction of sectoral AML/CFT obligations in 2020, there is room for improved risk understanding among the very heterogeneous group of VASPs. However, interviewed VASPs demonstrated an understanding of their high inherent ML/TF risks, systematically conduct business risk assessments and revise them based on market developments and prior to the introduction of new products and/or technological developments. 265. ISPs and asset managers did not demonstrate an ML/TF risk understanding commensurate with the sector’s materiality and risk, since their risk understanding was limited to compliance risk. They do not adequately conduct business risk assessments in a systematic manner and only a limited number of securities firms (37%), life insurance companies (32%), and investment fund management companies and alternative investment fund managers (59%) have implemented a formalised customer acceptance policy based on the results of their business risk assessment. The life insurance sector, including intermediaries, nevertheless demonstrated an understanding of the limited risk it is exposed to." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="262. FIs generally have a developed understanding of existing and developing ML risks related to relationships with offshore customers, listed higher-risk jurisdictions, complex structures, and the use of fraudulent companies (IO.5), but to a somewhat lesser extent risks from the use of cash, laundering the proceeds of crime through real estate, and corruption. ML risk related to corruption seems to be predominantly approached from a focus on PEP-list compliance instead of an inherent vulnerability perspective. CIs generally understand TF risk as related to NPOs, international payments to higher risk jurisdictions (including jurisdictions neighbouring conflict countries or regions), and TFS/TF compliance. 263. Most CIs demonstrate an improved ability to maintain an understanding of their exposure to ML risks, considering emerging risks, including at group-wide level (where applicable). They approach business risk assessment as a dynamic, data-driven process tailored to their business models. The FMA continues to identify shortcomings in relation to FIs’ risk assessments, but these are reported now of a less systemic nature, underlining the improved understanding of ML/TF risks over time. Most large FIs with an international presence seem to systematically include their foreign subsidiaries and branches in their group-wide risk assessments. 264. While the sector has undergone a steep learning curve since the introduction of sectoral AML/CFT obligations in 2020, there is room for improved risk understanding among the very heterogeneous group of VASPs. However, interviewed VASPs demonstrated an understanding of their high inherent ML/TF risks, systematically conduct business risk assessments and revise them based on market developments and prior to the introduction of new products and/or technological developments. 265. ISPs and asset managers did not demonstrate an ML/TF risk understanding commensurate with the sector’s materiality and risk, since their risk understanding was limited to compliance risk. They do not adequately conduct business risk assessments in a systematic manner and only a limited number of securities firms (37%), life insurance companies (32%), and investment fund management companies and alternative investment fund managers (59%) have implemented a formalised customer acceptance policy based on the results of their business risk assessment. The life insurance sector, including intermediaries, nevertheless demonstrated an understanding of the limited risk it is exposed to." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="335. DNFBPs’ understanding of their sectoral and internal ML/TF risks varies significantly across sectors and is weakest among the high-risk sectors. Casinos demonstrated a good understanding of ML/TF risks. Notaries and lawyers are generally risk-aware but demonstrated some shortcomings. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities and accountants showed a basic understanding of ML/TF risks. Despite their high-risk context, real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS did not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of their existing and evolving ML/TF/PF risks. 336. Real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and DPMS in general were unable to demonstrate a correct understanding of existing or evolving sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. At entity-level, they demonstrated over-reliance on their perception that their networks of clients are always low risk, and on the role played by other DNFBPs, especially when notaries or lawyers intervene. 337. The real estate sector, in particular, was not able to recognise its exposure to sectoral ML/TF risks. This contrasts with the findings of the NRAs’ assessment that this sector continues to present heightened opportunities for ML and PF (Introduction and IO.1). Major improvements are still needed, especially when considering sectors such as real estate agents and TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), whose services, when connected to higher risk clients or transactions, are usually complex in nature and may involve several intermediaries. 338. Notaries and lawyers were generally aware of sectoral ML/TF risks but could not always identify relevant risks connected to Austria’s context or internal risks related to the services specifically provided by them. They could not always identify exposure to relevant vulnerabilities such as the use of cash or use of fraudulent companies. 339. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services and accountancy professionals have a more limited and high-level understanding of their sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. Although tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities are responsible for registering clients in the Beneficial Ownership Register and demonstrated a good knowledge of how they should identify beneficial owners, they were unable to correctly identify the specific ML/TF risks they are exposed to, when considering their network of clients or services provided. With regards to TCSPs (other than tax advisors), authorities demonstrated a very low understanding of the activities, risks and compliance with CDD obligations, including regarding the identification and verification of beneficial owner, of these OEs. Due to lack of data and information on TCSPs (other than tax advisors), authorities were unable to demonstrate that these OEs are able to correctly identify the specific ML/TF risks they are exposed to and comply with their AML/CFT obligations, including correctly identifying and verifying beneficial owners. 340. Casinos demonstrated a good understanding of sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. They were able to identify specific risks related to types of customers and transactions, differentiating between risks related to land-based casinos and on-line casinos, and were aware of new ML/TF trends and typologies. 341. The DNFBP sector’s varied and often insufficient ML/TF risk understanding is also reflected in the very low number of STRs/SARs submitted during the period under review (table 4.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="335. DNFBPs’ understanding of their sectoral and internal ML/TF risks varies significantly across sectors and is weakest among the high-risk sectors. Casinos demonstrated a good understanding of ML/TF risks. Notaries and lawyers are generally risk-aware but demonstrated some shortcomings. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities and accountants showed a basic understanding of ML/TF risks. Despite their high-risk context, real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS did not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of their existing and evolving ML/TF/PF risks. 336. Real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), and DPMS in general were unable to demonstrate a correct understanding of existing or evolving sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. At entity-level, they demonstrated over-reliance on their perception that their networks of clients are always low risk, and on the role played by other DNFBPs, especially when notaries or lawyers intervene. 337. The real estate sector, in particular, was not able to recognise its exposure to sectoral ML/TF risks. This contrasts with the findings of the NRAs’ assessment that this sector continues to present heightened opportunities for ML and PF (Introduction and IO.1). Major improvements are still needed, especially when considering sectors such as real estate agents and TCSPs (other than tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities), whose services, when connected to higher risk clients or transactions, are usually complex in nature and may involve several intermediaries. 338. Notaries and lawyers were generally aware of sectoral ML/TF risks but could not always identify relevant risks connected to Austria’s context or internal risks related to the services specifically provided by them. They could not always identify exposure to relevant vulnerabilities such as the use of cash or use of fraudulent companies. 339. Tax advisors undertaking TCSP services and accountancy professionals have a more limited and high-level understanding of their sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. Although tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities are responsible for registering clients in the Beneficial Ownership Register and demonstrated a good knowledge of how they should identify beneficial owners, they were unable to correctly identify the specific ML/TF risks they are exposed to, when considering their network of clients or services provided. With regards to TCSPs (other than tax advisors), authorities demonstrated a very low understanding of the activities, risks and compliance with CDD obligations, including regarding the identification and verification of beneficial owner, of these OEs. Due to lack of data and information on TCSPs (other than tax advisors), authorities were unable to demonstrate that these OEs are able to correctly identify the specific ML/TF risks they are exposed to and comply with their AML/CFT obligations, including correctly identifying and verifying beneficial owners. 340. Casinos demonstrated a good understanding of sectoral and internal ML/TF risks. They were able to identify specific risks related to types of customers and transactions, differentiating between risks related to land-based casinos and on-line casinos, and were aware of new ML/TF trends and typologies. 341. The DNFBP sector’s varied and often insufficient ML/TF risk understanding is also reflected in the very low number of STRs/SARs submitted during the period under review (table 4.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="394. Austria uses a multi-pronged approach to effectively ensure that competent authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information of domestic LPs and relevant foreign legal entities. The primary sources of basic and beneficial ownership information are the Beneficial Ownership Register, the Company Register, the Register of Foundations and Funds and the Associations Register. In addition to the registers, competent authorities have the necessary powers to obtain basic and beneficial ownership information from OEs and directly from legal entities themselves and use these powers to some extent. 395. Austria’s registers with basic information and the Beneficial Ownership Register are interconnected and information, including changes, is automatically transferred from one register to the other, thereby ensuring accurate and up-to-date information in all registers. Data from Austria’s Central Register of Residents (ZMR) are automatically integrated in these registers, which is an important tool to ensure that details on beneficial owners who are residents in Austria remain up to date. Without exception, the A-FIU, LEAs, prosecutors and other competent authorities indicated that the registers with basic and beneficial ownership information are a crucial source of information, which they use to inform their operational activities. 396. Criminal investigators systematically use the Beneficial Ownership Register in support of their investigations, particularly in relation to typical core economic and financial offences (e.g., breach of trust, fraudulent bankruptcy, grossly negligent impairment of creditors’ interests, etc.) as well as social security fraud. In addition, in organised crime investigations, systematic consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register take place, as this information is crucial in determining organisational structures and for clarifying individuals’ roles in criminal activities. During the analytical process, the A-FIU systematically cross-checks information contained in STRs/SARs against the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register. This is done using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass”, rather than stand-alone searches in the Beneficial Ownership Register through the A-FIU’s direct access (IO.6). 5.3.1. Timely access to adequate, accurate, and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information via the Beneficial Ownership Register 397. The multi-pronged approach is in place to ensure effective access to basic and beneficial ownership information, and competent authorities prefer to use the Beneficial Ownership Register, which they describe as a highly effective and reliable tool. The Register is directly accessible to them, including through a dedicated web-application with additional analytical capabilities for some of them, [75] which is integrated into their own portals. It contains adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information of 98% of all domestic LPs and relevant foreign legal entities. [76] Information extends to details on the entire ownership and control structure of LPs and relevant LAs, including details of foreign persons and entities that exercise control over the legal entity. Direct access for OEs is also ensured through a dedicated web-application. As mentioned in IO.1, there is very effective regular operational coordination in place between the Beneficial Owner Registry Authority and competent authorities. This allows for the identification of operational challenges in the identification of beneficial ownership information and functionalities of the Beneficial Owner Register to ensure that competent authorities have easy and swift access to this register. 398. In general, competent authorities reported that they consult the Beneficial Ownership Register as a starting point to corroborate information . Table 5.1 shows the number of formal excerpts retrieved from the Beneficial Ownership Register by Austrian competent authorities in support of their day-to-day work. These do not include consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register without retrieving a formal excerpt. In addition to the 13 561 excerpts delivered to competent authorities in 2024, these authorities also consulted beneficial ownership data in another 15 677 cases without requesting an excerpt. These numbers do not include the A-FIU’s automatic cross-checks against the Register using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass” (see above). Table 5.1. Competent authorities’ access to beneficial ownership data supported by excerpts of information Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 Excerpts retrieved by authorities 9 244 14 138 11 257 12 199 Simple checks 15 677 TOTAL 29 238 Box 5.1. Demonstrating competent authorities’ access to and use of information from the Beneficial Ownership Register in complex financial investigations with cross border dimension When conducting monitoring of implementation and potential circumvention of other EU financial sanctions (IO.11), DSN systematically checks the Beneficial Ownership Register and Central Account Register, in addition to other sources of information. Through consultation of the Beneficial Ownership Register and the Land Register, it was determined that a sanctioned individual indirectly held economic resources (i.e., real estate and beneficial ownership of a legal person) in Austria. The results of these consultations revealed that the legal owner of the Austrian company was a company located in Cyprus, where the sanctioned individual acted as the managing director. The chain of ownership as reflected in the Beneficial Ownership Register also identified several Russian companies, with the sanctioned individual as the beneficial owner. This case was immediately reported to the competent courts, which resulted in the freezing of the relevant assets and the Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a judicial investigation for suspicion of EU sanctions violation and evasion. While this example is outside the scope of the assessment of IO.11, it nevertheless illustrates that competent authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and up to date beneficial ownership information in support of their operational activities. 399. Competent authorities presented various other case examples, including those presented in IO.6 and IO.7, demonstrating that the A-FIU and LEAs could identify (foreign) legal entities involved in ML, TF and PF schemes, including by, but not limited to, using beneficial ownership information registered in Austria. Investigative authorities encounter more difficulties in identifying the beneficial ownership of complex legal structures when foreign legal persons are involved in financial transactions because of limitations in the scope and quality of beneficial ownership information collected and registered abroad, or the lack thereof. 400. The DSN also presented several case examples demonstrating the use of beneficial ownership information, including from other sources than the Beneficial Ownership Register, in complex financial investigations and how this information allowed to identify new targets and detect additional financial flows. 401. The Beneficial Ownership Register also plays an important role to support international cooperation (i.e., when Austrian authorities respond to international cooperation requests). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority can directly request beneficial ownership information from legal entities, including at the request of foreign competent authorities. International co-operation feedback demonstrates that basic and beneficial ownership information is exchanged regularly and in an accurate and timely manner. There are furthermore no impediments to the exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information with foreign counterparts as this information is also publicly available to all foreign competent authorities with a legitimate interest. In addition, foreign competent authorities can also obtain beneficial ownership information upon request from their Austrian counterparts. Measures to ensure that basic and beneficial ownership information remains accurate and up to date 402. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority continuously improves its risk-based supervision to ensure compliance with the transparency requirements and improve data quality (table 5.2). The Registry Authority consists of seven staff members of which three persons are full-time dedicated to supervision. As a first step, at the time of the creation of a legal entity, the beneficial ownership information across the entire ownership and control chain is always subject to in-depth risk-based verification. Subsequently, during the lifetime of the legal entity, the Registry Authority conducts active risk-based supervision and relies on its extensive analytic capabilities to ensure that the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date. It also has the power to request documentation on beneficial ownership directly from both domestic and foreign legal entities and their legal and beneficial owners to carry out offsite audits, including interviews (if so required), and demonstrated that it makes active use of this power, i.e., 454 times in 2024 and 457 times in 2023. 403. There is a comprehensive manual in place to inform and guide the Registry Authority’s supervisory process. As a first step, all incoming beneficial ownership reports are reviewed using an automated system. Cases for in-depth inspections are identified on a risk-sensitive basis using multiple sources of information. [77] Cases for inspection are also identified based on various threat scenarios (e.g., shell companies, including fraudulent companies, and sanctions evasion) and risk indicators (e.g., reported nominee arrangements, private foundations with no reported beneficiaries, beneficial owners with residence in or nationality of high-risk countries, registered office at a letter box address). Particular attention is given to cases under monitoring because of discrepancy reports. The sample for in-depth inspection is completed with cases randomly selected. 404. The following two tables demonstrate the application of the risk-based approach to ensuring adequate, accurate and up to date beneficial ownership information. They show that around 10% of all cases with a very high risk are regularly checked by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. It should also be noted that checking one legal entity in a group of entities ensures that the reporting of all legal entities in that group is adequate, as they generally have the same ownership structure and the same beneficial owner. Table 5.2. Overview of the number of reports subject to risk-based in-depth review by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority as part of its ongoing supervision [78] 2023 Risk level Reports submitted to the BO Register % in relation to total reports Reports reviewed by BO Registry Authority % Low 145.801 81,02% 337 0,23% Medium 19.445 10,81% 213 1,10% High 9.907 5,51% 386 3,90% Very high 4.809 2,67% 438 9,11% Total 179.962 1374 0,76% 2024 Risk level Reports submitted to the BO Register % in relation to total reports Reports reviewed by BO Registry Authority % Low 147.176 81,16% 366 0,25% Medium 20.272 11,18% 173 0,85% High 8.964 4,94% 367 4,09% Very high 4.936 2,72% 502 10,17% Total 181.348 1408 0,78% 405. Table 5.3 below demonstrates that the risk-based case selection is effective as a higher proportion of risk-based cases lead to follow-up measures compared to those examined as part of random sample testing. [79] In addition, it is important to clarify that group structures, which consist of a larger number of entities with complex structures, quite often have the same ownership and control structure and are classified as very high- or high-risk. This implies that checking one legal entity that is part of a group of entities is sufficient to ensure that the reporting of all legal entities in that group is correct. As a result, the number of audits of reports filed by very high-risk entities is significantly higher than the 10% as shown in Table 5.2. [80] Table 5.3. Follow-up measures taken following a review of reports Reports Analysed Remarks Referrals to Other Authorities Requests for Documents Supplements to compliance packages Plausible Reports No Follow-up Action Necessary Selection Category No. No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Random 360 17 4.72 0 0.00 28 7.78 0 0.00 317 88.06 314 87.22 Risk-based 720 138 19.17 27 3.75 120 16.67 0 0.00 432 60.00 435 60.42 Ad hoc 118 13 11.02 33 27.97 42 35.59 2 1.69 29 24.58 28 23.73 Compliance Package 300 4 1.33 0 0.00 1 0.00 4 1.33 291 97.00 289 96.33 Total 1 498 172 60 191 6 1 069 1 066 406. All Beneficial Ownership disclosure reports are also automatically checked against legally applicable financial sanctions lists upon creation of the legal entity and when updates are filed. In addition, the entire Beneficial Ownership Register is scanned against sanctions lists on a weekly basis. To address the differences in compliance between certain categories of legal entities, the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority monitors the reporting rates for each type of legal entity. The interconnection between the Beneficial Ownership Register, the registers with basic information and ZMR, which contains information on all residents in Austria, also constitutes an important tool to ensure that sources of basic and beneficial ownership information remain up to date. The PACC proactively uses datamining technologies to detect inconsistencies between the various registers and makes the results available to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority for follow-up. Box 5.2. Illustrating PACC’s data analysis to identify fraudulent companies The PACC submitted 60 legal entities which presented characteristics of fraudulent companies to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority proceeded with a review of these entities and identified inconsistencies/incorrect reports for 18 of them. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority's monthly risk-based supervision was therefore extended to these 18 cases on an ad hoc basis. This led to the identification of compliance failures for 12 of these entities, which were forwarded to the Anti-Fraud Office for the application of administrative fiscal penalties or further investigation by the Fraud Office’s investigation team. The latter opened investigations against these 12 entities and concluded that all of them were indeed fraudulent companies. Proceedings were initiated against these 12 entities, and they were removed from the Company Register and their VAT and social security numbers were cancelled. These entities were also added to the public list on the BMF public website. The other 6 entities, which were not fraudulent but nevertheless failed to comply with the beneficial ownership registration requirements, and the natural persons behind these entities were subject to investigation by the Fraud Office’s investigation team. 407. As part of the multi-pronged approach, competent authorities can also obtain information directly from LPs and relevant LAs. In addition to a shareholder register, LPs and LAs are required to maintain accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and file changes in their beneficial ownership information with the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. In addition to filing changes within four weeks, they should check the details of their registered beneficial owner(s) at least once a year and report any changes, or confirm that there are no changes, to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority (R.24). In 2024, over 87 000 reports not related to the mandatory annual update were filed which demonstrates effective implementation. 408. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority does directly request beneficial ownership information from LPs and LAs. The Registry’s access to this information is crucial for the verification of beneficial ownership beyond direct ownership (i.e., control). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority presented several examples demonstrating frequent interaction with LPs and LAs, and their legal and beneficial owners, including cases with foreign ownership (case examples in section 5.5). 409. A mandatory requirement for OEs to report discrepancies to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority exists. If OEs discover a discrepancy between the information included in the Beneficial Ownership Register and information collected from the customer, they should file a report unless the customer updates the relevant information included in the Beneficial Ownership Register himself within a reasonable period (usually one week). The discrepancy reporting allows the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority to identify legal entities which did not spontaneously update changed beneficial ownership information and initiate enforcement measures, if so required. Table 5.4. Number of discrepancies reported by OEs 2020 2021 2022 2023 Discrepancies reported by OEs 177 283 208 216 410. Discrepancy reporting by OEs is limited as a result of the OEs’ CDD processes, which alert customers of discrepancies and prompt them to update relevant data in the Beneficial Ownership Register themselves (self-correction). OEs explained that they generally give the customer a few weeks to address the inconsistencies in the register and reports are only filed when the customer does not follow up on that request. CIs and professionals filing information on behalf of their clients, i.e., lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and notaries generally implement the discrepancy reporting effectively. The overreliance by a few types of OEs, especially real estate agents, other TCSPs and DPMS on the Beneficial Ownership Register for conducting CDD might also contribute to the low levels of discrepancy reporting. Overall OEs make a positive contribution to ensuring that the data in the Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date by prompting their customers to proceed with self-correction. 411. The number of reported discrepancies by competent authorities remains very limited and not in line with their use of this information (i.e., from three reports in 2021 to 12 reports in 2024) . This can be explained by the fact that competent authorities do not have a legal obligation to file discrepancy reports and are simply encouraged to do so. There is frequent interaction between competent authorities and the Beneficial Ownership Register, including during investigations, providing for opportunities for giving direct feedback on the quality of information on legal entities. While this feedback is very valuable in ensuring that information remains adequate, accurate and up to date, competent authorities would benefit from further awareness raising of their legal obligation to file discrepancy reports. [81] Timely access to the Company Register, the Associations Register, and the Register of Foundations and Funds 412. Competent authorities continue to frequently access the registers with basic information, and authorities provided supporting statistics to demonstrate this. They do not use the Beneficial Ownership Register as much for obtaining basic information, even though the Beneficial Ownership Register is linked to this register and also holds basic information. In addition to linking the registers, there are various other measures in place to ensure that the information in the registers with basic information remains accurate and up to date, including but not limited to mandatory and promptly reporting of changes by legal entities. Timely access to basic and beneficial ownership information upon request from OEs 413. As a supplementary measure to the registers mentioned above, competent authorities have easy access to beneficial ownership information maintained by OEs even though the directly accessible registers with basic and beneficial ownership information generally constitute their preferred sources. A-FIU and LEAs indicated that they do not face any difficulties in obtaining information from OEs in a timely manner. Reports filed by OEs with A-FIU generally contain information on beneficial owners when LPs or LAs are involved. This information is said to be accurate and up to date. Similarly, when as part of their investigation, LEAs request information from OEs, beneficial ownership information is included because an integral part of CDD information. 414. OEs can benefit from a very helpful and effective tool in ensuring that the beneficial ownership information of their customers on record remains adequate, accurate, and up to date. They can sign up for receiving automatic alerts from the Beneficial Ownership Register informing them about any changes in the beneficial ownership information of their customers, which prompts them to update CDD information. This tool is particularly appreciated by CIs and professionals filing beneficial ownership information on behalf of their customer but less known to other OEs. 415. The WiEReG is clear that OEs cannot solely rely on the information contained in the Beneficial Ownership Register but must follow a risk-based approach to CDD . Implementation of CDD requirements in line with legal requirements was observed for CIs and professionals filing beneficial ownership information on behalf of their clients (i.e., lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services and notaries). Certain other DNFBPs appear to overly rely on the Register for fulfilling their CDD obligations (see above), which limits their value as an independent source of beneficial ownership information to some extent. Footnotes [75] The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, A-FIU, DSN, provincial police directorates responsible for state security, federal tax administration authorities, the Federal Tax Court, the criminal police, health insurance institutions, public prosecutor’s offices and the courts. [76] All competent authorities and OEs have access to the following information: the name of the legal entity and address details, the identification number and identification register of the legal entity, the legal form and information about the period of time for which the legal entity has been in existence, the NACE code for the legal entity's main activities, the identification details of both direct and indirect beneficial owners (i.e., control) and the nature and scope of their beneficial interest. As of 1 October 2025, information on all nominee arrangements. [77] The Register of Companies, the Associations Register, the Register of Foundations and Funds, the Austrian Central Register of Residents, internal databases (such as Orbis), and other statistical data. [78] Note that these tables do not contain the checks performed at the time of creation of the legal entity and initial filing of beneficial ownership information. [79] The difference in the number of audits as shown in Table 5.2 and the number of audits as shown in Table 5.3 can be explained as follows: Table 5.2 only includes reports that were submitted to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and automatically received their risk points from the system during this period. Table 5.3, on the other hand, also shows audits performed in 2024, which relate to reports submitted during the period November 2023 to October 2024. This is because manually carrying out checks takes a certain amount of time, consisting of the check itself and an internal review and approval process. [80] For example, if a very high-risk group consists of 50 legal entities and the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority requests documents from one of these legal entities (which are usually all high-risk due to the same group structure) to check the ownership and control structure, the reporting of all legal entities can be checked, even though statistically only one audit is recorded. [81] Even though not required by the FATF Standards, following the on-site visit, Austrian authorities presented amendments to the legal framework to make discrepancy reporting by competent authorities mandatory to the extent that such requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="394. Austria uses a multi-pronged approach to effectively ensure that competent authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information of domestic LPs and relevant foreign legal entities. The primary sources of basic and beneficial ownership information are the Beneficial Ownership Register, the Company Register, the Register of Foundations and Funds and the Associations Register. In addition to the registers, competent authorities have the necessary powers to obtain basic and beneficial ownership information from OEs and directly from legal entities themselves and use these powers to some extent. 395. Austria’s registers with basic information and the Beneficial Ownership Register are interconnected and information, including changes, is automatically transferred from one register to the other, thereby ensuring accurate and up-to-date information in all registers. Data from Austria’s Central Register of Residents (ZMR) are automatically integrated in these registers, which is an important tool to ensure that details on beneficial owners who are residents in Austria remain up to date. Without exception, the A-FIU, LEAs, prosecutors and other competent authorities indicated that the registers with basic and beneficial ownership information are a crucial source of information, which they use to inform their operational activities. 396. Criminal investigators systematically use the Beneficial Ownership Register in support of their investigations, particularly in relation to typical core economic and financial offences (e.g., breach of trust, fraudulent bankruptcy, grossly negligent impairment of creditors’ interests, etc.) as well as social security fraud. In addition, in organised crime investigations, systematic consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register take place, as this information is crucial in determining organisational structures and for clarifying individuals’ roles in criminal activities. During the analytical process, the A-FIU systematically cross-checks information contained in STRs/SARs against the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register. This is done using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass”, rather than stand-alone searches in the Beneficial Ownership Register through the A-FIU’s direct access (IO.6). 5.3.1. Timely access to adequate, accurate, and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information via the Beneficial Ownership Register 397. The multi-pronged approach is in place to ensure effective access to basic and beneficial ownership information, and competent authorities prefer to use the Beneficial Ownership Register, which they describe as a highly effective and reliable tool. The Register is directly accessible to them, including through a dedicated web-application with additional analytical capabilities for some of them, [75] which is integrated into their own portals. It contains adequate, accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information of 98% of all domestic LPs and relevant foreign legal entities. [76] Information extends to details on the entire ownership and control structure of LPs and relevant LAs, including details of foreign persons and entities that exercise control over the legal entity. Direct access for OEs is also ensured through a dedicated web-application. As mentioned in IO.1, there is very effective regular operational coordination in place between the Beneficial Owner Registry Authority and competent authorities. This allows for the identification of operational challenges in the identification of beneficial ownership information and functionalities of the Beneficial Owner Register to ensure that competent authorities have easy and swift access to this register. 398. In general, competent authorities reported that they consult the Beneficial Ownership Register as a starting point to corroborate information . Table 5.1 shows the number of formal excerpts retrieved from the Beneficial Ownership Register by Austrian competent authorities in support of their day-to-day work. These do not include consultations of the Beneficial Ownership Register without retrieving a formal excerpt. In addition to the 13 561 excerpts delivered to competent authorities in 2024, these authorities also consulted beneficial ownership data in another 15 677 cases without requesting an excerpt. These numbers do not include the A-FIU’s automatic cross-checks against the Register using the Austrian Companies Database “Wirtschaftskompass” (see above). Table 5.1. Competent authorities’ access to beneficial ownership data supported by excerpts of information Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 Excerpts retrieved by authorities 9 244 14 138 11 257 12 199 Simple checks 15 677 TOTAL 29 238 Box 5.1. Demonstrating competent authorities’ access to and use of information from the Beneficial Ownership Register in complex financial investigations with cross border dimension When conducting monitoring of implementation and potential circumvention of other EU financial sanctions (IO.11), DSN systematically checks the Beneficial Ownership Register and Central Account Register, in addition to other sources of information. Through consultation of the Beneficial Ownership Register and the Land Register, it was determined that a sanctioned individual indirectly held economic resources (i.e., real estate and beneficial ownership of a legal person) in Austria. The results of these consultations revealed that the legal owner of the Austrian company was a company located in Cyprus, where the sanctioned individual acted as the managing director. The chain of ownership as reflected in the Beneficial Ownership Register also identified several Russian companies, with the sanctioned individual as the beneficial owner. This case was immediately reported to the competent courts, which resulted in the freezing of the relevant assets and the Public Prosecutor’s Office opened a judicial investigation for suspicion of EU sanctions violation and evasion. While this example is outside the scope of the assessment of IO.11, it nevertheless illustrates that competent authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and up to date beneficial ownership information in support of their operational activities. 399. Competent authorities presented various other case examples, including those presented in IO.6 and IO.7, demonstrating that the A-FIU and LEAs could identify (foreign) legal entities involved in ML, TF and PF schemes, including by, but not limited to, using beneficial ownership information registered in Austria. Investigative authorities encounter more difficulties in identifying the beneficial ownership of complex legal structures when foreign legal persons are involved in financial transactions because of limitations in the scope and quality of beneficial ownership information collected and registered abroad, or the lack thereof. 400. The DSN also presented several case examples demonstrating the use of beneficial ownership information, including from other sources than the Beneficial Ownership Register, in complex financial investigations and how this information allowed to identify new targets and detect additional financial flows. 401. The Beneficial Ownership Register also plays an important role to support international cooperation (i.e., when Austrian authorities respond to international cooperation requests). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority can directly request beneficial ownership information from legal entities, including at the request of foreign competent authorities. International co-operation feedback demonstrates that basic and beneficial ownership information is exchanged regularly and in an accurate and timely manner. There are furthermore no impediments to the exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information with foreign counterparts as this information is also publicly available to all foreign competent authorities with a legitimate interest. In addition, foreign competent authorities can also obtain beneficial ownership information upon request from their Austrian counterparts. Measures to ensure that basic and beneficial ownership information remains accurate and up to date 402. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority continuously improves its risk-based supervision to ensure compliance with the transparency requirements and improve data quality (table 5.2). The Registry Authority consists of seven staff members of which three persons are full-time dedicated to supervision. As a first step, at the time of the creation of a legal entity, the beneficial ownership information across the entire ownership and control chain is always subject to in-depth risk-based verification. Subsequently, during the lifetime of the legal entity, the Registry Authority conducts active risk-based supervision and relies on its extensive analytic capabilities to ensure that the data in the Beneficial Ownership Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date. It also has the power to request documentation on beneficial ownership directly from both domestic and foreign legal entities and their legal and beneficial owners to carry out offsite audits, including interviews (if so required), and demonstrated that it makes active use of this power, i.e., 454 times in 2024 and 457 times in 2023. 403. There is a comprehensive manual in place to inform and guide the Registry Authority’s supervisory process. As a first step, all incoming beneficial ownership reports are reviewed using an automated system. Cases for in-depth inspections are identified on a risk-sensitive basis using multiple sources of information. [77] Cases for inspection are also identified based on various threat scenarios (e.g., shell companies, including fraudulent companies, and sanctions evasion) and risk indicators (e.g., reported nominee arrangements, private foundations with no reported beneficiaries, beneficial owners with residence in or nationality of high-risk countries, registered office at a letter box address). Particular attention is given to cases under monitoring because of discrepancy reports. The sample for in-depth inspection is completed with cases randomly selected. 404. The following two tables demonstrate the application of the risk-based approach to ensuring adequate, accurate and up to date beneficial ownership information. They show that around 10% of all cases with a very high risk are regularly checked by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. It should also be noted that checking one legal entity in a group of entities ensures that the reporting of all legal entities in that group is adequate, as they generally have the same ownership structure and the same beneficial owner. Table 5.2. Overview of the number of reports subject to risk-based in-depth review by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority as part of its ongoing supervision [78] 2023 Risk level Reports submitted to the BO Register % in relation to total reports Reports reviewed by BO Registry Authority % Low 145.801 81,02% 337 0,23% Medium 19.445 10,81% 213 1,10% High 9.907 5,51% 386 3,90% Very high 4.809 2,67% 438 9,11% Total 179.962 1374 0,76% 2024 Risk level Reports submitted to the BO Register % in relation to total reports Reports reviewed by BO Registry Authority % Low 147.176 81,16% 366 0,25% Medium 20.272 11,18% 173 0,85% High 8.964 4,94% 367 4,09% Very high 4.936 2,72% 502 10,17% Total 181.348 1408 0,78% 405. Table 5.3 below demonstrates that the risk-based case selection is effective as a higher proportion of risk-based cases lead to follow-up measures compared to those examined as part of random sample testing. [79] In addition, it is important to clarify that group structures, which consist of a larger number of entities with complex structures, quite often have the same ownership and control structure and are classified as very high- or high-risk. This implies that checking one legal entity that is part of a group of entities is sufficient to ensure that the reporting of all legal entities in that group is correct. As a result, the number of audits of reports filed by very high-risk entities is significantly higher than the 10% as shown in Table 5.2. [80] Table 5.3. Follow-up measures taken following a review of reports Reports Analysed Remarks Referrals to Other Authorities Requests for Documents Supplements to compliance packages Plausible Reports No Follow-up Action Necessary Selection Category No. No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Random 360 17 4.72 0 0.00 28 7.78 0 0.00 317 88.06 314 87.22 Risk-based 720 138 19.17 27 3.75 120 16.67 0 0.00 432 60.00 435 60.42 Ad hoc 118 13 11.02 33 27.97 42 35.59 2 1.69 29 24.58 28 23.73 Compliance Package 300 4 1.33 0 0.00 1 0.00 4 1.33 291 97.00 289 96.33 Total 1 498 172 60 191 6 1 069 1 066 406. All Beneficial Ownership disclosure reports are also automatically checked against legally applicable financial sanctions lists upon creation of the legal entity and when updates are filed. In addition, the entire Beneficial Ownership Register is scanned against sanctions lists on a weekly basis. To address the differences in compliance between certain categories of legal entities, the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority monitors the reporting rates for each type of legal entity. The interconnection between the Beneficial Ownership Register, the registers with basic information and ZMR, which contains information on all residents in Austria, also constitutes an important tool to ensure that sources of basic and beneficial ownership information remain up to date. The PACC proactively uses datamining technologies to detect inconsistencies between the various registers and makes the results available to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority for follow-up. Box 5.2. Illustrating PACC’s data analysis to identify fraudulent companies The PACC submitted 60 legal entities which presented characteristics of fraudulent companies to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority proceeded with a review of these entities and identified inconsistencies/incorrect reports for 18 of them. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority's monthly risk-based supervision was therefore extended to these 18 cases on an ad hoc basis. This led to the identification of compliance failures for 12 of these entities, which were forwarded to the Anti-Fraud Office for the application of administrative fiscal penalties or further investigation by the Fraud Office’s investigation team. The latter opened investigations against these 12 entities and concluded that all of them were indeed fraudulent companies. Proceedings were initiated against these 12 entities, and they were removed from the Company Register and their VAT and social security numbers were cancelled. These entities were also added to the public list on the BMF public website. The other 6 entities, which were not fraudulent but nevertheless failed to comply with the beneficial ownership registration requirements, and the natural persons behind these entities were subject to investigation by the Fraud Office’s investigation team. 407. As part of the multi-pronged approach, competent authorities can also obtain information directly from LPs and relevant LAs. In addition to a shareholder register, LPs and LAs are required to maintain accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information and file changes in their beneficial ownership information with the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority. In addition to filing changes within four weeks, they should check the details of their registered beneficial owner(s) at least once a year and report any changes, or confirm that there are no changes, to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority (R.24). In 2024, over 87 000 reports not related to the mandatory annual update were filed which demonstrates effective implementation. 408. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority does directly request beneficial ownership information from LPs and LAs. The Registry’s access to this information is crucial for the verification of beneficial ownership beyond direct ownership (i.e., control). The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority presented several examples demonstrating frequent interaction with LPs and LAs, and their legal and beneficial owners, including cases with foreign ownership (case examples in section 5.5). 409. A mandatory requirement for OEs to report discrepancies to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority exists. If OEs discover a discrepancy between the information included in the Beneficial Ownership Register and information collected from the customer, they should file a report unless the customer updates the relevant information included in the Beneficial Ownership Register himself within a reasonable period (usually one week). The discrepancy reporting allows the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority to identify legal entities which did not spontaneously update changed beneficial ownership information and initiate enforcement measures, if so required. Table 5.4. Number of discrepancies reported by OEs 2020 2021 2022 2023 Discrepancies reported by OEs 177 283 208 216 410. Discrepancy reporting by OEs is limited as a result of the OEs’ CDD processes, which alert customers of discrepancies and prompt them to update relevant data in the Beneficial Ownership Register themselves (self-correction). OEs explained that they generally give the customer a few weeks to address the inconsistencies in the register and reports are only filed when the customer does not follow up on that request. CIs and professionals filing information on behalf of their clients, i.e., lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, and notaries generally implement the discrepancy reporting effectively. The overreliance by a few types of OEs, especially real estate agents, other TCSPs and DPMS on the Beneficial Ownership Register for conducting CDD might also contribute to the low levels of discrepancy reporting. Overall OEs make a positive contribution to ensuring that the data in the Register remain adequate, accurate, and up to date by prompting their customers to proceed with self-correction. 411. The number of reported discrepancies by competent authorities remains very limited and not in line with their use of this information (i.e., from three reports in 2021 to 12 reports in 2024) . This can be explained by the fact that competent authorities do not have a legal obligation to file discrepancy reports and are simply encouraged to do so. There is frequent interaction between competent authorities and the Beneficial Ownership Register, including during investigations, providing for opportunities for giving direct feedback on the quality of information on legal entities. While this feedback is very valuable in ensuring that information remains adequate, accurate and up to date, competent authorities would benefit from further awareness raising of their legal obligation to file discrepancy reports. [81] Timely access to the Company Register, the Associations Register, and the Register of Foundations and Funds 412. Competent authorities continue to frequently access the registers with basic information, and authorities provided supporting statistics to demonstrate this. They do not use the Beneficial Ownership Register as much for obtaining basic information, even though the Beneficial Ownership Register is linked to this register and also holds basic information. In addition to linking the registers, there are various other measures in place to ensure that the information in the registers with basic information remains accurate and up to date, including but not limited to mandatory and promptly reporting of changes by legal entities. Timely access to basic and beneficial ownership information upon request from OEs 413. As a supplementary measure to the registers mentioned above, competent authorities have easy access to beneficial ownership information maintained by OEs even though the directly accessible registers with basic and beneficial ownership information generally constitute their preferred sources. A-FIU and LEAs indicated that they do not face any difficulties in obtaining information from OEs in a timely manner. Reports filed by OEs with A-FIU generally contain information on beneficial owners when LPs or LAs are involved. This information is said to be accurate and up to date. Similarly, when as part of their investigation, LEAs request information from OEs, beneficial ownership information is included because an integral part of CDD information. 414. OEs can benefit from a very helpful and effective tool in ensuring that the beneficial ownership information of their customers on record remains adequate, accurate, and up to date. They can sign up for receiving automatic alerts from the Beneficial Ownership Register informing them about any changes in the beneficial ownership information of their customers, which prompts them to update CDD information. This tool is particularly appreciated by CIs and professionals filing beneficial ownership information on behalf of their customer but less known to other OEs. 415. The WiEReG is clear that OEs cannot solely rely on the information contained in the Beneficial Ownership Register but must follow a risk-based approach to CDD . Implementation of CDD requirements in line with legal requirements was observed for CIs and professionals filing beneficial ownership information on behalf of their clients (i.e., lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services and notaries). Certain other DNFBPs appear to overly rely on the Register for fulfilling their CDD obligations (see above), which limits their value as an independent source of beneficial ownership information to some extent. Footnotes [75] The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, A-FIU, DSN, provincial police directorates responsible for state security, federal tax administration authorities, the Federal Tax Court, the criminal police, health insurance institutions, public prosecutor’s offices and the courts. [76] All competent authorities and OEs have access to the following information: the name of the legal entity and address details, the identification number and identification register of the legal entity, the legal form and information about the period of time for which the legal entity has been in existence, the NACE code for the legal entity's main activities, the identification details of both direct and indirect beneficial owners (i.e., control) and the nature and scope of their beneficial interest. As of 1 October 2025, information on all nominee arrangements. [77] The Register of Companies, the Associations Register, the Register of Foundations and Funds, the Austrian Central Register of Residents, internal databases (such as Orbis), and other statistical data. [78] Note that these tables do not contain the checks performed at the time of creation of the legal entity and initial filing of beneficial ownership information. [79] The difference in the number of audits as shown in Table 5.2 and the number of audits as shown in Table 5.3 can be explained as follows: Table 5.2 only includes reports that were submitted to the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and automatically received their risk points from the system during this period. Table 5.3, on the other hand, also shows audits performed in 2024, which relate to reports submitted during the period November 2023 to October 2024. This is because manually carrying out checks takes a certain amount of time, consisting of the check itself and an internal review and approval process. [80] For example, if a very high-risk group consists of 50 legal entities and the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority requests documents from one of these legal entities (which are usually all high-risk due to the same group structure) to check the ownership and control structure, the reporting of all legal entities can be checked, even though statistically only one audit is recorded. [81] Even though not required by the FATF Standards, following the on-site visit, Austrian authorities presented amendments to the legal framework to make discrepancy reporting by competent authorities mandatory to the extent that such requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 455. There is diverse and intensive co-operation and information exchange between the A-FIU and other competent authorities at the operational and strategic level. The A-FIU acts as a hub for information access, particularly for LEAs. Due to the A-FIU being part of BKA, relevant information flows rapidly and informally between A-FIU and investigation units, respecting confidentiality safeguards. No statistics are kept on this co-operation which both A-FIU and BKA nevertheless reported to be very frequent. Some of the red notice warnings have been issued based on precisely this type of exchange (Box 6.1). There is also information exchange with supervisory authorities, as reported by both the A-FIU and supervisors, including in the framework of PPPs. The PPPs provide an opportunity for the A-FIU to share typologies and feedback on reporting. 456. LEAs proactively request A-FIU's support for the analysis of complex financial flows which has resulted in A-FIU’s disseminations upon request (section 6.2.2). Competent authorities and A-FIU are also working together to build capacity. From 2020 to 2022, prosecutors and criminal investigators were trained on the use of financial intelligence, and the A-FIU provided practical information on use of bank data, VAs, the identification of international account connections, and the benefits of collecting information via Egmont. 457. The A-FIU and the DSN closely cooperate in the development of financial intelligence for TF and PF (see above). Between 2021 and 2023, the A-FIU made 580 disseminations to DSN, mainly information from TF-related STRs/SARs, which were systematically forwarded with very limited financial analysis. A memorandum of understanding is in place between both agencies, and intelligence and policy coordination meetings take place at least four times a year. Topics include coordination of identification of assets by UN designated individuals and entities, developing A-FIU notices on TF, and the NPO SRA (IO.10). 458. The A-FIU and the Tax Authority work closely together mutually supporting each other’s activities. They developed a common initiative to detect shell companies involved in tax and social security fraud schemes (i.e., fraudulent companies) (IO.5). This resulted in 11 tax-recovering orders for a total of EUR 5 million for suspected tax fraud and frozen bank accounts for a value of about EUR 2 million. Where ML indicia are identified in the investigation of tax crimes, the tax authority also submit STRs to the A-FIU (26 in 2020, 22 in 2021, 17 in 2022, 15 in 2023 and 18 in 2024). The Tax Authority and the A-FIU have also established a job rotation program to improve co-operation and development of financial intelligence for tax purposes. Customs also submitted STRs (9 in 2020, 42 in 2021, 10 in 2022, 9 in 2023 and 9 in 2024), in addition to sharing declarations on the cross-border movement of cash and BNI with the A-FIU. 459. In 2022, the A-FIU and ARO established a co-operation mechanism to enable LEAs to utilise A-FIU’s cooperation channels for seeking information from foreign counterparts to support asset freezing. The A-FIU also developed a guideline to LEAs on international freezing requests (IO.8). 460. Co-operation and information exchange between the A-FIU and the FMA is extensive and frequent, almost daily, via goAML or in meetings. A-FIU regularly disseminates reports [95] to the FMA, on suspected breaches of regulatory laws or preventive measures, as well as data that contribute to the FMA’s risk profiling of FIs or support the licensing/registration of new FIs. This is illustrated by one case where the FMA, after close cooperation with the A-FIU, imposed a fine of EUR 100 000 on a CI, also leading the CI to stop issuing a specific illicit high-risk product (i.e., anonymous saving bearer books) which demonstrates effective cooperation (IO.3), albeit with minimal direct consequences for the bank for a serious criminal/administrative misconduct. The FMA also files SARs/STRs resulting from its supervisory activities (34 in 2019, 22 in 2020, 18 in 2021, 11 in 2022, 4 in 2023 and 7 in 2024). The FMA also consults A-FIU before the publication of circulars/ decrees on preventive measures. The A-FIU and the CIS Austria supported the FMA during the creation of a biometric customer identification process. A job rotation program has also been established between the FMA and the A-FIU. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 461. The A-FIU takes appropriate measures to ensure that sensitive information remains protected, including security-clearing of employees who are also bound to strict confidentiality rules. The A-FIU's premises are physically separate from other BKA offices and only accessible to authorised personnel to protect confidentiality. While the A-FIU shares BKA's IT infrastructure, access to its database is restricted. Externally, data is transmitted primarily via secure channels: nationally, via the encrypted goAML platform or special police networks; internationally, via Egmont Secure Web or FIU.net. When disseminating analysis reports to competent authorities, the need-to-know principle is always observed: reports are only sent to those agencies that are necessary for further investigations. Footnotes [95] Which may include information from STRs and SARs. The STR and SAR will be anonymised regarding the persons involved in the report." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 455. There is diverse and intensive co-operation and information exchange between the A-FIU and other competent authorities at the operational and strategic level. The A-FIU acts as a hub for information access, particularly for LEAs. Due to the A-FIU being part of BKA, relevant information flows rapidly and informally between A-FIU and investigation units, respecting confidentiality safeguards. No statistics are kept on this co-operation which both A-FIU and BKA nevertheless reported to be very frequent. Some of the red notice warnings have been issued based on precisely this type of exchange (Box 6.1). There is also information exchange with supervisory authorities, as reported by both the A-FIU and supervisors, including in the framework of PPPs. The PPPs provide an opportunity for the A-FIU to share typologies and feedback on reporting. 456. LEAs proactively request A-FIU's support for the analysis of complex financial flows which has resulted in A-FIU’s disseminations upon request (section 6.2.2). Competent authorities and A-FIU are also working together to build capacity. From 2020 to 2022, prosecutors and criminal investigators were trained on the use of financial intelligence, and the A-FIU provided practical information on use of bank data, VAs, the identification of international account connections, and the benefits of collecting information via Egmont. 457. The A-FIU and the DSN closely cooperate in the development of financial intelligence for TF and PF (see above). Between 2021 and 2023, the A-FIU made 580 disseminations to DSN, mainly information from TF-related STRs/SARs, which were systematically forwarded with very limited financial analysis. A memorandum of understanding is in place between both agencies, and intelligence and policy coordination meetings take place at least four times a year. Topics include coordination of identification of assets by UN designated individuals and entities, developing A-FIU notices on TF, and the NPO SRA (IO.10). 458. The A-FIU and the Tax Authority work closely together mutually supporting each other’s activities. They developed a common initiative to detect shell companies involved in tax and social security fraud schemes (i.e., fraudulent companies) (IO.5). This resulted in 11 tax-recovering orders for a total of EUR 5 million for suspected tax fraud and frozen bank accounts for a value of about EUR 2 million. Where ML indicia are identified in the investigation of tax crimes, the tax authority also submit STRs to the A-FIU (26 in 2020, 22 in 2021, 17 in 2022, 15 in 2023 and 18 in 2024). The Tax Authority and the A-FIU have also established a job rotation program to improve co-operation and development of financial intelligence for tax purposes. Customs also submitted STRs (9 in 2020, 42 in 2021, 10 in 2022, 9 in 2023 and 9 in 2024), in addition to sharing declarations on the cross-border movement of cash and BNI with the A-FIU. 459. In 2022, the A-FIU and ARO established a co-operation mechanism to enable LEAs to utilise A-FIU’s cooperation channels for seeking information from foreign counterparts to support asset freezing. The A-FIU also developed a guideline to LEAs on international freezing requests (IO.8). 460. Co-operation and information exchange between the A-FIU and the FMA is extensive and frequent, almost daily, via goAML or in meetings. A-FIU regularly disseminates reports [95] to the FMA, on suspected breaches of regulatory laws or preventive measures, as well as data that contribute to the FMA’s risk profiling of FIs or support the licensing/registration of new FIs. This is illustrated by one case where the FMA, after close cooperation with the A-FIU, imposed a fine of EUR 100 000 on a CI, also leading the CI to stop issuing a specific illicit high-risk product (i.e., anonymous saving bearer books) which demonstrates effective cooperation (IO.3), albeit with minimal direct consequences for the bank for a serious criminal/administrative misconduct. The FMA also files SARs/STRs resulting from its supervisory activities (34 in 2019, 22 in 2020, 18 in 2021, 11 in 2022, 4 in 2023 and 7 in 2024). The FMA also consults A-FIU before the publication of circulars/ decrees on preventive measures. The A-FIU and the CIS Austria supported the FMA during the creation of a biometric customer identification process. A job rotation program has also been established between the FMA and the A-FIU. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 461. The A-FIU takes appropriate measures to ensure that sensitive information remains protected, including security-clearing of employees who are also bound to strict confidentiality rules. The A-FIU's premises are physically separate from other BKA offices and only accessible to authorised personnel to protect confidentiality. While the A-FIU shares BKA's IT infrastructure, access to its database is restricted. Externally, data is transmitted primarily via secure channels: nationally, via the encrypted goAML platform or special police networks; internationally, via Egmont Secure Web or FIU.net. When disseminating analysis reports to competent authorities, the need-to-know principle is always observed: reports are only sent to those agencies that are necessary for further investigations. Footnotes [95] Which may include information from STRs and SARs. The STR and SAR will be anonymised regarding the persons involved in the report." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Austria imposes a range of sanctions against natural persons convicted of ML, and those sanctions, while broadly proportionate to other criminal sanctions applied in Austria, are not sufficiently effective and dissuasive. In addition, there are no cases of sanctions being applied against a legal person for ML. The 2021 legal reform increased the sentencing range resulting in the basic ML offence carrying a prison sentence of six months to five years, instead of a maximum of three years' imprisonment previously. A fine of up to 720 daily rates [108] (up to EUR 3 600 000) may be imposed instead of imprisonment of up to one year, provided that a custodial sentence is not deemed necessary to prevent the offender from committing further criminal acts. The sentence increases to one to ten years if the criminal proceeds exceed EUR 50 000 or if the offence was committed by a member of a criminal organisation. 493. While Austria collects data on the length of sentences imposed, this information does not in itself allow for a conclusive assessment of ML component's impact on the overall sentencing. If a person is sentenced for committing more than one criminal offences through a single or multiple acts, a single sentence is generally imposed, based on the offence that by law carries the highest penalty. [109] As a result, when a person is convicted of both ML and other offences in a single judgment, it is impossible to determine the portion of the sentence attributable solely to ML. This would only be possible if ML were the sole offence being sentenced. However, concurrent convictions for multiple offences are very common. Where ML was the primary or sole offence in a conviction, very few unconditional prison sentences were issued. For instance, in 2023, only five cases involved prison sentences of more than three years, and in 2024, there were only eight of such cases. There were no convictions of LPs and very few fines were applied. Table 7.5. ML as primary or sole offence: Type of penalty and annual share (number of convicted persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Fine 4 (6%) 4 (7%) 2 (4%) 0 0 Conditional prison sentence up to 1 month 0 0 0 0 0 Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 months 7 (10%) 4 (7%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 0 Conditional prison sentence over 3 to 6 months 9 (13%) 6 (11%) 7 (15%) 2 (3%) 7 (8%) Conditional prison sentence over 6 to 12 months (partly with additional fine) 11 (16%) 11 (20%) 14 (29%) 12 (18%) 20 (22%) Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years (partly with additional fine) 6 (9%) 11 (20%) 6 (13%) 14 (21%) 15 (17%) Partly conditional: 6–12 months total; 1–2 months unconditional 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 0 2 (2%) Partly conditional: 6–12 months total; 2–4 months unconditional 3 (4%) 0 0 2 (3%) 4 (4%) Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 1–4 months unconditional 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 5 (8%) 2 (2%) Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 7 (10%) 7 (13%) 4 (8%) 11 (17%) 9 (10%) Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 1–4 months unconditional 0 0 0 0 0 Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 0 0 0 1 (2%) 0 Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 8–12 months unconditional 1 (1%) 1 (2%) 4 (8%) 2 (3%) 1 (1%) Partly conditional: – not classifiable 0 0 0 0 1 (1%) Unconditional prison sentence up to 1 month 1 (1%) 0 0 0 0 Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 months 1 (1%) 0 0 0 0 Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 6 months 1 (1%) 0 0 0 1 (1%) Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 6 (9%) 6 (11%) 7 (15%) 10 (15%) 16 (18%) Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 5 years 5 (7%) 2 (4%) 0 4 (6%) 6 (7%) Unconditional prison sentence over 5 years 0 0 0 1 (2%) 2 (2%) Total: ML as primary offence (cases) 67 54 48 66 89 Total: all ML convictions (cases) 92 83 78 116 153 Note: &quot;The data generally refer to the number of individuals who were subject to final convictions (rather than the number of cases, which may involve multiple persons being convicted together). Since some individuals might be convicted more than once within a reporting year or may receive an additional conviction at a later date, the number of convictions may exceed the number of distinct convicted persons. Source: Statistik Austria 494. Sentences imposed in recent years have generally become more severe, which is likely due to the increase in the statutory penalty range. Cases also evidence that, in most instances, courts tend to impose sentences in the lower third of the applicable sentencing range, which may not result in effective and dissuasive sentences. Box 7.5. Case examples: Sentences for ML 1. Cryptocurrency Laundering: The accused used EUR 205 062 from aggravated fraud to purchase cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin), which were transferred to an unknown offender. On 20 September 2024, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court sentenced her to three years imprisonment for ML under Art. 165(4) StGB. On appeal (15 May 2025), the Vienna Higher Regional Court upheld the sentence but conditionally suspended two years with three-year probation. The court found the sentence appropriate given it was less than one-third of the maximum (1–10 years range). Mitigating factors: no personal enrichment. Aggravating factors: prior similar conviction, rapid recidivism, offence during probation, amount exceeded EUR 50 000 threshold by four times. [110] 2. Drug Money Handling. The accused received cash of unknown value from drug trafficking on several occasions between May and September 2022. The Wiener Neustadt Regional Court assumed in her favour that the amount was below EUR 50 000 and sentenced her for ML under §165(2) StGB to ten months of imprisonment, conditionally suspended with a three-year probation period. The Vienna Higher Regional Court rejected her appeal, noting the sentence was only slightly above the statutory minimum (6 months–5 years range). [111] 3. Vehicle Fraud: In November–December 2022, the defendant brought fraud-derived vehicles to Austria, fictitiously transferred them to a limited liability company, and hid them in a storage facility rented in the name of the company. He was convicted of ML under §165(4) StGB and sentenced to three years unconditional imprisonment, confirmed by Linz Higher Regional Court (7 August 2024). Mitigating factors: clean record, partial confession, substantial compensation (9 vehicles recovered). Aggravating factors: repeat offending, multiple aggravating elements, damages 17 times the EUR 50 000 threshold, criminal tourism, criminal organisation membership, central role as managing director, personal involvement in cross-border transport. 495. The generally lenient sentences for ML are nevertheless proportionate with the general sentencing practices in Austria . This was confirmed through discussions with prosecutors and judges and also shown by a comparison with statistical data for other crimes and case examples. For instance, the level of sentences for aggravated commercial fraud (Art.148 StGB) closely mirrors to that for ML. The EXW case—one of the largest and most serious fraud cases in Austria in recent years, involving around 40 000 victims and damages of at least EUR 17.6 million—was, as noted, punished with a maximum of five years of imprisonment. The CEO fraud case (section 7.1), despite the significant damage and the scale of the criminal network involved, also resulted in a prison sentence of only seven years for aggravated commercial fraud and membership in a criminal organisation. Table 7.6. Aggravated (Commercial) Fraud (§ 148 StGB): Distribution of Selected Types of Penalties (Most Frequent and Most Severe) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Conditional prison sentence over 6 to 12 months 25% 34% 36% 33% 24% Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 7% 19% 13% 13% 16% Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 15% 16% 18% 23% 23% Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 20% 26% 30% 25% 27% Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 5 years 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% Unconditional prison sentence over 5 years 0% 0% 0% &lt;1% 0% Source: Statistik Austria Footnotes [108] Daily rate amounts vary from EUR 4 to EUR 5 000 depending on the financial capacity of the convicted person (Art. 19 para 2 StGB). [109] Art. 28(1) StGB. [110] OLG Vienna, Decision of 15 May 2025, Case Number 18 Bs 77/25t. [111] OLG Vienna, Decision of 13 January 2025, Case number 30 Bs 155/24z." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Austria imposes a range of sanctions against natural persons convicted of ML, and those sanctions, while broadly proportionate to other criminal sanctions applied in Austria, are not sufficiently effective and dissuasive. In addition, there are no cases of sanctions being applied against a legal person for ML. The 2021 legal reform increased the sentencing range resulting in the basic ML offence carrying a prison sentence of six months to five years, instead of a maximum of three years' imprisonment previously. A fine of up to 720 daily rates [108] (up to EUR 3 600 000) may be imposed instead of imprisonment of up to one year, provided that a custodial sentence is not deemed necessary to prevent the offender from committing further criminal acts. The sentence increases to one to ten years if the criminal proceeds exceed EUR 50 000 or if the offence was committed by a member of a criminal organisation. 493. While Austria collects data on the length of sentences imposed, this information does not in itself allow for a conclusive assessment of ML component's impact on the overall sentencing. If a person is sentenced for committing more than one criminal offences through a single or multiple acts, a single sentence is generally imposed, based on the offence that by law carries the highest penalty. [109] As a result, when a person is convicted of both ML and other offences in a single judgment, it is impossible to determine the portion of the sentence attributable solely to ML. This would only be possible if ML were the sole offence being sentenced. However, concurrent convictions for multiple offences are very common. Where ML was the primary or sole offence in a conviction, very few unconditional prison sentences were issued. For instance, in 2023, only five cases involved prison sentences of more than three years, and in 2024, there were only eight of such cases. There were no convictions of LPs and very few fines were applied. Table 7.5. ML as primary or sole offence: Type of penalty and annual share (number of convicted persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Fine 4 (6%) 4 (7%) 2 (4%) 0 0 Conditional prison sentence up to 1 month 0 0 0 0 0 Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 months 7 (10%) 4 (7%) 1 (2%) 2 (3%) 0 Conditional prison sentence over 3 to 6 months 9 (13%) 6 (11%) 7 (15%) 2 (3%) 7 (8%) Conditional prison sentence over 6 to 12 months (partly with additional fine) 11 (16%) 11 (20%) 14 (29%) 12 (18%) 20 (22%) Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years (partly with additional fine) 6 (9%) 11 (20%) 6 (13%) 14 (21%) 15 (17%) Partly conditional: 6–12 months total; 1–2 months unconditional 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 0 2 (2%) Partly conditional: 6–12 months total; 2–4 months unconditional 3 (4%) 0 0 2 (3%) 4 (4%) Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 1–4 months unconditional 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 5 (8%) 2 (2%) Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 7 (10%) 7 (13%) 4 (8%) 11 (17%) 9 (10%) Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 1–4 months unconditional 0 0 0 0 0 Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 0 0 0 1 (2%) 0 Partly conditional: 24–36 months total; 8–12 months unconditional 1 (1%) 1 (2%) 4 (8%) 2 (3%) 1 (1%) Partly conditional: – not classifiable 0 0 0 0 1 (1%) Unconditional prison sentence up to 1 month 1 (1%) 0 0 0 0 Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 months 1 (1%) 0 0 0 0 Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 6 months 1 (1%) 0 0 0 1 (1%) Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 6 (9%) 6 (11%) 7 (15%) 10 (15%) 16 (18%) Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 5 years 5 (7%) 2 (4%) 0 4 (6%) 6 (7%) Unconditional prison sentence over 5 years 0 0 0 1 (2%) 2 (2%) Total: ML as primary offence (cases) 67 54 48 66 89 Total: all ML convictions (cases) 92 83 78 116 153 Note: &quot;The data generally refer to the number of individuals who were subject to final convictions (rather than the number of cases, which may involve multiple persons being convicted together). Since some individuals might be convicted more than once within a reporting year or may receive an additional conviction at a later date, the number of convictions may exceed the number of distinct convicted persons. Source: Statistik Austria 494. Sentences imposed in recent years have generally become more severe, which is likely due to the increase in the statutory penalty range. Cases also evidence that, in most instances, courts tend to impose sentences in the lower third of the applicable sentencing range, which may not result in effective and dissuasive sentences. Box 7.5. Case examples: Sentences for ML 1. Cryptocurrency Laundering: The accused used EUR 205 062 from aggravated fraud to purchase cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin), which were transferred to an unknown offender. On 20 September 2024, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court sentenced her to three years imprisonment for ML under Art. 165(4) StGB. On appeal (15 May 2025), the Vienna Higher Regional Court upheld the sentence but conditionally suspended two years with three-year probation. The court found the sentence appropriate given it was less than one-third of the maximum (1–10 years range). Mitigating factors: no personal enrichment. Aggravating factors: prior similar conviction, rapid recidivism, offence during probation, amount exceeded EUR 50 000 threshold by four times. [110] 2. Drug Money Handling. The accused received cash of unknown value from drug trafficking on several occasions between May and September 2022. The Wiener Neustadt Regional Court assumed in her favour that the amount was below EUR 50 000 and sentenced her for ML under §165(2) StGB to ten months of imprisonment, conditionally suspended with a three-year probation period. The Vienna Higher Regional Court rejected her appeal, noting the sentence was only slightly above the statutory minimum (6 months–5 years range). [111] 3. Vehicle Fraud: In November–December 2022, the defendant brought fraud-derived vehicles to Austria, fictitiously transferred them to a limited liability company, and hid them in a storage facility rented in the name of the company. He was convicted of ML under §165(4) StGB and sentenced to three years unconditional imprisonment, confirmed by Linz Higher Regional Court (7 August 2024). Mitigating factors: clean record, partial confession, substantial compensation (9 vehicles recovered). Aggravating factors: repeat offending, multiple aggravating elements, damages 17 times the EUR 50 000 threshold, criminal tourism, criminal organisation membership, central role as managing director, personal involvement in cross-border transport. 495. The generally lenient sentences for ML are nevertheless proportionate with the general sentencing practices in Austria . This was confirmed through discussions with prosecutors and judges and also shown by a comparison with statistical data for other crimes and case examples. For instance, the level of sentences for aggravated commercial fraud (Art.148 StGB) closely mirrors to that for ML. The EXW case—one of the largest and most serious fraud cases in Austria in recent years, involving around 40 000 victims and damages of at least EUR 17.6 million—was, as noted, punished with a maximum of five years of imprisonment. The CEO fraud case (section 7.1), despite the significant damage and the scale of the criminal network involved, also resulted in a prison sentence of only seven years for aggravated commercial fraud and membership in a criminal organisation. Table 7.6. Aggravated (Commercial) Fraud (§ 148 StGB): Distribution of Selected Types of Penalties (Most Frequent and Most Severe) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Conditional prison sentence over 6 to 12 months 25% 34% 36% 33% 24% Conditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 7% 19% 13% 13% 16% Partly conditional: 12–24 months total; 4–8 months unconditional 15% 16% 18% 23% 23% Unconditional prison sentence over 1 to 3 years 20% 26% 30% 25% 27% Unconditional prison sentence over 3 to 5 years 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% Unconditional prison sentence over 5 years 0% 0% 0% &lt;1% 0% Source: Statistik Austria Footnotes [108] Daily rate amounts vary from EUR 4 to EUR 5 000 depending on the financial capacity of the convicted person (Art. 19 para 2 StGB). [109] Art. 28(1) StGB. [110] OLG Vienna, Decision of 15 May 2025, Case Number 18 Bs 77/25t. [111] OLG Vienna, Decision of 13 January 2025, Case number 30 Bs 155/24z." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 518. Measures for freezing or seizing of criminal property cover a broad range of assets, but overall values are moderate considering Austria’s risk and context (see below). Statistics on the total value of secured assets show significant annual fluctuations, those being explained by cases of exceptionally high-value assets seized in some years (Table 8.2), mostly relating to real estate and stocks (Table 8.3). 519. Overall, the application of provisional measures slightly decreased during the period under review, whilst the number of reported economic crimes has increased (Table 8.1). As per Table 8.2, there were on average 2 297 seizures on annual basis during the period, amounting to approximately EUR 47 million a year, whereas they were on average 2 748 annual seizures for the period 2013–2017 (according to the Court of Audit’s 2019). The reasons for this decrease are not clear. The tables below refer to assets seized by the police, which is typically the execution of a corresponding order issued by the public prosecutor’s office. While prosecutors indicate that a considerable amount of assets is seized in the course of investigations without the police executing the order (particularly in the case of bank accounts), no statistical information from the PPO was available on the number of such seizures or the amounts involved. Table 8.2. Number of provisional measures and amount of assets in police-executed seizures (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average per year Number of offences where provisional measures (seizure/ freezing order) were issued 2 468 2 091 2 502 2 536 1 890 2 297 Amount of assets seized/ frozen 102 639 687 33 452 321 26 644 206 45 582 016 27 372 082 47 138 062 Note: Statistics include seizures by DSN and the BAK. Source: Austrian authorities Table 8.3. Types of assets in police-executed seizures (EUR) Types of assets seized 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Average per year Cash 5 003 343 6 896 220 7 848 838 6 224 496 9 165 645 35 138 542 7 027 708 Money held in bank accounts 10 309 743 5 833 634 3 254 758 4 428 465 4 564 773 28 391 373 5 978 274 Real estate – 2 320 954 5 040 000 19 182 888 7 243 120 33 786 962 8 446 740 High value goods 3 125 103 2 636 048 2 225 331 7 731 634 2 081 063 17 799 179 3 559 835 Virtual assets – – – 39 185 1 164 448 1 203 633 601 816 Stocks 34 513 086 837 256 191 664 246 303 885 637 36 673 946 7 334 789 Other assets 49 688 409 14 928 207 8 083 613 7 729 042 2 267 394 82 696 665 16 539 333 Total 102 639 687 33 452 321 26 644 206 45 582 016 27 372 082 235 690 312 47 138 062 Note: VAs were only recorded as a separate category as of 2023. Until then, the seizure of VAs was statistically recorded under “other.” Real estate was recorded as a separate category starting from 2021. Until then, the seizure of real estate was statistically recorder under “other”. Source: Austrian authorities 520. The authorities generally possess the capability to secure substantial assets of various types in complex cases, but volumes appear modest considering Austria’s risk and context . Cash and bank account deposits each account for a significant share of seized assets, although the total amounts seized in bank accounts appears extremely low considering Austria's being a financial centre. However, measured against the amounts generated through online fraud and drug trafficking (IO.7), and especially the large amounts of cash transported through Austria, the total amounts appear rather low as well. Data available in relation to VAs since 2023 also indicates that the recovery of VAs is insufficient with a need for measurable increase. Table 8.4. Five-year average of the number of seizures and amounts seized in the 10 most frequent offence categories (2020–2024) Offence Average Number of Seizures per year Average Amount Seized per year Fraud 190 EUR 12 813 702 Drug crime 1 353 EUR 6 675 723 Money laundering 49 EUR 3 106 160 Breach of trust 24 EUR 2 934 701 Fraudulent bankruptcy 23 EUR 1 253 864 Theft 117 EUR 519 922 Misappropriation 12 EUR 311 252 Human smuggling 100 EUR 221 011 Note: The selected offence corresponds to the top 10 offences each year in terms of the number of seizures or the total value of assets seized. Source: Austrian authorities 521. Seizures applied appear to be broadly in line with the main type of ML and TF threats, except for corruption and except for the volumes. Seventy-five percent of seizures refer to 10 main categories of offences, in particular fraud, drug crimes, ML and breach of trust. For offences such as theft and human smuggling, whilst the seized amounts are significantly lower, these offences still account for a good number of seizures, suggesting that LEAs apply AR measures consistently. For TF offences case studies demonstrate that seizures are consistently carried out by the DSN, with one significant seizure of around EUR 25.3 million in 2020 (IO.9). Provisional measures do not play any role in investigations conducted by the BAK. 522. Efforts to improve the detection and prosecution of fraud are generating some results reflected in amounts seized . Seizures related to fraud demonstrate that very high results were achieved in 2020 due to high-value cases, with a significant fall in 2021 and 2022. The 2023 and 2024 increased numbers indicate that efforts to improve the detection and prosecution of fraud may be generating some results. For drug trafficking, seizures show relatively more stable results. Table 8.5. Amount seized in the area of drug and fraud offences Amount seized (EUR)—offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Drug crime 9 559 933 6 914 394 4 075 397 3 157 670 9 671 221 Fraud 46 385 834 1 281 205 1 642 271 8 096 044 6 663 154 Source: Austrian authorities 523. The authorities demonstrated capability to seize property of corresponding value but not to seize property owned or held by non-bona fide third parties (R.4). The capacity to seize property of corresponding value was demonstrated through cases (Box 8.5) as the authorities do not maintain records of how commonly they seek to seize property of corresponding value, where criminal property cannot. Box 8.5. Confiscation measures in a terrorist association case [122] The Vienna PPO investigated several individuals for terrorist association and related offences. During a court-unauthorised search of a residence, around EUR 4 425 in cash was seized along with numerous mobile phones, SIM cards, and electronic devices. Court Proceedings: · The accused's relatives requested the return of the funds. · First-instance court rejected the PPO's seizure application. · PPO appealed the decision. Appeal Outcome (17 October 2024): Vienna Higher Regional Court (OLG) overturned the first-instance decision and ordered the lower court to reconsider the seizure. Key Legal Findings: Based on DSN-recorded conversations in the suspect's car, he was suspected of being part of a network collecting substantial cash donations in German-speaking countries for terrorist organisation ISIS. The first-instance court erred by examining only standard confiscation requirements (Art. 20 StGB) and failing to consider extended confiscation (Art. 20b StGB). For seizure purposes, it is sufficient that there is suspicion that a future confiscation order is merely probable. 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 524. The authorities can effectively and promptly secure assets. This is usually done by means of freezing and seizing measures via the PPO. The A-FIU rarely uses its transaction suspension powers, and it prefers requesting LEAs/ prosecutors to issue freezing/seizing orders. LEAs and PPOs are available on short notice for these measures for amounts starting at EUR 10 000 (IO.6). Cases show that this system generally works well in practice. Nonetheless, Austria does not seem to be making full use of the possibility to suspend transactions, in particular in the context of fraud cases via the financial sector and transactions below the EUR 10 000 threshold, for which no similarly effective mechanism could be demonstrated. 525. Austria also uses an effective mechanism specific to the fight against social fraud . This mechanism allows the Tax Authority’s Anti-Fraud Office to freeze assets—similar to a transaction suspension by the FIU—until a seizure can be ordered in criminal proceedings. Based on this, Austria managed to secure EUR 3 775 163 held in accounts of fraudulent or front companies, along with a luxury vehicle and gold coins. However, the seizures of these assets were based on administrative tax claims and not on criminal offences. Nonetheless, the Anti-Fraud Office has proven to be very effective, having been able to secure around EUR 50 million in the first half of 2025 as a result of various operations. 526. Austria enacted legislation to lower the burden of proof for freezing of bank accounts and real estate assets but implementation is not yet consistent. Following a recommendation from the 2016 MER to lower the burdens that prosecutors face applying to freeze those assets. In 2018. Austria removed the legal requirement for prosecutors to prove to the court that there was a specific risk that the assets would disperse without the issuance of a freezing order. However, despite this legal amendment, some courts continue to apply the old framework, although others have adopted the new one. [123] BMJ plans to instruct the Austrian General Prosecutor’s Office to file an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court to ensure legal clarity and consistency going forward on the interpretation of the 2018 law. No action nor timeline in this regard has been adopted yet. Footnotes [122] Decision of the Vienna Higher Regional Court of 17 October 2024, case number 18Bs272-24t. [123] Example of a ruling in line with the previous legal framework: Vienna Higher Regional Court, decision of 26 September 2022, case numbers 18 Bs 145/22p and 18 Bs 185/22w; example of departure from the previous legal framework: Linz Higher Regional Court, decision of 23 May 2025, case number 9 Bs 100/25g." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 518. Measures for freezing or seizing of criminal property cover a broad range of assets, but overall values are moderate considering Austria’s risk and context (see below). Statistics on the total value of secured assets show significant annual fluctuations, those being explained by cases of exceptionally high-value assets seized in some years (Table 8.2), mostly relating to real estate and stocks (Table 8.3). 519. Overall, the application of provisional measures slightly decreased during the period under review, whilst the number of reported economic crimes has increased (Table 8.1). As per Table 8.2, there were on average 2 297 seizures on annual basis during the period, amounting to approximately EUR 47 million a year, whereas they were on average 2 748 annual seizures for the period 2013–2017 (according to the Court of Audit’s 2019). The reasons for this decrease are not clear. The tables below refer to assets seized by the police, which is typically the execution of a corresponding order issued by the public prosecutor’s office. While prosecutors indicate that a considerable amount of assets is seized in the course of investigations without the police executing the order (particularly in the case of bank accounts), no statistical information from the PPO was available on the number of such seizures or the amounts involved. Table 8.2. Number of provisional measures and amount of assets in police-executed seizures (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average per year Number of offences where provisional measures (seizure/ freezing order) were issued 2 468 2 091 2 502 2 536 1 890 2 297 Amount of assets seized/ frozen 102 639 687 33 452 321 26 644 206 45 582 016 27 372 082 47 138 062 Note: Statistics include seizures by DSN and the BAK. Source: Austrian authorities Table 8.3. Types of assets in police-executed seizures (EUR) Types of assets seized 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Average per year Cash 5 003 343 6 896 220 7 848 838 6 224 496 9 165 645 35 138 542 7 027 708 Money held in bank accounts 10 309 743 5 833 634 3 254 758 4 428 465 4 564 773 28 391 373 5 978 274 Real estate – 2 320 954 5 040 000 19 182 888 7 243 120 33 786 962 8 446 740 High value goods 3 125 103 2 636 048 2 225 331 7 731 634 2 081 063 17 799 179 3 559 835 Virtual assets – – – 39 185 1 164 448 1 203 633 601 816 Stocks 34 513 086 837 256 191 664 246 303 885 637 36 673 946 7 334 789 Other assets 49 688 409 14 928 207 8 083 613 7 729 042 2 267 394 82 696 665 16 539 333 Total 102 639 687 33 452 321 26 644 206 45 582 016 27 372 082 235 690 312 47 138 062 Note: VAs were only recorded as a separate category as of 2023. Until then, the seizure of VAs was statistically recorded under “other.” Real estate was recorded as a separate category starting from 2021. Until then, the seizure of real estate was statistically recorder under “other”. Source: Austrian authorities 520. The authorities generally possess the capability to secure substantial assets of various types in complex cases, but volumes appear modest considering Austria’s risk and context . Cash and bank account deposits each account for a significant share of seized assets, although the total amounts seized in bank accounts appears extremely low considering Austria's being a financial centre. However, measured against the amounts generated through online fraud and drug trafficking (IO.7), and especially the large amounts of cash transported through Austria, the total amounts appear rather low as well. Data available in relation to VAs since 2023 also indicates that the recovery of VAs is insufficient with a need for measurable increase. Table 8.4. Five-year average of the number of seizures and amounts seized in the 10 most frequent offence categories (2020–2024) Offence Average Number of Seizures per year Average Amount Seized per year Fraud 190 EUR 12 813 702 Drug crime 1 353 EUR 6 675 723 Money laundering 49 EUR 3 106 160 Breach of trust 24 EUR 2 934 701 Fraudulent bankruptcy 23 EUR 1 253 864 Theft 117 EUR 519 922 Misappropriation 12 EUR 311 252 Human smuggling 100 EUR 221 011 Note: The selected offence corresponds to the top 10 offences each year in terms of the number of seizures or the total value of assets seized. Source: Austrian authorities 521. Seizures applied appear to be broadly in line with the main type of ML and TF threats, except for corruption and except for the volumes. Seventy-five percent of seizures refer to 10 main categories of offences, in particular fraud, drug crimes, ML and breach of trust. For offences such as theft and human smuggling, whilst the seized amounts are significantly lower, these offences still account for a good number of seizures, suggesting that LEAs apply AR measures consistently. For TF offences case studies demonstrate that seizures are consistently carried out by the DSN, with one significant seizure of around EUR 25.3 million in 2020 (IO.9). Provisional measures do not play any role in investigations conducted by the BAK. 522. Efforts to improve the detection and prosecution of fraud are generating some results reflected in amounts seized . Seizures related to fraud demonstrate that very high results were achieved in 2020 due to high-value cases, with a significant fall in 2021 and 2022. The 2023 and 2024 increased numbers indicate that efforts to improve the detection and prosecution of fraud may be generating some results. For drug trafficking, seizures show relatively more stable results. Table 8.5. Amount seized in the area of drug and fraud offences Amount seized (EUR)—offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Drug crime 9 559 933 6 914 394 4 075 397 3 157 670 9 671 221 Fraud 46 385 834 1 281 205 1 642 271 8 096 044 6 663 154 Source: Austrian authorities 523. The authorities demonstrated capability to seize property of corresponding value but not to seize property owned or held by non-bona fide third parties (R.4). The capacity to seize property of corresponding value was demonstrated through cases (Box 8.5) as the authorities do not maintain records of how commonly they seek to seize property of corresponding value, where criminal property cannot. Box 8.5. Confiscation measures in a terrorist association case [122] The Vienna PPO investigated several individuals for terrorist association and related offences. During a court-unauthorised search of a residence, around EUR 4 425 in cash was seized along with numerous mobile phones, SIM cards, and electronic devices. Court Proceedings: · The accused's relatives requested the return of the funds. · First-instance court rejected the PPO's seizure application. · PPO appealed the decision. Appeal Outcome (17 October 2024): Vienna Higher Regional Court (OLG) overturned the first-instance decision and ordered the lower court to reconsider the seizure. Key Legal Findings: Based on DSN-recorded conversations in the suspect's car, he was suspected of being part of a network collecting substantial cash donations in German-speaking countries for terrorist organisation ISIS. The first-instance court erred by examining only standard confiscation requirements (Art. 20 StGB) and failing to consider extended confiscation (Art. 20b StGB). For seizure purposes, it is sufficient that there is suspicion that a future confiscation order is merely probable. 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 524. The authorities can effectively and promptly secure assets. This is usually done by means of freezing and seizing measures via the PPO. The A-FIU rarely uses its transaction suspension powers, and it prefers requesting LEAs/ prosecutors to issue freezing/seizing orders. LEAs and PPOs are available on short notice for these measures for amounts starting at EUR 10 000 (IO.6). Cases show that this system generally works well in practice. Nonetheless, Austria does not seem to be making full use of the possibility to suspend transactions, in particular in the context of fraud cases via the financial sector and transactions below the EUR 10 000 threshold, for which no similarly effective mechanism could be demonstrated. 525. Austria also uses an effective mechanism specific to the fight against social fraud . This mechanism allows the Tax Authority’s Anti-Fraud Office to freeze assets—similar to a transaction suspension by the FIU—until a seizure can be ordered in criminal proceedings. Based on this, Austria managed to secure EUR 3 775 163 held in accounts of fraudulent or front companies, along with a luxury vehicle and gold coins. However, the seizures of these assets were based on administrative tax claims and not on criminal offences. Nonetheless, the Anti-Fraud Office has proven to be very effective, having been able to secure around EUR 50 million in the first half of 2025 as a result of various operations. 526. Austria enacted legislation to lower the burden of proof for freezing of bank accounts and real estate assets but implementation is not yet consistent. Following a recommendation from the 2016 MER to lower the burdens that prosecutors face applying to freeze those assets. In 2018. Austria removed the legal requirement for prosecutors to prove to the court that there was a specific risk that the assets would disperse without the issuance of a freezing order. However, despite this legal amendment, some courts continue to apply the old framework, although others have adopted the new one. [123] BMJ plans to instruct the Austrian General Prosecutor’s Office to file an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court to ensure legal clarity and consistency going forward on the interpretation of the 2018 law. No action nor timeline in this regard has been adopted yet. Footnotes [122] Decision of the Vienna Higher Regional Court of 17 October 2024, case number 18Bs272-24t. [123] Example of a ruling in line with the previous legal framework: Vienna Higher Regional Court, decision of 26 September 2022, case numbers 18 Bs 145/22p and 18 Bs 185/22w; example of departure from the previous legal framework: Linz Higher Regional Court, decision of 23 May 2025, case number 9 Bs 100/25g." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. Sentences appear effective, proportionate, and dissuasive in relation to the criminal behaviours involved . Most cases relate indeed to small amounts and do not involve extensive operations by organised groups. Despite the fact that authorities were not in a position to provide any statistics on sanctions, the 10 decisions issued in 2023 and 2024 were made available. The analysis of the judgments shows that penalties range from 6 months suspended with probation, to 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, and identifies two acquittals. It includes three convictions to 18 months suspended, one conviction to 10 months imprisonment and 60 daily rates of EUR 23, one conviction to 6 months, one conviction to 6 months suspended, one conviction to 2 years and 1 year (2 offenders), and one conviction to 3 and a half years upheld by the Court of Appeals. The size of the sample of decisions does not allow to give any statistical value to this finding but provides a valuable indication of the type of sanctions issued in the last two years. 576. In two instances, Courts pronounced a decision of confiscation in equivalent value for TF . In one of the cases, the Court of Appeals of Vienna reversed the first instance decision which stated that since no asset was seized and available, it was impossible to issue a confiscation order. The appellate Court invalidated this interpretation, stating that the fact that collected donations were not available anymore did not prevent from confiscating the amount in equivalent value, in application of art. 20(3) and 20b(1) of the Criminal Code. It ordered the confiscation of EUR 20 000 corresponding to the amount sent to the terrorist organisation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. Sentences appear effective, proportionate, and dissuasive in relation to the criminal behaviours involved . Most cases relate indeed to small amounts and do not involve extensive operations by organised groups. Despite the fact that authorities were not in a position to provide any statistics on sanctions, the 10 decisions issued in 2023 and 2024 were made available. The analysis of the judgments shows that penalties range from 6 months suspended with probation, to 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, and identifies two acquittals. It includes three convictions to 18 months suspended, one conviction to 10 months imprisonment and 60 daily rates of EUR 23, one conviction to 6 months, one conviction to 6 months suspended, one conviction to 2 years and 1 year (2 offenders), and one conviction to 3 and a half years upheld by the Court of Appeals. The size of the sample of decisions does not allow to give any statistical value to this finding but provides a valuable indication of the type of sanctions issued in the last two years. 576. In two instances, Courts pronounced a decision of confiscation in equivalent value for TF . In one of the cases, the Court of Appeals of Vienna reversed the first instance decision which stated that since no asset was seized and available, it was impossible to issue a confiscation order. The appellate Court invalidated this interpretation, stating that the fact that collected donations were not available anymore did not prevent from confiscating the amount in equivalent value, in application of art. 20(3) and 20b(1) of the Criminal Code. It ordered the confiscation of EUR 20 000 corresponding to the amount sent to the terrorist organisation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of NPOs corresponding to the FATF definition 595. As part of its NPO risk assessments in 2024 and 2025, Austria identified around 135 000 legal entities operating in the not-for-profit realm . Most of these entities are small and have the following purposes (in order of importance): sports, arts and culture, social services, education, and research, industry and professional associations (including trade unions), and leisure clubs. Less than 1% has a religious purpose. 596. Out of these 135 000 entities, 1 200 correspond to the FATF definition of NPO (hereafter the NPO sector), and they benefit from around 63% (equivalent of just under EUR 650 million) of all donations in Austria. Donations are concentrated in a relatively small group of large, professionally structured and multi-audited NPOs. [137] Seventy-five percent of donations are being used by NPOs for activities in Austria while 25% are destined for international aid. Understanding of risk and mitigating measures 597. Austria demonstrated a high level of understanding of NPOs’ exposure to TF risks which was developed through robust NPO risk assessments . The authorities used a very wide range of information sources for the 2024 and 2025 NPO risk assessments to identify the nature of TF risks posed to NPOs, including through the consideration of various TF threat scenarios. Information was collected through direct engagement with NPOs and their umbrella associations, information exchange in the PPP with the NPO sector (PPP NPOs), dedicated questionnaires, lessons learned from TF investigations, findings from risk-based audits of NPOs, including on NPOs’ financial flows and risk-mitigating measures, academic research by the Vienna University of Economics and Business, and interaction with competent authorities. Engagement and exchange of information with these stakeholders continued at every stage of the process to ensure qualitative analysis. 598. The nature of TF risks affecting NPOs was identified through the consideration of various TF threat scenarios. [138] In addition to the TF threat scenarios, other factors including but not limited to geographical areas with higher exposure to TF threats, [139] the type of activity, with a particular focus on support to ethnic/religious minorities targeted by terrorist groups, the source of funding, [140] risk mitigation measures, and certification/accreditation by independent third parties and/or donor agencies [141] were considered in determining which NPOs could potentially be misused for TF. This led to the identification of a subset of 80 (75 associations and 5 foundations) out of the total of 1 200 NPOs, or 6.7% of the NPO sector (and 0.06% of the entire not-for-profit sector), as potentially exposed to TF. The overall TF risk of Austria’s NPO sector (i.e., the 1 200 NPOs) was assessed as low, while the TF risk of the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF was assessed as medium to high. [142] 599. Austria implements sound risk mitigation measures for NPOs, in addition to the implementation of clear policies to promote accountability, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs . These risk mitigation measures include targeted risk-based and general tax audits, strong coordination and collaboration between relevant stakeholders, and initiatives focusing on enhancing transparency and risk management of NPOs. The detailed description of these measures below illustrates not only their preventive nature but also demonstrates that they are risk-based and do not disrupt legitimate NPO activities. A majority of NPOs implement a wide range of self-regulatory measures. The most important initiative is the Austrian Donation Seal of Approval, which was introduced in 2001 on the initiative of six NPO umbrella organisations and the Chamber of Tax Advisors and Public Accountants. [143] These NPOs undergo an annual audit by independent tax advisors or public accountants, who also verify whether NPOs have measures in place to identify potential misuse for ML and TF. [144] Nearly all 1 200 NPOs publish project information and financial statements on their websites to demonstrate sound financial management. Seventy-five percent of all donations are subject to an in-depth audit [145] and 98.9% of international project funds are managed by NPOs subject to audits. Outreach to the sector and its understanding of the risk 600. Austria demonstrates a proactive approach and undertakes sustained outreach to deepen awareness among NPOs about TF risks and mitigation measures . BMF established a PPP NPOs involving competent authorities, the NPO sector and its umbrella organisations, and academia. In 2023 and 2024, the PPP NPOs met on seven occasions with written exchanges in between meetings. During the same period, 10 targeted outreach events were organised and topics for discussion [146] were identified through consultation with NPOs and their umbrella associations. The BMF also organises regular workshops to raise further awareness and has prioritised the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF for these activities. Moreover, Austria published extensive information on the BMF website setting out how NPOs can mitigate the risk of being misused for terrorist purposes. 601. NPOs and umbrella organisations demonstrated a very comprehensive understanding of TF risks . They confirmed that there is an excellent dialogue with competent authorities and particularly welcomed the engagement through the PPP NPOs and outreach events. They reported on their risk mitigation measures in place, such as stricter controls and reporting for high-risk projects, checks against sanctions lists, training for staff, policies on the prevention of TF, and strengthened measures for partner organisations. The NPO umbrella organisations frequently engage with their members, including through regular workshops on CFT matters, and have also specifically targeted those NPOs with higher exposure to TF in its outreach. Oversight and action taken 602. Austria’s Tax Authority, the competent authority for the risk-based oversight of the NPO sector, demonstrated an excellent understanding of NPOs’ exposure to TF risks . TF risks are integrated in the criteria for identification of NPOs for TF-targeted inspections, with NPOs being placed in four risk categories depending on their level of TF risks (i.e., low, medium, high, and very high). Of the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF, 17 are classified as very high risk, 20 as high risk, 40 as medium risk, and 3 as low risk. The risk classification is updated annually based on NPOs’ questionnaire responses and findings of TF-targeted inspections and general tax audits. 603. In 2024, in application of the risk-based approach, the tax authority conducted targeted inspections of 10 smaller NPOs with less developed risk mitigation measures (i.e., 4 very high risk, 4 high risk, and 2 medium risk). In 2025, an additional 10 NPOs classified as very high risk and high risk were scheduled for inspection, and planning of additional risk-based audits for 2026 was ongoing. When tax auditors identify suspicions of ML/TF, they are required to submit an STR with A-FIU. The authorities presented a few case studies illustrating successful investigations by the DSN, including one complex financial investigation, initiated following an A-FIU dissemination informed by an STR from the tax authority. 604. A-FIU, LEAs and prosecutors showed a comprehensive understanding of NPOs’ TF exposure . During the period under review, 36 TF investigations were conducted involving 34 domestic NPOs. These investigations were initiated following STR information forwarded by the A-FIU to the DSN (IO.6). The investigations revealed actual links to TF but none of them resulted in prosecutions (IO.9). 605. When following a TF investigation, there is insufficient evidence of the misuse of NPOs for TF purposes, the DSN systematically reports the case to the tax authority for action and further follow-up as part of its risk-based supervision of the NPO sector . The DSN also developed a Strategy for Countering Terrorist Financing by Associations to steer its activities focusing on the identification of those NPOs that facilitate TF. The implementation of this Strategy has produced good results (IO.9). Footnotes [137] In 2023, the 100 largest NPOs received 75.4% of all donations made to NPOs. The largest Austrian NPO had a donation volume more than ten times higher than the NPO in sixteenth place and a donation volume more than a hundred times higher than the NPO in one-hundredth place. Source: Fundraising Association Austria, Donation Report 2024, p. 30–31. https://www.fundraising.at/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FVA-Spendenbericht-2024.pdf [138] Examples of identified TF risks include but are not limited to direct/indirect diversion of aid and extorsion, theft, recruitment/infiltration, expropriation, and attempted influencing of procurement. [139] Projects in countries included in the EC’s List of High-risk Third Countries and/or the FATF’s grey or blacklist, and projects where NPOs themselves identified TF risks. Only a relative minority of NPOs is active in regions with a specific terrorist threat, especially Lebanon, Yemen. [140] Funding from institutional donors (including but not limited to the Austrian Development Agency and the European Commission's ECHO programme) vs. collection of donations, including through crowdfunding. [141] The Austrian Donation Seal of Approval, ADA accreditation and/or ECHO certification. [142] NPOs with an Austrian Donation Seal of Approval and/or an ADA accreditation and/or ECHO certification were assigned a medium TF risk while NPOs operating without such approval, accreditation or certification were assigned a medium to high TF risk. [143] At the time of onsite visit, 274 NPOs were authorised to use the Donation Seal of Approval. [144] This includes verification of the accuracy of accounts, internal control system, use of donations in accordance with articles of association and for the intended purpose, compliance with the principles of “economy” and “efficiency,” organisation's financial policy on the use of donations and human resources. [145] Fundraising Association Austria. (2024), p. 32. 2024 Donation Report. Retrieved 20 March 2025, from https://www.fundraising.at/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FVA-Spendenbericht-2024.pdf [146] Topics included among others responding to the NPO questionnaire, efforts to protect NPOs against abuse for TF purposes and mitigation of unintended consequences, TF risk factors and indicators of suspicious transactions involving NPOs, revision of R.8, NPO risk assessment, the use of formal financial systems and applicable legal requirements when transporting cash, developing specific country TF risk fact sheets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of NPOs corresponding to the FATF definition 595. As part of its NPO risk assessments in 2024 and 2025, Austria identified around 135 000 legal entities operating in the not-for-profit realm . Most of these entities are small and have the following purposes (in order of importance): sports, arts and culture, social services, education, and research, industry and professional associations (including trade unions), and leisure clubs. Less than 1% has a religious purpose. 596. Out of these 135 000 entities, 1 200 correspond to the FATF definition of NPO (hereafter the NPO sector), and they benefit from around 63% (equivalent of just under EUR 650 million) of all donations in Austria. Donations are concentrated in a relatively small group of large, professionally structured and multi-audited NPOs. [137] Seventy-five percent of donations are being used by NPOs for activities in Austria while 25% are destined for international aid. Understanding of risk and mitigating measures 597. Austria demonstrated a high level of understanding of NPOs’ exposure to TF risks which was developed through robust NPO risk assessments . The authorities used a very wide range of information sources for the 2024 and 2025 NPO risk assessments to identify the nature of TF risks posed to NPOs, including through the consideration of various TF threat scenarios. Information was collected through direct engagement with NPOs and their umbrella associations, information exchange in the PPP with the NPO sector (PPP NPOs), dedicated questionnaires, lessons learned from TF investigations, findings from risk-based audits of NPOs, including on NPOs’ financial flows and risk-mitigating measures, academic research by the Vienna University of Economics and Business, and interaction with competent authorities. Engagement and exchange of information with these stakeholders continued at every stage of the process to ensure qualitative analysis. 598. The nature of TF risks affecting NPOs was identified through the consideration of various TF threat scenarios. [138] In addition to the TF threat scenarios, other factors including but not limited to geographical areas with higher exposure to TF threats, [139] the type of activity, with a particular focus on support to ethnic/religious minorities targeted by terrorist groups, the source of funding, [140] risk mitigation measures, and certification/accreditation by independent third parties and/or donor agencies [141] were considered in determining which NPOs could potentially be misused for TF. This led to the identification of a subset of 80 (75 associations and 5 foundations) out of the total of 1 200 NPOs, or 6.7% of the NPO sector (and 0.06% of the entire not-for-profit sector), as potentially exposed to TF. The overall TF risk of Austria’s NPO sector (i.e., the 1 200 NPOs) was assessed as low, while the TF risk of the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF was assessed as medium to high. [142] 599. Austria implements sound risk mitigation measures for NPOs, in addition to the implementation of clear policies to promote accountability, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs . These risk mitigation measures include targeted risk-based and general tax audits, strong coordination and collaboration between relevant stakeholders, and initiatives focusing on enhancing transparency and risk management of NPOs. The detailed description of these measures below illustrates not only their preventive nature but also demonstrates that they are risk-based and do not disrupt legitimate NPO activities. A majority of NPOs implement a wide range of self-regulatory measures. The most important initiative is the Austrian Donation Seal of Approval, which was introduced in 2001 on the initiative of six NPO umbrella organisations and the Chamber of Tax Advisors and Public Accountants. [143] These NPOs undergo an annual audit by independent tax advisors or public accountants, who also verify whether NPOs have measures in place to identify potential misuse for ML and TF. [144] Nearly all 1 200 NPOs publish project information and financial statements on their websites to demonstrate sound financial management. Seventy-five percent of all donations are subject to an in-depth audit [145] and 98.9% of international project funds are managed by NPOs subject to audits. Outreach to the sector and its understanding of the risk 600. Austria demonstrates a proactive approach and undertakes sustained outreach to deepen awareness among NPOs about TF risks and mitigation measures . BMF established a PPP NPOs involving competent authorities, the NPO sector and its umbrella organisations, and academia. In 2023 and 2024, the PPP NPOs met on seven occasions with written exchanges in between meetings. During the same period, 10 targeted outreach events were organised and topics for discussion [146] were identified through consultation with NPOs and their umbrella associations. The BMF also organises regular workshops to raise further awareness and has prioritised the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF for these activities. Moreover, Austria published extensive information on the BMF website setting out how NPOs can mitigate the risk of being misused for terrorist purposes. 601. NPOs and umbrella organisations demonstrated a very comprehensive understanding of TF risks . They confirmed that there is an excellent dialogue with competent authorities and particularly welcomed the engagement through the PPP NPOs and outreach events. They reported on their risk mitigation measures in place, such as stricter controls and reporting for high-risk projects, checks against sanctions lists, training for staff, policies on the prevention of TF, and strengthened measures for partner organisations. The NPO umbrella organisations frequently engage with their members, including through regular workshops on CFT matters, and have also specifically targeted those NPOs with higher exposure to TF in its outreach. Oversight and action taken 602. Austria’s Tax Authority, the competent authority for the risk-based oversight of the NPO sector, demonstrated an excellent understanding of NPOs’ exposure to TF risks . TF risks are integrated in the criteria for identification of NPOs for TF-targeted inspections, with NPOs being placed in four risk categories depending on their level of TF risks (i.e., low, medium, high, and very high). Of the 80 NPOs potentially exposed to TF, 17 are classified as very high risk, 20 as high risk, 40 as medium risk, and 3 as low risk. The risk classification is updated annually based on NPOs’ questionnaire responses and findings of TF-targeted inspections and general tax audits. 603. In 2024, in application of the risk-based approach, the tax authority conducted targeted inspections of 10 smaller NPOs with less developed risk mitigation measures (i.e., 4 very high risk, 4 high risk, and 2 medium risk). In 2025, an additional 10 NPOs classified as very high risk and high risk were scheduled for inspection, and planning of additional risk-based audits for 2026 was ongoing. When tax auditors identify suspicions of ML/TF, they are required to submit an STR with A-FIU. The authorities presented a few case studies illustrating successful investigations by the DSN, including one complex financial investigation, initiated following an A-FIU dissemination informed by an STR from the tax authority. 604. A-FIU, LEAs and prosecutors showed a comprehensive understanding of NPOs’ TF exposure . During the period under review, 36 TF investigations were conducted involving 34 domestic NPOs. These investigations were initiated following STR information forwarded by the A-FIU to the DSN (IO.6). The investigations revealed actual links to TF but none of them resulted in prosecutions (IO.9). 605. When following a TF investigation, there is insufficient evidence of the misuse of NPOs for TF purposes, the DSN systematically reports the case to the tax authority for action and further follow-up as part of its risk-based supervision of the NPO sector . The DSN also developed a Strategy for Countering Terrorist Financing by Associations to steer its activities focusing on the identification of those NPOs that facilitate TF. The implementation of this Strategy has produced good results (IO.9). Footnotes [137] In 2023, the 100 largest NPOs received 75.4% of all donations made to NPOs. The largest Austrian NPO had a donation volume more than ten times higher than the NPO in sixteenth place and a donation volume more than a hundred times higher than the NPO in one-hundredth place. Source: Fundraising Association Austria, Donation Report 2024, p. 30–31. https://www.fundraising.at/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FVA-Spendenbericht-2024.pdf [138] Examples of identified TF risks include but are not limited to direct/indirect diversion of aid and extorsion, theft, recruitment/infiltration, expropriation, and attempted influencing of procurement. [139] Projects in countries included in the EC’s List of High-risk Third Countries and/or the FATF’s grey or blacklist, and projects where NPOs themselves identified TF risks. Only a relative minority of NPOs is active in regions with a specific terrorist threat, especially Lebanon, Yemen. [140] Funding from institutional donors (including but not limited to the Austrian Development Agency and the European Commission's ECHO programme) vs. collection of donations, including through crowdfunding. [141] The Austrian Donation Seal of Approval, ADA accreditation and/or ECHO certification. [142] NPOs with an Austrian Donation Seal of Approval and/or an ADA accreditation and/or ECHO certification were assigned a medium TF risk while NPOs operating without such approval, accreditation or certification were assigned a medium to high TF risk. [143] At the time of onsite visit, 274 NPOs were authorised to use the Donation Seal of Approval. [144] This includes verification of the accuracy of accounts, internal control system, use of donations in accordance with articles of association and for the intended purpose, compliance with the principles of “economy” and “efficiency,” organisation's financial policy on the use of donations and human resources. [145] Fundraising Association Austria. (2024), p. 32. 2024 Donation Report. Retrieved 20 March 2025, from https://www.fundraising.at/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FVA-Spendenbericht-2024.pdf [146] Topics included among others responding to the NPO questionnaire, efforts to protect NPOs against abuse for TF purposes and mitigation of unintended consequences, TF risk factors and indicators of suspicious transactions involving NPOs, revision of R.8, NPO risk assessment, the use of formal financial systems and applicable legal requirements when transporting cash, developing specific country TF risk fact sheets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="632. During the period under review, Austria did not implement PF-related TFS without delay as it relied solely on the EU for implementing UNSCR 1718 and successor resolutions . The bridging mechanism to mitigate EU delays described in IO.10 should also allow for implementation without delay of future designations under UNSCR 1718. [157] 633. Austria has yet to propose a listing to the UN pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and, during the reporting period, no funds or assets in relation to this Resolution were identified and frozen . This is not consistent with Austria’s identified PF risks set out above. Footnotes [157] Austria applied the bridging mechanism within minutes after the UNSC issued the snapback mechanism for Iran. This is for illustration purposes only because outside the scope of IO.11 as assessed at the time of the onsite visit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="632. During the period under review, Austria did not implement PF-related TFS without delay as it relied solely on the EU for implementing UNSCR 1718 and successor resolutions . The bridging mechanism to mitigate EU delays described in IO.10 should also allow for implementation without delay of future designations under UNSCR 1718. [157] 633. Austria has yet to propose a listing to the UN pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and, during the reporting period, no funds or assets in relation to this Resolution were identified and frozen . This is not consistent with Austria’s identified PF risks set out above. Footnotes [157] Austria applied the bridging mechanism within minutes after the UNSC issued the snapback mechanism for Iran. This is for illustration purposes only because outside the scope of IO.11 as assessed at the time of the onsite visit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="156. The objectives and activities of competent authorities are driven by their specific mandate and are generally in line with the identified risks in the SNRA, NRAs, and particularly SRAs. Shortcomings to a comprehensive understanding of domestic and cross-border risks identified above, limit LEAs’ ability to target their efforts effectively in line with the country context. In addition, the legal framework, particularly for prosecutions, constitutes an impediment to the prioritisation of cases in line with identified risks and the country context (IO.7). 157. Several competent authorities have successfully incorporated the results of Austria’s risk identification [26] into their operational practices and sector-specific guidance. As an example, BMF established a dedicated unit on ML/TF Prevention in charge of overall domestic coordination in strategic, policy, and international matters, including the coordination of the NRA. BMF also created a dedicated Beneficial Owner Registry Authority for the management of the Beneficial Ownership Register, thereby responding to the ML/TF risks associated to LPs and LAs. The Beneficial Owner Registry Authority in cooperation with other competent authorities identified risks associated to fraudulent companies and introduced comprehensive mitigation measures (IO.5). Other authorities have also established dedicated AML/CFT teams, including in response to identified ML/TF risks, such as the Chamber of Civil-Law Notaries and the Fraud Intelligence Unit within the BKA. 158. A-FIU plays an important role in the analysis of Austria’s ML/TF threats and implements its FIU functions to some extent in line with identified risks. While A-FIU prioritises the analysis of STRs based on a risk-scoring system, the prioritisation criteria heavily weight fraud offences and other ML threats to which Austria is exposed are insufficiently targeted (IO.6). While A-FIU has also started to develop studies on ML typologies and trends more recently, the identification of topics for strategic analysis suffers from uneven levels of reporting and quality of reports across sectors. Credit should nevertheless be given to A-FIU’s efforts to issue notices to OEs. The latter have been proven to be effective in triggering STRs in strategically important fraud cases therefore preventing fraud scams with international ramifications. 159. The FMA continuously refines its risk understanding, including through its 2025 SRA, to support its RBS (IO.3) while DNFBP supervisors took initial steps to develop an RBS strategy (IO.4). At the time of the onsite visit, except for casinos, DNFBPs’ supervision on a risk-sensitive basis is at a nascent stage and over-reliant on self-assessment questionnaires completed by DNFBPs themselves. 160. The DSN prioritises its work based on its very comprehensive assessments of both TF and PF risks. The findings of these confidential internal reports, which are continuously updated, allow DSN to ensure that its objectives and activities stay fully aligned with evolving risks (IO.9/IO.11). 161. LEAs have been effective in detecting and conducting investigations into fraud offences but insufficiently target investigative efforts and resources to ML and other predicate offences (IO.7). Financial investigations are conducted by default for all proceeds generating offences, but insufficient attention is being paid to ML offences. An overwhelming majority of cases relate to fraud while Austria equally faces various other important ML threats. Efforts to investigate and detect proceeds from foreign predicate offences remain scarce reflecting an inadequate understanding of transnational risks. Insufficient resources, limited training, and lack of feedback within the judiciary, prosecution, and BMJ hinder these authorities’ capacity to target resources and set polices and priorities in line with ML/TF risks. Footnotes [26] Note the limitations in risk identification set out above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="156. The objectives and activities of competent authorities are driven by their specific mandate and are generally in line with the identified risks in the SNRA, NRAs, and particularly SRAs. Shortcomings to a comprehensive understanding of domestic and cross-border risks identified above, limit LEAs’ ability to target their efforts effectively in line with the country context. In addition, the legal framework, particularly for prosecutions, constitutes an impediment to the prioritisation of cases in line with identified risks and the country context (IO.7). 157. Several competent authorities have successfully incorporated the results of Austria’s risk identification [26] into their operational practices and sector-specific guidance. As an example, BMF established a dedicated unit on ML/TF Prevention in charge of overall domestic coordination in strategic, policy, and international matters, including the coordination of the NRA. BMF also created a dedicated Beneficial Owner Registry Authority for the management of the Beneficial Ownership Register, thereby responding to the ML/TF risks associated to LPs and LAs. The Beneficial Owner Registry Authority in cooperation with other competent authorities identified risks associated to fraudulent companies and introduced comprehensive mitigation measures (IO.5). Other authorities have also established dedicated AML/CFT teams, including in response to identified ML/TF risks, such as the Chamber of Civil-Law Notaries and the Fraud Intelligence Unit within the BKA. 158. A-FIU plays an important role in the analysis of Austria’s ML/TF threats and implements its FIU functions to some extent in line with identified risks. While A-FIU prioritises the analysis of STRs based on a risk-scoring system, the prioritisation criteria heavily weight fraud offences and other ML threats to which Austria is exposed are insufficiently targeted (IO.6). While A-FIU has also started to develop studies on ML typologies and trends more recently, the identification of topics for strategic analysis suffers from uneven levels of reporting and quality of reports across sectors. Credit should nevertheless be given to A-FIU’s efforts to issue notices to OEs. The latter have been proven to be effective in triggering STRs in strategically important fraud cases therefore preventing fraud scams with international ramifications. 159. The FMA continuously refines its risk understanding, including through its 2025 SRA, to support its RBS (IO.3) while DNFBP supervisors took initial steps to develop an RBS strategy (IO.4). At the time of the onsite visit, except for casinos, DNFBPs’ supervision on a risk-sensitive basis is at a nascent stage and over-reliant on self-assessment questionnaires completed by DNFBPs themselves. 160. The DSN prioritises its work based on its very comprehensive assessments of both TF and PF risks. The findings of these confidential internal reports, which are continuously updated, allow DSN to ensure that its objectives and activities stay fully aligned with evolving risks (IO.9/IO.11). 161. LEAs have been effective in detecting and conducting investigations into fraud offences but insufficiently target investigative efforts and resources to ML and other predicate offences (IO.7). Financial investigations are conducted by default for all proceeds generating offences, but insufficient attention is being paid to ML offences. An overwhelming majority of cases relate to fraud while Austria equally faces various other important ML threats. Efforts to investigate and detect proceeds from foreign predicate offences remain scarce reflecting an inadequate understanding of transnational risks. Insufficient resources, limited training, and lack of feedback within the judiciary, prosecution, and BMJ hinder these authorities’ capacity to target resources and set polices and priorities in line with ML/TF risks. Footnotes [26] Note the limitations in risk identification set out above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 226. Considering the lack of statistics referred to above, it is not possible to come to an informed conclusion as to how effective A-FIU is in providing assistance at the request of foreign FIUs. Information included in A-FIU's Annual Reports suggests that A-FIU provides more information spontaneously to its counterparts compared to the information it receives from foreign counterparts, but this could not be confirmed. A-FIU indicates that the average time to reply to information requests is about 19 calendar days. The response time varies depending on the type of assistance requested. Upon receipt of requests, these are ranked according to their priority and processed accordingly, with priority given to urgent requests. 227. The A-FIU does not usually request feedback from foreign counterparts on the quality and usefulness of the information provided. FATF/FSRB members generally considered cooperation with A-FIU effective and easy. Information is said to be usually very useful and relevant, and timely. A-FIU’s spontaneous disclosures of information and its responsiveness to requests made by foreign FIUs on behalf of other competent authorities were identified as strengths of A-FIU’s international information exchange. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 228. LEAs (including ARO) actively provide assistance and information to their foreign counterparts. During the period under review, Austria received more than 10 000 ML-related requests for information from EU counterparts through the SIENA system. [39] Austria has participated and is still part of several JITs. In AR matters, once a foreign authority requests information, ARO may access all databases to which the Austrian police have access for national cases. ARO’s average response time is eight to nine days but in urgent cases, the response can be provided within hours. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs FMA 229. The FMA is also active in providing informal cooperation. The FMA’s AML/CFT division regularly receives, processes and answers legal enquiries by foreign authorities. Table 2.14. Exchange of information by the FMA in ML/TF matters 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Legal enquiries from foreign authorities 60 61 46 31 30 Formal MLA requests in the area of AML/CFT 12 42 15 22 9 Foreign F&amp;P assessment information requests 73 75 59 64 108 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 230. The international cooperation mechanisms for the Tax Administration are described in previous sections. The provision of other forms of international cooperation follows the same rules as for the requests made by Austria and figures and charts regarding the provision of informal cooperation are displayed in previous sections. DNFBPs 231. The mechanisms by which lawyers, notaries, and supervisors of the trade sector engage in international cooperation are described in previous sections. The provision of informal cooperation follows the same arrangements and procedures. DNFBP supervisors provide very limited informal cooperation, if any, to foreign counterparts. Limited incoming and outgoing international cooperation in DNFBP supervision impact Austria’s effectiveness in supervising the sector (IO.4). Footnotes [39] See table 2.9 on Exchange of Information through the SIENA system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 226. Considering the lack of statistics referred to above, it is not possible to come to an informed conclusion as to how effective A-FIU is in providing assistance at the request of foreign FIUs. Information included in A-FIU's Annual Reports suggests that A-FIU provides more information spontaneously to its counterparts compared to the information it receives from foreign counterparts, but this could not be confirmed. A-FIU indicates that the average time to reply to information requests is about 19 calendar days. The response time varies depending on the type of assistance requested. Upon receipt of requests, these are ranked according to their priority and processed accordingly, with priority given to urgent requests. 227. The A-FIU does not usually request feedback from foreign counterparts on the quality and usefulness of the information provided. FATF/FSRB members generally considered cooperation with A-FIU effective and easy. Information is said to be usually very useful and relevant, and timely. A-FIU’s spontaneous disclosures of information and its responsiveness to requests made by foreign FIUs on behalf of other competent authorities were identified as strengths of A-FIU’s international information exchange. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 228. LEAs (including ARO) actively provide assistance and information to their foreign counterparts. During the period under review, Austria received more than 10 000 ML-related requests for information from EU counterparts through the SIENA system. [39] Austria has participated and is still part of several JITs. In AR matters, once a foreign authority requests information, ARO may access all databases to which the Austrian police have access for national cases. ARO’s average response time is eight to nine days but in urgent cases, the response can be provided within hours. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs FMA 229. The FMA is also active in providing informal cooperation. The FMA’s AML/CFT division regularly receives, processes and answers legal enquiries by foreign authorities. Table 2.14. Exchange of information by the FMA in ML/TF matters 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Legal enquiries from foreign authorities 60 61 46 31 30 Formal MLA requests in the area of AML/CFT 12 42 15 22 9 Foreign F&amp;P assessment information requests 73 75 59 64 108 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 230. The international cooperation mechanisms for the Tax Administration are described in previous sections. The provision of other forms of international cooperation follows the same rules as for the requests made by Austria and figures and charts regarding the provision of informal cooperation are displayed in previous sections. DNFBPs 231. The mechanisms by which lawyers, notaries, and supervisors of the trade sector engage in international cooperation are described in previous sections. The provision of informal cooperation follows the same arrangements and procedures. DNFBP supervisors provide very limited informal cooperation, if any, to foreign counterparts. Limited incoming and outgoing international cooperation in DNFBP supervision impact Austria’s effectiveness in supervising the sector (IO.4). Footnotes [39] See table 2.9 on Exchange of Information through the SIENA system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 266. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of and understand their basic CDD obligations such as customer identification and verification and record keeping requirements. The FMA reports that the application of CDD measures for natural persons and legal entities in low to moderate risk circumstances does not pose significant problems. Below 5% of identified shortcomings since 2020 are reported to relate to the requirement to identify and verify the customer’s identity. 267. Most CDD-related findings from onsite inspections of FIs and VASPs relate to deficiencies in the application of ongoing monitoring measures (around 12%). The FMA indicates that these mostly relate to individual, isolated cases and not to systemic issues. Over 70% of FIs and VASPs have implemented elaborate automated transaction monitoring systems from recognised providers. The FMA’s findings therefore do not relate to a complete lack of monitoring, but rather to the calibration of the transaction monitoring to ensure adequate risk-based ongoing monitoring of individual cases. 268. Despite the identification and verification of the identity of the customer’s beneficial owner remaining one of the top five most identified findings related to CDD requirements, CIs however demonstrate an increased risk understanding and conduct improved CDD and EDD measures. This is supported by reliable beneficial ownership information which is available in the Austrian Beneficial Ownership Register (IO.5). Most CIs require customers to provide beneficial ownership information by submitting an excerpt from the Beneficial Ownership Register while verifying through additional (open) sources using automated name screening and—where necessary—documentation provided by the customer as well. It is not clear if this is practice in non-CI financial sectors. 269. The main issue for CIs is the identification and verification of the beneficial owner(s) in more complex ownership and control situations, including with a non-Austrian nexus. Larger, as well as higher-risk, CIs have decreased their risk appetite over the past few years, applying lower thresholds for earmarking ownership and control structures as complex. This triggers enhanced measures and introduces additional enhanced measures such as requiring face-to-face interviews with the beneficial owner(s), reviewing the complete business relationship following any change in beneficial ownership, and requesting notarised documents demonstrating beneficial ownership. Several interviewed (higher risk) FIs also stated they do not onboard customers of which the beneficial ownership structure does not make sense from a commercial perspective. 270. The CI sector has seen a trend towards outsourcing in recent years, which leads in some cases to challenges for the CIs due to a lack of clear definitions and controls. 67% of CIs have at least partially outsourced CDD-related activities, while only a small proportion of CIs (13%) still conduct all CDD activities internally. Almost all CIs currently offer online identification, and most have outsourced this process. The use of ID Austria is reported to compensate for risks associated with non-face-to-face interactions, ensuring compliance. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 271. The application of enhanced or specific measures varies significantly between international financial groups, which often leverage consolidated resources and harmonised group-wide policies, and smaller domestic institutions with more limited resources and understanding of ML/TF risks. 272. Overall, FIs and VASPs have measures and systems in place to comply with requirements for enhanced or specific measures, such as regarding PEPs, and high-risk jurisdictions. In some cases, the execution of such measures however, particularly regarding PEPs, is inadequate. Most of the FMA’s PEP-related findings relate to failure to adequately determine or screen for the PEP-status of all persons relevant to the business relationship. Most identified breaches are in the VASP sector, followed by CIs. However, the FMA data indicates a positive trend since 2020, but this could be the result of OEs de-risking as well, since some CIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit confirmed they were completely de-risking PEPs. 273. CIs have generally defined and implemented specific processes and measures for CBRs, entailing enhanced ongoing monitoring and the application of EDD. Overall awareness of the associated risks has increased, as demonstrated by an increased number of related STRs/SARs from 252 (2020) to 391 (2024) and led to a downward trend in relationships of Austrian banks with correspondent banks in third countries since 2019. 274. With the rise of VAs and the swift development of new technologies in that area, FIs in Austria face challenges related to the verification of the source of funds involving VAs. 91% of CIs are not accepting customers who commercially trade with VAs, and 5% do not accept new customers when they are involved in non-commercial trades of VAs. Almost half of all OEs over the last five years refrained from the introduction of a new product, business model, business segment, market expansion, or other business activities due to the associated ML/TF risks. 275. CIs are generally aware of their wire transfer obligations but some VASPs have challenges in setting up and implementing technological solutions to comply with the FATF’s travel rule. The travel rule has been in force in Austria since 30 December 2024. 276. Generally, FIs adequately identify customer relationships related to higher-risk jurisdictions and apply EDD measures, but their customer risk classification remains to be improved. Most instances of non-compliance with EDD requirements are the consequence of deficiencies related to OEs’ customer risk assessment and risk scoring system (e.g., insufficient incorporation of risks related to high-risk jurisdictions), rather than outright violations of mandatory EDD measures. This is corroborated by a number of (large) CIs reporting relatively low to very low shares of high-risk customers, while some indicated a very large number of customers categorised as low risk (2 % high-risk and 93% low-risk at one CI, respectively 1% and 56% at another). The FMA reported a steady increase of customers domiciled in high-risk jurisdictions in recent years, partly due to the inclusion of EU members in the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. 277. The majority of CIs (83 % ) have implemented systemic measures for de-risking specific higher-risk jurisdictions (e.g., Russia and Belarus). Most CIs interviewed onsite stated that this is not necessarily done from a ML/TF risk management and mitigation perspective, but rather to avoid non-compliance with sanctions regimes. However, a large CI with presence in Russia stated it has completely ring-fenced its local subsidiary for sanctions compliance and for AML/CFT reasons. Some CIs manage identified higher ML risks related to offshore customers by taking de-risking measures against new customers when domiciled in an offshore jurisdiction, and/or by exiting existing customers once any nexus with an offshore jurisdiction is discovered. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 278. The number of STRs/SARs submitted by CIs and VASPs is steadily increasing but remains low to very low across all sectors. This also considers that CIs often report STRs/SARs from other non-banking FIs in their financial group (where applicable). In general, FIs and VASPs have implemented internal systems and procedures to comply with their reporting requirements. There is no increase in the number of STRs/SARs filed by money remitters or other FIs (Table 3.2). 279. A relatively small number of 59 FIs is responsible for the STRs/SARs filed since 2019, which can be partly explained by the structure of the Austrian financial market, and reluctance of FIs from sub-sectors to file STRs/SARs. Some supervisory findings point to the need for formalisation of detailed measures for dealing with affected customers after submitting a STR or to the timeliness of reporting. In practice, the timeliness of STR/SAR filings after the suspicion/reasonable ground first materialised (e.g., alert of monitoring system) is often the cause for further investigations by the FMA, as are inadequate internal reporting/escalation procedures. It is not clear to what extent the overall quality of STRs and SARs has improved over the years, yet some individual cases showed an improved quality. Table 3.2. STRs/SARs filed from 2019–2024 Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All REs 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 11 111 FIs* 264 1 992 2 976 3 450 5 419 9 139 VASPs - 60 279 1 393 699 1 228 Payment Service Providers - 180 558 509 513 565 Gambling and betting providers - 6 4 15 18 18 Lawyers - 2 6 13 8 19 Notaries - 3 9 13 13 33 Others/Other DNFBPs 3 6 14 17 25 86 Insurance companies - 9 10 14 9 23 Note: all FI (excluding PSPs and insurance) including the Abbaugesellschaft, the Austrian federal government’s restructuring and winding-up agency ABBAG 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 280. Most FIs have established internal controls, procedures, and audit mechanisms to ensure AML/CFT compliance. Large CIs have set up specialised AML competence centres to enhance resource efficiency and consistent implementation of AML/CFT measures, while providing support to local staff throughout the groups. Smaller CIs have implemented dedicated AML/CFT compliance functions. Onsite inspections of CIs found challenges in the practical suitability and regular updating of these measures. 281. Financial groups implement standardised group-level controls and developed and rolled out uniform AML/CFT policies and procedures, both domestically and internationally. They also provide support and expert advice to subsidiaries and branches to ensure proper application locally. Groups’ internal policies and procedures set out that, where there is a conflict between a group standard and local legal requirements, the more stringent rule prevails. 282. Where AML/CFT measures cannot be fully implemented in a third country, OEs apply additional measures to ensure effective management of respective risk. A major financial group reported practical compliance challenges with less stringent legal requirements in non-EU CESEE jurisdictions and took measures to effectively manage the respective risk. Onsite inspection findings in 2021 related to group policies indicated substantial shortcomings concerning the establishment of group-wide policies and such findings dropped largely in 2024, which suggests that CIs have strengthened group-wide compliance frameworks and addressed previously identified weaknesses. 283. While no overall data could be provided on the measures taken to ensure FIs apply the highest standards when hiring staff, there is a low number of findings related to the adequacy of (human) resources during onsite inspections. Almost all FIs have annual AML/CFT training measures in place, including for non-AML/CFT staff members. Almost all related supervisory findings since 2020 concern the VASP sector, with half of those found at VASPs that no longer hold a registration with the FMA. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 284. FI secrecy laws do not impede the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. The FM-GwG requires that, for AML/CFT purposes, OEs must exchange information with other OEs about cases that involve the same customer or the same transaction. A large majority of interviewed FIs consider such exchange possible. However, notwithstanding the FMA’s communications that financial secrecy does not impede the application of AML/CFT measures, some CIs (of different size and profiles) expressed doubts whether they could exchange customer- and transaction-related information with other FIs without the customer’s explicit permission." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 266. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of and understand their basic CDD obligations such as customer identification and verification and record keeping requirements. The FMA reports that the application of CDD measures for natural persons and legal entities in low to moderate risk circumstances does not pose significant problems. Below 5% of identified shortcomings since 2020 are reported to relate to the requirement to identify and verify the customer’s identity. 267. Most CDD-related findings from onsite inspections of FIs and VASPs relate to deficiencies in the application of ongoing monitoring measures (around 12%). The FMA indicates that these mostly relate to individual, isolated cases and not to systemic issues. Over 70% of FIs and VASPs have implemented elaborate automated transaction monitoring systems from recognised providers. The FMA’s findings therefore do not relate to a complete lack of monitoring, but rather to the calibration of the transaction monitoring to ensure adequate risk-based ongoing monitoring of individual cases. 268. Despite the identification and verification of the identity of the customer’s beneficial owner remaining one of the top five most identified findings related to CDD requirements, CIs however demonstrate an increased risk understanding and conduct improved CDD and EDD measures. This is supported by reliable beneficial ownership information which is available in the Austrian Beneficial Ownership Register (IO.5). Most CIs require customers to provide beneficial ownership information by submitting an excerpt from the Beneficial Ownership Register while verifying through additional (open) sources using automated name screening and—where necessary—documentation provided by the customer as well. It is not clear if this is practice in non-CI financial sectors. 269. The main issue for CIs is the identification and verification of the beneficial owner(s) in more complex ownership and control situations, including with a non-Austrian nexus. Larger, as well as higher-risk, CIs have decreased their risk appetite over the past few years, applying lower thresholds for earmarking ownership and control structures as complex. This triggers enhanced measures and introduces additional enhanced measures such as requiring face-to-face interviews with the beneficial owner(s), reviewing the complete business relationship following any change in beneficial ownership, and requesting notarised documents demonstrating beneficial ownership. Several interviewed (higher risk) FIs also stated they do not onboard customers of which the beneficial ownership structure does not make sense from a commercial perspective. 270. The CI sector has seen a trend towards outsourcing in recent years, which leads in some cases to challenges for the CIs due to a lack of clear definitions and controls. 67% of CIs have at least partially outsourced CDD-related activities, while only a small proportion of CIs (13%) still conduct all CDD activities internally. Almost all CIs currently offer online identification, and most have outsourced this process. The use of ID Austria is reported to compensate for risks associated with non-face-to-face interactions, ensuring compliance. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 271. The application of enhanced or specific measures varies significantly between international financial groups, which often leverage consolidated resources and harmonised group-wide policies, and smaller domestic institutions with more limited resources and understanding of ML/TF risks. 272. Overall, FIs and VASPs have measures and systems in place to comply with requirements for enhanced or specific measures, such as regarding PEPs, and high-risk jurisdictions. In some cases, the execution of such measures however, particularly regarding PEPs, is inadequate. Most of the FMA’s PEP-related findings relate to failure to adequately determine or screen for the PEP-status of all persons relevant to the business relationship. Most identified breaches are in the VASP sector, followed by CIs. However, the FMA data indicates a positive trend since 2020, but this could be the result of OEs de-risking as well, since some CIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit confirmed they were completely de-risking PEPs. 273. CIs have generally defined and implemented specific processes and measures for CBRs, entailing enhanced ongoing monitoring and the application of EDD. Overall awareness of the associated risks has increased, as demonstrated by an increased number of related STRs/SARs from 252 (2020) to 391 (2024) and led to a downward trend in relationships of Austrian banks with correspondent banks in third countries since 2019. 274. With the rise of VAs and the swift development of new technologies in that area, FIs in Austria face challenges related to the verification of the source of funds involving VAs. 91% of CIs are not accepting customers who commercially trade with VAs, and 5% do not accept new customers when they are involved in non-commercial trades of VAs. Almost half of all OEs over the last five years refrained from the introduction of a new product, business model, business segment, market expansion, or other business activities due to the associated ML/TF risks. 275. CIs are generally aware of their wire transfer obligations but some VASPs have challenges in setting up and implementing technological solutions to comply with the FATF’s travel rule. The travel rule has been in force in Austria since 30 December 2024. 276. Generally, FIs adequately identify customer relationships related to higher-risk jurisdictions and apply EDD measures, but their customer risk classification remains to be improved. Most instances of non-compliance with EDD requirements are the consequence of deficiencies related to OEs’ customer risk assessment and risk scoring system (e.g., insufficient incorporation of risks related to high-risk jurisdictions), rather than outright violations of mandatory EDD measures. This is corroborated by a number of (large) CIs reporting relatively low to very low shares of high-risk customers, while some indicated a very large number of customers categorised as low risk (2 % high-risk and 93% low-risk at one CI, respectively 1% and 56% at another). The FMA reported a steady increase of customers domiciled in high-risk jurisdictions in recent years, partly due to the inclusion of EU members in the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. 277. The majority of CIs (83 % ) have implemented systemic measures for de-risking specific higher-risk jurisdictions (e.g., Russia and Belarus). Most CIs interviewed onsite stated that this is not necessarily done from a ML/TF risk management and mitigation perspective, but rather to avoid non-compliance with sanctions regimes. However, a large CI with presence in Russia stated it has completely ring-fenced its local subsidiary for sanctions compliance and for AML/CFT reasons. Some CIs manage identified higher ML risks related to offshore customers by taking de-risking measures against new customers when domiciled in an offshore jurisdiction, and/or by exiting existing customers once any nexus with an offshore jurisdiction is discovered. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 278. The number of STRs/SARs submitted by CIs and VASPs is steadily increasing but remains low to very low across all sectors. This also considers that CIs often report STRs/SARs from other non-banking FIs in their financial group (where applicable). In general, FIs and VASPs have implemented internal systems and procedures to comply with their reporting requirements. There is no increase in the number of STRs/SARs filed by money remitters or other FIs (Table 3.2). 279. A relatively small number of 59 FIs is responsible for the STRs/SARs filed since 2019, which can be partly explained by the structure of the Austrian financial market, and reluctance of FIs from sub-sectors to file STRs/SARs. Some supervisory findings point to the need for formalisation of detailed measures for dealing with affected customers after submitting a STR or to the timeliness of reporting. In practice, the timeliness of STR/SAR filings after the suspicion/reasonable ground first materialised (e.g., alert of monitoring system) is often the cause for further investigations by the FMA, as are inadequate internal reporting/escalation procedures. It is not clear to what extent the overall quality of STRs and SARs has improved over the years, yet some individual cases showed an improved quality. Table 3.2. STRs/SARs filed from 2019–2024 Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All REs 267 2 258 3 858 5 424 6 704 11 111 FIs* 264 1 992 2 976 3 450 5 419 9 139 VASPs - 60 279 1 393 699 1 228 Payment Service Providers - 180 558 509 513 565 Gambling and betting providers - 6 4 15 18 18 Lawyers - 2 6 13 8 19 Notaries - 3 9 13 13 33 Others/Other DNFBPs 3 6 14 17 25 86 Insurance companies - 9 10 14 9 23 Note: all FI (excluding PSPs and insurance) including the Abbaugesellschaft, the Austrian federal government’s restructuring and winding-up agency ABBAG 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 280. Most FIs have established internal controls, procedures, and audit mechanisms to ensure AML/CFT compliance. Large CIs have set up specialised AML competence centres to enhance resource efficiency and consistent implementation of AML/CFT measures, while providing support to local staff throughout the groups. Smaller CIs have implemented dedicated AML/CFT compliance functions. Onsite inspections of CIs found challenges in the practical suitability and regular updating of these measures. 281. Financial groups implement standardised group-level controls and developed and rolled out uniform AML/CFT policies and procedures, both domestically and internationally. They also provide support and expert advice to subsidiaries and branches to ensure proper application locally. Groups’ internal policies and procedures set out that, where there is a conflict between a group standard and local legal requirements, the more stringent rule prevails. 282. Where AML/CFT measures cannot be fully implemented in a third country, OEs apply additional measures to ensure effective management of respective risk. A major financial group reported practical compliance challenges with less stringent legal requirements in non-EU CESEE jurisdictions and took measures to effectively manage the respective risk. Onsite inspection findings in 2021 related to group policies indicated substantial shortcomings concerning the establishment of group-wide policies and such findings dropped largely in 2024, which suggests that CIs have strengthened group-wide compliance frameworks and addressed previously identified weaknesses. 283. While no overall data could be provided on the measures taken to ensure FIs apply the highest standards when hiring staff, there is a low number of findings related to the adequacy of (human) resources during onsite inspections. Almost all FIs have annual AML/CFT training measures in place, including for non-AML/CFT staff members. Almost all related supervisory findings since 2020 concern the VASP sector, with half of those found at VASPs that no longer hold a registration with the FMA. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 284. FI secrecy laws do not impede the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. The FM-GwG requires that, for AML/CFT purposes, OEs must exchange information with other OEs about cases that involve the same customer or the same transaction. A large majority of interviewed FIs consider such exchange possible. However, notwithstanding the FMA’s communications that financial secrecy does not impede the application of AML/CFT measures, some CIs (of different size and profiles) expressed doubts whether they could exchange customer- and transaction-related information with other FIs without the customer’s explicit permission." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="342. With the exception of casino supervisors, DNFBP supervisors could not provide sufficiently detailed information of their respective sectors’ understanding of and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. This includes a lack of disaggregated data on DNFBPs’ understanding of AML/CFT obligations and effective application of appropriate measures with regards to (a) CDD, including in relation to beneficial ownership and record-keeping; (b) enhanced or specific measures for (i) PEPs, (ii) new technologies and (iii) high-risk countries identified by the FATF; (c) reporting obligations, including prevention of tipping-off; and (d) internal controls and procedures, and audit requirements. No legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures were identified. 343. Based on the information collected by the assessment team, understanding and compliance of individual DNFBPs with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures varies significantly across the different types of DNFBPs. All DNFBPs are aware of the need to collect information for CDD purposes, however, most do not demonstrate a good level understanding of which situations should trigger EDD measures or what kind of measures should be applied in those instances. 344. DNFBPs’ understanding of and compliance with their AML/CFT obligations varies significantly across sectors. Casinos demonstrate a good level of understanding and compliance, as do notaries, who are able to rely on a more complex compliance system, supported by the services provided by the Notartreuhandbank AG (NTB—a bank solely serving the notary sector), to process payments from buyer to seller in real estate (in lieu of escrow accounts at any other bank). 345. Real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS as a whole, did not demonstrate an adequate level of understanding and compliance with their AML/CFT obligations, also reflected in their low levels of STRs reported. They do not have AML/CFT procedures in place, e.g., to guide the application of general CDD measures versus when to apply EDD measures. They were unable to provide cases of STRs submitted. As they present the largest number of entities combined in the DNFBP sector, their low level of STR reporting (table 4.10) is also significant. 346. Lawyers are generally aware of their AML/CFT obligations. They conduct CDD checks, and in certain situations will apply EDD measures, such as collection of information on the source of funds. The most common deficiencies identified by the supervisor are the failure to conduct adequate risk self-assessments, to establish and verify the identity of the client or counterparty and the beneficial owner in transactions with ML/TF risk, or to perform checks for transactions with ML/TF risk. Deficiencies related to record-keeping and training were also identified. 347. Private accountancy professions demonstrated a basic understanding and compliance of AML/CFT obligations. The most common deficiencies identified by the supervisor are related to failure to conduct appropriate risk assessments and to fulfil CDD obligations. 348. Although tax advisors undertaking TCSP services recognise their AML/CFT obligations, shortcomings on certain obligations persist. They conduct checks on the identity of the beneficial owner and demonstrated a good knowledge of how they should identify them, as they frequently provide beneficial ownership registration services, but lack sufficient knowledge on other AML/CFT obligations. These include risk identification and assessment, and adequate application of EDD measures to PEPs. 349. Notaries are, to a large extent, aware of their AML/CFT obligations. They conduct CDD checks at onboarding stage, identify the relevant beneficial owners and apply EDD measures in certain situations (e.g., foreign clients, cash transactions, or transactions outside Europe). Additionally, notaries have access to a dedicated compliance screening system provided through the NTB, which allows them to screen against a comprehensive set of information including global PEP and sanctions lists and adverse media. The compliance system carries out approximately 650 000 transaction screenings annually. 350. Casinos have a good understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and have adequate procedures in place to ensure compliance. They apply CDD measures to all visitors of casinos, monitor transactions, are able to identify trends, and submit STRs/SARs. 351. The DNFBP sector’s often insufficient ML/TF risk understanding also negatively impacts sectoral STR/SAR reporting during the assessment period. There has been a positive increase over the past year in the number of STRs/SARs submitted by casinos and notaries, which is in line with an improving understanding of ML/TF risks within these sectors. Austria did not demonstrate that the number of STRs aligns with the identified sectorial ML/TF risks and there is also no data available on whether STRs match cross-sectorial main risks such as use of cash and PEPs. Table 4.1. STRs/SARs submitted by DNFBPs (2019–2024) Sector and number of OEs 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents (6 304) 0 0 1 1 1 3 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) (36 621) - - - - - 1 DPMS (23 961) 0 0 2 0 5 11 Notaries (540 notaries, 671 notarial candidates) 8 3 9 13 13 33 Lawyers (7 138) 0 2 6 13 8 19 Chartered public accountants (3 064) and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services (9 061) 3 4 8 7 7 10 Private accountancy professionals (§ 1 BiBuG 2014) (4 279) 0 0 0 2 2 5 Casinos (Gambling Services and Lotteries, Bookmaker/Betting) (12 land-based casinos, 1 on-line casino) 0 6 4 15 18 19" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="342. With the exception of casino supervisors, DNFBP supervisors could not provide sufficiently detailed information of their respective sectors’ understanding of and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. This includes a lack of disaggregated data on DNFBPs’ understanding of AML/CFT obligations and effective application of appropriate measures with regards to (a) CDD, including in relation to beneficial ownership and record-keeping; (b) enhanced or specific measures for (i) PEPs, (ii) new technologies and (iii) high-risk countries identified by the FATF; (c) reporting obligations, including prevention of tipping-off; and (d) internal controls and procedures, and audit requirements. No legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures were identified. 343. Based on the information collected by the assessment team, understanding and compliance of individual DNFBPs with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures varies significantly across the different types of DNFBPs. All DNFBPs are aware of the need to collect information for CDD purposes, however, most do not demonstrate a good level understanding of which situations should trigger EDD measures or what kind of measures should be applied in those instances. 344. DNFBPs’ understanding of and compliance with their AML/CFT obligations varies significantly across sectors. Casinos demonstrate a good level of understanding and compliance, as do notaries, who are able to rely on a more complex compliance system, supported by the services provided by the Notartreuhandbank AG (NTB—a bank solely serving the notary sector), to process payments from buyer to seller in real estate (in lieu of escrow accounts at any other bank). 345. Real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS as a whole, did not demonstrate an adequate level of understanding and compliance with their AML/CFT obligations, also reflected in their low levels of STRs reported. They do not have AML/CFT procedures in place, e.g., to guide the application of general CDD measures versus when to apply EDD measures. They were unable to provide cases of STRs submitted. As they present the largest number of entities combined in the DNFBP sector, their low level of STR reporting (table 4.10) is also significant. 346. Lawyers are generally aware of their AML/CFT obligations. They conduct CDD checks, and in certain situations will apply EDD measures, such as collection of information on the source of funds. The most common deficiencies identified by the supervisor are the failure to conduct adequate risk self-assessments, to establish and verify the identity of the client or counterparty and the beneficial owner in transactions with ML/TF risk, or to perform checks for transactions with ML/TF risk. Deficiencies related to record-keeping and training were also identified. 347. Private accountancy professions demonstrated a basic understanding and compliance of AML/CFT obligations. The most common deficiencies identified by the supervisor are related to failure to conduct appropriate risk assessments and to fulfil CDD obligations. 348. Although tax advisors undertaking TCSP services recognise their AML/CFT obligations, shortcomings on certain obligations persist. They conduct checks on the identity of the beneficial owner and demonstrated a good knowledge of how they should identify them, as they frequently provide beneficial ownership registration services, but lack sufficient knowledge on other AML/CFT obligations. These include risk identification and assessment, and adequate application of EDD measures to PEPs. 349. Notaries are, to a large extent, aware of their AML/CFT obligations. They conduct CDD checks at onboarding stage, identify the relevant beneficial owners and apply EDD measures in certain situations (e.g., foreign clients, cash transactions, or transactions outside Europe). Additionally, notaries have access to a dedicated compliance screening system provided through the NTB, which allows them to screen against a comprehensive set of information including global PEP and sanctions lists and adverse media. The compliance system carries out approximately 650 000 transaction screenings annually. 350. Casinos have a good understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and have adequate procedures in place to ensure compliance. They apply CDD measures to all visitors of casinos, monitor transactions, are able to identify trends, and submit STRs/SARs. 351. The DNFBP sector’s often insufficient ML/TF risk understanding also negatively impacts sectoral STR/SAR reporting during the assessment period. There has been a positive increase over the past year in the number of STRs/SARs submitted by casinos and notaries, which is in line with an improving understanding of ML/TF risks within these sectors. Austria did not demonstrate that the number of STRs aligns with the identified sectorial ML/TF risks and there is also no data available on whether STRs match cross-sectorial main risks such as use of cash and PEPs. Table 4.1. STRs/SARs submitted by DNFBPs (2019–2024) Sector and number of OEs 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents (6 304) 0 0 1 1 1 3 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) (36 621) - - - - - 1 DPMS (23 961) 0 0 2 0 5 11 Notaries (540 notaries, 671 notarial candidates) 8 3 9 13 13 33 Lawyers (7 138) 0 2 6 13 8 19 Chartered public accountants (3 064) and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services (9 061) 3 4 8 7 7 10 Private accountancy professionals (§ 1 BiBuG 2014) (4 279) 0 0 0 2 2 5 Casinos (Gambling Services and Lotteries, Bookmaker/Betting) (12 land-based casinos, 1 on-line casino) 0 6 4 15 18 19" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="416. Austria ensures timely access to adequate, accurate, and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information of foreign LAs with sufficient links to Austria in the same manner as for domestic and relevant foreign LPs (see previous section). Foreign trusts and similar LAs that are managed from within Austria or appear on the top level in the ownership and control structure of domestic LPs or acquire/own real estate in Austria are subject to the beneficial ownership disclosure requirements set out above. Express trusts and similar LAs holding accounts in Austria can be identified through the Central Register of Accounts and Safe Deposit Boxes and basic and beneficial ownership information can be obtained from OEs upon request. 417. Information on beneficial ownership of these trusts and similar legal arrangements can be accessed via the Beneficial Ownership Register. As of 30 September 2024, five foreign trusts were registered in the Beneficial Ownership Register, which is inexplicably low. Two of these five trusts had natural persons with a residence in Austria as trustees. In addition, 329 domestic legal persons were owned indirectly by foreign trusts or similar legal arrangements (i.e., more than 25% of the shares are held directly or indirectly by a trust or similar legal arrangements). These domestic legal persons are mostly LLCs which are set up for investment purposes, including investment in real estate. 418. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority presented examples of its interaction with foreign beneficial owners and trustees which demonstrate the Registry Authority’s efforts to understand the entire ownership and control structure of registered legal entities. In addition, foreign trusts and similar legal arrangements should disclose basic and beneficial ownership information before entering into a business relationship with an OE, which is required to verify whether relevant information is on record in the Beneficial Ownership Register. Based on the low number of registered foreign trusts and similar LAs (only five), this requirement appears however not yet effectively implemented. 419. Against this background, and notwithstanding the limited number of separately registered legal arrangements observed in practice, competent authorities are, where relevant, able to obtain information on the beneficial ownership of such trusts or similar legal arrangements, the residence of the trustees or equivalent persons, and assets managed or held through FIs and DNFBPs. While the overall exposure to legal arrangements is considered limited, the existing legal and operational mechanisms allow competent authorities to access the necessary information in a timely manner when required for ML/TF investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="416. Austria ensures timely access to adequate, accurate, and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information of foreign LAs with sufficient links to Austria in the same manner as for domestic and relevant foreign LPs (see previous section). Foreign trusts and similar LAs that are managed from within Austria or appear on the top level in the ownership and control structure of domestic LPs or acquire/own real estate in Austria are subject to the beneficial ownership disclosure requirements set out above. Express trusts and similar LAs holding accounts in Austria can be identified through the Central Register of Accounts and Safe Deposit Boxes and basic and beneficial ownership information can be obtained from OEs upon request. 417. Information on beneficial ownership of these trusts and similar legal arrangements can be accessed via the Beneficial Ownership Register. As of 30 September 2024, five foreign trusts were registered in the Beneficial Ownership Register, which is inexplicably low. Two of these five trusts had natural persons with a residence in Austria as trustees. In addition, 329 domestic legal persons were owned indirectly by foreign trusts or similar legal arrangements (i.e., more than 25% of the shares are held directly or indirectly by a trust or similar legal arrangements). These domestic legal persons are mostly LLCs which are set up for investment purposes, including investment in real estate. 418. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority presented examples of its interaction with foreign beneficial owners and trustees which demonstrate the Registry Authority’s efforts to understand the entire ownership and control structure of registered legal entities. In addition, foreign trusts and similar legal arrangements should disclose basic and beneficial ownership information before entering into a business relationship with an OE, which is required to verify whether relevant information is on record in the Beneficial Ownership Register. Based on the low number of registered foreign trusts and similar LAs (only five), this requirement appears however not yet effectively implemented. 419. Against this background, and notwithstanding the limited number of separately registered legal arrangements observed in practice, competent authorities are, where relevant, able to obtain information on the beneficial ownership of such trusts or similar legal arrangements, the residence of the trustees or equivalent persons, and assets managed or held through FIs and DNFBPs. While the overall exposure to legal arrangements is considered limited, the existing legal and operational mechanisms allow competent authorities to access the necessary information in a timely manner when required for ML/TF investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 462. Financial intelligence is commonly used by LEAs and other competent authorities for investigations even though the extent to which they produce financial intelligence themselves remains more limited (except the DSN and the Tax Authority). In relation to TF, most cases originate from the transfer of information from TF-related STRs/SARs to DSN (section 6.2.3 and IO.9 case). On that basis, DSN collects and develops its own financial intelligence to determine if and to what extent the information reported to the FIU is indeed related to TF. In the area of fraud prevention, the FIU's analyses often serve as the starting point for investigations as well, in addition to victim's complaints (which likely trigger FIs to file STRs). 463. For ML, financial intelligence produced by the A-FIU often supports the commencement of predicate offences and related ML investigations or is used to develop evidence. Austria does not keep statistics on the main triggers for ML investigations—e.g. how many result from financial investigations into the predicate offences, victim complaints (e.g. on fraud cases), FIU disseminations, cash controls at the borders, MLA requests, etc. LEAs interviewed and case studies indicate that many ML investigations likely derive from investigations on predicate offences, which themselves commonly start by or are supported by A-FIU disseminations. This is particularly the case for investigations into fraud-related offences, where FIs’ internal controls (or victim complaints received by FIs) often lead to STRs. There are examples where FIU disseminations assisted in uncovering complex fraud schemes early on, securing assets (see below and IO.7) and LEAs commended the A-FIU for the noticeable improvements in the quality of dissemination in recent years. Box 6.2. Case Study: Goldeneye Customs submitted an STR to the A-FIU reporting that, during a customs control at the Vienna Airport, two travellers were apprehended with undeclared cash totalling almost EUR 700 000. The STR included the identity of the travellers and circumstances involved. The A-FIU identified a network involving the two travellers and numerous other individuals and companies after analysing extensive transaction data, links to other STRs, cash transaction information and database checks, supported by Europol inquiries and open-source research. The A-FIU also contacted two foreign FIUs for further information on specific transactions. A-FIU disseminated a financial intelligence report to LEAs who proceeded with a criminal investigation, identifying individuals suspected of laundering proceeds from criminal activities, including human smuggling. LEAs analysis of the respective bank accounts of the suspects showed that 3 190 transactions totalling over EUR 13 million were recorded in a 2-year time span. The suspicious account activity stemmed from cash deposits and none of the suspects could prove the source of funds and source of wealth, which initiated further financial investigations. One individual has been sentenced for smuggling of human beings, and mobile phones, cash, and jewellery have been seized. Financial investigations regarding the multiple other suspects are still ongoing. 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 464. Financial intelligence is used by LEAs to identify and trace criminal proceeds and instrumentalities, as some case studies demonstrate. LEAs routinely work to identify and trace proceeds and instrumentalities as part of their integrated financial investigations (IO.8). They also make use of international channels when assets are located abroad. There is close cooperation between the A-FIU and LEAs, and some case studies indicate that A-FIU disseminations assisted uncovering complex fraud schemes and securing assets early (cases below). The possibility of the A-FIU sending automated notices to OEs requiring immediate action supports asset tracing efforts and was identified by LEAs as a strength. Easy and rapid access to data on land ownership, beneficial ownership, and account holders also assists with the tracing of criminal property. Box 6.3. Case Study: FINLINK In 2023, LEAs became aware of a phishing fraud scheme. The perpetrators sent fake SMS messages, claiming to be from the tax office, and that the recipient was entitled to a tax refund. In order to receive such refund, users were instructed to verify their information via a link included in the message. In reality, the link led to a fake website that requested users to enter their banking details. A “Situation Report Fraud” from CIS unit 7.2 identified this phishing pattern at an early stage through live screening of new fraud cases. The CIS unit immediately informed the A-FIU, which subsequently issued Red Warning Notices through goAML to relevant reporting entities in order to identify perpetrator and money mule accounts, as the identified pattern involved, among other things, linked to accounts in Lithuania, specific transaction amounts, and particular payment references. CIs quickly adjusted their transaction monitoring systems. As a result, the A-FIU received around 150 STRs via goAML from FIs and VASPs concerning fraudulent transactions. With the support of the ARO, investigators and public prosecutors were able to block 21 bank accounts and seize EUR 239 945 from them. Although approximately EUR 150 000 had already disappeared through foreign channels by that point, these measures immediately brought the fraud scheme to a halt. Box 6.4. Case Study: PONZI Starting in October 2019, the A-FIU received 18 STRs over 3 years concerning a fraudulent crypto investment scheme, operated via social media and a website, by suspects that did not hold a regulatory license from the FMA for the provision of financial services. The suspects promoted the scheme aggressively, including through encrypted messaging and physical events, luring investors with promises of daily returns of up to 0.32%. Customers were induced to transfer funds—often to constantly changing, mostly foreign accounts—under the false pretence of profitable cryptocurrency or real estate investments. The funds were used to finance the suspects’ lavish lifestyles, while the advertised projects were never realised. Through analysis, case linkage, and international cooperation, the A-FIU produced an analysis report and disseminated it to the competent LEAs. The FMA issued an investor warning. In 2024, authorities seized high-value assets (e.g., sports car, jewellery, expensive watch, 83 mobile devices, and 30 cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanged 112 Europol/Interpol messages). One suspect was extradited from South America. In October 2024, five defendants were convicted—two of them received five-year of unconditional imprisonment—while five other defendants were acquitted. 465. The A-FIU rarely makes use of its transaction suspension powers, as it prefers to reach out directly to public prosecutors who are generally available at short notice for issuing freezing orders, including to follow up on informal requests by the A-FIU or LEAs . While authorities reported that this system generally works well in practice. it can be questioned, particularly for cases above EUR 10 000, whether Austria is making full use of the possibility to suspend transactions, in particular in the context of combating fraud cases via the financial sector (IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 462. Financial intelligence is commonly used by LEAs and other competent authorities for investigations even though the extent to which they produce financial intelligence themselves remains more limited (except the DSN and the Tax Authority). In relation to TF, most cases originate from the transfer of information from TF-related STRs/SARs to DSN (section 6.2.3 and IO.9 case). On that basis, DSN collects and develops its own financial intelligence to determine if and to what extent the information reported to the FIU is indeed related to TF. In the area of fraud prevention, the FIU's analyses often serve as the starting point for investigations as well, in addition to victim's complaints (which likely trigger FIs to file STRs). 463. For ML, financial intelligence produced by the A-FIU often supports the commencement of predicate offences and related ML investigations or is used to develop evidence. Austria does not keep statistics on the main triggers for ML investigations—e.g. how many result from financial investigations into the predicate offences, victim complaints (e.g. on fraud cases), FIU disseminations, cash controls at the borders, MLA requests, etc. LEAs interviewed and case studies indicate that many ML investigations likely derive from investigations on predicate offences, which themselves commonly start by or are supported by A-FIU disseminations. This is particularly the case for investigations into fraud-related offences, where FIs’ internal controls (or victim complaints received by FIs) often lead to STRs. There are examples where FIU disseminations assisted in uncovering complex fraud schemes early on, securing assets (see below and IO.7) and LEAs commended the A-FIU for the noticeable improvements in the quality of dissemination in recent years. Box 6.2. Case Study: Goldeneye Customs submitted an STR to the A-FIU reporting that, during a customs control at the Vienna Airport, two travellers were apprehended with undeclared cash totalling almost EUR 700 000. The STR included the identity of the travellers and circumstances involved. The A-FIU identified a network involving the two travellers and numerous other individuals and companies after analysing extensive transaction data, links to other STRs, cash transaction information and database checks, supported by Europol inquiries and open-source research. The A-FIU also contacted two foreign FIUs for further information on specific transactions. A-FIU disseminated a financial intelligence report to LEAs who proceeded with a criminal investigation, identifying individuals suspected of laundering proceeds from criminal activities, including human smuggling. LEAs analysis of the respective bank accounts of the suspects showed that 3 190 transactions totalling over EUR 13 million were recorded in a 2-year time span. The suspicious account activity stemmed from cash deposits and none of the suspects could prove the source of funds and source of wealth, which initiated further financial investigations. One individual has been sentenced for smuggling of human beings, and mobile phones, cash, and jewellery have been seized. Financial investigations regarding the multiple other suspects are still ongoing. 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 464. Financial intelligence is used by LEAs to identify and trace criminal proceeds and instrumentalities, as some case studies demonstrate. LEAs routinely work to identify and trace proceeds and instrumentalities as part of their integrated financial investigations (IO.8). They also make use of international channels when assets are located abroad. There is close cooperation between the A-FIU and LEAs, and some case studies indicate that A-FIU disseminations assisted uncovering complex fraud schemes and securing assets early (cases below). The possibility of the A-FIU sending automated notices to OEs requiring immediate action supports asset tracing efforts and was identified by LEAs as a strength. Easy and rapid access to data on land ownership, beneficial ownership, and account holders also assists with the tracing of criminal property. Box 6.3. Case Study: FINLINK In 2023, LEAs became aware of a phishing fraud scheme. The perpetrators sent fake SMS messages, claiming to be from the tax office, and that the recipient was entitled to a tax refund. In order to receive such refund, users were instructed to verify their information via a link included in the message. In reality, the link led to a fake website that requested users to enter their banking details. A “Situation Report Fraud” from CIS unit 7.2 identified this phishing pattern at an early stage through live screening of new fraud cases. The CIS unit immediately informed the A-FIU, which subsequently issued Red Warning Notices through goAML to relevant reporting entities in order to identify perpetrator and money mule accounts, as the identified pattern involved, among other things, linked to accounts in Lithuania, specific transaction amounts, and particular payment references. CIs quickly adjusted their transaction monitoring systems. As a result, the A-FIU received around 150 STRs via goAML from FIs and VASPs concerning fraudulent transactions. With the support of the ARO, investigators and public prosecutors were able to block 21 bank accounts and seize EUR 239 945 from them. Although approximately EUR 150 000 had already disappeared through foreign channels by that point, these measures immediately brought the fraud scheme to a halt. Box 6.4. Case Study: PONZI Starting in October 2019, the A-FIU received 18 STRs over 3 years concerning a fraudulent crypto investment scheme, operated via social media and a website, by suspects that did not hold a regulatory license from the FMA for the provision of financial services. The suspects promoted the scheme aggressively, including through encrypted messaging and physical events, luring investors with promises of daily returns of up to 0.32%. Customers were induced to transfer funds—often to constantly changing, mostly foreign accounts—under the false pretence of profitable cryptocurrency or real estate investments. The funds were used to finance the suspects’ lavish lifestyles, while the advertised projects were never realised. Through analysis, case linkage, and international cooperation, the A-FIU produced an analysis report and disseminated it to the competent LEAs. The FMA issued an investor warning. In 2024, authorities seized high-value assets (e.g., sports car, jewellery, expensive watch, 83 mobile devices, and 30 cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanged 112 Europol/Interpol messages). One suspect was extradited from South America. In October 2024, five defendants were convicted—two of them received five-year of unconditional imprisonment—while five other defendants were acquitted. 465. The A-FIU rarely makes use of its transaction suspension powers, as it prefers to reach out directly to public prosecutors who are generally available at short notice for issuing freezing orders, including to follow up on informal requests by the A-FIU or LEAs . While authorities reported that this system generally works well in practice. it can be questioned, particularly for cases above EUR 10 000, whether Austria is making full use of the possibility to suspend transactions, in particular in the context of combating fraud cases via the financial sector (IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="496. When it is not possible to secure a conviction for ML, Austria pursues alternative criminal measures, but data is lacking to determine how often this is achieved in practice. The most important measures consist for instance of prosecuting the money launderer as the main offender or at least as a participant in the commission of the predicate offence, but this is generally limited to fraud cases (e.g. conviction of money mules for participation in fraud). These measures are consistently pursued due to legal requirements—regardless of whether a conviction for ML can be obtained or not. According to the jurisprudence, the participation (e.g. particularly in a fraud offence) is possible even after the formal completion of the offence by the principal offender, which opens up further possibilities for sanctioning in cases involving money mules. However, there are no statistics to evaluate how often this has occurred. In addition, confiscating proceeds of crime or property of corresponding value is also pursued, even if overall results are low (IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="496. When it is not possible to secure a conviction for ML, Austria pursues alternative criminal measures, but data is lacking to determine how often this is achieved in practice. The most important measures consist for instance of prosecuting the money launderer as the main offender or at least as a participant in the commission of the predicate offence, but this is generally limited to fraud cases (e.g. conviction of money mules for participation in fraud). These measures are consistently pursued due to legal requirements—regardless of whether a conviction for ML can be obtained or not. According to the jurisprudence, the participation (e.g. particularly in a fraud offence) is possible even after the formal completion of the offence by the principal offender, which opens up further possibilities for sanctioning in cases involving money mules. However, there are no statistics to evaluate how often this has occurred. In addition, confiscating proceeds of crime or property of corresponding value is also pursued, even if overall results are low (IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="527. Austria does not apply asset management tools, beyond mere storage, and there is no system in place to regularly assess potential loss of value of frozen/seized property. The authorities did not provide evidence of taking measures to preserve value and actively use assets, such as the rental of seized real estate assets or the pre-confiscation sales of assets such as VA. Special departments at the courts are used for the storage of smaller physical items. For larger assets such as vehicles or items that require specific knowledge for storage (e.g. valuable paintings), the authorities often use the services of professional enterprises, including car dealerships or auction houses. In such cases, the LEAs typically obtain an order from the PPO to contract these services. For managing real estate and VAs, there are no specific provisions or guidance in place." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="527. Austria does not apply asset management tools, beyond mere storage, and there is no system in place to regularly assess potential loss of value of frozen/seized property. The authorities did not provide evidence of taking measures to preserve value and actively use assets, such as the rental of seized real estate assets or the pre-confiscation sales of assets such as VA. Special departments at the courts are used for the storage of smaller physical items. For larger assets such as vehicles or items that require specific knowledge for storage (e.g. valuable paintings), the authorities often use the services of professional enterprises, including car dealerships or auction houses. In such cases, the LEAs typically obtain an order from the PPO to contract these services. For managing real estate and VAs, there are no specific provisions or guidance in place." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities Involvement of enforcement or prosecution authorities in the definition of Counter Terrorism (CT) strategies 577. The national strategy to CT is contained in the 2021 “Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and De-radicalisation” and the 2024 “National Security Strategy” (NSS). The first one is more a prevention strategy aiming at protecting from radicalisation and extremism moves. It does not refer to terrorism or TF. The NSS provides a brief action plan to CT through the strengthening of interministerial national and international coordination, reinforcing human resources, strengthening investigations, developing the legal framework and continue to focus on the prevention of extremism. 578. It does not refer to TF and does not contain specifics about investigations and prosecution of TF nor about resources needed at enforcement and prosecution level . The lack of reference to TF in the overall security and counter-terrorism strategy raises an issue as to the level of priority given at strategic level on the fight against TF. In the absence of any strategic direction and impetus, prioritisation and allocation of appropriate resources are left with enforcement and prosecution authorities. Results achieved so far could be further improved by the definition of strategic directions at policy level. 579. The DSN, a core authority in the development of CT policies, is involved in the definition of the overall anti-terrorism strategy. Conversely, neither the BMJ nor the judicial authority have been involved in the design of the strategies and the assessment of needs. This is also true for AML/CFT risk assessment exercises and development of strategies, for which the BMJ contribution seems to be limited (IO.1). 580. As the DSN and LSEs are in charge of both CT activities as well as TF and belong to the same hierarchy, internal coordination is informal and very efficient. In every terrorism investigation, the TF aspects are also investigated. On the other hand, since a majority of TF investigations are conducted under the offence of participation in a terrorist organisation, TF investigations serve the broader aim of investigating terrorist activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities Involvement of enforcement or prosecution authorities in the definition of Counter Terrorism (CT) strategies 577. The national strategy to CT is contained in the 2021 “Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and De-radicalisation” and the 2024 “National Security Strategy” (NSS). The first one is more a prevention strategy aiming at protecting from radicalisation and extremism moves. It does not refer to terrorism or TF. The NSS provides a brief action plan to CT through the strengthening of interministerial national and international coordination, reinforcing human resources, strengthening investigations, developing the legal framework and continue to focus on the prevention of extremism. 578. It does not refer to TF and does not contain specifics about investigations and prosecution of TF nor about resources needed at enforcement and prosecution level . The lack of reference to TF in the overall security and counter-terrorism strategy raises an issue as to the level of priority given at strategic level on the fight against TF. In the absence of any strategic direction and impetus, prioritisation and allocation of appropriate resources are left with enforcement and prosecution authorities. Results achieved so far could be further improved by the definition of strategic directions at policy level. 579. The DSN, a core authority in the development of CT policies, is involved in the definition of the overall anti-terrorism strategy. Conversely, neither the BMJ nor the judicial authority have been involved in the design of the strategies and the assessment of needs. This is also true for AML/CFT risk assessment exercises and development of strategies, for which the BMJ contribution seems to be limited (IO.1). 580. As the DSN and LSEs are in charge of both CT activities as well as TF and belong to the same hierarchy, internal coordination is informal and very efficient. In every terrorism investigation, the TF aspects are also investigated. On the other hand, since a majority of TF investigations are conducted under the offence of participation in a terrorist organisation, TF investigations serve the broader aim of investigating terrorist activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="606. FIs, VASPs, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated that they understand and implement their TFS obligations . They routinely screen their customers against UN, EU, and other sanctions lists at onboarding and on an ongoing basis using software solutions. According to the FMA, which supervises TF preventive measures of FIs and VASPs, over 80% of FIs and VASPs and 99% of CIs implement automated screening against sanctions lists, and 97% of CIs screen at least once a day. OEs using software were confident that these tools are usually updated one day after designations are made, but do not verify this. The identification of indirect links, close associations and screening of external parties to a transaction presents some challenges, which might have a negative impact on their ability to identify assets of designated persons. 607. Two FIs had identified hits with TF-related TFS, and a few others had practical experience in freezing funds and filing reports with the OeNB in the context of other EU sanctions regimes . FIs had very limited interaction with the OeNB regarding false positives while VASPs requested and obtained advice from the OeNB on a few occasions, even though the OeNB has no competence over VASPs. [147] The low amounts frozen are not entirely consistent with Austria’s TF risk and context, including the TF risk exposure of the financial and VASP sectors. 608. Except for tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and to some extent lawyers, DNFBPs did not demonstrate that they properly understand and implement their TFS obligations . Real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS either consider that TFS can be implemented on a risk-sensitive basis or are simply not applicable to their business. These DNFBPs and insurance intermediaries undertake sanctions screening at onboarding and periodically (from weekly to annually), with some of them using software and others conducting manual checks. Notaries benefit from the Notartreuhandbank ’s (NTB) [148] daily automated checks against compliance software, and the NTB would immediately inform them about any hits. 609. The poor understanding of TFS obligations by insurance intermediaries and certain categories of DNFBPs is due to the absence of targeted guidance [149] and TFS-related supervision (see below). For instance, these DNFBPs and insurance intermediaries were generally unaware of the role of the DSN in Austria’s TFS framework while the DSN is the designated authority for TFS-supervision of these sectors. Shortcomings in implementation of CDD measures by certain DNFBPs (IO.4) also have an impact on the effective application of TFS. Footnotes [147] As of 1 January 2026, FIs (including VASPs, credit and financial institutions, insurance undertakings, investment service providers, and asset managers) should report frozen funds and other actions taken in application of TFS to FMA. Their implementation of TFS will also be supervised by FMA. [148] NTB acts sector-exclusive escrow bank for notaries. For more details, see IO.3/4. [149] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance on implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its public website." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="606. FIs, VASPs, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated that they understand and implement their TFS obligations . They routinely screen their customers against UN, EU, and other sanctions lists at onboarding and on an ongoing basis using software solutions. According to the FMA, which supervises TF preventive measures of FIs and VASPs, over 80% of FIs and VASPs and 99% of CIs implement automated screening against sanctions lists, and 97% of CIs screen at least once a day. OEs using software were confident that these tools are usually updated one day after designations are made, but do not verify this. The identification of indirect links, close associations and screening of external parties to a transaction presents some challenges, which might have a negative impact on their ability to identify assets of designated persons. 607. Two FIs had identified hits with TF-related TFS, and a few others had practical experience in freezing funds and filing reports with the OeNB in the context of other EU sanctions regimes . FIs had very limited interaction with the OeNB regarding false positives while VASPs requested and obtained advice from the OeNB on a few occasions, even though the OeNB has no competence over VASPs. [147] The low amounts frozen are not entirely consistent with Austria’s TF risk and context, including the TF risk exposure of the financial and VASP sectors. 608. Except for tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and to some extent lawyers, DNFBPs did not demonstrate that they properly understand and implement their TFS obligations . Real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS either consider that TFS can be implemented on a risk-sensitive basis or are simply not applicable to their business. These DNFBPs and insurance intermediaries undertake sanctions screening at onboarding and periodically (from weekly to annually), with some of them using software and others conducting manual checks. Notaries benefit from the Notartreuhandbank ’s (NTB) [148] daily automated checks against compliance software, and the NTB would immediately inform them about any hits. 609. The poor understanding of TFS obligations by insurance intermediaries and certain categories of DNFBPs is due to the absence of targeted guidance [149] and TFS-related supervision (see below). For instance, these DNFBPs and insurance intermediaries were generally unaware of the role of the DSN in Austria’s TFS framework while the DSN is the designated authority for TFS-supervision of these sectors. Shortcomings in implementation of CDD measures by certain DNFBPs (IO.4) also have an impact on the effective application of TFS. Footnotes [147] As of 1 January 2026, FIs (including VASPs, credit and financial institutions, insurance undertakings, investment service providers, and asset managers) should report frozen funds and other actions taken in application of TFS to FMA. Their implementation of TFS will also be supervised by FMA. [148] NTB acts sector-exclusive escrow bank for notaries. For more details, see IO.3/4. [149] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance on implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its public website." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 634. Austria has frozen a total amount of EUR 273 963 pursuant to UNSCR 1718 on one occasion in 2009. Since that time, no additional assets were identified and frozen in relation to this Resolution. This is not consistent with Austria’s identified PF risks. 635. As a national security and intelligence service, the DSN has adequate intelligence gathering and investigative powers. It employs both preventive and investigative measures to combat circumvention of PF-related TFS. 636. With a view to detect PF-related activities, Austria has an inspection regime for the export of dual-use goods. In application of this regime, the DSN and Customs stopped the export of sanctioned goods to DPRK on 12 occasions since 2020, and relevant goods and assets for a total estimated value of EUR 50 000 were seized. These cases were subsequently dismissed by the PPO or settled through a diversion by court. 637. The DSN’s systematic screening of data included in the company, beneficial ownership, land, and account registers against designations pursuant to UNSCR 1718 is a pertinent measure to identify sanctions evasion. This screening has not yet identified links to persons or entities designated under UNSCR 1718. Any matches with the UNSCR 1718 sanctions list would be reported to relevant local courts which are responsible for issuing freezing orders, just as DSN did for 21 cases related to autonomous EU sanctions. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority screens the data included in the Beneficial Ownership Register against UN and EU sanctions lists upon registration of a legal entity, when changes in beneficial ownership information and annual reports are filed, and, more generally, on a weekly basis. 638. The DSN has the capacity to investigate complex PF-related sanctions evasion schemes. Since 2020, in addition to the twelve cases mentioned above, the DSN reported a total of 49 cases because of circumvention of financial sanctions to the PPO. These 49 cases were mainly related to UNSCR 2231 (2015). Although with no direct impact on effectiveness under IO.11 as assessed at the time of the on-site visit, these cases demonstrate that the DSN was able to identify, trace, and freeze funds and other assets for the benefit of persons and entities engaged in proliferation of WMD or designated under other UN sanctions regimes, including through very effective domestic and international cooperation, extensive use of financial intelligence (including information from the beneficial ownership register) and comprehensive financial flow analysis. Concrete examples demonstrating complex financial investigations identifying PF sanctions evasion schemes, including but not limited to the DPRK, were presented during the onsite visit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 634. Austria has frozen a total amount of EUR 273 963 pursuant to UNSCR 1718 on one occasion in 2009. Since that time, no additional assets were identified and frozen in relation to this Resolution. This is not consistent with Austria’s identified PF risks. 635. As a national security and intelligence service, the DSN has adequate intelligence gathering and investigative powers. It employs both preventive and investigative measures to combat circumvention of PF-related TFS. 636. With a view to detect PF-related activities, Austria has an inspection regime for the export of dual-use goods. In application of this regime, the DSN and Customs stopped the export of sanctioned goods to DPRK on 12 occasions since 2020, and relevant goods and assets for a total estimated value of EUR 50 000 were seized. These cases were subsequently dismissed by the PPO or settled through a diversion by court. 637. The DSN’s systematic screening of data included in the company, beneficial ownership, land, and account registers against designations pursuant to UNSCR 1718 is a pertinent measure to identify sanctions evasion. This screening has not yet identified links to persons or entities designated under UNSCR 1718. Any matches with the UNSCR 1718 sanctions list would be reported to relevant local courts which are responsible for issuing freezing orders, just as DSN did for 21 cases related to autonomous EU sanctions. The Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority screens the data included in the Beneficial Ownership Register against UN and EU sanctions lists upon registration of a legal entity, when changes in beneficial ownership information and annual reports are filed, and, more generally, on a weekly basis. 638. The DSN has the capacity to investigate complex PF-related sanctions evasion schemes. Since 2020, in addition to the twelve cases mentioned above, the DSN reported a total of 49 cases because of circumvention of financial sanctions to the PPO. These 49 cases were mainly related to UNSCR 2231 (2015). Although with no direct impact on effectiveness under IO.11 as assessed at the time of the on-site visit, these cases demonstrate that the DSN was able to identify, trace, and freeze funds and other assets for the benefit of persons and entities engaged in proliferation of WMD or designated under other UN sanctions regimes, including through very effective domestic and international cooperation, extensive use of financial intelligence (including information from the beneficial ownership register) and comprehensive financial flow analysis. Concrete examples demonstrating complex financial investigations identifying PF sanctions evasion schemes, including but not limited to the DPRK, were presented during the onsite visit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="162. Austria effectively established formal domestic cooperation and coordination mechanisms, including to enhance the development and implementation of policies. The formal mechanisms described below constitute crucial efforts for policy coordination. 163. Austria established the NCC which, under the leadership of the BMF, has played a fundamental role in advancing key AML/CFT measures. Those include the coordination of the NRAs, the National Strategy, and related Action Plan, as well as other initiatives to develop legislation to improve compliance with international standards (e.g. AML/CFT preventive measures, legislation to ensure transparency of LPs and LAs, and recent improvements to the TFS legal framework). The NCC is chaired by the BMF and comprises members from BMJ, BMI, BMEIA, BMWET, FMA, and OeNB. Through their membership, these ministries represent various AML/CFT/CPF competences and authorities. In some cases, ministries delegate NCC representation to competent authorities within their remit (i.e., BMI delegated to A-FIU and DSN). The NCC meets around three times a year and covers international, EU and national strategic and policy matters. 164. The NCC’s functioning does not currently include stakeholders from all ministries and competent authorities with sufficient technical experience and decision-making authority. This does not allow for consistent commitment and input from all relevant authorities. The current high-level representation at ministry level does not ensure that practical and technical AML/CFT expertise, which the NCC needs to meet its objectives, is available. Furthermore, the representatives to the NCC might not have the decision-making authority, which, at times, results in unnecessary delays and inconsistent input in policy development or implementation. These challenges became evident during the various NRA exercises and the elaboration of the AML/CFT Strategy. 165. Building on the NRA, the NCC should be used for collective and bilateral policy and operational coordination and feedback. National accountability mechanisms to ensure consistency in the members’ inputs, outputs and commitments are currently limited and would contribute to further increase the effectiveness of the Austrian AML/CFT system. The NCC provides the institutional basis for an excellent policy and operational platform for agencies to build on the risk understanding and develop, monitor and mutually agree on joint objectives, annual performance, and collaboration or output targets between authorities, collectively and bilaterally. As the risk assessment changes over time, said arrangements and the collective regular feedback can support maintaining the common understanding of emerging ML/TF risks that the country is facing (as well as filling the gaps in the current risk understanding)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="162. Austria effectively established formal domestic cooperation and coordination mechanisms, including to enhance the development and implementation of policies. The formal mechanisms described below constitute crucial efforts for policy coordination. 163. Austria established the NCC which, under the leadership of the BMF, has played a fundamental role in advancing key AML/CFT measures. Those include the coordination of the NRAs, the National Strategy, and related Action Plan, as well as other initiatives to develop legislation to improve compliance with international standards (e.g. AML/CFT preventive measures, legislation to ensure transparency of LPs and LAs, and recent improvements to the TFS legal framework). The NCC is chaired by the BMF and comprises members from BMJ, BMI, BMEIA, BMWET, FMA, and OeNB. Through their membership, these ministries represent various AML/CFT/CPF competences and authorities. In some cases, ministries delegate NCC representation to competent authorities within their remit (i.e., BMI delegated to A-FIU and DSN). The NCC meets around three times a year and covers international, EU and national strategic and policy matters. 164. The NCC’s functioning does not currently include stakeholders from all ministries and competent authorities with sufficient technical experience and decision-making authority. This does not allow for consistent commitment and input from all relevant authorities. The current high-level representation at ministry level does not ensure that practical and technical AML/CFT expertise, which the NCC needs to meet its objectives, is available. Furthermore, the representatives to the NCC might not have the decision-making authority, which, at times, results in unnecessary delays and inconsistent input in policy development or implementation. These challenges became evident during the various NRA exercises and the elaboration of the AML/CFT Strategy. 165. Building on the NRA, the NCC should be used for collective and bilateral policy and operational coordination and feedback. National accountability mechanisms to ensure consistency in the members’ inputs, outputs and commitments are currently limited and would contribute to further increase the effectiveness of the Austrian AML/CFT system. The NCC provides the institutional basis for an excellent policy and operational platform for agencies to build on the risk understanding and develop, monitor and mutually agree on joint objectives, annual performance, and collaboration or output targets between authorities, collectively and bilaterally. As the risk assessment changes over time, said arrangements and the collective regular feedback can support maintaining the common understanding of emerging ML/TF risks that the country is facing (as well as filling the gaps in the current risk understanding)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="285. The FMA has a data-driven supervisory framework combining onsite and offsite engagements to monitor and supervise compliance of FIs and VASPs. This approach is risk-based to a moderate extent due to the limitations in its model as described above and based on the following findings. 286. The FMA engages with its OEs based on the outcomes of the RAT, for which a dashboard provides an overview of all relevant risk information of each OE. This includes information on the overall residual ML/TF risk category and sub-risks, and planned and ongoing engagements, while it allows for peer comparisons, trend analysis, and a sectoral overview. Major events or developments in the management of the OE potentially impacting the entity’s risk profile are reflected when reported or identified during engagements. The FMA’s supervisory approach is modified as necessary. 287. The dashboard supports the data-driven and risk-based selection and planning of supervisory engagements. The dashboard has an integrated planning tool allowing to select OEs based on weights selected for their score on particular risk factors, materiality and context. The FMA firstly considers risk when selecting OEs for engagement, while it additionally considers institutional size; sectoral criteria to ensure diversification, and cross-checks among all sub-sectors and not only rely on the same OEs; regional criteria; and supervisory perceptions (e.g., findings from prudential supervision). These principles cannot overrule the risk principle but are only added following risk assessment and categorisation under the tool. However, given the limited selection of high-risk CIs for onsite inspections and examinations, this seems to work out somewhat differently in practice. 288. The FMA effectively uses different onsite and offsite supervisory tools to engage with FIs and VASPs, and to supervise their AML/CFT compliance to a varying extent. These tools can be grouped into onsite engagements and offsite investigative proceedings. Onsite engagements as defined by the FMA include onsite inspections, onsite examinations, and management talks. i. Onsite inspections last between one to three weeks (depending on type of OE and scope) and seek to provide a more thorough systemic analysis of the quality of OE's AML/CFT set-up and application in practice. Thematic focus areas may apply (e.g., groupwide compliance, specific groups of customers, business risk assessment, personnel resources). Their adequacy is assessed against the entity’s ML/TF risk, and FMA staff takes sample cases of customer files and transaction records and conducts in-depth interviews. ii. Onsite examinations (or: spot checks) consist of a short meeting with management and compliance staff of an OE to gain an understanding of the set-up of (elements of) its AML/CFT framework. FMA staff do not conduct sample testing of customer files or transactions but may request additional information/documents on a case-by-case basis. iii. Management talks focus on AML/CFT strategy and procedures, strategic and other key topics tailored to the respective OE or its management. The FMA organises them on an ad hoc basis in response to horizontal issues in relation to specific risks (e.g., through whistleblower submissions, media reports, other supervisory perceptions). A management talk may also be conducted as a follow-up to previous onsite inspections or examinations, or proceedings to restore legal compliance. Such talks take the form of a bilateral exchange, or as a broader forum for exchange with multiple OEs. Recent topics included virtual IBANs, online identification, and PEP identification. 289. A further increase in AML/CFT supervisory staff at the FMA is needed to respond to current challenges and foreseen developments . Staffing of the FMA’s AML/CFT division is set to increase in the next year to ensure an adequate and effective allocation of human resources for future supervision of the sector. The FMA’s AML/CFT division currently has 33.15 FTE which has gradually increased from 13.25 in 2016. In anticipation of the implementation of the new EU AML/CFT framework and the gradual takeover of new duties in the monitoring of TFS and other international financial sanctions starting in 2026, the number of FTE is expected to further increase gradually to 44.25. Given the size of the sectors, the different AML/CFT tasks from market entry to remediation and considering a necessary shift towards extending the number of onsite inspections and targeting more higher-risk OEs annually, a further increase in AML/CFT supervisory FTEs at the FMA should be considered." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="285. The FMA has a data-driven supervisory framework combining onsite and offsite engagements to monitor and supervise compliance of FIs and VASPs. This approach is risk-based to a moderate extent due to the limitations in its model as described above and based on the following findings. 286. The FMA engages with its OEs based on the outcomes of the RAT, for which a dashboard provides an overview of all relevant risk information of each OE. This includes information on the overall residual ML/TF risk category and sub-risks, and planned and ongoing engagements, while it allows for peer comparisons, trend analysis, and a sectoral overview. Major events or developments in the management of the OE potentially impacting the entity’s risk profile are reflected when reported or identified during engagements. The FMA’s supervisory approach is modified as necessary. 287. The dashboard supports the data-driven and risk-based selection and planning of supervisory engagements. The dashboard has an integrated planning tool allowing to select OEs based on weights selected for their score on particular risk factors, materiality and context. The FMA firstly considers risk when selecting OEs for engagement, while it additionally considers institutional size; sectoral criteria to ensure diversification, and cross-checks among all sub-sectors and not only rely on the same OEs; regional criteria; and supervisory perceptions (e.g., findings from prudential supervision). These principles cannot overrule the risk principle but are only added following risk assessment and categorisation under the tool. However, given the limited selection of high-risk CIs for onsite inspections and examinations, this seems to work out somewhat differently in practice. 288. The FMA effectively uses different onsite and offsite supervisory tools to engage with FIs and VASPs, and to supervise their AML/CFT compliance to a varying extent. These tools can be grouped into onsite engagements and offsite investigative proceedings. Onsite engagements as defined by the FMA include onsite inspections, onsite examinations, and management talks. i. Onsite inspections last between one to three weeks (depending on type of OE and scope) and seek to provide a more thorough systemic analysis of the quality of OE's AML/CFT set-up and application in practice. Thematic focus areas may apply (e.g., groupwide compliance, specific groups of customers, business risk assessment, personnel resources). Their adequacy is assessed against the entity’s ML/TF risk, and FMA staff takes sample cases of customer files and transaction records and conducts in-depth interviews. ii. Onsite examinations (or: spot checks) consist of a short meeting with management and compliance staff of an OE to gain an understanding of the set-up of (elements of) its AML/CFT framework. FMA staff do not conduct sample testing of customer files or transactions but may request additional information/documents on a case-by-case basis. iii. Management talks focus on AML/CFT strategy and procedures, strategic and other key topics tailored to the respective OE or its management. The FMA organises them on an ad hoc basis in response to horizontal issues in relation to specific risks (e.g., through whistleblower submissions, media reports, other supervisory perceptions). A management talk may also be conducted as a follow-up to previous onsite inspections or examinations, or proceedings to restore legal compliance. Such talks take the form of a bilateral exchange, or as a broader forum for exchange with multiple OEs. Recent topics included virtual IBANs, online identification, and PEP identification. 289. A further increase in AML/CFT supervisory staff at the FMA is needed to respond to current challenges and foreseen developments . Staffing of the FMA’s AML/CFT division is set to increase in the next year to ensure an adequate and effective allocation of human resources for future supervision of the sector. The FMA’s AML/CFT division currently has 33.15 FTE which has gradually increased from 13.25 in 2016. In anticipation of the implementation of the new EU AML/CFT framework and the gradual takeover of new duties in the monitoring of TFS and other international financial sanctions starting in 2026, the number of FTE is expected to further increase gradually to 44.25. Given the size of the sectors, the different AML/CFT tasks from market entry to remediation and considering a necessary shift towards extending the number of onsite inspections and targeting more higher-risk OEs annually, a further increase in AML/CFT supervisory FTEs at the FMA should be considered." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="352. Most DNFBP supervisors have only very recently started to develop a risk-based supervisory approach based on relevant risk factors for each supervised sector. Casino supervisors present a more established approach, followed by notaries, lawyers and accountants. For the real estate, TCSP (other than tax advisors) and DPMS sectors, off- and onsite supervisory actions have considered AML/CFT issues since at least 2020, but these did not reflect a consolidated approach among the different regional supervisory authorities and were not based on adequate entity-level risk assessments. 353. To implement a risk-based supervisory approach, the real estate, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS sectors have been receiving technical support on risk-based supervision from the Council of Europe [60] since 2023. The project has developed a risk-based supervision manual, an entity-level risk assessment questionnaire to provide guidance on the conduct of inspections of real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS in Austria and organised several training and outreach sessions. 354. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, a consistent and adequate supervisory strategy is still emerging among the 94 local district authorities [61] overseeing these sectors. Common guidelines and manuals for supervisory actions have recently been completed. Collection (at the national level) of relevant information on risks and controls is needed to promote a consistent approach between sectors, but also within each supervised sector and district. Information provided in these documents on the supervisory approach to the different DNFBP sectors is however very high-level and does not demonstrate that supervisory actions and allocation of resources are commensurate with the size, complexity, and impact of the entity or activity supervised (tables 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13). 355. Due to a lack of specific data on the different sectors and of the different supervised districts, supervisors, which represent a very fragmented framework, are missing contextual insights to justify which supervisory actions should be taken and by which supervisor. Real estate agents are considered the highest risk sector by supervisors, as they were identified as such by the FIU. The supervisory strategy defined at the BMWET ministerial level merely highlights the need to prioritise higher-risk entities for supervisory action and sets out that the different districts are responsible for allocating resources to onsite and offsite supervision. At the district level, information on supervisory planning indicates that supervisors should focus on staff training, CDD, and DNFBPs’ registration with the goAML platform. The indicative duration of onsite and offsite checks proposed by the BMWET supervisory strategy for 2024 for district trade authorities for onsite and offsite checks is indicated as up to 16 and 4 hours, respectively, however, at least one regional authority’s supervisory plan indicative duration for an onsite audit is up to 4 hours. While this may be sufficient for conducting surface-level compliance checks on lower risk entities, it is not adequate to guarantee in-depth analysis and adequately cover risk identification and prevention, such as assessing the adequacy of internal controls, reviewing complex documentation or follow complex audit trails connected to higher-risk clients or transactions. 356. Supervisors of casinos demonstrated the most developed approach to risk-based supervision. They collect monthly statistics on the casinos’ activities and risk and carry out frequent onsite inspections throughout the year, which include, but are not solely dedicated to, AML/CFT issues. Supervisors of notaries and lawyers do not collect specific information on ML/TF risks or conduct offsite actions; however, they regularly perform general audits (onsite), which include, but are not solely dedicated to, AML/CFT issues. 357. Supervisors of notaries, lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities, and accountants demonstrated a good level of coordination at the national level with regard to supervisory strategies. They apply a similar methodology among different districts and exchange information between the different district authorities within each DNFBP sector. This coordination is recent though and information collected at a national level on intrinsic risk and the quality of controls of OEs needs to be improved, to correctly identify which districts or entities represent a higher risk and to allocate adequate supervisory resources. 358. Most DNFBP supervisors do not have mechanisms in place to ensure that all higher-risk entities are effectively identified and are subject to regular supervision. An individual risk rating is lacking for most DNFBPs (notaries, lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) and where it exists – for real estate agents, other TCSPs, DPMS, and accountants—the methodology used is not clear and does not provide adequate, actionable results for the supervisors (e.g., higher-risk entities are not identified). Most supervisory authorities rely on self-reported information to inform their supervisory approach. Except for casino supervisors, which collect adequate and detailed information, and supervisors of notaries and lawyers, which consider additional information when performing onsite supervision, monitoring and supervision of most DNFBP sectors is over-reliant on self-assessment questionnaires distributed to the OEs. As for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, only a part of the OEs is targeted by such questionnaires. 359. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, the authorities provided limited case studies of very recent onsite supervisory actions, which did not demonstrate effective risk-based supervision. Except for one case presented from 2023, all other cases stem from 2024 and include different subsectors such as real estate agents. The cases do not contain information justifying selection of entities and related supervisory actions, e.g., entity risk profiles and risk assessments of the different sectors are lacking. Shortcomings identified are described at a very high-level (e.g., a lack of risk assessments, or insufficient CDD, including PEP identification), lacking a description of the findings’ gravity or seriousness. Only three findings were noted (failure to check for PEP status, origin of funds and identity verification) and outcomes of the supervisory actions were limited to the conclusion that the entity improved its risk-based approach. This indicates that the supervisory strategy and methodology need substantial improvements. 360. Supervisors are focusing on the existence of basic compliance procedures, without a specific assessment of ML/TF risks connected to high-risk clients or transactions. The authorities did not present any supervisory actions (onsite or offsite) related to complex ML/TF cases, e.g., related to complex legal structures or fraudulent companies. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, authorities were not able to demonstrate that higher-risk entities are adequately identified and monitored regularly in line with their risk profile. The lack of complex supervisory actions connected to higher-risk entities also highlights the need for supervisory coverage of all relevant sectors. 361. With the exception of the casino sector, DNFBP supervisors do not conduct thematic or targeted supervisory actions. When AML/CFT audits (e.g., of notaries) or offsite and onsite supervisory actions are conducted (e.g., for public chartered accountants), these focus on simple compliance issues such as customer identification and identification of PEPs. They do not take into consideration specific risks related to the sector or to the specific OE subject to the supervisory action. 362. DNFBP supervisors, except for casinos, are not able to detect systemic and serious infringements, nor to collect granular data on the nature and gravity of findings. Supervisors, although without the adequate granularity, are, however able to detect and provide information on the most common compliance breaches. Table 4.2. Number of offsite examinations conducted (2019–2024) Sector 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents 2 423 69 2 756 291 2 681 1 019 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) [62] 2 744 498 7 563 1 320 5 636 4 396 DPMS (including DHVG [63] ) 2 614 435 7 518 418 5 369 4 932 Notaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lawyers - 0 0 0 0 0 Chartered public accountants and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services [64] - - - - 157 167 Private accountancy professionals - 0 7 0 78 0 Casinos 600 542 436 647 601 600 Total 8 381 1 544 18 280 2 676 14 522 11 114 Table 4.3. Number of onsite examinations conducted (2019–2024) Sector 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents 100 42 0 105 285 526 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) 85 14 119 90 303 425 DPMS (including DHVG) 270 80 119 177 348 662 Notaries 86 60 85 173 86 78 Lawyers - 963 1 216 4 658 1 630 - Chartered public accountants and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services [65] - - - - 40 56 Private accountancy professionals - 0 0 0 0 0 Casinos - 89 56 168 286 249 Total 541 1 248 1 595 5 371 2 978 1 996 Note: Data in tables 4.2 and 4.3 as provided by the supervisory authorities. Data does not contain information on the duration and scope of all off- and onsite engagements. 363. Supervisory examinations of the DNFBP sector are not commensurate with the size, complexity, and impact of the entity or activity supervised. Relative to the size of the total DNFBP sector of 90 981 entities in 2024, supervisory authorities conducted 9 328 offsite examinations (corresponding to approximately 10% of the DNFBP sector) and 1 647 onsite examinations (corresponding to approximately 1.8% of the DNFBP sector) in 2024. The number of offsite and onsite examinations has fluctuated over the years, with a decline in 2024 compared to 2023. Regarding the higher-risk sectors, only 8% of real estate agents and 1% of TCSPs (other than tax advisors) and 3% of DPMS have been subjected to an onsite examination in 2024. 364. Supervisory resources available vary considerably between authorities and across most sectors the majority of the resources are not exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT . With regards to real estate agents, all types of TCSPs, DPMS, and accountancy professionals, the number of human resources within the supervisory authorities is low compared to the number of OEs (table 4.13). Table 4.4. Supervisory human resources for AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs Type of DNFBP Number of OEs Supervisory Human Resources Real estate agents 6 304 17.5 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) 36 621 DPMS 23 961 TCSPs (tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) 9 061 1.5 plus additional 19 ad hoc available to conduct onsite inspections (together with chartered public accountants) Lawyers 7,138 145 Notaries 540 notaries, 671 notarial candidates (July 2025) 143 (97 revisors, 46 revision assistants) Chartered public accountants 3 064 1.5 plus additional 19 ad hoc available to conduct onsite inspections (together with tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) Private accountancy professionals (§ 1 BiBuG 2014) 4 279 1, supported by 8 AML/CFT committee members. 22 external reviewers available to conduct onsite inspections Casinos 12 land-based casinos, 1 online casino 3.5 Footnotes [60] Under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) project “Regional and local authorities—enhancing quality of public administration and cooperation, preventing of money laundering and terrorism financing in Austria.” The project started on 1 September 2023 and is projected to last for 24 months. ( Technical Support Instrument (TSI) Programme - Austria - Economic Crime and Cooperation Division ) [61] In the states of Vorarlberg, Styria, and Upper Austria these have been concentrated into one authority. [62] These numbers include business consultants not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of consultants. [63] DHVG fall outside of the scope of FATF standard, however the authorities do not disaggregate data between DPMS and DHVG. [64] These numbers include tax advisors not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of tax advisors. [65] These numbers include tax advisors not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of tax advisors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="352. Most DNFBP supervisors have only very recently started to develop a risk-based supervisory approach based on relevant risk factors for each supervised sector. Casino supervisors present a more established approach, followed by notaries, lawyers and accountants. For the real estate, TCSP (other than tax advisors) and DPMS sectors, off- and onsite supervisory actions have considered AML/CFT issues since at least 2020, but these did not reflect a consolidated approach among the different regional supervisory authorities and were not based on adequate entity-level risk assessments. 353. To implement a risk-based supervisory approach, the real estate, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS sectors have been receiving technical support on risk-based supervision from the Council of Europe [60] since 2023. The project has developed a risk-based supervision manual, an entity-level risk assessment questionnaire to provide guidance on the conduct of inspections of real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS in Austria and organised several training and outreach sessions. 354. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, a consistent and adequate supervisory strategy is still emerging among the 94 local district authorities [61] overseeing these sectors. Common guidelines and manuals for supervisory actions have recently been completed. Collection (at the national level) of relevant information on risks and controls is needed to promote a consistent approach between sectors, but also within each supervised sector and district. Information provided in these documents on the supervisory approach to the different DNFBP sectors is however very high-level and does not demonstrate that supervisory actions and allocation of resources are commensurate with the size, complexity, and impact of the entity or activity supervised (tables 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13). 355. Due to a lack of specific data on the different sectors and of the different supervised districts, supervisors, which represent a very fragmented framework, are missing contextual insights to justify which supervisory actions should be taken and by which supervisor. Real estate agents are considered the highest risk sector by supervisors, as they were identified as such by the FIU. The supervisory strategy defined at the BMWET ministerial level merely highlights the need to prioritise higher-risk entities for supervisory action and sets out that the different districts are responsible for allocating resources to onsite and offsite supervision. At the district level, information on supervisory planning indicates that supervisors should focus on staff training, CDD, and DNFBPs’ registration with the goAML platform. The indicative duration of onsite and offsite checks proposed by the BMWET supervisory strategy for 2024 for district trade authorities for onsite and offsite checks is indicated as up to 16 and 4 hours, respectively, however, at least one regional authority’s supervisory plan indicative duration for an onsite audit is up to 4 hours. While this may be sufficient for conducting surface-level compliance checks on lower risk entities, it is not adequate to guarantee in-depth analysis and adequately cover risk identification and prevention, such as assessing the adequacy of internal controls, reviewing complex documentation or follow complex audit trails connected to higher-risk clients or transactions. 356. Supervisors of casinos demonstrated the most developed approach to risk-based supervision. They collect monthly statistics on the casinos’ activities and risk and carry out frequent onsite inspections throughout the year, which include, but are not solely dedicated to, AML/CFT issues. Supervisors of notaries and lawyers do not collect specific information on ML/TF risks or conduct offsite actions; however, they regularly perform general audits (onsite), which include, but are not solely dedicated to, AML/CFT issues. 357. Supervisors of notaries, lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP activities, and accountants demonstrated a good level of coordination at the national level with regard to supervisory strategies. They apply a similar methodology among different districts and exchange information between the different district authorities within each DNFBP sector. This coordination is recent though and information collected at a national level on intrinsic risk and the quality of controls of OEs needs to be improved, to correctly identify which districts or entities represent a higher risk and to allocate adequate supervisory resources. 358. Most DNFBP supervisors do not have mechanisms in place to ensure that all higher-risk entities are effectively identified and are subject to regular supervision. An individual risk rating is lacking for most DNFBPs (notaries, lawyers, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) and where it exists – for real estate agents, other TCSPs, DPMS, and accountants—the methodology used is not clear and does not provide adequate, actionable results for the supervisors (e.g., higher-risk entities are not identified). Most supervisory authorities rely on self-reported information to inform their supervisory approach. Except for casino supervisors, which collect adequate and detailed information, and supervisors of notaries and lawyers, which consider additional information when performing onsite supervision, monitoring and supervision of most DNFBP sectors is over-reliant on self-assessment questionnaires distributed to the OEs. As for real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, only a part of the OEs is targeted by such questionnaires. 359. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, the authorities provided limited case studies of very recent onsite supervisory actions, which did not demonstrate effective risk-based supervision. Except for one case presented from 2023, all other cases stem from 2024 and include different subsectors such as real estate agents. The cases do not contain information justifying selection of entities and related supervisory actions, e.g., entity risk profiles and risk assessments of the different sectors are lacking. Shortcomings identified are described at a very high-level (e.g., a lack of risk assessments, or insufficient CDD, including PEP identification), lacking a description of the findings’ gravity or seriousness. Only three findings were noted (failure to check for PEP status, origin of funds and identity verification) and outcomes of the supervisory actions were limited to the conclusion that the entity improved its risk-based approach. This indicates that the supervisory strategy and methodology need substantial improvements. 360. Supervisors are focusing on the existence of basic compliance procedures, without a specific assessment of ML/TF risks connected to high-risk clients or transactions. The authorities did not present any supervisory actions (onsite or offsite) related to complex ML/TF cases, e.g., related to complex legal structures or fraudulent companies. For real estate agents, TCSPs (other than tax advisors), and DPMS, authorities were not able to demonstrate that higher-risk entities are adequately identified and monitored regularly in line with their risk profile. The lack of complex supervisory actions connected to higher-risk entities also highlights the need for supervisory coverage of all relevant sectors. 361. With the exception of the casino sector, DNFBP supervisors do not conduct thematic or targeted supervisory actions. When AML/CFT audits (e.g., of notaries) or offsite and onsite supervisory actions are conducted (e.g., for public chartered accountants), these focus on simple compliance issues such as customer identification and identification of PEPs. They do not take into consideration specific risks related to the sector or to the specific OE subject to the supervisory action. 362. DNFBP supervisors, except for casinos, are not able to detect systemic and serious infringements, nor to collect granular data on the nature and gravity of findings. Supervisors, although without the adequate granularity, are, however able to detect and provide information on the most common compliance breaches. Table 4.2. Number of offsite examinations conducted (2019–2024) Sector 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents 2 423 69 2 756 291 2 681 1 019 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) [62] 2 744 498 7 563 1 320 5 636 4 396 DPMS (including DHVG [63] ) 2 614 435 7 518 418 5 369 4 932 Notaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lawyers - 0 0 0 0 0 Chartered public accountants and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services [64] - - - - 157 167 Private accountancy professionals - 0 7 0 78 0 Casinos 600 542 436 647 601 600 Total 8 381 1 544 18 280 2 676 14 522 11 114 Table 4.3. Number of onsite examinations conducted (2019–2024) Sector 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real Estate Agents 100 42 0 105 285 526 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) 85 14 119 90 303 425 DPMS (including DHVG) 270 80 119 177 348 662 Notaries 86 60 85 173 86 78 Lawyers - 963 1 216 4 658 1 630 - Chartered public accountants and tax advisors undertaking TCSP services [65] - - - - 40 56 Private accountancy professionals - 0 0 0 0 0 Casinos - 89 56 168 286 249 Total 541 1 248 1 595 5 371 2 978 1 996 Note: Data in tables 4.2 and 4.3 as provided by the supervisory authorities. Data does not contain information on the duration and scope of all off- and onsite engagements. 363. Supervisory examinations of the DNFBP sector are not commensurate with the size, complexity, and impact of the entity or activity supervised. Relative to the size of the total DNFBP sector of 90 981 entities in 2024, supervisory authorities conducted 9 328 offsite examinations (corresponding to approximately 10% of the DNFBP sector) and 1 647 onsite examinations (corresponding to approximately 1.8% of the DNFBP sector) in 2024. The number of offsite and onsite examinations has fluctuated over the years, with a decline in 2024 compared to 2023. Regarding the higher-risk sectors, only 8% of real estate agents and 1% of TCSPs (other than tax advisors) and 3% of DPMS have been subjected to an onsite examination in 2024. 364. Supervisory resources available vary considerably between authorities and across most sectors the majority of the resources are not exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT . With regards to real estate agents, all types of TCSPs, DPMS, and accountancy professionals, the number of human resources within the supervisory authorities is low compared to the number of OEs (table 4.13). Table 4.4. Supervisory human resources for AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs Type of DNFBP Number of OEs Supervisory Human Resources Real estate agents 6 304 17.5 TCSPs (other than tax advisors) 36 621 DPMS 23 961 TCSPs (tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) 9 061 1.5 plus additional 19 ad hoc available to conduct onsite inspections (together with chartered public accountants) Lawyers 7,138 145 Notaries 540 notaries, 671 notarial candidates (July 2025) 143 (97 revisors, 46 revision assistants) Chartered public accountants 3 064 1.5 plus additional 19 ad hoc available to conduct onsite inspections (together with tax advisors undertaking TCSP services) Private accountancy professionals (§ 1 BiBuG 2014) 4 279 1, supported by 8 AML/CFT committee members. 22 external reviewers available to conduct onsite inspections Casinos 12 land-based casinos, 1 online casino 3.5 Footnotes [60] Under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) project “Regional and local authorities—enhancing quality of public administration and cooperation, preventing of money laundering and terrorism financing in Austria.” The project started on 1 September 2023 and is projected to last for 24 months. ( Technical Support Instrument (TSI) Programme - Austria - Economic Crime and Cooperation Division ) [61] In the states of Vorarlberg, Styria, and Upper Austria these have been concentrated into one authority. [62] These numbers include business consultants not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of consultants. [63] DHVG fall outside of the scope of FATF standard, however the authorities do not disaggregate data between DPMS and DHVG. [64] These numbers include tax advisors not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of tax advisors. [65] These numbers include tax advisors not providing TCSPs services, as the authorities do not differentiate between the different kinds of tax advisors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Sanctions for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting requirements 420. Compliance with the obligation to report beneficial ownership information is ensured on an ongoing basis through the implementation of automated fines. If a report is not filed within the deadline—either within 28 days for a newly established legal entity or within 28 days after the annual reporting obligation—then the competent tax office automatically sends a reminder letter with the threat of a fine of EUR 1 000. If the legal entity fails to report as per the reminder, the fine will be set, and a warning with a higher penalty of EUR 4 000 is imposed. If the LP or foreign LA still fails to report within the given deadline, the penalty of EUR 4 000 will be imposed, and the case will be forwarded to the fiscal authority, which can sanction the legal entity for fiscal offences and impose administrative fines up to EUR 200 000 based on Art. 15 WiEReG. 421. The approach to sanctions implemented by Austria illustrates that proportionate sanctions are in place depending on the severity and the continuity of the breach. Legal entities are explicitly warned that failure to comply with their beneficial ownership reporting obligations would expose them to administrative sanctions and possible referral to the fiscal authority and its financial police, which are empowered to impose heavier sanctions. Ultimately, the automated sanctions imposed, coupled with the credible threat of referral to the fiscal authority, have clearly had a dissuasive effect on legal entities, prompting them to comply proactively, thereby reducing the need for additional and heavier sanctions. Table 5.5. Warnings and coercive penalties for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting requirements 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Warnings of Impending Penalties 33 717 - 27 469 - 24 382 - 21 958 - Penalty 1 (EUR 1 000) 3 592 3 592 000 2 519 2 519 000 2 884 2 884 000 2 452 2 452 000 Penalty 2 (EUR 4 000) 870 3 480 000 832 3 328 000 798 3 192 000 1 266 5 064 000 Total 7 072 000 5 847 000 6 076 000 7 516 000 Table 5.6. Charges and penalties in financial criminal proceedings for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership requirements including intentional filing of incorrect or incomplete reports 2021 2022 2023 2024 No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR Charges brought against legal entities and related natural persons regarding breaches of the reporting obligations 73 404 500 207 1 022 950 131 738 800 150 1 192 900 Charges brought against natural persons for violations of the reporting obligations (sub-set of line 1 above) 54 362 000 68 676 900 422. Consistent application of the automated penalty procedure and the initiation of fiscal proceedings led to significant improved compliance with reporting obligations. The reporting rate of the legal entities subject to reporting increased to over 98.5% in 2025. Implementation manuals and guidelines, sample templates, and FAQs support the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, the competent tax offices, and the Anti-Fraud Office with the implementation of the sanctioning provisions. In addition to the automated and coercive sanctions (paras 421-22 and Table 5.5), Austria’s Anti-Fraud Office within the Tax Authority is responsible for conducting financial criminal proceedings. In case of persistent failings after the coercive penalty procedure is exhausted, the legal entity will be placed on a list of offenders, which is processed by the Anti-Fraud Office. If an intentional violation of the reporting obligations is suspected, financial criminal proceedings are initiated by the Anti-Fraud Office within the Tax Office. More generally, in case the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority identifies an intentional violation of the reporting obligation (i.e., incorrect and/or incomplete reports), it refers the case to the Anti-Fraud Office because in line with legal requirements, fiscal penal proceedings must be initiated without prior enforcement of coercive penalty proceedings. As far as the fiscal criminal penalties are concerned, sanctions of a legal entity generally presuppose sanctions of the natural person. In cases where the natural person is sanctioned, the legal person is usually sanctioned as part of the same proceeding. [83] Most of the cases identified in Table 5.7 below relate to intentional violations of the reporting obligations by filing incorrect or incomplete reports. 423. The following two case examples illustrate the robust monitoring implemented by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and the application of proportionate sanctions when more serious breaches of the beneficial ownership reporting obligation are identified. · Case example 1: A report by a legal entity involved in the sale of other goods was chosen for a visual inspection under the risk-based case selection procedure. The report was categorised as high risk because a subsidiary report was made by top-level management stating that, after exhausting all possible measures, it had proven to be impossible for them to identify a beneficial owner for the company. Reports indicating that no beneficial owners could be identified are always classified as high risk. After the visual inspection, the legal entity was asked to submit documents so that the beneficial owners could be identified and verified. The comprehensive audit revealed that a stock company above the legal entity held the shares in trust for a natural person, which meant that the nominator should have been reported as the indirect beneficial owner. Since an inaccurate report had been submitted, and because this had resulted in a failure to disclose the beneficial owner of the entity concerned, there was a substantiated suspicion of a breach of reporting obligations. This led the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority to refer the case to the relevant fiscal penalty authority. · Case example 2: This case was initiated by a discrepancy report filed by an OE stating that one or more beneficial owners of an LLC had not been reported. To allow for an in-depth review, the Beneficial Ownership Authority requested documents from the legal entity. According to the Register of Companies, the sole legal owner was a foundation domiciled in Liechtenstein, with only one natural person disclosed as the beneficial owner. However, upon examination of the documents submitted by the legal entity, it quickly became clear that there were office-holders subject to reporting as well as a group of beneficiaries of the foundation. In addition, the officeholders (including beneficiaries) of another private foundation should have been disclosed because that private foundation was a co-founder of the Lichtenstein foundation. Due to the failure to disclose two founders, two members of the foundation board and group of beneficiaries, and the officeholders of the founding private foundation, the Registry Authority referred the case to the relevant fiscal penalty authority. Sanctions for failure to comply with the requirements to update basic information. Table 5.7. Overview of initial fines for failure to comply with the requirement to update basic information in the Company Register [84] Affected legal entities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Foreign AG 1 - 3 - 7 - 9 10 700 0 0 GmbH 6 - 14 - 14 - 20 17 700 17 13 100 KG 2 - 2 - 2 - 7 5 500 2 2 000 Domestic AG 2 - 0 - 5 - 10 16 500 7 12 700 GmbH 251 - 329 - 350 - 366 197 095 545 349 940 KG 256 - 178 - 235 - 452 176 640 319 179 220 OG 81 - 75 - 117 - 174 62 510 132 63 730 Gen 0 - 1 - 0 - 2 1 400 2 1 500 PSt 0 - 0 - 6 - 0 0 0 0 424. Fines are an effective tool to address compliance failures. In case of persistent failures to update basic information, additional fines are imposed, and these are always accompanied by a publication on the website used by the Company Register for informing the public. The number of such publications is limited, especially compared to the total number of registered legal entities, which suggests that compliance failures are addressed following the initial fine. Table 5.8. Overview of additional coercive fines for continued failure to comply with the requirement to update basic information in the Company Register accompanied by a publication on the website of the Company Register 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of affected legal entities 44 36 52 43 82 425. The authorities could not present statistics about fines imposed for non-compliance with the obligation to report changes in basic information to the Associations Register. Authorities indicated that compliance with the legal requirement is generally high as demonstrated by the finding that during the first six months of 2025, there were 20 838 changes in basic information of associations reported to the Associations Register. Footnotes [83] In financial criminal proceedings by the Anti-Fraud Office, as the Fiscal Authority for Fiscal Criminal Offences is responsible for conducting the oral proceedings and rendering the penalty decision, as well as for the execution of the penalty. If the penally amount exceeds EUR 33 000, an appraisal court (Federal Tax Court) of three members, chaired by a judge, shall be responsible for conducting the oral proceedings and rendering the decision. [84] For the years 2020 to February 2023, only the number of fines is available while since March 2023, data on the total amounts of fines imposed is also recorded." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Sanctions for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting requirements 420. Compliance with the obligation to report beneficial ownership information is ensured on an ongoing basis through the implementation of automated fines. If a report is not filed within the deadline—either within 28 days for a newly established legal entity or within 28 days after the annual reporting obligation—then the competent tax office automatically sends a reminder letter with the threat of a fine of EUR 1 000. If the legal entity fails to report as per the reminder, the fine will be set, and a warning with a higher penalty of EUR 4 000 is imposed. If the LP or foreign LA still fails to report within the given deadline, the penalty of EUR 4 000 will be imposed, and the case will be forwarded to the fiscal authority, which can sanction the legal entity for fiscal offences and impose administrative fines up to EUR 200 000 based on Art. 15 WiEReG. 421. The approach to sanctions implemented by Austria illustrates that proportionate sanctions are in place depending on the severity and the continuity of the breach. Legal entities are explicitly warned that failure to comply with their beneficial ownership reporting obligations would expose them to administrative sanctions and possible referral to the fiscal authority and its financial police, which are empowered to impose heavier sanctions. Ultimately, the automated sanctions imposed, coupled with the credible threat of referral to the fiscal authority, have clearly had a dissuasive effect on legal entities, prompting them to comply proactively, thereby reducing the need for additional and heavier sanctions. Table 5.5. Warnings and coercive penalties for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership reporting requirements 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Number Total value EUR Warnings of Impending Penalties 33 717 - 27 469 - 24 382 - 21 958 - Penalty 1 (EUR 1 000) 3 592 3 592 000 2 519 2 519 000 2 884 2 884 000 2 452 2 452 000 Penalty 2 (EUR 4 000) 870 3 480 000 832 3 328 000 798 3 192 000 1 266 5 064 000 Total 7 072 000 5 847 000 6 076 000 7 516 000 Table 5.6. Charges and penalties in financial criminal proceedings for failure to comply with the beneficial ownership requirements including intentional filing of incorrect or incomplete reports 2021 2022 2023 2024 No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR No. Total value EUR Charges brought against legal entities and related natural persons regarding breaches of the reporting obligations 73 404 500 207 1 022 950 131 738 800 150 1 192 900 Charges brought against natural persons for violations of the reporting obligations (sub-set of line 1 above) 54 362 000 68 676 900 422. Consistent application of the automated penalty procedure and the initiation of fiscal proceedings led to significant improved compliance with reporting obligations. The reporting rate of the legal entities subject to reporting increased to over 98.5% in 2025. Implementation manuals and guidelines, sample templates, and FAQs support the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority, the competent tax offices, and the Anti-Fraud Office with the implementation of the sanctioning provisions. In addition to the automated and coercive sanctions (paras 421-22 and Table 5.5), Austria’s Anti-Fraud Office within the Tax Authority is responsible for conducting financial criminal proceedings. In case of persistent failings after the coercive penalty procedure is exhausted, the legal entity will be placed on a list of offenders, which is processed by the Anti-Fraud Office. If an intentional violation of the reporting obligations is suspected, financial criminal proceedings are initiated by the Anti-Fraud Office within the Tax Office. More generally, in case the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority identifies an intentional violation of the reporting obligation (i.e., incorrect and/or incomplete reports), it refers the case to the Anti-Fraud Office because in line with legal requirements, fiscal penal proceedings must be initiated without prior enforcement of coercive penalty proceedings. As far as the fiscal criminal penalties are concerned, sanctions of a legal entity generally presuppose sanctions of the natural person. In cases where the natural person is sanctioned, the legal person is usually sanctioned as part of the same proceeding. [83] Most of the cases identified in Table 5.7 below relate to intentional violations of the reporting obligations by filing incorrect or incomplete reports. 423. The following two case examples illustrate the robust monitoring implemented by the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority and the application of proportionate sanctions when more serious breaches of the beneficial ownership reporting obligation are identified. · Case example 1: A report by a legal entity involved in the sale of other goods was chosen for a visual inspection under the risk-based case selection procedure. The report was categorised as high risk because a subsidiary report was made by top-level management stating that, after exhausting all possible measures, it had proven to be impossible for them to identify a beneficial owner for the company. Reports indicating that no beneficial owners could be identified are always classified as high risk. After the visual inspection, the legal entity was asked to submit documents so that the beneficial owners could be identified and verified. The comprehensive audit revealed that a stock company above the legal entity held the shares in trust for a natural person, which meant that the nominator should have been reported as the indirect beneficial owner. Since an inaccurate report had been submitted, and because this had resulted in a failure to disclose the beneficial owner of the entity concerned, there was a substantiated suspicion of a breach of reporting obligations. This led the Beneficial Ownership Registry Authority to refer the case to the relevant fiscal penalty authority. · Case example 2: This case was initiated by a discrepancy report filed by an OE stating that one or more beneficial owners of an LLC had not been reported. To allow for an in-depth review, the Beneficial Ownership Authority requested documents from the legal entity. According to the Register of Companies, the sole legal owner was a foundation domiciled in Liechtenstein, with only one natural person disclosed as the beneficial owner. However, upon examination of the documents submitted by the legal entity, it quickly became clear that there were office-holders subject to reporting as well as a group of beneficiaries of the foundation. In addition, the officeholders (including beneficiaries) of another private foundation should have been disclosed because that private foundation was a co-founder of the Lichtenstein foundation. Due to the failure to disclose two founders, two members of the foundation board and group of beneficiaries, and the officeholders of the founding private foundation, the Registry Authority referred the case to the relevant fiscal penalty authority. Sanctions for failure to comply with the requirements to update basic information. Table 5.7. Overview of initial fines for failure to comply with the requirement to update basic information in the Company Register [84] Affected legal entities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Number of fines Amount of fines Foreign AG 1 - 3 - 7 - 9 10 700 0 0 GmbH 6 - 14 - 14 - 20 17 700 17 13 100 KG 2 - 2 - 2 - 7 5 500 2 2 000 Domestic AG 2 - 0 - 5 - 10 16 500 7 12 700 GmbH 251 - 329 - 350 - 366 197 095 545 349 940 KG 256 - 178 - 235 - 452 176 640 319 179 220 OG 81 - 75 - 117 - 174 62 510 132 63 730 Gen 0 - 1 - 0 - 2 1 400 2 1 500 PSt 0 - 0 - 6 - 0 0 0 0 424. Fines are an effective tool to address compliance failures. In case of persistent failures to update basic information, additional fines are imposed, and these are always accompanied by a publication on the website used by the Company Register for informing the public. The number of such publications is limited, especially compared to the total number of registered legal entities, which suggests that compliance failures are addressed following the initial fine. Table 5.8. Overview of additional coercive fines for continued failure to comply with the requirement to update basic information in the Company Register accompanied by a publication on the website of the Company Register 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of affected legal entities 44 36 52 43 82 425. The authorities could not present statistics about fines imposed for non-compliance with the obligation to report changes in basic information to the Associations Register. Authorities indicated that compliance with the legal requirement is generally high as demonstrated by the finding that during the first six months of 2025, there were 20 838 changes in basic information of associations reported to the Associations Register. Footnotes [83] In financial criminal proceedings by the Anti-Fraud Office, as the Fiscal Authority for Fiscal Criminal Offences is responsible for conducting the oral proceedings and rendering the penalty decision, as well as for the execution of the penalty. If the penally amount exceeds EUR 33 000, an appraisal court (Federal Tax Court) of three members, chaired by a judge, shall be responsible for conducting the oral proceedings and rendering the decision. [84] For the years 2020 to February 2023, only the number of fines is available while since March 2023, data on the total amounts of fines imposed is also recorded." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 528. Austria implements its legal framework to confiscate criminal property and property of corresponding value only to some extent and was able to present only three cases of using its NCBC regime, none of which involved the application of its NCBC mechanism introduced in 2021, which provides for reduced evidentiary requirements . Austria has a robust legal framework that enables the confiscation of criminal assets and property of corresponding value through a broad range of instruments, both with and without conviction (R.4). 529. The authorities have increased final confiscations of criminal assets during the period under review, but overall amounts remain low (EUR 8.5 million, annual average). Austria does not maintain data on the estimate proceeds of crime in the country. From 2020 to 2024, the total value of confiscated assets increased by nearly three quarters. This mainly related to the confiscation of proceeds of crime (i.e. forfeiture) and excludes assets returned to victims before a final conviction, which seems a common practice from the cases analysed. No data is kept measuring the value of these returned assets or to demonstrate how often restitution of assets occur in the course of proceedings. In addition, since 2023, the Financial Police is entitled to confiscate unpaid tax debts from fictitious companies, resulting in the confiscation of EUR 14.6 million in 35 cases during years 2023 and 2024. 530. Overall, average annual confiscation values have fallen considerably in relation to the previous period under review (MER 2016: EUR 14.4 million annual average). The previous period figures also reflected some exceptional individual large-scale cases with substantial amounts. Table 8.6. Amounts realised based on confiscation orders from 2020 to 2024 (including both assets located abroad and domestically) [124] – EUR and % Category 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Average per year Total assets realised to the federal treasury, of which: 6 398 019 (100%) 108 286 (100%) 676 291 (100%) 974 720 (100%) 1 159 544 (100%) 42 316 860 463 372 Forfeiture (Art. 20 StGB), including extended forfeiture (20b StGB), covering proceeds of crime 5 228 901 (81.7%) 5 669 229 (79.8%) 244 718 (68.3%) 8 062 656 (80.8%) 9 801 165 (87.8%) 34 006 669 6 801 334 Confiscation under § 19a StGB (mainly instrumentalities) 4 863 (0.7%) 6 854 (0.5%) 39 851 (0.5%) 59 568 (0.6%) 13 617 (0.1%) 194 753 38 951 Confiscation under § 26 StGB (mainly dangerous instrumentalities) 1 540 (0.0%) 13 130 (0.2%) 637 (0.0%) 4 784 (0.0%) 7 766 (0.9%) 117 857 23 571 Confiscation orders/penalties under ancillary criminal laws 81 669 (1.3%) 148 421 (2.1%) 103 246 (1.3%) 41 488 (0.4%) 111 110 (1.0%) 485 934 97 187 Other confiscations allocated to the federal treasury [125] 1 041 044 (16.3%) 240 649 (17.5%) 2 287 839 (29.8%) 806 222 (18.1%) 1 135 884 (10.2%) 7 511 638 1 502 328 531. The authorities illustrated the capability to confiscate property of corresponding value through case studies, but it is not possible to determine how commonly this occurs . Austria does not keep statistics on confiscated property of corresponding value but provided cases in relation to different offences to demonstrate that this occurs in practice (IO.9). Box 8.6. Drug Trafficking Case - Confiscation Orders (18 January 2024) [126] On 18 January 2024, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court sentenced a defendant to three years imprisonment for drug trafficking (comparatively lenient due to significant time elapsed since offences). The defendant was a member of a criminal organisation involved in drug trafficking, acting as co-organiser, financier, and actual owner of cannabis plantations at six locations. A total of 523 kg cannabis was produced and sold (except approximately 100 kg that was seized) for approximately EUR 2 million in value. Value seized (Art. 20b(1) with Art. 20(2) StGB): Seized cash (EUR 3 800, EUR 105 000, and EUR 9 690) on the grounds that it had been under the control of the criminal organisation Real estate property: purchased one-and-half years after criminal activities began, while offences were ongoing at five other sites. The court found that the purchase had been made using proceeds from drug sales, and starting in November 2017, the property had been used for the cultivation of large quantities of narcotics as part of the criminal organisation’s operations. A seized watch—owned by the defendant and valued at EUR 10 000, as it considered that it has been financed using drug trafficking proceeds. The court issued confiscation orders (Based on Art. 20b paras. 1 and 2 StGB—Extended Forfeiture), as it considered that assets were either proceeds obtained through/used for offences (Art. 20b(1) with Art. 20(1) StGB) or assets of corresponding value. 532. Confiscation measures can extend to other property of the person being convicted of ML, TF and some predicate offences, [127] but application of extended confiscation is rare . This applies when the court is satisfied that such property is derived from criminal conduct (Drug Trafficking case in Box 8.6). Statistics available however demonstrate that such application is rare. Table 8.7. Number of confiscation orders (cases) Type of Confiscation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Confiscation under § 19a StGB 1 507 1 909 2 045 2 106 2 115 Confiscation under § 20 StGB applicable until 31 Dec 2010 (illicit enrichment) 13 7 7 14 6 Confiscation under § 20 StGB 2 156 2 318 2 415 2 444 2 529 Extended Confiscation under § 20b StGB 5 10 13 16 9 Confiscation under § 26 StGB 2 884 2 945 2.673 2 755 2 747 Total 6 889 7 483 7 430 7 335 7 406 Source: Austrian Authorities 533. Austria has not made use of its NCBC regime introduced in 2021, and the regime remains largely unknown by LEAs and prosecutors . This was confirmed by discussions with practitioners and reflects the fact that AR guidelines have not been updated to provide guidance on its use (section 8.1). 534. Austria does not sufficiently enforce confiscation orders, where assets have not been previously secured and the convicted does not have sufficient assets . Courts often refrain from pursuing confiscation if the convicted does not hold sufficient assets at the time of conviction. In such cases, usually only one enforcement attempt is made. No further recovery efforts are undertaken further, even though the confiscation order remains enforceable for at least five years. No new assessment of the convicted person’s financial situation or the use of coercive measures such as searches seem to be made to support confiscation if a first attempt has been unsuccessful. 535. Significant challenges arise when a defendant’s criminal assets (located in Austria or abroad) are held by straw men or companies registered in offshore jurisdictions . Even though confiscation of a legal person’s assets without involvement of the owner during court proceedings has been confirmed by Supreme court, courts continue to rely on a more stringent jurisprudence which makes it extremely challenging for Austria to confiscate assets held through offshore fraudulent companies. One of the challenges is that courts continue to require the summons of the owners and beneficial owners of front companies, and where these companies and persons are outside Austria, the process can be very cumbersome. Interviews with practitioners indicate that the judiciary is lacking guidance on this issue, which is critical considering Austria’s risk and context. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 536. Austria did not demonstrate seeking assistance from foreign counterparts in confiscation matters, except for a few cases (IO.2). The authorities did not provide data on the number of MLA requests issued to seize or confiscate assets located abroad, and the nature of the assistance requested, including regarding seizures and confiscation in equivalent value. The central authority estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued by Austria on a yearly basis, which is notably low given Austria’s risk profile. No information was provided on the amounts of assets seized or confiscated at Austria’s request. Footnotes [124] The figures do not include the amount of assets confiscated because of the very low scale of TF patterns and the difficulty to trace assets in the receiving countries (see IO.9). [125] Other confiscations allocated to the federal treasury” include criminal measures (e.g. proceeds from forfeited deposits) as well as measures that are not related to criminal proceedings (e.g. items deposited by a debtor with the court for a creditor that the creditor failed to collect). [126] Judgment of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court of 18 January 2024, Case No. 607 Hv 5/19v. [127] See R.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 528. Austria implements its legal framework to confiscate criminal property and property of corresponding value only to some extent and was able to present only three cases of using its NCBC regime, none of which involved the application of its NCBC mechanism introduced in 2021, which provides for reduced evidentiary requirements . Austria has a robust legal framework that enables the confiscation of criminal assets and property of corresponding value through a broad range of instruments, both with and without conviction (R.4). 529. The authorities have increased final confiscations of criminal assets during the period under review, but overall amounts remain low (EUR 8.5 million, annual average). Austria does not maintain data on the estimate proceeds of crime in the country. From 2020 to 2024, the total value of confiscated assets increased by nearly three quarters. This mainly related to the confiscation of proceeds of crime (i.e. forfeiture) and excludes assets returned to victims before a final conviction, which seems a common practice from the cases analysed. No data is kept measuring the value of these returned assets or to demonstrate how often restitution of assets occur in the course of proceedings. In addition, since 2023, the Financial Police is entitled to confiscate unpaid tax debts from fictitious companies, resulting in the confiscation of EUR 14.6 million in 35 cases during years 2023 and 2024. 530. Overall, average annual confiscation values have fallen considerably in relation to the previous period under review (MER 2016: EUR 14.4 million annual average). The previous period figures also reflected some exceptional individual large-scale cases with substantial amounts. Table 8.6. Amounts realised based on confiscation orders from 2020 to 2024 (including both assets located abroad and domestically) [124] – EUR and % Category 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Average per year Total assets realised to the federal treasury, of which: 6 398 019 (100%) 108 286 (100%) 676 291 (100%) 974 720 (100%) 1 159 544 (100%) 42 316 860 463 372 Forfeiture (Art. 20 StGB), including extended forfeiture (20b StGB), covering proceeds of crime 5 228 901 (81.7%) 5 669 229 (79.8%) 244 718 (68.3%) 8 062 656 (80.8%) 9 801 165 (87.8%) 34 006 669 6 801 334 Confiscation under § 19a StGB (mainly instrumentalities) 4 863 (0.7%) 6 854 (0.5%) 39 851 (0.5%) 59 568 (0.6%) 13 617 (0.1%) 194 753 38 951 Confiscation under § 26 StGB (mainly dangerous instrumentalities) 1 540 (0.0%) 13 130 (0.2%) 637 (0.0%) 4 784 (0.0%) 7 766 (0.9%) 117 857 23 571 Confiscation orders/penalties under ancillary criminal laws 81 669 (1.3%) 148 421 (2.1%) 103 246 (1.3%) 41 488 (0.4%) 111 110 (1.0%) 485 934 97 187 Other confiscations allocated to the federal treasury [125] 1 041 044 (16.3%) 240 649 (17.5%) 2 287 839 (29.8%) 806 222 (18.1%) 1 135 884 (10.2%) 7 511 638 1 502 328 531. The authorities illustrated the capability to confiscate property of corresponding value through case studies, but it is not possible to determine how commonly this occurs . Austria does not keep statistics on confiscated property of corresponding value but provided cases in relation to different offences to demonstrate that this occurs in practice (IO.9). Box 8.6. Drug Trafficking Case - Confiscation Orders (18 January 2024) [126] On 18 January 2024, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court sentenced a defendant to three years imprisonment for drug trafficking (comparatively lenient due to significant time elapsed since offences). The defendant was a member of a criminal organisation involved in drug trafficking, acting as co-organiser, financier, and actual owner of cannabis plantations at six locations. A total of 523 kg cannabis was produced and sold (except approximately 100 kg that was seized) for approximately EUR 2 million in value. Value seized (Art. 20b(1) with Art. 20(2) StGB): Seized cash (EUR 3 800, EUR 105 000, and EUR 9 690) on the grounds that it had been under the control of the criminal organisation Real estate property: purchased one-and-half years after criminal activities began, while offences were ongoing at five other sites. The court found that the purchase had been made using proceeds from drug sales, and starting in November 2017, the property had been used for the cultivation of large quantities of narcotics as part of the criminal organisation’s operations. A seized watch—owned by the defendant and valued at EUR 10 000, as it considered that it has been financed using drug trafficking proceeds. The court issued confiscation orders (Based on Art. 20b paras. 1 and 2 StGB—Extended Forfeiture), as it considered that assets were either proceeds obtained through/used for offences (Art. 20b(1) with Art. 20(1) StGB) or assets of corresponding value. 532. Confiscation measures can extend to other property of the person being convicted of ML, TF and some predicate offences, [127] but application of extended confiscation is rare . This applies when the court is satisfied that such property is derived from criminal conduct (Drug Trafficking case in Box 8.6). Statistics available however demonstrate that such application is rare. Table 8.7. Number of confiscation orders (cases) Type of Confiscation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Confiscation under § 19a StGB 1 507 1 909 2 045 2 106 2 115 Confiscation under § 20 StGB applicable until 31 Dec 2010 (illicit enrichment) 13 7 7 14 6 Confiscation under § 20 StGB 2 156 2 318 2 415 2 444 2 529 Extended Confiscation under § 20b StGB 5 10 13 16 9 Confiscation under § 26 StGB 2 884 2 945 2.673 2 755 2 747 Total 6 889 7 483 7 430 7 335 7 406 Source: Austrian Authorities 533. Austria has not made use of its NCBC regime introduced in 2021, and the regime remains largely unknown by LEAs and prosecutors . This was confirmed by discussions with practitioners and reflects the fact that AR guidelines have not been updated to provide guidance on its use (section 8.1). 534. Austria does not sufficiently enforce confiscation orders, where assets have not been previously secured and the convicted does not have sufficient assets . Courts often refrain from pursuing confiscation if the convicted does not hold sufficient assets at the time of conviction. In such cases, usually only one enforcement attempt is made. No further recovery efforts are undertaken further, even though the confiscation order remains enforceable for at least five years. No new assessment of the convicted person’s financial situation or the use of coercive measures such as searches seem to be made to support confiscation if a first attempt has been unsuccessful. 535. Significant challenges arise when a defendant’s criminal assets (located in Austria or abroad) are held by straw men or companies registered in offshore jurisdictions . Even though confiscation of a legal person’s assets without involvement of the owner during court proceedings has been confirmed by Supreme court, courts continue to rely on a more stringent jurisprudence which makes it extremely challenging for Austria to confiscate assets held through offshore fraudulent companies. One of the challenges is that courts continue to require the summons of the owners and beneficial owners of front companies, and where these companies and persons are outside Austria, the process can be very cumbersome. Interviews with practitioners indicate that the judiciary is lacking guidance on this issue, which is critical considering Austria’s risk and context. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 536. Austria did not demonstrate seeking assistance from foreign counterparts in confiscation matters, except for a few cases (IO.2). The authorities did not provide data on the number of MLA requests issued to seize or confiscate assets located abroad, and the nature of the assistance requested, including regarding seizures and confiscation in equivalent value. The central authority estimates that an average of 10 requests may be issued by Austria on a yearly basis, which is notably low given Austria’s risk profile. No information was provided on the amounts of assets seized or confiscated at Austria’s request. Footnotes [124] The figures do not include the amount of assets confiscated because of the very low scale of TF patterns and the difficulty to trace assets in the receiving countries (see IO.9). [125] Other confiscations allocated to the federal treasury” include criminal measures (e.g. proceeds from forfeited deposits) as well as measures that are not related to criminal proceedings (e.g. items deposited by a debtor with the court for a creditor that the creditor failed to collect). [126] Judgment of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court of 18 January 2024, Case No. 607 Hv 5/19v. [127] See R.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="581. When the authorities cannot secure a conviction, several options are available to disrupt TF activities. Prosecutors often choose alternative prosecution measures for which the evidence standard is lower, such as participation in a terrorist organisation. Confiscation of assets of a person who cannot be prosecuted is also a possible alternative measure under sect. 20 and 20b. (2a) StGB, but no such case was reported. Administrative measures include travel bans, administrative dissolution of NPOs, personal measures such as enrolment in de-radicalisation programmes and obligation to appear. There is no evidence though that those measures have been used in TF cases. 582. The most common measure taken by DSN is to address the case to the tax authorities to ascertain the situation of a legal entity in terms of tax returns and to ensure follow-up by the tax authority as part of its monitoring and oversight of the NPO sector . There is no indication that other measures were implemented." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="581. When the authorities cannot secure a conviction, several options are available to disrupt TF activities. Prosecutors often choose alternative prosecution measures for which the evidence standard is lower, such as participation in a terrorist organisation. Confiscation of assets of a person who cannot be prosecuted is also a possible alternative measure under sect. 20 and 20b. (2a) StGB, but no such case was reported. Administrative measures include travel bans, administrative dissolution of NPOs, personal measures such as enrolment in de-radicalisation programmes and obligation to appear. There is no evidence though that those measures have been used in TF cases. 582. The most common measure taken by DSN is to address the case to the tax authorities to ascertain the situation of a legal entity in terms of tax returns and to ensure follow-up by the tax authority as part of its monitoring and oversight of the NPO sector . There is no indication that other measures were implemented." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="610. At the time of the onsite visit and in line with the SanktG 2024, Austria had two competent authorities for monitoring and ensuring compliance with TF-related TFS, i.e., the OeNB for FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) and the DSN for VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs . As of 1 January 2026, the FMA will become the competent supervisor for TFS implementation by FIs and VASPs. [150] Following the adoption of the SanktG 2024 in February 2025, the FMA and the OeNB have been coordinating their activities and had scheduled joint inspections starting in July 2025 to ensure smooth transition. 10.5.1. FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) 611. The OeNB’s supervision of 443 FIs does not distinguish between TF- and PF-related TFS . The analysis and conclusions below therefore equally apply to section 10.6 on PF-related TFS. 612. A dedicated team within the OeNB's Legal Department—i.e., the sanctions team—is responsible for supervision of TFS implementation by FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) . This team is composed of 13 staff members, who are among other duties within the competence of the OeNB’s Legal Department, also responsible for handling sanctions matters. It consists of three sub-teams, i.e., onsite measures team, reporting obligations team, and general tasks and services team. The onsite measures team is supported by external audit firms which conduct full-scope onsite inspections of FIs on behalf of the OeNB. The OeNB issued general instructions to guide onsite and offsite supervision activities. 613. Since 2022, the OeNB applies a risk-based approach to select supervised FIs for onsite inspections, but it could not articulate a solid risk understanding of TFS supervision . The OeNB does not distinguish between TF and PF related TFS supervision and does therefore not adequately consider the relevant risk, including that of potential breaches, non-implementation or evasion of TFS. It considers quarterly collected data on transaction volumes with 39 countries, which are subject to financial sanctions in the broadest sense. Other factors such as transactional values are not considered and information from other sources such as FMA and DSN is not taken into consideration for the risk calculation either. This results in an overwhelming majority of supervised entities, i.e., 81% being rated as low-risk, 13 % as moderate, 5% as elevated, and less than 1% as high. 614. Prior to mid-2022 and the new autonomous EU sanctions, the OeNB conducted limited supervision, with only three CIs subject to a full-scope inspection in 2020 and four in 2021 . Since mid-2022, the frequency and scope of the OeNB’s supervision significantly improved. Between mid-2022 and mid-2025, external audit firms conducted a total of 47 full-scope onsite inspections under the coordination of the OeNB (45 CIs and 2 PIs). Inspections were driven by the risk profile of supervised entities as understood by the OeNB and equally targeted entities in all four risk categories. They focused on account opening and risk assessment, transaction monitoring and screening, process and procedures for asset freezing, internal control system, employee training, and reporting obligations to the management board. Onsite inspections were supplemented by offsite measures which mainly consist of more in-depth analysis of questionnaire responses. 615. Onsite inspections identified significant and material deficiencies, which were mainly addressed through dedicated follow-up by the OeNB. The most frequently identified deficiencies related to shortcomings in sanctions screening at the time of onboarding and when updating CDD information, in processes to assess the risk of TFS circumvention, in transaction monitoring for TFS (i.e., no sanction screening for domestic payments, no sanction checks on direct debit payments and high thresholds for sanctions checks), and inadequate IT systems for TFS screening (i.e., no regular check of system parameters and resource lists, and no effectiveness tests). 616. The OeNB does not have sanctioning powers [151] and is required to report sustained breaches of TFS obligations to the public prosecutor (for transactions above EUR 100 000) or to the competent State Police Directorate (for transactions up to EUR 100 000). During the period under review, the OeNB did not identify sustained breaches of TFS obligations. 617. The OeNB provides general information on the implementation of TFS, including comprehensive Q&amp;A and reporting templates, on its website. It also issued dedicated guidance on TFS obligations. The OeNB staff actively contribute to various sector-specific initiatives to raise awareness among credit, financial, and payment institutions. These initiatives were significantly intensified following new autonomous EU sanctions in 2022 and extended to TFS obligations. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 618. While the SanktG 2024 designates the DSN as the competent authority for monitoring compliance with TFS obligations of VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs, in practice, such monitoring in line with FATF Standards is not taking place . This can be explained by the fact that the DSN is a state security and intelligence service and not a supervisory authority, such as the OeNB, the FMA, and other AML/CFT supervisors. The absence of targeted monitoring of implementation of TF-TFS is reflected in identified shortcomings in implementation by insurance intermediaries and DNFBPs (section 4.3.4). 619. At the time of the on-site visit, the DSN had not yet issued guidance to assist VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs with the implementation of their TFS obligations. DSN’s PF-related awareness-raising initiatives (IO.11) contribute to some extent to improving the understanding of and compliance with TF-related TFS. Footnotes [150] FMA reported on various measures to prepare for its TFS-related supervisory role, including but not limited to TFS targeted questionnaires for supervised entities and a dedicated assessment of the risks of non-implementation of TFS by CIs to inform its risk-based supervision (i.e., called FMA’s Sanctions Heat Map 2025). [151] The SanktG 2024 grants FMA the power to impose administrative sanctions for failures to comply with the provisions of the Act as of 1 January 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="610. At the time of the onsite visit and in line with the SanktG 2024, Austria had two competent authorities for monitoring and ensuring compliance with TF-related TFS, i.e., the OeNB for FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) and the DSN for VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs . As of 1 January 2026, the FMA will become the competent supervisor for TFS implementation by FIs and VASPs. [150] Following the adoption of the SanktG 2024 in February 2025, the FMA and the OeNB have been coordinating their activities and had scheduled joint inspections starting in July 2025 to ensure smooth transition. 10.5.1. FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) 611. The OeNB’s supervision of 443 FIs does not distinguish between TF- and PF-related TFS . The analysis and conclusions below therefore equally apply to section 10.6 on PF-related TFS. 612. A dedicated team within the OeNB's Legal Department—i.e., the sanctions team—is responsible for supervision of TFS implementation by FIs (except ISPs and asset managers) . This team is composed of 13 staff members, who are among other duties within the competence of the OeNB’s Legal Department, also responsible for handling sanctions matters. It consists of three sub-teams, i.e., onsite measures team, reporting obligations team, and general tasks and services team. The onsite measures team is supported by external audit firms which conduct full-scope onsite inspections of FIs on behalf of the OeNB. The OeNB issued general instructions to guide onsite and offsite supervision activities. 613. Since 2022, the OeNB applies a risk-based approach to select supervised FIs for onsite inspections, but it could not articulate a solid risk understanding of TFS supervision . The OeNB does not distinguish between TF and PF related TFS supervision and does therefore not adequately consider the relevant risk, including that of potential breaches, non-implementation or evasion of TFS. It considers quarterly collected data on transaction volumes with 39 countries, which are subject to financial sanctions in the broadest sense. Other factors such as transactional values are not considered and information from other sources such as FMA and DSN is not taken into consideration for the risk calculation either. This results in an overwhelming majority of supervised entities, i.e., 81% being rated as low-risk, 13 % as moderate, 5% as elevated, and less than 1% as high. 614. Prior to mid-2022 and the new autonomous EU sanctions, the OeNB conducted limited supervision, with only three CIs subject to a full-scope inspection in 2020 and four in 2021 . Since mid-2022, the frequency and scope of the OeNB’s supervision significantly improved. Between mid-2022 and mid-2025, external audit firms conducted a total of 47 full-scope onsite inspections under the coordination of the OeNB (45 CIs and 2 PIs). Inspections were driven by the risk profile of supervised entities as understood by the OeNB and equally targeted entities in all four risk categories. They focused on account opening and risk assessment, transaction monitoring and screening, process and procedures for asset freezing, internal control system, employee training, and reporting obligations to the management board. Onsite inspections were supplemented by offsite measures which mainly consist of more in-depth analysis of questionnaire responses. 615. Onsite inspections identified significant and material deficiencies, which were mainly addressed through dedicated follow-up by the OeNB. The most frequently identified deficiencies related to shortcomings in sanctions screening at the time of onboarding and when updating CDD information, in processes to assess the risk of TFS circumvention, in transaction monitoring for TFS (i.e., no sanction screening for domestic payments, no sanction checks on direct debit payments and high thresholds for sanctions checks), and inadequate IT systems for TFS screening (i.e., no regular check of system parameters and resource lists, and no effectiveness tests). 616. The OeNB does not have sanctioning powers [151] and is required to report sustained breaches of TFS obligations to the public prosecutor (for transactions above EUR 100 000) or to the competent State Police Directorate (for transactions up to EUR 100 000). During the period under review, the OeNB did not identify sustained breaches of TFS obligations. 617. The OeNB provides general information on the implementation of TFS, including comprehensive Q&amp;A and reporting templates, on its website. It also issued dedicated guidance on TFS obligations. The OeNB staff actively contribute to various sector-specific initiatives to raise awareness among credit, financial, and payment institutions. These initiatives were significantly intensified following new autonomous EU sanctions in 2022 and extended to TFS obligations. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 618. While the SanktG 2024 designates the DSN as the competent authority for monitoring compliance with TFS obligations of VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs, in practice, such monitoring in line with FATF Standards is not taking place . This can be explained by the fact that the DSN is a state security and intelligence service and not a supervisory authority, such as the OeNB, the FMA, and other AML/CFT supervisors. The absence of targeted monitoring of implementation of TF-TFS is reflected in identified shortcomings in implementation by insurance intermediaries and DNFBPs (section 4.3.4). 619. At the time of the on-site visit, the DSN had not yet issued guidance to assist VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs with the implementation of their TFS obligations. DSN’s PF-related awareness-raising initiatives (IO.11) contribute to some extent to improving the understanding of and compliance with TF-related TFS. Footnotes [150] FMA reported on various measures to prepare for its TFS-related supervisory role, including but not limited to TFS targeted questionnaires for supervised entities and a dedicated assessment of the risks of non-implementation of TFS by CIs to inform its risk-based supervision (i.e., called FMA’s Sanctions Heat Map 2025). [151] The SanktG 2024 grants FMA the power to impose administrative sanctions for failures to comply with the provisions of the Act as of 1 January 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="639. FIs, VASPs, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated that they understand their TFS obligations and implement them without delay (IO.10). They screen against sanctions lists at onboarding and FIs and VASPs also on an ongoing basis (usually daily) using software solutions. None of the interviewed entities had identified funds or assets owned or controlled by persons and entities designated under UNSCR 1718, which is not consistent with Austria’s PF risk and context. 640. Around 93% of CIs have more sophisticated measures in place to detect sanctions evasion and complement name screening with other PF-specific screening measures . These measures include, but are not limited to, screening of all inbound and outbound cross-border payments against key words related to PF (e.g., dual use or luxury goods). A few larger CIs with trade finance activities, which by the nature of their activities are more exposed to PF sanctions evasion risks, developed internal lists [158] for additional screening on a risk-sensitive basis. These CIs also conduct more extensive compliance checks, including but not limited to the application of measures to Know Your Customer’s Customer (KYCC), analysis of export licences, and verification of invoices and contracts to detect inconsistencies in transaction behaviour. 641. End 2024, Austria further strengthened the preventive measures for all OEs by extending them to PF internal control measures and business risk assessments . At the time of the onsite visit, implementation of these measures, which should support compliance with PF-related TFS and limit TFS circumvention, was still at a nascent stage. 642. The findings on implementation of TFS by insurance intermediaries, real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS as described in the analysis of IO.10 equally apply to IO.11. These include negative effects of shortcomings in the implementation of CDD measures by DNFBPs. Footnotes [158] These lists include information on proliferation-sensitive goods, results of media research and internal investigations, and external alerts (e.g., FIU notices)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="639. FIs, VASPs, tax advisors undertaking TCSP services, public accountants, notaries and, to some extent, lawyers demonstrated that they understand their TFS obligations and implement them without delay (IO.10). They screen against sanctions lists at onboarding and FIs and VASPs also on an ongoing basis (usually daily) using software solutions. None of the interviewed entities had identified funds or assets owned or controlled by persons and entities designated under UNSCR 1718, which is not consistent with Austria’s PF risk and context. 640. Around 93% of CIs have more sophisticated measures in place to detect sanctions evasion and complement name screening with other PF-specific screening measures . These measures include, but are not limited to, screening of all inbound and outbound cross-border payments against key words related to PF (e.g., dual use or luxury goods). A few larger CIs with trade finance activities, which by the nature of their activities are more exposed to PF sanctions evasion risks, developed internal lists [158] for additional screening on a risk-sensitive basis. These CIs also conduct more extensive compliance checks, including but not limited to the application of measures to Know Your Customer’s Customer (KYCC), analysis of export licences, and verification of invoices and contracts to detect inconsistencies in transaction behaviour. 641. End 2024, Austria further strengthened the preventive measures for all OEs by extending them to PF internal control measures and business risk assessments . At the time of the onsite visit, implementation of these measures, which should support compliance with PF-related TFS and limit TFS circumvention, was still at a nascent stage. 642. The findings on implementation of TFS by insurance intermediaries, real estate agents, other TCSPs, and DPMS as described in the analysis of IO.10 equally apply to IO.11. These include negative effects of shortcomings in the implementation of CDD measures by DNFBPs. Footnotes [158] These lists include information on proliferation-sensitive goods, results of media research and internal investigations, and external alerts (e.g., FIU notices)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="166. Austria demonstrated capacity for national coordination and cooperation for operational purposes in some areas. The authorities shared extensive information and practical examples demonstrating reliance on formal and informal communication and cooperation mechanisms to support operational objectives, but in other areas, cooperation and information exchange is limited, notably within the Justice apparatus. 167. Coordination seems particularly seamless among BMF, A-FIU, DSN, other parts of BMI, and FMA, but BMJ and prosecutors are less effective in their coordination role. The flow of information among BMF, A-FIU, DSN, other parts of BMI, and FMA to support their operational activities is ensured by several effective mechanisms, predominantly informal. A-FIU collaborates closely with LEAs and supervisory authorities, including SRBs (IO.6). There is no structured process by prosecutors for the coordination of all services involved in TF/ML investigations, and coordination is limited to supervision of individual investigations by DSN/local branches of the DSN (LSEs) and Police units (IO.7/IO.9). Information flows between prosecution and BMJ is insufficient, including regarding new jurisprudence (which BMJ is not necessarily made aware of) and the lack of feedback loops because of a missing case management system (a recommended action from the 2016 MER still pending). These shortcomings in operational coordination present additional challenges further limiting Austria’s capacity to successfully prosecute ML offences (IO.7). 168. The authorities demonstrated the close operational cooperation between the DSN, A-FIU, and other competent authorities in complex financial investigations through several case examples. These examples cannot be published due to the sensitive nature of ongoing investigations. 169. Operational coordination also uses formal mechanisms and the DSN and A-FIU also established formal coordination mechanisms to support their operational activities, including through the signature of a memorandum of understanding (MoU). The Intelligence and Policy Coordination Meeting (IPCM) provides a forum for quarterly meetings between the DSN and A-FIU to discuss specific topics and cases on an operational and strategic level. The DSN and A-FIU can also involve representatives of other investigative authorities, public prosecutors, and court representatives, as needed for individual cases. There is also institutionalised cooperation and exchange of information between the DSN and the nine police directorates at state-level. 170. Another example of very effective regular operational coordination are the meetings between the Beneficial Owner Registry Authority and the FIU, DSN, AML/CFT supervisors, and LEAs. These meetings are intended to discuss operational challenges in the identification of beneficial ownership information and functionalities of the Beneficial Owner Register to ensure that competent authorities can easily and swiftly consult the Beneficial Owner Register (see dedicated web-applications referred to in IO.5). 171. The working group established by the Ministry of Economy, Energy, and Tourism (BMWET) is an effective mechanism for the operational coordination of supervision of trade persons even though RBS is only at a nascent stage. The group meets approximately four times per year and discusses AML/CFT issues such as the importance of RBS, results of the (S)NRA to inform RBS, ML/TF risk questionnaires for supervised entities, the development of an overarching supervisory strategy, and detailed checklists for supervision. 172. Coordination with the private sector through PPPs (except the one for VASPs, which was not yet fully operational) was consistently highlighted as a strength contributing to competent authorities’ efforts to achieve operational objectives. Austria has several PPPs which contribute to enhancing ML/TF risk understanding by OEs and should ultimately result in improvements in the identification and reporting of STRs. The PPPs proved effective in supporting the NRA process, including by raising awareness on ML/TF/PF risks. Both competent authorities and OEs highlighted the usefulness of PPPs even though the PPP with the DNFBP sector has not yet resulted in notable increases in STRs. The PPP with the NPO sector has produced excellent results (IO.10)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="166. Austria demonstrated capacity for national coordination and cooperation for operational purposes in some areas. The authorities shared extensive information and practical examples demonstrating reliance on formal and informal communication and cooperation mechanisms to support operational objectives, but in other areas, cooperation and information exchange is limited, notably within the Justice apparatus. 167. Coordination seems particularly seamless among BMF, A-FIU, DSN, other parts of BMI, and FMA, but BMJ and prosecutors are less effective in their coordination role. The flow of information among BMF, A-FIU, DSN, other parts of BMI, and FMA to support their operational activities is ensured by several effective mechanisms, predominantly informal. A-FIU collaborates closely with LEAs and supervisory authorities, including SRBs (IO.6). There is no structured process by prosecutors for the coordination of all services involved in TF/ML investigations, and coordination is limited to supervision of individual investigations by DSN/local branches of the DSN (LSEs) and Police units (IO.7/IO.9). Information flows between prosecution and BMJ is insufficient, including regarding new jurisprudence (which BMJ is not necessarily made aware of) and the lack of feedback loops because of a missing case management system (a recommended action from the 2016 MER still pending). These shortcomings in operational coordination present additional challenges further limiting Austria’s capacity to successfully prosecute ML offences (IO.7). 168. The authorities demonstrated the close operational cooperation between the DSN, A-FIU, and other competent authorities in complex financial investigations through several case examples. These examples cannot be published due to the sensitive nature of ongoing investigations. 169. Operational coordination also uses formal mechanisms and the DSN and A-FIU also established formal coordination mechanisms to support their operational activities, including through the signature of a memorandum of understanding (MoU). The Intelligence and Policy Coordination Meeting (IPCM) provides a forum for quarterly meetings between the DSN and A-FIU to discuss specific topics and cases on an operational and strategic level. The DSN and A-FIU can also involve representatives of other investigative authorities, public prosecutors, and court representatives, as needed for individual cases. There is also institutionalised cooperation and exchange of information between the DSN and the nine police directorates at state-level. 170. Another example of very effective regular operational coordination are the meetings between the Beneficial Owner Registry Authority and the FIU, DSN, AML/CFT supervisors, and LEAs. These meetings are intended to discuss operational challenges in the identification of beneficial ownership information and functionalities of the Beneficial Owner Register to ensure that competent authorities can easily and swiftly consult the Beneficial Owner Register (see dedicated web-applications referred to in IO.5). 171. The working group established by the Ministry of Economy, Energy, and Tourism (BMWET) is an effective mechanism for the operational coordination of supervision of trade persons even though RBS is only at a nascent stage. The group meets approximately four times per year and discusses AML/CFT issues such as the importance of RBS, results of the (S)NRA to inform RBS, ML/TF risk questionnaires for supervised entities, the development of an overarching supervisory strategy, and detailed checklists for supervision. 172. Coordination with the private sector through PPPs (except the one for VASPs, which was not yet fully operational) was consistently highlighted as a strength contributing to competent authorities’ efforts to achieve operational objectives. Austria has several PPPs which contribute to enhancing ML/TF risk understanding by OEs and should ultimately result in improvements in the identification and reporting of STRs. The PPPs proved effective in supporting the NRA process, including by raising awareness on ML/TF/PF risks. Both competent authorities and OEs highlighted the usefulness of PPPs even though the PPP with the DNFBP sector has not yet resulted in notable increases in STRs. The PPP with the NPO sector has produced excellent results (IO.10)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="303. The FMA’s supervision, monitoring, outreach, training, and enforcement have had a demonstrably positive effect and, to a large extent, improved compliance among FIs and VASPs over time. The FMA provides guidance through its circulars on interpreting legal requirements and identifying best practices, and to OEs individually by answering legal enquiries and by giving feedback during engagements. These efforts have reduced supervisory findings related to reporting violations, while increasing STR filings in the CI sector, indicating heightened vigilance and improved monitoring among OEs. 304. In its onsite inspections and offsite investigations, the FMA has repeatedly focused on high-risk products and customers. These include business relationships with customers domiciled in offshore locations. The regulatory focus on adequate application of EDD measures coupled with improved risk understanding has led to a reduction of CIs’ offshore customers. Regarding high-risk products, the FMA demonstrated effect through a case study where, in close cooperation with the A-FIU, based on its internal investigations, a subsequent onsite inspection and a fine of EUR 100 000 led a CI to stop issuing a specific high-risk product (i.e., unnamed saving books). This demonstrated a broader effect in the sector as well. 305. The FMA initiates proceedings to restore legal compliance, requiring an OE to restore compliance within a set timeframe while providing guidance where necessary. Such proceedings remain open until compliance is fully restored by the OE and are closed with an administrative notice. The proceedings may be an initial step to imposing a fine if the proceedings are not complied with. The FMA initiated 27 of such proceedings in 2020 (including 25 to CIs), 12 in 2024 and five in the first half of 2025. 306. However, the FMA’s focus on identification of suspicious activities and subsequent filing of STRs is not sufficient to substantially increase compliance with reporting obligations. This is grounded in a very low number of targeted findings during onsite inspections on reporting to the A-FIU [54] (18 in the CI and 14 in the VASP sector, since 2020) and a very limited number of STRs/SARs filed across the sectors (table 3.2). 307. While the overall number of remedial actions is decreasing, the overall number of findings (weaknesses and breaches) is not. However, the number of systemic and serious identified infringements at CIs has decreased from 62 in 2020 to 33 in 2024. In conjunction with subsection 3.4, this indicates that CIs’ compliance is improving, while the identified infringements require less stringent measures for effective remediation. 308. The number of effectively applied administrative sanctions (fines, publications of fines, and license withdrawals) has remained stable. There were three sanctions on CIs in 2020 [55] and five in 2024. [56] In 2023, the FMA initiated 48 administrative penal proceedings (first instance) on AML/CFT, including proceedings against responsible natural persons as part of the prosecution of the legal person. In 10 cases, penal orders imposing a fine were issued, of which seven related to CIs in Austria, one case to an insurance company, one to a VASP, and three to a natural person. 309. In the imposition of fines, the FMA focuses on legal breaches of policies and procedures (Art. 23 FM-GwG), as well as on breaches of the FM-GwG in individual cases (customer files and transactions). Thirteen fines were issued on OEs of which nine on CIs in 2024, and two in 2025 (as of 30 June 2025). In addition, the FMA increasingly uses publication of fines as a sanctioning tool: one in 2020; one in 2021; one in 2022; one in 2023; four in 2024; and three in 2025 (up to 30 June 2025). The published fines were imposed on CIs in nine cases, with an amount of EUR 490 444 on average, with one outlier of EUR 2 million, and on two insurance companies (EUR 40 000 and EUR 367 542). 310. The risk of sanctioning for breaches of AML/CFT requirements and publication of the sanctions have a demonstrated effect on the overall awareness among FIs and VASPs. This is especially the case at an executive level, as reputational risks may be considerable. The FMA pursues a consistent zero-tolerance policy for particularly serious breaches, which is evidenced by withdrawals of two banking licenses in 2020 and 2025, and four VASP registrations between 2020 and 2024 due to continued systematic AML failures. Furthermore, the FMA has also rejected new applications and acquisitions (both in the VA sector and in the financial sector) due to increased ML/TF risk and has prompted 18 voluntary withdrawals of VASP registrations due to its increased supervisory activities (two in 2021, four in 2022, six in 2023, six in 2024). 311. Besides the feedback provided throughout supervisory engagements, the FMA actively and regularly engages with the supervised entities and stakeholders. This includes discussing and informing them about the latest regulatory and supervisory developments, providing practical guidance with regard to the implementation of AML/CFT requirements through a range of formats, or answering of legal enquiries. Footnotes [54] Identified weaknesses and breaches concerning Art. 16 of the FM-GwG. [55] In addition, two sanctions were imposed, which were appealed. In one case, the FMA has been upheld in the merits, and the fine was reduced. In the other case, the FMA has been confirmed for the second time by the Federal Administrative Court (BVwG), and the matter is pending before the Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH) in the second round of legal proceedings. [56] In addition, four sanctions were imposed, which were appealed. All proceedings are currently pending before the BVwG, three of which have been suspended due to preliminary ruling requests submitted by the BVwG to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="303. The FMA’s supervision, monitoring, outreach, training, and enforcement have had a demonstrably positive effect and, to a large extent, improved compliance among FIs and VASPs over time. The FMA provides guidance through its circulars on interpreting legal requirements and identifying best practices, and to OEs individually by answering legal enquiries and by giving feedback during engagements. These efforts have reduced supervisory findings related to reporting violations, while increasing STR filings in the CI sector, indicating heightened vigilance and improved monitoring among OEs. 304. In its onsite inspections and offsite investigations, the FMA has repeatedly focused on high-risk products and customers. These include business relationships with customers domiciled in offshore locations. The regulatory focus on adequate application of EDD measures coupled with improved risk understanding has led to a reduction of CIs’ offshore customers. Regarding high-risk products, the FMA demonstrated effect through a case study where, in close cooperation with the A-FIU, based on its internal investigations, a subsequent onsite inspection and a fine of EUR 100 000 led a CI to stop issuing a specific high-risk product (i.e., unnamed saving books). This demonstrated a broader effect in the sector as well. 305. The FMA initiates proceedings to restore legal compliance, requiring an OE to restore compliance within a set timeframe while providing guidance where necessary. Such proceedings remain open until compliance is fully restored by the OE and are closed with an administrative notice. The proceedings may be an initial step to imposing a fine if the proceedings are not complied with. The FMA initiated 27 of such proceedings in 2020 (including 25 to CIs), 12 in 2024 and five in the first half of 2025. 306. However, the FMA’s focus on identification of suspicious activities and subsequent filing of STRs is not sufficient to substantially increase compliance with reporting obligations. This is grounded in a very low number of targeted findings during onsite inspections on reporting to the A-FIU [54] (18 in the CI and 14 in the VASP sector, since 2020) and a very limited number of STRs/SARs filed across the sectors (table 3.2). 307. While the overall number of remedial actions is decreasing, the overall number of findings (weaknesses and breaches) is not. However, the number of systemic and serious identified infringements at CIs has decreased from 62 in 2020 to 33 in 2024. In conjunction with subsection 3.4, this indicates that CIs’ compliance is improving, while the identified infringements require less stringent measures for effective remediation. 308. The number of effectively applied administrative sanctions (fines, publications of fines, and license withdrawals) has remained stable. There were three sanctions on CIs in 2020 [55] and five in 2024. [56] In 2023, the FMA initiated 48 administrative penal proceedings (first instance) on AML/CFT, including proceedings against responsible natural persons as part of the prosecution of the legal person. In 10 cases, penal orders imposing a fine were issued, of which seven related to CIs in Austria, one case to an insurance company, one to a VASP, and three to a natural person. 309. In the imposition of fines, the FMA focuses on legal breaches of policies and procedures (Art. 23 FM-GwG), as well as on breaches of the FM-GwG in individual cases (customer files and transactions). Thirteen fines were issued on OEs of which nine on CIs in 2024, and two in 2025 (as of 30 June 2025). In addition, the FMA increasingly uses publication of fines as a sanctioning tool: one in 2020; one in 2021; one in 2022; one in 2023; four in 2024; and three in 2025 (up to 30 June 2025). The published fines were imposed on CIs in nine cases, with an amount of EUR 490 444 on average, with one outlier of EUR 2 million, and on two insurance companies (EUR 40 000 and EUR 367 542). 310. The risk of sanctioning for breaches of AML/CFT requirements and publication of the sanctions have a demonstrated effect on the overall awareness among FIs and VASPs. This is especially the case at an executive level, as reputational risks may be considerable. The FMA pursues a consistent zero-tolerance policy for particularly serious breaches, which is evidenced by withdrawals of two banking licenses in 2020 and 2025, and four VASP registrations between 2020 and 2024 due to continued systematic AML failures. Furthermore, the FMA has also rejected new applications and acquisitions (both in the VA sector and in the financial sector) due to increased ML/TF risk and has prompted 18 voluntary withdrawals of VASP registrations due to its increased supervisory activities (two in 2021, four in 2022, six in 2023, six in 2024). 311. Besides the feedback provided throughout supervisory engagements, the FMA actively and regularly engages with the supervised entities and stakeholders. This includes discussing and informing them about the latest regulatory and supervisory developments, providing practical guidance with regard to the implementation of AML/CFT requirements through a range of formats, or answering of legal enquiries. Footnotes [54] Identified weaknesses and breaches concerning Art. 16 of the FM-GwG. [55] In addition, two sanctions were imposed, which were appealed. In one case, the FMA has been upheld in the merits, and the fine was reduced. In the other case, the FMA has been confirmed for the second time by the Federal Administrative Court (BVwG), and the matter is pending before the Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH) in the second round of legal proceedings. [56] In addition, four sanctions were imposed, which were appealed. All proceedings are currently pending before the BVwG, three of which have been suspended due to preliminary ruling requests submitted by the BVwG to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="365. The number of remedial actions applied across the DNFBP sector, except for casinos, is very low, and most authorities could not demonstrate a positive impact of supervisory and remedial actions. For casinos, very regular supervisory actions are conducted and provided examples demonstrated that upon identification of deficiencies, the OE was notified and subsequently improved the relevant AML/CFT controls. While supervisors of notaries, lawyers, tax advisors and accountants have intensified systematic supervisory activities and incorporated AML/CFT matters into staff training, the persistent failure to detect systemic and serious infringements—together with the consequent insufficient application of remedial measures and proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in follow‑up to supervisory findings—adversely affects the effective implementation of adequate compliance controls. Similarly, although the number of STRs/SARs submitted by some sectors, in particular notaries, has improved slightly, STRs/SARs across the entire DNFBP sector remain low and the progress achieved is not sufficient to demonstrate a relevant impact of supervisory actions and outreach initiatives." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="365. The number of remedial actions applied across the DNFBP sector, except for casinos, is very low, and most authorities could not demonstrate a positive impact of supervisory and remedial actions. For casinos, very regular supervisory actions are conducted and provided examples demonstrated that upon identification of deficiencies, the OE was notified and subsequently improved the relevant AML/CFT controls. While supervisors of notaries, lawyers, tax advisors and accountants have intensified systematic supervisory activities and incorporated AML/CFT matters into staff training, the persistent failure to detect systemic and serious infringements—together with the consequent insufficient application of remedial measures and proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in follow‑up to supervisory findings—adversely affects the effective implementation of adequate compliance controls. Similarly, although the number of STRs/SARs submitted by some sectors, in particular notaries, has improved slightly, STRs/SARs across the entire DNFBP sector remain low and the progress achieved is not sufficient to demonstrate a relevant impact of supervisory actions and outreach initiatives." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="537. Austria has a mechanism to return property to victims. Cases reviewed show that victims/private claimants participated in the criminal proceedings and were regularly awarded compensation. In addition, several judgments also showed that Austria regularly often returns seized assets to victims already during the investigation phase. The country does not maintain information on the value of returned assets or on how often restitution takes place. However, the moderate level of seizures indicates that the amount of returned assets is also likely to be moderate at best. 538. At the same time, several cases indicated that assets seized and confiscated were often insufficient to satisfy the victims’ claims. Austria has taken legislative measures in 2024 to widen the possibility of restitution of seized assets to victims before a final judgement. This can now take place either ex officio or at the request of the victim—if possible, after the accused has been heard. As such, restitution of assets to victims can no longer be blocked by an impossibility of hearing or locating the accused, strengthening victims’ rights and a faster path to compensation. As the provision is new, there is no sufficient experience with its application yet" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="537. Austria has a mechanism to return property to victims. Cases reviewed show that victims/private claimants participated in the criminal proceedings and were regularly awarded compensation. In addition, several judgments also showed that Austria regularly often returns seized assets to victims already during the investigation phase. The country does not maintain information on the value of returned assets or on how often restitution takes place. However, the moderate level of seizures indicates that the amount of returned assets is also likely to be moderate at best. 538. At the same time, several cases indicated that assets seized and confiscated were often insufficient to satisfy the victims’ claims. Austria has taken legislative measures in 2024 to widen the possibility of restitution of seized assets to victims before a final judgement. This can now take place either ex officio or at the request of the victim—if possible, after the accused has been heard. As such, restitution of assets to victims can no longer be blocked by an impossibility of hearing or locating the accused, strengthening victims’ rights and a faster path to compensation. As the provision is new, there is no sufficient experience with its application yet" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs 643. As described in IO.10, the OeNB’s supervision did not distinguish between TF- and PF-related TFS . The findings of IO.10, including identified deficiencies, therefore equally apply to IO.11. 644. Since end 2024, the scope of the FMA’s supervision was extended to include supervision of internal risk assessments, strategies, checks and procedures for the prevention of non-implementation and evasion of PF-TFS by FIs and VASPs, consistent with the FATF Recommendations, requiring organisational measures and training that OEs are required to implement . With the extension of the FMA’s scope of supervision, the FMA complemented its annual risk assessment questionnaire with PF-related questions (see above), included specific PF risk factors in its RAT, conducted a PF market analysis, monitored observances of these rules and issued guidance on a dedicated homepage. 11.6.2. VASPs and DNFBPs 645. As described in IO.10, monitoring of compliance with TFS obligations by VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs in line with the FATF Standard does not take place, nor did these OEs benefit from TFS-related guidance . [159] 646. The DSN nevertheless engages with the OEs under its supervision on TFS to some extent . Considering Austria’s strategically important industrial manufacturing with many companies producing proliferation-sensitive goods, the DSN reaches out to companies which it identifies as being vulnerable to threats of espionage and proliferation, as well as their service providers (i.e., FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs). It raises awareness about the application of financial sanctions, sanctions evasion, and related legal consequences (i.e., DSN’s preventive measures). While these preventive measures focus both on sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and other EU sanctions regimes, the 260 monitoring and awareness-raising activities conducted between mid-2022 and mid-2025 have been mainly driven by autonomous EU sanctions. Around 30% of these activities targeted VASPs and DNFBPs. Footnotes [159] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance for the implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its website." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs 643. As described in IO.10, the OeNB’s supervision did not distinguish between TF- and PF-related TFS . The findings of IO.10, including identified deficiencies, therefore equally apply to IO.11. 644. Since end 2024, the scope of the FMA’s supervision was extended to include supervision of internal risk assessments, strategies, checks and procedures for the prevention of non-implementation and evasion of PF-TFS by FIs and VASPs, consistent with the FATF Recommendations, requiring organisational measures and training that OEs are required to implement . With the extension of the FMA’s scope of supervision, the FMA complemented its annual risk assessment questionnaire with PF-related questions (see above), included specific PF risk factors in its RAT, conducted a PF market analysis, monitored observances of these rules and issued guidance on a dedicated homepage. 11.6.2. VASPs and DNFBPs 645. As described in IO.10, monitoring of compliance with TFS obligations by VASPs, insurance intermediaries, ISPs, asset managers, and DNFBPs in line with the FATF Standard does not take place, nor did these OEs benefit from TFS-related guidance . [159] 646. The DSN nevertheless engages with the OEs under its supervision on TFS to some extent . Considering Austria’s strategically important industrial manufacturing with many companies producing proliferation-sensitive goods, the DSN reaches out to companies which it identifies as being vulnerable to threats of espionage and proliferation, as well as their service providers (i.e., FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs). It raises awareness about the application of financial sanctions, sanctions evasion, and related legal consequences (i.e., DSN’s preventive measures). While these preventive measures focus both on sanctions pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and other EU sanctions regimes, the 260 monitoring and awareness-raising activities conducted between mid-2022 and mid-2025 have been mainly driven by autonomous EU sanctions. Around 30% of these activities targeted VASPs and DNFBPs. Footnotes [159] On 16 September 2025, DSN published high-level guidance for the implementation of financial sanctions, including but not limited to TFS, on its website." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 539. Austria has some measures to detect and prevent cross-border movements of currency and BNIs with a focus on its external EU borders but has not implemented them in line with its risk profile. It does not maintain records on the amounts of cash and BNI seized or confiscated. Overall, there is insufficient evidence of measures, strategies, or objectives aimed at detecting cash and BNI at the EU internal borders, despite Austria’s position as a transit country and cross-border cash smuggling and hawala being identified as common ML and TF methods. 540. There is a declaration system in place for all persons entering or leaving its EU external borders with currency or BNIs above a EUR 10 000 threshold. In addition, Austria has also implemented a disclosure system which requires movements within the EU to be disclosed to Customs officials. The number of cash/BNI declarations and disclosures received over the past years is relatively stable, with BNIs playing virtually no role. Table 8.8. Cash/BNI declarations and disclosures Year Declarations Incoming - Cash Declarations - Incoming - BNI Incoming declarations - Volume in EUR millions Declarations Outgoing - Cash Declarations Outgoing - BNI Outgoing declarations - Volume in EUR millions 2020 1 199 0 1.27 761 0 1.28 2021 (until 02 June) 450 0 0.44 375 0 1.10 2021 (after 02 June) 840 0 3.77 685 1 1.96 2022 1 191 1 1.48 1 201 0 1.90 2023 1 165 1 0.93 1 160 0 1.26 2024 1 267 0 0.84 1 221 0 1.51 Note: Until 2 June 2021, all precious metals, such as gold, silver and platinum, had to be declared directly to Austria when they were brought across the customs border. Therefore, the total amounts also include the values of precious metal shipments. With the entry into force of EU Regulation 2018/1672, gold coins, gold bars and gold nuggets are now also subject to declaration when imported into the European Union and are included in the total amount of cash. Source: Austrian authorities 541. In relation to controls at its external EU borders, there was a short-term increase in the number of controls, seizures and identified false declarations at Austria’s EU borders likely due to an initial period of adjustment to the entry into force of EU Regulation 2018/1672 in June 2021 . According to the authorities, many travellers were largely unaware of the declaration obligation at the time the regulation was introduced—which led to a higher number of withheld cash. The awareness of the obligation has increased significantly in the following years. Table 8.9. Controls and number of false declarations identified Year Controls at EU's external border False Declarations Cash/BNIs Seized 2020 117 535 14 36 2021 (until 2 June 2021) 120 954 23 123 2021 (after 2 June 2021) 20 2022 139 661 60 74 2023 141 772 73 82 2024 110 287 83 89 Source: Austrian authorities 542. More recently, Customs adapted their strategy to conduct fewer but more targeted checks. In 2025, the authorities are introducing a tool called &quot;risk person&quot; which contains a database of persons who have already been convicted for failing to declare cash movements, to facilitate their identification, but no results concerning its application were available . The figures on controls at the EU external borders for 2024 show a significant decrease in controls at the EU external border, but at the same time an increase in the number of seizures. 543. Mobile control units participate in the monitoring the movement of cash across borders, which triggers criminal investigations. There is no evidence that they trigger ML investigations or prosecutions more than only very rarely, which the authorities attribute in particular to the design of the ML offence (section 7.1). In 2024, the mobile control units identified 32 violations of the obligation to provide information. Further questioning revealed that in 28 of these cases, a declaration obligation upon entry into the EU in another Member State had been breached. In all of these cases, criminal proceedings were initiated in accordance with Section 48a of the Fiscal Penal Code. The data collected on the persons involved were forwarded to the A-FIU, the Tax Authority and the Anti-Fraud Office. It is not known if cases have triggered prosecution for ML. 544. There is no evidence that assets temporarily withheld by Customs are systemically subjected to subsequent criminal seizure in the context of criminal investigations . The authorities indicated that the cross-border transfer of large suitcases of cash of unknow origin alone would not per se give sufficient ground for criminal prosecution, even though the NCBC mechanism could provide an appropriate confiscation tool in this context. The authorities indicated that the withheld cash can be used to satisfy executable tax claims against individuals who failed to declare the cash at the border but provided no evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 545. Austria has not provided data on the amount of cross-border currency confiscated during the review period . The country is a cash-intensive eurozone economy, which makes it an attractive destination to launder foreign and domestic proceeds of crime. Case studies provided show that controls uncovered cases of large cash transports, but the authorities could not evidence that such cases led to confiscation orders, in the context of ML or other crimes. The 2016 MER recommended Austria to ensure a more deterrent system for the confiscation of undeclared or falsely declared cross-border movements of currency/BNIs. There is no evidence that the country has taken measures to address that. 8.7.3. Sanctions 546. Austria did not provide evidence of any sanctions imposed for violations of declaration and disclosure obligations nor any on the control of mail and cargo. The country does not maintain records on the amount of cash and BNI seized at its borders, internal or external. Similarly, there is no information on the submitted controls or disclosures received in relation to its EU internal borders." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 539. Austria has some measures to detect and prevent cross-border movements of currency and BNIs with a focus on its external EU borders but has not implemented them in line with its risk profile. It does not maintain records on the amounts of cash and BNI seized or confiscated. Overall, there is insufficient evidence of measures, strategies, or objectives aimed at detecting cash and BNI at the EU internal borders, despite Austria’s position as a transit country and cross-border cash smuggling and hawala being identified as common ML and TF methods. 540. There is a declaration system in place for all persons entering or leaving its EU external borders with currency or BNIs above a EUR 10 000 threshold. In addition, Austria has also implemented a disclosure system which requires movements within the EU to be disclosed to Customs officials. The number of cash/BNI declarations and disclosures received over the past years is relatively stable, with BNIs playing virtually no role. Table 8.8. Cash/BNI declarations and disclosures Year Declarations Incoming - Cash Declarations - Incoming - BNI Incoming declarations - Volume in EUR millions Declarations Outgoing - Cash Declarations Outgoing - BNI Outgoing declarations - Volume in EUR millions 2020 1 199 0 1.27 761 0 1.28 2021 (until 02 June) 450 0 0.44 375 0 1.10 2021 (after 02 June) 840 0 3.77 685 1 1.96 2022 1 191 1 1.48 1 201 0 1.90 2023 1 165 1 0.93 1 160 0 1.26 2024 1 267 0 0.84 1 221 0 1.51 Note: Until 2 June 2021, all precious metals, such as gold, silver and platinum, had to be declared directly to Austria when they were brought across the customs border. Therefore, the total amounts also include the values of precious metal shipments. With the entry into force of EU Regulation 2018/1672, gold coins, gold bars and gold nuggets are now also subject to declaration when imported into the European Union and are included in the total amount of cash. Source: Austrian authorities 541. In relation to controls at its external EU borders, there was a short-term increase in the number of controls, seizures and identified false declarations at Austria’s EU borders likely due to an initial period of adjustment to the entry into force of EU Regulation 2018/1672 in June 2021 . According to the authorities, many travellers were largely unaware of the declaration obligation at the time the regulation was introduced—which led to a higher number of withheld cash. The awareness of the obligation has increased significantly in the following years. Table 8.9. Controls and number of false declarations identified Year Controls at EU's external border False Declarations Cash/BNIs Seized 2020 117 535 14 36 2021 (until 2 June 2021) 120 954 23 123 2021 (after 2 June 2021) 20 2022 139 661 60 74 2023 141 772 73 82 2024 110 287 83 89 Source: Austrian authorities 542. More recently, Customs adapted their strategy to conduct fewer but more targeted checks. In 2025, the authorities are introducing a tool called &quot;risk person&quot; which contains a database of persons who have already been convicted for failing to declare cash movements, to facilitate their identification, but no results concerning its application were available . The figures on controls at the EU external borders for 2024 show a significant decrease in controls at the EU external border, but at the same time an increase in the number of seizures. 543. Mobile control units participate in the monitoring the movement of cash across borders, which triggers criminal investigations. There is no evidence that they trigger ML investigations or prosecutions more than only very rarely, which the authorities attribute in particular to the design of the ML offence (section 7.1). In 2024, the mobile control units identified 32 violations of the obligation to provide information. Further questioning revealed that in 28 of these cases, a declaration obligation upon entry into the EU in another Member State had been breached. In all of these cases, criminal proceedings were initiated in accordance with Section 48a of the Fiscal Penal Code. The data collected on the persons involved were forwarded to the A-FIU, the Tax Authority and the Anti-Fraud Office. It is not known if cases have triggered prosecution for ML. 544. There is no evidence that assets temporarily withheld by Customs are systemically subjected to subsequent criminal seizure in the context of criminal investigations . The authorities indicated that the cross-border transfer of large suitcases of cash of unknow origin alone would not per se give sufficient ground for criminal prosecution, even though the NCBC mechanism could provide an appropriate confiscation tool in this context. The authorities indicated that the withheld cash can be used to satisfy executable tax claims against individuals who failed to declare the cash at the border but provided no evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 545. Austria has not provided data on the amount of cross-border currency confiscated during the review period . The country is a cash-intensive eurozone economy, which makes it an attractive destination to launder foreign and domestic proceeds of crime. Case studies provided show that controls uncovered cases of large cash transports, but the authorities could not evidence that such cases led to confiscation orders, in the context of ML or other crimes. The 2016 MER recommended Austria to ensure a more deterrent system for the confiscation of undeclared or falsely declared cross-border movements of currency/BNIs. There is no evidence that the country has taken measures to address that. 8.7.3. Sanctions 546. Austria did not provide evidence of any sanctions imposed for violations of declaration and disclosure obligations nor any on the control of mail and cargo. The country does not maintain records on the amount of cash and BNI seized at its borders, internal or external. Similarly, there is no information on the submitted controls or disclosures received in relation to its EU internal borders." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="84. Overall, Italy has a well-developed understanding of its ML and TF risks. Since 2014, Italy has completed three ML/TF national risk assessments (NRAs) and continues to update and adapt its NRA regularly with the next iteration to be finalised in 2028. The regular updates of the NRA have helped ensure risk findings are informed by the latest financial crime landscape and emerging threats, such as new financial crime typologies that appeared during the COVID-19 pandemic. Italy’s ML/TF risks are diverse and include both domestic and foreign illicit financial threats. 85. Italy’s NRA uses a robust, well-defined and comprehensive assessment methodology which follows from and modifies the methodology used in the earlier iterations of the NRA in 2014 and 2018. The NRA assessed residual risks based on inherent risks and the effectiveness of mitigation measures at the national level. This was complimented by a sectoral analysis of each category of financial intermediary, professionals and non-financial operators. The sectoral part of the NRA assessed vulnerabilities in relation to the operations of the analysed category. However, there are deficiencies in the sources of information accessed to develop risk understanding. Specifically, the NRA did not use quantitative data from law enforcement agencies on predicate offences underlying ML offences (which Italy does not monitor) to help determine the risk profile of the country. Instead, Italy used more general information on total estimated illegal proceeds related to predicate offences and the sanctions applied for them. 86. All relevant AML/CFT authorities in Italy contributed to the NRA through the Financial Security Committee (FSC), which presided over the NRA process. The cooperation between authorities through the FSC has contributed to a strong shared understanding of the key risks that Italy faces. The NRA process also involved substantial input from the private sector, which was collected via questionnaires and engagements organised by professional associations for financial institutions, DNFBPs, as well as other professions with AML/CFT obligations under Italy law. In particular, Italy relied heavily on private sector feedback to help assess risks related to emerging sectors such as virtual assets. 87. Further, key authorities continuously assess inherent risks in critical sectors through strategic and operational risk products. The Bank of Italy (BoI) conducts risk analyses of the different financial sub-sectors to better understand specific risk factors posed by the different products and services offered by the various FIs. This assessment is based on an evaluation of risk factors that characterize the FIs in each sector, such as the products and services offered, distribution channels, customer characteristics, cash transactions, cross-border operations, and operations with high-risk countries. Since 2023, the BoI has used a data-driven algorithm, information gained from supervisory activities and from the supervised entities themselves, and qualitative assessments to determine risk ratings for individual obliged entities. 88. The GdF conducts operational risk analyses that merge information gained from inspections of DNFBPs and from judicial investigations, as well as other sources such as tax data. The UIF conducts annual or semi-annual projects, which are based on a wide set of information, namely aggregate STR analysis, SARA reports, gold-transactions declarations, and threshold-based communications on cash and are focused on specific sectors or challenges such as the risks posed by the use of cash or the gold sector. 89. The FSC proactively disseminates the results of the NRA with stakeholders, including with the private sector. Most recently a sanitised version of the NRA was shared with key obliged entities in May 2025. FIs leverage the NRA findings to inform their own self-risk assessments, which is mandated by the BoI, and these appear to be well-developed and detailed, especially for the larger institutions. The VASPs met with during the on-site visit also indicated that they prepare self-risk assessments. 90. Self-Regulatory Bodies (SRBs) of lawyers, notaries and accountants also participated in the development of the NRA, and Italy has made efforts in recent years to enhance SRBs’ understanding of the risks. While these efforts have been more successful with certain SRBs than others, they have somewhat contributed to a rise in the ML/TF risk awareness of obliged entities in some non-financial sectors. For example, Italy has made concerted efforts to reach notaries, as key intermediaries for significant financial transactions in Italy, through the corresponding SRB, resulting in a more systematic approach to training notaries on their AML/CFT obligations and a greater risk awareness in the sector. However, other high-risk sectors, as identified in the NRA, retain lower levels of understanding such as lawyers, which have not taken a systematic approach to AML/CFT training through their SRB and have independently claimed their sector is at low risk for ML/TF, despite case examples of abuse of lawyers in complex ML schemes in Italy. This has created uneven levels of risk understanding among the DNFBPs, though Italy has made some efforts to tackle this deficiency already, as discussed above. 1.1.1. ML risks 91. Italy’s assessment of its ML risk is reasonably sound. The NRA has characterised the traditional ML risk areas such as organised crime and tax offences as critical issues which pose high (or “very significant”) ML risk. According to NRA 2024 and acknowledging the deficiency related to specific data on ML predicates noted above, Italy identified corruption, extortion, tax evasion and offences, drug trafficking and bankruptcy and corporate offences as the predicate offences posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by counterfeiting, smuggling, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, illicit waste trafficking, gambling, fraud and usury. In terms of sectoral risks, fiduciary companies, DPMS, and lawyers are assessed as having the highest inherent ML risks. Emerging risks such as those related to virtual assets have been thoroughly assessed in the NRA. Insurance companies and non-bank intermediaries such as investment firms are considered to have medium inherent risks, which are offset by the high level of supervision by the BoI. As a result, these two sectors are assessed as having medium ML risks. 92. For certain high-risk areas, such as corruption, Italy has published a series of indicators to help improve the public and private sector understanding of corruption-related risks. Public offices that handle administrative procedures in specific public sectors (public tenders and contracts, public funding, real estate and trade) are required to communicate to the UIF detected suspicious transactions. The UIF has issued risk indicators linked to projects and activities funded with EU resources. The UIF and GdF collaborate and use their analytical tools to identify anomalous patterns around these risks, such as criminal abuse related to Italy’s COVID-19 economic recovery incentives. While the NRA lacks detail on certain areas of significant ML risk such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, these have been the subject of risk analyses by the authorities previously, such as in the 2018 and 2014 NRAs and separate UIF analysis. In advance of the latest NRA, the Italian authorities considered, the specific threats posed by these activities for Italy have not changed substantially over the past 10 years. 93. Despite Italy’s reasonably sound understanding of risks, Italian authorities do not share a common understanding of geographic risks posed by foreign jurisdictions and assess these risks using different methodologies. For instance, the UIF maintains an internal list of “risky” jurisdictions based on STR analysis, the BoI consolidates public international lists of riskier foreign jurisdictions, and the GdF has its own internal methodology to assess geographic risks that incorporates broader data on economic and security threats. Geographic risks posed by foreign jurisdictions are not well detailed in the NRA beyond those related to topics such as cross-border currency controls or human trafficking, and there is little cooperation between authorities on how best to assess these specific risks. 1.1.2. TF Risks 94. The NRA is less well developed in detailing TF risks, mainly due to variations in the availability of foundational information and data. The NRA relies predominantly on STR analysis with the addition of some open-source and intelligence information, as well as a few private sector reflections. A particular concern is the lack of information on TF international flows and the most frequently used TF typologies for such flows, which Italy indicated may be discussed by the relevant authorities in classified environments but have not been codified. While Italy has identified hawala, cash couriers and electronic money instruments as major mechanisms for TF, the particular risks from these activities have not been fully developed. Further, the authorities do not have a detailed understanding of the use of Italy as a source of terror financing abroad, as authorities link the risk of TF with the risk of terrorism within Italy. 95. While key authorities such as the UIF and GdF demonstrate a good understanding of the various TF risks and vulnerabilities the broader counterterrorism authorities do not fully share this understanding. Discrepancies exist in the alignment of the significant risk posed by lone wolf operators, who rely on micro-financing and Italy’s focus on complex while pursuing TF financiers. (Refer to IO9). Simple TF and small transfers are identified as Italy’s highest TF threat based on open-source reporting and reflections from terrorism investigations. 96. The 2024 NRA identified the risk of TF in Italy to be medium (or “rather significant”). International religious terrorism such as jihadism continues to pose the most substantial TF risk. TF risks related to domestic left-wing terrorist groups are also present but less substantial than international religious terrorism. Other TF risks posed by threats such as right-wing terrorism were analysed but were not considered very substantial. Italy has identified the abuse of prepaid cards and money transfers as the two most prominent vulnerabilities for TF, which Italy mostly tracks through STR analysis, followed by hawala networks, which Italy tracks through tools to identify the anomalous use of cash." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="84. Overall, Italy has a well-developed understanding of its ML and TF risks. Since 2014, Italy has completed three ML/TF national risk assessments (NRAs) and continues to update and adapt its NRA regularly with the next iteration to be finalised in 2028. The regular updates of the NRA have helped ensure risk findings are informed by the latest financial crime landscape and emerging threats, such as new financial crime typologies that appeared during the COVID-19 pandemic. Italy’s ML/TF risks are diverse and include both domestic and foreign illicit financial threats. 85. Italy’s NRA uses a robust, well-defined and comprehensive assessment methodology which follows from and modifies the methodology used in the earlier iterations of the NRA in 2014 and 2018. The NRA assessed residual risks based on inherent risks and the effectiveness of mitigation measures at the national level. This was complimented by a sectoral analysis of each category of financial intermediary, professionals and non-financial operators. The sectoral part of the NRA assessed vulnerabilities in relation to the operations of the analysed category. However, there are deficiencies in the sources of information accessed to develop risk understanding. Specifically, the NRA did not use quantitative data from law enforcement agencies on predicate offences underlying ML offences (which Italy does not monitor) to help determine the risk profile of the country. Instead, Italy used more general information on total estimated illegal proceeds related to predicate offences and the sanctions applied for them. 86. All relevant AML/CFT authorities in Italy contributed to the NRA through the Financial Security Committee (FSC), which presided over the NRA process. The cooperation between authorities through the FSC has contributed to a strong shared understanding of the key risks that Italy faces. The NRA process also involved substantial input from the private sector, which was collected via questionnaires and engagements organised by professional associations for financial institutions, DNFBPs, as well as other professions with AML/CFT obligations under Italy law. In particular, Italy relied heavily on private sector feedback to help assess risks related to emerging sectors such as virtual assets. 87. Further, key authorities continuously assess inherent risks in critical sectors through strategic and operational risk products. The Bank of Italy (BoI) conducts risk analyses of the different financial sub-sectors to better understand specific risk factors posed by the different products and services offered by the various FIs. This assessment is based on an evaluation of risk factors that characterize the FIs in each sector, such as the products and services offered, distribution channels, customer characteristics, cash transactions, cross-border operations, and operations with high-risk countries. Since 2023, the BoI has used a data-driven algorithm, information gained from supervisory activities and from the supervised entities themselves, and qualitative assessments to determine risk ratings for individual obliged entities. 88. The GdF conducts operational risk analyses that merge information gained from inspections of DNFBPs and from judicial investigations, as well as other sources such as tax data. The UIF conducts annual or semi-annual projects, which are based on a wide set of information, namely aggregate STR analysis, SARA reports, gold-transactions declarations, and threshold-based communications on cash and are focused on specific sectors or challenges such as the risks posed by the use of cash or the gold sector. 89. The FSC proactively disseminates the results of the NRA with stakeholders, including with the private sector. Most recently a sanitised version of the NRA was shared with key obliged entities in May 2025. FIs leverage the NRA findings to inform their own self-risk assessments, which is mandated by the BoI, and these appear to be well-developed and detailed, especially for the larger institutions. The VASPs met with during the on-site visit also indicated that they prepare self-risk assessments. 90. Self-Regulatory Bodies (SRBs) of lawyers, notaries and accountants also participated in the development of the NRA, and Italy has made efforts in recent years to enhance SRBs’ understanding of the risks. While these efforts have been more successful with certain SRBs than others, they have somewhat contributed to a rise in the ML/TF risk awareness of obliged entities in some non-financial sectors. For example, Italy has made concerted efforts to reach notaries, as key intermediaries for significant financial transactions in Italy, through the corresponding SRB, resulting in a more systematic approach to training notaries on their AML/CFT obligations and a greater risk awareness in the sector. However, other high-risk sectors, as identified in the NRA, retain lower levels of understanding such as lawyers, which have not taken a systematic approach to AML/CFT training through their SRB and have independently claimed their sector is at low risk for ML/TF, despite case examples of abuse of lawyers in complex ML schemes in Italy. This has created uneven levels of risk understanding among the DNFBPs, though Italy has made some efforts to tackle this deficiency already, as discussed above. 1.1.1. ML risks 91. Italy’s assessment of its ML risk is reasonably sound. The NRA has characterised the traditional ML risk areas such as organised crime and tax offences as critical issues which pose high (or “very significant”) ML risk. According to NRA 2024 and acknowledging the deficiency related to specific data on ML predicates noted above, Italy identified corruption, extortion, tax evasion and offences, drug trafficking and bankruptcy and corporate offences as the predicate offences posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by counterfeiting, smuggling, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, illicit waste trafficking, gambling, fraud and usury. In terms of sectoral risks, fiduciary companies, DPMS, and lawyers are assessed as having the highest inherent ML risks. Emerging risks such as those related to virtual assets have been thoroughly assessed in the NRA. Insurance companies and non-bank intermediaries such as investment firms are considered to have medium inherent risks, which are offset by the high level of supervision by the BoI. As a result, these two sectors are assessed as having medium ML risks. 92. For certain high-risk areas, such as corruption, Italy has published a series of indicators to help improve the public and private sector understanding of corruption-related risks. Public offices that handle administrative procedures in specific public sectors (public tenders and contracts, public funding, real estate and trade) are required to communicate to the UIF detected suspicious transactions. The UIF has issued risk indicators linked to projects and activities funded with EU resources. The UIF and GdF collaborate and use their analytical tools to identify anomalous patterns around these risks, such as criminal abuse related to Italy’s COVID-19 economic recovery incentives. While the NRA lacks detail on certain areas of significant ML risk such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, these have been the subject of risk analyses by the authorities previously, such as in the 2018 and 2014 NRAs and separate UIF analysis. In advance of the latest NRA, the Italian authorities considered, the specific threats posed by these activities for Italy have not changed substantially over the past 10 years. 93. Despite Italy’s reasonably sound understanding of risks, Italian authorities do not share a common understanding of geographic risks posed by foreign jurisdictions and assess these risks using different methodologies. For instance, the UIF maintains an internal list of “risky” jurisdictions based on STR analysis, the BoI consolidates public international lists of riskier foreign jurisdictions, and the GdF has its own internal methodology to assess geographic risks that incorporates broader data on economic and security threats. Geographic risks posed by foreign jurisdictions are not well detailed in the NRA beyond those related to topics such as cross-border currency controls or human trafficking, and there is little cooperation between authorities on how best to assess these specific risks. 1.1.2. TF Risks 94. The NRA is less well developed in detailing TF risks, mainly due to variations in the availability of foundational information and data. The NRA relies predominantly on STR analysis with the addition of some open-source and intelligence information, as well as a few private sector reflections. A particular concern is the lack of information on TF international flows and the most frequently used TF typologies for such flows, which Italy indicated may be discussed by the relevant authorities in classified environments but have not been codified. While Italy has identified hawala, cash couriers and electronic money instruments as major mechanisms for TF, the particular risks from these activities have not been fully developed. Further, the authorities do not have a detailed understanding of the use of Italy as a source of terror financing abroad, as authorities link the risk of TF with the risk of terrorism within Italy. 95. While key authorities such as the UIF and GdF demonstrate a good understanding of the various TF risks and vulnerabilities the broader counterterrorism authorities do not fully share this understanding. Discrepancies exist in the alignment of the significant risk posed by lone wolf operators, who rely on micro-financing and Italy’s focus on complex while pursuing TF financiers. (Refer to IO9). Simple TF and small transfers are identified as Italy’s highest TF threat based on open-source reporting and reflections from terrorism investigations. 96. The 2024 NRA identified the risk of TF in Italy to be medium (or “rather significant”). International religious terrorism such as jihadism continues to pose the most substantial TF risk. TF risks related to domestic left-wing terrorist groups are also present but less substantial than international religious terrorism. Other TF risks posed by threats such as right-wing terrorism were analysed but were not considered very substantial. Italy has identified the abuse of prepaid cards and money transfers as the two most prominent vulnerabilities for TF, which Italy mostly tracks through STR analysis, followed by hawala networks, which Italy tracks through tools to identify the anomalous use of cash." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 129. There are two parallel mechanisms used in Italy to respond to international requests to provide evidence and locate criminals on behalf of a foreign authority. One builds on the EU legislation on European investigation orders (EIO’s) which facilitates direct and seamless cooperation. The other is based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or reciprocity and establishes a more traditional international cooperation framework for requests of mutual legal assistance (MLA’s). Through either of these, Italy can provide very broad range of assistance in criminal matters. 130. The Ministry of Justice (The Directorate-General for International Affairs and Judicial Cooperation, Office I) (‘MoJ’) is the Central Authority for international judicial cooperation. As Central Authority, the MoJ receives letters rotatory in international criminal matters, including MLAs. The MoJ distributes the requests to the appropriate competent authorities for execution since the MoJ itself is not usually directly involved in the execution of requests. The executing competent authority can, without the involvement of the Central Authority, send the request to another unit or competent authority, if appropriate. 131. Competent authorities generally execute requests in a chronological order as they are received but the seriousness of the offence as well as the urgency of the matter are important factors for prioritisation. The Italian authorities informed that they make every effort to respond to every request that comes in. Case studies presented as well as feedback from the FATF global network, reflected that the competent authorities were providing judicial assistance to countries in criminal matters, usually with good quality and within a reasonable time. 132. The MoJ uses computerised case management systems to facilitate the processing of all international requests, including MLA’s. The most established is the web-based document management software system called ‘Calliope’ which enables automatic registration and transmission of requests to the competent executing authority through a paperless network. The system processes requests according to a strict chronological order, which can be overridden if a particularly urgent situation is presented from an Italian or foreign authority. The Calliope enables the MoJ to monitor actions taken on specific judicial assistance or extradition requests as well as the timeliness of responses. Such monitoring is conducted whenever necessary based on emerging needs or specific requests coming from either Italian or foreign authorities. However, it was not demonstrated that the MoJ regularly and systematically uses the Calliope software to monitor the quality and to enforce the timelines for the execution of requests. There is also no other process at national level for monitoring the quality and timeliness of the requests in their entirety, which means that any challenges faced for execution are not routinely identified, which may affect the possibilities for Italy to effectively identify any emerging needs for improvement of its mutual legal assistance system. However, direct engagement between foreign authorities and regional PPOs to process various international requests, contributes to speed and connectivity. Such requests are made under the applicable EU-regulations which contains clear time frames and mechanisms which facilitate follow-up through direct contact between domestic and foreign authorities. Thus, the risk that requests are falling through the cracks is not a significant one in the case of Italy. 133. Since 2017, the ‘Watson’ software is used alongside the Calliope. Watson is able to create statistical reports on international cooperation requests, distinguished by country, crime category, legal basis and type of activity. However, at the time of the on-site, the Watson software was still in the process of being populated in view of some glitches that had been identified. This meant that during this period, Italy’s case management systems for its international cooperation framework (particularly for EIOs and MLAs) both for requests within and outside the EU did not provide effective oversight or allow effective monitoring for the quality and timeliness of international requests [11] . 134. Within the EU framework, EIOs are received directly by the Public Prosecutors Office (PPO) and captured chronologically in 26 Assistenza Giudiziaria Internazionale (AGI) regional registers maintained by the respective regional PPO. While this allows for some monitoring, foreign judicial counterparts usually follow up directly with the Italian judicial authorities. EIOs are governed by EU Regulations which prescribe timelines (90 days from the receipt of the EIO, unless the requesting country indicates urgency), and which are monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region. The assigned Public Prosecutor (PP) is also obliged to notify both the MoJ and the DNA of the receipt of an EIO. The DNA will have a coordinating role for crimes handled by the DNA (mafia-style crimes, organised criminality, terrorism and cybercrimes). 135. As reflected in tables 2.1, Italy received 10 260 MLA requests over the evaluation period, of which 3324 related to ML/TF. In addition, Italy received 11 844 EIOs over the same period, with an average of over 2 000 requests annually. Significant number of requests received related to offences against property, counterfeiting, economic and trade-related offences, terrorism and drug-related offences and the average completion time was one and a half months. Italy has not been able to provide statistics on how many requests had been executed and how many remained pending. Nevertheless, feedback relating to EIOs from the FATF Global Network was generally satisfactory with occasional delays. Table 2.1. Legal Assistance Requests Received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of MLA requests received 2 049 1 244 490 3 907 2 444 126 10 260 Nos of EIO requests received 2 066 2 199 2 335 2 149 1 987 1 108 11 844 Box 2.1. MLA with the Vatican City Vatican City made an MLA request to Italy in February 2021 in relation to an ongoing investigation for the crimes of embezzlement, abuse of office, fraud, and self-laundering involving illicit real estate investment in London. Vatican City requested copies of the investigation findings conducted by the Rome Prosecutor’s Office which was conducting an investigation on the same property. The MoJ as the central authority forwarded the request to the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Rome. In March 2021, the Rome judicial authority ordered the transmission to the MoJ of the crime report and the indictment order for the requesting State’s authorities. MoJ forwarded this to the MFA, which transmitted the documents to the Vatican City authorities. There were several follow-up requests on this investigation in 2022 and 2023 which were duly executed by the Italian authorities. 2.1.2. Extradition 136. The mechanisms through which criminals can be extradited from Italy are either under the EU's European arrest warrants (EAW) framework, or under the frameworks of bilateral and multilateral treaties or based on under reciprocity assurances. Italy has entered into extradition arrangements with a broad range of countries, especially since 2024. 137. The MoJ is the Central Authority for extradition requests outside the EU framework. It uses the Calliope software to receive and transmit extradition requests as described above. Within the EU framework, EAWs are received directly by the PPO and are recorded chronologically in the 26 AGI regional registers. However, the decision to extradite, surrender or return the fugitive is a decision made by court. Both are supported by the Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP) under the Ministry of Interior in dealing also with INTERPOL’s Red Notices and Diffusions. 138. Unlike MLA requests, the court procedures for extradition and EAWs prescribe strict timelines failing which the fugitive must be released. Most extradition requests are based on bilateral or multilateral treaties and about 10% based on reciprocity assurance. Significant number of extradition requests and requests to execute EAWs related to property offences, counterfeiting offences, narcotics offences, sexual crimes, economic trade related offences and tax and customs offences. As reflected in Table 2.2, over the evaluation period, Italy received 1382 extradition requests and 2889 EAWs. 139. At the time of the onsite, Italy was working to implement the IT system for collecting and managing international judicial cooperation procedures and therefore was not able to present statistics how many of these had been executed and rejected, and how many remained pending. However, Italy provided cases where extradition requests were executed which reflected a functioning framework. Authorities confirmed that most of the rejections were related to human rights concerns and the availability of death penalty for the offence for which extradition was requested, these concerns did not usually come up for ML/TF requests. Feedback relating to extradition requests from the FATF Global Network noted some instances of delays, but more positive for the execution of EAWs. Table 2.2. Extradition and EAW Requests Received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of extradition requests received 223 206 195 332 307 119 1 382 Nos of EAW requests received 478 566 426 593 545 281 2 889 Box 2.2. Extradition to the USA In October 2021, the USA issued an arrest warrant against a non-EU citizen for charges of bank fraud, wire fraud, ML and aggravated identity theft that involved a complex criminal scheme that caused financial damage exceeding USD 31 million to various financial institutions. The fugitive was arrested in Italy in December 2024, and the Milan Court of Appeal ordered the pre-trial detention. The Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the INTERPOL Division of the Ministry of the Interior, swiftly activated the procedures provided under the bilateral extradition treaty, managing the transmission of the required documentation and requesting simplified extradition, made possible by the suspect’s consent. By decree in February 2025, the Minister of Justice granted the extradition, which was successfully carried out with the transfer of the individual to U.S. authorities on March 6, 2025. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 140. Italy is able to enforce foreign freezing, seizing and confiscation orders based on the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), as well as on EU Regulations. Requests from countries outside the EU framework are handled in the same manner as MLA requests (see above). Requests under the EU framework are transmitted directly from the foreign judicial authorities and registered with the appropriate PPO in Italy as the Regulation allows for direct communication between the judicial authorities. Similar to EIOs, the execution is monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region. There is an obligation to notify the Central Authority of the request, although this does not always happen (which affects statistical collection). Italian authorities are implementing enhanced systems to be able to completely map the movement. Currently, no data was provided on the number of foreign orders for seizures or confiscations and the volume of assets seized and confiscated on behalf of foreign requests. Based on case studies and feedback, no concerns were raised regarding Italy’s response to MLA and other requests for legal assistance to facilitate asset recovery, including enforcement of foreign freezing, seizing and confiscation orders. However, the lack of systematic monitoring in this area means that any challenges are not routinely identified, which may affect the possibilities for Italy to effectively identify any emerging needs for improvement of its asset recovery system. Box 2.3. Asset Recovery and Sharing with the UK The UK issued a confiscation order against an individual for drug-related offence in 2014 which was recognised by the Court of Appeal of Rome in 2015. Amongst the assets identified was agricultural land and a villa. The management of the real estate was complex, and the sale process was completed in 2023. In 2024, the Court of Appeal of Rome informed the MoJ that the net amount obtained from the sale was over EUR 100 000. A new post-Brexit sharing agreement had to be negotiated with the UK, which was agreed, based on which the UK and Italy came to an agreement to equally divide the proceeds from the sale of the real estate. In April 2025, the Court of Appeal of Rome ordered the transfer of the proceeds as agreed, to the bank account of the UK authorities, concluding he judicial cooperation for this. Footnotes [11] Following completion of data migration from Calliope, since November 2025, the Watson software has been fully operational with current data. The team was thus subsequently provided more granular data on the offences for which international cooperation was sought and received during the evaluation period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 129. There are two parallel mechanisms used in Italy to respond to international requests to provide evidence and locate criminals on behalf of a foreign authority. One builds on the EU legislation on European investigation orders (EIO’s) which facilitates direct and seamless cooperation. The other is based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or reciprocity and establishes a more traditional international cooperation framework for requests of mutual legal assistance (MLA’s). Through either of these, Italy can provide very broad range of assistance in criminal matters. 130. The Ministry of Justice (The Directorate-General for International Affairs and Judicial Cooperation, Office I) (‘MoJ’) is the Central Authority for international judicial cooperation. As Central Authority, the MoJ receives letters rotatory in international criminal matters, including MLAs. The MoJ distributes the requests to the appropriate competent authorities for execution since the MoJ itself is not usually directly involved in the execution of requests. The executing competent authority can, without the involvement of the Central Authority, send the request to another unit or competent authority, if appropriate. 131. Competent authorities generally execute requests in a chronological order as they are received but the seriousness of the offence as well as the urgency of the matter are important factors for prioritisation. The Italian authorities informed that they make every effort to respond to every request that comes in. Case studies presented as well as feedback from the FATF global network, reflected that the competent authorities were providing judicial assistance to countries in criminal matters, usually with good quality and within a reasonable time. 132. The MoJ uses computerised case management systems to facilitate the processing of all international requests, including MLA’s. The most established is the web-based document management software system called ‘Calliope’ which enables automatic registration and transmission of requests to the competent executing authority through a paperless network. The system processes requests according to a strict chronological order, which can be overridden if a particularly urgent situation is presented from an Italian or foreign authority. The Calliope enables the MoJ to monitor actions taken on specific judicial assistance or extradition requests as well as the timeliness of responses. Such monitoring is conducted whenever necessary based on emerging needs or specific requests coming from either Italian or foreign authorities. However, it was not demonstrated that the MoJ regularly and systematically uses the Calliope software to monitor the quality and to enforce the timelines for the execution of requests. There is also no other process at national level for monitoring the quality and timeliness of the requests in their entirety, which means that any challenges faced for execution are not routinely identified, which may affect the possibilities for Italy to effectively identify any emerging needs for improvement of its mutual legal assistance system. However, direct engagement between foreign authorities and regional PPOs to process various international requests, contributes to speed and connectivity. Such requests are made under the applicable EU-regulations which contains clear time frames and mechanisms which facilitate follow-up through direct contact between domestic and foreign authorities. Thus, the risk that requests are falling through the cracks is not a significant one in the case of Italy. 133. Since 2017, the ‘Watson’ software is used alongside the Calliope. Watson is able to create statistical reports on international cooperation requests, distinguished by country, crime category, legal basis and type of activity. However, at the time of the on-site, the Watson software was still in the process of being populated in view of some glitches that had been identified. This meant that during this period, Italy’s case management systems for its international cooperation framework (particularly for EIOs and MLAs) both for requests within and outside the EU did not provide effective oversight or allow effective monitoring for the quality and timeliness of international requests [11] . 134. Within the EU framework, EIOs are received directly by the Public Prosecutors Office (PPO) and captured chronologically in 26 Assistenza Giudiziaria Internazionale (AGI) regional registers maintained by the respective regional PPO. While this allows for some monitoring, foreign judicial counterparts usually follow up directly with the Italian judicial authorities. EIOs are governed by EU Regulations which prescribe timelines (90 days from the receipt of the EIO, unless the requesting country indicates urgency), and which are monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region. The assigned Public Prosecutor (PP) is also obliged to notify both the MoJ and the DNA of the receipt of an EIO. The DNA will have a coordinating role for crimes handled by the DNA (mafia-style crimes, organised criminality, terrorism and cybercrimes). 135. As reflected in tables 2.1, Italy received 10 260 MLA requests over the evaluation period, of which 3324 related to ML/TF. In addition, Italy received 11 844 EIOs over the same period, with an average of over 2 000 requests annually. Significant number of requests received related to offences against property, counterfeiting, economic and trade-related offences, terrorism and drug-related offences and the average completion time was one and a half months. Italy has not been able to provide statistics on how many requests had been executed and how many remained pending. Nevertheless, feedback relating to EIOs from the FATF Global Network was generally satisfactory with occasional delays. Table 2.1. Legal Assistance Requests Received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of MLA requests received 2 049 1 244 490 3 907 2 444 126 10 260 Nos of EIO requests received 2 066 2 199 2 335 2 149 1 987 1 108 11 844 Box 2.1. MLA with the Vatican City Vatican City made an MLA request to Italy in February 2021 in relation to an ongoing investigation for the crimes of embezzlement, abuse of office, fraud, and self-laundering involving illicit real estate investment in London. Vatican City requested copies of the investigation findings conducted by the Rome Prosecutor’s Office which was conducting an investigation on the same property. The MoJ as the central authority forwarded the request to the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Rome. In March 2021, the Rome judicial authority ordered the transmission to the MoJ of the crime report and the indictment order for the requesting State’s authorities. MoJ forwarded this to the MFA, which transmitted the documents to the Vatican City authorities. There were several follow-up requests on this investigation in 2022 and 2023 which were duly executed by the Italian authorities. 2.1.2. Extradition 136. The mechanisms through which criminals can be extradited from Italy are either under the EU's European arrest warrants (EAW) framework, or under the frameworks of bilateral and multilateral treaties or based on under reciprocity assurances. Italy has entered into extradition arrangements with a broad range of countries, especially since 2024. 137. The MoJ is the Central Authority for extradition requests outside the EU framework. It uses the Calliope software to receive and transmit extradition requests as described above. Within the EU framework, EAWs are received directly by the PPO and are recorded chronologically in the 26 AGI regional registers. However, the decision to extradite, surrender or return the fugitive is a decision made by court. Both are supported by the Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP) under the Ministry of Interior in dealing also with INTERPOL’s Red Notices and Diffusions. 138. Unlike MLA requests, the court procedures for extradition and EAWs prescribe strict timelines failing which the fugitive must be released. Most extradition requests are based on bilateral or multilateral treaties and about 10% based on reciprocity assurance. Significant number of extradition requests and requests to execute EAWs related to property offences, counterfeiting offences, narcotics offences, sexual crimes, economic trade related offences and tax and customs offences. As reflected in Table 2.2, over the evaluation period, Italy received 1382 extradition requests and 2889 EAWs. 139. At the time of the onsite, Italy was working to implement the IT system for collecting and managing international judicial cooperation procedures and therefore was not able to present statistics how many of these had been executed and rejected, and how many remained pending. However, Italy provided cases where extradition requests were executed which reflected a functioning framework. Authorities confirmed that most of the rejections were related to human rights concerns and the availability of death penalty for the offence for which extradition was requested, these concerns did not usually come up for ML/TF requests. Feedback relating to extradition requests from the FATF Global Network noted some instances of delays, but more positive for the execution of EAWs. Table 2.2. Extradition and EAW Requests Received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of extradition requests received 223 206 195 332 307 119 1 382 Nos of EAW requests received 478 566 426 593 545 281 2 889 Box 2.2. Extradition to the USA In October 2021, the USA issued an arrest warrant against a non-EU citizen for charges of bank fraud, wire fraud, ML and aggravated identity theft that involved a complex criminal scheme that caused financial damage exceeding USD 31 million to various financial institutions. The fugitive was arrested in Italy in December 2024, and the Milan Court of Appeal ordered the pre-trial detention. The Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the INTERPOL Division of the Ministry of the Interior, swiftly activated the procedures provided under the bilateral extradition treaty, managing the transmission of the required documentation and requesting simplified extradition, made possible by the suspect’s consent. By decree in February 2025, the Minister of Justice granted the extradition, which was successfully carried out with the transfer of the individual to U.S. authorities on March 6, 2025. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 140. Italy is able to enforce foreign freezing, seizing and confiscation orders based on the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), as well as on EU Regulations. Requests from countries outside the EU framework are handled in the same manner as MLA requests (see above). Requests under the EU framework are transmitted directly from the foreign judicial authorities and registered with the appropriate PPO in Italy as the Regulation allows for direct communication between the judicial authorities. Similar to EIOs, the execution is monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region. There is an obligation to notify the Central Authority of the request, although this does not always happen (which affects statistical collection). Italian authorities are implementing enhanced systems to be able to completely map the movement. Currently, no data was provided on the number of foreign orders for seizures or confiscations and the volume of assets seized and confiscated on behalf of foreign requests. Based on case studies and feedback, no concerns were raised regarding Italy’s response to MLA and other requests for legal assistance to facilitate asset recovery, including enforcement of foreign freezing, seizing and confiscation orders. However, the lack of systematic monitoring in this area means that any challenges are not routinely identified, which may affect the possibilities for Italy to effectively identify any emerging needs for improvement of its asset recovery system. Box 2.3. Asset Recovery and Sharing with the UK The UK issued a confiscation order against an individual for drug-related offence in 2014 which was recognised by the Court of Appeal of Rome in 2015. Amongst the assets identified was agricultural land and a villa. The management of the real estate was complex, and the sale process was completed in 2023. In 2024, the Court of Appeal of Rome informed the MoJ that the net amount obtained from the sale was over EUR 100 000. A new post-Brexit sharing agreement had to be negotiated with the UK, which was agreed, based on which the UK and Italy came to an agreement to equally divide the proceeds from the sale of the real estate. In April 2025, the Court of Appeal of Rome ordered the transfer of the proceeds as agreed, to the bank account of the UK authorities, concluding he judicial cooperation for this. Footnotes [11] Following completion of data migration from Calliope, since November 2025, the Watson software has been fully operational with current data. The team was thus subsequently provided more granular data on the offences for which international cooperation was sought and received during the evaluation period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 178. Italy has robust controls in place to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the market. This consists of licencing procedures and fit and proper requirements and checks on senior management and beneficial owners in the institutions. All FIs and VASPs must be licensed or approved by the relevant authority. BoI is the responsible authority for all FIs except investments firms and crowdfunding service providers, for whom CONSOB is responsible, while IVASS is responsible for life insurance companies. BoI and CONSOB cooperate on the licencing of asset managers, investment firms and crowdfunding service providers. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the competent authority for final decisions on licencing of banks, after prior assessment by the BoI. 179. Up until December 2024, VASPs were subject to a registration regime by the OAM following the introduction of AML obligations on VASPs in 2017, with a specific register having been set up in May 2022. The OAM conducts fit and proper checks before registering VASPs and has and continues to verify fulfilment of fit and proper requirements subsequent to registration. Since the application date of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA), no new registrations have been accepted, and a transitory arrangement is in place for already registered VASPs to apply for a licence under MiCA. The deadline was in December 2025, and CONSOB has a deadline of June 2026 to take decisions on possible licencing. Give this timeframe, activity under this new licencing regime was not considered in this report. 180. Fit and proper and beneficial owner checks are conducted by the responsible authority. These include checks on the reputation and soundness of persons in managerial positions, including information on criminal records. The licensing authorities consult various databases and open-source information as well as information received from the UIF. There are examples of applications concerning fit and proper or beneficial owner requirements being rejected by the BoI, as well as examples of applications being withdrawn or not reaching the formal application phase following questions raised by the BoI as part of the procedures. Overall, the checks made by authorities are thorough, even though there are some examples of criminals or their associates controlling financial institutions. 181. The number of applications received and adjudicated by the BoI can be seen below: Table 3.1. Market entry procedures by the Bank of Italy Year Administrative procedure Received Approved Withdrawn Rejected 2020 authorization 107 103 1 3 QH 78 77 1 0 FAP 1 553 1 531 22 0 2021 authorization 106 102 2 2 QH 58 56 2 0 FAP 2 565 2 511 54 0 2022 authorization 44 39 5 0 QH 67 66 0 1 FAP 2 517 2 488 29 0 2023 authorization 95 69 22 4 QH 54 53 1 0 FAP 2 144 2 127 17 0 2024 Authorization 43 14 7 3 QH 56 56 0 0 FAP 1 070 1 047 10 0 182. In addition to fit and proper checks at the licensing phase, the BoI also conducts fit and proper tests during on-going monitoring, in the event of a qualifying holding acquisition [12] and whenever new appointments of managers, directors, and key functionaries is done. The appointees are subjected to such reassessment during on-going monitoring or when new relevant facts emerge potentially impacting the FAP relevant profiles previously assessed. Box 3 . 1 . Fit and Proper check on UBO In a particular case, the Bank of Italy identified links of the UBO with companies based in third countries outside the EU and had concerns related to the origins of the funds used to subscribe the capital of the applicant. The UBO of the applicant owned several companies across different jurisdictions (including both EU and non-EU countries), some of which were inactive, and the reasons for their establishment and activities were unclear. Additionally, it was revealed that a company based in a non-EU jurisdiction owned by the UBO had received a significant investment of EUR10 million from another non-EU company. The applicant failed to provide clear explanations on these matters and did not disclose all the information required by the Bank of Italy during the proceedings. As a result, the application was rejected. One year later, the same entrepreneur submitted a new application for the authorization of a payment institution, after having completely restructured its shareholdings. In particular, he had simplified the structure of the companies to focus exclusively on the provision of payment services in Italy and had interrupted all the business relationships with the non-EU company. He also provided detailed information about his financial and family links and the origin of his funds, as well as the “uninterrupted paper trail” regarding the capital of the applicant. In this case, the outcome of the assessment was positive, and the company was authorized. 183. There are examples of investigations uncovering the presence of criminal infiltration in FIs, specifically in small banks. In the last ten years, three FIs have been subject to the measure “judicial administration”, which entails a form of preventive seizure of the activities of legal persons. The affected banks were two small, local cooperative banks and one less significant bank. While these cases present examples of a general concern in Italy as regards criminal infiltration of the legal economy, they also show that Italy actively takes measures to deprive criminals of such control. 184. Overall, the combined licensing framework in Italy, including pre-application checks and ongoing monitoring is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning, controlling or holding key management functions in FIs to a large extent. Comprehensive dialogue with applicants at the pre-application stage explain why there are low numbers of rejected applications. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 185. Authorities proactively detect and address breaches of licensing requirements. While the supervisors can apply sanction for illegal use of protected terms, the illegal rendering of FI or VASP service is a criminal offence. 186. The use of the terms associated with licensed activity are protected in Italy, and the BoI has the competence to sanction the illegal use of such terms. For instance, the use of the term “bank” without having a banking licence is subject to sanction by the BoI. Between 2019 and June 2025, one penalty has been imposed by the BoI for such illegal use of this protected term. 187. Where there is a suspicion of illegal provision of financial services, the BoI is required to refer those situations to law enforcement bodies for investigation and prosecution. The main sources of information about such violations are individual reports to the BoI. In the period under review, BoI reported a total of 212 cases to judicial and investigative bodies. Additionally, the GdF actively identifies illegal financial activity. Between 2020 and June 2025, the GdF conducted a total of 329 investigations, where 153 were based on external triggers (as opposed to the GdF’s own analysis), which resulted in over EUR 5 million in seizures and EUR 1.5 million in confiscation. 188. CONSOB has strong tools to hinder unlicenced provision of VASP services to the Italian market, including the powers to require the internet domains of the unlicensed VASP service provider to be blocked. This power is frequently used CONSOB to prevent illicit provisions of VASP services. Between July 2019 until June 2025, more than 1 300 websites were blocked for access from Italy for illicit provisions of financial investment services, with the actions against 55 illicit VASP in 2025, up till the date of the onsite. This is in addition to the possibility of OAM to report possible illegal conduct to GdF and judicial authorities for action. Footnotes [12] A qualifying holding is defined as: a. 10% or more of capital b. holdings which make it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the undertaking c. holdings which result in the financial institution becoming the proposed acquirer’s subsidiary" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 178. Italy has robust controls in place to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the market. This consists of licencing procedures and fit and proper requirements and checks on senior management and beneficial owners in the institutions. All FIs and VASPs must be licensed or approved by the relevant authority. BoI is the responsible authority for all FIs except investments firms and crowdfunding service providers, for whom CONSOB is responsible, while IVASS is responsible for life insurance companies. BoI and CONSOB cooperate on the licencing of asset managers, investment firms and crowdfunding service providers. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the competent authority for final decisions on licencing of banks, after prior assessment by the BoI. 179. Up until December 2024, VASPs were subject to a registration regime by the OAM following the introduction of AML obligations on VASPs in 2017, with a specific register having been set up in May 2022. The OAM conducts fit and proper checks before registering VASPs and has and continues to verify fulfilment of fit and proper requirements subsequent to registration. Since the application date of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA), no new registrations have been accepted, and a transitory arrangement is in place for already registered VASPs to apply for a licence under MiCA. The deadline was in December 2025, and CONSOB has a deadline of June 2026 to take decisions on possible licencing. Give this timeframe, activity under this new licencing regime was not considered in this report. 180. Fit and proper and beneficial owner checks are conducted by the responsible authority. These include checks on the reputation and soundness of persons in managerial positions, including information on criminal records. The licensing authorities consult various databases and open-source information as well as information received from the UIF. There are examples of applications concerning fit and proper or beneficial owner requirements being rejected by the BoI, as well as examples of applications being withdrawn or not reaching the formal application phase following questions raised by the BoI as part of the procedures. Overall, the checks made by authorities are thorough, even though there are some examples of criminals or their associates controlling financial institutions. 181. The number of applications received and adjudicated by the BoI can be seen below: Table 3.1. Market entry procedures by the Bank of Italy Year Administrative procedure Received Approved Withdrawn Rejected 2020 authorization 107 103 1 3 QH 78 77 1 0 FAP 1 553 1 531 22 0 2021 authorization 106 102 2 2 QH 58 56 2 0 FAP 2 565 2 511 54 0 2022 authorization 44 39 5 0 QH 67 66 0 1 FAP 2 517 2 488 29 0 2023 authorization 95 69 22 4 QH 54 53 1 0 FAP 2 144 2 127 17 0 2024 Authorization 43 14 7 3 QH 56 56 0 0 FAP 1 070 1 047 10 0 182. In addition to fit and proper checks at the licensing phase, the BoI also conducts fit and proper tests during on-going monitoring, in the event of a qualifying holding acquisition [12] and whenever new appointments of managers, directors, and key functionaries is done. The appointees are subjected to such reassessment during on-going monitoring or when new relevant facts emerge potentially impacting the FAP relevant profiles previously assessed. Box 3 . 1 . Fit and Proper check on UBO In a particular case, the Bank of Italy identified links of the UBO with companies based in third countries outside the EU and had concerns related to the origins of the funds used to subscribe the capital of the applicant. The UBO of the applicant owned several companies across different jurisdictions (including both EU and non-EU countries), some of which were inactive, and the reasons for their establishment and activities were unclear. Additionally, it was revealed that a company based in a non-EU jurisdiction owned by the UBO had received a significant investment of EUR10 million from another non-EU company. The applicant failed to provide clear explanations on these matters and did not disclose all the information required by the Bank of Italy during the proceedings. As a result, the application was rejected. One year later, the same entrepreneur submitted a new application for the authorization of a payment institution, after having completely restructured its shareholdings. In particular, he had simplified the structure of the companies to focus exclusively on the provision of payment services in Italy and had interrupted all the business relationships with the non-EU company. He also provided detailed information about his financial and family links and the origin of his funds, as well as the “uninterrupted paper trail” regarding the capital of the applicant. In this case, the outcome of the assessment was positive, and the company was authorized. 183. There are examples of investigations uncovering the presence of criminal infiltration in FIs, specifically in small banks. In the last ten years, three FIs have been subject to the measure “judicial administration”, which entails a form of preventive seizure of the activities of legal persons. The affected banks were two small, local cooperative banks and one less significant bank. While these cases present examples of a general concern in Italy as regards criminal infiltration of the legal economy, they also show that Italy actively takes measures to deprive criminals of such control. 184. Overall, the combined licensing framework in Italy, including pre-application checks and ongoing monitoring is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning, controlling or holding key management functions in FIs to a large extent. Comprehensive dialogue with applicants at the pre-application stage explain why there are low numbers of rejected applications. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 185. Authorities proactively detect and address breaches of licensing requirements. While the supervisors can apply sanction for illegal use of protected terms, the illegal rendering of FI or VASP service is a criminal offence. 186. The use of the terms associated with licensed activity are protected in Italy, and the BoI has the competence to sanction the illegal use of such terms. For instance, the use of the term “bank” without having a banking licence is subject to sanction by the BoI. Between 2019 and June 2025, one penalty has been imposed by the BoI for such illegal use of this protected term. 187. Where there is a suspicion of illegal provision of financial services, the BoI is required to refer those situations to law enforcement bodies for investigation and prosecution. The main sources of information about such violations are individual reports to the BoI. In the period under review, BoI reported a total of 212 cases to judicial and investigative bodies. Additionally, the GdF actively identifies illegal financial activity. Between 2020 and June 2025, the GdF conducted a total of 329 investigations, where 153 were based on external triggers (as opposed to the GdF’s own analysis), which resulted in over EUR 5 million in seizures and EUR 1.5 million in confiscation. 188. CONSOB has strong tools to hinder unlicenced provision of VASP services to the Italian market, including the powers to require the internet domains of the unlicensed VASP service provider to be blocked. This power is frequently used CONSOB to prevent illicit provisions of VASP services. Between July 2019 until June 2025, more than 1 300 websites were blocked for access from Italy for illicit provisions of financial investment services, with the actions against 55 illicit VASP in 2025, up till the date of the onsite. This is in addition to the possibility of OAM to report possible illegal conduct to GdF and judicial authorities for action. Footnotes [12] A qualifying holding is defined as: a. 10% or more of capital b. holdings which make it possible to exercise a significant influence over the management of the undertaking c. holdings which result in the financial institution becoming the proposed acquirer’s subsidiary" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="264. There are two supervisors responsible for supervision of DNFBPs: GdF (casinos (land-based and online), accountants, real estate agents, lawyers, TCSPs and CONSOB (PIE auditors). In addition, the UIF performs on- and off-site controls on STR obligations for all DNFBPs. 265. Further, three SRBs, The National Council of Chartered Accountants, National Lawyers’ Council (CNF), and National Council of Notaries control accreditation for professionals. However, the SRBs have no supervisory role for AML/CFT/CPF. 266. In assessing the effectiveness of Italy’s supervision of DNFPBs, the Assessment Team placed the most weight on notaries, real estate agents, lawyers and accountants due to the inherent risks faced by these sectors. Less weight was given to PIE auditors. 267. The conclusions in IO.4 are based on statistics and examples of supervisory activities and actions provided by Italy, guidelines and guidance issued by the supervisors, documents used to monitor the different reporting sectors and discussions with the relevant authorities and representatives of a broad sample of DNFBPs. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 268. DNFBPs in Italy are required to be licensed or registered by the relevant competent authorities and SRBs as outlined in the introduction. There is no specific AML/CFT licensing requirement for parts of the DPMS sector, although they must be licensed with the police, and must clear criminal checks. Further, DPMSs are also registered with the Organisation of Agents and Brokers (OAM). To be registered with the OAM requirements regarding offences apply, e.g. anyone who have been sentenced to more than three years of imprisonment and not rehabilitated cannot obtain a registration. 269. There are only four land-based casinos licensed in Italy, and these are public run institutions created by acts of Parliament. These casinos are state institutions and are operated by municipalities and the municipality conducts yearly checks on those with managerial positions. 270. All lawyers, notaries and accountants must be accredited by respective SRBs before they can carry out activity in line with their professions. Professional codes regulating each of these sectors provide specific criteria for fit-and-proper tests and information required as part of the accreditation process. Most of the focus of these processes relates to the professional suitability of the applicant. Additionally, there are certain criteria which disqualify some people from being members of the professional bodies. These are related to a history of criminal conduct and requirements for unimpeachable moral character. These SRBs must regularly check that their members meet these essential criteria even after registration. Real Estate agents too require to be accredited to the Chamber of Commerce, and they must also meet certain educational requirements and must not have criminal convictions. 271. For TCSPs, (CAFs – other entities performing accounting and tax activities, a subset of TCSPs), a relatively stricter set of requirements for the authorisation applies, entailing that the TCSP cannot be authorised e.g. if convictions or sentences are issued regarding financial offences, also if these are not final, or if criminal proceedings are pending in the trial phase for financial offences. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 272. The GdF has established systems for detecting businesses carrying out unlicensed activities. This includes processes for identifying and investigating suspected unauthorised activity as well as criminal activity. The GdF can verify compliance with registration and licensing requirements as a part of its onsite inspections as well as based on specific information. For professionals, checks are performed by the SRBs on receipt of information of inconsistencies from the GdF, and deregistration processes are initiated if they are required. 273. The OAM maintains and keeps up to date a register of gold-buying operators. Gold dealers shall promptly notify the OAM when a new gold shop is opened, and the OAM verifies all information received by the applicants and carry out random controls aimed at verifying if the data are up to date and that the registration requirements are fulfilled. There have been several cases of deregistration due to various breaches of the authorisation, registration or licencing requirements identified by the GdF. Box 4.1. Case Study 4.1 An accountant operating in Milan was discovered based on STRs to be using invoices for non-existent transactions worth approximately EUR 20 million in the tax returns of a company of which he was 99% shareholder and legal representative. He prepared these invoices using the data of third-party companies - all about to go bankrupt or already bankrupt - of which he was the domiciliary. Investigation ascertained that the company's profits were being converted into cash, and justified in the accounts by numerous invoices for non-existent transactions (the accountant had printed invoices for non-existent transactions for over 30 million euros, and then only used 20 million of them in relation to the revenues actually received) it was used to create financial resources that were further exploited by granting loans, some even at illegal interest rates, or by purchasing investment goods (gold coins and bars, precious stones, jewels, branded watches and collectible pens). After investigation, the competent judicial authority GIP ( Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari , the judge in charge of preliminary investigations) of Milan issued a preventive seizure decree for the equivalent of the registered movable or immovable property or credits, sums of money and/or securities, company shareholdings up to the value of the evaded taxes equal to 7,629.044.17 and, subsequently, an order for precautionary custody in prison. Following the conviction, the disqualification measures provided for in Article 19 of the Penal Code were applied and the case was referred to the competent professional association for removal from the professional register, which took place in 2021. 274. Details of sanctions for unlicensed activity for lawyers, notaries, (labour consultants), non-PIE auditors, accountants and TCSPs can be seen below: Table 4.1. Unlicensed Activity by DNFPBs Year Number of cases of ‘unlawful practice of a profession’ pursuant to Article 348 of the Italian Criminal Code. 2020 76 2021 93 2022 108 2023 89 2024 117 2025 51" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="264. There are two supervisors responsible for supervision of DNFBPs: GdF (casinos (land-based and online), accountants, real estate agents, lawyers, TCSPs and CONSOB (PIE auditors). In addition, the UIF performs on- and off-site controls on STR obligations for all DNFBPs. 265. Further, three SRBs, The National Council of Chartered Accountants, National Lawyers’ Council (CNF), and National Council of Notaries control accreditation for professionals. However, the SRBs have no supervisory role for AML/CFT/CPF. 266. In assessing the effectiveness of Italy’s supervision of DNFPBs, the Assessment Team placed the most weight on notaries, real estate agents, lawyers and accountants due to the inherent risks faced by these sectors. Less weight was given to PIE auditors. 267. The conclusions in IO.4 are based on statistics and examples of supervisory activities and actions provided by Italy, guidelines and guidance issued by the supervisors, documents used to monitor the different reporting sectors and discussions with the relevant authorities and representatives of a broad sample of DNFBPs. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 268. DNFBPs in Italy are required to be licensed or registered by the relevant competent authorities and SRBs as outlined in the introduction. There is no specific AML/CFT licensing requirement for parts of the DPMS sector, although they must be licensed with the police, and must clear criminal checks. Further, DPMSs are also registered with the Organisation of Agents and Brokers (OAM). To be registered with the OAM requirements regarding offences apply, e.g. anyone who have been sentenced to more than three years of imprisonment and not rehabilitated cannot obtain a registration. 269. There are only four land-based casinos licensed in Italy, and these are public run institutions created by acts of Parliament. These casinos are state institutions and are operated by municipalities and the municipality conducts yearly checks on those with managerial positions. 270. All lawyers, notaries and accountants must be accredited by respective SRBs before they can carry out activity in line with their professions. Professional codes regulating each of these sectors provide specific criteria for fit-and-proper tests and information required as part of the accreditation process. Most of the focus of these processes relates to the professional suitability of the applicant. Additionally, there are certain criteria which disqualify some people from being members of the professional bodies. These are related to a history of criminal conduct and requirements for unimpeachable moral character. These SRBs must regularly check that their members meet these essential criteria even after registration. Real Estate agents too require to be accredited to the Chamber of Commerce, and they must also meet certain educational requirements and must not have criminal convictions. 271. For TCSPs, (CAFs – other entities performing accounting and tax activities, a subset of TCSPs), a relatively stricter set of requirements for the authorisation applies, entailing that the TCSP cannot be authorised e.g. if convictions or sentences are issued regarding financial offences, also if these are not final, or if criminal proceedings are pending in the trial phase for financial offences. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 272. The GdF has established systems for detecting businesses carrying out unlicensed activities. This includes processes for identifying and investigating suspected unauthorised activity as well as criminal activity. The GdF can verify compliance with registration and licensing requirements as a part of its onsite inspections as well as based on specific information. For professionals, checks are performed by the SRBs on receipt of information of inconsistencies from the GdF, and deregistration processes are initiated if they are required. 273. The OAM maintains and keeps up to date a register of gold-buying operators. Gold dealers shall promptly notify the OAM when a new gold shop is opened, and the OAM verifies all information received by the applicants and carry out random controls aimed at verifying if the data are up to date and that the registration requirements are fulfilled. There have been several cases of deregistration due to various breaches of the authorisation, registration or licencing requirements identified by the GdF. Box 4.1. Case Study 4.1 An accountant operating in Milan was discovered based on STRs to be using invoices for non-existent transactions worth approximately EUR 20 million in the tax returns of a company of which he was 99% shareholder and legal representative. He prepared these invoices using the data of third-party companies - all about to go bankrupt or already bankrupt - of which he was the domiciliary. Investigation ascertained that the company's profits were being converted into cash, and justified in the accounts by numerous invoices for non-existent transactions (the accountant had printed invoices for non-existent transactions for over 30 million euros, and then only used 20 million of them in relation to the revenues actually received) it was used to create financial resources that were further exploited by granting loans, some even at illegal interest rates, or by purchasing investment goods (gold coins and bars, precious stones, jewels, branded watches and collectible pens). After investigation, the competent judicial authority GIP ( Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari , the judge in charge of preliminary investigations) of Milan issued a preventive seizure decree for the equivalent of the registered movable or immovable property or credits, sums of money and/or securities, company shareholdings up to the value of the evaded taxes equal to 7,629.044.17 and, subsequently, an order for precautionary custody in prison. Following the conviction, the disqualification measures provided for in Article 19 of the Penal Code were applied and the case was referred to the competent professional association for removal from the professional register, which took place in 2021. 274. Details of sanctions for unlicensed activity for lawyers, notaries, (labour consultants), non-PIE auditors, accountants and TCSPs can be seen below: Table 4.1. Unlicensed Activity by DNFPBs Year Number of cases of ‘unlawful practice of a profession’ pursuant to Article 348 of the Italian Criminal Code. 2020 76 2021 93 2022 108 2023 89 2024 117 2025 51" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="329. Italian authorities have a well-developed understanding of risks associated with most domestic legal persons and legal arrangements, as well as foreign legal persons and arrangements with sufficient links to Italy (i.e. holding assets or generating income in Italy, settlor or beneficiaries being tax residents in Italy or the trust otherwise producing legal or tax effects in Italy). The risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements has featured in several NRAs (lastly in 2024). The NRA process used a range of information sources, such as quantitative data and statistics, case studies, financial intelligence, studies by academics and feedback from the private sector. 330. The NRA concludes that the main risks in Italy are presented by companies with legal personality and foreign companies registered in territories at risk being present in Italy or in the ownership chain of Italian companies. Overall, the risks associated with legal persons is at a significant level, while the risks associated with national and foreign trusts is considered to be high. This is line with findings in the last NRA in Italy (2018). Italy has also conducted various studies to understand the risks associated with companies, which supplement the conclusions of the NRA. Some examples are the studies on the existence of possible ‘figureheads’ (informal nominees or “strawmen”) which involved the use of criminal databases to understand how, why and where criminal infiltration of companies occurs. These studies contribute to a deeper understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with legal persons and legal arrangements to the authorities. Italy has also analysed legal persons subject to judicial seizure to understand the characteristics of criminally infiltrated firms. The NRA would benefit from further incorporating such findings in its analyses. Box 5.1. Analysis of Criminally infiltrated firms An experimental mapping of the firms potentially connected to organized crime In 2020, the UIF conducted a preliminary mapping of firms potentially connected to organized crime circles. The identifying particulars of all the firms listed in the Company Register and of their respective corporate officers (some 14 million subjects) were cross-tabulated with internal data (STRs, information exchanges with the DNA, requests for information from the judicial authorities), resulting in the identification of more than 150 000 active firms as of November 2020. The firms included in the mapping belong to one (or more) of the following subsets: 1) they were flagged in STRs that appear to relate to organized crime circles and that the Unit received between January 2016 and September 2020; 2) their directors and other corporate officers include persons mentioned in the STRs referred to in the preceding point); 3) their directors and other corporate officers include persons of interest on the basis of information exchanges with the DNA, persons investigated for mafia crimes who appear in business archives, or persons named in information requests from the judicial authorities regarding organized crime. The firms included in the mapping exercise could not be deemed with certainty to be infiltrated or controlled by or linked to organized crime, which only be ascertained at the investigative and judicial level. However, the mapping surveyed a firm’s potential ‘proximity’ to organized criminal circles, which may then be verified through follow up processes. The largest portion of the firms surveyed in the mapping were in the South of Italy and Islands (41.9 per cent), but significant portions also operated in the North (36.2 per cent) and the Centre (21.9 per cent), corroborating the latest analytical and investigative findings. The largest anomalous financial flows were found not only in the mafia organizations’ home regions in the South and Islands, but also in the rich provinces of the North and Centre where economic activity is liveliest, specifically Rome, Milan and Naples. The results of the mapping can assist the analysis of STRs and make possible analysis and research on the phenomenon of potentially infiltrated firms. 331. While the risk understanding is overall well-developed, it is not comprehensively covered in the NRA. For example, attention paid to the availability of beneficial ownership information is the outset for risk analysis, but the underlying basis is not explained in detail. Additionally, the NRA has gaps in terms of substantiating the understanding of risks from certain types of entities. For example, the NRA barely covers the risks posed by partnerships, due to the lack of legal separation of assets which these represent, compared to companies such as limited liability companies. While the underlying rationale and Italy’s experience make this appear well founded and there is little to suggest that partnerships pose a specific risk in Italy, the reasons as presented in the NRA for omitting comprehensive evaluation of these risks are not robust. 332. Further, the NRA assumes that the risks associated with cooperatives are so low that they do not warrant analysis. This is based on an assessment of the mitigation measures. One measure referred to the requirement for representative associations or the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy (MiMiT) to conduct oversight or controls every second year (biennially). Another is the possibility of extraordinary supervision. However, no information was presented about the extent to which such extraordinary supervision was performed in practice. There also appeared to be certain unexplained differences in supervision between different parts of Italy (with exemptions for Sardinia). Given case examples of misuse of cooperatives for purchasing real estate inconsistent with the cooperatives’ purpose and economic capacity, the reduced attention to risks from cooperatives remains a concern." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="329. Italian authorities have a well-developed understanding of risks associated with most domestic legal persons and legal arrangements, as well as foreign legal persons and arrangements with sufficient links to Italy (i.e. holding assets or generating income in Italy, settlor or beneficiaries being tax residents in Italy or the trust otherwise producing legal or tax effects in Italy). The risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements has featured in several NRAs (lastly in 2024). The NRA process used a range of information sources, such as quantitative data and statistics, case studies, financial intelligence, studies by academics and feedback from the private sector. 330. The NRA concludes that the main risks in Italy are presented by companies with legal personality and foreign companies registered in territories at risk being present in Italy or in the ownership chain of Italian companies. Overall, the risks associated with legal persons is at a significant level, while the risks associated with national and foreign trusts is considered to be high. This is line with findings in the last NRA in Italy (2018). Italy has also conducted various studies to understand the risks associated with companies, which supplement the conclusions of the NRA. Some examples are the studies on the existence of possible ‘figureheads’ (informal nominees or “strawmen”) which involved the use of criminal databases to understand how, why and where criminal infiltration of companies occurs. These studies contribute to a deeper understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with legal persons and legal arrangements to the authorities. Italy has also analysed legal persons subject to judicial seizure to understand the characteristics of criminally infiltrated firms. The NRA would benefit from further incorporating such findings in its analyses. Box 5.1. Analysis of Criminally infiltrated firms An experimental mapping of the firms potentially connected to organized crime In 2020, the UIF conducted a preliminary mapping of firms potentially connected to organized crime circles. The identifying particulars of all the firms listed in the Company Register and of their respective corporate officers (some 14 million subjects) were cross-tabulated with internal data (STRs, information exchanges with the DNA, requests for information from the judicial authorities), resulting in the identification of more than 150 000 active firms as of November 2020. The firms included in the mapping belong to one (or more) of the following subsets: 1) they were flagged in STRs that appear to relate to organized crime circles and that the Unit received between January 2016 and September 2020; 2) their directors and other corporate officers include persons mentioned in the STRs referred to in the preceding point); 3) their directors and other corporate officers include persons of interest on the basis of information exchanges with the DNA, persons investigated for mafia crimes who appear in business archives, or persons named in information requests from the judicial authorities regarding organized crime. The firms included in the mapping exercise could not be deemed with certainty to be infiltrated or controlled by or linked to organized crime, which only be ascertained at the investigative and judicial level. However, the mapping surveyed a firm’s potential ‘proximity’ to organized criminal circles, which may then be verified through follow up processes. The largest portion of the firms surveyed in the mapping were in the South of Italy and Islands (41.9 per cent), but significant portions also operated in the North (36.2 per cent) and the Centre (21.9 per cent), corroborating the latest analytical and investigative findings. The largest anomalous financial flows were found not only in the mafia organizations’ home regions in the South and Islands, but also in the rich provinces of the North and Centre where economic activity is liveliest, specifically Rome, Milan and Naples. The results of the mapping can assist the analysis of STRs and make possible analysis and research on the phenomenon of potentially infiltrated firms. 331. While the risk understanding is overall well-developed, it is not comprehensively covered in the NRA. For example, attention paid to the availability of beneficial ownership information is the outset for risk analysis, but the underlying basis is not explained in detail. Additionally, the NRA has gaps in terms of substantiating the understanding of risks from certain types of entities. For example, the NRA barely covers the risks posed by partnerships, due to the lack of legal separation of assets which these represent, compared to companies such as limited liability companies. While the underlying rationale and Italy’s experience make this appear well founded and there is little to suggest that partnerships pose a specific risk in Italy, the reasons as presented in the NRA for omitting comprehensive evaluation of these risks are not robust. 332. Further, the NRA assumes that the risks associated with cooperatives are so low that they do not warrant analysis. This is based on an assessment of the mitigation measures. One measure referred to the requirement for representative associations or the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy (MiMiT) to conduct oversight or controls every second year (biennially). Another is the possibility of extraordinary supervision. However, no information was presented about the extent to which such extraordinary supervision was performed in practice. There also appeared to be certain unexplained differences in supervision between different parts of Italy (with exemptions for Sardinia). Given case examples of misuse of cooperatives for purchasing real estate inconsistent with the cooperatives’ purpose and economic capacity, the reduced attention to risks from cooperatives remains a concern." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 351. The UIF, established at the Bank of Italy (BoI), is an autonomous and operationally independent administrative financial intelligence unit. The UIF Director manages, directs and controls the activities of UIF by defining its strategic guidelines and planning. As the competent authority responsible for receiving STRs and other mandatory reports, UIF has to access to a broad range of domestic financial and administrative information and produces high-quality financial intelligence. Its mandate is distinct from that of law enforcement authorities, in light of Italy’s legal and constitutional framework which separates administrative financial analysis from investigative functions. 352. Aside from STRs, the UIF receives threshold-based cash transaction reports (OGG), gold transactions (ORO) and aggregated monthly AML reports from financial institutions (SARA), It also accesses extra-EU and intra-EU cash transportation declarations and other customs information, including on suspicious sub-threshold movements (see c.32.6),and has accesses to several government registers and commercial databases that enable integrated, cross-validated risk analysis (see Table 6.1). Information exchange with foreign FIUs (see IO.2) through FIU.NET (and its Ma3tch functionality) and ESW further enhances cross-border detection capabilities. UIF’s RADAR platform integrates these data sources and provide analysts with automated risk scoring and cross-matching tools. Table 6.1. Overview of UIF Databases Database Information provided Type of Analysis used for Direct access Accounts and Deposits Database Accounts held by natural and legal persons. Operational Tax registry Tax returns, real estate transactions and other information, such as successions, capital share transfers, transfers of claims. Operational Land registry Properties listed in the cadastral databank. Operational Financial instruments database Financial instruments issued by national companies (type, amount, data) and on all the financial instruments present in Italy by any kind of holder in national intermediaries (amount, market value, category of holder, nationality of holder). Operational Commercial registers Information in company registries, on company equity investments, management positions and accounting data. Operational Strategic Central credit register (BoI) Records on loans granted to customers, the amount, the guarantees provided by or received from customers and the amount of capital and rates returned. Operational Strategic Customs Information System (CIS) Declarations on cross-border transportation of values of an amount of €10 000 or more. Operational Strategic Public administrators database Whether subjects exercise public functions in Italy. Operational Strategic National State Aid Register Public financing received by Italian companies. Operational Strategic National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Data on underground economy (provincial and municipality level). Strategic Indirect access TARGET2 Wire transfers inside the Euro area. Operational European financial instruments database Financial instruments held in European intermediaries. Operational Open Access Database of Public Contracts (BDNCP) Provided by Italy’s Central Anti-Corruption Authority Operational Strategic Agency for the Administration and Destination of Seized and Confiscated Assets (ANBSC) Businesses seized or confiscated by judicial bodies. Strategic National Institute of Social Security (INPS). Employment and payroll data. Strategic Public Administration Database (BDAP) Harmonized final certificates at municipality level, provided by the State General Accounting Office. Strategic BoI Prudential Supervision Department Prudential supervision data mandatorily filed by financial intermediaries. Strategic Italian Revenue Agency Disposable taxable income (municipal level). Strategic National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Import-Export data of Italian firms (provincial level). Strategic Foreign databases COMTRADE - aggregated data on international trade by UNCTAD; WDI - WB database on Development Indicators; Tariffs data by WITS; UN Foreign Direct Investment database; Strategic 353. Italy’s legal framework does not permit administrative authorities, including the UIF, to directly access investigative law-enforcement databases (e.g., SIDNA, SDI). This separation reflects the institutional and constitutional design of Italy’s AML/CFT system. In practice, Italy has implemented mechanisms that allow the UIF to obtain relevant law-enforcement information at an early stage. Under the SAFE system and the 2023 UIF-GdF-DIA-DNA MoU, anonymised personal data from STRs are automatically cross-matched every 15 days with DNA judicial databases, while GdF and DIA provide “interest flags” on STRs linked to ongoing investigations on average within two weeks. These mechanisms mitigate the limitations of indirect access and enable effective risk-based prioritisation of STR. The authorities recognise that further improvements in the timeliness of interest-flag transmissions would strengthen the UIF’s ability to prioritise STRs, and work is underway to accelerate this process. 354.  Operationally, the UIF processes STRs through multiple analytical layers including ( Lettura Assistita Segnalazioni per l’Elaborazione del Rischio (LASER) which is its enhanced risk-indicator and data-enrichment system, Classificatore automatico (automatic classificatory - CLAUT) which is its automated classification tool, Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Identity Resolution System (IDRES)). According to UIF’s 2024 Annual Report, 51.3% of high and medium-high-risk STRs were disseminated to the GdF and the DIA within 7 days, and 92.4% of all STRs within 30 days, which is timely. NSPV also conducts its own aggregation analysis of STRs cycle. While the UIF does not carry out investigative assessments of predicate offences (which is consistent with its administrative mandate), the SAFE system provides early contextual indicators, such as the type of criminality and the existence of judicial proceedings. Further technical initiatives with DNA aim to strengthen the speed and depth of SAFE cross-matching. 355. Most STRs were submitted by banks, e-money and payment institutions, notaries, and gaming service providers, while reports from other DNFBPs remain limited. The total number of STRs reported annually over the evaluation period has been generally constant, particularly since the post-Covid period. STRs and all other reports are received and managed by UIF through its secure RADAR platform. Registration also helps ensure the consistent identification of reporting entities, which support the quality of information received by the UIF. Some smaller DNFBPs may occasionally find the registration process unfamiliar (see IO.4). UIF provides prompt assistance during registration, including through a dedicated email service, which helps ensure that registration does not materially delay STR submissions. 356. When submitting STRs, FIs and DNFBPs provide details on persons, operations, transactions and financial relationships (e.g. bank accounts, credit cards), describe the ground for suspicion and indicate the estimated level of risk and criminal typologies. Through RADAR, each new STR is matched with information within the system. These processes generate automated risk score ratings scaled from 1 (no or low risk) to 5 (high risk). In addition, RADAR extracts a large set of automated indicators, such as the presence of PEPs, individuals subject to criminal investigations or specific criminal typologies, which further supports the prioritisation and analysis of reports. 357. Enhancing the quality of STRs is a strategic objective under UIF’s Strategic Plan 2023-25. This has been done through cooperation with FIs and DNFBPs through the launch of a monitoring system (Quasar) that uses quality measurement indicators. UIF also monitors the timelines of STRs, noting that more than half of the STRs were reported within a month of the most recent reported transaction. Quarterly feedback provided to FIs and DNFBPs on low-quality or low-risk STRs has contributed to improvements in the accuracy and effectiveness of reporting. 358. As an example, over the evaluation period, UIF identified a significant increase in reports arising out of automatic suspicious transaction detection tools used by banks that were not always accompanied by an increase in their quality. Through focussed meetings and intervention letters, this led to less STRs and an improvement in their quality. UIF also developed sector-specific reporting templates for certain sectors that submitted large volume of STRs i.e. MVTS, payment card operators, the gaming sector and VASPs, based on discussions with these entities. 359. Over the evaluation period, UIF received 771 671 STRs, of which 769 359 were related to ML, 2218 to TF and 94 to PF. In terms of predicate offences, most STRs related to tax crime (18%) and organised crime (17%). There was a sharp increase in STRs related to cybercrime as a predicate offence (from 3% in 2020-21, to 12% in 2024) and corruption as a predicate offence (from 4% to 7.4% over the same period). The reporting is generally in line with ML risks identified in the NRA, although reporting for drug trafficking (1.5%) and human trafficking/migrant smuggling (less than 1%) is low. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 360. Alongside the UIF, GdF’s NSPV and DIA structurally analyse STRs to produce financial intelligence through their own respective platforms. UIF disseminates STRs (with risk rating of medium to high risk) and first or second level analytical reports to the NSPV, DIA and DNA, via its confidential and secure communication portal called ‘SAFE’. NSPV and DIA independently use these to develop financial intelligence tailored to their operational needs. NSPV also has the additional responsibility to disseminates STRs and analytical reports to the Carabinieri and the State Police (SP) when they appear relevant to their investigations based on keyword searches conducted in the Sistema Informativo Valutario (‘SIVA’) database or following a request from the Carabinieri or SP. NSPV thus serves as the primary operational hub for distributing STR-based intelligence to Carabinieri and SP, ensuring that relevant STRs are channelled to these LEAs when linked to their investigations. Ongoing technical work with the DNA aims to refine the SAFE/DNA cross-matching workflow to accelerate feedback cycles and improve analytical depth. 361. Information NSPV receives from the UIF is integrated in the SIVA system to structure information contained in the STRs and categorise them based on ML/TF risk. The Analysis Office in the NSPV routinely enhances the STRs and UIF technical reports, using information in GdF’s broad database (Dorsale Informatica) which also contains law enforcement information that allows the GdF to link the STRs to on-going investigations and subjects of interest (see IO.7). It is also linked to the GdF’s highly sophisticated in-house financial analysis IT tool (Molecola). In addition, the GdF obtains information in cooperation with its foreign counterparts, through international cooperation networks like INTERPOL and EUROPOL (see IO.2) as well as through the UIF, for recourse to its foreign network. Overall, the GdF has access to a broader range of information. Benefiting from UIF’s risk rating, classification, analysis and other output, the GdF is able to produce high-quality financial intelligence to support its investigations. 362. DIA uses its system, the Elaborazioni Investigative Operazioni Sospette (‘ELIOS’) to analyse and examine STRs received from UIF. This works similarly to SIVA to match the personal data of the reported entities to evidence in DIA’s main databases (see IO.7). In view of the fact that the DIA is a multi-agency body which includes GdF personnel, the databases to which the DIA has access to, is the same as GdF’s (except for Molecola). These are then used to produce investigative evidence or linked to the analysis of the dynamics and trends characterising mafia-type organised crime groups. Information contained in the STRs support DIA investigations into the sources of income, standard of living, financial resources, and assets of individuals linked to organised crime." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 351. The UIF, established at the Bank of Italy (BoI), is an autonomous and operationally independent administrative financial intelligence unit. The UIF Director manages, directs and controls the activities of UIF by defining its strategic guidelines and planning. As the competent authority responsible for receiving STRs and other mandatory reports, UIF has to access to a broad range of domestic financial and administrative information and produces high-quality financial intelligence. Its mandate is distinct from that of law enforcement authorities, in light of Italy’s legal and constitutional framework which separates administrative financial analysis from investigative functions. 352. Aside from STRs, the UIF receives threshold-based cash transaction reports (OGG), gold transactions (ORO) and aggregated monthly AML reports from financial institutions (SARA), It also accesses extra-EU and intra-EU cash transportation declarations and other customs information, including on suspicious sub-threshold movements (see c.32.6),and has accesses to several government registers and commercial databases that enable integrated, cross-validated risk analysis (see Table 6.1). Information exchange with foreign FIUs (see IO.2) through FIU.NET (and its Ma3tch functionality) and ESW further enhances cross-border detection capabilities. UIF’s RADAR platform integrates these data sources and provide analysts with automated risk scoring and cross-matching tools. Table 6.1. Overview of UIF Databases Database Information provided Type of Analysis used for Direct access Accounts and Deposits Database Accounts held by natural and legal persons. Operational Tax registry Tax returns, real estate transactions and other information, such as successions, capital share transfers, transfers of claims. Operational Land registry Properties listed in the cadastral databank. Operational Financial instruments database Financial instruments issued by national companies (type, amount, data) and on all the financial instruments present in Italy by any kind of holder in national intermediaries (amount, market value, category of holder, nationality of holder). Operational Commercial registers Information in company registries, on company equity investments, management positions and accounting data. Operational Strategic Central credit register (BoI) Records on loans granted to customers, the amount, the guarantees provided by or received from customers and the amount of capital and rates returned. Operational Strategic Customs Information System (CIS) Declarations on cross-border transportation of values of an amount of €10 000 or more. Operational Strategic Public administrators database Whether subjects exercise public functions in Italy. Operational Strategic National State Aid Register Public financing received by Italian companies. Operational Strategic National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Data on underground economy (provincial and municipality level). Strategic Indirect access TARGET2 Wire transfers inside the Euro area. Operational European financial instruments database Financial instruments held in European intermediaries. Operational Open Access Database of Public Contracts (BDNCP) Provided by Italy’s Central Anti-Corruption Authority Operational Strategic Agency for the Administration and Destination of Seized and Confiscated Assets (ANBSC) Businesses seized or confiscated by judicial bodies. Strategic National Institute of Social Security (INPS). Employment and payroll data. Strategic Public Administration Database (BDAP) Harmonized final certificates at municipality level, provided by the State General Accounting Office. Strategic BoI Prudential Supervision Department Prudential supervision data mandatorily filed by financial intermediaries. Strategic Italian Revenue Agency Disposable taxable income (municipal level). Strategic National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Import-Export data of Italian firms (provincial level). Strategic Foreign databases COMTRADE - aggregated data on international trade by UNCTAD; WDI - WB database on Development Indicators; Tariffs data by WITS; UN Foreign Direct Investment database; Strategic 353. Italy’s legal framework does not permit administrative authorities, including the UIF, to directly access investigative law-enforcement databases (e.g., SIDNA, SDI). This separation reflects the institutional and constitutional design of Italy’s AML/CFT system. In practice, Italy has implemented mechanisms that allow the UIF to obtain relevant law-enforcement information at an early stage. Under the SAFE system and the 2023 UIF-GdF-DIA-DNA MoU, anonymised personal data from STRs are automatically cross-matched every 15 days with DNA judicial databases, while GdF and DIA provide “interest flags” on STRs linked to ongoing investigations on average within two weeks. These mechanisms mitigate the limitations of indirect access and enable effective risk-based prioritisation of STR. The authorities recognise that further improvements in the timeliness of interest-flag transmissions would strengthen the UIF’s ability to prioritise STRs, and work is underway to accelerate this process. 354.  Operationally, the UIF processes STRs through multiple analytical layers including ( Lettura Assistita Segnalazioni per l’Elaborazione del Rischio (LASER) which is its enhanced risk-indicator and data-enrichment system, Classificatore automatico (automatic classificatory - CLAUT) which is its automated classification tool, Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Identity Resolution System (IDRES)). According to UIF’s 2024 Annual Report, 51.3% of high and medium-high-risk STRs were disseminated to the GdF and the DIA within 7 days, and 92.4% of all STRs within 30 days, which is timely. NSPV also conducts its own aggregation analysis of STRs cycle. While the UIF does not carry out investigative assessments of predicate offences (which is consistent with its administrative mandate), the SAFE system provides early contextual indicators, such as the type of criminality and the existence of judicial proceedings. Further technical initiatives with DNA aim to strengthen the speed and depth of SAFE cross-matching. 355. Most STRs were submitted by banks, e-money and payment institutions, notaries, and gaming service providers, while reports from other DNFBPs remain limited. The total number of STRs reported annually over the evaluation period has been generally constant, particularly since the post-Covid period. STRs and all other reports are received and managed by UIF through its secure RADAR platform. Registration also helps ensure the consistent identification of reporting entities, which support the quality of information received by the UIF. Some smaller DNFBPs may occasionally find the registration process unfamiliar (see IO.4). UIF provides prompt assistance during registration, including through a dedicated email service, which helps ensure that registration does not materially delay STR submissions. 356. When submitting STRs, FIs and DNFBPs provide details on persons, operations, transactions and financial relationships (e.g. bank accounts, credit cards), describe the ground for suspicion and indicate the estimated level of risk and criminal typologies. Through RADAR, each new STR is matched with information within the system. These processes generate automated risk score ratings scaled from 1 (no or low risk) to 5 (high risk). In addition, RADAR extracts a large set of automated indicators, such as the presence of PEPs, individuals subject to criminal investigations or specific criminal typologies, which further supports the prioritisation and analysis of reports. 357. Enhancing the quality of STRs is a strategic objective under UIF’s Strategic Plan 2023-25. This has been done through cooperation with FIs and DNFBPs through the launch of a monitoring system (Quasar) that uses quality measurement indicators. UIF also monitors the timelines of STRs, noting that more than half of the STRs were reported within a month of the most recent reported transaction. Quarterly feedback provided to FIs and DNFBPs on low-quality or low-risk STRs has contributed to improvements in the accuracy and effectiveness of reporting. 358. As an example, over the evaluation period, UIF identified a significant increase in reports arising out of automatic suspicious transaction detection tools used by banks that were not always accompanied by an increase in their quality. Through focussed meetings and intervention letters, this led to less STRs and an improvement in their quality. UIF also developed sector-specific reporting templates for certain sectors that submitted large volume of STRs i.e. MVTS, payment card operators, the gaming sector and VASPs, based on discussions with these entities. 359. Over the evaluation period, UIF received 771 671 STRs, of which 769 359 were related to ML, 2218 to TF and 94 to PF. In terms of predicate offences, most STRs related to tax crime (18%) and organised crime (17%). There was a sharp increase in STRs related to cybercrime as a predicate offence (from 3% in 2020-21, to 12% in 2024) and corruption as a predicate offence (from 4% to 7.4% over the same period). The reporting is generally in line with ML risks identified in the NRA, although reporting for drug trafficking (1.5%) and human trafficking/migrant smuggling (less than 1%) is low. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 360. Alongside the UIF, GdF’s NSPV and DIA structurally analyse STRs to produce financial intelligence through their own respective platforms. UIF disseminates STRs (with risk rating of medium to high risk) and first or second level analytical reports to the NSPV, DIA and DNA, via its confidential and secure communication portal called ‘SAFE’. NSPV and DIA independently use these to develop financial intelligence tailored to their operational needs. NSPV also has the additional responsibility to disseminates STRs and analytical reports to the Carabinieri and the State Police (SP) when they appear relevant to their investigations based on keyword searches conducted in the Sistema Informativo Valutario (‘SIVA’) database or following a request from the Carabinieri or SP. NSPV thus serves as the primary operational hub for distributing STR-based intelligence to Carabinieri and SP, ensuring that relevant STRs are channelled to these LEAs when linked to their investigations. Ongoing technical work with the DNA aims to refine the SAFE/DNA cross-matching workflow to accelerate feedback cycles and improve analytical depth. 361. Information NSPV receives from the UIF is integrated in the SIVA system to structure information contained in the STRs and categorise them based on ML/TF risk. The Analysis Office in the NSPV routinely enhances the STRs and UIF technical reports, using information in GdF’s broad database (Dorsale Informatica) which also contains law enforcement information that allows the GdF to link the STRs to on-going investigations and subjects of interest (see IO.7). It is also linked to the GdF’s highly sophisticated in-house financial analysis IT tool (Molecola). In addition, the GdF obtains information in cooperation with its foreign counterparts, through international cooperation networks like INTERPOL and EUROPOL (see IO.2) as well as through the UIF, for recourse to its foreign network. Overall, the GdF has access to a broader range of information. Benefiting from UIF’s risk rating, classification, analysis and other output, the GdF is able to produce high-quality financial intelligence to support its investigations. 362. DIA uses its system, the Elaborazioni Investigative Operazioni Sospette (‘ELIOS’) to analyse and examine STRs received from UIF. This works similarly to SIVA to match the personal data of the reported entities to evidence in DIA’s main databases (see IO.7). In view of the fact that the DIA is a multi-agency body which includes GdF personnel, the databases to which the DIA has access to, is the same as GdF’s (except for Molecola). These are then used to produce investigative evidence or linked to the analysis of the dynamics and trends characterising mafia-type organised crime groups. Information contained in the STRs support DIA investigations into the sources of income, standard of living, financial resources, and assets of individuals linked to organised crime." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of ML 396. Italy’s ML legislation, which follows an all-crimes approach to ML, embeds the ‘follow the money’ approach in the context of investigations related to organised crime and mafia activity. There are four police forces in Italy, Polizia di Stato (‘State Police’), Arma dei Carabinier i (‘Carabinieri’), Guardia di Finanza (‘GdF’) and Corpo di Polizia Penitenziaria (‘Penitentiary Police’), all of whom are authorised to investigate ML, although in practice, the Penitentiary Police do not investigate ML. Every ML investigation is (as is every formal investigation in Italy) led by a Public Prosecutor (‘PP’) who may assign one or more of Italy’s police forces to conduct investigations under its direction. Thus, the police forces are both operational and judicial police. The Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (‘DIA’) also plays an important role. The investigative powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), Criminal Code (CC) and the Anti-Mafia Code (AMC) apply to all the police forces. Their roles are summarised as follows (for more information, see Recommendation 30 in the TC annex, and the introduction for a summary). · State Police is a civilian police force with general competence tasked, among others, to maintain public order. · The Carabinieri is a military corps with police duties which is also tasked to maintain public order. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) within the Carabinieri deals mainly with organised crime and financial investigations, as well as terrorism and TF, both at the national and international level. · The GdF is a police force with military status. Unlike the other police forces, the GdF’s main objective is to combat financial crime, corruption, tax evasion and avoidance, smuggling, TF and ML. The GdF is well resourced to investigate complex ML schemes. · The DIA is an inter-agency law enforcement body composed of personnel from the other police forces with experience in financial investigations and organised crime investigations. DIA focussed on investigations to prevent and counter organised crime Their investigations are typically complex and lengthy as they analyse the criminal activities of the mafia-type organised crime groups, including their complex ML schemes such as those involving numerous interconnected businesses. The DIA described one complex scheme that led to the reconstruction of assets accumulated by organised crime over a period of more than ten years. 397. The GdF uses several avenues to detect ML in Italy as reflected in its Operational Plan nos. 34 on the ‘Fight against the ML of Illicit Capital’ which dates back to 2015 and is updated annually. The operational guidelines list several triggers for investigations which include (i) direct information, (ii) reports from other authorities, (iii) UIF analytical reports and related STRs are systematically sent to GdF (see IO.6) to which the GdF adds further pre-investigative analysis using its sophisticated IT tools and broad access to databases, resulting in this as a valuable source of identification for ML. These may also contain cross border currency movement reports, (iv) information from AML inspections, (v) tax-evasion activity and (vi) parallel financial investigations conducted by judicial police. In addition to these, information obtained from international cooperation requests is also in practice used to trigger domestic ML investigation. Table 7.1 indicates the extent to which these different avenues were used by the GdF in practise to detect ML and the extent to which they resulted in ML investigations. While no data was available relating to detection through information from international cooperation, case studies provided showed that this was also used regularly. In general, the data confirms the broad avenues used by the GdF to initiate ML investigations as well as the increasing detection through parallel investigations and STR disseminations over the evaluation period. Table 7 . 1 . Avenues to detect ML investigations (GdF) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 2025 Total Parallel investigation 471 612 511 827 766 299 3 486 STR dissemination 32 171 152 153 178 56 742 Tax information 66 210 244 389 320 161 1 390 Information from internal databases 359 169 133 137 138 47 983 Open-source information 12 21 29 39 36 18 155 Cash or BNIs declaration 0 9 14 6 1 4 34 Other sources 22 25 25 61 60 13 206 398. For every criminal activity investigated by the GdF, it initiates financial investigations aimed at reconstructing the real assets held by criminals for the subsequent asset recovery action (See IO.8) as well as all financial movements relevant to the identification of possible ML conduct for subsequent investigation. This ensures that complex and stand-alone ML cases are detected, which is important to the risk and context of Italy where organised crime contributes significantly to the generation of illicit proceeds and to ML. Over 70% of ML investigations in Italy are launched by the GdF. 399. The AMC is the legislation that targets organised crime activity and the assets derived from this (see IO.8 for the scope of the AMC). The AMC provides for a number of preventive measures that specifically follow the assets linked to criminal activity or suspected criminal activity (see IO.8). Early asset tracing investigations conducted under the AMC provides a valuable source for the GdF on its own or within the DIA, to identify ML. 400. The State Police and the Carabinieri investigate predicate offences that are under their territorial jurisdiction or are assigned to them by the judicial authorities. Unlike the GdF, the State Police and the Carabinieri do not systematically detect ML through external sources. However, under the direction of the PP, they conduct financial investigations for cases where there are financial aspects and where assets are involved. Where ML emerges from their investigations, this is pursued. Data indicates that over the evaluation period, over 5 000 of ML investigations launched in Italy are done so by the State Police and the Carabinieri which represents less than 30% of ML investigations in Italy. Table 7 . 2 . ML Investigations in Italy 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Total GdF Investigations Investigations launched (number of cases registered in the year) 1 144 1 701 2 872 3 057 2 727 1 055 12 566 Investigations (number of cases concluded in the year) 962 1 217 1 108 1 612 1 499 526 6 924 Investigations (number of individuals for cases concluded in the year) 2 300 3 391 3 549 4 069 4 113 1 146 18 568 Number of arrests 253 472 303 287 498 94 1 907 Investigations by all LEAs (excluding GdF) Investigations launched (number of cases registered in the year) 1 759 1 372 266 358 997 286 5 038 401. Although its focus is largely on pursuing assets of mafia-style organised criminals, the DIA also pursues ML investigation as a tool to fight organised crime. As part of its investigations, the DIA regularly reconstructs the economic activities and illicitly accumulated assets of associates of mafia-type organised criminal groups, including elaborate ML schemes employed for this. The DIA has access to similar databases as the GdF (except Molecola) in addition to National Anti-Mafia Database (BDNA) which provides outcomes on anti-mafia proceedings related to the participation of mafia related individuals for public contracts and procurements. Although less than 5% of ML investigations in Italy are launched by the DIA, these relate to deep and lengthy investigations over several years, involving the reconstruction of substantial illicit assets accumulated by mafia subjects which lead to a limited number of highly complex criminal investigations (which includes ML) Table 7.3. DIA ML Identification and Investigations 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Nos of ML cases identified and investigated 156 114 34 2 81 387 Nos of persons investigated for ML 28 138 234 21 131 580 Investigation of ML 402. The Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) is the competent authority for leading and directing ML investigations and prosecutions. The PP directs criminal investigations at a very early stage when a notitia criminis (information on a fact that could constitute a criminal offence) is registered (this is mandatory). From then on, the PPO leads the investigation and prosecution and assigns investigative tasks to the polices and coordinates their cooperation throughout the investigation and prosecution brings on a mandatory basis, the case to the courts if sufficient grounds exist gathered during the investigations to support a charge in court. For all investigations, including those investigated outside the AMC, the PP will coordinate the different LEAs’ investigative activities and assign the task to the police force that has reported the crime but may delegate tasks to several LEAs jointly as appropriate, e.g. even as the State Police and the Carabinieri can investigate the specific crime, the GdF may be assigned to join the investigation where their expertise is needed to carry out more specialised financial investigations. 403.  The GdF has several functions and units tasked to combat ML, one of which is the unit that functions as the judicial police. It is well resourced to investigate complex ML, including those that involve transnational elements. The GdF is structured militarily with a central command structure and territorial units. It has approximately 30 000 staff who perform judicial police functions, divided between the NSPV and 500 territorial units. Basic training courses are compulsory for all GdF personnel which cover the acquisition of investigative skills as well as applicable rules and procedures. In addition, there are further specialised courses, which are constantly updated on new techniques, methodologies, trends and money laundering risks. Case studies reflected how the GdF utilises its investigative skills and training in complex ML investigations. The GdF also frequently draws on its international networks where needed, to build its case (see IO.2). 404. The main strength of the GdF lies in its networks and access to information that is useful to support the complex ML investigations it is mostly involved in. In conducting investigations, the GdF uses its internally developed databases, the Dorsale Informatica to access 138 confidential and open-sourced databases which include real estate ownership information, bank account information, business registers, vehicle registers etc. supported by the Molecola software which also contains law enforcement databases, tax administration database, land register, company register etc. The system is able to draw analyses and linkages to the different information in the databases including investigative information (e.g. transcripts of wiretaps, account statement details etc) in order to quickly identify ownership details and asset movement to support ML investigations. 405. The State Police and the Carabinieri also investigate ML, although the cases are usually but not always less complex than those investigated by GdF as their focus is on the predicate offending. The State Police has over 170 staff assigned to the dedicated central and local units responsible for crime and serious organised crime of which ten function in the central command and 160 are spread across competent local units (e.g. Rome has 13 staff and Milan, Naples and Palermo have three staff each), who deal with investigations into ML activity. There was no information over the number of staff that represent the judicial police who support the Carabinieri. Their investigations are also supported by IT applications and other technology to analyse data, 406. Based on discussions with these authorities, the State Police and the Carabinieri are well-trained to fighting criminal activity and to conduct financial investigations even at the district level and have access to similar financial investigation tools as the GdF which are employed under the direction of the PP. When conducting ML investigations, the Carabinieri is guided by the General Staff of the Carabinieri Headquarters (“Organised Crime, Subversion and Terrorism Office”) circular issued in 2019 which detail ML laws and highlights a broad range of databases which it has access to for financial information. This includes the Sistema di Indagine (SDI) database that allows for the sharing of general information on offences, reports, orders issued or executed and complaints received against individuals and legal entities as well as some other external databases and how these may be useful. The Carabinieri does not have direct access to GdF’s sophisticated IT tools or STR’s which could be useful for STR analyses and to discover linkages across the information to conduct more sophisticated investigations more quickly. However, for more complex investigations, the PP would be able to draw on the GdF as noted above. 407. In view of the general and specialised criminal investigation responsibilities, there are coordination mechanisms amongst the authorities, which work satisfactorily. The Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo (‘DNA’) is a judicial coordinating body responsible for coordination of investigations into organised crime (including financial crimes) and terrorism offences (including TF). It comprises of prosecutors experienced in investigating organised crime and works in close coordination with the DIA in coordinating investigations and prosecutions of organised crime across the country. For prioritised serious offences, including organised crime, the DNA coordinates investigations across the 26 PPOs through a linked database. All LEAs have access to this database that allows for the sharing of general information on offences, reports, orders issued or executed and complaints received against individuals and legal entities. As noted above, the PP is also key to the coordination among the different LEAs, which is often done in complex financial investigations to be able to appropriately exploit the specific expertise and access to information of the different LEAs. 408. The most significant ML threats identified in Italy’s NRA are corruption, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and sexual exploitation. Most criminal conduct is attributable to organised crime, including mafia-style crime (e.g. drug trafficking, extortion, tax crimes, gambling, illegal waste trafficking, smuggling and counterfeiting). Italy does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the underlying predicate offences for ML investigations, which limits the ability to assess whether the country’s pursuit of ML was in line with its risks. However, based on discussions with the Italian authorities, there is significant focus on investigations for these predicate offences, and also for fraud and forgery related to EU and/or public grants. The GdF noted that it prioritises ML related to tax evasion, corruption, drug trafficking and forgery investigations, which is consistent with its mandate. Significant number of STRs are made on suspicions of organised crime, fraud (including cyber fraud and other types of fraud), tax crimes and corruption, which are followed up particularly by the GdF and the DIA. In addition, Italy presented a large number of case studies involving complex ML case studies in line with the GDF’s and DIA’s national level operational and policy mandates, that reflected that the GdF and the DIA are pursuing ML related to serious organised crime which is consistent with the country’s risk and context. Asset recovery data also indicated that over 90% of asset seizures and confiscations related to mafia type organised crime which included ML. Box 7.1. Investigation into a complex fraud and ML scheme (GdF) The NSPV of GdF carried out targeted investigations based on an inherent risk analysis of anomalous financial transactions to and from European Countries, carried out through the issuance of fake invoices creating a complex Trade based Money Laundering system. Through investigations, GdF uncovered a criminal network that was involved in tax crimes committed though a company operating in the waste disposal sector. GdF analysed numerous invoices for non-existent transactions issued by shell companies that allowed the main company to generate fictitious costs to reduce taxable income. The money was then laundered abroad. Investigation tools utilised by GdF included the use of its databases for the reconstruction of the profiles of the suspects and legal entities involved, wire-tapping and surveillance against 25 persons, in-depth analysis of numerous STRs, reconstruction of financial flows through examination of 80 financial reports and 50 pre-paid cards and the consultation of a bank to corroborate the criminal hypothesis. Investigations led to the arrest of eight suspects who were ultimately convicted of ML offences, fraudulent tax declaration, fictitious registration of assets and issuance of fake invoices. For ML offences, they were each sentenced to between three and four years’ imprisonment. A total of EUR 21 million was seized as a result of the investigation. Box 7.2. Operation Moby Dick (GdF and State Police) The investigation that took place between 2022 and 2024, targeted a transnational criminal organisation engaged in issuing and utilising invoices for non-existent transactions as well as ML, reinvesting and self-laundering proceeds through ‘carousel’ fraud schemes. The criminal group operated through a multi-layered corporate structure, using companies active in the trade of consumer IT products, with operational branches in Italy and other ten other overseas jurisdictions. 195 individuals and 144 Italian and foreign companies were investigated and 43 persons were arrested. Seizure orders amounting to EUR 520 million were executed. Eleven persons have been charged with aggravating circumstance of mafia-type involvement, by providing financial support to mafia groups. MLA requests for recovery of assets are pending and criminal proceedings are on-going. Box 7.3. Operation Pick Up (DNA) Italian authorities investigated the ML mechanism of a complex network of international financial brokers for a South American criminal association of cocaine suppliers and the Italian criminal associations. The proceeds of drug trafficking were collected in cash in Italy and distributed through a widespread network of collaborators and facilitators for laundering. Italy employed undercover agents and front undercover company through which the judicial authorities were able to gain access to ML mechanism. The investigations revealed that once the illicit proceeds were deposited into the foreign company’s accounts at the direction of the traffickers, the cash was transferred to foreign accounts located in USA, China, Türkiye, Panama, etc in order to be subsequently channelled to the South American cocaine suppliers. The investigations involved collaboration with 27 foreign countries as well as working with the EUROPOL’s European Financial and Economic Crime Centra as well as the Italian representative of EUROJUST who coordinated with investigations activities with other European prosecutor’s offices. In April 2023, significant seizures were made in various counties against the money laundered through the facilitators. 409. The data (see Table 7.4 below) reflects that the GdF regularly conducts ML investigations involving legal persons which is in line with how organised crime groups in Italy generally launder their proceeds of crime. DIA constantly monitors companies that receive public procurements to ascertain that no violation is committed and conducts investigations into business that are used by organised crime groups to launder illicit assets. However, no data was presented to demonstrate how it was routinely pursuing ML investigations against legal persons. Table 7.4. GdF Investigations against Legal Persons for ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Total Number of cases identified 62 89 70 366 130 65 782 Number of legal entities involved 141 228 136 557 295 232 1 589" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of ML 396. Italy’s ML legislation, which follows an all-crimes approach to ML, embeds the ‘follow the money’ approach in the context of investigations related to organised crime and mafia activity. There are four police forces in Italy, Polizia di Stato (‘State Police’), Arma dei Carabinier i (‘Carabinieri’), Guardia di Finanza (‘GdF’) and Corpo di Polizia Penitenziaria (‘Penitentiary Police’), all of whom are authorised to investigate ML, although in practice, the Penitentiary Police do not investigate ML. Every ML investigation is (as is every formal investigation in Italy) led by a Public Prosecutor (‘PP’) who may assign one or more of Italy’s police forces to conduct investigations under its direction. Thus, the police forces are both operational and judicial police. The Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (‘DIA’) also plays an important role. The investigative powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), Criminal Code (CC) and the Anti-Mafia Code (AMC) apply to all the police forces. Their roles are summarised as follows (for more information, see Recommendation 30 in the TC annex, and the introduction for a summary). · State Police is a civilian police force with general competence tasked, among others, to maintain public order. · The Carabinieri is a military corps with police duties which is also tasked to maintain public order. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) within the Carabinieri deals mainly with organised crime and financial investigations, as well as terrorism and TF, both at the national and international level. · The GdF is a police force with military status. Unlike the other police forces, the GdF’s main objective is to combat financial crime, corruption, tax evasion and avoidance, smuggling, TF and ML. The GdF is well resourced to investigate complex ML schemes. · The DIA is an inter-agency law enforcement body composed of personnel from the other police forces with experience in financial investigations and organised crime investigations. DIA focussed on investigations to prevent and counter organised crime Their investigations are typically complex and lengthy as they analyse the criminal activities of the mafia-type organised crime groups, including their complex ML schemes such as those involving numerous interconnected businesses. The DIA described one complex scheme that led to the reconstruction of assets accumulated by organised crime over a period of more than ten years. 397. The GdF uses several avenues to detect ML in Italy as reflected in its Operational Plan nos. 34 on the ‘Fight against the ML of Illicit Capital’ which dates back to 2015 and is updated annually. The operational guidelines list several triggers for investigations which include (i) direct information, (ii) reports from other authorities, (iii) UIF analytical reports and related STRs are systematically sent to GdF (see IO.6) to which the GdF adds further pre-investigative analysis using its sophisticated IT tools and broad access to databases, resulting in this as a valuable source of identification for ML. These may also contain cross border currency movement reports, (iv) information from AML inspections, (v) tax-evasion activity and (vi) parallel financial investigations conducted by judicial police. In addition to these, information obtained from international cooperation requests is also in practice used to trigger domestic ML investigation. Table 7.1 indicates the extent to which these different avenues were used by the GdF in practise to detect ML and the extent to which they resulted in ML investigations. While no data was available relating to detection through information from international cooperation, case studies provided showed that this was also used regularly. In general, the data confirms the broad avenues used by the GdF to initiate ML investigations as well as the increasing detection through parallel investigations and STR disseminations over the evaluation period. Table 7 . 1 . Avenues to detect ML investigations (GdF) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 2025 Total Parallel investigation 471 612 511 827 766 299 3 486 STR dissemination 32 171 152 153 178 56 742 Tax information 66 210 244 389 320 161 1 390 Information from internal databases 359 169 133 137 138 47 983 Open-source information 12 21 29 39 36 18 155 Cash or BNIs declaration 0 9 14 6 1 4 34 Other sources 22 25 25 61 60 13 206 398. For every criminal activity investigated by the GdF, it initiates financial investigations aimed at reconstructing the real assets held by criminals for the subsequent asset recovery action (See IO.8) as well as all financial movements relevant to the identification of possible ML conduct for subsequent investigation. This ensures that complex and stand-alone ML cases are detected, which is important to the risk and context of Italy where organised crime contributes significantly to the generation of illicit proceeds and to ML. Over 70% of ML investigations in Italy are launched by the GdF. 399. The AMC is the legislation that targets organised crime activity and the assets derived from this (see IO.8 for the scope of the AMC). The AMC provides for a number of preventive measures that specifically follow the assets linked to criminal activity or suspected criminal activity (see IO.8). Early asset tracing investigations conducted under the AMC provides a valuable source for the GdF on its own or within the DIA, to identify ML. 400. The State Police and the Carabinieri investigate predicate offences that are under their territorial jurisdiction or are assigned to them by the judicial authorities. Unlike the GdF, the State Police and the Carabinieri do not systematically detect ML through external sources. However, under the direction of the PP, they conduct financial investigations for cases where there are financial aspects and where assets are involved. Where ML emerges from their investigations, this is pursued. Data indicates that over the evaluation period, over 5 000 of ML investigations launched in Italy are done so by the State Police and the Carabinieri which represents less than 30% of ML investigations in Italy. Table 7 . 2 . ML Investigations in Italy 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Total GdF Investigations Investigations launched (number of cases registered in the year) 1 144 1 701 2 872 3 057 2 727 1 055 12 566 Investigations (number of cases concluded in the year) 962 1 217 1 108 1 612 1 499 526 6 924 Investigations (number of individuals for cases concluded in the year) 2 300 3 391 3 549 4 069 4 113 1 146 18 568 Number of arrests 253 472 303 287 498 94 1 907 Investigations by all LEAs (excluding GdF) Investigations launched (number of cases registered in the year) 1 759 1 372 266 358 997 286 5 038 401. Although its focus is largely on pursuing assets of mafia-style organised criminals, the DIA also pursues ML investigation as a tool to fight organised crime. As part of its investigations, the DIA regularly reconstructs the economic activities and illicitly accumulated assets of associates of mafia-type organised criminal groups, including elaborate ML schemes employed for this. The DIA has access to similar databases as the GdF (except Molecola) in addition to National Anti-Mafia Database (BDNA) which provides outcomes on anti-mafia proceedings related to the participation of mafia related individuals for public contracts and procurements. Although less than 5% of ML investigations in Italy are launched by the DIA, these relate to deep and lengthy investigations over several years, involving the reconstruction of substantial illicit assets accumulated by mafia subjects which lead to a limited number of highly complex criminal investigations (which includes ML) Table 7.3. DIA ML Identification and Investigations 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Nos of ML cases identified and investigated 156 114 34 2 81 387 Nos of persons investigated for ML 28 138 234 21 131 580 Investigation of ML 402. The Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) is the competent authority for leading and directing ML investigations and prosecutions. The PP directs criminal investigations at a very early stage when a notitia criminis (information on a fact that could constitute a criminal offence) is registered (this is mandatory). From then on, the PPO leads the investigation and prosecution and assigns investigative tasks to the polices and coordinates their cooperation throughout the investigation and prosecution brings on a mandatory basis, the case to the courts if sufficient grounds exist gathered during the investigations to support a charge in court. For all investigations, including those investigated outside the AMC, the PP will coordinate the different LEAs’ investigative activities and assign the task to the police force that has reported the crime but may delegate tasks to several LEAs jointly as appropriate, e.g. even as the State Police and the Carabinieri can investigate the specific crime, the GdF may be assigned to join the investigation where their expertise is needed to carry out more specialised financial investigations. 403.  The GdF has several functions and units tasked to combat ML, one of which is the unit that functions as the judicial police. It is well resourced to investigate complex ML, including those that involve transnational elements. The GdF is structured militarily with a central command structure and territorial units. It has approximately 30 000 staff who perform judicial police functions, divided between the NSPV and 500 territorial units. Basic training courses are compulsory for all GdF personnel which cover the acquisition of investigative skills as well as applicable rules and procedures. In addition, there are further specialised courses, which are constantly updated on new techniques, methodologies, trends and money laundering risks. Case studies reflected how the GdF utilises its investigative skills and training in complex ML investigations. The GdF also frequently draws on its international networks where needed, to build its case (see IO.2). 404. The main strength of the GdF lies in its networks and access to information that is useful to support the complex ML investigations it is mostly involved in. In conducting investigations, the GdF uses its internally developed databases, the Dorsale Informatica to access 138 confidential and open-sourced databases which include real estate ownership information, bank account information, business registers, vehicle registers etc. supported by the Molecola software which also contains law enforcement databases, tax administration database, land register, company register etc. The system is able to draw analyses and linkages to the different information in the databases including investigative information (e.g. transcripts of wiretaps, account statement details etc) in order to quickly identify ownership details and asset movement to support ML investigations. 405. The State Police and the Carabinieri also investigate ML, although the cases are usually but not always less complex than those investigated by GdF as their focus is on the predicate offending. The State Police has over 170 staff assigned to the dedicated central and local units responsible for crime and serious organised crime of which ten function in the central command and 160 are spread across competent local units (e.g. Rome has 13 staff and Milan, Naples and Palermo have three staff each), who deal with investigations into ML activity. There was no information over the number of staff that represent the judicial police who support the Carabinieri. Their investigations are also supported by IT applications and other technology to analyse data, 406. Based on discussions with these authorities, the State Police and the Carabinieri are well-trained to fighting criminal activity and to conduct financial investigations even at the district level and have access to similar financial investigation tools as the GdF which are employed under the direction of the PP. When conducting ML investigations, the Carabinieri is guided by the General Staff of the Carabinieri Headquarters (“Organised Crime, Subversion and Terrorism Office”) circular issued in 2019 which detail ML laws and highlights a broad range of databases which it has access to for financial information. This includes the Sistema di Indagine (SDI) database that allows for the sharing of general information on offences, reports, orders issued or executed and complaints received against individuals and legal entities as well as some other external databases and how these may be useful. The Carabinieri does not have direct access to GdF’s sophisticated IT tools or STR’s which could be useful for STR analyses and to discover linkages across the information to conduct more sophisticated investigations more quickly. However, for more complex investigations, the PP would be able to draw on the GdF as noted above. 407. In view of the general and specialised criminal investigation responsibilities, there are coordination mechanisms amongst the authorities, which work satisfactorily. The Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo (‘DNA’) is a judicial coordinating body responsible for coordination of investigations into organised crime (including financial crimes) and terrorism offences (including TF). It comprises of prosecutors experienced in investigating organised crime and works in close coordination with the DIA in coordinating investigations and prosecutions of organised crime across the country. For prioritised serious offences, including organised crime, the DNA coordinates investigations across the 26 PPOs through a linked database. All LEAs have access to this database that allows for the sharing of general information on offences, reports, orders issued or executed and complaints received against individuals and legal entities. As noted above, the PP is also key to the coordination among the different LEAs, which is often done in complex financial investigations to be able to appropriately exploit the specific expertise and access to information of the different LEAs. 408. The most significant ML threats identified in Italy’s NRA are corruption, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and sexual exploitation. Most criminal conduct is attributable to organised crime, including mafia-style crime (e.g. drug trafficking, extortion, tax crimes, gambling, illegal waste trafficking, smuggling and counterfeiting). Italy does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the underlying predicate offences for ML investigations, which limits the ability to assess whether the country’s pursuit of ML was in line with its risks. However, based on discussions with the Italian authorities, there is significant focus on investigations for these predicate offences, and also for fraud and forgery related to EU and/or public grants. The GdF noted that it prioritises ML related to tax evasion, corruption, drug trafficking and forgery investigations, which is consistent with its mandate. Significant number of STRs are made on suspicions of organised crime, fraud (including cyber fraud and other types of fraud), tax crimes and corruption, which are followed up particularly by the GdF and the DIA. In addition, Italy presented a large number of case studies involving complex ML case studies in line with the GDF’s and DIA’s national level operational and policy mandates, that reflected that the GdF and the DIA are pursuing ML related to serious organised crime which is consistent with the country’s risk and context. Asset recovery data also indicated that over 90% of asset seizures and confiscations related to mafia type organised crime which included ML. Box 7.1. Investigation into a complex fraud and ML scheme (GdF) The NSPV of GdF carried out targeted investigations based on an inherent risk analysis of anomalous financial transactions to and from European Countries, carried out through the issuance of fake invoices creating a complex Trade based Money Laundering system. Through investigations, GdF uncovered a criminal network that was involved in tax crimes committed though a company operating in the waste disposal sector. GdF analysed numerous invoices for non-existent transactions issued by shell companies that allowed the main company to generate fictitious costs to reduce taxable income. The money was then laundered abroad. Investigation tools utilised by GdF included the use of its databases for the reconstruction of the profiles of the suspects and legal entities involved, wire-tapping and surveillance against 25 persons, in-depth analysis of numerous STRs, reconstruction of financial flows through examination of 80 financial reports and 50 pre-paid cards and the consultation of a bank to corroborate the criminal hypothesis. Investigations led to the arrest of eight suspects who were ultimately convicted of ML offences, fraudulent tax declaration, fictitious registration of assets and issuance of fake invoices. For ML offences, they were each sentenced to between three and four years’ imprisonment. A total of EUR 21 million was seized as a result of the investigation. Box 7.2. Operation Moby Dick (GdF and State Police) The investigation that took place between 2022 and 2024, targeted a transnational criminal organisation engaged in issuing and utilising invoices for non-existent transactions as well as ML, reinvesting and self-laundering proceeds through ‘carousel’ fraud schemes. The criminal group operated through a multi-layered corporate structure, using companies active in the trade of consumer IT products, with operational branches in Italy and other ten other overseas jurisdictions. 195 individuals and 144 Italian and foreign companies were investigated and 43 persons were arrested. Seizure orders amounting to EUR 520 million were executed. Eleven persons have been charged with aggravating circumstance of mafia-type involvement, by providing financial support to mafia groups. MLA requests for recovery of assets are pending and criminal proceedings are on-going. Box 7.3. Operation Pick Up (DNA) Italian authorities investigated the ML mechanism of a complex network of international financial brokers for a South American criminal association of cocaine suppliers and the Italian criminal associations. The proceeds of drug trafficking were collected in cash in Italy and distributed through a widespread network of collaborators and facilitators for laundering. Italy employed undercover agents and front undercover company through which the judicial authorities were able to gain access to ML mechanism. The investigations revealed that once the illicit proceeds were deposited into the foreign company’s accounts at the direction of the traffickers, the cash was transferred to foreign accounts located in USA, China, Türkiye, Panama, etc in order to be subsequently channelled to the South American cocaine suppliers. The investigations involved collaboration with 27 foreign countries as well as working with the EUROPOL’s European Financial and Economic Crime Centra as well as the Italian representative of EUROJUST who coordinated with investigations activities with other European prosecutor’s offices. In April 2023, significant seizures were made in various counties against the money laundered through the facilitators. 409. The data (see Table 7.4 below) reflects that the GdF regularly conducts ML investigations involving legal persons which is in line with how organised crime groups in Italy generally launder their proceeds of crime. DIA constantly monitors companies that receive public procurements to ascertain that no violation is committed and conducts investigations into business that are used by organised crime groups to launder illicit assets. However, no data was presented to demonstrate how it was routinely pursuing ML investigations against legal persons. Table 7.4. GdF Investigations against Legal Persons for ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Total Number of cases identified 62 89 70 366 130 65 782 Number of legal entities involved 141 228 136 557 295 232 1 589" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="422. Italy has a strong legislative and operational framework that began to take shape into 1980 to ‘follow the money’ approach through conviction and non-conviction-based seizures and forfeitures, which it uses effectively to prioritise the pursuit of assets of criminals, especially for mafia-style organised criminal activity. Italian LEAs understand the importance of asset-tracing and recovery in achieving their objectives. The authorities have a clear asset-oriented approach to identify and to investigate crimes which is of great importance also for Italy’s asset-recovery regime. This asset-oriented approach to identify and to investigate crimes has resulted in substantial amounts and a variety of assets seized and confiscated. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 423. The legal framework in Italy provides the comprehensive tools and essential elements for an effective asset recovery regime that emphasises a ‘follow the money’ approach particularly for organised criminal activity. All authorities involved in this have confirmed that they are following such an approach, and the authorities have all underlined the importance of asset recovery of illegal assets in achieving an effective overall law enforcement. The Minister of Interior’s general prioritisation directive to all LEAs for 2025 includes the strengthening activity of mafia infiltration attempts relating to public works, major works and the intensification of combating ML in the context of the protection of the legal economy against mafia infiltration. 424. The main criminal investigative institutional structures in the country, especially those established to counter large scale organised crime that is prevalent in Italy, are empowered by the Anti-Mafia Code (AMC) and organised with the key objectives of tracing criminal assets and assets of criminals. In particular, the set-up of the DIA and its operational goal to investigate mafia-style criminal activity through preventive measures that includes asset-based measures against mafia-related individuals is a reflection of Italy’s strong commitment in prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective. 425. All LEAs conduct financial investigations to support investigations into offences that can generate illicit proceeds. The LEAs use asset-tracing and recovery powers available under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC), and when useful to their investigations, the powers under the AMC. As the PP leads investigations in Italy, the expertise of the PP includes the use of financial investigation techniques to support asset recovery. More highly experienced prosecutors are assigned to cases involving organised crime, including mafia-style criminality, reflecting again Italy’s commitment to prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective. 426. In addition, the GdF is guided by the MEF’s policy priorities which for the period 2024-6, highlighted the responsibility of GdF to prevent and to repress attempts to infiltrate crime, including transnational crime, into the legal economy through the in-depth analysis of suspicious financial flows, the identification and removal of assets and financial assets illegally accumulated by individuals and legal entities. The GdF also issues regular Strategic Goals and Operational Plans. Operational Plan Nos 34 which dates back to 2015 and is updated annually. This plan prioritises to “reconstructing the origin and/or destination of financial flows and assets of illicit origin, in order to identify the beneficial owner of the illegal proceeds generated by profit crimes and ‘attack’ the related assets with actual precautionary measures”, which is done whenever “criminal relevant conduct” emerge and based on a list of “main trigger sources”. The GdF is acutely aware of these high-level objectives and is operationally structured and resourced to achieve them. 427. Italy has not adopted a national strategy or policy for the collection of statistics for the asset recovery regime in its entirety covering all authorities involved in asset recovery (see paragraphs under effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks below). This may limit Italy’s ability to evaluate its asset regime holistically and detect changes that may need to be made to the system as including coordination and broad use across authorities of financial investigations and international cooperation to support asset recovery. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 428. The constant focus at the ministerial and agency level on going after the asset of criminals has resulted in the establishment over the years of the various sophisticated legislation and authorities for asset recovery and management. For example, the DIA issued a circular in 2023 on a new internal organisational structure of the peripheral branches of the DIA to be able to have adequate human and instrumental resources to provide absolute priority for its asset recovery mandate. 429. Through the issuance of regular internal circulars, the Director of the DIA assigns the territorial branches of the DIA, annual goals and objectives concerning preventive measures (non-conviction-based seizures and confiscations under the AMC). These review the success of the outcomes of the objectives of the previous year as well. The latest internal circular was issued in February 2025. The DIA also drafts six monthly reports to the Ministry of Interior which is tabled in Parliament to ensure that the DIA’s resourcing remains current. Similarly, annual Strategic Goals and Operational Plans issued by the GdF underline the asset tracing and recovery measures that are central to every investigation. As noted above however, there is not a periodic review at the national level that includes all operational authorities involved in asset recovery in order to achieve a more effective resource distribution. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 430. Italy’s criminal framework relating to asset-tracing and recovery depends on the legislation under which the investigation takes place. The ‘traditional’ framework for asset seizures and confiscation linked to investigations into crimes that yield proceeds is based on the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC). Under these laws, seizure is primarily meant to prevent assets from being altered, dispersed or otherwise modified and confiscation is based on conviction. 431. Italy also has robust legislation that allows the LEAs to take preventive measures in relation to mafia-style crime through tough preventive measures focussed on facilitating the recovery of assets linked to specific serious crimes and depriving criminals of the assets at their disposal. This is based on the AMC which targets the assets of persons who (i) are linked to organised; (ii) ‘habitually’ conduct criminal activities (including ML), i.e., persons who, in light of their conducts and standard of living, appear to be living, even in part, on the proceeds of criminal activity; or (iii) are suspected of TF (including natural and legal persons designated by the UNSC). 432. Measures under the AMC can be applied independently from the prosecution based (i.e. non-conviction based) on the key prerequisite being the potentially socially dangerous conduct of the subject (e.g., potential affiliation to a criminal organisation or involvement in certain serious crimes, including ML). Under preventive confiscation, the burden of proof is reversed if it is established that the person is habitually engaged in criminal activities or is living, even in part, from the proceeds of criminal activity. In anticipation of confiscation, provisional measures, such as the preventive seizure of property under the direct or indirect control of the accused or early seizure of assets can be applied. 433. The DIA is responsible for coordinating preventive investigations into organised crime and carrying out judicial police investigations exclusively for mafia-type crimes or mafia-type organised crime groups (see IO.7). With a focus on prevention, the DIA conducts strategic analysis on the criminal phenomena and their evolution, identifies areas at risk of ML and combats mafia infiltration in procurements and the potential involvement, even indirectly, of individuals with mafia-related criminal records in corporate entities. The DIA does this through investigations into the standard of living, the financial resources and the assets of the suspects/entities linked to organised crime as well as investigations into their economic activities to identify the sources of income of suspects often before a criminal report is registered. 434. The main objective of the GdF's action is to detect the many ways in which crime, including organised crime, can affect the free exercise of economic activities. Investigations on illicit assets are carried out through the identification of targets supported by its internal IT software such as Molecola (see IO.7) and based on parallel financial investigations, including through STR analysis and financial investigations before a criminal report is registered. This is aimed at reconstructing the real assets held by criminals for any subsequent asset recovery action. 435. Even though the State Police and the Carabinieri have a broader objective than the GdF, they do nevertheless conduct financial investigations to support investigations into offences that can generate illicit proceeds under the direction of the public prosecutor. These LEAs use asset-tracing and recovery powers available under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC), and, when useful to an investigation into organised crime (for example to pursue property of corresponding value), the powers under the AMC. 436. Financial investigations whether to support asset recovery or to build a case for prosecution, in all cases once the criminal case is registered, is led by the Public Prosecutor (PP). As with its role in criminal investigations, the PP can direct different LEAs to support asset recovery investigations based on their resources and expertise. As noted in IO.7, where special expertise is needed by the State Police and the Carabinieri for asset-tracing and recovery, the PP involves the GdF. 437. Assets seized and confiscated in Italy are managed by three agencies (i) the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organized Crime ( Agenzia Nationale per l’amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestratie e confiscate alla criminalità - ANBSC) which is in charge of the administration, management and custody of assets other than funds definitely confiscated, (ii) the Fondo Unico Giustizia (FUG), which is in charge of the administration of seized and confiscated funds and (iii) the Agenzia del Demanio , which is the central authority in charge of the administration, management and custody of public property. The International Police Co-operation Service within the Criminal Police Central Directorate acts also as Assets Recovery Office (ARO) through which the LEAs seek international cooperation on asset recovery relating to information that does not require formal judicial authorisation and are conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements (see IO.2). Finally, LEAs, in particular the GdF and the DIA also coordinate with the UIF on STR information (see IO.6) which is used heavily in asset-tracing for identification of assets for seizures and confiscations. 438. The domestic authorities have cooperation and coordination mechanisms with each other based on bilateral or multilateral MOUs through which information is exchanged. The GdF in particular, has strong networks through MOUs with the different authorities that support its broad range of activities which has contributed to its asset recovery efforts. As noted above, to achieve even more proactivity, broad and systematic coordination, a comprehensive national statistics collection on asset recovery that involves all relevant authorities would enhance coordination through even more proactivity, broad and systematic coordination with common understanding on the prioritisation of asset recovery and the roles and expectation at all stages of the process and across all agencies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="422. Italy has a strong legislative and operational framework that began to take shape into 1980 to ‘follow the money’ approach through conviction and non-conviction-based seizures and forfeitures, which it uses effectively to prioritise the pursuit of assets of criminals, especially for mafia-style organised criminal activity. Italian LEAs understand the importance of asset-tracing and recovery in achieving their objectives. The authorities have a clear asset-oriented approach to identify and to investigate crimes which is of great importance also for Italy’s asset-recovery regime. This asset-oriented approach to identify and to investigate crimes has resulted in substantial amounts and a variety of assets seized and confiscated. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 423. The legal framework in Italy provides the comprehensive tools and essential elements for an effective asset recovery regime that emphasises a ‘follow the money’ approach particularly for organised criminal activity. All authorities involved in this have confirmed that they are following such an approach, and the authorities have all underlined the importance of asset recovery of illegal assets in achieving an effective overall law enforcement. The Minister of Interior’s general prioritisation directive to all LEAs for 2025 includes the strengthening activity of mafia infiltration attempts relating to public works, major works and the intensification of combating ML in the context of the protection of the legal economy against mafia infiltration. 424. The main criminal investigative institutional structures in the country, especially those established to counter large scale organised crime that is prevalent in Italy, are empowered by the Anti-Mafia Code (AMC) and organised with the key objectives of tracing criminal assets and assets of criminals. In particular, the set-up of the DIA and its operational goal to investigate mafia-style criminal activity through preventive measures that includes asset-based measures against mafia-related individuals is a reflection of Italy’s strong commitment in prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective. 425. All LEAs conduct financial investigations to support investigations into offences that can generate illicit proceeds. The LEAs use asset-tracing and recovery powers available under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC), and when useful to their investigations, the powers under the AMC. As the PP leads investigations in Italy, the expertise of the PP includes the use of financial investigation techniques to support asset recovery. More highly experienced prosecutors are assigned to cases involving organised crime, including mafia-style criminality, reflecting again Italy’s commitment to prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective. 426. In addition, the GdF is guided by the MEF’s policy priorities which for the period 2024-6, highlighted the responsibility of GdF to prevent and to repress attempts to infiltrate crime, including transnational crime, into the legal economy through the in-depth analysis of suspicious financial flows, the identification and removal of assets and financial assets illegally accumulated by individuals and legal entities. The GdF also issues regular Strategic Goals and Operational Plans. Operational Plan Nos 34 which dates back to 2015 and is updated annually. This plan prioritises to “reconstructing the origin and/or destination of financial flows and assets of illicit origin, in order to identify the beneficial owner of the illegal proceeds generated by profit crimes and ‘attack’ the related assets with actual precautionary measures”, which is done whenever “criminal relevant conduct” emerge and based on a list of “main trigger sources”. The GdF is acutely aware of these high-level objectives and is operationally structured and resourced to achieve them. 427. Italy has not adopted a national strategy or policy for the collection of statistics for the asset recovery regime in its entirety covering all authorities involved in asset recovery (see paragraphs under effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks below). This may limit Italy’s ability to evaluate its asset regime holistically and detect changes that may need to be made to the system as including coordination and broad use across authorities of financial investigations and international cooperation to support asset recovery. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 428. The constant focus at the ministerial and agency level on going after the asset of criminals has resulted in the establishment over the years of the various sophisticated legislation and authorities for asset recovery and management. For example, the DIA issued a circular in 2023 on a new internal organisational structure of the peripheral branches of the DIA to be able to have adequate human and instrumental resources to provide absolute priority for its asset recovery mandate. 429. Through the issuance of regular internal circulars, the Director of the DIA assigns the territorial branches of the DIA, annual goals and objectives concerning preventive measures (non-conviction-based seizures and confiscations under the AMC). These review the success of the outcomes of the objectives of the previous year as well. The latest internal circular was issued in February 2025. The DIA also drafts six monthly reports to the Ministry of Interior which is tabled in Parliament to ensure that the DIA’s resourcing remains current. Similarly, annual Strategic Goals and Operational Plans issued by the GdF underline the asset tracing and recovery measures that are central to every investigation. As noted above however, there is not a periodic review at the national level that includes all operational authorities involved in asset recovery in order to achieve a more effective resource distribution. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 430. Italy’s criminal framework relating to asset-tracing and recovery depends on the legislation under which the investigation takes place. The ‘traditional’ framework for asset seizures and confiscation linked to investigations into crimes that yield proceeds is based on the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC). Under these laws, seizure is primarily meant to prevent assets from being altered, dispersed or otherwise modified and confiscation is based on conviction. 431. Italy also has robust legislation that allows the LEAs to take preventive measures in relation to mafia-style crime through tough preventive measures focussed on facilitating the recovery of assets linked to specific serious crimes and depriving criminals of the assets at their disposal. This is based on the AMC which targets the assets of persons who (i) are linked to organised; (ii) ‘habitually’ conduct criminal activities (including ML), i.e., persons who, in light of their conducts and standard of living, appear to be living, even in part, on the proceeds of criminal activity; or (iii) are suspected of TF (including natural and legal persons designated by the UNSC). 432. Measures under the AMC can be applied independently from the prosecution based (i.e. non-conviction based) on the key prerequisite being the potentially socially dangerous conduct of the subject (e.g., potential affiliation to a criminal organisation or involvement in certain serious crimes, including ML). Under preventive confiscation, the burden of proof is reversed if it is established that the person is habitually engaged in criminal activities or is living, even in part, from the proceeds of criminal activity. In anticipation of confiscation, provisional measures, such as the preventive seizure of property under the direct or indirect control of the accused or early seizure of assets can be applied. 433. The DIA is responsible for coordinating preventive investigations into organised crime and carrying out judicial police investigations exclusively for mafia-type crimes or mafia-type organised crime groups (see IO.7). With a focus on prevention, the DIA conducts strategic analysis on the criminal phenomena and their evolution, identifies areas at risk of ML and combats mafia infiltration in procurements and the potential involvement, even indirectly, of individuals with mafia-related criminal records in corporate entities. The DIA does this through investigations into the standard of living, the financial resources and the assets of the suspects/entities linked to organised crime as well as investigations into their economic activities to identify the sources of income of suspects often before a criminal report is registered. 434. The main objective of the GdF's action is to detect the many ways in which crime, including organised crime, can affect the free exercise of economic activities. Investigations on illicit assets are carried out through the identification of targets supported by its internal IT software such as Molecola (see IO.7) and based on parallel financial investigations, including through STR analysis and financial investigations before a criminal report is registered. This is aimed at reconstructing the real assets held by criminals for any subsequent asset recovery action. 435. Even though the State Police and the Carabinieri have a broader objective than the GdF, they do nevertheless conduct financial investigations to support investigations into offences that can generate illicit proceeds under the direction of the public prosecutor. These LEAs use asset-tracing and recovery powers available under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and the Criminal Code (CC), and, when useful to an investigation into organised crime (for example to pursue property of corresponding value), the powers under the AMC. 436. Financial investigations whether to support asset recovery or to build a case for prosecution, in all cases once the criminal case is registered, is led by the Public Prosecutor (PP). As with its role in criminal investigations, the PP can direct different LEAs to support asset recovery investigations based on their resources and expertise. As noted in IO.7, where special expertise is needed by the State Police and the Carabinieri for asset-tracing and recovery, the PP involves the GdF. 437. Assets seized and confiscated in Italy are managed by three agencies (i) the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organized Crime ( Agenzia Nationale per l’amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestratie e confiscate alla criminalità - ANBSC) which is in charge of the administration, management and custody of assets other than funds definitely confiscated, (ii) the Fondo Unico Giustizia (FUG), which is in charge of the administration of seized and confiscated funds and (iii) the Agenzia del Demanio , which is the central authority in charge of the administration, management and custody of public property. The International Police Co-operation Service within the Criminal Police Central Directorate acts also as Assets Recovery Office (ARO) through which the LEAs seek international cooperation on asset recovery relating to information that does not require formal judicial authorisation and are conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements (see IO.2). Finally, LEAs, in particular the GdF and the DIA also coordinate with the UIF on STR information (see IO.6) which is used heavily in asset-tracing for identification of assets for seizures and confiscations. 438. The domestic authorities have cooperation and coordination mechanisms with each other based on bilateral or multilateral MOUs through which information is exchanged. The GdF in particular, has strong networks through MOUs with the different authorities that support its broad range of activities which has contributed to its asset recovery efforts. As noted above, to achieve even more proactivity, broad and systematic coordination, a comprehensive national statistics collection on asset recovery that involves all relevant authorities would enhance coordination through even more proactivity, broad and systematic coordination with common understanding on the prioritisation of asset recovery and the roles and expectation at all stages of the process and across all agencies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="464. As informed by its NRA, Italy has a good understanding of its TF risks which is characterised as medium or ‘rather’ significant (see IO.1). The most usual modes through which TF takes place is through the use of pre-paid cards, money transfers and hawala networks. Self-radicalised and other terrorists using cash and small sums of money – often legitimately obtained – to fund preparation for attacks represents a very significant type of TF activity for Italy. 9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 465. TF activity is primarily identified through the following triggers (i) STRs and financial investigation independent of terrorism investigations, and (ii) other intelligence information. It is secondarily identified through financial investigation conducted in parallel to ongoing terrorism cases. 466. As the first stop for the analysis of STRs, UIF clearly prioritises the analysis and dissemination of STRs related to TF (see IO.6) so that there is no delay for the intelligence to be used to start new TF investigations or support TF investigations already opened. Over the evaluation period, UIF received 2218 STRs related to TF, all of which were reviewed and disseminated to the GdF, DIA and DNA, and since 2022, also directly to the Carabinieri. Italy also maintains a process to reclassify STRs as TF-related that had been originally flagged as ML-related based on non-financial intelligence by GdF accessed through other Committee for Strategic Counterterrorism Analysis (CASA) members (see below) to re-categorise STRs and provide feedback to the UIF. Operational directives and communication flows, provide specific instructions to GdF on how to analyse, develop and treat STRs relating to TF. GdF uses a broad range of investigative tools, such as bank account analysis, wiretapping, etc., to supplement the STRs during a formal TF investigation. 467. Outside of STRs, Italy’s LEAs, particularly GdF, can conduct financial investigations where analysis of financial flows may also lead to the identification of TF activity. For example, document or cash flow analysis when conducting tax investigations may reveal links to cells or organisation of a terrorist nature, or resulting from possible cases of terrorist acts. However, identification of TF activity through these means by the Italian authorities is rare. 468. Identification of TF activity can also occur in coordination with other domestic authorities through the CASA, established in 2004, which is a multi-agency platform for the strategic and tactical assessment of terrorist threats. LEAs and intelligence services participate on this platform through high-level coordination and decision-making. Aside from the four police forces, Italy’s intelligence agencies, including the Department of Security Information (DIS), also contribute to CASA. 469. CASA holds weekly meetings where TF-related information, including STRs and reports from foreign FIUs are shared, and anomalies are discussed among other topics. Intelligence, including TF-related intelligence, shared during these discussions is a valuable trigger for new TF investigations. Italy monitors the anomalous use of cash that could indicate TF-related hawala networks through its tracking tools. As described above, the information on terrorist activity shared amongst CASA members has also been used to re-classify STRs which may trigger for TF investigations, Between 2020 and 2024, there were 686 instances of STRs originally classified as ML that were re-classified by the GdF to be related to TF. These (i.e., TF-related STRs and associated analysis, corroborated by terrorism-related information from CASA and international counterparts) have led to Italy identifying additional complex TF activity. For example, as part of a TF-related law enforcement operation, Italy identified about 140 suspicious remittance transactions processed through 17 money service businesses, which were then cross-referenced with international financial data obtained through EU channels. Box 9.1. Operation Foreign Fighters The investigation (2016 to 2019) and prosecution were carried out by several Italian authorities against a complex TF network involved in the transfer of funds to Syrian terrorist groups. The case resulted from STR analysis conducted by UIF on the financial activities of an Al-Qaeda terrorist cell in Sardinia. UIF originally focused on this cell for their analysis because Italian authorities had successfully executed a CT operation against the cell in. The UIF’s analysis outlined a network of individuals, some of whom were connected to Italy-based car dealerships and migrant smuggling activities involved in money transfers through third-country jurisdictions and then onwards to Syria. GdF began an investigation based on the UIF analysis and identified financial flows from around 30 suspects through Sardinia and the Lake Como area. At the direction of the prosecutor, GdF used undercover operations and sought international cooperation with Europol and Sweden to build evidence to prosecute for TF activity. The investigation was completed in 2020. In 2024, prosecutors successfully obtained final convictions for TF against three natural persons, one of whom was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 470. In Italy, as with ML, all LEAs have the competency to investigate TF offences. The focus of the State Police (SP) is largely on more general offences. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) is the investigative arm of the Carabinieri which deals with organised crime and terrorism, both at national and international levels. The SP and Carabinieri have significant numbers of personnel dedicated to counterterrorism investigations and may receive some training in analysing financial flows. Both authorities usually investigate potential TF as part of their traditional terrorism investigations by gathering financial evidence during the investigation (such as receipts or cash), obtaining bank, VASP, e-money institution, and other corroborating information from intermediaries, and conducting financial transaction analysis. In practice, these parallel financial investigations by the SP and Carabinieri sometimes undercover movements of small sums of money or self-financing, which would less likely be caught by STRs or other autonomous financial flow analysis conducted by the UIF or GdF. Unlike other types of STRs, the Carabinieri can receive TF-related STRs directly from UIF upon the Carabinieri’s request. However, this has only occurred three times since the channel was established in 2022 in relation to urgent cases, as the Carabinieri relies mostly on CASA channels for receiving STR-related information. 471. GdF has unique tools, such as the expertise to analyse STRs, identify and pursue complex financial investigations as well as access to a very broad range of databases (see IO.7), and is thus well resourced to identify and investigate complex stand-alone TF. It has approximately 50 personnel dedicated to TF spread across its NSPV and three specialised field units in Milan, Rome, and Naples, supported by a further 2 000 units covering the rest of the country who may conduct TF identification. When GdF initiates TF investigations, they are entered into the PP’s database which will show matches with on-going terrorism investigations. While the constant exchange of information is coordinated by the PP, traditional terrorism investigations and GdF’s stand-alone TF investigations, generally remains separate. The GdF is generally delegated by the PP to investigate complex TF-related matters. 472. This specialisation relating to the identification and investigation of TF, allows the GdF to build strong expertise to handle complex, stand-alone TF activity. The SP and Carabinieri focus instead on more simple TF activity in the course of their terrorism investigations. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 473. As with ML, TF investigations are led by prosecutors. All terrorism-related cases, including TF cases, are prioritised for investigation by the prosecutors regardless of their significance due to the serious nature of terrorist threats. On average, Italy pursues around 100 TF investigations per year, both into complex, stand-alone TF and simple TF activity. The deficiencies related to the alignment between the prosecutors’ activities and objectives and the risks identified, as outlined in the introduction/IO.1, also apply to TF cases. 474. GdF’s resources and expertise in conducting investigations through being able to link data to follow financial flows (IO.7) apply also to the investigation of TF offences. GdF’s use of investigative tools such as sophisticated surveillance methods, including electronic surveillance, undercover operations and wiretapping as well as its involvement in border controls (see IO.8) allow it to pursue complex TF investigations. This can be particularly useful in cases involving informal methods of money transfer like hawala mechanisms and rechargeable payment cards, that are often used for TF. 475. In addition, GdF’s international cooperation networks particularly within the European framework are also useful considering the cross-border nature of TF activity in Italy. However, Italy has encountered some difficulties obtaining cooperation on TF cases from certain countries outside Europe, usually due to the requested country’s political willingness and capacity to assist. Nevertheless, its participation in initiatives such as the Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) has led to measures against foreign suspects for supporting terrorism in the region (see IO.2). Box 9.2. Operation Dhanubian PP delegated to GdF the investigation of a terrorist attack perpetrated in Vienna in 2020. GdF worked in coordination with other Milan authorities and the European Counter Terrorism Centre of EUROPOL (ECTC). The attacker belonged to an organisation called 'The Lions of the Balkans'. A search of a money transfer agency was conducted in light of significant anomalies with money transfer operations. Suspicious financial transactions were also found linked to 17 money transfer agencies. Financial information was also shared under the TFTP international cooperation procedure. 140 money remittances made by non-residents of Italy were analysed. At the end of the investigative activities, the judicial authorities ordered the execution of personal precautionary measures against seven persons for offences under articles 416 and 482 (material forgery committed by a private individual) and 497-bis (possession and manufacture of false identification documents) of the Criminal Code, as they were responsible for the counterfeiting identity documents that were sold to persons residing in Italy and European countries. The financial flow examined did not reveal any funds provided or collected for the benefit of terrorism, to a terrorist organization, or to an individual terrorist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="464. As informed by its NRA, Italy has a good understanding of its TF risks which is characterised as medium or ‘rather’ significant (see IO.1). The most usual modes through which TF takes place is through the use of pre-paid cards, money transfers and hawala networks. Self-radicalised and other terrorists using cash and small sums of money – often legitimately obtained – to fund preparation for attacks represents a very significant type of TF activity for Italy. 9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 465. TF activity is primarily identified through the following triggers (i) STRs and financial investigation independent of terrorism investigations, and (ii) other intelligence information. It is secondarily identified through financial investigation conducted in parallel to ongoing terrorism cases. 466. As the first stop for the analysis of STRs, UIF clearly prioritises the analysis and dissemination of STRs related to TF (see IO.6) so that there is no delay for the intelligence to be used to start new TF investigations or support TF investigations already opened. Over the evaluation period, UIF received 2218 STRs related to TF, all of which were reviewed and disseminated to the GdF, DIA and DNA, and since 2022, also directly to the Carabinieri. Italy also maintains a process to reclassify STRs as TF-related that had been originally flagged as ML-related based on non-financial intelligence by GdF accessed through other Committee for Strategic Counterterrorism Analysis (CASA) members (see below) to re-categorise STRs and provide feedback to the UIF. Operational directives and communication flows, provide specific instructions to GdF on how to analyse, develop and treat STRs relating to TF. GdF uses a broad range of investigative tools, such as bank account analysis, wiretapping, etc., to supplement the STRs during a formal TF investigation. 467. Outside of STRs, Italy’s LEAs, particularly GdF, can conduct financial investigations where analysis of financial flows may also lead to the identification of TF activity. For example, document or cash flow analysis when conducting tax investigations may reveal links to cells or organisation of a terrorist nature, or resulting from possible cases of terrorist acts. However, identification of TF activity through these means by the Italian authorities is rare. 468. Identification of TF activity can also occur in coordination with other domestic authorities through the CASA, established in 2004, which is a multi-agency platform for the strategic and tactical assessment of terrorist threats. LEAs and intelligence services participate on this platform through high-level coordination and decision-making. Aside from the four police forces, Italy’s intelligence agencies, including the Department of Security Information (DIS), also contribute to CASA. 469. CASA holds weekly meetings where TF-related information, including STRs and reports from foreign FIUs are shared, and anomalies are discussed among other topics. Intelligence, including TF-related intelligence, shared during these discussions is a valuable trigger for new TF investigations. Italy monitors the anomalous use of cash that could indicate TF-related hawala networks through its tracking tools. As described above, the information on terrorist activity shared amongst CASA members has also been used to re-classify STRs which may trigger for TF investigations, Between 2020 and 2024, there were 686 instances of STRs originally classified as ML that were re-classified by the GdF to be related to TF. These (i.e., TF-related STRs and associated analysis, corroborated by terrorism-related information from CASA and international counterparts) have led to Italy identifying additional complex TF activity. For example, as part of a TF-related law enforcement operation, Italy identified about 140 suspicious remittance transactions processed through 17 money service businesses, which were then cross-referenced with international financial data obtained through EU channels. Box 9.1. Operation Foreign Fighters The investigation (2016 to 2019) and prosecution were carried out by several Italian authorities against a complex TF network involved in the transfer of funds to Syrian terrorist groups. The case resulted from STR analysis conducted by UIF on the financial activities of an Al-Qaeda terrorist cell in Sardinia. UIF originally focused on this cell for their analysis because Italian authorities had successfully executed a CT operation against the cell in. The UIF’s analysis outlined a network of individuals, some of whom were connected to Italy-based car dealerships and migrant smuggling activities involved in money transfers through third-country jurisdictions and then onwards to Syria. GdF began an investigation based on the UIF analysis and identified financial flows from around 30 suspects through Sardinia and the Lake Como area. At the direction of the prosecutor, GdF used undercover operations and sought international cooperation with Europol and Sweden to build evidence to prosecute for TF activity. The investigation was completed in 2020. In 2024, prosecutors successfully obtained final convictions for TF against three natural persons, one of whom was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 470. In Italy, as with ML, all LEAs have the competency to investigate TF offences. The focus of the State Police (SP) is largely on more general offences. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) is the investigative arm of the Carabinieri which deals with organised crime and terrorism, both at national and international levels. The SP and Carabinieri have significant numbers of personnel dedicated to counterterrorism investigations and may receive some training in analysing financial flows. Both authorities usually investigate potential TF as part of their traditional terrorism investigations by gathering financial evidence during the investigation (such as receipts or cash), obtaining bank, VASP, e-money institution, and other corroborating information from intermediaries, and conducting financial transaction analysis. In practice, these parallel financial investigations by the SP and Carabinieri sometimes undercover movements of small sums of money or self-financing, which would less likely be caught by STRs or other autonomous financial flow analysis conducted by the UIF or GdF. Unlike other types of STRs, the Carabinieri can receive TF-related STRs directly from UIF upon the Carabinieri’s request. However, this has only occurred three times since the channel was established in 2022 in relation to urgent cases, as the Carabinieri relies mostly on CASA channels for receiving STR-related information. 471. GdF has unique tools, such as the expertise to analyse STRs, identify and pursue complex financial investigations as well as access to a very broad range of databases (see IO.7), and is thus well resourced to identify and investigate complex stand-alone TF. It has approximately 50 personnel dedicated to TF spread across its NSPV and three specialised field units in Milan, Rome, and Naples, supported by a further 2 000 units covering the rest of the country who may conduct TF identification. When GdF initiates TF investigations, they are entered into the PP’s database which will show matches with on-going terrorism investigations. While the constant exchange of information is coordinated by the PP, traditional terrorism investigations and GdF’s stand-alone TF investigations, generally remains separate. The GdF is generally delegated by the PP to investigate complex TF-related matters. 472. This specialisation relating to the identification and investigation of TF, allows the GdF to build strong expertise to handle complex, stand-alone TF activity. The SP and Carabinieri focus instead on more simple TF activity in the course of their terrorism investigations. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 473. As with ML, TF investigations are led by prosecutors. All terrorism-related cases, including TF cases, are prioritised for investigation by the prosecutors regardless of their significance due to the serious nature of terrorist threats. On average, Italy pursues around 100 TF investigations per year, both into complex, stand-alone TF and simple TF activity. The deficiencies related to the alignment between the prosecutors’ activities and objectives and the risks identified, as outlined in the introduction/IO.1, also apply to TF cases. 474. GdF’s resources and expertise in conducting investigations through being able to link data to follow financial flows (IO.7) apply also to the investigation of TF offences. GdF’s use of investigative tools such as sophisticated surveillance methods, including electronic surveillance, undercover operations and wiretapping as well as its involvement in border controls (see IO.8) allow it to pursue complex TF investigations. This can be particularly useful in cases involving informal methods of money transfer like hawala mechanisms and rechargeable payment cards, that are often used for TF. 475. In addition, GdF’s international cooperation networks particularly within the European framework are also useful considering the cross-border nature of TF activity in Italy. However, Italy has encountered some difficulties obtaining cooperation on TF cases from certain countries outside Europe, usually due to the requested country’s political willingness and capacity to assist. Nevertheless, its participation in initiatives such as the Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) has led to measures against foreign suspects for supporting terrorism in the region (see IO.2). Box 9.2. Operation Dhanubian PP delegated to GdF the investigation of a terrorist attack perpetrated in Vienna in 2020. GdF worked in coordination with other Milan authorities and the European Counter Terrorism Centre of EUROPOL (ECTC). The attacker belonged to an organisation called 'The Lions of the Balkans'. A search of a money transfer agency was conducted in light of significant anomalies with money transfer operations. Suspicious financial transactions were also found linked to 17 money transfer agencies. Financial information was also shared under the TFTP international cooperation procedure. 140 money remittances made by non-residents of Italy were analysed. At the end of the investigative activities, the judicial authorities ordered the execution of personal precautionary measures against seven persons for offences under articles 416 and 482 (material forgery committed by a private individual) and 497-bis (possession and manufacture of false identification documents) of the Criminal Code, as they were responsible for the counterfeiting identity documents that were sold to persons residing in Italy and European countries. The financial flow examined did not reveal any funds provided or collected for the benefit of terrorism, to a terrorist organization, or to an individual terrorist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="487. To some extent, Italy is implementing without delay, targeted financial sanctions related to terrorist financing (TF-TFS). The FSC is the competent authority for implementing TFS pursuant to i) UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988; ii) EU designations and national designations; and iii) in response to requests from third countries to take freezing action pursuant to UNSCR 1373. Designations under UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 488. For UN designations pursuant to UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988, Italy is not implementing TFS without delay. Italy does have domestic measures to address the delays in transposing UN designations to the EU framework. Under this framework, the FSC may recommend to the MEF to issue decrees within 24 hours for UN-designated persons while awaiting formal EU designation. (See Recommendation 6). 489. However, the domestic decrees have not been applied to new UN designations during the reporting period (where the UN made new listings 15 times, listing 13 individuals and 7 entities between 2020 and June 2025) and where there was an average of 6.7-day delay between UN and EU designations). Instead, upon new UN designations, the UIF promptly informs intermediaries of new UN listings, and the Italian authorities conducted comprehensive searches of their numerous databases for potential funds, assets and other economic resources (e.g. bank accounts, real estate, automobiles, company shares, boats, works of art – see core issue 10.2 below) belonging directly or indirectly to newly listed persons. As no matches were found, the Italian authorities determined that MEF decrees were not needed. While Italian authorities pro-actively identify funds, this system puts the onus for implementation on the government disproportionally. 490. While this process mitigates the risk of asset flight following new UN listings to some extent and demonstrates limited materiality of such threats in the Italian context, it does not sufficiently address implementation of TF-TFS without delay. In the time between the UN listing and EU listing, a transaction could potentially be processed through the Italian financial system, and there is no legal basis for financial intermediaries or other persons to freeze funds or prohibition to make funds available to newly listed UN persons or entities. Private sector entities met during the on-site visit indicated that in the event of a name match based on a new designation from the UN, they would freeze transactions based on civil contractual agreements. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 491. No national designations using domestic decrees were issued during the reporting period. Italy co-sponsored one listing proposal under the EU sanctions regime CP 931 (implementing UNSCR 1373) of two individuals involved in the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023. 492. Italy further received two requests from third countries for freezing action pursuant to UNSCR 1373, but these were not executed based on the lack of reasonable ground to proceed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="487. To some extent, Italy is implementing without delay, targeted financial sanctions related to terrorist financing (TF-TFS). The FSC is the competent authority for implementing TFS pursuant to i) UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988; ii) EU designations and national designations; and iii) in response to requests from third countries to take freezing action pursuant to UNSCR 1373. Designations under UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 488. For UN designations pursuant to UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988, Italy is not implementing TFS without delay. Italy does have domestic measures to address the delays in transposing UN designations to the EU framework. Under this framework, the FSC may recommend to the MEF to issue decrees within 24 hours for UN-designated persons while awaiting formal EU designation. (See Recommendation 6). 489. However, the domestic decrees have not been applied to new UN designations during the reporting period (where the UN made new listings 15 times, listing 13 individuals and 7 entities between 2020 and June 2025) and where there was an average of 6.7-day delay between UN and EU designations). Instead, upon new UN designations, the UIF promptly informs intermediaries of new UN listings, and the Italian authorities conducted comprehensive searches of their numerous databases for potential funds, assets and other economic resources (e.g. bank accounts, real estate, automobiles, company shares, boats, works of art – see core issue 10.2 below) belonging directly or indirectly to newly listed persons. As no matches were found, the Italian authorities determined that MEF decrees were not needed. While Italian authorities pro-actively identify funds, this system puts the onus for implementation on the government disproportionally. 490. While this process mitigates the risk of asset flight following new UN listings to some extent and demonstrates limited materiality of such threats in the Italian context, it does not sufficiently address implementation of TF-TFS without delay. In the time between the UN listing and EU listing, a transaction could potentially be processed through the Italian financial system, and there is no legal basis for financial intermediaries or other persons to freeze funds or prohibition to make funds available to newly listed UN persons or entities. Private sector entities met during the on-site visit indicated that in the event of a name match based on a new designation from the UN, they would freeze transactions based on civil contractual agreements. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 491. No national designations using domestic decrees were issued during the reporting period. Italy co-sponsored one listing proposal under the EU sanctions regime CP 931 (implementing UNSCR 1373) of two individuals involved in the terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023. 492. Italy further received two requests from third countries for freezing action pursuant to UNSCR 1373, but these were not executed based on the lack of reasonable ground to proceed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 511. Competent authorities are co-operating and co-ordinating the development and implementation of CPF policies to a large extent. The FSC is the competent authority for CPF risk analysis and policy development and effectively coordinates the activities of the various national authorities involved in preventing PF. This coordination enables synergies between government agencies, law enforcement agencies and financial institutions, ensuring a homogeneous and effective response to PF. 512. The FSC supports the implementation and enforcement of financial sanctions against individuals, entities or states involved in financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and utilises the significant information and expertise of other authorities to ensure that financial sanctions are properly implemented. 513. The FSC has also the powers to formulate proposals for listing to the competent bodies of the United Nations, as well as all other related tasks (exemptions, delisting, exchange of information between participating authorities – see R.6, R.7 and IO.10). 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 514. The FSC also facilitates CPF cooperation and coordination at operational level. This occurs for PF in the same way that the FSC facilitates cooperation and coordination for ML and TF (see Immediate Outcome 1), involving all relevant national authorities. The regular meetings (normally weekly) of the FSC allow a prompt, flexible, and often informal cooperation among the authorities on operational issues. The FSC framework ensures the timely exchange of relevant information among the authorities involved in order to identify networks or funding channels associated with designated subjects and possible sanctions evasion. 515. Members of MEF and FSC also take part into UAMA (Unit for Armament Materials Authorisation)-led interagency dual use export council, which is responsible for approving dual use export applications. This ensures coordination between the Dual-Use Committee and the FSC in various situations, in particular where dual-use exports are intertwined with potential illicit financing threats by coordinating with the FSC to assess the risks of financing such activities. During the reporting period, no licences were issued for the DPRK for the export of armament equipment nor for dual-use items. 516. The coordinated approach of the FSC and the UAMA has also resulted in consolidated controls for cross-border operations, including specific risk profiles within the Customs Control Circuit for counter-proliferation aspects, including to the DPRK. 517. Within the FSC, the UIF shares information in its possession, such as the amount of assets seized or PF-related STRs. The UIF also cooperates regularly with the other authorities of the FSC; in particular, for TFS implementation the UIF actively shares the information in its possession relating to designated subjects. The UIF also transmits to the GdF’s Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) any STRs presenting a risk of WMD proliferation financing together with the results of the financial analysis carried for subsequent in-depth investigation. The GdF exercises its powers for countering proliferation financing, reporting to the FSC on the type, legal situation, assets and state of use of assets, as well as on the existence of ongoing contracts, even if not registered or not transcribed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 511. Competent authorities are co-operating and co-ordinating the development and implementation of CPF policies to a large extent. The FSC is the competent authority for CPF risk analysis and policy development and effectively coordinates the activities of the various national authorities involved in preventing PF. This coordination enables synergies between government agencies, law enforcement agencies and financial institutions, ensuring a homogeneous and effective response to PF. 512. The FSC supports the implementation and enforcement of financial sanctions against individuals, entities or states involved in financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and utilises the significant information and expertise of other authorities to ensure that financial sanctions are properly implemented. 513. The FSC has also the powers to formulate proposals for listing to the competent bodies of the United Nations, as well as all other related tasks (exemptions, delisting, exchange of information between participating authorities – see R.6, R.7 and IO.10). 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 514. The FSC also facilitates CPF cooperation and coordination at operational level. This occurs for PF in the same way that the FSC facilitates cooperation and coordination for ML and TF (see Immediate Outcome 1), involving all relevant national authorities. The regular meetings (normally weekly) of the FSC allow a prompt, flexible, and often informal cooperation among the authorities on operational issues. The FSC framework ensures the timely exchange of relevant information among the authorities involved in order to identify networks or funding channels associated with designated subjects and possible sanctions evasion. 515. Members of MEF and FSC also take part into UAMA (Unit for Armament Materials Authorisation)-led interagency dual use export council, which is responsible for approving dual use export applications. This ensures coordination between the Dual-Use Committee and the FSC in various situations, in particular where dual-use exports are intertwined with potential illicit financing threats by coordinating with the FSC to assess the risks of financing such activities. During the reporting period, no licences were issued for the DPRK for the export of armament equipment nor for dual-use items. 516. The coordinated approach of the FSC and the UAMA has also resulted in consolidated controls for cross-border operations, including specific risk profiles within the Customs Control Circuit for counter-proliferation aspects, including to the DPRK. 517. Within the FSC, the UIF shares information in its possession, such as the amount of assets seized or PF-related STRs. The UIF also cooperates regularly with the other authorities of the FSC; in particular, for TFS implementation the UIF actively shares the information in its possession relating to designated subjects. The UIF also transmits to the GdF’s Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) any STRs presenting a risk of WMD proliferation financing together with the results of the financial analysis carried for subsequent in-depth investigation. The GdF exercises its powers for countering proliferation financing, reporting to the FSC on the type, legal situation, assets and state of use of assets, as well as on the existence of ongoing contracts, even if not registered or not transcribed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="97. Italy’s AML/CFT policies are broadly aligned to their identified ML/TF risks. The Financial Security Committee, which is chaired by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and includes all key authorities [10] as its members, effectively coordinates AML/CFT policy and action at the national level. 98. The FSC mechanism is generally effective at ensuring a unified AML/CFT approach in Italy, especially among the core authorities such as the BoI, GdF, and UIF, and can react quickly to emerging ML/TF threats with novel policies and activities. 99. In addition, competent authorities’ strategies and operational plans incorporate the ML/TF risks identified and are reviewed on a regular basis within the FSC. For instance: · The BoI maintains goals related to AML/CFT, including enhancement of risk methodologies and introduction of new supervisory tools, within its overall three-year strategic plan. In addition, the BoI has developed a more specific four-year AML/CFT strategic plan to determine supervisory priorities and allocate resources accordingly. · The GdF’s General Command issues annual strategic and operational plans on AML/CFT priorities, which incorporate the NRA findings, STR analysis, inspection results, and other data, to determine their activities. 100. The authorities also actively contribute to national AML/CFT legislation by leveraging the information they obtain on the identified risks. In particular, the UIF and the Bank of Italy has informed legislative changes such as the transposition of new EU regulations related to virtual assets and other initiatives. 101. The various authorities are responsible for the implementations of the lines of action and intervention. The Parliament is informed annually by the Ministry of Economy and Finance on the policies and activities of the competent AML/TF authorities, and this allows for parliamentary oversight of the authorities’ work. 102. While the policies and activities of the competent authorities generally address the identified ML/TF risks, some concerns remain about the appropriate allocation of resources between authorities at the national level in line with risk, especially in the absence of processes to consider resource allocation on a risk sensitive basis at the national level. The FSC does not discuss resource allocation at the interagency level, and there is no determination of the resource needs among different authorities in line with the identified risks. Therefore, resource allocation across the different agencies could be improved to streamline Italy’s AML/CFT system. 103. While this does not represent a substantial deficiency, in certain situations, this can lead to resource imbalances across authorities, with some authorities being over-resourced and others under-resourced. One example of this is that the DNA, which has only around 20 prosecutors with significant responsibility for coordinating all major Italian anti-mafia and anti-terrorism investigations among 26 different regional prosecutorial offices. At the same time, Italy has taken steps to bolster the resources available to some specific authorities in line with increasing workloads. This can be seen in the increased allocation of resources to the BoI, to ensure adequate resources are available for the upcoming and more intensive EU-wide AML/CFT approach. 104. Overall, Italy’s national policies and activities appropriately address its identified ML/TF risks. The country has established a comprehensive and robust framework, supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework includes a well-coordinated mechanism that ensures the consistent and efficient implementation of AML/CFT measures across various sectors. Additionally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes, particularly periodic monitoring by Parliament, ensure the continued effectiveness and impact of the objectives of the different competent authorities. Addressing the challenge related to the appropriate allocation of resources at the national level would further assist in the effective implementation of the objectives. Footnotes [10] Authorities in the FSC: MEF, MoI, MoJ, MOFA, MAECI, BoI, CONSOB, IVASS, UIF, GdF, DIA and DNA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="97. Italy’s AML/CFT policies are broadly aligned to their identified ML/TF risks. The Financial Security Committee, which is chaired by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and includes all key authorities [10] as its members, effectively coordinates AML/CFT policy and action at the national level. 98. The FSC mechanism is generally effective at ensuring a unified AML/CFT approach in Italy, especially among the core authorities such as the BoI, GdF, and UIF, and can react quickly to emerging ML/TF threats with novel policies and activities. 99. In addition, competent authorities’ strategies and operational plans incorporate the ML/TF risks identified and are reviewed on a regular basis within the FSC. For instance: · The BoI maintains goals related to AML/CFT, including enhancement of risk methodologies and introduction of new supervisory tools, within its overall three-year strategic plan. In addition, the BoI has developed a more specific four-year AML/CFT strategic plan to determine supervisory priorities and allocate resources accordingly. · The GdF’s General Command issues annual strategic and operational plans on AML/CFT priorities, which incorporate the NRA findings, STR analysis, inspection results, and other data, to determine their activities. 100. The authorities also actively contribute to national AML/CFT legislation by leveraging the information they obtain on the identified risks. In particular, the UIF and the Bank of Italy has informed legislative changes such as the transposition of new EU regulations related to virtual assets and other initiatives. 101. The various authorities are responsible for the implementations of the lines of action and intervention. The Parliament is informed annually by the Ministry of Economy and Finance on the policies and activities of the competent AML/TF authorities, and this allows for parliamentary oversight of the authorities’ work. 102. While the policies and activities of the competent authorities generally address the identified ML/TF risks, some concerns remain about the appropriate allocation of resources between authorities at the national level in line with risk, especially in the absence of processes to consider resource allocation on a risk sensitive basis at the national level. The FSC does not discuss resource allocation at the interagency level, and there is no determination of the resource needs among different authorities in line with the identified risks. Therefore, resource allocation across the different agencies could be improved to streamline Italy’s AML/CFT system. 103. While this does not represent a substantial deficiency, in certain situations, this can lead to resource imbalances across authorities, with some authorities being over-resourced and others under-resourced. One example of this is that the DNA, which has only around 20 prosecutors with significant responsibility for coordinating all major Italian anti-mafia and anti-terrorism investigations among 26 different regional prosecutorial offices. At the same time, Italy has taken steps to bolster the resources available to some specific authorities in line with increasing workloads. This can be seen in the increased allocation of resources to the BoI, to ensure adequate resources are available for the upcoming and more intensive EU-wide AML/CFT approach. 104. Overall, Italy’s national policies and activities appropriately address its identified ML/TF risks. The country has established a comprehensive and robust framework, supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework includes a well-coordinated mechanism that ensures the consistent and efficient implementation of AML/CFT measures across various sectors. Additionally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes, particularly periodic monitoring by Parliament, ensure the continued effectiveness and impact of the objectives of the different competent authorities. Addressing the challenge related to the appropriate allocation of resources at the national level would further assist in the effective implementation of the objectives. Footnotes [10] Authorities in the FSC: MEF, MoI, MoJ, MOFA, MAECI, BoI, CONSOB, IVASS, UIF, GdF, DIA and DNA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 141. Italian authorities can seek evidence and locate criminals internationally based on the same mechanisms described above, i.e. through EIOs which facilitate direct and seamless cooperation as part of the EU framework and based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or reciprocity which establish a more traditional international cooperation framework for requests of MLAs. For outgoing MLA requests, the PP can make an MLA request and transmit it directly to the requested country (if permitted under the applicable treaty), or through the MoJ. EIOs are transmitted directly to their counterparts in Europe. Requests are made based on the needs of individual cases. There are no strict domestic requirements, which means that the PP has the flexibility to seek the most efficient channel for assistance depending on the request and the requested country. In deciding whether to make an outgoing judicial request, the PP considers the seriousness of the offence. 142. The case management system records data that are communicated by judicial officers, for information purposes. Due to the direct nature of some of the requests, there is only partial oversight on requests being made by Italy. Over the evaluation period, Italy made 2255 MLA requests (Table 2.3). Based on data and cases presented, Italy demonstrated that it had MLA requests made to a range of countries within and outside the EU, reflecting that despite the ease of the reaching out to counterparts within the EU framework, Italy was also seeking international cooperation from a range of non—EU countries where criminals and their assets were moving to. 143. Italian authorities face the usual challenges when making MLA requests i.e. the uncertainties brought about by different systems and the specific formalities required by different requested countries. In practice, the MoJ’s role in the transmission of the report is limited to ensuring compliance with domestic requirements and the conveyance to the foreign authority in the correct form. Although it occurs from time to time, the MoJ does not regularly provide support with engaging the counterpart to understand their specific formalities which is particularly important where this involves asset-tracing and recovery. Due to its de-centralised framework, it is not possible for the MoJ to be able to monitor the extent to which the different PPOs are aware of the formal international cooperation channels and how they could be optimally. 144. Italy made 1153 EIO requests over the evaluation period. Support to engage with counterparts and understand their specific formalities (particularly important for asset-tracing and recovery) is effectively provided through the European Judicial Network (EJN) contact points, liaison magistrates, Eurojust representatives, and through direct informal consultations. Although the number of outgoing EIOs appears low in the context of Italy, its authorities actively participate in joint investigative teams (JITs), mostly on the initiative of Italy (see detail below), in many cases within the EU. This reduces the need to obtain evidence through an EIO. 145. Statistics provided by Italy reflected that more than half of the MLA requests involved ML offences. Outside of ML, most requests related to property offences and participation in organised crime. Several case studies presented for IO.7 and IO.8 reflected that in cases that involved a transnational element, Italian authorities made international requests to support their investigations or asset recovery. All of this indicates that Italy is broadly seeking legal assistance abroad in line with its risk profile. On the other hand, there were much fewer requests relating to other offences that relate to Italy’s risk profile where there would have been an expectation for more requests i.e. for offences relating to narcotics, tax and customs offences as well as TF. No overall data was presented on how many requests that were executed, rejected and pending. Table 2.3. Legal Assistance Requests Sought 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of MLA requests sought 418 490 313 600 397 37 2 255 Nos of EIO requests sought 213 211 231 239 168 91 1 153 Box 2.4. MLA to Panama In December 2023, the MoJ received a request for judicial assistance from the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Turin to Panama, as part of investigations into criminal conspiracy for VAT related tax fraud in the online sale of tires, preparation and use of false invoices, incorrect accounting and ML. The criminal scheme involved a chain of shell companies formally registered in EU countries (Spain, Romania, Estonia), but operating exclusively in Italy. The request for judicial cooperation sought to verify the existence of a bank account registered to a suspect at a Panamanian bank and to order its seizure if confirmed , verify whether the suspects owned assets subject to seizure and to authorise the participation of Italian police and EPPO officers in the search and seizure operations. In January 2024, the MoJ transmitted the MLA request to the Italian embassy in Panama. However, due to the absence of original apostilles it could not be transmitted. This was sent by the PP’s office of Turin in March 2024. Documentation was received from Panama in response to the request in May and December 2024. 2.2.2. Extradition 146. As above, the mechanisms through which Italy can seek the apprehensions or extradition of criminals abroad is based the EU's EAW framework, or under the frameworks of bilateral and multilateral treaties or based on under reciprocity assurances. For outgoing extradition and EAW requests, the decision to issue the request falls within the competence of the court or the PP, based on the seriousness of the crime. As the Central Authority, the role of the MoJ is to ensure that the request complies with the legal requirements and to transmit the request to the requested country via the appropriate channel. To facilitate this role, as with EIOs, MoJ participates in the EJN, which aims to accelerate and facilitate judicial cooperation by providing legal and practical information to national and foreign judicial authorities. 147. The search of criminals (including execution of extradition requests) is entrusted to the police officers and judicial authorities of Italy. In the context of combatting organised crime, there is proactive and constant monitoring action of fugitive criminals conducted both by SCIP in coordination with domestic Italian authorities as well as foreign counterparts. The Integrated Interagency Group for Fugitive Search is an inter-agency search programme that provides a forum for members of the group to meet when necessary, to exchange and analyse information on dangerous fugitives, and develop consistent guidelines for their search and apprehension, and is a valuable tool to develop coordinated strategic lines for their location and subsequent extradition. Consequently, formal judicial cooperation is supported by technical groups that benefit from this. 148. Italy provided statistics and information on extradition requests made to a range of countries within and outside the EU, reflecting that despite the ease of the reaching out to counterparts within the EU framework, Italy was also seeking international cooperation from a range of non-EU countries where criminal fugitives were located. Table 2.4 reflects the number of requests for extradition and EAWs made by Italy over the evaluation period. Approximately 8% of extradition sought involved ML offences. Outside of ML, most requests related to narcotics, offences against property, participation in organised crime, and to some extent tax and customs offences, which are in line with Italy’s risk profile. Table 2.4. Extradition Requests Sought 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of extradition requests sought 52 142 104 210 267 139 914 Nos of EAW requests sought 1 099 889 678 1 237 1 012 296 5 211 Box 2.5. EAW from Germany Proceeding (2023) - Reggio Calabria - German citizen This case concerned the execution of a European Arrest Warrant issued in March 2023, by the Investigating Judge of the Court of Reggio Calabria against a German citizen, charged with participation in a criminal organization aimed at international drug trafficking, importation of narcotics (both completed and attempted), money laundering, and self-laundering. The arrest was carried out in Germany on May 3, 2023. The Italian Ministry of Justice promptly acquired the relevant documentation and ensured the transmission of the EAW translated into German to the competent judicial authority. The request for surrender was accepted on June 7, 2023, and the transfer was completed on June 18, 2023 . 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 149. Italy is able seek international assistance to enforce domestic freezing, seizing and confiscation orders through MLAs or through requests based on EU Regulations. Requests under the EU framework are transmitted directly by the domestic judicial authority to the judicial authority of the requested EU country. Like EIOs, the execution is monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region, and while there is an obligation to notify the Central Authority of the request, this does not always happen. Italian authorities noted they had previously encountered problems obtaining international cooperation for foreign non-conviction-based confiscation (i.e. preventive confiscation under the AML) as many countries did not recognise preventive confiscation. However, greater awareness regarding this has improved the situation. Although Italy’s active participation in JITs was noted, this was mainly in the EU context and no data on assets seized or confiscated in Italy or abroad as a result of this was provided, which did not allow the assessment team to draw conclusions the effectiveness of JITs in facilitating asset recovery. 150. Decisions regarding outgoing requests are dependent on the prosecutors involved in the investigations based on the need of the case. There is no comprehensive guidance for all prosecutors on the mechanics of making MLA requests which can sometimes be challenging to navigate outside the EU, where requesting countries may have varied formal requirements. There is no overall proactive effort to align cooperation efforts with Italy’s ML/TF risks nor to monitor whether Italy is seeking cooperation in line with its risk and context, which means that no comprehensive data was provided on the volume of assets seized and confiscated based on the execution abroad of Italy’s seizure and confiscation orders. 151. Table 2.6 below shows concrete asset recovery data where assets were identified through CARIN/ARIN networks and the final confiscation orders were executed through MLAs and EIOs over the evaluation period, which amounts to over EUR 198 million seized and EUR 472 million confiscated through these networks. Despite somewhat limited data, Italy was able to demonstrate that assets recovered through international cooperation related largely to ML and organised crime, which is broadly in line with Italy’s risks. This was done through a large number of case studies which reflected Italy’s efforts through structured domestic coordination and use of strong international networks and different international cooperation channels in different contexts. The details in the numerous case studies (including those in IO.8) reflected that the Italian authorities were successfully pursuing assets laundered abroad and pursuing international cooperation whenever there is a significant transnational link, and these more likely relate to transnational serious or organised criminal activity. The lack of data on the volume of assets seized and confiscated is a result ofthe lack of systematic monitoring Italy’s overall proactive efforts. Box 2.6. Freezing Order for Asset Recovery – Operation Skipper In 2021, DIA and the Lecce State Police concluded Operation Skipper which resulted in the arrest of 34 individuals belonging to a criminal association for international drug trafficking that trafficked drugs from South America to Europe. Complex financial investigations aimed at illicit assets accumulated abroad was conducted by DIA and the PP at the Court of Lecce, which included property in Amsterdam that was used for the storage and transport of the drugs. On the basis of Italy’s preventive measures, the Court of Lecce issued a freezing order on the property located in the Netherlands. Based on this, the Dutch authorities issued a seizure order for the confiscation of immovable property for a total value of EUR 1 million. A confiscation order was issued in 2023. Box 2.7. Confiscation Order for Asset Recovery In 2019, the Court of Appeal of Milan transmitted to the Swiss authorities a request for legal assistance in relation to criminal proceedings for crimes of criminal association, ML and other offences. The ML activities involved several counties and involved significant sums, with EUR 2.5 million held in various bank accounts in Switzerland. In execution of the request, the Swiss authorities confiscated EUR 2.65 million, which the Italian judicial authorities requested the return for. Equal distribution of the proceeds was proposed and agreed to in October 2024, The funds will be credited to the bank account of the Italian authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 141. Italian authorities can seek evidence and locate criminals internationally based on the same mechanisms described above, i.e. through EIOs which facilitate direct and seamless cooperation as part of the EU framework and based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or reciprocity which establish a more traditional international cooperation framework for requests of MLAs. For outgoing MLA requests, the PP can make an MLA request and transmit it directly to the requested country (if permitted under the applicable treaty), or through the MoJ. EIOs are transmitted directly to their counterparts in Europe. Requests are made based on the needs of individual cases. There are no strict domestic requirements, which means that the PP has the flexibility to seek the most efficient channel for assistance depending on the request and the requested country. In deciding whether to make an outgoing judicial request, the PP considers the seriousness of the offence. 142. The case management system records data that are communicated by judicial officers, for information purposes. Due to the direct nature of some of the requests, there is only partial oversight on requests being made by Italy. Over the evaluation period, Italy made 2255 MLA requests (Table 2.3). Based on data and cases presented, Italy demonstrated that it had MLA requests made to a range of countries within and outside the EU, reflecting that despite the ease of the reaching out to counterparts within the EU framework, Italy was also seeking international cooperation from a range of non—EU countries where criminals and their assets were moving to. 143. Italian authorities face the usual challenges when making MLA requests i.e. the uncertainties brought about by different systems and the specific formalities required by different requested countries. In practice, the MoJ’s role in the transmission of the report is limited to ensuring compliance with domestic requirements and the conveyance to the foreign authority in the correct form. Although it occurs from time to time, the MoJ does not regularly provide support with engaging the counterpart to understand their specific formalities which is particularly important where this involves asset-tracing and recovery. Due to its de-centralised framework, it is not possible for the MoJ to be able to monitor the extent to which the different PPOs are aware of the formal international cooperation channels and how they could be optimally. 144. Italy made 1153 EIO requests over the evaluation period. Support to engage with counterparts and understand their specific formalities (particularly important for asset-tracing and recovery) is effectively provided through the European Judicial Network (EJN) contact points, liaison magistrates, Eurojust representatives, and through direct informal consultations. Although the number of outgoing EIOs appears low in the context of Italy, its authorities actively participate in joint investigative teams (JITs), mostly on the initiative of Italy (see detail below), in many cases within the EU. This reduces the need to obtain evidence through an EIO. 145. Statistics provided by Italy reflected that more than half of the MLA requests involved ML offences. Outside of ML, most requests related to property offences and participation in organised crime. Several case studies presented for IO.7 and IO.8 reflected that in cases that involved a transnational element, Italian authorities made international requests to support their investigations or asset recovery. All of this indicates that Italy is broadly seeking legal assistance abroad in line with its risk profile. On the other hand, there were much fewer requests relating to other offences that relate to Italy’s risk profile where there would have been an expectation for more requests i.e. for offences relating to narcotics, tax and customs offences as well as TF. No overall data was presented on how many requests that were executed, rejected and pending. Table 2.3. Legal Assistance Requests Sought 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of MLA requests sought 418 490 313 600 397 37 2 255 Nos of EIO requests sought 213 211 231 239 168 91 1 153 Box 2.4. MLA to Panama In December 2023, the MoJ received a request for judicial assistance from the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Turin to Panama, as part of investigations into criminal conspiracy for VAT related tax fraud in the online sale of tires, preparation and use of false invoices, incorrect accounting and ML. The criminal scheme involved a chain of shell companies formally registered in EU countries (Spain, Romania, Estonia), but operating exclusively in Italy. The request for judicial cooperation sought to verify the existence of a bank account registered to a suspect at a Panamanian bank and to order its seizure if confirmed , verify whether the suspects owned assets subject to seizure and to authorise the participation of Italian police and EPPO officers in the search and seizure operations. In January 2024, the MoJ transmitted the MLA request to the Italian embassy in Panama. However, due to the absence of original apostilles it could not be transmitted. This was sent by the PP’s office of Turin in March 2024. Documentation was received from Panama in response to the request in May and December 2024. 2.2.2. Extradition 146. As above, the mechanisms through which Italy can seek the apprehensions or extradition of criminals abroad is based the EU's EAW framework, or under the frameworks of bilateral and multilateral treaties or based on under reciprocity assurances. For outgoing extradition and EAW requests, the decision to issue the request falls within the competence of the court or the PP, based on the seriousness of the crime. As the Central Authority, the role of the MoJ is to ensure that the request complies with the legal requirements and to transmit the request to the requested country via the appropriate channel. To facilitate this role, as with EIOs, MoJ participates in the EJN, which aims to accelerate and facilitate judicial cooperation by providing legal and practical information to national and foreign judicial authorities. 147. The search of criminals (including execution of extradition requests) is entrusted to the police officers and judicial authorities of Italy. In the context of combatting organised crime, there is proactive and constant monitoring action of fugitive criminals conducted both by SCIP in coordination with domestic Italian authorities as well as foreign counterparts. The Integrated Interagency Group for Fugitive Search is an inter-agency search programme that provides a forum for members of the group to meet when necessary, to exchange and analyse information on dangerous fugitives, and develop consistent guidelines for their search and apprehension, and is a valuable tool to develop coordinated strategic lines for their location and subsequent extradition. Consequently, formal judicial cooperation is supported by technical groups that benefit from this. 148. Italy provided statistics and information on extradition requests made to a range of countries within and outside the EU, reflecting that despite the ease of the reaching out to counterparts within the EU framework, Italy was also seeking international cooperation from a range of non-EU countries where criminal fugitives were located. Table 2.4 reflects the number of requests for extradition and EAWs made by Italy over the evaluation period. Approximately 8% of extradition sought involved ML offences. Outside of ML, most requests related to narcotics, offences against property, participation in organised crime, and to some extent tax and customs offences, which are in line with Italy’s risk profile. Table 2.4. Extradition Requests Sought 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) Total Nos of extradition requests sought 52 142 104 210 267 139 914 Nos of EAW requests sought 1 099 889 678 1 237 1 012 296 5 211 Box 2.5. EAW from Germany Proceeding (2023) - Reggio Calabria - German citizen This case concerned the execution of a European Arrest Warrant issued in March 2023, by the Investigating Judge of the Court of Reggio Calabria against a German citizen, charged with participation in a criminal organization aimed at international drug trafficking, importation of narcotics (both completed and attempted), money laundering, and self-laundering. The arrest was carried out in Germany on May 3, 2023. The Italian Ministry of Justice promptly acquired the relevant documentation and ensured the transmission of the EAW translated into German to the competent judicial authority. The request for surrender was accepted on June 7, 2023, and the transfer was completed on June 18, 2023 . 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 149. Italy is able seek international assistance to enforce domestic freezing, seizing and confiscation orders through MLAs or through requests based on EU Regulations. Requests under the EU framework are transmitted directly by the domestic judicial authority to the judicial authority of the requested EU country. Like EIOs, the execution is monitored by the Chief Prosecutor of the region, and while there is an obligation to notify the Central Authority of the request, this does not always happen. Italian authorities noted they had previously encountered problems obtaining international cooperation for foreign non-conviction-based confiscation (i.e. preventive confiscation under the AML) as many countries did not recognise preventive confiscation. However, greater awareness regarding this has improved the situation. Although Italy’s active participation in JITs was noted, this was mainly in the EU context and no data on assets seized or confiscated in Italy or abroad as a result of this was provided, which did not allow the assessment team to draw conclusions the effectiveness of JITs in facilitating asset recovery. 150. Decisions regarding outgoing requests are dependent on the prosecutors involved in the investigations based on the need of the case. There is no comprehensive guidance for all prosecutors on the mechanics of making MLA requests which can sometimes be challenging to navigate outside the EU, where requesting countries may have varied formal requirements. There is no overall proactive effort to align cooperation efforts with Italy’s ML/TF risks nor to monitor whether Italy is seeking cooperation in line with its risk and context, which means that no comprehensive data was provided on the volume of assets seized and confiscated based on the execution abroad of Italy’s seizure and confiscation orders. 151. Table 2.6 below shows concrete asset recovery data where assets were identified through CARIN/ARIN networks and the final confiscation orders were executed through MLAs and EIOs over the evaluation period, which amounts to over EUR 198 million seized and EUR 472 million confiscated through these networks. Despite somewhat limited data, Italy was able to demonstrate that assets recovered through international cooperation related largely to ML and organised crime, which is broadly in line with Italy’s risks. This was done through a large number of case studies which reflected Italy’s efforts through structured domestic coordination and use of strong international networks and different international cooperation channels in different contexts. The details in the numerous case studies (including those in IO.8) reflected that the Italian authorities were successfully pursuing assets laundered abroad and pursuing international cooperation whenever there is a significant transnational link, and these more likely relate to transnational serious or organised criminal activity. The lack of data on the volume of assets seized and confiscated is a result ofthe lack of systematic monitoring Italy’s overall proactive efforts. Box 2.6. Freezing Order for Asset Recovery – Operation Skipper In 2021, DIA and the Lecce State Police concluded Operation Skipper which resulted in the arrest of 34 individuals belonging to a criminal association for international drug trafficking that trafficked drugs from South America to Europe. Complex financial investigations aimed at illicit assets accumulated abroad was conducted by DIA and the PP at the Court of Lecce, which included property in Amsterdam that was used for the storage and transport of the drugs. On the basis of Italy’s preventive measures, the Court of Lecce issued a freezing order on the property located in the Netherlands. Based on this, the Dutch authorities issued a seizure order for the confiscation of immovable property for a total value of EUR 1 million. A confiscation order was issued in 2023. Box 2.7. Confiscation Order for Asset Recovery In 2019, the Court of Appeal of Milan transmitted to the Swiss authorities a request for legal assistance in relation to criminal proceedings for crimes of criminal association, ML and other offences. The ML activities involved several counties and involved significant sums, with EUR 2.5 million held in various bank accounts in Switzerland. In execution of the request, the Swiss authorities confiscated EUR 2.65 million, which the Italian judicial authorities requested the return for. Equal distribution of the proceeds was proposed and agreed to in October 2024, The funds will be credited to the bank account of the Italian authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 189. The supervisory authorities have a good understanding of the ML/TF risks in the financial sector. This is largely informed through involvement in the NRA process, sectoral risk assessments conducted by the supervisors and engagements with industry associations. BoI has been conducting ML/TF risk assessments of banks under its supervision since 2015. The scope of the risk assessment was extended to other FIs and the methodology was revised starting in 2022 (with input from the UIF), and the first revised sectoral and individual risk assessments under the new methodology was conducted in 2023. The methodology for the sectoral risk assessment combines qualitative and quantitative elements. The qualitative elements include BoI’s supervisory experience, evidence from the UIF and other qualitative analyses, such as the NRA or the EU Supra-National Risk Assessment (SNRA). The quantitative elements include characteristics on customers, delivery channels and, depending on the sector, characteristics of the operations of the FIs. The sectoral analysis provides the BoI with an overview of the relative sizes of the various sectors, combined with an inherent risk rating on a four-point scale. The risk analysis also provides the BoI with a more granular understanding of relevant differences within sectors, in cases where for example the services provided by banks vary. 190. In December 2024, a specific addendum to the 2023 sectoral analysis was conducted concerning VASPs. The analysis was mostly performed based on qualitative information, given the lack of comparable quantitative data which the BoI has been collecting and used for risk analyses from FIs. The qualitative information stemmed from the NRA, discussions with the UIF and counterpart supervisors in the EU who already supervise VASPs. The BoI indicated that its findings were confirmed by the meetings held with VASPs so far in preparation for possible licencing procedures under MiCA. 191. The sectoral analysis is supplemented by horizontal analyses such as thematic on-site campaigns. Examples of such thematic analyses include on-line funding, fraud and corruption risks associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, CDD in private banking, digital onboarding, transaction monitoring and the use of virtual IBANs. The BoI’s AML Unit’s involvement in licencing procedures also contributes to its understanding of new business models etc., as well as information on the governance and control functions in the sector. Furthermore, BoI conducts regular workshops with the industry, as well as annual meetings with larger entities (including groups) in the banking sector. 192. In addition to the sectoral risk analysis conducted by the BoI, it also conducts risk assessments of individual FIs under its supervision. The individual risk assessment is done by an algorithm which assigns numerical risk scores to individual entities and then a qualitative risk evaluation performed by BoI personnel. The quantitative risk analysis considers inherent risks as well as risk mitigation measures. The model emphasizes the role of vulnerabilities (quality of the mitigating measures) to the extent that the residual risk score may be higher than the inherent risk. Some types of information which are considered during the quantitative risk analysis are: the entity’s annual AML report and ML/TF self-risk assessment, outcomes of on- and off-site supervisory action, reports by the entity’s auditors concerning AML/CFT, corporate complaints or whistleblower reports and information from other authorities. 193. IVASS also has in place processes to identify and understands the risks associated with the sector and entities under its supervision. Although this process is conducted on an annual basis, it is not sufficiently detailed to allow for adequate understanding of risk. 194. The GdF, which has supervisory responsibility for currency exchange offices, credit brokers and for agents in financial services (including agents of foreign payment services), bases much of its activity on the national risk. While this in general provides the GdF with an understanding of risks in the Italian economy more broadly, it is unclear how the GdF understands risks associated with individual FI entities under its supervision. 195. The understanding of risks in individual VASPs is more ad hoc and situational, based on the analytical work of the NSPV of the GdF. In practice, GdF has made specific risk assessments in 2023 and 2024 which have formed the basis for operational plans to perform inspections in VASPs. While this provides a level of risk understanding, the process is centralised and is linked to operational planning and not entail a coherent and consistent understanding of the individual entities over time. This is partly due to the launch of the register at OAM in 2022, five years after VASPs were regulated in 2017. 196. Overall, the supervisors have a well-founded understanding of risk in the sectors and entities under its supervision, with some sectors being better understood than others. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 197. Authorities take a range of steps to promote the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations among FIs and VASPs. As supervision is covered in Core Issue 3.5 below, this section will be concentrated on the outreach and guidance activities of the supervisors. The impact on compliance is discussed under Core Issue 3.6. 198. As for risks, the results of the NRA have been communicated to FIs and VASPs through a specific meeting in May 2025. Representatives of the sectors confirmed their awareness of the NRA results. The requirements to conduct ML/TF self-risk assessments, paired with guidance and frequently asked questions (FAQs) also contribute to the sectors’ understanding of risks. To promote understanding of both risks and obligations, authorities also participate in conferences, workshops and training sessions organised by the industry. BoI’s annual meetings with the AML officers of FIs and public consultation on development of regulations further contributes. The UIF’s annual report is also a source of information which some representatives of the private sector met on-site indicated using. Generally, the representatives of the private sector appeared satisfied with the outreach and engagement of the authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 189. The supervisory authorities have a good understanding of the ML/TF risks in the financial sector. This is largely informed through involvement in the NRA process, sectoral risk assessments conducted by the supervisors and engagements with industry associations. BoI has been conducting ML/TF risk assessments of banks under its supervision since 2015. The scope of the risk assessment was extended to other FIs and the methodology was revised starting in 2022 (with input from the UIF), and the first revised sectoral and individual risk assessments under the new methodology was conducted in 2023. The methodology for the sectoral risk assessment combines qualitative and quantitative elements. The qualitative elements include BoI’s supervisory experience, evidence from the UIF and other qualitative analyses, such as the NRA or the EU Supra-National Risk Assessment (SNRA). The quantitative elements include characteristics on customers, delivery channels and, depending on the sector, characteristics of the operations of the FIs. The sectoral analysis provides the BoI with an overview of the relative sizes of the various sectors, combined with an inherent risk rating on a four-point scale. The risk analysis also provides the BoI with a more granular understanding of relevant differences within sectors, in cases where for example the services provided by banks vary. 190. In December 2024, a specific addendum to the 2023 sectoral analysis was conducted concerning VASPs. The analysis was mostly performed based on qualitative information, given the lack of comparable quantitative data which the BoI has been collecting and used for risk analyses from FIs. The qualitative information stemmed from the NRA, discussions with the UIF and counterpart supervisors in the EU who already supervise VASPs. The BoI indicated that its findings were confirmed by the meetings held with VASPs so far in preparation for possible licencing procedures under MiCA. 191. The sectoral analysis is supplemented by horizontal analyses such as thematic on-site campaigns. Examples of such thematic analyses include on-line funding, fraud and corruption risks associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, CDD in private banking, digital onboarding, transaction monitoring and the use of virtual IBANs. The BoI’s AML Unit’s involvement in licencing procedures also contributes to its understanding of new business models etc., as well as information on the governance and control functions in the sector. Furthermore, BoI conducts regular workshops with the industry, as well as annual meetings with larger entities (including groups) in the banking sector. 192. In addition to the sectoral risk analysis conducted by the BoI, it also conducts risk assessments of individual FIs under its supervision. The individual risk assessment is done by an algorithm which assigns numerical risk scores to individual entities and then a qualitative risk evaluation performed by BoI personnel. The quantitative risk analysis considers inherent risks as well as risk mitigation measures. The model emphasizes the role of vulnerabilities (quality of the mitigating measures) to the extent that the residual risk score may be higher than the inherent risk. Some types of information which are considered during the quantitative risk analysis are: the entity’s annual AML report and ML/TF self-risk assessment, outcomes of on- and off-site supervisory action, reports by the entity’s auditors concerning AML/CFT, corporate complaints or whistleblower reports and information from other authorities. 193. IVASS also has in place processes to identify and understands the risks associated with the sector and entities under its supervision. Although this process is conducted on an annual basis, it is not sufficiently detailed to allow for adequate understanding of risk. 194. The GdF, which has supervisory responsibility for currency exchange offices, credit brokers and for agents in financial services (including agents of foreign payment services), bases much of its activity on the national risk. While this in general provides the GdF with an understanding of risks in the Italian economy more broadly, it is unclear how the GdF understands risks associated with individual FI entities under its supervision. 195. The understanding of risks in individual VASPs is more ad hoc and situational, based on the analytical work of the NSPV of the GdF. In practice, GdF has made specific risk assessments in 2023 and 2024 which have formed the basis for operational plans to perform inspections in VASPs. While this provides a level of risk understanding, the process is centralised and is linked to operational planning and not entail a coherent and consistent understanding of the individual entities over time. This is partly due to the launch of the register at OAM in 2022, five years after VASPs were regulated in 2017. 196. Overall, the supervisors have a well-founded understanding of risk in the sectors and entities under its supervision, with some sectors being better understood than others. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 197. Authorities take a range of steps to promote the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations among FIs and VASPs. As supervision is covered in Core Issue 3.5 below, this section will be concentrated on the outreach and guidance activities of the supervisors. The impact on compliance is discussed under Core Issue 3.6. 198. As for risks, the results of the NRA have been communicated to FIs and VASPs through a specific meeting in May 2025. Representatives of the sectors confirmed their awareness of the NRA results. The requirements to conduct ML/TF self-risk assessments, paired with guidance and frequently asked questions (FAQs) also contribute to the sectors’ understanding of risks. To promote understanding of both risks and obligations, authorities also participate in conferences, workshops and training sessions organised by the industry. BoI’s annual meetings with the AML officers of FIs and public consultation on development of regulations further contributes. The UIF’s annual report is also a source of information which some representatives of the private sector met on-site indicated using. Generally, the representatives of the private sector appeared satisfied with the outreach and engagement of the authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 275. The GdF has a reasonable understanding of risk in the DNFBP sectors. The GdF’s active participation in the NRA process, and the analysis which was developed to support the NRA have been instrumental in developing the understanding of sector. Additionally, the risk understanding of the GdF is supplemented through wide range of databases and registers which the GdF can access, which includes an IT tool consisting of 130 databases with both publicly available data, but also confidential information. Further, the GdF uses information from inspections that it performs on DNFPBs to refine its understanding of risk. 276. The GdF also develops its risk understanding through the “Operational Risk Analysis” (AOR) process of Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) of the GdF. The AOR process was set up after the 2016 MER and helps the GdF in its risk understanding of entities under supervision as well as the prioritisation of its supervisory functions. 277. The AOR process identifies the risk within and between sectors and also identifies activities where emerging risk are seen. This relies largely on feedback from STRs sent and outcomes of AML/CFT inspections, and inputs from internal case management systems. After this, the AOR mechanism is used to identify and prioritise supervisory action and support the planning of their annual supervisory plan. 278. The UIF primarily bases its risk understanding on the NRA, STRs and other information received and their inspections in DNFBPs which are focused on adherence to STR requirements. Given that most DNFBPs only submit a limited number of STRs and only a few inspections are done in DNFPBs by the UIF, the information received through these sources would naturally be lower than for the sectors submitting larger numbers of STRs. 279. CONSOB has a well-developed understanding of the ML/TF risks of the PIE auditors, informed by the analysis of data and information from the annual self-assessments that PIE auditors submit and by supervisory actions (both offsite activities and the outcomes of AML/CFT onsite inspections). 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 280. The supervisors promote risk understanding of DNFBPs primarily through outreach activities. This is visible through AML/CFT focused events organised by the UIF and the GdF during the reference period, which were attended by more than 6 500 participants, across most types of DNFBPs. The non-financial entities met during the on-site emphasised the utility of the events and stated these had led them to develop a more nuanced understanding of the risks and obligations. However, given the large size of the DNFPB sector and relatively modest number of participants for these events, these events are inadequate to support risk understanding across all DNFBPs, particularly in view of the lack of guidance from supervisors. The UIF publishes anomaly indicators to help DNFBPs in identifying areas to pay attention to regarding trends and patterns of anomalous conduct. Also, the UIF issues communications regarding relevant issues for the DNFBPs on various subjects, such as regarding new patterns of anomalous tax behaviour. 281. The SRBs play a crucial role in promoting risk understanding for professionals, through training activities and controls on regional level. 282. The national council of chartered accountants and accountants has in place courses for members to improve their understanding of ML/TF risks. These initiatives are recent, and it is difficult to determine if they have a significant impact on risk understanding, outside of an improved quality of STRs. 283. The council of notaries also provides guidance on risks and obligations to their members. The council has organised webinars with members to make them understand the legislation better and in order to facilitate communication on the evolution of the risk situation. Notaries met onsite consider the work done by the SRB as important. 284. The national lawyer’s council has relatively simple technical rules and does not seem to update these or provide guidance to their members regularly enough. The technical rules were last updated in September 2019. Lawyers met onsite expressed that the support from the SRB could be better to raise the awareness of AML/CFT requirements. A representative met onsite expressed that from a law firm perspective, they do not see themselves reflected in the training activities conducted by the GdF and the UIF. However, Q&amp;A on the MEF’s webpage was mentioned as a useful tool in terms of guidance to some extent. The council also informed the assessment team that a protocol will be signed with the GdF to give a standard for training and that at local level initiatives have been taken to organise training with participation of the GdF and the UIF. 285. The real estate associations FIAIP and FIIMA, in total covering approximately 55.000 real estate agents, perform training courses with support from the GdF and UIF. However, there is no information to indicate that this has substantially improved risk understanding or understanding of AML/CFT/CPF obligations amongst the entities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 275. The GdF has a reasonable understanding of risk in the DNFBP sectors. The GdF’s active participation in the NRA process, and the analysis which was developed to support the NRA have been instrumental in developing the understanding of sector. Additionally, the risk understanding of the GdF is supplemented through wide range of databases and registers which the GdF can access, which includes an IT tool consisting of 130 databases with both publicly available data, but also confidential information. Further, the GdF uses information from inspections that it performs on DNFPBs to refine its understanding of risk. 276. The GdF also develops its risk understanding through the “Operational Risk Analysis” (AOR) process of Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) of the GdF. The AOR process was set up after the 2016 MER and helps the GdF in its risk understanding of entities under supervision as well as the prioritisation of its supervisory functions. 277. The AOR process identifies the risk within and between sectors and also identifies activities where emerging risk are seen. This relies largely on feedback from STRs sent and outcomes of AML/CFT inspections, and inputs from internal case management systems. After this, the AOR mechanism is used to identify and prioritise supervisory action and support the planning of their annual supervisory plan. 278. The UIF primarily bases its risk understanding on the NRA, STRs and other information received and their inspections in DNFBPs which are focused on adherence to STR requirements. Given that most DNFBPs only submit a limited number of STRs and only a few inspections are done in DNFPBs by the UIF, the information received through these sources would naturally be lower than for the sectors submitting larger numbers of STRs. 279. CONSOB has a well-developed understanding of the ML/TF risks of the PIE auditors, informed by the analysis of data and information from the annual self-assessments that PIE auditors submit and by supervisory actions (both offsite activities and the outcomes of AML/CFT onsite inspections). 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 280. The supervisors promote risk understanding of DNFBPs primarily through outreach activities. This is visible through AML/CFT focused events organised by the UIF and the GdF during the reference period, which were attended by more than 6 500 participants, across most types of DNFBPs. The non-financial entities met during the on-site emphasised the utility of the events and stated these had led them to develop a more nuanced understanding of the risks and obligations. However, given the large size of the DNFPB sector and relatively modest number of participants for these events, these events are inadequate to support risk understanding across all DNFBPs, particularly in view of the lack of guidance from supervisors. The UIF publishes anomaly indicators to help DNFBPs in identifying areas to pay attention to regarding trends and patterns of anomalous conduct. Also, the UIF issues communications regarding relevant issues for the DNFBPs on various subjects, such as regarding new patterns of anomalous tax behaviour. 281. The SRBs play a crucial role in promoting risk understanding for professionals, through training activities and controls on regional level. 282. The national council of chartered accountants and accountants has in place courses for members to improve their understanding of ML/TF risks. These initiatives are recent, and it is difficult to determine if they have a significant impact on risk understanding, outside of an improved quality of STRs. 283. The council of notaries also provides guidance on risks and obligations to their members. The council has organised webinars with members to make them understand the legislation better and in order to facilitate communication on the evolution of the risk situation. Notaries met onsite consider the work done by the SRB as important. 284. The national lawyer’s council has relatively simple technical rules and does not seem to update these or provide guidance to their members regularly enough. The technical rules were last updated in September 2019. Lawyers met onsite expressed that the support from the SRB could be better to raise the awareness of AML/CFT requirements. A representative met onsite expressed that from a law firm perspective, they do not see themselves reflected in the training activities conducted by the GdF and the UIF. However, Q&amp;A on the MEF’s webpage was mentioned as a useful tool in terms of guidance to some extent. The council also informed the assessment team that a protocol will be signed with the GdF to give a standard for training and that at local level initiatives have been taken to organise training with participation of the GdF and the UIF. 285. The real estate associations FIAIP and FIIMA, in total covering approximately 55.000 real estate agents, perform training courses with support from the GdF and UIF. However, there is no information to indicate that this has substantially improved risk understanding or understanding of AML/CFT/CPF obligations amongst the entities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="333. Italy has implemented several measures during the evaluation period to mitigate the risks of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements being used for ML/TF purposes. These measures are largely driven by the findings from the various risk assessments undertaken by the authorities. 334. As required by European legislation, Italy has established a beneficial ownership register, which is intended to facilitate access to beneficial ownership information on all legal persons in Italy as well as legal arrangements managed by trustees residing in or established in Italy. However, access to the register, even for competent authorities, and the obligation to provide information to the register, was suspended for a substantial part of the period under review due to an ongoing case. As part of the procedure, the supreme court for administrative measures in Italy (The Council of State) ordered the suspension of the register on 15 October 2024, and, as of the time of the on-site visit, Italy’s challenge to the case was before the EU Court of Justice. The register’s use to mitigate the risks of ML/TF associated with legal persons and legal arrangements could therefore not be demonstrated. 335. Italy places significant emphasis on notaries as gatekeepers for preventing the misuse of LPs and LAs. All Italian LPs and LAs are incorporated by notarial deeds, and while companies can transfer shares without the use of notaries, notaries are predominantly involved as intermediary in subsequent transfers of ownerships. Specific prioritisation of increasing the involvement of notaries, through updated guidance and increased training, is also relevant, given the central role notaries play in the establishment and life cycle of Italian companies. 336. Additionally, all trusts or legal arrangements in Italy with tax consequences must register with the tax authority to obtain a tax code. Such a code is necessary for most business activity, including buying property. 337. The UIF develops studies to identify companies most at risk for being infiltrated by criminals. These studies are published as “working papers” by the UIF and have been used in practice by competent authorities as well as reporting entities to better develop their understanding of risk. 338. The UIF’s anomalies indicators include specific indicators on unusual tax behaviour, where the abuse of corporate vehicles is covered. The UIF has also specifically considered the risks associated with trusts and legal arrangements in its indicators. Such indicators have been provided to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs since 2013, but they were broadened and enriched in 2023, as part of the new, general anomaly indicators issued by the UIF (see Para, 306, IO6) 339. Nominee directors and bearer shares proper do not feature in the Italian legal system (the “bearer shares” and bearer share warrants are dematerialised and can only be traded through a central securities depository through regulated intermediaries), while nominee shareholders are regulated as fiduciary companies (See IO4). Nominal owners must be identified to the same extent as legal owners, including information on name, date of birth and nationality. Where a nominal owner is a legal entity, the natural person behind the nominal owner must be possible to identify. The status of a nominal owner is available in the business register. While these situations do not qualify as nominee shareholding or directorship arrangements, there are general rules on representation which allows for the representation of shareholders and exercising their voting right in shareholders’ meetings based on a power of attorney. In such cases, the company must keep a copy of the power of attorney, which contributes to transparency of the representation. Despite this, informal nominees and ‘strawmen’ continue to be a concern and the UIF has conducted work to assess the characteristics of legal persons and arrangements where informal nominees may exist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="333. Italy has implemented several measures during the evaluation period to mitigate the risks of Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements being used for ML/TF purposes. These measures are largely driven by the findings from the various risk assessments undertaken by the authorities. 334. As required by European legislation, Italy has established a beneficial ownership register, which is intended to facilitate access to beneficial ownership information on all legal persons in Italy as well as legal arrangements managed by trustees residing in or established in Italy. However, access to the register, even for competent authorities, and the obligation to provide information to the register, was suspended for a substantial part of the period under review due to an ongoing case. As part of the procedure, the supreme court for administrative measures in Italy (The Council of State) ordered the suspension of the register on 15 October 2024, and, as of the time of the on-site visit, Italy’s challenge to the case was before the EU Court of Justice. The register’s use to mitigate the risks of ML/TF associated with legal persons and legal arrangements could therefore not be demonstrated. 335. Italy places significant emphasis on notaries as gatekeepers for preventing the misuse of LPs and LAs. All Italian LPs and LAs are incorporated by notarial deeds, and while companies can transfer shares without the use of notaries, notaries are predominantly involved as intermediary in subsequent transfers of ownerships. Specific prioritisation of increasing the involvement of notaries, through updated guidance and increased training, is also relevant, given the central role notaries play in the establishment and life cycle of Italian companies. 336. Additionally, all trusts or legal arrangements in Italy with tax consequences must register with the tax authority to obtain a tax code. Such a code is necessary for most business activity, including buying property. 337. The UIF develops studies to identify companies most at risk for being infiltrated by criminals. These studies are published as “working papers” by the UIF and have been used in practice by competent authorities as well as reporting entities to better develop their understanding of risk. 338. The UIF’s anomalies indicators include specific indicators on unusual tax behaviour, where the abuse of corporate vehicles is covered. The UIF has also specifically considered the risks associated with trusts and legal arrangements in its indicators. Such indicators have been provided to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs since 2013, but they were broadened and enriched in 2023, as part of the new, general anomaly indicators issued by the UIF (see Para, 306, IO6) 339. Nominee directors and bearer shares proper do not feature in the Italian legal system (the “bearer shares” and bearer share warrants are dematerialised and can only be traded through a central securities depository through regulated intermediaries), while nominee shareholders are regulated as fiduciary companies (See IO4). Nominal owners must be identified to the same extent as legal owners, including information on name, date of birth and nationality. Where a nominal owner is a legal entity, the natural person behind the nominal owner must be possible to identify. The status of a nominal owner is available in the business register. While these situations do not qualify as nominee shareholding or directorship arrangements, there are general rules on representation which allows for the representation of shareholders and exercising their voting right in shareholders’ meetings based on a power of attorney. In such cases, the company must keep a copy of the power of attorney, which contributes to transparency of the representation. Despite this, informal nominees and ‘strawmen’ continue to be a concern and the UIF has conducted work to assess the characteristics of legal persons and arrangements where informal nominees may exist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 363. The UIF produces financial intelligence to support the operational needs of competent authorities to a large extent, which has contributed directly to several major investigations, including organised-crime infiltration schemes, subsidy-fraud networks (such as NRRP-related cases), and complex crypto-laundering activities. DIA incorporated 1,565 STRs into organized-crime investigations during 2020-2023, demonstrating the operational relevance of UIF’s work. In accordance with its 2023-2025 staffing plan, the UIF’s staff has grown from 153 in 2020 to 191, strengthening its analytical capability. 364. Each STR is assigned an automatic risk indicator, and for nearly all STRs, a phenomenon classification, associated with the underlying illegal activity. These indicators are constantly updated to reflect current and emerging ML/TF risks and include the presence of PEPs, association to organised crime, subjects under investigations, indication of cash operations, involvement of public funds and the use of virtual currencies, gaming or money transfer services. TF-related STRs are prioritised to allow expedited review and dissemination. Both the NRA findings as well as UIF’s own strategic analyses feed into the identification of current and emerging risks. 365. The UIF mitigates limited reporting from DNFBPs by relying on complementary datasets such as SARA, ORO, OGG, public procurement data, tax files and company registers. As a result, even sectors with very low STR volumes such as lawyers, accountants, real-estate agents or DPMS—are still captured within the UIF’s strategic analysis, allowing emerging risks and anomalous patterns to be detected through aggregate and cross-sector data. The RADAR platform enhances the analytical value of STRs regardless of sectoral volume and structured data modules and sector-specific reporting templates (used for MVTS, payment card operators, gaming, VASPs, etc.) allow reporting entities to submit detailed transactional datasets in standardised formats. These structured datasets enable the UIF to perform granular behavioural analysis, typology identification, and large-scale network mapping. 366. UIF analysts conduct a first level analysis on every STR to verify the automated risk rating to integrate further information into the STR, to classify STRs according to underlying financial illicit phenomena and to decide if the STR needs further UIF in-depth analyses. To facilitate this, UIF may seek from the reporting entities, further detail on the STRs submitted. Over the evaluation period, approximately 11% of the requests for information sent to reporting entities occurred when the STR was under first level analysis and the remaining, when it was under second level analysis. Data regarding subjects included in STRs are then sent to NSPV, DIA and DNA for their cross matching with law enforcement information. 367. For in-depth analysis for STRs with a higher risk level, a second-level financial analysis is performed through the use of more sophisticated tools, such as the examination of operational networks, blockchain forensics software for crypto assets etc. UIF disseminates a report to NSPV, DIA and DNA, usually within 15 days, although it can take up to three months for more complex analysis. Box 6.1. UIF’s STRs Analysis to produce Financial Intelligence Laundering of illicit funds derived from tax evasion and the sale of non-existent tax credits (2022) UIF received STRs regarding anomalous transfers of tax credits in 2022. The operations were carried out by a newly established consulting firm traceable to a lawyer and a company offering professional training, who were under investigation and previously reported to the UIF for tax fraud and fake invoicing. The UIF performed extended financial analysis, requesting information from the REs involved and from foreign FIUs. The UIF detected a network of 16 companies directly related to the same subject, some established abroad, that were used for laundering the proceeds of many offences (tax offenses, corporate crimes, offences related to organized crime) through a fraudulent-invoicing scheme. The beneficial owner of the foreign companies was an Italian individual present in the DNA’s records who appeared to be the mastermind of the whole operation. The tax credits turned out to be non-existent. The case led to a criminal proceeding against 37 people and 11 companies for tax evasion and the sale of non-existent tax credits. Preventive measures were issued, among which a seizure order worth more than € 12 million. The alleged mastermind of the operation was also sentenced to a prison term. 368. ’Special sectors’ are identified based on the basis of the operational features of certain reporting entities such as virtual asset transactions, money transfer services, payment cards operators and gaming services. These sectors characterised by high transaction volumes, fragmented flows and numerous parties involved, which require specialised analytical approaches. For these sectors, UIF periodically performs aggregate analysis based on risk indicators by collecting or grouping linked STRs to identify potential networks. Such aggregate analysis may lead to further in-depth financial analysis, using criteria such as transaction amount, number of victims and STRs involved, investigative information and social network analysis. All the in-depth analysis conducted for these sectors are disseminated to the relevant LEAs. 369. TF-related STRs are treated as priority and analysis is conducted by a specialised division so that they are ready for dissemination within a few days after the first level analysis. TF-related STRs that are selected to undergo the second level of STR analysis are analysed by adopting the usual techniques used for in-depth analysis for ML STRs, with particular reference to social network analysis on financial channels most exposed to TF abuse, as well as the identification of operational patterns of activity most likely to be used for TF in the region. As a reflection of strong domestic coordination, UIF performs these TF-related STRs disseminations to GdF and DIA every week the evening before the weekly CASA meetings, accompanied by a summary of the contents of most significant STRs and UIF’s financial reports from the second level analysis. (see IO.9). Table 6.2. Number of STRs and type of analysis conducted by UIF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 1 st Level Analysis 113 643 138 482 153 412 151 678 143 850 68 751 Aggregate Analysis 26 314 45 761 45 754 47 306 40 415 22 263 2 nd Level In-Depth Analysis 6 584 7 110 8 073 7 117 5 487 2 085 [19] 370. The UIF undertakes strategic analysis projects based on identified threats, vulnerabilities or methodologies for computing risk indicators associated with those threats. Strategic analysis topics are selected through a structured dual process that combines a top-down approach aligned with NRA and national priorities, and a bottom-up approach based on anomaly detection from large datasets (including SARA, OGG, ORO and network indicators). The UIF draws on these datasets (see IO.1), external sources and several methodological tools, including descriptive statistical analysis, econometric modelling and machine-learning techniques. Over the evaluation period, a number of strategic products were produced on a regular (on a yearly or half-yearly) basis and disseminated through publication, proactively to LEAs, or in response to requests from LEAs and judicial authorities. These products have had operational implications for UIF’s own analysis and for LEAs’ investigations and have contributed to the development of risk indicators used by other actors in the AML system, such as supervisors or reporting entities. The strategic analysis products are closely aligned with the risk picture set out in the NRA and address high-risk ML areas such as cash-intensive activities, corporate opacity, organised-crime infiltration, subsidy-fraud schemes and crypto-related ML (see Table 6.3). Their quality, regular production and operational relevance enhance the overall value of financial intelligence available to competent authorities. Nevertheless, the Operational Technical Tables (OTT) established with the GdF in 2024 (see below) may result in a more systematic and collaborative approach to risk identification and prioritisation in the production of strategic analysis. Table 6.3. Strategic Analysis Products Produced 2020 – May 2025 (by output) ML/TF risks Strategic Analysis Products Output Cash/Underground economy Ongoing - monitoring of anomalous cash use in Italian province Provincial heat maps in UIF’s annual report 2022 - Study of causal relationship between cash and shadow economy Publication 2024 - Study of causal relationship between cash and shadow economy at provincial/sectoral level Publication 2024 - Study of causal relationship between cash in the proximity of local elections Publication Risk indicators at the municipal level Foreign transfers Ongoing - monitoring of anomalies in Italy’s international transfers for detecting structural break Internal report Leads to LEAs Ongoing - monitoring of anomalies in Italy’s international transfers Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs 2024 - Study on possible alternative approaches to compile risky country list Internal report Application to operational analysis Corporate vehicles 2020 – definition of an indicator of opacity of Italian firms Application to operational analysis Criminal activities Underway – study on the estimate of the value of ML and other illicit financial conducts Publication Geographical risk indicators Criminal infiltration of the economy 2020 – experimental mapping of firms potentially connected to organized crime Threat analysis Application by LEAs for operational purposes 2022 – study on the financial profiles of firms infiltrated by organized crime Publication 2024 – study on the rationales of criminal organisations for infiltrating legal firms Publication 2024 – a machine learning approach for the detection of firms linked to organized crime in Italy, based on balance sheet data Risk indicators Cooperation with LEAs Corruption 2024 – Definition of indicators of corruption risk in public tenders Publication Risk indicators Co-operation with ANAC 2024 – study on anomalous use of cash in the proximity of local elections Publication Risk indicators Tax fraud 2020 – definition of an indicator for detecting shell companies Publication Application to operational analysis Underway – study on characteristics of buffer companies using financial statement indicators Publication Application to operational analysis Banking and financial intermediaries Underway – definition of a statistical approach to measure bank’s compliance with STR obligations Application by BOI’s competent department to oversight activity Non-banking financial intermediaries Underway – definition of a statistical approach to measure intermediaries’ ML risk Application to oversight activity Gold sector Periodical – anomaly detection exercise in gold transactions Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs NPOs 2024 – monitoring of international financial flows in SARA data Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs 371. NSPV also develops the information contained in STRs and UIF analyses. NSPV has 74 personnel for this, including a dedicated unit of 11 personnel for TF-related STRs. Like UIF, NSPV conducts a risk classification on STRs received from UIF (that have undergone first level or additional levels of analysis) to prioritise them for operational purposes. Although starting from the UIF’s risk classification NSPV applies its own risk indicators, which include the indication of a crime, judicial interest, and the results of aggregated analysis (below). 372. NSPV also conducts its own aggregation analysis of STRs by phenomenon, which has contributed to investigation information from apparently unconnected STRs. This has been useful, for example for investigations that showed a link between loan sharking activities to tax evasion offences and to connect seemingly unconnected hawala operators to a larger criminal organisation. NSPV also produces strategic analysis products for use in its investigations. Over the evaluation period, most of these involved international and domestic tax crime and fraud, which are high risk predicate offences for ML in Italy, although there were also products relates as well as others related to corruption in the case of abuse of public funding, specific organised criminal groups as well as underground banking systems amongst others 373.  DIA, through the ELIOS system, also conducts its own analyses to aggregate STRs by typology, particularly those linked to organised crime. DIA conducts strategic analysis of STRs with a focus on identifying areas at risk of ML and combating mafia infiltration in procurements and the potential involvement, even indirectly, of individuals with mafia-related criminal records in corporate entities. 374. In 2023, the DNA, the UIF, the GdF and the Department of Public Security signed an MOU on exchange of information related to STRs aimed at streamlining operational procedures using the SAFE platform. The MoU allows the simultaneous sharing, also with the DIA and the NSPV, of the results of matching procedures of individuals appearing in DNA’s databases and registers, along with additional information provided by the UIF. 375. The STR risk classifications and analyses conducted by the UIF, NSPV and DIA reflects their distinct mandates and analytical needs. UIF performs financial analysis based on FIU-only datasets, producing anomaly-based risk scores (one to five) and phenomenon classifications that highlight suspicious financial behaviour. NSPV, conducts financial analysis using law-enforcement databases (LEA-only data) to assess investigative relevance, identify links to ongoing cases and develop evidential leads. DIA applies a similar investigative approach within the organised-crime sphere. As a result, analytical processes sometimes run in parallel, reflecting different purposes rather than duplication. Coordination between UIF and NSPV is further enhanced through the OTTs to align analytical sequencing and promote efficient use of analytical resources. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 376. UIF spontaneously transmits STRs and the results of its operational and financial analyses to NSPV and DIA through the SAFE portal. STRs with low-risk ratings do not undergo the second level of analysis and are disseminated separately and remain available to NSPV and DIA should they appear necessary in the future. Higher risk-rated STRs (and related analysis) are disseminated to LEAs on a weekly basis. STRs of particular prioritisation or urgency are highlighted with specific messages and have been disseminated within a shorter timeframe. TF-related STRs are processed by a specialised unit and disseminated to NSPV and DIA on a weekly basis, specifically on the day before CASA meeting, thereby ensuring their immediate operational uses. Table 6.4. Spontaneous Dissemination of STRs by UIF to NSPV, DIA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 STRs received by REs 113 187 139 524 155.426 150 418 145 401 67 715 STRs disseminated to LEAs 113 643 138 482 153 412 151 578 143 850 68 751 377. UIF also disseminates both the STRs and its financial analysis to judicial authorities upon request, to assist their investigations. Most requests have related to investigations into organised crime, ML, fraud, corruption and breaches of immigration regulations. Judicial authorities also seek information for international cooperation (see IO.2) which have mostly involved investigations into online fraud, crypto-asset investments, tax crime, mafia crime, unlawful financial activities, corruption and other crimes against public administrations, terrorism, and criminal association linked to international drug and human trafficking. The UIF also supports the EPPO by providing targeted financial intelligence upon request, which has contributed to the EPPO’s investigations. Table 6.5. Dissemination of STRs by UIF to Judicial Authorities on Request 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Requests for information (RFIs) from judicial authorities 558 518 313 411 373 176 Responses by UIF (including all subsequent communication) 1 188 1 463 1 059 777 741 127 Nos. of STRs forwarded 2 927 3 420 2 854 2 756 2 975 1 230 378. A major challenge for Italian authorities is the limited feedback provided by judicial authorities to UIF. While UIF receives, analyses STRs and disseminates financial intelligence, there is an expectation that the feedback loop is completed. In Italy, this cycle operates only partially. Operational feedback from the GdF and DIA exists, but systematic feedback from prosecutors on investigative outcomes is still missing (see core issue 6.4). Without such a mechanism, the UIF faces difficulty in updating its risk models and assessing the actual impact of its analytical work. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 379. LEAs provide feedback on the interest of the STRs transmitted by UIF. NSPV provides prompt feedback to UIF on the initial interest and assignment by the GdF, while for LEAs, the median time is about 80 days. This feedback is an indication of the extent to which financial intelligence from UIF supports the needs of competent authorities and also contributes to UIF in their providing FIs and DNFBPs with a qualitative assessment of their STRs. UIF also collects feedback from NSPV, DIA and DNA on the usefulness of STRs and related financial analysis disseminated by the UIF. Feedback from DNA may include information on any links to on-going investigations which could assist with decisions on the treatment to be given to further the STRs on the same subjects. Positive feedback from GdF and DIA indicates that the dissemination led to “further investigations” or the initiation of a criminal or administrative proceeding, while negative feedback indicates that for the time being, the dissemination was considered not relevant for further investigative analysis. On average, 80% of medium-high to high risk STRs disseminated to GdF, DIA and DNA received positive feedback and were used in asset recovery investigations for mafia-type criminal activity in investigations into ML and TF, as well as in those relating to associated predicate offences. 380. Judicial authorities (usually the PP) also seek STR information and financial analysis through the SAFE platform for their on-going investigations. UIF has thirteen dedicated officers in charge of responding to these requests. There have been cases where the PP has sought direct cooperation with UIF to deepen the analysis such as where the financial analysis supports the suspicion that several diverse fraudulent flows are in fact linked to one or a group of connected offenders. Although UIF has provided several case studies of successful cooperation between UIF and judicial authorities (see examples below), structured outcome-based feedback from judicial authorities on how disseminated STRs and financial analysis contribute to investigations, prosecutions or asset recovery remains limited. This reflects a system-level constraint rather than any deficiency in UIF’s dissemination practices and affects the UIF’s ability to fully assess the impact of its analytical work (see Core Issue 6.4). Box 6.2. UIF’s STRs Analysis to support Judicial Investigations Corruption involving PEPs (2020) In-depth analysis on several STRs carried out by the UIF revealed a complex system of financial flows through corporate bank accounts led to an important lawyer, Mr. GG. The corporations were funded almost exclusively through payments of invoices by companies that operated mainly with the Italian public administration (public procurement and waste management) and further analysis linked funds to administrative Magistrates. Fund transfers through these companies were made to foreign bank accounts, fake insurance policies and fake gold purchases which were used to hide the origins of money paid for flights and holidays of the Magistrates and their families. On the request of the judicial authority, financial investigations were conducted in collaboration with UIF and UIF analysis was sent to the PPO and the GdF. Aside from STRs, UIF also obtained account information from its databases, tax declaration from the tax registry and gold declaration. UIF’s activity focussed in analysing the financial flows of individuals involved in the illegal scheme and liaised with foreign FIUs in close operational co-operation with the bodies responsible for the investigations. Investigations led to four-year prison sentenced imposed on two Magistrates and three-year imprisonment on Mr GG for corruption in judicial proceedings. EUR 150 000 seized by the judicial authority in this case were a direct result of UIF’s STR analysis. Fraud involving NRRP Funds (2023) UIF carried out analysis of several STRs forward by a public body in relation to requests made by three companies for public funds disbursed under a National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). STRs were reported in view of the immediate transfer of sums received to countries in Easter Europe as well as transactions that appeared inconsistent with the economic profile of the customers. UIF’s in-depth analysis focussed on identifying connections between the companies and other financial connections. Some of the companies were already known to UIF as they were the subject of previous STRs, and the same professional who had assisted with over a hundred companies involved in the scheme was identified through the analysis. Further investigations found accounting sheets of common suppliers with incorrect or non-existent VAT numbers and certificates showing data that did not correspond to those of the tax returns in the Tax Registry. UIF ultimately identified the involvement of180 companies through which EUR 194 million worth of subsidies had been requested to the public body, and EUR 50 million had been disbursed to fraudsters. Investigation by the judicial authority based on UIF financial analysis resulted in the arrest of twenty-four individuals and the seizure of various assets including apartments, villas, crypto currencies, watches, jewellery, luxury cars, gold and over EUR 600 million in non-existent credits generated by the same companies involved in the scheme. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 381. As noted above (core issue 6.1.2), NSPV and DIA produce their own financial intelligence based on STRs and financial analysis provided by UIF mainly for their own respective investigations rather than for disseminations. In some investigations, just like with judicial authorities, there have been collaboration with UIF. Since UIF holds FIU-only datasets (including STRs, SARA, OGG, gold reports and information from foreign FIUs) that are not available to law-enforcement bodies, such collaboration provides added value for investigative purposes. Their analytical work builds on UIF’s analysis and STR-based financial intelligence is operationalised in downstream investigations. Box 6.3. Financial Analysis by NSPV leading to Investigations In 2024, exploiting the financial analysis of STRs conducted by the UIF, which provided relevant information and details concerning possible fraud in public procurement, the NSPV carried out further “pre-investigative” activities acquiring documentation from the public offices involved , and information contained in the various databases to which the GDF has access, uncovering a case involving corruption in a public company where a tender was promised to an entity in exchange for a bribe. A lawyer was also found to be involved for providing non-existent consultancy service to create fictious expenses, in return for substantial sums of money. Aside from the above, NSPV also analysed bank statements and telephone records. Wiretapping and surveillance activity was carried out. Investigations led to the arrest of four suspects, and three were convicted of corruption for an act contrary to official duties under the Criminal Code, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. EUR 143 000 was confiscated. The offenders were also banned from public office and the ability to contract with the public administration for five years. Footnotes [19] The number of STRs under the second level analysis for the 2025 figures reflects also the fact that on aggregate analysis has yet been performed on 2025 STRs, so the second level analysis triggered by it are still absent." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 363. The UIF produces financial intelligence to support the operational needs of competent authorities to a large extent, which has contributed directly to several major investigations, including organised-crime infiltration schemes, subsidy-fraud networks (such as NRRP-related cases), and complex crypto-laundering activities. DIA incorporated 1,565 STRs into organized-crime investigations during 2020-2023, demonstrating the operational relevance of UIF’s work. In accordance with its 2023-2025 staffing plan, the UIF’s staff has grown from 153 in 2020 to 191, strengthening its analytical capability. 364. Each STR is assigned an automatic risk indicator, and for nearly all STRs, a phenomenon classification, associated with the underlying illegal activity. These indicators are constantly updated to reflect current and emerging ML/TF risks and include the presence of PEPs, association to organised crime, subjects under investigations, indication of cash operations, involvement of public funds and the use of virtual currencies, gaming or money transfer services. TF-related STRs are prioritised to allow expedited review and dissemination. Both the NRA findings as well as UIF’s own strategic analyses feed into the identification of current and emerging risks. 365. The UIF mitigates limited reporting from DNFBPs by relying on complementary datasets such as SARA, ORO, OGG, public procurement data, tax files and company registers. As a result, even sectors with very low STR volumes such as lawyers, accountants, real-estate agents or DPMS—are still captured within the UIF’s strategic analysis, allowing emerging risks and anomalous patterns to be detected through aggregate and cross-sector data. The RADAR platform enhances the analytical value of STRs regardless of sectoral volume and structured data modules and sector-specific reporting templates (used for MVTS, payment card operators, gaming, VASPs, etc.) allow reporting entities to submit detailed transactional datasets in standardised formats. These structured datasets enable the UIF to perform granular behavioural analysis, typology identification, and large-scale network mapping. 366. UIF analysts conduct a first level analysis on every STR to verify the automated risk rating to integrate further information into the STR, to classify STRs according to underlying financial illicit phenomena and to decide if the STR needs further UIF in-depth analyses. To facilitate this, UIF may seek from the reporting entities, further detail on the STRs submitted. Over the evaluation period, approximately 11% of the requests for information sent to reporting entities occurred when the STR was under first level analysis and the remaining, when it was under second level analysis. Data regarding subjects included in STRs are then sent to NSPV, DIA and DNA for their cross matching with law enforcement information. 367. For in-depth analysis for STRs with a higher risk level, a second-level financial analysis is performed through the use of more sophisticated tools, such as the examination of operational networks, blockchain forensics software for crypto assets etc. UIF disseminates a report to NSPV, DIA and DNA, usually within 15 days, although it can take up to three months for more complex analysis. Box 6.1. UIF’s STRs Analysis to produce Financial Intelligence Laundering of illicit funds derived from tax evasion and the sale of non-existent tax credits (2022) UIF received STRs regarding anomalous transfers of tax credits in 2022. The operations were carried out by a newly established consulting firm traceable to a lawyer and a company offering professional training, who were under investigation and previously reported to the UIF for tax fraud and fake invoicing. The UIF performed extended financial analysis, requesting information from the REs involved and from foreign FIUs. The UIF detected a network of 16 companies directly related to the same subject, some established abroad, that were used for laundering the proceeds of many offences (tax offenses, corporate crimes, offences related to organized crime) through a fraudulent-invoicing scheme. The beneficial owner of the foreign companies was an Italian individual present in the DNA’s records who appeared to be the mastermind of the whole operation. The tax credits turned out to be non-existent. The case led to a criminal proceeding against 37 people and 11 companies for tax evasion and the sale of non-existent tax credits. Preventive measures were issued, among which a seizure order worth more than € 12 million. The alleged mastermind of the operation was also sentenced to a prison term. 368. ’Special sectors’ are identified based on the basis of the operational features of certain reporting entities such as virtual asset transactions, money transfer services, payment cards operators and gaming services. These sectors characterised by high transaction volumes, fragmented flows and numerous parties involved, which require specialised analytical approaches. For these sectors, UIF periodically performs aggregate analysis based on risk indicators by collecting or grouping linked STRs to identify potential networks. Such aggregate analysis may lead to further in-depth financial analysis, using criteria such as transaction amount, number of victims and STRs involved, investigative information and social network analysis. All the in-depth analysis conducted for these sectors are disseminated to the relevant LEAs. 369. TF-related STRs are treated as priority and analysis is conducted by a specialised division so that they are ready for dissemination within a few days after the first level analysis. TF-related STRs that are selected to undergo the second level of STR analysis are analysed by adopting the usual techniques used for in-depth analysis for ML STRs, with particular reference to social network analysis on financial channels most exposed to TF abuse, as well as the identification of operational patterns of activity most likely to be used for TF in the region. As a reflection of strong domestic coordination, UIF performs these TF-related STRs disseminations to GdF and DIA every week the evening before the weekly CASA meetings, accompanied by a summary of the contents of most significant STRs and UIF’s financial reports from the second level analysis. (see IO.9). Table 6.2. Number of STRs and type of analysis conducted by UIF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 1 st Level Analysis 113 643 138 482 153 412 151 678 143 850 68 751 Aggregate Analysis 26 314 45 761 45 754 47 306 40 415 22 263 2 nd Level In-Depth Analysis 6 584 7 110 8 073 7 117 5 487 2 085 [19] 370. The UIF undertakes strategic analysis projects based on identified threats, vulnerabilities or methodologies for computing risk indicators associated with those threats. Strategic analysis topics are selected through a structured dual process that combines a top-down approach aligned with NRA and national priorities, and a bottom-up approach based on anomaly detection from large datasets (including SARA, OGG, ORO and network indicators). The UIF draws on these datasets (see IO.1), external sources and several methodological tools, including descriptive statistical analysis, econometric modelling and machine-learning techniques. Over the evaluation period, a number of strategic products were produced on a regular (on a yearly or half-yearly) basis and disseminated through publication, proactively to LEAs, or in response to requests from LEAs and judicial authorities. These products have had operational implications for UIF’s own analysis and for LEAs’ investigations and have contributed to the development of risk indicators used by other actors in the AML system, such as supervisors or reporting entities. The strategic analysis products are closely aligned with the risk picture set out in the NRA and address high-risk ML areas such as cash-intensive activities, corporate opacity, organised-crime infiltration, subsidy-fraud schemes and crypto-related ML (see Table 6.3). Their quality, regular production and operational relevance enhance the overall value of financial intelligence available to competent authorities. Nevertheless, the Operational Technical Tables (OTT) established with the GdF in 2024 (see below) may result in a more systematic and collaborative approach to risk identification and prioritisation in the production of strategic analysis. Table 6.3. Strategic Analysis Products Produced 2020 – May 2025 (by output) ML/TF risks Strategic Analysis Products Output Cash/Underground economy Ongoing - monitoring of anomalous cash use in Italian province Provincial heat maps in UIF’s annual report 2022 - Study of causal relationship between cash and shadow economy Publication 2024 - Study of causal relationship between cash and shadow economy at provincial/sectoral level Publication 2024 - Study of causal relationship between cash in the proximity of local elections Publication Risk indicators at the municipal level Foreign transfers Ongoing - monitoring of anomalies in Italy’s international transfers for detecting structural break Internal report Leads to LEAs Ongoing - monitoring of anomalies in Italy’s international transfers Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs 2024 - Study on possible alternative approaches to compile risky country list Internal report Application to operational analysis Corporate vehicles 2020 – definition of an indicator of opacity of Italian firms Application to operational analysis Criminal activities Underway – study on the estimate of the value of ML and other illicit financial conducts Publication Geographical risk indicators Criminal infiltration of the economy 2020 – experimental mapping of firms potentially connected to organized crime Threat analysis Application by LEAs for operational purposes 2022 – study on the financial profiles of firms infiltrated by organized crime Publication 2024 – study on the rationales of criminal organisations for infiltrating legal firms Publication 2024 – a machine learning approach for the detection of firms linked to organized crime in Italy, based on balance sheet data Risk indicators Cooperation with LEAs Corruption 2024 – Definition of indicators of corruption risk in public tenders Publication Risk indicators Co-operation with ANAC 2024 – study on anomalous use of cash in the proximity of local elections Publication Risk indicators Tax fraud 2020 – definition of an indicator for detecting shell companies Publication Application to operational analysis Underway – study on characteristics of buffer companies using financial statement indicators Publication Application to operational analysis Banking and financial intermediaries Underway – definition of a statistical approach to measure bank’s compliance with STR obligations Application by BOI’s competent department to oversight activity Non-banking financial intermediaries Underway – definition of a statistical approach to measure intermediaries’ ML risk Application to oversight activity Gold sector Periodical – anomaly detection exercise in gold transactions Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs NPOs 2024 – monitoring of international financial flows in SARA data Anomaly detection Leads to LEAs 371. NSPV also develops the information contained in STRs and UIF analyses. NSPV has 74 personnel for this, including a dedicated unit of 11 personnel for TF-related STRs. Like UIF, NSPV conducts a risk classification on STRs received from UIF (that have undergone first level or additional levels of analysis) to prioritise them for operational purposes. Although starting from the UIF’s risk classification NSPV applies its own risk indicators, which include the indication of a crime, judicial interest, and the results of aggregated analysis (below). 372. NSPV also conducts its own aggregation analysis of STRs by phenomenon, which has contributed to investigation information from apparently unconnected STRs. This has been useful, for example for investigations that showed a link between loan sharking activities to tax evasion offences and to connect seemingly unconnected hawala operators to a larger criminal organisation. NSPV also produces strategic analysis products for use in its investigations. Over the evaluation period, most of these involved international and domestic tax crime and fraud, which are high risk predicate offences for ML in Italy, although there were also products relates as well as others related to corruption in the case of abuse of public funding, specific organised criminal groups as well as underground banking systems amongst others 373.  DIA, through the ELIOS system, also conducts its own analyses to aggregate STRs by typology, particularly those linked to organised crime. DIA conducts strategic analysis of STRs with a focus on identifying areas at risk of ML and combating mafia infiltration in procurements and the potential involvement, even indirectly, of individuals with mafia-related criminal records in corporate entities. 374. In 2023, the DNA, the UIF, the GdF and the Department of Public Security signed an MOU on exchange of information related to STRs aimed at streamlining operational procedures using the SAFE platform. The MoU allows the simultaneous sharing, also with the DIA and the NSPV, of the results of matching procedures of individuals appearing in DNA’s databases and registers, along with additional information provided by the UIF. 375. The STR risk classifications and analyses conducted by the UIF, NSPV and DIA reflects their distinct mandates and analytical needs. UIF performs financial analysis based on FIU-only datasets, producing anomaly-based risk scores (one to five) and phenomenon classifications that highlight suspicious financial behaviour. NSPV, conducts financial analysis using law-enforcement databases (LEA-only data) to assess investigative relevance, identify links to ongoing cases and develop evidential leads. DIA applies a similar investigative approach within the organised-crime sphere. As a result, analytical processes sometimes run in parallel, reflecting different purposes rather than duplication. Coordination between UIF and NSPV is further enhanced through the OTTs to align analytical sequencing and promote efficient use of analytical resources. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 376. UIF spontaneously transmits STRs and the results of its operational and financial analyses to NSPV and DIA through the SAFE portal. STRs with low-risk ratings do not undergo the second level of analysis and are disseminated separately and remain available to NSPV and DIA should they appear necessary in the future. Higher risk-rated STRs (and related analysis) are disseminated to LEAs on a weekly basis. STRs of particular prioritisation or urgency are highlighted with specific messages and have been disseminated within a shorter timeframe. TF-related STRs are processed by a specialised unit and disseminated to NSPV and DIA on a weekly basis, specifically on the day before CASA meeting, thereby ensuring their immediate operational uses. Table 6.4. Spontaneous Dissemination of STRs by UIF to NSPV, DIA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 STRs received by REs 113 187 139 524 155.426 150 418 145 401 67 715 STRs disseminated to LEAs 113 643 138 482 153 412 151 578 143 850 68 751 377. UIF also disseminates both the STRs and its financial analysis to judicial authorities upon request, to assist their investigations. Most requests have related to investigations into organised crime, ML, fraud, corruption and breaches of immigration regulations. Judicial authorities also seek information for international cooperation (see IO.2) which have mostly involved investigations into online fraud, crypto-asset investments, tax crime, mafia crime, unlawful financial activities, corruption and other crimes against public administrations, terrorism, and criminal association linked to international drug and human trafficking. The UIF also supports the EPPO by providing targeted financial intelligence upon request, which has contributed to the EPPO’s investigations. Table 6.5. Dissemination of STRs by UIF to Judicial Authorities on Request 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Requests for information (RFIs) from judicial authorities 558 518 313 411 373 176 Responses by UIF (including all subsequent communication) 1 188 1 463 1 059 777 741 127 Nos. of STRs forwarded 2 927 3 420 2 854 2 756 2 975 1 230 378. A major challenge for Italian authorities is the limited feedback provided by judicial authorities to UIF. While UIF receives, analyses STRs and disseminates financial intelligence, there is an expectation that the feedback loop is completed. In Italy, this cycle operates only partially. Operational feedback from the GdF and DIA exists, but systematic feedback from prosecutors on investigative outcomes is still missing (see core issue 6.4). Without such a mechanism, the UIF faces difficulty in updating its risk models and assessing the actual impact of its analytical work. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 379. LEAs provide feedback on the interest of the STRs transmitted by UIF. NSPV provides prompt feedback to UIF on the initial interest and assignment by the GdF, while for LEAs, the median time is about 80 days. This feedback is an indication of the extent to which financial intelligence from UIF supports the needs of competent authorities and also contributes to UIF in their providing FIs and DNFBPs with a qualitative assessment of their STRs. UIF also collects feedback from NSPV, DIA and DNA on the usefulness of STRs and related financial analysis disseminated by the UIF. Feedback from DNA may include information on any links to on-going investigations which could assist with decisions on the treatment to be given to further the STRs on the same subjects. Positive feedback from GdF and DIA indicates that the dissemination led to “further investigations” or the initiation of a criminal or administrative proceeding, while negative feedback indicates that for the time being, the dissemination was considered not relevant for further investigative analysis. On average, 80% of medium-high to high risk STRs disseminated to GdF, DIA and DNA received positive feedback and were used in asset recovery investigations for mafia-type criminal activity in investigations into ML and TF, as well as in those relating to associated predicate offences. 380. Judicial authorities (usually the PP) also seek STR information and financial analysis through the SAFE platform for their on-going investigations. UIF has thirteen dedicated officers in charge of responding to these requests. There have been cases where the PP has sought direct cooperation with UIF to deepen the analysis such as where the financial analysis supports the suspicion that several diverse fraudulent flows are in fact linked to one or a group of connected offenders. Although UIF has provided several case studies of successful cooperation between UIF and judicial authorities (see examples below), structured outcome-based feedback from judicial authorities on how disseminated STRs and financial analysis contribute to investigations, prosecutions or asset recovery remains limited. This reflects a system-level constraint rather than any deficiency in UIF’s dissemination practices and affects the UIF’s ability to fully assess the impact of its analytical work (see Core Issue 6.4). Box 6.2. UIF’s STRs Analysis to support Judicial Investigations Corruption involving PEPs (2020) In-depth analysis on several STRs carried out by the UIF revealed a complex system of financial flows through corporate bank accounts led to an important lawyer, Mr. GG. The corporations were funded almost exclusively through payments of invoices by companies that operated mainly with the Italian public administration (public procurement and waste management) and further analysis linked funds to administrative Magistrates. Fund transfers through these companies were made to foreign bank accounts, fake insurance policies and fake gold purchases which were used to hide the origins of money paid for flights and holidays of the Magistrates and their families. On the request of the judicial authority, financial investigations were conducted in collaboration with UIF and UIF analysis was sent to the PPO and the GdF. Aside from STRs, UIF also obtained account information from its databases, tax declaration from the tax registry and gold declaration. UIF’s activity focussed in analysing the financial flows of individuals involved in the illegal scheme and liaised with foreign FIUs in close operational co-operation with the bodies responsible for the investigations. Investigations led to four-year prison sentenced imposed on two Magistrates and three-year imprisonment on Mr GG for corruption in judicial proceedings. EUR 150 000 seized by the judicial authority in this case were a direct result of UIF’s STR analysis. Fraud involving NRRP Funds (2023) UIF carried out analysis of several STRs forward by a public body in relation to requests made by three companies for public funds disbursed under a National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). STRs were reported in view of the immediate transfer of sums received to countries in Easter Europe as well as transactions that appeared inconsistent with the economic profile of the customers. UIF’s in-depth analysis focussed on identifying connections between the companies and other financial connections. Some of the companies were already known to UIF as they were the subject of previous STRs, and the same professional who had assisted with over a hundred companies involved in the scheme was identified through the analysis. Further investigations found accounting sheets of common suppliers with incorrect or non-existent VAT numbers and certificates showing data that did not correspond to those of the tax returns in the Tax Registry. UIF ultimately identified the involvement of180 companies through which EUR 194 million worth of subsidies had been requested to the public body, and EUR 50 million had been disbursed to fraudsters. Investigation by the judicial authority based on UIF financial analysis resulted in the arrest of twenty-four individuals and the seizure of various assets including apartments, villas, crypto currencies, watches, jewellery, luxury cars, gold and over EUR 600 million in non-existent credits generated by the same companies involved in the scheme. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 381. As noted above (core issue 6.1.2), NSPV and DIA produce their own financial intelligence based on STRs and financial analysis provided by UIF mainly for their own respective investigations rather than for disseminations. In some investigations, just like with judicial authorities, there have been collaboration with UIF. Since UIF holds FIU-only datasets (including STRs, SARA, OGG, gold reports and information from foreign FIUs) that are not available to law-enforcement bodies, such collaboration provides added value for investigative purposes. Their analytical work builds on UIF’s analysis and STR-based financial intelligence is operationalised in downstream investigations. Box 6.3. Financial Analysis by NSPV leading to Investigations In 2024, exploiting the financial analysis of STRs conducted by the UIF, which provided relevant information and details concerning possible fraud in public procurement, the NSPV carried out further “pre-investigative” activities acquiring documentation from the public offices involved , and information contained in the various databases to which the GDF has access, uncovering a case involving corruption in a public company where a tender was promised to an entity in exchange for a bribe. A lawyer was also found to be involved for providing non-existent consultancy service to create fictious expenses, in return for substantial sums of money. Aside from the above, NSPV also analysed bank statements and telephone records. Wiretapping and surveillance activity was carried out. Investigations led to the arrest of four suspects, and three were convicted of corruption for an act contrary to official duties under the Criminal Code, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. EUR 143 000 was confiscated. The offenders were also banned from public office and the ability to contract with the public administration for five years. Footnotes [19] The number of STRs under the second level analysis for the 2025 figures reflects also the fact that on aggregate analysis has yet been performed on 2025 STRs, so the second level analysis triggered by it are still absent." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="410. Italy’s judiciary is composed of judges and prosecutors, all considered magistrates. There are 3439 prosecutors in 140 PPOs in the 26 districts over the different regions in Italy. Investigations are carried out by the PP’s office where the offence has been perpetrated, although DNA will intervene to coordinate serious and complex cases involving more than one region if such a case is under its competence. The size and structure of each office differs depending on the region. For example, there are more prosecutors in larger cities like Rome, Milan, Naples and Palermo, there are 292, 286, 387 and 203 prosecutors respectively, representing a third of the total number of prosecutors in the country. There are also specialised units within certain regional departments based on the prevalent type of crime (e.g. the Milan office has a specific department for financial and corporate affairs). More experienced prosecutors are assigned for mafia-style offences. 411. By law, from the time a crime report is registered, the PP must proceed to investigate it and prosecute before the court if there are sufficient grounds, or seek a dismissal (in which case, the investigation can be resurrected if new grounds are obtained), within two years. The two-year time frame is carefully balanced to protect fundamental rights when conducting complex investigations. Italian authorities are aware of the deadline and adapt their investigative work accordingly, and the assessment team did not encounter any case where the procedure resulted in investigations being interrupted or delayed. 412. The table (IO.7.5 below) provides a broad view of ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions in Italy since 2020, which reflects a relatively large number of cases annually, indicating broadly the well-functioning investigation and prosecution of ML in Italy. Approximately half of cases where the PP has decided to initiate criminal proceedings lead to conviction, which is broadly in line with conviction rates for other offences in Italy. Statistics presented to the AT reflected that the number of pending cases appear large, they are consistent over the years, which suggests also a reasonable turnover without a backlog of cases. Table 7.5. ML Investigations, Prosecution, Conviction 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Investigations registered in the year 2 903 (7 074 persons) 3 073 (8 634 persons) 3 138 (8 732 persons) 3 415 (9 249 persons) 3 724 (8 684 persons) 1 002 (2 432 persons) 17 255 (44 805 persons) Ongoing prosecutions (including dismissals) in the year 3 165 (7 548 persons) 3876 (10 082 persons) 3 910 (10 005 persons) 3 922 (9620 persons) 4 051 (9 290 persons) 1 001 (2 602 persons) 19 925 (49 149 persons) Initiation of criminal proceedings in court in the year 1 631 2 023 1 934 1 868 2 142 453 10 051 Final Convictions by cases in the year 664 (653 persons) 901 (878 persons) 847 (822 persons) 933 (905 persons) 752 (729 persons) 46 (35 persons) 4 114 (4 153 persons) 413. In Italy, when sufficient grounds exist to support criminal proceedings, prosecutors are constitutionally obliged to initiate prosecution. This means that prosecutorial decisions are strictly not based on ML risks (including geographic risks or channels to launder ML) of the country, nor is there any process to monitor if this is the case (since monitoring is based on asset seizures and confiscations – see IO.8). As with ML investigations, Italy does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the underlying predicate offences for ML prosecutions and convictions. However, since severe penalties are prescribed for ML offences, ML offences are as serious offences, prioritised in prosecutorial workload management. In areas where there is elevated ML risk due to the presence of organised crime, additional resources are assigned in the form of more specialised prosecutorial magistrates, judicial police assignments and enhanced administrative. This risk-based deployment ensures higher-risk areas receive proportionally greater capacity for ML prosecutions. Over the last five years, there have been discussions between the heads of the PPOs and court presidents to establish high-level prioritisation along the lines of pursuing organised crime, financial crime, crimes against public administration, asset seizures etc. 414. Italy classifies its ML offences based on three types of ML activity: (i) article 648 bis Criminal Code (stand-alone ML to hinder the identification of the criminal origin, without culpability in the crime), (ii) article 648 ter Criminal Code (use of money, goods or other utilities from crime in economic or financial activities – excluding cases of complicity in the crime) and (iii) article 648 ter 1 Criminal Code (self-laundering). Self-laundering was made an offence in Italy in 2015. It was noted in Italy’s previous MER (2016) that the new self-laundering offense clearly opens additional avenues to fight crime and provides opportunities for greater international cooperation. However, it had not yet been tested by the prosecutors and courts. And the impact it would have on the effectiveness of Italy’s AML efforts would depend on the courts’ jurisprudence. 415. The data supported by cases reflects that Italy is mostly pursuing ML under articles 648 bis and 648 ter of the CC which represents stand alone and autonomous ML, which is a result of Italy’s focus on combating organised crime. Due to the complexity, such cases will invariably involve the GdF or the DIA and the assessment team was presented a large number of cases where intermediary launderers, usually as part of organised criminal groups, were investigated and prosecuted for ML. Many of these involved transnational elements where launderers relied on international ML networks to launder the proceeds of domestic crime. Box 7.4. Investigation of Stand-Alone ML Case 1 (2023) The GdF carried out investigation into the drug trafficking activities of a mafia-type organised criminal group. The proceeds of the criminal activity were laundered through a foreign national in Italy that relied on an international cash controller network based in China that worked with a network of money mules. The cash collector based in Italy would collect the cash from the group and send it to China through an informal compensation mechanism. Agents based in other countries would release sums and deliver them to the final beneficiary. GdF investigations included the surveillance of chat groups that led to information relating to the drug trafficking activity as well as the video surveillance of the movements of the launderer and his family based in Italy who were suspected of laundering for the criminal group. A search was conducted at his home and a sum of EUR 133 000 in cash was seized. The suspect was arrested and pleaded guilty to ML charges. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. The court also ordered confiscation of assets to the value of EUR 700 000. The leaders of the OCG were also sentenced for money laundering and self-money laundering charges, as they used part of the profits from drug trafficking to buy precious metals. Case 2 (2022) STR analysis revealed anomalous money flow, based on which GdF initiated investigation into several companies that were recipients of public contracts. It was found that a group of companies were involved in carousel tax fraud. The proceeds of the fraud were laundered in smaller amounts through smaller companies using cheques, money orders and pre-paid cards. Natural persons and sole-proprietorships were finally used to monetise the proceeds. The money was used by a mafia-type group to send money to the families of prisoners. The operation consisted of linking information from GdF’s databases (bank accounts and pre-paid card data) to reconstruct fund flows to cross reference with information obtained from wiretaps and surveillance of suspects involved, as well as tax audits. Fifty seven natural persons and eight legal persons were prosecuted and convicted of stand-alone ML. The natural persons were sentenced to imprisonment from a range between two and nine years, as well as fines. The legal persons were fined between EUR 51 600 and EUR 1 239 200. 416. Since 2020, the number of investigations and prosecutions for self-laundering (see table 7.6 below) under article 648 ter 1 Criminal Code, although increasing, appears to rest between 10% and 15% of all ML investigations and prosecutions. Convictions for such cases rests at an average of only 6% of self-laundering prosecutions. Italian authorities attributed this to the complexity of such cases, particularly in light of the recency of the introduction of the legislation and the judicial response to this. Considering that it has been ten years since the enactment of article 648 ter 1 of the Criminal Code, there still appear to be barriers (e.g. legal, procedural or training/capacity) to obtaining convictions for this offence. To mitigate this, Italy relies also on article 512-bis (fraudulent transfer of assets) of the Criminal Code which prescribes imprisonment from two to six years and is evidentiarily easier to prosecute since it only requires proof of fictious ownership of assets with the specific intent to evade preventive measures or facilitate ML crimes. Over the evaluation period, 535 persons had been convicted under this provision. 417. A significant number of investigations launched by the GdF for ML against legal persons (1589 legal persons as reflected in table 7.3 above) have resulted only in a small number of convictions (68 legal persons as reflected in table 7.6 below). No data was available on the number of legal persons prosecuted. Italy uses asset recovery (including through its preventive measures) and other tools against legal persons and owners of legal persons used for ML. Corporate preservation with remediation through judicial administration by removal of all managers are used to clean up corporate vehicles or seizures and confiscations are used to dismantle them altogether. However, considering that laundering criminal proceeds through businesses and corporations is a recognised modus operandi for organised crime in Italy and appears in several case studies, this is an important area for Italy to pursue more ML prosecutions and convictions. Table 7.6. ML Investigations, Prosecution, Convictions by Type of ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Self-laundering (art. 648 ter.1 CC ) ML investigations 340 367 426 435 468 97 2 133 ML prosecutions 185 355 406 450 549 113 2 058 ML convictions 17 28 25 27 23 3 123 Stand-alone (autonomous) ML (Art. 648 bis CC, 648 ter CC.) ML investigations 2 705 2 862 2 896 3 149 3 417 939 15 968 ML prosecutions 3 052 3653 3 669 3 637 3 707 940 18 658 ML convictions 663 894 840 928 751 38 4 114 ML convictions of legal persons 10 18 20 7 8 5 68" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="410. Italy’s judiciary is composed of judges and prosecutors, all considered magistrates. There are 3439 prosecutors in 140 PPOs in the 26 districts over the different regions in Italy. Investigations are carried out by the PP’s office where the offence has been perpetrated, although DNA will intervene to coordinate serious and complex cases involving more than one region if such a case is under its competence. The size and structure of each office differs depending on the region. For example, there are more prosecutors in larger cities like Rome, Milan, Naples and Palermo, there are 292, 286, 387 and 203 prosecutors respectively, representing a third of the total number of prosecutors in the country. There are also specialised units within certain regional departments based on the prevalent type of crime (e.g. the Milan office has a specific department for financial and corporate affairs). More experienced prosecutors are assigned for mafia-style offences. 411. By law, from the time a crime report is registered, the PP must proceed to investigate it and prosecute before the court if there are sufficient grounds, or seek a dismissal (in which case, the investigation can be resurrected if new grounds are obtained), within two years. The two-year time frame is carefully balanced to protect fundamental rights when conducting complex investigations. Italian authorities are aware of the deadline and adapt their investigative work accordingly, and the assessment team did not encounter any case where the procedure resulted in investigations being interrupted or delayed. 412. The table (IO.7.5 below) provides a broad view of ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions in Italy since 2020, which reflects a relatively large number of cases annually, indicating broadly the well-functioning investigation and prosecution of ML in Italy. Approximately half of cases where the PP has decided to initiate criminal proceedings lead to conviction, which is broadly in line with conviction rates for other offences in Italy. Statistics presented to the AT reflected that the number of pending cases appear large, they are consistent over the years, which suggests also a reasonable turnover without a backlog of cases. Table 7.5. ML Investigations, Prosecution, Conviction 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Investigations registered in the year 2 903 (7 074 persons) 3 073 (8 634 persons) 3 138 (8 732 persons) 3 415 (9 249 persons) 3 724 (8 684 persons) 1 002 (2 432 persons) 17 255 (44 805 persons) Ongoing prosecutions (including dismissals) in the year 3 165 (7 548 persons) 3876 (10 082 persons) 3 910 (10 005 persons) 3 922 (9620 persons) 4 051 (9 290 persons) 1 001 (2 602 persons) 19 925 (49 149 persons) Initiation of criminal proceedings in court in the year 1 631 2 023 1 934 1 868 2 142 453 10 051 Final Convictions by cases in the year 664 (653 persons) 901 (878 persons) 847 (822 persons) 933 (905 persons) 752 (729 persons) 46 (35 persons) 4 114 (4 153 persons) 413. In Italy, when sufficient grounds exist to support criminal proceedings, prosecutors are constitutionally obliged to initiate prosecution. This means that prosecutorial decisions are strictly not based on ML risks (including geographic risks or channels to launder ML) of the country, nor is there any process to monitor if this is the case (since monitoring is based on asset seizures and confiscations – see IO.8). As with ML investigations, Italy does not maintain comprehensive statistics on the underlying predicate offences for ML prosecutions and convictions. However, since severe penalties are prescribed for ML offences, ML offences are as serious offences, prioritised in prosecutorial workload management. In areas where there is elevated ML risk due to the presence of organised crime, additional resources are assigned in the form of more specialised prosecutorial magistrates, judicial police assignments and enhanced administrative. This risk-based deployment ensures higher-risk areas receive proportionally greater capacity for ML prosecutions. Over the last five years, there have been discussions between the heads of the PPOs and court presidents to establish high-level prioritisation along the lines of pursuing organised crime, financial crime, crimes against public administration, asset seizures etc. 414. Italy classifies its ML offences based on three types of ML activity: (i) article 648 bis Criminal Code (stand-alone ML to hinder the identification of the criminal origin, without culpability in the crime), (ii) article 648 ter Criminal Code (use of money, goods or other utilities from crime in economic or financial activities – excluding cases of complicity in the crime) and (iii) article 648 ter 1 Criminal Code (self-laundering). Self-laundering was made an offence in Italy in 2015. It was noted in Italy’s previous MER (2016) that the new self-laundering offense clearly opens additional avenues to fight crime and provides opportunities for greater international cooperation. However, it had not yet been tested by the prosecutors and courts. And the impact it would have on the effectiveness of Italy’s AML efforts would depend on the courts’ jurisprudence. 415. The data supported by cases reflects that Italy is mostly pursuing ML under articles 648 bis and 648 ter of the CC which represents stand alone and autonomous ML, which is a result of Italy’s focus on combating organised crime. Due to the complexity, such cases will invariably involve the GdF or the DIA and the assessment team was presented a large number of cases where intermediary launderers, usually as part of organised criminal groups, were investigated and prosecuted for ML. Many of these involved transnational elements where launderers relied on international ML networks to launder the proceeds of domestic crime. Box 7.4. Investigation of Stand-Alone ML Case 1 (2023) The GdF carried out investigation into the drug trafficking activities of a mafia-type organised criminal group. The proceeds of the criminal activity were laundered through a foreign national in Italy that relied on an international cash controller network based in China that worked with a network of money mules. The cash collector based in Italy would collect the cash from the group and send it to China through an informal compensation mechanism. Agents based in other countries would release sums and deliver them to the final beneficiary. GdF investigations included the surveillance of chat groups that led to information relating to the drug trafficking activity as well as the video surveillance of the movements of the launderer and his family based in Italy who were suspected of laundering for the criminal group. A search was conducted at his home and a sum of EUR 133 000 in cash was seized. The suspect was arrested and pleaded guilty to ML charges. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. The court also ordered confiscation of assets to the value of EUR 700 000. The leaders of the OCG were also sentenced for money laundering and self-money laundering charges, as they used part of the profits from drug trafficking to buy precious metals. Case 2 (2022) STR analysis revealed anomalous money flow, based on which GdF initiated investigation into several companies that were recipients of public contracts. It was found that a group of companies were involved in carousel tax fraud. The proceeds of the fraud were laundered in smaller amounts through smaller companies using cheques, money orders and pre-paid cards. Natural persons and sole-proprietorships were finally used to monetise the proceeds. The money was used by a mafia-type group to send money to the families of prisoners. The operation consisted of linking information from GdF’s databases (bank accounts and pre-paid card data) to reconstruct fund flows to cross reference with information obtained from wiretaps and surveillance of suspects involved, as well as tax audits. Fifty seven natural persons and eight legal persons were prosecuted and convicted of stand-alone ML. The natural persons were sentenced to imprisonment from a range between two and nine years, as well as fines. The legal persons were fined between EUR 51 600 and EUR 1 239 200. 416. Since 2020, the number of investigations and prosecutions for self-laundering (see table 7.6 below) under article 648 ter 1 Criminal Code, although increasing, appears to rest between 10% and 15% of all ML investigations and prosecutions. Convictions for such cases rests at an average of only 6% of self-laundering prosecutions. Italian authorities attributed this to the complexity of such cases, particularly in light of the recency of the introduction of the legislation and the judicial response to this. Considering that it has been ten years since the enactment of article 648 ter 1 of the Criminal Code, there still appear to be barriers (e.g. legal, procedural or training/capacity) to obtaining convictions for this offence. To mitigate this, Italy relies also on article 512-bis (fraudulent transfer of assets) of the Criminal Code which prescribes imprisonment from two to six years and is evidentiarily easier to prosecute since it only requires proof of fictious ownership of assets with the specific intent to evade preventive measures or facilitate ML crimes. Over the evaluation period, 535 persons had been convicted under this provision. 417. A significant number of investigations launched by the GdF for ML against legal persons (1589 legal persons as reflected in table 7.3 above) have resulted only in a small number of convictions (68 legal persons as reflected in table 7.6 below). No data was available on the number of legal persons prosecuted. Italy uses asset recovery (including through its preventive measures) and other tools against legal persons and owners of legal persons used for ML. Corporate preservation with remediation through judicial administration by removal of all managers are used to clean up corporate vehicles or seizures and confiscations are used to dismantle them altogether. However, considering that laundering criminal proceeds through businesses and corporations is a recognised modus operandi for organised crime in Italy and appears in several case studies, this is an important area for Italy to pursue more ML prosecutions and convictions. Table 7.6. ML Investigations, Prosecution, Convictions by Type of ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Self-laundering (art. 648 ter.1 CC ) ML investigations 340 367 426 435 468 97 2 133 ML prosecutions 185 355 406 450 549 113 2 058 ML convictions 17 28 25 27 23 3 123 Stand-alone (autonomous) ML (Art. 648 bis CC, 648 ter CC.) ML investigations 2 705 2 862 2 896 3 149 3 417 939 15 968 ML prosecutions 3 052 3653 3 669 3 637 3 707 940 18 658 ML convictions 663 894 840 928 751 38 4 114 ML convictions of legal persons 10 18 20 7 8 5 68" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="439. The DIA’s investigations into the standard of living, the financial resources and the assets of the natural and legal persons linked to organised crime as well as investigations into their economic activities to identify the sources of income, support both the tracing of criminal property for seizure and confiscation, including property of corresponding value where the criminal property has been dissipated. Following its internal policies as reflected in its Circular 335160 (issued in November 2013 and updated in February 2022), the GdF conducts parallel financial investigations as soon as an investigation is initiated and even before a criminal case is registered. They do this using sophisticated databases and IT tools that are able to draw linkages across different open and confidential databases (see IO.7), to develop evidence and identify criminal property and property of corresponding value for seizure and confiscation. Potential assets are thus identified at an early stage to minimise dissipation once criminals realise that they or their assets are being investigated. Where there are cross-border links, the GdF also utilises international cooperation tools and networks to identify property abroad for the purpose of confiscation (see IO.2). Both the DIA and the GdF receive directly and routinely STRs and operational analysis from UIF, and this information is also instrumental to the asset-tracing and identification before the crime is registered (see case studies below as well as in IO.6). Table 8.1. Value of asset seizure/confiscations resulting from STR information ( in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 GdF investigations seizures NA 615 940 103 2 827 454 758 423 843 192 1 445 990168 251 357 808 GdF investigations confiscations NA 27 391 913 6 391 409 51 846 476 94 398 922 1 446 321 DIA investigations seizures 71 309 233 149 466 083 44 930 963 65 225 108 72 937 268 6 574 049 DIA investigations confiscations 50 045 842 99 038 363 171 868 011 84 149 885 122 154 317 12 290 000 440. The State Police and the Carabinieri also carry out financial investigations as directed by the PP to support their investigations in line with their more general mandate to maintain public order and to investigate all types of crime. These LEAs routinely conduct asset tracing in order to identify property for seizure and confiscation. In line with the type of investigations, most asset-tracing and recovery are conducted based on the CCP and the CC rather than preventive measures under the AMC, although this occurs where appropriate. As with IO.7, the State Police and the Carabinieri do not have access to all the sophisticated IT-tools used by the GdF (for example the Molecola), but in cases where this is needed, the PP is able to involve the GdF in the investigation for this purpose. As this is only done after a criminal report has been filed, the risk of asset dissipation increases. Box 8.1. Complex financial investigations resulting in confiscation Confiscation from a fiduciary company running an ML scheme (GdF) The GdF was tasked by the PP to conduct investigations into a Swiss fiduciary company operating in Milan. Investigations included cross-border surveillance in co-operation with Swiss authorities. Switzerland (where the fiduciary company was based) and France (home to the company that received the bribe) conducted parallel investigations in coordination with the Italian proceedings. Investigation revealed the role of the fiduciary company in a complex illicit mechanism to transfer capital (over EUR 20 million) abroad to evade tax and to create a slush fund to be used for subsequent bribery payments. In 2021, two suspects were arrested for setting up and managing the ML scheme. Approximately EUR 20 million was seized in Italy. In relation to a Milan-based company involved in the ML, administrative liability was established under LD 231/2001 due to organisational shortcomings and judicial administration measures were applied under the AMC for 8 months, during which a thorough restructuring of the company’s governance resulted in a significant strengthening of internal controls and compliance systems. Based on a plea agreement, the company was fined EUR 250 000, and EUR 8.8 million was confiscated. The court also confiscated EUR 3.3 million from the off-shore bank accounts of the two suspects through a plea bargain. The suspects pleaded guilty to creating and managing a laundering scheme and each was sentenced to three years and four months of imprisonment for ML (article 648-bis CC). In total, EUR 12.1 million were definitively confiscated in relation to this case. Catania criminal security operation (DIA) Two entrepreneurs linked to a prominent boss from Cosa Nostra, acting as their long hand, managed over several years, to create a genuine business network of cleaning service companies, waste treatment and disposal firms, real estate enterprises, and the management of a seaside resort located along the Catania coastline. DIA investigators analysed 40 years of their economic and entrepreneurial history (from construction worker to a businessman connected to the mafia boss to become a wealthy entrepreneur with links to politics finance and business networks. DIA reconstructed the entrepreneur’s assets and financial flows through financial investigations and STR analysis. The complex investigation revealed a standard of living and investments supported by massive financial resources that could not be justified by the legitimate personal or corporate income. One modus operandi of the entrepreneur was to avoid detection was through repeated loss-making and insurance redemptions. The DIA initiated an asset seizure process in 2021. In 2024, across several cities, DIA executed the confiscation of eight real estate properties, 14 companies and several financial assets with a total value of EUR 100 million." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="439. The DIA’s investigations into the standard of living, the financial resources and the assets of the natural and legal persons linked to organised crime as well as investigations into their economic activities to identify the sources of income, support both the tracing of criminal property for seizure and confiscation, including property of corresponding value where the criminal property has been dissipated. Following its internal policies as reflected in its Circular 335160 (issued in November 2013 and updated in February 2022), the GdF conducts parallel financial investigations as soon as an investigation is initiated and even before a criminal case is registered. They do this using sophisticated databases and IT tools that are able to draw linkages across different open and confidential databases (see IO.7), to develop evidence and identify criminal property and property of corresponding value for seizure and confiscation. Potential assets are thus identified at an early stage to minimise dissipation once criminals realise that they or their assets are being investigated. Where there are cross-border links, the GdF also utilises international cooperation tools and networks to identify property abroad for the purpose of confiscation (see IO.2). Both the DIA and the GdF receive directly and routinely STRs and operational analysis from UIF, and this information is also instrumental to the asset-tracing and identification before the crime is registered (see case studies below as well as in IO.6). Table 8.1. Value of asset seizure/confiscations resulting from STR information ( in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 GdF investigations seizures NA 615 940 103 2 827 454 758 423 843 192 1 445 990168 251 357 808 GdF investigations confiscations NA 27 391 913 6 391 409 51 846 476 94 398 922 1 446 321 DIA investigations seizures 71 309 233 149 466 083 44 930 963 65 225 108 72 937 268 6 574 049 DIA investigations confiscations 50 045 842 99 038 363 171 868 011 84 149 885 122 154 317 12 290 000 440. The State Police and the Carabinieri also carry out financial investigations as directed by the PP to support their investigations in line with their more general mandate to maintain public order and to investigate all types of crime. These LEAs routinely conduct asset tracing in order to identify property for seizure and confiscation. In line with the type of investigations, most asset-tracing and recovery are conducted based on the CCP and the CC rather than preventive measures under the AMC, although this occurs where appropriate. As with IO.7, the State Police and the Carabinieri do not have access to all the sophisticated IT-tools used by the GdF (for example the Molecola), but in cases where this is needed, the PP is able to involve the GdF in the investigation for this purpose. As this is only done after a criminal report has been filed, the risk of asset dissipation increases. Box 8.1. Complex financial investigations resulting in confiscation Confiscation from a fiduciary company running an ML scheme (GdF) The GdF was tasked by the PP to conduct investigations into a Swiss fiduciary company operating in Milan. Investigations included cross-border surveillance in co-operation with Swiss authorities. Switzerland (where the fiduciary company was based) and France (home to the company that received the bribe) conducted parallel investigations in coordination with the Italian proceedings. Investigation revealed the role of the fiduciary company in a complex illicit mechanism to transfer capital (over EUR 20 million) abroad to evade tax and to create a slush fund to be used for subsequent bribery payments. In 2021, two suspects were arrested for setting up and managing the ML scheme. Approximately EUR 20 million was seized in Italy. In relation to a Milan-based company involved in the ML, administrative liability was established under LD 231/2001 due to organisational shortcomings and judicial administration measures were applied under the AMC for 8 months, during which a thorough restructuring of the company’s governance resulted in a significant strengthening of internal controls and compliance systems. Based on a plea agreement, the company was fined EUR 250 000, and EUR 8.8 million was confiscated. The court also confiscated EUR 3.3 million from the off-shore bank accounts of the two suspects through a plea bargain. The suspects pleaded guilty to creating and managing a laundering scheme and each was sentenced to three years and four months of imprisonment for ML (article 648-bis CC). In total, EUR 12.1 million were definitively confiscated in relation to this case. Catania criminal security operation (DIA) Two entrepreneurs linked to a prominent boss from Cosa Nostra, acting as their long hand, managed over several years, to create a genuine business network of cleaning service companies, waste treatment and disposal firms, real estate enterprises, and the management of a seaside resort located along the Catania coastline. DIA investigators analysed 40 years of their economic and entrepreneurial history (from construction worker to a businessman connected to the mafia boss to become a wealthy entrepreneur with links to politics finance and business networks. DIA reconstructed the entrepreneur’s assets and financial flows through financial investigations and STR analysis. The complex investigation revealed a standard of living and investments supported by massive financial resources that could not be justified by the legitimate personal or corporate income. One modus operandi of the entrepreneur was to avoid detection was through repeated loss-making and insurance redemptions. The DIA initiated an asset seizure process in 2021. In 2024, across several cities, DIA executed the confiscation of eight real estate properties, 14 companies and several financial assets with a total value of EUR 100 million." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="476. The PPs are well trained and experienced in terrorism and TF cases and also lead all TF investigations. Prosecutors face some difficulties in prosecuting and obtaining convictions for different types of TF. An average of 15% of TF investigations launched annually proceed for prosecution. This is largely due to the complex nature of the TF activity Italy focuses on and the need to confirm suspicious TF activity reported in STRs that triggered the TF investigation, to prove that the suspect had knowledge they were engaged in TF, to confirm the final destination of the TF, and other such evidential requirements. For example, in one TF investigation that was launched based on financial intelligence, it took six months for the LEAs to obtain admissible evidence of the activity reported in STRs, but the prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant was ultimately denied by the judge due to lack of evidence. The prosecutors choose not to proceed with the majority of TF cases originally identified due to these challenges, instead prioritising a handful of TF cases and pursuing and obtaining evidence to prosecute these. 477. In particular, complex financial investigations as noted in the NRA of organised criminal activity resulted in links to TF activity involving the use of money remittances, rechargeable payment cards, virtual assets and through illegal migrant smuggling. While criminal measures and action against assets were taken against the offenders in these cases, they were not prosecuted for TF offences Table 9.1.TF cases - Investigations, Prosecutions and Convictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) TF Judicial investigations 101 99 109 94 85 47 TF Court prosecutions 18 11 13 13 12 13 TF Final convictions 11 7 5 5 17 2 478. No data was provided regarding the different types of TF activity that were investigated and prosecuted as Italy does not collect data on this. Based on cases presented, Italy’s focus on more complex TF activity and prioritisation of resources to pursue evidence for these has resulted in few cases being prosecuted related to simple TF activity, including small transfers and self-financing. 479. There has been no prosecution against legal persons for TF activity. However, case studies indicate that Italy has been able to pursue organised groups involved in terrorism and TF activity in the region that may be abusing legal persons. In view of this, it is not clear why Italy has not pursued any prosecution against legal persons for TF activity. 480. Of the TF cases that are brought to court, Italy achieves a high percentage of convictions, with approximately 60% resulting in convictions over 2020-2024. This impressive conviction rate, particularly given the complexity of TF cases, reflects both the competence of Italian prosecutors and their strategic approach to selecting which cases to pursue (i.e. they pursue TF cases in court where they believe the Judge will ultimately decide to convict.). Box 9.3. Court of Appeal of Brescia (Judgment No. 2990/2020) The investigation successfully employed sophisticated, multi-layered investigative approaches to TF which included digital surveillance (social media), coordination between multiple countries' law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities (Italian prosecutors in Brescia and Cagliari, Swedish authorities, and monitoring of third-country based operations), tracking informal money transfer systems and identifying suspicious cash movements using financial intelligence, searches yielding electronic devices, cash, and incriminating images, corroborative witness testimony and forensic analysis of f digital devices to uncover financial records and extremist materials. Investigations revealed a network, structured around two branches, each led by Syrian patriarchs who acted as guarantors for financial transactions: D.A. and B.S and used a hawala system to transfer money across borders without using any formal currency exchange instruments. The network had strategically positioned offices in a third country near the Syrian border and combat zones. Funds were being channelled to support the Al Nusra Front (later known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) and factions of the Free Syrian Army operating in Idlib province and along the Lebanese border. The defendant C.H. played a key role in these operations, working closely with his brother C.S. and the network leader D.A. Italian authorities with the co-operation of Swedish authorities conducted extensive telephone interceptions which revealed the operational details of the Hawala network, showed reliance on trustees in Sweden, acting as collection and delivery points as well as CH’s leadership position in the network. D.A. was stopped at the airport in Milan and was found with EUR 9 050 in cash despite being dependent on Swedish social security. Swedish authorities conducted searches of D.A. and his family members and found evidence in seized electronic devices linking D.A. to terrorist organisations, and photographs on C.H.'s device showing a table covered with stacks of EUR 500 banknotes. Investigators were also able to link suspects being investigated in Sardinia for organizing illegal migrant transport, to the network and obtained details on how the network operated. One particularly significant transaction involved the transfer of EUR 200 000 from Italy to a third country on 26 August 2016, in which C.H. directly participated. C.H. was convicted under Article 270-quinquies.1 of the Criminal Code (financing of acts of terrorism) and the final judgement in 2021 confirmed the sentence of two years and two months' imprisonment, plus expulsion from Italian territory upon completion of the sentence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="476. The PPs are well trained and experienced in terrorism and TF cases and also lead all TF investigations. Prosecutors face some difficulties in prosecuting and obtaining convictions for different types of TF. An average of 15% of TF investigations launched annually proceed for prosecution. This is largely due to the complex nature of the TF activity Italy focuses on and the need to confirm suspicious TF activity reported in STRs that triggered the TF investigation, to prove that the suspect had knowledge they were engaged in TF, to confirm the final destination of the TF, and other such evidential requirements. For example, in one TF investigation that was launched based on financial intelligence, it took six months for the LEAs to obtain admissible evidence of the activity reported in STRs, but the prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant was ultimately denied by the judge due to lack of evidence. The prosecutors choose not to proceed with the majority of TF cases originally identified due to these challenges, instead prioritising a handful of TF cases and pursuing and obtaining evidence to prosecute these. 477. In particular, complex financial investigations as noted in the NRA of organised criminal activity resulted in links to TF activity involving the use of money remittances, rechargeable payment cards, virtual assets and through illegal migrant smuggling. While criminal measures and action against assets were taken against the offenders in these cases, they were not prosecuted for TF offences Table 9.1.TF cases - Investigations, Prosecutions and Convictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until May) TF Judicial investigations 101 99 109 94 85 47 TF Court prosecutions 18 11 13 13 12 13 TF Final convictions 11 7 5 5 17 2 478. No data was provided regarding the different types of TF activity that were investigated and prosecuted as Italy does not collect data on this. Based on cases presented, Italy’s focus on more complex TF activity and prioritisation of resources to pursue evidence for these has resulted in few cases being prosecuted related to simple TF activity, including small transfers and self-financing. 479. There has been no prosecution against legal persons for TF activity. However, case studies indicate that Italy has been able to pursue organised groups involved in terrorism and TF activity in the region that may be abusing legal persons. In view of this, it is not clear why Italy has not pursued any prosecution against legal persons for TF activity. 480. Of the TF cases that are brought to court, Italy achieves a high percentage of convictions, with approximately 60% resulting in convictions over 2020-2024. This impressive conviction rate, particularly given the complexity of TF cases, reflects both the competence of Italian prosecutors and their strategic approach to selecting which cases to pursue (i.e. they pursue TF cases in court where they believe the Judge will ultimately decide to convict.). Box 9.3. Court of Appeal of Brescia (Judgment No. 2990/2020) The investigation successfully employed sophisticated, multi-layered investigative approaches to TF which included digital surveillance (social media), coordination between multiple countries' law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities (Italian prosecutors in Brescia and Cagliari, Swedish authorities, and monitoring of third-country based operations), tracking informal money transfer systems and identifying suspicious cash movements using financial intelligence, searches yielding electronic devices, cash, and incriminating images, corroborative witness testimony and forensic analysis of f digital devices to uncover financial records and extremist materials. Investigations revealed a network, structured around two branches, each led by Syrian patriarchs who acted as guarantors for financial transactions: D.A. and B.S and used a hawala system to transfer money across borders without using any formal currency exchange instruments. The network had strategically positioned offices in a third country near the Syrian border and combat zones. Funds were being channelled to support the Al Nusra Front (later known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) and factions of the Free Syrian Army operating in Idlib province and along the Lebanese border. The defendant C.H. played a key role in these operations, working closely with his brother C.S. and the network leader D.A. Italian authorities with the co-operation of Swedish authorities conducted extensive telephone interceptions which revealed the operational details of the Hawala network, showed reliance on trustees in Sweden, acting as collection and delivery points as well as CH’s leadership position in the network. D.A. was stopped at the airport in Milan and was found with EUR 9 050 in cash despite being dependent on Swedish social security. Swedish authorities conducted searches of D.A. and his family members and found evidence in seized electronic devices linking D.A. to terrorist organisations, and photographs on C.H.'s device showing a table covered with stacks of EUR 500 banknotes. Investigators were also able to link suspects being investigated in Sardinia for organizing illegal migrant transport, to the network and obtained details on how the network operated. One particularly significant transaction involved the transfer of EUR 200 000 from Italy to a third country on 26 August 2016, in which C.H. directly participated. C.H. was convicted under Article 270-quinquies.1 of the Criminal Code (financing of acts of terrorism) and the final judgement in 2021 confirmed the sentence of two years and two months' imprisonment, plus expulsion from Italian territory upon completion of the sentence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="493. Italy employs comprehensive mechanisms to identify the assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations, and terrorist financiers, and to prevent such persons from raising, moving and using their assets including by operating or executing financial transactions. Both the UIF and the GdF have extensive powers with regards to identifying potential TF assets and preventing TF in this context. 494. Upon any new listing by the UN, the UIF runs various searches in the databases at its disposal to identify any funds held in Italy by designated subjects. This includes STR databases as well as bank account registers (including beneficial ownership information from accounts). (See Immediate Outcome 6). The UIF shares any pertinent information with the GdF for further checks. The UIF also promptly informs intermediaries of new UN listings. FIs must identify and report any potential suspicious transactions, which would include any with a suspected link to the new UN listings. FIs and DNFBPs generally make use of automated IT systems screening their customers, which would assist to identify any potential funds or assets and support the issuing of an MEF decree. The UIF also receives any communications regarding the freezing measures applied by all FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs as well as information regarding transaction data, including attempted transactions, data relating to business relationships and any other available information relating to designated persons or entities. 495. In parallel, the GdF searches its sources to quickly identify any assets or economic resources directly and indirectly traceable to designated persons. To do this, the GdF checks its internally developed databases, the Dorsale Informatica, to access 138 confidential and open-sourced databases which include real estate ownership information, bank account information, business registers, vehicle registers etc. supported by the Molecola which also contains law enforcement databases, tax administration database, land register, boat registries, company register etc. The system is able to draw analyses and linkages to the different information in the databases including investigative information (e.g. transcripts of wiretaps, account statement details etc.) in order to quickly identify assets and economic resources. The GdF also accesses AML/CFT information held by the DNFBPs and certain FIs (as supervisory authority for these, the GdF can request data and concerning CDD information), as well as of information resulting from international cooperation. The GdF then reports these results to the FSC, which can propose to the MEF to adopt a freezing order. 496. Since 2010, no new funds have been identified or reported as frozen by FIs and DNFBPs with regards to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. Nor has there been any instance where relevant assets or economic resources of a designated individual or entity have been found (although the effectiveness of these measures has been shown in relation to other TFS regimes). Funds remain frozen relating measures taken before then – to one current account and two savings accounts – totalling EUR 5 252. During the evaluation period, the FSC has not received requests for exemptions or unfreezing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="493. Italy employs comprehensive mechanisms to identify the assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations, and terrorist financiers, and to prevent such persons from raising, moving and using their assets including by operating or executing financial transactions. Both the UIF and the GdF have extensive powers with regards to identifying potential TF assets and preventing TF in this context. 494. Upon any new listing by the UN, the UIF runs various searches in the databases at its disposal to identify any funds held in Italy by designated subjects. This includes STR databases as well as bank account registers (including beneficial ownership information from accounts). (See Immediate Outcome 6). The UIF shares any pertinent information with the GdF for further checks. The UIF also promptly informs intermediaries of new UN listings. FIs must identify and report any potential suspicious transactions, which would include any with a suspected link to the new UN listings. FIs and DNFBPs generally make use of automated IT systems screening their customers, which would assist to identify any potential funds or assets and support the issuing of an MEF decree. The UIF also receives any communications regarding the freezing measures applied by all FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs as well as information regarding transaction data, including attempted transactions, data relating to business relationships and any other available information relating to designated persons or entities. 495. In parallel, the GdF searches its sources to quickly identify any assets or economic resources directly and indirectly traceable to designated persons. To do this, the GdF checks its internally developed databases, the Dorsale Informatica, to access 138 confidential and open-sourced databases which include real estate ownership information, bank account information, business registers, vehicle registers etc. supported by the Molecola which also contains law enforcement databases, tax administration database, land register, boat registries, company register etc. The system is able to draw analyses and linkages to the different information in the databases including investigative information (e.g. transcripts of wiretaps, account statement details etc.) in order to quickly identify assets and economic resources. The GdF also accesses AML/CFT information held by the DNFBPs and certain FIs (as supervisory authority for these, the GdF can request data and concerning CDD information), as well as of information resulting from international cooperation. The GdF then reports these results to the FSC, which can propose to the MEF to adopt a freezing order. 496. Since 2010, no new funds have been identified or reported as frozen by FIs and DNFBPs with regards to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. Nor has there been any instance where relevant assets or economic resources of a designated individual or entity have been found (although the effectiveness of these measures has been shown in relation to other TFS regimes). Funds remain frozen relating measures taken before then – to one current account and two savings accounts – totalling EUR 5 252. During the evaluation period, the FSC has not received requests for exemptions or unfreezing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="518. Italy has effectively identified and assessed its PF risk and understands and mitigates this risk. Italy has established its first thorough risk analysis through its CPF NRA, involving relevant public and private sector partners. Italy assesses the threat of direct proliferation financing as limited, since trade flows to DPRK are very low and closely monitored due to the sanctions imposed. Overall, the risk of financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is assessed as medium – low. 519. Italy has a clear understanding of its general and country-specific risks of PF-TFS violations. The preventive, investigative and repressive system as a whole is deemed responsive and sufficiently mitigates PF risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="518. Italy has effectively identified and assessed its PF risk and understands and mitigates this risk. Italy has established its first thorough risk analysis through its CPF NRA, involving relevant public and private sector partners. Italy assesses the threat of direct proliferation financing as limited, since trade flows to DPRK are very low and closely monitored due to the sanctions imposed. Overall, the risk of financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is assessed as medium – low. 519. Italy has a clear understanding of its general and country-specific risks of PF-TFS violations. The preventive, investigative and repressive system as a whole is deemed responsive and sufficiently mitigates PF risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions and simplified measures 105. Italy does not allow any general exemptions from AML/CFT requirements for financial activities covered by the FATF standards, however, the requirement to do CDD can be dispensed in two limited situations: · payment of taxes or penalties to public administrations or bill-payment services to pay for utilities and other household bills. · cash withdrawals of up to EUR 250, which were excluded from the CDD requirement in 2023, based on an analysis of business models and the low risks associated with such withdrawals. 106. FIs and DNFBPs in Italy can apply simplified due diligence measures. The AML law provides for some situations where simplified due diligence (SDD) measures may apply and incorporates a list of low-risk situations transposed from the EU AML directive. These situations, however, do not correspond to Italy’s national context and the lower risks identified in Italy’s NRA. For instance, the legislative list includes reference to certain gambling activities as low risk, though Italy has identified the national gaming sector as posing higher risks in the Italian context. Other low-risk factors are detailed in BoI and CONSOB regulations. The FIs and VASPs met with during the on-site visit do not use this legislative list in an automatic manner to identify certain customers and situations as low risk, but rather take a comprehensive approach to assessing lower risks based on the customers’ profile and commercial activity. FIs generally classify Italian individuals engaged in consistent retail banking activities as low risk. 107. However, most FIs and VASPs generally prefer to not apply SDD for the customers identified as low risk, and only around three percent of customers are subject to SDD. The BoI has issued some guidance on de-risking in line with EU guidelines and has consulted with specific obliged entities on the proper application of SDD. Italian authorities’ outreach to the DNFBP sectors has been focused mainly on the proper application of EDD and CDD, rather than on the application of SDD. However, Italy has indicated that the application of SDD is also quite low for these sectors. 1.3.2. Enhanced measures 108. Overall, the results of Italy’s assessments of ML/TF risks informs and supports the application of enhanced measures for higher-risk scenarios. 109. FIs and DNFBPs in Italy generally apply enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers in line with their evolving risk profiles. They often identify high-risk customers in Italy using indicators such as PEP involvement, connections with countries on international lists, association with perceived high-risk activities such as gaming or money transfers, linkages to previous STR reporting or law enforcement requests, involvement of a trust in the customer’s company ownership structure, and other factors. The AML law and the regulations issues by the BoI, IVASS and Consob provide for certain situations where EDD must be considered. Italian entities usually subject high-risk customers to more regular review (e.g., once a year versus once every three or five years for a lower risk customer). 110. Given the higher risks associated with agents and distributors of Payment Service Providers and Electronic Money Institutions, Italy has required these FIs to apply CDD measures for all occasional transactions and not only in cases where a business relationship is established." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions and simplified measures 105. Italy does not allow any general exemptions from AML/CFT requirements for financial activities covered by the FATF standards, however, the requirement to do CDD can be dispensed in two limited situations: · payment of taxes or penalties to public administrations or bill-payment services to pay for utilities and other household bills. · cash withdrawals of up to EUR 250, which were excluded from the CDD requirement in 2023, based on an analysis of business models and the low risks associated with such withdrawals. 106. FIs and DNFBPs in Italy can apply simplified due diligence measures. The AML law provides for some situations where simplified due diligence (SDD) measures may apply and incorporates a list of low-risk situations transposed from the EU AML directive. These situations, however, do not correspond to Italy’s national context and the lower risks identified in Italy’s NRA. For instance, the legislative list includes reference to certain gambling activities as low risk, though Italy has identified the national gaming sector as posing higher risks in the Italian context. Other low-risk factors are detailed in BoI and CONSOB regulations. The FIs and VASPs met with during the on-site visit do not use this legislative list in an automatic manner to identify certain customers and situations as low risk, but rather take a comprehensive approach to assessing lower risks based on the customers’ profile and commercial activity. FIs generally classify Italian individuals engaged in consistent retail banking activities as low risk. 107. However, most FIs and VASPs generally prefer to not apply SDD for the customers identified as low risk, and only around three percent of customers are subject to SDD. The BoI has issued some guidance on de-risking in line with EU guidelines and has consulted with specific obliged entities on the proper application of SDD. Italian authorities’ outreach to the DNFBP sectors has been focused mainly on the proper application of EDD and CDD, rather than on the application of SDD. However, Italy has indicated that the application of SDD is also quite low for these sectors. 1.3.2. Enhanced measures 108. Overall, the results of Italy’s assessments of ML/TF risks informs and supports the application of enhanced measures for higher-risk scenarios. 109. FIs and DNFBPs in Italy generally apply enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers in line with their evolving risk profiles. They often identify high-risk customers in Italy using indicators such as PEP involvement, connections with countries on international lists, association with perceived high-risk activities such as gaming or money transfers, linkages to previous STR reporting or law enforcement requests, involvement of a trust in the customer’s company ownership structure, and other factors. The AML law and the regulations issues by the BoI, IVASS and Consob provide for certain situations where EDD must be considered. Italian entities usually subject high-risk customers to more regular review (e.g., once a year versus once every three or five years for a lower risk customer). 110. Given the higher risks associated with agents and distributors of Payment Service Providers and Electronic Money Institutions, Italy has required these FIs to apply CDD measures for all occasional transactions and not only in cases where a business relationship is established." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1. FIU 152. UIF actively engages its counterparts abroad to seek international cooperation to obtain financial intelligence in line with Italy’s risks and to support asset recovery. UIF sends outgoing requests to FIUs, both within Europe and outside Europe, during the analysis of STRs received and for cooperation with domestic judicial authorities in the framework of criminal investigations to track cross-border flows. It is active in both EGMONT and European networks through which is has access to FIU.NET and the Ma3tch functionality to anonymously cross-match databases (IO.6). Table 2.5. UIF requests sent to foreign FIUs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Requests submitted 1 050 834 790 693 723 345 Of which: For UIF’s internal analysis 475 470 456 427 422 168 For domestic cooperation with judicial authorities 575 364 334 266 301 177 153. Requests are made particularly in areas such as virtual assets, public fund fraud, organised crime and TF and on a range of information such as on STRs, bank account and assets held abroad linked to suspicious activities carried out by physical and legal persons under analysis. Financial information is often requested on specific transactions originated or sent abroad, as well as criminal and business information on persons, companies, legal arrangements and their respective beneficial owners, as well as for tax, real estate and BO information of foreign entities and arrangements. On behalf of domestic judicial investigations, UIF has also made multiple requests for international cooperation for tax fraud, and corruption. 154. Particularly in the European context, UIF has over the evaluation period submitted 34 requests for freezing of funds, of which twelve requests were successfully executed and as a result EUR 5.9 million had been frozen. Eight requests involved non-EU jurisdictions, of which one resulted in EUR 16 000 being frozen. The most common reasons for requests not being executed was that the asset had already been frozen by local judicial authorities, the sums were not available any more or that the FIU concerned did not have the legal powers to order a funds freeze. Box 2.8. Successful request to freeze a bank account In 2024, UIF cooperated with the domestic LEAs and the PPs Office on a case of ‘CEO fraud’ against an Italian company whereby there was fraudulent representation through voice messages, created with the help of artificial intelligence, to induce a bank transfer for a fraudulent purchase. More than EUR 790 000 were transferred from the Italian bank account held by the company in favour of a Southern European bank account. Based on the PP’s request, a request was made to immediately freeze the funds possibly remaining on the account. Also, the Southern European FIU contacted the recipient bank and sent a freezing order of the account. The bank executed the freezing order of the account that contained about EUR 800 000. 155. UIF also conducts joint analyses with other EU FIUs (as provided under the AML Law and the AML EU Directive). These are done to understand and counter more effectively cases with a predominant cross-border dimension. Over the evaluation period (2020 to 2025), the UIF conducted two joint analyses with EU counterparts relating to offences such as fraud and tax offences and the analysis reports were disseminated to competent domestic LEAs of Italy and other EU countries. Box 2.9. Joint Analysis on Underground Banking (2024) UIF launched a Joint Analysis exercise together with the Spanish and Dutch FIUs where it was discovered that an international financial group was acting as a channel for layering illicit proceeds throughout Europe destined for scheme had been initially detected by UIF’s STR analysis on EUR 33 million transferred to the payment account held in Spain by a Dutch payment agent. The STRs concerned companies held by Chinese citizens involved in fiscal frauds or beneficiaries of public funds. Based on triangulation of the financial flows, the relevant amounts transacted, the links with ongoing investigations carried out by LEAs and the involvement of several financial institutions from different countries, joint analysis was proposed with the Spanish and Dutch FIUs as they had also been working together to collect information from their reporting entities, other FIUs, national customs authorities and supervisory authorities. The Joint Analysis led to the identification of a more complex scheme where the Dutch payment agent has resulted to cover a pivotal role supported by its belonging to an international financial group (with branches in the Netherlands, Italy, UK, USA and countries in Africa) which managed a complex cross-border ML scheme for over 95 million euros from 2021 to 2024. An investigation was launched in 2024 which is ongoing. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 156. There are several avenues through which LEAs in Italy, especially GdF, DIA and the International Police Cooperation Service (SCIP), actively engage with their counterparts abroad to seek international cooperation to obtain evidence for active cases as well as to support asset recovery. 157. The SCIP coordinates directly with domestic and foreign LEAs for the search of fugitive criminals for subsequent extradition action. SCIP also participates in I-CAN which is an Interpol cooperation project that has been instrumental in the arrest of over 60 ‘Ndrangheta members in different countries. The SCIP also participates in a Europol campaign aimed at facilitating the extradition of high-profile fugitives. Over the evaluation period, SCIP’s efforts have been instrumental in the arrest abroad of more than 400 fugitives from Italy, of which 17 were suspected to be involved in crimes related to ML. 158. The SCIP also operates a joint national police force unit, which includes the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) to manage international police cooperation channels such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL and the CARIN/ARIN. It has established a wide network of liaison officers located in 74 Italian embassies abroad to facilitate bilateral police cooperation. As the contact point for CARIN/ARIN, through ARO, Italy sent on average 1 000 requests a year relating to asset-tracing and recovery over the evaluation period. Both outgoing requests as well as responding to incoming requests (below), contributed to substantial amounts in freezing, seizing and confiscation of assets largely within the EU framework. Table 2.6. Asset Recovery facilitated by CARIN/ARIN Networks (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until June) Freezing/ Seizures 28 252 434 73 727 516 41 084 650 24 532 792 1 466 772 29 174 843 Confiscations 6 734 500 10 869 845 11 921 919 3 100 000 407 694 957 32 280 378 159. The GdF in its own capacity, has a network of 30 attachés and two liaison officers deployed in Italian diplomatic representations in a range of strategically important countries and regions abroad. Through financial intelligence and investigations as well as engagements with its networks, GdF also identifies jurisdictions where funds or criminals have moved to, which is followed by formal requests to pursue the assets or the criminals. The role of the Italian attachés to UAE was useful in facilitating in 2024, the cooperation between the central authorities for the arrest and extradition of a fugitive from Italy who had committed fraud causing losses amounting to EUR 300 million. In the same year, GdF liaison attachés also supported the coordinated action amongst 20 (EU and non-EU) countries in an investigation related to VAT fraud which resulted in two arrests in the US and UAE, and seizures of financial and crypto assets amounting to EUR 40 million. 160. The importance of pursuing evidence through international cooperation to GdF, is also reflected by the fact that it is guided by an in-house Operations Manual on International Cooperation which provides a detailed overview of the information exchange opportunities offered as well as a practical guide on how to use them, as well as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the activation of the international police cooperation network. This ensures that the GdF regularly and systematically seeks international cooperation for appropriate cases including asset recovery. For TF, over the evaluation period, GdF has sought cooperation on 132 occasions. 161. In January 2025, GdF, together with Brazil, Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong have also been pioneers of the INTERPOL Silver Notice, which is a new tool to facilitate the tracing of illicit proceeds for seizure and confiscation purposes. GdF successfully used this tool to search for assets linked to a multi-million Euro ML case involving over four jurisdictions. At the EU level, GdF is also involved in several EUROPOL strategical projects, such as European Multidisciplinary Platform, and it is linked to EUROPOL Analysis Projects - Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which tracks financial flows of terrorist networks and allows GdF to have access to financial data for this purpose. (see case study in IO.9) GdF is a member of the FIN–NET Financial Crime Information Network and it also exchanges information with foreign counterparts to support its role in developing the ‘pre-investigative’ analysis activities of STRs. The GDF is member of the Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership project (EFIPPP), to promote the exchange with private sector of AML/CFT good practices. Box 2.10. International Cooperation involving GdF Global ML connected to drug trafficking (2023) The investigation involved a global network of companies that offered professional services to launder money from illegal drug trafficking. The criminals offered a service of trade-based money laundering known as the “Black Market Pesos Exchange” where the drug producers would provide drugs to Italian buyers as a form of credit and profits generated would be introduced into companies and used for ordering foreign goods, that would be shipped to the US and further transported to Colombia, where they were sold and the drug cartels would receive the cash. Based on international law enforcement cooperation between GdF and the Spanish Policía Nacional, supported by EUROPOL and EUROJUST, the criminal network’s modus operandi and a network of electronics companies located around the globe was uncovered. In Italy alone, EUR 18.5 million was traced back as money laundered for organised crime groups. GDF also arrested 33 suspects in a coordinated action with Spain. ML using Electronic Money Institution (2022) During a GdF tax crime investigation, a suspect appeared to have tried to fragment a huge number of illicit assets through mechanisms provided by Fin-Tech institutions in Lithuania that offered ML services to criminals across the EU by carrying out fictitious financial transactions through a web of shell companies operated by an Italian-based OCG. Investigations into the OCG were initiated in 2021 by GdF and the PPO of Naples and Lecce in Italy, involving their counterparts in Latvia and Lithuania. During the investigation, all the LEAs involved took part to a Joint Investigation Team under the coordination of EURJUST. Searches conducted led to seizures of data and documents and bank transactions were analysed. This led to the arrest of 18 persons and over EUR 11.5 million in assets and bank accounts were frozen. 162. At the EU level, DIA maintains operational information exchange with LEAs as well as best practices to combat mafia-type organised crime groups through the @ON Project” since 2018 which operates with the coordination of EUROPOL and SCIP and involves 44 countries (26 EU countries and 18 non-EU countries). The main objective of the project is to promote the operational exchange of information and the sharing of best practices in the fight against mafia-type criminal organizations. These exchanges have led to drug-trafficking information as well the arrest of fugitives linked to Italian mafia groups. Box 2.11. International Cooperation involving DIA Operation Nexus-Goliath (2024) This investigation was triggered by investigations of the German police, coordinated by EURPOL and involved coordination with the Kenyan investigating authorities. The investigation related to the head of a criminal organisation that had perpetrated a multimillion international VAT fraud. The investigation concluded with the arrest in Nairobi. Operation Tre-Croci (2024) This investigation was triggered by investigations of the German police, coordinated by EUROPOL and EUROJUST. The investigation led to the arrest of 36 individuals suspected of having imported – also through the corruption of staff operating in certain Italian ports – tons of cocaine from South America into Italy and the rest of Europe. 163. Italy has also participated in several JITs which facilitated cooperation on criminal investigations as well as asset recovery. Over the evaluation period, Italian authorities were involved in over 50 JITs with various countries in Europe, of which 37 were formed on the initiative of Italian authorities. Most JITs related to drug-trafficking, organised crime and economic crimes, which is in line with Italy’s ML risks. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 164. Financial supervisors in general seek and provide international cooperation with their foreign counterparts to a large extent, especially under the EU framework. The BoI, primarily through the 135 supervisory colleges it participates in, actively cooperates with other EU member state supervisors, particularly on FIs with cross-border links and activities. AML/CFT supervisory colleges are set for all intermediaries operating in at least three EU Member States. The BoI also has close cooperation with the ECB, who is the prudential supervisor of significant banking groups. 165. IVASS can exchange information with other insurance supervisors covering all issues related to the supervision of the insurance sector, including AML/CFT via an MMoU through the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). IVASS has also established an EU AML/CFT supervisory college. 166. DNFBP supervisors have not engaged in international cooperation in their role as supervisors. Most DNFBPs are domestically based and the need for international cooperation has not been relevant so far, according to the supervisory authorities. 167. Overall, the feedback from the FATF Global Network relating to supervisory cooperation was very positive. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 168. At the EU level, the Agenzia delle Entrate (Italian Revenue Agency) is involved in the exchanges of information that serves to enrich GdF’s databases and facilitating their detection of and investigations into tax fraud as well as related ML. Although there are no specific data regarding the Italian Revenue Agency was provided, ML relating to tax and serious offences relating to cross-border cash movement are generally investigated by GdF. 169. As part of its role to detect cross-border cash movement, ADM and GdF are also connected to various platforms for mutual assistance and for the cooperation among customs administrations, such as Naples II and Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) operated by European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as well as other EU platforms to exchange risk information with other customs officials. ADM also participates in joint operations to tackle ML/TF organized at EU level as well as in the World Customs Organization (WCO) AML/CTF Programme and Tentacle project which has resulted in large amounts of cash seized at borders and the uncovering of cash flow routes for ML." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1. FIU 152. UIF actively engages its counterparts abroad to seek international cooperation to obtain financial intelligence in line with Italy’s risks and to support asset recovery. UIF sends outgoing requests to FIUs, both within Europe and outside Europe, during the analysis of STRs received and for cooperation with domestic judicial authorities in the framework of criminal investigations to track cross-border flows. It is active in both EGMONT and European networks through which is has access to FIU.NET and the Ma3tch functionality to anonymously cross-match databases (IO.6). Table 2.5. UIF requests sent to foreign FIUs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Requests submitted 1 050 834 790 693 723 345 Of which: For UIF’s internal analysis 475 470 456 427 422 168 For domestic cooperation with judicial authorities 575 364 334 266 301 177 153. Requests are made particularly in areas such as virtual assets, public fund fraud, organised crime and TF and on a range of information such as on STRs, bank account and assets held abroad linked to suspicious activities carried out by physical and legal persons under analysis. Financial information is often requested on specific transactions originated or sent abroad, as well as criminal and business information on persons, companies, legal arrangements and their respective beneficial owners, as well as for tax, real estate and BO information of foreign entities and arrangements. On behalf of domestic judicial investigations, UIF has also made multiple requests for international cooperation for tax fraud, and corruption. 154. Particularly in the European context, UIF has over the evaluation period submitted 34 requests for freezing of funds, of which twelve requests were successfully executed and as a result EUR 5.9 million had been frozen. Eight requests involved non-EU jurisdictions, of which one resulted in EUR 16 000 being frozen. The most common reasons for requests not being executed was that the asset had already been frozen by local judicial authorities, the sums were not available any more or that the FIU concerned did not have the legal powers to order a funds freeze. Box 2.8. Successful request to freeze a bank account In 2024, UIF cooperated with the domestic LEAs and the PPs Office on a case of ‘CEO fraud’ against an Italian company whereby there was fraudulent representation through voice messages, created with the help of artificial intelligence, to induce a bank transfer for a fraudulent purchase. More than EUR 790 000 were transferred from the Italian bank account held by the company in favour of a Southern European bank account. Based on the PP’s request, a request was made to immediately freeze the funds possibly remaining on the account. Also, the Southern European FIU contacted the recipient bank and sent a freezing order of the account. The bank executed the freezing order of the account that contained about EUR 800 000. 155. UIF also conducts joint analyses with other EU FIUs (as provided under the AML Law and the AML EU Directive). These are done to understand and counter more effectively cases with a predominant cross-border dimension. Over the evaluation period (2020 to 2025), the UIF conducted two joint analyses with EU counterparts relating to offences such as fraud and tax offences and the analysis reports were disseminated to competent domestic LEAs of Italy and other EU countries. Box 2.9. Joint Analysis on Underground Banking (2024) UIF launched a Joint Analysis exercise together with the Spanish and Dutch FIUs where it was discovered that an international financial group was acting as a channel for layering illicit proceeds throughout Europe destined for scheme had been initially detected by UIF’s STR analysis on EUR 33 million transferred to the payment account held in Spain by a Dutch payment agent. The STRs concerned companies held by Chinese citizens involved in fiscal frauds or beneficiaries of public funds. Based on triangulation of the financial flows, the relevant amounts transacted, the links with ongoing investigations carried out by LEAs and the involvement of several financial institutions from different countries, joint analysis was proposed with the Spanish and Dutch FIUs as they had also been working together to collect information from their reporting entities, other FIUs, national customs authorities and supervisory authorities. The Joint Analysis led to the identification of a more complex scheme where the Dutch payment agent has resulted to cover a pivotal role supported by its belonging to an international financial group (with branches in the Netherlands, Italy, UK, USA and countries in Africa) which managed a complex cross-border ML scheme for over 95 million euros from 2021 to 2024. An investigation was launched in 2024 which is ongoing. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 156. There are several avenues through which LEAs in Italy, especially GdF, DIA and the International Police Cooperation Service (SCIP), actively engage with their counterparts abroad to seek international cooperation to obtain evidence for active cases as well as to support asset recovery. 157. The SCIP coordinates directly with domestic and foreign LEAs for the search of fugitive criminals for subsequent extradition action. SCIP also participates in I-CAN which is an Interpol cooperation project that has been instrumental in the arrest of over 60 ‘Ndrangheta members in different countries. The SCIP also participates in a Europol campaign aimed at facilitating the extradition of high-profile fugitives. Over the evaluation period, SCIP’s efforts have been instrumental in the arrest abroad of more than 400 fugitives from Italy, of which 17 were suspected to be involved in crimes related to ML. 158. The SCIP also operates a joint national police force unit, which includes the Asset Recovery Office (ARO) to manage international police cooperation channels such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL and the CARIN/ARIN. It has established a wide network of liaison officers located in 74 Italian embassies abroad to facilitate bilateral police cooperation. As the contact point for CARIN/ARIN, through ARO, Italy sent on average 1 000 requests a year relating to asset-tracing and recovery over the evaluation period. Both outgoing requests as well as responding to incoming requests (below), contributed to substantial amounts in freezing, seizing and confiscation of assets largely within the EU framework. Table 2.6. Asset Recovery facilitated by CARIN/ARIN Networks (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (until June) Freezing/ Seizures 28 252 434 73 727 516 41 084 650 24 532 792 1 466 772 29 174 843 Confiscations 6 734 500 10 869 845 11 921 919 3 100 000 407 694 957 32 280 378 159. The GdF in its own capacity, has a network of 30 attachés and two liaison officers deployed in Italian diplomatic representations in a range of strategically important countries and regions abroad. Through financial intelligence and investigations as well as engagements with its networks, GdF also identifies jurisdictions where funds or criminals have moved to, which is followed by formal requests to pursue the assets or the criminals. The role of the Italian attachés to UAE was useful in facilitating in 2024, the cooperation between the central authorities for the arrest and extradition of a fugitive from Italy who had committed fraud causing losses amounting to EUR 300 million. In the same year, GdF liaison attachés also supported the coordinated action amongst 20 (EU and non-EU) countries in an investigation related to VAT fraud which resulted in two arrests in the US and UAE, and seizures of financial and crypto assets amounting to EUR 40 million. 160. The importance of pursuing evidence through international cooperation to GdF, is also reflected by the fact that it is guided by an in-house Operations Manual on International Cooperation which provides a detailed overview of the information exchange opportunities offered as well as a practical guide on how to use them, as well as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the activation of the international police cooperation network. This ensures that the GdF regularly and systematically seeks international cooperation for appropriate cases including asset recovery. For TF, over the evaluation period, GdF has sought cooperation on 132 occasions. 161. In January 2025, GdF, together with Brazil, Singapore, Switzerland and Hong Kong have also been pioneers of the INTERPOL Silver Notice, which is a new tool to facilitate the tracing of illicit proceeds for seizure and confiscation purposes. GdF successfully used this tool to search for assets linked to a multi-million Euro ML case involving over four jurisdictions. At the EU level, GdF is also involved in several EUROPOL strategical projects, such as European Multidisciplinary Platform, and it is linked to EUROPOL Analysis Projects - Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which tracks financial flows of terrorist networks and allows GdF to have access to financial data for this purpose. (see case study in IO.9) GdF is a member of the FIN–NET Financial Crime Information Network and it also exchanges information with foreign counterparts to support its role in developing the ‘pre-investigative’ analysis activities of STRs. The GDF is member of the Europol Financial Intelligence Public Private Partnership project (EFIPPP), to promote the exchange with private sector of AML/CFT good practices. Box 2.10. International Cooperation involving GdF Global ML connected to drug trafficking (2023) The investigation involved a global network of companies that offered professional services to launder money from illegal drug trafficking. The criminals offered a service of trade-based money laundering known as the “Black Market Pesos Exchange” where the drug producers would provide drugs to Italian buyers as a form of credit and profits generated would be introduced into companies and used for ordering foreign goods, that would be shipped to the US and further transported to Colombia, where they were sold and the drug cartels would receive the cash. Based on international law enforcement cooperation between GdF and the Spanish Policía Nacional, supported by EUROPOL and EUROJUST, the criminal network’s modus operandi and a network of electronics companies located around the globe was uncovered. In Italy alone, EUR 18.5 million was traced back as money laundered for organised crime groups. GDF also arrested 33 suspects in a coordinated action with Spain. ML using Electronic Money Institution (2022) During a GdF tax crime investigation, a suspect appeared to have tried to fragment a huge number of illicit assets through mechanisms provided by Fin-Tech institutions in Lithuania that offered ML services to criminals across the EU by carrying out fictitious financial transactions through a web of shell companies operated by an Italian-based OCG. Investigations into the OCG were initiated in 2021 by GdF and the PPO of Naples and Lecce in Italy, involving their counterparts in Latvia and Lithuania. During the investigation, all the LEAs involved took part to a Joint Investigation Team under the coordination of EURJUST. Searches conducted led to seizures of data and documents and bank transactions were analysed. This led to the arrest of 18 persons and over EUR 11.5 million in assets and bank accounts were frozen. 162. At the EU level, DIA maintains operational information exchange with LEAs as well as best practices to combat mafia-type organised crime groups through the @ON Project” since 2018 which operates with the coordination of EUROPOL and SCIP and involves 44 countries (26 EU countries and 18 non-EU countries). The main objective of the project is to promote the operational exchange of information and the sharing of best practices in the fight against mafia-type criminal organizations. These exchanges have led to drug-trafficking information as well the arrest of fugitives linked to Italian mafia groups. Box 2.11. International Cooperation involving DIA Operation Nexus-Goliath (2024) This investigation was triggered by investigations of the German police, coordinated by EURPOL and involved coordination with the Kenyan investigating authorities. The investigation related to the head of a criminal organisation that had perpetrated a multimillion international VAT fraud. The investigation concluded with the arrest in Nairobi. Operation Tre-Croci (2024) This investigation was triggered by investigations of the German police, coordinated by EUROPOL and EUROJUST. The investigation led to the arrest of 36 individuals suspected of having imported – also through the corruption of staff operating in certain Italian ports – tons of cocaine from South America into Italy and the rest of Europe. 163. Italy has also participated in several JITs which facilitated cooperation on criminal investigations as well as asset recovery. Over the evaluation period, Italian authorities were involved in over 50 JITs with various countries in Europe, of which 37 were formed on the initiative of Italian authorities. Most JITs related to drug-trafficking, organised crime and economic crimes, which is in line with Italy’s ML risks. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 164. Financial supervisors in general seek and provide international cooperation with their foreign counterparts to a large extent, especially under the EU framework. The BoI, primarily through the 135 supervisory colleges it participates in, actively cooperates with other EU member state supervisors, particularly on FIs with cross-border links and activities. AML/CFT supervisory colleges are set for all intermediaries operating in at least three EU Member States. The BoI also has close cooperation with the ECB, who is the prudential supervisor of significant banking groups. 165. IVASS can exchange information with other insurance supervisors covering all issues related to the supervision of the insurance sector, including AML/CFT via an MMoU through the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). IVASS has also established an EU AML/CFT supervisory college. 166. DNFBP supervisors have not engaged in international cooperation in their role as supervisors. Most DNFBPs are domestically based and the need for international cooperation has not been relevant so far, according to the supervisory authorities. 167. Overall, the feedback from the FATF Global Network relating to supervisory cooperation was very positive. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 168. At the EU level, the Agenzia delle Entrate (Italian Revenue Agency) is involved in the exchanges of information that serves to enrich GdF’s databases and facilitating their detection of and investigations into tax fraud as well as related ML. Although there are no specific data regarding the Italian Revenue Agency was provided, ML relating to tax and serious offences relating to cross-border cash movement are generally investigated by GdF. 169. As part of its role to detect cross-border cash movement, ADM and GdF are also connected to various platforms for mutual assistance and for the cooperation among customs administrations, such as Naples II and Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) operated by European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as well as other EU platforms to exchange risk information with other customs officials. ADM also participates in joint operations to tackle ML/TF organized at EU level as well as in the World Customs Organization (WCO) AML/CTF Programme and Tentacle project which has resulted in large amounts of cash seized at borders and the uncovering of cash flow routes for ML." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="199. Most FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the level and nature of their ML/TF risk. Risk understanding in larger FIs is more sophisticated and generally well aligned with the main risks identified in the NRA. Understanding of risk in smaller FIs is less developed, but commensurate with their more limited risk exposure. 200. All FIs are required to conduct ML/TF institutional risk assessments in line with criteria and approaches set by BoI, an obligation which have been in place since 2019, even though several FIs did conduct institutional risk assessments prior to this. These risk assessments are periodically updated, and there is a requirement for them to be updated in case of material new risks or significant changes in existing operations or organizational framework of the institution. Paired with the requirement to send an annual AML/CFT report to the BoI (which applies to all FIs except life insurance companies and currency exchange offices), this lays a solid foundation for obtaining information on how FIs understand ML/TF risks. The institutional risk assessment is required to identify current and potential risk which the FI is exposed to (inherent risk), assess the vulnerabilities of the preventive measures in place and, as a consequence, determine the residual ML/TF risk in a risk matrix. 201. Overall, banks have an extensive knowledge of their ML/TF risk exposure, and the processes underpinning their institutional risk assessments are thorough, and this is also reflected in supervisory findings of the BoI. The BoI examines risk understanding of entities during on-site inspections and in annual meetings. Banks are responsive to the BoI’s recommendations and proactively implement these to improve institutional risk awareness. 202. Amongst other FIs, the asset management companies and investment companies often pay less attention to ML/TF risks, perceiving their business models as less exposed to such threats. Even though these entities conduct institutional risk assessments as required, these risk assessments do not contribute to a developed understanding of specific risks. However, larger entities demonstrate better understanding of risk, particularly those which are part of corporate groups. The risk understanding amongst PIs and EMIs is uneven. While larger institutions have a good understanding of their exposure to ML/TF risks, this is not seen in smaller and newer PIs/EMIs. 203. Non-bank credit operators produce simpler and less complex ML/TF risk self-assessments, which appear to be in line with the risks the sector is exposed to. Trust companies/fiduciary companies vary in their risk awareness, and those which belong to banking groups (17 of 33 under the BoI’s supervision) have stronger risk governance and control frameworks. The lower risk understanding in other parts of the sector is a concern, particularly due to the higher risk associated with the sector. Insurance companies have been found by IVASS to have an increasing awareness of ML/TF risks. 204. VASPs have been mandated to perform institutional risk assessments of ML/TF risks by the AML law, but they have not been subject to the more detailed requirements laid down by BoI (since the BoI was not the AML supervisor). However, the BoI has extended the obligation to transmit the AML report and the results of the institutional risk assessments of ML/TF risks on an annual basis to CASPs that will be authorised under the MiCA Regulation. The general supervisory understanding of VASPs (such as on STR quality and the supervisor’s experience during interactions in preparation for the application of MiCA) indicates that the understanding of risks is less developed than among FIs. However, the VASPs met on-site showed a developed understanding of the risks facing at the sectoral level as well as their specific exposure at an institutional level." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="199. Most FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the level and nature of their ML/TF risk. Risk understanding in larger FIs is more sophisticated and generally well aligned with the main risks identified in the NRA. Understanding of risk in smaller FIs is less developed, but commensurate with their more limited risk exposure. 200. All FIs are required to conduct ML/TF institutional risk assessments in line with criteria and approaches set by BoI, an obligation which have been in place since 2019, even though several FIs did conduct institutional risk assessments prior to this. These risk assessments are periodically updated, and there is a requirement for them to be updated in case of material new risks or significant changes in existing operations or organizational framework of the institution. Paired with the requirement to send an annual AML/CFT report to the BoI (which applies to all FIs except life insurance companies and currency exchange offices), this lays a solid foundation for obtaining information on how FIs understand ML/TF risks. The institutional risk assessment is required to identify current and potential risk which the FI is exposed to (inherent risk), assess the vulnerabilities of the preventive measures in place and, as a consequence, determine the residual ML/TF risk in a risk matrix. 201. Overall, banks have an extensive knowledge of their ML/TF risk exposure, and the processes underpinning their institutional risk assessments are thorough, and this is also reflected in supervisory findings of the BoI. The BoI examines risk understanding of entities during on-site inspections and in annual meetings. Banks are responsive to the BoI’s recommendations and proactively implement these to improve institutional risk awareness. 202. Amongst other FIs, the asset management companies and investment companies often pay less attention to ML/TF risks, perceiving their business models as less exposed to such threats. Even though these entities conduct institutional risk assessments as required, these risk assessments do not contribute to a developed understanding of specific risks. However, larger entities demonstrate better understanding of risk, particularly those which are part of corporate groups. The risk understanding amongst PIs and EMIs is uneven. While larger institutions have a good understanding of their exposure to ML/TF risks, this is not seen in smaller and newer PIs/EMIs. 203. Non-bank credit operators produce simpler and less complex ML/TF risk self-assessments, which appear to be in line with the risks the sector is exposed to. Trust companies/fiduciary companies vary in their risk awareness, and those which belong to banking groups (17 of 33 under the BoI’s supervision) have stronger risk governance and control frameworks. The lower risk understanding in other parts of the sector is a concern, particularly due to the higher risk associated with the sector. Insurance companies have been found by IVASS to have an increasing awareness of ML/TF risks. 204. VASPs have been mandated to perform institutional risk assessments of ML/TF risks by the AML law, but they have not been subject to the more detailed requirements laid down by BoI (since the BoI was not the AML supervisor). However, the BoI has extended the obligation to transmit the AML report and the results of the institutional risk assessments of ML/TF risks on an annual basis to CASPs that will be authorised under the MiCA Regulation. The general supervisory understanding of VASPs (such as on STR quality and the supervisor’s experience during interactions in preparation for the application of MiCA) indicates that the understanding of risks is less developed than among FIs. However, the VASPs met on-site showed a developed understanding of the risks facing at the sectoral level as well as their specific exposure at an institutional level." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="286. DNFBPs in most sectors met during the onsite generally have a basic understanding of the ML/TF risks they face and the inherent risk of their sectors determined by the NRA, apart from lawyers, whose risk understanding was inadequate. The risk understanding is more mature in larger entities than the smaller ones. Most DNFPBs, unless they are members of large groups, do not conduct internal risk assessments, and unlike FIs, there is no obligation on the DNFPBs sector to conduct such assessments, apart from PIE auditors. 287. Notaries, PIE auditors and large on-line gambling service providers met during the onsite conveyed a detailed understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks. The notaries met referred to the risks related to corporate transactions, involving criminal infiltration and transnational elements, especially in some regions of Italy. The notaries met indicated that this growing phenomenon is also reflected in the number of STRs submitted relating to these activities compared to STRs sent regarding real estate transactions, that used to be more prevalent. 288. Land-based casinos met seemed to be focused on very few risk elements for their sector and appeared not to be well informed about emerging risks for the sector. Real estate agents met primarily focused on the risk of cash in transactions and assessed that the risks in the sector are decreasing due to general economic slowdown. The sector’s reliance on other obliged entities’ AML/CFT obligations, such as notaries and banks make the sector less aware of the specific risks it is exposed to it. The perception of a low risk is not in line with the NRA findings. 289. Lawyers and accountants’ risk understanding is less developed, which is especially problematic given the inherent risks these sectors face. Large law firms are aware of risks in the sector, but the medium size and small law firms are less informed and underestimate the inherent risks of the sector. Another concern is the excessive reliance on other obliged entities’ AML/CFT obligations to mitigate risks. 290. TCSPs (CAFs) are required to have a labour consultant or accountant consulting as a part of the CAFs, and these members leverage the training provided by their SRBs help understand the exposure to risk. It is, however, unclear if such an approach is effective and the extent to which the sector fully understands the risk exposure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="286. DNFBPs in most sectors met during the onsite generally have a basic understanding of the ML/TF risks they face and the inherent risk of their sectors determined by the NRA, apart from lawyers, whose risk understanding was inadequate. The risk understanding is more mature in larger entities than the smaller ones. Most DNFPBs, unless they are members of large groups, do not conduct internal risk assessments, and unlike FIs, there is no obligation on the DNFPBs sector to conduct such assessments, apart from PIE auditors. 287. Notaries, PIE auditors and large on-line gambling service providers met during the onsite conveyed a detailed understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks. The notaries met referred to the risks related to corporate transactions, involving criminal infiltration and transnational elements, especially in some regions of Italy. The notaries met indicated that this growing phenomenon is also reflected in the number of STRs submitted relating to these activities compared to STRs sent regarding real estate transactions, that used to be more prevalent. 288. Land-based casinos met seemed to be focused on very few risk elements for their sector and appeared not to be well informed about emerging risks for the sector. Real estate agents met primarily focused on the risk of cash in transactions and assessed that the risks in the sector are decreasing due to general economic slowdown. The sector’s reliance on other obliged entities’ AML/CFT obligations, such as notaries and banks make the sector less aware of the specific risks it is exposed to it. The perception of a low risk is not in line with the NRA findings. 289. Lawyers and accountants’ risk understanding is less developed, which is especially problematic given the inherent risks these sectors face. Large law firms are aware of risks in the sector, but the medium size and small law firms are less informed and underestimate the inherent risks of the sector. Another concern is the excessive reliance on other obliged entities’ AML/CFT obligations to mitigate risks. 290. TCSPs (CAFs) are required to have a labour consultant or accountant consulting as a part of the CAFs, and these members leverage the training provided by their SRBs help understand the exposure to risk. It is, however, unclear if such an approach is effective and the extent to which the sector fully understands the risk exposure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="340. Relevant competent authorities generally have access to basic information on all legal persons that are present in Italy. However, access to BO information is more limited, particularly in light of the suspension of the BO register. 341. Basic information about companies is readily available in the Italian business register. Information about other types of legal persons, such as public bodies, associations and other types of organisations, are available in the Economic and Administrative Index ( Repertorio delle notizie Economiche e Amministrative - REA). This information is generally adequate, up-to-date and accurate with specific attention on issues concerning “figureheads”/informal nominees. All authorities met onsite highlighted the value and use of the business register, with some authorities, such as the GdF, having direct integration of data into their own data systems. 342. As for beneficial ownership information, Italy has in place a multi-pronged approach to access BO information, leveraging a combination of access information at the companies themselves, obtaining information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs and accessing the BO register. The provision of BO information as well as access to it was suspended at the time of the on-site. This source for accessing beneficial ownership information is therefore currently unavailable to competent authorities. 343. Italy can also access information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. As noted in the TC Annex on c.24.6, the GdF, UIF and DIA can access information on the name of the beneficial owner in cases of customer relationships with FIs from the Accounts and Deposits Database, which is updated monthly. This, however, does not constitute a sufficient alternative mechanism. 344. Access to BO information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is relatively prompt and the authorities, especially the GdF and the UIF, are able to access with current, adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information from FIs in a timely manner. The Accounts and Deposits Database, and similar information provided to the OAM from VASPs, enables identification of FIs and VASPs from whom the information is to be obtained. The business register contains information on the notary or accountant involved in relevant company transactions, which could enable immediate identification of the DNFBP to obtain relevant information. The effective access to updated and accurate BO information is diluted by the weaknesses that have been identified in BO identification amongst FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs (see IO3 and IO4), and the periodicity of ongoing CDD and verification of BO information (see Section 3.4.1 on FIs and VASPs and Section 4.4.1 on DNFBPs). For notaries and accountants, the non-ongoing nature of their interaction with companies also impacts how up to date the information can be, in particular if there have been changes higher up in the ownership structure. The overall average response time for authorities’ requests to BO information across FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs was 3.6 days in 2024, which is considered timely. Banks, which are most significant sources of BO information as companies require bank accounts to conduct financial transactions, have quicker response times, with an average of 2.3 days in 2024. This avenue for obtaining information is limited to LPs which have customer relationships with Italian FIs, VASPs or DNFPBs. 345. There does not appear to be any use in practice of the possibility of obtaining BO information directly from legal persons themselves. 346. Authorities met on-site instead highlighted the usefulness of the business register for identifying beneficial owners, but did not provide information on how they access information on legal persons where legal ownership may not correspond with beneficial ownership. All non-listed companies with shares must file information on shareholders with the business register. Changes in shareholding must be filed within 30 days of the transfer. The authorities met on-site also demonstrated how various data visualisation tools make it possible to see linkages between companies. Provided that the chain of ownership is wholly Italian, this enables, in principle the identification of beneficial owners in a timely manner. The access to BO information through the business register does, however, have some limitations. While company structures in Italy with foreign ownership linkages appear relatively limited (about 2% of companies have shareholdings from abroad), information on such LPs is not possible through the business register. Further, and more importantly, is that the business register does not contain information on the voting rights associated with the shares, although it does contain information (through the company financial statements and statutes) on whether a specific company has decided to allocate the voting rights in a different manner. This limits the ability to immediately understand the control structure of the companies. The business register does not contain information on other types of control, although basic information about the management and right to represent companies may be useful (and sufficient) in many cases in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="340. Relevant competent authorities generally have access to basic information on all legal persons that are present in Italy. However, access to BO information is more limited, particularly in light of the suspension of the BO register. 341. Basic information about companies is readily available in the Italian business register. Information about other types of legal persons, such as public bodies, associations and other types of organisations, are available in the Economic and Administrative Index ( Repertorio delle notizie Economiche e Amministrative - REA). This information is generally adequate, up-to-date and accurate with specific attention on issues concerning “figureheads”/informal nominees. All authorities met onsite highlighted the value and use of the business register, with some authorities, such as the GdF, having direct integration of data into their own data systems. 342. As for beneficial ownership information, Italy has in place a multi-pronged approach to access BO information, leveraging a combination of access information at the companies themselves, obtaining information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs and accessing the BO register. The provision of BO information as well as access to it was suspended at the time of the on-site. This source for accessing beneficial ownership information is therefore currently unavailable to competent authorities. 343. Italy can also access information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. As noted in the TC Annex on c.24.6, the GdF, UIF and DIA can access information on the name of the beneficial owner in cases of customer relationships with FIs from the Accounts and Deposits Database, which is updated monthly. This, however, does not constitute a sufficient alternative mechanism. 344. Access to BO information from FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is relatively prompt and the authorities, especially the GdF and the UIF, are able to access with current, adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information from FIs in a timely manner. The Accounts and Deposits Database, and similar information provided to the OAM from VASPs, enables identification of FIs and VASPs from whom the information is to be obtained. The business register contains information on the notary or accountant involved in relevant company transactions, which could enable immediate identification of the DNFBP to obtain relevant information. The effective access to updated and accurate BO information is diluted by the weaknesses that have been identified in BO identification amongst FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs (see IO3 and IO4), and the periodicity of ongoing CDD and verification of BO information (see Section 3.4.1 on FIs and VASPs and Section 4.4.1 on DNFBPs). For notaries and accountants, the non-ongoing nature of their interaction with companies also impacts how up to date the information can be, in particular if there have been changes higher up in the ownership structure. The overall average response time for authorities’ requests to BO information across FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs was 3.6 days in 2024, which is considered timely. Banks, which are most significant sources of BO information as companies require bank accounts to conduct financial transactions, have quicker response times, with an average of 2.3 days in 2024. This avenue for obtaining information is limited to LPs which have customer relationships with Italian FIs, VASPs or DNFPBs. 345. There does not appear to be any use in practice of the possibility of obtaining BO information directly from legal persons themselves. 346. Authorities met on-site instead highlighted the usefulness of the business register for identifying beneficial owners, but did not provide information on how they access information on legal persons where legal ownership may not correspond with beneficial ownership. All non-listed companies with shares must file information on shareholders with the business register. Changes in shareholding must be filed within 30 days of the transfer. The authorities met on-site also demonstrated how various data visualisation tools make it possible to see linkages between companies. Provided that the chain of ownership is wholly Italian, this enables, in principle the identification of beneficial owners in a timely manner. The access to BO information through the business register does, however, have some limitations. While company structures in Italy with foreign ownership linkages appear relatively limited (about 2% of companies have shareholdings from abroad), information on such LPs is not possible through the business register. Further, and more importantly, is that the business register does not contain information on the voting rights associated with the shares, although it does contain information (through the company financial statements and statutes) on whether a specific company has decided to allocate the voting rights in a different manner. This limits the ability to immediately understand the control structure of the companies. The business register does not contain information on other types of control, although basic information about the management and right to represent companies may be useful (and sufficient) in many cases in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 382. Overall, the FIU and other competent authorities co-operate and exchange financial intelligence and information to a large extent. Under its Regulation and Institutional Cooperation Directorate, UIF liaises with judicial authorities and other national institutions. Cooperation between UIF and various authorities, particularly NSPV, DIA and DNA, is based on bilateral and multi-lateral MOUs relating to information exchange, that have been updated and improved over the evaluation period. The UIF also has a liaison officer at the DNA to support better and faster information exchanges. Cooperation mechanisms enable the cross-referencing of STR risk scores, subject profiles and analytical context with prior records and prosecutorial information from GdF and DNA, contributing to more targeted disseminations. While these authorities conduct analyses in parallel due to their distinct mandates and data environments, ongoing initiatives, including the OTTs, aim to further refine coordination and sequencing of analytical steps to support an efficient use of resources. 383.  Operational coordination with these authorities takes place at various stages of the STR analysis process. At a very early stage, every fifteen days, UIF shares with the DNA, (through the GdF and DIA) personal data on natural and legal persons reported in the STRs. DNA cross checks this information using an automated matching procedure in their own criminal register databases and then returns feedback to the three authorities as well as to the PP where there is a link to an on-going investigation. Over the evaluation period, 193 702 individuals were cross-matched against judicial databases, leading to over 120 332 STRs being transmitted to DIA and ultimately 17 619 STRs being forwarded to district prosecutors. 384. Information feedback from DNA assists UIF with the assignment of the risk level to the STR. If there is a match based on prior criminal and police records, NSPV will also convey this information to UIF. On a weekly basis, UIF disseminates STRs and financial analysis with NSPV and DIA. NSPV may also communicate to the relevant LEAs such as the Carabinieri or SP, STRs and financial analysis from UIF if relevant to their investigation, and they may send feedback directly back to NSPV, which promptly forwards it to the UIF. The procedure is somewhat formal and complex but is designed to balance confidentiality with cooperation and transparency. 385. UIF receives regular requests for information (RFIs) from the judicial authorities through a specific template which include information on the relevant offences and a brief description of the investigative context. UIF can also collaborate directly with judicial authorities through joint investigations to reconstruct and provide in-depth analysis on financial flows traceable to persons of interest both in Italy and abroad and have received and responded to about 430 requests from judicial authorities annually. UIF has also cooperated with other authorities such as public prosecutor’s offices, DNA and LEAs on request to assist in their investigations with complex reconstructions and analyses of financial flows traceable to persons of interest both in Italy and abroad. This can take two months to a year depending on the complexity of the request and the UIF has received and responded to on average about 15 such requests annually. Based on the data provided by Italy, these have involved ML offences as well as offences that have been identified as ML threats according to the NRA (corruption, tax evasion, fraud, drug trafficking etc). 386. Specifically for TF, over the evaluation period, UIF received and responded to three collaboration requests from judicial authorities and one from the DNA. No feedback was received on these cases. UIF has also responded to requests directly from LEAs, including the Carabinieri, to obtain STRs to conduct financial investigations for terrorism investigations. Box 6.4. Financial Investigation through Joint Analysis Transnational Organised Crime (2015 – ongoing) UIF received several STRs on suspicious financial flows between Italy and Asia, on which UIF conducted operational and strategic analyses that it developed, to promptly identify the illicit techniques used (misuse of money transfer operators, wire transfers and cross-border cash movement etc.) by criminal organisations active across Europe to launder huge profits of major tax crimes and other criminal offences. Through in-depth analysis of STRs, UIF discovered that multiple transactions were being artificially split into smaller amounts to circumvent the restrictions on the use of cash. From an initial sample of almost 25 suspicious companies, more specific analyses on almost 400 companies and related flows were conducted. Drawing from BoI statistical reports on remittances, information shared by ADM (for cross-border cash declarations) and the revenue agency (for VAT declarations) and information from inspections conducted by BoI and GdF, strategic analysis was used to reconstruct the cash flow. UIF identified five Italian banks and related branches as being potentially used for the anomalous flows and through data extracted from reports from the banks, the anomalous peaks of wire transfers were identified in the period under analysis. UIF developed a broad range of financial intelligence products, in continuous cooperation with other FIUs (including a European Joint Analysis Exercise) and domestic competent authorities to trace assets and launch investigations, leading to the revelation of a multi-billion euro ML scheme that relied on the misuse of Correspondent Banking and Virtual IBAN services for tax fraud and organized crime activities (including concealing cross-border payments for mafia-linked drug traffickers) between Europe and Asia. The investigations into the organised and complex underground system, led to the ban of money transfer operators involved in the suspicious flows, the launch of judicial investigations into 85 people and a large number of arrests in Italy. 140 companies were seized, 1569 bank accounts were blocked, and assets worth EUR 350 million, including cash, luxury cars and real estate were seized. GdF further exploited UIF’s financial analysis to unveil further instances of fraud against the State for over EUR 1.3 billion and tax evasion of over EUR 1.1billion. More than EUR 1 billion was seized. 387. In July 2024, UIF and GdF entered into a bilateral MOU on the establishment of the Operating Technical Table (OTT) to facilitate cooperation in the following eleven areas: (i) coordination on the target groups of AML inspections; (ii) mutual updating on further areas and risk phenomena and other issues emerging from control activities, also to assess the conduct of joint inspections or controls; (iii) definition of criteria and modalities for information exchange in international cooperation and feedback flows related thereto; (iv) definition of the IT procedures to be adopted for suspension requests and return flows pursuant to the judiciary’s suspension guidelines; (v) definition of technical specifications to support the UIF in identifying areas of possible investigative relevance in relation to STRs and indicators of investigative prejudice concerning natural and legal persons structured in STRs; (vi) comparison of innovative or complex or high-risk cases and development of advanced analytical methods, including sharing of research findings and data and feedback flows (investigative feedback) related to STRs and financial analysis; (vii) definition of criteria for making requests to the UIF for threshold-based communications on areas deemed at risk; (viii) comparison of additional information of possible interest and data concerning declarations of gold traders in particularly complex or high or significant risk cases; (ix) adoption of procedures to ensure the security of information exchanges and the protection of confidentiality; (x) strategic analysis projects and studies and regulatory development of operational issues; (xi) training activities on operational issues. While many of these are in place, some important items (i.e., items iii, vii and viii) have yet to be implemented. The OTT is an important mechanism for further strengthening coordination between the UIF and GdF, whose analytical processes operate in parallel due to their distinct mandates and data environments. Ensuring continued progress in the outstanding OTT areas would support greater operational consistency and efficiency. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 388. The FIU and other competent authorities securely protect the confidentiality of the information they exchange and use. Access to the UIF premises is strictly limited and well-guarded. UIF has a range of technological and organisational safeguards with acquisition and dissemination of report flows occurring through highly secure and encrypted IT channels. All internal processing of STRs, interactions with FIs and DNFBPs, and exchanges with LEAs take place through RADAR and SAFE, which are encrypted. Audit logs track internal user access, enabling monitoring and auditing of activities. UIF staff are also subject to several circulars on confidentiality in work process with special precautions prescribed when handling reports of PEPs. The multilayered security architecture of RADAR and SAFE, including the separation between FIU-only and LEA-only data environments, provides strong safeguards while enabling efficient operational cooperation. 389. The GdF receives and analyses STRs through the NSPV department The management of STR data is carried out by the GdF through the SIVA IT system which guarantees high confidentiality safeguards through technical-organisational measures. This is done through dedicated access which can be monitored and audited and the possibility to increase the calibration of confidentiality when handling sensitive STRs. Within SIVA, enhanced confidentiality protocols apply to high-sensitivity STRs, and access is restricted to authorised investigative personnel in accordance with judicial secrecy requirements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 382. Overall, the FIU and other competent authorities co-operate and exchange financial intelligence and information to a large extent. Under its Regulation and Institutional Cooperation Directorate, UIF liaises with judicial authorities and other national institutions. Cooperation between UIF and various authorities, particularly NSPV, DIA and DNA, is based on bilateral and multi-lateral MOUs relating to information exchange, that have been updated and improved over the evaluation period. The UIF also has a liaison officer at the DNA to support better and faster information exchanges. Cooperation mechanisms enable the cross-referencing of STR risk scores, subject profiles and analytical context with prior records and prosecutorial information from GdF and DNA, contributing to more targeted disseminations. While these authorities conduct analyses in parallel due to their distinct mandates and data environments, ongoing initiatives, including the OTTs, aim to further refine coordination and sequencing of analytical steps to support an efficient use of resources. 383.  Operational coordination with these authorities takes place at various stages of the STR analysis process. At a very early stage, every fifteen days, UIF shares with the DNA, (through the GdF and DIA) personal data on natural and legal persons reported in the STRs. DNA cross checks this information using an automated matching procedure in their own criminal register databases and then returns feedback to the three authorities as well as to the PP where there is a link to an on-going investigation. Over the evaluation period, 193 702 individuals were cross-matched against judicial databases, leading to over 120 332 STRs being transmitted to DIA and ultimately 17 619 STRs being forwarded to district prosecutors. 384. Information feedback from DNA assists UIF with the assignment of the risk level to the STR. If there is a match based on prior criminal and police records, NSPV will also convey this information to UIF. On a weekly basis, UIF disseminates STRs and financial analysis with NSPV and DIA. NSPV may also communicate to the relevant LEAs such as the Carabinieri or SP, STRs and financial analysis from UIF if relevant to their investigation, and they may send feedback directly back to NSPV, which promptly forwards it to the UIF. The procedure is somewhat formal and complex but is designed to balance confidentiality with cooperation and transparency. 385. UIF receives regular requests for information (RFIs) from the judicial authorities through a specific template which include information on the relevant offences and a brief description of the investigative context. UIF can also collaborate directly with judicial authorities through joint investigations to reconstruct and provide in-depth analysis on financial flows traceable to persons of interest both in Italy and abroad and have received and responded to about 430 requests from judicial authorities annually. UIF has also cooperated with other authorities such as public prosecutor’s offices, DNA and LEAs on request to assist in their investigations with complex reconstructions and analyses of financial flows traceable to persons of interest both in Italy and abroad. This can take two months to a year depending on the complexity of the request and the UIF has received and responded to on average about 15 such requests annually. Based on the data provided by Italy, these have involved ML offences as well as offences that have been identified as ML threats according to the NRA (corruption, tax evasion, fraud, drug trafficking etc). 386. Specifically for TF, over the evaluation period, UIF received and responded to three collaboration requests from judicial authorities and one from the DNA. No feedback was received on these cases. UIF has also responded to requests directly from LEAs, including the Carabinieri, to obtain STRs to conduct financial investigations for terrorism investigations. Box 6.4. Financial Investigation through Joint Analysis Transnational Organised Crime (2015 – ongoing) UIF received several STRs on suspicious financial flows between Italy and Asia, on which UIF conducted operational and strategic analyses that it developed, to promptly identify the illicit techniques used (misuse of money transfer operators, wire transfers and cross-border cash movement etc.) by criminal organisations active across Europe to launder huge profits of major tax crimes and other criminal offences. Through in-depth analysis of STRs, UIF discovered that multiple transactions were being artificially split into smaller amounts to circumvent the restrictions on the use of cash. From an initial sample of almost 25 suspicious companies, more specific analyses on almost 400 companies and related flows were conducted. Drawing from BoI statistical reports on remittances, information shared by ADM (for cross-border cash declarations) and the revenue agency (for VAT declarations) and information from inspections conducted by BoI and GdF, strategic analysis was used to reconstruct the cash flow. UIF identified five Italian banks and related branches as being potentially used for the anomalous flows and through data extracted from reports from the banks, the anomalous peaks of wire transfers were identified in the period under analysis. UIF developed a broad range of financial intelligence products, in continuous cooperation with other FIUs (including a European Joint Analysis Exercise) and domestic competent authorities to trace assets and launch investigations, leading to the revelation of a multi-billion euro ML scheme that relied on the misuse of Correspondent Banking and Virtual IBAN services for tax fraud and organized crime activities (including concealing cross-border payments for mafia-linked drug traffickers) between Europe and Asia. The investigations into the organised and complex underground system, led to the ban of money transfer operators involved in the suspicious flows, the launch of judicial investigations into 85 people and a large number of arrests in Italy. 140 companies were seized, 1569 bank accounts were blocked, and assets worth EUR 350 million, including cash, luxury cars and real estate were seized. GdF further exploited UIF’s financial analysis to unveil further instances of fraud against the State for over EUR 1.3 billion and tax evasion of over EUR 1.1billion. More than EUR 1 billion was seized. 387. In July 2024, UIF and GdF entered into a bilateral MOU on the establishment of the Operating Technical Table (OTT) to facilitate cooperation in the following eleven areas: (i) coordination on the target groups of AML inspections; (ii) mutual updating on further areas and risk phenomena and other issues emerging from control activities, also to assess the conduct of joint inspections or controls; (iii) definition of criteria and modalities for information exchange in international cooperation and feedback flows related thereto; (iv) definition of the IT procedures to be adopted for suspension requests and return flows pursuant to the judiciary’s suspension guidelines; (v) definition of technical specifications to support the UIF in identifying areas of possible investigative relevance in relation to STRs and indicators of investigative prejudice concerning natural and legal persons structured in STRs; (vi) comparison of innovative or complex or high-risk cases and development of advanced analytical methods, including sharing of research findings and data and feedback flows (investigative feedback) related to STRs and financial analysis; (vii) definition of criteria for making requests to the UIF for threshold-based communications on areas deemed at risk; (viii) comparison of additional information of possible interest and data concerning declarations of gold traders in particularly complex or high or significant risk cases; (ix) adoption of procedures to ensure the security of information exchanges and the protection of confidentiality; (x) strategic analysis projects and studies and regulatory development of operational issues; (xi) training activities on operational issues. While many of these are in place, some important items (i.e., items iii, vii and viii) have yet to be implemented. The OTT is an important mechanism for further strengthening coordination between the UIF and GdF, whose analytical processes operate in parallel due to their distinct mandates and data environments. Ensuring continued progress in the outstanding OTT areas would support greater operational consistency and efficiency. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 388. The FIU and other competent authorities securely protect the confidentiality of the information they exchange and use. Access to the UIF premises is strictly limited and well-guarded. UIF has a range of technological and organisational safeguards with acquisition and dissemination of report flows occurring through highly secure and encrypted IT channels. All internal processing of STRs, interactions with FIs and DNFBPs, and exchanges with LEAs take place through RADAR and SAFE, which are encrypted. Audit logs track internal user access, enabling monitoring and auditing of activities. UIF staff are also subject to several circulars on confidentiality in work process with special precautions prescribed when handling reports of PEPs. The multilayered security architecture of RADAR and SAFE, including the separation between FIU-only and LEA-only data environments, provides strong safeguards while enabling efficient operational cooperation. 389. The GdF receives and analyses STRs through the NSPV department The management of STR data is carried out by the GdF through the SIVA IT system which guarantees high confidentiality safeguards through technical-organisational measures. This is done through dedicated access which can be monitored and audited and the possibility to increase the calibration of confidentiality when handling sensitive STRs. Within SIVA, enhanced confidentiality protocols apply to high-sensitivity STRs, and access is restricted to authorised investigative personnel in accordance with judicial secrecy requirements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="418. Italy has a range of sentences available for different types of ML, ranging from fines and prison sentences of up to twelve years. Sentences are imposed based on the offence as well as the mitigating and aggravating circumstances surrounding the offence and the offender. 419. The statistics on sentences provided by Italy, albeit incomplete, reflects that in most cases, the lower end of prescribed sentences are imposed for ML, and only in very few cases are sentences imposed on the higher end. The broad range of sentences imposed indicates that the judiciary is committed to calibrating the sentence based on the specific circumstances of the case and this is reflected in the dissuasive and proportionate sentences imposed in some of the case studies related to complex cases presented by Italy. Also, approximately 60% of final judgments are the result of plea bargaining and abbreviated procedures which result in a reduction of penalties applied. According to Italian authorities, the focus of ML investigations and prosecutions have been on cases involving organised crime in light of the phenomena of mafia-style criminal activity in Italy. The predominance of sentencing at the lower end of the spectrum does not appear to be fully in line with the type of ML activity that is pursued by Italian authorities. However, Italy did provide cases of complex ML where the stand-alone launderers obtained higher sentences that were dissuasive Table 7.7. Sentences applied [21] for ML (natural persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Fines only 1 3 Nil Nil Nil 0 – 3 years’ imprisonment 60 65 86 88 90 &gt;3 years – 5 years’ imprisonment 16 16 19 20 25 &gt;5 years – 10 years’ imprisonment 4 9 7 6 10 &gt;10 imprisonment 5 0 2 0 1 420. Applicable penalties for legal persons involved in ML offences include fines, disqualifications (which can include the suspension or revocation of government concessions/financing and prohibition from conducting business) and confiscation. Sanctions can be applied at any stage of the investigation, including as interim measures. The data on sanctions applied on legal persons for ML is incomplete and as such Italy did not demonstrate that sanctions applied have been proportionate and dissuasive. Footnotes [21] Each sentence may have been applied to one or more ML convictions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="418. Italy has a range of sentences available for different types of ML, ranging from fines and prison sentences of up to twelve years. Sentences are imposed based on the offence as well as the mitigating and aggravating circumstances surrounding the offence and the offender. 419. The statistics on sentences provided by Italy, albeit incomplete, reflects that in most cases, the lower end of prescribed sentences are imposed for ML, and only in very few cases are sentences imposed on the higher end. The broad range of sentences imposed indicates that the judiciary is committed to calibrating the sentence based on the specific circumstances of the case and this is reflected in the dissuasive and proportionate sentences imposed in some of the case studies related to complex cases presented by Italy. Also, approximately 60% of final judgments are the result of plea bargaining and abbreviated procedures which result in a reduction of penalties applied. According to Italian authorities, the focus of ML investigations and prosecutions have been on cases involving organised crime in light of the phenomena of mafia-style criminal activity in Italy. The predominance of sentencing at the lower end of the spectrum does not appear to be fully in line with the type of ML activity that is pursued by Italian authorities. However, Italy did provide cases of complex ML where the stand-alone launderers obtained higher sentences that were dissuasive Table 7.7. Sentences applied [21] for ML (natural persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Fines only 1 3 Nil Nil Nil 0 – 3 years’ imprisonment 60 65 86 88 90 &gt;3 years – 5 years’ imprisonment 16 16 19 20 25 &gt;5 years – 10 years’ imprisonment 4 9 7 6 10 &gt;10 imprisonment 5 0 2 0 1 420. Applicable penalties for legal persons involved in ML offences include fines, disqualifications (which can include the suspension or revocation of government concessions/financing and prohibition from conducting business) and confiscation. Sanctions can be applied at any stage of the investigation, including as interim measures. The data on sanctions applied on legal persons for ML is incomplete and as such Italy did not demonstrate that sanctions applied have been proportionate and dissuasive. Footnotes [21] Each sentence may have been applied to one or more ML convictions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 441. The statistics in the table below (Table IO.8.2) show that during the evaluation period, over EUR 20.5 billion of assets were seized to support the asset recovery of criminal activity. More than 80% of the seizures were made by GdF, which reflects the operationalisation of its strategic prioritisation on asset recovery. More than half of the seizures by DIA are based on preventive measures under the AMC. Although that DIA has similar priorities, its investigations are significantly more complex, identifies fewer targets and it can take over a year to reconstruct the business dealings of entire mafia families and as such their seizures are not comparable to GdF’s. Considering the large number of criminal investigations the State Police and the Carabinieri across the country, their low asset seizures as reflected, indicates that there is not sufficient high-level direction and resourcing to contribute to more asset recovery. Table 8.2. Asset Seizures – by different LEAs (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 2 296 219 027 3 577 472 627 3 001 735 546 2 244 818 974 4 501 253 052 1 081 602 087 16 703 101 313 DIA 401 379 519 451 887 907 338 222 235 107 231 854 120 824 758 26 169 014 1 445 715 386 Carabinieri 307 565 614 473 462 797 153 969 120 147 075 495 121 174 980 15 795 094 1 219 043 100 State Police 176 069 519 237 408 030 397 718 347 359 725 470 85 467 783 8 650 997 1 265 040 146 Total (all LEAs) 3 181 233 679 4 740 231 361 3 891 645 248 2 838 851 793 4 828 720 573 1 106 048 178 20 586 730 931 442. Data provided by Italy reflected that asset seizures are largely in line with the ML and predicate offences risk in Italy with the bulk of the seizures relating to tax evasion and tax offences (52%) and significant seizures relating to corruption (10%), bankruptcy and corporate offences (9%) and mafia-type organised crime (7%), although less so for fraud (6%) and drug trafficking (5%). No asset seizures were reported relating to TF. As noted in IO.10, while assets and economic resources of over EUR 2 billion remain frozen, no new TFS funds were identified or reported as frozen with regards to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 since 2010, nor was there any instance where relevant assets or economic resources of a designated individual or entity, found. 443. Based solely on data on seizures from the GdF and the DIA, about a third of the seizure amounts relate to ML (see table 8.3). The largest proportion of ML seizures by GdF (more than 60%) relate to tax evasion and tax crimes. Data provided indicates that 40% of seizures made by GdF and DIA relate to seizures of property of corresponding value. The State Police and the Carabinieri have declared that they are also pursuing and seizing property of corresponding value but no data was presented to support that statement. By value, the bulk of GdF seizures over the evaluation period were financial accounts and real estate. Table 8.3. Asset Seizures relating to ML (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 525 445 210 1 253 464 578 1 334 568 860 867 615 979 1 086 738 509 215 834 090 5 283 667 226 DIA 18 825 100 162 103 045 206 883 888 1 209 834 5 253 282 2 037 657 396 312 806 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 444. Under Italy’s AML Law (see criterion 4.3), the UIF is empowered to suspend suspicious transactions for a maximum of five working days. This can be triggered directly by the reporting entity or initiated autonomously by the UIF, since it carries out daily checks to identify and evaluate STRs where transactions yet to be executed. It can also be done also at the request of qualified authorities, such as the GdF, the DIA, judicial authorities or at the request of a foreign FIU. The UIF has internal operating procedures and dedicated resources in the Division of the Suspicious Transactions Directorate, to this process. Where a suspension procedure is carried out, the UIF promptly shares the information with relevant LEAs to verify that the suspension would not prejudice an ongoing investigation and whether they have any interest in adopting provisional measures; feedback is received quickly. 445. The statistics in the table below (Table 8.4) reflect the frequency of the suspension procedures having taken place over the assessment period. More than 80% of suspensions triggered by reporting entities related to insurance policy redemption and were triggered by insurance companies themselves to be able to obtain more time for evaluation considering maximum of thirty days available to execute the insurance policy redemption. Approximately 10% of suspensions related to wire transfers and were triggered by banks. In particular, only one suspension was triggered by an LEA in 2020, which resulted in the suspension of EUR3.7 million. Of the number of transactions evaluated, nine related to TF. None of the transactions related to TF were ultimately suspended. 446. Despite the increasing risks in Italy related to fraud, suspension activity has decreased, in recent years. Italy attributed this to the increase in the use of instant payments often used in fraud cases, which makes it difficult to intervene quickly enough to suspend the transfer. As a result, the preference is to submit STRs and develop banking monitoring systems to block transactions before they are executed. However, there is no evidence that shows that bank transfers have decreased because of more instant payments. The number of requests for suspension from the GdF, the DIA or the judicial authorities is very small. While GdF’s preference is to use the powers under the AMC, CCP and CC, to seize property at an early stage, the purpose of the suspension and preventive seizure measures are not the same. Against this background, LEAs and judicial authorities in Italy are not making full use of the possibility to trigger an evaluation for suspension. Table 8.4. Suspensions of Suspicious Transactions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Transactions evaluated for suspensions Total Numbers 308 227 212 183 188 54 Triggered by UIF 68 67 90 85 78 15 Triggered by REs/ LEAs/ judicial authorities 240 160 122 98 110 39 Transactions suspended (domestic entities) Numbers 37 30 32 25 208 6 Triggered by UIF 11 10 4 9 9 1 Triggered by REs 25 20 28 19 19 5 Triggered by LEAs/ judicial authorities 1 0 0 0 0 0 Total amount suspended (EUR) 13 million 18 million 108.7 million 8.7 million 4.7 million ½ million Transactions suspended (from foreign FIUs) Triggered by foreign FIUs 29 53 53 52 75 41 Total amount suspended (EUR) 493 800 0 0 0 0 0" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 441. The statistics in the table below (Table IO.8.2) show that during the evaluation period, over EUR 20.5 billion of assets were seized to support the asset recovery of criminal activity. More than 80% of the seizures were made by GdF, which reflects the operationalisation of its strategic prioritisation on asset recovery. More than half of the seizures by DIA are based on preventive measures under the AMC. Although that DIA has similar priorities, its investigations are significantly more complex, identifies fewer targets and it can take over a year to reconstruct the business dealings of entire mafia families and as such their seizures are not comparable to GdF’s. Considering the large number of criminal investigations the State Police and the Carabinieri across the country, their low asset seizures as reflected, indicates that there is not sufficient high-level direction and resourcing to contribute to more asset recovery. Table 8.2. Asset Seizures – by different LEAs (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 2 296 219 027 3 577 472 627 3 001 735 546 2 244 818 974 4 501 253 052 1 081 602 087 16 703 101 313 DIA 401 379 519 451 887 907 338 222 235 107 231 854 120 824 758 26 169 014 1 445 715 386 Carabinieri 307 565 614 473 462 797 153 969 120 147 075 495 121 174 980 15 795 094 1 219 043 100 State Police 176 069 519 237 408 030 397 718 347 359 725 470 85 467 783 8 650 997 1 265 040 146 Total (all LEAs) 3 181 233 679 4 740 231 361 3 891 645 248 2 838 851 793 4 828 720 573 1 106 048 178 20 586 730 931 442. Data provided by Italy reflected that asset seizures are largely in line with the ML and predicate offences risk in Italy with the bulk of the seizures relating to tax evasion and tax offences (52%) and significant seizures relating to corruption (10%), bankruptcy and corporate offences (9%) and mafia-type organised crime (7%), although less so for fraud (6%) and drug trafficking (5%). No asset seizures were reported relating to TF. As noted in IO.10, while assets and economic resources of over EUR 2 billion remain frozen, no new TFS funds were identified or reported as frozen with regards to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 since 2010, nor was there any instance where relevant assets or economic resources of a designated individual or entity, found. 443. Based solely on data on seizures from the GdF and the DIA, about a third of the seizure amounts relate to ML (see table 8.3). The largest proportion of ML seizures by GdF (more than 60%) relate to tax evasion and tax crimes. Data provided indicates that 40% of seizures made by GdF and DIA relate to seizures of property of corresponding value. The State Police and the Carabinieri have declared that they are also pursuing and seizing property of corresponding value but no data was presented to support that statement. By value, the bulk of GdF seizures over the evaluation period were financial accounts and real estate. Table 8.3. Asset Seizures relating to ML (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 525 445 210 1 253 464 578 1 334 568 860 867 615 979 1 086 738 509 215 834 090 5 283 667 226 DIA 18 825 100 162 103 045 206 883 888 1 209 834 5 253 282 2 037 657 396 312 806 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 444. Under Italy’s AML Law (see criterion 4.3), the UIF is empowered to suspend suspicious transactions for a maximum of five working days. This can be triggered directly by the reporting entity or initiated autonomously by the UIF, since it carries out daily checks to identify and evaluate STRs where transactions yet to be executed. It can also be done also at the request of qualified authorities, such as the GdF, the DIA, judicial authorities or at the request of a foreign FIU. The UIF has internal operating procedures and dedicated resources in the Division of the Suspicious Transactions Directorate, to this process. Where a suspension procedure is carried out, the UIF promptly shares the information with relevant LEAs to verify that the suspension would not prejudice an ongoing investigation and whether they have any interest in adopting provisional measures; feedback is received quickly. 445. The statistics in the table below (Table 8.4) reflect the frequency of the suspension procedures having taken place over the assessment period. More than 80% of suspensions triggered by reporting entities related to insurance policy redemption and were triggered by insurance companies themselves to be able to obtain more time for evaluation considering maximum of thirty days available to execute the insurance policy redemption. Approximately 10% of suspensions related to wire transfers and were triggered by banks. In particular, only one suspension was triggered by an LEA in 2020, which resulted in the suspension of EUR3.7 million. Of the number of transactions evaluated, nine related to TF. None of the transactions related to TF were ultimately suspended. 446. Despite the increasing risks in Italy related to fraud, suspension activity has decreased, in recent years. Italy attributed this to the increase in the use of instant payments often used in fraud cases, which makes it difficult to intervene quickly enough to suspend the transfer. As a result, the preference is to submit STRs and develop banking monitoring systems to block transactions before they are executed. However, there is no evidence that shows that bank transfers have decreased because of more instant payments. The number of requests for suspension from the GdF, the DIA or the judicial authorities is very small. While GdF’s preference is to use the powers under the AMC, CCP and CC, to seize property at an early stage, the purpose of the suspension and preventive seizure measures are not the same. Against this background, LEAs and judicial authorities in Italy are not making full use of the possibility to trigger an evaluation for suspension. Table 8.4. Suspensions of Suspicious Transactions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 until May 25 Transactions evaluated for suspensions Total Numbers 308 227 212 183 188 54 Triggered by UIF 68 67 90 85 78 15 Triggered by REs/ LEAs/ judicial authorities 240 160 122 98 110 39 Transactions suspended (domestic entities) Numbers 37 30 32 25 208 6 Triggered by UIF 11 10 4 9 9 1 Triggered by REs 25 20 28 19 19 5 Triggered by LEAs/ judicial authorities 1 0 0 0 0 0 Total amount suspended (EUR) 13 million 18 million 108.7 million 8.7 million 4.7 million ½ million Transactions suspended (from foreign FIUs) Triggered by foreign FIUs 29 53 53 52 75 41 Total amount suspended (EUR) 493 800 0 0 0 0 0" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="481. Italy's legal framework provides a range of imprisonment terms for TF offenses. Judges in the Italian system calibrate sanctions based on the specific circumstances of each case and on the procedure followed (e.g., abbreviated trial procedures that result in mandatory sentence reductions of up to one-third). Final judgements may also be affected by reductions due to plea bargaining. On average, sanctions applied in more than half of TF cases have been for three years imprisonment or less. These sanctions are somewhat low in the context of the type of TF activity Italy has pursued (i.e., complex, stand-alone TF rather than low-level self-financing). However, Italy indicated sanctions for TF are within a similar range as sanctions applied in other terrorism-related cases in Italy, such as disseminating terrorist propaganda. Italy also provided several examples of high-profile TF cases involving the financing of international terrorist organizations that resulted in relatively higher sanctions between seven to nine years. It remains unclear if the sanctions applied for TF cases have been dissuasive. As noted above, there have not been any prosecutions against legal persons for TF. Table 9.2. Sentencing for Natural Persons Convicted of TF (under Article 270 CC) Imprisonment (years) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total 0 to 3 11 7 5 5 17 45 &gt;3 to 5 4 3 0 1 9 17 &gt;5 to 10 5 2 4 1 3 15 &gt;10 to 15 1 0 0 1 0 2 &gt;15 0 0 0 2 0 2 Box 9.4. Appellate Court of Assizes of Lecce (Judgment No. 2/2019) The defendant was involved in soliciting donations for a mosque in Berlin, which investigators discovered was serving as a collection hub for jihadists traveling to fight in Syria. The mosque was eventually shut down in February 2017 during an anti-terrorism operation. The defendant also engaged in fraudulent consumer credit schemes by entering into a fraudulent loan agreement to purchase two phone devices worth EUR 869 each, which were resold to generate cash for financing travel to ISIS-controlled territories. Another associate used the exact same method, demonstrating this was an organized approach rather than an isolated incident. The money was being raised for operations involving the transport of group members to reach IS-controlled territories safely. The evidentiary framework was built on telephone communication interceptions, particularly WhatsApp and Telegram messages, and involved close cooperation between the Berlin State General Prosecutor's Office and the DIGOS (General Investigations and Special Operations Division) of Brindisi. The defendant was convicted under Article 270-bis of the Criminal Code (participation in a terrorist association - Islamic State) for having provided and collected funds (to finance travel to Syria) in 2020 and sentenced to five years' imprisonment (reduced from seven years and six months due to the abbreviated trial procedure). Evidentiary elements which led to conviction were collected on the basis of the MLA framework. The suspect was arrested in an EU State and handed to Italy for the trial." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="481. Italy's legal framework provides a range of imprisonment terms for TF offenses. Judges in the Italian system calibrate sanctions based on the specific circumstances of each case and on the procedure followed (e.g., abbreviated trial procedures that result in mandatory sentence reductions of up to one-third). Final judgements may also be affected by reductions due to plea bargaining. On average, sanctions applied in more than half of TF cases have been for three years imprisonment or less. These sanctions are somewhat low in the context of the type of TF activity Italy has pursued (i.e., complex, stand-alone TF rather than low-level self-financing). However, Italy indicated sanctions for TF are within a similar range as sanctions applied in other terrorism-related cases in Italy, such as disseminating terrorist propaganda. Italy also provided several examples of high-profile TF cases involving the financing of international terrorist organizations that resulted in relatively higher sanctions between seven to nine years. It remains unclear if the sanctions applied for TF cases have been dissuasive. As noted above, there have not been any prosecutions against legal persons for TF. Table 9.2. Sentencing for Natural Persons Convicted of TF (under Article 270 CC) Imprisonment (years) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total 0 to 3 11 7 5 5 17 45 &gt;3 to 5 4 3 0 1 9 17 &gt;5 to 10 5 2 4 1 3 15 &gt;10 to 15 1 0 0 1 0 2 &gt;15 0 0 0 2 0 2 Box 9.4. Appellate Court of Assizes of Lecce (Judgment No. 2/2019) The defendant was involved in soliciting donations for a mosque in Berlin, which investigators discovered was serving as a collection hub for jihadists traveling to fight in Syria. The mosque was eventually shut down in February 2017 during an anti-terrorism operation. The defendant also engaged in fraudulent consumer credit schemes by entering into a fraudulent loan agreement to purchase two phone devices worth EUR 869 each, which were resold to generate cash for financing travel to ISIS-controlled territories. Another associate used the exact same method, demonstrating this was an organized approach rather than an isolated incident. The money was being raised for operations involving the transport of group members to reach IS-controlled territories safely. The evidentiary framework was built on telephone communication interceptions, particularly WhatsApp and Telegram messages, and involved close cooperation between the Berlin State General Prosecutor's Office and the DIGOS (General Investigations and Special Operations Division) of Brindisi. The defendant was convicted under Article 270-bis of the Criminal Code (participation in a terrorist association - Islamic State) for having provided and collected funds (to finance travel to Syria) in 2020 and sentenced to five years' imprisonment (reduced from seven years and six months due to the abbreviated trial procedure). Evidentiary elements which led to conviction were collected on the basis of the MLA framework. The suspect was arrested in an EU State and handed to Italy for the trial." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="497. Italy has to some extent applied a focused, proportionate and risk-based mitigation measures to only those organisations which fall within the FATF definition of NPOs, in line with identified risks. Through the NRA process, Italy identified approximately 26 000 NPOs that largely fit into the FATF definition. Italy has further identified the following criteria to identify for defining which part of the non-profit sector overall is exposed to the risk of abuse of terrorism financing. These are regarding: type of activities, beneficiaries and/or recipients, operational geographical area, and financing channels. 498. This has resulted in the identification of approximately 1 058 entities potentially exposed to TF risks, consisting of 1 000 cultural or religious associations and 58 NPOs, working in the area of development cooperation in conflict zones or with subjects coming from conflict areas. While not all of the 1 000 cultural or religious associations primarily engage in raising or disbursing funds for charitable purposes, they are unincorporated associations which lack legal foundation, budgetary powers but may occasionally conduct fundraising activities. Italy has identified these as exposed to potential higher risk due to the fact that they pose exposure to terrorism-related threats. 499. Italy does not have a targeted, interagency coordinated approach to mitigative measures for NPOs that Italy identified as exposed to TF. There are numerous authorities - the GdF, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies (MLSP) and their regional RUNTS offices (which registers most NPOs), the Ministry of Interior, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation ( Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo – AICS) and the Revenue Agency - involved in the monitoring and investigation of NPOs at different levels and there is no targeted oversight or monitoring measures for those defined as higher risk in the NRA. The Ministry of Interior focusses their monitoring on Islamic cultural associations and places of worship and the AICS focusses their monitoring on Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in development cooperation that they finance. These entities measures are described below. 500. As a prevention authority, the UIF pays attention to STRs involving NPOs - particularly with regard to TF risk – as a significant sector of reporting entities’ customers, and has consequently given due relevance to the NPO sector in developing its financial analyses and anomaly indicators. With reference to these latter activities, the UIF has provided some relevant outreach for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs. However, Italy has not focussed its outreach activities on NPOs at risk. 501. The GdF’s Investigative Group on the Financing of Terrorism at the Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) conducts tactical and operative analysis of risk and context, to identify the trends and dynamics concerning the financing of terrorism, of the relative illicit schemes adopted and of the subjects involved. In this context, they developed a risk activity tool dedicated to the risk of terrorist financing abuse of NPOs and investigating entities that may be involved in TF. This Operational Risk Analysis (AOR) called “Books, Money, Gun” analysed information on registered NPOs and unregistered associations using available information (e.g. the NPO registry, tax registry, STR information, investigative analysis, and open-source material) to select NPOs most exposed to risk, namely Islamic NPOs as well as entities linked to them. The tool also identified trends and dynamics concerning the financing of terrorism, of the relative illicit schemes adopted and of the subjects involved. While not based on the NRA’s findings directly of high-risk entities, the results largely matched the NRA’s findings. 502. Based on the findings, the NSPV identified 21 NPOs (up to February 2025) with scores for each of 27 analysis parameters taken into consideration and assigning each of them a specific risk score for investigation by the GdF territorial units. Preliminary investigations by the territorial units led to the launch of nine investigations. Eight cases were brought to the attention of the competent Public Prosecutor, who initiated for three cases for the crimes of “training for activities with terrorist purposes, including international terrorism” (Article 270 quinquies of the Italian Criminal Code) in one case; “association with the aim of terrorism, including international terrorism, or subversion of the democratic order” (Article 270 bis of the Italian Criminal Code) and “misappropriation” (Article 646 of the Italian Criminal Code). One of these investigations was still ongoing at the time of the on-site visits, while the others concluded without further action. 503. As part of the ongoing updating of this monitoring tool up to June 2025 (as of the on-site visit), the GdF identified an additional 18 NPOs that were undergoing further investigation at the central level by the NSPV. 504. The Ministry of Interior , through its territorial branches, monitors Islamic cultural associations and places of worship present on the national territory, including in order to prevent and counter potential threats against the security of the State from radical Islamist environments. The Ministry’s main functions pertain to verifying certain legal requirements, e.g. safety of the premises, occupancy and fire code compliance. The MoI also conducts intelligence gathering, and if it finds other information requiring further investigation, it will refer the case to the GdF or other police forces to coordinate any further action. No cases were referred during the reporting period. 505. The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation ( Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo – AICS) also monitors NPOs for compliance with development cooperation and procurement requirements. In addition to registry in the NPO register (RUNTs), AICS maintains its own register of 261 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and conducts checks in order to verify whether they can receive foreign aid funding. These checks are the same for all registered CSO and do not differentiate between higher or lower risk entities as identified in the NRA. AICS verifies that projects are implemented as planned, meet financial disclosure and expense auditing requirements. While not specifically aimed at preventing TF, AICS’ measures include checking against UN, FATF, and EU lists to ensure that the CSOs are not related to or involved with the listed entities. All registered CSOs are checked every three years, including contracting clauses that include clauses on preventing TF and other crimes. Several CSOs have been cancelled and de-registered, although not relating to TF. 506. With a multitude of governmental agencies exercising monitoring responsibilities over different aspects of the NPO sector, Italy’s NPO monitoring lacks effective national coordination. While the NPO sector in Italy does not pose a significant TF risk, the monitoring measures by the different agencies described above do not specifically target those NPOs determined to be higher risk. Additionally, not all entities Italy considers high risk fit within the FATF definition. The NPOs that the assessment team met with are registered at RUNTS, have activities in conflict zones and have a thorough understanding of TF risk mitigation both for incoming and outgoing financial flows." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="497. Italy has to some extent applied a focused, proportionate and risk-based mitigation measures to only those organisations which fall within the FATF definition of NPOs, in line with identified risks. Through the NRA process, Italy identified approximately 26 000 NPOs that largely fit into the FATF definition. Italy has further identified the following criteria to identify for defining which part of the non-profit sector overall is exposed to the risk of abuse of terrorism financing. These are regarding: type of activities, beneficiaries and/or recipients, operational geographical area, and financing channels. 498. This has resulted in the identification of approximately 1 058 entities potentially exposed to TF risks, consisting of 1 000 cultural or religious associations and 58 NPOs, working in the area of development cooperation in conflict zones or with subjects coming from conflict areas. While not all of the 1 000 cultural or religious associations primarily engage in raising or disbursing funds for charitable purposes, they are unincorporated associations which lack legal foundation, budgetary powers but may occasionally conduct fundraising activities. Italy has identified these as exposed to potential higher risk due to the fact that they pose exposure to terrorism-related threats. 499. Italy does not have a targeted, interagency coordinated approach to mitigative measures for NPOs that Italy identified as exposed to TF. There are numerous authorities - the GdF, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policies (MLSP) and their regional RUNTS offices (which registers most NPOs), the Ministry of Interior, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation ( Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo – AICS) and the Revenue Agency - involved in the monitoring and investigation of NPOs at different levels and there is no targeted oversight or monitoring measures for those defined as higher risk in the NRA. The Ministry of Interior focusses their monitoring on Islamic cultural associations and places of worship and the AICS focusses their monitoring on Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in development cooperation that they finance. These entities measures are described below. 500. As a prevention authority, the UIF pays attention to STRs involving NPOs - particularly with regard to TF risk – as a significant sector of reporting entities’ customers, and has consequently given due relevance to the NPO sector in developing its financial analyses and anomaly indicators. With reference to these latter activities, the UIF has provided some relevant outreach for FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs. However, Italy has not focussed its outreach activities on NPOs at risk. 501. The GdF’s Investigative Group on the Financing of Terrorism at the Special Currency Police Unit (NSPV) conducts tactical and operative analysis of risk and context, to identify the trends and dynamics concerning the financing of terrorism, of the relative illicit schemes adopted and of the subjects involved. In this context, they developed a risk activity tool dedicated to the risk of terrorist financing abuse of NPOs and investigating entities that may be involved in TF. This Operational Risk Analysis (AOR) called “Books, Money, Gun” analysed information on registered NPOs and unregistered associations using available information (e.g. the NPO registry, tax registry, STR information, investigative analysis, and open-source material) to select NPOs most exposed to risk, namely Islamic NPOs as well as entities linked to them. The tool also identified trends and dynamics concerning the financing of terrorism, of the relative illicit schemes adopted and of the subjects involved. While not based on the NRA’s findings directly of high-risk entities, the results largely matched the NRA’s findings. 502. Based on the findings, the NSPV identified 21 NPOs (up to February 2025) with scores for each of 27 analysis parameters taken into consideration and assigning each of them a specific risk score for investigation by the GdF territorial units. Preliminary investigations by the territorial units led to the launch of nine investigations. Eight cases were brought to the attention of the competent Public Prosecutor, who initiated for three cases for the crimes of “training for activities with terrorist purposes, including international terrorism” (Article 270 quinquies of the Italian Criminal Code) in one case; “association with the aim of terrorism, including international terrorism, or subversion of the democratic order” (Article 270 bis of the Italian Criminal Code) and “misappropriation” (Article 646 of the Italian Criminal Code). One of these investigations was still ongoing at the time of the on-site visits, while the others concluded without further action. 503. As part of the ongoing updating of this monitoring tool up to June 2025 (as of the on-site visit), the GdF identified an additional 18 NPOs that were undergoing further investigation at the central level by the NSPV. 504. The Ministry of Interior , through its territorial branches, monitors Islamic cultural associations and places of worship present on the national territory, including in order to prevent and counter potential threats against the security of the State from radical Islamist environments. The Ministry’s main functions pertain to verifying certain legal requirements, e.g. safety of the premises, occupancy and fire code compliance. The MoI also conducts intelligence gathering, and if it finds other information requiring further investigation, it will refer the case to the GdF or other police forces to coordinate any further action. No cases were referred during the reporting period. 505. The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation ( Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo – AICS) also monitors NPOs for compliance with development cooperation and procurement requirements. In addition to registry in the NPO register (RUNTs), AICS maintains its own register of 261 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and conducts checks in order to verify whether they can receive foreign aid funding. These checks are the same for all registered CSO and do not differentiate between higher or lower risk entities as identified in the NRA. AICS verifies that projects are implemented as planned, meet financial disclosure and expense auditing requirements. While not specifically aimed at preventing TF, AICS’ measures include checking against UN, FATF, and EU lists to ensure that the CSOs are not related to or involved with the listed entities. All registered CSOs are checked every three years, including contracting clauses that include clauses on preventing TF and other crimes. Several CSOs have been cancelled and de-registered, although not relating to TF. 506. With a multitude of governmental agencies exercising monitoring responsibilities over different aspects of the NPO sector, Italy’s NPO monitoring lacks effective national coordination. While the NPO sector in Italy does not pose a significant TF risk, the monitoring measures by the different agencies described above do not specifically target those NPOs determined to be higher risk. Additionally, not all entities Italy considers high risk fit within the FATF definition. The NPOs that the assessment team met with are registered at RUNTS, have activities in conflict zones and have a thorough understanding of TF risk mitigation both for incoming and outgoing financial flows." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="520. Italy has the mechanisms to apply targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing (PF-TFS) without delay. These mechanisms apply in the same way that they apply for TF-TFS. 521. Italy’s framework for PF-TFS applies in the same way as for TF-TFS, with the EU framework being supplemented by domestic measures (see Recommendation 7). Domestically, Italy can address delays regarding UN designations, whereby the MEF, upon proposal by the FSC, issues a decree regarding legal and natural persons in the interim period between UN Security Council action and relative EU implementing action. This decree is for a period for six months renewable in the same form as long as the required conditions are duly met. However, there are some minor gaps in this supplemental national framework that apply equally to R.6, R.7 and IO.11 (see Recommendation 7). During the reporting period (2020 – May 2025), the UN made no new listing pursuant to UNSCR 1718; therefore, no domestic decrees needed to be issued." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="520. Italy has the mechanisms to apply targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing (PF-TFS) without delay. These mechanisms apply in the same way that they apply for TF-TFS. 521. Italy’s framework for PF-TFS applies in the same way as for TF-TFS, with the EU framework being supplemented by domestic measures (see Recommendation 7). Domestically, Italy can address delays regarding UN designations, whereby the MEF, upon proposal by the FSC, issues a decree regarding legal and natural persons in the interim period between UN Security Council action and relative EU implementing action. This decree is for a period for six months renewable in the same form as long as the required conditions are duly met. However, there are some minor gaps in this supplemental national framework that apply equally to R.6, R.7 and IO.11 (see Recommendation 7). During the reporting period (2020 – May 2025), the UN made no new listing pursuant to UNSCR 1718; therefore, no domestic decrees needed to be issued." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="111. To a large extent, the objectives and activities of the competent authorities are consistent with the evolving national AML/CFT policies and with the ML/TF risks identified, ensuring alignment with the NRAs and other risk assessments. 112. Competent authorities such as the BoI, the UIF, the GdF, IVASS and Consob set their priorities through annual work plans or multi-year strategic plans. These work plans take into consideration the findings of the NRA as well as the priority areas of action that have been identified as a part of the NRA process. Competent authorities also adjust their regulatory and supervisory activities in line with the evolving ML/TF risks. 113. For instance, the BoI has introduced several regulatory amendments and issued several supervisory guidance to respond to risks identified in the EU SNRA and the NRA. Additionally, the BoI sets specific supervisory objectives for its activity through a four-year AML/CFT strategic plan, which was developed from the findings of the NRA. Similarly, the UIF’s strategic plan, which is also informed by the NRA findings, determines the UIF’s priority areas of intervention, resource allocation, analytical activities, outreach, and supervisory functions which are then carried out consistently with such plan. The UIF’s inspection activity is targeted mainly towards the financial sector and certain risky non-financial operators (e.g., the gold and gaming sectors). In addition, the GdF's annual operational plans are formulated taking into account the strategic priorities set by the MEF and the contents of the NRA, as well as information gathered by the GdF on the sectors and phenomena posing the greatest risk. 114. Further, SRBs align their objectives and activities with evolving AML/CFT policies, and the risks identified, to some extent. The SRBs coordinate with the FSC on developing technical rules for professionals, which aid professionals in implementing their AML/CFT responsibilities. Further, some SRBs, such as the National Notarial Council, prioritise their own activity in line with identified risks. The other SRBs, such as the SRBs for lawyers and accountants (i.e. the National Bar Association and the National Council on Accountants), do not have the same level of alignment between their activities and the risks identified. Closer alignment between the SRBs’ activities and the ML/TF risks identified could bolster professionals’ risk awareness and understanding of their AML/CFT requirements. 115. However, despite this general alignment of objectives and activities of authorities, there are instances where the objectives and activities of the competent authorities are not consistent with AML/CFT policy and risks. While the GdF somewhat aligns its operational plans and activities with the risks identified, the allocation of its supervisory efforts across the different DNFBP sectors does not fully match with the risks presented by the various sectors. 116. Prosecutors’ objectives and activities are only somewhat aligned with the national understanding of ML/TF risks, as they instead prioritise their activities based on broader considerations, including the fact that criminal prosecution is mandatory under Italy’s Constitution. Further, cases are prioritised in accordance with a list of priority crimes issued by parliament, which has expanded since its creation and prioritises all crimes punishable by four years or more imprisonment. In addition to the list promulgated by parliament, each of the individual prosecutor’s offices can determine their own more specific prioritisation for cases, which do not appear to be informed by the ML/TF risks Italy has identified. Italy does not maintain any more specific strategic or guidelines related to prosecutorial priorities. The prosecutor plays a central role in directing the conduct of official investigations, granting the LEAs powers to use measures such as wiretapping, and deciding whether the evidence obtained warrants a court case. Given the central role of the prosector, this lack of national alignment between objectives and ML/TF risks identified can result in difficulties pursuing priority ML/TF cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="111. To a large extent, the objectives and activities of the competent authorities are consistent with the evolving national AML/CFT policies and with the ML/TF risks identified, ensuring alignment with the NRAs and other risk assessments. 112. Competent authorities such as the BoI, the UIF, the GdF, IVASS and Consob set their priorities through annual work plans or multi-year strategic plans. These work plans take into consideration the findings of the NRA as well as the priority areas of action that have been identified as a part of the NRA process. Competent authorities also adjust their regulatory and supervisory activities in line with the evolving ML/TF risks. 113. For instance, the BoI has introduced several regulatory amendments and issued several supervisory guidance to respond to risks identified in the EU SNRA and the NRA. Additionally, the BoI sets specific supervisory objectives for its activity through a four-year AML/CFT strategic plan, which was developed from the findings of the NRA. Similarly, the UIF’s strategic plan, which is also informed by the NRA findings, determines the UIF’s priority areas of intervention, resource allocation, analytical activities, outreach, and supervisory functions which are then carried out consistently with such plan. The UIF’s inspection activity is targeted mainly towards the financial sector and certain risky non-financial operators (e.g., the gold and gaming sectors). In addition, the GdF's annual operational plans are formulated taking into account the strategic priorities set by the MEF and the contents of the NRA, as well as information gathered by the GdF on the sectors and phenomena posing the greatest risk. 114. Further, SRBs align their objectives and activities with evolving AML/CFT policies, and the risks identified, to some extent. The SRBs coordinate with the FSC on developing technical rules for professionals, which aid professionals in implementing their AML/CFT responsibilities. Further, some SRBs, such as the National Notarial Council, prioritise their own activity in line with identified risks. The other SRBs, such as the SRBs for lawyers and accountants (i.e. the National Bar Association and the National Council on Accountants), do not have the same level of alignment between their activities and the risks identified. Closer alignment between the SRBs’ activities and the ML/TF risks identified could bolster professionals’ risk awareness and understanding of their AML/CFT requirements. 115. However, despite this general alignment of objectives and activities of authorities, there are instances where the objectives and activities of the competent authorities are not consistent with AML/CFT policy and risks. While the GdF somewhat aligns its operational plans and activities with the risks identified, the allocation of its supervisory efforts across the different DNFBP sectors does not fully match with the risks presented by the various sectors. 116. Prosecutors’ objectives and activities are only somewhat aligned with the national understanding of ML/TF risks, as they instead prioritise their activities based on broader considerations, including the fact that criminal prosecution is mandatory under Italy’s Constitution. Further, cases are prioritised in accordance with a list of priority crimes issued by parliament, which has expanded since its creation and prioritises all crimes punishable by four years or more imprisonment. In addition to the list promulgated by parliament, each of the individual prosecutor’s offices can determine their own more specific prioritisation for cases, which do not appear to be informed by the ML/TF risks Italy has identified. Italy does not maintain any more specific strategic or guidelines related to prosecutorial priorities. The prosecutor plays a central role in directing the conduct of official investigations, granting the LEAs powers to use measures such as wiretapping, and deciding whether the evidence obtained warrants a court case. Given the central role of the prosector, this lack of national alignment between objectives and ML/TF risks identified can result in difficulties pursuing priority ML/TF cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 170. UIF actively provides timely assistance in the form of financial intelligence to its counterparts. Information received from foreign FIUs from ESW or FIU.NET are managed and prioritised via its domestic IT platform called “SAFE” which is fully integrated with the main UIF IT system RADAR (see IO.6). Communications are constantly monitored, and urgency levels are considered even when not explicitly specified. The average response time decreased from 42 days in 2019 to around 20–23 days in 2023–2024, while urgent requests were processed within 5–7 days on average, which are satisfactory and have shown improvement over the evaluation period. In addition to responding to requests, UIF also spontaneously disseminates intelligence to foreign FIUs as appropriate and disseminated 117 requests over the evaluation period. UIF received 9193 incoming requests, including 689 requests on TF from foreign FIUs which was responded promptly. In the EU context, UIF also transmits cross-border disseminations (XBDs) and cross-border reports (XBRs) to its EU counterparts. The number of XBDs has steadily increased since 2021 (from 6 888 to 10 268 in 2024), following a temporary dip in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic. Overall, the feedback from the FATF Global Network relating to the FIU was very positive. Box 2 . 12 . Unauthorized accesses to crypto wallet The case was triggered in 2024 by an investigation conducted by the police of a Northern European country and its FIU made the request. A few years after the victim had died, there was a robbery his home. It was known that the victim had invested money in cryptocurrencies and during the break-in, laptops, notebooks and passport were stolen from his home. The possible aim were the keys for the wallets. The foreign FIU so requested the UIF to contact the VASP, to check whether there had been any movement in the deceased’s accounts since he died. The information revealed that in fact the overall balance in the crypto-accounts was extremely low and the three accounts had been currently blocked, long before the victim’s death. There had been no access since the day of his death. UIF’s rapid contribution was crucial in solving the case. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 171. SCIP responds on a daily basis to foreign requests on cross-border investigations for specific information regarding Italians or foreigners connected to Italy. It receives on average 700 requests daily and responds within three days. SCIP’s efforts on Europol has been instrumental to approximately 1 000 arrests over the evaluation period based on requests from foreign authorities in the region. As the contact point for CARIN/ARIN, through ARO, Italy responded on average to over 1 000 requests a year relating to asset-tracing and recovery. These resulted in substantial asset freezing, seizures and confiscations as reflected above. Some delays in responding the requests and noted by feedback from the FATF Global Network could be an indication that the ARO could benefit from more resourcing. 172. The DIA provides assistance to foreign counterparts through an internal branch that coordinates with other Italian authorities (including ARO) as well as other national and international bodies (including CARIN). GdF also provided cases that involved providing assistance, mainly to investigations involving the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). For TF, over the evaluation period, GdF has provided cooperation on 181 occasions. Box 2 . 13 . International Cooperation involving GdF on international corruption (2020) The investigation was triggered by information from the US involving a criminal organisation involved in energy product sales, gold smuggling, speculative currency exchange, and laundering of funds. Aside from MLA requests, the GdF worked in coordination with INTERPOL services in Spain, UK, U.S., Russia, Bulgaria, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, France, and Liechtenstein. Additionally, European Asset Recovery Offices (ARO) in the UK, France, Spain, and Russia, as well as the FIN-NET and FIUs in Austria, Panama, Colombia, and other nations, were involved. The investigations resulted in the seizure of EUR 7.2 million from bank accounts as well as the arrest of a Colombian businessman at the airport of Cape Verde who was subsequently extradited to the United States. This extensive international collaboration dismantled part of the global laundering network and the connections and accounts tied to the Italian suspects under investigation were identified. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 173. See above 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 174. See above" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 170. UIF actively provides timely assistance in the form of financial intelligence to its counterparts. Information received from foreign FIUs from ESW or FIU.NET are managed and prioritised via its domestic IT platform called “SAFE” which is fully integrated with the main UIF IT system RADAR (see IO.6). Communications are constantly monitored, and urgency levels are considered even when not explicitly specified. The average response time decreased from 42 days in 2019 to around 20–23 days in 2023–2024, while urgent requests were processed within 5–7 days on average, which are satisfactory and have shown improvement over the evaluation period. In addition to responding to requests, UIF also spontaneously disseminates intelligence to foreign FIUs as appropriate and disseminated 117 requests over the evaluation period. UIF received 9193 incoming requests, including 689 requests on TF from foreign FIUs which was responded promptly. In the EU context, UIF also transmits cross-border disseminations (XBDs) and cross-border reports (XBRs) to its EU counterparts. The number of XBDs has steadily increased since 2021 (from 6 888 to 10 268 in 2024), following a temporary dip in 2020 due to the COVID pandemic. Overall, the feedback from the FATF Global Network relating to the FIU was very positive. Box 2 . 12 . Unauthorized accesses to crypto wallet The case was triggered in 2024 by an investigation conducted by the police of a Northern European country and its FIU made the request. A few years after the victim had died, there was a robbery his home. It was known that the victim had invested money in cryptocurrencies and during the break-in, laptops, notebooks and passport were stolen from his home. The possible aim were the keys for the wallets. The foreign FIU so requested the UIF to contact the VASP, to check whether there had been any movement in the deceased’s accounts since he died. The information revealed that in fact the overall balance in the crypto-accounts was extremely low and the three accounts had been currently blocked, long before the victim’s death. There had been no access since the day of his death. UIF’s rapid contribution was crucial in solving the case. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 171. SCIP responds on a daily basis to foreign requests on cross-border investigations for specific information regarding Italians or foreigners connected to Italy. It receives on average 700 requests daily and responds within three days. SCIP’s efforts on Europol has been instrumental to approximately 1 000 arrests over the evaluation period based on requests from foreign authorities in the region. As the contact point for CARIN/ARIN, through ARO, Italy responded on average to over 1 000 requests a year relating to asset-tracing and recovery. These resulted in substantial asset freezing, seizures and confiscations as reflected above. Some delays in responding the requests and noted by feedback from the FATF Global Network could be an indication that the ARO could benefit from more resourcing. 172. The DIA provides assistance to foreign counterparts through an internal branch that coordinates with other Italian authorities (including ARO) as well as other national and international bodies (including CARIN). GdF also provided cases that involved providing assistance, mainly to investigations involving the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). For TF, over the evaluation period, GdF has provided cooperation on 181 occasions. Box 2 . 13 . International Cooperation involving GdF on international corruption (2020) The investigation was triggered by information from the US involving a criminal organisation involved in energy product sales, gold smuggling, speculative currency exchange, and laundering of funds. Aside from MLA requests, the GdF worked in coordination with INTERPOL services in Spain, UK, U.S., Russia, Bulgaria, Panama, Mexico, Colombia, France, and Liechtenstein. Additionally, European Asset Recovery Offices (ARO) in the UK, France, Spain, and Russia, as well as the FIN-NET and FIUs in Austria, Panama, Colombia, and other nations, were involved. The investigations resulted in the seizure of EUR 7.2 million from bank accounts as well as the arrest of a Colombian businessman at the airport of Cape Verde who was subsequently extradited to the United States. This extensive international collaboration dismantled part of the global laundering network and the connections and accounts tied to the Italian suspects under investigation were identified. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 173. See above 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 174. See above" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="205. The understanding of AML/CFT obligations and the application of mitigating measures varies between FIs but generally appear to be at a satisfactory level. Compliance in the VASP sector appears weaker overall (as described below), which is concerning given its risk and growing importance. Supervisory findings of the BoI reflect an improvement in FIs’ controls, and a steady reduction in the number and severity of supervisory actions over the last five years. These are detailed below. The BoI characterises supervisory findings after on-site inspections as either ‘operational’ findings or ‘compliance’ findings. Operational findings are more minor issues which do not necessitate administrative measures or sanctions and are generally addressed through dialogue with the entity concerned. Compliance findings are more serious deficiencies which may be subject to sanctions or criminal liability. 206. CDD related deficiencies are the most common type of deficiency identified during on-site inspections of FIs in the period 2019-2023. The following tables illustrate the most prevalent deficiencies across sectors: Table 3.2. On-site findings per category of FIs (2019-2024) FI Category CDD Organizational structure and internal controls Record-keeping Limitations on the use of cash Reporting of STRs Banks 181 136 23 7 79 PIs/EMIs 23 21 7 0 14 AMCs 46 25 5 0 8 ICs 14 8 1 0 1 Non-bank credit operators 61 33 10 0 11 Trusts 5 2 0 0 2 Total 330 225 46 7 115 Table 3.3. Off-site findings per category of FIs (2019-2024) FI Category CDD Organizational structure and internal controls Reporting of STs Record-keeping CFT Limitations on the use of cash Self-risk assessment Banks 196 129 149 44 3 16 37 PIs/EMIs 21 20 15 10 0 0 14 AMCs 32 73 12 11 0 0 27 ICs 6 22 3 1 1 0 14 Non-bank credit operators 54 71 23 13 0 1 5 Trusts 10 5 6 2 0 0 0 Total 319 320 208 81 4 17 97 207. There are significant differences in the type of findings across sectors. Particularly worrying are the high proportion of compliance findings among trust companies / fiduciary companies and PIs/EMIs, given the risks related to these sectors, even though the number of findings for trust companies/fiduciaries is not a high number. Figure 3.1. Incidence of compliance and operational findings, per category of FIs Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 208. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures. Smaller FIs appear to spend significant time and resources in identification of BOs, particularly when complicated corporate structures are involved. This is less of a case for larger FIs, which tend to have more advanced systems, resources or contracts with third-party providers specialising in this area. Although supervisors often find shortcomings in CDD measures during on-site examinations, they suggest these are more often operational findings rather than compliance findings. 209. FIs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. CDD is predominantly performed face-to-face, and in 2023, remote identification was used in 14 % of the onboarding of new customers. Among the remote identification methods, only a small percentage of new customers are onboarded through digital identities and signatures (3.3%), and more advanced biometric recognition procedures are used in customer onboarding (2.6%). 210. FIs classify their customers according to risk and perform ongoing CDD at various intervals in line with these classifications. Typically, high risk customers are reviewed annually, medium risk customers every 2-3 years and low risk customers seldom or only based on triggers (such as a change in the operations or structure of the entity). There appears to be very little use of simplified due diligence (only 2 % of customers onboarded by FIs). This practice may lead to less risk-based use of resources by FIs, as well as increase the risk of financial exclusion. However, the BoI is aware of this issue and has led outreach activities to reduce these risks. 211. FIs are required to check for beneficial ownership and understand the ownership and control structure of an entity as a part of the CDD process. This is done using a range of available sources, including the companies register, and FIs generally do not rely solely on self- certification by clients. The lack of a functioning beneficial ownership register in Italy was well known to the representatives met on-site, but there were few concerns expressed by this, due to the perceived good availability of other information of use either in the Italian business register or through external service providers (especially in cases where the ownership structure had linkages outside of Italy). The importance of accurate information in the business register is therefore worthwhile to highlight, (cf. Section 4.4 on notaries’ compliance and Section 5.3). The representatives met by the Assessment Team were aware of the specific issues which presence of trusts and similar legal arrangements (including Italian fiduciaria) entail in terms of beneficial ownership identification. 212. While FIs are generally fulfilling their CDD and ongoing monitoring obligations, there are cases of breaches of basic requirements concerning CDD (both at the onboarding and ongoing monitoring stages) 213. As for VASPs the information from supervisory action by the GdF indicates less developed understanding of CDD and ongoing monitoring obligations. It is illustrating that during 2019-2024, the GdF conducted 36 inspections and found a total of 72 administrative violations and 1 criminal violation, where 38 of the administrative violations concerned CDD and 15 of the same concerned record-keeping. Based on this, the compliance level appears to be lower than among FIs, both for CDD and record-keeping requirements. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 214. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their family members and close associates: Italy has a comprehensive definition of PEPs and their associates. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through checks against commercial databases. This extends to corporate customers whose BOs are PEPs. FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and the FIs and VASPs met during the on-site were aware of and implemented EDD measures for PEPs. While the legal definition of PEPs for the period under review limited the definition of PEPs to one year after them ceasing to be PEPs, entities continue to monitor these individuals and apply EDD measures commensurate with risks. While the authorities and the entities met during the on-site did not express any concerns stemming from this legal deficiency, given Italy’s high risk of corruption, this was viewed as a material deficiency. While FIs and VASPs may have been complying with the applicable requirements in Italy during the period under review, their compliance have only partly been in line with the standards. 215. Correspondent banking: Banks in Italy have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. Banks ensure ongoing monitoring of the relationship with the respondent, with frequency and depth commensurate with the correspondent banking service provided. They adopt dedicated IT procedures to detect transactions of an unusual nature owing to the recurrence or amount of the transactions, or by the destination or origin of the flows. Most of the activity is performed by the top ten banks in Italy (93.5 % of correspondent banking transactions in 2023). However, there are instances of inadequate application of mitigation measures, and supervisory activity has identified gaps in implementation of mitigation measures relating to transaction monitoring related to the correspondent relationship, and a cease-and-desist order was issued for one large Italian banking group. 216. New technologies: FIs generally show an understanding of the impacts on ML/TF risks stemming from the strategic development of the business (e.g. wealth management, private banking, digitalization) and the adoption of innovative projects, including the launch of new activities and entering in new markets. The BoI conducts a specific “FinTech Survey” in the banking and parts of the non-bank credit operating sector every two years to obtain information on the impact of technology on AML. Based on this, paired with an off-site thematic review on use of innovative tools, the BoI confirmed the potential and identified risk associated with such tools. On the one hand, tools could support more timely updating of information and customer risk profiling, but the tools could also lead to underestimation of risk profiles in case of a lack of appropriate safeguards. One example of a type of product which appears to have been launched without sufficient consideration of ML/TF risks, is the virtual IBAN (vIBAN). The UIF performed a targeted campaign in the beginning of 2023, which revealed its use in some cases. Following the campaign, the UIF and BoI issued a joint communication in December 2024 on the topic, highlighting risks and useful guidance. Limited information has been available on the VASPs’ compliance with the relevant obligations, but one VASP representative met on-site confirmed the participation of AML/CFT competences in the relevant company bodies before product launches. 217. Wire and virtual asset transfer rules: FIs have systems in place to detect atypical transactions, taking into account the customers' risk profile, the beneficiaries and their location, in order to support the STR process. The new rules on virtual asset transfers applied in the EU (including Italy) from 31 December 2024, as part of the Transfer of Funds Regulation (TFR recast). Limited information has been made available on the compliance with these obligations up until the on-site, but BoI has drawn attention to the issue as part of pre-filing meetings concerning licencing according to MiCA. This has shown that some VASPs have a high-level awareness of these obligations and the VASPs’ potential mitigating measures (such as blocking self-hosted wallets and only transacting with other VASPs that comply with the travel rule requirements). At the same time, other VASPs are less aware of the critical issues, such as over reliance on third party service providers. At the time of the on-site, no FI offered transfer of virtual assets services, but the one FI which was considering this exhibited a high level of awareness of the possible risks. 218. High-risk countries: BoI’s supervision indicates that FIs generally apply enhanced due diligence in cases where high-risk countries identified by the FATF are involved (including when this is different than the countries identified by the EU). This was largely reiterated by representatives of FIs and VASPs met on-site. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 219. Overall, compliance by FIs with STR obligation has improved over time, and the FIs and VASPs met on-site confirmed having filed STRs in practice. The BoI considers that there is still a need for FIs to strengthen transaction monitoring processes. This is seen in supervisory findings of STR non-compliance and associated supervisory actions taken, including pecuniary sanctions. The seriousness of the shortcomings noted in the supervisory findings indicate the extent of the shortcomings in the implementation of the reporting obligation. 220. The implementation of reporting obligations is not very advanced in VASPs. Data from the UIF indicates that only 27 VASPs (of a total of 150 registered for providing services in Italy in 2024) have ever reported STRs although these constitute larger VASPs which account for about 75 % of transactions between crypto and fiat performed by Italian VASPs during 2024 (as reported to the OAM). 221. While all supervisors include compliance with STR obligations as part of on-site inspections, the UIF may additionally perform its own inspections concerning STR compliance. The UIF also conducts internal analyses on the STRs received to understand how and to what extent STRs are filed in accordance with the requirements. The inspections are coordinated by the Inspections Coordination and Analysis of Irregularities Division (CIS Division) following a risk-based approach. 222. During the on-site the UIF confirmed that there had previously been issues with “defensive reporting”, where low-quality STRs were filed prior to any substantial analysis was made on the part of the FI/VASP. Outreach activities conducted by the UIF is believed to have contributed to fewer STRs from some sectors (large banks), but with a higher quality. There has also been attention paid by the UIF to the issue of many STRs being filed concerning single transactions, while the more valuable STRs may instead be a single STR including information on several (potentially hundreds of transactions). VASPs STRs are generally considered to be of low quality, with deficiencies both in formal (i.e. required information) and substantive aspect (i.e. description of the reason for the suspicion), but there exist differences in quality of reporting between VASPs, with the VASPs reporting by using the tailored CSV file format generally providing more useful STRs. These are the VASPs which, prior to the introduction of such filing possibility, had sent a significant portion of the STRs. 223. The UIF reports that STRs overall have a high quality of “formal accuracy”, which means that they are filed with the information required. Some sectors do, however, have relatively high percentages STRs with “non-blocking issues. These are STRs that have some form of lacking information, but which are nevertheless captured by the systems of the UIF. These sectors include large (7%) and medium-small banks (13%), as well as STRs relating to payment cards (19 %). The UIF furthermore underlines that STRs have a high degree of complexity, by involving multiple parties and structured transaction. UIF data show that the timeliness for filing STRs is steadily improving across the sectors, with some numbers being less representative due to the low number of STRs filed. 224. Despite the encouraging improvements in abiding by reporting regulations, there exists some concern related to the technical requirements for STR filing. Filing an STR requires registering with the UIF’s RADAR system, a process which has been simplified by the UIF in 2024 for ease of registration, but such registration is not a mandatory requirement for FIs or VASPs. In practice, this could hamper the provision of STRs in certain cases, or lead to delays while the FI or VASP is registered on the portal. 225. There are rules and systems in place to prevent tipping off, including high degree of technical confidentiality in the system for reporting and communicating with the UIF about STRs or follow-up. The BoI’s examines, as part of on-site inspections, whether FIs have in place a sound STR framework and procedures in place, including to prevent tipping off. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 226. The internal controls and procedures have been strengthening over time in FIs, with differences across sectors, although deficiencies related to internal organization etc. remains a large category of supervisory findings. While the situation in banks appear largely satisfactory, the PIs/EMIs have more often a less mature compliance culture, weaker internal governance arrangements and risk management. BoI states that following its supervisory engagement, including a horizontal off-site analysis, the controls are slightly improving. AMCs and ICs tend to use a “tick the box”-governance rather than actively managing ML/TF risks. Only less serious findings have been identified for trust companies / fiduciary companies. 227. Limited information has been available to the assessment team of VASPs’ compliance with internal organization requirements. GdF findings have not explicitly referred to such findings during inspections, but UIF inspection activity has identified the lack of any internal regulations in inspected entities in practice. Although the VASPs met on-site appeared aware of and implemented internal control measures, the impression based on BoI’s meetings with VASPs in preparation for the application of MiCA appear to indicate that there is much room for improvement in the sector. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 228. There are no indications that there are legal or regulatory impediments in Italy to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. There are specific rules in place concerning the requirement to ensure sharing of information within groups. In cases where this is limited by the law of other states, there are specific requirements on FIs to manage the ensuing ML/TF risks. In practice, such measures have been necessary in a very limited number of cases (two Italian banks with subsidiaries in Russia), and following the BoI’s approach, measures were taken by the banks to mitigate the risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="205. The understanding of AML/CFT obligations and the application of mitigating measures varies between FIs but generally appear to be at a satisfactory level. Compliance in the VASP sector appears weaker overall (as described below), which is concerning given its risk and growing importance. Supervisory findings of the BoI reflect an improvement in FIs’ controls, and a steady reduction in the number and severity of supervisory actions over the last five years. These are detailed below. The BoI characterises supervisory findings after on-site inspections as either ‘operational’ findings or ‘compliance’ findings. Operational findings are more minor issues which do not necessitate administrative measures or sanctions and are generally addressed through dialogue with the entity concerned. Compliance findings are more serious deficiencies which may be subject to sanctions or criminal liability. 206. CDD related deficiencies are the most common type of deficiency identified during on-site inspections of FIs in the period 2019-2023. The following tables illustrate the most prevalent deficiencies across sectors: Table 3.2. On-site findings per category of FIs (2019-2024) FI Category CDD Organizational structure and internal controls Record-keeping Limitations on the use of cash Reporting of STRs Banks 181 136 23 7 79 PIs/EMIs 23 21 7 0 14 AMCs 46 25 5 0 8 ICs 14 8 1 0 1 Non-bank credit operators 61 33 10 0 11 Trusts 5 2 0 0 2 Total 330 225 46 7 115 Table 3.3. Off-site findings per category of FIs (2019-2024) FI Category CDD Organizational structure and internal controls Reporting of STs Record-keeping CFT Limitations on the use of cash Self-risk assessment Banks 196 129 149 44 3 16 37 PIs/EMIs 21 20 15 10 0 0 14 AMCs 32 73 12 11 0 0 27 ICs 6 22 3 1 1 0 14 Non-bank credit operators 54 71 23 13 0 1 5 Trusts 10 5 6 2 0 0 0 Total 319 320 208 81 4 17 97 207. There are significant differences in the type of findings across sectors. Particularly worrying are the high proportion of compliance findings among trust companies / fiduciary companies and PIs/EMIs, given the risks related to these sectors, even though the number of findings for trust companies/fiduciaries is not a high number. Figure 3.1. Incidence of compliance and operational findings, per category of FIs Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 208. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures. Smaller FIs appear to spend significant time and resources in identification of BOs, particularly when complicated corporate structures are involved. This is less of a case for larger FIs, which tend to have more advanced systems, resources or contracts with third-party providers specialising in this area. Although supervisors often find shortcomings in CDD measures during on-site examinations, they suggest these are more often operational findings rather than compliance findings. 209. FIs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. CDD is predominantly performed face-to-face, and in 2023, remote identification was used in 14 % of the onboarding of new customers. Among the remote identification methods, only a small percentage of new customers are onboarded through digital identities and signatures (3.3%), and more advanced biometric recognition procedures are used in customer onboarding (2.6%). 210. FIs classify their customers according to risk and perform ongoing CDD at various intervals in line with these classifications. Typically, high risk customers are reviewed annually, medium risk customers every 2-3 years and low risk customers seldom or only based on triggers (such as a change in the operations or structure of the entity). There appears to be very little use of simplified due diligence (only 2 % of customers onboarded by FIs). This practice may lead to less risk-based use of resources by FIs, as well as increase the risk of financial exclusion. However, the BoI is aware of this issue and has led outreach activities to reduce these risks. 211. FIs are required to check for beneficial ownership and understand the ownership and control structure of an entity as a part of the CDD process. This is done using a range of available sources, including the companies register, and FIs generally do not rely solely on self- certification by clients. The lack of a functioning beneficial ownership register in Italy was well known to the representatives met on-site, but there were few concerns expressed by this, due to the perceived good availability of other information of use either in the Italian business register or through external service providers (especially in cases where the ownership structure had linkages outside of Italy). The importance of accurate information in the business register is therefore worthwhile to highlight, (cf. Section 4.4 on notaries’ compliance and Section 5.3). The representatives met by the Assessment Team were aware of the specific issues which presence of trusts and similar legal arrangements (including Italian fiduciaria) entail in terms of beneficial ownership identification. 212. While FIs are generally fulfilling their CDD and ongoing monitoring obligations, there are cases of breaches of basic requirements concerning CDD (both at the onboarding and ongoing monitoring stages) 213. As for VASPs the information from supervisory action by the GdF indicates less developed understanding of CDD and ongoing monitoring obligations. It is illustrating that during 2019-2024, the GdF conducted 36 inspections and found a total of 72 administrative violations and 1 criminal violation, where 38 of the administrative violations concerned CDD and 15 of the same concerned record-keeping. Based on this, the compliance level appears to be lower than among FIs, both for CDD and record-keeping requirements. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 214. Politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their family members and close associates: Italy has a comprehensive definition of PEPs and their associates. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through checks against commercial databases. This extends to corporate customers whose BOs are PEPs. FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and the FIs and VASPs met during the on-site were aware of and implemented EDD measures for PEPs. While the legal definition of PEPs for the period under review limited the definition of PEPs to one year after them ceasing to be PEPs, entities continue to monitor these individuals and apply EDD measures commensurate with risks. While the authorities and the entities met during the on-site did not express any concerns stemming from this legal deficiency, given Italy’s high risk of corruption, this was viewed as a material deficiency. While FIs and VASPs may have been complying with the applicable requirements in Italy during the period under review, their compliance have only partly been in line with the standards. 215. Correspondent banking: Banks in Italy have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. Banks ensure ongoing monitoring of the relationship with the respondent, with frequency and depth commensurate with the correspondent banking service provided. They adopt dedicated IT procedures to detect transactions of an unusual nature owing to the recurrence or amount of the transactions, or by the destination or origin of the flows. Most of the activity is performed by the top ten banks in Italy (93.5 % of correspondent banking transactions in 2023). However, there are instances of inadequate application of mitigation measures, and supervisory activity has identified gaps in implementation of mitigation measures relating to transaction monitoring related to the correspondent relationship, and a cease-and-desist order was issued for one large Italian banking group. 216. New technologies: FIs generally show an understanding of the impacts on ML/TF risks stemming from the strategic development of the business (e.g. wealth management, private banking, digitalization) and the adoption of innovative projects, including the launch of new activities and entering in new markets. The BoI conducts a specific “FinTech Survey” in the banking and parts of the non-bank credit operating sector every two years to obtain information on the impact of technology on AML. Based on this, paired with an off-site thematic review on use of innovative tools, the BoI confirmed the potential and identified risk associated with such tools. On the one hand, tools could support more timely updating of information and customer risk profiling, but the tools could also lead to underestimation of risk profiles in case of a lack of appropriate safeguards. One example of a type of product which appears to have been launched without sufficient consideration of ML/TF risks, is the virtual IBAN (vIBAN). The UIF performed a targeted campaign in the beginning of 2023, which revealed its use in some cases. Following the campaign, the UIF and BoI issued a joint communication in December 2024 on the topic, highlighting risks and useful guidance. Limited information has been available on the VASPs’ compliance with the relevant obligations, but one VASP representative met on-site confirmed the participation of AML/CFT competences in the relevant company bodies before product launches. 217. Wire and virtual asset transfer rules: FIs have systems in place to detect atypical transactions, taking into account the customers' risk profile, the beneficiaries and their location, in order to support the STR process. The new rules on virtual asset transfers applied in the EU (including Italy) from 31 December 2024, as part of the Transfer of Funds Regulation (TFR recast). Limited information has been made available on the compliance with these obligations up until the on-site, but BoI has drawn attention to the issue as part of pre-filing meetings concerning licencing according to MiCA. This has shown that some VASPs have a high-level awareness of these obligations and the VASPs’ potential mitigating measures (such as blocking self-hosted wallets and only transacting with other VASPs that comply with the travel rule requirements). At the same time, other VASPs are less aware of the critical issues, such as over reliance on third party service providers. At the time of the on-site, no FI offered transfer of virtual assets services, but the one FI which was considering this exhibited a high level of awareness of the possible risks. 218. High-risk countries: BoI’s supervision indicates that FIs generally apply enhanced due diligence in cases where high-risk countries identified by the FATF are involved (including when this is different than the countries identified by the EU). This was largely reiterated by representatives of FIs and VASPs met on-site. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 219. Overall, compliance by FIs with STR obligation has improved over time, and the FIs and VASPs met on-site confirmed having filed STRs in practice. The BoI considers that there is still a need for FIs to strengthen transaction monitoring processes. This is seen in supervisory findings of STR non-compliance and associated supervisory actions taken, including pecuniary sanctions. The seriousness of the shortcomings noted in the supervisory findings indicate the extent of the shortcomings in the implementation of the reporting obligation. 220. The implementation of reporting obligations is not very advanced in VASPs. Data from the UIF indicates that only 27 VASPs (of a total of 150 registered for providing services in Italy in 2024) have ever reported STRs although these constitute larger VASPs which account for about 75 % of transactions between crypto and fiat performed by Italian VASPs during 2024 (as reported to the OAM). 221. While all supervisors include compliance with STR obligations as part of on-site inspections, the UIF may additionally perform its own inspections concerning STR compliance. The UIF also conducts internal analyses on the STRs received to understand how and to what extent STRs are filed in accordance with the requirements. The inspections are coordinated by the Inspections Coordination and Analysis of Irregularities Division (CIS Division) following a risk-based approach. 222. During the on-site the UIF confirmed that there had previously been issues with “defensive reporting”, where low-quality STRs were filed prior to any substantial analysis was made on the part of the FI/VASP. Outreach activities conducted by the UIF is believed to have contributed to fewer STRs from some sectors (large banks), but with a higher quality. There has also been attention paid by the UIF to the issue of many STRs being filed concerning single transactions, while the more valuable STRs may instead be a single STR including information on several (potentially hundreds of transactions). VASPs STRs are generally considered to be of low quality, with deficiencies both in formal (i.e. required information) and substantive aspect (i.e. description of the reason for the suspicion), but there exist differences in quality of reporting between VASPs, with the VASPs reporting by using the tailored CSV file format generally providing more useful STRs. These are the VASPs which, prior to the introduction of such filing possibility, had sent a significant portion of the STRs. 223. The UIF reports that STRs overall have a high quality of “formal accuracy”, which means that they are filed with the information required. Some sectors do, however, have relatively high percentages STRs with “non-blocking issues. These are STRs that have some form of lacking information, but which are nevertheless captured by the systems of the UIF. These sectors include large (7%) and medium-small banks (13%), as well as STRs relating to payment cards (19 %). The UIF furthermore underlines that STRs have a high degree of complexity, by involving multiple parties and structured transaction. UIF data show that the timeliness for filing STRs is steadily improving across the sectors, with some numbers being less representative due to the low number of STRs filed. 224. Despite the encouraging improvements in abiding by reporting regulations, there exists some concern related to the technical requirements for STR filing. Filing an STR requires registering with the UIF’s RADAR system, a process which has been simplified by the UIF in 2024 for ease of registration, but such registration is not a mandatory requirement for FIs or VASPs. In practice, this could hamper the provision of STRs in certain cases, or lead to delays while the FI or VASP is registered on the portal. 225. There are rules and systems in place to prevent tipping off, including high degree of technical confidentiality in the system for reporting and communicating with the UIF about STRs or follow-up. The BoI’s examines, as part of on-site inspections, whether FIs have in place a sound STR framework and procedures in place, including to prevent tipping off. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 226. The internal controls and procedures have been strengthening over time in FIs, with differences across sectors, although deficiencies related to internal organization etc. remains a large category of supervisory findings. While the situation in banks appear largely satisfactory, the PIs/EMIs have more often a less mature compliance culture, weaker internal governance arrangements and risk management. BoI states that following its supervisory engagement, including a horizontal off-site analysis, the controls are slightly improving. AMCs and ICs tend to use a “tick the box”-governance rather than actively managing ML/TF risks. Only less serious findings have been identified for trust companies / fiduciary companies. 227. Limited information has been available to the assessment team of VASPs’ compliance with internal organization requirements. GdF findings have not explicitly referred to such findings during inspections, but UIF inspection activity has identified the lack of any internal regulations in inspected entities in practice. Although the VASPs met on-site appeared aware of and implemented internal control measures, the impression based on BoI’s meetings with VASPs in preparation for the application of MiCA appear to indicate that there is much room for improvement in the sector. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 228. There are no indications that there are legal or regulatory impediments in Italy to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. There are specific rules in place concerning the requirement to ensure sharing of information within groups. In cases where this is limited by the law of other states, there are specific requirements on FIs to manage the ensuing ML/TF risks. In practice, such measures have been necessary in a very limited number of cases (two Italian banks with subsidiaries in Russia), and following the BoI’s approach, measures were taken by the banks to mitigate the risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 291. Basic CDD requirements are required to be implemented for all DNFBPs, but there are variations in the level of compliance with these obligations between sectors. DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated they consistently do CDD before they establish business relationship with clients. 292. Despite the general understanding of the CDD requirements, supervisory activity commonly reveals breaches of CDD obligations in entities inspected, with half of all inspections finding breaches of CDD obligations. These lapses are more pronounced in some sectors, such as accountants (breaches found in 100% of inspection), REAs (90%), notaries (70%), other independent legal professionals (57%) and TCSPs (95%) than others, such as casinos (25%) and gold buying dealers (10%). There have been instances observed during inspections of DNFBPs omitting to obtain CDD information. 293. Data retention breaches are also relatively common in some sectors. For instance, in casinos (land-based and online) breaches were found in 28% of inspections, for Real Estate Agents, such violations were found in 43% of inspections and for professional gold dealers in 47%. Data retention concerns were lower for gold buying dealers (13 % of inspections), lawyers (19%) and for notaries (13%). 294. CONSOB finds that the CDD processes in general are in place for PIE auditors, but that some weaknesses in record keeping remains. The most challenging area in terms of CDD is in ensuring robust and effective procedures for EDD. 295. On-line casinos have advanced tool in place for ongoing monitoring. The on-line casinos stated that customers’ activities are monitored through AI tools to identify unusual patterns in their conduct. 296. Land-based casinos met at the on-site were also aware of their CDD obligations especially regarding ongoing monitoring, however, an inspection done by the UIF in 2023 on one of the four land-based casinos showed quite significant breaches of the AML/CFT regulation, including not acquiring any basic information about the customers’ financial situation and a lack of monitoring to detect anomalous conduct by regular customers. Given that there are only four land-based casinos in Italy, this is a material shortcoming. 297. Outside the gaming sector, other sectors do not do ongoing monitoring of their clients. Box 4 . 2 . Case Study 4.2 During an inspection carried out by the Special Currency Police Unit on a high-risk target identified by the AOR &quot;compliance visa 2023&quot;, it was found that the reporting entity had not correctly fulfilled its customer due diligence obligations, as it had acquired unreliable information regarding the locations of the companies involved in the transactions underlying the transfer of tax credits for which the professional had affixed compliance visas. Furthermore, the professional was unable to produce documentation certifying the checks carried out to identify the beneficial owner, who was sometimes incorrectly identified. With regard to some clients, it was also found that the accountant had failed to report suspicious transactions despite the fact that some of the companies involved in the transfer of credits: i) appeared in press reports that evoked contexts of criminal relevance; ii) had been recently established and had share capital that was not compatible with the construction activity carried out and with the value of the renovation works declared. 298. The GdF has explained that 22 inspections in other legal professional entities led to findings of major deficiencies in CDD requirements, which were mainly in regard to cases involving COVID funds. In these cases, CDD deficiencies were especially prevalent for cases involving legal persons. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 299. The casino sector representatives met on-site seemed to have procedures in place regarding enhanced and specific measures for PEPs and high-risk third countries. However, given the deficiencies related to CDD identified in supervisory activity, this does not appear to be consistent throughout the sector. PIE auditors in general also have sufficient measures in place, although a few instances of non-application of EDD for PEPs who have ceased from office for more than one year appeared in practice. Other DNFBPs did not appear consistently to have sufficient measures in place. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 300. In general, the reporting level for DNFBPs is low, and this has been identified as a concern in the NRA and been highlighted by supervisors. However, there has been an upward trend in reporting level, and these have increased between 2020 and 2024. The general increase in STR reporting is mainly be attributed to increased reporting by notaries. This is a consequence of increased focus from UIF and GdF and the Notaries council has had a positive effect in increasing the number and quality of STRs submitted for notaries. 301. Some sectors, such as the accounting sector, have seen a decrease in the number of STRs submitted, but this is accompanied by an increase in quality of the reports submitted. For other sectors with high inherent risks, such as real estate agents, the number of STRs is increasing, but from a very low level (19 STRs in 2020 to 41 STRs in 2024) and for lawyers remain at a low level (39 STRs in 2020 to 44 STRs in 2024). UIF analysis of STRs filed by DNFPBs has found that most DNFBPs managed to correctly identify the risk levels of the reports which were submitted. 302. Control activity by the UIF has found that formal accuracy of the reports filed by DNFPBs is generally high, with only few STRs having anomalies or requiring to be cancelled. The highest percentage of STRs with anomalies are filed by auditing firms (4.9%). The timeliness of reporting varied across the sector with notaries (80% average) and for gold traders (85% average) submitted most STRs within 30 days of the last transaction referred to in the STR, while accountants and auditing firms filing a high percentage of their STRs after 120 days. Tipping off 303. There are rules and systems in place to prevent tipping off, including high degree of technical confidentiality in the system for reporting and communicating with the UIF about STRs or follow-up. The GdF’s examines, as part of on-site inspections, whether DNFBPs have in place a sound STR framework and procedures in place, including to prevent tipping off. No significant breaches have been identified by the GdF. Regarding PIE auditors, no breaches of tipping off requirements have been detected. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 304. Most DNFPBs do not have robust internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations. PIE auditors are the only sector having adequate and efficient internal AML procedures and internal control functions in place, although the CONSOB has identified weaknesses that the auditors’ own measures failed to identify. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 305. There are no legal or regulatory impediments for DNFPBs to fulfil their AML/CFT obligations and to apply mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 291. Basic CDD requirements are required to be implemented for all DNFBPs, but there are variations in the level of compliance with these obligations between sectors. DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated they consistently do CDD before they establish business relationship with clients. 292. Despite the general understanding of the CDD requirements, supervisory activity commonly reveals breaches of CDD obligations in entities inspected, with half of all inspections finding breaches of CDD obligations. These lapses are more pronounced in some sectors, such as accountants (breaches found in 100% of inspection), REAs (90%), notaries (70%), other independent legal professionals (57%) and TCSPs (95%) than others, such as casinos (25%) and gold buying dealers (10%). There have been instances observed during inspections of DNFBPs omitting to obtain CDD information. 293. Data retention breaches are also relatively common in some sectors. For instance, in casinos (land-based and online) breaches were found in 28% of inspections, for Real Estate Agents, such violations were found in 43% of inspections and for professional gold dealers in 47%. Data retention concerns were lower for gold buying dealers (13 % of inspections), lawyers (19%) and for notaries (13%). 294. CONSOB finds that the CDD processes in general are in place for PIE auditors, but that some weaknesses in record keeping remains. The most challenging area in terms of CDD is in ensuring robust and effective procedures for EDD. 295. On-line casinos have advanced tool in place for ongoing monitoring. The on-line casinos stated that customers’ activities are monitored through AI tools to identify unusual patterns in their conduct. 296. Land-based casinos met at the on-site were also aware of their CDD obligations especially regarding ongoing monitoring, however, an inspection done by the UIF in 2023 on one of the four land-based casinos showed quite significant breaches of the AML/CFT regulation, including not acquiring any basic information about the customers’ financial situation and a lack of monitoring to detect anomalous conduct by regular customers. Given that there are only four land-based casinos in Italy, this is a material shortcoming. 297. Outside the gaming sector, other sectors do not do ongoing monitoring of their clients. Box 4 . 2 . Case Study 4.2 During an inspection carried out by the Special Currency Police Unit on a high-risk target identified by the AOR &quot;compliance visa 2023&quot;, it was found that the reporting entity had not correctly fulfilled its customer due diligence obligations, as it had acquired unreliable information regarding the locations of the companies involved in the transactions underlying the transfer of tax credits for which the professional had affixed compliance visas. Furthermore, the professional was unable to produce documentation certifying the checks carried out to identify the beneficial owner, who was sometimes incorrectly identified. With regard to some clients, it was also found that the accountant had failed to report suspicious transactions despite the fact that some of the companies involved in the transfer of credits: i) appeared in press reports that evoked contexts of criminal relevance; ii) had been recently established and had share capital that was not compatible with the construction activity carried out and with the value of the renovation works declared. 298. The GdF has explained that 22 inspections in other legal professional entities led to findings of major deficiencies in CDD requirements, which were mainly in regard to cases involving COVID funds. In these cases, CDD deficiencies were especially prevalent for cases involving legal persons. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 299. The casino sector representatives met on-site seemed to have procedures in place regarding enhanced and specific measures for PEPs and high-risk third countries. However, given the deficiencies related to CDD identified in supervisory activity, this does not appear to be consistent throughout the sector. PIE auditors in general also have sufficient measures in place, although a few instances of non-application of EDD for PEPs who have ceased from office for more than one year appeared in practice. Other DNFBPs did not appear consistently to have sufficient measures in place. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 300. In general, the reporting level for DNFBPs is low, and this has been identified as a concern in the NRA and been highlighted by supervisors. However, there has been an upward trend in reporting level, and these have increased between 2020 and 2024. The general increase in STR reporting is mainly be attributed to increased reporting by notaries. This is a consequence of increased focus from UIF and GdF and the Notaries council has had a positive effect in increasing the number and quality of STRs submitted for notaries. 301. Some sectors, such as the accounting sector, have seen a decrease in the number of STRs submitted, but this is accompanied by an increase in quality of the reports submitted. For other sectors with high inherent risks, such as real estate agents, the number of STRs is increasing, but from a very low level (19 STRs in 2020 to 41 STRs in 2024) and for lawyers remain at a low level (39 STRs in 2020 to 44 STRs in 2024). UIF analysis of STRs filed by DNFPBs has found that most DNFBPs managed to correctly identify the risk levels of the reports which were submitted. 302. Control activity by the UIF has found that formal accuracy of the reports filed by DNFPBs is generally high, with only few STRs having anomalies or requiring to be cancelled. The highest percentage of STRs with anomalies are filed by auditing firms (4.9%). The timeliness of reporting varied across the sector with notaries (80% average) and for gold traders (85% average) submitted most STRs within 30 days of the last transaction referred to in the STR, while accountants and auditing firms filing a high percentage of their STRs after 120 days. Tipping off 303. There are rules and systems in place to prevent tipping off, including high degree of technical confidentiality in the system for reporting and communicating with the UIF about STRs or follow-up. The GdF’s examines, as part of on-site inspections, whether DNFBPs have in place a sound STR framework and procedures in place, including to prevent tipping off. No significant breaches have been identified by the GdF. Regarding PIE auditors, no breaches of tipping off requirements have been detected. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 304. Most DNFPBs do not have robust internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations. PIE auditors are the only sector having adequate and efficient internal AML procedures and internal control functions in place, although the CONSOB has identified weaknesses that the auditors’ own measures failed to identify. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 305. There are no legal or regulatory impediments for DNFPBs to fulfil their AML/CFT obligations and to apply mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="347. The tools available for competent authorities to obtain information on trusts and other legal arrangements vary somewhat depending on the type of legal arrangement. 348. Italian law provides for the establishment of two types of legal arrangements similar to trusts, the fiduciary mandate and the vincolo di destinazione . See the TC annex on R.25 for a further description. Additionally, Italy as a party to the Hague Convention on the law of the trusts, recognises trusts established under foreign law. 349. All legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements having tax consequences in Italy, need to be registered by the tax authority, which entails access to basic information about the legal arrangement. Since fiduciary mandates can only be managed by fiduciary companies, which are obliged entities under the AML law, information can be obtained in a timely fashion. The same applies for trustees of trusts or other similar legal arrangements created under foreign law, as they will also be obliged entities. The actual obtaining of such information in practice has not been demonstrated specifically for such information from these entities, but the authorities generally have broad powers to quickly obtain information when needed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="347. The tools available for competent authorities to obtain information on trusts and other legal arrangements vary somewhat depending on the type of legal arrangement. 348. Italian law provides for the establishment of two types of legal arrangements similar to trusts, the fiduciary mandate and the vincolo di destinazione . See the TC annex on R.25 for a further description. Additionally, Italy as a party to the Hague Convention on the law of the trusts, recognises trusts established under foreign law. 349. All legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements having tax consequences in Italy, need to be registered by the tax authority, which entails access to basic information about the legal arrangement. Since fiduciary mandates can only be managed by fiduciary companies, which are obliged entities under the AML law, information can be obtained in a timely fashion. The same applies for trustees of trusts or other similar legal arrangements created under foreign law, as they will also be obliged entities. The actual obtaining of such information in practice has not been demonstrated specifically for such information from these entities, but the authorities generally have broad powers to quickly obtain information when needed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 390. In line with its multiple AML/CFT functions, STRs developed by UIF are used by GdF for various outcomes, including to reconstruct asset movements to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. On average 22% of STRs received by NSPV/GdF were linked to pre-existing criminal proceedings, and 57% were used in the preventive tax evasion and corruption context (in line with the GdF’s mandate and with Italy’s identified ML risks). A smaller portion (3-4%) gave rise to new criminal investigative contexts, which is expected in a system where STRs primarily feed into ongoing tax, and corruption. 391. In practice, many STRs that are not formally counted as “new cases” nonetheless provide investigative leads within major ongoing investigations, particularly in organised-crime and corruption contexts. As a result, the operational role of STRs is broader than what is captured by the narrow category of “new investigative contexts”. The number of STRs initiated as new investigations also increased in the second half of the evaluation period reflecting improvements in STR quality, enhanced analytical capabilities within GdF through greater specialisation and new analytical tools, and more structured information-sharing with UIF. Similarly for TF, most STRs were linked to pre-existing criminal proceedings. 392. NSPV initiated several thousand investigations per year based on STRs and financial intelligence developed by UIF. Italy’s framework, in which STRs are developed within UIF, and subsequently, enriched by the NSPV through its in-house databases, ensures that financial intelligence is operationally useful to GdF’s investigations. In line with Italy’s ML risks, most STRs were exploited by GdF for tax evasion and related offences, crimes against public administration as well as bankruptcy and corporate offences. Significantly fewer STRs were exploited for drug-trafficking. While this is consistent with the fact that drug trafficking proceeds often do not pass through the regulated financial system, GdF analyses drug-related financial flows using a range of non-STR information sources, including fiscal, customs and administrative data as well as law-enforcement intelligence, which provides relevant insights even where STR-based indicators are limited. Box 6.5. GdF’s use of STRs and Financial Intelligence in Investigations and Asset Recovery Operation Anatrante (2021) The operation conducted by NSPV originated from the in-depth investigation of an STR concerning credit facilities of EUR 1.25 billion, made by the Extraordinary Commissioner for the COVID-19 emergency in favour of 3 foreign consortiums for the acquisition of more than 800 million masks. Financial intelligence by UIF revealed that the Italian companies involved had no previous experience in the healthcare sector and that the beneficial owner of these companies was linked to a person involved in the decision-making support structure of the Extraordinary Commissioner. The investigative activities, delegated by the Rome Public Prosecutor's Office, focused on a criminal group, composed of 8 individuals, responsible, in concert, for ML and trafficking in illicit influence (aggravated by transnationality). As a result of the investigations, the aforementioned Special Department executed, at the order of the competent prosecutor's office, five arrest orders executed by GdF and the emergency preventive seizure, directly and by equivalent, of bank, financial and insurance relations, real estate and luxury goods attributable to the suspects for a total of EUR 70 million (equal to the commissions collected). Operation Fonzie (2022) The operation conducted by Milan-based GdF specialized Unit (Nucleo PEF) originated from an anonymous complaint concerning a complex fraudulent mechanism set up by a criminal syndicate operating between Italy, Hungary, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Portugal, Poland, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the UAE, for ML of illicit proceeds from tax fraud through operations of a listed company in the office machinery and equipment rental industry. The feedback provided by the STRs and UIF’s financial intelligence made it easier for the GdF to identify several front men used by criminals to appear as representatives of companies used in the ML schemes. The GdF carried out in-depth investigations of STRs together with consultation of databases, open-source research and telephone and environmental wiretaps, revealed the role of companies. The frontmen appeared to belong to the same family groups and there was no financial consistency with transactions carried out. The GdF examined the accounts of all the suspects involved and through wiretaps and searches, found tokens for making remote bank transfers that revealed parallel bank accounts. Investigations revealed 48 Italian and foreign shell companies established and used to launder EUR 17 million through the issuance of fraudulent invoices to transfer money to foreign countries with the simultaneous return of part of the mentioned capital., through physical cash transportation (“muling”) in order to conceal the illicit proceeds. In particular, it was revealed that EUR 8.5 million were laundered through “specialised” individuals who, on behalf of the criminal organisation, were responsible for returning cash to Italy through air travels. Investigation resulted in the preventive seizure of financial assets, movable property (including luxury cars, motorcycles, and boats) real estate, valuables, and share capital of shell companies with a total value of over EUR 11 million. 393. The DIA analysed more than 700 000 STRs between 2020 and 2024 (which represents the number of STRs received by UIF), and integrated 2035 of them into their investigative cases on organised crime as these related to organised crime under its mandate. The STRs supported both judicial investigations and preventive asset-based measures against mafia-style criminal organisations and transnational fraud schemes. Information contained in the STRs is routinely used to reconstruct sources of income, standard of living, financial resources, and assets of individuals linked to organised crime and to identify potential assets or financial connections at an early stage prior to in-depth financial investigative work. Financial intelligence derived from STRs also plays a central role in preventive measures under the Anti-Mafia Code, where unexplained wealth, interposed ownership structures and asset transfers are assessed to support the application of preventive confiscation. In this context, STR-based intelligence often provides the initial leads DIA to reconstruct complex asset portfolios and identify assets held through front companies or family networks. This reflects the dual use of STRs in both judicial and preventive anti-mafia functions. (See IO.8 Box 8.1) The DNA does not itself use STRs to develop evidence in investigations but plays a key role in pre-screening STRs, coordinating with district prosecutors, and structuring investigative priorities to support organised crime and TF investigations. Approximately 5% of STRs received by UIF were forwarded to district prosecutors over the evaluation period. Box 6.6. DIA’s use of STRs and Financial Intelligence in Asset Investigations and Recovery Confiscation from an entrepreneur linked to a Mafia organization In March 2025, the DIA executed a confiscation order issued by the Court of Naples against a real estate entrepreneur, belonging to a family with deep-rooted ties to the mafia. STR analysis showed serious anomalies in the use of cashier’s cheques connected to savings books, apparently related to real estate transactions. The economic and asset discrepancy was demonstrated by analysing the declared net income; the information contained in the Tax Registry and the competent offices for the identification of real estate and corporate assets; bank transactions, and the data collection elements and statistical calculation tools developed by ISTAT. The asset and financial investigations carried out by the DIA, on the entire family of the entrepreneur and covered the period from 1990 to 2020, revealed assets and financial resources and the standard of living significantly disproportionate to the declared income levels. The investigations also showed that the criminal activity had been conducted mainly through reinvestment of proceeds derived from unlawful activities into apparently legitimate economic enterprises, followed by the registration of assets in the names of family members to circumvent anti-mafia legislation. The Court of Naples ordered the confiscation of one company operating in the real estate sector, 115 properties, four registered movable assets, and 60 financial relationships, for a total estimated value of approximately EUR 10 million. 394. Approximately 40% of STRs received by UIF have been selected by DNA for further in-depth analysis under the S.O.S Working Group composed of police officers from GdF, DIA and the Carabinieri. This mechanism generates pre-investigative activity of which approximately 60% of these relate to organised crime and 40% relate to TF, reflecting Italy’s risk profile. STRs are also analysed and extensively used in the in the CASA platform to identify terrorist activity and TF (see IO.9). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 395. Case studies reflected above show that financial intelligence is used by LEAs (especially GdF and DIA) and the judicial authorities to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds, and these have often resulted in asset seizures. Resulting from STRs, over EUR 5 billion in assets have been seized by the GdF and EUR 1.8 million in assets have been confiscated over the evaluation period. For DIA, over EUR 4 million in assets have been seized by the DIA and EUR 540 million in assets have been confiscated over the evaluation period. (see Table 8.1) For DIA, 80% and 76% of the total value of assets seized and confiscated during the year resulted from STRs. The data contained in the STRs were also widely used in judicial police activities, contributing to seizure and confiscation orders." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 390. In line with its multiple AML/CFT functions, STRs developed by UIF are used by GdF for various outcomes, including to reconstruct asset movements to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. On average 22% of STRs received by NSPV/GdF were linked to pre-existing criminal proceedings, and 57% were used in the preventive tax evasion and corruption context (in line with the GdF’s mandate and with Italy’s identified ML risks). A smaller portion (3-4%) gave rise to new criminal investigative contexts, which is expected in a system where STRs primarily feed into ongoing tax, and corruption. 391. In practice, many STRs that are not formally counted as “new cases” nonetheless provide investigative leads within major ongoing investigations, particularly in organised-crime and corruption contexts. As a result, the operational role of STRs is broader than what is captured by the narrow category of “new investigative contexts”. The number of STRs initiated as new investigations also increased in the second half of the evaluation period reflecting improvements in STR quality, enhanced analytical capabilities within GdF through greater specialisation and new analytical tools, and more structured information-sharing with UIF. Similarly for TF, most STRs were linked to pre-existing criminal proceedings. 392. NSPV initiated several thousand investigations per year based on STRs and financial intelligence developed by UIF. Italy’s framework, in which STRs are developed within UIF, and subsequently, enriched by the NSPV through its in-house databases, ensures that financial intelligence is operationally useful to GdF’s investigations. In line with Italy’s ML risks, most STRs were exploited by GdF for tax evasion and related offences, crimes against public administration as well as bankruptcy and corporate offences. Significantly fewer STRs were exploited for drug-trafficking. While this is consistent with the fact that drug trafficking proceeds often do not pass through the regulated financial system, GdF analyses drug-related financial flows using a range of non-STR information sources, including fiscal, customs and administrative data as well as law-enforcement intelligence, which provides relevant insights even where STR-based indicators are limited. Box 6.5. GdF’s use of STRs and Financial Intelligence in Investigations and Asset Recovery Operation Anatrante (2021) The operation conducted by NSPV originated from the in-depth investigation of an STR concerning credit facilities of EUR 1.25 billion, made by the Extraordinary Commissioner for the COVID-19 emergency in favour of 3 foreign consortiums for the acquisition of more than 800 million masks. Financial intelligence by UIF revealed that the Italian companies involved had no previous experience in the healthcare sector and that the beneficial owner of these companies was linked to a person involved in the decision-making support structure of the Extraordinary Commissioner. The investigative activities, delegated by the Rome Public Prosecutor's Office, focused on a criminal group, composed of 8 individuals, responsible, in concert, for ML and trafficking in illicit influence (aggravated by transnationality). As a result of the investigations, the aforementioned Special Department executed, at the order of the competent prosecutor's office, five arrest orders executed by GdF and the emergency preventive seizure, directly and by equivalent, of bank, financial and insurance relations, real estate and luxury goods attributable to the suspects for a total of EUR 70 million (equal to the commissions collected). Operation Fonzie (2022) The operation conducted by Milan-based GdF specialized Unit (Nucleo PEF) originated from an anonymous complaint concerning a complex fraudulent mechanism set up by a criminal syndicate operating between Italy, Hungary, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Portugal, Poland, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the UAE, for ML of illicit proceeds from tax fraud through operations of a listed company in the office machinery and equipment rental industry. The feedback provided by the STRs and UIF’s financial intelligence made it easier for the GdF to identify several front men used by criminals to appear as representatives of companies used in the ML schemes. The GdF carried out in-depth investigations of STRs together with consultation of databases, open-source research and telephone and environmental wiretaps, revealed the role of companies. The frontmen appeared to belong to the same family groups and there was no financial consistency with transactions carried out. The GdF examined the accounts of all the suspects involved and through wiretaps and searches, found tokens for making remote bank transfers that revealed parallel bank accounts. Investigations revealed 48 Italian and foreign shell companies established and used to launder EUR 17 million through the issuance of fraudulent invoices to transfer money to foreign countries with the simultaneous return of part of the mentioned capital., through physical cash transportation (“muling”) in order to conceal the illicit proceeds. In particular, it was revealed that EUR 8.5 million were laundered through “specialised” individuals who, on behalf of the criminal organisation, were responsible for returning cash to Italy through air travels. Investigation resulted in the preventive seizure of financial assets, movable property (including luxury cars, motorcycles, and boats) real estate, valuables, and share capital of shell companies with a total value of over EUR 11 million. 393. The DIA analysed more than 700 000 STRs between 2020 and 2024 (which represents the number of STRs received by UIF), and integrated 2035 of them into their investigative cases on organised crime as these related to organised crime under its mandate. The STRs supported both judicial investigations and preventive asset-based measures against mafia-style criminal organisations and transnational fraud schemes. Information contained in the STRs is routinely used to reconstruct sources of income, standard of living, financial resources, and assets of individuals linked to organised crime and to identify potential assets or financial connections at an early stage prior to in-depth financial investigative work. Financial intelligence derived from STRs also plays a central role in preventive measures under the Anti-Mafia Code, where unexplained wealth, interposed ownership structures and asset transfers are assessed to support the application of preventive confiscation. In this context, STR-based intelligence often provides the initial leads DIA to reconstruct complex asset portfolios and identify assets held through front companies or family networks. This reflects the dual use of STRs in both judicial and preventive anti-mafia functions. (See IO.8 Box 8.1) The DNA does not itself use STRs to develop evidence in investigations but plays a key role in pre-screening STRs, coordinating with district prosecutors, and structuring investigative priorities to support organised crime and TF investigations. Approximately 5% of STRs received by UIF were forwarded to district prosecutors over the evaluation period. Box 6.6. DIA’s use of STRs and Financial Intelligence in Asset Investigations and Recovery Confiscation from an entrepreneur linked to a Mafia organization In March 2025, the DIA executed a confiscation order issued by the Court of Naples against a real estate entrepreneur, belonging to a family with deep-rooted ties to the mafia. STR analysis showed serious anomalies in the use of cashier’s cheques connected to savings books, apparently related to real estate transactions. The economic and asset discrepancy was demonstrated by analysing the declared net income; the information contained in the Tax Registry and the competent offices for the identification of real estate and corporate assets; bank transactions, and the data collection elements and statistical calculation tools developed by ISTAT. The asset and financial investigations carried out by the DIA, on the entire family of the entrepreneur and covered the period from 1990 to 2020, revealed assets and financial resources and the standard of living significantly disproportionate to the declared income levels. The investigations also showed that the criminal activity had been conducted mainly through reinvestment of proceeds derived from unlawful activities into apparently legitimate economic enterprises, followed by the registration of assets in the names of family members to circumvent anti-mafia legislation. The Court of Naples ordered the confiscation of one company operating in the real estate sector, 115 properties, four registered movable assets, and 60 financial relationships, for a total estimated value of approximately EUR 10 million. 394. Approximately 40% of STRs received by UIF have been selected by DNA for further in-depth analysis under the S.O.S Working Group composed of police officers from GdF, DIA and the Carabinieri. This mechanism generates pre-investigative activity of which approximately 60% of these relate to organised crime and 40% relate to TF, reflecting Italy’s risk profile. STRs are also analysed and extensively used in the in the CASA platform to identify terrorist activity and TF (see IO.9). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 395. Case studies reflected above show that financial intelligence is used by LEAs (especially GdF and DIA) and the judicial authorities to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds, and these have often resulted in asset seizures. Resulting from STRs, over EUR 5 billion in assets have been seized by the GdF and EUR 1.8 million in assets have been confiscated over the evaluation period. For DIA, over EUR 4 million in assets have been seized by the DIA and EUR 540 million in assets have been confiscated over the evaluation period. (see Table 8.1) For DIA, 80% and 76% of the total value of assets seized and confiscated during the year resulted from STRs. The data contained in the STRs were also widely used in judicial police activities, contributing to seizure and confiscation orders." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="421. Where it is difficult to establish any link to a predicate offence, and thus obtain a conviction for ML, Italy’s response is largely to aggressively pursue the assets of the launderer where this relates to organised crime. It is able to do so under the AMC that provides broad powers for asset seizure and confiscations even where convictions for ML is not possible, as well as through the expertise of the DIA which often leads the investigations in such cases (see IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="421. Where it is difficult to establish any link to a predicate offence, and thus obtain a conviction for ML, Italy’s response is largely to aggressively pursue the assets of the launderer where this relates to organised crime. It is able to do so under the AMC that provides broad powers for asset seizure and confiscations even where convictions for ML is not possible, as well as through the expertise of the DIA which often leads the investigations in such cases (see IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="447. In all cases, the application for seizures is made by the PP or the DIA, and decided by the court, after which a judge is appointed to be responsible for the management of the seized assets. Moveable property is kept in the custody of the police or Bank of Italy (BoI), depending on the value. Perishable assets can be sold or destroyed on the authorisation of a judge. 448. For property seized and confiscated under the AMC, the assistance to the judiciary on the management of these assets are tasked to the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organised Crime (ANBSC) established in 2010 under the AMC LD 109/2011. For all other assets, the management is governed by the CPC. The mechanics of both processes are generally similar. 449. Judicial administrators chosen from among the members of the National Register of Judicial Administrators may also be appointed to manage assets that require active management to conserve their value. The judicial administrator has the status of a public official and must diligently carry out the duties of his office and are appointed based on the expertise required related to the nature and size of asset to be managed. The judicial administrator may also obtain the assistance of other experts where needed. On the assets, the judicial administrator will make proposal that needs to be authorised by the director of the ANBSC for AMC asset recoveries and by the judge all other asset recoveries. and annually provide and update to account for the assets. This is done in line with the national strategy for the valorisation of seized and confiscated assets through cohesion policies to facilitate the effective and efficient use of real estate and business assets confiscated from organised crime. 450. Under this framework, Italy has managed a variety of assets which include companies, expensive vehicles, yachts, real estate, shares, securities and bonds, amongst others. In light of the mafia phenomena in Italy where there is a well-known typology relating to control of businesses, Italian authorities demonstrated that they have considerable experience in the judicial administration of working businesses and corporations that have been seized." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="447. In all cases, the application for seizures is made by the PP or the DIA, and decided by the court, after which a judge is appointed to be responsible for the management of the seized assets. Moveable property is kept in the custody of the police or Bank of Italy (BoI), depending on the value. Perishable assets can be sold or destroyed on the authorisation of a judge. 448. For property seized and confiscated under the AMC, the assistance to the judiciary on the management of these assets are tasked to the National Agency for the Administration and Destination of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organised Crime (ANBSC) established in 2010 under the AMC LD 109/2011. For all other assets, the management is governed by the CPC. The mechanics of both processes are generally similar. 449. Judicial administrators chosen from among the members of the National Register of Judicial Administrators may also be appointed to manage assets that require active management to conserve their value. The judicial administrator has the status of a public official and must diligently carry out the duties of his office and are appointed based on the expertise required related to the nature and size of asset to be managed. The judicial administrator may also obtain the assistance of other experts where needed. On the assets, the judicial administrator will make proposal that needs to be authorised by the director of the ANBSC for AMC asset recoveries and by the judge all other asset recoveries. and annually provide and update to account for the assets. This is done in line with the national strategy for the valorisation of seized and confiscated assets through cohesion policies to facilitate the effective and efficient use of real estate and business assets confiscated from organised crime. 450. Under this framework, Italy has managed a variety of assets which include companies, expensive vehicles, yachts, real estate, shares, securities and bonds, amongst others. In light of the mafia phenomena in Italy where there is a well-known typology relating to control of businesses, Italian authorities demonstrated that they have considerable experience in the judicial administration of working businesses and corporations that have been seized." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 482. The Financial Security Committee (FSC) (see IO.1) is the responsible body for the coordination of TF prevention policies in Italy. However, it focuses much more regularly on ML than TF for both strategic and operational purposes, which is generally in line with Italy’s risks and context. Although there have been examples of the FSC discussing TF-related STR analysis and broader terrorism threat analysis, this has been mainly within the ML/TF NRA process. 483.  CFT is not formally considered as part of Italy’s CT priorities, as promulgated by the Ministry of Interior. These priorities include mapping new terrorist threats, conducting joint counterterrorism exercises with international partners, expanding the level of understanding of terrorists’ countries of origin, and other items, but they do not mention TF. Italy does not maintain a counter-terrorism strategy. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 484. The CASA platform provides the central forum to coordinate counter-terrorism activities in Italy with input on TF activity uncovered by STR analysis as well as other intelligence information. UIF does not attend the CASA weekly meetings but TF-related STRs and UIF analysis are presented to it by GdF which presents notable TF-related STRs and any corresponding analysis. 485. CASA prepares an annual report on its activities, which was not provided to the assessment team due to its security classification. CASA meetings are also used to inform operational directives issued by the CT authorities. Overall, it was not evident how information relating to TF investigation (other than STR analysis), prosecution and conviction of TF was fed into the CASA mechanism to formulate CT strategies and corresponding operational plans. Financial investigation information provided by GdF also does not clearly feed into operational CT activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 482. The Financial Security Committee (FSC) (see IO.1) is the responsible body for the coordination of TF prevention policies in Italy. However, it focuses much more regularly on ML than TF for both strategic and operational purposes, which is generally in line with Italy’s risks and context. Although there have been examples of the FSC discussing TF-related STR analysis and broader terrorism threat analysis, this has been mainly within the ML/TF NRA process. 483.  CFT is not formally considered as part of Italy’s CT priorities, as promulgated by the Ministry of Interior. These priorities include mapping new terrorist threats, conducting joint counterterrorism exercises with international partners, expanding the level of understanding of terrorists’ countries of origin, and other items, but they do not mention TF. Italy does not maintain a counter-terrorism strategy. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 484. The CASA platform provides the central forum to coordinate counter-terrorism activities in Italy with input on TF activity uncovered by STR analysis as well as other intelligence information. UIF does not attend the CASA weekly meetings but TF-related STRs and UIF analysis are presented to it by GdF which presents notable TF-related STRs and any corresponding analysis. 485. CASA prepares an annual report on its activities, which was not provided to the assessment team due to its security classification. CASA meetings are also used to inform operational directives issued by the CT authorities. Overall, it was not evident how information relating to TF investigation (other than STR analysis), prosecution and conviction of TF was fed into the CASA mechanism to formulate CT strategies and corresponding operational plans. Financial investigation information provided by GdF also does not clearly feed into operational CT activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="507. TFS implementation in general has been a major point of focus for FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs. The UIF and GdF have a number of ongoing mechanisms and outreach to help ensure that FIs and DNFBPs understand and comply with and understand their TF-TFS obligations. The UIF’s website shows changes to the relevant TFS regimes, and the UIF also communicates changes proactively to all persons that are registered to the UIF’s email alert service. 508. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs generally have a good understanding of their TF-TFS obligations and have put in place adequate processes in order to ensure compliance with the relevant TFS lists. They generally make use of automated IT systems for checking changes to sanction regimes and use the UIF’s website to stay informed of new UN listings. Smaller DNFBPs (that are less exposed to sanction violations risks) have less advanced screening methods and a less developed understanding of sanctions implementation. They must report to the UIF the freezing measures applied, providing information on the persons involved, the amount and nature of the funds and economic resources. These reporting requirements also cover data on transactions or relationships, as well as any additional available information traceable to the designated subjects. These sectors have not identified any TF-TFS related funds since the previous MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="507. TFS implementation in general has been a major point of focus for FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs. The UIF and GdF have a number of ongoing mechanisms and outreach to help ensure that FIs and DNFBPs understand and comply with and understand their TF-TFS obligations. The UIF’s website shows changes to the relevant TFS regimes, and the UIF also communicates changes proactively to all persons that are registered to the UIF’s email alert service. 508. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs generally have a good understanding of their TF-TFS obligations and have put in place adequate processes in order to ensure compliance with the relevant TFS lists. They generally make use of automated IT systems for checking changes to sanction regimes and use the UIF’s website to stay informed of new UN listings. Smaller DNFBPs (that are less exposed to sanction violations risks) have less advanced screening methods and a less developed understanding of sanctions implementation. They must report to the UIF the freezing measures applied, providing information on the persons involved, the amount and nature of the funds and economic resources. These reporting requirements also cover data on transactions or relationships, as well as any additional available information traceable to the designated subjects. These sectors have not identified any TF-TFS related funds since the previous MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="522. Italy employs to a large extent comprehensive mechanisms to identify the funds and other assets of designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf and such persons and to prevent such persons or entities from operating or executing financing transactions related to proliferation. Both the UIF and the GdF have extensive powers with regards to identifying and preventing PF, which are described under IO.10 (see Core Issue 10.2). During the reporting period (2020 – May 2025), no funds or other assets were identified. Funds remain frozen relating measures taken before then - to three bank accounts relating to four individuals – totalling EUR 7 897.07, as well as a building in Rome (valued at approximately EUR 400 000) being frozen by the GdF as instructed by the FSC. During the evaluation period the FSC has not received requests for exemptions or unfreezing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="522. Italy employs to a large extent comprehensive mechanisms to identify the funds and other assets of designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf and such persons and to prevent such persons or entities from operating or executing financing transactions related to proliferation. Both the UIF and the GdF have extensive powers with regards to identifying and preventing PF, which are described under IO.10 (see Core Issue 10.2). During the reporting period (2020 – May 2025), no funds or other assets were identified. Funds remain frozen relating measures taken before then - to three bank accounts relating to four individuals – totalling EUR 7 897.07, as well as a building in Rome (valued at approximately EUR 400 000) being frozen by the GdF as instructed by the FSC. During the evaluation period the FSC has not received requests for exemptions or unfreezing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="117. The Italian AML/CFT system is founded on strong domestic cooperation on AML/CFT issues at the both the policy and operational level. The FSC serves as a central body to coordinate ML/TF policy across a broad range of authorities, including government agencies and regulatory authorities. The FSC is chaired by the MEF and has regular monthly meetings, even though, in practice, the FSC often meets more regularly to discuss emerging risks. 118. Authorities also coordinate outside the FSC on policy development. The supervisory authorities (BoI, UIF, GdF, CONSOB, and IVASS) and the UIF regularly coordinate amongst each other and with other stakeholders on policy development and implementation. An instance of this can be seen in committees organised by one authority to update technical regulations related to FIs and DNFPBs that often include representation from multiple authorities. 119. The authorities maintain and update MoUs between each other. Such MoUs facilitate communication and collaboration and allow for a fluid flow of information between competent authorities. As an example, the MoU between the BoI and the UIF allow the authorities to easily share a wide range of information, such as open-source intelligence results, information on sanctioning proceedings, and remedial actions undertaken by the reporting entities. 120. Italian authorities coordinate regularly with the SRBs to draft and finalise their technical regulations, which must be approved by the FSC before issuance, and other formal policies related to the non-financial sector. Additionally, MoUs between SRBs and competent authorities have strengthened cooperation and coordination between the authorities and the SRBs. For example, the MoU between the National Council of Accountants and the UIF has led to the regulation of technical specifications for forwarding STRs filed by the accountants." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="117. The Italian AML/CFT system is founded on strong domestic cooperation on AML/CFT issues at the both the policy and operational level. The FSC serves as a central body to coordinate ML/TF policy across a broad range of authorities, including government agencies and regulatory authorities. The FSC is chaired by the MEF and has regular monthly meetings, even though, in practice, the FSC often meets more regularly to discuss emerging risks. 118. Authorities also coordinate outside the FSC on policy development. The supervisory authorities (BoI, UIF, GdF, CONSOB, and IVASS) and the UIF regularly coordinate amongst each other and with other stakeholders on policy development and implementation. An instance of this can be seen in committees organised by one authority to update technical regulations related to FIs and DNFPBs that often include representation from multiple authorities. 119. The authorities maintain and update MoUs between each other. Such MoUs facilitate communication and collaboration and allow for a fluid flow of information between competent authorities. As an example, the MoU between the BoI and the UIF allow the authorities to easily share a wide range of information, such as open-source intelligence results, information on sanctioning proceedings, and remedial actions undertaken by the reporting entities. 120. Italian authorities coordinate regularly with the SRBs to draft and finalise their technical regulations, which must be approved by the FSC before issuance, and other formal policies related to the non-financial sector. Additionally, MoUs between SRBs and competent authorities have strengthened cooperation and coordination between the authorities and the SRBs. For example, the MoU between the National Council of Accountants and the UIF has led to the regulation of technical specifications for forwarding STRs filed by the accountants." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="229. The BoI, IVASS and GdF apply a risk-based approach to supervision respectively following their own robust supervisory framework. The supervisors produce annual supervision plans, which generally prioritise the highest risk areas and enable effective allocation of supervisory resources. 230. Overall, the supervisory activity by the BoI is adequate, risk-based and calibrated according to the relative importance and risks of individual entities. Supervision generally consists of a mix of off-site, on-site and thematic inspections, which are well interlinked. Off-site supervision generally consists of desktop reviews on all FIs, including lower-risk institutions, to perform individual FI risk assessments and identify area of concern. The desktop review is conducted mainly based on periodic information submissions by FIs, which include quantitative data on risks, qualitative questionnaire on regulatory self-assessment, AML/CFT internal audit reports, etc. Results from off-site supervision are generally fed into the on-site inspection plans and are used to target specific areas of focus. On-site supervision generally focuses on firms’ risk assessments, completion of CDD and record keeping, promptness of STR submissions, robustness of AML/CFT compliance programme, including policies and procedures, as well as effectiveness of customer risk profiling, sanction screening and transaction monitoring. There is a particular focus placed on the design of the firm’s risk control framework and operational implementation. The amount of information assessed appears comprehensive enough to provide a good picture of the firm’s risks and control framework. FIs supervised by the BoI 231. The BoI established a dedicated AML/CFT supervisory unit (AML Unit) in June 2022, which now reports directly to the BoI’s Governing Board. The AML Unit is responsible for participation in international and supranational AML/CFT bodies, drafting of national regulations and off-site supervision. On-site supervision and issuing of sanctions for non-compliance is handled by the BoI’s Financial Supervision and Regulation Directorate (DG FSR). The creation of the AML Unit led to a substantial increase in the resources dedicated to AML/CFT supervision in the BoI, which at the end of 2023 total an estimated 95 FTEs across the various activities. 232. Based on its resourcing and its understanding of risks (cf. CI 3.2 above), the BoI performs different types of on- and off-site supervisory activities towards FIs under its supervision. These are categorised as follows: · Annual meetings – generally held since January 2023 at the premises of the FI, with the AML function, with the largest banking groups and selected large players in other sectors, including PIs/EMIs. The largest banking groups cover about 80 % of the market (in operational volumes) and 36 % of customers of all FIs under BoI’s supervision. The large players in other sectors are chosen according to risk plus e.g. number of customers, number of transactions, market share and cross-border activities. · Off-site thematic in-depth assessment (“deep dives”) – a type of assessments whose intrusiveness ranges between on-site inspections and standardised off-site activity. Given the operational efforts needed, the targets of deep dives are only very high priority FIs in terms of risk or operational complexity. · Horizontal analyses – analytical activities concerning (parts of) the financial system, e.g. specific sectors, sample of supervised entities, business lines etc. It typically entails information requests (questionnaires) or thematic cross-sectional insights via off-site reviews or thematic on-site campaigns. · On-site inspections, of various types: o Full-scope – investigates all core AML/CFT safeguards, sample testing, interviews with personnel, testing of systems. These may be conducted as part of full-scope prudential on-site inspections. o Follow-up – investigates whether previously identified weaknesses have been rectified. o Targeted – focus on specific processes or risks o Thematic – addressed to a sample of FIs to understand how specific sectors or types of entities mitigate risks 233. Based on these so-called “observation actions”, the BoI may find it necessary to follow-up with enforcement actions. These may entail ‘to do-letters’, measures which restrict the activities of the entities as well as sanctioning measures. Only the sanctioning measures are published by the BoI. 234. The BoI has established a supervisory manual and trains its staff to ensure a consistent approach to supervision. 235. The BoI’s 4-year strategic plans ensure that supervision is risk based (the current plan is from 2024-2027). The plan incorporates the sectoral risk assessment and risk assessment of individual FIs. Based on this, priority classes are identified, and these determine how often a full individual risk assessment is performed and the intensity of supervisory actions. The priority classes are then compared to an assessment of capacity, and this determines the frequency of supervisory action and the nature of the inspections and horizontal analyses to be performed. 236. The strategic plan determines the AML Unit’s annual operational plan. All entities which are classed as ‘Very High’ in priority are inspected (on-site) during the four-year period. For the other priority classes, the frequency of inspections is lower and depends on a number of factors, such as the results of the individual risk assessment of the FI. The BoI also conducts on-site inspections when the need arises, even though the strategic or operational plan may not have required it. This also serves as an opportunity to verify the robustness of the selection process. 237. The type of inspection to be used is tailored to the supervisory needs and the priority class to which an FI belongs. Full-scope and targeted on-site AML/CFT inspections are generally used for FIs in the ‘Very High’ and ‘High’ priority classes, while FIs in the lower priority classes may instead be inspected as a component of prudential full-scope inspection. Thematic and follow-up inspections are used for all intermediaries regardless of priority class, depending on the needs. 238. Areas for in-depth horizontal analysis are determined by the strategic plan. For 2024-2027, the selected areas of focus include i) FIs’ organizational structures and, for banks, AML functions’ operational models and, for PIs/EMIs, improvements in the organizational structures of foreign PIs/EMIs established in Italy; ii) AML core processes, with regard to the transaction monitoring, due diligence and risk profiling, self-assessment of ML/TF risks and the outsourcing of AML functions and activities; iii) implementation of EBA guidelines on the role of the compliance managers/officers, the remote on-boarding and de-risking. . In addition to that, in 2025 the BoI AML Unit also started an in-depth analysis on the measures adopted by FIs to ensure compliance with obligations related to combating the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or those stemming from the application of EU and national restrictive measures. 239. The supervisory actions to be taken towards the FIs takes into account the individual risk assessment score of an entity, according to the following figure: Table 3.4. Supervisory actions associated with risk assessment score Risk assessment score Expected supervisory actions 1 Regular desk review [13] Horizontal analysis 2 Regular desk review Observation actions (letter/meeting/deep- dive/on-site inspection) Horizontal analysis 3 Regular desk review Observation actions (letter/meeting/deep-dive/on-site inspection) Horizontal analysis Enforcement actions: “to do” letter; sanctioning measures applied in case of serious, systematic, repeated breaches Follow-up actions (letter, meeting, follow-up on-site inspection) 4 Regular desk review Enforcement actions: restrictive measures; sanctioning measures applied in case of serious, systematic, repeated breaches Follow-up action (letter, meeting, follow-up on-site inspection) 240. Overall, the BoI has performed the following supervisory actions in the period 2020-2024: Table 3.5. Number of off-site and on-site actions by type per year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 OBSERVATION OFF-SITE ACTIONS 137 277 242 370 466 observation letters / emails 66 154 105 160 208 meetings /calls 71 123 137 209 258 deep-dives 0 0 0 1 0 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 116 89 89 123 154 enforcement letters 96 76 80 114 140 sanctions 19 12 6 8 8 cease and desist orders 0 1 2 0 0 restrictive measures 1 0 1 1 6 TOT. OFF-SITE INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 253 366 331 493 620 HORIZONTAL ACTIONS 0 11 10 6 6 thematic off-site 0 0 0 2 1 thematic on-site 0 11 10 4 5 OBSERVATION ON-SITE ACTIONS 43 72 57 58 36 full-scope on-site 40 72 57 56 32 targeted on-site 0 0 0 0 3 follow-up on-site 3 0 0 2 1 241. According to the BoI, the increase in the off-site actions which have been taken is attributable to the establishment of the AML Unit. The impression of representatives of FIs met during the on-site confirmed the impact of the organizational changes implemented by the BoI through a more positive and impactful supervisory engagement. While noting that the largest portion of the activity relates to less-intrusive measures (letters, e-mails, meetings and calls), the activity level still appears to be on a reasonable level. 242. The supervisory activity of the BoI is supplemented by the supervisory activity by the UIF. Furthermore, CONSOB occasionally conducts supervision on behalf of BoI. In the period 2019-2024 CONSOB performed 3 full scope on-site inspections on behalf of BoI. 243. The UIF carried out 65 on-site inspections and 21 off-site controls in FIs and VASPs in the period 2019-2024. These inspections have a special focus on the reporting obligations of the entities. The outcomes of the findings are in all cases shared with supervisory authorities as well as with the entities themselves, to enable the adoption of remedial measures. The UIF has also initiated sanctions in some cases. FIs supervised by the GdF 244. The GdF is the sole supervisory authority for certain FIs and entities, including fiduciary companies (except those supervised by the BoI), currency exchangers, agents of FIs (most commonly Payment Institutions) and credit brokers. The GdF performed 514 on-site inspections in the period 2019-2024 (this includes inspections in some FIs under other supervisors’ remit, after its prior agreement). Most of these inspections (310) were on agents of Payment Institutions, which aligns with the risk assessment of these operators. 245. While the supervisory activity of the GdF appears to be broadly risk-based, the effectiveness of its supervisory activity should be enhanced further. A specific issue concerns the apparent lack of sufficient interaction between the GdF and the central contact points of foreign payment institutions established in Italy. This concern is further exacerbated by the limited follow-up with central contact points and the BoI on remedial action for the deficiencies identified in agents during on-site inspections although the AML Law in principle requires the GdF to provide the central contact points with information about inspection outcomes. Insurance Sector 246. IVASS performs both on- and off-site supervisory on insurance companies and distributors, and these are conducted in line with an annual risk assessment. On-site inspections are performed by the IVASS’ specialised AML unit, which is currently made up of 5 people. The inspections detailed in the table below are AML-specific inspections. Off-site AML activity is performed by the same unit. During inspections at insurance undertakings, IVASS also checks compliance of distributors with their CDD obligations. Further, GdF performs inspections on these distributors, after prior agreement with IVASS. 247. An overview of IVASS’ on-site activity in 2020-2024 is included in the following table: Table 3.6. On-site activity by IVASS On-site inspections and sanctions imposed 2020-2024 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Inspections 5 5 7 - 11 Serious findings - 1 - - 2 Moderate findings 5 - - - 3 Light findings - 3 - - 3 Sanctions imposed: - pecuniary - cease and desist orders - 2 2 - - - 6 - 2 - 248. The activity appears to be sufficient, given the risks and size of the life insurance sector. The sector is very stable in terms of the companies licensed to provide services (69), with very limited changes in the supervisory population in the last 20 years. Supervision of VASPs 249. The supervisory activity of the GdF towards VASPs has been concentrated in the period following the introduction of the OAM register of VASPs in May 2022. Before this, the GdF used a specific IT tool to identify operators in Italy, based on open sources, but the intensity of supervisory activity was lower. In this, the GdF has done two thematic supervisory reviews of the sector through the AOR process (see paras 239-240). These led to the identification of 24 and 8 operators at risk, respectively. These operators have been subject to on-site inspections by the GdF, together with a further 20 VASPs at medium risk. In addition, the UIF conducted some inspections on VASPs. Two VASPs were inspected in between 2019 and 2020, while a further two inspections were performed in 2022 and 2024. The UIF used STRs, especially STRs from other FIs concerning VA and the VASP’s activity, to select the targets for inspection. 250. The risks and importance of VA and VASPs may appear somewhat lower in Italy than in comparable countries, based on Italian authorities’ analysis of the spread and use of VA and VASP services (with Italy ranking 50th in the world in 2022 for number of VA holders.), however the sector is categorised as high risk due to inherent risks of the sector. Overall, supervisory action appears to be effective and aligned with risk. Footnotes [13] Update of the ML/TF risk assessment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="229. The BoI, IVASS and GdF apply a risk-based approach to supervision respectively following their own robust supervisory framework. The supervisors produce annual supervision plans, which generally prioritise the highest risk areas and enable effective allocation of supervisory resources. 230. Overall, the supervisory activity by the BoI is adequate, risk-based and calibrated according to the relative importance and risks of individual entities. Supervision generally consists of a mix of off-site, on-site and thematic inspections, which are well interlinked. Off-site supervision generally consists of desktop reviews on all FIs, including lower-risk institutions, to perform individual FI risk assessments and identify area of concern. The desktop review is conducted mainly based on periodic information submissions by FIs, which include quantitative data on risks, qualitative questionnaire on regulatory self-assessment, AML/CFT internal audit reports, etc. Results from off-site supervision are generally fed into the on-site inspection plans and are used to target specific areas of focus. On-site supervision generally focuses on firms’ risk assessments, completion of CDD and record keeping, promptness of STR submissions, robustness of AML/CFT compliance programme, including policies and procedures, as well as effectiveness of customer risk profiling, sanction screening and transaction monitoring. There is a particular focus placed on the design of the firm’s risk control framework and operational implementation. The amount of information assessed appears comprehensive enough to provide a good picture of the firm’s risks and control framework. FIs supervised by the BoI 231. The BoI established a dedicated AML/CFT supervisory unit (AML Unit) in June 2022, which now reports directly to the BoI’s Governing Board. The AML Unit is responsible for participation in international and supranational AML/CFT bodies, drafting of national regulations and off-site supervision. On-site supervision and issuing of sanctions for non-compliance is handled by the BoI’s Financial Supervision and Regulation Directorate (DG FSR). The creation of the AML Unit led to a substantial increase in the resources dedicated to AML/CFT supervision in the BoI, which at the end of 2023 total an estimated 95 FTEs across the various activities. 232. Based on its resourcing and its understanding of risks (cf. CI 3.2 above), the BoI performs different types of on- and off-site supervisory activities towards FIs under its supervision. These are categorised as follows: · Annual meetings – generally held since January 2023 at the premises of the FI, with the AML function, with the largest banking groups and selected large players in other sectors, including PIs/EMIs. The largest banking groups cover about 80 % of the market (in operational volumes) and 36 % of customers of all FIs under BoI’s supervision. The large players in other sectors are chosen according to risk plus e.g. number of customers, number of transactions, market share and cross-border activities. · Off-site thematic in-depth assessment (“deep dives”) – a type of assessments whose intrusiveness ranges between on-site inspections and standardised off-site activity. Given the operational efforts needed, the targets of deep dives are only very high priority FIs in terms of risk or operational complexity. · Horizontal analyses – analytical activities concerning (parts of) the financial system, e.g. specific sectors, sample of supervised entities, business lines etc. It typically entails information requests (questionnaires) or thematic cross-sectional insights via off-site reviews or thematic on-site campaigns. · On-site inspections, of various types: o Full-scope – investigates all core AML/CFT safeguards, sample testing, interviews with personnel, testing of systems. These may be conducted as part of full-scope prudential on-site inspections. o Follow-up – investigates whether previously identified weaknesses have been rectified. o Targeted – focus on specific processes or risks o Thematic – addressed to a sample of FIs to understand how specific sectors or types of entities mitigate risks 233. Based on these so-called “observation actions”, the BoI may find it necessary to follow-up with enforcement actions. These may entail ‘to do-letters’, measures which restrict the activities of the entities as well as sanctioning measures. Only the sanctioning measures are published by the BoI. 234. The BoI has established a supervisory manual and trains its staff to ensure a consistent approach to supervision. 235. The BoI’s 4-year strategic plans ensure that supervision is risk based (the current plan is from 2024-2027). The plan incorporates the sectoral risk assessment and risk assessment of individual FIs. Based on this, priority classes are identified, and these determine how often a full individual risk assessment is performed and the intensity of supervisory actions. The priority classes are then compared to an assessment of capacity, and this determines the frequency of supervisory action and the nature of the inspections and horizontal analyses to be performed. 236. The strategic plan determines the AML Unit’s annual operational plan. All entities which are classed as ‘Very High’ in priority are inspected (on-site) during the four-year period. For the other priority classes, the frequency of inspections is lower and depends on a number of factors, such as the results of the individual risk assessment of the FI. The BoI also conducts on-site inspections when the need arises, even though the strategic or operational plan may not have required it. This also serves as an opportunity to verify the robustness of the selection process. 237. The type of inspection to be used is tailored to the supervisory needs and the priority class to which an FI belongs. Full-scope and targeted on-site AML/CFT inspections are generally used for FIs in the ‘Very High’ and ‘High’ priority classes, while FIs in the lower priority classes may instead be inspected as a component of prudential full-scope inspection. Thematic and follow-up inspections are used for all intermediaries regardless of priority class, depending on the needs. 238. Areas for in-depth horizontal analysis are determined by the strategic plan. For 2024-2027, the selected areas of focus include i) FIs’ organizational structures and, for banks, AML functions’ operational models and, for PIs/EMIs, improvements in the organizational structures of foreign PIs/EMIs established in Italy; ii) AML core processes, with regard to the transaction monitoring, due diligence and risk profiling, self-assessment of ML/TF risks and the outsourcing of AML functions and activities; iii) implementation of EBA guidelines on the role of the compliance managers/officers, the remote on-boarding and de-risking. . In addition to that, in 2025 the BoI AML Unit also started an in-depth analysis on the measures adopted by FIs to ensure compliance with obligations related to combating the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or those stemming from the application of EU and national restrictive measures. 239. The supervisory actions to be taken towards the FIs takes into account the individual risk assessment score of an entity, according to the following figure: Table 3.4. Supervisory actions associated with risk assessment score Risk assessment score Expected supervisory actions 1 Regular desk review [13] Horizontal analysis 2 Regular desk review Observation actions (letter/meeting/deep- dive/on-site inspection) Horizontal analysis 3 Regular desk review Observation actions (letter/meeting/deep-dive/on-site inspection) Horizontal analysis Enforcement actions: “to do” letter; sanctioning measures applied in case of serious, systematic, repeated breaches Follow-up actions (letter, meeting, follow-up on-site inspection) 4 Regular desk review Enforcement actions: restrictive measures; sanctioning measures applied in case of serious, systematic, repeated breaches Follow-up action (letter, meeting, follow-up on-site inspection) 240. Overall, the BoI has performed the following supervisory actions in the period 2020-2024: Table 3.5. Number of off-site and on-site actions by type per year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 OBSERVATION OFF-SITE ACTIONS 137 277 242 370 466 observation letters / emails 66 154 105 160 208 meetings /calls 71 123 137 209 258 deep-dives 0 0 0 1 0 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 116 89 89 123 154 enforcement letters 96 76 80 114 140 sanctions 19 12 6 8 8 cease and desist orders 0 1 2 0 0 restrictive measures 1 0 1 1 6 TOT. OFF-SITE INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 253 366 331 493 620 HORIZONTAL ACTIONS 0 11 10 6 6 thematic off-site 0 0 0 2 1 thematic on-site 0 11 10 4 5 OBSERVATION ON-SITE ACTIONS 43 72 57 58 36 full-scope on-site 40 72 57 56 32 targeted on-site 0 0 0 0 3 follow-up on-site 3 0 0 2 1 241. According to the BoI, the increase in the off-site actions which have been taken is attributable to the establishment of the AML Unit. The impression of representatives of FIs met during the on-site confirmed the impact of the organizational changes implemented by the BoI through a more positive and impactful supervisory engagement. While noting that the largest portion of the activity relates to less-intrusive measures (letters, e-mails, meetings and calls), the activity level still appears to be on a reasonable level. 242. The supervisory activity of the BoI is supplemented by the supervisory activity by the UIF. Furthermore, CONSOB occasionally conducts supervision on behalf of BoI. In the period 2019-2024 CONSOB performed 3 full scope on-site inspections on behalf of BoI. 243. The UIF carried out 65 on-site inspections and 21 off-site controls in FIs and VASPs in the period 2019-2024. These inspections have a special focus on the reporting obligations of the entities. The outcomes of the findings are in all cases shared with supervisory authorities as well as with the entities themselves, to enable the adoption of remedial measures. The UIF has also initiated sanctions in some cases. FIs supervised by the GdF 244. The GdF is the sole supervisory authority for certain FIs and entities, including fiduciary companies (except those supervised by the BoI), currency exchangers, agents of FIs (most commonly Payment Institutions) and credit brokers. The GdF performed 514 on-site inspections in the period 2019-2024 (this includes inspections in some FIs under other supervisors’ remit, after its prior agreement). Most of these inspections (310) were on agents of Payment Institutions, which aligns with the risk assessment of these operators. 245. While the supervisory activity of the GdF appears to be broadly risk-based, the effectiveness of its supervisory activity should be enhanced further. A specific issue concerns the apparent lack of sufficient interaction between the GdF and the central contact points of foreign payment institutions established in Italy. This concern is further exacerbated by the limited follow-up with central contact points and the BoI on remedial action for the deficiencies identified in agents during on-site inspections although the AML Law in principle requires the GdF to provide the central contact points with information about inspection outcomes. Insurance Sector 246. IVASS performs both on- and off-site supervisory on insurance companies and distributors, and these are conducted in line with an annual risk assessment. On-site inspections are performed by the IVASS’ specialised AML unit, which is currently made up of 5 people. The inspections detailed in the table below are AML-specific inspections. Off-site AML activity is performed by the same unit. During inspections at insurance undertakings, IVASS also checks compliance of distributors with their CDD obligations. Further, GdF performs inspections on these distributors, after prior agreement with IVASS. 247. An overview of IVASS’ on-site activity in 2020-2024 is included in the following table: Table 3.6. On-site activity by IVASS On-site inspections and sanctions imposed 2020-2024 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Inspections 5 5 7 - 11 Serious findings - 1 - - 2 Moderate findings 5 - - - 3 Light findings - 3 - - 3 Sanctions imposed: - pecuniary - cease and desist orders - 2 2 - - - 6 - 2 - 248. The activity appears to be sufficient, given the risks and size of the life insurance sector. The sector is very stable in terms of the companies licensed to provide services (69), with very limited changes in the supervisory population in the last 20 years. Supervision of VASPs 249. The supervisory activity of the GdF towards VASPs has been concentrated in the period following the introduction of the OAM register of VASPs in May 2022. Before this, the GdF used a specific IT tool to identify operators in Italy, based on open sources, but the intensity of supervisory activity was lower. In this, the GdF has done two thematic supervisory reviews of the sector through the AOR process (see paras 239-240). These led to the identification of 24 and 8 operators at risk, respectively. These operators have been subject to on-site inspections by the GdF, together with a further 20 VASPs at medium risk. In addition, the UIF conducted some inspections on VASPs. Two VASPs were inspected in between 2019 and 2020, while a further two inspections were performed in 2022 and 2024. The UIF used STRs, especially STRs from other FIs concerning VA and the VASP’s activity, to select the targets for inspection. 250. The risks and importance of VA and VASPs may appear somewhat lower in Italy than in comparable countries, based on Italian authorities’ analysis of the spread and use of VA and VASP services (with Italy ranking 50th in the world in 2022 for number of VA holders.), however the sector is categorised as high risk due to inherent risks of the sector. Overall, supervisory action appears to be effective and aligned with risk. Footnotes [13] Update of the ML/TF risk assessment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Supervision by the GdF 306. The GdF conducts supervisory activities on all types of DNFPBs, apart from PIE auditors, who are supervised by the CONSOB. The GdF have a range of supervisory tools at its disposal, and this includes both on site full-scope inspections and targeted inspections, as well as offsite inspections. The full-scope inspections verify compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. These onsite inspections vary in intensity, with targeted inspections conducted only for a few specific AML/CFT obligations. However, despite the wide powers at the disposal of the GdF to perform supervisory activity, its efficacy is diluted by the lack of coordination between the SRBs and the GdF for the purposes of supervisory activity. 307. Italy to some extent applies a risk-based approach to the supervision of its large DNFBP population, which consists of approximately 340 000 DNFBPs. Annual supervisory planning determines which entities will be subject to specific supervisory activity. Higher priority DNFBPs are identified through the GdF’s operational plan, which determines the GdF’s supervisory activity, which is carried out by the territorial units and the Special Currency Police units, who has national jurisdiction. The operation plan is formulated taking into account the strategic priorities set by the MEF and inputs from the NRA, as well as with information from GdF of sectors and phenomena of greatest risk. However, many high risk sectors such as lawyers and Real Estate agents are not supervised commensurate to their risk. Further, even though the cash limit means that the DPMS sector is outside the scope of the assessment, the GdF carries out targeted inspections on some parts of the sector. 308. DNFBPs are selected in the operational plan based on the economic relevance, geographic location and information on their risk perception. The operational units (local GdF authorities) decide which DNFBPs to conduct supervision on, based on a pre-defined target of on-site inspections to be conducted. Additionally, any DNFBPs identified by the operational risk analysis (AOR) process [see C.I. 3.2] are prioritised for supervisory activity. For inspections which emerge from AORs the relevant local units determine the specific DNFBPs that will be prioritised for inspections. Therefore, some DNFBPs selected in the AOR process as high risk might not be inspected immediately, given the territorial unit’s decision, but would be inspected within a five-year timeline. Box 4 . 3 . AOR conducted by the GdF In 2020 the Special Currency Police Unit of GDF developed an AOR (called STRANGER GOLD) with regard to the whole population of professional gold dealers on the basis of the data and information extracted from the declarations contained in the database on gold transactions (called O.R.O.) communicated by the FIU as part of the cooperation relationships pursuant to Article 12, Legislative Decree no. 231/2007. The in-depth examinations of those data, together with information gathered in numerous databases and on the basis of their economic importance and geographical location, made it possible to identify positions characterised by money laundering risk profiles linked to possible predicate offences of abusive gold trading and tax evasion. This kind of activities, performed by GDF in different sectors, allow the identification of possible high-risk target for subsequent on-site inspections. 309. While this is usually a top-down process, with the supervisory plan being formulated by central command, the GdF has some flexibility to change the number of on-site inspections every year, according to emerging risks. Cases from supervision shows how this was done in a sector where emerging risks appeared. This can be seen in cases from 2022 where 22 full scope inspections were conducted in TCSPs (CAFs) due to COVID-recovery laws that increased the risks for the sector, with fraudulent companies being formed to take advantage of state funds. Significant deficiencies were found because of these supervisory activities, which would not have taken place if derogations were not made from the supervisory plan. 310. Overall, the GDF’s selection processes, though oriented to risk, needs to be refined to ensure adequate coverage of high-risk sectors (such as lawyers), and medium and lower-risk entities. While the GdF is able to a large extent, to identify sectors and entities with higher and emerging ML/TF risks, the selection process for entities is structured such that only the highest-risk entities are selected for on-site supervision, and other entities are not effectively prioritised for onsite activity. The GdF conducted very few inspections in lower than high-risk sectors, which could contribute to increasing the level of knowledge about the sectors’ compliance and substantiate the risk categories for the sectors that are not characterised as higher risk. 311. The high number of DNFBPs (as well as some FIs) under GdF’s supervision makes it challenging to allocate sufficient resources to supervise the different sectors to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations. This concern is further exacerbated by the length of time which an onsite takes (between six to twelve weeks). During inspections, the GdF goes through all the entities’ activities, ensuring that the entities understand the breaches to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. It is uncertain if the supervision is adequate in terms of mitigating the risk of sectors, particularly those identified to be higher risk (e.g. lawyers and accountants). For the notary sector, the supervisory activities of the GdF appear to have had a positive effect of the risk understanding of the sector, as noted in C.I 4.3. Table 4.2. Supervisory activity by the GdF (from 2020 to 2024) DNFPB No. of on-site inspections No. of STR violations No. of CDD violations No. of Ret. Data violations Casino, including on-line 53 4 9 11 Real estate agencies 434 50 357 175 Lawyers 333 22 126 52 Notaries 542 179 350 157 Auditors (non PIE) 30 8 26 7 Chartered accountants and accounting experts 1 058 154 846 424 Other entities (TCSPs) performing accounting and tax activities (CAF) 144 33 131 44 Total 2 594 450 1 845 870 312. Further, the lack of cooperation between the GdF and SRBs on supervisory activity is a concern. The GdF does not share its supervisory priorities or the result of inspections with SRBs, which deprives the SRBs of valuable information which could be utilised in their professional oversight of the DNFPBs. Information is only shared by the MEF at the end of the sanctioning procedure and only for the most serious violations committed by professionals. Supervision by the UIF 313. The UIF also performs control activity for DNFPBs, focused on compliance with STR filing obligations. These are done through general guidelines for its such controls, even though specific inspection methodologies have been created for some sectors, such as gaming service providers, auditing companies and DPMS. The UIF’s inspections in DNFBPs are carried out in coordination with GdF. 314. As the table 4.3 illustrates, the number of inspections done by the UIF are overall low. Table 4.3. Supervisory activity by UIF Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Gaming service providers - - 1 - 5 Auction houses and art galleries 1 - – 2 Auditing companies [15] - - 1 1 - Cash in transit companies [16] - - 2 1 - Dealers in gold and precious metals - - - 1 3-2(*) Real estate agents - - - 2* Casinos - - - 1 1(*) Total - 2 5 4 - 2 (*) 10 -3(*) * Indicates off-site inspections Checks by SRBs 315. In addition to supervision by the GdF and the UIF, a limited role is played by the SRBs as well, even though they are not tasked with AML/CFT/CPF supervision. These checks vary by SRB and include AML/CFT elements alongside other checks. 316. The national council of chartered accountants and accounts conducts AML/CFT/CPF checks as part of their prudential inspection. The controls are done by the local branch and from information given onsite they seem to conduct a relatively thorough check in terms of AML/CFT requirements. The local branches of the council are independent and can chose to check all their members or do sample checks. This could lead to a very uneven result at national level and is not in line with a risk-based approach. 317. The council of notaries’ local units conducts checks of their members every second year, including AML/CFT requirements. If issues are identified, extraordinary checks can be carried out. 318. Further, CONSOB supervises PIE auditors with a risk-based approach, through offsite activities (192 between 2019-2024) and onsite activities (18, mostly full scope inspections). Guidance and outreach activities are often performed to strengthen the PIE auditor’s compliance. The increasing trend in compliance level of PIE auditors demonstrates the efficacy of CONSOB’s activity. Footnotes [15] Auditing firms supervised by CONSOB. [16] Additional category to the FATF scope of DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Supervision by the GdF 306. The GdF conducts supervisory activities on all types of DNFPBs, apart from PIE auditors, who are supervised by the CONSOB. The GdF have a range of supervisory tools at its disposal, and this includes both on site full-scope inspections and targeted inspections, as well as offsite inspections. The full-scope inspections verify compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. These onsite inspections vary in intensity, with targeted inspections conducted only for a few specific AML/CFT obligations. However, despite the wide powers at the disposal of the GdF to perform supervisory activity, its efficacy is diluted by the lack of coordination between the SRBs and the GdF for the purposes of supervisory activity. 307. Italy to some extent applies a risk-based approach to the supervision of its large DNFBP population, which consists of approximately 340 000 DNFBPs. Annual supervisory planning determines which entities will be subject to specific supervisory activity. Higher priority DNFBPs are identified through the GdF’s operational plan, which determines the GdF’s supervisory activity, which is carried out by the territorial units and the Special Currency Police units, who has national jurisdiction. The operation plan is formulated taking into account the strategic priorities set by the MEF and inputs from the NRA, as well as with information from GdF of sectors and phenomena of greatest risk. However, many high risk sectors such as lawyers and Real Estate agents are not supervised commensurate to their risk. Further, even though the cash limit means that the DPMS sector is outside the scope of the assessment, the GdF carries out targeted inspections on some parts of the sector. 308. DNFBPs are selected in the operational plan based on the economic relevance, geographic location and information on their risk perception. The operational units (local GdF authorities) decide which DNFBPs to conduct supervision on, based on a pre-defined target of on-site inspections to be conducted. Additionally, any DNFBPs identified by the operational risk analysis (AOR) process [see C.I. 3.2] are prioritised for supervisory activity. For inspections which emerge from AORs the relevant local units determine the specific DNFBPs that will be prioritised for inspections. Therefore, some DNFBPs selected in the AOR process as high risk might not be inspected immediately, given the territorial unit’s decision, but would be inspected within a five-year timeline. Box 4 . 3 . AOR conducted by the GdF In 2020 the Special Currency Police Unit of GDF developed an AOR (called STRANGER GOLD) with regard to the whole population of professional gold dealers on the basis of the data and information extracted from the declarations contained in the database on gold transactions (called O.R.O.) communicated by the FIU as part of the cooperation relationships pursuant to Article 12, Legislative Decree no. 231/2007. The in-depth examinations of those data, together with information gathered in numerous databases and on the basis of their economic importance and geographical location, made it possible to identify positions characterised by money laundering risk profiles linked to possible predicate offences of abusive gold trading and tax evasion. This kind of activities, performed by GDF in different sectors, allow the identification of possible high-risk target for subsequent on-site inspections. 309. While this is usually a top-down process, with the supervisory plan being formulated by central command, the GdF has some flexibility to change the number of on-site inspections every year, according to emerging risks. Cases from supervision shows how this was done in a sector where emerging risks appeared. This can be seen in cases from 2022 where 22 full scope inspections were conducted in TCSPs (CAFs) due to COVID-recovery laws that increased the risks for the sector, with fraudulent companies being formed to take advantage of state funds. Significant deficiencies were found because of these supervisory activities, which would not have taken place if derogations were not made from the supervisory plan. 310. Overall, the GDF’s selection processes, though oriented to risk, needs to be refined to ensure adequate coverage of high-risk sectors (such as lawyers), and medium and lower-risk entities. While the GdF is able to a large extent, to identify sectors and entities with higher and emerging ML/TF risks, the selection process for entities is structured such that only the highest-risk entities are selected for on-site supervision, and other entities are not effectively prioritised for onsite activity. The GdF conducted very few inspections in lower than high-risk sectors, which could contribute to increasing the level of knowledge about the sectors’ compliance and substantiate the risk categories for the sectors that are not characterised as higher risk. 311. The high number of DNFBPs (as well as some FIs) under GdF’s supervision makes it challenging to allocate sufficient resources to supervise the different sectors to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations. This concern is further exacerbated by the length of time which an onsite takes (between six to twelve weeks). During inspections, the GdF goes through all the entities’ activities, ensuring that the entities understand the breaches to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. It is uncertain if the supervision is adequate in terms of mitigating the risk of sectors, particularly those identified to be higher risk (e.g. lawyers and accountants). For the notary sector, the supervisory activities of the GdF appear to have had a positive effect of the risk understanding of the sector, as noted in C.I 4.3. Table 4.2. Supervisory activity by the GdF (from 2020 to 2024) DNFPB No. of on-site inspections No. of STR violations No. of CDD violations No. of Ret. Data violations Casino, including on-line 53 4 9 11 Real estate agencies 434 50 357 175 Lawyers 333 22 126 52 Notaries 542 179 350 157 Auditors (non PIE) 30 8 26 7 Chartered accountants and accounting experts 1 058 154 846 424 Other entities (TCSPs) performing accounting and tax activities (CAF) 144 33 131 44 Total 2 594 450 1 845 870 312. Further, the lack of cooperation between the GdF and SRBs on supervisory activity is a concern. The GdF does not share its supervisory priorities or the result of inspections with SRBs, which deprives the SRBs of valuable information which could be utilised in their professional oversight of the DNFPBs. Information is only shared by the MEF at the end of the sanctioning procedure and only for the most serious violations committed by professionals. Supervision by the UIF 313. The UIF also performs control activity for DNFPBs, focused on compliance with STR filing obligations. These are done through general guidelines for its such controls, even though specific inspection methodologies have been created for some sectors, such as gaming service providers, auditing companies and DPMS. The UIF’s inspections in DNFBPs are carried out in coordination with GdF. 314. As the table 4.3 illustrates, the number of inspections done by the UIF are overall low. Table 4.3. Supervisory activity by UIF Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Gaming service providers - - 1 - 5 Auction houses and art galleries 1 - – 2 Auditing companies [15] - - 1 1 - Cash in transit companies [16] - - 2 1 - Dealers in gold and precious metals - - - 1 3-2(*) Real estate agents - - - 2* Casinos - - - 1 1(*) Total - 2 5 4 - 2 (*) 10 -3(*) * Indicates off-site inspections Checks by SRBs 315. In addition to supervision by the GdF and the UIF, a limited role is played by the SRBs as well, even though they are not tasked with AML/CFT/CPF supervision. These checks vary by SRB and include AML/CFT elements alongside other checks. 316. The national council of chartered accountants and accounts conducts AML/CFT/CPF checks as part of their prudential inspection. The controls are done by the local branch and from information given onsite they seem to conduct a relatively thorough check in terms of AML/CFT requirements. The local branches of the council are independent and can chose to check all their members or do sample checks. This could lead to a very uneven result at national level and is not in line with a risk-based approach. 317. The council of notaries’ local units conducts checks of their members every second year, including AML/CFT requirements. If issues are identified, extraordinary checks can be carried out. 318. Further, CONSOB supervises PIE auditors with a risk-based approach, through offsite activities (192 between 2019-2024) and onsite activities (18, mostly full scope inspections). Guidance and outreach activities are often performed to strengthen the PIE auditor’s compliance. The increasing trend in compliance level of PIE auditors demonstrates the efficacy of CONSOB’s activity. Footnotes [15] Auditing firms supervised by CONSOB. [16] Additional category to the FATF scope of DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="350. While there are possibilities of sanctioning non-compliance with the requirements pertaining to registering basic and beneficial ownership information (see the TC Annex on R.24), limited information was provided to substantiate how such breaches of the requirements are sanctioned in practice. Sanctioning is handled by the Chambers of Commerce, based on detection and description of violations by other authorities, especially by GdF. The sanctioning procedure takes a few weeks, and the size of the fines are laid down in the law. As found in the TC Annex, the sanctions for breaches of basic information are not dissuasive and proportionate. However, breaches of the obligations of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, including for identifying BOs, are identified and sanctioned in practice, as provided for in IO.3 and IO.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="350. While there are possibilities of sanctioning non-compliance with the requirements pertaining to registering basic and beneficial ownership information (see the TC Annex on R.24), limited information was provided to substantiate how such breaches of the requirements are sanctioned in practice. Sanctioning is handled by the Chambers of Commerce, based on detection and description of violations by other authorities, especially by GdF. The sanctioning procedure takes a few weeks, and the size of the fines are laid down in the law. As found in the TC Annex, the sanctions for breaches of basic information are not dissuasive and proportionate. However, breaches of the obligations of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, including for identifying BOs, are identified and sanctioned in practice, as provided for in IO.3 and IO.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 451. Confiscation levels have been maintained at regular and healthy levels by the authorities that are central to Italy’s asset recovery regime. DIA confiscates over 70% of its asset seizures, which is reasonable as it operates mostly under the AMC under which non-conviction confiscations are anticipated. GdF routinely uses both conviction and non-conviction-based confiscation and confiscates about 35% of its asset seizures. In total, assets valued at about EUR 7 billion have been confiscated by the GdF and DIA over the evaluation period. As stated above, the State Police and the Carabinieri have declared that those authorities are pursuing and seizing property of corresponding value but no data was presented to support that statement (see 443). Likewise, data regarding confiscations resulting from the seizure of property of corresponding value in investigations carried out by the State Police and the Carabinieri is not available and as a result it is not demonstrated to what extent these authorities are pursuing assets through confiscation. Table 8.5. Asset Confiscation– by GdF and DIA (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 797 009 826 1 363 762 978 1 568 060 523 748 140 120 1 081 845 653 263 556 904 5 822 376 004 DIA 223 245 593 237 902 700 224 890 081 164 564 544 160 898 454 31 713 531 1 045 214 903 452. Approximately 13% of confiscations by the GdF relate to ML, while only 0.08% of confiscations by DIA relate to ML (see Table 8.6 below) which appears low considering DIA’s focus on serious organised crime. Data provided by Italy reflected that asset confiscations are largely in line with the ML and predicate offences risk in Italy with the bulk of the seizures relating to mafia-type organised crime (50%), fraud (12.5%) and tax evasion and tax offences (15%), although less so for corruption (4%) and drug trafficking (2.5%). No asset confiscations were reported relating to TF. Seizures and confiscations under the AMC can be challenged on grounds that the underlying criminality does not relate to mafia-style criminality and Italian authorities noted that their asset recovery efforts under the AMC are regularly challenged on this basis. Thus, despite the broad powers, there remains a need for the authorities to identify and address challenges to the pursuit of asset recovery under the AMC. Table 8.6. Asset Confiscations relating to ML (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 170 819 040 221 469 151 99 623 497 41 726 668 151 598 015 55 497 351 740 733 722 DIA 80 000 0 0 0 502 000 7 918 875 8 500 875 453. As with seizures, although Italy’s legislation provides for the confiscation of property of corresponding value and this is a tool used mostly by the GdF and the DIA (under the AMC), only limited figures were provided as to how frequently this was used. The bulk of ML confiscations by GdF was confiscations under article 240 bis CC [22] and related to assets of corresponding value. No data was presented that shows to what extent the State Police and the Carabinieri confiscate property of corresponding value relating to ML. There was no data to demonstrate the extent to which asset confiscations relating to TF or other crime types were being conducted. Table 8.7. Types Asset Confiscations relating to ML (GdF only) (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Direct and corresponding value 7 132 996 12 496 932 51 753 071 10 092 616 77 775 322 2 052 015 161 302 952 Under article 240 bis CC 114 747 457 168 526 131 30 099 406 14 923 190 44 649 163 52 455 163 425 400 510 Non-conviction based 48 938 587 40 446 088 17 771 020 16 710 862 29 173 530 990 173 154 030 260 Conviction-based confiscation 7 132 996 12 496 932 51 753 071 10 092 616 77 775 322 2 052 015 161 302 952 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 454. As noted in IO.2 as well as case studies reflected in IO.7, there are cross border linkages to many ML and other economic offences investigated in Italy. The GdF in particular, and the DIA to a lesser extent, seek international cooperation to recover criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad, resulting in significant assets located abroad that have been seized and confiscated over the evaluation period. Over the evaluation period, the State Police, obtained seizures for EUR 710 399 and confiscation of EUR 330 583 of illicit assets from their investigations located abroad. The lower amount is in line with the type of investigations conducted by the State Police which have less cross-border linkages. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) within the Carabinieri deals mainly with organised crime and financial investigations, as well as terrorism and TF, both at the national and international level (see IO.7) and cross border linkages would be expected in relation to their investigations. However, based on only limited information provided, it was not possible to draw conclusions on the extent to which the Carabinieri pursues assets abroad. Table 8.8. Recovery of assets abroad (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Seizures – assets abroad GdF 15 052 434 43 363 138 34 434 650 15 189 742 535 752 671 28 874 843 672 667 478 DIA 51 574 492 1 381 532 5 513 612 2 150 000 1 500 000 No data &gt;62 119 636 Confiscation – assets abroad GdF 6 734 514 1 807 445 11 672 919 200 000 407 694. 957 25 240 378 453 350 213 DIA 5 809 979 50 553 000 30 624 190 3 145 691 1 500 112 No data &gt;91 632 972 Box 8.2. Seizures of assets located abroad In 2021, the GdF uncovered illegal betting, tax evasion, fraud and ML activities to promote the interests of a mafia-type organised criminal group. Investigations starting from the close examination of an STR that revealed Italian criminal connections to gaming platform owned by a Maltese company. The owner of the Maltese company had evaded income tax for over EUR 30 million which was mixed with the volume of bets collected. The betting amounts and the proceeds of evasion then flowed into the accounts of the Maltese company and were further laundered through the acquisition of land, buildings and companies. Significant assets in Italy, Malta and Poland of the association that were seized consisted of eight bank accounts, 17 real estate properties, five movable properties, five business activities, to a total value of EUR 80 million, as well as to find cash of EUR 180 000 hidden in the false bottom of a car. At the conclusion of the investigation, following a plea bargain, the suspects were convicted and all assets based in all three countries were confiscated in 2022. Footnotes [22] Confiscation on ‘money, goods and other items of value of which the individual convicted cannot justify the provenance’ and of which ‘he or she has the availability under any title in a value disproportionate to his or her income, declared for his or her income tax purposes, or his or her economic activity’ (article 240-bis of the Criminal Code)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 451. Confiscation levels have been maintained at regular and healthy levels by the authorities that are central to Italy’s asset recovery regime. DIA confiscates over 70% of its asset seizures, which is reasonable as it operates mostly under the AMC under which non-conviction confiscations are anticipated. GdF routinely uses both conviction and non-conviction-based confiscation and confiscates about 35% of its asset seizures. In total, assets valued at about EUR 7 billion have been confiscated by the GdF and DIA over the evaluation period. As stated above, the State Police and the Carabinieri have declared that those authorities are pursuing and seizing property of corresponding value but no data was presented to support that statement (see 443). Likewise, data regarding confiscations resulting from the seizure of property of corresponding value in investigations carried out by the State Police and the Carabinieri is not available and as a result it is not demonstrated to what extent these authorities are pursuing assets through confiscation. Table 8.5. Asset Confiscation– by GdF and DIA (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 797 009 826 1 363 762 978 1 568 060 523 748 140 120 1 081 845 653 263 556 904 5 822 376 004 DIA 223 245 593 237 902 700 224 890 081 164 564 544 160 898 454 31 713 531 1 045 214 903 452. Approximately 13% of confiscations by the GdF relate to ML, while only 0.08% of confiscations by DIA relate to ML (see Table 8.6 below) which appears low considering DIA’s focus on serious organised crime. Data provided by Italy reflected that asset confiscations are largely in line with the ML and predicate offences risk in Italy with the bulk of the seizures relating to mafia-type organised crime (50%), fraud (12.5%) and tax evasion and tax offences (15%), although less so for corruption (4%) and drug trafficking (2.5%). No asset confiscations were reported relating to TF. Seizures and confiscations under the AMC can be challenged on grounds that the underlying criminality does not relate to mafia-style criminality and Italian authorities noted that their asset recovery efforts under the AMC are regularly challenged on this basis. Thus, despite the broad powers, there remains a need for the authorities to identify and address challenges to the pursuit of asset recovery under the AMC. Table 8.6. Asset Confiscations relating to ML (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total GdF 170 819 040 221 469 151 99 623 497 41 726 668 151 598 015 55 497 351 740 733 722 DIA 80 000 0 0 0 502 000 7 918 875 8 500 875 453. As with seizures, although Italy’s legislation provides for the confiscation of property of corresponding value and this is a tool used mostly by the GdF and the DIA (under the AMC), only limited figures were provided as to how frequently this was used. The bulk of ML confiscations by GdF was confiscations under article 240 bis CC [22] and related to assets of corresponding value. No data was presented that shows to what extent the State Police and the Carabinieri confiscate property of corresponding value relating to ML. There was no data to demonstrate the extent to which asset confiscations relating to TF or other crime types were being conducted. Table 8.7. Types Asset Confiscations relating to ML (GdF only) (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Direct and corresponding value 7 132 996 12 496 932 51 753 071 10 092 616 77 775 322 2 052 015 161 302 952 Under article 240 bis CC 114 747 457 168 526 131 30 099 406 14 923 190 44 649 163 52 455 163 425 400 510 Non-conviction based 48 938 587 40 446 088 17 771 020 16 710 862 29 173 530 990 173 154 030 260 Conviction-based confiscation 7 132 996 12 496 932 51 753 071 10 092 616 77 775 322 2 052 015 161 302 952 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 454. As noted in IO.2 as well as case studies reflected in IO.7, there are cross border linkages to many ML and other economic offences investigated in Italy. The GdF in particular, and the DIA to a lesser extent, seek international cooperation to recover criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad, resulting in significant assets located abroad that have been seized and confiscated over the evaluation period. Over the evaluation period, the State Police, obtained seizures for EUR 710 399 and confiscation of EUR 330 583 of illicit assets from their investigations located abroad. The lower amount is in line with the type of investigations conducted by the State Police which have less cross-border linkages. The Specialised Operational Group (R.O.S.) within the Carabinieri deals mainly with organised crime and financial investigations, as well as terrorism and TF, both at the national and international level (see IO.7) and cross border linkages would be expected in relation to their investigations. However, based on only limited information provided, it was not possible to draw conclusions on the extent to which the Carabinieri pursues assets abroad. Table 8.8. Recovery of assets abroad (in Euros) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until March 2025 Total Seizures – assets abroad GdF 15 052 434 43 363 138 34 434 650 15 189 742 535 752 671 28 874 843 672 667 478 DIA 51 574 492 1 381 532 5 513 612 2 150 000 1 500 000 No data &gt;62 119 636 Confiscation – assets abroad GdF 6 734 514 1 807 445 11 672 919 200 000 407 694. 957 25 240 378 453 350 213 DIA 5 809 979 50 553 000 30 624 190 3 145 691 1 500 112 No data &gt;91 632 972 Box 8.2. Seizures of assets located abroad In 2021, the GdF uncovered illegal betting, tax evasion, fraud and ML activities to promote the interests of a mafia-type organised criminal group. Investigations starting from the close examination of an STR that revealed Italian criminal connections to gaming platform owned by a Maltese company. The owner of the Maltese company had evaded income tax for over EUR 30 million which was mixed with the volume of bets collected. The betting amounts and the proceeds of evasion then flowed into the accounts of the Maltese company and were further laundered through the acquisition of land, buildings and companies. Significant assets in Italy, Malta and Poland of the association that were seized consisted of eight bank accounts, 17 real estate properties, five movable properties, five business activities, to a total value of EUR 80 million, as well as to find cash of EUR 180 000 hidden in the false bottom of a car. At the conclusion of the investigation, following a plea bargain, the suspects were convicted and all assets based in all three countries were confiscated in 2022. Footnotes [22] Confiscation on ‘money, goods and other items of value of which the individual convicted cannot justify the provenance’ and of which ‘he or she has the availability under any title in a value disproportionate to his or her income, declared for his or her income tax purposes, or his or her economic activity’ (article 240-bis of the Criminal Code)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="486. Italy has alternative measures available to leverage where a TF conviction is not possible. This includes the use of preventative measures under the AMC such as non-conviction-based seizures and confiscations (see IO.8) of assets relating to TF, deportation of foreign citizens from Italy for suspected TF (see Operation Foreign Fighters above), and other mechanisms. Italy provided data to indicate the authorities have over the evaluation period, conducted 378 expulsions of foreign citizens but it is unclear how many of these specifically were related to TF (as opposed to terrorism or other crimes). Where there is sufficient evidence against TF offenders for the commission of other offences (e.g. immigration offences, forgery, etc.), Italy has also pursued criminal proceedings against the individuals to obtain convictions for these other offences. However, in the case of preventative measures such as non-conviction-based seizures, there is no evidence that Italy uses these powers to disrupt TF activity (see IO.8). Italy does not use these powers to disrupt TF activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="486. Italy has alternative measures available to leverage where a TF conviction is not possible. This includes the use of preventative measures under the AMC such as non-conviction-based seizures and confiscations (see IO.8) of assets relating to TF, deportation of foreign citizens from Italy for suspected TF (see Operation Foreign Fighters above), and other mechanisms. Italy provided data to indicate the authorities have over the evaluation period, conducted 378 expulsions of foreign citizens but it is unclear how many of these specifically were related to TF (as opposed to terrorism or other crimes). Where there is sufficient evidence against TF offenders for the commission of other offences (e.g. immigration offences, forgery, etc.), Italy has also pursued criminal proceedings against the individuals to obtain convictions for these other offences. However, in the case of preventative measures such as non-conviction-based seizures, there is no evidence that Italy uses these powers to disrupt TF activity (see IO.8). Italy does not use these powers to disrupt TF activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="509. Competent authorities – BoI, CONSOB, IVASS and GdF – are generally comprehensively monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs with their TF-TFS obligations. BoI carried out 388 on-site inspections, 92% of which encompassed controls for TFS preventive measures. CONSOB monitors PIE auditors’ compliance with the TF-TFS and PF-TFS requirements during on-site inspections for AML/CFT. In particular, 16 out of 18 total on-site inspections have included TF-TFS and PF-TFS compliance since 2019 (89%). In the same period, similar checks have been performed during the two on-site inspections carried out on FIs on behalf of BoI. All “full scope” on-site inspections by the GdF also cover TFS compliance, including checking customers and BOs with sanctions lists although it is not clear that they check more broadly that TFS policies and procedures are in place. These included 494 inspections from 2019 to 31 May 2025 (11 Casino, 48 real estate, 23 DPMS, 41 lawyers, 107 Notaries, 22 other independent legal professionals, 208 accountants, 20 TCSP, and 14 VASPs). All the AML inspections carried out by IVASS pay special attention to the procedures set up by insurance companies to promptly implement the measures of the competent authorities ordering the freezing of funds and economic resources held by individuals, legal persons, groups, entities and organisations”. From 2019 – 2025, none of the supervisors detected any violation in TFS compliance. 510. Complementary to the above supervisors, the UIF also conducts on-site visits to FIs and DNFBPs focusing on STR measures as well as TFS freezing measures and related reporting requirements. During the assessed period the UIF did not detect any TF-TFS violations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="509. Competent authorities – BoI, CONSOB, IVASS and GdF – are generally comprehensively monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs with their TF-TFS obligations. BoI carried out 388 on-site inspections, 92% of which encompassed controls for TFS preventive measures. CONSOB monitors PIE auditors’ compliance with the TF-TFS and PF-TFS requirements during on-site inspections for AML/CFT. In particular, 16 out of 18 total on-site inspections have included TF-TFS and PF-TFS compliance since 2019 (89%). In the same period, similar checks have been performed during the two on-site inspections carried out on FIs on behalf of BoI. All “full scope” on-site inspections by the GdF also cover TFS compliance, including checking customers and BOs with sanctions lists although it is not clear that they check more broadly that TFS policies and procedures are in place. These included 494 inspections from 2019 to 31 May 2025 (11 Casino, 48 real estate, 23 DPMS, 41 lawyers, 107 Notaries, 22 other independent legal professionals, 208 accountants, 20 TCSP, and 14 VASPs). All the AML inspections carried out by IVASS pay special attention to the procedures set up by insurance companies to promptly implement the measures of the competent authorities ordering the freezing of funds and economic resources held by individuals, legal persons, groups, entities and organisations”. From 2019 – 2025, none of the supervisors detected any violation in TFS compliance. 510. Complementary to the above supervisors, the UIF also conducts on-site visits to FIs and DNFBPs focusing on STR measures as well as TFS freezing measures and related reporting requirements. During the assessed period the UIF did not detect any TF-TFS violations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="523. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs understand and comply with their PF-TFS obligations to a large extent, in the same way as TF-TFS obligations (see IO.10, Core Issue 10.4). FIs have also shown to be aware of PF-TFS circumvention risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="523. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs understand and comply with their PF-TFS obligations to a large extent, in the same way as TF-TFS obligations (see IO.10, Core Issue 10.4). FIs have also shown to be aware of PF-TFS circumvention risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="121. Italian authorities maintain close cooperation and coordination for AML/CFT operational purposes. The BoI, UIF, GdF, CONSOB, and IVASS coordinate for operational purposes, formally and informally, as evidenced by their collaboration prior to and during inspections and other supervisory activities. This includes regular meetings between the authorities to share information on the entities targeted for supervision and to avoid overlapping activities for specific inspections. 122. The authorities have also begun to utilise strategic Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to enhance operational cooperation. The UIF and the BoI have a PPP with the Italian Banking Association (ABI), and most relevant banks’ experiences and emerging trends and risks are shared with the private sector. While it is still in its nascent stages, this PPP will eventually be leveraged to assist the UIF in updating its risk indicators and could help refine the instructions on detecting and reporting STRs. In the future and in its role as supervisory authority, the BoI could potentially benefit from evidence discussed in the PPP to strengthen its risk understanding and effectiveness of its actions, including cooperation with the banking sector. 123. There are good operational communication channels between the UIF and other competent authorities, especially with the GdF and DIA. The UIF shares STRs and corresponding analysis quickly with GdF and DIA. While LEAs cooperate and coordinate amongst each other to some extent, the GdF plays a gatekeeping role regarding ML/TF cooperation with the Carabinieri and the State Police, and acts as an intermediary for transmitting financial intelligence to them in line with their respective competencies in economic and financial police tasks assigned by law. The GdF having developed several in-house IT tools to meet the specific needs of a specialised police force in the fight against financial crime, retains sole access to certain operational tools and databases which are used for ML/TF investigations. In addition, operational coordination and feedback mechanisms between the UIF and the Carabinieri and the State Police exist, but these are limited in scope. The UIF can respond to ad hoc operational requests from other authorities such as the prosecutors and EPPO, also on the basis of specific MOUs and using a dedicated channel. 124. Italian authorities also coordinate with the SRBs and have established MoUs with the different SRBs. However, the focus of such cooperation is on training and outreach activities. Also, there is a lack of cooperation with SRBs on AML/CFT supervisory activities. While the SRBs are informed about sanctions imposed on specific entities, the GdF does not communicate broader outcomes of its supervisory activity to the SRBs, in particular concerning the exchange of information about specific entities that could bolster both the GdF’s supervision and the SRBs’ professional oversight." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="121. Italian authorities maintain close cooperation and coordination for AML/CFT operational purposes. The BoI, UIF, GdF, CONSOB, and IVASS coordinate for operational purposes, formally and informally, as evidenced by their collaboration prior to and during inspections and other supervisory activities. This includes regular meetings between the authorities to share information on the entities targeted for supervision and to avoid overlapping activities for specific inspections. 122. The authorities have also begun to utilise strategic Public Private Partnerships (PPP) to enhance operational cooperation. The UIF and the BoI have a PPP with the Italian Banking Association (ABI), and most relevant banks’ experiences and emerging trends and risks are shared with the private sector. While it is still in its nascent stages, this PPP will eventually be leveraged to assist the UIF in updating its risk indicators and could help refine the instructions on detecting and reporting STRs. In the future and in its role as supervisory authority, the BoI could potentially benefit from evidence discussed in the PPP to strengthen its risk understanding and effectiveness of its actions, including cooperation with the banking sector. 123. There are good operational communication channels between the UIF and other competent authorities, especially with the GdF and DIA. The UIF shares STRs and corresponding analysis quickly with GdF and DIA. While LEAs cooperate and coordinate amongst each other to some extent, the GdF plays a gatekeeping role regarding ML/TF cooperation with the Carabinieri and the State Police, and acts as an intermediary for transmitting financial intelligence to them in line with their respective competencies in economic and financial police tasks assigned by law. The GdF having developed several in-house IT tools to meet the specific needs of a specialised police force in the fight against financial crime, retains sole access to certain operational tools and databases which are used for ML/TF investigations. In addition, operational coordination and feedback mechanisms between the UIF and the Carabinieri and the State Police exist, but these are limited in scope. The UIF can respond to ad hoc operational requests from other authorities such as the prosecutors and EPPO, also on the basis of specific MOUs and using a dedicated channel. 124. Italian authorities also coordinate with the SRBs and have established MoUs with the different SRBs. However, the focus of such cooperation is on training and outreach activities. Also, there is a lack of cooperation with SRBs on AML/CFT supervisory activities. While the SRBs are informed about sanctions imposed on specific entities, the GdF does not communicate broader outcomes of its supervisory activity to the SRBs, in particular concerning the exchange of information about specific entities that could bolster both the GdF’s supervision and the SRBs’ professional oversight." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="251. The supervisory authorities widely employ remedial actions where they identify failures in compliance in line with their respective enforcement and penalties framework. Although Italy has a mechanism to apply formal measures for violations, this power is only sparingly applied. 252. The BoI employs a wide range of measures including enforcement letters, sanctions (pecuniary), cease and desist orders and restrictive measures to induce increased compliance in among FIs. Some prudential measures can also be taken, such as requiring changes in the management or appointing temporary administrators, as well as convening the management board. In principle, extremely serious breaches of AML/CFT obligations may also lead the prudential arm of the BoI to initiate compulsory liquidation or resolution of FIs. 253. Despite these wide powers, there is a preference for the use of enforcement letters and restrictive measures, rather than other forms of sanctions, such as fines or cease and desist orders. The enforcement letters recommend measures which must be taken to strengthen compliance or remedy gaps. 254. The BoI only gives limited publicity to the remedial measures that it takes. Only sanctions are published by the BoI and other types of supervisory actions are not made public, not even in an anonymised form. Even restrictive measures which require prohibitions on taking on new clients will often have to be made public by the affected entity. The following presents the BoI’s sanctioning practice for AML/CFT breaches: Table 3.7. Enforcement actions by BoI, by category and per year Enforcement Actions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Enforcement Letters 96 76 80 123 154 Sanctions 19 12 6 8 8 Cease and desist orders 0 1 2 0 0 Restrictive measures 1 0 1 1 6 255. The follow-up process to inspections is formalised and include deadlines for specific remedial actions and requires regular reporting from the relevant FI of the corrective measures implemented. Such information to the BoI is required to be approved by the FI’s board. For the most serious issues, the BoI conducts regular checks on the progress made by the FI. BoI further usually requires a verification of the implementation of the remedial plan by the FI’s internal audit function, which in turn must be approved by the board of the entity. Depending on the severity of the case, the BoI may also perform follow-up on-site inspection. Where restrictive measures have been imposed, an on-site inspection is usually planned to verify the improvements necessary before the restrictive measure can be lifted. 256. The supervisory action of the BoI has had a positive impact on FIs’ compliance. This is evidenced by the decreasing number of serious breaches found during supervisory activity. Further, case examples demonstrate how FI’s which have previously been the subject of supervisory actions have improved their compliance over time. Changes in the behaviour of FIs may also be seen in the annual reports of the AML functions which are submitted to the BoI, as well as relevant changes made to the self-risk assessments. Box 3.2. Impact of Remedial measures The results of the 2019 AML/CFT on-site inspection carried out by the BoI on a branch of an EU Group. The OSI ended with a ‘non-compliant’ rating (4 out of 4), highlighting serious shortcomings in all the AML processes, especially customer due diligence (CDD). Weaknesses were highlighted concerning customer profiling and enhanced due diligence (EDD), transaction monitoring, anomalous transaction analysis and suspicious transaction reporting (STR), within a framework characterized by very weak AML governance, management and control systems. Serious shortcomings were also detected in the monitoring tools and safeguards for the use of cash. Considering the results of the OSI, Bank of Italy imposed on the branch an administrative fine of a significant amount for breaches of the Italian AML Law. To address the serious deficiencies in the bank, the Governing Body of Bank of Italy decided the following measures: i) requiring the supervised institution to take urgent actions and submit a remedial plan; ii) imposing the prohibition to undertake any operation with new customers. In addition, the BoI provided the supervised entity with the inspection report and a remedial plan for the strengthening of AML governance and internal controls functions and the complete resolution of shortcomings in the AML processes. The results of the OSI and the subsequent supervisory activity carried out by Bank of Italy were communicated to the Parent’s company AML/CFT Supervisory Authority. Bank of Italy conducted a follow-up on-site inspection in 2020 to verify the effectiveness of the remedial plan. The follow up ended up with a positive rating (‘partially compliant’ - 2 out of 4), revealing the overcoming of the weaknesses in the AML processes and safeguards. Considering these outcomes, the Bank of Italy lifted the operational ban imposed. 257. While the BoI’s approach to inducing strengthened compliance works well, there are room for improvement. The lack of publication, including in an anonymous manner, of other enforcement actions than sanctions, lessens the possible dissuasiveness of the supervisory measure and effectively hinders the possibility of those specific examples of non-compliance contributing to strengthened compliance in other entities than the one directly affected by the decision. The indirect publication of restrictive measures, by the necessary publication of information about restrictions on its business by the FI, may help, but it will seldom contain information on the issues of non-compliance which led to the imposition of the restrictive measure in the first place. 258. Pecuniary sanctions are determined based on factors such as the seriousness of the violation and the financial capacity (expressed in terms of total turnover) of the entity involved. Several sanctions are close to the legal minimum, which is explained by the small size of the entities involved. Further, there is some reluctance to use the full range of pecuniary sanctions, due to the broader impact such actions could have on entities – either by the reputational risks contributing to a quickly deteriorating financial status or the imposition of a higher pecuniary sanction risking the financial soundness of the entity. Nevertheless, Italy does at times impose more serious pecuniary sanctions, such as a fine for an EMI for EUR 2.5 million in March 2025. As only sanctions are published by the BoI this implies that the BoI publishes information about only a fraction of the actions it is taking to improve compliance The number and total amounts of sanctions imposed by the BoI were as follows between 2019 and January 2025): Table 3.8. Sanctions imposed by Bol No. of AML/CFT sanction Amount of AML/CFT sanctions 2019 19 3 174 000 2020 19 5 603 000 2021 12 701 000 2022 6 310 000 2023 8 435 000 2024 8 265 000 2025 (Jan) 2 440 000 259. IVASS applies sanctions for non-compliance, as referred to in the Table 3.6. This comes in addition to the remedial actions that the IVASS takes to improve the compliance of insurance undertakings under its supervision. IVASS believes its activities has contributed to increased compliance, and therefore lowering of residual risks, in the life insurance sector. The decrease in number and severity of the shortcomings identified in the period alludes to the effectiveness of these remedial measures. While sanctions generally support increased compliance. the timeline for imposition of sanctions is generally 21-22 months after the on-site inspection. This timeline for the imposition of sanctions lessens their impact in practice. 260. UIF and GdF may request the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to impose sanctions following their inspections. In particular, the UIF may request sanctioning procedures for the failure to report STRs, given its regulatory remit. When the GdF performs inspections on entities which fall under the supervisory competence of the sector supervisory authorities (CONSOB, IVASS, BoI), the report about initiating a sanctioning procedure is instead handled by the respective supervisory authority. 261. Data has been provided by the MEF on the overall sanctioning for breaches of AML/CFT obligations among FIs and VASPs, with the latter being subject to 8 fines totalling EUR 191 500 between 2019 and April 2025. Overall, the data from the MEF confirm a willingness to impose pecuniary sanctions for breaches of the relevant obligations, but there are some concerns which persist. 262. First, the sanctions of the MEF are not published, not even in an anonymous form. This therefore lessens the dissuasiveness and effectiveness of the sanctions imposed, in particular the possibility of the sanctions inducing strengthened compliance among other FIs and VASPs than the entity directly affected. Second, the MEF has a two-year deadline for imposing sanctions, which automatically is prolonged by six months in cases where the affected entity avails itself of the right to be heard. Since this deadline starts to run when the MEF receives the possible sanctioning case, the time since the actual inspection or other supervisory activity identifying the relevant breaches is even longer, depending on the time taken in the GdF or UIF. The length of the sanctioning procedure undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions but considering that the VASP sector, as CASPs, will come under the sanctioning responsibility of the Bank of Italy as a result of the MICAR Regulation, this issue (represents a temporary shortcoming under IO3. 263. The authorities conduct various types of outreach activity to enhance the compliance in the FI and VASP sectors. The BoI conducts supervisory dialogue with the entities under its supervision in various ways. For the relevant entities it covers, the annual meeting (cf. CI 3.5 above) provides an arena for direct dialogue with supervised entities. The BoI further provides guidance and FAQs to FIs on the application of the regulatory framework, including after thematic/horizontal reviews. The UIF has published anomaly indicators to help FIs and VASPs in conducting transaction monitoring and identifying STRs and regularly issues collections of sanitized cases, trends and patterns of anomalous conduct. Representatives of the authorities (especially from the BoI, UIF and GdF) also regularly participate in various types of conferences, workshops and training sessions to improve the compliance of the FIs and VASPs. On the other hand, the GdF as a supervisor does not appear to prepare guidance or similar documents to help the entities under its supervision to comply with their obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="251. The supervisory authorities widely employ remedial actions where they identify failures in compliance in line with their respective enforcement and penalties framework. Although Italy has a mechanism to apply formal measures for violations, this power is only sparingly applied. 252. The BoI employs a wide range of measures including enforcement letters, sanctions (pecuniary), cease and desist orders and restrictive measures to induce increased compliance in among FIs. Some prudential measures can also be taken, such as requiring changes in the management or appointing temporary administrators, as well as convening the management board. In principle, extremely serious breaches of AML/CFT obligations may also lead the prudential arm of the BoI to initiate compulsory liquidation or resolution of FIs. 253. Despite these wide powers, there is a preference for the use of enforcement letters and restrictive measures, rather than other forms of sanctions, such as fines or cease and desist orders. The enforcement letters recommend measures which must be taken to strengthen compliance or remedy gaps. 254. The BoI only gives limited publicity to the remedial measures that it takes. Only sanctions are published by the BoI and other types of supervisory actions are not made public, not even in an anonymised form. Even restrictive measures which require prohibitions on taking on new clients will often have to be made public by the affected entity. The following presents the BoI’s sanctioning practice for AML/CFT breaches: Table 3.7. Enforcement actions by BoI, by category and per year Enforcement Actions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Enforcement Letters 96 76 80 123 154 Sanctions 19 12 6 8 8 Cease and desist orders 0 1 2 0 0 Restrictive measures 1 0 1 1 6 255. The follow-up process to inspections is formalised and include deadlines for specific remedial actions and requires regular reporting from the relevant FI of the corrective measures implemented. Such information to the BoI is required to be approved by the FI’s board. For the most serious issues, the BoI conducts regular checks on the progress made by the FI. BoI further usually requires a verification of the implementation of the remedial plan by the FI’s internal audit function, which in turn must be approved by the board of the entity. Depending on the severity of the case, the BoI may also perform follow-up on-site inspection. Where restrictive measures have been imposed, an on-site inspection is usually planned to verify the improvements necessary before the restrictive measure can be lifted. 256. The supervisory action of the BoI has had a positive impact on FIs’ compliance. This is evidenced by the decreasing number of serious breaches found during supervisory activity. Further, case examples demonstrate how FI’s which have previously been the subject of supervisory actions have improved their compliance over time. Changes in the behaviour of FIs may also be seen in the annual reports of the AML functions which are submitted to the BoI, as well as relevant changes made to the self-risk assessments. Box 3.2. Impact of Remedial measures The results of the 2019 AML/CFT on-site inspection carried out by the BoI on a branch of an EU Group. The OSI ended with a ‘non-compliant’ rating (4 out of 4), highlighting serious shortcomings in all the AML processes, especially customer due diligence (CDD). Weaknesses were highlighted concerning customer profiling and enhanced due diligence (EDD), transaction monitoring, anomalous transaction analysis and suspicious transaction reporting (STR), within a framework characterized by very weak AML governance, management and control systems. Serious shortcomings were also detected in the monitoring tools and safeguards for the use of cash. Considering the results of the OSI, Bank of Italy imposed on the branch an administrative fine of a significant amount for breaches of the Italian AML Law. To address the serious deficiencies in the bank, the Governing Body of Bank of Italy decided the following measures: i) requiring the supervised institution to take urgent actions and submit a remedial plan; ii) imposing the prohibition to undertake any operation with new customers. In addition, the BoI provided the supervised entity with the inspection report and a remedial plan for the strengthening of AML governance and internal controls functions and the complete resolution of shortcomings in the AML processes. The results of the OSI and the subsequent supervisory activity carried out by Bank of Italy were communicated to the Parent’s company AML/CFT Supervisory Authority. Bank of Italy conducted a follow-up on-site inspection in 2020 to verify the effectiveness of the remedial plan. The follow up ended up with a positive rating (‘partially compliant’ - 2 out of 4), revealing the overcoming of the weaknesses in the AML processes and safeguards. Considering these outcomes, the Bank of Italy lifted the operational ban imposed. 257. While the BoI’s approach to inducing strengthened compliance works well, there are room for improvement. The lack of publication, including in an anonymous manner, of other enforcement actions than sanctions, lessens the possible dissuasiveness of the supervisory measure and effectively hinders the possibility of those specific examples of non-compliance contributing to strengthened compliance in other entities than the one directly affected by the decision. The indirect publication of restrictive measures, by the necessary publication of information about restrictions on its business by the FI, may help, but it will seldom contain information on the issues of non-compliance which led to the imposition of the restrictive measure in the first place. 258. Pecuniary sanctions are determined based on factors such as the seriousness of the violation and the financial capacity (expressed in terms of total turnover) of the entity involved. Several sanctions are close to the legal minimum, which is explained by the small size of the entities involved. Further, there is some reluctance to use the full range of pecuniary sanctions, due to the broader impact such actions could have on entities – either by the reputational risks contributing to a quickly deteriorating financial status or the imposition of a higher pecuniary sanction risking the financial soundness of the entity. Nevertheless, Italy does at times impose more serious pecuniary sanctions, such as a fine for an EMI for EUR 2.5 million in March 2025. As only sanctions are published by the BoI this implies that the BoI publishes information about only a fraction of the actions it is taking to improve compliance The number and total amounts of sanctions imposed by the BoI were as follows between 2019 and January 2025): Table 3.8. Sanctions imposed by Bol No. of AML/CFT sanction Amount of AML/CFT sanctions 2019 19 3 174 000 2020 19 5 603 000 2021 12 701 000 2022 6 310 000 2023 8 435 000 2024 8 265 000 2025 (Jan) 2 440 000 259. IVASS applies sanctions for non-compliance, as referred to in the Table 3.6. This comes in addition to the remedial actions that the IVASS takes to improve the compliance of insurance undertakings under its supervision. IVASS believes its activities has contributed to increased compliance, and therefore lowering of residual risks, in the life insurance sector. The decrease in number and severity of the shortcomings identified in the period alludes to the effectiveness of these remedial measures. While sanctions generally support increased compliance. the timeline for imposition of sanctions is generally 21-22 months after the on-site inspection. This timeline for the imposition of sanctions lessens their impact in practice. 260. UIF and GdF may request the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to impose sanctions following their inspections. In particular, the UIF may request sanctioning procedures for the failure to report STRs, given its regulatory remit. When the GdF performs inspections on entities which fall under the supervisory competence of the sector supervisory authorities (CONSOB, IVASS, BoI), the report about initiating a sanctioning procedure is instead handled by the respective supervisory authority. 261. Data has been provided by the MEF on the overall sanctioning for breaches of AML/CFT obligations among FIs and VASPs, with the latter being subject to 8 fines totalling EUR 191 500 between 2019 and April 2025. Overall, the data from the MEF confirm a willingness to impose pecuniary sanctions for breaches of the relevant obligations, but there are some concerns which persist. 262. First, the sanctions of the MEF are not published, not even in an anonymous form. This therefore lessens the dissuasiveness and effectiveness of the sanctions imposed, in particular the possibility of the sanctions inducing strengthened compliance among other FIs and VASPs than the entity directly affected. Second, the MEF has a two-year deadline for imposing sanctions, which automatically is prolonged by six months in cases where the affected entity avails itself of the right to be heard. Since this deadline starts to run when the MEF receives the possible sanctioning case, the time since the actual inspection or other supervisory activity identifying the relevant breaches is even longer, depending on the time taken in the GdF or UIF. The length of the sanctioning procedure undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions but considering that the VASP sector, as CASPs, will come under the sanctioning responsibility of the Bank of Italy as a result of the MICAR Regulation, this issue (represents a temporary shortcoming under IO3. 263. The authorities conduct various types of outreach activity to enhance the compliance in the FI and VASP sectors. The BoI conducts supervisory dialogue with the entities under its supervision in various ways. For the relevant entities it covers, the annual meeting (cf. CI 3.5 above) provides an arena for direct dialogue with supervised entities. The BoI further provides guidance and FAQs to FIs on the application of the regulatory framework, including after thematic/horizontal reviews. The UIF has published anomaly indicators to help FIs and VASPs in conducting transaction monitoring and identifying STRs and regularly issues collections of sanitized cases, trends and patterns of anomalous conduct. Representatives of the authorities (especially from the BoI, UIF and GdF) also regularly participate in various types of conferences, workshops and training sessions to improve the compliance of the FIs and VASPs. On the other hand, the GdF as a supervisor does not appear to prepare guidance or similar documents to help the entities under its supervision to comply with their obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="319. Supervisors heavily rely on pecuniary sanctions to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations, and apart from CONSOB, there is no recourse to other remedial measures to enhance compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations. Italy lays emphasis on outreach to enhance DNFPBs awareness and compliance with AML/CFT/CPF regulations. Outreach activities 320. Outreach activities to promote understanding of risks and obligations across DNFBPs are performed by the GdF, CONSOB and UIF. These activities are complemented by the SRBs, which conduct training for their members, even though this is more extensive for certain SRBs than for others. The sectors and representatives from the SRBs met at the onsite who have attended training seemed to have gained valuable insights from the outreach activities and from collaboration initiatives with the supervisors. 321. The UIF provides guidance to all DNFPBs on STR requirements which appear thorough and detailed. Apart from PIE auditors, who are supervised by CONSOB it is unclear if the efforts done by the supervisors have significantly increased the DNFBPs’ risk understanding and understanding of the AML/CFT/CPF requirements. 322. An example of the impact of outreach activities and cooperation can be seen from the improvements in the notaries’ risk understanding and their attention to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. The initiatives of the National Council of Notaries, such as training being provided for members and training provided by the UIF has contributed to improving the sectors compliance with AML/CFT obligations and this can be seen in the sector’s increase in STR reporting and an improved quality of STRs. Sanctions and remedial actions 323. The GdF can recommend imposition of pecuniary sanctions within a wide range, depending on the severity of the breaches, these can include fines of from EUR 2 000 for first time, single violations of CDD requirements to fines of up to EUR 50 000 for serious, repeated, systematic or multiple breaches of CDD obligations. The limits of fines for serious obligations vary according to the failures observed, and can are as follows: Table 4.4. Sanctioning powers of the MEF Violation Sanction Failure during due diligence, to obtain and verify identification data- basic violation, retention obligations. Administrative fine of EUR 2 000 Serious, repeated or systematic or multiple breaches of customer due diligence obligations or retention obligations. Administrative fine ranging from EUR 2 500 to EUR 50 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report suspicious transactions Administrative fine of EUR 3 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report serious, repeated or systematic or multiple suspicious transactions Administrative fine ranging from EUR 30 000 to EUR 300 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report serious, repeated or systematic suspicious transactions or multiple suspicious transactions resulting in an economic advantage Administrative fine equal to double the amount of the economic advantage gained, where determined, however not less than EUR 450 000 euro or up to EUR 1 million in the case of an advantage not determined or determinable. 324. In the period under consideration, the MEF has imposed the following pecuniary sanctions: Table 4.5. Sanctions (in EUR) imposed by the MEF YEAR DECREES SANCTIONS AMOUNT DECREES W/O SANCTIONS STR Decrees AMOUNT STR SANCTIONS CDD/record keeping Decrees AMOUNT CDD/record keeping SANCTIONS 2019 201 9 237 142 52 96 8 621 042 105 616 100 2020 168 9 477 811 26 76 8 595 738 92 882 073 2021 235 10 252 687 38 121 9 161 743 114 1 090 944 2022 133 6 453 218 14 71 6 054 718 62 398 500 2023 333 6 982 661 5 112 5 716 382 221 1 266 333 2024 416 6 524 119 13 150 5 195 264 266 1 328 855 2025* 80 1 347 900 2 41 1 070 700 39 277 200 TOTAL 1 566 31 692 290 150 * = January 1st-April 30th By sector, the total number of decrees issued by the MEF and sanctions applied between 2019 and April 2025 was as follows: Table 4.6. Sanctions imposed by sector SECTOR NUMBER OF DECREES AMOUNTS [EUR] REAL ESTATE 254 6 007 308 Notaries 173 4 111 848 Lawyers 127 3 593 197 Accountants 257 3 340 937 Auditors 47 1 318 950 OTHERS 291 6 520 022 Casinos, online gaming and gambling 9 420 743 DPMS and TCSPs 97 2 743 933 TOTAL 1 485 46 758 981 325. Despite the generally dissuasive nature of the fines which are imposed, their effect is diminished by the lengthy process for issuing administrative sanctions. The administrative fines are imposed by the MEF on the receipt of a supervisory report by the GdF, and the imposition of the fines typically takes between two years after the onsite report is sent to the MEF. In cases where a hearing is requested by the DNFPB to provide further arguments, the MEF can extend the deadline for imposition of sanction by six months. Furthermore, the sanctions of the MEF are not published, which could help promoting understanding of obligations and encourage compliance for other entities. 326. Aside from imposing pecuniary sanctions, the GdF does not do enough to remedy the deficiencies identified in supervised entities. There is no structured follow-up with the entities which are sanctioned, and there is little evidence to demonstrate that the sanctions lead to enhanced compliance in entities. The lack of timely coordination with SRBs further limits the possibility for targeted guidance and support to DNFPBs where deficiencies have been identified. Box 4.4. Sanctions for breach of obligations During an inspection carried out in 2021 by the GdF, nine violations of the obligation to carry out customer due diligence measures were found. These were: i) failure to identify customers and beneficial owners, ii) lack of information on the subject matter and nature of the relationship, iii) absence of risk assessment, iv) failure to apply enhanced measures in the presence of non-transparent corporate structures. In addition, one reporting entity failed to report suspicious transactions (punishable by a maximum fine of EUR 300 000) for a total amount of EUR 2 087 288.46, despite the presence of elements indicating transactions without economic or financial justification. At the conclusion of the investigation, accounting for the fact that the operator did not have formalised internal procedures or adequate organisational measures in place to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations, nor had any anti-money laundering training been carried out, as noted by the GdF operational unit, the MEF imposed an administrative fine of EUR 140 000 in 2023. 327. The SRBs issue disciplinary sanctions against serious, repeated or systematic or multiple violations of obligations imposed to their members. This process is relatively fast and will normally not last more than six months. However, these administrative measures are usually only taken once the SRB has received a report from the MEF imposing a sanction, and this entails a large delay in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, and may blunt the impact of such sanctions. 328. The UIF can initiate sanction proceedings against DNFBPs for failure to report suspicious transactions and have also started proceedings for violations of the limits on the use of cash. The UIF, at the end of the inspection activity, sends an intervention letter to the inspected entity identifying any deficiencies observed during the inspection and the inspected entity is requested to address providing prompt feedback to the UIF. Given the UIF’s low number of inspections regarding the STR requirements these do not seem to have a significant dissuasive effect in the DNFBP sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="319. Supervisors heavily rely on pecuniary sanctions to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations, and apart from CONSOB, there is no recourse to other remedial measures to enhance compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations. Italy lays emphasis on outreach to enhance DNFPBs awareness and compliance with AML/CFT/CPF regulations. Outreach activities 320. Outreach activities to promote understanding of risks and obligations across DNFBPs are performed by the GdF, CONSOB and UIF. These activities are complemented by the SRBs, which conduct training for their members, even though this is more extensive for certain SRBs than for others. The sectors and representatives from the SRBs met at the onsite who have attended training seemed to have gained valuable insights from the outreach activities and from collaboration initiatives with the supervisors. 321. The UIF provides guidance to all DNFPBs on STR requirements which appear thorough and detailed. Apart from PIE auditors, who are supervised by CONSOB it is unclear if the efforts done by the supervisors have significantly increased the DNFBPs’ risk understanding and understanding of the AML/CFT/CPF requirements. 322. An example of the impact of outreach activities and cooperation can be seen from the improvements in the notaries’ risk understanding and their attention to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. The initiatives of the National Council of Notaries, such as training being provided for members and training provided by the UIF has contributed to improving the sectors compliance with AML/CFT obligations and this can be seen in the sector’s increase in STR reporting and an improved quality of STRs. Sanctions and remedial actions 323. The GdF can recommend imposition of pecuniary sanctions within a wide range, depending on the severity of the breaches, these can include fines of from EUR 2 000 for first time, single violations of CDD requirements to fines of up to EUR 50 000 for serious, repeated, systematic or multiple breaches of CDD obligations. The limits of fines for serious obligations vary according to the failures observed, and can are as follows: Table 4.4. Sanctioning powers of the MEF Violation Sanction Failure during due diligence, to obtain and verify identification data- basic violation, retention obligations. Administrative fine of EUR 2 000 Serious, repeated or systematic or multiple breaches of customer due diligence obligations or retention obligations. Administrative fine ranging from EUR 2 500 to EUR 50 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report suspicious transactions Administrative fine of EUR 3 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report serious, repeated or systematic or multiple suspicious transactions Administrative fine ranging from EUR 30 000 to EUR 300 000 Failure to comply with the obligation to report serious, repeated or systematic suspicious transactions or multiple suspicious transactions resulting in an economic advantage Administrative fine equal to double the amount of the economic advantage gained, where determined, however not less than EUR 450 000 euro or up to EUR 1 million in the case of an advantage not determined or determinable. 324. In the period under consideration, the MEF has imposed the following pecuniary sanctions: Table 4.5. Sanctions (in EUR) imposed by the MEF YEAR DECREES SANCTIONS AMOUNT DECREES W/O SANCTIONS STR Decrees AMOUNT STR SANCTIONS CDD/record keeping Decrees AMOUNT CDD/record keeping SANCTIONS 2019 201 9 237 142 52 96 8 621 042 105 616 100 2020 168 9 477 811 26 76 8 595 738 92 882 073 2021 235 10 252 687 38 121 9 161 743 114 1 090 944 2022 133 6 453 218 14 71 6 054 718 62 398 500 2023 333 6 982 661 5 112 5 716 382 221 1 266 333 2024 416 6 524 119 13 150 5 195 264 266 1 328 855 2025* 80 1 347 900 2 41 1 070 700 39 277 200 TOTAL 1 566 31 692 290 150 * = January 1st-April 30th By sector, the total number of decrees issued by the MEF and sanctions applied between 2019 and April 2025 was as follows: Table 4.6. Sanctions imposed by sector SECTOR NUMBER OF DECREES AMOUNTS [EUR] REAL ESTATE 254 6 007 308 Notaries 173 4 111 848 Lawyers 127 3 593 197 Accountants 257 3 340 937 Auditors 47 1 318 950 OTHERS 291 6 520 022 Casinos, online gaming and gambling 9 420 743 DPMS and TCSPs 97 2 743 933 TOTAL 1 485 46 758 981 325. Despite the generally dissuasive nature of the fines which are imposed, their effect is diminished by the lengthy process for issuing administrative sanctions. The administrative fines are imposed by the MEF on the receipt of a supervisory report by the GdF, and the imposition of the fines typically takes between two years after the onsite report is sent to the MEF. In cases where a hearing is requested by the DNFPB to provide further arguments, the MEF can extend the deadline for imposition of sanction by six months. Furthermore, the sanctions of the MEF are not published, which could help promoting understanding of obligations and encourage compliance for other entities. 326. Aside from imposing pecuniary sanctions, the GdF does not do enough to remedy the deficiencies identified in supervised entities. There is no structured follow-up with the entities which are sanctioned, and there is little evidence to demonstrate that the sanctions lead to enhanced compliance in entities. The lack of timely coordination with SRBs further limits the possibility for targeted guidance and support to DNFPBs where deficiencies have been identified. Box 4.4. Sanctions for breach of obligations During an inspection carried out in 2021 by the GdF, nine violations of the obligation to carry out customer due diligence measures were found. These were: i) failure to identify customers and beneficial owners, ii) lack of information on the subject matter and nature of the relationship, iii) absence of risk assessment, iv) failure to apply enhanced measures in the presence of non-transparent corporate structures. In addition, one reporting entity failed to report suspicious transactions (punishable by a maximum fine of EUR 300 000) for a total amount of EUR 2 087 288.46, despite the presence of elements indicating transactions without economic or financial justification. At the conclusion of the investigation, accounting for the fact that the operator did not have formalised internal procedures or adequate organisational measures in place to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations, nor had any anti-money laundering training been carried out, as noted by the GdF operational unit, the MEF imposed an administrative fine of EUR 140 000 in 2023. 327. The SRBs issue disciplinary sanctions against serious, repeated or systematic or multiple violations of obligations imposed to their members. This process is relatively fast and will normally not last more than six months. However, these administrative measures are usually only taken once the SRB has received a report from the MEF imposing a sanction, and this entails a large delay in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, and may blunt the impact of such sanctions. 328. The UIF can initiate sanction proceedings against DNFBPs for failure to report suspicious transactions and have also started proceedings for violations of the limits on the use of cash. The UIF, at the end of the inspection activity, sends an intervention letter to the inspected entity identifying any deficiencies observed during the inspection and the inspected entity is requested to address providing prompt feedback to the UIF. Given the UIF’s low number of inspections regarding the STR requirements these do not seem to have a significant dissuasive effect in the DNFBP sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="455. Once confiscated, legislation under the CCP and the AMC allows the courts to return assets to the rightful owners, including through authorising the sale of assets in order to compensate the victim. For criminal confiscations , the Italian law provides that ‘the rights of the person injured by the crime to restitution and compensation for damages’ are guaranteed. [23] In practice, the victim must ‘become a civil party’ in the criminal proceedings and request the restitution of the asset that was seized. No data was provided to the AT as to the extent to which confiscated property was directly returned to victims, particularly victims of fraud where the link between the victims and the proceeds is clear. 456. However, Italy has a mechanism under the AMC whereby the court may authorise the sale of movable assets, including securities and corporations and the proceeds paid to the Single Justice Fund which is aimed at compensating victims. In addition, Italy has legislation that provides for the possibility confiscated assets such as real estate, from organised crime to be &quot;returned to the community&quot; for public use or social purposes. One example provided was sending confiscated art works for museums to display to through travelling exhibitions. Vehicles could be used by law enforcement officers to avoid damage from non-use. In all other cases, assets are sold and the proceeds become property of the State. Footnotes [23] Art. 104-bis, paragraph 1-sexies, implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="455. Once confiscated, legislation under the CCP and the AMC allows the courts to return assets to the rightful owners, including through authorising the sale of assets in order to compensate the victim. For criminal confiscations , the Italian law provides that ‘the rights of the person injured by the crime to restitution and compensation for damages’ are guaranteed. [23] In practice, the victim must ‘become a civil party’ in the criminal proceedings and request the restitution of the asset that was seized. No data was provided to the AT as to the extent to which confiscated property was directly returned to victims, particularly victims of fraud where the link between the victims and the proceeds is clear. 456. However, Italy has a mechanism under the AMC whereby the court may authorise the sale of movable assets, including securities and corporations and the proceeds paid to the Single Justice Fund which is aimed at compensating victims. In addition, Italy has legislation that provides for the possibility confiscated assets such as real estate, from organised crime to be &quot;returned to the community&quot; for public use or social purposes. One example provided was sending confiscated art works for museums to display to through travelling exhibitions. Vehicles could be used by law enforcement officers to avoid damage from non-use. In all other cases, assets are sold and the proceeds become property of the State. Footnotes [23] Art. 104-bis, paragraph 1-sexies, implementing provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="524. Competent authorities are generally comprehensively monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs with their PF-TFS obligations. These obligations are checked along with TF-TFS obligations through their supervisory process (see IO.10 – Core Issue 10.5). During the reporting period, no violations of PF-TFS obligations were detected. 525. PIE auditors, in response to a CONSOB specific request from 2024, show a very low exposure of clients to the PF risk (99,9% of customers are at deemed to be low risk for PF). Moreover, starting from 2025 PIE auditors have to report the results of the PF risks evaluation in their annual self-assessment process, illustrating any vulnerabilities detected in their mitigation procedures and the subsequent remedial actions planned. 526. The UIF has EU specific responsibilities with regards to PF. There is a specific obligation for credit and financial institution to transmit STRs where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that funds could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities (art. 23 of EU Reg. 1509/2017). During the assessed period 2020-2024, the UIF received only 2 reports regarding DPRK legal entities, which were analysed and their findings disseminated to the competent LEAs. The UIF has also created PF-TFS specific indicators, as well as other guidance, to help ensure that FIs and DNFBPs comply with and understand their PF-TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="524. Competent authorities are generally comprehensively monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs with their PF-TFS obligations. These obligations are checked along with TF-TFS obligations through their supervisory process (see IO.10 – Core Issue 10.5). During the reporting period, no violations of PF-TFS obligations were detected. 525. PIE auditors, in response to a CONSOB specific request from 2024, show a very low exposure of clients to the PF risk (99,9% of customers are at deemed to be low risk for PF). Moreover, starting from 2025 PIE auditors have to report the results of the PF risks evaluation in their annual self-assessment process, illustrating any vulnerabilities detected in their mitigation procedures and the subsequent remedial actions planned. 526. The UIF has EU specific responsibilities with regards to PF. There is a specific obligation for credit and financial institution to transmit STRs where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that funds could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic-missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities (art. 23 of EU Reg. 1509/2017). During the assessed period 2020-2024, the UIF received only 2 reports regarding DPRK legal entities, which were analysed and their findings disseminated to the competent LEAs. The UIF has also created PF-TFS specific indicators, as well as other guidance, to help ensure that FIs and DNFBPs comply with and understand their PF-TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 457. The Agenzia della Dogane e Monopoli (ADM), which is the customs administration of Italy, and the GdF, concurrently administer the identification of falsely or non-declared currency/BNI and take action against violations. Unlike the GdF, the ADM does not have broad enforcement and judicial powers beyond its mandate in the area of customs regulation. The ADM manages the cash declaration mechanism and identifies violations through various detection methods. The use of their Customs Currency Circuit (CDV) takes into account routes, subjects, airline slots, currency and violation reports, import and export information and other information from various databases to select people for more in-depth checks against their currency declarations. Table 8.9. Currency violations detected by the ADM 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until May 2025 Nos of violations detected 3 247 6 139 7 356 7 114 7 978 2 853 Amount detected from violations (in EUR) 49.7 million 88.5 million 131.9 million 145 million 120.1 million 39.9 million Settlements though penalties on the spot (oblations in EUR) 3 109 5 901 7 099 6 842 7 729 2 757 Amounts collected through oblations 1,4 million 2.6 million 3.3 million 3 million 3.3 million 2.2 million Nos of seizures 138 238 263 272 249 96 Amount seized (in EUR) 3.2 million 3.2 million 15.5 million 24.7 million 6.5 million 1.4 million 458. The GdF’s surveillance regarding illicit cash is focussed on ML and fraudulent trafficking of currency which includes movement of cash across borders. As such the intelligence that underlies the GdF’s selection for checks include police intelligence and investigative skills which is particularly useful at Schengen land borders. The GdF has sophisticated surveillance equipment such as mobile vans equipped with video and data recording technology as well as number plate recognition systems. They also have specially trained dogs to recognise the scent of watermarked paper and ink used in banknote printing which are used at airports and border crossing. Most cross border interventions by the GdF are conducted with the cooperation of ADM. Based on the GdF’s data, more than 80% of violations come from and are destined for outside the EU which is in line with the NRA findings that the main countries where undeclared cash comes in from are Switzerland, Türkiye and UAE, and is destined to are Egypt, Morocco and Albania. Table 8.10. Currency violations detected by GdF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until June 2025 Nos of violations detected 3 339 6 292 7 475 7 381 8 347 3 586 Amount detected from violations (in EUR) 517 million 218 million 179 million 173 million 200 million 83 million Settlements though penalties on the spot (oblations in EUR) N.A. N.A. N.A. 2 million 3 million 3 million Amount seized (in EUR) 4.5 million 4 million 6 million 7 million 8 million 2 million Number of violations that resulted directly in new ML investigations 0 9 14 6 1 4 Nos of violations that resulted in other investigations N.A. 78 50 34 58 147 459. Violations detected by the GdF have resulted in a large number of investigations, most of which relate to tax evasion, as well as 34 ML investigations. Violations detected by the ADM may be communicated to the police for ML investigations. During the evaluation period, the ADM filed 37 reports to the judicial authority concerning ML that resulted in seizures amounting to EUR 87 million. More commonly however, violations are reported to the UIF which are used to develop financial intelligence (which may ultimately lead to ML investigations). During the evaluation period, the ADM forwarded 582 reports to the UIF, of which 427 concerned cross-border cash movements amounting to EUR 23 million. The ADM also has a cooperation arrangement with the DNA under the DNA-ADM Technical Protocol, pursuant to which the ADM forwards reports to the DNA. Over the evaluation period, the ADM forwarded 130 reports to the DNA, of which 101 reports were related to cross-border cash movements. 460. An MOU between the ADM and the GdF sets out the cooperation and coordination mechanism in this area which has resulted in some operational cooperation between the ADM and the GdF. For example, they can exchange information on cash declarations, declarations compiled in cases of unfulfilled obligations and information on sub-threshold amounts suspected to be related to criminal activity via the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) portal. Italy has explained that coordination is based on the scope of their respective operational and institutional responsibilities and priorities, in full respect of mutual competences and institutional responsibilities as well as rationalization of action in the field. There remains scope for greater clarity on how they work together in practice in a manner that avoids duplicity, to ensure each authority is appropriately resourced, to ensure appropriate sanctions are being applied to violations and that as well as on follow-up criminal and ML investigations arising out of violations. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 461. Based on the data, over EUR 665.4 million has been seized from currency declaration violations at Italian borders by both the ADM and the GdF over the evaluation period, which is a substantial amount. Both the number of violations and consequently seizures have also increased over the five years. Based on this, Italy would benefit from even more enhanced resourcing, efficient coordination and strong enforcement among the border authorities. 8.7.3. Sanctions 462. Anyone who enters or leaves Italy and transports cash/BNI of EUR 10 000 or more must declare this to the ADM. When there is no suspicion of an underlying crime such as cash smuggling or money laundering, the authorities apply an administrative process with fines as a consequence (see Recommendation 32). Sanctions range from EUR 300 in addition to an increasing percentage of the undeclared value over the threshold. The significant number of violations have been followed with corresponding sanctions (Table 8.11) imposed, reflecting the large volume of fines imposed. 463. A reduced on the spot payment, known as an oblation, may be paid for undeclared case EUR 40 000 or less, where the violation is not disputed or where an oblation has not been recorded in the past five years. Oblations range from EUR 200 in addition to an increasing percentage of the undeclared value over the threshold. The amounts collected based on oblations are not significant compared to the fines imposed, as reflected in tables IO.8.9 and IO.8.10 above. Table 8.11. Sanctions issued by Ministry of Economy and Finance 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until June 2025 Nos of sanction decrees 242 255 226 276 315 116 Sanction amount (in EUR) 551 350 600 2 629 351 750 349 034 700 509 603 363 3 430 047 821 139 021 930" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 457. The Agenzia della Dogane e Monopoli (ADM), which is the customs administration of Italy, and the GdF, concurrently administer the identification of falsely or non-declared currency/BNI and take action against violations. Unlike the GdF, the ADM does not have broad enforcement and judicial powers beyond its mandate in the area of customs regulation. The ADM manages the cash declaration mechanism and identifies violations through various detection methods. The use of their Customs Currency Circuit (CDV) takes into account routes, subjects, airline slots, currency and violation reports, import and export information and other information from various databases to select people for more in-depth checks against their currency declarations. Table 8.9. Currency violations detected by the ADM 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until May 2025 Nos of violations detected 3 247 6 139 7 356 7 114 7 978 2 853 Amount detected from violations (in EUR) 49.7 million 88.5 million 131.9 million 145 million 120.1 million 39.9 million Settlements though penalties on the spot (oblations in EUR) 3 109 5 901 7 099 6 842 7 729 2 757 Amounts collected through oblations 1,4 million 2.6 million 3.3 million 3 million 3.3 million 2.2 million Nos of seizures 138 238 263 272 249 96 Amount seized (in EUR) 3.2 million 3.2 million 15.5 million 24.7 million 6.5 million 1.4 million 458. The GdF’s surveillance regarding illicit cash is focussed on ML and fraudulent trafficking of currency which includes movement of cash across borders. As such the intelligence that underlies the GdF’s selection for checks include police intelligence and investigative skills which is particularly useful at Schengen land borders. The GdF has sophisticated surveillance equipment such as mobile vans equipped with video and data recording technology as well as number plate recognition systems. They also have specially trained dogs to recognise the scent of watermarked paper and ink used in banknote printing which are used at airports and border crossing. Most cross border interventions by the GdF are conducted with the cooperation of ADM. Based on the GdF’s data, more than 80% of violations come from and are destined for outside the EU which is in line with the NRA findings that the main countries where undeclared cash comes in from are Switzerland, Türkiye and UAE, and is destined to are Egypt, Morocco and Albania. Table 8.10. Currency violations detected by GdF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until June 2025 Nos of violations detected 3 339 6 292 7 475 7 381 8 347 3 586 Amount detected from violations (in EUR) 517 million 218 million 179 million 173 million 200 million 83 million Settlements though penalties on the spot (oblations in EUR) N.A. N.A. N.A. 2 million 3 million 3 million Amount seized (in EUR) 4.5 million 4 million 6 million 7 million 8 million 2 million Number of violations that resulted directly in new ML investigations 0 9 14 6 1 4 Nos of violations that resulted in other investigations N.A. 78 50 34 58 147 459. Violations detected by the GdF have resulted in a large number of investigations, most of which relate to tax evasion, as well as 34 ML investigations. Violations detected by the ADM may be communicated to the police for ML investigations. During the evaluation period, the ADM filed 37 reports to the judicial authority concerning ML that resulted in seizures amounting to EUR 87 million. More commonly however, violations are reported to the UIF which are used to develop financial intelligence (which may ultimately lead to ML investigations). During the evaluation period, the ADM forwarded 582 reports to the UIF, of which 427 concerned cross-border cash movements amounting to EUR 23 million. The ADM also has a cooperation arrangement with the DNA under the DNA-ADM Technical Protocol, pursuant to which the ADM forwards reports to the DNA. Over the evaluation period, the ADM forwarded 130 reports to the DNA, of which 101 reports were related to cross-border cash movements. 460. An MOU between the ADM and the GdF sets out the cooperation and coordination mechanism in this area which has resulted in some operational cooperation between the ADM and the GdF. For example, they can exchange information on cash declarations, declarations compiled in cases of unfulfilled obligations and information on sub-threshold amounts suspected to be related to criminal activity via the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) portal. Italy has explained that coordination is based on the scope of their respective operational and institutional responsibilities and priorities, in full respect of mutual competences and institutional responsibilities as well as rationalization of action in the field. There remains scope for greater clarity on how they work together in practice in a manner that avoids duplicity, to ensure each authority is appropriately resourced, to ensure appropriate sanctions are being applied to violations and that as well as on follow-up criminal and ML investigations arising out of violations. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 461. Based on the data, over EUR 665.4 million has been seized from currency declaration violations at Italian borders by both the ADM and the GdF over the evaluation period, which is a substantial amount. Both the number of violations and consequently seizures have also increased over the five years. Based on this, Italy would benefit from even more enhanced resourcing, efficient coordination and strong enforcement among the border authorities. 8.7.3. Sanctions 462. Anyone who enters or leaves Italy and transports cash/BNI of EUR 10 000 or more must declare this to the ADM. When there is no suspicion of an underlying crime such as cash smuggling or money laundering, the authorities apply an administrative process with fines as a consequence (see Recommendation 32). Sanctions range from EUR 300 in addition to an increasing percentage of the undeclared value over the threshold. The significant number of violations have been followed with corresponding sanctions (Table 8.11) imposed, reflecting the large volume of fines imposed. 463. A reduced on the spot payment, known as an oblation, may be paid for undeclared case EUR 40 000 or less, where the violation is not disputed or where an oblation has not been recorded in the past five years. Oblations range from EUR 200 in addition to an increasing percentage of the undeclared value over the threshold. The amounts collected based on oblations are not significant compared to the fines imposed, as reflected in tables IO.8.9 and IO.8.10 above. Table 8.11. Sanctions issued by Ministry of Economy and Finance 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Until June 2025 Nos of sanction decrees 242 255 226 276 315 116 Sanction amount (in EUR) 551 350 600 2 629 351 750 349 034 700 509 603 363 3 430 047 821 139 021 930" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="137. Türkiye has a sound legal basis to provide and seek the widest possible range of MLA including extradition in relation to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Türkiye is party to several bilateral agreements, although, based on reciprocity, no agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoUs) are required to provide co-operation. Technical enhancements, such as seven specialised judicial co-operation bureaus (CADIB), the UYAP system (official and secure digital platform where all judicial proceedings and data entered by officials during judicial proceedings are recorded and can be prioritised) and roll-out of a Central Monitoring System (CMS) launched under the EU Project on Improving International Co-operation in Criminal Matters for enhancing the management and tracking of incoming and outgoing requests, improved efficiency and co-ordination to some extent since Türkiye’s 2019 MER. 138. Türkiye has also put in place supplementary guidance tools such as the Circular on the Issues to be Considered by the Judicial Authorities for the Proceedings of International Criminal Rogatory, Circular on the International Service of Documents in Criminal Matters and Circular on Issues to be Considered by Judicial Authorities on Extradition. 139. Significantly, since Türkiye’s 2019 MER, 49 foreign countries and one international organisation have deployed 138 police liaison officers in Türkiye, through whom a significant portion of operational exchanges is conducted. Türkiye also has approximately 102 counsellors stationed abroad, who similarly play an important role in seeking and providing information. Additionally, there are law enforcement officers from other countries who are posted to Türkiye; an arrangement which facilitates, inter alia, the exchange of information. Information exchange and joint operations are conducted through these liaison officers whereby “Police Co-operation Meetings” and visits have been organised to ensure the successful and effective completion of operations and to enhance success to fight against international and transnational criminal organisations. In addition, a conference is held and has been held once a year with the participation of police liaison officers, providing an opportunity to convey their requests regarding operational and law enforcement co-operation. Furthermore, Türkiye has assigned specific contact points to address or serve as a desk for incoming requests from specific countries to also help improve quality and timeliness of responses. 140. As in the 2019 MER, competent authorities are required to maintain the secrecy and confidentiality of investigations and inquiries, with information exchange being secured through established measures and in line with the jurisdiction’s legislative framework which includes the International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Law and the Turkish Criminal Procedure law. 141. Feedback from the Global Network members reflects that international co-operation with Türkiye is generally viewed as active and functional, with many countries describing co-operation as constructive and noting timely or satisfactory responses to requests. While some jurisdictions raised concerns about delays or legal and procedural hurdles - particularly in more complex judicial co-operation matters - the overall feedback indicates that positive co-operation experiences were more commonly reported. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 142. Türkiye provides MLA and extradition in accordance with a clear and comprehensive legal framework, applicable bilateral and multilateral treaties and co-operation on the basis of reciprocity. There are no legal impediments that prevent Türkiye from providing assistance in relation to ML, TF, terrorism or associated predicate offences, including for the purpose of asset recovery. Under the Directorate General for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs, the MoJ, serves as the Central Authority, within which a Bureau of MLA in Criminal Matters and a Bureau of Extradition operate. As of November 2025, the staff levels for the Bureau of MLA in Criminal Matters comprised 10 judges/experts, 1 department director, three chiefs, two statisticians and 33 clerks. While there is no evidence to suggest that this composition is inadequate for the volume of incoming requests, the Central Authority intends to conduct a review of its staffing complement in line with Türkiye’s efforts (e.g. increase in ML/TF investigations as expressed in IO.7 and IO.9). 143. During the reporting period, Türkiye’s Central Authority received a substantial volume of incoming MLA requests across a broad range of offences. As detailed in Table 2.1 below, there were over 700 incoming MLA requests between 2021–2024 [25] for ML, terrorism, TF and other major economic offences (including serious predicate offences). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA Requests from 2021-2024 Category Incoming MLA Requests Money Laundering 186 Terrorist Financing 6 Terrorism (non-TF) 96 Other major economic offences 437 Total 725 144. Of the 186 ML-related requests, 80 were fully executed, 9 partially executed, 18 rejected and 79 remained pending at the end of the period, with an average processing time of approximately 161 days, which is considered by the AT as relatively timely for more complex requests but less so for expectations regarding simpler requests. While the rejection rate is low (approximately 10% of incoming requests were denied) and refusals were grounded in clear legal or procedural reasons, there is a considerable number of pending requests (approximately 42.5% of incoming requests). Most pending requests were however under active execution rather than inactive and the volume, intricate technological nature of some of the incoming requests and countries submitting several supplementary requests, amongst other factors, place operational demands on the system, which contribute to longer than average execution times for some categories of requests, particularly ML. 145. Incoming MLA requests related to terrorism and TF are prioritised, with the average response time for execution being 7.5 months, which as noted above tends to be in the higher, longer end for more complex matters and expected for TF. Türkiye received a limited number of TF-specific MLA requests and a higher volume of terrorism-related requests. These requests benefit from dedicated prioritisation tools, specialised prosecutors and courts as well as electronic coding that flags urgency, resulting in faster execution compared to ML cases. This demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to deliver timely assistance where risks are clearly identified and prioritised and where operational arrangements enable rapid processing. 146. Türkiye does not have a mechanism to seek feedback on the assistance it rendered; however the country provided several examples and newspaper articles of the positive feedback conveyed by assisted jurisdictions. Additionally, general accounts from the Global Network reflected that Türkiye has engaged collaboratively in the information exchange process, quality responses were submitted and critical assistance was provided. Furthermore, some jurisdictions reported that Türkiye’s responses were provided in a timely manner with urgent requests being prioritised. Box 2.1 includes examples of Türkiye’s effective execution of MLA requests notwithstanding operational constraints. Box 2.1. Successful execution of mutual legal assistance despite operational constraints Case Study 1. In 2021, Country X submitted an MLA request to Türkiye seeking bank account details and transaction records related to fraud proceeds transferred to an account located in Türkiye. The request was processed and fulfilled, with all relevant information and documentation transmitted to the competent authorities in Country X, demonstrating Türkiye’s commitment to providing constructive, timely and quality assistance in line with FATF Core Issue 2.1. Notably, Country X also provided assurances regarding the protection of bona fide third parties in relation to potential seizure measures, highlighting an important safeguard in cross-border asset recovery efforts. However, the seizure request itself could not be executed due to the absence of funds in the account at the time the request was received. This case also involved procedural delays, as the request required location-related information (such as a postal or IP-related address), but the address initially provided by Country X was inaccurate. Consequently, the request had to be disseminated to Chief Public Prosecutors’ Offices across three separate jurisdictions within Türkiye, extending the response timeline. Despite these operational challenges, Türkiye proceeded to fully co-operate and provide comprehensive feedback, underscoring its adherence to international co-operation standards and good faith engagement in MLA processes. Case Study 2. The suspect was accused of hacking various companies’ information and ML, therefore the provision of documents and information was sought. Information about cryptocurrency records was also among the requested assistance. The requests were followed by supplementary requests over a period of time and after execution, authorities of the requesting country sent an email to show their appreciation. Case Study 3. The suspect was accused of murder. However, bank records constituted an important component of the request and was vital for the resolution of the case. Additionally, requested vital information and documents could not be used unless confirmed and approved by Turkish authorities. In this case, information and documents were successfully provided and the testimony of a witness, who was unable to attend trials in the requesting country, was provided via videoconference. An email from the requesting country’s authorities regarding their appreciation and importance of Türkiye’s assistance was provided. 2.1.2. Extradition 147. Extradition requests received by Türkiye are assessed and processed through a structured central authority framework led by the MoJ, with judicial determination by competent courts and the availability of appeal. The Bureau of Extradition is staffed with nine judges, one director, one deputy general director, five heads of departments, one chief clerk, 22 clerks, two statisticians and 2 archivists. Requests are examined against defined admissibility criteria, including minimum penalty thresholds, dual criminality, nationality restrictions and human-rights safeguards. Simplified extradition procedures are available and used in practice where consent is given, contributing to shorter timelines in such cases. Table 2.2 identifies the number of simplified extraditions. Table 2.2. Number of simplified extraditions (Categorised by region) Country 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Western Europe 1 4 5 Non- EU 1 2 3 Central Asia 1 1 2 Eastern Europe 1 1 2 Southeast Europe 1 1 2 Middle East 1 1 Total 1 3 2 2 7 15 148. Aside from the above simplified extraditions, during the reporting period, Türkiye received 75 incoming extradition requests related to ML, TF and terrorism offences, almost half of which were from countries with different extradition laws. As reflected in Table 2.3 , which spans 2021-2025, a limited number resulted in surrender, while a significant proportion remained pending or disposed without extradition. From the descriptions and details provided, the AT appreciated that the reasons for disposal were beyond Türkiye’s control, such as the withdrawal of an extradition request because an arrest warrant was lifted in the requesting country or the withdrawal of an extradition request because the statute of limitations for the offence had expired in the requesting country. Regarding the four rejected requests, the main grounds for refusal were legal constraints, notably the prohibition on extraditing nationals and the absence of dual criminality, which are consistent with international grounds for refusal. There is no indication that such requests were refused arbitrarily or without transparency. 149. Competent authorities report that simplified extradition procedures can result in surrender within approximately 180 days, while other requests averaged 594 days (less than twenty months), which demonstrates operational capacity in eligible cases. Pending cases remain constrained by several factors, such as, representatives raising objections in court matters. Other challenges include the requirement to locate and identify foreign nationals who enter through unofficial channels and use Türkiye to transit to other countries, lack of fixed residences or use of forged identification. Additionally, at times, Red Notices do not contain essential identity and personal information such as distinguishing features. In some cases, use of different alphabets leads to individuals being registered under different names in the Turkish system, resulting in matching difficulties. In all those instances, the fugitive status of such individuals necessitates extensive field operations to locate and identify them, given Türkiye’s wide geographic expanse. Importantly, some extradition requests related to cases where the principle of ne bis in idem clearly applied in Türkiye, as individuals sought for extradition on grounds of being a member of ISIL were already prosecuted and convicted in Türkiye for being a member of ISIL, with their sentences being executed in Türkiye. These convicts, after the execution of the penalties, can be later subject to deportation measures. Furthermore, where part of the alleged offence has been committed within the jurisdiction, investigations are initiated in Türkiye against the persons sought for extradition. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests Category Requests Received Accepted/ Surrendered Rejected Pending Withdrawn ML 28 3 1 18 6 Terrorism 42 - 2 30 10 TF 5 0 1 4 0 Total 75 3 4 52 16 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 150. Türkiye has demonstrated the capacity to enforce foreign seizure and confiscation orders and to maintain follow-up arrangements for ongoing restraint measures. Türkiye also has measures in place for the deduction or sharing of substantial or extraordinary costs associated with executing freezing, seizure, or confiscation orders. In this regard, legislation provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, costs incurred in executing a request for judicial co-operation are to be borne by the executing state (IJCL, art. 34). 151. During the reporting period, Türkiye received 82 requests relating to seizure and one for confiscation measures, of which 13 were finalised (executed or otherwise completed). In other cases, seizure or confiscation was not possible due to insufficient funds in the account, lack of causal connection, or absence of supporting documentation. Furthermore, where possible unlawful seizures arose, authorities followed provisions requiring a guarantee on allocation or reimbursement of possible damages (Criminal Procedure Law Article 141 and Law nr 6706 on International Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters article 3/3). In this regard, additional information and documentation were required from countries requesting the seizure in order to continue the proceedings. While some foreign countries acquiesced to this requirement, there were a few jurisdictions which did not. The case study in Box 2.2 is an example of Türkiye’s successful recovery of assets through co-operation at the behest of an international partner. Box 2.2. Facilitating a request for confiscation Case Study: Double (dual) Türkiye received a request from Country X to locate and seize the assets of Individual A, who was investigated for drug trafficking and ML. After Türkiye seized the assets, Country X’s court finalised its confiscation order, which Türkiye recognised and following co-operation and co-ordination to avoid double/dual enforcement, a final amount of EUR 736 650,86 was confiscated in 2024. 152. Türkiye has treaty-based mechanisms which facilitate the sharing of confiscated assets with other countries. Türkiye has entered into bilateral agreements with a number of countries—including China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, the United States and several others—which expressly allow for the sharing of confiscated proceeds resulting from judicial co-operation. In the absence of a treaty, Türkiye may still accept and act on co-operation requests on the basis of reciprocity (the analysis in c. 38.7 refers). Qualitative or quantitative information regarding the sharing of confiscated assets was unavailable, however Box 2.3 provides examples of successful repatriation of assets. Box 2.3. Confiscating and returning assets Case Study 1 On 17 February 2025, the FIU of Country X requested the suspension of a financial transaction suspected to be linked to kidnapping and aggravated fraud, after a victim, Ms. J., had been manipulated into transferring funds to Türkiye. The scheme began on 10 February 2025, when a man falsely claiming to represent a national criminal investigation authority contacted Ms. J. and persuaded her that she could assist in apprehending organised fraudsters in Türkiye by purchasing an apartment allegedly used by the criminals. The following day, a woman purporting to be from INTERPOL reinforced the deception and convinced Ms. J. that she needed to travel to Türkiye to complete the transaction. Ms. J. travelled alone to a city in Türkiye, met the suspect at a hotel and remained there until 18 February 2025, during which EUR 291 000 was transferred to an account held by a Turkish national under the suspects’ direction. Following the FIU request, MASAK imposed a seven-working-day suspension measure on 19 February 2025 to prevent dissipation of the funds. A Financial Detection Report, prepared on 24 February 2025 and submitted to the Chief Public Prosecutor, concluded that no reasonable connection could be established between the suspect’s financial profile and the transferred amount and assessed that the funds were likely proceeds of fraud. In the meantime, in March, a formal MLA request was received from Country X where the victim resides and same was evaluated and examined, in accordance with relevant legislation, by the Central Authority. In order to prevent dissipation, immediate contact was made with the FIU, as the request letter indicated suspension on the account. Subsequently, contact was made with the judicial authority which is authorised for seizure. On 14 March 2025, X City’s Court of Peace ordered the seizure of the full EUR 291 000. When the request was transmitted to the relevant judicial authority, it was discovered that the proceeds of crime had already been returned to the victim. The authorities in X country were afterwards asked if they want to proceed with their request and a letter of acceptance of conclusion and appreciation was delivered as a reply. Case Study 2: In 2021, a request was received from an EU member country —one of the countries with which Türkiye collaborates most closely in the field of legal co-operation—to carry out a search and seizure at the Turkish address of a Turkish citizen under investigation for fraud. The request was immediately forwarded to the relevant Turkish judicial authorities for the purpose of obtaining information and documents. Meanwhile, a guarantee against unlawful seizure was requested from the EU member country authorities, and once this guarantee was received, the seizure request was immediately forwarded to the relevant judicial authority. Information regarding the seized items was promptly communicated to the EU member country and the items were handed over to officials at the EU member country Embassy for examination. 153. Türkiye maintains a clear legal framework and adequate operational capacity to deliver constructive and comprehensive MLA and extradition, including in support of foreign investigations and asset recovery. Authorities execute a broad spectrum of measures—such as collecting and transmitting evidence, financial and asset information (movable and immovable), criminal records, testimony (including via videoconference), transfer of proceedings and the implementation of seizure and confiscation orders, while engaging proactively with requesting jurisdictions to clarify issues and minimise refusals or partial execution. The system demonstrates particular effectiveness in terrorism and TF cases, where prioritisation mechanisms, specialised expertise and urgency coding facilitate expedited handling. Although processing times for ML-related MLA requests can at times affect timeliness and the proportion of incoming extradition requests resulting in surrender is relatively limited, these outcomes are generally attributable to legitimate judicial, procedural and constitutional safeguards (such as the ne bis in idem principle explained above) rather than deficiencies in co-operation. Competent authorities obtain informal feedback on assistance rendered and address issues on a case-by-case basis, however the jurisdiction would benefit from performance monitoring so that any quality and timeliness issues could be proactively and appropriately addressed. Notwithstanding these moderate areas for improvement, the framework operates effectively in practice and demonstrates the provision of meaningful international co-operation. Footnotes [25] Due to an update on the UYAP informatic system and UYAP-2/3 integration, electronic capture and consolidation of statistics for 2025 was not possible." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 154. Türkiye actively seeks international co-operation and issued a high volume of outgoing MLA and extradition requests over the period 2021-2024, reflecting a strong willingness to engage foreign counterparts. Türkiye provided the AT with extensive quantitative and qualitative data which demonstrated significant and varied use of outgoing MLA, both in stand-alone ML and TF cases and more extensively, in predicate offences and terrorism-related matters. Regarding stand-alone ML cases, Türkiye sent 38 requests to 18 jurisdictions. Of these requests, which touched and concerned underlying offences such as drug trafficking, fraud, illegal betting and gambling, human trafficking, establishing a criminal organisation/membership of a criminal organisation and tax evasion, nine were accepted, eight were rejected, one was partially accepted and 20 were pending. 6 649 MLA requests were generated pertaining to major predicates identified in the country’s risk assessment. These requests covered offences such as fraud, forgery, theft and robbery, customs smuggling, usury, illegal betting and gambling and migrant smuggling. Of those, 2 794 were accepted and 2 763 are pending, with the remainder accounting for rejected or partially rejected outcomes. For terrorism and TF related cases, 1 131 and seven requests were sent, respectively. Of the seven TF requests, two were accepted, three rejected and 2 were pending at the end of the on-site. For the terrorism-related matters, there were 577 pending requests, 243 accepted requests, 302 rejected requests and 9 partially rejected requests. The statistics therefore reveal that while outgoing MLA is extensive and consistent with the country’s risk profile, pending and rejected requests form a substantial share of outcomes. 155. Procedurally, if the relevant judicial authority detects an international connection in the case file, it will decide to submit an MLA request. For information such as criminal records, population registry data and bank account numbers that can be obtained through informal channels, judicial authorities are directed to informal channels by CADIB offices or the Central Authority. If the Central Authority reviews and approves that procedural requirements for a MLA request have been fulfilled, it forwards the file to the relevant country. In the interim, the Central Authority may remind the relevant judicial authority of other MLA instruments provided for in multilateral treaties and laws such as video conference. Alternatively, if a case involves a request against assets, it will be assigned a seizure code and cases assigned this code are reviewed and examined with urgency. These cases generally involve ML, TF and some predicate offences. Through the UYAP system, any requested file can be specially marked, casing a coloured alert to appear at the top of the screens of the experts responsible for the file’s workflow. Files to be sent to MoJ through CADIB are also prioritised in this manner at the courts. Urgent requests are at times sought through police co-operation at the very beginning of the investigation (at times simultaneously with the MLA request) which prevents both delays and the loss of data. Box 2.4 highlights an example of Türkiye’s use of international co-operation channels to further active investigations. Box 2.4. Case examples: Foreign predicate ML Case Study A complex transnational investigation dismantled multiple organised crime networks engaged in large-scale drug trafficking and the laundering of illicit proceeds. The case originated from financial intelligence analysis that identified sophisticated laundering patterns linked to narcotics distribution across several regions. From the outset, the investigation was built on extensive international judicial co-operation and co-ordinated law-enforcement action. Evidence derived from encrypted communication platforms—lawfully obtained and shared through judicial channels—proved central, enabling authorities to determine leadership and operational tiers, identify financial facilitators and trace cross-border cash. The operation was conducted in close partnership with Europol, Eurojust and INTERPOL, alongside numerous national authorities. Approximately 10 MLA requests and over 150 intelligence exchanges supported the investigation, complemented by operational co-ordination meetings to align prosecutorial strategies and evidentiary standards. Financial and asset-tracing intelligence further enabled investigators to connect drug trafficking proceeds to assets held across multiple jurisdictions. Analysis of approximately 6 million encrypted messages identified more than 500 key accounts linked to organised crime actors, revealing a network of several thousand associated identifiers and illustrating the scale of the illicit operational network. Illicit proceeds were primarily moved through cash, precious metals and high-value goods, using laundering methods such as front companies, structured deposits, cash couriers and investments in real estate and commercial enterprises. A co-ordinated enforcement phase, involving several thousand officers across multiple jurisdictions, resulted in around 250 arrests, over 200 pre-trial detentions and the location of more than 10 internationally wanted individuals through INTERPOL channels. Asset recovery was a core objective, with authorities freezing or seizing properties, vehicles, corporate shares and financial accounts valued at over USD 355 million in Türkiye and various other countries. As the investigation expanded to over 300 suspects in Türkiye and various other countries, key lessons emerged: the critical role of MLA frameworks and joint investigation teams in ensuring cross-border admissibility of digital evidence; the importance of real-time operational co-ordination; and the effectiveness of parallel financial and narcotics investigations. The case underscores how integrating encrypted communication exploitation with financial intelligence can dismantle entire criminal networks while simultaneously targeting both operational capacity and illicit assets. 156. Türkiye has invested in improving, inter alia, the quality of outgoing requests through the establishment of CADIBs, detailed guidance and templates, a central monitoring system and extensive training of judges, prosecutors and clerks. These measures have strengthened the formal quality and legal completeness of outgoing co-operation requests and support constructive engagement with foreign counterparts. 157. Türkiye has underscored that average response times from foreign counterparts are long, particularly for seizure and confiscation-related requests. When there is a protracted delay, Türkiye undertakes follow-up on delayed outgoing MLA requests, including through periodic (annual) review of pending cases. However, such follow-up is not conducted through a structured, risk-based escalation framework with graduated timelines or scheduled interim tracking. As a result, although foreign response times are outside Türkiye’s control, the limited frequency and formality of follow-up can impact time-sensitive and asset recovery cases where asset dissipation risks may be elevated. 2.2.2. Extradition 158. Türkiye actively seeks extradition and issued a very large number of outgoing extradition requests, particularly in terrorism-related cases as reflected in Table 2.4 . Table 2.4. Outgoing Extradition Requests: 2021-2025 Year Money Laundering Terror Offence TF Total outgoing extradition requests/ year Accept Reject Pending Disposed Total Accept Reject Pending Disposed Total Reject Pending Disposed Total 2021 1 1 1 2 5 91 101 43 235 6 5 7 18 258 2022 1 1 1 69 67 38 175 1 2 3 6 182 2023 1 1 1 121 167 22 311 4 1 5 317 2024 2 6 8 1 157 570 18 746 2 8 10 764 2025 2 2 9 230 239 2 2 243 Total 1 3 11 2 17 3 447 1135 121 1706 13 18 10 41 1764 159. The timely execution or low execution rate of outgoing extradition requests, particularly in terrorism related matters, should be viewed against factors outside Türkiye’s control, including differing legal frameworks, asylum/refugee policies, judicial requirements and evidentiary thresholds applied in requested jurisdictions. As a result, while Türkiye demonstrates strong intent to pursue extradition, the practical impact of outgoing extradition remains challenging. 160. If the person is detained in the requested State for extradition purposes, the process is monitored continuously and periodically within the timeframes prescribed by the relevant extradition treaties. If the person sought for extradition is not detained in the requested State, inquiries are made through diplomatic channels and via Interpol, at intervals not exceeding three months, to ascertain whether the person is still in that country and to obtain updated information on the extradition proceedings. Proactively, in cases where Türkiye’s extradition request is rejected, available judicial remedies are pursued, including appeals and review mechanisms, in order to challenge the rejection and seek reconsideration of the extradition. Accordingly, if there is no extradition request for the purpose of execution and if the extradition request is denied, the judicial authorities are instructed to seek judicial co-operation to finalise the case so that files currently in the investigation or prosecution stage can proceed to the execution stage. If requests that have reached the execution stage are denied, relevant authorities may be directed to file a request for transfer of execution, if the statute of limitations is approaching. In cases where neither of these conditions applies, the judicial authorities will continue to search for the individual until the statute of limitations expires. Furthermore, the use of alternative measures if an extradition request is denied typically occurs when the individual could be deported due to the lack of a valid residence permit. 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 161. Türkiye has evidenced a clear legal framework and institutional capacity to pursue asset recovery through international co-operation and while the number of outgoing MLA requests specifically targeting assets abroad during the evaluation period (8 for seizure and 2 for confiscation) remains modest, the existing cases reflect a deliberate and targeted use of available mechanisms by competent authorities. Confiscation is established as a policy objective and as it pertains to asset tracing, depending on the case, outgoing information requests transmitted through the Egmont Group encompass a broad spectrum of financial intelligence inquiries—including STR and Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) data, LEAs records, bank account information, transaction flows, BO and sectoral risk profiling. While “asset tracing” is not formally captured as a specific field within the EMIS system and therefore not statistically disaggregated, internal estimates indicate that approximately 70% of such requests substantively relate to asset tracing objectives. Competent authorities have demonstrated the ability to generate tangible results in cross-border cases, as illustrated in Boxes 2.4 and 2.5 and further examples in Chapters 7 and 8. Although the use of early freezing or restraint measures in outgoing requests has not yet been standardised, the functioning legal basis and demonstrated operational outcomes provide a solid foundation to enhance asset recovery efforts and further strengthen the effectiveness of international co-operation measures in this area. Box 2.5. Recovering Assets Case Study 1: Operation Exchange A major drug trafficking and ML case was initiated by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of Province A following the detection of drug proceeds generated abroad and transported into Türkiye through couriers, then laundered via safe deposit boxes, real estate purchases and misuse of legal entities. The investigation, conducted by the TNP Narcotics Department in close collaboration with MASAK, became the largest of its kind in Türkiye’s history. A comprehensive financial intelligence effort followed, with MASAK producing 17 analytical reports between 2019 and 2021, while LEAs applied surveillance, communication interception and undercover operations to refine the suspect network, leading to indictments against 73 individuals, including the organisation’s leadership. International co-operation was a central component of the investigation. To trace the suspects’ overseas activities, Türkiye issued MLA requests to 8 countries, sought information from 23 countries through INTERPOL and exchanged financial intelligence with 21 countries via the Egmont Secure Web. These co-ordinated international efforts enabled the authorities to identify and restrain assets valued at approximately EUR 15 million, USD 15.8 million, GBP 6 million, TRY 121 million, as well as 160 real estate properties and 22 vehicles worth an estimated EUR 100 million. Substantial seizures were executed across financial and physical assets and the prosecution remains ongoing, demonstrating the effectiveness of sustained international co-operation in dismantling complex transnational laundering operations. Case Study 2 MASAK submitted a request to Country Y regarding Individual X, who carried out acts of bid-rigging, qualified fraud and bribery, and have transferred high amounts of money to accounts in Country Y. In this context, a significant amount of information regarding person X was requested, and it was specified that bank account details, transfer transactions, current balances of the accounts and information on the further movements of the transfers received from Türkiye are required. In response to the request, Country X provided account statements and transaction information." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="162. Beyond formal MLA, Türkiye generally makes extensive and appropriate use of other forms of international co-operation to seek information and assistance for inter alia, AML/CFT purposes, the identification of suspects, understanding complex ownership structures and supporting asset tracing. A broad range of competent authorities are involved, including FIU, LEAs, supervisory authorities and customs as well as tax authorities, each using channels relevant to its mandates. 2.3.1. FIU 163. MASAK plays a central role in seeking international co-operation through FIU-to-FIU channels, primarily via the Egmont Secure Web and where relevant, alternative secure arrangements with non-Egmont counterparts. MASAK demonstrated that it consistently seeks and receives a wide range of information, including financial intelligence, transaction data, account information as well as basic and BO information. Requests are clearly linked to a broad range of predicate offences, including fraud, drug trafficking, tax crimes, corruption, customs smuggling, illegal betting and gambling, TF, sanctions violations and virtual assets related offences; crimes which align with the risks identified under the NRA. In this context, requests are made to the relevant countries based on prioritisation in accordance with the Egmont Principles and FATF standards. MASAK’s extensive direct access to domestic databases enhances its ability to formulate targeted requests and make effective use of information received from abroad. 164. MASAK’s international co-operation is operationally embedded in its legislative framework and approximately 67 MOUs with foreign FIUs, (Egmont Group Members and non-members). Exchanges include incoming, outgoing and spontaneous submissions. This form of co-operation supports domestic analysis and operational decision-making and is not limited to reactive or ad hoc use . In the analysis, assessment and investigation of ML and TF offences, when foreign connections are identified regarding individuals and/or transactions, requests for information are made to foreign financial intelligence units promptly. When MASAK requests information from foreign counterpart financial intelligence units or shares information on its own initiative, there are rules that must be observed in accordance with national legislation and the Egmont Principles of Information Sharing. Furthermore, prioritising areas identified as high-risk through analyses and assessments conducted by MASAK or other competent authorities during information sharing enhances national effectiveness in combating ML and TF. In this regard, the following elements must be specifically considered and prioritised in both information requests and spontaneous sharing: · Cases involving threat actors identified in NRA reports as having a medium or higher risk level regarding TF and ML; · Cases involving sectors identified in NRA reports as having a medium or higher vulnerability risk level regarding TF and ML; · Requests requiring the postponement of transactions; · Requests involving legal entities identified as high-risk based on analyses and assessments conducted by MASAK or other competent authorities; and · Requests for information that must be obtained urgently within the scope of the case under review, regardless of whether they fall under the categories listed above. 165. The responses to requests received provide relevant information that leads to the identification of the suspects involved in the case, the identification of the crimes and their value, the transmission of such information to prosecutors’ offices, or the further expansion of the case based on the information received. This facilitates international co-operation by enabling the involvement of competent authorities in other countries, such as LEAs and prosecutors’ offices. All incoming information is recorded in the system. If distribution authorisation is granted, all incoming spontaneous requests are forwarded to the relevant unit within MASAK for further review. Additionally, if there is a file in MASAK its owner is notified regarding all incoming information requests, regardless of whether they are still open or closed. Similarly, if the information request concerns a suspicious transaction report regarding a natural or legal person, multiple countries have made requests regarding the same natural person, or there are serious issues involved, this is also forwarded to the relevant analysis department. In addition, responses to requests for information are forwarded to the relevant department or unit that submitted the request, and, following the completion of the analysis, are also forwarded to law enforcement and judicial authorities, subject to distribution authorisation. 166. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 detail outgoing requests by MASAK to Egmont and non-Egmont Group members, respectively, while Table 2.7 provides an overview of the requests made for BO information. The case study at Box 7.2 in Chapter 7 (ML Investigations - Operation Comanchero) provides a practical example of the jurisdiction’s collaboration with foreign partners. Table 2.5. Number of outgoing information requests through Egmont Secure Web Year Outgoing Requests Spontaneous Disclosures Total 2021 368 1 369 2022 75 3 78 2023 99 2 101 2024 75 1 76 2025 164 0 164 Table 2.6. Number of Outgoing Financial Intelligence Exchanges with Non-Egmont Group Members Requested country 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total East Asia 2 2 3 3 3 13 South Asia 2 0 0 0 1 3 Non EU 1 3 3 4 4 15 Table 2.7. Outgoing requests for BO information Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Country Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Non-EU 1 3 0 1 3 0 North America 1 0 2 1 4 0 3 0 4 5 4 6 North Africa 2 0 3 2 0 3 Northern Europe 4 0 11 2 9 2 6 9 13 Eastern Europe 16 2 330 1 4 0 2 11 14 19 17 344 South Asia 6 0 14 1 2 1 7 2 15 Western Europe 8 0 15 1 1 0 3 0 8 12 1 23 Central Europe 13 10 77 13 10 77 Southeast Asia 9 0 25 1 0 2 10 0 27 Middle East 3 1 8 1 1 1 6 1 30 10 3 39 Central Asia 1 0 2 1 0 2 Southern Europe 7 0 20 7 0 20 East Asia 2 0 4 2 0 4 East Africa 1 0 2 1 0 2 Total 69 13 505 4 12 1 5 21 16 1 0 2 17 3 51 96 49 575 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 167. LEAs seek information through police-to-police co-operation channels, including INTERPOL (as an example, 46 requests were sent in 2025), Camden Asset Recovery Inter-agency Network (CARIN) and liaison officers abroad, to obtain criminal intelligence, locate suspects and identify assets. See Boxes 2.4 and 2.6 as well as Chapters 6, 7 and 8 (IOs 6-8). Box 2.6. Case Study: Turkish National Police – Tracing the proceeds of drug trafficking In connection with the laundering in Türkiye of proceeds derived from drug trafficking, which is a predicate offence committed abroad, a simultaneous operation was conducted in 2024 under the co-ordination of TNP Narcotics Department, targeting an armed criminal organisation led by X. The operation involved 79 locations across six provinces, with Y City as the central hub. On the day of the operation, following the discovery of documents linked to EU-member country during a search of a suspect’s residence, real-time intelligence was exchanged with EU member authorities. Furthermore, the answers provided by suspect Y to the questions posed were shared in real time with EU member country authorities as part of police co-operation. In this context, authorities in EU member country conducted searches of suspect Y’s residence, workplace and rental safe deposit box in an EU member country and seized the 121.000 Euros in his bank account. Furthermore, the digital data imaged during searches conducted by the EU member country judicial authorities was shared with the Narcotics Unit. As a result of the examination of the digital data, a connection was established between the seven vehicles and two properties located in Türkiye and the criminal organisation, and a money laundering report was sent to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in Y City. As a result, the Y City Criminal Court of Peace seized seven vehicles and two properties, valued at 11.258.000 USD, that were under the suspect Y’s control. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 168. Supervisory authorities in Türkiye engage in international co-operation, to a moderate extent, to support both market supervision and AML/CFT objectives. For the BRSA, information requests are generally related to fit and proper processes for opening overseas branches and appointing senior executives. The Capital Markets Board (CMB), in particular, makes extensive use of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Multilateral MoU, having concluded 54 co-operation agreements and exchanged information with numerous foreign supervisors on cases involving market abuse, unauthorised capital market activities, fraud, VAs investigations and fit-and-proper assessments. The information exchanged—including ownership and partnership structures, personal and corporate data, account information and other supervisory-relevant intelligence with BO elements—demonstrates that international supervisory co-operation is effectively leveraged for AML/CFT-relevant purposes. CMB co-operates with foreign counterparts for various areas within its mandate, including the ongoing supervision of FIs, such as assessing fit and properness of supervised entities, which also contributes to AML/CFT objectives. In addition, the second paragraph of Article 257 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCC) states: (2) Except in cases specifically defined as crimes under the law, a public official who, by neglecting or delaying the performance of their duties, causes harm to individuals or the public, or provides an unjust advantage to individuals, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three months to one year. 169. The CBRT requests the necessary information from the relevant authorities in the licensing processes of payment and electronic money institutions, as well as in cases where such information is required after licensing. If there are non-Turkish citizens or non-resident firms among the shareholders of these institutions, the CBRT requests intelligence regarding these individuals and companies from the relevant authorities abroad. Multinational companies operate in Türkiye’s insurance and pension market and regular meetings are held with regulatory and supervisory authorities in the countries where the headquarters of these multinational entities are located. These meetings, referred to as “College meetings” are organised by the relevant authorities and facilitate information sharing among authorities within the framework of macro prudential supervision and oversight. For example, Y Insurance has its headquarters in Country B. Regular meetings are held under the supervision of the Central Bank of Country B. Another example is D Insurance Inc., a company headquartered in Country F that operates in Türkiye. Similarly, meetings are held with the relevant supervisory authority under the Central Bank of Country F. Furthermore, the exchange of information is not limited to the information and documents requested during the establishment phase; it also includes correspondence with the authorities of the relevant countries regarding the evaluation of submitted documents and the monitoring of the process, particularly in connection with share transfers. 170. Supervisory authorities (notably the CMB and the Insurance and IPRSA) also make targeted use of MASAK as an international co-operation channel, particularly in urgent cases involving foreign legal persons and share transfers requiring immediate supervisory action. This practice reflects effective domestic co-ordination and a risk-based selection of co-operation channels to ensure timely supervisory intervention (see Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 as well as case studies in Box 2.7 ). MASAK has requested information regarding obliged parties from 14 foreign competent authorities in 2025 to enhance co-operation for supervisory purposes and this information is taken into account in the preparation of its 2026 supervision program. For the CMB, responses to information requests received from foreign countries are provided to the person assigned to the audited entity for consideration during the audit, and these matters are taken into account during the audit. In addition, information obtained regarding the obliged entity in the context of AML/CFT is reported to MASAK in accordance with the protocol signed with MASAK. For the BRSA, information exchange regarding fit and proper checks is directly linked to AML/CFT objectives because they ensure that individuals in key positions within financial institutions are trustworthy, competent and free from any criminal associations. It contributes to the risk mitigation efforts. Table 2.8. Number of Information Requests Sent (CMB) Country Years State of Request 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Yes No Central Europe 1 1 North America 1 1 Western Europe 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 1 Middle East 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 1 Middle East 1 1 Northern Europe 1 1 2 South America 1 1 Total 3 1 5 1 6 4 Table 2.9. Number of information requests sent (BRSA) Country Years State of Request 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Yes No Middle East 3 2 5 Southern Europe 1 1 Northern Europe 1 1 2 Total 2 4 2 8 Table 2.10. Number of information requests sent (IPRSA) Country Years 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Middle East 1 Southern Europe 1 1 Central Europe 2 Non EU 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 Total 1 1 2 3 1 Box 2.7. Seeking of information by financial supervisors Case Study 1 There was a request to transfer the shares of an insurance company established in Türkiye to a legal entity based in country X. In this context, a request for information was made by IPRSA to MASAK to promptly determine whether there was information regarding the beneficial owner and whether any investigations or similar proceedings have been conducted regarding these persons. Note: In the event of a request from a foreign legal entity, the Institution contacts the authorities of the relevant country directly. However, in cases where a decision/measure must be taken urgently, the request is made to MASAK. Case Study 2 As a result of the oversight activities carried out by IPRSA, it was determined that an insurance company transferred and registered shares without the permission of the IPRSA. In this regard, the insurance company was urgently requested to provide a defence on the matter. Also, despite the unauthorised nature of the transaction, information was requested from MASAK and relevant institutions regarding local and foreign legal and natural persons, as a share transfer was involved. In the statement made by the company, it was claimed that the share transfer in question was made mistakenly. In this context, the company was requested to delete the share transfer in question from the share register, restore the entries in the share register to their previous state and submit the updated share register to IPRSA for approval. Case 3 This case study comprises two separate applications reviewed by the CMB, with input from MASAK in the context of fit-and-proper and background assessments. Case 3(a): Portfolio Management Company An application was submitted to the CMB requesting authorisation to establish a portfolio management company (“A”) with an initial capital of EURO 1.1 million within a registered capital ceiling of EURO 5.5 million. As part of the evaluation process, the CMB requested MASAK to provide information on any findings concerning the direct and indirect shareholders, as well as authorised representatives, of the proposed company. MASAK conducted the necessary inquiries and shared its findings with the CMB. In addition, the opinion of the competent foreign authority was obtained in respect of an indirect legal entity shareholder exercising significant influence over the company. The assessments of both MASAK and the foreign authority did not reveal any adverse information and the application was assessed positively. Case 3(b): VA Service Provider Separate applications for establishment and/or operating licences relating to crypto asset service provider activities were submitted to the CMB. The CMB requested MASAK to assess the natural and legal persons included in the application against fit-and-proper criteria. MASAK carried out the relevant checks and provided its findings to the CMB. For further details on the fit-and-proper assessment framework applied in this context, see IO3. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 171. The MoT, Directorate General of Customs Enforcement (DGCE) adopts a structured and increasingly proactive approach to the use of outgoing international co-operation requests as a core operational tool in combating smuggling, predicate offences and associated financial crime. DGCE’s authority to initiate international information exchange is established under Presidential Decree No. 1 and further operationalised through 72 bilateral Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreements, enabling systematic and lawful outbound co-operation with a wide range of foreign counterparts. CE authorities seek information through mutual administrative assistance and international operational co-operation to address all types of cross-border smuggling and trade-based risks. The DGCE co-operates with foreign counterparts and international organisations such as the WCO, Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), and INTERPOL in order to determine potential risky routes related to smuggling and violations of customs regulations, including misdeclaration of origin and undervaluation; to identify high-risk consignments and related to persons, vehicles, and companies; trace criminal networks and facilitators; and co-ordinate simultaneous enforcement actions. 172.  Statistical data indicates that there is regular and targeted use of outgoing co-operation mechanisms. In 2024, there were 65 outgoing information requests and 21 outgoing intelligence exchanges. In 2025, there were 116 outgoing information requests and 29 outgoing intelligence exchanges. Outgoing requests for information are primarily sent to support risk analysis and intelligence activities concerning seizures and suspicious persons and incidents. The feedback and intelligence outcomes obtained from international inquiries are carefully evaluated and can be utilised by the DGCE at the central level; furthermore, as deemed necessary based on the nature of the case, this information may be shared with the relevant provincial customs administrations to be integrated into real-time risk analysis, targeting, and profiling operations. 173. Moreover, in combating cross-border crimes and various types of smuggling at both global and regional levels, the DGCE demonstrates a proactive approach. In this regard, successful outcomes are achieved through participation in international operations co-ordinated by organizations such as WCO, INTERPOL, and SELEC. Examples of such operations include EMPACT, THUNDER, DEMETER, PANGEA, PANDORA, TOX, GAMMA, WISE, Project Global Shield and STOP IV. Within the scope of the EMPACT operation co-ordinated by SELEC and conducted in October 2024, an operation targeting the smuggling of firearms, narcotics and commercial goods was carried out with the participation of EU Member States. During the operation, as a result of the risk analysis conducted by the DGCE, 120 kg of cocaine, migrants and undeclared goods were seized. Within the scope of the intelligence exchanges, controls carried out by the Customs Administrations of the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal and Hungary regarding 10 suspicious shipments resulted in seizures with an approximate total value of EUR 26 400 000. 174. The tax authorities did not seek assistance from foreign counterparts during the period under review." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="505. Türkiye has mechanisms in place to manage and dispose of frozen and seized property. However, it was not possible to assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms in relation to the assets value preservation due to lack of information provided on this specific aspect though Türkiye has several measures that authorities have to apply to preserve value, such as sale of assets and using interest bearing accounts as explained below. 506. The procedures concerning the criminal properties are carried out by the Depository Bureau under the surveillance and control of the Chief PPO. Depository Bureaus are available in the 81 provinces. Immovable properties resulting in seizures are registered in the UYAP system under the name of the Public Treasury by the General Directorate of National Property (GDNP). In the case of movable assets, the judicial authority conducting the investigation (public prosecutor or LEAs) ensures the safe storage and inventory of items seized. Once released from judicial custody, these items are received, stored, and classified by the GDNP. Depending on the type of asset, appropriate actions such as storage, destruction, allocation to a public institution, or liquidation can be taken. When the administration of seized immovable, rights, and credits is necessary, a receiver may be appointed for the administration of these assets. 507. Türkiye applies different strategies to manage seized assets depending on the type of assets: a) Receivers’ appointments: these applies to the administration of seized immovable, rights, credits and companies. The judge instructs the receiver to preserve the asset value in accordance with the practices and standards observed by a prudent trader, up to five years, safeguarding its integrity and market value. a. For seizure companies in ML/TF cases, assets are managed under the supervision of Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The receiver will administrate the company to preserve its legitimate business. If the company’s financial situation, partnership structure or market conditions requires, the receiver can request the sale of the company (totally or partially), its assets, or the companies’ liquidation. Sale and liquidation procedures are carried out by the relevant company's board of directors/managers or receivers or the SDIF. The consent of minority shareholders is not required for sale and liquidation proceedings. After the debts have been paid at the end of the dissolution and liquidation proceedings, the remaining amount shall be held in an account bearing interest until the proceedings are finally concluded. Once the case reaches to conviction and confiscation, the ownership of the company is transposed to Türkiye’s government (Ministry of Treasury). MoT assesses the asset and chooses between continuing managing the company and liquidating it. If the liquidation is decided, the company is sold, and the gain goes into the general administration budget. b) Between 2021-2025, a total of 815 companies and businesses were subject to SDIF's receiver administration, including 480 joint stock companies, 273 limited companies, and 62 other types of companies and businesses. c) Liquidation of the asset or legal persons: this measure is applied when there is a likelihood that a seized item will be damaged or suffer a substantial loss of value, the item in question may be liquidated before final judgment. d) PPOs custody applies for the movable assets subject to seizure. While cash is immediately deposited in an interest-generating bank account, gold, precious stones and equipment that must be physically preserved are taken in custody warehouses until the criminal investigation is finished and the confiscation or devolution is ordered. e) For VAs, since June 2025, public prosecutors are instructed to sell all VAs seized at market price, convert them into TRY and immediately deposit the cash into an interest-generating bank account without waiting for the completion of the investigation and prosecution. Before, public prosecutors transferred the VAs into public wallets under the PPOs. The new management system was enacted considering the high-risk of VAs, their volatile nature and the of the risk in VA based in the strategy document to enhance the fight against ML/TF. f) Goods that are seized or confiscated and/or abandoned at the Customs Enforcement facilities are transferred to Treasury and subjected to liquidation. For these cases, the liquidation procedures are carried out by the General Directorate of Liquidation Services (TASİŞ), a revolving fund enterprise operating under the Ministry of Trade. TASİŞ is responsible for the sale (via e-auction, public auction, or retail), allocation to public institutions, destruction, or recycling of such goods. Sales are conducted both electronically through online and physically at designated retail stores operated by TASİŞ. Goods deemed unsuitable or hazardous to health are destroyed in accordance with environmental regulations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="642. Over the reporting period, no assets were identified as being held by designated individuals or entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. There was one case of false positive identified in 2024 (see below). The absence of PF-related funds or assets related to DPRK and identified by Türkiye, is compensated to some extent by mitigating measures and investigations into potential cases. Yet there are residual concerns regarding whether the lack of identification is reasonable given Türkiye’s exposure, arising from its status as regional financial and trade hub. The absence of identification of PF cases in relation to Iran is not fully consistent with Türkiye’s identified PF risks and context. 643. As described below, reporting entities understanding of PF TFS is limited and in the best cases is focusing on the requirement to detect positive matches against sanctioned individuals and entities through screening. The lack of understanding and consideration of more complex sanctions evasion techniques, coupled with the reliance on commercial databases to identify listed natural and legal persons, do not support potential identification of more complex TF schemes including of persons acting on behalf or at the direction of UN designated persons and entities. In addition, as highlighted in IO.3 and IO.4, smaller FIs and DNFBs face challenges in identifying and/or verifying BO, particularly involving complex structures or foreign ownership. This weakens Türkiye’s ability to detect and prevent sanctions evasion schemes, particularly those involving individuals acting on behalf of or exerting indirect control over designated persons or entities. Box 11.2. False positive case study In January 2024, MASAK was informed of a potential match during an attempted transaction in the land registry. Initial inquiries revealed that a person named Mr A, known to have served as a Rear Admiral in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, had been designated under UNSCR 2231 and had his assets in Türkiye frozen by a Presidential Decision. Upon a detailed inquiry by MASAK and verification of the identity information, it was determined that the individual was not the same person as the one designated under the UNSC sanctions list. Land registry was informed of the false positive case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="642. Over the reporting period, no assets were identified as being held by designated individuals or entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. There was one case of false positive identified in 2024 (see below). The absence of PF-related funds or assets related to DPRK and identified by Türkiye, is compensated to some extent by mitigating measures and investigations into potential cases. Yet there are residual concerns regarding whether the lack of identification is reasonable given Türkiye’s exposure, arising from its status as regional financial and trade hub. The absence of identification of PF cases in relation to Iran is not fully consistent with Türkiye’s identified PF risks and context. 643. As described below, reporting entities understanding of PF TFS is limited and in the best cases is focusing on the requirement to detect positive matches against sanctioned individuals and entities through screening. The lack of understanding and consideration of more complex sanctions evasion techniques, coupled with the reliance on commercial databases to identify listed natural and legal persons, do not support potential identification of more complex TF schemes including of persons acting on behalf or at the direction of UN designated persons and entities. In addition, as highlighted in IO.3 and IO.4, smaller FIs and DNFBs face challenges in identifying and/or verifying BO, particularly involving complex structures or foreign ownership. This weakens Türkiye’s ability to detect and prevent sanctions evasion schemes, particularly those involving individuals acting on behalf of or exerting indirect control over designated persons or entities. Box 11.2. False positive case study In January 2024, MASAK was informed of a potential match during an attempted transaction in the land registry. Initial inquiries revealed that a person named Mr A, known to have served as a Rear Admiral in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, had been designated under UNSCR 2231 and had his assets in Türkiye frozen by a Presidential Decision. Upon a detailed inquiry by MASAK and verification of the identity information, it was determined that the individual was not the same person as the one designated under the UNSC sanctions list. Land registry was informed of the false positive case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.2.1. PF risk understanding 626. The understanding and update of PF risks has been set as a policy objective in Türkiye with the adoption of the PF Strategy Document (2025-2029). As a result, Türkiye completed its first PF NRA in 2025 and is to conduct annual PF risk analyses while fully updating its PF NRA at least once every three years. 627. Competent authorities overall demonstrated a sound understanding of PF risks and this has been enhanced by the work conducting in the development of the first PF NRA. This work was conducted by the PF Commission gathering all relevant competent authorities (see above) and professional associations representing the private sector. Similar to the methodology employed for the ML/TF NRA (see IO.1), Türkiye developed a comprehensive and data-driven PF NRA. It considers the risks of the financing of proliferation of mass destruction as well as both the risks to the effective implementation of sanctions regimes against DPRK and Iran and the risks arising from activities aimed at circumventing these sanctions. 628. Overall, the assessment was based on 76 risk indicators, assessing PF threats—considering both likelihood and impact—and associated vulnerabilities. Among those factors potentially posing PF threats are crimes closely linked to proliferation, as well as economic, commercial, social, and criminal activities of nationals from DPRK and Iran in Türkiye. Trade relationship with these countries and their main commercial partners was also assessed. Additionally, the effectiveness of existing mitigation measures was taken into account in light of the institutional capacities of relevant authorities. The NRA was also prepared with the co-operation of the private sector to a certain extent via the issuance of surveys on TFS compliance (both TF and PF) to sectoral associations to the exception of VASPs, newly regulated sector. The PF NRA also includes a sectoral risk assessment for every FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs establishing the risk exposure of each sector to PF risks. 629. As a result of the PF NRA, Türkiye concluded that its PF risk is relatively low (medium-low), with a medium risk exposure to Iran and a low-risk exposure to DPRK. The overall risk level identified in relation to Iran took into consideration the numerous threats Türkiye is exposed to. Those include Türkiye’ strategic position as a regional trade and transit hub, its land border with Iran and the presence of a large Iranian population in Türkiye with a significant portion involved in informal economy and Iranians having partnerships in many companies from different sectors, its trading relationship with Iran including the export and transit of sensitive and dual-use goods. 630. Türkiye demonstrated an overall understanding of evasion of PF related TFS obligation, especially via third country and/or through the use of virtual assets. The PF NRA has a dedicated section on Türkiye’s trade of sensitive and dual-use goods with DPRK and Iran main partners and competent authorities have detected typologies of potential sanctions circumvention via jurisdictions that could act as proxy for DPRK and Iran. Beyond the scope of the NRA, and despite the termination of the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts in 2024, authorities demonstrated awareness in relation to recent typologies of sanctions evasion by DPRK in collecting information via other international and regional sources. Authorities also considered the increase of virtual asset transactions in global PF typologies as an inherent risk of PF for the circumvention of UNSC sanctions, particularly where this activity involves actors linked to DPRK and Iran. 631. Nevertheless, the NRA analysis on circumvention of PF related TFS is generic and mostly relies on international typologies. Risks related to potential sanction evasions via the misuse of legal persons are understood to a lesser extent and could hinder Türkiye’s ability to deter PF risks to some extent. Challenges in obtaining accurate and up-to-date BO information (see IO.5), reinforces risks related to the misuse of front and shell companies to impede PF detection efforts. 11.2.2. PF risk mitigation 632. The PF Strategy Document and the PF NRA support the implementation of mitigating measures to some extent, but actions are still to be taken in light of their recent adoption. As part of the NRA, strategic analysis studies were conducted using data such as STRs, foreign currency transfers, company asset size, import and export data, foreign sales, central province, date of establishment, and number of employees, with the aim of preventing the potential circumvention of sanctions against Iran, preventing the misuse of the Turkish financial sector, and preventing illegal money flows. As a result of the analysis, the activities of a total of 139 companies were found to be suspicious, and a more comprehensive operational analysis study was initiated. The operational analysis of 65 of these companies was ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. The data obtained as a result of this analysis is planned to be shared with the relevant competent authorities. MASAK also issued in October 2025 a PF guideline for reporting entities. 633. In Türkiye, reporting entities can send STRs specifically on PF since May 2024. STRs received by MASAK after this date are not directly related to PF, and reporting entities have so far resorted to defensive reporting on their customers related to high-risk jurisdictions, further outreach to enhance the awareness of reporting entities on PF is needed (see 11.5). 634. As a result of STRs analysis, MASAK also disseminated strategic analysis for operational purposes to competent authorities to mitigate PF risks. Over the reporting period, MASAK received 167 STRs related to PF, and approximately 1 000 STRs were submitted to MASAK in relation to Iran nationals and 180 in relation to DPRK. None was linked to potential PF activity, but other predicate offences such as fraud, illegal betting and drugs trafficking. The absence of PF related STRs is not in line with Türkiye’s risk exposure. 635. Operational analysis is also conducted in relation to DPRK and Iran, yet there is no clear finding of PF related activities. In 2025, a detailed operational analysis was conducted on 46 individuals and legal entities allegedly associated with Iran. Findings were shared with LEAs and intelligence units and supervisory authorities. An information note regarding 16 legal persons and 1 natural person assessed as potentially linked to DPRK was shared with the National Intelligence Organization and the MoT. Additional research was also conducted regarding potential cryptocurrency transfer transactions claimed to be related to DPRK involving the individual mentioned in STR. No data was found indicating that the legal person subject to the analysis has direct links to DPRK and it was assessed that the matter was not related to DPRK. In 9 cases where suspicious transaction reports were filled in relation to DPRK, transactions were rejected. 636. Some reporting entities, especially large banks, apply mitigating measures in relation to PF due to their international exposure via correspondent banking relationships, taking into consideration domestic, UN and foreign based sanctions lists. In foreign trade payments intermediated by banks, especially within the scope of intermediation of trade payments for high-risk countries, some entities have controls over documents such as customs declaration, bill of lading, certificate of origin, etc. Within this framework enhanced due diligence measures are applied in relation to customer and BO identification. Those entities also resort to commercial databases and software to search for a possible match on a sanction list regarding one of the customers and vessels involved in the shipment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 613. Türkiye is monitoring FIs and VASPs compliance on TF TFS to some extent. In line with its 2021 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye implemented a risk-based approach for monitoring reporting entities compliance with TFS obligations, by developing separate supervision programmes based on a separate risk analysis specifically for TFS monitoring, both in terms of TF and PF. On an annual basis, competent authorities assess reporting entities risk level for TFS compliance taking into consideration several factors such as control measures applied by reporting entities, asset size, outcome of previous inspections. Within each sector, reporting entities are then categorised into high/medium and low TFS risk and authorities conduct onsite inspections to all high risks entities and some medium risks. Apart from planned inspections, if evidence emerges that an obligated party has violated the sanctions, that party is supervised independently of the program, and sanctions are imposed in case of violation. Periodic inquiries are also conducted to determine whether individuals and legal entities on asset freeze lists have committed any violations following the freeze decision. 614. As a result, between 2022 to 2024, Türkiye has inspected over 500 FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on their compliance with TFS obligations, out of which all high risks entities from each sector have been monitored. Almost 300 FIs and VASPs have been inspected with 25 entities found to have been violating TFS obligations. No distinction has been provided to the assessment team on specific TF TFS obligations monitoring and violations. Compliance with those obligations has increased over the reporting period for financial institutions and VASPs that have been inspected. Cases where FIs violations have been identified by supervisors mostly relate to persons whose assets were frozen having multiple names or their names could be typed in various ways which lead the names not to match with the one used by the reporting entity. In cases where co-ordination between the compliance and operational units could be further strengthened, FIs receive a formal warning notification. 615. Despite having followed a RBA, over the reporting period Türkiye has only monitored compliance with TFS obligations for approximately 20% of FIs through dedicated supervision programmes which represents a limited portion of the entire sector. In addition, the amount of the sanctions applied for TFS violations is low and does not appear to be dissuasive nor proportionate. Table 10.4. TFS supervisory actions Sector 2022 2023 2024 High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR *1 000) High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR*1 000) High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR*1 000) Banks 17 17 4 181 21 16 5 190 33 16 1 2 Factoring / Leasing / Financing Companies 22 8 0 0 52 13 0 0 41 12 0 0 Capital Market Intermediaries 10 10 0 0 25 10 0 0 22 10 0 0 Portfolio management companies &amp; Investment Partnerships 2 2 0 0 14 2 0 0 5 1 0 0 Insurance Companies 11 8 4 6 26 8 2 6 33 8 0 0 MVTS 16 16 3 18 24 13 4 11 22 14 1 1 EOs 146 30 0 0 121 29 0 0 110 31 1 3 VASPs -- - - - 25 10 0 0 23 10 0 0 FIs total 224 90 11 205 308 101 11 207 289 102 3 6 REAs 107 10 0 0 115 16 0 0 82 17 0 0 DPMS 200 55 0 0 216 51 0 0 241 58 1 114 DNFBPs total 307 65 0 0 331 67 0 0 323 75 1 114 Total 531 155 11 205 639 168 11 207 612 177 4 120 10.5.2. DNFBPs 616. As described above, authorities developed risk-based supervisory programmes to specifically monitor compliance with TFS obligations for reporting entities. For DNFBPs, those supervisory activities covered approximately 200 entities, including all high and some medium risks DPMS and real estate agents. Only one entity within the DPMS and REAs sector was found as violating its TF TFS obligations within the reporting period. This result does not fully align with the overall low level of understanding of TFS obligations across those sectors. 617. Overall, only a marginal portion of DNFBPs have been monitored against their TFS obligations, this finding coupled with the deficiencies in the understanding of TFS obligations, increase the risk of potential abuse of the DNFBP sector by designated persons or entities. There was no supervision of compliance with TFS obligations for accountants, lawyers and notaries. Given the shortcomings in TFS understanding of those sectors, the absence of supervision is concerning." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Multi-pronged approach of Türkiye 362. Türkiye’s multi-pronged approach to obtaining BO information, draws on several complementary sources. These include the BO Registry maintained by the TRA based on tax declarations, information collected by obliged entities through CDD measures, MoT records such as the Trade Registry Gazette and MERSIS database, and the CSD for dematerialised bearer shares. This framework is supported by cross-checking mechanisms, including controls conducted through MASAK’s databases and audit processes. Basic Information – Adequate, Accurate, and Up to Date 363. Türkiye collects and maintains basic information on domestic and foreign created legal persons with sufficient link to Türkiye through the Trade Registry Gazette, MERSIS, DERBIS, VBYS and KOOPBIS (commercial companies, associations, foundations and co-operatives [28] ). These systems provide structured basic information on all legal persons in Türkiye and foreign created legal persons (excepting limited taxpayers) with sufficient links. For commercial companies, at incorporation, all companies are required to submit information on shareholders, partners and directors, which is recorded in the Trade Registry and maintained through the MERSIS system. Registration and subsequent amendments are conducted electronically and reviewed by Trade Registry officials, with supporting documentation submitted through notaries before approval. However, no information was provided on how the accuracy of this information is substantively verified within MERSIS beyond formal checks, which focus on the completeness and consistency of submitted documentation, and compliance with procedural and legal requirements. The registry data is also not used for more analytical or risk-based verification, such as identifying multiple entities registered at the same address, mapping common directors or shareholders across companies, detecting complex or rapidly changing ownership structures. In practice, notaries appear to perform primarily formal compliance functions—ensuring that documents are complete and correctly executed—rather than verifying the underlying accuracy or truthfulness of the information submitted. Similarly, lawyers do not have a formal role in verifying the accuracy of ownership information in registry systems and, where involved, their role is generally limited to drafting articles of association, preparing documentation and filing-related activities, rather than acting as an independent validation mechanism. While the system provides transparency and traceability through public access to Trade Registry Gazette and MERSIS records, there is no systemic or systematic verification of information contained in the registry. 364. For other legal persons, more structured monitoring and compliance mechanisms are in place. Associations and foundations are subject to registration and reporting requirements, with information recorded in the DERBIS and VBYS systems respectively. These systems include broader datasets (e.g. governance, financial and asset-related information) and are directly accessible to law enforcement authorities. Robust risk-based monitoring and administrative and proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, ensure to a good extent compliance and data quality (See 5.5, IO.10 and R.8). Beneficial Ownership Information - Adequate, Accurate, and Up to Date 365. Türkiye has adopted a definition of BO that is aligned with the FATF standard, focusing on the identification of the natural person(s) who ultimately own or control a legal person, whether through direct or indirect ownership, control through other means, or, where no such person can be identified, senior managing officials as a last resort (See R. 24). The BO Registry contains structured information on beneficial ownership and control, including for foreign legal persons. MASAK, the TRA, TIB have direct access to the BO Registry and other competent authorities including law enforcement can access the information upon request to MASAK or the TRA. Co-ordination between MASAK and the TRA and the integration of BO reporting into routine tax processes along with penalties for non-compliance have contributed to high compliance with BO filing obligations (See 5.5). 366. Verification of basic and BO information is conducted through targeted cross-checks, inspections, and discrepancy analysis, including comparison exercises between the BO Registry and the Trade Registry. These measures have identified inconsistencies and led to corrective actions and sanctions, demonstrating that verification, to some extent, occurs in practice. However, verification remains largely ad hoc and is not organised under a comprehensive, planned, risk-based framework covering all registries holding ownership information. Following the establishment of a WG in 2021 and the signing of co-operation protocols in June/July 2021, a joint data-matching project was initiated in 2022 comparing MoT and TRA records, identifying 240 violations out of 355 taxpayers. The project was re-initiated in March 2024, identifying 120 violations out of 188 taxpayers, with fines imposed and the BO Registry updated. In parallel, tax inspections identified 89 taxpayers with incorrect BO information. These exercises are valuable efforts towards ensuring baseline verification. But their effectiveness is limited without more sophisticated checks especially for higher-risk legal persons, complex structures and foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links. The authorities also indicated that in 2025, the TIB examined 66 656 taxpayers and verified BO Registry information for each taxpayer subject to reporting requirements. While the verification of BO for 66 656 taxpayers demonstrate a significant level of activity, limited information was provided on the methodology, scope and depth of these checks, how they connect to other discrepancy detection mechanisms, or whether they apply to foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye. Based on the information available, these checks include elements of identity verification of beneficial owners; even where this is limited to confirming that an individual is who they claim to be, it represents a meaningful step in establishing a basic level of accuracy. However, identity verification alone does not address whether the identified individual is in fact the true beneficial owner. There is limited evidence of meaningful checks to verify the basis on which a person is identified as a beneficial owner, including whether they genuinely exercise ownership or control. As such, while these efforts, to some extent, provide an important initial safeguard, their effectiveness is constrained by the ad hoc nature of the checks, the quality of verification and the absence of a systematic, risk-based approach to verification. 367.  FIs and DNFBPs in Türkiye are subject to CDD obligations under the AML/CFT framework, which require them to identify and verify the identity of their customers, determine and take reasonable measures to identify the BO, and understand the ownership and control structure of legal persons when establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions above the applicable thresholds. These obligations also include ongoing monitoring of the business relationship, keeping information up to date, and applying enhanced due diligence measures in higher-risk situations. FIs and DNFBPs use MERSIS to some extent and the BO registry to a lesser extent to supplement their CDD processes. FIs and DNFPBs obtain BO information primarily through their own CDD processes, including customer declarations and supporting documentation. Because of tax confidentiality provisions, Turkish authorities provide FIs and DNFBPs with an indirect means of accessing information in the BO Registry, whereby they may request from customers an official document containing BO data with a QR code, the authenticity of which can be verified. While FIs and DNFBPs can indirectly access the BO Registry though a customer-provided QR code, the number of taxpayers generating QR codes for sharing information with obliged entities and DNFBPs remains relatively low, with 21 721 in 2022, 68 406 in 2023, 71 774 in 2024 and 38 700 in 2025 ( Table 5.2 refers ). 368. When considered against the total population of approximately 1.6 million companies and a significantly larger number of potential beneficial owners, these figures suggest that the mechanism is not widely used in practice. This is further reflected in BO discrepancy related STR) data, where reports linked to BO verification through QR-coded documents total 2 490 between 2022 and 2025 and are overwhelmingly submitted by banks, with limited engagement from other FIs and no evidence of reporting by DNFBPs ( Table 5.3 refers ). However, no information was provided that demonstrates how competent authorities act upon such reports in practice. In particular, it remains unclear, in practice, whether authorities request corrections or updates to BO information, whether obliged entities in line with a risk-based approach have taken appropriate mitigating measures (such as restricting or closing accounts or business relationships), or whether such discrepancy reporting results in automatic or targeted sanctions, including administrative fines. While the reporting of BO discrepancies by obliged entities is a positive feature of the framework, the absence of information on specific follow-up actions, remedial measures or outcomes significantly limits the overall value of this process in improving the accuracy and reliability of BO information in practice. Table 5.2. Statistics on the number of Official Documents issued through Interactive Tax Office [29] Year of Inquiry Number of Documents Number of Taxpayers Creating Documents (Unique Tax ID) 2022 26 690 21 721 2023 87 626 68 406 2024 93 973 71 774 2025* 45 890 38 700 TOTAL 254 179 200 601 Table 5.3. STRs on beneficial ownership resulted from TRA’s QR coded documents Sector 2022* 2023 2024 2025 TOTAL Banks 392 954 659 263 2 268 Factoring 2 1 21 0 24 Financing 1 3 3 1 8 Leasing 1 0 2 0 3 EO 0 0 0 9 9 CASPs 0 4 0 3 7 PEMIs 22 65 56 23 166 Capital Market Intermediary 2 1 0 2 5 TOTAL 420 1 028 741 301 2 490 * This mechanism (QR coded documents) was established in 2022 therefore 2021 statistics are not available Availability to Competent Authorities 369. BO information must be provided to competent authorities upon request. There are explicit requirements in law to ensure that BO information is accessible within specific timeframes. Selected case examples shared by MASAK demonstrate that BO and related company information can be accessed and transmitted within relatively short timeframes, typically within a few days to around one week, with some larger or more complex requests taking several weeks. This is representative of the close working relationship seen between MASAK and LEAs. These examples involve requests from Chief PPOs and LEAs authorities between 2023 and 2025 and include ownership, partnership, management and BO records. While these cases illustrate good timeliness in practice, they do not indicate whether the information provided was complete and accurate at the time of transmission, whether follow-up requests were required, or whether any delays arose due to incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable information. In addition, the use of such information appears to be primarily driven by LEAs, with no recorded cases of supervisors making such requests, and no information on the frequency of access requests, or instances where access was delayed. No specific information was provided on access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye, or whether timelines differ in such cases. 370. LEAs primarily rely on MASAK for information as no instances of requests to FIs, DNFPBs or companies for information on domestic legal persons or foreign created legal persons with sufficient links were evidenced. While Türkiye has a well-developed multi-prong framework, its effectiveness is constrained by a concentration of reliance on the BO Registry. In practice, authorities appear to rely significantly on MASAK as a central node, with information flows largely dependent on data derived from the BO Registry, creating a degree of circularity in the use of BO information. There is limited evidence that competent authorities seek or use BO information directly from FIs, VASPs, DNFBPs, or legal persons themselves. Although obliged entities are required to report discrepancies and penalties are imposed for non-compliance with CDD obligations, no information was provided on how discrepancy reports are used. The different elements of the multi-pronged framework operate largely in parallel, reducing the extent to which the benefits of the multi-pronged system are fully leveraged to improve data accuracy or mitigate risks from legal persons. 371. Türkiye’s public procurement framework does not clearly provide public authorities with the powers to obtain timely access to BO information in the course of public procurement. While the Public Procurement Law and associated regulations establish a framework for verifying the legal identity of bidders, authorised representation, and certain registry-based ownership information through systems such as EKAP (Electronic Public Procurement Platform), these controls primarily rely on data from sources such as MERSİS and focus on legal ownership and representation, and therefore the deficiencies within MERSIS apply to this aspect of the public procurement process and representation. There is no clear requirement for contracting authorities to access BO information, including from a BO Registry, nor for bidders or contract recipients to provide such information as part of procurement processes. In this context, although the framework supports transparency and traceability of procurement procedures, it does not ensure access to BO information as a component of risk mitigation, which is relevant given Türkiye’s identification of corruption as a medium risk in its NRA. 372. In the context of international co-operation, Türkiye’s competent authorities, including MASAK and Public Prosecutors, have demonstrated their ability to respond to requests for BO information, including through mutual legal assistance and other forms of co-operation. No concerns have been raised by international partners regarding the accuracy or reliability of the information provided. BO information is obtained through a multi-pronged framework, drawing on registries as well as information held by FIs and DNFBPs, with MASAK able to request such information from relevant entities in support of foreign requests. Access to BO information held in registries appears to be relatively timely, and information is generally provided without delay, with any delays in mutual legal assistance primarily arising in more complex cases requiring additional investigative measures. However, no information was provided on access timelines through other mechanisms beyond registries. Footnotes [28] Co-operatives are registered in the Trade Registry and recorded in MERSIS, consistent with other commercial companies, and are also subject to monitoring through the dedicated KOOPBIS platform, which is used by co-operative managers and trade directorates. [29] This mechanism (QR coded documents) was established in 2022 therefore 2021 statistics are not available." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="241. Türkiye supervises FIs and VASPs following a RBA. High and medium risks entities are subject to frequent onsite inspections and all entities can be inspected offsite or as part of a specific thematic review with entities’ risk scoring reassessed on a yearly basis. For VASPs, the supervisory framework was recently strengthened, and supervision is only effective to some extent. Although recent on‑site inspections show a marked decrease in the proportion of VASPs found in violation, the supervisory framework cannot yet be considered fully effective. The sectoral supervisor has only recently changed, and at the same time the regulatory requirements for VASPs have been significantly tightened. The new licensing process is still ongoing, which means that all VASPs still continue to operate under transitional arrangements. As a result, the supervisory system is still in the process of stabilising, and its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed as fully achieved. 242. As a result of the findings of 2019 MER and ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye adopted a risk-based supervision (RBS) approach in 2020 to prioritise the supervision of highest risk sectors and highest risk entities within each sector. Dedicated protocols between MASAK and sectoral supervisors have been signed establishing principles and procedures for information exchange, co-operation and co-ordination in RBS of FIs and VASPs. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, prepares annual supervision plans for all FIs and VASPs. The Threat &amp; Vulnerability WGs and the sectoral risks analysis working groups (see 3.2) provide a platform for MASAK to exchange with sectoral supervisors as well as the private sector and the development of the sectoral risk assessments support the definition of yearly supervisory programs. 243. Türkiye’s RBS methodology requires obliged entities categorised as high-risk to be supervised every year, and obliged entities categorised as medium-risk to be supervised every three years at the latest. The AML/CFT supervision programmes prioritise the on-site supervisions of higher risk sectors, as determined by Türkiye’s national risk assessments banks, including VASPs, MVTS and EOs. In this context, it is noteworthy that, based on Türkiye’s entity‑level risk‑scoring, approximately 5% of FIs and VASPs in sectors assessed as high or medium‑high risk are classified as high risk at the entity level (see 3.2). 244. The supervision of compliance by FIs and VASPs is carried out through three types of supervisory activities. First, dedicated AML/CFT supervision programmes are defined annually by MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department and are conducted either by MASAK’s Treasury and Finance Experts, sectoral supervisors, or other staff listed below in Table 3.7 under the guidance of MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department. Those onsite inspections aim at assessing the compliance status of the reporting entity against AML/CFT obligations. Second, prudential supervision conducted by sectoral supervisors. Even though those are not targeted at AML/CFT obligations, related shortcomings might be identified by the sectoral supervisor (e.g. CDD requirements, BO, etc.) and are referred to MASAK for further examination. Third, “case-based AML/CFT inspections”, outside the scope of pre-planned activities, to determine whether any AML/CFT or prudential obligation has been violated. As mentioned above, the entity-level risk score is updated yearly, yet Türkiye cannot manually change – over the course of the year - the risk score to take into consideration new or emerging information that would impact the risk score of a specific entity. Nevertheless, this can be mitigated by ad hoc supervisory actions even in the absence of a revaluation of the entity risk score. 245. Those three types of monitoring activities are complementary and both onsite and off-site inspections are resorted to, allowing for a close monitoring of the financial sector. The scope of the case-based supervision can be as encompassing as the ones conducted within the scope of a programme, or it can be only on one obligation. Supervisory activities are applied in line with entities’ risk profiles and are supported by close and ongoing engagement between MASAK, sectoral supervisors and obliged entities, including guidance and outreach activities. In practice, this approach has contributed to improved compliance, particularly at the level of individual institutions. For instance, in 2022 ten banks were supervised as case based only on their periodical reporting obligations. Parts of these supervisions can be conducted off-site, appointed supervisors can request information and documents (e.g. information on customers, transactions, products and services, policies, procedures, systems used etc.) from the reporting entities and evaluates them off-site. This information is then used to determine the areas of focus for the on-site supervision. 246. MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department consists of 33 staff members fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. The Department prepares the annual AML/CFT supervision programmes. Beyond these dedicated resources, the Department also assigns the staff listed in Table 3.6 to conduct AML/CFT supervisory activities. These staff members can perform AML/CFT supervisory tasks alongside other responsibilities (e.g. prudential supervision in the case of sectoral supervisors) and are therefore not exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. Table 3.7. Staff that can conduct AML/CFT supervision alongside their other responsibilities Supervisors Number of staff for supervision (as of June 2025) MASAK (Treasury and Finance Experts) 129 BRSA 245 CMB 178 CBRT 47 ISPRA 50 Trade inspectors 293 Total 846 Others (Tax Inspectors + Treasury controllers) 6 816 247. The integrated approach between MASAK and sectoral supervisors ensures that prudential and AML/CFT supervision are complementary. After completing on-site examinations, the examiners submit their reports to MASAK. The Supervision of Obligations Department reviews these reports to ensure compliance with MASAK’s reporting standards and to identify any legal or substantive errors. Reports recommending criminal penalties are forwarded to the relevant PPOs. 248. While the framework for co-operation is established, its practical implementation could be strengthened. Opportunities exist to deepen ML/TF risk understanding among sectoral supervisors (see 3.2) which have lesser expertise to carry out AML/CFT examinations in some technical areas, particularly when they require in-depth evaluation (e.g., transaction monitoring scenarios, sanction screening system rules, customer risk scoring models, etc). Addressing those challenges would further improve the effective supervision of FIs and VASPs. 249. In line with its ICRG Action Plan, MASAK’s resources dedicated to Supervision of Obligations Department have been strengthened since the 2019 MER, from 12 staff members to 33 as of 2025. As of the time of the onsite visit, MASAK indicated that recruitment was ongoing, and further staff could be allocated to the supervision department. However, MASAK supervision department oversees compliance for FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, it receives and analyses the reports of all sectoral supervisors, and is in charge of taking further actions, including issuing sanctions. Even though MASAK relies on sectoral supervisors, those do not have dedicated AML/CFT units nor specialised staff. In light of MASAK’s broad prerogatives and pivotal role played by the Supervision of Obligations Department across all sectors, in conducting and co-ordinating AML/CFT supervision across all sectors, the resources of this department would benefit from further strengthening. 250. While Türkiye has a broad pool of examiners who may conduct AML/CFT inspections, the effectiveness of supervision may be affected by the distribution of AML/CFT expertise across supervisory authorities. MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department, which consists of staff fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision and with the highest level of AML/CFT expertise, plays a central role in risk‑based planning and oversight. Alongside this, sectoral supervisors integrate AML/CFT supervision into their wider supervisory mandates (e.g. prudential supervision), reflecting Türkiye’s holistic supervisory model. However, sectoral supervisors’ do not have dedicated AML/CFT staff and expertise. This can impede the effective supervision of some sectors, especially high-risk sectors with emerging actors and complex ML/TF typologies. As mentioned above, CMB’s understanding of VASP-related ML/TF risks is still developing. Supervising VASPs is a new responsibility for CMB and while staff have received general AML training, there are no AML/CFT specialists. This gap in risk comprehension could, to some extent, undermine the ability to prioritise resources and tailor supervisory actions to the sector’s high-risk profile. 251. Since the legislation for licensing VASPs is relatively recent and VASPs have been obliged parties since 2021, the AML/CFT supervision of VASPs was initially conducted by experts from the Treasury employed at MASAK. Since 2025, VASPs AML/CFT supervision has been conducted by CMB in addition to the supervision of capital market intermediaries and portfolio management companies. 252. The number of supervised obliged entities significantly increased over the reporting period and Türkiye prioritises the supervision of higher risk sectors. Supervision activities are conducted in line with entities risk profile to a large extent. All entities considered as high risks are subject to a yearly onsite inspection, across all sectors. In addition, while medium risk entities are required to be supervised at least every three years, those operating in the highest risk sectors are prioritised for selection in annual supervision programmes, ahead of medium risk entities in medium/low risk sectors. As a result, for banks, VASPs and EOs, all high and most medium risk entities are monitored each year, in line with a risk-based approach. 253. During onsite visits, supervisors mainly focus on the application of CDD requirement as well as the implementation by reporting entities of enhanced due diligence in higher risk scenarios and to also review the internal controls in place to mitigate risks. With regard to BO, the supervisory guidance documents direct supervisors to assess whether reporting entities identify the natural persons or legal persons holding more than 25% of the shares in a legal entity when establishing a permanent business relationship with legal persons registered in the trade registry. However, the guidance documents do not instruct supervisors to consider whether reporting entities have taken into account other forms of control in the identification of the BO, such as control exercised through means other than ownership. As a result, the supervision may overlook at such situations. 254. For banks, during onsite audits the institutional risk assessment is constantly reviewed, yet authorities did not provide statistics on infringements with those obligations. Customers risk scoring and mitigating measures process are also reviewed, including whether those have been included in internal policy documents and if the staff are aware of those. Supervisors assess internal controls including in conducting interviews with employees to assess awareness levels as well as the adequacy of compliance units staffing in comparison with other departments of the reporting entity. High risk transactions and customers are also systematically monitored in the course of inspections, using automated tools. The scope of the onsite can be further defined with an offsite preliminary assessment based on internal documents from the reporting entity (internal policies, risk scenarios, etc.). Supervision programs for banks can take from several weeks to a year depending on the size and complexity of the case. 255. For VASPs, similar scrutiny is applied to CDD measures and internal controls, especially KYC measures taken when the onboarding of a new client is done remotely. As VASPs is a newly regulated sector, the presence of a compliance unit is also systematically checked as well as the presence of internal policies and procedures. Türkiye also set up a repository for all VASPs customers who are allocated a unique number. Supervisors monitor if VASP have referred their customer in the repository and if the transactions related to the client have been reporting accordingly. Supervisors are also resorting to electronical tools to monitor transaction and potential absence of STR reporting. As per the recent supervision and ongoing licensing process of VASPs in Türkiye, the monitoring of AML/CFT compliance for VASPs is to be further developed. 256. For MVTS and EOs, the focus is on the type and level of transactions carried out as well as the implementation of CDD measures which generally represents a challenge in the sector. Transactions among MVTS or between MVTS/exchange offices and other high-risk sectors, such as DPMS, are also given additional scrutiny by supervisors. For exchange offices, supervisors also screen video footage to detect any potential suspicious activity. 257. For NBFIs and Insurance, representing the lowest risk level for FIs, supervision is conducted yearly for high-risk entities and to a lesser extent to medium risk entities. The monitoring is conducted on the overall compliance with AML/CFT obligations. 258. Table 3.8 provides an overview of AML/CFT supervisory activities by year. For each year, the table sets out the number of obliged entities included in the annual supervision programme (Prog), the number of case-based (ad hoc) supervisions conducted outside the programme (Case), and the number of entities classified as high‑ or medium‑risk based on risk analyses. The final columns present cumulative figures for the period covered. For example, in 2024, 31 banks were classified as high‑ or medium‑risk, of which 15 were inspected as part of the annual supervision programme and one through a case‑based supervision. Table 3.8. Risk-based supervisory activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 Prog Case Total High Medium entities Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Banks 15 5 25 16 0 18 21 10 21 15 0 28 VASPs 0 0 0 5 13 0 19 22 1 24 MVTS 17 1 27 14 1 26 20 1 27 20 6 33 EO 35 1 125 36 3 118 63 3 272 72 2 156 CM 21 0 24 0 29 0 12 0 NBFIs 14 0 26 17 0 27 24 0 33 16 1 49 Insurance 8 0 17 9 0 19 14 0 26 0 0 not av PMIs 0 0 not av 0 4 not av 4 0 11 0 0 not av Sector 2024 2025 Total Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Banks 15 1 31 22 0 39 113 16 123 VASPs 23 0 38 27 0 43 96 6 81 MVTS 33 1 40 33 0 45 144 10 153 EO 80 0 164 117 0 323 450 9 835 CM 19 0 17 0 29 105 0 0 NBFIs 14 0 42 19 0 41 127 1 177 Insurance 2 0 2 10 0 19 35 0 64 PMIs 2 0 2 3 0 3 8 4 13 259. Not all entities in high-risk sectors have been subject to supervision over the reporting period. A total of 50 banks (out of 63) have been subject to AML/CFT supervisions since 2021, either through supervision programme, case-based monitoring or both. Authorities indicate that out of the remaining ones, 9 are either recently established with limited banking activities or investment and development banks not accepting deposits and participation, only providing credit for investments and hence being consider much lower risk. Since 2020, only a small number of payment and e‑money institutions (10) have not yet been subject to AML/CFT supervision, most of which obtained their licences only recently, whereas a much larger number of exchange offices (526) remain unsupervised over the same period, demonstrating a more limited supervisory coverage in that medium‑high risk sector. With regard to NBFIs, out of the 48 Factoring, 20 Leasing and 24 Financing companies (92 in total), 30 of those have not been supervised since 2021. Of those, 7 of them were established after 2022 and have limited activity. However, NBFIs are not considered high nor medium-high risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="99. Türkiye has a generally good understanding of its ML/TF risks, supported by a comprehensive and data-driven NRA process and continuous analytical work co-ordinated by the FIU. The assessment process is based on a common and well-resourced methodology that combines quantitative and qualitative data and is sustained through the Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups, which include all relevant competent authorities and private-sector representatives. The country’s risk understanding includes the findings of its three NRAs (2019, 2023 and 2025) and incorporates emerging threats identified through typology and strategic analysis reports. 100.  The 2025 NRA has continued to evolve Türkiye’s risk assessment methodology and introduced a 40 criteria quantitative scoring framework integrating 2021–2024 case data and linking results directly to an operational Action Plan for 2025–2026. This approach provides a dynamic, cross-sectoral picture of national ML/TF risks, supported by regular inter agency co-operation and information exchange. Complementing the NRA, Türkiye’s LPRA assesses vulnerabilities associated with the misuse of company structures, sectoral exposure and BO information. Similarly, Türkiye also conducted a separate assessment of NPOs as described in IO.10. 1.1.1. ML risks 101. Türkiye’s understanding of cross-border ML/TF risks remains developing. The NRA treats TBML, sanctions evasion and smuggling largely as extensions of predicate offences, rather than standalone systemic risks. For example, given the size of Türkiye’s informal economy (29–30% of GDP) and extensive cross-border trade flows, this approach may understate exposure to ML through trade finance, logistics chains, manufacturing exports, and commodity trading. Limited sectoral differentiation constrains understanding of how proceeds from organised crime and corruption integrate into legitimate activity. TBML risks per company types and economic sectors are nevertheless assessed in the LPRA which is a complementary exercise of the NRA. Further strengthening of risk understanding would benefit from more granular and systematic analysis of cross-border dynamics, particularly in relation to trade, smuggling, and associated financial flows. While Türkiye’s role as a regional trade and transit hub is well recognised, deeper use of quantitative and qualitative data—covering trade finance, shipping activity, customs controls, logistics and cargo operations, and cross-border cash or value movements—would enhance the ability to fully assess and mitigate these risks. There is also scope to further strengthen the analysis of certain risk areas, including corruption-related risks, by more systematically incorporating findings from recognised international sources to enhance the analysis and deepen the overall understanding. 102. Türkiye’s risk understanding also reflects awareness of the evolving and transnational nature of ML threats. Authorities recognise that foreign predicate offences, organised crime groups, and professional enablers exploit similar vulnerabilities, reinforcing the country’s exposure to external risks. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the interlinkages between ML and TF risks, particularly in relation to cash-based activity, informal or cross-border financial flows, and organised criminality. Efforts to look beyond case-based evidence—by examining sectoral exposure, typologies, and emerging trends—indicate a more forward-looking approach to risk identification. This is illustrated by the identification of shifts toward virtual assets in drug trafficking, reflecting an understanding of how criminals adapt to technological developments and regulatory gaps, and highlighting areas where risk mitigation frameworks will need to continue evolving. Table 1.1. Main ML risks identified by Türkiye, most abused sectors and methods Offence Predominant Sector Other Sectors Abused Primary ML Methods Fraud Banking, VASPs PEMIs, REAs, jewellery, car dealerships, legal betting platforms, exchange offices Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, front companies, cash transactions, front accounts, Point of Sale (POS) transactions Illegal Betting and Gambling Banking, PEMIs VASPs, real estate, front companies, car dealerships Cash transactions, Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets [21] for conversion and/or disguise, front companies, cash transactions, front accounts, POS transactions Drug Trafficking Banking, VASPs REAs, car dealerships, jewellery, EOs Cash transactions, Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, front accounts, POS transactions Theft and Robbery Car dealership Banking, REAse, jewellery, PEMIs, retail trade Purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Smuggling Abuse of Legal Persons, Banking REAs, shipment, car dealership Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets/foreign currency for conversion and/or disguise Forgery Car dealership REAs, Banking, front companies, notaries; VASPs Purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Domestic/international fund transfers Corruption Banking, Abuse of Legal Persons, REAs, car dealership, PEMIs, associations Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Accounting Tax Evasion Banking Abuse of legal persons, REAs, car dealership, EOs Domestic/international fund transfers, Accounting, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Migrant Smuggling, Human Trafficking Abuse of Legal Persons, Banking Car dealership, banking, REAs, jewellery, EOs Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Usury REAs (Banking,PEMIs– in case of POS Usury) Car dealerships, front companies; insurance, rent-a-car Cash transactions, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Accounting, Source: Türkiye’s NRA 2025, p. 90. 1.1.2. TF risks 103. Türkiye’s TF risk understanding is strongly prioritised around threats posed by FETÖ, PKK/KCK–PYD/YPG, ISIL, AQ and their networks, as well as risks linked to FTFs and cross-border financial flows. While detailed and operationally informed, this actor centric focus may limit a cohesive picture of how TF enters and moves through the financial and non-financial system, especially for methodologies involving trade activity, informal value transfer systems and foreign linked channels. 104. Türkiye demonstrates a strong central understanding of TF risks, supported by MASAK’s analytical capabilities and access to a wide range of financial and non-financial information. This understanding extends to a range of financing channels, including the use of cash, informal transfer mechanisms, virtual assets, and abuse of legal persons. The NRA identifies the abuse of NPOs for TF purposes as generally low risk, while recognising higher exposure for humanitarian organisations operating near conflict zones or vulnerable to impersonation, reflecting an understanding of specific sectoral vulnerabilities. However, overall understanding is more developed in relation to known threats and is less clearly demonstrated with respect to those involving non-designated actors. In addition, while linkages between TF, ML and other forms of criminal activity are recognised, there remains scope for improvement and how these interconnections may manifest in practice. TF risk understanding is not consistently reflected across supervisory authorities where the articulation of TF risks—particularly beyond sanctions-related obligations varies and is in some cases more limited. Authorities demonstrate practical understanding of TF risks inherent in Türkiye’s geography—long standing smuggling corridors, overlapping licit/illicit trade flows and complex migration routes. These interlinked dynamics are not yet fully reflected in formal risk assessments and would benefit from further expansion and analysis to strengthen a more comprehensive and forward-looking understanding of TF risks and improve the identification of relevant indicators. 105. Strong interagency co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms support Türkiye’s understanding of TF risks. Authorities draw on a wide range of inputs—including financial intelligence, law enforcement information, intelligence sources, and cross-border data—and collaborate closely through established co-ordination structures, joint investigative approaches, and shared analytical platforms. This facilitates the identification of TF typologies and trends and contributes to a well-developed and operationally informed understanding of TF risks across relevant authorities. Efforts to raise awareness of TF risks, including through guidance and outreach, have contributed to an improved understanding of certain TF vulnerabilities. However, this understanding remains uneven and is often more closely linked to compliance with targeted financial sanctions obligations. 106. TF risk understanding across the private sector varies across sectors and institutions. Banks generally demonstrate a more developed understanding, while other financial institutions, VASPs and DNFBPs show a more limited articulation of TF risks, often focused on targeted financial sanctions obligations. This is more evident among DNFBPs and smaller entities, where TF is less consistently identified as an inherent risk. As a result, the overall level of understanding is not uniform across sectors and is less developed in some higher-risk areas, which may affect the extent to which TF risks are identified and assessed in practice. Table 1.2. Main TF risks identified by Türkiye, most abused sectors and methods TF Risk Factor Predominant sector Other Abused Sectors Predominant TF Methods FETÖ Banking Front company abuse in the retail sector, PEMIs, VASP [22] , NPOs. Collecting, providing, using funds under the names of money transfer, donation, himmet etc., physical cash supply and courier activities, VAs abuse PKK and Factions Banking Front company abuse in the retail sector, PEMIs, EOs, jewellers, NPOs, REAs, VASP and cultural activities. Collecting, providing, using funds under the names of money transfer, extortion, tax etc., smuggling, cash supply and courier activities, hawala, supply of weapons, illegal sources of finance, abuse of VAs, sales of publications Tos Abusing Religion Banking PEMIs,VASP, EOs, NPOs, jewellers, cash courier activity, front company abuse in the retail sector Domestic and/or international fund transfer, transactions for raising, providing and using funds especially through the Internet, hawala transactions, abuse of VAs. Leftist Terrorist Org. Banking Cash courier activity, Cultural publications Transactions for raising, providing and using funds, cash transactions, courier activity, sale of cultural publications Note 1: Türkiye includes in the category of “terrorist organisations that abuse religion” AQ and ISIL, and their factions which are mentioned in UNSCR 1267(1999),1989(2011) and 2253(2015). Also, risks associated with FTFs mentioned in different UNSCR including 2170(2014), 2178(2014), etc., in the FATF methodology criteria 5.2bis , and so-called lone wolf. Note 2: This category covers DHKP/C, MLKP, TKP/ML, MKP, DKP/BÖG and the other Leftist Organisations which aim to destroy the current constitutional order by means of an armed civil Insurrection. Source: Türkiye’s NRA 2025, p. 90. 1.2.3 Cross-cutting ML/TF risks 107. Türkiye’s ML/TF risk understanding is strong and evidence based; however, there are cross-cutting gaps in the overall risk picture that indicate that certain high-risk channels are not yet fully captured within the NRA framework. Insights drawn from across the assessment point to uneven incorporation of system-level risks. In particular, the assessment highlights that TF STR reporting remains disproportionately low across several high-risk sectors—especially MVTS, exchange offices and VASPs—despite their central role in Türkiye’s ML/TF typologies. This suggests uneven risk recognition and under-reporting in sectors where cash-intensive activity, foreign-linked flows and unlicensed operations persist despite measures to detect these. 108. Gaps remain in fully capturing vulnerabilities related to complex ML schemes involving foreign predicate offences, the misuse of multilayered legal person structures, trade-based mechanisms, and the role of legal and accounting professionals. These patterns involve sophisticated layering, cross-border integration, and the use of shell or front companies that are not consistently reflected in the NRA or LPRA. In addition, there are gaps in the understanding of cross-border cash smuggling risks, where high declaration volumes are not matched by seizures or follow-up investigations, and limited dissemination of customs data constrains integration into the broader risk picture. 109. Cross-cutting limitations are also evident in the extent to which DNFBPs understand ML/TF risks. While national level risk understanding is generally good, this does not translate consistently across DNFPB sub-sectors. Risk awareness is uneven – more developed in some sectors than some others, and TF risk understanding is particularly weak across the DNFPB segment. 110. There are also ongoing gaps in the understanding of ML/TF risks associated with foreign-created legal persons due to an analytical aperture that constrains the scope of risk analysis, as well as insufficient cohesion between risk identification, assessment, and understanding. In parallel, gaps persist in the identification, assessment and understanding of risks related to foreign-created legal arrangements, as current processes do not fully capture how such structures may be used in practice, particularly in cross-border contexts, limiting a comprehensive and forward-looking view within the national risk framework. 111. Taken together, these cross-cutting gaps demonstrate that, while Türkiye’s national risk understanding is generally robust, system level insights from financial intelligence (IO.6), ML investigations (IO.7) and asset recovery/cash controls (IO.8) are not yet fully integrated into the national assessment and understanding of risk, particularly concerning foreign linked ML schemes, unlicensed MVTS, professional facilitators and cross-border cash movement vulnerabilities. Footnotes [21] Purchase of assets includes all kinds of purchases made for conversion purposes (crypto assets, securities, real estate, etc.)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="5.1.1. Turkish Legal Persons 338. Türkiye demonstrates a generally good and evolving understanding of ML/TF risks associated with legal persons created in the country. This understanding is grounded in the NRA and the LPRA conducted in 2021 and updated in 2025. The LPRA applies a structured methodology based on indicators relating to legal form, sectoral activity, transactional behaviour, geographic exposure and ownership characteristics. The 2025 update reflects methodological refinement with expanded indicators and increased use of tax, supervisory and law-enforcement data, contributing to a more differentiated assessment of domestic risks and providing a common analytical reference point for competent authorities. Competent authorities considered a wide range of sources in the formation of the LPRA. 339. The LPRA differentiates risks by company type and sector, identifying joint stock companies and limited liability companies as posing higher inherent risk due to their prevalence, transactional capacity, and suitability for layered ownership and control structures. It further identifies vulnerabilities in cash-intensive and trade-oriented sectors, including wholesale and retail trade, logistics and real estate. These conclusions broadly align with STR trends and domestic case experience, indicating that the formal risk assessment reflects the main channels through which domestically created legal persons are misused for ML purposes. 340. The understanding of TF risks associated with legal persons is established but remains broad and would benefit from greater precision and differentiation. The NRA, supported to a more limited extent by the LPRA, identifies TF risks as concentrated in specific actors, sectors and cross-border channels, while recognising vulnerabilities linked to cash-intensive activity, informal transfer mechanisms and the use of legal persons and commercial structures to facilitate financial flows, including in cross-border contexts and in proximity to conflict zones. However, the articulation of these risks remains largely at a general level and is not sufficiently or systematically differentiated across types of legal persons. In particular, the analysis does not adequately distinguish between domestic and foreign legal persons in the context of TF risk and would benefit from a more granular assessment of how TF risks may manifest across different legal forms and structures, including in harder to detect trade-exposed and cross-border sectors. 5.1.2. Foreign Created Legal Persons 341. Türkiye has taken meaningful steps to identify and assess risks related to foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links; however, some limitations remain in the scope and calibration of the framework, particularly in how sufficiency thresholds are applied across different higher-risk sectors identified or complex ownership structures in the LPRA, including trade-related activities, logistics and real estate, in light of the country’s risk and context. Understanding of ML/TF risks associated with foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye is less developed amongst both authorities and obliged entities. 342. Türkiye identifies certain foreign-created legal persons as limited taxpayers where they derive income from sources in Türkiye, typically through a permanent establishment, branch, agency or other taxable presence under domestic tax legislation. For the period 2021–2024, 388 limited taxpayer companies were identified within the scope of the legal person risk analysis. This dataset reflects foreign legal persons that have a recognised taxable presence in Türkiye. To widen the scope of analysis, MASAK also included 84 189 commercial companies with more than 50% foreign ownership. Within these datasets, 345 of the 388 limited taxpayer companies and 76 028 of the 84 189 companies with more than 50% foreign ownership were identified as holding bank accounts in Türkiye, indicating financial linkages to the jurisdiction. 343.  Legal persons with more than 50% foreign ownership interests represent 5.3% of all corporate taxpayers (9.4% of all corporate taxpayers is representative of companies that have at least 1 foreign shareholder). Methodologically, this approach potentially restricts the aperture of risk, as other than limited taxpayer status, it focuses on shareholding as a main criterion to determine sufficient link. The basis for considering the 50% threshold as an appropriate proxy for sufficient link, in light of Türkiye’s risk and threat context, was not clearly elaborated, nor to what extent this approach may leave certain risks outside the scope of analysis. Authorities did not appear to consider whether differentiated thresholds or criteria may be warranted in higher-risk sectors identified in the LPRA or in light of Türkiye’s exposure to cross-border activity, including where ownership structures are more complex or involve multiple layers across jurisdictions. In particular, the use of a single threshold may not fully capture risks in sectors or structures where lower ownership stakes or other forms of control may be sufficient to conceal BO. Given Türkiye’s open investment climate and exposure to cross-border activity, exploring whether a more differentiated approach—particularly in higher-risk sectors or areas identified in the LPRA—would better capture these risks and could further support a more comprehensive understanding. 344. The LPRA defines foreign-linked entities through structural criteria such as tax presence and majority foreign ownership. The typology guidance—intended to support and deepen this understanding—does not reflect or operationalise these categories. Instead, it illustrates the use of legal persons in ML/TF schemes based on their functional role in cross-border activities, without linking these patterns to the LPRA’s framework. For instance, typology material provides some evidence of the use of foreign legal persons and cross-border corporate structures, with such elements featuring in approximately one-third of the ML cases reviewed; however, these examples predominantly involve companies incorporated abroad or offshore entities used in multi-jurisdictional structures that do not satisfy the country’s tests for sufficient link. No examples were identified that correspond to limited taxpayers or commercial companies with more than 50% foreign shareholding. For TF cases, typology material provides limited examples of foreign legal persons, with only one or two cases across the sample involving companies established abroad or foreign-controlled structures with a discernible link to Türkiye, primarily through fund transfers or organisational networks. As the typology guidance is a key tool through which the authorities communicate risk understanding, this indicates a disconnect between the risks observed in practice and the analytical framework applied, constraining the overall understanding of foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links. 345. MASAK and LEAs demonstrate a strong operational understanding of how corporate structures are misused in practice, notably in complex ML investigations. However, this level of operational insight is not consistently reflected across all other parts of the government, where understanding of risks appears more uneven, including among tax, company registry and supervisory authorities. MASAK consistently observed that legal persons are primarily exploited within complex ML schemes, including those involving multiple interposed entities, opaque ownership chains and the integration of illicit proceeds through seemingly legitimate commercial activity. This operational insight informs investigative prioritisation and analytical work. However, this understanding is not explicitly reflected in the LPRA narrative, limiting the extent to which these insights are institutionalised and systematically communicated across all competent authorities and reporting entities. Furthermore, this understanding is not reflected to the same degree across the private sector. While a basic understanding of BO risks is generally present, banks tend to demonstrate a stronger grasp of ML/TF risks overall. By contrast, the level of understanding is more uneven among DNFBPs and parts of the wider financial sector, including certain VASPs and capital market participants. In these sectors, awareness of risks—especially those involving complex ownership structures, cross-border elements or the misuse of legal arrangements—appears less developed and less consistently translated into practice. 5.1.3. Trusts and Foreign Created Legal Arrangements 346. Türkiye’s overall understanding of risks related to trusts and foreign legal arrangements is partial. Authorities demonstrate strong awareness of risks where such structures are directly customer-facing, supported by outreach to obliged entities and targeted analysis. However, this understanding is more limited where such arrangements are embedded within layered, indirect or cross-border ownership structures, and is not yet fully developed in terms of identification, assessment and analysis of these more complex risks. Türkiye does not recognise trusts or equivalent domestic legal arrangements and authorities have substantiated the absence of such structures through legal analysis and empirical checks of registries, tax records and supervisory information. This position is appropriately reflected in the LPRA, when read in conjunction with the NRA. This does not preclude their use through cross-border arrangements. Under Turkish law, a person domiciled in Türkiye may act as settlor or beneficiary of a trust governed by foreign law, and foreign legal arrangements may operate in Türkiye, including through ownership or control of Turkish legal entities. The assessment of legal arrangement risks in the 2025 LPRA remains relatively narrow and concludes that risks related to trusts and similar legal arrangements are low, primarily based on the absence of formally identifiable trust structures. The analysis included outreach to obliged entities, including FIs, which identified a limited number of cases (e.g. 15 foreign start-up companies linked to investment fund structures). These were examined and excluded from the scope of trusts, as they did not exhibit the defining structural features of trust arrangements and were instead assessed as regulated investment relationships. Investment funds and family foundations were similarly excluded based on their legal form and regulatory framework. 347. However, the assessment focuses primarily on whether structures formally qualify as trusts and does not sufficiently analyse how foreign legal arrangements may be used in practice. While the authorities have made efforts to raise awareness—including issuing guidance and conducting training for obliged entities—these efforts are limited by the prevailing view that trusts are not present in Türkiye. In addition, no typologies or case-based examples are presented to illustrate how such arrangements could be used, particularly in layered or cross-border structures. Given that trusts are not a familiar legal concept in the jurisdiction, this creates challenges in identifying and assessing related risks. The AT is of the view that this gap, while present, is of lesser materiality given that foreign legal arrangements are not directly established or operating within the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the absence of basic awareness remains a vulnerability that warrants attention, particularly in the context of cross-border layering typologies and Türkiye’s role as a growing investment hub and recognised real estate investment hub. 348. Potential exposure through foreign legal arrangements—such as cross-border investment vehicles including for real estate, asset-management structures and arrangements involving intermediary jurisdictions—is not comprehensively integrated into the risk analysis. This gap in identifying, analysing and understanding is consistently reflected in discussions with both competent authorities and obliged entities. A recurring misconception is that the absence of domestic recognition of trusts or similar legal arrangements precludes their use as a layering vehicle in money laundering typologies. Obliged entities – notably legal professionals – demonstrated limited awareness of how BO transparency obligations required them to look through legal arrangements to identify the beneficial owner, of the circumstances under which such arrangements may be deliberately exploited to obscure the origin, movement or control of illicit finds. Overall, Türkiye’s understanding of ML/TF risks associated with domestically created legal persons is sound and continues to improve, particularly at the operational level. Gaps in the depth and formalisation of analysis relating to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements reduce the extent to which risk understanding is comprehensive, forward-looking and uniformly shared, with implications for the consistency of preventive and supervisory responses. Awareness of risks linked to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements is more limited, particularly among DNFBPs. Banks tend to have a more sophisticated understanding, while other FIs and DNFBPs show weaker and more uneven awareness, reducing the effectiveness of mitigation measures in identifying complex misuse typologies in practice. A similar pattern is observed in the understanding of TF risks, where the analysis does not adequately distinguish between domestic and foreign-created legal persons and remains insufficiently granular to capture how such risks may manifest across different structures, particularly in cross-border contexts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="5.1.1. Turkish Legal Persons 338. Türkiye demonstrates a generally good and evolving understanding of ML/TF risks associated with legal persons created in the country. This understanding is grounded in the NRA and the LPRA conducted in 2021 and updated in 2025. The LPRA applies a structured methodology based on indicators relating to legal form, sectoral activity, transactional behaviour, geographic exposure and ownership characteristics. The 2025 update reflects methodological refinement with expanded indicators and increased use of tax, supervisory and law-enforcement data, contributing to a more differentiated assessment of domestic risks and providing a common analytical reference point for competent authorities. Competent authorities considered a wide range of sources in the formation of the LPRA. 339. The LPRA differentiates risks by company type and sector, identifying joint stock companies and limited liability companies as posing higher inherent risk due to their prevalence, transactional capacity, and suitability for layered ownership and control structures. It further identifies vulnerabilities in cash-intensive and trade-oriented sectors, including wholesale and retail trade, logistics and real estate. These conclusions broadly align with STR trends and domestic case experience, indicating that the formal risk assessment reflects the main channels through which domestically created legal persons are misused for ML purposes. 340. The understanding of TF risks associated with legal persons is established but remains broad and would benefit from greater precision and differentiation. The NRA, supported to a more limited extent by the LPRA, identifies TF risks as concentrated in specific actors, sectors and cross-border channels, while recognising vulnerabilities linked to cash-intensive activity, informal transfer mechanisms and the use of legal persons and commercial structures to facilitate financial flows, including in cross-border contexts and in proximity to conflict zones. However, the articulation of these risks remains largely at a general level and is not sufficiently or systematically differentiated across types of legal persons. In particular, the analysis does not adequately distinguish between domestic and foreign legal persons in the context of TF risk and would benefit from a more granular assessment of how TF risks may manifest across different legal forms and structures, including in harder to detect trade-exposed and cross-border sectors. 5.1.2. Foreign Created Legal Persons 341. Türkiye has taken meaningful steps to identify and assess risks related to foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links; however, some limitations remain in the scope and calibration of the framework, particularly in how sufficiency thresholds are applied across different higher-risk sectors identified or complex ownership structures in the LPRA, including trade-related activities, logistics and real estate, in light of the country’s risk and context. Understanding of ML/TF risks associated with foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye is less developed amongst both authorities and obliged entities. 342. Türkiye identifies certain foreign-created legal persons as limited taxpayers where they derive income from sources in Türkiye, typically through a permanent establishment, branch, agency or other taxable presence under domestic tax legislation. For the period 2021–2024, 388 limited taxpayer companies were identified within the scope of the legal person risk analysis. This dataset reflects foreign legal persons that have a recognised taxable presence in Türkiye. To widen the scope of analysis, MASAK also included 84 189 commercial companies with more than 50% foreign ownership. Within these datasets, 345 of the 388 limited taxpayer companies and 76 028 of the 84 189 companies with more than 50% foreign ownership were identified as holding bank accounts in Türkiye, indicating financial linkages to the jurisdiction. 343.  Legal persons with more than 50% foreign ownership interests represent 5.3% of all corporate taxpayers (9.4% of all corporate taxpayers is representative of companies that have at least 1 foreign shareholder). Methodologically, this approach potentially restricts the aperture of risk, as other than limited taxpayer status, it focuses on shareholding as a main criterion to determine sufficient link. The basis for considering the 50% threshold as an appropriate proxy for sufficient link, in light of Türkiye’s risk and threat context, was not clearly elaborated, nor to what extent this approach may leave certain risks outside the scope of analysis. Authorities did not appear to consider whether differentiated thresholds or criteria may be warranted in higher-risk sectors identified in the LPRA or in light of Türkiye’s exposure to cross-border activity, including where ownership structures are more complex or involve multiple layers across jurisdictions. In particular, the use of a single threshold may not fully capture risks in sectors or structures where lower ownership stakes or other forms of control may be sufficient to conceal BO. Given Türkiye’s open investment climate and exposure to cross-border activity, exploring whether a more differentiated approach—particularly in higher-risk sectors or areas identified in the LPRA—would better capture these risks and could further support a more comprehensive understanding. 344. The LPRA defines foreign-linked entities through structural criteria such as tax presence and majority foreign ownership. The typology guidance—intended to support and deepen this understanding—does not reflect or operationalise these categories. Instead, it illustrates the use of legal persons in ML/TF schemes based on their functional role in cross-border activities, without linking these patterns to the LPRA’s framework. For instance, typology material provides some evidence of the use of foreign legal persons and cross-border corporate structures, with such elements featuring in approximately one-third of the ML cases reviewed; however, these examples predominantly involve companies incorporated abroad or offshore entities used in multi-jurisdictional structures that do not satisfy the country’s tests for sufficient link. No examples were identified that correspond to limited taxpayers or commercial companies with more than 50% foreign shareholding. For TF cases, typology material provides limited examples of foreign legal persons, with only one or two cases across the sample involving companies established abroad or foreign-controlled structures with a discernible link to Türkiye, primarily through fund transfers or organisational networks. As the typology guidance is a key tool through which the authorities communicate risk understanding, this indicates a disconnect between the risks observed in practice and the analytical framework applied, constraining the overall understanding of foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links. 345. MASAK and LEAs demonstrate a strong operational understanding of how corporate structures are misused in practice, notably in complex ML investigations. However, this level of operational insight is not consistently reflected across all other parts of the government, where understanding of risks appears more uneven, including among tax, company registry and supervisory authorities. MASAK consistently observed that legal persons are primarily exploited within complex ML schemes, including those involving multiple interposed entities, opaque ownership chains and the integration of illicit proceeds through seemingly legitimate commercial activity. This operational insight informs investigative prioritisation and analytical work. However, this understanding is not explicitly reflected in the LPRA narrative, limiting the extent to which these insights are institutionalised and systematically communicated across all competent authorities and reporting entities. Furthermore, this understanding is not reflected to the same degree across the private sector. While a basic understanding of BO risks is generally present, banks tend to demonstrate a stronger grasp of ML/TF risks overall. By contrast, the level of understanding is more uneven among DNFBPs and parts of the wider financial sector, including certain VASPs and capital market participants. In these sectors, awareness of risks—especially those involving complex ownership structures, cross-border elements or the misuse of legal arrangements—appears less developed and less consistently translated into practice. 5.1.3. Trusts and Foreign Created Legal Arrangements 346. Türkiye’s overall understanding of risks related to trusts and foreign legal arrangements is partial. Authorities demonstrate strong awareness of risks where such structures are directly customer-facing, supported by outreach to obliged entities and targeted analysis. However, this understanding is more limited where such arrangements are embedded within layered, indirect or cross-border ownership structures, and is not yet fully developed in terms of identification, assessment and analysis of these more complex risks. Türkiye does not recognise trusts or equivalent domestic legal arrangements and authorities have substantiated the absence of such structures through legal analysis and empirical checks of registries, tax records and supervisory information. This position is appropriately reflected in the LPRA, when read in conjunction with the NRA. This does not preclude their use through cross-border arrangements. Under Turkish law, a person domiciled in Türkiye may act as settlor or beneficiary of a trust governed by foreign law, and foreign legal arrangements may operate in Türkiye, including through ownership or control of Turkish legal entities. The assessment of legal arrangement risks in the 2025 LPRA remains relatively narrow and concludes that risks related to trusts and similar legal arrangements are low, primarily based on the absence of formally identifiable trust structures. The analysis included outreach to obliged entities, including FIs, which identified a limited number of cases (e.g. 15 foreign start-up companies linked to investment fund structures). These were examined and excluded from the scope of trusts, as they did not exhibit the defining structural features of trust arrangements and were instead assessed as regulated investment relationships. Investment funds and family foundations were similarly excluded based on their legal form and regulatory framework. 347. However, the assessment focuses primarily on whether structures formally qualify as trusts and does not sufficiently analyse how foreign legal arrangements may be used in practice. While the authorities have made efforts to raise awareness—including issuing guidance and conducting training for obliged entities—these efforts are limited by the prevailing view that trusts are not present in Türkiye. In addition, no typologies or case-based examples are presented to illustrate how such arrangements could be used, particularly in layered or cross-border structures. Given that trusts are not a familiar legal concept in the jurisdiction, this creates challenges in identifying and assessing related risks. The AT is of the view that this gap, while present, is of lesser materiality given that foreign legal arrangements are not directly established or operating within the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the absence of basic awareness remains a vulnerability that warrants attention, particularly in the context of cross-border layering typologies and Türkiye’s role as a growing investment hub and recognised real estate investment hub. 348. Potential exposure through foreign legal arrangements—such as cross-border investment vehicles including for real estate, asset-management structures and arrangements involving intermediary jurisdictions—is not comprehensively integrated into the risk analysis. This gap in identifying, analysing and understanding is consistently reflected in discussions with both competent authorities and obliged entities. A recurring misconception is that the absence of domestic recognition of trusts or similar legal arrangements precludes their use as a layering vehicle in money laundering typologies. Obliged entities – notably legal professionals – demonstrated limited awareness of how BO transparency obligations required them to look through legal arrangements to identify the beneficial owner, of the circumstances under which such arrangements may be deliberately exploited to obscure the origin, movement or control of illicit finds. Overall, Türkiye’s understanding of ML/TF risks associated with domestically created legal persons is sound and continues to improve, particularly at the operational level. Gaps in the depth and formalisation of analysis relating to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements reduce the extent to which risk understanding is comprehensive, forward-looking and uniformly shared, with implications for the consistency of preventive and supervisory responses. Awareness of risks linked to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements is more limited, particularly among DNFBPs. Banks tend to have a more sophisticated understanding, while other FIs and DNFBPs show weaker and more uneven awareness, reducing the effectiveness of mitigation measures in identifying complex misuse typologies in practice. A similar pattern is observed in the understanding of TF risks, where the analysis does not adequately distinguish between domestic and foreign-created legal persons and remains insufficiently granular to capture how such risks may manifest across different structures, particularly in cross-border contexts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="349. Türkiye has implemented a broad range of preventive and mitigating measures aimed at reducing the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes. These measures are grounded in company law, AML/CFT legislation, tax law and sectoral supervisory frameworks and apply throughout the existence of legal persons. Responsibilities are distributed across several competent authorities, with MASAK playing a central co-ordinating role in relation to AML/CFT obligations. While the framework is comprehensive and has strengthened transparency—particularly through incorporation controls and the BO Registry—its effectiveness is uneven in practice, with limited evidence of the detection of breaches of basic information related to commercial legal persons, reliance on self-reported information, and gaps in verification, enforcement and coverage across higher-risk areas, including joint stock and limited liability companies and foreign created legal persons with sufficient links. 350. Incorporation and Customer Onboarding: At incorporation and customer onboarding stage in Türkiye, a range of company law, tax, banking and AML/CFT controls on obliged entities apply to promote transparency to mitigate the misuse of all legal persons. Legal persons must register with the Trade Registry under the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (and the Co-operatives Law No. 1163, where applicable), with incorporation information recorded and publicly disclosed through the Turkish Trade Registry Gazette and accessible via the MERSIS system. Newly established entities must submit a commencement of business notification to the tax authorities under the Tax Procedure Law No. 213, and trade registry directorates transmit incorporation documentation to the tax office via web service to enable cross-checks and address verification, including start-up inspections where the address information and submitted documents cannot be confirmed, along with additional safeguards for high-risk taxpayers (including collateral requirements in relevant cases). 351.  CDD controls also operate as an early gatekeeper: obliged entities conduct CDD and identify BOs at account opening under the Regulation on Measures (RoM). In addition, these controls apply across all financial institutions (FIs) and DNFPBs. As part of their AML/CFT obligations, obliged entities are required to collect, maintain and update relevant customer and BO information, and to make this information available to competent authorities upon request. Türkiye has however not provided information on the number of such requests by competent authorities, their frequency and the timelines for provision of said information. Sanctions are imposed for non-compliance, but these are not proportionate or dissuasive in view of Türkiye’s risk and context (See 5.5, IO.3 and IO.4). 352. Transparency of basic legal person information at the time of incorporation and through the life cycle of commercial legal persons is ensured through the Trade Registry and MERSIS systems, with public disclosure via the Trade Registry Gazette. Legal persons are required to register directors, shareholders and changes in ownership and management, without exemptions. These measures are intended to provide a transparent baseline and facilitate access to information by competent authorities and obliged entities. In practice, they are meant to constitute important mitigation measures against the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes, particularly by supporting traceability of legal ownership and corporate changes. However, their effectiveness appears mixed, as they primarily capture formal legal ownership and rely on self-reported information, with checks focused on formal compliance rather than substantive verification. While penalties are applied where discrepancies are identified through complaints or audits, there is limited evidence of such checks and enforcement in practice, and none has been demonstrated in relation to foreign legal persons. Article 210/3 of the TCC allows the Ministry of Trade to seek the dissolution of companies involved in fraudulent or unlawful activities; however, its use has been limited—applied to only 4 companies in 2021, 2 in 2022, 4 in 2023, 3 in 2024, and 5 in 2025. Given the use of multi-layered ML/TF schemes that feature shell and front companies and TBML laundering schemes, the application is not in line with the risk and context of Türkiye, particularly where the LPRA identifies joint stock and limited liability companies—those most commonly used in such structures—as posing higher inherent risks. This also underscores the limited evidence of detection at the point of incorporation and early-stage controls, with available data focusing primarily on limited ex post enforcement actions. 353. While this framework establishes multiple controls at the incorporation stage, only three cases – one initiated by the supervisory authority and two through complaints ( Box 5.1 refers ) were provided to demonstrate how Trade Registry and tax-level controls have, in practice, led to the identification of inaccuracies, corrective actions, sanctions or the detection and prevention of misuse of legal persons at the company law or tax levels. This is notably limited in light of Türkiye’s risk and context, particularly given the concentration of legal person risks among commercial companies and the identified vulnerabilities associated with both domestic and foreign-created legal persons. Box 5.1. Corrective Action against a company In a notification sent by the Tax Office to the Commercial Registry Directorate, it was reported that during a tax audit conducted at “A” Limited Company it was determined that the company was not present at the address registered in the Commercial Registry. Consequently, the Commercial Registry Office notified the company and its partner “Y” that, pursuant to Article 33 of the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), the change of address must be registered within 30 days. The company’s partners determined the new registered office address as “P…….” within the same neighbourhood via a general meeting resolution and had it registered with the Commercial Registry. 354. Associations and foundations are subject to structured registration and reporting through the DERBIS and VBYS systems respectively, which capture governance, financial and operational information and are directly accessible to competent authorities, supporting effective monitoring and transparency (See 5.3 and 5.5). Co-operatives are registered in the Trade Registry and recorded in MERSIS and are also subject to monitoring through the KOOPBIS platform to a limited extent; and given that co-operatives are also captured within MERSIS, the same limitations related to the use and verification of MERSIS registry information apply. 355. BO Registry: The introduction of the BO Registry in 2021 represents a significant enhancement of Türkiye’s preventive framework. Additionally, BO information must be reported to the TRA under Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué No. 529 through periodic and event-driven notifications, with penalties for non-compliance. The accuracy of reporting may also be tested through tax inspections, while MASAK supervises the implementation of preventive measures under the AML Law No. 5549. Compliance has improved steadily, reaching approximately 99% by early 2025, reflecting sustained outreach, guidance and enforcement by MASAK and the TRA. This framework has substantially increased transparency regarding ownership and control of legal persons. Effectiveness of the overall regime is constrained by the gaps in verification. (See 5.3) 356. Bearer shares: Türkiye has not prohibited the issuance of bearer shares, but they are only permitted in a restricted and registered dematerialized form. Since the last evaluation, the country has taken meaningful steps to address the anonymity risks associated with bearer shares through the amendments to the TCC and the subsequent Communiqué of April 2021, which established a mandatory registration regime with the Central Securities Depository (CSD). The regime represents a genuine improvement as noted in Türkiye’s 2022 Follow-Up report, removing the anonymity of bearer share ownership. The CSD maintains electronic records of bearer share holders and transfers, which are accessible to competent authorities and administrative sanctions apply for failures to comply with notification requirements. Notably, the suspension of all shareholder rights — including dividend entitlements and general assembly participation — pending CSD notification provides a useful deterrent against non-registration. As of November 2025, 3,336 companies registered (0.20% of total companies) a total of 734,243 bearer shares held by 12,741 shareholders. Since the amendments in 2021, 8 companies have been audited (two in 2022, one in 2023, two in 2024 and three in 2025). A single shareholder was fined 27,240 TL (1.552,68 EUR) in 2022 for failing to report ownership on time. Despite these improvements, the bearer share dematerialisation regime may present a residual vulnerability. While transfers are effected upon physical delivery, the exercise of shareholder rights is contingent on notification to the CSD. In the absence of further clarification from the authorities on how this interim period is monitored or mitigated in practice, this could give rise to a situation where ownership is not yet reflected in the system, creating a temporarily non-transparent ownership state that could be exploited for passive asset concealment, evasion techniques and proceeds placement. 357. Notaries : The role of notaries at key corporate events — including incorporation under Article 335, capital increases and amendments to articles of association under Articles 454 and 456 and share transfers in limited liability companies — does not provide sufficient AML/CFT safeguards against the misuse of legal persons. While notarial involvement ensures that the legal form of the transaction is properly executed and that the identity of the persons appearing before them is authenticated, their function does not extend beyond this. Notaries are not required to verify registered office addresses against physical evidence, to identify whether a director or shareholder is acting as a nominee for an undisclosed principal, or to inquire into the source of funds injected as capital. The result is a framework that provides formal legal authentication at key moments in a company’s lifecycle without any substantive AML/CFT mitigation of the risk. 358. Nominee Directors and Shareholders : Türkiye has also taken targeted measures to address specific higher-risk features. Nominee directors and shareholders are not recognised under Turkish law, limiting anonymity. Nominee arrangements have not been identified as a key risk in the LPRA, and this is not reflected as an identified risk in the complex ML cases presented. However, competent authorities do not actively identify de facto nominee arrangements in practice through testing of the registry, despite the continued advertisement of such services, including nominee arrangements, by obliged entities. 359. Dissolution of Inactive Companies : Türkiye applies measures to address inactive companies, demonstrating sustained efforts to ensure compliance with reporting and transparency obligations; however, some limitations remain in addressing repeated misuse of legal persons. The TRA as an ongoing programme of monitoring inactive companies and actively strikes off inactive companies, with 38,306 entities struck off in 2021, 38,021 in 2022, 40,534 in 2023, 44,105 in 2024, and 26,960 in 2025, reflecting continuous action to mitigate the risk of dormant companies. The dissolution of inactive companies provides a meaningful structural control. However, there is limited information on whether complementary measures target the individuals behind these entities, including whether directors, shareholders or beneficial owners associated with struck-off companies are monitored, restricted or sanctioned in cases of repeated involvement. In the absence of such measures, particularly given the repeated use of shell and front companies identified in typologies, these actions address the legal entity risk to a certain extent but not the underlying risk, which may persist through the continued activity of the same individuals. 360. Financial Transparency Measures : Financial transparency measures in Türkiye contribute to transparency to a limited extent for commercial legal persons and to a better extent for associations and foundations. For joint stock and limited liability companies, financial statements must be prepared and submitted to the tax authorities; companies subject to independent audit—determined by size thresholds or sector—are additionally required to make financial information publicly available (e.g. via a company website), and listed companies must publish their financial statements on the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP). General and limited partnerships are similarly required to keep accounts and meet tax reporting obligations, but are not subject to public financial disclosure requirements. Ordinary partnerships do have obligations but do not have legal personality; while they may maintain accounts for operational purposes, tax obligations, as is typically the case, are borne at the level of the partners, who are required to declare income individually. Co-operatives are also required to maintain accounting records and comply with applicable reporting obligations, with relevant information recorded in systems such as MERSIS and subject to monitoring through KOOPBIS. When considered in light of the risk context identified in the LPRA—particularly the higher risks associated with capital companies—and the limited use of enforcement measures for fraudulent activities, these financial transparency measures appear to contribute only to a limited extent to the detection and prevention of misuse of legal persons in practice. By contrast, associations and foundations are required to submit financial and operational information through dedicated systems (DERBIS and VBYS), which are accessible to competent authorities and support ongoing monitoring, contributing to financial transparency and oversight to a better extent for other legal persons. 361. Foreign Created Legal Persons with sufficient links : Foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links are subject to the same BO reporting obligations as other corporate taxpayers. In addition to BO filing requirements, preventive measures applicable to legal persons—including those related to registration, CDD and monitoring—apply where relevant. In practice, the effectiveness of these measures is primarily evidenced through enforcement actions related to BO reporting obligations, particularly in relation to limited taxpayers. Overall, effectiveness for foreign-created legal persons remains constrained by the gaps outlined in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5, including limited enforcement in higher-risk areas such as MERSIS-related obligations and fraudulent companies, which is not fully aligned with the risk profile and is consistent with the more limited understanding of risks related to foreign-created legal persons (see 5.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. ML/TF measures 121. Türkiye does not have exemptions from compliance with the FATF Standards and applies AML/CFT obligations, as noted above, to other sectors in line with its ML/TF risks. 122. Türkiye applies enhanced and simplified due diligence (EDD, SDD in some cases, as provided for in the RoM (see R.1 and R.10) in line with its ML/TF risks and FATF R.10. SDD is not permitted where ML/TF risk might occur. Türkiye demonstrates good use of NRA results to calibrate EDD and SDD. Updated STR typologies and guidance further show risk responsive adjustments. 123. On EDD, examples include removing POS/virtual POS from SDD eligibility due to misuse and tightening EDD for VASPs (MASAK Communiqué No. 29 and RoM) including through introducing cooling off periods. Virtual assets purchased cannot be transferred within 48 hours of purchase and withdrawals cannot be made before 72 hours. 124. On SDD, following the 2023 earthquake that affected many of Türkiye’s provinces, different means of identification were added to Communiqué No. 5 to facilitate CDD and access to financial services. In addition, after its 2025 NRA and in line with the FATF’s changes to R.1(though Türkiye is not yet being assessed against this aspect of the Methodology), MASAK issued new SDD measures and updated the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section in its website clarifying related AML/CFT obligations. 125. However, gaps remain in applying enhanced measures to trade related ML, cross-border cash flows and informal MVTS. Evidence that supervisory authorities integrate these risks consistently into prioritisation remains limited. Evidence that supervisory authorities integrate these risks consistently into prioritisation remains limited Some variation remains in how risk understanding is translated into supervisory and preventive outcomes, particularly in the consistent application of risk-based prioritisation across sectors and in ensuring that supervisory responses fully reflect the scale and nature of underlying risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="650. The approach for monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). In line with its 2021 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye implemented a risk-based approach for monitoring reporting entities compliance with TFS obligations, by developing separate supervision programmes based on a separate risk analysis specifically for TFS monitoring, both in terms of TF and PF. On an annual basis, competent authorities assess reporting entities risk level for TFS compliance taking into consideration several factors such as control measures applied by reporting entities, asset size, outcome of previous inspections. Within each sector, reporting entities are then categorised into high/medium and low TFS risk and authorities conduct onsite inspections to all high risks entities and some medium risks. Apart from planned inspections, if evidence emerges that an obligated party has violated the sanctions, that party is supervised independently of the program, and sanctions are imposed in case of violation. Periodic inquiries are also conducted to determine whether individuals and legal entities on asset freeze lists have committed any violations following the freeze decision. Yet, this approach led to the monitoring of an overall limited number of reporting entities over the reporting period, Türkiye could make wider use of offsite supervision to expand the scope of entities supervised on PF related TFS obligations. 651. Violations related to TF TFS were detected in the supervisions of the banking, MVTS and insurance sectors (see IO.10) but not for PF TFS. The PF NRA recognises that the systems of the relevant companies were not sufficiently capable of handling TFS, including related to PF. This coupled with Türkiye unique position as a regional financial and transit hub and its specific risk exposure to Iran, and the specific risks related to potential breaches and evasions of sanctions which is taken into consideration to a limited extent by some reporting entities could likely to result in more PF violation risks. 652. Building upon the results of the PF NRA, authorities decided in 2025 to differentiate the risk analyses for TF related and PF related TFS in order to carry out separate supervisions with better risk understanding and better scoping either on TF or PF. As of the time of the onsite visit, the supervision programmes had not been finalised but the plan was for supervisors to inspect 147 entities, among which 108 FIs and 39 DPMS/REAs, following a risk-based approach. Türkiye’s plan to prioritise the supervision of the entities posing the highest risk within the sectors most at risk of PF according to the PF NRA results is a positive development, however the effectiveness of such measure is yet to be demonstrated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 469. Türkiye prioritises asset recovery as a national and operational policy objective at the highest level including through its Judicial Reform Strategy Document (updated in 2025), the Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices (2021-2025), and operational documents and guidelines produced by competent authorities in the context of their duties (for example, the FIU regarding confiscation of VAs). 470. The Judicial Strategy Document is the highest policy document on judicial matters including criminal policies related to asset recovery. Under its Strategic Objective 3 titled “Increasing the Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System” Türkiye aims at making the necessary arrangements to: (i) solve problems arising from confiscation and seizure in criminal proceedings; (ii) enhance the identification, confiscation and management of the proceeds of crime; and (iii) establish an institutional structure for the purpose of improving Türkiye’s asset recovery systems by examining international examples. The document also includes objectives to strengthen judicial authorities’ human resources and capacities to improve the asset recovery system. 471. Following the guidance in the Judicial Strategy Document, the FIU prepared and published the Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices for the 2021-2025 period emphasising the need for depriving criminals of their proceeds and enhancing financial intelligence capabilities for the implementation of effective seizure and confiscation measures in ML, associate predicate offences, and TF. The implementation of the Strategy is supported by three working groups and sub-groups at a national level which includes all competent authorities relevant to the asset recovery process. 472. As part of its ICRG action plan and beyond, Türkiye has also introduced a performance-based approach to asset recovery, aiming to ensure accountability and institutional efficiency in the implementation of seizure and confiscation measures. To this end, a series of specific, measurable criteria have been established across relevant institutions to clarify mandates and monitor effectiveness in recovering the proceeds of crime. Türkiye’s judicial performance evaluation framework has integrated asset recovery expectations into the core duties of judges and prosecutors. Specifically, it requires public prosecutors to initiate parallel financial investigations in ML/TF cases, apply seizure and confiscation orders proactively, and consider proportional restraint measures to prevent asset dissipation. Integrating asset recovery into performance evaluation mechanisms helps ensure that institutional priorities are internalised at the individual level. By tying prosecutorial and judicial advancement to the effective use of financial investigative tools and confiscation measure. Türkiye fosters a results-oriented culture that reinforces the broader policy objective of depriving proceeds of crime. As a result of the implementation of the performance evaluation over the past two years, forty-seven specialised ML/TF public prosecutors were not promoted because they did not fully meet the performance criteria described above demonstrating the effective application of the system. 473. In addition, the MoJ Circular No. 155/1 prioritises conducting PFIs in line with national risks as part of Türkiye's broader criminal policy and increasing the effectiveness of implementing seizure and confiscation processes, effectively enforce security measures and administrative sanctions for legal entities in cases of ML/TF and ensure specialisation in conducting investigations. This circular is applicable to all public prosecutors and courts in the 81 provinces and is operationally oriented, providing competent authorities with the procedures for the seizure and confiscation of property and funds. Public prosecutors should in all cases: a) Conduct a detailed examination of bank loans, bank and traveller’s checks, remittances, transfers, securities, stocks, VAs, guarantees, bonds, bills, policies, letters of credit and similar assets that can be represented by money or money value, and all kinds of movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, all kinds of goods, rights, receivables and all kinds of economic values, including those in electronic or digital media that certify and represent a property right or interest on them, and determine the assets of persons in close relationship with the suspect; b) Examine whether assets were taken abroad and explore ways to trace them. c) Apply all effective investigative techniques. d) Consider seizure and confiscation of assets at early stages of the prosecution when preparing indictments for ML/TF offences. e) Examining the funding issue separately in the investigations conducted to those suspected of being founder or leadership of a terrorist organisation for TF cases. 474. The practical orientation of the Circular helps to translate national policy goals into day-to-day operational guidance. By providing structured expectations across all provinces and reinforcing them through regular evaluation meetings, the system supports a more coherent and results-driven approach to asset recovery. 475. The MoI also issued a circular to strengthen LEAs practices in effectively combating offences that generate proceeds of crime and ensuring the identification and deprivation of such assets for the benefit of the State. LEAs should: a) Conduct comprehensive financial profiling and asset-tracing activities covering immovables, vehicles, bank accounts, receivables, negotiable instruments, company shares, and other tangible or intangible assets. b) Gather financial intelligence from relevant institutions, particularly MASAK, to support the identification of criminal proceeds and related actors. c) Perform parallel or integrated financial investigations in cases involving predicate offences with potential proceeds, especially those assessed as high or medium risk in the NRA. d) Secure timely seizure of suspected proceeds of crime, ensuring these measures are taken under the legal framework and promptly submitted for judicial approval, as per the CPL and the AML Law. e) Include detailed information in the case file regarding the origin, nature, and estimated value of the assets, including documentation to support confiscation decisions. f) Differentiate assets whose criminal origin cannot be definitively proven to facilitate value-based confiscation and expose potential concealment schemes. g) Refer assets at risk of damage or loss of value for judicial authorisation of pre-conviction disposal to protect both public interest and third-party rights. h) Record the appraised value of seized assets in the national enforcement system (EKIP) and ensure all actions are lawfully executed. 476. The MoI circular also considers asset recovery as a strategic priority and instructs field units in all 81 provinces to act in co-ordination with PPOs. It mandates timely reporting, cross-institutional co-operation, and adherence to procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and effectiveness of all seizure and confiscation measures. 477. The policies implemented to strengthen asset recovery system in Türkiye have progressively translated into tangible operational results. The MoF and MASAK’s internal frameworks have enhanced the systematic use of postponement of transactions, ensuring that freezing measures are applied periodically and effectively following financial analysis. Likewise, the MoJ circulars have reinforced the prioritisation of seizure and confiscation within criminal proceedings, enabling prosecutors and judges to apply these mechanisms more consistently. Overall, these measures demonstrate a clear prioritisation of asset recovery as a policy objective which is positively translating into the operationalisation of asset recovery tools. 8.1.1. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 478. Türkiye demonstrates a robust history of prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective which is complemented by the periodic revision of the legal framework and practices, considering emerging risks, evolving typologies, and international standards. Türkiye’s CBCFC is the competent authority for reviewing the asset recovery regime. Within the CBCFC, the MoJ leads the drafting process for amending policies and legislation and designing new ones, which are then discussed with all relevant authorities, including MASAK, LEAs and PPOs, through the CBCFC Threat Working Group. These multi-agency efforts ensure that asset recovery practices are not static but subject to ongoing review and adjustment. Through annual evaluations, regular data collection, and co-ordinated feedback mechanisms, Türkiye maintains a responsive and evolving confiscation regime that reflects operational realities. 479. As a result of these co-ordination mechanisms, the Judicial Reform Strategy Document (enforced in 2009) was reviewed and followed by strategy documents in 2015 and 2019. Since 2021, the Threats and Vulnerabilities WG hosted twenty-five meetings to discuss amendments to the asset recovery regime resulting in: (i) a full update of the Judicial Reform Strategy Document (covering the years 2025-2029); (ii) the publication of FIU’s Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices for the 2021-2025 period; (iii) adoption of the MoJ Circular 155/1 which resulted in periodic evaluation meetings held by the Directorate General for Criminal Affairs and the PPOs with the objective of keeping the asset recovery system up to date and enhance seizure and confiscation procedures. 480. The period for revision of these documents is not stated in the legislation. However, competent authorities have demonstrated to routinely review them through the above-mentioned mechanisms. 8.1.2. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 481. The CBCFC plays a central role in ensuring co-operation and co-ordination among all AML/CFT relevant competent authorities including in the development of strategies and mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts, reviewing draft legislation and strengthening interagency co-operation when implementing asset recovery strategies. The CBCFC is chaired by the MoTF and integrated by policy and operational AML/CFT authorities at the highest level (Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Organisation, General Director of Financial Markets and Foreign Exchange, Head of the Tax Inspection Board, Head of the Financial Crimes Investigation Board, MoJ Director General of Criminal Affairs, MFA Director General of Intelligence and Security, MoT Director General of Customs Enforcement, BRSA Deputy Chairman and the TNP Deputy director General) which demonstrates Türkiye’s integral approach to the development of asset recovery criminal policies. Most of legislations revisions were conducted between 2023-2025 and their implementation have recently started to show positive results with an increment of 50% of FIU’s financial reports on proceeds of crimes in 2024, over 75% of postponement of transactions and 90% of files subject to seizure and confiscation issued between 2023-2025. 482. This interagency co-operation approach is also translated into operational levels through the implementation of asset recovery criminal policies in investigations and prosecutions. In all stages of ML/TF investigations and prosecutions, competent authorities are required to register all information related to the proceeds of crimes and their status (seized or confiscated) in the UYAP which facilitates operational authorities searches all kinds of data (such as amount, quantity, type, value, etc.) and documents of assets taken under custody, seized or confiscated, enhancing the co-ordination mechanisms between prosecutors, LEAs and authorities managing the seized and confiscated assets, including tax authorities. 483. Operational findings and contribution of LEAs (TNP, GGC and CE) and MASAK are also regularly informed to the MoJ with the aim of keeping these frameworks up to date in alliance to the operational trends. This allows a continuous assessment and supports a more responsive and impactful regime flexible enough to adapt to the changing nature of criminal threats providing effective and timely responses to prevent the dissipation of illegal proceeds of crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="241. Türkiye supervises FIs and VASPs following a RBA. High and medium risks entities are subject to frequent onsite inspections and all entities can be inspected offsite or as part of a specific thematic review with entities’ risk scoring reassessed on a yearly basis. For VASPs, the supervisory framework was recently strengthened, and supervision is only effective to some extent. Although recent on‑site inspections show a marked decrease in the proportion of VASPs found in violation, the supervisory framework cannot yet be considered fully effective. The sectoral supervisor has only recently changed, and at the same time the regulatory requirements for VASPs have been significantly tightened. The new licensing process is still ongoing, which means that all VASPs still continue to operate under transitional arrangements. As a result, the supervisory system is still in the process of stabilising, and its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed as fully achieved. 242. As a result of the findings of 2019 MER and ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye adopted a risk-based supervision (RBS) approach in 2020 to prioritise the supervision of highest risk sectors and highest risk entities within each sector. Dedicated protocols between MASAK and sectoral supervisors have been signed establishing principles and procedures for information exchange, co-operation and co-ordination in RBS of FIs and VASPs. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, prepares annual supervision plans for all FIs and VASPs. The Threat &amp; Vulnerability WGs and the sectoral risks analysis working groups (see 3.2) provide a platform for MASAK to exchange with sectoral supervisors as well as the private sector and the development of the sectoral risk assessments support the definition of yearly supervisory programs. 243. Türkiye’s RBS methodology requires obliged entities categorised as high-risk to be supervised every year, and obliged entities categorised as medium-risk to be supervised every three years at the latest. The AML/CFT supervision programmes prioritise the on-site supervisions of higher risk sectors, as determined by Türkiye’s national risk assessments banks, including VASPs, MVTS and EOs. In this context, it is noteworthy that, based on Türkiye’s entity‑level risk‑scoring, approximately 5% of FIs and VASPs in sectors assessed as high or medium‑high risk are classified as high risk at the entity level (see 3.2). 244. The supervision of compliance by FIs and VASPs is carried out through three types of supervisory activities. First, dedicated AML/CFT supervision programmes are defined annually by MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department and are conducted either by MASAK’s Treasury and Finance Experts, sectoral supervisors, or other staff listed below in Table 3.7 under the guidance of MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department. Those onsite inspections aim at assessing the compliance status of the reporting entity against AML/CFT obligations. Second, prudential supervision conducted by sectoral supervisors. Even though those are not targeted at AML/CFT obligations, related shortcomings might be identified by the sectoral supervisor (e.g. CDD requirements, BO, etc.) and are referred to MASAK for further examination. Third, “case-based AML/CFT inspections”, outside the scope of pre-planned activities, to determine whether any AML/CFT or prudential obligation has been violated. As mentioned above, the entity-level risk score is updated yearly, yet Türkiye cannot manually change – over the course of the year - the risk score to take into consideration new or emerging information that would impact the risk score of a specific entity. Nevertheless, this can be mitigated by ad hoc supervisory actions even in the absence of a revaluation of the entity risk score. 245. Those three types of monitoring activities are complementary and both onsite and off-site inspections are resorted to, allowing for a close monitoring of the financial sector. The scope of the case-based supervision can be as encompassing as the ones conducted within the scope of a programme, or it can be only on one obligation. Supervisory activities are applied in line with entities’ risk profiles and are supported by close and ongoing engagement between MASAK, sectoral supervisors and obliged entities, including guidance and outreach activities. In practice, this approach has contributed to improved compliance, particularly at the level of individual institutions. For instance, in 2022 ten banks were supervised as case based only on their periodical reporting obligations. Parts of these supervisions can be conducted off-site, appointed supervisors can request information and documents (e.g. information on customers, transactions, products and services, policies, procedures, systems used etc.) from the reporting entities and evaluates them off-site. This information is then used to determine the areas of focus for the on-site supervision. 246. MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department consists of 33 staff members fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. The Department prepares the annual AML/CFT supervision programmes. Beyond these dedicated resources, the Department also assigns the staff listed in Table 3.6 to conduct AML/CFT supervisory activities. These staff members can perform AML/CFT supervisory tasks alongside other responsibilities (e.g. prudential supervision in the case of sectoral supervisors) and are therefore not exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. Table 3.7. Staff that can conduct AML/CFT supervision alongside their other responsibilities Supervisors Number of staff for supervision (as of June 2025) MASAK (Treasury and Finance Experts) 129 BRSA 245 CMB 178 CBRT 47 ISPRA 50 Trade inspectors 293 Total 846 Others (Tax Inspectors + Treasury controllers) 6 816 247. The integrated approach between MASAK and sectoral supervisors ensures that prudential and AML/CFT supervision are complementary. After completing on-site examinations, the examiners submit their reports to MASAK. The Supervision of Obligations Department reviews these reports to ensure compliance with MASAK’s reporting standards and to identify any legal or substantive errors. Reports recommending criminal penalties are forwarded to the relevant PPOs. 248. While the framework for co-operation is established, its practical implementation could be strengthened. Opportunities exist to deepen ML/TF risk understanding among sectoral supervisors (see 3.2) which have lesser expertise to carry out AML/CFT examinations in some technical areas, particularly when they require in-depth evaluation (e.g., transaction monitoring scenarios, sanction screening system rules, customer risk scoring models, etc). Addressing those challenges would further improve the effective supervision of FIs and VASPs. 249. In line with its ICRG Action Plan, MASAK’s resources dedicated to Supervision of Obligations Department have been strengthened since the 2019 MER, from 12 staff members to 33 as of 2025. As of the time of the onsite visit, MASAK indicated that recruitment was ongoing, and further staff could be allocated to the supervision department. However, MASAK supervision department oversees compliance for FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, it receives and analyses the reports of all sectoral supervisors, and is in charge of taking further actions, including issuing sanctions. Even though MASAK relies on sectoral supervisors, those do not have dedicated AML/CFT units nor specialised staff. In light of MASAK’s broad prerogatives and pivotal role played by the Supervision of Obligations Department across all sectors, in conducting and co-ordinating AML/CFT supervision across all sectors, the resources of this department would benefit from further strengthening. 250. While Türkiye has a broad pool of examiners who may conduct AML/CFT inspections, the effectiveness of supervision may be affected by the distribution of AML/CFT expertise across supervisory authorities. MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department, which consists of staff fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision and with the highest level of AML/CFT expertise, plays a central role in risk‑based planning and oversight. Alongside this, sectoral supervisors integrate AML/CFT supervision into their wider supervisory mandates (e.g. prudential supervision), reflecting Türkiye’s holistic supervisory model. However, sectoral supervisors’ do not have dedicated AML/CFT staff and expertise. This can impede the effective supervision of some sectors, especially high-risk sectors with emerging actors and complex ML/TF typologies. As mentioned above, CMB’s understanding of VASP-related ML/TF risks is still developing. Supervising VASPs is a new responsibility for CMB and while staff have received general AML training, there are no AML/CFT specialists. This gap in risk comprehension could, to some extent, undermine the ability to prioritise resources and tailor supervisory actions to the sector’s high-risk profile. 251. Since the legislation for licensing VASPs is relatively recent and VASPs have been obliged parties since 2021, the AML/CFT supervision of VASPs was initially conducted by experts from the Treasury employed at MASAK. Since 2025, VASPs AML/CFT supervision has been conducted by CMB in addition to the supervision of capital market intermediaries and portfolio management companies. 252. The number of supervised obliged entities significantly increased over the reporting period and Türkiye prioritises the supervision of higher risk sectors. Supervision activities are conducted in line with entities risk profile to a large extent. All entities considered as high risks are subject to a yearly onsite inspection, across all sectors. In addition, while medium risk entities are required to be supervised at least every three years, those operating in the highest risk sectors are prioritised for selection in annual supervision programmes, ahead of medium risk entities in medium/low risk sectors. As a result, for banks, VASPs and EOs, all high and most medium risk entities are monitored each year, in line with a risk-based approach. 253. During onsite visits, supervisors mainly focus on the application of CDD requirement as well as the implementation by reporting entities of enhanced due diligence in higher risk scenarios and to also review the internal controls in place to mitigate risks. With regard to BO, the supervisory guidance documents direct supervisors to assess whether reporting entities identify the natural persons or legal persons holding more than 25% of the shares in a legal entity when establishing a permanent business relationship with legal persons registered in the trade registry. However, the guidance documents do not instruct supervisors to consider whether reporting entities have taken into account other forms of control in the identification of the BO, such as control exercised through means other than ownership. As a result, the supervision may overlook at such situations. 254. For banks, during onsite audits the institutional risk assessment is constantly reviewed, yet authorities did not provide statistics on infringements with those obligations. Customers risk scoring and mitigating measures process are also reviewed, including whether those have been included in internal policy documents and if the staff are aware of those. Supervisors assess internal controls including in conducting interviews with employees to assess awareness levels as well as the adequacy of compliance units staffing in comparison with other departments of the reporting entity. High risk transactions and customers are also systematically monitored in the course of inspections, using automated tools. The scope of the onsite can be further defined with an offsite preliminary assessment based on internal documents from the reporting entity (internal policies, risk scenarios, etc.). Supervision programs for banks can take from several weeks to a year depending on the size and complexity of the case. 255. For VASPs, similar scrutiny is applied to CDD measures and internal controls, especially KYC measures taken when the onboarding of a new client is done remotely. As VASPs is a newly regulated sector, the presence of a compliance unit is also systematically checked as well as the presence of internal policies and procedures. Türkiye also set up a repository for all VASPs customers who are allocated a unique number. Supervisors monitor if VASP have referred their customer in the repository and if the transactions related to the client have been reporting accordingly. Supervisors are also resorting to electronical tools to monitor transaction and potential absence of STR reporting. As per the recent supervision and ongoing licensing process of VASPs in Türkiye, the monitoring of AML/CFT compliance for VASPs is to be further developed. 256. For MVTS and EOs, the focus is on the type and level of transactions carried out as well as the implementation of CDD measures which generally represents a challenge in the sector. Transactions among MVTS or between MVTS/exchange offices and other high-risk sectors, such as DPMS, are also given additional scrutiny by supervisors. For exchange offices, supervisors also screen video footage to detect any potential suspicious activity. 257. For NBFIs and Insurance, representing the lowest risk level for FIs, supervision is conducted yearly for high-risk entities and to a lesser extent to medium risk entities. The monitoring is conducted on the overall compliance with AML/CFT obligations. 258. Table 3.8 provides an overview of AML/CFT supervisory activities by year. For each year, the table sets out the number of obliged entities included in the annual supervision programme (Prog), the number of case-based (ad hoc) supervisions conducted outside the programme (Case), and the number of entities classified as high‑ or medium‑risk based on risk analyses. The final columns present cumulative figures for the period covered. For example, in 2024, 31 banks were classified as high‑ or medium‑risk, of which 15 were inspected as part of the annual supervision programme and one through a case‑based supervision. Table 3.8. Risk-based supervisory activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 Prog Case Total High Medium entities Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Banks 15 5 25 16 0 18 21 10 21 15 0 28 VASPs 0 0 0 5 13 0 19 22 1 24 MVTS 17 1 27 14 1 26 20 1 27 20 6 33 EO 35 1 125 36 3 118 63 3 272 72 2 156 CM 21 0 24 0 29 0 12 0 NBFIs 14 0 26 17 0 27 24 0 33 16 1 49 Insurance 8 0 17 9 0 19 14 0 26 0 0 not av PMIs 0 0 not av 0 4 not av 4 0 11 0 0 not av Sector 2024 2025 Total Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Prog Case High Medium Banks 15 1 31 22 0 39 113 16 123 VASPs 23 0 38 27 0 43 96 6 81 MVTS 33 1 40 33 0 45 144 10 153 EO 80 0 164 117 0 323 450 9 835 CM 19 0 17 0 29 105 0 0 NBFIs 14 0 42 19 0 41 127 1 177 Insurance 2 0 2 10 0 19 35 0 64 PMIs 2 0 2 3 0 3 8 4 13 259. Not all entities in high-risk sectors have been subject to supervision over the reporting period. A total of 50 banks (out of 63) have been subject to AML/CFT supervisions since 2021, either through supervision programme, case-based monitoring or both. Authorities indicate that out of the remaining ones, 9 are either recently established with limited banking activities or investment and development banks not accepting deposits and participation, only providing credit for investments and hence being consider much lower risk. Since 2020, only a small number of payment and e‑money institutions (10) have not yet been subject to AML/CFT supervision, most of which obtained their licences only recently, whereas a much larger number of exchange offices (526) remain unsupervised over the same period, demonstrating a more limited supervisory coverage in that medium‑high risk sector. With regard to NBFIs, out of the 48 Factoring, 20 Leasing and 24 Financing companies (92 in total), 30 of those have not been supervised since 2021. Of those, 7 of them were established after 2022 and have limited activity. However, NBFIs are not considered high nor medium-high risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="494. When a ML/TF or associated predicate offence are suspected, the MoTF has the authority to postpone transactions for seven working days (renewable), which allows MASAK to conduct the preliminary analysis to verify the suspicion, analyse the transaction, and if necessary, disseminate it to the competent authorities for seizing purposes. Türkiye considers the postponement of transactions as a provisional measure equivalent to freezing of assets mechanism, covering a wide range of financial activities, including VASPs. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye has postponed transactions worth approximately EUR 1 138 M. 495. Within the seven days of verification, MASAK analyses all the financial information related to the persons- natural or legal- executing the transactions (originator and beneficiary), the relevant indicators of the transaction (i.e., channel used, country of origin and destination) and all related financial information. Out of 19 276 postponements of transactions, only 612 (3.2%) resulted in asset seizure. The extremely low conversion rate suggests either an excessive reliance on the postponement tool or significant shortcomings in the judicial process for authorising seizures. Although a direct comparison between these figures can represent methodological limitations, as the total number of postponed transactions may include repetitive renewals of the same operation, the conclusion is reinforced by the absence of disaggregated data across the years limits the authorities’ ability to clearly demonstrate the real ratio of postponement of transactions resulting in actual seizures or confiscations. Table 8.1. Number of postpones transactions by MASAK resulting in confiscation (2021-2025)* Year Number of postponed transactions (PT) Number of assets subject to postponed transactions (EUR)*** Number of confiscations Amount confiscated (EUR) 2021 4663 € 296,444,124.00 - 2022 2111 € 169,137,215.00 12 € 56,196.00 2023 3091 € 146,908,202.00 3 € 60,221.00 2024 4635 € 216,053,836.00 4 € 237,978.00 2025** 4776 € 309,385,966.00 9 € 1,631,097.00 Total 19276 € 1,137,929,343.00 28 € 1,985,492.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 496. Although Türkiye does not have in place other freezing mechanisms apart from the postponement of transactions and those related to the implementation of targeted financial sanctions (see IO.10), the implementation of postponement of transactions have led to seizure of assets and confiscation in some cases. For example: Box 8.1. MASAK financial detection report leads to the seizure of EUR 28 000 An STR was submitted requesting the suspension of a transaction after wallet addresses linked to him were reported as being used to transfer illegal betting proceeds. Acting on strong suspicion of ML, MASAK applied a suspension of approximately EUR 28 000. MASAK prepared a financial detection report and disseminated it to the PPOs with a seizure request. After 15 days, the public prosecutor obtained a seizure order from the Criminal Court of Peace. The public prosecutor filled an indictment requesting the confiscation of assets seven months later. Source: MASAK 497. Asset seizures are conducted in the context of a criminal investigation, and the seizure order must be issued by a judge. As the lead of investigations and prosecutions, public prosecutor instructs the relevant LEAs unit to identify and trace the property linked to the offence under investigation. Where delay is prejudicial, the public prosecutor is authorised to order the seizure directly in ML/TF cases. This decision must then be submitted to the competent judge for homologation within twenty-four hours. When immediate action is required in urgent situations, LEAs can also seize property and instrumentalities exceptionally upon a written order of the head of unit. For example, when LEAs are conducting enforcement measures (i.e., search warrants, wiretapping, etc.) and physical evidence is found on illicit proceeds of funds, they can verbally report it to the public prosecutor to secure the evidence in urgent circumstances. For this purpose, a public prosecutor is appointed for emergency calls taking 24 hours turns. The public prosecutor will then initiate the formal seizure request order to prevent the assets for being transferred and will report the seizure decision to the judge within twenty-four hours. The judge is required to decide within forty-eight hours, otherwise, the seizure shall be deemed void. 498. Following Türkiye’s asset recovery strategy, public prosecutors and LEAS have progressively included asset identification and tracing as part as their investigations strategies resulting in more request for seizure of assets during 2024-2025 (see table 8.1). LEAs do have strong co-operation and co-ordination with prosecutor as meetings prior to judicial investigations are being initiated to ensure documentation and verification of information prior proceeding to court. LEAs and prosecutors have presented a number of examples where this interagency co-operation have resulted in the detection and immediate seizure of assets. 499. At the end of an investigation, the prosecutor will request the asset confiscation to the trial judge in case there is reasonable grounds to understand that the proceeds of crime and/or assets were used or are a result of the offence under investigation. If the court finds the defendant guilty, the sanction applied will include both, the relevant sanction and the asset confiscation. If the defendant dies during the trial, proceedings continue, and the court may still order confiscation of crime proceeds and any property whose possession is inherently unlawful. Once the confiscation decision becomes final, the court forwards it to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance for enforcement, which then handles the liquidation process according to the asset type, without further court involvement. 500. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye has progressively implemented all available asset recovery tools. However, out of all the assets subject to these measures only the 13% are subject to seizures and 8.2% to confiscation which is not aligned with the country’s risk profile. This low conversion rate from provisional measures to seizure and confiscation points to deficiencies at the criminal stage of asset recovery, linked to lengthy and complex procedures required to identify assets and secure their confiscation through the court. In addition, competent authorities are not able to distinguish whether if the assets subject to any of these measures are related to criminal property or property of corresponding value, which further limits the assessment on the extent to which asset recovery measures target all type of illicit proceeds in the context of a criminal investigation. See the table below: Table 8.2. Total assets subject to postponement of transaction, seizure and confiscation (2021-2025)* Year Postponement of transactions (EUR) (***) Seizure of assets (EUR) Confiscation of assets (EUR) 2021 € 296,444,124.00 € 43,848,005.00 € 31,177,633.00 2022 € 169,137,215.00 € 23,106,615.00 € 6,133,628.00 2023 € 146,908,202.00 € 33,203,734.00 € 14,558,166.00 2024 € 216,053,836.00 € 41,543,149.00 € 36,226,217.00 2025** € 309,385,966.00 € 5,863,040.00 € 5,154,835.00 Total € 1,137,929,344.00 € 147,564,543.00 € 93,250,477.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 501. Finally, Türkiye can seize and confiscate different type of other assets as part of criminal procedures. Between 2021-2025 Türkiye has seized a total of 921 assets and confiscated 560 which is not in line with the country’s risk profile. Particularly in the number of bank accounts and immovable property being seized and confiscated. Table 8.3. Type of assets subject to seizure and confiscation (2021-2025) Type of asset Number of seizures Number of confiscations Vehicles (land, sea or air vehicles) 322 203 Bank/FIs accounts 137 69 Negotiable instruments 21 8 Balance on safe deposits box 1 1 Partnership shares 5 3 Immovable property 111 69 Other assets 320 206 All kind of rights and claim 4 1 Total 921 560 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 502. Türkiye can implement these provisional measures as result of parallel financial investigations. For example, competent authorities successfully dismantled four international criminal organisations and seized a wide range of assets, including 1575 properties, 43 cars, 1765 bank accounts, 101 kg gold, EUR 1.7 billion, among others. These actions demonstrate their capacity to disrupt ML and organised crime networks by including the seizure of assets as part of the parallel financial investigation’s strategies. 503. If deemed necessary, public prosecutors can request the MASAK to conduct financial analysis on specific cases to enrich the results of parallel financial investigations. In this context, the MoTF can apply can issue an order of postponement of transactions for MASAK to analyse the case-related transactions in a period of 7 working days (renewable). During this period, MASAK will determine if other measures such as freezing or seizing of assets should apply and report back to the public prosecutor. The large implementation of postponement of transactions (EUR 1 138 M) demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to disrupt the movement or use of illicit assets before they can be further layered or integrated into the financial system. However, as explained above, the rate of these transactions leading to seizure remains very limited. 504. Türkiye applies specific measures for smuggled goods that are seized or detained at customs due to violations of customs regulations or anti-smuggling laws, demonstrating an ascendent trend in the confiscation of goods at customs supervised areas. The DGCE leads the seizure process at CE checkpoints. Between 2021 and 2025, they seized a total of nearly EUR 3.5 billion in customs check points, represented in vehicles (8%), miscellaneous items (20%), textile products (10%), Electronics (8.4%), precious metals (30.8%), among others. Although the total number of seizures may seem aligned with the country’s risk profile, the limited number of cross-border seizure of cash (1%), weapons or ammunition (1%), fuel and other petroleum products (1%) is concerning given Türkiye’s risk and context. The final confiscation of these goods or their return to the rightful owner is determined by a court decision at the end of the prosecution process. The lack of information on how many seized goods and assets ended confiscated limits the assessment on the extent to which asset recovery measures target all type of illicit proceeds in the context of a criminal investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 436. Türkiye uses financial intelligence and other relevant financial information to a very large extent pursuing positive results when investigating and prosecuting ML, associate predicate offences and TF. This was demonstrated through several case studies where financial intelligence is being translated into concrete enforcement actions to pursue investigations and prosecutions. 437. To achieve these results, competent authorities are using various and broad range of financial intelligence and information (e.g., MASAK’s report, denunciation, public institutions information, and foreign counterparts). Between 2021 and 2025, MASAK disseminated a total of 8 150 ML and/or associated predicate offences report and a total of 31 470 TF related reports (see table 6.8) to competent authorities. The ratio of the total number ML cases opened after MASAK’s dissemination is approximately 37.5%, from which approximately 75% ends in conviction which confirms the high-level of utility of financial intelligence products. 438. Other competent authorities, have used MASAK’s financial intelligence and information reports for the following purposes: a) LEAs: start of a new research and/or investigation (68%); assessment phase (16%); ongoing research and investigation (9%); acquiring information for LEAs operational needs (7%). b) TIB: imposition of fines related to tax or other administrative matters on the persons subject to reporting (37%); opening new tax checks, audits and reviews (25%); use for further analysis on ongoing tax checks, audits and reviews (25%); filling criminal complaints against the person subject to report (11%); other (2%). c) Supervisory authorities (BRSA, CMB, CBRT, etc): opening new inspections, audits and reviews (32%); ongoing inspections, audits and reviews (8%); filling criminal complaint against the person subject to MASAK investigation (22%); imposition of administrative fines (12%) and other purposes (26%). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 439. Türkiye makes a good use of information and financial intelligence to assist and trace proceeds or instrumentalities which is progressively resulting in seizures and confiscations (see IO.8). The FIU produces specific proceeds of crime report including financial intelligence on the links between possible proceeds of crime and the assets of individuals or third parties, identify proceeds of crime that can be seized and confiscated through its analysis, and share this information with public prosecutors and judges. 440. Competent authorities have used FIU information and financial intelligence products to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value in 1 197 cases (See 8.2 and 8.3). Between 2021 and 2025, 612 cases triggered seizure of assets for a total of EUR 147 M and confiscation of assets for EUR 93 M. Furthermore, the criminal complaints of MASAK can also be considered within the scope of evidence development. In this respect, following the freezing orders, criminal complaints for TF were filed against all 1 434 individuals (see 10.1) and criminal investigations were initiated against 342 individuals for TF offence (see 9.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="137. Türkiye has a sound legal basis to provide and seek the widest possible range of MLA including extradition in relation to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Türkiye is party to several bilateral agreements, although, based on reciprocity, no agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoUs) are required to provide co-operation. Technical enhancements, such as seven specialised judicial co-operation bureaus (CADIB), the UYAP system (official and secure digital platform where all judicial proceedings and data entered by officials during judicial proceedings are recorded and can be prioritised) and roll-out of a Central Monitoring System (CMS) launched under the EU Project on Improving International Co-operation in Criminal Matters for enhancing the management and tracking of incoming and outgoing requests, improved efficiency and co-ordination to some extent since Türkiye’s 2019 MER. 138. Türkiye has also put in place supplementary guidance tools such as the Circular on the Issues to be Considered by the Judicial Authorities for the Proceedings of International Criminal Rogatory, Circular on the International Service of Documents in Criminal Matters and Circular on Issues to be Considered by Judicial Authorities on Extradition. 139. Significantly, since Türkiye’s 2019 MER, 49 foreign countries and one international organisation have deployed 138 police liaison officers in Türkiye, through whom a significant portion of operational exchanges is conducted. Türkiye also has approximately 102 counsellors stationed abroad, who similarly play an important role in seeking and providing information. Additionally, there are law enforcement officers from other countries who are posted to Türkiye; an arrangement which facilitates, inter alia, the exchange of information. Information exchange and joint operations are conducted through these liaison officers whereby “Police Co-operation Meetings” and visits have been organised to ensure the successful and effective completion of operations and to enhance success to fight against international and transnational criminal organisations. In addition, a conference is held and has been held once a year with the participation of police liaison officers, providing an opportunity to convey their requests regarding operational and law enforcement co-operation. Furthermore, Türkiye has assigned specific contact points to address or serve as a desk for incoming requests from specific countries to also help improve quality and timeliness of responses. 140. As in the 2019 MER, competent authorities are required to maintain the secrecy and confidentiality of investigations and inquiries, with information exchange being secured through established measures and in line with the jurisdiction’s legislative framework which includes the International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Law and the Turkish Criminal Procedure law. 141. Feedback from the Global Network members reflects that international co-operation with Türkiye is generally viewed as active and functional, with many countries describing co-operation as constructive and noting timely or satisfactory responses to requests. While some jurisdictions raised concerns about delays or legal and procedural hurdles - particularly in more complex judicial co-operation matters - the overall feedback indicates that positive co-operation experiences were more commonly reported. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 142. Türkiye provides MLA and extradition in accordance with a clear and comprehensive legal framework, applicable bilateral and multilateral treaties and co-operation on the basis of reciprocity. There are no legal impediments that prevent Türkiye from providing assistance in relation to ML, TF, terrorism or associated predicate offences, including for the purpose of asset recovery. Under the Directorate General for Foreign Relations and EU Affairs, the MoJ, serves as the Central Authority, within which a Bureau of MLA in Criminal Matters and a Bureau of Extradition operate. As of November 2025, the staff levels for the Bureau of MLA in Criminal Matters comprised 10 judges/experts, 1 department director, three chiefs, two statisticians and 33 clerks. While there is no evidence to suggest that this composition is inadequate for the volume of incoming requests, the Central Authority intends to conduct a review of its staffing complement in line with Türkiye’s efforts (e.g. increase in ML/TF investigations as expressed in IO.7 and IO.9). 143. During the reporting period, Türkiye’s Central Authority received a substantial volume of incoming MLA requests across a broad range of offences. As detailed in Table 2.1 below, there were over 700 incoming MLA requests between 2021–2024 [25] for ML, terrorism, TF and other major economic offences (including serious predicate offences). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA Requests from 2021-2024 Category Incoming MLA Requests Money Laundering 186 Terrorist Financing 6 Terrorism (non-TF) 96 Other major economic offences 437 Total 725 144. Of the 186 ML-related requests, 80 were fully executed, 9 partially executed, 18 rejected and 79 remained pending at the end of the period, with an average processing time of approximately 161 days, which is considered by the AT as relatively timely for more complex requests but less so for expectations regarding simpler requests. While the rejection rate is low (approximately 10% of incoming requests were denied) and refusals were grounded in clear legal or procedural reasons, there is a considerable number of pending requests (approximately 42.5% of incoming requests). Most pending requests were however under active execution rather than inactive and the volume, intricate technological nature of some of the incoming requests and countries submitting several supplementary requests, amongst other factors, place operational demands on the system, which contribute to longer than average execution times for some categories of requests, particularly ML. 145. Incoming MLA requests related to terrorism and TF are prioritised, with the average response time for execution being 7.5 months, which as noted above tends to be in the higher, longer end for more complex matters and expected for TF. Türkiye received a limited number of TF-specific MLA requests and a higher volume of terrorism-related requests. These requests benefit from dedicated prioritisation tools, specialised prosecutors and courts as well as electronic coding that flags urgency, resulting in faster execution compared to ML cases. This demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to deliver timely assistance where risks are clearly identified and prioritised and where operational arrangements enable rapid processing. 146. Türkiye does not have a mechanism to seek feedback on the assistance it rendered; however the country provided several examples and newspaper articles of the positive feedback conveyed by assisted jurisdictions. Additionally, general accounts from the Global Network reflected that Türkiye has engaged collaboratively in the information exchange process, quality responses were submitted and critical assistance was provided. Furthermore, some jurisdictions reported that Türkiye’s responses were provided in a timely manner with urgent requests being prioritised. Box 2.1 includes examples of Türkiye’s effective execution of MLA requests notwithstanding operational constraints. Box 2.1. Successful execution of mutual legal assistance despite operational constraints Case Study 1. In 2021, Country X submitted an MLA request to Türkiye seeking bank account details and transaction records related to fraud proceeds transferred to an account located in Türkiye. The request was processed and fulfilled, with all relevant information and documentation transmitted to the competent authorities in Country X, demonstrating Türkiye’s commitment to providing constructive, timely and quality assistance in line with FATF Core Issue 2.1. Notably, Country X also provided assurances regarding the protection of bona fide third parties in relation to potential seizure measures, highlighting an important safeguard in cross-border asset recovery efforts. However, the seizure request itself could not be executed due to the absence of funds in the account at the time the request was received. This case also involved procedural delays, as the request required location-related information (such as a postal or IP-related address), but the address initially provided by Country X was inaccurate. Consequently, the request had to be disseminated to Chief Public Prosecutors’ Offices across three separate jurisdictions within Türkiye, extending the response timeline. Despite these operational challenges, Türkiye proceeded to fully co-operate and provide comprehensive feedback, underscoring its adherence to international co-operation standards and good faith engagement in MLA processes. Case Study 2. The suspect was accused of hacking various companies’ information and ML, therefore the provision of documents and information was sought. Information about cryptocurrency records was also among the requested assistance. The requests were followed by supplementary requests over a period of time and after execution, authorities of the requesting country sent an email to show their appreciation. Case Study 3. The suspect was accused of murder. However, bank records constituted an important component of the request and was vital for the resolution of the case. Additionally, requested vital information and documents could not be used unless confirmed and approved by Turkish authorities. In this case, information and documents were successfully provided and the testimony of a witness, who was unable to attend trials in the requesting country, was provided via videoconference. An email from the requesting country’s authorities regarding their appreciation and importance of Türkiye’s assistance was provided. 2.1.2. Extradition 147. Extradition requests received by Türkiye are assessed and processed through a structured central authority framework led by the MoJ, with judicial determination by competent courts and the availability of appeal. The Bureau of Extradition is staffed with nine judges, one director, one deputy general director, five heads of departments, one chief clerk, 22 clerks, two statisticians and 2 archivists. Requests are examined against defined admissibility criteria, including minimum penalty thresholds, dual criminality, nationality restrictions and human-rights safeguards. Simplified extradition procedures are available and used in practice where consent is given, contributing to shorter timelines in such cases. Table 2.2 identifies the number of simplified extraditions. Table 2.2. Number of simplified extraditions (Categorised by region) Country 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Western Europe 1 4 5 Non- EU 1 2 3 Central Asia 1 1 2 Eastern Europe 1 1 2 Southeast Europe 1 1 2 Middle East 1 1 Total 1 3 2 2 7 15 148. Aside from the above simplified extraditions, during the reporting period, Türkiye received 75 incoming extradition requests related to ML, TF and terrorism offences, almost half of which were from countries with different extradition laws. As reflected in Table 2.3 , which spans 2021-2025, a limited number resulted in surrender, while a significant proportion remained pending or disposed without extradition. From the descriptions and details provided, the AT appreciated that the reasons for disposal were beyond Türkiye’s control, such as the withdrawal of an extradition request because an arrest warrant was lifted in the requesting country or the withdrawal of an extradition request because the statute of limitations for the offence had expired in the requesting country. Regarding the four rejected requests, the main grounds for refusal were legal constraints, notably the prohibition on extraditing nationals and the absence of dual criminality, which are consistent with international grounds for refusal. There is no indication that such requests were refused arbitrarily or without transparency. 149. Competent authorities report that simplified extradition procedures can result in surrender within approximately 180 days, while other requests averaged 594 days (less than twenty months), which demonstrates operational capacity in eligible cases. Pending cases remain constrained by several factors, such as, representatives raising objections in court matters. Other challenges include the requirement to locate and identify foreign nationals who enter through unofficial channels and use Türkiye to transit to other countries, lack of fixed residences or use of forged identification. Additionally, at times, Red Notices do not contain essential identity and personal information such as distinguishing features. In some cases, use of different alphabets leads to individuals being registered under different names in the Turkish system, resulting in matching difficulties. In all those instances, the fugitive status of such individuals necessitates extensive field operations to locate and identify them, given Türkiye’s wide geographic expanse. Importantly, some extradition requests related to cases where the principle of ne bis in idem clearly applied in Türkiye, as individuals sought for extradition on grounds of being a member of ISIL were already prosecuted and convicted in Türkiye for being a member of ISIL, with their sentences being executed in Türkiye. These convicts, after the execution of the penalties, can be later subject to deportation measures. Furthermore, where part of the alleged offence has been committed within the jurisdiction, investigations are initiated in Türkiye against the persons sought for extradition. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests Category Requests Received Accepted/ Surrendered Rejected Pending Withdrawn ML 28 3 1 18 6 Terrorism 42 - 2 30 10 TF 5 0 1 4 0 Total 75 3 4 52 16 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 150. Türkiye has demonstrated the capacity to enforce foreign seizure and confiscation orders and to maintain follow-up arrangements for ongoing restraint measures. Türkiye also has measures in place for the deduction or sharing of substantial or extraordinary costs associated with executing freezing, seizure, or confiscation orders. In this regard, legislation provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, costs incurred in executing a request for judicial co-operation are to be borne by the executing state (IJCL, art. 34). 151. During the reporting period, Türkiye received 82 requests relating to seizure and one for confiscation measures, of which 13 were finalised (executed or otherwise completed). In other cases, seizure or confiscation was not possible due to insufficient funds in the account, lack of causal connection, or absence of supporting documentation. Furthermore, where possible unlawful seizures arose, authorities followed provisions requiring a guarantee on allocation or reimbursement of possible damages (Criminal Procedure Law Article 141 and Law nr 6706 on International Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters article 3/3). In this regard, additional information and documentation were required from countries requesting the seizure in order to continue the proceedings. While some foreign countries acquiesced to this requirement, there were a few jurisdictions which did not. The case study in Box 2.2 is an example of Türkiye’s successful recovery of assets through co-operation at the behest of an international partner. Box 2.2. Facilitating a request for confiscation Case Study: Double (dual) Türkiye received a request from Country X to locate and seize the assets of Individual A, who was investigated for drug trafficking and ML. After Türkiye seized the assets, Country X’s court finalised its confiscation order, which Türkiye recognised and following co-operation and co-ordination to avoid double/dual enforcement, a final amount of EUR 736 650,86 was confiscated in 2024. 152. Türkiye has treaty-based mechanisms which facilitate the sharing of confiscated assets with other countries. Türkiye has entered into bilateral agreements with a number of countries—including China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, the United States and several others—which expressly allow for the sharing of confiscated proceeds resulting from judicial co-operation. In the absence of a treaty, Türkiye may still accept and act on co-operation requests on the basis of reciprocity (the analysis in c. 38.7 refers). Qualitative or quantitative information regarding the sharing of confiscated assets was unavailable, however Box 2.3 provides examples of successful repatriation of assets. Box 2.3. Confiscating and returning assets Case Study 1 On 17 February 2025, the FIU of Country X requested the suspension of a financial transaction suspected to be linked to kidnapping and aggravated fraud, after a victim, Ms. J., had been manipulated into transferring funds to Türkiye. The scheme began on 10 February 2025, when a man falsely claiming to represent a national criminal investigation authority contacted Ms. J. and persuaded her that she could assist in apprehending organised fraudsters in Türkiye by purchasing an apartment allegedly used by the criminals. The following day, a woman purporting to be from INTERPOL reinforced the deception and convinced Ms. J. that she needed to travel to Türkiye to complete the transaction. Ms. J. travelled alone to a city in Türkiye, met the suspect at a hotel and remained there until 18 February 2025, during which EUR 291 000 was transferred to an account held by a Turkish national under the suspects’ direction. Following the FIU request, MASAK imposed a seven-working-day suspension measure on 19 February 2025 to prevent dissipation of the funds. A Financial Detection Report, prepared on 24 February 2025 and submitted to the Chief Public Prosecutor, concluded that no reasonable connection could be established between the suspect’s financial profile and the transferred amount and assessed that the funds were likely proceeds of fraud. In the meantime, in March, a formal MLA request was received from Country X where the victim resides and same was evaluated and examined, in accordance with relevant legislation, by the Central Authority. In order to prevent dissipation, immediate contact was made with the FIU, as the request letter indicated suspension on the account. Subsequently, contact was made with the judicial authority which is authorised for seizure. On 14 March 2025, X City’s Court of Peace ordered the seizure of the full EUR 291 000. When the request was transmitted to the relevant judicial authority, it was discovered that the proceeds of crime had already been returned to the victim. The authorities in X country were afterwards asked if they want to proceed with their request and a letter of acceptance of conclusion and appreciation was delivered as a reply. Case Study 2: In 2021, a request was received from an EU member country —one of the countries with which Türkiye collaborates most closely in the field of legal co-operation—to carry out a search and seizure at the Turkish address of a Turkish citizen under investigation for fraud. The request was immediately forwarded to the relevant Turkish judicial authorities for the purpose of obtaining information and documents. Meanwhile, a guarantee against unlawful seizure was requested from the EU member country authorities, and once this guarantee was received, the seizure request was immediately forwarded to the relevant judicial authority. Information regarding the seized items was promptly communicated to the EU member country and the items were handed over to officials at the EU member country Embassy for examination. 153. Türkiye maintains a clear legal framework and adequate operational capacity to deliver constructive and comprehensive MLA and extradition, including in support of foreign investigations and asset recovery. Authorities execute a broad spectrum of measures—such as collecting and transmitting evidence, financial and asset information (movable and immovable), criminal records, testimony (including via videoconference), transfer of proceedings and the implementation of seizure and confiscation orders, while engaging proactively with requesting jurisdictions to clarify issues and minimise refusals or partial execution. The system demonstrates particular effectiveness in terrorism and TF cases, where prioritisation mechanisms, specialised expertise and urgency coding facilitate expedited handling. Although processing times for ML-related MLA requests can at times affect timeliness and the proportion of incoming extradition requests resulting in surrender is relatively limited, these outcomes are generally attributable to legitimate judicial, procedural and constitutional safeguards (such as the ne bis in idem principle explained above) rather than deficiencies in co-operation. Competent authorities obtain informal feedback on assistance rendered and address issues on a case-by-case basis, however the jurisdiction would benefit from performance monitoring so that any quality and timeliness issues could be proactively and appropriately addressed. Notwithstanding these moderate areas for improvement, the framework operates effectively in practice and demonstrates the provision of meaningful international co-operation. Footnotes [25] Due to an update on the UYAP informatic system and UYAP-2/3 integration, electronic capture and consolidation of statistics for 2025 was not possible." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="441. Türkiye identifies and investigates all types of ML activities, including through PFIs to a large extent. Türkiye demonstrated through case studies their ability to identify and investigate ML activities in all stages. In general, cases triggering investigations are typically related to cash deposits into bank accounts, followed by the use MVTS (licensed or unlicensed), VASPs and money mules. While layering techniques are investigated to a lesser extent, with typologies including the creation of multiple small business and companies, professional ML (i.e., through lawyers and accountants) and TBML, ultimately, the purchase of real estate and gold, and the creation of small business and enterprises are recognised as the main integration mechanisms in most ML investigations. Türkiye’s remaining challenges appear related to the detection and identification ML activities through cross-border currency movements which does not align with Türkiye’s risk profile given the country’s position as a transit hub for funds and goods, including concerning the abuse of cash-based intensive in Türkiye (see IO.1). 442. ML activities are generally identified through public prosecutors predicate offences investigations, LEAs operational work and the FIU financial analysis. Complex ML schemes are generally triggered by domestic predicate offences investigations and international requests. Türkiye identifies and investigates ML through different mechanisms, including from the dissemination of FIU reports (37,5%) (see IO.6), LEAs intelligence information, denunciation from other competent authorities, foreign counterparts’ international co-operation (see IO.2) and victims’ denunciation. 443. When ML activities are detected LEAs, intelligence units, and MASAK immediately shares the findings of suspicious laundering activities with the PPOs, who will direct the investigation ensuring a unified and co-ordinated action. As a civil law jurisdiction, the public prosecutor will lead the investigation supported by LEAs. This centralized approach enables co-ordinated inquiries into both the predicate crime and ML offences. In the metropolitan cities, Specialised ML prosecutors lead ML investigations supported by LEAS specialised units (TNP and GGC) while in the rest of the cities, investigations can be led by public prosecutors. Since 2021, public prosecutors are required to initiate parallel financial investigations after even the slightest suspicion of ML following Türkiye’s national policy on ML investigations and prosecutions and mandatory Circular issued to all Prosecutors. However, despite the growth of ML investigations and prosecutions has recently increased some challenges remain on how judicial authorities proves knowledge and intent through circumstantial evidence which negatively impacted achieving ML convictions. Prosecutors and LEAs rely on the FIU financial intelligence and analysis for complex ML cases. When needed, public prosecutors can require support to the CGC and CE, intelligence units, supervisory and regulatory authorities. 444. To gather information, collect and produce evidence, public prosecutors can request information of all natural, legal persons and competent authorities in the context of an investigation. LEAs can access basic information and beneficial owner of legal persons through various channels (i.e., MERSIS, request to MASAK and Turkish Revenue Authority (TRA) and LEAs can obtain BO information from competent authorities. Interagency request of information is hosted in the UYAP system to guarantee the confidentiality during exchanges. Investigations are co-ordinated in a robust manner combining the use of special techniques of investigations and the creation of ad hoc interagency and international joint investigations teams, when needed due to the complexity of the case. 445. Türkiye has implemented mechanisms to identify ML activities and discuss new trends at an operational level based on the NRA findings. As part of the Threat WG duties, prosecutors, LEAs, intelligence agencies, FIU and all other relevant competent authorities regularly meet to discuss ML typologies, emerging trends and specific cases to exchange knowledge, develop new ML indicators and best practices on disrupting ML activities. Since 2019, personnel from the TNP Narcotics, MASAK, foreign liaison officers, and public prosecutors have held approximately 350 meetings on investigation topics related to ML/TF. Although no specific information was provided to assess how many of these meetings were solely focused on ML specific cases, competent authorities explained they were mainly focused on drug trafficking-related ML crimes and, as a result, they issued 498 investigation orders covering 4 743 individuals and converted 129 preliminary investigations into operations which further demonstrates Türkiye’s use of solid operational interagency co-operation mechanisms. There is no information has been provided the prioritization related to fraud, high-level smuggling, and illegal betting as high-risk predicate offences. 446. To support the development of investigations, competent authorities have designed several PFIs guidance (i.e., guidance published in 2025 by different units of GGC and TNP) complemented by MASAK’s ML typologies reports for operational use (2023 and 2025). These documents are periodically updated and published, including the consolidation of case studies, best practices, and templates for interagency information sharing that LEAs have already implemented. This has led to a marked improvement in LEAs, prosecutors and MASAK staff’s awareness, which in turn resulted in a substantial increase in the number of ML investigations conducted in 2024 and 2025. Prosecutors, supported by LEAs and MASAK, use these indicators to investigate ML schemes from simple cases to complex networks involving multiple predicate offences. 447. Türkiye also has mechanisms in place to identify foreign-linked ML activities through solid channels of communication with LEAs counterparts, Interpol and Europol, as well as liaison officers (see IO.2). Türkiye’s majority of ML investigations are triggered by domestic predicate offences, including coupled with foreign elements (97%) although complex ML investigations involving professional and cross-border currency movement is more limited. The table below shows the differences between domestic ML investigations vs. those triggered by foreign counterpart requests. Table 7.1. ML investigations per triggering source (domestic vs. foreign predicates offences) Triggering source Domestic ML investigations (*) Foreign ML investigations Total investigations Ration of total ML investigations Complaints from victims 1593 46 1639 7% Referrals from other agencies 11044 319 11363 49% Ex Officio (Foreign counterparts) 4797 138 4935 21% LEAs 5100 147 5247 23% Total 22534 650 23184 100% Note: (*) Domestic ML investigation refers to cases where: (i) part of the predicate offence or the money‑laundering conduct occurs in Türkiye; or (ii) the related financial flows pass through the Turkish financial system. In both scenarios, the cases are recorded as domestic ML investigations, notwithstanding the presence of foreign elements within the iter criminis. 448. Türkiye has a robust institutional and well-resourced framework to investigate ML and predicate offences. Public prosecutors lead ML investigations supports by all LEAs, and when the specificity of the case needs it, they can request MASAK experts’ and other competent authorities for further analysis. Despite LEAs wide range of capacity and competences to support a criminal investigation, the limited numbers of investigations triggered by CE remains a concern given the country risks of cross-border currency movement, high levels of smuggling, and transnational drug trafficking. 449. PPOs operate in all 81 provinces of Türkiye independently. Each PPO is directed by a Chief Prosecutor who decides on the operational implementation of the national criminal policies designed by the MoJ. Since 2023, 15 PPOs have specialised ML Bureaus with at least one specialised ML prosecutor leading and co-ordinating ML investigations. These 15 PPOs are located in the metropolitan municipalities with the highest criminal indexes [31] where the allocation of ML specialised resources is needed. In addition, Türkiye has also implemented a prioritisation mechanism for ML cases in those remaining 10 PPOs metropolitan cities [32] where no specialised ML bureaus are established by requesting public prosecutors in charge of other units (i.e., organised crime) to prioritise ML cases at a 1/2 workload ratio, but the effectiveness of this instruction was not demonstrated.  In the remaining 145 PPOs, prosecutors manage these cases at a 1/3 workload ratio. If needed, competent authorities can open more specialised units or assign a specialised ML prosecutor on case basis. When ML prosecutors conduct independent investigations alongside ongoing predicate crime inquiries, they co-ordinate closely with the prosecutor handling the predicate offence, obtaining necessary information to complete the laundering investigation. It was not possible to distinguish how many of these prosecutors intervene in during the investigation and prosecution phases. 450. To pursue effective investigations, the public prosecutor selects the appropriate specialized LEAs unit to handle the case and co-ordinates parallel financial investigations strategies through their ML bureaus. Public prosecutors can also request several LEAs to intervene in different enforcement actions based on LEAs competences, resources and expertise to accelerate investigations and ensuring effective enforcement outcomes. a) The TNP has approximately 5 000 officials distributed within different specialised departments on investigating high and medium-high risk predicate offences. Most of them supports the implementation of enforcement actions and special techniques of investigations (i.e., control deliveries, search warrants, wiretapping, etc) in the field upon the prosecutor’s request. Although all specialised departments can produce financial intelligence and/or analysis of the proceeds of crimes, it was not possible to assess the officials’ level of expertise and effectiveness of the parallel financial investigations led by them and if they are sufficient to support the ML investigations needs. The specialised department are as follows: a. TNP KOM is present in all 81 provinces with different degrees of specialisation in combatting criminal proceeds. The department has 17 dedicated officials working in headquarters in Ankara and 293 in the provincial units. However, it is not possible to distinguish the level of expertise of the staff in the production of financial intelligence and/or if they only support operational needs in the field. b. TNP Narcotics oversees complex international investigations related to drug trafficking and the laundering of proceeds from this crime and plays a guiding and co-ordinating role in ML investigations conducted in Türkiye. Although they operate in the 81 provinces, approximately 30 officers are based in headquarters and 120 in the provinces. In addition, this department is supported by other TNP departments that conducts operations in the field in relation to ML and drug trafficking enforcement actions (i.e., control deliveries, search warrants, intelligence, etc) with approximately 3 100 officials supporting this work. In sum, a total of 3 250 officials is dedicated to ML and drug trafficking investigations, but only 5% are dedicated to the production of financial intelligence while the 95% supports operational needs in the field. c. Migrant Smuggling and Border Gates Department operates in the 81 provinces with 148 officials dedicate to ML investigations in headquarters and 151 in the remaining cities. d. Cybercrime Department (TNP Cyber) oversees cybercrime investigations and the proceeds of this crime, particularly investigating illegal betting and cyber-enabled fraud. With a total of 3 198 officials, only 198 (6%) are engaged in ML investigations. However, it was not possible to assess their level of expertise on investigating ML. e. Public Security Department assigned 202 personnel in the Criminal Proceeds Bureau Commands in headquarter and provincial units. b) The GGC organised crime unit (GGC KOM) has 1 404 officials dedicates to conduct ML investigations throughout the rural areas of the country. However, it was not possible to assess the type of support they can provide to public prosecutors. c) The CGC and CE also have responsibilities in investigating ML offences. There are 2 700 officials from the Customs Protection Unit, and 200 officials from the Coast Guard Command but it was not feasible to determine how many of them are ML experts and contributes to supporting ML investigations, limiting their ability to detect and identify cross-border currency movement, high levels of smuggling, and transnational drug trafficking. 451. TNP supports most ML investigations (95%), the GGC only supports a limited number of ML investigations (5%) given their areas of competences as the GGC operates primarily in rural areas. This difference also explains the significant difference between TNP and GGC resources assigned to ML investigations. Both agencies have demonstrated their involvement in investigating large and complex ML cases and have shown strong co-operation when predicate offences occur across both rural and urban areas. In rural regions, ML investigations linked to fraud are primarily managed by the Gendarmerie KOM and the Proceeds of Crime Bureau, while in urban areas, responsibility lies with the TNP KOM. Prosecutors generally adhere to this division of expertise but may involve additional units or form joint investigation teams when needed, for instance, combining TNP KOM with TNP Cyber for cyber-related fraud cases. TNP demonstrates broad range effectiveness of financial investigation techniques to investigate complex case that misuse shell companies’, VAs, PML and TBML. TNP also using digital forensic techniques to trace the asset through investigating social media and instant messaging, also conducting joint operation with multi-foreign counterparts (see IO.2) and requesting information to global VASPs. Other LEAs demonstrate limited extent effectiveness, particularly to investigate complex ML related to drug trafficking and smuggling which is not aligned with country’s risk profile. 452. In addition, there is a limited need for participation of other LEAs when supporting ML investigations mainly due to the scope of their work and procedural mandates. For example, the CGC prevents crimes at sea and immediately informs the competent prosecutor once the case reaches land, enabling co-ordination with TNP or the GGC. However, given the risks of cross-border currency movement and high smuggling levels, as well as transnational drug trafficking, the limited number of investigations initiated by CE and their collaboration with prosecutors remains a concern. Box 7.1. Trade-based ML investigation Sunflower case The investigation started upon a victim denunciation to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in province “A”, which led to investigation for organised aggravated fraud and ML, with foreign links. The Public prosecutor was supported by TNP KOM during the investigation phase. The investigation revealed that the criminal network was targeting businesspeople located in Middle East and European Countries under the guise of marketing sunflower seed oil to attract foreign investments. Although these companies had no registered activities, suspects working as customs brokers issued false documents and bills of lading. Even after the judicial investigation started, the organisation established a new company at the same address under a different name. The organisation’s leader, S.Y., concealed the control of these companies by registering himself as a worker while remaining the true beneficial owner. The laundering process was equally sophisticated: suspect B.A. converted funds into VAs through VASP and transferred them abroad to obscure the tracing of the proceeds, while others, like Y.K. and M.T., funnelled thousands of euros (approximately 4 100) through payment institutions to also obscure the tracing of assets. The fraud’s proceeds moved through layers of FI accounts by company managers and where then transferred to third-party owned accounts. To then been transferred to jewellers’ who purchase physical gold and luxury watches to integrate the illicit funds. Results of the investigation In 2023, simultaneous operations were launched in 5 provinces under the co-ordination of the Chief Prosecutor in province A, leading to the arrest of 49 suspects and the seizure of numerous physical and digital materials incorporated as evidence during the ongoing prosecution. A total of EUR 6 M is estimated to have been laundered by organisation, from which approximately EUR 2.5 M were seized along with 20 grams of gold, luxury brand watched, real state and luxury vehicles. 453. Prosecutors may also request information, documents, and expertise from other institutions to ensure comprehensive case handling. When conducting PFIs in complex ML cases, public prosecutors generally request MASAK to provide financial intelligence and analysis. Both LEAs and prosecutors have highlighted the quality and importance of MASAK’s reports when targeting ML networks with international connections. In addition, when the complexity of the case requires it, FIU officials has been assigned to work jointly with LEAs in the financial analysis of an investigation. Although this demonstrates a solid co-ordination among Türkiye’s operational authorities, including the robust request of financial intelligence and analysis to MASAK, this also indicates a more limited ability for LEAs to independently analyse financial information when conducting parallel financial investigations in relation to complex ML cases. 454. Türkiye investigate cases with foreign links to a large extent. However, its investigative capacity remains more limited in relation to complex ML activities involving professional, cross‑border movements, particularly those associated with drug trafficking and smuggling. Due to the robust financial information collected by the competent authorities, in case the domestic criminal activity or assets are detected within Türkiye’s borders, competent authorities use all investigations tools available to disrupt the ML activity and have demonstrated good results in disrupting organised crime structures operating in several jurisdictions. Box 7.2. ML investigation triggered by a foreign predicate offence Operation Comanchero. Operation Comanchero, launched in November 2023, was a co-ordinated operation across eight cities, led by the TNP Counter Narcotics Department with support from city A Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, MASAK, and city A Police. The operation targeted the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds and involved high-profile suspects: nine individuals wanted internationally under INTERPOL Red Notices and another nine under Blue Notices. These suspects were linked to serious crimes, including drug trafficking, organised crime, money laundering, obstruction of justice, armed robbery, arson, and even murder. The criminal organisation was led by Mr. A, a double national (Turkish and Australian) who was listed in Australia’s most-wanted list. The ML investigation was triggered by open-source research initiated by MASAK (FIU) upon an EGMONT request on the links between the international motorcycle gang “Comanchero” and their business in Türkiye. The financial intelligence and analysis conducted by the FIU revealed that majority of proceeds from drug trafficking were deposited into the banking system as cash (in foreign currencies or as gold coins) and were used for purchasing properties and motor vehicles, transferred for funding shell companies or individuals. They also transferred funds through VASP. Moreover, some of the organisations where only involved in the provision of technical assistance in the laundering process as professional launderers (lawyer, financial consultant). MASAK disseminated a financial analysis report (FAR) to city A Chief Public Prosecutor Office, city A Police and the TNP Counter Narcotics Department, including the financial profile of 55 individuals and 22 companies. To deepen the investigation, a Joint Investigation Team was established, comprising inspectors from the Social Security Agency, Tax Inspection Board, Customs, and FIU experts. Their mandate was to uncover links between suspects and companies, analyse digital evidence, and identify laundering activities. These efforts revealed a broader financial network, significantly expanding the scope of the investigation. In parallel with the financial investigation, authorities uncovered strong connections to large-scale drug trafficking operations. Australian and Turkish judicial authorities held five co-ordination meetings, and a formal request was made to transfer the lawsuit related to the predicate offence tied to the Australian “Comanchero” operation. The information exchanges have been made with 25 countries, Evidence revealed that the criminal organisation, led by Mr. A, orchestrated the transport of drugs sourced from Türkiye and South America to destinations including Australia, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong, China, using transit routes through South Korea and South Africa. Between 2018- 2021, LEAs seized approximately 4 000 kilograms of narcotics—cocaine, methamphetamine, and ecstasy—linked to this network, underscoring the transnational scale and severity of the underlying criminal activity. Results of the Investigation Assets pertaining to 55 people including professional launderers and domestically or internationally wanted persons were seized and 44 people were arrested by the decision of city A 3rd Criminal Court of Peace. The prosecution is ongoing. i Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 455. Türkiye progressively incremented the number of ML investigations since its last MER in 2019. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye opened approximately 23 184 ML investigations, with a significant surge in 2024 (33%) and 2025 (43%). However, given Türkiye’s contextual and material factors (i.e., size of the financial sector, geographical position as a transit hub, the extent of cash based, and size of informal economy), ML investigations, prosecutions, and convictions in high-risk areas other than fraud (i.e., professional, misuse of legal person, and cross-border movement) (see IO.1) is more limited. 456. Fraud (including aggravated fraud) is the most relevant predicate offences of ML with total 16 586 cases (80%), followed by a low number of investigation in other high and medium risk predicate offences, such as illegal betting with 1 428 (7%), drug trafficking with 1 267 cases (13%), customs smuggling with 590 cases (3%) which is not aligned with the country’s risk profile. Table 7.2. ML investigation files (2021-2025)* Year ML Files Suspects Offences charged 2021 514 2168 2595 2022 1585 5335 6541 2023 3469 8969 10662 2024 7700 14650 16601 2025** 9916 18531 22930 Total 23184 49653 59329 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 457. Türkiye identifies different type of ML activity while conducting investigations, being self-laundering (48%) and third-party money laundering (35%) the most predominant ones in line with the country risk profile, including effective stand-alone ML related to illegal betting. However, the reviewed case studies demonstrate a limited extent of stand‑alone ML investigations related to fraud and other predicate offences, notwithstanding the country’s risk profile as a hub or destination for the transfer of proceeds of crime derived from foreign predicate offences. Table 7.3. ML investigations disaggregated per type of ML offence (2021-2025)* Year Third-party ML Self-laundering Self-laundering and third-party ML Foreign predicate offence Total investigations/year 2021 856 1373 316 50 2595 2022 3060 2740 516 225 6541 2023 3865 5817 744 236 10662 2024 2973 3908 2504 72 9457 2025** 3554 5359 2558 67 11538 Total 14308 19197 6638 650 40793 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 458. Türkiye demonstrates positive development on numerous complex ML and transnational cases, except ML activities that involve professional ML and cross-border currency movement, which resulted in numerous arrests, disruption of large networks. Notwithstanding the robust international co-operation, competent authorities face challenges to secure and recover assets located abroad (see IO.8). Despite these efforts, improvements in investigations involving cross border cash movement, unlicensed intermediaries (i.e., hawala, foreign exchanges), and misuse of legal persons that include facilitation by accounting and legal professionals are also needed. Although fraud, drug trafficking, and smuggling are assessed as high or medium-risk predicate offences, public prosecutors and LEAs face challenges in tracing crime proceeds due to limited understanding of complex laundering methods such as cash smuggling, professional money laundering networks, hawala, and foreign exchange operations. This gap is particularly significant given Türkiye’s role as a transit hub for global financial flows (see IO.1). Footnotes [31] Ankara, Antalya, Adana, Bakırköy, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Istanbul Anatolia, Izmir, Kayseri, Konya, Küçükçekmece, Mersin and Şanlıurfa. [32] Batı, Denizli, Eskişehir, Gebze, Karşıyaka, Kocaeli, Mardin, Sakarya, Van, Büyükçekmece." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="212. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit have a generally strong understanding of the ML risks they are exposed to. The main identified ML threats for the highest risk sectors (banks, VASPS, and MVTS, and to a lesser extent exchange offices) are in line with the main predicate offences of the NRA, namely fraud, illegal betting and gambling. Understanding of TF risks is more uneven, while banks (representing more than 75% of the sector) have a good understanding, other FIs and VASPs have a more limited understanding, mainly considering TF risks in the scope of targeted financial sanctions. Also, the low levels of TF STR reporting across several other higher-risk sectors - particularly MVTS, exchange offices, and VASPs - indicate an uneven understanding of TF risks. 213. Representatives of the Turkish banking sector met during the onsite demonstrated a good understanding of specific ML/TF risks their institution is exposed to, as well as related mitigation measures. This understanding has been supported by the work conducted by the Risk Analysis WG, gathering competent authorities and representatives of the private sector (see above) including the banks association of Türkiye. The WG identified inherent risks across almost forty distinct products and services and the related mitigated measures adopted by banks. This also supports the implementation of a risk-based approach by banks, while higher-risk products (e.g., third-party payments, cardless transactions, banking services for VASPs and payment institutions) receive more intensive measures, lower-risk are subject to fewer controls. 214. VASPs met during the onsite despite their more recent entry in the market, also demonstrated an overall solid understanding of their ML risks. There was some variation in the depth of understanding, with larger and more established entities demonstrating a more comprehensive grasp compared to smaller and recently established ones. The differences were more pronounced for TF risks, with the larger entity identifying those while others having a much more limited understanding, which is somehow concerning, considering the sector high exposure. 215. Among other FIs, understanding of ML risks is uneven. Across sector, larger institutions generally have a deeper understanding of these risks while others focus on risk mitigation measures rather than the inherent risks their sector and institution are exposed to. The fact that all institutions were able to describe risk mitigation measures indicates a general awareness of ML threats even if not always articulated as such by FIs representatives. 216. The understanding of TF risk among FIs – except for banks - is more limited and mainly considered within the scope of targeted financial sanctions. Banks, which represent the largest and most materially significant part of the financial system, demonstrated a generally more developed understanding of TF risks. This is more concerning for MVTS and exchange offices. While TF risk exposure may vary across entities depending on size, business models and products offered, TF‑related vulnerabilities identified in these sectors in Türkiye’s context, and the uneven understanding of TF risks observed during on‑site discussions, increase their susceptibility to misuse. This concern is further supported by the NRA, which recognises TF risks in both the exchange office and MVTS sectors, including cases where terrorist organisations have abused these sectors. Competent authorities indicated that, while such cases exist, they are limited in number. MASAK has undertaken a range of initiatives in recent years to strengthen the private sector’s understanding of TF risks—including workshops, updated guidance documents and TF typologies. However, these measures have not yet translated into a corresponding improvement in the practical understanding of TF risks among FIs, except for banks, and some larger VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 188. Türkiye has established a comprehensive framework for the licensing of all FIs based on an effective multi-tier licensing system. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, and sectoral supervisors access a wide range of information to perform effective market entry controls to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the market. Authorities also conduct checks after the license has been granted as part of their supervisory activities. For VASPs, a solid regulatory framework has recently come into force but is still being implemented. Fit-and-proper checks were at an advanced stage at the time of the onsite, but had not yet been completed. 189. Market entry controls are carried out by sectoral supervisor for each relevant sector. All FIs and VASPs are required to be licensed and registered by competent authorities through a multiple stages licensing process consisting of two main steps: an establishment permit and an operating permit. 190. During the establishment phase, FIs must be established as joint-stock companies, with contracts of incorporation, and they must meet certain conditions such as capital requirement. Fit &amp; proper requirements also apply to the founding partners, shareholders above 10% or persons having ultimate control over the FI, which require that those individuals should not have been convicted of any crime including those related to capital market and have sufficient financial strength and professional competency. The shareholding structure is required to be transparent and as joint-stock companies, FIs are required to file their BO information to the TRA. 191. In most cases, this initial phase includes a physical meeting between the sectoral supervisor and the applicant, allowing to further inquire on fit and proper requirements as well as better understand the objectives and business model of the applicant. In cases where the conditions, qualifications and competencies required for obtaining the permits are not met, applications are halted at this initial stage, including if founding partners, ownership structures or business model are deemed unsuitable. Most rejections of applications happen at this initial stage, with candidates also withdrawing their applications before a negative decision is made. 192. The licensing process is supported by extensive inter-agency co-operation. Supervisors obtain information from multiple sources (open-source media, sanctions screening) and there is strong co-operation with other competent authorities to access more sensitive information (criminal records, etc). When needed, additional information is also requested to foreign competent authorities, particularly in relation to foreign ownership applications. Sectoral supervisors obtain BO information indirectly through the TRA or other competent authorities, whereas MASAK and the TIB have direct access to the BO Registry. The TIB may also carry out AML/CFT supervisory tasks, in addition to its tax inspection activities. The supervisors demonstrated a sound understanding of the concept of BO taking into consideration that a partner owing less than 10% of the share could actually be the BO via appointment rights of privileged shares. 193. Based on its licensing process, Türkiye has a high level of rejection of applications in all FIs sectors with the exception of the banking sector. Authorities explain that this is due to the thoroughness of the establishment permit phase especially for banks, where applicants prefer to withdraw their applications if shortcomings are identified at this early stage. The high number of rejections in the EO sector is explained by a legislative change in 2024 leading to enhanced requirements, as this led authorities to reject all applications in the sector for this year and reconsidering them the following year. For precious metal intermediaries, financial liability shortcomings is the main reason for rejecting licenses. Table 3.1. Licensing of FIs and VASPs (2020-2025) Institutions Approved Rejected Cancelled / Suspended Overall number of FIs Banks 33 0 1 63 Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFIs) 60 21 21 124 MVTS 42 15 7 89 Capital Market Sector 115 46 4 205 VASPs 98 76 0 58 Insurance 31 20 6 73 EO 94 123 41 773 Precious Metals Intermediary 33 74 24 46 194. VASPs were brought within the scope of obliged entities under the AML/CFT framework in 2021. However, it was not until March 2025, that Türkiye established a robust licensing process for VASPs, similar as for other FIs. Before that, there were no comprehensive entry controls, including fit‑and‑proper and ownership checks. At the time of the on‑site visit, the fit‑and‑proper assessments were well advanced but had not yet been finalised; moreover, the broader licensing process, including other entry controls, was still ongoing. As none of the fit and proper assessments had been finalised and no VASP licences had been granted by the end of the on‑site visit, the assessment team could not assess its effectiveness at that stage. CMB is applying enhanced measures at market entry due to the high ML/TF risks associated with VASPs in Türkiye. All VASPs willing to continue operating in Türkiye had to reapply by mid-2025 in line with the newly introduced requirements. Consequently, none of the VASPs is yet obliged to comply with the new, stricter regulatory framework. Those that did not reapply will have to cease their activities by the end of 2025 while the remaining ones have been granted a transition period to comply with the new requirements by June 2026. As a result, the overall number of VASPs operating in Türkiye has already decreased from 88 in 2024 to 58 currently, all waiting to be licensed. All foreign VASPs willing to operate in Türkiye must establish a branch or subsidiary that is subject to the fit and proper requirements described above. Foreign legal and natural persons involved in the ownership or management structure of a VASP are subject to stringent controls. The CMB built upon its experience of licensing capital intermediaries’ institutions to initiate the licensing process to VASPs while ensuring its staff and procedures were adapted to the challenges brought by those new actors. In addition to fit and proper requirements on founders and managers, CMB supervisors are supported by specialists from Türkiye’s national scientific and technologic agency (TUBITAK) to test the IT systems before delivering the operational permit. 195. Sectoral supervisors maintain active monitoring of fit and proper requirements following the licensing process. This ongoing monitoring also applies to VASPs after the completion of the licensing process and the granting of a licence. By law, any change in the ownership structure involving 10% or more of the share has to be declared to the supervisor. The partnership and ownership structures are also part of the elements review during the supervision activities conducted by both prudential supervisors and MASAK in the scope of its AML/CFT monitoring activities. Sectoral supervisors can also attend annual FIs board meeting. In the EO sector, monitoring is applied to newly licensed entities after 90 days. Entities have to provide camera footage for the GDFMFE to review if the activity is indeed conducted by the individuals declared as holding management functions. Box 3.1. Fit &amp; proper requirements case studies Case 1 - BO : In 2020, an investigation was conducted into a company owned by two individuals named X and Y on suspicion of unauthorised activity, and it was determined that this company was providing unauthorised payment services. A complaint was filed with the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office against the company and its shareholders, and legal proceedings were initiated. While the legal proceedings were ongoing, in 2021, during an application for an activity licence, it was determined that the applicant company had a sole shareholder, whose spouse was X, and that one of the companies from which the applicant company planned to receive services was another company owned by Y. The application was rejected on the grounds that the shareholder of the applicant company was not the beneficial owner and that his spouse, X, and Y were acting fraudulently to conceal the beneficial owner. Case 2 – Foreign individual : A foreign national, Mr. A submitted an application to the Capital Markets Board requesting a licence to establish an intermediary institution under the trade name “XXX A.Ş.” It was envisaged that the company to be established would have a capital of approx. EUR 10M and that all of its shares (100%) would be owned by Mr. A. In the scope of the examination of the application, opinions were obtained from other public institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Mr. A was a political figure with tied relation in Country A and that he had contacts with persons considered as terrorists by Country B, and that he was involved in smuggling oil smuggling through fake contracts. BRSA also stated that Mr. A was a founding partner of an asset management company and the operating licence of that company was revoked on the grounds that Mr. A had lost the founding conditions. Taking this into account, it was concluded that MR A did not meet the fit and proper requirements and therefore the license to establish XXX A.Ş. was rejected by CMB. Case 3 – monitoring requirements : The CMB filed a criminal complaint against Mr. E for “improper public offer and unauthorised capital market activity” (Law 6362, art. 109/2). Mr. E, an indirect shareholder of Investment Firm YYY A.Ş. and also chairman of its board of directors, holds 100% of the shares in BBB Investment Holding A.Ş., through which he indirectly owns 100% of YYY A.Ş. Following his conviction, Mr. E lost the condition that founding partners must not have a final conviction for the offences specified in the CMB Law. Therefore, the CMB took a measure regarding both the shareholding structure (granting the investment firm a 3-month period to ensure that Mr. E’s indirect shares were transferred to persons who meet the legal requirements) and the board membership (removing Mr. E from his position as a member of the board of directors of Investment Firm YYY A.Ş). 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 196. Türkiye detects unlicensed FIs activities to a large extent and measures are taken when those are identified. Overall, authorities demonstrated a co-ordinated approach combining preventive, supervisory, and enforcement actions, contributing positively to the effectiveness in detecting unlicensed activities. Identification is allowed through various channels such as denunciation mechanisms open to public, LEAs, tax inspections, notifications from other supervisory authorities and social media monitoring. 197. After their detection, persons engaging in unlicensed activities are sanctioned in accordance with the respective legislation, either leading to administrative sanctions or to judicial proceedings depending on the qualification of the offence (see below table). Acting as an FI without a licence is an offence, but some cases relate more to fraud than carrying out unlicensed FI activity. Supervisory authorities are also entitled to act accordingly to stop the unlicensed activity and deliver administrative fines. Table 3.2. Judicial actions undertaken for unlicensed activities (2020 – 2025) Institutions Investigations Prosecutions Convictions Files Persons Files Persons Files Persons Banks 183 282 85 126 8 10 NBFIs 43 88 19 45 8 26 MVTSs 1 301 2 732 653 1 166 169 248 Capital Market Sector 439 1 247 74 305 70 106 Insurance 159 222 42 66 10 12 198. CMB established a dedicated unit in charge of monitoring VASPs licensing as well as examining complaints received from the public on illegal activities. So far, 132 complaints have been processed leading to the referral of 10 actors to the PPO. By the end of the onsite, no sanctions had been imposed against unlicensed VASP activities. However, CMB also blocks access to the websites of unlicensed VASPs, which forms part of its efforts to prevent illegal operations. Due to VASPs being a newly supervised entities, CMB, is still developing its understanding of VASPs business models, operational techniques, and risk profiles. This learning curve may affect the ability to fully identify unlicensed VASPs activities and emerging risks. Strengthening co-operation with LEAs and other competent authorities would further enhance detection capabilities and support effective enforcement. 199. Authorities have identified and taken remedial actions against unlicensed MVTS to a large extent with a significant increase in the number of cases detected, investigated and prosecuted over the reporting period. This highlights enhanced efforts by competent authorities to address unlicensed MVTS activities, including hawala– illegal in Türkiye- which have been resorted to in ML/TF cases in Türkiye (see IO.7). However, gaps remain in identifying the full scope of such unlicensed operators. In particular, authorities may not consistently recognise cases where entities licensed for other activities (e.g., as DPMS or cargo operators) also engage in unlicensed MVTS. Information collected by other authorities about these mixed-activity entities is also not always effectively shared with CBRT, which may impact its ability to fully detect unlicensed actors. 200. As mentioned above, authorities strengthened in 2024 their requirements for licensing and monitoring exchange offices. More than 100 companies were asked to submit camera footage to verify operations and detect wrong doings. This process, that will be repeated annually, has led to an enhanced detection of wrongdoings of exchange offices in 2025 and the allocation of fines. Table 3.3. Actions undertaken against unlicensed exchange offices Year Closure of workplace Total amount of admin fine (EUR) Temporary Permanent 2021 53 19 204 000 2022 97 23 192 000 2023 72 23 336 000 2024 145 48 1 163 000 2025* 116 18 480 000 Total 483 131 2 375 000 Note: *until November 2025. Box 3.2. Unlicensed activities cases study Case 1 : BRSA received information through various channels, alleging that a company established in Country A under the name XXX Bank is providing banking services by claiming to be a branch of a bank in Istanbul, posting information and announcements on its website, making efforts to acquire customers, and issuing a letter of guarantee. First, the relevant counterpart authority in Country A was contacted to request information on whether there was a bank operating under this name in their country, and it was confirmed that no such bank was established. As it was determined that the activities of XXX Bank could constitute the “crime of unauthorised activity”, BRSA submitted the case to the PPO, also requesting to suspend the activities, advertisements, website, and, if applicable, the operations of any branches of XXX Bank, and block access to its website. This was obtained and the prosecution regarding the case is ongoing. Case 2 : In a complaint/notification submitted to CMB through the Presidential Communication Center, it was alleged that virtual asset service provider activities were being conducted through a website ABCD. In this case, it was found that activities of the website ABCD were directed towards persons resident in Türkiye while ABCD did not have any established activity in the country as required by law. The necessary legal procedures for blocking access to the ABCD were undertaken. In addition, during the review of the website ABCD, it has also been determined that the domain name service provider was acquired by an individual named X. When approached by authorities, X claimed that individuals were using his identity to conduct their illegal activities which was confirmed following further investigation. Upon reviewing the payment information related to the purchase of the ABCD domain, it was determined that the payment had not been made by X, but instead by two individuals named YY and ZZ who are currently under investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="494. When a ML/TF or associated predicate offence are suspected, the MoTF has the authority to postpone transactions for seven working days (renewable), which allows MASAK to conduct the preliminary analysis to verify the suspicion, analyse the transaction, and if necessary, disseminate it to the competent authorities for seizing purposes. Türkiye considers the postponement of transactions as a provisional measure equivalent to freezing of assets mechanism, covering a wide range of financial activities, including VASPs. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye has postponed transactions worth approximately EUR 1 138 M. 495. Within the seven days of verification, MASAK analyses all the financial information related to the persons- natural or legal- executing the transactions (originator and beneficiary), the relevant indicators of the transaction (i.e., channel used, country of origin and destination) and all related financial information. Out of 19 276 postponements of transactions, only 612 (3.2%) resulted in asset seizure. The extremely low conversion rate suggests either an excessive reliance on the postponement tool or significant shortcomings in the judicial process for authorising seizures. Although a direct comparison between these figures can represent methodological limitations, as the total number of postponed transactions may include repetitive renewals of the same operation, the conclusion is reinforced by the absence of disaggregated data across the years limits the authorities’ ability to clearly demonstrate the real ratio of postponement of transactions resulting in actual seizures or confiscations. Table 8.1. Number of postpones transactions by MASAK resulting in confiscation (2021-2025)* Year Number of postponed transactions (PT) Number of assets subject to postponed transactions (EUR)*** Number of confiscations Amount confiscated (EUR) 2021 4663 € 296,444,124.00 - 2022 2111 € 169,137,215.00 12 € 56,196.00 2023 3091 € 146,908,202.00 3 € 60,221.00 2024 4635 € 216,053,836.00 4 € 237,978.00 2025** 4776 € 309,385,966.00 9 € 1,631,097.00 Total 19276 € 1,137,929,343.00 28 € 1,985,492.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 496. Although Türkiye does not have in place other freezing mechanisms apart from the postponement of transactions and those related to the implementation of targeted financial sanctions (see IO.10), the implementation of postponement of transactions have led to seizure of assets and confiscation in some cases. For example: Box 8.1. MASAK financial detection report leads to the seizure of EUR 28 000 An STR was submitted requesting the suspension of a transaction after wallet addresses linked to him were reported as being used to transfer illegal betting proceeds. Acting on strong suspicion of ML, MASAK applied a suspension of approximately EUR 28 000. MASAK prepared a financial detection report and disseminated it to the PPOs with a seizure request. After 15 days, the public prosecutor obtained a seizure order from the Criminal Court of Peace. The public prosecutor filled an indictment requesting the confiscation of assets seven months later. Source: MASAK 497. Asset seizures are conducted in the context of a criminal investigation, and the seizure order must be issued by a judge. As the lead of investigations and prosecutions, public prosecutor instructs the relevant LEAs unit to identify and trace the property linked to the offence under investigation. Where delay is prejudicial, the public prosecutor is authorised to order the seizure directly in ML/TF cases. This decision must then be submitted to the competent judge for homologation within twenty-four hours. When immediate action is required in urgent situations, LEAs can also seize property and instrumentalities exceptionally upon a written order of the head of unit. For example, when LEAs are conducting enforcement measures (i.e., search warrants, wiretapping, etc.) and physical evidence is found on illicit proceeds of funds, they can verbally report it to the public prosecutor to secure the evidence in urgent circumstances. For this purpose, a public prosecutor is appointed for emergency calls taking 24 hours turns. The public prosecutor will then initiate the formal seizure request order to prevent the assets for being transferred and will report the seizure decision to the judge within twenty-four hours. The judge is required to decide within forty-eight hours, otherwise, the seizure shall be deemed void. 498. Following Türkiye’s asset recovery strategy, public prosecutors and LEAS have progressively included asset identification and tracing as part as their investigations strategies resulting in more request for seizure of assets during 2024-2025 (see table 8.1). LEAs do have strong co-operation and co-ordination with prosecutor as meetings prior to judicial investigations are being initiated to ensure documentation and verification of information prior proceeding to court. LEAs and prosecutors have presented a number of examples where this interagency co-operation have resulted in the detection and immediate seizure of assets. 499. At the end of an investigation, the prosecutor will request the asset confiscation to the trial judge in case there is reasonable grounds to understand that the proceeds of crime and/or assets were used or are a result of the offence under investigation. If the court finds the defendant guilty, the sanction applied will include both, the relevant sanction and the asset confiscation. If the defendant dies during the trial, proceedings continue, and the court may still order confiscation of crime proceeds and any property whose possession is inherently unlawful. Once the confiscation decision becomes final, the court forwards it to the Ministry of Treasury and Finance for enforcement, which then handles the liquidation process according to the asset type, without further court involvement. 500. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye has progressively implemented all available asset recovery tools. However, out of all the assets subject to these measures only the 13% are subject to seizures and 8.2% to confiscation which is not aligned with the country’s risk profile. This low conversion rate from provisional measures to seizure and confiscation points to deficiencies at the criminal stage of asset recovery, linked to lengthy and complex procedures required to identify assets and secure their confiscation through the court. In addition, competent authorities are not able to distinguish whether if the assets subject to any of these measures are related to criminal property or property of corresponding value, which further limits the assessment on the extent to which asset recovery measures target all type of illicit proceeds in the context of a criminal investigation. See the table below: Table 8.2. Total assets subject to postponement of transaction, seizure and confiscation (2021-2025)* Year Postponement of transactions (EUR) (***) Seizure of assets (EUR) Confiscation of assets (EUR) 2021 € 296,444,124.00 € 43,848,005.00 € 31,177,633.00 2022 € 169,137,215.00 € 23,106,615.00 € 6,133,628.00 2023 € 146,908,202.00 € 33,203,734.00 € 14,558,166.00 2024 € 216,053,836.00 € 41,543,149.00 € 36,226,217.00 2025** € 309,385,966.00 € 5,863,040.00 € 5,154,835.00 Total € 1,137,929,344.00 € 147,564,543.00 € 93,250,477.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 501. Finally, Türkiye can seize and confiscate different type of other assets as part of criminal procedures. Between 2021-2025 Türkiye has seized a total of 921 assets and confiscated 560 which is not in line with the country’s risk profile. Particularly in the number of bank accounts and immovable property being seized and confiscated. Table 8.3. Type of assets subject to seizure and confiscation (2021-2025) Type of asset Number of seizures Number of confiscations Vehicles (land, sea or air vehicles) 322 203 Bank/FIs accounts 137 69 Negotiable instruments 21 8 Balance on safe deposits box 1 1 Partnership shares 5 3 Immovable property 111 69 Other assets 320 206 All kind of rights and claim 4 1 Total 921 560 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 502. Türkiye can implement these provisional measures as result of parallel financial investigations. For example, competent authorities successfully dismantled four international criminal organisations and seized a wide range of assets, including 1575 properties, 43 cars, 1765 bank accounts, 101 kg gold, EUR 1.7 billion, among others. These actions demonstrate their capacity to disrupt ML and organised crime networks by including the seizure of assets as part of the parallel financial investigation’s strategies. 503. If deemed necessary, public prosecutors can request the MASAK to conduct financial analysis on specific cases to enrich the results of parallel financial investigations. In this context, the MoTF can apply can issue an order of postponement of transactions for MASAK to analyse the case-related transactions in a period of 7 working days (renewable). During this period, MASAK will determine if other measures such as freezing or seizing of assets should apply and report back to the public prosecutor. The large implementation of postponement of transactions (EUR 1 138 M) demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to disrupt the movement or use of illicit assets before they can be further layered or integrated into the financial system. However, as explained above, the rate of these transactions leading to seizure remains very limited. 504. Türkiye applies specific measures for smuggled goods that are seized or detained at customs due to violations of customs regulations or anti-smuggling laws, demonstrating an ascendent trend in the confiscation of goods at customs supervised areas. The DGCE leads the seizure process at CE checkpoints. Between 2021 and 2025, they seized a total of nearly EUR 3.5 billion in customs check points, represented in vehicles (8%), miscellaneous items (20%), textile products (10%), Electronics (8.4%), precious metals (30.8%), among others. Although the total number of seizures may seem aligned with the country’s risk profile, the limited number of cross-border seizure of cash (1%), weapons or ammunition (1%), fuel and other petroleum products (1%) is concerning given Türkiye’s risk and context. The final confiscation of these goods or their return to the rightful owner is determined by a court decision at the end of the prosecution process. The lack of information on how many seized goods and assets ended confiscated limits the assessment on the extent to which asset recovery measures target all type of illicit proceeds in the context of a criminal investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="637. Türkiye has a similar mechanism for the implementation of PF and TF TFS which ensures implementation without delay to some extent but does not ensure application without delay in a consistent manner (see IO.10). TFS pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and pursuant to UNSCR 1737 and its successor resolutions are not immediately enforceable in Türkiye upon UN designation. While the process has allowed for the implementation of TFS without delay, it takes on average two and a half days for TFS to be enforceable in Türkiye. The time required for the UN listing decision to be transposed into domestic law impedes Türkiye’s ability to implement TFS without delay. The mechanism described under IO.10 to address to some extent delay in domestic transposition does not apply for PF TFS (see Rec 7). 638. Türkiye has been applying PF related TFS on DPRK and Iran since 2021 and has listed individuals and entities accordingly, in line with relevant UNSCRs and the FATF Standards for the vast majority of the reporting period. As of the end of the onsite visit, Türkiye has listed individuals and entities included in UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and in UNSCR 1737 and its successor resolutions. However, at the end of the onsite visit, individuals and entities pursuant to the 1737 were listed in Türkiye within the scope of UNSCR 2231 which no longer provides for the implementation of TFS since the triggering of the snapback mechanism on 27 September 2025 [43] . 639. As described under Recommendation 7, Türkiye’s legal framework for the implementation of PF TFS is composed of a Law, Regulation and Presidential Decrees. The PF Law (7262) provides for a legal basis on the application of TFS on UNSC resolutions “on the sanctions for countering the financing of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons” without a reference to specific UNSCRs to be able to include all relevant UNSCRs. The principles and procedures of the PF Law are further defined in a Regulation (RoPF) and the implementation of PF related TFS through the adoption of Presidential Decrees. 640. The RoPF identifies UNSCR 1718 (2006) and successive resolutions and UNSCR 2231 (2015) and successive resolutions as the two regimes for the implementation of PF related TFS. In line with the RoPF, Türkiye has adopted and gazetted ten Presidential Decrees since 2021 for the implementation of PF related TFS. Among those, three Presidential Decrees- respectively adopted in February 2021, August 2022 and October 2025 – are adding individuals and entities on the domestic list, while the seven remaining Presidential Decrees updated the information of persons and entities on the list. Those Presidential Decrees explicitly mention that they are implementing PF related TFS in the scope of UNSCR 1718 and successor resolutions and of UNSCR 2231. 641. For PF related TFS on Iran, UNSCR 2231 does no longer provide for the implementation of TFS since the triggering of the snapback mechanism of UNSCR 2231. At the end of the onsite visit, Türkiye had not amended the RoPF nor the Presidential Decrees to implement TFS on the basis of UNSCR 1737 and successor resolutions. While Türkiye had been implementing PF related TFS since 2021 and during a large part of the reporting period, at the end of the onsite visit, despite the listing of individuals and entities, it could not be considered that Türkiye was implementing PF related TFS on Iran in line with the relevant UNSCRs nor with the FATF Standards since 27 September 2025. Footnotes [43] In line with the process set forward in paragraphs 11 and 12 of UNSCR 2231 (the Snapback Mechanism), all provisions of UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929 that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 of UNSCR 2231 shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of UNSCR 2231 on 20 July 2015. Four of these six UNSCRs - 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 (collectively referred to as the Iran TFS UNSCRs) - identify targeted financial sanctions that, in accordance with FATF Recommendation 7, must be applied. The obligation to implement those targeted financial sanctions was effective immediately for all UN Member States on 27 September at 8:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time. See FATF/PLEN(2025)71 ." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="568. Türkiye has a well-developed domestic CT/CFT strategy, with structured inter-agency mechanisms and policy documents. TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions inform the broader national CT Strategy and operational priorities, including typologies such as VAs, hawala, and the use of digital platforms for TF purposes. The National Security Council (MGK) and the National Security Policy Document (MGSB) set high-level threat perceptions, including PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, FETÖ, ISIL and AQ. The Strategy Document on CFT, the Strategy Document 2021–2025 and the 2025 NRA provide a comprehensive framework for TF risk management, albeit with strong limitations where risks linked to non-UNSC and non-domestically designated organisations are assessed as not significant without detailed analysis. Competent authorities also analyse TF cases and update typology guides, STR guidance and sector-specific instructions. 9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 569. Türkiye demonstrates that TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions directly inform the formulation and updating of national CT/CFT strategies, through a structured bottom-up mechanism. Operational findings are systematically channelled into strategic documents, including the AML/CFT Strategy, the TF NRA, and the Strategy Document on CFT. 570. The core analytical contribution stems from the integration of operational casework into strategic decision-making. Türkiye provided multiple examples demonstrating that empirical findings from TF cases trigger concrete strategic adjustments, including: a) reclassification of sectors (e.g. jewellery sector upgraded to high-risk following its use as a financial conduit in ISIL-related cases) b) identification of emerging high-risk areas (e.g. VASPs, based on cases involving privacy coins and cross-border wallet structures) c) introduction of regulatory measures (e.g. MASAK Communiqué No. 29 imposing enhanced due diligence and stablecoin restrictions) d) expansion of the scope of obliged entities (e.g. inclusion of e-commerce platforms following TF abuse cases linked to FETÖ); and e) prioritisation of cross-border risks and designation proposals, informed by international co-operation and financial intelligence. 571. In addition, typology development and guidance updates are derived from case outcomes, including the TF Typology Guide, sector-specific guidelines, and STR indicators. These outputs are regularly updated (most recently in 2025) and disseminated across competent authorities. These elements indicate that Türkiye effectively incorporates operational lessons into strategic frameworks, ensuring that national CT/CFT strategies remain responsive to evolving TF risks. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 572. TF investigation outputs are embedded in domestic CT/CFT strategies, supported by interagency co-ordination (e.g., Threat WG) and data integration into the NRA. The findings derived from investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing in TF-related cases constitute an important foundation for shaping Türkiye’s TF and broader CT strategies and action plans. 573. Investigations, prosecutions and convictions outputs also inform the ongoing development and refinement of TF risk assessments and operational measures. For example, the Strategy Document, as a high-level policy instrument, addresses TF within a comprehensive framework through macro-level evaluations, while complementary documents such as the NRA provide more granular, sector-specific and organisational analyses by integrating risk factor assessments into operational planning. In addition, the Activity Report prepared in accordance with the Strategy Document is submitted to the Presidency of Türkiye Council for Legal Policies and the Presidency of Türkiye Security and Foreign Policy Council and serves as the basis for the MGSB outputs created under the MGK, as described earlier. In addition, the NRA is also sent to the Presidency of Türkiye General Directorate of Security Affairs and is therefore submitted to the President of Türkiye, who is the highest authority determining the country's CT strategies. Consequently, the mechanism described above, which feeds from the bottom up, serves as the basis for the policies of the Presidency of Türkiye. 574. However, evidence of how such information is systematically used for operational CT purposes (particularly for identification, targeting and designation of individuals and entities) is more limited. Although Türkiye reported examples of designation proposals submitted to the UN and the use of international co-operation (e.g. FIU exchanges, MLA, cross-border tracing), the link between TF case outputs and concrete CT actions is not consistently demonstrated. While information sharing mechanisms are in place and contribute to risk understanding and policy development, the extent to which TF intelligence is operationally leveraged for CT purposes, including designations and disruptions, is not sufficiently evidenced." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="568. Türkiye has a well-developed domestic CT/CFT strategy, with structured inter-agency mechanisms and policy documents. TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions inform the broader national CT Strategy and operational priorities, including typologies such as VAs, hawala, and the use of digital platforms for TF purposes. The National Security Council (MGK) and the National Security Policy Document (MGSB) set high-level threat perceptions, including PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, FETÖ, ISIL and AQ. The Strategy Document on CFT, the Strategy Document 2021–2025 and the 2025 NRA provide a comprehensive framework for TF risk management, albeit with strong limitations where risks linked to non-UNSC and non-domestically designated organisations are assessed as not significant without detailed analysis. Competent authorities also analyse TF cases and update typology guides, STR guidance and sector-specific instructions. 9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 569. Türkiye demonstrates that TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions directly inform the formulation and updating of national CT/CFT strategies, through a structured bottom-up mechanism. Operational findings are systematically channelled into strategic documents, including the AML/CFT Strategy, the TF NRA, and the Strategy Document on CFT. 570. The core analytical contribution stems from the integration of operational casework into strategic decision-making. Türkiye provided multiple examples demonstrating that empirical findings from TF cases trigger concrete strategic adjustments, including: a) reclassification of sectors (e.g. jewellery sector upgraded to high-risk following its use as a financial conduit in ISIL-related cases) b) identification of emerging high-risk areas (e.g. VASPs, based on cases involving privacy coins and cross-border wallet structures) c) introduction of regulatory measures (e.g. MASAK Communiqué No. 29 imposing enhanced due diligence and stablecoin restrictions) d) expansion of the scope of obliged entities (e.g. inclusion of e-commerce platforms following TF abuse cases linked to FETÖ); and e) prioritisation of cross-border risks and designation proposals, informed by international co-operation and financial intelligence. 571. In addition, typology development and guidance updates are derived from case outcomes, including the TF Typology Guide, sector-specific guidelines, and STR indicators. These outputs are regularly updated (most recently in 2025) and disseminated across competent authorities. These elements indicate that Türkiye effectively incorporates operational lessons into strategic frameworks, ensuring that national CT/CFT strategies remain responsive to evolving TF risks. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 572. TF investigation outputs are embedded in domestic CT/CFT strategies, supported by interagency co-ordination (e.g., Threat WG) and data integration into the NRA. The findings derived from investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing in TF-related cases constitute an important foundation for shaping Türkiye’s TF and broader CT strategies and action plans. 573. Investigations, prosecutions and convictions outputs also inform the ongoing development and refinement of TF risk assessments and operational measures. For example, the Strategy Document, as a high-level policy instrument, addresses TF within a comprehensive framework through macro-level evaluations, while complementary documents such as the NRA provide more granular, sector-specific and organisational analyses by integrating risk factor assessments into operational planning. In addition, the Activity Report prepared in accordance with the Strategy Document is submitted to the Presidency of Türkiye Council for Legal Policies and the Presidency of Türkiye Security and Foreign Policy Council and serves as the basis for the MGSB outputs created under the MGK, as described earlier. In addition, the NRA is also sent to the Presidency of Türkiye General Directorate of Security Affairs and is therefore submitted to the President of Türkiye, who is the highest authority determining the country's CT strategies. Consequently, the mechanism described above, which feeds from the bottom up, serves as the basis for the policies of the Presidency of Türkiye. 574. However, evidence of how such information is systematically used for operational CT purposes (particularly for identification, targeting and designation of individuals and entities) is more limited. Although Türkiye reported examples of designation proposals submitted to the UN and the use of international co-operation (e.g. FIU exchanges, MLA, cross-border tracing), the link between TF case outputs and concrete CT actions is not consistently demonstrated. While information sharing mechanisms are in place and contribute to risk understanding and policy development, the extent to which TF intelligence is operationally leveraged for CT purposes, including designations and disruptions, is not sufficiently evidenced." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="129. Co-operation and co-ordination on AML/CFT policies in Türkiye are anchored in a Presidential mandate (the AML/CFT Strategy) requiring all agencies to align with NRA findings. MASAK chairs the Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups, which meet frequently and bring together over 30 competent authorities. The 2025 NRA sets out several multi agency action plans—covering illegal betting, fuel smuggling and abuse of NPOs for TF purpose—which demonstrate clear co-ordination and defined deliverables. There is generally robust co-operation among competent authorities, particularly between the FIU and LEAs, supported by ongoing communication and structured engagement through these working groups. This co-operation is also reflected in regular interactions with public prosecutors across provinces. 130. There is some evidence of cross-cutting adoption of best practices, such as lessons from the 2018–2021 fuel smuggling initiative informing the 2023–2025 tobacco smuggling plan. However, Türkiye’s co-ordination remains largely output focused. While mechanisms produce valuable activities—meetings, training sessions, typology reports, and action plans—there is limited evidence of how these efforts translate into measurable reductions in ML/TF risk. A more outcome-oriented approach would enable Türkiye to assess progress against defined objectives, strengthen learning and adaptation, and ensure that existing reforms are used to their fullest potential. 131. Greater use of the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection (KİHBİ [23] ) platform (e.g. through structured and regular engagement) could further strengthen the operationalisation of policy implementation by systematically consolidating outcomes from action plans, aligning priorities across competent authorities, enabling cross-sectoral visibility of how risks are addressed, and ensuring that implementation results are translated into a shared understanding of risk mitigation in practice, and ensuring that these results are consistently translated into a shared and coherent understanding of ML/TF risks and progress. While outcome data is collected to some extent, its use to inform a common operational picture and strategic direction across authorities appears more limited in practice. In particular, greater use of the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection (KİHBİ) platform (e.g. quarterly meetings) could also facilitate system wide reflection on lessons learned, alignment of priorities, and more strategic future policy development. KİHBİ is the entity responsible for co-ordinating anti-smuggling activities, improving inter-agency co-ordination and ensuring the guidance of the relevant authorities and is also in charge of monitoring, co-ordinating and evaluating the National Strategy Document and Action Plans on the Fight against Organised Crimes. Footnotes [23] KİHBİ is the entity responsible for co-ordinating anti-smuggling activities, improving inter-agency co-ordination and ensuring the guidance of the relevant authorities and is also in charge of monitoring, co-ordinating and evaluating the National Strategy Document and Action Plans on the Fight against Organised Crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 388. MASAK, is the country central authority for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of STRs. As an administrative-style FIU, it plays a pivotal role in Türkiye’s AML/CFT/CPF system and is the main authority responsible for producing financial intelligence at an institutional and operational level. Due to the robustness of its dataset, MASAK accesses timely and up-to-date broad range of financial and non-financial information to a very large extent. MASAK’s access to multiple sources of information is a major strength as it enables extensive real-time cross-checking and verification of data, significantly enhancing accuracy and reliability of the information when producing financial intelligence. 389. To perform its functions MASAK uses one offline (intranet connection) and one online system (internet connection). MASAK accesses a data set composed by more than 300 databases from public entities (32 data bases) and private institutions, legal persons’ basic information (through MERSIS system), STRs (2 740 332 between 2020-2025), cross-border declarations or disclosures on currency (over 162 000) and financial analysis reports. Türkiye’s competent authorities have moved all their data collection to an electronic format (UYAP system) allowing MASAK to have a direct extensive and real time access to up-to-date information which has greatly contributed to insource accurate data collection and to produce well-informed financial analysis and intelligence reports. Through these data bases, MASAK can access personal, basic and BO information, cash declarations/disclosures, criminal records, tax and revenue information, information on personal income, prior related STRs, including information registered by obliged entities (FIs, DNFBPs and VASPS), information hosted by the land and property, vessels and vehicles registries. 390. STRs are the main source of information inputting MASAK’s work. Between 2020-2025, MASAK received approximately 2.7 M STRs from FIs and DNFBPs, and more recently VASP (see IO.3), with most of them emanating from the banking sector (63%), payment service providers and electronic money institutions (26%) and VASPs (7%), all of them identified as high-risk sectors in Türkiye’s 2023 and 2025 NRAs. However, less than 1% STRs from public accountants have been registered which is not commensurate with the country’s risk profile. In terms of quality, most STRs contain sufficient and qualitative information depending on the reporting sector, with those submitted by FIs generally being the most comprehensive ones. When the STRs lack sufficient information, MASAK requests additional information from the reporting entities to support its analysis. The below table provides an overview of the STRs received since 2020. Table 6.1. STRs reported by FIs, DNFBPs and VASP sector (2020-2025) Sector Net Risk profile* 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total STRs/reporting period Ratio/ reporting period ML TF PF Banking Institutions H H M 182828 205793 314700 432499 349988 235358 1721166 63% PEMIs Institutions M/H M/H M 46840 284544 74513 102776 110949 101987 721609 26% VASP (CASP) H H M N/A 2233 20569 48678 63603 53490 188573 7% EOs M/H M/H M/L 2660 4500 6188 9108 5726 4315 32497 1% Those Who Operate in The Field of Lotteries And Betting M/L M 262 36 64 1755 17301 6366 25784 1% Factoring companies M M/L 1893 2729 2154 2277 3686 3631 16370 1% Financing companies M/L L 165 497 1571 1325 1793 1048 6399 0% Capital Market Brokerage Houses M M L 368 692 595 897 1215 1088 4855 0% Cargo companies M/L 359 666 740 641 736 345 3487 0% Insurance, reinsurance and pension companies L M/L 361 404 496 529 747 674 3211 0% DPMS M/H M/H 51 138 320 683 1097 2161 4450 0% Intermediaries of Precious metals and stones (jewelers) M/L L M/L 0 0 0 0 1392 717 2109 0% Financing leasing companies M/L L L 12 60 335 302 295 342 1346 0% Dealers of Any Kind of Sea, Air and Land Transportation of vehicles including construction machines M 54 52 60 42 43 15 266 0% Savings finance companies L 0 0 12 13 15 488 528 0% Notaries L L 5 24 22 4 1 3 59 0% REAs M/H L 0 9 2 19 1 6 37 0% Lawyers M/L L 0 2 0 3 3 0 8 0% Asset management companies L 0 0 1 4 1 4 10 0% Independent audit institutions M/L 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0% Portfolio management companies M/L L 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 0% Other*** 1671 2615 2980 0 0 290 7556 0% Total 237531 504995 425322 601555 558595 412334 2740332 100% Note: (*) Risk profile: ratings based on Türkiye’s 2025 NRA (H: high risk; M/H: medium-high risk; M: medium risk; M/L: medium-low risk; L: low risk); (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); Other**: including 42 STRs from public accountants received between 1 August-28 November 2025. 391. The numbers of STRs received are generally in line with the NRA findings. However, several DNFBPs sectors consistently file low number of STRs even when considered medium risks in the respective NRAs (i.e., exchange offices and DPMS). This raises concerns about the understanding of ML/TF risks obligations within these sectors (see IO.4). 392. Reporting entities submit STRs electronically by filling out an online form, which requires the reporting entity to indicate the underlying associate predicate offence and if the suspicious activity is related to ML, TF or PF, among other relevant information. While submitting the STR, the reporting entity receives automated messages with best practices on how to fill in the information to guarantee and alerts in case some relevant information has not been submitted. This system guarantees comprehensiveness of the information being submitted. 393. As outlined in the table below, the majority of submitted STRs are related to ML and associate predicate offences (99%) including, illegal betting and gambling (32%), tax evasion (24%), and fraud (13%) in line to some extent with the country’s risk profile. However, the number of STRs related to some high-risk or medium high-risk predicate offences remains very low. For instance, between 2020 and 2025, MASAK received only 7961 STRs (0.3%) related to drug trafficking, 13699 on customs smuggling (0.5%) and 5 749 on migrant/human smuggling (0.2%). The low numbers of STRs received against predicate offences categorised as high or medium-high risks indicates reporting entities have challenges in identifying the underlying predicate offence behind the transaction being reported. 394. In addition, TF STRs submissions remain very limited (1%) given Türkiye’s risk profile, particularly across TF high-risk sectors likes banks (10 697 STRs), VASP (1 896 STRs), exchange offices (87 STRs), and payment and e-money institutions (4 747 STRs). Competent authorities explained that the reason behind the low number of submissions on of TF STR corresponds a lesser understanding of TF risk, except for targeted financial obligations, identification of suspicious more generally and complexity of establishing clear links between the transaction being reported (as a silo transaction) and terrorism/TF activity (see IO.3). For this reason, reporting entities revert to submit these STRs under a ML or an associated predicate offence. To overcome this challenge, MASAK implemented a scoring system which allows analysts to reassess the submitted information by cross-checking the information with previous submitted STRs and ongoing analysis on the TF Evaluation and Analysis departments, screening on all the names against the designations lists which allows MASAK to understand- at an early stage of the analysis process- if the isolated reported transaction corresponds to a TF scheme. MASAK identified all TF STRs as high priority. Table 6.2. Breakdown of STRs by possible underlying offence (2020-2025) Suspected offence Risk Profile* 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total/ offence % of Total Predicate offences Facilitating illegal betting and gambling M/H 78919 311917 112219 161442 144643 126130 935250 32% Tax evasion and tax avoidance M 62768 66543 131016 186992 152866 95782 695967 24% Fraud H 16212 20025 24613 78673 126263 122623 388409 13% Not declaring transactions for someone else’s account 8734 17161 36370 61367 62959 47041 233632 8% Cybercrime 6416 2940 3453 15054 16001 7533 51397 2% Unlicensed payment and electronic money services 1963 3904 6390 10459 13260 8331 44307 2% Offences related to capital markets 973 1610 2538 3927 4476 3990 17514 1% POS usury M/L 1973 1381 1233 2266 5048 8566 20467 1% Forgery of official/private documents M 4719 2097 3113 3713 2678 1484 17804 1% Banking offences 221 364 1400 2610 5850 7869 18304 1% Others*** 72436 88498 116829 105941 63984 22782 470470 16% ML/predicate offence 255334 516440 439174 632424 598028 452131 2893521 98% Terrorism/TF H 1987 2785 2934 4037 3825 3907 19475 1% TF**** H 2217 2757 4164 8520 5956 3898 27512 1% PF M/L 0 0 0 0 38 129 167 0% Note: (*) Risk profile: ratings based on Türkiye’s 2025 NRA (H: high risk; M/H: medium-high risk; M: medium risk; M/L: medium-low risk; L: low risk); (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025).; (***) Others: includes the following predicate offences: Money and valuable document fraud/forgery (13165 STRs); Customs smuggling (13699 STRs); Drug trafficking (7961 STRs); Usury (5355 STRs); Violation of obligations (2508 STRs); Crimes against property (theft, robbery, etc.) 2721( STRs); Migrant smuggling and/or human trafficking (5749 STRs); Smuggling of precious metals and stones (3881 STRs); Illegal bill payment centre activities (3008 STRs); Pyramid selling systems (Ponzi) (1966 STRs); Corruption and offences involving public officials (2667 STRs); Threats/blackmail/force and kidnapping (1748 STRs); Illegal aid and fundraising and solicitation (5589 STRs); Insurance fraud/ policy forgery (1125 STRs); Encouraging or facilitating prostitution (1765 STRs); Misuse of civil society organisation (913 STRs); Fuel smuggling (1859 STRs); Violation of social security legislation (662 STRs); Unauthorised VASP (CASP) activity (929 STRs); Smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, tobacco products (709 STRs); Smuggling of weapons and ammunition (620 STRs); Obscenity (539 STRs); Smuggling of historical artefacts and trade in cultural property (728 STRs); other predicate offences (390604 STRs); (****) the TF STRs number is higher than STRs received under reporting category because a STR received from a obliged entity may include more than one crime. 395. MASAK has carried out activities aimed at increasing the accuracy and quality of STR reporting through training, supervision and workshops, publishing guidelines, and continuously reviewing the automated system messaged to raise awareness on how to submit the STR information. 396. At the analysis phase, MASAK can access- directly and indirectly- additional information, both online and offline, (i.e., personal information, cash declarations/disclosures, criminal records, tax and revenue information, information on personal income, including BO information of legal persons, among others) to verify and complement the STRs information. MASAK can also access MERSIS (legal person’s basic information). A new data base integrated financial intelligence system (EMIS) was implemented in May 2025, from which MASAK analysts can access different layers of information according to the duties they perform and can access and filter the financial information needed case by case. STRs can be cross-checked against the other 300 data bases that integrates MASAK’s data set to conduct the financial analysis, including access to other public institutions data bases, such as the revenue administration data, which keep records regarding economic activities, wealth items, tax liabilities, census information and illegal activities. Furthermore, MASAK can request any public institution, reporting entities, natural and legal persons, and any other organisation to provide all kind of information, documents and related records. These organisations shall fully and accurately provide the information requested including the necessary passwords to access the information or make these records decipherable. 397. MASAK has direct access to cross-border declarations (incoming: 132 699 transactions/ outgoing: 24 071 transactions) and disclosures (incoming: 54 475 transactions/ outgoing: 98 571 transactions) and the information on the number of seizures conducted by Customs Enforcement. If needed, the customs officer can request the passenger information regarding the cash or payment instruments being transported and report to MASAK in case there is a failure in the declaration or disclosure (See IO.8). This information is consistently integrated into the MASAK’s data base. 398. When deemed necessary, MASAK can request information from their counterparts whether through the Egmont Group and/or the bilateral MOUs signed with 66 other jurisdictions. This broadens the scope of the MASAK’s information including foreign-based financial intelligence. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 399. Competent authorities also have access to a broad range of financial and non-financial information through their own databases to support their intelligence and investigative functions. While these databases are generally less comprehensive than MASAK ones, competent authorities can request their counterparts and stakeholders any type of information in the context of an investigation, including financial information hosted on MASAK’s data bases. STR cannot be accessed by other competent authorities other than MASAK, courts during trials and examiners while conducting supervisions. 400. Prosecutors and courts can request MASAK to provide information on STRs in the context of a criminal investigation. In line with confidentiality rules, MASAK will share this information as an intelligence product including an annex of the raw data supporting the report. MASAK products are disseminated via electronic document management systems such as KEP and BELGENET, or by post depending on their level of importance. 401. Competent authorities conduct specific procedures to ensure that the sources of information contain relevant, accurate and up to date data. Public prosecutors and LEAs are legally obliged to supply and usually supply, as gathered from interviews during the onsite visit, the knowledge and documents needed for an ongoing investigation without delay. 402. The GGC, the TNP and the Coast Guard Command (CGC), can also access a broad range of information to perform its functions. TNP and GGC have direct access other competent authorities’ databases and information systems such as UYAP (National Judgement Network Project), KPS (Identity and Address Sharing System), DERBIS (Association Information System), VBYS (Foundation Information Management System). Among other law enforcement units, Customs Enforcement and Coast Guard Command provide access to information and databases related to their fields of duty within the framework of protocols signed with the relevant institutions. Information is exchanged between institutions thanks to these protocols. 403. For TF investigations, specific programs are used by GGC Counter-Terrorism Department (GGC-TEM) personnel to access financial information in a timely manner. In this context, through the KAFES programme they access dates of entry/exit of the person/suspect at the country’s land borders, the amount and type of cash being carried, flight entry/exit information, identification of persons traveling with them, membership information of foundations/associations, to social security institution records and job data in real time. Through the JABS system they also access information’s like individual/suspect's criminal records obtained from UYAP/KİHBİ data, current address, prison entry and exit information and vehicle ownership information. Twelve other programmes are used to examine financial analysis reports obtained from the FIU and to understand the relationship between money transfers and other transactions between individuals/suspects. In addition, GGC (KOM- Fight against Smuggling and Organised Crime) makes use of PARS analyses system that provides them with similar features. 404. For combatting customs smuggling, CEcan access directly the license Plate Recognition System (under a protocol with the TNP); the Vessel Tracking Module (Ministry of Transport); the Port Single Window System; the Decision Support System; the Intelligence Information System; as well as the Automation data of fuel distribution companies transmitted to the Ministry and relevant combatting agencies by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). The GIBINTRANET system (used by Revenue Experts) provides them with access to fiscal data. When filling in a Cash Declaration Form or Cash Disclosure Form, the passenger is requested to provide information and documents verifying the source of the cash (e.g. customs declaration or contract, proforma invoice, invoice, etc., for cash declared as export proceeds) all of them are registered under the Customs Enforcement data base. Customs Enforcement can also access information from other relevant public institutions through protocols and verified via the Cash Control Program, which provides convenience to the personnel entering the data and ensures the reliability of the shared information. 405. Information regarding individuals, companies, goods, and vehicles reported to Public Prosecutor’s Office by the Directorate General is recorded within 24 hours in the Smuggling Information Database for tracking purposes. The unit manager reviews all information that authorised officials enter the Smuggling Information Database, if the information is deemed appropriate the entry is approved and transferred to the system. Information regarding individuals, goods, vehicles, and companies involved in smuggling incidents is also periodically queried by personnel responsible for the program at the Directorate General, and any existing deficiencies are completed based on new information received through feedback. 406. Furthermore, a wide range of data is provided to the competent authorities in an accurate and up-to-date format thanks to the TNP’s EKİP-UYAP system integrations, INTERPOL channels, and the Gendarmerie’s JİKİP-UYAP system integrations. For example, to verify that the information obtained is accurate and up-to-date, LEAs correspond with official institutions such as the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the TRA, the Directorate General of Land Registry and Cadastre, the Turkish Banks Association and the Turkish Notaries Association. Also, the data from different sources, including MASAK, is analysed by LEAs using analysis programmes (Asena, Kafes, Ataç, I2, etc.) to support the production of intelligence which is then effectively utilised during investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.1.1. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 579. TFS pursuant to UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions are not immediately enforceable in Türkiye upon UN designation. The process takes on average two and a half days for TFS to be enforceable in Türkiye, even though it represents a significant improvement from the estimated 33 transposition days in Türkiye 2019 MER, TF TFS related to UNSCRs 1267 and successors are not always implemented without delay. 580. When the UNSCRs 1267 and 1988 lists are updated, MASAK is notified without delay, both directly via the distribution list of the UN and via a formal letter from Türkiye’s Permanent Representation at the UN. Upon receipt of the notification, MASAK notifies the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye via a formal letter signed by the MoTF  to which a draft Presidential Decree is attached, this process also takes place without delay. Upon signature by the President of the Republic of Türkiye, the Presidential Decree is published in the Official Gazette and becomes enforceable. Since 2021, Türkiye has been able to implement this process without delay in some instances for TF TFS under the 1267 regime. Yet, the process takes place on an average of 2.5 days (see table below). The time required for the Presidential Decree to be formally signed is the main reason for the delay in the implementation. Box 10.1. Infographic on TFS implementation Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 581. Türkiye can apply mitigating measures to address to some extent the delay in the legal enforcement of TFS under UNSCR 1267 regime. Prior to sending listings decision to the Presidency for ratification, MASAK identifies potential funds or assets and verify possible occurrences or links within Türkiye. If such funds or assets are found, the MoTF can postpone the transactions on the targeted funds and assets for seven working days (Law 5549, art. 19/A) even before the formal ratification of the Presidential decree implementing TFS would have occurred. However, as no matches were found over the reporting period, this mechanism has not been resorted to over the reporting period. This mechanism also relies on competent authorities’ ability to identify potential funds or assets subject to UN freezing which can take time and would not automatically lead to the freezing of funds and assets by reporting entities without delay. 582. Türkiye proposes individuals or entities to the UNSC 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation via Presidential Decree. The TFS Assessment Commission – chaired by MASAK and composed of relevant competent authorities (Presidency, National Intelligence, MoFA, MoI, MoJ, MoTF) – is the competent authority in charge to propose the names to President of the Republic of Türkiye. During the reporting period, five Presidential Decrees were issued in Türkiye, authorising the submission of proposals to the UNSC for the listing of a total of 32 individuals under relevant sanctions regimes, with 14 of those proposals being co-sponsored by a UNSC member, with one leading to a UNSC listing. [41] 10.1.2. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 583. Türkiye has a robust framework and process for listing individuals and entities to its domestic designation list and resorts to this tool to a large extent. The procedures and criteria for designation and de-listing are outlined in Law 6415 and are based on reasonable grounds that a person or entity has committed TF related acts (see Rec 6). Within this framework, MASAK is in charge of preparing a report based on its own intelligence or collected by other LEAs. The report is reviewed by the TFS Assessment Commission which is the authority in charge of proposing domestic listings that have to be co-signed by the MoTF and the MoJ. Once the decision is issued in the Official Gazette, it is immediately enforced and submitted, within 48 hours, to the Ankara High Criminal Court for judicial approval. The court reviews the decision in terms of the existence of reasonable grounds and must issue a ruling within five days, either upholding or revoking the asset freezing measure. 584. The Assessment Commission is responsible for reassessing the existence of reasonable grounds at intervals not exceeding six 6 months and submits its recommendation to the relevant ministers. In addition, relevant parties may request the lifting of an asset freezing decision. These requests are reviewed by the Commission and its recommendations are submitted to the Ministers. If the request is deemed unjustified, it is forwarded to the competent court for a decision on whether to maintain or lift the asset freezing measure. 585. Over the reporting period, Türkiye has made use of its domestic regime and adopted asset freezing measures following requests from foreign countries in line with its risk profile. Between 2021 and June 2025, under Türkiye’s domestic freezing mechanism, a total of 19 Presidential Decrees were issued, resulting in the asset freezing of 1 377 natural persons and 87 legal entities, with 325 freezing related to UN designated terrorist organisations. 586. Asset freezing requests received from foreign countries are also evaluated by the Assessment Commission but finalised by Presidential Decree. In this framework, countries having information regarding targets that might meet the designation threshold (reasonable grounds) submit their request. MASAK prepares a report on this case enriched by relevant information from its own data sources and other relevant competent authorities. This report is then submitted to the Assessment Commission which can propose adoption of listing measures to the Presidency. 587. Among those 1 434 assets freezing decisions, 62 individuals and 8 legal entities had their assets frozen in Türkiye following requests submitted by two foreign countries. As for rejected foreign requests, the average response time for notification to the relevant country is 8 months. Situations requiring additional information to be provided by the requesting country, may lead to an extension of the evaluation period. Box 10.2. Joint designations with a foreign country Within the framework of the joint mechanism established with the US to prevent the TF, five individuals and two legal entities have been identified for transferring funds to ISIL members and their families. The assets of the individuals and legal entities were frozen simultaneously in 2023 (1). Subsequently, five individuals whose assets were frozen as a result of denunciation were convicted of TF offences, while a confiscation order was issued against one legal entity. In 2023 (2), the assets of two other individuals alleged to have facilitated ISIL financing activities in conflict zones were frozen as part of joint efforts with the US and an indictment was issued against one of the individuals for TF offences. In 2024 (3), the assets of three foreign individuals alleged to have carried out educational and logistical activities in Türkiye were frozen. These individuals were found to have links to those who carried out the 2024 attack on a church in Sarıyer. Criminal denunciations were filed against the three individuals and two of them have been convicted of membership in a terrorist organization, while one had been acquitted of the same charge. Source: (1) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1181 (2) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1456 (3) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2406 588. Designations are published in the Official Gazette and by law MASAK has to inform competent authorities as well as natural and legal persons to whom notification is deemed necessary. Decisions are communicated on MASAK website and via an e-notification system with banks and most financial institutions. Clear guidance to FIs and other persons or entities, including DNFBPs that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations to take freezing action is also available on MASAK website. 589. In order to immediately block any potential financial activity following an asset-freezing decision updates in the lists are securely shared with FIs several hours prior to publication in the Official Gazette. Upon issuance of the freezing order, all bank accounts, debit and credit cards, e-money accounts, and virtual assets belonging to the designated individuals have to be blocked. 590. Natural and legal persons, as well as public institutions and organisations, are required to inform MASAK of any “asset records” within 7 days, upon the notification of the freezing decision. In practice, this delay could impede competent authorities to become aware of the frozen assets in a timely manner and take appropriate actions. In addition, designated individuals and entities are required to inform MASAK of all other assets, and natural and legal persons who are in claim or debt relationship with those about whom decision on freezing of asset has been made and shall also inform MASAK of the amount of the claim or debt within 30 days of publication of the freezing decision. This has happened in practice in relation to the individuals listed under the UNSC 1267/1988 regime and whose assets have been identified and frozen in Türkiye. Footnotes [41] Türkiye submitted the proposal during the reporting period (2024), the UNSC designation occurred on 26 March 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 298. Türkiye has largely identified and understood the ML/TF risks in the DNFBP sector through a comprehensive risk assessment. MASAK demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of ML/TF risks across the DNFBP sector. Sectoral supervisors’ risk understanding is more limited and focuses more on risk mitigation measures than on actual ML/TF risks. Given MASAK’s role as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, this difference in understanding is expected; however, enhancing sectoral supervisors’ knowledge of ML/TF risks would improve their ability to carry out AML-related supervisory tasks effectively. 299. As described in IO.3, Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups were established in 2021 as a result of the adoption of the AML/CFT Strategy. Under the Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG, 8 risk analysis sub-groups were created to assess sectoral risks and entities risk level including one for DNFBPs, focusing on DPMS, REAs and vehicles traders (those are outside the scope of the FATF Methodology, see IO.1). A methodology different than the one for FIs was used to assess the risk in of DPMS and REAs to take into consideration the specificities of those sectors such as the high number of entities, the absence of a professional association representing the entire sector, their limited products and services, the relatively recent AML/CFT requirements and limited awareness and the high level of unlicensed activities. The WG established comprehensive risk scenarios and took into consideration specific risk factors in each sector, allowing to group entities in risk levels groups and then calculating the final risk score for each entity. As a result, both DPMS and REAs sectors have been considered as medium-high risk. 300. Although lawyers, accountants and notaries have not been included in the risk analysis WG, a similar methodology has been used for analysing the risks in each sector. Risk analyses for accountants, notaries and lawyers are performed by MASAK with the support of related stakeholders by using past studies, experiences and professional expertise information. Several factors have been considered in the risk analyses of these sectors such as requirements for operating in the sector, supervision results, products and services, previous ML/TF abuses in the sector, STRs submitted- after assessing these factors, obliged parties with ML/TF risks were identified for each sector to constitute a basis for supervision of obligations. As a result, accountants have been classified as “medium”, lawyers as “medium-low” and notaries as “low” in terms of ML/TF risks. 301. Entities risk rating in the entire DNFBP sector is reviewed annually and forms the basis for the establishment of risk-based supervision programs (see 4.5). Sectoral risks are reviewed annually for highest risk sectors (DPMS, REAs and accountants) as a basis of supervision programme and every two years for other sectors as part of the NRA process. Table 4.3. DNFBP sectors risk level Sector Risk Level Number of institutions Number of high-medium risk (as of 2024) DPMS Medium-High 11 986 288 REA Medium-High 77 831 182 Accountants Medium 133 439 24 Lawyers Medium-Low 199 142 80 Notaries Low 2 383 - 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 302. MASAK’s activities have strengthened DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and their related obligations, with DNFBPs widely acknowledging the informative work conducted by MASAK. Professionals met during the onsite reported that they would benefit from further awareness raising sessions, especially on ML/TF typologies to better capture potential suspicious cases. 303. MASAK also published several guidance specifically for the DNFBP sector. These guidelines provide information on ML/TF risks, but also AML/CFT obligations of DNFBPs, including a specific guidance on combating TF for DNFBPs (2022) and a guidance on ML/TF obligations in the DNFBP sector (2025). 304. In addition, MASAK, in co-ordination with sectoral regulatory and supervisory authorities organised numerous workshops and trainings for all DNFBP sectors. Those also cover both understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations. Through feedback obtained during those workshops, MASAK has updated its DNFBP sectoral guidance accordingly." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 298. Türkiye has largely identified and understood the ML/TF risks in the DNFBP sector through a comprehensive risk assessment. MASAK demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of ML/TF risks across the DNFBP sector. Sectoral supervisors’ risk understanding is more limited and focuses more on risk mitigation measures than on actual ML/TF risks. Given MASAK’s role as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, this difference in understanding is expected; however, enhancing sectoral supervisors’ knowledge of ML/TF risks would improve their ability to carry out AML-related supervisory tasks effectively. 299. As described in IO.3, Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups were established in 2021 as a result of the adoption of the AML/CFT Strategy. Under the Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG, 8 risk analysis sub-groups were created to assess sectoral risks and entities risk level including one for DNFBPs, focusing on DPMS, REAs and vehicles traders (those are outside the scope of the FATF Methodology, see IO.1). A methodology different than the one for FIs was used to assess the risk in of DPMS and REAs to take into consideration the specificities of those sectors such as the high number of entities, the absence of a professional association representing the entire sector, their limited products and services, the relatively recent AML/CFT requirements and limited awareness and the high level of unlicensed activities. The WG established comprehensive risk scenarios and took into consideration specific risk factors in each sector, allowing to group entities in risk levels groups and then calculating the final risk score for each entity. As a result, both DPMS and REAs sectors have been considered as medium-high risk. 300. Although lawyers, accountants and notaries have not been included in the risk analysis WG, a similar methodology has been used for analysing the risks in each sector. Risk analyses for accountants, notaries and lawyers are performed by MASAK with the support of related stakeholders by using past studies, experiences and professional expertise information. Several factors have been considered in the risk analyses of these sectors such as requirements for operating in the sector, supervision results, products and services, previous ML/TF abuses in the sector, STRs submitted- after assessing these factors, obliged parties with ML/TF risks were identified for each sector to constitute a basis for supervision of obligations. As a result, accountants have been classified as “medium”, lawyers as “medium-low” and notaries as “low” in terms of ML/TF risks. 301. Entities risk rating in the entire DNFBP sector is reviewed annually and forms the basis for the establishment of risk-based supervision programs (see 4.5). Sectoral risks are reviewed annually for highest risk sectors (DPMS, REAs and accountants) as a basis of supervision programme and every two years for other sectors as part of the NRA process. Table 4.3. DNFBP sectors risk level Sector Risk Level Number of institutions Number of high-medium risk (as of 2024) DPMS Medium-High 11 986 288 REA Medium-High 77 831 182 Accountants Medium 133 439 24 Lawyers Medium-Low 199 142 80 Notaries Low 2 383 - 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 302. MASAK’s activities have strengthened DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and their related obligations, with DNFBPs widely acknowledging the informative work conducted by MASAK. Professionals met during the onsite reported that they would benefit from further awareness raising sessions, especially on ML/TF typologies to better capture potential suspicious cases. 303. MASAK also published several guidance specifically for the DNFBP sector. These guidelines provide information on ML/TF risks, but also AML/CFT obligations of DNFBPs, including a specific guidance on combating TF for DNFBPs (2022) and a guidance on ML/TF obligations in the DNFBP sector (2025). 304. In addition, MASAK, in co-ordination with sectoral regulatory and supervisory authorities organised numerous workshops and trainings for all DNFBP sectors. Those also cover both understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations. Through feedback obtained during those workshops, MASAK has updated its DNFBP sectoral guidance accordingly." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="459. Türkiye extensively pursues prosecutions and recorded convictions related to all type of ML offences, except for stand-alone ML and ML derived from foreign predicate offences. The investigation-to-prosecution rate is about 46% which is commensurate with Türkiye’s risk profile and context to some extent, as low initiation thresholds are required for investigations while proving the knowledge and intention for to pursue prosecutions and convictions remains more complex. The effectiveness of the implementation of the national strategy for investigating and prosecuting ML is evidenced by a 42-fold increase in the number of prosecutions between 2021 and 2025. 460. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye has prosecuted 10 581 cases for ML offences. Prosecutions are predominantly related to self-laundering (56%), third party ML (25%), a combination of both categories (18%). In addition, standalone ML prosecutions are only limited to illegal betting-related cases and has not been applied to other type of predicate offences. Türkiye achieved convictions in 556 cases, predominantly in self-laundering cases (55%) followed by third-party ML cases (26%) and a combination of both (19%), including effective stand-alone ML related to illegal betting. Given Türkiye’s risk as transit hub for funds and destination to transfer proceed of crimes related to fraud and other predicate offences, the stand-alone ML prosecution and convictions is more limited. There are several case studies demonstrate the prosecution of foreign predicate offences triggered by domestic predicate offences or foreign elements within those and three cases of convictions related to independent foreign predicate offences. The table below provides a detailed explanation of these numbers including investigations. Table 7.4. ML types of investigations, prosecutions and convictions (2021-2025)* ML type 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total/ reporting period % Pending files INVESTIGATIONS Self-laundering 1373 2740 5817 3908 5359 19197 47% 3286 3 rd party ML 856 3060 3865 2973 3554 14308 35% 1989 Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 316 516 744 2504 2558 6638 17% 1856 Foreign predicate offences 50 225 236 72 67 650 2% 117 Total investigations 2595 6541 10662 9457 11538 40793 100% 7248 PROSECUTIONS Self-laundering 867 491 2017 1848 3159 8382 56% 3796 3 rd party ML 378 395 1295 680 990 3738 25% 934 Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 195 115 263 811 1337 2721 18% 1301 Foreign predicate offences 9 31 9 31 16 96 1% 54 Total prosecutions 1449 1032 3584 3370 5502 14937 100% 6085 CONVICTIONS Self-laundering 38 87 85 76 186 472 55% 3 rd party ML 7 6 35 42 133 223 26% Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 16 25 21 28 69 159 19% Foreign predicate offences 0 0 0 1 2 3 0% Total convictions 61 118 141 147 390 857 100% Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 461. Although ML prosecutions and convictions are in line with Türkiye’s risk profile, particularly for fraud and illegal betting, this is not the case for medium-high risk and medium predicate offences (i.e., drug trafficking and smuggling). Prosecutors presented challenges in prosecuting complex ML schemes involving sophisticated layering structures, including legal persons, shell companies, misuse of legal professionals and trade-based mechanisms, and systemic layering networks, as well as the misuse of technology. 462. The data reveals that prosecutions still pending represents the 47% (7 248) of those already finalised (14 937), and the number of pending convictions (6 085 files) exceed finalised convictions (556) by a factor of nine. Authorities attribute the significant backlog of prosecutions to the complexity and scope of cases and the appeal which require extended timeframes for resolution. The absence of a clear guidance to prioritise ML prosecutions, combined with the average 1.5-year timeframe required to complete a single ML case, contributes to the accumulation of these cases generating significantly impacting the prosecutors and LEAs workload. Conviction rates are expected to rise gradually as these cases advance through the judicial process and reach the verdict stage. 463. In addition, it is important to note that the number of natural persons subject to investigations, prosecutions and being convicted varies considerably. The total number of natural persons convicted represents only the 2% of those subject to investigation which also implies challenges in attributing the criminal activity to the prosecuted person at a conviction stage. In these regard, competent authorities signalled challenges in proving knowledge and intention during trial. Table 7.5. Natural persons subject to ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions (2021-2025)* Criminal procedure stage 2021 2021 2023 2024 2025** Total Suspects subject to investigation 2168 5335 8969 14650 18531 49653 Defendants subject to prosecutions 1421 976 2902 6409 10374 22082 Convicted persons 61 116 137 253 391 958 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="597. Türkiye has classified 80 195 associations as NPOs, on the basis of their financial materiality and exposure to TF risk which is not fully in line with the FATF functional definition of NPOs. As of July 2025, the non-profit sector in Türkiye consisted of 101 237 associations and approximately 6 400 foundations. Authorities have classified associations in 22 subgroups, out of which Türkiye considered that 80 195 fall within the FATF definition of NPOs on the basis that their subgroups account for more than 1% of total financial activity of the NPO sector. As a result of these calculations, 16 subgroups [42] have been considered to fall within the FATF definition of NPO. Türkiye also excluded 6 subgroups from the FATF definition of NPOs (see R. 8). This approach is not fully in line with the FATF definition of NPOs which focuses on function (i.e. raising or disbursing funds) and some associations included in the scope of NPOs may have been excluded based on the types of activity they carry out and vice versa. Similarly, foundations, have been excluded from the scope of NPOs based on their low TF risks according to the results of the 2023 and 2025 NRA, and since entrance into the sector requires more rigid procedures. Identification of at-risk NPOs 598. Türkiye’s General Directorate of Relations with Civil Society (GDRCS), under the Ministry of Interior, is the competent authority responsible for monitoring NPOs. It maintains up-to-date information on NPOs via DERBIS. Türkiye’s classification as NPOs on the basis of their financial materiality and TF risk exposure which is not fully in line with the functional definition of NPOs has on the other hand supported the oversight of NPOs to focus primarily on those most at risk of TF. Türkiye already takes into account a risk element when establishing the associations that fall under the definition of NPOs. In addition, the GDRCS conducts a yearly robust risk assessment to determine which NPOs are most at risks of being abused for TF purposes. Associations operating in Türkiye are divided according to their fields of activity (types) and an examination is made on which associations operating in which fields are at risk. Afterwards, an analysis of the current situation in institutional, economic, geographical and demographic frameworks was also conducted taking into account nine risk criteria. 599. Türkiye considers that the highest TF risk within the NPO sector is to be found within humanitarian aid associations operating close to an area posing an active terrorist threat such as the southern border, which is in line with the country’s risk profile. Türkiye has conducted a thorough risk assessment of the sector and established a risk scoring methodology revised on a yearly basis, allowing to consider that only 1.2% of the NPO population represent a high or medium risk. The GDRCS re-evaluates yearly the risk ratings of high and medium risk NPOs. This has led to amending NPOs risk scores, especially downgrading the risk from high to medium risk or even from medium to low risk, thus being left out of the scope of monitoring/auditing process. As a result of risk analyses conducted within the scope of the methodology, a total of 1 095 associations changed risk groups between 2023, 2024 and 2025 which demonstrates that the methodology is actively working and effective. Over the reporting period a yearly average of 135 NPOs are considered high risk yearly, and 710 medium risks. 600. While the number of high risks NPOs has remained relatively stable, the number of medium risks NPOs varied more intensely, reflecting contextual factors. For instance, the number of medium risks NPOs has more than doubled between 2024 and 2025. This is explained as the determination of the risk scoring for NPOs in 2025 was based on the information available on NPOs as of the 2023 financial year. However, in 2023, Türkiye suffered from a massive earthquake, leading NPOs to receive much more funds from abroad than usual and deploy activities in the regions most affected, which are neighbouring Syria and represent a higher potential TF risk. This contextual factor explains the surge in the number of NPOs classified as medium risk in 2025. Table 10.2. NPO risk classification (2021-2025) Year High risk NPOs Medium risk NPOs 2021 170 1 172 2022 169 533 2023 115 558 2024 100 432 2025 131 860 NPO oversight 601. In Türkiye, NPOs in the form of associations are formed by at least seven natural or legal persons and acquire legal personality without the need for prior permission the moment they submit their establishment notification the local administrative authority. Foreign NPOs can engage in activities in Türkiye and open representative offices subject to approval from the MoI. NPOs information is centralised in DERBIS which both, authorities and NPOs, consider very convenient to keep up-to-date information. 602. Türkiye’s legal framework provides for measures applicable to all NPOs which could unduly disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activities. For example, all NPOs are obliged to submit a yearly financial statement, to report the aid they receive from abroad before using it, to report beforehand any aid they will be providing and all persons collecting aid should obtain prior authorisation from competent authorities. NPOs are also not only monitored in the scope of TF but also for ML purposes which goes beyond the requirement of the FATF Standards and could create unjustified additional oversight of NPOs activities. 603. Notwithstanding the above, the AT did not receive evidence that the mentioned measures are resorted to in practice to unduly disrupt NPOs activities. During onsite meetings, representatives from the NPO sector considered those measures as necessary, in light of Türkiye’ specific risk exposure, to ensure the soundness of the NPO sector in the country and that those requirements facilitate the establishment of relationship with foreign donors. In addition, in January 2024 the Constitutional Court annulled the provision of the Law on Associations (Law 5253) that gave powers to the MoI to temporarily suspend the activities of an NPOs on the basis of a suspicion of a criminal activity. Authorities confirmed that they have no intention to reintroduce such measure. 604. Following a RBA, Türkiye has focused its oversight activities on the high and medium risk NPOs. In light of the yearly risk scoring described above, the GDRCS focuses its audit activities on all high risk NPOs yearly and medium risk NPOs at least every two years. Even though Türkiye’s framework provides for the audit of low-risk NPOs, more than 80 000 entities, the GDRCS do not in practice conduct such audits as it is impossible to audit such a large population and oversight efforts are focused on the higher risk entities in line with a targeted, RBA. To support audit activities, Türkiye developed regulations and guidance for NPOs’ oversight limiting the scope of the audit an NPO is subject to. Monitoring of NPOs is conducted by GDRCS within the framework of the risk-based audit methodology updated annually. All NPOs the AT engaged with during the onsite visit had been subject to onsite monitoring by GDRCS, none consider that the scope of the audit was too broad nor that it disrupted their activities. Some received fines which they considered helpful to improve further their compliance with the requirements. Table 10.3. Outcomes of audits for high and medium risks NPOs (2021-2025) Year Audited Associations Judicial Fine Administrative Fine Both Judicial Proceeding and Administrative Fine 2021 1 342 21 370 53 2022 701 23 273 43 2023 671 18 301 29 2024 530 11 189 18 2025* 560 9 243 29 Note: (*) Covering the period from 1 January - 28 November 2025 605. Sanctions against NPOs are applied in a proportionate manner depending on the degree of the offence. Fines and sanctions are defined by law following the principle of proportionality, hence limiting the discretion of the administration. Also, sanctions, administrative fines or judicial fines/penalties are not to be imposed to the NPOs themselves in accordance with the principle of individual criminal responsibility, penalties can be only imposed to the natural person(s) who committed the misdemeanour or the crime. The most common reasons for imposing sanctions on NPOs as a result of monitoring activities are failure to notify and keep proper books obligations, such as failure to submit the association declaration, holding general assembly meetings, failure to comply with money transfer obligations through the banking system (including by resorting to hawala) or discrepancies with accounting procedures and principles. 606. In line with its risk profile, Türkiye has also identified several NPOs being abused for TF purposes and taken measures mitigating measures accordingly. GDRCS informs other relevant authorities in cases where an association is suspected to being linked to a TO or TF, GDRCS may either notify MASAK or it may directly report a criminal complaint to the public prosecutors. Türkiye has frozen the assets of 3 NPOs located in Türkiye, of whom 2 are considered to be affiliated to UN designated terrorist organisations. In addition, 35 NPOs located abroad have been added to Türkiye domestic listing regime, all are branches of NPOs linked with domestically designated TOs. Box 10.4. NPO abused for TF purposes Following an audit by the GDRCS, Association X was reported to MASAK for analysis due to various suspicions, including being used to finance activities and carry out propaganda in support of a domestically listed TO. As a result of the analysis conducted by MASAK, it was found that many financial transactions were carried out within the scope of the domestic TO's financial structure, management and activities of the association were dedicated to the organisation. Front companies were also used to provide financial support to the organisation and conceal their activities. These front companies were connected to genuine commercial enterprises that could act as intermediaries in providing financial support to the organisation. Intelligence obtained from security and intelligence units also revealed that the funds collected were also used to finance experienced members of the terrorist organisation who issued orders for actions and activities within Türkiye, as well as to support terrorist acts. A was sent to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office to initiate legal proceedings. Accordingly, 23 suspects, including individuals identified as having been selected from among those holding managerial positions within the domestic terrorist organization, were investigated on charges of “membership in an armed terrorist organization” and “propaganda for a terrorist organization. Following a thorough examination of the information and documents obtained from relevant institutions and organisations regarding data accessed by MASAK, it was assessed that the activities of the individuals subject to the analysis could constitute reasonable grounds for the commission of acts falling within the scope of the crime of terrorist financing. The Evaluation Commission recommended to the MoTF and the MoI that the assets of several individuals and Association X in Türkiye be frozen. Association X was then dissolved by decision of the Civil Court of First Instance in 2024. 607. Authorities have engaged with the sector to a large extent in awareness raising activities and demonstrated efforts to monitor the sector without disrupting legitimate activities especially for NPOs operating in high-risk areas. Authorities established several guidance and good practices paper to inform NPOs about their risks of being abused for TF purposes and have conducted many outreach activities to raise awareness in the sector, for over 50 000 NPOs representatives. The GDRCS is deployed in all 81 provinces in Türkiye and NPO oversight is achieved via the local governorate and association auditors which ensure close relationship and understanding of the realities NPOs face on the ground. NPOs representatives highlighted the close co-operation with the GDCRS. Some NPOs operating in high-risk areas (i.e. at the border with Syria) and met during the onsite visit underscored the close co-ordination with the GDRCS for them to access the formal financial system to receive funds and also in the disbursement of their aid in cash if needed (e.g. where no bank presence). Footnotes [42] Associations for: 1) Professional and Solidarity Associations (social) ,2) Sports and Sports-Related Associations (social and cultural) , 3) Associations Engaged in Activities Related to the Provision of Religious Services (religious), 4) Education Research Associations (education), 5) Culture, Arts, and Tourism Associations (cultural), 6) Humanitarian Aid Associations (charitable), 7) Associations for Preserving Social Values (cultural), 8) Associations Engaged in Health Activities (good works), 9) Urban Planning, Development, and Improvement Associations (good works), 10) International Organizations and Co-operation Associations (good works), 11) Environmental, Natural Life, and Animal Protection Associations (good works), 12) Associations for the Disabled (good works), 13) Associations Active in the Fields of Food, Agriculture, and Animal Husbandry (good works), 14) Associations for Solidarity with Turks Abroad (good works), 15) Associations for the Elderly and Children (good works),16) Associations for Individual Education and Social Development (social)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="597. Türkiye has classified 80 195 associations as NPOs, on the basis of their financial materiality and exposure to TF risk which is not fully in line with the FATF functional definition of NPOs. As of July 2025, the non-profit sector in Türkiye consisted of 101 237 associations and approximately 6 400 foundations. Authorities have classified associations in 22 subgroups, out of which Türkiye considered that 80 195 fall within the FATF definition of NPOs on the basis that their subgroups account for more than 1% of total financial activity of the NPO sector. As a result of these calculations, 16 subgroups [42] have been considered to fall within the FATF definition of NPO. Türkiye also excluded 6 subgroups from the FATF definition of NPOs (see R. 8). This approach is not fully in line with the FATF definition of NPOs which focuses on function (i.e. raising or disbursing funds) and some associations included in the scope of NPOs may have been excluded based on the types of activity they carry out and vice versa. Similarly, foundations, have been excluded from the scope of NPOs based on their low TF risks according to the results of the 2023 and 2025 NRA, and since entrance into the sector requires more rigid procedures. Identification of at-risk NPOs 598. Türkiye’s General Directorate of Relations with Civil Society (GDRCS), under the Ministry of Interior, is the competent authority responsible for monitoring NPOs. It maintains up-to-date information on NPOs via DERBIS. Türkiye’s classification as NPOs on the basis of their financial materiality and TF risk exposure which is not fully in line with the functional definition of NPOs has on the other hand supported the oversight of NPOs to focus primarily on those most at risk of TF. Türkiye already takes into account a risk element when establishing the associations that fall under the definition of NPOs. In addition, the GDRCS conducts a yearly robust risk assessment to determine which NPOs are most at risks of being abused for TF purposes. Associations operating in Türkiye are divided according to their fields of activity (types) and an examination is made on which associations operating in which fields are at risk. Afterwards, an analysis of the current situation in institutional, economic, geographical and demographic frameworks was also conducted taking into account nine risk criteria. 599. Türkiye considers that the highest TF risk within the NPO sector is to be found within humanitarian aid associations operating close to an area posing an active terrorist threat such as the southern border, which is in line with the country’s risk profile. Türkiye has conducted a thorough risk assessment of the sector and established a risk scoring methodology revised on a yearly basis, allowing to consider that only 1.2% of the NPO population represent a high or medium risk. The GDRCS re-evaluates yearly the risk ratings of high and medium risk NPOs. This has led to amending NPOs risk scores, especially downgrading the risk from high to medium risk or even from medium to low risk, thus being left out of the scope of monitoring/auditing process. As a result of risk analyses conducted within the scope of the methodology, a total of 1 095 associations changed risk groups between 2023, 2024 and 2025 which demonstrates that the methodology is actively working and effective. Over the reporting period a yearly average of 135 NPOs are considered high risk yearly, and 710 medium risks. 600. While the number of high risks NPOs has remained relatively stable, the number of medium risks NPOs varied more intensely, reflecting contextual factors. For instance, the number of medium risks NPOs has more than doubled between 2024 and 2025. This is explained as the determination of the risk scoring for NPOs in 2025 was based on the information available on NPOs as of the 2023 financial year. However, in 2023, Türkiye suffered from a massive earthquake, leading NPOs to receive much more funds from abroad than usual and deploy activities in the regions most affected, which are neighbouring Syria and represent a higher potential TF risk. This contextual factor explains the surge in the number of NPOs classified as medium risk in 2025. Table 10.2. NPO risk classification (2021-2025) Year High risk NPOs Medium risk NPOs 2021 170 1 172 2022 169 533 2023 115 558 2024 100 432 2025 131 860 NPO oversight 601. In Türkiye, NPOs in the form of associations are formed by at least seven natural or legal persons and acquire legal personality without the need for prior permission the moment they submit their establishment notification the local administrative authority. Foreign NPOs can engage in activities in Türkiye and open representative offices subject to approval from the MoI. NPOs information is centralised in DERBIS which both, authorities and NPOs, consider very convenient to keep up-to-date information. 602. Türkiye’s legal framework provides for measures applicable to all NPOs which could unduly disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activities. For example, all NPOs are obliged to submit a yearly financial statement, to report the aid they receive from abroad before using it, to report beforehand any aid they will be providing and all persons collecting aid should obtain prior authorisation from competent authorities. NPOs are also not only monitored in the scope of TF but also for ML purposes which goes beyond the requirement of the FATF Standards and could create unjustified additional oversight of NPOs activities. 603. Notwithstanding the above, the AT did not receive evidence that the mentioned measures are resorted to in practice to unduly disrupt NPOs activities. During onsite meetings, representatives from the NPO sector considered those measures as necessary, in light of Türkiye’ specific risk exposure, to ensure the soundness of the NPO sector in the country and that those requirements facilitate the establishment of relationship with foreign donors. In addition, in January 2024 the Constitutional Court annulled the provision of the Law on Associations (Law 5253) that gave powers to the MoI to temporarily suspend the activities of an NPOs on the basis of a suspicion of a criminal activity. Authorities confirmed that they have no intention to reintroduce such measure. 604. Following a RBA, Türkiye has focused its oversight activities on the high and medium risk NPOs. In light of the yearly risk scoring described above, the GDRCS focuses its audit activities on all high risk NPOs yearly and medium risk NPOs at least every two years. Even though Türkiye’s framework provides for the audit of low-risk NPOs, more than 80 000 entities, the GDRCS do not in practice conduct such audits as it is impossible to audit such a large population and oversight efforts are focused on the higher risk entities in line with a targeted, RBA. To support audit activities, Türkiye developed regulations and guidance for NPOs’ oversight limiting the scope of the audit an NPO is subject to. Monitoring of NPOs is conducted by GDRCS within the framework of the risk-based audit methodology updated annually. All NPOs the AT engaged with during the onsite visit had been subject to onsite monitoring by GDRCS, none consider that the scope of the audit was too broad nor that it disrupted their activities. Some received fines which they considered helpful to improve further their compliance with the requirements. Table 10.3. Outcomes of audits for high and medium risks NPOs (2021-2025) Year Audited Associations Judicial Fine Administrative Fine Both Judicial Proceeding and Administrative Fine 2021 1 342 21 370 53 2022 701 23 273 43 2023 671 18 301 29 2024 530 11 189 18 2025* 560 9 243 29 Note: (*) Covering the period from 1 January - 28 November 2025 605. Sanctions against NPOs are applied in a proportionate manner depending on the degree of the offence. Fines and sanctions are defined by law following the principle of proportionality, hence limiting the discretion of the administration. Also, sanctions, administrative fines or judicial fines/penalties are not to be imposed to the NPOs themselves in accordance with the principle of individual criminal responsibility, penalties can be only imposed to the natural person(s) who committed the misdemeanour or the crime. The most common reasons for imposing sanctions on NPOs as a result of monitoring activities are failure to notify and keep proper books obligations, such as failure to submit the association declaration, holding general assembly meetings, failure to comply with money transfer obligations through the banking system (including by resorting to hawala) or discrepancies with accounting procedures and principles. 606. In line with its risk profile, Türkiye has also identified several NPOs being abused for TF purposes and taken measures mitigating measures accordingly. GDRCS informs other relevant authorities in cases where an association is suspected to being linked to a TO or TF, GDRCS may either notify MASAK or it may directly report a criminal complaint to the public prosecutors. Türkiye has frozen the assets of 3 NPOs located in Türkiye, of whom 2 are considered to be affiliated to UN designated terrorist organisations. In addition, 35 NPOs located abroad have been added to Türkiye domestic listing regime, all are branches of NPOs linked with domestically designated TOs. Box 10.4. NPO abused for TF purposes Following an audit by the GDRCS, Association X was reported to MASAK for analysis due to various suspicions, including being used to finance activities and carry out propaganda in support of a domestically listed TO. As a result of the analysis conducted by MASAK, it was found that many financial transactions were carried out within the scope of the domestic TO's financial structure, management and activities of the association were dedicated to the organisation. Front companies were also used to provide financial support to the organisation and conceal their activities. These front companies were connected to genuine commercial enterprises that could act as intermediaries in providing financial support to the organisation. Intelligence obtained from security and intelligence units also revealed that the funds collected were also used to finance experienced members of the terrorist organisation who issued orders for actions and activities within Türkiye, as well as to support terrorist acts. A was sent to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office to initiate legal proceedings. Accordingly, 23 suspects, including individuals identified as having been selected from among those holding managerial positions within the domestic terrorist organization, were investigated on charges of “membership in an armed terrorist organization” and “propaganda for a terrorist organization. Following a thorough examination of the information and documents obtained from relevant institutions and organisations regarding data accessed by MASAK, it was assessed that the activities of the individuals subject to the analysis could constitute reasonable grounds for the commission of acts falling within the scope of the crime of terrorist financing. The Evaluation Commission recommended to the MoTF and the MoI that the assets of several individuals and Association X in Türkiye be frozen. Association X was then dissolved by decision of the Civil Court of First Instance in 2024. 607. Authorities have engaged with the sector to a large extent in awareness raising activities and demonstrated efforts to monitor the sector without disrupting legitimate activities especially for NPOs operating in high-risk areas. Authorities established several guidance and good practices paper to inform NPOs about their risks of being abused for TF purposes and have conducted many outreach activities to raise awareness in the sector, for over 50 000 NPOs representatives. The GDRCS is deployed in all 81 provinces in Türkiye and NPO oversight is achieved via the local governorate and association auditors which ensure close relationship and understanding of the realities NPOs face on the ground. NPOs representatives highlighted the close co-operation with the GDCRS. Some NPOs operating in high-risk areas (i.e. at the border with Syria) and met during the onsite visit underscored the close co-ordination with the GDRCS for them to access the formal financial system to receive funds and also in the disbursement of their aid in cash if needed (e.g. where no bank presence). Footnotes [42] Associations for: 1) Professional and Solidarity Associations (social) ,2) Sports and Sports-Related Associations (social and cultural) , 3) Associations Engaged in Activities Related to the Provision of Religious Services (religious), 4) Education Research Associations (education), 5) Culture, Arts, and Tourism Associations (cultural), 6) Humanitarian Aid Associations (charitable), 7) Associations for Preserving Social Values (cultural), 8) Associations Engaged in Health Activities (good works), 9) Urban Planning, Development, and Improvement Associations (good works), 10) International Organizations and Co-operation Associations (good works), 11) Environmental, Natural Life, and Animal Protection Associations (good works), 12) Associations for the Disabled (good works), 13) Associations Active in the Fields of Food, Agriculture, and Animal Husbandry (good works), 14) Associations for Solidarity with Turks Abroad (good works), 15) Associations for the Elderly and Children (good works),16) Associations for Individual Education and Social Development (social)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 517. Türkiye has a hybrid system (cash declaration and disclosure systems) in terms of seizing non-declared or falsely declared cross-border currency movements. Despite Türkiye’s efforts in resourcing Customs Enforcement checkpoints with the highest technology, in line with its ICRG Action Plan, the number of non-declared or falsely declared cross-border currency and BNI movements detection and seizure remains limited. This is not aligned with the country’s risk profile as cash-smuggling is rated as a medium risk in the 2025 NRA. 518. Customs Enforcement is the competent authority accountable for receiving cash declarations and disclosures, detecting illegal cross-border movements of currencies and BNIs and seizing them at border check points. Türkiye has demonstrated a stable increase in cash declarations and disclosures since 2021. See below: Table 8.5. Cash declaration and disclosure reports (2020-2025) Cash declarations Cash disclosures Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Year No. Transactions Amount (EUR)** No. Transactions Amount (EUR) No. Transactions Amount (EUR) No. Transactions Amount (EUR) 2020 14765 €7,364,160.,755 1030 €1,347,734,215 117 €45,085,575 1378 € 5,049,663 2021 25601 €21,480,648,592 3658 €3,219,262,980 10340 $213,296,666 17067 €12,482,095 2022 31344 €23,976,412,012 5798 €6,922,315,173 14874 $56,205,333 29146 €19,458,874 2023 32339 €19,793,870,221 6174 €8,410,409,850 5928 $35,787,546 16086 €11,688,858 2024 19175 €8,402,391,339 4211 €2,568,120,646 12156 $47,884,222 15366 €9,701,931 2025* 9475 €6,859,573,745 3200 €2,967,308,686 11060 $37,298,362 19528 €19,021,589 Total 132699 €87,887,056,601 24071 €25,435,151,551 54475 $435,557,704 98751 €77,403,010 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 519. To improve the identification of non-declared or falsely declared cross-border movements of currency and BNI, CE has invested significantly in technical equipment including advanced technology, such as drones and tomographic luggage X-ray devices. In addition, 17 money counting machines with features such as distinguishing counterfeit money, recording serial numbers of money and counting more than one currency at the same time, have been provided to provincial administrations to carry out cash control operations in a reliable and fast manner. Competent authorities highlight this investment as significant improvements in the detection of cash smuggling. In 2016, the CE has established a certified World Customs Organisation K9 training facility to train cash, narcotics, tea/tobacco and explosive detector dogs. Between 2021-2025, CE trained a total of 11 268 officers in charge or passengers operations cash control trainings. Competent authorities report that these investments have led to an increase in cross- cash interceptions at customs checkpoints. 520. CE carry out controls upon entry to and exit from the country. Customs officers can physically verify the declared amount of currency were deemed necessary (i.e., when observing red flags, inconsistencies, or behaviour-based alerts). In such cases, the cash may be inspected, counted, and compared against the declared figure. If a passenger has failed to declare or made a false declaration or disclosure, the CE officer completes a new declaration form reflecting the accurate amount, the cash is seized, and the case is reported to the public prosecutor. A copy of the case file, including the declaration form and seizure records, is transmitted to MASAK in accordance with the reporting obligations. This reflects the existence of financial monitoring at border points aimed at identifying potential ML risks associated with cross‑border movements. However, the number of opened cases remains limited (506) given Türkiye’s medium level of cash smuggling. 521. In addition to the declaration system, Türkiye operates a disclosure system that allows customs officers to request information from passengers regarding the cash or payment instruments they carry. Under this framework, passengers may be invited to make a disclosure by customs officers based on risk profiling, behavioural red flags, or random selection, regardless of whether the amount carried exceeds a legal threshold. Officers may request details about the amount, origin, and intended use of the funds upon entry to or exit from the country, and the process is not limited to specific types of currency or financial instruments. If a passenger refuses to respond, or provides a false or misleading explanation upon request, a Cash Disclosure Report is drawn up and signed by at least two customs officers and the passenger. This report is forwarded to MASAK, and the case is also submitted to the Public Prosecutor. If a violation is confirmed, the undeclared or miss declared funds are seized. 522. In situations where the cash or other items being transported include foreign exchange, securities, precious metals, or other high-value instruments and the act involves unauthorized import or exports procedures, administrative fines can also be imposed up to the full value of the goods, or 50% in case of attempt unless the conduct constitutes a smuggling offence. 523. Between 2020 and 2025, CE have identified and seized non-declared and falsely declared currency for a total of EUR 85.2 M in land and airport customs controls points. The currencies more frequently seized are US dollars, Turkish lira and Euros. Within the scope of cash controls, suspicious indicators such as the unusual behaviour of individuals carrying cash, the presence of large-denomination banknotes (e.g., EUR 200 and EUR 500), concealment of money on persons or in vehicles, and disproportionate transaction volumes conducted by companies relative to their declared business activities are monitored closely. In addition, data derived from risk analyses conducted on legal entities and transaction patterns are evaluated. When such elements raise suspicion, reports are submitted to the judicial authorities, and the MASAK is granted access to the related data to conduct further financial analysis on potentially high-risk individuals, transactions, or corporate entities. The number of such reports submitted by year is presented in the table below. Table 8.6. Cash seizures at CE checkpoints leading to notifications to MASAK (2020-2025)* Year Number of transactions Cash Seized (EUR)** Notifications to MASAK 2020 55 € 15,025,403 0 2021 52 €7,421,798 1 2022 58 €10,592,182 1 2023 72 €13,763,745 19 2024 139 €21,680,024 76 2025 130 €16,721,928 366 Total 506 €85,205,081 463 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 524. The significant higher volume of incoming cash declarations (EUR 87.9 billion) compared to outgoing ones (EUR 25.4 billion), and the incoming cash disclosure (EUR 435 M) and outgoing (EUR 77 M), coupled with minimal seizures and the high risk of smuggling, indicates limited effectiveness of the existing control measures. In addition, the predominance of inbound declarations and the dissemination of only 506 reports to MASAK, while seizing 463 times in customs gates, suggests potential gaps in enforcement and risks management at entry points. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 525. Türkiye authorities have shown they can confiscate currency or BNIs where they considered there is a link to ML/TF or associated predicate offences through six case studies. While the competent authorities have seized foreign currency, cash, and goods (notably gold and technology) to some extent and have, where relevant, initiated criminal investigations, they are not able to demonstrate that these seizures are linked to money laundering, terrorist financing, or specific predicate offences. This points to limitations in Türkiye’s ability to effectively identify and substantiate ML, TF, or related predicate offence typologies when pursuing confiscation orders when assets are being seized as a result of the application of CE enforcement measures. 8.7.3. Sanctions 526. For cash disclosure an administrative fine equal to 10% of the difference between the declared and actual amounts is imposed on the traveller. However, if the discrepancy is below EUR 1 000 (50 000TRY), no penalty is applied. Sanctions effectiveness was not measured due to the lack of information. Table 8.7. Cash seized based on CE sanctions imposed (2020-2025) Year Value Seized (TRY) Value Seize (EUR)** 2020 ₺ 10,737,242 € 1,288,469 2021 ₺ 19,723,944 € 1,913,223 2022 ₺ 35,830,821 € 2,042,357 2023 ₺ 147,542,972.00 € 6,049,262 2024 ₺ 72,466,244 € 2,029,055 2025* ₺ 70,170,782 € 1,543,757 Total ₺ 356,472,005 € 14,866,122 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 201. Supervisors generally have a good understanding of ML/TF risks both at sectoral and entities level for FIs and VASPs. The AML/CFT expert resources within MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department demonstrates a deep understanding of ML/TF risks across different financial sectors, types of institutions, and emerging threats. By contrast, sectoral supervisors risk understanding is less developed and focuses more on risk mitigation measures and, to a lesser extent, on the underlying and actual ML/TF risks themselves. Given MASAK’s role as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, this difference in understanding is expected; however, enhancing sectoral supervisors’ knowledge of ML/TF risks would strengthen the effectiveness of their AML‑related supervisory activities. 202. In 2021, as part of its AML/CFT Strategy, Türkiye established the “Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups”, led by MASAK and comprising all relevant competent authorities, in charge of assessing Türkiye’s ML/TF risks. Under the Vulnerability Working Group (WGs), 8 risk analysis sub-groups were created to assess sectoral risks and entities risk level for banks, NBFIs, capital markets, MVTS, insurance, EO, VASPs and DNFBPs. Under the supervision of MASAK, those sub-groups are gathering sectoral regulatory and supervisory authorities, professional associations of each sector and representatives of the private sector. 203. In 2022, the Risk Analysis WGs first determined and evaluated the inherent risks of the sectors and calculated residual risk scores, considering mitigating measures applied by the obliged entities. The general method used in the risk analysis of the financial sector is comprised of 4 phases. In the first phase, inherent risks of the sectors are identified and assessed by taking the impact and likelihood of the risks. In the second phase, measures used by the sectors to mitigate the inherent are identified and assessed to determine their effects. This leads to the third phase where a survey is sent to reporting entities in each sector to determine which of the risk mitigating measures (among the ones identified in the second phase) they are using to manage their risks. As a result, residual risk scores for each obliged party is calculated by assessing the measures they are taking. In the fourth phase, risk factors that are not included in the first three phases but that are important for risk analysis are included in the analysis. Those criteria consist of size of the sector, results of supervision of AML/CFT and prudential obligations, materiality (transaction volume, asset size etc.), STRs, analyses report from MASAK, and other notifications/denunciations sent about the reporting entities. All those factors are considered, and the sectoral risk level is identified and assessed annually. 204. Türkiye has established a similar, multi-phased methodology to assess ML/TF risks at the level of individual FIs and VASPs (entity level risk scoring), updated yearly which serves as a basis for the implementation of risk-based supervisory programmes (see 3.5). The methodology combines inherent risk analysis, evaluation of mitigating measures, and integration of supervisory and enforcement data to produce a comprehensive risk profile for each entity. Consultation with the private sector is ensured though professional associations. For the EO sector, while there is no professional association for which the membership is mandatory, consultation was conducted through the Risk Analysis WGs for EOs, which includes participation from private sector representatives. For VASPs, consultation occurs through the Türkiye Capital Markets Association (TCMA), as there is no professional association dedicated solely to VASPs. Each entity is categorized into one of three risk categories (high, medium, low) based on their overall net rating. Entities’ individual rating is reviewed annually for all FIs and VASPs. Table 3.4. FIs and VASP risk level Institutions Sectoral risk level Overall number of Institutions 2024 Entities Risk Level (number) High Medium Banks High 63 3 28 VASPs* High 88 5 33 MVTs Medium High 89 5 35 Exchange Offices Medium High 773 35 129 Capital Market Sector Medium 205 10 42 NBFIs Medium 124 6 36 Insurance Medium Low 73 2 0 Precious Metals Intermediary Medium Low 46 2 0 Note: * the figures presented for VASPs are before the introduction of the 2025 licensing process that was still ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. 205. The distribution of entity‑level ratings indicates that only a small proportion of institutions within each financial sector are classified as high risk - approximately 5–6% even in sectors assessed as having high or medium‑high inherent risk (banks, VASPs, MVTS providers and EOs). This does not, in itself, indicate misclassification of risk at entity level, as sector‑level risk does not imply that all entities within the sector present the same risk profile, and entity‑level risk assessments appropriately reflect differences in size, products, services and exposure. Nevertheless, the limited number of entities classified as high risk may suggest that the current scoring methodology does not fully capture variations in risk across the FI and VASP population. As outlined in section 3.5, Türkiye’s supervisory authorities direct supervisory attention not only to high‑risk but also to medium‑risk institutions. In this context, while the small number of entities classified as high risk should be noted, the assessment of how supervisory resources are applied proportionately across different risk levels is even more important. The risk categorisation is ultimately a tool to guide supervisory prioritisation, rather than an objective in itself. 206. MASAK has undertaken significant efforts to build an understanding of ML/TF risks in the VASP sector through a strategic analysis in 2022, updated in 2025. The updated study involved data collection on 74 VASPs, including transaction patterns, customer activity, banking relationships, STRs, adverse media, and enforcement records. This analysis concluded that VASPs pose high ML/TF risks, driven by factors such as sector size, product diversity, high violation rates, and confirmed cases of misuse for fraud, illegal betting, gambling, drug trafficking, forgery, and TF linked to terrorist organisations exploiting religious beliefs. These findings demonstrate that MASAK has a strong grasp of sectoral vulnerabilities and emerging risks. CMB’s understanding of VASP-related ML/TF risks is still developing, in particular with regard to the technical specificities of VASP operations and the emerging risk profiles unique to the sector, as supervision of VASPs is a new responsibility for CMB. While CMB has longstanding experience in licensing and supervising capital market actors its awareness of VASP-specific risks is less developed than MASAK’s, indicating uneven understanding across competent authorities. 207. In general, sectoral supervisors’ understanding focuses more on risk mitigation measures and, to a lesser extent, on comprehensive understanding of the actual ML/TF risks their sectors are exposed to. This could explain why sectoral supervisors - whose primary focus is on prudential supervision - despite participating in the risk working groups, articulate the actual ML/TF risks their sector is exposed to less comprehensively than MASAK. While this is to some extent aligned with the role they play in the system, strengthening their understanding would significantly enhance their effectiveness, particularly as they form part of MASAK’s AML/CFT supervisory strategy. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 208. Authorities actively promote FIs’ and VASPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks through structured engagement mechanisms. As described above, the Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG and the sectoral risks working groups provide a platform for FIs and VASPs to share their perspectives on emerging risks and, in turn, to gain insight into the supervisors’ risk assessments and supervisory priorities. These forums not only facilitate dialogue but also contribute directly to the development of the sectoral risk assessments which feed the NRA and of supervisory programs (see 3.5). 209. Findings from Risk Analysis WGs have informed the preparation of Sectoral Risk Assessment Reports by professional associations, ensuring that sector-specific vulnerabilities are clearly identified and communicated. However, such reports have not been prepared for some high/medium-high risk sectors (e.g. VASPs and exchange offices). This is largely due to the absence of a dedicated professional association for these sectors. While the Türkiye TCMA participated in the Risk Analysis Working Group for VASPs, it is not an association exclusively established for VASPs. During the onsite visit, VASP representatives emphasized the need to create a dedicated professional association to further promote understanding and information sharing on ML/TF risks. 210. MASAK’s activities have strengthened FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and their related obligations to a large extent, with financial institutions widely acknowledging the quality of the work conducted by MASAK. Over the reporting period, and in line with the requirement of the ICRG Action Plan, MASAK has conducted a significant number of trainings and workshops for all FIs and VASPs. 211. MASAK also provides feedback to FIs and VASPs relating to their AML/CFT supervision results and publishes guidelines on ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. This collaborative approach enhances transparency and supports FIs in aligning their risk management frameworks with national priorities. This is an ongoing work, as a result of the 2025 NRA, more than 10 guidance documents are being updated including on STRs, ML/TF typologies, PEP, VASPs, BO, identification of parties to a trust agreement established abroad. FIs met during the onsite were also keen on receiving more general feedback on the overall results of supervision in their respective sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 201. Supervisors generally have a good understanding of ML/TF risks both at sectoral and entities level for FIs and VASPs. The AML/CFT expert resources within MASAK’s Supervision of Obligations Department demonstrates a deep understanding of ML/TF risks across different financial sectors, types of institutions, and emerging threats. By contrast, sectoral supervisors risk understanding is less developed and focuses more on risk mitigation measures and, to a lesser extent, on the underlying and actual ML/TF risks themselves. Given MASAK’s role as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, this difference in understanding is expected; however, enhancing sectoral supervisors’ knowledge of ML/TF risks would strengthen the effectiveness of their AML‑related supervisory activities. 202. In 2021, as part of its AML/CFT Strategy, Türkiye established the “Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups”, led by MASAK and comprising all relevant competent authorities, in charge of assessing Türkiye’s ML/TF risks. Under the Vulnerability Working Group (WGs), 8 risk analysis sub-groups were created to assess sectoral risks and entities risk level for banks, NBFIs, capital markets, MVTS, insurance, EO, VASPs and DNFBPs. Under the supervision of MASAK, those sub-groups are gathering sectoral regulatory and supervisory authorities, professional associations of each sector and representatives of the private sector. 203. In 2022, the Risk Analysis WGs first determined and evaluated the inherent risks of the sectors and calculated residual risk scores, considering mitigating measures applied by the obliged entities. The general method used in the risk analysis of the financial sector is comprised of 4 phases. In the first phase, inherent risks of the sectors are identified and assessed by taking the impact and likelihood of the risks. In the second phase, measures used by the sectors to mitigate the inherent are identified and assessed to determine their effects. This leads to the third phase where a survey is sent to reporting entities in each sector to determine which of the risk mitigating measures (among the ones identified in the second phase) they are using to manage their risks. As a result, residual risk scores for each obliged party is calculated by assessing the measures they are taking. In the fourth phase, risk factors that are not included in the first three phases but that are important for risk analysis are included in the analysis. Those criteria consist of size of the sector, results of supervision of AML/CFT and prudential obligations, materiality (transaction volume, asset size etc.), STRs, analyses report from MASAK, and other notifications/denunciations sent about the reporting entities. All those factors are considered, and the sectoral risk level is identified and assessed annually. 204. Türkiye has established a similar, multi-phased methodology to assess ML/TF risks at the level of individual FIs and VASPs (entity level risk scoring), updated yearly which serves as a basis for the implementation of risk-based supervisory programmes (see 3.5). The methodology combines inherent risk analysis, evaluation of mitigating measures, and integration of supervisory and enforcement data to produce a comprehensive risk profile for each entity. Consultation with the private sector is ensured though professional associations. For the EO sector, while there is no professional association for which the membership is mandatory, consultation was conducted through the Risk Analysis WGs for EOs, which includes participation from private sector representatives. For VASPs, consultation occurs through the Türkiye Capital Markets Association (TCMA), as there is no professional association dedicated solely to VASPs. Each entity is categorized into one of three risk categories (high, medium, low) based on their overall net rating. Entities’ individual rating is reviewed annually for all FIs and VASPs. Table 3.4. FIs and VASP risk level Institutions Sectoral risk level Overall number of Institutions 2024 Entities Risk Level (number) High Medium Banks High 63 3 28 VASPs* High 88 5 33 MVTs Medium High 89 5 35 Exchange Offices Medium High 773 35 129 Capital Market Sector Medium 205 10 42 NBFIs Medium 124 6 36 Insurance Medium Low 73 2 0 Precious Metals Intermediary Medium Low 46 2 0 Note: * the figures presented for VASPs are before the introduction of the 2025 licensing process that was still ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. 205. The distribution of entity‑level ratings indicates that only a small proportion of institutions within each financial sector are classified as high risk - approximately 5–6% even in sectors assessed as having high or medium‑high inherent risk (banks, VASPs, MVTS providers and EOs). This does not, in itself, indicate misclassification of risk at entity level, as sector‑level risk does not imply that all entities within the sector present the same risk profile, and entity‑level risk assessments appropriately reflect differences in size, products, services and exposure. Nevertheless, the limited number of entities classified as high risk may suggest that the current scoring methodology does not fully capture variations in risk across the FI and VASP population. As outlined in section 3.5, Türkiye’s supervisory authorities direct supervisory attention not only to high‑risk but also to medium‑risk institutions. In this context, while the small number of entities classified as high risk should be noted, the assessment of how supervisory resources are applied proportionately across different risk levels is even more important. The risk categorisation is ultimately a tool to guide supervisory prioritisation, rather than an objective in itself. 206. MASAK has undertaken significant efforts to build an understanding of ML/TF risks in the VASP sector through a strategic analysis in 2022, updated in 2025. The updated study involved data collection on 74 VASPs, including transaction patterns, customer activity, banking relationships, STRs, adverse media, and enforcement records. This analysis concluded that VASPs pose high ML/TF risks, driven by factors such as sector size, product diversity, high violation rates, and confirmed cases of misuse for fraud, illegal betting, gambling, drug trafficking, forgery, and TF linked to terrorist organisations exploiting religious beliefs. These findings demonstrate that MASAK has a strong grasp of sectoral vulnerabilities and emerging risks. CMB’s understanding of VASP-related ML/TF risks is still developing, in particular with regard to the technical specificities of VASP operations and the emerging risk profiles unique to the sector, as supervision of VASPs is a new responsibility for CMB. While CMB has longstanding experience in licensing and supervising capital market actors its awareness of VASP-specific risks is less developed than MASAK’s, indicating uneven understanding across competent authorities. 207. In general, sectoral supervisors’ understanding focuses more on risk mitigation measures and, to a lesser extent, on comprehensive understanding of the actual ML/TF risks their sectors are exposed to. This could explain why sectoral supervisors - whose primary focus is on prudential supervision - despite participating in the risk working groups, articulate the actual ML/TF risks their sector is exposed to less comprehensively than MASAK. While this is to some extent aligned with the role they play in the system, strengthening their understanding would significantly enhance their effectiveness, particularly as they form part of MASAK’s AML/CFT supervisory strategy. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 208. Authorities actively promote FIs’ and VASPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks through structured engagement mechanisms. As described above, the Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG and the sectoral risks working groups provide a platform for FIs and VASPs to share their perspectives on emerging risks and, in turn, to gain insight into the supervisors’ risk assessments and supervisory priorities. These forums not only facilitate dialogue but also contribute directly to the development of the sectoral risk assessments which feed the NRA and of supervisory programs (see 3.5). 209. Findings from Risk Analysis WGs have informed the preparation of Sectoral Risk Assessment Reports by professional associations, ensuring that sector-specific vulnerabilities are clearly identified and communicated. However, such reports have not been prepared for some high/medium-high risk sectors (e.g. VASPs and exchange offices). This is largely due to the absence of a dedicated professional association for these sectors. While the Türkiye TCMA participated in the Risk Analysis Working Group for VASPs, it is not an association exclusively established for VASPs. During the onsite visit, VASP representatives emphasized the need to create a dedicated professional association to further promote understanding and information sharing on ML/TF risks. 210. MASAK’s activities have strengthened FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and their related obligations to a large extent, with financial institutions widely acknowledging the quality of the work conducted by MASAK. Over the reporting period, and in line with the requirement of the ICRG Action Plan, MASAK has conducted a significant number of trainings and workshops for all FIs and VASPs. 211. MASAK also provides feedback to FIs and VASPs relating to their AML/CFT supervision results and publishes guidelines on ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. This collaborative approach enhances transparency and supports FIs in aligning their risk management frameworks with national priorities. This is an ongoing work, as a result of the 2025 NRA, more than 10 guidance documents are being updated including on STRs, ML/TF typologies, PEP, VASPs, BO, identification of parties to a trust agreement established abroad. FIs met during the onsite were also keen on receiving more general feedback on the overall results of supervision in their respective sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 307. Overall, DNFBPs apply CDD to some extent and have a basic understanding of BO requirements but rely too heavily on other reporting entities’ AML/CFT obligations to mitigate risks. 308. CDD requirements are implemented across all sectors for any transaction above the legal threshold of approx. EUR 3 500, with certain accountant and legal professions applying CDD measures for any customer. DNFBPs also rely on official identification documents as part of CDD process and some entities reported their refusal to carry out a business relationship due to the inability to identify or verify the identity of the customer. However, violation of CDD requirements is the most common violation of AML/CFT requirements by DNFBPs and the ratio of entities that have been supervised and found in violation remains high, highlighting that the implementation of those requirements needs to be strengthened. 309. Many DPMS and REAs use a KYC form that includes all the criteria requested by law, and collect customer and beneficiary information through this way, but verification of the accuracy of the information is not always conducted. For REAs, an online system has been established by the MoT for the advertisement of real estate which requires, any person willing to buy/sell property via a REA to disclose identity information and provide relevant documentation. 310. Some entities have published their obligations regarding customer identification on their websites to give information to customers, including the need for those who act for the benefit of others to disclose it. Accountants, lawyers and notaries are by virtue of their activities more familiar with their clients and perform CDD at the onboarding stage. Nevertheless, DNFBPs conduct CDD monitoring to a more limited extent, mostly if a suspicion arises. 311. There is an overall understanding of the concept of BO in the DNFBP sector. Yet, DNFBPs largely rely on information provided by their clients to identify BO and report challenges to perform BO identification in the case of foreign legal persons. The ownership structure is only checked to some extent in accordance with the information held by the TRA through the tax statement that legal persons are asked to provide when entering into a business relationship. Some DNFBPs also conduct manual checks on open-source information if doubts arise. Notaries are performing public service duties and cannot carry out transactions within the scope of their authority (sales of assets, registration, company contracts, power of attorney) without BO verification. 312. As FIs, DNFBPs are required to retain the documents, books and records, identification documents kept in all forms regarding their transactions and obligations for eight years and provide all kinds of information and documents when requested by supervisors. Since the violation of this obligation will result in criminal charges and potential imprisonment up to three years there is general awareness on this requirement across DNFBPs. Since 2021, three criminal complaints were filled by supervisors to the public prosecutor’s office for infringement with record-keeping requirements and two criminal complaints were filled for infringement with providing information requirements. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 313. DNFBPs met during the onsite generally perform EDD when considering high-risk clients and/or transactions. Criteria such as destination of the transaction, origin of wealth, use of cash, suspicion on client identity or ultimate beneficiary of the transaction. DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers from higher-risk jurisdictions, while some indicated that they would automatically reject customers from specific countries which could lead to disproportionate exclusion of some. 314. DNFBPs have an overall understanding of the concept of PEP but identification is achieved to a limited extent. Checks are mostly conducted manually and while larger DNFBPs resort to commercial databases, smaller entities rely on their own knowledge of the customer. Some DNFBPs reported that EDD could extend to PEP relatives when they are identified but reported challenges in identifying foreign PEP. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 315. Except for DPMS, other DNFBP sectors barely report suspicious transactions, this is not in line with the risks they are exposed to especially for REAs, accountants and to a lesser extent lawyers. 316. In line with its 2020 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye has strengthened awareness raising for DPMS and REAs in terms of suspicious reporting, including via the issuance of a specific guidance. This has led to a significant increase in the number of STRs, nevertheless, this increase is solely driven by the enhanced reporting of DPMS, while other sectors reporting remains negligeable. This coupled with the DNFBPs generally lower understanding of ML/TF risks, increase the risks of undetected suspicious activities. In addition, supervisors barely detect breaches of STRs reporting when conducting inspections of DPMS and REAs, which questions the effective monitoring of this criteria. DNFBPs met during the onsite reported that they would benefit from further understanding of ML/TF typologies to better capture potential suspicious cases. 317. DNFBPs are generally aware of the risk of tipping-off. To prevent potential tipping off, some entities conduct trainings to their personnel most involved in commercial relations, especially in the REAs and DPMS sectors. Table 4.4. Suspicious reporting by DNFBPs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* DPMS 51 138 320 683 1 097 2 161 REAs - 9 2 19 1 6 Lawyers - 2 - 3 3 - Notaries 5 24 22 4 1 3 Accountants - - - - - 42 Total 56 173 344 709 1 102 2 212 Note: *until November 2025. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 318. Unlike FIs, DNFBPs are not obliged to prepare a compliance program but are required to carry out training, surveillance, monitoring and control activities to identify risks and take appropriate mitigating measures, in practice this is only done by larger DNFBPs. As described above, DNFBPs develop institutional risk assessment to a limited extent which does not support the implementation of effective internal controls and procedures to ensure compliance. In addition, supervisors almost did not identify infringement of internal controls requirements, indicating that there is a lack of focus on the implementation of such measures in the course of supervisory activities which is a concern. 319. Internal controls are generally established in larger DNFBPs with internal control processes and procedures specifically related to their business activities and designation of compliance officers. Some international firms (accounting, law, DPMS) apply group-wide AML/CFT controls. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 320. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 508. Türkiye is able to confiscate and enforce orders on criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically. However, the size of assets recovered appears to be modest given Türkiye’s risk and context. 509. For an asset to be subject to confiscation, it must either constitute the object of the offence, be derived from the offence, be used in its commission, or be intended for its commission. Additionally, any property whose production, possession, use, transportation, purchase, or sale constitutes an offence shall be confiscated directly, without the need to meet the above conditions. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye confiscated above EUR 93 M (see table 8.2) which demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to convert seizures into final confiscations to some extent. In addition, a total of 560 assets (see table 8.3), including vehicles (36%), bank and other type of FIs accounts (12%) and immovable properties (12%). The low number of banks and other FIs accounts remains a concern given Türkiye’s’ risk profile (see IO.1 and IO.3). In addition, it was not possible to distinguish if the confiscated assets were located domestically or abroad. 510. In addition to confiscation measures conducted under a criminal process, complementary administrative mechanisms are also employed to deprive criminals of illicit assets. These include the seizure and detention of smuggled goods under the Customs Law and Anti-Smuggling Law, as well as tax audits and fines arising from tax evasion inspections. These measures are implemented concurrently. Since the benefits derived from tax crimes are followed up by the Tax Board, a confiscation decision cannot be made regarding the income derived from these crimes. However, recovery of the illicit benefit is largely pursued through the tax administration via tax assessments and penalties, rather than through criminal confiscation. Tax fines represent nearly 75% of the total tax revenue collected by the country. 511. Non-conviction-based confiscations (NCBC) are applicable when the offence perpetrator is a fugitive, unknown or abroad, or in case of death if the legal requirements are met. In these cases, NCBC is applicable to items whose production, possession, use, transport, purchase or sale constitute an offence. Türkiye has applied NCBC in one case. Türkiye can also apply an ‘additional indictment’ (post-conviction confiscation) procedure to extend confiscation to assets linked to prior convictions. This process does not equal a general confiscation an/or other assets that cannot be proven to be linked to the prior conviction. However, due to the limited information on the implementation of such measures, their effectiveness cannot be assessed. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 512. Türkiye enforces confiscation orders from abroad (see IO.2) and has demonstrated through case studies to be able to repatriate assets from abroad to a limited extent. 513. When an asset located outside Türkiye is identified, public prosecutors develop a strategy to engage with their counterparts in the foreign jurisdiction and establish both informal and formal co-operation mechanisms to request the freezing, seizure, or confiscation of the asset (see IO.2). Informal co-operation mechanisms are generally initiated to identify the asset and develop a financial assessment of the suspect (i.e., bank accounts, travel history, nationality, whether dual citizenships or not) prior to issuing the MLA order. The aim is not only to trace the identified asset but also to expand the search to all other possible assets the suspect owns or holds outside Türkiye. When assets are identified, public prosecutors initiate the formal MLA process requesting the freezing, seizing or confiscation as needed. 514. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye requested the seizure of assets located abroad on a few times (eight) and initiated the formal MLA confiscation process in limited times (two). These two confiscation cases resulted in historical artifacts smuggled from Türkiye being successfully confiscated and repatriated. The low number of requests to execute freezing, seizure, and confiscation of assets abroad highlights the limited application of cross-border asset tracing and enforcement of seizure and confiscation measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. Türkiye applies a range of alternative criminal justice and administrative measures in cases where securing a TF conviction is not practicable. These include the use of alternative terrorism-related offences, offences related to unauthorised payment services, deportation measures, administrative asset freezing, and transaction postponements. While this provides an additional avenue to address unlawful conduct, the available information does not clearly distinguish between preventive and alternative measures, nor does it sufficiently demonstrate their contribution to disrupting the financial aspects of TF activity. 576. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye secured 59 convictions under alternative terrorism-related offences. This indicates that authorities are able to pursue alternative legal avenues where TF charges cannot be substantiated. In situations where the intent required for a TF offence cannot be established, authorities may pursue charges related to conducting payment services without proper authorisation. These measures can address illicit financial activity and may contribute to limiting the movement of funds, although their specific role in disrupting TF networks is not clearly articulated. 577. Türkiye also applies deportation measures in cases involving foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism or TF. Deportation may occur following conviction or be applied as a preventive measure on national security grounds. Over the assessment period, 15 524 deportations of foreign nationals were executed, although it is not specified how many of these relate directly to TF. While such measures may reduce immediate risks, their impact on the underlying financial aspects of TF activity is less evident. 578. Administrative tools include domestic asset freezing and transaction postponements. Transaction postponements (1 677 cases) are used as short-term preventive measures, allowing authorities additional time to conduct analysis and, where appropriate, pursue further investigative or judicial actions. These measures can support broader investigative processes, but on their own are temporary in nature. Authorities may also refer cases to tax authorities where financial irregularities are identified but do not meet the evidentiary threshold for TF prosecution. While this provides an additional avenue to address unlawful conduct, the connection between such measures and the disruption of TF activity is not clearly demonstrated. Box 9.3. Alternative conviction where TF prosecution was not possible The defendant Mr. M was investigated for conducting extensive domestic and international money transfers via the hawala system on behalf of a suspected armed TO. Communications were intercepted pursuant to Art. 135 of the CPC. Mr. M routed transfer-related communications through encrypted messaging applications and received commission on transactions. A search of his residence yielded digital materials, account passbooks in foreign names, Temporary Protection Identity Documents, passports, EUR 11 000 and USD 6 830 in cash. CBRT reporting confirmed high-volume transfers across his bank accounts. Although charges were brought for membership in an armed TO, the court found insufficient evidence of an organic link to the organisation's hierarchical structure and acquitted Mr. M of that charge. The court nonetheless found on the basis of intercepted communications, seized materials, witness statements, partial confessions and CBRT findings, that Mr. M had systematically conducted unauthorised fund transfers for commission while actively concealing his activities. He was convicted under Article 28/1 of Law No. 6493 and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment. The seized cash was confiscated. The case demonstrates the use of alternative financial legislation as a fall back where a TF conviction cannot be secured, allowing courts to sanction conduct and confiscate assets linked to suspected terrorist financing activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 644. In general, reporting entities’ level of understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations is more limited than for TF TFS. 645. Banks have a better understanding of their PF TFS obligations and of PF risks in general than other reporting entities. They are overall aware of potential cases of breach or non-implementation of TFS, as well as of more sophisticated ways of evading PF, identifying jurisdictions, beyond DPRK and Iran, that can be used for sanctions evasion, typologies related to the financing of dual use goods and transhipment risks. Banks in Türkiye clearly identify risks emanating from Iran as their main PF exposure. Banks understanding of their PF risks has been supported by two specific PF surveys circulated to the sector by the Banks Association of Türkiye and BRSA. The fact that the banking sector in Türkiye is highly connected to the international financial system with Turkish banks having branches abroad and being sensitive to UN as well as other domestic sanction regimes has enhanced sectoral efforts to understand and comply with PF requirements. However, in light of Türkiye’s context, the over reliance on commercial screening software may not support the identification of those acting on behalf or at the direction of UN designated persons and entities. 646. VASPs’ understanding of PF related TFS is limited to screening requirements rather than obligations related to the detection of those acting on behalf, or at the direction of, designated persons and entities. As for TF TFS, banks and VASPs comply with their PF TFS to a large extent, relying on international monitoring programs and software and applying daily screening to their customer database and/or transactions. 647. Other FIs are aware of their obligations to comply with UN lists screening however they have a vague to negligible understanding of the PF risks they are exposed to. Some entities are not aware of the difference between TF and PF TFS and a few representatives the assessment team met with considered that there was no PF risk in their sector. Those entities comply with their PF TFS obligations in a similar way as to their TF TFS ones. As highlighted under IO.10, except for banks and VASPs, most other FIs rely on manual screening, the lack of systematic updates and understanding of the specificities of PF TFS requirements can cause delays or even lack of PF TFS compliance. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 648. There is a severe lack of understanding of PF risks in the DNFBP sector and some have a limited understanding of the concept of beneficial owner (see IO.4), which impede the sector ability to identify methods of evading PF TFS beyond list screening. DPMS and REAs have some knowledge of their obligations related to UN lists screening but those are only performed at the onboarding stage and there is no awareness within those sectors that they can be used to evade sanctions regimes, including by those acting on behalf of designated persons and entities. Accountants and legal professions did not demonstrate awareness of their PF TFS obligations, including lawyers whose clients are international transhipment companies. Given Türkiye’s exposure to PF risks, especially from one of its neighbouring jurisdictions, DNFBP’s lack of understanding of PF risks and related obligations is a concern. 649. Competent authorities’ efforts to support reporting entities understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations is effective to a limited extent. At the time of the onsite visit, most actions were still to be developed or just recently adopted. A generic guidance on TFS obligations for reporting entities was published in 2022 without specific details for the specificities of PF related TFS. Authorities also adopted and made public in 2025 both Türkiye’s PF Strategy Document (2025-2029) and a PF NRA (2025) and outreach activities to raise awareness on those findings are ongoing. Türkiye also amended its legal framework end of 2024 to request that reporting entities’ institutional policies include the monitoring and mitigation of the risks of violation, non-implementation and avoidance of asset freezing decisions as well as enhanced controls for the implementation of both TF and PF TFS. This measure is still being implemented." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 217. Generally, FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and applying CDD supported by electronical automated system. CDD are performed regularly, the frequency of customer profile’s review follows a RBA. It is typically conducted every year for high risks clients, every two to three years for medium risks and every four to five years for lower risks clients. Those reviews are often supported by the use of electronical tool including artificial intelligence (AI), allowing for a modular approach taking into account several risk parameters at the same time: client risk profile but also typologies of transactions or specific jurisdictions. Those tools allow entities to adapt their monitoring by taking into consideration a wide range of indicators, analyse cross-cutting data to cope with emerging and evolving risks and also identify triggering scenarios even for lower risk customers. 218. Certain sectors, specifically exchange offices, MVTS, and VASPs, have a higher incidence of CDD deficiencies compared to banks and other FIs. While the number of CDD deficiencies has decreased over the reporting period for most sectors, a continued identification of a high number of breaches has been observed among exchange offices. 219. VASPs mostly resort to virtual know your customer (KYC) procedures for onboarding natural persons or Turkish nationals, depending on institutional policy, while in-person onboarding process are conducted for legal persons and/or foreigners. On average, VASP report a low number of clients being legal entities. New customers also have to make their initial deposit via a bank account transfer which allows for further monitoring of their profile. 220. FIs and VASPs demonstrated their general ability to check BO information by resorting to a range of information sources and supported by digital tools. All FIs and VASPs acknowledged challenges in verifying BO information in complex structures but were able to explain the verification sources and channels used. Some FIs, especially banks and VASPs, reported the use of in-house AI program to check BO information, particularly for shareholders below the 10% partnership threshold and when foreign partners are involved. FIs and VASPs do not have direct access to the BO Registry. Instead, they request their customers to provide a QR code that grants access to the customers’ BO information in the BO R registry. Customers also have an obligation to declare any transaction they would conduct on behalf of someone else, and FIs and VASPs apply enhanced monitoring in those cases with some rejecting such activity. Overall, FIs and VASPs demonstrated a sound understanding of basic beneficial ownership concepts. However, while banks exhibit a more developed and structured appreciation of risks linked to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements, there was variation in the ability of some other FIs and VASPs to describe the measures they take to fulfil their CDD and BO obligations in multi-jurisdictional ownership chains and in more complex interactions involving foreign legal persons, including legal arrangements which do not exist domestically. Such variation may indicate limitations in risk understanding, which in turn may affect the consistency and robustness of the mitigation measures applied. 221. The AT was also made aware of a case in which supervisory authorities identified significant deficiencies regarding a VASP in the context of supervisory activities. In this case, the VASP lacked any real‑time, periodic or automated monitoring, and had no processes to assess whether customer transactions were consistent with the customer’s professional or economic profile. While the VASP addressed the deficiencies identified through supervisory action, this individual case indicates that there may be substantial differences in compliance within the VASP sector. This is particularly relevant in light of the transitional period granted for the implementation of the more stringent regulatory requirements applicable to VASPs and the fact that supervision under the new more stringent regulatory framework has not yet been conducted. 222. Reliance on third party is resorted to a limited extent, mostly by FIs with a broader international remit who take advantage of institutional capacities especially when identifying or verifying foreign customer, for CDD and BO. 223. Record keeping requirements are overall understood and applied, especially with the use of digital tools. Failure to comply with record keeping requirements is an offence in Türkiye, supervisors have filled 11 criminal complaints against FIs and VASPs for such shortcomings over the reporting period. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 224. Most FIs and VASPs have procedures for identifying PEPs, but compliance with this obligation is relatively recent (2022) and remains challenging to some extent. However, as noted in the previous MER (2019, KF c)), FIs had already applied EDD measures to PEPs, their family members and close associates prior to 2022, although these measures were not considered comprehensive at the time. FIs and VASPs ask customers about their principal occupation or employment and resort to commercial databases and open sources information to identify PEPs and their relatives. Those tools present limitation especially in the identification of PEPs closes relatives and associates and none of the entity met onsite reported to directly ask their customer whether they are considered as a PEP or a relative. In addition, some FIs have limited awareness that close associates include not only relatives but also individuals with social or professional ties to a PEP. Main FIs and VASPs, especially those belonging to international groups, demonstrate a better ability to detect PEPs, including foreign ones. 225. However, only half of the EOs declared to have procedures for identifying PEPs, which severely impacts the sector’s ability to identify PEPs. This is to a large extent explained by the regulatory framework, under which Group B exchange offices - which constitute approximately 78% of all EOs and are typically smaller entities - are not required to establish formal written procedures. However, the absence of a legal requirement for Group B Eos to establish formalised, documented procedures for identifying and reviewing PEPs, combined with the fact that in practice only around half of all exchange offices have such procedures, significantly weakens the sector’s overall capacity to comply with PEP‑related obligations. Although the exclusive compliance officers appointed by Group B exchange offices carry out risk management, monitoring and control activities to some extent even without clear written procedures, the lack of documented and standardised processes means that there is no assurance that Group B exchange offices can consistently detect higher‑risk customers or comply reliably with EDD requirements (including PEP‑related requirements). Without clear and documented procedures, it cannot be ensured that EDD obligations are implemented effectively and uniformly across Group B exchange offices. 226. While a limited number of other FIs and VASPs do not have clear procedures for the identification and review of PEPs, discussions held during the onsite visit indicated limitations in the practical identification of PEP customers by some of the entities met. This points to shortcomings in the effectiveness of PEP identification measures in practice. While MASAK’s PEP guidance outlines methods to identify PEPs, family members, and close associates, it does not provide examples of prominent public functions considered PEPs in Türkiye. 227. Banks have a good understanding and take appropriate mitigating measures in relation to correspondent banking relationship. They have an institutional policy defining how to operate and high-risk jurisdictions and entities defined at the group level. Even though those policies can differ among financial institutions, they include high-risk jurisdictions as identified by the FATF. There is also an automated monitoring of open-source information monitoring potential adverse media reports, allowing to take appropriate measures as needed towards identified entities. Banks widely reported the systematic involvement of compliance units for transactions with entities located in high-risk jurisdictions or entities considered as presenting a higher risk. None of the banks met during the onsite offered payable-through accounts. 228. Banks and MVTSs are also taking enhanced measures to monitor the use of higher risk products such as prepaid card services. Entities run scenario alerts daily, monthly and quarterly, and review their criteria on an ongoing basis to monitor such products with the implementation of EDD measures. 229. Despite the recent implementation of travel rule obligations in Türkiye (December 2024), VASPs met during the onsite demonstrated a strong understanding of those requirements. Certain VASPs reported to have their own institutional policy which goes beyond legal requirements and to refuse transfers with entities that do not comply with the travel rule requirements. VASPs also compel clients’ declaration regarding the beneficiary/originator of the VA transfer and trace transactions through blockchain analytic tools. TUBITAK is currently developing tools to support VASPs complying with travel rule obligations and VASPs met during the onsite highlighted the positive expected impact of such initiative. Enhanced controls are applied to transactions involving hot wallets connected to certain jurisdictions. In these cases, the transaction is automatically flagged and the entity must complete an additional step to validate it. VASPs reported that transactions involving mixers or unhosted wallets are generally not accepted and returned to the originator There is also a daily withdrawal threshold of approx. EUR 2 500 and a monthly threshold of EUR 42 000 allowing to amount transferred. 230. FIs and VASPs have also adopted specific measures to address risks arising from new technologies. The implementation of controls for new technologies is particularly strong among highest risk sectors. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 231. Overall, FIs and VASPs have a general sound understanding of their STRs obligations. Between 2020 and 2024, suspicious transaction reporting has significantly increased by approximately 130%, with all sectors increasing their reporting demonstrating an enhanced compliance over the reporting period. In 2024, 98% of STRs were submitted by banks, MVTS and VASPs, which is in line with those sectors risk profile. EOs, assessed as presenting medium‑high risk, reported a marked increase in STRs between 2020 and 2024 (approximately 115%), with volumes peaking in 2023. Nevertheless, in 2024, Eos accounted for just over 1% of all STRs submitted. 232. FIs and VASPs are also aware of their obligations to report suspicion in a timely manner and reporting occurs within a couple of days, with immediate reporting for TF suspicion. Most entities use software to monitor suspicious activities, including AI, to better monitor typologies matching higher risk scenarios. However, the AT also noted that supervisory authorities have identified material weaknesses in some VASPs’ implementation of STR reporting obligations, with significant gaps in monitoring and detection practices (which were later addressed by the VASP in question) indicating uneven compliance across the sector. STRs are broadly in line with main predicate offences, fraud and illegal betting and gambling are the most identified and reported suspicious activities (see IO.6). 233. FIs and VASPs are generally aware that multiple reporting on a single suspicion is possible and whenever there is doubt on the nature of the suspicion, entities confirmed that they report on both ML and TF. However, except for banks, most FIs report suspicious activities related to TF to a limited extent, which is in line with their more limited understanding of TF risks described above. While banks account for the majority of TF‑related STRs in absolute terms, the overall volumes remain somewhat modest when viewed in light of the central role of the banking sector in Türkiye’s TF risk context. The nexus with a terrorist organisation remains the main criterion for reporting entities to consider that a case could present a TF suspicion, which limits the scope of potential TF detection. For exchange offices, this finding is coupled with the information that entities met onsite indicated that EDD measures are more frequently identified once transaction‑value thresholds are reached. This reliance on value‑based triggers may limit the detection of TF cases involving low-amounts transactions, especially in light of the sector exposure to TF. Box 3.3. VASP TF suspicion case study As part of its monitoring activities, a VASP was made aware that a terrorist organisation posted on social media the links to three wallet address to receive funds. The VASP identified its clients conducting transactions with those wallets and filled TF STRs. As a result, foreign nationals were identified and designated by Türkiye under its domestic TF TFS regime. 234. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations related to tipping off. To prevent potential tipping off, most entities conduct trainings to their staff, with specific in-person trainings for the personnel most involved in commercial relations with clients. Reporting entities considered that MASAK’s trainings have effectively supported further awareness of this obligation. Table 3.5. STRs for FIs and VASPs Institutions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Banks 182 828 205 793 314 700 432 499 349 988 235 358 1 721 166 VASPs 0 2 233 20 569 48 678 63 603 53 490 188 573 MVTs 46 840 284 544 74 513 102 776 110 949 101 897 721 519 EOs 2 660 4 500 6 188 9 108 5 726 4 315 32 497 Capital Market Sector 368 692 595 897 1 218 1 088 4 858 NBFIs 2 070 3 286 4 073 3 921 5 790 5 021 24 161 Insurance 361 404 496 529 747 674 3 211 Precious Metals Intermediary 0 0 0 0 1392 717 2 109 Total 235 127 501 452 421 134 598 408 539 413 402 560 2 698094 Table 3.6. TF STRs for FIs and VASPs Institutions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* Total Banks 1 460 2 067 1 374 2 535 1 950 1 311 10 697 EOs 0 1 9 6 44 27 87 VASPs 0 40 411 368 577 500 1 896 MVTS 158 403 937 938 930 1 381 4 747 Note: *as of November 2025. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 235. FIs and VASPs generally demonstrate a strong understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and have established internal controls and procedures appropriate to their business activities. Entities, especially in the highest risk sectors, have a developed AML/CFT culture, reviewing their compliance policies annually or at least every 1–3 years and have formal procedures in place to support these policies, with coverage rates above 90% across most sectors. This is in line with supervisory findings, especially in the banking sector where infringement to AML/CFT requirements have steadily decreased over the reporting period. 236. While most FIs and VASPs have dedicated units to assess compliance risks, the presence of such units is significantly less consistent among EOs– which are in essence much smaller actors yet considered as medium-high risk. Türkiye’s framework applies a risk-based approach that differentiates EOs by size and business activities. Under this approach, the obligation to assign compliance officers and establish a compliance programme applies only to larger exchange offices (Group A), while smaller exchange offices (Group B) must appoint an exclusively designated compliance officer; however, they are not required to implement a compliance programme, despite the sector being assessed as medium‑high risk. As there is no mandatory requirement for compliance programs for Group B EOs, the coverage and sophistication of compliance controls remain uneven, particularly among smaller entities. While the NRA identifies risk‑reducing factors for Group B EOs relating to limitations in activities and lower business volumes, it also notes that the lack of a requirement to employ an internal control officer constitutes a risk‑increasing factor. At the same time, although the authorities consider that Group B exchange offices are typically less exposed to ML/TF risks, weaknesses in internal control arrangements limit the effective and consistent implementation of AML/CFT controls within a sector assessed overall as medium‑high risk. 237. Training and certification programs for compliance staff are widely implemented, except among exchange offices, and regular measurement and evaluation of training activities are reported by FIs and VASPS to a large extent. 238. Overall, FIs and VASPs have internal controls, procedures, and audit mechanisms in place especially for the highest risks sectors but to a lesser extent for EOs. . For EOs, these differences reflect the fact that Group B entities are not subject to the same legal requirements as Group A EOs. Internal audits under AML/CFT legislation are conducted at least annually by the vast majority of institutions while periodic independent audit services are also resorted to, though with more variation. Where applicable, group-level internal controls and audit requirements are implemented, despite some variation depending on the sector and group structure. 239. However, supervisors also reported that one of the common shortcomings for FIs and VASPs, is the minimal amount of resources allocated to the compliance units in comparison with other units and in light of the entities size and materiality. For more recent entities, especially VASPs, and smaller actors, MVTS and EOs, this may constitute a contributing background factor to the still elevated number of identified shortcomings with AML/CFT obligations, especially on CDD and to a lesser extent STR requirements (see 3.6). 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 240. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Türkiye." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="132. Since the 2019 MER, Türkiye has enhanced its mechanisms for inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination for AML/CFT operational purposes. Türkiye maintains a structured and functioning co-ordination system, anchored in the AML/CFT Strategy and Action Plan, and reinforced through a network of dedicated working groups and inter-ministerial forums. The Threat Working Group—comprising the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Trade, Treasury and Finance, Environment and Urbanization, and law enforcement agencies (TNP, GGC, and Coast Guard)—serves as a standing operational co-ordination forum for emerging threats. The Case Working Group, established in 2021, follows up on complex ML/TF cases and supports FATF-related submissions, having convened 25 times since its inception. Moreover, high-level and practitioner-level co-ordination meetings, many led by Deputy Ministers from the Ministries of Treasury and Finance (MoTF), MoJ, MoI , MoT, and MoFA, have institutionalised co-operation on legislative alignment, case management, statistics, and operational improvements. 133. FIUs co-operation with LEAs has also become more operationally focused. FIU–LEA feedback mechanisms are now formalised through protocols and operationalised via the working groups. LEAs are required to report on follow-up actions stemming from FIU disseminations, and the FIU has increased the volume of joint trainings and typology-based workshops with public prosecutors and LEAs since 2023, promoting two-way information flow. The NRA is now fully integrated into operational decision-making, as evidenced by the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 155/1 (2021), updates to financial investigation and supervision guidelines, and the use of NRA results in prioritising investigations and prosecutions. These developments collectively demonstrate an improvement in Türkiye’s ability to co-ordinate and co-operate for operational purposes. 134. Co-ordination relies heavily on MASAK for financial analysis in complex cases, indicating more limited capacity within LEAs to independently conduct PFIs. In addition, co-ordination is uneven across authorities, with more limited operational contribution from agencies such as Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard, particularly in higher-risk areas such as cross-border currency movements, smuggling and the informal economy, which affects the overall effectiveness of co-ordinated responses in these areas. Moreover, while co-ordination has matured around the highest-risk areas identified in the NRA (organised crime, fraud, and illegal betting), cross-cutting systemic risks—such as those linked to the informal economy—require stronger operational co-operation. The Action Plan for Combating the Informal Economy (2023–2025) provides a solid policy basis, but its operational implementation, especially among fiscal, trade, and enforcement authorities, remains less advanced compared to case-based co-operation. 135. Türkiye also demonstrates strong and well-institutionalised operational co-ordination for TF. Public prosecutors play a central co-ordinating role within Türkiye’s operational framework, supported by specialised LEAs, MASAK and intelligence agencies, with the systematic application of parallel financial inquiries in terrorism cases. Co-ordination is further strengthened through extensive information-sharing mechanisms, integrated databases (e.g. UYAP), and the use of ad hoc joint investigation teams. Competent authorities make use of a wide range of domestic and international information sources, and operational co-operation is supported by specialised units, regular inter-agency engagement and strong data integration capabilities, enabling timely detection and co-ordinated investigative responses. Operational co-ordination is generally effective, particularly in cases involving domestically designated and UNSCR-listed terrorist organisations but could be strengthened for more complex TF typologies. In addition, co-ordination across all relevant authorities, including those with responsibilities in cross-border and trade-related contexts, could be further enhanced to support a more consistent operational response across the full range of TF risks. Overall, while co-ordination mechanisms are strong, further enhancements in these areas would support a more comprehensive and forward-looking operational approach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="260. Supervisory authorities employ remedial actions to a large extent where breaches in compliance with CDD and STR obligations are detected. The adoption of the RBS approach in 2020 has led to a significant increase in the number of compliance supervisions - particularly on high-risk entities. 261. Over the reporting period and in line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action Plan there has been overall significant improvements in the AML/CFT compliance and the overall compliance culture of the FIs and VASPs due to enhanced supervisory actions, although significant weaknesses continue to be identified in certain sectors, notably EOs. Onsite examinations find less issues for FIs and VASPs with past enforcement records. The representatives of FIs and VASPs met during the onsite praise the quality of the relationship with their supervisors and provided tangible examples that supervisory activities had positive impact in supporting their compliance with AML/CFT requirements. 262. Supervisory authorities impose sanctions in relation to their scope of competence as defined by law. MASAK is the sole authority entitled to issues sanctions with regard AML/CFT breaches while sectoral supervisors apply sanctions on their respective field of competence. As described above, there is close co-ordination among supervisory authorities, if a sectoral supervisor detects a potential ML/TF infringement in the course of its monitoring of a reporting entity, the case is referred to MASAK for further actions. 263. MASAK can impose several types of formal remedial supervisory actions depending on several factors, including whether the breaches constitute criminality; their severity, the constancy and repetitiveness of violations; the compliance history of the FI or VASP. 264. Türkiye’s approach is firstly directed at enhancing compliance by issuing written warnings, especially to entities in violation for failure to develop training, internal supervision and risk management system or assign a compliance officer. When shortcomings are identified over the course of monitoring activity, those are listed and sent to the reporting entity. 265. However, concerns arise as to whether sanctions related to internal controls are sufficiently severe and dissuasive. The very limited use of such fines suggest that the current practice may not deliver outcomes that are proportionate to risks or sufficiently dissuasive across the FI and VASP sectors. For certain breaches, namely internal audit, trainings and risk management system, a remedial time of not less than 30 days, is given to the entity to address the shortcomings and an administrative fine is imposed only if deficiencies persist after the remedial period. The legislation does not prescribe a maximum period for obliged entities to remedy identified shortcomings. The timeframe is determined on a case‑by‑case basis according to the nature of the deficiency and communicated to the obliged entity; in practice, the period generally does not exceed 60 days. In most instances a written warning has been sufficient for the obliged party to take necessary actions. Out of 77 reporting entities, only two failed to address their deficiencies within the given time. The imposition of administrative fines on the obliged entity and the senior manager, along with the second written warning, ensured that these two obliged parties also addressed their deficiencies. While deficiencies in internal controls may in some cases coincide with, or give rise to, additional CDD or STR breaches that are sanctioned accordingly, the fact that even systematic and severe AML breaches can be resolved through a written warning—provided deficiencies are corrected within the grace period—indicates that the regime in practice allows FI and VASP entities to avoid proportionate and dissuasive sanctions as long as remedial action is taken within the allotted timeframe. In this respect, the current sanctioning regime is not fully proportionate to the risks and is not sufficiently deterrent to prevent non-compliant behaviour especially in cases of severe breaches. 266. Türkiye applies a risk‑based methodology to determine annual supervisory programmes, taking into account the results of previous AML/CFT inspections. FIs and VASPs with repeated or serious violations, as well as those not previously supervised, receive higher risk scores and are more likely to be included in subsequent supervisory cycles. Entities that are subject to repeated supervision generally display significantly fewer or no violations in follow‑up inspections, indicating that supervisory engagement leads to improved compliance for the individual institution concerned over time. 267. When criminal offences are detected, MASAK files a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor and can in parallel suspend the reporting entity. Over the reporting period, MASAK has filled 11 criminal complaints against FIs for record keeping infringement. Judicial penal procedures can also apply in other cases of serious breaches, such as breaches of STR confidentiality and not providing information and documents when requested. These offences did not occur during the reporting period, so in general judicial proceedings comparatively lower than administrative fines. In 2024, there were 11 referrals to the public prosecutor’s office for such breaches, indicating that while criminal enforcement measures exist and can include custodial sentences, their application is limited in practice. 268. Supervisors have a wide range of administrative sanctions available. For CDD and STR breaches, administrative fines are imposed on a per‑breach basis through fixed statutory amounts, with a mandatory transaction‑based minimum threshold applying to FIs, as set out in the AML Law.  In line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action plan, the amount of administrative fines has significantly increased since 2020. In addition, the amount is reviewed on a yearly basis according to the revaluation rate in order not to lose value due to inflation and in accordance with the Tax Procedure Law. Accordingly, the amount of the applicable administrative fines for CDD, STR and periodic reporting breaches has significantly increased since 2020, ensuring that available sanctions remain dissuasive. Authorities can also suspend or revoke reporting entities depending on the persistence or severity of the violations. Table 3.9. Applicable administrative fines for FIs and VASPs (applicable per breach of obligation) Obligation Applicable Administrative Fine Amounts (EUR, per breach) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 CDD 1 200 1 309 1 783 3 975 6 299 9 067 STR 1 000 2 182 2 972 6 626 10 499 15 111 Periodic Reporting 1 200 1 309 1 783 3 975 6 299 9 067 Max Amounts (Annual) 800 000 872 880 1 188 863 2 650 331 4 199 715 6 044 650 269. Sanctions are largely tied to the number of concrete violations identified in relation to customer‑specific CDD and STR obligations. In contrast, even extensive systemic weaknesses, such as inadequate governance, training, monitoring, procedures or identifying and reporting suspicious transactions, technical capacity, and risk assessment, are systematically addressed through a two‑stage supervisory response, whereby a written warning accompanied by a remedial period, constitutes the initial enforcement action and remains the sole measure where the deficiencies are remedied within the prescribed timeframe. This imbalance, where isolated customer‑level breaches attract stronger sanctions than broad structural failings, weakens the overall proportionality, effectiveness, and deterrent impact of the supervisory sanctioning framework. This raises concerns primarily in relation to the supervisory responses to serious or systemic shortcomings in governance, internal controls and risk assessment frameworks, rather than to the availability of sanctions for individual CDD or STR breaches. Box 3.4. Deficiencies in AML/CFT internal framework control During an on‑site inspection, supervisors identified deficiencies in the bank’s risk‑based transaction monitoring and internal control framework, which limited the effective detection and escalation of suspicious activity. In particular, transactions were not systematically verified against supporting documentation to assess their consistency with customers’ financial profiles, customer information and documentation were not kept up to date, and communication and co-ordination between internal departments were inadequate. As a result, the compliance unit was not adequately or sufficiently informed, and monitoring and control activities were not carried out effectively. A written warning was issued to the bank, requiring it to address the identified deficiencies and to implement specified corrective and remedial measures within 60 days. After the given time, the bank reported that it had reviewed the relevant internal regulations and implementation processes, taken corrective and remedial measures to address the identified deficiencies, and implemented these measures supported by substantiating information and documentation. In this context, it was assessed that the bank had effectively established and implemented the risk‑based control and monitoring systems envisaged under Article 5 of the AML Law. No administrative sanctions were imposed. However, the bank was included in the following year’s supervision programme to monitor the continuity and effectiveness of the measures taken. 270. Also, enforcement actions for PEP‑related obligations are not sufficiently risk‑based or proportionate. Emphasis is placed on the presence of individual PEP customers and on whether EDD has been applied to them, rather than treating weaknesses in preventive controls as breaches warranting stronger measures. Since PEP obligations were introduced in 2022, only one entity (a bank) has been sanctioned for deficiencies in EDD for PEPs, questioning the effectiveness of monitoring against PEP requirements. Türkiye’s NRA identifies payment institutions as a medium‑high‑risk sector, partly due to corruption vulnerabilities; however, even in a case where a payment institution lacked any policies or procedures for applying EDD to PEPs, only a written warning was issued because no PEP customers were identified in the customer base and the institution’s non‑compliance could not be demonstrated in relation to a specific customer. This approach, which is not commensurate with the systemic nature of the deficiency or with the sector’s risk profile, undermines the dissuasive effect of enforcement and limits the overall effectiveness of supervision. Box 3.5.Case 1 (PEPs) Supervision identified that PEPs were neither classified as a high-risk customer group in the payment institution’s compliance programme nor in its internal policy documents, and that EDD measures applicable to PEPs were not set out in these documents. This indicated policy-level weaknesses in the application of the risk-based approach. However, during supervision, the authorities conducted testing of the institution’s automated screening tool, which successfully identified a mayor of a city in Türkiye as a PEP. Screening of the institution’s customer base also revealed that it had no PEP customers. As no breaches relating to PEP-related EDD occurred in practice, no administrative fine was imposed. Instead, a warning letter was issued and a period of time was provided for the institution to remedy the identified deficiencies in its policies and procedures. Table 3.10. Fines issued for CDD and STR breaches (2020 – 2025) Sector Number of supervised obliged entities CDD STR Total Admin Fines (EUR) Obliged entities in violation Administrative Fine (EUR) Obliged entities in violation Administrative Fine (EUR) Banks 98 13 478 000 13 1 648 400 2 126 400 VASPs 64 27 756 800 23 1 393 400 2 150 200 MVTS 114 45 7 633 300 20 10 305 700 17 939 000 EO 295 178 4 491 500 25 207 200 4 698 700 Capital Market 105 14 272 800 6 18 100 290 900 NBFIs 86 19 186 700 10 18 000 204 700 Insurance 33 4 31 400 0 - 31 400 PMIs 10 4 32 600 2 82 900 115 500 Table 3.11. Application of sanctions for deficiencies in AML/CFT internal control, risk management and compliance arrangements Obligation Application Article 5 (1) of AML Law no. 5549 Developing training, internal supervision and control and risk management systems, assigning compliance officers in FIs. 2021 13 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. All obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2022 21 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. All obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2023 9 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. 7 of these obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2 of these obliged entities failed to address the deficiencies and 1.518.153 TRY administrative fine (each) was imposed. After that, a second written warning and period of time was given. Both of these obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2024 34 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. Actions taken by the obliged entities are being evaluated to determine whether the deficiencies were addressed or further action is necessary. 271. For the banking sector, 98 on-site supervisions (both within the scope of a programme and cased based) were carried out over the reporting period. On the basis of these on-site findings, few banks were found to be in violation of their CDD/STR obligations and those that were had very few violations. This is reflected in the low amounts of imposed administrative fines. Between 2021 and 2024, only five banks were subject to a written warning and a remedial period in response to deficiencies in AML/CFT internal control, risk management and compliance arrangements The assessment team reviewed, for instance, a case example in which supervisors, during an on‑site inspection, identified insufficient algorithmic analysis infrastructure to detect transaction repetitions and systematic movements and transactions were not subjected to specific limits based on their risks. 272. As part of its offsite review of the annual survey sent to banks, MASAK also identified that some entities were carrying out derisking with considered high risk customers, such as NPOs or VASPs, which was confirmed during the onsite. This finding supported further outreach to the sector to sensitise against such practices, yet NPOs and VASPs met during the onsite confirmed that their access to the financial system via banks was not hindered. In addition, a 2023 survey by the Banks Association of Türkiye shows that banks apply markedly restrictive onboarding practices toward certain customer groups. VASPs faced by far the highest refusal levels (approximately 40 %), followed by payment and electronic money institutions (approximately 25%), with EOs also encountering notable rejection rates (approximately 17%). Authorities further explained that some banks only prefer to work with PEMIs within the same financial group, which contributes to higher rejection rates. They also noted that rejection rates for VASPs are expected to decrease following the introduction of the new licensing regime; however, at the time of the onsite, there was no evidence of such an impact, as no licences under the new regime had yet been granted. 273. VASPs have been obliged entities since 2021, and initial supervision showed that all entities subject to inspections had numerous violations of their AML/CFT obligations. As a result, Türkiye’s enhanced supervisory activities by including more VASPs as part of the supervision programmes (from 5 VASPs in 2021 to 23 in 2023 and 2024). İn addition, MASAK enhanced outreach activities, issuing specific guidance for VASPs and conducting further trainings. Authorities reported that recent shortcomings were linked to the absence of technology supported process to adopt enhanced measures for high-risk customers and transactions. Overall, the sector has been issued for more than EUR 2 million fines. Ongoing licensing process for VASPs is expected to reduce the number of actors in the sector and support further compliance, yet this process was still ongoing at the time of the onsite. 274. MVTS have been the most heavily fined sector over the reporting period with EUR 18 M fines allocated. The ratio of MVTS with violations in comparison with the overall the number of supervised entities has steadily decreased over the reporting period, demonstrating in overall progress in sectoral compliance with AML/CFT obligations and effectiveness of the supervisory activities and remedial actions taken. While 90% of the MVTS supervised were in violation with their CDD obligations in 2020, this ratio dropped to 15% in 2024. While improvements have been achieved, some singular significant cases were also identified, where MVTS are used for illegal betting, ML or TF, emphasising the need for close monitoring of the sector and potential enhanced remedial actions. 275. Exchange offices are the second highest fined sector for breaches in CDD/STR obligations and the one presenting the highest number of breaches. Despite taking into consideration the high number of entities in the sector (over 750 exchange offices), the fact that in 2024 65% of the 80 supervised entities were in violations of their CDD obligations is concerning. The number of Eos found in breach has increased steadily over the period, while the total amount of administrative sanctions has grown more moderately and not in direct proportion, despite the fact that applicable administrative fines are increased every year. Authorities consider that the low level of administrative fines imposed in light of the number of violations illustrates that the entities’ violations were not major nor numerous. At the same time, it is noted that the sanctions imposed can, in certain cases, reach levels that are significant and proportionate relative to the capital and financial capacity of the obliged entities concerned. Authorities also explained that, although measurable improvements are observed at the level of individual EOs once they have been subject to supervision, these entity‑level gains are not reflected in the aggregated annual statistics. According to the authorities, this is primarily due to the structural composition of the sector: each annual supervision cycle incorporates a significant number of entities that are being examined for the first time and that, according to the authorities, systematically exhibit a higher likelihood of non‑compliance. The authorities further noted that this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the exchange office sector, which comprises a very large number of supervised entities and a high turnover in the pool of entities selected for supervision. 276. In addition, the EO sector accounts for the highest proportion of enforcement cases among FIs and VASPs involving deficiencies with respect to risk management, internal governance and other AML/CFT requirements under AML Law Act. 5, representing more than 61% of such cases. These cases follow a graduated enforcement process, whereby a written warning and a remedial period to address the identified deficiencies are issued as a first step, and an administrative sanction may be imposed only where deficiencies are not remedied within the prescribed timeframe. 277. Consequently, the continued identification of a high number of breaches in the EO sector could be seen as an indication of the broad compliance weaknesses across the sector as a whole. Even after some entities have undergone inspection, received corrective instructions and, in many cases, demonstrated improvements upon re‑inspection, the overall statistical profile remains dominated by newly identified violations. From a supervisory effectiveness perspective, this pattern raises concerns regarding the capacity of the current sanctioning framework to generate a sufficiently robust dissuasive effect at the sector level. While sanctions may induce compliance improvements within the entities directly subjected to them, the consistently high incidence of violations—especially among first‑time supervised entities—suggests that the signalling effect of sanctions is not strong enough to incentivise preventive compliance across the wider sector. 278. Despite the capital market, NBFIs, Insurance and precious metal intermediaries having been subject to less supervisory activities in line with the risk-based approach, MASAK identified violations for CDD and STR violations and allocated administrative penalties. Overall, the supervised entities demonstrated good level of compliance. 279. MASAK does not publish its enforcement actions, including sanctions and remedial measures, not even in an anonymous form, limiting transparency and undermining the potential deterrent effect of its sanctioning regime. While MASAK communicates annually through its activity report, the information made public is limited only to high-level aggregated data, such as the total number of sanctions imposed and the number of obliged entities sanctioned each year, together with a general reference to the legal basis for imposing sanctions. The activity report does not provide a breakdown of sanctions by sector, nor does it distinguish sanctions by type of breach, or severity, and it does not include case examples, even in anonymised form. No information is published on remedial measures. However, during the course of its outreach activities to each sector, MASAK communicates on the main regulatory breaches. Nevertheless, some FIs considered that publishing enforcement actions could have a positive impact for sectoral compliance, while others consider that it would be too prejudicial to the sanctioned entities. The current lack publication of enforcement actions, including sanctions and remedial measures, imposed within each sector diminishes the dissuasive impact of the sanctioning framework and hinders the possibility of those specific examples of non-compliance contributing to strengthened compliance in other entities than the one directly affected by the decision. Publication of enforcement actions would provide the financial sector with the clarity and visibility to support enhanced compliance. Box 3.6. Sanctions for AML/CFT breaches – case studies The case below illustrates that prudential supervisors can also impose sanctions in situations where the identified deficiencies cut across both sector‑specific regulatory requirements and AML/CFT legislation. Case 1 : It was identified that B Investment Securities A.Ş., when entering into electronic contracts with clients for opening investment accounts, implemented practices that were contrary to the legislation in relation to identification and customer due diligence obligations. According to the findings, the institution was carrying out remote identification procedures through an external service provider, E Information Technologies A.Ş., but was opening accounts without completing the video call step. It was found that out of 12,288 clients, only 230 had completed the video call, and the remaining clients had accounts opened without video verification. It was also identified that in some video calls, image and sound quality were inadequate, the serial number of the client’s ID card was not read out loud, and that the video call was conducted after the account opening. The non-compliant implementation of remote identification procedures by B Investment Securities A.Ş. has constituted a breach both of capital markets legislation and MASAK regulations. This has led to unfair competition among investment firms, undermined investor confidence and been deemed contrary to the essence of customer due diligence obligations. Taking into account the severity and persistence (in file of several clients) of the breach and the high number of clients, authorities departed from the minimum fine level and imposed administrative sanctions for a total of approx. EUR 260 000. The case below illustrates how findings originating from MASAK’s analytical work can be operationalised through sectoral supervision, including in situations where sanctions are imposed under sector‑specific legislation rather than the AML Law. Case 2 : The findings of an analysis report prepared by MASAK and submitted to BRSA, were examined by the BRSA on-site inspection team, resulting in the following findings at P Bank: · It was assessed that the change made to the criteria of the program used by the bank in customer identification processes weakened the effectiveness of the customer identification process. · It was noted that customers could open multiple accounts and obtain IBANs to conduct transactions below the limits, thereby falling outside the monitoring scenarios. · It was noted that the failure to share the information and documents required by the Compliance Department during its audits with TKB constituted a violation of the Internal Systems Regulation. · It was noted that despite the customer volume doubling in approximately 5 years as a result of high growth appetite, the number of personnel in internal systems units remained relatively low, and that an appropriate number of qualified personnel should be assigned. · It was noted that the program used in the customer identification process was not fit for purpose, and that the tools used by internal systems units needed to be updated to meet current conditions. An administrative fine amounting to approx. EUR 152 000 was imposed on the Bank, and instructions were given to remedy the deficiencies. The sanction was imposed by BRSA under sectoral legislation (Banking Law), and not pursuant to the AML Law. Currently, the audit team assigned to this Bank is evaluating whether actions have been taken. The case below illustrates the use of supervisory measures to address breaches relating to internal control and internal audit arrangements Case 3 : During a supervision conducted at an MVTS, when internal audit activities were evaluated, it was determined that internal control was carried out by an expert, that the same person also carried out internal audit activities, and that this person worked under the management board member responsible for internal systems. It was also noted that no person was specifically appointed for internal auditing, no internal audit reports were produced, and therefore internal auditing and internal control activities were combined within the same person, which is forbidden by legislation. A written warning was sent to the reporting entity and a period of time was given for obliged party to address the deficiency. The case below illustrates how the use of MASAK’s Analysis and Evaluation Reports, together with supervision results from sectoral supervisors, in the preparation of supervisory programmes has proven to be beneficial. It also demonstrates that effective results can be achieved through close, co‑operation between MASAK and the relevant sectoral supervisors. Case 4 : Analysis and Evaluation Report was prepared by MASAK to examine whether an MVTS was abused for illegal betting activities. This report was sent to CBRT as well. Additionally, this obliged entity was also included in the 2024 supervision programme. The supervision found that the MVTS did have control and risk management mechanisms but purposefully allowed opening of accounts to be used as fronts for illegal betting and ML, system alerts were ignored and not turned into STRs. Therefore, it was concluded that the MVTS was not simply abused for illegal betting and ML but also became a front for these activities. An administrative fine of over EUR 11,5 million was imposed for serious CDD and STR violations resulting from purposefully allowed conduct. CBRT, after carrying out its own audits, concluded that the MVTS’s continued operation poses a threat to the security of payment systems and temporarily suspended the MVTS license and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) was appointed as trustee to the institution as well as the other members of the financial group, in which the payment institutions was the main financial institution." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 307. Overall, DNFBPs apply CDD to some extent and have a basic understanding of BO requirements but rely too heavily on other reporting entities’ AML/CFT obligations to mitigate risks. 308. CDD requirements are implemented across all sectors for any transaction above the legal threshold of approx. EUR 3 500, with certain accountant and legal professions applying CDD measures for any customer. DNFBPs also rely on official identification documents as part of CDD process and some entities reported their refusal to carry out a business relationship due to the inability to identify or verify the identity of the customer. However, violation of CDD requirements is the most common violation of AML/CFT requirements by DNFBPs and the ratio of entities that have been supervised and found in violation remains high, highlighting that the implementation of those requirements needs to be strengthened. 309. Many DPMS and REAs use a KYC form that includes all the criteria requested by law, and collect customer and beneficiary information through this way, but verification of the accuracy of the information is not always conducted. For REAs, an online system has been established by the MoT for the advertisement of real estate which requires, any person willing to buy/sell property via a REA to disclose identity information and provide relevant documentation. 310. Some entities have published their obligations regarding customer identification on their websites to give information to customers, including the need for those who act for the benefit of others to disclose it. Accountants, lawyers and notaries are by virtue of their activities more familiar with their clients and perform CDD at the onboarding stage. Nevertheless, DNFBPs conduct CDD monitoring to a more limited extent, mostly if a suspicion arises. 311. There is an overall understanding of the concept of BO in the DNFBP sector. Yet, DNFBPs largely rely on information provided by their clients to identify BO and report challenges to perform BO identification in the case of foreign legal persons. The ownership structure is only checked to some extent in accordance with the information held by the TRA through the tax statement that legal persons are asked to provide when entering into a business relationship. Some DNFBPs also conduct manual checks on open-source information if doubts arise. Notaries are performing public service duties and cannot carry out transactions within the scope of their authority (sales of assets, registration, company contracts, power of attorney) without BO verification. 312. As FIs, DNFBPs are required to retain the documents, books and records, identification documents kept in all forms regarding their transactions and obligations for eight years and provide all kinds of information and documents when requested by supervisors. Since the violation of this obligation will result in criminal charges and potential imprisonment up to three years there is general awareness on this requirement across DNFBPs. Since 2021, three criminal complaints were filled by supervisors to the public prosecutor’s office for infringement with record-keeping requirements and two criminal complaints were filled for infringement with providing information requirements. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 313. DNFBPs met during the onsite generally perform EDD when considering high-risk clients and/or transactions. Criteria such as destination of the transaction, origin of wealth, use of cash, suspicion on client identity or ultimate beneficiary of the transaction. DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers from higher-risk jurisdictions, while some indicated that they would automatically reject customers from specific countries which could lead to disproportionate exclusion of some. 314. DNFBPs have an overall understanding of the concept of PEP but identification is achieved to a limited extent. Checks are mostly conducted manually and while larger DNFBPs resort to commercial databases, smaller entities rely on their own knowledge of the customer. Some DNFBPs reported that EDD could extend to PEP relatives when they are identified but reported challenges in identifying foreign PEP. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 315. Except for DPMS, other DNFBP sectors barely report suspicious transactions, this is not in line with the risks they are exposed to especially for REAs, accountants and to a lesser extent lawyers. 316. In line with its 2020 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye has strengthened awareness raising for DPMS and REAs in terms of suspicious reporting, including via the issuance of a specific guidance. This has led to a significant increase in the number of STRs, nevertheless, this increase is solely driven by the enhanced reporting of DPMS, while other sectors reporting remains negligeable. This coupled with the DNFBPs generally lower understanding of ML/TF risks, increase the risks of undetected suspicious activities. In addition, supervisors barely detect breaches of STRs reporting when conducting inspections of DPMS and REAs, which questions the effective monitoring of this criteria. DNFBPs met during the onsite reported that they would benefit from further understanding of ML/TF typologies to better capture potential suspicious cases. 317. DNFBPs are generally aware of the risk of tipping-off. To prevent potential tipping off, some entities conduct trainings to their personnel most involved in commercial relations, especially in the REAs and DPMS sectors. Table 4.4. Suspicious reporting by DNFBPs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* DPMS 51 138 320 683 1 097 2 161 REAs - 9 2 19 1 6 Lawyers - 2 - 3 3 - Notaries 5 24 22 4 1 3 Accountants - - - - - 42 Total 56 173 344 709 1 102 2 212 Note: *until November 2025. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 318. Unlike FIs, DNFBPs are not obliged to prepare a compliance program but are required to carry out training, surveillance, monitoring and control activities to identify risks and take appropriate mitigating measures, in practice this is only done by larger DNFBPs. As described above, DNFBPs develop institutional risk assessment to a limited extent which does not support the implementation of effective internal controls and procedures to ensure compliance. In addition, supervisors almost did not identify infringement of internal controls requirements, indicating that there is a lack of focus on the implementation of such measures in the course of supervisory activities which is a concern. 319. Internal controls are generally established in larger DNFBPs with internal control processes and procedures specifically related to their business activities and designation of compliance officers. Some international firms (accounting, law, DPMS) apply group-wide AML/CFT controls. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 320. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 508. Türkiye is able to confiscate and enforce orders on criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically. However, the size of assets recovered appears to be modest given Türkiye’s risk and context. 509. For an asset to be subject to confiscation, it must either constitute the object of the offence, be derived from the offence, be used in its commission, or be intended for its commission. Additionally, any property whose production, possession, use, transportation, purchase, or sale constitutes an offence shall be confiscated directly, without the need to meet the above conditions. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye confiscated above EUR 93 M (see table 8.2) which demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to convert seizures into final confiscations to some extent. In addition, a total of 560 assets (see table 8.3), including vehicles (36%), bank and other type of FIs accounts (12%) and immovable properties (12%). The low number of banks and other FIs accounts remains a concern given Türkiye’s’ risk profile (see IO.1 and IO.3). In addition, it was not possible to distinguish if the confiscated assets were located domestically or abroad. 510. In addition to confiscation measures conducted under a criminal process, complementary administrative mechanisms are also employed to deprive criminals of illicit assets. These include the seizure and detention of smuggled goods under the Customs Law and Anti-Smuggling Law, as well as tax audits and fines arising from tax evasion inspections. These measures are implemented concurrently. Since the benefits derived from tax crimes are followed up by the Tax Board, a confiscation decision cannot be made regarding the income derived from these crimes. However, recovery of the illicit benefit is largely pursued through the tax administration via tax assessments and penalties, rather than through criminal confiscation. Tax fines represent nearly 75% of the total tax revenue collected by the country. 511. Non-conviction-based confiscations (NCBC) are applicable when the offence perpetrator is a fugitive, unknown or abroad, or in case of death if the legal requirements are met. In these cases, NCBC is applicable to items whose production, possession, use, transport, purchase or sale constitute an offence. Türkiye has applied NCBC in one case. Türkiye can also apply an ‘additional indictment’ (post-conviction confiscation) procedure to extend confiscation to assets linked to prior convictions. This process does not equal a general confiscation an/or other assets that cannot be proven to be linked to the prior conviction. However, due to the limited information on the implementation of such measures, their effectiveness cannot be assessed. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 512. Türkiye enforces confiscation orders from abroad (see IO.2) and has demonstrated through case studies to be able to repatriate assets from abroad to a limited extent. 513. When an asset located outside Türkiye is identified, public prosecutors develop a strategy to engage with their counterparts in the foreign jurisdiction and establish both informal and formal co-operation mechanisms to request the freezing, seizure, or confiscation of the asset (see IO.2). Informal co-operation mechanisms are generally initiated to identify the asset and develop a financial assessment of the suspect (i.e., bank accounts, travel history, nationality, whether dual citizenships or not) prior to issuing the MLA order. The aim is not only to trace the identified asset but also to expand the search to all other possible assets the suspect owns or holds outside Türkiye. When assets are identified, public prosecutors initiate the formal MLA process requesting the freezing, seizing or confiscation as needed. 514. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye requested the seizure of assets located abroad on a few times (eight) and initiated the formal MLA confiscation process in limited times (two). These two confiscation cases resulted in historical artifacts smuggled from Türkiye being successfully confiscated and repatriated. The low number of requests to execute freezing, seizure, and confiscation of assets abroad highlights the limited application of cross-border asset tracing and enforcement of seizure and confiscation measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 644. In general, reporting entities’ level of understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations is more limited than for TF TFS. 645. Banks have a better understanding of their PF TFS obligations and of PF risks in general than other reporting entities. They are overall aware of potential cases of breach or non-implementation of TFS, as well as of more sophisticated ways of evading PF, identifying jurisdictions, beyond DPRK and Iran, that can be used for sanctions evasion, typologies related to the financing of dual use goods and transhipment risks. Banks in Türkiye clearly identify risks emanating from Iran as their main PF exposure. Banks understanding of their PF risks has been supported by two specific PF surveys circulated to the sector by the Banks Association of Türkiye and BRSA. The fact that the banking sector in Türkiye is highly connected to the international financial system with Turkish banks having branches abroad and being sensitive to UN as well as other domestic sanction regimes has enhanced sectoral efforts to understand and comply with PF requirements. However, in light of Türkiye’s context, the over reliance on commercial screening software may not support the identification of those acting on behalf or at the direction of UN designated persons and entities. 646. VASPs’ understanding of PF related TFS is limited to screening requirements rather than obligations related to the detection of those acting on behalf, or at the direction of, designated persons and entities. As for TF TFS, banks and VASPs comply with their PF TFS to a large extent, relying on international monitoring programs and software and applying daily screening to their customer database and/or transactions. 647. Other FIs are aware of their obligations to comply with UN lists screening however they have a vague to negligible understanding of the PF risks they are exposed to. Some entities are not aware of the difference between TF and PF TFS and a few representatives the assessment team met with considered that there was no PF risk in their sector. Those entities comply with their PF TFS obligations in a similar way as to their TF TFS ones. As highlighted under IO.10, except for banks and VASPs, most other FIs rely on manual screening, the lack of systematic updates and understanding of the specificities of PF TFS requirements can cause delays or even lack of PF TFS compliance. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 648. There is a severe lack of understanding of PF risks in the DNFBP sector and some have a limited understanding of the concept of beneficial owner (see IO.4), which impede the sector ability to identify methods of evading PF TFS beyond list screening. DPMS and REAs have some knowledge of their obligations related to UN lists screening but those are only performed at the onboarding stage and there is no awareness within those sectors that they can be used to evade sanctions regimes, including by those acting on behalf of designated persons and entities. Accountants and legal professions did not demonstrate awareness of their PF TFS obligations, including lawyers whose clients are international transhipment companies. Given Türkiye’s exposure to PF risks, especially from one of its neighbouring jurisdictions, DNFBP’s lack of understanding of PF risks and related obligations is a concern. 649. Competent authorities’ efforts to support reporting entities understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations is effective to a limited extent. At the time of the onsite visit, most actions were still to be developed or just recently adopted. A generic guidance on TFS obligations for reporting entities was published in 2022 without specific details for the specificities of PF related TFS. Authorities also adopted and made public in 2025 both Türkiye’s PF Strategy Document (2025-2029) and a PF NRA (2025) and outreach activities to raise awareness on those findings are ongoing. Türkiye also amended its legal framework end of 2024 to request that reporting entities’ institutional policies include the monitoring and mitigation of the risks of violation, non-implementation and avoidance of asset freezing decisions as well as enhanced controls for the implementation of both TF and PF TFS. This measure is still being implemented." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 154. Türkiye actively seeks international co-operation and issued a high volume of outgoing MLA and extradition requests over the period 2021-2024, reflecting a strong willingness to engage foreign counterparts. Türkiye provided the AT with extensive quantitative and qualitative data which demonstrated significant and varied use of outgoing MLA, both in stand-alone ML and TF cases and more extensively, in predicate offences and terrorism-related matters. Regarding stand-alone ML cases, Türkiye sent 38 requests to 18 jurisdictions. Of these requests, which touched and concerned underlying offences such as drug trafficking, fraud, illegal betting and gambling, human trafficking, establishing a criminal organisation/membership of a criminal organisation and tax evasion, nine were accepted, eight were rejected, one was partially accepted and 20 were pending. 6 649 MLA requests were generated pertaining to major predicates identified in the country’s risk assessment. These requests covered offences such as fraud, forgery, theft and robbery, customs smuggling, usury, illegal betting and gambling and migrant smuggling. Of those, 2 794 were accepted and 2 763 are pending, with the remainder accounting for rejected or partially rejected outcomes. For terrorism and TF related cases, 1 131 and seven requests were sent, respectively. Of the seven TF requests, two were accepted, three rejected and 2 were pending at the end of the on-site. For the terrorism-related matters, there were 577 pending requests, 243 accepted requests, 302 rejected requests and 9 partially rejected requests. The statistics therefore reveal that while outgoing MLA is extensive and consistent with the country’s risk profile, pending and rejected requests form a substantial share of outcomes. 155. Procedurally, if the relevant judicial authority detects an international connection in the case file, it will decide to submit an MLA request. For information such as criminal records, population registry data and bank account numbers that can be obtained through informal channels, judicial authorities are directed to informal channels by CADIB offices or the Central Authority. If the Central Authority reviews and approves that procedural requirements for a MLA request have been fulfilled, it forwards the file to the relevant country. In the interim, the Central Authority may remind the relevant judicial authority of other MLA instruments provided for in multilateral treaties and laws such as video conference. Alternatively, if a case involves a request against assets, it will be assigned a seizure code and cases assigned this code are reviewed and examined with urgency. These cases generally involve ML, TF and some predicate offences. Through the UYAP system, any requested file can be specially marked, casing a coloured alert to appear at the top of the screens of the experts responsible for the file’s workflow. Files to be sent to MoJ through CADIB are also prioritised in this manner at the courts. Urgent requests are at times sought through police co-operation at the very beginning of the investigation (at times simultaneously with the MLA request) which prevents both delays and the loss of data. Box 2.4 highlights an example of Türkiye’s use of international co-operation channels to further active investigations. Box 2.4. Case examples: Foreign predicate ML Case Study A complex transnational investigation dismantled multiple organised crime networks engaged in large-scale drug trafficking and the laundering of illicit proceeds. The case originated from financial intelligence analysis that identified sophisticated laundering patterns linked to narcotics distribution across several regions. From the outset, the investigation was built on extensive international judicial co-operation and co-ordinated law-enforcement action. Evidence derived from encrypted communication platforms—lawfully obtained and shared through judicial channels—proved central, enabling authorities to determine leadership and operational tiers, identify financial facilitators and trace cross-border cash. The operation was conducted in close partnership with Europol, Eurojust and INTERPOL, alongside numerous national authorities. Approximately 10 MLA requests and over 150 intelligence exchanges supported the investigation, complemented by operational co-ordination meetings to align prosecutorial strategies and evidentiary standards. Financial and asset-tracing intelligence further enabled investigators to connect drug trafficking proceeds to assets held across multiple jurisdictions. Analysis of approximately 6 million encrypted messages identified more than 500 key accounts linked to organised crime actors, revealing a network of several thousand associated identifiers and illustrating the scale of the illicit operational network. Illicit proceeds were primarily moved through cash, precious metals and high-value goods, using laundering methods such as front companies, structured deposits, cash couriers and investments in real estate and commercial enterprises. A co-ordinated enforcement phase, involving several thousand officers across multiple jurisdictions, resulted in around 250 arrests, over 200 pre-trial detentions and the location of more than 10 internationally wanted individuals through INTERPOL channels. Asset recovery was a core objective, with authorities freezing or seizing properties, vehicles, corporate shares and financial accounts valued at over USD 355 million in Türkiye and various other countries. As the investigation expanded to over 300 suspects in Türkiye and various other countries, key lessons emerged: the critical role of MLA frameworks and joint investigation teams in ensuring cross-border admissibility of digital evidence; the importance of real-time operational co-ordination; and the effectiveness of parallel financial and narcotics investigations. The case underscores how integrating encrypted communication exploitation with financial intelligence can dismantle entire criminal networks while simultaneously targeting both operational capacity and illicit assets. 156. Türkiye has invested in improving, inter alia, the quality of outgoing requests through the establishment of CADIBs, detailed guidance and templates, a central monitoring system and extensive training of judges, prosecutors and clerks. These measures have strengthened the formal quality and legal completeness of outgoing co-operation requests and support constructive engagement with foreign counterparts. 157. Türkiye has underscored that average response times from foreign counterparts are long, particularly for seizure and confiscation-related requests. When there is a protracted delay, Türkiye undertakes follow-up on delayed outgoing MLA requests, including through periodic (annual) review of pending cases. However, such follow-up is not conducted through a structured, risk-based escalation framework with graduated timelines or scheduled interim tracking. As a result, although foreign response times are outside Türkiye’s control, the limited frequency and formality of follow-up can impact time-sensitive and asset recovery cases where asset dissipation risks may be elevated. 2.2.2. Extradition 158. Türkiye actively seeks extradition and issued a very large number of outgoing extradition requests, particularly in terrorism-related cases as reflected in Table 2.4 . Table 2.4. Outgoing Extradition Requests: 2021-2025 Year Money Laundering Terror Offence TF Total outgoing extradition requests/ year Accept Reject Pending Disposed Total Accept Reject Pending Disposed Total Reject Pending Disposed Total 2021 1 1 1 2 5 91 101 43 235 6 5 7 18 258 2022 1 1 1 69 67 38 175 1 2 3 6 182 2023 1 1 1 121 167 22 311 4 1 5 317 2024 2 6 8 1 157 570 18 746 2 8 10 764 2025 2 2 9 230 239 2 2 243 Total 1 3 11 2 17 3 447 1135 121 1706 13 18 10 41 1764 159. The timely execution or low execution rate of outgoing extradition requests, particularly in terrorism related matters, should be viewed against factors outside Türkiye’s control, including differing legal frameworks, asylum/refugee policies, judicial requirements and evidentiary thresholds applied in requested jurisdictions. As a result, while Türkiye demonstrates strong intent to pursue extradition, the practical impact of outgoing extradition remains challenging. 160. If the person is detained in the requested State for extradition purposes, the process is monitored continuously and periodically within the timeframes prescribed by the relevant extradition treaties. If the person sought for extradition is not detained in the requested State, inquiries are made through diplomatic channels and via Interpol, at intervals not exceeding three months, to ascertain whether the person is still in that country and to obtain updated information on the extradition proceedings. Proactively, in cases where Türkiye’s extradition request is rejected, available judicial remedies are pursued, including appeals and review mechanisms, in order to challenge the rejection and seek reconsideration of the extradition. Accordingly, if there is no extradition request for the purpose of execution and if the extradition request is denied, the judicial authorities are instructed to seek judicial co-operation to finalise the case so that files currently in the investigation or prosecution stage can proceed to the execution stage. If requests that have reached the execution stage are denied, relevant authorities may be directed to file a request for transfer of execution, if the statute of limitations is approaching. In cases where neither of these conditions applies, the judicial authorities will continue to search for the individual until the statute of limitations expires. Furthermore, the use of alternative measures if an extradition request is denied typically occurs when the individual could be deported due to the lack of a valid residence permit. 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 161. Türkiye has evidenced a clear legal framework and institutional capacity to pursue asset recovery through international co-operation and while the number of outgoing MLA requests specifically targeting assets abroad during the evaluation period (8 for seizure and 2 for confiscation) remains modest, the existing cases reflect a deliberate and targeted use of available mechanisms by competent authorities. Confiscation is established as a policy objective and as it pertains to asset tracing, depending on the case, outgoing information requests transmitted through the Egmont Group encompass a broad spectrum of financial intelligence inquiries—including STR and Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) data, LEAs records, bank account information, transaction flows, BO and sectoral risk profiling. While “asset tracing” is not formally captured as a specific field within the EMIS system and therefore not statistically disaggregated, internal estimates indicate that approximately 70% of such requests substantively relate to asset tracing objectives. Competent authorities have demonstrated the ability to generate tangible results in cross-border cases, as illustrated in Boxes 2.4 and 2.5 and further examples in Chapters 7 and 8. Although the use of early freezing or restraint measures in outgoing requests has not yet been standardised, the functioning legal basis and demonstrated operational outcomes provide a solid foundation to enhance asset recovery efforts and further strengthen the effectiveness of international co-operation measures in this area. Box 2.5. Recovering Assets Case Study 1: Operation Exchange A major drug trafficking and ML case was initiated by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of Province A following the detection of drug proceeds generated abroad and transported into Türkiye through couriers, then laundered via safe deposit boxes, real estate purchases and misuse of legal entities. The investigation, conducted by the TNP Narcotics Department in close collaboration with MASAK, became the largest of its kind in Türkiye’s history. A comprehensive financial intelligence effort followed, with MASAK producing 17 analytical reports between 2019 and 2021, while LEAs applied surveillance, communication interception and undercover operations to refine the suspect network, leading to indictments against 73 individuals, including the organisation’s leadership. International co-operation was a central component of the investigation. To trace the suspects’ overseas activities, Türkiye issued MLA requests to 8 countries, sought information from 23 countries through INTERPOL and exchanged financial intelligence with 21 countries via the Egmont Secure Web. These co-ordinated international efforts enabled the authorities to identify and restrain assets valued at approximately EUR 15 million, USD 15.8 million, GBP 6 million, TRY 121 million, as well as 160 real estate properties and 22 vehicles worth an estimated EUR 100 million. Substantial seizures were executed across financial and physical assets and the prosecution remains ongoing, demonstrating the effectiveness of sustained international co-operation in dismantling complex transnational laundering operations. Case Study 2 MASAK submitted a request to Country Y regarding Individual X, who carried out acts of bid-rigging, qualified fraud and bribery, and have transferred high amounts of money to accounts in Country Y. In this context, a significant amount of information regarding person X was requested, and it was specified that bank account details, transfer transactions, current balances of the accounts and information on the further movements of the transfers received from Türkiye are required. In response to the request, Country X provided account statements and transaction information." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="328. MASAK has implemented some remedial actions and has imposed fines for non-compliance with CDD measures to some extent and suspicious reporting to a limited extent, but an overall positive impact from such measures has yet to be demonstrated. 329. Supervisors have a range of administrative sanctions available, with flexibility on the monetary amount depending on the severity of the breaches. In line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action plan, the amount of administrative fines has increased since 2021 but remain relatively low for breaches of AML/CFT obligations. This amount is reviewed on a yearly basis according to the revaluation rate in order not to lose value due to inflation and in accordance with the Tax Procedure Law. Table 4.6. Applicable administrative fines for DNFBPs Obligation Applicable Administrative Fine Amounts (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 CDD 3600 3 175 2 541 4 075 4 410 4 987 STR 6000 5 292 4 235 6 791 7 349 8311 Periodic Reporting 3600 3 175 2 541 4 075 4 407 4 987 Max Amounts 480 000 449 537 338 826 502 318 587 960 664 911 330. When criminal offences are detected, MASAK files a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor and can in parallel suspend the reporting entity. Over the reporting period, MASAK has filled 3 criminal complaints against DNFBPs for record keeping infringement and 2 criminal complaints for violation of providing information requirement. 331. Over the reporting period, in line with the RBS undertaken with a focus on DPMS and REAs, representing the highest risk sectors, AML/CFT violations have mainly been detected mostly for those two sectors. Except in nine cases, all other violations are related to shortcomings on CDD. Supervision and remedial actions are mainly undertaken on CDD requirements, which limits the effectiveness of supervisory activities to improve overall compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. This is a concern especially for STRs reporting where the overall reporting of suspicious activities remain low, except for DPMS, but supervisors do not identify breaches of those obligations which could indicate a limited focus on this requirement during the course of supervisory inspections. 332. When shortcomings are identified, entities are prioritised to be subjected to a supervision programme the following year to monitor that deficiencies have been addressed. Yet, in light of the persistence of a high rate of supervised reporting entity found to be in violations with CDD requirements, remedial actions and sanctions can only be considered effective to a limited extent, and sanctions imposed not sufficiently dissuasive to foster compliance. 333. The limited remedial actions and sanctions applied against accountants and legal professionals is in line with the lower focus of the supervisors on those sectors. However, in light of the limited understanding of the professionals met during the onsite visit on ML/TF risks related obligations, further identification of higher risk entities and supervision of those are needed. Table 4.7. Sanctions against DNFBPs on AML/CFT breaches Sectors 2021 2022 2023 2024 Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) REAs 53 29 735 100 57 492 109 37 413 98 41 759 DPMS 51 43 1364 100 78 954 120 93 2065 105 45 1076 Accountants 5 0 - 0 15 8 101 11 4 24 Lawyers - - 8 3 15 - - Notaries - - - - 334. MASAK does not publish enforcement actions but it communicates annually through its activity report and during the course of its outreach activities to each sector on the main regulatory breaches. However, entities met during the onsite visit had limited knowledge of the most common breaches in their sector and further awareness raising from MASAK would be beneficial. 335. Over the reporting period, MASAK has undertaken significant efforts to increase DNFBPs’ understanding of their AML/CFT obligations with the issuance of dedicated guidance and the conduct of numerous trainings for all sectors. Some professionals met during the onsite visit also considered that MASAK’s inspections were beneficial and informative as they did not only focus on identifying shortcomings, but supervisors also take the time to train and explain obligations to reporting entities’ staff. Those activities are having a positive, yet still limited, impact on DNFBPs’ compliance. Box 4.1. Outcomes of supervision programmes and enforcement actions DPMS A was included in the 2023 supervision programme, and it has been determined that, DPMS A had 23 violations, and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 37 000. Based on those shortcomings, in 2024 DPMS A was again included in the supervision programme, and it has been determined DPMS A still had 10 violations, and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 20 000. REA Y was included in the 2022 supervision programme, and it has been determined that, it had 29 violations and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 23 000. In 2024, REA Y was included in the supervision programme again and it has been determined That it had 3 violations and was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 6 000." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="515. In principle confiscation revenues cannot be allocated directly for the compensation of the victims and these revenues need to integrate into the government general budget. However, there are four exceptions to this rule where victims can be compensated for their losses: remorse provisions, alternative sanctions applied to the criminal, settlements and civil lawsuits. 516. Türkiye has returned a large number of assets and funds subject to seizure and/or confiscation to identified victims (EUR 151 M). Most of the returned assets relate to fraud and forgery (92%), followed by drug trafficking (3.6%) and theft cases. The value of assets returned to victims (EUR 151 M) is nearly twice the total value of assets confiscated (EUR 93 M). Türkiye authorities explains this disparity stating that confiscation of assets is not possible where seized assets belong to a victim whose identity is known, as such assets must be returned to the victim. Final confiscation by the government is only permitted where restitution is not possible and for specific offences (see table below). Similarly, seized assets belonging to third parties are returned when they are no longer required for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution, or when they are not subject to confiscation. In this context. However, this deficiency continues to raise concerns as the disparity highlights the limited application of confiscation measures. Table 8.4. Overall assets returned to victims (2021-2025)* Year Fraud &amp; Forgery (EUR)*** Drug Trafficking (EUR) Theft (EUR) Human Trafficking (EUR) Illegal betting (EUR) Arms trade (EUR) Damage to property (EUR) 2021 € 188,452.76 € 32,607.33 € 111,369.29 € 11,005.14 € 18,863.59 € 32.98 € 1.46 2022 € 569,125.34 € 23,936.18 € 69,503.81 € 12,295.58 € 1,271.56 € 3,485.38 € 91.54 2023 € 118,220,723.32 € 860,962.44 € 1,849,124.40 € 152,507.70 € 533,757.15 € 83,852.67 € 91,854.68 2024 € 7,698,562.40 € 1,905,334.34 € 1,064,846.13 € 257,773.40 € 114,561.58 € 44,814.84 € 36,764.88 2025** € 12,350,124.09 € 2,578,686.31 € 1,601,836.36 € 523,317.59 € 22,364.68 € 222,022.14 € 23,470.01 Total € 139,026,987.91 € 5,401,526.60 € 4,696,679.99 € 956,899.41 € 690,818.56 € 354,208.01 € 152,182.57 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 529. Türkiye has well-developed and institutionalised capabilities to identify and investigate TF for risks related to TOs, associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated by the UNSC [37] and those designated under its national sanctions’ regime. Türkiye’s operational focus covers a wide range of TF activities, including a combination of traditional and evolving TF methods, and aligns with the TF threats identified in its NRA (FETÖ, PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, ISIL, AQ). However, Türkiye has not demonstrated investigations involving TOs and networks not subject to designation under UNSCRs or Türkiye’s domestic regime but identified through international sources and co-operation channels as relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. This limits the demonstrated ability to identify TF activity across the full range of Türkiye’s relevant TF risk environment. 530. Türkiye identifies TF activity through different operational tools, including (i) broader terrorism investigations; (ii) domestic operational detection channels; (iii) foreign intelligence sharing or co-operation requests; and (iv) detection of positive matches when screening against sanctions lists. While the overall detection ecosystem is robust, foreign intelligence has triggered relatively few domestic TF investigations, and the demonstrated use of foreign-generated information is strongest where the relevant terrorist organisation or network corresponds to Türkiye’s designated threat profile (see also table 9.2 below). 531. All CT/CFT competent authorities have a sufficient degree of specialisation to identify and investigate TF and are well equipped to assess and identify TF activity in the context of a broader terrorism investigation. PFIs are the most common method of detecting TF activity in the country. When a new TF trend or activity is detected, the Threats and Vulnerability WG discusses the case and the indicators for detection to design a holistic strategy to disrupt the activity including all relevant CFT authorities. 532. Türkiye demonstrates a strong use of a wide range of sources of information to initiate TF investigations as TF activity detection also arises from MASAK analytical outputs, LEA and intelligence agency information (mainly from TNP and GGC), social media monitoring, and border/security operations. The specific channels include: reports from local and foreign counterparts’ intelligence units, financial networks analysis of individuals linked to terrorist organisations, information from customs and migration offices, and a broad access to different sources of information, including open-source intelligence information (OSINT) and social media monitoring, examination of the financial movements of associations, foundations, companies, or aid organisations affiliated with terrorist organisations, examination of evidence seized during judicial or rural terrain operation against terrorist organisations (bank statements, VAs data, etc.), reviews of existing databases and anomaly studies created in AI-supported databases, examination of all types of smuggling activities and their connection to terrorist organisations; and typologies obtained from international reports. TF activity is also detected when conducting the verification of the positive matches arising from screening against sanctions lists. Once the positive match is reported, a financial investigation is conducted against the listed person or entities and their relatives. 533. Türkiye identifies a range of complex TF typologies, including the use of VAs, hawala networks, social media, abuse of NPOs, and commercial entities linked to FETÖ, demonstrating an ability to detect sophisticated TF schemes. However, a significant share of investigations concerns lower-value individual donations, ATM micro-transfers or minor facilitation. This is acknowledged as a common feature of TF networks, which often include many low-level contributors and fewer central collectors or co-ordinators. Nevertheless, given Türkiye’s broader risk profile as a regional financial, trade and logistics hub, further demonstration is needed of investigations involving TBTF, large-scale procurement networks and complex use of legal persons beyond the FETÖ-related commercial structures demonstrated. 534. Türkiye has demonstrated strong use of interagency information sharing mechanisms and broad access to TF-related information, enabling competent authorities to take timely action to disrupt TF activity. Türkiye has established formal mechanisms for information sharing through interagency MoUs, including between prosecutors, LEAs, MASAK, and other competent authorities. Ad hoc interagency teams can be constituted for specific investigations or to address a developing trend. Through the dedicated UYAP system, public prosecutors can access in a single platform a wide range of information, including bank account and transaction data, travel information, and criminal-justice records, enabling rapid cross-checking of financial footprints, travel, communications, and criminal records. This is a major operational strength. 535. Although most TF investigations originate from domestic intelligence sources in the context of a broader terrorism-related investigation concerning UNSC-listed or domestically designated organisations, Türkiye has a well- established mechanism to identify related foreign-linked TF activities, relying mainly on informal bilateral and international co-operation processes. For this purpose, competent authorities use LEA co-operation networks (bilateral agreements and INTERPOL channels), legal liaison officers posted in Türkiye's embassies, and FIU co-operation mechanisms, including the EGMONT Group (see IO.2). Box 9.1. TF investigation triggered by an international request led to an international ISIL activity disruption case. TNP TEM-CFT Division: Case “Open Radar” In 2025, TNP-TEM received a co-operation request from its liaison officer posted in a European country in relation to seven Turkish nationals being investigated for collecting funds for ISIL members in Syria. The suspects allegedly organized crowdfunding campaigns and collected money via instant messaging application channels, which was then transferred to Syria to support ISIL prisoners. TNP in co-ordination with the FIU, TNP cyber units and intelligence agencies, expanded the analysis of seven Turkish nationals and conducted a financial investigation. As a result of these co-ordinated efforts, 82 suspects were detected, of whom 43 were Turkish nationals and 39 foreigners. 22 of the total suspects had criminal records related to terrorism offences, 10 were subject to investigation in a European country, 5 had assets frozen in Türkiye and 4 were on a wanted list for terrorism offences. The results were communicated to the Public Prosecutor’s Office who initiated the TF investigation. The parallel financial investigation concluded that suspicious transactions were made by four of the suspects through electronic payment companies and by using VASPs in different currencies (EUR, USD, TRY) totalling EUR 312 000 over a period of six years. All transactions had a common coded pattern and had no business justification or linkages. Transactions also included high value cash withdrawals. In a co-ordinated operation led by the public prosecutor and enforced by TNP TEM, 15 suspects were arrested, digital material, documents and EUR 12 320 were seized. All operational results were communicated to the requesting country and prosecution is ongoing. 536. Most financial information and intelligence requests are related to tracing, profiling, transactions records and asset freezing purposes. For foreign linked TF activity, many requests relate to information exchange on foreign individuals’ entry and exit information, addresses, citizenships, and financial profiles. Türkiye has presented some cases, in which it has successfully responded to foreign counterparts’ investigations and asset freezing requests, including in a small number of instances involving terrorist entities that are neither UNSC nor domestically designated by Türkiye. Türkiye provided only two such cases for assessment (see Box 9.2 below), which limits the ability to evaluate the scope and consistency of this practice; no aggregate figures were provided. Box 9.2. International responses to foreign intelligence requests related to entities designated unilaterally by other jurisdictions (neither UNSC nor domestically designated by Türkiye). Case 1: In 2023, Country X requested information from Türkiye through the Egmont Group in relation to a real estate investment partnership established in 2013, and some of its partners, which were suspected of exploiting the real estate sector and financial sector in Türkiye for the purpose of raising and transferring these funds to an entity that was not UNSC-listed but had been unilaterally designated by Country X domestically. Türkiye’s FIU initiated a financial analysis in response to the request on the company and its partners, including a review of the statement made to the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP), open-source intelligence and financial data from the FIU’s databases. The analysis revealed that 25 % of the company's shares are publicly traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange and that the company is subject to independent audit in accordance with the Capital Markets Law and the TCC. Furthermore, it was understood that following a unilateral designation by Country X, partner’s duties at the company have been terminated and their shares have been transferred to the other partners. The investigation concluded the company's current partners did not hold partnerships in other companies, had no registered criminal records. No significant or unexplained high-value cash inflows or outflows were identified in their account, and no notifications had been received from financial institutions indicating individuals had been listed by any jurisdiction other than the requesting country. Regarding the company’s accounts, no transfers of funds of significant size or from unknown sources, whether domestic or foreign, were identified, and it was determined that the transfers recorded in the accounts were consistent with the company's declared field of activity. A summary of the analysis results was shared with the requesting country in accordance with Egmont Group principles. Case 2: In 2024 an EU country filed an urgent information request through the Egmont Group on a target (Mr A) indicating that he was suspected of financing illegal organisations abroad. The requesting country was particularly seeking to determine whether Mr A had any financial transactions with Mr B, who according to open-source information, was one of the “central figures” of a non-UNSC-listed entity in the country. The media reports indicated that Mr B was allegedly arrested on terrorism and terrorism financing charges. MASAK and the requesting country’s FIU held consultations to discuss the case details following which MASAK conducted a financial analysis of the individuals concerned and replied to the request with all available information. According to the analysis Mr B had been subject to judicial proceedings in a third country and was acquitted of all alleged terrorism and terrorism financing charges. No further information was received from the requesting country. 537. In addition, Türkiye has utilised foreign intelligence in investigations to identify TF activities related to its main TF threats resulting in concrete enforcement actions. Türkiye has a system in place to integrate all foreign financial information (i.e., migration information, bank accounts, criminal records) into the UYAP system with the objective of integrating it into the national records. Both domestic and foreign intelligence sources are evaluated and incorporated as evidence when appropriate. However, the integration of foreign-generated intelligence is more limited. The table below shows the number of times in which foreign intelligence was integrated into TF files processed by the FIU and disseminated to LEAs. Table 9.1. Cases of foreign intelligence provided through EGMONT Group integrated into TF files analysed by MASAK and disseminated to LEAs (2021-2025)* Year Number of files Number of persons subject to analysis 2021 73 189 2022 84 120 2023 68 138 2024 90 198 2025** 61 144 Total 376 789 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 538. Public prosecutors lead TF investigations and are responsible for setting the strategic direction of the case and decide which LEAs will assist to produce evidence to support the investigations. Following the priorities established by the National CFT Strategy, the Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors assigned more than 100 specialised public prosecutors to TF investigations. These prosecutors are distributed across all 81 provinces including at least 1 in each province and more than one in metropolitan cities. 539. Public prosecutors handling TF investigations and LEAs routinely identify whether a suspect: (a) collects funds (through donations, coercive fundraising, diaspora channels, VAs, and crowdfunding campaigns); (b) moves funds (through hawala chains, payment institutions, VASPs, front companies, and couriers); or (c) uses funds (for procurement, logistics, payment to fighters, family support, and operational expenses). 540. PFIs are systematically opened for all terrorism files. Following a MoJ Circular, this policy has been adopted in 2020 and led to PFIs being conducted in around 60% of cases in 2020 up to 100% in 2025. Public prosecutors can initiate an investigation under the simple suspicion of TF activity. PFIs are conducted to determine whether each suspected TO member or individual is also able to provide, collect or hold funds for the organisation. PFIs, involve a thorough review of suspects’ and their family members’ assets (including analysis of movable and immovable property, bank accounts, and VAs) to assess consistency with declared income and business activities. The goal is to identify disproportionate wealth, trace asset sources, and uncover links between financial accounts and terrorist organisations. PFIs also focus on the examination of physical evidence such as diaries, receipts, and bank cards seized during searches, as well as social media activity and personal networks to detect hidden financial channels or affiliations. In addition, all investigations conducted for searching, seizing and confiscating proceeds of crime shall also include research whether the investigated persons are affiliated with any terrorist organisation, and whether they used proceeds of crime for financing any terrorist organisation or terrorist act. 541. Competent authorities co-operate to a large extent for detecting and identifying TF activity. Public prosecutors generally rely on TNP and GGC CT/CFT specialised units to support most of the investigations as they have a vital role in the prevention of both terrorism and TF activity. For complex TF cases, public prosecutors also request the production of financial analysis and intelligence from the FIU. Throughout the course of the investigation, all competent authorities co-ordinate their enforcement actions creating ad hoc joint investigations teams led by the public prosecutors. Public prosecutors also request support from the CGC in case of TF activity detected in maritime areas and CE Agencies when the TF activity is being detected at points under customs supervision, including borders, ports and airports. 542. Competent authorities are well-equipped to detect and investigate TF and work together in a highly co-ordinated and complementary manner. The main CFT structures in place for supporting TF and parallel financial investigations are as follows: b) The TNP and its specialised TEM unit have sufficient staff to conduct TF-focused investigation in addition to their general duties. [38] The TNP TEM unit has sub-units specialised in each terrorist organisation identified as a threat in the NRA, i.e. UNSCR-listed and domestically designated organisations. In addition to TEM, the anti-smuggling and organised crime unit (KOM) manage TF cases related to FETÖ organisation with the help of 52 officers. Between 2021-2025, TNP has sent 9 written orders covering 81 cities/ TNP TF Branches in Türkiye on the importance of revealing the financial structures of terrorist organisations, prioritizing the financing of terrorism, the use of social media and VAs by terrorist organisations, terrorist financing typology guides, raising funds for terrorist organisations with proceeds of crime and increasing the effectiveness of TF investigations. u) GGC is competent in supporting CT/CFT investigations when occurring in rural areas. The GGC Anti-Terrorism Financing Branch Directorate (GGC TEM) employs around 1 500 personnel across headquarters and provincial CT units. Of these, 136 officers (8 at headquarters and 128 in the provinces) are fully dedicated to combating TF, while the remaining staff carry out broader CT and CFT duties. Most of the latter have received training on TF, enabling them to participate in CFT-related operations as part of their general CT responsibilities. The GGC TEM has sub-units specialised in each relevant terrorist organisation following the NRA findings (i.e., those organisations listed under the UNSCRs or domestically designated by Türkiye). The GGC TEM can access cross-border movement information allowing LEAs to add information on the dates of entry/exit of the person/suspect at the country's land borders, the amount and type of cash they carry, flight entry/exit information, identification of persons traveling with them, membership information of foundations/associations, providing access to social security institution records and job data, which contributes to creating a full profile of the suspect. v) CGC has a responsibility for combating all sea border related crimes with over 8 002 officers. After the 2019 MER, the Coast Guard established the first TF Section Chief transformed into a TF Branch Directorate in 2024 to increase the focus on TF-activity detection, allocating 31 officers in the headquarters office and 169 in the provinces. w) CE have responsibilities with respect to smuggling activity detected at points under customs supervision, including borders, ports, and airports. Customs Enforcement has no dedicated TF unit; in cases of TF-related suspicion, officers report to the Public Prosecutor and MASAK. Given the significant TF risks associated with trade-based activity and cash smuggling at borders, ports, and airports the absence of a specialised TF capacity within Customs Enforcement is a relevant limitation. 543. MASAK plays an important role in contributing to TF investigations when proactively disseminating financial intelligence to the public prosecutor’s offices and when contributing with case-specific financial analysis when requested by a public prosecutor in the context of an investigation. MASAK has 44 officials dedicated to the analysis of TF activity distributed in two different units: (i) Terrorism Financing Analysis with 22 analysts and (ii) Terrorism Financing Analysis Department also with 22 analysts. While both departments conduct analysis on FETÖ, the first department conducts analysis on UN-listed terrorist organisations such as ISIL/Al-Qaida and organisations which abuse religion, and the second department conducts analysis on PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. TF examinations can be triggered by various sources of information (see earlier in this Chapter and IO.6 analysis). 544. All LEAs are extensively trained to detect and disrupt terrorist financing activity. Türkiye provided through MOJ, MASAK and the relevant LEAs almost 217 CFT-related trainings, courses, workshops and drill scenarios when applicable. The table below shows the number of CFT trainings delivered and participants: Table 9.2. CFT Trainings delivered to operational experts (2020-2025)* Year Item MOJ MASAK TNP GGC Customs Enforcement Coast Guard 2021 Training 10 15 4 5 - 1 Trainees 2052 1511 1812 2022 - 2 2022 Training 23 13 6 7 - 5 Trainees 1922 869 1612 2585 - 18 2023 Training 31 9 8 7 - 4 Trainees 2652 979 964 1687 - 65 2024 Training 6 18 5 6 1 4 Trainees 280 1360 1500 2443 33 74 2025** Training 3 6 8 7 1 5 Trainees 185 944 674 2440 10 81 Total Training 73 61 31 31 2 19 Trainees 7091 5693 6562 11174 43 240 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 545. LEAs have developed several TF risks indicators as part of the collaborative process conducted under the Threat and Vulnerabilities working group, to help all enforcement agencies to detect and disrupt TF activities. These efforts are complemented by a range of guidance documents, prepared in accordance with their respective roles and responsibilities, covering a wide spectrum of TF typologies identified in Türkiye as well as best practices for disrupting and investigating them. For example, the TNP 2021, 2023 and 2025 “Guide on Combatting the Financing of Terrorism”, the 2023 “Questions on Terrorism Financing Investigations and Statement Interrogation” and the 2024 “Evaluation of Alternative Money Transfer Methods and Virtual Asset Service Providers in terms of Terrorism Financing (Hawala)”, among others, and the GGC 2021 and 2025 “Guidance On Effective Fight Against Terrorist Financing”, “Countering Financing of Terrorism”, and “Guidance About Informal Value Transfer Systems (Hawala)” as well as a control form (Hawala Control Form) to increase awareness of the personnel on their intranet web service, among others. MASAK also provides LEAs with up-to-date TF typologies guidelines, which includes recent trends, typologies and case examples to increase LEAs staff awareness of recent developments and provides indicators to be considered in the context of an investigation. 546. Operational detection capacity is strong and benefits from extensive data integration. Through UYAP, public prosecutors handling TF investigations can access in a single platform a wide range of information including bank account and transaction data, travel information and criminal-justice records. This allows prosecutors and LEAs to rapidly cross-check by combining financial footprints, travel, communications and criminal-justice records. These capabilities, supported by a widespread use of special investigative techniques, are a major operational strength. 547. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye investigated a total of 11 476 TF cases and 23 349 natural persons were subject to TF investigations. While 47% of the total cases under investigation are related to ISIL/AQ financing, 24% related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, 23% related to FETÖ, only 3% are related to other terrorist organisations. 548. In addition, Türkiye investigated a total of 421 216 cases and 376 978 persons for either leadership to an armed terrorist organisation, membership to an armed terrorist organisation and the provision of weapons to an armed terrorist organisation. Table 9.3. Number of TF investigations (2021-2025)* TO 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Terrorist financing offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects ISIL/AQ 741 1505 807 1105 844 1054 1253 1669 1746 1815 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 350 928 427 931 482 2720 719 3010 770 2697 FETO 241 569 269 573 333 575 472 1495 1358 1831 DHKP-C 7 43 82 89 58 154 236 181 63 75 Other 21 44 44 69 32 49 54 84 67 84 Total 1360 3089 1629 2767 1749 4552 2734 6439 4004 6502 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL Article 314/1) 1783 1739 1985 1727 445 419 559 501 262 216 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL Article 314/2) 139343 113434 99934 84490 66865 60719 57075 63593 52686 49808 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL 315) 75 76 67 83 80 88 31 52 26 33 Total 141201 115249 101986 86300 67390 61226 57665 64146 52974 50057 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 549. The scale of investigations is significant and broadly reflects Türkiye’s high exposure to TF risks, which involve the potential misuse of a wide range of financial and non-financial sectors. However, the volume of cases is not, in itself, determinative of effectiveness under IO.9, as it may be influenced by a high number of lower-value cases. At the same time, the demonstrated casework does not fully cover the full range of relevant TF risks, including areas where no ex-officio investigations were demonstrated. 550. Türkiye demonstrates a good ability to investigate TF offences related to UNSCR-listed and domestically designated terrorism threats in alignment with the country’s risk profile. However, a significant effectiveness gap remains regarding TOs and networks not subject to designation under UNSCRs or Türkiye’s domestic regime but identified through international sources and co-operation channels as relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. In the context of its NRA, Türkiye has acknowledged that its TF risks are also shaped by its geographical position bordering areas of intensive instability and conflict. While Türkiye does not recognise certain regional actors as TOs, specifically those that are neither listed under the UNSCRs nor domestically designated, the risks stemming from those actors are described as being sensitively monitored. Yet Türkiye has not identified foreign-linked TF activity stemming from such organisations within its borders, and did not report proactive or standalone TF investigations, prosecutions, or convictions specifically targeting them, despite Türkiye's geographic position as a key regional transit and connectivity hub. In some instances, however, Türkiye responded constructively to international requests for information related to individuals associated with such entities (see Box 9.2 regarding the two cases which have been presented). This materially limits effectiveness, as it constrains Türkiye’s demonstrated ability to identify and investigate TF activity across the full spectrum of its relevant TF risk profile. 551. Türkiye identifies and investigates a broad range of TF activities involving both legal and illegal sources of funds. Authorities have identified the use of informal value transfer systems, including hawala-type mechanisms, VAs and social media-based fundraising, as well as schemes involving the misuse of NPOs and commercial entities. These cases demonstrate an ability to detect and investigate different TF methods. Demonstrated casework involving more complex structures, including the use of legal persons and commercial arrangements, remains limited and is concentrated in a narrower subset of TF cases related to FETÖ. 552. Detection gaps remain in relation to certain areas of Türkiye’s TF risk environment. In particular, further demonstration is needed for cases involving TBTF, large-scale procurement activities and more complex financial structures, including those involving legal persons. While a range of TF methods has been identified, these are not yet systematically reflected in operational casework across the full range of relevant TF risks, which limits the extent to which Türkiye demonstrates coverage of its overall TF risk profile. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 553. Türkiye has implemented a holistic approach to identify the role of a terrorist financier in TF investigations. Türkiye uses different techniques to create a detailed financial footprint by connecting financial traces with operational realities to accurately identify and attribute the financier’s role. 554. Public prosecutors use both financial intelligence and forensic evidence collection methods to identify a person’s role as a terrorist financier focusing on (i) the identification of financial traces: enabling a comprehensive analysis of financial flows and ownership structures, revealing the origin, movement, and destination of the funds (i.e., analysis of bank transfers, SWIFT records, VAs chain analysis, payments done through MVTS, exchange houses, legal persons involved, cross-border cash declarations and disclosures, etc.; (ii) transaction timing, amounts, and cyclical transfers analysis to help detect suspicious patterns, while cross-border tracing and cash declaration reviews provide insight into international movements and undeclared assets; (iii) combining financial analysis with operational intelligence to enhance data validation (i.e., data bases cross-check, social media and donation campaigns monitoring to reveal potential fundraising channels, and witness statements or confessions obtained during interrogations linked to organisational structures); and (iv) the integrated use of technical surveillance that helps identify communication roles (e.g., recruiters, logisticians). 555. Although PFIs are widely used to identify the role of the terrorist financier, and many cases demonstrate detailed analysis of the collection, movement and use of funds, establishing the ultimate end-use of funds remains inherently challenging, particularly in complex or cross-border cases. In a number of instances, investigations focus primarily on the movement of funds, without fully demonstrating the final use, hierarchical roles, facilitators abroad, or the upstream organisational structure. While this reflects common evidentiary challenges in TF investigations, the absence of complementary elements—such as broader network mapping or identification of higher-level facilitators—limits the overall evidentiary depth in some cases. In addition, some cases involve small amounts, short financial cycles or single intermediaries, suggesting that operational facilitators are detected but that investigations do not always expand to identify wider networks. Footnotes [37] Pursuant resolutions 1267(1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253(2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. 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Identification and investigation of TF activity 529. Türkiye has well-developed and institutionalised capabilities to identify and investigate TF for risks related to TOs, associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated by the UNSC [37] and those designated under its national sanctions’ regime. Türkiye’s operational focus covers a wide range of TF activities, including a combination of traditional and evolving TF methods, and aligns with the TF threats identified in its NRA (FETÖ, PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, ISIL, AQ). However, Türkiye has not demonstrated investigations involving TOs and networks not subject to designation under UNSCRs or Türkiye’s domestic regime but identified through international sources and co-operation channels as relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. This limits the demonstrated ability to identify TF activity across the full range of Türkiye’s relevant TF risk environment. 530. Türkiye identifies TF activity through different operational tools, including (i) broader terrorism investigations; (ii) domestic operational detection channels; (iii) foreign intelligence sharing or co-operation requests; and (iv) detection of positive matches when screening against sanctions lists. While the overall detection ecosystem is robust, foreign intelligence has triggered relatively few domestic TF investigations, and the demonstrated use of foreign-generated information is strongest where the relevant terrorist organisation or network corresponds to Türkiye’s designated threat profile (see also table 9.2 below). 531. All CT/CFT competent authorities have a sufficient degree of specialisation to identify and investigate TF and are well equipped to assess and identify TF activity in the context of a broader terrorism investigation. PFIs are the most common method of detecting TF activity in the country. When a new TF trend or activity is detected, the Threats and Vulnerability WG discusses the case and the indicators for detection to design a holistic strategy to disrupt the activity including all relevant CFT authorities. 532. Türkiye demonstrates a strong use of a wide range of sources of information to initiate TF investigations as TF activity detection also arises from MASAK analytical outputs, LEA and intelligence agency information (mainly from TNP and GGC), social media monitoring, and border/security operations. The specific channels include: reports from local and foreign counterparts’ intelligence units, financial networks analysis of individuals linked to terrorist organisations, information from customs and migration offices, and a broad access to different sources of information, including open-source intelligence information (OSINT) and social media monitoring, examination of the financial movements of associations, foundations, companies, or aid organisations affiliated with terrorist organisations, examination of evidence seized during judicial or rural terrain operation against terrorist organisations (bank statements, VAs data, etc.), reviews of existing databases and anomaly studies created in AI-supported databases, examination of all types of smuggling activities and their connection to terrorist organisations; and typologies obtained from international reports. TF activity is also detected when conducting the verification of the positive matches arising from screening against sanctions lists. Once the positive match is reported, a financial investigation is conducted against the listed person or entities and their relatives. 533. Türkiye identifies a range of complex TF typologies, including the use of VAs, hawala networks, social media, abuse of NPOs, and commercial entities linked to FETÖ, demonstrating an ability to detect sophisticated TF schemes. However, a significant share of investigations concerns lower-value individual donations, ATM micro-transfers or minor facilitation. This is acknowledged as a common feature of TF networks, which often include many low-level contributors and fewer central collectors or co-ordinators. Nevertheless, given Türkiye’s broader risk profile as a regional financial, trade and logistics hub, further demonstration is needed of investigations involving TBTF, large-scale procurement networks and complex use of legal persons beyond the FETÖ-related commercial structures demonstrated. 534. Türkiye has demonstrated strong use of interagency information sharing mechanisms and broad access to TF-related information, enabling competent authorities to take timely action to disrupt TF activity. Türkiye has established formal mechanisms for information sharing through interagency MoUs, including between prosecutors, LEAs, MASAK, and other competent authorities. Ad hoc interagency teams can be constituted for specific investigations or to address a developing trend. Through the dedicated UYAP system, public prosecutors can access in a single platform a wide range of information, including bank account and transaction data, travel information, and criminal-justice records, enabling rapid cross-checking of financial footprints, travel, communications, and criminal records. This is a major operational strength. 535. Although most TF investigations originate from domestic intelligence sources in the context of a broader terrorism-related investigation concerning UNSC-listed or domestically designated organisations, Türkiye has a well- established mechanism to identify related foreign-linked TF activities, relying mainly on informal bilateral and international co-operation processes. For this purpose, competent authorities use LEA co-operation networks (bilateral agreements and INTERPOL channels), legal liaison officers posted in Türkiye's embassies, and FIU co-operation mechanisms, including the EGMONT Group (see IO.2). Box 9.1. TF investigation triggered by an international request led to an international ISIL activity disruption case. TNP TEM-CFT Division: Case “Open Radar” In 2025, TNP-TEM received a co-operation request from its liaison officer posted in a European country in relation to seven Turkish nationals being investigated for collecting funds for ISIL members in Syria. The suspects allegedly organized crowdfunding campaigns and collected money via instant messaging application channels, which was then transferred to Syria to support ISIL prisoners. TNP in co-ordination with the FIU, TNP cyber units and intelligence agencies, expanded the analysis of seven Turkish nationals and conducted a financial investigation. As a result of these co-ordinated efforts, 82 suspects were detected, of whom 43 were Turkish nationals and 39 foreigners. 22 of the total suspects had criminal records related to terrorism offences, 10 were subject to investigation in a European country, 5 had assets frozen in Türkiye and 4 were on a wanted list for terrorism offences. The results were communicated to the Public Prosecutor’s Office who initiated the TF investigation. The parallel financial investigation concluded that suspicious transactions were made by four of the suspects through electronic payment companies and by using VASPs in different currencies (EUR, USD, TRY) totalling EUR 312 000 over a period of six years. All transactions had a common coded pattern and had no business justification or linkages. Transactions also included high value cash withdrawals. In a co-ordinated operation led by the public prosecutor and enforced by TNP TEM, 15 suspects were arrested, digital material, documents and EUR 12 320 were seized. All operational results were communicated to the requesting country and prosecution is ongoing. 536. Most financial information and intelligence requests are related to tracing, profiling, transactions records and asset freezing purposes. For foreign linked TF activity, many requests relate to information exchange on foreign individuals’ entry and exit information, addresses, citizenships, and financial profiles. Türkiye has presented some cases, in which it has successfully responded to foreign counterparts’ investigations and asset freezing requests, including in a small number of instances involving terrorist entities that are neither UNSC nor domestically designated by Türkiye. Türkiye provided only two such cases for assessment (see Box 9.2 below), which limits the ability to evaluate the scope and consistency of this practice; no aggregate figures were provided. Box 9.2. International responses to foreign intelligence requests related to entities designated unilaterally by other jurisdictions (neither UNSC nor domestically designated by Türkiye). Case 1: In 2023, Country X requested information from Türkiye through the Egmont Group in relation to a real estate investment partnership established in 2013, and some of its partners, which were suspected of exploiting the real estate sector and financial sector in Türkiye for the purpose of raising and transferring these funds to an entity that was not UNSC-listed but had been unilaterally designated by Country X domestically. Türkiye’s FIU initiated a financial analysis in response to the request on the company and its partners, including a review of the statement made to the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP), open-source intelligence and financial data from the FIU’s databases. The analysis revealed that 25 % of the company's shares are publicly traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange and that the company is subject to independent audit in accordance with the Capital Markets Law and the TCC. Furthermore, it was understood that following a unilateral designation by Country X, partner’s duties at the company have been terminated and their shares have been transferred to the other partners. The investigation concluded the company's current partners did not hold partnerships in other companies, had no registered criminal records. No significant or unexplained high-value cash inflows or outflows were identified in their account, and no notifications had been received from financial institutions indicating individuals had been listed by any jurisdiction other than the requesting country. Regarding the company’s accounts, no transfers of funds of significant size or from unknown sources, whether domestic or foreign, were identified, and it was determined that the transfers recorded in the accounts were consistent with the company's declared field of activity. A summary of the analysis results was shared with the requesting country in accordance with Egmont Group principles. Case 2: In 2024 an EU country filed an urgent information request through the Egmont Group on a target (Mr A) indicating that he was suspected of financing illegal organisations abroad. The requesting country was particularly seeking to determine whether Mr A had any financial transactions with Mr B, who according to open-source information, was one of the “central figures” of a non-UNSC-listed entity in the country. The media reports indicated that Mr B was allegedly arrested on terrorism and terrorism financing charges. MASAK and the requesting country’s FIU held consultations to discuss the case details following which MASAK conducted a financial analysis of the individuals concerned and replied to the request with all available information. According to the analysis Mr B had been subject to judicial proceedings in a third country and was acquitted of all alleged terrorism and terrorism financing charges. No further information was received from the requesting country. 537. In addition, Türkiye has utilised foreign intelligence in investigations to identify TF activities related to its main TF threats resulting in concrete enforcement actions. Türkiye has a system in place to integrate all foreign financial information (i.e., migration information, bank accounts, criminal records) into the UYAP system with the objective of integrating it into the national records. Both domestic and foreign intelligence sources are evaluated and incorporated as evidence when appropriate. However, the integration of foreign-generated intelligence is more limited. The table below shows the number of times in which foreign intelligence was integrated into TF files processed by the FIU and disseminated to LEAs. Table 9.1. Cases of foreign intelligence provided through EGMONT Group integrated into TF files analysed by MASAK and disseminated to LEAs (2021-2025)* Year Number of files Number of persons subject to analysis 2021 73 189 2022 84 120 2023 68 138 2024 90 198 2025** 61 144 Total 376 789 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 538. Public prosecutors lead TF investigations and are responsible for setting the strategic direction of the case and decide which LEAs will assist to produce evidence to support the investigations. Following the priorities established by the National CFT Strategy, the Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors assigned more than 100 specialised public prosecutors to TF investigations. These prosecutors are distributed across all 81 provinces including at least 1 in each province and more than one in metropolitan cities. 539. Public prosecutors handling TF investigations and LEAs routinely identify whether a suspect: (a) collects funds (through donations, coercive fundraising, diaspora channels, VAs, and crowdfunding campaigns); (b) moves funds (through hawala chains, payment institutions, VASPs, front companies, and couriers); or (c) uses funds (for procurement, logistics, payment to fighters, family support, and operational expenses). 540. PFIs are systematically opened for all terrorism files. Following a MoJ Circular, this policy has been adopted in 2020 and led to PFIs being conducted in around 60% of cases in 2020 up to 100% in 2025. Public prosecutors can initiate an investigation under the simple suspicion of TF activity. PFIs are conducted to determine whether each suspected TO member or individual is also able to provide, collect or hold funds for the organisation. PFIs, involve a thorough review of suspects’ and their family members’ assets (including analysis of movable and immovable property, bank accounts, and VAs) to assess consistency with declared income and business activities. The goal is to identify disproportionate wealth, trace asset sources, and uncover links between financial accounts and terrorist organisations. PFIs also focus on the examination of physical evidence such as diaries, receipts, and bank cards seized during searches, as well as social media activity and personal networks to detect hidden financial channels or affiliations. In addition, all investigations conducted for searching, seizing and confiscating proceeds of crime shall also include research whether the investigated persons are affiliated with any terrorist organisation, and whether they used proceeds of crime for financing any terrorist organisation or terrorist act. 541. Competent authorities co-operate to a large extent for detecting and identifying TF activity. Public prosecutors generally rely on TNP and GGC CT/CFT specialised units to support most of the investigations as they have a vital role in the prevention of both terrorism and TF activity. For complex TF cases, public prosecutors also request the production of financial analysis and intelligence from the FIU. Throughout the course of the investigation, all competent authorities co-ordinate their enforcement actions creating ad hoc joint investigations teams led by the public prosecutors. Public prosecutors also request support from the CGC in case of TF activity detected in maritime areas and CE Agencies when the TF activity is being detected at points under customs supervision, including borders, ports and airports. 542. Competent authorities are well-equipped to detect and investigate TF and work together in a highly co-ordinated and complementary manner. The main CFT structures in place for supporting TF and parallel financial investigations are as follows: b) The TNP and its specialised TEM unit have sufficient staff to conduct TF-focused investigation in addition to their general duties. [38] The TNP TEM unit has sub-units specialised in each terrorist organisation identified as a threat in the NRA, i.e. UNSCR-listed and domestically designated organisations. In addition to TEM, the anti-smuggling and organised crime unit (KOM) manage TF cases related to FETÖ organisation with the help of 52 officers. Between 2021-2025, TNP has sent 9 written orders covering 81 cities/ TNP TF Branches in Türkiye on the importance of revealing the financial structures of terrorist organisations, prioritizing the financing of terrorism, the use of social media and VAs by terrorist organisations, terrorist financing typology guides, raising funds for terrorist organisations with proceeds of crime and increasing the effectiveness of TF investigations. u) GGC is competent in supporting CT/CFT investigations when occurring in rural areas. The GGC Anti-Terrorism Financing Branch Directorate (GGC TEM) employs around 1 500 personnel across headquarters and provincial CT units. Of these, 136 officers (8 at headquarters and 128 in the provinces) are fully dedicated to combating TF, while the remaining staff carry out broader CT and CFT duties. Most of the latter have received training on TF, enabling them to participate in CFT-related operations as part of their general CT responsibilities. The GGC TEM has sub-units specialised in each relevant terrorist organisation following the NRA findings (i.e., those organisations listed under the UNSCRs or domestically designated by Türkiye). The GGC TEM can access cross-border movement information allowing LEAs to add information on the dates of entry/exit of the person/suspect at the country's land borders, the amount and type of cash they carry, flight entry/exit information, identification of persons traveling with them, membership information of foundations/associations, providing access to social security institution records and job data, which contributes to creating a full profile of the suspect. v) CGC has a responsibility for combating all sea border related crimes with over 8 002 officers. After the 2019 MER, the Coast Guard established the first TF Section Chief transformed into a TF Branch Directorate in 2024 to increase the focus on TF-activity detection, allocating 31 officers in the headquarters office and 169 in the provinces. w) CE have responsibilities with respect to smuggling activity detected at points under customs supervision, including borders, ports, and airports. Customs Enforcement has no dedicated TF unit; in cases of TF-related suspicion, officers report to the Public Prosecutor and MASAK. Given the significant TF risks associated with trade-based activity and cash smuggling at borders, ports, and airports the absence of a specialised TF capacity within Customs Enforcement is a relevant limitation. 543. MASAK plays an important role in contributing to TF investigations when proactively disseminating financial intelligence to the public prosecutor’s offices and when contributing with case-specific financial analysis when requested by a public prosecutor in the context of an investigation. MASAK has 44 officials dedicated to the analysis of TF activity distributed in two different units: (i) Terrorism Financing Analysis with 22 analysts and (ii) Terrorism Financing Analysis Department also with 22 analysts. While both departments conduct analysis on FETÖ, the first department conducts analysis on UN-listed terrorist organisations such as ISIL/Al-Qaida and organisations which abuse religion, and the second department conducts analysis on PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. TF examinations can be triggered by various sources of information (see earlier in this Chapter and IO.6 analysis). 544. All LEAs are extensively trained to detect and disrupt terrorist financing activity. Türkiye provided through MOJ, MASAK and the relevant LEAs almost 217 CFT-related trainings, courses, workshops and drill scenarios when applicable. The table below shows the number of CFT trainings delivered and participants: Table 9.2. CFT Trainings delivered to operational experts (2020-2025)* Year Item MOJ MASAK TNP GGC Customs Enforcement Coast Guard 2021 Training 10 15 4 5 - 1 Trainees 2052 1511 1812 2022 - 2 2022 Training 23 13 6 7 - 5 Trainees 1922 869 1612 2585 - 18 2023 Training 31 9 8 7 - 4 Trainees 2652 979 964 1687 - 65 2024 Training 6 18 5 6 1 4 Trainees 280 1360 1500 2443 33 74 2025** Training 3 6 8 7 1 5 Trainees 185 944 674 2440 10 81 Total Training 73 61 31 31 2 19 Trainees 7091 5693 6562 11174 43 240 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 545. LEAs have developed several TF risks indicators as part of the collaborative process conducted under the Threat and Vulnerabilities working group, to help all enforcement agencies to detect and disrupt TF activities. These efforts are complemented by a range of guidance documents, prepared in accordance with their respective roles and responsibilities, covering a wide spectrum of TF typologies identified in Türkiye as well as best practices for disrupting and investigating them. For example, the TNP 2021, 2023 and 2025 “Guide on Combatting the Financing of Terrorism”, the 2023 “Questions on Terrorism Financing Investigations and Statement Interrogation” and the 2024 “Evaluation of Alternative Money Transfer Methods and Virtual Asset Service Providers in terms of Terrorism Financing (Hawala)”, among others, and the GGC 2021 and 2025 “Guidance On Effective Fight Against Terrorist Financing”, “Countering Financing of Terrorism”, and “Guidance About Informal Value Transfer Systems (Hawala)” as well as a control form (Hawala Control Form) to increase awareness of the personnel on their intranet web service, among others. MASAK also provides LEAs with up-to-date TF typologies guidelines, which includes recent trends, typologies and case examples to increase LEAs staff awareness of recent developments and provides indicators to be considered in the context of an investigation. 546. Operational detection capacity is strong and benefits from extensive data integration. Through UYAP, public prosecutors handling TF investigations can access in a single platform a wide range of information including bank account and transaction data, travel information and criminal-justice records. This allows prosecutors and LEAs to rapidly cross-check by combining financial footprints, travel, communications and criminal-justice records. These capabilities, supported by a widespread use of special investigative techniques, are a major operational strength. 547. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye investigated a total of 11 476 TF cases and 23 349 natural persons were subject to TF investigations. While 47% of the total cases under investigation are related to ISIL/AQ financing, 24% related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, 23% related to FETÖ, only 3% are related to other terrorist organisations. 548. In addition, Türkiye investigated a total of 421 216 cases and 376 978 persons for either leadership to an armed terrorist organisation, membership to an armed terrorist organisation and the provision of weapons to an armed terrorist organisation. Table 9.3. Number of TF investigations (2021-2025)* TO 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Terrorist financing offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects No. investigations No. Suspects ISIL/AQ 741 1505 807 1105 844 1054 1253 1669 1746 1815 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 350 928 427 931 482 2720 719 3010 770 2697 FETO 241 569 269 573 333 575 472 1495 1358 1831 DHKP-C 7 43 82 89 58 154 236 181 63 75 Other 21 44 44 69 32 49 54 84 67 84 Total 1360 3089 1629 2767 1749 4552 2734 6439 4004 6502 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL Article 314/1) 1783 1739 1985 1727 445 419 559 501 262 216 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL Article 314/2) 139343 113434 99934 84490 66865 60719 57075 63593 52686 49808 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation (TCL 315) 75 76 67 83 80 88 31 52 26 33 Total 141201 115249 101986 86300 67390 61226 57665 64146 52974 50057 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 549. The scale of investigations is significant and broadly reflects Türkiye’s high exposure to TF risks, which involve the potential misuse of a wide range of financial and non-financial sectors. However, the volume of cases is not, in itself, determinative of effectiveness under IO.9, as it may be influenced by a high number of lower-value cases. At the same time, the demonstrated casework does not fully cover the full range of relevant TF risks, including areas where no ex-officio investigations were demonstrated. 550. Türkiye demonstrates a good ability to investigate TF offences related to UNSCR-listed and domestically designated terrorism threats in alignment with the country’s risk profile. However, a significant effectiveness gap remains regarding TOs and networks not subject to designation under UNSCRs or Türkiye’s domestic regime but identified through international sources and co-operation channels as relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. In the context of its NRA, Türkiye has acknowledged that its TF risks are also shaped by its geographical position bordering areas of intensive instability and conflict. While Türkiye does not recognise certain regional actors as TOs, specifically those that are neither listed under the UNSCRs nor domestically designated, the risks stemming from those actors are described as being sensitively monitored. Yet Türkiye has not identified foreign-linked TF activity stemming from such organisations within its borders, and did not report proactive or standalone TF investigations, prosecutions, or convictions specifically targeting them, despite Türkiye's geographic position as a key regional transit and connectivity hub. In some instances, however, Türkiye responded constructively to international requests for information related to individuals associated with such entities (see Box 9.2 regarding the two cases which have been presented). This materially limits effectiveness, as it constrains Türkiye’s demonstrated ability to identify and investigate TF activity across the full spectrum of its relevant TF risk profile. 551. Türkiye identifies and investigates a broad range of TF activities involving both legal and illegal sources of funds. Authorities have identified the use of informal value transfer systems, including hawala-type mechanisms, VAs and social media-based fundraising, as well as schemes involving the misuse of NPOs and commercial entities. These cases demonstrate an ability to detect and investigate different TF methods. Demonstrated casework involving more complex structures, including the use of legal persons and commercial arrangements, remains limited and is concentrated in a narrower subset of TF cases related to FETÖ. 552. Detection gaps remain in relation to certain areas of Türkiye’s TF risk environment. In particular, further demonstration is needed for cases involving TBTF, large-scale procurement activities and more complex financial structures, including those involving legal persons. While a range of TF methods has been identified, these are not yet systematically reflected in operational casework across the full range of relevant TF risks, which limits the extent to which Türkiye demonstrates coverage of its overall TF risk profile. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 553. Türkiye has implemented a holistic approach to identify the role of a terrorist financier in TF investigations. Türkiye uses different techniques to create a detailed financial footprint by connecting financial traces with operational realities to accurately identify and attribute the financier’s role. 554. Public prosecutors use both financial intelligence and forensic evidence collection methods to identify a person’s role as a terrorist financier focusing on (i) the identification of financial traces: enabling a comprehensive analysis of financial flows and ownership structures, revealing the origin, movement, and destination of the funds (i.e., analysis of bank transfers, SWIFT records, VAs chain analysis, payments done through MVTS, exchange houses, legal persons involved, cross-border cash declarations and disclosures, etc.; (ii) transaction timing, amounts, and cyclical transfers analysis to help detect suspicious patterns, while cross-border tracing and cash declaration reviews provide insight into international movements and undeclared assets; (iii) combining financial analysis with operational intelligence to enhance data validation (i.e., data bases cross-check, social media and donation campaigns monitoring to reveal potential fundraising channels, and witness statements or confessions obtained during interrogations linked to organisational structures); and (iv) the integrated use of technical surveillance that helps identify communication roles (e.g., recruiters, logisticians). 555. Although PFIs are widely used to identify the role of the terrorist financier, and many cases demonstrate detailed analysis of the collection, movement and use of funds, establishing the ultimate end-use of funds remains inherently challenging, particularly in complex or cross-border cases. In a number of instances, investigations focus primarily on the movement of funds, without fully demonstrating the final use, hierarchical roles, facilitators abroad, or the upstream organisational structure. While this reflects common evidentiary challenges in TF investigations, the absence of complementary elements—such as broader network mapping or identification of higher-level facilitators—limits the overall evidentiary depth in some cases. In addition, some cases involve small amounts, short financial cycles or single intermediaries, suggesting that operational facilitators are detected but that investigations do not always expand to identify wider networks. Footnotes [37] Pursuant resolutions 1267(1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253(2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. [38] The employee figures were submitted to the assessment team, but the state’s request to refrain from publishing them due to their sensitive nature was considered" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 407. Türkiye has a robust system to produce good quality financial intelligence and all other relevant information to appropriately support competent authorities’ operational needs when conducting ML, associate predicate offences and TF investigation and prosecutions. 408. MASAK operations are divided into sixteen departments consisting of 249 analysts supporting their activities which is considered adequate. Eight departments produce different financial intelligence products depending on the stages of the analysis, from which two departments are responsible for STR analysis: (i) the Strategic Analysis Department, which performs bulk data analysis to guide other units; and (ii) the Operational Analysis Department, which manages STR data and co-ordinates efforts related to ML/TF cases. 409. Two other departments are specialised in TF analysis, one focusing on UN-listed terrorist organisations (ISIL, Al-Qaida and associate affiliates) and other terrorist groups exploiting religion, and another dedicated to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. Both departments also analyse cases related to FETÖ and other organisation. The table below demonstrates MASAK’s number of files subject to further analysis in both, the TF Analysis and Evaluation Departments which demonstrates their ability to produce several types of financial intelligence products prioritising on of their main high-risk offences. Table 6.3. MASAK TF reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Year Financial Analysis Report Financial Detection Report Information Note Raw Data (CDs) Total TF files/year 2021 5543 92 148 9080 14863 2022 3756 26 177 1621 5580 2023 2514 31 173 1209 3927 2024 2762 47 141 1440 4390 2025** 2245 70 246 122 2683 Total 16820 266 885 13472 31443 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 410. Reporting entities submit STRs online. All STRs received by MASAK are reviewed on daily basis. An automated scoring system was implemented in 2021, and machine learning techniques were introduced in 2025. From 2021 to 2025, the scoring system was rule-based, generating index values from numerical and text-derived parameters (i.e., number of natural and legal persons mentioned in the STR; amount of the transaction; matching files and warnings in the data base; Egmont information requests, among others). Scores were calculated as raw values without statistical scaling. In 2025, MASAK implemented an EMIS-based AI system which has proven to accelerate the scoring system and improve the quality of the STRs categorisation, accelerating its preliminary analysis to then be disseminated to the respective departments. 411. This EMIS-based AI system, will score all STRs as ‘normal’, ‘urgent’ or ‘highly urgent’ based on indicators developed by MASAK staff and the underlying predicate offence reported in the STR. The model converts the binary classification output into a score between 0 and 100 using min-max scaling, referred to as the model score. The system will also categorise those STRs including a postponement of transaction. This scoring mechanism incorporates descriptions of suspicious transactions, history above a defined threshold, aggregate value of large money transfers, high-value payments to e-money institutions, and significant transfers to VASPs by using 632 terms in the model training and scoring generation and have proven to facilitate experts STRs revision once the preliminary scoring process is finished. 412. A dedicated group of 10 experts will review on daily basis those STRs categorised as ‘urgent’ and ‘highly urgent’ or requiring a postponement of transaction (approximately 1700 per day). FIU analysts provide their views on the assigned score and delegate them to the relevant departments for further analysis if needed. The Strategic Analysis Department directly analyses and assesses all TF and PF-related STRs and those categorised as ‘urgent’ and ‘highly urgent’. As expressed in the table below, from a total of 2.7 M received STRs the majority are categorised as normal (91%). The AI-generated system categorises only a small proportion of STRs as urgent (6%), highly urgent (less than 1%) or as requesting a postponement of transaction (2%) at the entry level reflecting the capacity of experts to review these STRs on daily basis. Table 6.4. STRs overall scoring (2020-2025) Year Normal Urgent Highly Urgent STRs with request for postponement of transaction Total 2020 209324 20385 1276 6546 237531 2021 473371 23292 1114 7218 504995 2022 389105 30351 959 4907 425322 2023 540554 44798 761 15442 601555 2024 508853 33415 559 15768 558595 2025* 382959 16201 440 12734 412334 Total 2504166 168442 5109 62615 2740332 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 413. When the group of experts reviews the preliminary scoring, they are able to electronically cross-check all the information submitted in the STR against the data bases and produce a preliminary report indicating all the available information related to the natural or legal persons reported and if information related to a previous STR matches the information, submitted in the new one, the previous STR is linked to the new one and referenced for further analysis. The expert’s revision of the preliminary scoring system enables MASAK to revisit STRs initially rated as normal or urgent for deeper analysis later, minimising overlooked information and ensuring its effective use. 414. From the total STRs received, MASAK analysed 1.2 million STRs (46%) mostly as part of their strategic analysis work. This number is significantly higher than those MASAK is required to review during the scoring process, which only represents the 8% of the total submitted STRs. However, only 228 770 STRs (16%) out of all STRs were used for ML, TF, and predicate offences operational analysis and examination which remains modest given the large number of STRs received. MASAK proactively opened 360 files for case relation search, which included searches on approximately 218 000 individuals. Most of these files are related to illegal betting and gambling (18%), fraud (11%), tax evasion (7%) which is generally aligned with the country’s risk profile. Although the number of TF-related files seems limited (3%) compared to the overall number of opened files, competent authorities have confirmed that all TF-related STRs are analysed by the two TF analysis departments. 415. MASAK analyses STRs and other relevant information and produces strategic and operational analysis. It also carries out risk and sectoral studies regarding emerging developments on the field of laundering proceeds of crime (i.e., cash smuggling, misuse of e-market place, drugs, fraud, and misuse of cryptocurrency), and TF. MASAK produces ML/TF analysis and evaluations reports at a policy level and strategic analysis reports aiming at identifying and detecting activities of large and organised criminal networks. Whereas at an operational level, MASAK produces four types of financial intelligence reports for ML-related cases: financial analysis report (FAR), financial detection report (FDR), proceeds of crime reports (PCR) and informative reports (IR). MASAK has the ability to identify and trace complex ML/TF cases, identifying criminal networks using a combination of different channels to launder proceeds of crimes and finance terrorist activities (i.e. misuse nominee, shell companies, real estate, and unhosted VA wallet). 416. To produce these wide range of analysis and reports, MASAK uses several IT tools (EMIS, MOS, NPL, among others) which allows MASAK to connect all data available in Türkiye’s data bases and produce robust intelligence reports to be disseminated to the relevant competent authorities. The table below shows the number of files opened for further analysis within the scope of the work of the FIU confirming that most of the analysis work is orientated towards TF files (76.4%) compared to ML/PO files (23.6%). Table 6.5. Files opened for further financial analysis (2020-2025)* Year ML/PO files TF files Total files/year 2020 1223 10261 11484 2021 1133 6631 7764 2022 1446 5508 6954 2023 1665 4011 5676 2024 2071 4283 6354 2025* 2472 2226 4698 Total files opened/offence 10010 32920 42930 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 417. MASAK disseminates financial intelligence to different competent authorities spontaneously (proactive dissemination) or upon request (reactive dissemination). Each dissemination file is built on a comprehensive analysis with the financial profile of every reported individual, intelligence emanating from multiple STRs and all other financial data available in the MASAK’s database. 418. The FIU prepares different type of reports for dissemination: (i) the FAR is disseminated to judicial authorities answering to their requests or informing a suspicious of a criminal activity; (ii) the FDR is prepared after the finishing the verification of the transactions subject to postponement and is disseminated to judicial authorities for seizure purposes; (iii) the PCR informs the judicial authorities on the available assets or funds for preparation and planning of a seizure; (iv) IR are prepared within the scope of opened files to share the files analysis results with relevant authorities, typically after file completion; (v) ML/TF analysis and evaluation reports analyses trends and/or specific cases on either offences; (vi) CD reports are disseminated in urgent cases containing raw data on a specific event being investigated and are mainly distributed for disruption purposes. 419. Between 2021 and 2025, MASAK disseminated 7 679 files related to ML or associated predicate offences (ML/PO), 48% proactively (3 683 files) and 52% reactively (3 996 files), demonstrating a balanced approach and strong capability to produce and share financial intelligence. Proactive dissemination has incremented in a 72% from 2021 to 2025, which also reflects the MASAK’s efforts in the use of financial intelligence. In this context, 3 060 files related to aggravated fraud/fraud (42%) and 1 808 on illegal betting (25%) were disseminated, which represents a 67% ratio of the total disseminated reports in alignment with the top two predicate offences in the country. However, dissemination of other high or medium-high risk predicate offences remains limited (i.e. 634 files for drug trafficking; 249 for smuggling; and 275 for migrant smuggling/human trafficking) which does not align with the country’s risk profile. The table below indicates the type of reports disseminated: Table 6.6. MASAK ML/PO reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* REACTIVE DISSEMINATION Year ML examination PCR FAR ML Evaluation IR CD Report (Raw data) FDR Formal Letter/Other Total 2021 40 177 61 71 4 104 28 0 485 2022 44 197 53 123 7 127 11 5 567 2023 31 126 152 190 4 13 13 4 533 2024 35 108 389 554 2 2 0 0 1090 2025** 59 83 426 719 31 1 0 2 1321 Total 209 691 1081 1657 48 247 52 11 3996 PROACTIVE DISSEMINATION 2021 0 0 0 0 321 0 294 0 615 2022 0 0 27 3 485 0 198 11 724 2023 0 0 117 9 404 2 125 0 657 2024 0 0 361 0 47 0 193 21 622 2025 0 0 389 0 101 0 575 0 1065 Total 0 0 894 12 1358 2 1385 32 3683 OVERALL DISSEMINATION TOTAL 209 691 1975 1669 1406 249 1437 43 7679 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 420. MASAK also disseminated a total of 31 443 files related to terrorism and TF, 2.5% proactively (796 files) and 97.5% reactively (30 647 files). Although proactive dissemination has incremented in 56% form 2021-2025, the low rate of proactive TF disseminations reflects that most investigations stem from intelligence and terrorism cases, making MASAK’s approach largely reactive to the analysis of TF files. The high ratio of reactive dissemination signals limited detection of TF-related suspicions transactions in MASAK’s databases prior to judicial requests, though such requests enable the MASAK to connect the necessary links during investigations and provide high quality reports. Table 6.7 MASAK TF reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Year* FAR FDR IR CR Report (Raw data) Total disseminated reports/Year Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive 2021 5536 7 0 92 133 15 9077 3 14863 2022 3726 30 0 26 136 41 1619 2 5580 2023 2507 7 0 31 113 60 1206 3 3927 2024 2755 7 0 47 58 83 1437 3 4390 2025** 2181 64 0 70 48 198 119 3 2683 Total 16705 115 0 266 488 397 13458 14 31443 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 421. MASAK disseminated 26 774 TF products related to FETÖ (85%), 2 842 related to terrorist organisations abusing religion (9%), 1 445 related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (5%), 164 related to leftist organisations (less than 1%) and 218 related to other TOs(less than 1%). Proactive disseminations are more balanced as 672 files were disseminated in relation to terrorist organisations abusing religion (34%), 187 FETÖ (28%), 119 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (18%) and 133 on other TO (20%) which is align to the country’s risk profile to some extent. 422. All competent authorities highlighted the role, the quality and the timing of the MASAK’s financial analysis to pursue complex ML/TF/PF investigations including with transnational element, which was confirmed through case studies. MASAK has considerably improved the dissemination of financial intelligence reports upon judicial requests to an average time of 2 weeks, even lesser, by utilising digital transformation which has been highly noted by public prosecutors and LEAs. As a member of Egmont Group, the production and dissemination of financial intelligence have also benefited from information exchanges with other FIUs (see IO.2). 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 423. The financial intelligence produced by the MASAK largely contributes to support the needs of competent authorities at an operational level. Between 2021-2025, MASAK disseminated a total of 39 620 reports to other competent authorities, mainly to judicial authorities (85%), including prosecutors, and to a lesser extent to LEAs (11%), supervisory authorities and other relevant ministries (3%) and other intelligence units (1%). The large number of reports disseminated to judicial authorities is consistent Türkiye’s institutional framework and the fact that public prosecutors lead ML/TF investigations and courts are deciding on seizure and confiscating measures. Table 6.8. MASAK overall dissemination to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Competent authorities PCR FAR Examination ML evaluation IR FDR CD (raw data) Other Total files/authority ML/PO-RELATED FILES Judicial authorities 1282 485 198 1187 683 1511 246 62 5654 LEAs 8 503 10 3 912 43 3 5 1487 Supervisory authorities 0 153 1 2 413 60 0 8 637 Other Ministries 0 15 0 0 116 8 0 3 142 MASAK 4 22 0 2 93 11 0 17 149 Intelligence Units 0 16 0 0 61 3 0 1 81 Total ML/PO-related files 1294 1194 209 1194 2278 1636 249 96 8150 TF-RELATED FILES Judicial authorities 0 15868 19 0 83 247 11897 0 28114 LEAs 0 837 0 0 403 41 1524 0 2805 Intelligence units 0 5 0 0 80 21 9 0 115 Other (relevant ministries supervisory authorities, etc.) 0 85 5 0 333 4 9 0 436 Total TF-related files 0 16795 24 0 899 313 13439 0 31470 TOTAL NUMBER OF FILES Total files 1294 17898 233 1194 3177 1949 13688 96 39620 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 424. Between 2021 and 2025, the 37.5% of MASAK disseminations (16 758 files) triggered ML/TF investigations (see IO.7), with most reports either initiating new investigations (68%), supporting ongoing cases (9%) and meeting other LEAs needs (7%). MASAK products also assist tax and supervisory authorities for audits, complaints, and administrative sanctions. While MASAK collaborates closely with prosecutors and LEAs throughout investigations and uses working groups to share expertise, there is no clear mechanism to monitor the quality of disseminated intelligence. Additionally, MASAK conducts regular statistical and strategic analyses of STRs to help operational authorities in the timely detection of new trends. Below, this is exemplified by a case on a strategic analysis conducted on ML case abusing social media. Box 6.1. Broadcast: MASAK’s proactive financial intelligence dissemination resulting in enforcement actions Operation BROADCAST was launched following the MASAK’s dissemination of a financial detection report to public prosecutors, triggering a nationwide crackdown. The case involves stand-alone money laundering using VASP, credit cards, virtual POS systems, and MVTS, and is currently at the prosecution stage. In June 2023, MASAK detected suspicious ML activity patterns emerging on a popular social media platform. By leveraging its analytical capabilities, MASAK examined over 4 000 bank account movements, identifying links to crimes such as fraud via information systems, misuse of bank and credit cards, money laundering and establishing an organisation for committing crimes. The transaction volumes among the suspects were approximately EUR 34 M. Once the intelligence was consolidated, MASAK activated its dissemination mechanisms. Detailed reports and actionable intelligence were shared with law enforcement and judicial authorities through secure channels, enabling rapid co-ordination. This collaboration culminated in simultaneous operations across 37 provinces. In 2023, 164 suspects were taken into custody. MASAK also provided comprehensive asset-tracing intelligence, leading to the seizure of real estate (38 apartments), vehicles (38), shares of 14 companies, bank and VAs accounts (1 700), and cash—valued at approximately EUR 18 M. These seizures were possible because the MASAK’s information flow ensured prosecutors and courts had the evidence needed to act decisively. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 425. LEAs produces financial intelligence to conduct their prevention duties and upon prosecutors’ requests. Prosecutors mainly rely on MASAK financial analysis to support complex cases as they have direct access to all types of financial information and better staff specialisation. TNP and GGC can produce financial intelligence based on their databases and can request other competent authorities to provide financial information if needed. In addition, LEAs uses specialised programmes to examine financial analysis reports obtained from MASAK and to understand the relationship between money transfers and other transactions between individuals/suspects. For example, GGC (KOM- Fight against Smuggling and Organised Crime) makes use of PARS analyses system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 407. Türkiye has a robust system to produce good quality financial intelligence and all other relevant information to appropriately support competent authorities’ operational needs when conducting ML, associate predicate offences and TF investigation and prosecutions. 408. MASAK operations are divided into sixteen departments consisting of 249 analysts supporting their activities which is considered adequate. Eight departments produce different financial intelligence products depending on the stages of the analysis, from which two departments are responsible for STR analysis: (i) the Strategic Analysis Department, which performs bulk data analysis to guide other units; and (ii) the Operational Analysis Department, which manages STR data and co-ordinates efforts related to ML/TF cases. 409. Two other departments are specialised in TF analysis, one focusing on UN-listed terrorist organisations (ISIL, Al-Qaida and associate affiliates) and other terrorist groups exploiting religion, and another dedicated to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. Both departments also analyse cases related to FETÖ and other organisation. The table below demonstrates MASAK’s number of files subject to further analysis in both, the TF Analysis and Evaluation Departments which demonstrates their ability to produce several types of financial intelligence products prioritising on of their main high-risk offences. Table 6.3. MASAK TF reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Year Financial Analysis Report Financial Detection Report Information Note Raw Data (CDs) Total TF files/year 2021 5543 92 148 9080 14863 2022 3756 26 177 1621 5580 2023 2514 31 173 1209 3927 2024 2762 47 141 1440 4390 2025** 2245 70 246 122 2683 Total 16820 266 885 13472 31443 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 410. Reporting entities submit STRs online. All STRs received by MASAK are reviewed on daily basis. An automated scoring system was implemented in 2021, and machine learning techniques were introduced in 2025. From 2021 to 2025, the scoring system was rule-based, generating index values from numerical and text-derived parameters (i.e., number of natural and legal persons mentioned in the STR; amount of the transaction; matching files and warnings in the data base; Egmont information requests, among others). Scores were calculated as raw values without statistical scaling. In 2025, MASAK implemented an EMIS-based AI system which has proven to accelerate the scoring system and improve the quality of the STRs categorisation, accelerating its preliminary analysis to then be disseminated to the respective departments. 411. This EMIS-based AI system, will score all STRs as ‘normal’, ‘urgent’ or ‘highly urgent’ based on indicators developed by MASAK staff and the underlying predicate offence reported in the STR. The model converts the binary classification output into a score between 0 and 100 using min-max scaling, referred to as the model score. The system will also categorise those STRs including a postponement of transaction. This scoring mechanism incorporates descriptions of suspicious transactions, history above a defined threshold, aggregate value of large money transfers, high-value payments to e-money institutions, and significant transfers to VASPs by using 632 terms in the model training and scoring generation and have proven to facilitate experts STRs revision once the preliminary scoring process is finished. 412. A dedicated group of 10 experts will review on daily basis those STRs categorised as ‘urgent’ and ‘highly urgent’ or requiring a postponement of transaction (approximately 1700 per day). FIU analysts provide their views on the assigned score and delegate them to the relevant departments for further analysis if needed. The Strategic Analysis Department directly analyses and assesses all TF and PF-related STRs and those categorised as ‘urgent’ and ‘highly urgent’. As expressed in the table below, from a total of 2.7 M received STRs the majority are categorised as normal (91%). The AI-generated system categorises only a small proportion of STRs as urgent (6%), highly urgent (less than 1%) or as requesting a postponement of transaction (2%) at the entry level reflecting the capacity of experts to review these STRs on daily basis. Table 6.4. STRs overall scoring (2020-2025) Year Normal Urgent Highly Urgent STRs with request for postponement of transaction Total 2020 209324 20385 1276 6546 237531 2021 473371 23292 1114 7218 504995 2022 389105 30351 959 4907 425322 2023 540554 44798 761 15442 601555 2024 508853 33415 559 15768 558595 2025* 382959 16201 440 12734 412334 Total 2504166 168442 5109 62615 2740332 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 413. When the group of experts reviews the preliminary scoring, they are able to electronically cross-check all the information submitted in the STR against the data bases and produce a preliminary report indicating all the available information related to the natural or legal persons reported and if information related to a previous STR matches the information, submitted in the new one, the previous STR is linked to the new one and referenced for further analysis. The expert’s revision of the preliminary scoring system enables MASAK to revisit STRs initially rated as normal or urgent for deeper analysis later, minimising overlooked information and ensuring its effective use. 414. From the total STRs received, MASAK analysed 1.2 million STRs (46%) mostly as part of their strategic analysis work. This number is significantly higher than those MASAK is required to review during the scoring process, which only represents the 8% of the total submitted STRs. However, only 228 770 STRs (16%) out of all STRs were used for ML, TF, and predicate offences operational analysis and examination which remains modest given the large number of STRs received. MASAK proactively opened 360 files for case relation search, which included searches on approximately 218 000 individuals. Most of these files are related to illegal betting and gambling (18%), fraud (11%), tax evasion (7%) which is generally aligned with the country’s risk profile. Although the number of TF-related files seems limited (3%) compared to the overall number of opened files, competent authorities have confirmed that all TF-related STRs are analysed by the two TF analysis departments. 415. MASAK analyses STRs and other relevant information and produces strategic and operational analysis. It also carries out risk and sectoral studies regarding emerging developments on the field of laundering proceeds of crime (i.e., cash smuggling, misuse of e-market place, drugs, fraud, and misuse of cryptocurrency), and TF. MASAK produces ML/TF analysis and evaluations reports at a policy level and strategic analysis reports aiming at identifying and detecting activities of large and organised criminal networks. Whereas at an operational level, MASAK produces four types of financial intelligence reports for ML-related cases: financial analysis report (FAR), financial detection report (FDR), proceeds of crime reports (PCR) and informative reports (IR). MASAK has the ability to identify and trace complex ML/TF cases, identifying criminal networks using a combination of different channels to launder proceeds of crimes and finance terrorist activities (i.e. misuse nominee, shell companies, real estate, and unhosted VA wallet). 416. To produce these wide range of analysis and reports, MASAK uses several IT tools (EMIS, MOS, NPL, among others) which allows MASAK to connect all data available in Türkiye’s data bases and produce robust intelligence reports to be disseminated to the relevant competent authorities. The table below shows the number of files opened for further analysis within the scope of the work of the FIU confirming that most of the analysis work is orientated towards TF files (76.4%) compared to ML/PO files (23.6%). Table 6.5. Files opened for further financial analysis (2020-2025)* Year ML/PO files TF files Total files/year 2020 1223 10261 11484 2021 1133 6631 7764 2022 1446 5508 6954 2023 1665 4011 5676 2024 2071 4283 6354 2025* 2472 2226 4698 Total files opened/offence 10010 32920 42930 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 417. MASAK disseminates financial intelligence to different competent authorities spontaneously (proactive dissemination) or upon request (reactive dissemination). Each dissemination file is built on a comprehensive analysis with the financial profile of every reported individual, intelligence emanating from multiple STRs and all other financial data available in the MASAK’s database. 418. The FIU prepares different type of reports for dissemination: (i) the FAR is disseminated to judicial authorities answering to their requests or informing a suspicious of a criminal activity; (ii) the FDR is prepared after the finishing the verification of the transactions subject to postponement and is disseminated to judicial authorities for seizure purposes; (iii) the PCR informs the judicial authorities on the available assets or funds for preparation and planning of a seizure; (iv) IR are prepared within the scope of opened files to share the files analysis results with relevant authorities, typically after file completion; (v) ML/TF analysis and evaluation reports analyses trends and/or specific cases on either offences; (vi) CD reports are disseminated in urgent cases containing raw data on a specific event being investigated and are mainly distributed for disruption purposes. 419. Between 2021 and 2025, MASAK disseminated 7 679 files related to ML or associated predicate offences (ML/PO), 48% proactively (3 683 files) and 52% reactively (3 996 files), demonstrating a balanced approach and strong capability to produce and share financial intelligence. Proactive dissemination has incremented in a 72% from 2021 to 2025, which also reflects the MASAK’s efforts in the use of financial intelligence. In this context, 3 060 files related to aggravated fraud/fraud (42%) and 1 808 on illegal betting (25%) were disseminated, which represents a 67% ratio of the total disseminated reports in alignment with the top two predicate offences in the country. However, dissemination of other high or medium-high risk predicate offences remains limited (i.e. 634 files for drug trafficking; 249 for smuggling; and 275 for migrant smuggling/human trafficking) which does not align with the country’s risk profile. The table below indicates the type of reports disseminated: Table 6.6. MASAK ML/PO reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* REACTIVE DISSEMINATION Year ML examination PCR FAR ML Evaluation IR CD Report (Raw data) FDR Formal Letter/Other Total 2021 40 177 61 71 4 104 28 0 485 2022 44 197 53 123 7 127 11 5 567 2023 31 126 152 190 4 13 13 4 533 2024 35 108 389 554 2 2 0 0 1090 2025** 59 83 426 719 31 1 0 2 1321 Total 209 691 1081 1657 48 247 52 11 3996 PROACTIVE DISSEMINATION 2021 0 0 0 0 321 0 294 0 615 2022 0 0 27 3 485 0 198 11 724 2023 0 0 117 9 404 2 125 0 657 2024 0 0 361 0 47 0 193 21 622 2025 0 0 389 0 101 0 575 0 1065 Total 0 0 894 12 1358 2 1385 32 3683 OVERALL DISSEMINATION TOTAL 209 691 1975 1669 1406 249 1437 43 7679 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 420. MASAK also disseminated a total of 31 443 files related to terrorism and TF, 2.5% proactively (796 files) and 97.5% reactively (30 647 files). Although proactive dissemination has incremented in 56% form 2021-2025, the low rate of proactive TF disseminations reflects that most investigations stem from intelligence and terrorism cases, making MASAK’s approach largely reactive to the analysis of TF files. The high ratio of reactive dissemination signals limited detection of TF-related suspicions transactions in MASAK’s databases prior to judicial requests, though such requests enable the MASAK to connect the necessary links during investigations and provide high quality reports. Table 6.7 MASAK TF reports disseminated to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Year* FAR FDR IR CR Report (Raw data) Total disseminated reports/Year Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive Reactive Proactive 2021 5536 7 0 92 133 15 9077 3 14863 2022 3726 30 0 26 136 41 1619 2 5580 2023 2507 7 0 31 113 60 1206 3 3927 2024 2755 7 0 47 58 83 1437 3 4390 2025** 2181 64 0 70 48 198 119 3 2683 Total 16705 115 0 266 488 397 13458 14 31443 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 421. MASAK disseminated 26 774 TF products related to FETÖ (85%), 2 842 related to terrorist organisations abusing religion (9%), 1 445 related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (5%), 164 related to leftist organisations (less than 1%) and 218 related to other TOs(less than 1%). Proactive disseminations are more balanced as 672 files were disseminated in relation to terrorist organisations abusing religion (34%), 187 FETÖ (28%), 119 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (18%) and 133 on other TO (20%) which is align to the country’s risk profile to some extent. 422. All competent authorities highlighted the role, the quality and the timing of the MASAK’s financial analysis to pursue complex ML/TF/PF investigations including with transnational element, which was confirmed through case studies. MASAK has considerably improved the dissemination of financial intelligence reports upon judicial requests to an average time of 2 weeks, even lesser, by utilising digital transformation which has been highly noted by public prosecutors and LEAs. As a member of Egmont Group, the production and dissemination of financial intelligence have also benefited from information exchanges with other FIUs (see IO.2). 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 423. The financial intelligence produced by the MASAK largely contributes to support the needs of competent authorities at an operational level. Between 2021-2025, MASAK disseminated a total of 39 620 reports to other competent authorities, mainly to judicial authorities (85%), including prosecutors, and to a lesser extent to LEAs (11%), supervisory authorities and other relevant ministries (3%) and other intelligence units (1%). The large number of reports disseminated to judicial authorities is consistent Türkiye’s institutional framework and the fact that public prosecutors lead ML/TF investigations and courts are deciding on seizure and confiscating measures. Table 6.8. MASAK overall dissemination to competent authorities (2021-2025)* Competent authorities PCR FAR Examination ML evaluation IR FDR CD (raw data) Other Total files/authority ML/PO-RELATED FILES Judicial authorities 1282 485 198 1187 683 1511 246 62 5654 LEAs 8 503 10 3 912 43 3 5 1487 Supervisory authorities 0 153 1 2 413 60 0 8 637 Other Ministries 0 15 0 0 116 8 0 3 142 MASAK 4 22 0 2 93 11 0 17 149 Intelligence Units 0 16 0 0 61 3 0 1 81 Total ML/PO-related files 1294 1194 209 1194 2278 1636 249 96 8150 TF-RELATED FILES Judicial authorities 0 15868 19 0 83 247 11897 0 28114 LEAs 0 837 0 0 403 41 1524 0 2805 Intelligence units 0 5 0 0 80 21 9 0 115 Other (relevant ministries supervisory authorities, etc.) 0 85 5 0 333 4 9 0 436 Total TF-related files 0 16795 24 0 899 313 13439 0 31470 TOTAL NUMBER OF FILES Total files 1294 17898 233 1194 3177 1949 13688 96 39620 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 424. Between 2021 and 2025, the 37.5% of MASAK disseminations (16 758 files) triggered ML/TF investigations (see IO.7), with most reports either initiating new investigations (68%), supporting ongoing cases (9%) and meeting other LEAs needs (7%). MASAK products also assist tax and supervisory authorities for audits, complaints, and administrative sanctions. While MASAK collaborates closely with prosecutors and LEAs throughout investigations and uses working groups to share expertise, there is no clear mechanism to monitor the quality of disseminated intelligence. Additionally, MASAK conducts regular statistical and strategic analyses of STRs to help operational authorities in the timely detection of new trends. Below, this is exemplified by a case on a strategic analysis conducted on ML case abusing social media. Box 6.1. Broadcast: MASAK’s proactive financial intelligence dissemination resulting in enforcement actions Operation BROADCAST was launched following the MASAK’s dissemination of a financial detection report to public prosecutors, triggering a nationwide crackdown. The case involves stand-alone money laundering using VASP, credit cards, virtual POS systems, and MVTS, and is currently at the prosecution stage. In June 2023, MASAK detected suspicious ML activity patterns emerging on a popular social media platform. By leveraging its analytical capabilities, MASAK examined over 4 000 bank account movements, identifying links to crimes such as fraud via information systems, misuse of bank and credit cards, money laundering and establishing an organisation for committing crimes. The transaction volumes among the suspects were approximately EUR 34 M. Once the intelligence was consolidated, MASAK activated its dissemination mechanisms. Detailed reports and actionable intelligence were shared with law enforcement and judicial authorities through secure channels, enabling rapid co-ordination. This collaboration culminated in simultaneous operations across 37 provinces. In 2023, 164 suspects were taken into custody. MASAK also provided comprehensive asset-tracing intelligence, leading to the seizure of real estate (38 apartments), vehicles (38), shares of 14 companies, bank and VAs accounts (1 700), and cash—valued at approximately EUR 18 M. These seizures were possible because the MASAK’s information flow ensured prosecutors and courts had the evidence needed to act decisively. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 425. LEAs produces financial intelligence to conduct their prevention duties and upon prosecutors’ requests. Prosecutors mainly rely on MASAK financial analysis to support complex cases as they have direct access to all types of financial information and better staff specialisation. TNP and GGC can produce financial intelligence based on their databases and can request other competent authorities to provide financial information if needed. In addition, LEAs uses specialised programmes to examine financial analysis reports obtained from MASAK and to understand the relationship between money transfers and other transactions between individuals/suspects. For example, GGC (KOM- Fight against Smuggling and Organised Crime) makes use of PARS analyses system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="459. Türkiye extensively pursues prosecutions and recorded convictions related to all type of ML offences, except for stand-alone ML and ML derived from foreign predicate offences. The investigation-to-prosecution rate is about 46% which is commensurate with Türkiye’s risk profile and context to some extent, as low initiation thresholds are required for investigations while proving the knowledge and intention for to pursue prosecutions and convictions remains more complex. The effectiveness of the implementation of the national strategy for investigating and prosecuting ML is evidenced by a 42-fold increase in the number of prosecutions between 2021 and 2025. 460. Between 2021 and 2025, Türkiye has prosecuted 10 581 cases for ML offences. Prosecutions are predominantly related to self-laundering (56%), third party ML (25%), a combination of both categories (18%). In addition, standalone ML prosecutions are only limited to illegal betting-related cases and has not been applied to other type of predicate offences. Türkiye achieved convictions in 556 cases, predominantly in self-laundering cases (55%) followed by third-party ML cases (26%) and a combination of both (19%), including effective stand-alone ML related to illegal betting. Given Türkiye’s risk as transit hub for funds and destination to transfer proceed of crimes related to fraud and other predicate offences, the stand-alone ML prosecution and convictions is more limited. There are several case studies demonstrate the prosecution of foreign predicate offences triggered by domestic predicate offences or foreign elements within those and three cases of convictions related to independent foreign predicate offences. The table below provides a detailed explanation of these numbers including investigations. Table 7.4. ML types of investigations, prosecutions and convictions (2021-2025)* ML type 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total/ reporting period % Pending files INVESTIGATIONS Self-laundering 1373 2740 5817 3908 5359 19197 47% 3286 3 rd party ML 856 3060 3865 2973 3554 14308 35% 1989 Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 316 516 744 2504 2558 6638 17% 1856 Foreign predicate offences 50 225 236 72 67 650 2% 117 Total investigations 2595 6541 10662 9457 11538 40793 100% 7248 PROSECUTIONS Self-laundering 867 491 2017 1848 3159 8382 56% 3796 3 rd party ML 378 395 1295 680 990 3738 25% 934 Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 195 115 263 811 1337 2721 18% 1301 Foreign predicate offences 9 31 9 31 16 96 1% 54 Total prosecutions 1449 1032 3584 3370 5502 14937 100% 6085 CONVICTIONS Self-laundering 38 87 85 76 186 472 55% 3 rd party ML 7 6 35 42 133 223 26% Together (Self-laundering and 3 rd party ML) 16 25 21 28 69 159 19% Foreign predicate offences 0 0 0 1 2 3 0% Total convictions 61 118 141 147 390 857 100% Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 461. Although ML prosecutions and convictions are in line with Türkiye’s risk profile, particularly for fraud and illegal betting, this is not the case for medium-high risk and medium predicate offences (i.e., drug trafficking and smuggling). Prosecutors presented challenges in prosecuting complex ML schemes involving sophisticated layering structures, including legal persons, shell companies, misuse of legal professionals and trade-based mechanisms, and systemic layering networks, as well as the misuse of technology. 462. The data reveals that prosecutions still pending represents the 47% (7 248) of those already finalised (14 937), and the number of pending convictions (6 085 files) exceed finalised convictions (556) by a factor of nine. Authorities attribute the significant backlog of prosecutions to the complexity and scope of cases and the appeal which require extended timeframes for resolution. The absence of a clear guidance to prioritise ML prosecutions, combined with the average 1.5-year timeframe required to complete a single ML case, contributes to the accumulation of these cases generating significantly impacting the prosecutors and LEAs workload. Conviction rates are expected to rise gradually as these cases advance through the judicial process and reach the verdict stage. 463. In addition, it is important to note that the number of natural persons subject to investigations, prosecutions and being convicted varies considerably. The total number of natural persons convicted represents only the 2% of those subject to investigation which also implies challenges in attributing the criminal activity to the prosecuted person at a conviction stage. In these regard, competent authorities signalled challenges in proving knowledge and intention during trial. Table 7.5. Natural persons subject to ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions (2021-2025)* Criminal procedure stage 2021 2021 2023 2024 2025** Total Suspects subject to investigation 2168 5335 8969 14650 18531 49653 Defendants subject to prosecutions 1421 976 2902 6409 10374 22082 Convicted persons 61 116 137 253 391 958 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. ML/TF measures 121. Türkiye does not have exemptions from compliance with the FATF Standards and applies AML/CFT obligations, as noted above, to other sectors in line with its ML/TF risks. 122. Türkiye applies enhanced and simplified due diligence (EDD, SDD in some cases, as provided for in the RoM (see R.1 and R.10) in line with its ML/TF risks and FATF R.10. SDD is not permitted where ML/TF risk might occur. Türkiye demonstrates good use of NRA results to calibrate EDD and SDD. Updated STR typologies and guidance further show risk responsive adjustments. 123. On EDD, examples include removing POS/virtual POS from SDD eligibility due to misuse and tightening EDD for VASPs (MASAK Communiqué No. 29 and RoM) including through introducing cooling off periods. Virtual assets purchased cannot be transferred within 48 hours of purchase and withdrawals cannot be made before 72 hours. 124. On SDD, following the 2023 earthquake that affected many of Türkiye’s provinces, different means of identification were added to Communiqué No. 5 to facilitate CDD and access to financial services. In addition, after its 2025 NRA and in line with the FATF’s changes to R.1(though Türkiye is not yet being assessed against this aspect of the Methodology), MASAK issued new SDD measures and updated the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section in its website clarifying related AML/CFT obligations. 125. However, gaps remain in applying enhanced measures to trade related ML, cross-border cash flows and informal MVTS. Evidence that supervisory authorities integrate these risks consistently into prioritisation remains limited. Evidence that supervisory authorities integrate these risks consistently into prioritisation remains limited Some variation remains in how risk understanding is translated into supervisory and preventive outcomes, particularly in the consistent application of risk-based prioritisation across sectors and in ensuring that supervisory responses fully reflect the scale and nature of underlying risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="564. Türkiye has a robust sanctioning framework for natural persons convicted of TF, with imprisonment of 5-10 years for TF and 10-30 years when linked to organisational leadership, which is considered effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The absence of criminal liability for legal persons may limit Türkiye’s ability to dissuade the misuse of legal persons for TF purposes. 565. TF is convicted either as a standalone offence or as an aggravating factor, increasing sentences by up to one-half. In practice, standalone TF convictions commonly result in around 4 years and 6 months; combined with other factors sentencing can reach up to 15–20 years with multiple aggravating factors. While combined TF with membership cases generally lead to 6–9 years. The minimum sentencing range for TF cases represents at least 2-5 times higher than for other serious crimes (i.e., 6 months for intentional damage to environment, 12 months for fraud, 3 years for tampering with a public tenders and aggravated theft) which is considered proportionate in Türkiye’s context. TF sanctions (minimum 5 years) are aligned with terrorism-membership penalties and are generally harsher than standard economic crimes. Recidivism statistics (8% for 6415 offenders) also indicate a dissuasive effect. The substantial minimum sentencing range of 5 years, combined with the demonstrated willingness of courts to impose sentences of 6–20 years in aggravated cases, creates a credible deterrence signal for potential offenders, particularly given the public nature of conviction outcomes in high-profile FETÖ and ISIL-related cases. Table 9.6. Sentencing range (2021-2025)* TF standalone convictions Year Minimum imprisonment range (days) Maximum imprisonment range (days) Average sentencing range (days) Average sentencing range (years) 2021 755 2375 1637 4 years, 6 months 2022 755 2920 1773 4 years, 10 months 2023 755 2920 1609 4 years, 5 months 2024 755 2280 1586 4 years, 4 months 2025** 755 2190 1557 4 years, 3 months Total average 755 2537 1632 4 years, 6 months TF convictions coupled with membership, leadership or provision of weapons Year Minimum imprisonment range (days) Maximum imprisonment range (days) Average sentencing range (days) Average sentencing range (years) 2021 NIP*** NIP NIP NIP 2022 NIP NIP NIP NIP 2023 1000 5840 3060 8 years, 5 months 2024 1140 3987 2374 6 years, 5 months 2025** 1520 3040 2469 6 years, 10 months Total average 1220 4289 2643 7 years, 3 months Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) NIP: No information provided. 566. Sentences may be reduced by one-sixth upon judges’ consideration or as part of the prosecutorial strategy. Defendants co-operating with authorities during the investigation/prosecution stage may receive discretionary reductions, and behaviour such as demonstrating remorse may also be considered. Although sentences can be reduced to 2–4 years, the sanctions remain proportionate and dissuasive in TF cases related to domestically and UNSC-listed terrorist organisations with a domestic nexus. 567. In line with Türkiye’s fundamental principles of domestic law, legal persons are not subject to criminal liability for TF. Alternative measures, including confiscation and administrative sanctions, are available and have been applied in practice. Türkiye has demonstrated some cases involving the use of legal persons and commercial structures across different terrorist organisations. These examples show the ability to identify and take action against TF activity involving businesses. However, such cases remain relatively limited in scope and are not yet representative of consistent outcomes involving complex or layered structures across the broader TF risk environment. More developed and systematic casework involving legal persons is primarily observed in FETÖ-related commercial structures. Overall, the use of available measures remains relatively limited and does not yet demonstrate consistent outcomes involving complex or layered legal persons, legal arrangements and commercial structures across Türkiye’s broader TF risk environment. The overall dissuasive effect of these measures is therefore not fully demonstrated, particularly given their materiality in Türkiye’s economy and TF risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="373. Türkiye’s legal framework does not recognise trusts or equivalent domestic legal arrangements. Authorities have substantiated this position through legal analysis and empirical checks of registries, tax records and supervisory information, and this conclusion is appropriately reflected in the LPRA. 374. Mechanisms exist to obtain information on foreign legal arrangements that have a nexus with Türkiye, including arrangements owning domestic assets or maintaining financial accounts. Competent authorities have legal powers to request relevant information from FIs and DNFBPs where such relationships are identified. 375. FIs demonstrate awareness of their obligations to identify and report relationships involving foreign legal arrangements, supported by written guidance and requirements imposed by supervisors. These mechanisms provide a basis for accessing information when such risks arise. 376. Competent authorities in Türkiye have legal powers to request relevant information from FIs and DNFBPs where such relationships are identified. In practice, this provides an important channel for accessing information on legal arrangements, particularly where these are part of customer relationships subject to CDD and BO requirements. Through MASAK’s powers and supervisory frameworks, authorities are generally able to obtain available information in a timely manner when such arrangements are visible within the regulated sector. 377. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is constrained by Türkiye’s overall gaps in understanding of legal arrangements. As the NRA does not identify trusts or similar legal arrangements as a significant domestic feature, there is limited direct focus on these structures. This more limited understanding affects the extent to which legal arrangements—particularly those established abroad—are consistently identified within ownership structures, thereby limiting the capacity to identify potential beneficial ownership risks, hidden control relationships, and complex ownership chains. As a result, while mechanisms exist to obtain information, their practical effectiveness depends on whether such arrangements are first recognised and captured within the system, which may impact the completeness and timeliness of information obtained in practice. 378. In practice, no cases involving foreign trusts or similar arrangements were identified during the reporting period. While this reflects a low assessed risk, it also means that information-gathering powers may not have been tested extensively in operational cases. As a result, assurance that emerging risks related to foreign legal arrangements would be identified and addressed in a timely and systematic manner remains limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="373. Türkiye’s legal framework does not recognise trusts or equivalent domestic legal arrangements. Authorities have substantiated this position through legal analysis and empirical checks of registries, tax records and supervisory information, and this conclusion is appropriately reflected in the LPRA. 374. Mechanisms exist to obtain information on foreign legal arrangements that have a nexus with Türkiye, including arrangements owning domestic assets or maintaining financial accounts. Competent authorities have legal powers to request relevant information from FIs and DNFBPs where such relationships are identified. 375. FIs demonstrate awareness of their obligations to identify and report relationships involving foreign legal arrangements, supported by written guidance and requirements imposed by supervisors. These mechanisms provide a basis for accessing information when such risks arise. 376. Competent authorities in Türkiye have legal powers to request relevant information from FIs and DNFBPs where such relationships are identified. In practice, this provides an important channel for accessing information on legal arrangements, particularly where these are part of customer relationships subject to CDD and BO requirements. Through MASAK’s powers and supervisory frameworks, authorities are generally able to obtain available information in a timely manner when such arrangements are visible within the regulated sector. 377. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is constrained by Türkiye’s overall gaps in understanding of legal arrangements. As the NRA does not identify trusts or similar legal arrangements as a significant domestic feature, there is limited direct focus on these structures. This more limited understanding affects the extent to which legal arrangements—particularly those established abroad—are consistently identified within ownership structures, thereby limiting the capacity to identify potential beneficial ownership risks, hidden control relationships, and complex ownership chains. As a result, while mechanisms exist to obtain information, their practical effectiveness depends on whether such arrangements are first recognised and captured within the system, which may impact the completeness and timeliness of information obtained in practice. 378. In practice, no cases involving foreign trusts or similar arrangements were identified during the reporting period. While this reflects a low assessed risk, it also means that information-gathering powers may not have been tested extensively in operational cases. As a result, assurance that emerging risks related to foreign legal arrangements would be identified and addressed in a timely and systematic manner remains limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 436. Türkiye uses financial intelligence and other relevant financial information to a very large extent pursuing positive results when investigating and prosecuting ML, associate predicate offences and TF. This was demonstrated through several case studies where financial intelligence is being translated into concrete enforcement actions to pursue investigations and prosecutions. 437. To achieve these results, competent authorities are using various and broad range of financial intelligence and information (e.g., MASAK’s report, denunciation, public institutions information, and foreign counterparts). Between 2021 and 2025, MASAK disseminated a total of 8 150 ML and/or associated predicate offences report and a total of 31 470 TF related reports (see table 6.8) to competent authorities. The ratio of the total number ML cases opened after MASAK’s dissemination is approximately 37.5%, from which approximately 75% ends in conviction which confirms the high-level of utility of financial intelligence products. 438. Other competent authorities, have used MASAK’s financial intelligence and information reports for the following purposes: a) LEAs: start of a new research and/or investigation (68%); assessment phase (16%); ongoing research and investigation (9%); acquiring information for LEAs operational needs (7%). b) TIB: imposition of fines related to tax or other administrative matters on the persons subject to reporting (37%); opening new tax checks, audits and reviews (25%); use for further analysis on ongoing tax checks, audits and reviews (25%); filling criminal complaints against the person subject to report (11%); other (2%). c) Supervisory authorities (BRSA, CMB, CBRT, etc): opening new inspections, audits and reviews (32%); ongoing inspections, audits and reviews (8%); filling criminal complaint against the person subject to MASAK investigation (22%); imposition of administrative fines (12%) and other purposes (26%). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 439. Türkiye makes a good use of information and financial intelligence to assist and trace proceeds or instrumentalities which is progressively resulting in seizures and confiscations (see IO.8). The FIU produces specific proceeds of crime report including financial intelligence on the links between possible proceeds of crime and the assets of individuals or third parties, identify proceeds of crime that can be seized and confiscated through its analysis, and share this information with public prosecutors and judges. 440. Competent authorities have used FIU information and financial intelligence products to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value in 1 197 cases (See 8.2 and 8.3). Between 2021 and 2025, 612 cases triggered seizure of assets for a total of EUR 147 M and confiscation of assets for EUR 93 M. Furthermore, the criminal complaints of MASAK can also be considered within the scope of evidence development. In this respect, following the freezing orders, criminal complaints for TF were filed against all 1 434 individuals (see 10.1) and criminal investigations were initiated against 342 individuals for TF offence (see 9.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="260. Supervisory authorities employ remedial actions to a large extent where breaches in compliance with CDD and STR obligations are detected. The adoption of the RBS approach in 2020 has led to a significant increase in the number of compliance supervisions - particularly on high-risk entities. 261. Over the reporting period and in line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action Plan there has been overall significant improvements in the AML/CFT compliance and the overall compliance culture of the FIs and VASPs due to enhanced supervisory actions, although significant weaknesses continue to be identified in certain sectors, notably EOs. Onsite examinations find less issues for FIs and VASPs with past enforcement records. The representatives of FIs and VASPs met during the onsite praise the quality of the relationship with their supervisors and provided tangible examples that supervisory activities had positive impact in supporting their compliance with AML/CFT requirements. 262. Supervisory authorities impose sanctions in relation to their scope of competence as defined by law. MASAK is the sole authority entitled to issues sanctions with regard AML/CFT breaches while sectoral supervisors apply sanctions on their respective field of competence. As described above, there is close co-ordination among supervisory authorities, if a sectoral supervisor detects a potential ML/TF infringement in the course of its monitoring of a reporting entity, the case is referred to MASAK for further actions. 263. MASAK can impose several types of formal remedial supervisory actions depending on several factors, including whether the breaches constitute criminality; their severity, the constancy and repetitiveness of violations; the compliance history of the FI or VASP. 264. Türkiye’s approach is firstly directed at enhancing compliance by issuing written warnings, especially to entities in violation for failure to develop training, internal supervision and risk management system or assign a compliance officer. When shortcomings are identified over the course of monitoring activity, those are listed and sent to the reporting entity. 265. However, concerns arise as to whether sanctions related to internal controls are sufficiently severe and dissuasive. The very limited use of such fines suggest that the current practice may not deliver outcomes that are proportionate to risks or sufficiently dissuasive across the FI and VASP sectors. For certain breaches, namely internal audit, trainings and risk management system, a remedial time of not less than 30 days, is given to the entity to address the shortcomings and an administrative fine is imposed only if deficiencies persist after the remedial period. The legislation does not prescribe a maximum period for obliged entities to remedy identified shortcomings. The timeframe is determined on a case‑by‑case basis according to the nature of the deficiency and communicated to the obliged entity; in practice, the period generally does not exceed 60 days. In most instances a written warning has been sufficient for the obliged party to take necessary actions. Out of 77 reporting entities, only two failed to address their deficiencies within the given time. The imposition of administrative fines on the obliged entity and the senior manager, along with the second written warning, ensured that these two obliged parties also addressed their deficiencies. While deficiencies in internal controls may in some cases coincide with, or give rise to, additional CDD or STR breaches that are sanctioned accordingly, the fact that even systematic and severe AML breaches can be resolved through a written warning—provided deficiencies are corrected within the grace period—indicates that the regime in practice allows FI and VASP entities to avoid proportionate and dissuasive sanctions as long as remedial action is taken within the allotted timeframe. In this respect, the current sanctioning regime is not fully proportionate to the risks and is not sufficiently deterrent to prevent non-compliant behaviour especially in cases of severe breaches. 266. Türkiye applies a risk‑based methodology to determine annual supervisory programmes, taking into account the results of previous AML/CFT inspections. FIs and VASPs with repeated or serious violations, as well as those not previously supervised, receive higher risk scores and are more likely to be included in subsequent supervisory cycles. Entities that are subject to repeated supervision generally display significantly fewer or no violations in follow‑up inspections, indicating that supervisory engagement leads to improved compliance for the individual institution concerned over time. 267. When criminal offences are detected, MASAK files a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor and can in parallel suspend the reporting entity. Over the reporting period, MASAK has filled 11 criminal complaints against FIs for record keeping infringement. Judicial penal procedures can also apply in other cases of serious breaches, such as breaches of STR confidentiality and not providing information and documents when requested. These offences did not occur during the reporting period, so in general judicial proceedings comparatively lower than administrative fines. In 2024, there were 11 referrals to the public prosecutor’s office for such breaches, indicating that while criminal enforcement measures exist and can include custodial sentences, their application is limited in practice. 268. Supervisors have a wide range of administrative sanctions available. For CDD and STR breaches, administrative fines are imposed on a per‑breach basis through fixed statutory amounts, with a mandatory transaction‑based minimum threshold applying to FIs, as set out in the AML Law.  In line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action plan, the amount of administrative fines has significantly increased since 2020. In addition, the amount is reviewed on a yearly basis according to the revaluation rate in order not to lose value due to inflation and in accordance with the Tax Procedure Law. Accordingly, the amount of the applicable administrative fines for CDD, STR and periodic reporting breaches has significantly increased since 2020, ensuring that available sanctions remain dissuasive. Authorities can also suspend or revoke reporting entities depending on the persistence or severity of the violations. Table 3.9. Applicable administrative fines for FIs and VASPs (applicable per breach of obligation) Obligation Applicable Administrative Fine Amounts (EUR, per breach) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 CDD 1 200 1 309 1 783 3 975 6 299 9 067 STR 1 000 2 182 2 972 6 626 10 499 15 111 Periodic Reporting 1 200 1 309 1 783 3 975 6 299 9 067 Max Amounts (Annual) 800 000 872 880 1 188 863 2 650 331 4 199 715 6 044 650 269. Sanctions are largely tied to the number of concrete violations identified in relation to customer‑specific CDD and STR obligations. In contrast, even extensive systemic weaknesses, such as inadequate governance, training, monitoring, procedures or identifying and reporting suspicious transactions, technical capacity, and risk assessment, are systematically addressed through a two‑stage supervisory response, whereby a written warning accompanied by a remedial period, constitutes the initial enforcement action and remains the sole measure where the deficiencies are remedied within the prescribed timeframe. This imbalance, where isolated customer‑level breaches attract stronger sanctions than broad structural failings, weakens the overall proportionality, effectiveness, and deterrent impact of the supervisory sanctioning framework. This raises concerns primarily in relation to the supervisory responses to serious or systemic shortcomings in governance, internal controls and risk assessment frameworks, rather than to the availability of sanctions for individual CDD or STR breaches. Box 3.4. Deficiencies in AML/CFT internal framework control During an on‑site inspection, supervisors identified deficiencies in the bank’s risk‑based transaction monitoring and internal control framework, which limited the effective detection and escalation of suspicious activity. In particular, transactions were not systematically verified against supporting documentation to assess their consistency with customers’ financial profiles, customer information and documentation were not kept up to date, and communication and co-ordination between internal departments were inadequate. As a result, the compliance unit was not adequately or sufficiently informed, and monitoring and control activities were not carried out effectively. A written warning was issued to the bank, requiring it to address the identified deficiencies and to implement specified corrective and remedial measures within 60 days. After the given time, the bank reported that it had reviewed the relevant internal regulations and implementation processes, taken corrective and remedial measures to address the identified deficiencies, and implemented these measures supported by substantiating information and documentation. In this context, it was assessed that the bank had effectively established and implemented the risk‑based control and monitoring systems envisaged under Article 5 of the AML Law. No administrative sanctions were imposed. However, the bank was included in the following year’s supervision programme to monitor the continuity and effectiveness of the measures taken. 270. Also, enforcement actions for PEP‑related obligations are not sufficiently risk‑based or proportionate. Emphasis is placed on the presence of individual PEP customers and on whether EDD has been applied to them, rather than treating weaknesses in preventive controls as breaches warranting stronger measures. Since PEP obligations were introduced in 2022, only one entity (a bank) has been sanctioned for deficiencies in EDD for PEPs, questioning the effectiveness of monitoring against PEP requirements. Türkiye’s NRA identifies payment institutions as a medium‑high‑risk sector, partly due to corruption vulnerabilities; however, even in a case where a payment institution lacked any policies or procedures for applying EDD to PEPs, only a written warning was issued because no PEP customers were identified in the customer base and the institution’s non‑compliance could not be demonstrated in relation to a specific customer. This approach, which is not commensurate with the systemic nature of the deficiency or with the sector’s risk profile, undermines the dissuasive effect of enforcement and limits the overall effectiveness of supervision. Box 3.5.Case 1 (PEPs) Supervision identified that PEPs were neither classified as a high-risk customer group in the payment institution’s compliance programme nor in its internal policy documents, and that EDD measures applicable to PEPs were not set out in these documents. This indicated policy-level weaknesses in the application of the risk-based approach. However, during supervision, the authorities conducted testing of the institution’s automated screening tool, which successfully identified a mayor of a city in Türkiye as a PEP. Screening of the institution’s customer base also revealed that it had no PEP customers. As no breaches relating to PEP-related EDD occurred in practice, no administrative fine was imposed. Instead, a warning letter was issued and a period of time was provided for the institution to remedy the identified deficiencies in its policies and procedures. Table 3.10. Fines issued for CDD and STR breaches (2020 – 2025) Sector Number of supervised obliged entities CDD STR Total Admin Fines (EUR) Obliged entities in violation Administrative Fine (EUR) Obliged entities in violation Administrative Fine (EUR) Banks 98 13 478 000 13 1 648 400 2 126 400 VASPs 64 27 756 800 23 1 393 400 2 150 200 MVTS 114 45 7 633 300 20 10 305 700 17 939 000 EO 295 178 4 491 500 25 207 200 4 698 700 Capital Market 105 14 272 800 6 18 100 290 900 NBFIs 86 19 186 700 10 18 000 204 700 Insurance 33 4 31 400 0 - 31 400 PMIs 10 4 32 600 2 82 900 115 500 Table 3.11. Application of sanctions for deficiencies in AML/CFT internal control, risk management and compliance arrangements Obligation Application Article 5 (1) of AML Law no. 5549 Developing training, internal supervision and control and risk management systems, assigning compliance officers in FIs. 2021 13 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. All obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2022 21 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. All obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2023 9 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. 7 of these obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2 of these obliged entities failed to address the deficiencies and 1.518.153 TRY administrative fine (each) was imposed. After that, a second written warning and period of time was given. Both of these obliged entities addressed the deficiencies within the given time. 2024 34 obliged entities who were in violation of this Article were sent a written warning and a period of time (not less than 30 days) was given. Actions taken by the obliged entities are being evaluated to determine whether the deficiencies were addressed or further action is necessary. 271. For the banking sector, 98 on-site supervisions (both within the scope of a programme and cased based) were carried out over the reporting period. On the basis of these on-site findings, few banks were found to be in violation of their CDD/STR obligations and those that were had very few violations. This is reflected in the low amounts of imposed administrative fines. Between 2021 and 2024, only five banks were subject to a written warning and a remedial period in response to deficiencies in AML/CFT internal control, risk management and compliance arrangements The assessment team reviewed, for instance, a case example in which supervisors, during an on‑site inspection, identified insufficient algorithmic analysis infrastructure to detect transaction repetitions and systematic movements and transactions were not subjected to specific limits based on their risks. 272. As part of its offsite review of the annual survey sent to banks, MASAK also identified that some entities were carrying out derisking with considered high risk customers, such as NPOs or VASPs, which was confirmed during the onsite. This finding supported further outreach to the sector to sensitise against such practices, yet NPOs and VASPs met during the onsite confirmed that their access to the financial system via banks was not hindered. In addition, a 2023 survey by the Banks Association of Türkiye shows that banks apply markedly restrictive onboarding practices toward certain customer groups. VASPs faced by far the highest refusal levels (approximately 40 %), followed by payment and electronic money institutions (approximately 25%), with EOs also encountering notable rejection rates (approximately 17%). Authorities further explained that some banks only prefer to work with PEMIs within the same financial group, which contributes to higher rejection rates. They also noted that rejection rates for VASPs are expected to decrease following the introduction of the new licensing regime; however, at the time of the onsite, there was no evidence of such an impact, as no licences under the new regime had yet been granted. 273. VASPs have been obliged entities since 2021, and initial supervision showed that all entities subject to inspections had numerous violations of their AML/CFT obligations. As a result, Türkiye’s enhanced supervisory activities by including more VASPs as part of the supervision programmes (from 5 VASPs in 2021 to 23 in 2023 and 2024). İn addition, MASAK enhanced outreach activities, issuing specific guidance for VASPs and conducting further trainings. Authorities reported that recent shortcomings were linked to the absence of technology supported process to adopt enhanced measures for high-risk customers and transactions. Overall, the sector has been issued for more than EUR 2 million fines. Ongoing licensing process for VASPs is expected to reduce the number of actors in the sector and support further compliance, yet this process was still ongoing at the time of the onsite. 274. MVTS have been the most heavily fined sector over the reporting period with EUR 18 M fines allocated. The ratio of MVTS with violations in comparison with the overall the number of supervised entities has steadily decreased over the reporting period, demonstrating in overall progress in sectoral compliance with AML/CFT obligations and effectiveness of the supervisory activities and remedial actions taken. While 90% of the MVTS supervised were in violation with their CDD obligations in 2020, this ratio dropped to 15% in 2024. While improvements have been achieved, some singular significant cases were also identified, where MVTS are used for illegal betting, ML or TF, emphasising the need for close monitoring of the sector and potential enhanced remedial actions. 275. Exchange offices are the second highest fined sector for breaches in CDD/STR obligations and the one presenting the highest number of breaches. Despite taking into consideration the high number of entities in the sector (over 750 exchange offices), the fact that in 2024 65% of the 80 supervised entities were in violations of their CDD obligations is concerning. The number of Eos found in breach has increased steadily over the period, while the total amount of administrative sanctions has grown more moderately and not in direct proportion, despite the fact that applicable administrative fines are increased every year. Authorities consider that the low level of administrative fines imposed in light of the number of violations illustrates that the entities’ violations were not major nor numerous. At the same time, it is noted that the sanctions imposed can, in certain cases, reach levels that are significant and proportionate relative to the capital and financial capacity of the obliged entities concerned. Authorities also explained that, although measurable improvements are observed at the level of individual EOs once they have been subject to supervision, these entity‑level gains are not reflected in the aggregated annual statistics. According to the authorities, this is primarily due to the structural composition of the sector: each annual supervision cycle incorporates a significant number of entities that are being examined for the first time and that, according to the authorities, systematically exhibit a higher likelihood of non‑compliance. The authorities further noted that this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the exchange office sector, which comprises a very large number of supervised entities and a high turnover in the pool of entities selected for supervision. 276. In addition, the EO sector accounts for the highest proportion of enforcement cases among FIs and VASPs involving deficiencies with respect to risk management, internal governance and other AML/CFT requirements under AML Law Act. 5, representing more than 61% of such cases. These cases follow a graduated enforcement process, whereby a written warning and a remedial period to address the identified deficiencies are issued as a first step, and an administrative sanction may be imposed only where deficiencies are not remedied within the prescribed timeframe. 277. Consequently, the continued identification of a high number of breaches in the EO sector could be seen as an indication of the broad compliance weaknesses across the sector as a whole. Even after some entities have undergone inspection, received corrective instructions and, in many cases, demonstrated improvements upon re‑inspection, the overall statistical profile remains dominated by newly identified violations. From a supervisory effectiveness perspective, this pattern raises concerns regarding the capacity of the current sanctioning framework to generate a sufficiently robust dissuasive effect at the sector level. While sanctions may induce compliance improvements within the entities directly subjected to them, the consistently high incidence of violations—especially among first‑time supervised entities—suggests that the signalling effect of sanctions is not strong enough to incentivise preventive compliance across the wider sector. 278. Despite the capital market, NBFIs, Insurance and precious metal intermediaries having been subject to less supervisory activities in line with the risk-based approach, MASAK identified violations for CDD and STR violations and allocated administrative penalties. Overall, the supervised entities demonstrated good level of compliance. 279. MASAK does not publish its enforcement actions, including sanctions and remedial measures, not even in an anonymous form, limiting transparency and undermining the potential deterrent effect of its sanctioning regime. While MASAK communicates annually through its activity report, the information made public is limited only to high-level aggregated data, such as the total number of sanctions imposed and the number of obliged entities sanctioned each year, together with a general reference to the legal basis for imposing sanctions. The activity report does not provide a breakdown of sanctions by sector, nor does it distinguish sanctions by type of breach, or severity, and it does not include case examples, even in anonymised form. No information is published on remedial measures. However, during the course of its outreach activities to each sector, MASAK communicates on the main regulatory breaches. Nevertheless, some FIs considered that publishing enforcement actions could have a positive impact for sectoral compliance, while others consider that it would be too prejudicial to the sanctioned entities. The current lack publication of enforcement actions, including sanctions and remedial measures, imposed within each sector diminishes the dissuasive impact of the sanctioning framework and hinders the possibility of those specific examples of non-compliance contributing to strengthened compliance in other entities than the one directly affected by the decision. Publication of enforcement actions would provide the financial sector with the clarity and visibility to support enhanced compliance. Box 3.6. Sanctions for AML/CFT breaches – case studies The case below illustrates that prudential supervisors can also impose sanctions in situations where the identified deficiencies cut across both sector‑specific regulatory requirements and AML/CFT legislation. Case 1 : It was identified that B Investment Securities A.Ş., when entering into electronic contracts with clients for opening investment accounts, implemented practices that were contrary to the legislation in relation to identification and customer due diligence obligations. According to the findings, the institution was carrying out remote identification procedures through an external service provider, E Information Technologies A.Ş., but was opening accounts without completing the video call step. It was found that out of 12,288 clients, only 230 had completed the video call, and the remaining clients had accounts opened without video verification. It was also identified that in some video calls, image and sound quality were inadequate, the serial number of the client’s ID card was not read out loud, and that the video call was conducted after the account opening. The non-compliant implementation of remote identification procedures by B Investment Securities A.Ş. has constituted a breach both of capital markets legislation and MASAK regulations. This has led to unfair competition among investment firms, undermined investor confidence and been deemed contrary to the essence of customer due diligence obligations. Taking into account the severity and persistence (in file of several clients) of the breach and the high number of clients, authorities departed from the minimum fine level and imposed administrative sanctions for a total of approx. EUR 260 000. The case below illustrates how findings originating from MASAK’s analytical work can be operationalised through sectoral supervision, including in situations where sanctions are imposed under sector‑specific legislation rather than the AML Law. Case 2 : The findings of an analysis report prepared by MASAK and submitted to BRSA, were examined by the BRSA on-site inspection team, resulting in the following findings at P Bank: · It was assessed that the change made to the criteria of the program used by the bank in customer identification processes weakened the effectiveness of the customer identification process. · It was noted that customers could open multiple accounts and obtain IBANs to conduct transactions below the limits, thereby falling outside the monitoring scenarios. · It was noted that the failure to share the information and documents required by the Compliance Department during its audits with TKB constituted a violation of the Internal Systems Regulation. · It was noted that despite the customer volume doubling in approximately 5 years as a result of high growth appetite, the number of personnel in internal systems units remained relatively low, and that an appropriate number of qualified personnel should be assigned. · It was noted that the program used in the customer identification process was not fit for purpose, and that the tools used by internal systems units needed to be updated to meet current conditions. An administrative fine amounting to approx. EUR 152 000 was imposed on the Bank, and instructions were given to remedy the deficiencies. The sanction was imposed by BRSA under sectoral legislation (Banking Law), and not pursuant to the AML Law. Currently, the audit team assigned to this Bank is evaluating whether actions have been taken. The case below illustrates the use of supervisory measures to address breaches relating to internal control and internal audit arrangements Case 3 : During a supervision conducted at an MVTS, when internal audit activities were evaluated, it was determined that internal control was carried out by an expert, that the same person also carried out internal audit activities, and that this person worked under the management board member responsible for internal systems. It was also noted that no person was specifically appointed for internal auditing, no internal audit reports were produced, and therefore internal auditing and internal control activities were combined within the same person, which is forbidden by legislation. A written warning was sent to the reporting entity and a period of time was given for obliged party to address the deficiency. The case below illustrates how the use of MASAK’s Analysis and Evaluation Reports, together with supervision results from sectoral supervisors, in the preparation of supervisory programmes has proven to be beneficial. It also demonstrates that effective results can be achieved through close, co‑operation between MASAK and the relevant sectoral supervisors. Case 4 : Analysis and Evaluation Report was prepared by MASAK to examine whether an MVTS was abused for illegal betting activities. This report was sent to CBRT as well. Additionally, this obliged entity was also included in the 2024 supervision programme. The supervision found that the MVTS did have control and risk management mechanisms but purposefully allowed opening of accounts to be used as fronts for illegal betting and ML, system alerts were ignored and not turned into STRs. Therefore, it was concluded that the MVTS was not simply abused for illegal betting and ML but also became a front for these activities. An administrative fine of over EUR 11,5 million was imposed for serious CDD and STR violations resulting from purposefully allowed conduct. CBRT, after carrying out its own audits, concluded that the MVTS’s continued operation poses a threat to the security of payment systems and temporarily suspended the MVTS license and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) was appointed as trustee to the institution as well as the other members of the financial group, in which the payment institutions was the main financial institution." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="464. Türkiye applies average 4-years 4 months imprisonment for natural persons convicted with ML charges which is considered effective, proportionate, and dissuasive in general. However, the low application of criminal sanctions on complex ML cases, including the involvement of professional money launderers, and in those related to organised crime undermines the overall dissuasiveness of the sanction framework. Table 7.6. Sentences applied to natural persons for ML offences (2020-2025) Type of sentence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* Total Ratio on type of sentences applied Fines only 5 - 1 25 4 4 39 4% 0-3 years of imprisonment 16 26 27 61 143 321 594 58% &gt;3- 5 years of imprisonment 11 22 22 21 92 47 215 21% &gt;5-10 years of imprisonment 29 2 61 29 14 13 148 15% &gt;10 years of imprisonment - 11 5 2 - 6 24 2% Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 465. In accordance with the principle of personal liability for criminal penalties, Türkiye cannot apply criminal sanctions to legal persons, but is able to apply administrative sanctions (i.e., confiscation measures, appointment of receivers, license revocation or cancellation, fines, among others). Türkiye has demonstrated the application of administrative sanctions (14 receivers’ appointments, 6 licenses revocation or cancellation, and 13 seizure measures) to 18 legal persons, such as, payment institutions, a bank, a VASP, a licensed betting platform and a media company through case studies. Although this demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to implement sanctions to legal persons, the number of sanctions applied is neither dissuasive nor commensurate with the country risk profile given the increasing use of professional money launderers, the multi-layered ML schemes, including through the creation of shell companies, cargo and logistics companies, and exchange offices facilitating ML activities (see IO.1). The lack of clear and systemic implementation of administrative sanctions and fines to legal persons negatively affects the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="564. Türkiye has a robust sanctioning framework for natural persons convicted of TF, with imprisonment of 5-10 years for TF and 10-30 years when linked to organisational leadership, which is considered effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The absence of criminal liability for legal persons may limit Türkiye’s ability to dissuade the misuse of legal persons for TF purposes. 565. TF is convicted either as a standalone offence or as an aggravating factor, increasing sentences by up to one-half. In practice, standalone TF convictions commonly result in around 4 years and 6 months; combined with other factors sentencing can reach up to 15–20 years with multiple aggravating factors. While combined TF with membership cases generally lead to 6–9 years. The minimum sentencing range for TF cases represents at least 2-5 times higher than for other serious crimes (i.e., 6 months for intentional damage to environment, 12 months for fraud, 3 years for tampering with a public tenders and aggravated theft) which is considered proportionate in Türkiye’s context. TF sanctions (minimum 5 years) are aligned with terrorism-membership penalties and are generally harsher than standard economic crimes. Recidivism statistics (8% for 6415 offenders) also indicate a dissuasive effect. The substantial minimum sentencing range of 5 years, combined with the demonstrated willingness of courts to impose sentences of 6–20 years in aggravated cases, creates a credible deterrence signal for potential offenders, particularly given the public nature of conviction outcomes in high-profile FETÖ and ISIL-related cases. Table 9.6. Sentencing range (2021-2025)* TF standalone convictions Year Minimum imprisonment range (days) Maximum imprisonment range (days) Average sentencing range (days) Average sentencing range (years) 2021 755 2375 1637 4 years, 6 months 2022 755 2920 1773 4 years, 10 months 2023 755 2920 1609 4 years, 5 months 2024 755 2280 1586 4 years, 4 months 2025** 755 2190 1557 4 years, 3 months Total average 755 2537 1632 4 years, 6 months TF convictions coupled with membership, leadership or provision of weapons Year Minimum imprisonment range (days) Maximum imprisonment range (days) Average sentencing range (days) Average sentencing range (years) 2021 NIP*** NIP NIP NIP 2022 NIP NIP NIP NIP 2023 1000 5840 3060 8 years, 5 months 2024 1140 3987 2374 6 years, 5 months 2025** 1520 3040 2469 6 years, 10 months Total average 1220 4289 2643 7 years, 3 months Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) NIP: No information provided. 566. Sentences may be reduced by one-sixth upon judges’ consideration or as part of the prosecutorial strategy. Defendants co-operating with authorities during the investigation/prosecution stage may receive discretionary reductions, and behaviour such as demonstrating remorse may also be considered. Although sentences can be reduced to 2–4 years, the sanctions remain proportionate and dissuasive in TF cases related to domestically and UNSC-listed terrorist organisations with a domestic nexus. 567. In line with Türkiye’s fundamental principles of domestic law, legal persons are not subject to criminal liability for TF. Alternative measures, including confiscation and administrative sanctions, are available and have been applied in practice. Türkiye has demonstrated some cases involving the use of legal persons and commercial structures across different terrorist organisations. These examples show the ability to identify and take action against TF activity involving businesses. However, such cases remain relatively limited in scope and are not yet representative of consistent outcomes involving complex or layered structures across the broader TF risk environment. More developed and systematic casework involving legal persons is primarily observed in FETÖ-related commercial structures. Overall, the use of available measures remains relatively limited and does not yet demonstrate consistent outcomes involving complex or layered legal persons, legal arrangements and commercial structures across Türkiye’s broader TF risk environment. The overall dissuasive effect of these measures is therefore not fully demonstrated, particularly given their materiality in Türkiye’s economy and TF risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 175. Türkiye receives a large volume of international information requests relating to ML and associated crimes through multiple co-operation channels and Türkiye’s international partners confirmed that Türkiye extensively provides quality non-MLA international co-operation. MASAK responds to a large number of incoming requests and provides spontaneous disclosures where relevant. LEAs, supervisory authorities and customs authorities similarly provide information and assistance through their respective channels. 176. MASAK prioritises incoming requests based on specific criteria. In this context, priority is given to requests in NRA reports regarding ML and TF threats at medium and higher risk levels, as well as requests involving vulnerable sectors and postponement of transactions, in addition to requests concerning customers, transactions and countries identified as high-risk by international organisations, particularly the FATF. Requests that are marked as “Very Urgent” and have a specific deadline are fulfilled separately from the matters mentioned above. Additionally, reminder emails are sent via EMIS before the deadline. Urgent requests are prioritised and fulfilled before routine or standard ones. Standard requests are typically responded to within 30 days in accordance with the Egmont Rules. 177. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 capture incoming requests, all of which were addressed by MASAK and Box 2.8 covers the postponement of a transaction and seizure of assets in addition to the outcomes of spontaneous disclosures made by Türkiye. Table 2.11.: Number of Information Requests Received through Egmont Secure Web Year Incoming Requests Spontaneous Requests Total Average Response Time (days) 2021 681 279 964 34 2022 715 198 946 47 2023 877 240 1124 49 2024 684 251 942 45 2025 574 201 775 34 Table 2.12.: Number of Incoming Financial Intelligence Exchanges with Other Non-Egmont Group Members Requesting Countries Years 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total East Asia 1 1 2 South Asia 1 3 1 1 6 Non-EU 3 30 7 5 20 65 Average Time of Response 18 days 46 days 55 days 71 days 23 days Box 2.8. Seeking of information by financial supervisors and Impact of submission of spontaneous disclosures Case Study 1 In 2025, MASAK received a request from the FIU of Country X concerning suspected fraud against Bank Y involving EUR10.5 million, part of which had been transferred to three bank accounts held by Company Z in Türkiye. Following a request from the foreign authorities to postpone the transaction due to suspicions of fraud and ML, MASAK postponed the withdrawal of the EUR 382 000 held in one of Company Z’s accounts, with the same quantum of funds subsequently seized. Case Study 2 Country X was at different times spontaneously informed of certain suspicious actions that could form a fraud crime in line with Article 21 of ETS 30. Different suspects were accused of calling especially elderly and retired people living in Country X to convince them to invest in Türkiye and fraudulently taking their money. Eventually, this spontaneous information led to discovering the criminal organisation which was in charge of these crimes. Thanks to the dialogue between Türkiye and Country X, these spontaneous information sharing has resulted in the prosecution of fraud and the case is still ongoing. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 178. The TNP receives and executes requests for information from foreign LEAs units. Table 2.13. sets out the number of information requests received by INTERPOL – Europol Directorate with an average response time of 2 to 8 weeks per year. Box 2.4 contains an example of a joint investigation. Table 2.13.: Number of Information Requests Received via Interpol Channel on ML Offence Region 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Central Europe 15 4 2 2 0 23 Southeast Europe 1 1 9 4 0 15 Western Europe 3 5 3 1 1 13 Northern Europe 2 4 3 0 0 9 Eastern Europe 5 3 1 1 0 10 Southern Europe 2 2 4 0 0 8 Middle East 0 0 1 1 1 3 Central Asia 0 0 2 1 0 3 Southeast Asia 3 0 0 0 0 3 Western Asia 0 0 0 0 1 1 South America 1 0 0 0 0 1 North Africa 1 0 0 0 0 1 East Africa 0 0 0 1 0 1 Grand Total 33 19 25 11 3 91 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 179. Supervisory authorities also play an important role in international co-operation. For the BRSA, the requests are generally related to fit and proper processes for opening overseas branches and appointing senior executives. For the IPRSA, the requests are generally related to identifying the beneficial owner of legal entities during the establishment phase and share transfer processes. For the CMB, the requests are generally related to fit and proper process. The CMB has not received any negative feedback regarding the coverage and timeliness of the information provided. If further information was required from the counterparty, in any case, there are open channels for bilateral dialog and any clarification. For the BRSA, information requests are prioritised and processed within a very short period of time. No negative feedback has been received from foreign counterparts regarding the contents of the information provided. 180. The CMB handled over 50 incoming requests from more than 25 jurisdictions during the period, responding to the vast majority of them, with average response times improving significantly from 82–94 days (2021–2023) to 41 days in 2025. The BRSA processed 68 requests from 2021–2025 with consistently short turnaround times (generally 10–27 days), reflecting efficient handling of supervisory co-operation. The IPRSA also engaged with a wide network of foreign supervisors, international organisations, and international bodies, exchanging regulatory and BO information as part of ongoing supervisory collaboration. Collectively, these figures demonstrate that Türkiye’s supervisory authorities are not only recipients of international requests but also timely, reliable and proactive partners in addressing foreign authorities’ information needs, including on legal and BO. IOSCO has a mechanism to follow the use of the IOSCO MoU by its members and assess its effectiveness. The statistics on the use of the mechanism by each signatory authority is collected every year by a dedicated international working group of IOSCO. Based on this mechanism, MMoU’s effectiveness, the quality and the usefulness of the provided information and whether there is a discrepancy between members is checked and reported periodically. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 181. Given Türkiye’s strategic location and exposure to smuggling and transnational crime risks, international co-operation is an important component of CE’s operational response. CE engages extensively in international information exchange to support risk analysis, intelligence development and operational enforcement against smuggling and related crimes. In 2023, CE conducted 129 formal information exchanges and 144 intelligence exchanges. In 2024, co-operation expanded significantly, with 195 incoming out of 260 information exchanges and 101 incoming out of 122 intelligence exchanges involving international organisations and partner countries. The high volume of incoming requests reflects both the importance of international co-operation in Türkiye’s risk context and foreign reliance on CE’s operational capabilities. Requests are prioritised according to subject matter and urgency and are generally addressed within one week to three months depending on complexity. While many intelligence exchanges are co-ordinated rapidly, more complex matters may require co-ordination across the General Directorate, provincial units, other Ministry units and external institutions. Information and document requests are supported through available databases, relevant sources and liaison channels, enabling a continuous flow of information that supports result-oriented risk analysis and operational action. 182. This co-operation supports investigations relating to hazardous waste, drugs, counterfeit medicines, wildlife, firearms, cultural property and high-value goods and has translated into co-ordinated enforcement outcomes. CE has participated in multinational operations including DEMETER 10, THUNDER 2024, PANGEA XVII, TOX, EMPACT, GAMMA and PANDORA IX targeting a broad range of transnational criminal activity. In 2025, CE processed 194 incoming information requests and 135 intelligence exchanges and participated in three international operations. Information exchange also contributed to concrete results, including arrests related to cigarette smuggling in various countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France. The consistently high volume of requests and demonstrated operational outcomes indicate that international co-operation is being used constructively to support disruption of transnational criminal activity. 183. Complementing this co-operation, the Turkish tax authorities play a substantive role in domestic and international co-operation supporting AML/CFT objectives. The Turkish Revenue Administration (TRA) and the TIB operate as complementary institutions with distinct functions, with the TRA serving as the competent authority for international exchange of tax information and the TIB contributing investigative expertise through audits and inspections. Through analysis of corporate structures, partnership relations and financial records, tax authorities contribute to identifying concealed ownership structures, entities misused for criminal purposes and laundering typologies. The TRA also functions as a designated channel for receipt and provision of beneficial ownership information to foreign counterparts, reinforcing Türkiye’s capacity to support international investigations involving tax-related and ownership transparency concerns. The TRA has not received negative feedback regarding assistance provided. 184. Türkiye actively seeks and provides international co-operation for AML/CFT purposes through a wide range of channels used by the FIU, LEAs, supervisors, customs and tax authorities. Outgoing requests are generally aligned with the jurisdiction’s risk profile and include financial intelligence, criminal intelligence and beneficial ownership information, with case examples demonstrating effective operational co-ordination and tangible asset restraint outcomes. Authorities also respond to a significant volume of incoming requests in a constructive and generally timely manner and international partners view Türkiye as a reliable counterpart. The volume of incoming requests, participation in multinational operations, demonstrated operational outcomes and complementary support provided by tax authorities indicate that co-operation is functioning effectively and broadly aligned with Türkiye’s risk profile. While the number of outgoing asset-focused MLA requests remains modest relative to risk exposure and early freezing measures appear less consistently pursued in some cross-border asset recovery matters, these issues do not materially detract from otherwise effective co-operation outcomes. Overall, co-operation mechanisms appear stronger in providing co-operation and in seeking co-operation to investigate ML, TF and associated predicate offences, while further improvements remain possible in the more consistent pursuit of cross-border asset recovery." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1. FIU 175. Türkiye receives a large volume of international information requests relating to ML and associated crimes through multiple co-operation channels and Türkiye’s international partners confirmed that Türkiye extensively provides quality non-MLA international co-operation. MASAK responds to a large number of incoming requests and provides spontaneous disclosures where relevant. LEAs, supervisory authorities and customs authorities similarly provide information and assistance through their respective channels. 176. MASAK prioritises incoming requests based on specific criteria. In this context, priority is given to requests in NRA reports regarding ML and TF threats at medium and higher risk levels, as well as requests involving vulnerable sectors and postponement of transactions, in addition to requests concerning customers, transactions and countries identified as high-risk by international organisations, particularly the FATF. Requests that are marked as “Very Urgent” and have a specific deadline are fulfilled separately from the matters mentioned above. Additionally, reminder emails are sent via EMIS before the deadline. Urgent requests are prioritised and fulfilled before routine or standard ones. Standard requests are typically responded to within 30 days in accordance with the Egmont Rules. 177. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 capture incoming requests, all of which were addressed by MASAK and Box 2.8 covers the postponement of a transaction and seizure of assets in addition to the outcomes of spontaneous disclosures made by Türkiye. Table 2.11.: Number of Information Requests Received through Egmont Secure Web Year Incoming Requests Spontaneous Requests Total Average Response Time (days) 2021 681 279 964 34 2022 715 198 946 47 2023 877 240 1124 49 2024 684 251 942 45 2025 574 201 775 34 Table 2.12.: Number of Incoming Financial Intelligence Exchanges with Other Non-Egmont Group Members Requesting Countries Years 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total East Asia 1 1 2 South Asia 1 3 1 1 6 Non-EU 3 30 7 5 20 65 Average Time of Response 18 days 46 days 55 days 71 days 23 days Box 2.8. Seeking of information by financial supervisors and Impact of submission of spontaneous disclosures Case Study 1 In 2025, MASAK received a request from the FIU of Country X concerning suspected fraud against Bank Y involving EUR10.5 million, part of which had been transferred to three bank accounts held by Company Z in Türkiye. Following a request from the foreign authorities to postpone the transaction due to suspicions of fraud and ML, MASAK postponed the withdrawal of the EUR 382 000 held in one of Company Z’s accounts, with the same quantum of funds subsequently seized. Case Study 2 Country X was at different times spontaneously informed of certain suspicious actions that could form a fraud crime in line with Article 21 of ETS 30. Different suspects were accused of calling especially elderly and retired people living in Country X to convince them to invest in Türkiye and fraudulently taking their money. Eventually, this spontaneous information led to discovering the criminal organisation which was in charge of these crimes. Thanks to the dialogue between Türkiye and Country X, these spontaneous information sharing has resulted in the prosecution of fraud and the case is still ongoing. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 178. The TNP receives and executes requests for information from foreign LEAs units. Table 2.13. sets out the number of information requests received by INTERPOL – Europol Directorate with an average response time of 2 to 8 weeks per year. Box 2.4 contains an example of a joint investigation. Table 2.13.: Number of Information Requests Received via Interpol Channel on ML Offence Region 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Central Europe 15 4 2 2 0 23 Southeast Europe 1 1 9 4 0 15 Western Europe 3 5 3 1 1 13 Northern Europe 2 4 3 0 0 9 Eastern Europe 5 3 1 1 0 10 Southern Europe 2 2 4 0 0 8 Middle East 0 0 1 1 1 3 Central Asia 0 0 2 1 0 3 Southeast Asia 3 0 0 0 0 3 Western Asia 0 0 0 0 1 1 South America 1 0 0 0 0 1 North Africa 1 0 0 0 0 1 East Africa 0 0 0 1 0 1 Grand Total 33 19 25 11 3 91 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 179. Supervisory authorities also play an important role in international co-operation. For the BRSA, the requests are generally related to fit and proper processes for opening overseas branches and appointing senior executives. For the IPRSA, the requests are generally related to identifying the beneficial owner of legal entities during the establishment phase and share transfer processes. For the CMB, the requests are generally related to fit and proper process. The CMB has not received any negative feedback regarding the coverage and timeliness of the information provided. If further information was required from the counterparty, in any case, there are open channels for bilateral dialog and any clarification. For the BRSA, information requests are prioritised and processed within a very short period of time. No negative feedback has been received from foreign counterparts regarding the contents of the information provided. 180. The CMB handled over 50 incoming requests from more than 25 jurisdictions during the period, responding to the vast majority of them, with average response times improving significantly from 82–94 days (2021–2023) to 41 days in 2025. The BRSA processed 68 requests from 2021–2025 with consistently short turnaround times (generally 10–27 days), reflecting efficient handling of supervisory co-operation. The IPRSA also engaged with a wide network of foreign supervisors, international organisations, and international bodies, exchanging regulatory and BO information as part of ongoing supervisory collaboration. Collectively, these figures demonstrate that Türkiye’s supervisory authorities are not only recipients of international requests but also timely, reliable and proactive partners in addressing foreign authorities’ information needs, including on legal and BO. IOSCO has a mechanism to follow the use of the IOSCO MoU by its members and assess its effectiveness. The statistics on the use of the mechanism by each signatory authority is collected every year by a dedicated international working group of IOSCO. Based on this mechanism, MMoU’s effectiveness, the quality and the usefulness of the provided information and whether there is a discrepancy between members is checked and reported periodically. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 181. Given Türkiye’s strategic location and exposure to smuggling and transnational crime risks, international co-operation is an important component of CE’s operational response. CE engages extensively in international information exchange to support risk analysis, intelligence development and operational enforcement against smuggling and related crimes. In 2023, CE conducted 129 formal information exchanges and 144 intelligence exchanges. In 2024, co-operation expanded significantly, with 195 incoming out of 260 information exchanges and 101 incoming out of 122 intelligence exchanges involving international organisations and partner countries. The high volume of incoming requests reflects both the importance of international co-operation in Türkiye’s risk context and foreign reliance on CE’s operational capabilities. Requests are prioritised according to subject matter and urgency and are generally addressed within one week to three months depending on complexity. While many intelligence exchanges are co-ordinated rapidly, more complex matters may require co-ordination across the General Directorate, provincial units, other Ministry units and external institutions. Information and document requests are supported through available databases, relevant sources and liaison channels, enabling a continuous flow of information that supports result-oriented risk analysis and operational action. 182. This co-operation supports investigations relating to hazardous waste, drugs, counterfeit medicines, wildlife, firearms, cultural property and high-value goods and has translated into co-ordinated enforcement outcomes. CE has participated in multinational operations including DEMETER 10, THUNDER 2024, PANGEA XVII, TOX, EMPACT, GAMMA and PANDORA IX targeting a broad range of transnational criminal activity. In 2025, CE processed 194 incoming information requests and 135 intelligence exchanges and participated in three international operations. Information exchange also contributed to concrete results, including arrests related to cigarette smuggling in various countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France. The consistently high volume of requests and demonstrated operational outcomes indicate that international co-operation is being used constructively to support disruption of transnational criminal activity. 183. Complementing this co-operation, the Turkish tax authorities play a substantive role in domestic and international co-operation supporting AML/CFT objectives. The Turkish Revenue Administration (TRA) and the TIB operate as complementary institutions with distinct functions, with the TRA serving as the competent authority for international exchange of tax information and the TIB contributing investigative expertise through audits and inspections. Through analysis of corporate structures, partnership relations and financial records, tax authorities contribute to identifying concealed ownership structures, entities misused for criminal purposes and laundering typologies. The TRA also functions as a designated channel for receipt and provision of beneficial ownership information to foreign counterparts, reinforcing Türkiye’s capacity to support international investigations involving tax-related and ownership transparency concerns. The TRA has not received negative feedback regarding assistance provided. 184. Türkiye actively seeks and provides international co-operation for AML/CFT purposes through a wide range of channels used by the FIU, LEAs, supervisors, customs and tax authorities. Outgoing requests are generally aligned with the jurisdiction’s risk profile and include financial intelligence, criminal intelligence and beneficial ownership information, with case examples demonstrating effective operational co-ordination and tangible asset restraint outcomes. Authorities also respond to a significant volume of incoming requests in a constructive and generally timely manner and international partners view Türkiye as a reliable counterpart. The volume of incoming requests, participation in multinational operations, demonstrated operational outcomes and complementary support provided by tax authorities indicate that co-operation is functioning effectively and broadly aligned with Türkiye’s risk profile. While the number of outgoing asset-focused MLA requests remains modest relative to risk exposure and early freezing measures appear less consistently pursued in some cross-border asset recovery matters, these issues do not materially detract from otherwise effective co-operation outcomes. Overall, co-operation mechanisms appear stronger in providing co-operation and in seeking co-operation to investigate ML, TF and associated predicate offences, while further improvements remain possible in the more consistent pursuit of cross-border asset recovery." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Multi-pronged approach of Türkiye 362. Türkiye’s multi-pronged approach to obtaining BO information, draws on several complementary sources. These include the BO Registry maintained by the TRA based on tax declarations, information collected by obliged entities through CDD measures, MoT records such as the Trade Registry Gazette and MERSIS database, and the CSD for dematerialised bearer shares. This framework is supported by cross-checking mechanisms, including controls conducted through MASAK’s databases and audit processes. Basic Information – Adequate, Accurate, and Up to Date 363. Türkiye collects and maintains basic information on domestic and foreign created legal persons with sufficient link to Türkiye through the Trade Registry Gazette, MERSIS, DERBIS, VBYS and KOOPBIS (commercial companies, associations, foundations and co-operatives [28] ). These systems provide structured basic information on all legal persons in Türkiye and foreign created legal persons (excepting limited taxpayers) with sufficient links. For commercial companies, at incorporation, all companies are required to submit information on shareholders, partners and directors, which is recorded in the Trade Registry and maintained through the MERSIS system. Registration and subsequent amendments are conducted electronically and reviewed by Trade Registry officials, with supporting documentation submitted through notaries before approval. However, no information was provided on how the accuracy of this information is substantively verified within MERSIS beyond formal checks, which focus on the completeness and consistency of submitted documentation, and compliance with procedural and legal requirements. The registry data is also not used for more analytical or risk-based verification, such as identifying multiple entities registered at the same address, mapping common directors or shareholders across companies, detecting complex or rapidly changing ownership structures. In practice, notaries appear to perform primarily formal compliance functions—ensuring that documents are complete and correctly executed—rather than verifying the underlying accuracy or truthfulness of the information submitted. Similarly, lawyers do not have a formal role in verifying the accuracy of ownership information in registry systems and, where involved, their role is generally limited to drafting articles of association, preparing documentation and filing-related activities, rather than acting as an independent validation mechanism. While the system provides transparency and traceability through public access to Trade Registry Gazette and MERSIS records, there is no systemic or systematic verification of information contained in the registry. 364. For other legal persons, more structured monitoring and compliance mechanisms are in place. Associations and foundations are subject to registration and reporting requirements, with information recorded in the DERBIS and VBYS systems respectively. These systems include broader datasets (e.g. governance, financial and asset-related information) and are directly accessible to law enforcement authorities. Robust risk-based monitoring and administrative and proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, ensure to a good extent compliance and data quality (See 5.5, IO.10 and R.8). Beneficial Ownership Information - Adequate, Accurate, and Up to Date 365. Türkiye has adopted a definition of BO that is aligned with the FATF standard, focusing on the identification of the natural person(s) who ultimately own or control a legal person, whether through direct or indirect ownership, control through other means, or, where no such person can be identified, senior managing officials as a last resort (See R. 24). The BO Registry contains structured information on beneficial ownership and control, including for foreign legal persons. MASAK, the TRA, TIB have direct access to the BO Registry and other competent authorities including law enforcement can access the information upon request to MASAK or the TRA. Co-ordination between MASAK and the TRA and the integration of BO reporting into routine tax processes along with penalties for non-compliance have contributed to high compliance with BO filing obligations (See 5.5). 366. Verification of basic and BO information is conducted through targeted cross-checks, inspections, and discrepancy analysis, including comparison exercises between the BO Registry and the Trade Registry. These measures have identified inconsistencies and led to corrective actions and sanctions, demonstrating that verification, to some extent, occurs in practice. However, verification remains largely ad hoc and is not organised under a comprehensive, planned, risk-based framework covering all registries holding ownership information. Following the establishment of a WG in 2021 and the signing of co-operation protocols in June/July 2021, a joint data-matching project was initiated in 2022 comparing MoT and TRA records, identifying 240 violations out of 355 taxpayers. The project was re-initiated in March 2024, identifying 120 violations out of 188 taxpayers, with fines imposed and the BO Registry updated. In parallel, tax inspections identified 89 taxpayers with incorrect BO information. These exercises are valuable efforts towards ensuring baseline verification. But their effectiveness is limited without more sophisticated checks especially for higher-risk legal persons, complex structures and foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links. The authorities also indicated that in 2025, the TIB examined 66 656 taxpayers and verified BO Registry information for each taxpayer subject to reporting requirements. While the verification of BO for 66 656 taxpayers demonstrate a significant level of activity, limited information was provided on the methodology, scope and depth of these checks, how they connect to other discrepancy detection mechanisms, or whether they apply to foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye. Based on the information available, these checks include elements of identity verification of beneficial owners; even where this is limited to confirming that an individual is who they claim to be, it represents a meaningful step in establishing a basic level of accuracy. However, identity verification alone does not address whether the identified individual is in fact the true beneficial owner. There is limited evidence of meaningful checks to verify the basis on which a person is identified as a beneficial owner, including whether they genuinely exercise ownership or control. As such, while these efforts, to some extent, provide an important initial safeguard, their effectiveness is constrained by the ad hoc nature of the checks, the quality of verification and the absence of a systematic, risk-based approach to verification. 367.  FIs and DNFBPs in Türkiye are subject to CDD obligations under the AML/CFT framework, which require them to identify and verify the identity of their customers, determine and take reasonable measures to identify the BO, and understand the ownership and control structure of legal persons when establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions above the applicable thresholds. These obligations also include ongoing monitoring of the business relationship, keeping information up to date, and applying enhanced due diligence measures in higher-risk situations. FIs and DNFBPs use MERSIS to some extent and the BO registry to a lesser extent to supplement their CDD processes. FIs and DNFPBs obtain BO information primarily through their own CDD processes, including customer declarations and supporting documentation. Because of tax confidentiality provisions, Turkish authorities provide FIs and DNFBPs with an indirect means of accessing information in the BO Registry, whereby they may request from customers an official document containing BO data with a QR code, the authenticity of which can be verified. While FIs and DNFBPs can indirectly access the BO Registry though a customer-provided QR code, the number of taxpayers generating QR codes for sharing information with obliged entities and DNFBPs remains relatively low, with 21 721 in 2022, 68 406 in 2023, 71 774 in 2024 and 38 700 in 2025 ( Table 5.2 refers ). 368. When considered against the total population of approximately 1.6 million companies and a significantly larger number of potential beneficial owners, these figures suggest that the mechanism is not widely used in practice. This is further reflected in BO discrepancy related STR) data, where reports linked to BO verification through QR-coded documents total 2 490 between 2022 and 2025 and are overwhelmingly submitted by banks, with limited engagement from other FIs and no evidence of reporting by DNFBPs ( Table 5.3 refers ). However, no information was provided that demonstrates how competent authorities act upon such reports in practice. In particular, it remains unclear, in practice, whether authorities request corrections or updates to BO information, whether obliged entities in line with a risk-based approach have taken appropriate mitigating measures (such as restricting or closing accounts or business relationships), or whether such discrepancy reporting results in automatic or targeted sanctions, including administrative fines. While the reporting of BO discrepancies by obliged entities is a positive feature of the framework, the absence of information on specific follow-up actions, remedial measures or outcomes significantly limits the overall value of this process in improving the accuracy and reliability of BO information in practice. Table 5.2. Statistics on the number of Official Documents issued through Interactive Tax Office [29] Year of Inquiry Number of Documents Number of Taxpayers Creating Documents (Unique Tax ID) 2022 26 690 21 721 2023 87 626 68 406 2024 93 973 71 774 2025* 45 890 38 700 TOTAL 254 179 200 601 Table 5.3. STRs on beneficial ownership resulted from TRA’s QR coded documents Sector 2022* 2023 2024 2025 TOTAL Banks 392 954 659 263 2 268 Factoring 2 1 21 0 24 Financing 1 3 3 1 8 Leasing 1 0 2 0 3 EO 0 0 0 9 9 CASPs 0 4 0 3 7 PEMIs 22 65 56 23 166 Capital Market Intermediary 2 1 0 2 5 TOTAL 420 1 028 741 301 2 490 * This mechanism (QR coded documents) was established in 2022 therefore 2021 statistics are not available Availability to Competent Authorities 369. BO information must be provided to competent authorities upon request. There are explicit requirements in law to ensure that BO information is accessible within specific timeframes. Selected case examples shared by MASAK demonstrate that BO and related company information can be accessed and transmitted within relatively short timeframes, typically within a few days to around one week, with some larger or more complex requests taking several weeks. This is representative of the close working relationship seen between MASAK and LEAs. These examples involve requests from Chief PPOs and LEAs authorities between 2023 and 2025 and include ownership, partnership, management and BO records. While these cases illustrate good timeliness in practice, they do not indicate whether the information provided was complete and accurate at the time of transmission, whether follow-up requests were required, or whether any delays arose due to incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable information. In addition, the use of such information appears to be primarily driven by LEAs, with no recorded cases of supervisors making such requests, and no information on the frequency of access requests, or instances where access was delayed. No specific information was provided on access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links to Türkiye, or whether timelines differ in such cases. 370. LEAs primarily rely on MASAK for information as no instances of requests to FIs, DNFPBs or companies for information on domestic legal persons or foreign created legal persons with sufficient links were evidenced. While Türkiye has a well-developed multi-prong framework, its effectiveness is constrained by a concentration of reliance on the BO Registry. In practice, authorities appear to rely significantly on MASAK as a central node, with information flows largely dependent on data derived from the BO Registry, creating a degree of circularity in the use of BO information. There is limited evidence that competent authorities seek or use BO information directly from FIs, VASPs, DNFBPs, or legal persons themselves. Although obliged entities are required to report discrepancies and penalties are imposed for non-compliance with CDD obligations, no information was provided on how discrepancy reports are used. The different elements of the multi-pronged framework operate largely in parallel, reducing the extent to which the benefits of the multi-pronged system are fully leveraged to improve data accuracy or mitigate risks from legal persons. 371. Türkiye’s public procurement framework does not clearly provide public authorities with the powers to obtain timely access to BO information in the course of public procurement. While the Public Procurement Law and associated regulations establish a framework for verifying the legal identity of bidders, authorised representation, and certain registry-based ownership information through systems such as EKAP (Electronic Public Procurement Platform), these controls primarily rely on data from sources such as MERSİS and focus on legal ownership and representation, and therefore the deficiencies within MERSIS apply to this aspect of the public procurement process and representation. There is no clear requirement for contracting authorities to access BO information, including from a BO Registry, nor for bidders or contract recipients to provide such information as part of procurement processes. In this context, although the framework supports transparency and traceability of procurement procedures, it does not ensure access to BO information as a component of risk mitigation, which is relevant given Türkiye’s identification of corruption as a medium risk in its NRA. 372. In the context of international co-operation, Türkiye’s competent authorities, including MASAK and Public Prosecutors, have demonstrated their ability to respond to requests for BO information, including through mutual legal assistance and other forms of co-operation. No concerns have been raised by international partners regarding the accuracy or reliability of the information provided. BO information is obtained through a multi-pronged framework, drawing on registries as well as information held by FIs and DNFBPs, with MASAK able to request such information from relevant entities in support of foreign requests. Access to BO information held in registries appears to be relatively timely, and information is generally provided without delay, with any delays in mutual legal assistance primarily arising in more complex cases requiring additional investigative measures. However, no information was provided on access timelines through other mechanisms beyond registries. Footnotes [28] Co-operatives are registered in the Trade Registry and recorded in MERSIS, consistent with other commercial companies, and are also subject to monitoring through the dedicated KOOPBIS platform, which is used by co-operative managers and trade directorates. [29] This mechanism (QR coded documents) was established in 2022 therefore 2021 statistics are not available." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="321. Türkiye follows a risk-based approach for the supervision of DNFBPs. Given the high number of DNFBPs in the country (more than 400 000), MASAK prioritises the supervision of high-risk entities within the highest risk sectors (DPMS, REAs and accountants to a lesser extent). 322. Similarly, as for FIs (see IO.3), as a result of its ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye adopted a risk-based supervision approach in 2021 to prioritise the supervision of highest risk sectors and highest risk entities within those sectors. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, prepares annual supervision plans for DNFBP sectors presenting the highest risks (DPMS, REAs and accountants). The Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG and the DNFBP risk WGs provides a platform for MASAK to exchange with sectoral supervisors as well as the private sector and the development of the sectoral risk assessments support the definition of yearly supervisory programs. Türkiye’s RBS methodology requires obliged entities categorised as high-risk to be supervised every year, and obliged entities categorised as medium risk to be supervised every three years at the latest. 323. Supervision programs are carried out either by MASAK or sectoral supervisors under MASAK’s oversight. Dedicated protocols between MASAK, MoT and TIB were signed to enhance co-operation and co-ordination and ensure that supervisions will be performed with a risk-based approach and ML/TF risk understanding of supervisors will improve. They also set forth the duties and responsibilities of the institutions on exchange of information, on trainings and on organising workshops with the participation of professional associations. All the supervisory authorities prepared RBS guidance to ensure that their own supervisions, within the scope of their regulatory laws, are performed by taking ML/TF risks into consideration. 324. On that basis, supervision of DNFBPs follows an integrated approach. First, dedicated AML/CFT supervision programmes defined yearly by MASAK are conducted either by MASAK or sectoral supervisors under MASAK’s guidance. Those onsite inspections aim at assessing the compliance status of the reporting entity against AML/CFT obligations. Second, sector specific/operational supervision conducted by sectoral supervisors. Those are not targeted at AML/CFT obligations but if related shortcomings is identified by the sectoral supervisor (e.g. CDD requirements, BO, etc.) the case is referred to MASAK for further examination. Third, “case-based AML/CFT inspections”, if there is a suspicion of a violation outside the scope of pre-planned activities. As a result, all high-risk entities in the DPMS, REAs and accountants sectors are supervised yearly and medium risk ones have been supervised at least once over a three-year period. 325. However, the effectiveness of supervisory measures is limited by some weaknesses. MASAK supervisory staff is somewhat limited, and sectoral supervisors monitor AML/CFT obligations to a lesser extent. In line with its ICRG Action Plan, MASAK’s resources dedicated to supervision have been strengthened since the 2019 MER, from 12 staff members to 33 as of 2025. Nevertheless, MASAK supervision department oversees compliance for all reporting entities (FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs) and receives and analyses the reports of all sectoral supervisors, and is in charge of taking further actions, including issuing sanctions and conducting onsite inspections. Even though MASAK relies on sectoral supervisors, those do not have dedicated AML/CFT units nor specialised staff. In addition, while sectoral supervisors have a larger amount of resources to carry out inspections, their understanding of ML/TF risks in the DNFBP sector is limited which does not ensure their full ability to identify the full scope of potential AML/CFT obligations beyond basic ones. In light of MASAK’s broad prerogatives and pivotal role it plays to conduct and co-ordinate AML/CFT supervision, its resources for supervision still need to be further strengthened. This coupled with DNFBP sectoral supervisors limited ML/TF expertise, hinders the effective supervision of the DNFBP sector. 326. In addition, the number of supervisory activities conducted over the reporting period is marginal in comparison with the size of the sector. The overall low number of entities supervised in the DPMS and REAs sectors is mostly in line with the low number of entities identified as high/medium risk in those sectors. Yet, in 2024 the number of entities supervised in both sectors amount to approx. 0,2% of the overall number of entities in those sectors. Based on the risks those sectors are exposed to, the fact that some sectors (i.e. lawyers) have been recently subjected to AML/CFT obligations and their overall low-level awareness of those requirements, supervisory activities remain marginal to enhance compliance across those sectors. Supervisors could rely to a larger extent on a mix of onsite and offsite supervision activities which would allow to broaden the scope of reporting entities monitored on the basis of their AML/CFT obligations. 327. Sectors considered as presenting a medium risk (accountants) or medium-low risk (lawyers), received marginal supervision over the reporting period, while no supervisory activities were conducted for notaries. Based on the types of activities performed by those sectors, especially support to the creation and management of legal persons and registration of transactions, supervision for those sectors is not in line with the risks they are exposed to. These challenges suggest that the effectiveness of the risk-based supervision in the DNFBP sector is only achieved to some extent. Table 4.5. Supervision of DNFBPs Sectors Number of entities (as of 2024) 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised REAs 77 831 96 53 549 100 131 109 182 98 958 360 DPMS 11 986 98 51 1 869 100 301 120 288 105 2 556 376 Accountants 133 439 15 5 0 0 32 15 24 11 71 31 Lawyers* 199 142 0 - 0 - 80 8 0 -* 80 8 Notaries 2 383 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - Total 424 781 209 109 2 418 200 544 252 494 214 3 665 775 Note: *Lawyers could not be included in the supervision programme in 2024 due to the Constitutional Court's decision annulling their designation as an obliged party (Official Gazette 32509, dated 03.04.2024)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="515. In principle confiscation revenues cannot be allocated directly for the compensation of the victims and these revenues need to integrate into the government general budget. However, there are four exceptions to this rule where victims can be compensated for their losses: remorse provisions, alternative sanctions applied to the criminal, settlements and civil lawsuits. 516. Türkiye has returned a large number of assets and funds subject to seizure and/or confiscation to identified victims (EUR 151 M). Most of the returned assets relate to fraud and forgery (92%), followed by drug trafficking (3.6%) and theft cases. The value of assets returned to victims (EUR 151 M) is nearly twice the total value of assets confiscated (EUR 93 M). Türkiye authorities explains this disparity stating that confiscation of assets is not possible where seized assets belong to a victim whose identity is known, as such assets must be returned to the victim. Final confiscation by the government is only permitted where restitution is not possible and for specific offences (see table below). Similarly, seized assets belonging to third parties are returned when they are no longer required for the purposes of the investigation or prosecution, or when they are not subject to confiscation. In this context. However, this deficiency continues to raise concerns as the disparity highlights the limited application of confiscation measures. Table 8.4. Overall assets returned to victims (2021-2025)* Year Fraud &amp; Forgery (EUR)*** Drug Trafficking (EUR) Theft (EUR) Human Trafficking (EUR) Illegal betting (EUR) Arms trade (EUR) Damage to property (EUR) 2021 € 188,452.76 € 32,607.33 € 111,369.29 € 11,005.14 € 18,863.59 € 32.98 € 1.46 2022 € 569,125.34 € 23,936.18 € 69,503.81 € 12,295.58 € 1,271.56 € 3,485.38 € 91.54 2023 € 118,220,723.32 € 860,962.44 € 1,849,124.40 € 152,507.70 € 533,757.15 € 83,852.67 € 91,854.68 2024 € 7,698,562.40 € 1,905,334.34 € 1,064,846.13 € 257,773.40 € 114,561.58 € 44,814.84 € 36,764.88 2025** € 12,350,124.09 € 2,578,686.31 € 1,601,836.36 € 523,317.59 € 22,364.68 € 222,022.14 € 23,470.01 Total € 139,026,987.91 € 5,401,526.60 € 4,696,679.99 € 956,899.41 € 690,818.56 € 354,208.01 € 152,182.57 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="650. The approach for monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). In line with its 2021 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye implemented a risk-based approach for monitoring reporting entities compliance with TFS obligations, by developing separate supervision programmes based on a separate risk analysis specifically for TFS monitoring, both in terms of TF and PF. On an annual basis, competent authorities assess reporting entities risk level for TFS compliance taking into consideration several factors such as control measures applied by reporting entities, asset size, outcome of previous inspections. Within each sector, reporting entities are then categorised into high/medium and low TFS risk and authorities conduct onsite inspections to all high risks entities and some medium risks. Apart from planned inspections, if evidence emerges that an obligated party has violated the sanctions, that party is supervised independently of the program, and sanctions are imposed in case of violation. Periodic inquiries are also conducted to determine whether individuals and legal entities on asset freeze lists have committed any violations following the freeze decision. Yet, this approach led to the monitoring of an overall limited number of reporting entities over the reporting period, Türkiye could make wider use of offsite supervision to expand the scope of entities supervised on PF related TFS obligations. 651. Violations related to TF TFS were detected in the supervisions of the banking, MVTS and insurance sectors (see IO.10) but not for PF TFS. The PF NRA recognises that the systems of the relevant companies were not sufficiently capable of handling TFS, including related to PF. This coupled with Türkiye unique position as a regional financial and transit hub and its specific risk exposure to Iran, and the specific risks related to potential breaches and evasions of sanctions which is taken into consideration to a limited extent by some reporting entities could likely to result in more PF violation risks. 652. Building upon the results of the PF NRA, authorities decided in 2025 to differentiate the risk analyses for TF related and PF related TFS in order to carry out separate supervisions with better risk understanding and better scoping either on TF or PF. As of the time of the onsite visit, the supervision programmes had not been finalised but the plan was for supervisors to inspect 147 entities, among which 108 FIs and 39 DPMS/REAs, following a risk-based approach. Türkiye’s plan to prioritise the supervision of the entities posing the highest risk within the sectors most at risk of PF according to the PF NRA results is a positive development, however the effectiveness of such measure is yet to be demonstrated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. Türkiye prosecutes and convicts a broad range of TF activities, largely in line with its identified TF risk profile relating to designated terrorist organisations. 557. Türkiye has increased TF prosecutions since the previous MER 2019, from 1 913 cases in 2013–2017 to 2 524 cases in 2021–2025, of which approximately 10% involved legal persons. Nearly half of the prosecuted cases are related to ISIL/AQ (43%) and the rest are related to domestic designated organisations PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (26%), FETÖ (22%) and DHKP-C (6%) in line with the country’s risk profile relating to designated TOs. Türkiye did not present prosecutions relating to cases linked to terrorist organisations or networks that are neither listed under UNSCRs nor designated at the domestic level but relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. The majority of prosecutions involved the use of banking channels (46%), followed by cash courier activities (25%), abuse of legal persons (13%) and licensed MVTS (6%) and hawala-type transfers (5%). [39] Table 9.4. Number of TF prosecutions (2021-2025)* 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** TF offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) TO No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects ISIL/AQ 73 155 206 320 204 313 245 405 366 605 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 187 318 142 205 93 186 125 179 116 194 FETO 110 235 72 145 124 350 107 147 135 389 DHKP-C 1 1 18 27 31 34 69 69 39 99 Other 10 22 18 36 12 32 7 14 14 17 Total 381 731 456 733 464 915 553 814 670 1304 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation 448 563 567 669 113 156 92 117 59 56 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation 24 279 28 392 16 291 19 013 10060 13127 7806 9557 5311 6902 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation 23 45 15 34 15 24 4 9 9 24 Total 24750 29000 16873 19716 10188 13307 7902 9683 5379 6982 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 558. When a TF offence is evident alongside other terrorism-related crimes, such as membership in a terrorist organisation or providing arms or support, the public prosecutor determines the charges to be brought before the court. TF offences may be, and in practice have been, prosecuted concurrently with other terrorism-related offences, and it is ultimately for the judge to decide which charge aligns best with the evidence. 559. In cases where the TF offence can be coupled with membership, leadership or provision of weapons to an armed TO, the principle of concurrent offences applies, covering situations where a perpetrator meets the criteria for multiple penal provisions. Where evidence supports both TF and predicate terrorism offences, courts tend to prioritise terrorism-related charges, which carry heavier penalties than TF alone (see analysis under section 9.4). In such cases, TF conduct is often used as corroborative evidence of terrorist organisation membership. 560. Türkiye has substantially increased TF convictions since the previous MER, from 53 cases in 2013-2017 to 418 cases in 2021-2025 [40] , almost an eightfold increase, with 52% related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, 32% to ISIL/AQ, 10% to FETÖ and 2% to DHKP-C and others. These convictions resulted in 584 convicted persons, the vast majority of whom were Turkish nationals (547). In line with the TF risk profile in relation to designated TOs, 49% of convicted persons were linked to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG and 32% to ISIL/AQ. Table 9.5. Number of TF convictions (2021-2025)* 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** TF offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) TO Convictions Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons ISIL/AQ 5 20 13 18 38 51 39 52 43 47 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 16 24 129 132 42 51 19 46 20 33 FETO 5 13 4 4 9 10 15 50 11 23 DHKP-C 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 1 Other 0 0 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 Total 26 57 147 155 95 118 74 149 76 105 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation 99 109 67 75 56 60 43 50 37 36 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation 19241 22803 13541 16143 9465 11110 6919 8128 6637 7570 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation 39 47 25 42 24 38 10 13 8 8 Total 19379 22959 13633 16260 9545 11208 6972 8191 6682 7614 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 561. Türkiye has demonstrated the ability to prosecute and convict a wide range of TF activities. Approximately 90% of TF convictions relate to the provision of funds to terrorist organisations, predominantly PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (57%), ISIL/AQ (28%) and FETÖ (13%). In contrast, the collection and use of funds account for a smaller proportion of convictions (10%), with nearly 60% linked to ISIL/AQ and 21% to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. This suggests that authorities are more effective in cases with a clear and direct nexus to a TO, while more complex TF typologies are prosecuted less frequently. The majority of convictions (76%) involved domestic fund movements, with the remaining 24% involving cross-border transactions. 562. Competent authorities acknowledge that a key challenge in securing TF convictions lies in establishing the requisite mens rea , particularly where funds are raised through small-scale, unauthorised social media campaigns presented as charitable causes, and where transaction amounts are low. In such cases, prosecutors rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate terrorist intent. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye identified 59 cases in which prosecutions were initially initiated under TF offences but ultimately resulted in convictions for membership in an armed TO. Occasionally, these outcomes stemmed from a deliberate strategy by prosecutors, whereas in other instances they arose from pursuing alternative offences to achieve greater penalties. 563. While TF activity is subject to significant prosecution and conviction efforts, case studies and statistics point to uneven outcomes across the full risk profile. In particular, outcomes are less clearly demonstrated for TBTF, procurement networks, complex legal person structures, foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements, and TF activity linked to relevant non-designated terrorist organisations or networks. This is an important limitation in effectiveness, notwithstanding the high number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions overall. Footnotes [39] Türkiye analyses MVTS and Hawala as two different concepts for statistics purposes. Due to the methodology applied, a single case may fall under more than one sector and/or typology of abuse. [40] 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 608. FIs and VASPs have a generally good understanding of their TF TFS obligations, including their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay. A guidance on TFS obligations for reporting entities was published in 2022 and competent authorities are in the process of updating it. Understanding of TFS obligations has also been supported via trainings and outreach activities. 609. FI and VASPs rely on international monitoring programs and apply daily screening to their customer database. In some instances, FIs have identified and frozen terrorist funds and other related assets, including those owned, controlled or held by individuals acting on behalf of designated entities. This is indicative of financial institutions understanding of their TFS obligations. 610. Smaller FIs, as well as capital markets institutions and NBFIs mostly rely on manual screening. Concerns arise in the timely implementation of TFS obligations for FIs and VASPs that do not use commercial databases that automatically update sanctions lists. While this is likely marginal for banks and VASPs, most other FIs rely on manual screening, the lack of systematic updates can cause delays in TFS compliance. In addition, exchange offices and MVTS interviewed by the AT during the onsite visit mostly screen customers at the onboarding stage but monitor their ongoing business relationship to a lesser extent which also creates concerns, especially in light of the exposure of those sectors to TF abuse. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 611. Apart from some entities, DNFBPs have in general a limited understanding of their TF TFS obligations, especially with regard the need to implement those obligations without delay. DPMS and REAs considered that the structure of their client relationship (mostly single transaction) exposes them to less risks in terms of TFS, while accountants and legal professions consider that having well-known databases of customers mitigate their risks. While DNFBPs are mostly aware that TFS lists can be consulted on MASAK website, there were shortcomings in the understanding of what TFS decisions relate to and the scope to whom those decisions would apply to, which is not limited to foreign individuals (some mentioned “foreigners”). Furthermore, most DNFBPs met during the onsite visit considered that their exposure to TFS risks was minimal as they perform transactions through the banking system, so the reliance on other reporting entities is seen as a major mitigator of their risk. This is a concern as it prevents sound implementation of TFS requirements. 612. DNFBPs only perform screening at the onboarding stage which is not in line with their TFS obligations. While direct notification process exists, most DNFBPs rely on manual checks of the UN and MASAK websites. Not all entities are aware nor subscribed to MASAK’s notification system. This can create challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are updated in a timely manner. The fact that no DNFBP has reported potential matches, despite Türkiye’s active use of domestic designations, is a concern on the limited understanding and compliance of the sector with TF TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="379. Türkiye has strengthened its sanctions framework for breaches related to the transparency of legal persons and BO, with evidence of active enforcement; however, certain elements of the regime remain limited in their overall dissuasiveness. Administrative sanctions—particularly those linked to BO obligations—have been significantly increased and consistent application has contributed to high levels of compliance, including near-complete BO filing rates. Authorities also apply sanctions to associations and foundations, which appear broadly aligned with the risks identified in the non-profit sector, and make active use of measures to strike off inactive companies, although the absence of safeguards preventing the same individuals from establishing new legal persons limits the effectiveness of this tool. Türkiye has dematerialized bearer shares, enhancing transparency, although penalties for related breaches remain modest and unchanged from the 2022 follow-up report. Some important tools—such as the dissolution of companies under Article 210/3 of the TCC—are used only sparingly. Sanctioning in relation to MERSIS registry obligations remains particularly limited, and, combined with the absence of criminal liability for legal persons - (see Chapters 7 and 9: IOs 7 and 9), the framework relies predominantly on administrative fines which may not be sufficiently dissuasive, particularly for larger or more complex legal persons. 380. Sanctions for breaches of BO obligations have been significantly strengthened and are actively enforced in practice. Under Article 355/bis of the Tax Procedure Law, administrative fines are adjusted annually and, as of 2025, violations trigger an automatic tripling of the base fine to TRY 84 000 (EUR 2 304), with an additional 25% increase for repeat offences within two years. These measures are applied through inspections and administrative actions, with fines reaching TRY 291 M (EUR11.9 M) across 49 171 taxpayers in 2023 and TRY 258 M (EUR 7.2 M) across 14 764 taxpayers in 2024. The use of enhanced penalties for repeat violations—totalling TRY 180 M (EUR 7.38 M) in 2023 and TRY 231 million (EUR6.48 M) in 2024—demonstrates a functioning corrective mechanism, contributing to high levels of compliance (99.02%) with BO reporting obligations. This represents a useful tool to ensure compliance with a newer reporting mechanism; as a next step, its application could be further leveraged to support the accuracy and timeliness of BO information. 381. Administrative fines against foreign-created legal persons for failure to comply with BO reporting obligations demonstrate effectiveness to some extent in promoting compliance but are limited as they do not address the accuracy of information. The sanctions imposed apply only to limited taxpayers (foreign-created legal persons with a taxable presence), with 55 entities sanctioned between 2021 and 2025, resulting in fines of approximately TRY 432 900 (EUR 12 806), and an additional TRY 294 000 (EUR 7 431) for repeated violations in 2024–2025. This represents the only evidence of enforcement action against foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links, with no information provided on measures applied to other foreign-linked entities, including those with more than 50% foreign shareholding, indicating a narrow and incomplete enforcement approach relative to identified risks. 382. In parallel, Article 15 of the AML Law provides for imprisonment (six months to one year) or judicial fines for undisclosed front person activity, with enforcement increasing from 909 investigations and 143 convictions in 2021 to 1 262 investigations and 689 convictions in 2024 (893/654 in 2025). Conversion rates for front person activity have improved significantly, with investigation-to-conviction rates increasing from approximately 16% in 2021 to 55% in 2024 (73% in 2025), and prosecution-to-conviction rates rising from 16% to 78% (81% in 2025), demonstrating more effective case progression and judicial follow-through. While this demonstrates active use of the provision and partial effectiveness, information was unavailable on the nature and complexity of cases, the application of custodial versus financial sanctions in practice, their relevance to higher-risk ML/TF scenarios, and if there are measures in place to address persistent non-compliance. 383. Sanctions imposed by the MoT under the TCC are the least developed element of the framework, particularly given the higher-risk exposure identified in the LPRA for commonly used corporate forms and sectors vulnerable to misuse. Enforcement under Articles 33/2, 38/1, 64, 65, and 562/13(a)—covering registration, trade name accuracy, and bookkeeping obligations—has been relatively limited in practice, with only a small number of companies sanctioned annually (generally between 3 and 10 cases) and modest fines, demonstrating that enforcement activity is not fully aligned with the identified risk profile ( Table 5.6 refers ). Several provisions show limited consistency in enforcement, suggesting that more systematic verification of core registry information, including address data, could be beneficial. While LEAs have indicated that identifying multiple or suspicious addresses is a key starting point in detecting misuse, this type of basic verification could be more proactively undertaken at the registry level. In parallel, although Article 210/3 of the TCC provides for the dissolution of companies engaged in fraudulent or unlawful activities, it has been used only in a small number of cases (4 in 2021, 2 in 2022, 4 in 2023, 3 in 2024, and 5 in 2025). Strengthening the use of these tools—particularly at the stage of ongoing operations—could further enhance the reliability of corporate information and help mitigate risks related to the misuse of legal persons, including for concealing beneficial ownership and ML/TF related financial flows. 384. Sanctions applied through DERBIS (for associations) and VBYS (for foundations) indicate active enforcement of compliance obligations in the non-profit sector, primarily targeting failures in reporting, registration, governance, and transparency requirements. Under DERBIS, sanctions relate to breaches such as non-compliance with notification and reporting obligations, with 444 associations sanctioned in 2021, 339 in 2022, 348 in 2023, 218 in 2024, and 281 in 2025 (as of November), and total penalties reaching TRY 17.3 M (EUR 379 818) in 2025 ( Table 5.5 refers ). Under VBYS, sanctions on foundations—primarily for violations including non-submission of annual declarations, deficiencies in internal audit reports, failures to declare foreign donations, and non-compliance with notification obligations (e.g. management changes, address updates, and real estate declarations)—increased from TRY 1.9 million (EUR 109 165) in 2022 to TRY 10.7 million (EUR 235 275) in 2025 ( Table 5.4 refers ). These sanctions form one element of robust ongoing monitoring efforts by authorities to ensure that information is accurate, and up to date and the sanctions applied to associations and foundations are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 385. Türkiye has not prohibited the issuance of bearer shares of companies not listed on a stock exchange, but since 2022 has dematerialized the issuance of bearer shares, enhancing transparency and reducing risks associated with anonymous ownership (See R.24). Nevertheless, penalties for breaches of bearer share requirements remain modest, with a single penalty applied, indicating that while transparency has improved, and the sanctions framework has not been further strengthened and is not dissuasive. (See 5.2 above). Table 5.4. Sanctions imposed by VBYS on Foundations (2022-2025)* Name of the Transaction Subject to Administrative Fine Number of administrative fines imposed Administrative fine amount (EUR) 2022 2023 2024 2025** 2022 2023 2024 2025 Branch/Representative Office Opening 0 9 2 4 0.00 1,937.99 466.03 973.57 Branch/Representative Office Closure 1 1 1 2 134.29 215.33 147.06 526.99 Annual Declaration 116 213 153 240 14,964.32 44,533.95 32,563.72 59,130.57 Receiving Aid/Donations from Abroad 106 98 42 87 12,030.31 20,431.86 8,902.21 22,132.75 Donating/Aiding Abroad 74 11 8 29 8,260.55 2,368.65 1,864.13 6,947.20 Real Estate Declaration 169 129 112 106 19,860.85 27,421.62 25,582.03 25,054.96 Establishing an Economic Enterprise/Company 30 14 26 15 3,693.83 3,014.65 6,058.42 3,563.23 Closure of Economic Enterprise/Company 13 9 12 20 1,666.22 1,937.99 2,796.19 4,787.42 Internal Audit Report 187 181 275 342 23,811.64 36,115.83 51,528.54 72,272.73 Account Statement of Mülhak Foundations 3 12 8 5 295.83 1,820.24 1,434.33 928.29 Change of Address and Contact Information 19 7 10 23 2,375.76 1,388.59 2,244.20 4,778.27 Foundation Management Change 166 146 133 132 20,737.34 30,081.04 29,534.68 32,678.32 Other 11 6 28 6 1,334.48 1,173.26 6,266.57 1,500.55 Total number of administrative fines imposed. 895 836 810 1011 109,165.42 172,441.00 169,388.11 235,274.85 Number of Foundations That Received Administrative Fines 535 536 534 684 Note: (*) Data for 2020 and 2021 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); and year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028). Table 5.5. Sanctions imposed by DERBIS on Associations Period Administrative Fine Judicial Action Judicial Action and Administrative Fine Total Fine Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (TRY) Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (EUR)*** Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (US) 2021 370 21 53 444 1,665,365 161,540.41 124,532.00 2022 273 23 43 339 4,724,000 269,268.00 251,812.00 2023 301 18 29 348 12,708,342 521,042.02 430,354.00 2024 189 11 18 218 4,196,985 117,515.58 118,559.00 2025* 243 9 29 281 17.638.703,62 388.051,48 415.126.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). Table 5.6. Sanctions imposed by MERSIS on companies (2021-2025) TCC Articles (TRY) 33/2 38/1 64 65 562/13a 2021 6,190.00 ₺ (600,43EUR) (3 companies) 108,387.00₺ (10.513,54 EUR) (4 companies) 2022 314,944.00 ₺ (17.951,81 EUR) (7 companies) 27,240.00₺ (1.552,68 EUR) (1 shareholder) 2023 163,036.00 ₺ (6.684,48 EUR) (4 companies) 222,031.00₺ (9.103,27 EUR) (4 companies) 2024 884,553.00 ₺ (24.767,48 EUR) (10 companies) 147,822.00₺ (4.139,02 EUR ) (1 company) 2025 41,796.00 ₺ (919,51 EUR ) (1 company) 479,061.00 ₺ (10.539,34 EUR) (5 companies) 344,918.00₺ (7.588,20 EUR) (3 companies) Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 386. Sanctions for BO violations under Article 17/A of the RoM demonstrate that Türkiye applies administrative measures for non-compliance, particularly across FIs, including banks and PEMIs, where most observed violations are concentrated ( Table 5.7 refer s). MASAK has implemented some remedial actions and has imposed fines for non-compliance with CDD measures to some extent but an overall positive impact from such measures has yet to be demonstrated. In addition, the legal design of the sanctioning regime—where fines are largely imposed on a per breach basis through fixed statutory amounts, with transaction-based minimum thresholds applying only to certain financial institutions and not DNFPBs—limits the extent to which penalties can reflect the overall seriousness or scale of breaches. As a result, while sanctions are being applied, they are not proportionate to the nature and scale of violations and are not sufficiently dissuasive in practice, particularly in higher-risk sectors. Table 5.7. BO Violations in AML/CFT Supervisions by Obliged Entities Year Sector Number of Obliged Parties in violation Number of Violations Administrative Fines (TRY) Administrative Fines (EUR) 2020 Banks 1 6 214 360 25 723 PEMIs 3 13 167 080 20 050 Factoring Companies 1 2 66 928 8 031 Leasing Companies 1 3 90 210 10 825 TOTAL 6 24 538 578 64 629 2021 PEMIs 3 23 386 533 37 494 Factoring Companies 1 3 90 210 8 750 Crypto Asset Service Providers 4 15 450 000 43 650 TOTAL 8 41 926 743 89 894 2022 Banks 5 35 2 100 000 119 700 PEMIs 2 13 862 472 49 161 Factoring Companies 3 13 866 880 49 412 Financing Companies 1 1 81 720 4 658 Leasing Companies 1 8 1 763 502 100 520 TOTAL 12 70 5 674 574 323 451 2023 Banks 1 5 609 516 24 990 PEMIs 2 18 1 820 808 74 653 REAs 7 20 611 217 25 060 DPMS 3 7 220 149 9 026 Vehicle Traders 2 5 254529 10 436 VASP 1 1 91 089 3 735 Lawyers 1 3 273 267 11 204 Accountants 6 17 1 247 139 51 133 TOTAL 23 76 5 127 714 210 236 2024 DPMS 1 1 99 386 2 783 EOs 1 1 198 772 5 566 Accountants 3 6 596 316 16 697 TOTAL 5 8 894 474 25 045" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="99. Türkiye has a generally good understanding of its ML/TF risks, supported by a comprehensive and data-driven NRA process and continuous analytical work co-ordinated by the FIU. The assessment process is based on a common and well-resourced methodology that combines quantitative and qualitative data and is sustained through the Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups, which include all relevant competent authorities and private-sector representatives. The country’s risk understanding includes the findings of its three NRAs (2019, 2023 and 2025) and incorporates emerging threats identified through typology and strategic analysis reports. 100.  The 2025 NRA has continued to evolve Türkiye’s risk assessment methodology and introduced a 40 criteria quantitative scoring framework integrating 2021–2024 case data and linking results directly to an operational Action Plan for 2025–2026. This approach provides a dynamic, cross-sectoral picture of national ML/TF risks, supported by regular inter agency co-operation and information exchange. Complementing the NRA, Türkiye’s LPRA assesses vulnerabilities associated with the misuse of company structures, sectoral exposure and BO information. Similarly, Türkiye also conducted a separate assessment of NPOs as described in IO.10. 1.1.1. ML risks 101. Türkiye’s understanding of cross-border ML/TF risks remains developing. The NRA treats TBML, sanctions evasion and smuggling largely as extensions of predicate offences, rather than standalone systemic risks. For example, given the size of Türkiye’s informal economy (29–30% of GDP) and extensive cross-border trade flows, this approach may understate exposure to ML through trade finance, logistics chains, manufacturing exports, and commodity trading. Limited sectoral differentiation constrains understanding of how proceeds from organised crime and corruption integrate into legitimate activity. TBML risks per company types and economic sectors are nevertheless assessed in the LPRA which is a complementary exercise of the NRA. Further strengthening of risk understanding would benefit from more granular and systematic analysis of cross-border dynamics, particularly in relation to trade, smuggling, and associated financial flows. While Türkiye’s role as a regional trade and transit hub is well recognised, deeper use of quantitative and qualitative data—covering trade finance, shipping activity, customs controls, logistics and cargo operations, and cross-border cash or value movements—would enhance the ability to fully assess and mitigate these risks. There is also scope to further strengthen the analysis of certain risk areas, including corruption-related risks, by more systematically incorporating findings from recognised international sources to enhance the analysis and deepen the overall understanding. 102. Türkiye’s risk understanding also reflects awareness of the evolving and transnational nature of ML threats. Authorities recognise that foreign predicate offences, organised crime groups, and professional enablers exploit similar vulnerabilities, reinforcing the country’s exposure to external risks. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the interlinkages between ML and TF risks, particularly in relation to cash-based activity, informal or cross-border financial flows, and organised criminality. Efforts to look beyond case-based evidence—by examining sectoral exposure, typologies, and emerging trends—indicate a more forward-looking approach to risk identification. This is illustrated by the identification of shifts toward virtual assets in drug trafficking, reflecting an understanding of how criminals adapt to technological developments and regulatory gaps, and highlighting areas where risk mitigation frameworks will need to continue evolving. Table 1.1. Main ML risks identified by Türkiye, most abused sectors and methods Offence Predominant Sector Other Sectors Abused Primary ML Methods Fraud Banking, VASPs PEMIs, REAs, jewellery, car dealerships, legal betting platforms, exchange offices Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, front companies, cash transactions, front accounts, Point of Sale (POS) transactions Illegal Betting and Gambling Banking, PEMIs VASPs, real estate, front companies, car dealerships Cash transactions, Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets [21] for conversion and/or disguise, front companies, cash transactions, front accounts, POS transactions Drug Trafficking Banking, VASPs REAs, car dealerships, jewellery, EOs Cash transactions, Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, front accounts, POS transactions Theft and Robbery Car dealership Banking, REAse, jewellery, PEMIs, retail trade Purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Smuggling Abuse of Legal Persons, Banking REAs, shipment, car dealership Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets/foreign currency for conversion and/or disguise Forgery Car dealership REAs, Banking, front companies, notaries; VASPs Purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Domestic/international fund transfers Corruption Banking, Abuse of Legal Persons, REAs, car dealership, PEMIs, associations Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Accounting Tax Evasion Banking Abuse of legal persons, REAs, car dealership, EOs Domestic/international fund transfers, Accounting, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Migrant Smuggling, Human Trafficking Abuse of Legal Persons, Banking Car dealership, banking, REAs, jewellery, EOs Domestic/international fund transfers, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise Usury REAs (Banking,PEMIs– in case of POS Usury) Car dealerships, front companies; insurance, rent-a-car Cash transactions, purchase of assets for conversion and/or disguise, Accounting, Source: Türkiye’s NRA 2025, p. 90. 1.1.2. TF risks 103. Türkiye’s TF risk understanding is strongly prioritised around threats posed by FETÖ, PKK/KCK–PYD/YPG, ISIL, AQ and their networks, as well as risks linked to FTFs and cross-border financial flows. While detailed and operationally informed, this actor centric focus may limit a cohesive picture of how TF enters and moves through the financial and non-financial system, especially for methodologies involving trade activity, informal value transfer systems and foreign linked channels. 104. Türkiye demonstrates a strong central understanding of TF risks, supported by MASAK’s analytical capabilities and access to a wide range of financial and non-financial information. This understanding extends to a range of financing channels, including the use of cash, informal transfer mechanisms, virtual assets, and abuse of legal persons. The NRA identifies the abuse of NPOs for TF purposes as generally low risk, while recognising higher exposure for humanitarian organisations operating near conflict zones or vulnerable to impersonation, reflecting an understanding of specific sectoral vulnerabilities. However, overall understanding is more developed in relation to known threats and is less clearly demonstrated with respect to those involving non-designated actors. In addition, while linkages between TF, ML and other forms of criminal activity are recognised, there remains scope for improvement and how these interconnections may manifest in practice. TF risk understanding is not consistently reflected across supervisory authorities where the articulation of TF risks—particularly beyond sanctions-related obligations varies and is in some cases more limited. Authorities demonstrate practical understanding of TF risks inherent in Türkiye’s geography—long standing smuggling corridors, overlapping licit/illicit trade flows and complex migration routes. These interlinked dynamics are not yet fully reflected in formal risk assessments and would benefit from further expansion and analysis to strengthen a more comprehensive and forward-looking understanding of TF risks and improve the identification of relevant indicators. 105. Strong interagency co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms support Türkiye’s understanding of TF risks. Authorities draw on a wide range of inputs—including financial intelligence, law enforcement information, intelligence sources, and cross-border data—and collaborate closely through established co-ordination structures, joint investigative approaches, and shared analytical platforms. This facilitates the identification of TF typologies and trends and contributes to a well-developed and operationally informed understanding of TF risks across relevant authorities. Efforts to raise awareness of TF risks, including through guidance and outreach, have contributed to an improved understanding of certain TF vulnerabilities. However, this understanding remains uneven and is often more closely linked to compliance with targeted financial sanctions obligations. 106. TF risk understanding across the private sector varies across sectors and institutions. Banks generally demonstrate a more developed understanding, while other financial institutions, VASPs and DNFBPs show a more limited articulation of TF risks, often focused on targeted financial sanctions obligations. This is more evident among DNFBPs and smaller entities, where TF is less consistently identified as an inherent risk. As a result, the overall level of understanding is not uniform across sectors and is less developed in some higher-risk areas, which may affect the extent to which TF risks are identified and assessed in practice. Table 1.2. Main TF risks identified by Türkiye, most abused sectors and methods TF Risk Factor Predominant sector Other Abused Sectors Predominant TF Methods FETÖ Banking Front company abuse in the retail sector, PEMIs, VASP [22] , NPOs. Collecting, providing, using funds under the names of money transfer, donation, himmet etc., physical cash supply and courier activities, VAs abuse PKK and Factions Banking Front company abuse in the retail sector, PEMIs, EOs, jewellers, NPOs, REAs, VASP and cultural activities. Collecting, providing, using funds under the names of money transfer, extortion, tax etc., smuggling, cash supply and courier activities, hawala, supply of weapons, illegal sources of finance, abuse of VAs, sales of publications Tos Abusing Religion Banking PEMIs,VASP, EOs, NPOs, jewellers, cash courier activity, front company abuse in the retail sector Domestic and/or international fund transfer, transactions for raising, providing and using funds especially through the Internet, hawala transactions, abuse of VAs. Leftist Terrorist Org. Banking Cash courier activity, Cultural publications Transactions for raising, providing and using funds, cash transactions, courier activity, sale of cultural publications Note 1: Türkiye includes in the category of “terrorist organisations that abuse religion” AQ and ISIL, and their factions which are mentioned in UNSCR 1267(1999),1989(2011) and 2253(2015). Also, risks associated with FTFs mentioned in different UNSCR including 2170(2014), 2178(2014), etc., in the FATF methodology criteria 5.2bis , and so-called lone wolf. Note 2: This category covers DHKP/C, MLKP, TKP/ML, MKP, DKP/BÖG and the other Leftist Organisations which aim to destroy the current constitutional order by means of an armed civil Insurrection. Source: Türkiye’s NRA 2025, p. 90. 1.2.3 Cross-cutting ML/TF risks 107. Türkiye’s ML/TF risk understanding is strong and evidence based; however, there are cross-cutting gaps in the overall risk picture that indicate that certain high-risk channels are not yet fully captured within the NRA framework. Insights drawn from across the assessment point to uneven incorporation of system-level risks. In particular, the assessment highlights that TF STR reporting remains disproportionately low across several high-risk sectors—especially MVTS, exchange offices and VASPs—despite their central role in Türkiye’s ML/TF typologies. This suggests uneven risk recognition and under-reporting in sectors where cash-intensive activity, foreign-linked flows and unlicensed operations persist despite measures to detect these. 108. Gaps remain in fully capturing vulnerabilities related to complex ML schemes involving foreign predicate offences, the misuse of multilayered legal person structures, trade-based mechanisms, and the role of legal and accounting professionals. These patterns involve sophisticated layering, cross-border integration, and the use of shell or front companies that are not consistently reflected in the NRA or LPRA. In addition, there are gaps in the understanding of cross-border cash smuggling risks, where high declaration volumes are not matched by seizures or follow-up investigations, and limited dissemination of customs data constrains integration into the broader risk picture. 109. Cross-cutting limitations are also evident in the extent to which DNFBPs understand ML/TF risks. While national level risk understanding is generally good, this does not translate consistently across DNFPB sub-sectors. Risk awareness is uneven – more developed in some sectors than some others, and TF risk understanding is particularly weak across the DNFPB segment. 110. There are also ongoing gaps in the understanding of ML/TF risks associated with foreign-created legal persons due to an analytical aperture that constrains the scope of risk analysis, as well as insufficient cohesion between risk identification, assessment, and understanding. In parallel, gaps persist in the identification, assessment and understanding of risks related to foreign-created legal arrangements, as current processes do not fully capture how such structures may be used in practice, particularly in cross-border contexts, limiting a comprehensive and forward-looking view within the national risk framework. 111. Taken together, these cross-cutting gaps demonstrate that, while Türkiye’s national risk understanding is generally robust, system level insights from financial intelligence (IO.6), ML investigations (IO.7) and asset recovery/cash controls (IO.8) are not yet fully integrated into the national assessment and understanding of risk, particularly concerning foreign linked ML schemes, unlicensed MVTS, professional facilitators and cross-border cash movement vulnerabilities. Footnotes [21] Purchase of assets includes all kinds of purchases made for conversion purposes (crypto assets, securities, real estate, etc.)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="349. Türkiye has implemented a broad range of preventive and mitigating measures aimed at reducing the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes. These measures are grounded in company law, AML/CFT legislation, tax law and sectoral supervisory frameworks and apply throughout the existence of legal persons. Responsibilities are distributed across several competent authorities, with MASAK playing a central co-ordinating role in relation to AML/CFT obligations. While the framework is comprehensive and has strengthened transparency—particularly through incorporation controls and the BO Registry—its effectiveness is uneven in practice, with limited evidence of the detection of breaches of basic information related to commercial legal persons, reliance on self-reported information, and gaps in verification, enforcement and coverage across higher-risk areas, including joint stock and limited liability companies and foreign created legal persons with sufficient links. 350. Incorporation and Customer Onboarding: At incorporation and customer onboarding stage in Türkiye, a range of company law, tax, banking and AML/CFT controls on obliged entities apply to promote transparency to mitigate the misuse of all legal persons. Legal persons must register with the Trade Registry under the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 (and the Co-operatives Law No. 1163, where applicable), with incorporation information recorded and publicly disclosed through the Turkish Trade Registry Gazette and accessible via the MERSIS system. Newly established entities must submit a commencement of business notification to the tax authorities under the Tax Procedure Law No. 213, and trade registry directorates transmit incorporation documentation to the tax office via web service to enable cross-checks and address verification, including start-up inspections where the address information and submitted documents cannot be confirmed, along with additional safeguards for high-risk taxpayers (including collateral requirements in relevant cases). 351.  CDD controls also operate as an early gatekeeper: obliged entities conduct CDD and identify BOs at account opening under the Regulation on Measures (RoM). In addition, these controls apply across all financial institutions (FIs) and DNFPBs. As part of their AML/CFT obligations, obliged entities are required to collect, maintain and update relevant customer and BO information, and to make this information available to competent authorities upon request. Türkiye has however not provided information on the number of such requests by competent authorities, their frequency and the timelines for provision of said information. Sanctions are imposed for non-compliance, but these are not proportionate or dissuasive in view of Türkiye’s risk and context (See 5.5, IO.3 and IO.4). 352. Transparency of basic legal person information at the time of incorporation and through the life cycle of commercial legal persons is ensured through the Trade Registry and MERSIS systems, with public disclosure via the Trade Registry Gazette. Legal persons are required to register directors, shareholders and changes in ownership and management, without exemptions. These measures are intended to provide a transparent baseline and facilitate access to information by competent authorities and obliged entities. In practice, they are meant to constitute important mitigation measures against the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes, particularly by supporting traceability of legal ownership and corporate changes. However, their effectiveness appears mixed, as they primarily capture formal legal ownership and rely on self-reported information, with checks focused on formal compliance rather than substantive verification. While penalties are applied where discrepancies are identified through complaints or audits, there is limited evidence of such checks and enforcement in practice, and none has been demonstrated in relation to foreign legal persons. Article 210/3 of the TCC allows the Ministry of Trade to seek the dissolution of companies involved in fraudulent or unlawful activities; however, its use has been limited—applied to only 4 companies in 2021, 2 in 2022, 4 in 2023, 3 in 2024, and 5 in 2025. Given the use of multi-layered ML/TF schemes that feature shell and front companies and TBML laundering schemes, the application is not in line with the risk and context of Türkiye, particularly where the LPRA identifies joint stock and limited liability companies—those most commonly used in such structures—as posing higher inherent risks. This also underscores the limited evidence of detection at the point of incorporation and early-stage controls, with available data focusing primarily on limited ex post enforcement actions. 353. While this framework establishes multiple controls at the incorporation stage, only three cases – one initiated by the supervisory authority and two through complaints ( Box 5.1 refers ) were provided to demonstrate how Trade Registry and tax-level controls have, in practice, led to the identification of inaccuracies, corrective actions, sanctions or the detection and prevention of misuse of legal persons at the company law or tax levels. This is notably limited in light of Türkiye’s risk and context, particularly given the concentration of legal person risks among commercial companies and the identified vulnerabilities associated with both domestic and foreign-created legal persons. Box 5.1. Corrective Action against a company In a notification sent by the Tax Office to the Commercial Registry Directorate, it was reported that during a tax audit conducted at “A” Limited Company it was determined that the company was not present at the address registered in the Commercial Registry. Consequently, the Commercial Registry Office notified the company and its partner “Y” that, pursuant to Article 33 of the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), the change of address must be registered within 30 days. The company’s partners determined the new registered office address as “P…….” within the same neighbourhood via a general meeting resolution and had it registered with the Commercial Registry. 354. Associations and foundations are subject to structured registration and reporting through the DERBIS and VBYS systems respectively, which capture governance, financial and operational information and are directly accessible to competent authorities, supporting effective monitoring and transparency (See 5.3 and 5.5). Co-operatives are registered in the Trade Registry and recorded in MERSIS and are also subject to monitoring through the KOOPBIS platform to a limited extent; and given that co-operatives are also captured within MERSIS, the same limitations related to the use and verification of MERSIS registry information apply. 355. BO Registry: The introduction of the BO Registry in 2021 represents a significant enhancement of Türkiye’s preventive framework. Additionally, BO information must be reported to the TRA under Tax Procedure Law General Communiqué No. 529 through periodic and event-driven notifications, with penalties for non-compliance. The accuracy of reporting may also be tested through tax inspections, while MASAK supervises the implementation of preventive measures under the AML Law No. 5549. Compliance has improved steadily, reaching approximately 99% by early 2025, reflecting sustained outreach, guidance and enforcement by MASAK and the TRA. This framework has substantially increased transparency regarding ownership and control of legal persons. Effectiveness of the overall regime is constrained by the gaps in verification. (See 5.3) 356. Bearer shares: Türkiye has not prohibited the issuance of bearer shares, but they are only permitted in a restricted and registered dematerialized form. Since the last evaluation, the country has taken meaningful steps to address the anonymity risks associated with bearer shares through the amendments to the TCC and the subsequent Communiqué of April 2021, which established a mandatory registration regime with the Central Securities Depository (CSD). The regime represents a genuine improvement as noted in Türkiye’s 2022 Follow-Up report, removing the anonymity of bearer share ownership. The CSD maintains electronic records of bearer share holders and transfers, which are accessible to competent authorities and administrative sanctions apply for failures to comply with notification requirements. Notably, the suspension of all shareholder rights — including dividend entitlements and general assembly participation — pending CSD notification provides a useful deterrent against non-registration. As of November 2025, 3,336 companies registered (0.20% of total companies) a total of 734,243 bearer shares held by 12,741 shareholders. Since the amendments in 2021, 8 companies have been audited (two in 2022, one in 2023, two in 2024 and three in 2025). A single shareholder was fined 27,240 TL (1.552,68 EUR) in 2022 for failing to report ownership on time. Despite these improvements, the bearer share dematerialisation regime may present a residual vulnerability. While transfers are effected upon physical delivery, the exercise of shareholder rights is contingent on notification to the CSD. In the absence of further clarification from the authorities on how this interim period is monitored or mitigated in practice, this could give rise to a situation where ownership is not yet reflected in the system, creating a temporarily non-transparent ownership state that could be exploited for passive asset concealment, evasion techniques and proceeds placement. 357. Notaries : The role of notaries at key corporate events — including incorporation under Article 335, capital increases and amendments to articles of association under Articles 454 and 456 and share transfers in limited liability companies — does not provide sufficient AML/CFT safeguards against the misuse of legal persons. While notarial involvement ensures that the legal form of the transaction is properly executed and that the identity of the persons appearing before them is authenticated, their function does not extend beyond this. Notaries are not required to verify registered office addresses against physical evidence, to identify whether a director or shareholder is acting as a nominee for an undisclosed principal, or to inquire into the source of funds injected as capital. The result is a framework that provides formal legal authentication at key moments in a company’s lifecycle without any substantive AML/CFT mitigation of the risk. 358. Nominee Directors and Shareholders : Türkiye has also taken targeted measures to address specific higher-risk features. Nominee directors and shareholders are not recognised under Turkish law, limiting anonymity. Nominee arrangements have not been identified as a key risk in the LPRA, and this is not reflected as an identified risk in the complex ML cases presented. However, competent authorities do not actively identify de facto nominee arrangements in practice through testing of the registry, despite the continued advertisement of such services, including nominee arrangements, by obliged entities. 359. Dissolution of Inactive Companies : Türkiye applies measures to address inactive companies, demonstrating sustained efforts to ensure compliance with reporting and transparency obligations; however, some limitations remain in addressing repeated misuse of legal persons. The TRA as an ongoing programme of monitoring inactive companies and actively strikes off inactive companies, with 38,306 entities struck off in 2021, 38,021 in 2022, 40,534 in 2023, 44,105 in 2024, and 26,960 in 2025, reflecting continuous action to mitigate the risk of dormant companies. The dissolution of inactive companies provides a meaningful structural control. However, there is limited information on whether complementary measures target the individuals behind these entities, including whether directors, shareholders or beneficial owners associated with struck-off companies are monitored, restricted or sanctioned in cases of repeated involvement. In the absence of such measures, particularly given the repeated use of shell and front companies identified in typologies, these actions address the legal entity risk to a certain extent but not the underlying risk, which may persist through the continued activity of the same individuals. 360. Financial Transparency Measures : Financial transparency measures in Türkiye contribute to transparency to a limited extent for commercial legal persons and to a better extent for associations and foundations. For joint stock and limited liability companies, financial statements must be prepared and submitted to the tax authorities; companies subject to independent audit—determined by size thresholds or sector—are additionally required to make financial information publicly available (e.g. via a company website), and listed companies must publish their financial statements on the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP). General and limited partnerships are similarly required to keep accounts and meet tax reporting obligations, but are not subject to public financial disclosure requirements. Ordinary partnerships do have obligations but do not have legal personality; while they may maintain accounts for operational purposes, tax obligations, as is typically the case, are borne at the level of the partners, who are required to declare income individually. Co-operatives are also required to maintain accounting records and comply with applicable reporting obligations, with relevant information recorded in systems such as MERSIS and subject to monitoring through KOOPBIS. When considered in light of the risk context identified in the LPRA—particularly the higher risks associated with capital companies—and the limited use of enforcement measures for fraudulent activities, these financial transparency measures appear to contribute only to a limited extent to the detection and prevention of misuse of legal persons in practice. By contrast, associations and foundations are required to submit financial and operational information through dedicated systems (DERBIS and VBYS), which are accessible to competent authorities and support ongoing monitoring, contributing to financial transparency and oversight to a better extent for other legal persons. 361. Foreign Created Legal Persons with sufficient links : Foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links are subject to the same BO reporting obligations as other corporate taxpayers. In addition to BO filing requirements, preventive measures applicable to legal persons—including those related to registration, CDD and monitoring—apply where relevant. In practice, the effectiveness of these measures is primarily evidenced through enforcement actions related to BO reporting obligations, particularly in relation to limited taxpayers. Overall, effectiveness for foreign-created legal persons remains constrained by the gaps outlined in Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5, including limited enforcement in higher-risk areas such as MERSIS-related obligations and fraudulent companies, which is not fully aligned with the risk profile and is consistent with the more limited understanding of risks related to foreign-created legal persons (see 5.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="126. Since the 2019 MER, Türkiye has significantly strengthened alignment of competent authorities and self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) objectives and activities with national AML/CFT policies through the AML/CFT Strategy, which is a binding and cohesive document requesting support of all public institutions and organisations (including some SRBs with public function such as the Union of Notaries Public) to carry out their responsibilities within the Strategy and enhanced the FIU leadership. Ministries and regulators integrated NRA findings into operational policies, supervision manuals, and investigative guidance as shown throughout the following Chapters (see IO.3 in particular on implementation of risk-based supervision and IO.7 on dedicated resources including special courts for ML cases). All competent authorities and some SRBs have also participated in NRA exercises and Threat and Vulnerability working groups. 127. Threat and Vulnerability working groups allow for AML/CFT policies to be collaboratively developed by taking into account the ML/TF risks identified, including through the FIU’s strategic analysis. 128. However, SRBs show uneven implementation of risk-based obligations, and operational alignment in areas such as informal economy risks remain weaker. To fully demonstrate effectiveness, SRBs should more systematically embed NRA findings into licensing, fit and proper assessments, thematic reviews, inspections, and sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="379. Türkiye has strengthened its sanctions framework for breaches related to the transparency of legal persons and BO, with evidence of active enforcement; however, certain elements of the regime remain limited in their overall dissuasiveness. Administrative sanctions—particularly those linked to BO obligations—have been significantly increased and consistent application has contributed to high levels of compliance, including near-complete BO filing rates. Authorities also apply sanctions to associations and foundations, which appear broadly aligned with the risks identified in the non-profit sector, and make active use of measures to strike off inactive companies, although the absence of safeguards preventing the same individuals from establishing new legal persons limits the effectiveness of this tool. Türkiye has dematerialized bearer shares, enhancing transparency, although penalties for related breaches remain modest and unchanged from the 2022 follow-up report. Some important tools—such as the dissolution of companies under Article 210/3 of the TCC—are used only sparingly. Sanctioning in relation to MERSIS registry obligations remains particularly limited, and, combined with the absence of criminal liability for legal persons - (see Chapters 7 and 9: IOs 7 and 9), the framework relies predominantly on administrative fines which may not be sufficiently dissuasive, particularly for larger or more complex legal persons. 380. Sanctions for breaches of BO obligations have been significantly strengthened and are actively enforced in practice. Under Article 355/bis of the Tax Procedure Law, administrative fines are adjusted annually and, as of 2025, violations trigger an automatic tripling of the base fine to TRY 84 000 (EUR 2 304), with an additional 25% increase for repeat offences within two years. These measures are applied through inspections and administrative actions, with fines reaching TRY 291 M (EUR11.9 M) across 49 171 taxpayers in 2023 and TRY 258 M (EUR 7.2 M) across 14 764 taxpayers in 2024. The use of enhanced penalties for repeat violations—totalling TRY 180 M (EUR 7.38 M) in 2023 and TRY 231 million (EUR6.48 M) in 2024—demonstrates a functioning corrective mechanism, contributing to high levels of compliance (99.02%) with BO reporting obligations. This represents a useful tool to ensure compliance with a newer reporting mechanism; as a next step, its application could be further leveraged to support the accuracy and timeliness of BO information. 381. Administrative fines against foreign-created legal persons for failure to comply with BO reporting obligations demonstrate effectiveness to some extent in promoting compliance but are limited as they do not address the accuracy of information. The sanctions imposed apply only to limited taxpayers (foreign-created legal persons with a taxable presence), with 55 entities sanctioned between 2021 and 2025, resulting in fines of approximately TRY 432 900 (EUR 12 806), and an additional TRY 294 000 (EUR 7 431) for repeated violations in 2024–2025. This represents the only evidence of enforcement action against foreign-created legal persons with sufficient links, with no information provided on measures applied to other foreign-linked entities, including those with more than 50% foreign shareholding, indicating a narrow and incomplete enforcement approach relative to identified risks. 382. In parallel, Article 15 of the AML Law provides for imprisonment (six months to one year) or judicial fines for undisclosed front person activity, with enforcement increasing from 909 investigations and 143 convictions in 2021 to 1 262 investigations and 689 convictions in 2024 (893/654 in 2025). Conversion rates for front person activity have improved significantly, with investigation-to-conviction rates increasing from approximately 16% in 2021 to 55% in 2024 (73% in 2025), and prosecution-to-conviction rates rising from 16% to 78% (81% in 2025), demonstrating more effective case progression and judicial follow-through. While this demonstrates active use of the provision and partial effectiveness, information was unavailable on the nature and complexity of cases, the application of custodial versus financial sanctions in practice, their relevance to higher-risk ML/TF scenarios, and if there are measures in place to address persistent non-compliance. 383. Sanctions imposed by the MoT under the TCC are the least developed element of the framework, particularly given the higher-risk exposure identified in the LPRA for commonly used corporate forms and sectors vulnerable to misuse. Enforcement under Articles 33/2, 38/1, 64, 65, and 562/13(a)—covering registration, trade name accuracy, and bookkeeping obligations—has been relatively limited in practice, with only a small number of companies sanctioned annually (generally between 3 and 10 cases) and modest fines, demonstrating that enforcement activity is not fully aligned with the identified risk profile ( Table 5.6 refers ). Several provisions show limited consistency in enforcement, suggesting that more systematic verification of core registry information, including address data, could be beneficial. While LEAs have indicated that identifying multiple or suspicious addresses is a key starting point in detecting misuse, this type of basic verification could be more proactively undertaken at the registry level. In parallel, although Article 210/3 of the TCC provides for the dissolution of companies engaged in fraudulent or unlawful activities, it has been used only in a small number of cases (4 in 2021, 2 in 2022, 4 in 2023, 3 in 2024, and 5 in 2025). Strengthening the use of these tools—particularly at the stage of ongoing operations—could further enhance the reliability of corporate information and help mitigate risks related to the misuse of legal persons, including for concealing beneficial ownership and ML/TF related financial flows. 384. Sanctions applied through DERBIS (for associations) and VBYS (for foundations) indicate active enforcement of compliance obligations in the non-profit sector, primarily targeting failures in reporting, registration, governance, and transparency requirements. Under DERBIS, sanctions relate to breaches such as non-compliance with notification and reporting obligations, with 444 associations sanctioned in 2021, 339 in 2022, 348 in 2023, 218 in 2024, and 281 in 2025 (as of November), and total penalties reaching TRY 17.3 M (EUR 379 818) in 2025 ( Table 5.5 refers ). Under VBYS, sanctions on foundations—primarily for violations including non-submission of annual declarations, deficiencies in internal audit reports, failures to declare foreign donations, and non-compliance with notification obligations (e.g. management changes, address updates, and real estate declarations)—increased from TRY 1.9 million (EUR 109 165) in 2022 to TRY 10.7 million (EUR 235 275) in 2025 ( Table 5.4 refers ). These sanctions form one element of robust ongoing monitoring efforts by authorities to ensure that information is accurate, and up to date and the sanctions applied to associations and foundations are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 385. Türkiye has not prohibited the issuance of bearer shares of companies not listed on a stock exchange, but since 2022 has dematerialized the issuance of bearer shares, enhancing transparency and reducing risks associated with anonymous ownership (See R.24). Nevertheless, penalties for breaches of bearer share requirements remain modest, with a single penalty applied, indicating that while transparency has improved, and the sanctions framework has not been further strengthened and is not dissuasive. (See 5.2 above). Table 5.4. Sanctions imposed by VBYS on Foundations (2022-2025)* Name of the Transaction Subject to Administrative Fine Number of administrative fines imposed Administrative fine amount (EUR) 2022 2023 2024 2025** 2022 2023 2024 2025 Branch/Representative Office Opening 0 9 2 4 0.00 1,937.99 466.03 973.57 Branch/Representative Office Closure 1 1 1 2 134.29 215.33 147.06 526.99 Annual Declaration 116 213 153 240 14,964.32 44,533.95 32,563.72 59,130.57 Receiving Aid/Donations from Abroad 106 98 42 87 12,030.31 20,431.86 8,902.21 22,132.75 Donating/Aiding Abroad 74 11 8 29 8,260.55 2,368.65 1,864.13 6,947.20 Real Estate Declaration 169 129 112 106 19,860.85 27,421.62 25,582.03 25,054.96 Establishing an Economic Enterprise/Company 30 14 26 15 3,693.83 3,014.65 6,058.42 3,563.23 Closure of Economic Enterprise/Company 13 9 12 20 1,666.22 1,937.99 2,796.19 4,787.42 Internal Audit Report 187 181 275 342 23,811.64 36,115.83 51,528.54 72,272.73 Account Statement of Mülhak Foundations 3 12 8 5 295.83 1,820.24 1,434.33 928.29 Change of Address and Contact Information 19 7 10 23 2,375.76 1,388.59 2,244.20 4,778.27 Foundation Management Change 166 146 133 132 20,737.34 30,081.04 29,534.68 32,678.32 Other 11 6 28 6 1,334.48 1,173.26 6,266.57 1,500.55 Total number of administrative fines imposed. 895 836 810 1011 109,165.42 172,441.00 169,388.11 235,274.85 Number of Foundations That Received Administrative Fines 535 536 534 684 Note: (*) Data for 2020 and 2021 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); and year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028). Table 5.5. Sanctions imposed by DERBIS on Associations Period Administrative Fine Judicial Action Judicial Action and Administrative Fine Total Fine Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (TRY) Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (EUR)*** Total Administrative Penalties Imposed (US) 2021 370 21 53 444 1,665,365 161,540.41 124,532.00 2022 273 23 43 339 4,724,000 269,268.00 251,812.00 2023 301 18 29 348 12,708,342 521,042.02 430,354.00 2024 189 11 18 218 4,196,985 117,515.58 118,559.00 2025* 243 9 29 281 17.638.703,62 388.051,48 415.126.00 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). Table 5.6. Sanctions imposed by MERSIS on companies (2021-2025) TCC Articles (TRY) 33/2 38/1 64 65 562/13a 2021 6,190.00 ₺ (600,43EUR) (3 companies) 108,387.00₺ (10.513,54 EUR) (4 companies) 2022 314,944.00 ₺ (17.951,81 EUR) (7 companies) 27,240.00₺ (1.552,68 EUR) (1 shareholder) 2023 163,036.00 ₺ (6.684,48 EUR) (4 companies) 222,031.00₺ (9.103,27 EUR) (4 companies) 2024 884,553.00 ₺ (24.767,48 EUR) (10 companies) 147,822.00₺ (4.139,02 EUR ) (1 company) 2025 41,796.00 ₺ (919,51 EUR ) (1 company) 479,061.00 ₺ (10.539,34 EUR) (5 companies) 344,918.00₺ (7.588,20 EUR) (3 companies) Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (***) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 386. Sanctions for BO violations under Article 17/A of the RoM demonstrate that Türkiye applies administrative measures for non-compliance, particularly across FIs, including banks and PEMIs, where most observed violations are concentrated ( Table 5.7 refer s). MASAK has implemented some remedial actions and has imposed fines for non-compliance with CDD measures to some extent but an overall positive impact from such measures has yet to be demonstrated. In addition, the legal design of the sanctioning regime—where fines are largely imposed on a per breach basis through fixed statutory amounts, with transaction-based minimum thresholds applying only to certain financial institutions and not DNFPBs—limits the extent to which penalties can reflect the overall seriousness or scale of breaches. As a result, while sanctions are being applied, they are not proportionate to the nature and scale of violations and are not sufficiently dissuasive in practice, particularly in higher-risk sectors. Table 5.7. BO Violations in AML/CFT Supervisions by Obliged Entities Year Sector Number of Obliged Parties in violation Number of Violations Administrative Fines (TRY) Administrative Fines (EUR) 2020 Banks 1 6 214 360 25 723 PEMIs 3 13 167 080 20 050 Factoring Companies 1 2 66 928 8 031 Leasing Companies 1 3 90 210 10 825 TOTAL 6 24 538 578 64 629 2021 PEMIs 3 23 386 533 37 494 Factoring Companies 1 3 90 210 8 750 Crypto Asset Service Providers 4 15 450 000 43 650 TOTAL 8 41 926 743 89 894 2022 Banks 5 35 2 100 000 119 700 PEMIs 2 13 862 472 49 161 Factoring Companies 3 13 866 880 49 412 Financing Companies 1 1 81 720 4 658 Leasing Companies 1 8 1 763 502 100 520 TOTAL 12 70 5 674 574 323 451 2023 Banks 1 5 609 516 24 990 PEMIs 2 18 1 820 808 74 653 REAs 7 20 611 217 25 060 DPMS 3 7 220 149 9 026 Vehicle Traders 2 5 254529 10 436 VASP 1 1 91 089 3 735 Lawyers 1 3 273 267 11 204 Accountants 6 17 1 247 139 51 133 TOTAL 23 76 5 127 714 210 236 2024 DPMS 1 1 99 386 2 783 EOs 1 1 198 772 5 566 Accountants 3 6 596 316 16 697 TOTAL 5 8 894 474 25 045" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="484. Türkiye demonstrates a good number of resources to prioritise asset recovery at an operational level and can identify and trace criminal property domestically to a large extent. However, no information was provided on tools used to identify and trace assets located abroad. Considering Türkiye’s risk and context profile, characterised by a significant trade activity, substantial foreign investments, exposure to smuggling risks and the presence of cross-border criminal organisations, the limited ability to identify and trace assets located abroad represents a major shortcoming that constraints the overall effectives of the country’s asset recovery system. 485. Prosecutors and LEAs have mechanisms in place to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value, whether located domestically or abroad (see R.31) and regularly do so for assets located domestically. Public prosecutors often request MASAK to identify and trace assets in the context of criminal investigations. Upon request, MASAK produces a financial analysis report identifying all assets linked to the suspects and refers it to the public prosecutor for decision on seizure or confiscation. Public prosecutors have highlighted the utility of these reports as positive. 486. The main responsibility for the identification and tracing of criminal property and property of corresponding value falls on Türkiye’s Prosecutors and LEAs, who use different tools to collect evidence and, when possible, seize assets, including direct access to databases of the TRA, the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre and the MoT and the UYAP system which allows them to conduct quick searches on the assets ownership of all suspects subject to investigations. In addition, the UYAP system also interconnects all available assets-related data in ongoing criminal investigations which provides prosecutors and LEAs with a robust roster of financial information for asset identification. Through these systems, competent authorities can identify bank account records, movable and immovable registries, tax records and shareholders information, among others. If needed, prosecutors can request other competent authorities (MASAK, BRSA, CMB, MoTF and the Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority) to identify new data either through their internal data bases or by international co-operation mechanisms (see IO.2). 487. Between 2024-2025, Türkiye identified 525 416 assets as criminal property or property of corresponding value in the context of criminal investigations, from which 1 197 were identified through MASAK’s financial intelligence (0.23%) for seizure or confiscation purposes. However, no information was provided on the remaining years of the reporting period nor was the assessment team able to distinguish which of the assets belongs to each category. 488. Competent authorities use different methods to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value. When conducting a PFI, authorities conduct a comprehensive review of suspects’ assets to verify consistency with their legitimate income and activities. This includes examining movable and immovable property, bank and VAs accounts, and transactions involving close family members. Public prosecutors assess whether assets are disproportionate to income, trace their sources, and analyse the links of those assets to the criminal activity under investigation. In addition, they collect traditional physical evidence such as diaries, invoices, receipts, and bank cards are also seized when conducting search warrants to identify hidden accounts or third-party involvement. Additionally, social media activity and personal networks are scrutinised for connections to crimes. 489. Public prosecutors and LEAs also make the appropriate consultations through UYAP, searching for all kind of financial data available in Türkiye’s system. For instance, all personal and financial data can be accessed through UYAP including the information of seized or confiscated assets valuations. As the determination of the value of seized immovable property, vehicles and valuables, as well as companies, requires specific expertise, it takes time to determine the value of many assets seized within the scope of the same investigation and to enter the data. For this reason, it is considered that the seizures and confiscated figures seen in UYAP do not fully correspond to the actual situation and that this discrepancy will be resolved as the data entries are completed in the future. 490. Türkiye identifies property of corresponding value in cases where the assets or material benefits subject to confiscation cannot be seized or delivered to the competent authority, the equivalent value of such property can be confiscated. Upon the prosecutor’s petition, the judge will examine the suspects’ financial information and request a valuation expert (called expert witness) from the MoJ-approved list to determine the value of the asset potentially subject to seizure/confiscation. These experts are categorised by field of expertise (i.e., vehicles, real state, companies, etc.) and vetted by the MoJ Appraisal Department before integrating the list. Judicial authorities may directly assign experts by selecting the necessary areas of expertise from the expert witness search screen in UYAP. In complex cases, the judge can request expert witnesses to work in panels. For reporting purposes, they are required to fill out a form (jointly if being elaborated by a panel) with a checklist to specify the valuation of the assets. Although the competent authorities note the added value of expert witnesses in supporting the identification of property of corresponding value, the information provided offers limited insight into how these reports contributed in practice, including the extent to which they have resulted in the seizure or confiscation of assets of corresponding value. 491. This system is used throughout the country and there is a total of 36 235 experts witness registered in the 17 Experts Witness Committees to assist in the valuation process. Currently, the expert witness system comprises a total of 721 sub areas, including 63 core areas of expertise such as mining, archaeology, art and collectibles, ancient manuscripts and documents, cultural productions, media and communication. In order to ensure that reports are of a higher quality and standard, the Department for Expert Witnesses has established a common basic template for expert witness reports and expert witnesses are monitored to ensure that they fulfil their duties from the moment they receive the file for examination until its delivery. 492. The assigned expert witness or panel of expert witnesses prepares a report using their scientific and technical expertise in the case file they have examined. This report must be technically standard and meet the technical requirements requested by the prosecutor, judge or court. After conducting their research and examination within the previously specified timeframe, they fill out the standard form and submit it via UYAP and, if requested, also physically. The prosecutor or court can view the expert witness report simultaneously via UYAP. A copy of the final decision concerning the confiscation of their corresponding value shall be sent directly by the court to the chief revenue officer of the location where the decision was rendered. 493. Although Türkiye has a robust legal and institutional framework to identify property of corresponding value, only information on how witness experts contribute to assigning value to the asset was provided. The lack of information on its implementation and how many assets of corresponding value were seized and confiscated confirms the incipient implementation of the mechanism and prevents the effectiveness assessment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="484. Türkiye demonstrates a good number of resources to prioritise asset recovery at an operational level and can identify and trace criminal property domestically to a large extent. However, no information was provided on tools used to identify and trace assets located abroad. Considering Türkiye’s risk and context profile, characterised by a significant trade activity, substantial foreign investments, exposure to smuggling risks and the presence of cross-border criminal organisations, the limited ability to identify and trace assets located abroad represents a major shortcoming that constraints the overall effectives of the country’s asset recovery system. 485. Prosecutors and LEAs have mechanisms in place to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value, whether located domestically or abroad (see R.31) and regularly do so for assets located domestically. Public prosecutors often request MASAK to identify and trace assets in the context of criminal investigations. Upon request, MASAK produces a financial analysis report identifying all assets linked to the suspects and refers it to the public prosecutor for decision on seizure or confiscation. Public prosecutors have highlighted the utility of these reports as positive. 486. The main responsibility for the identification and tracing of criminal property and property of corresponding value falls on Türkiye’s Prosecutors and LEAs, who use different tools to collect evidence and, when possible, seize assets, including direct access to databases of the TRA, the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre and the MoT and the UYAP system which allows them to conduct quick searches on the assets ownership of all suspects subject to investigations. In addition, the UYAP system also interconnects all available assets-related data in ongoing criminal investigations which provides prosecutors and LEAs with a robust roster of financial information for asset identification. Through these systems, competent authorities can identify bank account records, movable and immovable registries, tax records and shareholders information, among others. If needed, prosecutors can request other competent authorities (MASAK, BRSA, CMB, MoTF and the Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority) to identify new data either through their internal data bases or by international co-operation mechanisms (see IO.2). 487. Between 2024-2025, Türkiye identified 525 416 assets as criminal property or property of corresponding value in the context of criminal investigations, from which 1 197 were identified through MASAK’s financial intelligence (0.23%) for seizure or confiscation purposes. However, no information was provided on the remaining years of the reporting period nor was the assessment team able to distinguish which of the assets belongs to each category. 488. Competent authorities use different methods to identify and trace criminal property and property of corresponding value. When conducting a PFI, authorities conduct a comprehensive review of suspects’ assets to verify consistency with their legitimate income and activities. This includes examining movable and immovable property, bank and VAs accounts, and transactions involving close family members. Public prosecutors assess whether assets are disproportionate to income, trace their sources, and analyse the links of those assets to the criminal activity under investigation. In addition, they collect traditional physical evidence such as diaries, invoices, receipts, and bank cards are also seized when conducting search warrants to identify hidden accounts or third-party involvement. Additionally, social media activity and personal networks are scrutinised for connections to crimes. 489. Public prosecutors and LEAs also make the appropriate consultations through UYAP, searching for all kind of financial data available in Türkiye’s system. For instance, all personal and financial data can be accessed through UYAP including the information of seized or confiscated assets valuations. As the determination of the value of seized immovable property, vehicles and valuables, as well as companies, requires specific expertise, it takes time to determine the value of many assets seized within the scope of the same investigation and to enter the data. For this reason, it is considered that the seizures and confiscated figures seen in UYAP do not fully correspond to the actual situation and that this discrepancy will be resolved as the data entries are completed in the future. 490. Türkiye identifies property of corresponding value in cases where the assets or material benefits subject to confiscation cannot be seized or delivered to the competent authority, the equivalent value of such property can be confiscated. Upon the prosecutor’s petition, the judge will examine the suspects’ financial information and request a valuation expert (called expert witness) from the MoJ-approved list to determine the value of the asset potentially subject to seizure/confiscation. These experts are categorised by field of expertise (i.e., vehicles, real state, companies, etc.) and vetted by the MoJ Appraisal Department before integrating the list. Judicial authorities may directly assign experts by selecting the necessary areas of expertise from the expert witness search screen in UYAP. In complex cases, the judge can request expert witnesses to work in panels. For reporting purposes, they are required to fill out a form (jointly if being elaborated by a panel) with a checklist to specify the valuation of the assets. Although the competent authorities note the added value of expert witnesses in supporting the identification of property of corresponding value, the information provided offers limited insight into how these reports contributed in practice, including the extent to which they have resulted in the seizure or confiscation of assets of corresponding value. 491. This system is used throughout the country and there is a total of 36 235 experts witness registered in the 17 Experts Witness Committees to assist in the valuation process. Currently, the expert witness system comprises a total of 721 sub areas, including 63 core areas of expertise such as mining, archaeology, art and collectibles, ancient manuscripts and documents, cultural productions, media and communication. In order to ensure that reports are of a higher quality and standard, the Department for Expert Witnesses has established a common basic template for expert witness reports and expert witnesses are monitored to ensure that they fulfil their duties from the moment they receive the file for examination until its delivery. 492. The assigned expert witness or panel of expert witnesses prepares a report using their scientific and technical expertise in the case file they have examined. This report must be technically standard and meet the technical requirements requested by the prosecutor, judge or court. After conducting their research and examination within the previously specified timeframe, they fill out the standard form and submit it via UYAP and, if requested, also physically. The prosecutor or court can view the expert witness report simultaneously via UYAP. A copy of the final decision concerning the confiscation of their corresponding value shall be sent directly by the court to the chief revenue officer of the location where the decision was rendered. 493. Although Türkiye has a robust legal and institutional framework to identify property of corresponding value, only information on how witness experts contribute to assigning value to the asset was provided. The lack of information on its implementation and how many assets of corresponding value were seized and confiscated confirms the incipient implementation of the mechanism and prevents the effectiveness assessment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.2.1. PF risk understanding 626. The understanding and update of PF risks has been set as a policy objective in Türkiye with the adoption of the PF Strategy Document (2025-2029). As a result, Türkiye completed its first PF NRA in 2025 and is to conduct annual PF risk analyses while fully updating its PF NRA at least once every three years. 627. Competent authorities overall demonstrated a sound understanding of PF risks and this has been enhanced by the work conducting in the development of the first PF NRA. This work was conducted by the PF Commission gathering all relevant competent authorities (see above) and professional associations representing the private sector. Similar to the methodology employed for the ML/TF NRA (see IO.1), Türkiye developed a comprehensive and data-driven PF NRA. It considers the risks of the financing of proliferation of mass destruction as well as both the risks to the effective implementation of sanctions regimes against DPRK and Iran and the risks arising from activities aimed at circumventing these sanctions. 628. Overall, the assessment was based on 76 risk indicators, assessing PF threats—considering both likelihood and impact—and associated vulnerabilities. Among those factors potentially posing PF threats are crimes closely linked to proliferation, as well as economic, commercial, social, and criminal activities of nationals from DPRK and Iran in Türkiye. Trade relationship with these countries and their main commercial partners was also assessed. Additionally, the effectiveness of existing mitigation measures was taken into account in light of the institutional capacities of relevant authorities. The NRA was also prepared with the co-operation of the private sector to a certain extent via the issuance of surveys on TFS compliance (both TF and PF) to sectoral associations to the exception of VASPs, newly regulated sector. The PF NRA also includes a sectoral risk assessment for every FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs establishing the risk exposure of each sector to PF risks. 629. As a result of the PF NRA, Türkiye concluded that its PF risk is relatively low (medium-low), with a medium risk exposure to Iran and a low-risk exposure to DPRK. The overall risk level identified in relation to Iran took into consideration the numerous threats Türkiye is exposed to. Those include Türkiye’ strategic position as a regional trade and transit hub, its land border with Iran and the presence of a large Iranian population in Türkiye with a significant portion involved in informal economy and Iranians having partnerships in many companies from different sectors, its trading relationship with Iran including the export and transit of sensitive and dual-use goods. 630. Türkiye demonstrated an overall understanding of evasion of PF related TFS obligation, especially via third country and/or through the use of virtual assets. The PF NRA has a dedicated section on Türkiye’s trade of sensitive and dual-use goods with DPRK and Iran main partners and competent authorities have detected typologies of potential sanctions circumvention via jurisdictions that could act as proxy for DPRK and Iran. Beyond the scope of the NRA, and despite the termination of the mandate of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts in 2024, authorities demonstrated awareness in relation to recent typologies of sanctions evasion by DPRK in collecting information via other international and regional sources. Authorities also considered the increase of virtual asset transactions in global PF typologies as an inherent risk of PF for the circumvention of UNSC sanctions, particularly where this activity involves actors linked to DPRK and Iran. 631. Nevertheless, the NRA analysis on circumvention of PF related TFS is generic and mostly relies on international typologies. Risks related to potential sanction evasions via the misuse of legal persons are understood to a lesser extent and could hinder Türkiye’s ability to deter PF risks to some extent. Challenges in obtaining accurate and up-to-date BO information (see IO.5), reinforces risks related to the misuse of front and shell companies to impede PF detection efforts. 11.2.2. PF risk mitigation 632. The PF Strategy Document and the PF NRA support the implementation of mitigating measures to some extent, but actions are still to be taken in light of their recent adoption. As part of the NRA, strategic analysis studies were conducted using data such as STRs, foreign currency transfers, company asset size, import and export data, foreign sales, central province, date of establishment, and number of employees, with the aim of preventing the potential circumvention of sanctions against Iran, preventing the misuse of the Turkish financial sector, and preventing illegal money flows. As a result of the analysis, the activities of a total of 139 companies were found to be suspicious, and a more comprehensive operational analysis study was initiated. The operational analysis of 65 of these companies was ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. The data obtained as a result of this analysis is planned to be shared with the relevant competent authorities. MASAK also issued in October 2025 a PF guideline for reporting entities. 633. In Türkiye, reporting entities can send STRs specifically on PF since May 2024. STRs received by MASAK after this date are not directly related to PF, and reporting entities have so far resorted to defensive reporting on their customers related to high-risk jurisdictions, further outreach to enhance the awareness of reporting entities on PF is needed (see 11.5). 634. As a result of STRs analysis, MASAK also disseminated strategic analysis for operational purposes to competent authorities to mitigate PF risks. Over the reporting period, MASAK received 167 STRs related to PF, and approximately 1 000 STRs were submitted to MASAK in relation to Iran nationals and 180 in relation to DPRK. None was linked to potential PF activity, but other predicate offences such as fraud, illegal betting and drugs trafficking. The absence of PF related STRs is not in line with Türkiye’s risk exposure. 635. Operational analysis is also conducted in relation to DPRK and Iran, yet there is no clear finding of PF related activities. In 2025, a detailed operational analysis was conducted on 46 individuals and legal entities allegedly associated with Iran. Findings were shared with LEAs and intelligence units and supervisory authorities. An information note regarding 16 legal persons and 1 natural person assessed as potentially linked to DPRK was shared with the National Intelligence Organization and the MoT. Additional research was also conducted regarding potential cryptocurrency transfer transactions claimed to be related to DPRK involving the individual mentioned in STR. No data was found indicating that the legal person subject to the analysis has direct links to DPRK and it was assessed that the matter was not related to DPRK. In 9 cases where suspicious transaction reports were filled in relation to DPRK, transactions were rejected. 636. Some reporting entities, especially large banks, apply mitigating measures in relation to PF due to their international exposure via correspondent banking relationships, taking into consideration domestic, UN and foreign based sanctions lists. In foreign trade payments intermediated by banks, especially within the scope of intermediation of trade payments for high-risk countries, some entities have controls over documents such as customs declaration, bill of lading, certificate of origin, etc. Within this framework enhanced due diligence measures are applied in relation to customer and BO identification. Those entities also resort to commercial databases and software to search for a possible match on a sanction list regarding one of the customers and vessels involved in the shipment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="305. Despite the positive steps taken by competent authorities and described above, DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains limited. In the DPMS and REAs sectors, the understanding of ML risks is more developed, especially for larger entities. TF risk understanding is limited to awareness of TF related TFS obligations. Some DPMS and REAs, especially larger groups, met during the onsite visit had institutional risk assessment related to their customers, products/services, distribution channels and geographical risks. 306. Accountants, lawyers and notaries have a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks, mainly considering that their professions are largely prevented from those risks based on the strong requirements to become an accountant or a legal professional and of the knowledge they have of their clients. They also considered as a mitigating factor the fact that most transactions they are operating are going through the banking sector and rely on this sector for the detection of potential suspicious activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 282. Türkiye has a licensing framework in place for all DNFBPs and conducts fit and proper checks to a certain extent, responsibility is shared among several authorities and SRBs. DPMS and REAs 283. DPMS and REAs are licensed by the MoT. Applicants shall submit their application through the electronic system of the Ministry and the application is reviewed electronically, there is no face-to-face meeting with applicants. After the applicant submits the application through the systems, the relevant Provincial Directorate of Trade in the province where it carries out its activities reviews the documents uploaded by the applicant, as well as the data obtained from other integrated information systems. Some requirements are applied to DPMS and REAs applicants such as not being convicted of a crime, providing a tax registration number, registering with the relevant professional union, possessing relevant qualification. The fulfilment of these conditions is examined with supporting documents prior to the issuance of certificate of authorisation, within ten days from the date of submission. 284. In Türkiye, it is not compulsory to obtain the services of a REA to buy/sell a property. 285. BO information is indirectly checked. Applicants, either natural or legal person, have to provide their tax registry information and as taxpayers they need to file their BO information to Turkish Revenue Authority (TRA) as part of tax returns. Obliged entities can verify and identify discrepancies between the information provided to them during CDD process and through QR code provided by the TRA. If the applicant is a foreign legal person without a tax code, it would need to register to the TRA and disclose its BO information. The MoT does not have direct access to the BO information and does not consistently check the coherence between the information submitted by the applicant and the BO information as collected by the TA, but it can file a request to the TRA in case of suspicion. 286. However, under Türkiye’s legal framework the fit and proper requirements do not extend to associates of criminals from being professionally accredited or holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest in a DNFBP (see R.28). 287. Authorities have rejected a significant number of applications. The most common reasons for the rejection of certificates in both sectors are similar, they include the submission of incomplete or incorrect documents to the system, errors in the document demonstrating the absence of tax debt to the tax office and the lack or absence of professional experience and professional training among the fields of activity listed in the applicant’s professional union registration. The number of applications rejected is very high as any application missing one of the requested documents is automatically rejected and applicants must fill a new application. Accountants 288. In Türkiye, accountants are either certified public accountant (CPA) or sworn-in public accountants (SPA), their licenses are issued exclusively by the SRB called TURMOB, and the licensing process is standardised. Specific requirements to enter the profession apply, following completion of the accountant exam, at least 4 years are required to obtain a CPA license. Whether the person meets the required conditions is examined prior to licensing, along with supporting documents. To become a SPA, one must work as a CPA for at least 10 years and then pass the competency exams. The most common reason for license applications being rejected is that the individual's criminal record does not comply with the law. Lawyers 289. The Bar (SRB) is the licensing authority for lawyers. Lawyers need to have certain qualifications and the Bar reviews the applicant’s file to ensure that none of the disqualifying conditions (such as criminal conviction, disciplinary issues, or ethical incompatibility) apply. Upon successful completion of an internship, the candidate must apply for inclusion on the bar register as a full attorney. The bar’s executive board examines the application and makes a decision to approve or reject admission. Records of those whose admission requests are rejected are kept by Bar Associations and Union of the Turkish Bar Association. Lawyers whether they are corporate taxpayers or established as individual businesses are required to file their beneficial ownership information to TRA. The most common reason for rejection of the license is lack of necessary application documents and failure to meet the entry requirements for the profession. Notaries 290. Notaries are appointed by the MoJ. The requirements for entering in the sector are strict and the notaries public are under the monitoring and supervision of the MoJ and the Union of Notaries Public of Türkiye. Accordingly, the Supervisory Board of the Union of Notaries Public of Türkiye supervises whether the notary chambers and notaries public carry out their duties in compliance with the laws, regulations, circulars and mandatory professional rules. The MoJ supervises all kinds of activities of the Union, the chambers and the notaries public as well as their accounts and transactions by employing judicial inspectors or public prosecutors. In this respect, notaries public are under constant supervision of public prosecutors and are subject to on-site inspections at least once a year. Notaries Public are required to file their beneficial ownership information to the TRA. The most common reason for rejection of the application is that the entry requirements for the profession have not been met. (notary public certificate with insufficient seniority). 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 291. Türkiye has detected unlicensed activities in relation to DNFBPs to some extent. As with FIs unlicensed activities (see IO.3), authorities demonstrated a co-ordinated approach combining preventive, supervisory, and enforcement actions, contributing positively to the effectiveness in detecting unlicensed activities. Identification is allowed through various channels such as denunciation mechanisms open to public, LEAs, tax inspections, notifications from other supervisory authorities, social media monitoring. 292. To ensure that complaints regarding natural or legal persons engaged in unlicensed DPMS and REAs activities can be made in a faster and in an easier manner, the MoT set up specific a reporting system. Complaints are examined directly by the Provincial Directorates of Trade, and inspections are conducted accordingly. Table 4.1. Administrative fines for unauthorised DPMS and REAs activities Year Number of Persons Fined (REA) Total Amount of Administrative Fine (EUR)-REAs Number of Persons Fined (DPMS) Total Amount of Administrative Fine (EUR)-DPMS 2021 329 198 054 - - 2022 114 54 606 - - 2023 1200 3 796 146 - - 2024 572 1 318 824 125 700 000 2025* 625 1 959 706 93 419 700 Total 2 840 7 327 336 218 1 119 700 Note: *until 28 November 2025. 293. The persistence of a high number of unlicensed actors in the DPMS and REA sectors could reflect a lack of dissuasiveness of the sanctions allocated in those cases. 294. Monitoring of fit and proper requirements post licensing is ensured through supervisory activities. Those are conducted by the regional directorates of the Ministry of Trade for DPMS and REAs. Accountants and lawyers are monitored via their SRB while notaries are regularly inspected by the Ministry of Justice. 295. For accountants, the licenses of those found to have lost these conditions are revoked by decision of the Union Management Board. For example, the licenses of members who have been convicted of certain crimes, who have lost their legal capacity, or who are found to be in situations that are incompatible with the honour and dignity of the profession are revoked. 296. For lawyers, there are supervision and disciplinary mechanisms that operate ex officio, based on reports and complaints, regarding colleagues who commence and continue their legal practice. If a lawyer receives a license revocation penalty, all notaries are informed since the lawyer-client relationship is established through a power of attorney. In addition, since their e-signature authorisations have been revoked, they cannot use the UYAP system in any way and therefore cannot carry out duties as a lawyer. Over the reporting period, 17 licenses were suspended and 122 cancelled. Table 4.2. Lawyers licenses suspended/cancelled Year Licences Suspended* Licenses Cancelled 2020 0 9 2021 2 14 2022 5 40 2023 4 39 2024 4 14 2025 2 6 297. Notaries who act contrary to professional rules, perform their duties negligently, or engage in conduct that undermines public trust are subject to disciplinary proceedings. The possible sanctions range from warnings and reprimands to fines, temporary suspension, and revocation of the notary’s license. License revocation effectively removes the notary’s authority to perform notarial duties and permanently halts their official activities. 26 notaries have been dismissed from their profession in the period of 2022-2025. The cause of repeal is having lost the qualification to be a judge, prosecutor, civil servant, or lawyer as a result of a final criminal or disciplinary decision." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="441. Türkiye identifies and investigates all types of ML activities, including through PFIs to a large extent. Türkiye demonstrated through case studies their ability to identify and investigate ML activities in all stages. In general, cases triggering investigations are typically related to cash deposits into bank accounts, followed by the use MVTS (licensed or unlicensed), VASPs and money mules. While layering techniques are investigated to a lesser extent, with typologies including the creation of multiple small business and companies, professional ML (i.e., through lawyers and accountants) and TBML, ultimately, the purchase of real estate and gold, and the creation of small business and enterprises are recognised as the main integration mechanisms in most ML investigations. Türkiye’s remaining challenges appear related to the detection and identification ML activities through cross-border currency movements which does not align with Türkiye’s risk profile given the country’s position as a transit hub for funds and goods, including concerning the abuse of cash-based intensive in Türkiye (see IO.1). 442. ML activities are generally identified through public prosecutors predicate offences investigations, LEAs operational work and the FIU financial analysis. Complex ML schemes are generally triggered by domestic predicate offences investigations and international requests. Türkiye identifies and investigates ML through different mechanisms, including from the dissemination of FIU reports (37,5%) (see IO.6), LEAs intelligence information, denunciation from other competent authorities, foreign counterparts’ international co-operation (see IO.2) and victims’ denunciation. 443. When ML activities are detected LEAs, intelligence units, and MASAK immediately shares the findings of suspicious laundering activities with the PPOs, who will direct the investigation ensuring a unified and co-ordinated action. As a civil law jurisdiction, the public prosecutor will lead the investigation supported by LEAs. This centralized approach enables co-ordinated inquiries into both the predicate crime and ML offences. In the metropolitan cities, Specialised ML prosecutors lead ML investigations supported by LEAS specialised units (TNP and GGC) while in the rest of the cities, investigations can be led by public prosecutors. Since 2021, public prosecutors are required to initiate parallel financial investigations after even the slightest suspicion of ML following Türkiye’s national policy on ML investigations and prosecutions and mandatory Circular issued to all Prosecutors. However, despite the growth of ML investigations and prosecutions has recently increased some challenges remain on how judicial authorities proves knowledge and intent through circumstantial evidence which negatively impacted achieving ML convictions. Prosecutors and LEAs rely on the FIU financial intelligence and analysis for complex ML cases. When needed, public prosecutors can require support to the CGC and CE, intelligence units, supervisory and regulatory authorities. 444. To gather information, collect and produce evidence, public prosecutors can request information of all natural, legal persons and competent authorities in the context of an investigation. LEAs can access basic information and beneficial owner of legal persons through various channels (i.e., MERSIS, request to MASAK and Turkish Revenue Authority (TRA) and LEAs can obtain BO information from competent authorities. Interagency request of information is hosted in the UYAP system to guarantee the confidentiality during exchanges. Investigations are co-ordinated in a robust manner combining the use of special techniques of investigations and the creation of ad hoc interagency and international joint investigations teams, when needed due to the complexity of the case. 445. Türkiye has implemented mechanisms to identify ML activities and discuss new trends at an operational level based on the NRA findings. As part of the Threat WG duties, prosecutors, LEAs, intelligence agencies, FIU and all other relevant competent authorities regularly meet to discuss ML typologies, emerging trends and specific cases to exchange knowledge, develop new ML indicators and best practices on disrupting ML activities. Since 2019, personnel from the TNP Narcotics, MASAK, foreign liaison officers, and public prosecutors have held approximately 350 meetings on investigation topics related to ML/TF. Although no specific information was provided to assess how many of these meetings were solely focused on ML specific cases, competent authorities explained they were mainly focused on drug trafficking-related ML crimes and, as a result, they issued 498 investigation orders covering 4 743 individuals and converted 129 preliminary investigations into operations which further demonstrates Türkiye’s use of solid operational interagency co-operation mechanisms. There is no information has been provided the prioritization related to fraud, high-level smuggling, and illegal betting as high-risk predicate offences. 446. To support the development of investigations, competent authorities have designed several PFIs guidance (i.e., guidance published in 2025 by different units of GGC and TNP) complemented by MASAK’s ML typologies reports for operational use (2023 and 2025). These documents are periodically updated and published, including the consolidation of case studies, best practices, and templates for interagency information sharing that LEAs have already implemented. This has led to a marked improvement in LEAs, prosecutors and MASAK staff’s awareness, which in turn resulted in a substantial increase in the number of ML investigations conducted in 2024 and 2025. Prosecutors, supported by LEAs and MASAK, use these indicators to investigate ML schemes from simple cases to complex networks involving multiple predicate offences. 447. Türkiye also has mechanisms in place to identify foreign-linked ML activities through solid channels of communication with LEAs counterparts, Interpol and Europol, as well as liaison officers (see IO.2). Türkiye’s majority of ML investigations are triggered by domestic predicate offences, including coupled with foreign elements (97%) although complex ML investigations involving professional and cross-border currency movement is more limited. The table below shows the differences between domestic ML investigations vs. those triggered by foreign counterpart requests. Table 7.1. ML investigations per triggering source (domestic vs. foreign predicates offences) Triggering source Domestic ML investigations (*) Foreign ML investigations Total investigations Ration of total ML investigations Complaints from victims 1593 46 1639 7% Referrals from other agencies 11044 319 11363 49% Ex Officio (Foreign counterparts) 4797 138 4935 21% LEAs 5100 147 5247 23% Total 22534 650 23184 100% Note: (*) Domestic ML investigation refers to cases where: (i) part of the predicate offence or the money‑laundering conduct occurs in Türkiye; or (ii) the related financial flows pass through the Turkish financial system. In both scenarios, the cases are recorded as domestic ML investigations, notwithstanding the presence of foreign elements within the iter criminis. 448. Türkiye has a robust institutional and well-resourced framework to investigate ML and predicate offences. Public prosecutors lead ML investigations supports by all LEAs, and when the specificity of the case needs it, they can request MASAK experts’ and other competent authorities for further analysis. Despite LEAs wide range of capacity and competences to support a criminal investigation, the limited numbers of investigations triggered by CE remains a concern given the country risks of cross-border currency movement, high levels of smuggling, and transnational drug trafficking. 449. PPOs operate in all 81 provinces of Türkiye independently. Each PPO is directed by a Chief Prosecutor who decides on the operational implementation of the national criminal policies designed by the MoJ. Since 2023, 15 PPOs have specialised ML Bureaus with at least one specialised ML prosecutor leading and co-ordinating ML investigations. These 15 PPOs are located in the metropolitan municipalities with the highest criminal indexes [31] where the allocation of ML specialised resources is needed. In addition, Türkiye has also implemented a prioritisation mechanism for ML cases in those remaining 10 PPOs metropolitan cities [32] where no specialised ML bureaus are established by requesting public prosecutors in charge of other units (i.e., organised crime) to prioritise ML cases at a 1/2 workload ratio, but the effectiveness of this instruction was not demonstrated.  In the remaining 145 PPOs, prosecutors manage these cases at a 1/3 workload ratio. If needed, competent authorities can open more specialised units or assign a specialised ML prosecutor on case basis. When ML prosecutors conduct independent investigations alongside ongoing predicate crime inquiries, they co-ordinate closely with the prosecutor handling the predicate offence, obtaining necessary information to complete the laundering investigation. It was not possible to distinguish how many of these prosecutors intervene in during the investigation and prosecution phases. 450. To pursue effective investigations, the public prosecutor selects the appropriate specialized LEAs unit to handle the case and co-ordinates parallel financial investigations strategies through their ML bureaus. Public prosecutors can also request several LEAs to intervene in different enforcement actions based on LEAs competences, resources and expertise to accelerate investigations and ensuring effective enforcement outcomes. a) The TNP has approximately 5 000 officials distributed within different specialised departments on investigating high and medium-high risk predicate offences. Most of them supports the implementation of enforcement actions and special techniques of investigations (i.e., control deliveries, search warrants, wiretapping, etc) in the field upon the prosecutor’s request. Although all specialised departments can produce financial intelligence and/or analysis of the proceeds of crimes, it was not possible to assess the officials’ level of expertise and effectiveness of the parallel financial investigations led by them and if they are sufficient to support the ML investigations needs. The specialised department are as follows: a. TNP KOM is present in all 81 provinces with different degrees of specialisation in combatting criminal proceeds. The department has 17 dedicated officials working in headquarters in Ankara and 293 in the provincial units. However, it is not possible to distinguish the level of expertise of the staff in the production of financial intelligence and/or if they only support operational needs in the field. b. TNP Narcotics oversees complex international investigations related to drug trafficking and the laundering of proceeds from this crime and plays a guiding and co-ordinating role in ML investigations conducted in Türkiye. Although they operate in the 81 provinces, approximately 30 officers are based in headquarters and 120 in the provinces. In addition, this department is supported by other TNP departments that conducts operations in the field in relation to ML and drug trafficking enforcement actions (i.e., control deliveries, search warrants, intelligence, etc) with approximately 3 100 officials supporting this work. In sum, a total of 3 250 officials is dedicated to ML and drug trafficking investigations, but only 5% are dedicated to the production of financial intelligence while the 95% supports operational needs in the field. c. Migrant Smuggling and Border Gates Department operates in the 81 provinces with 148 officials dedicate to ML investigations in headquarters and 151 in the remaining cities. d. Cybercrime Department (TNP Cyber) oversees cybercrime investigations and the proceeds of this crime, particularly investigating illegal betting and cyber-enabled fraud. With a total of 3 198 officials, only 198 (6%) are engaged in ML investigations. However, it was not possible to assess their level of expertise on investigating ML. e. Public Security Department assigned 202 personnel in the Criminal Proceeds Bureau Commands in headquarter and provincial units. b) The GGC organised crime unit (GGC KOM) has 1 404 officials dedicates to conduct ML investigations throughout the rural areas of the country. However, it was not possible to assess the type of support they can provide to public prosecutors. c) The CGC and CE also have responsibilities in investigating ML offences. There are 2 700 officials from the Customs Protection Unit, and 200 officials from the Coast Guard Command but it was not feasible to determine how many of them are ML experts and contributes to supporting ML investigations, limiting their ability to detect and identify cross-border currency movement, high levels of smuggling, and transnational drug trafficking. 451. TNP supports most ML investigations (95%), the GGC only supports a limited number of ML investigations (5%) given their areas of competences as the GGC operates primarily in rural areas. This difference also explains the significant difference between TNP and GGC resources assigned to ML investigations. Both agencies have demonstrated their involvement in investigating large and complex ML cases and have shown strong co-operation when predicate offences occur across both rural and urban areas. In rural regions, ML investigations linked to fraud are primarily managed by the Gendarmerie KOM and the Proceeds of Crime Bureau, while in urban areas, responsibility lies with the TNP KOM. Prosecutors generally adhere to this division of expertise but may involve additional units or form joint investigation teams when needed, for instance, combining TNP KOM with TNP Cyber for cyber-related fraud cases. TNP demonstrates broad range effectiveness of financial investigation techniques to investigate complex case that misuse shell companies’, VAs, PML and TBML. TNP also using digital forensic techniques to trace the asset through investigating social media and instant messaging, also conducting joint operation with multi-foreign counterparts (see IO.2) and requesting information to global VASPs. Other LEAs demonstrate limited extent effectiveness, particularly to investigate complex ML related to drug trafficking and smuggling which is not aligned with country’s risk profile. 452. In addition, there is a limited need for participation of other LEAs when supporting ML investigations mainly due to the scope of their work and procedural mandates. For example, the CGC prevents crimes at sea and immediately informs the competent prosecutor once the case reaches land, enabling co-ordination with TNP or the GGC. However, given the risks of cross-border currency movement and high smuggling levels, as well as transnational drug trafficking, the limited number of investigations initiated by CE and their collaboration with prosecutors remains a concern. Box 7.1. Trade-based ML investigation Sunflower case The investigation started upon a victim denunciation to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in province “A”, which led to investigation for organised aggravated fraud and ML, with foreign links. The Public prosecutor was supported by TNP KOM during the investigation phase. The investigation revealed that the criminal network was targeting businesspeople located in Middle East and European Countries under the guise of marketing sunflower seed oil to attract foreign investments. Although these companies had no registered activities, suspects working as customs brokers issued false documents and bills of lading. Even after the judicial investigation started, the organisation established a new company at the same address under a different name. The organisation’s leader, S.Y., concealed the control of these companies by registering himself as a worker while remaining the true beneficial owner. The laundering process was equally sophisticated: suspect B.A. converted funds into VAs through VASP and transferred them abroad to obscure the tracing of the proceeds, while others, like Y.K. and M.T., funnelled thousands of euros (approximately 4 100) through payment institutions to also obscure the tracing of assets. The fraud’s proceeds moved through layers of FI accounts by company managers and where then transferred to third-party owned accounts. To then been transferred to jewellers’ who purchase physical gold and luxury watches to integrate the illicit funds. Results of the investigation In 2023, simultaneous operations were launched in 5 provinces under the co-ordination of the Chief Prosecutor in province A, leading to the arrest of 49 suspects and the seizure of numerous physical and digital materials incorporated as evidence during the ongoing prosecution. A total of EUR 6 M is estimated to have been laundered by organisation, from which approximately EUR 2.5 M were seized along with 20 grams of gold, luxury brand watched, real state and luxury vehicles. 453. Prosecutors may also request information, documents, and expertise from other institutions to ensure comprehensive case handling. When conducting PFIs in complex ML cases, public prosecutors generally request MASAK to provide financial intelligence and analysis. Both LEAs and prosecutors have highlighted the quality and importance of MASAK’s reports when targeting ML networks with international connections. In addition, when the complexity of the case requires it, FIU officials has been assigned to work jointly with LEAs in the financial analysis of an investigation. Although this demonstrates a solid co-ordination among Türkiye’s operational authorities, including the robust request of financial intelligence and analysis to MASAK, this also indicates a more limited ability for LEAs to independently analyse financial information when conducting parallel financial investigations in relation to complex ML cases. 454. Türkiye investigate cases with foreign links to a large extent. However, its investigative capacity remains more limited in relation to complex ML activities involving professional, cross‑border movements, particularly those associated with drug trafficking and smuggling. Due to the robust financial information collected by the competent authorities, in case the domestic criminal activity or assets are detected within Türkiye’s borders, competent authorities use all investigations tools available to disrupt the ML activity and have demonstrated good results in disrupting organised crime structures operating in several jurisdictions. Box 7.2. ML investigation triggered by a foreign predicate offence Operation Comanchero. Operation Comanchero, launched in November 2023, was a co-ordinated operation across eight cities, led by the TNP Counter Narcotics Department with support from city A Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, MASAK, and city A Police. The operation targeted the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds and involved high-profile suspects: nine individuals wanted internationally under INTERPOL Red Notices and another nine under Blue Notices. These suspects were linked to serious crimes, including drug trafficking, organised crime, money laundering, obstruction of justice, armed robbery, arson, and even murder. The criminal organisation was led by Mr. A, a double national (Turkish and Australian) who was listed in Australia’s most-wanted list. The ML investigation was triggered by open-source research initiated by MASAK (FIU) upon an EGMONT request on the links between the international motorcycle gang “Comanchero” and their business in Türkiye. The financial intelligence and analysis conducted by the FIU revealed that majority of proceeds from drug trafficking were deposited into the banking system as cash (in foreign currencies or as gold coins) and were used for purchasing properties and motor vehicles, transferred for funding shell companies or individuals. They also transferred funds through VASP. Moreover, some of the organisations where only involved in the provision of technical assistance in the laundering process as professional launderers (lawyer, financial consultant). MASAK disseminated a financial analysis report (FAR) to city A Chief Public Prosecutor Office, city A Police and the TNP Counter Narcotics Department, including the financial profile of 55 individuals and 22 companies. To deepen the investigation, a Joint Investigation Team was established, comprising inspectors from the Social Security Agency, Tax Inspection Board, Customs, and FIU experts. Their mandate was to uncover links between suspects and companies, analyse digital evidence, and identify laundering activities. These efforts revealed a broader financial network, significantly expanding the scope of the investigation. In parallel with the financial investigation, authorities uncovered strong connections to large-scale drug trafficking operations. Australian and Turkish judicial authorities held five co-ordination meetings, and a formal request was made to transfer the lawsuit related to the predicate offence tied to the Australian “Comanchero” operation. The information exchanges have been made with 25 countries, Evidence revealed that the criminal organisation, led by Mr. A, orchestrated the transport of drugs sourced from Türkiye and South America to destinations including Australia, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong, China, using transit routes through South Korea and South Africa. Between 2018- 2021, LEAs seized approximately 4 000 kilograms of narcotics—cocaine, methamphetamine, and ecstasy—linked to this network, underscoring the transnational scale and severity of the underlying criminal activity. Results of the Investigation Assets pertaining to 55 people including professional launderers and domestically or internationally wanted persons were seized and 44 people were arrested by the decision of city A 3rd Criminal Court of Peace. The prosecution is ongoing. i Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 455. Türkiye progressively incremented the number of ML investigations since its last MER in 2019. Between 2021-2025, Türkiye opened approximately 23 184 ML investigations, with a significant surge in 2024 (33%) and 2025 (43%). However, given Türkiye’s contextual and material factors (i.e., size of the financial sector, geographical position as a transit hub, the extent of cash based, and size of informal economy), ML investigations, prosecutions, and convictions in high-risk areas other than fraud (i.e., professional, misuse of legal person, and cross-border movement) (see IO.1) is more limited. 456. Fraud (including aggravated fraud) is the most relevant predicate offences of ML with total 16 586 cases (80%), followed by a low number of investigation in other high and medium risk predicate offences, such as illegal betting with 1 428 (7%), drug trafficking with 1 267 cases (13%), customs smuggling with 590 cases (3%) which is not aligned with the country’s risk profile. Table 7.2. ML investigation files (2021-2025)* Year ML Files Suspects Offences charged 2021 514 2168 2595 2022 1585 5335 6541 2023 3469 8969 10662 2024 7700 14650 16601 2025** 9916 18531 22930 Total 23184 49653 59329 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 457. Türkiye identifies different type of ML activity while conducting investigations, being self-laundering (48%) and third-party money laundering (35%) the most predominant ones in line with the country risk profile, including effective stand-alone ML related to illegal betting. However, the reviewed case studies demonstrate a limited extent of stand‑alone ML investigations related to fraud and other predicate offences, notwithstanding the country’s risk profile as a hub or destination for the transfer of proceeds of crime derived from foreign predicate offences. Table 7.3. ML investigations disaggregated per type of ML offence (2021-2025)* Year Third-party ML Self-laundering Self-laundering and third-party ML Foreign predicate offence Total investigations/year 2021 856 1373 316 50 2595 2022 3060 2740 516 225 6541 2023 3865 5817 744 236 10662 2024 2973 3908 2504 72 9457 2025** 3554 5359 2558 67 11538 Total 14308 19197 6638 650 40793 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 458. Türkiye demonstrates positive development on numerous complex ML and transnational cases, except ML activities that involve professional ML and cross-border currency movement, which resulted in numerous arrests, disruption of large networks. Notwithstanding the robust international co-operation, competent authorities face challenges to secure and recover assets located abroad (see IO.8). Despite these efforts, improvements in investigations involving cross border cash movement, unlicensed intermediaries (i.e., hawala, foreign exchanges), and misuse of legal persons that include facilitation by accounting and legal professionals are also needed. Although fraud, drug trafficking, and smuggling are assessed as high or medium-risk predicate offences, public prosecutors and LEAs face challenges in tracing crime proceeds due to limited understanding of complex laundering methods such as cash smuggling, professional money laundering networks, hawala, and foreign exchange operations. This gap is particularly significant given Türkiye’s role as a transit hub for global financial flows (see IO.1). Footnotes [31] Ankara, Antalya, Adana, Bakırköy, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Istanbul Anatolia, Izmir, Kayseri, Konya, Küçükçekmece, Mersin and Şanlıurfa. [32] Batı, Denizli, Eskişehir, Gebze, Karşıyaka, Kocaeli, Mardin, Sakarya, Van, Büyükçekmece." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.1.1. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 579. TFS pursuant to UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions are not immediately enforceable in Türkiye upon UN designation. The process takes on average two and a half days for TFS to be enforceable in Türkiye, even though it represents a significant improvement from the estimated 33 transposition days in Türkiye 2019 MER, TF TFS related to UNSCRs 1267 and successors are not always implemented without delay. 580. When the UNSCRs 1267 and 1988 lists are updated, MASAK is notified without delay, both directly via the distribution list of the UN and via a formal letter from Türkiye’s Permanent Representation at the UN. Upon receipt of the notification, MASAK notifies the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye via a formal letter signed by the MoTF  to which a draft Presidential Decree is attached, this process also takes place without delay. Upon signature by the President of the Republic of Türkiye, the Presidential Decree is published in the Official Gazette and becomes enforceable. Since 2021, Türkiye has been able to implement this process without delay in some instances for TF TFS under the 1267 regime. Yet, the process takes place on an average of 2.5 days (see table below). The time required for the Presidential Decree to be formally signed is the main reason for the delay in the implementation. Box 10.1. Infographic on TFS implementation Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 581. Türkiye can apply mitigating measures to address to some extent the delay in the legal enforcement of TFS under UNSCR 1267 regime. Prior to sending listings decision to the Presidency for ratification, MASAK identifies potential funds or assets and verify possible occurrences or links within Türkiye. If such funds or assets are found, the MoTF can postpone the transactions on the targeted funds and assets for seven working days (Law 5549, art. 19/A) even before the formal ratification of the Presidential decree implementing TFS would have occurred. However, as no matches were found over the reporting period, this mechanism has not been resorted to over the reporting period. This mechanism also relies on competent authorities’ ability to identify potential funds or assets subject to UN freezing which can take time and would not automatically lead to the freezing of funds and assets by reporting entities without delay. 582. Türkiye proposes individuals or entities to the UNSC 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation via Presidential Decree. The TFS Assessment Commission – chaired by MASAK and composed of relevant competent authorities (Presidency, National Intelligence, MoFA, MoI, MoJ, MoTF) – is the competent authority in charge to propose the names to President of the Republic of Türkiye. During the reporting period, five Presidential Decrees were issued in Türkiye, authorising the submission of proposals to the UNSC for the listing of a total of 32 individuals under relevant sanctions regimes, with 14 of those proposals being co-sponsored by a UNSC member, with one leading to a UNSC listing. [41] 10.1.2. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 583. Türkiye has a robust framework and process for listing individuals and entities to its domestic designation list and resorts to this tool to a large extent. The procedures and criteria for designation and de-listing are outlined in Law 6415 and are based on reasonable grounds that a person or entity has committed TF related acts (see Rec 6). Within this framework, MASAK is in charge of preparing a report based on its own intelligence or collected by other LEAs. The report is reviewed by the TFS Assessment Commission which is the authority in charge of proposing domestic listings that have to be co-signed by the MoTF and the MoJ. Once the decision is issued in the Official Gazette, it is immediately enforced and submitted, within 48 hours, to the Ankara High Criminal Court for judicial approval. The court reviews the decision in terms of the existence of reasonable grounds and must issue a ruling within five days, either upholding or revoking the asset freezing measure. 584. The Assessment Commission is responsible for reassessing the existence of reasonable grounds at intervals not exceeding six 6 months and submits its recommendation to the relevant ministers. In addition, relevant parties may request the lifting of an asset freezing decision. These requests are reviewed by the Commission and its recommendations are submitted to the Ministers. If the request is deemed unjustified, it is forwarded to the competent court for a decision on whether to maintain or lift the asset freezing measure. 585. Over the reporting period, Türkiye has made use of its domestic regime and adopted asset freezing measures following requests from foreign countries in line with its risk profile. Between 2021 and June 2025, under Türkiye’s domestic freezing mechanism, a total of 19 Presidential Decrees were issued, resulting in the asset freezing of 1 377 natural persons and 87 legal entities, with 325 freezing related to UN designated terrorist organisations. 586. Asset freezing requests received from foreign countries are also evaluated by the Assessment Commission but finalised by Presidential Decree. In this framework, countries having information regarding targets that might meet the designation threshold (reasonable grounds) submit their request. MASAK prepares a report on this case enriched by relevant information from its own data sources and other relevant competent authorities. This report is then submitted to the Assessment Commission which can propose adoption of listing measures to the Presidency. 587. Among those 1 434 assets freezing decisions, 62 individuals and 8 legal entities had their assets frozen in Türkiye following requests submitted by two foreign countries. As for rejected foreign requests, the average response time for notification to the relevant country is 8 months. Situations requiring additional information to be provided by the requesting country, may lead to an extension of the evaluation period. Box 10.2. Joint designations with a foreign country Within the framework of the joint mechanism established with the US to prevent the TF, five individuals and two legal entities have been identified for transferring funds to ISIL members and their families. The assets of the individuals and legal entities were frozen simultaneously in 2023 (1). Subsequently, five individuals whose assets were frozen as a result of denunciation were convicted of TF offences, while a confiscation order was issued against one legal entity. In 2023 (2), the assets of two other individuals alleged to have facilitated ISIL financing activities in conflict zones were frozen as part of joint efforts with the US and an indictment was issued against one of the individuals for TF offences. In 2024 (3), the assets of three foreign individuals alleged to have carried out educational and logistical activities in Türkiye were frozen. These individuals were found to have links to those who carried out the 2024 attack on a church in Sarıyer. Criminal denunciations were filed against the three individuals and two of them have been convicted of membership in a terrorist organization, while one had been acquitted of the same charge. Source: (1) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1181 (2) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1456 (3) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2406 588. Designations are published in the Official Gazette and by law MASAK has to inform competent authorities as well as natural and legal persons to whom notification is deemed necessary. Decisions are communicated on MASAK website and via an e-notification system with banks and most financial institutions. Clear guidance to FIs and other persons or entities, including DNFBPs that may be holding targeted funds or other assets, on their obligations to take freezing action is also available on MASAK website. 589. In order to immediately block any potential financial activity following an asset-freezing decision updates in the lists are securely shared with FIs several hours prior to publication in the Official Gazette. Upon issuance of the freezing order, all bank accounts, debit and credit cards, e-money accounts, and virtual assets belonging to the designated individuals have to be blocked. 590. Natural and legal persons, as well as public institutions and organisations, are required to inform MASAK of any “asset records” within 7 days, upon the notification of the freezing decision. In practice, this delay could impede competent authorities to become aware of the frozen assets in a timely manner and take appropriate actions. In addition, designated individuals and entities are required to inform MASAK of all other assets, and natural and legal persons who are in claim or debt relationship with those about whom decision on freezing of asset has been made and shall also inform MASAK of the amount of the claim or debt within 30 days of publication of the freezing decision. This has happened in practice in relation to the individuals listed under the UNSC 1267/1988 regime and whose assets have been identified and frozen in Türkiye. Footnotes [41] Türkiye submitted the proposal during the reporting period (2024), the UNSC designation occurred on 26 March 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="212. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit have a generally strong understanding of the ML risks they are exposed to. The main identified ML threats for the highest risk sectors (banks, VASPS, and MVTS, and to a lesser extent exchange offices) are in line with the main predicate offences of the NRA, namely fraud, illegal betting and gambling. Understanding of TF risks is more uneven, while banks (representing more than 75% of the sector) have a good understanding, other FIs and VASPs have a more limited understanding, mainly considering TF risks in the scope of targeted financial sanctions. Also, the low levels of TF STR reporting across several other higher-risk sectors - particularly MVTS, exchange offices, and VASPs - indicate an uneven understanding of TF risks. 213. Representatives of the Turkish banking sector met during the onsite demonstrated a good understanding of specific ML/TF risks their institution is exposed to, as well as related mitigation measures. This understanding has been supported by the work conducted by the Risk Analysis WG, gathering competent authorities and representatives of the private sector (see above) including the banks association of Türkiye. The WG identified inherent risks across almost forty distinct products and services and the related mitigated measures adopted by banks. This also supports the implementation of a risk-based approach by banks, while higher-risk products (e.g., third-party payments, cardless transactions, banking services for VASPs and payment institutions) receive more intensive measures, lower-risk are subject to fewer controls. 214. VASPs met during the onsite despite their more recent entry in the market, also demonstrated an overall solid understanding of their ML risks. There was some variation in the depth of understanding, with larger and more established entities demonstrating a more comprehensive grasp compared to smaller and recently established ones. The differences were more pronounced for TF risks, with the larger entity identifying those while others having a much more limited understanding, which is somehow concerning, considering the sector high exposure. 215. Among other FIs, understanding of ML risks is uneven. Across sector, larger institutions generally have a deeper understanding of these risks while others focus on risk mitigation measures rather than the inherent risks their sector and institution are exposed to. The fact that all institutions were able to describe risk mitigation measures indicates a general awareness of ML threats even if not always articulated as such by FIs representatives. 216. The understanding of TF risk among FIs – except for banks - is more limited and mainly considered within the scope of targeted financial sanctions. Banks, which represent the largest and most materially significant part of the financial system, demonstrated a generally more developed understanding of TF risks. This is more concerning for MVTS and exchange offices. While TF risk exposure may vary across entities depending on size, business models and products offered, TF‑related vulnerabilities identified in these sectors in Türkiye’s context, and the uneven understanding of TF risks observed during on‑site discussions, increase their susceptibility to misuse. This concern is further supported by the NRA, which recognises TF risks in both the exchange office and MVTS sectors, including cases where terrorist organisations have abused these sectors. Competent authorities indicated that, while such cases exist, they are limited in number. MASAK has undertaken a range of initiatives in recent years to strengthen the private sector’s understanding of TF risks—including workshops, updated guidance documents and TF typologies. However, these measures have not yet translated into a corresponding improvement in the practical understanding of TF risks among FIs, except for banks, and some larger VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 426. Türkiye’s competent authorities have close formal and informal co-operation mechanisms in place to exchange financial intelligence and other relevant information to pursue ML/TF investigations and prosecutions. Through different case studies, public prosecutors, LEAs (in particular, TNP and GGC) and MASAK have demonstrated to formally share information on daily basis through the UYAP system but also through case-specific strategy co-ordination round tables. Close ad hoc and formal interagency co-operation mechanisms between MASAK and competent authorities have proven to facilitate the exchange of financial intelligence leading to the disruption of large criminal networks and high-impact outcomes on investigations. 427. Due to MASAK’s pivotal role in the AML/CFT/CPF system, they received 9 600 information sharing requests and fulfilled 5 628 (59%) between 2020 and2025. From which, the majority corresponds to information sharing requests from public prosecutors (41%), TNP (24%) and other ministries (12%), indicating the fluid interagency exchange of information for operational purposes. MASAK’s prioritises TF and urgent operations requests but also has an established prioritisation system based on the risk country profile. All competent authorities highlighted the role, quality and timing of MASAK’s responses as adding great value to pursue complex ML/TF/PF investigations including with transnational element. Table 6.9. MASAK’s number of initiated and fulfilled information sharing requests (2020-2025) Requesting competent authority 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Initiated* fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled PPO 479 237 1804 370 280 277 318 193 412 262 671 308 Ministries 123 209 189 287 145 275 181 222 161 205 130 203 TNP 269 99 287 110 342 124 437 115 523 151 428 86 Courts 50 72 344 181 90 120 34 48 44 89 62 81 TIB 16 11 19 43 22 41 18 16 12 31 21 50 CMB 76 21 129 24 125 65 93 52 72 13 31 5 CBRT 8 13 18 16 16 20 14 21 22 33 23 44 Customs Enforcement 2 2 18 16 15 50 7 16 1 3 2 5 GGC 11 0 11 4 16 9 32 5 42 21 39 7 BRSA 12 20 15 6 12 1 6 7 8 4 3 3 Other 36 71 85 95 139 130 155 93 179 103 216 114 Total 1082 755 2919 1152 1202 1112 1295 788 1476 915 1626 906 Note: (*) the numbers under the “initiated” category may also include letters received in response to request for information sharing submitted by MASAK to competent authorities; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 428. Through the signature of 32 MoUs, MASAK can directly access other 32 competent authorities’ databases (i.e., TNP, MoI, MoT, MoJ, Risk centre of Banks Association in Türkiye, among others), which also enhances the exchange of information for the development of financial intelligence and creates a robust roster of information. TNP and GGC also have direct access other competent authorities’ databases and information systems such as UYAP, KPS, DERBIS and VBYS Among other LEAs, CE and CGC provide access to information and databases related to their fields of duty within the framework of protocols signed with the relevant institutions. Information is exchanged between institutions thanks to these protocols. 429. All LEAs can form joint task forces for a specific case or an issue. For example, a joint task force has been established under customs to combat fuel smuggling with the involvement of TNP, GGC, and TIB and MASAK. Specialised public prosecutors discuss complex cases with the FIU in daily basis, and all LEAs, prosecutors and MASAK can and do form joint investigation teams for specific cases or the study of an emerging trend. Even MASAK’s officials have been temporarily assigned to work on LEAs offices when the complexity of the case required it. 430. Furthermore, competent authorities can exchange of information with its foreign counterparts either through a liaison officer or secure international IT system (such as Egmont Secure Web), encrypted communication for non-Egmont member, or as members specific operational networks (such as CARIN and INTERPOL). 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 431. To protect the information’s confidentiality, competent authorities exchange the information through encrypted integrated judicial information systems. During investigations, all competent authorities are obliged not to disclose any information attained by FIU staff, examiners and members of CBCFC during their in-service activities. 432. All information subject to dissemination are considered as official documents and are subject to confidentiality measures. Both MASAK and competent authorities apply robust legal, technical, and operational safeguards to ensure that all exchanged information is protected by strict confidentiality and used securely and appropriately. For example, MASAK’s products that are disseminated to the competent authorities through the UYAP system, Recorded Electronic Post System (KEP) and BELGENET, or by post depending on their level of importance. Furthermore, the FIU keeps its IT systems up to date to prevent leaks of information and have also established protocols to exchange information with FIs and DNFBPs supervisory authorities, which has been certified through TS ISO/IEC 27001, including physical environment and data security. MASAK stores data in both the database and an isolated network infrastructure and have established a disaster recovery program with high security protocol. 433. MASAK secures the information based on three pillars: a) Information security processes: established information security policies to protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets, supported by ISO 27001-based risk management, continuity plans, and awareness activities. A multi-layered security approach was implemented, including user authentication, IT infrastructure protection, network security, and continuous monitoring and audits. b) Security of physical environments: access to IT areas and the data centre is strictly controlled through ID cards, face recognition, and supervision, with all entries recorded. The data centre is secured with physical barriers, fire protection, environmental monitoring, redundant systems, and a separate business continuity site. Confidential documents are locked, visitor access is restricted, and personnel follow Clean Desk policies, ensuring security and operational continuity. c) Data security: the access to information is categorised and limited based on functional groups and departmental hierarchy, ensuring role-specific permissions and controlled workflows. Information sharing is secured through electronic systems like KEP, MOS, BELGENET, and ESW, with strict confidentiality protocols. Encryption using symmetric and public keys protects data integrity during exchanges with judicial authorities and FIUs. Other additional security measures include closing USB ports, administrator-controlled file transfers, and monitored personal folders for secure internal and external sharing. 434. Other competent authorities can request information from MASAK data base through the UYAP system, which contains encryptions features to guarantee the confidentiality when transmitting the information. However, it is not clear how the information is preserved once disseminated to other authorities. 435. All competent authorities involved in joint investigation processes adhere to the correspondence procedures outlined within the scope of the Regulation on the Procedure of Official Correspondence. The institutions constituting the task force distribute the information and documents they have prepared as hard copies or soft copies based on confidentiality levels, and in addition, the relevant institutions are required to carry out the necessary IT infrastructure for the protection of this information and documents." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="464. Türkiye applies average 4-years 4 months imprisonment for natural persons convicted with ML charges which is considered effective, proportionate, and dissuasive in general. However, the low application of criminal sanctions on complex ML cases, including the involvement of professional money launderers, and in those related to organised crime undermines the overall dissuasiveness of the sanction framework. Table 7.6. Sentences applied to natural persons for ML offences (2020-2025) Type of sentence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* Total Ratio on type of sentences applied Fines only 5 - 1 25 4 4 39 4% 0-3 years of imprisonment 16 26 27 61 143 321 594 58% &gt;3- 5 years of imprisonment 11 22 22 21 92 47 215 21% &gt;5-10 years of imprisonment 29 2 61 29 14 13 148 15% &gt;10 years of imprisonment - 11 5 2 - 6 24 2% Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 465. In accordance with the principle of personal liability for criminal penalties, Türkiye cannot apply criminal sanctions to legal persons, but is able to apply administrative sanctions (i.e., confiscation measures, appointment of receivers, license revocation or cancellation, fines, among others). Türkiye has demonstrated the application of administrative sanctions (14 receivers’ appointments, 6 licenses revocation or cancellation, and 13 seizure measures) to 18 legal persons, such as, payment institutions, a bank, a VASP, a licensed betting platform and a media company through case studies. Although this demonstrates Türkiye’s ability to implement sanctions to legal persons, the number of sanctions applied is neither dissuasive nor commensurate with the country risk profile given the increasing use of professional money launderers, the multi-layered ML schemes, including through the creation of shell companies, cargo and logistics companies, and exchange offices facilitating ML activities (see IO.1). The lack of clear and systemic implementation of administrative sanctions and fines to legal persons negatively affects the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 217. Generally, FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and applying CDD supported by electronical automated system. CDD are performed regularly, the frequency of customer profile’s review follows a RBA. It is typically conducted every year for high risks clients, every two to three years for medium risks and every four to five years for lower risks clients. Those reviews are often supported by the use of electronical tool including artificial intelligence (AI), allowing for a modular approach taking into account several risk parameters at the same time: client risk profile but also typologies of transactions or specific jurisdictions. Those tools allow entities to adapt their monitoring by taking into consideration a wide range of indicators, analyse cross-cutting data to cope with emerging and evolving risks and also identify triggering scenarios even for lower risk customers. 218. Certain sectors, specifically exchange offices, MVTS, and VASPs, have a higher incidence of CDD deficiencies compared to banks and other FIs. While the number of CDD deficiencies has decreased over the reporting period for most sectors, a continued identification of a high number of breaches has been observed among exchange offices. 219. VASPs mostly resort to virtual know your customer (KYC) procedures for onboarding natural persons or Turkish nationals, depending on institutional policy, while in-person onboarding process are conducted for legal persons and/or foreigners. On average, VASP report a low number of clients being legal entities. New customers also have to make their initial deposit via a bank account transfer which allows for further monitoring of their profile. 220. FIs and VASPs demonstrated their general ability to check BO information by resorting to a range of information sources and supported by digital tools. All FIs and VASPs acknowledged challenges in verifying BO information in complex structures but were able to explain the verification sources and channels used. Some FIs, especially banks and VASPs, reported the use of in-house AI program to check BO information, particularly for shareholders below the 10% partnership threshold and when foreign partners are involved. FIs and VASPs do not have direct access to the BO Registry. Instead, they request their customers to provide a QR code that grants access to the customers’ BO information in the BO R registry. Customers also have an obligation to declare any transaction they would conduct on behalf of someone else, and FIs and VASPs apply enhanced monitoring in those cases with some rejecting such activity. Overall, FIs and VASPs demonstrated a sound understanding of basic beneficial ownership concepts. However, while banks exhibit a more developed and structured appreciation of risks linked to foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements, there was variation in the ability of some other FIs and VASPs to describe the measures they take to fulfil their CDD and BO obligations in multi-jurisdictional ownership chains and in more complex interactions involving foreign legal persons, including legal arrangements which do not exist domestically. Such variation may indicate limitations in risk understanding, which in turn may affect the consistency and robustness of the mitigation measures applied. 221. The AT was also made aware of a case in which supervisory authorities identified significant deficiencies regarding a VASP in the context of supervisory activities. In this case, the VASP lacked any real‑time, periodic or automated monitoring, and had no processes to assess whether customer transactions were consistent with the customer’s professional or economic profile. While the VASP addressed the deficiencies identified through supervisory action, this individual case indicates that there may be substantial differences in compliance within the VASP sector. This is particularly relevant in light of the transitional period granted for the implementation of the more stringent regulatory requirements applicable to VASPs and the fact that supervision under the new more stringent regulatory framework has not yet been conducted. 222. Reliance on third party is resorted to a limited extent, mostly by FIs with a broader international remit who take advantage of institutional capacities especially when identifying or verifying foreign customer, for CDD and BO. 223. Record keeping requirements are overall understood and applied, especially with the use of digital tools. Failure to comply with record keeping requirements is an offence in Türkiye, supervisors have filled 11 criminal complaints against FIs and VASPs for such shortcomings over the reporting period. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 224. Most FIs and VASPs have procedures for identifying PEPs, but compliance with this obligation is relatively recent (2022) and remains challenging to some extent. However, as noted in the previous MER (2019, KF c)), FIs had already applied EDD measures to PEPs, their family members and close associates prior to 2022, although these measures were not considered comprehensive at the time. FIs and VASPs ask customers about their principal occupation or employment and resort to commercial databases and open sources information to identify PEPs and their relatives. Those tools present limitation especially in the identification of PEPs closes relatives and associates and none of the entity met onsite reported to directly ask their customer whether they are considered as a PEP or a relative. In addition, some FIs have limited awareness that close associates include not only relatives but also individuals with social or professional ties to a PEP. Main FIs and VASPs, especially those belonging to international groups, demonstrate a better ability to detect PEPs, including foreign ones. 225. However, only half of the EOs declared to have procedures for identifying PEPs, which severely impacts the sector’s ability to identify PEPs. This is to a large extent explained by the regulatory framework, under which Group B exchange offices - which constitute approximately 78% of all EOs and are typically smaller entities - are not required to establish formal written procedures. However, the absence of a legal requirement for Group B Eos to establish formalised, documented procedures for identifying and reviewing PEPs, combined with the fact that in practice only around half of all exchange offices have such procedures, significantly weakens the sector’s overall capacity to comply with PEP‑related obligations. Although the exclusive compliance officers appointed by Group B exchange offices carry out risk management, monitoring and control activities to some extent even without clear written procedures, the lack of documented and standardised processes means that there is no assurance that Group B exchange offices can consistently detect higher‑risk customers or comply reliably with EDD requirements (including PEP‑related requirements). Without clear and documented procedures, it cannot be ensured that EDD obligations are implemented effectively and uniformly across Group B exchange offices. 226. While a limited number of other FIs and VASPs do not have clear procedures for the identification and review of PEPs, discussions held during the onsite visit indicated limitations in the practical identification of PEP customers by some of the entities met. This points to shortcomings in the effectiveness of PEP identification measures in practice. While MASAK’s PEP guidance outlines methods to identify PEPs, family members, and close associates, it does not provide examples of prominent public functions considered PEPs in Türkiye. 227. Banks have a good understanding and take appropriate mitigating measures in relation to correspondent banking relationship. They have an institutional policy defining how to operate and high-risk jurisdictions and entities defined at the group level. Even though those policies can differ among financial institutions, they include high-risk jurisdictions as identified by the FATF. There is also an automated monitoring of open-source information monitoring potential adverse media reports, allowing to take appropriate measures as needed towards identified entities. Banks widely reported the systematic involvement of compliance units for transactions with entities located in high-risk jurisdictions or entities considered as presenting a higher risk. None of the banks met during the onsite offered payable-through accounts. 228. Banks and MVTSs are also taking enhanced measures to monitor the use of higher risk products such as prepaid card services. Entities run scenario alerts daily, monthly and quarterly, and review their criteria on an ongoing basis to monitor such products with the implementation of EDD measures. 229. Despite the recent implementation of travel rule obligations in Türkiye (December 2024), VASPs met during the onsite demonstrated a strong understanding of those requirements. Certain VASPs reported to have their own institutional policy which goes beyond legal requirements and to refuse transfers with entities that do not comply with the travel rule requirements. VASPs also compel clients’ declaration regarding the beneficiary/originator of the VA transfer and trace transactions through blockchain analytic tools. TUBITAK is currently developing tools to support VASPs complying with travel rule obligations and VASPs met during the onsite highlighted the positive expected impact of such initiative. Enhanced controls are applied to transactions involving hot wallets connected to certain jurisdictions. In these cases, the transaction is automatically flagged and the entity must complete an additional step to validate it. VASPs reported that transactions involving mixers or unhosted wallets are generally not accepted and returned to the originator There is also a daily withdrawal threshold of approx. EUR 2 500 and a monthly threshold of EUR 42 000 allowing to amount transferred. 230. FIs and VASPs have also adopted specific measures to address risks arising from new technologies. The implementation of controls for new technologies is particularly strong among highest risk sectors. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 231. Overall, FIs and VASPs have a general sound understanding of their STRs obligations. Between 2020 and 2024, suspicious transaction reporting has significantly increased by approximately 130%, with all sectors increasing their reporting demonstrating an enhanced compliance over the reporting period. In 2024, 98% of STRs were submitted by banks, MVTS and VASPs, which is in line with those sectors risk profile. EOs, assessed as presenting medium‑high risk, reported a marked increase in STRs between 2020 and 2024 (approximately 115%), with volumes peaking in 2023. Nevertheless, in 2024, Eos accounted for just over 1% of all STRs submitted. 232. FIs and VASPs are also aware of their obligations to report suspicion in a timely manner and reporting occurs within a couple of days, with immediate reporting for TF suspicion. Most entities use software to monitor suspicious activities, including AI, to better monitor typologies matching higher risk scenarios. However, the AT also noted that supervisory authorities have identified material weaknesses in some VASPs’ implementation of STR reporting obligations, with significant gaps in monitoring and detection practices (which were later addressed by the VASP in question) indicating uneven compliance across the sector. STRs are broadly in line with main predicate offences, fraud and illegal betting and gambling are the most identified and reported suspicious activities (see IO.6). 233. FIs and VASPs are generally aware that multiple reporting on a single suspicion is possible and whenever there is doubt on the nature of the suspicion, entities confirmed that they report on both ML and TF. However, except for banks, most FIs report suspicious activities related to TF to a limited extent, which is in line with their more limited understanding of TF risks described above. While banks account for the majority of TF‑related STRs in absolute terms, the overall volumes remain somewhat modest when viewed in light of the central role of the banking sector in Türkiye’s TF risk context. The nexus with a terrorist organisation remains the main criterion for reporting entities to consider that a case could present a TF suspicion, which limits the scope of potential TF detection. For exchange offices, this finding is coupled with the information that entities met onsite indicated that EDD measures are more frequently identified once transaction‑value thresholds are reached. This reliance on value‑based triggers may limit the detection of TF cases involving low-amounts transactions, especially in light of the sector exposure to TF. Box 3.3. VASP TF suspicion case study As part of its monitoring activities, a VASP was made aware that a terrorist organisation posted on social media the links to three wallet address to receive funds. The VASP identified its clients conducting transactions with those wallets and filled TF STRs. As a result, foreign nationals were identified and designated by Türkiye under its domestic TF TFS regime. 234. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations related to tipping off. To prevent potential tipping off, most entities conduct trainings to their staff, with specific in-person trainings for the personnel most involved in commercial relations with clients. Reporting entities considered that MASAK’s trainings have effectively supported further awareness of this obligation. Table 3.5. STRs for FIs and VASPs Institutions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Banks 182 828 205 793 314 700 432 499 349 988 235 358 1 721 166 VASPs 0 2 233 20 569 48 678 63 603 53 490 188 573 MVTs 46 840 284 544 74 513 102 776 110 949 101 897 721 519 EOs 2 660 4 500 6 188 9 108 5 726 4 315 32 497 Capital Market Sector 368 692 595 897 1 218 1 088 4 858 NBFIs 2 070 3 286 4 073 3 921 5 790 5 021 24 161 Insurance 361 404 496 529 747 674 3 211 Precious Metals Intermediary 0 0 0 0 1392 717 2 109 Total 235 127 501 452 421 134 598 408 539 413 402 560 2 698094 Table 3.6. TF STRs for FIs and VASPs Institutions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025* Total Banks 1 460 2 067 1 374 2 535 1 950 1 311 10 697 EOs 0 1 9 6 44 27 87 VASPs 0 40 411 368 577 500 1 896 MVTS 158 403 937 938 930 1 381 4 747 Note: *as of November 2025. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 235. FIs and VASPs generally demonstrate a strong understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and have established internal controls and procedures appropriate to their business activities. Entities, especially in the highest risk sectors, have a developed AML/CFT culture, reviewing their compliance policies annually or at least every 1–3 years and have formal procedures in place to support these policies, with coverage rates above 90% across most sectors. This is in line with supervisory findings, especially in the banking sector where infringement to AML/CFT requirements have steadily decreased over the reporting period. 236. While most FIs and VASPs have dedicated units to assess compliance risks, the presence of such units is significantly less consistent among EOs– which are in essence much smaller actors yet considered as medium-high risk. Türkiye’s framework applies a risk-based approach that differentiates EOs by size and business activities. Under this approach, the obligation to assign compliance officers and establish a compliance programme applies only to larger exchange offices (Group A), while smaller exchange offices (Group B) must appoint an exclusively designated compliance officer; however, they are not required to implement a compliance programme, despite the sector being assessed as medium‑high risk. As there is no mandatory requirement for compliance programs for Group B EOs, the coverage and sophistication of compliance controls remain uneven, particularly among smaller entities. While the NRA identifies risk‑reducing factors for Group B EOs relating to limitations in activities and lower business volumes, it also notes that the lack of a requirement to employ an internal control officer constitutes a risk‑increasing factor. At the same time, although the authorities consider that Group B exchange offices are typically less exposed to ML/TF risks, weaknesses in internal control arrangements limit the effective and consistent implementation of AML/CFT controls within a sector assessed overall as medium‑high risk. 237. Training and certification programs for compliance staff are widely implemented, except among exchange offices, and regular measurement and evaluation of training activities are reported by FIs and VASPS to a large extent. 238. Overall, FIs and VASPs have internal controls, procedures, and audit mechanisms in place especially for the highest risks sectors but to a lesser extent for EOs. . For EOs, these differences reflect the fact that Group B entities are not subject to the same legal requirements as Group A EOs. Internal audits under AML/CFT legislation are conducted at least annually by the vast majority of institutions while periodic independent audit services are also resorted to, though with more variation. Where applicable, group-level internal controls and audit requirements are implemented, despite some variation depending on the sector and group structure. 239. However, supervisors also reported that one of the common shortcomings for FIs and VASPs, is the minimal amount of resources allocated to the compliance units in comparison with other units and in light of the entities size and materiality. For more recent entities, especially VASPs, and smaller actors, MVTS and EOs, this may constitute a contributing background factor to the still elevated number of identified shortcomings with AML/CFT obligations, especially on CDD and to a lesser extent STR requirements (see 3.6). 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 240. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Türkiye." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Türkiye applies alternative measures when securing a ML conviction is not feasible, provided evidentiary standards are met (e.g., pursuing tax evasion or other predicate offences). 467. When it is not possible to reach a ML conviction, Türkiye applies laundering of stolen goods charges (art. 165) to secure a conviction and tax evasion charges. Article 165 serves as a practical mechanism to criminalise laundering activities, applying a “probable cause” evidentiary standard. Under this provision, individuals can face criminal penalties for simply selling, transferring, purchasing, or accepting criminal property without the need to prove specific intent. Between 2021 and 2025, 23 266 convictions were secured under Article 165. 468. Türkiye also employs tax evasion measures as an alternative measure and presented a case example where this was applied in the context of forged documents. However, despite initiating over 220 664 investigations and 146 808 prosecutions for tax evasion between 2020 and 2025, resulting in approximately 91 285 convictions, authorities have not demonstrated how these cases function as an alternative for ML convictions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="132. Since the 2019 MER, Türkiye has enhanced its mechanisms for inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination for AML/CFT operational purposes. Türkiye maintains a structured and functioning co-ordination system, anchored in the AML/CFT Strategy and Action Plan, and reinforced through a network of dedicated working groups and inter-ministerial forums. The Threat Working Group—comprising the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Trade, Treasury and Finance, Environment and Urbanization, and law enforcement agencies (TNP, GGC, and Coast Guard)—serves as a standing operational co-ordination forum for emerging threats. The Case Working Group, established in 2021, follows up on complex ML/TF cases and supports FATF-related submissions, having convened 25 times since its inception. Moreover, high-level and practitioner-level co-ordination meetings, many led by Deputy Ministers from the Ministries of Treasury and Finance (MoTF), MoJ, MoI , MoT, and MoFA, have institutionalised co-operation on legislative alignment, case management, statistics, and operational improvements. 133. FIUs co-operation with LEAs has also become more operationally focused. FIU–LEA feedback mechanisms are now formalised through protocols and operationalised via the working groups. LEAs are required to report on follow-up actions stemming from FIU disseminations, and the FIU has increased the volume of joint trainings and typology-based workshops with public prosecutors and LEAs since 2023, promoting two-way information flow. The NRA is now fully integrated into operational decision-making, as evidenced by the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 155/1 (2021), updates to financial investigation and supervision guidelines, and the use of NRA results in prioritising investigations and prosecutions. These developments collectively demonstrate an improvement in Türkiye’s ability to co-ordinate and co-operate for operational purposes. 134. Co-ordination relies heavily on MASAK for financial analysis in complex cases, indicating more limited capacity within LEAs to independently conduct PFIs. In addition, co-ordination is uneven across authorities, with more limited operational contribution from agencies such as Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard, particularly in higher-risk areas such as cross-border currency movements, smuggling and the informal economy, which affects the overall effectiveness of co-ordinated responses in these areas. Moreover, while co-ordination has matured around the highest-risk areas identified in the NRA (organised crime, fraud, and illegal betting), cross-cutting systemic risks—such as those linked to the informal economy—require stronger operational co-operation. The Action Plan for Combating the Informal Economy (2023–2025) provides a solid policy basis, but its operational implementation, especially among fiscal, trade, and enforcement authorities, remains less advanced compared to case-based co-operation. 135. Türkiye also demonstrates strong and well-institutionalised operational co-ordination for TF. Public prosecutors play a central co-ordinating role within Türkiye’s operational framework, supported by specialised LEAs, MASAK and intelligence agencies, with the systematic application of parallel financial inquiries in terrorism cases. Co-ordination is further strengthened through extensive information-sharing mechanisms, integrated databases (e.g. UYAP), and the use of ad hoc joint investigation teams. Competent authorities make use of a wide range of domestic and international information sources, and operational co-operation is supported by specialised units, regular inter-agency engagement and strong data integration capabilities, enabling timely detection and co-ordinated investigative responses. Operational co-ordination is generally effective, particularly in cases involving domestically designated and UNSCR-listed terrorist organisations but could be strengthened for more complex TF typologies. In addition, co-ordination across all relevant authorities, including those with responsibilities in cross-border and trade-related contexts, could be further enhanced to support a more consistent operational response across the full range of TF risks. Overall, while co-ordination mechanisms are strong, further enhancements in these areas would support a more comprehensive and forward-looking operational approach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 517. Türkiye has a hybrid system (cash declaration and disclosure systems) in terms of seizing non-declared or falsely declared cross-border currency movements. Despite Türkiye’s efforts in resourcing Customs Enforcement checkpoints with the highest technology, in line with its ICRG Action Plan, the number of non-declared or falsely declared cross-border currency and BNI movements detection and seizure remains limited. This is not aligned with the country’s risk profile as cash-smuggling is rated as a medium risk in the 2025 NRA. 518. Customs Enforcement is the competent authority accountable for receiving cash declarations and disclosures, detecting illegal cross-border movements of currencies and BNIs and seizing them at border check points. Türkiye has demonstrated a stable increase in cash declarations and disclosures since 2021. See below: Table 8.5. Cash declaration and disclosure reports (2020-2025) Cash declarations Cash disclosures Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Year No. Transactions Amount (EUR)** No. Transactions Amount (EUR) No. Transactions Amount (EUR) No. Transactions Amount (EUR) 2020 14765 €7,364,160.,755 1030 €1,347,734,215 117 €45,085,575 1378 € 5,049,663 2021 25601 €21,480,648,592 3658 €3,219,262,980 10340 $213,296,666 17067 €12,482,095 2022 31344 €23,976,412,012 5798 €6,922,315,173 14874 $56,205,333 29146 €19,458,874 2023 32339 €19,793,870,221 6174 €8,410,409,850 5928 $35,787,546 16086 €11,688,858 2024 19175 €8,402,391,339 4211 €2,568,120,646 12156 $47,884,222 15366 €9,701,931 2025* 9475 €6,859,573,745 3200 €2,967,308,686 11060 $37,298,362 19528 €19,021,589 Total 132699 €87,887,056,601 24071 €25,435,151,551 54475 $435,557,704 98751 €77,403,010 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 519. To improve the identification of non-declared or falsely declared cross-border movements of currency and BNI, CE has invested significantly in technical equipment including advanced technology, such as drones and tomographic luggage X-ray devices. In addition, 17 money counting machines with features such as distinguishing counterfeit money, recording serial numbers of money and counting more than one currency at the same time, have been provided to provincial administrations to carry out cash control operations in a reliable and fast manner. Competent authorities highlight this investment as significant improvements in the detection of cash smuggling. In 2016, the CE has established a certified World Customs Organisation K9 training facility to train cash, narcotics, tea/tobacco and explosive detector dogs. Between 2021-2025, CE trained a total of 11 268 officers in charge or passengers operations cash control trainings. Competent authorities report that these investments have led to an increase in cross- cash interceptions at customs checkpoints. 520. CE carry out controls upon entry to and exit from the country. Customs officers can physically verify the declared amount of currency were deemed necessary (i.e., when observing red flags, inconsistencies, or behaviour-based alerts). In such cases, the cash may be inspected, counted, and compared against the declared figure. If a passenger has failed to declare or made a false declaration or disclosure, the CE officer completes a new declaration form reflecting the accurate amount, the cash is seized, and the case is reported to the public prosecutor. A copy of the case file, including the declaration form and seizure records, is transmitted to MASAK in accordance with the reporting obligations. This reflects the existence of financial monitoring at border points aimed at identifying potential ML risks associated with cross‑border movements. However, the number of opened cases remains limited (506) given Türkiye’s medium level of cash smuggling. 521. In addition to the declaration system, Türkiye operates a disclosure system that allows customs officers to request information from passengers regarding the cash or payment instruments they carry. Under this framework, passengers may be invited to make a disclosure by customs officers based on risk profiling, behavioural red flags, or random selection, regardless of whether the amount carried exceeds a legal threshold. Officers may request details about the amount, origin, and intended use of the funds upon entry to or exit from the country, and the process is not limited to specific types of currency or financial instruments. If a passenger refuses to respond, or provides a false or misleading explanation upon request, a Cash Disclosure Report is drawn up and signed by at least two customs officers and the passenger. This report is forwarded to MASAK, and the case is also submitted to the Public Prosecutor. If a violation is confirmed, the undeclared or miss declared funds are seized. 522. In situations where the cash or other items being transported include foreign exchange, securities, precious metals, or other high-value instruments and the act involves unauthorized import or exports procedures, administrative fines can also be imposed up to the full value of the goods, or 50% in case of attempt unless the conduct constitutes a smuggling offence. 523. Between 2020 and 2025, CE have identified and seized non-declared and falsely declared currency for a total of EUR 85.2 M in land and airport customs controls points. The currencies more frequently seized are US dollars, Turkish lira and Euros. Within the scope of cash controls, suspicious indicators such as the unusual behaviour of individuals carrying cash, the presence of large-denomination banknotes (e.g., EUR 200 and EUR 500), concealment of money on persons or in vehicles, and disproportionate transaction volumes conducted by companies relative to their declared business activities are monitored closely. In addition, data derived from risk analyses conducted on legal entities and transaction patterns are evaluated. When such elements raise suspicion, reports are submitted to the judicial authorities, and the MASAK is granted access to the related data to conduct further financial analysis on potentially high-risk individuals, transactions, or corporate entities. The number of such reports submitted by year is presented in the table below. Table 8.6. Cash seizures at CE checkpoints leading to notifications to MASAK (2020-2025)* Year Number of transactions Cash Seized (EUR)** Notifications to MASAK 2020 55 € 15,025,403 0 2021 52 €7,421,798 1 2022 58 €10,592,182 1 2023 72 €13,763,745 19 2024 139 €21,680,024 76 2025 130 €16,721,928 366 Total 506 €85,205,081 463 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR). 524. The significant higher volume of incoming cash declarations (EUR 87.9 billion) compared to outgoing ones (EUR 25.4 billion), and the incoming cash disclosure (EUR 435 M) and outgoing (EUR 77 M), coupled with minimal seizures and the high risk of smuggling, indicates limited effectiveness of the existing control measures. In addition, the predominance of inbound declarations and the dissemination of only 506 reports to MASAK, while seizing 463 times in customs gates, suggests potential gaps in enforcement and risks management at entry points. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 525. Türkiye authorities have shown they can confiscate currency or BNIs where they considered there is a link to ML/TF or associated predicate offences through six case studies. While the competent authorities have seized foreign currency, cash, and goods (notably gold and technology) to some extent and have, where relevant, initiated criminal investigations, they are not able to demonstrate that these seizures are linked to money laundering, terrorist financing, or specific predicate offences. This points to limitations in Türkiye’s ability to effectively identify and substantiate ML, TF, or related predicate offence typologies when pursuing confiscation orders when assets are being seized as a result of the application of CE enforcement measures. 8.7.3. Sanctions 526. For cash disclosure an administrative fine equal to 10% of the difference between the declared and actual amounts is imposed on the traveller. However, if the discrepancy is below EUR 1 000 (50 000TRY), no penalty is applied. Sanctions effectiveness was not measured due to the lack of information. Table 8.7. Cash seized based on CE sanctions imposed (2020-2025) Year Value Seized (TRY) Value Seize (EUR)** 2020 ₺ 10,737,242 € 1,288,469 2021 ₺ 19,723,944 € 1,913,223 2022 ₺ 35,830,821 € 2,042,357 2023 ₺ 147,542,972.00 € 6,049,262 2024 ₺ 72,466,244 € 2,029,055 2025* ₺ 70,170,782 € 1,543,757 Total ₺ 356,472,005 € 14,866,122 Note: (*) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); (**) Conversion rates were calculated on annual average bases as follows: year 2020 (1 TRY=0.12 EUR); year 2021 (1 TRY= 0.097 EUR); year 2022 (1 TRY= 0.057 EUR); year 2023 (1 TRY=0.041 EUR); year 2024 (1 TRY= 0.028); and year 2025 (1 TRY= 0.022 EUR)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 188. Türkiye has established a comprehensive framework for the licensing of all FIs based on an effective multi-tier licensing system. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, and sectoral supervisors access a wide range of information to perform effective market entry controls to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the market. Authorities also conduct checks after the license has been granted as part of their supervisory activities. For VASPs, a solid regulatory framework has recently come into force but is still being implemented. Fit-and-proper checks were at an advanced stage at the time of the onsite, but had not yet been completed. 189. Market entry controls are carried out by sectoral supervisor for each relevant sector. All FIs and VASPs are required to be licensed and registered by competent authorities through a multiple stages licensing process consisting of two main steps: an establishment permit and an operating permit. 190. During the establishment phase, FIs must be established as joint-stock companies, with contracts of incorporation, and they must meet certain conditions such as capital requirement. Fit &amp; proper requirements also apply to the founding partners, shareholders above 10% or persons having ultimate control over the FI, which require that those individuals should not have been convicted of any crime including those related to capital market and have sufficient financial strength and professional competency. The shareholding structure is required to be transparent and as joint-stock companies, FIs are required to file their BO information to the TRA. 191. In most cases, this initial phase includes a physical meeting between the sectoral supervisor and the applicant, allowing to further inquire on fit and proper requirements as well as better understand the objectives and business model of the applicant. In cases where the conditions, qualifications and competencies required for obtaining the permits are not met, applications are halted at this initial stage, including if founding partners, ownership structures or business model are deemed unsuitable. Most rejections of applications happen at this initial stage, with candidates also withdrawing their applications before a negative decision is made. 192. The licensing process is supported by extensive inter-agency co-operation. Supervisors obtain information from multiple sources (open-source media, sanctions screening) and there is strong co-operation with other competent authorities to access more sensitive information (criminal records, etc). When needed, additional information is also requested to foreign competent authorities, particularly in relation to foreign ownership applications. Sectoral supervisors obtain BO information indirectly through the TRA or other competent authorities, whereas MASAK and the TIB have direct access to the BO Registry. The TIB may also carry out AML/CFT supervisory tasks, in addition to its tax inspection activities. The supervisors demonstrated a sound understanding of the concept of BO taking into consideration that a partner owing less than 10% of the share could actually be the BO via appointment rights of privileged shares. 193. Based on its licensing process, Türkiye has a high level of rejection of applications in all FIs sectors with the exception of the banking sector. Authorities explain that this is due to the thoroughness of the establishment permit phase especially for banks, where applicants prefer to withdraw their applications if shortcomings are identified at this early stage. The high number of rejections in the EO sector is explained by a legislative change in 2024 leading to enhanced requirements, as this led authorities to reject all applications in the sector for this year and reconsidering them the following year. For precious metal intermediaries, financial liability shortcomings is the main reason for rejecting licenses. Table 3.1. Licensing of FIs and VASPs (2020-2025) Institutions Approved Rejected Cancelled / Suspended Overall number of FIs Banks 33 0 1 63 Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFIs) 60 21 21 124 MVTS 42 15 7 89 Capital Market Sector 115 46 4 205 VASPs 98 76 0 58 Insurance 31 20 6 73 EO 94 123 41 773 Precious Metals Intermediary 33 74 24 46 194. VASPs were brought within the scope of obliged entities under the AML/CFT framework in 2021. However, it was not until March 2025, that Türkiye established a robust licensing process for VASPs, similar as for other FIs. Before that, there were no comprehensive entry controls, including fit‑and‑proper and ownership checks. At the time of the on‑site visit, the fit‑and‑proper assessments were well advanced but had not yet been finalised; moreover, the broader licensing process, including other entry controls, was still ongoing. As none of the fit and proper assessments had been finalised and no VASP licences had been granted by the end of the on‑site visit, the assessment team could not assess its effectiveness at that stage. CMB is applying enhanced measures at market entry due to the high ML/TF risks associated with VASPs in Türkiye. All VASPs willing to continue operating in Türkiye had to reapply by mid-2025 in line with the newly introduced requirements. Consequently, none of the VASPs is yet obliged to comply with the new, stricter regulatory framework. Those that did not reapply will have to cease their activities by the end of 2025 while the remaining ones have been granted a transition period to comply with the new requirements by June 2026. As a result, the overall number of VASPs operating in Türkiye has already decreased from 88 in 2024 to 58 currently, all waiting to be licensed. All foreign VASPs willing to operate in Türkiye must establish a branch or subsidiary that is subject to the fit and proper requirements described above. Foreign legal and natural persons involved in the ownership or management structure of a VASP are subject to stringent controls. The CMB built upon its experience of licensing capital intermediaries’ institutions to initiate the licensing process to VASPs while ensuring its staff and procedures were adapted to the challenges brought by those new actors. In addition to fit and proper requirements on founders and managers, CMB supervisors are supported by specialists from Türkiye’s national scientific and technologic agency (TUBITAK) to test the IT systems before delivering the operational permit. 195. Sectoral supervisors maintain active monitoring of fit and proper requirements following the licensing process. This ongoing monitoring also applies to VASPs after the completion of the licensing process and the granting of a licence. By law, any change in the ownership structure involving 10% or more of the share has to be declared to the supervisor. The partnership and ownership structures are also part of the elements review during the supervision activities conducted by both prudential supervisors and MASAK in the scope of its AML/CFT monitoring activities. Sectoral supervisors can also attend annual FIs board meeting. In the EO sector, monitoring is applied to newly licensed entities after 90 days. Entities have to provide camera footage for the GDFMFE to review if the activity is indeed conducted by the individuals declared as holding management functions. Box 3.1. Fit &amp; proper requirements case studies Case 1 - BO : In 2020, an investigation was conducted into a company owned by two individuals named X and Y on suspicion of unauthorised activity, and it was determined that this company was providing unauthorised payment services. A complaint was filed with the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office against the company and its shareholders, and legal proceedings were initiated. While the legal proceedings were ongoing, in 2021, during an application for an activity licence, it was determined that the applicant company had a sole shareholder, whose spouse was X, and that one of the companies from which the applicant company planned to receive services was another company owned by Y. The application was rejected on the grounds that the shareholder of the applicant company was not the beneficial owner and that his spouse, X, and Y were acting fraudulently to conceal the beneficial owner. Case 2 – Foreign individual : A foreign national, Mr. A submitted an application to the Capital Markets Board requesting a licence to establish an intermediary institution under the trade name “XXX A.Ş.” It was envisaged that the company to be established would have a capital of approx. EUR 10M and that all of its shares (100%) would be owned by Mr. A. In the scope of the examination of the application, opinions were obtained from other public institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Mr. A was a political figure with tied relation in Country A and that he had contacts with persons considered as terrorists by Country B, and that he was involved in smuggling oil smuggling through fake contracts. BRSA also stated that Mr. A was a founding partner of an asset management company and the operating licence of that company was revoked on the grounds that Mr. A had lost the founding conditions. Taking this into account, it was concluded that MR A did not meet the fit and proper requirements and therefore the license to establish XXX A.Ş. was rejected by CMB. Case 3 – monitoring requirements : The CMB filed a criminal complaint against Mr. E for “improper public offer and unauthorised capital market activity” (Law 6362, art. 109/2). Mr. E, an indirect shareholder of Investment Firm YYY A.Ş. and also chairman of its board of directors, holds 100% of the shares in BBB Investment Holding A.Ş., through which he indirectly owns 100% of YYY A.Ş. Following his conviction, Mr. E lost the condition that founding partners must not have a final conviction for the offences specified in the CMB Law. Therefore, the CMB took a measure regarding both the shareholding structure (granting the investment firm a 3-month period to ensure that Mr. E’s indirect shares were transferred to persons who meet the legal requirements) and the board membership (removing Mr. E from his position as a member of the board of directors of Investment Firm YYY A.Ş). 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 196. Türkiye detects unlicensed FIs activities to a large extent and measures are taken when those are identified. Overall, authorities demonstrated a co-ordinated approach combining preventive, supervisory, and enforcement actions, contributing positively to the effectiveness in detecting unlicensed activities. Identification is allowed through various channels such as denunciation mechanisms open to public, LEAs, tax inspections, notifications from other supervisory authorities and social media monitoring. 197. After their detection, persons engaging in unlicensed activities are sanctioned in accordance with the respective legislation, either leading to administrative sanctions or to judicial proceedings depending on the qualification of the offence (see below table). Acting as an FI without a licence is an offence, but some cases relate more to fraud than carrying out unlicensed FI activity. Supervisory authorities are also entitled to act accordingly to stop the unlicensed activity and deliver administrative fines. Table 3.2. Judicial actions undertaken for unlicensed activities (2020 – 2025) Institutions Investigations Prosecutions Convictions Files Persons Files Persons Files Persons Banks 183 282 85 126 8 10 NBFIs 43 88 19 45 8 26 MVTSs 1 301 2 732 653 1 166 169 248 Capital Market Sector 439 1 247 74 305 70 106 Insurance 159 222 42 66 10 12 198. CMB established a dedicated unit in charge of monitoring VASPs licensing as well as examining complaints received from the public on illegal activities. So far, 132 complaints have been processed leading to the referral of 10 actors to the PPO. By the end of the onsite, no sanctions had been imposed against unlicensed VASP activities. However, CMB also blocks access to the websites of unlicensed VASPs, which forms part of its efforts to prevent illegal operations. Due to VASPs being a newly supervised entities, CMB, is still developing its understanding of VASPs business models, operational techniques, and risk profiles. This learning curve may affect the ability to fully identify unlicensed VASPs activities and emerging risks. Strengthening co-operation with LEAs and other competent authorities would further enhance detection capabilities and support effective enforcement. 199. Authorities have identified and taken remedial actions against unlicensed MVTS to a large extent with a significant increase in the number of cases detected, investigated and prosecuted over the reporting period. This highlights enhanced efforts by competent authorities to address unlicensed MVTS activities, including hawala– illegal in Türkiye- which have been resorted to in ML/TF cases in Türkiye (see IO.7). However, gaps remain in identifying the full scope of such unlicensed operators. In particular, authorities may not consistently recognise cases where entities licensed for other activities (e.g., as DPMS or cargo operators) also engage in unlicensed MVTS. Information collected by other authorities about these mixed-activity entities is also not always effectively shared with CBRT, which may impact its ability to fully detect unlicensed actors. 200. As mentioned above, authorities strengthened in 2024 their requirements for licensing and monitoring exchange offices. More than 100 companies were asked to submit camera footage to verify operations and detect wrong doings. This process, that will be repeated annually, has led to an enhanced detection of wrongdoings of exchange offices in 2025 and the allocation of fines. Table 3.3. Actions undertaken against unlicensed exchange offices Year Closure of workplace Total amount of admin fine (EUR) Temporary Permanent 2021 53 19 204 000 2022 97 23 192 000 2023 72 23 336 000 2024 145 48 1 163 000 2025* 116 18 480 000 Total 483 131 2 375 000 Note: *until November 2025. Box 3.2. Unlicensed activities cases study Case 1 : BRSA received information through various channels, alleging that a company established in Country A under the name XXX Bank is providing banking services by claiming to be a branch of a bank in Istanbul, posting information and announcements on its website, making efforts to acquire customers, and issuing a letter of guarantee. First, the relevant counterpart authority in Country A was contacted to request information on whether there was a bank operating under this name in their country, and it was confirmed that no such bank was established. As it was determined that the activities of XXX Bank could constitute the “crime of unauthorised activity”, BRSA submitted the case to the PPO, also requesting to suspend the activities, advertisements, website, and, if applicable, the operations of any branches of XXX Bank, and block access to its website. This was obtained and the prosecution regarding the case is ongoing. Case 2 : In a complaint/notification submitted to CMB through the Presidential Communication Center, it was alleged that virtual asset service provider activities were being conducted through a website ABCD. In this case, it was found that activities of the website ABCD were directed towards persons resident in Türkiye while ABCD did not have any established activity in the country as required by law. The necessary legal procedures for blocking access to the ABCD were undertaken. In addition, during the review of the website ABCD, it has also been determined that the domain name service provider was acquired by an individual named X. When approached by authorities, X claimed that individuals were using his identity to conduct their illegal activities which was confirmed following further investigation. Upon reviewing the payment information related to the purchase of the ABCD domain, it was determined that the payment had not been made by X, but instead by two individuals named YY and ZZ who are currently under investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="305. Despite the positive steps taken by competent authorities and described above, DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains limited. In the DPMS and REAs sectors, the understanding of ML risks is more developed, especially for larger entities. TF risk understanding is limited to awareness of TF related TFS obligations. Some DPMS and REAs, especially larger groups, met during the onsite visit had institutional risk assessment related to their customers, products/services, distribution channels and geographical risks. 306. Accountants, lawyers and notaries have a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks, mainly considering that their professions are largely prevented from those risks based on the strong requirements to become an accountant or a legal professional and of the knowledge they have of their clients. They also considered as a mitigating factor the fact that most transactions they are operating are going through the banking sector and rely on this sector for the detection of potential suspicious activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Türkiye applies alternative measures when securing a ML conviction is not feasible, provided evidentiary standards are met (e.g., pursuing tax evasion or other predicate offences). 467. When it is not possible to reach a ML conviction, Türkiye applies laundering of stolen goods charges (art. 165) to secure a conviction and tax evasion charges. Article 165 serves as a practical mechanism to criminalise laundering activities, applying a “probable cause” evidentiary standard. Under this provision, individuals can face criminal penalties for simply selling, transferring, purchasing, or accepting criminal property without the need to prove specific intent. Between 2021 and 2025, 23 266 convictions were secured under Article 165. 468. Türkiye also employs tax evasion measures as an alternative measure and presented a case example where this was applied in the context of forged documents. However, despite initiating over 220 664 investigations and 146 808 prosecutions for tax evasion between 2020 and 2025, resulting in approximately 91 285 convictions, authorities have not demonstrated how these cases function as an alternative for ML convictions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. Türkiye applies a range of alternative criminal justice and administrative measures in cases where securing a TF conviction is not practicable. These include the use of alternative terrorism-related offences, offences related to unauthorised payment services, deportation measures, administrative asset freezing, and transaction postponements. While this provides an additional avenue to address unlawful conduct, the available information does not clearly distinguish between preventive and alternative measures, nor does it sufficiently demonstrate their contribution to disrupting the financial aspects of TF activity. 576. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye secured 59 convictions under alternative terrorism-related offences. This indicates that authorities are able to pursue alternative legal avenues where TF charges cannot be substantiated. In situations where the intent required for a TF offence cannot be established, authorities may pursue charges related to conducting payment services without proper authorisation. These measures can address illicit financial activity and may contribute to limiting the movement of funds, although their specific role in disrupting TF networks is not clearly articulated. 577. Türkiye also applies deportation measures in cases involving foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism or TF. Deportation may occur following conviction or be applied as a preventive measure on national security grounds. Over the assessment period, 15 524 deportations of foreign nationals were executed, although it is not specified how many of these relate directly to TF. While such measures may reduce immediate risks, their impact on the underlying financial aspects of TF activity is less evident. 578. Administrative tools include domestic asset freezing and transaction postponements. Transaction postponements (1 677 cases) are used as short-term preventive measures, allowing authorities additional time to conduct analysis and, where appropriate, pursue further investigative or judicial actions. These measures can support broader investigative processes, but on their own are temporary in nature. Authorities may also refer cases to tax authorities where financial irregularities are identified but do not meet the evidentiary threshold for TF prosecution. While this provides an additional avenue to address unlawful conduct, the connection between such measures and the disruption of TF activity is not clearly demonstrated. Box 9.3. Alternative conviction where TF prosecution was not possible The defendant Mr. M was investigated for conducting extensive domestic and international money transfers via the hawala system on behalf of a suspected armed TO. Communications were intercepted pursuant to Art. 135 of the CPC. Mr. M routed transfer-related communications through encrypted messaging applications and received commission on transactions. A search of his residence yielded digital materials, account passbooks in foreign names, Temporary Protection Identity Documents, passports, EUR 11 000 and USD 6 830 in cash. CBRT reporting confirmed high-volume transfers across his bank accounts. Although charges were brought for membership in an armed TO, the court found insufficient evidence of an organic link to the organisation's hierarchical structure and acquitted Mr. M of that charge. The court nonetheless found on the basis of intercepted communications, seized materials, witness statements, partial confessions and CBRT findings, that Mr. M had systematically conducted unauthorised fund transfers for commission while actively concealing his activities. He was convicted under Article 28/1 of Law No. 6493 and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment. The seized cash was confiscated. The case demonstrates the use of alternative financial legislation as a fall back where a TF conviction cannot be secured, allowing courts to sanction conduct and confiscate assets linked to suspected terrorist financing activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 112. Türkiye’s AML/CFT policies broadly align with NRA identified risks. The AML/CFT Strategy (2021–2025) as the main guiding document is embedded in a Presidential Decree, demonstrating utmost level of priority. The National AML/CFT Strategy focuses on improving detection, prevention and confiscation outcomes. For example, by directing the setting up of national multidisciplinary joint investigation teams according to subject matter expertise, especially regarding fraud and illegal betting and gambling and requiring all law enforcement agencies to prepare or update financial investigation guidelines in line with the findings of the NRA. 113. Authorities conducted extensive outreach, typology dissemination and training across all sectors to further reinforce alignment with risks identified. 114. As part of its ICRG action plan, Türkiye developed a separate Strategy Document on CFT and an accompanying Presidential Circular (No. 2022/13) in July 2022. The CFT Strategy and the Circular, which are to be updated on an ongoing basis as needed, emphasise and prioritise CTFT as an essential part of combatting terrorism, including through investigations and prosecutions, and conducting a study of Türkiye’s capacity to combat TF and on the abuse of VAs for TF purposes. Work stirred by these two strategies is complemented by longstanding actions to combat other predicate offences and contextual factors such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, organised crime and the informal economy, which refer to preventive efforts as well as proceeds of crime. For example, the National Strategy for Combatting Drugs includes training by MASAK to LEAs staff. 115. Other priority actions operationalise the NRA-identified high-risk predicates—especially illegal betting/gambling, abuse of VASPs, misuse of POS systems and organised crime. These risks are embedded in Türkiye’s AML/CFT Strategy and the 2023/2025 NRAs action plans, and are implemented through whole-of-government co-ordination mechanisms (notably the CBCFC and the Strategy Document working groups). Concretely, Türkiye is developing dedicated action plans for illegal betting and fraud; expanding typologies and STR scenarios (including risky VAs/PF indicators); applying risk-based supervision to payment/e-money institutions, VASPs, and merchant-acquiring channels vulnerable to POS abuse; and strengthening PFIs and confiscation practices through LEAs and judicial guidelines and organised crime. 116. On fraud, Türkiye’s top predicate offence, a Fraud Prevention Research Report and draft national action plan were prepared focusing on education and awareness, strengthening of legal infrastructure and actions undertaken (so far) included recommending certain enhanced measures (e.g. approval by senior manager and transactional limits) for VASPs onboarded by banks. 117. On illegal betting and gambling, identified as the second major predicate offence, Türkiye adopted a strategy document (Presidential Circular No. 2025/18) instructing detection and intervention in electronic communications and virtual environments, along with focus on awareness and international co-operation. 118. Türkiye also adopted important legislative amendments in line with risks identified regarding payment services providers, virtual assets, stablecoins and both physical and virtual points of sale. For example, in 2021, following identified risks and misuse of payment services, Türkiye limited the use of prepaid cards in some instances (e.g. by requiring physical presence of cardholders or a Trusted Certificate for e-commerce) reducing prepaid card use in illegal betting and gambling. 119. Despite alignment of the AML/CFT strategy with risks, there are areas that need further development, such as strategies towards the real estate market. The use of the real estate market, especially for ML, is high as noted in Türkiye’s 2025 NRA. However, the real estate framework—although comprehensive on paper (e.g. real estate agents are covered by AML/CFT obligations)—does not fully reflect how the market operates, as many transactions occur directly between buyers and sellers without intermediaries. This limits the practical reach of AML/CFT obligations of real estate agents as reporting entities and needs further reflection. 120. AML/CFT obligations in Türkiye extend beyond FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, to other non-financial entities such as car dealers, postal and transportation service (e.g. cargo companies), sports clubs, lotteries and bets, considering ML/TF risks identified by Türkiye. Car dealers (purchase-sale of motor vehicles and showroom) have been identified as an important method to launder proceeds of theft and robbery (Among the top 5 predicate offences; 5th in 2023, 4th in 2025). In addition, to mitigate abuse of the sector further, authorities established a “Secure Payment System” in February 2020 mandating payment of purchases through banking and payment institutions and with assistance of a Notary." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="321. Türkiye follows a risk-based approach for the supervision of DNFBPs. Given the high number of DNFBPs in the country (more than 400 000), MASAK prioritises the supervision of high-risk entities within the highest risk sectors (DPMS, REAs and accountants to a lesser extent). 322. Similarly, as for FIs (see IO.3), as a result of its ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye adopted a risk-based supervision approach in 2021 to prioritise the supervision of highest risk sectors and highest risk entities within those sectors. MASAK, as the main AML/CFT supervisor, prepares annual supervision plans for DNFBP sectors presenting the highest risks (DPMS, REAs and accountants). The Threat &amp; Vulnerability WG and the DNFBP risk WGs provides a platform for MASAK to exchange with sectoral supervisors as well as the private sector and the development of the sectoral risk assessments support the definition of yearly supervisory programs. Türkiye’s RBS methodology requires obliged entities categorised as high-risk to be supervised every year, and obliged entities categorised as medium risk to be supervised every three years at the latest. 323. Supervision programs are carried out either by MASAK or sectoral supervisors under MASAK’s oversight. Dedicated protocols between MASAK, MoT and TIB were signed to enhance co-operation and co-ordination and ensure that supervisions will be performed with a risk-based approach and ML/TF risk understanding of supervisors will improve. They also set forth the duties and responsibilities of the institutions on exchange of information, on trainings and on organising workshops with the participation of professional associations. All the supervisory authorities prepared RBS guidance to ensure that their own supervisions, within the scope of their regulatory laws, are performed by taking ML/TF risks into consideration. 324. On that basis, supervision of DNFBPs follows an integrated approach. First, dedicated AML/CFT supervision programmes defined yearly by MASAK are conducted either by MASAK or sectoral supervisors under MASAK’s guidance. Those onsite inspections aim at assessing the compliance status of the reporting entity against AML/CFT obligations. Second, sector specific/operational supervision conducted by sectoral supervisors. Those are not targeted at AML/CFT obligations but if related shortcomings is identified by the sectoral supervisor (e.g. CDD requirements, BO, etc.) the case is referred to MASAK for further examination. Third, “case-based AML/CFT inspections”, if there is a suspicion of a violation outside the scope of pre-planned activities. As a result, all high-risk entities in the DPMS, REAs and accountants sectors are supervised yearly and medium risk ones have been supervised at least once over a three-year period. 325. However, the effectiveness of supervisory measures is limited by some weaknesses. MASAK supervisory staff is somewhat limited, and sectoral supervisors monitor AML/CFT obligations to a lesser extent. In line with its ICRG Action Plan, MASAK’s resources dedicated to supervision have been strengthened since the 2019 MER, from 12 staff members to 33 as of 2025. Nevertheless, MASAK supervision department oversees compliance for all reporting entities (FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs) and receives and analyses the reports of all sectoral supervisors, and is in charge of taking further actions, including issuing sanctions and conducting onsite inspections. Even though MASAK relies on sectoral supervisors, those do not have dedicated AML/CFT units nor specialised staff. In addition, while sectoral supervisors have a larger amount of resources to carry out inspections, their understanding of ML/TF risks in the DNFBP sector is limited which does not ensure their full ability to identify the full scope of potential AML/CFT obligations beyond basic ones. In light of MASAK’s broad prerogatives and pivotal role it plays to conduct and co-ordinate AML/CFT supervision, its resources for supervision still need to be further strengthened. This coupled with DNFBP sectoral supervisors limited ML/TF expertise, hinders the effective supervision of the DNFBP sector. 326. In addition, the number of supervisory activities conducted over the reporting period is marginal in comparison with the size of the sector. The overall low number of entities supervised in the DPMS and REAs sectors is mostly in line with the low number of entities identified as high/medium risk in those sectors. Yet, in 2024 the number of entities supervised in both sectors amount to approx. 0,2% of the overall number of entities in those sectors. Based on the risks those sectors are exposed to, the fact that some sectors (i.e. lawyers) have been recently subjected to AML/CFT obligations and their overall low-level awareness of those requirements, supervisory activities remain marginal to enhance compliance across those sectors. Supervisors could rely to a larger extent on a mix of onsite and offsite supervision activities which would allow to broaden the scope of reporting entities monitored on the basis of their AML/CFT obligations. 327. Sectors considered as presenting a medium risk (accountants) or medium-low risk (lawyers), received marginal supervision over the reporting period, while no supervisory activities were conducted for notaries. Based on the types of activities performed by those sectors, especially support to the creation and management of legal persons and registration of transactions, supervision for those sectors is not in line with the risks they are exposed to. These challenges suggest that the effectiveness of the risk-based supervision in the DNFBP sector is only achieved to some extent. Table 4.5. Supervision of DNFBPs Sectors Number of entities (as of 2024) 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised High/Med risk Supervised REAs 77 831 96 53 549 100 131 109 182 98 958 360 DPMS 11 986 98 51 1 869 100 301 120 288 105 2 556 376 Accountants 133 439 15 5 0 0 32 15 24 11 71 31 Lawyers* 199 142 0 - 0 - 80 8 0 -* 80 8 Notaries 2 383 0 - 0 - - - 0 - 0 - Total 424 781 209 109 2 418 200 544 252 494 214 3 665 775 Note: *Lawyers could not be included in the supervision programme in 2024 due to the Constitutional Court's decision annulling their designation as an obliged party (Official Gazette 32509, dated 03.04.2024)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 112. Türkiye’s AML/CFT policies broadly align with NRA identified risks. The AML/CFT Strategy (2021–2025) as the main guiding document is embedded in a Presidential Decree, demonstrating utmost level of priority. The National AML/CFT Strategy focuses on improving detection, prevention and confiscation outcomes. For example, by directing the setting up of national multidisciplinary joint investigation teams according to subject matter expertise, especially regarding fraud and illegal betting and gambling and requiring all law enforcement agencies to prepare or update financial investigation guidelines in line with the findings of the NRA. 113. Authorities conducted extensive outreach, typology dissemination and training across all sectors to further reinforce alignment with risks identified. 114. As part of its ICRG action plan, Türkiye developed a separate Strategy Document on CFT and an accompanying Presidential Circular (No. 2022/13) in July 2022. The CFT Strategy and the Circular, which are to be updated on an ongoing basis as needed, emphasise and prioritise CTFT as an essential part of combatting terrorism, including through investigations and prosecutions, and conducting a study of Türkiye’s capacity to combat TF and on the abuse of VAs for TF purposes. Work stirred by these two strategies is complemented by longstanding actions to combat other predicate offences and contextual factors such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, organised crime and the informal economy, which refer to preventive efforts as well as proceeds of crime. For example, the National Strategy for Combatting Drugs includes training by MASAK to LEAs staff. 115. Other priority actions operationalise the NRA-identified high-risk predicates—especially illegal betting/gambling, abuse of VASPs, misuse of POS systems and organised crime. These risks are embedded in Türkiye’s AML/CFT Strategy and the 2023/2025 NRAs action plans, and are implemented through whole-of-government co-ordination mechanisms (notably the CBCFC and the Strategy Document working groups). Concretely, Türkiye is developing dedicated action plans for illegal betting and fraud; expanding typologies and STR scenarios (including risky VAs/PF indicators); applying risk-based supervision to payment/e-money institutions, VASPs, and merchant-acquiring channels vulnerable to POS abuse; and strengthening PFIs and confiscation practices through LEAs and judicial guidelines and organised crime. 116. On fraud, Türkiye’s top predicate offence, a Fraud Prevention Research Report and draft national action plan were prepared focusing on education and awareness, strengthening of legal infrastructure and actions undertaken (so far) included recommending certain enhanced measures (e.g. approval by senior manager and transactional limits) for VASPs onboarded by banks. 117. On illegal betting and gambling, identified as the second major predicate offence, Türkiye adopted a strategy document (Presidential Circular No. 2025/18) instructing detection and intervention in electronic communications and virtual environments, along with focus on awareness and international co-operation. 118. Türkiye also adopted important legislative amendments in line with risks identified regarding payment services providers, virtual assets, stablecoins and both physical and virtual points of sale. For example, in 2021, following identified risks and misuse of payment services, Türkiye limited the use of prepaid cards in some instances (e.g. by requiring physical presence of cardholders or a Trusted Certificate for e-commerce) reducing prepaid card use in illegal betting and gambling. 119. Despite alignment of the AML/CFT strategy with risks, there are areas that need further development, such as strategies towards the real estate market. The use of the real estate market, especially for ML, is high as noted in Türkiye’s 2025 NRA. However, the real estate framework—although comprehensive on paper (e.g. real estate agents are covered by AML/CFT obligations)—does not fully reflect how the market operates, as many transactions occur directly between buyers and sellers without intermediaries. This limits the practical reach of AML/CFT obligations of real estate agents as reporting entities and needs further reflection. 120. AML/CFT obligations in Türkiye extend beyond FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, to other non-financial entities such as car dealers, postal and transportation service (e.g. cargo companies), sports clubs, lotteries and bets, considering ML/TF risks identified by Türkiye. Car dealers (purchase-sale of motor vehicles and showroom) have been identified as an important method to launder proceeds of theft and robbery (Among the top 5 predicate offences; 5th in 2023, 4th in 2025). In addition, to mitigate abuse of the sector further, authorities established a “Secure Payment System” in February 2020 mandating payment of purchases through banking and payment institutions and with assistance of a Notary." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="591. Türkiye has made use of its TF TFS framework to a large extent to mitigate its TF risks. Over the reporting period, under Türkiye’s domestic freezing mechanism, 1 377 natural persons and 87 legal entities have been subject to asset freezing. Out of those 1 434 assets freezing decisions, 1 109 were related to domestically designated organisations and 325 to UN designated terrorist organisations. While 88% of the listed persons are Turkish nationals, Türkiye has citizens from more than 25 countries on its domestic list which is in line with the country risk profile. Also, 62 individuals and 8 legal entities were subject to assess freezing measures in Türkiye following requests submitted by two foreign countries. 592. Due to the entry into force of the TFS mechanism in December 2020, 1 145 natural persons were listed in 2021. Since, Türkiye has on average listed 58 individuals and 18 entities yearly since 2022. Overall, 15 decisions were lifted through formal legal procedures, with the Court considering as insufficient the “reasonable grounds” supporting the freezing decision. A significant portion of the designated individuals are Turkish nationals, with several foreign individuals from abroad. Türkiye has made use of its domestic regime to also freeze assets of persons/entities acting on behalf of designated persons. 593. Authorities monitor financial activities of close relatives and commercial associates of designated individuals. If suspicious fund transfers linked to a designated person are detected, the relevant transaction is suspended with Ministerial approval and if there is enough evidence, the matter is also referred to the PPO. Where justified, such entities or individuals are also subjected to asset-freezing measures. Box 10.3. Use of TF TFS mechanism against terrorists or persons acting on their behalf Case study 1 : As a result of investigations into preventing ISIL financing, in April 2021, the assets of an individual named S.Ö. were frozen. During monitoring activities, intelligence information was received from TNP that informed MASAK about the accounts of S.Ö.'s sister, F.Ö., which had previously been rarely used, showed a significant volume of transactions after the freezing decision. Upon this, F.Ö.'s accounts were examined, and it was observed that some of the transfers were made to individuals who had previously been subject to legal proceedings within the scope of ISIL, and that some of the transactions matched to the TO's fundraising methods. Consequently, a report was prepared on F.Ö., and the individual's assets were frozen in June 2022. Case study 2 : During the investigation into T.K., whose assets were frozen in January 2025 regarding his affiliation to ISIL, intelligence later confirmed by a bank STR indicated that he used accounts opened in the name of his mother, G.K. After T.K.'s assets were frozen, an investigation into his mother G.K.'s accounts revealed unusual transactions in one of the individual's accounts starting the day after the aforementioned decision. The relevant bank was contacted to take the necessary measures. As a result, the individual's accounts were frozen. Case Study 3 : In January 2022, a domestic VASP reported suspicious activity concerning two users, whose names appeared in adverse media alleging ISIL involvement as regional logistics operatives. Key findings from the investigation included: VAs deposits and withdrawals linked to small foreign platforms, other suspicious users transacting with the same wallet addresses, and arrests of both individuals in 2019 for suspected ISIL ties MASAK’s deeper review revealed that the terminology used in transactions was consistent with ISIL donation language, the financial behaviour inconsistent with declared income levels, Tether USD (USDT) transfers made to multiple wallet addresses, evasive responses in compliance-related communications with VAs firms. In June 2022, asset-freezing orders were issued for three individuals who had transacted with the same wallets. In addition, criminal complaints were filed, and judicial proceedings are still ongoing. 594. Türkiye’s efforts to identify assets have resulted in the freezing of accounts and assets, including movable and immovables ones, not only owned directly by designated individuals, but those that are controlled by the designated individual. These are accounts or assets belonging to the spouse or other relatives of the designated persons and entities that have been used to circumvent the asset freezing decision. The AT did not find evidence that the mechanism was being used to disproportionately target all funds and assets of relatives of designated persons and entities. Table 10.1. Assets frozen related to TF TFS Sanctions Regime Affiliated organisation Value EUR Real Estate Motor Vehicles Gold (g) &amp; Jewelry Legal persons UNSCR 1267/1988 UN designated terrorist organisation 1 200 - - - - UNSCR 1373 FETÖ 112 122 710 851 66 + 1 yacht 107g + 76 precious items 132 PKK-KCK 921 953 303 8 - - Leftist organisation 102 230 103 3 + 1 yacht - 8 ISIL &amp; Al Qaeda 568 560 283 49 11g 31 UNSCR 1373 (upon foreign requests) ISIL &amp; Al Qaeda 23 120 1 9 5 Total - 113 739 773 1 541 137 118g + 76 precious items 176 595. To prevent designated individuals and entities from receiving funds through indirect means, MASAK regularly reviews reports submitted by FIs either based on detected links or through their own risk assessments. This process ensures that no financial support is channelled to listed persons via proxy individuals or organizations. 596. MASAK manages the requests for access to funds and assets that are frozen following the procedures set out in UNSCR 1452. The designated persons shall notify all their rights, receivables and payables and other assets to MASAK electronically and in writing within thirty days as from the date of publication of the asset freezing decision the process, by filling out forms available MASAK’s website. Between 2021 and November, 2025, Türkiye received 118 requests for access to frozen assets out of which 77 permissions to access frozen assets were granted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="591. Türkiye has made use of its TF TFS framework to a large extent to mitigate its TF risks. Over the reporting period, under Türkiye’s domestic freezing mechanism, 1 377 natural persons and 87 legal entities have been subject to asset freezing. Out of those 1 434 assets freezing decisions, 1 109 were related to domestically designated organisations and 325 to UN designated terrorist organisations. While 88% of the listed persons are Turkish nationals, Türkiye has citizens from more than 25 countries on its domestic list which is in line with the country risk profile. Also, 62 individuals and 8 legal entities were subject to assess freezing measures in Türkiye following requests submitted by two foreign countries. 592. Due to the entry into force of the TFS mechanism in December 2020, 1 145 natural persons were listed in 2021. Since, Türkiye has on average listed 58 individuals and 18 entities yearly since 2022. Overall, 15 decisions were lifted through formal legal procedures, with the Court considering as insufficient the “reasonable grounds” supporting the freezing decision. A significant portion of the designated individuals are Turkish nationals, with several foreign individuals from abroad. Türkiye has made use of its domestic regime to also freeze assets of persons/entities acting on behalf of designated persons. 593. Authorities monitor financial activities of close relatives and commercial associates of designated individuals. If suspicious fund transfers linked to a designated person are detected, the relevant transaction is suspended with Ministerial approval and if there is enough evidence, the matter is also referred to the PPO. Where justified, such entities or individuals are also subjected to asset-freezing measures. Box 10.3. Use of TF TFS mechanism against terrorists or persons acting on their behalf Case study 1 : As a result of investigations into preventing ISIL financing, in April 2021, the assets of an individual named S.Ö. were frozen. During monitoring activities, intelligence information was received from TNP that informed MASAK about the accounts of S.Ö.'s sister, F.Ö., which had previously been rarely used, showed a significant volume of transactions after the freezing decision. Upon this, F.Ö.'s accounts were examined, and it was observed that some of the transfers were made to individuals who had previously been subject to legal proceedings within the scope of ISIL, and that some of the transactions matched to the TO's fundraising methods. Consequently, a report was prepared on F.Ö., and the individual's assets were frozen in June 2022. Case study 2 : During the investigation into T.K., whose assets were frozen in January 2025 regarding his affiliation to ISIL, intelligence later confirmed by a bank STR indicated that he used accounts opened in the name of his mother, G.K. After T.K.'s assets were frozen, an investigation into his mother G.K.'s accounts revealed unusual transactions in one of the individual's accounts starting the day after the aforementioned decision. The relevant bank was contacted to take the necessary measures. As a result, the individual's accounts were frozen. Case Study 3 : In January 2022, a domestic VASP reported suspicious activity concerning two users, whose names appeared in adverse media alleging ISIL involvement as regional logistics operatives. Key findings from the investigation included: VAs deposits and withdrawals linked to small foreign platforms, other suspicious users transacting with the same wallet addresses, and arrests of both individuals in 2019 for suspected ISIL ties MASAK’s deeper review revealed that the terminology used in transactions was consistent with ISIL donation language, the financial behaviour inconsistent with declared income levels, Tether USD (USDT) transfers made to multiple wallet addresses, evasive responses in compliance-related communications with VAs firms. In June 2022, asset-freezing orders were issued for three individuals who had transacted with the same wallets. In addition, criminal complaints were filed, and judicial proceedings are still ongoing. 594. Türkiye’s efforts to identify assets have resulted in the freezing of accounts and assets, including movable and immovables ones, not only owned directly by designated individuals, but those that are controlled by the designated individual. These are accounts or assets belonging to the spouse or other relatives of the designated persons and entities that have been used to circumvent the asset freezing decision. The AT did not find evidence that the mechanism was being used to disproportionately target all funds and assets of relatives of designated persons and entities. Table 10.1. Assets frozen related to TF TFS Sanctions Regime Affiliated organisation Value EUR Real Estate Motor Vehicles Gold (g) &amp; Jewelry Legal persons UNSCR 1267/1988 UN designated terrorist organisation 1 200 - - - - UNSCR 1373 FETÖ 112 122 710 851 66 + 1 yacht 107g + 76 precious items 132 PKK-KCK 921 953 303 8 - - Leftist organisation 102 230 103 3 + 1 yacht - 8 ISIL &amp; Al Qaeda 568 560 283 49 11g 31 UNSCR 1373 (upon foreign requests) ISIL &amp; Al Qaeda 23 120 1 9 5 Total - 113 739 773 1 541 137 118g + 76 precious items 176 595. To prevent designated individuals and entities from receiving funds through indirect means, MASAK regularly reviews reports submitted by FIs either based on detected links or through their own risk assessments. This process ensures that no financial support is channelled to listed persons via proxy individuals or organizations. 596. MASAK manages the requests for access to funds and assets that are frozen following the procedures set out in UNSCR 1452. The designated persons shall notify all their rights, receivables and payables and other assets to MASAK electronically and in writing within thirty days as from the date of publication of the asset freezing decision the process, by filling out forms available MASAK’s website. Between 2021 and November, 2025, Türkiye received 118 requests for access to frozen assets out of which 77 permissions to access frozen assets were granted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 282. Türkiye has a licensing framework in place for all DNFBPs and conducts fit and proper checks to a certain extent, responsibility is shared among several authorities and SRBs. DPMS and REAs 283. DPMS and REAs are licensed by the MoT. Applicants shall submit their application through the electronic system of the Ministry and the application is reviewed electronically, there is no face-to-face meeting with applicants. After the applicant submits the application through the systems, the relevant Provincial Directorate of Trade in the province where it carries out its activities reviews the documents uploaded by the applicant, as well as the data obtained from other integrated information systems. Some requirements are applied to DPMS and REAs applicants such as not being convicted of a crime, providing a tax registration number, registering with the relevant professional union, possessing relevant qualification. The fulfilment of these conditions is examined with supporting documents prior to the issuance of certificate of authorisation, within ten days from the date of submission. 284. In Türkiye, it is not compulsory to obtain the services of a REA to buy/sell a property. 285. BO information is indirectly checked. Applicants, either natural or legal person, have to provide their tax registry information and as taxpayers they need to file their BO information to Turkish Revenue Authority (TRA) as part of tax returns. Obliged entities can verify and identify discrepancies between the information provided to them during CDD process and through QR code provided by the TRA. If the applicant is a foreign legal person without a tax code, it would need to register to the TRA and disclose its BO information. The MoT does not have direct access to the BO information and does not consistently check the coherence between the information submitted by the applicant and the BO information as collected by the TA, but it can file a request to the TRA in case of suspicion. 286. However, under Türkiye’s legal framework the fit and proper requirements do not extend to associates of criminals from being professionally accredited or holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest in a DNFBP (see R.28). 287. Authorities have rejected a significant number of applications. The most common reasons for the rejection of certificates in both sectors are similar, they include the submission of incomplete or incorrect documents to the system, errors in the document demonstrating the absence of tax debt to the tax office and the lack or absence of professional experience and professional training among the fields of activity listed in the applicant’s professional union registration. The number of applications rejected is very high as any application missing one of the requested documents is automatically rejected and applicants must fill a new application. Accountants 288. In Türkiye, accountants are either certified public accountant (CPA) or sworn-in public accountants (SPA), their licenses are issued exclusively by the SRB called TURMOB, and the licensing process is standardised. Specific requirements to enter the profession apply, following completion of the accountant exam, at least 4 years are required to obtain a CPA license. Whether the person meets the required conditions is examined prior to licensing, along with supporting documents. To become a SPA, one must work as a CPA for at least 10 years and then pass the competency exams. The most common reason for license applications being rejected is that the individual's criminal record does not comply with the law. Lawyers 289. The Bar (SRB) is the licensing authority for lawyers. Lawyers need to have certain qualifications and the Bar reviews the applicant’s file to ensure that none of the disqualifying conditions (such as criminal conviction, disciplinary issues, or ethical incompatibility) apply. Upon successful completion of an internship, the candidate must apply for inclusion on the bar register as a full attorney. The bar’s executive board examines the application and makes a decision to approve or reject admission. Records of those whose admission requests are rejected are kept by Bar Associations and Union of the Turkish Bar Association. Lawyers whether they are corporate taxpayers or established as individual businesses are required to file their beneficial ownership information to TRA. The most common reason for rejection of the license is lack of necessary application documents and failure to meet the entry requirements for the profession. Notaries 290. Notaries are appointed by the MoJ. The requirements for entering in the sector are strict and the notaries public are under the monitoring and supervision of the MoJ and the Union of Notaries Public of Türkiye. Accordingly, the Supervisory Board of the Union of Notaries Public of Türkiye supervises whether the notary chambers and notaries public carry out their duties in compliance with the laws, regulations, circulars and mandatory professional rules. The MoJ supervises all kinds of activities of the Union, the chambers and the notaries public as well as their accounts and transactions by employing judicial inspectors or public prosecutors. In this respect, notaries public are under constant supervision of public prosecutors and are subject to on-site inspections at least once a year. Notaries Public are required to file their beneficial ownership information to the TRA. The most common reason for rejection of the application is that the entry requirements for the profession have not been met. (notary public certificate with insufficient seniority). 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 291. Türkiye has detected unlicensed activities in relation to DNFBPs to some extent. As with FIs unlicensed activities (see IO.3), authorities demonstrated a co-ordinated approach combining preventive, supervisory, and enforcement actions, contributing positively to the effectiveness in detecting unlicensed activities. Identification is allowed through various channels such as denunciation mechanisms open to public, LEAs, tax inspections, notifications from other supervisory authorities, social media monitoring. 292. To ensure that complaints regarding natural or legal persons engaged in unlicensed DPMS and REAs activities can be made in a faster and in an easier manner, the MoT set up specific a reporting system. Complaints are examined directly by the Provincial Directorates of Trade, and inspections are conducted accordingly. Table 4.1. Administrative fines for unauthorised DPMS and REAs activities Year Number of Persons Fined (REA) Total Amount of Administrative Fine (EUR)-REAs Number of Persons Fined (DPMS) Total Amount of Administrative Fine (EUR)-DPMS 2021 329 198 054 - - 2022 114 54 606 - - 2023 1200 3 796 146 - - 2024 572 1 318 824 125 700 000 2025* 625 1 959 706 93 419 700 Total 2 840 7 327 336 218 1 119 700 Note: *until 28 November 2025. 293. The persistence of a high number of unlicensed actors in the DPMS and REA sectors could reflect a lack of dissuasiveness of the sanctions allocated in those cases. 294. Monitoring of fit and proper requirements post licensing is ensured through supervisory activities. Those are conducted by the regional directorates of the Ministry of Trade for DPMS and REAs. Accountants and lawyers are monitored via their SRB while notaries are regularly inspected by the Ministry of Justice. 295. For accountants, the licenses of those found to have lost these conditions are revoked by decision of the Union Management Board. For example, the licenses of members who have been convicted of certain crimes, who have lost their legal capacity, or who are found to be in situations that are incompatible with the honour and dignity of the profession are revoked. 296. For lawyers, there are supervision and disciplinary mechanisms that operate ex officio, based on reports and complaints, regarding colleagues who commence and continue their legal practice. If a lawyer receives a license revocation penalty, all notaries are informed since the lawyer-client relationship is established through a power of attorney. In addition, since their e-signature authorisations have been revoked, they cannot use the UYAP system in any way and therefore cannot carry out duties as a lawyer. Over the reporting period, 17 licenses were suspended and 122 cancelled. Table 4.2. Lawyers licenses suspended/cancelled Year Licences Suspended* Licenses Cancelled 2020 0 9 2021 2 14 2022 5 40 2023 4 39 2024 4 14 2025 2 6 297. Notaries who act contrary to professional rules, perform their duties negligently, or engage in conduct that undermines public trust are subject to disciplinary proceedings. The possible sanctions range from warnings and reprimands to fines, temporary suspension, and revocation of the notary’s license. License revocation effectively removes the notary’s authority to perform notarial duties and permanently halts their official activities. 26 notaries have been dismissed from their profession in the period of 2022-2025. The cause of repeal is having lost the qualification to be a judge, prosecutor, civil servant, or lawyer as a result of a final criminal or disciplinary decision." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 388. MASAK, is the country central authority for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of STRs. As an administrative-style FIU, it plays a pivotal role in Türkiye’s AML/CFT/CPF system and is the main authority responsible for producing financial intelligence at an institutional and operational level. Due to the robustness of its dataset, MASAK accesses timely and up-to-date broad range of financial and non-financial information to a very large extent. MASAK’s access to multiple sources of information is a major strength as it enables extensive real-time cross-checking and verification of data, significantly enhancing accuracy and reliability of the information when producing financial intelligence. 389. To perform its functions MASAK uses one offline (intranet connection) and one online system (internet connection). MASAK accesses a data set composed by more than 300 databases from public entities (32 data bases) and private institutions, legal persons’ basic information (through MERSIS system), STRs (2 740 332 between 2020-2025), cross-border declarations or disclosures on currency (over 162 000) and financial analysis reports. Türkiye’s competent authorities have moved all their data collection to an electronic format (UYAP system) allowing MASAK to have a direct extensive and real time access to up-to-date information which has greatly contributed to insource accurate data collection and to produce well-informed financial analysis and intelligence reports. Through these data bases, MASAK can access personal, basic and BO information, cash declarations/disclosures, criminal records, tax and revenue information, information on personal income, prior related STRs, including information registered by obliged entities (FIs, DNFBPs and VASPS), information hosted by the land and property, vessels and vehicles registries. 390. STRs are the main source of information inputting MASAK’s work. Between 2020-2025, MASAK received approximately 2.7 M STRs from FIs and DNFBPs, and more recently VASP (see IO.3), with most of them emanating from the banking sector (63%), payment service providers and electronic money institutions (26%) and VASPs (7%), all of them identified as high-risk sectors in Türkiye’s 2023 and 2025 NRAs. However, less than 1% STRs from public accountants have been registered which is not commensurate with the country’s risk profile. In terms of quality, most STRs contain sufficient and qualitative information depending on the reporting sector, with those submitted by FIs generally being the most comprehensive ones. When the STRs lack sufficient information, MASAK requests additional information from the reporting entities to support its analysis. The below table provides an overview of the STRs received since 2020. Table 6.1. STRs reported by FIs, DNFBPs and VASP sector (2020-2025) Sector Net Risk profile* 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total STRs/reporting period Ratio/ reporting period ML TF PF Banking Institutions H H M 182828 205793 314700 432499 349988 235358 1721166 63% PEMIs Institutions M/H M/H M 46840 284544 74513 102776 110949 101987 721609 26% VASP (CASP) H H M N/A 2233 20569 48678 63603 53490 188573 7% EOs M/H M/H M/L 2660 4500 6188 9108 5726 4315 32497 1% Those Who Operate in The Field of Lotteries And Betting M/L M 262 36 64 1755 17301 6366 25784 1% Factoring companies M M/L 1893 2729 2154 2277 3686 3631 16370 1% Financing companies M/L L 165 497 1571 1325 1793 1048 6399 0% Capital Market Brokerage Houses M M L 368 692 595 897 1215 1088 4855 0% Cargo companies M/L 359 666 740 641 736 345 3487 0% Insurance, reinsurance and pension companies L M/L 361 404 496 529 747 674 3211 0% DPMS M/H M/H 51 138 320 683 1097 2161 4450 0% Intermediaries of Precious metals and stones (jewelers) M/L L M/L 0 0 0 0 1392 717 2109 0% Financing leasing companies M/L L L 12 60 335 302 295 342 1346 0% Dealers of Any Kind of Sea, Air and Land Transportation of vehicles including construction machines M 54 52 60 42 43 15 266 0% Savings finance companies L 0 0 12 13 15 488 528 0% Notaries L L 5 24 22 4 1 3 59 0% REAs M/H L 0 9 2 19 1 6 37 0% Lawyers M/L L 0 2 0 3 3 0 8 0% Asset management companies L 0 0 1 4 1 4 10 0% Independent audit institutions M/L 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0% Portfolio management companies M/L L 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 0% Other*** 1671 2615 2980 0 0 290 7556 0% Total 237531 504995 425322 601555 558595 412334 2740332 100% Note: (*) Risk profile: ratings based on Türkiye’s 2025 NRA (H: high risk; M/H: medium-high risk; M: medium risk; M/L: medium-low risk; L: low risk); (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025); Other**: including 42 STRs from public accountants received between 1 August-28 November 2025. 391. The numbers of STRs received are generally in line with the NRA findings. However, several DNFBPs sectors consistently file low number of STRs even when considered medium risks in the respective NRAs (i.e., exchange offices and DPMS). This raises concerns about the understanding of ML/TF risks obligations within these sectors (see IO.4). 392. Reporting entities submit STRs electronically by filling out an online form, which requires the reporting entity to indicate the underlying associate predicate offence and if the suspicious activity is related to ML, TF or PF, among other relevant information. While submitting the STR, the reporting entity receives automated messages with best practices on how to fill in the information to guarantee and alerts in case some relevant information has not been submitted. This system guarantees comprehensiveness of the information being submitted. 393. As outlined in the table below, the majority of submitted STRs are related to ML and associate predicate offences (99%) including, illegal betting and gambling (32%), tax evasion (24%), and fraud (13%) in line to some extent with the country’s risk profile. However, the number of STRs related to some high-risk or medium high-risk predicate offences remains very low. For instance, between 2020 and 2025, MASAK received only 7961 STRs (0.3%) related to drug trafficking, 13699 on customs smuggling (0.5%) and 5 749 on migrant/human smuggling (0.2%). The low numbers of STRs received against predicate offences categorised as high or medium-high risks indicates reporting entities have challenges in identifying the underlying predicate offence behind the transaction being reported. 394. In addition, TF STRs submissions remain very limited (1%) given Türkiye’s risk profile, particularly across TF high-risk sectors likes banks (10 697 STRs), VASP (1 896 STRs), exchange offices (87 STRs), and payment and e-money institutions (4 747 STRs). Competent authorities explained that the reason behind the low number of submissions on of TF STR corresponds a lesser understanding of TF risk, except for targeted financial obligations, identification of suspicious more generally and complexity of establishing clear links between the transaction being reported (as a silo transaction) and terrorism/TF activity (see IO.3). For this reason, reporting entities revert to submit these STRs under a ML or an associated predicate offence. To overcome this challenge, MASAK implemented a scoring system which allows analysts to reassess the submitted information by cross-checking the information with previous submitted STRs and ongoing analysis on the TF Evaluation and Analysis departments, screening on all the names against the designations lists which allows MASAK to understand- at an early stage of the analysis process- if the isolated reported transaction corresponds to a TF scheme. MASAK identified all TF STRs as high priority. Table 6.2. Breakdown of STRs by possible underlying offence (2020-2025) Suspected offence Risk Profile* 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Total/ offence % of Total Predicate offences Facilitating illegal betting and gambling M/H 78919 311917 112219 161442 144643 126130 935250 32% Tax evasion and tax avoidance M 62768 66543 131016 186992 152866 95782 695967 24% Fraud H 16212 20025 24613 78673 126263 122623 388409 13% Not declaring transactions for someone else’s account 8734 17161 36370 61367 62959 47041 233632 8% Cybercrime 6416 2940 3453 15054 16001 7533 51397 2% Unlicensed payment and electronic money services 1963 3904 6390 10459 13260 8331 44307 2% Offences related to capital markets 973 1610 2538 3927 4476 3990 17514 1% POS usury M/L 1973 1381 1233 2266 5048 8566 20467 1% Forgery of official/private documents M 4719 2097 3113 3713 2678 1484 17804 1% Banking offences 221 364 1400 2610 5850 7869 18304 1% Others*** 72436 88498 116829 105941 63984 22782 470470 16% ML/predicate offence 255334 516440 439174 632424 598028 452131 2893521 98% Terrorism/TF H 1987 2785 2934 4037 3825 3907 19475 1% TF**** H 2217 2757 4164 8520 5956 3898 27512 1% PF M/L 0 0 0 0 38 129 167 0% Note: (*) Risk profile: ratings based on Türkiye’s 2025 NRA (H: high risk; M/H: medium-high risk; M: medium risk; M/L: medium-low risk; L: low risk); (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025).; (***) Others: includes the following predicate offences: Money and valuable document fraud/forgery (13165 STRs); Customs smuggling (13699 STRs); Drug trafficking (7961 STRs); Usury (5355 STRs); Violation of obligations (2508 STRs); Crimes against property (theft, robbery, etc.) 2721( STRs); Migrant smuggling and/or human trafficking (5749 STRs); Smuggling of precious metals and stones (3881 STRs); Illegal bill payment centre activities (3008 STRs); Pyramid selling systems (Ponzi) (1966 STRs); Corruption and offences involving public officials (2667 STRs); Threats/blackmail/force and kidnapping (1748 STRs); Illegal aid and fundraising and solicitation (5589 STRs); Insurance fraud/ policy forgery (1125 STRs); Encouraging or facilitating prostitution (1765 STRs); Misuse of civil society organisation (913 STRs); Fuel smuggling (1859 STRs); Violation of social security legislation (662 STRs); Unauthorised VASP (CASP) activity (929 STRs); Smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, tobacco products (709 STRs); Smuggling of weapons and ammunition (620 STRs); Obscenity (539 STRs); Smuggling of historical artefacts and trade in cultural property (728 STRs); other predicate offences (390604 STRs); (****) the TF STRs number is higher than STRs received under reporting category because a STR received from a obliged entity may include more than one crime. 395. MASAK has carried out activities aimed at increasing the accuracy and quality of STR reporting through training, supervision and workshops, publishing guidelines, and continuously reviewing the automated system messaged to raise awareness on how to submit the STR information. 396. At the analysis phase, MASAK can access- directly and indirectly- additional information, both online and offline, (i.e., personal information, cash declarations/disclosures, criminal records, tax and revenue information, information on personal income, including BO information of legal persons, among others) to verify and complement the STRs information. MASAK can also access MERSIS (legal person’s basic information). A new data base integrated financial intelligence system (EMIS) was implemented in May 2025, from which MASAK analysts can access different layers of information according to the duties they perform and can access and filter the financial information needed case by case. STRs can be cross-checked against the other 300 data bases that integrates MASAK’s data set to conduct the financial analysis, including access to other public institutions data bases, such as the revenue administration data, which keep records regarding economic activities, wealth items, tax liabilities, census information and illegal activities. Furthermore, MASAK can request any public institution, reporting entities, natural and legal persons, and any other organisation to provide all kind of information, documents and related records. These organisations shall fully and accurately provide the information requested including the necessary passwords to access the information or make these records decipherable. 397. MASAK has direct access to cross-border declarations (incoming: 132 699 transactions/ outgoing: 24 071 transactions) and disclosures (incoming: 54 475 transactions/ outgoing: 98 571 transactions) and the information on the number of seizures conducted by Customs Enforcement. If needed, the customs officer can request the passenger information regarding the cash or payment instruments being transported and report to MASAK in case there is a failure in the declaration or disclosure (See IO.8). This information is consistently integrated into the MASAK’s data base. 398. When deemed necessary, MASAK can request information from their counterparts whether through the Egmont Group and/or the bilateral MOUs signed with 66 other jurisdictions. This broadens the scope of the MASAK’s information including foreign-based financial intelligence. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 399. Competent authorities also have access to a broad range of financial and non-financial information through their own databases to support their intelligence and investigative functions. While these databases are generally less comprehensive than MASAK ones, competent authorities can request their counterparts and stakeholders any type of information in the context of an investigation, including financial information hosted on MASAK’s data bases. STR cannot be accessed by other competent authorities other than MASAK, courts during trials and examiners while conducting supervisions. 400. Prosecutors and courts can request MASAK to provide information on STRs in the context of a criminal investigation. In line with confidentiality rules, MASAK will share this information as an intelligence product including an annex of the raw data supporting the report. MASAK products are disseminated via electronic document management systems such as KEP and BELGENET, or by post depending on their level of importance. 401. Competent authorities conduct specific procedures to ensure that the sources of information contain relevant, accurate and up to date data. Public prosecutors and LEAs are legally obliged to supply and usually supply, as gathered from interviews during the onsite visit, the knowledge and documents needed for an ongoing investigation without delay. 402. The GGC, the TNP and the Coast Guard Command (CGC), can also access a broad range of information to perform its functions. TNP and GGC have direct access other competent authorities’ databases and information systems such as UYAP (National Judgement Network Project), KPS (Identity and Address Sharing System), DERBIS (Association Information System), VBYS (Foundation Information Management System). Among other law enforcement units, Customs Enforcement and Coast Guard Command provide access to information and databases related to their fields of duty within the framework of protocols signed with the relevant institutions. Information is exchanged between institutions thanks to these protocols. 403. For TF investigations, specific programs are used by GGC Counter-Terrorism Department (GGC-TEM) personnel to access financial information in a timely manner. In this context, through the KAFES programme they access dates of entry/exit of the person/suspect at the country’s land borders, the amount and type of cash being carried, flight entry/exit information, identification of persons traveling with them, membership information of foundations/associations, to social security institution records and job data in real time. Through the JABS system they also access information’s like individual/suspect's criminal records obtained from UYAP/KİHBİ data, current address, prison entry and exit information and vehicle ownership information. Twelve other programmes are used to examine financial analysis reports obtained from the FIU and to understand the relationship between money transfers and other transactions between individuals/suspects. In addition, GGC (KOM- Fight against Smuggling and Organised Crime) makes use of PARS analyses system that provides them with similar features. 404. For combatting customs smuggling, CEcan access directly the license Plate Recognition System (under a protocol with the TNP); the Vessel Tracking Module (Ministry of Transport); the Port Single Window System; the Decision Support System; the Intelligence Information System; as well as the Automation data of fuel distribution companies transmitted to the Ministry and relevant combatting agencies by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). The GIBINTRANET system (used by Revenue Experts) provides them with access to fiscal data. When filling in a Cash Declaration Form or Cash Disclosure Form, the passenger is requested to provide information and documents verifying the source of the cash (e.g. customs declaration or contract, proforma invoice, invoice, etc., for cash declared as export proceeds) all of them are registered under the Customs Enforcement data base. Customs Enforcement can also access information from other relevant public institutions through protocols and verified via the Cash Control Program, which provides convenience to the personnel entering the data and ensures the reliability of the shared information. 405. Information regarding individuals, companies, goods, and vehicles reported to Public Prosecutor’s Office by the Directorate General is recorded within 24 hours in the Smuggling Information Database for tracking purposes. The unit manager reviews all information that authorised officials enter the Smuggling Information Database, if the information is deemed appropriate the entry is approved and transferred to the system. Information regarding individuals, goods, vehicles, and companies involved in smuggling incidents is also periodically queried by personnel responsible for the program at the Directorate General, and any existing deficiencies are completed based on new information received through feedback. 406. Furthermore, a wide range of data is provided to the competent authorities in an accurate and up-to-date format thanks to the TNP’s EKİP-UYAP system integrations, INTERPOL channels, and the Gendarmerie’s JİKİP-UYAP system integrations. For example, to verify that the information obtained is accurate and up-to-date, LEAs correspond with official institutions such as the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the TRA, the Directorate General of Land Registry and Cadastre, the Turkish Banks Association and the Turkish Notaries Association. Also, the data from different sources, including MASAK, is analysed by LEAs using analysis programmes (Asena, Kafes, Ataç, I2, etc.) to support the production of intelligence which is then effectively utilised during investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 469. Türkiye prioritises asset recovery as a national and operational policy objective at the highest level including through its Judicial Reform Strategy Document (updated in 2025), the Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices (2021-2025), and operational documents and guidelines produced by competent authorities in the context of their duties (for example, the FIU regarding confiscation of VAs). 470. The Judicial Strategy Document is the highest policy document on judicial matters including criminal policies related to asset recovery. Under its Strategic Objective 3 titled “Increasing the Effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System” Türkiye aims at making the necessary arrangements to: (i) solve problems arising from confiscation and seizure in criminal proceedings; (ii) enhance the identification, confiscation and management of the proceeds of crime; and (iii) establish an institutional structure for the purpose of improving Türkiye’s asset recovery systems by examining international examples. The document also includes objectives to strengthen judicial authorities’ human resources and capacities to improve the asset recovery system. 471. Following the guidance in the Judicial Strategy Document, the FIU prepared and published the Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices for the 2021-2025 period emphasising the need for depriving criminals of their proceeds and enhancing financial intelligence capabilities for the implementation of effective seizure and confiscation measures in ML, associate predicate offences, and TF. The implementation of the Strategy is supported by three working groups and sub-groups at a national level which includes all competent authorities relevant to the asset recovery process. 472. As part of its ICRG action plan and beyond, Türkiye has also introduced a performance-based approach to asset recovery, aiming to ensure accountability and institutional efficiency in the implementation of seizure and confiscation measures. To this end, a series of specific, measurable criteria have been established across relevant institutions to clarify mandates and monitor effectiveness in recovering the proceeds of crime. Türkiye’s judicial performance evaluation framework has integrated asset recovery expectations into the core duties of judges and prosecutors. Specifically, it requires public prosecutors to initiate parallel financial investigations in ML/TF cases, apply seizure and confiscation orders proactively, and consider proportional restraint measures to prevent asset dissipation. Integrating asset recovery into performance evaluation mechanisms helps ensure that institutional priorities are internalised at the individual level. By tying prosecutorial and judicial advancement to the effective use of financial investigative tools and confiscation measure. Türkiye fosters a results-oriented culture that reinforces the broader policy objective of depriving proceeds of crime. As a result of the implementation of the performance evaluation over the past two years, forty-seven specialised ML/TF public prosecutors were not promoted because they did not fully meet the performance criteria described above demonstrating the effective application of the system. 473. In addition, the MoJ Circular No. 155/1 prioritises conducting PFIs in line with national risks as part of Türkiye's broader criminal policy and increasing the effectiveness of implementing seizure and confiscation processes, effectively enforce security measures and administrative sanctions for legal entities in cases of ML/TF and ensure specialisation in conducting investigations. This circular is applicable to all public prosecutors and courts in the 81 provinces and is operationally oriented, providing competent authorities with the procedures for the seizure and confiscation of property and funds. Public prosecutors should in all cases: a) Conduct a detailed examination of bank loans, bank and traveller’s checks, remittances, transfers, securities, stocks, VAs, guarantees, bonds, bills, policies, letters of credit and similar assets that can be represented by money or money value, and all kinds of movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, all kinds of goods, rights, receivables and all kinds of economic values, including those in electronic or digital media that certify and represent a property right or interest on them, and determine the assets of persons in close relationship with the suspect; b) Examine whether assets were taken abroad and explore ways to trace them. c) Apply all effective investigative techniques. d) Consider seizure and confiscation of assets at early stages of the prosecution when preparing indictments for ML/TF offences. e) Examining the funding issue separately in the investigations conducted to those suspected of being founder or leadership of a terrorist organisation for TF cases. 474. The practical orientation of the Circular helps to translate national policy goals into day-to-day operational guidance. By providing structured expectations across all provinces and reinforcing them through regular evaluation meetings, the system supports a more coherent and results-driven approach to asset recovery. 475. The MoI also issued a circular to strengthen LEAs practices in effectively combating offences that generate proceeds of crime and ensuring the identification and deprivation of such assets for the benefit of the State. LEAs should: a) Conduct comprehensive financial profiling and asset-tracing activities covering immovables, vehicles, bank accounts, receivables, negotiable instruments, company shares, and other tangible or intangible assets. b) Gather financial intelligence from relevant institutions, particularly MASAK, to support the identification of criminal proceeds and related actors. c) Perform parallel or integrated financial investigations in cases involving predicate offences with potential proceeds, especially those assessed as high or medium risk in the NRA. d) Secure timely seizure of suspected proceeds of crime, ensuring these measures are taken under the legal framework and promptly submitted for judicial approval, as per the CPL and the AML Law. e) Include detailed information in the case file regarding the origin, nature, and estimated value of the assets, including documentation to support confiscation decisions. f) Differentiate assets whose criminal origin cannot be definitively proven to facilitate value-based confiscation and expose potential concealment schemes. g) Refer assets at risk of damage or loss of value for judicial authorisation of pre-conviction disposal to protect both public interest and third-party rights. h) Record the appraised value of seized assets in the national enforcement system (EKIP) and ensure all actions are lawfully executed. 476. The MoI circular also considers asset recovery as a strategic priority and instructs field units in all 81 provinces to act in co-ordination with PPOs. It mandates timely reporting, cross-institutional co-operation, and adherence to procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and effectiveness of all seizure and confiscation measures. 477. The policies implemented to strengthen asset recovery system in Türkiye have progressively translated into tangible operational results. The MoF and MASAK’s internal frameworks have enhanced the systematic use of postponement of transactions, ensuring that freezing measures are applied periodically and effectively following financial analysis. Likewise, the MoJ circulars have reinforced the prioritisation of seizure and confiscation within criminal proceedings, enabling prosecutors and judges to apply these mechanisms more consistently. Overall, these measures demonstrate a clear prioritisation of asset recovery as a policy objective which is positively translating into the operationalisation of asset recovery tools. 8.1.1. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 478. Türkiye demonstrates a robust history of prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective which is complemented by the periodic revision of the legal framework and practices, considering emerging risks, evolving typologies, and international standards. Türkiye’s CBCFC is the competent authority for reviewing the asset recovery regime. Within the CBCFC, the MoJ leads the drafting process for amending policies and legislation and designing new ones, which are then discussed with all relevant authorities, including MASAK, LEAs and PPOs, through the CBCFC Threat Working Group. These multi-agency efforts ensure that asset recovery practices are not static but subject to ongoing review and adjustment. Through annual evaluations, regular data collection, and co-ordinated feedback mechanisms, Türkiye maintains a responsive and evolving confiscation regime that reflects operational realities. 479. As a result of these co-ordination mechanisms, the Judicial Reform Strategy Document (enforced in 2009) was reviewed and followed by strategy documents in 2015 and 2019. Since 2021, the Threats and Vulnerabilities WG hosted twenty-five meetings to discuss amendments to the asset recovery regime resulting in: (i) a full update of the Judicial Reform Strategy Document (covering the years 2025-2029); (ii) the publication of FIU’s Strategy Document for Increasing Effectiveness in AML/CFT and Confiscation Practices for the 2021-2025 period; (iii) adoption of the MoJ Circular 155/1 which resulted in periodic evaluation meetings held by the Directorate General for Criminal Affairs and the PPOs with the objective of keeping the asset recovery system up to date and enhance seizure and confiscation procedures. 480. The period for revision of these documents is not stated in the legislation. However, competent authorities have demonstrated to routinely review them through the above-mentioned mechanisms. 8.1.2. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 481. The CBCFC plays a central role in ensuring co-operation and co-ordination among all AML/CFT relevant competent authorities including in the development of strategies and mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts, reviewing draft legislation and strengthening interagency co-operation when implementing asset recovery strategies. The CBCFC is chaired by the MoTF and integrated by policy and operational AML/CFT authorities at the highest level (Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Organisation, General Director of Financial Markets and Foreign Exchange, Head of the Tax Inspection Board, Head of the Financial Crimes Investigation Board, MoJ Director General of Criminal Affairs, MFA Director General of Intelligence and Security, MoT Director General of Customs Enforcement, BRSA Deputy Chairman and the TNP Deputy director General) which demonstrates Türkiye’s integral approach to the development of asset recovery criminal policies. Most of legislations revisions were conducted between 2023-2025 and their implementation have recently started to show positive results with an increment of 50% of FIU’s financial reports on proceeds of crimes in 2024, over 75% of postponement of transactions and 90% of files subject to seizure and confiscation issued between 2023-2025. 482. This interagency co-operation approach is also translated into operational levels through the implementation of asset recovery criminal policies in investigations and prosecutions. In all stages of ML/TF investigations and prosecutions, competent authorities are required to register all information related to the proceeds of crimes and their status (seized or confiscated) in the UYAP which facilitates operational authorities searches all kinds of data (such as amount, quantity, type, value, etc.) and documents of assets taken under custody, seized or confiscated, enhancing the co-ordination mechanisms between prosecutors, LEAs and authorities managing the seized and confiscated assets, including tax authorities. 483. Operational findings and contribution of LEAs (TNP, GGC and CE) and MASAK are also regularly informed to the MoJ with the aim of keeping these frameworks up to date in alliance to the operational trends. This allows a continuous assessment and supports a more responsive and impactful regime flexible enough to adapt to the changing nature of criminal threats providing effective and timely responses to prevent the dissipation of illegal proceeds of crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. Türkiye prosecutes and convicts a broad range of TF activities, largely in line with its identified TF risk profile relating to designated terrorist organisations. 557. Türkiye has increased TF prosecutions since the previous MER 2019, from 1 913 cases in 2013–2017 to 2 524 cases in 2021–2025, of which approximately 10% involved legal persons. Nearly half of the prosecuted cases are related to ISIL/AQ (43%) and the rest are related to domestic designated organisations PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (26%), FETÖ (22%) and DHKP-C (6%) in line with the country’s risk profile relating to designated TOs. Türkiye did not present prosecutions relating to cases linked to terrorist organisations or networks that are neither listed under UNSCRs nor designated at the domestic level but relevant to Türkiye’s TF risk exposure. The majority of prosecutions involved the use of banking channels (46%), followed by cash courier activities (25%), abuse of legal persons (13%) and licensed MVTS (6%) and hawala-type transfers (5%). [39] Table 9.4. Number of TF prosecutions (2021-2025)* 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** TF offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) TO No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects No. Prosecutions No. Suspects ISIL/AQ 73 155 206 320 204 313 245 405 366 605 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 187 318 142 205 93 186 125 179 116 194 FETO 110 235 72 145 124 350 107 147 135 389 DHKP-C 1 1 18 27 31 34 69 69 39 99 Other 10 22 18 36 12 32 7 14 14 17 Total 381 731 456 733 464 915 553 814 670 1304 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation 448 563 567 669 113 156 92 117 59 56 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation 24 279 28 392 16 291 19 013 10060 13127 7806 9557 5311 6902 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation 23 45 15 34 15 24 4 9 9 24 Total 24750 29000 16873 19716 10188 13307 7902 9683 5379 6982 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 558. When a TF offence is evident alongside other terrorism-related crimes, such as membership in a terrorist organisation or providing arms or support, the public prosecutor determines the charges to be brought before the court. TF offences may be, and in practice have been, prosecuted concurrently with other terrorism-related offences, and it is ultimately for the judge to decide which charge aligns best with the evidence. 559. In cases where the TF offence can be coupled with membership, leadership or provision of weapons to an armed TO, the principle of concurrent offences applies, covering situations where a perpetrator meets the criteria for multiple penal provisions. Where evidence supports both TF and predicate terrorism offences, courts tend to prioritise terrorism-related charges, which carry heavier penalties than TF alone (see analysis under section 9.4). In such cases, TF conduct is often used as corroborative evidence of terrorist organisation membership. 560. Türkiye has substantially increased TF convictions since the previous MER, from 53 cases in 2013-2017 to 418 cases in 2021-2025 [40] , almost an eightfold increase, with 52% related to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG, 32% to ISIL/AQ, 10% to FETÖ and 2% to DHKP-C and others. These convictions resulted in 584 convicted persons, the vast majority of whom were Turkish nationals (547). In line with the TF risk profile in relation to designated TOs, 49% of convicted persons were linked to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG and 32% to ISIL/AQ. Table 9.5. Number of TF convictions (2021-2025)* 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** TF offence (Law no.6415 Art.4/1) TO Convictions Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons Conviction Convicted persons ISIL/AQ 5 20 13 18 38 51 39 52 43 47 PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG 16 24 129 132 42 51 19 46 20 33 FETO 5 13 4 4 9 10 15 50 11 23 DHKP-C 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 1 Other 0 0 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 Total 26 57 147 155 95 118 74 149 76 105 Terrorism (TCL, Arts. 314/1, 314/2 and 315) Leadership to an armed terrorist organisation 99 109 67 75 56 60 43 50 37 36 Membership to an armed terrorist organisation 19241 22803 13541 16143 9465 11110 6919 8128 6637 7570 Providing weapons to an armed terrorist organisation 39 47 25 42 24 38 10 13 8 8 Total 19379 22959 13633 16260 9545 11208 6972 8191 6682 7614 Note: (*) Data for 2020 were unavailable and are not reflected in the table; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 561. Türkiye has demonstrated the ability to prosecute and convict a wide range of TF activities. Approximately 90% of TF convictions relate to the provision of funds to terrorist organisations, predominantly PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG (57%), ISIL/AQ (28%) and FETÖ (13%). In contrast, the collection and use of funds account for a smaller proportion of convictions (10%), with nearly 60% linked to ISIL/AQ and 21% to PKK/KCK-PYD/YPG. This suggests that authorities are more effective in cases with a clear and direct nexus to a TO, while more complex TF typologies are prosecuted less frequently. The majority of convictions (76%) involved domestic fund movements, with the remaining 24% involving cross-border transactions. 562. Competent authorities acknowledge that a key challenge in securing TF convictions lies in establishing the requisite mens rea , particularly where funds are raised through small-scale, unauthorised social media campaigns presented as charitable causes, and where transaction amounts are low. In such cases, prosecutors rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate terrorist intent. Between 2021 and 2025 (Nov), Türkiye identified 59 cases in which prosecutions were initially initiated under TF offences but ultimately resulted in convictions for membership in an armed TO. Occasionally, these outcomes stemmed from a deliberate strategy by prosecutors, whereas in other instances they arose from pursuing alternative offences to achieve greater penalties. 563. While TF activity is subject to significant prosecution and conviction efforts, case studies and statistics point to uneven outcomes across the full risk profile. In particular, outcomes are less clearly demonstrated for TBTF, procurement networks, complex legal person structures, foreign-created legal persons and foreign legal arrangements, and TF activity linked to relevant non-designated terrorist organisations or networks. This is an important limitation in effectiveness, notwithstanding the high number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions overall. Footnotes [39] Türkiye analyses MVTS and Hawala as two different concepts for statistics purposes. Due to the methodology applied, a single case may fall under more than one sector and/or typology of abuse. [40] 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 426. Türkiye’s competent authorities have close formal and informal co-operation mechanisms in place to exchange financial intelligence and other relevant information to pursue ML/TF investigations and prosecutions. Through different case studies, public prosecutors, LEAs (in particular, TNP and GGC) and MASAK have demonstrated to formally share information on daily basis through the UYAP system but also through case-specific strategy co-ordination round tables. Close ad hoc and formal interagency co-operation mechanisms between MASAK and competent authorities have proven to facilitate the exchange of financial intelligence leading to the disruption of large criminal networks and high-impact outcomes on investigations. 427. Due to MASAK’s pivotal role in the AML/CFT/CPF system, they received 9 600 information sharing requests and fulfilled 5 628 (59%) between 2020 and2025. From which, the majority corresponds to information sharing requests from public prosecutors (41%), TNP (24%) and other ministries (12%), indicating the fluid interagency exchange of information for operational purposes. MASAK’s prioritises TF and urgent operations requests but also has an established prioritisation system based on the risk country profile. All competent authorities highlighted the role, quality and timing of MASAK’s responses as adding great value to pursue complex ML/TF/PF investigations including with transnational element. Table 6.9. MASAK’s number of initiated and fulfilled information sharing requests (2020-2025) Requesting competent authority 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025** Initiated* fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled initiated fulfilled PPO 479 237 1804 370 280 277 318 193 412 262 671 308 Ministries 123 209 189 287 145 275 181 222 161 205 130 203 TNP 269 99 287 110 342 124 437 115 523 151 428 86 Courts 50 72 344 181 90 120 34 48 44 89 62 81 TIB 16 11 19 43 22 41 18 16 12 31 21 50 CMB 76 21 129 24 125 65 93 52 72 13 31 5 CBRT 8 13 18 16 16 20 14 21 22 33 23 44 Customs Enforcement 2 2 18 16 15 50 7 16 1 3 2 5 GGC 11 0 11 4 16 9 32 5 42 21 39 7 BRSA 12 20 15 6 12 1 6 7 8 4 3 3 Other 36 71 85 95 139 130 155 93 179 103 216 114 Total 1082 755 2919 1152 1202 1112 1295 788 1476 915 1626 906 Note: (*) the numbers under the “initiated” category may also include letters received in response to request for information sharing submitted by MASAK to competent authorities; (**) 2025 figures reflect information available up to the end of the on‑site visit (November 2025). 428. Through the signature of 32 MoUs, MASAK can directly access other 32 competent authorities’ databases (i.e., TNP, MoI, MoT, MoJ, Risk centre of Banks Association in Türkiye, among others), which also enhances the exchange of information for the development of financial intelligence and creates a robust roster of information. TNP and GGC also have direct access other competent authorities’ databases and information systems such as UYAP, KPS, DERBIS and VBYS Among other LEAs, CE and CGC provide access to information and databases related to their fields of duty within the framework of protocols signed with the relevant institutions. Information is exchanged between institutions thanks to these protocols. 429. All LEAs can form joint task forces for a specific case or an issue. For example, a joint task force has been established under customs to combat fuel smuggling with the involvement of TNP, GGC, and TIB and MASAK. Specialised public prosecutors discuss complex cases with the FIU in daily basis, and all LEAs, prosecutors and MASAK can and do form joint investigation teams for specific cases or the study of an emerging trend. Even MASAK’s officials have been temporarily assigned to work on LEAs offices when the complexity of the case required it. 430. Furthermore, competent authorities can exchange of information with its foreign counterparts either through a liaison officer or secure international IT system (such as Egmont Secure Web), encrypted communication for non-Egmont member, or as members specific operational networks (such as CARIN and INTERPOL). 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 431. To protect the information’s confidentiality, competent authorities exchange the information through encrypted integrated judicial information systems. During investigations, all competent authorities are obliged not to disclose any information attained by FIU staff, examiners and members of CBCFC during their in-service activities. 432. All information subject to dissemination are considered as official documents and are subject to confidentiality measures. Both MASAK and competent authorities apply robust legal, technical, and operational safeguards to ensure that all exchanged information is protected by strict confidentiality and used securely and appropriately. For example, MASAK’s products that are disseminated to the competent authorities through the UYAP system, Recorded Electronic Post System (KEP) and BELGENET, or by post depending on their level of importance. Furthermore, the FIU keeps its IT systems up to date to prevent leaks of information and have also established protocols to exchange information with FIs and DNFBPs supervisory authorities, which has been certified through TS ISO/IEC 27001, including physical environment and data security. MASAK stores data in both the database and an isolated network infrastructure and have established a disaster recovery program with high security protocol. 433. MASAK secures the information based on three pillars: a) Information security processes: established information security policies to protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets, supported by ISO 27001-based risk management, continuity plans, and awareness activities. A multi-layered security approach was implemented, including user authentication, IT infrastructure protection, network security, and continuous monitoring and audits. b) Security of physical environments: access to IT areas and the data centre is strictly controlled through ID cards, face recognition, and supervision, with all entries recorded. The data centre is secured with physical barriers, fire protection, environmental monitoring, redundant systems, and a separate business continuity site. Confidential documents are locked, visitor access is restricted, and personnel follow Clean Desk policies, ensuring security and operational continuity. c) Data security: the access to information is categorised and limited based on functional groups and departmental hierarchy, ensuring role-specific permissions and controlled workflows. Information sharing is secured through electronic systems like KEP, MOS, BELGENET, and ESW, with strict confidentiality protocols. Encryption using symmetric and public keys protects data integrity during exchanges with judicial authorities and FIUs. Other additional security measures include closing USB ports, administrator-controlled file transfers, and monitored personal folders for secure internal and external sharing. 434. Other competent authorities can request information from MASAK data base through the UYAP system, which contains encryptions features to guarantee the confidentiality when transmitting the information. However, it is not clear how the information is preserved once disseminated to other authorities. 435. All competent authorities involved in joint investigation processes adhere to the correspondence procedures outlined within the scope of the Regulation on the Procedure of Official Correspondence. The institutions constituting the task force distribute the information and documents they have prepared as hard copies or soft copies based on confidentiality levels, and in addition, the relevant institutions are required to carry out the necessary IT infrastructure for the protection of this information and documents." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="505. Türkiye has mechanisms in place to manage and dispose of frozen and seized property. However, it was not possible to assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms in relation to the assets value preservation due to lack of information provided on this specific aspect though Türkiye has several measures that authorities have to apply to preserve value, such as sale of assets and using interest bearing accounts as explained below. 506. The procedures concerning the criminal properties are carried out by the Depository Bureau under the surveillance and control of the Chief PPO. Depository Bureaus are available in the 81 provinces. Immovable properties resulting in seizures are registered in the UYAP system under the name of the Public Treasury by the General Directorate of National Property (GDNP). In the case of movable assets, the judicial authority conducting the investigation (public prosecutor or LEAs) ensures the safe storage and inventory of items seized. Once released from judicial custody, these items are received, stored, and classified by the GDNP. Depending on the type of asset, appropriate actions such as storage, destruction, allocation to a public institution, or liquidation can be taken. When the administration of seized immovable, rights, and credits is necessary, a receiver may be appointed for the administration of these assets. 507. Türkiye applies different strategies to manage seized assets depending on the type of assets: a) Receivers’ appointments: these applies to the administration of seized immovable, rights, credits and companies. The judge instructs the receiver to preserve the asset value in accordance with the practices and standards observed by a prudent trader, up to five years, safeguarding its integrity and market value. a. For seizure companies in ML/TF cases, assets are managed under the supervision of Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The receiver will administrate the company to preserve its legitimate business. If the company’s financial situation, partnership structure or market conditions requires, the receiver can request the sale of the company (totally or partially), its assets, or the companies’ liquidation. Sale and liquidation procedures are carried out by the relevant company's board of directors/managers or receivers or the SDIF. The consent of minority shareholders is not required for sale and liquidation proceedings. After the debts have been paid at the end of the dissolution and liquidation proceedings, the remaining amount shall be held in an account bearing interest until the proceedings are finally concluded. Once the case reaches to conviction and confiscation, the ownership of the company is transposed to Türkiye’s government (Ministry of Treasury). MoT assesses the asset and chooses between continuing managing the company and liquidating it. If the liquidation is decided, the company is sold, and the gain goes into the general administration budget. b) Between 2021-2025, a total of 815 companies and businesses were subject to SDIF's receiver administration, including 480 joint stock companies, 273 limited companies, and 62 other types of companies and businesses. c) Liquidation of the asset or legal persons: this measure is applied when there is a likelihood that a seized item will be damaged or suffer a substantial loss of value, the item in question may be liquidated before final judgment. d) PPOs custody applies for the movable assets subject to seizure. While cash is immediately deposited in an interest-generating bank account, gold, precious stones and equipment that must be physically preserved are taken in custody warehouses until the criminal investigation is finished and the confiscation or devolution is ordered. e) For VAs, since June 2025, public prosecutors are instructed to sell all VAs seized at market price, convert them into TRY and immediately deposit the cash into an interest-generating bank account without waiting for the completion of the investigation and prosecution. Before, public prosecutors transferred the VAs into public wallets under the PPOs. The new management system was enacted considering the high-risk of VAs, their volatile nature and the of the risk in VA based in the strategy document to enhance the fight against ML/TF. f) Goods that are seized or confiscated and/or abandoned at the Customs Enforcement facilities are transferred to Treasury and subjected to liquidation. For these cases, the liquidation procedures are carried out by the General Directorate of Liquidation Services (TASİŞ), a revolving fund enterprise operating under the Ministry of Trade. TASİŞ is responsible for the sale (via e-auction, public auction, or retail), allocation to public institutions, destruction, or recycling of such goods. Sales are conducted both electronically through online and physically at designated retail stores operated by TASİŞ. Goods deemed unsuitable or hazardous to health are destroyed in accordance with environmental regulations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 608. FIs and VASPs have a generally good understanding of their TF TFS obligations, including their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay. A guidance on TFS obligations for reporting entities was published in 2022 and competent authorities are in the process of updating it. Understanding of TFS obligations has also been supported via trainings and outreach activities. 609. FI and VASPs rely on international monitoring programs and apply daily screening to their customer database. In some instances, FIs have identified and frozen terrorist funds and other related assets, including those owned, controlled or held by individuals acting on behalf of designated entities. This is indicative of financial institutions understanding of their TFS obligations. 610. Smaller FIs, as well as capital markets institutions and NBFIs mostly rely on manual screening. Concerns arise in the timely implementation of TFS obligations for FIs and VASPs that do not use commercial databases that automatically update sanctions lists. While this is likely marginal for banks and VASPs, most other FIs rely on manual screening, the lack of systematic updates can cause delays in TFS compliance. In addition, exchange offices and MVTS interviewed by the AT during the onsite visit mostly screen customers at the onboarding stage but monitor their ongoing business relationship to a lesser extent which also creates concerns, especially in light of the exposure of those sectors to TF abuse. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 611. Apart from some entities, DNFBPs have in general a limited understanding of their TF TFS obligations, especially with regard the need to implement those obligations without delay. DPMS and REAs considered that the structure of their client relationship (mostly single transaction) exposes them to less risks in terms of TFS, while accountants and legal professions consider that having well-known databases of customers mitigate their risks. While DNFBPs are mostly aware that TFS lists can be consulted on MASAK website, there were shortcomings in the understanding of what TFS decisions relate to and the scope to whom those decisions would apply to, which is not limited to foreign individuals (some mentioned “foreigners”). Furthermore, most DNFBPs met during the onsite visit considered that their exposure to TFS risks was minimal as they perform transactions through the banking system, so the reliance on other reporting entities is seen as a major mitigator of their risk. This is a concern as it prevents sound implementation of TFS requirements. 612. DNFBPs only perform screening at the onboarding stage which is not in line with their TFS obligations. While direct notification process exists, most DNFBPs rely on manual checks of the UN and MASAK websites. Not all entities are aware nor subscribed to MASAK’s notification system. This can create challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are updated in a timely manner. The fact that no DNFBP has reported potential matches, despite Türkiye’s active use of domestic designations, is a concern on the limited understanding and compliance of the sector with TF TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 613. Türkiye is monitoring FIs and VASPs compliance on TF TFS to some extent. In line with its 2021 ICRG Action Plan, Türkiye implemented a risk-based approach for monitoring reporting entities compliance with TFS obligations, by developing separate supervision programmes based on a separate risk analysis specifically for TFS monitoring, both in terms of TF and PF. On an annual basis, competent authorities assess reporting entities risk level for TFS compliance taking into consideration several factors such as control measures applied by reporting entities, asset size, outcome of previous inspections. Within each sector, reporting entities are then categorised into high/medium and low TFS risk and authorities conduct onsite inspections to all high risks entities and some medium risks. Apart from planned inspections, if evidence emerges that an obligated party has violated the sanctions, that party is supervised independently of the program, and sanctions are imposed in case of violation. Periodic inquiries are also conducted to determine whether individuals and legal entities on asset freeze lists have committed any violations following the freeze decision. 614. As a result, between 2022 to 2024, Türkiye has inspected over 500 FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on their compliance with TFS obligations, out of which all high risks entities from each sector have been monitored. Almost 300 FIs and VASPs have been inspected with 25 entities found to have been violating TFS obligations. No distinction has been provided to the assessment team on specific TF TFS obligations monitoring and violations. Compliance with those obligations has increased over the reporting period for financial institutions and VASPs that have been inspected. Cases where FIs violations have been identified by supervisors mostly relate to persons whose assets were frozen having multiple names or their names could be typed in various ways which lead the names not to match with the one used by the reporting entity. In cases where co-ordination between the compliance and operational units could be further strengthened, FIs receive a formal warning notification. 615. Despite having followed a RBA, over the reporting period Türkiye has only monitored compliance with TFS obligations for approximately 20% of FIs through dedicated supervision programmes which represents a limited portion of the entire sector. In addition, the amount of the sanctions applied for TFS violations is low and does not appear to be dissuasive nor proportionate. Table 10.4. TFS supervisory actions Sector 2022 2023 2024 High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR *1 000) High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR*1 000) High Medium risks Supervised obliged entities Number of obliged entities in violation Fines (EUR*1 000) Banks 17 17 4 181 21 16 5 190 33 16 1 2 Factoring / Leasing / Financing Companies 22 8 0 0 52 13 0 0 41 12 0 0 Capital Market Intermediaries 10 10 0 0 25 10 0 0 22 10 0 0 Portfolio management companies &amp; Investment Partnerships 2 2 0 0 14 2 0 0 5 1 0 0 Insurance Companies 11 8 4 6 26 8 2 6 33 8 0 0 MVTS 16 16 3 18 24 13 4 11 22 14 1 1 EOs 146 30 0 0 121 29 0 0 110 31 1 3 VASPs -- - - - 25 10 0 0 23 10 0 0 FIs total 224 90 11 205 308 101 11 207 289 102 3 6 REAs 107 10 0 0 115 16 0 0 82 17 0 0 DPMS 200 55 0 0 216 51 0 0 241 58 1 114 DNFBPs total 307 65 0 0 331 67 0 0 323 75 1 114 Total 531 155 11 205 639 168 11 207 612 177 4 120 10.5.2. DNFBPs 616. As described above, authorities developed risk-based supervisory programmes to specifically monitor compliance with TFS obligations for reporting entities. For DNFBPs, those supervisory activities covered approximately 200 entities, including all high and some medium risks DPMS and real estate agents. Only one entity within the DPMS and REAs sector was found as violating its TF TFS obligations within the reporting period. This result does not fully align with the overall low level of understanding of TFS obligations across those sectors. 617. Overall, only a marginal portion of DNFBPs have been monitored against their TFS obligations, this finding coupled with the deficiencies in the understanding of TFS obligations, increase the risk of potential abuse of the DNFBP sector by designated persons or entities. There was no supervision of compliance with TFS obligations for accountants, lawyers and notaries. Given the shortcomings in TFS understanding of those sectors, the absence of supervision is concerning." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 619. Türkiye has several co-ordination bodies in relation to combatting proliferation and its financing. Those mechanisms demonstrated effectiveness in setting up several recent policy objectives and documents. The main one is regular interagency co-ordination meetings held under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These meetings in the larger format bringing together around 20 government agencies and relevant authorities are organized regularly at least twice a year, while meetings in smaller formats are organized more frequently throughout the year, even at short notice, with the aim of assessing non-proliferation related issues as well as export controls, enabling regular meetings with various formats. Türkiye also has the NTFPF for the interagency co-ordination meetings is broader than the scope of PF as per the FATF definition. Under the leadership of the MFA, frequent interagency co-ordination meetings in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and export controls are taking place. 620. Following the adoption of its PF Law (7262) in December 2020 and Regulation on PF (RoPF) in March 2021, Türkiye also established the Commission of Supervision and Co-operation on PF (referred to as the “PF Commission”). Under the leadership of MASAK, the PF Commission gathers representatives from 12 government agencies, most of whom are also members of the NTFPF in addition to three supervisors (BRSA, CMB and Treasury). The PF Commission’s mandate is centred on monitoring the implementation of PF related TFS in Türkiye. In addition, a CPF Working Group, under the supervision of the PF Commission, has been established at experts’ level in 2025 to specifically assess PF threats and vulnerabilities and support PF risk assessment work. 621. Türkiye has demonstrated effective co-operation and co-ordination to design policies to CFWMD. Their effective implementation could not be assessed by the AT at the time of the onsite visit due to their recent establishment. The PF Commission developed the national PF Strategy Document (2025 - 2029) and Türkiye’s first PF NRA (2025) and both documents were published in 2025. The PF Strategy focuses on both the financing of proliferation of WMD and PF risk mitigation, centred around four main objectives namely i) strengthening national co-ordination; ii) enhancing international co-operation; iii) developing supervision mechanisms and iv) ensuring an up-to-date PF NRA. In addition to the PF Strategy, under the lead of MoFA an operational “In-Service Guide on Combating the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” was prepared in September and disseminated to the relevant ministries and Turkish missions abroad. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 622. Overall, Türkiye’s competent authorities demonstrate good co-operation and co-ordination for operational purposes in CFWMD . There is a complementary relationship between the NTFPF and the PF Commission. While the NTFPF primarily focuses on counter-proliferation and export controls, several of its members including MFA, MoT, Intelligence Organisation, Nuclear Regulatory Authority are also members of the PF Commission which focuses on PF related TFS. Hence, authorities involved in monitoring PF TFS are well aware of broader proliferation and financing of proliferation of WMD typologies. 623. Türkiye has established a comprehensive export, import and transit control strategy and framework on dual-use goods and technologies, supported by the operational co-ordination of the various government institutions. The MoT is the authority in charge of monitoring potential unauthorised transfer of dual-use goods and uses different methods (intelligence, profile targeting, inspections) as well as an automated pre-warning system to detect such goods. The PF Commission established lists of dual-use products and “sensitive goods”, with a clear list of criteria, for stricter monitoring to be applied for the export or transit of such goods. If there is a suspicion an assessment is made based on the documents showing the technical characteristics of the item and the documents showing the buyer. Opinions from other competent authorities, including foreign counterparts, are frequently asked for according to the nature of the goods. A similar process applies to goods in transit. 624. For DPRK, by law, the sale of any dual-use goods is prohibited and there were no trade relations with DPRK over the reporting period. 625. Türkiye's exports to Iran accounted for approximately 1.2% of the country's total exports and 10% of Iran's total imports in the 2021-2023 period. Iran became Türkiye's 21st largest export partner However, authorities consider that the share of electronics, machinery, chemical and metal products, is close to 40% of which 7% are considered to be sensitive in exports to Iran, including dual-use goods. Since 2019, a total of 33 export authorisation applications for export permits of potential dual-use or sensitive goods exported to Iran or transiting via Türkiye to Iran have been made, including transit of nuclear products. The export of nuclear and dual-use items are subject to prior authorisation from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which has not issued any nuclear export permits to Iran since 2019. The MoT authorised 16 of these export authorisation applications, while the remaining 17 were rejected. The authorisations were delivered for goods which would not fall within the dual use category and when needed, where reassurance was provided by the exporting country/institution. Türkiye’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority is always consulted before allowing transit authorisation of nuclear products. Box 11.1. Trade and export controls case studies Case study 1 : Based on information received from relevant institutions, a cargo containing 423 “electronic parts” originating from Country A was to be sent from Country B to Iran through Türkiye. The cargo was halted upon the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goods were detected to be listed as part of international PF lists and their transfer to Iran was subject to the authorisation of UNSC including for transit passages. In addition, the country of origin (Country A) did not permit the sale and shipping of the goods. Based on the intelligence that the content of the cargo may be used for Iran’s ballistic missile program, the shipping was ceased pursuant to the obligations required under relevant UNSCR and the goods were returned to the sending country (Country B). Case study 2 : Turbojet engines were to be sent from Country C to Iran with transit passage in Türkiye. No information was found to verify the shipping neither by Iranian nor Country C authorities. Further examination did not allow to conclude that purchasing company existed in the name provided nor that it was active. On that basis, the transit shipping was not allowed. Case study 3 : Dual-use goods of other country of origin were planned to be transited via Türkiye to a third country (country D), known as having trade relationship with DPRK. Suspicions emerged due to the specificities of the materials to be transited via Türkiye. As a result of co-operation between competent authorities and information gathering it was concluded that the end user in country E presented a risk of resending the materials to DPRK and the shipment was not allowed. Competent authorities in countries D and E were also informed of the reasons for not allowing the shipment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 619. Türkiye has several co-ordination bodies in relation to combatting proliferation and its financing. Those mechanisms demonstrated effectiveness in setting up several recent policy objectives and documents. The main one is regular interagency co-ordination meetings held under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These meetings in the larger format bringing together around 20 government agencies and relevant authorities are organized regularly at least twice a year, while meetings in smaller formats are organized more frequently throughout the year, even at short notice, with the aim of assessing non-proliferation related issues as well as export controls, enabling regular meetings with various formats. Türkiye also has the NTFPF for the interagency co-ordination meetings is broader than the scope of PF as per the FATF definition. Under the leadership of the MFA, frequent interagency co-ordination meetings in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and export controls are taking place. 620. Following the adoption of its PF Law (7262) in December 2020 and Regulation on PF (RoPF) in March 2021, Türkiye also established the Commission of Supervision and Co-operation on PF (referred to as the “PF Commission”). Under the leadership of MASAK, the PF Commission gathers representatives from 12 government agencies, most of whom are also members of the NTFPF in addition to three supervisors (BRSA, CMB and Treasury). The PF Commission’s mandate is centred on monitoring the implementation of PF related TFS in Türkiye. In addition, a CPF Working Group, under the supervision of the PF Commission, has been established at experts’ level in 2025 to specifically assess PF threats and vulnerabilities and support PF risk assessment work. 621. Türkiye has demonstrated effective co-operation and co-ordination to design policies to CFWMD. Their effective implementation could not be assessed by the AT at the time of the onsite visit due to their recent establishment. The PF Commission developed the national PF Strategy Document (2025 - 2029) and Türkiye’s first PF NRA (2025) and both documents were published in 2025. The PF Strategy focuses on both the financing of proliferation of WMD and PF risk mitigation, centred around four main objectives namely i) strengthening national co-ordination; ii) enhancing international co-operation; iii) developing supervision mechanisms and iv) ensuring an up-to-date PF NRA. In addition to the PF Strategy, under the lead of MoFA an operational “In-Service Guide on Combating the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” was prepared in September and disseminated to the relevant ministries and Turkish missions abroad. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 622. Overall, Türkiye’s competent authorities demonstrate good co-operation and co-ordination for operational purposes in CFWMD . There is a complementary relationship between the NTFPF and the PF Commission. While the NTFPF primarily focuses on counter-proliferation and export controls, several of its members including MFA, MoT, Intelligence Organisation, Nuclear Regulatory Authority are also members of the PF Commission which focuses on PF related TFS. Hence, authorities involved in monitoring PF TFS are well aware of broader proliferation and financing of proliferation of WMD typologies. 623. Türkiye has established a comprehensive export, import and transit control strategy and framework on dual-use goods and technologies, supported by the operational co-ordination of the various government institutions. The MoT is the authority in charge of monitoring potential unauthorised transfer of dual-use goods and uses different methods (intelligence, profile targeting, inspections) as well as an automated pre-warning system to detect such goods. The PF Commission established lists of dual-use products and “sensitive goods”, with a clear list of criteria, for stricter monitoring to be applied for the export or transit of such goods. If there is a suspicion an assessment is made based on the documents showing the technical characteristics of the item and the documents showing the buyer. Opinions from other competent authorities, including foreign counterparts, are frequently asked for according to the nature of the goods. A similar process applies to goods in transit. 624. For DPRK, by law, the sale of any dual-use goods is prohibited and there were no trade relations with DPRK over the reporting period. 625. Türkiye's exports to Iran accounted for approximately 1.2% of the country's total exports and 10% of Iran's total imports in the 2021-2023 period. Iran became Türkiye's 21st largest export partner However, authorities consider that the share of electronics, machinery, chemical and metal products, is close to 40% of which 7% are considered to be sensitive in exports to Iran, including dual-use goods. Since 2019, a total of 33 export authorisation applications for export permits of potential dual-use or sensitive goods exported to Iran or transiting via Türkiye to Iran have been made, including transit of nuclear products. The export of nuclear and dual-use items are subject to prior authorisation from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which has not issued any nuclear export permits to Iran since 2019. The MoT authorised 16 of these export authorisation applications, while the remaining 17 were rejected. The authorisations were delivered for goods which would not fall within the dual use category and when needed, where reassurance was provided by the exporting country/institution. Türkiye’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority is always consulted before allowing transit authorisation of nuclear products. Box 11.1. Trade and export controls case studies Case study 1 : Based on information received from relevant institutions, a cargo containing 423 “electronic parts” originating from Country A was to be sent from Country B to Iran through Türkiye. The cargo was halted upon the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goods were detected to be listed as part of international PF lists and their transfer to Iran was subject to the authorisation of UNSC including for transit passages. In addition, the country of origin (Country A) did not permit the sale and shipping of the goods. Based on the intelligence that the content of the cargo may be used for Iran’s ballistic missile program, the shipping was ceased pursuant to the obligations required under relevant UNSCR and the goods were returned to the sending country (Country B). Case study 2 : Turbojet engines were to be sent from Country C to Iran with transit passage in Türkiye. No information was found to verify the shipping neither by Iranian nor Country C authorities. Further examination did not allow to conclude that purchasing company existed in the name provided nor that it was active. On that basis, the transit shipping was not allowed. Case study 3 : Dual-use goods of other country of origin were planned to be transited via Türkiye to a third country (country D), known as having trade relationship with DPRK. Suspicions emerged due to the specificities of the materials to be transited via Türkiye. As a result of co-operation between competent authorities and information gathering it was concluded that the end user in country E presented a risk of resending the materials to DPRK and the shipment was not allowed. Competent authorities in countries D and E were also informed of the reasons for not allowing the shipment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="162. Beyond formal MLA, Türkiye generally makes extensive and appropriate use of other forms of international co-operation to seek information and assistance for inter alia, AML/CFT purposes, the identification of suspects, understanding complex ownership structures and supporting asset tracing. A broad range of competent authorities are involved, including FIU, LEAs, supervisory authorities and customs as well as tax authorities, each using channels relevant to its mandates. 2.3.1. FIU 163. MASAK plays a central role in seeking international co-operation through FIU-to-FIU channels, primarily via the Egmont Secure Web and where relevant, alternative secure arrangements with non-Egmont counterparts. MASAK demonstrated that it consistently seeks and receives a wide range of information, including financial intelligence, transaction data, account information as well as basic and BO information. Requests are clearly linked to a broad range of predicate offences, including fraud, drug trafficking, tax crimes, corruption, customs smuggling, illegal betting and gambling, TF, sanctions violations and virtual assets related offences; crimes which align with the risks identified under the NRA. In this context, requests are made to the relevant countries based on prioritisation in accordance with the Egmont Principles and FATF standards. MASAK’s extensive direct access to domestic databases enhances its ability to formulate targeted requests and make effective use of information received from abroad. 164. MASAK’s international co-operation is operationally embedded in its legislative framework and approximately 67 MOUs with foreign FIUs, (Egmont Group Members and non-members). Exchanges include incoming, outgoing and spontaneous submissions. This form of co-operation supports domestic analysis and operational decision-making and is not limited to reactive or ad hoc use . In the analysis, assessment and investigation of ML and TF offences, when foreign connections are identified regarding individuals and/or transactions, requests for information are made to foreign financial intelligence units promptly. When MASAK requests information from foreign counterpart financial intelligence units or shares information on its own initiative, there are rules that must be observed in accordance with national legislation and the Egmont Principles of Information Sharing. Furthermore, prioritising areas identified as high-risk through analyses and assessments conducted by MASAK or other competent authorities during information sharing enhances national effectiveness in combating ML and TF. In this regard, the following elements must be specifically considered and prioritised in both information requests and spontaneous sharing: · Cases involving threat actors identified in NRA reports as having a medium or higher risk level regarding TF and ML; · Cases involving sectors identified in NRA reports as having a medium or higher vulnerability risk level regarding TF and ML; · Requests requiring the postponement of transactions; · Requests involving legal entities identified as high-risk based on analyses and assessments conducted by MASAK or other competent authorities; and · Requests for information that must be obtained urgently within the scope of the case under review, regardless of whether they fall under the categories listed above. 165. The responses to requests received provide relevant information that leads to the identification of the suspects involved in the case, the identification of the crimes and their value, the transmission of such information to prosecutors’ offices, or the further expansion of the case based on the information received. This facilitates international co-operation by enabling the involvement of competent authorities in other countries, such as LEAs and prosecutors’ offices. All incoming information is recorded in the system. If distribution authorisation is granted, all incoming spontaneous requests are forwarded to the relevant unit within MASAK for further review. Additionally, if there is a file in MASAK its owner is notified regarding all incoming information requests, regardless of whether they are still open or closed. Similarly, if the information request concerns a suspicious transaction report regarding a natural or legal person, multiple countries have made requests regarding the same natural person, or there are serious issues involved, this is also forwarded to the relevant analysis department. In addition, responses to requests for information are forwarded to the relevant department or unit that submitted the request, and, following the completion of the analysis, are also forwarded to law enforcement and judicial authorities, subject to distribution authorisation. 166. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 detail outgoing requests by MASAK to Egmont and non-Egmont Group members, respectively, while Table 2.7 provides an overview of the requests made for BO information. The case study at Box 7.2 in Chapter 7 (ML Investigations - Operation Comanchero) provides a practical example of the jurisdiction’s collaboration with foreign partners. Table 2.5. Number of outgoing information requests through Egmont Secure Web Year Outgoing Requests Spontaneous Disclosures Total 2021 368 1 369 2022 75 3 78 2023 99 2 101 2024 75 1 76 2025 164 0 164 Table 2.6. Number of Outgoing Financial Intelligence Exchanges with Non-Egmont Group Members Requested country 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total East Asia 2 2 3 3 3 13 South Asia 2 0 0 0 1 3 Non EU 1 3 3 4 4 15 Table 2.7. Outgoing requests for BO information Year 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total Country Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Request Natural Person Legal Person Non-EU 1 3 0 1 3 0 North America 1 0 2 1 4 0 3 0 4 5 4 6 North Africa 2 0 3 2 0 3 Northern Europe 4 0 11 2 9 2 6 9 13 Eastern Europe 16 2 330 1 4 0 2 11 14 19 17 344 South Asia 6 0 14 1 2 1 7 2 15 Western Europe 8 0 15 1 1 0 3 0 8 12 1 23 Central Europe 13 10 77 13 10 77 Southeast Asia 9 0 25 1 0 2 10 0 27 Middle East 3 1 8 1 1 1 6 1 30 10 3 39 Central Asia 1 0 2 1 0 2 Southern Europe 7 0 20 7 0 20 East Asia 2 0 4 2 0 4 East Africa 1 0 2 1 0 2 Total 69 13 505 4 12 1 5 21 16 1 0 2 17 3 51 96 49 575 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 167. LEAs seek information through police-to-police co-operation channels, including INTERPOL (as an example, 46 requests were sent in 2025), Camden Asset Recovery Inter-agency Network (CARIN) and liaison officers abroad, to obtain criminal intelligence, locate suspects and identify assets. See Boxes 2.4 and 2.6 as well as Chapters 6, 7 and 8 (IOs 6-8). Box 2.6. Case Study: Turkish National Police – Tracing the proceeds of drug trafficking In connection with the laundering in Türkiye of proceeds derived from drug trafficking, which is a predicate offence committed abroad, a simultaneous operation was conducted in 2024 under the co-ordination of TNP Narcotics Department, targeting an armed criminal organisation led by X. The operation involved 79 locations across six provinces, with Y City as the central hub. On the day of the operation, following the discovery of documents linked to EU-member country during a search of a suspect’s residence, real-time intelligence was exchanged with EU member authorities. Furthermore, the answers provided by suspect Y to the questions posed were shared in real time with EU member country authorities as part of police co-operation. In this context, authorities in EU member country conducted searches of suspect Y’s residence, workplace and rental safe deposit box in an EU member country and seized the 121.000 Euros in his bank account. Furthermore, the digital data imaged during searches conducted by the EU member country judicial authorities was shared with the Narcotics Unit. As a result of the examination of the digital data, a connection was established between the seven vehicles and two properties located in Türkiye and the criminal organisation, and a money laundering report was sent to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in Y City. As a result, the Y City Criminal Court of Peace seized seven vehicles and two properties, valued at 11.258.000 USD, that were under the suspect Y’s control. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 168. Supervisory authorities in Türkiye engage in international co-operation, to a moderate extent, to support both market supervision and AML/CFT objectives. For the BRSA, information requests are generally related to fit and proper processes for opening overseas branches and appointing senior executives. The Capital Markets Board (CMB), in particular, makes extensive use of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Multilateral MoU, having concluded 54 co-operation agreements and exchanged information with numerous foreign supervisors on cases involving market abuse, unauthorised capital market activities, fraud, VAs investigations and fit-and-proper assessments. The information exchanged—including ownership and partnership structures, personal and corporate data, account information and other supervisory-relevant intelligence with BO elements—demonstrates that international supervisory co-operation is effectively leveraged for AML/CFT-relevant purposes. CMB co-operates with foreign counterparts for various areas within its mandate, including the ongoing supervision of FIs, such as assessing fit and properness of supervised entities, which also contributes to AML/CFT objectives. In addition, the second paragraph of Article 257 of the Turkish Criminal Code (TCC) states: (2) Except in cases specifically defined as crimes under the law, a public official who, by neglecting or delaying the performance of their duties, causes harm to individuals or the public, or provides an unjust advantage to individuals, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three months to one year. 169. The CBRT requests the necessary information from the relevant authorities in the licensing processes of payment and electronic money institutions, as well as in cases where such information is required after licensing. If there are non-Turkish citizens or non-resident firms among the shareholders of these institutions, the CBRT requests intelligence regarding these individuals and companies from the relevant authorities abroad. Multinational companies operate in Türkiye’s insurance and pension market and regular meetings are held with regulatory and supervisory authorities in the countries where the headquarters of these multinational entities are located. These meetings, referred to as “College meetings” are organised by the relevant authorities and facilitate information sharing among authorities within the framework of macro prudential supervision and oversight. For example, Y Insurance has its headquarters in Country B. Regular meetings are held under the supervision of the Central Bank of Country B. Another example is D Insurance Inc., a company headquartered in Country F that operates in Türkiye. Similarly, meetings are held with the relevant supervisory authority under the Central Bank of Country F. Furthermore, the exchange of information is not limited to the information and documents requested during the establishment phase; it also includes correspondence with the authorities of the relevant countries regarding the evaluation of submitted documents and the monitoring of the process, particularly in connection with share transfers. 170. Supervisory authorities (notably the CMB and the Insurance and IPRSA) also make targeted use of MASAK as an international co-operation channel, particularly in urgent cases involving foreign legal persons and share transfers requiring immediate supervisory action. This practice reflects effective domestic co-ordination and a risk-based selection of co-operation channels to ensure timely supervisory intervention (see Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 as well as case studies in Box 2.7 ). MASAK has requested information regarding obliged parties from 14 foreign competent authorities in 2025 to enhance co-operation for supervisory purposes and this information is taken into account in the preparation of its 2026 supervision program. For the CMB, responses to information requests received from foreign countries are provided to the person assigned to the audited entity for consideration during the audit, and these matters are taken into account during the audit. In addition, information obtained regarding the obliged entity in the context of AML/CFT is reported to MASAK in accordance with the protocol signed with MASAK. For the BRSA, information exchange regarding fit and proper checks is directly linked to AML/CFT objectives because they ensure that individuals in key positions within financial institutions are trustworthy, competent and free from any criminal associations. It contributes to the risk mitigation efforts. Table 2.8. Number of Information Requests Sent (CMB) Country Years State of Request 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Yes No Central Europe 1 1 North America 1 1 Western Europe 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 1 Middle East 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 1 Middle East 1 1 Northern Europe 1 1 2 South America 1 1 Total 3 1 5 1 6 4 Table 2.9. Number of information requests sent (BRSA) Country Years State of Request 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Yes No Middle East 3 2 5 Southern Europe 1 1 Northern Europe 1 1 2 Total 2 4 2 8 Table 2.10. Number of information requests sent (IPRSA) Country Years 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Middle East 1 Southern Europe 1 1 Central Europe 2 Non EU 1 1 Southeast Asia 1 Total 1 1 2 3 1 Box 2.7. Seeking of information by financial supervisors Case Study 1 There was a request to transfer the shares of an insurance company established in Türkiye to a legal entity based in country X. In this context, a request for information was made by IPRSA to MASAK to promptly determine whether there was information regarding the beneficial owner and whether any investigations or similar proceedings have been conducted regarding these persons. Note: In the event of a request from a foreign legal entity, the Institution contacts the authorities of the relevant country directly. However, in cases where a decision/measure must be taken urgently, the request is made to MASAK. Case Study 2 As a result of the oversight activities carried out by IPRSA, it was determined that an insurance company transferred and registered shares without the permission of the IPRSA. In this regard, the insurance company was urgently requested to provide a defence on the matter. Also, despite the unauthorised nature of the transaction, information was requested from MASAK and relevant institutions regarding local and foreign legal and natural persons, as a share transfer was involved. In the statement made by the company, it was claimed that the share transfer in question was made mistakenly. In this context, the company was requested to delete the share transfer in question from the share register, restore the entries in the share register to their previous state and submit the updated share register to IPRSA for approval. Case 3 This case study comprises two separate applications reviewed by the CMB, with input from MASAK in the context of fit-and-proper and background assessments. Case 3(a): Portfolio Management Company An application was submitted to the CMB requesting authorisation to establish a portfolio management company (“A”) with an initial capital of EURO 1.1 million within a registered capital ceiling of EURO 5.5 million. As part of the evaluation process, the CMB requested MASAK to provide information on any findings concerning the direct and indirect shareholders, as well as authorised representatives, of the proposed company. MASAK conducted the necessary inquiries and shared its findings with the CMB. In addition, the opinion of the competent foreign authority was obtained in respect of an indirect legal entity shareholder exercising significant influence over the company. The assessments of both MASAK and the foreign authority did not reveal any adverse information and the application was assessed positively. Case 3(b): VA Service Provider Separate applications for establishment and/or operating licences relating to crypto asset service provider activities were submitted to the CMB. The CMB requested MASAK to assess the natural and legal persons included in the application against fit-and-proper criteria. MASAK carried out the relevant checks and provided its findings to the CMB. For further details on the fit-and-proper assessment framework applied in this context, see IO3. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 171. The MoT, Directorate General of Customs Enforcement (DGCE) adopts a structured and increasingly proactive approach to the use of outgoing international co-operation requests as a core operational tool in combating smuggling, predicate offences and associated financial crime. DGCE’s authority to initiate international information exchange is established under Presidential Decree No. 1 and further operationalised through 72 bilateral Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreements, enabling systematic and lawful outbound co-operation with a wide range of foreign counterparts. CE authorities seek information through mutual administrative assistance and international operational co-operation to address all types of cross-border smuggling and trade-based risks. The DGCE co-operates with foreign counterparts and international organisations such as the WCO, Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC), and INTERPOL in order to determine potential risky routes related to smuggling and violations of customs regulations, including misdeclaration of origin and undervaluation; to identify high-risk consignments and related to persons, vehicles, and companies; trace criminal networks and facilitators; and co-ordinate simultaneous enforcement actions. 172.  Statistical data indicates that there is regular and targeted use of outgoing co-operation mechanisms. In 2024, there were 65 outgoing information requests and 21 outgoing intelligence exchanges. In 2025, there were 116 outgoing information requests and 29 outgoing intelligence exchanges. Outgoing requests for information are primarily sent to support risk analysis and intelligence activities concerning seizures and suspicious persons and incidents. The feedback and intelligence outcomes obtained from international inquiries are carefully evaluated and can be utilised by the DGCE at the central level; furthermore, as deemed necessary based on the nature of the case, this information may be shared with the relevant provincial customs administrations to be integrated into real-time risk analysis, targeting, and profiling operations. 173. Moreover, in combating cross-border crimes and various types of smuggling at both global and regional levels, the DGCE demonstrates a proactive approach. In this regard, successful outcomes are achieved through participation in international operations co-ordinated by organizations such as WCO, INTERPOL, and SELEC. Examples of such operations include EMPACT, THUNDER, DEMETER, PANGEA, PANDORA, TOX, GAMMA, WISE, Project Global Shield and STOP IV. Within the scope of the EMPACT operation co-ordinated by SELEC and conducted in October 2024, an operation targeting the smuggling of firearms, narcotics and commercial goods was carried out with the participation of EU Member States. During the operation, as a result of the risk analysis conducted by the DGCE, 120 kg of cocaine, migrants and undeclared goods were seized. Within the scope of the intelligence exchanges, controls carried out by the Customs Administrations of the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal and Hungary regarding 10 suspicious shipments resulted in seizures with an approximate total value of EUR 26 400 000. 174. The tax authorities did not seek assistance from foreign counterparts during the period under review." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="637. Türkiye has a similar mechanism for the implementation of PF and TF TFS which ensures implementation without delay to some extent but does not ensure application without delay in a consistent manner (see IO.10). TFS pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and pursuant to UNSCR 1737 and its successor resolutions are not immediately enforceable in Türkiye upon UN designation. While the process has allowed for the implementation of TFS without delay, it takes on average two and a half days for TFS to be enforceable in Türkiye. The time required for the UN listing decision to be transposed into domestic law impedes Türkiye’s ability to implement TFS without delay. The mechanism described under IO.10 to address to some extent delay in domestic transposition does not apply for PF TFS (see Rec 7). 638. Türkiye has been applying PF related TFS on DPRK and Iran since 2021 and has listed individuals and entities accordingly, in line with relevant UNSCRs and the FATF Standards for the vast majority of the reporting period. As of the end of the onsite visit, Türkiye has listed individuals and entities included in UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and in UNSCR 1737 and its successor resolutions. However, at the end of the onsite visit, individuals and entities pursuant to the 1737 were listed in Türkiye within the scope of UNSCR 2231 which no longer provides for the implementation of TFS since the triggering of the snapback mechanism on 27 September 2025 [43] . 639. As described under Recommendation 7, Türkiye’s legal framework for the implementation of PF TFS is composed of a Law, Regulation and Presidential Decrees. The PF Law (7262) provides for a legal basis on the application of TFS on UNSC resolutions “on the sanctions for countering the financing of the proliferation of mass destruction weapons” without a reference to specific UNSCRs to be able to include all relevant UNSCRs. The principles and procedures of the PF Law are further defined in a Regulation (RoPF) and the implementation of PF related TFS through the adoption of Presidential Decrees. 640. The RoPF identifies UNSCR 1718 (2006) and successive resolutions and UNSCR 2231 (2015) and successive resolutions as the two regimes for the implementation of PF related TFS. In line with the RoPF, Türkiye has adopted and gazetted ten Presidential Decrees since 2021 for the implementation of PF related TFS. Among those, three Presidential Decrees- respectively adopted in February 2021, August 2022 and October 2025 – are adding individuals and entities on the domestic list, while the seven remaining Presidential Decrees updated the information of persons and entities on the list. Those Presidential Decrees explicitly mention that they are implementing PF related TFS in the scope of UNSCR 1718 and successor resolutions and of UNSCR 2231. 641. For PF related TFS on Iran, UNSCR 2231 does no longer provide for the implementation of TFS since the triggering of the snapback mechanism of UNSCR 2231. At the end of the onsite visit, Türkiye had not amended the RoPF nor the Presidential Decrees to implement TFS on the basis of UNSCR 1737 and successor resolutions. While Türkiye had been implementing PF related TFS since 2021 and during a large part of the reporting period, at the end of the onsite visit, despite the listing of individuals and entities, it could not be considered that Türkiye was implementing PF related TFS on Iran in line with the relevant UNSCRs nor with the FATF Standards since 27 September 2025. Footnotes [43] In line with the process set forward in paragraphs 11 and 12 of UNSCR 2231 (the Snapback Mechanism), all provisions of UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835 and 1929 that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 of UNSCR 2231 shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of UNSCR 2231 on 20 July 2015. Four of these six UNSCRs - 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 (collectively referred to as the Iran TFS UNSCRs) - identify targeted financial sanctions that, in accordance with FATF Recommendation 7, must be applied. The obligation to implement those targeted financial sanctions was effective immediately for all UN Member States on 27 September at 8:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time. See FATF/PLEN(2025)71 ." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="126. Since the 2019 MER, Türkiye has significantly strengthened alignment of competent authorities and self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) objectives and activities with national AML/CFT policies through the AML/CFT Strategy, which is a binding and cohesive document requesting support of all public institutions and organisations (including some SRBs with public function such as the Union of Notaries Public) to carry out their responsibilities within the Strategy and enhanced the FIU leadership. Ministries and regulators integrated NRA findings into operational policies, supervision manuals, and investigative guidance as shown throughout the following Chapters (see IO.3 in particular on implementation of risk-based supervision and IO.7 on dedicated resources including special courts for ML cases). All competent authorities and some SRBs have also participated in NRA exercises and Threat and Vulnerability working groups. 127. Threat and Vulnerability working groups allow for AML/CFT policies to be collaboratively developed by taking into account the ML/TF risks identified, including through the FIU’s strategic analysis. 128. However, SRBs show uneven implementation of risk-based obligations, and operational alignment in areas such as informal economy risks remain weaker. To fully demonstrate effectiveness, SRBs should more systematically embed NRA findings into licensing, fit and proper assessments, thematic reviews, inspections, and sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="129. Co-operation and co-ordination on AML/CFT policies in Türkiye are anchored in a Presidential mandate (the AML/CFT Strategy) requiring all agencies to align with NRA findings. MASAK chairs the Threat and Vulnerability Working Groups, which meet frequently and bring together over 30 competent authorities. The 2025 NRA sets out several multi agency action plans—covering illegal betting, fuel smuggling and abuse of NPOs for TF purpose—which demonstrate clear co-ordination and defined deliverables. There is generally robust co-operation among competent authorities, particularly between the FIU and LEAs, supported by ongoing communication and structured engagement through these working groups. This co-operation is also reflected in regular interactions with public prosecutors across provinces. 130. There is some evidence of cross-cutting adoption of best practices, such as lessons from the 2018–2021 fuel smuggling initiative informing the 2023–2025 tobacco smuggling plan. However, Türkiye’s co-ordination remains largely output focused. While mechanisms produce valuable activities—meetings, training sessions, typology reports, and action plans—there is limited evidence of how these efforts translate into measurable reductions in ML/TF risk. A more outcome-oriented approach would enable Türkiye to assess progress against defined objectives, strengthen learning and adaptation, and ensure that existing reforms are used to their fullest potential. 131. Greater use of the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection (KİHBİ [23] ) platform (e.g. through structured and regular engagement) could further strengthen the operationalisation of policy implementation by systematically consolidating outcomes from action plans, aligning priorities across competent authorities, enabling cross-sectoral visibility of how risks are addressed, and ensuring that implementation results are translated into a shared understanding of risk mitigation in practice, and ensuring that these results are consistently translated into a shared and coherent understanding of ML/TF risks and progress. While outcome data is collected to some extent, its use to inform a common operational picture and strategic direction across authorities appears more limited in practice. In particular, greater use of the Department of Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection (KİHBİ) platform (e.g. quarterly meetings) could also facilitate system wide reflection on lessons learned, alignment of priorities, and more strategic future policy development. KİHBİ is the entity responsible for co-ordinating anti-smuggling activities, improving inter-agency co-ordination and ensuring the guidance of the relevant authorities and is also in charge of monitoring, co-ordinating and evaluating the National Strategy Document and Action Plans on the Fight against Organised Crimes. Footnotes [23] KİHBİ is the entity responsible for co-ordinating anti-smuggling activities, improving inter-agency co-ordination and ensuring the guidance of the relevant authorities and is also in charge of monitoring, co-ordinating and evaluating the National Strategy Document and Action Plans on the Fight against Organised Crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="328. MASAK has implemented some remedial actions and has imposed fines for non-compliance with CDD measures to some extent and suspicious reporting to a limited extent, but an overall positive impact from such measures has yet to be demonstrated. 329. Supervisors have a range of administrative sanctions available, with flexibility on the monetary amount depending on the severity of the breaches. In line with Türkiye’s ICRG Action plan, the amount of administrative fines has increased since 2021 but remain relatively low for breaches of AML/CFT obligations. This amount is reviewed on a yearly basis according to the revaluation rate in order not to lose value due to inflation and in accordance with the Tax Procedure Law. Table 4.6. Applicable administrative fines for DNFBPs Obligation Applicable Administrative Fine Amounts (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 CDD 3600 3 175 2 541 4 075 4 410 4 987 STR 6000 5 292 4 235 6 791 7 349 8311 Periodic Reporting 3600 3 175 2 541 4 075 4 407 4 987 Max Amounts 480 000 449 537 338 826 502 318 587 960 664 911 330. When criminal offences are detected, MASAK files a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor and can in parallel suspend the reporting entity. Over the reporting period, MASAK has filled 3 criminal complaints against DNFBPs for record keeping infringement and 2 criminal complaints for violation of providing information requirement. 331. Over the reporting period, in line with the RBS undertaken with a focus on DPMS and REAs, representing the highest risk sectors, AML/CFT violations have mainly been detected mostly for those two sectors. Except in nine cases, all other violations are related to shortcomings on CDD. Supervision and remedial actions are mainly undertaken on CDD requirements, which limits the effectiveness of supervisory activities to improve overall compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. This is a concern especially for STRs reporting where the overall reporting of suspicious activities remain low, except for DPMS, but supervisors do not identify breaches of those obligations which could indicate a limited focus on this requirement during the course of supervisory inspections. 332. When shortcomings are identified, entities are prioritised to be subjected to a supervision programme the following year to monitor that deficiencies have been addressed. Yet, in light of the persistence of a high rate of supervised reporting entity found to be in violations with CDD requirements, remedial actions and sanctions can only be considered effective to a limited extent, and sanctions imposed not sufficiently dissuasive to foster compliance. 333. The limited remedial actions and sanctions applied against accountants and legal professionals is in line with the lower focus of the supervisors on those sectors. However, in light of the limited understanding of the professionals met during the onsite visit on ML/TF risks related obligations, further identification of higher risk entities and supervision of those are needed. Table 4.7. Sanctions against DNFBPs on AML/CFT breaches Sectors 2021 2022 2023 2024 Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) Supervised Violations Fines (EUR *1 000) REAs 53 29 735 100 57 492 109 37 413 98 41 759 DPMS 51 43 1364 100 78 954 120 93 2065 105 45 1076 Accountants 5 0 - 0 15 8 101 11 4 24 Lawyers - - 8 3 15 - - Notaries - - - - 334. MASAK does not publish enforcement actions but it communicates annually through its activity report and during the course of its outreach activities to each sector on the main regulatory breaches. However, entities met during the onsite visit had limited knowledge of the most common breaches in their sector and further awareness raising from MASAK would be beneficial. 335. Over the reporting period, MASAK has undertaken significant efforts to increase DNFBPs’ understanding of their AML/CFT obligations with the issuance of dedicated guidance and the conduct of numerous trainings for all sectors. Some professionals met during the onsite visit also considered that MASAK’s inspections were beneficial and informative as they did not only focus on identifying shortcomings, but supervisors also take the time to train and explain obligations to reporting entities’ staff. Those activities are having a positive, yet still limited, impact on DNFBPs’ compliance. Box 4.1. Outcomes of supervision programmes and enforcement actions DPMS A was included in the 2023 supervision programme, and it has been determined that, DPMS A had 23 violations, and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 37 000. Based on those shortcomings, in 2024 DPMS A was again included in the supervision programme, and it has been determined DPMS A still had 10 violations, and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 20 000. REA Y was included in the 2022 supervision programme, and it has been determined that, it had 29 violations and it was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 23 000. In 2024, REA Y was included in the supervision programme again and it has been determined That it had 3 violations and was imposed an administrative fine of approx. EUR 6 000." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 78. Canada has a robust understanding of its ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. Canada’s understanding of threats and vulnerabilities is ingrained in three National Risk Assessment (NRA) iterations in 2015, 2023 and 2025. The recently published 2025 NRA provides a comprehensive analysis of threats, threat actors, and vulnerabilities along with risk summaries targeted at sectors. This risk understanding is complemented by sectoral and thematic risk assessments, strategic intelligence products, risk-based guidance and assessments of evolving threats and vulnerabilities produced by intelligence and operational partners of Canada’s AML/CFT regime, covering areas such as legal professions, tax evasion in real estate, role of VASP ATMs in laundering proceeds of crime (PoC), online gambling, illegal wildlife trade, informal value transfer systems (IVTS), fraud and others. These assessments allow regime partners to develop a deeper understanding of thematic areas and have fed into each iteration of the NRA. Figure 1.1. Canada’s Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Assessment Framework Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 79. Between the 2015 and 2023 iterations of the NRA, Canada’s risk understanding was strengthened through several thematic, sectoral, strategic intelligence products. Central to this process is the Strategic Intelligence Risk Assessment Working Group (SIRA-WG) which brings together experts from 13 federal partners that comprise Canada’s AML/CFT regime. SIRA-WG undertakes analyses and development of threat and vulnerability assessments that underpin Canada’s NRA. Since 2020, NRA has been increasingly supplemented with thematic and strategic intelligence products which has reinforced Canada’s risk understanding. Findings from the NRA reports and other risk products have been widely shared with competent authorities, supervisors, reporting entities and general public, and have greatly contributed to developing and maintaining the authorities’ assessments and understanding of risks. 80. The robust level of understanding of threats and vulnerabilities is supported by the variety of information sources used for the NRA. Canada’s NRA process is a co-ordinated effort led by the SIRA working group (co-chaired by Department of Finance Canada and FINTRAC) consulting the private sector through a dedicated working group under the public-private Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ACMLTF). The NRA was also informed by discussions with provinces and territories and the non-profit organization sector. Findings of the NRA are first discussed among the key regime partners through the SIRA and ACMLTF working group meetings, then reviewed by the AML/CTF governance committees, including the AML/CFT committee at Deputy Minister level, for endorsement prior to publication. 81. National AML/CFT policies and operational activities are guided by a risk-based approach informed by the findings of risk assessments and consultation with stakeholders. The national AML/CFT Strategy (2023-2026) is influenced by ML/TF risks identified in the 2023 NRA and supported by internal interdepartmental action plans which have led to legislative, regulatory, and operational reforms under all priority areas for action. 82. Canada’s NRA process demonstrates some good practices including, effective implementation of working groups across public and private sector, frequent meetings, and strong interaction with the private sector and law enforcement authorities. The NRA findings are disseminated widely through the ACMLTF working group as well as through FINTRAC’s outreach, written guidance, and consultations with industry and provincial and territorial partners. The NRA provides robust analysis of higher risk areas; however, it places limited emphasis to identify lower risk sectors or activities, impeding Canada’s ability to present a balanced view of the whole risk spectrum, to apply simplified measures commensurate with low-risk areas. 83. Canada’s risk assessment framework defines ML/TF risk as a function of three components: threats, inherent vulnerabilities and consequences, with risk reflecting the likelihood that identified threats exploit inherent vulnerabilities to launder illicit proceeds or finance terrorism, and the resulting impact should this occur. However, the published NRA primarily assesses inherent threats and inherent vulnerabilities, without deriving the risk component. This synthesis of risk information was achieved in 2023 NRA in a separate chapter using scenario-based risk analysis. Canadian authorities have since identified that these presentations were overly complex and not user friendly for a broad range of stakeholders including policy and enforcement authorities. Consequently, 2025 NRA does not adequately articulate the ML/TF risks it faces because it lacks a clear analytical linkage between the identified threats, vulnerabilities and the resulting risk levels. Enhancements are needed to assess and articulate risk levels in a manner that demonstrates how specific threats interact with particular vulnerabilities to generate overall risks. 84. A substantive modification introduced to the methodology of the 2025 NRA was to consider residual risk, i.e. incorporating an assessment of the mitigation measures already applied to respond to identified threats and inherent vulnerabilities. In this regard, Canada has applied a “residual risk lens” that considered corresponding policy responses, supervisory and enforcement actions, and public-private collaboration efforts undertaken to combat the illicit activity. However, while the NRA analysis includes some new analysis of residual risk, the results of this &quot;residual risk lens&quot; are not yet included in the published NRA, which remains centred on more mature methodologies assessing inherent risks. This approach is reasonable for public consumption, particularly when communicating with regulated sectors and allowing additional time to develop robust methodologies for assessing residual risks. Nevertheless, clearer articulation of residual risks could result in more efficient allocation of resources in national AML/CFT strategies. 85. Canada’s NRA identifies illegal drug trafficking, fraud, commercial trade and Trade based Money Laundering (TBML and tax evasion and other tax crimes as the country’s highest ML threats. Corruption, cross border smuggling, human smuggling and trafficking, illegal gambling, ransomware and extortion and robbery (including auto theft) are identified as presenting medium-level ML threats. Environmental crimes, loan sharking, and counterfeiting and piracy are assessed to pose low level ML threats. The NRA also outlines corporations, express trusts, D-SIBS, money service businesses (MSBs) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) as ”very” highly vulnerable to ML while the lawyers and Québec notaries, credit unions, crowdfunding platforms, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), foreign bank branches and subsidiaries, import/export companies, mortgage lenders, securities lenders, trust and loan companies, other domestic banks, armoured car companies casinos, and the real estate sector remain highly vulnerable. 86. The NRA assesses ML threats based on criteria including the level of threat actor sophistication, the complexity of ML activity, the scope of ML activity and the estimated value of proceeds of crime. To arrive at its conclusions, the NRA employs both quantitative and qualitative data from a range of public and private sources to identify and assess above criteria. ML threats were assessed against a set of key parameters, primarily the degree of actor sophistication, scope and complexity of laundering activity and estimated value of proceeds of crime involved. In assessing vulnerabilities, consideration was given to sector’s inherent characteristics, nature of products and services, nature of business relationship, geographic reach and nature of delivery channels. 87. D-SIBs, private corporations, express trusts, crypto-asset service providers, and certain categories of money service businesses (MSBs) constitute the sectors and structures most inherently vulnerable to ML and TF exploitation. These sectors are readily accessible to individuals both within Canada and internationally, and they are characterized by high transaction volumes and rapid processing capabilities and complex transaction arrangements which could reduce transparency and obscure the origin and destination of funds. Entities that engage with politically exposed persons (PEPs), or that transact with jurisdictions exhibiting weak AML/CFT frameworks or known activity by listed terrorist organizations, may face elevated ML/TF risks and therefore require the application of enhanced due-diligence (EDD) measures. Table 1.1. Overall ML/TF Threat Ratings High Threat Rating Illegal Drug Trafficking Fraud Commercial Trade Fraud and TBML Tax Evasion and Other Tax Crimes Medium Threat Rating Corruption, Bribery, and Collusion Cross-Border Smuggling Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking Illegal Gambling Ransomware and other types of Extortion Robbery and Theft (including Auto theft) Low Threat Rating Environmental Crimes Loan Sharking Counterfeiting and Piracy (with Currency Counterfeiting as a typology) Source: Canada’s NRA Table 1.2. Overall ML/TF Vulnerability Ratings Very High Vulnerability Rating Corporations* Express Trusts* Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) Money Services Businesses (MSBs) Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASPs) High Vulnerability Rating Armoured Car Companies Lawyers and Québec Notaries Brick-and-Mortar and Online Casinos Mortgage Lenders Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Other Domestic Banks Crowdfunding Platforms Payment Service Providers Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Real Estate Brokers, Sales Foreign Bank Branches Representatives and Developers Foreign Bank Subsidiaries Securities Dealers Import/Export Companies Trust and Loan Companies Medium Vulnerability Rating Accountants Financing and Leasing Companies British Columbia Notaries Life Insurance Companies Cheque Cashing Businesses Mortgage Brokers Company Service Providers Non-Profit Organizations Customs Brokerages and Freight Forwarders Partnerships* Factoring Companies White-Label ATMs Note: *The vulnerability relates to the ability of these entities to be used to conceal beneficial ownership, therefore facilitating the disguise and conversion of illicit proceeds. Source: Canada’s NRA 88. Whilst Canada’s NRA is broad, and the process of risk assessment is comprehensive; some moderate gaps remain. Currently, the NRA’s emphasis is on the threats posed by predicate offences and the inherent vulnerabilities of sectors. While the social harms caused by ML are mentioned, the key enabling role of ML in relation to key predicate offences such as drug trafficking or organised crime is not highlighted. This contributes to an over-emphasis (in strategic and operational decisions) on the predicate offences themselves, as opposed to ML infrastructure that enables them. A clearer articulation in the NRA of the links between money laundering and wider criminal activity would enable ML to be better integrated into coherent strategies to reduce the harm caused by crime. 89. Canada's NRA has not clearly distinguished the different risks associated with laundering the proceeds of domestic crimes within Canada, of laundering foreign proceeds of crime in Canada (as a destination or an intermediary jurisdiction); and of the proceeds of crime within Canada being laundered in other countries. Exposure to cross border flows and transnational linkages are integrated into threat and sector vulnerability assessments. Thematic and topical risk assessments by FINTRAC and operational agencies that supplement the NRA discuss these patterns of illicit financial flows to support Canada’s overall risk understanding. However, reflecting the scale and distribution of these different activities in the assessments would greatly benefit the assessment and enable better targeting of mitigating measures. 90. While the NRA provides a broad and comprehensive overview of Canada’s ML/TF risks, its scope does not allow for an in-depth analysis of specific vulnerabilities in individual sectors. To complement this risk understanding, Canadian authorities have published regular topical and thematic risk assessments that provide a more granular risk analysis. However, these sector-specific assessments have yet to cover all sectors identified as having ML/TF vulnerabilities, such as shell companies and opaque legal-entity structures, high-risk DNFBPs, accountants, trusts/nominee structures. 91. In addition to filling the gaps above, future iterations of Canada's NRA could also be strengthened by including a more granular consideration of the differential risk exposure of the different geographical regions, including clearer distinctions between domestic, inbound, and outbound laundering of proceeds where relevant, to enable these to be addressed in future iterations of the NRA. 1.1.2. TF Risks 92. Canada has a sound understanding of its TF threats informed by its NRA and significant number of strategic intelligence products. The NRA indicates that Canada’s TF landscape is largely low volume, characterised by low value and low volume financial flows. There is little evidence of funds flowing into Canada from other countries to finance domestic terrorism. Suspicious funds are more likely to originate from Canada and to be either directed to domestic violent extremist actors, who largely use self-financing methods to support possible attacks, or to be destined to high-risk jurisdictions and/or conflict zones that are a risk for terrorist financing. Most terrorist attacks in Canada over the past decade have been by ideologically motivated lone actors, generally using self-financing without drawing on significant external financing sources. 93. The 2025 NRA highlights several methods that terrorist actors may use to raise funds including, crowdfunding, cryptocurrencies, IVTS such as hawala, abuse of NPOs, self-financing or state sponsorship. Canada distinguishes among three broad categories of terrorist threats as ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE), politically motivated violent extremism and religiously motivated violent extremism . While the overall TF threat is assessed as low, the potential for misuse of funds remains real given evolving global threats, technological factors and criminal networks that straddle both organised crime groups (OCG) and terrorism. The authorities demonstrated a sound understanding of TF methods, classifying TF threat actors and identifying that the majority fall within the IMVE category which the authorities assess as representing the most significant TF threat. 94. D-SIBs, private corporations, express trusts, crypto assets, and certain types of MSBs namely multi-retail service MSBs and informal value transfer services, are the sectors, corporate structures and payment products most inherently vulnerable to exploitation for TF. 95. Canada has aligned intelligence production with a whole of government strategy to support counter terrorism efforts. Canada’s core legislations pertaining to AML/CFT, notably the PCMLTFA and the Criminal Code, as well as the Income Tax Act, provide the foundational legal framework to criminalize terrorist-financing offences, require reporting, regulate financial institutions, and enable financial intelligence gathering. Implementation of United Nations resolutions on terrorist financing and international sanctions regimes complements domestic law." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="620. LEAs and competent authorities are identifying and tracing criminal property to some extent and implement a ‘follow the money approach’ during parallel financial investigations. Consistent with competent authorities’ increased emphasis on conducting financial inquiries in their investigations (see IO7), this is trending upward. 621. Forfeiture of criminal property under the CC framework is the sole approach in the federal jurisdiction and the primary approach in most provinces. In developing the criminal case, investigators will conduct initial analysis to identify and trace potential criminal property. They utilise a broad range of information gathering tools (see IO.7) such as production orders to identify potential targets and financial flows for further investigation. 622. Investigators executing search warrants are trained to identify potential criminal property and seize evidence of source and use of funds (such as receipts and account information) to support further and more detailed analysis. Seized cash is scanned through RCMP’s Currency Reading and Tracing System (CRATS) and traced against other cash seizures to build links between targets. From the case studies provided, these initial inquiries to identify potential criminal property are conducted routinely and support the use of more advanced techniques in more complex cases. 623. Cases of greater complexity and volume are typically referred to a dedicated unit (such as OPP’s PAFU or TPS’ Asset Forfeiture Unit) or an RCMP IMLIT for further analysis. In some provinces, where cases are referred to a CFO, their asset tracing capabilities are used independent of an LEA investigation. In other provinces, results from LEA financial investigations are used by CFOs to support asset tracing. 624. The development of specialist capabilities within these structures has improved Canada’s ability to identify and trace criminal benefit, particularly in complex cases. Specialist financial crime and asset recovery teams, such as the PAFU and the IMLITs, employ civilian investigators with specialised expertise to trace property through complex ownership structures. This is aided by improved access to beneficial ownership information. Despite this, many case studies demonstrated asset tracing efforts only prioritising property clearly within the legal ownership of the person, at the expense of more expansive identification and tracing of criminal benefit. With some good exceptions, efforts to pursue assets held by nominees, front persons, or other third parties, including close relatives and associates, were less evident, as the focus appears to be on formal/legal ownership and not structures or transactions intended to conceal ownership. 625. These teams have access to and employ technology and innovative approaches to trace and identify criminal property, and recover proceeds and benefits obtained through cyber-enabled crimes, including scams. Notably, the use of trained cryptocurrency investigators and analysis tools to trace funds on the blockchain has resulted in several successful seizures and confiscations (see Box 8.1). Box 8.1. Case study – Identification and tracing of criminal property A ransomware matter involved an Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigation into an Ontario‑based cybercriminal responsible for ransomware attacks against businesses worldwide. The offender operated through criminal online forums and concealed their identity using remote desktop protocols. Proceeds of crime were channelled into multiple cryptocurrency accounts, requiring specialised digital asset tracing techniques. Following intelligence from international partners, the OPP conducted an 18-month covert investigation, which included covert entries into the suspect’s residence, remote access warrants for digital devices, and continuous monitoring of dark‑web activity and cryptocurrency wallets. Officers conducted surveillance of online platforms to track the suspect’s movements, transactions, and command and control infrastructure. During a search of the suspect’s residence, police found him actively conducting a ransomware attack and were able to shut down the command-and-control server at the time of arrest. A total of 41 devices and two illegal handguns were seized. Investigators also identified and traced substantial cryptocurrency holdings, which were confiscated for future restitution. 626. In the most complex asset recovery matters, PSPC’s FAMG is engaged to provide forensic asset tracing analysis to determine the source and use of funds in acquiring property suspected of being proceeds of crime. FAMG conducts extensive net worth analysis to accurately quantify the benefit obtained through criminal enterprises, in comparison to a person’s lawful sources of wealth. This analysis is admissible in courts and is fundamental in obtaining fines in lieu of forfeiture (Canada’s mechanism for indirectly confiscating PoCV). The use of FAMG expertise has increased and is a significant force multiplier for Canada’s LEAs in relevant cases. It enables competent authorities to identify the scale of criminal benefit and trace proceeds to support restraint and forfeiture. These structures and specialised resources have enhanced Canada’s capability to identify and trace criminal property. 627. Despite Canada’s efforts to improve identification and tracing of criminal property, competent authorities do not effectively identify and trace PoCV. In the federal jurisdiction, authorities are limited in their capacity to identify and trace PoCV due to the operation of fines-in-lieu of forfeiture. 628. Fines in lieu of forfeiture are not directly enforceable against other property of the person and authorities do not extend the scope of their asset tracing work to PoCV. This mechanism (including approaches to enforce unpaid fines-in-lieu) is detailed in core issues 8.3 and 8.5 below with respect to provisional measures and enforcement of forfeiture. This approach has major shortcomings that undermine the effectiveness of Canada’s asset recovery system in achieving the confiscation and permanent deprivation of PoCV. 629. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture frameworks also do not contain mechanisms to identify or trace PoCV. Shortcoming – property beyond legal ownership 630. FAMG analysis can uncover the scale of, and in many cases quantify, the benefits obtained through criminal enterprises. Given criminal forfeiture is the primary vehicle for criminal property to be ultimately recovered (except for BC and Manitoba), competent authorities’ efforts to trace criminal property tend to prioritise assets clearly within the suspect’s legal ownership, to the exclusion of assets that may be beneficially owners or controlled by the suspect but titled to third parties. This is reportedly due to the requirement to prove the property was obtained or derived from the commission of the offence, on a balance of probabilities (general forfeiture at CC s. 462.37(1)), or, that the property is otherwise proceeds of crime beyond a reasonable doubt (a form of extended forfeiture at CC s. 462. 37(2)). 631. In practice, this has limited competent authorities’ ability to trace criminal property that is further removed from the suspect’s legal ownership but ultimately remains within their effective control (particularly where that property is beneficially owned or controlled by the suspect but held or titled to third parties). 632. In case studies provided, the identification and tracing process focuses primarily to cash tracing, flows of funds (fiat or virtual) and property the purchase of which can be linked to proceeds of crime (such as luxury vehicles or real estate). This was despite FAMG analysis showing substantially greater proceeds being generated or laundered than what was traced and subject to provisional measures. There were no statistics available on instances of asset tracing through more complex structures. FAMG has been involved in several matters that demonstrated advanced asset tracing including through businesses used for trade offsetting and otherwise legitimate business accounts. 633. The approach to asset identification and tracing, and its success, varies between provinces. Cases demonstrate that Ontario and Québec appear to limit their identification and tracing activities to the specific period of criminality under investigation. This is due to these provinces’ prioritisation of conviction-based forfeiture under the CC, and requires that assets can be linked to the criminal offence. Other provinces that have prioritised the use of their civil forfeiture frameworks (such as BC and Manitoba) take a more expansive approach to asset tracing across a broader period of suspected criminality, in the absence of a need to link the assets to a specific criminal offence. These provinces are also aided by the lower burden of proof required under civil rules of evidence and procedure. Through this approach, authorities in these provinces are able to avoid some of the challenges of proving ownership and control or dealing with intermingled funds under the CC forfeiture framework, ultimately resulting in more effective identification and tracing of criminal property. Shortcoming – access to tax information 634. In the context of privacy rights under Canada’s fundamental principles of domestic law, the sharing of tax information with law enforcement is subject to stringent conditions (Income Tax Act (ITA) s 241, and Excise Tax Act (ETA) s 295). If not proactively disclosed to an LEA (per ITA subs 241(9.5)), tax information can only be obtained through judicial authorisation (CC s 462.48). Tax information can be obtained when investigating non-tax offences. The practice of embedding CRA officers (such as in the IMLITs) and the use of joint forces operations has streamlined the process for proactive disclosures. Access to this information outside of these structures is less expeditious, though judicial authorisations can typically be obtained quickly. Municipal LEAs in particular can struggle to obtain tax information given their more limited engagement with CRA and the various mechanisms available. Investigators from provincial CFOs are not considered criminal investigators, so have even more limited access to tax information and cannot receive disclosures directly from CRA or obtain judicial authorisations. Typically, they are reliant on tax information being referred by an LEA if discovered during the execution of a search warrant or through civil discovery procedures once proceedings are commenced." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 78. Canada has a robust understanding of its ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. Canada’s understanding of threats and vulnerabilities is ingrained in three National Risk Assessment (NRA) iterations in 2015, 2023 and 2025. The recently published 2025 NRA provides a comprehensive analysis of threats, threat actors, and vulnerabilities along with risk summaries targeted at sectors. This risk understanding is complemented by sectoral and thematic risk assessments, strategic intelligence products, risk-based guidance and assessments of evolving threats and vulnerabilities produced by intelligence and operational partners of Canada’s AML/CFT regime, covering areas such as legal professions, tax evasion in real estate, role of VASP ATMs in laundering proceeds of crime (PoC), online gambling, illegal wildlife trade, informal value transfer systems (IVTS), fraud and others. These assessments allow regime partners to develop a deeper understanding of thematic areas and have fed into each iteration of the NRA. Figure 1.1. Canada’s Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Assessment Framework Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 79. Between the 2015 and 2023 iterations of the NRA, Canada’s risk understanding was strengthened through several thematic, sectoral, strategic intelligence products. Central to this process is the Strategic Intelligence Risk Assessment Working Group (SIRA-WG) which brings together experts from 13 federal partners that comprise Canada’s AML/CFT regime. SIRA-WG undertakes analyses and development of threat and vulnerability assessments that underpin Canada’s NRA. Since 2020, NRA has been increasingly supplemented with thematic and strategic intelligence products which has reinforced Canada’s risk understanding. Findings from the NRA reports and other risk products have been widely shared with competent authorities, supervisors, reporting entities and general public, and have greatly contributed to developing and maintaining the authorities’ assessments and understanding of risks. 80. The robust level of understanding of threats and vulnerabilities is supported by the variety of information sources used for the NRA. Canada’s NRA process is a co-ordinated effort led by the SIRA working group (co-chaired by Department of Finance Canada and FINTRAC) consulting the private sector through a dedicated working group under the public-private Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ACMLTF). The NRA was also informed by discussions with provinces and territories and the non-profit organization sector. Findings of the NRA are first discussed among the key regime partners through the SIRA and ACMLTF working group meetings, then reviewed by the AML/CTF governance committees, including the AML/CFT committee at Deputy Minister level, for endorsement prior to publication. 81. National AML/CFT policies and operational activities are guided by a risk-based approach informed by the findings of risk assessments and consultation with stakeholders. The national AML/CFT Strategy (2023-2026) is influenced by ML/TF risks identified in the 2023 NRA and supported by internal interdepartmental action plans which have led to legislative, regulatory, and operational reforms under all priority areas for action. 82. Canada’s NRA process demonstrates some good practices including, effective implementation of working groups across public and private sector, frequent meetings, and strong interaction with the private sector and law enforcement authorities. The NRA findings are disseminated widely through the ACMLTF working group as well as through FINTRAC’s outreach, written guidance, and consultations with industry and provincial and territorial partners. The NRA provides robust analysis of higher risk areas; however, it places limited emphasis to identify lower risk sectors or activities, impeding Canada’s ability to present a balanced view of the whole risk spectrum, to apply simplified measures commensurate with low-risk areas. 83. Canada’s risk assessment framework defines ML/TF risk as a function of three components: threats, inherent vulnerabilities and consequences, with risk reflecting the likelihood that identified threats exploit inherent vulnerabilities to launder illicit proceeds or finance terrorism, and the resulting impact should this occur. However, the published NRA primarily assesses inherent threats and inherent vulnerabilities, without deriving the risk component. This synthesis of risk information was achieved in 2023 NRA in a separate chapter using scenario-based risk analysis. Canadian authorities have since identified that these presentations were overly complex and not user friendly for a broad range of stakeholders including policy and enforcement authorities. Consequently, 2025 NRA does not adequately articulate the ML/TF risks it faces because it lacks a clear analytical linkage between the identified threats, vulnerabilities and the resulting risk levels. Enhancements are needed to assess and articulate risk levels in a manner that demonstrates how specific threats interact with particular vulnerabilities to generate overall risks. 84. A substantive modification introduced to the methodology of the 2025 NRA was to consider residual risk, i.e. incorporating an assessment of the mitigation measures already applied to respond to identified threats and inherent vulnerabilities. In this regard, Canada has applied a “residual risk lens” that considered corresponding policy responses, supervisory and enforcement actions, and public-private collaboration efforts undertaken to combat the illicit activity. However, while the NRA analysis includes some new analysis of residual risk, the results of this &quot;residual risk lens&quot; are not yet included in the published NRA, which remains centred on more mature methodologies assessing inherent risks. This approach is reasonable for public consumption, particularly when communicating with regulated sectors and allowing additional time to develop robust methodologies for assessing residual risks. Nevertheless, clearer articulation of residual risks could result in more efficient allocation of resources in national AML/CFT strategies. 85. Canada’s NRA identifies illegal drug trafficking, fraud, commercial trade and Trade based Money Laundering (TBML and tax evasion and other tax crimes as the country’s highest ML threats. Corruption, cross border smuggling, human smuggling and trafficking, illegal gambling, ransomware and extortion and robbery (including auto theft) are identified as presenting medium-level ML threats. Environmental crimes, loan sharking, and counterfeiting and piracy are assessed to pose low level ML threats. The NRA also outlines corporations, express trusts, D-SIBS, money service businesses (MSBs) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) as ”very” highly vulnerable to ML while the lawyers and Québec notaries, credit unions, crowdfunding platforms, dealers in precious metals and stones (DPMS), foreign bank branches and subsidiaries, import/export companies, mortgage lenders, securities lenders, trust and loan companies, other domestic banks, armoured car companies casinos, and the real estate sector remain highly vulnerable. 86. The NRA assesses ML threats based on criteria including the level of threat actor sophistication, the complexity of ML activity, the scope of ML activity and the estimated value of proceeds of crime. To arrive at its conclusions, the NRA employs both quantitative and qualitative data from a range of public and private sources to identify and assess above criteria. ML threats were assessed against a set of key parameters, primarily the degree of actor sophistication, scope and complexity of laundering activity and estimated value of proceeds of crime involved. In assessing vulnerabilities, consideration was given to sector’s inherent characteristics, nature of products and services, nature of business relationship, geographic reach and nature of delivery channels. 87. D-SIBs, private corporations, express trusts, crypto-asset service providers, and certain categories of money service businesses (MSBs) constitute the sectors and structures most inherently vulnerable to ML and TF exploitation. These sectors are readily accessible to individuals both within Canada and internationally, and they are characterized by high transaction volumes and rapid processing capabilities and complex transaction arrangements which could reduce transparency and obscure the origin and destination of funds. Entities that engage with politically exposed persons (PEPs), or that transact with jurisdictions exhibiting weak AML/CFT frameworks or known activity by listed terrorist organizations, may face elevated ML/TF risks and therefore require the application of enhanced due-diligence (EDD) measures. Table 1.1. Overall ML/TF Threat Ratings High Threat Rating Illegal Drug Trafficking Fraud Commercial Trade Fraud and TBML Tax Evasion and Other Tax Crimes Medium Threat Rating Corruption, Bribery, and Collusion Cross-Border Smuggling Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking Illegal Gambling Ransomware and other types of Extortion Robbery and Theft (including Auto theft) Low Threat Rating Environmental Crimes Loan Sharking Counterfeiting and Piracy (with Currency Counterfeiting as a typology) Source: Canada’s NRA Table 1.2. Overall ML/TF Vulnerability Ratings Very High Vulnerability Rating Corporations* Express Trusts* Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) Money Services Businesses (MSBs) Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASPs) High Vulnerability Rating Armoured Car Companies Lawyers and Québec Notaries Brick-and-Mortar and Online Casinos Mortgage Lenders Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Other Domestic Banks Crowdfunding Platforms Payment Service Providers Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones Real Estate Brokers, Sales Foreign Bank Branches Representatives and Developers Foreign Bank Subsidiaries Securities Dealers Import/Export Companies Trust and Loan Companies Medium Vulnerability Rating Accountants Financing and Leasing Companies British Columbia Notaries Life Insurance Companies Cheque Cashing Businesses Mortgage Brokers Company Service Providers Non-Profit Organizations Customs Brokerages and Freight Forwarders Partnerships* Factoring Companies White-Label ATMs Note: *The vulnerability relates to the ability of these entities to be used to conceal beneficial ownership, therefore facilitating the disguise and conversion of illicit proceeds. Source: Canada’s NRA 88. Whilst Canada’s NRA is broad, and the process of risk assessment is comprehensive; some moderate gaps remain. Currently, the NRA’s emphasis is on the threats posed by predicate offences and the inherent vulnerabilities of sectors. While the social harms caused by ML are mentioned, the key enabling role of ML in relation to key predicate offences such as drug trafficking or organised crime is not highlighted. This contributes to an over-emphasis (in strategic and operational decisions) on the predicate offences themselves, as opposed to ML infrastructure that enables them. A clearer articulation in the NRA of the links between money laundering and wider criminal activity would enable ML to be better integrated into coherent strategies to reduce the harm caused by crime. 89. Canada's NRA has not clearly distinguished the different risks associated with laundering the proceeds of domestic crimes within Canada, of laundering foreign proceeds of crime in Canada (as a destination or an intermediary jurisdiction); and of the proceeds of crime within Canada being laundered in other countries. Exposure to cross border flows and transnational linkages are integrated into threat and sector vulnerability assessments. Thematic and topical risk assessments by FINTRAC and operational agencies that supplement the NRA discuss these patterns of illicit financial flows to support Canada’s overall risk understanding. However, reflecting the scale and distribution of these different activities in the assessments would greatly benefit the assessment and enable better targeting of mitigating measures. 90. While the NRA provides a broad and comprehensive overview of Canada’s ML/TF risks, its scope does not allow for an in-depth analysis of specific vulnerabilities in individual sectors. To complement this risk understanding, Canadian authorities have published regular topical and thematic risk assessments that provide a more granular risk analysis. However, these sector-specific assessments have yet to cover all sectors identified as having ML/TF vulnerabilities, such as shell companies and opaque legal-entity structures, high-risk DNFBPs, accountants, trusts/nominee structures. 91. In addition to filling the gaps above, future iterations of Canada's NRA could also be strengthened by including a more granular consideration of the differential risk exposure of the different geographical regions, including clearer distinctions between domestic, inbound, and outbound laundering of proceeds where relevant, to enable these to be addressed in future iterations of the NRA. 1.1.2. TF Risks 92. Canada has a sound understanding of its TF threats informed by its NRA and significant number of strategic intelligence products. The NRA indicates that Canada’s TF landscape is largely low volume, characterised by low value and low volume financial flows. There is little evidence of funds flowing into Canada from other countries to finance domestic terrorism. Suspicious funds are more likely to originate from Canada and to be either directed to domestic violent extremist actors, who largely use self-financing methods to support possible attacks, or to be destined to high-risk jurisdictions and/or conflict zones that are a risk for terrorist financing. Most terrorist attacks in Canada over the past decade have been by ideologically motivated lone actors, generally using self-financing without drawing on significant external financing sources. 93. The 2025 NRA highlights several methods that terrorist actors may use to raise funds including, crowdfunding, cryptocurrencies, IVTS such as hawala, abuse of NPOs, self-financing or state sponsorship. Canada distinguishes among three broad categories of terrorist threats as ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE), politically motivated violent extremism and religiously motivated violent extremism . While the overall TF threat is assessed as low, the potential for misuse of funds remains real given evolving global threats, technological factors and criminal networks that straddle both organised crime groups (OCG) and terrorism. The authorities demonstrated a sound understanding of TF methods, classifying TF threat actors and identifying that the majority fall within the IMVE category which the authorities assess as representing the most significant TF threat. 94. D-SIBs, private corporations, express trusts, crypto assets, and certain types of MSBs namely multi-retail service MSBs and informal value transfer services, are the sectors, corporate structures and payment products most inherently vulnerable to exploitation for TF. 95. Canada has aligned intelligence production with a whole of government strategy to support counter terrorism efforts. Canada’s core legislations pertaining to AML/CFT, notably the PCMLTFA and the Criminal Code, as well as the Income Tax Act, provide the foundational legal framework to criminalize terrorist-financing offences, require reporting, regulate financial institutions, and enable financial intelligence gathering. Implementation of United Nations resolutions on terrorist financing and international sanctions regimes complements domestic law." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="117. International co-operation is important for Canada due to the transnational nature of its ML/TF threats and the open nature of its financial, commercial, and economic systems. The US is Canada’s primary partner in commercial and financial trade. The Canadian financial system is widely developed and globally interconnected. Providing assistance and seeking assistance from foreign counterparts is key to the global fight against ML/TF which Canadian competent authorities clearly recognise. Canada’s most strategic partner for international co-operation is the US. Additional partners are countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Australia. 118. The report’s findings are based on statistics on MLA, extradition and other forms of international co-operation; cases and examples; feedback from 68 jurisdictions from the Global Network, including most of Canada’s strategic partners; interviews with all the relevant competent authorities and other data. 119. The International Assistance Group (IAG), in the Criminal Law Operations Section, in the National Litigation Sector of the Department of Justice Canada, is the central authority (CA) for Canada. It reviews and co-ordinates all extradition and MLA requests made either by or to Canada. On a day-to-day basis, the IAG works with foreign and Canadian competent authorities, providing them with assistance and support in relation to MLA and extradition. 120. Starting in 2019-2020, a new electronic case management system was adopted, allowing IAG to monitor all requests and track events, updates and final outcomes, as well as to manage records. This tool is a positive instrument that helps Canadian authorities to maintain a clear overview of incoming and outgoing MLA and extradition requests, including their prioritization, status, and deadlines. Incoming urgent ML/TF MLA and extradition requests are prioritized and dispatched within hours by senior staff at IAG, including outside office hours. Incoming requests are prioritized based on urgency, including where there is a risk of evidence being lost, risk of dissipation of assets, flight of fugitive, and/or public safety concerns. Where the incoming request is not flagged as urgent but falls under one of the above-mentioned categories, IAG proactively contacts international partners to properly assess urgency and to address any quality issues, if needed. 121. IAG is adequately staffed with 38 lawyers and 14 paralegals, supported by 14 legal assistants. Some of the lawyers are posted abroad in the most relevant foreign partners jurisdictions, as liaison counsellors to facilitate formal and informal international co-operation. The IAG’s staff members bring a range of expertise, including a specialization in geographic regions or types of cases. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 122. In Canada MLA is available to multilateral or bilateral treaty partners as well as “Designated States or Entities” listed in the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA). Canada has bilateral treaties in force with 35 foreign states, including neighbouring countries and relevant commercial counterparts. In the absence of a listing in the MLACMA or a relevant treaty, Canada can provide assistance pursuant to court issued non-treaty letters of request (letters rogatory), non-treaty letters of request, and administrative arrangements. Pursuant to MLACMA, Canada may enter into an administrative arrangement with a State or Entity for the purpose of giving effect to a request for MLA in a particular case. During the relevant period, Canada entered into 15 administrative arrangements. Twelve ML MLA requests were received from non-partner countries during the review period. Of these 12 requests, 7 were fully executed, while the remaining 5 were either withdrawn (in 2 cases the requesting state did not reply to Canada’s request to clarify the legal grounds to proceed in the absence of a treaty, while in 2 other cases the requesting State did not respond to Canada’s request to provide the location of the witness to interview, or the type of evidence sought) or abandoned (in 1 case, because the evidence was no longer required) by the requesting country. 123. In the period under review, Canada received 4 577 incoming MLA requests across all offences. A total of 464 MLA requests arose from the investigation or prosecution of ML (451) and TF (13) offences, mostly from the US, other countries from the Americas and Europe, and a small percentage from other regions, in line with Canada’s risk profile (see Table 2.1). 124. Most of the MLA requests received relate to fraud (42%), corruption and bribery (11%), illicit drug trafficking (10%), which is consistent with Canada’s risk profile. 72% of incoming MLA requests related to drug trafficking involved OCGs (34 out of 47 requests), which is in line with Canada's risk and context. Additional incoming requests are related to robbery and theft (6%), counterfeiting (3%), TF (3%), and other crimes (33%) [18] . Some requests relate to more than one type of offence. 125. Most of the incoming ML/TF MLA requests have been executed (63%), with high degree of execution for MLAs related to high-risk predicate offences such as fraud (73%) and drug trafficking (61%) (see Box 2.1). Some of the more recent incoming MLA requests are ongoing (22.8%) and a small percentage was refused by Canada (about 2%) [19] . A number of requests were withdrawn (5.8%) or abandoned (6%) by the requesting country. With respect to refusals, they are generally communicated in advance to try to address any gaps. Most of the incoming MLA requests were executed within 12 (ML) to 13 (TF) months (See Table 2.2). Urgent ML MLA requests are executed by Canada more rapidly, on average within five (5) months, while urgent TF MLA are executed on average within 17 months. In cases where it took more than six (6) months to execute the requests, these were related to complex cases. Such cases take time to ascertain all the requirements are met; collect additional information; manage delays in obtaining or complying with a judicial authorization; manage additional time requests by competent authorities and identify and resolve electronic case management system anomalies. Statistics show that in 103 cases (36%), Canada required more than one year to provide assistance and in 28 cases (10%) Canada required between 2 and 5 years. There are 17 MLA requests (4%) received between 2019 and 2022 which are still ongoing. This is due to delays in execution by executing authorities and/or regional counsel; requests for additional information from requesting states; and assessing compliance with treaty and legal requirements in complex cases. This data and statistical data do indicate inconsistencies in recording timeframes of executing requests, which is considered as not consistently timely. In urgent cases, case studies demonstrate that assistance provided was timely. Moreover, where provided, Canada’s assistance is constructive and generally of good quality. 126. Foreign counterparts make use of MLA mostly for compelled or voluntary production of documentary evidence (61%) (such as financial transaction records, business records, accounts’ owners); voluntary or compelled witness interview (16%); corporate information, both basic (12%) and, occasionally). A small percentage of documentary evidence is related to beneficial ownership records (1%). Box 2.1. Case of effective incoming MLA In June 2022, country “B” made an MLA request to Canada to advance an anti-corruption and ML investigation. The suspects allegedly laundered proceeds of crime arising from the corruption of a public official using shell companies with ties to Canada and other jurisdictions and illegally transferred assets worth billions of dollars. Country “B” requested assistance in obtaining business records related to the beneficial ownership and movement of the impugned assets. IAG prioritized the request as there was a risk that high value assets would dissipate. The IAG worked closely with their counterpart in country “B” to address information gaps. Once the request was perfected, Canadian authorities sought a court order for the production of records. The court application was made on a confidential basis, so as to protect the integrity of the investigation in country “B”. Pursuant to a Canadian court order, the requested records were produced and sent to country “B”. The request was executed in full in March 2023. The investigation in country “B” is still going on and remains confidential, however, the authorities in country “B” have confirmed the importance of the evidence to their investigation and thanked Canada for the efficient manner in which the assistance was provided. Source: Canada Table 2.1. Incoming ML/TF MLA requests Fiscal year (fy) Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total 2019-2020 62 6 8 0 4 80 2020-2021 55 5 7 1 6 74 2021-2022 58 7 5 4 7 81 2022-2023 64 5 4 0 14 87 2023-2024 40 4 2 1 28 75 2024-2025 15 0 2 3 47 67 Total 294 27 28 9 106 464 Note: Data updated as of 29 September 2025. Of the 110 in progress MLA requests, 16 are currently in progress in the requesting country. Source: Canada Table 2.2. Time to execute incoming MLA requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 109 6 - 9 mo 35 9 mo - 1 yr 43 1 - 2 yrs 75 2 - 5 yrs 28 Total 290* Note: Data as of 29 September 2025. *The discrepancy with the total number of executed requests in Table 2.1 is attributable to four cases for which Canada provided incomplete data regarding execution timelines. Source: Canada 127. International co-operation feedback shows that Canada’s responses to MLA requests are generally useful and of good quality, when provided. One country reported a lack of assistance due to the absence of a treaty. Three reported that it was not possible to receive the requested documents, such as civil and financial documents . Some foreign counterparts underlined that differences in legal systems contributed to delays. Two countries also highlighted the responsiveness of Canada’s CA and one country noted Canada’s willingness to work together to understand differences between legal systems, which has led to some improvements in timeliness. 2.1.2. Extradition 128. Extradition is available to bilateral (51) or multilateral (26) treaty partners, as well as “States and Entities” designated in the Extradition Act (31 States and three international courts or tribunals). Extradition is available to Canada’s most relevant partners. Canada also has the ability to execute incoming extradition requests pursuant to case specific agreements. During the period under review, Canada did not conclude any new agreements; however, bilateral negotiations were reportedly ongoing to expand the treaty network. Dual criminality must be assessed. There is no bar to extraditing nationals under Canadian law and Canada has extradited Canadian citizens. Canada’s legal framework for executing extradition requests involves multiple Ministerial and judicial steps. This process altogether can be time-consuming as the process must balance efficiency with the protection of individual liberty under domestic law. 129. Canada has received 469 extradition requests across all offence types (see Table 2.3). A total of 65 extradition requests arose from the prosecution of ML (52) and TF (13) offences. Canada executed 18 out of 52 ML and predicate extradition requests on average within 18 months, coming mostly from the US, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Notably, none of the 13 TF extradition request were executed. Most urgent requests (additional 20 out of 25) for provisional arrest were executed by Canada within 2 days or less (40%) or within 4 to 6 days (33%), depending on whether the person sought was readily located. Pursuant to the Extradition Act , urgent requests for provisional arrest can be made by the requesting country or entity, which must be followed by the receipt of a formal extradition request. Majority of the incoming extradition requests are related to fraud (14), TF (13), organized crime (6) and drug trafficking (6). TF is largely low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial flows, as set out in the 2025 NRA. The relatively high percentage of TF-related requests is because the majority (11 out of 13) were received from only two countries, related to two international terrorist groups. 130. 45% of the incoming regular ML and TF-extradition requests are ongoing, and at different stages of execution (see Table 2.4). Half of the ongoing ML extradition requests are starting the judicial or Ministerial phase, while the remaining are under review. 12% are awaiting additional information from the requesting state or in litigation, as Ministerial decisions to surrender may be subject to judicial review before the appellate courts. 17% were refused by Canada, primarily due to the person sought was not located in Canada or the requesting state was not an extradition partner. Others were withdrawn (8%) or abandoned (3%) by the requesting state. Two TF requests were abandoned by the requesting State following the requests for additional information by Canada in order to meet the double criminality requirement. When provided, assistance is constructive and mostly of good quality. 131. There are four ongoing TF extradition requests as of the onsite. During the period under review two requests were abandoned by the requesting state as they failed to respond to Canada’s requests for additional information and to meet the double criminality requirement; and six were refused by Canada for different reasons (person sought was not located in Canada, absence of treaty or other legal basis to execute the requests, Minister of Justice discharged the person from extradition at the surrender stage of extradition). [20] 132. Nevertheless, Canada showed constructive co-operation with respect to these TF requests. Efforts were made to assist the extradition partners in improving the quality of their requests by travelling to requesting states (2) for in-person targeted consultations and conducting follow-up virtual meetings to monitor progress. Regarding the six organised crime extradition requests received, none was executed: one was refused for failing to meet the treaty requirements, including meeting definition of organized crime, and three were withdrawn by the requesting country. The remaining two are ongoing, in one case Canada met in person with the requesting State to provide further guidance on the request for additional information, in the other request, Canada is trying to locate the person sought. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests Executed – extradited Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Regular 18 5 2 11 29 65 Provisional Arrests 20 2 1 2 0 25 Total 38 7 3 13 29 90 Note: Of the 29 in progress extradition requests, 12 are currently in progress in the requesting country. Source: Canada Table 2.4. Time to execute incoming extradition requests Time Regular Provisional Arrests 1 - 6 mo 1 20 6 - 9 mo 2 0 9 mo - 1 yr 4 0 1 - 2 yrs 8 0 2 - 5 yrs 3 0 Total 18 0 Source: Canada 133. International co-operation feedback, underlined Canada’s positive assistance for extradition requests and good practice to hold bilateral periodical meetings to facilitate a fruitful collaboration. Five countries, including one main partner, specifically underlined the length of the process due to the number of requests for further information leading to delays, and for one country, the refusal of requests. Two countries reported instances where requests were returned for not meeting legal requirements and three countries reported that Canada did not provide assistance due to the lack of a treaty or any legal basis. Several civil law system countries highlighted challenges in obtaining international co-operation due to the difference with Canada’s common law system. This is due to the differing standards of evidence required. To address this issue Canada constructively had direct contact with the counterpart States, provided training to extradition partners and, to reduce the need for additional information, provided mock extradition requests to foreign partners tailored to fraud and drug trafficking cases. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 134. Pursuant to multilateral and bilateral treaties, Canada has the ability to directly enforce foreign freezing, confiscation and seizure orders to trace assets and enforce foreign criminal fines, including restitution orders. 135. In contrast to MLA generally, dual criminality is required as a basis for providing MLA for asset recovery. For incoming confiscation MLA requests, IAG legal counsel must also determine if any of the grounds for refusal are present. A senior legal counsel acts as the IAG asset recovery co-ordinator to ensure a consistent approach to criminal asset recovery MLA requests, and monitors the process to avoid dissipation of assets. 136. Canada has executed 8 (18%) of the 45 asset recovery incoming requests (5 requests for freezing orders and 3 requests for confiscation orders), across all offences, which is limited. Of these requests, 32 (71%) were ML related, while none of the requests were TF related, which is in line with Canada’s risk profile. Most of the confiscation requests were received from the US, which is also in line with Canada’s risk and context. Asset freezing requests are mostly received from other counterparts, including a non-partner country [21] . Around a quarter of these requests are ongoing (both in Canada and in the requesting state). Case studies provided by Canada show that assistance was provided to foreign jurisdictions; however, figures show that competent authorities’ assistance with incoming requests to freeze, confiscate and share criminal property and property of corresponding value (PoCV) is limited (see table 2.5). Assets restrained following the enforcement of a freezing order amounted to CAD 21.8 million [22] , while the total amount requested by foreign jurisdictions was not provided by Canada. Out of the total of CAD 17.5 million of assets sought for confiscation by foreign counterparts, only CAD 1.4 million was confiscated (8%), including CAD 1 million shared with the requesting states. 137. The majority of the 38 freezing requests were withdrawn, abandoned or refused (25) while none of the 7 confiscation requests were withdrawn, abandoned or refused (see Table 2.5). For the abandoned and withdrawn freezing requests, 70.5% of the requests (12 of 17) failed to provide the foreign order. MLACMA requires a copy of the foreign order to execute these requests. In all cases, Canada requested and did not receive a copy of the order. Refused requests were due to proceeds not being located in Canada, no funds were available on the account, or the request failed to meet Canada’s legal requirements for execution. In all of these latter cases, Canada provided guidance to the requesting State who was unable to address those gaps. Twelve freezing and confiscation requests were ongoing during the assessment period: f5 requests under review to ensure MLACMA requirements were met; 4 cases required additional information from requesting states; 2 cases are in the process of being executed; and one is in litigation as the enforcement of the confiscation order was being contested. Challenges in tracing and restraining intermingled property and property beyond the person’s legal ownership, are considered contributing factors to the lack of execution of freeze and confiscation requests (see IO.8). Additionally, following the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Georgiou it is now broadly accepted that Canada can enforce incoming requests to recover proceeds of corresponding value (PoCV). This has not yet occurred, which is inconsistent with Canada’s risk and extensive outreach. 138. Overall, in several cases Canada requested additional information to the requesting State. Most of the incoming asset recovery requests were executed within a period of more than 18 months. Canada’s main counterpart reports competent authorities are quick in restraining asset, but significant delays were reported in returning the confiscated funds. Table 2.5. 2019-2025: Incoming asset recovery MLA requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Type of MLA request Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Freezing orders 5 8 9 8 8 38 Confiscations 3 0 0 0 4 7 Total 8 8 9 8 12 45 Source: Canada 139. There is limited international co-operation feedback on Canada’s effectiveness in providing assistance in asset recovery. Whilst Canada is reported to quickly restrain assets at the behest of the requesting country’s authorities, it also reported that the legislative mandate of a minimum 10% cut off the top of any assets slated for sharing undermines the counterparts’ ability to seek to fully compensate victims of crime. The cut off percentage raises up to 50% or 90% depending on the contributions of each jurisdiction to the confiscation. While it is appropriate for Canadian competent authorities to retain a portion as reimbursement of expenses related to the confiscation and investigations, this can dissuade foreign counterpart countries from requesting asset recovery MLA. Delays in return of forfeiture to the requesting State can also be ascribed to the once yearly process for adjudicating asset sharing requests for both domestic and international matters. 140. Provincial CFOs cannot utilise formal MLA and require MOUs with foreign counterparts to co-operate. During the period under review, the BC and Alberta CFOs collectively received six incoming requests for asset confiscation. Half of the received requests are concluded, taking an average of 1-2 years to complete. To date, approximately 10% of confiscated assets were shared with the foreign counterparts. International co-operation feedback on NCB confiscations is mixed. 141. Competent authorities’ assistance with incoming requests to freeze, confiscate and share criminal property and PoCV are moderate over the review period. Constructiveness and quality of assistance provided is low in terms of the number of requests executed (many still ongoing), timeliness (mostly over 18 months) and amounts confiscated (8%) and shared (CAD 1 million over CAD 17.5 million sought). The modest assistance in asset recovery through formal MLA is only partially offset by LEA’s use of informal measures. These are focussed on identification and tracing efforts through CARIN and RCMP’s LO network. Evidence that these resulted in assets being restrained and confiscated in Canada or abroad is unclear. Footnotes [18] Other crimes include the following offences: Abuse of duties; Abuse of trust; Accounting Offenses; Aiding and Abetting; Aggravated damage to computer data; Breach of trust; Breach of economic sanctions; Conspiracy to commit illicit drug trafficking, fraud, organized crime, bribery, other smuggling/trafficking, illegal gambling, corruption; Crime against the economic order; Copyright infringement; Counterfeit cheques; Cybercrimes; Embezzlement; Extortion; Fraudulent evasion of duties; False accounting; False declaration; False statements on loan applications; Falsification of public documents; Financial abuse; Fraudulent trading; Hacking; Hidden funding of political parties; Human smuggling and trafficking; Illegal gambling; Illegal mining; Illicit enrichment by an official; Illicit streaming; Infringement on bankruptcy; Influence peddling; Insider trading; Issuance of no funds cheque; Intrusion into computer systems; Misappropriation; Misconduct; Operating an unlicensed money transmitting business; Other smuggling and trafficking; Pimping (procuring prostitution); Prohibited foreign trade practices by domestic concerns; Possession of forged document; Possession and publication of child pornography; Receiving stolen goods; (Autonomous) sanctions evasion; Sale of stolen vehicles; Tax offences; Transferring criminal property; Unlawful computer access; Unlawfully recording data; Uttering a forged document. [19] Reason for refusals are the following (9 requests): the evidence was not located in Canada (2); there was insufficient information to meet Canada’s legal threshold to apply for the required MLA court order and Canada provided guidance to the requesting states who were unfortunately unable to address the gaps (4); could not be executed due to COVID-19 restrictions (1), could not be advanced as to do so would have been contrary to Canada’s public interest (2), [20] One request was full executed after the period under review in January 2026, and the person sought was surrended. [21] In all three cases, Canada attempted to obtain additional information from the requesting state to determine a legal basis to proceed. In two cases, the non-partner country did not provide the required information and the requests were abandoned. In the other case, it was withdrawn after the non partner country informed Canada that the assistance was no longer needed for the foreign investigation. [22] An additional CAD 730 000 was recently confiscated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="158. In general, competent authorities seek other forms of international co-operation to varying degrees, with the FIU seeking international co-operation to a limited extent while the other competent authorities to a large extent. 2.3.1. FIU 159. FINTRAC, in its role as an FIU, is empowered to exchange information with 111 FIUs through MOUs. FINTRAC has requested financial intelligence to a limited extent. A total of 740 requests for information were sent by FINTRAC to foreign FIU counterparts between 2019 and 2025. 93% of these were sent following receipt of a Voluntary Information Record (VIR), while the remaining 7% were issued following the receipt of an STR. The FIU plays a central role in supporting other forms of co-operation for ML/TF and predicate offences for the needs of competent authorities, including RCMP, provincial and municipal police services, CBSA, CRA, and CSIS (see IO.6). These requests were mainly on ML related offences including fraud (41.2%), customs and trade-based illicit financial flows (29.1%), tax evasion (21.8%), drug trafficking (13.7%), TF (9.8%), human trafficking (9.7%) and corruption (2.1%) (see table 2.12), in line with Canada’s risk and context. FINTRAC does not prioritise seeking intelligence through informal co-operation on asset recovery. Most requests were addressed to US, UK, Australia, and Mexico, in line with Canada’s risk profile (see Box 2.3). 160. The low volume of requests sent (on average, 123 requests per year) indicates an underuse of international co-operation as a means of obtaining financial intelligence and is not consistent with the cross-border nature of the threats faced by Canada (see Chapter 1), nor with the overall number of STRs received. Although some cases show that information sought from FINTRAC positively contributed to investigations, Canada does not systematically track their outcomes. Box 2.3. International Co-operation with AUSTRAC and New Zealand FIU In 2023, FINTRAC received voluntary information from a LEA regarding an ongoing investigation into an international drug smuggling and professional money-laundering network involving Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. After receiving the information, FINTRAC performed its analysis and determined that the designated information would be relevant to multiple law enforcement agencies, AUSTRAC (Australia’s FIU), and the New Zealand FIU. FINTRAC also sent queries to AUSTRAC and the New Zealand FIU. The FINTRAC disclosure contained designated information from suspicious transaction reports, attempted suspicious transaction reports, large cash transaction reports, electronic fund transfer reports, and casino disbursement reports, totalling approximately CAD 21.3 million. FINTRAC’s disclosure included financial intelligence on subjects identified in the voluntary information, as well as numerous additional individuals and entities previously unknown to law enforcement and the FIUs. The disclosure identified the illicit flow of funds and relationships between individuals and entities through shared bank accounts, addresses, and ownership. Financial activity included third-party wire transfers, bank draft purchases, email money transfers, unlicensed gambling, payment purchases, and cryptocurrency transactions. Co-operation between law enforcement, FINTRAC, and the FIUs, including information that was provided by an FIU in response to FINTRAC’s query, helped to determine the flow of funds and the scope of the transnational criminal network. Source: Canada Table 2.12. FINTRAC as FIU - outgoing request by offence (%) Predicate Offence* 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 TOTAL Fraud 43.4 55.3 42.6 37.1 35.7 33.0 41.2 Customs/TB Illicit Financial Flows 11.2 22.4 37.0 24.2 44.3 35.7 29.1 Tax Evasion 26.6 16.5 31.5 19.4 18.6 18.3 21.8 Drug 13.3 8.2 18.5 14.5 10.0 17.4 13.7 Terrorism Financing 8.5 3.3 30.8 3.8 4.0 8.7 9.8 Human Trafficking 8.4 7.1 11.1 8.1 14.3 9.6 9.7 Corruption 1.4 1.2 0 4.8 4.3 0.9 2.1 N. of requests sent 153 122 78 104 76 207 740 Source: Canada Note: (*) One request may relate to more than one predicate offence 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 161. The RCMP is a party to 47 MOUs with international partners and is part of many law enforcement co-operation agreements with foreign counterparts. The RCMP engaged in 48 major projects tied to ML and international criminal activity, with 14 foreign agencies, including from the US and EU. The RCMP also leverages a network of 46 international Liaison Officers (LOs) posted in 29 countries and to international policing bodies (including Interpol and Europol) to support Canadian ML, TF and predicate investigations in co-operating with foreign counterparts. 162. RCMP sought assistance from international partners in at least 477 ML/TF and related predicate offence files, showing a marked increase compared to the previous MER, where 252 requests were sent (see Table 2.13). This reinforces an increased prioritisation on informal co-operation instead of formal co-operation (see 2.2.1). Additional requests for assistance also occurred but data was not available. Canada notes that several of these cases involved asset identification and tracing elements; however, it is unclear the extent to which this has occurred. No specific data was provided on the results of LEAs requests in terms of prosecutions or other outcomes; however, a number of case studies provided were positive. Requests were addressed to foreign counterparts in line with Canada’s risks. Table 2.13. RCMP - outgoing requests Foreign Agency Criminal Code and PCMLTFA Occurrence Type Total Unique Occurrences Criminal Code Laundering POC PCMLTFA Specific Criminal Code TF Europe, Middle East, Africa 104 9 119 231 Indo Pacific 44 5 7 56 Latin America and Caribbean 102 7 11 120 North America 91 11 14 115 Total Unique Occurrences 299 29 150 477 Note: Since a request may be sent to multiple foreign agencies, it is counted only once in the overall totals (unique occurrences). Source: Canada 163. RCMP participates in international working groups and committees to facilitate international co-operation in asset recovery [26] . The number of requests sent by RCMP to foreign partners on asset recovery, via CARIN and similar bodies, is low (10 in total for the review period). There is a lack of proactive use of the asset recovery fora, particularly considering the limited use of formal international co-operation for asset recovery (see 2.2.3). Case study discussions demonstrate LEAs are using different informal means to try and pursue asset recovery; however, effective results are not realised based on the evidence available for this assessment. 164. Provincial prosecution authorities also participate in CARIN, in relation to non-criminal seizure and confiscation, as such matters fall within the provincial sphere under Canada’s constitutional division of powers. During the period under review, only one request was made in the 2021-2022 fiscal year, on behalf of LEAs in Québec. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 165. In its role as AML/CFT supervisor, FINTRAC has engaged actively in informal co-operation with foreign partners bilaterally (71 engagements in total) and multilaterally through the five-eyes countries’ International Supervisory Forum (ISF); over 20 meetings from 2019-2025). Main counterparts are Australia, the US and New Zealand, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Canada reported that FINTRAC sought information through the ISF with other AML regulators and supervisors on FIs and DNFBPs. 166. Since 2016, FINTRAC signed seven (7) MOUs, bringing the total number to 11 MOUs with supervisory authorities in six (6) countries. This is in addition to the 30 MOUs signed by OSFI targeted on Federally Regulated Financial Institutions (FRFIs). Foreign supervisors can request information to FINTRAC via OSFI, who both leverage their respective MOUs to share information, subject to safeguards of confidentiality, data protection and security. Notably, a MOU between FINTRAC and foreign counterparts is not a prerequisite for supervisory co-operation and information exchange with respect to AML/CFT. 167. These supervisory co-operation arrangements create a mechanism for information exchange that expand FINTRAC’s ability to collaborate with foreign regulatory and supervisory authorities, enhancing FINTRAC’s ability to fulfil its supervisory mandate. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 168. Between 2020 and 2025, the CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) made a total of 83 requests relating to ML/TF to foreign customs, law enforcement and regulatory partners, mostly in the US and the UK. Fifty-three of these requests were made for information to support internal analysis and investigations. An additional eight disclosures were a combination of a standard request for customs information as well as spontaneous disclosures. Information on timeliness to receive a response from a foreign counterpart is not available, as the program is relatively new and information has not been tracked consistently during the period under review. The BFCC further received foreign financial intelligence from foreign FIUs on 15 cases, based on Egmont requests submitted through FINTRAC, corroborating the BFCC’s reasonable grounds to suspect activity indicative of ML, TF or sanctions evasion. 169. CRA-CIP investigates ML cases that arise from tax evasion and other tax crimes. CRA has 94 Tax Treaties and 24 Tax Information Exchange Agreement with its international partners. Canada is also a party to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters , which includes over 150 members. CRA-CIP has conducted 3 simultaneous criminal investigations under the Simultaneous Criminal Investigations Program (SCIP). This joint arrangement, generally between Canada and the US, allows both parties to simultaneously investigate taxpayers residing in either country suspected of tax evasion. 170. CRA-CIP also actively participates and contributes to several and working groups (Trade Based Money Laundering International Working Group, International Visitors’ Program). Through its participation in these networks, CRA-CIP has created a network with other tax administrations on a global scale. These relationships have led to an increase in the sharing of strategic intelligence. In collaboration with J5 partners, hundreds of data exchanges have occurred. 171. The CRA has received information from foreign partners spontaneously and reactively on tax evasion and income tax matters (civil queries) to a good extent. Furthermore, CRA automatically exchanges information through the transmission of bulk data with treaty partners, usually on an annual basis (144 cases in the period under assessment). No data was provided on the timeliness to receive a reply from counterparts, but Canada reports to be pleased with the co-operation received (see Box 2.4). Box 2.4. CRA-CIP investigation The CRA-CIP conducted an investigation that targeted international investors through a scheme designed to solicit funds for investment in shares of various companies. However, no funds were ever returned to the international investors. Instead, the money was misappropriated for personal use. The accused personally appropriated more than one million dollars from his corporations’ bank accounts and failed to report any of it in his individual income tax, thereby evading over CAD 275 000 in federal income tax. The success of this investigation was largely on the basis of international co-operation through the use of treaties and witness interviews. Canada made international treaty requests for banking information in several jurisdictions outside of Canada. Leveraging treaties and fostering cross-border co-operation played a crucial role in empowering CRA-CIP investigators to gather the essential evidence needed to effectively pursue justice, ultimately leading to a conviction, in December 2021, in which the accused was conditionally sentenced to two years less a day in prison and fined over CAD 200 000. Source: Canada Footnotes [26] Such as Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group, INTERPOL Expert Group on AML, Counterfeit and Security Documents Working Group, the Global Focal Point Conference on Asset Recovery, the FATF-INTERPOL Roundtable Engagement on Asset Recovery, and other FATF working groups, Camden Asset Recovery Informal Network (CARIN), in the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for the Caribbean (ARIN-CARIB) and in the UK-backed International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC), (see c.40.23)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Competent authorities have timely access to the information held in the registers of BO data operated by Corporations Canada and by REQ in Québec. For timely access via other prongs of Canada’s multi-pronged approach, the BO record-keeping obligations introduced for legal persons in most provinces and territories mean data can be accessed by competent authorities and also support REs to meet CDD obligations under the PCMLTFA. However, data is not available on levels of compliance with the BO obligations in provinces where central registries have not yet been established. In addition, case studies provided by Canada show that LEAs primarily use the corporate and beneficial ownership registries, records held by reporting entities, and disclosures from FINTRAC rather than going directly to legal persons to seek their BO data. 404. The registries show good levels of compliance with the filing obligations, although this is better for the federal registry than Québec’s. While REQ performs some a priori and a posteriori verifications, the federal registry firstly verifies the identity of the filers (who may not be a BO) and then verifies the accuracy of the BO information provided on a risk/audit basis that uses AI and other analytical tools to cross-reference data and detect anomalies and other data integrity issues. Corporations are flagged for follow up if BO data appears fictitious, if a corporation claims to not have any ISC or where corroborating data identifies an issue. As of January 2026, 10 512 letters had been issued for different failings and data provided indicates that these had led to greater compliance in a slight majority of cases. 405. REs have a good understanding of their obligations to gather BO data as part of the CDD process and authorities can access this through disclosures from FINTRAC or using production orders. For access from other government agencies, while CRA holds data on the totality of judicial orders and/or requests from law enforcement, a breakdown of this data to obtain figures specific to BO was not available. While FINTRAC does not hold specific data on how frequently LEAs seek BO data from FINTRAC, in 2024-2025, 47% of FINTRAC’s reactive disclosures (i.e. as a result of a VIR from a LEA) included information on a legal entity. 5.3.1. Basic information 406. Basic information on corporations is held by all federal, provincial and territorial authorities responsible for incorporation and is available to any member of the public. 407. Basic information on other forms of legal persons, including co-operatives, boards of trade and non-profit organisations, is held by respective federal and provincial authorities under various applicable legislation and is available to the public and competent authorities via the corporate registries in each of the federal/provincial and territorial jurisdictions. 5.3.2. Beneficial ownership information 408. Canada follows a multi-pronged approach to ensure that the BO of a private corporation can be determined by competent authorities in a timely manner. Beneficial ownership information on corporations is available to competent authorities from four main sources: (1) corporations themselves, (2) government registers where these have been established (currently at the federal level and in Québec), (3) reporting entities who have obtained BO data as part of their CDD processes and (4) proactive and reactive disclosures from FINTRAC and other government agencies. Information held by legal persons 409. At a federal level, since June 2019, private corporations are required to prepare and maintain their own adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on individuals with significant control (ISC) over the corporation. There are similar requirements at a provincial level (except for Alberta) for corporations to hold (or, in Québec, declare to the REQ) information on their ISCs at a provincial level [46] , covering over 88% of corporations in Canada. While Québec collects data on compliance with BO disclosure requirements, authorities in other jurisdictions in Canada do not collect information on compliance with these record-keeping obligations (although at federal level, the level of compliance with record-keeping requirements can be inferred from the level of filing of BO information with the federal registry). This is a particular concern regarding Ontario as it is where 38% of Canadian corporations are formed. Authorities cannot fully demonstrate to what degree corporations in the provinces without central BO registries, notably Ontario and BC, are complying with the requirements to record BO information. 410. Where BO record-keeping obligations have been introduced, they generally also require this information to be provided to investigative bodies by corporations upon request. Case studies provided by Canadian authorities demonstrated the value and use of the federal and Québec registries, RE CDD data obtained via FINTRAC disclosures and production orders and CRA and RQ data rather than seeking BO data from legal persons themselves. Registries 411. Since 2024, federal corporations governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) are required to file information on their individuals with significant control (ISC) with the federal registry operated by Corporations Canada. As of November 2025, the information held in the CBCA registry covers 94% of federal corporations, which in turn constitute 16% of all Canadian corporations. 412. The BO filing obligations which have been introduced for legal persons are generally consistent in the requirements for the information to be kept accurate and up to date. To ensure accuracy of its ISC register, CC verifies the identity of the filer (separate to information on BO) and then takes a risk-based approach to BO information verification. The focus of its verification efforts so far has been on those corporations declaring that they have no ISCs, where this conflicts with other data available to CC. CC uses various tools, including large language models, to determine which filings require closer scrutiny. The ISC register can also be cross-referenced with CRA data to verify accuracy. As of January 2026, 10 512 verification activities had been undertaken, with six staff members dedicated to Compliance/Integrity and Transparency. 413. As of 1 October 2025, REs have been required to report discrepancies discovered on CC’s register to Corporations Canada within 30 days, as a further means of ensuring accuracy. CC shares the reports with FINTRAC. This reflects Canada’s multi-pronged approach to supporting the integrity of the registry. However, the introduction of this obligation was too recent for its effectiveness to be assessed. 414. FINTRAC has ingested the data on CC’s ISC register, and on Alberta’s corporate register, in bulk and so has comprehensive access to this for its analysis function to identify BO relationships through the nature of patterns, transactions and entity-level information, among others. Work is underway to allow FINTRAC to similarly ingest the data available in the corporate registries of other provinces and territories. It is important to note however that the provincial corporate registries contain information on legal, as opposed to beneficial, ownership and so the information is not equivalent to that held on the federal ISC register or Québec’s REQ. CC’s public register receives on average 600 000 visits per month. CC does not track which of these are authorities, businesses conducting CDD or members of the public. Since CC started collecting BO data, it has received eleven requests from LEAs for non-public BO data and this information can be provided within one day. LEAs also consult the registry for public information. 415. Québec was the first province to establish a similar beneficial ownership registry, where obligations for domestic and foreign corporations include transmitting to the Registraire des entreprises information on the ultimate beneficiaries in order to make their identity public. This registry accounts for approximately 13 % of the total population of Canadian corporations. 416. The REQ in Québec verifies on a risk basis BO information provided to it upon filing. Like CC, a focus is placed on those companies claiming not to have any BOs or to be exempt from the requirements. After an enterprise is created or registered, any declaration filed electronically must be made using the company's ClicSÉQUR (i.e. the Québec government authentication system) authentication code to ensure that the person filing the declaration is authorized to do so by the company. The REQ has chosen to take a non-aggressive approach to ensuring compliance, including by issuing non-disclosure notices in May 2025 to corporations known not to have filed BO data. It had 70% compliance at the time of the onsite and authorities stated they were aiming to reach 85% by March 2026. Both above registers require information to be updated within reasonable timeframes upon there being a material change. 417. While REQ similarly does not track LEA use of the register, it receives general disclosure orders from law enforcement at least once per month and approximately five requests per month for non-public data held by the register without a general disclosure order. This is in addition to the general access provided to those agencies using the Office of the Investigator tool, which removes the need for specific access requests to be made and therefore further assists in providing timely access. The Sûreté du Québec has nearly 250 police officers who have access to this tool, which allows for searches beyond those permitted to the public, e.g. by name, by field of activity and others. The RCMP is currently engaging with REQ to access this tool also. 418. The obligations on foreign businesses (including corporations and trusts) to file BO data currently explicitly only apply in Québec as it is the only established provincial BO register. They apply in BC in relation to real estate ownership where relevant corporations, including foreign corporations, that have a registered ownership or similar interest in land, must centrally file transparency reports containing beneficial ownership information with the Land Title and Survey Authority. Foreign beneficial owners of land must be disclosed in transparency reports, which are partially available to the public and fully available to competent authorities. Therefore, the ability of competent authorities to access BO, as opposed to basic, information on foreign corporations varies across the provinces. 419. LEAs have demonstrated the utility of the central registers, both for comparison of data with that obtained elsewhere and for obtaining data without having to seek it from corporations themselves. The RCMP indicated that BO data was used in at least 2 452 cases between 2019 and 2025, although this was not broken down between legal persons and arrangements. Reporting entities 420. Financial entities, DNFPBs and dealers in virtual currency (since 2014) and foreign money services businesses (since 2021) are required to obtain and verify beneficial ownership information for clients that are legal persons. Information gathered as part of CDD can be provided to LEAs by reporting entities via production orders and to FINTRAC via STRs. Over the review period, data was not recorded on how many requests for beneficial ownership details LEAs have made from reporting entities. In addition, and as outlined under IO7, access to such information via production orders may not be timely 421. REs interviewed during the onsite demonstrated a good understanding of their obligations to collect BO data as part of CDD. A view expressed by several was that they would not engage in business with a company whose BO data could not be provided. As part of its supervisory activities, FINTRAC examines whether REs are fulfilling their obligations in this regard. During the review period, FINTRAC issued six AMPs for violations of PCMLTFA requirements that include breaches of non-compliance with BO requirements. Other sources 422. In 2017, the PCMLTFA was amended to expand the scope of information FINTRAC discloses to law enforcement and other competent authorities to include beneficial ownership details. In practice, LEAs have obtained FINTRAC data on beneficial ownership details on 2 233 entities over the period 2023/24-2024/25. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) collects corporate tax filings, financial records and shareholder information which support BO identification for tax enforcement and compliance. Since January 2024 the CRA can share information on shareholders and affiliations with the Director of Corporations Canada for the purpose of verifying and validating the BO information required to be filed with Corporations Canada. In practice Corporations Canada used CRA bulk data to confirm beneficial ownership details on 44 215 entities over the review period to verify accuracy of their claims that they do not have any ISCs. Box 5.1. Case study of timely access In this stolen vehicle export and criminal proceeds laundering case, the Sûreté du Québec ’s (SQ) Bureau of Investigation Partnership conducted an investigation targeting a company that rented container spaces on cargo ships to Europe. This company then offered its spaces to people who wanted to send a container to Europe. The investigation revealed that several of the containers sent through this company contained stolen vehicles. The SQ’s bureau of criminal asset recovery was called in to assist due to the highly lucrative nature of this investigation. Checks at the REQ allowed the bureau of criminal asset recovery to discover that the company in question belonged to the suspect's spouse, and that he had transferred his rights to her some time before declaring bankruptcy, a few years earlier. During this same period, he also transferred all ownership rights to his luxurious residence to his spouse. Bank disclosure orders were subsequently obtained against the company, the suspect, and his spouse, in addition to obtaining their income declarations from Revenu Québec. Analysis of the evidence obtained demonstrated that money laundering had taken place and that part of the proceeds had been used to pay for the residence. A search of the residence also resulted in the seizure of more than CAD 615 000 in cash. Civil proceedings were initiated to obtain the confiscation of the money and the suspect's residence. An application to initiate proceedings was obtained in July 2025, Investigators are awaiting further proceedings Source: Sureté du Québec Footnotes [46] Ontario , Québec , Saskatchewan , Nova Scotia , since 2023; New Brunswick , since 2022; British Columbia (BC Business Corporations Act , for Companies (including limited companies, community contribution companies, benefit companies and unlimited liability companies)), Manitoba , Prince Edward Island , since 2020; Federal , Newfoundland and Labrador , since 2019." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 504. Canada’s key competent authorities use financial intelligence and other relevant information to a large extent to investigate ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Canadian LEAs conduct financial inquiries when investigating predicate offences and RCMP case samples demonstrate high utilisation rates for financial intelligence (94% of investigations into ML or ‘possession’ offences utilised FINTRAC disclosures). Information obtained in FINTRAC disclosures (transactional reporting and STRs), production orders and search warrants allows LEAs to develop initial investigations. This is particularly relevant to developing the identities of the persons of interest and identifying the financial criminal activity. See core issue 7.1 for further details on LEAs regular conduct of parallel financial investigations at the initial phases of ML, predicate offence and TF related investigations. 505. During 2020-2025, FINTRAC has received feedback on 1 118 disclosures to competent authorities (out of a total of 10 127 disclosures). Approximately 94% of the feedback found the financial intelligence and information valuable, and/or actionable (See Table 6.7 below). This feedback is positive (consistent with section 6.2.3). FINTRAC’s feedback mechanism can be strengthened to ensure constructive feedback is systematically used to improve areas of deficiency (such as timeliness of disseminations). Figure 6.1. Feedback on FINTRAC disclosures to competent authorities Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 506. FINTRAC has sought further feedback on 162 disclosures to RCMP, CRA and CSIS between the period of 2020-2024. Enforcement outcomes of these disclosures include 30 charges and 10 convictions. This data contributes to a positive reflection of the use of financial intelligence and information in developing investigations and evidence. 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 507. FINTRAC’s financial intelligence has contributed to the identification and tracing of criminal proceeds and instrumentalities and is used extensively by LEAs in their asset tracing efforts. Alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques, PPP information sharing and FINTRAC disclosures are the primary tools used to establish production orders to further trace and identify. This information requires active reporting and participation from public and private entities (see Box 6.3). This case study demonstrates how the RCMP uses FINTRAC’s financial intelligence to investigate cases that lead to tangible enforcement results, including arrests, convictions, seizures and forfeitures. Following amendments to the PCMLTFA, FINTRAC information can be disclosed (proactively or reactively through a VIR) to provincial CFOs, removing a barrier to CFOs’ ability to identify and trace assets. Since 2025, CFOs are now a disclosure recipient and have submitted 16 VIRs. FINTRAC has disclosed 1 proactive disclosure and 5 reactive disclosures with the remaining reactive disclosures still in progress. Box 6.3. Project Legion: Combatting the Laundering of Proceeds from Illegal Cannabis Activities Project Legion, a PPP led by TD Bank, was launched in September 2022 to enhance awareness of the harms associated with illicit cannabis activities and strengthen the detection of laundering of the proceeds. Based on FINTRAC's review of 5 000 STRs received between 2020-21, an Operational Alert Laundering of Proceeds from Illicit Cannabis was disseminated, describing the methods used to launder proceeds of illicit cannabis sales. It provided actionable indicators to help reporting entities identify and submit STRs. Subsequently, 44 105 PPP Legion STRs were reported to FINTRAC. Cases involving the laundering of illicit cannabis proceeds are often large and complex, with networks spanning multiple jurisdictions. FINTRAC helped investigators link illicit cannabis activity across provinces and disclosed 169 unique STRs to seven LEA via disclosure packages. These reports involved 163 individuals, over 90 accounts, and more than CAD 53 million in suspected illicit sales." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 828. Reporting entities under the PCMLTFA have a “duty to determine” on a continuous basis whether they are in possession or control of property that is owned, held or controlled by or on behalf of a designated person. At the same time, every person in Canada and Canadians outside of Canada must disclose without delay to RCMP or CSIS the existence of property in their possession or control that is believed to be owned or controlled by a designated person, regardless of whether it falls under the person’s name or is managed by a third party on their behalf. This provision establishes an obligation to report property held in one’s possession or where the property is held separately and being dealt with indirectly. The PCMLTFA’s sanction evasion offence links back to obligations under Canada’s sanctions laws and the reporting of efforts to evade prohibition in place under Canada’s sanctions framework related to the direct, or indirect, dealing with property belonging to designated persons. 829. UN sanctions are augmented by more restrictive and broad-based sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act, which are similarly applicable to all persons in Canada and Canadians abroad. These prohibit any dealing with DPRK property, directly or indirectly, and the PCMLTFA requires mandatory reporting to FINTRAC where there is reasonable ground to suspect a transaction is linked with the DPRK pursuant to paragraph 7(1)(c), while any transaction with Iran must be reported to FINTRAC pursuant to the Ministerial Directive. 830. The mechanisms currently in place to identify funds or assets consist primarily of STRs and LPEPRs. This along with other mandatory reporting obligations (e.g. all international electronic fund transfers over CAD 10 000) form the basis of Canada’s efforts to identify sanctioned property in the name of a designated individual as well as associations where other assets may be controlled by an individual acting on behalf, or at the direction, of a designated person. FINTRAC uses this information to proactively map networks and account relationships to identify additional assets. The CBSA also assesses FINTRAC reporting against customs transactions to identify instances where goods are used to conceal sanctioned funds. While these sources provide valuable information to Canadian authorities, Canada lacks proactive measures and actions to identify funds and other assets held by individuals or entities within complex ownership structures. This includes the absence of systematic checks of the relevant registries. Consequently, in the absence of an existing report, Canadian authorities may face significant challenges in detecting such assets. Therefore, Canada should expand authorities’ competencies by improving their ability to proactively identify assets, funds, and economic resources held by designated persons and entities, and by persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction. 831. Canada reported that it was able to identify and pursue the seizure of a corporate structure, specifically the subsidiary of a foreign company whose ultimate beneficial owner was a designated person. Canada also seized a physical asset, namely an aircraft. In both instances, the seized assets were linked to Canada’s autonomous sanctions programmes. Although not related to Iran or the DPRK, Canada indicated that its authorities and abilities would be substantively the same should such circumstances arise. In more detail, while UN measures against Iran and DPRK require only asset freezing, Canada’s domestic sanctions regime (SEMA) is broader and can support asset seizure. Freezing processes are the same regardless of the act. Any asset where there is a crossover between the UN Act and autonomous legislation would follow the same domestic process: assets are first identified and frozen and a seizure of the asset may occur, if appropriate. Where there is no crossover with domestic legislation, the law requires the asset remain frozen unless a change is made by the relevant UNSCRs. 832. Iran-linked assets have been reported but are not linked to UN obligations, while no DPRK-linked assets have been reported. However, as of November 2025, based on reports submitted to RCMP, Canada effectively froze some assets under autonomous sanctions regimes. Additional assets belonging to persons designated by the UN have not been reported to Canadian authorities under the UN Act or Special Economic Measures Act since the Snapback provision was triggered, which is anticipated given the overlap between the UN Act and SEMA (Special Economic Measures Act) requirements. If assets were to be identified, they are expected to be reported immediately to FINTRAC. Table 11.1. Frozen assets and blocked transactions under the SEMA regime reported to RCMP Sanction regime Sanctioned Country Assets frozen (in CAD) Transactions blocked (in CAD) Total (in CAD) Special Economic Measures Act Iran $ 78 908 - $ 78 908 Note: Data from 24 February 2022 to 28 November 2025. Source: Canada 833. The sectors that report the most sanctioned property to the RCMP are banks (60.4%) and trust companies (19.8%). No reports on sanctioned property were received from DPMS, and very limited number of reports were received from law firms and MSBs, which is not in line with the high risk of these sectors in being potentially exploited by DPRK and Iran in evading sanctions and may indicate a low level of awareness or capability in those sectors. In the assessment period there were no Iran or DPRK UNSCRs linked assets reported. 834. In FY 2024-2025, following the new clarification to report STRs related to sanction evasion, FINTRAC received 1 007 STRs of this kind, mostly from MSBs and banks, which is in line with Canada’s risk and context. However, Canada does not specifically track PF-related STRs, as they are captured as a subset of sanction evasion STRs. Prior to 2024-2025, proliferation financing formed part of the sanctions evasion reporting but STRs on sanction evasion were not tracked by FINTRAC. The STR obligation was specific to only ML and TF, and reporting entities could reference sanctions evasion in an ML/TF STR submission, but it was not subject to distinct tracking. Financial intelligence has been used by RCMP to identify and seize a financial asset under Canada’s autonomous sanctions program, but not for UNSCRs related sanctions. Table 11.2. STRs reported to FINTRAC in 2024-2025 related to Sanction Evasion Grouped Sector Activity Sector Number of STRs on SE MSB Foreign money services business 166 Money services business 314 Bank Bank 414 Securities Securities dealer 66 CU/CP Credit union 19 Financial services co-operative 3 Provincial savings office 3 Real estate Real estate 10 Mortgage Mortgage administrators 4 Mortgage brokers 1 Trust and Loan Trust and/or loan company 4 DPMS Dealer in precious metals and stones 2 Life insurance Life insurance company 1 TOTAL 1 007 Source: Canada 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 835. Canada’s approach to the DPRK and Iran goes beyond UNSCRs obligations. The PCMLTFA requires all transactions linked with the DPRK (directly or indirectly) be reported to FINTRAC due to the blanket prohibition on all DPRK transactions under Canada’s autonomous sanctions framework. The Ministerial Directive for Iran requires that all transactions directly or indirectly linked to Iran must be reported to FINTRAC since 2020. Similarly, all transactions with Iran are required to be treated as high risk and reporting entities must monitor transactions for the purpose of determining whether a STR or a LPEPR must be submitted to FINTRAC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 828. Reporting entities under the PCMLTFA have a “duty to determine” on a continuous basis whether they are in possession or control of property that is owned, held or controlled by or on behalf of a designated person. At the same time, every person in Canada and Canadians outside of Canada must disclose without delay to RCMP or CSIS the existence of property in their possession or control that is believed to be owned or controlled by a designated person, regardless of whether it falls under the person’s name or is managed by a third party on their behalf. This provision establishes an obligation to report property held in one’s possession or where the property is held separately and being dealt with indirectly. The PCMLTFA’s sanction evasion offence links back to obligations under Canada’s sanctions laws and the reporting of efforts to evade prohibition in place under Canada’s sanctions framework related to the direct, or indirect, dealing with property belonging to designated persons. 829. UN sanctions are augmented by more restrictive and broad-based sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act, which are similarly applicable to all persons in Canada and Canadians abroad. These prohibit any dealing with DPRK property, directly or indirectly, and the PCMLTFA requires mandatory reporting to FINTRAC where there is reasonable ground to suspect a transaction is linked with the DPRK pursuant to paragraph 7(1)(c), while any transaction with Iran must be reported to FINTRAC pursuant to the Ministerial Directive. 830. The mechanisms currently in place to identify funds or assets consist primarily of STRs and LPEPRs. This along with other mandatory reporting obligations (e.g. all international electronic fund transfers over CAD 10 000) form the basis of Canada’s efforts to identify sanctioned property in the name of a designated individual as well as associations where other assets may be controlled by an individual acting on behalf, or at the direction, of a designated person. FINTRAC uses this information to proactively map networks and account relationships to identify additional assets. The CBSA also assesses FINTRAC reporting against customs transactions to identify instances where goods are used to conceal sanctioned funds. While these sources provide valuable information to Canadian authorities, Canada lacks proactive measures and actions to identify funds and other assets held by individuals or entities within complex ownership structures. This includes the absence of systematic checks of the relevant registries. Consequently, in the absence of an existing report, Canadian authorities may face significant challenges in detecting such assets. Therefore, Canada should expand authorities’ competencies by improving their ability to proactively identify assets, funds, and economic resources held by designated persons and entities, and by persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction. 831. Canada reported that it was able to identify and pursue the seizure of a corporate structure, specifically the subsidiary of a foreign company whose ultimate beneficial owner was a designated person. Canada also seized a physical asset, namely an aircraft. In both instances, the seized assets were linked to Canada’s autonomous sanctions programmes. Although not related to Iran or the DPRK, Canada indicated that its authorities and abilities would be substantively the same should such circumstances arise. In more detail, while UN measures against Iran and DPRK require only asset freezing, Canada’s domestic sanctions regime (SEMA) is broader and can support asset seizure. Freezing processes are the same regardless of the act. Any asset where there is a crossover between the UN Act and autonomous legislation would follow the same domestic process: assets are first identified and frozen and a seizure of the asset may occur, if appropriate. Where there is no crossover with domestic legislation, the law requires the asset remain frozen unless a change is made by the relevant UNSCRs. 832. Iran-linked assets have been reported but are not linked to UN obligations, while no DPRK-linked assets have been reported. However, as of November 2025, based on reports submitted to RCMP, Canada effectively froze some assets under autonomous sanctions regimes. Additional assets belonging to persons designated by the UN have not been reported to Canadian authorities under the UN Act or Special Economic Measures Act since the Snapback provision was triggered, which is anticipated given the overlap between the UN Act and SEMA (Special Economic Measures Act) requirements. If assets were to be identified, they are expected to be reported immediately to FINTRAC. Table 11.1. Frozen assets and blocked transactions under the SEMA regime reported to RCMP Sanction regime Sanctioned Country Assets frozen (in CAD) Transactions blocked (in CAD) Total (in CAD) Special Economic Measures Act Iran $ 78 908 - $ 78 908 Note: Data from 24 February 2022 to 28 November 2025. Source: Canada 833. The sectors that report the most sanctioned property to the RCMP are banks (60.4%) and trust companies (19.8%). No reports on sanctioned property were received from DPMS, and very limited number of reports were received from law firms and MSBs, which is not in line with the high risk of these sectors in being potentially exploited by DPRK and Iran in evading sanctions and may indicate a low level of awareness or capability in those sectors. In the assessment period there were no Iran or DPRK UNSCRs linked assets reported. 834. In FY 2024-2025, following the new clarification to report STRs related to sanction evasion, FINTRAC received 1 007 STRs of this kind, mostly from MSBs and banks, which is in line with Canada’s risk and context. However, Canada does not specifically track PF-related STRs, as they are captured as a subset of sanction evasion STRs. Prior to 2024-2025, proliferation financing formed part of the sanctions evasion reporting but STRs on sanction evasion were not tracked by FINTRAC. The STR obligation was specific to only ML and TF, and reporting entities could reference sanctions evasion in an ML/TF STR submission, but it was not subject to distinct tracking. Financial intelligence has been used by RCMP to identify and seize a financial asset under Canada’s autonomous sanctions program, but not for UNSCRs related sanctions. Table 11.2. STRs reported to FINTRAC in 2024-2025 related to Sanction Evasion Grouped Sector Activity Sector Number of STRs on SE MSB Foreign money services business 166 Money services business 314 Bank Bank 414 Securities Securities dealer 66 CU/CP Credit union 19 Financial services co-operative 3 Provincial savings office 3 Real estate Real estate 10 Mortgage Mortgage administrators 4 Mortgage brokers 1 Trust and Loan Trust and/or loan company 4 DPMS Dealer in precious metals and stones 2 Life insurance Life insurance company 1 TOTAL 1 007 Source: Canada 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 835. Canada’s approach to the DPRK and Iran goes beyond UNSCRs obligations. The PCMLTFA requires all transactions linked with the DPRK (directly or indirectly) be reported to FINTRAC due to the blanket prohibition on all DPRK transactions under Canada’s autonomous sanctions framework. The Ministerial Directive for Iran requires that all transactions directly or indirectly linked to Iran must be reported to FINTRAC since 2020. Similarly, all transactions with Iran are required to be treated as high risk and reporting entities must monitor transactions for the purpose of determining whether a STR or a LPEPR must be submitted to FINTRAC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="381. Canada demonstrates a good understanding of the inherent ML/TF risks associated with legal persons and arrangements, both those originating in Canada and those having sufficient links with it. The main assessment of legal persons and arrangements is contained within the 2025 national risk assessment. The national risk assessment is structured around inherent threats and vulnerabilities rather than arriving at residual risk ratings for different legal vehicles. The 2025 NRA was led by the Department of Finance Canada, co-chaired by FINTRAC, developed through collaboration with LEAs and supervisors and involved consultations with federal departments and provincial and territorial governments, as well as the private sector. This included corporate law experts from different Canadian jurisdictions. The federal-provincial territorial working group on BO contributed expertise on legal persons and arrangements created in their respective jurisdictions. The NRA also built on public consultations which were conducted by federal, provincial and territorial governments on the ML/TF risks associated with complex corporate ownership to inform the implementation of BO registries. The assessment drew on a range of qualitative and quantitative information including FINTRAC intelligence and supervisory findings, PSPC procurement and supplier-integrity data, RCMP investigative and intelligence reporting, broader Government of Canada intelligence assessments, targeted public and private research and consultations with academics, industry and civil society. 382. Corporations are assessed as holding ’very high’ levels of inherent vulnerability. This is partly based on their ease of formation and the fact that this can be done from anywhere in the world and without the need for professional intermediaries. However, public corporations are assessed as being less vulnerable than private corporations due to existing disclosure obligations under provincial and territorial securities regulations and stock exchange rules. These effectively require disclosure of those owning 10% or more of such corporations. 383. Other forms of legal persons, such as co-operatives and boards of trade, are assessed as having low levels of vulnerability for ML and TF due to their ownership structures, governance and purposes. 384. Express trusts are also assessed as holding ’very high’ levels of vulnerability. This is based upon their potential complexity, making ultimate beneficial ownership difficult to determine, and providing options for them to have a global reach. 385. The national risk assessment does not make a clear distinction between the assessment of the risks of legal arrangements which are governed under Canadian law and those which are administered in Canada, essentially treating these as one category (See R.25). It does refer to foreign legal arrangements having sufficient links with Canada but, other than in the case of offshore asset protection trusts where the vulnerabilities are described as ‘heightened’, does not distinctly assess the risks of these arrangements, rather stating that the same vulnerabilities apply to all, whether originating in Canada or elsewhere. Therefore, while Canada has a good understanding of the vulnerabilities inherent to express trusts, it has not clearly assessed how risks may differ between foreign trusts with sufficient links to Canada and those administered or originating in Canada. 386. Authorities demonstrated a good understanding of the risk of different legal vehicles being used for different purposes. Authorities have mainly seen trusts used for tax avoidance or evasion rather than ML or TF. Most legal vehicles used for ML/TF have been corporations. 387. Based on the CRA’s audit experience, domestic trusts mostly use a province or territory of Canada as their source of law, for the formation, administration and interpretation of the trust and for the legal forum, unless the domestic settlor is attempting to establish a trust with tax residency in another country. The “source of law” is normally noted in the trust deed as the settlor’s choice of governing law. Typically, trust deeds for foreign trusts mention the foreign jurisdiction in which the trust seeks to establish tax residency as the settlor’s choice of governing law. 388. The NRA assigns vulnerability ratings based on joint assessments of the ML and TF vulnerabilities of different legal persons and arrangements, rather than making distinct assessments for TF and ML, given a high degree of common vulnerabilities that can be exploited for both purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="109. Canada’s AML/CFT governance framework co-ordinates federal, provincial and territorial authorities through dedicated co-ordinating committees and thematic working groups. Federal AML/ATF committees up to the Deputy Minister level are co-chaired by Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada. The federal, provincial, and territorial working group on AML/CFT is co-chaired by Finance Canada and a rotating provincial co-chair (the British Columbia Ministry of Finance at the time of the evaluation). These committees have led the development of legislative and regulatory measures for consideration by the Government, to strengthen the investigative, enforcement, and information sharing tools of Canada's AML/CFT Regime. 110. The AML/CFT Regime is supported by a structured governance framework with committees at multiple levels, including the Deputy Minister level AML/CFT Committee, the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Steering Committee, and the Director General Interdepartmental Co-ordinating Committee (DG-ICC), each responsible for oversight, strategic alignment, and co-ordination across policy and operational partners. Working groups, such as the Strategic Intelligence and Risk Assessment Working Group (SIRA-WG), provide analysis on ML/TF risks, emerging threats, and sector vulnerabilities, informing policy and operational decisions. This committee structure is actively co-ordinated by the thematic lead departments (Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada), with participation from the Privy Council Office (PCO), to ensure coherence with broader government objectives. The AML/CFT Regime committees, together with PCO-led national security governance structures, work in a complementary manner to ensure cross-government buy-in to strategies and implementation at the appropriate level and operate flexibly to ensure a timely response to urgent issues when these arise. 111. Effective cross-jurisdictional co-ordination is established for Canada’s national response to ML/TF threats, given its federal structure, and involves collaboration among federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal stakeholders through working groups and bilateral engagement. 112. AML/CFT priorities are regularly advanced through meetings of Finance Ministers, financial regulators, police chiefs, and other co-ordination fora, with dedicated federal-provincial-territorial (FPT) forums supporting policy alignment and operational co-operation. Notable FPT bodies include the Meetings of Ministers and Deputy Ministers Responsible for Justice and Public Safety, the Crime Prevention and Policing Committee, the Working Group on AML/CFT, the Co-ordinating Committee of Senior Officials on Criminal Justice, and the National Co-ordinating Committee on Organized Crime. Sector-specific working groups, such as the Beneficial Ownership Working Group and the Joint Government of Canada - Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) Working Group, further enhance co-ordination on corporate transparency and ML/TF risks in the legal profession. Additionally, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Organized Crime Committee contributes to national and international policy development, law enforcement innovation, public awareness, and unified responses to organized crime. The appointment of Canada’s Fentanyl Czar demonstrates the focused governance arrangements to address high priority, cross cutting risks through leadership and enhanced co-ordination when a rapid and flexible response is required. The Fentanyl Czar model provides a national focal point to align the actions of multiple authorities and accelerate implementation of priority actions to address evolving risks which require co-ordinate national action. 113. In support of the Regime, the ACMLTF is a public-private advisory committee that encourages collaboration with the private sector and promote transparency in risk understanding, policymaking. Canada’s provincial and territorial law societies, co-ordinated by the FLSC, collaborate with the Government of Canada through a joint working group aimed at strengthening information sharing on ML/TF risks specific to the legal sector. They also co-ordinate through a variety of committees to develop and enforce AML/CFT standards, guidance, and disciplinary frameworks within the legal profession. Figure 1.2. Canada’s AML/CFT Governance Structure Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="756. Where TF prosecution is not practicable, Canada applies a broad set of disruption tools, including prosecutions for other offences, terrorism peace bonds (23), terrorism listings (34), immigration actions, regulatory measures, charitable-status revocation, PCMLTFA seizures, and operational interventions. Authorities have a good awareness of the range of disruption tools available, as well as their triggers and preconditions, and consider them as part of their case management decisions. 757. Project SEYANT (Box 9.5), which resulted in a conviction for a (non-TF) terrorist offence following a TF investigation, shows that these alternative tools can effectively disrupt TF activity even without a conviction. Such tools are particularly useful in responding to ideologically motivated violent extremist (IMVE) and low-value facilitation cases where evidentiary thresholds for a TF prosecution are difficult to meet. 758. In addition to pursuing alternate criminal charges, between 2019 and 2025, Canadian authorities have also used the following interventions to disrupt terrorist financing: · RCMP’s engagement with private sector: Established collaborative relationships with key private sector partners, including Canada’s largest banks. These partnerships serve as an important tool to strengthen the security and resilience of Canada’s financial system. Through ongoing engagement, the RCMP shares insights on emerging trends, provides education on threats, and works with the private sector together to identify and mitigate risks. · CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs): Where there are reasonable grounds to believe the security of Canada is at risk, CSIS can take measures to reduce threats, as defined under the CSIS Act. In 2024, CSIS conducted two (2) warranted and 13 non-warranted TRMs. Generally, TRMs fall into three broad categories that can include: · Messaging : Directly or indirectly pushing information to a threat actor or person impacted by the threat in an attempt to influence their behaviour or reduce the threat. · Leveraging: Disclosing information to a third party to enable them to take action, at their discretion, against the identified threat-related activities. · Interference : Directly affecting the ability of a threat actor to engage in threat-related activity. · Designations under targeted financial sanctions regimes: In 2025, Canada designated seven transnational organised crime groups as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code , as set out below in relation to IO.10. Listing strengthens Canada’s ability to prevent and disrupt terrorist activity and TF, even where these have not yet been investigated or prosecuted. · Prevention: Canada’s primary goal in countering terrorism efforts is to maintain public safety, and Canada places a strong focus on disrupting terrorist organizations and terrorist acts before they occur. To complement national security and intelligence disruption measures, an important part of Canada’s approach is preventing individuals from radicalizing to terrorism and violent extremism in the first place and supporting their deradicalization, if possible. For example, through Public Safety Canada’s Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, Canada funded 81 projects totalling CAD 85.4M to support disengagement from violent ideologies and help at-risk individuals. Box 9.5. Use of Other Criminal Charges to Disrupt Provision of Services for Benefit of a Terrorist Group (Project Seyant) The financing of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code s. 83.03(1) and 83.03(2) include providing, making available (etc) property or financial or other related services for terrorist purposes or for use by a terrorist group. In 2020, in response to information received from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) opened an investigation on individuals suspected of involvement in activities linked to the Atomwaffen Division and with ties to neo-Nazi accelerationist ideology. The Atomwaffen Division was listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code in February 2021. It has branches in countries including the US, the UK, Germany and Canada. Criminal Techniques Observed in the Case This case focuses on the role of one individual, known as Dark Foreigner, who produced propaganda material for the benefit of Atomwaffen Division. The individual participated in the creation and editing of three recruitment videos encouraging viewers to commit violent acts on behalf of Atomwaffen Division. He posted these violent acts and other violent images online as propaganda for the group. He also provided his equipment, such as his Fuji camera, drone and lenses to take images for the videos, and used his expertise as a graphic designer to produce the videos. The material was posted to various social media platforms, including those known for hate content, and received significant views and attention. The individual offered his artistic and technical expertise to further the Atomwaffen Division cause and support other extremist groups, such as the Sonnenkreig Division. He also produced graphic designs for the book “Siege 4th edition”, authored by James Mason, who is also listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code in Canada. During its investigation, the RCMP considered the TF elements of the case in line with the Criminal Code definition, which includes the provision of financial or other related services for a terrorist group. Domestic and International Co-operation Authorities used both formal and informal co-operation mechanisms to support this case. Throughout the investigation, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) provided approximately 15 disclosures of financial intelligence to the RCMP. These disclosures led to production orders to financial institutions, which provided insights into the financial activities of the individuals under investigation. Financial intelligence and subsequent banking records also allowed investigators to place the individual in the same locations where the videos were filmed and led to search warrants that generated evidence tying the individual to the videos. CSIS shared information with the RCMP that prompted the INSET to initiate the investigation and was vital to the file. Further engagement with CSIS, which included additional intelligence disclosures under the One Vision framework, also provided crucial information to reducing the threat. The RCMP worked with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), which provided information that was significant in bolstering the case. Internationally, the RCMP used informal and formal co-operation with several European countries to demonstrate the individual’s association with international groups with similar ideology and to gather evidence. For example, Canada used a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the UK to obtain evidence. The information was first shared informally for intelligence and investigative purposes and then, through MLAT, for purposes of evidence in court proceedings. This work was facilitated by the RCMP’s liaison officer network to engage with foreign counterparts. Charges and Sentencing Following the investigation led by the INSET, the RCMP arrested and charged the individual under the Criminal Code for: · Section 83.18: Participation in activity of terrorist group · Section 83.19: Facilitating terrorist activity · Section 83.2: Commission of offence for terrorist group (wilful promotion of hatred (319(2)) This was the first time both terrorism and hate propaganda charges have been brought forward in Canada against someone accused of promoting violent far-right ideology. While the RCMP did pursue the TF element during its investigation, ultimately the disruption of TF activity was achieved through the arrest of the individual and the charges above. On September 8, 2025, in the Ontario Superior Court, the individual was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for the following criminal Code offences: · Section 83.18: Participation in activity of terrorist group – 4 years, consecutive to all other sentences · Section 83.19: Facilitating terrorist activity – 4 years · Section 83.2 Commission of offence for terrorist group (wilful promotion of hatred (319(2)– 2 years Disruption of TF The arrest of the individual and the laying of other Criminal Code and terrorism charges stopped the individual’s provision of services to the Atomwaffen Division. It prevented the production and spread of hate propaganda for the benefit of a listed terrorist entity, thereby disrupting the listed terrorist entity’s ability to recruit, propagate their message and obtain contributions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="381. Canada demonstrates a good understanding of the inherent ML/TF risks associated with legal persons and arrangements, both those originating in Canada and those having sufficient links with it. The main assessment of legal persons and arrangements is contained within the 2025 national risk assessment. The national risk assessment is structured around inherent threats and vulnerabilities rather than arriving at residual risk ratings for different legal vehicles. The 2025 NRA was led by the Department of Finance Canada, co-chaired by FINTRAC, developed through collaboration with LEAs and supervisors and involved consultations with federal departments and provincial and territorial governments, as well as the private sector. This included corporate law experts from different Canadian jurisdictions. The federal-provincial territorial working group on BO contributed expertise on legal persons and arrangements created in their respective jurisdictions. The NRA also built on public consultations which were conducted by federal, provincial and territorial governments on the ML/TF risks associated with complex corporate ownership to inform the implementation of BO registries. The assessment drew on a range of qualitative and quantitative information including FINTRAC intelligence and supervisory findings, PSPC procurement and supplier-integrity data, RCMP investigative and intelligence reporting, broader Government of Canada intelligence assessments, targeted public and private research and consultations with academics, industry and civil society. 382. Corporations are assessed as holding ’very high’ levels of inherent vulnerability. This is partly based on their ease of formation and the fact that this can be done from anywhere in the world and without the need for professional intermediaries. However, public corporations are assessed as being less vulnerable than private corporations due to existing disclosure obligations under provincial and territorial securities regulations and stock exchange rules. These effectively require disclosure of those owning 10% or more of such corporations. 383. Other forms of legal persons, such as co-operatives and boards of trade, are assessed as having low levels of vulnerability for ML and TF due to their ownership structures, governance and purposes. 384. Express trusts are also assessed as holding ’very high’ levels of vulnerability. This is based upon their potential complexity, making ultimate beneficial ownership difficult to determine, and providing options for them to have a global reach. 385. The national risk assessment does not make a clear distinction between the assessment of the risks of legal arrangements which are governed under Canadian law and those which are administered in Canada, essentially treating these as one category (See R.25). It does refer to foreign legal arrangements having sufficient links with Canada but, other than in the case of offshore asset protection trusts where the vulnerabilities are described as ‘heightened’, does not distinctly assess the risks of these arrangements, rather stating that the same vulnerabilities apply to all, whether originating in Canada or elsewhere. Therefore, while Canada has a good understanding of the vulnerabilities inherent to express trusts, it has not clearly assessed how risks may differ between foreign trusts with sufficient links to Canada and those administered or originating in Canada. 386. Authorities demonstrated a good understanding of the risk of different legal vehicles being used for different purposes. Authorities have mainly seen trusts used for tax avoidance or evasion rather than ML or TF. Most legal vehicles used for ML/TF have been corporations. 387. Based on the CRA’s audit experience, domestic trusts mostly use a province or territory of Canada as their source of law, for the formation, administration and interpretation of the trust and for the legal forum, unless the domestic settlor is attempting to establish a trust with tax residency in another country. The “source of law” is normally noted in the trust deed as the settlor’s choice of governing law. Typically, trust deeds for foreign trusts mention the foreign jurisdiction in which the trust seeks to establish tax residency as the settlor’s choice of governing law. 388. The NRA assigns vulnerability ratings based on joint assessments of the ML and TF vulnerabilities of different legal persons and arrangements, rather than making distinct assessments for TF and ML, given a high degree of common vulnerabilities that can be exploited for both purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="703. The way in which victims of crime can be compensated through confiscated property differs significantly depending on whether confiscation occurs under the CC framework, or through a provincial/territorial civil forfeiture framework. Across the frameworks restitution to victims and victims compensation through direct and community-based approaches is moderate. Criminal Code forfeiture 704. Restitution is the primary mechanism in the CC whereby victims may obtain payment from offenders for financial losses associated with the crime. Restitution orders for ML offences occur primarily in cases such as fraud, where there is an identifiable victim who has suffered a financial loss. In other cases, such as drug prosecutions, there may not be identifiable victims, and restitution may not be an appropriate or possible option. The CC requires property of an offender (including property that may satisfy a forfeiture order) be used to satisfy restitution or compensation orders before such property may be used to satisfy a forfeiture order (CC cs462.49(2)). While restitution is commonly ordered, the orders are rarely satisfied (see Table 8.10), particularly in the case of orders exceeding CAD 5 000. Victims may commence civil proceedings to enforce unpaid orders, and some provinces have additional avenues to assist victims in obtaining restitution or to pursue or incentivise offenders for payment. More significant CC forfeiture outcomes - particularly enforcement of fines in lieu of forfeiture - could make additional funds available to satisfy restitution, in light of the hierarchy of uses for forfeited funds. Table 8.10. Proportion of restitution orders restored (CAD) 1 to 499 500 to 999 1 000 to 4 999 5 000 to 9 999 10 000+ Total Reporting Provinces, 2019-20 to 2022-23: 44% 21% 26% 4% 5% Source: Canada 705. The CC also provides for the return of property forfeited in circumstances (see s 462.42). Such property can only be returned to victims where their loss can be tied to the specific forfeited property or a lawful interest in it. For example, a stolen vehicle registered in the victim’s name can be returned to the victim as its lawful owner. Confiscated proceeds of human trafficking held in a bank account cannot be returned directly to the victim in the absence of specific evidence linking a certain amount of proceeds to the victim. 706. Under the CC, property that cannot be directly and specifically linked to a lawful owner is generally forfeited to the crown for disposal. In the case of property forfeited to the federal jurisdiction, the proceeds of disposal are credited to the consolidated revenue fund. The federal government maintains a Victims Fund that provides grants and contributions to support organisations and initiatives that enhance services for victims of crime and improve their access to justice. Recovered proceeds are credited to the Victims Fund through regular budget appropriations from consolidated revenue, and are not directly credited to the Fund. As of May 2025, the Victims Fund totalled CAD 50.3 million. 707. Provincial authorities are providing compensation to victims through forfeited criminal property to a large extent. In Québec, the Directeur des Poursuites Criminelles et Penales (DPCP) has provided approximately CAD 10.8 million in direct compensation and distributed CAD 43.5 million in LEA and community grants. In Ontario, the DAM-Criminal RFO has provided CAD 17.7 million in direct compensation and CAD 4.9 million in grants. These positive examples are complemented by good examples of the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC) and the OPP’s Serious Fraud Office returning property to victims (see Table 8.11). Table 8.11. Restoration by CAFC and OPP SFO (CAD) Year CAFC Amount restored to victims OPP Serious Fraud Office restitution 2019 396 493 2020 2 887 892 2021 3 350 000 1 017 703 2022 2 900 000 33 429 548 2023 381 933 - 2024 5 387 626 - 2025 2 046 899 - Source: Canada Civil forfeiture compensation 708. Provincial/territorial CFOs provide support for victims to a very large extent. A proportion of the amounts confiscated are provided to the victim through direct compensation payments, and grants for community initiatives and crime prevention. It is effectively reinvesting criminal property into social measures for the communities harmed by offending. Across the provincial frameworks approximately CAD 52 million have been provided to victims through these mechanisms, as set out in Table 8.12. Table 8.12. Compensation, restitution and grants through civil forfeiture (CAD) Restitution Category 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Direct Compensation and restitution 3 790 000 851 900 946 623 328 724 522 000 108 000 6 547 247 Grants for Victim Support Initiatives 18 031 000 15 091 000 9 500 000 11 623 230 10 898 000 18 890 000 29 788 000 Grants for Police Initiatives 4 095 000 11 393 000 15 488 000 Total: 21 821 000 15 942 900 10 446 623 11 951 954 15 515 000 30 391 000 51 823 247 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="703. The way in which victims of crime can be compensated through confiscated property differs significantly depending on whether confiscation occurs under the CC framework, or through a provincial/territorial civil forfeiture framework. Across the frameworks restitution to victims and victims compensation through direct and community-based approaches is moderate. Criminal Code forfeiture 704. Restitution is the primary mechanism in the CC whereby victims may obtain payment from offenders for financial losses associated with the crime. Restitution orders for ML offences occur primarily in cases such as fraud, where there is an identifiable victim who has suffered a financial loss. In other cases, such as drug prosecutions, there may not be identifiable victims, and restitution may not be an appropriate or possible option. The CC requires property of an offender (including property that may satisfy a forfeiture order) be used to satisfy restitution or compensation orders before such property may be used to satisfy a forfeiture order (CC cs462.49(2)). While restitution is commonly ordered, the orders are rarely satisfied (see Table 8.10), particularly in the case of orders exceeding CAD 5 000. Victims may commence civil proceedings to enforce unpaid orders, and some provinces have additional avenues to assist victims in obtaining restitution or to pursue or incentivise offenders for payment. More significant CC forfeiture outcomes - particularly enforcement of fines in lieu of forfeiture - could make additional funds available to satisfy restitution, in light of the hierarchy of uses for forfeited funds. Table 8.10. Proportion of restitution orders restored (CAD) 1 to 499 500 to 999 1 000 to 4 999 5 000 to 9 999 10 000+ Total Reporting Provinces, 2019-20 to 2022-23: 44% 21% 26% 4% 5% Source: Canada 705. The CC also provides for the return of property forfeited in circumstances (see s 462.42). Such property can only be returned to victims where their loss can be tied to the specific forfeited property or a lawful interest in it. For example, a stolen vehicle registered in the victim’s name can be returned to the victim as its lawful owner. Confiscated proceeds of human trafficking held in a bank account cannot be returned directly to the victim in the absence of specific evidence linking a certain amount of proceeds to the victim. 706. Under the CC, property that cannot be directly and specifically linked to a lawful owner is generally forfeited to the crown for disposal. In the case of property forfeited to the federal jurisdiction, the proceeds of disposal are credited to the consolidated revenue fund. The federal government maintains a Victims Fund that provides grants and contributions to support organisations and initiatives that enhance services for victims of crime and improve their access to justice. Recovered proceeds are credited to the Victims Fund through regular budget appropriations from consolidated revenue, and are not directly credited to the Fund. As of May 2025, the Victims Fund totalled CAD 50.3 million. 707. Provincial authorities are providing compensation to victims through forfeited criminal property to a large extent. In Québec, the Directeur des Poursuites Criminelles et Penales (DPCP) has provided approximately CAD 10.8 million in direct compensation and distributed CAD 43.5 million in LEA and community grants. In Ontario, the DAM-Criminal RFO has provided CAD 17.7 million in direct compensation and CAD 4.9 million in grants. These positive examples are complemented by good examples of the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC) and the OPP’s Serious Fraud Office returning property to victims (see Table 8.11). Table 8.11. Restoration by CAFC and OPP SFO (CAD) Year CAFC Amount restored to victims OPP Serious Fraud Office restitution 2019 396 493 2020 2 887 892 2021 3 350 000 1 017 703 2022 2 900 000 33 429 548 2023 381 933 - 2024 5 387 626 - 2025 2 046 899 - Source: Canada Civil forfeiture compensation 708. Provincial/territorial CFOs provide support for victims to a very large extent. A proportion of the amounts confiscated are provided to the victim through direct compensation payments, and grants for community initiatives and crime prevention. It is effectively reinvesting criminal property into social measures for the communities harmed by offending. Across the provincial frameworks approximately CAD 52 million have been provided to victims through these mechanisms, as set out in Table 8.12. Table 8.12. Compensation, restitution and grants through civil forfeiture (CAD) Restitution Category 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Direct Compensation and restitution 3 790 000 851 900 946 623 328 724 522 000 108 000 6 547 247 Grants for Victim Support Initiatives 18 031 000 15 091 000 9 500 000 11 623 230 10 898 000 18 890 000 29 788 000 Grants for Police Initiatives 4 095 000 11 393 000 15 488 000 Total: 21 821 000 15 942 900 10 446 623 11 951 954 15 515 000 30 391 000 51 823 247 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 807. Canada’s development and implementation of policy on proliferation-based sanctions and the administration of Canada’s broader sanctions framework involves several partners that co-operate to develop and implement policies and strategies. Figure 11.1. Canada’s Governance and Co-ordination Mechanism for PF (and TF) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 808. As noted under IO.9, the governance of both PF and TF issues is integrated into the broader national security and intelligence framework, ensuring co-ordination between policy and operational efforts across Canada’s system. Further details on Canada’s risk assessment framework, including the role of the sanctions evasion risk assessment working group, are provided under IO.1. 809. Canada’s intelligence priorities help establish and contextualise the main security threats and risks (including those that pertain to PF) facing the country. The Privy Council Office (PCO) of Canada leads a governance committee structure that helps to identify intelligence priorities, ensuring that intelligence production efforts are aligned with whole-of-government strategic interests. The intelligence priorities are renewed by the Government every two years, or as required, based on recommendations from the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and the intelligence community. One such intelligence priority is linked to sanctions evasion and associated proliferation financing along with broader priorities linked to illicit and threat finance, financial sector integrity, foreign interference and malign influence, and espionage and extraction of knowledge information. Intelligence collected through co-ordinated government efforts across these priorities helps inform Canada’s national understanding of threats and vulnerabilities, which also feed into Canada’s NRA. This intelligence is an integral part of Canada’s policy development process and its approach to set measures to counter illicit financing threats, including PF. 810. Public Safety’s Counter Proliferation Policy Working Group, which includes GAC, CSIS, Department of Finance, FINTRAC, CBSA, RCMP, CSE, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and Health Canada, serves as the overarching policy co-operation mechanism to identify and address policy and operational gaps in the counter proliferation sanctions program. The group ensures that senior level decision-makers are informed of potential challenges and co-ordinated actions to address or mitigate them. For example, the group’s advice led to the implementation of secure electronic reporting of exports to the CBSA in January 2020, which has improved CBSA’s ability to assess export declarations and identify possible contraventions with Canada's export controls. The Counter Proliferation Policy Working Group meets on an “as needed basis” to discuss elements of Canada’s counterproliferation framework and policy gaps that need to be bridged. 811. GAC is the primary policy department responsible for the administration of Canada’s sanctions legislation related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while Finance Canada is responsible for co-ordinating Canada’s assessment of PF risks, in consultation with other authorities, departments, agencies and with the involvement of the private sector. Finance Canada leads policy work in partnership with FINTRAC to focus on financial sector related considerations. FINTRAC also produces strategic intelligence products that identify emerging trends and typologies and discloses financial intelligence to competent authorities on suspected sanctions evasion. CSIS collects and analyses intelligence and provides information and assistance to other government departments. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing sanctions obligations at the border and the RCMP is the lead for criminal investigations involving contraventions of Canada’s sanctions regime. In 2025, relevant competent authorities effectively co-operated to develop the first NRA on sanctions evasion which includes PF. 812. In recent years, Canada has effectively implemented and identified a set of new roles and powers for authorities, new obligations for the private sector, and has enhanced awareness of PF across the overall Canadian system, including both the public and the private sectors. In 2022 a new sanctions-based asset seizure and information sharing regime was created; in 2024 the PCMLTFA was amended to require entities to report to FINTRAC transactions suspected to be related to sanctions evasion, which enables FINTRAC to produce tactical and strategic intelligence products relating to sanctions evasion; in March 2025 the new obligation (LPEPRs – see IO.10) to report to FINTRAC property owned or controlled by persons and entities under an order or regulation made under the UN Act came in effect; finally, in October 2025, additional requirements to report property under Canada’s autonomous sanctions programme related to the DPRK and Iran came into effect. This has armed Canada with stronger tools to combat proliferation financing and ensure the effective implementation of TFS-PF. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 813. Canada has mechanisms in place to permit effective operational co-operation, and where appropriate, co-ordination and timely sharing of relevant information domestically between different competent authorities, both proactively and on request, for operational purposes related to sanctions evasion, including PF. Authorities discuss emerging trends and risks which can be used to inform potential operational and/or policy responses related to Canada’s sanctions regime, including proliferation sanctions. 814. Relevant competent authorities participate in and share information (including at operational level) on PF via the SIRA WG, which is co-chaired by the Department of Finance Canada and FINTRAC and meets every two months or more as needed. 815. All Canadian federal AML/CFT Regime members with an operational intelligence mandate (CBSA, CSIS, RCMP, FINTRAC) have direct access to classified systems containing extremely sensitive human, signals, and financial intelligence that is collected, analysed and shared by Canada and its key international partners, including with regards to TFS-PF. Intelligence is monitored daily by officials and used to develop and refine intelligence on threat actor capabilities, methods, and intentions feeding into operational and strategic work. 816. CBSA chairs the Interdepartmental Counter-Proliferation Operations Committee, an example of a formal mechanism whereby operational information can be shared with operational partners. The committee ensures that operational activities are co-ordinated and promotes co-operation across authorities. It meets monthly to ensure ongoing tactical-level co-ordination and de-confliction among security and intelligence partners and discusses strategic export control and sanctions cases. CBSA also chairs the Sanctions and Border Enforcement Co-ordination Committee, which is tasked with identifying gaps associated with export controls and improving co-ordination and information sharing on export control and sanctions-related issues. The group was used as a central point of co-ordination to discuss work underway, evolution of sanctions evasion methods as well as underlying data and information sources to support the administration of the sanctions regime and the means of gathering data, typologies, indicators and case studies. 817. The multi-committee structure of Canada’s approach in combating PF allows the committees to focus on different aspects of the PF threat and response. Canada reports that this multi‑committee structure does not hinder effective co-ordination, as decisions can be taken quickly when needed, as set out in IO.1, particularly in urgent situations, and without the need to go through all the committees. For example, Canada identified, drafted and published sanctioned subjects within a 24-hour period over a weekend. While these subjects were not related to PF, the example show Canada’s ability to act swiftly across committees, taking and implementing decisions quickly in urgent cases. The Department of Finance co-ordinated with intelligence and enforcement partners to assess risks linked to circumvention of UNSCRs on DPRK. This formed the basis of strengthening the DPRK MD to impose more rigorous compliance program obligations related to correspondent banking relationships, which took effect within one week. Box 11.1. CBSA and RCMP mitigate DPRK sanctions evasion threats In 2024, information was provided to the CBSA’s Counter Proliferation Operations Section and the RCMP from a foreign partner alleging that the DPRK was seeking to obtain military technology from Canada, in violation of Canada’s export controls and sanctions regime and UNSCRs. The information indicated that a Canadian company would export the goods in question to its foreign subsidiary in a known sanctions’ evasion transshipment jurisdiction, who in turn sought to tranship the goods onwards through a third jurisdiction to the DPRK. The Counter Proliferation Operations Section consulted and deconflicted with domestic (e.g., RCMP) and overseas enforcement partners and worked to declassify the information to enable regulatory verifications of the allegations in Canada. Representatives of the Counter Proliferation Operations Section and the RCMP then approached the Canadian manufacturer and learned that the company was in litigation with the foreign subsidiary for theft of design materials and branding. The company provided legal documents and other holdings that effectively demonstrated a lack of any conspiratorial activity on the part of the Canadian company. The company also voluntarily provided additional information to further substantiate the alleged illicit activities of their subsidiary. Prompt and co-ordinated outreach to the Canadian company by Canadian law enforcement, working together under the umbrella of a co-ordinated counter-proliferation operation, demonstrates Canada’s capability to effectively mitigate an active proliferation threat in a timely manner. Source: CBSA" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="620. LEAs and competent authorities are identifying and tracing criminal property to some extent and implement a ‘follow the money approach’ during parallel financial investigations. Consistent with competent authorities’ increased emphasis on conducting financial inquiries in their investigations (see IO7), this is trending upward. 621. Forfeiture of criminal property under the CC framework is the sole approach in the federal jurisdiction and the primary approach in most provinces. In developing the criminal case, investigators will conduct initial analysis to identify and trace potential criminal property. They utilise a broad range of information gathering tools (see IO.7) such as production orders to identify potential targets and financial flows for further investigation. 622. Investigators executing search warrants are trained to identify potential criminal property and seize evidence of source and use of funds (such as receipts and account information) to support further and more detailed analysis. Seized cash is scanned through RCMP’s Currency Reading and Tracing System (CRATS) and traced against other cash seizures to build links between targets. From the case studies provided, these initial inquiries to identify potential criminal property are conducted routinely and support the use of more advanced techniques in more complex cases. 623. Cases of greater complexity and volume are typically referred to a dedicated unit (such as OPP’s PAFU or TPS’ Asset Forfeiture Unit) or an RCMP IMLIT for further analysis. In some provinces, where cases are referred to a CFO, their asset tracing capabilities are used independent of an LEA investigation. In other provinces, results from LEA financial investigations are used by CFOs to support asset tracing. 624. The development of specialist capabilities within these structures has improved Canada’s ability to identify and trace criminal benefit, particularly in complex cases. Specialist financial crime and asset recovery teams, such as the PAFU and the IMLITs, employ civilian investigators with specialised expertise to trace property through complex ownership structures. This is aided by improved access to beneficial ownership information. Despite this, many case studies demonstrated asset tracing efforts only prioritising property clearly within the legal ownership of the person, at the expense of more expansive identification and tracing of criminal benefit. With some good exceptions, efforts to pursue assets held by nominees, front persons, or other third parties, including close relatives and associates, were less evident, as the focus appears to be on formal/legal ownership and not structures or transactions intended to conceal ownership. 625. These teams have access to and employ technology and innovative approaches to trace and identify criminal property, and recover proceeds and benefits obtained through cyber-enabled crimes, including scams. Notably, the use of trained cryptocurrency investigators and analysis tools to trace funds on the blockchain has resulted in several successful seizures and confiscations (see Box 8.1). Box 8.1. Case study – Identification and tracing of criminal property A ransomware matter involved an Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigation into an Ontario‑based cybercriminal responsible for ransomware attacks against businesses worldwide. The offender operated through criminal online forums and concealed their identity using remote desktop protocols. Proceeds of crime were channelled into multiple cryptocurrency accounts, requiring specialised digital asset tracing techniques. Following intelligence from international partners, the OPP conducted an 18-month covert investigation, which included covert entries into the suspect’s residence, remote access warrants for digital devices, and continuous monitoring of dark‑web activity and cryptocurrency wallets. Officers conducted surveillance of online platforms to track the suspect’s movements, transactions, and command and control infrastructure. During a search of the suspect’s residence, police found him actively conducting a ransomware attack and were able to shut down the command-and-control server at the time of arrest. A total of 41 devices and two illegal handguns were seized. Investigators also identified and traced substantial cryptocurrency holdings, which were confiscated for future restitution. 626. In the most complex asset recovery matters, PSPC’s FAMG is engaged to provide forensic asset tracing analysis to determine the source and use of funds in acquiring property suspected of being proceeds of crime. FAMG conducts extensive net worth analysis to accurately quantify the benefit obtained through criminal enterprises, in comparison to a person’s lawful sources of wealth. This analysis is admissible in courts and is fundamental in obtaining fines in lieu of forfeiture (Canada’s mechanism for indirectly confiscating PoCV). The use of FAMG expertise has increased and is a significant force multiplier for Canada’s LEAs in relevant cases. It enables competent authorities to identify the scale of criminal benefit and trace proceeds to support restraint and forfeiture. These structures and specialised resources have enhanced Canada’s capability to identify and trace criminal property. 627. Despite Canada’s efforts to improve identification and tracing of criminal property, competent authorities do not effectively identify and trace PoCV. In the federal jurisdiction, authorities are limited in their capacity to identify and trace PoCV due to the operation of fines-in-lieu of forfeiture. 628. Fines in lieu of forfeiture are not directly enforceable against other property of the person and authorities do not extend the scope of their asset tracing work to PoCV. This mechanism (including approaches to enforce unpaid fines-in-lieu) is detailed in core issues 8.3 and 8.5 below with respect to provisional measures and enforcement of forfeiture. This approach has major shortcomings that undermine the effectiveness of Canada’s asset recovery system in achieving the confiscation and permanent deprivation of PoCV. 629. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture frameworks also do not contain mechanisms to identify or trace PoCV. Shortcoming – property beyond legal ownership 630. FAMG analysis can uncover the scale of, and in many cases quantify, the benefits obtained through criminal enterprises. Given criminal forfeiture is the primary vehicle for criminal property to be ultimately recovered (except for BC and Manitoba), competent authorities’ efforts to trace criminal property tend to prioritise assets clearly within the suspect’s legal ownership, to the exclusion of assets that may be beneficially owners or controlled by the suspect but titled to third parties. This is reportedly due to the requirement to prove the property was obtained or derived from the commission of the offence, on a balance of probabilities (general forfeiture at CC s. 462.37(1)), or, that the property is otherwise proceeds of crime beyond a reasonable doubt (a form of extended forfeiture at CC s. 462. 37(2)). 631. In practice, this has limited competent authorities’ ability to trace criminal property that is further removed from the suspect’s legal ownership but ultimately remains within their effective control (particularly where that property is beneficially owned or controlled by the suspect but held or titled to third parties). 632. In case studies provided, the identification and tracing process focuses primarily to cash tracing, flows of funds (fiat or virtual) and property the purchase of which can be linked to proceeds of crime (such as luxury vehicles or real estate). This was despite FAMG analysis showing substantially greater proceeds being generated or laundered than what was traced and subject to provisional measures. There were no statistics available on instances of asset tracing through more complex structures. FAMG has been involved in several matters that demonstrated advanced asset tracing including through businesses used for trade offsetting and otherwise legitimate business accounts. 633. The approach to asset identification and tracing, and its success, varies between provinces. Cases demonstrate that Ontario and Québec appear to limit their identification and tracing activities to the specific period of criminality under investigation. This is due to these provinces’ prioritisation of conviction-based forfeiture under the CC, and requires that assets can be linked to the criminal offence. Other provinces that have prioritised the use of their civil forfeiture frameworks (such as BC and Manitoba) take a more expansive approach to asset tracing across a broader period of suspected criminality, in the absence of a need to link the assets to a specific criminal offence. These provinces are also aided by the lower burden of proof required under civil rules of evidence and procedure. Through this approach, authorities in these provinces are able to avoid some of the challenges of proving ownership and control or dealing with intermingled funds under the CC forfeiture framework, ultimately resulting in more effective identification and tracing of criminal property. Shortcoming – access to tax information 634. In the context of privacy rights under Canada’s fundamental principles of domestic law, the sharing of tax information with law enforcement is subject to stringent conditions (Income Tax Act (ITA) s 241, and Excise Tax Act (ETA) s 295). If not proactively disclosed to an LEA (per ITA subs 241(9.5)), tax information can only be obtained through judicial authorisation (CC s 462.48). Tax information can be obtained when investigating non-tax offences. The practice of embedding CRA officers (such as in the IMLITs) and the use of joint forces operations has streamlined the process for proactive disclosures. Access to this information outside of these structures is less expeditious, though judicial authorisations can typically be obtained quickly. Municipal LEAs in particular can struggle to obtain tax information given their more limited engagement with CRA and the various mechanisms available. Investigators from provincial CFOs are not considered criminal investigators, so have even more limited access to tax information and cannot receive disclosures directly from CRA or obtain judicial authorisations. Typically, they are reliant on tax information being referred by an LEA if discovered during the execution of a search warrant or through civil discovery procedures once proceedings are commenced." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="824. Canada primarily imposes sanctions through Regulations established under three Acts under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: The United Nations Act, the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law). In Canada’s regime, a sanctions evasion offence means an offence arising from the contravention of a restriction or prohibition established by an order or regulation made under one of these three Acts. Generally, these Acts prohibit Canadians from dealing with property that is owned, held or controlled by a designated person and providing financial services to designated persons. This includes persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, a designated person, and captures functions such as the potential provision of indirect services as part of a correspondent banking relationship. 825. The UN Act authorises Canada to incorporate UNSCRs into domestic law with immediate effect. Any person designated by the UNSC is automatically designated under the relevant Canadian regulations under the UN Act. The designation of a person by the UNSC is immediately incorporated by reference into the UN Act and its regulations, meaning there is no delay between designation by the UNSC, and the obligation to immobilize and report property under Canadian law. The implementation of this obligation by reporting entities under the PCMLTFA is supervised by FINTRAC. 826. Whenever there is a change in the UNSCRs listings, GAC and FINTRAC rapidly send alert emails to over 11 000 subscribers (about 1 800 subscribers to GAC’s alerts and roughly 9 400 to FINTRAC’s alerts), a low number considering Canada’s materiality. In fact, there are a total number of 33 000 obliged entities under PCMLTFA (21 114 FIs and VASPs, 12 054 DNFBPs), approximately more than 136 000 lawyers and 4 200 Québec notaries active in the country, and additional potentially relevant subjects. Furthermore, Canada reports that all sectors are represented but it was not possible to ascertain the effective coverage of the alerts in terms of the representation of the private sector and entities. 827. To reimpose UN sanctions against Iran following the trigger of the Snapback mechanism on 27 September 2025, Canada reported that no amendments were needed to the relevant law as they were automatically and immediately effective. On 30 September 2025, Canada communicated the prohibitions through updates to the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran and the Minister of Finance issued a news release on 1 October 2025, reiterating the nature of the changes. Obligations under the PCMLTFA to report sanctioned property obligated reporting entities to submit any sanctioned property to FINTRAC immediately, but no property linked to UNSCRs has been identified. Box 11.2. Implementation without delay of UNSCRs on Iran after the trigger of the snapback mechanism On 14 July 2015, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Germany reached an agreement with Iran, i.e. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On 28 August 2025, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (collectively the “E3”) triggered the snapback mechanism process under the JCPOA, which led to the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran on 27 September 2025. Canada incorporates UNSC sanctions list changes by reference in the United Nations Act (UN Act). This means that no action was required by Canada to implement into Canadian law the reimposed UNSC sanctions as the legal prohibitions were in place immediately. Subsequently, a clear articulation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations under the UN Act was published by Global Affairs Canada on 30 September 2025. Despite the UN having lifted its sanctions through the JCPOA, Canada remained concerned about Iran’s weapons program and chose to maintain the scope of UN proliferation sanctions through its autonomous sanctions regime. This included tight restrictions on sensitive goods related to nuclear proliferation and the development of Iran’s ballistic missile program. These autonomous sanctions were in place up until the reimposition of UN sanctions, and their implementation without delay under Canada’s UN Act. Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. While LEAs can manage frozen or seized property, particularly at the initial stage, asset management in Canada is typically conducted by specialist asset management providers. 659. At the federal level, seized and restrained property is managed by PSPC’s SPMD. SPMD is well resourced and provides asset management services across Canada, primarily supporting seizures and restraints affected by federal authorities. SPMD employs more than 50 people across Canada and has seven secure warehouses [58] . SPMD also regularly engages external providers with specialist expertise to conduct inspections; appraise assets’ condition and market value, and provide specialist asset care (e.g. vessel maintenance in dry dock). At the time of the onsite visit, SPMD had approximately 17,890 assets under management with an approximate value of CAD 536 million, managed through an electronic inventory system. These span a wide range of property types (see box 8.3). Case studies demonstrate that SPMD is managing assets at the federal level and preserving their value well. 660. SPMD also uses pre-forfeiture sale court orders when needed to preserve asset value, including without the consent of the other party in situations where the property is rapidly depreciating or the cost of managing the property is unreasonable. Court orders can be obtained expeditiously through electronic means where required enabling reasonably timely action, even in the most urgent cases. Where necessary, the Minister of Public Services and Procurement has the power to make an interlocutory sale of perishable or rapidly depreciating property without a court order. Canada reports this is a rare occurrence with one example of its use. It is unclear whether this power has been exercised beyond this circumstance. 661. SPMD manages virtual currency as directed by court orders, including converting it to fiat currency if directed to do so. In the absence of a court order, SPMD manages virtual currency in its initial form and does not speculate on markets without direction. An accused may apply to the court to have SPMD transfer virtual currency into fiat currency to be held in lieu if there are potential volatile market conditions. Box 8.3. Example of effective SPMD asset management. A recent case demonstrates strong co-ordination between the SPMD and the Alberta Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) during a large-scale stolen property investigation. ALERT uncovered a significant criminal operation involving stolen vehicles, farm machinery, trailers, ATVs, and power tools. SPMD assumed responsibility for over 145 seized assets, co-ordinating towing, secure storage, and ongoing maintenance. SPMD later managed the disposal of assets through sale, transfer to the Alberta Civil Forfeiture Office, or return to lawful owners. By taking on comprehensive asset‑management duties, SPMD relieved investigators of major operational and logistical burdens, enabling ALERT to maintain focus on complex investigative work. 662. SPMD also provides asset management to provinces and territories upon request, including when provincial authorities are unable to effectively manage the property (due to specific management needs or costs). SPMD has a well-demonstrated track record of co-operation with LEAs and provincial CFOs across Canada (see Box 7.7). 663. In most cases, asset management at the provincial level, particularly pre-forfeiture, is conducted by the relevant provincial and municipal police. The exceptions to this are in BC, Ontario and Québec (since 2024). 664. BC’s dedicated asset management office Asset Investment Recovery’ (AIR) adopts a similar approach to the SPMD and is considered best practice in Canada for provincial asset management. Assets seized from provincially prosecuted offences are put under the management of AIR, rather than in police custody. This ensures preservation and management by independent asset management specialists and is an important transparency measure. Québec’s civil forfeiture office (established in 2024 under the Procureur général du Québec (PGQ)) is responsible for managing and administering seized, restrained and confiscated property in Québec. 665. In Ontario, pre-forfeiture asset management is led by Director Asset Management – Criminal (DAM-Criminal), which is responsible for managing all property under a CC restraint order in Ontario, and for taking custody of property under a management order. Following forfeiture, management of the property becomes the responsibility of the Director Asset Management – Criminal (DAM-Criminal) Restraint and Forfeiture Office (RFO). Case studies provided by the RFO demonstrate its effective management and disposal of forfeited property. 666. Similarly, pre-forfeiture management of seized property in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia is conducted by the seizing LEA, with property transferred to each province’s respective CFO at the point forfeiture is ordered. The Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia CFOs have in-house asset management specialists. Real property subject to preservation orders are either in possession of the CFO or the defendant with the order prescribing conditions on the maintenance of the property. Bank accounts subject to preservation orders remain in the possession of the financial institution. Post-forfeiture management 667. Post-forfeiture management and disposal of assets is occurring effectively across Canada. of property subject to forfeiture (see core issue 8.5) is occurring effectively. Following the issuance of a forfeiture order and the conclusion of any appeal period, assets not managed by a specialist asset management function or CFO are transferred to the relevant authority (SPMD at the federal level and contracted arrangements in provinces without specialist functions). Asset managers obtain professional appraisals and conduct market value analysis to maximise realised value. Cash and funds (including proceeds from virtual assets, stocks, and securities) are deposited into controlled accounts and subsequently credited to consolidated revenue, or dedicated forfeited asset funds (for example, the SPMD managed Seized Property Proceeds Account) as applicable. Physical and real property is generally disposed of through sales or auctions, with specialist resources engaged where necessary. Proceeds are credited in accordance with the jurisdiction’s forfeiture framework. Footnotes [58] Situated in Atlantic Canada, Ontario (2), Québec, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 363. FINTRAC has several measures for remedial actions, including issuance of supervisory letters following compliance assessments or examinations, along with action plans where necessary. Twenty requests for action plans were issued in the past five years, and FINTRAC monitors the completion of action plan items to ensure improvements are implemented. For more severe cases of non-compliance, FINTRAC may apply sanctions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) and non-compliance disclosures to law enforcement agencies. Although casinos have maintained strong levels of compliance across the reporting period thanks to FINTRAC’s significant activities in this sector, further work needs to be done to have a strong impact on the compliance of the Real Estate and DPMS sectors. 364. Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs): After a FINTRAC supervision officer conducts an examination or finds evidence of non-compliance, FINTRAC assesses the extent of the entity’s non-compliance against the severity/harm done (i.e. consequence) and reviews the entity’s overall compliance history. The amount of the AMP varies based on the severity of the violation. At the time of the evaluation, AMPs were up to CAD 100 000 (USD 73 092) for a person and CAD 500 000 (USD 365 462) for a reporting entity. Each individual violation can be subject to its own AMP and there is no cumulative penalty limit. When AMPs are imposed, the amount is considered proportionate. However, the number of AMPs is limited, and the positive impact of monitoring and supervision on DNFBPs’ compliance is not clearly demonstrated. 365. Once an administrative monetary penalty is imposed, FINTRAC must make public the name of the reporting entity, the nature of the violation or default, and the amount of the penalty. AMPs can cause financial strain for reporting entities, as well as reputational damage, given the public naming after the penalty is imposed. The public naming aspect of penalties provides an additional deterrence effect in addition to the penalty amount. However, in some cases, AMPs are published several months after being issued; for dissuasive effect in similar cases by other entities, it is important that AMPs be disclosed promptly. 366. Between 2020 and 2025, FINTRAC has issued 31 Notices of Violation for DNFBPs, which included one for accountants, two for casinos, five for DPMS, and 23 for real estate, for a total of CAD 5 236 388. This aligns with higher risk DNFBP sectors subject to the majority of compliance assessments. The Notice of Violation itself concerns various violations of the PCMLTFA and regulations, with the most frequent being compliance programs violations and violations for record keeping. It also included violations for failure to file an STR, which is one of the most serious violations and has high penalties associated with it. Proactive examinations, followed by appropriate sanctions, when warranted, and dissemination of STR obligations by public naming, should be carried out as part of awareness raising efforts across the entire sector. Table 4.21. Number/Total Dollar Value of Penalty Issued onto DNFBPs Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD Casinos 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 275 000 2 1 275 000 DPMS 3 000 2 272 910 1 222 750 1 99 314 0 0 1 264 000 5 858 974 Real Estate 7 742 5 538 230 8 1 517 176 0 0 5 549 533 5 423 225 23 3 028 164 Accountants 1 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 74 250 1 74 250 BC Notaries 293 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 12 054 7 811 140 9 1 739 926 1 99 314 5 549 533 9 2 036 475 31 5 236 388 Source: Canada Box ‎ 4.2. Case study – Behaviour Change Following an Administrative Monetary Penalty (AMP) in the Real Estate Sector This case study illustrates how an AMP issued in the real estate sector led to the rectification of non-compliance and meaningful behavioral change. FINTRAC had imposed AMPs on two of three brokerages in British Columbia linked through the same managing broker or corporate ownership. One AMP was imposed for CAD 149 886 in April 2022, and the second AMP was imposed for CAD 275 385 in July 2022. Subsequently, FINTRAC conducted a follow-up examination on the third brokerage and found that the real estate brokerage had implemented significant improvements to its compliance program. The follow-up examination, which assessed all applicable regulatory requirements, was conducted on-site in 2024. It marked a turning point in the reporting entity’s compliance approach. During this assessment, the compliance officer demonstrated a robust understanding of AML requirements and FINTRAC’s mandate. The reporting entity also presented a revised risk assessment, rectifying the incomplete version from 2022. The compliance officer had a strong understanding of the brokerage’s AML requirements and FINTRAC obligations, the policies and procedures were complete, agent interviews demonstrated that the ongoing training program and plan was effective, and the two-year review was completed by an external auditor, with its full scope documented. FINTRAC reviewed over 50 records and only two had record keeping errors: one for inadequate occupation, and one missing PEP form. The findings letter from the 2024 examination was flagged as “no further activity required,” as the reporting entity made significant improvements and no major deficiencies were identified. The reporting entity improved its compliance program due to FINTRAC’s interventions, which included the AMP applied to other related brokerages. This third brokerage expressed how FINTRAC’s previous examinations, including those on the other two brokerages, clarified the criteria for reporting STRs, in addition to their AML/CFT obligations. This resulted in significant improvements to their compliance program and knowledge of AML/CFT. Non-Compliance Disclosures (NCDs) 367. FINTRAC has the legislative authority to disclose information about non-compliance of reporting entities to law enforcement when it suspects on reasonable grounds that the information would be relevant to investigating or prosecuting criminal non-compliance offences under the PCMLTFA. Since 2020, FINTRAC has disclosed nine non-compliance disclosures to law enforcement on DNFBPs. Enforcement by Other Regulators 368. Regulatory bodies other than FINTRAC have the authority to independently impose sanctions or disqualify reporting entities through self-regulatory frameworks, based on violations of their respective legislation and regulations. These actions may include panel decisions and a range of punitive measures, such as disciplinary actions and monetary penalties. FINTRAC actively collaborates with other regulatory bodies to ensure it leverages all relevant remedial powers to enforce compliance. For example: · In the casino sector, the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) , the Ontario provincial regulator, has intervened to penalize casino operators for failure to meet requirements that have a nexus to AML. · The British Columbia Financial Services Authority (BCFSA) has issued professional misconduct penalties to British Columbia real estate brokers and agents for failure to comply with PCMLTFA obligations, such as failure to report suspicious transactions, amongst other violations. · The Organisme d’autoréglementation du courtage immobilier du Québec (OACIQ), the real estate regulator in Québec, requires all its registrants to provide information about the presence of a compliance program and shares its results with FINTRAC. 369. FINTRAC undertakes outreach activities to promote understanding of risk and obligations. FINTRAC’s restructuring from geographic to sector focus in 2023 has contributed to strengthening outreach by each sector and enhancing co-operation with reporting entities and relevant industrial associations (Also see 4.2.2). For the legal profession 370. Law societies have a wide variety of sanction options, including reprimands, fines, restrictions or conditions on practice, and revocation of license (disbarment). The grounds for sanctions are not limited to violation of AML/CFT rules but also include, among other things, improper use of trust account or involvement in fraudulent activities. 371. Canada provided case studies where law societies imposed a range of sanctions (including fines, suspensions, restrictions and conditions on practice, and disbarment) on lawyers for professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming, including for breach of AML/CFT rules. The majority of sanctions imposed against legal professionals for AML/CFT related conduct are suspensions or license revocations. Law societies do not maintain statistics related to sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT rules (See Table. 4.2). 372. In all law societies, disciplinary hearings are generally open to the public and disciplinary decisions, including notices of suspension and disbarment are publicly disclosed. This publicity is intended to have a dissuasive effect (see R.28, c. 28.4c)). Certain law societies, particularly in British Columbia, Ontario, Québec and Alberta, have more cases than others in relation to breaches of AML/CFT rules, in line with the general higher number of members. However, the sanctions imposed in several cases did not appear proportionate and dissuasive in relation to such breaches (e.g. suspensions for a few weeks or months, and fines in the order of thousands or tens of thousands). Disbarment was typically ordered in cases where lawyers not only breached AML/CFT rules but also aided or engaged in dishonesty, crime or fraud (e.g., misappropriation of client funds), contrary to rules of professional conduct. Considering the number of lawyers and their high vulnerability to ML/TF risks, the regional variations, relatively low monetary value of fines and limited duration of suspensions for breach of AML/CFT obligations as a whole, law society sanctions are not proportionate nor dissuasive and are not sufficient to ensure effective implementation of obligations by lawyers (see Table 4.2). 373. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a lawyer has committed a criminal offence, most (but not all) statutes governing law societies include mechanisms to authorize the law society to refer the matter to law enforcement and other competent authorities, subject to exceptions or safeguards for information covered by solicitor-client privilege, professional secrecy and/or confidentiality. For example, since 2021, the Law Society of Ontario has made 46 referrals to law enforcement, and the Law Society of British Columbia has made five referrals to law enforcement. The basis for these referrals includes misappropriation of client funds, AML concerns, and interference in the administration of justice. During an investigation, the Law Society of British Columbia also encourages complainants and witnesses to report to law enforcement if they have concerns in respect of a lawyer’s suspected criminal conduct. 374. Certain law societies such as British Columbia, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have concluded information sharing agreements with other regulators and law enforcement, such as the RCMP, to support investigations into professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Other law societies are working to finalize similar agreements with the RCMP. These information sharing agreements and initiatives are aligned with the objectives of the Government of Canada-FLSC joint working group and with the spirit of enhanced collaboration between law societies and law enforcement, recommended in the Cullen Commission’s Final Report. These information sharing agreements help strengthen Canada’s ability to enforce lawyers’ compliance and could result in more cases of law enforcement sanctions over time. Nevertheless, these agreements do not clarify the process for sharing of information from law societies to the RCMP and it is not yet clear whether they may lead to more referrals to law enforcement. Further, Canada has not provided evidence that law societies’ referrals and information sharing with LEAs have resulted in criminal prosecutions and sanctions in relation to money laundering. 375. Law Societies and the FLSC undertake a broad range of outreach activities and issue guidance to promote risk understanding and obligations across lawyers. These outreach initiatives have improved lawyers’ comprehension of AML/CFT obligations; however, lawyers’ risk awareness and flexible mitigation measures commensurate to the risks they assessed still have room for improvement. To advance from rule-based to risk-based approach, more effective ways of outreach should be considered, using FINTRAC and other relevant authorities’ outreach as references when needed (Also see 4.2.2)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="103. Canada applies a risk-based approach to its AML/CFT regulatory framework, strengthening requirements where higher risks are identified and allowing simplified measures or exemptions where risks are demonstrably lower, as determined through NRA and supporting risk assessments, although some limitations remain in the identification of lower risk areas). This approach is embedded in the federal regulatory system, which mandates that regulatory decisions be grounded in evidence and that all regulatory proposals incorporate structured and transparent risk assessments. 104. Most sectors are obliged to comply fully with AML/CFT obligations. There are simplified measures in the regulatory framework available for some lower risk scenarios. The framework allows certain entities such as entities subject to legal transparency requirements or assessed as low risk, to undergo simplified identity verification provided that the reporting entity has conducted a risk assessment and proven the low level of risk. As highlighted in the 2025 NRA, public corporations display a low vulnerability to ML/TF, as they are subject to stringent legal constraints under provincial and territorial securities laws and stock exchange rules. In recognition of this lower vulnerability profile, Canada’s AML/CFT framework has introduced simplified measures in certain low-risk scenarios involving public corporations. This approach has also allowed for the exclusion of low-risk activities offered by sectors, such as financing and leasing services for low value consumer products (rent-to-own furniture, personal electronics, etc.). Managing general agents, where they act as facilitators between brokers and insurers, typically offering services to assist with contracting of insurance agents and commission payments are also exempted as per the identified low risk. 105. Simplified measures can also be applied to certain categories of entities, including administrators of pension plans or regulated investment funds, a corporation or trust whose shares are traded on the Canadian stock exchange or a stock exchange designated under the Income Tax Act, a subsidiary whose financial statements are consolidated with these entities, or a state-owned enterprise, institution or agency or public service body, subject to specific record-keeping obligations. These categories are underpinned by ongoing risk assessment and monitoring, consultations with FINTRAC, private sector stakeholders, and other relevant authorities as part of the policy development process. However, the NRA focuses its analytical emphasis on the higher-risk end of the spectrum of entities and activities. While this approach supports the identification of significant ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities, it may mean some further, lower risk areas are not assessed in sufficient detail to determine where simplified measures may be appropriate. A more detailed analysis of lower-risk activities in a future iteration of the NRA could be the basis for additional applications of simplified measures under a risk-based approach. 106. Canada has strengthened its regulatory framework for sectors consistently assessed as highly vulnerable to ML/TF, with particular focus on MSBs, which have been rated as very highly vulnerable in recent NRAs. In response, the government introduced legislative and regulatory measures, specifically enhanced PCMLTFA registration requirements obliging domestic MSBs to provide criminal record checks for every person who directly or indirectly controls 20% or more of the business upon registration to address this persistent elevated risk. This is a good example of Canada’s ability to act rapidly on its evolving understanding of national risks and implement enhanced measures to more vulnerable sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. While LEAs can manage frozen or seized property, particularly at the initial stage, asset management in Canada is typically conducted by specialist asset management providers. 659. At the federal level, seized and restrained property is managed by PSPC’s SPMD. SPMD is well resourced and provides asset management services across Canada, primarily supporting seizures and restraints affected by federal authorities. SPMD employs more than 50 people across Canada and has seven secure warehouses [58] . SPMD also regularly engages external providers with specialist expertise to conduct inspections; appraise assets’ condition and market value, and provide specialist asset care (e.g. vessel maintenance in dry dock). At the time of the onsite visit, SPMD had approximately 17,890 assets under management with an approximate value of CAD 536 million, managed through an electronic inventory system. These span a wide range of property types (see box 8.3). Case studies demonstrate that SPMD is managing assets at the federal level and preserving their value well. 660. SPMD also uses pre-forfeiture sale court orders when needed to preserve asset value, including without the consent of the other party in situations where the property is rapidly depreciating or the cost of managing the property is unreasonable. Court orders can be obtained expeditiously through electronic means where required enabling reasonably timely action, even in the most urgent cases. Where necessary, the Minister of Public Services and Procurement has the power to make an interlocutory sale of perishable or rapidly depreciating property without a court order. Canada reports this is a rare occurrence with one example of its use. It is unclear whether this power has been exercised beyond this circumstance. 661. SPMD manages virtual currency as directed by court orders, including converting it to fiat currency if directed to do so. In the absence of a court order, SPMD manages virtual currency in its initial form and does not speculate on markets without direction. An accused may apply to the court to have SPMD transfer virtual currency into fiat currency to be held in lieu if there are potential volatile market conditions. Box 8.3. Example of effective SPMD asset management. A recent case demonstrates strong co-ordination between the SPMD and the Alberta Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) during a large-scale stolen property investigation. ALERT uncovered a significant criminal operation involving stolen vehicles, farm machinery, trailers, ATVs, and power tools. SPMD assumed responsibility for over 145 seized assets, co-ordinating towing, secure storage, and ongoing maintenance. SPMD later managed the disposal of assets through sale, transfer to the Alberta Civil Forfeiture Office, or return to lawful owners. By taking on comprehensive asset‑management duties, SPMD relieved investigators of major operational and logistical burdens, enabling ALERT to maintain focus on complex investigative work. 662. SPMD also provides asset management to provinces and territories upon request, including when provincial authorities are unable to effectively manage the property (due to specific management needs or costs). SPMD has a well-demonstrated track record of co-operation with LEAs and provincial CFOs across Canada (see Box 7.7). 663. In most cases, asset management at the provincial level, particularly pre-forfeiture, is conducted by the relevant provincial and municipal police. The exceptions to this are in BC, Ontario and Québec (since 2024). 664. BC’s dedicated asset management office Asset Investment Recovery’ (AIR) adopts a similar approach to the SPMD and is considered best practice in Canada for provincial asset management. Assets seized from provincially prosecuted offences are put under the management of AIR, rather than in police custody. This ensures preservation and management by independent asset management specialists and is an important transparency measure. Québec’s civil forfeiture office (established in 2024 under the Procureur général du Québec (PGQ)) is responsible for managing and administering seized, restrained and confiscated property in Québec. 665. In Ontario, pre-forfeiture asset management is led by Director Asset Management – Criminal (DAM-Criminal), which is responsible for managing all property under a CC restraint order in Ontario, and for taking custody of property under a management order. Following forfeiture, management of the property becomes the responsibility of the Director Asset Management – Criminal (DAM-Criminal) Restraint and Forfeiture Office (RFO). Case studies provided by the RFO demonstrate its effective management and disposal of forfeited property. 666. Similarly, pre-forfeiture management of seized property in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia is conducted by the seizing LEA, with property transferred to each province’s respective CFO at the point forfeiture is ordered. The Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia CFOs have in-house asset management specialists. Real property subject to preservation orders are either in possession of the CFO or the defendant with the order prescribing conditions on the maintenance of the property. Bank accounts subject to preservation orders remain in the possession of the financial institution. Post-forfeiture management 667. Post-forfeiture management and disposal of assets is occurring effectively across Canada. of property subject to forfeiture (see core issue 8.5) is occurring effectively. Following the issuance of a forfeiture order and the conclusion of any appeal period, assets not managed by a specialist asset management function or CFO are transferred to the relevant authority (SPMD at the federal level and contracted arrangements in provinces without specialist functions). Asset managers obtain professional appraisals and conduct market value analysis to maximise realised value. Cash and funds (including proceeds from virtual assets, stocks, and securities) are deposited into controlled accounts and subsequently credited to consolidated revenue, or dedicated forfeited asset funds (for example, the SPMD managed Seized Property Proceeds Account) as applicable. Physical and real property is generally disposed of through sales or auctions, with specialist resources engaged where necessary. Proceeds are credited in accordance with the jurisdiction’s forfeiture framework. Footnotes [58] Situated in Atlantic Canada, Ontario (2), Québec, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="801. Canadian authorities have established supervisory frameworks to monitor and ensure compliance with TF-TFS obligations. FINTRAC, as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, monitors reporting entities’ compliance with TF-related target financial sanctions through examinations and ongoing supervision and is equipped with sanctions powers. Supervisory systems are clearly structured and include mechanisms for co-ordination and escalation among competent authorities, however there is a concern on whether the authorities are able to identify any property not frozen and reported in a timely manner. 802. A central component of FINTRAC’s approach concerns LPEPR (formerly TPR) obligations. Examinations review whether reporting entities screen customers at onboarding and on an ongoing basis against prescribed lists, and whether escalation procedures allow for immediate reporting and freezing when matches are identified. Supervisors test systems through case file reviews, walkthroughs of automated screening solutions, and assessment of anomalies and match-handling workflows. Supervisors also assess whether freezing actions and reporting occur without delay, although comprehensive aggregate data on timeliness is limited. Where a triggering event is detected, FINTRAC verifies that the entity froze funds, halted the transaction, filed an LPEPR without delay, and submitted an STR if suspicion thresholds were met. Where entities conclude that no report was required, FINTRAC requires documented justification and evidence of internal consideration. There is no pro-active supervision of REs specifically to their freezing obligation, creating a possible gap to effective monitoring of these TF-TFS obligations. Nonetheless, FINTRAC reviews reporting entities’ policies, escalation procedures, screening capabilities, and case files to verify that potential matches are identified quickly and internal controls are followed, reducing the possibility of residual risks on asset identification and freezing delays. The authorities report that, over the last five years, FINTRAC did not identify cases where an LPEPR was required but not filed. This is presented as indicative of strong compliance. At the same time, supervisors acknowledge that non-compliance, when detected, is addressed through a graduated response framework including follow-up examinations, action plans, monitoring of reporting behaviours, revocation tools for MSBs, administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), public naming, and referrals to law enforcement in serious cases. During the reference period, FINTRAC issued 15 AMPs in which at least one violation related to policies and procedures for TPR obligations, and the steps needed to identify property subject to reporting. The fines ranged from CAD 36 360 (to a Real Estate firm) to CAD 9 185 000 (to a Bank). This indicates that supervisors detect weaknesses in TF-related controls, although all breaches relate to program deficiencies rather than failures to freeze or report terrorist property, which limits insight into effectiveness under real-world pressure. 803. One case study illustrates FINTRAC’s ability to align intelligence-led risk insights with targeted supervisory action. In 2024, intelligence work flagged MSBs disproportionately exposed to a high-risk jurisdiction associated with a terrorist organization. Subsequent examinations uncovered repeat deficiencies across compliance program elements and resulted in an AMP and ongoing monitoring. While this demonstrates an ability to escalate supervision in response to emerging TF risk, the deficiencies identified in the case were largely general program weaknesses, and authorities did not highlight specific TF-TFS violations uncovered through the examination. To improve their detection of TF-TFS violations Canadian authorities would benefit from continuing a more proactive approach by monitoring transactions and assets independently of any existing reports. 804. FINTRAC also supervises reporting entities’ implementation of Canada’s Ministerial Directives during examinations. FI and VASPs generally have good understanding on their obligations under the Ministerial Directives, with some deficiencies identified in compliance mostly in CU/CP sectors. There is also a gradual increase in the level of deficiency for FIs, MSBs and VASPs since FY2022/23 mainly attributed to the onboarding of new MSB sub-sectors and updates to Ministerial Directives. 805. Canada has access to strong sanctioning powers, including AMPs and severe criminal penalties under the United Nations Act (up to CAD 100 000 in fines and 10 years’ imprisonment). Authorities argue that these penalties deter non-compliance and that financial institutions publicly acknowledge their seriousness. These tools are complemented by inter-agency co-operation, notably with CSIS, which can share intelligence on possible under-reporting. The framework is therefore capable of applying proportionate and dissuasive measures where warranted, though not many opportunities have existed to test this in practice, as there has been no case of severe administrative sanctions being deployed in relation to TF-TFS breaches specifically. In the absence of cases where these sanctions were applied specifically for TF-TFS breaches, deterrence remains largely inferred, although the framework is clearly capable of imposing proportionate and dissuasive measures where warranted. 806. Capabilities within the DNFBP sector vary considerably, leading to uneven implementation of TF-TFS controls. Although relevant information is publicly available, many DNFBPs would benefit from more practical tools and simplified, user-friendly sanctions lists to support timely screening and freezing. There are DNFBP sectors that FINTRAC does not supervise, which decreases their ability to ensure sanctions are implemented (i.e. lawyers). Further, there is currently no designated supervisor responsible for overseeing lawyers’ and law firms’ compliance with TFS controls under Canadian sanctions legislation. Canada should have a more proactive framework in place to immediately review across those it supervises when there has been a change in sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.6.1. Remedial actions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions 272. Following an examination, FINTRAC communicates with an FI or VASP any findings and necessary corrective measures through an exit interview and a findings letter and whether any follow-up actions are required. Findings letters made available for this assessment contained deficiencies noted and not all of them provide specific recommendations / guidance. Minor deficiencies are typically addressed through general guidance in the examination report, with no further action required. When significant or numerous deficiencies are found, FINTRAC may initiate follow-up measures, such as requiring an action plan detailing the corrective measures the entity will implement along with specified timelines to complete the remedial measures or conducting a follow-up examination. These decisions are based on factors including the entity’s size, sector-specific risks, and the materiality of the deficiencies. In cases of serious or repeated non-compliance, FINTRAC may pursue enforcement actions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMP) or making non-compliance disclosures (NCD) to law enforcement to ensure compliance and uphold the integrity of Canada’s financial system. 273. Over the review period, 59% of examinations were concluded as no follow-up actions required. Among the remainder, 33% were identified for follow-up - including follow-up examinations (21%), submissions of action plans (10%), compliance monitoring meetings (2%); data integrity monitoring of monetary threshold reports (1%); and 8% were identified for enforcement actions including AMP (6%), NCD (1%) and MSB / VASP registration revocation (1%). Where an entity is required to submit an action plan, FINTRAC monitors progress of the action plans and closure of the issues must be supported by documentation or evidence submitted by the entity to demonstrate corrective actions have been completed. For action plans involving more serious deficiencies or FRFI such as banks, FINTRAC applies enhanced monitoring and each action item is assessed for remediation before closure. Action plans are also standing agenda items in FINTRAC’s regular monitoring meetings with banks. Remediations are also be reviewed through follow-up examinations by FINTRAC for 21% of the examinations conducted in the review period. 274. The measures adopted by FINTRAC to bring about prompt remedial actions to address non-compliance and to prevent recurrence are confined to action plan monitoring through compliance monitoring meetings and regular submissions from FIs and VASPs; and enforcement actions (i.e. AMP, NCD or revocation of MSB and VASP). FINTRAC does not have the power under the PCMLTFA to compel remediation of non-compliance [36] , remove incompetent senior management of FIs and VASPs, to impose directions or restrictions. It has to rely on OSFI and provincial supervisory authorities which have powers to do so for FRFIs and provincially regulated FIs respectively in cases where non-compliance with PCMLTFA poses serious concerns about the FIs’ financial soundness, integrity or security. OSFI and FINTRAC presented case studies to demonstrate both information sharing and effectiveness of joint supervisory actions to address issues where PCMLTFA non-compliance poses prudential concerns such as risk governance. The cases involved significant OSFI supervisory action related to senior personnel/investors, restricted business activities and downgrading supervisory ratings of the FRFI concerned. Despite this, the range of measures adopted by FINTRAC to tackle non-compliance of different levels of severity is limited. Cases indicate that progress can be very slow in addressing some long-outstanding control issues. This reinforces the AT’s view in this aspect. Table 3.13. Examination outcomes for FIs and VASPs (FY2020/21 to FY2024-25) Sector Year Sub-total 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Enforcement activity: consider an AMP Banks 2 3 3 1 2 11 CU/CPs 2 0 0 1 4 7 Securities 0 0 1 2 1 4 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 0 4 2 3 4 13 VASPs 0 0 1 1 4 6 Enforcement activity: consider an NCD MSBs 0 1 1 3 0 4 VASPs 0 0 0 2 1 3 Enforcement activity: consider revocation VASPs 0 0 0 0 6 6 Follow-up activity: Follow-up examination Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 CU/CPs 2 4 2 3 4 15 Securities 4 4 13 4 1 26 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 13 14 23 13 11 74 VASPs 1 3 4 5 20 33 Follow-up activity: Action plan submission Banks 0 8 6 1 5 20 CU/CPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 Securities 3 8 6 1 0 18 Life Insurance 0 1 0 0 0 1 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 3 8 4 3 5 23 VASPs 0 0 1 3 1 5 Follow-up activity: Compliance Monitoring Meetings Banks 0 1 1 0 0 2 CU/CPs 0 2 1 1 0 4 Securities 2 0 0 0 0 2 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 1 0 2 0 0 3 VASPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 Follow-up activity: Data integrity monitoring MSBs 0 1 4 0 0 5 VASPs 0 0 0 1 0 1 Concluded no further action required Banks 0 1 1 0 3 5 CU/CPs 7 4 4 14 5 34 Securities 16 22 18 12 1 69 Life Insurance 0 0 1 2 0 3 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 30 51 38 11 11 141 VASPs 2 7 8 4 138 159 Source: Canada 275. FINTRAC has increasingly made use of enforcement actions against FIs and VASPs for non-compliance in recent years. The number of AMPs issued has nearly doubled between FY2023/2024 and FY2024/2025, from 8 to 15, and continued to increase in the first half of FY2025/26. The dollar amount of AMPs has also significantly increased with record amounts issued in FY2023/24 (CAD 25.6 million) and FY2024/25 (CAD 23.5 million). Most of the AMPs are issued to banks, MSBs and VASPs over the last five years, and the average bank penalty is significantly higher than average penalties for all non-bank sectors combined (CAD 3 350 164 vs CAD 349 217). Once an AMP [37] is imposed, FINTRAC must make public the name of the reporting entity, the nature of the violation, and the amount of the penalty. AMPs would cause reputational damage to the entities concerned and will provide a deterrent effect. While the AMP is only one of the options to address non-compliance, use of enforcement actions is still limited in scope taking into account the size of the FI and the VASP sectors, compliance of FIs and VASP with core obligations, depth of the supervisory assessment of system effectiveness and also the outcomes of using other remediation actions (refer to the section on impact of outreach, monitoring, supervision, remedial action and sanctions). The majority of cases where AMP imposed on FIs and VASPs related to the failure to file STR and /or monetary threshold reports and there were not many violations relating to the FIs and VASPs’ compliance programmes and control effectiveness. Although total sum of the penalties for non-compliance has increased, it is not sufficiently dissuasive and proportionate for large FIs and VASPs. This may be attributable to the fact that the purpose of the AMP is to encourage compliance and not to “punish” (non-punitive) [38] . Table 3.14. Number and amount of AMP imposed on FIs, MSBs and VASPs (FY 2020-21 to FY 2024-25) FY 2020-21 FY2021-22 FY2022-23 FY2023-24 FY2024-25 Total (amount in CAD) Banks - 2 1 3 1 7 (23 451 150) CU/CP - 2 - - 1 3 (602 910) Securities - - - - 4 4 (115 500) MSBs 2 1 4 2 7 16 (2 265 855) VASPs - - - 2 1 3 (25 587 000) Total 2 5 5 7 14 33 (52 022 415) Source: Canada 276. FINTRAC has the legislative authority to disclose information about non-compliance of reporting entities to law enforcement when it suspects on reasonable grounds that the information would be relevant to investigating or prosecuting criminal non-compliance offences under the PCMLTFA. FINTRAC makes Non-Compliance Disclosures (NCD) when it suspects the non-compliance is criminal in nature (e.g. wilful and deliberate, or linked to other suspected criminal offences such as money laundering). Between FY2018/2019 to FY2024/2025 (7 years), a total of 69 NCDs relevant to MSBs (including VASPs) were provided to LEAs, with 19 NCD (about 27%) initiated by FINTRAC’s supervisory activities. In the same period, there were a total of 69 convictions of PCMLTFA offences, however the number that were initiated by NCDs is not systematically tracked. Among them, many are related to contraventions with MSB registration requirements and there are 16 conviction cases relating to violations of PCMLTFA requirements on preventive measures. Table 3.15. Number of NCDs from 2020-21 to 2024-25 Grouped Activity Sector 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total MSB (all MSBs) 8 7* 9 13* 32* 69 DNFBPs 1 - 1 1 1 4 Total 9 7 10 14 33 73 * Five of these NCDs involve an MSB and entities in DNFBP sectors, in the same NCD. Source: Canada Table 3.16. PCMLTFA prosecution outcomes relevant to preventive measures (FY2018-19 to FY2024/25) PCMLTFA Number of Outcomes Section 74 Section 11.1 Contravention – Registration requirement 10 Section 6 Contravention – Record Keeping 5 Section 6.1 Contravention – Verifying identity 6 Section 75(1) Failure to report suspicious transactions 5 Source: Canada Impact of outreach, monitoring, supervision, remedial action and sanctions 277. FINTRAC's supervision and assessment activities include quarterly meetings with D-SIBs and annual meetings with small-to-medium banks. FINTRAC also maintains a two-way communication approach with the MSB sector. Sector specific guidance is provided through FINTRAC’s website and dedicated call centre to help businesses comply with the PCMLTFA and associated Regulations. Guidance includes information on legislative updates, risk assessment, STR quality, and know-your-client practices, such as client identification and record-keeping. Reporting entities can stay informed of changes by subscribing to FINTRAC’s alerts and consulting the latest guidance at FINTRAC’s website. Score Cards are deployed by FINTRAC as one of its supervisory activities to evaluate the performance of FIs and VASPs with respect to the timeliness and quality of STR and threshold reporting. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit are generally satisfied with the outreach of and guidance provided by AML supervisory authorities. 278. FINTRAC provides feedback to industry through an outreach and assistance program for reporting entities. This includes participating in conferences, seminars, presentations and other events providing feedback on compliance with AML/CFT legislation. Training sessions are conducted at various industry conferences and forums, such as the Banking Forums and Canadian MSB association which cover topics such as identifying red flags for ML and implementing effective compliance programs. Despite these efforts, there is limited information demonstrating that overall compliance improved over the review period for most sectors, especially for banks and MSBs. Over the assessment period, significant or numerous deficiencies were found in 41% of on-site examinations on FIs and VASPs for which consideration of enforcement actions (8%), or intense follow-up supervisory actions including follow-up examinations (21%) and close monitoring of action plans (12%) were warranted. Among 57 follow-up examinations conducted in the review period, nearly half (47%) were assessed as partially remediated with varying level of deficiencies. The overall improvement rate for sectors which are assessed as very high/high risks (i.e. banks, MSB and VASP) is less than satisfactory (ranging from 25% to 50%), although FINTRAC provided some case examples supporting that supervision, outreach and monitoring of remedial actions have demonstrated a positive impact on compliance by the targeted FIs and VASPs. The current level of AMP under the PCMLTFA is also insufficient to provide a dissuasive effect of increasing compliance by large reporting entities. Canada has introduced a bill to Parliament that would increase PCMLTFA penalties and address this issue, however the bill had not passed at the time of the onsite visit [39] . Footnotes [36] Canada passed legislative changes to PCMLTFA on 26 March 2026, which include, among others, granting the power for FINTRAC to compel the reporting entities subject to AMP to enter into a compliance agreement to remediate the violations. [37] Canada passed legislative changes to PCMLTFA on 26 March 2026, which include, among others, increasing the size of AMPs which FINTRAC is empowered to impose, with the maximum increased by 40 times. [38] Administrative monetary penalties policy on fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/pen/2-eng [39] The legislative amendments to introduce a higher AMP framework was passed in late March 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 807. Canada’s development and implementation of policy on proliferation-based sanctions and the administration of Canada’s broader sanctions framework involves several partners that co-operate to develop and implement policies and strategies. Figure 11.1. Canada’s Governance and Co-ordination Mechanism for PF (and TF) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 808. As noted under IO.9, the governance of both PF and TF issues is integrated into the broader national security and intelligence framework, ensuring co-ordination between policy and operational efforts across Canada’s system. Further details on Canada’s risk assessment framework, including the role of the sanctions evasion risk assessment working group, are provided under IO.1. 809. Canada’s intelligence priorities help establish and contextualise the main security threats and risks (including those that pertain to PF) facing the country. The Privy Council Office (PCO) of Canada leads a governance committee structure that helps to identify intelligence priorities, ensuring that intelligence production efforts are aligned with whole-of-government strategic interests. The intelligence priorities are renewed by the Government every two years, or as required, based on recommendations from the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and the intelligence community. One such intelligence priority is linked to sanctions evasion and associated proliferation financing along with broader priorities linked to illicit and threat finance, financial sector integrity, foreign interference and malign influence, and espionage and extraction of knowledge information. Intelligence collected through co-ordinated government efforts across these priorities helps inform Canada’s national understanding of threats and vulnerabilities, which also feed into Canada’s NRA. This intelligence is an integral part of Canada’s policy development process and its approach to set measures to counter illicit financing threats, including PF. 810. Public Safety’s Counter Proliferation Policy Working Group, which includes GAC, CSIS, Department of Finance, FINTRAC, CBSA, RCMP, CSE, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and Health Canada, serves as the overarching policy co-operation mechanism to identify and address policy and operational gaps in the counter proliferation sanctions program. The group ensures that senior level decision-makers are informed of potential challenges and co-ordinated actions to address or mitigate them. For example, the group’s advice led to the implementation of secure electronic reporting of exports to the CBSA in January 2020, which has improved CBSA’s ability to assess export declarations and identify possible contraventions with Canada's export controls. The Counter Proliferation Policy Working Group meets on an “as needed basis” to discuss elements of Canada’s counterproliferation framework and policy gaps that need to be bridged. 811. GAC is the primary policy department responsible for the administration of Canada’s sanctions legislation related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while Finance Canada is responsible for co-ordinating Canada’s assessment of PF risks, in consultation with other authorities, departments, agencies and with the involvement of the private sector. Finance Canada leads policy work in partnership with FINTRAC to focus on financial sector related considerations. FINTRAC also produces strategic intelligence products that identify emerging trends and typologies and discloses financial intelligence to competent authorities on suspected sanctions evasion. CSIS collects and analyses intelligence and provides information and assistance to other government departments. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing sanctions obligations at the border and the RCMP is the lead for criminal investigations involving contraventions of Canada’s sanctions regime. In 2025, relevant competent authorities effectively co-operated to develop the first NRA on sanctions evasion which includes PF. 812. In recent years, Canada has effectively implemented and identified a set of new roles and powers for authorities, new obligations for the private sector, and has enhanced awareness of PF across the overall Canadian system, including both the public and the private sectors. In 2022 a new sanctions-based asset seizure and information sharing regime was created; in 2024 the PCMLTFA was amended to require entities to report to FINTRAC transactions suspected to be related to sanctions evasion, which enables FINTRAC to produce tactical and strategic intelligence products relating to sanctions evasion; in March 2025 the new obligation (LPEPRs – see IO.10) to report to FINTRAC property owned or controlled by persons and entities under an order or regulation made under the UN Act came in effect; finally, in October 2025, additional requirements to report property under Canada’s autonomous sanctions programme related to the DPRK and Iran came into effect. This has armed Canada with stronger tools to combat proliferation financing and ensure the effective implementation of TFS-PF. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 813. Canada has mechanisms in place to permit effective operational co-operation, and where appropriate, co-ordination and timely sharing of relevant information domestically between different competent authorities, both proactively and on request, for operational purposes related to sanctions evasion, including PF. Authorities discuss emerging trends and risks which can be used to inform potential operational and/or policy responses related to Canada’s sanctions regime, including proliferation sanctions. 814. Relevant competent authorities participate in and share information (including at operational level) on PF via the SIRA WG, which is co-chaired by the Department of Finance Canada and FINTRAC and meets every two months or more as needed. 815. All Canadian federal AML/CFT Regime members with an operational intelligence mandate (CBSA, CSIS, RCMP, FINTRAC) have direct access to classified systems containing extremely sensitive human, signals, and financial intelligence that is collected, analysed and shared by Canada and its key international partners, including with regards to TFS-PF. Intelligence is monitored daily by officials and used to develop and refine intelligence on threat actor capabilities, methods, and intentions feeding into operational and strategic work. 816. CBSA chairs the Interdepartmental Counter-Proliferation Operations Committee, an example of a formal mechanism whereby operational information can be shared with operational partners. The committee ensures that operational activities are co-ordinated and promotes co-operation across authorities. It meets monthly to ensure ongoing tactical-level co-ordination and de-confliction among security and intelligence partners and discusses strategic export control and sanctions cases. CBSA also chairs the Sanctions and Border Enforcement Co-ordination Committee, which is tasked with identifying gaps associated with export controls and improving co-ordination and information sharing on export control and sanctions-related issues. The group was used as a central point of co-ordination to discuss work underway, evolution of sanctions evasion methods as well as underlying data and information sources to support the administration of the sanctions regime and the means of gathering data, typologies, indicators and case studies. 817. The multi-committee structure of Canada’s approach in combating PF allows the committees to focus on different aspects of the PF threat and response. Canada reports that this multi‑committee structure does not hinder effective co-ordination, as decisions can be taken quickly when needed, as set out in IO.1, particularly in urgent situations, and without the need to go through all the committees. For example, Canada identified, drafted and published sanctioned subjects within a 24-hour period over a weekend. While these subjects were not related to PF, the example show Canada’s ability to act swiftly across committees, taking and implementing decisions quickly in urgent cases. The Department of Finance co-ordinated with intelligence and enforcement partners to assess risks linked to circumvention of UNSCRs on DPRK. This formed the basis of strengthening the DPRK MD to impose more rigorous compliance program obligations related to correspondent banking relationships, which took effect within one week. Box 11.1. CBSA and RCMP mitigate DPRK sanctions evasion threats In 2024, information was provided to the CBSA’s Counter Proliferation Operations Section and the RCMP from a foreign partner alleging that the DPRK was seeking to obtain military technology from Canada, in violation of Canada’s export controls and sanctions regime and UNSCRs. The information indicated that a Canadian company would export the goods in question to its foreign subsidiary in a known sanctions’ evasion transshipment jurisdiction, who in turn sought to tranship the goods onwards through a third jurisdiction to the DPRK. The Counter Proliferation Operations Section consulted and deconflicted with domestic (e.g., RCMP) and overseas enforcement partners and worked to declassify the information to enable regulatory verifications of the allegations in Canada. Representatives of the Counter Proliferation Operations Section and the RCMP then approached the Canadian manufacturer and learned that the company was in litigation with the foreign subsidiary for theft of design materials and branding. The company provided legal documents and other holdings that effectively demonstrated a lack of any conspiratorial activity on the part of the Canadian company. The company also voluntarily provided additional information to further substantiate the alleged illicit activities of their subsidiary. Prompt and co-ordinated outreach to the Canadian company by Canadian law enforcement, working together under the umbrella of a co-ordinated counter-proliferation operation, demonstrates Canada’s capability to effectively mitigate an active proliferation threat in a timely manner. Source: CBSA" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="114. Canada’s operational reforms and initiatives show a strong alignment with the highest – risk threats identified in the NRA. To address drug trafficking – one of the most important sources of criminal proceeds - Canada has established and expanded mechanisms including the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar; integrated drug intelligence cells; a precursor chemical monitoring Unit; and the North American Drug Dialogue . To counter fraud, and other major threats, initiatives such as the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership (IMLIP), the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC), Integrated Money Laundering Investigation Teams (IMLITs), Integrated Market Enforcement Teams, and expanded Joint Force Operations (JFOs) have been established. Canada announced in 2025 that it will be establishing a new Financial Crimes Agency to lead Canada’s efforts in combating sophisticated financial crimes. Its operational approach would benefit from a more systematic focus on the ML activity associated with the threats, particularly to ensure that operational responses extend beyond predicate offence disruption to fully address the laundering methodologies identified in the NRA. 115. Canada’s public-private partnerships (PPP) allow for operational collaboration and this has enabled law enforcement agencies at all levels of policing to develop formal and informal information sharing, develop thematic projects to form best practices to combat ML, establish secretariats and co-ordination offices to ensure ML activities are adequately resourced and leverage private sector forums to address AML operational priorities. 116. FINTRAC co-ordinates closely with OSFI and provincial regulators, such as the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), the British Columbia Financial Services Authority (BCFSA), and the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO), through MOUs that facilitate information sharing, strengthen sectoral risk understanding, and support more targeted enforcement. FINTRAC also collaborates with supervisory authorities like the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) to align examination approaches and address compliance issues in the securities sector, leading to improved implementation of PCMLTFA requirements by market participants. Box 1.2. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) Counterterrorism and National Security Committee The CACP Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee aims to harmonize the work of the Canadian law enforcement in identifying, preventing, deterring, and responding to criminal activities related to terrorism and national security threats. Its objectives include: a) Promoting collaboration and integration among law enforcement agencies and with appropriate public/private security and intelligence partners; Improving the ability to operate in a co-operative and integrated manner with the view of addressing emerging trends; Developing processes and facilitate strong communication at all levels; Recommending legislative reforms; and Promoting education and training in matters of counter-terrorism and national security. Eighteen partner agencies participate on the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee. They represent federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities (RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, PSPC, FINTRAC) as well as police of jurisdiction (Calgary Police Service, Edmonton Police Service, Vancouver Police Department, York Regional Police, Toronto Police Service, Sûreté du Québec, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal, New Westminster Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Ottawa Police Service). Recent accomplishments of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee include: a) Launch of the “See Something Say Something” campaign to improve understanding of national security threats both within Canadian law enforcement agencies and with the public; The Countering Violent Extremism Guidebook; and Establishment a new working group to develop operational guidance and standardize processes relating to Foreign Actor Interference investigations and engagement activities. Source: Department of Finance, Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 453. Canada’s FIU, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), operates under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). FINTRAC is staffed by approximately 500 people, with approximately 104 staff dedicated to intelligence analysis. The intelligence function is responsible for producing and disclosing timely and actionable financial intelligence to LEAs, competent authorities and foreign FIU counterparts. 454. FINTRAC has access to a wide range of reporting types from REs, including several forms of threshold-based reporting (transactions above CAD 10 000 or multiple transactions with a cumulative total of CAD 10 000, within 24hrs). Types of reports submitted include: · Large Cash Transaction Reports (LCTRs) · Electronic Funds Transfers Reports (EFTRs) (international transactions with a Canadian nexus (funds incoming or outgoing)) · Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) (no monetary threshold) · Casino Disbursement Reports (CDRs) · Large Virtual Currency Transaction Reports (LVCTRs) · Listed Persons and Entities Property Reports (LPEPRs) (no monetary threshold) 455. FINTRAC receives batches of Cross-Border Currency Reports (CBCRs) monthly and Cross-Boder Seizure Reports (CBSRs) batches approximately every 5 days from the CBSA. Upon receipt, FINTRAC automatically ingests these reports into its database and is available for immediate analytical use. 456. The patterns of reporting in LVCTR, CBCR and CBSRs, and LPEPRs are in line with Canada’s financial environment (including the general increase in use of virtual currency, restricted travel during COVID-19 and introduction of new LPEPR requirements) (see Table 6.1). Table 6.1. Types and Number of Reports Received by FINTRAC per fiscal year 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Total EFTR 23 507 176 25 065 370 27 315 564 41 587 294 61 170 154 178 645 558 LCTR 6 069 896 7 220 383 8 041 942 6 203 220 2 898 347 30 433 788 STR 468 079 585 853 560 858 631 137 573 469 2 819 396 CDR 29 043 153 195 273 785 292 350 263 568 1 011 941 LVCTR N/A 60 361 94 790 86 405 137 105 378 661 CBCR 12 832 12 628 23 530 35 322 7 872 92 184 CBSR 217 0 155 3 645 2 398 6 415 LPEPR 10 21 14 10 38 93 Total 30 087 253 33 097 811 36 310 638 48 839 383 65 052 951 213 388 036 Source: Canada 457. Significant amendments to the PCMLTFA in 2021 and 2024 have increased FINTRAC’s capability to capture transactions linked to sanctions-related property (LPEPRs); introduced LVCTR requirements; enhanced REs’ abilities to share information with each other for the purposes of ML, TF and sanctions evasion; and integrated Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) customs reporting and declarations into Canada’s AML/ATF regime. 458. In 2024, FINTRAC transitioned to a database application programming interface (API) for RE transaction reporting to aid with ingestion of large volumes of data and facilitate integration with FINTRAC’s analytical database. A webform is still maintained for use by smaller scale reporting entities. This system allows up to 5 000 transactions to be in a report (both attempted and completed transactions). 459. Since June 2020, STRs are required to be submitted as soon as practicable after a suspicion is formed (previously they were to be submitted within 30 days) and are generally submitted promptly. Canada has emphasised the importance of timely submissions of STRs through this legislative amendment; however, some REs continue to take extended periods to report STRs in practice. This is particularly the case where multiple transactions are involved, with delays of three weeks or more observed in some cases. These negatively contribute to the timeliness of STR reporting, impacting the FIU’s and competent authorities’ ability to detect and respond to ML/TF activities in a timely manner. 460. During the period under review, FIs and VASPs submitted 2 783 536 STRs and DNFBPs submitted 35 860 STRs. Notably, excluding casinos, the broader DNFBP sectors accounted for only 2 255 STRs (see IO.3 and IO.4 for a detailed breakdown of each sector). The large majority of STRs are reported by FIs, predominantly the large D-SIBs, which is reflective of the size of the sector. There has been a general increase in the volume of reporting of STRs. The quality of information disclosed is good with the STR format quite detailed and user friendly, noting the transition to database API. The volume of reporting from D-SIBS reflects their dominant role in Canada’s financial sector and is consistent with their risk profile. D-SIBs are full-service financial groups offering banking, insurance, and securities products (among others). The aggregated reporting numbers for banks also includes STRs which relate to insurance or securities related business conducted within the same group. 461. DNFBPs (except casinos) submit a lower-than-expected volume of STRs despite the vulnerability of the sector (see IO.4 for further analysis). The level of reporting from regulated DNFBPs in Canada (less than 1% of the total approx. 2.8 million STRs reported) is low, even relative to a reasonable expectation, given their role and risk environment. FINTRAC receives a notable number of STRs (approximately 589 000) through third party reporting, namely D-SIBs, related to DNFBPs. Although such third-party reporting and some strategic intelligence related to DNFBPs helps FINTRAC’s access to DNFBP transactional behaviour, a lack of direct reporting from DNFBPs does limit visibility of their behaviours. Limited direct reporting from DNFBPs constrains FINTRAC from proactively engaging those REs to obtain additional information without submitted reports. 462. Lawyers are not subject to STR reporting requirements under the PCMLTFA (see IO4). FINTRAC reports that 76 025 STRs submitted by REs in other sectors, include links with legal sector activity. Third party reporting and some strategic intelligence is providing some limited coverage of the sector despite its non-reporting status. 463. Overall, whilst a broad range of transaction reporting is captured by FINTRAC, these information sources are heavily reliant on D-SIBs and other FI reporting to generate financial intelligence. There is less access to data and information on DNFBP sector trends and illicit activity due to low numbers in STR reporting and limited coverage of non-reporting legal sector. 464. FINTRAC also has access to police databases, the CRA public charities database, private/commercially developed databases, and is also ingesting data from Canada’s federal BO and corporate registries (including Alberta’s corporate registry). FINTRAC also receives information and intelligence holdings from LEAs and other competent authorities through Voluntary Information Records (VIRs). [48] These are both a channel for agencies to provide information to FINTRAC, and a channel to request information from FINTRAC (frequently a single VIR will combine both a request and provision of information). FINTRAC receives a majority of VIRs from RCMP which is commensurate with their role as the national LEA (see Table 6.2). Other agencies submitting VIRs include Federal Government agencies such as Department of National Defence; and provincial government entities such as securities regulators and Revenu Québec. FINTRAC can receive legal arrangements BO data from CRA through the VIR mechanism (see IO.5). This additional information, increases FINTRAC’s understanding of LEA priorities where financial intelligence can play a vital role. Table 6.2. Number of VIRs Received by FINTRAC, 2020-2025 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Grand Total RCMP 661 602 633 714 788 3 398 Provincial Police 232 221 319 323 348 1 443 Municipal Police 572 522 573 651 626 2 944 CBSA 237 249 257 302 263 1 308 CSIS 165 137 160 130 87 679 CRA 28 18 15 25 29 115 Other 379 467 679 298 329 2 152 Grand Total 2 274 2 216 2 636 2 443 2 470 12 039 Source: Canada 465. Under PCMLTFA amendments (s54(1.1)), FINTRAC has the authority to go back to a reporting entity for additional or missing information in relation to a submitted report. The act does not allow for FINTRAC to proactively request additional information from a RE if no report has been submitted. This is a prima facie limitation on FINTRAC's ability to gather the supplementary information necessary to support its analysis. In practice FINTRAC can draw information from its databases which captures a wide range of reports (including LCTRs and EFTRs) and use another filed report to seek additional information. In addition, co-operation with LEAs, who do have the necessary powers, can proactively request additional information from REs in relation to an investigation. There are several cases where proactive information shared by FINTRAC or LEAs has alerted REs to the risks of a particular activity or entity. Subsequently, this has prompted them to submit additional STRs relating to the person of interest. While these mechanisms can largely fill the gap in access to information, they do involve additional steps to obtain information and take longer. 466. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are used as a mechanism to increase access to quality information and enhance co-operation between LEAs, FIs and FINTRAC. The first PPP was established in 2016 and since then six PPPs have been created on some high-risk threats [49] and global crime types of interest. The PPP on the illegal wildlife trade is a low-risk threat in Canada’s NRA but is of significant importance regionally and globally. Data and Intelligence from PPPs can open up access to previously unreported and unknown activity, subsequently informing risk assessments and typologies. Private-to-private information sharing arrangements between REs were only introduced under the 2024 PCMLTFA amendments but were not operational at the time of the onsite visit. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 467. LEAs and other competent authorities have access to financial reports, data and other information directly from FINTRAC through the PPP mechanism and through their respective production related powers and databases. In addition to the CBSA’s reporting to FINTRAC, the CBSA reports proceeds of crime seizures, in line with reporting thresholds, directly to RCMP. This is separate to CBSA reporting to FINTRAC. Together these ensure access to a broad range of relevant and up-to-date information. Timely access to FINTRAC information is hindered by delays in FINTRAC’s response to VIRs. 468. LEA and competent authorities’ access financial intelligence through FINTRAC proactive disclosures or through FINTRAC's responses to VIRs (reactive disclosures). The majority of FINTRAC disclosures to law enforcement are reactive, in response to VIRs. Proactive disclosures, and the quality of information disseminated, are considered in the next section below. This section focuses on the authorities' ability to request information from FINTRAC via the VIR framework, and to access additional information directly or through PPP mechanism. 469. VIRs are the mechanism for LEAs to request information from FINTRAC (or share information with) to support their investigations or intelligence collection. VIRs are submitted through a standard template which enables FINTRAC to understand the nature and relevance of the request to prioritise the response appropriately. This formal mechanism is further supported by informal co-ordination with the main competent authorities who submit VIRs. The RCMP submits the majority of VIRs, which reflects their national role and their responsibility to conduct financial inquiries into all predicate offence investigations. Most inquiries seek further information to support ongoing investigations, such as records of financial activity by a person of interest or analysis of other persons transacting with them. It is routine for RCMP to submit one or more VIRs during any investigation into serious proceeds generating crime. 470. FINTRAC triages and prioritises VIRs for response based on the seriousness and urgency of the request. FINTRAC is not obligated to respond to every VIR; however, is required to share designated information to the respective competent authority where thresholds are met. All VIRs are triaged and stored in FINTRAC’s database for searchability and continued intelligence development. 471. FINTRAC can quickly disseminate VIR reactive disclosures when assessed as urgent. Approximately 40% of VIRs assessed as urgent resulted in a FINTRAC disclosure in less than 10 days. The remaining 60% of urgent requests take between 11-30 plus days to process, averaging approximately 27 days. LEAs and competent authorities can specify a required timeframe for urgent VIRs. FINTRAC work with the LEAs to manage the level of urgency. 472. The average timeframe for FINTRAC reactive disclosures to a VIR submitted by LEAs is 65 days. While disclosure timeframes have shortened during the period under review (from 80 days to 65 days), these disclosures are not considered timely. These delays have potential further impacts on the investigation of ML and the forfeiture of assets. Slower financial investigations can lag behind the non-financial elements of a case. Non-timely access to financial intelligence or information can impede on investigations, affording criminals the opportunity to further hide or dissipate assets before they can be traced. Overall, FINTRAC is not responding to general VIRs in a timely manner. 473. LEAs have means to directly access financial information through alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques to aid in the targeting of production orders. These are used to obtain information through channels that enable its use as evidence. The techniques also partially mitigate the effect of the delays in FINTRAC's response to VIRs, as well as the limitations on FINTRAC powers to request additional information. 474. Alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques have been developed to rapidly provide information to LEAs as to whether a person of interest has dealings with a given FI. Upon receipt of this information, LEAs will apply for a judicially authorised production order requiring the relevant FI to produce information on the individual's account activity, CDD and beneficial ownership information, and transaction records. LEAs can structure the production order to allow for more time sensitive information to be responded to first and then subsequent information to follow. Information obtained through a production order is admissible as evidence. Therefore, such orders are routinely used to request information which is already available in the form of (non-admissible) intelligence. 475. As discussed above, the PPP mechanism allows LEAs access to financial intelligence in addition to the VIR mechanism and production powers. The Integrated money laundering intelligence partnership (IMLIP) is another mechanism that can facilitate access to information and intelligence (in addition to sharing information and intelligence) on money laundering and organised crime between LEAs and the six largest banks (DSIBs). [50] The IMLIP was announced in February 2025. As it becomes operational, IMLIP will focus on streamlining the exchange of information between the RCMP and DSIBs to ensure timelier access. This will help manage timeliness concerns on VIR responses. IMLIP will be complimented by private-to-private sharing arrangement to enhance the relevancy, accuracy and timeliness of financial intelligence information and intelligence. 476. Key competent authorities, the CRA Criminal Investigations Program (CRA-CIP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) have access to a wide range of financial information from other government agencies' databases, participation in joint agency arrangements, open-source information and classified materials (accessed via secure means). CRA-CIP sources information specific to tax crimes through Canadian Police Information Centre (CIPC) system, government registries and Passport Canada. 477. CBSA’s role of customs and immigration administration and enforcement has expanded to include detecting and disrupting border related illicit financial flows (ML, TF and sanctions) occurring through the movement of people, goods, currency and monetary instruments. CBSA receives CBSRs and CBCRs, and shares this information with FINTRAC and sometimes with RCMP (where certain reporting thresholds are met). CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre is responsible for the collection, analysis and production of tactical, strategic and operational intelligence related to border and trade based financial crimes; and has access to a range of internal and external sources of information. This includes intelligence pertaining to travellers (customs information), traders and goods, proprietary goods shipping data and certain CRA taxpayer information. See Box 6.1 for an example of competent authorities’ access to a broad range of information in support of its TBML responsibilities. Box 6.1. Case Study – Enhancing the CBSA’s Capabilities to Combat Trade-Based Financial Crime As part of Canada’s 2021 Amendments to the PCMLTFA, new legislation was introduced (in 2024) providing CBSA with legal authority to obtain a much broader range of data from entities involved in international trade (PCMLTFA, Part 2.1 Reporting of Goods). This includes importers, exporters, customs brokers, freight forwarders, and other actors across the supply chain. These entities are now required to provide accurate customs declarations, answer CBSA inquiries, supply supporting documents, and maintain records for AML/CFT purposes. The amended authorities also allow CBSA to receive and operationalise FINTRAC disclosures relating to suspicious trade activity, and to compel declarations linked to suspicious fund transfers when physical goods movements are unclear. The accompanying Reporting of Goods Regulations (effective April 2025) further enable the CBSA to: · Compel previously inaccessible trade‑related information, including documents capable of confirming the legitimacy of goods movements. · Identify discrepancies between financial and physical flows, such as phantom shipments, through proactive use of customs, trade, and financial intelligence. · Apply enforcement tools, including seizures and administrative penalties, which incentivise accurate reporting and support the development of high‑quality intelligence. A newly established Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) (since 2025) within its Border Financial Crime Centre, will integrate customs, trade, and financial data to generate proactive intelligence leads on TBML/TF typologies. These amendments have significantly strengthened the CBSA’s ability to access, use, and share information relevant to detecting and disrupting trade‑based money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion with LEA, FINTRAC and foreign counterparts. Footnotes [48] VIRs are for both requesting information from FINTRAC and sharing information that might be of intelligence value to FINTRAC (such as suspicions of ML, TF, sanctions evasion or threats to national security. VIRs are submitted through a smart PDF template, that at a minimum require sending agency/ organisation name and selection of the suspicion type (ML, TF or national security). They are approximately 8 pages long with fields covering subject, identifiers, information related to previous investigations/disclosures, category of offence, judicial authorisations, asset information and financial details. This form ensures consistency of information for ease of integration into FINTRAC’s database. [49] PPP thematics include human trafficking (2016), Romance fraud (2017), Fentanyl trafficking (2018), ML through underground banking (2019), online child exploitation (2020), illegal cannabis activities (2022) and illegal wildlife trade (2023). [50] Bank of Montreal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Royal Bank of Canada, Scotiabank, TD Bank, and National Bank of Canada." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. Canada has increased its strategic and operational prioritisation of asset recovery since its last mutual evaluation. There remains a lack of a national policy prioritising asset recovery. While Canada’s constitutional division of powers between the federal and provincial levels partly explains the different approaches to asset recovery between the federation and the provinces, the level of priority given to asset recovery as a policy objective varies across the country and between provinces. This is reflected in the variable development of agency structures to pursue asset recovery across LEAs and other competent authorities at the federal, provincial and territorial levels. The system in place to prioritise asset recovery, while strong in parts, does not stem from a cohesive and consistent national policy approach, ultimately resulting in the recovery of assets to varying degrees. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 591. At the federal level, Canada’s Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime Strategy 2023-2026 sets out Canada’s policy priorities for combatting ML and TF. It prioritises increasing operational effectiveness as one of the key pillars for enhancing the effectiveness of the Canadian system. Substantial resourcing and funding have been injected into the Canadian system across successive federal budgets to support this objective. As an outcome four IMLITs have been established with embedded civilian specialists and FAMG’s forensic accounting investigators to identify and trace criminal benefit. The announcement in the 2025/26 federal Budget that Canada would establish a dedicated Financial Crimes Agency, with ongoing funding responsibility for investigating complex financial crime and recovering the proceeds, is positive and reinforces this increasing prioritisation. LEAs 592. This increased prioritisation at the policy level has translated down to the operational level with increased focus on asset identification and tracing by LEAs. LEAs across Canada are to a large extent prioritising asset recovery despite the absence of formal operational policies. Introducing such policies would assist in embedding a consistent approach across the country. 593. RCMP-FP leads Canada’s operational approach to financial crime and has the primary responsibility in Canada for combatting transnational and serious organised crime. Asset recovery is embedded as a priority within RCMP-FP’s Strategic Plan, flowing through to operational directives. As discussed in IO.7, RCMP tiering has been a useful approach to ensuring potential proceeds of crime are considered at an early stage and in all major proceeds-generating cases. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Sûreté du Québec, and large municipal police services (Toronto Police Service (TPS), Vancouver Police Department (VPD), Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM)) have operational policies identifying the confiscation of criminal benefits as an important law enforcement priority. 594. RCMP-FP also provides extensive support to other LEAs on asset recovery, including through training and specialist units (see IO.7). This has enhanced the capacity of LEAs nationally to progress asset recovery cases and is building a cadre of officers that prioritise asset recovery within their organisation. RCMP-FP has developed specific operational structures dedicated to asset recovery (see section 8.1.3). Interviews with RCMP-FP, and provincial and municipal police demonstrated that the heightened focus given to asset recovery is driving a positive asset recovery culture at the officer level. This is particularly evident in some LEAs (including the Vancouver Police Department VPD and the integrated Alberta Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) which is Alberta’s co-ordinated response to serious and organised crime); however, it remains an area for improvement elsewhere. 595. There is a general positive trend on prioritising asset recovery amongst various LEAs, which demonstrated an improved awareness within frontline policing of the importance of asset recovery. Frontline police are generally aware of, and undergo training to identify, indicators of financially motivated offending and have clear processes in place to refer matters to specialist units within their police service, or to specialised units of the RCMP where necessary. CRA and CBSA 596. Other competent authorities are prioritising the pursuit of asset recovery as policy objective to a large extent. CRA has increased its focus on asset recovery since 2020 establishing a civil audit and recovery function (the IIAP) to recover liabilities against those who generate revenue from illicit activities without declaring income. This supports the existing asset recovery mandate of CRA-CIP in recovering the proceeds of tax offences. Following its 2025 review of its ML and POC initiatives and the November 2025 publication of a new ML investigation policy and guide (see core issue 7.1), CRA-CIP is positioning its Criminal Investigations Program to play a more significant asset recovery role. While the results of this remain to be seen, the enhanced priority CRA has given to this issue is good progress. 597. Recognising its role given the risk and prevalence of TBML, CBSA has also increased the priority given to asset recovery within its mandate. Beyond cross-border currency controls, CBSA (together with Finance Canada) has implemented a new framework within the PCMLTFA to enable the seizure as forfeit of falsely or undeclared goods, including over and under-invoiced goods. These were introduced to provide CBSA with additional powers to address potential instances of trade-based illicit financial flows (including money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion) at the border. They demonstrate CBSA’s responsiveness and the priority it affords to seizing goods and funds used in potential cross-border criminal activity (see core issue 7.4 and section 8.5.2 for further detail). Prosecution services 598. Within the CC asset recovery framework, PPSC and provincial prosecution services share jurisdiction and are responsible (in close co-ordination with investigators) for seeking asset recovery orders. 599. Chapter 3.7 of its Deskbook requires PPSC prosecutors to consider forfeiture of proceeds of crime in all relevant cases. PPSC’s policy for asset recovery is set by the Director and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and its operationalisation is supported by the HQ Counsel Group through its ML Working Group. Prosecutors routinely consider asset recovery in the context of sentencing and typically may not waive the requirement to seek forfeiture without approval from PPSC management. Similar structures exist within provincial prosecution services. Asset recovery issues have featured in policy roundtables bringing together all prosecution services, demonstrating its prioritisation at the policy level to some extent. 600. Despite the policy outlined above, asset recovery is not a core business for prosecutors. Prosecutors prioritise securing convictions and typically consider asset recovery at the sentencing stage of a prosecution. While it is an independent process from sentencing, seeking asset recovery through the CC is the responsibility of prosecutors and is inherently linked to the progression of, and is viewed consistent with the framing of the criminal case, rather than being prioritised as a separate outcome to disrupt the criminal business model through deprivation of the benefits of crime. There is a degree of involvement by prosecutors in supporting LEAs in the application of provisional measures. However, they are not closely integrated into the process at that stage and are primarily focussed on supporting the criminal prosecution rather than developing a forward-leaning forfeiture strategy with the LEA from the investigation stage. Civil Forfeiture Offices (CFOs) 601. All material provinces [57] maintain dedicated civil forfeiture offices/authorities (collectively ‘CFOs’) with some provinces placing a stronger emphasis on civil forfeiture. Provincial CFOs prioritise asset recovery as a policy and operational objective to a very large extent, however the outcomes they achieve varies dependent on the model adopted, the way the province conceptualises the role of civil forfeiture, and its relationship with criminal forfeiture under the CC framework. 602. Of the more material provinces, Ontario and Québec adopt a more conservative policy approach to civil forfeiture. Cases are generally referred to their respective CFOs where a criminal prosecution and forfeiture (with limited exceptions,) is unavailable, unlikely to be successful, or has failed, or in the case of Québec, is less expedient. In contrast, BC and Alberta (as well as Manitoba and Saskatchewan) take more proactive approaches to civil forfeiture, and their co-operation, co-ordination and liaising with LEAs. The CFOs in these provinces seek to restrain and forfeit property through civil proceedings, independent of (but without jeopardising) any related criminal proceedings. These proceedings can support conviction-based forfeiture outcomes if the prosecution proceeds, but they also ensure that an independent proceeding to recover criminal property exists even in the absence of prosecution and conviction. 603. Additionally, in BC and Manitoba, civil forfeiture is used as a tool to prevent unjust enrichment. The effectiveness of this approach is clearly reflected in the confiscation results, with BC’s approach a strength of the Canadian system. 604. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture frameworks generally enable the recovery of property located in another province/territory. CFOs have established relationships and referral mechanisms that enable inter-provincial/territorial co-operation to identify, trace, restrain and forfeit criminal property. At the international level (see 8.5.3), CFOs can co-operate informally with foreign partners and have recovered property abroad in small number of cases. 605. Both conviction based and non-convictions (civil) forfeiture frameworks are weighted equally. However, those provinces that are prioritising civil forfeiture are achieving more effective asset recovery outcomes than the federal conviction-based framework and those provinces that take more conservative approaches. MLA 606. Per IO.2 and at 8.5.3, Canada is only recovering criminal property abroad through MLA in a small number of cases, and at relatively modest values. Supporting forfeiture abroad is one of the objects of the MLACMA and is one of the operational priorities of Canada’s Central Authority. However, this generally has not resulted in the forfeiture outcomes expected given Canada’s risk and context. While co-operation with the US for asset recovery is prioritised, co-operation with other jurisdictions is not routine, and in some instances not attempted despite evidence of asset flight. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 607. During the period under review, Canada has shown proactiveness in implementing legislative and administrative reforms to enhance the effective recovery of criminal property, in response to identified challenges. While many of these measures (described below) have only been recently implemented, they point to a positive evolution in the framework. 608. Canada’s quinquennial statutory reviews of the PCMLTFA examine the broader effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, including investigations and prosecutions. While there is no dedicated asset recovery review, recommendations implemented from the PCMLTFA review may indirectly enhance competent authorities’ ability to pursue criminal forfeiture in PML cases, e.g. through amendments to the ML offence in 2024 (outlined in core issue 7.2). aim to strengthen the ability of LEAs and prosecutors to secure convictions for PML. 609. Public consultation papers and policy briefs developed by Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada have complemented the PCMLTFA reviews. These papers and briefs are focused on enhancing the operational effectiveness of the criminal forfeiture framework. The Department of Justice has contributed to consultation papers and briefs on the AML/ATF regime in Canada and carried out stakeholder engagement with respect to criminal justice reforms. This has led to the implementation of several positive CC amendments addressing challenges experienced by LEAs in identifying and tracing proceeds of crime: · clarified that production orders for financial data cover accounts associated with digital currencies; · introduced a new production order for specified dates and a keep-account open order; · established a warrant power for the search and seizure of digital assets, and · simplified aspects of seizure warrants and restraint orders, including repealing the requirement to obtain an undertaking by the Attorney General for costs related to the seizure or restraint of property. 610. While these are recent developments, interviews with LEAs demonstrated their utility in recent cases in identifying and tracing financial flows in support of asset recovery. 611. Reflecting the growing appreciation for the role of provincial CFOs, Canada recently passed further amendments to the PCMLTFA allowing CFOs to be recipients of FINTRAC financial intelligence disclosures. Cullen Commission 612. The 2022 Final Report of the Cullen Commission, a provincial public inquiry into money laundering in British Columbia, was an important development for asset forfeiture in Canada. The Report made several notable recommendations to the BC government with respect to criminal and civil forfeiture in BC. It has had implications for federal resources and priorities, as well as other provinces and has driven increased focus on asset recovery and the BC framework, nationwide. 613. The genesis for many of Canada’s recent efforts to prioritise, modernise, and resource its asset recovery structures flow from the Commission’s recommendations. For instance, BC has implemented the most ambitious recommendation—an unexplained wealth order (UWO) regime leveraging the experience of Manitoba, which established the first unexplained wealth scheme in Canada. Both frameworks have been upheld in relevant provincial superior courts, establishing new precedent across Canada. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 614. LEA structures support asset recovery investigations to a large extent. During the period under review LEAs have increased their resourcing and either created or expanded dedicated financial crime and asset recovery units. RCMP-FP, OPP, Sûreté du Québec and major municipal LEAs have dedicated resources and units for financial crime and asset recovery. In many cases, these units combine responsibility for asset recovery with the investigation of specific proceeds generating crimes (i.e. RCMP-FP’s IMLITs and SOC sections and OPP’s Serious Fraud Office). Others, such as OPP’s Provincial Asset Forfeiture Unit (PAFU) and RCMP-FP’s Asset Forfeiture Unit in BC are asset recovery specialist units that receive referrals from investigative teams. In the case of the IMLITs, embedded CRA officers support the provision of tax information, which competent authorities use in understanding suspects’ financial circumstances. 615. These structures have improved the delivery of specialised asset recovery training to financial investigators and investigators in units targeting high risk predicate offences. This has increased the capacity of LEAs to identify and trace assets, including through improved use of information gathering powers, and is increasingly embedding a culture at the officer level that asset recovery is a core policing function. 616. The priority of these units is to support identification and tracing of criminal property for restraint and forfeiture applications through the CC framework. Notable exceptions to these are the RCMP-FP’s asset forfeiture unit in BC. This functions specifically as a gatekeeper for RCMP (both FP and C&amp;IP) investigations in BC for potential asset recovery. It ensures matters are referred to the CFO expeditiously to facilitate identification and tracing of criminal property with greater success. Co-ordination 617. Strategic co-ordination between these structures occurs through the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and through the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) which helps ensure law enforcement operational initiatives are co-ordinated and aligned with the top threats identified in the NRA. 618. LEAs co-ordinate at the tactical level to a large extent, despite the potential challenges of overlapping jurisdictions of federal, provincial and municipal LEAs. Most commonly, this occurs through Joint Forces Operations (JFOs), which bring together dedicated resources across all levels, and enable enhanced information sharing between agencies. JFOs are common and heavily used tool by Canadian authorities and are established for almost all complex investigations where multiple LEAs or competent authorities are involved. Integrated teams, such as RCMP-FP’s IMLITs, are also effectively supporting asset recovery outcomes at the operational level through their co-ordinated efforts to progress cases and trace criminal proceeds in the most significant cases. 619. Canada is effectively utilising these structures to co-ordinate the provision of specific technical expertise in support of asset recovery matters. For example, RCMP’s Crypto Tactical Operational Support (CTOS) teams supported RCMP-FP IMLIT investigators during the execution of a warrant to take control of multiple wallets in a major investigation. This resulted in the seizure of a large volume of cryptocurrency. Similarly, OPP’s Cyber Operations Section demonstrated effective co-ordination with the OPP PAFU to support an operational outcome. Footnotes [57] Ontario, Québec, British Columbia and Alberta. Civil forfeiture offices also exist in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, and the Territory of Nunavut." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity Canada’s TF Threat Environment 725. As set out in the evaluation of IO.1, Canada's National Risk Assessment assesses the overall TF risks to the country as low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial. At a more granular level, the NRA has identified the main threat actors, and the methods and channels exploited by them. Overall, the authorities have a good understanding of Canada’s TF threat environment. Figure 9.1. TF Modus operandi and their frequency, RCMP active files (2019 – 2024) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 726. Authorities have established a good operational understanding of the threat by analysis of a number of sources and methods to enable them to identify trends, tactics of specific organisations and new/updated methods used to finance terrorism both domestically and internationally. During this review period the typologies, tools, and modus operandi used to channel funds to finance terrorism in Canada have been identified as chiefly wire transfers and the use of MSBs. (Table 9.1). This understanding informs the actions set out below to identify, investigate, and prosecute terrorist financing activity. Identification of terrorist financing activity 727. Canada has a well-established system to detect and investigate TF, led by the RCMP – Federal Policing National Security (RCMP-FPNS). All cases which come under national security (i.e. all cases involving terrorism or TF) are reviewed by the RCMP-FPNS where there are two full-time dedicated TF reviewers. These reviewers are TF subject matter experts that have the requisite security clearances and undergo significant training. All complaints that fall under the National Security unit are reviewed by a TF reviewer for s.83 TF related offences of the Criminal Code and their findings documented. This process ensures all terrorism cases are reviewed to establish if TF offences can be identified. 728. National security investigations, including TF investigations, are tasked to either the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) who are specialised, multi-agency units in larger centres in Canada and are comprised of federal and provincial partners, or to the National Security Enforcement Sections (NSES) that are located in various provinces across the country where there is no INSET. Both these teams are centrally governed by RCMP-FPNS at headquarters who are responsible for providing oversight and guidance to all NS investigations across the country and for the prioritisation of investigations. Capability varies between INSETs and NSES units, though co-ordination helps mitigate gaps. This ensures a consistent and co-ordinated approach to TF investigations. 729. Prioritisation of cases is based on threat and complexity, and investigators (both INSET and NSES) receive dedicated TF training and have access to specialist resources such as Forensic Accounting Management Group (FAMG) and criminal intelligence analysts. The RCMP's TF training is open to other government agencies and also has inputs from the relevant units which the investigators will expect to collaborate with, enhancing the co-ordination between all units and agencies. 730. Even if initially TF offences are not identified in the initial review of a complaint related to national security, the review process remains ongoing for elements of TF during the course of the investigation and can lead to TF investigations at a later stage. TF reviewers and analysts within the RCMP-FPNS liaise with other reviewers and investigators monitoring investigations for any TF offences that may be evident. The role of a TF reviewer at FPNS National Headquarters is to ensure the investigation complies with applicable policies, Ministerial Directives and legislation. The reviewer is also responsible for sharing information with domestic and foreign partners, to assist with the collection of additional evidence to advance the investigation and support TF charges. This ensures a co-ordinated approach and ensures consistent input in NS related complaints. Figure 9.2. TF Investigations Process in Canada Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 731. There is a limited number of dedicated TF reviewers, but resilience is built into the system, through the availability of additional qualified staff when needed. There is also a fast time capacity for this reviewing process if required. Although there has never been an instance of a live-time intelligence investigation on TF in Canada, RCMP -FPNS has reviewers and managers on call 24/7 to respond to any urgent situation. 732. The sources of information which initiate TF investigations are wide ranging and include referrals from law enforcement (federal, provincial, and international) or from other agencies, FINTRAC disclosures, direct referrals from financial institutions, calls to the tip line, and CSIS intelligence (including from foreign partners). Once RCMP-FPNS receives financial information related to NS and if the information is classified as TF, then this is recorded as a TF occurrence (for each incident report) in the RCMP occurrence data set. During the relevant review period there were 368 TF occurrences/related incidents within the RCMP- FPNS holdings. FINTRAC issued 704 TF-related disclosures (9 804 STRs), which were the lead source of information for 207 of the 368 TF &quot;incidents&quot; (Figure 9.2). 733. Of the 368 TF-related incidents that were reviewed and assessed to determine aspects such as relevance, threshold, and mandate by the RCMP-FPNS team, 21 progressed to active TF investigations. As a result of these checks on the 21 active TF investigations, there were 11 reactive disclosures by FINTRAC. There were also four (4) proactive disclosures made by the FIU. FINTRAC disclosure is therefore one of the main sources of those TF cases which progressed to the stage of active investigation. Figure 9.3. Number of RCMP TF Occurrences, by lead source of information (2019-2024) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 734. FINTRAC receives Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs), which expand on the previous Terrorist Property Reports (TPRs), and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from RE’s which can be supplemented by threshold-based transaction reports. They have a comprehensive monitoring system that leverages specific terms aligned with TF priorities which has been determined by FINTRAC and other Government of Canada department and agencies. Any detections go to the TF analytical team at FINTRAC to action on a priority basis and disclose to partners when thresholds are met. All support the prioritization of TF investigations. 735. RCMP-FPNS-TF has developed protocols with Regime partners to expediate urgent requests. These established relationships allow RCMP-FPNS to contact Regime partners directly to request urgent action. This is followed by a formal written request. FINTRAC and the CRA have demonstrated they are able to provide intelligence disclosures within hours for urgent matters. FINTRAC’s knowledge and understanding of the reporting sectors, and the financial transaction reports they submit, allow for expediated, effective, and efficient searching of its holdings in support of these priority investigations. 736. Canada demonstrated that CSIS intelligence flows seamlessly to RCMP (One Vision), and both formal and informal international co-operation enables Canada to quickly receive and act on foreign intelligence to pursue TF cases. Investigation of Terrorist Financing cases 737. The primary legal tools and information sources used by RCMP to progress TF investigations are those set out above in the evaluation of IO.7. The analysis in this section focused on the specifics of how these are used in relation to TF investigations, where any differences arise. 738. RCMP submit Voluntary Information Records (VIRs) to FINTRAC in relation to each investigation, to obtain further information. While it is noted above that VIR responses are often subject to significant delays, this is not universal. TF-related VIRs are typically actioned promptly and are not subject to the delays noted above (see IO.6) in relation to lower-priority VIRs, with case interviews indicating that TF VIRs can expect to receive an initial response within a matter of hours. 739. When conducting terrorist financing investigations, RCMP makes extensive use of an intelligence collection technique to rapidly identify which financial institutions the individual of interest holds accounts with, followed by production orders to obtain information from those financial institutions. However, this technique isn’t comprehensive and requires expansion to be effective. 740. RCMP uses production orders to obtain information, and indicates that it receives prompt and full responses from D-SIBs, but responsiveness across other reporting entities varies The general use of production orders in investigations is discussed above in relation to IO.7, but authorities note particular challenges in relation to TF investigations due to the lack of a clear deadline for response, which means that some reporting entities do not reply sufficiently promptly, given the urgent nature of TF investigations. There is no legislation to ensure compliance within a certain time. 741. RCMP participates in Europol and INTERPOL global intelligence sharing and they have a comprehensive liaison officer network of officers and analysts deployed overseas which facilitate international co-operation on TF investigations. One of their remits is to fight national security threats such as TF by liaising with host countries developing the exchange of intelligence and assistance so combating the global aspect of TF. 742. Project Sabin (see Box 9.4) demonstrates Canada’s ability to pursue complex cross-border TF activity when this arises, using financial intelligence, CSIS contributions, and foreign co-operation to map a complex pattern of fundraising, peer-to-peer transfers, virtual asset use, and intermediaries. The case resulted in convictions for TF-specific offences and consecutive prison sentences for the accused. It showed the ability to identify specific financier roles, including fundraising, facilitation for listed entities, intermediaries, and online mobilisation. This example shows the subject setting up fake fundraising platform accounts to collect money over four accounts totalling CAD 9 342 which was transferred internationally to benefit ISIS. It also showed the subjects change of tactics as the ability to send money via Money or Value Transfer Service(s) (MVTS) entities was blocked so the subject moved to the use of virtual assets. Meanwhile, the three other case studies (see Boxes 9.1-9.3) provide examples of Canada’s ability to investigate different types of TF, leveraging both international, national and provincial co-operation to advance cases. Box 9.1. Politically Motivated Plot to Overthrow Foreign Government After receiving information from the Service de police de la Ville de Lévis (Lévis Police Service) in Québec, Canada, the RCMP-INSET initiated an investigation in July 2021 against a 51-year-old resident of Lévis, Québec. The resident took concrete actions, including travelling to Haiti to co-ordinate a group of individuals, whose intention was to take part in an armed revolution in Haiti and ultimately seize power from the Haitian Government led by the late president, Jovenel Moïse (the investigation is unrelated to the July 2021 assassination of President Moïse). The individual allegedly provided money and goods (e.g., tents and a generator) to the revolutionary cause that he was supporting in Haiti. These funds and goods were supplied directly to the group in question when the individual travelled to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He also attempted to acquire weapons during his travels; however, he was unsuccessful in doing so. In November 2022, the RCMP laid three terrorism charges against the suspect, including one TF charge, pursuant to the Criminal Code: · s. 83.03 – Providing property for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.191 – Leaving Canada to facilitate terrorist activity, and · s. 83.19(1) – Facilitating terrorist activity. Over the course of the investigation, the RCMP worked with domestic and three international partners to exchange information, leveraging police-to-police co-operation to gather evidence. Financial intelligence, including a FINTRAC disclosure, was extremely beneficial to the investigation in terms of identifying the suspect’s financial activities, his movements and overseas purchases, as well as his known associates. In March 2025, the individual was found guilty at trial of all three terrorism charges, with no plea resolution, and the sentence was fully argued before the court. The court imposed a total sentence of five years’ imprisonment, comprising a two-year custodial term for the travelling offence pursuant to s. 83.191 of the Criminal Code and a consecutive three-year custodial term for the facilitation offence pursuant to s. 83.19. Both are terrorism offences. The offender was also found guilty of terrorism financing, but that charge was stayed in accordance with the Kienapple principle, a fundamental principle of Canadian domestic law which prevents double punishment where offences share the same factual and legal nexus; this reflects a constitutional safeguard rather than any leniency towards TF. In light of the gravity of the conduct, the court ordered that the offender serve at least half of the sentence before becoming eligible for parole under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code. Box 9.2. Canadian FTF In November 2014, the RCMP-INSET opened a NS investigation concerning a 27-year-old resident of Montreal, Québec. The RCMP-INSET investigation identified that the resident left her home in Québec, Canada at the age of 19 to travel to Syria and Iraq with the intention of joining the Islamic State armed group (ISIS). In Syria, the individual is alleged to have participated in terrorist activities on behalf of ISIS and in November 2017 she was taken prisoner by the Syrian Democratic Forces. As a result of the investigation, the RCMP arrested the suspect in October 2022 at the Montréal-Trudeau international airport after she arrived from a camp for ISIS detainees in Syria with her two children and another adult. Pursuant to the Criminal Code, four (4) terrorism charges were laid against the suspect, including one (1) TF charge: · s. 83.03 – Providing, making available, etc. property or services for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.181 – Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group, · s. 83.18 – Participation in activity of terrorist group, and · s. 465(1)(c) – Conspiracy under 83.181 for leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group. This investigation involved the extensive use of Liaison Officers, co-operation with multiple Government of Canada agencies, and assistance from six (6) international partners to gather evidence and share information that was critical to the investigation and subsequent arrest of the suspect. Financial intelligence was also material to the success of the investigation, with FINTRAC providing multiple disclosures, including detailed financial analyses. The file resolved after extensive discussions between the PPSC and defence counsel. As part of the resolution, the offender pleaded guilty to one count of participating in the activities of a terrorist group, namely ISIS, contrary to s. 83.18 of the Criminal Code. An agreed statement of facts was placed before the court outlining the comprehensive nature of her offending, including that she travelled to Syria to join the ranks of ISIS, knowing that her expected role would include marrying an ISIS fighter and raising children under the ISIS doctrine. This offender was the first person in Canada convicted for providing family support to a terrorist group as a spouse. The resolution in this file reflects the particular facts of the case and takes into consideration the early, ongoing, demonstrated and independently evaluated steps the individual has taken to demonstrate remorse, take responsibility, commit to fundamental change and a rejection of extremist ideology. The offender was sentenced to a global sentence of 111 days and a three-year probation order with conditions. Box 9.3. Ideologically Motivated Terrorist Financing and Provincial-Federal Co-operation In January 2024, a 28-year-old security guard brought a gun into the City Hall in Edmonton, Alberta, and then proceeded to throw incendiary devices while shooting several rounds into the ceiling, walls and windows. The Edmonton Police Service stated that the individual parked his vehicle in the City Hall underground parkade then entered the building from the parkade access. Once inside City Hall, he lit several handheld incendiary devices, believed to be Molotov cocktails, which caused a small fire outside an elevator. He then fired several rounds from a long gun into the ceiling, walls and windows. There were no injuries. The man dropped the long gun onto the floor and surrendered to City Hall security who detained him until police arrived. On the day of the shooting, the individual uploaded a manifesto-style video to YouTube entitled “Rise Up”. In the video, the individual says he is about to complete a “mission” and that he is “not a psychopath” or “one of these monsters that hurt children.” The video addressed multiple grievances, including corruption, inflation, immigration, housing cost and what he dubbed the “genocide in Gaza” and throughout the world. Authorities arrested the suspect and he remains in custody after being denied bail. The Deputy Director of Public Prosecution on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada gave consent to the commencement of terrorism proceedings in respect of the following offences: · Counselling commission of terrorism offence, contrary to section 83.221(1) of the Criminal Code; and, · Possession of property for terrorist purposes, contrary to section 83.04 of the Criminal Code. The suspect is also charged with eight (8) additional offences, which constitute terrorism offences pursuant to sections 2, 83.01(1)(b) and 83.27 of the Criminal Code. These offences include intentional arson of an occupied property, possessing incendiary materials, using a firearm while committing an offence, careless use of a firearm, throwing an explosive substance and discharging a firearm into a building. The RCMP laid terrorism and terrorist financing charges above and beyond the substantive offences as the elements, ideology and motivation were met. This case demonstrates the co-operation between the RCMP and Canada’s provincial and municipal police forces. The case remains pending before the courts. The trial is set for October 2026. 743. Although Canada recognises the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime groups (OCGs) in its 2025 NRA and has taken some steps to address this issue through TFS listings (see Core Issue 9.5), there have, to date, been no readily identifiable TF specific investigative initiatives in this area. Given Canada’s high exposure to OCG related threats, further exploitation of these links could strengthen its TF investigative and prosecutorial efforts. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 744. Canada's TF investigations identify and focus on the specific role played by terrorist financiers in enabling wider terrorist activity. Both Project Sabin and Project Seyant (Boxes 9.4 and 9.5) investigated individuals acting as financiers and facilitators for terrorist groups. The prioritisation of these cases shows a strong awareness of the importance of such financiers and facilitators to sustaining terrorist groups, and the investigations focused on the specific enabling roles that they played in the wider terrorist activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="792. Overall, Canadian FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs demonstrate a generally good awareness of TF-TFS obligations, supported by extensive guidance, outreach and communication by competent authorities. Authorities have invested significantly in sanctions implementation capacity and infrastructure since 2022 and have built mechanisms to disseminate timely information and practical guidance. However, awareness does not always translate into consistent implementation, particularly among some DNFBP sectors. While outreach volume and content appear substantial, during the on-site visit many DFNBPs (lawyers, real estate and DPMS) demonstrated gaps in their understanding of their ML/TF obligations and consequent compliance with them 793. GAC plays a central role in providing primary guidance on sanctions obligations. The Canadian sanctions website consolidates information on all sanctions regimes, including those implementing UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, and provides links to legal instruments, UN lists, FAQs, certificate/permit processes and delisting procedures. Importantly, stakeholders are able to communicate directly with the Sanctions Bureau through designated inboxes for general inquiries and delisting requests. Additionally, GAC’s website directs users to other relevant government websites such as Public Safety Canada’s website on the Criminal Code listing process and currently listed entities, among others. While the website appears comprehensive and regularly updated, it remains difficult to assess whether the website functions primarily as an information repository or as an instrument that materially improves compliance behaviour. There is a need to strengthen its contents and seek user feedback to ensure it is effective as an instrument that materially improves compliance behaviour. 794. FINTRAC supplements GAC’s legal guidance with operationally focused material directed at RE. Guidance covers the obligation to submit Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs) and clarifies what is considered to be property (i.e. anything owned or controlled by a listed person or entity, tangible or intangible), the triggers for reporting, and the lists that should be monitored. FINTRAC also issues indicators, typologies and bulletins on terrorist financing and sanctions evasion, including thematic alerts and special bulletins on ideologically motivated violent extremism and other typologies These communications aim to promote better detection practices and reinforce risk-based approaches. The existence of tailored bulletins suggests an effort to align private-sector awareness with evolving risk. These materials are well designed to promote better detection practices, but the on-site visit did not indicate that reporting entities across the board have integrated them into their day-to-day screening and monitoring systems. 795. Public-private engagement mechanisms support ongoing dialogue. The Supervision Public-Private Working Group (SPPWG) meets quarterly and brings together regulators and industry representatives to discuss emerging risks, regulatory changes and best practices, including sanctions evasion. Members also include associations, who will educate and consult other reporting entities in their sector. New sectors, including white label ATMs and title insurers, are also members of the working group. FINTRAC also conducts bilateral monitoring meetings to discuss implementation practices and risk mitigation measures with individual entities. These fora provide credible channels for feedback and clarification, and they help ensure that entities remain up to date on TF-TFS expectations. For example, specifically related to TFS, FINTRAC consulted the SPPWG on the LPEPR guidance, which resulted in refinements to the guidance to improve clarity and useability for reporting entities Nevertheless, while these mechanisms are active, it is not possible at this stage to quantify participation or measure shifts in compliance quality resulting from them. 796. Outreach activity appears broad and sustained. GAC issues sanctions alerts to 1 838 subscribers (at the time of writing) when changes occur to UN or Canadian lists, generally within 24 hours, thereby supporting timely awareness. However, the breakdown of the subscribers (and therefore clarity on whether these are reporting entities and if so which kinds, or private persons) is not available. It also delivers presentations that cover the architecture of Canadian sanctions, explain stakeholder obligations and use scenario-based discussions. In 2023, Canada created a team to undertake robust and sustained outreach which increased stakeholder engagement. After outreach events were held with 673 stakeholders in 2023 the number of subscribers to the GAC list grew to 1 796 in 2024 and 2 881 in 2025. Positive informal feedback is reported, though the absence of structured evaluation limits insight into whether outreach leads to behavioural change. FINTRAC, who also issues sanction alerts, similarly delivers targeted webinars, including a 2025 series on sanctions evasion and property reporting that reached over 2 100 participants and recorded self-reported improvements in understanding among 73% of respondents. These figures indicate growing reach across all reporting sectors, including newly regulated ones. While increasing participation numbers show a rise in interest, authorities do not systematically measure whether participants subsequently change policies, procedures or controls. 797. Authorities also convene joint events with law enforcement and policy partners. A 2024 Economic Sanctions Enforcement symposium brought together financial institutions, DNFBPs and competent authorities to discuss new reporting obligations and enforcement expectations. Feedback was reportedly used to refine the system, illustrating a learning loop between supervisors and industry. This demonstrates a willingness to move beyond one-directional communication and towards collaborative implementation. 798. Overall, it appears that Canadian entities, particularly larger financial institutions, have ready access to information, channels to seek clarification, and regular interaction with authorities. There is an increasing sophistication among more mature reporting entities, particularly given the scale of sanctions activity since 2022. 799. Notably, well-resourced FIs and many VASPs are able to deploy automated screening tools and specialist staff, whereas smaller entities often rely on more basic controls, which increases the risk of uneven implementation. 800. In several DNFBP sectors (particularly lawyers, real estate brokers and DPMS), sanctions checks are often conducted only at onboarding, with limited ongoing screening of existing customers' activities. This creates a tangible risk that newly designated individuals may not be identified and that freezing obligations will not be triggered. Canada state that they regularly communicate with professional bodies and associations to encourage them to emphasize the need to regularly consult Canada's sanctions, nevertheless this remains a concern." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="801. Canadian authorities have established supervisory frameworks to monitor and ensure compliance with TF-TFS obligations. FINTRAC, as the primary AML/CFT supervisor, monitors reporting entities’ compliance with TF-related target financial sanctions through examinations and ongoing supervision and is equipped with sanctions powers. Supervisory systems are clearly structured and include mechanisms for co-ordination and escalation among competent authorities, however there is a concern on whether the authorities are able to identify any property not frozen and reported in a timely manner. 802. A central component of FINTRAC’s approach concerns LPEPR (formerly TPR) obligations. Examinations review whether reporting entities screen customers at onboarding and on an ongoing basis against prescribed lists, and whether escalation procedures allow for immediate reporting and freezing when matches are identified. Supervisors test systems through case file reviews, walkthroughs of automated screening solutions, and assessment of anomalies and match-handling workflows. Supervisors also assess whether freezing actions and reporting occur without delay, although comprehensive aggregate data on timeliness is limited. Where a triggering event is detected, FINTRAC verifies that the entity froze funds, halted the transaction, filed an LPEPR without delay, and submitted an STR if suspicion thresholds were met. Where entities conclude that no report was required, FINTRAC requires documented justification and evidence of internal consideration. There is no pro-active supervision of REs specifically to their freezing obligation, creating a possible gap to effective monitoring of these TF-TFS obligations. Nonetheless, FINTRAC reviews reporting entities’ policies, escalation procedures, screening capabilities, and case files to verify that potential matches are identified quickly and internal controls are followed, reducing the possibility of residual risks on asset identification and freezing delays. The authorities report that, over the last five years, FINTRAC did not identify cases where an LPEPR was required but not filed. This is presented as indicative of strong compliance. At the same time, supervisors acknowledge that non-compliance, when detected, is addressed through a graduated response framework including follow-up examinations, action plans, monitoring of reporting behaviours, revocation tools for MSBs, administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), public naming, and referrals to law enforcement in serious cases. During the reference period, FINTRAC issued 15 AMPs in which at least one violation related to policies and procedures for TPR obligations, and the steps needed to identify property subject to reporting. The fines ranged from CAD 36 360 (to a Real Estate firm) to CAD 9 185 000 (to a Bank). This indicates that supervisors detect weaknesses in TF-related controls, although all breaches relate to program deficiencies rather than failures to freeze or report terrorist property, which limits insight into effectiveness under real-world pressure. 803. One case study illustrates FINTRAC’s ability to align intelligence-led risk insights with targeted supervisory action. In 2024, intelligence work flagged MSBs disproportionately exposed to a high-risk jurisdiction associated with a terrorist organization. Subsequent examinations uncovered repeat deficiencies across compliance program elements and resulted in an AMP and ongoing monitoring. While this demonstrates an ability to escalate supervision in response to emerging TF risk, the deficiencies identified in the case were largely general program weaknesses, and authorities did not highlight specific TF-TFS violations uncovered through the examination. To improve their detection of TF-TFS violations Canadian authorities would benefit from continuing a more proactive approach by monitoring transactions and assets independently of any existing reports. 804. FINTRAC also supervises reporting entities’ implementation of Canada’s Ministerial Directives during examinations. FI and VASPs generally have good understanding on their obligations under the Ministerial Directives, with some deficiencies identified in compliance mostly in CU/CP sectors. There is also a gradual increase in the level of deficiency for FIs, MSBs and VASPs since FY2022/23 mainly attributed to the onboarding of new MSB sub-sectors and updates to Ministerial Directives. 805. Canada has access to strong sanctioning powers, including AMPs and severe criminal penalties under the United Nations Act (up to CAD 100 000 in fines and 10 years’ imprisonment). Authorities argue that these penalties deter non-compliance and that financial institutions publicly acknowledge their seriousness. These tools are complemented by inter-agency co-operation, notably with CSIS, which can share intelligence on possible under-reporting. The framework is therefore capable of applying proportionate and dissuasive measures where warranted, though not many opportunities have existed to test this in practice, as there has been no case of severe administrative sanctions being deployed in relation to TF-TFS breaches specifically. In the absence of cases where these sanctions were applied specifically for TF-TFS breaches, deterrence remains largely inferred, although the framework is clearly capable of imposing proportionate and dissuasive measures where warranted. 806. Capabilities within the DNFBP sector vary considerably, leading to uneven implementation of TF-TFS controls. Although relevant information is publicly available, many DNFBPs would benefit from more practical tools and simplified, user-friendly sanctions lists to support timely screening and freezing. There are DNFBP sectors that FINTRAC does not supervise, which decreases their ability to ensure sanctions are implemented (i.e. lawyers). Further, there is currently no designated supervisor responsible for overseeing lawyers’ and law firms’ compliance with TFS controls under Canadian sanctions legislation. Canada should have a more proactive framework in place to immediately review across those it supervises when there has been a change in sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.6.1. Remedial actions and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions 272. Following an examination, FINTRAC communicates with an FI or VASP any findings and necessary corrective measures through an exit interview and a findings letter and whether any follow-up actions are required. Findings letters made available for this assessment contained deficiencies noted and not all of them provide specific recommendations / guidance. Minor deficiencies are typically addressed through general guidance in the examination report, with no further action required. When significant or numerous deficiencies are found, FINTRAC may initiate follow-up measures, such as requiring an action plan detailing the corrective measures the entity will implement along with specified timelines to complete the remedial measures or conducting a follow-up examination. These decisions are based on factors including the entity’s size, sector-specific risks, and the materiality of the deficiencies. In cases of serious or repeated non-compliance, FINTRAC may pursue enforcement actions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMP) or making non-compliance disclosures (NCD) to law enforcement to ensure compliance and uphold the integrity of Canada’s financial system. 273. Over the review period, 59% of examinations were concluded as no follow-up actions required. Among the remainder, 33% were identified for follow-up - including follow-up examinations (21%), submissions of action plans (10%), compliance monitoring meetings (2%); data integrity monitoring of monetary threshold reports (1%); and 8% were identified for enforcement actions including AMP (6%), NCD (1%) and MSB / VASP registration revocation (1%). Where an entity is required to submit an action plan, FINTRAC monitors progress of the action plans and closure of the issues must be supported by documentation or evidence submitted by the entity to demonstrate corrective actions have been completed. For action plans involving more serious deficiencies or FRFI such as banks, FINTRAC applies enhanced monitoring and each action item is assessed for remediation before closure. Action plans are also standing agenda items in FINTRAC’s regular monitoring meetings with banks. Remediations are also be reviewed through follow-up examinations by FINTRAC for 21% of the examinations conducted in the review period. 274. The measures adopted by FINTRAC to bring about prompt remedial actions to address non-compliance and to prevent recurrence are confined to action plan monitoring through compliance monitoring meetings and regular submissions from FIs and VASPs; and enforcement actions (i.e. AMP, NCD or revocation of MSB and VASP). FINTRAC does not have the power under the PCMLTFA to compel remediation of non-compliance [36] , remove incompetent senior management of FIs and VASPs, to impose directions or restrictions. It has to rely on OSFI and provincial supervisory authorities which have powers to do so for FRFIs and provincially regulated FIs respectively in cases where non-compliance with PCMLTFA poses serious concerns about the FIs’ financial soundness, integrity or security. OSFI and FINTRAC presented case studies to demonstrate both information sharing and effectiveness of joint supervisory actions to address issues where PCMLTFA non-compliance poses prudential concerns such as risk governance. The cases involved significant OSFI supervisory action related to senior personnel/investors, restricted business activities and downgrading supervisory ratings of the FRFI concerned. Despite this, the range of measures adopted by FINTRAC to tackle non-compliance of different levels of severity is limited. Cases indicate that progress can be very slow in addressing some long-outstanding control issues. This reinforces the AT’s view in this aspect. Table 3.13. Examination outcomes for FIs and VASPs (FY2020/21 to FY2024-25) Sector Year Sub-total 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Enforcement activity: consider an AMP Banks 2 3 3 1 2 11 CU/CPs 2 0 0 1 4 7 Securities 0 0 1 2 1 4 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 0 4 2 3 4 13 VASPs 0 0 1 1 4 6 Enforcement activity: consider an NCD MSBs 0 1 1 3 0 4 VASPs 0 0 0 2 1 3 Enforcement activity: consider revocation VASPs 0 0 0 0 6 6 Follow-up activity: Follow-up examination Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 CU/CPs 2 4 2 3 4 15 Securities 4 4 13 4 1 26 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 13 14 23 13 11 74 VASPs 1 3 4 5 20 33 Follow-up activity: Action plan submission Banks 0 8 6 1 5 20 CU/CPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 Securities 3 8 6 1 0 18 Life Insurance 0 1 0 0 0 1 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 3 8 4 3 5 23 VASPs 0 0 1 3 1 5 Follow-up activity: Compliance Monitoring Meetings Banks 0 1 1 0 0 2 CU/CPs 0 2 1 1 0 4 Securities 2 0 0 0 0 2 Life Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 1 0 2 0 0 3 VASPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 Follow-up activity: Data integrity monitoring MSBs 0 1 4 0 0 5 VASPs 0 0 0 1 0 1 Concluded no further action required Banks 0 1 1 0 3 5 CU/CPs 7 4 4 14 5 34 Securities 16 22 18 12 1 69 Life Insurance 0 0 1 2 0 3 Trust and Loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 MSBs 30 51 38 11 11 141 VASPs 2 7 8 4 138 159 Source: Canada 275. FINTRAC has increasingly made use of enforcement actions against FIs and VASPs for non-compliance in recent years. The number of AMPs issued has nearly doubled between FY2023/2024 and FY2024/2025, from 8 to 15, and continued to increase in the first half of FY2025/26. The dollar amount of AMPs has also significantly increased with record amounts issued in FY2023/24 (CAD 25.6 million) and FY2024/25 (CAD 23.5 million). Most of the AMPs are issued to banks, MSBs and VASPs over the last five years, and the average bank penalty is significantly higher than average penalties for all non-bank sectors combined (CAD 3 350 164 vs CAD 349 217). Once an AMP [37] is imposed, FINTRAC must make public the name of the reporting entity, the nature of the violation, and the amount of the penalty. AMPs would cause reputational damage to the entities concerned and will provide a deterrent effect. While the AMP is only one of the options to address non-compliance, use of enforcement actions is still limited in scope taking into account the size of the FI and the VASP sectors, compliance of FIs and VASP with core obligations, depth of the supervisory assessment of system effectiveness and also the outcomes of using other remediation actions (refer to the section on impact of outreach, monitoring, supervision, remedial action and sanctions). The majority of cases where AMP imposed on FIs and VASPs related to the failure to file STR and /or monetary threshold reports and there were not many violations relating to the FIs and VASPs’ compliance programmes and control effectiveness. Although total sum of the penalties for non-compliance has increased, it is not sufficiently dissuasive and proportionate for large FIs and VASPs. This may be attributable to the fact that the purpose of the AMP is to encourage compliance and not to “punish” (non-punitive) [38] . Table 3.14. Number and amount of AMP imposed on FIs, MSBs and VASPs (FY 2020-21 to FY 2024-25) FY 2020-21 FY2021-22 FY2022-23 FY2023-24 FY2024-25 Total (amount in CAD) Banks - 2 1 3 1 7 (23 451 150) CU/CP - 2 - - 1 3 (602 910) Securities - - - - 4 4 (115 500) MSBs 2 1 4 2 7 16 (2 265 855) VASPs - - - 2 1 3 (25 587 000) Total 2 5 5 7 14 33 (52 022 415) Source: Canada 276. FINTRAC has the legislative authority to disclose information about non-compliance of reporting entities to law enforcement when it suspects on reasonable grounds that the information would be relevant to investigating or prosecuting criminal non-compliance offences under the PCMLTFA. FINTRAC makes Non-Compliance Disclosures (NCD) when it suspects the non-compliance is criminal in nature (e.g. wilful and deliberate, or linked to other suspected criminal offences such as money laundering). Between FY2018/2019 to FY2024/2025 (7 years), a total of 69 NCDs relevant to MSBs (including VASPs) were provided to LEAs, with 19 NCD (about 27%) initiated by FINTRAC’s supervisory activities. In the same period, there were a total of 69 convictions of PCMLTFA offences, however the number that were initiated by NCDs is not systematically tracked. Among them, many are related to contraventions with MSB registration requirements and there are 16 conviction cases relating to violations of PCMLTFA requirements on preventive measures. Table 3.15. Number of NCDs from 2020-21 to 2024-25 Grouped Activity Sector 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total MSB (all MSBs) 8 7* 9 13* 32* 69 DNFBPs 1 - 1 1 1 4 Total 9 7 10 14 33 73 * Five of these NCDs involve an MSB and entities in DNFBP sectors, in the same NCD. Source: Canada Table 3.16. PCMLTFA prosecution outcomes relevant to preventive measures (FY2018-19 to FY2024/25) PCMLTFA Number of Outcomes Section 74 Section 11.1 Contravention – Registration requirement 10 Section 6 Contravention – Record Keeping 5 Section 6.1 Contravention – Verifying identity 6 Section 75(1) Failure to report suspicious transactions 5 Source: Canada Impact of outreach, monitoring, supervision, remedial action and sanctions 277. FINTRAC's supervision and assessment activities include quarterly meetings with D-SIBs and annual meetings with small-to-medium banks. FINTRAC also maintains a two-way communication approach with the MSB sector. Sector specific guidance is provided through FINTRAC’s website and dedicated call centre to help businesses comply with the PCMLTFA and associated Regulations. Guidance includes information on legislative updates, risk assessment, STR quality, and know-your-client practices, such as client identification and record-keeping. Reporting entities can stay informed of changes by subscribing to FINTRAC’s alerts and consulting the latest guidance at FINTRAC’s website. Score Cards are deployed by FINTRAC as one of its supervisory activities to evaluate the performance of FIs and VASPs with respect to the timeliness and quality of STR and threshold reporting. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit are generally satisfied with the outreach of and guidance provided by AML supervisory authorities. 278. FINTRAC provides feedback to industry through an outreach and assistance program for reporting entities. This includes participating in conferences, seminars, presentations and other events providing feedback on compliance with AML/CFT legislation. Training sessions are conducted at various industry conferences and forums, such as the Banking Forums and Canadian MSB association which cover topics such as identifying red flags for ML and implementing effective compliance programs. Despite these efforts, there is limited information demonstrating that overall compliance improved over the review period for most sectors, especially for banks and MSBs. Over the assessment period, significant or numerous deficiencies were found in 41% of on-site examinations on FIs and VASPs for which consideration of enforcement actions (8%), or intense follow-up supervisory actions including follow-up examinations (21%) and close monitoring of action plans (12%) were warranted. Among 57 follow-up examinations conducted in the review period, nearly half (47%) were assessed as partially remediated with varying level of deficiencies. The overall improvement rate for sectors which are assessed as very high/high risks (i.e. banks, MSB and VASP) is less than satisfactory (ranging from 25% to 50%), although FINTRAC provided some case examples supporting that supervision, outreach and monitoring of remedial actions have demonstrated a positive impact on compliance by the targeted FIs and VASPs. The current level of AMP under the PCMLTFA is also insufficient to provide a dissuasive effect of increasing compliance by large reporting entities. Canada has introduced a bill to Parliament that would increase PCMLTFA penalties and address this issue, however the bill had not passed at the time of the onsite visit [39] . Footnotes [36] Canada passed legislative changes to PCMLTFA on 26 March 2026, which include, among others, granting the power for FINTRAC to compel the reporting entities subject to AMP to enter into a compliance agreement to remediate the violations. [37] Canada passed legislative changes to PCMLTFA on 26 March 2026, which include, among others, increasing the size of AMPs which FINTRAC is empowered to impose, with the maximum increased by 40 times. [38] Administrative monetary penalties policy on fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/pen/2-eng [39] The legislative amendments to introduce a higher AMP framework was passed in late March 2026." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="389. Canada has introduced several significant mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons and arrangements since its 2016 MER. These have been driven both by changes to the FATF standards and by the findings of risk assessments. Obligations for private corporations to obtain and record information on their beneficial ownership 390. Federal, provincial and territorial finance ministers affirmed in 2017, and again in 2019, their commitment to work towards transparency of beneficial ownership. Stemming from this, all provinces and territories, apart from Alberta (11.7% of Canadian corporations), NWT and Nunavut (with Yukon, 0.2% of Canadian corporations) have introduced obligations for private corporations to obtain and record information on their beneficial ownership. Québec did not introduce record-keeping requirements but instead requires BO reporting to the REQ. This has been a significant change, but despite that private sector representatives generally have a good awareness of their obligations in this regard and there does not seem to have been any significant resistance to implementing these new obligations. 391. As only private corporations at the federal level and in Québec are required to file BO information to government registers, it is not known to what extent private corporations in other provinces and territories are complying with their obligations to record BO information. Authorities do not collect this information, which is a particular concern with regard to Ontario, where obligations were introduced in 2023, and where 38% of Canadian incorporations take place. Ontario incorporates more corporations than Québec and the federal level combined, therefore making Ontario significant materially, particularly given the high vulnerability assigned to corporations in the national risk assessment. In 2025, Ontario announced its commitment to establish a beneficial ownership registry, aligned with the federal government, and is actively working towards implementation in 2027. In the interim, FIs and DNFBPs across Canada subject to the PCMLTFA demonstrate generally high levels of compliance with obligations to obtain and verify BO information, although with some specific sectoral deficiencies. These obligations provide a certain degree of mitigation, although they do not substitute for the requirement to establish a comprehensive BO register or equivalent alternative mechanism. 392. The absence of BO record-keeping obligations in Alberta, one of the materially significant provinces, creates a vulnerability, as 11.7% of all Canadian incorporations take place there. However, this is mitigated to some degree by the requirement to include information on the five largest shareholders in the basic information provided to Alberta’s corporate register. That basic information is also provided in bulk to FINTRAC under an MOU, which enables FINTRAC to systematically integrate the data in its analytical processes and detect anomalies in corporate information reported to REs through CDD and to FINTRAC via STRs as well as through the MSB registration process. Requirement for foreign legal persons to register with provinces and to record BO information 393. Foreign legal persons seeking to conduct business in Canada are obliged to register with the provinces in which they intend to conduct business and relevant provincial regulations also apply to them. Foreign corporations represent less than 1% of corporations operating in Canada. In 2025 there were 9 817 foreign private corporations registered in Ontario, 3 381 in Québec, and 1,694 in Alberta. Most provinces and territories have the legislative authority to collect BO information at the time of registration by a foreign corporation. However, foreign corporations are subject to provincial obligations regarding BO reporting only in Québec and under BC’s LOTR. Federal obligations do not apply in this regard. The obligation to file BO data centrally applies in Québec and, in relation to land ownership or interest, in BC. Therefore, outside of those provinces, incorporation authorities have limited visibility on the BO of foreign corporations operating in their respective jurisdictions. Requirement for reporting entities under the PCMLTFA to obtain BO information as part of their CDD processes 394. Reporting entities under the PCMLTFA have obligations to obtain and keep up to date BO information as part of their CDD processes. Since Canada’s 2016 MER, this obligation was extended beyond financial entities and securities dealers to all reporting entities. [45] The private sector demonstrated a good understanding of these obligations with several stating definitively that they will not engage in business with anyone whose BO information is not provided. As part of its supervisory activities, FINTRAC examines whether REs are fulfilling their obligations in this regard. Six of the administrative monetary penalties imposed on REs during the relevant period were for non-compliance with BO requirements. Requirement for Canadian federal corporations and Québec corporations to file their BO data with central registers 395. Corporations Canada (CC) established a register of BO information, or ‘Individuals with Significant Control’ (ISCs) for corporations formed at the federal level in January 2024. This means that approximately 16% of Canadian corporations are required to file their BO data with this central register. As of the onsite visit, 98% of those had complied with these obligations. The majority of corporations filing are small to medium enterprises and therefore predominantly (96%) record only one or two BOs. 396. The first province to establish a similar register is Québec, with the Registre des Entreprises du Québec (REQ), in March 2023. Not only must corporations formed in Québec file BO data with this register but so must trusts/fiducies operating a commercial enterprise in Québec. As of the onsite approximately 70% of corporations required to file BO data had done so, including 100% of those which were formed after introduction of the obligations. REQ has taken a gradual approach to enforcing compliance, with letters of non-disclosure issuing in May 2025 to improve on the current 70% compliance rate. As of July 2024, no new corporation can register to operate in Québec without providing BO data. 397. Ontario and BC have both committed to establishing central registers of BO data and are working towards this. Disclosure obligations under provincial securities and stock exchange regulations for public corporations 398. Public corporations are already subject to robust disclosure obligations under provincial and territorial securities regulations and stock exchange rules. These requirements are broadly aligned across Canada and effectively require transparency regarding those owning 10% or more of publicly traded corporations. Administrative monetary penalties and late fees for late ‘insider reports’ are tools used by Canadian securities regulators to deter and promote compliance among insiders. Data provided indicates that while administrative sanctions are regularly applied for late filings of insider reports, these are not clearly proportionate or dissuasive. While the proportion of late insider reports relative to total insider reports filed with a given securities regulator is generally low, additional efforts could be made to enhance compliance. The proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness of sanctions for other contraventions of provincial and territorial securities laws, which can result in significant fines and/or imprisonment, are outside the scope of this assessment. Legal arrangements: requirements to file BO information in annual tax income returns 399. The key mitigating measure introduced in relation to transparency of legal arrangements has been the introduction of enhanced trust reporting requirements for trustees of express trusts and their civil law equivalents, to file information on the BO of their legal arrangements as part of annual income tax returns with the Canada Revenue Agency and, where applicable, Revenu Québec. These obligations were introduced for tax years ending on or after 31 December 2023 and apply to express trusts that are factually resident in Canada, deemed resident in Canada, or those not resident in Canada with a sufficient link to Canada. There are similar obligations for trusts resident in Québec, deemed resident in Québec or linked to a Québec contributor. The enhanced trust reporting requirements have significantly increased the number of trusts required to file trust income tax returns in Canada, as they can apply even if the trust has no income tax payable. For the CRA, this has led to an increase of over 30% in the number of express trusts for which annual income tax filings have been made, with similar although slightly lower increases for Revenu Québec. It has also created legislative requirements for trustees to obtain and hold this information to fulfil this obligation. There are some limited exemptions to these obligations for ‘listed trusts’ (i.e. specifically listed in the Income Tax Act as being exempt), which are deemed to hold lower ML/TF risks. The temporary relief from filing for bare trusts, to allow for legislative changes providing greater clarity on requirements, has been ended as of the onsite visit. Legislation in progress proposes to legislatively exempt bare trusts for the 2024 and 2025 taxation years and to provide for filing obligations for certain bare trusts starting with the 2026 taxation year. Therefore, data is not yet available on how many bare trusts may be required to file but whose information is currently not filed with CRA. Land Owner Transparency Registry: requirement to file BO data of corporations, trusts or partnerships purchasing real estate 400. BC introduced a Land Owner Transparency Registry in 2020 to address tax evasion and criminals using the real estate sector in that province to launder illicit funds. This requires the filing of BO data of corporations, trusts or partnerships purchasing real estate or having an ownership or other interest in land prior to 30 November 2020 when the regime came into force. While not a requirement of the FATF standards, this is a positive measure introduced to address the specific targeting of the BC real estate sector as a means of laundering money. Information must be filed by a legal professional, which assists with accuracy. As of 31 December 2025, the registry had approximately 1 010 000 records, most of which are basic transparency declarations, which must accompany any application to register an interest in land. At least 167 000 of these are the more detailed transparency reports which must be filed by reporting entities in cases where the owner registered on the title is a trustee of a relevant trust, a relevant corporation or a relevant partnership. A transparency report lists all individuals who are “interest holders” – that is, those individuals with a significant interest, as defined in the legislation. Over 40 000 audits have been conducted by the registry to verify this data, and the enforcement officer has taken over 8 000 remedial actions, including sending letters, to verify information. Prohibition of bearer shares 401. The use of bearer shares has effectively been prohibited by the introduction of legal requirements at all federal, provincial and territorial levels for shares to be issued in registered form. Corporate registries do not have information on the number of bearer shares converted to registered form because such transactions would occur between the corporation and the bearer shareholder. Canada believes the numbers to be low since bearer shares did not historically have a significant presence in Canada. Requirements to declare conflicts of interest and certain nominee arrangements 402. The use of nominee directors and shareholders is addressed by the obligations of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) at federal level. These include requirements to declare conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation. These obligations are reflected in equivalent provincial and territorial legislation. Québec introduced in 2019 explicit legislative requirements for nominee arrangements ( contrats de prête-nom ) to be declared as part of tax returns. This led to approximately 10 000 such declarations in 2020 and between 1 500-3 000 further declarations each subsequent year. There are no other explicit requirements for nominee arrangements to be declared. In other Canadian provinces and territories, nominee arrangements might qualify as bare trusts subject to the enhanced trust reporting rules, depending on the facts and circumstances. However, corporate BO record-keeping obligations as outlined above, also effectively require nominators to be declared by virtue of being individuals with significant control. Furthermore, in all jurisdictions, proxyholders (who may act similarly to nominees) are required to disclose their proxies, which must be in writing and signed by the appointing shareholder. Footnotes [45] The scope of reporting entity sectors under the PCMLTFA has expanded to a variety of new sectors since 2016, including factoring companies, financing and leasing companies, cheque cashing businesses, white label ATM acquirers, businesses involved in the mortgage lending process, armoured car companies, and businesses offering crowdfunding platform services (see IO1 for more details)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 315. The results of the National Risk Assessment have been spread through DNFBP sectors. Nevertheless, the level of understanding among each reporting entity regarding ML/TF risks they face varies between sectors. Casinos 316. In the interviews conducted in the on-site visit, casinos demonstrated a strong understanding of ML/TF risks. In addition to recognizing risks aligned with their business characteristics such as customer base and business model, casinos also showed awareness of evolving risks, including online gaming and cryptocurrency. With respect to online gaming, casinos have enhanced their understanding of the ML/TF risks faced and the corresponding mitigation measures by co-operating with provincial regulators specialized in online gaming, such as iGaming Ontario (IGO). This understanding is further reinforced by the results of FINTRAC’s supervisory assessments, revealing that the majority of casinos assessed from 2020-2025 were fully compliant with their PCMLTFA obligation to conduct risk assessments (see Table 4.4). DPMS 317. DPMS still face challenges in their understanding of ML/TF risks. This is evidenced by the results of FINTRAC’s supervisory assessments from 2020-2025 where only 23% of assessed DPMS were “compliant” with the PCMLTFA obligation to conduct risk assessments, 52% were “partially compliant”, and 25% were “deficient”, including entities that did not have their risk assessment at all (see Table 4.4.). These compliance results raise concerns about DPMS’ understanding of ML/TF risks faced by their business activities. The main ML/TF risks highlighted in the NRA have been spread among the DPMS sector, although more time is required to build awareness around new and evolving risks, such as those related to new technologies including online trading or cryptocurrency. Continued outreach efforts in collaboration with national industry associations such as Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA) are expected to promote a deeper understanding of ML/TF risks. Real Estate 318. Awareness of ML risks in the real estate sector has increased, in part due to the Cullen Commission report in British Columbia, which outlined key industry vulnerabilities. However, FINTRAC’s review of past supervisory activities has found that, although risk assessments are commonly developed, they are often incomplete and not effectively implemented in practice. Only 41% of real estate agents were compliant with their institutional risk assessment obligations, 41% were partially compliant and 18% were deficient, including entities that did not have their risk assessment at all (See Table 4.4.). In addition to further outreach and engagement by the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA), it is also worth considering more tailored and sector-specific guidance by FINTRAC. Accountants 319. FINTRAC's examinations of the accounting sector over the review period reveal that accountants generally have a good understanding of ML/TF risks. This is evidenced by the high compliance rates – 58% of assessed accountants were “compliant” with risk assessment obligations, although the sector needs to implement risk assessments for all members, as 25% of accountants still have not conducted their own risk assessments (See Table 4.4.). BC notaries 320. The majority of BC Notaries demonstrate a good understanding of risks, having developed and implemented risk assessments to manage their day-to-day business activities. This proficiency can be explained by high compliance rates - 64% of assessed BC notaries were “compliant” with risk assessment obligations, and only 6% of BC notaries were assessed as “deficient” (See Table 4.4.). Table 4.4. Supervisory findings of Risk Assessment deficiencies for DNFBP Sectors – 2020-2025 “Compliant”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. “ Partially compliant” : while the obligation is documented, it is either not applied, has been only partially implemented, or has quality issues. “ Deficient”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 63% 19% 19% DPMS 23% 52% 25% Real estate 41% 41% 18% Accountants 58% 17% 25% BC notaries 64% 30% 6% Source: FINTRAC Note: Not all sectors are subject to an annual risk assessment review by FINTRAC. The timing and selection of these reviews are determined based on specific requirements and the focus of targeted sectors. For the legal profession 321. Unlike the PCMLTFA requirements for other DNFBPs, rules of provincial/territorial law societies do not oblige lawyers to conduct ML/TF risk assessments. The FLSC has issued guidance regarding ML/TF risk assessment for lawyers, yet progress in risk assessment implementation remains limited. Risks in certain activities such as the operation of trust account, which the FLSC and provincial/territorial Law Societies identify as high-risk, are recognized. While lawyers are aware of information on ML/TF risks provided by the FLSC and law societies passively, they do not appear to proactively identify and understand ML/TF risks tailored to their own business model or evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="172. In general, competent authorities provide other forms of international co-operation to varying degrees, with the FIU providing international co-operation to some extent while the other competent authorities to a large extent. 2.4.1. FIU 173. FINTRAC is providing assistance to some extent. During the period under review, the FIU sent a total of 1 457 disclosures, which include 695 proactive disclosures and 762 reactive disclosures to 1 617 requests received (47%) (see Table 2.14). Disclosures included 33 388 STRs (1.2% of received STRs). On average, within five days, FINTRAC informs the foreign FIU whether it has information within its holdings to provide a disclosure and information is then provided at a later stage. The FIU provided a positive response, on average, to 61% of incoming requests deemed admissible by Canada. A negative response to incoming requests deemed admissible was provided, on average, in 39% of cases. FINTRAC reports that 24% are due to the lack of financial information in the query received, limiting FINTRAC’s possible actions combined with the absence of information in FINTRAC’s holding. 15% are due to the lack of authority for FINTRAC to request further information from reporting entities without a prior STR or report. 174. FINTRAC‘s ability to provide effective and comprehensive international co-operation is restricted when needing to seek additional information from REs (see R.29 and IO.6). This issue is also reported in international co-operation feedback. Table 2.14. FINTRAC as FIU – incoming requests Fiscal year (FY) Received requests Received requests deemed admissible * Positive replies in response to a request deemed admissible No information to provide to a request deemed admissible Days to provide a positive reply 2019-2020 227 181 106 75 N/A 2020-2021 209 174 107 67 60 2021-2022 268 222 140 82 92 2022-2023 255 195 122 73 53 2023-2024 280 189 121 68 80 2024-2025 378 297 166 131 39 TOTAL 1 617 1 258 762 (61%) 496 (39%) ** 65 Note: (*) Requests deemed admissible are those requests received from a MOU partner and having a link with Canada; (**) indicates averages on available data only. Source: Canada 175. FINTRAC prioritises incoming requests based on nature of the investigation, predicate offences, critical deadlines, previous disclosure work, and the relevance of the transactions within its database. Of the 121 urgent requests received between 2020 and 2025, 59% were responded to in less than 10 days, 20% between 11 and 30 days, 21% in more than 30 days. Overall, FINTRAC replies, on average, within 5 days to inform whether it has or does not have information. Positive replies to incoming requests are provided in 65 days, on average. The trend in positive response times is inconsistent, with averages always exceeding 30 days and peaks of over 90 days. While an improvement is observed in the most recent year (FY 2024-2025), FINTRAC’s timeliness providing responses is inconsistent. 176. In addition, FINTRAC proactively sent 695 disclosures (Table 2.15), 88% on ML and 12% on TF. A proactive disclosure is either spontaneous disclosures of information in FINTRAC’s data holdings or dissemination of a disclosure prepared for another partner where FINTRAC also assessed relevance to another FIU and subsequently disclosed. On average, proactive disclosures are mostly related to customs/TBML (33.9%), frauds (26.1%), tax evasion (23.8%), TF (12.1%), human smuggling or trafficking (12%), drug trafficking (10.3%) and corruption (1.7%), mostly in line with Canada’s risk profile. Table 2.15. Proactive disclosures sent to foreign FIUs (%) 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Total Customs/TBML 22,4 25,4 31,5 34,9 43,3 46,0 33,9 Fraud 41,4 29,6 27,0 19,3 19,4 20,0 26,1 Tax Evasion 15,5 25,4 19,1 13,3 26,9 32,0 23,8 TF 4,0 15,1 18,2 9,0 6,7 19,8 12,1 HS / HT 8,6 16,9 14,6 9,6 11,9 10,0 12,0 Drugs 11,2 14,1 4,5 10,8 9,0 12,0 10,3 Corruption 1,7 1,4 1,1 1,2 3,0 2,0 1,7 Total number sent 50 93 137 144 165 106 695 Note: TF proactive disclosures can be proactive or reactive. One disclosure may involve more than one predicate offence. Data, with the exception of the total, are expressed as percentages. Source: Canada 177. Canada does not have the authority to suspend funds or withhold transactions when a request is received from a foreign counterpart. LEAs do not have legislative suspension powers (see TC Annex, c. 4.3(a)), but they can share information with financial institutions, which may suspend or withhold a transaction while awaiting restraint. FINTRAC used this process 18 times (out of 20) in the past five years, where following an alert from a foreign FIU, FINTRAC disseminated the information to the RCMP and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. This process does take additional time for domestic authorities to exchange information among themselves before sharing information with the relevant reporting entity that may, or may not, suspend funds or withhold transactions. 178. FINTRAC produces and shares with many partners internationally, strategic intelligence that details emerging characteristics, trends, and tactics used by criminals to launder money and fund terrorist activities (e.g. Project Anton which is the first international public-private partnership on illegal wildlife trafficking). As an active member of the Egmont Group, FINTRAC drives a range of initiatives, such as developing typologies and providing technical assistance, training, and contributing to capacity-building efforts. 179. International co-operation feedback shows that assistance provided by FINTRAC is generally of good quality, even though in some cases delays were reported (see Box 2.5). Additionally, some countries reported that they did not receive a reply to their requests due to the absence of an MOU with Canada. Canada reports that in such cases, the countries would receive a negative response outlining the procedure for entering into an MOU with Canada. Box 2.5. International Co-operation with AUSTRAC In 2023, voluntary information was received by FINTRAC regarding an ongoing investigation into an international drug smuggling network involving Canada, Australia and Country X. According to information submitted by AUSTRAC, the case was instigated by law enforcement to determine the flow of funds, the suspected involvement of various individuals, and the scope of the international network. After receiving this information, FINTRAC performed its analysis and developed a disclosure (22 suspicious transaction reports, 1 suspicious attempted transaction report, 4 large cash transaction reports and 37 electronic funds transfer reports) to AUSTRAC. FINTRAC’s disclosure included financial intelligence on individuals and an entity identified in the voluntary information, as well as several additional individuals previously unknown to the partner FIU and to law enforcement. The disclosure also contained financial transactions, publicly available information, and a case summary highlighting the relationships between subjects and the flow of funds. Further, FINTRAC initiated a proactive disclosure based on a cross-border seizure report submitted on another individual suspected to be involved in the same international drug smuggling network, and that was later determined to be traveling quite regularly to Country X to meet with the main suspect. The disclosure contained financial transactions, publicly available information, and a case summary on the suspected involvement of one individual and one entity. AUSTRAC provided feedback that indicated that FINTRAC’s disclosure answered major intelligence gaps and showcased the physical movement of funds to and from Canada, and Country X, highlighting how the criminal network was possibly being financed. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 180. RCMP LOs collaborate with INTERPOL Ottawa and are often the first point of contact for foreign requests for police assistance, such as subscriber checks, locating travellers, criminal record checks and fingerprint verification. RCMP provided assistance to foreign counterpart in 1 618 cases, mostly from the US (see Table 2.16). Direct requests for assistance by the foreign police agency to in country or regional RCMP LOs are another major source of requests. Table 2.16. RCMP – incoming requests Foreign Agency Criminal Code and PCMLTFA Occurrence Type Total Unique Occurrences Criminal Code Laundering POC PCMLTFA Specific Criminal Code TF FBI 43 4 420 467 Foreign (except US) Police Agency 286 21 217 524 Foreign INTERPOL Offices 293 29 98 103 US non-Police Agency 20 3 9 32 US Police Agency (except FBI) 56 7 9 72 Total Unique Occurrences 793 65 760 1 618 Source: Canada 181. As above, LEAs may leverage established information channels with the reporting entity for a suspension, while a formal restraint order is sought. Timeliness of intervention is managed through established informal channels, and private-public partnerships (see Box 2.6 below). Canada also provided one case where foreign authorities approached Canadian LEAs, including RCMP Liaison Network and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), asking for intervention to recover funds that were the object of fraud against foreign entities. 182. RCMP received 108 requests related to asset recovery through the CARIN and similar networks (see Table 2.17). Most requests come through CARIN, but the RCMP has also received requests from ARIN-CARIB, Red de Recuperation des Activos GALIFAT (RRAG), ARIN Asia Pacific (ARIN-AP), and ARIN Southern Africa (ARIN-SA). Table 2.17. RCMP – incoming requests on asset recovery via CARIN networks Year Incoming and answered requests 2019 21 2020 10 2021 23 2022 13 2023 21 2024 20 Total 108 Source: Canada 183. Provincial and territorial authorities received requests related to asset recovery via CARIN. During the period under review, 39 out of 40 incoming requests were completed, including 35 relating to asset tracing. Box 2.6. Case of effective suspension of funds by Canadian competent authorities, following a request of foreign FIU In 2022, a foreign FIU informed FINTRAC that CAD 127 000 of illicit funds obtained from a romance scam, were transferred to an account at a major Canadian FI. Information was shared with the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), who immediately engaged the Canadian FI. It was determined that the illicit funds had been transmitted outside of Canada, but that recovery efforts were possible if the foreign jurisdiction issued a wire recall. Through collaboration with the FIUs, domestic and internation law enforcement agencies and banking institutions, the funds were traced and returned to the foreign jurisdiction and to the victim via a wire recall. Source: Canada 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 184. FINTRAC received, on average, between 2-3 requests for supervisory information per year, which were responded within a timely manner (1-5 days). 185. Through ISF, FINTRAC participates in the multilateral sharing of supervisory information, best practices, and approaches with other AML regulators and supervisors from the UK, US, Australia, and New Zealand. The ISF provides a venue to share information, operational practices, and to develop common performance indicators with a goal to establish best practices and harmonize collective processes wherever possible. For example, with FinCEN (US) and AUSTRAC (Australia), discussions revolved around how to ensure virtual currency compliance. On two occasions, FINTRAC presented its approach to compliance to, and shared best practices with, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. FINTRAC also provided a case study on international co-operation related to the sharing of information on banking supervision (see Box 2.7). 186. FINTRAC and FinCEN meet quarterly, with the possibility for ad hoc meetings to discuss emerging issues. These meetings focus on the exchange of information pertaining to virtual currency dealers, other money services businesses (MSBs), current exam approaches, hiring practices, and technical training for employees with subject-matter expertise in virtual currencies, and experiences using various blockchain analytics tools. For example, in the course of supervisory work, both agencies identified crossovers in operations involving a foreign MSB with operations in both countries, which enables information sharing on supervisory best practices. FINTRAC and FinCEN also share knowledge regarding virtual currency typologies and how to assess and supervise this sub-sector. To this end, a joint examination resulted in FINTRAC revoking the license of a virtual currency dealer. Box 2.7. FINTRAC and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC): International Co-operation in Information Sharing on a Bank In July 2025, FINTRAC conducted a supervisory activity on a Canadian bank with operational presence in the United States, among other countries. Given the gaps that were noted by FINTRAC’s supervisory team, the high-risk nature of cross-border activities, and possible impact at a global level, FINTRAC reached out to OCC in order to gain better insight into the bank’s operations in the United States and assess the bank’s oversight and compliance with AML/TF Regulations in the United States. During the meeting, both OCC and FINTRAC supervisory teams shared information on the compliance history of the bank on each side of the border, the deficiencies noted, enforcement actions taken, and more importantly, discussed possible impact of the deficiencies and risk areas noted at both domestic and global levels. In addition, both agencies shared assessment and examination methodologies, as well as best practices. As a result, FINTRAC gained targeted knowledge that enhanced its risk-based supervisory approach. Source: Canada 187. FINTRAC provided assistance to a foreign counterpart sharing its own experience supervisory methodology on DPMS. Additionally, in 2024, FINTRAC met with Australia regarding sanitized information on STRs pertaining to notaries and real estate after a request from AUSTRAC. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 188. From 2020 to June 2025, CBSA’s BFCC produced a total of 71 tactical intelligence assessments and reports, which identify a range of trade-based illicit financial flow threats. Each intelligence assessment produced contains indicators of non-compliance/offences, customs-based trade fraud behaviours, suspected financial crime behaviours and may also contain financial intelligence reporting from FINTRAC. Some of these reports were shared with the US, the UK, Mexico and Australia. 189. In the same period, the BFCC received 44 requests for customs information from foreign customs (17) and law enforcement (27) partners. In each case, the BFCC responded with the requested custom information to assist these partners, with caveats limiting use to intelligence purposes only. Information on timeliness to provide a reply to incoming requests is not available, as the program is relatively new and information has not been tracked consistently over the review period. An additional 24 spontaneous disclosure of CBSA information and intelligence were shared with foreign counterparts, as well as 26 operational or strategic intelligence products on emerging, typologies and broader assessments of threat associated with complex trade fraud or trade-based movements of illicit financial flows. 190. The BFCC has also collaborated with several multi-lateral working groups to document and share intelligence to broaden awareness of typologies, trends and indicators regarding trade-based illicit financial flows, mostly with US, UK, Australia and New Zealand through the Border Five. The division also works closely with local US and UK liaison officers to share information and intelligence and develop joint investigative leads. In the relevant period, CRA shared information with foreign partners spontaneously, simultaneously or in response to an incoming request in relation to criminal investigations for tax evasion and in relation to income tax matters (civil queries)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="172. In general, competent authorities provide other forms of international co-operation to varying degrees, with the FIU providing international co-operation to some extent while the other competent authorities to a large extent. 2.4.1. FIU 173. FINTRAC is providing assistance to some extent. During the period under review, the FIU sent a total of 1 457 disclosures, which include 695 proactive disclosures and 762 reactive disclosures to 1 617 requests received (47%) (see Table 2.14). Disclosures included 33 388 STRs (1.2% of received STRs). On average, within five days, FINTRAC informs the foreign FIU whether it has information within its holdings to provide a disclosure and information is then provided at a later stage. The FIU provided a positive response, on average, to 61% of incoming requests deemed admissible by Canada. A negative response to incoming requests deemed admissible was provided, on average, in 39% of cases. FINTRAC reports that 24% are due to the lack of financial information in the query received, limiting FINTRAC’s possible actions combined with the absence of information in FINTRAC’s holding. 15% are due to the lack of authority for FINTRAC to request further information from reporting entities without a prior STR or report. 174. FINTRAC‘s ability to provide effective and comprehensive international co-operation is restricted when needing to seek additional information from REs (see R.29 and IO.6). This issue is also reported in international co-operation feedback. Table 2.14. FINTRAC as FIU – incoming requests Fiscal year (FY) Received requests Received requests deemed admissible * Positive replies in response to a request deemed admissible No information to provide to a request deemed admissible Days to provide a positive reply 2019-2020 227 181 106 75 N/A 2020-2021 209 174 107 67 60 2021-2022 268 222 140 82 92 2022-2023 255 195 122 73 53 2023-2024 280 189 121 68 80 2024-2025 378 297 166 131 39 TOTAL 1 617 1 258 762 (61%) 496 (39%) ** 65 Note: (*) Requests deemed admissible are those requests received from a MOU partner and having a link with Canada; (**) indicates averages on available data only. Source: Canada 175. FINTRAC prioritises incoming requests based on nature of the investigation, predicate offences, critical deadlines, previous disclosure work, and the relevance of the transactions within its database. Of the 121 urgent requests received between 2020 and 2025, 59% were responded to in less than 10 days, 20% between 11 and 30 days, 21% in more than 30 days. Overall, FINTRAC replies, on average, within 5 days to inform whether it has or does not have information. Positive replies to incoming requests are provided in 65 days, on average. The trend in positive response times is inconsistent, with averages always exceeding 30 days and peaks of over 90 days. While an improvement is observed in the most recent year (FY 2024-2025), FINTRAC’s timeliness providing responses is inconsistent. 176. In addition, FINTRAC proactively sent 695 disclosures (Table 2.15), 88% on ML and 12% on TF. A proactive disclosure is either spontaneous disclosures of information in FINTRAC’s data holdings or dissemination of a disclosure prepared for another partner where FINTRAC also assessed relevance to another FIU and subsequently disclosed. On average, proactive disclosures are mostly related to customs/TBML (33.9%), frauds (26.1%), tax evasion (23.8%), TF (12.1%), human smuggling or trafficking (12%), drug trafficking (10.3%) and corruption (1.7%), mostly in line with Canada’s risk profile. Table 2.15. Proactive disclosures sent to foreign FIUs (%) 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Total Customs/TBML 22,4 25,4 31,5 34,9 43,3 46,0 33,9 Fraud 41,4 29,6 27,0 19,3 19,4 20,0 26,1 Tax Evasion 15,5 25,4 19,1 13,3 26,9 32,0 23,8 TF 4,0 15,1 18,2 9,0 6,7 19,8 12,1 HS / HT 8,6 16,9 14,6 9,6 11,9 10,0 12,0 Drugs 11,2 14,1 4,5 10,8 9,0 12,0 10,3 Corruption 1,7 1,4 1,1 1,2 3,0 2,0 1,7 Total number sent 50 93 137 144 165 106 695 Note: TF proactive disclosures can be proactive or reactive. One disclosure may involve more than one predicate offence. Data, with the exception of the total, are expressed as percentages. Source: Canada 177. Canada does not have the authority to suspend funds or withhold transactions when a request is received from a foreign counterpart. LEAs do not have legislative suspension powers (see TC Annex, c. 4.3(a)), but they can share information with financial institutions, which may suspend or withhold a transaction while awaiting restraint. FINTRAC used this process 18 times (out of 20) in the past five years, where following an alert from a foreign FIU, FINTRAC disseminated the information to the RCMP and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. This process does take additional time for domestic authorities to exchange information among themselves before sharing information with the relevant reporting entity that may, or may not, suspend funds or withhold transactions. 178. FINTRAC produces and shares with many partners internationally, strategic intelligence that details emerging characteristics, trends, and tactics used by criminals to launder money and fund terrorist activities (e.g. Project Anton which is the first international public-private partnership on illegal wildlife trafficking). As an active member of the Egmont Group, FINTRAC drives a range of initiatives, such as developing typologies and providing technical assistance, training, and contributing to capacity-building efforts. 179. International co-operation feedback shows that assistance provided by FINTRAC is generally of good quality, even though in some cases delays were reported (see Box 2.5). Additionally, some countries reported that they did not receive a reply to their requests due to the absence of an MOU with Canada. Canada reports that in such cases, the countries would receive a negative response outlining the procedure for entering into an MOU with Canada. Box 2.5. International Co-operation with AUSTRAC In 2023, voluntary information was received by FINTRAC regarding an ongoing investigation into an international drug smuggling network involving Canada, Australia and Country X. According to information submitted by AUSTRAC, the case was instigated by law enforcement to determine the flow of funds, the suspected involvement of various individuals, and the scope of the international network. After receiving this information, FINTRAC performed its analysis and developed a disclosure (22 suspicious transaction reports, 1 suspicious attempted transaction report, 4 large cash transaction reports and 37 electronic funds transfer reports) to AUSTRAC. FINTRAC’s disclosure included financial intelligence on individuals and an entity identified in the voluntary information, as well as several additional individuals previously unknown to the partner FIU and to law enforcement. The disclosure also contained financial transactions, publicly available information, and a case summary highlighting the relationships between subjects and the flow of funds. Further, FINTRAC initiated a proactive disclosure based on a cross-border seizure report submitted on another individual suspected to be involved in the same international drug smuggling network, and that was later determined to be traveling quite regularly to Country X to meet with the main suspect. The disclosure contained financial transactions, publicly available information, and a case summary on the suspected involvement of one individual and one entity. AUSTRAC provided feedback that indicated that FINTRAC’s disclosure answered major intelligence gaps and showcased the physical movement of funds to and from Canada, and Country X, highlighting how the criminal network was possibly being financed. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 180. RCMP LOs collaborate with INTERPOL Ottawa and are often the first point of contact for foreign requests for police assistance, such as subscriber checks, locating travellers, criminal record checks and fingerprint verification. RCMP provided assistance to foreign counterpart in 1 618 cases, mostly from the US (see Table 2.16). Direct requests for assistance by the foreign police agency to in country or regional RCMP LOs are another major source of requests. Table 2.16. RCMP – incoming requests Foreign Agency Criminal Code and PCMLTFA Occurrence Type Total Unique Occurrences Criminal Code Laundering POC PCMLTFA Specific Criminal Code TF FBI 43 4 420 467 Foreign (except US) Police Agency 286 21 217 524 Foreign INTERPOL Offices 293 29 98 103 US non-Police Agency 20 3 9 32 US Police Agency (except FBI) 56 7 9 72 Total Unique Occurrences 793 65 760 1 618 Source: Canada 181. As above, LEAs may leverage established information channels with the reporting entity for a suspension, while a formal restraint order is sought. Timeliness of intervention is managed through established informal channels, and private-public partnerships (see Box 2.6 below). Canada also provided one case where foreign authorities approached Canadian LEAs, including RCMP Liaison Network and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), asking for intervention to recover funds that were the object of fraud against foreign entities. 182. RCMP received 108 requests related to asset recovery through the CARIN and similar networks (see Table 2.17). Most requests come through CARIN, but the RCMP has also received requests from ARIN-CARIB, Red de Recuperation des Activos GALIFAT (RRAG), ARIN Asia Pacific (ARIN-AP), and ARIN Southern Africa (ARIN-SA). Table 2.17. RCMP – incoming requests on asset recovery via CARIN networks Year Incoming and answered requests 2019 21 2020 10 2021 23 2022 13 2023 21 2024 20 Total 108 Source: Canada 183. Provincial and territorial authorities received requests related to asset recovery via CARIN. During the period under review, 39 out of 40 incoming requests were completed, including 35 relating to asset tracing. Box 2.6. Case of effective suspension of funds by Canadian competent authorities, following a request of foreign FIU In 2022, a foreign FIU informed FINTRAC that CAD 127 000 of illicit funds obtained from a romance scam, were transferred to an account at a major Canadian FI. Information was shared with the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), who immediately engaged the Canadian FI. It was determined that the illicit funds had been transmitted outside of Canada, but that recovery efforts were possible if the foreign jurisdiction issued a wire recall. Through collaboration with the FIUs, domestic and internation law enforcement agencies and banking institutions, the funds were traced and returned to the foreign jurisdiction and to the victim via a wire recall. Source: Canada 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 184. FINTRAC received, on average, between 2-3 requests for supervisory information per year, which were responded within a timely manner (1-5 days). 185. Through ISF, FINTRAC participates in the multilateral sharing of supervisory information, best practices, and approaches with other AML regulators and supervisors from the UK, US, Australia, and New Zealand. The ISF provides a venue to share information, operational practices, and to develop common performance indicators with a goal to establish best practices and harmonize collective processes wherever possible. For example, with FinCEN (US) and AUSTRAC (Australia), discussions revolved around how to ensure virtual currency compliance. On two occasions, FINTRAC presented its approach to compliance to, and shared best practices with, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. FINTRAC also provided a case study on international co-operation related to the sharing of information on banking supervision (see Box 2.7). 186. FINTRAC and FinCEN meet quarterly, with the possibility for ad hoc meetings to discuss emerging issues. These meetings focus on the exchange of information pertaining to virtual currency dealers, other money services businesses (MSBs), current exam approaches, hiring practices, and technical training for employees with subject-matter expertise in virtual currencies, and experiences using various blockchain analytics tools. For example, in the course of supervisory work, both agencies identified crossovers in operations involving a foreign MSB with operations in both countries, which enables information sharing on supervisory best practices. FINTRAC and FinCEN also share knowledge regarding virtual currency typologies and how to assess and supervise this sub-sector. To this end, a joint examination resulted in FINTRAC revoking the license of a virtual currency dealer. Box 2.7. FINTRAC and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC): International Co-operation in Information Sharing on a Bank In July 2025, FINTRAC conducted a supervisory activity on a Canadian bank with operational presence in the United States, among other countries. Given the gaps that were noted by FINTRAC’s supervisory team, the high-risk nature of cross-border activities, and possible impact at a global level, FINTRAC reached out to OCC in order to gain better insight into the bank’s operations in the United States and assess the bank’s oversight and compliance with AML/TF Regulations in the United States. During the meeting, both OCC and FINTRAC supervisory teams shared information on the compliance history of the bank on each side of the border, the deficiencies noted, enforcement actions taken, and more importantly, discussed possible impact of the deficiencies and risk areas noted at both domestic and global levels. In addition, both agencies shared assessment and examination methodologies, as well as best practices. As a result, FINTRAC gained targeted knowledge that enhanced its risk-based supervisory approach. Source: Canada 187. FINTRAC provided assistance to a foreign counterpart sharing its own experience supervisory methodology on DPMS. Additionally, in 2024, FINTRAC met with Australia regarding sanitized information on STRs pertaining to notaries and real estate after a request from AUSTRAC. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 188. From 2020 to June 2025, CBSA’s BFCC produced a total of 71 tactical intelligence assessments and reports, which identify a range of trade-based illicit financial flow threats. Each intelligence assessment produced contains indicators of non-compliance/offences, customs-based trade fraud behaviours, suspected financial crime behaviours and may also contain financial intelligence reporting from FINTRAC. Some of these reports were shared with the US, the UK, Mexico and Australia. 189. In the same period, the BFCC received 44 requests for customs information from foreign customs (17) and law enforcement (27) partners. In each case, the BFCC responded with the requested custom information to assist these partners, with caveats limiting use to intelligence purposes only. Information on timeliness to provide a reply to incoming requests is not available, as the program is relatively new and information has not been tracked consistently over the review period. An additional 24 spontaneous disclosure of CBSA information and intelligence were shared with foreign counterparts, as well as 26 operational or strategic intelligence products on emerging, typologies and broader assessments of threat associated with complex trade fraud or trade-based movements of illicit financial flows. 190. The BFCC has also collaborated with several multi-lateral working groups to document and share intelligence to broaden awareness of typologies, trends and indicators regarding trade-based illicit financial flows, mostly with US, UK, Australia and New Zealand through the Border Five. The division also works closely with local US and UK liaison officers to share information and intelligence and develop joint investigative leads. In the relevant period, CRA shared information with foreign partners spontaneously, simultaneously or in response to an incoming request in relation to criminal investigations for tax evasion and in relation to income tax matters (civil queries)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 751. Canada’s TF intelligence feeds into national counter-terrorism efforts through, the One Vision Partnership Framework, and interdepartmental co-ordination and collaboration. Financial intelligence from FINTRAC has been used to map extremist networks, identify financial conduits, support designations under targeted financial sanctions, and inform strategic analysis. However, the national CT strategy (2011) is currently under revision to reflect Canada’s evolved TF risk understanding, as detailed in the NRA. 752. There is a National Co-ordination and Governance framework made up of three committees, all led at Deputy Minister level – a Committee on Intelligence, on Operational Co-ordination and on National Security, Cyber and Intelligence Policy, which play a key role in policy and operational co-ordination and decision making for Canada’s National Security and intelligence services. These committees have overlapping membership with the national AML/CFT Regime detailed in IO.1, reinforcing linkages between TF and other national security issues facing Canada and supporting a co-ordinated framework. 753. An example of this co-ordination in practice is Canada’s approach to terrorist listings, which is designed to be a “whole of government” approach with participation from multiple departments and agencies that have intelligence, law enforcement, or policy roles. The Terrorist Listings Policy and Planning Committee is chaired by Public Safety and includes core representatives from Canada’s AML/CFT Regime, including Finance Canada, FINTRAC, CSIS, and the RCMP. Involvement of these partners ensures that consideration of financial intelligence and developments in Canada’s TF risk environment are actively integrated into decision-making. Additionally, since the scope of the Committee includes both operational and policy partners, it ensures that Canadian policymakers working in CFT have visibility into emerging operational trends that may inform future CFT strategies and shape interaction with private sector stakeholders under governance structures outlined in IO.1. Finally, as outlined in further detail under IO.10, listing decisions are made upon recommendation by the Minister of Public Safety and are discussed at Deputy Minister Committees and Cabinet, ensuring the highest levels of Canadian government have a strong factual basis upon which to list the entity. This multistakeholder participation at multiple levels of Canadian government strengthens linkages between counter terrorist financing efforts and broader national security priorities, and supports a co-ordinated, whole of government approach to addressing terrorist threats. Figure 9.4. Canada’s National Co-ordination and Governance Framework for TF Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 754. RCMP’s FPNS TF unit collaborates with FINTRAC, the CRA, CSIS and foreign partners working within protocols/agreements/Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate timely information sharing. They are responsible for: · monitoring and co-ordinating major ongoing investigational projects related to terrorist organizations focusing primarily on their financial and procurement infrastructures; · liaising on a routine basis with partner agencies such as FINTRAC, CSIS and the CRA Charities Directorate and, · communicating with international law enforcement agencies in the sharing of intelligence and evidence. 755. This collaboration alongside the One Vision Framework (which governs information sharing between CSIS and the RCMP with strategic and tactical deconfliction and disclosure of information protocols and how this can be used by the RCMP) shows a co-ordinated approach to counterterrorism and counter-terrorism financing. This process can be expedited in cases of imminent threat." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 351. Each year, FINTRAC develops an annual operational plan to guide its various supervisory activities. This plan is informed by FINTRAC’s risk model, public data, past compliance assessments, transaction reports, Intelligence Notices provided from its Tactical and Strategic Intelligence unit, and information from regulatory partners, risk questionnaires, and non-compliance reports (See c.28.5). FINTRAC’s supervisory activities have varying intensity and are selected on the basis of risks observed. There are generally three types of supervisory activities: on-site examinations; desk-based assessments of submissions (i.e. risk questionnaire and self-assessment); and ongoing supervisory engagements, including monitoring meetings and outreach. 352. For further improvement of risk-based supervision frameworks, it is necessary to conduct entity-level risk assessment properly. Apart from casinos, FINTRAC has conducted supervisory assessment activities for fewer than 10% of all entities in the past five years. In addition, supervisory coverage of DPMS and real estate is substantially lower than casinos, all of which are assessed as high-risk, whereas coverage of lower risk sector (i.e. BC notaries) is higher than DPMS and real estate (see Table 4.13). Table 4.13. Assessment Activities and SRM Risk Scores Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) Assessment Activities (Past 5 yrs) Number of Reporters Number of Non-reporters Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk No-flag Casinos 19 154(811%) 1 5 4 10 - - DPMS 3 000 168(6%) - - 8 54 4 2 934 (97.8%) Real Estate 7 742 440(6%) - - 19 176 15 7 532 (97.3%) Accountants 1 000 110(11%) - - 1 1 116 882 (88.2%) BC Notaries 293 21(7%) - - - 19 - 274 (93.5%) Sub-total 12 054 893(7%) 1 5 32 260 135 11 622 (96.4%) Source: Canada 353. FINTRAC is unable to articulate how annual operational plan for supervisory activities is developed based on the above risk assessment results; or provide the analysis of supervisory activities by risk categories of DNFBPs in the past 5 years. Canada explains that the SRM is only one tool used by FINTRAC to assess the risk of individual DNFBPs, however it has not been able to sufficiently demonstrate how other factors are taken into account in the risk assessment and supervisory prioritisation process in practice. Given the high number of ‘no-flag’ entities, the accuracy and significance of the risk categorization under the SRM is minimal for DNFBPs. 354. FINTRAC employs a range of different supervisory tools, including examinations, monitoring meetings, risk questionnaires and Voluntary Self-Declaration of Non-Compliance (VSDONC), which may apply when a reporting entity discovers non-compliance issues in reporting, client identification, record keeping, or other aspects of their compliance program during periodically review, ongoing risk assessment, or quality control activities. FINTRAC maintains a regular examination cycle for casinos. On the other hand, DNFBPs subject to examination represent only 0.56% of the total number of entities subject to examination in the year 2024-2025 (67 out of 12 054). While FINTRAC conducts other supervisory activities to supplement examinations, the low supervisory coverage of examinations for DPMS and real estate professionals relative to their large population raises concern that not all high-risk entities within those sectors are subject to in-depth assessment (see Table 4.14). Table 4.14. AML/CFT Examinations of DNFBPs Conducted by FINTRAC Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025,) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total (percentage in relation to the total DNFBP as of 1 April 2025) Casinos 19 4 0 6 2 5 17 (89.4%) DPMS 3 000 3 10 8 8 25 54 (1.8%) Real Estate 7 742 53 96 71 15 31 266 (3.4%) Accountants 1 000 0 0 0 5 3 8 (0.8%) BC Notaries 293 1 5 7 5 3 21 (7.1%) Total 12 054 61 111 92 35 67 366 (3.0%) Source: Canada 355. In 2023, FINTRAC launched an assessment tool called the risk questionnaire, intended to gather detailed information on reporting entities including their business model, risk exposure, and compliance measures. During the interviews in the on-site visit, positive feedback was received that risk questionnaires are a useful tool for reporting entities in properly identifying ML/TF risks and implementing mitigation measures proportionate to those risks. As noted in the DPMS section below, there remains room for further improvement in the selection of target entities who need to complete risk questionnaires. Increasing the coverage of examinations and risk questionnaires in higher risk areas, would further support a risk-based supervision. Casinos 356. From 2020 to 2024, FINTRAC conducted examinations on a cyclical basis for all brick-and-mortar casinos, with a frequency of two to five years. This schedule was based on variables such as casino size, compliance history, and ML/TF risk levels, to ensure continuous risk oversight. In the past five years, 68% of the casino sector was examined. Beginning in 2024–25, FINTRAC further strengthened its risk-based approach, including risk questionnaires, monitoring meetings, targeted reviews, and full scope examinations of both bricks-and-mortar casinos and online gaming. Furthermore, in 2023-24, FINTRAC adopted a portfolio approach in supervising the casino sector similar to the banking sector. Under the revised framework, FINTRAC assigns a dedicated supervision officer to each casino to offer compliance assistance, relay the agency's expectations and updates, and monitor any operational or regulatory changes. Five of the largest casinos have quarterly meetings, the three remaining large casinos have biannual meetings, and the remaining eleven small and medium-sized casinos meet annually. This approach has been well-received for improving communication and compliance. Table 4.15. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Casinos in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 4 - 6 2 5 17 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - 1 - 1 Questionnaires - - - - 18 18 VSDONCs 8 22 29 31 28 118 Totals 12 22 35 34 51 154 Source: Canada DPMS 357. Over the past five years, FINTRAC conducted 54 examinations of DPMS, focusing on the largest and highest-risk entities, including follow-up examinations where deficiencies had been previously identified. These entities were deemed high-risk due to their significant market share, broad geographic reach, and status as luxury dealers of high-value products. Of the 54 examinations, 25 examinations resulted in follow-up supervisory activities, with 10 resulting in enforcement action, including four Notices of Violation issued, totalling CAD 594 974 (USD 434 881). Targeted questionnaires for the DPMS sector were launched in 2024-25, with 95 questionnaires administered. FINTRAC selected reporting entities based on the following risk factors: geographic risk exposure, product and service risk, adverse media results, and third party STRs indicating known criminal associates. From 95 questionnaires administered, FINTRAC received a completed response from 74 entities, 13 entities were unresponsive, and 9 were deemed not covered (i.e. did not perform triggering activities). Based on these results, a number of entities were selected for action plan meetings to ensure that FINTRAC monitored the DPMS’ implementation of their compliance programs. Other DPMS entities that exhibited higher risk based on the results of the questionnaires were selected for comprehensive examinations. As noted above, further coverage of examinations and risk questionnaires would enhance FINTRAC’s risk-based supervision, considering the risk and context in the sector. Table 4.16. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for DPMS in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 3 10 8 8 25 54 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - 8 8 Questionnaires - - - - 95 95 VSDONCs 1 1 4 2 3 11 Totals 4 11 12 10 131 168 Source: Canada Real estate 358. FINTRAC's strategy in the real estate sector involves targeted examinations across various sub segments, including new brokerages, developers, and the luxury and commercial markets. Additionally, FINTRAC conducts follow-up examinations to confirm that previously identified deficiencies are addressed. Over the past five years, of the 266 examinations conducted, 23 were considered for enforcement activities, 128 were considered for follow up activity and 114 required no further action. FINTRAC administered 71 risk questionnaires in 2023-24 and 97 in 2024-25. To address the gaps identified, FINTRAC provided reporting entities with outcome letters detailing the gaps and collaborated with them to ensure these were addressed. The responses were assessed using a standardized risk rubric, leading to targeted supervisory actions. During the fiscal year 2023-24, FINTRAC introduced monitoring meetings as a follow-up assessment activity with major brokerages. FINTRAC held 10 meetings with large real estate brokerages, to increase the reporting of STRs and promote best practices. FINTRAC should continue such activities considering the low volume of STRs, in collaboration with CREA for additional outreach as necessary. Table 4.17. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Real estate in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 53 96 71 15 31 266 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - 10 1 11 Questionnaires - - - 71 97 168 VSDONCs 1 5 6 1 2 15 Totals 54 101 77 97 131 460 Source: Canada Accountants 359. The number of examinations against accountants is low, although in part this reflects their relatively small number subject to the PCMLTFA (estimated at 1 000). FINTRAC has started risk questionnaires, improving its understanding of sector risks, uncovering compliance gaps, and identifying additional firms. From the 95 questionnaires administered in 2024-25, FINTRAC pinpointed common deficiencies such as the absence of a compliance officer, inadequate training, and missing obligations in policies and procedures. In some cases, policies and procedures for the firm were present, but lacked obligations like PEP and HIO determinations, risk assessment of new technologies, and large cash transaction and large virtual cash transaction reporting requirements. Based on these findings, five were selected for follow-up examinations and seven for action plan monitoring. Table 4.18. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Accountants in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations - - - 5 3 8 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - 3 3 Questionnaires - - - - 95 95 VSDONCs - 1 1 - 2 4 Totals 0 1 1 5 103 110 Source: Canada BC notaries 360. The BC notary sector has low member turnover and few new entrants annually. Over the past five years, FINTRAC conducted 15 full examinations, three targeted exams and three follow-ups, finding most entities compliant. Of the 15 full examinations, nine were fully compliant and six had some deficiencies flagged for future supervision. Of the three follow-ups, two entities continued to show issues, indicating that some do not fully address deficiencies or encounter new compliance challenges. FINTRAC schedules follow-ups based on the severity of deficiencies and the risk profile of both the sector and the entity. Table 4.19. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for BC notaries in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 1 5 7 5 3 21 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - - 0 Questionnaires - - - - - 0 VSDONCs - - - - - 0 Totals 1 5 7 5 3 21 Source: Canada For the legal profession 361. Law societies use a range of different tools, including audits and investigations, to ensure that their members respect AML/CFT rules. While these tools have helped advancing lawyers’ implementation of AML/CFT measures, they are still largely rule-based and lack a risk-based approach. Law societies conduct audits reviews of lawyers or law firms’ financial records, books and accounts as well as the handling of client file matters. Audits also examine compliance with AML/CFT rules and regulations, such as CDD, BO inquiries and record-keeping. The importance of fulfilling obligations appears to be well embedded among lawyers in certain provinces, such as British Columbia, where between 2020 and 2025, referrals arising from the Law Society audits accounted for approximately 75% of all new AML/CTF investigation files and some audit referrals for AML/CTF obligations have resulted in revocations. In contrast, regarding areas such as enhanced due diligence, which are not prescribed by rules and regulations but are instead addressed only through non-binding guidance, implementation among lawyers appears inconsistent (Also see 10.5 and 11.6.2. for TF/PF monitoring and compliance). Both law societies and lawyers remain largely focused on rule-based measures, and lack of risk-based approaches is a deficiency, including building on risk awareness both by law societies and by lawyers. In addition to risk assessments by law societies or the FLSC, Canada should further promote the implementation of a risk-based approach by ensuring that designated supervisory authorities, which may be self-regulated bodies such as law societies, can share the results of examinations with individual lawyers, have lawyers do their own ML/TF risk assessments, which is different from lawyers’ general obligation to assess whether there is a risk that the lawyer may be aiding or encouraging fraud or other illegal conduct, and implement commensurate mitigation measures. During the interviews in the on-site visit, differences were noted across provinces regarding the preparedness and the progress of sectoral and entity level risk assessment. Law societies should share initiatives and best practices from different provinces in appropriate forums such as the FLSC to effectively strengthen the legal sector’s approach to AML/CFT. 362. Law societies’ audits of firms follow to some extent a risk-based approach, for example by focusing on trust accounts, which are typically regarded as high-risk. Law societies should further enhance their risk-based approach and conduct more comprehensive supervisory risk assessments. Considering the volume of members, the number of audits, especially targeted to AML/CFT obligations, is limited. It is positively noted that some law societies have made efforts to select entities targeted for review following a risk-based approach. For example, Ontario selects entities based on firm size, area of practice, new sole practice or other factors, and British Columbia audits all law firms at least once every six years, with firms practicing in higher-risk areas audited at least once every four years. To further enhance alignment and compliance with the FATF Standards, each law society should conduct its own risk assessment at the starting point of risk-based approach and then develop and refine supervisory approaches based on the assessment. Canada should also consider measures to monitor the effectiveness of law societies’ risk-based supervision, including enhancing transparency through detailed disclosure in annual reports and introducing independent review of law societies’ risk-based supervision by third parties. Table 4.20. Estimated Number of Annual Law Society Audits (2019-2024) Estimated number of law firms Estimated Number of Audits Performed Annually Law Society of Ontario 14 090 law firms 1 200 Barreau du Québec 3 908 681 (as in March 2025) (All trust accounts are audited once every 5 years) Chambre des notaires du Québec 828 551 (for the year ending 31 March 2024) Law Society of British Columbia 4 000 585 Law Society of Alberta 2 700 150-200 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="761. UN listings and delistings are automatically incorporated into Canadian law through regulations under the United Nations Act, ensuring freezing obligations apply without delay (see Recommendation 6 for more details). 762. Canada implements UNSCR 1373 through the Criminal Code , whereas previously they used the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Suppression of Terrorism (RIUNRST) under the UN Act. All recent listings have been under Section 83.05 of the Criminal Code, however, there remain 36 individuals and entities listed under RIUNRST, the most recent being from 2006. 763. Since 2019 there have been 38 listings under Section 83.05 of the Criminal Code . The listing process can be expediated when required and completed in days or weeks. The Criminal Code authorises the Government of Canada to independently list both domestic and international terrorist entities - defined under the Criminal Code as including persons, groups, or organisations that knowingly engage in or facilitate terrorist activity. This regime provides the legal and institutional framework to freeze assets, prohibit terrorist financing, and criminalise support activities. The listing and delisting processes follow a whole-of-government approach led by Public Safety, ensuring co-ordinated and accountable efforts to combat terrorism. 764. Once an entity is listed, it is considered a “terrorist group” under the Criminal Code . The Criminal Code prohibits certain actions in relation to terrorist groups, including those related to terrorist financing, travel, and recruitment. Examples of related criminal offences include participating in or contributing to any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity (section 83.18), providing or collecting property/funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to carry out or benefit a terrorist activity or group (section 83.03. instructing someone to carry out an activity for a terrorist group (section 83.21). 765. Any department or agency can propose an entity to be considered for listing or delisting if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the group or individual has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity, or the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with, an entity involved in a terrorist activity. This is a “whole of government approach” involving multiple phases and interdepartmental consultation (See Box 10.1). A security intelligence report developed by the CSIS or Public Safety, or a criminal intelligence report prepared by RCMP will be completed and reviewed by the Department of Justice to determine whether the legal threshold has been met. Public Safety then creates a listing package for the Minister of Public Safety approval. The Minister recommends to the Governor in Council that the entity be listed. The Governor in Council’s decision is supported by a discussion at Cabinet that includes considerations related to the domestic and international implications of a listing. Lastly, if satisfied that the legal threshold has been met, the Governor in Council may list the entity, and once approved, the listing will be published in the Canada Gazette. Figure 10.1. Procedure for [De-]Listing Entities Pursuant to the Criminal Code Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Department of Finance, Canada 766. Meanwhile, Canada implements UNSCR 1267 through the United Nations Act Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Taliban, ISIL and Al- Qaida (UNAQITR). Section 2 of the UNAQITR imposes financial prohibitions on any person (individual or entity) in Canada or a Canadian outside Canada related to listed persons or a person acting on behalf/direction of them or an entity held, controlled directly or indirectly by that person. 767. Currently, there are 252 individuals and 89 entities on the 1267 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida Sanctions list and 135 individuals and 5 entities on the 1988 Taliban Sanctions List, both of which are fully in force in Canada. Since the inception of the lists, Canada has co-designated 11 individuals and entities to the UN 1267 sanctions list and co-sponsored an additional 7 designations put forward by another Member State. 768. GAC disseminates changes to UN lists within 24 hours and provides direct links and alerts, helping ensure that reporting entities can implement freezing obligations without delay. A subscription-based sanctions update alert service (with 1 838 subscribers at the time of writing), FAQs, and scenario-based guidance further support implementation. Domestic listings under the Criminal Code, administered by PS, complement the UN regime, with 86 entities currently listed. In addition to GAC alerts, Canada uses FINTRAC’s digital communications channels and its mailing list, comprising of reporting entities, associations, and media representatives to provide updates regarding the list to stakeholders. 769. General information on listing and delisting procedures is also available on GAC’s sanctions website, as well as guidance on how to apply to the UN for delisting and required information. Pursuant to UNAQITR, an individual or entity claiming not to be a listed person may apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for a certificate of mistaken identity. If it is established that the applicant is not the listed person, the Minister will issue a certificate. If it is not so established, the applicant will receive notice of the determination. This mechanism has not yet been tested as to date Canada has not received a request for a certificate of mistaken identity under UNAQITR. 770. Canada's TF-TFS regime requires reporting entities to quickly identify and immediately freeze funds and economic resources linked to listed persons, thus depriving them of the means to finance terrorism. Reporting entities are prohibited from allowing listed entities to access property and from dealing with or otherwise disposing of the property. 771. Despite the strength of the legal framework, implementation risks persist. Screening practices vary across sectors, and some DNFBPs rely on less user-friendly tools or third-party foreign sites. This increases the likelihood that new designations may not be identified immediately, creating pockets of residual delay risk that authorities should address through further outreach and supervision. Box 10.1. 1267 Delisting – November 2025 On 6 November 2025, the UN Security Council decided to remove two individuals from its Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list (1267). Upon the update, the delisting immediately came into effect in Canada as per the UNAQITR. Canada incorporates UNSC sanctions list changes involving individuals and entities by reference in the United Nations Act (UNA). This means that no action was required by Canada to implement the decision by the UNSC to delist these two individuals. On November 7, GAC communicated the listing via an alert from the sanctions mailbox. To support timely awareness of sanctions related information, FINTRAC references GAC sanctions webpages in its compliance guidance and directs reporting entities to consult these sources regularly. Reporting entities can also subscribe to GAC’s email alerts to ensure they receive immediate updates on new or amended listings, helping reinforce strong compliance processes. Source: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 478. FINTRAC is to a very large extent supporting the operational needs of competent authorities through the provision of operational and strategic intelligence products. 479. FINTRAC’s operational team is made up of two money laundering units and one terrorist financing unit (totalling three managers, ten team leaders and 54 analysts). The strategic intelligence team is made up of 13 staff who focus on ML, TF, national security, data science, beneficial ownership and sanctions. Operational intelligence products are disseminated through the VIR mechanism and through proactive STR dissemination. Strategic intelligence products are disseminated through encrypted emails and secure channels. Some products, such as operational alerts, special bulletins, indicators papers and trend analysis are for public consumption. This helps inform REs which subsequently improves the quality of reporting FINTRAC receives. 480. Operational intelligence products are developed proactively or reactively, prioritising information captured in FINTRAC’s database, VIR mechanism, open-source reporting and/or third-party intelligence reports. Information is first prioritised by critical urgency (threat to life or national security) and immediately triaged, then analysed and disseminated to the relevant competent authority. The prioritisation reflects operational priorities, informed by the NRA and the broader Government of Canada intelligence priorities. Prioritisation is managed by the Intel Intake Team. Once information is prioritised it is assigned to an intelligence analyst to research and analyse for product development (where reporting thresholds are met). The product is reviewed and approved through line management (team leader, manager and deputy director) before being disseminated to competent authorities by the dissemination team (4 staff). 481. For STRs, once a report is ingested, it is then filtered by FINTRAC’s system using keywords and tagged priorities (such as indicators and PPPs). The system automatically sends a daily report with the priority STRs to the Team Leader or PPP lead for their respective team’s actioning. All other STRs are reviewed by an STR review analyst, who is a member of the intake team, in line with FINTRAC prioritisation method and resources. During the period under review, approximately 13% of total STRs received were included in a proactive or a reactive disclosure to LEAs and competent authorities. 482. Strategic intelligence is developed by the strategic intelligence, research and analytics (SIRA) unit. This unit has developed a total of 91 strategic intelligence products during the period under review (2020-2025) covering high and medium threats (including professional ML, ML and organised crime, human trafficking) (see Table 6.3). Strategic financial intelligence products include financial intelligence reports and perspectives, 'placemats', and background and predicate assessments (covering TF, ML transactional behaviour, online gambling, human trafficking, proceeds of narcotics and virtual currency activity). Research Reports and environmental scans provide descriptive analysis (including trend analysis) and updates on specific thematics associated illicit financial activity (e.g. COVID-19 and trend analysis of ML and TF). Public facing reports include operational alerts (e.g. Tax evasion in Real Estate and ML and illicit synthetic opioids), sectoral and geographical advisories, operational briefs and special bulletins (financial activity and suspected sanctions evasion). The focus of these products is in line with Canada’s risk profile and they remain dynamic to meet consumer needs and inform national intelligence priorities. 483. FINTRAC's strategic intelligence products are a significant input to Canada's understanding of ML/TF risks and have demonstrable influence on national strategies and policies. They can be attributable to an increase on private sector understanding of risk and risk mitigation practises. A Special Bulletin (2024) on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion, focused on the risks of ML through legal professionals' pooled trust accounts. It has contributed to the awareness and understanding of ML, TF and sanctions evasion risks among law societies and legal professionals. Table 6.3. FINTRAC strategic intelligence products, 2020-2025 Products 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 TOTAL Strategic Financial Intelligence Products* 6 8 11 18 18 61 Research Reports and Environmental Scans** 5 - 7 1 1 14 Public Facing Reports*** 2 3 4 3 4 16 TOTAL 13 11 22 22 23 91 Source: Canada 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 484. During the period under review, FINTRAC has disseminated 10 127 financial intelligence disclosures to domestic LEA and competent authorities (see Table 6.4). Of those disclosures, 70% were reactive and 30% were proactive. In addition to these domestic disclosures, FINTRAC has also disseminated intelligence disclosures and STRs to foreign counterparts (see Table 6.5 for FINTRAC disclosures as a whole [51] ). FINTRAC can also make disclosure packages which include multiple reports and can be disseminated to more than one competent authority [52] (noting information sensitivities and need-to-know principle). [53] The majority of disclosures are sent to the RCMP and to provincial and municipal LEAs (approximately 74%), followed by CBSA (approximately 11%) and then CRA and CSIS (approximate combined total 9%). These agencies are the key agencies for financial intelligence and disclosures are aligned with their respective authorities on ML/TF and predicate offences. FINTRAC disseminates financial intelligence in support of ongoing investigations. Table 6.4. FINTRAC Disclosures disseminated to domestic partners, 2020-2025] Disclosure fiscal year Proactive Reactive Total 2020-2021 551 1 323 1 874 2021-2022 817 1 255 2 072 2022-2023 519 1 382 1 901 2023-2024 307 1 325 1 632 2024-2025 878 1 770 2 648 Total 3 072 7 055 10 127 Source: Canada Table 6.5. FINTRAC disclosures including STRs to foreign FIU counterparts, 2020-2025 Fiscal Period Disclosures STRs/STRAs Disclosed 2020-2021 2 046 49 678 2021-2022 2 292 70 838 2022-2023 2 085 86 092 2023-2024 1 783 84 299 2024-2025 2 730 111 149 Total 10 936 402 056 Source: Canada 485. The STR disclosures made by FINTRAC are mostly consistent with Canada’s risk profile, with approximately 60% associated with high-threat predicate offences. FINTRAC has disseminated 15 065 STRs related to counterfeiting and piracy during 2024-2025, which are categorised as low-threat predicate offences. Similarly, STR disseminations on robbery and theft (28 241, approximately 21%) exceed comparative disseminations, which are not commensurate with the threat levels identified in the NRA. The average timeframe for FINTRAC to disseminate an urgent STR is approximately 12 days and 34 days for non-urgent STRs. To meet time sensitive urgent needs of competent authorities, FINTRAC has the flexibility to disclose just the STR within hours, with additional analysis and financial intelligence followed up in subsequent STR disclosures. 486. FINTRAC disclosures are broadly in line with Canada’s risk profile, with a majority being associated with predicate offences of drug trafficking and fraud (see Table 6.6). This also aligns with the main recipient of FINTRAC disclosures, RCMP, who have responsibility for investigating these crime types. Table 6.6. FINTRAC disclosures by offence type 2020-2025 Fiscal Year Disclosure count Related Offences Predicate Offences 2020-2021 2 046 ML: 1 812 TF: 146 ML, TF, *Other: 88 Fraud: 35% Drugs: 34% Tax Evasion: 9% Customs and Excise: 8% Immigration and Refugee Prot Act: 5% 2021-2022 2 292 ML: 1 937 TF: 191 ML, TF, *Other: 164 Drugs: 33% Fraud: 23% HS/HT: 15% Tax Evasion: 10% Customs and Excise: 8% 2022-2023 2 085 ML: 1 797 TF: 111 ML, TF, *Other: 177 Drugs: 31% Fraud: 25% Crimes Against Persons: 13% HS/HT: 12% Tax Evasion: 11% 2023-2024 1 783 ML: 1 571 TF: 90 ML, TF, *Other: 122 Drugs: 23% Fraud: 20% Tax Evasion: 10% Customs/Excise: 7% Crimes Against Persons (also including HT): 7% Immigration and Refugee Protection Act offences (also including HT and HS): 7% 2024-2025 2 730 ML: 2 317 TF: 166 ML, TF, *Other: 247 Drugs: 20% Fraud: 25% Crimes Against Persons: 16% Immigration and Refugee Protection Act offences: 6% Customs and Excise: 11% Tax Evasion: 12% Source: Canada Note: “Other” refers to threat to the security of Canada. 487. During the period under review, FINTRAC has disseminated 704 TF disclosures. FINTRAC can prioritise TF related matters as urgent, disseminating TF financial intelligence within 5-24 hours (See IO.9, Box 9.4). They can also expedite a disclosure when and if new information becomes available that increases the priority. Proactive TF disclosures are informed by assessing STRs, open-source intelligence and publicly available information. TF disclosures are timely and meet the operational needs of competent authorities. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 488. As previously mentioned, key agencies in receipt of FINTRAC financial intelligence are primarily the RCMP, followed by other law enforcement authorities, CBSA, CRA and CSIS, which is reflective of their VIRs sent to FINTRAC (see core issue 6.1). A total of 12 039 VIRs were sent to FINTRAC from LEAs and competent authorities. FINTRAC’s proactive and reactive disclosures contributed to 1 469 major investigations (see Box 6.2). Financial intelligence is used across a spectrum of investigations relating to ML and predicate offences including drug trafficking, fraud, tax crimes and TBML. Box 6.2. Ontario Provincial Police – Major Fraud Investigation In 2018, the Ontario Provincial Police – Serious Fraud Office (OPP‑SFO) received information from nine Canadian police agencies regarding an elaborate Ponzi scheme involving point‑of‑sale debit terminals. The suspect had operated the scheme between 2012 and 2017 before fleeing the country with significant assets. Subsequently, a multi‑agency effort was established involving FINTRAC, CBSA, the Forensic Accounting Management Group, CRA, RCMP, foreign law enforcement partners, and Interpol. FINTRAC provided reactive financial intelligence disclosures that supported OPP‑SFO’s operational needs by identifying financial accounts, transaction patterns, and movements of funds connected to the suspect. Leveraging FINTRAC’s financial intelligence, LEAs identified bank accounts held by the suspect at all six major Canadian banks and corroborated witness statements describing wire transfers to a foreign jurisdiction. Additional investigative steps included the use of cloud‑based survey tools to efficiently contact victims and gather structured witness information. LEAs were able to trace and seize approximately USD 4 million in illicit assets located abroad. In September 2020, the suspect located abroad was arrested, and deported to Canada. He was charged and convicted of fraud over CAD 5 000 and ML. He received a seven‑year custodial sentence, along with a Restitution Order, enabling seized Canadian assets to be distributed to victims. The suspect’s wife and business partner were also arrested and convicted in a foreign jurisdiction and forfeited approximately USD 4 million. 489. To ensure FINTRAC financial intelligence is supporting the needs of competent authorities, FINTRAC can tailor their products for ease of use and understanding. At a minimum, the disclosure presents a high-level overview of the flow of suspicious funds, linkages between entities, and any relevant ML, TF or sanctions evasions indicators. FINTRAC does also informally meet with LEAs and competent authorities as a follow up to ensure a clear understanding of the designated information and to discuss opportunities to improve disclosures. This is intended to improve usability of FINTRAC disclosures and increase uptake by LEAs and competent authorities. Financial intelligence disclosures are of high quality. 490. FINTRAC has received feedback on 1 118 disclosures from LEAs and competent authorities (out of a total of 10 127 disclosures). Proactive disclosures contributed to 89.8% of investigations, which attributes FINTRAC’s ongoing analysis of reporting to be complimentary to reactive disclosures. Approximately 64.6% of proactive disclosures identified additional entities of interest or previously unknown entities. Proactive disclosures are informative to investigations. Reactive disclosures, requested through the VIR mechanism, contributed to approximately 98.4% of investigations. 491. Overall, 10% of proactive and reactive disclosures, triggered a new investigation. Disclosures have predominantly been used in ongoing investigations resulting in new information on known and unknown subjects, and corroborating information. Disclosures support LEA and competent authorities in evidence development and initial tracing; however, feedback indicates less utility of disclosures in generating new investigations. 492. A high percentage (approximately 81.9%) of reactive disclosures in response to VIRs corroborated information already known to the requesting LEA. FINTRAC’s full capability (providing financial intelligence expertise and high value financial analysis on suspicious activity) is not being sought to the full extent through the VIR mechanism. Competent authorities could benefit from having direct or self-service access to a financial intelligence disclosure repository that allows for fact checking in support of their investigations. This approach could reduce the number of incoming VIRs by eliminating simple database queries, and free up FINTRAC resources to focus on higher value-added analysis. This is in comparison to reactive disclosures that could be addressed by competent authorities themselves through streamlined access to financial intelligence reporting repository. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 493. Outside of FINTRAC disclosures, LEAs have access to other data sources to produce financial intelligence in support of their investigations, as noted above (particularly through alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques and production orders). The RCMP develops its own financial intelligence to a large extent on ML, TF and predicate offences. It does this through its specialised units and teams (such as the serious organised crime (SOC) units and integrated money laundering investigative teams (IMLIT) leveraging off of expertise from other departments and agencies, production orders and search warrants, and police intelligence. 494. CBSA and CRA also develop their own financial intelligence to a large extent. CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre produces intelligence to identify cross-border movements of trade based illicit financial flows (ML/TF and sanctions) such as TBML activity. It has expanded its capability to document trade fraud threats and make appropriate recommendations regarding the need for enforcement by the CBSA, the RCMP or other regulatory bodies. During the period under review, CBSA has produced 27 strategic intelligence products and 71 strategic intelligence assessments on trade based financial crime (see IO7 for further details). CBSA triangulates STR and financial transaction reporting (received from FINTRAC) with its own data. It can further use intelligence from CRA information to validate suspicious activity. 495. CRA-CIP is responsible for developing financial intelligence related to tax crimes, with the criminal intelligence section responsible for analytical assessments on new leads. It collects and analyses external and internal data to identify new workloads and enhance existing leads and referrals by identifying patterns and schemes of criminal activity. They also support investigations in regional offices by analysing and providing a mix of CRA data and intelligence that adds value to cases at both the workload and investigation stages. During the period under review, the criminal intelligence section has produced 19 strategic intelligence reports and over 2,100 tactical intelligence assessments. 496. CSIS can use its own intelligence holdings to develop financial intelligence and does so to a large extent. CSIS’ financial intelligence is fused with further financial information, predominantly from FINTRAC, to enhance their intelligence reporting. A CSIS intelligence report on TF was developed using information from FINTRAC to further develop the intelligence picture of virtual currency use in a counter terrorism investigation. Footnotes [51] Of the total disclosures, 1 320 were disseminated to foreign FIUs [52] Disclosure recipients of FINTRAC financial intelligence are RCMP, municipal and provincial police services, CSIS, CRA, CBSA, Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence, provincial securities regulators, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Revenue Québec, the Competition Bureau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), and provincial and territorial civil asset forfeiture offices. [53] Disclosure packages significantly increase the total number of FINTRAC disclosures to 28 242 as more than one competent authority can receive the same disclosure. The total number of unique disclosure packages disseminated to domestic counterparts is 10 127." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="780. Canada’s non-profit organisation (NPO) population is broad and diverse and includes tax-exempt non-profits and registered charities (the two entity types for tax purposes that make up the NPO sector in Canada). However, only a subset meets the FATF definition of an NPO - the majority of registered charities, but only some tax-exempt non -profits (see Figure 10.2). The highest TF exposure lies among registered charities that raise and disburse funds, particularly those operating internationally. Canada therefore focuses its oversight on this subset, which represents the greatest vulnerability to TF abuse. 781. TF risks in the NPO sector are assessed by the CRA-RAD, which oversees the sector and has a strong understanding of TF exposure, consequently applying risk-based measures to the subset of the sector most at risk. This understanding underpins the targeted and proportionate nature of CRA-RAD’s interventions across the sector. Figure 10.2. Canada’s NPO Population Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 782. The 2024 NPO profile assessed the residual vulnerability of NPOs in Canada as low. Canada’s NRA has classed the non-profit sector as having a medium level of inherent vulnerability to TF abuse. The most vulnerable NPOs are those operating in high-risk jurisdictions, particularly where activities may support the operational needs of threat actors and are therefore susceptible to diversion or misuse. Domestically, organisations linked to at-risk diaspora communities connected to conflict zones are also considered relatively more vulnerable. Canada’s assessment of inherent and residual TF risk directly informs the level and type of oversight applied, with more intensive monitoring focused on organisations operating in or near high-risk jurisdictions, and proportionate measures applied to the wider sector. 783. CRA-RAD operates a dedicated TF team (25 staff). In 2019-2025, CRA-RAD reviewed 9 515 applications to become a registered charity. It identified TF vulnerabilities in 74 cases, which were mostly resolved during the registration process through mitigating measures. In most cases, concerns were mitigated through requests for additional information, changes to governance arrangements, or clarification of the nature of the activities to be undertaken, with only one application refused. The very small proportion of applications presenting TF indicators (less than 1 percent) suggests that systemic TF vulnerabilities at entry appear limited, although this also highlights the importance of ongoing monitoring once charities become operational. 784. Registered charities must complete an annual information filing (FormT3010) and must adhere to spending requirements whilst conducting their activities and using their resources as specified by law. If requirements of registration aren’t met the registered charity can be subject to a CRA audit. If non-compliance is identified, then there is a range of regulatory interventions available, and registration can be revoked. No revocations have resulted from TF-related audits in the last five years, and authorities report that compliance issues identified were addressed through remedial actions. This preference for corrective measures over punitive sanctions is generally proportionate, although it limits the evidence available to demonstrate deterrence in practice. 785. CRA-RAD applies a risk-based monitoring model, using leads from FINTRAC, intelligence partners, public complaints and open sources to identify charities that may warrant closer scrutiny. Interventions range from education and letters of concern through to audits and referrals to law enforcement where appropriate, although CRA-RAD has not made referrals to law enforcement during the review period. However, the nine completed audits during that same period have resulted in nine compliance agreements, demonstrating its ability to work with the organizations to mitigate outstanding vulnerabilities, in line with its risk-based approach to monitoring and compliance. Five follow-ups on previous compliance agreements were also conducted during the review period which yielded positive results with 80% having effectively implemented the previously agreed upon corrective measures and requiring no further interventions. Only one compliance agreement follow-up noted minor areas for improvement and as such resulted in an administrative measure proportionate to the outstanding vulnerabilities, i.e. an education letter from CRA-RAD to encourage continued compliance. 786. Canada conducts other risk-based measures to organisations operating in or near high-risk jurisdictions. For example, GAC provides international assistance in the form of grants and contributions to trusted partners which include charities and tax-exempt non-profits so they can provide lifesaving assistance. GAC conducts due diligence on recipients, including review of anti-terrorism policies, internal controls and governance processes, to ensure funds are used for intended purposes. All projects are publicly listed on GAC’s website, supporting transparency. Box 10.2. Targeted Facilitation of Specific Activities in Geographic Areas Controlled by Terrorist Groups In June 2023, Canada amended the Criminal Code to establish a statutory carve-out from criminal liability under the TF offences in section 83.03 for the delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance activities and created an Authorisation Regime to facilitate the delivery of needed, specific activities (e.g. health services, education services, programs to promote or protect human rights) in geographic regions controlled by a terrorist group, via authorizations granted by the Minister of Public Safety. The Authorization Regime helps ensure the provision of needed international assistance, whilst maintaining the anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code. The Regime was publicly launched in June 2024, and eligible individuals or organisations can apply for an authorisation. If granted, an authorization shields the holder – as well as any persons involved in carrying out the activity - from the criminal liability of incidental terrorist financing (per sub section 83.03(2) of the Criminal Code), for the activities set out in the authorisation, subject to terms and conditions. The Minister of Public Safety is ultimately responsible for granting or refusing authorisations after a comprehensive review process which assesses each application on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility based on statutory requirements. The review process also includes a mandatory security review which weighs the risk of TF against the benefits of the activity. As of November 2025, eight authorisations have been granted, in addition to one renewal. The Authorisation Regime is an optional process that introduces important safeguards and enables NPO’s to carry out certain international assistance operations in high-risk environments, where required. Given this, applicants are required to provide a range of personal and organizational information necessary to facilitate a comprehensive review. While this could be a lengthy and resource intensive process, guidance and outreach efforts have been made to ensure application requirements are clear and the application process itself is streamlined to avoid unnecessary burdens. Government authorities recognise the need to monitor implementation to ensure the Regime continues to balance the facilitation of international assistance activities and maintain sufficient safeguards against the risk of terrorist financing. This mechanism exceeds the requirements of the current FATF Recommendations and is included as it represents an emerging good practise for countries seeking to enable humanitarian and international assistance operations. 787. REs that have links to the NPO sector such as banks, accountants and MSBs may submit an STR in relation to activity of an NPO to FINTRAC. FINTRAC under PCMLTFA shall disclose to CRA-RAD any information in relation to the Income Tax Act for those registered as charities, that have applied to register or may apply to register. This gives CRA-RAD a comprehensive picture of NPO risks and vulnerabilities. In the last five years, FINTRAC has produced 29 disclosures to CRA-RAD. These structured information flows contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of TF exposure within the charitable sector. FINTRAC can also disclose to the RCMP and/or CSIS for investigation or disruption. The 29 disclosures are dealt with as intelligence leads by CRA-RAD. Statistics on intelligence leads received by CRA – RAD are mentioned as a whole and not where they originate from. Canada however can confirm that 10% of disclosures referred proactively by FINTRAC and closed over the April 2021 – December 2025 period led to further assessment by CRA, informing a monitoring risk assessment. 788. A decision to not pursue a FINTRAC proactive lead for further assessment through the monitoring process does not mean the information had no value. Rather, in some cases, these disclosures have complemented existing CRA information and helped inform or advance actions already underway. Of the disclosures that were not pursued, reasons include: · No current intersect with entities in the charitable sector (in which case information on those leads is still kept within the CRA system in case there is a future intersection between that organization and a registered charity, or in case those entities apply for registered charity status in the future, meaning the disclosure could still have value in informing future decisions on risk); or · They did not relate to CRA-RAD's focussed mandate on preventing terrorism abuse. 789. FINTRAC proactive disclosures related to NPOs are often sent to CRA along with other recipients, such as law enforcement, who may be better positioned to consider that information given their mandate. 790. In addition to the above targeted measures, Canada also has general administrative oversight over all NPOs. For example, corporations or legal persons account for approximately 97% of organizations in Canada’s non-profit sector so the majority of NPOs are subject to federal or provincial oversight relating to incorporation, with certain jurisdictions providing additional oversight on fundraising or charitable gaming. The government of Canada has also undertaken a variety of engagement and outreach activities with the NPO sector, consistent with risks identified, such as the NPO Sector Dialogue Forum on Illicit Financing Risks and Related Issues to develop NPO sector risk awareness and help identify best practices among those most at-risk. 791. Overall, Canada’s measures are well aligned to the subset of NPOs that present meaningful TF exposure, and interventions are generally proportionate to risk, although outcome data remains limited in some areas. Larger organisations demonstrate stronger governance and awareness of TF risk, while smaller organisations face resource constraints and uneven understanding of obligations, creating pockets of residual vulnerability. Continued outreach and tailored guidance would help strengthen resilience across the wider NPO population." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 709. CBSA identifies and seizes non-declared and falsely declared currency to a large extent. During the period under review, CBSA seized CAD 149 646 217 (approx. EUR 92.2 million). Identification 710. CBSA officers are highly trained in examination techniques and are well resourced with advanced detection tools and technologies deployed across international airports, land border points and seaports to support the administration of Canada’s Cross-Border Currency Program Reporting (CBCR). These include specific training on the identification of proceeds of crime and examination skills to detect smuggled currency, as well as the use of imaging technology (see Table 8.13). RCMP’s JETWAY course (a training course undertaken by RCMP, CBSA and other LEAs specifically aimed at enhancing the detection of criminal activities in the airport environment) includes a focus on the identification and detection of proceeds of crime including currency. Table 8.13. CBSA participants in relevant training and qualifications Training Participants 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 TOTAL Proceeds of Crime N/A 354 283 398 457 184 1 676 Examination Skills 3 374 1 168 931 1 219 1 561 549 8 802 Roving 148 14 28 109 129 87 515 Essential Awareness of Lookouts 25 281 362 397 471 192 1 728 Officer Authorities 96 51 81 71 54 18 371 Imaging Equipment 404 405 683 1 233 1 705 310 4 740 Source: Canada 711. All travellers and traders entering or exiting Canada are required to declare whether they have currency and/or monetary instruments valued at CAD 10 000 or more. CBSA takes an intelligence-led approach to the identification of non and falsely declared currency. It leverages intelligence generated by the BFCC, and shared by other competent authorities (RCMP, FINTRAC, CSIS) and international partners (including through the World Customs Organisation and the Border 5). This intelligence is used to conduct targeted inspections of travellers and traders to identify non and falsely declared currency and currency associated with proceeds of crime or other illicit financial flows. Seizure 712. Section 18 of the PCMLTFA empowers CBSA officers to seize as forfeit any under- or non-reported currency or monetary instruments. When officers determine that there are no grounds to suspect proceeds of crime or terrorist financing, the officer may return the seized property upon payment of an administrative penalty (see section 8.7.3). 713. During the period under review, CBSA conducted 8 259 seizures of under- and non-reported currency or monetary instruments at the border (see Table 8.14). The total amount of funds seized was over CAD 149 million (see Table 8.15). 714. The PCMLTFA establishes four ‘levels’ of seizure by which seizures are categorised and further action taken, prioritising more serious or habitual violators and potential proceeds, over those who make declaration errors: · Level One: person made a full disclosure of facts upon discovery of the funds and the funds were not concealed. · Level Two: person concealed the funds other than by using a false compartment in a conveyance or made a false declaration or has a previous level one seizure. · Level Three: person concealed the funds in a false compartment in a conveyance or has a previous seizure for any form of concealment or making false declarations. · Level Four: officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the currency or monetary instruments are proceeds of crime, or funds for use in TF activities. Table 8.14. CBSA seizures – cross-border movements of currency and other monetary instruments by level Fiscal Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total 2019-20 1 509 193 4 115 1 821 2020-21 495 59 - 65 613 2021-22 664 91 - 63 818 2022-23 903 104 1 76 1 084 2023-24 1 507 94 2 103 1 760 2024-25 1 885 132 2 144 2 163 Total 6 963 673 9 566 8 259 Source: Canada Table 8.15. Amount of funds seized by the CBSA 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total currency seized (CAD) 30 590 591 13 272 692 14 559 185 18 590 662 29 859 200 42 773 886 149 646 217 Source: Canada 715. The total amount of currency seized at the border has decreased compared to Canada’s previous evaluation which is attributable to COVID-19 travel restrictions, a declining use in cash by travellers, and the uptake of other typologies to move value across borders by criminals (to avoid cross-border currency controls). As a proportion of falsely and non-reported currency seized, the amounts confiscated (see 8.7.2), and the penalties imposed (see 8.7.3), have increased. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 716. CBSA confiscates currency and monetary instruments suspected of being proceeds of crime or for use in TF, to a large extent. 717. Where non or falsely reported currency or monetary instruments are seized and the officer has reasonable grounds for suspicion, the funds are seized as forfeit with no terms of release (a ‘level four’ violation) (see Table 8.16). It is sufficient for the CBSA officer to articulate their reasonable suspicion with reference to suspicious indicators of the currency (such as point of origin and transit location). Table 8.16. Amount of funds seized as forfeit 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total currency seized (CAD) 2 595 664 3 098 119 2 249 484 1 496 582 3 626 096 6 083 935 19 149 879 Source: Canada 718. There is no requirement for the CBSA officer to obtain a court order to implement the seizure as forfeit. Where a currency or monetary instruments are seized as forfeit, the person from whom the currency or monetary instruments were seized may seek merits review by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, through a delegated impartial CBSA official to decide on the appropriateness of the enforcement action. The funds are then returned if no contravention can be proved. Judicial review is also available where merits review is unsuccessful. During the period under review, approximately CAD 4.5 million in funds were returned following successful appeal of the administrative seizure (see Box 8.7). Box 8.7. Case study – seizure as forfeit On 2 May 2023, an individual arrived at the CBSA Rainbow Bridge Port of Entry in Niagara Falls, Ontario, and was referred for a secondary examination. During the vehicle inspection, CBSA officers discovered 181 kg of suspected cannabis (valued at approximately CAD 1.34 million) and USD 602 985 (CAD 816 803.48) in undeclared currency concealed within the vehicle. CBSA officers seized the 181 kg of cannabis as forfeit under the Customs Act and seized the undeclared currency under the PCMLTFA. The RCMP was notified and initiated a criminal investigation. The offender was subsequently charged with possession and importation of cannabis under the Cannabis Act and with possession of proceeds of crime over CAD 5 000 under the CC. In September 2023, the offender pled guilty to possessing cannabis for the purpose of distribution and possession of proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to 58 days’ imprisonment, and USD 562 210, along with related property, was forfeited. 8.7.3. Sanctions 719. CBSA imposes administrative penalties for false and non-reports in all cases of funds seized at levels 1-3. Currency suspected to be proceeds of crime is always seized as forfeit with no penalty offered for release. Criminal penalties under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA are not sought in practice in relation to anything except level 4 violations. While this is largely in line with Canada’s risks, a lack of criminal penalties even for repeated level 3 seizures may impact the dissuasiveness of the overall cross-border currency declaration framework. 720. Currency and monetary instruments seized at levels 1-3 is returned upon payment of an administrative penalty, a set percentage of the amount of currency based on the level of violation (with each level requiring an increased level of culpability). Failure to pay the prescribed penalty ensures that seized amounts remain forfeited. Canada has increased the administrative penalties available under the PCMLTFA for violations across levels 1-3, as shown in the Table 8.17. These are more proportionally and dissuasively aligned; however, have only been in effect since September 2023. While promising, additional time is needed to assess the effectiveness of these new penalties. Table 8.17. Administrative penalties by level of violation Level Threshold Amended Penalty Structure (since September 26, 2023) Previous Penalty Structure Level 1 Offender who makes a full disclosure of facts upon discovery of the funds, and the funds were not concealed 5% of the undeclared funds, up to a maximum penalty of CAD 2 500 CAD 250 Level 2 Offender who concealed the funds other than by using a false compartment in a conveyance, or made a false declaration, or has a previous seizure (other than for reasons of concealment or making false declarations) 25% of the undeclared funds CAD 2 500 Level 3 Offender who concealed the funds in a false compartment in a conveyance, or has a previous seizure for any form of concealment or making false declarations 50% of the undeclared funds CAD 5 000 Source: Canada 721. Although many seizures in 2024/25 occurred at the level 1 threshold, Canada has made a notable increase in the amount of penalties it collected in the same period (see Table 8.18). Table 8.18. Total administrative penalties collected 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total penalties collected (CAD) 884 550 266 750 406 750 500 750 1 075 158 2 249 031 5 382 988 Source: Canada 722. While violations under levels 2 and particularly 3 could indicate potential illicit activities, the CBSA does not refer currency seized under levels 2 and 3 to the RCMP for investigation. This is largely proportionate given these seizures are not suspected of being proceeds of crime. However, in the case of repeated level 3 violations - which involve extensive conduct to conceal currency or repeat false declarations - the lack of criminal enforcement either, including under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA, is surprising and in serious cases may not be proportionate and dissuasive. 723. CBSA reports that following a level 4 seizure, it generally refers the case to the RCMP to conduct a criminal investigation. This can include on criminal charges under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA or for ML. Between 1 January 2023 and 31 December 2024, CBSA referred approximately 60 level 4 seizure files (totalling over CAD 2 million) to RCMP for investigation, leading to eight PCMLTFA charges and an unspecified number of ongoing investigations. In roughly the same period, CBSA made approximately 247 level 4 seizures totalling approximately CAD 9.6 million. The referral of roughly 24% of level 4 seizures to RCMP is low for the seizure classification, and authorities are missing the opportunity to initiate investigations despite the existence of sufficient red flags to justify seizure as forfeiture on the basis of suspected proceeds of crime. Very few referrals for criminal investigation were made in relation to level 3 seizures, which display clear intent to conceal. 724. As such, the sanctions imposed in practice are not always proportionate to conduct, moderately impacting the framework’s dissuasiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="818. In 2017, FINTRAC issued an operational bulletin linked to the DPRK and, since then, has published products in 2022-2025 on sanctions evasion risks, vulnerabilities, and indicators linked to the financial sector and legal profession. In October 2025, Department of Finance, with the support of an interdepartmental committee, finalized the first NRA on Sanctions Evasion (SE), which includes assessment of the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF-TFS. While there is no legislated requirement for Canada to realize an NRA that includes PF, PCMLTFA allows FINTRAC to conduct strategic and tactical intelligence analysis to contribute to an understanding of sanctions evasion risk (including PF). FINTRAC, together with the Department of Finance, are the functional leads of the analysis to identify, understand, assess and mitigate risks, limited to the financial sector. When producing the NRA on SE, Canada consulted all sectors through its public-private consultation mechanisms, with some of the most exposed sectors, such as large FIs and MSBs, consulted more in depth. Over the recent years, consultations with additional categories of FIs and DNFBPs occurred on other drafts and publications, such as FINTRAC’s bulletins. The private sector (other than Canada’s largest FIs and MSBs involved in its development) has not yet received the risk assessment, and Canada would benefit from publicising a sanitised version of the report for broader consumption. 819. In Canada’s NRA on sanctions evasion, Iran represents a significantly greater source of risk relative to the DPRK (because linkages with DPRK are reported to be non-existent) based on the presence of diaspora communities, the scope of the trade and financial relationships, and the identification of immobilized property. However, with the mandatory reporting obligation Canada was able to assess that transactions directly, or indirectly, involving Iran constitute less than one percent of cross border traffic. Canada provided an extract of the 2025 Overview of Proliferation Financing and Other Sanctions Evasion Risks in Canada report, which focuses on DPRK and Iran risks. Both DPRK and Iran are countries assessed as sophisticated actors with ability to employ complex methods and networks through intermediary jurisdictions to evade sanctions, making Canada vulnerable. As a result, the ability of DPRK and Iran to evade sanctions was assessed as high. However, due to several mitigating factors, such as Canada’s very limited financial connections with these two countries, and the lack of trade in sensitive goods to jurisdictions adjacent to DPRK and Iran, and the absence of a DPRK diaspora community in Canada, the overall risk of DPRK is rated as low while the overall risk of Iran is rated as medium. 820. Canada’s risk identification process includes the review of both classified and open-source information prepared by domestic partners. The identification of risk is also informed by stakeholder engagement and collaboration with international partners. Canada assesses both the role of goods as well as the use of the financial sector to move money. CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) and Counter Proliferation Operations Section (CPOS) have developed PF and other sanction-related tactical and strategic intelligence products where indicators of sanctions-related activity were identified in goods import or export transactions. CBSA developed an intelligence product was on DPRK proliferation networks, highlighting trends and technologies of concern and the forms of tradecraft used by the DPRK to acquire Western-origin goods to build their military technologies and objectives. Between 2020 and 2025, CPOS produced approximately 37 commodity profiles, 22 intelligence briefs, 49 dashboards and 51 alerts. 821. Canada has made significant progress in developing the capability and capacity to detect and deter sanctions-evasion activities occurring through international trade. In order to strengthen Canada’s anti-sanctions capabilities, Canada amended the PCMLTFA in 2024 to enable the CBSA to identify and enforce against the cross-border movements of sanctions-based illicit financial flows concealed through legitimate international trade. Since then, for example, the BFCC has identified, through financial intelligence and trade transaction analysis, the cross-border movement of funds and goods tied to third countries’ proliferation activities in addition to laundering drug proceeds. This capability has led to new insights into how professional money launderers are exploiting international trade in goods to move illicit financial flows. 822. Canada’s risk assessment also considers Iran and DPRK's financial and trade relationships with third countries and highlights the potential for indirect exposure to PF risks and proliferation-related procurement via those countries. Furthermore, Canada recognizes the risk of financial sectors and products such as correspondent banking, money value transfer services, VASPs, but also complex corporate structures and trade through intermediate jurisdictions. Nevertheless, some non-financial sectors and associated risks were not adequately developed in the NRA, such as the risk of exploitation of lawyers, dealers in precious metals and stones, CSPs and real estate; a future iteration of the NRA would benefit from a more thorough analysis of these sectors. 823. To mitigate the identified risks, in 2017 and 2020, Canada issued Ministerial Directives (MDs) against the DPRK and Iran respectively. MDs are enforceable instruments which remove the discretion of a reporting entity to determine the level of risk associated with a particular jurisdiction. These MDs require reporting entities to apply enhanced measures for relationships with DPRK and Iran, and they were both updated in 2025. The measures required are: i) enhanced due diligence, ii) record keeping and iii) reporting obligations. In recent years, especially since 2024, Canada has invested resources and introduced a variety of additional measures to mitigate PF risks, including: clarifying the obligation to report STRs beyond PF to include where there is suspicion of sanction evasion; enhanced FINTRAC’s ability to produce intelligence and make disclosures to authorities on sanction evasion; stronger requirements for financial institutions for due diligence and ongoing monitoring of correspondent banking; BO registers; publication of GAC and FINTRAC guidelines; and financial resources for CBSA to combat trade based financial crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="158. In general, competent authorities seek other forms of international co-operation to varying degrees, with the FIU seeking international co-operation to a limited extent while the other competent authorities to a large extent. 2.3.1. FIU 159. FINTRAC, in its role as an FIU, is empowered to exchange information with 111 FIUs through MOUs. FINTRAC has requested financial intelligence to a limited extent. A total of 740 requests for information were sent by FINTRAC to foreign FIU counterparts between 2019 and 2025. 93% of these were sent following receipt of a Voluntary Information Record (VIR), while the remaining 7% were issued following the receipt of an STR. The FIU plays a central role in supporting other forms of co-operation for ML/TF and predicate offences for the needs of competent authorities, including RCMP, provincial and municipal police services, CBSA, CRA, and CSIS (see IO.6). These requests were mainly on ML related offences including fraud (41.2%), customs and trade-based illicit financial flows (29.1%), tax evasion (21.8%), drug trafficking (13.7%), TF (9.8%), human trafficking (9.7%) and corruption (2.1%) (see table 2.12), in line with Canada’s risk and context. FINTRAC does not prioritise seeking intelligence through informal co-operation on asset recovery. Most requests were addressed to US, UK, Australia, and Mexico, in line with Canada’s risk profile (see Box 2.3). 160. The low volume of requests sent (on average, 123 requests per year) indicates an underuse of international co-operation as a means of obtaining financial intelligence and is not consistent with the cross-border nature of the threats faced by Canada (see Chapter 1), nor with the overall number of STRs received. Although some cases show that information sought from FINTRAC positively contributed to investigations, Canada does not systematically track their outcomes. Box 2.3. International Co-operation with AUSTRAC and New Zealand FIU In 2023, FINTRAC received voluntary information from a LEA regarding an ongoing investigation into an international drug smuggling and professional money-laundering network involving Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. After receiving the information, FINTRAC performed its analysis and determined that the designated information would be relevant to multiple law enforcement agencies, AUSTRAC (Australia’s FIU), and the New Zealand FIU. FINTRAC also sent queries to AUSTRAC and the New Zealand FIU. The FINTRAC disclosure contained designated information from suspicious transaction reports, attempted suspicious transaction reports, large cash transaction reports, electronic fund transfer reports, and casino disbursement reports, totalling approximately CAD 21.3 million. FINTRAC’s disclosure included financial intelligence on subjects identified in the voluntary information, as well as numerous additional individuals and entities previously unknown to law enforcement and the FIUs. The disclosure identified the illicit flow of funds and relationships between individuals and entities through shared bank accounts, addresses, and ownership. Financial activity included third-party wire transfers, bank draft purchases, email money transfers, unlicensed gambling, payment purchases, and cryptocurrency transactions. Co-operation between law enforcement, FINTRAC, and the FIUs, including information that was provided by an FIU in response to FINTRAC’s query, helped to determine the flow of funds and the scope of the transnational criminal network. Source: Canada Table 2.12. FINTRAC as FIU - outgoing request by offence (%) Predicate Offence* 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 TOTAL Fraud 43.4 55.3 42.6 37.1 35.7 33.0 41.2 Customs/TB Illicit Financial Flows 11.2 22.4 37.0 24.2 44.3 35.7 29.1 Tax Evasion 26.6 16.5 31.5 19.4 18.6 18.3 21.8 Drug 13.3 8.2 18.5 14.5 10.0 17.4 13.7 Terrorism Financing 8.5 3.3 30.8 3.8 4.0 8.7 9.8 Human Trafficking 8.4 7.1 11.1 8.1 14.3 9.6 9.7 Corruption 1.4 1.2 0 4.8 4.3 0.9 2.1 N. of requests sent 153 122 78 104 76 207 740 Source: Canada Note: (*) One request may relate to more than one predicate offence 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 161. The RCMP is a party to 47 MOUs with international partners and is part of many law enforcement co-operation agreements with foreign counterparts. The RCMP engaged in 48 major projects tied to ML and international criminal activity, with 14 foreign agencies, including from the US and EU. The RCMP also leverages a network of 46 international Liaison Officers (LOs) posted in 29 countries and to international policing bodies (including Interpol and Europol) to support Canadian ML, TF and predicate investigations in co-operating with foreign counterparts. 162. RCMP sought assistance from international partners in at least 477 ML/TF and related predicate offence files, showing a marked increase compared to the previous MER, where 252 requests were sent (see Table 2.13). This reinforces an increased prioritisation on informal co-operation instead of formal co-operation (see 2.2.1). Additional requests for assistance also occurred but data was not available. Canada notes that several of these cases involved asset identification and tracing elements; however, it is unclear the extent to which this has occurred. No specific data was provided on the results of LEAs requests in terms of prosecutions or other outcomes; however, a number of case studies provided were positive. Requests were addressed to foreign counterparts in line with Canada’s risks. Table 2.13. RCMP - outgoing requests Foreign Agency Criminal Code and PCMLTFA Occurrence Type Total Unique Occurrences Criminal Code Laundering POC PCMLTFA Specific Criminal Code TF Europe, Middle East, Africa 104 9 119 231 Indo Pacific 44 5 7 56 Latin America and Caribbean 102 7 11 120 North America 91 11 14 115 Total Unique Occurrences 299 29 150 477 Note: Since a request may be sent to multiple foreign agencies, it is counted only once in the overall totals (unique occurrences). Source: Canada 163. RCMP participates in international working groups and committees to facilitate international co-operation in asset recovery [26] . The number of requests sent by RCMP to foreign partners on asset recovery, via CARIN and similar bodies, is low (10 in total for the review period). There is a lack of proactive use of the asset recovery fora, particularly considering the limited use of formal international co-operation for asset recovery (see 2.2.3). Case study discussions demonstrate LEAs are using different informal means to try and pursue asset recovery; however, effective results are not realised based on the evidence available for this assessment. 164. Provincial prosecution authorities also participate in CARIN, in relation to non-criminal seizure and confiscation, as such matters fall within the provincial sphere under Canada’s constitutional division of powers. During the period under review, only one request was made in the 2021-2022 fiscal year, on behalf of LEAs in Québec. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 165. In its role as AML/CFT supervisor, FINTRAC has engaged actively in informal co-operation with foreign partners bilaterally (71 engagements in total) and multilaterally through the five-eyes countries’ International Supervisory Forum (ISF); over 20 meetings from 2019-2025). Main counterparts are Australia, the US and New Zealand, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Canada reported that FINTRAC sought information through the ISF with other AML regulators and supervisors on FIs and DNFBPs. 166. Since 2016, FINTRAC signed seven (7) MOUs, bringing the total number to 11 MOUs with supervisory authorities in six (6) countries. This is in addition to the 30 MOUs signed by OSFI targeted on Federally Regulated Financial Institutions (FRFIs). Foreign supervisors can request information to FINTRAC via OSFI, who both leverage their respective MOUs to share information, subject to safeguards of confidentiality, data protection and security. Notably, a MOU between FINTRAC and foreign counterparts is not a prerequisite for supervisory co-operation and information exchange with respect to AML/CFT. 167. These supervisory co-operation arrangements create a mechanism for information exchange that expand FINTRAC’s ability to collaborate with foreign regulatory and supervisory authorities, enhancing FINTRAC’s ability to fulfil its supervisory mandate. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 168. Between 2020 and 2025, the CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) made a total of 83 requests relating to ML/TF to foreign customs, law enforcement and regulatory partners, mostly in the US and the UK. Fifty-three of these requests were made for information to support internal analysis and investigations. An additional eight disclosures were a combination of a standard request for customs information as well as spontaneous disclosures. Information on timeliness to receive a response from a foreign counterpart is not available, as the program is relatively new and information has not been tracked consistently during the period under review. The BFCC further received foreign financial intelligence from foreign FIUs on 15 cases, based on Egmont requests submitted through FINTRAC, corroborating the BFCC’s reasonable grounds to suspect activity indicative of ML, TF or sanctions evasion. 169. CRA-CIP investigates ML cases that arise from tax evasion and other tax crimes. CRA has 94 Tax Treaties and 24 Tax Information Exchange Agreement with its international partners. Canada is also a party to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters , which includes over 150 members. CRA-CIP has conducted 3 simultaneous criminal investigations under the Simultaneous Criminal Investigations Program (SCIP). This joint arrangement, generally between Canada and the US, allows both parties to simultaneously investigate taxpayers residing in either country suspected of tax evasion. 170. CRA-CIP also actively participates and contributes to several and working groups (Trade Based Money Laundering International Working Group, International Visitors’ Program). Through its participation in these networks, CRA-CIP has created a network with other tax administrations on a global scale. These relationships have led to an increase in the sharing of strategic intelligence. In collaboration with J5 partners, hundreds of data exchanges have occurred. 171. The CRA has received information from foreign partners spontaneously and reactively on tax evasion and income tax matters (civil queries) to a good extent. Furthermore, CRA automatically exchanges information through the transmission of bulk data with treaty partners, usually on an annual basis (144 cases in the period under assessment). No data was provided on the timeliness to receive a reply from counterparts, but Canada reports to be pleased with the co-operation received (see Box 2.4). Box 2.4. CRA-CIP investigation The CRA-CIP conducted an investigation that targeted international investors through a scheme designed to solicit funds for investment in shares of various companies. However, no funds were ever returned to the international investors. Instead, the money was misappropriated for personal use. The accused personally appropriated more than one million dollars from his corporations’ bank accounts and failed to report any of it in his individual income tax, thereby evading over CAD 275 000 in federal income tax. The success of this investigation was largely on the basis of international co-operation through the use of treaties and witness interviews. Canada made international treaty requests for banking information in several jurisdictions outside of Canada. Leveraging treaties and fostering cross-border co-operation played a crucial role in empowering CRA-CIP investigators to gather the essential evidence needed to effectively pursue justice, ultimately leading to a conviction, in December 2021, in which the accused was conditionally sentenced to two years less a day in prison and fined over CAD 200 000. Source: Canada Footnotes [26] Such as Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group, INTERPOL Expert Group on AML, Counterfeit and Security Documents Working Group, the Global Focal Point Conference on Asset Recovery, the FATF-INTERPOL Roundtable Engagement on Asset Recovery, and other FATF working groups, Camden Asset Recovery Informal Network (CARIN), in the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for the Caribbean (ARIN-CARIB) and in the UK-backed International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC), (see c.40.23)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="109. Canada’s AML/CFT governance framework co-ordinates federal, provincial and territorial authorities through dedicated co-ordinating committees and thematic working groups. Federal AML/ATF committees up to the Deputy Minister level are co-chaired by Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada. The federal, provincial, and territorial working group on AML/CFT is co-chaired by Finance Canada and a rotating provincial co-chair (the British Columbia Ministry of Finance at the time of the evaluation). These committees have led the development of legislative and regulatory measures for consideration by the Government, to strengthen the investigative, enforcement, and information sharing tools of Canada's AML/CFT Regime. 110. The AML/CFT Regime is supported by a structured governance framework with committees at multiple levels, including the Deputy Minister level AML/CFT Committee, the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Steering Committee, and the Director General Interdepartmental Co-ordinating Committee (DG-ICC), each responsible for oversight, strategic alignment, and co-ordination across policy and operational partners. Working groups, such as the Strategic Intelligence and Risk Assessment Working Group (SIRA-WG), provide analysis on ML/TF risks, emerging threats, and sector vulnerabilities, informing policy and operational decisions. This committee structure is actively co-ordinated by the thematic lead departments (Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada), with participation from the Privy Council Office (PCO), to ensure coherence with broader government objectives. The AML/CFT Regime committees, together with PCO-led national security governance structures, work in a complementary manner to ensure cross-government buy-in to strategies and implementation at the appropriate level and operate flexibly to ensure a timely response to urgent issues when these arise. 111. Effective cross-jurisdictional co-ordination is established for Canada’s national response to ML/TF threats, given its federal structure, and involves collaboration among federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal stakeholders through working groups and bilateral engagement. 112. AML/CFT priorities are regularly advanced through meetings of Finance Ministers, financial regulators, police chiefs, and other co-ordination fora, with dedicated federal-provincial-territorial (FPT) forums supporting policy alignment and operational co-operation. Notable FPT bodies include the Meetings of Ministers and Deputy Ministers Responsible for Justice and Public Safety, the Crime Prevention and Policing Committee, the Working Group on AML/CFT, the Co-ordinating Committee of Senior Officials on Criminal Justice, and the National Co-ordinating Committee on Organized Crime. Sector-specific working groups, such as the Beneficial Ownership Working Group and the Joint Government of Canada - Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) Working Group, further enhance co-ordination on corporate transparency and ML/TF risks in the legal profession. Additionally, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Organized Crime Committee contributes to national and international policy development, law enforcement innovation, public awareness, and unified responses to organized crime. The appointment of Canada’s Fentanyl Czar demonstrates the focused governance arrangements to address high priority, cross cutting risks through leadership and enhanced co-ordination when a rapid and flexible response is required. The Fentanyl Czar model provides a national focal point to align the actions of multiple authorities and accelerate implementation of priority actions to address evolving risks which require co-ordinate national action. 113. In support of the Regime, the ACMLTF is a public-private advisory committee that encourages collaboration with the private sector and promote transparency in risk understanding, policymaking. Canada’s provincial and territorial law societies, co-ordinated by the FLSC, collaborate with the Government of Canada through a joint working group aimed at strengthening information sharing on ML/TF risks specific to the legal sector. They also co-ordinate through a variety of committees to develop and enforce AML/CFT standards, guidance, and disciplinary frameworks within the legal profession. Figure 1.2. Canada’s AML/CFT Governance Structure Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity Canada’s TF Threat Environment 725. As set out in the evaluation of IO.1, Canada's National Risk Assessment assesses the overall TF risks to the country as low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial. At a more granular level, the NRA has identified the main threat actors, and the methods and channels exploited by them. Overall, the authorities have a good understanding of Canada’s TF threat environment. Figure 9.1. TF Modus operandi and their frequency, RCMP active files (2019 – 2024) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 726. Authorities have established a good operational understanding of the threat by analysis of a number of sources and methods to enable them to identify trends, tactics of specific organisations and new/updated methods used to finance terrorism both domestically and internationally. During this review period the typologies, tools, and modus operandi used to channel funds to finance terrorism in Canada have been identified as chiefly wire transfers and the use of MSBs. (Table 9.1). This understanding informs the actions set out below to identify, investigate, and prosecute terrorist financing activity. Identification of terrorist financing activity 727. Canada has a well-established system to detect and investigate TF, led by the RCMP – Federal Policing National Security (RCMP-FPNS). All cases which come under national security (i.e. all cases involving terrorism or TF) are reviewed by the RCMP-FPNS where there are two full-time dedicated TF reviewers. These reviewers are TF subject matter experts that have the requisite security clearances and undergo significant training. All complaints that fall under the National Security unit are reviewed by a TF reviewer for s.83 TF related offences of the Criminal Code and their findings documented. This process ensures all terrorism cases are reviewed to establish if TF offences can be identified. 728. National security investigations, including TF investigations, are tasked to either the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) who are specialised, multi-agency units in larger centres in Canada and are comprised of federal and provincial partners, or to the National Security Enforcement Sections (NSES) that are located in various provinces across the country where there is no INSET. Both these teams are centrally governed by RCMP-FPNS at headquarters who are responsible for providing oversight and guidance to all NS investigations across the country and for the prioritisation of investigations. Capability varies between INSETs and NSES units, though co-ordination helps mitigate gaps. This ensures a consistent and co-ordinated approach to TF investigations. 729. Prioritisation of cases is based on threat and complexity, and investigators (both INSET and NSES) receive dedicated TF training and have access to specialist resources such as Forensic Accounting Management Group (FAMG) and criminal intelligence analysts. The RCMP's TF training is open to other government agencies and also has inputs from the relevant units which the investigators will expect to collaborate with, enhancing the co-ordination between all units and agencies. 730. Even if initially TF offences are not identified in the initial review of a complaint related to national security, the review process remains ongoing for elements of TF during the course of the investigation and can lead to TF investigations at a later stage. TF reviewers and analysts within the RCMP-FPNS liaise with other reviewers and investigators monitoring investigations for any TF offences that may be evident. The role of a TF reviewer at FPNS National Headquarters is to ensure the investigation complies with applicable policies, Ministerial Directives and legislation. The reviewer is also responsible for sharing information with domestic and foreign partners, to assist with the collection of additional evidence to advance the investigation and support TF charges. This ensures a co-ordinated approach and ensures consistent input in NS related complaints. Figure 9.2. TF Investigations Process in Canada Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 731. There is a limited number of dedicated TF reviewers, but resilience is built into the system, through the availability of additional qualified staff when needed. There is also a fast time capacity for this reviewing process if required. Although there has never been an instance of a live-time intelligence investigation on TF in Canada, RCMP -FPNS has reviewers and managers on call 24/7 to respond to any urgent situation. 732. The sources of information which initiate TF investigations are wide ranging and include referrals from law enforcement (federal, provincial, and international) or from other agencies, FINTRAC disclosures, direct referrals from financial institutions, calls to the tip line, and CSIS intelligence (including from foreign partners). Once RCMP-FPNS receives financial information related to NS and if the information is classified as TF, then this is recorded as a TF occurrence (for each incident report) in the RCMP occurrence data set. During the relevant review period there were 368 TF occurrences/related incidents within the RCMP- FPNS holdings. FINTRAC issued 704 TF-related disclosures (9 804 STRs), which were the lead source of information for 207 of the 368 TF &quot;incidents&quot; (Figure 9.2). 733. Of the 368 TF-related incidents that were reviewed and assessed to determine aspects such as relevance, threshold, and mandate by the RCMP-FPNS team, 21 progressed to active TF investigations. As a result of these checks on the 21 active TF investigations, there were 11 reactive disclosures by FINTRAC. There were also four (4) proactive disclosures made by the FIU. FINTRAC disclosure is therefore one of the main sources of those TF cases which progressed to the stage of active investigation. Figure 9.3. Number of RCMP TF Occurrences, by lead source of information (2019-2024) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: RCMP 734. FINTRAC receives Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs), which expand on the previous Terrorist Property Reports (TPRs), and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) from RE’s which can be supplemented by threshold-based transaction reports. They have a comprehensive monitoring system that leverages specific terms aligned with TF priorities which has been determined by FINTRAC and other Government of Canada department and agencies. Any detections go to the TF analytical team at FINTRAC to action on a priority basis and disclose to partners when thresholds are met. All support the prioritization of TF investigations. 735. RCMP-FPNS-TF has developed protocols with Regime partners to expediate urgent requests. These established relationships allow RCMP-FPNS to contact Regime partners directly to request urgent action. This is followed by a formal written request. FINTRAC and the CRA have demonstrated they are able to provide intelligence disclosures within hours for urgent matters. FINTRAC’s knowledge and understanding of the reporting sectors, and the financial transaction reports they submit, allow for expediated, effective, and efficient searching of its holdings in support of these priority investigations. 736. Canada demonstrated that CSIS intelligence flows seamlessly to RCMP (One Vision), and both formal and informal international co-operation enables Canada to quickly receive and act on foreign intelligence to pursue TF cases. Investigation of Terrorist Financing cases 737. The primary legal tools and information sources used by RCMP to progress TF investigations are those set out above in the evaluation of IO.7. The analysis in this section focused on the specifics of how these are used in relation to TF investigations, where any differences arise. 738. RCMP submit Voluntary Information Records (VIRs) to FINTRAC in relation to each investigation, to obtain further information. While it is noted above that VIR responses are often subject to significant delays, this is not universal. TF-related VIRs are typically actioned promptly and are not subject to the delays noted above (see IO.6) in relation to lower-priority VIRs, with case interviews indicating that TF VIRs can expect to receive an initial response within a matter of hours. 739. When conducting terrorist financing investigations, RCMP makes extensive use of an intelligence collection technique to rapidly identify which financial institutions the individual of interest holds accounts with, followed by production orders to obtain information from those financial institutions. However, this technique isn’t comprehensive and requires expansion to be effective. 740. RCMP uses production orders to obtain information, and indicates that it receives prompt and full responses from D-SIBs, but responsiveness across other reporting entities varies The general use of production orders in investigations is discussed above in relation to IO.7, but authorities note particular challenges in relation to TF investigations due to the lack of a clear deadline for response, which means that some reporting entities do not reply sufficiently promptly, given the urgent nature of TF investigations. There is no legislation to ensure compliance within a certain time. 741. RCMP participates in Europol and INTERPOL global intelligence sharing and they have a comprehensive liaison officer network of officers and analysts deployed overseas which facilitate international co-operation on TF investigations. One of their remits is to fight national security threats such as TF by liaising with host countries developing the exchange of intelligence and assistance so combating the global aspect of TF. 742. Project Sabin (see Box 9.4) demonstrates Canada’s ability to pursue complex cross-border TF activity when this arises, using financial intelligence, CSIS contributions, and foreign co-operation to map a complex pattern of fundraising, peer-to-peer transfers, virtual asset use, and intermediaries. The case resulted in convictions for TF-specific offences and consecutive prison sentences for the accused. It showed the ability to identify specific financier roles, including fundraising, facilitation for listed entities, intermediaries, and online mobilisation. This example shows the subject setting up fake fundraising platform accounts to collect money over four accounts totalling CAD 9 342 which was transferred internationally to benefit ISIS. It also showed the subjects change of tactics as the ability to send money via Money or Value Transfer Service(s) (MVTS) entities was blocked so the subject moved to the use of virtual assets. Meanwhile, the three other case studies (see Boxes 9.1-9.3) provide examples of Canada’s ability to investigate different types of TF, leveraging both international, national and provincial co-operation to advance cases. Box 9.1. Politically Motivated Plot to Overthrow Foreign Government After receiving information from the Service de police de la Ville de Lévis (Lévis Police Service) in Québec, Canada, the RCMP-INSET initiated an investigation in July 2021 against a 51-year-old resident of Lévis, Québec. The resident took concrete actions, including travelling to Haiti to co-ordinate a group of individuals, whose intention was to take part in an armed revolution in Haiti and ultimately seize power from the Haitian Government led by the late president, Jovenel Moïse (the investigation is unrelated to the July 2021 assassination of President Moïse). The individual allegedly provided money and goods (e.g., tents and a generator) to the revolutionary cause that he was supporting in Haiti. These funds and goods were supplied directly to the group in question when the individual travelled to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He also attempted to acquire weapons during his travels; however, he was unsuccessful in doing so. In November 2022, the RCMP laid three terrorism charges against the suspect, including one TF charge, pursuant to the Criminal Code: · s. 83.03 – Providing property for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.191 – Leaving Canada to facilitate terrorist activity, and · s. 83.19(1) – Facilitating terrorist activity. Over the course of the investigation, the RCMP worked with domestic and three international partners to exchange information, leveraging police-to-police co-operation to gather evidence. Financial intelligence, including a FINTRAC disclosure, was extremely beneficial to the investigation in terms of identifying the suspect’s financial activities, his movements and overseas purchases, as well as his known associates. In March 2025, the individual was found guilty at trial of all three terrorism charges, with no plea resolution, and the sentence was fully argued before the court. The court imposed a total sentence of five years’ imprisonment, comprising a two-year custodial term for the travelling offence pursuant to s. 83.191 of the Criminal Code and a consecutive three-year custodial term for the facilitation offence pursuant to s. 83.19. Both are terrorism offences. The offender was also found guilty of terrorism financing, but that charge was stayed in accordance with the Kienapple principle, a fundamental principle of Canadian domestic law which prevents double punishment where offences share the same factual and legal nexus; this reflects a constitutional safeguard rather than any leniency towards TF. In light of the gravity of the conduct, the court ordered that the offender serve at least half of the sentence before becoming eligible for parole under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code. Box 9.2. Canadian FTF In November 2014, the RCMP-INSET opened a NS investigation concerning a 27-year-old resident of Montreal, Québec. The RCMP-INSET investigation identified that the resident left her home in Québec, Canada at the age of 19 to travel to Syria and Iraq with the intention of joining the Islamic State armed group (ISIS). In Syria, the individual is alleged to have participated in terrorist activities on behalf of ISIS and in November 2017 she was taken prisoner by the Syrian Democratic Forces. As a result of the investigation, the RCMP arrested the suspect in October 2022 at the Montréal-Trudeau international airport after she arrived from a camp for ISIS detainees in Syria with her two children and another adult. Pursuant to the Criminal Code, four (4) terrorism charges were laid against the suspect, including one (1) TF charge: · s. 83.03 – Providing, making available, etc. property or services for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.181 – Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group, · s. 83.18 – Participation in activity of terrorist group, and · s. 465(1)(c) – Conspiracy under 83.181 for leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group. This investigation involved the extensive use of Liaison Officers, co-operation with multiple Government of Canada agencies, and assistance from six (6) international partners to gather evidence and share information that was critical to the investigation and subsequent arrest of the suspect. Financial intelligence was also material to the success of the investigation, with FINTRAC providing multiple disclosures, including detailed financial analyses. The file resolved after extensive discussions between the PPSC and defence counsel. As part of the resolution, the offender pleaded guilty to one count of participating in the activities of a terrorist group, namely ISIS, contrary to s. 83.18 of the Criminal Code. An agreed statement of facts was placed before the court outlining the comprehensive nature of her offending, including that she travelled to Syria to join the ranks of ISIS, knowing that her expected role would include marrying an ISIS fighter and raising children under the ISIS doctrine. This offender was the first person in Canada convicted for providing family support to a terrorist group as a spouse. The resolution in this file reflects the particular facts of the case and takes into consideration the early, ongoing, demonstrated and independently evaluated steps the individual has taken to demonstrate remorse, take responsibility, commit to fundamental change and a rejection of extremist ideology. The offender was sentenced to a global sentence of 111 days and a three-year probation order with conditions. Box 9.3. Ideologically Motivated Terrorist Financing and Provincial-Federal Co-operation In January 2024, a 28-year-old security guard brought a gun into the City Hall in Edmonton, Alberta, and then proceeded to throw incendiary devices while shooting several rounds into the ceiling, walls and windows. The Edmonton Police Service stated that the individual parked his vehicle in the City Hall underground parkade then entered the building from the parkade access. Once inside City Hall, he lit several handheld incendiary devices, believed to be Molotov cocktails, which caused a small fire outside an elevator. He then fired several rounds from a long gun into the ceiling, walls and windows. There were no injuries. The man dropped the long gun onto the floor and surrendered to City Hall security who detained him until police arrived. On the day of the shooting, the individual uploaded a manifesto-style video to YouTube entitled “Rise Up”. In the video, the individual says he is about to complete a “mission” and that he is “not a psychopath” or “one of these monsters that hurt children.” The video addressed multiple grievances, including corruption, inflation, immigration, housing cost and what he dubbed the “genocide in Gaza” and throughout the world. Authorities arrested the suspect and he remains in custody after being denied bail. The Deputy Director of Public Prosecution on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada gave consent to the commencement of terrorism proceedings in respect of the following offences: · Counselling commission of terrorism offence, contrary to section 83.221(1) of the Criminal Code; and, · Possession of property for terrorist purposes, contrary to section 83.04 of the Criminal Code. The suspect is also charged with eight (8) additional offences, which constitute terrorism offences pursuant to sections 2, 83.01(1)(b) and 83.27 of the Criminal Code. These offences include intentional arson of an occupied property, possessing incendiary materials, using a firearm while committing an offence, careless use of a firearm, throwing an explosive substance and discharging a firearm into a building. The RCMP laid terrorism and terrorist financing charges above and beyond the substantive offences as the elements, ideology and motivation were met. This case demonstrates the co-operation between the RCMP and Canada’s provincial and municipal police forces. The case remains pending before the courts. The trial is set for October 2026. 743. Although Canada recognises the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime groups (OCGs) in its 2025 NRA and has taken some steps to address this issue through TFS listings (see Core Issue 9.5), there have, to date, been no readily identifiable TF specific investigative initiatives in this area. Given Canada’s high exposure to OCG related threats, further exploitation of these links could strengthen its TF investigative and prosecutorial efforts. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 744. Canada's TF investigations identify and focus on the specific role played by terrorist financiers in enabling wider terrorist activity. Both Project Sabin and Project Seyant (Boxes 9.4 and 9.5) investigated individuals acting as financiers and facilitators for terrorist groups. The prioritisation of these cases shows a strong awareness of the importance of such financiers and facilitators to sustaining terrorist groups, and the investigations focused on the specific enabling roles that they played in the wider terrorist activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 843. Pursuant to section 40(e) of the PCMLTFA, FINTRAC has the authority to supervise the implementation of reporting entities’ (FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, excluding lawyers) obligations, including compliance with some obligations related to sanctions evasion and PF. Specifically, FINTRAC has the authority to supervise reporting entities for compliance with MDs and with reporting obligations linked to sanctions evasion. However, while the relevant obligations are implemented within Canada’s framework through the UN Act, no authority is explicitly mandated by law to supervise FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs in respect of all obligations arising from the implementation of UNSCR 1718(2006) and following, and UNSCR 1737(2006) and following. In fact, the MDs do not cover all obligations arising from these UNSCRs and the related UN Act, such as the obligation to effectively freeze funds, other financial assets, and economic resources, as required under the relevant provisions (Art. 8(d) of UNSCR 1718(2006) and subsequent resolutions, and Art. 12 of 1737(2006) and subsequent resolutions). 844. The 2017 Ministerial Directive on DPRK is applicable for all the reporting entities referred to in section 5 of the PCMLTFA. The Ministerial Directive on Iran was initially issued in 2020, updated in 2024 and again on 17 November 2025. Until 17 November 2025, the application of the MD on Iran was limited to some categories of reporting entities under the PCMLTFA that were considered high-risk and, consequently, did not provide full coverage. Since 17 November 2025, the MD on Iran applies to all reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. The 2017 MD on DPRK and 2024 MD on Iran require that the selected reporting entities treat financial transactions with DPRK and Iran as high risk, verify identities, exercise customer due diligence, keep record and report transactions, whereas the 2025 MD on Iran expands the obligations to all reporting entities and further introduces additional provisions related to correspondent banking and to transactions with third country and potential risk of sanction evasion associated with Iran. 845. FINTRAC’s supervision powers includes: i) obligation to file STRs where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a transaction is linked to the commission or attempted commission of a sanctions evasion offence, ii) reporting of sanctioned property, iii) compliance with Ministerial Directives, and iv) the underlying compliance programs that support these obligations. Furthermore, FINTRAC examinations review whether reporting entities screen customers at onboarding and on an ongoing basis against prescribed lists, and whether escalation procedures allow for immediate reporting and freezing when matches are identified. 846. For cases of non-compliance, FINTRAC may apply sanctions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), public naming, and non-compliance disclosures (NCDs) to law enforcement agencies. Since its implementation in 2017, three penalties were imposed by FINTRAC relating to the DPRK Ministerial Directive in 2024-2025, which is reflective of Canada’s low exposure to DPRK risks. In all three instances, the issue was about the entities policies and procedures that were not reflecting measures to address the requirements under the MD on the DPRK. However, FINTRAC also applied several administrative monetary penalties due to non-compliance with the MD related to Iran, before the trigger of the Snapback in September 2025. AMPs were applied mostly to MSBs but also to some securities dealers. In one case, a large AMP was applied to a bank where the failure to apply established enhanced due diligence measures to some clients contrary to the MD and the bank’s own policies and procedures formed part of the overall CAD 9 million penalty. No AMPs related to relevant UNSCRs were applied in the review period. 847. Canada has established the framework and programmes for supervising compliance of reporting entities with the obligations across the PCMLTFA, including the requirements related to TFS. However, given the significant role that FIs play in Canada’s economy and the risks posed by VASPs, Canada’s supervision strategy would benefit from further developing the supervisory framework and programmes for these entities, particularly VASPs, by more effectively targeting them to address PF risks and to adequately monitor the implementation of PF-related targeted financial sanctions. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 848. DPMS are considered low risk for PF in Canada, and they are not subject to licencing or registration requirements. This may limit FINTRAC’s ability to assess and monitor the PF risk of some entities in this sector, and their effective implementation of PF-TFS obligations. The implementation of a licensing or registration model for DPMS would make FINTRAC’s supervisory activities over the implementation of PF-TFS in the sector more effective. Lawyers and Québec notaries are supervised by provincial/territorial law societies and are subject to Canadian sanctions laws, however they are not subject to supervision of those laws by any regulator. 849. During compliance examinations, FINTRAC assesses whether REs have adequately integrated PF considerations into their risk assessments, policies, procedures, and training and whether REs can demonstrate that they understand their exposure to PF risks and have systems in place to detect and report relevant activity. FINTRAC imposed some AMPs related to Ministerial Directive deficiencies on four Real Estate agent companies between 2022 and 2025. These AMPs are mostly related to deficiencies in written policies and procedures, transaction restriction requirements, client identification and ongoing monitoring. 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CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 236. FIs and VASPs in general demonstrate a good awareness and understanding with respect to CDD, record keeping requirements, BO information and ongoing monitoring and this was supported through the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit. Most FIs are compliant with the CDD requirements, and largely compliant with record keeping obligations associated with, among others, special measures applied to high-risk customers, high-risk countries identified by the FATF, beneficial ownership; and correspondent banking requirements. FINTRAC does not maintain any analysis specific to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with the obligations in relation to wire transfer and virtual asset transfer rules and new technologies. 237. FIs and VASPs assign risk ratings to their customers based on factors such as business nature / occupation, connections to high-risk jurisdictions, onboarding channels and other relevant indicators. The frequency of customer profile reviews is determined by the assigned risk rating, with high-risk customers reviewed at least annually. FIs with international operations may leverage their groups to gather CDD information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD measures themselves. Similarly, where a referral is made through a mortgage broker, FIs conduct CDD themselves rather than relying on the brokers. While FIs and VASPs largely complied with verification of identity as a core obligation, only a low portion of MSB (65%) and VASPs (54%) fully complied with the record keeping requirement which is another core obligation. Quite a substantial portion of entities in these sectors are assessed as “partially compliant” (i.e. the record keeping obligation is not fully met, for example, the processes are not applied or have been only partially implemented or have quality issues) or “deficient” (i.e. the record keeping obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing). 238. For legal persons or legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs identify any beneficial owners by obtaining the ownership structure from the customer, and where applicable, accessing the governmental registers of corporate beneficial ownership data to verify their identities. FINTRAC assesses beneficial ownership obligations as part a reporting entity’s compliance program and has not found any significant issue in the last five years. 239. Ongoing monitoring obligations are generally well understood and effectively implemented, with some minor exceptions, especially among smaller MSBs and VASPs, due to limited resources or manual processes. Larger and more sophisticated entities, such as banks, deploy automated monitoring systems although room for improvement was noted in some banks in the application of appropriate enhanced due diligence measures as part of ongoing monitoring of high-risk clients, and for which FINTRAC has taken supervisory follow-up actions. Other common issues identified in FINTRAC examinations include undefined monitoring frequency, alert backlogs, and failure to adjust client risk ratings based on new information. Table 3.3. Compliance levels per obligations – Verifying identity (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 98% 2% 0% CU/CP 98% 0% 2% Securities 98% 1% 1% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 98% 0% 2% VASP 95% 0% 5% Source: Canada Table 3.4. Compliance levels per obligations – Record keeping (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 82% 18% 0% CU/CP 87% 10% 3% Securities 83% 13% 3% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 65% 33% 2% VASP 54% 38% 8% Source: Canada 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures Table 3.5 Compliance levels per obligations – Special measures (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 90% 10% 0% CU/CP 92% 8% 0% Securities 99% 1% 0% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 97% 2% 1% VASP 94% 5% 1% Source: Canada 240. FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the requirements for politically exposed persons (PEP), both foreign and domestic, under the PCMLTFA and have implemented systems and controls that address both identification and the application of enhanced measures. They primarily identify PEPs through CDD supported by checks against commercial databases. EDD measures include establishing source of funds and source of wealth and obtaining the necessary senior management approval. FIs and VASPs generally have very strong compliance with the requirements relating to PEPs and Heads of international organisations (HIO). A few exceptions to this understanding and compliance could be found in MSBs and VASPs which had omitted verification of domestic PEPs and HIOs. 241. FIs with cross-border correspondent banking relationships demonstrated a good understanding of the higher ML/TF risks and the need, for enhanced AML/CFT requirements and control programmes specific for the business line, with dedicated specialist teams assigned to manage the risk assessment and on-going monitoring of the relationships. FINTRAC assessments found in general high levels of compliance with correspondent banking requirements. There was a decreasing risk appetite for the sector, with some banks indicating they had terminated almost half of all correspondent banking relationships in recent years. 242. Risks and requirements regarding the use of new technologies also appear to be generally understood, with FIs and VASPs establishing their own internal risk assessment procedures and approval policies. Any use of technology or launch of new products which give rise to ML/TF risks requires endorsement from the AML Compliance function before being approved by senior management. Reporting entities must take into account the risk of new technologies on an ongoing basis and apply mitigating measures if the risk of ML/TF is high. FINTRAC evaluates how FIs and VASPs manage ML/TF risks associated with new technologies, including digital onboarding. Many VASPs leverage technology for compliance. FINTRAC monitors compliance with new technology obligations through risk assessments of reporting entity compliance programmes, which include provision of information on any new technologies being developed or implemented and how these have been assessed. This ensures that innovation is aligned with AML/CFT obligations and that emerging risks are appropriately mitigated. While FINTRAC does not maintain specific analysis to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with this obligation, common deficiencies noted were primarily on the failure to document the risk assessments. 243. FIs, MSBs and VASPs exhibit a good understanding of their payment transparency obligations, and put in place controls to ensure completeness of originator/beneficiary details in the wire transfers and VA transfers. FINTRAC, as part of its broader mandate, evaluates wire transfer rules compliance and VA transfer rules with assessments of electronic funds transfer (EFT) reporting requirements and large virtual currency transactions reports. FINTRAC does not maintain analysis specific to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with the payment transparency obligations. 244. FIs and VASPs put in place policies and procedures for managing customer relationships from high-risk jurisdictions identified by FATF, including the application of EDD and enhanced measures for customer transactions involving high risk countries including those identified by the FATF. Canada has Ministerial Directives on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Russia requiring enhanced measures on all transactions and customer relationships involving these jurisdictions and these appear to be generally well understood, with some deficiencies identified in compliance with the requirements mostly in CU/CP sectors attributed to their domestic nature of business activities. It was observed that there is a gradual increase in the level of deficiency for FIs, MSBs and VASPs since FY2022/23 mainly attributed to the onboarding of new MSB sub-sectors and recent updates to Ministerial Directives. The deficiencies are mainly relating to inadequate policies and procedures of a small number of MSBs for complying the Ministerial Directives such as establishing procedures to stay informed of newly issued directives and their potential applicability to the business’ operations. Table 3.6.a. FIs and VASPs – Compliance with Ministerial Directives Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. 2020-21 100% 0% 0% 2021-22 98% 2% 0% 2022-23 97% 1% 2% 2023-24 97% 0% 3% 2024-25 93% 0% 7% Table 3.6b. FIs and VASPs – Compliance with Ministerial Directives (breakdown by sectors) Compliant: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant: the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 100% 0% 0% CU/CP 100% 8% 0% Life insurance 100% 1% 0% Securities 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 97% 1% 2% VASP 95% 1% 4% Source: Canada 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 245. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit demonstrated good understanding on their reporting obligations and established internal policies and procedures for investigation and filing STR, and measures to prevent “tipping off” in practice. They generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities, and monitoring scenarios are designed depending on ML/TF vulnerabilities associated with the business segment (for example, scenario for detecting early repayment behaviour for lending business; common transaction pattern of money mules for retail banking segment, etc). There are prescribed timelines for filing STRs once suspicion is established. Table 3.7. Number of STRs by sectors Sector FY2020-21 FY2021-22 FY2022-23 FY2023-24 FY2024-25 Total Banks 361 705 443 880 393 450 431 709 365 999 1 996 743 CUs/CPs 29 791 35 647 53 414 64 737 43 167 226 756 Securities Dealers 864 3 944** 963 1 578 2 245 9 594 Life Insurance 493 617 591 781 639 3 121 Trusts and Loan companies 4 262 4 063 4 983 3 832 5 240 22 380 MSBs (including VASPs) 68 560 92 120 97 534 117 290 149 438 524 942 Total 465 675 580 271 550 935 619 927 566 728 2 783 536 Note: *About 15% drop year-on-year is attributed to FINTRAC’s implementation of second-generation (Gen2) reporting forms for STR. Please refer to IO6 chapter for details **The significant increase of STRs in 2021-22 from the securities dealers came from a single entity (one entity filed over 3 100 STRs) which remediated unreported STR in the past years identified through its own internal quality assurance reviews. Source: Canada 246. Banks and MSBs (including VASP) submitted about 72% and 19% of all STRs respectively on average in the past 5 years, while reporting from other FI sectors is comparatively low. 247. Compliance with reporting obligations has been a significant supervisory focus for FINTRAC, and shortcomings in quality, volume and timeliness of STR filings have been identified frequently during onsite examinations, with a large percentage of VASPs (31%), banks (27%), and credit unions (19%) being assessed as “deficient” in their STR reporting. FINTRAC also noted that some VASPs have created organisation-enforced transaction limits to circumvent compliance obligations. Table 3.8. FIs and VASPs – Compliance levels per obligation: reporting STR (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation is assessed as not existing. Bank 59% 14% 27% CU/CP 77% 4% 19% Securities 98% 0% 2% Life insurance 83% 17% 0% Trust and loan* Not available Not available Not available MSB (no VC) 87% 4% 12% VASP 69% 0% 31% Note: STR reporting obligations were not scoped into the examinations Source: Canada 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 248. FIs and VASPs generally put in place AML/CFT control policies and procedures to address compliance with the PCMLTFA and Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) requirements and FINTRAC’s sector specific guidelines. Implementation effectiveness of these policies and procedures is tested regularly by their AML/CFT compliance functions and internal audit functions, the findings from which are required to be reported to the board / board delegated committees for some of these FIs. 249. It is also mandated under the PCMLTFR [31] that a reporting entity should appoint a compliance officer who is responsible for implementing the AML/CFT compliance programme; and that a reporting entity should conduct a review on the effectiveness of its AML/CFT compliance programme once every 2 years. These reviews are conducted by internal or external auditors, or by the entity itself if they do not have an auditor [32] . A very high portion of FIs and VASP have an auditor internal or external to comply with the PCMLTFA. In practice, only small institutions would perform this review internally from a person that is not an auditor. The findings of the review must be reported to the senior management of the reporting entity. If the reporting entity is selected for onsite examination or scoping in for risk questionnaire exercise, the review findings will be submitted to FINTRAC for review. 250. Common deficiencies observed in the past 5 years are gaps in compliance policies and procedures and implementation effectiveness, and inadequate scope and depth of assurance testing programmes and documentation. These are mainly found in life insurance, securities, MSB and VASP sectors, in particular small firms which lack sophistication in internal control frameworks and compliance awareness. FINTRAC observes stable and sustained compliance with very few cases of deficiencies, though small decrease in compliance is noted in recent years, likely attributable to new sectors being onboarded as a subset of MSBs due to the expansion of the PCMLTFA framework (e.g. crowdfunding platforms, armoured cars). Table 3 . 9 . Co mpliance levels per obli gations – Policies and Procedures (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant: the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 37% 63% 0% CU/CP 37% 58% 5% Securities 15% 84% 1% Life insurance 25% 75% 0% Trust and loan 0% 100% 0% MSB (no VC) 17% 76% 7% VASP 22% 67% 10% Source: Canada Table 3.10. Compliance levels per obligations – Two-Year Review (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 86% 14% 0% CU/CP 93% 7% 0% Securities 67% 21% 12% Life insurance 83% 0% 17% Trust and loan 50% 50% 0% MSB (no VC) 71% 20% 8% VASP 88% 0% 12% Source: Canada 251. All domestic systemically important banks (DSIBs) operate under group-wide AML/CFT frameworks that cover subsidiaries and business lines (e.g., trusts, securities, life insurance). Most small and medium-sized banks in Canada operate under comparatively simple corporate structures, the few exceptions being where the parent company is a foreign entity. Most of the DSIBs centralise key control processes including customer risk assessment, screening and transaction monitoring in the group operating hubs to ensure consistency and effective implementation of the Group’s standard. Group oversight over AML/CFT compliance functions of major subsidiaries is exercised through different means, including direct functional reporting line to Group compliance, and representatives in regional risk management committee. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 252. There are no identified legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Canada. Footnotes [31] Sections 156 [32] The review should be conducted by someone who is knowledgeable of the AML/CFT regulatory requirements and is not directly involved in your compliance program activities. Please refer to FINTRAC’s compliance programme requirements on fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/compliance-conformite/Guide4/4-eng#s7" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 504. Canada’s key competent authorities use financial intelligence and other relevant information to a large extent to investigate ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Canadian LEAs conduct financial inquiries when investigating predicate offences and RCMP case samples demonstrate high utilisation rates for financial intelligence (94% of investigations into ML or ‘possession’ offences utilised FINTRAC disclosures). Information obtained in FINTRAC disclosures (transactional reporting and STRs), production orders and search warrants allows LEAs to develop initial investigations. This is particularly relevant to developing the identities of the persons of interest and identifying the financial criminal activity. See core issue 7.1 for further details on LEAs regular conduct of parallel financial investigations at the initial phases of ML, predicate offence and TF related investigations. 505. During 2020-2025, FINTRAC has received feedback on 1 118 disclosures to competent authorities (out of a total of 10 127 disclosures). Approximately 94% of the feedback found the financial intelligence and information valuable, and/or actionable (See Table 6.7 below). This feedback is positive (consistent with section 6.2.3). FINTRAC’s feedback mechanism can be strengthened to ensure constructive feedback is systematically used to improve areas of deficiency (such as timeliness of disseminations). Figure 6.1. Feedback on FINTRAC disclosures to competent authorities Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 506. FINTRAC has sought further feedback on 162 disclosures to RCMP, CRA and CSIS between the period of 2020-2024. Enforcement outcomes of these disclosures include 30 charges and 10 convictions. This data contributes to a positive reflection of the use of financial intelligence and information in developing investigations and evidence. 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 507. FINTRAC’s financial intelligence has contributed to the identification and tracing of criminal proceeds and instrumentalities and is used extensively by LEAs in their asset tracing efforts. Alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques, PPP information sharing and FINTRAC disclosures are the primary tools used to establish production orders to further trace and identify. This information requires active reporting and participation from public and private entities (see Box 6.3). This case study demonstrates how the RCMP uses FINTRAC’s financial intelligence to investigate cases that lead to tangible enforcement results, including arrests, convictions, seizures and forfeitures. Following amendments to the PCMLTFA, FINTRAC information can be disclosed (proactively or reactively through a VIR) to provincial CFOs, removing a barrier to CFOs’ ability to identify and trace assets. Since 2025, CFOs are now a disclosure recipient and have submitted 16 VIRs. FINTRAC has disclosed 1 proactive disclosure and 5 reactive disclosures with the remaining reactive disclosures still in progress. Box 6.3. Project Legion: Combatting the Laundering of Proceeds from Illegal Cannabis Activities Project Legion, a PPP led by TD Bank, was launched in September 2022 to enhance awareness of the harms associated with illicit cannabis activities and strengthen the detection of laundering of the proceeds. Based on FINTRAC's review of 5 000 STRs received between 2020-21, an Operational Alert Laundering of Proceeds from Illicit Cannabis was disseminated, describing the methods used to launder proceeds of illicit cannabis sales. It provided actionable indicators to help reporting entities identify and submit STRs. Subsequently, 44 105 PPP Legion STRs were reported to FINTRAC. Cases involving the laundering of illicit cannabis proceeds are often large and complex, with networks spanning multiple jurisdictions. FINTRAC helped investigators link illicit cannabis activity across provinces and disclosed 169 unique STRs to seven LEA via disclosure packages. These reports involved 163 individuals, over 90 accounts, and more than CAD 53 million in suspected illicit sales." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 282. In Canada, most DNFBPs have market entry controls that require them to be licensed or registered by provincial or territorial regulators. During the licensing or registration process, whether applicants are related to criminals is assessed through “fit and proper” requirements. Their practice varies by relevant regulators: some require criminal record checks for all applicants, others only when reasonable suspicion exists, and still others rely on self-declaration subject to committee review. The lack of a coherent and consistent licensing or registration regime for DPMS at the federal provincial and territorial level means no effective Canada-wide controls are applied for applicants to prevent criminals and their associates from entering this sector, although some municipalities have licensing regimes for DPMS that include criminal record check requirements. 283. Provincial/territorial authorities detect and address DNFBP’s breaches of licensing and registration requirements through monitoring each professional’s compliance with their code of conduct or other relevant regulations. Over the review period, supervisory authorities have taken actions against DNFBPs’ breaches of registration requirements, resulting in disciplinary actions. No disciplinary actions have been taken against DPMS at the federal or provincial level, since they are not subject to registration/licensing requirements except in a couple municipalities. Casinos 284. As of 1 April 2025, Canada has 19 casinos as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This population has decreased slightly since the last MER but remains stable. To operate legally, casinos must be officially licensed through their respective provincial or territorial regulators. Several provincial regulators operate their own online gaming platforms to support oversight, including Ontario Lottery Gaming Corporation (OLG.ca) for Ontario resident and PlayNow.com operated by the British Columbia Lottery Corporation (BCLC) for residents of British Columbia. In addition to OLG.ca, Ontario also established iGaming Ontario (iGO), which oversees a regulated market that permits private operators to offer online gaming services to Ontario players. 285. Regulatory bodies require casinos to submit application forms and conduct background/due diligence (financial and business information) checks before administering a license. Regulators also conduct “fit and proper” procedures for workers, including senior managers and directors, which typically include a licensing or registration prerequisite for those seeking employment within the gaming sector. For example, BCLC’s Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch (GPEB) controls licensing and registration as the provincial gaming regulator. For organizations and individuals involved in the commercial gaming industry in British Columbia, GPEB issues corporate registration, senior official (ownership), senior employee (executive team) and gaming worker registrations. 286. Regulatory authorities enforce protocols for the identification and management of improper conduct, which include conducting internal reviews. Provincial and territorial regulators can also issue penalties to encourage adherence to regulations among licensees, permit recipients, sanctioned retailers, and gaming personnel. For example, in Ontario, its regulator the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) has issued three warning letters (in 2023) and issued three orders of monetary penalty (one in 2022 (CAD 147 712,50), one in 2023 (CAD 55 000) and one in 2024 (still in the disciplinary process)) related to AML administrative shortcomings since 2020. Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) 287. Based on open-source search, outreach activities and risk questionnaires, Canada estimates that there are approximately 3 000 DPMS that perform the triggering activities that make them subject to the PCMLTFA. The exact number is unknown due to the lack of licensing or registration regime at the federal or provincial/territorial levels. 288. There are no licensing or registration regime for DPMS in Canada at the federal or provincial/territorial levels. Although some municipalities independently issue licences to DPMS, no federal/provincial/territorial controls are applied for applicants to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the DPMS sector. This is of particular concern since the DPMS sector is assessed as highly inherently vulnerable in Canada’s national risk assessment and the 4th round MER included a Recommended Action to consider introducing a licensing or registration regime, or other controls for DPMS. It may also limit FINTRAC’s ability to assess and monitor the PF risk of some entities in DPMS sector, and their effective implementation of PF-TFS obligations (See 11.6.2. for further details). 289. The Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA), the national industry association for DPMS, has a Code of Ethics and Standards and Conduct. However, as an industry association, membership is voluntary and the CJA does not have any disciplinary authority over its members. Real estate 290. As of 1 April 2025, Canada has 7 742 real estate brokerages as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This number represents less than half of the entities mentioned in the last MER, because the last MER included agents working with brokerages, examined under the brokerages and not as an entity on their own. Licensing and certification requirements in the Canadian real estate sector are set by provincial and territorial regulators. 291. Provincial and territorial regulatory bodies mandate that applicants either submit a criminal background check or provide consent for one to be obtained during the process of applying for a license. For example, in Québec, the Certification Department at the Organisme d’autoréglementation du courtage immobilier du Québec (OACIQ) analyses each license application thoroughly, including a criminal record checks and other criteria established by current regulations. 292. Breaches of real estate legislation and rules are monitored through customer complaints to the provincial or territorial real estate regulator. It is notable that the process depends on customer complaints. Provincial and territorial legislations and regulations may cover the licensing/registration requirements, general conduct of professionals, and disciplinary proceedings. Complaints of misconduct are investigated by professional bodies to verify the scope of authority in the offence, whether a penalty is appropriate, and if so, to deliver a proportionate outcome in line with the severity of the offence. Table 4.1 shows data from the four most populous provinces on breaches of licensing requirements by revocation/suspension of licenses and penalties. Table 4.1. Number of real estate licenses denied, revoked or suspended and penalties issued in Ontario, Québec, British Columbia and Alberta (2020-2025) Total licenses issued new/renewed Licenses Denied / Withdrawn/ Refused Licenses Revoked / Suspended Number of Penalties Issued Total Value (in CAD) 2020-2021 Ontario 44 484 6 4 75 529 000 Québec 1 802 3 99 88 230 000 British Columbia Not available - 12 Not available Not available Alberta 15 035 6 1 208 274 128 2021-2022 Ontario 51 824 7 10 88 738 500 Québec 2 189 8 128 157 500 500 British Columbia Not available - 8 48 195 750 Alberta 17 074 6 12 208 274 128 2022-2023 Ontario 54 080 7 7 129 1 267 500 Québec 2 294 10 100 114 344 000 British Columbia Not available - 4 48 654 581 Alberta 18 461 9 1 51 505 900 2023-2024 Ontario 53 674 12 6 89 1 052 700 Québec 1 784 13 128 69 380 000 British Columbia 20 171 - 6 74 1 313 171 Alberta 20 327 3 4 45 257 120 2024-2025 Ontario 51 300 6 13 69 834 500 Québec 1 629 3 199 107 552 500 British Columbia 19 347 - 10 145 1 692 250 Alberta 6 429 3 5 41 387 855 Source: Canada Accountants 293. FINTRAC estimates the number of accountants and accounting firms that are subject to the PCMLTFA (i.e. conducting activities that fall under the scope of the FATF Standards) at less than 1 000. In the previous MER, the number was estimated at 3 829. This change is the result of FINTRAC’s identification of accountants subject to the PCMLTFA for a more accurate estimate. 294. The professional certification and regulation of accountants is conducted at the provincial and territorial level through Chartered Professional Accountant (CPA) bodies. Provincial or territorial regulators ask applicants to disclose previous criminal convictions or bankruptcy to prevent criminals from becoming certified accountants. For example, under the Professional Code of Québec, candidates and members must notify CPA Québec within 10 days when they are subject to certain judicial or disciplinary decisions, including being found guilty of a criminal offence or an offence under a tax act, a securities act, or an AML/CFT act in Canada or abroad. They must also answer questions regarding their criminal/penal record once a year. Additionally, CPA Québec conducts targeted and random background checks. 295. Accountants must comply with Codes of Conduct and Regulations set by provincial and territorial bodies. A breach of these rules may result in disciplinary measures by the CPA body. Professional bodies conduct investigations against members when complaints of breaching professional conduct (including the relevant CPA code of conduct/ethics or CPA Act) are filed. It is notable that the process depends on third party complaints. Complaints are generally reviewed and assessed by an intake team, with more serious and unresolved complaints falling under CPA jurisdiction sent to a disciplinary committee. If grounds exist for disciplinary action, penalties can be imposed in line with the severity of offences. This includes financial sanctions, public announcements, notices to provincial and territorial bodies, suspension or revocation of registration, or a combination of penalties. BC notaries 296.  There are 293 BC notaries or notary firms identified by FINTRAC as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This population has slightly decreased since the last MER but remains stable. The Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia (SNPBC) is the regulatory body that oversees activities and memberships (licences) of all BC notaries. Members must demonstrate their “good standing” with the SNPBC to qualify for licenses, which is supported by criminal record checks. Only members may legally and beneficially own the voting shares of a notary corporation or serve as directors of the corporation. The SNPBC has the authority to investigate, make findings of fact, and take action against members of its society who engage in criminal wrongdoing or facilitate criminal activity. SNPBC conducts criminal background checks on those applying to the Notary Education Program (NEP) and verifies identification through a third-party resource. Where there is evidence of criminal activity, the SNPBC may reprimand, fine, terminate or seek a significant suspension of the member’s license. For Lawyers 297. Canada estimates there are 136 000 lawyers and 4 200 Québec notaries active in the country. The practice of law in any jurisdiction in Canada is limited to only individuals with a valid license from one of the fourteen law societies. 298. The Law Societies determine the requirements for admission to the legal profession and are responsible for all elements of licensing. This includes the required educational components, licensing examinations, articling or other experiential training programs, and requirements related to “good character”. Applicants must generally self-report any conduct or circumstances that may raise issues about their character, including prior convictions of criminal offences. These components are mainly consistent across law societies. A Canadian police clearance (i.e., a criminal record check) and/or reference letters may be required. If there are any concerns, the Law Society will investigate and, if needed, order a hearing. 299. There have been multiple instances, where a lawyer has had their license either suspended or revoked (disbarred) by a Law Society for professional misconduct that relates to breaches of Law Society AML/CFT rules and/or related duties (see Table 4.2). Table 4.2. Suspension and revocation of lawyers’ licenses (2017- April 2025, not limited to AML/CFT) Estimated number of law firms Individual members Suspension of individual lawyers ’ licenses Revocation of individual lawyers ’ licenses Law Society of Ontario 14 090 law firms 65 590 (lawyers) 486 231 Barreau du Québec 3 908 31 000 272 25 Chambre des notaires du Québec 828 3 900 119 4 Law Society of British Columbia 4 000 18 000 (approx..) 98 64 Law Society of Alberta 2 700 12 000 57 22 Source: Canada Box 4.1. Cases for detecting unauthorized practice of law in Ontario The Law Society of Ontario has been involved in a number of cases where it took measures to stop someone from the unauthorized practice of law. Some examples over the 2020 to 2025 period include the following: · Law Society of Ontario v. Helia Bayegan and HMB Canadian Immigration Firm Corp . (2024): The court issued an injunction preventing the respondents from holding themselves out as lawyers or legal service providers, or from engaging in any activities that constitute the practice of law. The respondents were ordered to pay restitution to individuals who had been harmed by their unauthorized practice, ensuring that affected parties were compensated for any financial losses. · Law Society of Ontario v Jonhattan Da Rosa, c.o.b. as AXE Consulting Group (2023) : The respondent, Da Rosa, was prohibited from engaging in the practice of law or providing legal services in Ontario unless properly licensed by the Law Society of Ontario. The court issued an injunction preventing Da Rosa from holding themselves out as a lawyer or legal service provider, or from engaging in any activities that constitute the practice of law. Law Societies are empowered by their enabling statutes to regulate the legal profession and protect the public from harm caused by the unauthorized practice of law. Their powers include investigations; cease-and-desist orders; fines and penalties; public warnings; and injunctions. Courts play a critical role in enforcing the law societies' mandates and addressing unauthorized practice. Their powers include injunctions, criminal prosecutions and civil remedies. Below are some examples of instances where a law society took measures for the unauthorized practice of law. Law Societies also take the necessary measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in a law firm, through ownership and management restrictions described in R28, c.28.4b. The restrictions ensure that only licensed legal professionals have control of law firms." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="508. Canada identifies and investigates ML to a significant extent. ML is typically identified by LEAs when conducting parallel financial investigations at the initial investigation stage 509. The Criminal Code establishes four different money laundering offences: laundering proceeds of crime (LPOC) (CC s462.31), possess property obtained by crime (PPOC) (CC s354), trafficking in property obtained by crime (TPOC) (CC 355.2), and possess property obtained by crime for the purpose of trafficking (PPOCPT) (CC 355.4). 510. The assessment has placed the most focus to the outcomes achieved in LPOC investigations and prosecutions and has also focused on the outcomes of PPOC cases involving complex, high value, and high impact ML activity. These cases generally involve the most significant and complex ML activity in Canada and results in these matters have the biggest impact in Canada’s efforts to combat ML. Less focus has been placed on the outcomes of PPOC offences. While PPOC offences span a range of criminality, they generally relate to lower-level criminality and typically to lower-value self-laundering. 511. LPOC captures the broadest range of laundering typologies, particularly the type of activity associated with high-value, complex, and sophisticated money laundering operations, including by professional money launders (PMLs). Competent authorities’ investigations and prosecutions of LPOC are the money laundering cases that target the high-risk money laundering threats and typologies outlined in the NRA. Case studies, interviews with authorities and sentencing data (see core issue 7.3) all clearly demonstrate that LPOC offences reflect the most serious ML cases investigated and prosecuted in Canada. 512. During the period under review, 3 173 LPOC investigations were carried out by LEAs (including RCMP, provincial and municipal police forces) with 1 585 LPOC charges laid. Agency level data shows 1 234 LPOC investigations were conducted by RCMP resulting in 156 charges. The remainder were conducted by Provincial and Municipal police forces. 513. PPOC, with some notable exceptions, generally relates to lower-level criminality, such as straightforward self-laundering or simple possession matters. PPOC is routinely charged by police as a standalone offence or in conjunction with a predicate offence, where a person is found in possession of property they obtained through the commission of a predicate offence, such as suspected stolen property from minor thefts, street-level drug dealing, or low-level fraud schemes. There are examples of PPOC being used in more significant cases resulting in significant penalties (see 7.3). However, PPOC cases are typically of lower significance in Canada’s ML landscape. As such, less focus was put on PPOC outcomes, except for case studies demonstrating serious ML activity that was investigated and subject to prosecution for PPOC. 514. During the period under review, 244 225 instances of PPOC were reported to Canadian LEAs, resulting in charges being laid in 155 875 instances. 515. The Supreme Court of Canada cases of R v Jordan [2016] 1 SCR 631 and R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326 clarify the scope of constitutionally-protected rights and shape how criminal offences, including ML, are investigated and prosecuted (see Box 7.1). To remain consistent with these principles, Canadian LEAs have adapted their approach to ML investigations. Further detailed analysis on their impacts at prosecution can be found in core issue 7.2. Box 7.1. R v Stinchcombe; R v Jordan R v Stinchcombe This Supreme Court of Canada decision clarified that the prosecution has a duty to provide the defence with all relevant, non-privileged information in its possession. This disclosure requirement is an important part of ensuring a fair trial for the defendant. An investigation into various kinds of offences, including financial crimes, may involve significant amounts of data or documentation. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it can require investigators and prosecutors to review, manage and disclose vast amounts of information, even if it is not intended to be used as evidence. R v Jordan This Supreme Court of Canada decision established presumptive time limits — from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial — beyond which delay is presumed to be unreasonable, unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The decision recognized that delay has a negative impact on the accused, victims of crime, and society’s interest in seeing that justice is done. In superior courts, the presumptive time limit is 30 months once charges are laid while in provincial courts, the presumptive time limit is 18 months. These timelines are presumptive, rather than fixed, and may be extended in certain circumstances, including where cases are particularly complex or due to events beyond the controls of the prosecution (such as delays from the defence). [54] 516. Practice since Jordan is for LEAs to investigate ML components of cases at the initial investigation stage, which runs in parallel to the predicate offence investigation. Investigators liaise closely with prosecutors to ensure an appropriate strategy is applied to remain within the Jordan timelines. 517. To remain within these timeframes, LEAs explained that they focus their investigation on a narrower number of priority targets (typically individuals that are controllers or can be most clearly linked to the offending) rather than targeting the broader criminal enterprise. This approach balances securing outcomes against these targets with Charter-protected rights, but can lead to more limited ML prosecution and restraint and forfeiture outcomes (see IO.8). 518. ML is identified, and investigations are conducted generally in line with Canada’s risk profile. There are fewer investigations into tax offences and TBML. In LPOC cases where ML can be associated with a predicate offence, drug related offences and fraud are the primary predicate offences identified. These offences account for almost 50% of all LPOC cases, with the bulk of remaining offences identified as standalone LPOC (see Table 7.1). Table 7.1. LEA reported ML incidents and associated offences (2019-2024) Breakdown LPOC PPOC/PPT/TPOC Standalone money laundering 1 389 115 574 Drug related offences 959 25 336 Fraud 567 20 166 Firearms Violations 207 11 455 Theft 102 52 070 Tax Evasion and Excise Act 11 74 Illegal Gambling 7 13 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 4 12 Customs Act 2 6 Other proceeds generating crimes (all other UCR violations not listed above) 184 30 701 TOTAL 3 432 255 407 Source: Canada 519. The large proportion of standalone ML is reflective of criminal activity by PMLs in Canada. Competent authorities are identifying this activity in almost all large-scale proceeds generating crime in Canada. While less prevalent in medium/smaller scale activity, it remains present. PML in Canada occurs with differing levels of sophistication, ranging from standalone operators engaging in unsophisticated cash mule activity to sophisticated use of underground MSBs and professional facilitators. Its prevalence and exploitation of multiple sectors have resulted in increased prioritisation by LEAs. While investigators are identifying standalone and PML LEAs face challenges in obtaining sufficient evidence to charge and proceed with prosecution as perpetrators remain at arm’s length from the predicate offending. These challenges are demonstrated in detail below. 520. Investigations are well co-ordinated between municipal and provincial LEAs, the RCMP, and relevant federal agencies with appropriate strategic and operational mechanisms in place to facilitate co-ordination. National co-ordination across jurisdictions is directed through the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) (see core issue 1.5) and operational co-ordination occurs through several mechanisms, notably the use of integrated teams such as the Integrated ML Investigative Teams (IMLITs) and joint taskforce operations. Joint force operations occur on an ad hoc basis, as well as through established mechanisms such as the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units (CFSEUs) in BC, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and Montreal. These bring together seconded officers from RCMP, CBSA, provincial police (in GTA and Montreal) and municipal police to work on specific criminal activity. 521. Police officers across Canada’s LEAs are trained to ‘follow the money’ (an investigative principle, tracing financial transactions to identify and reveal illicit activity), with specific training provided to financial investigators, with engagement from key partner agencies (FINTRAC, CRA, CBSA, and the Forensic Accounting Management Group (FAMG). This training supports the dedicated structures. 522. Frontline police and police investigators across Canada use clear procedures to ensure cases with financial elements are referred to these specialist financial investigators for parallel financial investigations, often following initial financial inquiries to identify financial elements. 523. RCMP-FP IMLITs in BC, Alberta, Ontario and Québec are new resources, established in 2020, to improve ML identification and investigation. The four IMLITs are comprised of embedded dedicated specialist police financial investigators, civilian specialists, FAMG’s forensic accounting investigators, and criminal tax investigators from CRA to identify and investigate complex money laundering, particularly PML linked to organised crime. 524. Conducting parallel financial investigations at the initial investigation stage is largely built into LEAs’ investigation processes for matters involving financial elements. For an RCMP-FP investigation to be prioritised (‘tiered’), the operational plan must clearly demonstrate that a parallel financial investigation will be conducted. In determining whether to prioritise the matter, RCMP HQ’s prioritisation committee considers the ML threat posed by the target and the extent to which their criminality threatens Canada’s economic integrity. 525. This is a robust process and is appropriate given matters investigated by RCMP-FP are typically of greater severity, complexity and scale. With the exception of the Ontario Provincial Police, provincial and municipal LEAs do not all have such formalised processes. 526. Parallel financial investigations and agency referrals are the primary mechanisms for commencing ML investigations. This is supplemented by the effective use of financial intelligence by LEAs. In a small random sample of RCMP-FP cases where ML activity was identified, 8% of these were initiated from FINTRAC proactive disclosures (see IO.6). RCMP and other competent authorities also make extensive use of financial intelligence throughout investigations. Using the same random sample, FINTRAC information was used in 94% of RCMP-FP cases involving ML or a possession offence. 527. LEAs and competent authorities with investigative mandates across Canada are peace officers or public officers for the purposes of the CC and have access to a broad range of information gathering powers. Numerous case studies demonstrate that LEAs generally make efficient and effective use of these measures (see Box 7.2). Case studies also showed that judicial authorisations are generally able to be obtained expeditiously in urgent matters. Box 7.2. BC gaming investigation case study Between 2019-2021, the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU) of BC investigated suspected money laundering, loan sharking, extortion and involvement in organised crime linked to cash facilitation for gamblers at casinos in BC. This investigation was initiated after a referral from the BC Lottery Corporation, which identified an initial suspected cash facilitator linked to money laundering, loan sharking, and organized crime. A wide variety of investigative tools was used including physical surveillance, undercover operations, financial intelligence from FINTRAC (including STRs), bank record analysis, digital communications review, and covert monitoring. Investigators uncovered conduct consistent with ML, including the use of large amounts of unsourced cash in casinos, illicit cash for chip exchanges, loan sharking at criminal interest rates, and the use of an instant messenger application and informal value transfer systems to move funds domestically and internationally. Investigators gathered evidence showing that the suspect facilitated cash loans and converted bulk cash into bank drafts or cheques. Investigators obtained 24 omnibus applications for 60 production orders (bank records, business records, depository receipts), 42 tracking warrants (phones and vehicles), 14 transmission data recorder warrants, 6 On Party Consents, 8 search warrants for residences and mobile phones and a number of general warrants. In undertaking this complex investigation, investigators consulted with the provincial prosecution service to ensure their proper execution without jeopardising the eventual prosecution. During the course of the investigation, LEAs identified a new potential suspect and were able to conduct an undercover (UC) operation during which that suspect laundered CAD 480 000 of bulk cash for UC operators, which was presented as the proceeds of crime. The suspect was charged with a standalone count of ML for the transactions involving UC operators, pleaded Guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in jail in November 2025. Source: Canada 528. Production orders are the most used tool, and LEAs regularly seek these in relation to accounts held with FIs identified through FINTRAC disclosures, or through the execution of search warrants. Production orders were used in 97% of cases in a random sample of RCMP-FP cases. While they are used extensively, production orders have had issues with timeliness, with the most significant improvements occurring in late 2025. For the bulk of the period under review, responses were typically provided within a 30-day timeframe (in some cases up to 90 days) limiting their effectiveness particularly in the most urgent matters. [55] 529. Since February 2025, the IMLIP (see IO.6) has driven significant efforts at the policy and operation levels to accelerate the timeliness of production orders, leading to average response timeframes for production orders relating to D-SIBs and other IMLIP participants of approximately seven (7) days. Improved use of informal channels enabled by IMLIP has led to faster responses (in under 24 hours) in some urgent cases. Alternative proactive information gathering techniques allow more targeted production orders with more timely responses (see IO.6). 530. Although significant work remains to increase timeliness, these initial efforts are a promising start. Canada is also pursuing legislative amendments to enhance timeliness of responses to production orders. [56] 531. Improved access to BO information (see IO.5) has enhanced LEAs’ ability to identify and investigate the beneficial owners of legal persons involved in ML activity. Legal persons are at significant risk of exploitation for ML in Canada. LEAs have not observed the same misuse of trusts and fiducies for ML and can access information on their beneficiaries where required. Efficient access to tax information can present a challenge to LEAs which need to rely on proactive disclosures from CRA (RQ in Québec) or obtain a court order to seek access. This is a key challenge provincial LEAs face when progressing ML and financial investigations. Despite this, it is somewhat mitigated by clear and well-established communication channels between LEAs and CRA. Given the importance of tax information in understanding the full financial picture, ensuring early and efficient access to this information would better support LEAs in their investigations. 532. Strong operational co-ordination and dedicated LEA structures, coupled with use of financial intelligence and investigative tools has led to ML being charged to a significant extent. Table 7.2 demonstrates the extent to which ML and PPOC is charged, and includes all ML activity, including standalone and matters with associated predicate charges. Of the 1 617 reported incidents of LPOC that were cleared during the period under review, 1 585 resulted in charges. Of these, 32 charges were declined by the prosecutor. For PPOC, the 160 250 cleared PPOC incidents led to 155 875 charges being laid. Table 7.2. Police-reported incidents involving an MLO, by clearance status, Canada, 2019-2024 Breakdown of ML Cleared activity LPOC PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT All Cleared 1 617 160 250 161 867 Cleared by Charge (includes charges recommended) 1 585 155 875 157 460 Charges recommended but declined by Crown 32 4 375 4 407 Not Cleared 1 479 67 219 68 698 Cleared otherwise 77 16 756 16 833 Total Incidents 3 173 244 225 247 398 Source: Canada 533. Note: ‘Cleared’ incidents are where the investigative phase has concluded. Where an incident is ‘cleared by charge’ this refers to a charge being laid and reflects the handover of the matter from the investigative phase to the prosecution phase. Investigations may remain ongoing to the prosecution of a matter cleared by charge. Where a matter is cleared without charge (including where charges were recommended but declined by the crown) it means that the investigation phase has concluded without the matter proceeding to prosecution on the LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge. 'Not cleared' includes incidents that are open/still under investigation, have insufficient evidence to proceed, and the victim or complainant declines to proceed (no suspect identified). ‘Cleared otherwise’ includes use of departmental discretion, victim requested no further action taken (suspect identified), diversionary program/mental health facility, suspect involved in other incidents, incident cleared by another agency, death of the suspect, among others. 534. LEAs face challenges in building cases sufficient to lay charges of LPOC in standalone ML and PML cases. Approximately 87 standalone LPOC charges have been laid in the period under review out of 1 389 possible instances of LPOC activity reported to LEAs. The bulk of these were not cleared due to insufficient evidence (see Table 7.3). This reflects the challenges competent authorities face in building cases with sufficient evidence to charge LPOC in the absence of a predicate offence, given the need to demonstrate reasonable prospect of conviction in order to prosecute (a fundamental principle of prosecutions within Canada). Table 7.3. Police-reported incidents involving a single money laundering or possession of proceeds of crime violation, by clearance status, Canada, 2019-2024 (standalone ML) Breakdown of ML Cleared activity LPOC PPOC/PPT/TPOC All Cleared by Charge/Charges Recommended 87 43 857 43 944 Not Cleared 1 256 59 705 60 961 Cleared otherwise 46 9 363 9 409 Total Incidents 1 389 112 925 114 314 Source: Canada CRA-CIP 535. CRA-CIP traces financial transactions using a “follow the money” approach to develop evidence and trace proceeds of crime related to tax offences, such as tax evasion. CRA criminal investigators are provided with training on core skills for financial investigations (methods of proving income, search and seizure skills, judicial authorisations etc). This approach supports the investigative process by uncovering the nature and scope of the suspected tax crime and identifies assets that may be subject to seizure and forfeiture. The CRA-CIP uses tax information, financial records (including those disclosed through FINTRAC VIRs), and open-source intelligence to identify possible assets for seizure and forfeiture. Table 7.4. CRA-CIP enforcement outcomes CRA-CIP Cases 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 CRA criminal investigations 252 236 205 183 175 200 Cases with ML charges 2 1 0 5 0 0 Cases with ML convictions 0 0 0 1 2 0 Source: CRA-CIP 536. To date, this approach has been taken to support CRA-CIP’s primary focus on charging and securing convictions for tax evasions and tax offences, with comparatively limited focus placed on investigating ML (see Table 7.4). As of 21 November 2025, per its revised Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Investigation Policy, CRA now requires that every CRA criminal investigation includes a mandatory assessment of potential ML charges and asset recovery opportunities at the commencement of, and throughout, all investigations. 537. This recent adoption represents a major shift in CRA-CIP’s approach to investigating money laundering and is a positive development to support increased prioritisation of ML investigations. CRA’s revised investigation policy has been supplemented by a dedicated ML Case Development Guide that has been circulated to its investigators. An ML specific training course is in development. CBSA 538. CBSA does not have a mandate to carry out criminal investigations of ML directly. It works extensively with the RCMP, provincial and municipal police, FINTRAC and other competent authorities in Canada and abroad where it identifies and enforces potential non-compliance with the Customs Act or PCMLTFA (Parts 2 and 2.1) at the border. CBSA’s BFCC leads CBSA’s capability to detect, deter and disrupt border-related movements of illicit financial flows, including trade based financial crime. The BFCC is well resourced and has expanded during the period under review. (see Box 6.1 in IO.6 for further details on BFCC capability) The BFCC refers suspected customs offences to CBSA criminal investigators and ML activity to LEAs (RCMP, provincial/municipal police as relevant), security intelligence agencies, or other competent authorities in Canada and abroad as appropriate. 539. During the period under review, the BFCC’s Trade Based Money Laundering Centre of Expertise developed 71 Tactical Intelligence Assessments identifying potential trade based financial crime. This resulted in CBSA investigators opening 40 criminal investigations for trade fraud offences under the Customs Act. A total of 11 matters involving suspected ML were referred to RCMP for criminal investigation with 29 matters referred to foreign law enforcement. 540. Additionally, CBSA officers are central to the operation of Canada’s Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and RCMPs’ various Border Integrity Units. These structures co-locate CBSA officers and investigators with RCMP officers enabling the streamlined referral of suspected criminal activity detected at the border, including ML, to RCMP for investigation (see Box 7.3). Box 7.3. Case study – cross-border ML investigations In 2023, CBSA officers seized 300 kg of methamphetamine concealed in a commercial truck entering Canada, triggering an immediate referral to the RCMP’s Border Integrity Unit. This referral initiated a joint investigation into an organized crime network involved in large‑scale importation and trafficking of methamphetamine and cocaine. A parallel financial investigation uncovered drug proceeds used to pay the suspects’ living expenses and purchase vehicles (in cash). These proceeds moved through structured deposits, nominee accounts, forged identities, shell companies, and international transfers using MSBs, currency exchanges, and cryptocurrency. Co-location of CBSA and RCMP officers, and access to regime partners (including FAMG analysts) facilitated the timely investigation. Investigators traced the flow of illicit proceeds and identified broader criminal conduct through the use of bank records, FINTRAC financial intelligence, production orders, surveillance and digital forensics. LEAs later intercepted 120 kg of cocaine and executed search warrants that uncovered additional drugs, forged documents, and evidence of ML activity. Two individuals were charged. The spouse pleaded guilty to laundering proceeds of crime and received a two‑year conditional sentence. The primary accused pleaded guilty to five offences, including importation, trafficking, conspiracy, and ML, and received a 16‑year sentence. Approximately CAD 50 000 in offence‑related property was forfeited. Footnotes [54] Legislation was introduced in December 2025 in the Canadian Parliament (Protecting Victims Act), intended to address some of the practical challenges associated with complying with Jordan timeframes. This legislation was not in force at the conclusion of the Onsite visit. [55] The 30-day timeframe is due to an interpretation, largely by the D-SIBs, of s 487.0193 (1) and (2) which provide that a person has 30 days to seek review, revocation or variation of a production order [56] Some legislative amendments are too recent to properly determine their impact on effectiveness or have entered into force after the onsite." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="508. Canada identifies and investigates ML to a significant extent. ML is typically identified by LEAs when conducting parallel financial investigations at the initial investigation stage 509. The Criminal Code establishes four different money laundering offences: laundering proceeds of crime (LPOC) (CC s462.31), possess property obtained by crime (PPOC) (CC s354), trafficking in property obtained by crime (TPOC) (CC 355.2), and possess property obtained by crime for the purpose of trafficking (PPOCPT) (CC 355.4). 510. The assessment has placed the most focus to the outcomes achieved in LPOC investigations and prosecutions and has also focused on the outcomes of PPOC cases involving complex, high value, and high impact ML activity. These cases generally involve the most significant and complex ML activity in Canada and results in these matters have the biggest impact in Canada’s efforts to combat ML. Less focus has been placed on the outcomes of PPOC offences. While PPOC offences span a range of criminality, they generally relate to lower-level criminality and typically to lower-value self-laundering. 511. LPOC captures the broadest range of laundering typologies, particularly the type of activity associated with high-value, complex, and sophisticated money laundering operations, including by professional money launders (PMLs). Competent authorities’ investigations and prosecutions of LPOC are the money laundering cases that target the high-risk money laundering threats and typologies outlined in the NRA. Case studies, interviews with authorities and sentencing data (see core issue 7.3) all clearly demonstrate that LPOC offences reflect the most serious ML cases investigated and prosecuted in Canada. 512. During the period under review, 3 173 LPOC investigations were carried out by LEAs (including RCMP, provincial and municipal police forces) with 1 585 LPOC charges laid. Agency level data shows 1 234 LPOC investigations were conducted by RCMP resulting in 156 charges. The remainder were conducted by Provincial and Municipal police forces. 513. PPOC, with some notable exceptions, generally relates to lower-level criminality, such as straightforward self-laundering or simple possession matters. PPOC is routinely charged by police as a standalone offence or in conjunction with a predicate offence, where a person is found in possession of property they obtained through the commission of a predicate offence, such as suspected stolen property from minor thefts, street-level drug dealing, or low-level fraud schemes. There are examples of PPOC being used in more significant cases resulting in significant penalties (see 7.3). However, PPOC cases are typically of lower significance in Canada’s ML landscape. As such, less focus was put on PPOC outcomes, except for case studies demonstrating serious ML activity that was investigated and subject to prosecution for PPOC. 514. During the period under review, 244 225 instances of PPOC were reported to Canadian LEAs, resulting in charges being laid in 155 875 instances. 515. The Supreme Court of Canada cases of R v Jordan [2016] 1 SCR 631 and R v Stinchcombe [1991] 3 SCR 326 clarify the scope of constitutionally-protected rights and shape how criminal offences, including ML, are investigated and prosecuted (see Box 7.1). To remain consistent with these principles, Canadian LEAs have adapted their approach to ML investigations. Further detailed analysis on their impacts at prosecution can be found in core issue 7.2. Box 7.1. R v Stinchcombe; R v Jordan R v Stinchcombe This Supreme Court of Canada decision clarified that the prosecution has a duty to provide the defence with all relevant, non-privileged information in its possession. This disclosure requirement is an important part of ensuring a fair trial for the defendant. An investigation into various kinds of offences, including financial crimes, may involve significant amounts of data or documentation. Depending on the circumstances of the case, it can require investigators and prosecutors to review, manage and disclose vast amounts of information, even if it is not intended to be used as evidence. R v Jordan This Supreme Court of Canada decision established presumptive time limits — from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial — beyond which delay is presumed to be unreasonable, unless exceptional circumstances justify it. The decision recognized that delay has a negative impact on the accused, victims of crime, and society’s interest in seeing that justice is done. In superior courts, the presumptive time limit is 30 months once charges are laid while in provincial courts, the presumptive time limit is 18 months. These timelines are presumptive, rather than fixed, and may be extended in certain circumstances, including where cases are particularly complex or due to events beyond the controls of the prosecution (such as delays from the defence). [54] 516. Practice since Jordan is for LEAs to investigate ML components of cases at the initial investigation stage, which runs in parallel to the predicate offence investigation. Investigators liaise closely with prosecutors to ensure an appropriate strategy is applied to remain within the Jordan timelines. 517. To remain within these timeframes, LEAs explained that they focus their investigation on a narrower number of priority targets (typically individuals that are controllers or can be most clearly linked to the offending) rather than targeting the broader criminal enterprise. This approach balances securing outcomes against these targets with Charter-protected rights, but can lead to more limited ML prosecution and restraint and forfeiture outcomes (see IO.8). 518. ML is identified, and investigations are conducted generally in line with Canada’s risk profile. There are fewer investigations into tax offences and TBML. In LPOC cases where ML can be associated with a predicate offence, drug related offences and fraud are the primary predicate offences identified. These offences account for almost 50% of all LPOC cases, with the bulk of remaining offences identified as standalone LPOC (see Table 7.1). Table 7.1. LEA reported ML incidents and associated offences (2019-2024) Breakdown LPOC PPOC/PPT/TPOC Standalone money laundering 1 389 115 574 Drug related offences 959 25 336 Fraud 567 20 166 Firearms Violations 207 11 455 Theft 102 52 070 Tax Evasion and Excise Act 11 74 Illegal Gambling 7 13 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 4 12 Customs Act 2 6 Other proceeds generating crimes (all other UCR violations not listed above) 184 30 701 TOTAL 3 432 255 407 Source: Canada 519. The large proportion of standalone ML is reflective of criminal activity by PMLs in Canada. Competent authorities are identifying this activity in almost all large-scale proceeds generating crime in Canada. While less prevalent in medium/smaller scale activity, it remains present. PML in Canada occurs with differing levels of sophistication, ranging from standalone operators engaging in unsophisticated cash mule activity to sophisticated use of underground MSBs and professional facilitators. Its prevalence and exploitation of multiple sectors have resulted in increased prioritisation by LEAs. While investigators are identifying standalone and PML LEAs face challenges in obtaining sufficient evidence to charge and proceed with prosecution as perpetrators remain at arm’s length from the predicate offending. These challenges are demonstrated in detail below. 520. Investigations are well co-ordinated between municipal and provincial LEAs, the RCMP, and relevant federal agencies with appropriate strategic and operational mechanisms in place to facilitate co-ordination. National co-ordination across jurisdictions is directed through the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) (see core issue 1.5) and operational co-ordination occurs through several mechanisms, notably the use of integrated teams such as the Integrated ML Investigative Teams (IMLITs) and joint taskforce operations. Joint force operations occur on an ad hoc basis, as well as through established mechanisms such as the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units (CFSEUs) in BC, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and Montreal. These bring together seconded officers from RCMP, CBSA, provincial police (in GTA and Montreal) and municipal police to work on specific criminal activity. 521. Police officers across Canada’s LEAs are trained to ‘follow the money’ (an investigative principle, tracing financial transactions to identify and reveal illicit activity), with specific training provided to financial investigators, with engagement from key partner agencies (FINTRAC, CRA, CBSA, and the Forensic Accounting Management Group (FAMG). This training supports the dedicated structures. 522. Frontline police and police investigators across Canada use clear procedures to ensure cases with financial elements are referred to these specialist financial investigators for parallel financial investigations, often following initial financial inquiries to identify financial elements. 523. RCMP-FP IMLITs in BC, Alberta, Ontario and Québec are new resources, established in 2020, to improve ML identification and investigation. The four IMLITs are comprised of embedded dedicated specialist police financial investigators, civilian specialists, FAMG’s forensic accounting investigators, and criminal tax investigators from CRA to identify and investigate complex money laundering, particularly PML linked to organised crime. 524. Conducting parallel financial investigations at the initial investigation stage is largely built into LEAs’ investigation processes for matters involving financial elements. For an RCMP-FP investigation to be prioritised (‘tiered’), the operational plan must clearly demonstrate that a parallel financial investigation will be conducted. In determining whether to prioritise the matter, RCMP HQ’s prioritisation committee considers the ML threat posed by the target and the extent to which their criminality threatens Canada’s economic integrity. 525. This is a robust process and is appropriate given matters investigated by RCMP-FP are typically of greater severity, complexity and scale. With the exception of the Ontario Provincial Police, provincial and municipal LEAs do not all have such formalised processes. 526. Parallel financial investigations and agency referrals are the primary mechanisms for commencing ML investigations. This is supplemented by the effective use of financial intelligence by LEAs. In a small random sample of RCMP-FP cases where ML activity was identified, 8% of these were initiated from FINTRAC proactive disclosures (see IO.6). RCMP and other competent authorities also make extensive use of financial intelligence throughout investigations. Using the same random sample, FINTRAC information was used in 94% of RCMP-FP cases involving ML or a possession offence. 527. LEAs and competent authorities with investigative mandates across Canada are peace officers or public officers for the purposes of the CC and have access to a broad range of information gathering powers. Numerous case studies demonstrate that LEAs generally make efficient and effective use of these measures (see Box 7.2). Case studies also showed that judicial authorisations are generally able to be obtained expeditiously in urgent matters. Box 7.2. BC gaming investigation case study Between 2019-2021, the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU) of BC investigated suspected money laundering, loan sharking, extortion and involvement in organised crime linked to cash facilitation for gamblers at casinos in BC. This investigation was initiated after a referral from the BC Lottery Corporation, which identified an initial suspected cash facilitator linked to money laundering, loan sharking, and organized crime. A wide variety of investigative tools was used including physical surveillance, undercover operations, financial intelligence from FINTRAC (including STRs), bank record analysis, digital communications review, and covert monitoring. Investigators uncovered conduct consistent with ML, including the use of large amounts of unsourced cash in casinos, illicit cash for chip exchanges, loan sharking at criminal interest rates, and the use of an instant messenger application and informal value transfer systems to move funds domestically and internationally. Investigators gathered evidence showing that the suspect facilitated cash loans and converted bulk cash into bank drafts or cheques. Investigators obtained 24 omnibus applications for 60 production orders (bank records, business records, depository receipts), 42 tracking warrants (phones and vehicles), 14 transmission data recorder warrants, 6 On Party Consents, 8 search warrants for residences and mobile phones and a number of general warrants. In undertaking this complex investigation, investigators consulted with the provincial prosecution service to ensure their proper execution without jeopardising the eventual prosecution. During the course of the investigation, LEAs identified a new potential suspect and were able to conduct an undercover (UC) operation during which that suspect laundered CAD 480 000 of bulk cash for UC operators, which was presented as the proceeds of crime. The suspect was charged with a standalone count of ML for the transactions involving UC operators, pleaded Guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in jail in November 2025. Source: Canada 528. Production orders are the most used tool, and LEAs regularly seek these in relation to accounts held with FIs identified through FINTRAC disclosures, or through the execution of search warrants. Production orders were used in 97% of cases in a random sample of RCMP-FP cases. While they are used extensively, production orders have had issues with timeliness, with the most significant improvements occurring in late 2025. For the bulk of the period under review, responses were typically provided within a 30-day timeframe (in some cases up to 90 days) limiting their effectiveness particularly in the most urgent matters. [55] 529. Since February 2025, the IMLIP (see IO.6) has driven significant efforts at the policy and operation levels to accelerate the timeliness of production orders, leading to average response timeframes for production orders relating to D-SIBs and other IMLIP participants of approximately seven (7) days. Improved use of informal channels enabled by IMLIP has led to faster responses (in under 24 hours) in some urgent cases. Alternative proactive information gathering techniques allow more targeted production orders with more timely responses (see IO.6). 530. Although significant work remains to increase timeliness, these initial efforts are a promising start. Canada is also pursuing legislative amendments to enhance timeliness of responses to production orders. [56] 531. Improved access to BO information (see IO.5) has enhanced LEAs’ ability to identify and investigate the beneficial owners of legal persons involved in ML activity. Legal persons are at significant risk of exploitation for ML in Canada. LEAs have not observed the same misuse of trusts and fiducies for ML and can access information on their beneficiaries where required. Efficient access to tax information can present a challenge to LEAs which need to rely on proactive disclosures from CRA (RQ in Québec) or obtain a court order to seek access. This is a key challenge provincial LEAs face when progressing ML and financial investigations. Despite this, it is somewhat mitigated by clear and well-established communication channels between LEAs and CRA. Given the importance of tax information in understanding the full financial picture, ensuring early and efficient access to this information would better support LEAs in their investigations. 532. Strong operational co-ordination and dedicated LEA structures, coupled with use of financial intelligence and investigative tools has led to ML being charged to a significant extent. Table 7.2 demonstrates the extent to which ML and PPOC is charged, and includes all ML activity, including standalone and matters with associated predicate charges. Of the 1 617 reported incidents of LPOC that were cleared during the period under review, 1 585 resulted in charges. Of these, 32 charges were declined by the prosecutor. For PPOC, the 160 250 cleared PPOC incidents led to 155 875 charges being laid. Table 7.2. Police-reported incidents involving an MLO, by clearance status, Canada, 2019-2024 Breakdown of ML Cleared activity LPOC PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT All Cleared 1 617 160 250 161 867 Cleared by Charge (includes charges recommended) 1 585 155 875 157 460 Charges recommended but declined by Crown 32 4 375 4 407 Not Cleared 1 479 67 219 68 698 Cleared otherwise 77 16 756 16 833 Total Incidents 3 173 244 225 247 398 Source: Canada 533. Note: ‘Cleared’ incidents are where the investigative phase has concluded. Where an incident is ‘cleared by charge’ this refers to a charge being laid and reflects the handover of the matter from the investigative phase to the prosecution phase. Investigations may remain ongoing to the prosecution of a matter cleared by charge. Where a matter is cleared without charge (including where charges were recommended but declined by the crown) it means that the investigation phase has concluded without the matter proceeding to prosecution on the LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge. 'Not cleared' includes incidents that are open/still under investigation, have insufficient evidence to proceed, and the victim or complainant declines to proceed (no suspect identified). ‘Cleared otherwise’ includes use of departmental discretion, victim requested no further action taken (suspect identified), diversionary program/mental health facility, suspect involved in other incidents, incident cleared by another agency, death of the suspect, among others. 534. LEAs face challenges in building cases sufficient to lay charges of LPOC in standalone ML and PML cases. Approximately 87 standalone LPOC charges have been laid in the period under review out of 1 389 possible instances of LPOC activity reported to LEAs. The bulk of these were not cleared due to insufficient evidence (see Table 7.3). This reflects the challenges competent authorities face in building cases with sufficient evidence to charge LPOC in the absence of a predicate offence, given the need to demonstrate reasonable prospect of conviction in order to prosecute (a fundamental principle of prosecutions within Canada). Table 7.3. Police-reported incidents involving a single money laundering or possession of proceeds of crime violation, by clearance status, Canada, 2019-2024 (standalone ML) Breakdown of ML Cleared activity LPOC PPOC/PPT/TPOC All Cleared by Charge/Charges Recommended 87 43 857 43 944 Not Cleared 1 256 59 705 60 961 Cleared otherwise 46 9 363 9 409 Total Incidents 1 389 112 925 114 314 Source: Canada CRA-CIP 535. CRA-CIP traces financial transactions using a “follow the money” approach to develop evidence and trace proceeds of crime related to tax offences, such as tax evasion. CRA criminal investigators are provided with training on core skills for financial investigations (methods of proving income, search and seizure skills, judicial authorisations etc). This approach supports the investigative process by uncovering the nature and scope of the suspected tax crime and identifies assets that may be subject to seizure and forfeiture. The CRA-CIP uses tax information, financial records (including those disclosed through FINTRAC VIRs), and open-source intelligence to identify possible assets for seizure and forfeiture. Table 7.4. CRA-CIP enforcement outcomes CRA-CIP Cases 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 CRA criminal investigations 252 236 205 183 175 200 Cases with ML charges 2 1 0 5 0 0 Cases with ML convictions 0 0 0 1 2 0 Source: CRA-CIP 536. To date, this approach has been taken to support CRA-CIP’s primary focus on charging and securing convictions for tax evasions and tax offences, with comparatively limited focus placed on investigating ML (see Table 7.4). As of 21 November 2025, per its revised Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Investigation Policy, CRA now requires that every CRA criminal investigation includes a mandatory assessment of potential ML charges and asset recovery opportunities at the commencement of, and throughout, all investigations. 537. This recent adoption represents a major shift in CRA-CIP’s approach to investigating money laundering and is a positive development to support increased prioritisation of ML investigations. CRA’s revised investigation policy has been supplemented by a dedicated ML Case Development Guide that has been circulated to its investigators. An ML specific training course is in development. CBSA 538. CBSA does not have a mandate to carry out criminal investigations of ML directly. It works extensively with the RCMP, provincial and municipal police, FINTRAC and other competent authorities in Canada and abroad where it identifies and enforces potential non-compliance with the Customs Act or PCMLTFA (Parts 2 and 2.1) at the border. CBSA’s BFCC leads CBSA’s capability to detect, deter and disrupt border-related movements of illicit financial flows, including trade based financial crime. The BFCC is well resourced and has expanded during the period under review. (see Box 6.1 in IO.6 for further details on BFCC capability) The BFCC refers suspected customs offences to CBSA criminal investigators and ML activity to LEAs (RCMP, provincial/municipal police as relevant), security intelligence agencies, or other competent authorities in Canada and abroad as appropriate. 539. During the period under review, the BFCC’s Trade Based Money Laundering Centre of Expertise developed 71 Tactical Intelligence Assessments identifying potential trade based financial crime. This resulted in CBSA investigators opening 40 criminal investigations for trade fraud offences under the Customs Act. A total of 11 matters involving suspected ML were referred to RCMP for criminal investigation with 29 matters referred to foreign law enforcement. 540. Additionally, CBSA officers are central to the operation of Canada’s Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and RCMPs’ various Border Integrity Units. These structures co-locate CBSA officers and investigators with RCMP officers enabling the streamlined referral of suspected criminal activity detected at the border, including ML, to RCMP for investigation (see Box 7.3). Box 7.3. Case study – cross-border ML investigations In 2023, CBSA officers seized 300 kg of methamphetamine concealed in a commercial truck entering Canada, triggering an immediate referral to the RCMP’s Border Integrity Unit. This referral initiated a joint investigation into an organized crime network involved in large‑scale importation and trafficking of methamphetamine and cocaine. A parallel financial investigation uncovered drug proceeds used to pay the suspects’ living expenses and purchase vehicles (in cash). These proceeds moved through structured deposits, nominee accounts, forged identities, shell companies, and international transfers using MSBs, currency exchanges, and cryptocurrency. Co-location of CBSA and RCMP officers, and access to regime partners (including FAMG analysts) facilitated the timely investigation. Investigators traced the flow of illicit proceeds and identified broader criminal conduct through the use of bank records, FINTRAC financial intelligence, production orders, surveillance and digital forensics. LEAs later intercepted 120 kg of cocaine and executed search warrants that uncovered additional drugs, forged documents, and evidence of ML activity. Two individuals were charged. The spouse pleaded guilty to laundering proceeds of crime and received a two‑year conditional sentence. The primary accused pleaded guilty to five offences, including importation, trafficking, conspiracy, and ML, and received a 16‑year sentence. Approximately CAD 50 000 in offence‑related property was forfeited. Footnotes [54] Legislation was introduced in December 2025 in the Canadian Parliament (Protecting Victims Act), intended to address some of the practical challenges associated with complying with Jordan timeframes. This legislation was not in force at the conclusion of the Onsite visit. [55] The 30-day timeframe is due to an interpretation, largely by the D-SIBs, of s 487.0193 (1) and (2) which provide that a person has 30 days to seek review, revocation or variation of a production order [56] Some legislative amendments are too recent to properly determine their impact on effectiveness or have entered into force after the onsite." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="761. UN listings and delistings are automatically incorporated into Canadian law through regulations under the United Nations Act, ensuring freezing obligations apply without delay (see Recommendation 6 for more details). 762. Canada implements UNSCR 1373 through the Criminal Code , whereas previously they used the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Suppression of Terrorism (RIUNRST) under the UN Act. All recent listings have been under Section 83.05 of the Criminal Code, however, there remain 36 individuals and entities listed under RIUNRST, the most recent being from 2006. 763. Since 2019 there have been 38 listings under Section 83.05 of the Criminal Code . The listing process can be expediated when required and completed in days or weeks. The Criminal Code authorises the Government of Canada to independently list both domestic and international terrorist entities - defined under the Criminal Code as including persons, groups, or organisations that knowingly engage in or facilitate terrorist activity. This regime provides the legal and institutional framework to freeze assets, prohibit terrorist financing, and criminalise support activities. The listing and delisting processes follow a whole-of-government approach led by Public Safety, ensuring co-ordinated and accountable efforts to combat terrorism. 764. Once an entity is listed, it is considered a “terrorist group” under the Criminal Code . The Criminal Code prohibits certain actions in relation to terrorist groups, including those related to terrorist financing, travel, and recruitment. Examples of related criminal offences include participating in or contributing to any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity (section 83.18), providing or collecting property/funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to carry out or benefit a terrorist activity or group (section 83.03. instructing someone to carry out an activity for a terrorist group (section 83.21). 765. Any department or agency can propose an entity to be considered for listing or delisting if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the group or individual has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity, or the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with, an entity involved in a terrorist activity. This is a “whole of government approach” involving multiple phases and interdepartmental consultation (See Box 10.1). A security intelligence report developed by the CSIS or Public Safety, or a criminal intelligence report prepared by RCMP will be completed and reviewed by the Department of Justice to determine whether the legal threshold has been met. Public Safety then creates a listing package for the Minister of Public Safety approval. The Minister recommends to the Governor in Council that the entity be listed. The Governor in Council’s decision is supported by a discussion at Cabinet that includes considerations related to the domestic and international implications of a listing. Lastly, if satisfied that the legal threshold has been met, the Governor in Council may list the entity, and once approved, the listing will be published in the Canada Gazette. Figure 10.1. Procedure for [De-]Listing Entities Pursuant to the Criminal Code Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Department of Finance, Canada 766. Meanwhile, Canada implements UNSCR 1267 through the United Nations Act Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Taliban, ISIL and Al- Qaida (UNAQITR). Section 2 of the UNAQITR imposes financial prohibitions on any person (individual or entity) in Canada or a Canadian outside Canada related to listed persons or a person acting on behalf/direction of them or an entity held, controlled directly or indirectly by that person. 767. Currently, there are 252 individuals and 89 entities on the 1267 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida Sanctions list and 135 individuals and 5 entities on the 1988 Taliban Sanctions List, both of which are fully in force in Canada. Since the inception of the lists, Canada has co-designated 11 individuals and entities to the UN 1267 sanctions list and co-sponsored an additional 7 designations put forward by another Member State. 768. GAC disseminates changes to UN lists within 24 hours and provides direct links and alerts, helping ensure that reporting entities can implement freezing obligations without delay. A subscription-based sanctions update alert service (with 1 838 subscribers at the time of writing), FAQs, and scenario-based guidance further support implementation. Domestic listings under the Criminal Code, administered by PS, complement the UN regime, with 86 entities currently listed. In addition to GAC alerts, Canada uses FINTRAC’s digital communications channels and its mailing list, comprising of reporting entities, associations, and media representatives to provide updates regarding the list to stakeholders. 769. General information on listing and delisting procedures is also available on GAC’s sanctions website, as well as guidance on how to apply to the UN for delisting and required information. Pursuant to UNAQITR, an individual or entity claiming not to be a listed person may apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for a certificate of mistaken identity. If it is established that the applicant is not the listed person, the Minister will issue a certificate. If it is not so established, the applicant will receive notice of the determination. This mechanism has not yet been tested as to date Canada has not received a request for a certificate of mistaken identity under UNAQITR. 770. Canada's TF-TFS regime requires reporting entities to quickly identify and immediately freeze funds and economic resources linked to listed persons, thus depriving them of the means to finance terrorism. Reporting entities are prohibited from allowing listed entities to access property and from dealing with or otherwise disposing of the property. 771. Despite the strength of the legal framework, implementation risks persist. Screening practices vary across sectors, and some DNFBPs rely on less user-friendly tools or third-party foreign sites. This increases the likelihood that new designations may not be identified immediately, creating pockets of residual delay risk that authorities should address through further outreach and supervision. Box 10.1. 1267 Delisting – November 2025 On 6 November 2025, the UN Security Council decided to remove two individuals from its Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list (1267). Upon the update, the delisting immediately came into effect in Canada as per the UNAQITR. Canada incorporates UNSC sanctions list changes involving individuals and entities by reference in the United Nations Act (UNA). This means that no action was required by Canada to implement the decision by the UNSC to delist these two individuals. On November 7, GAC communicated the listing via an alert from the sanctions mailbox. To support timely awareness of sanctions related information, FINTRAC references GAC sanctions webpages in its compliance guidance and directs reporting entities to consult these sources regularly. Reporting entities can also subscribe to GAC’s email alerts to ensure they receive immediate updates on new or amended listings, helping reinforce strong compliance processes. Source: Global Affairs Canada (GAC)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="541. Case studies demonstrate that ML is prosecuted to some extent. During the assessment period, there were 70 LPOC convictions in relation to 58 persons, and 12,960 guilty verdicts on PPOC/TPOC and PPOCPT charges in relation to 9 924 persons. 542. Prosecutors are adept at navigating the R v Jordan timeframes and have applied several strategies to ensure prosecutions are conducted and concluded within a reasonable time. This includes severing the ML prosecution from any predicate offence and proceeding with it separately. Where trial in a superior court would be appropriate, steps are to be taken to bring the charges to that court on an expedited basis. The strategies are functioning as there has not been a notable increase in the number of criminal proceedings stayed (for ML or associated predicate offences) during the period under review. Prioritisation of predicate convictions 543. Canada’s criminal justice system utilises resolution agreements (such as plea bargains) to ensure its efficient functioning, which is the result of many criminal matters. Extensive use of resolution agreements is a legitimate tool to facilitate efficient criminal justice outcomes in a manner consistent with Canada’s fundamental principles of domestic law. 544. Canada’s various prosecution services have guidelines for prosecutors. These guidelines provide that charges with lower maximum penalties may be dropped to secure a conviction on the charge with the highest maximum penalty through a resolution agreement. For example, where an accused facing serious drug charges is ready to accept a significant custodial sentence for those charges, prosecutors may elect to withdraw the ML charge rather than using finite judicial resources to conduct a trial on all charges. Global resolution agreements may require that the accused accept responsibility for broader factual elements of their criminal activity, which may include accepting responsibility for the facts relating to ML activity. The accused’s willingness to concede forfeiture of the proceeds of crime is also a relevant consideration. 545. Major predicate offences such as drug trafficking and fraud carry higher maximum penalties (up to life imprisonment and 14 years, respectively) than LPOC or PPOC offences (10 years). Resolution agreements would typically withdraw the LPOC or PPOC element to secure the predicate conviction. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below demonstrate this trend, showing when cases reach the prosecution stage, ML charges are commonly withdrawn to secure resolution agreements. Table 7.5. Adult criminal courts, money laundering offences (MLO) cases (considering all charges in a case) by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type All MLOs – all charges (including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 8 642 5 603 5 596 5 799 6 608 32 248 Acquitted 98 70 27 35 41 271 Stay of proceeding 1 445 1 225 1 255 1 197 1 264 6 386 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 3 040 2 654 3 125 3 106 3 662 15 587 Other decisions 60 44 35 48 49 236 Total 13 285 9 596 10 038 10 185 11 624 54 728 Source: Canada Note: Tables 7.6 through 7.11 do not include cases from Québec in 2021-22 onward and certain courts in Ontario Table 7.6. Adult criminal courts, money laundering offences (MLO) cases (only considering MLO charges) by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type All MLOs (only MLO charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 3 599 2 409 2 195 2 235 2 592 13 030 Acquitted 159 98 28 39 55 379 Stay of proceeding 2 797 2 233 1 989 1 961 1 977 10 957 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 6 640 4 785 5 782 5 879 6 934 30 020 Other decisions 90 71 44 71 66 342 Total 13 285 9 596 10 038 10 185 11 624 54 728 Source: Canada 546. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 both report the total number of cases with at least one LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge. Table 7.5 provides the outcome in relation to all charges (including predicate offence charges) and shows that out of 54 728 cases concluded over the period, nearly 59% ended in findings of guilt on at least one charge. Where only the outcome on the LPOC or PPOC charge (Table 7.6) is considered, charges are withdrawn or stayed in 75% of cases. 547. This trend becomes clearer when each of the MLOs is separated out: Table 7.7. Adult criminal courts, PPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type PPOC (all charges including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 8 266 357 5 364 5 527 6 387 30 901 Acquitted 93 68 27 32 38 258 Stay of proceeding 1 385 1 151 1 199 1 144 1 220 6 099 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 2 904 2 554 2 970 2 990 3 525 14 943 Other decisions 51 33 32 41 40 197 Total 12 699 9 163 9 592 9 734 11 210 52 398 Decision Type PPOC (only PPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 3,446 2,305 2,096 2,117 2,492 12,456 Acquitted 152 96 27 36 52 363 Stay of proceeding 2,698 2,133 1,920 1,894 1,919 10,564 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 6,325 4,573 5,509 5,636 6,698 28,741 Other decisions 78 56 40 51 49 274 Total 12,699 9,163 9,592 9,734 11,210 52,398 Source: Canada Table 7.8. Adult criminal courts, TPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type TPOC (all charges, including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 334 206 178 247 205 1 170 Acquitted 5 - 1 2 4 12 Stay of proceeding 43 52 41 38 26 200 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 97 70 103 92 120 482 Other decisions 5 7 2 5 5 24 Total 484 335 325 384 360 1 888 Decision Type TPOC (only TPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 121 76 77 96 83 453 Acquitted 7 - 1 1 4 13 Stay of proceeding 71 84 54 74 45 328 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 274 165 189 200 220 1 048 Other decisions 11 10 4 13 8 46 Total 484 335 325 384 360 1 888 Source: Canada Table 7.9. Adult criminal courts, PPOCPT by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type PPOCPT (all charges, including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 97 87 74 94 83 435 Acquitted 1 1 1 1 1 5 Stay of proceeding 11 23 11 16 22 83 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 50 30 43 33 66 222 Other decisions 1 3 2 1 1 8 Total 160 144 131 145 173 753 Decision Type PPOCPT (only PPOCPT charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 31 23 21 25 24 124 Acquitted 2 1 0 0 0 5 Stay of proceeding 26 36 14 20 20 123 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 99 81 94 95 115 484 Other decisions 2 3 2 5 5 17 Total 160 144 131 145 173 753 Source: Canada 548. For PPOC (Table 7.7), 59% of cases ended in a finding of guilt on either the PPOC charge or the predicate charge. Looking only at the decision on the PPOC charge, 24% of PPOC charges result in a guilty decision and the PPOC charge is withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed in 75% of cases. For PPOC, this high withdrawal rate is understandable, as the offence is often charged as an adjunct to predicate offences such as theft or when charged on a standalone basis, typically involves low level criminal conduct (possession or self-laundering) where prosecution may not be in the public interest and diversionary measures may be appropriate. During the assessment period, 9 461 persons were convicted of a charge of PPOC. 549. For TPOC (Table 7.8) a similar trend emerges with 62% of cases ended in a finding of guilt on either the TPOC charge or the predicate charge, and only 24% of TPOC charges resulting in a guilty decision. Given the more serious nature of TPOC, it is a concern that the TPOC charge is being withdrawn in 73% of cases. 364 persons were convicted of TPOC Similarly for PPOCPT (Table 7.9), 58% of cases led to a finding of guilt on either the PPOCPT charge or the predicate charge. Where only the PPOCPT charge is considered, only 16% of charges result in conviction.99 persons were convicted of PPOCPT. 550. For LPOC, the conviction rate is lower, which is a concern given the already modest number of charges (see Table 7.10). Table 7.10. Adult criminal courts, LPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type LPOC (all charges, including predicates) 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 Total Guilty 77 62 59 75 56 329 Acquitted 1 1 0 1 1 4 Stay of proceeding 13 17 25 23 17 95 Withdrawn/Dismissed/Discharged 42 44 77 46 52 261 Other decisions 3 4 1 2 4 14 Total 136 128 162 147 130 703 Decision Type LPOC (only LPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 14 20 11 14 11 70 Acquitted 1 1 - 2 1 5 Stay of proceeding 24 29 25 22 18 118 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 93 73 125 102 95 488 Other decisions 4 5 1 7 5 22 Total 136 128 162 147 130 703 Source: Canada Note: Tables 7.5 through 7.10 do not include cases from Québec in 2021-22 onward and certain courts in Ontario 551. In LPOC cases, 47% of all cases resulted in a finding of guilt on either the LPOC charge or the predicate charge. However, only 10% of LPOC charges resulted in a guilty decision and the LPOC charge was withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed in 86% of cases. 552. Ultimately, this resulted in 70 LPOC convictions in relation to 58 individuals. While acknowledging Canada’s approach prioritises predicate offences for resolution agreements, the lower conviction rate for LPOC can also be attributed to the relative difficulty of proving LPOC. These cases represent the most significant, sophisticated and complex ML activity that is investigated and prosecuted in Canada. 553. From these tables in approaching the prosecution of ML, Canada is prioritising securing a conviction on the predicate offence at the expense of securing an ML conviction. Prosecutors withdraw ML charges at a high rate to secure resolution agreements for a predicate offence with a higher maximum penalty. 554. While ML is viewed as serious, obtaining a conviction for ML is seen as having a less dissuasive impact in deterring offending than convictions for serious and visible predicate offences such as illicit drugs and fraud. This is reflected in prosecutors’ approaches to securing resolution agreements and reflects a system that prioritises convictions on the charge with the highest maximum penalty, yet places ML below several of the key predicate offence types in Canada. This is despite ML being the key enabler for organised crime in Canada and reinforces the findings in IO.1 that the Canadian system lacks a strong appreciation of social and economic harms caused by ML. Standalone and Professional ML 555. Resolution agreements do not fully explain the challenges Canada experiences in prosecuting ML, particularly in the absence of a predicate offence (particularly for LPOC). Of the 54 728 cases completed that included at least one LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge (set out in the tables above), 5 269 were ‘standalone’ cases (See table 7.11). 556. While data was not available to break this down by MLO, by extrapolating the data from table 7.3, potentially up to 87 of these include standalone LPOC charges (though a number of these are likely to be ongoing and therefore not reflected in the table below (Table 7.11)), potentially in combination with PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT offences. Table 7.11. Adult Criminal Courts, Money Laundering Offence (MLO) Standalone Cases by Type of Decision, 2019-2024 Decision Type Fiscal Year 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 291 140 105 118 147 801 Acquitted 18 15 3 1 2 39 Stay of Proceeding 281 216 220 198 176 1 091 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 579 540 683 616 882 3 300 Other 8 8 6 8 8 38 Total 1 177 919 1,017 941 1 215 5 269 Source: Canada 557. The assessment acknowledges limitations in this dataset. A single standalone ML charge may not reflect standalone money laundering activity. Conversely, a number of charges may represent standalone PML with a number of other charges unrelated to the Professional ML offence (unrelated predicates, administration of justice charges). Despite these limitations the dataset is important, given the need to understand Canada’s efforts to investigate and prosecute standalone and professional ML. 558. As these are standalone cases, resolution agreements do not explain why charges were withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed at a rate of 83%. Data is not available solely on the outcome of standalone ML charges. 559. These challenges are particularly prominent in the prosecution of sophisticated Professional ML. During the assessment period only a small number of cases involving Professional ML were prosecuted resulting in convictions for ML. (see Box 7.4). Box 7.4. Case Studies – Professional Money Laundering Québec PML matter In 2020, the RCMP’s Integrated Proceeds of Crime unit in Montreal launched an investigation into a professional money laundering network following an assistance request from a foreign LEA. The case involved sophisticated international movement of drug proceeds through shell companies and cross‑border cash transfers. Working with the foreign LEA, RCMP conducted a covert cash pickup of USD 560 000 in Montreal destined for a Colombian cocaine exporter. Using production orders, financial intelligence from FINTRAC, forensic accounting support from FAMG, and tax information from CRA, investigators traced more than CAD 18 million laundered in under a year. In July 2021, RCMP executed search warrants and arrested four suspects. Three individuals were charged with laundering the proceeds of crime without being charged with a predicate offence, reinforcing Canada’s prioritisation of standalone and professional ML prosecutions. All three pled guilty and received prison sentences of 30–36 months. Seizures included cash, prohibited firearms, and bookkeeping records. R v Ste Marie In 2016, several individuals operating a financial services business, Groupe Ste‑Marie, were convicted of professional money laundering, conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime, and gangsterism. The group provided services including credit recovery, currency conversion, and the creation of offshore bank accounts in Mauritius. They used these services to help members of the Hells Angels Trois‑Rivières chapter move funds offshore and later repatriate them for use in Canada. The court found that the accused were wilfully blind to the criminal origin of the funds and knowingly provided laundering services to individuals involved in drug trafficking and ML. The convictions were based on extensive electronic surveillance, documentary evidence, multiple financial transactions across various accounts, the creation of shell companies, and statements made to undercover officers. Importantly, the prosecution did not need to prove the precise criminal origin of the funds, only that the accused were wilfully blind and believed they were dealing with proceeds of crime. The Québec Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed them in 2022, finding no breach of trial‑delay rights. Sentences ranged from 42 to 72 months. 560. The cases above show Canada has demonstrated some success against Professional ML activity. It is modest in the context of Professional ML’s presence in a significant portion of proceeds generating crime, particularly large-scale and sophisticated activity. Interviews with competent authorities showed that significant resources are being invested into securing recent high-priority convictions, and that addressing Professional ML is both an investigatory and prosecution priority. Competent authorities also had clear awareness of the challenges associated with prosecuting Professional ML, and standalone ML in the absence of a predicate offence. 561. These challenges arise from the practical application of elements of Canada’s ML offence provisions when applied to the typologies employed by sophisticated PML groups. Notably, the need to prove knowledge or belief of a particular offence (though the offence itself does not need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt) has prevented them from being used to effectively prosecute Professional ML. 562. Building on prosecutors’ experiences, Justice Canada has developed several amendments to the Criminal Code to address these challenges. These amendments have entered into force in recent years. Except for the new mens rea of recklessness, these amendments are only relevant where the accused is not charged with a predicate offence. They are responsive to the Canadian context and are a positive step demonstrating Canada’s commitment to strengthening its effectiveness in prosecuting ML in line with its risk. These are recent amendments and their impact is yet to be tested in cases or by the courts. 563. Despite recent successes of LEAs and prosecutors in high profile PML cases, outcomes are generally modest against standalone and PML activity. Major improvements are required in this respect. Legal persons 564. Legal persons and arrangements are rarely prosecuted for ML in Canada (see Table 7.12 below). This is particularly the case for corporate ownership structures including shell companies. Investigators and prosecutors prioritise the prosecution of the natural persons behind these structures where possible, aided by access to beneficial ownership information (see IO 5). While at high risk of exploitation for ML, competent authorities consider the disruptive and deterrent effect of prosecuting the controlling natural person to be greater than prosecuting the legal entity directly. For shell companies, this is a reasonable approach given the more significant disruptive impact of prosecuting the controlling natural persons, rather than a replaceable shell company which can be better disrupted through administrative action, such as deregistering. Canada has had some success in prosecuting gatekeepers (including lawyers, accountants and real estate professionals) for ML but have focussed on the individual actor rather than the firm or company. For other legal persons beyond shell companies however, prosecutions for ML can have a significant impact, and the lack of these does not correspond to Canada’s risk profile. Prosecution of reporting entities for facilitating ML is limited and authorities respond to serious breaches of the PCMLTFA with civil measures rather than prosecutions for ML (see IOs 3 and 4). Competent authorities pursue action to forfeit the relevant legal persons (and their assets) as instrumentalities of crime to a more limited extent, missing opportunities to further disrupt criminal infrastructure and further deter the use of legitimate companies to commingle criminal proceeds. As noted above, Canada’s shortcomings in prosecuting ML generally impact the effectiveness of this strategy. A similar approach is taken for trusts, which do not present as great an ML risk. Table 7.12. MLO cases involving legal persons Accused Fiscal Year 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Company 2 0 4 0 0 6 Source: Canada In addition to statistics in Table 7.13, Canada provided an example of a corporation being actively prosecuted for ML during the period under review. Canada has prosecuted and convicted individuals in connection with corporations implicated in illicit activities (R v Ste Marie, SNC Lavalin), as well as corporations themselves for predicate offences (but not ML). Table 7.13. Number of corporations convicted in cases investigated by CRA-CIP Entity 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Grand Total Number of Corporations Convicted 3 9 4 13 1 30 Criminal Code - Fraud - 4 2 2 - - 8 Excise Tax Act 1 2 2 11 - 1 17 Income Tax Act 2 4 - - - 2 8 Total Charges Convicted 3 10 4 13 0 3 33 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="745. In 2019-2025, the PPSC initiated terrorism proceedings against 30 individuals, with four of these individuals’ cases involving prosecution for terrorist financing. Canada’s rate of TF prosecutions is low in absolute terms, but this is consistent with the country’s low level of terrorist and TF threats, as set out above. Overall, the authorities have a good understanding of the TF threat environment, and the number of prosecutions for terrorism offences and specifically for TF offences is consistent with the threat. 746. PPSC provides legal advice and support to the RCMP during all TF investigations. A prosecution is undertaken if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and the prosecution is in the public interest. Early advice from PPSC is available and routinely given in TF investigations in order to ensure sustainable prosecution. 747. Charter protections providing the right to a fair trial - engaging comprehensive court-related disclosure requirements (R v Stinchcombe) and stringent time limits for trials ( R v Jordan ) - can impact on more complex criminal investigations. PPSC and the RCMP have been proactive in overcoming these issues by ensuring disclosure is ready for the first court hearing and the PPSC have filed direct indictments pursuant to s. 577 of the Criminal Code. 748. TF-related investigations are often resolved due to charges laid under other provisions of the Criminal Code such as ML related offences, or through other disruption methods (see Section 9.5). This however could take away from the TF offences. That said, the conviction obtained in May 2025 in relation to Project Sabin (see box 9.4 below) shows that RCMP and PPSC can successfully obtain convictions for TF offences, including in the context of complex and multi-jurisdiction activity. Box 9.4. Project Sabin In 2020, the RCMP received foreign partner intelligence from the US and Spanish authorities regarding a Canadian citizen suspected of terrorist financing for the benefit of the Islamic State (ISIS). The intelligence indicated that a 34-year-old Toronto, Ontario resident was raising funds online under the guise of posting links seeking donations for supporting humanitarian causes. However, the funds were distributed abroad for the benefit of ISIS. In March 2021, RCMP-INSET began investigating the suspect and the pro-ISIS fundraising operation in Canada. The suspect allegedly conspired with an overseas member of the Islamic State to commit terrorist attacks against foreign embassies in Afghanistan and provided propaganda and research related to attacks conducted in Afghanistan against foreign nationals. It is alleged that the suspect is part of an international network of Islamic State supporters who utilize online and encrypted messaging platforms to provide recruitment and financial support to ISIS. A FINTRAC disclosure was critical to identifying the suspect and providing insight into the methods being used for ML and terrorist financing. In addition, RCMP-INSET employed various advanced investigative techniques to further collect information and evidence. The financial intelligence received, and the investigative efforts helped determine that the suspect conducted fundraising operations with fake accounts and wired funds abroad using money remittance companies to ISIS facilitators in several countries such as the US as well as high-risk jurisdictions within Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The suspect is alleged to have transferred funds from Canadian cryptocurrency wallets in support of ISIS. On 28 July 2023, based on the findings in their investigation, the RCMP arrested the suspect and charged him with terrorism-related offences, including one TF offence. Pursuant to the Criminal Code, the individual was charged with: · s. 83.03 – Providing, making, available property and services for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.18 – Participation in activity of terrorist group, and · s. 83.19 – Facilitating terrorist activity. In conjunction with the Canadian suspect’s arrest, three subjects were arrested and charged in the US in connection with the alleged scheme. RCMP-INSET collaborated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and Canadian provincial and municipal police services for police-to-police sharing. Further, the RCMP utilized the Canadian Forensic Accounting Management Group to uncover financial leads and leveraged FINTRAC’s financial intelligence with VIRs to establish the grounds for production orders in the tracing of money flows. The arrest and subsequent charges of the primary Canadian suspect obtained significant media coverage in large Canadian and American publications. The media coverage highlighted the RCMP’s commitment to fighting terrorist financing regardless of the methods being used. On 12 May 2025, the charged Canadian individual plead guilty to two (2) of the three (3) terrorism-related charges, s. 83.03 Providing, making, available property and services for terrorist purposes, and s. 83.19 Facilitating terrorist activity. The remaining charge was stayed considering the acknowledgement of the facts related to that charge as part of the guilty plea. The individual was sentenced to six (6) years per charge to be served consecutively for a total of 12 years of imprisonment, less the time already served in pre-trail custody. The individual will also need to serve half of the sentence before being released on full parole, pursuant to s. 743.6(1.2) of the Criminal Code and will be subjected to a weapons prohibition order, pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, following his release." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="231. Larger FIs have a strong understanding of ML/TF risks due to their maturity and resources, which allow them to invest in comprehensive risk identification frameworks. In contrast, smaller or entities subject to more nascent regulation, such as VASPs may lack the resources or experience to adequately understand their ML/TF risks and show varied levels of risk understanding. 232. Among different types of FIs, banks generally perform well in assessing risks relating to business lines, geographies, and products and services. CU/CPs generally conduct risk assessment, but the depth of risk understanding is not uniform across the sector. Factors such as the diversity of services provided, organization size, and resource sophistication impact their risk awareness. The size of a CU/CPs does not always correlate with their understanding of their ML/TF risk exposure. Larger CU/CPs often have more resources to manage their ML/TF risk while some smaller to medium-sized CU/CPs possess a strong understanding of their client profiles and associated risks, but they may underestimate the resources needed to implement a robust risk assessment framework. 233. For the securities sector, many entities still self-assess as exhibiting a lower vulnerability to ML/TF abuse than FINTRAC’s assessment suggests. For the life insurance sector, larger life insurance companies typically have more advanced compliance programs to support better risk assessment. Smaller companies, brokers, and agents show less maturity but are improving in their understanding of risks, especially regarding the exploitation of new technologies for ML/TF. For MSBs, the larger and more established traditional MSB subsectors have mature compliance programs and a better understanding of their ML/TF risks. Table 3.2. Risk Assessment deficiencies for FIs and VASPs – 2020-2025 Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : while the obligation is documented, it is either not applied, has been only partially implemented, or has quality issues. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 64% 36% 0% CU/CP 70% 27% 3% Securities 44% 46% 10% Life insurance 83% 0% 17% Trust and loan 0% 100% 0% MSB (no VC) 43% 48% 9% VASP 50% 34% 16% Source: Canada 234. The FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit have established AML/CFT programmes based on the requirements of PCMLTFA, including policies and procedures to conduct regular institutional ML/TF risk assessment based on their customer profile, products and services. All demonstrated understanding of the ML/TF vulnerabilities of their sectors set out in the NRA, this being stronger amongst FIs which were part of international financial groups, while variations were noted in other FIs regarding depth of ML/TF threat and vulnerability understanding, and in sophistication of control systems to target higher risk areas. DSIBs, including one met during the onsite, have the capability to better manage evolving risks with use of analytics tools and proactively identify suspicious criminal networks providing high-value STRs to FINTRAC which discloses intelligence to LEAs. 235. Some securities firms, VASPs and smaller MSBs met during the onsite visit demonstrated a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks associated with their business models and may have underestimated their vulnerabilities as related to geographical risks, risks associated with digital onboarding service or payment to third parties from wealth management accounts. These observations are generally consistent with FINTRAC’s own assessments with respect to VASPs, securities firms and small MSBs. Given the high ML/TF risks and materiality in terms of transaction volume in particular for MSB and VASP sectors, inadequate understanding of ML/TF risks impair the abilities of the sectors to manage rapidly evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="231. Larger FIs have a strong understanding of ML/TF risks due to their maturity and resources, which allow them to invest in comprehensive risk identification frameworks. In contrast, smaller or entities subject to more nascent regulation, such as VASPs may lack the resources or experience to adequately understand their ML/TF risks and show varied levels of risk understanding. 232. Among different types of FIs, banks generally perform well in assessing risks relating to business lines, geographies, and products and services. CU/CPs generally conduct risk assessment, but the depth of risk understanding is not uniform across the sector. Factors such as the diversity of services provided, organization size, and resource sophistication impact their risk awareness. The size of a CU/CPs does not always correlate with their understanding of their ML/TF risk exposure. Larger CU/CPs often have more resources to manage their ML/TF risk while some smaller to medium-sized CU/CPs possess a strong understanding of their client profiles and associated risks, but they may underestimate the resources needed to implement a robust risk assessment framework. 233. For the securities sector, many entities still self-assess as exhibiting a lower vulnerability to ML/TF abuse than FINTRAC’s assessment suggests. For the life insurance sector, larger life insurance companies typically have more advanced compliance programs to support better risk assessment. Smaller companies, brokers, and agents show less maturity but are improving in their understanding of risks, especially regarding the exploitation of new technologies for ML/TF. For MSBs, the larger and more established traditional MSB subsectors have mature compliance programs and a better understanding of their ML/TF risks. Table 3.2. Risk Assessment deficiencies for FIs and VASPs – 2020-2025 Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : while the obligation is documented, it is either not applied, has been only partially implemented, or has quality issues. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 64% 36% 0% CU/CP 70% 27% 3% Securities 44% 46% 10% Life insurance 83% 0% 17% Trust and loan 0% 100% 0% MSB (no VC) 43% 48% 9% VASP 50% 34% 16% Source: Canada 234. The FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit have established AML/CFT programmes based on the requirements of PCMLTFA, including policies and procedures to conduct regular institutional ML/TF risk assessment based on their customer profile, products and services. All demonstrated understanding of the ML/TF vulnerabilities of their sectors set out in the NRA, this being stronger amongst FIs which were part of international financial groups, while variations were noted in other FIs regarding depth of ML/TF threat and vulnerability understanding, and in sophistication of control systems to target higher risk areas. DSIBs, including one met during the onsite, have the capability to better manage evolving risks with use of analytics tools and proactively identify suspicious criminal networks providing high-value STRs to FINTRAC which discloses intelligence to LEAs. 235. Some securities firms, VASPs and smaller MSBs met during the onsite visit demonstrated a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks associated with their business models and may have underestimated their vulnerabilities as related to geographical risks, risks associated with digital onboarding service or payment to third parties from wealth management accounts. These observations are generally consistent with FINTRAC’s own assessments with respect to VASPs, securities firms and small MSBs. Given the high ML/TF risks and materiality in terms of transaction volume in particular for MSB and VASP sectors, inadequate understanding of ML/TF risks impair the abilities of the sectors to manage rapidly evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 497. Domestic co-operation mechanisms are a key strength of Canada’s AML/CFT regime. FINTRAC operates independently from LEAs and national-security bodies (as it is not an investigative body), while maintaining strong relationships to ensure its financial intelligence remains responsive to operational needs. 498. FINTRAC engages widely with provincial and federal partners through many arrangements. For example, the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario (CISO) (organised crime focus); the Counter-Illicit Finance Alliance of British Columbia (CIFA-BC); RCMP specialized units (IMLITs, provincial SOC units, Integrated Market Enforcement Team in Calgary and the National Child Exploitation Co-ordination Centre); Criminal Intelligence Service of Manitoba; Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; the Sûreté du Québec Asset Forfeiture Unit: Revenu Québec; and numerous CBSA and CRA teams across Canada. FINTRAC’s participation in national co-ordination bodies, including Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) and the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC), ensures that financial intelligence contributes to priority investigations targeting organized crime and illegal drug trafficking. 499. FINTRAC contributes directly to the broader intelligence community through regular participation in domestic security briefings, interdepartmental forums, international exchanges, and responses to ad hoc requests for ML/TF and sanctions evasion expertise. FINTRAC has engaged in significant intelligence sharing and co-ordination activities, participating in hundreds of operational meetings, workshops, working groups and training sessions with municipal, provincial and federal agencies. The RCMP and FINTRAC actively collaborate in training aimed at ensuring a broad understanding of best practices of the processes surrounding disclosure of financial intelligence. In 2024, at the request of CRA, FINTRAC created a joint training initiative specifically on the topic of International Co-operation where the Department of Justice and FINTRAC shared international information exchange mechanisms including the role of the Egmont Group. FINTRAC and CBSA have also worked to provide training across both organizations on their respective roles and mandates and have co-delivered briefings, outreach and awareness sessions to key domestic and international partners. 500. Canada’s PPPs have become a central feature of its AML/CFT framework, demonstrating successful collaboration between FINTRAC, reporting entities and LEAs on high-priority ML/TF threats. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 501. Canada has a strong privacy and security framework governing protection and confidentiality of financial intelligence. FINTRAC’s building is protected, secure and restricted to staff only. Physical access into its premises is subject to strict security protocols. 502. The PCMLTFA clearly defines what information shall be disclosed and sets out specific thresholds that must be met before FINTRAC is authorized to disclose it. FINTRAC has policies and procedures in place regarding the use of secure mechanisms to receive voluntary information and disseminate disclosures, which are also in accordance with the Government of Canada’s security requirements. Only designated personnel within FINTRAC’s Operational Integration and Support Team are able to send disclosures to recipients (domestic and international) via FINTRAC’s secure channels. 503. Measures are in place for Office of the Privacy Commissioner to conduct biennial audit of FINTRAC’s privacy protection measures, focusing on FINTRAC’s policies and procedures related to administrative, physical, and information technology security controls to protect information from unauthorized use and disclosure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="114. Canada’s operational reforms and initiatives show a strong alignment with the highest – risk threats identified in the NRA. To address drug trafficking – one of the most important sources of criminal proceeds - Canada has established and expanded mechanisms including the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar; integrated drug intelligence cells; a precursor chemical monitoring Unit; and the North American Drug Dialogue . To counter fraud, and other major threats, initiatives such as the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership (IMLIP), the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC), Integrated Money Laundering Investigation Teams (IMLITs), Integrated Market Enforcement Teams, and expanded Joint Force Operations (JFOs) have been established. Canada announced in 2025 that it will be establishing a new Financial Crimes Agency to lead Canada’s efforts in combating sophisticated financial crimes. Its operational approach would benefit from a more systematic focus on the ML activity associated with the threats, particularly to ensure that operational responses extend beyond predicate offence disruption to fully address the laundering methodologies identified in the NRA. 115. Canada’s public-private partnerships (PPP) allow for operational collaboration and this has enabled law enforcement agencies at all levels of policing to develop formal and informal information sharing, develop thematic projects to form best practices to combat ML, establish secretariats and co-ordination offices to ensure ML activities are adequately resourced and leverage private sector forums to address AML operational priorities. 116. FINTRAC co-ordinates closely with OSFI and provincial regulators, such as the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), the British Columbia Financial Services Authority (BCFSA), and the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO), through MOUs that facilitate information sharing, strengthen sectoral risk understanding, and support more targeted enforcement. FINTRAC also collaborates with supervisory authorities like the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) to align examination approaches and address compliance issues in the securities sector, leading to improved implementation of PCMLTFA requirements by market participants. Box 1.2. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) Counterterrorism and National Security Committee The CACP Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee aims to harmonize the work of the Canadian law enforcement in identifying, preventing, deterring, and responding to criminal activities related to terrorism and national security threats. Its objectives include: a) Promoting collaboration and integration among law enforcement agencies and with appropriate public/private security and intelligence partners; Improving the ability to operate in a co-operative and integrated manner with the view of addressing emerging trends; Developing processes and facilitate strong communication at all levels; Recommending legislative reforms; and Promoting education and training in matters of counter-terrorism and national security. Eighteen partner agencies participate on the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee. They represent federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities (RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, PSPC, FINTRAC) as well as police of jurisdiction (Calgary Police Service, Edmonton Police Service, Vancouver Police Department, York Regional Police, Toronto Police Service, Sûreté du Québec, Service de police de la Ville de Montréal, New Westminster Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Ottawa Police Service). Recent accomplishments of the Counter Terrorism and National Security Committee include: a) Launch of the “See Something Say Something” campaign to improve understanding of national security threats both within Canadian law enforcement agencies and with the public; The Countering Violent Extremism Guidebook; and Establishment a new working group to develop operational guidance and standardize processes relating to Foreign Actor Interference investigations and engagement activities. Source: Department of Finance, Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="635. Canada has seized and restrained criminal property equating to approximately CAD 1.5 billion (approx. EUR 935 million) (see Table 8.1). 636. When assessed against the criminal benefit estimated to be generated from crime in Canada, the value seized or restrained is modest, which also impacts the availability of property at the forfeiture stage. Table 8.1. Consolidated seizure and restraint data (CAD) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total RCMP 1 39 836 241 56 861 364 48 642 433 62 128 935 47 968 532 119 192 035 374 629 540 (SPMD) 62 504 908 44 050 483 77 472 699 121 796 403 90 912 560 32 005 842 375 644 493 Ontario 2 85 371 336 145 254 969 100 849 142 68 804 108 25 539 967 59 607 001 485 426 523 Québec 3 10 947 868 7 000 945 26 955 455 40 901 904 43 088 954 29 009 604 157 904 730 Total CC 198 660 353 253 167 761 253 919 729 293 631 350 154 411 613 239 814 482 1 393 605 288 BC Civil Forfeiture Office 4 4 579 000 4 090 000 9 439 000 7 642 000 70 000 000 (approx.) 12 394 000 108 144 000 Total all 203 239 353 257 257 761 263 358 729 301 273 350 224 411 613 252 208 482 1 501 749 288 Source: Canada 1 RCMP data does not include vehicles. Assets included in this data includes cash and securities, jewellery, luxury items and electronics 2 SPMD data includes assets under management, including vehicles, real property, and other high value goods 3 Ontario data include OPP Provincial Asset Forfeiture Unit (OPP-PAFU) and the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. Canada note that as Ontario MAG data includes data received from LEAs, there may be some overlap. 4 Québec data include Montréal Police, Sûreté du Québec (SQ) and SQ – Municipal Assistance 5 Only data from the BC civil forfeiture office was available to show value of property under civil preservation orders. 637. This table provides an aggregate figure of the total amount seized/restrained under the CC framework federally and in the two most material provinces (Ontario and Québec) as well as under the BC civil forfeiture framework. Civil forfeiture data was not available for other provinces. Alignment with risk 638. From the incomplete data provided, it is difficult to determine whether measures fully aligned with Canada’s risk. The data provided from SPMD shows that the bulk of seizures come from offences under the Controlled Drug and Substance Act, and ML and possession offences under the CC. 639. Seizures relating to fraud (CC, s 380) are low with only CAD 442 800 of seized property related to fraud managed by SPMD during the period under review. 640. This figure is substantially lower than would be anticipated given Canada’s risk profile, noting that this finding is drawn from incomplete data provided by Canada that likely understates the actual seizure amounts. Case studies provided by Canada and interviews with competent authorities demonstrate the use of provisional measures to seize and restrain criminal property derived from or used in other high and medium risk predicate offences (such as fraud, tax evasion, vehicle theft and human trafficking). The use of provisional measures in relation to trade fraud and TBML appear limited, despite its high risk and prevalence. Proceeds of Corresponding Value (PoCV) 641. Canada does not seize or restrain PoCV. At the federal level, Canada relies on fines in lieu of forfeiture as its primary tool to recover PoCV. This does not enable competent authorities to obtain provisional measures (such as seizure or restraint) to secure PoCV in advance of a fine in lieu being ordered. 642. As LEAs are unable to secure this property, it provides an opportunity for the person subject to the fine in lieu of forfeiture (or who believes they may become subject to one) to transfer their property out of the jurisdiction or to another person beyond the reach of LEAs. This has consequences on later efforts to enforce fines in lieu of forfeiture that are in default (see core issue 8.5). 643. This approach has major shortcomings that undermine Canada’s ability to confiscate and permanently deprive offenders of their criminal benefits when directly traceable criminal property is not available. Fines in lieu of forfeiture cannot be enforced directly against PoCV through provisional measures and mechanisms to enforce payment have not been used. Provincial civil forfeiture frameworks also do not contain mechanisms to identify or trace PoCV. 644. When assessed against the criminal benefit estimated to be generated in several key cases, the value seized or restrained is modest. The lack of a comprehensive and enforceable mechanism to provisionally secure PoCV is key reason for this shortcoming, which ultimately contributes to more limited forfeiture outcomes later in the process. 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 645. All LEAs generally pursue provisional measures in their investigation of proceeds generating crime to some extent. Seizure of suspected proceeds of crime and offence related property located during the execution of search warrants is prioritised. Restraint of financial accounts and real property identified through competent authorities’ asset tracing is also conducted routinely. Despite this, a lack of asset tracing beyond these property types limits the use of restraint orders. Reliance on seizures during the execution of search warrants may risk seizing only what is immediately available, and the execution of the warrant may allow other criminal property to be subsequently moved once the suspects and/or accomplices are alerted to the investigation. 646. Responsibility for seizing and restraining property suspected of being criminal property is split across the federal, provincial and municipal levels. The division in operational responsibility typically falls to the LEA leading the investigation. In practice, federal authorities typically lead seizure and restraint efforts in relation to Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) matters; offences under other federal laws; and CC matters involving federal aspects, with international elements, or involving multiple jurisdictions within Canada. RCMP also leads seizure and restraint in provinces where they provide contract policing, except in large cities with municipal LEAs (particularly Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver). OPP and Sûreté du Québec have extensive remits in those provinces to pursue the restraint and seizure of criminal property. 647. LEAs generally place the highest focus on seizing property identified while executing a search and seizure warrant. Particularly bulk cash, high value goods (jewellery etc), vehicles as well as any illicit property (such as drugs). Ontario’s Ministry of Attorney General is an exception to this, and primarily pursues restraints (noting they are not an LEA, and house the Crown Law office). Canada has significantly enhanced its ability to seize cryptocurrency and investigators receive specialist training to support wallet seizures through the execution of search and seizure warrants, leveraging recent investments in cryptocurrency tracing, such as the establishment of RCMP-FP’s Crypto Tactical Operational Support team, which provides investigators with a specialist capability when responding to matters involving suspected high values of virtual assets. Criminal restraint 648. Restraint is sought in more limited circumstances typically over accounts held with financial institutions or over real property. Restraining orders are pursued in a more limited way against other types of property. 649. Typically, restraint orders are sought where property is clearly within the person’s legal control. This is consistent with competent authorities’ approach to tracing criminal property and means that property within the person’s effective control but otherwise held at arm’s reach is rarely subject to provisional measures. This limits competent authorities’ ability to deprive controllers of the benefits of criminal enterprise. Canada has criminal procedures enabling third parties to challenge restraints and exclude property (CC subs 462.34(1), see criterion 4.12) and assets can and have been released when legal challenges are successful. However, there is limited jurisprudence in this space, reflecting a reluctance to pursue provisional measures against assets not nominally held by the defendant. This is a weakness of Canada’s approach to asset recovery and can enable asset flight and dissipation, especially for higher risk crime types where the swift movement of proceeds is prevalent (e.g. scams and fraud, cyber-enabled offences). 650. Authorities have faced challenges securing restraint orders over criminal property where it is intermingled with legitimate property. This is particularly problematic where financial accounts or real property are held jointly by the criminal and a person whose equity in the property has been derived from legitimate means. The CC has provisions enabling the exclusion of legitimate interests from restraint or forfeiture orders; to surgically exclude legitimate interests in intermingled property to enable the restraint of the criminal element. These have been used effectively in several cases, particularly with respect to offence-related property. However, their use has also been inconsistent and there are also examples where intermingled property was not pursued, including where criminal property has been intermingled in the accounts of family members not involved in the criminal activity or mixed with accounts of legitimate businesses. 651. In these circumstances, competent authorities did not seek provisional measures and instead had to seek a fine in lieu of forfeiture to the amount linked to crime. This approach can have limited effectiveness against common money laundering typologies, which is compounded by the lack of a mechanism to secure PoCV, allowing proceeds to remain in the control of suspects and decreasing the prospects that assets will be available for forfeiture 652. In particular, this limitation contributes to the limited restraint action taken in respect of business interests and assets, despite the high risk of their misuse. Exploitation of businesses often with legitimate revenue streams as a front for criminal activity is a common typology in Canada, particularly for businesses involved in international trade. As the proceeds of criminal activity become intermingled with legitimate business earnings, competent authorities can be hampered in their ability to seek restraint. Particularly where funds have been spent or used to pay expenses. This then necessitates the use of fines in lieu of forfeiture following a successful conviction. 653. Canada uses provisional measures to some extent when securing revenue generated from criminal property. There are some positive examples of competent authorities restraining condominiums with active rental agreements (the asset-management complexities of which are well managed). Despite this, authorities did not seek restraint of rental payments made prior to the seizure as proceeds generated by the property. Federal and Provincial use of provisional measures (seizure and restraint) 654. Detailed breakdowns of assets seized/restrained through provisional measures at the Federal level (see Table 8.2) are provided below. These are consistent with Canada’s materiality. The comparatively heavy reliance on seizure and a focus on physical currency, vehicles and other movable property, including high value goods is clearly demonstrated. Table 8.2. SPMD - managed seized/restrained assets, 2019-2024/25 (CAD) Asset Type 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Cash 30 406 710 18 514 501 16 000 486 19 655 232 20 586 104 15 321 182 120 484 216 Financial Instrument 19 518 832 111 605 11 354 561 232 146 520 651 969 355 32 707 150 Other Property 1 322 077 710 293 26 320 655 1 855 800 371 027 569 040 31 148 891 Real Estate 8 548 000 20 923 500 20 702 000 97 071 001 13 378 000 13 062 002 173 684 503 Vehicle 2 699 289 3 772 084 3 094 995 2 887 257 2 956 877 2 038 975 17 449 478 Vessel 10 000 18 500 0 94 968 1 500 45 287 170 255 Grand Total 62 504 908 44 050 483 77 472 699 121 796 403 90 912 560 32 005 842 375 644 493 Source: Canada Civil preservation orders 655. In addition to accepting referrals from LEAs on matters where a seizure or CC restraint order over property has been obtained, CFOs may separately apply under their own frameworks for civil restraint or preservation orders (see Box 8.2). This is typically done based on an ex parte application in a superior court. The test for granting civil forfeiture restraint varies depending on the jurisdictions, with an example being that it is reasonable to believe/suspect that property is proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity. Canada was unable to provide detailed statistics on the amount of property subject to civil restraint or preservation orders for the period under review, with the exception of assets civilly restrained by Sûreté du Québec. Per table 8.3, BC civil forfeiture office civil restrained at least CAD 108 million during the assessment period. Table 8.3. Sûreté du Québec - assets restrained (civil) (CAD) Type 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Civil - Introductory Applications 1 060 848 2 210 532 3 155 701 3 342 775 9 769 856 Real Estate 836 164 769 676 1 896 946 1 203 106 4 705 892 Cash 222 684 827 886 874 855 1 283 820 3 209 245 Vehicles/Other 2 000 613 000 87 900 455 390 1 158 290 Crypto Assets - - 296 000 - 296 000 Bank Accounts n/a n/a n/a 400 459 400 459 Source: Canada Box 8.2. Case Study: Civil restraint On November 28, 2022, the Criminal Property Forfeiture (CPF) (Manitoba CFO) was successful in the forfeiture of eight properties, as well as personal property in the form of cash, bank accounts, jewellery, and heavy-duty equipment. Forfeited items had a combined value of more than CAD 2 million. In the Northern-hemisphere spring of 2021, the Winnipeg Police Service Organized Crime Unit commenced a major drug investigation. This was a wiretap investigation into the illegal drug dealing activities of an individual and her drug trafficking organization, which had been operating for many years in Manitoba. The individual was laundering her proceeds through the casinos in Manitoba. Prior to take down day/arrest, CPF was brought into the project and was able to restrain the identified real properties and bank accounts just prior to arrests. CPF identified eight properties as both instruments and proceeds of unlawful activity. The cash, jewellery and equipment were identified as proceeds of unlawful activity (drug trafficking and production under the CDSA, conspiracy, ML, tax and other offences). The CPF partnered with Manitoba Housing to donate the eight residential properties to a non-profit community organization. Once the NPO completes renovations, these properties will be offered to low-income families in Winnipeg. The CPF used some of the proceeds to cover tax arrears, maintain the properties, and demolish and remediate some of the homes. 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 656. Where it is necessary to act expeditiously, Canada’s framework for provisional measures can flex quickly to affect seizure or restraint rapidly. Competent authorities showed that alternative informal mechanisms, are used with reasonable effectiveness to freeze accounts and prevent transactions. The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre has demonstrated success through its relationships with the private sector in preventing the movement of funds obtained through cyber-enabled frauds and scams through similar informal freezes and blocks on transactions. The amounts it has restored to victims is at table 8.11 657. This informal approach occurs in conjunction with formal mechanisms. Competent authorities notify the relevant private sector entity/entities that they are seeking an urgent restraint. The private sector entities can then voluntarily decide to temporarily freeze the account. Where required, competent authorities can seek and obtain restraint orders for accounts within a matter of hours through electronic means with on-call judges available outside of hours. While this approach is primarily available through established relationships with the six major FIs, there are examples of other private sector entities that have affected indirect suspensions in this manner to support expeditious prevention of transactions. While useful for temporarily blocking the movement of funds in advance of restraint, this practice depends on the advance knowledge of the funds by the LEA and is not legally enforceable. Competent authorities were not able to quantify how often this process is used or the amounts secured through this process." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="635. Canada has seized and restrained criminal property equating to approximately CAD 1.5 billion (approx. EUR 935 million) (see Table 8.1). 636. When assessed against the criminal benefit estimated to be generated from crime in Canada, the value seized or restrained is modest, which also impacts the availability of property at the forfeiture stage. Table 8.1. Consolidated seizure and restraint data (CAD) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total RCMP 1 39 836 241 56 861 364 48 642 433 62 128 935 47 968 532 119 192 035 374 629 540 (SPMD) 62 504 908 44 050 483 77 472 699 121 796 403 90 912 560 32 005 842 375 644 493 Ontario 2 85 371 336 145 254 969 100 849 142 68 804 108 25 539 967 59 607 001 485 426 523 Québec 3 10 947 868 7 000 945 26 955 455 40 901 904 43 088 954 29 009 604 157 904 730 Total CC 198 660 353 253 167 761 253 919 729 293 631 350 154 411 613 239 814 482 1 393 605 288 BC Civil Forfeiture Office 4 4 579 000 4 090 000 9 439 000 7 642 000 70 000 000 (approx.) 12 394 000 108 144 000 Total all 203 239 353 257 257 761 263 358 729 301 273 350 224 411 613 252 208 482 1 501 749 288 Source: Canada 1 RCMP data does not include vehicles. Assets included in this data includes cash and securities, jewellery, luxury items and electronics 2 SPMD data includes assets under management, including vehicles, real property, and other high value goods 3 Ontario data include OPP Provincial Asset Forfeiture Unit (OPP-PAFU) and the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. Canada note that as Ontario MAG data includes data received from LEAs, there may be some overlap. 4 Québec data include Montréal Police, Sûreté du Québec (SQ) and SQ – Municipal Assistance 5 Only data from the BC civil forfeiture office was available to show value of property under civil preservation orders. 637. This table provides an aggregate figure of the total amount seized/restrained under the CC framework federally and in the two most material provinces (Ontario and Québec) as well as under the BC civil forfeiture framework. Civil forfeiture data was not available for other provinces. Alignment with risk 638. From the incomplete data provided, it is difficult to determine whether measures fully aligned with Canada’s risk. The data provided from SPMD shows that the bulk of seizures come from offences under the Controlled Drug and Substance Act, and ML and possession offences under the CC. 639. Seizures relating to fraud (CC, s 380) are low with only CAD 442 800 of seized property related to fraud managed by SPMD during the period under review. 640. This figure is substantially lower than would be anticipated given Canada’s risk profile, noting that this finding is drawn from incomplete data provided by Canada that likely understates the actual seizure amounts. Case studies provided by Canada and interviews with competent authorities demonstrate the use of provisional measures to seize and restrain criminal property derived from or used in other high and medium risk predicate offences (such as fraud, tax evasion, vehicle theft and human trafficking). The use of provisional measures in relation to trade fraud and TBML appear limited, despite its high risk and prevalence. Proceeds of Corresponding Value (PoCV) 641. Canada does not seize or restrain PoCV. At the federal level, Canada relies on fines in lieu of forfeiture as its primary tool to recover PoCV. This does not enable competent authorities to obtain provisional measures (such as seizure or restraint) to secure PoCV in advance of a fine in lieu being ordered. 642. As LEAs are unable to secure this property, it provides an opportunity for the person subject to the fine in lieu of forfeiture (or who believes they may become subject to one) to transfer their property out of the jurisdiction or to another person beyond the reach of LEAs. This has consequences on later efforts to enforce fines in lieu of forfeiture that are in default (see core issue 8.5). 643. This approach has major shortcomings that undermine Canada’s ability to confiscate and permanently deprive offenders of their criminal benefits when directly traceable criminal property is not available. Fines in lieu of forfeiture cannot be enforced directly against PoCV through provisional measures and mechanisms to enforce payment have not been used. Provincial civil forfeiture frameworks also do not contain mechanisms to identify or trace PoCV. 644. When assessed against the criminal benefit estimated to be generated in several key cases, the value seized or restrained is modest. The lack of a comprehensive and enforceable mechanism to provisionally secure PoCV is key reason for this shortcoming, which ultimately contributes to more limited forfeiture outcomes later in the process. 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 645. All LEAs generally pursue provisional measures in their investigation of proceeds generating crime to some extent. Seizure of suspected proceeds of crime and offence related property located during the execution of search warrants is prioritised. Restraint of financial accounts and real property identified through competent authorities’ asset tracing is also conducted routinely. Despite this, a lack of asset tracing beyond these property types limits the use of restraint orders. Reliance on seizures during the execution of search warrants may risk seizing only what is immediately available, and the execution of the warrant may allow other criminal property to be subsequently moved once the suspects and/or accomplices are alerted to the investigation. 646. Responsibility for seizing and restraining property suspected of being criminal property is split across the federal, provincial and municipal levels. The division in operational responsibility typically falls to the LEA leading the investigation. In practice, federal authorities typically lead seizure and restraint efforts in relation to Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) matters; offences under other federal laws; and CC matters involving federal aspects, with international elements, or involving multiple jurisdictions within Canada. RCMP also leads seizure and restraint in provinces where they provide contract policing, except in large cities with municipal LEAs (particularly Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver). OPP and Sûreté du Québec have extensive remits in those provinces to pursue the restraint and seizure of criminal property. 647. LEAs generally place the highest focus on seizing property identified while executing a search and seizure warrant. Particularly bulk cash, high value goods (jewellery etc), vehicles as well as any illicit property (such as drugs). Ontario’s Ministry of Attorney General is an exception to this, and primarily pursues restraints (noting they are not an LEA, and house the Crown Law office). Canada has significantly enhanced its ability to seize cryptocurrency and investigators receive specialist training to support wallet seizures through the execution of search and seizure warrants, leveraging recent investments in cryptocurrency tracing, such as the establishment of RCMP-FP’s Crypto Tactical Operational Support team, which provides investigators with a specialist capability when responding to matters involving suspected high values of virtual assets. Criminal restraint 648. Restraint is sought in more limited circumstances typically over accounts held with financial institutions or over real property. Restraining orders are pursued in a more limited way against other types of property. 649. Typically, restraint orders are sought where property is clearly within the person’s legal control. This is consistent with competent authorities’ approach to tracing criminal property and means that property within the person’s effective control but otherwise held at arm’s reach is rarely subject to provisional measures. This limits competent authorities’ ability to deprive controllers of the benefits of criminal enterprise. Canada has criminal procedures enabling third parties to challenge restraints and exclude property (CC subs 462.34(1), see criterion 4.12) and assets can and have been released when legal challenges are successful. However, there is limited jurisprudence in this space, reflecting a reluctance to pursue provisional measures against assets not nominally held by the defendant. This is a weakness of Canada’s approach to asset recovery and can enable asset flight and dissipation, especially for higher risk crime types where the swift movement of proceeds is prevalent (e.g. scams and fraud, cyber-enabled offences). 650. Authorities have faced challenges securing restraint orders over criminal property where it is intermingled with legitimate property. This is particularly problematic where financial accounts or real property are held jointly by the criminal and a person whose equity in the property has been derived from legitimate means. The CC has provisions enabling the exclusion of legitimate interests from restraint or forfeiture orders; to surgically exclude legitimate interests in intermingled property to enable the restraint of the criminal element. These have been used effectively in several cases, particularly with respect to offence-related property. However, their use has also been inconsistent and there are also examples where intermingled property was not pursued, including where criminal property has been intermingled in the accounts of family members not involved in the criminal activity or mixed with accounts of legitimate businesses. 651. In these circumstances, competent authorities did not seek provisional measures and instead had to seek a fine in lieu of forfeiture to the amount linked to crime. This approach can have limited effectiveness against common money laundering typologies, which is compounded by the lack of a mechanism to secure PoCV, allowing proceeds to remain in the control of suspects and decreasing the prospects that assets will be available for forfeiture 652. In particular, this limitation contributes to the limited restraint action taken in respect of business interests and assets, despite the high risk of their misuse. Exploitation of businesses often with legitimate revenue streams as a front for criminal activity is a common typology in Canada, particularly for businesses involved in international trade. As the proceeds of criminal activity become intermingled with legitimate business earnings, competent authorities can be hampered in their ability to seek restraint. Particularly where funds have been spent or used to pay expenses. This then necessitates the use of fines in lieu of forfeiture following a successful conviction. 653. Canada uses provisional measures to some extent when securing revenue generated from criminal property. There are some positive examples of competent authorities restraining condominiums with active rental agreements (the asset-management complexities of which are well managed). Despite this, authorities did not seek restraint of rental payments made prior to the seizure as proceeds generated by the property. Federal and Provincial use of provisional measures (seizure and restraint) 654. Detailed breakdowns of assets seized/restrained through provisional measures at the Federal level (see Table 8.2) are provided below. These are consistent with Canada’s materiality. The comparatively heavy reliance on seizure and a focus on physical currency, vehicles and other movable property, including high value goods is clearly demonstrated. Table 8.2. SPMD - managed seized/restrained assets, 2019-2024/25 (CAD) Asset Type 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Cash 30 406 710 18 514 501 16 000 486 19 655 232 20 586 104 15 321 182 120 484 216 Financial Instrument 19 518 832 111 605 11 354 561 232 146 520 651 969 355 32 707 150 Other Property 1 322 077 710 293 26 320 655 1 855 800 371 027 569 040 31 148 891 Real Estate 8 548 000 20 923 500 20 702 000 97 071 001 13 378 000 13 062 002 173 684 503 Vehicle 2 699 289 3 772 084 3 094 995 2 887 257 2 956 877 2 038 975 17 449 478 Vessel 10 000 18 500 0 94 968 1 500 45 287 170 255 Grand Total 62 504 908 44 050 483 77 472 699 121 796 403 90 912 560 32 005 842 375 644 493 Source: Canada Civil preservation orders 655. In addition to accepting referrals from LEAs on matters where a seizure or CC restraint order over property has been obtained, CFOs may separately apply under their own frameworks for civil restraint or preservation orders (see Box 8.2). This is typically done based on an ex parte application in a superior court. The test for granting civil forfeiture restraint varies depending on the jurisdictions, with an example being that it is reasonable to believe/suspect that property is proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity. Canada was unable to provide detailed statistics on the amount of property subject to civil restraint or preservation orders for the period under review, with the exception of assets civilly restrained by Sûreté du Québec. Per table 8.3, BC civil forfeiture office civil restrained at least CAD 108 million during the assessment period. Table 8.3. Sûreté du Québec - assets restrained (civil) (CAD) Type 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Civil - Introductory Applications 1 060 848 2 210 532 3 155 701 3 342 775 9 769 856 Real Estate 836 164 769 676 1 896 946 1 203 106 4 705 892 Cash 222 684 827 886 874 855 1 283 820 3 209 245 Vehicles/Other 2 000 613 000 87 900 455 390 1 158 290 Crypto Assets - - 296 000 - 296 000 Bank Accounts n/a n/a n/a 400 459 400 459 Source: Canada Box 8.2. Case Study: Civil restraint On November 28, 2022, the Criminal Property Forfeiture (CPF) (Manitoba CFO) was successful in the forfeiture of eight properties, as well as personal property in the form of cash, bank accounts, jewellery, and heavy-duty equipment. Forfeited items had a combined value of more than CAD 2 million. In the Northern-hemisphere spring of 2021, the Winnipeg Police Service Organized Crime Unit commenced a major drug investigation. This was a wiretap investigation into the illegal drug dealing activities of an individual and her drug trafficking organization, which had been operating for many years in Manitoba. The individual was laundering her proceeds through the casinos in Manitoba. Prior to take down day/arrest, CPF was brought into the project and was able to restrain the identified real properties and bank accounts just prior to arrests. CPF identified eight properties as both instruments and proceeds of unlawful activity. The cash, jewellery and equipment were identified as proceeds of unlawful activity (drug trafficking and production under the CDSA, conspiracy, ML, tax and other offences). The CPF partnered with Manitoba Housing to donate the eight residential properties to a non-profit community organization. Once the NPO completes renovations, these properties will be offered to low-income families in Winnipeg. The CPF used some of the proceeds to cover tax arrears, maintain the properties, and demolish and remediate some of the homes. 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 656. Where it is necessary to act expeditiously, Canada’s framework for provisional measures can flex quickly to affect seizure or restraint rapidly. Competent authorities showed that alternative informal mechanisms, are used with reasonable effectiveness to freeze accounts and prevent transactions. The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre has demonstrated success through its relationships with the private sector in preventing the movement of funds obtained through cyber-enabled frauds and scams through similar informal freezes and blocks on transactions. The amounts it has restored to victims is at table 8.11 657. This informal approach occurs in conjunction with formal mechanisms. Competent authorities notify the relevant private sector entity/entities that they are seeking an urgent restraint. The private sector entities can then voluntarily decide to temporarily freeze the account. Where required, competent authorities can seek and obtain restraint orders for accounts within a matter of hours through electronic means with on-call judges available outside of hours. While this approach is primarily available through established relationships with the six major FIs, there are examples of other private sector entities that have affected indirect suspensions in this manner to support expeditious prevention of transactions. While useful for temporarily blocking the movement of funds in advance of restraint, this practice depends on the advance knowledge of the funds by the LEA and is not legally enforceable. Competent authorities were not able to quantify how often this process is used or the amounts secured through this process." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="824. Canada primarily imposes sanctions through Regulations established under three Acts under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: The United Nations Act, the Special Economic Measures Act and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law). In Canada’s regime, a sanctions evasion offence means an offence arising from the contravention of a restriction or prohibition established by an order or regulation made under one of these three Acts. Generally, these Acts prohibit Canadians from dealing with property that is owned, held or controlled by a designated person and providing financial services to designated persons. This includes persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, a designated person, and captures functions such as the potential provision of indirect services as part of a correspondent banking relationship. 825. The UN Act authorises Canada to incorporate UNSCRs into domestic law with immediate effect. Any person designated by the UNSC is automatically designated under the relevant Canadian regulations under the UN Act. The designation of a person by the UNSC is immediately incorporated by reference into the UN Act and its regulations, meaning there is no delay between designation by the UNSC, and the obligation to immobilize and report property under Canadian law. The implementation of this obligation by reporting entities under the PCMLTFA is supervised by FINTRAC. 826. Whenever there is a change in the UNSCRs listings, GAC and FINTRAC rapidly send alert emails to over 11 000 subscribers (about 1 800 subscribers to GAC’s alerts and roughly 9 400 to FINTRAC’s alerts), a low number considering Canada’s materiality. In fact, there are a total number of 33 000 obliged entities under PCMLTFA (21 114 FIs and VASPs, 12 054 DNFBPs), approximately more than 136 000 lawyers and 4 200 Québec notaries active in the country, and additional potentially relevant subjects. Furthermore, Canada reports that all sectors are represented but it was not possible to ascertain the effective coverage of the alerts in terms of the representation of the private sector and entities. 827. To reimpose UN sanctions against Iran following the trigger of the Snapback mechanism on 27 September 2025, Canada reported that no amendments were needed to the relevant law as they were automatically and immediately effective. On 30 September 2025, Canada communicated the prohibitions through updates to the Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Iran and the Minister of Finance issued a news release on 1 October 2025, reiterating the nature of the changes. Obligations under the PCMLTFA to report sanctioned property obligated reporting entities to submit any sanctioned property to FINTRAC immediately, but no property linked to UNSCRs has been identified. Box 11.2. Implementation without delay of UNSCRs on Iran after the trigger of the snapback mechanism On 14 July 2015, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Germany reached an agreement with Iran, i.e. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). On 28 August 2025, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (collectively the “E3”) triggered the snapback mechanism process under the JCPOA, which led to the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran on 27 September 2025. Canada incorporates UNSC sanctions list changes by reference in the United Nations Act (UN Act). This means that no action was required by Canada to implement into Canadian law the reimposed UNSC sanctions as the legal prohibitions were in place immediately. Subsequently, a clear articulation of the prohibitions imposed by the United Nations under the UN Act was published by Global Affairs Canada on 30 September 2025. Despite the UN having lifted its sanctions through the JCPOA, Canada remained concerned about Iran’s weapons program and chose to maintain the scope of UN proliferation sanctions through its autonomous sanctions regime. This included tight restrictions on sensitive goods related to nuclear proliferation and the development of Iran’s ballistic missile program. These autonomous sanctions were in place up until the reimposition of UN sanctions, and their implementation without delay under Canada’s UN Act. Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. Canada has increased its strategic and operational prioritisation of asset recovery since its last mutual evaluation. There remains a lack of a national policy prioritising asset recovery. While Canada’s constitutional division of powers between the federal and provincial levels partly explains the different approaches to asset recovery between the federation and the provinces, the level of priority given to asset recovery as a policy objective varies across the country and between provinces. This is reflected in the variable development of agency structures to pursue asset recovery across LEAs and other competent authorities at the federal, provincial and territorial levels. The system in place to prioritise asset recovery, while strong in parts, does not stem from a cohesive and consistent national policy approach, ultimately resulting in the recovery of assets to varying degrees. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 591. At the federal level, Canada’s Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime Strategy 2023-2026 sets out Canada’s policy priorities for combatting ML and TF. It prioritises increasing operational effectiveness as one of the key pillars for enhancing the effectiveness of the Canadian system. Substantial resourcing and funding have been injected into the Canadian system across successive federal budgets to support this objective. As an outcome four IMLITs have been established with embedded civilian specialists and FAMG’s forensic accounting investigators to identify and trace criminal benefit. The announcement in the 2025/26 federal Budget that Canada would establish a dedicated Financial Crimes Agency, with ongoing funding responsibility for investigating complex financial crime and recovering the proceeds, is positive and reinforces this increasing prioritisation. LEAs 592. This increased prioritisation at the policy level has translated down to the operational level with increased focus on asset identification and tracing by LEAs. LEAs across Canada are to a large extent prioritising asset recovery despite the absence of formal operational policies. Introducing such policies would assist in embedding a consistent approach across the country. 593. RCMP-FP leads Canada’s operational approach to financial crime and has the primary responsibility in Canada for combatting transnational and serious organised crime. Asset recovery is embedded as a priority within RCMP-FP’s Strategic Plan, flowing through to operational directives. As discussed in IO.7, RCMP tiering has been a useful approach to ensuring potential proceeds of crime are considered at an early stage and in all major proceeds-generating cases. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Sûreté du Québec, and large municipal police services (Toronto Police Service (TPS), Vancouver Police Department (VPD), Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM)) have operational policies identifying the confiscation of criminal benefits as an important law enforcement priority. 594. RCMP-FP also provides extensive support to other LEAs on asset recovery, including through training and specialist units (see IO.7). This has enhanced the capacity of LEAs nationally to progress asset recovery cases and is building a cadre of officers that prioritise asset recovery within their organisation. RCMP-FP has developed specific operational structures dedicated to asset recovery (see section 8.1.3). Interviews with RCMP-FP, and provincial and municipal police demonstrated that the heightened focus given to asset recovery is driving a positive asset recovery culture at the officer level. This is particularly evident in some LEAs (including the Vancouver Police Department VPD and the integrated Alberta Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) which is Alberta’s co-ordinated response to serious and organised crime); however, it remains an area for improvement elsewhere. 595. There is a general positive trend on prioritising asset recovery amongst various LEAs, which demonstrated an improved awareness within frontline policing of the importance of asset recovery. Frontline police are generally aware of, and undergo training to identify, indicators of financially motivated offending and have clear processes in place to refer matters to specialist units within their police service, or to specialised units of the RCMP where necessary. CRA and CBSA 596. Other competent authorities are prioritising the pursuit of asset recovery as policy objective to a large extent. CRA has increased its focus on asset recovery since 2020 establishing a civil audit and recovery function (the IIAP) to recover liabilities against those who generate revenue from illicit activities without declaring income. This supports the existing asset recovery mandate of CRA-CIP in recovering the proceeds of tax offences. Following its 2025 review of its ML and POC initiatives and the November 2025 publication of a new ML investigation policy and guide (see core issue 7.1), CRA-CIP is positioning its Criminal Investigations Program to play a more significant asset recovery role. While the results of this remain to be seen, the enhanced priority CRA has given to this issue is good progress. 597. Recognising its role given the risk and prevalence of TBML, CBSA has also increased the priority given to asset recovery within its mandate. Beyond cross-border currency controls, CBSA (together with Finance Canada) has implemented a new framework within the PCMLTFA to enable the seizure as forfeit of falsely or undeclared goods, including over and under-invoiced goods. These were introduced to provide CBSA with additional powers to address potential instances of trade-based illicit financial flows (including money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion) at the border. They demonstrate CBSA’s responsiveness and the priority it affords to seizing goods and funds used in potential cross-border criminal activity (see core issue 7.4 and section 8.5.2 for further detail). Prosecution services 598. Within the CC asset recovery framework, PPSC and provincial prosecution services share jurisdiction and are responsible (in close co-ordination with investigators) for seeking asset recovery orders. 599. Chapter 3.7 of its Deskbook requires PPSC prosecutors to consider forfeiture of proceeds of crime in all relevant cases. PPSC’s policy for asset recovery is set by the Director and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and its operationalisation is supported by the HQ Counsel Group through its ML Working Group. Prosecutors routinely consider asset recovery in the context of sentencing and typically may not waive the requirement to seek forfeiture without approval from PPSC management. Similar structures exist within provincial prosecution services. Asset recovery issues have featured in policy roundtables bringing together all prosecution services, demonstrating its prioritisation at the policy level to some extent. 600. Despite the policy outlined above, asset recovery is not a core business for prosecutors. Prosecutors prioritise securing convictions and typically consider asset recovery at the sentencing stage of a prosecution. While it is an independent process from sentencing, seeking asset recovery through the CC is the responsibility of prosecutors and is inherently linked to the progression of, and is viewed consistent with the framing of the criminal case, rather than being prioritised as a separate outcome to disrupt the criminal business model through deprivation of the benefits of crime. There is a degree of involvement by prosecutors in supporting LEAs in the application of provisional measures. However, they are not closely integrated into the process at that stage and are primarily focussed on supporting the criminal prosecution rather than developing a forward-leaning forfeiture strategy with the LEA from the investigation stage. Civil Forfeiture Offices (CFOs) 601. All material provinces [57] maintain dedicated civil forfeiture offices/authorities (collectively ‘CFOs’) with some provinces placing a stronger emphasis on civil forfeiture. Provincial CFOs prioritise asset recovery as a policy and operational objective to a very large extent, however the outcomes they achieve varies dependent on the model adopted, the way the province conceptualises the role of civil forfeiture, and its relationship with criminal forfeiture under the CC framework. 602. Of the more material provinces, Ontario and Québec adopt a more conservative policy approach to civil forfeiture. Cases are generally referred to their respective CFOs where a criminal prosecution and forfeiture (with limited exceptions,) is unavailable, unlikely to be successful, or has failed, or in the case of Québec, is less expedient. In contrast, BC and Alberta (as well as Manitoba and Saskatchewan) take more proactive approaches to civil forfeiture, and their co-operation, co-ordination and liaising with LEAs. The CFOs in these provinces seek to restrain and forfeit property through civil proceedings, independent of (but without jeopardising) any related criminal proceedings. These proceedings can support conviction-based forfeiture outcomes if the prosecution proceeds, but they also ensure that an independent proceeding to recover criminal property exists even in the absence of prosecution and conviction. 603. Additionally, in BC and Manitoba, civil forfeiture is used as a tool to prevent unjust enrichment. The effectiveness of this approach is clearly reflected in the confiscation results, with BC’s approach a strength of the Canadian system. 604. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture frameworks generally enable the recovery of property located in another province/territory. CFOs have established relationships and referral mechanisms that enable inter-provincial/territorial co-operation to identify, trace, restrain and forfeit criminal property. At the international level (see 8.5.3), CFOs can co-operate informally with foreign partners and have recovered property abroad in small number of cases. 605. Both conviction based and non-convictions (civil) forfeiture frameworks are weighted equally. However, those provinces that are prioritising civil forfeiture are achieving more effective asset recovery outcomes than the federal conviction-based framework and those provinces that take more conservative approaches. MLA 606. Per IO.2 and at 8.5.3, Canada is only recovering criminal property abroad through MLA in a small number of cases, and at relatively modest values. Supporting forfeiture abroad is one of the objects of the MLACMA and is one of the operational priorities of Canada’s Central Authority. However, this generally has not resulted in the forfeiture outcomes expected given Canada’s risk and context. While co-operation with the US for asset recovery is prioritised, co-operation with other jurisdictions is not routine, and in some instances not attempted despite evidence of asset flight. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 607. During the period under review, Canada has shown proactiveness in implementing legislative and administrative reforms to enhance the effective recovery of criminal property, in response to identified challenges. While many of these measures (described below) have only been recently implemented, they point to a positive evolution in the framework. 608. Canada’s quinquennial statutory reviews of the PCMLTFA examine the broader effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, including investigations and prosecutions. While there is no dedicated asset recovery review, recommendations implemented from the PCMLTFA review may indirectly enhance competent authorities’ ability to pursue criminal forfeiture in PML cases, e.g. through amendments to the ML offence in 2024 (outlined in core issue 7.2). aim to strengthen the ability of LEAs and prosecutors to secure convictions for PML. 609. Public consultation papers and policy briefs developed by Finance Canada and Public Safety Canada have complemented the PCMLTFA reviews. These papers and briefs are focused on enhancing the operational effectiveness of the criminal forfeiture framework. The Department of Justice has contributed to consultation papers and briefs on the AML/ATF regime in Canada and carried out stakeholder engagement with respect to criminal justice reforms. This has led to the implementation of several positive CC amendments addressing challenges experienced by LEAs in identifying and tracing proceeds of crime: · clarified that production orders for financial data cover accounts associated with digital currencies; · introduced a new production order for specified dates and a keep-account open order; · established a warrant power for the search and seizure of digital assets, and · simplified aspects of seizure warrants and restraint orders, including repealing the requirement to obtain an undertaking by the Attorney General for costs related to the seizure or restraint of property. 610. While these are recent developments, interviews with LEAs demonstrated their utility in recent cases in identifying and tracing financial flows in support of asset recovery. 611. Reflecting the growing appreciation for the role of provincial CFOs, Canada recently passed further amendments to the PCMLTFA allowing CFOs to be recipients of FINTRAC financial intelligence disclosures. Cullen Commission 612. The 2022 Final Report of the Cullen Commission, a provincial public inquiry into money laundering in British Columbia, was an important development for asset forfeiture in Canada. The Report made several notable recommendations to the BC government with respect to criminal and civil forfeiture in BC. It has had implications for federal resources and priorities, as well as other provinces and has driven increased focus on asset recovery and the BC framework, nationwide. 613. The genesis for many of Canada’s recent efforts to prioritise, modernise, and resource its asset recovery structures flow from the Commission’s recommendations. For instance, BC has implemented the most ambitious recommendation—an unexplained wealth order (UWO) regime leveraging the experience of Manitoba, which established the first unexplained wealth scheme in Canada. Both frameworks have been upheld in relevant provincial superior courts, establishing new precedent across Canada. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 614. LEA structures support asset recovery investigations to a large extent. During the period under review LEAs have increased their resourcing and either created or expanded dedicated financial crime and asset recovery units. RCMP-FP, OPP, Sûreté du Québec and major municipal LEAs have dedicated resources and units for financial crime and asset recovery. In many cases, these units combine responsibility for asset recovery with the investigation of specific proceeds generating crimes (i.e. RCMP-FP’s IMLITs and SOC sections and OPP’s Serious Fraud Office). Others, such as OPP’s Provincial Asset Forfeiture Unit (PAFU) and RCMP-FP’s Asset Forfeiture Unit in BC are asset recovery specialist units that receive referrals from investigative teams. In the case of the IMLITs, embedded CRA officers support the provision of tax information, which competent authorities use in understanding suspects’ financial circumstances. 615. These structures have improved the delivery of specialised asset recovery training to financial investigators and investigators in units targeting high risk predicate offences. This has increased the capacity of LEAs to identify and trace assets, including through improved use of information gathering powers, and is increasingly embedding a culture at the officer level that asset recovery is a core policing function. 616. The priority of these units is to support identification and tracing of criminal property for restraint and forfeiture applications through the CC framework. Notable exceptions to these are the RCMP-FP’s asset forfeiture unit in BC. This functions specifically as a gatekeeper for RCMP (both FP and C&amp;IP) investigations in BC for potential asset recovery. It ensures matters are referred to the CFO expeditiously to facilitate identification and tracing of criminal property with greater success. Co-ordination 617. Strategic co-ordination between these structures occurs through the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and through the Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) which helps ensure law enforcement operational initiatives are co-ordinated and aligned with the top threats identified in the NRA. 618. LEAs co-ordinate at the tactical level to a large extent, despite the potential challenges of overlapping jurisdictions of federal, provincial and municipal LEAs. Most commonly, this occurs through Joint Forces Operations (JFOs), which bring together dedicated resources across all levels, and enable enhanced information sharing between agencies. JFOs are common and heavily used tool by Canadian authorities and are established for almost all complex investigations where multiple LEAs or competent authorities are involved. Integrated teams, such as RCMP-FP’s IMLITs, are also effectively supporting asset recovery outcomes at the operational level through their co-ordinated efforts to progress cases and trace criminal proceeds in the most significant cases. 619. Canada is effectively utilising these structures to co-ordinate the provision of specific technical expertise in support of asset recovery matters. For example, RCMP’s Crypto Tactical Operational Support (CTOS) teams supported RCMP-FP IMLIT investigators during the execution of a warrant to take control of multiple wallets in a major investigation. This resulted in the seizure of a large volume of cryptocurrency. Similarly, OPP’s Cyber Operations Section demonstrated effective co-ordination with the OPP PAFU to support an operational outcome. Footnotes [57] Ontario, Québec, British Columbia and Alberta. Civil forfeiture offices also exist in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, and the Territory of Nunavut." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="792. Overall, Canadian FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs demonstrate a generally good awareness of TF-TFS obligations, supported by extensive guidance, outreach and communication by competent authorities. Authorities have invested significantly in sanctions implementation capacity and infrastructure since 2022 and have built mechanisms to disseminate timely information and practical guidance. However, awareness does not always translate into consistent implementation, particularly among some DNFBP sectors. While outreach volume and content appear substantial, during the on-site visit many DFNBPs (lawyers, real estate and DPMS) demonstrated gaps in their understanding of their ML/TF obligations and consequent compliance with them 793. GAC plays a central role in providing primary guidance on sanctions obligations. The Canadian sanctions website consolidates information on all sanctions regimes, including those implementing UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, and provides links to legal instruments, UN lists, FAQs, certificate/permit processes and delisting procedures. Importantly, stakeholders are able to communicate directly with the Sanctions Bureau through designated inboxes for general inquiries and delisting requests. Additionally, GAC’s website directs users to other relevant government websites such as Public Safety Canada’s website on the Criminal Code listing process and currently listed entities, among others. While the website appears comprehensive and regularly updated, it remains difficult to assess whether the website functions primarily as an information repository or as an instrument that materially improves compliance behaviour. There is a need to strengthen its contents and seek user feedback to ensure it is effective as an instrument that materially improves compliance behaviour. 794. FINTRAC supplements GAC’s legal guidance with operationally focused material directed at RE. Guidance covers the obligation to submit Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs) and clarifies what is considered to be property (i.e. anything owned or controlled by a listed person or entity, tangible or intangible), the triggers for reporting, and the lists that should be monitored. FINTRAC also issues indicators, typologies and bulletins on terrorist financing and sanctions evasion, including thematic alerts and special bulletins on ideologically motivated violent extremism and other typologies These communications aim to promote better detection practices and reinforce risk-based approaches. The existence of tailored bulletins suggests an effort to align private-sector awareness with evolving risk. These materials are well designed to promote better detection practices, but the on-site visit did not indicate that reporting entities across the board have integrated them into their day-to-day screening and monitoring systems. 795. Public-private engagement mechanisms support ongoing dialogue. The Supervision Public-Private Working Group (SPPWG) meets quarterly and brings together regulators and industry representatives to discuss emerging risks, regulatory changes and best practices, including sanctions evasion. Members also include associations, who will educate and consult other reporting entities in their sector. New sectors, including white label ATMs and title insurers, are also members of the working group. FINTRAC also conducts bilateral monitoring meetings to discuss implementation practices and risk mitigation measures with individual entities. These fora provide credible channels for feedback and clarification, and they help ensure that entities remain up to date on TF-TFS expectations. For example, specifically related to TFS, FINTRAC consulted the SPPWG on the LPEPR guidance, which resulted in refinements to the guidance to improve clarity and useability for reporting entities Nevertheless, while these mechanisms are active, it is not possible at this stage to quantify participation or measure shifts in compliance quality resulting from them. 796. Outreach activity appears broad and sustained. GAC issues sanctions alerts to 1 838 subscribers (at the time of writing) when changes occur to UN or Canadian lists, generally within 24 hours, thereby supporting timely awareness. However, the breakdown of the subscribers (and therefore clarity on whether these are reporting entities and if so which kinds, or private persons) is not available. It also delivers presentations that cover the architecture of Canadian sanctions, explain stakeholder obligations and use scenario-based discussions. In 2023, Canada created a team to undertake robust and sustained outreach which increased stakeholder engagement. After outreach events were held with 673 stakeholders in 2023 the number of subscribers to the GAC list grew to 1 796 in 2024 and 2 881 in 2025. Positive informal feedback is reported, though the absence of structured evaluation limits insight into whether outreach leads to behavioural change. FINTRAC, who also issues sanction alerts, similarly delivers targeted webinars, including a 2025 series on sanctions evasion and property reporting that reached over 2 100 participants and recorded self-reported improvements in understanding among 73% of respondents. These figures indicate growing reach across all reporting sectors, including newly regulated ones. While increasing participation numbers show a rise in interest, authorities do not systematically measure whether participants subsequently change policies, procedures or controls. 797. Authorities also convene joint events with law enforcement and policy partners. A 2024 Economic Sanctions Enforcement symposium brought together financial institutions, DNFBPs and competent authorities to discuss new reporting obligations and enforcement expectations. Feedback was reportedly used to refine the system, illustrating a learning loop between supervisors and industry. This demonstrates a willingness to move beyond one-directional communication and towards collaborative implementation. 798. Overall, it appears that Canadian entities, particularly larger financial institutions, have ready access to information, channels to seek clarification, and regular interaction with authorities. There is an increasing sophistication among more mature reporting entities, particularly given the scale of sanctions activity since 2022. 799. Notably, well-resourced FIs and many VASPs are able to deploy automated screening tools and specialist staff, whereas smaller entities often rely on more basic controls, which increases the risk of uneven implementation. 800. In several DNFBP sectors (particularly lawyers, real estate brokers and DPMS), sanctions checks are often conducted only at onboarding, with limited ongoing screening of existing customers' activities. This creates a tangible risk that newly designated individuals may not be identified and that freezing obligations will not be triggered. Canada state that they regularly communicate with professional bodies and associations to encourage them to emphasize the need to regularly consult Canada's sanctions, nevertheless this remains a concern." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="446. Administrative sanctions mainly focused on corporate dissolutions, and no criminal sanctions, were applied to natural persons for inaccuracy of information and failure to comply with corporate basic and BO information requirements over the review period. These were proportionate and dissuasive to some extent. New federal and Québec BO registries are demonstrating greater, proportionate use of administrative sanctions. 447. FINTRAC has issued six administrative monetary penalties for a total of CAD 1 181 335 since 2021 in cases which included failures relating to BO obligations. Penalties ranged from CAD 41 085 for violations related to adequate policies pertaining to BO information and other less serious violations, to CAD 544 500 for failure to keep up to date BO information on high-risk clients. 448. In relation to the obligations to file BO information on corporations, CC and REQ have taken the approach of sending non-compliance letters to corporations which have not yet filed information. At the time of the onsite visit, CC had achieved 94% compliance with filing obligations and REQ has achieved 70 % compliance. As of December 2025, Corporations Canada had conducted 10 512 follow ups with corporations that had yet to file their ISC information. The REQ conducted 2 350 follow ups in 2024 and 34 392 in 2025. 449. No sanctions have been applied for failures by corporations to record BO information in cases where central filing does not yet apply, e.g. Ontario. This stems from the fact that in provinces where central filing does not yet apply, meaning all apart from Québec, authorities do not conduct checks or collect data on whether corporations are meeting their obligations to record and keep up-to-date accurate BO information. 450. Data provided for CRA shows significant increases in the usage of financial penalties since introduction of the enhanced trust reporting requirements. These do not indicate that penalties applied are greater but do clearly show that penalties have been applied in relation to several thousand more trusts for reporting failures, with a consequent greater total monetary amount of penalties, amounting to several million CAD more. The application of late- and non-filing penalties decreased by 44% from the 2023 tax year to the 2024 tax year, demonstrating the effectiveness of penalties in increasing compliance. 451. Canada considers that the fiduciary duties of trustees under common law, and the equivalent obligations under the Civil Code of Québec, are relevant. While there is sufficient case law to demonstrate that the Canadian courts do sanction trustees who have breached those duties, cases are not yet available to demonstrate that any trustees have been sanctioned by the courts specifically for failing to obtain or record BO information, as required to satisfy the enhanced trust reporting rules. This is understandable given the recency of the rules (which entered into force for tax years ending on or after 31December 2023) and the time it takes for such matters to reach the courts. Case law was provided to demonstrate that trustees have been sanctioned by the courts for the failure to comply with tax filing obligations. Additionally, Canadian tax authorities have provided data on sanctions applied to trusts due to late-filing or failure to file trust beneficial ownership information required by the enhanced trust reporting rules. 452. Canada demonstrated that FINTRAC in its activity as supervisor has detected six failings across FI and DNFPB sectors relating to both basic and BO information., including where identification and verification of legal persons and BOs are checked during the broader scope of AML/CFT examinations. Sanctions have been applied in each of these six cases. Table 5.5. Remedial actions and sanctions imposed for breaches of basic and BO information Type of remedial actions and sanctions Amount of sanctions imposed (CAD) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 FINTRAC Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) 0 175 000 0 0 156 750 849 585 Corporations Canada Remedial action N/A N/A N/A 18 23 38 Warning letter 40 641 92 996 215 256 219 548 285 646 104 884* Striking off 4 142** 327** 13 835 56 603 56 150 48 459 Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Warning Letter CRA Confidential but reviewed by the assessment team. Remedial action Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) Warning Letter REQ Remedial action N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 350 34 392 Striking off N/A N/A N/A N/A 569 1 572 Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 Warning Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 350 34 392 Revenu Québec Confidential But reviewed By the assessment team N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Source: Canada, * Confidential but reviewed by the assessment team." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="446. Administrative sanctions mainly focused on corporate dissolutions, and no criminal sanctions, were applied to natural persons for inaccuracy of information and failure to comply with corporate basic and BO information requirements over the review period. These were proportionate and dissuasive to some extent. New federal and Québec BO registries are demonstrating greater, proportionate use of administrative sanctions. 447. FINTRAC has issued six administrative monetary penalties for a total of CAD 1 181 335 since 2021 in cases which included failures relating to BO obligations. Penalties ranged from CAD 41 085 for violations related to adequate policies pertaining to BO information and other less serious violations, to CAD 544 500 for failure to keep up to date BO information on high-risk clients. 448. In relation to the obligations to file BO information on corporations, CC and REQ have taken the approach of sending non-compliance letters to corporations which have not yet filed information. At the time of the onsite visit, CC had achieved 94% compliance with filing obligations and REQ has achieved 70 % compliance. As of December 2025, Corporations Canada had conducted 10 512 follow ups with corporations that had yet to file their ISC information. The REQ conducted 2 350 follow ups in 2024 and 34 392 in 2025. 449. No sanctions have been applied for failures by corporations to record BO information in cases where central filing does not yet apply, e.g. Ontario. This stems from the fact that in provinces where central filing does not yet apply, meaning all apart from Québec, authorities do not conduct checks or collect data on whether corporations are meeting their obligations to record and keep up-to-date accurate BO information. 450. Data provided for CRA shows significant increases in the usage of financial penalties since introduction of the enhanced trust reporting requirements. These do not indicate that penalties applied are greater but do clearly show that penalties have been applied in relation to several thousand more trusts for reporting failures, with a consequent greater total monetary amount of penalties, amounting to several million CAD more. The application of late- and non-filing penalties decreased by 44% from the 2023 tax year to the 2024 tax year, demonstrating the effectiveness of penalties in increasing compliance. 451. Canada considers that the fiduciary duties of trustees under common law, and the equivalent obligations under the Civil Code of Québec, are relevant. While there is sufficient case law to demonstrate that the Canadian courts do sanction trustees who have breached those duties, cases are not yet available to demonstrate that any trustees have been sanctioned by the courts specifically for failing to obtain or record BO information, as required to satisfy the enhanced trust reporting rules. This is understandable given the recency of the rules (which entered into force for tax years ending on or after 31December 2023) and the time it takes for such matters to reach the courts. Case law was provided to demonstrate that trustees have been sanctioned by the courts for the failure to comply with tax filing obligations. Additionally, Canadian tax authorities have provided data on sanctions applied to trusts due to late-filing or failure to file trust beneficial ownership information required by the enhanced trust reporting rules. 452. Canada demonstrated that FINTRAC in its activity as supervisor has detected six failings across FI and DNFPB sectors relating to both basic and BO information., including where identification and verification of legal persons and BOs are checked during the broader scope of AML/CFT examinations. Sanctions have been applied in each of these six cases. Table 5.5. Remedial actions and sanctions imposed for breaches of basic and BO information Type of remedial actions and sanctions Amount of sanctions imposed (CAD) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 FINTRAC Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) 0 175 000 0 0 156 750 849 585 Corporations Canada Remedial action N/A N/A N/A 18 23 38 Warning letter 40 641 92 996 215 256 219 548 285 646 104 884* Striking off 4 142** 327** 13 835 56 603 56 150 48 459 Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) 0 0 0 0 0 0 Warning Letter CRA Confidential but reviewed by the assessment team. Remedial action Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) Warning Letter REQ Remedial action N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 350 34 392 Striking off N/A N/A N/A N/A 569 1 572 Monetary penalty (amount in CAD) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 Warning Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 350 34 392 Revenu Québec Confidential But reviewed By the assessment team N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Source: Canada, * Confidential but reviewed by the assessment team." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 282. In Canada, most DNFBPs have market entry controls that require them to be licensed or registered by provincial or territorial regulators. During the licensing or registration process, whether applicants are related to criminals is assessed through “fit and proper” requirements. Their practice varies by relevant regulators: some require criminal record checks for all applicants, others only when reasonable suspicion exists, and still others rely on self-declaration subject to committee review. The lack of a coherent and consistent licensing or registration regime for DPMS at the federal provincial and territorial level means no effective Canada-wide controls are applied for applicants to prevent criminals and their associates from entering this sector, although some municipalities have licensing regimes for DPMS that include criminal record check requirements. 283. Provincial/territorial authorities detect and address DNFBP’s breaches of licensing and registration requirements through monitoring each professional’s compliance with their code of conduct or other relevant regulations. Over the review period, supervisory authorities have taken actions against DNFBPs’ breaches of registration requirements, resulting in disciplinary actions. No disciplinary actions have been taken against DPMS at the federal or provincial level, since they are not subject to registration/licensing requirements except in a couple municipalities. Casinos 284. As of 1 April 2025, Canada has 19 casinos as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This population has decreased slightly since the last MER but remains stable. To operate legally, casinos must be officially licensed through their respective provincial or territorial regulators. Several provincial regulators operate their own online gaming platforms to support oversight, including Ontario Lottery Gaming Corporation (OLG.ca) for Ontario resident and PlayNow.com operated by the British Columbia Lottery Corporation (BCLC) for residents of British Columbia. In addition to OLG.ca, Ontario also established iGaming Ontario (iGO), which oversees a regulated market that permits private operators to offer online gaming services to Ontario players. 285. Regulatory bodies require casinos to submit application forms and conduct background/due diligence (financial and business information) checks before administering a license. Regulators also conduct “fit and proper” procedures for workers, including senior managers and directors, which typically include a licensing or registration prerequisite for those seeking employment within the gaming sector. For example, BCLC’s Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch (GPEB) controls licensing and registration as the provincial gaming regulator. For organizations and individuals involved in the commercial gaming industry in British Columbia, GPEB issues corporate registration, senior official (ownership), senior employee (executive team) and gaming worker registrations. 286. Regulatory authorities enforce protocols for the identification and management of improper conduct, which include conducting internal reviews. Provincial and territorial regulators can also issue penalties to encourage adherence to regulations among licensees, permit recipients, sanctioned retailers, and gaming personnel. For example, in Ontario, its regulator the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) has issued three warning letters (in 2023) and issued three orders of monetary penalty (one in 2022 (CAD 147 712,50), one in 2023 (CAD 55 000) and one in 2024 (still in the disciplinary process)) related to AML administrative shortcomings since 2020. Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones (DPMS) 287. Based on open-source search, outreach activities and risk questionnaires, Canada estimates that there are approximately 3 000 DPMS that perform the triggering activities that make them subject to the PCMLTFA. The exact number is unknown due to the lack of licensing or registration regime at the federal or provincial/territorial levels. 288. There are no licensing or registration regime for DPMS in Canada at the federal or provincial/territorial levels. Although some municipalities independently issue licences to DPMS, no federal/provincial/territorial controls are applied for applicants to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the DPMS sector. This is of particular concern since the DPMS sector is assessed as highly inherently vulnerable in Canada’s national risk assessment and the 4th round MER included a Recommended Action to consider introducing a licensing or registration regime, or other controls for DPMS. It may also limit FINTRAC’s ability to assess and monitor the PF risk of some entities in DPMS sector, and their effective implementation of PF-TFS obligations (See 11.6.2. for further details). 289. The Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA), the national industry association for DPMS, has a Code of Ethics and Standards and Conduct. However, as an industry association, membership is voluntary and the CJA does not have any disciplinary authority over its members. Real estate 290. As of 1 April 2025, Canada has 7 742 real estate brokerages as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This number represents less than half of the entities mentioned in the last MER, because the last MER included agents working with brokerages, examined under the brokerages and not as an entity on their own. Licensing and certification requirements in the Canadian real estate sector are set by provincial and territorial regulators. 291. Provincial and territorial regulatory bodies mandate that applicants either submit a criminal background check or provide consent for one to be obtained during the process of applying for a license. For example, in Québec, the Certification Department at the Organisme d’autoréglementation du courtage immobilier du Québec (OACIQ) analyses each license application thoroughly, including a criminal record checks and other criteria established by current regulations. 292. Breaches of real estate legislation and rules are monitored through customer complaints to the provincial or territorial real estate regulator. It is notable that the process depends on customer complaints. Provincial and territorial legislations and regulations may cover the licensing/registration requirements, general conduct of professionals, and disciplinary proceedings. Complaints of misconduct are investigated by professional bodies to verify the scope of authority in the offence, whether a penalty is appropriate, and if so, to deliver a proportionate outcome in line with the severity of the offence. Table 4.1 shows data from the four most populous provinces on breaches of licensing requirements by revocation/suspension of licenses and penalties. Table 4.1. Number of real estate licenses denied, revoked or suspended and penalties issued in Ontario, Québec, British Columbia and Alberta (2020-2025) Total licenses issued new/renewed Licenses Denied / Withdrawn/ Refused Licenses Revoked / Suspended Number of Penalties Issued Total Value (in CAD) 2020-2021 Ontario 44 484 6 4 75 529 000 Québec 1 802 3 99 88 230 000 British Columbia Not available - 12 Not available Not available Alberta 15 035 6 1 208 274 128 2021-2022 Ontario 51 824 7 10 88 738 500 Québec 2 189 8 128 157 500 500 British Columbia Not available - 8 48 195 750 Alberta 17 074 6 12 208 274 128 2022-2023 Ontario 54 080 7 7 129 1 267 500 Québec 2 294 10 100 114 344 000 British Columbia Not available - 4 48 654 581 Alberta 18 461 9 1 51 505 900 2023-2024 Ontario 53 674 12 6 89 1 052 700 Québec 1 784 13 128 69 380 000 British Columbia 20 171 - 6 74 1 313 171 Alberta 20 327 3 4 45 257 120 2024-2025 Ontario 51 300 6 13 69 834 500 Québec 1 629 3 199 107 552 500 British Columbia 19 347 - 10 145 1 692 250 Alberta 6 429 3 5 41 387 855 Source: Canada Accountants 293. FINTRAC estimates the number of accountants and accounting firms that are subject to the PCMLTFA (i.e. conducting activities that fall under the scope of the FATF Standards) at less than 1 000. In the previous MER, the number was estimated at 3 829. This change is the result of FINTRAC’s identification of accountants subject to the PCMLTFA for a more accurate estimate. 294. The professional certification and regulation of accountants is conducted at the provincial and territorial level through Chartered Professional Accountant (CPA) bodies. Provincial or territorial regulators ask applicants to disclose previous criminal convictions or bankruptcy to prevent criminals from becoming certified accountants. For example, under the Professional Code of Québec, candidates and members must notify CPA Québec within 10 days when they are subject to certain judicial or disciplinary decisions, including being found guilty of a criminal offence or an offence under a tax act, a securities act, or an AML/CFT act in Canada or abroad. They must also answer questions regarding their criminal/penal record once a year. Additionally, CPA Québec conducts targeted and random background checks. 295. Accountants must comply with Codes of Conduct and Regulations set by provincial and territorial bodies. A breach of these rules may result in disciplinary measures by the CPA body. Professional bodies conduct investigations against members when complaints of breaching professional conduct (including the relevant CPA code of conduct/ethics or CPA Act) are filed. It is notable that the process depends on third party complaints. Complaints are generally reviewed and assessed by an intake team, with more serious and unresolved complaints falling under CPA jurisdiction sent to a disciplinary committee. If grounds exist for disciplinary action, penalties can be imposed in line with the severity of offences. This includes financial sanctions, public announcements, notices to provincial and territorial bodies, suspension or revocation of registration, or a combination of penalties. BC notaries 296.  There are 293 BC notaries or notary firms identified by FINTRAC as reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. This population has slightly decreased since the last MER but remains stable. The Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia (SNPBC) is the regulatory body that oversees activities and memberships (licences) of all BC notaries. Members must demonstrate their “good standing” with the SNPBC to qualify for licenses, which is supported by criminal record checks. Only members may legally and beneficially own the voting shares of a notary corporation or serve as directors of the corporation. The SNPBC has the authority to investigate, make findings of fact, and take action against members of its society who engage in criminal wrongdoing or facilitate criminal activity. SNPBC conducts criminal background checks on those applying to the Notary Education Program (NEP) and verifies identification through a third-party resource. Where there is evidence of criminal activity, the SNPBC may reprimand, fine, terminate or seek a significant suspension of the member’s license. For Lawyers 297. Canada estimates there are 136 000 lawyers and 4 200 Québec notaries active in the country. The practice of law in any jurisdiction in Canada is limited to only individuals with a valid license from one of the fourteen law societies. 298. The Law Societies determine the requirements for admission to the legal profession and are responsible for all elements of licensing. This includes the required educational components, licensing examinations, articling or other experiential training programs, and requirements related to “good character”. Applicants must generally self-report any conduct or circumstances that may raise issues about their character, including prior convictions of criminal offences. These components are mainly consistent across law societies. A Canadian police clearance (i.e., a criminal record check) and/or reference letters may be required. If there are any concerns, the Law Society will investigate and, if needed, order a hearing. 299. There have been multiple instances, where a lawyer has had their license either suspended or revoked (disbarred) by a Law Society for professional misconduct that relates to breaches of Law Society AML/CFT rules and/or related duties (see Table 4.2). Table 4.2. Suspension and revocation of lawyers’ licenses (2017- April 2025, not limited to AML/CFT) Estimated number of law firms Individual members Suspension of individual lawyers ’ licenses Revocation of individual lawyers ’ licenses Law Society of Ontario 14 090 law firms 65 590 (lawyers) 486 231 Barreau du Québec 3 908 31 000 272 25 Chambre des notaires du Québec 828 3 900 119 4 Law Society of British Columbia 4 000 18 000 (approx..) 98 64 Law Society of Alberta 2 700 12 000 57 22 Source: Canada Box 4.1. Cases for detecting unauthorized practice of law in Ontario The Law Society of Ontario has been involved in a number of cases where it took measures to stop someone from the unauthorized practice of law. Some examples over the 2020 to 2025 period include the following: · Law Society of Ontario v. Helia Bayegan and HMB Canadian Immigration Firm Corp . (2024): The court issued an injunction preventing the respondents from holding themselves out as lawyers or legal service providers, or from engaging in any activities that constitute the practice of law. The respondents were ordered to pay restitution to individuals who had been harmed by their unauthorized practice, ensuring that affected parties were compensated for any financial losses. · Law Society of Ontario v Jonhattan Da Rosa, c.o.b. as AXE Consulting Group (2023) : The respondent, Da Rosa, was prohibited from engaging in the practice of law or providing legal services in Ontario unless properly licensed by the Law Society of Ontario. The court issued an injunction preventing Da Rosa from holding themselves out as a lawyer or legal service provider, or from engaging in any activities that constitute the practice of law. Law Societies are empowered by their enabling statutes to regulate the legal profession and protect the public from harm caused by the unauthorized practice of law. Their powers include investigations; cease-and-desist orders; fines and penalties; public warnings; and injunctions. Courts play a critical role in enforcing the law societies' mandates and addressing unauthorized practice. Their powers include injunctions, criminal prosecutions and civil remedies. Below are some examples of instances where a law society took measures for the unauthorized practice of law. Law Societies also take the necessary measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in a law firm, through ownership and management restrictions described in R28, c.28.4b. The restrictions ensure that only licensed legal professionals have control of law firms." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="142. For formal outgoing MLA and extradition, IAG provides competent authorities with: templates; step by step guidance on how to make MLA requests; trainings; and extradition templates for provisional arrest and full extradition requests. IAG has two paralegals embedded within RCMP (IAG’s largest domestic counterpart) to facilitate the process and ensure the quality of draft requests. IAG has established central contacts in several provinces, including all material provinces (Ontario, Québec and BC), who are specialized in co-ordinating MLA and extradition requests from line agencies to IAG. This helps make the system more efficient, as the provincial central contacts engage with IAG and provide advice to prosecutors and LEAs who want to submit a request to foreign authorities. In provinces and territories where there are no central contacts, IAG engages directly with the LEAs and prosecutors. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 143. Canada seeks ML/TF MLA pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties to some extent. A total of 23 MLA partners advised the CA they would consider providing MLA to Canada in the absence of an applicable treaty. Assistance is also available pursuant to court issued non-treaty letters of request. International elements of investigations for ML and for proceeds generating offences are conducted routinely. This typically commences through informal channels, with formal co-operation sought at later stages where necessary. It is a strength of Canada’s domestic rules of evidence that foreign gathered evidence may be used in trials without necessarily receiving it via MLA. This contributes to an increased reliance on informal co-operation via LEAs (see 2.3.2). 144. For non-urgent matters, IAG takes four to five months to consult with LEAs or prosecutors to finalize the request. A large majority (95%) of requests received by IAG are then transmitted to the MLA foreign counterpart. These generally meet the standard required, reflecting the usefulness of IAG’s training to LEAs and their close engagement during the drafting process. 145. Canada sought MLA to some extent, with a total of 70 ML and TF-related outgoing requests, including 6 ML and 5 TF urgent MLA requests (see Table 2.6). During the period under review, the number of outgoing ML MLA has declined. Canada explains this reduction is due to two factors: (i) reliance on other forms of international co-operation; and (ii) the possibility for LEAs to rely on domestic production orders to obtain evidence held by foreign companies with a virtual presence in Canada [23] . The number of outgoing TF MLA requests is low but consistent with Canada’s TF risk, which is largely low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial flows, as set out in the 2025 NRA. 146. The volume of executed requests is high (69%), with all outgoing urgent requests executed and a low percentage (4%) of withdrawn or abandoned requests. None were refused during the assessment period. This demonstrates the good quality of Canada’s outgoing requests for the receiving State. Their timing of execution by requested state was on average 16 months for ML MLA and 18 months for TF MLA (table 2.7). Table 2.6. Outgoing MLA requests FISCAL YEAR (FY) EXECUTED WITHDRAWN ABANDONED REFUSED ONGOING TOTAL 2019-2020 16 0 0 0 2 18 2020-2021 12 0 0 0 2 14 2021-2022 8 2 1 0 5 16 2022-2023 9 0 0 0 3 12 2023-2024 3 0 0 0 4 7 2024-2025 0 0 0 0 3 3 TOTAL 48 2 1 0 19 70 Source: Canada Table 2.7. Time to execute outgoing MLA requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 11 6 - 9 mo 5 9 mo - 1 yr 5 1 - 2 yrs 18 2-5 yrs 9 TOTAL 48 Source: Canada 147. In most cases, MLA is sought to compel the production of documentary or physical evidence, to compel witness statements or testimony, and very occasionally to seek basic corporate and beneficial ownership information. Predicate offences underlying outgoing MLA requests are, fraud (66%) and counterfeiting (23%), with only a few requests for organized crime (12%), extortion (10%) and illicit drug trafficking (8.5%). This is only partially in line with Canada’s risk profile (see IO.1). 148. Most of the outgoing ML MLA requests are addressed to the US (57%), followed by EU countries (17%), which is in line with Canada’s risk profile. TF MLA requests are mostly addressed to EU countries (50%), followed by the US (30%) and Asian countries. 149. International co-operation feedback shows Canada’s requests for MLA are largely useful and of good quality. Canada’s main counterpart highlighted that requests received are among the most well-prepared, legally sound, clear and precisely tailored to meet statutory requirements. Additional countries highlighted that the quality of requests received from Canada is good. Competent authorities are reported as highly responsive when follow-ups are needed (see Box 2.2). Box 2.2. Case of effective outgoing MLA on TF In 2020, the RCMP commenced a criminal investigation into suspected terrorist activities of a Canadian citizen. It was alleged that between 2019 and 2022, the suspect created and administered fundraising campaigns using an online crowdfunding platform, ultimately benefiting individuals alleged to be involved in TF. Between 2022 and 2023, Canada sought MLA from three countries, to obtain urgent records related to foreign criminal investigative files and criminal convictions related to the alleged terrorism financing scheme linked to the suspect in Canada. Records were sought to assist the RCMP in furthering its investigation into the TF allegations and to allow Canadian authorities to lay charges. All requests were made pursuant to bilateral MLA treaties. The suspect was charged in Canada in July 2023 for terrorism-related and TF offences. In May 2025, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The RCMP reports that the records provided pursuant to the MLA requests were critical to the success of the Canadian investigation. Source: Canada 2.2.2. Extradition 150. Canada seeks extradition from bilateral, multilateral treaty partners or from foreign states that permit extradition to Canada under their domestic legal framework even without a formal treaty, e.g. UK and other Commonwealth partners. Canadian prosecutors or correctional authorities, with the assistance of IAG, may make extradition requests for persons wanted for prosecution or for the enforcement or imposition of a sentence. 151. The IAG provided training to competent authorities about best practices in drafting a provisional arrest (PA) request or straight arrest request. IAG legal counsel and paralegals are also available for consultation during the drafting process. During the period under review, IAG received eight new outgoing extradition requests related to ML, seven made by prosecutorial authorities and one from correctional authorities. All of which were then transmitted to the foreign counterpart. No TF extradition request was received by IAG, consistent with Canada’s risk and context. 152. IAG takes approximately 53 days from the receipt of the request to review it, consult with competent authorities, and transmit it to the foreign counterpart. 153. Canada sought extradition from other countries regarding ML/TF and main predicates to some extent. During the period under review, competent authorities sent a total of eight extradition requests, mostly related to fraud (see Table 2.8). Out of the three that were urgent extradition requests (PA), two were executed, one within one day and the other in under a month (arrested on a Red Notice), while the third one was withdrawn because the person sought was not in the extradition partner’s jurisdiction. The volume and nature of underlying offences are not fully in line with the NRA and Canada’s risks. Notably, six extradition requests are related to fraud and only one relates to drug trafficking. The majority of outgoing extradition requests were executed within one year. Canada provided some case studies showing that extradition assistance was sought in an appropriate and timely manner (see Table 2.9). Table 2.8. Outgoing extradition requests FISCAL YEAR (FY) EXECUTED WITHDRAWN ABANDONED REFUSED ONGOING TOTAL 2019-2025 3 1 2 0 2 8 Source: Canada Table 2.9. Time to execute outgoing extradition requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 1 6 - 9 mo 0 9 mo - 1 yr 1 1 - 2 yrs 0 2-5 yrs 1 TOTAL 3 Source: Canada 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 154. In criminal cases, MLA partners share confiscated proceeds, or proceeds from the disposition of confiscated property, pursuant to bilateral asset sharing agreements with Canada. Under the terms of these agreements, net proceeds can be shared in compliance with domestic law and without conditions. Furthermore, during the MLA process, Canada can seek the return of property via other mechanisms such as voluntary return of property, a Canadian court order requiring property to be returned, or enforcement by the MLA partner. Canada’s CA encourages the use of MLA asset recovery through targeted outreach and training to LEAs and prosecutors, provides guidance on a regular basis to domestic authorities with respect to the drafting of requests and has a designated asset recovery and asset sharing co-ordinator. 155. Canada sought MLA to trace and recover illicit assets abroad to some extent. Informal co-operation for asset recovery does support investigating and tracing; however, provisional measures are required through the formal MLA process to freeze, seize and confiscate assets. Informal co-operation (see core issue 2.3) is insufficient to effectively achieve asset recovery outcomes. 156. Canada sought assistance from foreign counterparts for 7 freezing orders and 18 [24] requests for confiscations, across all offences, mostly related to ML offences. The IAG processed asset freezing requests in approximately two and a half months, while confiscation requests were processed in approximately four months. Canada provided a case study showing that assistance was successfully sought to freeze assets on an urgent basis and outside business hours. Most of the asset freezing requests were addressed to the US, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Confiscation requests were mostly addressed to partners other than the US. 46% of MLA asset recovery requests were executed by the requested state, while 42% remain ongoing and are largely with the requested state (see Table 2.10). On average, all the freezing orders were executed by the requested state within two months, while confiscation orders mostly within 16 months (see Table 2.11). 157. During the period under review, assets worth about CAD 11.3 million were restrained. Canada sought the confiscation of approximately CAD 10.3 million and CAD 182 000 were confiscated abroad on behalf of Canada through asset recovery MLA. [25] These amounts are low in the context of Canada’s already modest confiscation outcomes (see IO.8). Table 2.10. 2019-2025: Outgoing asset recovery MLA requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Type of MLA request Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Freezing orders 4 0 0 2 1 7 Confiscations 8 0 0 1 10 19 Total 12 0 0 3 11 26 Source: Canada Table 2.11. Time to execute outgoing asset recovery ML requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Time Freezing orders Confiscations 1 - 6 mo 1 3 6 - 9 mo 3 0 9 mo - 1 yr 0 1 1 yr - 2 yrs 0 1 2 – 5 yrs 0 3 Total 4 8 Source: Canada Footnotes [23] This possibility follows decisions of the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia and Alberta. [24] One additional request was received by the IAG but was not transmitted to the foreign counterpart during the assessment period and was instead forwarded at a later stage. [25] In the context of an MLA request CAD 7 million was returned to Canada without enforcement of confiscation order abroad." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="253. FINTRAC’s supervisory framework relies on close working relationships with OSFI, CIRO and provincial supervisory authorities which facilitate its AML/CFT supervision of FIs. FINTRAC has established 11 MOUs with supervisory authorities across the country with responsibilities for the CUs, trusts and loans, life insurance and securities sectors which cover all provinces presenting the highest risks based on the population and the volume of transactions. FINTRAC supervises compliance with the PCMLTFA, while OSFI’s prudential oversight ensures that FRFIs have the governance, integrity, and risk management framework for effective implementation of control measures under various risk disciplines which include, among others, ML/TF risks. FINTRAC has regular meetings with OSFI to exchange views on emerging risks, supervisory assessment on sector-specific risks and individual FRFIs with supervisory concerns. FINTRAC provided a case example to demonstrate the usefulness of information sharing between FINTRAC, OSFI and a Canadian law enforcement agency concerning suspicion of ML and predicate offences related to an FI, which led to FINTRAC’s identification of significant compliance gaps and eventually imposition of AMP on the FI. FINTRAC also provided another case example to demonstrate its collaboration with CIRO through joint examination on a large securities dealer engaging VA dealings. FINTRAC shares its examination reports on provincially regulated FIs with the relevant provincially supervisory authorities, while CIRO and provincial supervisory authorities share with FINTRAC their examination findings and any issues with AML/CFT implications. Case examples illustrated how FINTRAC’s supervisory actions / assessment on FIs had been triggered on information shared by a provincial securities regulator and OSFI through supervisory information sharing arrangements. 254. FINTRAC applies four categories of supervisory activities to monitor compliance by FIs and VASPs: (1) on-site examinations, including both full-scope and target-scope examinations; (2) desk-based assessment on submissions required by FINTRAC on selected FIs and VASPs (i.e. risk questionnaire and self-assessment; validation of MSB/VASP registration) and on STR submissions through score cards (which is a tool specifically for assessing completeness of data contained in STR, timeliness and volume of STR submissions) ; (3) ongoing supervisory engagements including regular monitoring meetings with and outreach to FIs and VASPs; and (4) specifically for the banking sector, FINTRAC holds quarterly monitoring meetings with DSIBs and annual meetings with non-DSIB banks. These deliver customised information to these banks about specific topics, ML/TF typologies and trends within the banking sector, as well as updating ML/TF risk profiles, and following up on any outstanding compliance issues and progress of remedial actions to address examination findings, gathering FIU reporting metrics (e.g. number of STRs, aging analysis of outstanding internal investigation and outstanding periodic reviews of high-risk customers etc). Given the topics covered, FINTRAC considers these a form of supervisory oversight. In the engagement with banks in the past 12 months, topics such as AML/CFT program oversight, ML/TF risk exposure, status of AML/CFT controls, action plans, policies and procedures have been covered in the regular meeting with banks. 255. FINTRAC develops an annual operational plan to guide different types of supervisory activities across supervised sectors which is refined on in the middle of the year taking into consideration updated information from ongoing supervision, emerging risks and trends based on intelligence from different sources including but not limited to those from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Unit and open sources. An Annual Risk Assessment / Risk Outlook is prepared which provides a high-level plan and description of key risks by sector and a sectoral risk rating for each sector, the number of FIs and VASPs classified in different categories and non-reporters flagged as potentially high risk for each sector by the SRM for the purpose of annual planning exercise. 256. While the Risk Outlook provides a high-level assessment of risks at the sectoral level and the number of entities classified in different risk categories for each sector, FINTRAC was unable to demonstrate how this understanding is converted into fully risk-based activities. The annual operational plans reviewed for banks, MSBs and VASPs, and other FIs (including credit unions, and loan and trust companies) contained the resource level of supervisory teams, and high-level descriptions of various factors considered (e.g. guiding documents to identify risk and to guide FINTRAC’s monitoring and examination activities including the NRA, sector’s risk outlook, external factors, etc). However, FINTRAC is unable to demonstrate how supervisory planning, both in terms of year-to-year priorities as well as intensity and scope for individual FIs and VASPs is driven by risk assessment results at both the sectoral and institutional levels. 257. For example, in the annual operational plans for: · MSB : MSBs assessed as “high risk” or “very high risk” were selected for full scope examinations but some “high risk” or “very high risks” MSBs were not selected due to strong compliance maturity and low residual risk in recent examinations. However, there was no analysis or record of the residual risks of individual MSBs, or a clear methodology by which the strength of compliance maturity is determined to support that these MSBs could be exempted from full scope examinations. · Banks: There was also no documentation outlining the criteria for selecting banks subject to thematic reviews/deep dive assessments, or low intensity activities (e.g. score card, risk questionnaires). FINTRAC could only provide high-level principles of the selection criteria and is unable to demonstrate that the selection is based on the risk assessment results. 258. FINTRAC’s supervisory efforts and intensity may not be proportionate to the sectoral risk level. A high-level review on the supervisory activities conducted from FY2020/2021 to FY2024/2025 found that coverage of supervisory activities (in terms of number of on-site examinations, desk based reviews and ongoing supervisory engagements) for VASP sector and securities sector, which are assessed as very high risk and high risk respectively, is comparable to or even lower than the insurance sector which is assessed as high risk in the 2023 NRA; and medium risk in NRA 2025. Table 3.11. FINTRAC Supervisory activities by sectors from FY2020/21 to FY2024/25 Sector Banks CU/CP Securities Life insurance MSB VASP NRA vulnerability rating* H to VH H H M M to H VH Examinations (Coverage)** 40 (50%) 60 (32%) 119 (4%) 4 (5%) 260 (18%) 213 (16%) Desk-based reviews Score Cards 31 1 0 0 6 0 Questionnaires 67 25 24 25 0 0 Validations of MSB/VASP registration**** n/a n/a n/a n/a 327 313 Sub-total – desk-based reviews (Coverage) 98 (123%) 26 (14%) 24 (1%) 25 (30%) 333 (23%) 313 (23%) Total - examinations and desk-based reviews (Coverage) 138 (173%) 86 (46%) 143 (5%) 29 (35%) 593 (42%) 526 (39%) Others – event driven review Voluntary self-declarations of non-compliance (VSDONC) 214 (268%) 523 (281%) 14 (1%) 5 (6%) 260 (18%) 44 (3%) Ongoing supervisory engagements Meetings 535 (669%) 125 (67%) 19 (1%) 13 (15%) 113 (8%) 3 (0.2%) Source: Canada * VH: very high risk; H: high risk; M: medium risk; L: low risk according to NRA 2025 ** Coverage is compiled by dividing the number of activities by the number of entities within the sector *** DSIBs’ business lines of securities dealing accounting for nearly 90% of securities assets under management of the securities sector. **** total number of validations of MSB and VASP registration for FY2024/25 is 640. While Canada is unable to provide the breakdown of reviews by MSB and VASP, the number shown is estimated by apportioning the total number of reviews to each sector by population. 259. DSIBs, MSBs and VASPs are assessed as very high-risk sectors but are not sufficiently prioritised. Based on annual operational plans and discussions during the onsite visit, the actual period between examinations conducted by FINTRAC on a DSIB during the review period was six years. This is not sufficiently frequent and not commensurate with the DSIB’s very high-risk profile and significance in terms of customer base, transaction volume and high level of integration with other sectors including the securities sector and trust and loan sector, as their business lines of securities dealings and trust and loan activities contributed nearly 90% of these sectors. In one case example presented by FINTRAC, the scope of an on-site examination on a DSIB mainly focused on the progress made in addressing major control issues identified in the previous onsite examinations conducted six years previously, and repeated findings were identified in some of these non-remediated control areas. This supports the AT’s view that the gap between two examinations is too long to facilitate timely testing of effectiveness of controls subject to remediation and identification of any outstanding non-remediated issues. The intensity of other AML/CFT supervisory activities are considered insufficient for DSIBs which are complex and assessed as very high risk. They include (1) quarterly monitoring meetings where FINTRAC delivers customised information tracks progress and monitors status of remediation of examination findings, and gets updates of ML/TF risk profiles, AML/CFT control programme and outstanding compliance issues based on the information submissions by DSIBs. Issues of supervisory concerns identified in the monitoring meetings may trigger supervisory follow-up, e.g. examination. A compliance monitoring meeting is regarded as one type of ongoing supervisory engagements or system for monitoring [33] changes of risks and control environment; (2) score card, assessment scope of which is confined only to timeliness and quality of STRs and is not sufficient for assessing the AML/CFT systems of control of a DSIB; and (3) risk questionnaire which collects ML/TF risk profile information, and is regarded as one type of “system for monitoring” changes of risk profile. Regarding group-wide supervision of DSIBs, no examination / desk-based reviews were conducted by FINTRAC on major banking subsidiaries of DSIBs operating outside Canada. 260. Prudential supervision conducted by OSFI covers assessment of overall risk to the financial viability of an FRFI (including DSIBs), which takes into account, among other things, risk governance and regulatory compliance management, wherein they integrate consideration of AML/CFT controls as a sub-component. OSFI does not undertake AML/CFT operational supervision and its primary focus of assessment remains on enterprise-wide risk governance and regulatory compliance of an FRFI. In its role as the prudential regulator of FRFIs, OSFI complements FINTRAC’s AML supervision. For example, by using its supervisory tools to follow-up on issues which have implications for FRFI’s risk governance and regulatory compliance when these are identified through FINTRAC supervision. In practice, OSFI and FINTRAC have a coherent and co-operative approach to responding to issues which involve the mandates of both regulators. OSFI provided examples of risk governance or regulatory compliance issues identified in its supervisory activities of FRFIs which are related to AML/CFT in the past 5 years. These include findings with direct relevance to AML/CFT (e.g. board and senior management reporting and oversight of AML, resources of AML compliance functions, integrity and operational incidents which are relevant to AML, timeliness of response to third-party or FINTRAC’s AML reviews, etc), and findings on general risk controls which are also relevant to AML/CFT (e.g., ownership and accountability, risk culture etc). 261. Analysis of supervisory activities by risk categories of FIs and VASPs in the past five years was not provided for this evaluation. Based on Table 3.11, FINTRAC conducted examinations of on average 10% of non-DSIB banks annually, and fewer than 4% of MSBs and VASPs annually, which irrespective of the ongoing surveillance outlined below implies an overly long period between examinations not commensurate with the high to very high-risk profile of the sectors. Validation of registration is one of the major supervisory activities for MSBs and VASPs. However, it is not considered adequate to facilitate supervisory assessment the MSBs’ or VASP’s control effectiveness as its purpose is to verify whether a newly registered MSB is in operation, or any entity is offering MSB services without registration with FINTRAC, and therefore the assessment scope is narrow. 262. As a combined FIU and supervisor, FINTRAC demonstrated strong capacity in terms of strategic intelligence, research and analytics and does maximise its leverage to monitor emerging risks on an ongoing basis and inform FINTRAC’s assessment of FIs’ and VASPs’ effectiveness in meeting the STR obligations, with specific actionable assessments of anomalies in FIs / VASPs reporting, and/or by tracing known illicit financial flows back to specific reporting entities. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, intelligence from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Unit is one of the sources to facilitate FINTRAC to formulate or refine its annual operational plans, and it forms part of the ongoing surveillance process. 263. Onsite examinations on FIs and VASPs generally cover assessment of compliance with the requirements under the PCMLTFA with respect to policies and procedures, and testing of sample cases (in particular those relating to STR and monetary threshold reporting). Sample findings letters made available to the AT for onsite examinations of two DSIBs, a non-DSIB bank, a VASP and securities firm contain deficiencies identified but most of them do not provide specific recommendations to address the deficiencies or their root causes, even in cases where significant deficiencies in multiple control areas are identified which may indicate potential system-wide issues (e.g. inadequate governance and oversight, insufficient expertise and resources, limitation in system capabilities, etc). 264. For DSIBs, FINTRAC full scope examinations focus on their compliance with the PCMLTFA requirements, with a frequency of around once every six years on average. Normally, FINTRAC completes a full scope examination on a DSIB in 12 months. The examination is conducted in phases covering different key control areas, and a findings letter is issued at the end of each phase, with a final findings letter issued at end of the examination summarising all issues identified in each phase. Sample testing on a large number of transactions submitted through STR and monetary threshold reports are conducted to assess the DSIB’s ability to identify suspicious transactions and/or customer relationships for filing STRs, and implementing its AML/CFT control policies including CDD and EDD measures where applicable. Given the scale and complexity of a DSIB’s operations and its very high vulnerability to ML/TF, the supervisory assessment is not sufficiently risk focused targeting specific high-risk areas (e.g. business lines, products and services) with reference to the relevant threats and vulnerabilities in the NRA assessment as well as emerging risks, and assessing effectiveness of controls to mitigate the risks. A risk-based examination programme would help shorten the time span of an examination to support more timely supervisory feedback to DSIBs on their control effectiveness. 265. A sample targeted examination on a non-DSIB bank was reviewed. The examination focuses on a few key control areas and the processes last for about 7 months. Sample review is conducted to test the effectiveness of the relevant controls, with deficiencies identified in each sample case are covered in detail in the findings letter. Some high-level recommendations / guidance are provided to address deficiencies noted in individual sample cases. Supervision could be improved by providing analysis of root cause(s) of the deficiencies (e.g. governance and oversight) and specific guidance to address the causes. 266. For VASPs, FINTRAC examinations typically involve document gathering and review leading up to one day of examination fieldwork which is for interviews and then followed by further work finalizing results. Sample testing on transactions and CDD profile is also performed, as well as blockchain analysis. FINTRAC also performs off-site monitoring, leveraging blockchain analytics as part of its supervisory toolkit through which it monitors compliance with the travel rule and monetary threshold reporting requirements, and detects potentially high risks transactions (e.g. those connected with darknet market). Reviews on policies and sample documentation are largely done in the pre-onsite stage. Examination scope covers control designs, policies and procedures, and timeliness and quality of STR and monetary threshold reports. Given the VASP sector is a relatively new sector assessed as having very high ML/TF vulnerabilities and less mature risk management systems, supervision could be improved by providing more specific recommendations and guidance to address the deficiencies in their control design and implementation effectiveness. 267. For securities firms, FINTRAC collects policies and procedures and relevant documents, conducts offsite review and sample testing on CDD profile and transactions which take about 2.5 months and after completing the review, 1-2 hours exit interviews are held with the firm. No recommendation / specific guidance is provided to address the findings identified, in particular those repeated findings found in previous onsite examinations. 268. For MSB (with no VA activity), the AT was not provided with copies of the examination documentation for review until the F2F. [34] 269. FINTRAC has adopted a sector-specific supervision model since 2023 [35] . There are four units under the Operations Division responsible for supervising AML controls of FIs, VASPs and DNFBP sectors. 67 full-time employees are AML supervisors for the FI and VASP sectors, and they are under the Financial Institutions Unit, MSB Unit and Financial Entities Unit which focus on the supervision of banks, MSBs (including VASPs) and other FIs (including CU/CP, securities, trust and loan companies) respectively. In addition to supervising the AML/CFT controls of FIs and VASPs, the AML supervisors are also responsible for policy interpretation, outreaching activities, and enforcement activities. They generally possess adequate experience and appropriate qualifications to discharge their duties. Some of them have legal and investigative backgrounds, and professional qualification in AML/CFT. 270. Resources in the Supervision sector have been increased by approximately 10% since 2021 when FINTRAC assumed the overall responsibility for AML/CFT supervision of FRFIs and VASPs. The Operations Division was restructured to adopt a portfolio management approach in 2021, starting with Canada’s DSIBs, and extending to all other banks in 2023. 271. Despite the increase in headcount since 2021, resources of the AML supervisory teams dedicated for FIs and VASPs are not commensurate with the increase in supervisory responsibilities assumed in 2021. This was particularly apparent in the supervision of banks and MSBs (including VASPs) based on the observations on the overly long period between FINTRAC examinations of DSIBs and other high-risk sectors including MSB and VASP. Table 3.12. Division of the responsibilities with the number of supervisory staff in respective units Units Reporting entities under purview No. of staff dedicated to AML/CFT supervision Financial institutions Banks 22, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 18 supervisors Financial Entities CU/CP, Securities firms Trust and loans companies Mortgage sectors 23, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 19 supervisors MSB MSB VASP 23, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 19 supervisors Source: Canada Footnotes [33] Referred in FATF’s Guidance on Risk-based Supervision issued in March 2021. [34] The sample documentation was provided in the face-to-face meeting and the AT is unable to incorporate its assessment in the report. [35] Prior to 2023, supervision of FIs and VASPs are managed by national office in Ottawa, regional offices in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="253. FINTRAC’s supervisory framework relies on close working relationships with OSFI, CIRO and provincial supervisory authorities which facilitate its AML/CFT supervision of FIs. FINTRAC has established 11 MOUs with supervisory authorities across the country with responsibilities for the CUs, trusts and loans, life insurance and securities sectors which cover all provinces presenting the highest risks based on the population and the volume of transactions. FINTRAC supervises compliance with the PCMLTFA, while OSFI’s prudential oversight ensures that FRFIs have the governance, integrity, and risk management framework for effective implementation of control measures under various risk disciplines which include, among others, ML/TF risks. FINTRAC has regular meetings with OSFI to exchange views on emerging risks, supervisory assessment on sector-specific risks and individual FRFIs with supervisory concerns. FINTRAC provided a case example to demonstrate the usefulness of information sharing between FINTRAC, OSFI and a Canadian law enforcement agency concerning suspicion of ML and predicate offences related to an FI, which led to FINTRAC’s identification of significant compliance gaps and eventually imposition of AMP on the FI. FINTRAC also provided another case example to demonstrate its collaboration with CIRO through joint examination on a large securities dealer engaging VA dealings. FINTRAC shares its examination reports on provincially regulated FIs with the relevant provincially supervisory authorities, while CIRO and provincial supervisory authorities share with FINTRAC their examination findings and any issues with AML/CFT implications. Case examples illustrated how FINTRAC’s supervisory actions / assessment on FIs had been triggered on information shared by a provincial securities regulator and OSFI through supervisory information sharing arrangements. 254. FINTRAC applies four categories of supervisory activities to monitor compliance by FIs and VASPs: (1) on-site examinations, including both full-scope and target-scope examinations; (2) desk-based assessment on submissions required by FINTRAC on selected FIs and VASPs (i.e. risk questionnaire and self-assessment; validation of MSB/VASP registration) and on STR submissions through score cards (which is a tool specifically for assessing completeness of data contained in STR, timeliness and volume of STR submissions) ; (3) ongoing supervisory engagements including regular monitoring meetings with and outreach to FIs and VASPs; and (4) specifically for the banking sector, FINTRAC holds quarterly monitoring meetings with DSIBs and annual meetings with non-DSIB banks. These deliver customised information to these banks about specific topics, ML/TF typologies and trends within the banking sector, as well as updating ML/TF risk profiles, and following up on any outstanding compliance issues and progress of remedial actions to address examination findings, gathering FIU reporting metrics (e.g. number of STRs, aging analysis of outstanding internal investigation and outstanding periodic reviews of high-risk customers etc). Given the topics covered, FINTRAC considers these a form of supervisory oversight. In the engagement with banks in the past 12 months, topics such as AML/CFT program oversight, ML/TF risk exposure, status of AML/CFT controls, action plans, policies and procedures have been covered in the regular meeting with banks. 255. FINTRAC develops an annual operational plan to guide different types of supervisory activities across supervised sectors which is refined on in the middle of the year taking into consideration updated information from ongoing supervision, emerging risks and trends based on intelligence from different sources including but not limited to those from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Unit and open sources. An Annual Risk Assessment / Risk Outlook is prepared which provides a high-level plan and description of key risks by sector and a sectoral risk rating for each sector, the number of FIs and VASPs classified in different categories and non-reporters flagged as potentially high risk for each sector by the SRM for the purpose of annual planning exercise. 256. While the Risk Outlook provides a high-level assessment of risks at the sectoral level and the number of entities classified in different risk categories for each sector, FINTRAC was unable to demonstrate how this understanding is converted into fully risk-based activities. The annual operational plans reviewed for banks, MSBs and VASPs, and other FIs (including credit unions, and loan and trust companies) contained the resource level of supervisory teams, and high-level descriptions of various factors considered (e.g. guiding documents to identify risk and to guide FINTRAC’s monitoring and examination activities including the NRA, sector’s risk outlook, external factors, etc). However, FINTRAC is unable to demonstrate how supervisory planning, both in terms of year-to-year priorities as well as intensity and scope for individual FIs and VASPs is driven by risk assessment results at both the sectoral and institutional levels. 257. For example, in the annual operational plans for: · MSB : MSBs assessed as “high risk” or “very high risk” were selected for full scope examinations but some “high risk” or “very high risks” MSBs were not selected due to strong compliance maturity and low residual risk in recent examinations. However, there was no analysis or record of the residual risks of individual MSBs, or a clear methodology by which the strength of compliance maturity is determined to support that these MSBs could be exempted from full scope examinations. · Banks: There was also no documentation outlining the criteria for selecting banks subject to thematic reviews/deep dive assessments, or low intensity activities (e.g. score card, risk questionnaires). FINTRAC could only provide high-level principles of the selection criteria and is unable to demonstrate that the selection is based on the risk assessment results. 258. FINTRAC’s supervisory efforts and intensity may not be proportionate to the sectoral risk level. A high-level review on the supervisory activities conducted from FY2020/2021 to FY2024/2025 found that coverage of supervisory activities (in terms of number of on-site examinations, desk based reviews and ongoing supervisory engagements) for VASP sector and securities sector, which are assessed as very high risk and high risk respectively, is comparable to or even lower than the insurance sector which is assessed as high risk in the 2023 NRA; and medium risk in NRA 2025. Table 3.11. FINTRAC Supervisory activities by sectors from FY2020/21 to FY2024/25 Sector Banks CU/CP Securities Life insurance MSB VASP NRA vulnerability rating* H to VH H H M M to H VH Examinations (Coverage)** 40 (50%) 60 (32%) 119 (4%) 4 (5%) 260 (18%) 213 (16%) Desk-based reviews Score Cards 31 1 0 0 6 0 Questionnaires 67 25 24 25 0 0 Validations of MSB/VASP registration**** n/a n/a n/a n/a 327 313 Sub-total – desk-based reviews (Coverage) 98 (123%) 26 (14%) 24 (1%) 25 (30%) 333 (23%) 313 (23%) Total - examinations and desk-based reviews (Coverage) 138 (173%) 86 (46%) 143 (5%) 29 (35%) 593 (42%) 526 (39%) Others – event driven review Voluntary self-declarations of non-compliance (VSDONC) 214 (268%) 523 (281%) 14 (1%) 5 (6%) 260 (18%) 44 (3%) Ongoing supervisory engagements Meetings 535 (669%) 125 (67%) 19 (1%) 13 (15%) 113 (8%) 3 (0.2%) Source: Canada * VH: very high risk; H: high risk; M: medium risk; L: low risk according to NRA 2025 ** Coverage is compiled by dividing the number of activities by the number of entities within the sector *** DSIBs’ business lines of securities dealing accounting for nearly 90% of securities assets under management of the securities sector. **** total number of validations of MSB and VASP registration for FY2024/25 is 640. While Canada is unable to provide the breakdown of reviews by MSB and VASP, the number shown is estimated by apportioning the total number of reviews to each sector by population. 259. DSIBs, MSBs and VASPs are assessed as very high-risk sectors but are not sufficiently prioritised. Based on annual operational plans and discussions during the onsite visit, the actual period between examinations conducted by FINTRAC on a DSIB during the review period was six years. This is not sufficiently frequent and not commensurate with the DSIB’s very high-risk profile and significance in terms of customer base, transaction volume and high level of integration with other sectors including the securities sector and trust and loan sector, as their business lines of securities dealings and trust and loan activities contributed nearly 90% of these sectors. In one case example presented by FINTRAC, the scope of an on-site examination on a DSIB mainly focused on the progress made in addressing major control issues identified in the previous onsite examinations conducted six years previously, and repeated findings were identified in some of these non-remediated control areas. This supports the AT’s view that the gap between two examinations is too long to facilitate timely testing of effectiveness of controls subject to remediation and identification of any outstanding non-remediated issues. The intensity of other AML/CFT supervisory activities are considered insufficient for DSIBs which are complex and assessed as very high risk. They include (1) quarterly monitoring meetings where FINTRAC delivers customised information tracks progress and monitors status of remediation of examination findings, and gets updates of ML/TF risk profiles, AML/CFT control programme and outstanding compliance issues based on the information submissions by DSIBs. Issues of supervisory concerns identified in the monitoring meetings may trigger supervisory follow-up, e.g. examination. A compliance monitoring meeting is regarded as one type of ongoing supervisory engagements or system for monitoring [33] changes of risks and control environment; (2) score card, assessment scope of which is confined only to timeliness and quality of STRs and is not sufficient for assessing the AML/CFT systems of control of a DSIB; and (3) risk questionnaire which collects ML/TF risk profile information, and is regarded as one type of “system for monitoring” changes of risk profile. Regarding group-wide supervision of DSIBs, no examination / desk-based reviews were conducted by FINTRAC on major banking subsidiaries of DSIBs operating outside Canada. 260. Prudential supervision conducted by OSFI covers assessment of overall risk to the financial viability of an FRFI (including DSIBs), which takes into account, among other things, risk governance and regulatory compliance management, wherein they integrate consideration of AML/CFT controls as a sub-component. OSFI does not undertake AML/CFT operational supervision and its primary focus of assessment remains on enterprise-wide risk governance and regulatory compliance of an FRFI. In its role as the prudential regulator of FRFIs, OSFI complements FINTRAC’s AML supervision. For example, by using its supervisory tools to follow-up on issues which have implications for FRFI’s risk governance and regulatory compliance when these are identified through FINTRAC supervision. In practice, OSFI and FINTRAC have a coherent and co-operative approach to responding to issues which involve the mandates of both regulators. OSFI provided examples of risk governance or regulatory compliance issues identified in its supervisory activities of FRFIs which are related to AML/CFT in the past 5 years. These include findings with direct relevance to AML/CFT (e.g. board and senior management reporting and oversight of AML, resources of AML compliance functions, integrity and operational incidents which are relevant to AML, timeliness of response to third-party or FINTRAC’s AML reviews, etc), and findings on general risk controls which are also relevant to AML/CFT (e.g., ownership and accountability, risk culture etc). 261. Analysis of supervisory activities by risk categories of FIs and VASPs in the past five years was not provided for this evaluation. Based on Table 3.11, FINTRAC conducted examinations of on average 10% of non-DSIB banks annually, and fewer than 4% of MSBs and VASPs annually, which irrespective of the ongoing surveillance outlined below implies an overly long period between examinations not commensurate with the high to very high-risk profile of the sectors. Validation of registration is one of the major supervisory activities for MSBs and VASPs. However, it is not considered adequate to facilitate supervisory assessment the MSBs’ or VASP’s control effectiveness as its purpose is to verify whether a newly registered MSB is in operation, or any entity is offering MSB services without registration with FINTRAC, and therefore the assessment scope is narrow. 262. As a combined FIU and supervisor, FINTRAC demonstrated strong capacity in terms of strategic intelligence, research and analytics and does maximise its leverage to monitor emerging risks on an ongoing basis and inform FINTRAC’s assessment of FIs’ and VASPs’ effectiveness in meeting the STR obligations, with specific actionable assessments of anomalies in FIs / VASPs reporting, and/or by tracing known illicit financial flows back to specific reporting entities. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, intelligence from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence Unit is one of the sources to facilitate FINTRAC to formulate or refine its annual operational plans, and it forms part of the ongoing surveillance process. 263. Onsite examinations on FIs and VASPs generally cover assessment of compliance with the requirements under the PCMLTFA with respect to policies and procedures, and testing of sample cases (in particular those relating to STR and monetary threshold reporting). Sample findings letters made available to the AT for onsite examinations of two DSIBs, a non-DSIB bank, a VASP and securities firm contain deficiencies identified but most of them do not provide specific recommendations to address the deficiencies or their root causes, even in cases where significant deficiencies in multiple control areas are identified which may indicate potential system-wide issues (e.g. inadequate governance and oversight, insufficient expertise and resources, limitation in system capabilities, etc). 264. For DSIBs, FINTRAC full scope examinations focus on their compliance with the PCMLTFA requirements, with a frequency of around once every six years on average. Normally, FINTRAC completes a full scope examination on a DSIB in 12 months. The examination is conducted in phases covering different key control areas, and a findings letter is issued at the end of each phase, with a final findings letter issued at end of the examination summarising all issues identified in each phase. Sample testing on a large number of transactions submitted through STR and monetary threshold reports are conducted to assess the DSIB’s ability to identify suspicious transactions and/or customer relationships for filing STRs, and implementing its AML/CFT control policies including CDD and EDD measures where applicable. Given the scale and complexity of a DSIB’s operations and its very high vulnerability to ML/TF, the supervisory assessment is not sufficiently risk focused targeting specific high-risk areas (e.g. business lines, products and services) with reference to the relevant threats and vulnerabilities in the NRA assessment as well as emerging risks, and assessing effectiveness of controls to mitigate the risks. A risk-based examination programme would help shorten the time span of an examination to support more timely supervisory feedback to DSIBs on their control effectiveness. 265. A sample targeted examination on a non-DSIB bank was reviewed. The examination focuses on a few key control areas and the processes last for about 7 months. Sample review is conducted to test the effectiveness of the relevant controls, with deficiencies identified in each sample case are covered in detail in the findings letter. Some high-level recommendations / guidance are provided to address deficiencies noted in individual sample cases. Supervision could be improved by providing analysis of root cause(s) of the deficiencies (e.g. governance and oversight) and specific guidance to address the causes. 266. For VASPs, FINTRAC examinations typically involve document gathering and review leading up to one day of examination fieldwork which is for interviews and then followed by further work finalizing results. Sample testing on transactions and CDD profile is also performed, as well as blockchain analysis. FINTRAC also performs off-site monitoring, leveraging blockchain analytics as part of its supervisory toolkit through which it monitors compliance with the travel rule and monetary threshold reporting requirements, and detects potentially high risks transactions (e.g. those connected with darknet market). Reviews on policies and sample documentation are largely done in the pre-onsite stage. Examination scope covers control designs, policies and procedures, and timeliness and quality of STR and monetary threshold reports. Given the VASP sector is a relatively new sector assessed as having very high ML/TF vulnerabilities and less mature risk management systems, supervision could be improved by providing more specific recommendations and guidance to address the deficiencies in their control design and implementation effectiveness. 267. For securities firms, FINTRAC collects policies and procedures and relevant documents, conducts offsite review and sample testing on CDD profile and transactions which take about 2.5 months and after completing the review, 1-2 hours exit interviews are held with the firm. No recommendation / specific guidance is provided to address the findings identified, in particular those repeated findings found in previous onsite examinations. 268. For MSB (with no VA activity), the AT was not provided with copies of the examination documentation for review until the F2F. [34] 269. FINTRAC has adopted a sector-specific supervision model since 2023 [35] . There are four units under the Operations Division responsible for supervising AML controls of FIs, VASPs and DNFBP sectors. 67 full-time employees are AML supervisors for the FI and VASP sectors, and they are under the Financial Institutions Unit, MSB Unit and Financial Entities Unit which focus on the supervision of banks, MSBs (including VASPs) and other FIs (including CU/CP, securities, trust and loan companies) respectively. In addition to supervising the AML/CFT controls of FIs and VASPs, the AML supervisors are also responsible for policy interpretation, outreaching activities, and enforcement activities. They generally possess adequate experience and appropriate qualifications to discharge their duties. Some of them have legal and investigative backgrounds, and professional qualification in AML/CFT. 270. Resources in the Supervision sector have been increased by approximately 10% since 2021 when FINTRAC assumed the overall responsibility for AML/CFT supervision of FRFIs and VASPs. The Operations Division was restructured to adopt a portfolio management approach in 2021, starting with Canada’s DSIBs, and extending to all other banks in 2023. 271. Despite the increase in headcount since 2021, resources of the AML supervisory teams dedicated for FIs and VASPs are not commensurate with the increase in supervisory responsibilities assumed in 2021. This was particularly apparent in the supervision of banks and MSBs (including VASPs) based on the observations on the overly long period between FINTRAC examinations of DSIBs and other high-risk sectors including MSB and VASP. Table 3.12. Division of the responsibilities with the number of supervisory staff in respective units Units Reporting entities under purview No. of staff dedicated to AML/CFT supervision Financial institutions Banks 22, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 18 supervisors Financial Entities CU/CP, Securities firms Trust and loans companies Mortgage sectors 23, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 19 supervisors MSB MSB VASP 23, comprising 1 manager 3 team leaders 19 supervisors Source: Canada Footnotes [33] Referred in FATF’s Guidance on Risk-based Supervision issued in March 2021. [34] The sample documentation was provided in the face-to-face meeting and the AT is unable to incorporate its assessment in the report. [35] Prior to 2023, supervision of FIs and VASPs are managed by national office in Ottawa, regional offices in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 843. Pursuant to section 40(e) of the PCMLTFA, FINTRAC has the authority to supervise the implementation of reporting entities’ (FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, excluding lawyers) obligations, including compliance with some obligations related to sanctions evasion and PF. Specifically, FINTRAC has the authority to supervise reporting entities for compliance with MDs and with reporting obligations linked to sanctions evasion. However, while the relevant obligations are implemented within Canada’s framework through the UN Act, no authority is explicitly mandated by law to supervise FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs in respect of all obligations arising from the implementation of UNSCR 1718(2006) and following, and UNSCR 1737(2006) and following. In fact, the MDs do not cover all obligations arising from these UNSCRs and the related UN Act, such as the obligation to effectively freeze funds, other financial assets, and economic resources, as required under the relevant provisions (Art. 8(d) of UNSCR 1718(2006) and subsequent resolutions, and Art. 12 of 1737(2006) and subsequent resolutions). 844. The 2017 Ministerial Directive on DPRK is applicable for all the reporting entities referred to in section 5 of the PCMLTFA. The Ministerial Directive on Iran was initially issued in 2020, updated in 2024 and again on 17 November 2025. Until 17 November 2025, the application of the MD on Iran was limited to some categories of reporting entities under the PCMLTFA that were considered high-risk and, consequently, did not provide full coverage. Since 17 November 2025, the MD on Iran applies to all reporting entities under the PCMLTFA. The 2017 MD on DPRK and 2024 MD on Iran require that the selected reporting entities treat financial transactions with DPRK and Iran as high risk, verify identities, exercise customer due diligence, keep record and report transactions, whereas the 2025 MD on Iran expands the obligations to all reporting entities and further introduces additional provisions related to correspondent banking and to transactions with third country and potential risk of sanction evasion associated with Iran. 845. FINTRAC’s supervision powers includes: i) obligation to file STRs where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a transaction is linked to the commission or attempted commission of a sanctions evasion offence, ii) reporting of sanctioned property, iii) compliance with Ministerial Directives, and iv) the underlying compliance programs that support these obligations. Furthermore, FINTRAC examinations review whether reporting entities screen customers at onboarding and on an ongoing basis against prescribed lists, and whether escalation procedures allow for immediate reporting and freezing when matches are identified. 846. For cases of non-compliance, FINTRAC may apply sanctions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), public naming, and non-compliance disclosures (NCDs) to law enforcement agencies. Since its implementation in 2017, three penalties were imposed by FINTRAC relating to the DPRK Ministerial Directive in 2024-2025, which is reflective of Canada’s low exposure to DPRK risks. In all three instances, the issue was about the entities policies and procedures that were not reflecting measures to address the requirements under the MD on the DPRK. However, FINTRAC also applied several administrative monetary penalties due to non-compliance with the MD related to Iran, before the trigger of the Snapback in September 2025. AMPs were applied mostly to MSBs but also to some securities dealers. In one case, a large AMP was applied to a bank where the failure to apply established enhanced due diligence measures to some clients contrary to the MD and the bank’s own policies and procedures formed part of the overall CAD 9 million penalty. No AMPs related to relevant UNSCRs were applied in the review period. 847. Canada has established the framework and programmes for supervising compliance of reporting entities with the obligations across the PCMLTFA, including the requirements related to TFS. However, given the significant role that FIs play in Canada’s economy and the risks posed by VASPs, Canada’s supervision strategy would benefit from further developing the supervisory framework and programmes for these entities, particularly VASPs, by more effectively targeting them to address PF risks and to adequately monitor the implementation of PF-related targeted financial sanctions. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 848. DPMS are considered low risk for PF in Canada, and they are not subject to licencing or registration requirements. This may limit FINTRAC’s ability to assess and monitor the PF risk of some entities in this sector, and their effective implementation of PF-TFS obligations. The implementation of a licensing or registration model for DPMS would make FINTRAC’s supervisory activities over the implementation of PF-TFS in the sector more effective. Lawyers and Québec notaries are supervised by provincial/territorial law societies and are subject to Canadian sanctions laws, however they are not subject to supervision of those laws by any regulator. 849. During compliance examinations, FINTRAC assesses whether REs have adequately integrated PF considerations into their risk assessments, policies, procedures, and training and whether REs can demonstrate that they understand their exposure to PF risks and have systems in place to detect and report relevant activity. FINTRAC imposed some AMPs related to Ministerial Directive deficiencies on four Real Estate agent companies between 2022 and 2025. These AMPs are mostly related to deficiencies in written policies and procedures, transaction restriction requirements, client identification and ongoing monitoring. No AMPs related to PF-TFS have been issued by FINTRAC to casinos." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 709. CBSA identifies and seizes non-declared and falsely declared currency to a large extent. During the period under review, CBSA seized CAD 149 646 217 (approx. EUR 92.2 million). Identification 710. CBSA officers are highly trained in examination techniques and are well resourced with advanced detection tools and technologies deployed across international airports, land border points and seaports to support the administration of Canada’s Cross-Border Currency Program Reporting (CBCR). These include specific training on the identification of proceeds of crime and examination skills to detect smuggled currency, as well as the use of imaging technology (see Table 8.13). RCMP’s JETWAY course (a training course undertaken by RCMP, CBSA and other LEAs specifically aimed at enhancing the detection of criminal activities in the airport environment) includes a focus on the identification and detection of proceeds of crime including currency. Table 8.13. CBSA participants in relevant training and qualifications Training Participants 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 TOTAL Proceeds of Crime N/A 354 283 398 457 184 1 676 Examination Skills 3 374 1 168 931 1 219 1 561 549 8 802 Roving 148 14 28 109 129 87 515 Essential Awareness of Lookouts 25 281 362 397 471 192 1 728 Officer Authorities 96 51 81 71 54 18 371 Imaging Equipment 404 405 683 1 233 1 705 310 4 740 Source: Canada 711. All travellers and traders entering or exiting Canada are required to declare whether they have currency and/or monetary instruments valued at CAD 10 000 or more. CBSA takes an intelligence-led approach to the identification of non and falsely declared currency. It leverages intelligence generated by the BFCC, and shared by other competent authorities (RCMP, FINTRAC, CSIS) and international partners (including through the World Customs Organisation and the Border 5). This intelligence is used to conduct targeted inspections of travellers and traders to identify non and falsely declared currency and currency associated with proceeds of crime or other illicit financial flows. Seizure 712. Section 18 of the PCMLTFA empowers CBSA officers to seize as forfeit any under- or non-reported currency or monetary instruments. When officers determine that there are no grounds to suspect proceeds of crime or terrorist financing, the officer may return the seized property upon payment of an administrative penalty (see section 8.7.3). 713. During the period under review, CBSA conducted 8 259 seizures of under- and non-reported currency or monetary instruments at the border (see Table 8.14). The total amount of funds seized was over CAD 149 million (see Table 8.15). 714. The PCMLTFA establishes four ‘levels’ of seizure by which seizures are categorised and further action taken, prioritising more serious or habitual violators and potential proceeds, over those who make declaration errors: · Level One: person made a full disclosure of facts upon discovery of the funds and the funds were not concealed. · Level Two: person concealed the funds other than by using a false compartment in a conveyance or made a false declaration or has a previous level one seizure. · Level Three: person concealed the funds in a false compartment in a conveyance or has a previous seizure for any form of concealment or making false declarations. · Level Four: officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the currency or monetary instruments are proceeds of crime, or funds for use in TF activities. Table 8.14. CBSA seizures – cross-border movements of currency and other monetary instruments by level Fiscal Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total 2019-20 1 509 193 4 115 1 821 2020-21 495 59 - 65 613 2021-22 664 91 - 63 818 2022-23 903 104 1 76 1 084 2023-24 1 507 94 2 103 1 760 2024-25 1 885 132 2 144 2 163 Total 6 963 673 9 566 8 259 Source: Canada Table 8.15. Amount of funds seized by the CBSA 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total currency seized (CAD) 30 590 591 13 272 692 14 559 185 18 590 662 29 859 200 42 773 886 149 646 217 Source: Canada 715. The total amount of currency seized at the border has decreased compared to Canada’s previous evaluation which is attributable to COVID-19 travel restrictions, a declining use in cash by travellers, and the uptake of other typologies to move value across borders by criminals (to avoid cross-border currency controls). As a proportion of falsely and non-reported currency seized, the amounts confiscated (see 8.7.2), and the penalties imposed (see 8.7.3), have increased. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 716. CBSA confiscates currency and monetary instruments suspected of being proceeds of crime or for use in TF, to a large extent. 717. Where non or falsely reported currency or monetary instruments are seized and the officer has reasonable grounds for suspicion, the funds are seized as forfeit with no terms of release (a ‘level four’ violation) (see Table 8.16). It is sufficient for the CBSA officer to articulate their reasonable suspicion with reference to suspicious indicators of the currency (such as point of origin and transit location). Table 8.16. Amount of funds seized as forfeit 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total currency seized (CAD) 2 595 664 3 098 119 2 249 484 1 496 582 3 626 096 6 083 935 19 149 879 Source: Canada 718. There is no requirement for the CBSA officer to obtain a court order to implement the seizure as forfeit. Where a currency or monetary instruments are seized as forfeit, the person from whom the currency or monetary instruments were seized may seek merits review by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, through a delegated impartial CBSA official to decide on the appropriateness of the enforcement action. The funds are then returned if no contravention can be proved. Judicial review is also available where merits review is unsuccessful. During the period under review, approximately CAD 4.5 million in funds were returned following successful appeal of the administrative seizure (see Box 8.7). Box 8.7. Case study – seizure as forfeit On 2 May 2023, an individual arrived at the CBSA Rainbow Bridge Port of Entry in Niagara Falls, Ontario, and was referred for a secondary examination. During the vehicle inspection, CBSA officers discovered 181 kg of suspected cannabis (valued at approximately CAD 1.34 million) and USD 602 985 (CAD 816 803.48) in undeclared currency concealed within the vehicle. CBSA officers seized the 181 kg of cannabis as forfeit under the Customs Act and seized the undeclared currency under the PCMLTFA. The RCMP was notified and initiated a criminal investigation. The offender was subsequently charged with possession and importation of cannabis under the Cannabis Act and with possession of proceeds of crime over CAD 5 000 under the CC. In September 2023, the offender pled guilty to possessing cannabis for the purpose of distribution and possession of proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to 58 days’ imprisonment, and USD 562 210, along with related property, was forfeited. 8.7.3. Sanctions 719. CBSA imposes administrative penalties for false and non-reports in all cases of funds seized at levels 1-3. Currency suspected to be proceeds of crime is always seized as forfeit with no penalty offered for release. Criminal penalties under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA are not sought in practice in relation to anything except level 4 violations. While this is largely in line with Canada’s risks, a lack of criminal penalties even for repeated level 3 seizures may impact the dissuasiveness of the overall cross-border currency declaration framework. 720. Currency and monetary instruments seized at levels 1-3 is returned upon payment of an administrative penalty, a set percentage of the amount of currency based on the level of violation (with each level requiring an increased level of culpability). Failure to pay the prescribed penalty ensures that seized amounts remain forfeited. Canada has increased the administrative penalties available under the PCMLTFA for violations across levels 1-3, as shown in the Table 8.17. These are more proportionally and dissuasively aligned; however, have only been in effect since September 2023. While promising, additional time is needed to assess the effectiveness of these new penalties. Table 8.17. Administrative penalties by level of violation Level Threshold Amended Penalty Structure (since September 26, 2023) Previous Penalty Structure Level 1 Offender who makes a full disclosure of facts upon discovery of the funds, and the funds were not concealed 5% of the undeclared funds, up to a maximum penalty of CAD 2 500 CAD 250 Level 2 Offender who concealed the funds other than by using a false compartment in a conveyance, or made a false declaration, or has a previous seizure (other than for reasons of concealment or making false declarations) 25% of the undeclared funds CAD 2 500 Level 3 Offender who concealed the funds in a false compartment in a conveyance, or has a previous seizure for any form of concealment or making false declarations 50% of the undeclared funds CAD 5 000 Source: Canada 721. Although many seizures in 2024/25 occurred at the level 1 threshold, Canada has made a notable increase in the amount of penalties it collected in the same period (see Table 8.18). Table 8.18. Total administrative penalties collected 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Total penalties collected (CAD) 884 550 266 750 406 750 500 750 1 075 158 2 249 031 5 382 988 Source: Canada 722. While violations under levels 2 and particularly 3 could indicate potential illicit activities, the CBSA does not refer currency seized under levels 2 and 3 to the RCMP for investigation. This is largely proportionate given these seizures are not suspected of being proceeds of crime. However, in the case of repeated level 3 violations - which involve extensive conduct to conceal currency or repeat false declarations - the lack of criminal enforcement either, including under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA, is surprising and in serious cases may not be proportionate and dissuasive. 723. CBSA reports that following a level 4 seizure, it generally refers the case to the RCMP to conduct a criminal investigation. This can include on criminal charges under s 74(1) of the PCMLTFA or for ML. Between 1 January 2023 and 31 December 2024, CBSA referred approximately 60 level 4 seizure files (totalling over CAD 2 million) to RCMP for investigation, leading to eight PCMLTFA charges and an unspecified number of ongoing investigations. In roughly the same period, CBSA made approximately 247 level 4 seizures totalling approximately CAD 9.6 million. The referral of roughly 24% of level 4 seizures to RCMP is low for the seizure classification, and authorities are missing the opportunity to initiate investigations despite the existence of sufficient red flags to justify seizure as forfeiture on the basis of suspected proceeds of crime. Very few referrals for criminal investigation were made in relation to level 3 seizures, which display clear intent to conceal. 724. As such, the sanctions imposed in practice are not always proportionate to conduct, moderately impacting the framework’s dissuasiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 194. Canada has established licensing, registration and other controls for most FIs and VASPs to prevent criminals or their associates from being beneficial owners or hold a controlling interest. Almost all FIs and VASPs must be licensed or registered with the relevant authorities before they can carry out activity in Canada. MSBs and VASPs must register with FINTRAC. The federal prudential regulator (i.e. OSFI) and relevant provincial regulators are responsible for managing the approval of licensing applications and carrying out fit-and-proper tests on persons owning or controlling FIs in Canada. MSBs operating in Québec must also register with the provincial authority, Revenue Québec. While fit-and-proper requirements applicable to senior management staff of credit unions, trust and loan companies and life insurance companies are not clearly covered in the relevant regulatory requirements in some provinces, such requirements are applied in practice in most of them. 195. For FRFIs, applications comprise two phases involving two approvals: the Letters Patent approved by the Minister of Finance for creating banks and other FRFIs; and approval from OSFI to commence business, prior to which, OSFI undertakes a comprehensive review of the applicant and its proposed business model including ownership structure to identify ultimate controlling owners, as well as any shareholders acting in concert; fitness and propriety (F&amp;P) of shareholders, directors and senior officers; and risk management practices. As part of its review OSFI engages with FINTRAC which performs a review of the controls and oversight of AML/CFT requirements. In conducting its review of proposed owners, directors and senior officers, OSFI works with RCMP and CSIS to run background security checks, including, among others, criminal background checks on all shareholders that will have control and/or a significant interest in the FRFI and all proposed directors and senior officers. OSFI has a dedicated division, comprising about 25 staff responsible for assessing legislative approvals, including market entry. Other OSFI supervisory and specialist staff are also involved in market entry applications and review financial and non-financial risks. OSFI’s resources deployed for supporting market entry’s assessment for FRFIs are generally adequate. 196. Following market entry, FRFIs are subject to ongoing supervision by OSFI. OSFI follows its supervisory process to understand the FRFIs’ processes and procedures in a variety of areas, including but not limited to: recruitment and hiring practices for new senior management and board members, and the oversight of its relationships with affiliated and significant third-party individuals/entities. A FRFI must apply for and obtain the Minister of Finance’s approval for any change to significant or controlling owners [27] before the proposed new owner(s) acquire such an interest in the FRFI. OSFI undertakes the same process mentioned in the preceding paragraph to conduct an assessment of the suitability of the proposed controlling owners. For directors and senior management, all FRFIs should have in place assessment policies and procedures which are in line with the Integrity and Security Guideline issued by OSFI to ensure their F&amp;P. FRFIs’ compliance with the Guideline is reviewed by OSFI as part of its ongoing supervision. 197. There are approximately 200 front-line staff in OSFI responsible for ongoing supervision of over 400 FRFIs, supported by an additional 250 specialists who assist in targeted reviews of prudential risks. All supervisors are provided with training through OSFI’s Supervision Institute to ensure that they are familiar with approaches of prudential supervision and specific risk topics. 198. While no application was withdrawn for reasons relating to F&amp;P over the review period, OSFI indicated that there have been instances where applicants have chosen not to pursue an FRFI licence based on OSFI’s feedback provided at an early juncture, which could include concerns relating to prudential, integrity and security, legislative and public policy matters. OSFI presented to cases demonstrating the ability to take action regarding senior management and directors both at and after market entry. Securities sector 199. In Canada, all firms or individuals advising on or managing investments, selling securities, and/or trading derivatives must be registered in the appropriate category or categories with the relevant provincial or territorial regulator. Market entry controls are applied by the provincial/territorial regulators which include, among others, performing background checks on the applicant, shareholders who beneficially own more than 10% of voting shares of the applicant, and directors, and senior management staff of the applicant. Applications for registration from individuals must be sponsored by a registered firm which must file separate individual application forms through the National Registration Database. The individuals are required to make disclosure on, among others, whether they have been subject to any outstanding civil actions, and any outstanding or stayed criminal charges in the application forms, and provincial/territorial regulators conduct criminal record checks on the applicants. 200. Securities regulatory authorities in Canada’s provinces and territories delegate the registration of firms as investment dealers, mutual fund dealers and the individuals who act on their behalf to the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO), which is an adequately resourced self-regulatory organisation operating under Recognition Orders issued by the securities’ regulatory authorities. A firm applying to be registered as an investment dealer or mutual fund dealer firm must apply for membership with CIRO. CIRO’s subsequent review of the membership application is comprehensive covering all key areas including background checks and whether individuals who carry out required functions for CIRO Dealers pursuant to CIRO’s Rules (i.e. “Approved Persons”) comply with suitability or relevant “fit-and-proper” requirements under securities legislation and CIRO’s Rules. There are disclosure requirements on applicant firms including structure and ownership. 201. For ownership changes of 10% of voting rights or more, a written request for approval must be filed with CIRO at least 30 days before the proposed acquisition, including the appropriate Investor Application Form and organizational charts showing the pre-transaction and post-transaction ownership chain. CIRO reviews information regarding potential conflicts of interest, proposed changes to management or control of the entity, and the names of all directors and officers of any new entities. 202. There are 76 staff in CIRO responsible for assessing membership applications and relevant registration of Approved Persons. Adequate training is provided to these staff to ensure that they are familiar with assessment processes associated with application, post-licensing changes and specialized practices relevant to registration. 203. Securities regulators in Canada’s provinces and territories directly oversee securities firms and individuals that trade or advise in securities, commodity futures contracts or options, or act as investment fund managers. The regulators conduct reviews of persons who take a controlling interest in registered firms, and perform background checks on all shareholders beneficially owning more than 10% of the voting securities of the firm, and each director, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or chief operating officer, or the functional equivalents of any of these positions (with the material shareholders, these individuals are known as permitted individuals). Specific regulatory, civil and criminal disclosures are required for permitted individuals and applicants for registration under the standard form prescribed by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) [28] and are attested to by the individual applying for registration or notifying the relevant Commission that they intend to act as a permitted individual of the applicant. This includes disclosures related to any outstanding or stayed criminal charges, findings of guilt and absolute or conditional discharges against the individual or a firm in which the individual was a partner, director, or shareholder. In addition to the mandatory disclosure required of all applicants, the provincial / territorial securities regulators conduct background checks on every registered and permitted individual using both internal and external sources and include national Canadian criminal checks, select international checks where applicants reside or have previously resided outside Canada, and specific United States criminal checks on individuals who currently reside in the United States or have done so at any point during the past seven to ten years [29] . After market entry, a registered firm is required to notify its provincial or territorial securities regulator of any changes in permitted individuals and of any changes to the initially submitted information on an ongoing basis. The same disclosure requirements apply, and the provincial or territorial regulators conduct the same background checks for the newly appointed persons. 204. Major provincial and territorial securities regulators generally put in place adequate resources to support the assessment of applications for registration. Training and mentoring are provided to the responsible staff upon initial hire and on a continuous basis covering topics including how to conduct background checks, assessing beneficial ownership of securities firms, and emerging issues and regulatory developments expected to impact registration and on-going suitability. All provincial and territorial securities regulators have registration operations manuals that are updated regularly, and the CSA maintains committees and working groups which provide training and promote consistency across the provinces and territories. 205. Securities regulatory authorities in major provinces of Canada provided cases of revocation of licenses/registration due to F&amp;P concerns. For example, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) of Québec conducted four disciplinary proceedings in the past five years, including one case where a licence was withdrawn due to criminal ties. Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) indicated during the onsite visit that there were 18 cases over the past five years where registration was denied, suspended or revoked due to failing the criminal record check. OSC also provided the number of registration bans for individuals and firms over the past five years for breaches of registration requirements or other securities related misconducts. The British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) provided cases of denial of registration of individuals due to dishonest conduct or fraud. The Alberta Securities Commission provided statistics for firm registration applications having been denied or withdrawn, which included 1 firm subject to a notice of hearing alleging breach of undertaking and fraud, and statistics for firm registration suspensions, which included 2 firm registrations suspended for compliance failures. Other provincially regulated FIs 206. For other provincially regulated FIs (i.e. credit unions, life insurance companies and trust and loan companies), market entry requirements are specified in the relevant provincial legislation and regulations. The relevant provincial regulators manage the approval of licensing applications and conduct F&amp;P testing of the beneficial owners and directors at market entry. Although the relevant requirements applied to senior management staff of these FIs are not specifically codified in the regulatory requirements / guidance for some provinces, in practice assessment of F&amp;P is in place in most of these provinces. During the last five years, the Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario licenced only one new CU and conducted background checks on the relevant directors / incorporators. 207. There were no case of revocation/suspension of licence or registration of credit unions, life insurance companies and trust and loan companies over the review period, although case examples were provided regarding withdrawal of an application, and removal of an FI’s board of directors and placing the FI under administration due to mismanagement and misconduct. MSBs and VASPs 208. MSBs and VASPs must register with FINTRAC prior to commencing operations and renew registration every two years. This process requires completion of a pre-registration form to confirm whether the applicant qualifies as an MSB (including VASPs) under the PCMLTFA, which is reviewed by FINTRAC to assess the eligibility of the business ownership. FINTRAC requires the submission of criminal record checks for domestic and foreign MSB applicants for registration and renewal, and the same requirement extends to owners and entities in the MSB (including VASP) ownership chains - including the director, senior management or beneficial owners of these entities. Under the PCMLTFA, MSBs are obliged to notify FINTRAC of any changes to their registration information within 30 days and the same criminal record check will be applied to any new controller or officer. 209. FINTRAC scrutinizes every applicant and registered MSB and Federal Money Services Business (FMSB) (including VASPs) on an ongoing basis. and can revoke the registration where the eligibility requirements are no longer met, or if the MSB does not respond to an information demand. If FINTRAC becomes aware that an MSB has not met the obligation to report a registration change within 30 days, it sends out clarification requests and undertakes validation. As part of a special project to review the MSB population, FINTRAC revoked a total of 195 MSB registration in FY2021/22 and FY2022/23 due to findings that the owners/controllers had criminal records or did not respond to enquiries. FINTRAC continued to revoke MSB registrations where necessary in following years (i.e. 17 in FY2023/2024; and 12 in FY2024/2025). 210. There are 17 staff in FINTRAC responsible for assessing applications for registration as MSB (including VASPs) and beneficial owners, directors, senior management of firms applying for registration. Sufficient training is provided to staff at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, to ensure that they are familiar with assessment processes for application, renewal of registration and post-registration changes. FINTRAC’s resources to manage the registration and renewal are generally adequate. 211. MSBs located in Québec are also subjected to a fit-and-proper test by Revenu Québec. Any person or entity that wants to operate as an MSB for payment must hold a licence under the Money Services Businesses Act. To get the licence, the MSB must get security clearance reports which contain previous conviction record (if any) issued by the Sûreté du Québec for itself and each person associated with it. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 212. Canada employs various mechanisms to detect and address breaches in licensing and registration requirements for FIs and VASPs, with mechanisms varying depending on the sector and regulatory authority of jurisdiction. For instance, FINTRAC can detect unregistered activity through intelligence from various sources including suspicious transaction reports from FIs, information shared via MOUs with provincial regulatory authorities, LEAs, and external sources like media coverage and complaints. 213. OSFI has a mechanism for members of the public to submit queries, including with respect to unlicensed entities claiming to be banks or credit unions. Case examples were shared where follow-up actions were taken to clarify the business activities of entities concerned, and the legislative requirements restricting the use of “bank” or its derivatives. OSFI refers matters involving fraudulent conduct to appropriate authorities and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. Potential breaches are managed within OSFI’s existing approvals and market entry division mentioned in the relevant paragraph under 3.1.1. 214. Securities regulatory authorities of major provinces are proactive in detecting unlicensed activities through various sources, including complaints and information from the public; whistleblower tips through whistleblower programs; referrals from other functional divisions of the authorities, other regulatory and law enforcement partners; intelligence monitoring and issues uncovered during the course of investigations. The OSC operates a paid whistleblower program covering reporting of unregistered securities dealing, fraud, securities-related misconduct, etc., and assigns dedicated teams of staff to handle tips from the whistleblower program and complaints from the public and manage follow-up actions. The securities regulatory authorities generally put in place adequate resources to support the handling and investigation of suspicious unlicensed activities. For example, staff of Enforcement Division of OSC have legal, accounting, investigative and market specialist backgrounds and are supported by technological tools include data analytics, crypto tracing tools which facilitate access to and analysis large volumes of data from different sources. Between 5 June 2025 and 23 November 2025, the CSA in collaboration with CIRO worked to successfully deactivate more than 3 900 fake investment platforms and cryptocurrency scam websites involving more than 6 900 individual URLs associated with those sites. 215. FINTRAC identifies unregistered MSBs and VASPs through various measures, including monitoring STRs, and Intelligence Notices from FINTRAC’s Intelligence sector and Strategic Intelligence, Research and Analytics (SIRA) unit, which analyses FINTRAC’s data sources for anomalies in MSB/FMSB behaviour, such as geographic analysis of electronic fund transfers to high-risk jurisdictions or co-located corporate entities that share addresses with MSBs/FMSBs. FINTRAC is proactive in this area, increasingly leveraging technology and blockchain analytics for surveillance of VASPs, engaging with industry associations for insights, as well as undertaking media scans. FINTRAC also collaborates with other Canadian agencies, such as Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre to improve detection of fraudulent and unregistered MSBs. Suspected unregistered MSBs go through the FINTRAC MSB pre-registration validation process, to determine whether they are an MSB or FMSB subject to the PCMLTFA. FINTRAC reviews all individual/entity information from internal and external sources, conducts open-source research and contacts the individual/entity to confirm whether they are operating as an MSB/FMSB. Where this is confirmed to be the case, the MSB/FMSB has five business days to complete the registration. Failure to do so will result in enforcement action, which could include an administrative monetary penalty (AMP) or non-compliance disclosure (NCD) to law enforcement agencies, and there may be additional factors to consider such as criminal activity. 216. Between 1 April 2021 and 31 March 2023, FINTRAC detected and conducted 357 validations of suspected unregistered MSBs/VASPs. Of these, the vast majority were either no longer operational or not subject to the PCMLTFA, while forty-five renewed or completed their registration with FINTRAC retrospectively upon instruction, and three were recommended for imposing administrative monetary penalty (AMP). Since 2020-21, FINTRAC has imposed administrative monetary penalties (AMP) on six MSBs/VASPs for failure to register with FINTRAC and on one MSB/VASP for failure to renew registration, for a total amount of CAD 25.7 million. Since 2019-20, 61 NCDs were disclosed in relation to the registration offence of failing to be registered as an MSB and 19 NCDs were disclosed in relation to the registration offence of knowingly engaging in an MSB activity without being registered with FINTRAC (which came in force on June 23, 2024). Since 2018-19, there were 10 cases of convictions/sentencing for contravention of MSB/VASP registration. Canada provided multiple case examples of law enforcement investigating and laying criminal charges for failure to register as an MSB and engaging in MSB activities without registration. However, the number of enforcement actions (i.e. 1.4 cases involving AMP and 2 cases of conviction/ sentencing on average per year respectively) is small taking into account the size and the inherent risk level of the MSB and VASP sectors. The limited number reflects FINTRAC’s approach of requiring persons/entities identified undertaking unregistered money service business (including VA dealing activities) to complete registration within a specified timeline and taking enforcement actions only if the persons / entities fail to do so. While Canada considers that this approach has facilitated the inclusion of otherwise eligible MSBs within the supervisory perimeter, it may not provide a sufficient deterrent to unregistered activity. 217. There are currently 17 staff members within the MSB Registration team who work on suspected unregistered MSBs, in addition to registration duties, plus an additional 6 staff members within the NCD team who are responsible for referring suspected unregistered MSBs for criminal investigation where warranted. Beyond the specific staff on these two teams, FINTRAC uses a range of supervisory activities to detect suspected unregistered MSBs and enforce the PCMLTFA, leveraging staff expertise across the Centre and information sharing through established processes amongst its various divisions/sectors and within other units of Supervision. Supervision manages the follow up actions to address the non-compliance identified through supervisory activities or enforcement actions. Footnotes [27] A person has a significant interest in a class of shares of a FRFI if the aggregate of any shares of that class beneficially owned directly or indirectly by the person exceeds 10 per cent of all the outstanding shares of that class of shares of the FRFI (Section 8 of the Bank Act and similar provisions in Insurance Companies Act, Trust and Loan Companies Act); or a person controls a FRFI if it controls more than 50 per cent of the votes that may be cast to elect directors of FRFI OR if a person has any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of the FRFI (section 3 of the Bank Act and similar provisions in Insurance Companies Act, Trust and Loan Companies Act). [28] Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is the national umbrella organization that harmonizes legislation and regulatory policy wherever possible. All provincial and territorial securities regulators participate in the CSA. [29] The number of years may vary depending on the province/territory." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers ) 300. FINTRAC has a good understanding of DNFBPs’ sectoral risks. Under the national risk assessment in 2025, Casinos, DPMS, Real Estate and Lawyers are assessed as highly inherently vulnerable, reflecting the risk and context of Canada. 301. FINTRAC’s sectoral risk understanding is grounded in Canada’s National Risk Assessment (NRA). This foundation is enhanced through ongoing refinement of FINTRAC’s risk assessment methodology, which uses both quantitative and qualitative inputs, including the integration of strategic research and intelligence, publicly available information, and transactional data analysis. The transition from a regional structure to a sector-specific supervision model has deeply and thoroughly enhanced FINTRAC’s understanding of each sector. 302. To deepen its understanding of sectoral risks, FINTRAC engages regularly with industry associations, domestic and international regulators, and other regime partners. For newly regulated sectors and others with evolving risk dynamics, FINTRAC works closely with the Department of Finance Canada and other regime partners to build a comprehensive risk profile. 303. FINTRAC uses a variety of tools to maintain an up-to-date understanding of ML/TF risks of DNFBPs. This includes operational and strategic intelligence information from FINTRAC’s FIU side, analysis of transaction reporting data, information provided by provincial regulators and/or business associations, public data, past compliance assessments, and the Supervision Risk Model (SRM). FINTRAC uses the SRM which comprises 11 indicators, based on reports received from the entity concerned, to assign a risk score across a spectrum of Very High, High, Medium, or Low Risk for entities with sufficient transaction reporting data (i.e., entities that submitted STR or monetary threshold reports in the past three years). Given casinos‘ high volume of STR and transaction reporting, the SRM is able to differentiate and assign risk scores to all 19 entities in the casino sector. Since 2024-25, this risk understanding of casinos has been further complemented with the use of risk questionnaire assessments and regular monitoring meetings. 304. However, FINTRAC’s understanding of individual entities' risks needs significant enhancement. For DNFBPs where insufficient transaction reporting data exists to support the SRM’s application of all 11 indicators, these entities are categorized as “non-reporters” under FINTRAC’s SRM development methodology, which many DNFBPs apart from casinos fall into. Among these non-reporters, a limited number of entities are assessed as “potentially high risk”, based on available model indicators (third-party STR references, geographic exposure to human trafficking risk, and exposure to jurisdictions on FATF lists). The other entities (96.4%) remain categorised as “no-flag”, and no entity level risk assessment is performed on them. Hence, it cannot be considered that their risks have adequately been assessed. 305. For example, only 210 out of 7 742 (6%) of all reporting entities in the real estate sector have sufficient transaction reporting data to be assigned a risk score under the SRM, and of these, 176 are scored as low risk, although the real estate sector is assessed as highly inherently vulnerable in NRA. 15 entities are flagged as “potentially high risk”, and more than 97% (7 500) remain “no-flag”. Similarly, out of approximately 3 000 DPMS identified by FINTRAC, only 62 have sufficient transaction reporting data to be assigned a risk score under the SRM (8 medium and 54 low), while the remaining, 4 are flagged as “potentially high risk” and over 97% (around 2 900) are “no-flag”. 306. Beyond the SRM, FINTRAC conducts multiple complementary analyses to understand the risk profiles across the DNFBP sectors and to identify individual high-risk entities to be subject to heightened assessment. However, it remains unclear how analyses and risk assessments are conducted, and how these assessments are incorporated into risk-based prioritisation of supervisory activities for the vast majority of DNFBPs. Table 4.3. Breakdown of SRM Risk Score Sector Vulnerability Rating (NRA 2025) Number of Reporting Entities (as of Apr.1, 2025) Number of Reporters Number of Non-reporter s Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk No -flag Casinos High 19 1 5 4 10 - - DPMS High 3 000 - - 8 54 4 2,934 (97.8%) Real Estate High 7 742 - - 19 176 15 7,532 (97.3%) Accountants Medium 1 000 - - 1 1 116 882 (88.2%) BC Notaries Medium 293 - - - 19 - 274 (93.5%) Sub-total 12,054 1 5 32 260 135 11 622 (96.4%) Source: Canada For the legal profession 307. Canada’s federal AML/CFT Regime assessed the inherent ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal professionals in the NRA, concluding that lawyers and Québec notaries pose a high vulnerability. Neither provincial/territorial law societies nor their umbrella organization, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC), have carried out a formal sector-level risk assessment of lawyers. Although the FLSC issued risk assessment guidance and case studies and risk advisories for particular risk domains such as real estate, shell corporations, private lending, trusts and litigation, and certain law societies have issued similar guidance, they do not constitute a holistic sector-level risk assessment. Most law societies collect data on lawyers’ practicing areas posing high ML/TF risks through annual reporting requirements, practice declarations, as well as through their compliance audits and inspections and maintain statistics on the proportion of lawyers engaged in specific fields. However, Law Societies do not have a comprehensive framework for evaluating individual lawyers’ ML/TF risks, and the AML/CFT regulation of the legal sector needs considerable improvements. Some Law Societies, including in British Columbia, have started sectoral and individual risk assessments, but the FLSC/Law Societies’ understanding of lawyers’ risk is still evolving. 308. The Government of Canada-FLSC joint working group was launched in 2019 to explore issues related to the ML/TF risks arising in the practice of law, and to strengthen information sharing between the FLSC and the Government of Canada. The working group includes representatives from Finance Canada, Justice Canada, the FLSC and select Law Societies, with regular participation from FINTRAC and the RCMP. It meets on a quarterly basis. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 309. FINTRAC, in co-operation with provincial/territorial regulators and national industry associations, engages in activities to promote reporting entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. 310. FINTRAC’s outreach activities include virtual and in-person meetings, presentations, conferences, training sessions, and other exchanges of information, all aimed at strengthening compliance and risk awareness across the regime. FINTRAC also diffuses information through a mailing list providing additional information about new publications, guidelines, and changes to reporting mechanisms or requirements. FINTRAC also proactively contacts new reporting entities to educate them about their compliance responsibilities. In addition, FINTRAC consults with industry on a number of issues, including new and revised guidance, reporting forms, and the implementation of regulatory amendments. Engagement with industry has been further strengthened through the accessibility of virtual outreach and consultation activities. 311. FINTRAC has delivered some real estate–focused initiatives designed to strengthen sector understanding of ML/TF risks by hosting the National Real Estate Virtual Forum with dedicated sessions on PCMLTFA obligations, delivering targeted presentations to Québec’s Organisme d'autoréglementation du courtage immobilier (OACIQ) and British Columbia Real Estate Association. In October 2024, FINTRAC’s Supervision sector presented at the British Columbia Real Estate Association Managing Brokers’ Conference on sector specific ML risks, suspicion thresholds and clarified any misconceptions regarding STRs. 312. With respect to certain emerging risks, FINTRAC issues special bulletins and operational alerts to enhance risk awareness. Since 2024, FINTRAC has issued special bulletins or operational alerts regarding: online gambling; sanctions evasion; legal profession; tax evasion; underground banking and counter proliferation sanctions. 313. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement regarding outreach. During the on-site visit, multiple entities expressed their views on the necessity of more detailed sector-specific guidance (see 4.3). Greater outreach regarding the importance and procedures of STRs will help raise awareness and increase filings in DNFBPs sectors, especially in the real estate and DPMS sectors (see 4.4.3). For the legal profession 314. FINTRAC presented the Special Bulletin on the use of the Legal Profession in Money Laundering and Sanctions Evasion [41] to the FLSC with the intention of helping the legal sector identify and assess ML/TF activities and sanctions evasions risks and apply the controls and measures to mitigate those risks. The FLSC, as law societies’ national umbrella organization, has published ML/TF risk advisories for the legal profession in five core areas: real estate, shell corporations, trusts, private lending, and litigation. The FLSC has also published risk assessment case studies for the legal profession, designed to assist lawyers in identifying and responding to red flags, with a focus on high-risk areas including: the misuse of trust accounts; real estate and other financial transactions; and the creation of corporations and trusts. In 2022, the FLSC published “Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia Belarus: Implications for the Profession.” In 2023, the FLSC launched its online learning program, “Anti-Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing in the Canadian Legal Profession”. The program, is divided into five modules, focused on: (i) understanding the problem of ML/TF; (ii) assessing and managing money laundering risks; (iii) CDD requirements; (iv) proper use of trust accounts; and (v) cash transactions. All provincial/territorial law societies also issue guidance and provide online training courses to enhance lawyers’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. For example, the Law Society of British Columbia launched a webinar on AML/CFT measures in 2020, and in 2025, a Law Society of British Columbia Practice Advisor presented to the British Columbia Legal Management Association on AML/CFT obligations and best practices. In May 2025, the Law Society of British Columbia’s governing body approved a recommendation to implement mandatory AML/CFT training for all lawyers, extending beyond the scope of training recommended in the 2022 Cullen Commission Final Report [42] . Footnotes [41] Special Bulletin on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion [42] See e.g., Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia – Final Report , June 2022, Recommendations 53 to 65." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="565. Under the CC, the maximum custodial sentence for LPOC and PPOC is 10 years imprisonment. For LPOC, this is elevated to 14 years where the conduct is for the benefit or at the direction of a criminal organisation. TPOC and PPOCPT also carry penalties of up to 14 years. The maximum penalty for LPOC and PPOC is lower than high-risk proceeds generating offences (such as drug trafficking and serious fraud offences, which carry maximum custodial sentences of life and 14 years imprisonment respectively). It is similar to the maximum penalty for terrorism financing and is greater than most corruption offences. 566. Sanctions are applicable to legal persons convicted of offences. In lieu of a sentence of imprisonment a monetary fine can be ordered. There is no ceiling for fines applicable to legal persons under the CC, though certain offences may set out a maximum fine for the specific offence. However, given the limited number of legal persons prosecuted for ML during the assessment period, it is difficult to determine whether the penalties applied in practice are proportionate and dissuasive. 567.  Where an offender is convicted of more than one offence, sentences are typically ordered concurrently under Canada’s sentencing principles, with the head sentence reflecting the sentence for the charge with the highest imposed penalty. On that basis, a conviction on a drug trafficking charge (which attracts a higher maximum sentence than ML) will generally result in the same custodial sentence as if an ML charge was also pursued in tandem. 568. The maximum sentences for LPOC and PPOC are proportionate and dissuasive on paper; however, appear uneven in practice. Sentences imposed where conviction is achieved for the predicate offence alongside ML, or through a resolution agreement, generally appear proportionate and dissuasive. In contrast, cases where a conviction is achieved for LPOC or PPOC in the absence of a predicate offence conviction, or where it is the most serious offence convicted; the sentences imposed in practice are often at the lower end of the spectrum and are commonly not proportionate, dissuasive or effective. 569. For PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT convictions (where that offence was the most serious), custodial sentences were imposed in 55% of cases with probationary non-custodial sentences comprising most other sentences. Fines were imposed in 7% of cases. This breakdown reflects the nature of PPOC charges, which generally relate to lower level conduct—including straightforward self-laundering or simple possession matters resulting in non-custodial or probationary and conditional sentences served in the community or reasonably short custodial terms—with a smaller number of more complex and serious cases resulting in more significant custodial sentences. This is in comparison to more significant custodial sentences for LPOC. 570. Tables 7.14 and 7.15 provide breakdowns on the number and duration of custodial sentences imposed for each MLO. The greatest focus was placed on the outcomes for LPOC. These tables subtract time served in pre-trial custody, which is a data limitation. 571. Table 7.14 also shows that in cases where any MLO is the most serious offence, the average custodial sentence is 61 days and the average fine is CAD 763. Looking only at LPOC, in cases where LPOC was the most serious offence, custodial sentences were imposed in 25 of 68 cases, with an average custodial sentence of 402 days (see Table 7.14) and an average fine (from three cases) of CAD11 557. Conditional and probationary sentences (equivalent to suspended sentences) accounted for a further 35 cases. In 22% of these (five (5) cases) the length of the custodial sentences exceeded two years, with the majority (64%) of custodial sentences for ML receiving sentences under one (1) year (see Table 7.15). Table 7.14. Number of custodial sentences for MLO cases (most serious offence) Fiscal year Offence Number Mean Total – 2019/20 – 2023/24 Total 2 010 61 s.354(1) - PPOC 1 835 54 s.355.2 - TPOC 121 89 s.355.4 - PPOCPT 31 119 s.462.31 - LPOC 23 402 Source: Canada Table 7.15. Length of custodial sentences for MLO cases (most serious offence) Length of custody s.354(1) (PPOC) s.355.2 (TPOC) s.355.4 (PPOCPT) s.462.31 (ML) Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 % % % % 1-30 days (1 month or less) 61 49 39 4 31-90 days (&gt;1 month to 3 months) 24 26 32 13 91-180 days (&gt;3 months to 6 months) 10 13 16 17 181-365 days (&gt;6 months to 12 months) 4 9 3 30 366-729 days) (&gt;12 months to &lt;24 months) 1 1 6 13 &gt;24 months 1 2 3 22 Source: Canada 572. These datasets only reflect sentences imposed where MLOs are the most serious offence. This data is limited as it does not reflect instances where ML was charged alongside serious predicate offence conduct (for example drug and fraud offending), which comprised the bulk of Canada’s case studies. However, the high rate of withdrawal of ML charges in such matters limits the impact of this qualification. The penalties imposed for the ML component of that offending are typically at the lower end of the spectrum. By excluding these cases, it becomes clear that the penalties imposed for standalone ML, where a conviction can be obtained, are low. 573. Furthermore, this data does not consider time served in remand awaiting trial or sentencing. Canada provided examples where this substantially reduced the reported sentence: · Accused X was sentenced to 30 months, minus a credit of 467 days of preventative custody, for a remainder of 445 days. · Accused Y was sentenced to 4 years, 6 months and 22 days, minus a credit of 4 years, 6 months and 21 days, for a remainder of 1 day. 574. The AT recognises that in the most serious ML cases, bail is more likely to be refused. Given the strong presumption toward granting bail under Canada’s sentencing principles, the AT also recognises that the impact of this is somewhat mitigated. 575. Sentencing for LPOC and PPOC is often at the lower end of the spectrum. Particularly in the absence of a predicate offence or where LPOC or PPOC is the most serious offence. There are several case examples where Canada has achieved more dissuasive sentences for LPOC and PPOC in the most serious cases, but this is uneven (see Box 7.5). Box 7.5. Sample of sanctions imposed in significant LPOC and PPOC cases At the upper end of the spectrum, Canada has demonstrated that significant custodial sentences have been imposed in serious cases: · PML Case A , the head of the Toronto organisation received a 9-year sentence for LPOC. · Organised Crime Case A , lead to the primary offender in an extensive drug trafficking operation being sentenced to 9 years for PPOC. · R v Skinner , the architect of a CAD 2.37 million investment fraud was convicted of and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for LPOC (in addition to a restitution order). · R v Holden , resulted in an 8-year sentence for LPOC as part of a 12-year global sentence for fraud (alongside a sizeable fine in lieu of forfeiture and restitution order) · R v Eid , the offender was convicted of ten commercial fraud offences and LPOC and was sentenced to a 7-year concurrent sentence for the LPOC element. However, convictions for serious ML activity are also often at the lower end of the spectrum · PML Case A the head of the Montreal organisation and their associate was sentenced to 5 years and 3 years imprisonment respectively, despite the significant criminality observed (in contrast to the head of the Toronto organisation for similar conduct). · Organised Crime Case A , the associate of the primary offender was sentenced to 1 year for PPOC · PML Case B two individuals convicted of LPOC linked to laundering of in excess of CAD 18 million were sentenced to 30 to 36 months imprisonment. · PML Case C , two individuals pled guilty to LPOC and PPOC related to underground banking and the laundering of proceeds of illicit drugs, fraud and illegal gaming, and were sentenced to imprisonment for two years less a day. · PML Case D , investigators uncovered a professional money laundering operation valued at over CAD 2.7 million resulting in the controller convicted of PPOC and sentenced to a 2-year conditional sentence order 576. Based on Canada’s sentencing data in the tables above, combined with Box 7.6, the sentencing picture in Canada for ML can appear uneven. The penalties applied, particularly for cases where ML is the most serious offence, may not be proportionate or dissuasive in practice. A review of the implementation of the sentencing framework would support the consistent imposition of sentences for ML that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="389. Canada has introduced several significant mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons and arrangements since its 2016 MER. These have been driven both by changes to the FATF standards and by the findings of risk assessments. Obligations for private corporations to obtain and record information on their beneficial ownership 390. Federal, provincial and territorial finance ministers affirmed in 2017, and again in 2019, their commitment to work towards transparency of beneficial ownership. Stemming from this, all provinces and territories, apart from Alberta (11.7% of Canadian corporations), NWT and Nunavut (with Yukon, 0.2% of Canadian corporations) have introduced obligations for private corporations to obtain and record information on their beneficial ownership. Québec did not introduce record-keeping requirements but instead requires BO reporting to the REQ. This has been a significant change, but despite that private sector representatives generally have a good awareness of their obligations in this regard and there does not seem to have been any significant resistance to implementing these new obligations. 391. As only private corporations at the federal level and in Québec are required to file BO information to government registers, it is not known to what extent private corporations in other provinces and territories are complying with their obligations to record BO information. Authorities do not collect this information, which is a particular concern with regard to Ontario, where obligations were introduced in 2023, and where 38% of Canadian incorporations take place. Ontario incorporates more corporations than Québec and the federal level combined, therefore making Ontario significant materially, particularly given the high vulnerability assigned to corporations in the national risk assessment. In 2025, Ontario announced its commitment to establish a beneficial ownership registry, aligned with the federal government, and is actively working towards implementation in 2027. In the interim, FIs and DNFBPs across Canada subject to the PCMLTFA demonstrate generally high levels of compliance with obligations to obtain and verify BO information, although with some specific sectoral deficiencies. These obligations provide a certain degree of mitigation, although they do not substitute for the requirement to establish a comprehensive BO register or equivalent alternative mechanism. 392. The absence of BO record-keeping obligations in Alberta, one of the materially significant provinces, creates a vulnerability, as 11.7% of all Canadian incorporations take place there. However, this is mitigated to some degree by the requirement to include information on the five largest shareholders in the basic information provided to Alberta’s corporate register. That basic information is also provided in bulk to FINTRAC under an MOU, which enables FINTRAC to systematically integrate the data in its analytical processes and detect anomalies in corporate information reported to REs through CDD and to FINTRAC via STRs as well as through the MSB registration process. Requirement for foreign legal persons to register with provinces and to record BO information 393. Foreign legal persons seeking to conduct business in Canada are obliged to register with the provinces in which they intend to conduct business and relevant provincial regulations also apply to them. Foreign corporations represent less than 1% of corporations operating in Canada. In 2025 there were 9 817 foreign private corporations registered in Ontario, 3 381 in Québec, and 1,694 in Alberta. Most provinces and territories have the legislative authority to collect BO information at the time of registration by a foreign corporation. However, foreign corporations are subject to provincial obligations regarding BO reporting only in Québec and under BC’s LOTR. Federal obligations do not apply in this regard. The obligation to file BO data centrally applies in Québec and, in relation to land ownership or interest, in BC. Therefore, outside of those provinces, incorporation authorities have limited visibility on the BO of foreign corporations operating in their respective jurisdictions. Requirement for reporting entities under the PCMLTFA to obtain BO information as part of their CDD processes 394. Reporting entities under the PCMLTFA have obligations to obtain and keep up to date BO information as part of their CDD processes. Since Canada’s 2016 MER, this obligation was extended beyond financial entities and securities dealers to all reporting entities. [45] The private sector demonstrated a good understanding of these obligations with several stating definitively that they will not engage in business with anyone whose BO information is not provided. As part of its supervisory activities, FINTRAC examines whether REs are fulfilling their obligations in this regard. Six of the administrative monetary penalties imposed on REs during the relevant period were for non-compliance with BO requirements. Requirement for Canadian federal corporations and Québec corporations to file their BO data with central registers 395. Corporations Canada (CC) established a register of BO information, or ‘Individuals with Significant Control’ (ISCs) for corporations formed at the federal level in January 2024. This means that approximately 16% of Canadian corporations are required to file their BO data with this central register. As of the onsite visit, 98% of those had complied with these obligations. The majority of corporations filing are small to medium enterprises and therefore predominantly (96%) record only one or two BOs. 396. The first province to establish a similar register is Québec, with the Registre des Entreprises du Québec (REQ), in March 2023. Not only must corporations formed in Québec file BO data with this register but so must trusts/fiducies operating a commercial enterprise in Québec. As of the onsite approximately 70% of corporations required to file BO data had done so, including 100% of those which were formed after introduction of the obligations. REQ has taken a gradual approach to enforcing compliance, with letters of non-disclosure issuing in May 2025 to improve on the current 70% compliance rate. As of July 2024, no new corporation can register to operate in Québec without providing BO data. 397. Ontario and BC have both committed to establishing central registers of BO data and are working towards this. Disclosure obligations under provincial securities and stock exchange regulations for public corporations 398. Public corporations are already subject to robust disclosure obligations under provincial and territorial securities regulations and stock exchange rules. These requirements are broadly aligned across Canada and effectively require transparency regarding those owning 10% or more of publicly traded corporations. Administrative monetary penalties and late fees for late ‘insider reports’ are tools used by Canadian securities regulators to deter and promote compliance among insiders. Data provided indicates that while administrative sanctions are regularly applied for late filings of insider reports, these are not clearly proportionate or dissuasive. While the proportion of late insider reports relative to total insider reports filed with a given securities regulator is generally low, additional efforts could be made to enhance compliance. The proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness of sanctions for other contraventions of provincial and territorial securities laws, which can result in significant fines and/or imprisonment, are outside the scope of this assessment. Legal arrangements: requirements to file BO information in annual tax income returns 399. The key mitigating measure introduced in relation to transparency of legal arrangements has been the introduction of enhanced trust reporting requirements for trustees of express trusts and their civil law equivalents, to file information on the BO of their legal arrangements as part of annual income tax returns with the Canada Revenue Agency and, where applicable, Revenu Québec. These obligations were introduced for tax years ending on or after 31 December 2023 and apply to express trusts that are factually resident in Canada, deemed resident in Canada, or those not resident in Canada with a sufficient link to Canada. There are similar obligations for trusts resident in Québec, deemed resident in Québec or linked to a Québec contributor. The enhanced trust reporting requirements have significantly increased the number of trusts required to file trust income tax returns in Canada, as they can apply even if the trust has no income tax payable. For the CRA, this has led to an increase of over 30% in the number of express trusts for which annual income tax filings have been made, with similar although slightly lower increases for Revenu Québec. It has also created legislative requirements for trustees to obtain and hold this information to fulfil this obligation. There are some limited exemptions to these obligations for ‘listed trusts’ (i.e. specifically listed in the Income Tax Act as being exempt), which are deemed to hold lower ML/TF risks. The temporary relief from filing for bare trusts, to allow for legislative changes providing greater clarity on requirements, has been ended as of the onsite visit. Legislation in progress proposes to legislatively exempt bare trusts for the 2024 and 2025 taxation years and to provide for filing obligations for certain bare trusts starting with the 2026 taxation year. Therefore, data is not yet available on how many bare trusts may be required to file but whose information is currently not filed with CRA. Land Owner Transparency Registry: requirement to file BO data of corporations, trusts or partnerships purchasing real estate 400. BC introduced a Land Owner Transparency Registry in 2020 to address tax evasion and criminals using the real estate sector in that province to launder illicit funds. This requires the filing of BO data of corporations, trusts or partnerships purchasing real estate or having an ownership or other interest in land prior to 30 November 2020 when the regime came into force. While not a requirement of the FATF standards, this is a positive measure introduced to address the specific targeting of the BC real estate sector as a means of laundering money. Information must be filed by a legal professional, which assists with accuracy. As of 31 December 2025, the registry had approximately 1 010 000 records, most of which are basic transparency declarations, which must accompany any application to register an interest in land. At least 167 000 of these are the more detailed transparency reports which must be filed by reporting entities in cases where the owner registered on the title is a trustee of a relevant trust, a relevant corporation or a relevant partnership. A transparency report lists all individuals who are “interest holders” – that is, those individuals with a significant interest, as defined in the legislation. Over 40 000 audits have been conducted by the registry to verify this data, and the enforcement officer has taken over 8 000 remedial actions, including sending letters, to verify information. Prohibition of bearer shares 401. The use of bearer shares has effectively been prohibited by the introduction of legal requirements at all federal, provincial and territorial levels for shares to be issued in registered form. Corporate registries do not have information on the number of bearer shares converted to registered form because such transactions would occur between the corporation and the bearer shareholder. Canada believes the numbers to be low since bearer shares did not historically have a significant presence in Canada. Requirements to declare conflicts of interest and certain nominee arrangements 402. The use of nominee directors and shareholders is addressed by the obligations of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) at federal level. These include requirements to declare conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation. These obligations are reflected in equivalent provincial and territorial legislation. Québec introduced in 2019 explicit legislative requirements for nominee arrangements ( contrats de prête-nom ) to be declared as part of tax returns. This led to approximately 10 000 such declarations in 2020 and between 1 500-3 000 further declarations each subsequent year. There are no other explicit requirements for nominee arrangements to be declared. In other Canadian provinces and territories, nominee arrangements might qualify as bare trusts subject to the enhanced trust reporting rules, depending on the facts and circumstances. However, corporate BO record-keeping obligations as outlined above, also effectively require nominators to be declared by virtue of being individuals with significant control. Furthermore, in all jurisdictions, proxyholders (who may act similarly to nominees) are required to disclose their proxies, which must be in writing and signed by the appointing shareholder. Footnotes [45] The scope of reporting entity sectors under the PCMLTFA has expanded to a variety of new sectors since 2016, including factoring companies, financing and leasing companies, cheque cashing businesses, white label ATM acquirers, businesses involved in the mortgage lending process, armoured car companies, and businesses offering crowdfunding platform services (see IO1 for more details)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 315. The results of the National Risk Assessment have been spread through DNFBP sectors. Nevertheless, the level of understanding among each reporting entity regarding ML/TF risks they face varies between sectors. Casinos 316. In the interviews conducted in the on-site visit, casinos demonstrated a strong understanding of ML/TF risks. In addition to recognizing risks aligned with their business characteristics such as customer base and business model, casinos also showed awareness of evolving risks, including online gaming and cryptocurrency. With respect to online gaming, casinos have enhanced their understanding of the ML/TF risks faced and the corresponding mitigation measures by co-operating with provincial regulators specialized in online gaming, such as iGaming Ontario (IGO). This understanding is further reinforced by the results of FINTRAC’s supervisory assessments, revealing that the majority of casinos assessed from 2020-2025 were fully compliant with their PCMLTFA obligation to conduct risk assessments (see Table 4.4). DPMS 317. DPMS still face challenges in their understanding of ML/TF risks. This is evidenced by the results of FINTRAC’s supervisory assessments from 2020-2025 where only 23% of assessed DPMS were “compliant” with the PCMLTFA obligation to conduct risk assessments, 52% were “partially compliant”, and 25% were “deficient”, including entities that did not have their risk assessment at all (see Table 4.4.). These compliance results raise concerns about DPMS’ understanding of ML/TF risks faced by their business activities. The main ML/TF risks highlighted in the NRA have been spread among the DPMS sector, although more time is required to build awareness around new and evolving risks, such as those related to new technologies including online trading or cryptocurrency. Continued outreach efforts in collaboration with national industry associations such as Canadian Jewellers Association (CJA) are expected to promote a deeper understanding of ML/TF risks. Real Estate 318. Awareness of ML risks in the real estate sector has increased, in part due to the Cullen Commission report in British Columbia, which outlined key industry vulnerabilities. However, FINTRAC’s review of past supervisory activities has found that, although risk assessments are commonly developed, they are often incomplete and not effectively implemented in practice. Only 41% of real estate agents were compliant with their institutional risk assessment obligations, 41% were partially compliant and 18% were deficient, including entities that did not have their risk assessment at all (See Table 4.4.). In addition to further outreach and engagement by the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA), it is also worth considering more tailored and sector-specific guidance by FINTRAC. Accountants 319. FINTRAC's examinations of the accounting sector over the review period reveal that accountants generally have a good understanding of ML/TF risks. This is evidenced by the high compliance rates – 58% of assessed accountants were “compliant” with risk assessment obligations, although the sector needs to implement risk assessments for all members, as 25% of accountants still have not conducted their own risk assessments (See Table 4.4.). BC notaries 320. The majority of BC Notaries demonstrate a good understanding of risks, having developed and implemented risk assessments to manage their day-to-day business activities. This proficiency can be explained by high compliance rates - 64% of assessed BC notaries were “compliant” with risk assessment obligations, and only 6% of BC notaries were assessed as “deficient” (See Table 4.4.). Table 4.4. Supervisory findings of Risk Assessment deficiencies for DNFBP Sectors – 2020-2025 “Compliant”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. “ Partially compliant” : while the obligation is documented, it is either not applied, has been only partially implemented, or has quality issues. “ Deficient”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 63% 19% 19% DPMS 23% 52% 25% Real estate 41% 41% 18% Accountants 58% 17% 25% BC notaries 64% 30% 6% Source: FINTRAC Note: Not all sectors are subject to an annual risk assessment review by FINTRAC. The timing and selection of these reviews are determined based on specific requirements and the focus of targeted sectors. For the legal profession 321. Unlike the PCMLTFA requirements for other DNFBPs, rules of provincial/territorial law societies do not oblige lawyers to conduct ML/TF risk assessments. The FLSC has issued guidance regarding ML/TF risk assessment for lawyers, yet progress in risk assessment implementation remains limited. Risks in certain activities such as the operation of trust account, which the FLSC and provincial/territorial Law Societies identify as high-risk, are recognized. While lawyers are aware of information on ML/TF risks provided by the FLSC and law societies passively, they do not appear to proactively identify and understand ML/TF risks tailored to their own business model or evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 351. Each year, FINTRAC develops an annual operational plan to guide its various supervisory activities. This plan is informed by FINTRAC’s risk model, public data, past compliance assessments, transaction reports, Intelligence Notices provided from its Tactical and Strategic Intelligence unit, and information from regulatory partners, risk questionnaires, and non-compliance reports (See c.28.5). FINTRAC’s supervisory activities have varying intensity and are selected on the basis of risks observed. There are generally three types of supervisory activities: on-site examinations; desk-based assessments of submissions (i.e. risk questionnaire and self-assessment); and ongoing supervisory engagements, including monitoring meetings and outreach. 352. For further improvement of risk-based supervision frameworks, it is necessary to conduct entity-level risk assessment properly. Apart from casinos, FINTRAC has conducted supervisory assessment activities for fewer than 10% of all entities in the past five years. In addition, supervisory coverage of DPMS and real estate is substantially lower than casinos, all of which are assessed as high-risk, whereas coverage of lower risk sector (i.e. BC notaries) is higher than DPMS and real estate (see Table 4.13). Table 4.13. Assessment Activities and SRM Risk Scores Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) Assessment Activities (Past 5 yrs) Number of Reporters Number of Non-reporters Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk No-flag Casinos 19 154(811%) 1 5 4 10 - - DPMS 3 000 168(6%) - - 8 54 4 2 934 (97.8%) Real Estate 7 742 440(6%) - - 19 176 15 7 532 (97.3%) Accountants 1 000 110(11%) - - 1 1 116 882 (88.2%) BC Notaries 293 21(7%) - - - 19 - 274 (93.5%) Sub-total 12 054 893(7%) 1 5 32 260 135 11 622 (96.4%) Source: Canada 353. FINTRAC is unable to articulate how annual operational plan for supervisory activities is developed based on the above risk assessment results; or provide the analysis of supervisory activities by risk categories of DNFBPs in the past 5 years. Canada explains that the SRM is only one tool used by FINTRAC to assess the risk of individual DNFBPs, however it has not been able to sufficiently demonstrate how other factors are taken into account in the risk assessment and supervisory prioritisation process in practice. Given the high number of ‘no-flag’ entities, the accuracy and significance of the risk categorization under the SRM is minimal for DNFBPs. 354. FINTRAC employs a range of different supervisory tools, including examinations, monitoring meetings, risk questionnaires and Voluntary Self-Declaration of Non-Compliance (VSDONC), which may apply when a reporting entity discovers non-compliance issues in reporting, client identification, record keeping, or other aspects of their compliance program during periodically review, ongoing risk assessment, or quality control activities. FINTRAC maintains a regular examination cycle for casinos. On the other hand, DNFBPs subject to examination represent only 0.56% of the total number of entities subject to examination in the year 2024-2025 (67 out of 12 054). While FINTRAC conducts other supervisory activities to supplement examinations, the low supervisory coverage of examinations for DPMS and real estate professionals relative to their large population raises concern that not all high-risk entities within those sectors are subject to in-depth assessment (see Table 4.14). Table 4.14. AML/CFT Examinations of DNFBPs Conducted by FINTRAC Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025,) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total (percentage in relation to the total DNFBP as of 1 April 2025) Casinos 19 4 0 6 2 5 17 (89.4%) DPMS 3 000 3 10 8 8 25 54 (1.8%) Real Estate 7 742 53 96 71 15 31 266 (3.4%) Accountants 1 000 0 0 0 5 3 8 (0.8%) BC Notaries 293 1 5 7 5 3 21 (7.1%) Total 12 054 61 111 92 35 67 366 (3.0%) Source: Canada 355. In 2023, FINTRAC launched an assessment tool called the risk questionnaire, intended to gather detailed information on reporting entities including their business model, risk exposure, and compliance measures. During the interviews in the on-site visit, positive feedback was received that risk questionnaires are a useful tool for reporting entities in properly identifying ML/TF risks and implementing mitigation measures proportionate to those risks. As noted in the DPMS section below, there remains room for further improvement in the selection of target entities who need to complete risk questionnaires. Increasing the coverage of examinations and risk questionnaires in higher risk areas, would further support a risk-based supervision. Casinos 356. From 2020 to 2024, FINTRAC conducted examinations on a cyclical basis for all brick-and-mortar casinos, with a frequency of two to five years. This schedule was based on variables such as casino size, compliance history, and ML/TF risk levels, to ensure continuous risk oversight. In the past five years, 68% of the casino sector was examined. Beginning in 2024–25, FINTRAC further strengthened its risk-based approach, including risk questionnaires, monitoring meetings, targeted reviews, and full scope examinations of both bricks-and-mortar casinos and online gaming. Furthermore, in 2023-24, FINTRAC adopted a portfolio approach in supervising the casino sector similar to the banking sector. Under the revised framework, FINTRAC assigns a dedicated supervision officer to each casino to offer compliance assistance, relay the agency's expectations and updates, and monitor any operational or regulatory changes. Five of the largest casinos have quarterly meetings, the three remaining large casinos have biannual meetings, and the remaining eleven small and medium-sized casinos meet annually. This approach has been well-received for improving communication and compliance. Table 4.15. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Casinos in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 4 - 6 2 5 17 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - 1 - 1 Questionnaires - - - - 18 18 VSDONCs 8 22 29 31 28 118 Totals 12 22 35 34 51 154 Source: Canada DPMS 357. Over the past five years, FINTRAC conducted 54 examinations of DPMS, focusing on the largest and highest-risk entities, including follow-up examinations where deficiencies had been previously identified. These entities were deemed high-risk due to their significant market share, broad geographic reach, and status as luxury dealers of high-value products. Of the 54 examinations, 25 examinations resulted in follow-up supervisory activities, with 10 resulting in enforcement action, including four Notices of Violation issued, totalling CAD 594 974 (USD 434 881). Targeted questionnaires for the DPMS sector were launched in 2024-25, with 95 questionnaires administered. FINTRAC selected reporting entities based on the following risk factors: geographic risk exposure, product and service risk, adverse media results, and third party STRs indicating known criminal associates. From 95 questionnaires administered, FINTRAC received a completed response from 74 entities, 13 entities were unresponsive, and 9 were deemed not covered (i.e. did not perform triggering activities). Based on these results, a number of entities were selected for action plan meetings to ensure that FINTRAC monitored the DPMS’ implementation of their compliance programs. Other DPMS entities that exhibited higher risk based on the results of the questionnaires were selected for comprehensive examinations. As noted above, further coverage of examinations and risk questionnaires would enhance FINTRAC’s risk-based supervision, considering the risk and context in the sector. Table 4.16. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for DPMS in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 3 10 8 8 25 54 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - 8 8 Questionnaires - - - - 95 95 VSDONCs 1 1 4 2 3 11 Totals 4 11 12 10 131 168 Source: Canada Real estate 358. FINTRAC's strategy in the real estate sector involves targeted examinations across various sub segments, including new brokerages, developers, and the luxury and commercial markets. Additionally, FINTRAC conducts follow-up examinations to confirm that previously identified deficiencies are addressed. Over the past five years, of the 266 examinations conducted, 23 were considered for enforcement activities, 128 were considered for follow up activity and 114 required no further action. FINTRAC administered 71 risk questionnaires in 2023-24 and 97 in 2024-25. To address the gaps identified, FINTRAC provided reporting entities with outcome letters detailing the gaps and collaborated with them to ensure these were addressed. The responses were assessed using a standardized risk rubric, leading to targeted supervisory actions. During the fiscal year 2023-24, FINTRAC introduced monitoring meetings as a follow-up assessment activity with major brokerages. FINTRAC held 10 meetings with large real estate brokerages, to increase the reporting of STRs and promote best practices. FINTRAC should continue such activities considering the low volume of STRs, in collaboration with CREA for additional outreach as necessary. Table 4.17. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Real estate in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 53 96 71 15 31 266 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - 10 1 11 Questionnaires - - - 71 97 168 VSDONCs 1 5 6 1 2 15 Totals 54 101 77 97 131 460 Source: Canada Accountants 359. The number of examinations against accountants is low, although in part this reflects their relatively small number subject to the PCMLTFA (estimated at 1 000). FINTRAC has started risk questionnaires, improving its understanding of sector risks, uncovering compliance gaps, and identifying additional firms. From the 95 questionnaires administered in 2024-25, FINTRAC pinpointed common deficiencies such as the absence of a compliance officer, inadequate training, and missing obligations in policies and procedures. In some cases, policies and procedures for the firm were present, but lacked obligations like PEP and HIO determinations, risk assessment of new technologies, and large cash transaction and large virtual cash transaction reporting requirements. Based on these findings, five were selected for follow-up examinations and seven for action plan monitoring. Table 4.18. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for Accountants in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations - - - 5 3 8 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - 3 3 Questionnaires - - - - 95 95 VSDONCs - 1 1 - 2 4 Totals 0 1 1 5 103 110 Source: Canada BC notaries 360. The BC notary sector has low member turnover and few new entrants annually. Over the past five years, FINTRAC conducted 15 full examinations, three targeted exams and three follow-ups, finding most entities compliant. Of the 15 full examinations, nine were fully compliant and six had some deficiencies flagged for future supervision. Of the three follow-ups, two entities continued to show issues, indicating that some do not fully address deficiencies or encounter new compliance challenges. FINTRAC schedules follow-ups based on the severity of deficiencies and the risk profile of both the sector and the entity. Table 4.19. Supervisory Assessment and Monitoring Activities for BC notaries in 2020-2025 Assessment and monitoring activities 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Examinations 1 5 7 5 3 21 Meetings (Monitoring and Action Plan) - - - - - 0 Questionnaires - - - - - 0 VSDONCs - - - - - 0 Totals 1 5 7 5 3 21 Source: Canada For the legal profession 361. Law societies use a range of different tools, including audits and investigations, to ensure that their members respect AML/CFT rules. While these tools have helped advancing lawyers’ implementation of AML/CFT measures, they are still largely rule-based and lack a risk-based approach. Law societies conduct audits reviews of lawyers or law firms’ financial records, books and accounts as well as the handling of client file matters. Audits also examine compliance with AML/CFT rules and regulations, such as CDD, BO inquiries and record-keeping. The importance of fulfilling obligations appears to be well embedded among lawyers in certain provinces, such as British Columbia, where between 2020 and 2025, referrals arising from the Law Society audits accounted for approximately 75% of all new AML/CTF investigation files and some audit referrals for AML/CTF obligations have resulted in revocations. In contrast, regarding areas such as enhanced due diligence, which are not prescribed by rules and regulations but are instead addressed only through non-binding guidance, implementation among lawyers appears inconsistent (Also see 10.5 and 11.6.2. for TF/PF monitoring and compliance). Both law societies and lawyers remain largely focused on rule-based measures, and lack of risk-based approaches is a deficiency, including building on risk awareness both by law societies and by lawyers. In addition to risk assessments by law societies or the FLSC, Canada should further promote the implementation of a risk-based approach by ensuring that designated supervisory authorities, which may be self-regulated bodies such as law societies, can share the results of examinations with individual lawyers, have lawyers do their own ML/TF risk assessments, which is different from lawyers’ general obligation to assess whether there is a risk that the lawyer may be aiding or encouraging fraud or other illegal conduct, and implement commensurate mitigation measures. During the interviews in the on-site visit, differences were noted across provinces regarding the preparedness and the progress of sectoral and entity level risk assessment. Law societies should share initiatives and best practices from different provinces in appropriate forums such as the FLSC to effectively strengthen the legal sector’s approach to AML/CFT. 362. Law societies’ audits of firms follow to some extent a risk-based approach, for example by focusing on trust accounts, which are typically regarded as high-risk. Law societies should further enhance their risk-based approach and conduct more comprehensive supervisory risk assessments. Considering the volume of members, the number of audits, especially targeted to AML/CFT obligations, is limited. It is positively noted that some law societies have made efforts to select entities targeted for review following a risk-based approach. For example, Ontario selects entities based on firm size, area of practice, new sole practice or other factors, and British Columbia audits all law firms at least once every six years, with firms practicing in higher-risk areas audited at least once every four years. To further enhance alignment and compliance with the FATF Standards, each law society should conduct its own risk assessment at the starting point of risk-based approach and then develop and refine supervisory approaches based on the assessment. Canada should also consider measures to monitor the effectiveness of law societies’ risk-based supervision, including enhancing transparency through detailed disclosure in annual reports and introducing independent review of law societies’ risk-based supervision by third parties. Table 4.20. Estimated Number of Annual Law Society Audits (2019-2024) Estimated number of law firms Estimated Number of Audits Performed Annually Law Society of Ontario 14 090 law firms 1 200 Barreau du Québec 3 908 681 (as in March 2025) (All trust accounts are audited once every 5 years) Chambre des notaires du Québec 828 551 (for the year ending 31 March 2024) Law Society of British Columbia 4 000 585 Law Society of Alberta 2 700 150-200 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="103. Canada applies a risk-based approach to its AML/CFT regulatory framework, strengthening requirements where higher risks are identified and allowing simplified measures or exemptions where risks are demonstrably lower, as determined through NRA and supporting risk assessments, although some limitations remain in the identification of lower risk areas). This approach is embedded in the federal regulatory system, which mandates that regulatory decisions be grounded in evidence and that all regulatory proposals incorporate structured and transparent risk assessments. 104. Most sectors are obliged to comply fully with AML/CFT obligations. There are simplified measures in the regulatory framework available for some lower risk scenarios. The framework allows certain entities such as entities subject to legal transparency requirements or assessed as low risk, to undergo simplified identity verification provided that the reporting entity has conducted a risk assessment and proven the low level of risk. As highlighted in the 2025 NRA, public corporations display a low vulnerability to ML/TF, as they are subject to stringent legal constraints under provincial and territorial securities laws and stock exchange rules. In recognition of this lower vulnerability profile, Canada’s AML/CFT framework has introduced simplified measures in certain low-risk scenarios involving public corporations. This approach has also allowed for the exclusion of low-risk activities offered by sectors, such as financing and leasing services for low value consumer products (rent-to-own furniture, personal electronics, etc.). Managing general agents, where they act as facilitators between brokers and insurers, typically offering services to assist with contracting of insurance agents and commission payments are also exempted as per the identified low risk. 105. Simplified measures can also be applied to certain categories of entities, including administrators of pension plans or regulated investment funds, a corporation or trust whose shares are traded on the Canadian stock exchange or a stock exchange designated under the Income Tax Act, a subsidiary whose financial statements are consolidated with these entities, or a state-owned enterprise, institution or agency or public service body, subject to specific record-keeping obligations. These categories are underpinned by ongoing risk assessment and monitoring, consultations with FINTRAC, private sector stakeholders, and other relevant authorities as part of the policy development process. However, the NRA focuses its analytical emphasis on the higher-risk end of the spectrum of entities and activities. While this approach supports the identification of significant ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities, it may mean some further, lower risk areas are not assessed in sufficient detail to determine where simplified measures may be appropriate. A more detailed analysis of lower-risk activities in a future iteration of the NRA could be the basis for additional applications of simplified measures under a risk-based approach. 106. Canada has strengthened its regulatory framework for sectors consistently assessed as highly vulnerable to ML/TF, with particular focus on MSBs, which have been rated as very highly vulnerable in recent NRAs. In response, the government introduced legislative and regulatory measures, specifically enhanced PCMLTFA registration requirements obliging domestic MSBs to provide criminal record checks for every person who directly or indirectly controls 20% or more of the business upon registration to address this persistent elevated risk. This is a good example of Canada’s ability to act rapidly on its evolving understanding of national risks and implement enhanced measures to more vulnerable sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Competent authorities have timely access to the information held in the registers of BO data operated by Corporations Canada and by REQ in Québec. For timely access via other prongs of Canada’s multi-pronged approach, the BO record-keeping obligations introduced for legal persons in most provinces and territories mean data can be accessed by competent authorities and also support REs to meet CDD obligations under the PCMLTFA. However, data is not available on levels of compliance with the BO obligations in provinces where central registries have not yet been established. In addition, case studies provided by Canada show that LEAs primarily use the corporate and beneficial ownership registries, records held by reporting entities, and disclosures from FINTRAC rather than going directly to legal persons to seek their BO data. 404. The registries show good levels of compliance with the filing obligations, although this is better for the federal registry than Québec’s. While REQ performs some a priori and a posteriori verifications, the federal registry firstly verifies the identity of the filers (who may not be a BO) and then verifies the accuracy of the BO information provided on a risk/audit basis that uses AI and other analytical tools to cross-reference data and detect anomalies and other data integrity issues. Corporations are flagged for follow up if BO data appears fictitious, if a corporation claims to not have any ISC or where corroborating data identifies an issue. As of January 2026, 10 512 letters had been issued for different failings and data provided indicates that these had led to greater compliance in a slight majority of cases. 405. REs have a good understanding of their obligations to gather BO data as part of the CDD process and authorities can access this through disclosures from FINTRAC or using production orders. For access from other government agencies, while CRA holds data on the totality of judicial orders and/or requests from law enforcement, a breakdown of this data to obtain figures specific to BO was not available. While FINTRAC does not hold specific data on how frequently LEAs seek BO data from FINTRAC, in 2024-2025, 47% of FINTRAC’s reactive disclosures (i.e. as a result of a VIR from a LEA) included information on a legal entity. 5.3.1. Basic information 406. Basic information on corporations is held by all federal, provincial and territorial authorities responsible for incorporation and is available to any member of the public. 407. Basic information on other forms of legal persons, including co-operatives, boards of trade and non-profit organisations, is held by respective federal and provincial authorities under various applicable legislation and is available to the public and competent authorities via the corporate registries in each of the federal/provincial and territorial jurisdictions. 5.3.2. Beneficial ownership information 408. Canada follows a multi-pronged approach to ensure that the BO of a private corporation can be determined by competent authorities in a timely manner. Beneficial ownership information on corporations is available to competent authorities from four main sources: (1) corporations themselves, (2) government registers where these have been established (currently at the federal level and in Québec), (3) reporting entities who have obtained BO data as part of their CDD processes and (4) proactive and reactive disclosures from FINTRAC and other government agencies. Information held by legal persons 409. At a federal level, since June 2019, private corporations are required to prepare and maintain their own adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on individuals with significant control (ISC) over the corporation. There are similar requirements at a provincial level (except for Alberta) for corporations to hold (or, in Québec, declare to the REQ) information on their ISCs at a provincial level [46] , covering over 88% of corporations in Canada. While Québec collects data on compliance with BO disclosure requirements, authorities in other jurisdictions in Canada do not collect information on compliance with these record-keeping obligations (although at federal level, the level of compliance with record-keeping requirements can be inferred from the level of filing of BO information with the federal registry). This is a particular concern regarding Ontario as it is where 38% of Canadian corporations are formed. Authorities cannot fully demonstrate to what degree corporations in the provinces without central BO registries, notably Ontario and BC, are complying with the requirements to record BO information. 410. Where BO record-keeping obligations have been introduced, they generally also require this information to be provided to investigative bodies by corporations upon request. Case studies provided by Canadian authorities demonstrated the value and use of the federal and Québec registries, RE CDD data obtained via FINTRAC disclosures and production orders and CRA and RQ data rather than seeking BO data from legal persons themselves. Registries 411. Since 2024, federal corporations governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) are required to file information on their individuals with significant control (ISC) with the federal registry operated by Corporations Canada. As of November 2025, the information held in the CBCA registry covers 94% of federal corporations, which in turn constitute 16% of all Canadian corporations. 412. The BO filing obligations which have been introduced for legal persons are generally consistent in the requirements for the information to be kept accurate and up to date. To ensure accuracy of its ISC register, CC verifies the identity of the filer (separate to information on BO) and then takes a risk-based approach to BO information verification. The focus of its verification efforts so far has been on those corporations declaring that they have no ISCs, where this conflicts with other data available to CC. CC uses various tools, including large language models, to determine which filings require closer scrutiny. The ISC register can also be cross-referenced with CRA data to verify accuracy. As of January 2026, 10 512 verification activities had been undertaken, with six staff members dedicated to Compliance/Integrity and Transparency. 413. As of 1 October 2025, REs have been required to report discrepancies discovered on CC’s register to Corporations Canada within 30 days, as a further means of ensuring accuracy. CC shares the reports with FINTRAC. This reflects Canada’s multi-pronged approach to supporting the integrity of the registry. However, the introduction of this obligation was too recent for its effectiveness to be assessed. 414. FINTRAC has ingested the data on CC’s ISC register, and on Alberta’s corporate register, in bulk and so has comprehensive access to this for its analysis function to identify BO relationships through the nature of patterns, transactions and entity-level information, among others. Work is underway to allow FINTRAC to similarly ingest the data available in the corporate registries of other provinces and territories. It is important to note however that the provincial corporate registries contain information on legal, as opposed to beneficial, ownership and so the information is not equivalent to that held on the federal ISC register or Québec’s REQ. CC’s public register receives on average 600 000 visits per month. CC does not track which of these are authorities, businesses conducting CDD or members of the public. Since CC started collecting BO data, it has received eleven requests from LEAs for non-public BO data and this information can be provided within one day. LEAs also consult the registry for public information. 415. Québec was the first province to establish a similar beneficial ownership registry, where obligations for domestic and foreign corporations include transmitting to the Registraire des entreprises information on the ultimate beneficiaries in order to make their identity public. This registry accounts for approximately 13 % of the total population of Canadian corporations. 416. The REQ in Québec verifies on a risk basis BO information provided to it upon filing. Like CC, a focus is placed on those companies claiming not to have any BOs or to be exempt from the requirements. After an enterprise is created or registered, any declaration filed electronically must be made using the company's ClicSÉQUR (i.e. the Québec government authentication system) authentication code to ensure that the person filing the declaration is authorized to do so by the company. The REQ has chosen to take a non-aggressive approach to ensuring compliance, including by issuing non-disclosure notices in May 2025 to corporations known not to have filed BO data. It had 70% compliance at the time of the onsite and authorities stated they were aiming to reach 85% by March 2026. Both above registers require information to be updated within reasonable timeframes upon there being a material change. 417. While REQ similarly does not track LEA use of the register, it receives general disclosure orders from law enforcement at least once per month and approximately five requests per month for non-public data held by the register without a general disclosure order. This is in addition to the general access provided to those agencies using the Office of the Investigator tool, which removes the need for specific access requests to be made and therefore further assists in providing timely access. The Sûreté du Québec has nearly 250 police officers who have access to this tool, which allows for searches beyond those permitted to the public, e.g. by name, by field of activity and others. The RCMP is currently engaging with REQ to access this tool also. 418. The obligations on foreign businesses (including corporations and trusts) to file BO data currently explicitly only apply in Québec as it is the only established provincial BO register. They apply in BC in relation to real estate ownership where relevant corporations, including foreign corporations, that have a registered ownership or similar interest in land, must centrally file transparency reports containing beneficial ownership information with the Land Title and Survey Authority. Foreign beneficial owners of land must be disclosed in transparency reports, which are partially available to the public and fully available to competent authorities. Therefore, the ability of competent authorities to access BO, as opposed to basic, information on foreign corporations varies across the provinces. 419. LEAs have demonstrated the utility of the central registers, both for comparison of data with that obtained elsewhere and for obtaining data without having to seek it from corporations themselves. The RCMP indicated that BO data was used in at least 2 452 cases between 2019 and 2025, although this was not broken down between legal persons and arrangements. Reporting entities 420. Financial entities, DNFPBs and dealers in virtual currency (since 2014) and foreign money services businesses (since 2021) are required to obtain and verify beneficial ownership information for clients that are legal persons. Information gathered as part of CDD can be provided to LEAs by reporting entities via production orders and to FINTRAC via STRs. Over the review period, data was not recorded on how many requests for beneficial ownership details LEAs have made from reporting entities. In addition, and as outlined under IO7, access to such information via production orders may not be timely 421. REs interviewed during the onsite demonstrated a good understanding of their obligations to collect BO data as part of CDD. A view expressed by several was that they would not engage in business with a company whose BO data could not be provided. As part of its supervisory activities, FINTRAC examines whether REs are fulfilling their obligations in this regard. During the review period, FINTRAC issued six AMPs for violations of PCMLTFA requirements that include breaches of non-compliance with BO requirements. Other sources 422. In 2017, the PCMLTFA was amended to expand the scope of information FINTRAC discloses to law enforcement and other competent authorities to include beneficial ownership details. In practice, LEAs have obtained FINTRAC data on beneficial ownership details on 2 233 entities over the period 2023/24-2024/25. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) collects corporate tax filings, financial records and shareholder information which support BO identification for tax enforcement and compliance. Since January 2024 the CRA can share information on shareholders and affiliations with the Director of Corporations Canada for the purpose of verifying and validating the BO information required to be filed with Corporations Canada. In practice Corporations Canada used CRA bulk data to confirm beneficial ownership details on 44 215 entities over the review period to verify accuracy of their claims that they do not have any ISCs. Box 5.1. Case study of timely access In this stolen vehicle export and criminal proceeds laundering case, the Sûreté du Québec ’s (SQ) Bureau of Investigation Partnership conducted an investigation targeting a company that rented container spaces on cargo ships to Europe. This company then offered its spaces to people who wanted to send a container to Europe. The investigation revealed that several of the containers sent through this company contained stolen vehicles. The SQ’s bureau of criminal asset recovery was called in to assist due to the highly lucrative nature of this investigation. Checks at the REQ allowed the bureau of criminal asset recovery to discover that the company in question belonged to the suspect's spouse, and that he had transferred his rights to her some time before declaring bankruptcy, a few years earlier. During this same period, he also transferred all ownership rights to his luxurious residence to his spouse. Bank disclosure orders were subsequently obtained against the company, the suspect, and his spouse, in addition to obtaining their income declarations from Revenu Québec. Analysis of the evidence obtained demonstrated that money laundering had taken place and that part of the proceeds had been used to pay for the residence. A search of the residence also resulted in the seizure of more than CAD 615 000 in cash. Civil proceedings were initiated to obtain the confiscation of the money and the suspect's residence. An application to initiate proceedings was obtained in July 2025, Investigators are awaiting further proceedings Source: Sureté du Québec Footnotes [46] Ontario , Québec , Saskatchewan , Nova Scotia , since 2023; New Brunswick , since 2022; British Columbia (BC Business Corporations Act , for Companies (including limited companies, community contribution companies, benefit companies and unlimited liability companies)), Manitoba , Prince Edward Island , since 2020; Federal , Newfoundland and Labrador , since 2019." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="107. The overall objectives and activities of the competent authorities are generally aligned with the evolving national AML/CFT policies, and the extent to which authorities have aligned their objectives and activities to respond to the higher national ML/TF risks are consistent. For the AML supervisory authority, FINTRAC, generally demonstrates good understanding of the ML/TF risks of different FI, VASP, and DNFBP sectors. However, as mentioned in IO.3 and IO.4, some very high risk and high-risk sectors, identified as highly vulnerable to ML/TF in the NRA, including D-SIBs, VASPs, MSBs, securities and DPMS, are not sufficiently prioritised for supervision. This is discussed further in IO.3. 108. For LEAs, the fight against ML related to drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion and TBML continues to be prioritised in their daily work, which is consistent with Canada’s highest ML risks. While there is generally more emphasis placed on investigations for predicate crimes, as shown by the establishment of several working groups, LEAs (particularly RCMP) also demonstrated a clear focus on following the money, conducting parallel financial investigations to identify potential ML activity. LEAs and other competent authorities with investigative mandates (CBSA and CRA) have increased their focus on ML. While prosecutors demonstrated increased prioritisation of several high value Professional Money Laundering (PML) matters, they generally do not prioritise ML prosecutions and will often withdraw ML charges to secure convictions on the predicate offence (see Core issue 7.2). Recent structural changes and the adoption of new powers to target TBML and ML linked to commercial trade fraud demonstrate CBSA’s priority in this space. CRA-CIP is also increasing its focus on ML, introducing new guidance and case management practices in November 2025 requiring ML and proceeds of crime to be considered in all tax offence investigations. Box 1.1. Public-Private Collaboration to Combat Illegal Drug Trafficking Canada’s private sector, including large banks, has taken a leading role in public-private partnerships aimed at combating the trafficking of illegal drugs, with a particular focus on ML. These initiatives are supported by law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC, Canada’s FIU. Project Guardian, launched in 2018, is a public-private partnership led by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies, international partners and FINTRAC to combat the trafficking of illegal fentanyl. Tracing the movement of funds related to the trafficking of illegal fentanyl is a priority for FINTRAC. Through a strategic analysis of its financial intelligence, and in collaboration with Canada’s financial institutions and the RCMP, FINTRAC released a comprehensive Operational Alert on ML indicators related to this illicit activity in 2025. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC produced 108 disclosures of actionable financial intelligence which identified 456 subjects to law enforcement in association with Project Guardian. Project Legion, is a public-private partnership led by Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD), supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC, which targets illicit cannabis activities by focusing on the ML aspect of the crime. The illicit cannabis market results in a significant loss of tax revenue and helps fund other illegal and harmful activities by OCGs in communities across the country. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC produced 51 financial intelligence disclosures in support of law enforcement investigations involving illicit cannabis activities at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels. In addition, FINTRAC identified 142 subjects and supported 14 project-level investigations. Source: Department of Finance Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 96. Canada’s AML/CFT policies are strongly influenced by its understanding of ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. Canada applies a comprehensive risk-based approach to combating ML and TF, ensuring that national policies and operational actions are aligned with its understanding of both current and emerging risks through intelligence prioritisation, strategic planning, and co-ordinated engagement with provincial and territorial authorities, LEAs, self-regulatory bodies, and the private sector. 97. The national AML/CFT policies of Canada are outlined in the 2023-2026 AML/CFT strategy priority actions, which establishes a general framework to address the highest priority ML/TF threats based on findings of Canada’s NRAs and the results of other risk and effectiveness assessments or performance reviews of the regime. The strategy outlines the AML/CFT regime as operating through three independent pillars: (1) policy co-ordination, (2) prevention and detection, and (3) investigation and disruption. The strategy identifies four principal themes to guide AML/CFT efforts over 2023-2026 with a set of priority actions under each, increasing operational effectiveness, addressing legislative and regulatory gaps, improving regime governance and co-ordination, and contributing to international community efforts. 98. Since its last assessment, Canada has enacted extensive legislative, regulatory and operational reforms to strengthen its AML/CFT framework. Notable examples include expanding the scope of regulated entities under the PCMLTFA to cover sectors assessed as posing a heightened vulnerability to ML/TF through Canada’s NRA process, including factoring companies, check cashing businesses, and financing and leasing companies, among others; improving access to beneficial ownership information and enhancing information sharing between private institutions through private-to-private information sharing and the federal beneficial ownership registry; making significant amendments the Criminal Code to support investigations, prosecutions, and the recovery of proceeds of crime; and making amendments to the Income Tax Act. Since April 2025, amendments to the PCMLTFA have also expanded FINTRAC’s ability to disclose financial intelligence to provincial civil forfeiture offices, which may also submit VIRs as well as CBSA’s ability to proactively share intelligence on TBML and trade based illicit financial flows with the RCMP and key international stakeholders. Canada has enhanced its AML/CFT regime governance framework by introducing a new Deputy Minister level AML/ATF Committee in 2019 to elevate the priority of AML/CFT efforts across the Government of Canada and provide senior strategic direction which elevates political commitment. 99. The public National AML/CFT strategy and related activities are articulated at a high level and rely on co-operation among authorities and consultations with stakeholders to translate its broad priorities into operational measures. A consultation paper with specific proposed measures to strengthen Canada‘s AML/CFT regime was published in 2023, following the release of the strategy, to advance progress in priority areas for action. Based on these consultations, several targeted measures have been advanced under the leadership of Canada‘s AML/CFT governance committees as noted above. Canada’s AML/CTF Strategy consolidates identified priority areas into four overarching strategic objectives. Action plans were developed in parallel with the formulation of the 2023–2026 AML/CFT Strategy to operationalise these objectives. Implementation is co-ordinated and monitored through Canada’s AML/CFT interdepartmental governance committees, which provide strategic oversight. Canada monitors the progress of strategic objectives using an outcome-based performance measurement framework while maintaining flexibility to adapt its action plans to achieve objectives in each priority area as risk and context evolves. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 100. Canada employs a comprehensive, integrated CFT framework aimed at identifying, preventing, and disrupting terrorists, terrorist organisations, and their financiers from accessing funds. The framework is grounded in national security priorities and supported by senior-level governance structures that facilitate information sharing and co-ordinated decision-making on both policy and operational TF matters. Intelligence on illicit and threat finance is a priority for Canada more broadly, aligning CFT intelligence efforts with broader whole of government security objectives. 101. Canada pursues a whole-of-government approach to CFT, involving all levels of government, law enforcement, the private sector, citizens, and international partners. In recognition of evolving threats, Public Safety Canada is in the process of updating Canada’s National Counter Terrorism Strategy, originally published in 2011, while the RCMP is developing a Terrorist Financing Strategy to strengthen the strategic and operational framework for counter terrorism and counter terrorist financing efforts. Policy co-ordination between the lead agencies at the centre of government is strong, and this is reflected in a coherent approach to TF across the different strategies and agencies. Operationally, the RCMP leads TF investigations under the Criminal Code, while the PPSC conducts prosecutions. The Criminal Code also provides for the Government of Canada to list terrorist entities on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety Canada. While being listed does not, in itself, constitute a criminal offence, the listing enables disruption by obligating financial institutions and others to freeze property and restricting any dealings that may facilitate a listed group. These mechanisms support asset freezing, seizure, restraint and forfeiture, and impose prohibitions on providing funds or financial services to terrorist groups. 102. TF policies and activities also reflect a proportionate approach: the Canada Revenue Agency’s Charities Directorate plays a dedicated role in protecting the charity sector from TF abuse by monitoring, engaging, and applying targeted controls to registered charities at risk. This strengthens the integrity of the charity registration system and contributes to Canada’s broader CFT regime. The Government of Canada launched an interdepartmental dialogue with NPOs to increase awareness and understanding of ML/TF risks and policies, and to understand and mitigate potential impacts of AML/CFT policies on financial inclusion." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 96. Canada’s AML/CFT policies are strongly influenced by its understanding of ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. Canada applies a comprehensive risk-based approach to combating ML and TF, ensuring that national policies and operational actions are aligned with its understanding of both current and emerging risks through intelligence prioritisation, strategic planning, and co-ordinated engagement with provincial and territorial authorities, LEAs, self-regulatory bodies, and the private sector. 97. The national AML/CFT policies of Canada are outlined in the 2023-2026 AML/CFT strategy priority actions, which establishes a general framework to address the highest priority ML/TF threats based on findings of Canada’s NRAs and the results of other risk and effectiveness assessments or performance reviews of the regime. The strategy outlines the AML/CFT regime as operating through three independent pillars: (1) policy co-ordination, (2) prevention and detection, and (3) investigation and disruption. The strategy identifies four principal themes to guide AML/CFT efforts over 2023-2026 with a set of priority actions under each, increasing operational effectiveness, addressing legislative and regulatory gaps, improving regime governance and co-ordination, and contributing to international community efforts. 98. Since its last assessment, Canada has enacted extensive legislative, regulatory and operational reforms to strengthen its AML/CFT framework. Notable examples include expanding the scope of regulated entities under the PCMLTFA to cover sectors assessed as posing a heightened vulnerability to ML/TF through Canada’s NRA process, including factoring companies, check cashing businesses, and financing and leasing companies, among others; improving access to beneficial ownership information and enhancing information sharing between private institutions through private-to-private information sharing and the federal beneficial ownership registry; making significant amendments the Criminal Code to support investigations, prosecutions, and the recovery of proceeds of crime; and making amendments to the Income Tax Act. Since April 2025, amendments to the PCMLTFA have also expanded FINTRAC’s ability to disclose financial intelligence to provincial civil forfeiture offices, which may also submit VIRs as well as CBSA’s ability to proactively share intelligence on TBML and trade based illicit financial flows with the RCMP and key international stakeholders. Canada has enhanced its AML/CFT regime governance framework by introducing a new Deputy Minister level AML/ATF Committee in 2019 to elevate the priority of AML/CFT efforts across the Government of Canada and provide senior strategic direction which elevates political commitment. 99. The public National AML/CFT strategy and related activities are articulated at a high level and rely on co-operation among authorities and consultations with stakeholders to translate its broad priorities into operational measures. A consultation paper with specific proposed measures to strengthen Canada‘s AML/CFT regime was published in 2023, following the release of the strategy, to advance progress in priority areas for action. Based on these consultations, several targeted measures have been advanced under the leadership of Canada‘s AML/CFT governance committees as noted above. Canada’s AML/CTF Strategy consolidates identified priority areas into four overarching strategic objectives. Action plans were developed in parallel with the formulation of the 2023–2026 AML/CFT Strategy to operationalise these objectives. Implementation is co-ordinated and monitored through Canada’s AML/CFT interdepartmental governance committees, which provide strategic oversight. Canada monitors the progress of strategic objectives using an outcome-based performance measurement framework while maintaining flexibility to adapt its action plans to achieve objectives in each priority area as risk and context evolves. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 100. Canada employs a comprehensive, integrated CFT framework aimed at identifying, preventing, and disrupting terrorists, terrorist organisations, and their financiers from accessing funds. The framework is grounded in national security priorities and supported by senior-level governance structures that facilitate information sharing and co-ordinated decision-making on both policy and operational TF matters. Intelligence on illicit and threat finance is a priority for Canada more broadly, aligning CFT intelligence efforts with broader whole of government security objectives. 101. Canada pursues a whole-of-government approach to CFT, involving all levels of government, law enforcement, the private sector, citizens, and international partners. In recognition of evolving threats, Public Safety Canada is in the process of updating Canada’s National Counter Terrorism Strategy, originally published in 2011, while the RCMP is developing a Terrorist Financing Strategy to strengthen the strategic and operational framework for counter terrorism and counter terrorist financing efforts. Policy co-ordination between the lead agencies at the centre of government is strong, and this is reflected in a coherent approach to TF across the different strategies and agencies. Operationally, the RCMP leads TF investigations under the Criminal Code, while the PPSC conducts prosecutions. The Criminal Code also provides for the Government of Canada to list terrorist entities on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety Canada. While being listed does not, in itself, constitute a criminal offence, the listing enables disruption by obligating financial institutions and others to freeze property and restricting any dealings that may facilitate a listed group. These mechanisms support asset freezing, seizure, restraint and forfeiture, and impose prohibitions on providing funds or financial services to terrorist groups. 102. TF policies and activities also reflect a proportionate approach: the Canada Revenue Agency’s Charities Directorate plays a dedicated role in protecting the charity sector from TF abuse by monitoring, engaging, and applying targeted controls to registered charities at risk. This strengthens the integrity of the charity registration system and contributes to Canada’s broader CFT regime. The Government of Canada launched an interdepartmental dialogue with NPOs to increase awareness and understanding of ML/TF risks and policies, and to understand and mitigate potential impacts of AML/CFT policies on financial inclusion." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="107. The overall objectives and activities of the competent authorities are generally aligned with the evolving national AML/CFT policies, and the extent to which authorities have aligned their objectives and activities to respond to the higher national ML/TF risks are consistent. For the AML supervisory authority, FINTRAC, generally demonstrates good understanding of the ML/TF risks of different FI, VASP, and DNFBP sectors. However, as mentioned in IO.3 and IO.4, some very high risk and high-risk sectors, identified as highly vulnerable to ML/TF in the NRA, including D-SIBs, VASPs, MSBs, securities and DPMS, are not sufficiently prioritised for supervision. This is discussed further in IO.3. 108. For LEAs, the fight against ML related to drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion and TBML continues to be prioritised in their daily work, which is consistent with Canada’s highest ML risks. While there is generally more emphasis placed on investigations for predicate crimes, as shown by the establishment of several working groups, LEAs (particularly RCMP) also demonstrated a clear focus on following the money, conducting parallel financial investigations to identify potential ML activity. LEAs and other competent authorities with investigative mandates (CBSA and CRA) have increased their focus on ML. While prosecutors demonstrated increased prioritisation of several high value Professional Money Laundering (PML) matters, they generally do not prioritise ML prosecutions and will often withdraw ML charges to secure convictions on the predicate offence (see Core issue 7.2). Recent structural changes and the adoption of new powers to target TBML and ML linked to commercial trade fraud demonstrate CBSA’s priority in this space. CRA-CIP is also increasing its focus on ML, introducing new guidance and case management practices in November 2025 requiring ML and proceeds of crime to be considered in all tax offence investigations. Box 1.1. Public-Private Collaboration to Combat Illegal Drug Trafficking Canada’s private sector, including large banks, has taken a leading role in public-private partnerships aimed at combating the trafficking of illegal drugs, with a particular focus on ML. These initiatives are supported by law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC, Canada’s FIU. Project Guardian, launched in 2018, is a public-private partnership led by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies, international partners and FINTRAC to combat the trafficking of illegal fentanyl. Tracing the movement of funds related to the trafficking of illegal fentanyl is a priority for FINTRAC. Through a strategic analysis of its financial intelligence, and in collaboration with Canada’s financial institutions and the RCMP, FINTRAC released a comprehensive Operational Alert on ML indicators related to this illicit activity in 2025. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC produced 108 disclosures of actionable financial intelligence which identified 456 subjects to law enforcement in association with Project Guardian. Project Legion, is a public-private partnership led by Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD), supported by Canadian law enforcement agencies and FINTRAC, which targets illicit cannabis activities by focusing on the ML aspect of the crime. The illicit cannabis market results in a significant loss of tax revenue and helps fund other illegal and harmful activities by OCGs in communities across the country. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC produced 51 financial intelligence disclosures in support of law enforcement investigations involving illicit cannabis activities at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels. In addition, FINTRAC identified 142 subjects and supported 14 project-level investigations. Source: Department of Finance Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="749. Sentencing principles are set out in the Criminal Code as per CC s.718 to 718.3. Sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the degree of responsibility of the offender. However, whilst the Criminal Code establishes that TF offences may receive a sentence of “no more than 10 years” (cc 83.02, 83.03 and 83.04 – see Recommendation 5 for more information), in practice Canada has submitted that the sentencing for TF ranges from six months to six years imprisonment. This is less than other violent offences. Since the last ME, Canadian courts have emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing for terrorism offences. Terrorism offences are unusual in that courts are able to order sentences for multiple offences to be served consecutively, rather than concurrently as is the case for almost all other crimes in the Criminal Code. 750. Canada’s historical sentencing range leaves concerns about whether penalties are sufficient to deter terrorist financing activity, particularly by sophisticated or ideologically motivated facilitators. Previous ranges were R. v. Thambithurai , 2011 and R. v. Khawaja , 2012, where the sentence imposed on the TF charge were 6 months and 2 years, respectively. Within this reporting period Project Sabin (box 9.4 above) shows an increased sentencing of two six-year sentences (one for terrorism and one for TF) to be served consecutively, for a total of 12 years. This is a positive step towards sanctions reflecting the importance of TF as an enabler for terrorist attacks. Table 9.1. Penalties and Sanctions Issued for TF Convictions (2019-2025) Case TF charge Found guilty of TF Found guilty of other terrorism offence Sentence for TF Total sentence (including other offences) Case Study in Box 9.4 Yes Yes Yes 6 years 12 years Case Study in Box 9.1 Yes Yes Yes Stayed per Kienapple principle 5 years Case Study in Box 9.2 Yes No (TF count along with two other terrorism offences counts were stayed) Yes No 111 days and three year probation order with conditions Case Study in Box 9.3 Yes Pending Pending Pending Pending Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 363. FINTRAC has several measures for remedial actions, including issuance of supervisory letters following compliance assessments or examinations, along with action plans where necessary. Twenty requests for action plans were issued in the past five years, and FINTRAC monitors the completion of action plan items to ensure improvements are implemented. For more severe cases of non-compliance, FINTRAC may apply sanctions, including administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) and non-compliance disclosures to law enforcement agencies. Although casinos have maintained strong levels of compliance across the reporting period thanks to FINTRAC’s significant activities in this sector, further work needs to be done to have a strong impact on the compliance of the Real Estate and DPMS sectors. 364. Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs): After a FINTRAC supervision officer conducts an examination or finds evidence of non-compliance, FINTRAC assesses the extent of the entity’s non-compliance against the severity/harm done (i.e. consequence) and reviews the entity’s overall compliance history. The amount of the AMP varies based on the severity of the violation. At the time of the evaluation, AMPs were up to CAD 100 000 (USD 73 092) for a person and CAD 500 000 (USD 365 462) for a reporting entity. Each individual violation can be subject to its own AMP and there is no cumulative penalty limit. When AMPs are imposed, the amount is considered proportionate. However, the number of AMPs is limited, and the positive impact of monitoring and supervision on DNFBPs’ compliance is not clearly demonstrated. 365. Once an administrative monetary penalty is imposed, FINTRAC must make public the name of the reporting entity, the nature of the violation or default, and the amount of the penalty. AMPs can cause financial strain for reporting entities, as well as reputational damage, given the public naming after the penalty is imposed. The public naming aspect of penalties provides an additional deterrence effect in addition to the penalty amount. However, in some cases, AMPs are published several months after being issued; for dissuasive effect in similar cases by other entities, it is important that AMPs be disclosed promptly. 366. Between 2020 and 2025, FINTRAC has issued 31 Notices of Violation for DNFBPs, which included one for accountants, two for casinos, five for DPMS, and 23 for real estate, for a total of CAD 5 236 388. This aligns with higher risk DNFBP sectors subject to the majority of compliance assessments. The Notice of Violation itself concerns various violations of the PCMLTFA and regulations, with the most frequent being compliance programs violations and violations for record keeping. It also included violations for failure to file an STR, which is one of the most serious violations and has high penalties associated with it. Proactive examinations, followed by appropriate sanctions, when warranted, and dissemination of STR obligations by public naming, should be carried out as part of awareness raising efforts across the entire sector. Table 4.21. Number/Total Dollar Value of Penalty Issued onto DNFBPs Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD N CAD Casinos 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 275 000 2 1 275 000 DPMS 3 000 2 272 910 1 222 750 1 99 314 0 0 1 264 000 5 858 974 Real Estate 7 742 5 538 230 8 1 517 176 0 0 5 549 533 5 423 225 23 3 028 164 Accountants 1 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 74 250 1 74 250 BC Notaries 293 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 12 054 7 811 140 9 1 739 926 1 99 314 5 549 533 9 2 036 475 31 5 236 388 Source: Canada Box ‎ 4.2. Case study – Behaviour Change Following an Administrative Monetary Penalty (AMP) in the Real Estate Sector This case study illustrates how an AMP issued in the real estate sector led to the rectification of non-compliance and meaningful behavioral change. FINTRAC had imposed AMPs on two of three brokerages in British Columbia linked through the same managing broker or corporate ownership. One AMP was imposed for CAD 149 886 in April 2022, and the second AMP was imposed for CAD 275 385 in July 2022. Subsequently, FINTRAC conducted a follow-up examination on the third brokerage and found that the real estate brokerage had implemented significant improvements to its compliance program. The follow-up examination, which assessed all applicable regulatory requirements, was conducted on-site in 2024. It marked a turning point in the reporting entity’s compliance approach. During this assessment, the compliance officer demonstrated a robust understanding of AML requirements and FINTRAC’s mandate. The reporting entity also presented a revised risk assessment, rectifying the incomplete version from 2022. The compliance officer had a strong understanding of the brokerage’s AML requirements and FINTRAC obligations, the policies and procedures were complete, agent interviews demonstrated that the ongoing training program and plan was effective, and the two-year review was completed by an external auditor, with its full scope documented. FINTRAC reviewed over 50 records and only two had record keeping errors: one for inadequate occupation, and one missing PEP form. The findings letter from the 2024 examination was flagged as “no further activity required,” as the reporting entity made significant improvements and no major deficiencies were identified. The reporting entity improved its compliance program due to FINTRAC’s interventions, which included the AMP applied to other related brokerages. This third brokerage expressed how FINTRAC’s previous examinations, including those on the other two brokerages, clarified the criteria for reporting STRs, in addition to their AML/CFT obligations. This resulted in significant improvements to their compliance program and knowledge of AML/CFT. Non-Compliance Disclosures (NCDs) 367. FINTRAC has the legislative authority to disclose information about non-compliance of reporting entities to law enforcement when it suspects on reasonable grounds that the information would be relevant to investigating or prosecuting criminal non-compliance offences under the PCMLTFA. Since 2020, FINTRAC has disclosed nine non-compliance disclosures to law enforcement on DNFBPs. Enforcement by Other Regulators 368. Regulatory bodies other than FINTRAC have the authority to independently impose sanctions or disqualify reporting entities through self-regulatory frameworks, based on violations of their respective legislation and regulations. These actions may include panel decisions and a range of punitive measures, such as disciplinary actions and monetary penalties. FINTRAC actively collaborates with other regulatory bodies to ensure it leverages all relevant remedial powers to enforce compliance. For example: · In the casino sector, the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) , the Ontario provincial regulator, has intervened to penalize casino operators for failure to meet requirements that have a nexus to AML. · The British Columbia Financial Services Authority (BCFSA) has issued professional misconduct penalties to British Columbia real estate brokers and agents for failure to comply with PCMLTFA obligations, such as failure to report suspicious transactions, amongst other violations. · The Organisme d’autoréglementation du courtage immobilier du Québec (OACIQ), the real estate regulator in Québec, requires all its registrants to provide information about the presence of a compliance program and shares its results with FINTRAC. 369. FINTRAC undertakes outreach activities to promote understanding of risk and obligations. FINTRAC’s restructuring from geographic to sector focus in 2023 has contributed to strengthening outreach by each sector and enhancing co-operation with reporting entities and relevant industrial associations (Also see 4.2.2). For the legal profession 370. Law societies have a wide variety of sanction options, including reprimands, fines, restrictions or conditions on practice, and revocation of license (disbarment). The grounds for sanctions are not limited to violation of AML/CFT rules but also include, among other things, improper use of trust account or involvement in fraudulent activities. 371. Canada provided case studies where law societies imposed a range of sanctions (including fines, suspensions, restrictions and conditions on practice, and disbarment) on lawyers for professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming, including for breach of AML/CFT rules. The majority of sanctions imposed against legal professionals for AML/CFT related conduct are suspensions or license revocations. Law societies do not maintain statistics related to sanctions for breaches of AML/CFT rules (See Table. 4.2). 372. In all law societies, disciplinary hearings are generally open to the public and disciplinary decisions, including notices of suspension and disbarment are publicly disclosed. This publicity is intended to have a dissuasive effect (see R.28, c. 28.4c)). Certain law societies, particularly in British Columbia, Ontario, Québec and Alberta, have more cases than others in relation to breaches of AML/CFT rules, in line with the general higher number of members. However, the sanctions imposed in several cases did not appear proportionate and dissuasive in relation to such breaches (e.g. suspensions for a few weeks or months, and fines in the order of thousands or tens of thousands). Disbarment was typically ordered in cases where lawyers not only breached AML/CFT rules but also aided or engaged in dishonesty, crime or fraud (e.g., misappropriation of client funds), contrary to rules of professional conduct. Considering the number of lawyers and their high vulnerability to ML/TF risks, the regional variations, relatively low monetary value of fines and limited duration of suspensions for breach of AML/CFT obligations as a whole, law society sanctions are not proportionate nor dissuasive and are not sufficient to ensure effective implementation of obligations by lawyers (see Table 4.2). 373. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a lawyer has committed a criminal offence, most (but not all) statutes governing law societies include mechanisms to authorize the law society to refer the matter to law enforcement and other competent authorities, subject to exceptions or safeguards for information covered by solicitor-client privilege, professional secrecy and/or confidentiality. For example, since 2021, the Law Society of Ontario has made 46 referrals to law enforcement, and the Law Society of British Columbia has made five referrals to law enforcement. The basis for these referrals includes misappropriation of client funds, AML concerns, and interference in the administration of justice. During an investigation, the Law Society of British Columbia also encourages complainants and witnesses to report to law enforcement if they have concerns in respect of a lawyer’s suspected criminal conduct. 374. Certain law societies such as British Columbia, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have concluded information sharing agreements with other regulators and law enforcement, such as the RCMP, to support investigations into professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Other law societies are working to finalize similar agreements with the RCMP. These information sharing agreements and initiatives are aligned with the objectives of the Government of Canada-FLSC joint working group and with the spirit of enhanced collaboration between law societies and law enforcement, recommended in the Cullen Commission’s Final Report. These information sharing agreements help strengthen Canada’s ability to enforce lawyers’ compliance and could result in more cases of law enforcement sanctions over time. Nevertheless, these agreements do not clarify the process for sharing of information from law societies to the RCMP and it is not yet clear whether they may lead to more referrals to law enforcement. Further, Canada has not provided evidence that law societies’ referrals and information sharing with LEAs have resulted in criminal prosecutions and sanctions in relation to money laundering. 375. Law Societies and the FLSC undertake a broad range of outreach activities and issue guidance to promote risk understanding and obligations across lawyers. These outreach initiatives have improved lawyers’ comprehension of AML/CFT obligations; however, lawyers’ risk awareness and flexible mitigation measures commensurate to the risks they assessed still have room for improvement. To advance from rule-based to risk-based approach, more effective ways of outreach should be considered, using FINTRAC and other relevant authorities’ outreach as references when needed (Also see 4.2.2)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="772. Canada’s detection and freezing obligations are supported by strong reporting requirements, specifically: · Suspicious transactions reporting requirements when there are reasonable grounds to suspect TF is occurring; and · Property reporting requirements that apply to the frozen assets of all relevant listed entities (UNSCRs 1267 and 1373); · Listed Person or Entity Property Report (LPEPR) reporting to FINTRAC; and · Reporting to the RCMP or CSIS under the UN Act 773. REs submit LPEPRs to FINTRAC when designated property is identified, including indirect holdings, and report these to the RCMP or CSIS under the UN Act. Further, REs must also submit an STRs to FINTRAC on related transactions when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that TF or sanctions evasion is occurring or being attempted. All persons in Canada and all Canadians outside of Canada must disclose to RCMP or CSIS when designated property is identified or in their possession or control that is believed to be owned, held, or controlled by a listed person, including indirect holdings. These mechanisms provide competent authorities with visibility over designated assets and transactions and form the primary trigger for freezing and investigative follow-up when listed property is detected. 774. These reporting requirements exist in addition to financial information identified during the course of a TF investigation (see IO.9) and provide competent authorities with comprehensive financial information related to the financing of terrorist activity and frozen funds and other assets of listed persons. Together, these reporting streams provide authorities with visibility over designated assets and transactions and form the primary trigger for freezing and investigative follow-up when listed property is detected. 775. Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs) were introduced in March 2025 as the main mechanism for reporting on frozen assets by reporting entities. These replace and expand on the previous Terrorist Property Reports (TPRs) and apply across additional listings regimes. LPEPRs clarify that the reportable property also includes physical goods, financial assets, virtual currency, or deemed ownership. Reporting entities must also indicate how they determined or came to know that the property in question is held, owned, or controlled by or on behalf of a listed person or entity, and must indicate how they identified the listed person or entity. Submissions of TPRs were relatively low but consistent with Canada’s TF risk profile, as in 2020-2025 there have been a total of 88. Out of this total, 47 were from the 5 D-SIBs, 20 from MSBs, 12 from other financial entities [60] , 7 from casinos and 2 from a securities dealer. The transition to LPEPRs is expected increase visibility of frozen assets going forward as the requirements have broadened. While overall volumes remain relatively modest and broadly consistent with Canada’s TF risk profile, authorities recognise the need to continue monitoring to ensure low figures do not mask under-reporting in sectors with less sophisticated screening systems. A proactive approach to discover funds, other assets or economic resources of listed subjects using systematic checks of the relevant registries would be beneficial. 776. FINTRAC identifies LPEPRs requiring urgent assessment and prioritises their review, referring them to law enforcement, intelligence agencies or foreign FIUs as appropriate. This process is intended to ensure that potential terrorist-linked assets are identified and acted upon quickly, before funds can be moved or dissipated. However, authorities do not systematically monitor the timeliness of freezing across all sectors, leaving potential for delays to occur. 777. The majority of reporting continues to originate from large banks, which reflects both their higher exposure and more advanced screening capabilities. Reporting from DNFBPs and MSBs is comparatively limited, consistent with their assessed TF exposure but also indicating areas that require continued supervisory attention. FINTRAC can issue administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for deficiencies in sanctions controls and ministerial directive implementation, signalling that supervisory responses escalate where weaknesses are identified. Table 10.1. LPEPRs Submitted by Entity Type in since March 2025 Entity Type LPEPRs Submitted D-SIBs 2 Financial Entities 24 MSB 1 Casino 4 Security Dealers 2 Total 33 Note: Data from March 2025 to October 31, 2025 Source: FINTRAC 778. FINTRAC supervises compliance through examinations testing REs’ use of controls including onboarding controls, screening tools and timeliness of identification. Larger banks demonstrate high capability, using automated screening systems. In contrast, smaller DNFBPs and some MSBs rely on manual screening, increasing the risk that new designations may not be identified immediately and that opportunities to freeze assets may be lost. FINTRAC can issue AMPs for deficiencies in sanctions controls and application of Ministerial Directives. These sanctions have reinforced expectations regarding sanctions control and have prompted remediation plans in the affected entities. Disclosures arising from STRs and LPEPRs also feed into TF investigations and have, in multiple instances, contributed to the identification of networks and individuals subsequently subject to law-enforcement action (See Core Issue 9.1 and Figure 9.2). 779. Overall, Canada’s reporting and supervisory framework provides a basis for identifying and immobilising terrorist-linked assets, although continued attention to timeliness and coverage among smaller sectors remains important. Footnotes [60] Banks (not including D-SIBs), foreign banks, foreign branches, trust and loan, caisses populaires and credit unions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 836. In recent years, authorities involved in countering PF and implementing sanctions conducted several outreach engagement sessions with the private sector, including FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs (including legal professionals). Since 2023, the Department of Finance has hosted an annual “Sanctions Symposium” to share with and learn from key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Since 2022, GAC has increased both the frequency and pace of its outreach with stakeholders, through online webinars, conferences and other multilateral engagement tools. Furthermore, GAC maintains a sanctions website with information on all sanction measures Canada has in place. In July 2025, FINTRAC published a guidance providing background information relevant to financial transactions associated with the suspected evasion of sanctions related to counter proliferation. It informs FIs, DNBFPs, VASPs and the public on the characteristics and indicators of completed or attempted financial transactions related to this activity in order to facilitate their detection, prevention, and deterrence. FINTRAC also publishes indicators, typologies, and bulletins on sanctions evasion and PF. The existence of tailored bulletins, such as the one on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion, suggests an effort to align private-sector awareness with evolving risk. Canada should continue publishing tailored bulletins, indicators and typologies for the other private sector, following a risk-based approach. 837. As a result of the outreach activity, the majority of FIs and MSBs operating as VASPs demonstrate good awareness of their obligations regarding the implementation of PF-TFS. These entities generally conduct daily screening against the UN sanctions lists to ensure compliance. Large FIs including banks deploy automated systems to facilitate on-boarding and ongoing name screening, and transaction screening to ensure compliance. It is also FINTRAC’s supervisory expectation that banks should have automated screening systems in place given their business scale and complexity. Furthermore, the financial sector as a whole appears to have a sound understanding of its responsibility to perform checks not only on its customers but also on the counterparties to any transactions and, where applicable, on intermediaries involved. In most cases, institutions have established dedicated staff or specialized units tasked with overseeing the effective implementation of TFS, thereby reinforcing internal compliance frameworks. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 838. DNFBPs’ understanding and compliance varies significantly across sectors. While most DNFBPs are aware of the existence of sanctions regimes, including the UN sanctions, some are not conscious of all their obligations. DNFBPs as a whole demonstrated a less sophisticated understanding of TFS, for example often not distinguishing between TF-related and PF-related sanctions. 839. Some DNFBPs, particularly lawyers, DPMS and real estate agents, conduct sanctions screening exclusively at the onboarding stage and do not maintain ongoing monitoring throughout the business relationship. This practice creates potential vulnerabilities, as it may result in the failure to identify designated individuals among existing clients over time. Furthermore, lawyers often rely on FIs to perform checks required for sanctions compliance. 840. In addition, certain private sector entities (e.g. DPMS) apply CDD and supplementary screening only for transactions exceeding the threshold of CAD 10 000. This approach leaves significant gaps that could be exploited for sanctions evasion, especially in high-risk scenarios. Canada would benefit from further awareness raising among such stakeholders that the CAD 10 000 mandatory reporting threshold does not apply for the implementation of PF-TFS. 841. Transactions involving virtual assets present an elevated risk of proliferation financing, given the demonstrated expertise of DPRK and Iran in using them to circumvent sanctions. This risk should be properly considered by the private sector because, in some cases (e.g. DPMS), VA transactions are allowed within the non-financial sector which tend to rely on checks performed by financial sector to detect potential PF-related sanctions evasion. 842. Certain entities, such as casinos, frequently rely on commercial databases and are not always able to distinguish clearly between UN sanctions lists and other sanctions regimes. Moreover, in some cases, only high-risk customers are subject to continuous screening. Real estate agents sometimes conduct checks against UN designated subjects using a risk-based approach, whereby the frequency of the screening activities depends on the customer’s assessed risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="142. For formal outgoing MLA and extradition, IAG provides competent authorities with: templates; step by step guidance on how to make MLA requests; trainings; and extradition templates for provisional arrest and full extradition requests. IAG has two paralegals embedded within RCMP (IAG’s largest domestic counterpart) to facilitate the process and ensure the quality of draft requests. IAG has established central contacts in several provinces, including all material provinces (Ontario, Québec and BC), who are specialized in co-ordinating MLA and extradition requests from line agencies to IAG. This helps make the system more efficient, as the provincial central contacts engage with IAG and provide advice to prosecutors and LEAs who want to submit a request to foreign authorities. In provinces and territories where there are no central contacts, IAG engages directly with the LEAs and prosecutors. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 143. Canada seeks ML/TF MLA pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties to some extent. A total of 23 MLA partners advised the CA they would consider providing MLA to Canada in the absence of an applicable treaty. Assistance is also available pursuant to court issued non-treaty letters of request. International elements of investigations for ML and for proceeds generating offences are conducted routinely. This typically commences through informal channels, with formal co-operation sought at later stages where necessary. It is a strength of Canada’s domestic rules of evidence that foreign gathered evidence may be used in trials without necessarily receiving it via MLA. This contributes to an increased reliance on informal co-operation via LEAs (see 2.3.2). 144. For non-urgent matters, IAG takes four to five months to consult with LEAs or prosecutors to finalize the request. A large majority (95%) of requests received by IAG are then transmitted to the MLA foreign counterpart. These generally meet the standard required, reflecting the usefulness of IAG’s training to LEAs and their close engagement during the drafting process. 145. Canada sought MLA to some extent, with a total of 70 ML and TF-related outgoing requests, including 6 ML and 5 TF urgent MLA requests (see Table 2.6). During the period under review, the number of outgoing ML MLA has declined. Canada explains this reduction is due to two factors: (i) reliance on other forms of international co-operation; and (ii) the possibility for LEAs to rely on domestic production orders to obtain evidence held by foreign companies with a virtual presence in Canada [23] . The number of outgoing TF MLA requests is low but consistent with Canada’s TF risk, which is largely low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial flows, as set out in the 2025 NRA. 146. The volume of executed requests is high (69%), with all outgoing urgent requests executed and a low percentage (4%) of withdrawn or abandoned requests. None were refused during the assessment period. This demonstrates the good quality of Canada’s outgoing requests for the receiving State. Their timing of execution by requested state was on average 16 months for ML MLA and 18 months for TF MLA (table 2.7). Table 2.6. Outgoing MLA requests FISCAL YEAR (FY) EXECUTED WITHDRAWN ABANDONED REFUSED ONGOING TOTAL 2019-2020 16 0 0 0 2 18 2020-2021 12 0 0 0 2 14 2021-2022 8 2 1 0 5 16 2022-2023 9 0 0 0 3 12 2023-2024 3 0 0 0 4 7 2024-2025 0 0 0 0 3 3 TOTAL 48 2 1 0 19 70 Source: Canada Table 2.7. Time to execute outgoing MLA requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 11 6 - 9 mo 5 9 mo - 1 yr 5 1 - 2 yrs 18 2-5 yrs 9 TOTAL 48 Source: Canada 147. In most cases, MLA is sought to compel the production of documentary or physical evidence, to compel witness statements or testimony, and very occasionally to seek basic corporate and beneficial ownership information. Predicate offences underlying outgoing MLA requests are, fraud (66%) and counterfeiting (23%), with only a few requests for organized crime (12%), extortion (10%) and illicit drug trafficking (8.5%). This is only partially in line with Canada’s risk profile (see IO.1). 148. Most of the outgoing ML MLA requests are addressed to the US (57%), followed by EU countries (17%), which is in line with Canada’s risk profile. TF MLA requests are mostly addressed to EU countries (50%), followed by the US (30%) and Asian countries. 149. International co-operation feedback shows Canada’s requests for MLA are largely useful and of good quality. Canada’s main counterpart highlighted that requests received are among the most well-prepared, legally sound, clear and precisely tailored to meet statutory requirements. Additional countries highlighted that the quality of requests received from Canada is good. Competent authorities are reported as highly responsive when follow-ups are needed (see Box 2.2). Box 2.2. Case of effective outgoing MLA on TF In 2020, the RCMP commenced a criminal investigation into suspected terrorist activities of a Canadian citizen. It was alleged that between 2019 and 2022, the suspect created and administered fundraising campaigns using an online crowdfunding platform, ultimately benefiting individuals alleged to be involved in TF. Between 2022 and 2023, Canada sought MLA from three countries, to obtain urgent records related to foreign criminal investigative files and criminal convictions related to the alleged terrorism financing scheme linked to the suspect in Canada. Records were sought to assist the RCMP in furthering its investigation into the TF allegations and to allow Canadian authorities to lay charges. All requests were made pursuant to bilateral MLA treaties. The suspect was charged in Canada in July 2023 for terrorism-related and TF offences. In May 2025, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The RCMP reports that the records provided pursuant to the MLA requests were critical to the success of the Canadian investigation. Source: Canada 2.2.2. Extradition 150. Canada seeks extradition from bilateral, multilateral treaty partners or from foreign states that permit extradition to Canada under their domestic legal framework even without a formal treaty, e.g. UK and other Commonwealth partners. Canadian prosecutors or correctional authorities, with the assistance of IAG, may make extradition requests for persons wanted for prosecution or for the enforcement or imposition of a sentence. 151. The IAG provided training to competent authorities about best practices in drafting a provisional arrest (PA) request or straight arrest request. IAG legal counsel and paralegals are also available for consultation during the drafting process. During the period under review, IAG received eight new outgoing extradition requests related to ML, seven made by prosecutorial authorities and one from correctional authorities. All of which were then transmitted to the foreign counterpart. No TF extradition request was received by IAG, consistent with Canada’s risk and context. 152. IAG takes approximately 53 days from the receipt of the request to review it, consult with competent authorities, and transmit it to the foreign counterpart. 153. Canada sought extradition from other countries regarding ML/TF and main predicates to some extent. During the period under review, competent authorities sent a total of eight extradition requests, mostly related to fraud (see Table 2.8). Out of the three that were urgent extradition requests (PA), two were executed, one within one day and the other in under a month (arrested on a Red Notice), while the third one was withdrawn because the person sought was not in the extradition partner’s jurisdiction. The volume and nature of underlying offences are not fully in line with the NRA and Canada’s risks. Notably, six extradition requests are related to fraud and only one relates to drug trafficking. The majority of outgoing extradition requests were executed within one year. Canada provided some case studies showing that extradition assistance was sought in an appropriate and timely manner (see Table 2.9). Table 2.8. Outgoing extradition requests FISCAL YEAR (FY) EXECUTED WITHDRAWN ABANDONED REFUSED ONGOING TOTAL 2019-2025 3 1 2 0 2 8 Source: Canada Table 2.9. Time to execute outgoing extradition requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 1 6 - 9 mo 0 9 mo - 1 yr 1 1 - 2 yrs 0 2-5 yrs 1 TOTAL 3 Source: Canada 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 154. In criminal cases, MLA partners share confiscated proceeds, or proceeds from the disposition of confiscated property, pursuant to bilateral asset sharing agreements with Canada. Under the terms of these agreements, net proceeds can be shared in compliance with domestic law and without conditions. Furthermore, during the MLA process, Canada can seek the return of property via other mechanisms such as voluntary return of property, a Canadian court order requiring property to be returned, or enforcement by the MLA partner. Canada’s CA encourages the use of MLA asset recovery through targeted outreach and training to LEAs and prosecutors, provides guidance on a regular basis to domestic authorities with respect to the drafting of requests and has a designated asset recovery and asset sharing co-ordinator. 155. Canada sought MLA to trace and recover illicit assets abroad to some extent. Informal co-operation for asset recovery does support investigating and tracing; however, provisional measures are required through the formal MLA process to freeze, seize and confiscate assets. Informal co-operation (see core issue 2.3) is insufficient to effectively achieve asset recovery outcomes. 156. Canada sought assistance from foreign counterparts for 7 freezing orders and 18 [24] requests for confiscations, across all offences, mostly related to ML offences. The IAG processed asset freezing requests in approximately two and a half months, while confiscation requests were processed in approximately four months. Canada provided a case study showing that assistance was successfully sought to freeze assets on an urgent basis and outside business hours. Most of the asset freezing requests were addressed to the US, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Confiscation requests were mostly addressed to partners other than the US. 46% of MLA asset recovery requests were executed by the requested state, while 42% remain ongoing and are largely with the requested state (see Table 2.10). On average, all the freezing orders were executed by the requested state within two months, while confiscation orders mostly within 16 months (see Table 2.11). 157. During the period under review, assets worth about CAD 11.3 million were restrained. Canada sought the confiscation of approximately CAD 10.3 million and CAD 182 000 were confiscated abroad on behalf of Canada through asset recovery MLA. [25] These amounts are low in the context of Canada’s already modest confiscation outcomes (see IO.8). Table 2.10. 2019-2025: Outgoing asset recovery MLA requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Type of MLA request Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Freezing orders 4 0 0 2 1 7 Confiscations 8 0 0 1 10 19 Total 12 0 0 3 11 26 Source: Canada Table 2.11. Time to execute outgoing asset recovery ML requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Time Freezing orders Confiscations 1 - 6 mo 1 3 6 - 9 mo 3 0 9 mo - 1 yr 0 1 1 yr - 2 yrs 0 1 2 – 5 yrs 0 3 Total 4 8 Source: Canada Footnotes [23] This possibility follows decisions of the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia and Alberta. [24] One additional request was received by the IAG but was not transmitted to the foreign counterpart during the assessment period and was instead forwarded at a later stage. [25] In the context of an MLA request CAD 7 million was returned to Canada without enforcement of confiscation order abroad." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="818. In 2017, FINTRAC issued an operational bulletin linked to the DPRK and, since then, has published products in 2022-2025 on sanctions evasion risks, vulnerabilities, and indicators linked to the financial sector and legal profession. In October 2025, Department of Finance, with the support of an interdepartmental committee, finalized the first NRA on Sanctions Evasion (SE), which includes assessment of the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF-TFS. While there is no legislated requirement for Canada to realize an NRA that includes PF, PCMLTFA allows FINTRAC to conduct strategic and tactical intelligence analysis to contribute to an understanding of sanctions evasion risk (including PF). FINTRAC, together with the Department of Finance, are the functional leads of the analysis to identify, understand, assess and mitigate risks, limited to the financial sector. When producing the NRA on SE, Canada consulted all sectors through its public-private consultation mechanisms, with some of the most exposed sectors, such as large FIs and MSBs, consulted more in depth. Over the recent years, consultations with additional categories of FIs and DNFBPs occurred on other drafts and publications, such as FINTRAC’s bulletins. The private sector (other than Canada’s largest FIs and MSBs involved in its development) has not yet received the risk assessment, and Canada would benefit from publicising a sanitised version of the report for broader consumption. 819. In Canada’s NRA on sanctions evasion, Iran represents a significantly greater source of risk relative to the DPRK (because linkages with DPRK are reported to be non-existent) based on the presence of diaspora communities, the scope of the trade and financial relationships, and the identification of immobilized property. However, with the mandatory reporting obligation Canada was able to assess that transactions directly, or indirectly, involving Iran constitute less than one percent of cross border traffic. Canada provided an extract of the 2025 Overview of Proliferation Financing and Other Sanctions Evasion Risks in Canada report, which focuses on DPRK and Iran risks. Both DPRK and Iran are countries assessed as sophisticated actors with ability to employ complex methods and networks through intermediary jurisdictions to evade sanctions, making Canada vulnerable. As a result, the ability of DPRK and Iran to evade sanctions was assessed as high. However, due to several mitigating factors, such as Canada’s very limited financial connections with these two countries, and the lack of trade in sensitive goods to jurisdictions adjacent to DPRK and Iran, and the absence of a DPRK diaspora community in Canada, the overall risk of DPRK is rated as low while the overall risk of Iran is rated as medium. 820. Canada’s risk identification process includes the review of both classified and open-source information prepared by domestic partners. The identification of risk is also informed by stakeholder engagement and collaboration with international partners. Canada assesses both the role of goods as well as the use of the financial sector to move money. CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) and Counter Proliferation Operations Section (CPOS) have developed PF and other sanction-related tactical and strategic intelligence products where indicators of sanctions-related activity were identified in goods import or export transactions. CBSA developed an intelligence product was on DPRK proliferation networks, highlighting trends and technologies of concern and the forms of tradecraft used by the DPRK to acquire Western-origin goods to build their military technologies and objectives. Between 2020 and 2025, CPOS produced approximately 37 commodity profiles, 22 intelligence briefs, 49 dashboards and 51 alerts. 821. Canada has made significant progress in developing the capability and capacity to detect and deter sanctions-evasion activities occurring through international trade. In order to strengthen Canada’s anti-sanctions capabilities, Canada amended the PCMLTFA in 2024 to enable the CBSA to identify and enforce against the cross-border movements of sanctions-based illicit financial flows concealed through legitimate international trade. Since then, for example, the BFCC has identified, through financial intelligence and trade transaction analysis, the cross-border movement of funds and goods tied to third countries’ proliferation activities in addition to laundering drug proceeds. This capability has led to new insights into how professional money launderers are exploiting international trade in goods to move illicit financial flows. 822. Canada’s risk assessment also considers Iran and DPRK's financial and trade relationships with third countries and highlights the potential for indirect exposure to PF risks and proliferation-related procurement via those countries. Furthermore, Canada recognizes the risk of financial sectors and products such as correspondent banking, money value transfer services, VASPs, but also complex corporate structures and trade through intermediate jurisdictions. Nevertheless, some non-financial sectors and associated risks were not adequately developed in the NRA, such as the risk of exploitation of lawyers, dealers in precious metals and stones, CSPs and real estate; a future iteration of the NRA would benefit from a more thorough analysis of these sectors. 823. To mitigate the identified risks, in 2017 and 2020, Canada issued Ministerial Directives (MDs) against the DPRK and Iran respectively. MDs are enforceable instruments which remove the discretion of a reporting entity to determine the level of risk associated with a particular jurisdiction. These MDs require reporting entities to apply enhanced measures for relationships with DPRK and Iran, and they were both updated in 2025. The measures required are: i) enhanced due diligence, ii) record keeping and iii) reporting obligations. In recent years, especially since 2024, Canada has invested resources and introduced a variety of additional measures to mitigate PF risks, including: clarifying the obligation to report STRs beyond PF to include where there is suspicion of sanction evasion; enhanced FINTRAC’s ability to produce intelligence and make disclosures to authorities on sanction evasion; stronger requirements for financial institutions for due diligence and ongoing monitoring of correspondent banking; BO registers; publication of GAC and FINTRAC guidelines; and financial resources for CBSA to combat trade based financial crimes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="749. Sentencing principles are set out in the Criminal Code as per CC s.718 to 718.3. Sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the degree of responsibility of the offender. However, whilst the Criminal Code establishes that TF offences may receive a sentence of “no more than 10 years” (cc 83.02, 83.03 and 83.04 – see Recommendation 5 for more information), in practice Canada has submitted that the sentencing for TF ranges from six months to six years imprisonment. This is less than other violent offences. Since the last ME, Canadian courts have emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing for terrorism offences. Terrorism offences are unusual in that courts are able to order sentences for multiple offences to be served consecutively, rather than concurrently as is the case for almost all other crimes in the Criminal Code. 750. Canada’s historical sentencing range leaves concerns about whether penalties are sufficient to deter terrorist financing activity, particularly by sophisticated or ideologically motivated facilitators. Previous ranges were R. v. Thambithurai , 2011 and R. v. Khawaja , 2012, where the sentence imposed on the TF charge were 6 months and 2 years, respectively. Within this reporting period Project Sabin (box 9.4 above) shows an increased sentencing of two six-year sentences (one for terrorism and one for TF) to be served consecutively, for a total of 12 years. This is a positive step towards sanctions reflecting the importance of TF as an enabler for terrorist attacks. Table 9.1. Penalties and Sanctions Issued for TF Convictions (2019-2025) Case TF charge Found guilty of TF Found guilty of other terrorism offence Sentence for TF Total sentence (including other offences) Case Study in Box 9.4 Yes Yes Yes 6 years 12 years Case Study in Box 9.1 Yes Yes Yes Stayed per Kienapple principle 5 years Case Study in Box 9.2 Yes No (TF count along with two other terrorism offences counts were stayed) Yes No 111 days and three year probation order with conditions Case Study in Box 9.3 Yes Pending Pending Pending Pending Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="756. Where TF prosecution is not practicable, Canada applies a broad set of disruption tools, including prosecutions for other offences, terrorism peace bonds (23), terrorism listings (34), immigration actions, regulatory measures, charitable-status revocation, PCMLTFA seizures, and operational interventions. Authorities have a good awareness of the range of disruption tools available, as well as their triggers and preconditions, and consider them as part of their case management decisions. 757. Project SEYANT (Box 9.5), which resulted in a conviction for a (non-TF) terrorist offence following a TF investigation, shows that these alternative tools can effectively disrupt TF activity even without a conviction. Such tools are particularly useful in responding to ideologically motivated violent extremist (IMVE) and low-value facilitation cases where evidentiary thresholds for a TF prosecution are difficult to meet. 758. In addition to pursuing alternate criminal charges, between 2019 and 2025, Canadian authorities have also used the following interventions to disrupt terrorist financing: · RCMP’s engagement with private sector: Established collaborative relationships with key private sector partners, including Canada’s largest banks. These partnerships serve as an important tool to strengthen the security and resilience of Canada’s financial system. Through ongoing engagement, the RCMP shares insights on emerging trends, provides education on threats, and works with the private sector together to identify and mitigate risks. · CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs): Where there are reasonable grounds to believe the security of Canada is at risk, CSIS can take measures to reduce threats, as defined under the CSIS Act. In 2024, CSIS conducted two (2) warranted and 13 non-warranted TRMs. Generally, TRMs fall into three broad categories that can include: · Messaging : Directly or indirectly pushing information to a threat actor or person impacted by the threat in an attempt to influence their behaviour or reduce the threat. · Leveraging: Disclosing information to a third party to enable them to take action, at their discretion, against the identified threat-related activities. · Interference : Directly affecting the ability of a threat actor to engage in threat-related activity. · Designations under targeted financial sanctions regimes: In 2025, Canada designated seven transnational organised crime groups as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code , as set out below in relation to IO.10. Listing strengthens Canada’s ability to prevent and disrupt terrorist activity and TF, even where these have not yet been investigated or prosecuted. · Prevention: Canada’s primary goal in countering terrorism efforts is to maintain public safety, and Canada places a strong focus on disrupting terrorist organizations and terrorist acts before they occur. To complement national security and intelligence disruption measures, an important part of Canada’s approach is preventing individuals from radicalizing to terrorism and violent extremism in the first place and supporting their deradicalization, if possible. For example, through Public Safety Canada’s Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, Canada funded 81 projects totalling CAD 85.4M to support disengagement from violent ideologies and help at-risk individuals. Box 9.5. Use of Other Criminal Charges to Disrupt Provision of Services for Benefit of a Terrorist Group (Project Seyant) The financing of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code s. 83.03(1) and 83.03(2) include providing, making available (etc) property or financial or other related services for terrorist purposes or for use by a terrorist group. In 2020, in response to information received from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) opened an investigation on individuals suspected of involvement in activities linked to the Atomwaffen Division and with ties to neo-Nazi accelerationist ideology. The Atomwaffen Division was listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code in February 2021. It has branches in countries including the US, the UK, Germany and Canada. Criminal Techniques Observed in the Case This case focuses on the role of one individual, known as Dark Foreigner, who produced propaganda material for the benefit of Atomwaffen Division. The individual participated in the creation and editing of three recruitment videos encouraging viewers to commit violent acts on behalf of Atomwaffen Division. He posted these violent acts and other violent images online as propaganda for the group. He also provided his equipment, such as his Fuji camera, drone and lenses to take images for the videos, and used his expertise as a graphic designer to produce the videos. The material was posted to various social media platforms, including those known for hate content, and received significant views and attention. The individual offered his artistic and technical expertise to further the Atomwaffen Division cause and support other extremist groups, such as the Sonnenkreig Division. He also produced graphic designs for the book “Siege 4th edition”, authored by James Mason, who is also listed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code in Canada. During its investigation, the RCMP considered the TF elements of the case in line with the Criminal Code definition, which includes the provision of financial or other related services for a terrorist group. Domestic and International Co-operation Authorities used both formal and informal co-operation mechanisms to support this case. Throughout the investigation, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) provided approximately 15 disclosures of financial intelligence to the RCMP. These disclosures led to production orders to financial institutions, which provided insights into the financial activities of the individuals under investigation. Financial intelligence and subsequent banking records also allowed investigators to place the individual in the same locations where the videos were filmed and led to search warrants that generated evidence tying the individual to the videos. CSIS shared information with the RCMP that prompted the INSET to initiate the investigation and was vital to the file. Further engagement with CSIS, which included additional intelligence disclosures under the One Vision framework, also provided crucial information to reducing the threat. The RCMP worked with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), which provided information that was significant in bolstering the case. Internationally, the RCMP used informal and formal co-operation with several European countries to demonstrate the individual’s association with international groups with similar ideology and to gather evidence. For example, Canada used a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the UK to obtain evidence. The information was first shared informally for intelligence and investigative purposes and then, through MLAT, for purposes of evidence in court proceedings. This work was facilitated by the RCMP’s liaison officer network to engage with foreign counterparts. Charges and Sentencing Following the investigation led by the INSET, the RCMP arrested and charged the individual under the Criminal Code for: · Section 83.18: Participation in activity of terrorist group · Section 83.19: Facilitating terrorist activity · Section 83.2: Commission of offence for terrorist group (wilful promotion of hatred (319(2)) This was the first time both terrorism and hate propaganda charges have been brought forward in Canada against someone accused of promoting violent far-right ideology. While the RCMP did pursue the TF element during its investigation, ultimately the disruption of TF activity was achieved through the arrest of the individual and the charges above. On September 8, 2025, in the Ontario Superior Court, the individual was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for the following criminal Code offences: · Section 83.18: Participation in activity of terrorist group – 4 years, consecutive to all other sentences · Section 83.19: Facilitating terrorist activity – 4 years · Section 83.2 Commission of offence for terrorist group (wilful promotion of hatred (319(2)– 2 years Disruption of TF The arrest of the individual and the laying of other Criminal Code and terrorism charges stopped the individual’s provision of services to the Atomwaffen Division. It prevented the production and spread of hate propaganda for the benefit of a listed terrorist entity, thereby disrupting the listed terrorist entity’s ability to recruit, propagate their message and obtain contributions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="772. Canada’s detection and freezing obligations are supported by strong reporting requirements, specifically: · Suspicious transactions reporting requirements when there are reasonable grounds to suspect TF is occurring; and · Property reporting requirements that apply to the frozen assets of all relevant listed entities (UNSCRs 1267 and 1373); · Listed Person or Entity Property Report (LPEPR) reporting to FINTRAC; and · Reporting to the RCMP or CSIS under the UN Act 773. REs submit LPEPRs to FINTRAC when designated property is identified, including indirect holdings, and report these to the RCMP or CSIS under the UN Act. Further, REs must also submit an STRs to FINTRAC on related transactions when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that TF or sanctions evasion is occurring or being attempted. All persons in Canada and all Canadians outside of Canada must disclose to RCMP or CSIS when designated property is identified or in their possession or control that is believed to be owned, held, or controlled by a listed person, including indirect holdings. These mechanisms provide competent authorities with visibility over designated assets and transactions and form the primary trigger for freezing and investigative follow-up when listed property is detected. 774. These reporting requirements exist in addition to financial information identified during the course of a TF investigation (see IO.9) and provide competent authorities with comprehensive financial information related to the financing of terrorist activity and frozen funds and other assets of listed persons. Together, these reporting streams provide authorities with visibility over designated assets and transactions and form the primary trigger for freezing and investigative follow-up when listed property is detected. 775. Listed Person or Entity Property Reports (LPEPRs) were introduced in March 2025 as the main mechanism for reporting on frozen assets by reporting entities. These replace and expand on the previous Terrorist Property Reports (TPRs) and apply across additional listings regimes. LPEPRs clarify that the reportable property also includes physical goods, financial assets, virtual currency, or deemed ownership. Reporting entities must also indicate how they determined or came to know that the property in question is held, owned, or controlled by or on behalf of a listed person or entity, and must indicate how they identified the listed person or entity. Submissions of TPRs were relatively low but consistent with Canada’s TF risk profile, as in 2020-2025 there have been a total of 88. Out of this total, 47 were from the 5 D-SIBs, 20 from MSBs, 12 from other financial entities [60] , 7 from casinos and 2 from a securities dealer. The transition to LPEPRs is expected increase visibility of frozen assets going forward as the requirements have broadened. While overall volumes remain relatively modest and broadly consistent with Canada’s TF risk profile, authorities recognise the need to continue monitoring to ensure low figures do not mask under-reporting in sectors with less sophisticated screening systems. A proactive approach to discover funds, other assets or economic resources of listed subjects using systematic checks of the relevant registries would be beneficial. 776. FINTRAC identifies LPEPRs requiring urgent assessment and prioritises their review, referring them to law enforcement, intelligence agencies or foreign FIUs as appropriate. This process is intended to ensure that potential terrorist-linked assets are identified and acted upon quickly, before funds can be moved or dissipated. However, authorities do not systematically monitor the timeliness of freezing across all sectors, leaving potential for delays to occur. 777. The majority of reporting continues to originate from large banks, which reflects both their higher exposure and more advanced screening capabilities. Reporting from DNFBPs and MSBs is comparatively limited, consistent with their assessed TF exposure but also indicating areas that require continued supervisory attention. FINTRAC can issue administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for deficiencies in sanctions controls and ministerial directive implementation, signalling that supervisory responses escalate where weaknesses are identified. Table 10.1. LPEPRs Submitted by Entity Type in since March 2025 Entity Type LPEPRs Submitted D-SIBs 2 Financial Entities 24 MSB 1 Casino 4 Security Dealers 2 Total 33 Note: Data from March 2025 to October 31, 2025 Source: FINTRAC 778. FINTRAC supervises compliance through examinations testing REs’ use of controls including onboarding controls, screening tools and timeliness of identification. Larger banks demonstrate high capability, using automated screening systems. In contrast, smaller DNFBPs and some MSBs rely on manual screening, increasing the risk that new designations may not be identified immediately and that opportunities to freeze assets may be lost. FINTRAC can issue AMPs for deficiencies in sanctions controls and application of Ministerial Directives. These sanctions have reinforced expectations regarding sanctions control and have prompted remediation plans in the affected entities. Disclosures arising from STRs and LPEPRs also feed into TF investigations and have, in multiple instances, contributed to the identification of networks and individuals subsequently subject to law-enforcement action (See Core Issue 9.1 and Figure 9.2). 779. Overall, Canada’s reporting and supervisory framework provides a basis for identifying and immobilising terrorist-linked assets, although continued attention to timeliness and coverage among smaller sectors remains important. Footnotes [60] Banks (not including D-SIBs), foreign banks, foreign branches, trust and loan, caisses populaires and credit unions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="423. Competent authorities’ timely access to information on legal arrangements is more complicated than that on legal persons. While they can access this information from trustees, FIs/DNFBPs and FINTRAC disclosures and corporate / landowner transparency registries, the information provided by Canada primarily related to accessing this information via tax authorities. Trustees of most express trusts are required to file BO data as part of tax returns with CRA and Revenu Québec. Figures provided indicate that there have been good levels of compliance with these requirements. Verification of data is undertaken on a risk-sensitive basis. While thousands of trusts are audited on this basis by CRA, specific criteria used for risk assessments tied to inaccuracies of BO information could not be separated from overall taxation adjustments. The information may not always be up to date due to its being filed as part of annual returns, with limited options for filers for updating. Tax authorities can use other available information tools and registries to access up-to-date information. Revenu Québec conducts verification of the information provided based on a number of criteria, including income, its nature and source, and distributions made. Various sources allow for this validation, including information in the Revenu Québec systems, REQ information, property tax roll information and other real estate websites, and CRA information. 424. Canadian tax authorities can disclose trust BO data from tax return filings, as well as any updated information from the tax return filings of the specific reportable entities, to LEAs pursuant to judicial authorizations to support law enforcement investigations or disruption activities in relation to designated offences and associated money laundering / proceeds of crime activity, where the judge is satisfied that certain conditions are met. BO data can also be provided to LEAs by CRA or Revenu Québec proactively where there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (i) the information will afford evidence of specified serious offences, including money laundering (at the federal level), or (ii) a person has committed or is about to commit a criminal offence under Québec tax legislation and the information is necessary for the investigation relating to that offence (in Québec). Revenu Québec has received twenty production orders from LEAs since the new requirements applied, but there were no similar statistics for CRA to determine frequency and timeliness of access in practice. Authorities reported information is generally timely and provided case studies where the RCMP and the Sûreté du Québec accessed taxpayer information, including trust BO information, in a timely manner to support successful criminal investigations. However, outside of those LEAs timely access is more uneven and could be improved, as outlined under IO7. 425. FINTRAC receives legal arrangements’ BO data from CRA through the VIR mechanism (see IO.6), as this data is not available in either the CRA charities database or the federal BO and corporate registries, as outlined under IO6, responses to VIRs in non-urgent cases may not be timely. FINTRAC also receives BO data when included in STRs from REs that must obtain BO information as part of their CDD. Provincial civil forfeiture authorities can generally only access CRA data via referrals from LEAs and cannot receive proactive disclosures from CRA. In Québec, the civil forfeiture authority is authorized to access provincial taxpayer information from Revenu Québec through the Attorney General, for certain purposes related to the administration of Québec’s civil forfeiture statute, but subject to an information-sharing agreement which has not yet been concluded. Discussions are currently underway between the Québec Attorney General and Revenu Québec to conclude an information sharing agreement, which is required before such disclosure can occur. However, outside of those LEAs timely access is more uneven and could be improved, as outlined under IO7. 426. As with legal persons, competent authorities can access information on legal arrangements from four main sources – (1) trustees and fiduciaries, (2) revenue authorities holding BO data as part of tax returns (3) REs who have obtained the information as part of their CDD and FINTRAC when such information has been provided in STRs; and (4) corporate / landowner transparency registries. Trustees and fiduciaries 427. Information held by trustees or equivalents can be obtained by LEAs via production orders and search warrants under the Criminal Code. Data was not available on how many requests LEAs made to access information held by trustees/equivalents over the review period but Canada has provided case studies where LEAs obtained such information from trustees in practice The obligations to file BO data (outlined below under revenue authorities’ data) creates a legislative requirement for trustees to obtain and record this information. 428. Canada views trustees’ fiduciary obligations as highly relevant in this regard also, in that it is necessary for a trustee to know the identity of the beneficial owners in order to properly fulfil the terms of the trust and their fiduciary obligations as a trustee, including their duty to account. Revenue authorities 429. The tax system was chosen as the mechanism for creating BO filing obligations on trusts due to the links between tax offences and misuse of trusts, as well as the federal/provincial organisation of taxation in Canada. CRA administers and collects all federal taxes. It also administers and collects all provincial and territorial personal income taxes and trust income taxes for all provinces and territories with the exception of Québec, where these are administered and collected by Revenu Québec. 430. The obligation on trustees is to file BO data as part of annual trust tax returns and to ensure that the information provided be adequate and accurate. Information to be filed is on ‘reportable entities’ of a trust, which aligns with the FATF definition of the beneficial owners of a trust. The obligations apply to trusts which are factually or deemed resident in Canada, either because the trust is centrally managed or controlled in Canada or because there is a resident contributor or resident beneficiary under subsection 94(1) of the federal Income Tax Act. BO information must be filed even if the trust has no income tax payable. Foreign trusts are subject to the obligations where there is a sufficient link with Canada, such as if it has tax payable. In addition, the CRA receives basic and BO information on certain non-resident trusts through foreign reporting forms. Some of these trusts, but not all, are deemed resident under subsection 94(3 of the federal ITA) and therefore are required to file T3 returns with trust BO information. The same obligations exist under Québec tax legislation (ss. 593 and 595 of the Québec Taxation Act). 431. Verification efforts are undertaken in relation to the data filed by both CRA and Revenu Québec. Both do so using a risk-based approach. CRA’s audit process involves both individual taxpayers and ‘Economic Entities’, the process for which has been in place for over ten years, and which may include indicators of entities which have no filing history with CRA. Linkages are made using various information sources, including but not limited to BO filings. CRA has implemented a specific audit program for trusts’ tax returns which has audited thousands of returns and identified errors in some filings. While these audits are focused on tax compliance, they consider accuracy of BO data as a matter of course. Transaction data which is required to be filed in relation to foreign trusts can also be used to identify non-resident trusts that are deemed resident under the federal Income Tax Act. 432. CRA’s access to CC’s ISC register provides another tool for cross-referencing and verification. Revenu Québec may also request access to non-public data held by REQ (the Québec Enterprise Register). Monthly bulk data exchanges are carried out between Revenu Québec and the Québec Enterprise Register; requests are also made during file verification or selection processes. CRA and Revenu Québec have an Information Exchange Agreement which allows them to also exchange income tax information. CRA’s Criminal Investigation Division regularly accesses Corporation Canada’s registry as part of its investigative activities, including those at workload stage (whether they proceed to full scale or not). This is a standard tool used in every investigation. 433. Trustees may submit an adjustment request if they identify that inaccurate information has been filed. However, as the data is provided as part of annual tax returns, it may not always be up to date if there is a change in beneficial ownership. There is no requirement to update the information held by CRA or Revenu Québec upon a change in BO outside of the annual trust tax filing cycle other than in certain specific circumstances. CRA allows information on reportable entities to a trust to be updated at any time. 434. There is also no obligation on trustees to file information on the BO of parties to trusts which are themselves legal persons or arrangements. This information can be obtained by CRA/Revenu Québec via corporations’ and trusts’ own tax returns, securities filings such as insider reporting (where applicable) or corporate/landowner transparency BO data, where this is filed. 435. As with other jurisdictions where trusts may not previously have had any other requirement to register with government, it is difficult to determine what proportion of total relevant trusts in existence are in compliance with the obligations. However, figures provided by Canada demonstrate an increase by over one third in the total number of trusts filing information each year since the introduction of the enhanced trust filing obligations. They also demonstrate high rates of BO data filing from trusts already known to CRA, indicating a high degree of compliance with the new obligations. 436. CRA and Revenu Québec have immediate and direct access to the BO data on trusts which they hold. This is relevant to their investigative roles in relation to tax offences, as those are the offences in which misuse of trusts has been mostly seen. 437. Due to its status as taxpayer information and consequent restrictions on its sharing, access is more restricted than to data held by government registers on legal persons. At the federal level, the Income Tax Act and the Excise Tax Act both permit CRA to share information with LEAs where they have reasonable grounds to believe it will afford evidence of specified serious offences, including ML. Under Section 462.48 of the Criminal Code, tax records may be disclosed under a judicial order for investigations into designated offences. This has occurred in the context of joint forces operations (JFO) between the CRA and law enforcement. 438. Taxpayer data is generally provided to LEAs in 30 days or less as this is the standard timeline in judicial authorisations. Access can be provided in less time when a request is urgent. CRA’s liaison officers with LEAs provide a mechanism for notifying urgency and prioritising requests accordingly. The use of JFOs and the practice of embedding CRA officers within RCMP-led integrated teams (such as the Integrated Money Laundering Investigation Teams (IMLITs) accelerates the ability for CRA to disclose time-sensitive information to law enforcement counterparts within a ‘taskforce’ structure. 439. In Québec the Tax Administration Act contains similar provisions allowing Revenu Québec to share tax information with LEAs upon a judicial order if the judge is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe that the information may serve to prevent or repress a serious offence, among other circumstances. The utility of the various registers is acknowledged by Canada as an improvement on previously having to trace ownership through multiple layers or rely on third parties. Over the review period, 20 requests were received by Revenu Québec. 440. The competent authorities which have less timely access to BO data on trusts are provincial civil forfeiture authorities. Currently the mechanisms for their access to CRA information are via referrals from LEAs, i.e. where LEAs already have BO data held by tax authorities, gathered during their criminal investigations, they are able to provide it to civil forfeiture authorities. However, this is not an optimal situation for timely access. In Québec, the civil forfeiture authority is authorized to access provincial taxpayer information from Revenu Québec through the Attorney General. Discussions are currently underway between the Québec Attorney General and Revenu Québec to conclude an information sharing agreement, which is required before such disclosure can occur. 441. It is relevant, however, that authorities have not seen trusts misused in many cases of ML/TF. Where they have been misused it has mainly been for the purpose of tax avoidance and, to a lesser extent, tax evasion or other tax offences. CRA makes use of a wide range of tools to analyse the data to which it has access in order to identify connections and chains of ownership. If elements of tax evasion or fraud are identified, the file is considered for referral to criminal investigation, CRA criminal investigations include a mandatory assessment of potential ML charges and asset recovery opportunities at the commencement of, and throughout, all investigations. 442. The data filed with CRA and Revenu Québec includes the residence and tax identification number of trustees or equivalents and all other reportable entities to a trust (e.g. settlors, beneficiaries and control persons such as protectors) and so this is among data which may be obtained by LEAs. Reporting entities and FINTRAC 443. Information on assets held or managed by FIs and DNFBPS on behalf of legal arrangements, as well as names of beneficiaries, settlors, and trustee, may be obtained by LEAs via production orders or from tax authorities, if held by them, via Section 462.48 of the Criminal Code or Section 69.0.0.12 of the Québec Tax Administration Act. REs are likewise required to obtain and verify BO information when the client is a legal arrangement, such as a trust. Competent authorities can also access information on trusts and other legal arrangements where this is part of FINTRAC disclosures, as FINTRAC’s analysis of corporate registry data and the beneficial ownership information contained in STRs enables the detection of anomalies in ownership and control. 444. Competent authorities can access basic information on other service providers to trusts and legal arrangements either via production orders, if the information is held by trustees or via requests for taxpayer information, if it is among the data filed with tax authorities. The data regarding the number of requests over the review period is not available. Corporate and landowner transparency registries 445. Canadian competent authorities can also access adequate, accurate and up-to-date trust BO information through corporate and landowner transparency registries. LEAs frequently leverage the trust BO information included in Québec’s corporate BO transparency register, which covers trusts operating a commercial enterprise, to support successful criminal investigations, as illustrated by the case study in Box 5.2. Additionally, where a trust is an ISC to a corporation subject to corporate BO transparency requirements at the federal level or in Québec, competent authorities can access information on the trust through the corporation’s disclosures to the federal and Québec corporate BO registers. Box 5.2. Case study of timely access In a recent case study, investigators were able to obtain information regarding the trust by conducting a query on the online Registre des Entreprises du Québec. The results were instant and investigators received a copy of the trust constitution from the CRA. in a 241(9.5) Income Tax Act disclosure) trust disclosure forms were also provided by the different banks in response to production orders. Finally, official copies of the constitution of the trust were obtained during the execution of the search warrants at the beneficiaries and fiduciaries residences. This documentation obtained at the different stages of the investigation allowed investigator to obtain restraint orders of the trusts assets to prevent liquidation, pending charges. Source: RCMP" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="423. Competent authorities’ timely access to information on legal arrangements is more complicated than that on legal persons. While they can access this information from trustees, FIs/DNFBPs and FINTRAC disclosures and corporate / landowner transparency registries, the information provided by Canada primarily related to accessing this information via tax authorities. Trustees of most express trusts are required to file BO data as part of tax returns with CRA and Revenu Québec. Figures provided indicate that there have been good levels of compliance with these requirements. Verification of data is undertaken on a risk-sensitive basis. While thousands of trusts are audited on this basis by CRA, specific criteria used for risk assessments tied to inaccuracies of BO information could not be separated from overall taxation adjustments. The information may not always be up to date due to its being filed as part of annual returns, with limited options for filers for updating. Tax authorities can use other available information tools and registries to access up-to-date information. Revenu Québec conducts verification of the information provided based on a number of criteria, including income, its nature and source, and distributions made. Various sources allow for this validation, including information in the Revenu Québec systems, REQ information, property tax roll information and other real estate websites, and CRA information. 424. Canadian tax authorities can disclose trust BO data from tax return filings, as well as any updated information from the tax return filings of the specific reportable entities, to LEAs pursuant to judicial authorizations to support law enforcement investigations or disruption activities in relation to designated offences and associated money laundering / proceeds of crime activity, where the judge is satisfied that certain conditions are met. BO data can also be provided to LEAs by CRA or Revenu Québec proactively where there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (i) the information will afford evidence of specified serious offences, including money laundering (at the federal level), or (ii) a person has committed or is about to commit a criminal offence under Québec tax legislation and the information is necessary for the investigation relating to that offence (in Québec). Revenu Québec has received twenty production orders from LEAs since the new requirements applied, but there were no similar statistics for CRA to determine frequency and timeliness of access in practice. Authorities reported information is generally timely and provided case studies where the RCMP and the Sûreté du Québec accessed taxpayer information, including trust BO information, in a timely manner to support successful criminal investigations. However, outside of those LEAs timely access is more uneven and could be improved, as outlined under IO7. 425. FINTRAC receives legal arrangements’ BO data from CRA through the VIR mechanism (see IO.6), as this data is not available in either the CRA charities database or the federal BO and corporate registries, as outlined under IO6, responses to VIRs in non-urgent cases may not be timely. FINTRAC also receives BO data when included in STRs from REs that must obtain BO information as part of their CDD. Provincial civil forfeiture authorities can generally only access CRA data via referrals from LEAs and cannot receive proactive disclosures from CRA. In Québec, the civil forfeiture authority is authorized to access provincial taxpayer information from Revenu Québec through the Attorney General, for certain purposes related to the administration of Québec’s civil forfeiture statute, but subject to an information-sharing agreement which has not yet been concluded. Discussions are currently underway between the Québec Attorney General and Revenu Québec to conclude an information sharing agreement, which is required before such disclosure can occur. However, outside of those LEAs timely access is more uneven and could be improved, as outlined under IO7. 426. As with legal persons, competent authorities can access information on legal arrangements from four main sources – (1) trustees and fiduciaries, (2) revenue authorities holding BO data as part of tax returns (3) REs who have obtained the information as part of their CDD and FINTRAC when such information has been provided in STRs; and (4) corporate / landowner transparency registries. Trustees and fiduciaries 427. Information held by trustees or equivalents can be obtained by LEAs via production orders and search warrants under the Criminal Code. Data was not available on how many requests LEAs made to access information held by trustees/equivalents over the review period but Canada has provided case studies where LEAs obtained such information from trustees in practice The obligations to file BO data (outlined below under revenue authorities’ data) creates a legislative requirement for trustees to obtain and record this information. 428. Canada views trustees’ fiduciary obligations as highly relevant in this regard also, in that it is necessary for a trustee to know the identity of the beneficial owners in order to properly fulfil the terms of the trust and their fiduciary obligations as a trustee, including their duty to account. Revenue authorities 429. The tax system was chosen as the mechanism for creating BO filing obligations on trusts due to the links between tax offences and misuse of trusts, as well as the federal/provincial organisation of taxation in Canada. CRA administers and collects all federal taxes. It also administers and collects all provincial and territorial personal income taxes and trust income taxes for all provinces and territories with the exception of Québec, where these are administered and collected by Revenu Québec. 430. The obligation on trustees is to file BO data as part of annual trust tax returns and to ensure that the information provided be adequate and accurate. Information to be filed is on ‘reportable entities’ of a trust, which aligns with the FATF definition of the beneficial owners of a trust. The obligations apply to trusts which are factually or deemed resident in Canada, either because the trust is centrally managed or controlled in Canada or because there is a resident contributor or resident beneficiary under subsection 94(1) of the federal Income Tax Act. BO information must be filed even if the trust has no income tax payable. Foreign trusts are subject to the obligations where there is a sufficient link with Canada, such as if it has tax payable. In addition, the CRA receives basic and BO information on certain non-resident trusts through foreign reporting forms. Some of these trusts, but not all, are deemed resident under subsection 94(3 of the federal ITA) and therefore are required to file T3 returns with trust BO information. The same obligations exist under Québec tax legislation (ss. 593 and 595 of the Québec Taxation Act). 431. Verification efforts are undertaken in relation to the data filed by both CRA and Revenu Québec. Both do so using a risk-based approach. CRA’s audit process involves both individual taxpayers and ‘Economic Entities’, the process for which has been in place for over ten years, and which may include indicators of entities which have no filing history with CRA. Linkages are made using various information sources, including but not limited to BO filings. CRA has implemented a specific audit program for trusts’ tax returns which has audited thousands of returns and identified errors in some filings. While these audits are focused on tax compliance, they consider accuracy of BO data as a matter of course. Transaction data which is required to be filed in relation to foreign trusts can also be used to identify non-resident trusts that are deemed resident under the federal Income Tax Act. 432. CRA’s access to CC’s ISC register provides another tool for cross-referencing and verification. Revenu Québec may also request access to non-public data held by REQ (the Québec Enterprise Register). Monthly bulk data exchanges are carried out between Revenu Québec and the Québec Enterprise Register; requests are also made during file verification or selection processes. CRA and Revenu Québec have an Information Exchange Agreement which allows them to also exchange income tax information. CRA’s Criminal Investigation Division regularly accesses Corporation Canada’s registry as part of its investigative activities, including those at workload stage (whether they proceed to full scale or not). This is a standard tool used in every investigation. 433. Trustees may submit an adjustment request if they identify that inaccurate information has been filed. However, as the data is provided as part of annual tax returns, it may not always be up to date if there is a change in beneficial ownership. There is no requirement to update the information held by CRA or Revenu Québec upon a change in BO outside of the annual trust tax filing cycle other than in certain specific circumstances. CRA allows information on reportable entities to a trust to be updated at any time. 434. There is also no obligation on trustees to file information on the BO of parties to trusts which are themselves legal persons or arrangements. This information can be obtained by CRA/Revenu Québec via corporations’ and trusts’ own tax returns, securities filings such as insider reporting (where applicable) or corporate/landowner transparency BO data, where this is filed. 435. As with other jurisdictions where trusts may not previously have had any other requirement to register with government, it is difficult to determine what proportion of total relevant trusts in existence are in compliance with the obligations. However, figures provided by Canada demonstrate an increase by over one third in the total number of trusts filing information each year since the introduction of the enhanced trust filing obligations. They also demonstrate high rates of BO data filing from trusts already known to CRA, indicating a high degree of compliance with the new obligations. 436. CRA and Revenu Québec have immediate and direct access to the BO data on trusts which they hold. This is relevant to their investigative roles in relation to tax offences, as those are the offences in which misuse of trusts has been mostly seen. 437. Due to its status as taxpayer information and consequent restrictions on its sharing, access is more restricted than to data held by government registers on legal persons. At the federal level, the Income Tax Act and the Excise Tax Act both permit CRA to share information with LEAs where they have reasonable grounds to believe it will afford evidence of specified serious offences, including ML. Under Section 462.48 of the Criminal Code, tax records may be disclosed under a judicial order for investigations into designated offences. This has occurred in the context of joint forces operations (JFO) between the CRA and law enforcement. 438. Taxpayer data is generally provided to LEAs in 30 days or less as this is the standard timeline in judicial authorisations. Access can be provided in less time when a request is urgent. CRA’s liaison officers with LEAs provide a mechanism for notifying urgency and prioritising requests accordingly. The use of JFOs and the practice of embedding CRA officers within RCMP-led integrated teams (such as the Integrated Money Laundering Investigation Teams (IMLITs) accelerates the ability for CRA to disclose time-sensitive information to law enforcement counterparts within a ‘taskforce’ structure. 439. In Québec the Tax Administration Act contains similar provisions allowing Revenu Québec to share tax information with LEAs upon a judicial order if the judge is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe that the information may serve to prevent or repress a serious offence, among other circumstances. The utility of the various registers is acknowledged by Canada as an improvement on previously having to trace ownership through multiple layers or rely on third parties. Over the review period, 20 requests were received by Revenu Québec. 440. The competent authorities which have less timely access to BO data on trusts are provincial civil forfeiture authorities. Currently the mechanisms for their access to CRA information are via referrals from LEAs, i.e. where LEAs already have BO data held by tax authorities, gathered during their criminal investigations, they are able to provide it to civil forfeiture authorities. However, this is not an optimal situation for timely access. In Québec, the civil forfeiture authority is authorized to access provincial taxpayer information from Revenu Québec through the Attorney General. Discussions are currently underway between the Québec Attorney General and Revenu Québec to conclude an information sharing agreement, which is required before such disclosure can occur. 441. It is relevant, however, that authorities have not seen trusts misused in many cases of ML/TF. Where they have been misused it has mainly been for the purpose of tax avoidance and, to a lesser extent, tax evasion or other tax offences. CRA makes use of a wide range of tools to analyse the data to which it has access in order to identify connections and chains of ownership. If elements of tax evasion or fraud are identified, the file is considered for referral to criminal investigation, CRA criminal investigations include a mandatory assessment of potential ML charges and asset recovery opportunities at the commencement of, and throughout, all investigations. 442. The data filed with CRA and Revenu Québec includes the residence and tax identification number of trustees or equivalents and all other reportable entities to a trust (e.g. settlors, beneficiaries and control persons such as protectors) and so this is among data which may be obtained by LEAs. Reporting entities and FINTRAC 443. Information on assets held or managed by FIs and DNFBPS on behalf of legal arrangements, as well as names of beneficiaries, settlors, and trustee, may be obtained by LEAs via production orders or from tax authorities, if held by them, via Section 462.48 of the Criminal Code or Section 69.0.0.12 of the Québec Tax Administration Act. REs are likewise required to obtain and verify BO information when the client is a legal arrangement, such as a trust. Competent authorities can also access information on trusts and other legal arrangements where this is part of FINTRAC disclosures, as FINTRAC’s analysis of corporate registry data and the beneficial ownership information contained in STRs enables the detection of anomalies in ownership and control. 444. Competent authorities can access basic information on other service providers to trusts and legal arrangements either via production orders, if the information is held by trustees or via requests for taxpayer information, if it is among the data filed with tax authorities. The data regarding the number of requests over the review period is not available. Corporate and landowner transparency registries 445. Canadian competent authorities can also access adequate, accurate and up-to-date trust BO information through corporate and landowner transparency registries. LEAs frequently leverage the trust BO information included in Québec’s corporate BO transparency register, which covers trusts operating a commercial enterprise, to support successful criminal investigations, as illustrated by the case study in Box 5.2. Additionally, where a trust is an ISC to a corporation subject to corporate BO transparency requirements at the federal level or in Québec, competent authorities can access information on the trust through the corporation’s disclosures to the federal and Québec corporate BO registers. Box 5.2. Case study of timely access In a recent case study, investigators were able to obtain information regarding the trust by conducting a query on the online Registre des Entreprises du Québec. The results were instant and investigators received a copy of the trust constitution from the CRA. in a 241(9.5) Income Tax Act disclosure) trust disclosure forms were also provided by the different banks in response to production orders. Finally, official copies of the constitution of the trust were obtained during the execution of the search warrants at the beneficiaries and fiduciaries residences. This documentation obtained at the different stages of the investigation allowed investigator to obtain restraint orders of the trusts assets to prevent liquidation, pending charges. Source: RCMP" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 836. In recent years, authorities involved in countering PF and implementing sanctions conducted several outreach engagement sessions with the private sector, including FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs (including legal professionals). Since 2023, the Department of Finance has hosted an annual “Sanctions Symposium” to share with and learn from key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Since 2022, GAC has increased both the frequency and pace of its outreach with stakeholders, through online webinars, conferences and other multilateral engagement tools. Furthermore, GAC maintains a sanctions website with information on all sanction measures Canada has in place. In July 2025, FINTRAC published a guidance providing background information relevant to financial transactions associated with the suspected evasion of sanctions related to counter proliferation. It informs FIs, DNBFPs, VASPs and the public on the characteristics and indicators of completed or attempted financial transactions related to this activity in order to facilitate their detection, prevention, and deterrence. FINTRAC also publishes indicators, typologies, and bulletins on sanctions evasion and PF. The existence of tailored bulletins, such as the one on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion, suggests an effort to align private-sector awareness with evolving risk. Canada should continue publishing tailored bulletins, indicators and typologies for the other private sector, following a risk-based approach. 837. As a result of the outreach activity, the majority of FIs and MSBs operating as VASPs demonstrate good awareness of their obligations regarding the implementation of PF-TFS. These entities generally conduct daily screening against the UN sanctions lists to ensure compliance. Large FIs including banks deploy automated systems to facilitate on-boarding and ongoing name screening, and transaction screening to ensure compliance. It is also FINTRAC’s supervisory expectation that banks should have automated screening systems in place given their business scale and complexity. Furthermore, the financial sector as a whole appears to have a sound understanding of its responsibility to perform checks not only on its customers but also on the counterparties to any transactions and, where applicable, on intermediaries involved. In most cases, institutions have established dedicated staff or specialized units tasked with overseeing the effective implementation of TFS, thereby reinforcing internal compliance frameworks. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 838. DNFBPs’ understanding and compliance varies significantly across sectors. While most DNFBPs are aware of the existence of sanctions regimes, including the UN sanctions, some are not conscious of all their obligations. DNFBPs as a whole demonstrated a less sophisticated understanding of TFS, for example often not distinguishing between TF-related and PF-related sanctions. 839. Some DNFBPs, particularly lawyers, DPMS and real estate agents, conduct sanctions screening exclusively at the onboarding stage and do not maintain ongoing monitoring throughout the business relationship. This practice creates potential vulnerabilities, as it may result in the failure to identify designated individuals among existing clients over time. Furthermore, lawyers often rely on FIs to perform checks required for sanctions compliance. 840. In addition, certain private sector entities (e.g. DPMS) apply CDD and supplementary screening only for transactions exceeding the threshold of CAD 10 000. This approach leaves significant gaps that could be exploited for sanctions evasion, especially in high-risk scenarios. Canada would benefit from further awareness raising among such stakeholders that the CAD 10 000 mandatory reporting threshold does not apply for the implementation of PF-TFS. 841. Transactions involving virtual assets present an elevated risk of proliferation financing, given the demonstrated expertise of DPRK and Iran in using them to circumvent sanctions. This risk should be properly considered by the private sector because, in some cases (e.g. DPMS), VA transactions are allowed within the non-financial sector which tend to rely on checks performed by financial sector to detect potential PF-related sanctions evasion. 842. Certain entities, such as casinos, frequently rely on commercial databases and are not always able to distinguish clearly between UN sanctions lists and other sanctions regimes. Moreover, in some cases, only high-risk customers are subject to continuous screening. Real estate agents sometimes conduct checks against UN designated subjects using a risk-based approach, whereby the frequency of the screening activities depends on the customer’s assessed risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers ) 300. FINTRAC has a good understanding of DNFBPs’ sectoral risks. Under the national risk assessment in 2025, Casinos, DPMS, Real Estate and Lawyers are assessed as highly inherently vulnerable, reflecting the risk and context of Canada. 301. FINTRAC’s sectoral risk understanding is grounded in Canada’s National Risk Assessment (NRA). This foundation is enhanced through ongoing refinement of FINTRAC’s risk assessment methodology, which uses both quantitative and qualitative inputs, including the integration of strategic research and intelligence, publicly available information, and transactional data analysis. The transition from a regional structure to a sector-specific supervision model has deeply and thoroughly enhanced FINTRAC’s understanding of each sector. 302. To deepen its understanding of sectoral risks, FINTRAC engages regularly with industry associations, domestic and international regulators, and other regime partners. For newly regulated sectors and others with evolving risk dynamics, FINTRAC works closely with the Department of Finance Canada and other regime partners to build a comprehensive risk profile. 303. FINTRAC uses a variety of tools to maintain an up-to-date understanding of ML/TF risks of DNFBPs. This includes operational and strategic intelligence information from FINTRAC’s FIU side, analysis of transaction reporting data, information provided by provincial regulators and/or business associations, public data, past compliance assessments, and the Supervision Risk Model (SRM). FINTRAC uses the SRM which comprises 11 indicators, based on reports received from the entity concerned, to assign a risk score across a spectrum of Very High, High, Medium, or Low Risk for entities with sufficient transaction reporting data (i.e., entities that submitted STR or monetary threshold reports in the past three years). Given casinos‘ high volume of STR and transaction reporting, the SRM is able to differentiate and assign risk scores to all 19 entities in the casino sector. Since 2024-25, this risk understanding of casinos has been further complemented with the use of risk questionnaire assessments and regular monitoring meetings. 304. However, FINTRAC’s understanding of individual entities' risks needs significant enhancement. For DNFBPs where insufficient transaction reporting data exists to support the SRM’s application of all 11 indicators, these entities are categorized as “non-reporters” under FINTRAC’s SRM development methodology, which many DNFBPs apart from casinos fall into. Among these non-reporters, a limited number of entities are assessed as “potentially high risk”, based on available model indicators (third-party STR references, geographic exposure to human trafficking risk, and exposure to jurisdictions on FATF lists). The other entities (96.4%) remain categorised as “no-flag”, and no entity level risk assessment is performed on them. Hence, it cannot be considered that their risks have adequately been assessed. 305. For example, only 210 out of 7 742 (6%) of all reporting entities in the real estate sector have sufficient transaction reporting data to be assigned a risk score under the SRM, and of these, 176 are scored as low risk, although the real estate sector is assessed as highly inherently vulnerable in NRA. 15 entities are flagged as “potentially high risk”, and more than 97% (7 500) remain “no-flag”. Similarly, out of approximately 3 000 DPMS identified by FINTRAC, only 62 have sufficient transaction reporting data to be assigned a risk score under the SRM (8 medium and 54 low), while the remaining, 4 are flagged as “potentially high risk” and over 97% (around 2 900) are “no-flag”. 306. Beyond the SRM, FINTRAC conducts multiple complementary analyses to understand the risk profiles across the DNFBP sectors and to identify individual high-risk entities to be subject to heightened assessment. However, it remains unclear how analyses and risk assessments are conducted, and how these assessments are incorporated into risk-based prioritisation of supervisory activities for the vast majority of DNFBPs. Table 4.3. Breakdown of SRM Risk Score Sector Vulnerability Rating (NRA 2025) Number of Reporting Entities (as of Apr.1, 2025) Number of Reporters Number of Non-reporter s Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk No -flag Casinos High 19 1 5 4 10 - - DPMS High 3 000 - - 8 54 4 2,934 (97.8%) Real Estate High 7 742 - - 19 176 15 7,532 (97.3%) Accountants Medium 1 000 - - 1 1 116 882 (88.2%) BC Notaries Medium 293 - - - 19 - 274 (93.5%) Sub-total 12,054 1 5 32 260 135 11 622 (96.4%) Source: Canada For the legal profession 307. Canada’s federal AML/CFT Regime assessed the inherent ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal professionals in the NRA, concluding that lawyers and Québec notaries pose a high vulnerability. Neither provincial/territorial law societies nor their umbrella organization, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC), have carried out a formal sector-level risk assessment of lawyers. Although the FLSC issued risk assessment guidance and case studies and risk advisories for particular risk domains such as real estate, shell corporations, private lending, trusts and litigation, and certain law societies have issued similar guidance, they do not constitute a holistic sector-level risk assessment. Most law societies collect data on lawyers’ practicing areas posing high ML/TF risks through annual reporting requirements, practice declarations, as well as through their compliance audits and inspections and maintain statistics on the proportion of lawyers engaged in specific fields. However, Law Societies do not have a comprehensive framework for evaluating individual lawyers’ ML/TF risks, and the AML/CFT regulation of the legal sector needs considerable improvements. Some Law Societies, including in British Columbia, have started sectoral and individual risk assessments, but the FLSC/Law Societies’ understanding of lawyers’ risk is still evolving. 308. The Government of Canada-FLSC joint working group was launched in 2019 to explore issues related to the ML/TF risks arising in the practice of law, and to strengthen information sharing between the FLSC and the Government of Canada. The working group includes representatives from Finance Canada, Justice Canada, the FLSC and select Law Societies, with regular participation from FINTRAC and the RCMP. It meets on a quarterly basis. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 309. FINTRAC, in co-operation with provincial/territorial regulators and national industry associations, engages in activities to promote reporting entities’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. 310. FINTRAC’s outreach activities include virtual and in-person meetings, presentations, conferences, training sessions, and other exchanges of information, all aimed at strengthening compliance and risk awareness across the regime. FINTRAC also diffuses information through a mailing list providing additional information about new publications, guidelines, and changes to reporting mechanisms or requirements. FINTRAC also proactively contacts new reporting entities to educate them about their compliance responsibilities. In addition, FINTRAC consults with industry on a number of issues, including new and revised guidance, reporting forms, and the implementation of regulatory amendments. Engagement with industry has been further strengthened through the accessibility of virtual outreach and consultation activities. 311. FINTRAC has delivered some real estate–focused initiatives designed to strengthen sector understanding of ML/TF risks by hosting the National Real Estate Virtual Forum with dedicated sessions on PCMLTFA obligations, delivering targeted presentations to Québec’s Organisme d'autoréglementation du courtage immobilier (OACIQ) and British Columbia Real Estate Association. In October 2024, FINTRAC’s Supervision sector presented at the British Columbia Real Estate Association Managing Brokers’ Conference on sector specific ML risks, suspicion thresholds and clarified any misconceptions regarding STRs. 312. With respect to certain emerging risks, FINTRAC issues special bulletins and operational alerts to enhance risk awareness. Since 2024, FINTRAC has issued special bulletins or operational alerts regarding: online gambling; sanctions evasion; legal profession; tax evasion; underground banking and counter proliferation sanctions. 313. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement regarding outreach. During the on-site visit, multiple entities expressed their views on the necessity of more detailed sector-specific guidance (see 4.3). Greater outreach regarding the importance and procedures of STRs will help raise awareness and increase filings in DNFBPs sectors, especially in the real estate and DPMS sectors (see 4.4.3). For the legal profession 314. FINTRAC presented the Special Bulletin on the use of the Legal Profession in Money Laundering and Sanctions Evasion [41] to the FLSC with the intention of helping the legal sector identify and assess ML/TF activities and sanctions evasions risks and apply the controls and measures to mitigate those risks. The FLSC, as law societies’ national umbrella organization, has published ML/TF risk advisories for the legal profession in five core areas: real estate, shell corporations, trusts, private lending, and litigation. The FLSC has also published risk assessment case studies for the legal profession, designed to assist lawyers in identifying and responding to red flags, with a focus on high-risk areas including: the misuse of trust accounts; real estate and other financial transactions; and the creation of corporations and trusts. In 2022, the FLSC published “Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia Belarus: Implications for the Profession.” In 2023, the FLSC launched its online learning program, “Anti-Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing in the Canadian Legal Profession”. The program, is divided into five modules, focused on: (i) understanding the problem of ML/TF; (ii) assessing and managing money laundering risks; (iii) CDD requirements; (iv) proper use of trust accounts; and (v) cash transactions. All provincial/territorial law societies also issue guidance and provide online training courses to enhance lawyers’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. For example, the Law Society of British Columbia launched a webinar on AML/CFT measures in 2020, and in 2025, a Law Society of British Columbia Practice Advisor presented to the British Columbia Legal Management Association on AML/CFT obligations and best practices. In May 2025, the Law Society of British Columbia’s governing body approved a recommendation to implement mandatory AML/CFT training for all lawyers, extending beyond the scope of training recommended in the 2022 Cullen Commission Final Report [42] . Footnotes [41] Special Bulletin on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion [42] See e.g., Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia – Final Report , June 2022, Recommendations 53 to 65." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="577. Where ML is not prosecuted, Canada pursues alternative criminal justice approaches with a reasonable, and increasing, level of effectiveness. Canada’s approach primarily focusses on obtaining convictions for the predicate offence as a disruption technique. Per 7.2, the AT recognises the broader criminal justice merits of this approach. Competent authorities reflect that this achieves the most beneficial criminal justice outcome consistent with resourcing demands; however, it is occurring at the expense of ML convictions. Prosecutions under PCMLTFA 578. In addition to pursuing prosecutions under the CC for ML, Canada prosecutes several offences under the PCMLTFA. These offences, which relate to non-compliance with Canadian AML/ATF obligations, can be pursued in parallel with LPOC or PPOC offences, or on their own. PCMLTFA offences play an important role in addressing underlying activities that enable ML such as bulk cash smuggling and unregistered MSBs. There have been successful prosecutions under the PCMLTFA to target PML, particularly against criminal ML facilitators that might otherwise escape prosecution due to the challenges in demonstrating knowledge around the illicit source of funds. 579. Prosecutions under PCMLTFA primarily arise from potential unregistered MSB activities identified through predicate investigations and FINTRAC referrals on identification of suspected non-compliance. PCMLTFA prosecutions may also result from bulk cash seizures (see core issue 8.7 for detailed analysis). LEAs investigate individuals and businesses operating outside the requirements of the PCMLTFA, including unregistered MSBs. Several case studies demonstrate effective investigative and prosecution of unregistered MSB operations. 580. During the period under review, PPSC prosecuted 84 cases with PCMLTFA charges laid under multiple provisions of the PCMLTFA (including sections 11.1, 12(1), 12(4), 36(1), 6, 6.1 and 75(1). There were 68 cases with outcomes during the period. Of these, 25 resulted in convictions. Charges were withdrawn or stayed in a further 27. These included two cases with convictions for failures to declare a suspicious transaction (subs 75(1)), four for breaches of registration requirements (s 11.1), eight for failure to report the import/export of currency/monetary instruments (subsection 12(1)), four convictions for contraventions of the PCMLTFA Regulations (s 74) and three for failure to answer and comply with the request of an officer (subs 12(4)). Convictions under the PCMLTFA can result in terms of imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to CAD 2 million. CRA and RQ 581. In cases where the CRA-CIP cannot pursue or obtain a criminal conviction for ML, it still pursues the predicate tax offence. In situations where it is not possible to obtain convictions for either the predicate tax crime or for ML, CRA-CIP may refer the case to its Illicit Income Audit Program (IIAP). See Table 7.16 for the total amount assessed and collected through the IIAP’s lifetime. Table 7.16. CRA-IIAP assessments raised and collected Fiscal Year Number of CRA-IIAP Assessments Amount Assessed (CAD) Amount Collected (CAD) 2020-21 1 23 875 23 875 2021-22 5 363 200 260 672 2022-23 34 21 176 541 5 096 932 2023-24 84 53 011 674 2 260 636 2024-25 103 69 577 530 2 689 895 Source: Canada Note: The difference between “assessed amounts” and “collected amounts” reflects the high rate of objections, during which the CRA cannot collect, and the legal processes required to enforce payment in complex illicit income cases. Collections tied to legal actions are often recorded only once proceedings conclude. In cases where there is a more imminent threat of financial loss, the CRA can take legal action to accelerate debt recovery. When this approach is applied, the CRA recovers nearly 50% of amounts owing within 18-24 months. 582. The effectiveness of IIAP’s approach in targeting PML has been demonstrated in practice. A tax evasion investigation revealed that the defendant was operating a money laundering network, from which he earned significant illicit gains that were unreported on his income tax returns. This resulted in a tax debt of millions for the defendant, in addition to criminal fines and jail sentences. Near the conclusion of the court proceeding, the CRA-CIP referred the case to the CRA-IIAP to apply civil measures to assess and collect the tax debt (see Table 7.17). All the tax debt was successfully collected, shortly after receiving the referral from the CRA-CIP in 2022. 583. Like CRA, RQ also has specialised teams dedicated to conducting civil audit activities targeting individuals and entities that derive income from illicit activities. This approach is an effective alternative measure providing a deterrent effect even where criminal prosecution is not possible. Table 7.17. Tax recovery from criminal activity (RQ) (CAD millions) Fiscal Year Tax Assessment Assessed Tax Recovered 2019-20 23.4 5.5 5.6 2020-21 0.0 5.1 0.5 2021-22 -0.2 5.3 0.6 2022-23 9.6 4.5 9.9 2023-24 10.8 n/a 8.0 2024-2025 (1 April – 31 December) 7.0 -1.2 8.9 Source: Canada CBSA 584. While CBSA does not criminally investigate ML, since 2024 it has significantly increased its regulatory capabilities and capacity to detect and mitigate the risk of border related movements of illicit financial flows. 585. In 2024, the establishment of the Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) focused CBSA resources towards the disruption of Canada’s most significant border-related risks, such as trade fraud and TBML. The BFCC facilitates production and sharing of intelligence on border-related and trade-based financial crime, supports CBSA criminal investigations under the Customs Act, and refers matters to other LEAs and regulatory bodies to combat ML (and TF and sanctions evasion) in addition to predicate crime investigations (see Box 7.6). 586. CBSA has been forward leaning during the period under review. The BFCC has proactively worked together with Finance Canada and other regime partners to introduce amendments to the PCMLTFA to enhance its response to border related and traded-based financial crime (see IO 6). This approach complements and expands on traditional criminal investigative and prosecution efforts better enabling CBSA to disrupt trade-based threats that would be otherwise difficult to prosecute. 587. These powers are only recently in force; however, interviews with CBSA demonstrated that these new powers are being implemented in initial investigations. The AT recognises this novel alternative approach to trade-based ML (and TF and sanctions evasion). Threat disruption demonstrates Canada’s proactiveness and commitment to addressing this complex and high-risk threat. Box 7.6. Case study: CBSA regulatory action The CBSA’s tactical intelligence efforts identified the exploitation of border processes by threat actors using commercial importations of banknotes to launder the proceeds of crime in Canada, and from there, into the financial systems of foreign jurisdictions. The volume and value of these shipments was assessed by the Agency to pose a significant threat to the integrity of the Canadian financial system. Several examinations of banknote shipments were conducted by officers with guidance from the Border Financial Crime Centre. The Border Financial Crime Centre conducted a tactical assessment and made referrals to law enforcement, and FINTRAC’s Supervision Sector (for probable non-compliance with the PCMLTFA). An administrative penalty was made on a financial institution. Forfeiture 588. Civil forfeiture frameworks are in place in all material provinces in Canada. These are being used to varying extents with some provinces (BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) applying more proactive and effective strategies. While this is discussed in greater depth in IO 8, civil asset recovery action is a strength of Canada’s system. Canada shared several case studies (discussed further in Box 8.12) where civil forfeiture enabled the recovery of assets where criminal charges were not pursued or were not successful. This demonstrates its potential effectiveness as an alternative approach where a prosecution for ML or a predicate offence is either not sought or is not possible. 589. In limited circumstances, courts have ordered forfeiture under CC s. 490(9) despite an acquittal for a predicate offence. This has occurred where the court determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property was not lawfully possessed by the person from whom it was seized, such as in the case of proceeds of crime (e.g. R v Breton, 2023 ONSC 5429)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 751. Canada’s TF intelligence feeds into national counter-terrorism efforts through, the One Vision Partnership Framework, and interdepartmental co-ordination and collaboration. Financial intelligence from FINTRAC has been used to map extremist networks, identify financial conduits, support designations under targeted financial sanctions, and inform strategic analysis. However, the national CT strategy (2011) is currently under revision to reflect Canada’s evolved TF risk understanding, as detailed in the NRA. 752. There is a National Co-ordination and Governance framework made up of three committees, all led at Deputy Minister level – a Committee on Intelligence, on Operational Co-ordination and on National Security, Cyber and Intelligence Policy, which play a key role in policy and operational co-ordination and decision making for Canada’s National Security and intelligence services. These committees have overlapping membership with the national AML/CFT Regime detailed in IO.1, reinforcing linkages between TF and other national security issues facing Canada and supporting a co-ordinated framework. 753. An example of this co-ordination in practice is Canada’s approach to terrorist listings, which is designed to be a “whole of government” approach with participation from multiple departments and agencies that have intelligence, law enforcement, or policy roles. The Terrorist Listings Policy and Planning Committee is chaired by Public Safety and includes core representatives from Canada’s AML/CFT Regime, including Finance Canada, FINTRAC, CSIS, and the RCMP. Involvement of these partners ensures that consideration of financial intelligence and developments in Canada’s TF risk environment are actively integrated into decision-making. Additionally, since the scope of the Committee includes both operational and policy partners, it ensures that Canadian policymakers working in CFT have visibility into emerging operational trends that may inform future CFT strategies and shape interaction with private sector stakeholders under governance structures outlined in IO.1. Finally, as outlined in further detail under IO.10, listing decisions are made upon recommendation by the Minister of Public Safety and are discussed at Deputy Minister Committees and Cabinet, ensuring the highest levels of Canadian government have a strong factual basis upon which to list the entity. This multistakeholder participation at multiple levels of Canadian government strengthens linkages between counter terrorist financing efforts and broader national security priorities, and supports a co-ordinated, whole of government approach to addressing terrorist threats. Figure 9.4. Canada’s National Co-ordination and Governance Framework for TF Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 754. RCMP’s FPNS TF unit collaborates with FINTRAC, the CRA, CSIS and foreign partners working within protocols/agreements/Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate timely information sharing. They are responsible for: · monitoring and co-ordinating major ongoing investigational projects related to terrorist organizations focusing primarily on their financial and procurement infrastructures; · liaising on a routine basis with partner agencies such as FINTRAC, CSIS and the CRA Charities Directorate and, · communicating with international law enforcement agencies in the sharing of intelligence and evidence. 755. This collaboration alongside the One Vision Framework (which governs information sharing between CSIS and the RCMP with strategic and tactical deconfliction and disclosure of information protocols and how this can be used by the RCMP) shows a co-ordinated approach to counterterrorism and counter-terrorism financing. This process can be expedited in cases of imminent threat." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 668. Canada is confiscating criminal property to some extent under the CC framework. Property of corresponding value is confiscated to a very limited extent. Criminal property 669. During the period under review, Canada reports CAD 332 598 542 (approx. EUR 205 million) as subject to forfeiture under the CC framework by federal and provincial (only data for Ontario and Québec was provided) authorities (see Table 8.9). Forfeiture of criminal property under the CC framework is typically sought by the prosecutor at the point of sentencing. Settlement on forfeiture commonly forms part of resolution agreements. The jurisdiction in which criminal property is forfeited can be determined by the location where a case is prosecuted and by the prosecution service responsible for the criminal case. Criminal property located in another Canadian jurisdiction can be forfeited under an order of a different province or territory. Criminal property located outside of Canada is typically forfeited under the federal jurisdiction (see 8.5.3 for further detail). Under the CC framework, forfeiture by federal authorities comprises approximately 63% of CC forfeiture. 670. The CC framework provides for extended confiscation (subsections 462.37(2.01-2.07)) when an offender is convicted of a criminal organisation offence, a serious offence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , certain Cannabis Act offences, or human trafficking. During the period under review, these provisions were used twice in R v Dematas , 2020 ONSC 4419 and R v Nweke , 2019 ONSC 2299. These cases demonstrate the potential to enhance CC forfeiture. Given its limited use (twice, and not during the last five years), this tool is not being routinely used by competent authorities to deprive and disrupt organised criminal groups. 671. In certain circumstances, defendants may be granted access to seized and restrained property to meet reasonable legal expenses incurred either in defending the relevant criminal charge or contesting forfeiture. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has recognised that these provisions engage Charter rights ( R v Rafilovich [2019] 3 SCR 838). Interviews with competent authorities demonstrated the detrimental impact this has had on forfeiture outcomes as it enables offenders to finance their legal defence with the alleged proceeds of crime. In challenging seizure and restraining orders defendants may deliberately incur unnecessary or unreasonable legal fees and tie up court and prosecution resources in considering applications with limited merit. Although the right to a defence is protected in the Charter, defendants are able to access restrained funds in bad faith with the objective of frustrating forfeiture or delaying proceedings. While measures in the CC exist to ensure the necessity and reasonableness of access, in some cases this ability has been abused and has resulted in the value available for forfeiture being depleted. 672. Where the criminal property subject to forfeiture has been exhausted, there is precedent for fines in lieu of forfeiture to be ordered, though this approach has the major shortcomings as outlined above. Table 8.4. Consolidated CC Forfeiture data (CAD) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Federal (SPMD) 34 829 263 24 997 092 47 874 220 27 190 025 40 081 851 33 993 859 208 966 310 Ontario 5 098 337 12 271 948 8 269 586 2 371 744 7 032 693 5 160 670 40 204 979 Québec (DPCP) 11 478 749 6 245 794 6 887 252 14 749 868 16 232 961 19 217 629 74 812 253 CRA (CIP) - - - 3 600 000 5 015 000 - 8 615 000 Source: Canada 673. Case studies show positive forfeiture outcomes (see Box 8.4). Canada has the ability and willingness to pursue forfeiture where convictions are obtained, including in large scale cases, at the federal and provincial levels. Despite positive examples, the approximate CAD 333 million forfeited during period under review represents a limited proportion of the overall proceeds generated from crime in Canada. Even in positive examples (see Box 8.4), amounts successfully forfeited are limited in comparison to the overall criminal benefit obtained and identified in a case. Box 8.4. Case studies – forfeiture of criminal property in large and complex cases Federal: PML case A federal RCMP‑led investigation into a sophisticated money laundering network that provided underground money transfer services to organised crime groups operating in drug‑exporting countries revealed a network relied on an informal value transfer system (IVTS) with international links to several jurisdictions of risk, enabling the cross‑border movement of criminal proceeds while obscuring their origin. The network used a web of shell companies, third‑party facilitators, and multi‑jurisdictional financial channels to receive, move, and settle illicit funds. The structure of the IVTS and the network’s reliance on business entities to conceal the flow of proceeds posed significant challenges for traditional tracing and identification of assets held by professional money launderers and their associates. The RCMP pursued a comprehensive financial investigation supported by significant federal level inter‑agency co-operation. Officers submitted numerous VIRs to FINTRAC, which provided financial intelligence instrumental in mapping the relationships between shell companies, identifying the financial institutions involved, and tracing the movement of illicit funds. The CRA played a central role in identifying and restraining real property assets linked to the network. Between May 2016 and February 2019, following co-ordinated arrests, the RCMP seized CAD 2.2 million in illicit drugs (including cannabis, cocaine, hashish, and methamphetamine). Concurrently, investigators restrained CAD 8.7 million in bank accounts and cash, and an additional seven properties valued at approximately CAD 22 million. Notably, CAD 7 million of the forfeited value was obtained directly from the ringleader of the money‑laundering network, underscoring the effectiveness of asset tracing and restraint actions against principal targets. Provincial: International fraud case A complex, multi‑year international investigation led by Ontario’s provincial police into a large‑scale Ponzi scheme operating between 2012 and 2017 identified a scheme that defrauded more than 500 victims in Canada and abroad before the perpetrator fled to country “G”. The investigation required extensive cross‑jurisdictional co-operation and resulted in criminal charges in both Canada and country “G”. The perpetrator moved funds across multiple jurisdictions and financial institutions, complicating efforts to trace, restrain, and ultimately recover proceeds. The international dimension of the fraud and the rapid dissipation of funds underscored the need for co-ordinated action across Canadian competent authorities and foreign counterparts, including specialised financial‑crime units. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Serious Fraud Office led the investigation with the support of FINTRAC, CBSA, CRA, FAMG, RCMP, INTERPOL, law‑enforcement partners in country “G”, and members of the Camden Asset Recovery Inter‑Agency Network (CARIN) and the Asset Recovery Interagency Network for the Caribbean (ARIN-CARIB). Authorities obtained several Restraint Orders, enabling the seizure of approximately CAD 1.5 million in Canada. This was subsequently forfeited and later distributed to victims through a Restitution Order. International partners seized an additional USD 4 million in country “G”. The use of cloud‑based survey tools to efficiently collect victim statements enhanced the investigation, while provincial Victim Liaisons ensured real‑time communication with victims throughout the process. INTERPOL co-ordinated the deportation of the suspect to Canada, and foreign police, supported by an RCMP liaison officer, located and arrested the individual in 2020. In February 2022, the accused pled guilty to fraud over CAD 5 000 and laundering proceeds of crime and received a seven‑year custodial sentence. A fine‑in‑lieu of forfeiture of CAD 26.9 million was imposed, requiring repayment within five years of release; failure to pay may result in an additional prison term of up to seven years. 674. Shortcomings in asset tracing and provisional measures identified in core issues 8.2 and 8.3 materially impact forfeiture results, particularly under the CC framework. These stem, in part, from to the operation of fundamental principles of domestic law and the development of compliant mechanisms. The confluence of these shortcomings was clearly demonstrated in the case below (see Box 8.5). Box 8.5. Human trafficking investigation A year‑long police investigation into a human‑trafficking network operating across a major Canadian city. The investigation revealed a complex financial structure in which proceeds from sexual services were laundered through an extensive network of flow‑through bank accounts held in the names of stolen identities, third parties, and family members. Over 130 bank accounts were ultimately linked to the primary suspect. The case resulted in the identification of seven victims and charges against six individuals. The investigation originated in November 2020 from a referral from the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) and FINTRAC, supported by a proactive disclosure indicating suspicious cash transactions, casino disbursements, and EFTs linked to the network. The police force’s proceeds of crime and asset forfeiture unit conducted a parallel financial investigation, using numerous Production Orders (bank and electronic funds transfer records) to map flows across 130+ accounts. Illicit proceeds (cash and electronic funds transfers) were deposited into accounts controlled centrally by the head of the organisation and moved through accounts of family members and ostensibly legitimate businesses. This commingling of illicit and lawful funds, combined with the use of multiple identity holders across all major financial institutions, materially increased complexity. The head of the organisation also displayed an illicit lifestyle consistent with the proceeds of crime. Forensic accountants from FAMG reconstructed financial activity to quantify illicit profits and expenditure patterns. In November 2021, police executed 20 search warrants, seizing ~CAD 4 million in cash (plus ~USD 4 000), ~CAD 3 million in illegal cannabis, and 34 firearms with ammunition. Partners included police services across the province, CBSA, FINTRAC, CRA, FAMG, CCEHT. Substantial tracing (banking/electronic funds transfer records and forensic accounting analysis) was conducted and discovered extensive commingling of legitimate funds and third party/family member control. Prosecutors and other competent authorities opted not to seek restraint of most of the accounts. Following a plea resolution in which ML charges were withdrawn, the primary suspect consented to criminal forfeiture of approximately CAD 4 000 000 and USD 3 291. A Co‑accused consented to approximately CAD 8 000 in additional forfeitures. The forfeiture outcome relied primarily on cash seizures and consent‑based forfeiture post‑plea; no significant bank account restraints converted to forfeiture, limiting the recovery of potentially larger value proceeds. The case evidences strong mobilisation of investigative tools (financial intelligence, forensic accounting, multi‑agency co-ordination) but shows that asset tracing does not consistently translate into comprehensive restraint and forfeiture in complex ML schemes, and that the presence of intermingling legitimate and criminal property and third‑party account control can be a contributing factor that can frustrate restraint and forfeiture. As a result, forfeiture outcomes were materially constrained, relying on seized cash and consent rather than broad recovery across the identified account network. 675. In the case study above, more than CAD 90 million was identified through financial intelligence and FAMG findings as being generated from a human trafficking business over the course of more than a decade. Despite the impressive investigative work by police, the overall forfeiture in this case was limited to approximately CAD 4 million in physical currency located in a safety deposit box. Several factors impacted the scope of the property that could be restrained, ultimately contributing to a more limited forfeiture. 676. Firstly (and most impactful) was the criminal nature of the asset recovery proceedings in this case. To remain within Jordan timeframes for the criminal matter, and within reasonable resourcing requirements, the criminal investigation focused only on the two-year period leading up to execution. During this period, approximately CAD 6 million was generated through the criminal enterprise. The criminal focus of this case limited the scope of what property could potentially be recovered from the outset as evidence collection only focussed on the criminal property amassed during the period of criminality under investigation, which required a higher standard of proof. 677. Secondly, asset tracing identified that the proceeds went through over 130 bank accounts under the effective control of the primary target. These were held in the names of family members and third parties (including businesses) not involved in the criminality (commingling of funds). As described in core issue 8.3, this common concealment tactic was an important factor that frustrated authorities from pursuing restraint of the majority of the accounts, which represented a significant amount of the proceeds generated across the period of criminality, significantly reducing the amount available for forfeiture. 678. Thirdly, much of the proceeds identified were traced as being spent on high value goods and on luxury condominium rentals. These were typically located outside of Canada and in a jurisdiction not amenable to international co-operation, frustrating their recovery. Payments for the rent of luxury condos could not be directly restrained as these had been made to a bona fide third party. A fine in lieu of forfeiture was not sought for amounts spent on these rental payments as they confer a temporary benefit (use of property for a specific period of time) despite their payment with proceeds of crime. 679. Finally, civil forfeiture was not separately sought in relation to these proceedings due to challenges tracing the specific proceeds, which had largely been moved beyond the jurisdiction. As provincial and territorial civil forfeiture frameworks do not have provisions enabling value-based confiscation, they would not have been effective in this case. PoCV – fines in lieu of forfeiture 680. The CC does not enable direct confiscation of PoCV. Instead, it allows the imposition of a fine in lieu of forfeiture of criminal property. The court may only order a fine in lieu of forfeiture where it is satisfied that forfeiture should be ordered but cannot be ordered due to specific circumstances. [59] When issued, the value of the fine is required to be equal to the value of the property that was proceeds of crime, and the Court cannot consider other factors (such as the ability of the offender to pay). Crucially, fines in lieu of forfeiture cannot be proactively enforced against other property of the offender and require the person subject to the fine to make payments. This distinguishes it from other value-based recovery processes and undermines its effectiveness. Other features, such as a lack of provisional measures (see 8.3) further reduce the utility of the model. Through this process, Canada has recovered PoCV to a very limited extent, federally recovering approximately CAD 7.6 million during the period under review (see Table 8.5). Table 8.5. Federal fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered and recovered FY Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture Ordered (CAD) Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture Recovered (CAD) 2019-2020 1 006 954 407 326 2020-2021 700 426 1 933 659 2021-2022 427 256 268 193 2022-2023 25 752 710 3 425 059 2023-2024 63 446 1 215 215 2024-2025 - 338 670 Gross Total 27 950 792 7 588 121 Source: Canada 681. The data provided on fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered is a minimum number, and is low in the context of Canada. As PPSC’s internal case management system does not track fines in lieu of forfeiture separately to other fines ordered in criminal matters, the true value recovered is likely somewhat higher. Nonetheless, there is a gap between fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered by courts and actual enforcement and collection of those amounts. 682. Canada reports that in federal cases where a fine in lieu of forfeiture ordered is over CAD 100 000, only one fine is currently categorised as in default. A lack of data beyond this (including for fines in lieu of forfeiture issued in provincial cases) suggests there are likely gaps in competent authorities’ ability to track and monitor the payment of fines in lieu of forfeiture, and that the true number of fines in default are higher. Additional information shared during interviews complements the finding that there are higher levels of default than demonstrated by the data, with some LEAs noting systemic issues in obtaining enforcement of fines in lieu of forfeiture. 683. Competent authorities report that where default on a fine in lieu of forfeiture is identified, it can be challenging to enforce payment in practice. This is despite the requirement for a term of imprisonment (additional to any term for the conviction) to be ordered in the event of default, where the offender has not paid, without a reasonable excuse (for which the onus to demonstrate is on the offender). Subjects of fines in lieu of forfeiture that are unable to pay cannot be subject to imprisonment as this does not meet the requires for a wilful refusal to pay ( R v. Wu , [2003] 3 SCR 530). 684. While ability to pay cannot be considered by the court when ordering a fine in lieu of forfeiture, it is in practice the crucial determinant for courts where competent authorities apply to enforce the order in the event of default. Canada reports that this is due to the application of Charter considerations by Courts. Canada reports that use of a general production order is gaining increasing judicial recognition (see R v. Neilsen , 2024 ACKB 767) as a tool that can be used post-conviction to support rebutting an offender’s argument on reasonable excuse, though the extent to which this occurs is unclear. Beyond this, it is unclear the extent to which the court examines broader criminal benefit or property beyond formal ownership in making this assessment. 685. This materially impacts the enforceability of fines in lieu that are in default and opens the potential for people subject to a fine to avoid paying it. For example, where a person has liquidated their property and spent it on expensive services they may have a genuine inability to pay that may result in them avoiding any additional imprisonment while not having to pay the fine amount despite having enjoyed the benefits. In contrast, where a person clearly owns assets that can be liquidated to pay this amount they may opt to do so, but the court cannot compel this. While this constitutes wilful refusal and would likely result in (additional) imprisonment, this may be an attractive option that allows the person to avoid repaying their criminal benefit. No other mechanisms to enforce recovery of a fine in lieu of forfeiture upon default have been used during the assessment period. This includes civil recovery through registration as a debt, which while reportedly an available option, has not been used in practice. The limited effectiveness of fines in lieu of forfeiture requires major improvements to enhance Canada’s ability to confiscate the benefits of crime. CRA-CIP 686. The CRA-CIP conducts criminal investigations into significant tax offences, which are then referred to PPSC for prosecution. Since 2022-23, CRA has begun to seek restraint and forfeiture under the CC to some extent (see Table 8.6). These volume of these results is lower than expected given tax evasion is assigned a high threat rating in the NRA, but CRA-CIP’s increased focus in this space is promising. To further enhance its focus on asset recovery CRA-CIP has developed and released a new ML and POC investigation policy and case management guidance (see core issue 7.1). This is a positive development, but it is too early to assess its impact. 687. This work is complemented by civil recovery by the CRA’s IIAP discussed in section 8.5.2, which has had further success in recovering assets to a greater extent. Table 8.6. CRA-CIP asset recovery outcomes Fiscal Year-End Ongoing Investigations Investigations where Assets Seized/ Restrained Value of Assets Seized/ Restrained (CAD) Investigations where Assets Forfeited (CAD) Value of Asset Forfeited (CAD) 2020-21 236 0 0 0 0 2021-22 205 0 0 0 0 2022-23 183 2 12 758 000 1 3 600 000 2023-24 175 2 6 650 000 2 5 015 000 2024-25 201 1 3 300 000 0 0 Source: Canada 8.5.2. Civil forfeiture 688. Non-conviction-based forfeiture is available under the CC in a limited number of circumstances, notably where a person charged has died or absconded before the conclusion of proceedings (s 462.38). This has not been used during the period under review. 689. Civil forfeiture is a provincial responsibility under Canada’s Constitutional division of powers, under which the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over administration of property and civil rights. Most provinces (except for Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador) and the Territory of Nunavut have implemented civil forfeiture frameworks. Those with such frameworks account for approximately 98% of the Canadian population, and all major cities, as well as the bulk of Canada’s exposure to money laundering and serious organised crime. The minor gaps in provincial uptake are not materially impacting effectiveness. Judicial civil forfeiture 690. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture is a strength of the Canadian system and has delivered positive forfeiture outcomes, particularly in the provinces where it is prioritised as the key asset forfeiture mechanism (see Table 8.7). Across Canada, provincial/territorial civil forfeiture officers recovered approximately CAD 200 million during the period under review, with increasing trends in its usage across most provinces. Table 8.7. Consolidated provincial/territorial civil forfeiture (CAD millions) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total British Columbia 16.7 16.0 12.4 14.3 30.2 20.1 109.7 Alberta 3.1 2.3 2.7 6.2 6.6 4.0 24.9 Saskatchewan 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.2 1.3 2.5 11.3 Manitoba 0.7 2.7 11.8 7.0 4.0 6.6 32.8 Ontario 2.3 2.2 n/a 1.7 4.2 1.6 12.0 Québec 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.4 8.5 New Brunswick 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 2.2 Nova Scotia NIL NIL NIL NIL 0.1 0.0 0.1 Nunavut NIL NIL NIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 Total 24.6 25.2 30.1 33.0 49.6 37.3 199.8 Source: Canada 691. Use of civil forfeiture frameworks is fragmented. BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba achieve strong results through their proactive approach to civil forfeiture which commonly proceeds in parallel with any criminal proceeding. Ontario and Québec are more conservative with civil forfeiture. In these provinces the criminal prosecution takes primacy and civil forfeiture is only sought where criminal forfeiture is unavailable, unlikely to succeed, is less expedient, or has failed (in the case of Ontario). In Québec, if criminal forfeiture has failed, after a contested hearing or after the prosecutor unsuccessfully sought forfeiture of the property, civil forfeiture is not an option. The difference in approaches across these provinces is well demonstrated through case studies (See box 8.6). Box 8.6. Case studies illustrating differences in civil forfeiture approach across Canada’s material provinces British Columbia In December 2023, the BC Civil Forfeiture Office (CFO) secured the largest civil forfeiture in provincial history. A total of CAD 10 million was forfeited in real properties and bank accounts linked to a Canadian MSB alleged to have provided payment processing services to international criminal organizations. These criminal organisations were operating large‑scale fraud schemes targeting seniors and other vulnerable victims. The Vancouver Police Department referred the matter to the BC CFO, supported by FINTRAC intelligence. Assets were forfeited as proceeds and instruments of unlawful activity, demonstrating BC’s capacity to pursue high‑value civil forfeiture actions in complex financial crime cases. Alberta An investigation, led by Calgary Police Service, uncovered a sophisticated interprovincial money laundering network linked to illegal online cannabis sales. Drug proceeds were funnelled through shell companies, nominees, and MSBs. Subsequently, they moved through an IVTS style network to accounts across Canada, laundering an estimated CAD 100 million annually. Using financial intelligence, production orders, and multi‑jurisdictional co-operation, police traced funds and identified properties and accounts suitable for civil forfeiture. Although criminal charges did not proceed, civil forfeiture actions were successful. Authorities seized three cannabis farms, a mixed-use Vancouver property, and multi-million dollar accounts. This came to an approximate total of property valued at CAD 9 million, plus CAD 86 000 from an Alberta account. Cannabis seizures were valued at CAD 29 million. This case illustrates the effectiveness of civil forfeiture in depriving offenders of significant assets despite challenges in securing criminal convictions. Manitoba In November 2022, Manitoba’s Criminal Property Forfeiture (CPF) office forfeited eight properties and significant personal property (cash, bank accounts, jewellery, and equipment) worth over CAD 2 million. The investigation, led by Winnipeg Police Service’s Organized Crime Unit, targeted a long running drug trafficking network laundering proceeds through Manitoba casinos. CPF joined the operation prior to arrest, enabling the timely restraint of real properties and accounts identified as proceeds or instruments criminal activity. The eight forfeited residential properties were transferred to a non‑profit housing organisation for redevelopment and future use by low-income families. This demonstrates Manitoba’s effective use of civil forfeiture to both disrupt criminal activity and support community benefit. Saskatchewan In 2023, Saskatchewan Civil Forfeiture successfully forfeited CAD 555 929 following a joint investigation into a high level, interprovincial drug‑trafficking network. The work of Saskatoon Police Service, Calgary Police Service, and the RCMP resulted in three separate seizures which formed the basis for unopposed forfeiture applications: · CAD 207 820 linked to a courier exchange between suspects; · CAD 55 319 , drugs, and paraphernalia seized during searches of residences and vehicles; · CAD 292 790 seized in Alberta and returned to Saskatchewan for forfeiture. These actions show Saskatchewan’s ability to efficiently forfeit proceeds of crime even where suspects are not charged or criminal proceedings are ongoing. Ontario In 2023, Ontario secured the forfeiture of CAD 438 437 and USD 1 587 after a duffle bag of bundled and vacuum sealed currency was found in a locked hotel locker. The currency exhibited indicators consistent with drug‑trafficking proceeds. Forensic testing revealed cocaine residue. The claimant, who had a significant drug related criminal history, provided no credible lawful explanation. The AG reached a settlement for full forfeiture, approved by the Court. This case demonstrates Ontario’s ability to use civil forfeiture to disrupt illicit cash-based activity linked to organized crime. Québec In 2020-2021, the AGQ and BC CFO pursued parallel forfeiture actions following the death of an individual involved in narcotics production and cryptocurrency. BC forfeited over CAD 2 million from bank accounts, while Québec forfeited a property valued at approximately CAD 400 000. In 2022, The AGQ forfeited CAD 500 000 linked to the illegal production of cannabis on a farm operated by the owner’s family. The property was deemed an instrument of unlawful activity despite the owner’s claimed lack of knowledge. In 2023, the AGQ forfeited CAD 302,405 in cash linked to a drug trafficking network investigated by SPVM. Although the individuals controlling the funds could not be charged, they had no legitimate income to justify possession. The money was found to be proceeds and/or instruments of criminal activity. These cases collectively demonstrate Québec’s effective application of civil forfeiture to disrupt criminal proceeds across drug‑trafficking and financially sophisticated cases. 692. BC’s civil forfeiture framework is the most mature in Canada and achieves the most significant results. These are driven by BC’s proactive approach to civil forfeiture with LEAs referring cases with proceeds elements to the CFO to conduct detailed analysis and tracing, and to seek restraint and forfeiture. This culture has been embedded into LEAs operating in BC (notably VPD and RCMP E Division (comprising both FP and C&amp;IP)) which maintain effective working relationships with the BC CFO that maintain each agency’s independence. Under this model, asset recovery proceedings are not tied to any potential criminal proceedings. They can be brought without, before, or in parallel with any criminal process, ensuring that criminal property is secured and recovered at an early stage. This approach is first-in-class for provincial/territorial civil forfeiture in Canada and other provinces, such as Manitoba, are following suit. 693. The strengths of BC’s civil forfeiture framework were noted in the Report of the Cullen Commission, which also provided recommendations (see Box 8.2) to further enhance the effectiveness of BC’s civil forfeiture framework. Following the Cullen Commission, BC, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia have introduced unexplained wealth frameworks (see 8.1). The BC Supreme Court recently delivered a decision upholding the constitutional validity of UWOs in BC. Since its implementation, BC courts have issued UWOs in three cases totalling CAD 11.5 million. The Manitoba Court of King’s Bench has also issued a UWO under the Manitoba framework for CAD 412 000. Administrative forfeiture 694. To supplement the civil forfeiture mechanisms, provinces can forfeit property administratively, subject to certain preconditions. Except for Ontario and Alberta, these frameworks prescribe a monetary threshold (typically between CAD 75 000 and CAD 125 000) above which administrative forfeiture cannot be pursued. For forfeiture to be pursued through administrative means, a statutory process must be followed including the notification of any known interest holders. In the event a person claims an interest, administrative forfeiture must be discontinued and judicial civil forfeiture sought if appropriate. It is unclear to what extent this approach is used, although competent authorities with access to it view it as a useful tool to efficiently forfeit lower value assets where forfeiture is unopposed. By requiring persons to oppose the forfeiture, it is also a beneficial tool to identify potential owners for further investigation. 695. In addition to its criminal investigation mandate, CRA-IIAP (see core issue 7.4) utilises civil tax audit measures under the Income Tax Act and the Excise Tax Act for the for the civil recovery of unpaid tax liabilities suspected of being related to illicit activities. Where it is necessary to act quicky, the CRA-IIAP can request a ‘jeopardy order’. If granted by the court, it allows the use of administrative powers available to the CRA, such as garnishments or asset liens, to collect tax debts without delay. 696. As noted above, this is a recently introduced program. It has grown from one assessment in 2020-21 (its first full year of operation) to more than 100 assessments in 2024/25, valued at approximately CAD 83 million. While in its early stages, this model is proving an effective and useful tool in supporting more traditional asset recovery approaches as demonstrated in Table 8.8. Table 8.8. CRA IIAP assessments raised and collected 1 Fiscal Year Number of CRA-IIAP Assessments Amount Assessed (CAD) Amount Collected (CAD) 2019-20 0 0 0 2020-21 1 23 875 23 875 2021-22 5 363 200 260 672 2022-23 34 21 176 541 5 096 932 2023-24 84 53 011 674 2 260 636 2024-25 103 69 577 530 2 689 895 Source: Canada 1 Note, the difference between ‘assessed amounts’ and ‘collected amounts’ reflects the high rate of objections, during which the CRA cannot collect amounts due to the legal processes required to enforce payment in complex illicit income cases. Collections tied to legal actions are often recorded only once proceedings conclude. In cases where there is a more imminent threat of financial loss, the CRA can take legal action to accelerate debt recovery. When this approach is applied, the CRA recovers nearly 50% amounts owing within 18-24 months. 697. Revenu Québec uses similar civil audit measures to recover undeclared tax liabilities in Québec (see Table 8.9). Table 8.9. RQ civil tax assessments and recovery (CAD millions) Fiscal Year Tax Assessment Assessed Tax Recovered 2019-20 23.4 5.5 5.6 2020-21 0.0 5.1 0.5 2021-22 -0.2 5.3 0.6 2022-23 9.6 4.5 9.9 2023-24 10.8 n/a 8.0 2024-2025 (April 1-December 31) 7.0 -1.2 8.9 Source: Canada CBSA – seizure of goods as forfeit 698. CBSA’s recently adopted seizure as forfeit provisions (PCMLTFA, Part 2.1) for goods crossing the border provide an additional administrative seizure and forfeiture tool. They enable CBSA to respond to the high threat of cross-border commercial movements of illicit financial flows, and the challenges in applying ‘traditional’ asset recovery measures. The provisions require persons importing or exporting goods across the Canadian border to declare whether the goods are proceeds of crime, or related to ML, TF or sanctions evasions. Failing to do so, or making a false declaration, is a criminal offence (PCMLTFA s 74(1)). The provisions also apply in respect of any financial transaction purporting to pay for goods being imported or exported, but for which no goods have been shipped (i.e. phantom shipping). Goods that a CBSA investigator suspects are proceeds of crime, or related to ML, TF or sanctions evasion may be seized as forfeit (merits review and judicial appeal are available). In the case of phantom financial shipments where no goods exist, the amount paid or the stated value of the ‘goods’ may be seized as forfeit. 699. This is a novel approach to a challenging TBML typology and CBSA investigators are already working with stakeholders on relevant matters. The seizure as forfeit provisions for goods have yet to be used, as legislation only entered into force in April 2025, but are aimed at supporting CBSA’s efforts to address trade fraud, TBML and other cross-border movements of illicit financial flows through the international trade system. 8.5.3. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 700. Canada uses formal and informal international co-operation mechanisms occasionally to recover criminal property abroad. Following the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Georgiou, Canada can enforce incoming requests to recover PoCV. However, this has not occurred during the assessment period, which is questionable given Canada’s context and the extensive outreach that authorities have conducted. 701. MLA has typically been the preferred route for Canadian competent authorities to seek recovery of property abroad. Statistics demonstrate modest volumes of property restrained (CAD 11.3 million) and limited values confiscated (CAD 182 000) through outgoing asset recovery MLA requests. Informal co-operation is increasingly being used as civil forfeiture processes are also increasingly used by the provinces. Formal MLA is generally not available to support non-conviction-based recovery of property located abroad as Canada’s MLACMA only supports forfeiture through the CC framework and does not permit registration of foreign non-conviction-based orders, or transmission of provincial civil forfeiture orders to the foreign jurisdiction. In these cases, informal co-operation through provincial CFOs is the only available route. The total value of property recovered by provincial CFOs from incoming foreign requests was CAD 5,283,056. 702. During the assessment period, RCMP engaged on 477 files where it sought assistance through its liaison officer network relating to proceeds generating offences. These were not all specific to asset recovery, though RCMP notes that the majority involved a degree of asset identification. Of these, 10 requests were made to foreign partners to support asset restraint or forfeiture abroad. Mechanisms to support the recovery of criminal property located in the United States are the most mature and utilised resulting in in the recovery of property on both sides of the Canada-US border. This is aligned with Canada’s risk and context given the volume of cross-border criminal activity but the co-operation activity related to other would-be partners based on risk and context is less robust. The recovery of property from other countries that represent significant destinations for illicit wealth is more limited. A perception of foreign jurisdictions’ lack of willingness to support does dissuade competent authorities from requesting assistance. Case studies demonstrate Canadian assistance to incoming requests has contributed to important seizure outcomes in foreign jurisdictions. Footnotes [59] See Criminal Code subs 462.37(3): if the property or any part of or interest in the property (a) cannot be located, (b) has been transferred to a third party, (c) is located outside Canada, (d) has substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless, or has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 668. Canada is confiscating criminal property to some extent under the CC framework. Property of corresponding value is confiscated to a very limited extent. Criminal property 669. During the period under review, Canada reports CAD 332 598 542 (approx. EUR 205 million) as subject to forfeiture under the CC framework by federal and provincial (only data for Ontario and Québec was provided) authorities (see Table 8.9). Forfeiture of criminal property under the CC framework is typically sought by the prosecutor at the point of sentencing. Settlement on forfeiture commonly forms part of resolution agreements. The jurisdiction in which criminal property is forfeited can be determined by the location where a case is prosecuted and by the prosecution service responsible for the criminal case. Criminal property located in another Canadian jurisdiction can be forfeited under an order of a different province or territory. Criminal property located outside of Canada is typically forfeited under the federal jurisdiction (see 8.5.3 for further detail). Under the CC framework, forfeiture by federal authorities comprises approximately 63% of CC forfeiture. 670. The CC framework provides for extended confiscation (subsections 462.37(2.01-2.07)) when an offender is convicted of a criminal organisation offence, a serious offence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , certain Cannabis Act offences, or human trafficking. During the period under review, these provisions were used twice in R v Dematas , 2020 ONSC 4419 and R v Nweke , 2019 ONSC 2299. These cases demonstrate the potential to enhance CC forfeiture. Given its limited use (twice, and not during the last five years), this tool is not being routinely used by competent authorities to deprive and disrupt organised criminal groups. 671. In certain circumstances, defendants may be granted access to seized and restrained property to meet reasonable legal expenses incurred either in defending the relevant criminal charge or contesting forfeiture. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has recognised that these provisions engage Charter rights ( R v Rafilovich [2019] 3 SCR 838). Interviews with competent authorities demonstrated the detrimental impact this has had on forfeiture outcomes as it enables offenders to finance their legal defence with the alleged proceeds of crime. In challenging seizure and restraining orders defendants may deliberately incur unnecessary or unreasonable legal fees and tie up court and prosecution resources in considering applications with limited merit. Although the right to a defence is protected in the Charter, defendants are able to access restrained funds in bad faith with the objective of frustrating forfeiture or delaying proceedings. While measures in the CC exist to ensure the necessity and reasonableness of access, in some cases this ability has been abused and has resulted in the value available for forfeiture being depleted. 672. Where the criminal property subject to forfeiture has been exhausted, there is precedent for fines in lieu of forfeiture to be ordered, though this approach has the major shortcomings as outlined above. Table 8.4. Consolidated CC Forfeiture data (CAD) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Federal (SPMD) 34 829 263 24 997 092 47 874 220 27 190 025 40 081 851 33 993 859 208 966 310 Ontario 5 098 337 12 271 948 8 269 586 2 371 744 7 032 693 5 160 670 40 204 979 Québec (DPCP) 11 478 749 6 245 794 6 887 252 14 749 868 16 232 961 19 217 629 74 812 253 CRA (CIP) - - - 3 600 000 5 015 000 - 8 615 000 Source: Canada 673. Case studies show positive forfeiture outcomes (see Box 8.4). Canada has the ability and willingness to pursue forfeiture where convictions are obtained, including in large scale cases, at the federal and provincial levels. Despite positive examples, the approximate CAD 333 million forfeited during period under review represents a limited proportion of the overall proceeds generated from crime in Canada. Even in positive examples (see Box 8.4), amounts successfully forfeited are limited in comparison to the overall criminal benefit obtained and identified in a case. Box 8.4. Case studies – forfeiture of criminal property in large and complex cases Federal: PML case A federal RCMP‑led investigation into a sophisticated money laundering network that provided underground money transfer services to organised crime groups operating in drug‑exporting countries revealed a network relied on an informal value transfer system (IVTS) with international links to several jurisdictions of risk, enabling the cross‑border movement of criminal proceeds while obscuring their origin. The network used a web of shell companies, third‑party facilitators, and multi‑jurisdictional financial channels to receive, move, and settle illicit funds. The structure of the IVTS and the network’s reliance on business entities to conceal the flow of proceeds posed significant challenges for traditional tracing and identification of assets held by professional money launderers and their associates. The RCMP pursued a comprehensive financial investigation supported by significant federal level inter‑agency co-operation. Officers submitted numerous VIRs to FINTRAC, which provided financial intelligence instrumental in mapping the relationships between shell companies, identifying the financial institutions involved, and tracing the movement of illicit funds. The CRA played a central role in identifying and restraining real property assets linked to the network. Between May 2016 and February 2019, following co-ordinated arrests, the RCMP seized CAD 2.2 million in illicit drugs (including cannabis, cocaine, hashish, and methamphetamine). Concurrently, investigators restrained CAD 8.7 million in bank accounts and cash, and an additional seven properties valued at approximately CAD 22 million. Notably, CAD 7 million of the forfeited value was obtained directly from the ringleader of the money‑laundering network, underscoring the effectiveness of asset tracing and restraint actions against principal targets. Provincial: International fraud case A complex, multi‑year international investigation led by Ontario’s provincial police into a large‑scale Ponzi scheme operating between 2012 and 2017 identified a scheme that defrauded more than 500 victims in Canada and abroad before the perpetrator fled to country “G”. The investigation required extensive cross‑jurisdictional co-operation and resulted in criminal charges in both Canada and country “G”. The perpetrator moved funds across multiple jurisdictions and financial institutions, complicating efforts to trace, restrain, and ultimately recover proceeds. The international dimension of the fraud and the rapid dissipation of funds underscored the need for co-ordinated action across Canadian competent authorities and foreign counterparts, including specialised financial‑crime units. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Serious Fraud Office led the investigation with the support of FINTRAC, CBSA, CRA, FAMG, RCMP, INTERPOL, law‑enforcement partners in country “G”, and members of the Camden Asset Recovery Inter‑Agency Network (CARIN) and the Asset Recovery Interagency Network for the Caribbean (ARIN-CARIB). Authorities obtained several Restraint Orders, enabling the seizure of approximately CAD 1.5 million in Canada. This was subsequently forfeited and later distributed to victims through a Restitution Order. International partners seized an additional USD 4 million in country “G”. The use of cloud‑based survey tools to efficiently collect victim statements enhanced the investigation, while provincial Victim Liaisons ensured real‑time communication with victims throughout the process. INTERPOL co-ordinated the deportation of the suspect to Canada, and foreign police, supported by an RCMP liaison officer, located and arrested the individual in 2020. In February 2022, the accused pled guilty to fraud over CAD 5 000 and laundering proceeds of crime and received a seven‑year custodial sentence. A fine‑in‑lieu of forfeiture of CAD 26.9 million was imposed, requiring repayment within five years of release; failure to pay may result in an additional prison term of up to seven years. 674. Shortcomings in asset tracing and provisional measures identified in core issues 8.2 and 8.3 materially impact forfeiture results, particularly under the CC framework. These stem, in part, from to the operation of fundamental principles of domestic law and the development of compliant mechanisms. The confluence of these shortcomings was clearly demonstrated in the case below (see Box 8.5). Box 8.5. Human trafficking investigation A year‑long police investigation into a human‑trafficking network operating across a major Canadian city. The investigation revealed a complex financial structure in which proceeds from sexual services were laundered through an extensive network of flow‑through bank accounts held in the names of stolen identities, third parties, and family members. Over 130 bank accounts were ultimately linked to the primary suspect. The case resulted in the identification of seven victims and charges against six individuals. The investigation originated in November 2020 from a referral from the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking (CCEHT) and FINTRAC, supported by a proactive disclosure indicating suspicious cash transactions, casino disbursements, and EFTs linked to the network. The police force’s proceeds of crime and asset forfeiture unit conducted a parallel financial investigation, using numerous Production Orders (bank and electronic funds transfer records) to map flows across 130+ accounts. Illicit proceeds (cash and electronic funds transfers) were deposited into accounts controlled centrally by the head of the organisation and moved through accounts of family members and ostensibly legitimate businesses. This commingling of illicit and lawful funds, combined with the use of multiple identity holders across all major financial institutions, materially increased complexity. The head of the organisation also displayed an illicit lifestyle consistent with the proceeds of crime. Forensic accountants from FAMG reconstructed financial activity to quantify illicit profits and expenditure patterns. In November 2021, police executed 20 search warrants, seizing ~CAD 4 million in cash (plus ~USD 4 000), ~CAD 3 million in illegal cannabis, and 34 firearms with ammunition. Partners included police services across the province, CBSA, FINTRAC, CRA, FAMG, CCEHT. Substantial tracing (banking/electronic funds transfer records and forensic accounting analysis) was conducted and discovered extensive commingling of legitimate funds and third party/family member control. Prosecutors and other competent authorities opted not to seek restraint of most of the accounts. Following a plea resolution in which ML charges were withdrawn, the primary suspect consented to criminal forfeiture of approximately CAD 4 000 000 and USD 3 291. A Co‑accused consented to approximately CAD 8 000 in additional forfeitures. The forfeiture outcome relied primarily on cash seizures and consent‑based forfeiture post‑plea; no significant bank account restraints converted to forfeiture, limiting the recovery of potentially larger value proceeds. The case evidences strong mobilisation of investigative tools (financial intelligence, forensic accounting, multi‑agency co-ordination) but shows that asset tracing does not consistently translate into comprehensive restraint and forfeiture in complex ML schemes, and that the presence of intermingling legitimate and criminal property and third‑party account control can be a contributing factor that can frustrate restraint and forfeiture. As a result, forfeiture outcomes were materially constrained, relying on seized cash and consent rather than broad recovery across the identified account network. 675. In the case study above, more than CAD 90 million was identified through financial intelligence and FAMG findings as being generated from a human trafficking business over the course of more than a decade. Despite the impressive investigative work by police, the overall forfeiture in this case was limited to approximately CAD 4 million in physical currency located in a safety deposit box. Several factors impacted the scope of the property that could be restrained, ultimately contributing to a more limited forfeiture. 676. Firstly (and most impactful) was the criminal nature of the asset recovery proceedings in this case. To remain within Jordan timeframes for the criminal matter, and within reasonable resourcing requirements, the criminal investigation focused only on the two-year period leading up to execution. During this period, approximately CAD 6 million was generated through the criminal enterprise. The criminal focus of this case limited the scope of what property could potentially be recovered from the outset as evidence collection only focussed on the criminal property amassed during the period of criminality under investigation, which required a higher standard of proof. 677. Secondly, asset tracing identified that the proceeds went through over 130 bank accounts under the effective control of the primary target. These were held in the names of family members and third parties (including businesses) not involved in the criminality (commingling of funds). As described in core issue 8.3, this common concealment tactic was an important factor that frustrated authorities from pursuing restraint of the majority of the accounts, which represented a significant amount of the proceeds generated across the period of criminality, significantly reducing the amount available for forfeiture. 678. Thirdly, much of the proceeds identified were traced as being spent on high value goods and on luxury condominium rentals. These were typically located outside of Canada and in a jurisdiction not amenable to international co-operation, frustrating their recovery. Payments for the rent of luxury condos could not be directly restrained as these had been made to a bona fide third party. A fine in lieu of forfeiture was not sought for amounts spent on these rental payments as they confer a temporary benefit (use of property for a specific period of time) despite their payment with proceeds of crime. 679. Finally, civil forfeiture was not separately sought in relation to these proceedings due to challenges tracing the specific proceeds, which had largely been moved beyond the jurisdiction. As provincial and territorial civil forfeiture frameworks do not have provisions enabling value-based confiscation, they would not have been effective in this case. PoCV – fines in lieu of forfeiture 680. The CC does not enable direct confiscation of PoCV. Instead, it allows the imposition of a fine in lieu of forfeiture of criminal property. The court may only order a fine in lieu of forfeiture where it is satisfied that forfeiture should be ordered but cannot be ordered due to specific circumstances. [59] When issued, the value of the fine is required to be equal to the value of the property that was proceeds of crime, and the Court cannot consider other factors (such as the ability of the offender to pay). Crucially, fines in lieu of forfeiture cannot be proactively enforced against other property of the offender and require the person subject to the fine to make payments. This distinguishes it from other value-based recovery processes and undermines its effectiveness. Other features, such as a lack of provisional measures (see 8.3) further reduce the utility of the model. Through this process, Canada has recovered PoCV to a very limited extent, federally recovering approximately CAD 7.6 million during the period under review (see Table 8.5). Table 8.5. Federal fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered and recovered FY Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture Ordered (CAD) Fine in Lieu of Forfeiture Recovered (CAD) 2019-2020 1 006 954 407 326 2020-2021 700 426 1 933 659 2021-2022 427 256 268 193 2022-2023 25 752 710 3 425 059 2023-2024 63 446 1 215 215 2024-2025 - 338 670 Gross Total 27 950 792 7 588 121 Source: Canada 681. The data provided on fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered is a minimum number, and is low in the context of Canada. As PPSC’s internal case management system does not track fines in lieu of forfeiture separately to other fines ordered in criminal matters, the true value recovered is likely somewhat higher. Nonetheless, there is a gap between fines in lieu of forfeiture ordered by courts and actual enforcement and collection of those amounts. 682. Canada reports that in federal cases where a fine in lieu of forfeiture ordered is over CAD 100 000, only one fine is currently categorised as in default. A lack of data beyond this (including for fines in lieu of forfeiture issued in provincial cases) suggests there are likely gaps in competent authorities’ ability to track and monitor the payment of fines in lieu of forfeiture, and that the true number of fines in default are higher. Additional information shared during interviews complements the finding that there are higher levels of default than demonstrated by the data, with some LEAs noting systemic issues in obtaining enforcement of fines in lieu of forfeiture. 683. Competent authorities report that where default on a fine in lieu of forfeiture is identified, it can be challenging to enforce payment in practice. This is despite the requirement for a term of imprisonment (additional to any term for the conviction) to be ordered in the event of default, where the offender has not paid, without a reasonable excuse (for which the onus to demonstrate is on the offender). Subjects of fines in lieu of forfeiture that are unable to pay cannot be subject to imprisonment as this does not meet the requires for a wilful refusal to pay ( R v. Wu , [2003] 3 SCR 530). 684. While ability to pay cannot be considered by the court when ordering a fine in lieu of forfeiture, it is in practice the crucial determinant for courts where competent authorities apply to enforce the order in the event of default. Canada reports that this is due to the application of Charter considerations by Courts. Canada reports that use of a general production order is gaining increasing judicial recognition (see R v. Neilsen , 2024 ACKB 767) as a tool that can be used post-conviction to support rebutting an offender’s argument on reasonable excuse, though the extent to which this occurs is unclear. Beyond this, it is unclear the extent to which the court examines broader criminal benefit or property beyond formal ownership in making this assessment. 685. This materially impacts the enforceability of fines in lieu that are in default and opens the potential for people subject to a fine to avoid paying it. For example, where a person has liquidated their property and spent it on expensive services they may have a genuine inability to pay that may result in them avoiding any additional imprisonment while not having to pay the fine amount despite having enjoyed the benefits. In contrast, where a person clearly owns assets that can be liquidated to pay this amount they may opt to do so, but the court cannot compel this. While this constitutes wilful refusal and would likely result in (additional) imprisonment, this may be an attractive option that allows the person to avoid repaying their criminal benefit. No other mechanisms to enforce recovery of a fine in lieu of forfeiture upon default have been used during the assessment period. This includes civil recovery through registration as a debt, which while reportedly an available option, has not been used in practice. The limited effectiveness of fines in lieu of forfeiture requires major improvements to enhance Canada’s ability to confiscate the benefits of crime. CRA-CIP 686. The CRA-CIP conducts criminal investigations into significant tax offences, which are then referred to PPSC for prosecution. Since 2022-23, CRA has begun to seek restraint and forfeiture under the CC to some extent (see Table 8.6). These volume of these results is lower than expected given tax evasion is assigned a high threat rating in the NRA, but CRA-CIP’s increased focus in this space is promising. To further enhance its focus on asset recovery CRA-CIP has developed and released a new ML and POC investigation policy and case management guidance (see core issue 7.1). This is a positive development, but it is too early to assess its impact. 687. This work is complemented by civil recovery by the CRA’s IIAP discussed in section 8.5.2, which has had further success in recovering assets to a greater extent. Table 8.6. CRA-CIP asset recovery outcomes Fiscal Year-End Ongoing Investigations Investigations where Assets Seized/ Restrained Value of Assets Seized/ Restrained (CAD) Investigations where Assets Forfeited (CAD) Value of Asset Forfeited (CAD) 2020-21 236 0 0 0 0 2021-22 205 0 0 0 0 2022-23 183 2 12 758 000 1 3 600 000 2023-24 175 2 6 650 000 2 5 015 000 2024-25 201 1 3 300 000 0 0 Source: Canada 8.5.2. Civil forfeiture 688. Non-conviction-based forfeiture is available under the CC in a limited number of circumstances, notably where a person charged has died or absconded before the conclusion of proceedings (s 462.38). This has not been used during the period under review. 689. Civil forfeiture is a provincial responsibility under Canada’s Constitutional division of powers, under which the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over administration of property and civil rights. Most provinces (except for Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador) and the Territory of Nunavut have implemented civil forfeiture frameworks. Those with such frameworks account for approximately 98% of the Canadian population, and all major cities, as well as the bulk of Canada’s exposure to money laundering and serious organised crime. The minor gaps in provincial uptake are not materially impacting effectiveness. Judicial civil forfeiture 690. Provincial/territorial civil forfeiture is a strength of the Canadian system and has delivered positive forfeiture outcomes, particularly in the provinces where it is prioritised as the key asset forfeiture mechanism (see Table 8.7). Across Canada, provincial/territorial civil forfeiture officers recovered approximately CAD 200 million during the period under review, with increasing trends in its usage across most provinces. Table 8.7. Consolidated provincial/territorial civil forfeiture (CAD millions) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total British Columbia 16.7 16.0 12.4 14.3 30.2 20.1 109.7 Alberta 3.1 2.3 2.7 6.2 6.6 4.0 24.9 Saskatchewan 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.2 1.3 2.5 11.3 Manitoba 0.7 2.7 11.8 7.0 4.0 6.6 32.8 Ontario 2.3 2.2 n/a 1.7 4.2 1.6 12.0 Québec 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.5 3.0 2.4 8.5 New Brunswick 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 2.2 Nova Scotia NIL NIL NIL NIL 0.1 0.0 0.1 Nunavut NIL NIL NIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 Total 24.6 25.2 30.1 33.0 49.6 37.3 199.8 Source: Canada 691. Use of civil forfeiture frameworks is fragmented. BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba achieve strong results through their proactive approach to civil forfeiture which commonly proceeds in parallel with any criminal proceeding. Ontario and Québec are more conservative with civil forfeiture. In these provinces the criminal prosecution takes primacy and civil forfeiture is only sought where criminal forfeiture is unavailable, unlikely to succeed, is less expedient, or has failed (in the case of Ontario). In Québec, if criminal forfeiture has failed, after a contested hearing or after the prosecutor unsuccessfully sought forfeiture of the property, civil forfeiture is not an option. The difference in approaches across these provinces is well demonstrated through case studies (See box 8.6). Box 8.6. Case studies illustrating differences in civil forfeiture approach across Canada’s material provinces British Columbia In December 2023, the BC Civil Forfeiture Office (CFO) secured the largest civil forfeiture in provincial history. A total of CAD 10 million was forfeited in real properties and bank accounts linked to a Canadian MSB alleged to have provided payment processing services to international criminal organizations. These criminal organisations were operating large‑scale fraud schemes targeting seniors and other vulnerable victims. The Vancouver Police Department referred the matter to the BC CFO, supported by FINTRAC intelligence. Assets were forfeited as proceeds and instruments of unlawful activity, demonstrating BC’s capacity to pursue high‑value civil forfeiture actions in complex financial crime cases. Alberta An investigation, led by Calgary Police Service, uncovered a sophisticated interprovincial money laundering network linked to illegal online cannabis sales. Drug proceeds were funnelled through shell companies, nominees, and MSBs. Subsequently, they moved through an IVTS style network to accounts across Canada, laundering an estimated CAD 100 million annually. Using financial intelligence, production orders, and multi‑jurisdictional co-operation, police traced funds and identified properties and accounts suitable for civil forfeiture. Although criminal charges did not proceed, civil forfeiture actions were successful. Authorities seized three cannabis farms, a mixed-use Vancouver property, and multi-million dollar accounts. This came to an approximate total of property valued at CAD 9 million, plus CAD 86 000 from an Alberta account. Cannabis seizures were valued at CAD 29 million. This case illustrates the effectiveness of civil forfeiture in depriving offenders of significant assets despite challenges in securing criminal convictions. Manitoba In November 2022, Manitoba’s Criminal Property Forfeiture (CPF) office forfeited eight properties and significant personal property (cash, bank accounts, jewellery, and equipment) worth over CAD 2 million. The investigation, led by Winnipeg Police Service’s Organized Crime Unit, targeted a long running drug trafficking network laundering proceeds through Manitoba casinos. CPF joined the operation prior to arrest, enabling the timely restraint of real properties and accounts identified as proceeds or instruments criminal activity. The eight forfeited residential properties were transferred to a non‑profit housing organisation for redevelopment and future use by low-income families. This demonstrates Manitoba’s effective use of civil forfeiture to both disrupt criminal activity and support community benefit. Saskatchewan In 2023, Saskatchewan Civil Forfeiture successfully forfeited CAD 555 929 following a joint investigation into a high level, interprovincial drug‑trafficking network. The work of Saskatoon Police Service, Calgary Police Service, and the RCMP resulted in three separate seizures which formed the basis for unopposed forfeiture applications: · CAD 207 820 linked to a courier exchange between suspects; · CAD 55 319 , drugs, and paraphernalia seized during searches of residences and vehicles; · CAD 292 790 seized in Alberta and returned to Saskatchewan for forfeiture. These actions show Saskatchewan’s ability to efficiently forfeit proceeds of crime even where suspects are not charged or criminal proceedings are ongoing. Ontario In 2023, Ontario secured the forfeiture of CAD 438 437 and USD 1 587 after a duffle bag of bundled and vacuum sealed currency was found in a locked hotel locker. The currency exhibited indicators consistent with drug‑trafficking proceeds. Forensic testing revealed cocaine residue. The claimant, who had a significant drug related criminal history, provided no credible lawful explanation. The AG reached a settlement for full forfeiture, approved by the Court. This case demonstrates Ontario’s ability to use civil forfeiture to disrupt illicit cash-based activity linked to organized crime. Québec In 2020-2021, the AGQ and BC CFO pursued parallel forfeiture actions following the death of an individual involved in narcotics production and cryptocurrency. BC forfeited over CAD 2 million from bank accounts, while Québec forfeited a property valued at approximately CAD 400 000. In 2022, The AGQ forfeited CAD 500 000 linked to the illegal production of cannabis on a farm operated by the owner’s family. The property was deemed an instrument of unlawful activity despite the owner’s claimed lack of knowledge. In 2023, the AGQ forfeited CAD 302,405 in cash linked to a drug trafficking network investigated by SPVM. Although the individuals controlling the funds could not be charged, they had no legitimate income to justify possession. The money was found to be proceeds and/or instruments of criminal activity. These cases collectively demonstrate Québec’s effective application of civil forfeiture to disrupt criminal proceeds across drug‑trafficking and financially sophisticated cases. 692. BC’s civil forfeiture framework is the most mature in Canada and achieves the most significant results. These are driven by BC’s proactive approach to civil forfeiture with LEAs referring cases with proceeds elements to the CFO to conduct detailed analysis and tracing, and to seek restraint and forfeiture. This culture has been embedded into LEAs operating in BC (notably VPD and RCMP E Division (comprising both FP and C&amp;IP)) which maintain effective working relationships with the BC CFO that maintain each agency’s independence. Under this model, asset recovery proceedings are not tied to any potential criminal proceedings. They can be brought without, before, or in parallel with any criminal process, ensuring that criminal property is secured and recovered at an early stage. This approach is first-in-class for provincial/territorial civil forfeiture in Canada and other provinces, such as Manitoba, are following suit. 693. The strengths of BC’s civil forfeiture framework were noted in the Report of the Cullen Commission, which also provided recommendations (see Box 8.2) to further enhance the effectiveness of BC’s civil forfeiture framework. Following the Cullen Commission, BC, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia have introduced unexplained wealth frameworks (see 8.1). The BC Supreme Court recently delivered a decision upholding the constitutional validity of UWOs in BC. Since its implementation, BC courts have issued UWOs in three cases totalling CAD 11.5 million. The Manitoba Court of King’s Bench has also issued a UWO under the Manitoba framework for CAD 412 000. Administrative forfeiture 694. To supplement the civil forfeiture mechanisms, provinces can forfeit property administratively, subject to certain preconditions. Except for Ontario and Alberta, these frameworks prescribe a monetary threshold (typically between CAD 75 000 and CAD 125 000) above which administrative forfeiture cannot be pursued. For forfeiture to be pursued through administrative means, a statutory process must be followed including the notification of any known interest holders. In the event a person claims an interest, administrative forfeiture must be discontinued and judicial civil forfeiture sought if appropriate. It is unclear to what extent this approach is used, although competent authorities with access to it view it as a useful tool to efficiently forfeit lower value assets where forfeiture is unopposed. By requiring persons to oppose the forfeiture, it is also a beneficial tool to identify potential owners for further investigation. 695. In addition to its criminal investigation mandate, CRA-IIAP (see core issue 7.4) utilises civil tax audit measures under the Income Tax Act and the Excise Tax Act for the for the civil recovery of unpaid tax liabilities suspected of being related to illicit activities. Where it is necessary to act quicky, the CRA-IIAP can request a ‘jeopardy order’. If granted by the court, it allows the use of administrative powers available to the CRA, such as garnishments or asset liens, to collect tax debts without delay. 696. As noted above, this is a recently introduced program. It has grown from one assessment in 2020-21 (its first full year of operation) to more than 100 assessments in 2024/25, valued at approximately CAD 83 million. While in its early stages, this model is proving an effective and useful tool in supporting more traditional asset recovery approaches as demonstrated in Table 8.8. Table 8.8. CRA IIAP assessments raised and collected 1 Fiscal Year Number of CRA-IIAP Assessments Amount Assessed (CAD) Amount Collected (CAD) 2019-20 0 0 0 2020-21 1 23 875 23 875 2021-22 5 363 200 260 672 2022-23 34 21 176 541 5 096 932 2023-24 84 53 011 674 2 260 636 2024-25 103 69 577 530 2 689 895 Source: Canada 1 Note, the difference between ‘assessed amounts’ and ‘collected amounts’ reflects the high rate of objections, during which the CRA cannot collect amounts due to the legal processes required to enforce payment in complex illicit income cases. Collections tied to legal actions are often recorded only once proceedings conclude. In cases where there is a more imminent threat of financial loss, the CRA can take legal action to accelerate debt recovery. When this approach is applied, the CRA recovers nearly 50% amounts owing within 18-24 months. 697. Revenu Québec uses similar civil audit measures to recover undeclared tax liabilities in Québec (see Table 8.9). Table 8.9. RQ civil tax assessments and recovery (CAD millions) Fiscal Year Tax Assessment Assessed Tax Recovered 2019-20 23.4 5.5 5.6 2020-21 0.0 5.1 0.5 2021-22 -0.2 5.3 0.6 2022-23 9.6 4.5 9.9 2023-24 10.8 n/a 8.0 2024-2025 (April 1-December 31) 7.0 -1.2 8.9 Source: Canada CBSA – seizure of goods as forfeit 698. CBSA’s recently adopted seizure as forfeit provisions (PCMLTFA, Part 2.1) for goods crossing the border provide an additional administrative seizure and forfeiture tool. They enable CBSA to respond to the high threat of cross-border commercial movements of illicit financial flows, and the challenges in applying ‘traditional’ asset recovery measures. The provisions require persons importing or exporting goods across the Canadian border to declare whether the goods are proceeds of crime, or related to ML, TF or sanctions evasions. Failing to do so, or making a false declaration, is a criminal offence (PCMLTFA s 74(1)). The provisions also apply in respect of any financial transaction purporting to pay for goods being imported or exported, but for which no goods have been shipped (i.e. phantom shipping). Goods that a CBSA investigator suspects are proceeds of crime, or related to ML, TF or sanctions evasion may be seized as forfeit (merits review and judicial appeal are available). In the case of phantom financial shipments where no goods exist, the amount paid or the stated value of the ‘goods’ may be seized as forfeit. 699. This is a novel approach to a challenging TBML typology and CBSA investigators are already working with stakeholders on relevant matters. The seizure as forfeit provisions for goods have yet to be used, as legislation only entered into force in April 2025, but are aimed at supporting CBSA’s efforts to address trade fraud, TBML and other cross-border movements of illicit financial flows through the international trade system. 8.5.3. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 700. Canada uses formal and informal international co-operation mechanisms occasionally to recover criminal property abroad. Following the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Georgiou, Canada can enforce incoming requests to recover PoCV. However, this has not occurred during the assessment period, which is questionable given Canada’s context and the extensive outreach that authorities have conducted. 701. MLA has typically been the preferred route for Canadian competent authorities to seek recovery of property abroad. Statistics demonstrate modest volumes of property restrained (CAD 11.3 million) and limited values confiscated (CAD 182 000) through outgoing asset recovery MLA requests. Informal co-operation is increasingly being used as civil forfeiture processes are also increasingly used by the provinces. Formal MLA is generally not available to support non-conviction-based recovery of property located abroad as Canada’s MLACMA only supports forfeiture through the CC framework and does not permit registration of foreign non-conviction-based orders, or transmission of provincial civil forfeiture orders to the foreign jurisdiction. In these cases, informal co-operation through provincial CFOs is the only available route. The total value of property recovered by provincial CFOs from incoming foreign requests was CAD 5,283,056. 702. During the assessment period, RCMP engaged on 477 files where it sought assistance through its liaison officer network relating to proceeds generating offences. These were not all specific to asset recovery, though RCMP notes that the majority involved a degree of asset identification. Of these, 10 requests were made to foreign partners to support asset restraint or forfeiture abroad. Mechanisms to support the recovery of criminal property located in the United States are the most mature and utilised resulting in in the recovery of property on both sides of the Canada-US border. This is aligned with Canada’s risk and context given the volume of cross-border criminal activity but the co-operation activity related to other would-be partners based on risk and context is less robust. The recovery of property from other countries that represent significant destinations for illicit wealth is more limited. A perception of foreign jurisdictions’ lack of willingness to support does dissuade competent authorities from requesting assistance. Case studies demonstrate Canadian assistance to incoming requests has contributed to important seizure outcomes in foreign jurisdictions. Footnotes [59] See Criminal Code subs 462.37(3): if the property or any part of or interest in the property (a) cannot be located, (b) has been transferred to a third party, (c) is located outside Canada, (d) has substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless, or has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="117. International co-operation is important for Canada due to the transnational nature of its ML/TF threats and the open nature of its financial, commercial, and economic systems. The US is Canada’s primary partner in commercial and financial trade. The Canadian financial system is widely developed and globally interconnected. Providing assistance and seeking assistance from foreign counterparts is key to the global fight against ML/TF which Canadian competent authorities clearly recognise. Canada’s most strategic partner for international co-operation is the US. Additional partners are countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Australia. 118. The report’s findings are based on statistics on MLA, extradition and other forms of international co-operation; cases and examples; feedback from 68 jurisdictions from the Global Network, including most of Canada’s strategic partners; interviews with all the relevant competent authorities and other data. 119. The International Assistance Group (IAG), in the Criminal Law Operations Section, in the National Litigation Sector of the Department of Justice Canada, is the central authority (CA) for Canada. It reviews and co-ordinates all extradition and MLA requests made either by or to Canada. On a day-to-day basis, the IAG works with foreign and Canadian competent authorities, providing them with assistance and support in relation to MLA and extradition. 120. Starting in 2019-2020, a new electronic case management system was adopted, allowing IAG to monitor all requests and track events, updates and final outcomes, as well as to manage records. This tool is a positive instrument that helps Canadian authorities to maintain a clear overview of incoming and outgoing MLA and extradition requests, including their prioritization, status, and deadlines. Incoming urgent ML/TF MLA and extradition requests are prioritized and dispatched within hours by senior staff at IAG, including outside office hours. Incoming requests are prioritized based on urgency, including where there is a risk of evidence being lost, risk of dissipation of assets, flight of fugitive, and/or public safety concerns. Where the incoming request is not flagged as urgent but falls under one of the above-mentioned categories, IAG proactively contacts international partners to properly assess urgency and to address any quality issues, if needed. 121. IAG is adequately staffed with 38 lawyers and 14 paralegals, supported by 14 legal assistants. Some of the lawyers are posted abroad in the most relevant foreign partners jurisdictions, as liaison counsellors to facilitate formal and informal international co-operation. The IAG’s staff members bring a range of expertise, including a specialization in geographic regions or types of cases. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 122. In Canada MLA is available to multilateral or bilateral treaty partners as well as “Designated States or Entities” listed in the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA). Canada has bilateral treaties in force with 35 foreign states, including neighbouring countries and relevant commercial counterparts. In the absence of a listing in the MLACMA or a relevant treaty, Canada can provide assistance pursuant to court issued non-treaty letters of request (letters rogatory), non-treaty letters of request, and administrative arrangements. Pursuant to MLACMA, Canada may enter into an administrative arrangement with a State or Entity for the purpose of giving effect to a request for MLA in a particular case. During the relevant period, Canada entered into 15 administrative arrangements. Twelve ML MLA requests were received from non-partner countries during the review period. Of these 12 requests, 7 were fully executed, while the remaining 5 were either withdrawn (in 2 cases the requesting state did not reply to Canada’s request to clarify the legal grounds to proceed in the absence of a treaty, while in 2 other cases the requesting State did not respond to Canada’s request to provide the location of the witness to interview, or the type of evidence sought) or abandoned (in 1 case, because the evidence was no longer required) by the requesting country. 123. In the period under review, Canada received 4 577 incoming MLA requests across all offences. A total of 464 MLA requests arose from the investigation or prosecution of ML (451) and TF (13) offences, mostly from the US, other countries from the Americas and Europe, and a small percentage from other regions, in line with Canada’s risk profile (see Table 2.1). 124. Most of the MLA requests received relate to fraud (42%), corruption and bribery (11%), illicit drug trafficking (10%), which is consistent with Canada’s risk profile. 72% of incoming MLA requests related to drug trafficking involved OCGs (34 out of 47 requests), which is in line with Canada's risk and context. Additional incoming requests are related to robbery and theft (6%), counterfeiting (3%), TF (3%), and other crimes (33%) [18] . Some requests relate to more than one type of offence. 125. Most of the incoming ML/TF MLA requests have been executed (63%), with high degree of execution for MLAs related to high-risk predicate offences such as fraud (73%) and drug trafficking (61%) (see Box 2.1). Some of the more recent incoming MLA requests are ongoing (22.8%) and a small percentage was refused by Canada (about 2%) [19] . A number of requests were withdrawn (5.8%) or abandoned (6%) by the requesting country. With respect to refusals, they are generally communicated in advance to try to address any gaps. Most of the incoming MLA requests were executed within 12 (ML) to 13 (TF) months (See Table 2.2). Urgent ML MLA requests are executed by Canada more rapidly, on average within five (5) months, while urgent TF MLA are executed on average within 17 months. In cases where it took more than six (6) months to execute the requests, these were related to complex cases. Such cases take time to ascertain all the requirements are met; collect additional information; manage delays in obtaining or complying with a judicial authorization; manage additional time requests by competent authorities and identify and resolve electronic case management system anomalies. Statistics show that in 103 cases (36%), Canada required more than one year to provide assistance and in 28 cases (10%) Canada required between 2 and 5 years. There are 17 MLA requests (4%) received between 2019 and 2022 which are still ongoing. This is due to delays in execution by executing authorities and/or regional counsel; requests for additional information from requesting states; and assessing compliance with treaty and legal requirements in complex cases. This data and statistical data do indicate inconsistencies in recording timeframes of executing requests, which is considered as not consistently timely. In urgent cases, case studies demonstrate that assistance provided was timely. Moreover, where provided, Canada’s assistance is constructive and generally of good quality. 126. Foreign counterparts make use of MLA mostly for compelled or voluntary production of documentary evidence (61%) (such as financial transaction records, business records, accounts’ owners); voluntary or compelled witness interview (16%); corporate information, both basic (12%) and, occasionally). A small percentage of documentary evidence is related to beneficial ownership records (1%). Box 2.1. Case of effective incoming MLA In June 2022, country “B” made an MLA request to Canada to advance an anti-corruption and ML investigation. The suspects allegedly laundered proceeds of crime arising from the corruption of a public official using shell companies with ties to Canada and other jurisdictions and illegally transferred assets worth billions of dollars. Country “B” requested assistance in obtaining business records related to the beneficial ownership and movement of the impugned assets. IAG prioritized the request as there was a risk that high value assets would dissipate. The IAG worked closely with their counterpart in country “B” to address information gaps. Once the request was perfected, Canadian authorities sought a court order for the production of records. The court application was made on a confidential basis, so as to protect the integrity of the investigation in country “B”. Pursuant to a Canadian court order, the requested records were produced and sent to country “B”. The request was executed in full in March 2023. The investigation in country “B” is still going on and remains confidential, however, the authorities in country “B” have confirmed the importance of the evidence to their investigation and thanked Canada for the efficient manner in which the assistance was provided. Source: Canada Table 2.1. Incoming ML/TF MLA requests Fiscal year (fy) Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total 2019-2020 62 6 8 0 4 80 2020-2021 55 5 7 1 6 74 2021-2022 58 7 5 4 7 81 2022-2023 64 5 4 0 14 87 2023-2024 40 4 2 1 28 75 2024-2025 15 0 2 3 47 67 Total 294 27 28 9 106 464 Note: Data updated as of 29 September 2025. Of the 110 in progress MLA requests, 16 are currently in progress in the requesting country. Source: Canada Table 2.2. Time to execute incoming MLA requests Time Total 1 - 6 mo 109 6 - 9 mo 35 9 mo - 1 yr 43 1 - 2 yrs 75 2 - 5 yrs 28 Total 290* Note: Data as of 29 September 2025. *The discrepancy with the total number of executed requests in Table 2.1 is attributable to four cases for which Canada provided incomplete data regarding execution timelines. Source: Canada 127. International co-operation feedback shows that Canada’s responses to MLA requests are generally useful and of good quality, when provided. One country reported a lack of assistance due to the absence of a treaty. Three reported that it was not possible to receive the requested documents, such as civil and financial documents . Some foreign counterparts underlined that differences in legal systems contributed to delays. Two countries also highlighted the responsiveness of Canada’s CA and one country noted Canada’s willingness to work together to understand differences between legal systems, which has led to some improvements in timeliness. 2.1.2. Extradition 128. Extradition is available to bilateral (51) or multilateral (26) treaty partners, as well as “States and Entities” designated in the Extradition Act (31 States and three international courts or tribunals). Extradition is available to Canada’s most relevant partners. Canada also has the ability to execute incoming extradition requests pursuant to case specific agreements. During the period under review, Canada did not conclude any new agreements; however, bilateral negotiations were reportedly ongoing to expand the treaty network. Dual criminality must be assessed. There is no bar to extraditing nationals under Canadian law and Canada has extradited Canadian citizens. Canada’s legal framework for executing extradition requests involves multiple Ministerial and judicial steps. This process altogether can be time-consuming as the process must balance efficiency with the protection of individual liberty under domestic law. 129. Canada has received 469 extradition requests across all offence types (see Table 2.3). A total of 65 extradition requests arose from the prosecution of ML (52) and TF (13) offences. Canada executed 18 out of 52 ML and predicate extradition requests on average within 18 months, coming mostly from the US, in line with Canada’s risk profile. Notably, none of the 13 TF extradition request were executed. Most urgent requests (additional 20 out of 25) for provisional arrest were executed by Canada within 2 days or less (40%) or within 4 to 6 days (33%), depending on whether the person sought was readily located. Pursuant to the Extradition Act , urgent requests for provisional arrest can be made by the requesting country or entity, which must be followed by the receipt of a formal extradition request. Majority of the incoming extradition requests are related to fraud (14), TF (13), organized crime (6) and drug trafficking (6). TF is largely low volume, characterized by low-value transactions and limited financial flows, as set out in the 2025 NRA. The relatively high percentage of TF-related requests is because the majority (11 out of 13) were received from only two countries, related to two international terrorist groups. 130. 45% of the incoming regular ML and TF-extradition requests are ongoing, and at different stages of execution (see Table 2.4). Half of the ongoing ML extradition requests are starting the judicial or Ministerial phase, while the remaining are under review. 12% are awaiting additional information from the requesting state or in litigation, as Ministerial decisions to surrender may be subject to judicial review before the appellate courts. 17% were refused by Canada, primarily due to the person sought was not located in Canada or the requesting state was not an extradition partner. Others were withdrawn (8%) or abandoned (3%) by the requesting state. Two TF requests were abandoned by the requesting State following the requests for additional information by Canada in order to meet the double criminality requirement. When provided, assistance is constructive and mostly of good quality. 131. There are four ongoing TF extradition requests as of the onsite. During the period under review two requests were abandoned by the requesting state as they failed to respond to Canada’s requests for additional information and to meet the double criminality requirement; and six were refused by Canada for different reasons (person sought was not located in Canada, absence of treaty or other legal basis to execute the requests, Minister of Justice discharged the person from extradition at the surrender stage of extradition). [20] 132. Nevertheless, Canada showed constructive co-operation with respect to these TF requests. Efforts were made to assist the extradition partners in improving the quality of their requests by travelling to requesting states (2) for in-person targeted consultations and conducting follow-up virtual meetings to monitor progress. Regarding the six organised crime extradition requests received, none was executed: one was refused for failing to meet the treaty requirements, including meeting definition of organized crime, and three were withdrawn by the requesting country. The remaining two are ongoing, in one case Canada met in person with the requesting State to provide further guidance on the request for additional information, in the other request, Canada is trying to locate the person sought. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests Executed – extradited Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Regular 18 5 2 11 29 65 Provisional Arrests 20 2 1 2 0 25 Total 38 7 3 13 29 90 Note: Of the 29 in progress extradition requests, 12 are currently in progress in the requesting country. Source: Canada Table 2.4. Time to execute incoming extradition requests Time Regular Provisional Arrests 1 - 6 mo 1 20 6 - 9 mo 2 0 9 mo - 1 yr 4 0 1 - 2 yrs 8 0 2 - 5 yrs 3 0 Total 18 0 Source: Canada 133. International co-operation feedback, underlined Canada’s positive assistance for extradition requests and good practice to hold bilateral periodical meetings to facilitate a fruitful collaboration. Five countries, including one main partner, specifically underlined the length of the process due to the number of requests for further information leading to delays, and for one country, the refusal of requests. Two countries reported instances where requests were returned for not meeting legal requirements and three countries reported that Canada did not provide assistance due to the lack of a treaty or any legal basis. Several civil law system countries highlighted challenges in obtaining international co-operation due to the difference with Canada’s common law system. This is due to the differing standards of evidence required. To address this issue Canada constructively had direct contact with the counterpart States, provided training to extradition partners and, to reduce the need for additional information, provided mock extradition requests to foreign partners tailored to fraud and drug trafficking cases. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 134. Pursuant to multilateral and bilateral treaties, Canada has the ability to directly enforce foreign freezing, confiscation and seizure orders to trace assets and enforce foreign criminal fines, including restitution orders. 135. In contrast to MLA generally, dual criminality is required as a basis for providing MLA for asset recovery. For incoming confiscation MLA requests, IAG legal counsel must also determine if any of the grounds for refusal are present. A senior legal counsel acts as the IAG asset recovery co-ordinator to ensure a consistent approach to criminal asset recovery MLA requests, and monitors the process to avoid dissipation of assets. 136. Canada has executed 8 (18%) of the 45 asset recovery incoming requests (5 requests for freezing orders and 3 requests for confiscation orders), across all offences, which is limited. Of these requests, 32 (71%) were ML related, while none of the requests were TF related, which is in line with Canada’s risk profile. Most of the confiscation requests were received from the US, which is also in line with Canada’s risk and context. Asset freezing requests are mostly received from other counterparts, including a non-partner country [21] . Around a quarter of these requests are ongoing (both in Canada and in the requesting state). Case studies provided by Canada show that assistance was provided to foreign jurisdictions; however, figures show that competent authorities’ assistance with incoming requests to freeze, confiscate and share criminal property and property of corresponding value (PoCV) is limited (see table 2.5). Assets restrained following the enforcement of a freezing order amounted to CAD 21.8 million [22] , while the total amount requested by foreign jurisdictions was not provided by Canada. Out of the total of CAD 17.5 million of assets sought for confiscation by foreign counterparts, only CAD 1.4 million was confiscated (8%), including CAD 1 million shared with the requesting states. 137. The majority of the 38 freezing requests were withdrawn, abandoned or refused (25) while none of the 7 confiscation requests were withdrawn, abandoned or refused (see Table 2.5). For the abandoned and withdrawn freezing requests, 70.5% of the requests (12 of 17) failed to provide the foreign order. MLACMA requires a copy of the foreign order to execute these requests. In all cases, Canada requested and did not receive a copy of the order. Refused requests were due to proceeds not being located in Canada, no funds were available on the account, or the request failed to meet Canada’s legal requirements for execution. In all of these latter cases, Canada provided guidance to the requesting State who was unable to address those gaps. Twelve freezing and confiscation requests were ongoing during the assessment period: f5 requests under review to ensure MLACMA requirements were met; 4 cases required additional information from requesting states; 2 cases are in the process of being executed; and one is in litigation as the enforcement of the confiscation order was being contested. Challenges in tracing and restraining intermingled property and property beyond the person’s legal ownership, are considered contributing factors to the lack of execution of freeze and confiscation requests (see IO.8). Additionally, following the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Georgiou it is now broadly accepted that Canada can enforce incoming requests to recover proceeds of corresponding value (PoCV). This has not yet occurred, which is inconsistent with Canada’s risk and extensive outreach. 138. Overall, in several cases Canada requested additional information to the requesting State. Most of the incoming asset recovery requests were executed within a period of more than 18 months. Canada’s main counterpart reports competent authorities are quick in restraining asset, but significant delays were reported in returning the confiscated funds. Table 2.5. 2019-2025: Incoming asset recovery MLA requests – Freezing orders and confiscations Type of MLA request Executed Withdrawn Abandoned Refused Ongoing Total Freezing orders 5 8 9 8 8 38 Confiscations 3 0 0 0 4 7 Total 8 8 9 8 12 45 Source: Canada 139. There is limited international co-operation feedback on Canada’s effectiveness in providing assistance in asset recovery. Whilst Canada is reported to quickly restrain assets at the behest of the requesting country’s authorities, it also reported that the legislative mandate of a minimum 10% cut off the top of any assets slated for sharing undermines the counterparts’ ability to seek to fully compensate victims of crime. The cut off percentage raises up to 50% or 90% depending on the contributions of each jurisdiction to the confiscation. While it is appropriate for Canadian competent authorities to retain a portion as reimbursement of expenses related to the confiscation and investigations, this can dissuade foreign counterpart countries from requesting asset recovery MLA. Delays in return of forfeiture to the requesting State can also be ascribed to the once yearly process for adjudicating asset sharing requests for both domestic and international matters. 140. Provincial CFOs cannot utilise formal MLA and require MOUs with foreign counterparts to co-operate. During the period under review, the BC and Alberta CFOs collectively received six incoming requests for asset confiscation. Half of the received requests are concluded, taking an average of 1-2 years to complete. To date, approximately 10% of confiscated assets were shared with the foreign counterparts. International co-operation feedback on NCB confiscations is mixed. 141. Competent authorities’ assistance with incoming requests to freeze, confiscate and share criminal property and PoCV are moderate over the review period. Constructiveness and quality of assistance provided is low in terms of the number of requests executed (many still ongoing), timeliness (mostly over 18 months) and amounts confiscated (8%) and shared (CAD 1 million over CAD 17.5 million sought). The modest assistance in asset recovery through formal MLA is only partially offset by LEA’s use of informal measures. These are focussed on identification and tracing efforts through CARIN and RCMP’s LO network. Evidence that these resulted in assets being restrained and confiscated in Canada or abroad is unclear. Footnotes [18] Other crimes include the following offences: Abuse of duties; Abuse of trust; Accounting Offenses; Aiding and Abetting; Aggravated damage to computer data; Breach of trust; Breach of economic sanctions; Conspiracy to commit illicit drug trafficking, fraud, organized crime, bribery, other smuggling/trafficking, illegal gambling, corruption; Crime against the economic order; Copyright infringement; Counterfeit cheques; Cybercrimes; Embezzlement; Extortion; Fraudulent evasion of duties; False accounting; False declaration; False statements on loan applications; Falsification of public documents; Financial abuse; Fraudulent trading; Hacking; Hidden funding of political parties; Human smuggling and trafficking; Illegal gambling; Illegal mining; Illicit enrichment by an official; Illicit streaming; Infringement on bankruptcy; Influence peddling; Insider trading; Issuance of no funds cheque; Intrusion into computer systems; Misappropriation; Misconduct; Operating an unlicensed money transmitting business; Other smuggling and trafficking; Pimping (procuring prostitution); Prohibited foreign trade practices by domestic concerns; Possession of forged document; Possession and publication of child pornography; Receiving stolen goods; (Autonomous) sanctions evasion; Sale of stolen vehicles; Tax offences; Transferring criminal property; Unlawful computer access; Unlawfully recording data; Uttering a forged document. [19] Reason for refusals are the following (9 requests): the evidence was not located in Canada (2); there was insufficient information to meet Canada’s legal threshold to apply for the required MLA court order and Canada provided guidance to the requesting states who were unfortunately unable to address the gaps (4); could not be executed due to COVID-19 restrictions (1), could not be advanced as to do so would have been contrary to Canada’s public interest (2), [20] One request was full executed after the period under review in January 2026, and the person sought was surrended. [21] In all three cases, Canada attempted to obtain additional information from the requesting state to determine a legal basis to proceed. In two cases, the non-partner country did not provide the required information and the requests were abandoned. In the other case, it was withdrawn after the non partner country informed Canada that the assistance was no longer needed for the foreign investigation. [22] An additional CAD 730 000 was recently confiscated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 218. The supervisory authority, FINTRAC generally demonstrates a good understanding of the ML/TF risks in different sectors based on sectoral risk assessments which use Canada’s NRA as a foundational input to identify, assess, and understand the ML/TF risks associated with each sector. This baseline is enhanced through the integration of strategic research, publicly available information, and analysis of data contained in the transaction reports submitted by FIs and VASPs to FINTRAC which consolidates these insights into a sectoral risk outlook. FINTRAC has also enhanced its identification of emerging risks relevant to different sectors through collaboration with domestic and international partners, either through joint partnerships on specific projects, including public-private partnerships mentioned in IO.6, in its regular participation in international projects at the Egmont Group and FATF, or participation in projects with provinces. Among various types of FIs, the NRA assessed the ML/TF vulnerabilities of DSIBs, MSBs and VASPs as Very High; and those of non-DSIB banks, CU/CP, securities dealers, trust and loans companies as High. 219. Canada’s NRA serves as the primary reference for sectoral and entity level risk analysis. The latest NRA (3 rd ) was published in August 2025, two years after the 2 nd NRA in 2023. There was an 8-year period between the 1 st NRA (in 2015) and 2 nd NRA. As noted in IO.1, the NRA is complemented by sectoral and thematic risk assessments, strategic intelligence products, risk-based guidance and assessments of evolving threats and vulnerabilities produced by intelligence and operational partners of Canada’s AML/CFT regime. FINTRAC produced multiple strategic intelligence reports relevant to the VA and VASP sector and published several operational alerts and indicators relevant to fraud, tax evasion, sanctions evasion, human trafficking and TF. From 2020 to 2025, sixteen strategic intelligence reports were published and were shared with the private sector through various channels, including industry forum and Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 220. Until 2024, FINTRAC used the Compliance Risk Model (CRM) to support annual examination planning of all reporting entities, which primarily predicted the likelihood of non-compliance rather than assessing the inherent ML/TF risks of the individual sectors and reporting entities. The annual operational plan for FY2023/24 is high- level and there was no information to support that FIs and VASPs were selected for on-site examination and other supervisory activities based on the results of CRM assessment and sectoral risk assessment. The FY2024/25 plan mainly focused on supervisory resource allocation and there was no articulation of how supervisory work priority and activities were developed based on the assessment of sectoral risk and individual institutions. FINTRAC has not fully satisfied assessors that regulated entities are selected for supervisory activities on the basis of risk. 221. In December 2024, FINTRAC adopted a new Supervision Risk Model (SRM), a model developed to quantify the inherent ML/TF risks associated with individual reporting entities with a view to differentiating the ML/TF risk profiles of FIs and VASPs to support FINTRAC’s risk-based supervision. In addition to the SRM assessment results, FINTRAC takes into consideration intelligence and information from various sources in determining the ML/TF risk profile of individual FIs or VASPs. These include public data, intelligence notices from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence unit, monetary threshold reports, additional information from regulatory partners, and non-compliance reports voluntarily filed by FIs and VASPs; and information collected through supervisory activities (e.g. risk questionnaire and past compliance assessments). FINTRAC regards this as a multi-pronged approach to risk assessment and understanding and updates the risk profiles of sectors and reporting entities at least annually to support the planning of its supervisory activities considering this additional information. 222. Under the SRM, an FI or VASP which submitted STRs or monetary threshold reports in the past 3 years is assigned a risk score informed by eleven indicators, including the risk level of each sector in the NRA. Any FI or VASP which did not file any STR or monetary threshold reports in the past 3 years (referred to as a “non-reporter”) is assessed as either “potentially high risk” or “no flag”. A non-reporter will only be flagged as “Potentially high risk” if it is flagged in an STR filed by another reporting entity; or its geographic location is in a high-risk location/jurisdiction prescribed by FINTRAC; or if there is any intelligence /adverse news suggesting potentially high ML/TF risks. The inherent risk of a non-reporter with “no flag” is regarded as “being consistent with the sectoral risk level in the NRA” by default, essentially meant that the ML/TF risk profile of each of these non-reporters is not differentiated or assessed within the SRM. 223. Most of the eleven indicators of the SRM primarily focus on geographical risks, quantitative figures and ratios compiled based on the transactions reported in STRs and the monetary threshold reports. There is no consideration of different customer types, business lines, or products and services of an FI or VASP in the assessment of the inherent ML/TF risk profile. It does not differentiate MSBs which include virtual asset operations (i.e. VASPs), and those which do not (e.g. remitters). At present, the SRM lacks sophistication and granularity, and is not adequate for assessing the risk profile of FIs, particularly those which have large and complex business operations, and different activities which do not all share the same risk profile, including many banks and securities firms, and particularly the DSIBs. FINTRAC obtains this information as noted in paragraph 220 above to complement the SRM. In practice, information about ML/TF profile of FRFIs is collected through regular information exchange mechanism with OSFI. In addition, a large portion of banks were subject to information collection exercise (over 80% subject to risk questionnaire from FY2021/22 to FY2024/25). However, for securities firms, information was collected on only a minimal portion (less than 1%) through risk questionnaires or monitoring meetings in the same period. FINTRAC indicated that information exchange with the CIRO help its understanding on the difference in ML/TF risk profile across broad categories of securities dealers. However, no supporting evidence was provided to demonstrate how the information collected is translated into institutional risk profile of securities dealers. FINTRAC also recognises room for enhancement of the SRM in this regard and plans to integrate residual risk or supervisory outputs into the model. 224. The SRM is over-reliant on data contained in STR and transaction reporting to the FIU and therefore struggles to adequately assess risks of non-reporters. It also does not differentiate between MSBs which include virtual asset operations (i.e. VASPs), and those which do not (e.g. remitters). Based on the assessment results generated from the SRM for the annual operational planning of supervisory activities of FINTRAC for FY2025/2026, about 79% of FIs and VASPs are non-reporters, of which less than 1% were flagged as potentially high risk. As a result, the inherent risk profile of the vast majority of non-reporters has not been assessed. In particular, more than 90% of the FIs in the securities sector and about 80% of MSBs (including VASPs) are non-reporters. FINTRAC takes into consideration various sources of intelligence collected in its ongoing surveillance process to inform the ML/TF risk profiles of individual FIs and VASPs. This additional information collected through supervisory activities (e.g. information collection through risk questionnaire from selected reporting entities), or driven by events which is by its nature ad hoc and reactive, covers only a small portion of FIs and VASPs. Given the identified gaps, the assessment team is of the view that FINTRAC has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of ML/TF risks of each non-FRFI and VASP which is fundamental for risk-based AML/CFT supervision. 225. Subsequent to the onsite visit, FINTRAC provided examples of “entity risk profile” documents of non-reporters [30] to illustrate how FINTRAC’s risk assessments combine and consider the various sources of information. The document contains a very brief summary setting out any sources of information / intelligence suggesting an entity faced “elevated risk” relative to the sector baseline, rationale of selection for supervisory activities, sector risk profile, business risk indicators (all inputted as “sectoral baseline” by default unless there is intelligence suggesting “elevated risks”), compliance risk indicator (showing past supervisory activities and the assessment results). For a non-reporter which has not been subject to any intelligence or information suggesting “elevated risk” in any one of business risk indicators or any past supervisory activities, its risk profile is marked as “sectoral baseline” (i.e. consistent with the sectoral risk level), with a decision marked as “not selected this time”. However, the assessment team understands that this “entity risk profile” is not prepared as a normal part of FINTRAC’s risk assessment processes for each regulated entity, as the information contained is scattered in different internal systems. The Assessment Team (AT) is of the view that – even if it were used in supervisory planning- the documents still could not address the gap that a large portion of non-FRFIs and VASPs whose risk profiles are not assessed. 226. FINTRAC has started collecting further information about the business profile and AML/CFT compliance programmes of more reporting entities through expanded risk questionnaires in FY2025/26 to assist its understanding of the risk profile of individual reporting entities as part of its supervisory activities. However, the information collection exercise does not cover the entire supervisory population and is applied selectively. For FY2025/2026 annual operational plan based on the SRM results, about 3.9% of non-reporters whose inherent risk profiles were not assessed are selected for information collection through risk questionnaire, and they are mainly securities firms. Risk questionnaires are not prioritised for MSB and VASP sectors as FINTRAC uses the registration process which needs review every two years as a comparable desk-based review mechanism. The scope of information for registration or registration renewal purpose includes, among others, approximate annual value of all foreign exchange transactions and all other MSB services or activities, names of beneficial owners and the AML officer, business addresses which is not considered adequate to facilitate entity level ML/TF risk profile assessment. In practice, analysis of such information is not conducted for assessing the ML/TF risk profile of each of the MSBs / VASPs which are non-reporters. Table 3.1. Breakdown of FIs and VASPs by risk categories Sector Vulnerability Rating (NRA 2025) Number of Entities by Risk Category Number of Non-reporter Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk “No flag” Total number of entities* Banks - DSIB Very High 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 Banks - non- DSIB High 0 11 15 38 0 4 68 CU/CP High 28 125 45 7 0 0 205 Securities High 0 0 29 66 1 1 328 1 424 Life insurance Medium 0 0 4 15 3 34 56 Trust and loan High 0 18 9 10 0 16 53 MSB (including VASP) Medium to Very High 32 161 176 317 12 2 854 3 552 Sub-total 64 317 278 453 16 4 236 5 364 Source: Canada * Data source from Risk Outlook 2025-26. The SRM population is different from the estimated‑population of each FI sectors because the SRM includes active and inactive entities. However, for banks, securities, insurance, trust and loan companies, the number of entities under SRM is smaller than the total population of their sector but Canada is unable to reconcile the numbers **. Mortgage lenders are newly regulated in 2024 and have not yet been assessed under SRM 227. As far as FRFIs are concerned, in additional to FINTRAC’s institutional ML/TF profile assessment, OSFI, the prudential regulator also conducts its own risk assessment on each FRFI from prudential supervision perspective. OSFI’s supervisory framework translates supervisory insights directly into an FRFI’s Overall Risk Rating (ORR), an 8-point scale risk rating system with four categories assessing the level of overall risk to the financial viability (risk of failure) of an FRFI. The four categories are business risk, financial resilience, operational resilience, and risk governance. AML/CFT control issues are included, among other things, in the assessment of risk governance, though OSFI’s primary focus of its prudential supervision is not on AML/CFT controls. OSFI’s supervisory focus is on the effectiveness of the FRFI’s governance, and oversight of cultures risk as they are important controls for integrity and security, including ML/TF risks. The AML control weaknesses can directly inform the ORR and trigger proportionate intervention. Examples of supervisory interventions include enhanced monitoring and targeted restrictions on one end of the spectrum, to capital or liquidity orders, variation of business authorities (including limitations), removal of directors or officers, or, in extreme cases, taking control (please also refer to 3.6). 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 228. FINTRAC collaborates with the Department of Finance and other agencies as required to conduct extensive outreach and consultation with industry, including on new and revised guidance, reporting forms, the NRA, and the implementation of regulatory amendments. It promotes a clear understanding amongst FIs and VASPs of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations through a range of engagements including in-person meetings, presentations, conferences and training sessions. 229. Finance Canada and FINTRAC disseminated the findings of the 2025 NRA Report prior to its publication through the Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ACMLTF) NRA working group. Following the publication of the 2023 and 2025 NRA Reports, Finance Canada and FINTRAC also met with reporting entities to promote a strong understanding of these risks. In addition to the dissemination of NRA Reports, FINTRAC enhances awareness of ML/TF risks through proactive communication and outreach. This includes the regular publication of operational briefs, guidance, bulletins, and ML/TF indicators that provide reporting entities with vital information on risks and mitigation strategies. 230. FINTRAC undertook over 110 engagement activities over the review period to promote risk and compliance awareness, comprising outreach activities with FIs and VASP, industry associations, provincial and federal regulators, and other stakeholders. These included virtual and in-person meetings, presentations, conferences, training sessions. Other examples include communication with the banking sector through the Canadian Bankers Association; monthly meetings and ad hoc meetings on technical discussions of FINTRAC Reporting Working Group, and the Cassels Brock Small and Medium Sized Bank Forum; banks forum hosted by FINTRAC in 2023 and 2024; webinars / virtual meetings targeting credit unions in 2022 and 2024; FINTRAC’s active participations in various events organised by CIRO and other industry associations of securities sectors as speakers. Footnotes [30] At the face-to-face meeting." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="541. Case studies demonstrate that ML is prosecuted to some extent. During the assessment period, there were 70 LPOC convictions in relation to 58 persons, and 12,960 guilty verdicts on PPOC/TPOC and PPOCPT charges in relation to 9 924 persons. 542. Prosecutors are adept at navigating the R v Jordan timeframes and have applied several strategies to ensure prosecutions are conducted and concluded within a reasonable time. This includes severing the ML prosecution from any predicate offence and proceeding with it separately. Where trial in a superior court would be appropriate, steps are to be taken to bring the charges to that court on an expedited basis. The strategies are functioning as there has not been a notable increase in the number of criminal proceedings stayed (for ML or associated predicate offences) during the period under review. Prioritisation of predicate convictions 543. Canada’s criminal justice system utilises resolution agreements (such as plea bargains) to ensure its efficient functioning, which is the result of many criminal matters. Extensive use of resolution agreements is a legitimate tool to facilitate efficient criminal justice outcomes in a manner consistent with Canada’s fundamental principles of domestic law. 544. Canada’s various prosecution services have guidelines for prosecutors. These guidelines provide that charges with lower maximum penalties may be dropped to secure a conviction on the charge with the highest maximum penalty through a resolution agreement. For example, where an accused facing serious drug charges is ready to accept a significant custodial sentence for those charges, prosecutors may elect to withdraw the ML charge rather than using finite judicial resources to conduct a trial on all charges. Global resolution agreements may require that the accused accept responsibility for broader factual elements of their criminal activity, which may include accepting responsibility for the facts relating to ML activity. The accused’s willingness to concede forfeiture of the proceeds of crime is also a relevant consideration. 545. Major predicate offences such as drug trafficking and fraud carry higher maximum penalties (up to life imprisonment and 14 years, respectively) than LPOC or PPOC offences (10 years). Resolution agreements would typically withdraw the LPOC or PPOC element to secure the predicate conviction. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below demonstrate this trend, showing when cases reach the prosecution stage, ML charges are commonly withdrawn to secure resolution agreements. Table 7.5. Adult criminal courts, money laundering offences (MLO) cases (considering all charges in a case) by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type All MLOs – all charges (including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 8 642 5 603 5 596 5 799 6 608 32 248 Acquitted 98 70 27 35 41 271 Stay of proceeding 1 445 1 225 1 255 1 197 1 264 6 386 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 3 040 2 654 3 125 3 106 3 662 15 587 Other decisions 60 44 35 48 49 236 Total 13 285 9 596 10 038 10 185 11 624 54 728 Source: Canada Note: Tables 7.6 through 7.11 do not include cases from Québec in 2021-22 onward and certain courts in Ontario Table 7.6. Adult criminal courts, money laundering offences (MLO) cases (only considering MLO charges) by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type All MLOs (only MLO charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 3 599 2 409 2 195 2 235 2 592 13 030 Acquitted 159 98 28 39 55 379 Stay of proceeding 2 797 2 233 1 989 1 961 1 977 10 957 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 6 640 4 785 5 782 5 879 6 934 30 020 Other decisions 90 71 44 71 66 342 Total 13 285 9 596 10 038 10 185 11 624 54 728 Source: Canada 546. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 both report the total number of cases with at least one LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge. Table 7.5 provides the outcome in relation to all charges (including predicate offence charges) and shows that out of 54 728 cases concluded over the period, nearly 59% ended in findings of guilt on at least one charge. Where only the outcome on the LPOC or PPOC charge (Table 7.6) is considered, charges are withdrawn or stayed in 75% of cases. 547. This trend becomes clearer when each of the MLOs is separated out: Table 7.7. Adult criminal courts, PPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type PPOC (all charges including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 8 266 357 5 364 5 527 6 387 30 901 Acquitted 93 68 27 32 38 258 Stay of proceeding 1 385 1 151 1 199 1 144 1 220 6 099 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 2 904 2 554 2 970 2 990 3 525 14 943 Other decisions 51 33 32 41 40 197 Total 12 699 9 163 9 592 9 734 11 210 52 398 Decision Type PPOC (only PPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 3,446 2,305 2,096 2,117 2,492 12,456 Acquitted 152 96 27 36 52 363 Stay of proceeding 2,698 2,133 1,920 1,894 1,919 10,564 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 6,325 4,573 5,509 5,636 6,698 28,741 Other decisions 78 56 40 51 49 274 Total 12,699 9,163 9,592 9,734 11,210 52,398 Source: Canada Table 7.8. Adult criminal courts, TPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type TPOC (all charges, including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 334 206 178 247 205 1 170 Acquitted 5 - 1 2 4 12 Stay of proceeding 43 52 41 38 26 200 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 97 70 103 92 120 482 Other decisions 5 7 2 5 5 24 Total 484 335 325 384 360 1 888 Decision Type TPOC (only TPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 121 76 77 96 83 453 Acquitted 7 - 1 1 4 13 Stay of proceeding 71 84 54 74 45 328 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 274 165 189 200 220 1 048 Other decisions 11 10 4 13 8 46 Total 484 335 325 384 360 1 888 Source: Canada Table 7.9. Adult criminal courts, PPOCPT by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type PPOCPT (all charges, including predicates) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 97 87 74 94 83 435 Acquitted 1 1 1 1 1 5 Stay of proceeding 11 23 11 16 22 83 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 50 30 43 33 66 222 Other decisions 1 3 2 1 1 8 Total 160 144 131 145 173 753 Decision Type PPOCPT (only PPOCPT charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 31 23 21 25 24 124 Acquitted 2 1 0 0 0 5 Stay of proceeding 26 36 14 20 20 123 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 99 81 94 95 115 484 Other decisions 2 3 2 5 5 17 Total 160 144 131 145 173 753 Source: Canada 548. For PPOC (Table 7.7), 59% of cases ended in a finding of guilt on either the PPOC charge or the predicate charge. Looking only at the decision on the PPOC charge, 24% of PPOC charges result in a guilty decision and the PPOC charge is withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed in 75% of cases. For PPOC, this high withdrawal rate is understandable, as the offence is often charged as an adjunct to predicate offences such as theft or when charged on a standalone basis, typically involves low level criminal conduct (possession or self-laundering) where prosecution may not be in the public interest and diversionary measures may be appropriate. During the assessment period, 9 461 persons were convicted of a charge of PPOC. 549. For TPOC (Table 7.8) a similar trend emerges with 62% of cases ended in a finding of guilt on either the TPOC charge or the predicate charge, and only 24% of TPOC charges resulting in a guilty decision. Given the more serious nature of TPOC, it is a concern that the TPOC charge is being withdrawn in 73% of cases. 364 persons were convicted of TPOC Similarly for PPOCPT (Table 7.9), 58% of cases led to a finding of guilt on either the PPOCPT charge or the predicate charge. Where only the PPOCPT charge is considered, only 16% of charges result in conviction.99 persons were convicted of PPOCPT. 550. For LPOC, the conviction rate is lower, which is a concern given the already modest number of charges (see Table 7.10). Table 7.10. Adult criminal courts, LPOC by type of decision, Canada, 2019-2024 Decision Type LPOC (all charges, including predicates) 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 Total Guilty 77 62 59 75 56 329 Acquitted 1 1 0 1 1 4 Stay of proceeding 13 17 25 23 17 95 Withdrawn/Dismissed/Discharged 42 44 77 46 52 261 Other decisions 3 4 1 2 4 14 Total 136 128 162 147 130 703 Decision Type LPOC (only LPOC charge) 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 14 20 11 14 11 70 Acquitted 1 1 - 2 1 5 Stay of proceeding 24 29 25 22 18 118 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 93 73 125 102 95 488 Other decisions 4 5 1 7 5 22 Total 136 128 162 147 130 703 Source: Canada Note: Tables 7.5 through 7.10 do not include cases from Québec in 2021-22 onward and certain courts in Ontario 551. In LPOC cases, 47% of all cases resulted in a finding of guilt on either the LPOC charge or the predicate charge. However, only 10% of LPOC charges resulted in a guilty decision and the LPOC charge was withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed in 86% of cases. 552. Ultimately, this resulted in 70 LPOC convictions in relation to 58 individuals. While acknowledging Canada’s approach prioritises predicate offences for resolution agreements, the lower conviction rate for LPOC can also be attributed to the relative difficulty of proving LPOC. These cases represent the most significant, sophisticated and complex ML activity that is investigated and prosecuted in Canada. 553. From these tables in approaching the prosecution of ML, Canada is prioritising securing a conviction on the predicate offence at the expense of securing an ML conviction. Prosecutors withdraw ML charges at a high rate to secure resolution agreements for a predicate offence with a higher maximum penalty. 554. While ML is viewed as serious, obtaining a conviction for ML is seen as having a less dissuasive impact in deterring offending than convictions for serious and visible predicate offences such as illicit drugs and fraud. This is reflected in prosecutors’ approaches to securing resolution agreements and reflects a system that prioritises convictions on the charge with the highest maximum penalty, yet places ML below several of the key predicate offence types in Canada. This is despite ML being the key enabler for organised crime in Canada and reinforces the findings in IO.1 that the Canadian system lacks a strong appreciation of social and economic harms caused by ML. Standalone and Professional ML 555. Resolution agreements do not fully explain the challenges Canada experiences in prosecuting ML, particularly in the absence of a predicate offence (particularly for LPOC). Of the 54 728 cases completed that included at least one LPOC or PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT charge (set out in the tables above), 5 269 were ‘standalone’ cases (See table 7.11). 556. While data was not available to break this down by MLO, by extrapolating the data from table 7.3, potentially up to 87 of these include standalone LPOC charges (though a number of these are likely to be ongoing and therefore not reflected in the table below (Table 7.11)), potentially in combination with PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT offences. Table 7.11. Adult Criminal Courts, Money Laundering Offence (MLO) Standalone Cases by Type of Decision, 2019-2024 Decision Type Fiscal Year 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Guilty 291 140 105 118 147 801 Acquitted 18 15 3 1 2 39 Stay of Proceeding 281 216 220 198 176 1 091 Withdrawn/Dismissed/ Discharged 579 540 683 616 882 3 300 Other 8 8 6 8 8 38 Total 1 177 919 1,017 941 1 215 5 269 Source: Canada 557. The assessment acknowledges limitations in this dataset. A single standalone ML charge may not reflect standalone money laundering activity. Conversely, a number of charges may represent standalone PML with a number of other charges unrelated to the Professional ML offence (unrelated predicates, administration of justice charges). Despite these limitations the dataset is important, given the need to understand Canada’s efforts to investigate and prosecute standalone and professional ML. 558. As these are standalone cases, resolution agreements do not explain why charges were withdrawn/dismissed/discharged or stayed at a rate of 83%. Data is not available solely on the outcome of standalone ML charges. 559. These challenges are particularly prominent in the prosecution of sophisticated Professional ML. During the assessment period only a small number of cases involving Professional ML were prosecuted resulting in convictions for ML. (see Box 7.4). Box 7.4. Case Studies – Professional Money Laundering Québec PML matter In 2020, the RCMP’s Integrated Proceeds of Crime unit in Montreal launched an investigation into a professional money laundering network following an assistance request from a foreign LEA. The case involved sophisticated international movement of drug proceeds through shell companies and cross‑border cash transfers. Working with the foreign LEA, RCMP conducted a covert cash pickup of USD 560 000 in Montreal destined for a Colombian cocaine exporter. Using production orders, financial intelligence from FINTRAC, forensic accounting support from FAMG, and tax information from CRA, investigators traced more than CAD 18 million laundered in under a year. In July 2021, RCMP executed search warrants and arrested four suspects. Three individuals were charged with laundering the proceeds of crime without being charged with a predicate offence, reinforcing Canada’s prioritisation of standalone and professional ML prosecutions. All three pled guilty and received prison sentences of 30–36 months. Seizures included cash, prohibited firearms, and bookkeeping records. R v Ste Marie In 2016, several individuals operating a financial services business, Groupe Ste‑Marie, were convicted of professional money laundering, conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime, and gangsterism. The group provided services including credit recovery, currency conversion, and the creation of offshore bank accounts in Mauritius. They used these services to help members of the Hells Angels Trois‑Rivières chapter move funds offshore and later repatriate them for use in Canada. The court found that the accused were wilfully blind to the criminal origin of the funds and knowingly provided laundering services to individuals involved in drug trafficking and ML. The convictions were based on extensive electronic surveillance, documentary evidence, multiple financial transactions across various accounts, the creation of shell companies, and statements made to undercover officers. Importantly, the prosecution did not need to prove the precise criminal origin of the funds, only that the accused were wilfully blind and believed they were dealing with proceeds of crime. The Québec Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed them in 2022, finding no breach of trial‑delay rights. Sentences ranged from 42 to 72 months. 560. The cases above show Canada has demonstrated some success against Professional ML activity. It is modest in the context of Professional ML’s presence in a significant portion of proceeds generating crime, particularly large-scale and sophisticated activity. Interviews with competent authorities showed that significant resources are being invested into securing recent high-priority convictions, and that addressing Professional ML is both an investigatory and prosecution priority. Competent authorities also had clear awareness of the challenges associated with prosecuting Professional ML, and standalone ML in the absence of a predicate offence. 561. These challenges arise from the practical application of elements of Canada’s ML offence provisions when applied to the typologies employed by sophisticated PML groups. Notably, the need to prove knowledge or belief of a particular offence (though the offence itself does not need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt) has prevented them from being used to effectively prosecute Professional ML. 562. Building on prosecutors’ experiences, Justice Canada has developed several amendments to the Criminal Code to address these challenges. These amendments have entered into force in recent years. Except for the new mens rea of recklessness, these amendments are only relevant where the accused is not charged with a predicate offence. They are responsive to the Canadian context and are a positive step demonstrating Canada’s commitment to strengthening its effectiveness in prosecuting ML in line with its risk. These are recent amendments and their impact is yet to be tested in cases or by the courts. 563. Despite recent successes of LEAs and prosecutors in high profile PML cases, outcomes are generally modest against standalone and PML activity. Major improvements are required in this respect. Legal persons 564. Legal persons and arrangements are rarely prosecuted for ML in Canada (see Table 7.12 below). This is particularly the case for corporate ownership structures including shell companies. Investigators and prosecutors prioritise the prosecution of the natural persons behind these structures where possible, aided by access to beneficial ownership information (see IO 5). While at high risk of exploitation for ML, competent authorities consider the disruptive and deterrent effect of prosecuting the controlling natural person to be greater than prosecuting the legal entity directly. For shell companies, this is a reasonable approach given the more significant disruptive impact of prosecuting the controlling natural persons, rather than a replaceable shell company which can be better disrupted through administrative action, such as deregistering. Canada has had some success in prosecuting gatekeepers (including lawyers, accountants and real estate professionals) for ML but have focussed on the individual actor rather than the firm or company. For other legal persons beyond shell companies however, prosecutions for ML can have a significant impact, and the lack of these does not correspond to Canada’s risk profile. Prosecution of reporting entities for facilitating ML is limited and authorities respond to serious breaches of the PCMLTFA with civil measures rather than prosecutions for ML (see IOs 3 and 4). Competent authorities pursue action to forfeit the relevant legal persons (and their assets) as instrumentalities of crime to a more limited extent, missing opportunities to further disrupt criminal infrastructure and further deter the use of legitimate companies to commingle criminal proceeds. As noted above, Canada’s shortcomings in prosecuting ML generally impact the effectiveness of this strategy. A similar approach is taken for trusts, which do not present as great an ML risk. Table 7.12. MLO cases involving legal persons Accused Fiscal Year 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Total Company 2 0 4 0 0 6 Source: Canada In addition to statistics in Table 7.13, Canada provided an example of a corporation being actively prosecuted for ML during the period under review. Canada has prosecuted and convicted individuals in connection with corporations implicated in illicit activities (R v Ste Marie, SNC Lavalin), as well as corporations themselves for predicate offences (but not ML). Table 7.13. Number of corporations convicted in cases investigated by CRA-CIP Entity 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Grand Total Number of Corporations Convicted 3 9 4 13 1 30 Criminal Code - Fraud - 4 2 2 - - 8 Excise Tax Act 1 2 2 11 - 1 17 Income Tax Act 2 4 - - - 2 8 Total Charges Convicted 3 10 4 13 0 3 33 Source: Canada" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="745. In 2019-2025, the PPSC initiated terrorism proceedings against 30 individuals, with four of these individuals’ cases involving prosecution for terrorist financing. Canada’s rate of TF prosecutions is low in absolute terms, but this is consistent with the country’s low level of terrorist and TF threats, as set out above. Overall, the authorities have a good understanding of the TF threat environment, and the number of prosecutions for terrorism offences and specifically for TF offences is consistent with the threat. 746. PPSC provides legal advice and support to the RCMP during all TF investigations. A prosecution is undertaken if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and the prosecution is in the public interest. Early advice from PPSC is available and routinely given in TF investigations in order to ensure sustainable prosecution. 747. Charter protections providing the right to a fair trial - engaging comprehensive court-related disclosure requirements (R v Stinchcombe) and stringent time limits for trials ( R v Jordan ) - can impact on more complex criminal investigations. PPSC and the RCMP have been proactive in overcoming these issues by ensuring disclosure is ready for the first court hearing and the PPSC have filed direct indictments pursuant to s. 577 of the Criminal Code. 748. TF-related investigations are often resolved due to charges laid under other provisions of the Criminal Code such as ML related offences, or through other disruption methods (see Section 9.5). This however could take away from the TF offences. That said, the conviction obtained in May 2025 in relation to Project Sabin (see box 9.4 below) shows that RCMP and PPSC can successfully obtain convictions for TF offences, including in the context of complex and multi-jurisdiction activity. Box 9.4. Project Sabin In 2020, the RCMP received foreign partner intelligence from the US and Spanish authorities regarding a Canadian citizen suspected of terrorist financing for the benefit of the Islamic State (ISIS). The intelligence indicated that a 34-year-old Toronto, Ontario resident was raising funds online under the guise of posting links seeking donations for supporting humanitarian causes. However, the funds were distributed abroad for the benefit of ISIS. In March 2021, RCMP-INSET began investigating the suspect and the pro-ISIS fundraising operation in Canada. The suspect allegedly conspired with an overseas member of the Islamic State to commit terrorist attacks against foreign embassies in Afghanistan and provided propaganda and research related to attacks conducted in Afghanistan against foreign nationals. It is alleged that the suspect is part of an international network of Islamic State supporters who utilize online and encrypted messaging platforms to provide recruitment and financial support to ISIS. A FINTRAC disclosure was critical to identifying the suspect and providing insight into the methods being used for ML and terrorist financing. In addition, RCMP-INSET employed various advanced investigative techniques to further collect information and evidence. The financial intelligence received, and the investigative efforts helped determine that the suspect conducted fundraising operations with fake accounts and wired funds abroad using money remittance companies to ISIS facilitators in several countries such as the US as well as high-risk jurisdictions within Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The suspect is alleged to have transferred funds from Canadian cryptocurrency wallets in support of ISIS. On 28 July 2023, based on the findings in their investigation, the RCMP arrested the suspect and charged him with terrorism-related offences, including one TF offence. Pursuant to the Criminal Code, the individual was charged with: · s. 83.03 – Providing, making, available property and services for terrorist purposes, · s. 83.18 – Participation in activity of terrorist group, and · s. 83.19 – Facilitating terrorist activity. In conjunction with the Canadian suspect’s arrest, three subjects were arrested and charged in the US in connection with the alleged scheme. RCMP-INSET collaborated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and Canadian provincial and municipal police services for police-to-police sharing. Further, the RCMP utilized the Canadian Forensic Accounting Management Group to uncover financial leads and leveraged FINTRAC’s financial intelligence with VIRs to establish the grounds for production orders in the tracing of money flows. The arrest and subsequent charges of the primary Canadian suspect obtained significant media coverage in large Canadian and American publications. The media coverage highlighted the RCMP’s commitment to fighting terrorist financing regardless of the methods being used. On 12 May 2025, the charged Canadian individual plead guilty to two (2) of the three (3) terrorism-related charges, s. 83.03 Providing, making, available property and services for terrorist purposes, and s. 83.19 Facilitating terrorist activity. The remaining charge was stayed considering the acknowledgement of the facts related to that charge as part of the guilty plea. The individual was sentenced to six (6) years per charge to be served consecutively for a total of 12 years of imprisonment, less the time already served in pre-trail custody. The individual will also need to serve half of the sentence before being released on full parole, pursuant to s. 743.6(1.2) of the Criminal Code and will be subjected to a weapons prohibition order, pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, following his release." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 322. Based on the results of the examinations, the majority of DNFBPs demonstrate an overall understanding of their obligations of CDD, record-keeping and BO information, and are required to comply with mitigation measures under the PCMLTFA. However, the degree of compliance varies depending on the sector and the nature of the obligations. Casinos 323. Casinos display a strong understanding of their ML/TF obligations, as demonstrated in FINTRAC assessment results for 2020-2025 when no casinos were assessed as deficient with verifying identity and record keeping (see Tables 4.5. and 4.6). Casinos typically exhibit robust measures in conducting CDD and maintaining meticulous record-keeping practices. They effectively utilize their internal client risk monitoring systems, which include comprehensive reviews for clients deemed high-risk. Many casinos included information on ML/TF indicators and scenarios common to the casino sector within their policies and procedures. Casinos should continue to build awareness and implement processes so that changes in a client's risk profile trigger appropriate and proportional ongoing monitoring as required by the PCMLTFA. DPMS 324. The DPMS sector demonstrates a moderate understanding of CDD obligations for verifying identity and record keeping, particularly in identifying clients and in obtaining the origin of funds for large cash transactions over CAD 10 000 as required by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR). Between 2020-2025, 3% of assessed DPMS (1.8% of the total number of reporting DPMS as of 1 April 2025) were deficient in their obligation to verify identity, and none were deficient in regard to record keeping (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). However, the DPMS sector should improve ongoing monitoring of existing business relationships to detect potential structuring of transactions and other suspicious indicators. Real estate 325. Overall, the real estate sector displays a moderate understanding and compliance with CDD obligations. Based on FINTRAC’s supervisory data 3.4% of the total number of reporting real estate entities had been subject to examination as of 1 April 2025, although the majority of the assessed real estate entities were “compliant” with obligations to verify identity, most of them were ”partially compliant” with record keeping obligations (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Further improvements are expected, particularly through the broader dissemination of templates by national industrial associations such as Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA). Additionally, common deficiencies cited in sanctions issued by FINTRAC stem from brokerages not fully understanding how to conduct ongoing monitoring on their business relationships and applying effective controls or enhanced measures when their transactions involve higher risk clients or transactions (e.g., those involving third parties). Accountants 326. Overall, this sector demonstrates moderate compliance with obligations, as 27% of assessed entities were ”deficient” with obligations to verify identity and 14% were ”deficient” in record keeping, per FINTRAC data (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). FINTRAC has observed that there is room for improvement in the policies and procedures concerning the verification of beneficial ownership and PEPs, and that some accountants need to enhance their record-keeping practices to meet the amended legislation and regulations, especially in verifying identities for transactions over CAD 3 000. BC notaries 327. BC Notaries generally understand their compliance obligations well, especially verifying client identity and documenting beneficial ownership information. FINTRAC observed that, although many notaries conduct ongoing monitoring and larger corporations use client management software, they do not detail the steps on how it is conducted in their policies and procedures. A common deficiency in record keeping note by FINTRAC within the BC Notaries sector is the recording of non-descriptive occupations (e.g. “manager” or “supervisor”). Table 4.5. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Verifying Identity (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 89% 11% 0% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 82% 16% 3% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 71% 7% 22% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 55% 18% 27% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 94% 3% 3% Source: FINTRAC Table 4.6. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Record Keeping (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 64% 36% 0% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 66% 34% 0% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 16% 81% 3% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 29% 57% 14% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 14% 86% 0% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 328. All law societies have rules, by-laws or codes of conduct regarding CDD, record-keeping and BO information (Also see R.22.1 and R.22.2). During the interviews in the on-site visit, lawyers seemed to have a sound understanding of law societies’ rules and to implement them properly. There are no legally binding rules or regulations specified to ongoing monitoring from AML/CFT perspectives, although lawyers are required to assess and monitor whether there is a risk that the lawyer may be aiding or encouraging fraud or other illegal conduct, and the FLSC has issued guidance on monitoring obligations. While sanctions by law societies have been imposed in cases of obligation breaches, law societies do not gather specific data or statistics to understand trends on lawyers’ overall level of compliance. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 329. Based on the results of the examinations, DNFBPs demonstrate near universal compliance with the application of special measures when high risk is identified (See Table 4.7). However, efforts in respect of policies and procedures governing PEPs differ across sectors, which FINTRAC assesses under general policies and procedures (See Table 4.10). Casinos 330. Casinos are proactive in implementing policies for enhanced due diligence, including for PEPs. Larger casinos often use third-party services to verify clients against sanctions lists, particularly concerning high-risk jurisdictions. Regarding new technologies such as online gaming, casinos regularly update their risk assessments and take mitigation measures to address risks in collaboration with relevant regulatory authorities. DPMS 331. DPMS businesses are exposed to high-risk clients such as PEPs and transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions. According to FINTRAC assessments based on the examinations, most DPMS businesses demonstrate an understanding of the obligations related to PEP clients and transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions and generally implement measures to mitigate these risks. FINTRAC observed that some DPMS lack understanding of PEP obligations, including the inclusion of family members or close associates, and application of enhanced due diligence measures. Real estate 332. The real estate sector may deal with high-risk clients including PEPs and foreign investors from high-risk jurisdictions. While FINTRAC has observed a growing awareness among brokerages of the increased risks associated with transactions involving PEPs/HIOs, high-risk countries, and involvement of unidentified third parties, further implementation efforts are required for PEP policies and procedures. Although updated forms now include PEP/HIO checks, most brokerages lack measures for verifying the source of funds for PEPs. There is still inadequate implementation of enhanced or specific measures. For example, most brokerages lack measures for verifying the source of funds for higher-risk clients or transactions. Accountants 333. Although the majority of Canadian firms operate primarily within the domestic market, larger firms which have international operations or connections may have exposure to high-risk jurisdictions or PEPs. According to FINTRAC assessments, all assessed accountant entities were compliant with obligations to implement special measures for high-risk clients (see Table 4.7). BC notaries 334. Their exposure to high-risk clients and transactions is relatively low due to the size of this sector, and due to their services being confined to the jurisdiction of British Columbia. Although there are some deficiencies in policy, procedures and risk assessments, documentation and accessibility of information on high-risk clients and transactions are generally well-maintained within the sector. Table 4.7. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Special Measures (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 86% 5% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 91% 3% 6% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 98% 1% 1% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 100% 0% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 97% 0% 3% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 335. During the interviews in the on-site visit, lawyers demonstrated an understanding of the obligations related to PEPs and high-risk jurisdictions, as well as the necessity of implementing enhanced measures in light of those risks. However, considering that lawyers and law firms in Canada are not subject to PEP or enhanced due diligence (EDD) requirements and there are no statistics regarding enhanced measures, Canada did not demonstrate evidence that lawyers effectively implement mitigating measures for PEPs, new technologies or high-risk countries. The FLSC and certain law societies have issued guidance to assist the legal profession in managing and mitigating higher ML/TF risks, including guidance in relation to PEPs/HIOs and in client matters involving higher country risks as well as limited guidance on new technologies. Additional steps are necessary to promote understanding of the importance of enhanced measures and ensure their implementation, further promoting such guidance developed by the FLSC and law societies. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 336. The volume of suspicious transaction reports (STR) filed with FINTRAC varies depending on several factors, including COVID-19 and format changes. First, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant drop in reporting in 2020–21, primarily due to reduced activity in the casino sector, with volumes rebounding since 2022–23. Second, the transition to second-generation (Gen 2) reporting completed in 2024, introduced changes to reporting forms that also affected report volumes, because the new format asks entities to consolidate multiple, relevant transactions into one report. 337. DNFBPs (except casinos) submit a lower-than-expected volume of STRs despite the vulnerability of the sector, which limits FINTRAC’s access to DNFBP transactional behaviour (See 6.1. for further details). The number of LPEPRs submitted by DNFBPs is also limited (See 10.2 for further details). Casinos 338. Casinos continue to account for more than 90% of the total of DNFBPs’ AML/CFT suspicious transaction reports. During the pandemic, as the brick-and-mortar casinos were closed, the casino sector experienced a noticeable decline in their STRs. However, 2022-23 marked a significant turnaround, with report volumes rebounding to levels comparable to those seen in the pre-pandemic period. Casinos have strong compliance with reporting obligations (See Table 4.8). DPMS 339. Although the DPMS sector experienced a notable increase in STR filing in 2024-25 compared to previous years (See Table 4.8.), the number of STRs remains at a low level considering the high ML/TF risks in this sector. Continued FINTRAC engagement and operationalization by industry would help further increase STR volume in line with the sector’s high-risk profile. Real estate 340. The real estate sector is traditionally characterized by low reporting volumes. Although FINTRAC’s outreach to the sector has resulted in STR reporting doubling from 2020-21 to 2022-23 (See Table 4.8.), the number of STRs continues to be at a low level considering the high risk of this sector. Continued FINTRAC engagement and operationalization by industry would help further increase STR volume in line with the sector’s high-risk profile. Accountants 341. The volume of STRs submitted by accountants is low and does not fully align with their vulnerability level (See Table 4.8). Continued awareness-raising activities by FINTRAC and provincial/territorial CPA bodies may help increase STR volume in line with the NRA risk profile. BC notaries 342. The number of STRs from BC Notaries is also low but consistent with their small population and risk profile (See Table 4.8). The sector is frequently reminded during examinations that STRs must be reported as soon as practicable. 343. Reporting entities generally have strong measures to prohibit their staff from tipping off. FINTRAC verifies during its examinations whether provisions to prevent tipping off are included in DNFBPs’ internal policies, controls and as part of their internal training content as required. To date, FINTRAC has not found any cases of reporting entities tipping off people that may have been the subject to an STR, as this obligation is well understood by reporting entities. Table 4.8. Number of STRs Filed by DNFBPs Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Casinos 19 2 091 5 138 9 427 10 780 6 169 33 605 DPMS 3 000 176 174 197 167 375 1 089 Real Estate 7 742 126 256 280 247 190 1 099 Accountants 1 000 1 2 4 3 0 10 BC Notaries 293 10 12 15 13 7 57 Total 12 054 2 404 5 582 9 923 11 210 6 741 35 860 (Casinos’ share of the total) (0.16%) (86.98%) (92.05%) (95.00%) (96.16%) (91.51%) (93.71%) Source: Canada For the legal profession 344. Lawyers in Canada are exempted from requirements to file suspicious transaction reports when they are providing legal services (PCMLTFA s. 10.1). 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 345. During the interviews in the on-site visit, examples were observed in several sectors where sanction screening and system-driven transaction monitoring were conducted. For example, casinos described quality assurance processes by second line of defence and conducted internal audit by third line of defence. The content and level of detail of the internal control applied vary according to the scale and business model of DNFBPs. Regarding policies and procedures, deficiencies have been identified by FINTRAC in all DNFBP sectors, including casinos with robust AML/CFT regimes. Compliance officer 346. FINTRAC assesses reporting entities’ compliance with the requirements to appoint a compliance officer who is responsible for implementing their compliance program. The compliance rate in DPMS and real estate sectors is lower than in other sectors, and there remains room for improvement. Establishing an independent compliance officer is necessary to further strengthen AML/CFT controls including detecting of unusual activities and reporting of STRs. Table 4.9. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Compliance Officer (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ”Partially compliant”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 91% 0% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 76% 10% 14% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 82% 12% 6% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 100% 0% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 95% 5% 0% Source: FINTRAC Policies and procedures 347. Larger entities are sophisticated in terms of their understanding and compliance with their obligations. The majority of small to mid-sized DNFBP entities are compliant or partially compliant in meeting their obligations. The most common deficiencies observed by FINTRAC include some incomplete compliance policies and procedures, which means that the reporting entity missed certain elements in its documents applicable to its operations and regulatory obligations, or did not fully apply its documented compliance program in practice. Table 4.10. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Policies and Procedures (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially complaint ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 13% 81% 6% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 13% 69% 19% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 16% 72% 12% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 0% 100% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 14% 81% 5% Source: FINTRAC Training program and two-year review 348. Over the past five years, FINTRAC has observed an increase among DNFBPs in their understanding and execution of ongoing compliance training programs and two-year review, as required by the PCMLTFA and its regulations. Overall, entities have become better at creating and implementing plans to deliver consistent training and have a documented strategy for periodic effectiveness reviews of their compliance programs, reassessed every two years. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC utilized a risk questionnaire in the casino sector to proactively assess casinos’ self-reported compliance with training programs and two-year reviews, in order to inform its risk-based supervision of the sector. This resulted in a larger number of casino examinations in 2024-25 that uncovered deficiencies in these areas. Through further utilization of risk questionnaires, more sophisticated risk-based supervision can be conducted. Table 4.11. Supervisory Findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Training Program (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 64% 27% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 51% 33% 15% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 53% 34% 13% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 57% 29% 14% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 64% 27% 9% Source: FINTRAC Table 4.12. Supervisory Findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Two-Year Review (2020-2025) [43] Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 79% 7% 14% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 55% 21% 23% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 56% 18% 26% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 80% 0% 20% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 59% 12% 29% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 349. Some examples were presented in which lawyers performed sanctions screening during on-boarding, and suspicious requests were examined by internal committees of law firms. The FLSC has also issued non-binding risk assessment guidance regarding AML/CFT internal controls and compliance programs. However, lawyers are not subject to any formal requirements in respect of the establishment and implementation of AML/CFT compliance programs by law societies’ rules or regulations. As such, Canada did not demonstrate evidence that lawyers effectively implement internal controls to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 350. There are no major legal or regulatory requirements that impede the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigation measures, both for DNFBP sectors, other than lawyers. In a 2015 decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada , the Supreme Court of Canada held that the PCMLTFA’s client identification and verification, record-keeping and search and seizure provisions, which then applied to lawyers, infringed Sections 7 and 8 of the Charter by providing inadequate safeguards for solicitor‑client privilege and interfering with a lawyer’s duty of commitment to their client’s cause. Lawyers and law firms were thus excluded from the operation of those provisions, which represents a gap in Canada’s current AML/CFT framework. Footnotes [43] Source: FINTRAC’s supervisory data." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 322. Based on the results of the examinations, the majority of DNFBPs demonstrate an overall understanding of their obligations of CDD, record-keeping and BO information, and are required to comply with mitigation measures under the PCMLTFA. However, the degree of compliance varies depending on the sector and the nature of the obligations. Casinos 323. Casinos display a strong understanding of their ML/TF obligations, as demonstrated in FINTRAC assessment results for 2020-2025 when no casinos were assessed as deficient with verifying identity and record keeping (see Tables 4.5. and 4.6). Casinos typically exhibit robust measures in conducting CDD and maintaining meticulous record-keeping practices. They effectively utilize their internal client risk monitoring systems, which include comprehensive reviews for clients deemed high-risk. Many casinos included information on ML/TF indicators and scenarios common to the casino sector within their policies and procedures. Casinos should continue to build awareness and implement processes so that changes in a client's risk profile trigger appropriate and proportional ongoing monitoring as required by the PCMLTFA. DPMS 324. The DPMS sector demonstrates a moderate understanding of CDD obligations for verifying identity and record keeping, particularly in identifying clients and in obtaining the origin of funds for large cash transactions over CAD 10 000 as required by the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR). Between 2020-2025, 3% of assessed DPMS (1.8% of the total number of reporting DPMS as of 1 April 2025) were deficient in their obligation to verify identity, and none were deficient in regard to record keeping (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). However, the DPMS sector should improve ongoing monitoring of existing business relationships to detect potential structuring of transactions and other suspicious indicators. Real estate 325. Overall, the real estate sector displays a moderate understanding and compliance with CDD obligations. Based on FINTRAC’s supervisory data 3.4% of the total number of reporting real estate entities had been subject to examination as of 1 April 2025, although the majority of the assessed real estate entities were “compliant” with obligations to verify identity, most of them were ”partially compliant” with record keeping obligations (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Further improvements are expected, particularly through the broader dissemination of templates by national industrial associations such as Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA). Additionally, common deficiencies cited in sanctions issued by FINTRAC stem from brokerages not fully understanding how to conduct ongoing monitoring on their business relationships and applying effective controls or enhanced measures when their transactions involve higher risk clients or transactions (e.g., those involving third parties). Accountants 326. Overall, this sector demonstrates moderate compliance with obligations, as 27% of assessed entities were ”deficient” with obligations to verify identity and 14% were ”deficient” in record keeping, per FINTRAC data (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). FINTRAC has observed that there is room for improvement in the policies and procedures concerning the verification of beneficial ownership and PEPs, and that some accountants need to enhance their record-keeping practices to meet the amended legislation and regulations, especially in verifying identities for transactions over CAD 3 000. BC notaries 327. BC Notaries generally understand their compliance obligations well, especially verifying client identity and documenting beneficial ownership information. FINTRAC observed that, although many notaries conduct ongoing monitoring and larger corporations use client management software, they do not detail the steps on how it is conducted in their policies and procedures. A common deficiency in record keeping note by FINTRAC within the BC Notaries sector is the recording of non-descriptive occupations (e.g. “manager” or “supervisor”). Table 4.5. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Verifying Identity (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 89% 11% 0% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 82% 16% 3% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 71% 7% 22% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 55% 18% 27% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 94% 3% 3% Source: FINTRAC Table 4.6. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Record Keeping (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 64% 36% 0% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 66% 34% 0% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 16% 81% 3% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 29% 57% 14% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 14% 86% 0% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 328. All law societies have rules, by-laws or codes of conduct regarding CDD, record-keeping and BO information (Also see R.22.1 and R.22.2). During the interviews in the on-site visit, lawyers seemed to have a sound understanding of law societies’ rules and to implement them properly. There are no legally binding rules or regulations specified to ongoing monitoring from AML/CFT perspectives, although lawyers are required to assess and monitor whether there is a risk that the lawyer may be aiding or encouraging fraud or other illegal conduct, and the FLSC has issued guidance on monitoring obligations. While sanctions by law societies have been imposed in cases of obligation breaches, law societies do not gather specific data or statistics to understand trends on lawyers’ overall level of compliance. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 329. Based on the results of the examinations, DNFBPs demonstrate near universal compliance with the application of special measures when high risk is identified (See Table 4.7). However, efforts in respect of policies and procedures governing PEPs differ across sectors, which FINTRAC assesses under general policies and procedures (See Table 4.10). Casinos 330. Casinos are proactive in implementing policies for enhanced due diligence, including for PEPs. Larger casinos often use third-party services to verify clients against sanctions lists, particularly concerning high-risk jurisdictions. Regarding new technologies such as online gaming, casinos regularly update their risk assessments and take mitigation measures to address risks in collaboration with relevant regulatory authorities. DPMS 331. DPMS businesses are exposed to high-risk clients such as PEPs and transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions. According to FINTRAC assessments based on the examinations, most DPMS businesses demonstrate an understanding of the obligations related to PEP clients and transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions and generally implement measures to mitigate these risks. FINTRAC observed that some DPMS lack understanding of PEP obligations, including the inclusion of family members or close associates, and application of enhanced due diligence measures. Real estate 332. The real estate sector may deal with high-risk clients including PEPs and foreign investors from high-risk jurisdictions. While FINTRAC has observed a growing awareness among brokerages of the increased risks associated with transactions involving PEPs/HIOs, high-risk countries, and involvement of unidentified third parties, further implementation efforts are required for PEP policies and procedures. Although updated forms now include PEP/HIO checks, most brokerages lack measures for verifying the source of funds for PEPs. There is still inadequate implementation of enhanced or specific measures. For example, most brokerages lack measures for verifying the source of funds for higher-risk clients or transactions. Accountants 333. Although the majority of Canadian firms operate primarily within the domestic market, larger firms which have international operations or connections may have exposure to high-risk jurisdictions or PEPs. According to FINTRAC assessments, all assessed accountant entities were compliant with obligations to implement special measures for high-risk clients (see Table 4.7). BC notaries 334. Their exposure to high-risk clients and transactions is relatively low due to the size of this sector, and due to their services being confined to the jurisdiction of British Columbia. Although there are some deficiencies in policy, procedures and risk assessments, documentation and accessibility of information on high-risk clients and transactions are generally well-maintained within the sector. Table 4.7. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Special Measures (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 86% 5% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 91% 3% 6% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 98% 1% 1% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 100% 0% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 97% 0% 3% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 335. During the interviews in the on-site visit, lawyers demonstrated an understanding of the obligations related to PEPs and high-risk jurisdictions, as well as the necessity of implementing enhanced measures in light of those risks. However, considering that lawyers and law firms in Canada are not subject to PEP or enhanced due diligence (EDD) requirements and there are no statistics regarding enhanced measures, Canada did not demonstrate evidence that lawyers effectively implement mitigating measures for PEPs, new technologies or high-risk countries. The FLSC and certain law societies have issued guidance to assist the legal profession in managing and mitigating higher ML/TF risks, including guidance in relation to PEPs/HIOs and in client matters involving higher country risks as well as limited guidance on new technologies. Additional steps are necessary to promote understanding of the importance of enhanced measures and ensure their implementation, further promoting such guidance developed by the FLSC and law societies. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 336. The volume of suspicious transaction reports (STR) filed with FINTRAC varies depending on several factors, including COVID-19 and format changes. First, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant drop in reporting in 2020–21, primarily due to reduced activity in the casino sector, with volumes rebounding since 2022–23. Second, the transition to second-generation (Gen 2) reporting completed in 2024, introduced changes to reporting forms that also affected report volumes, because the new format asks entities to consolidate multiple, relevant transactions into one report. 337. DNFBPs (except casinos) submit a lower-than-expected volume of STRs despite the vulnerability of the sector, which limits FINTRAC’s access to DNFBP transactional behaviour (See 6.1. for further details). The number of LPEPRs submitted by DNFBPs is also limited (See 10.2 for further details). Casinos 338. Casinos continue to account for more than 90% of the total of DNFBPs’ AML/CFT suspicious transaction reports. During the pandemic, as the brick-and-mortar casinos were closed, the casino sector experienced a noticeable decline in their STRs. However, 2022-23 marked a significant turnaround, with report volumes rebounding to levels comparable to those seen in the pre-pandemic period. Casinos have strong compliance with reporting obligations (See Table 4.8). DPMS 339. Although the DPMS sector experienced a notable increase in STR filing in 2024-25 compared to previous years (See Table 4.8.), the number of STRs remains at a low level considering the high ML/TF risks in this sector. Continued FINTRAC engagement and operationalization by industry would help further increase STR volume in line with the sector’s high-risk profile. Real estate 340. The real estate sector is traditionally characterized by low reporting volumes. Although FINTRAC’s outreach to the sector has resulted in STR reporting doubling from 2020-21 to 2022-23 (See Table 4.8.), the number of STRs continues to be at a low level considering the high risk of this sector. Continued FINTRAC engagement and operationalization by industry would help further increase STR volume in line with the sector’s high-risk profile. Accountants 341. The volume of STRs submitted by accountants is low and does not fully align with their vulnerability level (See Table 4.8). Continued awareness-raising activities by FINTRAC and provincial/territorial CPA bodies may help increase STR volume in line with the NRA risk profile. BC notaries 342. The number of STRs from BC Notaries is also low but consistent with their small population and risk profile (See Table 4.8). The sector is frequently reminded during examinations that STRs must be reported as soon as practicable. 343. Reporting entities generally have strong measures to prohibit their staff from tipping off. FINTRAC verifies during its examinations whether provisions to prevent tipping off are included in DNFBPs’ internal policies, controls and as part of their internal training content as required. To date, FINTRAC has not found any cases of reporting entities tipping off people that may have been the subject to an STR, as this obligation is well understood by reporting entities. Table 4.8. Number of STRs Filed by DNFBPs Number of Reporting Entities (as of 1 Apr. 2025) 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Total Casinos 19 2 091 5 138 9 427 10 780 6 169 33 605 DPMS 3 000 176 174 197 167 375 1 089 Real Estate 7 742 126 256 280 247 190 1 099 Accountants 1 000 1 2 4 3 0 10 BC Notaries 293 10 12 15 13 7 57 Total 12 054 2 404 5 582 9 923 11 210 6 741 35 860 (Casinos’ share of the total) (0.16%) (86.98%) (92.05%) (95.00%) (96.16%) (91.51%) (93.71%) Source: Canada For the legal profession 344. Lawyers in Canada are exempted from requirements to file suspicious transaction reports when they are providing legal services (PCMLTFA s. 10.1). 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance For DNFBP sectors (other than lawyers) 345. During the interviews in the on-site visit, examples were observed in several sectors where sanction screening and system-driven transaction monitoring were conducted. For example, casinos described quality assurance processes by second line of defence and conducted internal audit by third line of defence. The content and level of detail of the internal control applied vary according to the scale and business model of DNFBPs. Regarding policies and procedures, deficiencies have been identified by FINTRAC in all DNFBP sectors, including casinos with robust AML/CFT regimes. Compliance officer 346. FINTRAC assesses reporting entities’ compliance with the requirements to appoint a compliance officer who is responsible for implementing their compliance program. The compliance rate in DPMS and real estate sectors is lower than in other sectors, and there remains room for improvement. Establishing an independent compliance officer is necessary to further strengthen AML/CFT controls including detecting of unusual activities and reporting of STRs. Table 4.9. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Compliance Officer (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ”Partially compliant”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 91% 0% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 76% 10% 14% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 82% 12% 6% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 100% 0% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 95% 5% 0% Source: FINTRAC Policies and procedures 347. Larger entities are sophisticated in terms of their understanding and compliance with their obligations. The majority of small to mid-sized DNFBP entities are compliant or partially compliant in meeting their obligations. The most common deficiencies observed by FINTRAC include some incomplete compliance policies and procedures, which means that the reporting entity missed certain elements in its documents applicable to its operations and regulatory obligations, or did not fully apply its documented compliance program in practice. Table 4.10. Supervisory findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Policies and Procedures (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially complaint ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 13% 81% 6% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 13% 69% 19% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 16% 72% 12% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 0% 100% 0% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 14% 81% 5% Source: FINTRAC Training program and two-year review 348. Over the past five years, FINTRAC has observed an increase among DNFBPs in their understanding and execution of ongoing compliance training programs and two-year review, as required by the PCMLTFA and its regulations. Overall, entities have become better at creating and implementing plans to deliver consistent training and have a documented strategy for periodic effectiveness reviews of their compliance programs, reassessed every two years. In 2024-2025, FINTRAC utilized a risk questionnaire in the casino sector to proactively assess casinos’ self-reported compliance with training programs and two-year reviews, in order to inform its risk-based supervision of the sector. This resulted in a larger number of casino examinations in 2024-25 that uncovered deficiencies in these areas. Through further utilization of risk questionnaires, more sophisticated risk-based supervision can be conducted. Table 4.11. Supervisory Findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Training Program (2020-2025) Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 64% 27% 9% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 51% 33% 15% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 53% 34% 13% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 57% 29% 14% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 64% 27% 9% Source: FINTRAC Table 4.12. Supervisory Findings of Compliance levels per obligations – Two-Year Review (2020-2025) [43] Total number of examinations conducted (2020-2025) and percentage in relation to the total DNFBP population as per table 4.14. ”Compliant ”: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. ” Partially compliant ”: the full obligation was not met. ”Deficient ”: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Casinos 17 (89.4%) 79% 7% 14% DPMS 54 (1.8%) 55% 21% 23% Real estate 266 (3.4%) 56% 18% 26% Accountants 8 (0.8%) 80% 0% 20% BC notaries 21 (7.1%) 59% 12% 29% Source: FINTRAC For the legal profession 349. Some examples were presented in which lawyers performed sanctions screening during on-boarding, and suspicious requests were examined by internal committees of law firms. The FLSC has also issued non-binding risk assessment guidance regarding AML/CFT internal controls and compliance programs. However, lawyers are not subject to any formal requirements in respect of the establishment and implementation of AML/CFT compliance programs by law societies’ rules or regulations. As such, Canada did not demonstrate evidence that lawyers effectively implement internal controls to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 350. There are no major legal or regulatory requirements that impede the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigation measures, both for DNFBP sectors, other than lawyers. In a 2015 decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada , the Supreme Court of Canada held that the PCMLTFA’s client identification and verification, record-keeping and search and seizure provisions, which then applied to lawyers, infringed Sections 7 and 8 of the Charter by providing inadequate safeguards for solicitor‑client privilege and interfering with a lawyer’s duty of commitment to their client’s cause. Lawyers and law firms were thus excluded from the operation of those provisions, which represents a gap in Canada’s current AML/CFT framework. Footnotes [43] Source: FINTRAC’s supervisory data." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 194. Canada has established licensing, registration and other controls for most FIs and VASPs to prevent criminals or their associates from being beneficial owners or hold a controlling interest. Almost all FIs and VASPs must be licensed or registered with the relevant authorities before they can carry out activity in Canada. MSBs and VASPs must register with FINTRAC. The federal prudential regulator (i.e. OSFI) and relevant provincial regulators are responsible for managing the approval of licensing applications and carrying out fit-and-proper tests on persons owning or controlling FIs in Canada. MSBs operating in Québec must also register with the provincial authority, Revenue Québec. While fit-and-proper requirements applicable to senior management staff of credit unions, trust and loan companies and life insurance companies are not clearly covered in the relevant regulatory requirements in some provinces, such requirements are applied in practice in most of them. 195. For FRFIs, applications comprise two phases involving two approvals: the Letters Patent approved by the Minister of Finance for creating banks and other FRFIs; and approval from OSFI to commence business, prior to which, OSFI undertakes a comprehensive review of the applicant and its proposed business model including ownership structure to identify ultimate controlling owners, as well as any shareholders acting in concert; fitness and propriety (F&amp;P) of shareholders, directors and senior officers; and risk management practices. As part of its review OSFI engages with FINTRAC which performs a review of the controls and oversight of AML/CFT requirements. In conducting its review of proposed owners, directors and senior officers, OSFI works with RCMP and CSIS to run background security checks, including, among others, criminal background checks on all shareholders that will have control and/or a significant interest in the FRFI and all proposed directors and senior officers. OSFI has a dedicated division, comprising about 25 staff responsible for assessing legislative approvals, including market entry. Other OSFI supervisory and specialist staff are also involved in market entry applications and review financial and non-financial risks. OSFI’s resources deployed for supporting market entry’s assessment for FRFIs are generally adequate. 196. Following market entry, FRFIs are subject to ongoing supervision by OSFI. OSFI follows its supervisory process to understand the FRFIs’ processes and procedures in a variety of areas, including but not limited to: recruitment and hiring practices for new senior management and board members, and the oversight of its relationships with affiliated and significant third-party individuals/entities. A FRFI must apply for and obtain the Minister of Finance’s approval for any change to significant or controlling owners [27] before the proposed new owner(s) acquire such an interest in the FRFI. OSFI undertakes the same process mentioned in the preceding paragraph to conduct an assessment of the suitability of the proposed controlling owners. For directors and senior management, all FRFIs should have in place assessment policies and procedures which are in line with the Integrity and Security Guideline issued by OSFI to ensure their F&amp;P. FRFIs’ compliance with the Guideline is reviewed by OSFI as part of its ongoing supervision. 197. There are approximately 200 front-line staff in OSFI responsible for ongoing supervision of over 400 FRFIs, supported by an additional 250 specialists who assist in targeted reviews of prudential risks. All supervisors are provided with training through OSFI’s Supervision Institute to ensure that they are familiar with approaches of prudential supervision and specific risk topics. 198. While no application was withdrawn for reasons relating to F&amp;P over the review period, OSFI indicated that there have been instances where applicants have chosen not to pursue an FRFI licence based on OSFI’s feedback provided at an early juncture, which could include concerns relating to prudential, integrity and security, legislative and public policy matters. OSFI presented to cases demonstrating the ability to take action regarding senior management and directors both at and after market entry. Securities sector 199. In Canada, all firms or individuals advising on or managing investments, selling securities, and/or trading derivatives must be registered in the appropriate category or categories with the relevant provincial or territorial regulator. Market entry controls are applied by the provincial/territorial regulators which include, among others, performing background checks on the applicant, shareholders who beneficially own more than 10% of voting shares of the applicant, and directors, and senior management staff of the applicant. Applications for registration from individuals must be sponsored by a registered firm which must file separate individual application forms through the National Registration Database. The individuals are required to make disclosure on, among others, whether they have been subject to any outstanding civil actions, and any outstanding or stayed criminal charges in the application forms, and provincial/territorial regulators conduct criminal record checks on the applicants. 200. Securities regulatory authorities in Canada’s provinces and territories delegate the registration of firms as investment dealers, mutual fund dealers and the individuals who act on their behalf to the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO), which is an adequately resourced self-regulatory organisation operating under Recognition Orders issued by the securities’ regulatory authorities. A firm applying to be registered as an investment dealer or mutual fund dealer firm must apply for membership with CIRO. CIRO’s subsequent review of the membership application is comprehensive covering all key areas including background checks and whether individuals who carry out required functions for CIRO Dealers pursuant to CIRO’s Rules (i.e. “Approved Persons”) comply with suitability or relevant “fit-and-proper” requirements under securities legislation and CIRO’s Rules. There are disclosure requirements on applicant firms including structure and ownership. 201. For ownership changes of 10% of voting rights or more, a written request for approval must be filed with CIRO at least 30 days before the proposed acquisition, including the appropriate Investor Application Form and organizational charts showing the pre-transaction and post-transaction ownership chain. CIRO reviews information regarding potential conflicts of interest, proposed changes to management or control of the entity, and the names of all directors and officers of any new entities. 202. There are 76 staff in CIRO responsible for assessing membership applications and relevant registration of Approved Persons. Adequate training is provided to these staff to ensure that they are familiar with assessment processes associated with application, post-licensing changes and specialized practices relevant to registration. 203. Securities regulators in Canada’s provinces and territories directly oversee securities firms and individuals that trade or advise in securities, commodity futures contracts or options, or act as investment fund managers. The regulators conduct reviews of persons who take a controlling interest in registered firms, and perform background checks on all shareholders beneficially owning more than 10% of the voting securities of the firm, and each director, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or chief operating officer, or the functional equivalents of any of these positions (with the material shareholders, these individuals are known as permitted individuals). Specific regulatory, civil and criminal disclosures are required for permitted individuals and applicants for registration under the standard form prescribed by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) [28] and are attested to by the individual applying for registration or notifying the relevant Commission that they intend to act as a permitted individual of the applicant. This includes disclosures related to any outstanding or stayed criminal charges, findings of guilt and absolute or conditional discharges against the individual or a firm in which the individual was a partner, director, or shareholder. In addition to the mandatory disclosure required of all applicants, the provincial / territorial securities regulators conduct background checks on every registered and permitted individual using both internal and external sources and include national Canadian criminal checks, select international checks where applicants reside or have previously resided outside Canada, and specific United States criminal checks on individuals who currently reside in the United States or have done so at any point during the past seven to ten years [29] . After market entry, a registered firm is required to notify its provincial or territorial securities regulator of any changes in permitted individuals and of any changes to the initially submitted information on an ongoing basis. The same disclosure requirements apply, and the provincial or territorial regulators conduct the same background checks for the newly appointed persons. 204. Major provincial and territorial securities regulators generally put in place adequate resources to support the assessment of applications for registration. Training and mentoring are provided to the responsible staff upon initial hire and on a continuous basis covering topics including how to conduct background checks, assessing beneficial ownership of securities firms, and emerging issues and regulatory developments expected to impact registration and on-going suitability. All provincial and territorial securities regulators have registration operations manuals that are updated regularly, and the CSA maintains committees and working groups which provide training and promote consistency across the provinces and territories. 205. Securities regulatory authorities in major provinces of Canada provided cases of revocation of licenses/registration due to F&amp;P concerns. For example, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) of Québec conducted four disciplinary proceedings in the past five years, including one case where a licence was withdrawn due to criminal ties. Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) indicated during the onsite visit that there were 18 cases over the past five years where registration was denied, suspended or revoked due to failing the criminal record check. OSC also provided the number of registration bans for individuals and firms over the past five years for breaches of registration requirements or other securities related misconducts. The British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) provided cases of denial of registration of individuals due to dishonest conduct or fraud. The Alberta Securities Commission provided statistics for firm registration applications having been denied or withdrawn, which included 1 firm subject to a notice of hearing alleging breach of undertaking and fraud, and statistics for firm registration suspensions, which included 2 firm registrations suspended for compliance failures. Other provincially regulated FIs 206. For other provincially regulated FIs (i.e. credit unions, life insurance companies and trust and loan companies), market entry requirements are specified in the relevant provincial legislation and regulations. The relevant provincial regulators manage the approval of licensing applications and conduct F&amp;P testing of the beneficial owners and directors at market entry. Although the relevant requirements applied to senior management staff of these FIs are not specifically codified in the regulatory requirements / guidance for some provinces, in practice assessment of F&amp;P is in place in most of these provinces. During the last five years, the Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario licenced only one new CU and conducted background checks on the relevant directors / incorporators. 207. There were no case of revocation/suspension of licence or registration of credit unions, life insurance companies and trust and loan companies over the review period, although case examples were provided regarding withdrawal of an application, and removal of an FI’s board of directors and placing the FI under administration due to mismanagement and misconduct. MSBs and VASPs 208. MSBs and VASPs must register with FINTRAC prior to commencing operations and renew registration every two years. This process requires completion of a pre-registration form to confirm whether the applicant qualifies as an MSB (including VASPs) under the PCMLTFA, which is reviewed by FINTRAC to assess the eligibility of the business ownership. FINTRAC requires the submission of criminal record checks for domestic and foreign MSB applicants for registration and renewal, and the same requirement extends to owners and entities in the MSB (including VASP) ownership chains - including the director, senior management or beneficial owners of these entities. Under the PCMLTFA, MSBs are obliged to notify FINTRAC of any changes to their registration information within 30 days and the same criminal record check will be applied to any new controller or officer. 209. FINTRAC scrutinizes every applicant and registered MSB and Federal Money Services Business (FMSB) (including VASPs) on an ongoing basis. and can revoke the registration where the eligibility requirements are no longer met, or if the MSB does not respond to an information demand. If FINTRAC becomes aware that an MSB has not met the obligation to report a registration change within 30 days, it sends out clarification requests and undertakes validation. As part of a special project to review the MSB population, FINTRAC revoked a total of 195 MSB registration in FY2021/22 and FY2022/23 due to findings that the owners/controllers had criminal records or did not respond to enquiries. FINTRAC continued to revoke MSB registrations where necessary in following years (i.e. 17 in FY2023/2024; and 12 in FY2024/2025). 210. There are 17 staff in FINTRAC responsible for assessing applications for registration as MSB (including VASPs) and beneficial owners, directors, senior management of firms applying for registration. Sufficient training is provided to staff at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, to ensure that they are familiar with assessment processes for application, renewal of registration and post-registration changes. FINTRAC’s resources to manage the registration and renewal are generally adequate. 211. MSBs located in Québec are also subjected to a fit-and-proper test by Revenu Québec. Any person or entity that wants to operate as an MSB for payment must hold a licence under the Money Services Businesses Act. To get the licence, the MSB must get security clearance reports which contain previous conviction record (if any) issued by the Sûreté du Québec for itself and each person associated with it. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 212. Canada employs various mechanisms to detect and address breaches in licensing and registration requirements for FIs and VASPs, with mechanisms varying depending on the sector and regulatory authority of jurisdiction. For instance, FINTRAC can detect unregistered activity through intelligence from various sources including suspicious transaction reports from FIs, information shared via MOUs with provincial regulatory authorities, LEAs, and external sources like media coverage and complaints. 213. OSFI has a mechanism for members of the public to submit queries, including with respect to unlicensed entities claiming to be banks or credit unions. Case examples were shared where follow-up actions were taken to clarify the business activities of entities concerned, and the legislative requirements restricting the use of “bank” or its derivatives. OSFI refers matters involving fraudulent conduct to appropriate authorities and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre. Potential breaches are managed within OSFI’s existing approvals and market entry division mentioned in the relevant paragraph under 3.1.1. 214. Securities regulatory authorities of major provinces are proactive in detecting unlicensed activities through various sources, including complaints and information from the public; whistleblower tips through whistleblower programs; referrals from other functional divisions of the authorities, other regulatory and law enforcement partners; intelligence monitoring and issues uncovered during the course of investigations. The OSC operates a paid whistleblower program covering reporting of unregistered securities dealing, fraud, securities-related misconduct, etc., and assigns dedicated teams of staff to handle tips from the whistleblower program and complaints from the public and manage follow-up actions. The securities regulatory authorities generally put in place adequate resources to support the handling and investigation of suspicious unlicensed activities. For example, staff of Enforcement Division of OSC have legal, accounting, investigative and market specialist backgrounds and are supported by technological tools include data analytics, crypto tracing tools which facilitate access to and analysis large volumes of data from different sources. Between 5 June 2025 and 23 November 2025, the CSA in collaboration with CIRO worked to successfully deactivate more than 3 900 fake investment platforms and cryptocurrency scam websites involving more than 6 900 individual URLs associated with those sites. 215. FINTRAC identifies unregistered MSBs and VASPs through various measures, including monitoring STRs, and Intelligence Notices from FINTRAC’s Intelligence sector and Strategic Intelligence, Research and Analytics (SIRA) unit, which analyses FINTRAC’s data sources for anomalies in MSB/FMSB behaviour, such as geographic analysis of electronic fund transfers to high-risk jurisdictions or co-located corporate entities that share addresses with MSBs/FMSBs. FINTRAC is proactive in this area, increasingly leveraging technology and blockchain analytics for surveillance of VASPs, engaging with industry associations for insights, as well as undertaking media scans. FINTRAC also collaborates with other Canadian agencies, such as Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre to improve detection of fraudulent and unregistered MSBs. Suspected unregistered MSBs go through the FINTRAC MSB pre-registration validation process, to determine whether they are an MSB or FMSB subject to the PCMLTFA. FINTRAC reviews all individual/entity information from internal and external sources, conducts open-source research and contacts the individual/entity to confirm whether they are operating as an MSB/FMSB. Where this is confirmed to be the case, the MSB/FMSB has five business days to complete the registration. Failure to do so will result in enforcement action, which could include an administrative monetary penalty (AMP) or non-compliance disclosure (NCD) to law enforcement agencies, and there may be additional factors to consider such as criminal activity. 216. Between 1 April 2021 and 31 March 2023, FINTRAC detected and conducted 357 validations of suspected unregistered MSBs/VASPs. Of these, the vast majority were either no longer operational or not subject to the PCMLTFA, while forty-five renewed or completed their registration with FINTRAC retrospectively upon instruction, and three were recommended for imposing administrative monetary penalty (AMP). Since 2020-21, FINTRAC has imposed administrative monetary penalties (AMP) on six MSBs/VASPs for failure to register with FINTRAC and on one MSB/VASP for failure to renew registration, for a total amount of CAD 25.7 million. Since 2019-20, 61 NCDs were disclosed in relation to the registration offence of failing to be registered as an MSB and 19 NCDs were disclosed in relation to the registration offence of knowingly engaging in an MSB activity without being registered with FINTRAC (which came in force on June 23, 2024). Since 2018-19, there were 10 cases of convictions/sentencing for contravention of MSB/VASP registration. Canada provided multiple case examples of law enforcement investigating and laying criminal charges for failure to register as an MSB and engaging in MSB activities without registration. However, the number of enforcement actions (i.e. 1.4 cases involving AMP and 2 cases of conviction/ sentencing on average per year respectively) is small taking into account the size and the inherent risk level of the MSB and VASP sectors. The limited number reflects FINTRAC’s approach of requiring persons/entities identified undertaking unregistered money service business (including VA dealing activities) to complete registration within a specified timeline and taking enforcement actions only if the persons / entities fail to do so. While Canada considers that this approach has facilitated the inclusion of otherwise eligible MSBs within the supervisory perimeter, it may not provide a sufficient deterrent to unregistered activity. 217. There are currently 17 staff members within the MSB Registration team who work on suspected unregistered MSBs, in addition to registration duties, plus an additional 6 staff members within the NCD team who are responsible for referring suspected unregistered MSBs for criminal investigation where warranted. Beyond the specific staff on these two teams, FINTRAC uses a range of supervisory activities to detect suspected unregistered MSBs and enforce the PCMLTFA, leveraging staff expertise across the Centre and information sharing through established processes amongst its various divisions/sectors and within other units of Supervision. Supervision manages the follow up actions to address the non-compliance identified through supervisory activities or enforcement actions. Footnotes [27] A person has a significant interest in a class of shares of a FRFI if the aggregate of any shares of that class beneficially owned directly or indirectly by the person exceeds 10 per cent of all the outstanding shares of that class of shares of the FRFI (Section 8 of the Bank Act and similar provisions in Insurance Companies Act, Trust and Loan Companies Act); or a person controls a FRFI if it controls more than 50 per cent of the votes that may be cast to elect directors of FRFI OR if a person has any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of the FRFI (section 3 of the Bank Act and similar provisions in Insurance Companies Act, Trust and Loan Companies Act). [28] Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is the national umbrella organization that harmonizes legislation and regulatory policy wherever possible. All provincial and territorial securities regulators participate in the CSA. [29] The number of years may vary depending on the province/territory." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="565. Under the CC, the maximum custodial sentence for LPOC and PPOC is 10 years imprisonment. For LPOC, this is elevated to 14 years where the conduct is for the benefit or at the direction of a criminal organisation. TPOC and PPOCPT also carry penalties of up to 14 years. The maximum penalty for LPOC and PPOC is lower than high-risk proceeds generating offences (such as drug trafficking and serious fraud offences, which carry maximum custodial sentences of life and 14 years imprisonment respectively). It is similar to the maximum penalty for terrorism financing and is greater than most corruption offences. 566. Sanctions are applicable to legal persons convicted of offences. In lieu of a sentence of imprisonment a monetary fine can be ordered. There is no ceiling for fines applicable to legal persons under the CC, though certain offences may set out a maximum fine for the specific offence. However, given the limited number of legal persons prosecuted for ML during the assessment period, it is difficult to determine whether the penalties applied in practice are proportionate and dissuasive. 567.  Where an offender is convicted of more than one offence, sentences are typically ordered concurrently under Canada’s sentencing principles, with the head sentence reflecting the sentence for the charge with the highest imposed penalty. On that basis, a conviction on a drug trafficking charge (which attracts a higher maximum sentence than ML) will generally result in the same custodial sentence as if an ML charge was also pursued in tandem. 568. The maximum sentences for LPOC and PPOC are proportionate and dissuasive on paper; however, appear uneven in practice. Sentences imposed where conviction is achieved for the predicate offence alongside ML, or through a resolution agreement, generally appear proportionate and dissuasive. In contrast, cases where a conviction is achieved for LPOC or PPOC in the absence of a predicate offence conviction, or where it is the most serious offence convicted; the sentences imposed in practice are often at the lower end of the spectrum and are commonly not proportionate, dissuasive or effective. 569. For PPOC/TPOC/PPOCPT convictions (where that offence was the most serious), custodial sentences were imposed in 55% of cases with probationary non-custodial sentences comprising most other sentences. Fines were imposed in 7% of cases. This breakdown reflects the nature of PPOC charges, which generally relate to lower level conduct—including straightforward self-laundering or simple possession matters resulting in non-custodial or probationary and conditional sentences served in the community or reasonably short custodial terms—with a smaller number of more complex and serious cases resulting in more significant custodial sentences. This is in comparison to more significant custodial sentences for LPOC. 570. Tables 7.14 and 7.15 provide breakdowns on the number and duration of custodial sentences imposed for each MLO. The greatest focus was placed on the outcomes for LPOC. These tables subtract time served in pre-trial custody, which is a data limitation. 571. Table 7.14 also shows that in cases where any MLO is the most serious offence, the average custodial sentence is 61 days and the average fine is CAD 763. Looking only at LPOC, in cases where LPOC was the most serious offence, custodial sentences were imposed in 25 of 68 cases, with an average custodial sentence of 402 days (see Table 7.14) and an average fine (from three cases) of CAD11 557. Conditional and probationary sentences (equivalent to suspended sentences) accounted for a further 35 cases. In 22% of these (five (5) cases) the length of the custodial sentences exceeded two years, with the majority (64%) of custodial sentences for ML receiving sentences under one (1) year (see Table 7.15). Table 7.14. Number of custodial sentences for MLO cases (most serious offence) Fiscal year Offence Number Mean Total – 2019/20 – 2023/24 Total 2 010 61 s.354(1) - PPOC 1 835 54 s.355.2 - TPOC 121 89 s.355.4 - PPOCPT 31 119 s.462.31 - LPOC 23 402 Source: Canada Table 7.15. Length of custodial sentences for MLO cases (most serious offence) Length of custody s.354(1) (PPOC) s.355.2 (TPOC) s.355.4 (PPOCPT) s.462.31 (ML) Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 Total – 2019-2023 % % % % 1-30 days (1 month or less) 61 49 39 4 31-90 days (&gt;1 month to 3 months) 24 26 32 13 91-180 days (&gt;3 months to 6 months) 10 13 16 17 181-365 days (&gt;6 months to 12 months) 4 9 3 30 366-729 days) (&gt;12 months to &lt;24 months) 1 1 6 13 &gt;24 months 1 2 3 22 Source: Canada 572. These datasets only reflect sentences imposed where MLOs are the most serious offence. This data is limited as it does not reflect instances where ML was charged alongside serious predicate offence conduct (for example drug and fraud offending), which comprised the bulk of Canada’s case studies. However, the high rate of withdrawal of ML charges in such matters limits the impact of this qualification. The penalties imposed for the ML component of that offending are typically at the lower end of the spectrum. By excluding these cases, it becomes clear that the penalties imposed for standalone ML, where a conviction can be obtained, are low. 573. Furthermore, this data does not consider time served in remand awaiting trial or sentencing. Canada provided examples where this substantially reduced the reported sentence: · Accused X was sentenced to 30 months, minus a credit of 467 days of preventative custody, for a remainder of 445 days. · Accused Y was sentenced to 4 years, 6 months and 22 days, minus a credit of 4 years, 6 months and 21 days, for a remainder of 1 day. 574. The AT recognises that in the most serious ML cases, bail is more likely to be refused. Given the strong presumption toward granting bail under Canada’s sentencing principles, the AT also recognises that the impact of this is somewhat mitigated. 575. Sentencing for LPOC and PPOC is often at the lower end of the spectrum. Particularly in the absence of a predicate offence or where LPOC or PPOC is the most serious offence. There are several case examples where Canada has achieved more dissuasive sentences for LPOC and PPOC in the most serious cases, but this is uneven (see Box 7.5). Box 7.5. Sample of sanctions imposed in significant LPOC and PPOC cases At the upper end of the spectrum, Canada has demonstrated that significant custodial sentences have been imposed in serious cases: · PML Case A , the head of the Toronto organisation received a 9-year sentence for LPOC. · Organised Crime Case A , lead to the primary offender in an extensive drug trafficking operation being sentenced to 9 years for PPOC. · R v Skinner , the architect of a CAD 2.37 million investment fraud was convicted of and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for LPOC (in addition to a restitution order). · R v Holden , resulted in an 8-year sentence for LPOC as part of a 12-year global sentence for fraud (alongside a sizeable fine in lieu of forfeiture and restitution order) · R v Eid , the offender was convicted of ten commercial fraud offences and LPOC and was sentenced to a 7-year concurrent sentence for the LPOC element. However, convictions for serious ML activity are also often at the lower end of the spectrum · PML Case A the head of the Montreal organisation and their associate was sentenced to 5 years and 3 years imprisonment respectively, despite the significant criminality observed (in contrast to the head of the Toronto organisation for similar conduct). · Organised Crime Case A , the associate of the primary offender was sentenced to 1 year for PPOC · PML Case B two individuals convicted of LPOC linked to laundering of in excess of CAD 18 million were sentenced to 30 to 36 months imprisonment. · PML Case C , two individuals pled guilty to LPOC and PPOC related to underground banking and the laundering of proceeds of illicit drugs, fraud and illegal gaming, and were sentenced to imprisonment for two years less a day. · PML Case D , investigators uncovered a professional money laundering operation valued at over CAD 2.7 million resulting in the controller convicted of PPOC and sentenced to a 2-year conditional sentence order 576. Based on Canada’s sentencing data in the tables above, combined with Box 7.6, the sentencing picture in Canada for ML can appear uneven. The penalties applied, particularly for cases where ML is the most serious offence, may not be proportionate or dissuasive in practice. A review of the implementation of the sentencing framework would support the consistent imposition of sentences for ML that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="780. Canada’s non-profit organisation (NPO) population is broad and diverse and includes tax-exempt non-profits and registered charities (the two entity types for tax purposes that make up the NPO sector in Canada). However, only a subset meets the FATF definition of an NPO - the majority of registered charities, but only some tax-exempt non -profits (see Figure 10.2). The highest TF exposure lies among registered charities that raise and disburse funds, particularly those operating internationally. Canada therefore focuses its oversight on this subset, which represents the greatest vulnerability to TF abuse. 781. TF risks in the NPO sector are assessed by the CRA-RAD, which oversees the sector and has a strong understanding of TF exposure, consequently applying risk-based measures to the subset of the sector most at risk. This understanding underpins the targeted and proportionate nature of CRA-RAD’s interventions across the sector. Figure 10.2. Canada’s NPO Population Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: Canada 782. The 2024 NPO profile assessed the residual vulnerability of NPOs in Canada as low. Canada’s NRA has classed the non-profit sector as having a medium level of inherent vulnerability to TF abuse. The most vulnerable NPOs are those operating in high-risk jurisdictions, particularly where activities may support the operational needs of threat actors and are therefore susceptible to diversion or misuse. Domestically, organisations linked to at-risk diaspora communities connected to conflict zones are also considered relatively more vulnerable. Canada’s assessment of inherent and residual TF risk directly informs the level and type of oversight applied, with more intensive monitoring focused on organisations operating in or near high-risk jurisdictions, and proportionate measures applied to the wider sector. 783. CRA-RAD operates a dedicated TF team (25 staff). In 2019-2025, CRA-RAD reviewed 9 515 applications to become a registered charity. It identified TF vulnerabilities in 74 cases, which were mostly resolved during the registration process through mitigating measures. In most cases, concerns were mitigated through requests for additional information, changes to governance arrangements, or clarification of the nature of the activities to be undertaken, with only one application refused. The very small proportion of applications presenting TF indicators (less than 1 percent) suggests that systemic TF vulnerabilities at entry appear limited, although this also highlights the importance of ongoing monitoring once charities become operational. 784. Registered charities must complete an annual information filing (FormT3010) and must adhere to spending requirements whilst conducting their activities and using their resources as specified by law. If requirements of registration aren’t met the registered charity can be subject to a CRA audit. If non-compliance is identified, then there is a range of regulatory interventions available, and registration can be revoked. No revocations have resulted from TF-related audits in the last five years, and authorities report that compliance issues identified were addressed through remedial actions. This preference for corrective measures over punitive sanctions is generally proportionate, although it limits the evidence available to demonstrate deterrence in practice. 785. CRA-RAD applies a risk-based monitoring model, using leads from FINTRAC, intelligence partners, public complaints and open sources to identify charities that may warrant closer scrutiny. Interventions range from education and letters of concern through to audits and referrals to law enforcement where appropriate, although CRA-RAD has not made referrals to law enforcement during the review period. However, the nine completed audits during that same period have resulted in nine compliance agreements, demonstrating its ability to work with the organizations to mitigate outstanding vulnerabilities, in line with its risk-based approach to monitoring and compliance. Five follow-ups on previous compliance agreements were also conducted during the review period which yielded positive results with 80% having effectively implemented the previously agreed upon corrective measures and requiring no further interventions. Only one compliance agreement follow-up noted minor areas for improvement and as such resulted in an administrative measure proportionate to the outstanding vulnerabilities, i.e. an education letter from CRA-RAD to encourage continued compliance. 786. Canada conducts other risk-based measures to organisations operating in or near high-risk jurisdictions. For example, GAC provides international assistance in the form of grants and contributions to trusted partners which include charities and tax-exempt non-profits so they can provide lifesaving assistance. GAC conducts due diligence on recipients, including review of anti-terrorism policies, internal controls and governance processes, to ensure funds are used for intended purposes. All projects are publicly listed on GAC’s website, supporting transparency. Box 10.2. Targeted Facilitation of Specific Activities in Geographic Areas Controlled by Terrorist Groups In June 2023, Canada amended the Criminal Code to establish a statutory carve-out from criminal liability under the TF offences in section 83.03 for the delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance activities and created an Authorisation Regime to facilitate the delivery of needed, specific activities (e.g. health services, education services, programs to promote or protect human rights) in geographic regions controlled by a terrorist group, via authorizations granted by the Minister of Public Safety. The Authorization Regime helps ensure the provision of needed international assistance, whilst maintaining the anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code. The Regime was publicly launched in June 2024, and eligible individuals or organisations can apply for an authorisation. If granted, an authorization shields the holder – as well as any persons involved in carrying out the activity - from the criminal liability of incidental terrorist financing (per sub section 83.03(2) of the Criminal Code), for the activities set out in the authorisation, subject to terms and conditions. The Minister of Public Safety is ultimately responsible for granting or refusing authorisations after a comprehensive review process which assesses each application on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility based on statutory requirements. The review process also includes a mandatory security review which weighs the risk of TF against the benefits of the activity. As of November 2025, eight authorisations have been granted, in addition to one renewal. The Authorisation Regime is an optional process that introduces important safeguards and enables NPO’s to carry out certain international assistance operations in high-risk environments, where required. Given this, applicants are required to provide a range of personal and organizational information necessary to facilitate a comprehensive review. While this could be a lengthy and resource intensive process, guidance and outreach efforts have been made to ensure application requirements are clear and the application process itself is streamlined to avoid unnecessary burdens. Government authorities recognise the need to monitor implementation to ensure the Regime continues to balance the facilitation of international assistance activities and maintain sufficient safeguards against the risk of terrorist financing. This mechanism exceeds the requirements of the current FATF Recommendations and is included as it represents an emerging good practise for countries seeking to enable humanitarian and international assistance operations. 787. REs that have links to the NPO sector such as banks, accountants and MSBs may submit an STR in relation to activity of an NPO to FINTRAC. FINTRAC under PCMLTFA shall disclose to CRA-RAD any information in relation to the Income Tax Act for those registered as charities, that have applied to register or may apply to register. This gives CRA-RAD a comprehensive picture of NPO risks and vulnerabilities. In the last five years, FINTRAC has produced 29 disclosures to CRA-RAD. These structured information flows contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of TF exposure within the charitable sector. FINTRAC can also disclose to the RCMP and/or CSIS for investigation or disruption. The 29 disclosures are dealt with as intelligence leads by CRA-RAD. Statistics on intelligence leads received by CRA – RAD are mentioned as a whole and not where they originate from. Canada however can confirm that 10% of disclosures referred proactively by FINTRAC and closed over the April 2021 – December 2025 period led to further assessment by CRA, informing a monitoring risk assessment. 788. A decision to not pursue a FINTRAC proactive lead for further assessment through the monitoring process does not mean the information had no value. Rather, in some cases, these disclosures have complemented existing CRA information and helped inform or advance actions already underway. Of the disclosures that were not pursued, reasons include: · No current intersect with entities in the charitable sector (in which case information on those leads is still kept within the CRA system in case there is a future intersection between that organization and a registered charity, or in case those entities apply for registered charity status in the future, meaning the disclosure could still have value in informing future decisions on risk); or · They did not relate to CRA-RAD's focussed mandate on preventing terrorism abuse. 789. FINTRAC proactive disclosures related to NPOs are often sent to CRA along with other recipients, such as law enforcement, who may be better positioned to consider that information given their mandate. 790. In addition to the above targeted measures, Canada also has general administrative oversight over all NPOs. For example, corporations or legal persons account for approximately 97% of organizations in Canada’s non-profit sector so the majority of NPOs are subject to federal or provincial oversight relating to incorporation, with certain jurisdictions providing additional oversight on fundraising or charitable gaming. The government of Canada has also undertaken a variety of engagement and outreach activities with the NPO sector, consistent with risks identified, such as the NPO Sector Dialogue Forum on Illicit Financing Risks and Related Issues to develop NPO sector risk awareness and help identify best practices among those most at-risk. 791. Overall, Canada’s measures are well aligned to the subset of NPOs that present meaningful TF exposure, and interventions are generally proportionate to risk, although outcome data remains limited in some areas. Larger organisations demonstrate stronger governance and awareness of TF risk, while smaller organisations face resource constraints and uneven understanding of obligations, creating pockets of residual vulnerability. Continued outreach and tailored guidance would help strengthen resilience across the wider NPO population." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 236. FIs and VASPs in general demonstrate a good awareness and understanding with respect to CDD, record keeping requirements, BO information and ongoing monitoring and this was supported through the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit. Most FIs are compliant with the CDD requirements, and largely compliant with record keeping obligations associated with, among others, special measures applied to high-risk customers, high-risk countries identified by the FATF, beneficial ownership; and correspondent banking requirements. FINTRAC does not maintain any analysis specific to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with the obligations in relation to wire transfer and virtual asset transfer rules and new technologies. 237. FIs and VASPs assign risk ratings to their customers based on factors such as business nature / occupation, connections to high-risk jurisdictions, onboarding channels and other relevant indicators. The frequency of customer profile reviews is determined by the assigned risk rating, with high-risk customers reviewed at least annually. FIs with international operations may leverage their groups to gather CDD information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD measures themselves. Similarly, where a referral is made through a mortgage broker, FIs conduct CDD themselves rather than relying on the brokers. While FIs and VASPs largely complied with verification of identity as a core obligation, only a low portion of MSB (65%) and VASPs (54%) fully complied with the record keeping requirement which is another core obligation. Quite a substantial portion of entities in these sectors are assessed as “partially compliant” (i.e. the record keeping obligation is not fully met, for example, the processes are not applied or have been only partially implemented or have quality issues) or “deficient” (i.e. the record keeping obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing). 238. For legal persons or legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs identify any beneficial owners by obtaining the ownership structure from the customer, and where applicable, accessing the governmental registers of corporate beneficial ownership data to verify their identities. FINTRAC assesses beneficial ownership obligations as part a reporting entity’s compliance program and has not found any significant issue in the last five years. 239. Ongoing monitoring obligations are generally well understood and effectively implemented, with some minor exceptions, especially among smaller MSBs and VASPs, due to limited resources or manual processes. Larger and more sophisticated entities, such as banks, deploy automated monitoring systems although room for improvement was noted in some banks in the application of appropriate enhanced due diligence measures as part of ongoing monitoring of high-risk clients, and for which FINTRAC has taken supervisory follow-up actions. Other common issues identified in FINTRAC examinations include undefined monitoring frequency, alert backlogs, and failure to adjust client risk ratings based on new information. Table 3.3. Compliance levels per obligations – Verifying identity (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 98% 2% 0% CU/CP 98% 0% 2% Securities 98% 1% 1% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 98% 0% 2% VASP 95% 0% 5% Source: Canada Table 3.4. Compliance levels per obligations – Record keeping (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 82% 18% 0% CU/CP 87% 10% 3% Securities 83% 13% 3% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 65% 33% 2% VASP 54% 38% 8% Source: Canada 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures Table 3.5 Compliance levels per obligations – Special measures (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 90% 10% 0% CU/CP 92% 8% 0% Securities 99% 1% 0% Life insurance 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 97% 2% 1% VASP 94% 5% 1% Source: Canada 240. FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the requirements for politically exposed persons (PEP), both foreign and domestic, under the PCMLTFA and have implemented systems and controls that address both identification and the application of enhanced measures. They primarily identify PEPs through CDD supported by checks against commercial databases. EDD measures include establishing source of funds and source of wealth and obtaining the necessary senior management approval. FIs and VASPs generally have very strong compliance with the requirements relating to PEPs and Heads of international organisations (HIO). A few exceptions to this understanding and compliance could be found in MSBs and VASPs which had omitted verification of domestic PEPs and HIOs. 241. FIs with cross-border correspondent banking relationships demonstrated a good understanding of the higher ML/TF risks and the need, for enhanced AML/CFT requirements and control programmes specific for the business line, with dedicated specialist teams assigned to manage the risk assessment and on-going monitoring of the relationships. FINTRAC assessments found in general high levels of compliance with correspondent banking requirements. There was a decreasing risk appetite for the sector, with some banks indicating they had terminated almost half of all correspondent banking relationships in recent years. 242. Risks and requirements regarding the use of new technologies also appear to be generally understood, with FIs and VASPs establishing their own internal risk assessment procedures and approval policies. Any use of technology or launch of new products which give rise to ML/TF risks requires endorsement from the AML Compliance function before being approved by senior management. Reporting entities must take into account the risk of new technologies on an ongoing basis and apply mitigating measures if the risk of ML/TF is high. FINTRAC evaluates how FIs and VASPs manage ML/TF risks associated with new technologies, including digital onboarding. Many VASPs leverage technology for compliance. FINTRAC monitors compliance with new technology obligations through risk assessments of reporting entity compliance programmes, which include provision of information on any new technologies being developed or implemented and how these have been assessed. This ensures that innovation is aligned with AML/CFT obligations and that emerging risks are appropriately mitigated. While FINTRAC does not maintain specific analysis to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with this obligation, common deficiencies noted were primarily on the failure to document the risk assessments. 243. FIs, MSBs and VASPs exhibit a good understanding of their payment transparency obligations, and put in place controls to ensure completeness of originator/beneficiary details in the wire transfers and VA transfers. FINTRAC, as part of its broader mandate, evaluates wire transfer rules compliance and VA transfer rules with assessments of electronic funds transfer (EFT) reporting requirements and large virtual currency transactions reports. FINTRAC does not maintain analysis specific to the compliance of FIs and VASPs with the payment transparency obligations. 244. FIs and VASPs put in place policies and procedures for managing customer relationships from high-risk jurisdictions identified by FATF, including the application of EDD and enhanced measures for customer transactions involving high risk countries including those identified by the FATF. Canada has Ministerial Directives on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Russia requiring enhanced measures on all transactions and customer relationships involving these jurisdictions and these appear to be generally well understood, with some deficiencies identified in compliance with the requirements mostly in CU/CP sectors attributed to their domestic nature of business activities. It was observed that there is a gradual increase in the level of deficiency for FIs, MSBs and VASPs since FY2022/23 mainly attributed to the onboarding of new MSB sub-sectors and recent updates to Ministerial Directives. The deficiencies are mainly relating to inadequate policies and procedures of a small number of MSBs for complying the Ministerial Directives such as establishing procedures to stay informed of newly issued directives and their potential applicability to the business’ operations. Table 3.6.a. FIs and VASPs – Compliance with Ministerial Directives Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. 2020-21 100% 0% 0% 2021-22 98% 2% 0% 2022-23 97% 1% 2% 2023-24 97% 0% 3% 2024-25 93% 0% 7% Table 3.6b. FIs and VASPs – Compliance with Ministerial Directives (breakdown by sectors) Compliant: obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant: the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 100% 0% 0% CU/CP 100% 8% 0% Life insurance 100% 1% 0% Securities 100% 0% 0% Trust and loan 100% 0% 0% MSB (no VC) 97% 1% 2% VASP 95% 1% 4% Source: Canada 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 245. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite visit demonstrated good understanding on their reporting obligations and established internal policies and procedures for investigation and filing STR, and measures to prevent “tipping off” in practice. They generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities, and monitoring scenarios are designed depending on ML/TF vulnerabilities associated with the business segment (for example, scenario for detecting early repayment behaviour for lending business; common transaction pattern of money mules for retail banking segment, etc). There are prescribed timelines for filing STRs once suspicion is established. Table 3.7. Number of STRs by sectors Sector FY2020-21 FY2021-22 FY2022-23 FY2023-24 FY2024-25 Total Banks 361 705 443 880 393 450 431 709 365 999 1 996 743 CUs/CPs 29 791 35 647 53 414 64 737 43 167 226 756 Securities Dealers 864 3 944** 963 1 578 2 245 9 594 Life Insurance 493 617 591 781 639 3 121 Trusts and Loan companies 4 262 4 063 4 983 3 832 5 240 22 380 MSBs (including VASPs) 68 560 92 120 97 534 117 290 149 438 524 942 Total 465 675 580 271 550 935 619 927 566 728 2 783 536 Note: *About 15% drop year-on-year is attributed to FINTRAC’s implementation of second-generation (Gen2) reporting forms for STR. Please refer to IO6 chapter for details **The significant increase of STRs in 2021-22 from the securities dealers came from a single entity (one entity filed over 3 100 STRs) which remediated unreported STR in the past years identified through its own internal quality assurance reviews. Source: Canada 246. Banks and MSBs (including VASP) submitted about 72% and 19% of all STRs respectively on average in the past 5 years, while reporting from other FI sectors is comparatively low. 247. Compliance with reporting obligations has been a significant supervisory focus for FINTRAC, and shortcomings in quality, volume and timeliness of STR filings have been identified frequently during onsite examinations, with a large percentage of VASPs (31%), banks (27%), and credit unions (19%) being assessed as “deficient” in their STR reporting. FINTRAC also noted that some VASPs have created organisation-enforced transaction limits to circumvent compliance obligations. Table 3.8. FIs and VASPs – Compliance levels per obligation: reporting STR (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation is assessed as not existing. Bank 59% 14% 27% CU/CP 77% 4% 19% Securities 98% 0% 2% Life insurance 83% 17% 0% Trust and loan* Not available Not available Not available MSB (no VC) 87% 4% 12% VASP 69% 0% 31% Note: STR reporting obligations were not scoped into the examinations Source: Canada 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 248. FIs and VASPs generally put in place AML/CFT control policies and procedures to address compliance with the PCMLTFA and Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) requirements and FINTRAC’s sector specific guidelines. Implementation effectiveness of these policies and procedures is tested regularly by their AML/CFT compliance functions and internal audit functions, the findings from which are required to be reported to the board / board delegated committees for some of these FIs. 249. It is also mandated under the PCMLTFR [31] that a reporting entity should appoint a compliance officer who is responsible for implementing the AML/CFT compliance programme; and that a reporting entity should conduct a review on the effectiveness of its AML/CFT compliance programme once every 2 years. These reviews are conducted by internal or external auditors, or by the entity itself if they do not have an auditor [32] . A very high portion of FIs and VASP have an auditor internal or external to comply with the PCMLTFA. In practice, only small institutions would perform this review internally from a person that is not an auditor. The findings of the review must be reported to the senior management of the reporting entity. If the reporting entity is selected for onsite examination or scoping in for risk questionnaire exercise, the review findings will be submitted to FINTRAC for review. 250. Common deficiencies observed in the past 5 years are gaps in compliance policies and procedures and implementation effectiveness, and inadequate scope and depth of assurance testing programmes and documentation. These are mainly found in life insurance, securities, MSB and VASP sectors, in particular small firms which lack sophistication in internal control frameworks and compliance awareness. FINTRAC observes stable and sustained compliance with very few cases of deficiencies, though small decrease in compliance is noted in recent years, likely attributable to new sectors being onboarded as a subset of MSBs due to the expansion of the PCMLTFA framework (e.g. crowdfunding platforms, armoured cars). Table 3 . 9 . Co mpliance levels per obli gations – Policies and Procedures (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant: the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 37% 63% 0% CU/CP 37% 58% 5% Securities 15% 84% 1% Life insurance 25% 75% 0% Trust and loan 0% 100% 0% MSB (no VC) 17% 76% 7% VASP 22% 67% 10% Source: Canada Table 3.10. Compliance levels per obligations – Two-Year Review (2020-2025) Compliant : obligation was met in full compliance with the PCMLTFA. Partially compliant : the full obligation was not met. Deficient: the obligation has not been documented and is assessed as not existing. Bank 86% 14% 0% CU/CP 93% 7% 0% Securities 67% 21% 12% Life insurance 83% 0% 17% Trust and loan 50% 50% 0% MSB (no VC) 71% 20% 8% VASP 88% 0% 12% Source: Canada 251. All domestic systemically important banks (DSIBs) operate under group-wide AML/CFT frameworks that cover subsidiaries and business lines (e.g., trusts, securities, life insurance). Most small and medium-sized banks in Canada operate under comparatively simple corporate structures, the few exceptions being where the parent company is a foreign entity. Most of the DSIBs centralise key control processes including customer risk assessment, screening and transaction monitoring in the group operating hubs to ensure consistency and effective implementation of the Group’s standard. Group oversight over AML/CFT compliance functions of major subsidiaries is exercised through different means, including direct functional reporting line to Group compliance, and representatives in regional risk management committee. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 252. There are no identified legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Canada. Footnotes [31] Sections 156 [32] The review should be conducted by someone who is knowledgeable of the AML/CFT regulatory requirements and is not directly involved in your compliance program activities. Please refer to FINTRAC’s compliance programme requirements on fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/compliance-conformite/Guide4/4-eng#s7" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 453. Canada’s FIU, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), operates under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). FINTRAC is staffed by approximately 500 people, with approximately 104 staff dedicated to intelligence analysis. The intelligence function is responsible for producing and disclosing timely and actionable financial intelligence to LEAs, competent authorities and foreign FIU counterparts. 454. FINTRAC has access to a wide range of reporting types from REs, including several forms of threshold-based reporting (transactions above CAD 10 000 or multiple transactions with a cumulative total of CAD 10 000, within 24hrs). Types of reports submitted include: · Large Cash Transaction Reports (LCTRs) · Electronic Funds Transfers Reports (EFTRs) (international transactions with a Canadian nexus (funds incoming or outgoing)) · Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) (no monetary threshold) · Casino Disbursement Reports (CDRs) · Large Virtual Currency Transaction Reports (LVCTRs) · Listed Persons and Entities Property Reports (LPEPRs) (no monetary threshold) 455. FINTRAC receives batches of Cross-Border Currency Reports (CBCRs) monthly and Cross-Boder Seizure Reports (CBSRs) batches approximately every 5 days from the CBSA. Upon receipt, FINTRAC automatically ingests these reports into its database and is available for immediate analytical use. 456. The patterns of reporting in LVCTR, CBCR and CBSRs, and LPEPRs are in line with Canada’s financial environment (including the general increase in use of virtual currency, restricted travel during COVID-19 and introduction of new LPEPR requirements) (see Table 6.1). Table 6.1. Types and Number of Reports Received by FINTRAC per fiscal year 2020-2021 2021-2022 2022-2023 2023-2024 2024-2025 Total EFTR 23 507 176 25 065 370 27 315 564 41 587 294 61 170 154 178 645 558 LCTR 6 069 896 7 220 383 8 041 942 6 203 220 2 898 347 30 433 788 STR 468 079 585 853 560 858 631 137 573 469 2 819 396 CDR 29 043 153 195 273 785 292 350 263 568 1 011 941 LVCTR N/A 60 361 94 790 86 405 137 105 378 661 CBCR 12 832 12 628 23 530 35 322 7 872 92 184 CBSR 217 0 155 3 645 2 398 6 415 LPEPR 10 21 14 10 38 93 Total 30 087 253 33 097 811 36 310 638 48 839 383 65 052 951 213 388 036 Source: Canada 457. Significant amendments to the PCMLTFA in 2021 and 2024 have increased FINTRAC’s capability to capture transactions linked to sanctions-related property (LPEPRs); introduced LVCTR requirements; enhanced REs’ abilities to share information with each other for the purposes of ML, TF and sanctions evasion; and integrated Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) customs reporting and declarations into Canada’s AML/ATF regime. 458. In 2024, FINTRAC transitioned to a database application programming interface (API) for RE transaction reporting to aid with ingestion of large volumes of data and facilitate integration with FINTRAC’s analytical database. A webform is still maintained for use by smaller scale reporting entities. This system allows up to 5 000 transactions to be in a report (both attempted and completed transactions). 459. Since June 2020, STRs are required to be submitted as soon as practicable after a suspicion is formed (previously they were to be submitted within 30 days) and are generally submitted promptly. Canada has emphasised the importance of timely submissions of STRs through this legislative amendment; however, some REs continue to take extended periods to report STRs in practice. This is particularly the case where multiple transactions are involved, with delays of three weeks or more observed in some cases. These negatively contribute to the timeliness of STR reporting, impacting the FIU’s and competent authorities’ ability to detect and respond to ML/TF activities in a timely manner. 460. During the period under review, FIs and VASPs submitted 2 783 536 STRs and DNFBPs submitted 35 860 STRs. Notably, excluding casinos, the broader DNFBP sectors accounted for only 2 255 STRs (see IO.3 and IO.4 for a detailed breakdown of each sector). The large majority of STRs are reported by FIs, predominantly the large D-SIBs, which is reflective of the size of the sector. There has been a general increase in the volume of reporting of STRs. The quality of information disclosed is good with the STR format quite detailed and user friendly, noting the transition to database API. The volume of reporting from D-SIBS reflects their dominant role in Canada’s financial sector and is consistent with their risk profile. D-SIBs are full-service financial groups offering banking, insurance, and securities products (among others). The aggregated reporting numbers for banks also includes STRs which relate to insurance or securities related business conducted within the same group. 461. DNFBPs (except casinos) submit a lower-than-expected volume of STRs despite the vulnerability of the sector (see IO.4 for further analysis). The level of reporting from regulated DNFBPs in Canada (less than 1% of the total approx. 2.8 million STRs reported) is low, even relative to a reasonable expectation, given their role and risk environment. FINTRAC receives a notable number of STRs (approximately 589 000) through third party reporting, namely D-SIBs, related to DNFBPs. Although such third-party reporting and some strategic intelligence related to DNFBPs helps FINTRAC’s access to DNFBP transactional behaviour, a lack of direct reporting from DNFBPs does limit visibility of their behaviours. Limited direct reporting from DNFBPs constrains FINTRAC from proactively engaging those REs to obtain additional information without submitted reports. 462. Lawyers are not subject to STR reporting requirements under the PCMLTFA (see IO4). FINTRAC reports that 76 025 STRs submitted by REs in other sectors, include links with legal sector activity. Third party reporting and some strategic intelligence is providing some limited coverage of the sector despite its non-reporting status. 463. Overall, whilst a broad range of transaction reporting is captured by FINTRAC, these information sources are heavily reliant on D-SIBs and other FI reporting to generate financial intelligence. There is less access to data and information on DNFBP sector trends and illicit activity due to low numbers in STR reporting and limited coverage of non-reporting legal sector. 464. FINTRAC also has access to police databases, the CRA public charities database, private/commercially developed databases, and is also ingesting data from Canada’s federal BO and corporate registries (including Alberta’s corporate registry). FINTRAC also receives information and intelligence holdings from LEAs and other competent authorities through Voluntary Information Records (VIRs). [48] These are both a channel for agencies to provide information to FINTRAC, and a channel to request information from FINTRAC (frequently a single VIR will combine both a request and provision of information). FINTRAC receives a majority of VIRs from RCMP which is commensurate with their role as the national LEA (see Table 6.2). Other agencies submitting VIRs include Federal Government agencies such as Department of National Defence; and provincial government entities such as securities regulators and Revenu Québec. FINTRAC can receive legal arrangements BO data from CRA through the VIR mechanism (see IO.5). This additional information, increases FINTRAC’s understanding of LEA priorities where financial intelligence can play a vital role. Table 6.2. Number of VIRs Received by FINTRAC, 2020-2025 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 Grand Total RCMP 661 602 633 714 788 3 398 Provincial Police 232 221 319 323 348 1 443 Municipal Police 572 522 573 651 626 2 944 CBSA 237 249 257 302 263 1 308 CSIS 165 137 160 130 87 679 CRA 28 18 15 25 29 115 Other 379 467 679 298 329 2 152 Grand Total 2 274 2 216 2 636 2 443 2 470 12 039 Source: Canada 465. Under PCMLTFA amendments (s54(1.1)), FINTRAC has the authority to go back to a reporting entity for additional or missing information in relation to a submitted report. The act does not allow for FINTRAC to proactively request additional information from a RE if no report has been submitted. This is a prima facie limitation on FINTRAC's ability to gather the supplementary information necessary to support its analysis. In practice FINTRAC can draw information from its databases which captures a wide range of reports (including LCTRs and EFTRs) and use another filed report to seek additional information. In addition, co-operation with LEAs, who do have the necessary powers, can proactively request additional information from REs in relation to an investigation. There are several cases where proactive information shared by FINTRAC or LEAs has alerted REs to the risks of a particular activity or entity. Subsequently, this has prompted them to submit additional STRs relating to the person of interest. While these mechanisms can largely fill the gap in access to information, they do involve additional steps to obtain information and take longer. 466. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are used as a mechanism to increase access to quality information and enhance co-operation between LEAs, FIs and FINTRAC. The first PPP was established in 2016 and since then six PPPs have been created on some high-risk threats [49] and global crime types of interest. The PPP on the illegal wildlife trade is a low-risk threat in Canada’s NRA but is of significant importance regionally and globally. Data and Intelligence from PPPs can open up access to previously unreported and unknown activity, subsequently informing risk assessments and typologies. Private-to-private information sharing arrangements between REs were only introduced under the 2024 PCMLTFA amendments but were not operational at the time of the onsite visit. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 467. LEAs and other competent authorities have access to financial reports, data and other information directly from FINTRAC through the PPP mechanism and through their respective production related powers and databases. In addition to the CBSA’s reporting to FINTRAC, the CBSA reports proceeds of crime seizures, in line with reporting thresholds, directly to RCMP. This is separate to CBSA reporting to FINTRAC. Together these ensure access to a broad range of relevant and up-to-date information. Timely access to FINTRAC information is hindered by delays in FINTRAC’s response to VIRs. 468. LEA and competent authorities’ access financial intelligence through FINTRAC proactive disclosures or through FINTRAC's responses to VIRs (reactive disclosures). The majority of FINTRAC disclosures to law enforcement are reactive, in response to VIRs. Proactive disclosures, and the quality of information disseminated, are considered in the next section below. This section focuses on the authorities' ability to request information from FINTRAC via the VIR framework, and to access additional information directly or through PPP mechanism. 469. VIRs are the mechanism for LEAs to request information from FINTRAC (or share information with) to support their investigations or intelligence collection. VIRs are submitted through a standard template which enables FINTRAC to understand the nature and relevance of the request to prioritise the response appropriately. This formal mechanism is further supported by informal co-ordination with the main competent authorities who submit VIRs. The RCMP submits the majority of VIRs, which reflects their national role and their responsibility to conduct financial inquiries into all predicate offence investigations. Most inquiries seek further information to support ongoing investigations, such as records of financial activity by a person of interest or analysis of other persons transacting with them. It is routine for RCMP to submit one or more VIRs during any investigation into serious proceeds generating crime. 470. FINTRAC triages and prioritises VIRs for response based on the seriousness and urgency of the request. FINTRAC is not obligated to respond to every VIR; however, is required to share designated information to the respective competent authority where thresholds are met. All VIRs are triaged and stored in FINTRAC’s database for searchability and continued intelligence development. 471. FINTRAC can quickly disseminate VIR reactive disclosures when assessed as urgent. Approximately 40% of VIRs assessed as urgent resulted in a FINTRAC disclosure in less than 10 days. The remaining 60% of urgent requests take between 11-30 plus days to process, averaging approximately 27 days. LEAs and competent authorities can specify a required timeframe for urgent VIRs. FINTRAC work with the LEAs to manage the level of urgency. 472. The average timeframe for FINTRAC reactive disclosures to a VIR submitted by LEAs is 65 days. While disclosure timeframes have shortened during the period under review (from 80 days to 65 days), these disclosures are not considered timely. These delays have potential further impacts on the investigation of ML and the forfeiture of assets. Slower financial investigations can lag behind the non-financial elements of a case. Non-timely access to financial intelligence or information can impede on investigations, affording criminals the opportunity to further hide or dissipate assets before they can be traced. Overall, FINTRAC is not responding to general VIRs in a timely manner. 473. LEAs have means to directly access financial information through alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques to aid in the targeting of production orders. These are used to obtain information through channels that enable its use as evidence. The techniques also partially mitigate the effect of the delays in FINTRAC's response to VIRs, as well as the limitations on FINTRAC powers to request additional information. 474. Alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques have been developed to rapidly provide information to LEAs as to whether a person of interest has dealings with a given FI. Upon receipt of this information, LEAs will apply for a judicially authorised production order requiring the relevant FI to produce information on the individual's account activity, CDD and beneficial ownership information, and transaction records. LEAs can structure the production order to allow for more time sensitive information to be responded to first and then subsequent information to follow. Information obtained through a production order is admissible as evidence. Therefore, such orders are routinely used to request information which is already available in the form of (non-admissible) intelligence. 475. As discussed above, the PPP mechanism allows LEAs access to financial intelligence in addition to the VIR mechanism and production powers. The Integrated money laundering intelligence partnership (IMLIP) is another mechanism that can facilitate access to information and intelligence (in addition to sharing information and intelligence) on money laundering and organised crime between LEAs and the six largest banks (DSIBs). [50] The IMLIP was announced in February 2025. As it becomes operational, IMLIP will focus on streamlining the exchange of information between the RCMP and DSIBs to ensure timelier access. This will help manage timeliness concerns on VIR responses. IMLIP will be complimented by private-to-private sharing arrangement to enhance the relevancy, accuracy and timeliness of financial intelligence information and intelligence. 476. Key competent authorities, the CRA Criminal Investigations Program (CRA-CIP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) have access to a wide range of financial information from other government agencies' databases, participation in joint agency arrangements, open-source information and classified materials (accessed via secure means). CRA-CIP sources information specific to tax crimes through Canadian Police Information Centre (CIPC) system, government registries and Passport Canada. 477. CBSA’s role of customs and immigration administration and enforcement has expanded to include detecting and disrupting border related illicit financial flows (ML, TF and sanctions) occurring through the movement of people, goods, currency and monetary instruments. CBSA receives CBSRs and CBCRs, and shares this information with FINTRAC and sometimes with RCMP (where certain reporting thresholds are met). CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre is responsible for the collection, analysis and production of tactical, strategic and operational intelligence related to border and trade based financial crimes; and has access to a range of internal and external sources of information. This includes intelligence pertaining to travellers (customs information), traders and goods, proprietary goods shipping data and certain CRA taxpayer information. See Box 6.1 for an example of competent authorities’ access to a broad range of information in support of its TBML responsibilities. Box 6.1. Case Study – Enhancing the CBSA’s Capabilities to Combat Trade-Based Financial Crime As part of Canada’s 2021 Amendments to the PCMLTFA, new legislation was introduced (in 2024) providing CBSA with legal authority to obtain a much broader range of data from entities involved in international trade (PCMLTFA, Part 2.1 Reporting of Goods). This includes importers, exporters, customs brokers, freight forwarders, and other actors across the supply chain. These entities are now required to provide accurate customs declarations, answer CBSA inquiries, supply supporting documents, and maintain records for AML/CFT purposes. The amended authorities also allow CBSA to receive and operationalise FINTRAC disclosures relating to suspicious trade activity, and to compel declarations linked to suspicious fund transfers when physical goods movements are unclear. The accompanying Reporting of Goods Regulations (effective April 2025) further enable the CBSA to: · Compel previously inaccessible trade‑related information, including documents capable of confirming the legitimacy of goods movements. · Identify discrepancies between financial and physical flows, such as phantom shipments, through proactive use of customs, trade, and financial intelligence. · Apply enforcement tools, including seizures and administrative penalties, which incentivise accurate reporting and support the development of high‑quality intelligence. A newly established Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) (since 2025) within its Border Financial Crime Centre, will integrate customs, trade, and financial data to generate proactive intelligence leads on TBML/TF typologies. These amendments have significantly strengthened the CBSA’s ability to access, use, and share information relevant to detecting and disrupting trade‑based money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion with LEA, FINTRAC and foreign counterparts. Footnotes [48] VIRs are for both requesting information from FINTRAC and sharing information that might be of intelligence value to FINTRAC (such as suspicions of ML, TF, sanctions evasion or threats to national security. VIRs are submitted through a smart PDF template, that at a minimum require sending agency/ organisation name and selection of the suspicion type (ML, TF or national security). They are approximately 8 pages long with fields covering subject, identifiers, information related to previous investigations/disclosures, category of offence, judicial authorisations, asset information and financial details. This form ensures consistency of information for ease of integration into FINTRAC’s database. [49] PPP thematics include human trafficking (2016), Romance fraud (2017), Fentanyl trafficking (2018), ML through underground banking (2019), online child exploitation (2020), illegal cannabis activities (2022) and illegal wildlife trade (2023). [50] Bank of Montreal (BMO), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Royal Bank of Canada, Scotiabank, TD Bank, and National Bank of Canada." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 218. The supervisory authority, FINTRAC generally demonstrates a good understanding of the ML/TF risks in different sectors based on sectoral risk assessments which use Canada’s NRA as a foundational input to identify, assess, and understand the ML/TF risks associated with each sector. This baseline is enhanced through the integration of strategic research, publicly available information, and analysis of data contained in the transaction reports submitted by FIs and VASPs to FINTRAC which consolidates these insights into a sectoral risk outlook. FINTRAC has also enhanced its identification of emerging risks relevant to different sectors through collaboration with domestic and international partners, either through joint partnerships on specific projects, including public-private partnerships mentioned in IO.6, in its regular participation in international projects at the Egmont Group and FATF, or participation in projects with provinces. Among various types of FIs, the NRA assessed the ML/TF vulnerabilities of DSIBs, MSBs and VASPs as Very High; and those of non-DSIB banks, CU/CP, securities dealers, trust and loans companies as High. 219. Canada’s NRA serves as the primary reference for sectoral and entity level risk analysis. The latest NRA (3 rd ) was published in August 2025, two years after the 2 nd NRA in 2023. There was an 8-year period between the 1 st NRA (in 2015) and 2 nd NRA. As noted in IO.1, the NRA is complemented by sectoral and thematic risk assessments, strategic intelligence products, risk-based guidance and assessments of evolving threats and vulnerabilities produced by intelligence and operational partners of Canada’s AML/CFT regime. FINTRAC produced multiple strategic intelligence reports relevant to the VA and VASP sector and published several operational alerts and indicators relevant to fraud, tax evasion, sanctions evasion, human trafficking and TF. From 2020 to 2025, sixteen strategic intelligence reports were published and were shared with the private sector through various channels, including industry forum and Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 220. Until 2024, FINTRAC used the Compliance Risk Model (CRM) to support annual examination planning of all reporting entities, which primarily predicted the likelihood of non-compliance rather than assessing the inherent ML/TF risks of the individual sectors and reporting entities. The annual operational plan for FY2023/24 is high- level and there was no information to support that FIs and VASPs were selected for on-site examination and other supervisory activities based on the results of CRM assessment and sectoral risk assessment. The FY2024/25 plan mainly focused on supervisory resource allocation and there was no articulation of how supervisory work priority and activities were developed based on the assessment of sectoral risk and individual institutions. FINTRAC has not fully satisfied assessors that regulated entities are selected for supervisory activities on the basis of risk. 221. In December 2024, FINTRAC adopted a new Supervision Risk Model (SRM), a model developed to quantify the inherent ML/TF risks associated with individual reporting entities with a view to differentiating the ML/TF risk profiles of FIs and VASPs to support FINTRAC’s risk-based supervision. In addition to the SRM assessment results, FINTRAC takes into consideration intelligence and information from various sources in determining the ML/TF risk profile of individual FIs or VASPs. These include public data, intelligence notices from the Tactical and Strategic Intelligence unit, monetary threshold reports, additional information from regulatory partners, and non-compliance reports voluntarily filed by FIs and VASPs; and information collected through supervisory activities (e.g. risk questionnaire and past compliance assessments). FINTRAC regards this as a multi-pronged approach to risk assessment and understanding and updates the risk profiles of sectors and reporting entities at least annually to support the planning of its supervisory activities considering this additional information. 222. Under the SRM, an FI or VASP which submitted STRs or monetary threshold reports in the past 3 years is assigned a risk score informed by eleven indicators, including the risk level of each sector in the NRA. Any FI or VASP which did not file any STR or monetary threshold reports in the past 3 years (referred to as a “non-reporter”) is assessed as either “potentially high risk” or “no flag”. A non-reporter will only be flagged as “Potentially high risk” if it is flagged in an STR filed by another reporting entity; or its geographic location is in a high-risk location/jurisdiction prescribed by FINTRAC; or if there is any intelligence /adverse news suggesting potentially high ML/TF risks. The inherent risk of a non-reporter with “no flag” is regarded as “being consistent with the sectoral risk level in the NRA” by default, essentially meant that the ML/TF risk profile of each of these non-reporters is not differentiated or assessed within the SRM. 223. Most of the eleven indicators of the SRM primarily focus on geographical risks, quantitative figures and ratios compiled based on the transactions reported in STRs and the monetary threshold reports. There is no consideration of different customer types, business lines, or products and services of an FI or VASP in the assessment of the inherent ML/TF risk profile. It does not differentiate MSBs which include virtual asset operations (i.e. VASPs), and those which do not (e.g. remitters). At present, the SRM lacks sophistication and granularity, and is not adequate for assessing the risk profile of FIs, particularly those which have large and complex business operations, and different activities which do not all share the same risk profile, including many banks and securities firms, and particularly the DSIBs. FINTRAC obtains this information as noted in paragraph 220 above to complement the SRM. In practice, information about ML/TF profile of FRFIs is collected through regular information exchange mechanism with OSFI. In addition, a large portion of banks were subject to information collection exercise (over 80% subject to risk questionnaire from FY2021/22 to FY2024/25). However, for securities firms, information was collected on only a minimal portion (less than 1%) through risk questionnaires or monitoring meetings in the same period. FINTRAC indicated that information exchange with the CIRO help its understanding on the difference in ML/TF risk profile across broad categories of securities dealers. However, no supporting evidence was provided to demonstrate how the information collected is translated into institutional risk profile of securities dealers. FINTRAC also recognises room for enhancement of the SRM in this regard and plans to integrate residual risk or supervisory outputs into the model. 224. The SRM is over-reliant on data contained in STR and transaction reporting to the FIU and therefore struggles to adequately assess risks of non-reporters. It also does not differentiate between MSBs which include virtual asset operations (i.e. VASPs), and those which do not (e.g. remitters). Based on the assessment results generated from the SRM for the annual operational planning of supervisory activities of FINTRAC for FY2025/2026, about 79% of FIs and VASPs are non-reporters, of which less than 1% were flagged as potentially high risk. As a result, the inherent risk profile of the vast majority of non-reporters has not been assessed. In particular, more than 90% of the FIs in the securities sector and about 80% of MSBs (including VASPs) are non-reporters. FINTRAC takes into consideration various sources of intelligence collected in its ongoing surveillance process to inform the ML/TF risk profiles of individual FIs and VASPs. This additional information collected through supervisory activities (e.g. information collection through risk questionnaire from selected reporting entities), or driven by events which is by its nature ad hoc and reactive, covers only a small portion of FIs and VASPs. Given the identified gaps, the assessment team is of the view that FINTRAC has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of ML/TF risks of each non-FRFI and VASP which is fundamental for risk-based AML/CFT supervision. 225. Subsequent to the onsite visit, FINTRAC provided examples of “entity risk profile” documents of non-reporters [30] to illustrate how FINTRAC’s risk assessments combine and consider the various sources of information. The document contains a very brief summary setting out any sources of information / intelligence suggesting an entity faced “elevated risk” relative to the sector baseline, rationale of selection for supervisory activities, sector risk profile, business risk indicators (all inputted as “sectoral baseline” by default unless there is intelligence suggesting “elevated risks”), compliance risk indicator (showing past supervisory activities and the assessment results). For a non-reporter which has not been subject to any intelligence or information suggesting “elevated risk” in any one of business risk indicators or any past supervisory activities, its risk profile is marked as “sectoral baseline” (i.e. consistent with the sectoral risk level), with a decision marked as “not selected this time”. However, the assessment team understands that this “entity risk profile” is not prepared as a normal part of FINTRAC’s risk assessment processes for each regulated entity, as the information contained is scattered in different internal systems. The Assessment Team (AT) is of the view that – even if it were used in supervisory planning- the documents still could not address the gap that a large portion of non-FRFIs and VASPs whose risk profiles are not assessed. 226. FINTRAC has started collecting further information about the business profile and AML/CFT compliance programmes of more reporting entities through expanded risk questionnaires in FY2025/26 to assist its understanding of the risk profile of individual reporting entities as part of its supervisory activities. However, the information collection exercise does not cover the entire supervisory population and is applied selectively. For FY2025/2026 annual operational plan based on the SRM results, about 3.9% of non-reporters whose inherent risk profiles were not assessed are selected for information collection through risk questionnaire, and they are mainly securities firms. Risk questionnaires are not prioritised for MSB and VASP sectors as FINTRAC uses the registration process which needs review every two years as a comparable desk-based review mechanism. The scope of information for registration or registration renewal purpose includes, among others, approximate annual value of all foreign exchange transactions and all other MSB services or activities, names of beneficial owners and the AML officer, business addresses which is not considered adequate to facilitate entity level ML/TF risk profile assessment. In practice, analysis of such information is not conducted for assessing the ML/TF risk profile of each of the MSBs / VASPs which are non-reporters. Table 3.1. Breakdown of FIs and VASPs by risk categories Sector Vulnerability Rating (NRA 2025) Number of Entities by Risk Category Number of Non-reporter Very High High Medium Low Potentially high risk “No flag” Total number of entities* Banks - DSIB Very High 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 Banks - non- DSIB High 0 11 15 38 0 4 68 CU/CP High 28 125 45 7 0 0 205 Securities High 0 0 29 66 1 1 328 1 424 Life insurance Medium 0 0 4 15 3 34 56 Trust and loan High 0 18 9 10 0 16 53 MSB (including VASP) Medium to Very High 32 161 176 317 12 2 854 3 552 Sub-total 64 317 278 453 16 4 236 5 364 Source: Canada * Data source from Risk Outlook 2025-26. The SRM population is different from the estimated‑population of each FI sectors because the SRM includes active and inactive entities. However, for banks, securities, insurance, trust and loan companies, the number of entities under SRM is smaller than the total population of their sector but Canada is unable to reconcile the numbers **. Mortgage lenders are newly regulated in 2024 and have not yet been assessed under SRM 227. As far as FRFIs are concerned, in additional to FINTRAC’s institutional ML/TF profile assessment, OSFI, the prudential regulator also conducts its own risk assessment on each FRFI from prudential supervision perspective. OSFI’s supervisory framework translates supervisory insights directly into an FRFI’s Overall Risk Rating (ORR), an 8-point scale risk rating system with four categories assessing the level of overall risk to the financial viability (risk of failure) of an FRFI. The four categories are business risk, financial resilience, operational resilience, and risk governance. AML/CFT control issues are included, among other things, in the assessment of risk governance, though OSFI’s primary focus of its prudential supervision is not on AML/CFT controls. OSFI’s supervisory focus is on the effectiveness of the FRFI’s governance, and oversight of cultures risk as they are important controls for integrity and security, including ML/TF risks. The AML control weaknesses can directly inform the ORR and trigger proportionate intervention. Examples of supervisory interventions include enhanced monitoring and targeted restrictions on one end of the spectrum, to capital or liquidity orders, variation of business authorities (including limitations), removal of directors or officers, or, in extreme cases, taking control (please also refer to 3.6). 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 228. FINTRAC collaborates with the Department of Finance and other agencies as required to conduct extensive outreach and consultation with industry, including on new and revised guidance, reporting forms, the NRA, and the implementation of regulatory amendments. It promotes a clear understanding amongst FIs and VASPs of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations through a range of engagements including in-person meetings, presentations, conferences and training sessions. 229. Finance Canada and FINTRAC disseminated the findings of the 2025 NRA Report prior to its publication through the Advisory Committee on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ACMLTF) NRA working group. Following the publication of the 2023 and 2025 NRA Reports, Finance Canada and FINTRAC also met with reporting entities to promote a strong understanding of these risks. In addition to the dissemination of NRA Reports, FINTRAC enhances awareness of ML/TF risks through proactive communication and outreach. This includes the regular publication of operational briefs, guidance, bulletins, and ML/TF indicators that provide reporting entities with vital information on risks and mitigation strategies. 230. FINTRAC undertook over 110 engagement activities over the review period to promote risk and compliance awareness, comprising outreach activities with FIs and VASP, industry associations, provincial and federal regulators, and other stakeholders. These included virtual and in-person meetings, presentations, conferences, training sessions. Other examples include communication with the banking sector through the Canadian Bankers Association; monthly meetings and ad hoc meetings on technical discussions of FINTRAC Reporting Working Group, and the Cassels Brock Small and Medium Sized Bank Forum; banks forum hosted by FINTRAC in 2023 and 2024; webinars / virtual meetings targeting credit unions in 2022 and 2024; FINTRAC’s active participations in various events organised by CIRO and other industry associations of securities sectors as speakers. Footnotes [30] At the face-to-face meeting." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 478. FINTRAC is to a very large extent supporting the operational needs of competent authorities through the provision of operational and strategic intelligence products. 479. FINTRAC’s operational team is made up of two money laundering units and one terrorist financing unit (totalling three managers, ten team leaders and 54 analysts). The strategic intelligence team is made up of 13 staff who focus on ML, TF, national security, data science, beneficial ownership and sanctions. Operational intelligence products are disseminated through the VIR mechanism and through proactive STR dissemination. Strategic intelligence products are disseminated through encrypted emails and secure channels. Some products, such as operational alerts, special bulletins, indicators papers and trend analysis are for public consumption. This helps inform REs which subsequently improves the quality of reporting FINTRAC receives. 480. Operational intelligence products are developed proactively or reactively, prioritising information captured in FINTRAC’s database, VIR mechanism, open-source reporting and/or third-party intelligence reports. Information is first prioritised by critical urgency (threat to life or national security) and immediately triaged, then analysed and disseminated to the relevant competent authority. The prioritisation reflects operational priorities, informed by the NRA and the broader Government of Canada intelligence priorities. Prioritisation is managed by the Intel Intake Team. Once information is prioritised it is assigned to an intelligence analyst to research and analyse for product development (where reporting thresholds are met). The product is reviewed and approved through line management (team leader, manager and deputy director) before being disseminated to competent authorities by the dissemination team (4 staff). 481. For STRs, once a report is ingested, it is then filtered by FINTRAC’s system using keywords and tagged priorities (such as indicators and PPPs). The system automatically sends a daily report with the priority STRs to the Team Leader or PPP lead for their respective team’s actioning. All other STRs are reviewed by an STR review analyst, who is a member of the intake team, in line with FINTRAC prioritisation method and resources. During the period under review, approximately 13% of total STRs received were included in a proactive or a reactive disclosure to LEAs and competent authorities. 482. Strategic intelligence is developed by the strategic intelligence, research and analytics (SIRA) unit. This unit has developed a total of 91 strategic intelligence products during the period under review (2020-2025) covering high and medium threats (including professional ML, ML and organised crime, human trafficking) (see Table 6.3). Strategic financial intelligence products include financial intelligence reports and perspectives, 'placemats', and background and predicate assessments (covering TF, ML transactional behaviour, online gambling, human trafficking, proceeds of narcotics and virtual currency activity). Research Reports and environmental scans provide descriptive analysis (including trend analysis) and updates on specific thematics associated illicit financial activity (e.g. COVID-19 and trend analysis of ML and TF). Public facing reports include operational alerts (e.g. Tax evasion in Real Estate and ML and illicit synthetic opioids), sectoral and geographical advisories, operational briefs and special bulletins (financial activity and suspected sanctions evasion). The focus of these products is in line with Canada’s risk profile and they remain dynamic to meet consumer needs and inform national intelligence priorities. 483. FINTRAC's strategic intelligence products are a significant input to Canada's understanding of ML/TF risks and have demonstrable influence on national strategies and policies. They can be attributable to an increase on private sector understanding of risk and risk mitigation practises. A Special Bulletin (2024) on the use of the legal profession in money laundering and sanctions evasion, focused on the risks of ML through legal professionals' pooled trust accounts. It has contributed to the awareness and understanding of ML, TF and sanctions evasion risks among law societies and legal professionals. Table 6.3. FINTRAC strategic intelligence products, 2020-2025 Products 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 2024-25 TOTAL Strategic Financial Intelligence Products* 6 8 11 18 18 61 Research Reports and Environmental Scans** 5 - 7 1 1 14 Public Facing Reports*** 2 3 4 3 4 16 TOTAL 13 11 22 22 23 91 Source: Canada 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 484. During the period under review, FINTRAC has disseminated 10 127 financial intelligence disclosures to domestic LEA and competent authorities (see Table 6.4). Of those disclosures, 70% were reactive and 30% were proactive. In addition to these domestic disclosures, FINTRAC has also disseminated intelligence disclosures and STRs to foreign counterparts (see Table 6.5 for FINTRAC disclosures as a whole [51] ). FINTRAC can also make disclosure packages which include multiple reports and can be disseminated to more than one competent authority [52] (noting information sensitivities and need-to-know principle). [53] The majority of disclosures are sent to the RCMP and to provincial and municipal LEAs (approximately 74%), followed by CBSA (approximately 11%) and then CRA and CSIS (approximate combined total 9%). These agencies are the key agencies for financial intelligence and disclosures are aligned with their respective authorities on ML/TF and predicate offences. FINTRAC disseminates financial intelligence in support of ongoing investigations. Table 6.4. FINTRAC Disclosures disseminated to domestic partners, 2020-2025] Disclosure fiscal year Proactive Reactive Total 2020-2021 551 1 323 1 874 2021-2022 817 1 255 2 072 2022-2023 519 1 382 1 901 2023-2024 307 1 325 1 632 2024-2025 878 1 770 2 648 Total 3 072 7 055 10 127 Source: Canada Table 6.5. FINTRAC disclosures including STRs to foreign FIU counterparts, 2020-2025 Fiscal Period Disclosures STRs/STRAs Disclosed 2020-2021 2 046 49 678 2021-2022 2 292 70 838 2022-2023 2 085 86 092 2023-2024 1 783 84 299 2024-2025 2 730 111 149 Total 10 936 402 056 Source: Canada 485. The STR disclosures made by FINTRAC are mostly consistent with Canada’s risk profile, with approximately 60% associated with high-threat predicate offences. FINTRAC has disseminated 15 065 STRs related to counterfeiting and piracy during 2024-2025, which are categorised as low-threat predicate offences. Similarly, STR disseminations on robbery and theft (28 241, approximately 21%) exceed comparative disseminations, which are not commensurate with the threat levels identified in the NRA. The average timeframe for FINTRAC to disseminate an urgent STR is approximately 12 days and 34 days for non-urgent STRs. To meet time sensitive urgent needs of competent authorities, FINTRAC has the flexibility to disclose just the STR within hours, with additional analysis and financial intelligence followed up in subsequent STR disclosures. 486. FINTRAC disclosures are broadly in line with Canada’s risk profile, with a majority being associated with predicate offences of drug trafficking and fraud (see Table 6.6). This also aligns with the main recipient of FINTRAC disclosures, RCMP, who have responsibility for investigating these crime types. Table 6.6. FINTRAC disclosures by offence type 2020-2025 Fiscal Year Disclosure count Related Offences Predicate Offences 2020-2021 2 046 ML: 1 812 TF: 146 ML, TF, *Other: 88 Fraud: 35% Drugs: 34% Tax Evasion: 9% Customs and Excise: 8% Immigration and Refugee Prot Act: 5% 2021-2022 2 292 ML: 1 937 TF: 191 ML, TF, *Other: 164 Drugs: 33% Fraud: 23% HS/HT: 15% Tax Evasion: 10% Customs and Excise: 8% 2022-2023 2 085 ML: 1 797 TF: 111 ML, TF, *Other: 177 Drugs: 31% Fraud: 25% Crimes Against Persons: 13% HS/HT: 12% Tax Evasion: 11% 2023-2024 1 783 ML: 1 571 TF: 90 ML, TF, *Other: 122 Drugs: 23% Fraud: 20% Tax Evasion: 10% Customs/Excise: 7% Crimes Against Persons (also including HT): 7% Immigration and Refugee Protection Act offences (also including HT and HS): 7% 2024-2025 2 730 ML: 2 317 TF: 166 ML, TF, *Other: 247 Drugs: 20% Fraud: 25% Crimes Against Persons: 16% Immigration and Refugee Protection Act offences: 6% Customs and Excise: 11% Tax Evasion: 12% Source: Canada Note: “Other” refers to threat to the security of Canada. 487. During the period under review, FINTRAC has disseminated 704 TF disclosures. FINTRAC can prioritise TF related matters as urgent, disseminating TF financial intelligence within 5-24 hours (See IO.9, Box 9.4). They can also expedite a disclosure when and if new information becomes available that increases the priority. Proactive TF disclosures are informed by assessing STRs, open-source intelligence and publicly available information. TF disclosures are timely and meet the operational needs of competent authorities. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 488. As previously mentioned, key agencies in receipt of FINTRAC financial intelligence are primarily the RCMP, followed by other law enforcement authorities, CBSA, CRA and CSIS, which is reflective of their VIRs sent to FINTRAC (see core issue 6.1). A total of 12 039 VIRs were sent to FINTRAC from LEAs and competent authorities. FINTRAC’s proactive and reactive disclosures contributed to 1 469 major investigations (see Box 6.2). Financial intelligence is used across a spectrum of investigations relating to ML and predicate offences including drug trafficking, fraud, tax crimes and TBML. Box 6.2. Ontario Provincial Police – Major Fraud Investigation In 2018, the Ontario Provincial Police – Serious Fraud Office (OPP‑SFO) received information from nine Canadian police agencies regarding an elaborate Ponzi scheme involving point‑of‑sale debit terminals. The suspect had operated the scheme between 2012 and 2017 before fleeing the country with significant assets. Subsequently, a multi‑agency effort was established involving FINTRAC, CBSA, the Forensic Accounting Management Group, CRA, RCMP, foreign law enforcement partners, and Interpol. FINTRAC provided reactive financial intelligence disclosures that supported OPP‑SFO’s operational needs by identifying financial accounts, transaction patterns, and movements of funds connected to the suspect. Leveraging FINTRAC’s financial intelligence, LEAs identified bank accounts held by the suspect at all six major Canadian banks and corroborated witness statements describing wire transfers to a foreign jurisdiction. Additional investigative steps included the use of cloud‑based survey tools to efficiently contact victims and gather structured witness information. LEAs were able to trace and seize approximately USD 4 million in illicit assets located abroad. In September 2020, the suspect located abroad was arrested, and deported to Canada. He was charged and convicted of fraud over CAD 5 000 and ML. He received a seven‑year custodial sentence, along with a Restitution Order, enabling seized Canadian assets to be distributed to victims. The suspect’s wife and business partner were also arrested and convicted in a foreign jurisdiction and forfeited approximately USD 4 million. 489. To ensure FINTRAC financial intelligence is supporting the needs of competent authorities, FINTRAC can tailor their products for ease of use and understanding. At a minimum, the disclosure presents a high-level overview of the flow of suspicious funds, linkages between entities, and any relevant ML, TF or sanctions evasions indicators. FINTRAC does also informally meet with LEAs and competent authorities as a follow up to ensure a clear understanding of the designated information and to discuss opportunities to improve disclosures. This is intended to improve usability of FINTRAC disclosures and increase uptake by LEAs and competent authorities. Financial intelligence disclosures are of high quality. 490. FINTRAC has received feedback on 1 118 disclosures from LEAs and competent authorities (out of a total of 10 127 disclosures). Proactive disclosures contributed to 89.8% of investigations, which attributes FINTRAC’s ongoing analysis of reporting to be complimentary to reactive disclosures. Approximately 64.6% of proactive disclosures identified additional entities of interest or previously unknown entities. Proactive disclosures are informative to investigations. Reactive disclosures, requested through the VIR mechanism, contributed to approximately 98.4% of investigations. 491. Overall, 10% of proactive and reactive disclosures, triggered a new investigation. Disclosures have predominantly been used in ongoing investigations resulting in new information on known and unknown subjects, and corroborating information. Disclosures support LEA and competent authorities in evidence development and initial tracing; however, feedback indicates less utility of disclosures in generating new investigations. 492. A high percentage (approximately 81.9%) of reactive disclosures in response to VIRs corroborated information already known to the requesting LEA. FINTRAC’s full capability (providing financial intelligence expertise and high value financial analysis on suspicious activity) is not being sought to the full extent through the VIR mechanism. Competent authorities could benefit from having direct or self-service access to a financial intelligence disclosure repository that allows for fact checking in support of their investigations. This approach could reduce the number of incoming VIRs by eliminating simple database queries, and free up FINTRAC resources to focus on higher value-added analysis. This is in comparison to reactive disclosures that could be addressed by competent authorities themselves through streamlined access to financial intelligence reporting repository. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 493. Outside of FINTRAC disclosures, LEAs have access to other data sources to produce financial intelligence in support of their investigations, as noted above (particularly through alternative proactive intelligence gathering techniques and production orders). The RCMP develops its own financial intelligence to a large extent on ML, TF and predicate offences. It does this through its specialised units and teams (such as the serious organised crime (SOC) units and integrated money laundering investigative teams (IMLIT) leveraging off of expertise from other departments and agencies, production orders and search warrants, and police intelligence. 494. CBSA and CRA also develop their own financial intelligence to a large extent. CBSA’s Border Financial Crime Centre produces intelligence to identify cross-border movements of trade based illicit financial flows (ML/TF and sanctions) such as TBML activity. It has expanded its capability to document trade fraud threats and make appropriate recommendations regarding the need for enforcement by the CBSA, the RCMP or other regulatory bodies. During the period under review, CBSA has produced 27 strategic intelligence products and 71 strategic intelligence assessments on trade based financial crime (see IO7 for further details). CBSA triangulates STR and financial transaction reporting (received from FINTRAC) with its own data. It can further use intelligence from CRA information to validate suspicious activity. 495. CRA-CIP is responsible for developing financial intelligence related to tax crimes, with the criminal intelligence section responsible for analytical assessments on new leads. It collects and analyses external and internal data to identify new workloads and enhance existing leads and referrals by identifying patterns and schemes of criminal activity. They also support investigations in regional offices by analysing and providing a mix of CRA data and intelligence that adds value to cases at both the workload and investigation stages. During the period under review, the criminal intelligence section has produced 19 strategic intelligence reports and over 2,100 tactical intelligence assessments. 496. CSIS can use its own intelligence holdings to develop financial intelligence and does so to a large extent. CSIS’ financial intelligence is fused with further financial information, predominantly from FINTRAC, to enhance their intelligence reporting. A CSIS intelligence report on TF was developed using information from FINTRAC to further develop the intelligence picture of virtual currency use in a counter terrorism investigation. Footnotes [51] Of the total disclosures, 1 320 were disseminated to foreign FIUs [52] Disclosure recipients of FINTRAC financial intelligence are RCMP, municipal and provincial police services, CSIS, CRA, CBSA, Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence, provincial securities regulators, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Revenue Québec, the Competition Bureau, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), and provincial and territorial civil asset forfeiture offices. [53] Disclosure packages significantly increase the total number of FINTRAC disclosures to 28 242 as more than one competent authority can receive the same disclosure. The total number of unique disclosure packages disseminated to domestic counterparts is 10 127." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 497. Domestic co-operation mechanisms are a key strength of Canada’s AML/CFT regime. FINTRAC operates independently from LEAs and national-security bodies (as it is not an investigative body), while maintaining strong relationships to ensure its financial intelligence remains responsive to operational needs. 498. FINTRAC engages widely with provincial and federal partners through many arrangements. For example, the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario (CISO) (organised crime focus); the Counter-Illicit Finance Alliance of British Columbia (CIFA-BC); RCMP specialized units (IMLITs, provincial SOC units, Integrated Market Enforcement Team in Calgary and the National Child Exploitation Co-ordination Centre); Criminal Intelligence Service of Manitoba; Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; the Sûreté du Québec Asset Forfeiture Unit: Revenu Québec; and numerous CBSA and CRA teams across Canada. FINTRAC’s participation in national co-ordination bodies, including Canadian Integrated Response to Organised Crime (CIROC) and the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC), ensures that financial intelligence contributes to priority investigations targeting organized crime and illegal drug trafficking. 499. FINTRAC contributes directly to the broader intelligence community through regular participation in domestic security briefings, interdepartmental forums, international exchanges, and responses to ad hoc requests for ML/TF and sanctions evasion expertise. FINTRAC has engaged in significant intelligence sharing and co-ordination activities, participating in hundreds of operational meetings, workshops, working groups and training sessions with municipal, provincial and federal agencies. The RCMP and FINTRAC actively collaborate in training aimed at ensuring a broad understanding of best practices of the processes surrounding disclosure of financial intelligence. In 2024, at the request of CRA, FINTRAC created a joint training initiative specifically on the topic of International Co-operation where the Department of Justice and FINTRAC shared international information exchange mechanisms including the role of the Egmont Group. FINTRAC and CBSA have also worked to provide training across both organizations on their respective roles and mandates and have co-delivered briefings, outreach and awareness sessions to key domestic and international partners. 500. Canada’s PPPs have become a central feature of its AML/CFT framework, demonstrating successful collaboration between FINTRAC, reporting entities and LEAs on high-priority ML/TF threats. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 501. Canada has a strong privacy and security framework governing protection and confidentiality of financial intelligence. FINTRAC’s building is protected, secure and restricted to staff only. Physical access into its premises is subject to strict security protocols. 502. The PCMLTFA clearly defines what information shall be disclosed and sets out specific thresholds that must be met before FINTRAC is authorized to disclose it. FINTRAC has policies and procedures in place regarding the use of secure mechanisms to receive voluntary information and disseminate disclosures, which are also in accordance with the Government of Canada’s security requirements. Only designated personnel within FINTRAC’s Operational Integration and Support Team are able to send disclosures to recipients (domestic and international) via FINTRAC’s secure channels. 503. Measures are in place for Office of the Privacy Commissioner to conduct biennial audit of FINTRAC’s privacy protection measures, focusing on FINTRAC’s policies and procedures related to administrative, physical, and information technology security controls to protect information from unauthorized use and disclosure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="577. Where ML is not prosecuted, Canada pursues alternative criminal justice approaches with a reasonable, and increasing, level of effectiveness. Canada’s approach primarily focusses on obtaining convictions for the predicate offence as a disruption technique. Per 7.2, the AT recognises the broader criminal justice merits of this approach. Competent authorities reflect that this achieves the most beneficial criminal justice outcome consistent with resourcing demands; however, it is occurring at the expense of ML convictions. Prosecutions under PCMLTFA 578. In addition to pursuing prosecutions under the CC for ML, Canada prosecutes several offences under the PCMLTFA. These offences, which relate to non-compliance with Canadian AML/ATF obligations, can be pursued in parallel with LPOC or PPOC offences, or on their own. PCMLTFA offences play an important role in addressing underlying activities that enable ML such as bulk cash smuggling and unregistered MSBs. There have been successful prosecutions under the PCMLTFA to target PML, particularly against criminal ML facilitators that might otherwise escape prosecution due to the challenges in demonstrating knowledge around the illicit source of funds. 579. Prosecutions under PCMLTFA primarily arise from potential unregistered MSB activities identified through predicate investigations and FINTRAC referrals on identification of suspected non-compliance. PCMLTFA prosecutions may also result from bulk cash seizures (see core issue 8.7 for detailed analysis). LEAs investigate individuals and businesses operating outside the requirements of the PCMLTFA, including unregistered MSBs. Several case studies demonstrate effective investigative and prosecution of unregistered MSB operations. 580. During the period under review, PPSC prosecuted 84 cases with PCMLTFA charges laid under multiple provisions of the PCMLTFA (including sections 11.1, 12(1), 12(4), 36(1), 6, 6.1 and 75(1). There were 68 cases with outcomes during the period. Of these, 25 resulted in convictions. Charges were withdrawn or stayed in a further 27. These included two cases with convictions for failures to declare a suspicious transaction (subs 75(1)), four for breaches of registration requirements (s 11.1), eight for failure to report the import/export of currency/monetary instruments (subsection 12(1)), four convictions for contraventions of the PCMLTFA Regulations (s 74) and three for failure to answer and comply with the request of an officer (subs 12(4)). Convictions under the PCMLTFA can result in terms of imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to CAD 2 million. CRA and RQ 581. In cases where the CRA-CIP cannot pursue or obtain a criminal conviction for ML, it still pursues the predicate tax offence. In situations where it is not possible to obtain convictions for either the predicate tax crime or for ML, CRA-CIP may refer the case to its Illicit Income Audit Program (IIAP). See Table 7.16 for the total amount assessed and collected through the IIAP’s lifetime. Table 7.16. CRA-IIAP assessments raised and collected Fiscal Year Number of CRA-IIAP Assessments Amount Assessed (CAD) Amount Collected (CAD) 2020-21 1 23 875 23 875 2021-22 5 363 200 260 672 2022-23 34 21 176 541 5 096 932 2023-24 84 53 011 674 2 260 636 2024-25 103 69 577 530 2 689 895 Source: Canada Note: The difference between “assessed amounts” and “collected amounts” reflects the high rate of objections, during which the CRA cannot collect, and the legal processes required to enforce payment in complex illicit income cases. Collections tied to legal actions are often recorded only once proceedings conclude. In cases where there is a more imminent threat of financial loss, the CRA can take legal action to accelerate debt recovery. When this approach is applied, the CRA recovers nearly 50% of amounts owing within 18-24 months. 582. The effectiveness of IIAP’s approach in targeting PML has been demonstrated in practice. A tax evasion investigation revealed that the defendant was operating a money laundering network, from which he earned significant illicit gains that were unreported on his income tax returns. This resulted in a tax debt of millions for the defendant, in addition to criminal fines and jail sentences. Near the conclusion of the court proceeding, the CRA-CIP referred the case to the CRA-IIAP to apply civil measures to assess and collect the tax debt (see Table 7.17). All the tax debt was successfully collected, shortly after receiving the referral from the CRA-CIP in 2022. 583. Like CRA, RQ also has specialised teams dedicated to conducting civil audit activities targeting individuals and entities that derive income from illicit activities. This approach is an effective alternative measure providing a deterrent effect even where criminal prosecution is not possible. Table 7.17. Tax recovery from criminal activity (RQ) (CAD millions) Fiscal Year Tax Assessment Assessed Tax Recovered 2019-20 23.4 5.5 5.6 2020-21 0.0 5.1 0.5 2021-22 -0.2 5.3 0.6 2022-23 9.6 4.5 9.9 2023-24 10.8 n/a 8.0 2024-2025 (1 April – 31 December) 7.0 -1.2 8.9 Source: Canada CBSA 584. While CBSA does not criminally investigate ML, since 2024 it has significantly increased its regulatory capabilities and capacity to detect and mitigate the risk of border related movements of illicit financial flows. 585. In 2024, the establishment of the Border Financial Crime Centre (BFCC) focused CBSA resources towards the disruption of Canada’s most significant border-related risks, such as trade fraud and TBML. The BFCC facilitates production and sharing of intelligence on border-related and trade-based financial crime, supports CBSA criminal investigations under the Customs Act, and refers matters to other LEAs and regulatory bodies to combat ML (and TF and sanctions evasion) in addition to predicate crime investigations (see Box 7.6). 586. CBSA has been forward leaning during the period under review. The BFCC has proactively worked together with Finance Canada and other regime partners to introduce amendments to the PCMLTFA to enhance its response to border related and traded-based financial crime (see IO 6). This approach complements and expands on traditional criminal investigative and prosecution efforts better enabling CBSA to disrupt trade-based threats that would be otherwise difficult to prosecute. 587. These powers are only recently in force; however, interviews with CBSA demonstrated that these new powers are being implemented in initial investigations. The AT recognises this novel alternative approach to trade-based ML (and TF and sanctions evasion). Threat disruption demonstrates Canada’s proactiveness and commitment to addressing this complex and high-risk threat. Box 7.6. Case study: CBSA regulatory action The CBSA’s tactical intelligence efforts identified the exploitation of border processes by threat actors using commercial importations of banknotes to launder the proceeds of crime in Canada, and from there, into the financial systems of foreign jurisdictions. The volume and value of these shipments was assessed by the Agency to pose a significant threat to the integrity of the Canadian financial system. Several examinations of banknote shipments were conducted by officers with guidance from the Border Financial Crime Centre. The Border Financial Crime Centre conducted a tactical assessment and made referrals to law enforcement, and FINTRAC’s Supervision Sector (for probable non-compliance with the PCMLTFA). An administrative penalty was made on a financial institution. Forfeiture 588. Civil forfeiture frameworks are in place in all material provinces in Canada. These are being used to varying extents with some provinces (BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) applying more proactive and effective strategies. While this is discussed in greater depth in IO 8, civil asset recovery action is a strength of Canada’s system. Canada shared several case studies (discussed further in Box 8.12) where civil forfeiture enabled the recovery of assets where criminal charges were not pursued or were not successful. This demonstrates its potential effectiveness as an alternative approach where a prosecution for ML or a predicate offence is either not sought or is not possible. 589. In limited circumstances, courts have ordered forfeiture under CC s. 490(9) despite an acquittal for a predicate offence. This has occurred where the court determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property was not lawfully possessed by the person from whom it was seized, such as in the case of proceeds of crime (e.g. R v Breton, 2023 ONSC 5429)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. General understanding of ML/TF risks 174. Belgium has a satisfactory understanding of the ML/TF risks to which it is exposed. The complex ML mechanisms based on closely interconnected criminal activities – drug trafficking, social and tax fraud, abuse of legal persons, trafficking linked to cross-border cash transportation and circulation – involving criminal organisations with international ramifications, with the port of Antwerp as a logistical hub, are clearly identified in the ML national risk assessment, which considers them to be major threats to the country. Links with TF, particularly through drug trafficking and organised crime, are also identified in the TF national risk analysis. 175. The understanding of the risks varies from one authority to another, with the FIU ( Cellule de Transmission des Informations Financières – CTIF) having a better grasp of these issues. The supervisory authorities in the financial (National Bank of Belgium, (BNB), Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)) and non-financial (SPF Economy) sectors have a sound knowledge of the ML/TF risks in their respective sectors, although they do not always connect them with the national risk context (see point 2.2.4). In general, the self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) are aware of the main risks affecting their sectors and of the most common types of risk that may affect them. However, they lack a precise understanding of ML/TF mechanisms, which limits their prevention capacity. The investigating and prosecuting authorities generally have an adequate empirical knowledge of the risks and types of ML, and a better grasp of TF risks (see below). 176. Generally speaking, the national risk assessments’ conclusions do not always appear to be individually assimilated by the authorities and reflected in their approach to risks, which is still guided by a primarily sectoral approach. National and sectoral risk analyses still insufficiently feed one another, which is detrimental to the development of a shared understanding of national risks by the competent authorities. 177. The national risk analyses carried out by Belgium (see below) and a number of recent cases reveal the growing use of virtual assets by criminals in ML and TF typologies. The Belgian authorities spontaneously cite these risks as one of the major growing threats to the country. Although some authorities have acquired and maintain a degree of expertise in this field (e.g. the FSMA and the Police, see IOs 3,8 and 9), the knowledge and understanding of the practical techniques and channels used for ML and TF purposes appear still generally limited. In addition, insufficient resources prevent the adequate monitoring of technical developments, that would help identify and anticipate changes in ML/TF risk. 1.1.2. ML risks 178. With regard to ML, the understanding of risks is based on the holistic approach adopted for the National Risk Analysis (ML NRA) conducted in 2019 and updated in 2023, in addition to numerous sectoral analyses (the most recent of which include sectors supervised by the BNB and by the FSMA; real estate sector, lawyers, company service providers/business centres). The methodology used to conduct the ML NRA and the stakeholders involved ensure a coordinated and coherent assessment of the country's risks. They produce reasonable results for the identification of priorities (see the Introduction), with one reservation linked to the fact that the updates are not always based on completely up-to-date data. 179. The ML NRA is largely based on information collected by CTIF from reporting entities and players in the formal sectors. This information provides a solid basis for the ML NRA, but may lead to a bias in favour of ML mechanisms that have already been identified, and may not sufficiently highlight emerging risks or risks that are less visible through CTIF channels. ML risks in Belgium originate largely from alternative financial networks, which are developing outside the regulated AML scope and reporting entities. It is therefore difficult to measure these threats, even if their existence and scale have been confirmed, notably by the police activities that bring these activities to light. Belgium lacks a systematic and structured approach to the detection of alternative financial circuits, especially those based on cash and illicit money transfer activities, which would be key to providing a more accurate picture of the scale of these threats and detecting new risk patterns. 180. Belgium is strongly affected by a number of cross-cutting risks, such as the massive use of cash and the role of the port of Antwerp, which impact the types and levels of risks affecting the country. These aspects are included in the ML (and TF) NRA without conducting a systematic, in-depth analysis of their influence, which does not fully characterise their importance in the Belgian context, or explain the organised and polycriminal nature of the networks that exploit these aspects. Corruption has not been identified as a significant threat, despite the existence of proven cases that have led to money laundering. [77] 1.1.3. TF risks 181. There is a sound understanding of the risks relating to TF. This is based primarily on extensive sharing of information and sources concerning TF techniques between the operational authorities responsible for terrorism and TF. This approach draws on direct feedback from field work and is adapted to the current situation, which is characterised by a moderate or even low level of TF risks, and by the nature of these risks, which are based mainly on simple micro-financing mechanisms. However, it does not enable the anticipation of changes in risks or the identification of emerging new threats and vulnerabilities. 182. The current understanding of risk goes beyond what is reflected in the 2023 National Risk Assessment (TF NRA). The TF NRA paints an overall picture of micro- and macro-financing TF trends, which is useful for identifying changes in the threats identified (see the Introduction). However, the TF NRA is purportedly “academic” and does not always reflect the reality of the threats identified by Belgium. There is insufficient quantitative and qualitative data to provide a more granular analysis that would provide a realistic overview of the level of the different threats in Belgium and contextualise them for the country with a view to fostering a more dynamic understanding of TF risks and improving the identification of the high-priority areas of risk. Footnotes [77] In particular, see OECD (2025), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention - Phase 4 Evaluation Report of Belgium: Implementing the Convention and Related Legal Instruments , Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. General understanding of ML/TF risks 174. Belgium has a satisfactory understanding of the ML/TF risks to which it is exposed. The complex ML mechanisms based on closely interconnected criminal activities – drug trafficking, social and tax fraud, abuse of legal persons, trafficking linked to cross-border cash transportation and circulation – involving criminal organisations with international ramifications, with the port of Antwerp as a logistical hub, are clearly identified in the ML national risk assessment, which considers them to be major threats to the country. Links with TF, particularly through drug trafficking and organised crime, are also identified in the TF national risk analysis. 175. The understanding of the risks varies from one authority to another, with the FIU ( Cellule de Transmission des Informations Financières – CTIF) having a better grasp of these issues. The supervisory authorities in the financial (National Bank of Belgium, (BNB), Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)) and non-financial (SPF Economy) sectors have a sound knowledge of the ML/TF risks in their respective sectors, although they do not always connect them with the national risk context (see point 2.2.4). In general, the self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) are aware of the main risks affecting their sectors and of the most common types of risk that may affect them. However, they lack a precise understanding of ML/TF mechanisms, which limits their prevention capacity. The investigating and prosecuting authorities generally have an adequate empirical knowledge of the risks and types of ML, and a better grasp of TF risks (see below). 176. Generally speaking, the national risk assessments’ conclusions do not always appear to be individually assimilated by the authorities and reflected in their approach to risks, which is still guided by a primarily sectoral approach. National and sectoral risk analyses still insufficiently feed one another, which is detrimental to the development of a shared understanding of national risks by the competent authorities. 177. The national risk analyses carried out by Belgium (see below) and a number of recent cases reveal the growing use of virtual assets by criminals in ML and TF typologies. The Belgian authorities spontaneously cite these risks as one of the major growing threats to the country. Although some authorities have acquired and maintain a degree of expertise in this field (e.g. the FSMA and the Police, see IOs 3,8 and 9), the knowledge and understanding of the practical techniques and channels used for ML and TF purposes appear still generally limited. In addition, insufficient resources prevent the adequate monitoring of technical developments, that would help identify and anticipate changes in ML/TF risk. 1.1.2. ML risks 178. With regard to ML, the understanding of risks is based on the holistic approach adopted for the National Risk Analysis (ML NRA) conducted in 2019 and updated in 2023, in addition to numerous sectoral analyses (the most recent of which include sectors supervised by the BNB and by the FSMA; real estate sector, lawyers, company service providers/business centres). The methodology used to conduct the ML NRA and the stakeholders involved ensure a coordinated and coherent assessment of the country's risks. They produce reasonable results for the identification of priorities (see the Introduction), with one reservation linked to the fact that the updates are not always based on completely up-to-date data. 179. The ML NRA is largely based on information collected by CTIF from reporting entities and players in the formal sectors. This information provides a solid basis for the ML NRA, but may lead to a bias in favour of ML mechanisms that have already been identified, and may not sufficiently highlight emerging risks or risks that are less visible through CTIF channels. ML risks in Belgium originate largely from alternative financial networks, which are developing outside the regulated AML scope and reporting entities. It is therefore difficult to measure these threats, even if their existence and scale have been confirmed, notably by the police activities that bring these activities to light. Belgium lacks a systematic and structured approach to the detection of alternative financial circuits, especially those based on cash and illicit money transfer activities, which would be key to providing a more accurate picture of the scale of these threats and detecting new risk patterns. 180. Belgium is strongly affected by a number of cross-cutting risks, such as the massive use of cash and the role of the port of Antwerp, which impact the types and levels of risks affecting the country. These aspects are included in the ML (and TF) NRA without conducting a systematic, in-depth analysis of their influence, which does not fully characterise their importance in the Belgian context, or explain the organised and polycriminal nature of the networks that exploit these aspects. Corruption has not been identified as a significant threat, despite the existence of proven cases that have led to money laundering. [77] 1.1.3. TF risks 181. There is a sound understanding of the risks relating to TF. This is based primarily on extensive sharing of information and sources concerning TF techniques between the operational authorities responsible for terrorism and TF. This approach draws on direct feedback from field work and is adapted to the current situation, which is characterised by a moderate or even low level of TF risks, and by the nature of these risks, which are based mainly on simple micro-financing mechanisms. However, it does not enable the anticipation of changes in risks or the identification of emerging new threats and vulnerabilities. 182. The current understanding of risk goes beyond what is reflected in the 2023 National Risk Assessment (TF NRA). The TF NRA paints an overall picture of micro- and macro-financing TF trends, which is useful for identifying changes in the threats identified (see the Introduction). However, the TF NRA is purportedly “academic” and does not always reflect the reality of the threats identified by Belgium. There is insufficient quantitative and qualitative data to provide a more granular analysis that would provide a realistic overview of the level of the different threats in Belgium and contextualise them for the country with a view to fostering a more dynamic understanding of TF risks and improving the identification of the high-priority areas of risk. Footnotes [77] In particular, see OECD (2025), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention - Phase 4 Evaluation Report of Belgium: Implementing the Convention and Related Legal Instruments , Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 218. Belgium has a central authority for international cooperation on mutual legal assistance and extradition – Service Public Fédéral (SPF) Justice (see the Introduction ). A fourteen-staff unit manages cooperation requests from non-EU countries and is responsible for their management, quality, follow-up and confidentiality. They forward requests to the competent judicial authorities for their execution. SPF Justice collaborates closely with the Belgian public prosecutors' offices, each of which has a section specialising in international cooperation, as well as a magistrate in charge of this field (“ magistrat référent ”). The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, as the first operational point of contact, and the Prosecutor General’s Office in Ghent, which oversees the general policy of the Public Prosecutor's Office in this area, play a key role in this organisation. 219. For EU countries, and as in other Member States, requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition are communicated directly between national judicial authorities, which are responsible for their direct management, without the involvement of SPF Justice. This system of judicial cooperation is based on the principle of mutual recognition of court rulings in European countries. Belgian public prosecutors prioritise requests according to their content and the level of urgency indicated in the request itself by the requesting country. [83] In the event of any ambiguity or doubt about the degree of urgency, the judicial authorities contact their foreign counterparts to assess the urgency and attention to be given to the requests. Each prosecutor's office manages the requests received, using its own tracking system. In the majority of cases, the requesting authority follows up on the request. 220. In addition, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office has priority jurisdiction for terrorism-related cases, which also includes TF (see IO. 9), including cooperation with EU and non-EU countries. To establish any links with existing investigations, all requests to and from other countries are managed directly by the Anti-Terrorism Section at the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office is therefore the point of contact for foreign judicial authorities and institutions such as Eurojust, Europol and Interpol in terrorism and TF matters. Table 2.1. Mutual assistance requests received 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total EU EIO [84] - ML 71 87 154 176 185 147 820 MLA requests [85] - ML 15 28 31 40 54 18 186 EIO - TF 3 1 9 9 6 4 32 Total 89 116 194 225 245 169 1 038 Non-EU (via SPF Justice) ILR [86] - ML 18 12 37 20 50 64 201 ILR – FT 0 2 3 2 2 2 11 Total 18 14 40 22 52 66 212 Source: SPF Justice 221. Growing demand for mutual assistance has been observed since 2019. Between 2019 and 2024, Belgium received 1,215 requests for mutual assistance, 83% from European countries and 17% from non-EU countries. [87] This significant growth in 2021 and subsequent years can doubtless be explained by the resumption of international cooperation activities following the health crisis. It should also be considered in the context of ML projects with a strong European dimension, notably the Sky ECC project (see IO.7), for which Belgium has been approached by its European partners. The small number of TF-related requests is explained by the type of TF Belgium is currently facing, which is carried out mainly through microfinancing at domestic level (see IO.1 and 9). The biggest European partners in the TF field are France, the Netherlands and Germany. 222. The sizeable proportion of ML requests from EU countries reflects the intensity of interactions with these countries, especially Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Belgium has no specific information about response times but indicates that the deadlines imposed by European legislation are met (40 days for recognition, 90 days for enforcement). [88] 223. The non-EU countries with the highest number of requests are Switzerland (41), the United States (23) and Albania (21). The vast majority of the cases handled concern ML offences (the list of the main requesting countries suggests that some of the requests are linked to cases concerning tax fraud and organised crime), and only eight requests concern TF cases – from Libya, Thailand, Liechtenstein, Russia, the United States, Malaysia, Ireland and Switzerland. The median response time to the requesting judicial authorities is 170 days, which seems a satisfactory period and an improvement on the 2015 MER. This time frame includes the collection of the necessary information, legal analysis and transmission to the requesting authorities. SPF Justice has set up a reminder system for the judicial authorities to ensure that responses are provided within a satisfactory time frame. 224. No data has been provided on the ML cases linked to the requests, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of Belgium's responses. However, the countries in the FATF Global Network that gave feedback on the information or answers provided by Belgium in the framework of requests for mutual assistance reported a very high satisfaction rate. The quality and relevance of the information provided, in addition to the response times, were deemed satisfactory, especially with regard to TF. 225. Belgium has not reported any refusal to provide mutual legal assistance to a foreign authority in ML or TF matters on grounds of the possible application of the dual criminality or ne bis in idem principle. Box 2.1. Example of cooperation in international mutual assistance Agencies involved: SPF Justice, Belgian Public Prosecutor's Office, US judicial authorities Facts: on 11 April 2024, Belgium received a request from the United States by secure e-mail for mutual legal assistance in connection with an investigation into suspected fraud and money laundering. The US authorities requested company incorporation documents, information concerning company officers and employees, and details of the commercial activities of company X. SPF Justice, in its capacity as the central authority, forwarded the request to the competent public prosecutor's office. A case reference number was created on 23 April 2024. On 25 July 2024, all the case documents were sent to the US authorities. IO.2 relevance: thanks to Belgium's cooperation, the assistance requested by the US counterparts was provided promptly, despite the language barrier. This case demonstrates Belgium's commitment to tackling ML/TF proactively and in close collaboration with its international partners. Outcomes: the US authorities received the case documents. They issued no further requests following receipt of the documents, which closed the file in Belgium. The absence of additional requests was a positive indicator of the requesting authority’s satisfaction. 2.1.2. Extradition 226. Since 2019, Belgium has received 58 European arrest warrants for ML. [89] No data has been provided on the ML cases with which the requests were associated, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the responses. However, the feedback from FATF Global Network member countries on the assistance received from Belgium with their requests for extradition indicates an overall positive satisfaction rate. 227. Belgium lacks specific information on response times but states that European warrants are enforced within the time limits set by European regulations (60 days from the arrest; 10 days if the person consents to his or her surrender). Belgium cites the example of a request from Italy for the surrender of a person for handling stolen goods, ML and membership of a criminal organisation, which was processed in three weeks in 2024. 228. Since 2019, Belgium has received 12 extradition requests in ML cases from India (2), the United States (2), Armenia (2), Georgia (1), Ukraine (1), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2), Iran (1) and Northern Macedonia (1). Five cases have been closed and seven are in progress. In one of the cases involving large-scale money laundering, corruption and fraud, Belgium reported that it coordinated the countries involved (UAE, Germany, Switzerland) in order to facilitate the enforcement of requests in compliance with each country's criminal justice priorities. The average time taken to close an extradition application from a non-European country is 85 days, which illustrates the speed of enforcement. 2.1.3. Identification, freezing, seizing and sharing of criminal assets 229. Belgium has reported 39 European freezing orders (EFOs) received between 2019 and 2024, and two European confiscation orders (ECOs) relating to ML. These low figures show that the assets and proceeds of crime tend to be moved out of Belgium, [90] even though requests from abroad received by the OCSC through informal channels (see IO.8 and point 2.2.3 below) could enable certain goods and assets to be immobilised at a preliminary stage of the investigations. Belgium has no information about the time taken to enforce EFOs and ECOs, and also lacks information about predicate offences and the outcomes of requests. 230. Belgium has not provided detailed data on the number of international letters rogatory (ILR) corresponding to requests concerning assets of illicit origin located in Belgium. [91] Footnotes [83] Section B of the EIO form or the equivalent section of an LR form [87] The EIO and MLA requests figures relate to ML only. No data has been provided on mutual assistance requests received in relation to TF. [88] Directive 2014/41/EU [89] This figure should be interpreted with caution due to the current coding system for mutual legal assistance requests received from the EU, which automatically records the main qualification only. [90] However, the figures should be interpreted with caution, given the judicial authorities’ difficulty in extracting statistics due to the absence of a central system for monitoring mutual legal assistance requests in the EU, and the current coding system, which automatically records the main qualification only. [91] The data is included in the number of ILRs from non-EU countries and cannot be extracted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 218. Belgium has a central authority for international cooperation on mutual legal assistance and extradition – Service Public Fédéral (SPF) Justice (see the Introduction ). A fourteen-staff unit manages cooperation requests from non-EU countries and is responsible for their management, quality, follow-up and confidentiality. They forward requests to the competent judicial authorities for their execution. SPF Justice collaborates closely with the Belgian public prosecutors' offices, each of which has a section specialising in international cooperation, as well as a magistrate in charge of this field (“ magistrat référent ”). The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, as the first operational point of contact, and the Prosecutor General’s Office in Ghent, which oversees the general policy of the Public Prosecutor's Office in this area, play a key role in this organisation. 219. For EU countries, and as in other Member States, requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition are communicated directly between national judicial authorities, which are responsible for their direct management, without the involvement of SPF Justice. This system of judicial cooperation is based on the principle of mutual recognition of court rulings in European countries. Belgian public prosecutors prioritise requests according to their content and the level of urgency indicated in the request itself by the requesting country. [83] In the event of any ambiguity or doubt about the degree of urgency, the judicial authorities contact their foreign counterparts to assess the urgency and attention to be given to the requests. Each prosecutor's office manages the requests received, using its own tracking system. In the majority of cases, the requesting authority follows up on the request. 220. In addition, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office has priority jurisdiction for terrorism-related cases, which also includes TF (see IO. 9), including cooperation with EU and non-EU countries. To establish any links with existing investigations, all requests to and from other countries are managed directly by the Anti-Terrorism Section at the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office is therefore the point of contact for foreign judicial authorities and institutions such as Eurojust, Europol and Interpol in terrorism and TF matters. Table 2.1. Mutual assistance requests received 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total EU EIO [84] - ML 71 87 154 176 185 147 820 MLA requests [85] - ML 15 28 31 40 54 18 186 EIO - TF 3 1 9 9 6 4 32 Total 89 116 194 225 245 169 1 038 Non-EU (via SPF Justice) ILR [86] - ML 18 12 37 20 50 64 201 ILR – FT 0 2 3 2 2 2 11 Total 18 14 40 22 52 66 212 Source: SPF Justice 221. Growing demand for mutual assistance has been observed since 2019. Between 2019 and 2024, Belgium received 1,215 requests for mutual assistance, 83% from European countries and 17% from non-EU countries. [87] This significant growth in 2021 and subsequent years can doubtless be explained by the resumption of international cooperation activities following the health crisis. It should also be considered in the context of ML projects with a strong European dimension, notably the Sky ECC project (see IO.7), for which Belgium has been approached by its European partners. The small number of TF-related requests is explained by the type of TF Belgium is currently facing, which is carried out mainly through microfinancing at domestic level (see IO.1 and 9). The biggest European partners in the TF field are France, the Netherlands and Germany. 222. The sizeable proportion of ML requests from EU countries reflects the intensity of interactions with these countries, especially Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Belgium has no specific information about response times but indicates that the deadlines imposed by European legislation are met (40 days for recognition, 90 days for enforcement). [88] 223. The non-EU countries with the highest number of requests are Switzerland (41), the United States (23) and Albania (21). The vast majority of the cases handled concern ML offences (the list of the main requesting countries suggests that some of the requests are linked to cases concerning tax fraud and organised crime), and only eight requests concern TF cases – from Libya, Thailand, Liechtenstein, Russia, the United States, Malaysia, Ireland and Switzerland. The median response time to the requesting judicial authorities is 170 days, which seems a satisfactory period and an improvement on the 2015 MER. This time frame includes the collection of the necessary information, legal analysis and transmission to the requesting authorities. SPF Justice has set up a reminder system for the judicial authorities to ensure that responses are provided within a satisfactory time frame. 224. No data has been provided on the ML cases linked to the requests, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of Belgium's responses. However, the countries in the FATF Global Network that gave feedback on the information or answers provided by Belgium in the framework of requests for mutual assistance reported a very high satisfaction rate. The quality and relevance of the information provided, in addition to the response times, were deemed satisfactory, especially with regard to TF. 225. Belgium has not reported any refusal to provide mutual legal assistance to a foreign authority in ML or TF matters on grounds of the possible application of the dual criminality or ne bis in idem principle. Box 2.1. Example of cooperation in international mutual assistance Agencies involved: SPF Justice, Belgian Public Prosecutor's Office, US judicial authorities Facts: on 11 April 2024, Belgium received a request from the United States by secure e-mail for mutual legal assistance in connection with an investigation into suspected fraud and money laundering. The US authorities requested company incorporation documents, information concerning company officers and employees, and details of the commercial activities of company X. SPF Justice, in its capacity as the central authority, forwarded the request to the competent public prosecutor's office. A case reference number was created on 23 April 2024. On 25 July 2024, all the case documents were sent to the US authorities. IO.2 relevance: thanks to Belgium's cooperation, the assistance requested by the US counterparts was provided promptly, despite the language barrier. This case demonstrates Belgium's commitment to tackling ML/TF proactively and in close collaboration with its international partners. Outcomes: the US authorities received the case documents. They issued no further requests following receipt of the documents, which closed the file in Belgium. The absence of additional requests was a positive indicator of the requesting authority’s satisfaction. 2.1.2. Extradition 226. Since 2019, Belgium has received 58 European arrest warrants for ML. [89] No data has been provided on the ML cases with which the requests were associated, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the responses. However, the feedback from FATF Global Network member countries on the assistance received from Belgium with their requests for extradition indicates an overall positive satisfaction rate. 227. Belgium lacks specific information on response times but states that European warrants are enforced within the time limits set by European regulations (60 days from the arrest; 10 days if the person consents to his or her surrender). Belgium cites the example of a request from Italy for the surrender of a person for handling stolen goods, ML and membership of a criminal organisation, which was processed in three weeks in 2024. 228. Since 2019, Belgium has received 12 extradition requests in ML cases from India (2), the United States (2), Armenia (2), Georgia (1), Ukraine (1), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2), Iran (1) and Northern Macedonia (1). Five cases have been closed and seven are in progress. In one of the cases involving large-scale money laundering, corruption and fraud, Belgium reported that it coordinated the countries involved (UAE, Germany, Switzerland) in order to facilitate the enforcement of requests in compliance with each country's criminal justice priorities. The average time taken to close an extradition application from a non-European country is 85 days, which illustrates the speed of enforcement. 2.1.3. Identification, freezing, seizing and sharing of criminal assets 229. Belgium has reported 39 European freezing orders (EFOs) received between 2019 and 2024, and two European confiscation orders (ECOs) relating to ML. These low figures show that the assets and proceeds of crime tend to be moved out of Belgium, [90] even though requests from abroad received by the OCSC through informal channels (see IO.8 and point 2.2.3 below) could enable certain goods and assets to be immobilised at a preliminary stage of the investigations. Belgium has no information about the time taken to enforce EFOs and ECOs, and also lacks information about predicate offences and the outcomes of requests. 230. Belgium has not provided detailed data on the number of international letters rogatory (ILR) corresponding to requests concerning assets of illicit origin located in Belgium. [91] Footnotes [83] Section B of the EIO form or the equivalent section of an LR form [87] The EIO and MLA requests figures relate to ML only. No data has been provided on mutual assistance requests received in relation to TF. [88] Directive 2014/41/EU [89] This figure should be interpreted with caution due to the current coding system for mutual legal assistance requests received from the EU, which automatically records the main qualification only. [90] However, the figures should be interpreted with caution, given the judicial authorities’ difficulty in extracting statistics due to the absence of a central system for monitoring mutual legal assistance requests in the EU, and the current coding system, which automatically records the main qualification only. [91] The data is included in the number of ILRs from non-EU countries and cannot be extracted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls BNB 286. The BNB - the European Central Bank (ECB) for credit institutions since the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (see the Introduction )- is responsible for processing licensing or registration applications and, in this specific context, has mechanisms in place to verify the “fit and proper” character of directors and significant or controlling shareholders. This assessment takes place both at the time of initial licensing and throughout the life of the FIs, particularly in the event of any notifiable changes [101] . This ensures ongoing monitoring and identifies any shortcomings in governance as the institution evolves. The ECB and the BNB share responsibility for the fit and proper assessment of the directors of credit institutions based on their importance, ensuring consistent and harmonised monitoring of financial institutions. 287. The BNB has formalised its fit and proper assessment procedures in various public documents (including the cross-sectoral suitability assessment manual) and internal documents (flowcharts, checklists). The fit and proper assessment is based on several sources, including criminal records and checks with the competent authorities [102] , with which the BNB has been in contact in several sensitive cases. In a cross-border context, these verifications are reinforced by international cooperation with foreign counterparts. 288. Formal refusals to approve appointments remain rare: in practice, candidates often withdraw their applications before a negative decision is made, particularly if there are doubts about the candidate’s compliance with the fit and proper criteria. For example, in 2019, the BNB reassessed the situation of a director involved in a criminal case abroad. Faced with a draft unfavourable decision by the BNB, he resigned before it was adopted. 289. In addition to these verifications, there is regular and formalised cooperation between the AML/CFT [103] Group and the prudential teams. This coordination strengthens the consistency of AML/CFT measures and promotes an integrated approach to AML/CFT by coordinating prudential fit and proper requirements with AML/CFT regulatory obligations. In addition, the prudential team systematically consults the AML/CFT Group to analyse the AML/CFT framework put in place by institutions applying for licensing, thereby ensuring that new entrants to the financial market are properly assessed, a practice to be encouraged. 290. Finally, since 1 April 2024, a risk-based approach has been adopted for the review of the profiles of senior directors responsible for AML/CFT and/or AML/CFT Compliance Officers (AMLCOs). This targeted approach allows the level of review to be tailored to the nature and scale of the risks identified, thereby ensuring a proportionate and effective assessment of persons performing these strategic functions. FSMA 291. The FSMA also has supervisory mechanisms in place to assess the capacity of directors and shareholders exercising control over the entities under its supervision. These inspections are carried out when applications for licensing and registration are submitted, as well as in the event of changes in directors or shareholders requiring prior notification. 292. The FSMA’s anti-money laundering centre of expertise (AML unit ) works with the prudential departments responsible for examining licensing applications. They use the Fit &amp; Proper [104] platform, a cross-cutting procedure [105] , the work of a dedicated group [106] and the Fit &amp; Proper Centre of Expertise to harmonise the review of applications. This coordination results in approximately 9% of licences being refused or withdrawn [107] . A reassessment is carried out each time the mandate is automatically renewed or at predetermined intervals for mandates of indefinite duration, which would appear to be adequate. 293. Supervision of access to managerial positions or to the status of controlling shareholder is satisfactory and uses a standardised procedure for all FIs supervised by the FSMA. In practice, entities considered less risky, such as insurance intermediaries, are subject to less stringent supervision. 294. With regard to licensing and registration, the FSMA has recorded a significant number of deregistrations and rejections on fit and proper grounds, particularly among insurance intermediaries. In 2024, 22 of the 36 deregistrations of insurance intermediaries were for fit and proper reasons (not related to ML/TF). Nevertheless, the deregistration rate remains marginal compared to the total number of registered insurance intermediaries (4,835). VASPs 295. At the time of the on-site visit, no VASP was registered or approved with the FSMA. Since the entry into force of the MiCA regulation on 30 December 2024, no supervisory authority has been designated to license new entities in this particularly risky sector, which constitutes a major shortcoming (see R. 15 in the TC Annex). 296. The FSMA was responsible for monitoring the compliance of VASPs with their AML/CFT obligations when the AML Law was extended in 2022 to providers carrying out virtual and fiat currency exchange activities and offering custodial wallet services. Belgium has introduced a transitional regime for entities that can demonstrate that they were already carrying out these activities in Belgium on a regular and professional basis on 1 May 2022. Entities that notified the FSMA of these activities were entered in a special section of the FSMA register and were required to submit a full application for registration by 1 September 2022. During the period of provisional authorisation, they had to comply with the obligations of the AML Law. The FSMA received 14 applications for provisional authorisation. [108] A number of these applications were withdrawn following notification by the FSMA of non-compliance with, in particular, the conditions of professional integrity of effective directors and/or the sound and prudent management capabilities of the shareholders. These conditions were assessed on the basis of the criteria set by the FSMA for all FIs under its supervision (see above) and in accordance with a strict approach, given the high level of risk associated with the virtual assets sector. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 297. The FSMA’s Périmètre (scoping) Department, which covers the entire financial sector, is responsible for detecting illegal financial activities. Although its role covers both the prevention and investigation of offences, its work is primarily focused on consumer protection, with the aim of putting an end to fraudulent practices that could cause harm to investors and users of financial services. In this context, the FSMA publishes guidance documents to raise awareness among consumers and stakeholders in the sector. The Périmètre team relies on complaints received, its databases and automated tools (such as web scraping) to identify suspicious practices. 298. The Périmètre Department’s work is not limited to entities supervised directly by the FSMA, but also covers activities subject to BNB licensing, particularly in the area of fund transfers, which is a particularly sensitive issue in Belgium due to cases of cash trafficking and illicit transfers of crypto assets. While concentrating the detection of illegal financial activities within a single department has advantages in terms of efficiency and information flow, it also leads the FSMA to intervene in areas that fall outside its usual remit, for which it does not have the appropriate human and technical resources. 299. One of the main challenges in recent years has been the proliferation of illegal lenders (366 illegal entities detected between 2019 and 2024), which has been made particularly easy by digital channels. In response to this threat, in 2021 the FSMA developed an automated detection tool capable of identifying fraudulent websites offering misleading credit offers. This tool makes it possible to increase the number of sites detected by facilitating the identification of suspicious offers and establishing links with Belgium by identifying elements such as false Belgian addresses, the use of the local language or other location clues. The effectiveness of this tool has contributed to an increase in the number of fraudulent activities detected [109] and warnings issued, which is a significant step forward in preventing illegal activities. 300. When the FSMA detects illegal exercise of a regulated activity, the case is not automatically referred to the public prosecutor’s office. The department first assesses the appropriateness of regularisation of the activity in question. If the FSMA has evidence of a criminal offence, it may refer the case to the judicial authorities. Where there are indications of clear fraud, the files are systematically forwarded to the public prosecutor’s office and the FSMA proposes that the public prosecutor’s office block access to the fraudulent websites. In 2024, the FSMA notified the public prosecutor’s office of 33 cases, involving 424 fraudulent websites. 301. Operational limitations remain, particularly in relation to the priority mission of consumer protection assigned to the Périmètre Department, which therefore relies mainly on information received from consumers. As a result, certain clandestine practices that are not intended to harm consumer rights, such as informal fund transfers (hawalas) or informal transactions in virtual assets, fall outside its scope of monitoring. These systems are more difficult to detect and are mainly the responsibility of the police, which have more advanced investigative resources but have not put in place proactive detection measures or a systematic detection strategy for these activities (see IO.7). Information on these networks is sometimes passed on via the public prosecutor's office, but the FSMA does not have the capacity to identify these practices independently, which is a persistent challenge for financial supervision and a significant area of risk in the Belgian context. 302. The FSMA is aware of these challenges and has gradually strengthened its cooperation with the CTIF, in particular through the integration of GoAML at the end of 2024, which has improved the exchange and processing of ML/TF information. The effectiveness of the current system remains somewhat limited in the absence of enhanced cooperation with the police, which would provide access to more advanced investigative tools and better detection of the most opaque illicit financial phenomena. An inter-institutional approach, involving the FSMA, the CTIF, the BNB and law enforcement agencies, would provide a more robust response to the challenges posed by evolving and technologically sophisticated financial crime. Footnotes [101] This is the case when a qualifying holding is acquired. A holding is considered qualifying if it represents 10% or more of the capital or voting rights of the bank, or if it allows significant influence to be exercised over the bank. [102] In particular, the judicial authorities and the FSMA in the event of the first appointment of a prospective director. [103] The AML/CFT Group is the specialised AML/CFT team with cross-sector expertise in this area within the BNB. [104] This working group was set up by the FSMA with the aim of harmonising the fit &amp; proper assessment for the FIs under its supervision. [105] This is the “Fit &amp; Proper Manual”, which sets out the steps in the procedure for assessing the fit &amp; proper status of a prospective director and the criteria and sources to be taken into account. [106] It was introduced by the FSMA and must be consulted when there is doubt over the assessment of a candidate’s fit and proper status. This centre of expertise keeps an anonymised record of decisions taken in this area to ensure consistent assessment of fit and proper status. [107] In the bureaux de change sector, for example, only one rejection was issued in 2019, mainly due to fit and proper issues. [108] None of these applications were successful, due to incomplete applications, withdrawals or refusals by the FSMA. [109] 2018: 1; 2019: 30; 2020: 31; 2021: 80; 2022: 60; 2023: 95; at 30/06/2024: 70" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls BNB 286. The BNB - the European Central Bank (ECB) for credit institutions since the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (see the Introduction )- is responsible for processing licensing or registration applications and, in this specific context, has mechanisms in place to verify the “fit and proper” character of directors and significant or controlling shareholders. This assessment takes place both at the time of initial licensing and throughout the life of the FIs, particularly in the event of any notifiable changes [101] . This ensures ongoing monitoring and identifies any shortcomings in governance as the institution evolves. The ECB and the BNB share responsibility for the fit and proper assessment of the directors of credit institutions based on their importance, ensuring consistent and harmonised monitoring of financial institutions. 287. The BNB has formalised its fit and proper assessment procedures in various public documents (including the cross-sectoral suitability assessment manual) and internal documents (flowcharts, checklists). The fit and proper assessment is based on several sources, including criminal records and checks with the competent authorities [102] , with which the BNB has been in contact in several sensitive cases. In a cross-border context, these verifications are reinforced by international cooperation with foreign counterparts. 288. Formal refusals to approve appointments remain rare: in practice, candidates often withdraw their applications before a negative decision is made, particularly if there are doubts about the candidate’s compliance with the fit and proper criteria. For example, in 2019, the BNB reassessed the situation of a director involved in a criminal case abroad. Faced with a draft unfavourable decision by the BNB, he resigned before it was adopted. 289. In addition to these verifications, there is regular and formalised cooperation between the AML/CFT [103] Group and the prudential teams. This coordination strengthens the consistency of AML/CFT measures and promotes an integrated approach to AML/CFT by coordinating prudential fit and proper requirements with AML/CFT regulatory obligations. In addition, the prudential team systematically consults the AML/CFT Group to analyse the AML/CFT framework put in place by institutions applying for licensing, thereby ensuring that new entrants to the financial market are properly assessed, a practice to be encouraged. 290. Finally, since 1 April 2024, a risk-based approach has been adopted for the review of the profiles of senior directors responsible for AML/CFT and/or AML/CFT Compliance Officers (AMLCOs). This targeted approach allows the level of review to be tailored to the nature and scale of the risks identified, thereby ensuring a proportionate and effective assessment of persons performing these strategic functions. FSMA 291. The FSMA also has supervisory mechanisms in place to assess the capacity of directors and shareholders exercising control over the entities under its supervision. These inspections are carried out when applications for licensing and registration are submitted, as well as in the event of changes in directors or shareholders requiring prior notification. 292. The FSMA’s anti-money laundering centre of expertise (AML unit ) works with the prudential departments responsible for examining licensing applications. They use the Fit &amp; Proper [104] platform, a cross-cutting procedure [105] , the work of a dedicated group [106] and the Fit &amp; Proper Centre of Expertise to harmonise the review of applications. This coordination results in approximately 9% of licences being refused or withdrawn [107] . A reassessment is carried out each time the mandate is automatically renewed or at predetermined intervals for mandates of indefinite duration, which would appear to be adequate. 293. Supervision of access to managerial positions or to the status of controlling shareholder is satisfactory and uses a standardised procedure for all FIs supervised by the FSMA. In practice, entities considered less risky, such as insurance intermediaries, are subject to less stringent supervision. 294. With regard to licensing and registration, the FSMA has recorded a significant number of deregistrations and rejections on fit and proper grounds, particularly among insurance intermediaries. In 2024, 22 of the 36 deregistrations of insurance intermediaries were for fit and proper reasons (not related to ML/TF). Nevertheless, the deregistration rate remains marginal compared to the total number of registered insurance intermediaries (4,835). VASPs 295. At the time of the on-site visit, no VASP was registered or approved with the FSMA. Since the entry into force of the MiCA regulation on 30 December 2024, no supervisory authority has been designated to license new entities in this particularly risky sector, which constitutes a major shortcoming (see R. 15 in the TC Annex). 296. The FSMA was responsible for monitoring the compliance of VASPs with their AML/CFT obligations when the AML Law was extended in 2022 to providers carrying out virtual and fiat currency exchange activities and offering custodial wallet services. Belgium has introduced a transitional regime for entities that can demonstrate that they were already carrying out these activities in Belgium on a regular and professional basis on 1 May 2022. Entities that notified the FSMA of these activities were entered in a special section of the FSMA register and were required to submit a full application for registration by 1 September 2022. During the period of provisional authorisation, they had to comply with the obligations of the AML Law. The FSMA received 14 applications for provisional authorisation. [108] A number of these applications were withdrawn following notification by the FSMA of non-compliance with, in particular, the conditions of professional integrity of effective directors and/or the sound and prudent management capabilities of the shareholders. These conditions were assessed on the basis of the criteria set by the FSMA for all FIs under its supervision (see above) and in accordance with a strict approach, given the high level of risk associated with the virtual assets sector. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 297. The FSMA’s Périmètre (scoping) Department, which covers the entire financial sector, is responsible for detecting illegal financial activities. Although its role covers both the prevention and investigation of offences, its work is primarily focused on consumer protection, with the aim of putting an end to fraudulent practices that could cause harm to investors and users of financial services. In this context, the FSMA publishes guidance documents to raise awareness among consumers and stakeholders in the sector. The Périmètre team relies on complaints received, its databases and automated tools (such as web scraping) to identify suspicious practices. 298. The Périmètre Department’s work is not limited to entities supervised directly by the FSMA, but also covers activities subject to BNB licensing, particularly in the area of fund transfers, which is a particularly sensitive issue in Belgium due to cases of cash trafficking and illicit transfers of crypto assets. While concentrating the detection of illegal financial activities within a single department has advantages in terms of efficiency and information flow, it also leads the FSMA to intervene in areas that fall outside its usual remit, for which it does not have the appropriate human and technical resources. 299. One of the main challenges in recent years has been the proliferation of illegal lenders (366 illegal entities detected between 2019 and 2024), which has been made particularly easy by digital channels. In response to this threat, in 2021 the FSMA developed an automated detection tool capable of identifying fraudulent websites offering misleading credit offers. This tool makes it possible to increase the number of sites detected by facilitating the identification of suspicious offers and establishing links with Belgium by identifying elements such as false Belgian addresses, the use of the local language or other location clues. The effectiveness of this tool has contributed to an increase in the number of fraudulent activities detected [109] and warnings issued, which is a significant step forward in preventing illegal activities. 300. When the FSMA detects illegal exercise of a regulated activity, the case is not automatically referred to the public prosecutor’s office. The department first assesses the appropriateness of regularisation of the activity in question. If the FSMA has evidence of a criminal offence, it may refer the case to the judicial authorities. Where there are indications of clear fraud, the files are systematically forwarded to the public prosecutor’s office and the FSMA proposes that the public prosecutor’s office block access to the fraudulent websites. In 2024, the FSMA notified the public prosecutor’s office of 33 cases, involving 424 fraudulent websites. 301. Operational limitations remain, particularly in relation to the priority mission of consumer protection assigned to the Périmètre Department, which therefore relies mainly on information received from consumers. As a result, certain clandestine practices that are not intended to harm consumer rights, such as informal fund transfers (hawalas) or informal transactions in virtual assets, fall outside its scope of monitoring. These systems are more difficult to detect and are mainly the responsibility of the police, which have more advanced investigative resources but have not put in place proactive detection measures or a systematic detection strategy for these activities (see IO.7). Information on these networks is sometimes passed on via the public prosecutor's office, but the FSMA does not have the capacity to identify these practices independently, which is a persistent challenge for financial supervision and a significant area of risk in the Belgian context. 302. The FSMA is aware of these challenges and has gradually strengthened its cooperation with the CTIF, in particular through the integration of GoAML at the end of 2024, which has improved the exchange and processing of ML/TF information. The effectiveness of the current system remains somewhat limited in the absence of enhanced cooperation with the police, which would provide access to more advanced investigative tools and better detection of the most opaque illicit financial phenomena. An inter-institutional approach, involving the FSMA, the CTIF, the BNB and law enforcement agencies, would provide a more robust response to the challenges posed by evolving and technologically sophisticated financial crime. Footnotes [101] This is the case when a qualifying holding is acquired. A holding is considered qualifying if it represents 10% or more of the capital or voting rights of the bank, or if it allows significant influence to be exercised over the bank. [102] In particular, the judicial authorities and the FSMA in the event of the first appointment of a prospective director. [103] The AML/CFT Group is the specialised AML/CFT team with cross-sector expertise in this area within the BNB. [104] This working group was set up by the FSMA with the aim of harmonising the fit &amp; proper assessment for the FIs under its supervision. [105] This is the “Fit &amp; Proper Manual”, which sets out the steps in the procedure for assessing the fit &amp; proper status of a prospective director and the criteria and sources to be taken into account. [106] It was introduced by the FSMA and must be consulted when there is doubt over the assessment of a candidate’s fit and proper status. This centre of expertise keeps an anonymised record of decisions taken in this area to ensure consistent assessment of fit and proper status. [107] In the bureaux de change sector, for example, only one rejection was issued in 2019, mainly due to fit and proper issues. [108] None of these applications were successful, due to incomplete applications, withdrawals or refusals by the FSMA. [109] 2018: 1; 2019: 30; 2020: 31; 2021: 80; 2022: 60; 2023: 95; at 30/06/2024: 70" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Several authorities – public authorities or self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) – share responsibility for market entry supervision (see the Introduction). 404. Diamond dealers - Since the last assessment, the conditions for registering diamond dealers have been strengthened, particularly in terms of integrity, training and expertise. Between 2019 and 2024, the number of diamond dealers fell (by 163 out of a total of 1,390 licensed businesses), with only 48 new licences issued over the period (see the Introduction). These figures suggest a tightening of market entry conditions. Table ‎ 4.1. Diamond dealers: licensing, refusals, suspensions and terminations Year New licences Applications rejected Licences suspended Deregistered 2020 68 1 / 139 2021 84 1 1 143 2022 85 0 0 74 2023 74 3 1 82 2024 48 1 0 72 405. Diamond dealers must obtain a licence from SPF Economy before operating, with strict requirements including administrative documents, criminal record statements, information on directors, and a seminar including AML/CFT training. SPF Economy carries out rigorous checks on the information provided, using the ORBIS [116] database in particular to verify beneficial owners (BO) and politically exposed persons (PEP) among directors and shareholders. Additional research is carried out on the internet and social media to map companies and identify any anomalies. 406. The number of deregistrations remains significant, although it is falling. SPF Economy refuses few licensing applications, mainly when the files are incomplete or in cases of doubt about the company. However, SPF Economy does not have administrative penalties for licences, which limits its ability to punish irregularities without resorting to extreme measures. In the event of irregularities, the only option is licence suspension, whereas a graduated financial penalty would allow for a more proportionate and dissuasive response. 407. Business centres - Since 2018, these company service providers have been required to register with SPF Economy, which they can do online. The verification process covers directors and their BOs and criminal records. However, there is no automated supervision of changes of directors and registered offices once registration has been completed. This situation may allow high-risk individuals to discreetly join the management of business centres after registration, without triggering further checks, even though entities are legally required to inform SPF Economy of such changes. The below highlights a marked trend towards the approval of applications, with 340 registrations in the last five years, 65 applications refused and 30 classified without further action [117] , and a few rare cases of voluntary withdrawals. With an average of 13 refusals per year, the rejection rate is reasonable. Table 4.2. Business centres: status of applications for registration (2020-2024) Year Applications approved Applications rejected Applications withdrawn Without further action 2020 71 16 2 5 2021 58 14 5 8 2022 104 18 1 8 2023 79 13 0 7 2024 (end of Nov.) 50 6 5 4 Total 283 67 13 32 Source: SPF Economy 408. Post-registration checks in this sector reveal a persistent risk of non-compliant operators on the market, requiring stricter follow-up from the registration phase onwards. An investigation by SPF Economy in 2022 revealed a high rate of operators operating without registration (89 out of 147), which constitutes a significant ML/TF risk. However, SPF Economy takes this issue seriously. It sanctioned these infringements with warnings and fines, prompting 65 operators to comply with the rules, and carried out 320 checks for non-registration between 2021 and 2023, resulting in 121 reports, 24 warnings and sanctions totalling EUR 148,750. The lack of systematic monitoring of changes in directors and registered offices compromises the authorities’ ability to detect and prevent the infiltration of criminal structures post-registration. Given the sector’s high exposure to ML/TF risk and the high rate of non-compliance, further checks should be carried out in the short term, followed by dissuasive sanctions where necessary. 409. Real estate agents - The Professional Institute of Real Estate Agents (IPI) carries out targeted checks and has effective tools to detect unregistered real estate agents. The quality of its measures to control access to the profession and entry to the market is very good. In 2023, the IPI carried out 555 checks and inspections to ensure that real estate agents were registered and compliant with regulations, which led to 16 convictions for non-compliance with the rules in force. This level of monitoring demonstrates a significant effort to strengthen the integrity of the real estate agent sector and limit the infiltration of fraudulent operators. The IPI also carried out targeted audits of all companies in 2024 to ensure that all agents operating in these companies were properly registered and in compliance with the regulations. 410. Legal and accountancy professionals [118] - Subject to strict measures to gain access to their profession. These include rigorous training and skill requirements, as well as, in most cases, criminal record and integrity checks. These professionals are also subject to numerous ethical rules, compliance with which is regularly monitored. The misuse or fraudulent use of professional titles is a criminal offence and is prosecuted as such when detected, most often following reports from third parties. The SRBs responsible for these professions do not have investigative powers and therefore respond reactively to cases of illegal professional practice. 411. Access to the profession of notary , which is subject to a decision by the public authorities, is strictly regulated by law, with rigorous requirements in terms of qualifications, training and aptitude, as well as criminal record and integrity checks. Two authorities are responsible for detecting and dealing with non-compliance with obligations: the management committee of the National Chamber of Notaries and the provincial chambers of notaries (see the Introduction). Similarly, the Belgian Bars have robust procedures for admission to the profession of lawyer, ensuring rigorous screening of candidates. Any change in the statutes of a law firm must be submitted to the president of the bar for prior approval. Operation by criminal entities is limited, as only lawyers can manage and control a law firm. 412. For chartered accountants , the Institute for Tax Advisors and Accountants (ITAA) keeps a register of chartered accountants authorised to practise. Although licensing procedures are in place (including rigorous educational, training and aptitude requirements, and criminal record checks on applicants and ethical rules), refusals of applications remain rare, largely due to the strict procedures. All chartered accountants are required to keep their professional information up to date, and the ITAA actively monitors the compliance of its members. The ITAA does not carry out checks on the shareholding structure of accounting firms, which could facilitate criminal infiltration through opaque legal structures, in accordance with the scope of its legal obligations. [119] However, during quality reviews of its members, the ITAA verifies that firms still meet the legal requirements for the profession of chartered accountant, [120] in particular that the majority of the voting rights of the firm are still held by ITAA members, which mitigates the risks. 413. For statutory auditors , access to the profession is strictly regulated, requiring a criminal record check, extensive training and numerous exams in addition to a Master’s degree and a three-year internship supervised by an auditor, followed by an aptitude test. As a result of these stringent criteria, refusals are rare and mainly concern foreign candidates whose qualifications are not considered equivalent to Belgian standards. Post-registration follow-up is limited. 414. Casinos - When it receives a licence application or request for renewal, the Belgian Gaming Commission (CJH) conducts a thorough check on the transparency of the institution’s ownership and management, its financial stability as certified by an accountant, and carries out criminal record checks on directors and shareholders holding at least 20% of the shares. It also investigates the BOs of gaming operators by examining the group’s organisational chart and using various means, including external advice from specialist lawyers in the event of difficulties. The CJH closely monitors the entry of casinos into the market and actively blocks illegal gaming sites. In particular, the CJH carries out systematic searches leading to geo-blocking and systematically issues penalties. It also publishes a blacklist of illegal sites to inform and protect players. Since the last FATF evaluation, it has blocked 784 illegal sites. However, its post-approval follow-up is largely inadequate. Footnotes [116] Orbis is an analysis tool and global database developed by a private firm. [117] Applications classified “without further action” correspond to files for which the information necessary for their evaluation has not been provided. Despite a request for additional information, no response was received, which led to this status being assigned. [118] Among these professions, the categories most relevant for materiality in Belgium include notaries, chartered accountants and auditors. [119] Article 8 of the Royal Decree of 11 September 2020 laying down the details of the public register of accountants. [120] Article 10 of the law of 17 May 2019." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Several authorities – public authorities or self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) – share responsibility for market entry supervision (see the Introduction). 404. Diamond dealers - Since the last assessment, the conditions for registering diamond dealers have been strengthened, particularly in terms of integrity, training and expertise. Between 2019 and 2024, the number of diamond dealers fell (by 163 out of a total of 1,390 licensed businesses), with only 48 new licences issued over the period (see the Introduction). These figures suggest a tightening of market entry conditions. Table ‎ 4.1. Diamond dealers: licensing, refusals, suspensions and terminations Year New licences Applications rejected Licences suspended Deregistered 2020 68 1 / 139 2021 84 1 1 143 2022 85 0 0 74 2023 74 3 1 82 2024 48 1 0 72 405. Diamond dealers must obtain a licence from SPF Economy before operating, with strict requirements including administrative documents, criminal record statements, information on directors, and a seminar including AML/CFT training. SPF Economy carries out rigorous checks on the information provided, using the ORBIS [116] database in particular to verify beneficial owners (BO) and politically exposed persons (PEP) among directors and shareholders. Additional research is carried out on the internet and social media to map companies and identify any anomalies. 406. The number of deregistrations remains significant, although it is falling. SPF Economy refuses few licensing applications, mainly when the files are incomplete or in cases of doubt about the company. However, SPF Economy does not have administrative penalties for licences, which limits its ability to punish irregularities without resorting to extreme measures. In the event of irregularities, the only option is licence suspension, whereas a graduated financial penalty would allow for a more proportionate and dissuasive response. 407. Business centres - Since 2018, these company service providers have been required to register with SPF Economy, which they can do online. The verification process covers directors and their BOs and criminal records. However, there is no automated supervision of changes of directors and registered offices once registration has been completed. This situation may allow high-risk individuals to discreetly join the management of business centres after registration, without triggering further checks, even though entities are legally required to inform SPF Economy of such changes. The below highlights a marked trend towards the approval of applications, with 340 registrations in the last five years, 65 applications refused and 30 classified without further action [117] , and a few rare cases of voluntary withdrawals. With an average of 13 refusals per year, the rejection rate is reasonable. Table 4.2. Business centres: status of applications for registration (2020-2024) Year Applications approved Applications rejected Applications withdrawn Without further action 2020 71 16 2 5 2021 58 14 5 8 2022 104 18 1 8 2023 79 13 0 7 2024 (end of Nov.) 50 6 5 4 Total 283 67 13 32 Source: SPF Economy 408. Post-registration checks in this sector reveal a persistent risk of non-compliant operators on the market, requiring stricter follow-up from the registration phase onwards. An investigation by SPF Economy in 2022 revealed a high rate of operators operating without registration (89 out of 147), which constitutes a significant ML/TF risk. However, SPF Economy takes this issue seriously. It sanctioned these infringements with warnings and fines, prompting 65 operators to comply with the rules, and carried out 320 checks for non-registration between 2021 and 2023, resulting in 121 reports, 24 warnings and sanctions totalling EUR 148,750. The lack of systematic monitoring of changes in directors and registered offices compromises the authorities’ ability to detect and prevent the infiltration of criminal structures post-registration. Given the sector’s high exposure to ML/TF risk and the high rate of non-compliance, further checks should be carried out in the short term, followed by dissuasive sanctions where necessary. 409. Real estate agents - The Professional Institute of Real Estate Agents (IPI) carries out targeted checks and has effective tools to detect unregistered real estate agents. The quality of its measures to control access to the profession and entry to the market is very good. In 2023, the IPI carried out 555 checks and inspections to ensure that real estate agents were registered and compliant with regulations, which led to 16 convictions for non-compliance with the rules in force. This level of monitoring demonstrates a significant effort to strengthen the integrity of the real estate agent sector and limit the infiltration of fraudulent operators. The IPI also carried out targeted audits of all companies in 2024 to ensure that all agents operating in these companies were properly registered and in compliance with the regulations. 410. Legal and accountancy professionals [118] - Subject to strict measures to gain access to their profession. These include rigorous training and skill requirements, as well as, in most cases, criminal record and integrity checks. These professionals are also subject to numerous ethical rules, compliance with which is regularly monitored. The misuse or fraudulent use of professional titles is a criminal offence and is prosecuted as such when detected, most often following reports from third parties. The SRBs responsible for these professions do not have investigative powers and therefore respond reactively to cases of illegal professional practice. 411. Access to the profession of notary , which is subject to a decision by the public authorities, is strictly regulated by law, with rigorous requirements in terms of qualifications, training and aptitude, as well as criminal record and integrity checks. Two authorities are responsible for detecting and dealing with non-compliance with obligations: the management committee of the National Chamber of Notaries and the provincial chambers of notaries (see the Introduction). Similarly, the Belgian Bars have robust procedures for admission to the profession of lawyer, ensuring rigorous screening of candidates. Any change in the statutes of a law firm must be submitted to the president of the bar for prior approval. Operation by criminal entities is limited, as only lawyers can manage and control a law firm. 412. For chartered accountants , the Institute for Tax Advisors and Accountants (ITAA) keeps a register of chartered accountants authorised to practise. Although licensing procedures are in place (including rigorous educational, training and aptitude requirements, and criminal record checks on applicants and ethical rules), refusals of applications remain rare, largely due to the strict procedures. All chartered accountants are required to keep their professional information up to date, and the ITAA actively monitors the compliance of its members. The ITAA does not carry out checks on the shareholding structure of accounting firms, which could facilitate criminal infiltration through opaque legal structures, in accordance with the scope of its legal obligations. [119] However, during quality reviews of its members, the ITAA verifies that firms still meet the legal requirements for the profession of chartered accountant, [120] in particular that the majority of the voting rights of the firm are still held by ITAA members, which mitigates the risks. 413. For statutory auditors , access to the profession is strictly regulated, requiring a criminal record check, extensive training and numerous exams in addition to a Master’s degree and a three-year internship supervised by an auditor, followed by an aptitude test. As a result of these stringent criteria, refusals are rare and mainly concern foreign candidates whose qualifications are not considered equivalent to Belgian standards. Post-registration follow-up is limited. 414. Casinos - When it receives a licence application or request for renewal, the Belgian Gaming Commission (CJH) conducts a thorough check on the transparency of the institution’s ownership and management, its financial stability as certified by an accountant, and carries out criminal record checks on directors and shareholders holding at least 20% of the shares. It also investigates the BOs of gaming operators by examining the group’s organisational chart and using various means, including external advice from specialist lawyers in the event of difficulties. The CJH closely monitors the entry of casinos into the market and actively blocks illegal gaming sites. In particular, the CJH carries out systematic searches leading to geo-blocking and systematically issues penalties. It also publishes a blacklist of illegal sites to inform and protect players. Since the last FATF evaluation, it has blocked 784 illegal sites. However, its post-approval follow-up is largely inadequate. Footnotes [116] Orbis is an analysis tool and global database developed by a private firm. [117] Applications classified “without further action” correspond to files for which the information necessary for their evaluation has not been provided. Despite a request for additional information, no response was received, which led to this status being assigned. [118] Among these professions, the categories most relevant for materiality in Belgium include notaries, chartered accountants and auditors. [119] Article 8 of the Royal Decree of 11 September 2020 laying down the details of the public register of accountants. [120] Article 10 of the law of 17 May 2019." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="5.1.1. Belgian legal persons 497. The Belgian authorities have a general understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with legal persons. Nevertheless, the understanding of some key risks is sometimes inconsistent, especially with regard to important typologies in Belgium such as the use of straw men, shelf entities and certain risks associated with company service providers. Belgium identifies the risk of misuse of legal persons as a major ML risk. The CTIF and the prosecution authorities have a good understanding of the risks and types of use of legal persons for ML purposes. The authorities in charge of the basic information register (Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register), and SPF Finance-Treasury in charge of the beneficial ownership register (UBO register), have an adequate understanding of the risks. Certain reporting entities, particularly DNFBPs, exhibit a lower level of understanding. Notaries have a reasonable albeit sometimes theoretical understanding of these risks, as do company service providers (business centres, see IO.4), whose awareness appears to be more recent and sometimes approximate. 498. The understanding of ML risks is informed by the ML NRA and a cross-sectoral assessment of the risks associated with legal persons and legal arrangements carried out by SPF Finance - Treasury in 2019 and updated in 2024. The existence of this cross-sectoral assessment is a positive development since the 2015 FATF report. It is based mainly on the ML NRA, the European Commission's supranational ML/TF risk analysis and data provided by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department ( Police Judiciaire Fédérale – PJF), the CTIF and SPF Economy. The prosecuting authorities were not involved. The cross-sectoral assessment provides an overview of the applicable framework, threats and vulnerabilities to which legal entities are exposed in terms of ML and, to a certain extent, TF. It also identifies the main shortcomings in the applicable framework. 499. Overall, the cross-sectoral evaluation is mainly descriptive and lacks granularity in the analysis and on the use of typologies to allow for a more in depth understanding of the methods and techniques used to misuse legal persons. The typologies used in ML schemes linked to high-risk areas, e.g. drug trafficking, tax and social security fraud, diamond dealers, etc., have not been specifically examined. The description of certain modi operandi , such as the use of the offsetting system or TBML, is not accompanied by typologies to identify more specific methods of misuse of legal persons. Recent work on Brazilian and Romanian offsetting systems has helped to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms used (see IO.1 and 6). However, the assessment does not include a sufficiently detailed analysis of the Belgian context of polycriminal activities in which the abuse of legal persons takes place. 500. The Belgian legal framework contains an important number of vulnerabilities which the Belgian authorities have identified in the cross-sectoral assessment and which they broadly understand. However, a number of key vulnerabilities need to be further analysed and clarified, including to the use of nominee directors which enable the use of straw men. This issue is mentioned, but the assessment lacks detail concerning the profile, frequency and means of involvement of these straw men in ML schemes. 501. The cross-sectoral assessment considers that the main risks and vulnerabilities affecting legal entities are not specific to a particular legal form. Overall, the assessment identifies simple legal structures as being at risk of abuse but without defining this notion. However, levels of risk are attributed to the various forms of legal person, although they are not always sufficiently documented. General partnerships ( sociétés en nom collectif – SNC) are identified as the form of company presenting the highest risk of ML, although the mechanisms for using these entities in criminal cases are insufficiently documented. [129] Limited liability companies ( sociétés à responsabilité limitée – SRL) are also identified as being at risk due to their prevalence in the CTIF's reports to the judicial authorities and in investigations carried out by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [130] As far as public limited companies ( sociétés anonymes – SA) [131] and limited partnerships ( sociétés en commandite – Scomm) are concerned, [132] certain vulnerabilities have been identified, but they should be better documented and analysed (see the Introduction for a description of the different categories of company). “S ociétés simple s” also run the risk of being used as shell companies in complex corporate arrangements. The understanding of the risks exposure of this form of companies differs between certain authorities according to their scope of activity: SPF Economy has identified the risk posed by these entities during inspections of company service providers, whereas the judicial authorities consider that this risk is not corroborated by the judicial records. 502. The risk of TF associated with legal persons is lower than the ML risk. The entities the most at risk are non-profit organisations ( associations sans but lucratif – ASBL), which are perceived as posing a moderate risk due to their ability to collect and transfer large amounts of funds in high-risk areas. The TF NRA for NPOs (see IO.10) attributes a high degree of vulnerability to the multiplication of ASBLs, which are “dormant/inactive” shelf entities that can be reactivated for TF purposes. The measures taken to deregister and dissolve dormant ASBLs increase the identification of those that are active and, to some extent, reduce the risk of misuse of these entities for TF purposes. However, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office notes that the direct involvement of a legal person in TF matters is rare to date, based on judicial records. Nonetheless, the understanding of the TF risks appears to be uneven and needs to be improved to ensure that it is firmly rooted in the country's risk context. 5.1.2. Foreign legal persons and arrangements 503. The Belgian authorities' have a limited understanding of the risks to which Belgium is exposed from foreign legal entities. The open nature of the Belgian economy and the country's European and international connections (see the Introduction) mean that close attention should be paid to the risks associated with these entities. The Belgian authorities have not specifically assessed the risks posed by foreign legal entities and arrangements that have links with Belgium. Only the use of “limited liability” companies and legal entities or arrangements based in low-tax countries or territories or free trade zones, in the context of types of ML involving diamond dealers, is identified in the ML NRA. The cross-sectoral analysis also identifies a typology favouring identity concealment involving limited partnerships, in connection with a foreign limited liability company. However, no other form of foreign company, nor any other typology involving foreign legal entities, is considered in the cross-sectoral or national analysis of ML risks. 504. The authorities have identified a total of 66 012 foreign entities with links to Belgium, 7 645 of which have a branch or a unit in Belgium. The other foreign entities that have a link with Belgium are those subjected to various legal obligations in Belgium, such as engaging in activities subject to VAT in Belgium, employing staff subject to Belgian social security, participating in Belgian public procurement contracts, or renting property in Belgium. However, the Belgian authorities consider the materiality of the ML risk associated with these legal persons to be low, given that the 66 012 foreign entities are only a small proportion of the total of 870 410 Belgian legal entities listed at the end of the on-site visit (February 2025) and in the light of the low number of report based on STR involving foreign entities transmitted to the judicial authorities (8% of transmissions involving legal persons are foreign legal persons). However, these factors are not sufficient to justify a low level of risk. Foreign entities represent 7% of entities operating in Belgium, and ML cases involving offsetting schemes have revealed the use of foreign entities (e.g. see the “Clown” case, IO.7). 505. With regard to trusts or similar legal arrangements, Belgium has not ratified the Hague Convention and does not authorise the creation of legal arrangements in Belgium. However, foreign legal arrangements may be administered by a Belgian resident or hold property or rights in Belgium. A person domiciled in Belgium may also be the settlor or beneficiary of a trust governed by foreign law. Finally, these foreign legal arrangements may have effective control over a Belgian legal entity (see Rec. 25 in the TC Annex). The risks associated with trusts and similar legal arrangements in the specific context of Belgium are not identified in the cross-sectoral assessment of legal persons and are assimilated to the risks posed by foreign legal persons. The 2015 FATF report previously noted the lack of measures taken to identify and assess the vulnerabilities of legal arrangements operating in Belgium. [133] The fact that these legal structures are not created in the country makes it difficult to identify them and to understand and assess the risks associated with them. The mandatory UBO registration requirement only allows for the identification of certain entities: 746 foreign legal arrangements registered as intermediate entities of Belgian legal persons. Among these, the Belgian authorities have identified fourteen foreign legal structures administered from Belgium. Footnotes [129] General partnerships account for 9% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF, even though there are only 29,000 of them. [130] Limited liability companies account for 75% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF and 30% of the investigations opened by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [131] Public limited companies account for 6% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF and 6% of the investigations opened by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [132] Limited partnerships account for 2% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF. [133] MER, para. 7.27, p.139." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="5.1.1. Belgian legal persons 497. The Belgian authorities have a general understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with legal persons. Nevertheless, the understanding of some key risks is sometimes inconsistent, especially with regard to important typologies in Belgium such as the use of straw men, shelf entities and certain risks associated with company service providers. Belgium identifies the risk of misuse of legal persons as a major ML risk. The CTIF and the prosecution authorities have a good understanding of the risks and types of use of legal persons for ML purposes. The authorities in charge of the basic information register (Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register), and SPF Finance-Treasury in charge of the beneficial ownership register (UBO register), have an adequate understanding of the risks. Certain reporting entities, particularly DNFBPs, exhibit a lower level of understanding. Notaries have a reasonable albeit sometimes theoretical understanding of these risks, as do company service providers (business centres, see IO.4), whose awareness appears to be more recent and sometimes approximate. 498. The understanding of ML risks is informed by the ML NRA and a cross-sectoral assessment of the risks associated with legal persons and legal arrangements carried out by SPF Finance - Treasury in 2019 and updated in 2024. The existence of this cross-sectoral assessment is a positive development since the 2015 FATF report. It is based mainly on the ML NRA, the European Commission's supranational ML/TF risk analysis and data provided by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department ( Police Judiciaire Fédérale – PJF), the CTIF and SPF Economy. The prosecuting authorities were not involved. The cross-sectoral assessment provides an overview of the applicable framework, threats and vulnerabilities to which legal entities are exposed in terms of ML and, to a certain extent, TF. It also identifies the main shortcomings in the applicable framework. 499. Overall, the cross-sectoral evaluation is mainly descriptive and lacks granularity in the analysis and on the use of typologies to allow for a more in depth understanding of the methods and techniques used to misuse legal persons. The typologies used in ML schemes linked to high-risk areas, e.g. drug trafficking, tax and social security fraud, diamond dealers, etc., have not been specifically examined. The description of certain modi operandi , such as the use of the offsetting system or TBML, is not accompanied by typologies to identify more specific methods of misuse of legal persons. Recent work on Brazilian and Romanian offsetting systems has helped to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms used (see IO.1 and 6). However, the assessment does not include a sufficiently detailed analysis of the Belgian context of polycriminal activities in which the abuse of legal persons takes place. 500. The Belgian legal framework contains an important number of vulnerabilities which the Belgian authorities have identified in the cross-sectoral assessment and which they broadly understand. However, a number of key vulnerabilities need to be further analysed and clarified, including to the use of nominee directors which enable the use of straw men. This issue is mentioned, but the assessment lacks detail concerning the profile, frequency and means of involvement of these straw men in ML schemes. 501. The cross-sectoral assessment considers that the main risks and vulnerabilities affecting legal entities are not specific to a particular legal form. Overall, the assessment identifies simple legal structures as being at risk of abuse but without defining this notion. However, levels of risk are attributed to the various forms of legal person, although they are not always sufficiently documented. General partnerships ( sociétés en nom collectif – SNC) are identified as the form of company presenting the highest risk of ML, although the mechanisms for using these entities in criminal cases are insufficiently documented. [129] Limited liability companies ( sociétés à responsabilité limitée – SRL) are also identified as being at risk due to their prevalence in the CTIF's reports to the judicial authorities and in investigations carried out by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [130] As far as public limited companies ( sociétés anonymes – SA) [131] and limited partnerships ( sociétés en commandite – Scomm) are concerned, [132] certain vulnerabilities have been identified, but they should be better documented and analysed (see the Introduction for a description of the different categories of company). “S ociétés simple s” also run the risk of being used as shell companies in complex corporate arrangements. The understanding of the risks exposure of this form of companies differs between certain authorities according to their scope of activity: SPF Economy has identified the risk posed by these entities during inspections of company service providers, whereas the judicial authorities consider that this risk is not corroborated by the judicial records. 502. The risk of TF associated with legal persons is lower than the ML risk. The entities the most at risk are non-profit organisations ( associations sans but lucratif – ASBL), which are perceived as posing a moderate risk due to their ability to collect and transfer large amounts of funds in high-risk areas. The TF NRA for NPOs (see IO.10) attributes a high degree of vulnerability to the multiplication of ASBLs, which are “dormant/inactive” shelf entities that can be reactivated for TF purposes. The measures taken to deregister and dissolve dormant ASBLs increase the identification of those that are active and, to some extent, reduce the risk of misuse of these entities for TF purposes. However, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office notes that the direct involvement of a legal person in TF matters is rare to date, based on judicial records. Nonetheless, the understanding of the TF risks appears to be uneven and needs to be improved to ensure that it is firmly rooted in the country's risk context. 5.1.2. Foreign legal persons and arrangements 503. The Belgian authorities' have a limited understanding of the risks to which Belgium is exposed from foreign legal entities. The open nature of the Belgian economy and the country's European and international connections (see the Introduction) mean that close attention should be paid to the risks associated with these entities. The Belgian authorities have not specifically assessed the risks posed by foreign legal entities and arrangements that have links with Belgium. Only the use of “limited liability” companies and legal entities or arrangements based in low-tax countries or territories or free trade zones, in the context of types of ML involving diamond dealers, is identified in the ML NRA. The cross-sectoral analysis also identifies a typology favouring identity concealment involving limited partnerships, in connection with a foreign limited liability company. However, no other form of foreign company, nor any other typology involving foreign legal entities, is considered in the cross-sectoral or national analysis of ML risks. 504. The authorities have identified a total of 66 012 foreign entities with links to Belgium, 7 645 of which have a branch or a unit in Belgium. The other foreign entities that have a link with Belgium are those subjected to various legal obligations in Belgium, such as engaging in activities subject to VAT in Belgium, employing staff subject to Belgian social security, participating in Belgian public procurement contracts, or renting property in Belgium. However, the Belgian authorities consider the materiality of the ML risk associated with these legal persons to be low, given that the 66 012 foreign entities are only a small proportion of the total of 870 410 Belgian legal entities listed at the end of the on-site visit (February 2025) and in the light of the low number of report based on STR involving foreign entities transmitted to the judicial authorities (8% of transmissions involving legal persons are foreign legal persons). However, these factors are not sufficient to justify a low level of risk. Foreign entities represent 7% of entities operating in Belgium, and ML cases involving offsetting schemes have revealed the use of foreign entities (e.g. see the “Clown” case, IO.7). 505. With regard to trusts or similar legal arrangements, Belgium has not ratified the Hague Convention and does not authorise the creation of legal arrangements in Belgium. However, foreign legal arrangements may be administered by a Belgian resident or hold property or rights in Belgium. A person domiciled in Belgium may also be the settlor or beneficiary of a trust governed by foreign law. Finally, these foreign legal arrangements may have effective control over a Belgian legal entity (see Rec. 25 in the TC Annex). The risks associated with trusts and similar legal arrangements in the specific context of Belgium are not identified in the cross-sectoral assessment of legal persons and are assimilated to the risks posed by foreign legal persons. The 2015 FATF report previously noted the lack of measures taken to identify and assess the vulnerabilities of legal arrangements operating in Belgium. [133] The fact that these legal structures are not created in the country makes it difficult to identify them and to understand and assess the risks associated with them. The mandatory UBO registration requirement only allows for the identification of certain entities: 746 foreign legal arrangements registered as intermediate entities of Belgian legal persons. Among these, the Belgian authorities have identified fourteen foreign legal structures administered from Belgium. Footnotes [129] General partnerships account for 9% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF, even though there are only 29,000 of them. [130] Limited liability companies account for 75% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF and 30% of the investigations opened by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [131] Public limited companies account for 6% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF and 6% of the investigations opened by the Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department. [132] Limited partnerships account for 2% of the cases involving legal persons referred to the judicial authorities by the CTIF. [133] MER, para. 7.27, p.139." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="546. The CTIF has broad access to information essential for conducting its analysis, both through the reports it receives, mainly suspicious transaction reports (STRs), [156] and its access to several databases. Since 2022, the CTIF has been able to consult cross-border cash transport declarations directly via the Customs Information System (CIS) database. 6.1.1. Types of reports received 547. The CTIF plays a key role in receiving and analysing STRs from reporting entities, mainly in the financial sector (see table below). The volume of STRs received by the CTIF has been steadily increasing over the past five years (from 28,647 in 2020 to 89,457 in 2024). The nature and sophistication of these STRs vary considerably, particularly between sectors. Despite continuing sectoral disparities, this upward trend also reflects an improvement in the detection of suspicious transactions, as confirmed by the inspection reports of the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of reporting entities, particularly in the financial sector (see IO.3 and IO.4 on sectoral reporting activity). Table 6.1. Number of STRs received by the CTIF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Financial institutions 26 893 41 403 49 019 75 304 87 902 Sharp increase – with notable rises in 2021 (+53.9%), 2023 (+53.6%) and 2024 (+16.8%) DNFBPs 1 754 1 948 2 585 2 059 1 555 After an increase in 2022 (+31.6%), STRs fell in 2023 (-20.5%) and 2024 (-25.5%) Total 28 647 43 351 51 604 77363 89 457 Overall growth – with significant increases in 2021 (+51.3%) and 2023 (+49.9%) Source: CTIF 548. While the number of STRs has increased overall, sectoral disparities remain, with the majority of reports coming from FIs (96%), half from CIs (52% on average) and PIs. Conversely, some DNFBPs, despite being exposed to risks, some of which are significant, report very few suspicious transactions. This is particularly the case for diamond dealers, real estate agents, company service providers/business centres and lawyers, who remain under-represented in the reporting statistics (see IO.4). This high number of STRs from the financial sector, which reflects the overall importance of this sector, may have an impact on the diversity of financial intelligence available to the CTIF, thereby reducing its ability to detect certain types of ML/TF through non-financial channels. 549. Delays in the transmission of STRs by some reporting entities, in both the financial and non-financial sectors, is sometimes excessively long. For example, the inspections revealed cases where STRs were submitted more than three weeks after the end of the internal investigation, or even several months later. This situation raises concerns about the responsiveness and effectiveness of the reporting system for reporting entities, which could hinder early detection of certain ML/TF cases (see sections 3.4 of IO.3 and 4.4 of IO.4) and follow-up action. 550. To improve the quality of STRs , the CTIF is setting up a feedback system for reporting entities to improve their understanding of ML/TF typologies and refine their mechanisms for detecting suspicious transactions. This consists of talking directly with them, publishing guidance and holding awareness sessions (see section 6.3 for details on how this collaboration works and how effective it is). This feedback is having a positive impact, with noticeable improvements in how quickly reports are submitted and their quality. However, the feedback is still too limited to meet the needs of most reporting entities. It should be more frequent, especially for at-risk professions such as diamond traders and notaries. 551. The CTIF has also published an information note detailing the criteria for assessing the quality of STRs, which is a good way of improving the accuracy and relevance of the reports submitted by reporting entities. However, it has had limited real impact because the private sector has little or no knowledge of it. This suggests that these criteria need to be shared more widely. 552. Until very recently (end of September 2024), 95% of STRs were submitted electronically via the ORIS system, with reporting entities submitting their reports online using a secure form. This digitisation of the process made it easier to integrate reports into the CTIF database and helped to manage the growing volume of information received more efficiently. However, the ORIS system had several functional limitations, including the inability to segment reports, track reporting delays and analyse ML/TF trends. It was not possible to classify reports by type of risk or predicate offence, which prevented any detailed analysis of the ML/TF typologies reported. It was also unable to provide information on the time taken to submit STRs, which made it difficult to assess the responsiveness of reporting entities after detecting suspicious transactions. 553. Since 1 October 2024, the CTIF has been using the goAML reporting system. This tool, which some reporting entities, particularly small and medium-sized ones, still find difficult to use, includes advanced features for segmenting reports, tracking delays in reporting and analysing ML/TF trends. It aims to optimise the use of STRs, improve how they are managed and strengthen the collection of statistical data on reporting activity. 6.1.2. Access to databases 554. The CTIF requests and obtains all relevant information from reporting entities, even if they have not submitted a report, and from the supervisory authorities or government agencies. To this end, it has signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with several partners, including the Belgian General Intelligence and Security Service (SGRS), the Belgian State Security Service (VSSE), the National Bank of Belgium (BNB), the Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The CTIF also received information resources from other competent authorities (see table below), including supervisory authorities, and from its foreign counterparts (see IO.2). Table 6.2. Information received from other competent authorities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Office for Advance Tax Rulings 604 489 413 298 710 SPF Finance (Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service-CAF) 50 37 23 47 38 Customs &amp; Excise [157] 1 076 632 117 42 12 SPF Economy 26 19 32 11 10 Europol - - 5 4 Trustees in bankruptcy and interim administrators 2 2 - 4 3 Security 16 9 5 3 4 Penitentiary institutions 1 - 2 3 3 Flemish Tax Service 36 32 8 2 1 General Intelligence and Security Service 2 4 2 2 2 Centre for Information and Advice on Sectarian Organisations 2 1 5 1 3 Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) 2 - - 1 Federal Prosecutor’s Office 1 SPF Foreign Affairs - 2 - Social Inspectorate (federal and regional) 6 - - - Total 1 824 1 225 609 419 790 if !supportTextWrap Source: CTIF if !supportTextWrap Table 6.3. Communications received from supervisory authorities and self-regulatory bodies 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 BNB 1 FSMA 114 179 255 177 98 Institute for Tax Advisors &amp; Accountants (ITAA) 3 57 253 79 31 SPF Economy – Licensing Unit (Diamonds) 12 5 11 - 4 National Chamber of Notaries 1 - - Supervisory College of Auditors - - - 2 Gaming Commission (CJH) 1 Total 131 242 519 256 135 Source: CTIF 555. The CTIF makes extensive use of the databases available to it in order to enhance its financial investigations. The National Register and Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises (see box below) are by far the most frequently consulted sources of information. However, other databases are also consulted on a regular basis. In 2024, for example, the CTIF made around 65,000 requests to the police database via its two liaison officers. Authorities regularly consult the central register of financial accounts and contracts (PCC) (4,208 times), as it gives them easier access to centralised information on various accounts and financial contracts, their holders and the financial institutions that maintain them. However, some data is not available, including virtual asset portfolios and virtual IBANs linked to main accounts. The Social Security databases (DOLSIS – SPF Social Security) were searched in 981 cases (usually with several searches per case) and the tax databases (SPF Finance) were searched to find information on 343 natural persons and 1,009 legal persons. Box 6.1. Available files and databases (to which the CTIF has direct access) To which the CTIF has direct access · The National Register contains all identification data for the following natural persons: Belgians residing in Belgium; Belgian nationals residing abroad who are registered in the population registers kept by Belgian diplomatic missions or consular posts abroad; foreign nationals residing in Belgium who are admitted or authorised to settle or reside in Belgium, and foreign nationals who declare themselves refugees or who apply for refugee status. · The Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises contains all identification data for the following entities: legal persons under Belgian law; natural persons who are self-employed in Belgium; legal persons under foreign law with a head office or branch in Belgium; organisations without legal personality that, in Belgium, are either a company, subject to social security as an employer, or subject to VAT; bodies or agencies governed by Belgian law that perform public service remits or remits related to public order and have financial and accounting autonomy separate from that of the legal persons governed by Belgian public law to which they are attached; natural persons or legal persons governed by foreign law and organisations without legal personality required to register under specific Belgian legislation. · Social security and employment databases : via the DOLSIS application, including employment declarations, employer and employee files, pension and unemployment data. · Central criminal records system : lists final convictions of natural persons and legal persons (complete for legal persons since 2016). · Tax databases : tax returns (personal income tax, corporation tax, VAT), customer/supplier lists and cadastral data. · UBO register : centralises information on the ultimate beneficial owners of Belgian companies and legal persons. · Centralised register of financial accounts and contracts held by legal persons with Belgian financial institutions (PCC): established in 2011 for tax purposes and access extended for ML purposes in 2018. Register managed by the National Bank of Belgium’s central point of contact. · Banque de données communes (BDC): information on terrorism, extremism and radicalisation (restricted access). See IO.9. · Customs and financial systems : CIS (Customs Information System) via AFIS and the CIS (Customs Information System) database. Since 2022, the CTIF has also had direct access to cross-border cash transport declarations via the European Commission’s Customs Information System (CIS) database, thanks to a dedicated application developed in-house by its ICC department. · Centrale des Bilans : compiles the annual accounts of Belgian companies filed with the National Bank of Belgium. To which the CTIF has indirect access · KIK police database : can be accessed daily by the federal police liaison officer, with a standard response time of 24 hours and an emergency procedure that can be initiated every 15 minutes for urgent requests. · Public Prosecutor’s Office ADBA database: contains information supplementing the police databases, accessible by the CTIF via the federal police liaison officer, with a response within one to two days. 556. While the databases used by the CTIF and other authorities, such as the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, are generally considered useful sources of information, concerns have been raised about the updating and completeness of the basic data held by the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and about the beneficial owners listed in the UBO register (see IO.5). These shortcomings limit the authorities’ ability to make full use of these databases, which in turn may reduce the scope and reliability of the financial intelligence generated, thereby affecting the effectiveness of ML/FT investigations (see IO.7). 557. Investigative authorities also have broad access to various databases that are essential to their ML/TF investigations and to locating the proceeds of crime, and which serve as sources for enhancing financial intelligence. In practice, the Federal Judicial Police play a key role in using this data, carrying out searches and reporting their findings. At the same time, with a judge’s written authorisation, the investigative authorities can obtain all relevant information from other national authorities within a response time of between 24 hours and five working days, which can slow down certain procedures. Furthermore, when investigating social security and tax fraud, the police and prosecutor’s offices can draw on the expertise and operational support of finance officials and social security inspectors as part of multidisciplinary investigation teams (MOTEMs). In practice, the use of MOTEMs is limited and has not yet delivered tangible results in ML investigations (see IO.7). 558. For their part, prosecution authorities generally have similar access to information as the police, thereby ensuring continuity in the analysis and processing of cases. Footnotes [156] To a much lesser extent, reports sent by notaries and real estate agents when cash is used in real estate transactions in accordance with Article 66, §2 of the AML/CFT Law. [157] The drop in the number of Customs STRs since 2022 is due to the fact that the CTIF can now access cross-border cash transport declarations directly via the Customs Information System (CIS) database, using an application developed by its ICC department." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="546. The CTIF has broad access to information essential for conducting its analysis, both through the reports it receives, mainly suspicious transaction reports (STRs), [156] and its access to several databases. Since 2022, the CTIF has been able to consult cross-border cash transport declarations directly via the Customs Information System (CIS) database. 6.1.1. Types of reports received 547. The CTIF plays a key role in receiving and analysing STRs from reporting entities, mainly in the financial sector (see table below). The volume of STRs received by the CTIF has been steadily increasing over the past five years (from 28,647 in 2020 to 89,457 in 2024). The nature and sophistication of these STRs vary considerably, particularly between sectors. Despite continuing sectoral disparities, this upward trend also reflects an improvement in the detection of suspicious transactions, as confirmed by the inspection reports of the AML/CFT supervisory authorities of reporting entities, particularly in the financial sector (see IO.3 and IO.4 on sectoral reporting activity). Table 6.1. Number of STRs received by the CTIF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Financial institutions 26 893 41 403 49 019 75 304 87 902 Sharp increase – with notable rises in 2021 (+53.9%), 2023 (+53.6%) and 2024 (+16.8%) DNFBPs 1 754 1 948 2 585 2 059 1 555 After an increase in 2022 (+31.6%), STRs fell in 2023 (-20.5%) and 2024 (-25.5%) Total 28 647 43 351 51 604 77363 89 457 Overall growth – with significant increases in 2021 (+51.3%) and 2023 (+49.9%) Source: CTIF 548. While the number of STRs has increased overall, sectoral disparities remain, with the majority of reports coming from FIs (96%), half from CIs (52% on average) and PIs. Conversely, some DNFBPs, despite being exposed to risks, some of which are significant, report very few suspicious transactions. This is particularly the case for diamond dealers, real estate agents, company service providers/business centres and lawyers, who remain under-represented in the reporting statistics (see IO.4). This high number of STRs from the financial sector, which reflects the overall importance of this sector, may have an impact on the diversity of financial intelligence available to the CTIF, thereby reducing its ability to detect certain types of ML/TF through non-financial channels. 549. Delays in the transmission of STRs by some reporting entities, in both the financial and non-financial sectors, is sometimes excessively long. For example, the inspections revealed cases where STRs were submitted more than three weeks after the end of the internal investigation, or even several months later. This situation raises concerns about the responsiveness and effectiveness of the reporting system for reporting entities, which could hinder early detection of certain ML/TF cases (see sections 3.4 of IO.3 and 4.4 of IO.4) and follow-up action. 550. To improve the quality of STRs , the CTIF is setting up a feedback system for reporting entities to improve their understanding of ML/TF typologies and refine their mechanisms for detecting suspicious transactions. This consists of talking directly with them, publishing guidance and holding awareness sessions (see section 6.3 for details on how this collaboration works and how effective it is). This feedback is having a positive impact, with noticeable improvements in how quickly reports are submitted and their quality. However, the feedback is still too limited to meet the needs of most reporting entities. It should be more frequent, especially for at-risk professions such as diamond traders and notaries. 551. The CTIF has also published an information note detailing the criteria for assessing the quality of STRs, which is a good way of improving the accuracy and relevance of the reports submitted by reporting entities. However, it has had limited real impact because the private sector has little or no knowledge of it. This suggests that these criteria need to be shared more widely. 552. Until very recently (end of September 2024), 95% of STRs were submitted electronically via the ORIS system, with reporting entities submitting their reports online using a secure form. This digitisation of the process made it easier to integrate reports into the CTIF database and helped to manage the growing volume of information received more efficiently. However, the ORIS system had several functional limitations, including the inability to segment reports, track reporting delays and analyse ML/TF trends. It was not possible to classify reports by type of risk or predicate offence, which prevented any detailed analysis of the ML/TF typologies reported. It was also unable to provide information on the time taken to submit STRs, which made it difficult to assess the responsiveness of reporting entities after detecting suspicious transactions. 553. Since 1 October 2024, the CTIF has been using the goAML reporting system. This tool, which some reporting entities, particularly small and medium-sized ones, still find difficult to use, includes advanced features for segmenting reports, tracking delays in reporting and analysing ML/TF trends. It aims to optimise the use of STRs, improve how they are managed and strengthen the collection of statistical data on reporting activity. 6.1.2. Access to databases 554. The CTIF requests and obtains all relevant information from reporting entities, even if they have not submitted a report, and from the supervisory authorities or government agencies. To this end, it has signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with several partners, including the Belgian General Intelligence and Security Service (SGRS), the Belgian State Security Service (VSSE), the National Bank of Belgium (BNB), the Belgian Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The CTIF also received information resources from other competent authorities (see table below), including supervisory authorities, and from its foreign counterparts (see IO.2). Table 6.2. Information received from other competent authorities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Office for Advance Tax Rulings 604 489 413 298 710 SPF Finance (Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service-CAF) 50 37 23 47 38 Customs &amp; Excise [157] 1 076 632 117 42 12 SPF Economy 26 19 32 11 10 Europol - - 5 4 Trustees in bankruptcy and interim administrators 2 2 - 4 3 Security 16 9 5 3 4 Penitentiary institutions 1 - 2 3 3 Flemish Tax Service 36 32 8 2 1 General Intelligence and Security Service 2 4 2 2 2 Centre for Information and Advice on Sectarian Organisations 2 1 5 1 3 Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) 2 - - 1 Federal Prosecutor’s Office 1 SPF Foreign Affairs - 2 - Social Inspectorate (federal and regional) 6 - - - Total 1 824 1 225 609 419 790 if !supportTextWrap Source: CTIF if !supportTextWrap Table 6.3. Communications received from supervisory authorities and self-regulatory bodies 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 BNB 1 FSMA 114 179 255 177 98 Institute for Tax Advisors &amp; Accountants (ITAA) 3 57 253 79 31 SPF Economy – Licensing Unit (Diamonds) 12 5 11 - 4 National Chamber of Notaries 1 - - Supervisory College of Auditors - - - 2 Gaming Commission (CJH) 1 Total 131 242 519 256 135 Source: CTIF 555. The CTIF makes extensive use of the databases available to it in order to enhance its financial investigations. The National Register and Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises (see box below) are by far the most frequently consulted sources of information. However, other databases are also consulted on a regular basis. In 2024, for example, the CTIF made around 65,000 requests to the police database via its two liaison officers. Authorities regularly consult the central register of financial accounts and contracts (PCC) (4,208 times), as it gives them easier access to centralised information on various accounts and financial contracts, their holders and the financial institutions that maintain them. However, some data is not available, including virtual asset portfolios and virtual IBANs linked to main accounts. The Social Security databases (DOLSIS – SPF Social Security) were searched in 981 cases (usually with several searches per case) and the tax databases (SPF Finance) were searched to find information on 343 natural persons and 1,009 legal persons. Box 6.1. Available files and databases (to which the CTIF has direct access) To which the CTIF has direct access · The National Register contains all identification data for the following natural persons: Belgians residing in Belgium; Belgian nationals residing abroad who are registered in the population registers kept by Belgian diplomatic missions or consular posts abroad; foreign nationals residing in Belgium who are admitted or authorised to settle or reside in Belgium, and foreign nationals who declare themselves refugees or who apply for refugee status. · The Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises contains all identification data for the following entities: legal persons under Belgian law; natural persons who are self-employed in Belgium; legal persons under foreign law with a head office or branch in Belgium; organisations without legal personality that, in Belgium, are either a company, subject to social security as an employer, or subject to VAT; bodies or agencies governed by Belgian law that perform public service remits or remits related to public order and have financial and accounting autonomy separate from that of the legal persons governed by Belgian public law to which they are attached; natural persons or legal persons governed by foreign law and organisations without legal personality required to register under specific Belgian legislation. · Social security and employment databases : via the DOLSIS application, including employment declarations, employer and employee files, pension and unemployment data. · Central criminal records system : lists final convictions of natural persons and legal persons (complete for legal persons since 2016). · Tax databases : tax returns (personal income tax, corporation tax, VAT), customer/supplier lists and cadastral data. · UBO register : centralises information on the ultimate beneficial owners of Belgian companies and legal persons. · Centralised register of financial accounts and contracts held by legal persons with Belgian financial institutions (PCC): established in 2011 for tax purposes and access extended for ML purposes in 2018. Register managed by the National Bank of Belgium’s central point of contact. · Banque de données communes (BDC): information on terrorism, extremism and radicalisation (restricted access). See IO.9. · Customs and financial systems : CIS (Customs Information System) via AFIS and the CIS (Customs Information System) database. Since 2022, the CTIF has also had direct access to cross-border cash transport declarations via the European Commission’s Customs Information System (CIS) database, thanks to a dedicated application developed in-house by its ICC department. · Centrale des Bilans : compiles the annual accounts of Belgian companies filed with the National Bank of Belgium. To which the CTIF has indirect access · KIK police database : can be accessed daily by the federal police liaison officer, with a standard response time of 24 hours and an emergency procedure that can be initiated every 15 minutes for urgent requests. · Public Prosecutor’s Office ADBA database: contains information supplementing the police databases, accessible by the CTIF via the federal police liaison officer, with a response within one to two days. 556. While the databases used by the CTIF and other authorities, such as the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, are generally considered useful sources of information, concerns have been raised about the updating and completeness of the basic data held by the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and about the beneficial owners listed in the UBO register (see IO.5). These shortcomings limit the authorities’ ability to make full use of these databases, which in turn may reduce the scope and reliability of the financial intelligence generated, thereby affecting the effectiveness of ML/FT investigations (see IO.7). 557. Investigative authorities also have broad access to various databases that are essential to their ML/TF investigations and to locating the proceeds of crime, and which serve as sources for enhancing financial intelligence. In practice, the Federal Judicial Police play a key role in using this data, carrying out searches and reporting their findings. At the same time, with a judge’s written authorisation, the investigative authorities can obtain all relevant information from other national authorities within a response time of between 24 hours and five working days, which can slow down certain procedures. Furthermore, when investigating social security and tax fraud, the police and prosecutor’s offices can draw on the expertise and operational support of finance officials and social security inspectors as part of multidisciplinary investigation teams (MOTEMs). In practice, the use of MOTEMs is limited and has not yet delivered tangible results in ML investigations (see IO.7). 558. For their part, prosecution authorities generally have similar access to information as the police, thereby ensuring continuity in the analysis and processing of cases. Footnotes [156] To a much lesser extent, reports sent by notaries and real estate agents when cash is used in real estate transactions in accordance with Article 66, §2 of the AML/CFT Law. [157] The drop in the number of Customs STRs since 2022 is due to the fact that the CTIF can now access cross-border cash transport declarations directly via the Customs Information System (CIS) database, using an application developed by its ICC department." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="7.1.1. Identification of ML cases 613. Suspicious ML activities are mainly identified by police sources based on incidental findings in the course of criminal investigations (accounting for 57% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). [161] A significant proportion of these cases are small-scale and typically involve, for example, ‘money mules’. [162] ML investigations were initiated following the decryption of a large number of communications from the Sky ECC platform (see box below), made possible by Europol and Eurojust’s financial and technological support. The information provided by the CTIF has led to a lower proportion of investigations being opened by prosecutor’s offices (approximately 17% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). The number of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities based on the analyses of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) has remained stable since 2020. A total of 6,389 new files were forwarded between 2020 and 2024 (see IO.6) [163] Most of these files involve potential predicate criminal offences linked to fraud, organised crime, serious tax fraud, social security fraud and drug trafficking. [164] However, this source is not used to its full potential by the investigative and prosecuting authorities. A significant proportion of these referrals do not lead to the opening of an investigation, mainly due to a lack of resources and ability to seize illicit funds when they are not directly available, e.g. if they are located abroad, in accordance with the TRIM criteria (see section below). Between 2019 and 2024, 43% of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities were closed without further action, raising concerns that a significant proportion of CTIF communications are not being fully utilised. 614. Strengthening the detection of ML activity was identified as a priority area in the AML Action Plan adopted in March 2024 (see IO.1). However, this priority has not resulted in practical measures such as developing a strategic framework and allocating human and technological resources to support a stronger and more targeted approach to identifying ML cases. In practice, Belgium does not apply a strategic approach to identifying ML activity that is commensurate with the risks to which the country is exposed, in particular those related to the existence of organised networks, professional ML involving multiple criminal offences, the widespread use of cash, the diamond sector and illegal activities generating funds that are laundered outside the financial system (see IO.1). The FATF noted weaknesses in identifying money laundering cases back in 2015. The Belgian authorities have since become aware of the growing scale of criminal activities that could undermine the fundamental foundations of Belgian society and their potential repercussions at the international level, particularly in neighbouring countries . However, Belgium has not stepped up its response to the high risks to which the country is exposed in order to identify ML activities in a more targeted and proactive way. 615. The allocation of ML cases to the various district prosecutor’s offices is based on territorial distribution criteria that have an impact on the subsequent judicial handling of cases. This allocation does not always make it possible to identify and deal in a coordinated manner with related cases opened in several prosecutor’s offices, due to a lack of coordination between these offices. The operational limitations of the database that lists cases opened in the various prosecutor’s offices and police departments hinder operational coordination, as noted by the federal authorities. [165] Identifying links between different cases is random and should be improved to make it easier for Belgium to tackle offences involving multiple crimes across the country. New tools have been introduced to streamline the digital processing of files, but their recent rollout means that it is too early to measure their impact. [166] Box 7.1. The SKY ECC case The SKY ECC case demonstrates Belgium’s ability to identify ML cases involving significant financial flows with international connections. It illustrates the authorities’ ability to reorganise their operational framework to maximise the expertise available at federal and local level and the importance of the CTIF as a source of financial intelligence. The case originated with the interception, decryption and utilisation of data from the SKY ECC encrypted communication system used by numerous criminal networks. Analyses of the decrypted data revealed the extent of the criminal networks involved in drug trafficking in Belgium, the prevalence of the use of cash and money mules, and the growing use of virtual assets, particularly for transferring illegal assets out of Belgium. Financial flows mainly transit through Belgium to the countries of origin of those involved, but are also invested directly and laundered within Belgium. This case, which the Federal Judicial Police started in early 2021, led to the opening of a total of 643 judicial investigations under the name ‘Operation Edge’, including 442 new and 201 existing investigations that were expanded after the data was decrypted. Two thirds of the investigations (439 cases) involve drug trafficking and 63 involve ML offences. In response to the scale of the criminal activities identified, Belgium has reorganised its operational framework to split up and coordinate the various investigations between the federal police and local police forces and to allocate cases between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and district prosecutor’s offices. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has focused its efforts on recovering assets abroad and extraditing suspects. A stronger communication framework has also been put in place with the CTIF (see IO.6). Prosecution proceedings have been initiated and 131 judgements have been handed down to date, with more than 1,093 people convicted, all offences combined. The case has also resulted in convictions for ML, although the exact number of these was not shared with the evaluation team. . Based on an analyses of 75 court cases from Sky ECC, the Federal Judicial Police (DJSOC) conducted an internal analyses in 2024 to identify trends and modus operandi in these cases. 616. The allocation of cases between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and district prosecutor’s offices does not follow clearly established criteria. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has concurrent and subsidiary jurisdiction over district prosecutors in ML matters. A College of Prosecutors General circular [167] and the 2021 Priority Note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office stipulate that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office has jurisdiction over ML cases involving offsetting schemes and plays a coordinating role in cases handled by district prosecutors relating to criminal organisations with international connections. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office may also take on complex ML cases where it wishes to develop innovative investigation methods or tackle certain criminal phenomena. District prosecutor’s offices have indicated that they do not always understand the scope and characteristics of the cases taken on by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. One case illustrates how the transfer to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office of several cases handled by district prosecutor’s offices led to the identification and dismantling of a complex ML case involving an offsetting scheme (the Clown case, see box below). However, Belgium has not adopted a systematic approach to joining related money laundering cases with a view to dismantling criminal networks. The powers and functions of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to deal with complex ML cases with an international dimension and involving significant financial flows have therefore not been fully optimised. The least well-resourced prosecutor’s offices do not seem to be able to call on those with more resources and expertise to deal with more complex cases. 7.1.2. ML investigations 617. Approximately 400 new cases were opened each year by the Federal Judicial Police (FJP) between 2019 and 2024. Almost a quarter of these criminal investigations opened in 2023 involved drug trafficking, largely based on information from the Sky ECC case (see box above). However, these investigations do not necessarily include money laundering aspects. 618. In January 2025, out of a total of 10 868 cases referred to prosecutor’s offices, 5 782 ML cases were police investigation awaiting a decision on how to proceed, and 984 cases (representing 2.3% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices) were the subject of a judicial investigation (including cases awaiting formal charges prior to referral to a court). Figure 7.1. Most frequent predicate offences recorded by prosecutor’s offices in ML cases opened between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2024 Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Note: The unit of measurement in this graph is not the number of criminal cases but the number of 27b prevention codes (corresponding to ML). These figures should be treated with caution, as the predicate offences are not always identified when a case is opened and therefore not always recorded, and records are not necessarily updated during the investigation. Source: Database of the College of Prosecutors General – statistical analysts 619. Some cases presented to the evaluation team show that the Belgian authorities have the ability to investigate complex forms of ML, some of which have an international dimension. However, Belgium does not give specific priority to these types of ML investigations , despite the high risks to which the country is exposed. Investigations mainly focus on ML offences committed in Belgium in connection with predicate offences also committed in Belgium, as previously noted in the FATF’s 2015 evaluation report. 620. Belgium also does not appear to prioritise investigations into predicate offences that generate significant profits and pose a significant risk in Belgium, such as drug trafficking and tax and social security fraud (see chart above). However, these were identified as priority criminal activities by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in 2021, in line with the findings of the ML NRA (see the Introduction ). [168] Money laundering is also identified, but it is not correlated with the various forms of predicate offences. Only ML derived from frauds other than tax and social frauds also identified as a prevalent predicate offence in Belgium, ranks second in the ML investigations initiated during the period under review. 621. In practice, a significant proportion of investigations focus on establishing the facts of the predicate offences , without conducting an in-depth financial investigation into ML, which also impacts Belgium’s ability to deprive criminals of the illegal assets obtained (see IO.8). The investigative and prosecuting authorities are aware of the importance of conducting financial investigations into ML, but cite a lack of human and technological resources as the reason for this approach. As a result, some prosecutor’s offices consider that it is neither appropriate nor effective to prosecute the ML offence and prefer to seize the value of the illegal gains generated by the predicate offence. The Federal Judicial Police’s Internal Directive of January 2022, on economic and financial crime and the approach focused on the confiscation of criminal proceeds (‘spoils-focused’), emphasises the importance of stepping up the opening of ML investigations. In particular, it recommends setting up teams specialising in the search for illegally acquired assets (PLUK teams) to support investigations in priority areas such as drug trafficking (see IO.8). However, implementing these guidelines requires adequate human and technological resources, which they currently do not have. 622. Drug trafficking is one of the most prevalent forms of crime in Belgium (see IO.1). However, the volume and characteristics of investigations opened into ML linked to this trafficking are not commensurate with the significant risk to which Belgium is exposed, despite the Public Prosecutor’s observation that large amounts of money are being laundered in this way. These investigations do not therefore achieve the objective set by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of financially dismantling criminal networks, even though this trafficking is often part of wider professional ML and offsetting mechanisms. It is symptomatic that the remit of the National Drug Commission, created in January 2023, was only extended in early 2025 to include ML, reflecting the lack of priority given to tackling the money laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking until then. 623. The Public Prosecutor’s Office identified organised crime as a priority criminal activity in 2021 and set itself the objective of dismantling criminal structures by applying ‘a long-term investigation strategy [that] must not only lead to the prosecution of individuals who have committed specific offences, but also bring the real organisers of criminal networks to justice’. [169] However, these objectives are not reflected in investigations and prosecutions, which often focus on perpetrators at the bottom of the chain. The criteria guiding the opening of ML investigations also do not provide incentives to undertake long-term investigations (see below). 624. The more complex files handled by Belgium include ML cases involving offsetting schemes , initially identified by the CTIF and investigated mainly by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, particularly with a view to dismantling networks involved in organised social security fraud (see IO.1). A notable example is the ‘Clown’ case. Box 7.2. Clown’ case [170] This case demonstrates the ability of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to investigate complex ML cases involving offsetting schemes with an international dimension. The case was initially investigated over several years by various prosecutor’s offices and “auditorats du travail”, [171] without any connection initially being made between the various cases. However, the criminal activities were part of a more complex ML scheme that was identified when the Federal Prosecutor’s Office brought the investigation under federal jurisdiction following an exchange with one of the investigating judges. The ML scheme had been developed as part of a criminal organisation enabling illegal funds from cash-generating criminal circles (such as drugs and prostitution) to be made available to criminals whose illegal activities generate a need for cash (in this instance for social security fraud in the construction and cleaning sectors). Several CTIF reports sent to prosecutor’s offices and the “auditorats du travail” in several districts between 2015 and 2019 shed light on this scheme. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the investigation of the case in 2018 as part of a multidisciplinary investigation involving, among others, the social security inspectorates. Bringing the case under federal jurisdiction meant that the CTIF reports could be consolidated to trace the suspicious financial flows, estimated at over EUR 80 million. It also allowed the Prosecutor’s Office to expand the investigation into ML and organised crime, using evidence gathered during social security fraud investigations previously conducted by district prosecutors and the “auditorats du travail”. Convictions for autonomous ML were upheld on appeal in March 2023 against three of the defendants, with a seven-year prison sentence for the main defendant and suspended sentences for the other two defendants (four and five years respectively, suspended for five years). Equivalent-value confiscation orders were also handed down (between EUR 1 million and EUR 350 000), but the amounts were reduced by the judge to take into account the need to impose reasonable sentences (Art. 505(6) and (7) of the Penal Code). 7.1.3. Discretionary investigation of ML cases 625. Belgian criminal procedure is governed by the principle of discretionary prosecution. Investigation priorities for ML cases are set by the Target, Recoup, Impact, Mode (TRIM) criteria adopted by the College of Prosecutors General in 2022. [172] These criteria were developed based on the approach followed by the prosecutor’s offices and in response to the FATF’s recommendations in the 2015 MER. [173] They also serve to determine whether proceedings should be discontinued, even if there are grounds for suspecting that a money laundering offence has been committed. 626. These TRIM criteria primarily reflect a need to optimise the judicial handling of ML cases in the context of the persistent lack of resource allocated to the Belgian judicial system. They are not sufficient to effectively focus investigations and prosecutions on complex ML cases and predicate offences involving large amounts of money, commensurate with the prevailing ML risks to which Belgium is exposed. 627. While the significance and weight of ML risks may be reflected in the criteria (primarily the Impact one relating to the seriousness of the predicate offence), in practice, the main criterion for determining whether to open an investigation and prosecute is R(ecoup) , which relates to the likelihood of recovering property or financial gains (in addition to the available police resources, see below). 628. The central test is the ability to recover assets or financial gains of criminal origin (Recoup) , which determines whether it is worthwhile opening an investigation. However, the restrictive way in which this criterion is applied means that prosecutors and investigators are steered towards cases where ML assets and proceeds are easily and immediately accessible at the start of the investigation, which prevents the consideration of the financial volumes generated by the offences in their entirety. This approach means that the handling of ML cases involving complex financial schemes, where in-depth investigations are necessary to determine the extent of the profits generated by criminal activity, is not always prioritised. When assets and/or proceeds obtained through ML are located abroad, recovery is more difficult, and prosecutors often prefer to refer the cases to foreign authorities, which are better placed to prosecute the perpetrators, particularly in view of the difficulties encountered in international cooperation with certain foreign authorities (see IO.2). 629. The issue of police resources (primarily specialised investigators) is also a determining factor in the decision to open or close a ML investigation. Without adequate police resources to conduct investigations within a reasonable time frame, cases are likely to be closed on discretionary grounds without criminal prosecution. 630. Although considerations relating to the importance of prosecuting the person ( Target ), the damage caused by the ML offence ( Impact ) and the organised nature of the ML offence ( Mode ) are included in the TRIM criteria, they appear to be given secondary consideration compared to the Recoup criterion. In any event, it appears that the TRIM criteria filter is applied at an early stage, which does not provide a sufficiently in-depth view of the factual elements of the suspected ML activities that should guide the decision to open an investigation. 631. The TRIM circular also recommends avoiding ML cases involving a wide range of offences, the handling of which would extend the investigation period beyond a reasonable time frame (so-called ‘mammoth’ cases). In practice, cases are split up and focus on the aspects of the case where the facts are most clearly defined and the suspects identified. While this approach appears pragmatic given the limited resources available, it is not an optimal way to tackle cases involving active polycriminal networks in Belgium. 632. In ML cases involving social security fraud, the ” auditorats du travail ” (public prosecutors specialising in social security fraud and ML) apply similar criteria when deciding how to proceed with ML cases, which are usually instigated based on a report submitted by the CTIF. Cases are handled depending on whether there are signs of social security fraud, whether the suspects are already under investigation by the ” auditorat ” and depending on the available investigative resources of the social security inspection and police services or the designated judge. In practice, the Brussels ” auditorat ” also takes into account the estimated amount of social security fraud and only opens an ML investigation if this amount exceeds EUR 500 000, due to a lack of adequate resources. This threshold seems too high and is likely to limit the effectiveness of Belgium’s enforcement efforts against social security fraud, which has been identified as a significant risk area in Belgium. 7.1.4. ML investigation techniques and framework 633. The authorities have access to a large number of databases and financial information held by the CTIF (see IO.6). The judicial authorities ask the CTIF to provide them with any relevant information it holds and send it requests for information and financial analyses. [174] Where the request from the judicial authorities involves contacting foreign FIUs, the CTIF has the power to approach its foreign counterparts. [175] In practice, however, the CTIF only uses of this faculty for ML cases if it already has related information based on STR received and its own analyses. This approach limits informal cooperation and access to financial intelligence located abroad, thereby preventing judicial authorities from speeding up the international cooperation process and supporting ML investigations with international connections to which Belgium should give priority (see IO.2). Furthermore, the financial information held by the tax authorities (see IO.6) and customs authorities (see IO.8) is not sufficiently analysed and exploited to prosecute ML. One isolated high-profile case illustrates how the information held by the customs authorities can lead to ML convictions (see the box on the Pondjes case in section 7.3). 634. The judicial investigative authorities use various investigative techniques, in particular the special investigative techniques at their disposal , including intercepting phone calls. The dismantling of the Sky ECC encrypted messaging platform used by many criminal networks has provided access to many sources of information used in investigations since 2021. However, the increasing use, identified by law enforcement agencies, of virtual assets in ML cases is a challenge that requires innovative tools to which investigative authorities have a limited access due to a lack of resources . In more complex cases, the Belgian authorities frequently resort to international cooperation, particularly when assets derived from ML are located abroad. They also participate in joint investigation teams with other European authorities. However, mutual assistance with certain non-EU third countries to which assets derived from ML are mainly redirected is complex, and prosecutors have reported that it is difficult to obtain cooperation from authorities in these countries. Recently, steps have been taken to overcome these obstacles (see IO.2). 635. For social security and tax fraud investigations , [176] the prosecutor’s office has been able to call on multidisciplinary investigation teams (MOTEM) since 2019 and 2022 respectively. These investigation teams are set up on an ad hoc basis for a relatively short period of time (e.g. six months). They allow prosecutor’s offices to tap into specialist expertise and make up for shortcomings in police resources by seconding tax experts and investigators from social security inspection departments. In practice, the use of MOTEM is limited and has not yet delivered tangible results in ML investigations. Only 33 MOTEM were set up in tax investigations started between 2023 and 2024, including 10 cases where ML was specifically targeted. Three of these MOTEM came to an end in 2024, without any ML evidence being substantiated. The majority of these investigations are still ongoing and it is therefore too early to draw conclusions on the impact of MOTEM in ML cases. 7.1.5. ML cases referred to investigating judges 636. Since 2019, the proportion of ML cases in which an investigating judge has been assigned is relatively low compared with other types of cases and the number of cases closed without further action. However, a number of investigative measures cannot be ordered outside the framework of a judicial investigation. In general, ML cases do not appear to be subject to in-depth investigation at the police investigation stage, prior to the opening of a judicial investigation. 637. This finding is consistent with the lack of specialised resources available due to insufficient police capacity to carry out the investigative measures ordered. Fewer than 10% of the 42 115 ML cases filed with prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2024 were referred for judicial investigation. Cases handled by the ” auditorats du travail ” (related to social security offences) follow the same trend, with fewer than 5% of the 1 541 cases filed with labour prosecution offices progressing to the formal ML investigation stage between 2020 and 2024. However, the most complex ML cases, which generate significant profits, require investigative measures that can only be ordered by an investigating judge (e.g. searches, detention, etc.). 638. The Belgian authorities have investigated ML cases with international connections, with a total of 345 cases under formal investigation between 2019 and 2023, mainly conducted by the prosecutor’s offices in Brussels and Antwerp. However, Belgium does not provide information on the type of cases, the predicate offences targeted, or whether these investigations led to formal prosecutions and eventual convictions. 7.1.6. Resources and specialisation 639. The investigative and prosecuting authorities do not have adequate financial and technical resources to identify and investigate ML cases generating significant profits. In 2015, the FATF noted the significant lack of resources affecting the country’s ability to effectively tackle ML and predicate criminal offences . A 2023 European Commission report also highlights persistent resource gaps affecting the Belgian judicial system. [177] In light of this, the efforts of law enforcement agencies to take action against ML offences are commendable but remain insufficient, as they have been working at maximum capacity for years. 640. The Federal Judicial Police does not have sufficient human resources to carry out the investigations required by all district prosecutor’s offices, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the delegated prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Approximately 560 investigators specialising in financial matters are employed in the 14 Federal Judicial Police investigation units. The Judicial Police Directorate-General (DGJ) has reported persistent difficulties in recruiting specialised staff with economic and financial skills due to the unattractive nature of the profession. The police training programme has been strengthened since 2022 with the introduction of an annual round of specialised training courses on ECOFIN, which was extended to members of the judiciary in 2024. This training, delivered by external third parties rather than peers, focuses mainly on the legal framework and certain ML practices. However, it is not adequately geared towards developing the operational and strategic capabilities of the authorities responsible for ML investigations and prosecutions. 641. At the prosecutor’s office level, specialised ECOFIN sections deal with ML and economic and financial crime cases. However, unlike the EPPO’s delegated prosecutors, these prosecutor’s offices do not have their own financial analysts. The ECOFIN section of the Antwerp prosecutor’s office has only seven prosecutors, three of whom are specialised in tax matters. The Brussels prosecutor’s office has only nine prosecutors, and the Liège and Mons prosecutor’s offices have three prosecutors each. The sheer number of open files handled by each prosecutor makes it impossible to deal with complex ML cases. Only three investigating judges out of a total of 17 in Belgium specialise in financial matters, which is too few. [178] 642. The lack of staff, specialisation and access to effective technological tools, particularly for police authorities, places a significant constraint on ML investigations and has repercussions throughout the judicial process. 643. The significant proportion of ML cases that are closed without further action is also linked to the lack of resources allocated to the judicial authorities and impacts Belgium’s ability to deal successfully with important ML cases. Between 2019 and 2024, 19 212 cases were closed without further action by all prosecutor’s offices combined, equivalent to almost 46% of ML cases recorded by prosecutor’s offices. This finding is all the more worrying given that 7 896 of these cases (nearly 19% of those recorded by prosecutor’s offices) were closed for reasons of expediency, mainly due to insufficient investigative capacity. The same observation applies to cases brought before the ” auditorats du travail ”: between 2019 and 2024, 1 035 of the 1 984 ML cases recorded were closed without further action (52% of cases). Of these 1 035 cases closed without further action, 643 were closed for discretionary reasons (more than half of the cases closed without further action). 644. A limited number of cases (around 2% of cases brought before prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2024) are classified under the ‘judicial probation’ (“ probation prétorienne ”) mechanism (formal caution with conditional dismissal). The suspect is told that they have committed an offence. No criminal proceedings are brought, provided that the suspect does not reoffend and complies with any conditions set by the prosecutor’s office. 645. The lack of resources has an impact beyond the law enforcement agencies and undermines the impact of the CTIF’s actions, as the authorities responsible for investigations do not have the capacity to fully follow up on the information provided by the CTIF (see section 7.1). The 2015 FATF report highlighted the concerns raised by the CTIF since 1996 about the judicial treatment of ML cases referred by the CTIF. [179] The impact of the lack of resources also affects Belgium’s ability to conduct in-depth financial investigations to seize and confiscate criminal assets obtained through ML (see IO.8). Footnotes [161] Database of the College of Prosecutors General – statistical analysts [162] Annual Report 2024 of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The use of money mules was also highlighted in the typologies identified in the SKY ECC case. In addition, the findings of the Annual Report 2024 show an increase in files relating to the offences of concealing stolen goods and money laundering, which the authorities attribute mainly to the phenomenon of money mules or financial mules. [163] CTIF Annual Report 2023, p. 35 and CTIF Annual Report 2021, p. 39. [164] CTIF Annual Report 2023, pp. 50-52. [165] Evaluation Report of Belgium (2015), p. 61. [166] JustOne and JustCase. [167] COL 14/2022 [168] Priority note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (2021) [169] Priority note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office [170] Mons Court of Appeal ruling of 17 March 2023, FD.10.98.481/18. [171] When laundering is linked to social security fraud, it is the labour prosecution service (the “auditorats”, who are specialised public prosecutors) that handle money laundering cases. [172] COL 14/2022 [173] FATF Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium, 2015, p. 58. [174] Art. 84 para. 1 of the AML Law [175] Art. 123 of the AML Law [176] In tax fraud cases, the following factors will be considered when deciding whether to set up a MOTEM: the seriousness of the offences; the existence of serious indications that the offences are used to finance a criminal organisation; an international dimension; and the use of judicial investigation measures involving coercive measures. The prospect of seizing sums of money and crypto-assets is not a criterion for forming a MOTEM but is a determining factor in assessing the ‘profitability’ of the investigation. [177] European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report – Belgium, pp. 3, 7-8; An OECD report published in March 2025 also highlights these shortcomings. [178] Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium (2025), para. 119). OCDE (2025), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention – Phase 4 Report on Belgium: Implementing the Convention and Related Legal Instruments , Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris [179] Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium (2015), p. 64, para. 3.71). 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Identification of ML cases 613. Suspicious ML activities are mainly identified by police sources based on incidental findings in the course of criminal investigations (accounting for 57% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). [161] A significant proportion of these cases are small-scale and typically involve, for example, ‘money mules’. [162] ML investigations were initiated following the decryption of a large number of communications from the Sky ECC platform (see box below), made possible by Europol and Eurojust’s financial and technological support. The information provided by the CTIF has led to a lower proportion of investigations being opened by prosecutor’s offices (approximately 17% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). The number of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities based on the analyses of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) has remained stable since 2020. A total of 6,389 new files were forwarded between 2020 and 2024 (see IO.6) [163] Most of these files involve potential predicate criminal offences linked to fraud, organised crime, serious tax fraud, social security fraud and drug trafficking. [164] However, this source is not used to its full potential by the investigative and prosecuting authorities. A significant proportion of these referrals do not lead to the opening of an investigation, mainly due to a lack of resources and ability to seize illicit funds when they are not directly available, e.g. if they are located abroad, in accordance with the TRIM criteria (see section below). Between 2019 and 2024, 43% of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities were closed without further action, raising concerns that a significant proportion of CTIF communications are not being fully utilised. 614. Strengthening the detection of ML activity was identified as a priority area in the AML Action Plan adopted in March 2024 (see IO.1). However, this priority has not resulted in practical measures such as developing a strategic framework and allocating human and technological resources to support a stronger and more targeted approach to identifying ML cases. In practice, Belgium does not apply a strategic approach to identifying ML activity that is commensurate with the risks to which the country is exposed, in particular those related to the existence of organised networks, professional ML involving multiple criminal offences, the widespread use of cash, the diamond sector and illegal activities generating funds that are laundered outside the financial system (see IO.1). The FATF noted weaknesses in identifying money laundering cases back in 2015. The Belgian authorities have since become aware of the growing scale of criminal activities that could undermine the fundamental foundations of Belgian society and their potential repercussions at the international level, particularly in neighbouring countries . However, Belgium has not stepped up its response to the high risks to which the country is exposed in order to identify ML activities in a more targeted and proactive way. 615. The allocation of ML cases to the various district prosecutor’s offices is based on territorial distribution criteria that have an impact on the subsequent judicial handling of cases. This allocation does not always make it possible to identify and deal in a coordinated manner with related cases opened in several prosecutor’s offices, due to a lack of coordination between these offices. The operational limitations of the database that lists cases opened in the various prosecutor’s offices and police departments hinder operational coordination, as noted by the federal authorities. [165] Identifying links between different cases is random and should be improved to make it easier for Belgium to tackle offences involving multiple crimes across the country. New tools have been introduced to streamline the digital processing of files, but their recent rollout means that it is too early to measure their impact. [166] Box 7.1. The SKY ECC case The SKY ECC case demonstrates Belgium’s ability to identify ML cases involving significant financial flows with international connections. It illustrates the authorities’ ability to reorganise their operational framework to maximise the expertise available at federal and local level and the importance of the CTIF as a source of financial intelligence. The case originated with the interception, decryption and utilisation of data from the SKY ECC encrypted communication system used by numerous criminal networks. Analyses of the decrypted data revealed the extent of the criminal networks involved in drug trafficking in Belgium, the prevalence of the use of cash and money mules, and the growing use of virtual assets, particularly for transferring illegal assets out of Belgium. Financial flows mainly transit through Belgium to the countries of origin of those involved, but are also invested directly and laundered within Belgium. This case, which the Federal Judicial Police started in early 2021, led to the opening of a total of 643 judicial investigations under the name ‘Operation Edge’, including 442 new and 201 existing investigations that were expanded after the data was decrypted. Two thirds of the investigations (439 cases) involve drug trafficking and 63 involve ML offences. In response to the scale of the criminal activities identified, Belgium has reorganised its operational framework to split up and coordinate the various investigations between the federal police and local police forces and to allocate cases between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and district prosecutor’s offices. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has focused its efforts on recovering assets abroad and extraditing suspects. A stronger communication framework has also been put in place with the CTIF (see IO.6). Prosecution proceedings have been initiated and 131 judgements have been handed down to date, with more than 1,093 people convicted, all offences combined. The case has also resulted in convictions for ML, although the exact number of these was not shared with the evaluation team. . Based on an analyses of 75 court cases from Sky ECC, the Federal Judicial Police (DJSOC) conducted an internal analyses in 2024 to identify trends and modus operandi in these cases. 616. The allocation of cases between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and district prosecutor’s offices does not follow clearly established criteria. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has concurrent and subsidiary jurisdiction over district prosecutors in ML matters. A College of Prosecutors General circular [167] and the 2021 Priority Note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office stipulate that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office has jurisdiction over ML cases involving offsetting schemes and plays a coordinating role in cases handled by district prosecutors relating to criminal organisations with international connections. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office may also take on complex ML cases where it wishes to develop innovative investigation methods or tackle certain criminal phenomena. District prosecutor’s offices have indicated that they do not always understand the scope and characteristics of the cases taken on by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. One case illustrates how the transfer to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office of several cases handled by district prosecutor’s offices led to the identification and dismantling of a complex ML case involving an offsetting scheme (the Clown case, see box below). However, Belgium has not adopted a systematic approach to joining related money laundering cases with a view to dismantling criminal networks. The powers and functions of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to deal with complex ML cases with an international dimension and involving significant financial flows have therefore not been fully optimised. The least well-resourced prosecutor’s offices do not seem to be able to call on those with more resources and expertise to deal with more complex cases. 7.1.2. ML investigations 617. Approximately 400 new cases were opened each year by the Federal Judicial Police (FJP) between 2019 and 2024. Almost a quarter of these criminal investigations opened in 2023 involved drug trafficking, largely based on information from the Sky ECC case (see box above). However, these investigations do not necessarily include money laundering aspects. 618. In January 2025, out of a total of 10 868 cases referred to prosecutor’s offices, 5 782 ML cases were police investigation awaiting a decision on how to proceed, and 984 cases (representing 2.3% of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices) were the subject of a judicial investigation (including cases awaiting formal charges prior to referral to a court). Figure 7.1. Most frequent predicate offences recorded by prosecutor’s offices in ML cases opened between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2024 Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Note: The unit of measurement in this graph is not the number of criminal cases but the number of 27b prevention codes (corresponding to ML). These figures should be treated with caution, as the predicate offences are not always identified when a case is opened and therefore not always recorded, and records are not necessarily updated during the investigation. Source: Database of the College of Prosecutors General – statistical analysts 619. Some cases presented to the evaluation team show that the Belgian authorities have the ability to investigate complex forms of ML, some of which have an international dimension. However, Belgium does not give specific priority to these types of ML investigations , despite the high risks to which the country is exposed. Investigations mainly focus on ML offences committed in Belgium in connection with predicate offences also committed in Belgium, as previously noted in the FATF’s 2015 evaluation report. 620. Belgium also does not appear to prioritise investigations into predicate offences that generate significant profits and pose a significant risk in Belgium, such as drug trafficking and tax and social security fraud (see chart above). However, these were identified as priority criminal activities by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in 2021, in line with the findings of the ML NRA (see the Introduction ). [168] Money laundering is also identified, but it is not correlated with the various forms of predicate offences. Only ML derived from frauds other than tax and social frauds also identified as a prevalent predicate offence in Belgium, ranks second in the ML investigations initiated during the period under review. 621. In practice, a significant proportion of investigations focus on establishing the facts of the predicate offences , without conducting an in-depth financial investigation into ML, which also impacts Belgium’s ability to deprive criminals of the illegal assets obtained (see IO.8). The investigative and prosecuting authorities are aware of the importance of conducting financial investigations into ML, but cite a lack of human and technological resources as the reason for this approach. As a result, some prosecutor’s offices consider that it is neither appropriate nor effective to prosecute the ML offence and prefer to seize the value of the illegal gains generated by the predicate offence. The Federal Judicial Police’s Internal Directive of January 2022, on economic and financial crime and the approach focused on the confiscation of criminal proceeds (‘spoils-focused’), emphasises the importance of stepping up the opening of ML investigations. In particular, it recommends setting up teams specialising in the search for illegally acquired assets (PLUK teams) to support investigations in priority areas such as drug trafficking (see IO.8). However, implementing these guidelines requires adequate human and technological resources, which they currently do not have. 622. Drug trafficking is one of the most prevalent forms of crime in Belgium (see IO.1). However, the volume and characteristics of investigations opened into ML linked to this trafficking are not commensurate with the significant risk to which Belgium is exposed, despite the Public Prosecutor’s observation that large amounts of money are being laundered in this way. These investigations do not therefore achieve the objective set by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of financially dismantling criminal networks, even though this trafficking is often part of wider professional ML and offsetting mechanisms. It is symptomatic that the remit of the National Drug Commission, created in January 2023, was only extended in early 2025 to include ML, reflecting the lack of priority given to tackling the money laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking until then. 623. The Public Prosecutor’s Office identified organised crime as a priority criminal activity in 2021 and set itself the objective of dismantling criminal structures by applying ‘a long-term investigation strategy [that] must not only lead to the prosecution of individuals who have committed specific offences, but also bring the real organisers of criminal networks to justice’. [169] However, these objectives are not reflected in investigations and prosecutions, which often focus on perpetrators at the bottom of the chain. The criteria guiding the opening of ML investigations also do not provide incentives to undertake long-term investigations (see below). 624. The more complex files handled by Belgium include ML cases involving offsetting schemes , initially identified by the CTIF and investigated mainly by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, particularly with a view to dismantling networks involved in organised social security fraud (see IO.1). A notable example is the ‘Clown’ case. Box 7.2. Clown’ case [170] This case demonstrates the ability of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to investigate complex ML cases involving offsetting schemes with an international dimension. The case was initially investigated over several years by various prosecutor’s offices and “auditorats du travail”, [171] without any connection initially being made between the various cases. However, the criminal activities were part of a more complex ML scheme that was identified when the Federal Prosecutor’s Office brought the investigation under federal jurisdiction following an exchange with one of the investigating judges. The ML scheme had been developed as part of a criminal organisation enabling illegal funds from cash-generating criminal circles (such as drugs and prostitution) to be made available to criminals whose illegal activities generate a need for cash (in this instance for social security fraud in the construction and cleaning sectors). Several CTIF reports sent to prosecutor’s offices and the “auditorats du travail” in several districts between 2015 and 2019 shed light on this scheme. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the investigation of the case in 2018 as part of a multidisciplinary investigation involving, among others, the social security inspectorates. Bringing the case under federal jurisdiction meant that the CTIF reports could be consolidated to trace the suspicious financial flows, estimated at over EUR 80 million. It also allowed the Prosecutor’s Office to expand the investigation into ML and organised crime, using evidence gathered during social security fraud investigations previously conducted by district prosecutors and the “auditorats du travail”. Convictions for autonomous ML were upheld on appeal in March 2023 against three of the defendants, with a seven-year prison sentence for the main defendant and suspended sentences for the other two defendants (four and five years respectively, suspended for five years). Equivalent-value confiscation orders were also handed down (between EUR 1 million and EUR 350 000), but the amounts were reduced by the judge to take into account the need to impose reasonable sentences (Art. 505(6) and (7) of the Penal Code). 7.1.3. Discretionary investigation of ML cases 625. Belgian criminal procedure is governed by the principle of discretionary prosecution. Investigation priorities for ML cases are set by the Target, Recoup, Impact, Mode (TRIM) criteria adopted by the College of Prosecutors General in 2022. [172] These criteria were developed based on the approach followed by the prosecutor’s offices and in response to the FATF’s recommendations in the 2015 MER. [173] They also serve to determine whether proceedings should be discontinued, even if there are grounds for suspecting that a money laundering offence has been committed. 626. These TRIM criteria primarily reflect a need to optimise the judicial handling of ML cases in the context of the persistent lack of resource allocated to the Belgian judicial system. They are not sufficient to effectively focus investigations and prosecutions on complex ML cases and predicate offences involving large amounts of money, commensurate with the prevailing ML risks to which Belgium is exposed. 627. While the significance and weight of ML risks may be reflected in the criteria (primarily the Impact one relating to the seriousness of the predicate offence), in practice, the main criterion for determining whether to open an investigation and prosecute is R(ecoup) , which relates to the likelihood of recovering property or financial gains (in addition to the available police resources, see below). 628. The central test is the ability to recover assets or financial gains of criminal origin (Recoup) , which determines whether it is worthwhile opening an investigation. However, the restrictive way in which this criterion is applied means that prosecutors and investigators are steered towards cases where ML assets and proceeds are easily and immediately accessible at the start of the investigation, which prevents the consideration of the financial volumes generated by the offences in their entirety. This approach means that the handling of ML cases involving complex financial schemes, where in-depth investigations are necessary to determine the extent of the profits generated by criminal activity, is not always prioritised. When assets and/or proceeds obtained through ML are located abroad, recovery is more difficult, and prosecutors often prefer to refer the cases to foreign authorities, which are better placed to prosecute the perpetrators, particularly in view of the difficulties encountered in international cooperation with certain foreign authorities (see IO.2). 629. The issue of police resources (primarily specialised investigators) is also a determining factor in the decision to open or close a ML investigation. Without adequate police resources to conduct investigations within a reasonable time frame, cases are likely to be closed on discretionary grounds without criminal prosecution. 630. Although considerations relating to the importance of prosecuting the person ( Target ), the damage caused by the ML offence ( Impact ) and the organised nature of the ML offence ( Mode ) are included in the TRIM criteria, they appear to be given secondary consideration compared to the Recoup criterion. In any event, it appears that the TRIM criteria filter is applied at an early stage, which does not provide a sufficiently in-depth view of the factual elements of the suspected ML activities that should guide the decision to open an investigation. 631. The TRIM circular also recommends avoiding ML cases involving a wide range of offences, the handling of which would extend the investigation period beyond a reasonable time frame (so-called ‘mammoth’ cases). In practice, cases are split up and focus on the aspects of the case where the facts are most clearly defined and the suspects identified. While this approach appears pragmatic given the limited resources available, it is not an optimal way to tackle cases involving active polycriminal networks in Belgium. 632. In ML cases involving social security fraud, the ” auditorats du travail ” (public prosecutors specialising in social security fraud and ML) apply similar criteria when deciding how to proceed with ML cases, which are usually instigated based on a report submitted by the CTIF. Cases are handled depending on whether there are signs of social security fraud, whether the suspects are already under investigation by the ” auditorat ” and depending on the available investigative resources of the social security inspection and police services or the designated judge. In practice, the Brussels ” auditorat ” also takes into account the estimated amount of social security fraud and only opens an ML investigation if this amount exceeds EUR 500 000, due to a lack of adequate resources. This threshold seems too high and is likely to limit the effectiveness of Belgium’s enforcement efforts against social security fraud, which has been identified as a significant risk area in Belgium. 7.1.4. ML investigation techniques and framework 633. The authorities have access to a large number of databases and financial information held by the CTIF (see IO.6). The judicial authorities ask the CTIF to provide them with any relevant information it holds and send it requests for information and financial analyses. [174] Where the request from the judicial authorities involves contacting foreign FIUs, the CTIF has the power to approach its foreign counterparts. [175] In practice, however, the CTIF only uses of this faculty for ML cases if it already has related information based on STR received and its own analyses. This approach limits informal cooperation and access to financial intelligence located abroad, thereby preventing judicial authorities from speeding up the international cooperation process and supporting ML investigations with international connections to which Belgium should give priority (see IO.2). Furthermore, the financial information held by the tax authorities (see IO.6) and customs authorities (see IO.8) is not sufficiently analysed and exploited to prosecute ML. One isolated high-profile case illustrates how the information held by the customs authorities can lead to ML convictions (see the box on the Pondjes case in section 7.3). 634. The judicial investigative authorities use various investigative techniques, in particular the special investigative techniques at their disposal , including intercepting phone calls. The dismantling of the Sky ECC encrypted messaging platform used by many criminal networks has provided access to many sources of information used in investigations since 2021. However, the increasing use, identified by law enforcement agencies, of virtual assets in ML cases is a challenge that requires innovative tools to which investigative authorities have a limited access due to a lack of resources . In more complex cases, the Belgian authorities frequently resort to international cooperation, particularly when assets derived from ML are located abroad. They also participate in joint investigation teams with other European authorities. However, mutual assistance with certain non-EU third countries to which assets derived from ML are mainly redirected is complex, and prosecutors have reported that it is difficult to obtain cooperation from authorities in these countries. Recently, steps have been taken to overcome these obstacles (see IO.2). 635. For social security and tax fraud investigations , [176] the prosecutor’s office has been able to call on multidisciplinary investigation teams (MOTEM) since 2019 and 2022 respectively. These investigation teams are set up on an ad hoc basis for a relatively short period of time (e.g. six months). They allow prosecutor’s offices to tap into specialist expertise and make up for shortcomings in police resources by seconding tax experts and investigators from social security inspection departments. In practice, the use of MOTEM is limited and has not yet delivered tangible results in ML investigations. Only 33 MOTEM were set up in tax investigations started between 2023 and 2024, including 10 cases where ML was specifically targeted. Three of these MOTEM came to an end in 2024, without any ML evidence being substantiated. The majority of these investigations are still ongoing and it is therefore too early to draw conclusions on the impact of MOTEM in ML cases. 7.1.5. ML cases referred to investigating judges 636. Since 2019, the proportion of ML cases in which an investigating judge has been assigned is relatively low compared with other types of cases and the number of cases closed without further action. However, a number of investigative measures cannot be ordered outside the framework of a judicial investigation. In general, ML cases do not appear to be subject to in-depth investigation at the police investigation stage, prior to the opening of a judicial investigation. 637. This finding is consistent with the lack of specialised resources available due to insufficient police capacity to carry out the investigative measures ordered. Fewer than 10% of the 42 115 ML cases filed with prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2024 were referred for judicial investigation. Cases handled by the ” auditorats du travail ” (related to social security offences) follow the same trend, with fewer than 5% of the 1 541 cases filed with labour prosecution offices progressing to the formal ML investigation stage between 2020 and 2024. However, the most complex ML cases, which generate significant profits, require investigative measures that can only be ordered by an investigating judge (e.g. searches, detention, etc.). 638. The Belgian authorities have investigated ML cases with international connections, with a total of 345 cases under formal investigation between 2019 and 2023, mainly conducted by the prosecutor’s offices in Brussels and Antwerp. However, Belgium does not provide information on the type of cases, the predicate offences targeted, or whether these investigations led to formal prosecutions and eventual convictions. 7.1.6. Resources and specialisation 639. The investigative and prosecuting authorities do not have adequate financial and technical resources to identify and investigate ML cases generating significant profits. In 2015, the FATF noted the significant lack of resources affecting the country’s ability to effectively tackle ML and predicate criminal offences . A 2023 European Commission report also highlights persistent resource gaps affecting the Belgian judicial system. [177] In light of this, the efforts of law enforcement agencies to take action against ML offences are commendable but remain insufficient, as they have been working at maximum capacity for years. 640. The Federal Judicial Police does not have sufficient human resources to carry out the investigations required by all district prosecutor’s offices, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the delegated prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Approximately 560 investigators specialising in financial matters are employed in the 14 Federal Judicial Police investigation units. The Judicial Police Directorate-General (DGJ) has reported persistent difficulties in recruiting specialised staff with economic and financial skills due to the unattractive nature of the profession. The police training programme has been strengthened since 2022 with the introduction of an annual round of specialised training courses on ECOFIN, which was extended to members of the judiciary in 2024. This training, delivered by external third parties rather than peers, focuses mainly on the legal framework and certain ML practices. However, it is not adequately geared towards developing the operational and strategic capabilities of the authorities responsible for ML investigations and prosecutions. 641. At the prosecutor’s office level, specialised ECOFIN sections deal with ML and economic and financial crime cases. However, unlike the EPPO’s delegated prosecutors, these prosecutor’s offices do not have their own financial analysts. The ECOFIN section of the Antwerp prosecutor’s office has only seven prosecutors, three of whom are specialised in tax matters. The Brussels prosecutor’s office has only nine prosecutors, and the Liège and Mons prosecutor’s offices have three prosecutors each. The sheer number of open files handled by each prosecutor makes it impossible to deal with complex ML cases. Only three investigating judges out of a total of 17 in Belgium specialise in financial matters, which is too few. [178] 642. The lack of staff, specialisation and access to effective technological tools, particularly for police authorities, places a significant constraint on ML investigations and has repercussions throughout the judicial process. 643. The significant proportion of ML cases that are closed without further action is also linked to the lack of resources allocated to the judicial authorities and impacts Belgium’s ability to deal successfully with important ML cases. Between 2019 and 2024, 19 212 cases were closed without further action by all prosecutor’s offices combined, equivalent to almost 46% of ML cases recorded by prosecutor’s offices. This finding is all the more worrying given that 7 896 of these cases (nearly 19% of those recorded by prosecutor’s offices) were closed for reasons of expediency, mainly due to insufficient investigative capacity. The same observation applies to cases brought before the ” auditorats du travail ”: between 2019 and 2024, 1 035 of the 1 984 ML cases recorded were closed without further action (52% of cases). Of these 1 035 cases closed without further action, 643 were closed for discretionary reasons (more than half of the cases closed without further action). 644. A limited number of cases (around 2% of cases brought before prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2024) are classified under the ‘judicial probation’ (“ probation prétorienne ”) mechanism (formal caution with conditional dismissal). The suspect is told that they have committed an offence. No criminal proceedings are brought, provided that the suspect does not reoffend and complies with any conditions set by the prosecutor’s office. 645. The lack of resources has an impact beyond the law enforcement agencies and undermines the impact of the CTIF’s actions, as the authorities responsible for investigations do not have the capacity to fully follow up on the information provided by the CTIF (see section 7.1). The 2015 FATF report highlighted the concerns raised by the CTIF since 1996 about the judicial treatment of ML cases referred by the CTIF. [179] The impact of the lack of resources also affects Belgium’s ability to conduct in-depth financial investigations to seize and confiscate criminal assets obtained through ML (see IO.8). Footnotes [161] Database of the College of Prosecutors General – statistical analysts [162] Annual Report 2024 of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The use of money mules was also highlighted in the typologies identified in the SKY ECC case. In addition, the findings of the Annual Report 2024 show an increase in files relating to the offences of concealing stolen goods and money laundering, which the authorities attribute mainly to the phenomenon of money mules or financial mules. [163] CTIF Annual Report 2023, p. 35 and CTIF Annual Report 2021, p. 39. [164] CTIF Annual Report 2023, pp. 50-52. [165] Evaluation Report of Belgium (2015), p. 61. [166] JustOne and JustCase. [167] COL 14/2022 [168] Priority note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (2021) [169] Priority note from the Public Prosecutor’s Office [170] Mons Court of Appeal ruling of 17 March 2023, FD.10.98.481/18. [171] When laundering is linked to social security fraud, it is the labour prosecution service (the “auditorats”, who are specialised public prosecutors) that handle money laundering cases. [172] COL 14/2022 [173] FATF Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium, 2015, p. 58. [174] Art. 84 para. 1 of the AML Law [175] Art. 123 of the AML Law [176] In tax fraud cases, the following factors will be considered when deciding whether to set up a MOTEM: the seriousness of the offences; the existence of serious indications that the offences are used to finance a criminal organisation; an international dimension; and the use of judicial investigation measures involving coercive measures. The prospect of seizing sums of money and crypto-assets is not a criterion for forming a MOTEM but is a determining factor in assessing the ‘profitability’ of the investigation. [177] European Commission, 2023 Rule of Law Report – Belgium, pp. 3, 7-8; An OECD report published in March 2025 also highlights these shortcomings. [178] Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium (2025), para. 119). OCDE (2025), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention – Phase 4 Report on Belgium: Implementing the Convention and Related Legal Instruments , Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris [179] Mutual Evaluation Report of Belgium (2015), p. 64, para. 3.71). OCDE (2025), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention – Phase 4 Report on Belgium: Implementing the Convention and Related Legal Instruments , Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.1. Confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as a policy objective 666. Asset recovery was identified as a priority by the authorities at the time of the FATF’s 2015 report. Instructions issued since then by law enforcement agencies confirm the importance placed on seizing and confiscating criminal assets . The Federal Judicial Police’s 2022 Internal Directive recommends an approach focused on ‘the spoils’ (‘take the money’) and sets out a three-pronged strategy: strengthening police training, putting in place a more systematic structure of investigation teams dedicated to tracing illegally acquired assets (PLUK teams) and increasing the number of criminal investigations to recover confiscated assets (“ enquête pénale d’éxécution ”). The ability to recover assets is the central element to decide whether to open and conduct ML investigations, following the criminal justice policy guidelines issued by the College of Prosecutors General in the TRIM circular in 2022. However, in practice, Belgium often takes a narrow approach, focusing on the seizure and confiscation of assets and valuables that are immediately available (see IO.7). 667. Furthermore, the priority given to confiscation is not sufficiently supported at a higher level by the AML action plan adopted in March 2024, which merely reiterates the importance of applying the TRIM criteria ‘in view of Belgium’s evaluation by the FATF’ . In addition, these guidelines have not been accompanied by additional resources for law enforcement authorities, which continue to face insufficient police resources to conduct financial investigations (see IO.7). The February 2025 government agreement contains a number of points relating to asset recovery [187] Footnotes [187] Instructor’s Statement 2025–2029 ." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.1. Confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as a policy objective 666. Asset recovery was identified as a priority by the authorities at the time of the FATF’s 2015 report. Instructions issued since then by law enforcement agencies confirm the importance placed on seizing and confiscating criminal assets . The Federal Judicial Police’s 2022 Internal Directive recommends an approach focused on ‘the spoils’ (‘take the money’) and sets out a three-pronged strategy: strengthening police training, putting in place a more systematic structure of investigation teams dedicated to tracing illegally acquired assets (PLUK teams) and increasing the number of criminal investigations to recover confiscated assets (“ enquête pénale d’éxécution ”). The ability to recover assets is the central element to decide whether to open and conduct ML investigations, following the criminal justice policy guidelines issued by the College of Prosecutors General in the TRIM circular in 2022. However, in practice, Belgium often takes a narrow approach, focusing on the seizure and confiscation of assets and valuables that are immediately available (see IO.7). 667. Furthermore, the priority given to confiscation is not sufficiently supported at a higher level by the AML action plan adopted in March 2024, which merely reiterates the importance of applying the TRIM criteria ‘in view of Belgium’s evaluation by the FATF’ . In addition, these guidelines have not been accompanied by additional resources for law enforcement authorities, which continue to face insufficient police resources to conduct financial investigations (see IO.7). The February 2025 government agreement contains a number of points relating to asset recovery [187] Footnotes [187] Instructor’s Statement 2025–2029 ." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 712. The detection of TF in Belgium is closely linked to efforts to counter terrorism, which reached a turning point in 2016 after the attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (22 March 2016). These attacks profoundly changed the country’s security landscape, leading to a reorganisation of counter-terrorism strategies and, by extension, of efforts to counter TF. Since 2018/2019, the authorities have observed a change in the TF threat. Whereas terrorism previously relied on often structured and sizeable funding, it now depends on more modest and fragmented resources. The rise of isolated and/or radicalised actors has reduced the need for significant equipment funding, with attacks often carried out with limited resources (knives, vehicles, online propaganda). This shift towards more discreet and difficult-to-trace financing, particularly through the use of virtual assets, makes detection more difficult. The TF NRA partly reflects this shift towards more diffuse forms of financing, but it remains a relatively academic exercise that does not fully reflect the operational realities observed in the field (see IO. 1). 713. Detecting TF used to rely mainly on spotting visible financial flows, such as those going through manual money changers. It has gradually become more structured to include analysing micro-transactions and spotting links between people and opaque organisations. However, a significant proportion of TF activities take place through underground or alternative channels, such as informal transfers and cash, which operate outside regulated systems. This makes detecting them more difficult, especially when banking investigations do not reveal any obvious anomalies. This structural opaqueness is a major barrier to the early detection of TF cases. 714. The CTIF identifies suspicious transactions and alerts authorities to unusual movements. The decrease in the number of CTIF reports since 2021/2022 is linked to changes in the types of TF cases and the reduced number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) leaving Belgium to join terrorist groups. At the height of the TF phenomenon (2017–2022), 80% of TF files were opened as a result of reports received from the CTIF, as illustrated by the Syrian Wallets case (see box 4.1). Box 9.1. Syrian Wallets case Background: The Syrian Wallets case is part of a structured CFT project covering the period from 2017 to 2022. It involved transfers of funds to conflict zones, mainly via money collectors based in Lebanon and Turkey. The funds originated mainly from backers located in Belgium, outside traditional banking channels. The investigation aimed to identify links between these transfers and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) involved in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict zone. CTIF role: (IO.6 relevance): The CTIF was asked to analyse financial flows between individuals identified as money collectors. Based on lists provided by Europol, the CTIF helped to identify additional Belgian and foreign collectors, establish links with FTFs, and identify any evidence indicating that they were still alive or might return to Belgium. Investigation: The investigation was coordinated between the Belgian and French prosecutor’s offices, involving 18 investigating judges and specialised departments of the Federal Judicial Police (organised crime and financial section). The investigation consolidated evidence gathered by the CTIF and the police, in particular through investigations into Western Union transfers and targeted phone tapping. Outcome: The project led to the identification of numerous new money collectors, both Belgian and foreign, as well as new FTFs. It strengthened inter-agency cooperation, made it possible to link financial and judicial data, and supported several criminal proceedings. Prosecution: Although the main case was initially closed without further action to allow for a solid case to be built (particularly after receiving the CTIF’s analysis), several judicial investigations were subsequently opened based on the information provided. Prosecutions were brought pursuant to Art. 140 of the Penal Code (participation in a terrorist group). Conviction and sanction: On 26 June 2023, the Brussels Criminal Court handed down a judgement in absentia convicting several defendants for transferring money to Islamic State fundraisers, including: 1) 10 months’ imprisonment, a fine of €1,200 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund; 2) 11 months’ imprisonment, a fine of €1,600 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund; 3) 1 year’s imprisonment, a fine of €1,200 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund. 715. However, the CTIF’s detection of informal systems, such as hawala, remains very limited, as this system is by its very nature largely beyond the scope of conventional AML/CFT monitoring mechanisms. These informal networks are rarely detected in Belgium, with only four cases resulting in convictions for TF through hawala. Identifying them often relies indirectly on random police checks (money mules transporting cash), ad hoc investigations (drug trafficking, etc.) or the detection of weak signals, such as repeated transfers of small amounts to at-risk areas from bank accounts with no consistent economic profile. This two-track approach to detection requires constant changes to investigation and intelligence methods to ensure that both formal and informal financial flows are covered. Table 9.1. Number of CTIF TF reports (2019–2024) Year Number of CTIF reports 2020 33 2021 15 2022 22 2023 11 2024 6 716. Since 2016, numerous changes have taken place in Belgium, partly as a result of the findings of two parliamentary committees that sought to reflect on and learn lessons from the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016. A French report published in July 2016 [201] identified flaws in cooperation between the French and Belgian intelligence services and recommended measures to improve coordination. However, it was the Belgian report of 15 June 2017 [202] that marked a turning point by analysing how the security services (the police, judiciary and intelligence services) operate. It highlighted flaws in the Belgian security architecture, helping to explain why the terrorist networks behind the 2015 and 2016 attacks had not been dismantled in time. 717. The Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) and Joint Decision Centre (JDC) were created to strengthen information sharing between the police, the judiciary and the intelligence services. Initially set up within the Brussels district, these structures were extended in 2023 to cover all five districts of Belgium. These centres, which focus on counter-terrorism, promote closer coordination and a rapid response to terrorist threats through regular discussions between the relevant stakeholders. The JICs bring together, at varying intervals depending on the jurisdiction, the main counter-terrorism stakeholders (intelligence services – VSSE, SGRS; the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM); police – DJSOC [203] /Terrorism and the Federal Judicial Police) as soon as new relevant information is identified. Regular consultations are also held at least once a month – and sometimes every week, as in Brussels – to ensure a continuous exchange of information between the intelligence services, the police and the public prosecutor’s office, ensuring that information is shared in a systematic and coordinated manner. In addition to the JICs, JDCs have been set up to determine how to handle terrorism-related cases and TF cases more quickly. More specifically, they determine which authority is best placed to handle a case and take the most effective action. See the box below for details of how JDCs work. Box 9.2. How Joint Decision Centres (JDCs) work The JDCs provide a framework for continuous assessment of T/TF cases and joint decision-making between magistrates, investigators and intelligence services. · The JDC’s decision is largely based on the analysis prepared by the JIC, which is jointly developed and signed by all its partners. · Files are classified according to their level of seriousness and risk with the aim of assessing their ‘actionability’, i.e. the need for and feasibility of taking action, taking into account the intentions and logistical and financial capabilities of the suspects. · Decisions are based on specific criteria, such as the credibility, immediacy and scale of the threat. One notable example is the large number of ‘money collectors’ files, where an investigation that started out as financial quickly turned into a terrorism-related case as a result of information sharing. This type of collaboration has helped prevent TF activities from going unnoticed. 718. This JIC/JDC process, launched in Brussels in 2018 and given a formal framework in a confidential circular [204] in October 2024, has brought new impetus to the detection of TF. Any new data potentially linked to terrorism is now included and analysed, even if no link has been confirmed. However, although more structured, this detection remains focused on a limited number of already identified targets, limiting visibility of potential emerging threats or networks operating outside conventional systems (e.g. informal transfers, virtual assets, donations in kind). This integrated approach improves understanding of financial flows linked to terrorist networks, but there is no statistical data to measure precisely the number of TF cases actually detected in this way. The effectiveness of this system also depends on the ability to continue active coordination efforts and anticipate new financing patterns, particularly through emerging technologies and informal financial networks. 719. Furthermore, the CTIF, despite holding most of the financial intelligence in Belgium (see IO.6), does not systematically participate in the JIC/JDC process where TF is involved. Its participation is on an ad hoc basis, when invited as an expert, which is also the case for the tax authorities. To date, no such invitation has been made. This means that, since their creation in 2018, these inter-institutional coordination platforms have not had direct and systematic access to CTIF information and data, such as STRs. This also limits their ability to quickly integrate financial intelligence into operational decision-making. The use of intermediary channels, in particular via the intelligence services or OCAM, can lead to delays, loss of contextual information and even blind spots in the assessment of a TF case by the JIC/JDC. This situation can hamper the detection of the financing aspect in structures focused primarily on counter-terrorism. There are no figures available to assess the extent to which these mechanisms are used in identifying and dealing with TF cases. 720. Local Task Forces (LTFs) [205] also play a role in gathering data from the field, with the aim of monitoring known targets and identifying cases that may be linked to TF at an early stage. They interact with the JIC/JDC platforms and help with referring cases initially classified as ordinary cases but which in fact show signs of TF to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. Local Integrated Security Units (LISU-Rs), [206] which work to prevent radicalisation and extremism, also interact with the LTFs. The local police representative acts as a liaison between the LTFs and the LISU-Rs, ensuring that weak signals are passed on and taken into account in the judicial process via the JICs/JDCs. 721. Although these local platforms ensure effective coordination between the various counter-terrorism stakeholders and foster a multidisciplinary approach to detecting signs of radicalisation early, it is not clear whether they are adequately informed or aware of the challenges of CFT, or whether they receive adequate feedback from the police and judicial authorities on TF matters. In practice, there is no evidence that they have contributed to either instigating or supplementing TF investigations. Infographic 9.1. Strategy on Extremism and Terrorism Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: OCAM, Strategic Note on Extremism and Terrorism, September 2021 [ link ] 722. OCAM, [207] however, plays an important role in detecting and analysing terrorism/TF threats. In particular, it is involved in maintaining and updating the Banque de données communes (BDC), [208] which can be searched and shared by all stakeholders, including the CTIF. Support services are required to inform OCAM and provide it with information in the form of confidential notes or reports. In investigations, OCAM sometimes provides strategic notes, particularly on the use of innovative payment methods, such as virtual assets or decentralised platforms. 723. OCAM adopts a two-pronged approach to threat analysis: a) Its micro analysis is particularly useful to JICs for the operational management of investigations. It provides investigators with information on threats to or from individuals or networks linked to TF. It is largely fed by the BDC, which is managed by OCAM. In this regard, OCAM is responsible in particular for ensuring information is shared between all counter-terrorism and TF services (including intelligence, internal security and the armed forces). b) At the same time, its macro analysis is used to monitor major general trends in terrorism, confirm and support findings made in the field, and raise awareness among partner services of new trends, phenomena and/or threats. 724. Lastly, OCAM is required to provide ad hoc analyses on specific topics or certain files. For example, in an investigation into a suspicious financial scheme, it may cross-reference data with other sources and provide strategic insight into possible links with previously identified networks. This work helps to prioritise investigations and optimise investigators’ resources. 725. Belgium does not have statistical data on the number of TF cases. However, the on-site visit confirmed that the JICs/JDCs have handled all investigations. 726. In addition, all cases handled by the terrorism section of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office systematically involve a parallel financial asset investigation. Currently, around 10% of these cases focus primarily on TF offences. This percentage, which was significantly higher in the past, has fallen sharply following the defeat of the Islamic State terrorist organisation. This led to a temporary spike in TF cases, particularly those linked to Belgian FTFs travelling to Syria and the phenomenon known as Syrian Wallets (see Box 9.1). Footnotes [201] The French parliamentary committee report on the measures taken by France to combat terrorism since 7 January 2015. The committee visited Brussels and Molenbeek, a town often mentioned in connection with terrorist attacks, such as the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels (May 2014), the attack on the Brussels-Paris Thalys train (August 2015) and the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp [202] Committee tasked with investigating the circumstances surrounding the attacks at Brussels-National Airport and Maelbeek metro station. https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/1752/54K1752008.pdf [203] Belgian Central Directorate for Combating Serious and Organised Crime [204] Col 16/2024 of 09/10/2024 on the JIC/JDC procedure. [205] LTFs are set up at the level of each judicial district and bring together the police, justice and intelligence services, facilitating the exchange of operational information on individuals or networks suspected of radicalism. [206] These units, which focus more on social prevention, are coordinated by the mayor and bring together a representative of the local police, social services and prevention services and, where necessary, other relevant partners (e.g. representatives from the education sector and local associations). [207] CUTA is the federal centre of knowledge and expertise that assesses the terrorist and extremist threat in Belgium and to Belgian citizens and interests abroad. It also coordinates the response to it. The unit operates under the supervision of the Belgian Ministers of Justice and the Interior. CUTA carries out its tasks independently. This independence guarantees neutral and objective threat assessments. [208] The Common Data Bank on Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation (BDC T.E.R.) is a dynamic database created in 2016 and managed by CUTA. 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Identification and investigation of TF activity 712. The detection of TF in Belgium is closely linked to efforts to counter terrorism, which reached a turning point in 2016 after the attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (22 March 2016). These attacks profoundly changed the country’s security landscape, leading to a reorganisation of counter-terrorism strategies and, by extension, of efforts to counter TF. Since 2018/2019, the authorities have observed a change in the TF threat. Whereas terrorism previously relied on often structured and sizeable funding, it now depends on more modest and fragmented resources. The rise of isolated and/or radicalised actors has reduced the need for significant equipment funding, with attacks often carried out with limited resources (knives, vehicles, online propaganda). This shift towards more discreet and difficult-to-trace financing, particularly through the use of virtual assets, makes detection more difficult. The TF NRA partly reflects this shift towards more diffuse forms of financing, but it remains a relatively academic exercise that does not fully reflect the operational realities observed in the field (see IO. 1). 713. Detecting TF used to rely mainly on spotting visible financial flows, such as those going through manual money changers. It has gradually become more structured to include analysing micro-transactions and spotting links between people and opaque organisations. However, a significant proportion of TF activities take place through underground or alternative channels, such as informal transfers and cash, which operate outside regulated systems. This makes detecting them more difficult, especially when banking investigations do not reveal any obvious anomalies. This structural opaqueness is a major barrier to the early detection of TF cases. 714. The CTIF identifies suspicious transactions and alerts authorities to unusual movements. The decrease in the number of CTIF reports since 2021/2022 is linked to changes in the types of TF cases and the reduced number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) leaving Belgium to join terrorist groups. At the height of the TF phenomenon (2017–2022), 80% of TF files were opened as a result of reports received from the CTIF, as illustrated by the Syrian Wallets case (see box 4.1). Box 9.1. Syrian Wallets case Background: The Syrian Wallets case is part of a structured CFT project covering the period from 2017 to 2022. It involved transfers of funds to conflict zones, mainly via money collectors based in Lebanon and Turkey. The funds originated mainly from backers located in Belgium, outside traditional banking channels. The investigation aimed to identify links between these transfers and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) involved in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict zone. CTIF role: (IO.6 relevance): The CTIF was asked to analyse financial flows between individuals identified as money collectors. Based on lists provided by Europol, the CTIF helped to identify additional Belgian and foreign collectors, establish links with FTFs, and identify any evidence indicating that they were still alive or might return to Belgium. Investigation: The investigation was coordinated between the Belgian and French prosecutor’s offices, involving 18 investigating judges and specialised departments of the Federal Judicial Police (organised crime and financial section). The investigation consolidated evidence gathered by the CTIF and the police, in particular through investigations into Western Union transfers and targeted phone tapping. Outcome: The project led to the identification of numerous new money collectors, both Belgian and foreign, as well as new FTFs. It strengthened inter-agency cooperation, made it possible to link financial and judicial data, and supported several criminal proceedings. Prosecution: Although the main case was initially closed without further action to allow for a solid case to be built (particularly after receiving the CTIF’s analysis), several judicial investigations were subsequently opened based on the information provided. Prosecutions were brought pursuant to Art. 140 of the Penal Code (participation in a terrorist group). Conviction and sanction: On 26 June 2023, the Brussels Criminal Court handed down a judgement in absentia convicting several defendants for transferring money to Islamic State fundraisers, including: 1) 10 months’ imprisonment, a fine of €1,200 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund; 2) 11 months’ imprisonment, a fine of €1,600 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund; 3) 1 year’s imprisonment, a fine of €1,200 + €200 for the Victims’ Fund. 715. However, the CTIF’s detection of informal systems, such as hawala, remains very limited, as this system is by its very nature largely beyond the scope of conventional AML/CFT monitoring mechanisms. These informal networks are rarely detected in Belgium, with only four cases resulting in convictions for TF through hawala. Identifying them often relies indirectly on random police checks (money mules transporting cash), ad hoc investigations (drug trafficking, etc.) or the detection of weak signals, such as repeated transfers of small amounts to at-risk areas from bank accounts with no consistent economic profile. This two-track approach to detection requires constant changes to investigation and intelligence methods to ensure that both formal and informal financial flows are covered. Table 9.1. Number of CTIF TF reports (2019–2024) Year Number of CTIF reports 2020 33 2021 15 2022 22 2023 11 2024 6 716. Since 2016, numerous changes have taken place in Belgium, partly as a result of the findings of two parliamentary committees that sought to reflect on and learn lessons from the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016. A French report published in July 2016 [201] identified flaws in cooperation between the French and Belgian intelligence services and recommended measures to improve coordination. However, it was the Belgian report of 15 June 2017 [202] that marked a turning point by analysing how the security services (the police, judiciary and intelligence services) operate. It highlighted flaws in the Belgian security architecture, helping to explain why the terrorist networks behind the 2015 and 2016 attacks had not been dismantled in time. 717. The Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) and Joint Decision Centre (JDC) were created to strengthen information sharing between the police, the judiciary and the intelligence services. Initially set up within the Brussels district, these structures were extended in 2023 to cover all five districts of Belgium. These centres, which focus on counter-terrorism, promote closer coordination and a rapid response to terrorist threats through regular discussions between the relevant stakeholders. The JICs bring together, at varying intervals depending on the jurisdiction, the main counter-terrorism stakeholders (intelligence services – VSSE, SGRS; the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM); police – DJSOC [203] /Terrorism and the Federal Judicial Police) as soon as new relevant information is identified. Regular consultations are also held at least once a month – and sometimes every week, as in Brussels – to ensure a continuous exchange of information between the intelligence services, the police and the public prosecutor’s office, ensuring that information is shared in a systematic and coordinated manner. In addition to the JICs, JDCs have been set up to determine how to handle terrorism-related cases and TF cases more quickly. More specifically, they determine which authority is best placed to handle a case and take the most effective action. See the box below for details of how JDCs work. Box 9.2. How Joint Decision Centres (JDCs) work The JDCs provide a framework for continuous assessment of T/TF cases and joint decision-making between magistrates, investigators and intelligence services. · The JDC’s decision is largely based on the analysis prepared by the JIC, which is jointly developed and signed by all its partners. · Files are classified according to their level of seriousness and risk with the aim of assessing their ‘actionability’, i.e. the need for and feasibility of taking action, taking into account the intentions and logistical and financial capabilities of the suspects. · Decisions are based on specific criteria, such as the credibility, immediacy and scale of the threat. One notable example is the large number of ‘money collectors’ files, where an investigation that started out as financial quickly turned into a terrorism-related case as a result of information sharing. This type of collaboration has helped prevent TF activities from going unnoticed. 718. This JIC/JDC process, launched in Brussels in 2018 and given a formal framework in a confidential circular [204] in October 2024, has brought new impetus to the detection of TF. Any new data potentially linked to terrorism is now included and analysed, even if no link has been confirmed. However, although more structured, this detection remains focused on a limited number of already identified targets, limiting visibility of potential emerging threats or networks operating outside conventional systems (e.g. informal transfers, virtual assets, donations in kind). This integrated approach improves understanding of financial flows linked to terrorist networks, but there is no statistical data to measure precisely the number of TF cases actually detected in this way. The effectiveness of this system also depends on the ability to continue active coordination efforts and anticipate new financing patterns, particularly through emerging technologies and informal financial networks. 719. Furthermore, the CTIF, despite holding most of the financial intelligence in Belgium (see IO.6), does not systematically participate in the JIC/JDC process where TF is involved. Its participation is on an ad hoc basis, when invited as an expert, which is also the case for the tax authorities. To date, no such invitation has been made. This means that, since their creation in 2018, these inter-institutional coordination platforms have not had direct and systematic access to CTIF information and data, such as STRs. This also limits their ability to quickly integrate financial intelligence into operational decision-making. The use of intermediary channels, in particular via the intelligence services or OCAM, can lead to delays, loss of contextual information and even blind spots in the assessment of a TF case by the JIC/JDC. This situation can hamper the detection of the financing aspect in structures focused primarily on counter-terrorism. There are no figures available to assess the extent to which these mechanisms are used in identifying and dealing with TF cases. 720. Local Task Forces (LTFs) [205] also play a role in gathering data from the field, with the aim of monitoring known targets and identifying cases that may be linked to TF at an early stage. They interact with the JIC/JDC platforms and help with referring cases initially classified as ordinary cases but which in fact show signs of TF to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. Local Integrated Security Units (LISU-Rs), [206] which work to prevent radicalisation and extremism, also interact with the LTFs. The local police representative acts as a liaison between the LTFs and the LISU-Rs, ensuring that weak signals are passed on and taken into account in the judicial process via the JICs/JDCs. 721. Although these local platforms ensure effective coordination between the various counter-terrorism stakeholders and foster a multidisciplinary approach to detecting signs of radicalisation early, it is not clear whether they are adequately informed or aware of the challenges of CFT, or whether they receive adequate feedback from the police and judicial authorities on TF matters. In practice, there is no evidence that they have contributed to either instigating or supplementing TF investigations. Infographic 9.1. Strategy on Extremism and Terrorism Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Source: OCAM, Strategic Note on Extremism and Terrorism, September 2021 [ link ] 722. OCAM, [207] however, plays an important role in detecting and analysing terrorism/TF threats. In particular, it is involved in maintaining and updating the Banque de données communes (BDC), [208] which can be searched and shared by all stakeholders, including the CTIF. Support services are required to inform OCAM and provide it with information in the form of confidential notes or reports. In investigations, OCAM sometimes provides strategic notes, particularly on the use of innovative payment methods, such as virtual assets or decentralised platforms. 723. OCAM adopts a two-pronged approach to threat analysis: a) Its micro analysis is particularly useful to JICs for the operational management of investigations. It provides investigators with information on threats to or from individuals or networks linked to TF. It is largely fed by the BDC, which is managed by OCAM. In this regard, OCAM is responsible in particular for ensuring information is shared between all counter-terrorism and TF services (including intelligence, internal security and the armed forces). b) At the same time, its macro analysis is used to monitor major general trends in terrorism, confirm and support findings made in the field, and raise awareness among partner services of new trends, phenomena and/or threats. 724. Lastly, OCAM is required to provide ad hoc analyses on specific topics or certain files. For example, in an investigation into a suspicious financial scheme, it may cross-reference data with other sources and provide strategic insight into possible links with previously identified networks. This work helps to prioritise investigations and optimise investigators’ resources. 725. Belgium does not have statistical data on the number of TF cases. However, the on-site visit confirmed that the JICs/JDCs have handled all investigations. 726. In addition, all cases handled by the terrorism section of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office systematically involve a parallel financial asset investigation. Currently, around 10% of these cases focus primarily on TF offences. This percentage, which was significantly higher in the past, has fallen sharply following the defeat of the Islamic State terrorist organisation. This led to a temporary spike in TF cases, particularly those linked to Belgian FTFs travelling to Syria and the phenomenon known as Syrian Wallets (see Box 9.1). Footnotes [201] The French parliamentary committee report on the measures taken by France to combat terrorism since 7 January 2015. The committee visited Brussels and Molenbeek, a town often mentioned in connection with terrorist attacks, such as the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels (May 2014), the attack on the Brussels-Paris Thalys train (August 2015) and the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-enq/r3922-t1.asp [202] Committee tasked with investigating the circumstances surrounding the attacks at Brussels-National Airport and Maelbeek metro station. https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/1752/54K1752008.pdf [203] Belgian Central Directorate for Combating Serious and Organised Crime [204] Col 16/2024 of 09/10/2024 on the JIC/JDC procedure. [205] LTFs are set up at the level of each judicial district and bring together the police, justice and intelligence services, facilitating the exchange of operational information on individuals or networks suspected of radicalism. [206] These units, which focus more on social prevention, are coordinated by the mayor and bring together a representative of the local police, social services and prevention services and, where necessary, other relevant partners (e.g. representatives from the education sector and local associations). [207] CUTA is the federal centre of knowledge and expertise that assesses the terrorist and extremist threat in Belgium and to Belgian citizens and interests abroad. It also coordinates the response to it. The unit operates under the supervision of the Belgian Ministers of Justice and the Interior. CUTA carries out its tasks independently. This independence guarantees neutral and objective threat assessments. [208] The Common Data Bank on Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation (BDC T.E.R.) is a dynamic database created in 2016 and managed by CUTA. 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Implementation without delay 762. Since 2019, Belgium has had a legal framework enabling the immediate implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) for TF, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267/1989 and 1988. Designations made under this framework have been immediately applicable in Belgium since 2019 (Law of 2 May 2019, Art. 236, see TC Annex, R 6), which compensates for delays in transposing UN designations at EU level. Belgium implements designations adopted at European level through Regulations which are immediately applicable in Belgium from the date of their publication in the Official Journal of the EU (Regulation (EU) 2001/2580 and Regulation (EU) 2016/1686, see TC Annex, R 6). 763. Belgium has also been implementing TF related targeted financial sanctions adopted at the national level since 2016. The use of national designation and asset freezing measures became a more important tool in combating TF since the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016. Although this national TF freezing mechanism has been planned since 2006, [213] it was only implemented in May 2016, when Belgium first added names to the list. [214] The Belgian list is updated within 24 hours of a new designation being published in the Belgian official journal ( Moniteur belge ) by means of a Royal Decree (RD) identifying the person to be added. 10.1.2. Proposals for designations to the UN Sanctions Committees and the EU 764. Belgium rather takes a reactive approach and does not play an active role in proposing designations for inclusion on the UN and EU TF sanctions lists. As of 14 February 2025 (end of the on-site visit), Belgium had co-sponsored eight designation proposals at the request of other countries under UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988. Belgium has not submitted any proposals to the UN Sanctions Committees to designate Belgian nationals. At the EU level, Belgium submitted one designation proposal and supported eight co-sponsorships initiated at the request of other countries (Germany, France and the Netherlands) involving seven individuals and three entities. 765. Since 2015, Belgium has set-up an inter-institutional framework for identifying targets to be designated under UNSCRs 1267/1989, 1988 and subsequent resolutions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is the competent authority for designating individuals at the national level and subsequently submitting proposals to the UN Sanctions Committees and to the Working Party on Restrictive Measures to Combat Terrorism (COMET) at the EU level. The Minister coordinates with the National Security Council (NSC) (responsible for strategic coordination of the national response to terrorism and TF, see IO.1) after consulting the various national intelligence services (for details, see TC Annex, R 6). The authorities meet monthly to discuss designation proposals. 766. The Belgian judicial authorities are also consulted and must give their approval to the proposed designation to not compromise ongoing criminal proceedings. [215] However, the Belgian authorities indicate that they have no examples of a proposal that has been opposed by the judicial authorities. The CTIF is not one of the authorities formally consulted, but it does indirectly provide financial information for the database of the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) and allows the authorities involved in the designation process to access financial information about the potential target. 767. The procedure and criteria for TF-related designations are set out in two confidential NSC decisions of 11 December 2018 (UN designations) [216] and 20 November 2023 (EU designations), [217] which the evaluation team was able to review. These decisions set out relatively broad criteria for deciding whether to propose a name for a UN or EU designation. They include the existence of a threat to Belgian interests, which must be demonstrated to justify a designation proposal. However, Belgium also makes the designation proposal conditional on the existence of criminal proceedings in Belgium against the person or entity concerned, which limits Belgium’s effectiveness in proposing new designations to the Sanctions Committees (see TC Annex, R 6). 10.1.3. Designations on the national list under UNSCR 1373 768. Belgium makes more frequent use of designations under its national TF sanctions list when the targets are not already covered by sanctions established at the EU level. OCAM initiates the formal designation process. The judicial authorities must also give their approval, and a number of services are consulted (see TC Annex, R 6). Proposals are sent to the NSC for approval, with final approval resting with the Council of Ministers. Each amendment to the national list must be set out in a Royal Decree and the revised national list is published in the Belgian Official Journal (‘ Moniteur belge’ ). The procedure for delisting is the same, as is the procedure for proposing the designation of persons on a third country’s national list or for a third country to request additions to the Belgian list. The national list is reviewed at least twice a year [218] and when information reaches the competent authorities about possible intentions of potential targets to leave or return to Belgium or finance terrorism. 769. The level of requirement for inclusion on the Belgian national list goes beyond the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’ or a ‘reasonable basis’. Only behaviour constituting criminal offences can lead to a designation. Proposals for designation are conditional on the existence of a criminal proceeding, which limits the scope of potential targets for freezing measures (see R 6, c.6.2 (d)). The College of Prosecutors General states that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office preserves judicial proceedings and does not agree to a designation measure on the national list before the target is subject to pre-trial detention or conditional release, charged or brought before a court. As of 14 February 2025 (end of the on-site visit), the Belgian national sanctions list included 265 individuals, including 257 former foreign terrorist fighters who had left Belgium and were in a jihadist conflict zone, and eight former terrorist fighters who were en route to Belgium or had returned to Belgium after travelling to a jihadist conflict zone. OCAM was responsible for initiating all designations on the national list. No entities (non-profit organisations, foundations, etc.) appear on the national list. The Belgian authorities have made a deliberate choice to designate only natural persons, due to the ease with which legal persons can be created, dismantled and restructured and the indirect ability to freeze funds that natural persons may hold through control or significant participation in a legal person. 770. The composition of the sanctions list is largely consistent with the country’s risk profile (see the Introduction), although non-profit organisations (ASBLs) are identified as at risk in the TF NRA and TF cases have involved ASBLs (see IO.9). 771. However, Belgium does not fully implement national designations under UNSCR 1373. Since 2016, Belgium has not requested any third country to implement freezing measures taken at the Belgian level, confirming Belgium’s lack of a proactive approach to TF related TFS. No national designations have been made in response to requests from third countries. Belgium has received five informal requests from third countries (France in 2017 and 2020, Saudi Arabia in 2017, Turkey in 2018 and the United States in 2018). However, no link could be established with Belgium and these requests were therefore unsuccessful as no formal request was made. 772. Belgium periodically reviews the listing or delisting of national designations. Since 2016, the authorities have delisted at least 45 individuals on the national list. However, one of them was subsequently relisted. OCAM initiated all but one of the requests. These delistings followed an update of the threat assessment by OCAM and its partners, which concluded that these designated persons no longer met the criteria for designation, in accordance with the circular of 7 September 2015. The SPF Finance granted exemptions to the freezing measures, in accordance with the procedures laid down for this purpose, including for the repayment of existing debts to the State and for the payment of legal costs and various essential expenses should the person concerned be imprisoned, which are valid grounds for exemption. 10.1.4. Notification of designations 773. Belgium considers that reporting entities are themselves responsible for monitoring changes to the sanctions lists applicable in Belgium. New designations on the national list of national financial sanctions under UNSCR 1373 are published in the Belgian Official Journal (“ Moniteur belge ”) and are listed on the SPF Finance website , [219] in its capacity as the authority responsible for implementing freezing measures (see the Introduction ). The SPF Finance also maintains a consolidated list on its website , which includes all financial sanctions in force under the various sanction regimes adopted by the UN and the EU, as well as those included on the Belgian national list. When a UN designation is made just before a weekend or public holiday, the list is not updated immediately. There is therefore a risk of delay in implementing freezing measures following a UN designation if entities have not obtained the information by other means. However, the fact that the freezing obligation under UNSCRs 1267/1989, 1988 and subsequent resolutions is immediately applicable in Belgium and that financial institutions (FIs) use other tools to keep themselves informed of new designations mitigates the impact of these delays to a certain extent. Since 2024, the system for updating the consolidated list and notifying subscribers to this list has been automated. This notification system allows anyone interested to receive immediate updates on changes to the list. The SPF Finance also notifies the supervisory authorities of any changes by email. However, the Belgian authorities have not indicated how long it took to update the system before 2024. 774. The vast majority of FIs use various automated tools developed by private companies to assist in screening existing and potential customers against sanctions lists. Some FIs maintain their own internal lists (see IO.3). There have been cases where reporting entities did not use the most up-to-date lists. Reporting entities must ensure that the lists they use are complete and accurate, and this must be checked periodically by all supervisors. The National Bank of Belgium, as the supervisory authority, checks the completeness and accuracy of the lists used by its reporting entities during its inspections. 775. DNFBPs mainly perform manual checks using public sources, including the SPF Finance list. Some DNFBPs do not carry out the necessary checks against official lists, which they confuse with high-risk country lists (see IO.4). Footnotes [213] Royal Decree of 28 December 2006 [214] See RD of 30 May 2016 and the list of other Royal Decrees issued to add or remove persons from the Belgian national list. [215] In the case of sponsorship by Belgium, the prosecutor’s office is simply consulted. [216] National Security Council Decision – Procedure for determining the Belgian position within the UN Security Council with regard to the targeted application of sanctions against individuals, legal entities and others. [217] National Security Council Decision – Effective and uniform procedure for determining the Belgian position within the EU Council with regard to the application of restrictive measures against individuals, legal persons and other entities as part of efforts to combat terrorism. [218] CUTA reassesses the designations every six months to determine whether the persons listed still have an intention to cause harm. 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Implementation without delay 762. Since 2019, Belgium has had a legal framework enabling the immediate implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) for TF, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267/1989 and 1988. Designations made under this framework have been immediately applicable in Belgium since 2019 (Law of 2 May 2019, Art. 236, see TC Annex, R 6), which compensates for delays in transposing UN designations at EU level. Belgium implements designations adopted at European level through Regulations which are immediately applicable in Belgium from the date of their publication in the Official Journal of the EU (Regulation (EU) 2001/2580 and Regulation (EU) 2016/1686, see TC Annex, R 6). 763. Belgium has also been implementing TF related targeted financial sanctions adopted at the national level since 2016. The use of national designation and asset freezing measures became a more important tool in combating TF since the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016. Although this national TF freezing mechanism has been planned since 2006, [213] it was only implemented in May 2016, when Belgium first added names to the list. [214] The Belgian list is updated within 24 hours of a new designation being published in the Belgian official journal ( Moniteur belge ) by means of a Royal Decree (RD) identifying the person to be added. 10.1.2. Proposals for designations to the UN Sanctions Committees and the EU 764. Belgium rather takes a reactive approach and does not play an active role in proposing designations for inclusion on the UN and EU TF sanctions lists. As of 14 February 2025 (end of the on-site visit), Belgium had co-sponsored eight designation proposals at the request of other countries under UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988. Belgium has not submitted any proposals to the UN Sanctions Committees to designate Belgian nationals. At the EU level, Belgium submitted one designation proposal and supported eight co-sponsorships initiated at the request of other countries (Germany, France and the Netherlands) involving seven individuals and three entities. 765. Since 2015, Belgium has set-up an inter-institutional framework for identifying targets to be designated under UNSCRs 1267/1989, 1988 and subsequent resolutions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is the competent authority for designating individuals at the national level and subsequently submitting proposals to the UN Sanctions Committees and to the Working Party on Restrictive Measures to Combat Terrorism (COMET) at the EU level. The Minister coordinates with the National Security Council (NSC) (responsible for strategic coordination of the national response to terrorism and TF, see IO.1) after consulting the various national intelligence services (for details, see TC Annex, R 6). The authorities meet monthly to discuss designation proposals. 766. The Belgian judicial authorities are also consulted and must give their approval to the proposed designation to not compromise ongoing criminal proceedings. [215] However, the Belgian authorities indicate that they have no examples of a proposal that has been opposed by the judicial authorities. The CTIF is not one of the authorities formally consulted, but it does indirectly provide financial information for the database of the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) and allows the authorities involved in the designation process to access financial information about the potential target. 767. The procedure and criteria for TF-related designations are set out in two confidential NSC decisions of 11 December 2018 (UN designations) [216] and 20 November 2023 (EU designations), [217] which the evaluation team was able to review. These decisions set out relatively broad criteria for deciding whether to propose a name for a UN or EU designation. They include the existence of a threat to Belgian interests, which must be demonstrated to justify a designation proposal. However, Belgium also makes the designation proposal conditional on the existence of criminal proceedings in Belgium against the person or entity concerned, which limits Belgium’s effectiveness in proposing new designations to the Sanctions Committees (see TC Annex, R 6). 10.1.3. Designations on the national list under UNSCR 1373 768. Belgium makes more frequent use of designations under its national TF sanctions list when the targets are not already covered by sanctions established at the EU level. OCAM initiates the formal designation process. The judicial authorities must also give their approval, and a number of services are consulted (see TC Annex, R 6). Proposals are sent to the NSC for approval, with final approval resting with the Council of Ministers. Each amendment to the national list must be set out in a Royal Decree and the revised national list is published in the Belgian Official Journal (‘ Moniteur belge’ ). The procedure for delisting is the same, as is the procedure for proposing the designation of persons on a third country’s national list or for a third country to request additions to the Belgian list. The national list is reviewed at least twice a year [218] and when information reaches the competent authorities about possible intentions of potential targets to leave or return to Belgium or finance terrorism. 769. The level of requirement for inclusion on the Belgian national list goes beyond the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’ or a ‘reasonable basis’. Only behaviour constituting criminal offences can lead to a designation. Proposals for designation are conditional on the existence of a criminal proceeding, which limits the scope of potential targets for freezing measures (see R 6, c.6.2 (d)). The College of Prosecutors General states that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office preserves judicial proceedings and does not agree to a designation measure on the national list before the target is subject to pre-trial detention or conditional release, charged or brought before a court. As of 14 February 2025 (end of the on-site visit), the Belgian national sanctions list included 265 individuals, including 257 former foreign terrorist fighters who had left Belgium and were in a jihadist conflict zone, and eight former terrorist fighters who were en route to Belgium or had returned to Belgium after travelling to a jihadist conflict zone. OCAM was responsible for initiating all designations on the national list. No entities (non-profit organisations, foundations, etc.) appear on the national list. The Belgian authorities have made a deliberate choice to designate only natural persons, due to the ease with which legal persons can be created, dismantled and restructured and the indirect ability to freeze funds that natural persons may hold through control or significant participation in a legal person. 770. The composition of the sanctions list is largely consistent with the country’s risk profile (see the Introduction), although non-profit organisations (ASBLs) are identified as at risk in the TF NRA and TF cases have involved ASBLs (see IO.9). 771. However, Belgium does not fully implement national designations under UNSCR 1373. Since 2016, Belgium has not requested any third country to implement freezing measures taken at the Belgian level, confirming Belgium’s lack of a proactive approach to TF related TFS. No national designations have been made in response to requests from third countries. Belgium has received five informal requests from third countries (France in 2017 and 2020, Saudi Arabia in 2017, Turkey in 2018 and the United States in 2018). However, no link could be established with Belgium and these requests were therefore unsuccessful as no formal request was made. 772. Belgium periodically reviews the listing or delisting of national designations. Since 2016, the authorities have delisted at least 45 individuals on the national list. However, one of them was subsequently relisted. OCAM initiated all but one of the requests. These delistings followed an update of the threat assessment by OCAM and its partners, which concluded that these designated persons no longer met the criteria for designation, in accordance with the circular of 7 September 2015. The SPF Finance granted exemptions to the freezing measures, in accordance with the procedures laid down for this purpose, including for the repayment of existing debts to the State and for the payment of legal costs and various essential expenses should the person concerned be imprisoned, which are valid grounds for exemption. 10.1.4. Notification of designations 773. Belgium considers that reporting entities are themselves responsible for monitoring changes to the sanctions lists applicable in Belgium. New designations on the national list of national financial sanctions under UNSCR 1373 are published in the Belgian Official Journal (“ Moniteur belge ”) and are listed on the SPF Finance website , [219] in its capacity as the authority responsible for implementing freezing measures (see the Introduction ). The SPF Finance also maintains a consolidated list on its website , which includes all financial sanctions in force under the various sanction regimes adopted by the UN and the EU, as well as those included on the Belgian national list. When a UN designation is made just before a weekend or public holiday, the list is not updated immediately. There is therefore a risk of delay in implementing freezing measures following a UN designation if entities have not obtained the information by other means. However, the fact that the freezing obligation under UNSCRs 1267/1989, 1988 and subsequent resolutions is immediately applicable in Belgium and that financial institutions (FIs) use other tools to keep themselves informed of new designations mitigates the impact of these delays to a certain extent. Since 2024, the system for updating the consolidated list and notifying subscribers to this list has been automated. This notification system allows anyone interested to receive immediate updates on changes to the list. The SPF Finance also notifies the supervisory authorities of any changes by email. However, the Belgian authorities have not indicated how long it took to update the system before 2024. 774. The vast majority of FIs use various automated tools developed by private companies to assist in screening existing and potential customers against sanctions lists. Some FIs maintain their own internal lists (see IO.3). There have been cases where reporting entities did not use the most up-to-date lists. Reporting entities must ensure that the lists they use are complete and accurate, and this must be checked periodically by all supervisors. The National Bank of Belgium, as the supervisory authority, checks the completeness and accuracy of the lists used by its reporting entities during its inspections. 775. DNFBPs mainly perform manual checks using public sources, including the SPF Finance list. Some DNFBPs do not carry out the necessary checks against official lists, which they confuse with high-risk country lists (see IO.4). Footnotes [213] Royal Decree of 28 December 2006 [214] See RD of 30 May 2016 and the list of other Royal Decrees issued to add or remove persons from the Belgian national list. [215] In the case of sponsorship by Belgium, the prosecutor’s office is simply consulted. [216] National Security Council Decision – Procedure for determining the Belgian position within the UN Security Council with regard to the targeted application of sanctions against individuals, legal entities and others. [217] National Security Council Decision – Effective and uniform procedure for determining the Belgian position within the EU Council with regard to the application of restrictive measures against individuals, legal persons and other entities as part of efforts to combat terrorism. [218] CUTA reassesses the designations every six months to determine whether the persons listed still have an intention to cause harm. [219] UN and EU designations are also published in the Official Journal of the EU and are consolidated in the list maintained by the European Commission (EC), which is accessible through a similar notification system when updates are made." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 819. The National Security Council (NSC) (see the Introduction and IO.1) is responsible for coordinating efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its financing. The Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security), which is responsible for coordinating and implementing the NSC’s decisions, meets approximately once a month. It brings together all stakeholders involved in efforts to combat PF. The intelligence services (VSSE, SGRS), OCAM, the Federal Judicial Police and the SPF Foreign Affairs are permanent members of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security). The SPF Finance-Treasury, which is responsible for implementing asset freezing measures, may also be represented on the Coordination Committee when the topics discussed relate to its remit. 820. Belgium’s 2021 National Security Strategy includes sections on combating proliferation but does not address the issue of its financing. Similarly, PF is not addressed in the February 2025 government agreement, although combating proliferation is mentioned. Belgium does not have a targeted strategy on PF, and the NSC has not carried out any specific work in this area. The implementation of TFS is currently the only measure in place in Belgium specifically targeting PF. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 821. Frameworks for operational cooperation with authorities holding information on PF (i.e. the intelligence services (VSSE), Federal Prosecutor’s Office, SPF Economy, SPF Finance (Treasury and Customs), as well as regional export control services) are in place. The cooperation frameworks established under the auspices of the SPF Foreign Affairs (see IO.10) ensure that consultation takes place on proposals for designations at UN and European level. The VSSE holds and shares information on proliferation with a view to preventing financial transactions originating in or passing through Belgium related to materials and technologies that could be used to produce or develop unconventional or highly advanced weapons systems, and to implementing national, European and international sanctions on proliferation, including TFS. The Advisory Commission for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (CANPAN), which is responsible for granting export licences and supervising exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, also holds and shares relevant information. Over the past five years, no applications for exports to the DPRK have been submitted to CANPAN. In practice, the information available to these authorities has not to date identified any potential evasion of PF related TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 819. The National Security Council (NSC) (see the Introduction and IO.1) is responsible for coordinating efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its financing. The Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security), which is responsible for coordinating and implementing the NSC’s decisions, meets approximately once a month. It brings together all stakeholders involved in efforts to combat PF. The intelligence services (VSSE, SGRS), OCAM, the Federal Judicial Police and the SPF Foreign Affairs are permanent members of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security). The SPF Finance-Treasury, which is responsible for implementing asset freezing measures, may also be represented on the Coordination Committee when the topics discussed relate to its remit. 820. Belgium’s 2021 National Security Strategy includes sections on combating proliferation but does not address the issue of its financing. Similarly, PF is not addressed in the February 2025 government agreement, although combating proliferation is mentioned. Belgium does not have a targeted strategy on PF, and the NSC has not carried out any specific work in this area. The implementation of TFS is currently the only measure in place in Belgium specifically targeting PF. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 821. Frameworks for operational cooperation with authorities holding information on PF (i.e. the intelligence services (VSSE), Federal Prosecutor’s Office, SPF Economy, SPF Finance (Treasury and Customs), as well as regional export control services) are in place. The cooperation frameworks established under the auspices of the SPF Foreign Affairs (see IO.10) ensure that consultation takes place on proposals for designations at UN and European level. The VSSE holds and shares information on proliferation with a view to preventing financial transactions originating in or passing through Belgium related to materials and technologies that could be used to produce or develop unconventional or highly advanced weapons systems, and to implementing national, European and international sanctions on proliferation, including TFS. The Advisory Commission for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (CANPAN), which is responsible for granting export licences and supervising exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, also holds and shares relevant information. Over the past five years, no applications for exports to the DPRK have been submitted to CANPAN. In practice, the information available to these authorities has not to date identified any potential evasion of PF related TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 183. The ML NRA led to the extension of the list of entities subject to the national AML/CFT scheme to include certain activities and professions associated with high ML risks: the professional football sector, safe deposit box rental, intermediaries in the purchase and sale of company shares, and security firms. 184. The ML NRA also led to the adoption, in March 2024, of an AML Action plan by the Ministerial Committee for Coordinating Measures Against Laundering Money from Illegal Sources, which is the national coordination platform (see the Introduction and section 1.5 below). This action plan (“AML Strategy”) defines four guidelines for national AML/CFT policy: strengthen and monitor compliance with preventive measures; increase the transparency of legal structures and arrangements; reinforce detection and prosecution; optimise coordination and international cooperation. It sets out concrete recommendations to be implemented by the competent authorities in each of the four areas. 185. On the whole, these recommendations constitute appropriate measures for an improved AML/CFT policy in the country. For example, the proposed tightening of the AML/CFT supervision of diamond traders is necessary given the level of risk to which the country is exposed in this field and the limited number of controls currently in place (see IO.4). Similarly, the proposed intensification of measures against the misuse of legal persons seems essential (see IO.5), as does the introduction of measures to include virtual asset portfolios in the BNB's central register containing information on Belgian and foreign financial accounts and contracts (“PCC”). However, the measures included in the action plan are extremely ad hoc and do not reflect a strategic, long-term approach to the areas envisaged. This is notably the case for virtual assets, despite the recognition of the scale and extent of the associated risks in terms of both ML and TF (see the Introduction above). In addition, the envisaged measures are not based on an implementation timetable or on the prioritisation of actions. 186. Furthermore, the AML action plan lacks a vision based on strategic priorities for the country, which could be used to formulate in-depth responses to the major crime patterns that continue to develop in Belgium, highlighting the growing links between ML and organised crime. This approach should focus primarily on underground cash circulation and alternative financial networks, and be linked to the strategies already in place to combat the country's major underlying criminal activities – social and tax fraud, drug trafficking, organised crime and trafficking affecting the port of Antwerp. In particular, Belgium developed an action plan to counter social fraud in 2022, created a drugs commission in 2023 with a strong focus on trafficking at the port of Antwerp, and presented the fight against organised crime as one of the priorities of the government which took office in January 2025. All these policies include aspects that are also relevant to AML but which are not currently reflected in the AML action plan so as to foster the convergence and coherence of the policies pursued. In addition, the strategic approach will also need to learn from and build on the techniques implemented as part of the Sky ECC cases (see IO.7). 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 187. The Belgian authorities have demonstrated the existence of an operational CFT strategy, which was mainly developed following the 2016 attacks (see IO.9). This operational approach is based on close multi-disciplinary integration between counter-terrorism and TF measures, regular sharing of information on individual targets, and proposals for taking action against targets in the light of developments, notably via the Local Task Force ( Task Force Locales – TFL) scheme, the Joint Data Bank ( Banque de données communes – BDC) and the Joint Intelligence Centre/Joint Decision Centre (JIC/JDC) (see IO.9). This policy is based on the authorities' current capacity to take action against all targets likely to be involved in TF. 188. This operational approach has not been formalised and integrated into a dedicated TF strategy, including prevention and awareness-raising aspects among reporting entities, to complement the TER (Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism) Counter-Terrorism Strategy (see section 15 below) for the TF component." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 183. The ML NRA led to the extension of the list of entities subject to the national AML/CFT scheme to include certain activities and professions associated with high ML risks: the professional football sector, safe deposit box rental, intermediaries in the purchase and sale of company shares, and security firms. 184. The ML NRA also led to the adoption, in March 2024, of an AML Action plan by the Ministerial Committee for Coordinating Measures Against Laundering Money from Illegal Sources, which is the national coordination platform (see the Introduction and section 1.5 below). This action plan (“AML Strategy”) defines four guidelines for national AML/CFT policy: strengthen and monitor compliance with preventive measures; increase the transparency of legal structures and arrangements; reinforce detection and prosecution; optimise coordination and international cooperation. It sets out concrete recommendations to be implemented by the competent authorities in each of the four areas. 185. On the whole, these recommendations constitute appropriate measures for an improved AML/CFT policy in the country. For example, the proposed tightening of the AML/CFT supervision of diamond traders is necessary given the level of risk to which the country is exposed in this field and the limited number of controls currently in place (see IO.4). Similarly, the proposed intensification of measures against the misuse of legal persons seems essential (see IO.5), as does the introduction of measures to include virtual asset portfolios in the BNB's central register containing information on Belgian and foreign financial accounts and contracts (“PCC”). However, the measures included in the action plan are extremely ad hoc and do not reflect a strategic, long-term approach to the areas envisaged. This is notably the case for virtual assets, despite the recognition of the scale and extent of the associated risks in terms of both ML and TF (see the Introduction above). In addition, the envisaged measures are not based on an implementation timetable or on the prioritisation of actions. 186. Furthermore, the AML action plan lacks a vision based on strategic priorities for the country, which could be used to formulate in-depth responses to the major crime patterns that continue to develop in Belgium, highlighting the growing links between ML and organised crime. This approach should focus primarily on underground cash circulation and alternative financial networks, and be linked to the strategies already in place to combat the country's major underlying criminal activities – social and tax fraud, drug trafficking, organised crime and trafficking affecting the port of Antwerp. In particular, Belgium developed an action plan to counter social fraud in 2022, created a drugs commission in 2023 with a strong focus on trafficking at the port of Antwerp, and presented the fight against organised crime as one of the priorities of the government which took office in January 2025. All these policies include aspects that are also relevant to AML but which are not currently reflected in the AML action plan so as to foster the convergence and coherence of the policies pursued. In addition, the strategic approach will also need to learn from and build on the techniques implemented as part of the Sky ECC cases (see IO.7). 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 187. The Belgian authorities have demonstrated the existence of an operational CFT strategy, which was mainly developed following the 2016 attacks (see IO.9). This operational approach is based on close multi-disciplinary integration between counter-terrorism and TF measures, regular sharing of information on individual targets, and proposals for taking action against targets in the light of developments, notably via the Local Task Force ( Task Force Locales – TFL) scheme, the Joint Data Bank ( Banque de données communes – BDC) and the Joint Intelligence Centre/Joint Decision Centre (JIC/JDC) (see IO.9). This policy is based on the authorities' current capacity to take action against all targets likely to be involved in TF. 188. This operational approach has not been formalised and integrated into a dedicated TF strategy, including prevention and awareness-raising aspects among reporting entities, to complement the TER (Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism) Counter-Terrorism Strategy (see section 15 below) for the TF component." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 231. Belgium applies for international mutual legal assistance in ML cases or cases involving predicate offences using a similar system to that used for incoming requests, through SPF Justice for non-EU requests, directly to the judicial authorities in the EU for ML matters, and directly by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in TF matters (see 2.2.1.). 232. The Belgian authorities are aware of the importance of international cooperation due to the generally transnational nature of offences linked to financial crime in Belgium (see IO.1). However, this point needs to be qualified where TF is concerned, as the incidents often occur in Belgium, which reduces the need for systematic international cooperation. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals Table 2.2. Mutual assistance requests sent 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total EU EIO – ML 65 62 90 81 124 89 511 MLA requests - ML 6 2 5 7 6 5 31 EIO - TF 6 8 6 3 1 1 25 Total 77 72 101 91 131 95 567 Non-EU (via SPF Justice) ILR - ML 72 36 40 59 70 59 336 ILR - FT 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 Total non-EU 72 36 40 60 71 59 338 Source: SPF Justice 233. In general, the level of outgoing requests is fairly low, which does not seem to be linked to the transnational nature of ML cases put forward by Belgium, but should be seen in the light of the small number of complex cases with foreign ramifications giving rise to prosecutions (see IO.7). [92] The vast majority of requests are sent to European countries. Since 2019, demand for European Investigation Orders (EIOs) has grown, with significant increases in 2021 and 2023, probably due to an acceleration of cases linked to offsetting networks, based on better knowledge of these networks and their European connections, and to cases linked to the Sky ECC cases (see IO.1 and 7). 234. Furthermore, Belgium does not comprehensively map the type of ML cases for which it has requested assistance from its foreign counterparts, especially European ones; nor does it map the category(ies) of predicate offence(s) and the result(s) obtained. This makes it difficult to assess the alignment of Belgium's international cooperation activities with the country's ML risk profile, and the effectiveness of outgoing requests for mutual assistance. Nor does Belgium have sufficient data to assess exchanges of TF-related information with other European countries. Belgium’s biggest partners in TF matters are France, the Netherlands and Germany. 235. Outside the EU, the countries to which Belgium has issued the most requests for mutual assistance are Switzerland (32), Morocco (31), the United States (19), the United Kingdom (15), Turkey (14), the UAE (13) and Albania (12). The list of these countries reflects the mapping of cases and issues linked to international cooperation cited by Belgium (see below). On average, a Belgian request for mutual legal assistance takes 294 days to be implemented (the median period is 145 days). 236. Certain examples cited by both the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the district public prosecutor's offices (see IO.8, box on the Clown case) demonstrate the Belgian authorities’ ability to handle complex ML cases and/or trace ML networks, notably by participating in international cooperation initiatives, both within and outside the EU. International letters rogatory, requests for mutual assistance for investigative purposes, and requests for joint action in the field (“joint action days”) have produced results in major cases involving ML in offsetting or tax fraud proceedings. However, in the absence of comprehensive data for all public prosecutors' offices in ML cases, it is unclear whether international cooperation measures are being implemented systematically, particularly for cases managed by district public prosecutors' offices outside Brussels. [93] In connection with the observations made on the prosecution of ML (see IO.7), a lack of available resources hinders the Belgian judicial authorities’ systematic pursuit of these international ramifications. 237. Joint investigation teams (JITs) are regularly assigned to ML matters, mainly with neighbouring countries, which facilitates the consultation of statements/reports (“ procès-verbaux ”) and the performance of searches and hearings. These joint teams have proved useful in strategically important ML cases for Belgium, linked to drug trafficking and tax fraud. JITs have also been created in the TF field, especially with France for obtaining and processing evidence in the investigations linked to the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015 and 2016. 238. However, the Belgian authorities are hampered by the difficulties and slowness of formal judicial cooperation procedures, mainly with non-EU countries. They therefore often make discretionary decisions to prevent the interruption of proceedings due to unmet requests for mutual assistance or lengthy delays causing the limitation period to expire, which is particularly important when the confiscation of goods or products located abroad needs to be envisaged. In some cases, Belgian public prosecutors prefer to report the offences to the competent foreign authorities (“ dénonciations ”), accompanied by the transmission of the complete case file. This strategy, implemented notably with Morocco and Albania, is based on a pragmatic analysis of foreign legal systems and aims to ensure the effective in situ confiscation of criminal assets. This is a practical way to counter impunity, but also to strengthen bilateral cooperation by relying on national legal frameworks that are sometimes better adapted to certain offences or to the location of the assets to be seized. 239. The available data shows that Belgium submits far more requests to non-European countries than it receives (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 above), which shows that despite the difficulties, the judicial authorities are attempting to use international cooperation as an aid to resolve cases. Belgium is also actively striving to overcome these obstacles through various initiatives. SPF Justice has renegotiated or is in the process of renegotiating a number of bilateral agreements in the field of financial crime with key countries in order to extend the areas covered. This applies to Morocco, which is one of the countries to which Belgium submits the most requests for mutual assistance, particularly in relation to drug trafficking and asset confiscation (see below). 240. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office also cooperates with SPF Justice to resolve structural problems that hinder or limit international cooperation. A special unit has been created at the Federal Prosecutor's Office to foster more agile and productive international cooperation. This unit consists of four people, two of whom work part-time, which seems insufficient. Nevertheless, one example of this joint undertaking has been the identification of four high-priority countries as (presumed) safe havens for drug traffickers and for the funds resulting from the offences: Albania, Turkey, the UAE and Morocco. Action has been taken with each of these countries to find solutions. For example, the Federal Prosecutor's Office has signed a memorandum of understanding with its Albanian counterpart and the prosecutor's office specialising in organised crime and corruption. Two visits took place in 2024 to gain a better understanding of the legal framework and practices likely to achieve the best confiscation results. This approach has not yet produced concrete results, but it should help to improve and speed up the processing of Belgian requests. Also see the approaches adopted with the UAE (extradition) and Morocco (confiscation) below. 241. In the same vein, and to facilitate faster and more effective cooperation with the United States, another key partner of Belgium, a specialised cooperation unit has been set up at the Federal Prosecutor's Office. The members of this unit (specialised lawyers, investigating judges (“ juges d’instruction ”) and magistrates) have been trained by their US counterparts to help improve their understanding of their expectations and procedures, and of the specific formal requirements of the requests they receive. 242. A similar approach has been adopted in the field of terrorism/TF – notably with Iraq – to improve the gathering of evidence. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office has been involved in the Military Intelligence Services ( Services de renseignement militaire – SGRS) initiative to establish a dialogue with the authorities. The Federal Prosecutor's Office hosted an Iraqi delegation of judges, police officers and members of intelligence services in 2021 to explain the ongoing investigations into terrorism and TF and to sign concrete agreements on further cooperation. Following this visit, the Iraqi authorities spontaneously exchanged information on an ongoing TF investigation. 243. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, SPF Justice and SPF Foreign Affairs are also taking joint action, including by organising formal, high-level missions (“ missions protocolaires ”) involving the Prosecutor General to pave the way for more effective operational cooperation and make progress on judicial matters. This approach has produced positive results, as with Brazil, for example, in the Clown case. [94] 244. The Belgian authorities also exchange information with their counterparts on a regular basis, outside formal procedures but within the European framework for mutual assistance in criminal matters. [95] These discussions help to clarify requests quickly, resolve ambiguities and speed up the overall process, resulting in faster and better-quality formal police and judicial cooperation. In this way, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office maintains a close dialogue and spontaneously exchanges information with its French, Dutch and German counterparts on TF matters, and also organises regular bilateral contacts. These close contacts have proved particularly valuable in times of crisis, particularly during the terrorist attacks of 2015/2016. They have also been useful in connection with the “Syrian wallet” case, notably by providing the basis for launching investigations (see IO.9). Box 2.2. Cristo case Agencies involved: The CTIF, an investigating judge (“juge d’instruction”) at the Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance – TPI), the Spanish FIU, and the investigating and prosecuting authorities of the countries concerned. Facts: Based on information contained in suspicious transaction reports (STRs), the CTIF wished to conduct a more detailed analysis of the activities of a Spanish law firm, which appeared to operate as a collection, transfer and reinvestment centre for funds of dubious origin, including EUR 13 million from a group of companies based in Belgium whose actual activities were inconsistent with the financial flows they handled, and which appeared to be controlled by a criminal organisation actively engaged in money laundering. Thanks to the information received from CTIF, the case was referred to an investigating judge at the Brussels Court of First Instance, who sent seven requests for European mutual assistance and eight additional requests, all of which were answered. Three international letters rogatory were also sent to Morocco, the UK and the UAE. Simultaneous searches were conducted in Spain and Belgium. IO.2 relevance : The mutual assistance requests required for the investigation were sent to all parties that were able to provide information, in accordance with the mutual assistance procedures in force within and outside the EU. Results : International cooperation was essential in order to obtain information and justify the inconsistency in invoices noted by the CTIF. The analyses identified the network and its cross-border interconnections. Some of the law firm's Moroccan clients have been subject to tax reassessments in their own countries. The presence of a liaison judge in Morocco produced results, but required numerous follow-ups. The case is still under investigation. 2.2.2. Extradition 245. Belgium issued 80 European arrest warrants (EAWs) between 2019 and 2024. Requests for these EAWs are increasing and remain at a higher level than incoming applications, which confirms that offenders are fleeing the country. Belgium lacks sufficient data on the predicate offence category(ies) and on the results of its EAWs to assess the effectiveness of its actions and their alignment with the country's ML/TF risk exposure. However, the Belgian judicial authorities attest to the generally rapid implementation of these requests due to the application of a simplified procedure. 246. Belgium reported 25 extradition requests to non-EU countries between 2019 and 2024, ranging from 0 in 2020 (health crisis) to 8 in 2023, all concerning ML offences. Nine were granted and led to an effective surrender; 13 are currently being processed, accompanied in most cases by arrests and ongoing legal proceedings in the executing country; three were refused – one because priority was given to a European arrest warrant issued by France, where the person was extradited, and the two others because the wanted persons had left the territory of the executing country. On average, it takes 225 days for a request to be implemented (median 138 days), which seems satisfactory. 247. Eleven of these 25 requests were sent to the UAE. Belgium has taken steps to facilitate these procedures. Several missions have been carried out by Belgium and regular meetings have been held with the Emirati authorities to gain a better understanding of the local judicial system and overcome the difficulties associated with blocked extraditions, and with requests to identify and locate assets in asset investigations that may lead to confiscation. A judge specialising in international cooperation with the UAE has been appointed to the Federal Prosecutor's Office. These measures have led to four extraditions for offences relating to financial crime since the extradition treaty was signed in 2021. 2.2.3. Identification, freezing, seizing, confiscation and sharing of criminal assets 248. The Belgian authorities lack detailed information about requests for mutual assistance relating specifically to the temporary or permanent immobilisation of goods or products located abroad, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of international cooperation activities in this matter and their alignment with the country's risks. However, they stress that this area poses some of the greatest difficulties in judicial matters, which are often resolved by reporting the offences to the competent foreign authorities (“ dénonciations” , see above). 249. To make headway in this matter, Belgium has implemented measures, as with Morocco, which is one of the countries to which Belgium issues the most mutual assistance requests for the confiscation of assets, notably linked to drug trafficking (around 40 per year). A memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation and facilitate “ dénonciations” was signed in October 2024: seven of the 14 transmitted in recent years have been processed, four have led to convictions in Morocco, three of them with confiscations; three have led to dismissal or acquittal and one is still being processed. The bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance between Belgium and Morocco is being extended to cover asset confiscations. This should notably enable the authorities to go beyond the hitherto applicable freezing/seizure measures, and lead to the confiscation, in Belgium’s favour – of property or real estate that could not previously be confiscated by the Belgian authorities. Belgium’s only liaison judge posted abroad has also been appointed in Morocco. 250. The sharing of criminal assets and confiscated property with the countries concerned is carried out in accordance with European rules (shared equally when the amount of the confiscation exceeds EUR10,000) and in accordance with the applicable international conventions with non-EU countries (see IO.8). Footnotes [92] However, these figures should be interpreted with caution, given the judicial authorities’ difficulty in extracting statistics due to the absence of a central system for monitoring requests in the EU and the current coding system, which automatically records the main qualification only. [93] Analysis based on a sample of ML cases reported by Belgium. [94] Belgium has also drawn on the EMPACT project to provide resources for implementing and running judicial coordination. 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Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 231. Belgium applies for international mutual legal assistance in ML cases or cases involving predicate offences using a similar system to that used for incoming requests, through SPF Justice for non-EU requests, directly to the judicial authorities in the EU for ML matters, and directly by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office in TF matters (see 2.2.1.). 232. The Belgian authorities are aware of the importance of international cooperation due to the generally transnational nature of offences linked to financial crime in Belgium (see IO.1). However, this point needs to be qualified where TF is concerned, as the incidents often occur in Belgium, which reduces the need for systematic international cooperation. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals Table 2.2. Mutual assistance requests sent 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total EU EIO – ML 65 62 90 81 124 89 511 MLA requests - ML 6 2 5 7 6 5 31 EIO - TF 6 8 6 3 1 1 25 Total 77 72 101 91 131 95 567 Non-EU (via SPF Justice) ILR - ML 72 36 40 59 70 59 336 ILR - FT 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 Total non-EU 72 36 40 60 71 59 338 Source: SPF Justice 233. In general, the level of outgoing requests is fairly low, which does not seem to be linked to the transnational nature of ML cases put forward by Belgium, but should be seen in the light of the small number of complex cases with foreign ramifications giving rise to prosecutions (see IO.7). [92] The vast majority of requests are sent to European countries. Since 2019, demand for European Investigation Orders (EIOs) has grown, with significant increases in 2021 and 2023, probably due to an acceleration of cases linked to offsetting networks, based on better knowledge of these networks and their European connections, and to cases linked to the Sky ECC cases (see IO.1 and 7). 234. Furthermore, Belgium does not comprehensively map the type of ML cases for which it has requested assistance from its foreign counterparts, especially European ones; nor does it map the category(ies) of predicate offence(s) and the result(s) obtained. This makes it difficult to assess the alignment of Belgium's international cooperation activities with the country's ML risk profile, and the effectiveness of outgoing requests for mutual assistance. Nor does Belgium have sufficient data to assess exchanges of TF-related information with other European countries. Belgium’s biggest partners in TF matters are France, the Netherlands and Germany. 235. Outside the EU, the countries to which Belgium has issued the most requests for mutual assistance are Switzerland (32), Morocco (31), the United States (19), the United Kingdom (15), Turkey (14), the UAE (13) and Albania (12). The list of these countries reflects the mapping of cases and issues linked to international cooperation cited by Belgium (see below). On average, a Belgian request for mutual legal assistance takes 294 days to be implemented (the median period is 145 days). 236. Certain examples cited by both the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the district public prosecutor's offices (see IO.8, box on the Clown case) demonstrate the Belgian authorities’ ability to handle complex ML cases and/or trace ML networks, notably by participating in international cooperation initiatives, both within and outside the EU. International letters rogatory, requests for mutual assistance for investigative purposes, and requests for joint action in the field (“joint action days”) have produced results in major cases involving ML in offsetting or tax fraud proceedings. However, in the absence of comprehensive data for all public prosecutors' offices in ML cases, it is unclear whether international cooperation measures are being implemented systematically, particularly for cases managed by district public prosecutors' offices outside Brussels. [93] In connection with the observations made on the prosecution of ML (see IO.7), a lack of available resources hinders the Belgian judicial authorities’ systematic pursuit of these international ramifications. 237. Joint investigation teams (JITs) are regularly assigned to ML matters, mainly with neighbouring countries, which facilitates the consultation of statements/reports (“ procès-verbaux ”) and the performance of searches and hearings. These joint teams have proved useful in strategically important ML cases for Belgium, linked to drug trafficking and tax fraud. JITs have also been created in the TF field, especially with France for obtaining and processing evidence in the investigations linked to the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015 and 2016. 238. However, the Belgian authorities are hampered by the difficulties and slowness of formal judicial cooperation procedures, mainly with non-EU countries. They therefore often make discretionary decisions to prevent the interruption of proceedings due to unmet requests for mutual assistance or lengthy delays causing the limitation period to expire, which is particularly important when the confiscation of goods or products located abroad needs to be envisaged. In some cases, Belgian public prosecutors prefer to report the offences to the competent foreign authorities (“ dénonciations ”), accompanied by the transmission of the complete case file. This strategy, implemented notably with Morocco and Albania, is based on a pragmatic analysis of foreign legal systems and aims to ensure the effective in situ confiscation of criminal assets. This is a practical way to counter impunity, but also to strengthen bilateral cooperation by relying on national legal frameworks that are sometimes better adapted to certain offences or to the location of the assets to be seized. 239. The available data shows that Belgium submits far more requests to non-European countries than it receives (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 above), which shows that despite the difficulties, the judicial authorities are attempting to use international cooperation as an aid to resolve cases. Belgium is also actively striving to overcome these obstacles through various initiatives. SPF Justice has renegotiated or is in the process of renegotiating a number of bilateral agreements in the field of financial crime with key countries in order to extend the areas covered. This applies to Morocco, which is one of the countries to which Belgium submits the most requests for mutual assistance, particularly in relation to drug trafficking and asset confiscation (see below). 240. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office also cooperates with SPF Justice to resolve structural problems that hinder or limit international cooperation. A special unit has been created at the Federal Prosecutor's Office to foster more agile and productive international cooperation. This unit consists of four people, two of whom work part-time, which seems insufficient. Nevertheless, one example of this joint undertaking has been the identification of four high-priority countries as (presumed) safe havens for drug traffickers and for the funds resulting from the offences: Albania, Turkey, the UAE and Morocco. Action has been taken with each of these countries to find solutions. For example, the Federal Prosecutor's Office has signed a memorandum of understanding with its Albanian counterpart and the prosecutor's office specialising in organised crime and corruption. Two visits took place in 2024 to gain a better understanding of the legal framework and practices likely to achieve the best confiscation results. This approach has not yet produced concrete results, but it should help to improve and speed up the processing of Belgian requests. Also see the approaches adopted with the UAE (extradition) and Morocco (confiscation) below. 241. In the same vein, and to facilitate faster and more effective cooperation with the United States, another key partner of Belgium, a specialised cooperation unit has been set up at the Federal Prosecutor's Office. The members of this unit (specialised lawyers, investigating judges (“ juges d’instruction ”) and magistrates) have been trained by their US counterparts to help improve their understanding of their expectations and procedures, and of the specific formal requirements of the requests they receive. 242. A similar approach has been adopted in the field of terrorism/TF – notably with Iraq – to improve the gathering of evidence. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office has been involved in the Military Intelligence Services ( Services de renseignement militaire – SGRS) initiative to establish a dialogue with the authorities. The Federal Prosecutor's Office hosted an Iraqi delegation of judges, police officers and members of intelligence services in 2021 to explain the ongoing investigations into terrorism and TF and to sign concrete agreements on further cooperation. Following this visit, the Iraqi authorities spontaneously exchanged information on an ongoing TF investigation. 243. The Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, SPF Justice and SPF Foreign Affairs are also taking joint action, including by organising formal, high-level missions (“ missions protocolaires ”) involving the Prosecutor General to pave the way for more effective operational cooperation and make progress on judicial matters. This approach has produced positive results, as with Brazil, for example, in the Clown case. [94] 244. The Belgian authorities also exchange information with their counterparts on a regular basis, outside formal procedures but within the European framework for mutual assistance in criminal matters. [95] These discussions help to clarify requests quickly, resolve ambiguities and speed up the overall process, resulting in faster and better-quality formal police and judicial cooperation. In this way, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office maintains a close dialogue and spontaneously exchanges information with its French, Dutch and German counterparts on TF matters, and also organises regular bilateral contacts. These close contacts have proved particularly valuable in times of crisis, particularly during the terrorist attacks of 2015/2016. They have also been useful in connection with the “Syrian wallet” case, notably by providing the basis for launching investigations (see IO.9). Box 2.2. Cristo case Agencies involved: The CTIF, an investigating judge (“juge d’instruction”) at the Brussels Court of First Instance (Tribunal de première instance – TPI), the Spanish FIU, and the investigating and prosecuting authorities of the countries concerned. Facts: Based on information contained in suspicious transaction reports (STRs), the CTIF wished to conduct a more detailed analysis of the activities of a Spanish law firm, which appeared to operate as a collection, transfer and reinvestment centre for funds of dubious origin, including EUR 13 million from a group of companies based in Belgium whose actual activities were inconsistent with the financial flows they handled, and which appeared to be controlled by a criminal organisation actively engaged in money laundering. Thanks to the information received from CTIF, the case was referred to an investigating judge at the Brussels Court of First Instance, who sent seven requests for European mutual assistance and eight additional requests, all of which were answered. Three international letters rogatory were also sent to Morocco, the UK and the UAE. Simultaneous searches were conducted in Spain and Belgium. IO.2 relevance : The mutual assistance requests required for the investigation were sent to all parties that were able to provide information, in accordance with the mutual assistance procedures in force within and outside the EU. Results : International cooperation was essential in order to obtain information and justify the inconsistency in invoices noted by the CTIF. The analyses identified the network and its cross-border interconnections. Some of the law firm's Moroccan clients have been subject to tax reassessments in their own countries. The presence of a liaison judge in Morocco produced results, but required numerous follow-ups. The case is still under investigation. 2.2.2. Extradition 245. Belgium issued 80 European arrest warrants (EAWs) between 2019 and 2024. Requests for these EAWs are increasing and remain at a higher level than incoming applications, which confirms that offenders are fleeing the country. Belgium lacks sufficient data on the predicate offence category(ies) and on the results of its EAWs to assess the effectiveness of its actions and their alignment with the country's ML/TF risk exposure. However, the Belgian judicial authorities attest to the generally rapid implementation of these requests due to the application of a simplified procedure. 246. Belgium reported 25 extradition requests to non-EU countries between 2019 and 2024, ranging from 0 in 2020 (health crisis) to 8 in 2023, all concerning ML offences. Nine were granted and led to an effective surrender; 13 are currently being processed, accompanied in most cases by arrests and ongoing legal proceedings in the executing country; three were refused – one because priority was given to a European arrest warrant issued by France, where the person was extradited, and the two others because the wanted persons had left the territory of the executing country. On average, it takes 225 days for a request to be implemented (median 138 days), which seems satisfactory. 247. Eleven of these 25 requests were sent to the UAE. Belgium has taken steps to facilitate these procedures. Several missions have been carried out by Belgium and regular meetings have been held with the Emirati authorities to gain a better understanding of the local judicial system and overcome the difficulties associated with blocked extraditions, and with requests to identify and locate assets in asset investigations that may lead to confiscation. A judge specialising in international cooperation with the UAE has been appointed to the Federal Prosecutor's Office. These measures have led to four extraditions for offences relating to financial crime since the extradition treaty was signed in 2021. 2.2.3. Identification, freezing, seizing, confiscation and sharing of criminal assets 248. The Belgian authorities lack detailed information about requests for mutual assistance relating specifically to the temporary or permanent immobilisation of goods or products located abroad, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of international cooperation activities in this matter and their alignment with the country's risks. However, they stress that this area poses some of the greatest difficulties in judicial matters, which are often resolved by reporting the offences to the competent foreign authorities (“ dénonciations” , see above). 249. To make headway in this matter, Belgium has implemented measures, as with Morocco, which is one of the countries to which Belgium issues the most mutual assistance requests for the confiscation of assets, notably linked to drug trafficking (around 40 per year). A memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation and facilitate “ dénonciations” was signed in October 2024: seven of the 14 transmitted in recent years have been processed, four have led to convictions in Morocco, three of them with confiscations; three have led to dismissal or acquittal and one is still being processed. The bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance between Belgium and Morocco is being extended to cover asset confiscations. This should notably enable the authorities to go beyond the hitherto applicable freezing/seizure measures, and lead to the confiscation, in Belgium’s favour – of property or real estate that could not previously be confiscated by the Belgian authorities. Belgium’s only liaison judge posted abroad has also been appointed in Morocco. 250. The sharing of criminal assets and confiscated property with the countries concerned is carried out in accordance with European rules (shared equally when the amount of the confiscation exceeds EUR10,000) and in accordance with the applicable international conventions with non-EU countries (see IO.8). Footnotes [92] However, these figures should be interpreted with caution, given the judicial authorities’ difficulty in extracting statistics due to the absence of a central system for monitoring requests in the EU and the current coding system, which automatically records the main qualification only. [93] Analysis based on a sample of ML cases reported by Belgium. [94] Belgium has also drawn on the EMPACT project to provide resources for implementing and running judicial coordination. 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BNB has refined its approach to identifying ML threats and risks through its Sectoral Risk Analysis (SRA), updated in July 2023. The 2023 SRA, which is more detailed than the 2020 version, includes for the first time an assessment of the risk of TF and incorporates new emerging risks identified in the national ML risk assessment (ML NRA) (see IO.1). Among the trends identified, the emergence of e-IBANs is a major development, facilitating cross-border transactions but also making them more difficult to trace, thereby increasing the risk of misuse. Similarly, increasing attention is paid to the rise of virtual assets, although the BNB has not been at the forefront of this issue, which was the responsibility of the FSMA until 30 December 2024. 304. In addition, the BNB identifies other significant trends in ML risk, such as correspondent banking, which remains an exposed activity as it enables cross-border transactions which involve multiple banks and are often opaque. The impact of Brexit is also a concern, with the arrival on the Belgian market of a greater number of operators from the United Kingdom, which has required an adaptation of the supervisory framework to prevent potential compliance breaches. Finally, digital transformation is seen as a factor bringing about profound change in the financial sector, particularly with the emergence of new operators and services and the growing adoption of practices such as digital onboarding, which poses an increased challenge in terms of checking customer identity and monitoring transactions. 305. These advances in risk identification strengthen the BNB’s ability to anticipate risks, but certain limitations persist. The assessment of ML/TF threats is not explicitly included in the SRA, as the BNB has chosen to focus on the internal vulnerabilities of FIs, which are considered more directly actionable. This approach had already been adopted in the first SRA and therefore focuses on correcting compliance failures within FIs rather than on a quantitative assessment of the external threat. 306. While this approach provides a better understanding of the vulnerabilities specific to the sector, it remains incomplete in the absence of a more integrated threat analysis that also takes into account external developments and criminal modus operandi. Furthermore, the SRA does not establish a clear link between the risks identified and the types of FIs or services concerned. This limits its operational scope and makes it difficult to tailor supervision to the specific risk level of each segment. As a result, although well structured, the SRA remains largely theoretical and not particularly operational. 307. Certain risks, such as correspondent banking, are well identified, but their actual impact in Belgium is not clearly explained, which limits the relevance of mitigating measures. Cyclical risks, such as those related to Brexit or FinTechs, are only addressed generally, without specific figures or concrete examples to assess their real impact on ML/TF risks. For example, the section on money transfer services, which is considered a high-risk activity, contains approximations and does not provide sufficient detail on the specific money laundering patterns identified through the inspections carried out. On the other hand, certain issues, such as the use of cash, are analysed in greater depth and better illustrated, demonstrating that a more factual and documented approach is already being implemented in some areas and should be extended to others. 308. Better integration of data from the BNB’s AML/CFT supervisory actions and information reported by FIs would make this assessment more concrete and useful. While the formalisation of a framework for exchanges between the BNB and the CTIF in 2019 represents progress in light of the conclusions of the FATF’s 2015 Mutual Evaluation, greater cooperation with the CTIF, law enforcement agencies and other competent authorities, particularly on virtual assets and cross-border financial services, would improve anticipation of risks and the adjustment of supervisory measures. Such a development would ensure a more dynamic and responsive approach, better aligned with the realities on the ground and the proven challenges in the area of AML/CFT. 309. As part of its supervisory approach, the BNB carries out horizontal thematic actions aimed at deepening its understanding of FI risks. A notable example of this approach is the action taken on de-risking, which followed the publication in February 2022 of a circular incorporating the AML/CFT issues related to this problem. This type of initiative provides a structured framework for FIs and clarifies their expectations. A similar approach was adopted for asset repatriations (often involving large amounts), with a horizontal action carried out off-site in 2020 to assess the due diligence measures applied by FIs active in wealth management and the issue of single-premium life insurance contracts. This analysis led to the publication of a circular in 2021 formalising the expected best practices. In 2024, a horizontal action specific to correspondent banking was also carried out, in line with the BNB’s desire to assess the specific vulnerabilities of this activity in greater depth. 310. However, the BNB could strengthen its understanding of ML/TF risks through more frequent and structured exchanges directly with FIs. Certain risks, such as those related to high-risk situations in the context of basic banking services, are insufficiently identified and analysed, limiting the effective support provided to FIs in managing their risks and adjusting their preventive measures. In this regard, despite the obligation for FIs to inform the BNB of updates to their overall risk assessments, this is not accompanied by a more regular dialogue focused on risks. 311. The BNB requires each FI under its supervision to provide it with its updated assessment of risk(EGR) on an annual basis. The BNB conducted a horizontal review of these EGRs in 2018-2019. This was followed by the publication of a communication specifying the BNB’s expectations in this respect (January 2020). 312. The BNB develops risk profiles for each FI and assigns them a risk score based on a periodic AML/CFT questionnaire and the AMLCO report, as well as any events that may have affected the FI during the period under review. These elements are also used for updates. Newly licensed FIs are only assigned an individual profile after these elements have been submitted for the first time, which may lead to a delay in the formal assignment of their risk score. This delays the integration of these entities into the risk-based supervisory framework, even though relevant information has already been collected and analysed during the licensing process. In the absence of an anticipated initial risk score, initial supervisory actions may not be well aligned with the entity’s actual level of risk. 313. The BNB considers that the periodic reporting obligations of FIs, in particular the AML/CFT questionnaire and the updating of the EGR, constitute a significant administrative burden for the FIs under its supervision. It therefore provides for the possibility of exemption at the request of the FI concerned. This exemption (which at the end of 2024 concerned 17 FIs out of the 192 supervised by the BNB, see section 3.5) allows eligible institutions (FIs in the lowest risk categories, medium/low or low risk) not to submit these documents, with the exception of the AMLCO report, which may, however, be simplified. This procedure is part of a specific approach applied to certain FIs, pooled together and subject to lighter supervision, which would appear to be appropriate subject to regular reassessment (see section 3.5). FSMA 314. The FSMA’s first ML/FT SRA was finalised in September 2024 and uses a clear, two-step methodology (inherent risk followed by residual risk) based on a variety of relevant sources (both national and international). It is based in particular on the results of supervision carried out between 2018 and 2023 and on the ML/TF threat assessments described in the ML/TF NRAs. Although the SRA was finalised late, it provides a good quality analysis, identifying risks by sector in a detailed and comprehensive manner. However, the threat, particularly in terms of TF, is not assessed for several types of entity (e.g. mortgage lenders, asset management companies, collective investment scheme managers), which weakens the reliability of the overall analysis and impacts the reliability of the final rating for these entities. 315. In 2022, the FSMA formalised its cooperation with the CTIF regarding the transmission of suspicions of ML/TF revealed during inspections (see IO.6). This is a step towards better risk assessment in the sectors supervised. However, although exchanges with the CTIF are direct, they remain insufficiently developed, which limits alignment between the NRA and sectoral analyses. As a result, currency exchange offices are considered high risk in the FSMA’s SRA, while the NRA, based on a different methodology and external sources not available to the FSMA, classifies them as moderate risk. 316. The FSMA uses risk assessment models (an automated model or a semi-automated Excel model based on five risk categories) to assign an individual risk score to each FI. These assessment methods differ depending on the sectors supervised, allowing them to be adapted to the specific characteristics of each sector. However, the lack of convergence between these approaches limits the ability to obtain a comprehensive and consistent view of the risks. The work in which the FSMA is involved at European level aims to remedy this fragmentation in methodology. 317. Individual risk assessments are mainly based on periodic questionnaires sent to FIs via FiMiS, a tool that enables automated processing. For insurance intermediaries and social lenders, including those that no longer grant new loans, the risk profile is reviewed every three years. In the intervening years, a sample of around 3,500 to 4,000 entities (i.e. 80% of the 5,000 existing entities) receive a questionnaire, including in particular the major players and those assessed as presenting a risk. This approach, although based on the number of entities concerned rather than a strict risk-based approach, would appear to be appropriate. 318. The FSMA uses these periodic questionnaires to assess, among other things, the implementation of ML/TF risk mitigating measures by FIs. However, these responses are only subject to occasional monitoring, which limits the FSMA’s ability to monitor changes in residual risk in a consistent manner. 319. The FSMA does not require the FIs under its supervision to send it their updated ORAs, which prevents it from ensuring that the risks are properly understood. In principle, off-site compliance inspections include an analysis of the FI’s ORA. FSMA’s understanding of the risks faced by FIs varies greatly and is sometimes insufficient, making a more systematic analysis of risk assessment necessary, rather than waiting for an off-site compliance inspection to be carried out. 320. FSMA also relies on AMLCO reports to identify and monitor ML/TF risks in its sectors. However, although these reports are required annually, they are not systematically analysed, thus limiting their contribution to the understanding of risks. In 2024, only 275 reports were reviewed for 5,550 FIs under supervision, limiting the FSMA’s ability to identify trends and adjust its supervision in line with the vulnerabilities detected. To remedy this, the FSMA plans to develop an automated tool, inspired by FiMiS, to improve the use of this data and strengthen its risk-based approach. 321. The risk score generated by the risk analysis tool can be adjusted based on other factors, such as the results of inspections, information received from other authorities (in particular the BNB and the CTIF), or data from the press. Risk and mitigation factors are weighted according to their importance and relevance. This flexible methodology would appear to be well suited to ensuring a more detailed risk assessment tailored to the realities on the ground. 322. In 2023, the FSMA applied for the first time a procedure for FIs that did not respond to their periodic questionnaire, including suspension and then removal from the register in the event of non-response after formal notice. Although time-consuming due to the large number of FIs concerned (3,939 in 2023), this process proved to be effective in encouraging FIs to comply with this obligation. 323. With regard to VASPs, the FSMA demonstrated a good understanding of the risks associated with these entities, albeit based on limited activities in this area (see introductory paragraph to IO3 and section 3.1 above). The FSMA included VASPs in its 2024 SRA, without however assessing the residual risk associated with this activity, and based part of its expertise on the examination of applications for listing in the VASP register during the transitional period (see above). These activities enabled it to gain a better understanding of the specific business model of each VASP applicant and to better grasp the technological and legal issues related to virtual assets. The FSMA also benefited from exchanges and training with the judicial police. The absence of active service providers in this area and the uncertainties surrounding the future supervisory authority for VASPs in the country do nothing to help maintain advanced expertise in a field that requires constant updating of technical knowledge that is rapidly evolving. SPF Finance - Treasury 324. The product-specific risk analysis distributed by Bpost, carried out in 2020 by SPF Finance/Treasury, produced appropriate conclusions, although the depth of the analysis remained limited. In particular, this analysis concludes that there is a significant residual risk for payments to third-party accounts, payments to government postal accounts and Bpaid prepaid cards, mainly due to the use of cash, which is central to these financial products and services. The use of cash is also identified as the main risk to which Bpost is exposed, which would appear to be relevant and is clearly identified in the NRA. However, the different types of service offered by Bpost in relation to payments into third-party accounts are less clearly identified in the NRA. The risks associated with Bpaid prepaid cards are considered by the NRA to be lower due to the relative lack of anonymity, although this circumstance is considered to have no impact on risk by the risk analysis of Bpost products. The TF risk associated with these cards is nevertheless identified by both analyses. The risks associated with the substantial amounts that can be loaded onto each card (EUR 8,000, with each customer able to hold three cards) and the possibility of withdrawals from foreign ATMs do not appear to be sufficiently identified in the product risk analysis carried out by SPF Finance/Treasury. 325. Quarterly meetings are held between SPF Finance/Treasury and Bpost to discuss risks and trends in this area. Annual discussions are held with CTIF on trends and new types of ML/TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BNB 303. BNB has refined its approach to identifying ML threats and risks through its Sectoral Risk Analysis (SRA), updated in July 2023. The 2023 SRA, which is more detailed than the 2020 version, includes for the first time an assessment of the risk of TF and incorporates new emerging risks identified in the national ML risk assessment (ML NRA) (see IO.1). Among the trends identified, the emergence of e-IBANs is a major development, facilitating cross-border transactions but also making them more difficult to trace, thereby increasing the risk of misuse. Similarly, increasing attention is paid to the rise of virtual assets, although the BNB has not been at the forefront of this issue, which was the responsibility of the FSMA until 30 December 2024. 304. In addition, the BNB identifies other significant trends in ML risk, such as correspondent banking, which remains an exposed activity as it enables cross-border transactions which involve multiple banks and are often opaque. The impact of Brexit is also a concern, with the arrival on the Belgian market of a greater number of operators from the United Kingdom, which has required an adaptation of the supervisory framework to prevent potential compliance breaches. Finally, digital transformation is seen as a factor bringing about profound change in the financial sector, particularly with the emergence of new operators and services and the growing adoption of practices such as digital onboarding, which poses an increased challenge in terms of checking customer identity and monitoring transactions. 305. These advances in risk identification strengthen the BNB’s ability to anticipate risks, but certain limitations persist. The assessment of ML/TF threats is not explicitly included in the SRA, as the BNB has chosen to focus on the internal vulnerabilities of FIs, which are considered more directly actionable. This approach had already been adopted in the first SRA and therefore focuses on correcting compliance failures within FIs rather than on a quantitative assessment of the external threat. 306. While this approach provides a better understanding of the vulnerabilities specific to the sector, it remains incomplete in the absence of a more integrated threat analysis that also takes into account external developments and criminal modus operandi. Furthermore, the SRA does not establish a clear link between the risks identified and the types of FIs or services concerned. This limits its operational scope and makes it difficult to tailor supervision to the specific risk level of each segment. As a result, although well structured, the SRA remains largely theoretical and not particularly operational. 307. Certain risks, such as correspondent banking, are well identified, but their actual impact in Belgium is not clearly explained, which limits the relevance of mitigating measures. Cyclical risks, such as those related to Brexit or FinTechs, are only addressed generally, without specific figures or concrete examples to assess their real impact on ML/TF risks. For example, the section on money transfer services, which is considered a high-risk activity, contains approximations and does not provide sufficient detail on the specific money laundering patterns identified through the inspections carried out. On the other hand, certain issues, such as the use of cash, are analysed in greater depth and better illustrated, demonstrating that a more factual and documented approach is already being implemented in some areas and should be extended to others. 308. Better integration of data from the BNB’s AML/CFT supervisory actions and information reported by FIs would make this assessment more concrete and useful. While the formalisation of a framework for exchanges between the BNB and the CTIF in 2019 represents progress in light of the conclusions of the FATF’s 2015 Mutual Evaluation, greater cooperation with the CTIF, law enforcement agencies and other competent authorities, particularly on virtual assets and cross-border financial services, would improve anticipation of risks and the adjustment of supervisory measures. Such a development would ensure a more dynamic and responsive approach, better aligned with the realities on the ground and the proven challenges in the area of AML/CFT. 309. As part of its supervisory approach, the BNB carries out horizontal thematic actions aimed at deepening its understanding of FI risks. A notable example of this approach is the action taken on de-risking, which followed the publication in February 2022 of a circular incorporating the AML/CFT issues related to this problem. This type of initiative provides a structured framework for FIs and clarifies their expectations. A similar approach was adopted for asset repatriations (often involving large amounts), with a horizontal action carried out off-site in 2020 to assess the due diligence measures applied by FIs active in wealth management and the issue of single-premium life insurance contracts. This analysis led to the publication of a circular in 2021 formalising the expected best practices. In 2024, a horizontal action specific to correspondent banking was also carried out, in line with the BNB’s desire to assess the specific vulnerabilities of this activity in greater depth. 310. However, the BNB could strengthen its understanding of ML/TF risks through more frequent and structured exchanges directly with FIs. Certain risks, such as those related to high-risk situations in the context of basic banking services, are insufficiently identified and analysed, limiting the effective support provided to FIs in managing their risks and adjusting their preventive measures. In this regard, despite the obligation for FIs to inform the BNB of updates to their overall risk assessments, this is not accompanied by a more regular dialogue focused on risks. 311. The BNB requires each FI under its supervision to provide it with its updated assessment of risk(EGR) on an annual basis. The BNB conducted a horizontal review of these EGRs in 2018-2019. This was followed by the publication of a communication specifying the BNB’s expectations in this respect (January 2020). 312. The BNB develops risk profiles for each FI and assigns them a risk score based on a periodic AML/CFT questionnaire and the AMLCO report, as well as any events that may have affected the FI during the period under review. These elements are also used for updates. Newly licensed FIs are only assigned an individual profile after these elements have been submitted for the first time, which may lead to a delay in the formal assignment of their risk score. This delays the integration of these entities into the risk-based supervisory framework, even though relevant information has already been collected and analysed during the licensing process. In the absence of an anticipated initial risk score, initial supervisory actions may not be well aligned with the entity’s actual level of risk. 313. The BNB considers that the periodic reporting obligations of FIs, in particular the AML/CFT questionnaire and the updating of the EGR, constitute a significant administrative burden for the FIs under its supervision. It therefore provides for the possibility of exemption at the request of the FI concerned. This exemption (which at the end of 2024 concerned 17 FIs out of the 192 supervised by the BNB, see section 3.5) allows eligible institutions (FIs in the lowest risk categories, medium/low or low risk) not to submit these documents, with the exception of the AMLCO report, which may, however, be simplified. This procedure is part of a specific approach applied to certain FIs, pooled together and subject to lighter supervision, which would appear to be appropriate subject to regular reassessment (see section 3.5). FSMA 314. The FSMA’s first ML/FT SRA was finalised in September 2024 and uses a clear, two-step methodology (inherent risk followed by residual risk) based on a variety of relevant sources (both national and international). It is based in particular on the results of supervision carried out between 2018 and 2023 and on the ML/TF threat assessments described in the ML/TF NRAs. Although the SRA was finalised late, it provides a good quality analysis, identifying risks by sector in a detailed and comprehensive manner. However, the threat, particularly in terms of TF, is not assessed for several types of entity (e.g. mortgage lenders, asset management companies, collective investment scheme managers), which weakens the reliability of the overall analysis and impacts the reliability of the final rating for these entities. 315. In 2022, the FSMA formalised its cooperation with the CTIF regarding the transmission of suspicions of ML/TF revealed during inspections (see IO.6). This is a step towards better risk assessment in the sectors supervised. However, although exchanges with the CTIF are direct, they remain insufficiently developed, which limits alignment between the NRA and sectoral analyses. As a result, currency exchange offices are considered high risk in the FSMA’s SRA, while the NRA, based on a different methodology and external sources not available to the FSMA, classifies them as moderate risk. 316. The FSMA uses risk assessment models (an automated model or a semi-automated Excel model based on five risk categories) to assign an individual risk score to each FI. These assessment methods differ depending on the sectors supervised, allowing them to be adapted to the specific characteristics of each sector. However, the lack of convergence between these approaches limits the ability to obtain a comprehensive and consistent view of the risks. The work in which the FSMA is involved at European level aims to remedy this fragmentation in methodology. 317. Individual risk assessments are mainly based on periodic questionnaires sent to FIs via FiMiS, a tool that enables automated processing. For insurance intermediaries and social lenders, including those that no longer grant new loans, the risk profile is reviewed every three years. In the intervening years, a sample of around 3,500 to 4,000 entities (i.e. 80% of the 5,000 existing entities) receive a questionnaire, including in particular the major players and those assessed as presenting a risk. This approach, although based on the number of entities concerned rather than a strict risk-based approach, would appear to be appropriate. 318. The FSMA uses these periodic questionnaires to assess, among other things, the implementation of ML/TF risk mitigating measures by FIs. However, these responses are only subject to occasional monitoring, which limits the FSMA’s ability to monitor changes in residual risk in a consistent manner. 319. The FSMA does not require the FIs under its supervision to send it their updated ORAs, which prevents it from ensuring that the risks are properly understood. In principle, off-site compliance inspections include an analysis of the FI’s ORA. FSMA’s understanding of the risks faced by FIs varies greatly and is sometimes insufficient, making a more systematic analysis of risk assessment necessary, rather than waiting for an off-site compliance inspection to be carried out. 320. FSMA also relies on AMLCO reports to identify and monitor ML/TF risks in its sectors. However, although these reports are required annually, they are not systematically analysed, thus limiting their contribution to the understanding of risks. In 2024, only 275 reports were reviewed for 5,550 FIs under supervision, limiting the FSMA’s ability to identify trends and adjust its supervision in line with the vulnerabilities detected. To remedy this, the FSMA plans to develop an automated tool, inspired by FiMiS, to improve the use of this data and strengthen its risk-based approach. 321. The risk score generated by the risk analysis tool can be adjusted based on other factors, such as the results of inspections, information received from other authorities (in particular the BNB and the CTIF), or data from the press. Risk and mitigation factors are weighted according to their importance and relevance. This flexible methodology would appear to be well suited to ensuring a more detailed risk assessment tailored to the realities on the ground. 322. In 2023, the FSMA applied for the first time a procedure for FIs that did not respond to their periodic questionnaire, including suspension and then removal from the register in the event of non-response after formal notice. Although time-consuming due to the large number of FIs concerned (3,939 in 2023), this process proved to be effective in encouraging FIs to comply with this obligation. 323. With regard to VASPs, the FSMA demonstrated a good understanding of the risks associated with these entities, albeit based on limited activities in this area (see introductory paragraph to IO3 and section 3.1 above). The FSMA included VASPs in its 2024 SRA, without however assessing the residual risk associated with this activity, and based part of its expertise on the examination of applications for listing in the VASP register during the transitional period (see above). These activities enabled it to gain a better understanding of the specific business model of each VASP applicant and to better grasp the technological and legal issues related to virtual assets. The FSMA also benefited from exchanges and training with the judicial police. The absence of active service providers in this area and the uncertainties surrounding the future supervisory authority for VASPs in the country do nothing to help maintain advanced expertise in a field that requires constant updating of technical knowledge that is rapidly evolving. SPF Finance - Treasury 324. The product-specific risk analysis distributed by Bpost, carried out in 2020 by SPF Finance/Treasury, produced appropriate conclusions, although the depth of the analysis remained limited. In particular, this analysis concludes that there is a significant residual risk for payments to third-party accounts, payments to government postal accounts and Bpaid prepaid cards, mainly due to the use of cash, which is central to these financial products and services. The use of cash is also identified as the main risk to which Bpost is exposed, which would appear to be relevant and is clearly identified in the NRA. However, the different types of service offered by Bpost in relation to payments into third-party accounts are less clearly identified in the NRA. The risks associated with Bpaid prepaid cards are considered by the NRA to be lower due to the relative lack of anonymity, although this circumstance is considered to have no impact on risk by the risk analysis of Bpost products. The TF risk associated with these cards is nevertheless identified by both analyses. The risks associated with the substantial amounts that can be loaded onto each card (EUR 8,000, with each customer able to hold three cards) and the possibility of withdrawals from foreign ATMs do not appear to be sufficiently identified in the product risk analysis carried out by SPF Finance/Treasury. 325. Quarterly meetings are held between SPF Finance/Treasury and Bpost to discuss risks and trends in this area. Annual discussions are held with CTIF on trends and new types of ML/TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="415. The effectiveness of the Belgian authorities in identifying and understanding ML/TF risks varies according to the sectors of the DNFBP. While the supervisory authorities for diamond dealers and casinos have a good understanding of ML risks, this understanding is more limited in other sectors, particularly among SRBs. The risks of TF remain poorly understood overall, and awareness-raising efforts remain insufficient, which weakens their ability to detect and prevent offences (see section 4.3). 416. SPF Economy has a very good understanding of ML/TF risks related to diamond dealers, thanks to the use of data from licences, annual reports and strict controls on shipments and imports. However, the lack of AML/CFT resources within SPF Economy (see section4.3) limits the dissemination of this understanding to reporting entities. Outreach initiatives are insufficient. Furthermore, national and sectoral risk analyses do not yet appear to have had any significant impact on the sector. 417. SPF Economy has a good basic understanding of the risks in the real estate agent sector. Risk analysis is mainly based on information from the sector, including the general survey [121] conducted in 2021 (see below) and data from the police, the CTIF, the Chamber of Notaries and open sources. It is supplemented by information on consumer protection. 418. The authorities are aware of certain specific risks, in particular the overvaluation and undervaluation of property. They also understand the ML risks arising from large-scale real estate transactions that escape the traditional intermediation channels, in particular acquisitions made through integrated real estate companies, where the final purchaser does not use a notary, estate agent or Belgian financial institution. However, real estate agencies operating internationally and certain specialised services, such as B2B, are less well understood as they are not widely monitored. This situation is mainly due to a lack of staff dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. SPF Economy and the IPI promote AML/CFT obligations to a certain extent, but these efforts remain limited. Although the 2023 ML NAR has been distributed to real estate agents, understanding of the risks in the sector remains variable. The IPI has also developed a detailed manual and an IT risk analysis tool (ORIS), but these resources appear to be little used. 419. Since the sector became subject to AML/CFT requirements in 2018, SPF Economy has increased its understanding of the ML/TF risks of business centres . This assessment is based on several sources, including a sector survey conducted in 2022, and government data (in particular with police services as part of the BELFI project [122] – see IO.9). The analysis takes into account key factors such as turnover, number of domiciled customers, bankruptcies, dissolutions and address changes. The authorities estimate that around 40% of registered business centres present a significant or high risk. They also recognise the significant ML risks associated with illegal service providers, particularly due to their potential role in providing addresses to inactive or shell companies. Given the lack of human resources dedicated to AML/CFT, SPF Economy is forced to prioritise the identification of illegal operators (those not registered) at the expense of outreach to registered service providers. As a result, efforts to promote a better understanding of the risks in the sector remain in their infancy. 420. SRBs in the legal and accounting professions generally have a limited and fragmented understanding of ML/TF risks, based mainly on the NRA and ad hoc observations. Only the ITAA has a structured framework, with over ten years of analysis based on a variety of sources, including AML investigations and quality controls. Using these tools, the ITAA identifies between 250 and 300 high-risk members (chartered accountants) and provides a risk standard for its reporting entities. 421. The National Chamber of Notaries strengthened its understanding of ML/TF risks in 2021 by commissioning an academic to carry out an SRA. This study highlighted underestimated vulnerabilities, particularly those related to the creation of companies, and enabled the notarial authorities to better understand the extent of the risks to which the profession is exposed. However, this analysis has not been updated or integrated into a sector-specific methodology to monitor risks on an ongoing basis. The Chamber nevertheless takes into account CTIF publications to improve its understanding of the risks. While the National Chamber of Notaries is engaged in outreach efforts through the 2021 SRA and certain training activities, regulated entities have expressed a growing need for regular updates to better monitor developments in ML/TF risks. 422. For lawyers , the bars have a limited and outdated view of ML/TF risks, identifying certain risks related to quality accounts and considering that large firms are less exposed than small firms, thanks to stricter internal procedures. However, their approach does not follow a systematic analysis methodology and is based more on ad hoc findings than on a genuine analysis of vulnerabilities. In addition, the bars have not yet incorporated the 2023 NRA into their risk assessments, as they only received it at the end of 2024. Their analytical framework is therefore still based on the 2019 NRA, which limits their ability to identify recent developments in ML/TF patterns. The lack of a structured framework for monitoring and analysing trends makes it difficult to accurately assess how risks evolve over time and therefore constitutes a significant weakness in the ML/TF risk management for this profession. 423. The CJH has a very good understanding of ML/TF risks in the casino and other gambling sector, thanks to a sectoral analysis completed in September 2024, although this had not yet been published at the time of the visit. Its approach is based on a detailed analysis of the risks associated with different products, customer types and the interactions between them. Strict mitigating measures are in place, including a ban on current accounts for players, control of chips and transactions, and enhanced monitoring of high-risk profiles (such as PEPs whose identity cannot be verified). 424. The CJH maintains ongoing risk assessment, with formal discussions with operators twice a year and operational discussions three to four times a year. It also plays an active role in outreach to reporting entities, organising eight training sessions (four per official language) in 2024 for 1,100 people. The guidance (White Paper) – currently being developed – is not yet available to gaming operators, who have expressed a growing need for clear guidelines, suggesting that support could be improved. 425. Finally, the Audit Oversight Board (BAOB) has an adequate understanding of the risks associated with auditors , which is proportionate to the (limited) ML risk to which the sector is exposed. The BAOB conducts annual surveys on ML among auditors and prepares annual individual risk assessments, and conducted a sectoral risk analysis in 2022. Statutory auditors receive annual information on risks and typologies from the BAOB. The BAOB has also published a tool on its website to help auditors carry out risk assessments. Auditors also have access to a manual published by the professional organisation, the Institute of Statutory Auditors (IRE). Footnotes [121] A general survey is a control measure used by SPF Economy that involves collecting and analysing information on the implementation of obligations from all entities subject to them in a given sector, see section 4.5 [122] The BELFI project is a project to combat fraud through enhanced cooperation between judicial, tax and administrative authorities (see box under IO.10)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="415. The effectiveness of the Belgian authorities in identifying and understanding ML/TF risks varies according to the sectors of the DNFBP. While the supervisory authorities for diamond dealers and casinos have a good understanding of ML risks, this understanding is more limited in other sectors, particularly among SRBs. The risks of TF remain poorly understood overall, and awareness-raising efforts remain insufficient, which weakens their ability to detect and prevent offences (see section 4.3). 416. SPF Economy has a very good understanding of ML/TF risks related to diamond dealers, thanks to the use of data from licences, annual reports and strict controls on shipments and imports. However, the lack of AML/CFT resources within SPF Economy (see section4.3) limits the dissemination of this understanding to reporting entities. Outreach initiatives are insufficient. Furthermore, national and sectoral risk analyses do not yet appear to have had any significant impact on the sector. 417. SPF Economy has a good basic understanding of the risks in the real estate agent sector. Risk analysis is mainly based on information from the sector, including the general survey [121] conducted in 2021 (see below) and data from the police, the CTIF, the Chamber of Notaries and open sources. It is supplemented by information on consumer protection. 418. The authorities are aware of certain specific risks, in particular the overvaluation and undervaluation of property. They also understand the ML risks arising from large-scale real estate transactions that escape the traditional intermediation channels, in particular acquisitions made through integrated real estate companies, where the final purchaser does not use a notary, estate agent or Belgian financial institution. However, real estate agencies operating internationally and certain specialised services, such as B2B, are less well understood as they are not widely monitored. This situation is mainly due to a lack of staff dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. SPF Economy and the IPI promote AML/CFT obligations to a certain extent, but these efforts remain limited. Although the 2023 ML NAR has been distributed to real estate agents, understanding of the risks in the sector remains variable. The IPI has also developed a detailed manual and an IT risk analysis tool (ORIS), but these resources appear to be little used. 419. Since the sector became subject to AML/CFT requirements in 2018, SPF Economy has increased its understanding of the ML/TF risks of business centres . This assessment is based on several sources, including a sector survey conducted in 2022, and government data (in particular with police services as part of the BELFI project [122] – see IO.9). The analysis takes into account key factors such as turnover, number of domiciled customers, bankruptcies, dissolutions and address changes. The authorities estimate that around 40% of registered business centres present a significant or high risk. They also recognise the significant ML risks associated with illegal service providers, particularly due to their potential role in providing addresses to inactive or shell companies. Given the lack of human resources dedicated to AML/CFT, SPF Economy is forced to prioritise the identification of illegal operators (those not registered) at the expense of outreach to registered service providers. As a result, efforts to promote a better understanding of the risks in the sector remain in their infancy. 420. SRBs in the legal and accounting professions generally have a limited and fragmented understanding of ML/TF risks, based mainly on the NRA and ad hoc observations. Only the ITAA has a structured framework, with over ten years of analysis based on a variety of sources, including AML investigations and quality controls. Using these tools, the ITAA identifies between 250 and 300 high-risk members (chartered accountants) and provides a risk standard for its reporting entities. 421. The National Chamber of Notaries strengthened its understanding of ML/TF risks in 2021 by commissioning an academic to carry out an SRA. This study highlighted underestimated vulnerabilities, particularly those related to the creation of companies, and enabled the notarial authorities to better understand the extent of the risks to which the profession is exposed. However, this analysis has not been updated or integrated into a sector-specific methodology to monitor risks on an ongoing basis. The Chamber nevertheless takes into account CTIF publications to improve its understanding of the risks. While the National Chamber of Notaries is engaged in outreach efforts through the 2021 SRA and certain training activities, regulated entities have expressed a growing need for regular updates to better monitor developments in ML/TF risks. 422. For lawyers , the bars have a limited and outdated view of ML/TF risks, identifying certain risks related to quality accounts and considering that large firms are less exposed than small firms, thanks to stricter internal procedures. However, their approach does not follow a systematic analysis methodology and is based more on ad hoc findings than on a genuine analysis of vulnerabilities. In addition, the bars have not yet incorporated the 2023 NRA into their risk assessments, as they only received it at the end of 2024. Their analytical framework is therefore still based on the 2019 NRA, which limits their ability to identify recent developments in ML/TF patterns. The lack of a structured framework for monitoring and analysing trends makes it difficult to accurately assess how risks evolve over time and therefore constitutes a significant weakness in the ML/TF risk management for this profession. 423. The CJH has a very good understanding of ML/TF risks in the casino and other gambling sector, thanks to a sectoral analysis completed in September 2024, although this had not yet been published at the time of the visit. Its approach is based on a detailed analysis of the risks associated with different products, customer types and the interactions between them. Strict mitigating measures are in place, including a ban on current accounts for players, control of chips and transactions, and enhanced monitoring of high-risk profiles (such as PEPs whose identity cannot be verified). 424. The CJH maintains ongoing risk assessment, with formal discussions with operators twice a year and operational discussions three to four times a year. It also plays an active role in outreach to reporting entities, organising eight training sessions (four per official language) in 2024 for 1,100 people. The guidance (White Paper) – currently being developed – is not yet available to gaming operators, who have expressed a growing need for clear guidelines, suggesting that support could be improved. 425. Finally, the Audit Oversight Board (BAOB) has an adequate understanding of the risks associated with auditors , which is proportionate to the (limited) ML risk to which the sector is exposed. The BAOB conducts annual surveys on ML among auditors and prepares annual individual risk assessments, and conducted a sectoral risk analysis in 2022. Statutory auditors receive annual information on risks and typologies from the BAOB. The BAOB has also published a tool on its website to help auditors carry out risk assessments. Auditors also have access to a manual published by the professional organisation, the Institute of Statutory Auditors (IRE). Footnotes [121] A general survey is a control measure used by SPF Economy that involves collecting and analysing information on the implementation of obligations from all entities subject to them in a given sector, see section 4.5 [122] The BELFI project is a project to combat fraud through enhanced cooperation between judicial, tax and administrative authorities (see box under IO.10)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="506. Belgium has adopted a series of measures which, taken together, can to some extent mitigate the risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements for ML/TF purposes. Changes have been made to the legal framework in order to increase the transparency of legal persons and arrangements: (i) the abolition of bearer shares, which was introduced in 2005 came into full effect in January 2014; (ii) access to the central register of financial accounts and contracts (PCC) held by legal persons with Belgian FIs and initially set up in 2011 for tax purposes was extended to AML/CFT authorities in 2018; (iii) convictions of legal persons have been centralised in an criminal record effective since 2016, and (iv) company service providers offering corporate domiciliation services became subject to the AML Law in 2018 (see Rec. 22 in the TC Annex and IO.4). 507. The AML Action Plan adopted in March 2024 sets as a priority increasing the transparency of legal persons and legal arrangements (see IO. 1). The 2019 reform of the Companies and Associations Code (CSA) streamlined the legal framework by reducing the number of corporate forms and by consolidating all applicable rules within a single code. However, this reform has also further increased the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the legal framework by easing the conditions for creating entities, thereby facilitating the creation of shelf entities and shell companies used in ML schemes. These changes have led to a significant increase in the creation of limited liability companies – the type of company identified as being more highly exposed to ML risks (see section 5.1.1 above) – accounting for more than 97% of newly-formed companies. [134] This reform sends a strong signal to the priority given to economic considerations over AML/CFT. 508. Registers - All Belgian legal persons and certain foreign legal persons and entities with links to Belgium must register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. [135] Since September 2018, Belgian legal persons and foreign legal persons and arrangements administered in Belgium [136] are also required to declare their beneficial ownership to the UBO register managed by SPF Finance, which is a significant development. However, current shortcomings in checking the accuracy of the information provided prevent it from being used as a completely reliable tool (see section5.3 below) 509. A central register of bans imposed against individuals who are prohibited from managing – interdiction de gérer (JustBan ) was set up in May 2023 to prevent people subject to a ban, imposed as part of criminal or civil convictions, from setting up and controlling entities for ML/TF purposes. The Belgian authorities had found that 50% of persons that had been banned continued to exercise management functions, with 10% of them even taking on new functions, which illustrates the weakness of the checks carried out when new entities were created and when subsequent changes were made (see section5.3). On 30 January 2025, the register contained a total of 3 668 measures. It is freely accessible to the public and notaries and commercial court clerks are required to consult it and must refuse to register directors or managers who are subject to such a ban. [137] This register is a useful tool for ensuring the effective implementation of management bans. However, it does not include bans imposed as part of criminal transactions procedures, which are frequently used by the Belgian criminal justice system (see IO.7). Belgium did not provide data to enable the evaluation team to assess the extent to which this tool has prevented the exercise of managerial functions by persons subject to a ban. The possibility of using nominee directors and straw men also enables criminals to circumvent the bans imposed. 510. Nominee directors and shareholders – The concepts of nominee directors and shareholders [138] are not framed in Belgian law. Following a FATF recommendation in 2015, legal persons appointed as directors of another legal person may no longer appoint another legal entity as their permanent representative. The identity of the nominee directors/shareholders must be formalised by an instrument of appointment, filed with the registrar, published in the Belgian Official Journal ( Moniteur belge ) and entered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. However, the principal’s identity and the nominee’s status are not made public, which complicates any verification of the principal's capacity. In addition, nominee directors in a professional capacity are not subject to the AML requirements, despite a FATF recommendation in 2015 (also see Rec. 23, IO.1 and 4). The Belgian authorities state that the use of nominee directors remains marginal. However, most ML schemes, particularly those involving offsetting schemes, involve the use of “nominee” directors, particularly when new legal entities are created and registered. The reality of this phenomenon in Belgium was highlighted on several occasions during the on-site visit, including by the CTIF. It is also noted in the cross-sectoral analysis of legal persons in September 2024, which highlighted the risks associated with the absence of a relevant framework in Belgium. These factors constitute a major vulnerability in the Belgian system, and the mechanisms in place do not allow for the effective detection and control of the use of such staw men for ML/TF purposes. The cross-sectoral analysis of legal entities recommends several measures to counter the use of straw men, but they have not yet been implemented. 511. Beneficial ownership identification and verification measures - FIs and DNFBPs are required to identify their legal person and legal arrangement customers, as well as the beneficial owners, as part of their AML/CFT due diligence obligations (see Rec. 10 and 22 in the TC Annex). These obligations are an additional means of reducing the risks of misuse of these entities. However, some DNFBPs have a partial understanding of the notion of beneficial ownership, limited to holding 25% of the company's shares. This partial understanding of the concept of beneficial ownership reduces the ability of these reporting entities to identify and understand their customers’ ownership chains and beneficial owners (see IO.4). 512. Oversight by notaries when certain legal persons are created - Notaries do not play a sufficiently active role when new companies are created (see section 5.3). The incorporation and subsequent amendments of five of the nine corporate forms (especially limited liability companies (SRL) and public limited companies (SA), which are the most common types of company in Belgium) require a notarial deed (see the Introduction and Rec. 24 TC Annex). [139] Two of these five companies are seldom used (the European company (SE) and the European cooperative society (SCE)). However, corporate forms with high ML/TF risk are created by private deed (general partnerships (SNC) and limited partnerships (SComm)), as are non-profit associations (ASBL). Notaries are required to consult the JustBan register in addition to applying the AML/CFT diligence measures to which they are subject as reporting entities and under which they identify the parties to the deed. However, checks on the company's incorporation documents, such as the financial plan, are essentially formal (checks on the existence of the document, the presence of mandatory information and the number of financial years covered). The applicant is not required to provide proof of the registered office’s address, despite the vulnerability of the system identified by Belgium in this respect, and it has been found that in the presence of a nominee, a rigorous verification of the nominator’s identity is not always carried out. Therefore, their involvement is not sufficient to guarantee the reliability of the data that they subsequently transmit to the commercial court clerks who register the new entities in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. It does not effectively reduce the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes. [140] 513. Dissolutions - Finally, the Belgian authorities identify and dissolve “dormant/inactive” entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises to prevent them from being reactivated for ML/TF purposes. 514. In 2022, the Belgian authorities estimated that around 170 000 entities, including 70 000 ASBLs, registered with the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises were inactive. The dissolution measures have reduced the number of these entities by almost half. In November 2024, the Belgian authorities estimated that 80 000 inactive entities were still registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, 75% of which were non-profit associations. Inactive entities were identified on the basis of breaches such as failure to file annual accounts, register beneficial owners in the UBO register, appoint directors, publish the required documents in the Moniteur belge , or failure to comply with the modification of corporate forms following the entry into force of the CSA. The Belgian authorities have also undertaken to analayse data relating to Internet, electricity and telephone subscription contracts to identify inactive entities. However, there has been no systematic use of such data as an indication of inactive entities. 515. The dissolution measures taken by certain commercial tribunals [141] at district level in collaboration with SPF Economy are helping to reduce the number of inactive entities and therefore limit the possibility of reactivating shelf entities, which are already registered in the Banque Carrefour des Entreprises for ML/TF purposes. However, the risks have since moved, with some entities transferring their head offices to districts that have not yet introduced such measures so as to avoid these checks. In response, commercial tribunals in various districts have launched similar initiatives, although the results are not yet known. [142] 516. These dissolution measures therefore produce certain results (see section 5.5 below) but overall, they remain relatively ineffective due to the length and complexity of the procedures and the limited human and technical resources available. This is in contrast to the relative ease with which head offices can be relocated from one district of Belgium to another, and the simplified procedures for creating new entities, which lead to a significant increase in the number of companies created. Nor are these dissolution measures accompanied by sufficient measures to prevent the creation and use of new shell entities in ML/TF schemes in the absence of sufficient checks when legal persons are created (see section 5.3), a modus operandi that is observed in many offsetting schemes in Belgium. The AML Action Plan includes a proposal to introduce an administrative dissolution procedure for a more flexible and faster procedure (see IO 1). However, this currently remains at the draft stage. 517. Finally, financial transparency measures , such as the obligation to file annual accounts for certain types of legal entities (limited liability companies, non-profit associations and foundations), help to increase the transparency of the framework applicable to legal persons and possibly identify potential abuses. [143] However, this obligation to file accounts does not apply to all general partnerships, limited partnerships and ordinary simple partnerships, despite the ML/TF risks associated with these legal forms. [144] The obligation to provide notaries with a financial plan when certain companies are created is not part of an AML/CFT objective but is a measure that is likely to reduce the risks of misuse of legal persons. However, the conditions necessary for this requirement to have an impact in AML/CFT matters have not been met, as the plan does not have to be drawn up by a professional accountant and notaries only carry out formal checks on the documents. These measures can therefore only prevent and identify the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes to a minimal extent. Footnotes [134] In its business barometer published in July 2023, the Belgian Federation of Notaries (Fednot) noted an increase in the number of new businesses, particularly companies, each year between 2019 and 2023, despite the Covid crisis. Around 2,111 companies were created per month in the year prior to the introduction of the CSA in 2019, compared with 3,401 per month in 2023. FEDNOT’s analysis also shows that between 2022 and 2023, 97.4% of the companies created were limited liability companies (SRLs), which can be explained by the many advantages offered by this legal form since the introduction of the CSA. For non-profit associations, a positive trend has also been observed in recent years, with the number of ASBLs rising from over 134,000 in 2021 to around 144,500 at the start of 2024. [135] 66 012 foreign entities have links with Belgium, which requires them to register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. 7,645 of these have an establishment or branch in Belgium. Other foreign entities are entered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register in compliance with the various Belgian laws that require it, such as entities subject to VAT and Belgian social security as an employer, and those that take part in public procurement contracts or rent property in Belgium. Legal entities that are required to submit information to the UBO register must first register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. [136] This applies to subsidiaries whose registered office is located in Belgium and to trusts and legal arrangements whose trustee or fiduciary is established, domiciled or resident in Belgium; whose registered office, principal place of business or trustee’s or fiduciary’s place of management or administration is located in Belgium; which establishes a business relationship or acquires property in Belgium on behalf of the trust. [137] Legal obligation under Article 13 of the Law of 4 May 2023 on the central register of disqualifications from management. [138] Shareholders acting on behalf of another person, holding shares registered in the name of nominees [139] The creation of three forms of non-profit legal entity also requires an authentic instrument (international non-profit association ( association internationale sans but lucratif – AISBL), private foundation ( fondation privée – FP) and public interest foundation ( fondation d’utilité publique – FUP)). [140] Two court rulings transmitted by Belgium illustrate the fact that both entities formed by a private deed (SComm) and entities created by an authentic instrument (SA) may be involved in ML schemes. [141] The registries of the commercial courts are responsible for recording the data in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register and for publication in the Moniteur belge . [142] In addition to “Company Dumping” in Brussels, this project has been extended to the Halle/Vilvoorde and Walloon Brabant districts, under the same name. The project is called “Lescoop” in Leuven, “Figaro” in Ghent, “Horus” in Mons, “Ghostbusters” in Limburg, and “Kali” in Antwerp. [143] The obligation to file accounts does not apply to all general partnerships, limited partnerships or ordinary simple partnerships, despite the ML/TF risks associated with these legal forms. [144] For the filing of accounts for the 2023 financial year, 517 general partnerships and 924 limited partnerships met the criteria requiring them to file annual accounts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="506. Belgium has adopted a series of measures which, taken together, can to some extent mitigate the risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements for ML/TF purposes. Changes have been made to the legal framework in order to increase the transparency of legal persons and arrangements: (i) the abolition of bearer shares, which was introduced in 2005 came into full effect in January 2014; (ii) access to the central register of financial accounts and contracts (PCC) held by legal persons with Belgian FIs and initially set up in 2011 for tax purposes was extended to AML/CFT authorities in 2018; (iii) convictions of legal persons have been centralised in an criminal record effective since 2016, and (iv) company service providers offering corporate domiciliation services became subject to the AML Law in 2018 (see Rec. 22 in the TC Annex and IO.4). 507. The AML Action Plan adopted in March 2024 sets as a priority increasing the transparency of legal persons and legal arrangements (see IO. 1). The 2019 reform of the Companies and Associations Code (CSA) streamlined the legal framework by reducing the number of corporate forms and by consolidating all applicable rules within a single code. However, this reform has also further increased the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the legal framework by easing the conditions for creating entities, thereby facilitating the creation of shelf entities and shell companies used in ML schemes. These changes have led to a significant increase in the creation of limited liability companies – the type of company identified as being more highly exposed to ML risks (see section 5.1.1 above) – accounting for more than 97% of newly-formed companies. [134] This reform sends a strong signal to the priority given to economic considerations over AML/CFT. 508. Registers - All Belgian legal persons and certain foreign legal persons and entities with links to Belgium must register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. [135] Since September 2018, Belgian legal persons and foreign legal persons and arrangements administered in Belgium [136] are also required to declare their beneficial ownership to the UBO register managed by SPF Finance, which is a significant development. However, current shortcomings in checking the accuracy of the information provided prevent it from being used as a completely reliable tool (see section5.3 below) 509. A central register of bans imposed against individuals who are prohibited from managing – interdiction de gérer (JustBan ) was set up in May 2023 to prevent people subject to a ban, imposed as part of criminal or civil convictions, from setting up and controlling entities for ML/TF purposes. The Belgian authorities had found that 50% of persons that had been banned continued to exercise management functions, with 10% of them even taking on new functions, which illustrates the weakness of the checks carried out when new entities were created and when subsequent changes were made (see section5.3). On 30 January 2025, the register contained a total of 3 668 measures. It is freely accessible to the public and notaries and commercial court clerks are required to consult it and must refuse to register directors or managers who are subject to such a ban. [137] This register is a useful tool for ensuring the effective implementation of management bans. However, it does not include bans imposed as part of criminal transactions procedures, which are frequently used by the Belgian criminal justice system (see IO.7). Belgium did not provide data to enable the evaluation team to assess the extent to which this tool has prevented the exercise of managerial functions by persons subject to a ban. The possibility of using nominee directors and straw men also enables criminals to circumvent the bans imposed. 510. Nominee directors and shareholders – The concepts of nominee directors and shareholders [138] are not framed in Belgian law. Following a FATF recommendation in 2015, legal persons appointed as directors of another legal person may no longer appoint another legal entity as their permanent representative. The identity of the nominee directors/shareholders must be formalised by an instrument of appointment, filed with the registrar, published in the Belgian Official Journal ( Moniteur belge ) and entered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. However, the principal’s identity and the nominee’s status are not made public, which complicates any verification of the principal's capacity. In addition, nominee directors in a professional capacity are not subject to the AML requirements, despite a FATF recommendation in 2015 (also see Rec. 23, IO.1 and 4). The Belgian authorities state that the use of nominee directors remains marginal. However, most ML schemes, particularly those involving offsetting schemes, involve the use of “nominee” directors, particularly when new legal entities are created and registered. The reality of this phenomenon in Belgium was highlighted on several occasions during the on-site visit, including by the CTIF. It is also noted in the cross-sectoral analysis of legal persons in September 2024, which highlighted the risks associated with the absence of a relevant framework in Belgium. These factors constitute a major vulnerability in the Belgian system, and the mechanisms in place do not allow for the effective detection and control of the use of such staw men for ML/TF purposes. The cross-sectoral analysis of legal entities recommends several measures to counter the use of straw men, but they have not yet been implemented. 511. Beneficial ownership identification and verification measures - FIs and DNFBPs are required to identify their legal person and legal arrangement customers, as well as the beneficial owners, as part of their AML/CFT due diligence obligations (see Rec. 10 and 22 in the TC Annex). These obligations are an additional means of reducing the risks of misuse of these entities. However, some DNFBPs have a partial understanding of the notion of beneficial ownership, limited to holding 25% of the company's shares. This partial understanding of the concept of beneficial ownership reduces the ability of these reporting entities to identify and understand their customers’ ownership chains and beneficial owners (see IO.4). 512. Oversight by notaries when certain legal persons are created - Notaries do not play a sufficiently active role when new companies are created (see section 5.3). The incorporation and subsequent amendments of five of the nine corporate forms (especially limited liability companies (SRL) and public limited companies (SA), which are the most common types of company in Belgium) require a notarial deed (see the Introduction and Rec. 24 TC Annex). [139] Two of these five companies are seldom used (the European company (SE) and the European cooperative society (SCE)). However, corporate forms with high ML/TF risk are created by private deed (general partnerships (SNC) and limited partnerships (SComm)), as are non-profit associations (ASBL). Notaries are required to consult the JustBan register in addition to applying the AML/CFT diligence measures to which they are subject as reporting entities and under which they identify the parties to the deed. However, checks on the company's incorporation documents, such as the financial plan, are essentially formal (checks on the existence of the document, the presence of mandatory information and the number of financial years covered). The applicant is not required to provide proof of the registered office’s address, despite the vulnerability of the system identified by Belgium in this respect, and it has been found that in the presence of a nominee, a rigorous verification of the nominator’s identity is not always carried out. Therefore, their involvement is not sufficient to guarantee the reliability of the data that they subsequently transmit to the commercial court clerks who register the new entities in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. It does not effectively reduce the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes. [140] 513. Dissolutions - Finally, the Belgian authorities identify and dissolve “dormant/inactive” entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises to prevent them from being reactivated for ML/TF purposes. 514. In 2022, the Belgian authorities estimated that around 170 000 entities, including 70 000 ASBLs, registered with the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises were inactive. The dissolution measures have reduced the number of these entities by almost half. In November 2024, the Belgian authorities estimated that 80 000 inactive entities were still registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, 75% of which were non-profit associations. Inactive entities were identified on the basis of breaches such as failure to file annual accounts, register beneficial owners in the UBO register, appoint directors, publish the required documents in the Moniteur belge , or failure to comply with the modification of corporate forms following the entry into force of the CSA. The Belgian authorities have also undertaken to analayse data relating to Internet, electricity and telephone subscription contracts to identify inactive entities. However, there has been no systematic use of such data as an indication of inactive entities. 515. The dissolution measures taken by certain commercial tribunals [141] at district level in collaboration with SPF Economy are helping to reduce the number of inactive entities and therefore limit the possibility of reactivating shelf entities, which are already registered in the Banque Carrefour des Entreprises for ML/TF purposes. However, the risks have since moved, with some entities transferring their head offices to districts that have not yet introduced such measures so as to avoid these checks. In response, commercial tribunals in various districts have launched similar initiatives, although the results are not yet known. [142] 516. These dissolution measures therefore produce certain results (see section 5.5 below) but overall, they remain relatively ineffective due to the length and complexity of the procedures and the limited human and technical resources available. This is in contrast to the relative ease with which head offices can be relocated from one district of Belgium to another, and the simplified procedures for creating new entities, which lead to a significant increase in the number of companies created. Nor are these dissolution measures accompanied by sufficient measures to prevent the creation and use of new shell entities in ML/TF schemes in the absence of sufficient checks when legal persons are created (see section 5.3), a modus operandi that is observed in many offsetting schemes in Belgium. The AML Action Plan includes a proposal to introduce an administrative dissolution procedure for a more flexible and faster procedure (see IO 1). However, this currently remains at the draft stage. 517. Finally, financial transparency measures , such as the obligation to file annual accounts for certain types of legal entities (limited liability companies, non-profit associations and foundations), help to increase the transparency of the framework applicable to legal persons and possibly identify potential abuses. [143] However, this obligation to file accounts does not apply to all general partnerships, limited partnerships and ordinary simple partnerships, despite the ML/TF risks associated with these legal forms. [144] The obligation to provide notaries with a financial plan when certain companies are created is not part of an AML/CFT objective but is a measure that is likely to reduce the risks of misuse of legal persons. However, the conditions necessary for this requirement to have an impact in AML/CFT matters have not been met, as the plan does not have to be drawn up by a professional accountant and notaries only carry out formal checks on the documents. These measures can therefore only prevent and identify the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes to a minimal extent. Footnotes [134] In its business barometer published in July 2023, the Belgian Federation of Notaries (Fednot) noted an increase in the number of new businesses, particularly companies, each year between 2019 and 2023, despite the Covid crisis. Around 2,111 companies were created per month in the year prior to the introduction of the CSA in 2019, compared with 3,401 per month in 2023. FEDNOT’s analysis also shows that between 2022 and 2023, 97.4% of the companies created were limited liability companies (SRLs), which can be explained by the many advantages offered by this legal form since the introduction of the CSA. For non-profit associations, a positive trend has also been observed in recent years, with the number of ASBLs rising from over 134,000 in 2021 to around 144,500 at the start of 2024. [135] 66 012 foreign entities have links with Belgium, which requires them to register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. 7,645 of these have an establishment or branch in Belgium. Other foreign entities are entered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register in compliance with the various Belgian laws that require it, such as entities subject to VAT and Belgian social security as an employer, and those that take part in public procurement contracts or rent property in Belgium. Legal entities that are required to submit information to the UBO register must first register in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. [136] This applies to subsidiaries whose registered office is located in Belgium and to trusts and legal arrangements whose trustee or fiduciary is established, domiciled or resident in Belgium; whose registered office, principal place of business or trustee’s or fiduciary’s place of management or administration is located in Belgium; which establishes a business relationship or acquires property in Belgium on behalf of the trust. [137] Legal obligation under Article 13 of the Law of 4 May 2023 on the central register of disqualifications from management. [138] Shareholders acting on behalf of another person, holding shares registered in the name of nominees [139] The creation of three forms of non-profit legal entity also requires an authentic instrument (international non-profit association ( association internationale sans but lucratif – AISBL), private foundation ( fondation privée – FP) and public interest foundation ( fondation d’utilité publique – FUP)). [140] Two court rulings transmitted by Belgium illustrate the fact that both entities formed by a private deed (SComm) and entities created by an authentic instrument (SA) may be involved in ML schemes. [141] The registries of the commercial courts are responsible for recording the data in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register and for publication in the Moniteur belge . [142] In addition to “Company Dumping” in Brussels, this project has been extended to the Halle/Vilvoorde and Walloon Brabant districts, under the same name. The project is called “Lescoop” in Leuven, “Figaro” in Ghent, “Horus” in Mons, “Ghostbusters” in Limburg, and “Kali” in Antwerp. [143] The obligation to file accounts does not apply to all general partnerships, limited partnerships or ordinary simple partnerships, despite the ML/TF risks associated with these legal forms. [144] For the filing of accounts for the 2023 financial year, 517 general partnerships and 924 limited partnerships met the criteria requiring them to file annual accounts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="559. In 2024, the CTIF received around 91,000 STRs. Of these, around 15,000 were processed by the ML/TF department. To cope with this volume, the CTIF has implemented a multi-step process, consisting of initial screening, triage and enhancement, followed by in-depth analysis. 560. Until recently, this work was largely done manually. Enhancing STRs took analysts about two days per report before they could be added to the analysis pipeline. This way of working had obvious limits in terms of efficiency and responsiveness. Since early October 2024, STRs have been managed through the goAML system, which supports predefined indicators and structural elements, paving the way for more automated processing. The goal is to improve detection and prioritisation of urgent cases, while ensuring faster, more targeted analysis. As goAML has only recently been implemented, no conclusions can yet be drawn about how efficiently reports submitted to the CTIF are being processed. 561. The Triage and Enhancement Department, made up of seven to eight administrative staff, plays a key role in the initial screening of STRs. It carries out this screening using a set of objective criteria to identify the most critical reports. This preliminary analysis routes STRs to the relevant department for in-depth processing or, in less complex cases, for rapid analysis within the Triage team itself. 562. This work involves several tools and databases, including the CTIF’s internal databases, to search for possible matches with existing cases; police databases, accessed through the two liaison officers seconded to the CTIF; and the FIU-Net network, to identify any links with financial investigations conducted by other financial intelligence units (FIUs) abroad. 563. A scoring system is used to classify STRs according to their priority level (by type, e.g. ML, TF, tax offences) in order to streamline how they are handled. The evaluation team reviewed the internal procedures and scoring system and found them to be appropriate and relevant. STRs requiring only a quick analysis are handled directly by the Triage and Enhancement Department, which then forwards them to the most relevant authority. This department is also responsible for sending financial intelligence to foreign FIUs via FIU-Net, through the XBD and XBR processes (see IO.2). 564. Lastly, requests for information and spontaneous communications received from foreign FIUs are handled in the same way as domestic STRs, thereby ensuring consistency in how financial intelligence is analysed and disseminated (see IO.2). 6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 565. The CTIF’s analysis and dissemination activities largely support the competent authorities’ operational needs. The competent authorities interviewed during the on-site visit confirmed their close cooperation with the CTIF, its ability to disseminate high-quality reports and their suitability for operational requirements in connection with ML investigations and prosecutions, predicate offences and TF. Belgium provided a number of case studies confirming this. Operational analysis 566. The CTIF plays a key role in producing financial intelligence, conducting in-depth operational analyses which it disseminates proactively or on request to the competent national authorities and its foreign counterparts. Its ML/TF department, comprising 20 analysts, including two dedicated to TF analysis, is responsible for the operational processing of STRs. This is considered to be sufficient in terms of capacity. Among the 18 generalists, some have specialisations in virtual assets, the diamond sector or tax fraud. 567. The CTIF handles files at a steady pace, with an average of 100 to 200 files per analyst (depending on their level of experience). Approximately one file is handled per analyst per day, but the analysis work involves managing several files at the same time and can be slowed down by time delays in receiving responses from external sources. The average time taken by the CTIF to process suspicious transaction reports is approximately three months. However, some files, particularly those considered urgent, can be processed within a few days to a few weeks. These processing times reflect the complexity of the analysis and enhancement work carried out by the CTIF to produce actionable financial intelligence. It should be noted that these statistics are influenced by certain exceptional cases, such as a file opened in 2015, which remained formally open for 2 659 days due to the wait for external triggers, before finally being forwarded in 2023 following a request received nine days before dissemination. 568. The CTIF has adopted a priority-based approach to optimise the processing of files. This process is based on the targeted selection of STRs according to risk criteria, enabling certain categories of files to be processed more quickly. For example, around 2021, STRs related to the Sky ECC case (see IO.7) were dealt with as a priority. Similarly, STRs relating to Brazilian networks involving offsetting schemes were dealt with proactively, with a view to reducing the number of spontaneous communications. 569. Screened STRs are not automatically subject to in-depth operational analysis, but they are fed into a database that provides essential information to support future investigations. The aim of this approach is to quickly identify STRs that have the greatest potential for investigation, while reducing the workload of analysts and ensuring more efficient use of resources. 570. The processing of urgent files varies greatly depending on the severity and the steps required. Thanks to its direct access to databases and inter-agency cooperation, the CTIF can quickly obtain the information needed to process certain complex files within a day if necessary. The CTIF also has the right to block suspicious transactions and has a five-day window to do so, which has been found to be enough time to analyse the situation and prepare any information to be sent to the judicial authorities (see IO.8). 571. The CTIF makes use of several tools to ensure that its analysts adopt an effective and consistent approach to their work: · Internal procedure notes defining investigation methods, database searches, information gathering from reporting entities and authorities, and file management and forwarding. · An STR scoring system that prioritises STRs based on the risk inherent in each case and directs resources to the most critical cases. · A summary of reporting obligations specifying the information that must be provided to the various competent authorities. · An international cooperation matrix for managing communications with foreign FIUs while protecting personal data. · Internal training for analysts, including monthly newsletters, RADAR notes and workshops provided by other institutions. 572. Operational analysis relies on close interaction with other departments within the CTIF, particularly the Triage and Enhancement Department and the Strategic Analysis Department, which are part of the same division. This collaboration facilitates the sharing of information and optimises the quality of investigations. 573. The CTIF has IT tools to carry out its operational analyses, but their use remains limited given the increasing volume and complexity of financial data. The lack of advanced technological tools, such as specialised software, data mining or automated analysis solutions, makes it difficult to manage information flows effectively and undermines the analysis of financial flows, data traceability and the strategic use of data. Strategic analysis 574. The Analysis department, comprising four analysts, produces in-depth strategic analyses to identify emerging trends. Drawing on the 2023 Money Laundering National Risk Analysis (ML NRA), international trends (observed by FATF, Europol, foreign FIUs), national developments and internal information, such as that from operational analysis, this department develops targeted strategic analyses that enhance authorities’ response capabilities. 575. Since 2019, the CTIF has produced 12 strategic analyses targeting criminal threats, money laundering techniques and at-risk sectors and countries. This work has identified patterns linked to drug trafficking, organised crime groups and fraud, as well as sophisticated methods such as money laundering through the Brazilian network, the abuse of corporate vehicles and underground banking. This analytical approach is broadly in line with Belgium’s risk profile, as outlined in the ML NRA, which highlights in particular the predominance of cash, the role of professional money launderers, fictitious legal structures and investment in real estate (see IO.1). Some analyses, regularly updated through to 2024, adopt a cross-cutting approach, drawing on both lessons learned from operational analysis and broader strategic insights. For example, the 2024 analysis on ML linked to cyber-enabled fraud is based on a growing number of STRs received by the CTIF, while placing these findings in the context of trends identified at the international level (FATF and Europol). In another note from 2020, focused on Brazilian networks, the analysis highlights a money laundering scheme involving multiple criminal offences, with a combination of several predicate offences such as serious social security and tax fraud, human trafficking, drug trafficking and fraud, often linked to cyber fraud. The published note includes typical money laundering patterns (red flags), a detailed description of credit/debit transactions and an analysis of financial flows, particularly to Asia. Box 6.2. Alignment of the CTIF’s strategic analyses with the main national threats, in particular · Money laundering from drug trafficking: regularly identified as a national priority, this is covered in detail in the analyses (2019, 2023). · Professional money launderers and structured networks: addressed through studies on professional money launderers (2024), the Brazilian network (2022) and underground banking (2023). · Abusive corporate vehicles and tax/social security fraud: adequately addressed through analyses on the abuse of structures (2022) and the creation of shell or sham companies. · Fraud and cyber fraud: an emerging issue that is addressed in detail in the 2024 analysis. · Organised crime groups (OCGs): analyses focusing on Italian, Albanian and Chinese OCGs demonstrate a targeted approach based on origin or criminal community. · At-risk countries and sectors: Dubai, gambling and, to a certain extent, diamonds are covered. · Cross-border cash movements through Belgian airports (2024). 576. Although the CTIF’s strategic analyses cover several of the risks identified in the ML and TF NRAs, a number of key threats are still only partially covered or not covered at all in these analyses. The widespread use of cash, although addressed in several strategic analyses, is not dealt with in a cross-cutting manner, particularly in relation to cash-intensive sectors. No dedicated analysis has yet been undertaken on virtual assets, despite their growing role in ML/TF typologies (see IO.7 and IO.9). Similarly, fictitious legal arrangements, shell companies and sham entities, although addressed in the analysis on the misuse of corporate vehicles (2022), could be examined in greater depth, particularly with regard to the use of straw men, which is prevalent in the majority of ML cases. No distinct strategic analysis appears to have been conducted on real estate, despite it being identified as an at-risk sector for ML. Furthermore, emerging risks associated with the use of virtual IBANs and new financial services (fintech, neobanks) have not been explored in depth. Lastly, the TF perspective is largely absent from strategic analyses, even though the 2023 TF NRA highlights specific threats related to microfinance, the use of small amounts of cash and new payment methods. 577. All of these strategic analyses are shared internally with CTIF staff. However, only four have been forwarded to the competent authorities, which limits their operational scope. These strategic analyses are nevertheless essential tools for understanding risks, raising awareness among relevant stakeholders and alerting them to emerging threats. At present, their dissemination is still too limited, particularly among the reporting entities, which hampers the early detection of money laundering patterns and reduces authorities’ responsiveness. The lack of proactive dissemination, even with redacted versions tailoring the content to different audiences, limits their practical impact on raising awareness among relevant stakeholders. 578. The CTIF develops other high-quality strategic output for internal distribution, such as analysis notes, information notes, analysis sheets and a biannual strategic bulletin called ‘RADAR’ focusing on established trends, risk areas and early warning signs. This document has been shared with the Strategic Analysis department of the Federal Judicial Police. 579. The CTIF’s publication of annual reports, typological analyses and practical guides for reporting entities (Vademecum) provides reporting entities, competent authorities and other stakeholders with key tools to improve their understanding of the risks and adjust their mechanisms for detecting suspicious transactions. However, given the low level of implementation of AML/CFT obligations and the sometimes limited understanding that some reporting entities have of the risks, the visibility and effective use of these documents are still major challenges. More targeted dissemination and monitoring of their impact are needed to maximise their usefulness and improve the effectiveness of ML/TF measures. 580. The Intelligence Coordination Centre (comprising two data analysts) has implemented tools to support operational and strategic analysis. However, these tools do not include advanced technological solutions (such as analysis software, data mining solutions, etc.) that can process large volumes of data efficiently. This limits the in-depth use of CTIF data, particularly for proactive strategic analysis aimed at detecting and anticipating new trends or types of ML/TF. 581. Although the implementation of the goAML system at the end of 2024 is expected to improve the management of incoming information (classification of STRs, data structuring, timeliness of STRs, etc.) and make it easier to provide feedback to reporting entities and supervisory authorities, this tool still does not allow the available data to be used to its full potential, particularly for operational and strategic analysis purposes. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 582. When an analysis uncovers serious signs of ML/TF, the CTIF forwards its findings to the judicial authorities (district or federal prosecutor). However, the AML Law does not allow the CTIF to share this information directly with the police. In human trafficking or social security fraud cases, a copy is also sent to the labour prosecution service (which specialises in social security fraud). In 2024, the CTIF forwarded 3,054 files (new files and additional information) to the judicial authorities, working with a team of approximately 25 full-time-equivalent analysts and administrative staff, equating to an average of 122 files forwarded per analyst over the year. This volume is considered satisfactory given the resources available. 583. Between 2020 and 2024, the CTIF forwarded 6,389 new cases to the judicial authorities, involving an estimated total of €9.98 billion in illegal proceeds. At the same time, 8 131 pieces of additional information were provided to supplement cases already in progress, involving an additional €1.61 billion. Over this five-year period, the judicial authorities therefore benefited from information from 14,520 STRs, for a combined total of €11.58 billion. In addition, in 2,105 cases, a copy of the file was also sent to the labour prosecution service, particularly where the cases concerned offences related to social security fraud or human trafficking. However, a significant proportion of these referrals do not result in an investigation being opened, owing to a lack of sufficient resources available to the judicial authorities (see IO.7). 584. Furthermore, the CTIF shares and communicates information with the various services/authorities listed below: Table 6.4. Communication by the CTIF (based on Art. 83 of the AML/CFT Law) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total SPF Finance (Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service - CAF) 271 268 363 675 683 2260 Customs &amp; Excise 10 35 15 23 13 96 SPF Social Security (SIRS) 251 242 368 583 471 1915 SPF Economy (for investigation) 24 17 4 20 15 80 FSMA (for investigation) - - 2 6 9 17 OCSC 39 50 56 68 110 323 Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) 142 97 85 51 35 410 State Security (VSSE) 142 97 85 51 35 410 General Intelligence and Army Security Service (SGRS) 142 97 85 51 35 410 Banque de données communes (BDC) 31 8 30 11 13 93 General Treasury Department - - - 4 3 7 OLAF - - - 3 1 4 585. In addition, the CTIF continues to cooperate actively with the three AML/CFT supervisory authorities – mainly the BNB, the FSMA and SPF Economy – by exchanging information on, among other things, the reporting activities of reporting entities, any AML/CFT non-compliance identified during the operational analysis of files, the results of individual risk analyses or inspections carried out by supervisory authorities, their respective expertise on specific topics, and reports following referral to the prosecutor’s office of cases involving reporting entities. This exchange of information is evidence of ongoing inter-institutional cooperation, which helps to strengthen the supervisory chain. Table ‎ 6.5. Exchange of information between the CTIF and supervisory authorities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total BNB 13 21 21 17 18 90 FSMA 3 6 13 8 5 35 SPF Economy 28 14 15 38 30 125 SPF Finance (Bpost) 1 1 1 1 0 4 National Chamber of Notaries 2 1 4 3 10 11 Institute for Tax Advisors &amp; Accountants (ITAA) 2 7 9 1 7 26 Supervisory Board of Company Auditors 1 0 3 4 2 10 Bar Associations 0 1 1 6 4 12 Gaming Commission 2 2 0 2 2 8 Box 6.3. Example illustrating the relevance of CTIF communications i. To the FSMA in guiding its supervisory activities Exchanges between the CTIF and the FSMA led in 2023 to a thematic supervisory action targeting the reporting activities of bureaux de change. This initiative came in response to observations made by the CTIF, shared at a regular meeting, concerning an abnormal concentration of STRs from one operator in 2022, a significant decrease in STRs from others, and a level of quality deemed insufficient across the sector as a whole. The supervisory action was subsequently incorporated into the on-site inspections carried out by the FSMA. ii. For more targeted supervision by SPF Economy Between 2021 and 2023, these exchanges led to 17 files being opened, six of which resulted in reports, relating in particular to diamond traders, company service providers (business centres) and cash payments. This was done when a report was also forwarded to the prosecutor’s office. The data provided by the CTIF enabled SPF Economy to target reporting entities more effectively, as well as the ‘client’ files for analysis, particularly in the company service providers sector. iii. In the notarial sector In 2022, two notarial firms were reported for alleged non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations in similar situations involving the formation of at-risk companies (susceptible sectors, foreign founders, business introducers, shared addresses). These reports were referred to the executive committee of the National Chamber of Notaries, which initiated administrative sanction proceedings for failure to comply with the obligations of the AML Law. One of the two cases resulted in an administrative fine for non-compliance with the ban on disclosure and failure to report suspicious transactions. The other case was dismissed. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 586. The financial intelligence provided by the CTIF is tailored to the operational needs of the competent authorities, particularly in complex investigations involving organised crime, serious tax fraud and social security fraud. Over the years, the forwarded files have helped to document the interconnected nature of these predicate offences, highlighting examples of money laundering involving multiple criminal offences (such as the Brazilian networks). These referrals regularly reveal criminal structures that use sophisticated financial offsetting techniques, which are characteristic of organised networks. This type of information, which is only available to the CTIF, provides the judicial and law enforcement authorities with critical added value by helping them to understand financial flows, identify beneficial owners and strengthen financial evidence in investigations. 587. Feedback has been generally positive, with prosecutors, investigating judges and police services highlighting the quality and relevance of CTIF analyses, which are disseminated both proactively and on request, thereby helping to open new investigations and strengthen ongoing ones. See below for practical examples of the use of financial intelligence, particularly in cases involving high ML risks. Box 6.4. Example illustrating how CTIF financial intelligence meets the needs of competent authorities through a Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) typology Between 2022 and 2024, the CTIF submitted several files documenting international trade-based money laundering (TBML) schemes combined with offsetting mechanisms. In these cases, Belgian companies active in the construction sector made payments to wholesalers located in Asia or the EU for the purchase of goods that were actually intended for retail companies linked to criminal networks. These trade flows were used to recycle the proceeds of illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking. The goods involved ranged from everyday consumer goods (e.g. textiles imported from China) to luxury goods (e.g. watches and top-of-the-range vehicles). These files also revealed associated customs fraud, such as undervaluation. Outcome: This type of financial intelligence has provided critical added value to competent authorities to help them understand the economic structures used and target the entities involved. Box 6.5. Example illustrating the role of CTIF in the early detection and classification of ‘Brazilian’ networks’ ‘Brazilian’ networks, characterised by the use of short-lived companies in the construction and industrial cleaning sectors, often involve Portuguese or Brazilian nationals. Through analysis of DOS reports received, CTIF has documented the evolution of these structures towards increasingly complex arrangements, combining social fraud, undeclared work and money laundering. Results: These observations have raised awareness among judicial authorities of the growing seriousness of the phenomenon and its economic impact, directing their attention towards structured networks of shell companies operating according to repetitive patterns. 588. Since 2017, the number of TF-related STRs has been steadily falling, a trend linked to the shift towards microfinance models, which are more difficult to detect (see IO.1 and IO.9). Despite this challenge, the CTIF has played a key role, recognised by the competent authorities, in detecting TF-related networks. For example, the Syrian Wallets project has led to many TF cases being opened (see box in section 9.1 of IO.9). 589. In terms of ML, a significant proportion of the files forwarded by the CTIF are not used to their full potential. Between 2019 and 2024, 43% of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities were closed without further action (‘no criminal prosecution’). This situation is primarily due to the lack of resources available to the police and, as far as can be determined, not to the quality of the information provided by the CTIF (see IO.7). 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 590. In cases of serious tax fraud, whether organised or not, cooperation between the CTIF and SPF Finance’s Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service (CAF) provides valuable additional support to the CAF’s anti-tax fraud procedures. The CTIF regularly sends relevant information to the CAF, at the same time as it sends files to the judicial authorities. All files forwarded by the CTIF are entered into the StrirFraude application of the Special Tax Inspectorate (ISI), where they trigger preliminary investigations and, if necessary, tax investigations. The significant increase in referrals from the CTIF to the CAF (from 268 in 2021 to 683 in 2024) reflects the ongoing improvement in the exchange of information and the development of financial intelligence by other competent authorities, in particular by incorporating the CTIF’s analyses. Furthermore, if the CAF detects any signs of ML while carrying out its work, it informs the CTIF (see table 6.1). 591. In cases of suspected serious tax fraud, the tax authorities refer the matter to the relevant prosecutor’s office, which decides whether it should be dealt with through criminal or administrative tax proceedings. These files involve complex fraud schemes, including the use of offshore structures or fraudulent structures in the diamond sector. The tax authorities refer around 150 files involving serious tax fraud, whether organised or not, to the judicial authorities each year. However, these cases do not necessarily result in money laundering investigations relating to aggravated tax fraud, and the judicial authorities therefore do not make full use of the financial information available to the tax authorities in ML cases. The proportion of ML cases linked to tax fraud referred to prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2023 was 4%, which seems low given that tax fraud is identified as one of the most prevalent ML offences (see IO.7). 592. Customs authorities collect information on declarations of cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). When a customs offence is detected, a report is sent to the prosecutor’s office. They also send reports to the prosecutor’s office when no offence has been detected but there is suspicion of criminal activity. The CTIF has access to this data via the Customs Information System (CIS) database and uses it mainly for strategic analysis purposes. The information available may include identity, circumstances, sometimes a hearing or photos, indications or suspicions of ML/TF, and other information from customs databases. In addition, customs authorities also respond to requests for information received from the CTIF. However, this customs information is not used to its full potential by the authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting ML. The number of reports forwarded by customs to the judicial authorities remains relatively low. Between 2019 and October 2024, 149 reports/records were forwarded following inspections carried out at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi international airports (see IO.8). 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In 2024, the CTIF received around 91,000 STRs. Of these, around 15,000 were processed by the ML/TF department. To cope with this volume, the CTIF has implemented a multi-step process, consisting of initial screening, triage and enhancement, followed by in-depth analysis. 560. Until recently, this work was largely done manually. Enhancing STRs took analysts about two days per report before they could be added to the analysis pipeline. This way of working had obvious limits in terms of efficiency and responsiveness. Since early October 2024, STRs have been managed through the goAML system, which supports predefined indicators and structural elements, paving the way for more automated processing. The goal is to improve detection and prioritisation of urgent cases, while ensuring faster, more targeted analysis. As goAML has only recently been implemented, no conclusions can yet be drawn about how efficiently reports submitted to the CTIF are being processed. 561. The Triage and Enhancement Department, made up of seven to eight administrative staff, plays a key role in the initial screening of STRs. It carries out this screening using a set of objective criteria to identify the most critical reports. This preliminary analysis routes STRs to the relevant department for in-depth processing or, in less complex cases, for rapid analysis within the Triage team itself. 562. This work involves several tools and databases, including the CTIF’s internal databases, to search for possible matches with existing cases; police databases, accessed through the two liaison officers seconded to the CTIF; and the FIU-Net network, to identify any links with financial investigations conducted by other financial intelligence units (FIUs) abroad. 563. A scoring system is used to classify STRs according to their priority level (by type, e.g. ML, TF, tax offences) in order to streamline how they are handled. The evaluation team reviewed the internal procedures and scoring system and found them to be appropriate and relevant. STRs requiring only a quick analysis are handled directly by the Triage and Enhancement Department, which then forwards them to the most relevant authority. This department is also responsible for sending financial intelligence to foreign FIUs via FIU-Net, through the XBD and XBR processes (see IO.2). 564. Lastly, requests for information and spontaneous communications received from foreign FIUs are handled in the same way as domestic STRs, thereby ensuring consistency in how financial intelligence is analysed and disseminated (see IO.2). 6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 565. The CTIF’s analysis and dissemination activities largely support the competent authorities’ operational needs. The competent authorities interviewed during the on-site visit confirmed their close cooperation with the CTIF, its ability to disseminate high-quality reports and their suitability for operational requirements in connection with ML investigations and prosecutions, predicate offences and TF. Belgium provided a number of case studies confirming this. Operational analysis 566. The CTIF plays a key role in producing financial intelligence, conducting in-depth operational analyses which it disseminates proactively or on request to the competent national authorities and its foreign counterparts. Its ML/TF department, comprising 20 analysts, including two dedicated to TF analysis, is responsible for the operational processing of STRs. This is considered to be sufficient in terms of capacity. Among the 18 generalists, some have specialisations in virtual assets, the diamond sector or tax fraud. 567. The CTIF handles files at a steady pace, with an average of 100 to 200 files per analyst (depending on their level of experience). Approximately one file is handled per analyst per day, but the analysis work involves managing several files at the same time and can be slowed down by time delays in receiving responses from external sources. The average time taken by the CTIF to process suspicious transaction reports is approximately three months. However, some files, particularly those considered urgent, can be processed within a few days to a few weeks. These processing times reflect the complexity of the analysis and enhancement work carried out by the CTIF to produce actionable financial intelligence. It should be noted that these statistics are influenced by certain exceptional cases, such as a file opened in 2015, which remained formally open for 2 659 days due to the wait for external triggers, before finally being forwarded in 2023 following a request received nine days before dissemination. 568. The CTIF has adopted a priority-based approach to optimise the processing of files. This process is based on the targeted selection of STRs according to risk criteria, enabling certain categories of files to be processed more quickly. For example, around 2021, STRs related to the Sky ECC case (see IO.7) were dealt with as a priority. Similarly, STRs relating to Brazilian networks involving offsetting schemes were dealt with proactively, with a view to reducing the number of spontaneous communications. 569. Screened STRs are not automatically subject to in-depth operational analysis, but they are fed into a database that provides essential information to support future investigations. The aim of this approach is to quickly identify STRs that have the greatest potential for investigation, while reducing the workload of analysts and ensuring more efficient use of resources. 570. The processing of urgent files varies greatly depending on the severity and the steps required. Thanks to its direct access to databases and inter-agency cooperation, the CTIF can quickly obtain the information needed to process certain complex files within a day if necessary. The CTIF also has the right to block suspicious transactions and has a five-day window to do so, which has been found to be enough time to analyse the situation and prepare any information to be sent to the judicial authorities (see IO.8). 571. The CTIF makes use of several tools to ensure that its analysts adopt an effective and consistent approach to their work: · Internal procedure notes defining investigation methods, database searches, information gathering from reporting entities and authorities, and file management and forwarding. · An STR scoring system that prioritises STRs based on the risk inherent in each case and directs resources to the most critical cases. · A summary of reporting obligations specifying the information that must be provided to the various competent authorities. · An international cooperation matrix for managing communications with foreign FIUs while protecting personal data. · Internal training for analysts, including monthly newsletters, RADAR notes and workshops provided by other institutions. 572. Operational analysis relies on close interaction with other departments within the CTIF, particularly the Triage and Enhancement Department and the Strategic Analysis Department, which are part of the same division. This collaboration facilitates the sharing of information and optimises the quality of investigations. 573. The CTIF has IT tools to carry out its operational analyses, but their use remains limited given the increasing volume and complexity of financial data. The lack of advanced technological tools, such as specialised software, data mining or automated analysis solutions, makes it difficult to manage information flows effectively and undermines the analysis of financial flows, data traceability and the strategic use of data. Strategic analysis 574. The Analysis department, comprising four analysts, produces in-depth strategic analyses to identify emerging trends. Drawing on the 2023 Money Laundering National Risk Analysis (ML NRA), international trends (observed by FATF, Europol, foreign FIUs), national developments and internal information, such as that from operational analysis, this department develops targeted strategic analyses that enhance authorities’ response capabilities. 575. Since 2019, the CTIF has produced 12 strategic analyses targeting criminal threats, money laundering techniques and at-risk sectors and countries. This work has identified patterns linked to drug trafficking, organised crime groups and fraud, as well as sophisticated methods such as money laundering through the Brazilian network, the abuse of corporate vehicles and underground banking. This analytical approach is broadly in line with Belgium’s risk profile, as outlined in the ML NRA, which highlights in particular the predominance of cash, the role of professional money launderers, fictitious legal structures and investment in real estate (see IO.1). Some analyses, regularly updated through to 2024, adopt a cross-cutting approach, drawing on both lessons learned from operational analysis and broader strategic insights. For example, the 2024 analysis on ML linked to cyber-enabled fraud is based on a growing number of STRs received by the CTIF, while placing these findings in the context of trends identified at the international level (FATF and Europol). In another note from 2020, focused on Brazilian networks, the analysis highlights a money laundering scheme involving multiple criminal offences, with a combination of several predicate offences such as serious social security and tax fraud, human trafficking, drug trafficking and fraud, often linked to cyber fraud. The published note includes typical money laundering patterns (red flags), a detailed description of credit/debit transactions and an analysis of financial flows, particularly to Asia. Box 6.2. Alignment of the CTIF’s strategic analyses with the main national threats, in particular · Money laundering from drug trafficking: regularly identified as a national priority, this is covered in detail in the analyses (2019, 2023). · Professional money launderers and structured networks: addressed through studies on professional money launderers (2024), the Brazilian network (2022) and underground banking (2023). · Abusive corporate vehicles and tax/social security fraud: adequately addressed through analyses on the abuse of structures (2022) and the creation of shell or sham companies. · Fraud and cyber fraud: an emerging issue that is addressed in detail in the 2024 analysis. · Organised crime groups (OCGs): analyses focusing on Italian, Albanian and Chinese OCGs demonstrate a targeted approach based on origin or criminal community. · At-risk countries and sectors: Dubai, gambling and, to a certain extent, diamonds are covered. · Cross-border cash movements through Belgian airports (2024). 576. Although the CTIF’s strategic analyses cover several of the risks identified in the ML and TF NRAs, a number of key threats are still only partially covered or not covered at all in these analyses. The widespread use of cash, although addressed in several strategic analyses, is not dealt with in a cross-cutting manner, particularly in relation to cash-intensive sectors. No dedicated analysis has yet been undertaken on virtual assets, despite their growing role in ML/TF typologies (see IO.7 and IO.9). Similarly, fictitious legal arrangements, shell companies and sham entities, although addressed in the analysis on the misuse of corporate vehicles (2022), could be examined in greater depth, particularly with regard to the use of straw men, which is prevalent in the majority of ML cases. No distinct strategic analysis appears to have been conducted on real estate, despite it being identified as an at-risk sector for ML. Furthermore, emerging risks associated with the use of virtual IBANs and new financial services (fintech, neobanks) have not been explored in depth. Lastly, the TF perspective is largely absent from strategic analyses, even though the 2023 TF NRA highlights specific threats related to microfinance, the use of small amounts of cash and new payment methods. 577. All of these strategic analyses are shared internally with CTIF staff. However, only four have been forwarded to the competent authorities, which limits their operational scope. These strategic analyses are nevertheless essential tools for understanding risks, raising awareness among relevant stakeholders and alerting them to emerging threats. At present, their dissemination is still too limited, particularly among the reporting entities, which hampers the early detection of money laundering patterns and reduces authorities’ responsiveness. The lack of proactive dissemination, even with redacted versions tailoring the content to different audiences, limits their practical impact on raising awareness among relevant stakeholders. 578. The CTIF develops other high-quality strategic output for internal distribution, such as analysis notes, information notes, analysis sheets and a biannual strategic bulletin called ‘RADAR’ focusing on established trends, risk areas and early warning signs. This document has been shared with the Strategic Analysis department of the Federal Judicial Police. 579. The CTIF’s publication of annual reports, typological analyses and practical guides for reporting entities (Vademecum) provides reporting entities, competent authorities and other stakeholders with key tools to improve their understanding of the risks and adjust their mechanisms for detecting suspicious transactions. However, given the low level of implementation of AML/CFT obligations and the sometimes limited understanding that some reporting entities have of the risks, the visibility and effective use of these documents are still major challenges. More targeted dissemination and monitoring of their impact are needed to maximise their usefulness and improve the effectiveness of ML/TF measures. 580. The Intelligence Coordination Centre (comprising two data analysts) has implemented tools to support operational and strategic analysis. However, these tools do not include advanced technological solutions (such as analysis software, data mining solutions, etc.) that can process large volumes of data efficiently. This limits the in-depth use of CTIF data, particularly for proactive strategic analysis aimed at detecting and anticipating new trends or types of ML/TF. 581. Although the implementation of the goAML system at the end of 2024 is expected to improve the management of incoming information (classification of STRs, data structuring, timeliness of STRs, etc.) and make it easier to provide feedback to reporting entities and supervisory authorities, this tool still does not allow the available data to be used to its full potential, particularly for operational and strategic analysis purposes. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 582. When an analysis uncovers serious signs of ML/TF, the CTIF forwards its findings to the judicial authorities (district or federal prosecutor). However, the AML Law does not allow the CTIF to share this information directly with the police. In human trafficking or social security fraud cases, a copy is also sent to the labour prosecution service (which specialises in social security fraud). In 2024, the CTIF forwarded 3,054 files (new files and additional information) to the judicial authorities, working with a team of approximately 25 full-time-equivalent analysts and administrative staff, equating to an average of 122 files forwarded per analyst over the year. This volume is considered satisfactory given the resources available. 583. Between 2020 and 2024, the CTIF forwarded 6,389 new cases to the judicial authorities, involving an estimated total of €9.98 billion in illegal proceeds. At the same time, 8 131 pieces of additional information were provided to supplement cases already in progress, involving an additional €1.61 billion. Over this five-year period, the judicial authorities therefore benefited from information from 14,520 STRs, for a combined total of €11.58 billion. In addition, in 2,105 cases, a copy of the file was also sent to the labour prosecution service, particularly where the cases concerned offences related to social security fraud or human trafficking. However, a significant proportion of these referrals do not result in an investigation being opened, owing to a lack of sufficient resources available to the judicial authorities (see IO.7). 584. Furthermore, the CTIF shares and communicates information with the various services/authorities listed below: Table 6.4. Communication by the CTIF (based on Art. 83 of the AML/CFT Law) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total SPF Finance (Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service - CAF) 271 268 363 675 683 2260 Customs &amp; Excise 10 35 15 23 13 96 SPF Social Security (SIRS) 251 242 368 583 471 1915 SPF Economy (for investigation) 24 17 4 20 15 80 FSMA (for investigation) - - 2 6 9 17 OCSC 39 50 56 68 110 323 Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) 142 97 85 51 35 410 State Security (VSSE) 142 97 85 51 35 410 General Intelligence and Army Security Service (SGRS) 142 97 85 51 35 410 Banque de données communes (BDC) 31 8 30 11 13 93 General Treasury Department - - - 4 3 7 OLAF - - - 3 1 4 585. In addition, the CTIF continues to cooperate actively with the three AML/CFT supervisory authorities – mainly the BNB, the FSMA and SPF Economy – by exchanging information on, among other things, the reporting activities of reporting entities, any AML/CFT non-compliance identified during the operational analysis of files, the results of individual risk analyses or inspections carried out by supervisory authorities, their respective expertise on specific topics, and reports following referral to the prosecutor’s office of cases involving reporting entities. This exchange of information is evidence of ongoing inter-institutional cooperation, which helps to strengthen the supervisory chain. Table ‎ 6.5. Exchange of information between the CTIF and supervisory authorities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total BNB 13 21 21 17 18 90 FSMA 3 6 13 8 5 35 SPF Economy 28 14 15 38 30 125 SPF Finance (Bpost) 1 1 1 1 0 4 National Chamber of Notaries 2 1 4 3 10 11 Institute for Tax Advisors &amp; Accountants (ITAA) 2 7 9 1 7 26 Supervisory Board of Company Auditors 1 0 3 4 2 10 Bar Associations 0 1 1 6 4 12 Gaming Commission 2 2 0 2 2 8 Box 6.3. Example illustrating the relevance of CTIF communications i. To the FSMA in guiding its supervisory activities Exchanges between the CTIF and the FSMA led in 2023 to a thematic supervisory action targeting the reporting activities of bureaux de change. This initiative came in response to observations made by the CTIF, shared at a regular meeting, concerning an abnormal concentration of STRs from one operator in 2022, a significant decrease in STRs from others, and a level of quality deemed insufficient across the sector as a whole. The supervisory action was subsequently incorporated into the on-site inspections carried out by the FSMA. ii. For more targeted supervision by SPF Economy Between 2021 and 2023, these exchanges led to 17 files being opened, six of which resulted in reports, relating in particular to diamond traders, company service providers (business centres) and cash payments. This was done when a report was also forwarded to the prosecutor’s office. The data provided by the CTIF enabled SPF Economy to target reporting entities more effectively, as well as the ‘client’ files for analysis, particularly in the company service providers sector. iii. In the notarial sector In 2022, two notarial firms were reported for alleged non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations in similar situations involving the formation of at-risk companies (susceptible sectors, foreign founders, business introducers, shared addresses). These reports were referred to the executive committee of the National Chamber of Notaries, which initiated administrative sanction proceedings for failure to comply with the obligations of the AML Law. One of the two cases resulted in an administrative fine for non-compliance with the ban on disclosure and failure to report suspicious transactions. The other case was dismissed. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 586. The financial intelligence provided by the CTIF is tailored to the operational needs of the competent authorities, particularly in complex investigations involving organised crime, serious tax fraud and social security fraud. Over the years, the forwarded files have helped to document the interconnected nature of these predicate offences, highlighting examples of money laundering involving multiple criminal offences (such as the Brazilian networks). These referrals regularly reveal criminal structures that use sophisticated financial offsetting techniques, which are characteristic of organised networks. This type of information, which is only available to the CTIF, provides the judicial and law enforcement authorities with critical added value by helping them to understand financial flows, identify beneficial owners and strengthen financial evidence in investigations. 587. Feedback has been generally positive, with prosecutors, investigating judges and police services highlighting the quality and relevance of CTIF analyses, which are disseminated both proactively and on request, thereby helping to open new investigations and strengthen ongoing ones. See below for practical examples of the use of financial intelligence, particularly in cases involving high ML risks. Box 6.4. Example illustrating how CTIF financial intelligence meets the needs of competent authorities through a Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) typology Between 2022 and 2024, the CTIF submitted several files documenting international trade-based money laundering (TBML) schemes combined with offsetting mechanisms. In these cases, Belgian companies active in the construction sector made payments to wholesalers located in Asia or the EU for the purchase of goods that were actually intended for retail companies linked to criminal networks. These trade flows were used to recycle the proceeds of illegal activities, particularly drug trafficking. The goods involved ranged from everyday consumer goods (e.g. textiles imported from China) to luxury goods (e.g. watches and top-of-the-range vehicles). These files also revealed associated customs fraud, such as undervaluation. Outcome: This type of financial intelligence has provided critical added value to competent authorities to help them understand the economic structures used and target the entities involved. Box 6.5. Example illustrating the role of CTIF in the early detection and classification of ‘Brazilian’ networks’ ‘Brazilian’ networks, characterised by the use of short-lived companies in the construction and industrial cleaning sectors, often involve Portuguese or Brazilian nationals. Through analysis of DOS reports received, CTIF has documented the evolution of these structures towards increasingly complex arrangements, combining social fraud, undeclared work and money laundering. Results: These observations have raised awareness among judicial authorities of the growing seriousness of the phenomenon and its economic impact, directing their attention towards structured networks of shell companies operating according to repetitive patterns. 588. Since 2017, the number of TF-related STRs has been steadily falling, a trend linked to the shift towards microfinance models, which are more difficult to detect (see IO.1 and IO.9). Despite this challenge, the CTIF has played a key role, recognised by the competent authorities, in detecting TF-related networks. For example, the Syrian Wallets project has led to many TF cases being opened (see box in section 9.1 of IO.9). 589. In terms of ML, a significant proportion of the files forwarded by the CTIF are not used to their full potential. Between 2019 and 2024, 43% of files forwarded by the CTIF to the judicial authorities were closed without further action (‘no criminal prosecution’). This situation is primarily due to the lack of resources available to the police and, as far as can be determined, not to the quality of the information provided by the CTIF (see IO.7). 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 590. In cases of serious tax fraud, whether organised or not, cooperation between the CTIF and SPF Finance’s Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service (CAF) provides valuable additional support to the CAF’s anti-tax fraud procedures. The CTIF regularly sends relevant information to the CAF, at the same time as it sends files to the judicial authorities. All files forwarded by the CTIF are entered into the StrirFraude application of the Special Tax Inspectorate (ISI), where they trigger preliminary investigations and, if necessary, tax investigations. The significant increase in referrals from the CTIF to the CAF (from 268 in 2021 to 683 in 2024) reflects the ongoing improvement in the exchange of information and the development of financial intelligence by other competent authorities, in particular by incorporating the CTIF’s analyses. Furthermore, if the CAF detects any signs of ML while carrying out its work, it informs the CTIF (see table 6.1). 591. In cases of suspected serious tax fraud, the tax authorities refer the matter to the relevant prosecutor’s office, which decides whether it should be dealt with through criminal or administrative tax proceedings. These files involve complex fraud schemes, including the use of offshore structures or fraudulent structures in the diamond sector. The tax authorities refer around 150 files involving serious tax fraud, whether organised or not, to the judicial authorities each year. However, these cases do not necessarily result in money laundering investigations relating to aggravated tax fraud, and the judicial authorities therefore do not make full use of the financial information available to the tax authorities in ML cases. The proportion of ML cases linked to tax fraud referred to prosecutor’s offices between 2019 and 2023 was 4%, which seems low given that tax fraud is identified as one of the most prevalent ML offences (see IO.7). 592. Customs authorities collect information on declarations of cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). When a customs offence is detected, a report is sent to the prosecutor’s office. They also send reports to the prosecutor’s office when no offence has been detected but there is suspicion of criminal activity. The CTIF has access to this data via the Customs Information System (CIS) database and uses it mainly for strategic analysis purposes. The information available may include identity, circumstances, sometimes a hearing or photos, indications or suspicions of ML/TF, and other information from customs databases. In addition, customs authorities also respond to requests for information received from the CTIF. However, this customs information is not used to its full potential by the authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting ML. The number of reports forwarded by customs to the judicial authorities remains relatively low. Between 2019 and October 2024, 149 reports/records were forwarded following inspections carried out at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi international airports (see IO.8). Given the prevalence of cash in ML/TF cases, this underutilisation of customs information by the judicial authorities is a significant shortcoming." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="7.2.1. Prosecutions 646. Between 2019 and 2024, the Belgian authorities prosecuted 2 455 ML cases (less than 6% of the total number of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). In line with the findings relating to investigations, Belgium prosecutes a small proportion of money laundering cases, whose profile is not entirely consistent with the main types of criminality (i.e. drug trafficking, social security and tax fraud) . The proportion of cases prosecuted for autonomous ML is not known. ML cases resulting in prosecution are relatively less complex and mainly concern domestic ML. Based on the cases presented, the majority of ML prosecutions and convictions relate to self-laundering and to perpetrators at the bottom of the criminal chain. Belgium does not prioritise the tackling of criminal networks, although some complex cases involving criminal organisations have been taken to court and resulted in convictions. 647. Major cases exposing offsetting schemes and drug trafficking (Sky ECC) have resulted in prosecutions and convictions, demonstrating that the authorities are capable of prosecuting complex ML cases generating significant profits (see boxes on the Clown and Pondjes cases). However, Belgium lacks the strategy and resources to prioritise these cases. 648. The legal framework in Belgium allows ML cases to be prosecuted and convictions handed down without having to prove the predicate offence. According to established case law, [181] it is only necessary to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the financial gains have no lawful origin, which reverses the burden of proof to some extent. This framework should make it easier to prove ML, particularly ML as a stand-alone offence, and optimise the use of resources allocated to prosecuting ML. The opportunity to treat ML as a standalone offence is addressed in the TRIM circular. However, the authorities do not make sufficient use of this , even though it would make it easier to prosecute ML, particularly for predicate offences committed abroad. Box 7.3. Court of Cassation case law on the exclusion of lawful origin The Belgian Court of Cassation has consistently held that sums of money converted and/or invested which cannot be proven, based on the circumstances of the case (factual assessment), to have been obtained through legal activities, constitute financial gains of unlawful origin, the concealment or disguise of which constitutes money laundering (see, in particular, Cass., 21 March 2006, RG. no. P.06.0034.N, Pas., 2006, 165; Cass., 12 June 2013, RG no. P.13.0312.F, Pas. 2013, 363; Cass., 5 February 2019, RG no. P.18.1010.N). For example, the Court of Cassation ruled that ‘in order for the perpetrator of ML offences within the meaning of Article 505, paragraph 1, points 2°, 3° and 4° of the Penal Code to be found guilty and convicted, it is sufficient that the unlawful provenance or origin of the items referred to in Article 42, point 3°, of the Penal Code and the perpetrator’s knowledge thereof be established, without it being necessary for the criminal court to know the specific offence, provided that, based on the facts, the court can rule out any lawful provenance or origin. (…) The unlawful origin of the items may also be inferred from the fact that there is no credible evidence that their origin may be lawful.’ (Cass., 17 December 2013, RG no. P.13.1354.N). 649. Lastly, procedural aspects at the stage when formal charges are brought (before the “Chambre du conseil” and the “Chambre des Mises en Accusation”) slow down the progress of prosecutions. On average, it takes two years before a case is referred to a court at that stage of the proceedings. The lack of procedural time limits before these Chambers allows the defence to lodge multiple appeals, resulting in sometimes significant delays in the processing of cases. Added to this are the times for bringing cases before the courts, which can take another year in the district of Liège, for example. 7.2.2. Convictions 650. The number of natural persons convicted of ML has increased since 2019 (see table below). However, this increase in numbers should be considered with caution as these convictions are largely obtained in relatively straightforward domestic ML cases. The information provided does not reveal whether Belgium prosecutes and hands down convictions for different types of money laundering, including autonomous ML, self-laundering, ML by a third party, and ML of proceeds from predicate offences committed abroad. Belgium has also not provided figures on the number of cases dismissed or resulting in acquittals. 651. A small number of legal persons have been convicted since 2021. Proportionally, convictions of legal persons account for around 3% of total convictions handed down between 2022 and 2024. This proportion reflects the fact that legal entities are most often mere vehicles with no real economic substance, created deliberately by natural persons and which may have ceased to exist and no longer have any funds at the time of criminal proceedings. Table 7.1. Number of persons convicted for ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024* (estimate) Total Persons convicted 287 803 1 005 879 769 3 743 Of which natural persons - 758 983 860 725 3 326 Of which legal persons - 45 22 19 44 130 Note: Offences committed for attempted ML are included in these figures. *Data for 2024 is not yet complete Source: Criminal Policy Department – Criminal Records. Box 7.4. Pondjes Case This case illustrates Belgium’s ability to detect ML activities involving offsetting schemes, estimated to be worth at least EUR26.5 million and linked to an international criminal organisation following the perpetration of customs offences, and to secure convictions, although some of the sanctions imposed are relatively lenient. An investigation was opened in November 2019 by the Brussels Halle Vilvoorde prosecutor’s office into the activities of criminal organisations and ML, following the interception by customs officials of six cash couriers at Zaventem airport who were flying to Turkey. In June 2024, the Brussels Court of First Instance convicted 78 of the 81 defendants. The three leaders of the criminal organisation were sentenced to seven to ten years’ imprisonment, while the other defendants received sentences of one to four years, some with partial suspension. Fines were imposed ranging from EUR 16,000 to EUR200,000. Confiscation orders were made for £935,695 in undeclared cash, as well as equivalent-value confiscations of over EUR 26.5 million. Footnotes [181] Belgian Court of Cassation, 17 December 2013, P.13.1354.N." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="7.2.1. Prosecutions 646. Between 2019 and 2024, the Belgian authorities prosecuted 2 455 ML cases (less than 6% of the total number of cases referred to prosecutor’s offices). In line with the findings relating to investigations, Belgium prosecutes a small proportion of money laundering cases, whose profile is not entirely consistent with the main types of criminality (i.e. drug trafficking, social security and tax fraud) . The proportion of cases prosecuted for autonomous ML is not known. ML cases resulting in prosecution are relatively less complex and mainly concern domestic ML. Based on the cases presented, the majority of ML prosecutions and convictions relate to self-laundering and to perpetrators at the bottom of the criminal chain. Belgium does not prioritise the tackling of criminal networks, although some complex cases involving criminal organisations have been taken to court and resulted in convictions. 647. Major cases exposing offsetting schemes and drug trafficking (Sky ECC) have resulted in prosecutions and convictions, demonstrating that the authorities are capable of prosecuting complex ML cases generating significant profits (see boxes on the Clown and Pondjes cases). However, Belgium lacks the strategy and resources to prioritise these cases. 648. The legal framework in Belgium allows ML cases to be prosecuted and convictions handed down without having to prove the predicate offence. According to established case law, [181] it is only necessary to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the financial gains have no lawful origin, which reverses the burden of proof to some extent. This framework should make it easier to prove ML, particularly ML as a stand-alone offence, and optimise the use of resources allocated to prosecuting ML. The opportunity to treat ML as a standalone offence is addressed in the TRIM circular. However, the authorities do not make sufficient use of this , even though it would make it easier to prosecute ML, particularly for predicate offences committed abroad. Box 7.3. Court of Cassation case law on the exclusion of lawful origin The Belgian Court of Cassation has consistently held that sums of money converted and/or invested which cannot be proven, based on the circumstances of the case (factual assessment), to have been obtained through legal activities, constitute financial gains of unlawful origin, the concealment or disguise of which constitutes money laundering (see, in particular, Cass., 21 March 2006, RG. no. P.06.0034.N, Pas., 2006, 165; Cass., 12 June 2013, RG no. P.13.0312.F, Pas. 2013, 363; Cass., 5 February 2019, RG no. P.18.1010.N). For example, the Court of Cassation ruled that ‘in order for the perpetrator of ML offences within the meaning of Article 505, paragraph 1, points 2°, 3° and 4° of the Penal Code to be found guilty and convicted, it is sufficient that the unlawful provenance or origin of the items referred to in Article 42, point 3°, of the Penal Code and the perpetrator’s knowledge thereof be established, without it being necessary for the criminal court to know the specific offence, provided that, based on the facts, the court can rule out any lawful provenance or origin. (…) The unlawful origin of the items may also be inferred from the fact that there is no credible evidence that their origin may be lawful.’ (Cass., 17 December 2013, RG no. P.13.1354.N). 649. Lastly, procedural aspects at the stage when formal charges are brought (before the “Chambre du conseil” and the “Chambre des Mises en Accusation”) slow down the progress of prosecutions. On average, it takes two years before a case is referred to a court at that stage of the proceedings. The lack of procedural time limits before these Chambers allows the defence to lodge multiple appeals, resulting in sometimes significant delays in the processing of cases. Added to this are the times for bringing cases before the courts, which can take another year in the district of Liège, for example. 7.2.2. Convictions 650. The number of natural persons convicted of ML has increased since 2019 (see table below). However, this increase in numbers should be considered with caution as these convictions are largely obtained in relatively straightforward domestic ML cases. The information provided does not reveal whether Belgium prosecutes and hands down convictions for different types of money laundering, including autonomous ML, self-laundering, ML by a third party, and ML of proceeds from predicate offences committed abroad. Belgium has also not provided figures on the number of cases dismissed or resulting in acquittals. 651. A small number of legal persons have been convicted since 2021. Proportionally, convictions of legal persons account for around 3% of total convictions handed down between 2022 and 2024. This proportion reflects the fact that legal entities are most often mere vehicles with no real economic substance, created deliberately by natural persons and which may have ceased to exist and no longer have any funds at the time of criminal proceedings. Table 7.1. Number of persons convicted for ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024* (estimate) Total Persons convicted 287 803 1 005 879 769 3 743 Of which natural persons - 758 983 860 725 3 326 Of which legal persons - 45 22 19 44 130 Note: Offences committed for attempted ML are included in these figures. *Data for 2024 is not yet complete Source: Criminal Policy Department – Criminal Records. Box 7.4. Pondjes Case This case illustrates Belgium’s ability to detect ML activities involving offsetting schemes, estimated to be worth at least EUR26.5 million and linked to an international criminal organisation following the perpetration of customs offences, and to secure convictions, although some of the sanctions imposed are relatively lenient. An investigation was opened in November 2019 by the Brussels Halle Vilvoorde prosecutor’s office into the activities of criminal organisations and ML, following the interception by customs officials of six cash couriers at Zaventem airport who were flying to Turkey. In June 2024, the Brussels Court of First Instance convicted 78 of the 81 defendants. The three leaders of the criminal organisation were sentenced to seven to ten years’ imprisonment, while the other defendants received sentences of one to four years, some with partial suspension. Fines were imposed ranging from EUR 16,000 to EUR200,000. Confiscation orders were made for £935,695 in undeclared cash, as well as equivalent-value confiscations of over EUR 26.5 million. Footnotes [181] Belgian Court of Cassation, 17 December 2013, P.13.1354.N." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.2.Confiscation of proceeds instrumentalities and property of equivalent value from foreign and domestic predicates, and proceeds located abroad 8.2.1. Identification of property and assets liable to seizure 668. In the 2015 MER, the FATF noted that Belgium needed to conduct financial investigations in a more systematic way. Since then, financial investigations have been carried out more frequently, but not yet sufficiently given the country’s risks exposure. Law enforcement agencies have highlighted that, since 2015, there has been a better understanding of the importance of provisional seizing of assets and therefore of conducting financial investigations. Since 2022, the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General has recommended that ‘asset investigation teams’ (PLUK teams) be set up in each FJP unit to work with investigators on the financial aspects of investigations. These teams, which already existed in seven units, including the Brussels and Antwerp FJP units, have been set up in the remaining units as of 2025. [188] Across Belgium, a total of 66 financial investigators are assigned to these PLUK asset investigation teams. The 2022 FJP Directive recommends that investigators draw up an investigative plan with prosecutors to determine the necessary measures for recovering illegal assets. This is a step in the right direction but has not yet been fully implemented in practice. The Federal Judicial Police stressed the importance of this change in approach, given that most investigations have so far focused on the predicate offences, without giving adequate consideration to the illicit assets laundered (see IO.7). 669. The way in which financial investigations are conducted varies from one prosecutor’s office to another. They may be conducted separately from the investigation into the predicate offences or as part of a single investigation. Illicit assets located in Belgium are identified through several channels, including the central register for financial accounts and contracts (PCC – see IO.5), the Banque Carrefour des Entreprises database, the register of ultimate beneficial owners (UBOs), and the JustBan register of professional bans (see IO.5). Law enforcement authorities also have access to data held by the CTIF via liaison magistrates and the FJP officers seconded to it (see IO.6) and, to a limited extent, to tax and asset information held by SPF Finance and information held by the social security inspection services. The land registry, requests for banking information and searches are other channels for identifying illegal assets. 670. The Belgian authorities are also trying to determine whether it is possible to seize assets located abroad and are doing so with the help of their foreign counterparts through informal contacts arranged by the OCSC, which activates the ARO/CARIN networks (see section 8.2). 671. With regard to ML, identifying and recovering assets is central to the TRIM criteria that have guided the opening and handling of investigations since the end of 2022 (see IO.7). Criterion R, recoup, aims to assess the potential for recovering property or financial assets that could be confiscated. In practice, the authorities apply this criterion in a narrow way and start an investigation based on a criterion of profitability if they believe that they can immediately seize available and accessible assets during the initial stages of processing a case. In practice, seizures are mainly limited to the proceeds of the predicate offence (e.g. the resale price of cocaine in relation to the quantities trafficked, amounts evaded in social security fraud) and do not extend to funds already laundered and proceeds generated by ML activities. In ML cases involving criminal organisations, only cash constituting the network’s ‘cash float’ is seized; cash that has already been laundered in Belgium or transferred abroad is not being adequately pursued by the authorities. The ” auditorat du travail ”, responsible for social security frauds, highlighted that there is little point in prosecuting ML offences in the social fraud cases they handle, as ML does not make it any easier to obtain confiscation orders. A similar observation was made by the authorities in relation to drug trafficking. Furthermore, the high rate of cases being closed for discretionary reasons (lack of police resources) means that the potential for recovering illegal assets in some cases is not fully considered without in-depth financial investigations (see IO.7). 672. There is no guidance for investigators and prosecutors on identifying assets and on seizing and confiscating ML proceeds. Since 2022, the FJP has introduced training to familiarise financial investigators and judicial officers with the legal framework applicable for ML and with some seizure practices (e.g. virtual assets). The operational and practical aspects are not yet sufficiently covered in these trainings. 8.2.2. Provisional measures 673. Urgent precautionary freezing – The Belgian legal system allows for an urgent request for precautionary freezing of a transaction even before a criminal investigation has been opened (Art. 80 of the AML Law). The CTIF has the right to object to the execution of financial transactions reported by reporting entities and any related transactions for a period of five working days. [189] Box 8.1. Example of urgent precautionary freezing due to suspected ML In a case involving suspected ML from organised crime, tax and social fraud, the CTIF froze the account balance of an entity suspected of being a shell company used in a case involving Brazilian networks, which stood at more than EUR 50,000, which was then paid to the tax authorities. An investigation is currently being conducted at the Brussels prosecutor’s office. 674. At the beginning of 2022, the CTIF simplified the procedures for urgent request for precautionary measure to process requests more efficiently. The CTIF also used this urgent freezing procedure on its own initiative as part of a project to analyse the data available to it in order to dismantle the networks involved in ML cases related to offsetting schemes (see IO.1). 675. The number of transactions subject to urgent request for precautionary freezing is growing, from 29 transactions in 2019 to 110 transactions in 2024 (see table 8.1). These measures are a useful tool, although the Belgian authorities do not provide any details on the extent to which they subsequently lead to the seizure and confiscation of illegal assets. Their effectiveness is also increasingly being challenged by advances in payment technologies, such as instant and electronic payments, which shorten the time available to take action. In addition, the targeted bank accounts are often used as transit accounts, with balances that tend to be kept low, making it more difficult to effectively implement measures to prevent transactions and seize assets. Table 8.1. Urgent requests for precautionary freezing ordered by the CTIF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Amount (EUR millions) 3.77 30.58 7.04 4.72 4.49 9.63 60.23 No. of transactions 26 33 44 56 62 110 331 Source: CTIF 676. Seizures – Belgium has a comprehensive legal framework for seizures, which can be ordered directly by prosecutors and investigating judges without prior authorisation from a judge. Seizures were used in an increasing number of ML cases over the period from 2019 to 2024 (see table below), including for large amounts. Assets worth approximately EUR 30 million were seized. Approximately one quarter to one third of the amounts seized and managed by the OCSC were in 5 681 cases involving suspected ML totalling nearly EUR 166 million. However, Belgium often takes an approach that is still too limited, focusing on the seizure of assets and valuables that are immediately available (see IO.7). Table 8.2. Total sums seized for predicate offences, ML and TF (EUR million) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total All offences 93 108.2 104.7 114.9 109.8 110.3 640.9 Drug trafficking 8.8 15.9 14.2 11.7 12.8 15.390 78.81 Tax fraud 2.3 9 3.5 2.2 3.2 5.618 25.81 Social fraud 5.28 3.72 12.13 5.53 6.65 6.31 39.62 Scam 5.7 4.6 4.5 6.6 7.6 9.985 39.02 Organised crime 13.5 6.5 11.2 12.8 15 13.392 72.43 ML 22.7 21.6 31.5 22.7 27.3 39.6 165.66 TF 0.014 0.265 0.071 0.007 0.017 0.004 0.378 Note: These amounts correspond to the sums seized and managed by the OCSC. Due to a file coding procedure, some sums seized in relation to ML may not have been coded. Source: OCSC statistical data Table 8.3. Total value of assets in kind seized and managed by the OCSC for ML/TF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Seized (ML) 5 120 147 160 125 1 018 512 3 850 479 18812579 1464134 30425975 Investigations 9 4 6 9 14 10 52 Seized (TF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Source: OCSC statistical data 677. The Sky ECC case led to a significant number of seizures by the Belgian authorities, including abroad (totalling approximately EUR 215 million), some of which were in ML cases that resulted in confiscation. Nevertheless, the overall volume of seizures in Belgium did not increase significantly, due to resource constraints on the police, who had to limit seizures in other cases. 678. The total amount seized in ML cases appears limited overall given the country’s risk profile, dominated by organised crime and significant exposure to drug trafficking and social and tax fraud, generating substantial illegal proceeds, some of which are laundered in Belgium. The Belgian authorities explain that the limited number of seizures in ML cases is due to the difficulties involved in locating assets outside Belgium, as Belgium would be mainly as a transit country. This raises questions about the proactive nature and timing of the measures taken by the Belgian authorities to curb the movement of illegal assets out of Belgium and the flow of illegal funds remaining in Belgium, for example in the case of polycriminal ML activities involving offsetting schemes (see IO.7). 679. In terms of TF, the value of seizures handled by the OCSC is relatively low but appears consistent with the country’s risk profile, characterised in particular by microfinance (see table above and IO.1 and 9). Over the period from 2019 to 2024, seizures totalling EUR 378 000 were made in 27 TF cases. 680. Analysis of data decrypted in the Sky ECC case revealed a growing use of virtual assets by criminals. The Belgian authorities have demonstrated that they are capable of seizing virtual assets. Between 2019 and 2024, a total of almost EUR 28 million in virtual currency was seized across 59 investigation files covering all offences, including EUR 20 million in 48 ML investigations. These seizures were made possible by the existence of specialised officers within the FJP who are skilled in specific types of analytical work. The Belgian authorities explain that seizures and confiscations of virtual currency have been limited in ML/TF cases due to their complexity, which requires longer judicial proceedings. Table 8.4. Seizure of virtual assets in ML/TF cases 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Total virtual assets (EUR) 261 337 37 393 3 607 359 1 936 615 7 439 589 7 067 000 20 349 293 No. ML files 0 0 0 43 4 0 47 Total virtual assets (EUR) 0 0 0 0 0 8 737 8 737 No. TF files 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Source: OCSC statistical data 8.2.3. Asset management by the OCSC 681. The OCSC manages seized assets in a relatively effective manner. It sells certain seized assets prior to judgement to avoid depreciation. A pre-judgement sale results in the funds being deposited in the OCSC’s account for the duration of the proceedings. Between 2019 and 2023, disposal decisions were taken in 4 305 court cases involving vehicles. These were sold through Fin Shops for a total of EUR 20.88 million. In addition, the OCSC has set up special mechanisms for managing virtual assets (see box below). Box 8.2. Example illustrating the capability to seize and manage virtual assets In a case involving drugs and criminal conspiracy, significant seizures were made including cash, luxury watches, sports cars and virtual assets. An initial seizure of approximately EUR 6.5 million in virtual assets was made in October 2023 on an exchange platform. The seizure and management of the seized assets took place as part of a public-private partnership set up by the OCSC, with the police automatically creating different virtual asset portfolios for each seizure on the various platforms. The seizure was therefore effective as soon as the assets were transferred to accounts opened with the OCSC’s private partner. The seized assets could then be managed directly via the platform. Consequently, the OCSC sold part of the seized virtual assets for EUR 2.2 million. A new seizure was carried out in September 2024. The OCSC still manages virtual assets worth EUR 6.3 million. 8.2.4. Confiscation and enforcement of confiscation orders 682. Belgium has a legal framework that allows assets to be confiscated where no lawful origin can be established, [190] which should make it easier to confiscate proceeds, instrumentalities of crime or property of equivalent value (see TC Annex, R 4). Belgian case law considers that property obtained through money laundering constitutes a financial gain derived from that transaction and may be subject to confiscation. [191] Confiscations have been ordered following convictions in absentia , as well as in cases where sentencing has been deferred or a simple conviction has been handed down. 683. However, Belgium cannot enforce confiscation measures without a prior conviction, even at the request of foreign authorities, as Belgian law does not provide for this possibility. [192] In the case of a transaction procedure, Belgian law provides for the voluntary surrender of property or financial gains, whether seized or not, by the perpetrator of offences that may give rise to confiscation. Belgium does not provide the amounts that have been recovered in this way. 684. In ML cases, the evaluation team found, based on the case examples provided by Belgium, that the prosecutors’ indictments tend to be limited to confiscating the value of the laundered property, without quantifying the proceeds obtained through ML. The confiscation amounts imposed therefore represent only part of the benefits derived from ML. Prosecutors also reported frequent reductions in the confiscation amounts requested by trial judges. Judges have full discretion to assess the impact of confiscation measures so as not to impose an unreasonably heavy sentence on the convicted person (pursuant to Article 505(6) and (7) of the Penal Code). The amounts to be confiscated can also be reduced when judges consider that judicial treatment of cases exceeded a reasonable time limit. Judges have applied this reduction in the amounts to be confiscated even in cases of money laundering involving multiple offences committed by complex and organised networks. The ‘Clown’ case is one example (see box under IO.7). 685. The number of ML cases in which confiscations are ordered is rising, but the average value of the amounts confiscated remains relatively stable overall. This finding is based on partial statistical data provided by the OCSC on amounts confiscated following provisional seizures. Belgium has provided examples of ML cases demonstrating its ability to confiscate significant amounts. Between 2019 and 2024, EUR 39.5 million was confiscated in ML cases following prior seizures (see table below). These amounts demonstrate Belgium’s ability to strip criminals, to a certain extent, of assets obtained illegally through ML schemes. However, these amounts remain relatively low given Belgium’s context and risk profile (see IO.1). The amount of equivalent-value confiscations ordered without provisional seizures in ML/TF cases is not known. Table 8.5. Amounts confiscated for all offences and ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total ML* (EUR millions) 8.4 2.8 3.6 4 7.3 13.1 39.7 No. of files 198 180 244 267 340 119 1 348 All offences** Amounts of equivalent-value confiscations (sums and real estate) 241.2 236.5 216.19 319.9 547.7 509.3 2 070.79 Recovery rate of amounts confiscated (January 2025) 26.5% 32% 26.11% 13.87% 20% 10.43% 19.4% Amounts confiscated as a result of seizures managed by the OCSC 22.4 11.5 18.9 19.7 28 39.4 139.9 Note: These figures do not include amounts of equivalent-value confiscations without prior seizure that are not managed by the OCSC, nor amounts confiscated in cases opened for offences other than money laundering but resulting in convictions for money laundering. *The amounts include all assets seized prior to judgement (i.e. sold during the investigation of seized assets so that the cash proceeds could replace the original seized assets) and confiscated, in addition to the sums confiscated. Confiscated assets in kind that were not seized or disposed of prior to judgement are not included. **This includes all sums and the equivalent value of confiscated real estate managed by the OCSC, without details of the offences concerned being known. Source: OCSC 686. In terms of TF, the authorities confiscated a total of EUR 753 191 between 2019 and 2024 in eight cases. Although these figures are much lower than those for ML, they are in line with the number of TF cases opened and the TF typology, which since 2016 has mainly involved microfinance transactions (see IO.1 and IO.9). Table 8.6. Amounts confiscated for TF offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Confiscation (EUR) 0 6 530 10 365 0 33 880 702 416 753 191 No. of files 0 1 2 0 2 3 8 Note: These figures do not include amounts of equivalent-value confiscations without prior seizure that are not managed by the OCSC. Source: OCSC 687. Equivalent-value confiscations – Where prior seizures have not been possible, Belgium may resort to equivalent-value confiscation measures. [193] However, equivalent-value confiscation is only effective if it is supported by an effective asset recovery system, which is not the case in Belgium. During the period under review, Belgian courts ordered a total of EUR 2.07 billion in equivalent-value confiscations across all offences. However, there are significant difficulties in enforcing confiscation measures (see below). Belgium does not have more detailed data on the amounts of equivalent-value confiscations for each predicate offence and for ML/TF. However, examples provided to the evaluation team demonstrate that Belgium is able to order equivalent-value confiscations for significant amounts in ML cases. Box 8.3. Equivalent-value confiscation in an ML case involving international drug trafficking In an ML case involving international drug trafficking by a criminal organisation, the judicial authorities seized a total of more than EUR 4 million. The court ordered the confiscation of an equivalent value totalling EUR 89 million from 13 defendants. Furthermore, in the same case, a confiscation order for an equivalent value of EUR 7.6 million was handed down against a defaulting party. [194] 688. Additional confiscation measures – The Belgian authorities almost never make use of the option of imposing additional confiscation measures provided for in the Penal Code (Art. 43 quater, para. 2 and 3). These measures allow for extended confiscation orders to be imposed where the authorities find that the accused’s assets have increased and there are serious and substantive indications that this increase is the result of the offence for which they have been convicted. The authorities have stated that this legal option has only been used twice in connection with convictions for drug trafficking. 689. Enforcement – There are significant difficulties in enforcing confiscation measures. In total, Belgium has recovered less than one fifth (19.4%) of the amounts for which equivalent-value confiscation ordered between 2019 and 2024. [195] This low recovery rate is mainly due to the insufficient resources allocated to law enforcement agencies to identify and trace illegal assets. Belgium has the option of initiating a criminal investigation to enforce confiscation measures following a conviction and recover assets (“enquête pénale d’exécution” ). This investigation can be conducted by prosecutors with the support of the OCSC or delegated to the OCSC. The authorities have similar investigative powers to those available in regular criminal investigations. These investigations are a useful process to enforce confiscation measures, provided sufficient resources are available for their conduct. However, the same resource constraints apply for those criminal investigations. The authorities have indicated that approximately 150 cases per year lead to the opening of a criminal investigation to recover assets. 690. However, the results of these criminal investigations are not evidenced in the recovery rates, which remain low and are only marginally improving. Only 26.5% of the amounts confiscated in 2019 had actually been recovered by January 2025. 8.2.5. Confiscation of crime proceeds located abroad 691. The OCSC plays an active role in the identification and tracing of criminal assets located abroad. by using informal cooperation through the ARO and CARIN networks. It centralises and sends requests for mutual assistance abroad to support the needs of investigations in Belgium. Overall, incoming and outgoing requests for information relating to tracing, identifying and seizing proceeds of crime are increasing. Between 2019 and 2023, the OCSC sent a total of 1 586 requests abroad and received 1 115 requests from abroad through the ARIN/CARIN networks, across all offences. Between 2020 and 2024, the OCSC sent 584 requests abroad to identify property in ML cases. In 2023, the main partners were the Netherlands, Spain and France. During the same period, Belgium processed 483 ML-related requests from abroad, mainly from Germany, the Netherlands and France. The number of requests received suggests that Belgium is not only a transit country. 692. Belgium does not provide detailed information on the results of these requests, whether incoming or outgoing., It indicates that requests related to the identification of bank accounts (Belgium has authorised the sharing of bank information through the ARO/CARIN networks since September 2022) and real estate have led to formal requests for mutual assistance from the judicial authorities of the countries concerned for the purpose of seizing these assets. For example, in 2023, out of 447 outgoing requests, 301 led to the identification of assets abroad and the remaining 146 were unsuccessful. 693. The Belgian authorities are faced with difficulties in seizing assets located outside the EU, which require lengthy international cooperation measures that sometimes lead to results that are sometimes random. For some prosecutor’s offices, these difficulties are a reason for not launching investigations in Belgium and, in some cases, preferring to report the offences to competent foreign authorities (“dénonciations”, see IO.2). 694. Belgium pursues a proactive policy to enforce equivalent-value confiscation orders issued by Belgian courts abroad. However, the authorities face significant obstacles in certain countries of origin of suspects or countries that serve as safe havens outside the EU (i.e. Albania, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco and Turkey). The Belgian authorities are taking steps to build closer ties with these countries. For example, Belgium has signed a judicial cooperation agreement with the UAE and appointed a specialist prosecutor to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. It has seconded a liaison prosecutor to Morocco and is seeking to establish direct relations, which are sometimes hampered by diplomatic setbacks. Recent results have been encouraging and need to be sustained (see IO.2). Given the importance of equivalent-value confiscations of assets located abroad, strengthening the system for identifying criminals’ assets abroad and enforcing court decisions is of strategic importance for Belgium. However, Belgium does not have statistics on the enforcement of confiscation orders abroad and has not provided examples of cases that clearly demonstrate its effectiveness. Table 8.7. Requests issued by the OCSC (ML case) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total No. of ARO/CARIN mutual legal assistance requests in open ML cases 56 69 62 93 136 168 584 Total ARO/CARIN requests 251 249 299 340 447 620* 2206 Note: *For 2024, out of 620 outgoing requests (ARO and CARIN), 351 requests were made in connection with the enforcement of equivalent-value confiscations ordered by Belgian courts. Source: OCSC statistical data 8.2.6. Repatriation, sharing and restitution 695. With regard to sharing confiscated assets and property with the countries concerned, cooperation with EU countries takes place at the level of the competent judicial authorities, and the legal framework provides that where the amount confiscated exceeds EUR 10 000, the proceeds are shared equally between the enforcing State and the issuing State (Art. 38 of the law of 5 August 2006 and European regulations). Different sharing arrangements may be agreed on a case-by-case basis, and these must be formalised in a bilateral agreement between the Ministers of Justice. Outside the EU, sharing confiscated assets and property is governed by various international conventions and by the Law of 20 May 1997 (see TC Annex, R 38). In practice, SPF Justice, the judicial authorities and the OCSC work together and decide on a case-by-case basis whether sharing the property is appropriate. Footnotes [188] The FJP units in the districts of Luxembourg, Halle Vilvoorde, Walloon Brabant, Charleroi, Eupen, Namur and Mons. [189] In the case of a transaction reported by an obliged entity or identified in a suspicious transaction report or a request for assistance from a foreign FIU. The period may be extended beyond five days, in which case the CTIF must inform the public prosecutor or the federal prosecutor. [190] Cass., 21 March 2006, RG no. P.06.0034.N, Pas., 2006, 165; Cass., 12 June 2013, RG no. P.13.0312.F, Pas. 2013, 363; Cass., 5 February 2019, RG no. P.18.1010.N [191] Cass., 10 September 2024, RG no. P.14.0475.F/3 [192] A bill is currently being drafted to transpose Directive 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council into Belgian law. [193] This is a sentence to pay a sum of money equivalent to the benefits derived from committing the offence and not found in the convicted person’s assets. [194] Judgement of 27 April 2022 of the Brussels Criminal Court pursuant to Article 505 6° of the Penal Code. [195] These figures do not include confiscations in kind of movable and immovable property, which are mostly ordered on property that has been previously seized." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.2.Confiscation of proceeds instrumentalities and property of equivalent value from foreign and domestic predicates, and proceeds located abroad 8.2.1. Identification of property and assets liable to seizure 668. In the 2015 MER, the FATF noted that Belgium needed to conduct financial investigations in a more systematic way. Since then, financial investigations have been carried out more frequently, but not yet sufficiently given the country’s risks exposure. Law enforcement agencies have highlighted that, since 2015, there has been a better understanding of the importance of provisional seizing of assets and therefore of conducting financial investigations. Since 2022, the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General has recommended that ‘asset investigation teams’ (PLUK teams) be set up in each FJP unit to work with investigators on the financial aspects of investigations. These teams, which already existed in seven units, including the Brussels and Antwerp FJP units, have been set up in the remaining units as of 2025. [188] Across Belgium, a total of 66 financial investigators are assigned to these PLUK asset investigation teams. The 2022 FJP Directive recommends that investigators draw up an investigative plan with prosecutors to determine the necessary measures for recovering illegal assets. This is a step in the right direction but has not yet been fully implemented in practice. The Federal Judicial Police stressed the importance of this change in approach, given that most investigations have so far focused on the predicate offences, without giving adequate consideration to the illicit assets laundered (see IO.7). 669. The way in which financial investigations are conducted varies from one prosecutor’s office to another. They may be conducted separately from the investigation into the predicate offences or as part of a single investigation. Illicit assets located in Belgium are identified through several channels, including the central register for financial accounts and contracts (PCC – see IO.5), the Banque Carrefour des Entreprises database, the register of ultimate beneficial owners (UBOs), and the JustBan register of professional bans (see IO.5). Law enforcement authorities also have access to data held by the CTIF via liaison magistrates and the FJP officers seconded to it (see IO.6) and, to a limited extent, to tax and asset information held by SPF Finance and information held by the social security inspection services. The land registry, requests for banking information and searches are other channels for identifying illegal assets. 670. The Belgian authorities are also trying to determine whether it is possible to seize assets located abroad and are doing so with the help of their foreign counterparts through informal contacts arranged by the OCSC, which activates the ARO/CARIN networks (see section 8.2). 671. With regard to ML, identifying and recovering assets is central to the TRIM criteria that have guided the opening and handling of investigations since the end of 2022 (see IO.7). Criterion R, recoup, aims to assess the potential for recovering property or financial assets that could be confiscated. In practice, the authorities apply this criterion in a narrow way and start an investigation based on a criterion of profitability if they believe that they can immediately seize available and accessible assets during the initial stages of processing a case. In practice, seizures are mainly limited to the proceeds of the predicate offence (e.g. the resale price of cocaine in relation to the quantities trafficked, amounts evaded in social security fraud) and do not extend to funds already laundered and proceeds generated by ML activities. In ML cases involving criminal organisations, only cash constituting the network’s ‘cash float’ is seized; cash that has already been laundered in Belgium or transferred abroad is not being adequately pursued by the authorities. The ” auditorat du travail ”, responsible for social security frauds, highlighted that there is little point in prosecuting ML offences in the social fraud cases they handle, as ML does not make it any easier to obtain confiscation orders. A similar observation was made by the authorities in relation to drug trafficking. Furthermore, the high rate of cases being closed for discretionary reasons (lack of police resources) means that the potential for recovering illegal assets in some cases is not fully considered without in-depth financial investigations (see IO.7). 672. There is no guidance for investigators and prosecutors on identifying assets and on seizing and confiscating ML proceeds. Since 2022, the FJP has introduced training to familiarise financial investigators and judicial officers with the legal framework applicable for ML and with some seizure practices (e.g. virtual assets). The operational and practical aspects are not yet sufficiently covered in these trainings. 8.2.2. Provisional measures 673. Urgent precautionary freezing – The Belgian legal system allows for an urgent request for precautionary freezing of a transaction even before a criminal investigation has been opened (Art. 80 of the AML Law). The CTIF has the right to object to the execution of financial transactions reported by reporting entities and any related transactions for a period of five working days. [189] Box 8.1. Example of urgent precautionary freezing due to suspected ML In a case involving suspected ML from organised crime, tax and social fraud, the CTIF froze the account balance of an entity suspected of being a shell company used in a case involving Brazilian networks, which stood at more than EUR 50,000, which was then paid to the tax authorities. An investigation is currently being conducted at the Brussels prosecutor’s office. 674. At the beginning of 2022, the CTIF simplified the procedures for urgent request for precautionary measure to process requests more efficiently. The CTIF also used this urgent freezing procedure on its own initiative as part of a project to analyse the data available to it in order to dismantle the networks involved in ML cases related to offsetting schemes (see IO.1). 675. The number of transactions subject to urgent request for precautionary freezing is growing, from 29 transactions in 2019 to 110 transactions in 2024 (see table 8.1). These measures are a useful tool, although the Belgian authorities do not provide any details on the extent to which they subsequently lead to the seizure and confiscation of illegal assets. Their effectiveness is also increasingly being challenged by advances in payment technologies, such as instant and electronic payments, which shorten the time available to take action. In addition, the targeted bank accounts are often used as transit accounts, with balances that tend to be kept low, making it more difficult to effectively implement measures to prevent transactions and seize assets. Table 8.1. Urgent requests for precautionary freezing ordered by the CTIF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Amount (EUR millions) 3.77 30.58 7.04 4.72 4.49 9.63 60.23 No. of transactions 26 33 44 56 62 110 331 Source: CTIF 676. Seizures – Belgium has a comprehensive legal framework for seizures, which can be ordered directly by prosecutors and investigating judges without prior authorisation from a judge. Seizures were used in an increasing number of ML cases over the period from 2019 to 2024 (see table below), including for large amounts. Assets worth approximately EUR 30 million were seized. Approximately one quarter to one third of the amounts seized and managed by the OCSC were in 5 681 cases involving suspected ML totalling nearly EUR 166 million. However, Belgium often takes an approach that is still too limited, focusing on the seizure of assets and valuables that are immediately available (see IO.7). Table 8.2. Total sums seized for predicate offences, ML and TF (EUR million) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total All offences 93 108.2 104.7 114.9 109.8 110.3 640.9 Drug trafficking 8.8 15.9 14.2 11.7 12.8 15.390 78.81 Tax fraud 2.3 9 3.5 2.2 3.2 5.618 25.81 Social fraud 5.28 3.72 12.13 5.53 6.65 6.31 39.62 Scam 5.7 4.6 4.5 6.6 7.6 9.985 39.02 Organised crime 13.5 6.5 11.2 12.8 15 13.392 72.43 ML 22.7 21.6 31.5 22.7 27.3 39.6 165.66 TF 0.014 0.265 0.071 0.007 0.017 0.004 0.378 Note: These amounts correspond to the sums seized and managed by the OCSC. Due to a file coding procedure, some sums seized in relation to ML may not have been coded. Source: OCSC statistical data Table 8.3. Total value of assets in kind seized and managed by the OCSC for ML/TF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Seized (ML) 5 120 147 160 125 1 018 512 3 850 479 18812579 1464134 30425975 Investigations 9 4 6 9 14 10 52 Seized (TF) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Source: OCSC statistical data 677. The Sky ECC case led to a significant number of seizures by the Belgian authorities, including abroad (totalling approximately EUR 215 million), some of which were in ML cases that resulted in confiscation. Nevertheless, the overall volume of seizures in Belgium did not increase significantly, due to resource constraints on the police, who had to limit seizures in other cases. 678. The total amount seized in ML cases appears limited overall given the country’s risk profile, dominated by organised crime and significant exposure to drug trafficking and social and tax fraud, generating substantial illegal proceeds, some of which are laundered in Belgium. The Belgian authorities explain that the limited number of seizures in ML cases is due to the difficulties involved in locating assets outside Belgium, as Belgium would be mainly as a transit country. This raises questions about the proactive nature and timing of the measures taken by the Belgian authorities to curb the movement of illegal assets out of Belgium and the flow of illegal funds remaining in Belgium, for example in the case of polycriminal ML activities involving offsetting schemes (see IO.7). 679. In terms of TF, the value of seizures handled by the OCSC is relatively low but appears consistent with the country’s risk profile, characterised in particular by microfinance (see table above and IO.1 and 9). Over the period from 2019 to 2024, seizures totalling EUR 378 000 were made in 27 TF cases. 680. Analysis of data decrypted in the Sky ECC case revealed a growing use of virtual assets by criminals. The Belgian authorities have demonstrated that they are capable of seizing virtual assets. Between 2019 and 2024, a total of almost EUR 28 million in virtual currency was seized across 59 investigation files covering all offences, including EUR 20 million in 48 ML investigations. These seizures were made possible by the existence of specialised officers within the FJP who are skilled in specific types of analytical work. The Belgian authorities explain that seizures and confiscations of virtual currency have been limited in ML/TF cases due to their complexity, which requires longer judicial proceedings. Table 8.4. Seizure of virtual assets in ML/TF cases 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Total virtual assets (EUR) 261 337 37 393 3 607 359 1 936 615 7 439 589 7 067 000 20 349 293 No. ML files 0 0 0 43 4 0 47 Total virtual assets (EUR) 0 0 0 0 0 8 737 8 737 No. TF files 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Source: OCSC statistical data 8.2.3. Asset management by the OCSC 681. The OCSC manages seized assets in a relatively effective manner. It sells certain seized assets prior to judgement to avoid depreciation. A pre-judgement sale results in the funds being deposited in the OCSC’s account for the duration of the proceedings. Between 2019 and 2023, disposal decisions were taken in 4 305 court cases involving vehicles. These were sold through Fin Shops for a total of EUR 20.88 million. In addition, the OCSC has set up special mechanisms for managing virtual assets (see box below). Box 8.2. Example illustrating the capability to seize and manage virtual assets In a case involving drugs and criminal conspiracy, significant seizures were made including cash, luxury watches, sports cars and virtual assets. An initial seizure of approximately EUR 6.5 million in virtual assets was made in October 2023 on an exchange platform. The seizure and management of the seized assets took place as part of a public-private partnership set up by the OCSC, with the police automatically creating different virtual asset portfolios for each seizure on the various platforms. The seizure was therefore effective as soon as the assets were transferred to accounts opened with the OCSC’s private partner. The seized assets could then be managed directly via the platform. Consequently, the OCSC sold part of the seized virtual assets for EUR 2.2 million. A new seizure was carried out in September 2024. The OCSC still manages virtual assets worth EUR 6.3 million. 8.2.4. Confiscation and enforcement of confiscation orders 682. Belgium has a legal framework that allows assets to be confiscated where no lawful origin can be established, [190] which should make it easier to confiscate proceeds, instrumentalities of crime or property of equivalent value (see TC Annex, R 4). Belgian case law considers that property obtained through money laundering constitutes a financial gain derived from that transaction and may be subject to confiscation. [191] Confiscations have been ordered following convictions in absentia , as well as in cases where sentencing has been deferred or a simple conviction has been handed down. 683. However, Belgium cannot enforce confiscation measures without a prior conviction, even at the request of foreign authorities, as Belgian law does not provide for this possibility. [192] In the case of a transaction procedure, Belgian law provides for the voluntary surrender of property or financial gains, whether seized or not, by the perpetrator of offences that may give rise to confiscation. Belgium does not provide the amounts that have been recovered in this way. 684. In ML cases, the evaluation team found, based on the case examples provided by Belgium, that the prosecutors’ indictments tend to be limited to confiscating the value of the laundered property, without quantifying the proceeds obtained through ML. The confiscation amounts imposed therefore represent only part of the benefits derived from ML. Prosecutors also reported frequent reductions in the confiscation amounts requested by trial judges. Judges have full discretion to assess the impact of confiscation measures so as not to impose an unreasonably heavy sentence on the convicted person (pursuant to Article 505(6) and (7) of the Penal Code). The amounts to be confiscated can also be reduced when judges consider that judicial treatment of cases exceeded a reasonable time limit. Judges have applied this reduction in the amounts to be confiscated even in cases of money laundering involving multiple offences committed by complex and organised networks. The ‘Clown’ case is one example (see box under IO.7). 685. The number of ML cases in which confiscations are ordered is rising, but the average value of the amounts confiscated remains relatively stable overall. This finding is based on partial statistical data provided by the OCSC on amounts confiscated following provisional seizures. Belgium has provided examples of ML cases demonstrating its ability to confiscate significant amounts. Between 2019 and 2024, EUR 39.5 million was confiscated in ML cases following prior seizures (see table below). These amounts demonstrate Belgium’s ability to strip criminals, to a certain extent, of assets obtained illegally through ML schemes. However, these amounts remain relatively low given Belgium’s context and risk profile (see IO.1). The amount of equivalent-value confiscations ordered without provisional seizures in ML/TF cases is not known. Table 8.5. Amounts confiscated for all offences and ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total ML* (EUR millions) 8.4 2.8 3.6 4 7.3 13.1 39.7 No. of files 198 180 244 267 340 119 1 348 All offences** Amounts of equivalent-value confiscations (sums and real estate) 241.2 236.5 216.19 319.9 547.7 509.3 2 070.79 Recovery rate of amounts confiscated (January 2025) 26.5% 32% 26.11% 13.87% 20% 10.43% 19.4% Amounts confiscated as a result of seizures managed by the OCSC 22.4 11.5 18.9 19.7 28 39.4 139.9 Note: These figures do not include amounts of equivalent-value confiscations without prior seizure that are not managed by the OCSC, nor amounts confiscated in cases opened for offences other than money laundering but resulting in convictions for money laundering. *The amounts include all assets seized prior to judgement (i.e. sold during the investigation of seized assets so that the cash proceeds could replace the original seized assets) and confiscated, in addition to the sums confiscated. Confiscated assets in kind that were not seized or disposed of prior to judgement are not included. **This includes all sums and the equivalent value of confiscated real estate managed by the OCSC, without details of the offences concerned being known. Source: OCSC 686. In terms of TF, the authorities confiscated a total of EUR 753 191 between 2019 and 2024 in eight cases. Although these figures are much lower than those for ML, they are in line with the number of TF cases opened and the TF typology, which since 2016 has mainly involved microfinance transactions (see IO.1 and IO.9). Table 8.6. Amounts confiscated for TF offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 (est) Total Confiscation (EUR) 0 6 530 10 365 0 33 880 702 416 753 191 No. of files 0 1 2 0 2 3 8 Note: These figures do not include amounts of equivalent-value confiscations without prior seizure that are not managed by the OCSC. Source: OCSC 687. Equivalent-value confiscations – Where prior seizures have not been possible, Belgium may resort to equivalent-value confiscation measures. [193] However, equivalent-value confiscation is only effective if it is supported by an effective asset recovery system, which is not the case in Belgium. During the period under review, Belgian courts ordered a total of EUR 2.07 billion in equivalent-value confiscations across all offences. However, there are significant difficulties in enforcing confiscation measures (see below). Belgium does not have more detailed data on the amounts of equivalent-value confiscations for each predicate offence and for ML/TF. However, examples provided to the evaluation team demonstrate that Belgium is able to order equivalent-value confiscations for significant amounts in ML cases. Box 8.3. Equivalent-value confiscation in an ML case involving international drug trafficking In an ML case involving international drug trafficking by a criminal organisation, the judicial authorities seized a total of more than EUR 4 million. The court ordered the confiscation of an equivalent value totalling EUR 89 million from 13 defendants. Furthermore, in the same case, a confiscation order for an equivalent value of EUR 7.6 million was handed down against a defaulting party. [194] 688. Additional confiscation measures – The Belgian authorities almost never make use of the option of imposing additional confiscation measures provided for in the Penal Code (Art. 43 quater, para. 2 and 3). These measures allow for extended confiscation orders to be imposed where the authorities find that the accused’s assets have increased and there are serious and substantive indications that this increase is the result of the offence for which they have been convicted. The authorities have stated that this legal option has only been used twice in connection with convictions for drug trafficking. 689. Enforcement – There are significant difficulties in enforcing confiscation measures. In total, Belgium has recovered less than one fifth (19.4%) of the amounts for which equivalent-value confiscation ordered between 2019 and 2024. [195] This low recovery rate is mainly due to the insufficient resources allocated to law enforcement agencies to identify and trace illegal assets. Belgium has the option of initiating a criminal investigation to enforce confiscation measures following a conviction and recover assets (“enquête pénale d’exécution” ). This investigation can be conducted by prosecutors with the support of the OCSC or delegated to the OCSC. The authorities have similar investigative powers to those available in regular criminal investigations. These investigations are a useful process to enforce confiscation measures, provided sufficient resources are available for their conduct. However, the same resource constraints apply for those criminal investigations. The authorities have indicated that approximately 150 cases per year lead to the opening of a criminal investigation to recover assets. 690. However, the results of these criminal investigations are not evidenced in the recovery rates, which remain low and are only marginally improving. Only 26.5% of the amounts confiscated in 2019 had actually been recovered by January 2025. 8.2.5. Confiscation of crime proceeds located abroad 691. The OCSC plays an active role in the identification and tracing of criminal assets located abroad. by using informal cooperation through the ARO and CARIN networks. It centralises and sends requests for mutual assistance abroad to support the needs of investigations in Belgium. Overall, incoming and outgoing requests for information relating to tracing, identifying and seizing proceeds of crime are increasing. Between 2019 and 2023, the OCSC sent a total of 1 586 requests abroad and received 1 115 requests from abroad through the ARIN/CARIN networks, across all offences. Between 2020 and 2024, the OCSC sent 584 requests abroad to identify property in ML cases. In 2023, the main partners were the Netherlands, Spain and France. During the same period, Belgium processed 483 ML-related requests from abroad, mainly from Germany, the Netherlands and France. The number of requests received suggests that Belgium is not only a transit country. 692. Belgium does not provide detailed information on the results of these requests, whether incoming or outgoing., It indicates that requests related to the identification of bank accounts (Belgium has authorised the sharing of bank information through the ARO/CARIN networks since September 2022) and real estate have led to formal requests for mutual assistance from the judicial authorities of the countries concerned for the purpose of seizing these assets. For example, in 2023, out of 447 outgoing requests, 301 led to the identification of assets abroad and the remaining 146 were unsuccessful. 693. The Belgian authorities are faced with difficulties in seizing assets located outside the EU, which require lengthy international cooperation measures that sometimes lead to results that are sometimes random. For some prosecutor’s offices, these difficulties are a reason for not launching investigations in Belgium and, in some cases, preferring to report the offences to competent foreign authorities (“dénonciations”, see IO.2). 694. Belgium pursues a proactive policy to enforce equivalent-value confiscation orders issued by Belgian courts abroad. However, the authorities face significant obstacles in certain countries of origin of suspects or countries that serve as safe havens outside the EU (i.e. Albania, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco and Turkey). The Belgian authorities are taking steps to build closer ties with these countries. For example, Belgium has signed a judicial cooperation agreement with the UAE and appointed a specialist prosecutor to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. It has seconded a liaison prosecutor to Morocco and is seeking to establish direct relations, which are sometimes hampered by diplomatic setbacks. Recent results have been encouraging and need to be sustained (see IO.2). Given the importance of equivalent-value confiscations of assets located abroad, strengthening the system for identifying criminals’ assets abroad and enforcing court decisions is of strategic importance for Belgium. However, Belgium does not have statistics on the enforcement of confiscation orders abroad and has not provided examples of cases that clearly demonstrate its effectiveness. Table 8.7. Requests issued by the OCSC (ML case) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total No. of ARO/CARIN mutual legal assistance requests in open ML cases 56 69 62 93 136 168 584 Total ARO/CARIN requests 251 249 299 340 447 620* 2206 Note: *For 2024, out of 620 outgoing requests (ARO and CARIN), 351 requests were made in connection with the enforcement of equivalent-value confiscations ordered by Belgian courts. Source: OCSC statistical data 8.2.6. Repatriation, sharing and restitution 695. With regard to sharing confiscated assets and property with the countries concerned, cooperation with EU countries takes place at the level of the competent judicial authorities, and the legal framework provides that where the amount confiscated exceeds EUR 10 000, the proceeds are shared equally between the enforcing State and the issuing State (Art. 38 of the law of 5 August 2006 and European regulations). Different sharing arrangements may be agreed on a case-by-case basis, and these must be formalised in a bilateral agreement between the Ministers of Justice. Outside the EU, sharing confiscated assets and property is governed by various international conventions and by the Law of 20 May 1997 (see TC Annex, R 38). In practice, SPF Justice, the judicial authorities and the OCSC work together and decide on a case-by-case basis whether sharing the property is appropriate. Footnotes [188] The FJP units in the districts of Luxembourg, Halle Vilvoorde, Walloon Brabant, Charleroi, Eupen, Namur and Mons. [189] In the case of a transaction reported by an obliged entity or identified in a suspicious transaction report or a request for assistance from a foreign FIU. The period may be extended beyond five days, in which case the CTIF must inform the public prosecutor or the federal prosecutor. [190] Cass., 21 March 2006, RG no. P.06.0034.N, Pas., 2006, 165; Cass., 12 June 2013, RG no. P.13.0312.F, Pas. 2013, 363; Cass., 5 February 2019, RG no. P.18.1010.N [191] Cass., 10 September 2024, RG no. P.14.0475.F/3 [192] A bill is currently being drafted to transpose Directive 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council into Belgian law. [193] This is a sentence to pay a sum of money equivalent to the benefits derived from committing the offence and not found in the convicted person’s assets. [194] Judgement of 27 April 2022 of the Brussels Criminal Court pursuant to Article 505 6° of the Penal Code. [195] These figures do not include confiscations in kind of movable and immovable property, which are mostly ordered on property that has been previously seized." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.2.1. TF prosecutions 727. In cases involving terrorism and its financing, the decision to open a criminal investigation is taken by consensus following a collective assessment of the cases by the JICs/JDCs. At the JDC stage, a collegial decision is taken with the local and federal public prosecutors and the coordinating director of the local police on how to proceed with the JIC’s proposals. Based on the JIC’s analysis, the authorities have several options: either to open a judicial file, to launch an intelligence investigation (carried out by the intelligence services) or to take action to prevent potential wrongdoing (possibly by way of an existing related judicial file). The JDC may decide to postpone its decision to allow the authorities to continue refining the information. In the very rare instances where no consensus is reached, each authority remains bound by its legal role. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office could then, in theory, request that a judicial file be opened. Table 9.2. Number of new terrorism cases opened by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 86 95 64 54 70 not disclosed Source: Federal Prosecutor’s Office 728. While this system is effective in detecting terrorist activities and prevents the opening of unfounded investigations, its effectiveness in combating TF depends on the agility of the process and the responsiveness of the authorities to emerging threats, in particular through the proactive detection of TF cases by using weak signals to good advantage. Financial analysis needs to be strengthened to address the emergence of new financing channels, such as virtual assets, opaque legal structures and certain NPOs. 729. In Belgium, there are no prosecutors specialising exclusively in TF, but each district prosecutor’s office has at least one prosecutor responsible for terrorism cases. Jurisdiction is shared between districts prosecutor’s offices and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, but in practice the latter handles all cases related to terrorism or TF through its dedicated section, which comprises seven prosecutors specialising in terrorism, including two TF specialists. 730. The district prosecutor’s office reports any case with a link to terrorism to the JICs/JDCs, and if a criminal case is opened, it is then assigned to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. Only cases in which minors are involved in terrorism or TF are exempt from this central control and are dealt with by the youth justice system and appropriate local authorities. This centralisation of TF prosecutions at the federal level ensures case handling is consistent and improves coordination with the investigative services. The lack of prosecutors specialising exclusively in TF within the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is offset to some extent by the two TF specialist prosecutors. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office also organises ‘Monitor’ meetings to monitor on ongoing terrorism and TF cases (see box below). 731. The Belgian system is unique in that it has a strategic prosecutor (head of the terrorism section) within the Federal Prosecutor’s Office who is responsible for the strategic coordination of prosecutions relating to terrorism and TF. Without managing operational investigations, the strategic prosecutor maintains an overall view by participating in the main steering bodies, such as the national terrorism expertise network (REN-Terro) and MONITOR meetings. Box 9.3. MONITOR meetings · Meetings are organised every six weeks by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, chaired by the strategic prosecutor responsible for the terrorism section. They are attended by all partners involved in combating T/TF, including specialist prosecutors, the police, the intelligence services, OCAM and the CTIF. · These meetings provide an opportunity to review and discuss new judicial files, progress in major cases, information shared between partners and specific problems encountered. They foster smooth operational coordination and real-time information exchange and strengthen inter-agency cooperation, including at the international level, in particular with foreign prosecutors specialising in T/TF cases. · The active participation of the CTIF and OCAM enables reports to be processed more quickly and in context. Their analytical contributions are supplemented by their direct knowledge of the individuals and contexts discussed at these meetings, thereby optimising the effectiveness of investigations. · These meetings also provide an opportunity to address broader issues, new trends and problems encountered in both counter-terrorism and TF. 732. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has internal follow-up mechanisms, including a regularly updated dashboard [209] for cross-functional monitoring and a ‘digital tagging’ tool to aid in the identification of TF cases. Decisions and/or difficulties encountered are discussed at MONITOR meetings, and each decision on terrorism or TF is set out in a memo written by the principal prosecutor, which is distributed to the entire terrorism expertise network, including the specialist prosecutors in district prosecutor’s offices. However, this is not a structured feedback mechanism specific to TF cases. The lack of such a mechanism limits to some extent the ability to capitalise on lessons learned from TF cases, which slows down process improvements, the early detection of TF and the sharing of best practices. 733. The investigation may come to a standstill, in particular when it stagnates or makes no progress without clear justification. In these situations, the case may be referred to the Pre-Trial Division, which will review the content of the investigation and identify any obstacles. However, this procedure is extremely rare: it has only been used twice in six years. 734. The caseload is difficult to quantify precisely, as prosecutors do not work on these cases on a daily basis. Many files that have been open for several years involve international cooperation, which slows down their processing (see IO.2). On average, each federal prosecutor handles approximately 40 cases simultaneously, across all areas. With regard specifically to TF, each prosecutor handles around two to three cases per year, with two prosecutors mainly involved in these cases, resulting in a maximum of 36 cases between 2019 and 2024. In practice, federal prosecutors have priority access to resources and generally obtain the support they request. However, this preferential allocation has an unbalanced effect: it exacerbates the chronic understaffing of district and general prosecutor’s offices, which have not had the resources they need for several years. Furthermore, the lack of specialised resources within the police (DSJOC) is a major challenge, particularly given the changes in the way funds are transferred, such as virtual assets. This lack of capacity continues to be a structural problem (see IO.7). 9.2.2. TF Convictions 735. The judicial handling of TF cases in Belgium is structured around a specialised organisation, with divisions dedicated to terrorism and judges experienced in this field. A special terrorism division has been set up in Brussels to handle all cases related to terrorism and its financing for the Brussels judicial district. In some instances, these cases may be referred to the Court of Assizes. Other specialised divisions also exist in Liège, Charleroi, East Flanders and Antwerp, although the vast majority of T/TF litigation is concentrated in Brussels and Antwerp. 736. The allocation of TF cases may also take into account the nature of the offences. For example, TF cases involving hawala and other similar service providers may be referred to divisions specialising in economic and financial crime. This approach is justified by the complexity of financial schemes, which require specific expertise in unconventional financial flows. In 2024, four TF cases involving these types of flows were investigated, a figure that was consistent with previous years. As explained in the previous section, detecting these cases is particularly complex, as the transactions do not always pass through the traditional banking system. These cases are often uncovered by chance in the course of other legal proceedings, particularly through phone tapping or special investigation methods. These cases are difficult to quantify precisely and are often more complex to investigate. Nevertheless, a banking investigation is always carried out, even when the initial evidence is apparently limited. 737. However, TF cases involving individuals travelling to conflict zones are generally investigated by specialised terrorism divisions comprising three judges. [210] These cases, which are often small in scale, always include a banking and financial investigation to identify financing sources, assess logistical support networks and detect any links to terrorist organisations. This division of responsibilities ensures an approach that combines expertise in illicit financing and the analysis of terrorist dynamics, thereby optimising how TF cases are handled by the judiciary. 738. The vast majority of cases prosecuted for TF result in an actual conviction, with 46 of the 60 convictions between 2020 and 2024 for TF pursuant to Articles 140/141 of the Penal Code, or almost 60% of the total number of cases (see table below). Acquittals remain relatively rare, with only nine of the 79 cases over the same period being acquitted (i.e. one in 10 cases). This shows that the courts are keen to prosecute and punish perpetrators for TF activities when there is sufficient evidence. Furthermore, alternative or additional charges (e.g. TF combined with an offence under the Payment Services (PSD2) Law or the AML Law) show that there is some flexibility in the judicial approach. This suggests that, even when terrorist intent cannot be fully established, courts resort to alternative grounds to ensure some form of punishment, particularly in cases involving informal transfer networks (see section 9.5). In some cases, the criminal justice response has been softened due to procedural circumstances (exceeding the reasonable time limit) or sentencing being deferred despite proven TF offences. This lenient measure was motivated by specific factors, including the cooperation of the defendant, the isolated nature of the offence and family circumstances raised in mitigation. Although governed by guidelines, this type of decision raises questions about the clarity and consistency of the criminal law framework in cases of ‘small-scale TF’ (see next section). Table 9.3. Results of court rulings related to TF and PSD2/AML legislation (2019–2024) Criminal justice response Number of files (per defendant) Criminal classification Convictions 60 76% 46 for TF (140/141 PC) (i.e., around 60% of the total number of convictions) 7 for TF + PSD2/AML laws 7 for offences under Banking/AML laws Acquittals 9 11.5% 9 (100%) for TF cases (140/141 PC) Deferral of sentencing 9 11.5% 9 (100%) for TF cases (140/141 PC) Other (referral to court of appeal, etc.) 1 1% 1 TF case (140/141 PC) Total 79 100% 68 for TF (140/141 PC) 9 for TF + PSD2/AML laws 2 for offences under PSD2/AML laws Source: Evaluation team (based on information provided by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office) 739. With regard to the length of TF proceedings, Belgium adopts a balanced approach between risk prevention and respect for the rights of suspects. Thus, conditional release for six months during the investigation of a case appears to be a pragmatic measure, aimed at avoiding excessive pre-trial detention and allowing for behavioural assessment before considering more severe sanctions or probationary measures. However, this approach has to contend with the sometimes protracted nature of TF investigations, which can last up to two years, making it more difficult to monitor suspects and adapt legal measures. Monitoring mechanisms can be put in place to limit potential risks, particularly if suspects remain at liberty throughout this period. Probation officers monitor suspects after their release, at the request of the prosecutor’s office. In complex cases, such as the Hawala case, there have been periods of pre-trial detention lasting two years. Although long, this period is not considered excessive in sensitive cases involving opaque financial flows and international criminal networks. Footnotes [209] Updated and sent to the strategic prosecutor every 1 to 2 months. This tool provides an overview of all cases and their progress, allowing prosecutors to identify those that may warrant faster processing or resource adjustments. [210] The terrorism division of the Brussels Criminal Court handles cases related to terrorism and TF in the Brussels judicial district. Other specialised divisions also exist in Liège, Charleroi, East Flanders and Antwerp, although the majority of cases are centralised in Brussels and Antwerp, where the prosecutor’s offices generally handle these cases at the federal level." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.2.1. TF prosecutions 727. In cases involving terrorism and its financing, the decision to open a criminal investigation is taken by consensus following a collective assessment of the cases by the JICs/JDCs. At the JDC stage, a collegial decision is taken with the local and federal public prosecutors and the coordinating director of the local police on how to proceed with the JIC’s proposals. Based on the JIC’s analysis, the authorities have several options: either to open a judicial file, to launch an intelligence investigation (carried out by the intelligence services) or to take action to prevent potential wrongdoing (possibly by way of an existing related judicial file). The JDC may decide to postpone its decision to allow the authorities to continue refining the information. In the very rare instances where no consensus is reached, each authority remains bound by its legal role. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office could then, in theory, request that a judicial file be opened. Table 9.2. Number of new terrorism cases opened by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 86 95 64 54 70 not disclosed Source: Federal Prosecutor’s Office 728. While this system is effective in detecting terrorist activities and prevents the opening of unfounded investigations, its effectiveness in combating TF depends on the agility of the process and the responsiveness of the authorities to emerging threats, in particular through the proactive detection of TF cases by using weak signals to good advantage. Financial analysis needs to be strengthened to address the emergence of new financing channels, such as virtual assets, opaque legal structures and certain NPOs. 729. In Belgium, there are no prosecutors specialising exclusively in TF, but each district prosecutor’s office has at least one prosecutor responsible for terrorism cases. Jurisdiction is shared between districts prosecutor’s offices and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, but in practice the latter handles all cases related to terrorism or TF through its dedicated section, which comprises seven prosecutors specialising in terrorism, including two TF specialists. 730. The district prosecutor’s office reports any case with a link to terrorism to the JICs/JDCs, and if a criminal case is opened, it is then assigned to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. Only cases in which minors are involved in terrorism or TF are exempt from this central control and are dealt with by the youth justice system and appropriate local authorities. This centralisation of TF prosecutions at the federal level ensures case handling is consistent and improves coordination with the investigative services. The lack of prosecutors specialising exclusively in TF within the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is offset to some extent by the two TF specialist prosecutors. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office also organises ‘Monitor’ meetings to monitor on ongoing terrorism and TF cases (see box below). 731. The Belgian system is unique in that it has a strategic prosecutor (head of the terrorism section) within the Federal Prosecutor’s Office who is responsible for the strategic coordination of prosecutions relating to terrorism and TF. Without managing operational investigations, the strategic prosecutor maintains an overall view by participating in the main steering bodies, such as the national terrorism expertise network (REN-Terro) and MONITOR meetings. Box 9.3. MONITOR meetings · Meetings are organised every six weeks by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, chaired by the strategic prosecutor responsible for the terrorism section. They are attended by all partners involved in combating T/TF, including specialist prosecutors, the police, the intelligence services, OCAM and the CTIF. · These meetings provide an opportunity to review and discuss new judicial files, progress in major cases, information shared between partners and specific problems encountered. They foster smooth operational coordination and real-time information exchange and strengthen inter-agency cooperation, including at the international level, in particular with foreign prosecutors specialising in T/TF cases. · The active participation of the CTIF and OCAM enables reports to be processed more quickly and in context. Their analytical contributions are supplemented by their direct knowledge of the individuals and contexts discussed at these meetings, thereby optimising the effectiveness of investigations. · These meetings also provide an opportunity to address broader issues, new trends and problems encountered in both counter-terrorism and TF. 732. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office has internal follow-up mechanisms, including a regularly updated dashboard [209] for cross-functional monitoring and a ‘digital tagging’ tool to aid in the identification of TF cases. Decisions and/or difficulties encountered are discussed at MONITOR meetings, and each decision on terrorism or TF is set out in a memo written by the principal prosecutor, which is distributed to the entire terrorism expertise network, including the specialist prosecutors in district prosecutor’s offices. However, this is not a structured feedback mechanism specific to TF cases. The lack of such a mechanism limits to some extent the ability to capitalise on lessons learned from TF cases, which slows down process improvements, the early detection of TF and the sharing of best practices. 733. The investigation may come to a standstill, in particular when it stagnates or makes no progress without clear justification. In these situations, the case may be referred to the Pre-Trial Division, which will review the content of the investigation and identify any obstacles. However, this procedure is extremely rare: it has only been used twice in six years. 734. The caseload is difficult to quantify precisely, as prosecutors do not work on these cases on a daily basis. Many files that have been open for several years involve international cooperation, which slows down their processing (see IO.2). On average, each federal prosecutor handles approximately 40 cases simultaneously, across all areas. With regard specifically to TF, each prosecutor handles around two to three cases per year, with two prosecutors mainly involved in these cases, resulting in a maximum of 36 cases between 2019 and 2024. In practice, federal prosecutors have priority access to resources and generally obtain the support they request. However, this preferential allocation has an unbalanced effect: it exacerbates the chronic understaffing of district and general prosecutor’s offices, which have not had the resources they need for several years. Furthermore, the lack of specialised resources within the police (DSJOC) is a major challenge, particularly given the changes in the way funds are transferred, such as virtual assets. This lack of capacity continues to be a structural problem (see IO.7). 9.2.2. TF Convictions 735. The judicial handling of TF cases in Belgium is structured around a specialised organisation, with divisions dedicated to terrorism and judges experienced in this field. A special terrorism division has been set up in Brussels to handle all cases related to terrorism and its financing for the Brussels judicial district. In some instances, these cases may be referred to the Court of Assizes. Other specialised divisions also exist in Liège, Charleroi, East Flanders and Antwerp, although the vast majority of T/TF litigation is concentrated in Brussels and Antwerp. 736. The allocation of TF cases may also take into account the nature of the offences. For example, TF cases involving hawala and other similar service providers may be referred to divisions specialising in economic and financial crime. This approach is justified by the complexity of financial schemes, which require specific expertise in unconventional financial flows. In 2024, four TF cases involving these types of flows were investigated, a figure that was consistent with previous years. As explained in the previous section, detecting these cases is particularly complex, as the transactions do not always pass through the traditional banking system. These cases are often uncovered by chance in the course of other legal proceedings, particularly through phone tapping or special investigation methods. These cases are difficult to quantify precisely and are often more complex to investigate. Nevertheless, a banking investigation is always carried out, even when the initial evidence is apparently limited. 737. However, TF cases involving individuals travelling to conflict zones are generally investigated by specialised terrorism divisions comprising three judges. [210] These cases, which are often small in scale, always include a banking and financial investigation to identify financing sources, assess logistical support networks and detect any links to terrorist organisations. This division of responsibilities ensures an approach that combines expertise in illicit financing and the analysis of terrorist dynamics, thereby optimising how TF cases are handled by the judiciary. 738. The vast majority of cases prosecuted for TF result in an actual conviction, with 46 of the 60 convictions between 2020 and 2024 for TF pursuant to Articles 140/141 of the Penal Code, or almost 60% of the total number of cases (see table below). Acquittals remain relatively rare, with only nine of the 79 cases over the same period being acquitted (i.e. one in 10 cases). This shows that the courts are keen to prosecute and punish perpetrators for TF activities when there is sufficient evidence. Furthermore, alternative or additional charges (e.g. TF combined with an offence under the Payment Services (PSD2) Law or the AML Law) show that there is some flexibility in the judicial approach. This suggests that, even when terrorist intent cannot be fully established, courts resort to alternative grounds to ensure some form of punishment, particularly in cases involving informal transfer networks (see section 9.5). In some cases, the criminal justice response has been softened due to procedural circumstances (exceeding the reasonable time limit) or sentencing being deferred despite proven TF offences. This lenient measure was motivated by specific factors, including the cooperation of the defendant, the isolated nature of the offence and family circumstances raised in mitigation. Although governed by guidelines, this type of decision raises questions about the clarity and consistency of the criminal law framework in cases of ‘small-scale TF’ (see next section). Table 9.3. Results of court rulings related to TF and PSD2/AML legislation (2019–2024) Criminal justice response Number of files (per defendant) Criminal classification Convictions 60 76% 46 for TF (140/141 PC) (i.e., around 60% of the total number of convictions) 7 for TF + PSD2/AML laws 7 for offences under Banking/AML laws Acquittals 9 11.5% 9 (100%) for TF cases (140/141 PC) Deferral of sentencing 9 11.5% 9 (100%) for TF cases (140/141 PC) Other (referral to court of appeal, etc.) 1 1% 1 TF case (140/141 PC) Total 79 100% 68 for TF (140/141 PC) 9 for TF + PSD2/AML laws 2 for offences under PSD2/AML laws Source: Evaluation team (based on information provided by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office) 739. With regard to the length of TF proceedings, Belgium adopts a balanced approach between risk prevention and respect for the rights of suspects. Thus, conditional release for six months during the investigation of a case appears to be a pragmatic measure, aimed at avoiding excessive pre-trial detention and allowing for behavioural assessment before considering more severe sanctions or probationary measures. However, this approach has to contend with the sometimes protracted nature of TF investigations, which can last up to two years, making it more difficult to monitor suspects and adapt legal measures. Monitoring mechanisms can be put in place to limit potential risks, particularly if suspects remain at liberty throughout this period. Probation officers monitor suspects after their release, at the request of the prosecutor’s office. In complex cases, such as the Hawala case, there have been periods of pre-trial detention lasting two years. Although long, this period is not considered excessive in sensitive cases involving opaque financial flows and international criminal networks. Footnotes [209] Updated and sent to the strategic prosecutor every 1 to 2 months. This tool provides an overview of all cases and their progress, allowing prosecutors to identify those that may warrant faster processing or resource adjustments. [210] The terrorism division of the Brussels Criminal Court handles cases related to terrorism and TF in the Brussels judicial district. Other specialised divisions also exist in Liège, Charleroi, East Flanders and Antwerp, although the majority of cases are centralised in Brussels and Antwerp, where the prosecutor’s offices generally handle these cases at the federal level." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="776. The funds and other assets of designated persons are only identified and frozen to a certain extent by some FIs (banks and insurance companies). Notifications of frozen funds and economic resources to the SPF Finance are the main source for identifying the assets of listed persons. Reporting entities (and all other persons concerned) are required to notify SPF Finance of any freezing measures taken in relation to TFS for TF. If the person’s name is the same (false positives), the SPF Finance initiates an identification procedure with the security services, the police and OCAM to confirm whether the transaction falls within the scope of TFS. If it does not, the transaction is then unfrozen. 777. In practice, only FIs notify the SPF Finance when the designated persons have an account or have entered into a financial contract with them. The SPF Finance has not yet received any notifications from DNFBPs or the customs authorities in connection with TF related TFS. The SPF Finance may receive notifications from other government departments, such as the SPF Finance’s General Administration of Heritage Documentation , which provides information on real estate owned (jointly) by individuals included on the sanctions list. The number of notifications issued by these departments has not been provided, with the exception of one notification from the National Pensions Office, which froze the pension of a person on the national sanctions list. 778. The financial information held by the CTIF (see IO.6) and the information gathered in the course of terrorism investigations and prosecutions, where these have a financial component (see IO.9), are also important sources of information for identifying and depriving terrorists, terrorist organisations and individuals financing terrorism of funds and other assets. 779. The SPF Finance carries out verification measures for each person on the national sanctions list, to determine whether they hold funds and other assets in Belgium. These verification measures have not led to identifying any breaches. They are mainly carried out by checking with the central register for financial accounts and contracts (PCC, see IO.5), which establishes whether the individuals listed have a bank account or have entered into a financial contract with one of the Belgian FIs. The SPF Finance also searches the many databases in Belgium, such as the register of beneficial ownership (UBO), to check whether the people on the list are the beneficial owners of a legal entity (see IO.5). In practice, these checks have not identified any individuals or entities that should be subject to freezing measures. The checks carried out by the SPF Finance should in theory also enable it to identify FIs that have not notified it that they maintain a bank account or have entered into a financial contract with a listed person. In practice, the checks have not identified any such failures. 780. Between 2019 and 2024, Belgium froze EUR 8 548 under the EU Al-Qaida regulations and EUR 84 000 relating to individuals included on the national list. These freezing measures were in response to notifications from banks and insurance companies. One immovable property was also subject to a freezing measure. These relatively low amounts are consistent with the country’s TF risk profile (mainly micro-financing of terrorist cells, lone actors and former foreign terrorist fighters; see IO.1 and IO.9). However, the type of assets frozen (mainly bank account balances) is not consistent with the terrorist financing methods identified by Belgium, which places greater emphasis on the use of cash and virtual assets (see IO.1 and IO.9). The fact that no assets have been frozen by customs authorities or DNFBPs and the limited understanding of these entities raises concerns that transactions falling within the scope of TF related TFS may not have been identified, raising questions about the full effectiveness of TFS measures in Belgium. Nevertheless, Belgium has carried out some seizures and confiscations in TF cases (see IO.8 and IO.9). 781. Since November 2024, SPF Economy’s Basic Banking Service division, which is responsible for designating the credit institution (CI) that must provide basic banking services to entities subject to de-risking measures, has been checking national and international TFS for TF lists when reviewing applications from legal entities requesting this service. Because no such checks were carried out before November 2024, the Basic Banking Service Division could refer entities potentially subject to national TFS imposed by foreign authorities to CIs (see IO.1 and IO.3)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="776. The funds and other assets of designated persons are only identified and frozen to a certain extent by some FIs (banks and insurance companies). Notifications of frozen funds and economic resources to the SPF Finance are the main source for identifying the assets of listed persons. Reporting entities (and all other persons concerned) are required to notify SPF Finance of any freezing measures taken in relation to TFS for TF. If the person’s name is the same (false positives), the SPF Finance initiates an identification procedure with the security services, the police and OCAM to confirm whether the transaction falls within the scope of TFS. If it does not, the transaction is then unfrozen. 777. In practice, only FIs notify the SPF Finance when the designated persons have an account or have entered into a financial contract with them. The SPF Finance has not yet received any notifications from DNFBPs or the customs authorities in connection with TF related TFS. The SPF Finance may receive notifications from other government departments, such as the SPF Finance’s General Administration of Heritage Documentation , which provides information on real estate owned (jointly) by individuals included on the sanctions list. The number of notifications issued by these departments has not been provided, with the exception of one notification from the National Pensions Office, which froze the pension of a person on the national sanctions list. 778. The financial information held by the CTIF (see IO.6) and the information gathered in the course of terrorism investigations and prosecutions, where these have a financial component (see IO.9), are also important sources of information for identifying and depriving terrorists, terrorist organisations and individuals financing terrorism of funds and other assets. 779. The SPF Finance carries out verification measures for each person on the national sanctions list, to determine whether they hold funds and other assets in Belgium. These verification measures have not led to identifying any breaches. They are mainly carried out by checking with the central register for financial accounts and contracts (PCC, see IO.5), which establishes whether the individuals listed have a bank account or have entered into a financial contract with one of the Belgian FIs. The SPF Finance also searches the many databases in Belgium, such as the register of beneficial ownership (UBO), to check whether the people on the list are the beneficial owners of a legal entity (see IO.5). In practice, these checks have not identified any individuals or entities that should be subject to freezing measures. The checks carried out by the SPF Finance should in theory also enable it to identify FIs that have not notified it that they maintain a bank account or have entered into a financial contract with a listed person. In practice, the checks have not identified any such failures. 780. Between 2019 and 2024, Belgium froze EUR 8 548 under the EU Al-Qaida regulations and EUR 84 000 relating to individuals included on the national list. These freezing measures were in response to notifications from banks and insurance companies. One immovable property was also subject to a freezing measure. These relatively low amounts are consistent with the country’s TF risk profile (mainly micro-financing of terrorist cells, lone actors and former foreign terrorist fighters; see IO.1 and IO.9). However, the type of assets frozen (mainly bank account balances) is not consistent with the terrorist financing methods identified by Belgium, which places greater emphasis on the use of cash and virtual assets (see IO.1 and IO.9). The fact that no assets have been frozen by customs authorities or DNFBPs and the limited understanding of these entities raises concerns that transactions falling within the scope of TF related TFS may not have been identified, raising questions about the full effectiveness of TFS measures in Belgium. Nevertheless, Belgium has carried out some seizures and confiscations in TF cases (see IO.8 and IO.9). 781. Since November 2024, SPF Economy’s Basic Banking Service division, which is responsible for designating the credit institution (CI) that must provide basic banking services to entities subject to de-risking measures, has been checking national and international TFS for TF lists when reviewing applications from legal entities requesting this service. Because no such checks were carried out before November 2024, the Basic Banking Service Division could refer entities potentially subject to national TFS imposed by foreign authorities to CIs (see IO.1 and IO.3)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="822. Belgium has no legal basis for requiring PF risks to be identified and assessed, nor a designated competent authority (see TC Annex, R 1). Nevertheless, it conducted an initial PF national risk assessment (PF NRA) in April 2024, coordinated by the SPF Finance-Treasury. The scope of the NRA has provided a global understanding of PF risks and takes into account Belgium’s specific context in this area. However, the private sector was not directly involved. 823. The PF NRA concludes that Belgium’s exposure to PF risk is low. It notes that Belgium is not affected by any geographic or demographic factors that might facilitate proliferation and its financing or create increased vulnerability. There are no proven economic ties between Belgium and the DPRK, and the North Korean diaspora in Belgium is small, consisting of only a few political refugees. The NRA considered certain vulnerabilities that could lead to a risk of PF and concluded that this risk is low, given the mitigation measures in place. The NRA covers the existence of Belgian companies active in the nuclear field and producing ‘dual-use’ (civilian and military) goods that could be diverted to WMD development programmes, the fact that Belgium is home to the port of Antwerp and financial institutions connected to the international financial system, and the diamond trade and the use of virtual assets. However, the NRA does not establish a clear link between these factors and the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS to which Belgium may be exposed. 824. With regard to the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS, the NRA identifies a risk of indirect financing made possible by the use of intermediaries, shell companies and legal arrangements to conceal the beneficial owner of funds and obscure illicit financial flows relating to PF. However, it lacks a more in-depth contextual analysis of the different methods, trends and complex typologies related to evading PF related TFS. 825. Lastly, some of the ML threats identified as having a potential impact in terms of evading PF related TFS are not addressed, including the existence of transnational organised crime groups and networks operating in Belgium and the development of networks with international connections involving countries potentially at risk of PF. 826. Belgium has implemented measures to mitigate PF risks, through the implementation of PF related TFS and their monitoring by the SPF Finance, and these are consistent with its risk assessment. On this basis, Belgium has not defined higher-risk and lower-risk scenarios. 827. FIs, particularly banks, generally have a good understanding of their obligations on PF related TFS. This is also of the case for FI supervisors, although the supervision carried out does not necessarily identify weaknesses in reporting entities’ internal control procedures (see section 11.6). However, the level of understanding and supervision of DNFBPs on PF related TFS is weak, with the exception of SPF Economy (see section 11.5). This potentially impacts the ability of DNBFPs to identify designated persons or entities and more complex patterns of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS. Identifying potential evasion of PF related TFS is also made more difficult by certain shortcomings in identifying beneficial owners (see IO.5)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="822. Belgium has no legal basis for requiring PF risks to be identified and assessed, nor a designated competent authority (see TC Annex, R 1). Nevertheless, it conducted an initial PF national risk assessment (PF NRA) in April 2024, coordinated by the SPF Finance-Treasury. The scope of the NRA has provided a global understanding of PF risks and takes into account Belgium’s specific context in this area. However, the private sector was not directly involved. 823. The PF NRA concludes that Belgium’s exposure to PF risk is low. It notes that Belgium is not affected by any geographic or demographic factors that might facilitate proliferation and its financing or create increased vulnerability. There are no proven economic ties between Belgium and the DPRK, and the North Korean diaspora in Belgium is small, consisting of only a few political refugees. The NRA considered certain vulnerabilities that could lead to a risk of PF and concluded that this risk is low, given the mitigation measures in place. The NRA covers the existence of Belgian companies active in the nuclear field and producing ‘dual-use’ (civilian and military) goods that could be diverted to WMD development programmes, the fact that Belgium is home to the port of Antwerp and financial institutions connected to the international financial system, and the diamond trade and the use of virtual assets. However, the NRA does not establish a clear link between these factors and the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS to which Belgium may be exposed. 824. With regard to the risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS, the NRA identifies a risk of indirect financing made possible by the use of intermediaries, shell companies and legal arrangements to conceal the beneficial owner of funds and obscure illicit financial flows relating to PF. However, it lacks a more in-depth contextual analysis of the different methods, trends and complex typologies related to evading PF related TFS. 825. Lastly, some of the ML threats identified as having a potential impact in terms of evading PF related TFS are not addressed, including the existence of transnational organised crime groups and networks operating in Belgium and the development of networks with international connections involving countries potentially at risk of PF. 826. Belgium has implemented measures to mitigate PF risks, through the implementation of PF related TFS and their monitoring by the SPF Finance, and these are consistent with its risk assessment. On this basis, Belgium has not defined higher-risk and lower-risk scenarios. 827. FIs, particularly banks, generally have a good understanding of their obligations on PF related TFS. This is also of the case for FI supervisors, although the supervision carried out does not necessarily identify weaknesses in reporting entities’ internal control procedures (see section 11.6). However, the level of understanding and supervision of DNFBPs on PF related TFS is weak, with the exception of SPF Economy (see section 11.5). This potentially impacts the ability of DNBFPs to identify designated persons or entities and more complex patterns of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF related TFS. Identifying potential evasion of PF related TFS is also made more difficult by certain shortcomings in identifying beneficial owners (see IO.5)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions 189. The 2017 AML Law (see the Introduction) provides for the possibility of exempting certain sectors from the application of the AML/CFT regime by Royal Decree (gambling establishments; operators carrying out financial activities other than money transfers, on a limited basis and ancillary to their main business), based on an appropriate risk assessment (see R.1, c.1.6 TC Annex). This possibility was implemented by the Royal Decree of 30 January 2019 exempting cafés offering games of chance from the obligations of the AML Law. 190. However, lottery games organised by the National Lottery do not fall within the scope of the 2017 AML Law, on the grounds that their characteristics pose a low ML/TF risk, as set out in the explanatory memorandum to the Law. However, the risks appear to have changed over the last few years, with the introduction of new games, including online games similar to casino games. The application of the definition of games of chance in the AML Law should therefore be reassessed. 191. For company service providers, the scope of the 2017 AML Law includes only one of the five categories of activities stipulated by the FATF – providers of head offices for enterprises (business centres) (see R.22 e. in the TC Annex). The main justification for not applying the AML Law to other activities is the fact that they are not subject to registration requirements, as they are not carried out on a professional basis on behalf of third parties in Belgium. The activity of incorporating legal entities is the only category for which reference to low ML/TF risk is made, as measured in the ML risk analysis conducted by Belgium in 2013. The current non-application of AML/CFT obligations to certain categories of company service provider (role of director or secretary of a legal person; role of trustee; role of nominee shareholder) is therefore not justified by a low ML/TF risk. [78] Furthermore, these activities seem to be evolving rapidly in the country, as are the associated risks, which should justify a rapid reassessment of the situation. 1.3.2. Simplified and enhanced measures 192. Belgium does not have a general system of simplified measures as such (see R.1, c.1.8 and 12, TC Annex). 193. Belgium has not defined an enhanced measures regime based on the conclusions of the ML NRA. However, since 2014, it has applied strict measures concerning the use of cash (maximum amount of EUR 3 000; ban for property sales), in response to the still massive circulation of cash in certain sectors, as illustrated by the ML NRA. Footnotes [78] But rather by the fact that these professional activities are not carried out in Belgium, or at least only to a very limited extent, usually by professionals who are already obliged entities elsewhere." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions 189. The 2017 AML Law (see the Introduction) provides for the possibility of exempting certain sectors from the application of the AML/CFT regime by Royal Decree (gambling establishments; operators carrying out financial activities other than money transfers, on a limited basis and ancillary to their main business), based on an appropriate risk assessment (see R.1, c.1.6 TC Annex). This possibility was implemented by the Royal Decree of 30 January 2019 exempting cafés offering games of chance from the obligations of the AML Law. 190. However, lottery games organised by the National Lottery do not fall within the scope of the 2017 AML Law, on the grounds that their characteristics pose a low ML/TF risk, as set out in the explanatory memorandum to the Law. However, the risks appear to have changed over the last few years, with the introduction of new games, including online games similar to casino games. The application of the definition of games of chance in the AML Law should therefore be reassessed. 191. For company service providers, the scope of the 2017 AML Law includes only one of the five categories of activities stipulated by the FATF – providers of head offices for enterprises (business centres) (see R.22 e. in the TC Annex). The main justification for not applying the AML Law to other activities is the fact that they are not subject to registration requirements, as they are not carried out on a professional basis on behalf of third parties in Belgium. The activity of incorporating legal entities is the only category for which reference to low ML/TF risk is made, as measured in the ML risk analysis conducted by Belgium in 2013. The current non-application of AML/CFT obligations to certain categories of company service provider (role of director or secretary of a legal person; role of trustee; role of nominee shareholder) is therefore not justified by a low ML/TF risk. [78] Furthermore, these activities seem to be evolving rapidly in the country, as are the associated risks, which should justify a rapid reassessment of the situation. 1.3.2. Simplified and enhanced measures 192. Belgium does not have a general system of simplified measures as such (see R.1, c.1.8 and 12, TC Annex). 193. Belgium has not defined an enhanced measures regime based on the conclusions of the ML NRA. However, since 2014, it has applied strict measures concerning the use of cash (maximum amount of EUR 3 000; ban for property sales), in response to the still massive circulation of cash in certain sectors, as illustrated by the ML NRA. Footnotes [78] But rather by the fact that these professional activities are not carried out in Belgium, or at least only to a very limited extent, usually by professionals who are already obliged entities elsewhere." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 251. The Belgian authorities make extensive use of other forms of cooperation, including informal cooperation, to counter ML/TF. 2.3.1. FIU 252. The CTIF shares information with foreign FIUs via secure platforms – FIU.net (for European FIUs) and Egmont Secure Web. The CTIF also exchanges information with FIUs that are not members of these networks, based on memoranda of understanding to ensure the security of communications. Table 2.3. The CTIF’s incoming and outgoing requests Incoming international cooperation (requests or communications received by the CTIF) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests for information 381 475 601 624 682 611 - from the EU 320 427 531 564 624 561 Spontaneous reports 1081 522 911 474 491 494 - from the EU 173 304 549 436 442 435 - from North and South America 827 213 350 29 43 33 Outgoing international cooperation (requests or communications sent by the CTIF) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests for information 821 711 338 307 317 346 Spontaneous reports 282 280 379 635 759 1 134* Note: *Including 1,180 reports issued in connection with correspondent banking transactions. Source: CTIF 253. The CTIF employs three full-time staff to manage and filter incoming requests for information from foreign FIUs. The requests follow the same process as for STRs (see IO.6 - urgent, priority and normal requests). These three people process requests requiring no analysis and whose response only requires consultation of the CTIF database. Requests requiring more in-depth analysis are forwarded to specialist analysts in the Operational Analysis Department, who are responsible for replying to foreign counterparts. 254. As far as incoming requests are concerned, the vast majority (90%) of requests for specific information concern European counterparts, particularly from neighbouring countries. The origin of unsolicited information linked to Belgium is more varied. The high number of spontaneous reports from North and South America between 2019 and 2021 was mainly due to FinCEN reports relating to TF in the post-terrorist-attack period. In 2022 and 2023, the exchanges were linked to cases involving various types of fraud, tax fraud, virtual assets, TF and criminal organisations, and drugs. 255. The assistance given by the CTIF to foreign counterparts is identical in its scope and exhaustiveness to that provided to national authorities (see IO.6). For example, the CTIF provides information contained in its database or to which it has access, reports police or judicial investigations, and transmits financial information such as bank accounts, details of financial movements, or information on the beneficial owners of legal persons (with the deficiencies noted at national level in the quality of data on beneficial owners, see IO.5). 256. All requests for information received must be answered as quickly as possible and in any event within the deadlines set out in the FIU.net and Egmont Secure Web procedures. Weekly monitoring is carried out and reminders are sent to all analysts to ensure that these deadlines are met. The satisfactory quality of the information transmitted, including its accuracy and speed, has been confirmed, notably by feedback from the countries in the FATF Global Network. 257. The vast majority of the outgoing requests issued by the CTIF to its foreign counterparts concern European countries, both for specific requests for information and for spontaneous reports on information held by the CTIF. The overall drop in requests for information from 2021 onwards should be seen in light of the increase in spontaneous exchanges sent to foreign FIUs, as evidenced by the near doubling of these exchanges in 2023. This trend is driven by a number of changes in operational policy designed to improve efficiency, with the development of a new approach to tackling the ML cases linked to offsetting and TBML more effectively (see IO.6), as well as spontaneous reports concerning correspondent banking in response to an aspect prioritised at national level (see below). In addition, the entry into force of a new method of international exchange (XBD, “cross-border dissemination”, which mainly concerns cases relating to fraud) has had an impact on outgoing requests. Lastly, the drop in the number of TF-related cases (see IO.9) is reflected in these figures. 258. Since 2022, the number of spontaneous reports issued by the CTIF on correspondent banking has increased substantially following the COBA project launched with the professional association of financial institutions (FEBELFIN) in 2021, which was also addressed by a European project. The aim of this project was to improve the content of COBA reports sent to the CTIF by the four largest Belgian banks, in order to improve the characterisation of circumstances surrounding the suspicious transactions identified and to ensure that the information transmitted could be passed on to the law enforcement authorities. The analysis of COBA reports led to the transmission of 1,368 spontaneous reports to 54 different FIUs between January 2022 and July 2024. Feedback from several foreign FIUs indicated that the information provided by the CTIF was clear, comprehensive and qualitative, that it was an important source of new information, and that they wished to share the information with their competent national authorities. The international exchanges initiated by the CTIF in this area have therefore contributed to the fight against criminal activities carried out through correspondent banking, particularly in connection with corruption, TBML and organised crime networks. 259. Offsetting-related networks are another major field in which CTIF shares information intensively with its foreign counterparts, with a particular focus on Brazilian networks, characterised notably by their transnational dimension and their close links with Brazil and Portugal (see IO.7). The CTIF's requests concerning natural or legal persons involved in these networks have enhanced the analyses and enabled the reconstitution of the criminal chain and its international ramifications, producing significant results. 260. In the Sky ECC case (see IO.7), the CTIF played a key role in supporting operational activities, including by contacting foreign counterparts and prioritising the collection and processing of information gathered on the identified entities through the decryption of communications by the police. These actions led to the referral of 89 cases to local prosecutors’ offices. 261. The CTIF has also increased the number of spontaneous reports in a number of TF-related cases, such as the “Syrian wallets” (see IO.9). The available identification data on the “collectors” (the central link in the system for transmitting money to Belgian FTFs) identified by CTIF was shared after an investigation with all the FIUs of the countries involved with a view to triggering further research and mapping the networks to which these people belonged. Through four spontaneous reports issued between 2017 and 2022, the identification data of 336 collectors was shared with international partners. 262. The goAML tool in place since the end of 2024 (see IO.6) should provide CTIF with quantitative granular information on the type of requests received and issued, as well as on the time frames, nature and quality of the responses received and issued. Through the examples of cases cited above and illustrated below, the CTIF nonetheless demonstrates that it seeks to cooperate with its foreign counterparts in sectors with a high ML/TF risk. Box 2.3. Case of notarial reports Subject: ML through real estate acquisitions in Belgium Agencies involved: CTIF, United Arab Emirates (UAE) FIU, Mauritian FIU, German FIU, French FIU Facts: In 2019, the CTIF received an STR from a notary in connection with the acquisition by a French couple (Mr and Mrs X) of a property in Belgium worth EUR 1,660,000. The property was acquired through international transfers totalling more than EUR 1,875,000 to the account of the notary's office. These funds came from several bank accounts held by Mr X in the UAE, Mauritius and Germany. Mr X was unable to justify certain funds from Hong Kong, China. IO.2 relevance : The CTIF requested the cooperation of its counterparts in the UAE, Mauritius and Germany to obtain additional information on the origin of the funds and other relevant information. Results : The information received from the contacted FIUs enabled the CTIF to demonstrate the use of complex structures (multiple bank accounts and shell companies) to launder funds of illicit origin in Togo's oil sector. The investigations are still in progress. Box 2.4. Case involving the Ukrainian and Croatian FIUs Subject: Receipt of almost EUR 2 million originating from Croatia into Belgian bank accounts with the funds suspected to be of fraudulent origin. One of the accounts was held by a Belgian diamond trading company. Agencies involved: CTIF, Croatian FIU, Ukrainian FIU, one Belgian bank, the Belgian judicial authorities and the OCSC. Facts: At the end of April 2024, the CTIF received a spontaneous report from the Croatian FIU concerning Mr X, a Ukrainian national, manager and BO of the company A, involved in the purchase and resale of three hotels in Croatia for a total value of EUR 38 million using funds of dubious origin linked to Ukraine. Mr X subsequently made various transfers into an account held by his daughter Y with a Belgian bank. IO.2 relevance : The CTIF obtained additional information from the FIUs of Ukraine and Croatia, as well as from stakeholders (bank, central point of contact (PCC)), which was used to trace suspicious funds used in Belgium, notably to finance the share capital of a Belgian company C whose activities included trading in diamonds, other precious stones and jewellery. This additional information enabled the CTIF to reveal that a proportion of the suspicious funds had been transferred to Y to finance the share capital of company C whose activities included trading in diamonds, other precious stones and jewellery. The financial analysis also showed that another account held by Y with the same bank had been credited on a monthly basis on behalf of an account held by company A in Croatia. Some of this money was used for payments to a diamond exchange in Antwerp. Results : Due to the seriousness and urgency of the matter, the CTIF notified the bank concerned that it was blocking the execution of any debit transactions on all accounts opened in the names of Y and company C. The CTIF also forwarded the file to the Belgian judicial authorities as a matter of urgency and simultaneously informed the OCSC. It also passed on additional information received, particularly on developments in Ukraine, to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Sums totalling EUR 2,022,987.26 were seized and transferred to the OCSC. The case is still under investigation. 263. Since 2019, and in application of a European provision, [96] when the CTIF receives an STR concerning another EU country, it must automatically externalise the STR data to its foreign counterparts in a standardised manner. This gives rise to cooperation in the form of XBR (“Cross-border reporting”) – receipt of a report issued by an obliged entity whose main activity is carried out under the freedom to provide services from Belgium and which is therefore subject to the Belgian AML/CFT Law, but whose reports predominantly do not concern or have no direct link with Belgium; and XBD (“Cross-border dissemination”) – receipt of a “conventional” report that may be of interest to one or more other European FIUs. Table 2.4. XBD/XBR dissemination for European FIUs Number of 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 XBR 38 893 8.021 11.154 19.574 XBD 47 114 613 323 193 Source: CTIF 264. The massive increase in XBRs from 2021 onwards has been due mainly to STRs relating to payment service providers who moved to Belgium after Brexit under the European passport mechanism. These reports correspond to transactions conducted via these payment service providers with entities located in the country of the recipient FIU. Outgoing XBD exchanges (launched in 2021) mainly concern fraud-related cases, for which the CTIF changed its internal processing policy at the same time, entailing less analysis with a view to referral to the courts (and therefore fewer requests abroad) but more XBDs. 265. With regard to TF, the CTIF may request information from its foreign counterparts on natural or legal persons for whom it does not already hold information. It frequently does so to meet the needs of legal proceedings. This option should also be used in relation to ML where the CTIF does not already hold data on the persons concerned, in order to speed up the international cooperation process on ML and support international investigations by the judicial authorities (see IO.6 and 7). 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 266. At the police level, the Federal Police's Directorate for International Police Cooperation ( Coopération Policière Internationale – CGI) is responsible for managing and processing international cooperation at operational level. This department liaises between Belgian police units and their foreign counterparts. It is staffed by 20 people and operates 24/7. There is also a back office staffed by 60 people and 20 lawyers and translators. It also oversees of the network of police liaison officers. 267. Belgium has 15 liaison officers abroad (including in Romania, Spain, Albania, the United States, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco and Turkey), six at Europol and 60 foreign police liaison officers accredited by Belgium (including from the United States, Romania and France). Belgium can also ask Dutch liaison officers to request international cooperation from third countries, e.g. with the UAE. In TF matters, the central police service dedicated to terrorism and FT (DJSOC-Terro, see IO.9) also has a secure line of communication with the French domestic intelligence services (DGSI), which illustrates the links and the need for close cooperation between the two countries. 268. The CGI cooperates closely with its foreign counterparts, mainly through Interpol and Europol, on ML and TF. Information exchanges are based on secure channels. The requests mainly concern information relating to legal persons, such as company directors, or vehicles, especially with regard to their owners. However, when it comes to bank accounts, tax information or the location of assets, these issues require more complex and formalised judicial cooperation (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.). 269. The management of requests for police cooperation is governed by strict time frames, which are adapted according to the urgency of the matter. A “Flash” request is processed within an hour and an urgent request within 24 hours, while “normal” requests are processed within 10 days. The FATF Global Network member countries that provided feedback on cooperation with the Belgian police services have expressed their satisfaction. 270. The police authorities send and receive ML/TF-related requests via Europol and Interpol. The police authorities also reported a number of cases illustrating joint work with foreign police authorities. One of the most striking examples is Sky ECC. An operational task force was set up by Europol, in which 25 countries participated, with Belgium being one of the driving forces (see IO.7). 271. The Belgian police services (DJSOC-Terro and the Brussels Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department) also actively cooperated with Europol on the Syrian wallets cases (see box in IO. 9), participating in the dedicated Europol taskforce which drew up investigation plans with the countries concerned. The Belgian police also contributed to the use of information transmitted by police services in other EU countries via Europol. Lastly, cooperation between the Belgian authorities as a whole (Federal Prosecutor's Office, CTIF, Federal Police), Eurojust and Europol has enabled the identification of the financing channels used. 272. In the TF field, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office participates in the activities of Eurojust, focusing primarily on terrorism but also including TF aspects. For example, Belgium contributes to the Counter Terrorism Register (CTR), in place since 2021, which centralises judicial information on investigations, prosecutions and convictions in EU countries and enables links to be established between ongoing proceedings. Authority responsible for asset recovery 273. Belgium’s Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations ( Office central des saisies et confiscations ) is the national contact point for the EU's Asset Recovery Office Platform (ARO) and the international Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN). These two networks facilitate informal contacts and rapid exchanges of information on asset tracing, both for suspects under investigation (with a view to asset freezes) and for convicted offenders (with a view to asset recovery). Overall, incoming and outgoing requests for information via the ARO and CARIN networks have been increasing since 2019 (see IO.8). 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 274. The BNB maintains frequent bilateral contacts with other AML/CFT supervisory authorities, both within and outside the EU. These contacts include exchanges of information on supervised financial institutions and the results of inspections, the coordination of respective supervisory monitoring activities, which may lead to the organisation of joint inspections, and the identification of ML/TF risks. 275. For example, in 2022, the BNB exchanged information with its French counterpart (ACPR) in connection with a report of an infringement involving the management of a French credit institution and its branch in Belgium. The two authorities organised an inspection in 2023 covering the identified concerns. In 2024, the BNB and its Irish counterpart, the Central Bank of Ireland, travelled to Lithuania on a joint visit to the operational teams at the shared service centre of a payment institution based in Ireland, which offers services in Belgium through a large network of agents, in order to assess the compliance of the AML/CFT process and identify ML/TF risks. This action enabled them to coordinate their supervisory activities. Also in 2024, the BNB, with the European Central Bank’s agreement, contacted the New York State Department of Financial Services to investigate the veracity of the facts alleged in a report indicating offences concerning the Belgian subsidiary of a US credit institution. 276. The BNB also collaborates with the EU supervisory authorities for financial institutions operating in the territory of three or more EU Member States, including Belgium, which requires the creation of supervisory colleges (see IO.3). At the end of 2020, the BNB took part in the first colleges run by other supervisory authorities and organised the first meeting of an AML/CFT supervisory college for a Belgian credit institution. On 31 December 2024, the BNB had organised 33 college meetings for 17 financial institutions (credit institutions, life insurance companies, payment and electronic money institutions). It also took part in a total of 58 colleges organised by other European supervisory authorities, including 17 with France, nine with the Netherlands and eight with Luxembourg. In addition to closer cooperation, the colleges develop joint supervision strategies, particularly when significant ML/TF risks are associated with group entities. The BNB also cooperates with the European Central Bank within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism to check the fit and proper requirements of the managers and shareholders of credit institutions qualified as significant (see IO.3). 277. The FSMA consults its foreign counterparts on a regular basis when conducting the fit and proper checks of the directors and shareholders of the financial institutions it oversees. It also receives requests to this effect from foreign authorities. In addition, FSMA participates in 19 AML/CFT supervisory colleges set up at European level for financial institutions operating in more than one EU Member State (see above). 278. In its capacity as the AML/CFT supervisory authority for VASPs (see IO. 3), the FSMA examined registration applications of Belgian VASPs. It systematically consulted the foreign authorities of the countries concerned when the manager(s) or shareholder(s) had declared that they had held positions with a company under the supervision of another foreign authority, or when the entity was a company that was already regulated in another country. The FSMA requested information from the Polish, Spanish, French, Dutch, German, US and Luxembourg authorities. 279. The competent authorities responsible for supervising DNFBPs – SPF Economy, Belgian Gaming Commission, Belgian Audit Oversight Board – cooperate and maintain contacts with their foreign counterparts, particularly from neighbouring countries. Examples of this cooperation include sharing experiences, exchanging information and cooperating on supervision issues. In most sectors, the intensity of exchanges with foreign counterparts is relatively limited because DNFBPs rarely engage in international activity. However, the diamond sector is internationally oriented in many respects (e.g. origin and destination of the products, partners in the production chain, origin of the customers, Antwerp-based sites of entities linked to foreign groups). SPF Economy’s activities reflect this international scope, especially through its active participation in various mechanisms (G7 sanctions, Kimberley process, etc.) and technical contributions to them, which shed light on the sector's risk context. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 280. As part of its remit, and therefore for all matters relating to customs offences, Belgian Customs receives requests for information from other customs administrations and also issues requests to them. [97] Information sharing between Belgium and non-EU countries is based on bilateral agreements signed by Belgium and non-EU countries on a reciprocal basis. Information is shared between Belgian Customs and EU countries via Europol using the Siena communication channel. Information can also be shared via the Belgian liaison officer at Europol. Customs also share data on cash offences with Europol via the SIENA system to enable the cross-referencing of this data with the data in their database. For all AML aspects that do not constitute customs offences, Customs information is exchanged through the CTIF and via mutual legal assistance with the authorities of third countries. 281. The tax authorities do not report any international AML/CFT cooperation activities directly, but the specific tax fraud-related ML information they report to the CTIF is used in international cooperation with other FIUs, or by police or judicial authorities in the context of intelligence exchanges on the basis of judicial treaties or international letters rogatory. 2.3.5. International cooperation on information about legal persons and legal arrangements 282. Basic information on legal entities and arrangements is freely available in four languages (French, Dutch, German and English) to any interested party, including foreign authorities, via the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register [98] (see IO.5). The information on beneficial owners that CTIF or the supervisory authorities of financial institutions, or other competent Belgian authorities may exchange with their foreign counterparts (see above) includes beneficial ownership information to which they may have access via the obliged financial institutions. 283. Foreign authorities may access information on beneficial owners held in the UBO register, either in a request sent to SPF Finance (Treasury), or via the European Beneficial Ownership Register Interconnection System (BORIS) for EU authorities connected to this system, to which the UBO register has been linked since April 2024. [99] For requests sent to the Treasury, a legitimate interest must be demonstrated in order to verify that the requesting authority is acting as a competent authority. The Belgian authorities may also obtain and transmit information on beneficial owners available at national level on behalf of their foreign counterparts in the EU (see R.24 and 25 in the TC Annex). [100] However, the shortcomings of the UBO register are currently hampering the Belgian authorities’ efforts to provide verified and up-to-date information to their counterparts (see IO.5). Footnotes [96] Article 53.1 of the Fourth AML/CFT Directive transposed by Article 124 of the AML Law of 18 September 2017 [97] Mutual assistance under Regulation 515/97 and the Naples II Convention [98] Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises - Services for everyone | SPF Economie [99] General information on finding beneficial owners | European e-Justice Portal [100] At the end of the on-site visit (14 February 2025), the UBO register was not yet connected to the central European Beneficial Ownership Register Interconnection System (BORIS)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 251. The Belgian authorities make extensive use of other forms of cooperation, including informal cooperation, to counter ML/TF. 2.3.1. FIU 252. The CTIF shares information with foreign FIUs via secure platforms – FIU.net (for European FIUs) and Egmont Secure Web. The CTIF also exchanges information with FIUs that are not members of these networks, based on memoranda of understanding to ensure the security of communications. Table 2.3. The CTIF’s incoming and outgoing requests Incoming international cooperation (requests or communications received by the CTIF) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests for information 381 475 601 624 682 611 - from the EU 320 427 531 564 624 561 Spontaneous reports 1081 522 911 474 491 494 - from the EU 173 304 549 436 442 435 - from North and South America 827 213 350 29 43 33 Outgoing international cooperation (requests or communications sent by the CTIF) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests for information 821 711 338 307 317 346 Spontaneous reports 282 280 379 635 759 1 134* Note: *Including 1,180 reports issued in connection with correspondent banking transactions. Source: CTIF 253. The CTIF employs three full-time staff to manage and filter incoming requests for information from foreign FIUs. The requests follow the same process as for STRs (see IO.6 - urgent, priority and normal requests). These three people process requests requiring no analysis and whose response only requires consultation of the CTIF database. Requests requiring more in-depth analysis are forwarded to specialist analysts in the Operational Analysis Department, who are responsible for replying to foreign counterparts. 254. As far as incoming requests are concerned, the vast majority (90%) of requests for specific information concern European counterparts, particularly from neighbouring countries. The origin of unsolicited information linked to Belgium is more varied. The high number of spontaneous reports from North and South America between 2019 and 2021 was mainly due to FinCEN reports relating to TF in the post-terrorist-attack period. In 2022 and 2023, the exchanges were linked to cases involving various types of fraud, tax fraud, virtual assets, TF and criminal organisations, and drugs. 255. The assistance given by the CTIF to foreign counterparts is identical in its scope and exhaustiveness to that provided to national authorities (see IO.6). For example, the CTIF provides information contained in its database or to which it has access, reports police or judicial investigations, and transmits financial information such as bank accounts, details of financial movements, or information on the beneficial owners of legal persons (with the deficiencies noted at national level in the quality of data on beneficial owners, see IO.5). 256. All requests for information received must be answered as quickly as possible and in any event within the deadlines set out in the FIU.net and Egmont Secure Web procedures. Weekly monitoring is carried out and reminders are sent to all analysts to ensure that these deadlines are met. The satisfactory quality of the information transmitted, including its accuracy and speed, has been confirmed, notably by feedback from the countries in the FATF Global Network. 257. The vast majority of the outgoing requests issued by the CTIF to its foreign counterparts concern European countries, both for specific requests for information and for spontaneous reports on information held by the CTIF. The overall drop in requests for information from 2021 onwards should be seen in light of the increase in spontaneous exchanges sent to foreign FIUs, as evidenced by the near doubling of these exchanges in 2023. This trend is driven by a number of changes in operational policy designed to improve efficiency, with the development of a new approach to tackling the ML cases linked to offsetting and TBML more effectively (see IO.6), as well as spontaneous reports concerning correspondent banking in response to an aspect prioritised at national level (see below). In addition, the entry into force of a new method of international exchange (XBD, “cross-border dissemination”, which mainly concerns cases relating to fraud) has had an impact on outgoing requests. Lastly, the drop in the number of TF-related cases (see IO.9) is reflected in these figures. 258. Since 2022, the number of spontaneous reports issued by the CTIF on correspondent banking has increased substantially following the COBA project launched with the professional association of financial institutions (FEBELFIN) in 2021, which was also addressed by a European project. The aim of this project was to improve the content of COBA reports sent to the CTIF by the four largest Belgian banks, in order to improve the characterisation of circumstances surrounding the suspicious transactions identified and to ensure that the information transmitted could be passed on to the law enforcement authorities. The analysis of COBA reports led to the transmission of 1,368 spontaneous reports to 54 different FIUs between January 2022 and July 2024. Feedback from several foreign FIUs indicated that the information provided by the CTIF was clear, comprehensive and qualitative, that it was an important source of new information, and that they wished to share the information with their competent national authorities. The international exchanges initiated by the CTIF in this area have therefore contributed to the fight against criminal activities carried out through correspondent banking, particularly in connection with corruption, TBML and organised crime networks. 259. Offsetting-related networks are another major field in which CTIF shares information intensively with its foreign counterparts, with a particular focus on Brazilian networks, characterised notably by their transnational dimension and their close links with Brazil and Portugal (see IO.7). The CTIF's requests concerning natural or legal persons involved in these networks have enhanced the analyses and enabled the reconstitution of the criminal chain and its international ramifications, producing significant results. 260. In the Sky ECC case (see IO.7), the CTIF played a key role in supporting operational activities, including by contacting foreign counterparts and prioritising the collection and processing of information gathered on the identified entities through the decryption of communications by the police. These actions led to the referral of 89 cases to local prosecutors’ offices. 261. The CTIF has also increased the number of spontaneous reports in a number of TF-related cases, such as the “Syrian wallets” (see IO.9). The available identification data on the “collectors” (the central link in the system for transmitting money to Belgian FTFs) identified by CTIF was shared after an investigation with all the FIUs of the countries involved with a view to triggering further research and mapping the networks to which these people belonged. Through four spontaneous reports issued between 2017 and 2022, the identification data of 336 collectors was shared with international partners. 262. The goAML tool in place since the end of 2024 (see IO.6) should provide CTIF with quantitative granular information on the type of requests received and issued, as well as on the time frames, nature and quality of the responses received and issued. Through the examples of cases cited above and illustrated below, the CTIF nonetheless demonstrates that it seeks to cooperate with its foreign counterparts in sectors with a high ML/TF risk. Box 2.3. Case of notarial reports Subject: ML through real estate acquisitions in Belgium Agencies involved: CTIF, United Arab Emirates (UAE) FIU, Mauritian FIU, German FIU, French FIU Facts: In 2019, the CTIF received an STR from a notary in connection with the acquisition by a French couple (Mr and Mrs X) of a property in Belgium worth EUR 1,660,000. The property was acquired through international transfers totalling more than EUR 1,875,000 to the account of the notary's office. These funds came from several bank accounts held by Mr X in the UAE, Mauritius and Germany. Mr X was unable to justify certain funds from Hong Kong, China. IO.2 relevance : The CTIF requested the cooperation of its counterparts in the UAE, Mauritius and Germany to obtain additional information on the origin of the funds and other relevant information. Results : The information received from the contacted FIUs enabled the CTIF to demonstrate the use of complex structures (multiple bank accounts and shell companies) to launder funds of illicit origin in Togo's oil sector. The investigations are still in progress. Box 2.4. Case involving the Ukrainian and Croatian FIUs Subject: Receipt of almost EUR 2 million originating from Croatia into Belgian bank accounts with the funds suspected to be of fraudulent origin. One of the accounts was held by a Belgian diamond trading company. Agencies involved: CTIF, Croatian FIU, Ukrainian FIU, one Belgian bank, the Belgian judicial authorities and the OCSC. Facts: At the end of April 2024, the CTIF received a spontaneous report from the Croatian FIU concerning Mr X, a Ukrainian national, manager and BO of the company A, involved in the purchase and resale of three hotels in Croatia for a total value of EUR 38 million using funds of dubious origin linked to Ukraine. Mr X subsequently made various transfers into an account held by his daughter Y with a Belgian bank. IO.2 relevance : The CTIF obtained additional information from the FIUs of Ukraine and Croatia, as well as from stakeholders (bank, central point of contact (PCC)), which was used to trace suspicious funds used in Belgium, notably to finance the share capital of a Belgian company C whose activities included trading in diamonds, other precious stones and jewellery. This additional information enabled the CTIF to reveal that a proportion of the suspicious funds had been transferred to Y to finance the share capital of company C whose activities included trading in diamonds, other precious stones and jewellery. The financial analysis also showed that another account held by Y with the same bank had been credited on a monthly basis on behalf of an account held by company A in Croatia. Some of this money was used for payments to a diamond exchange in Antwerp. Results : Due to the seriousness and urgency of the matter, the CTIF notified the bank concerned that it was blocking the execution of any debit transactions on all accounts opened in the names of Y and company C. The CTIF also forwarded the file to the Belgian judicial authorities as a matter of urgency and simultaneously informed the OCSC. It also passed on additional information received, particularly on developments in Ukraine, to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Sums totalling EUR 2,022,987.26 were seized and transferred to the OCSC. The case is still under investigation. 263. Since 2019, and in application of a European provision, [96] when the CTIF receives an STR concerning another EU country, it must automatically externalise the STR data to its foreign counterparts in a standardised manner. This gives rise to cooperation in the form of XBR (“Cross-border reporting”) – receipt of a report issued by an obliged entity whose main activity is carried out under the freedom to provide services from Belgium and which is therefore subject to the Belgian AML/CFT Law, but whose reports predominantly do not concern or have no direct link with Belgium; and XBD (“Cross-border dissemination”) – receipt of a “conventional” report that may be of interest to one or more other European FIUs. Table 2.4. XBD/XBR dissemination for European FIUs Number of 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 XBR 38 893 8.021 11.154 19.574 XBD 47 114 613 323 193 Source: CTIF 264. The massive increase in XBRs from 2021 onwards has been due mainly to STRs relating to payment service providers who moved to Belgium after Brexit under the European passport mechanism. These reports correspond to transactions conducted via these payment service providers with entities located in the country of the recipient FIU. Outgoing XBD exchanges (launched in 2021) mainly concern fraud-related cases, for which the CTIF changed its internal processing policy at the same time, entailing less analysis with a view to referral to the courts (and therefore fewer requests abroad) but more XBDs. 265. With regard to TF, the CTIF may request information from its foreign counterparts on natural or legal persons for whom it does not already hold information. It frequently does so to meet the needs of legal proceedings. This option should also be used in relation to ML where the CTIF does not already hold data on the persons concerned, in order to speed up the international cooperation process on ML and support international investigations by the judicial authorities (see IO.6 and 7). 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 266. At the police level, the Federal Police's Directorate for International Police Cooperation ( Coopération Policière Internationale – CGI) is responsible for managing and processing international cooperation at operational level. This department liaises between Belgian police units and their foreign counterparts. It is staffed by 20 people and operates 24/7. There is also a back office staffed by 60 people and 20 lawyers and translators. It also oversees of the network of police liaison officers. 267. Belgium has 15 liaison officers abroad (including in Romania, Spain, Albania, the United States, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco and Turkey), six at Europol and 60 foreign police liaison officers accredited by Belgium (including from the United States, Romania and France). Belgium can also ask Dutch liaison officers to request international cooperation from third countries, e.g. with the UAE. In TF matters, the central police service dedicated to terrorism and FT (DJSOC-Terro, see IO.9) also has a secure line of communication with the French domestic intelligence services (DGSI), which illustrates the links and the need for close cooperation between the two countries. 268. The CGI cooperates closely with its foreign counterparts, mainly through Interpol and Europol, on ML and TF. Information exchanges are based on secure channels. The requests mainly concern information relating to legal persons, such as company directors, or vehicles, especially with regard to their owners. However, when it comes to bank accounts, tax information or the location of assets, these issues require more complex and formalised judicial cooperation (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2.). 269. The management of requests for police cooperation is governed by strict time frames, which are adapted according to the urgency of the matter. A “Flash” request is processed within an hour and an urgent request within 24 hours, while “normal” requests are processed within 10 days. The FATF Global Network member countries that provided feedback on cooperation with the Belgian police services have expressed their satisfaction. 270. The police authorities send and receive ML/TF-related requests via Europol and Interpol. The police authorities also reported a number of cases illustrating joint work with foreign police authorities. One of the most striking examples is Sky ECC. An operational task force was set up by Europol, in which 25 countries participated, with Belgium being one of the driving forces (see IO.7). 271. The Belgian police services (DJSOC-Terro and the Brussels Federal Police Criminal Investigation Department) also actively cooperated with Europol on the Syrian wallets cases (see box in IO. 9), participating in the dedicated Europol taskforce which drew up investigation plans with the countries concerned. The Belgian police also contributed to the use of information transmitted by police services in other EU countries via Europol. Lastly, cooperation between the Belgian authorities as a whole (Federal Prosecutor's Office, CTIF, Federal Police), Eurojust and Europol has enabled the identification of the financing channels used. 272. In the TF field, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office participates in the activities of Eurojust, focusing primarily on terrorism but also including TF aspects. For example, Belgium contributes to the Counter Terrorism Register (CTR), in place since 2021, which centralises judicial information on investigations, prosecutions and convictions in EU countries and enables links to be established between ongoing proceedings. Authority responsible for asset recovery 273. Belgium’s Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations ( Office central des saisies et confiscations ) is the national contact point for the EU's Asset Recovery Office Platform (ARO) and the international Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN). These two networks facilitate informal contacts and rapid exchanges of information on asset tracing, both for suspects under investigation (with a view to asset freezes) and for convicted offenders (with a view to asset recovery). Overall, incoming and outgoing requests for information via the ARO and CARIN networks have been increasing since 2019 (see IO.8). 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 274. The BNB maintains frequent bilateral contacts with other AML/CFT supervisory authorities, both within and outside the EU. These contacts include exchanges of information on supervised financial institutions and the results of inspections, the coordination of respective supervisory monitoring activities, which may lead to the organisation of joint inspections, and the identification of ML/TF risks. 275. For example, in 2022, the BNB exchanged information with its French counterpart (ACPR) in connection with a report of an infringement involving the management of a French credit institution and its branch in Belgium. The two authorities organised an inspection in 2023 covering the identified concerns. In 2024, the BNB and its Irish counterpart, the Central Bank of Ireland, travelled to Lithuania on a joint visit to the operational teams at the shared service centre of a payment institution based in Ireland, which offers services in Belgium through a large network of agents, in order to assess the compliance of the AML/CFT process and identify ML/TF risks. This action enabled them to coordinate their supervisory activities. Also in 2024, the BNB, with the European Central Bank’s agreement, contacted the New York State Department of Financial Services to investigate the veracity of the facts alleged in a report indicating offences concerning the Belgian subsidiary of a US credit institution. 276. The BNB also collaborates with the EU supervisory authorities for financial institutions operating in the territory of three or more EU Member States, including Belgium, which requires the creation of supervisory colleges (see IO.3). At the end of 2020, the BNB took part in the first colleges run by other supervisory authorities and organised the first meeting of an AML/CFT supervisory college for a Belgian credit institution. On 31 December 2024, the BNB had organised 33 college meetings for 17 financial institutions (credit institutions, life insurance companies, payment and electronic money institutions). It also took part in a total of 58 colleges organised by other European supervisory authorities, including 17 with France, nine with the Netherlands and eight with Luxembourg. In addition to closer cooperation, the colleges develop joint supervision strategies, particularly when significant ML/TF risks are associated with group entities. The BNB also cooperates with the European Central Bank within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism to check the fit and proper requirements of the managers and shareholders of credit institutions qualified as significant (see IO.3). 277. The FSMA consults its foreign counterparts on a regular basis when conducting the fit and proper checks of the directors and shareholders of the financial institutions it oversees. It also receives requests to this effect from foreign authorities. In addition, FSMA participates in 19 AML/CFT supervisory colleges set up at European level for financial institutions operating in more than one EU Member State (see above). 278. In its capacity as the AML/CFT supervisory authority for VASPs (see IO. 3), the FSMA examined registration applications of Belgian VASPs. It systematically consulted the foreign authorities of the countries concerned when the manager(s) or shareholder(s) had declared that they had held positions with a company under the supervision of another foreign authority, or when the entity was a company that was already regulated in another country. The FSMA requested information from the Polish, Spanish, French, Dutch, German, US and Luxembourg authorities. 279. The competent authorities responsible for supervising DNFBPs – SPF Economy, Belgian Gaming Commission, Belgian Audit Oversight Board – cooperate and maintain contacts with their foreign counterparts, particularly from neighbouring countries. Examples of this cooperation include sharing experiences, exchanging information and cooperating on supervision issues. In most sectors, the intensity of exchanges with foreign counterparts is relatively limited because DNFBPs rarely engage in international activity. However, the diamond sector is internationally oriented in many respects (e.g. origin and destination of the products, partners in the production chain, origin of the customers, Antwerp-based sites of entities linked to foreign groups). SPF Economy’s activities reflect this international scope, especially through its active participation in various mechanisms (G7 sanctions, Kimberley process, etc.) and technical contributions to them, which shed light on the sector's risk context. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 280. As part of its remit, and therefore for all matters relating to customs offences, Belgian Customs receives requests for information from other customs administrations and also issues requests to them. [97] Information sharing between Belgium and non-EU countries is based on bilateral agreements signed by Belgium and non-EU countries on a reciprocal basis. Information is shared between Belgian Customs and EU countries via Europol using the Siena communication channel. Information can also be shared via the Belgian liaison officer at Europol. Customs also share data on cash offences with Europol via the SIENA system to enable the cross-referencing of this data with the data in their database. For all AML aspects that do not constitute customs offences, Customs information is exchanged through the CTIF and via mutual legal assistance with the authorities of third countries. 281. The tax authorities do not report any international AML/CFT cooperation activities directly, but the specific tax fraud-related ML information they report to the CTIF is used in international cooperation with other FIUs, or by police or judicial authorities in the context of intelligence exchanges on the basis of judicial treaties or international letters rogatory. 2.3.5. International cooperation on information about legal persons and legal arrangements 282. Basic information on legal entities and arrangements is freely available in four languages (French, Dutch, German and English) to any interested party, including foreign authorities, via the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register [98] (see IO.5). The information on beneficial owners that CTIF or the supervisory authorities of financial institutions, or other competent Belgian authorities may exchange with their foreign counterparts (see above) includes beneficial ownership information to which they may have access via the obliged financial institutions. 283. Foreign authorities may access information on beneficial owners held in the UBO register, either in a request sent to SPF Finance (Treasury), or via the European Beneficial Ownership Register Interconnection System (BORIS) for EU authorities connected to this system, to which the UBO register has been linked since April 2024. [99] For requests sent to the Treasury, a legitimate interest must be demonstrated in order to verify that the requesting authority is acting as a competent authority. The Belgian authorities may also obtain and transmit information on beneficial owners available at national level on behalf of their foreign counterparts in the EU (see R.24 and 25 in the TC Annex). [100] However, the shortcomings of the UBO register are currently hampering the Belgian authorities’ efforts to provide verified and up-to-date information to their counterparts (see IO.5). Footnotes [96] Article 53.1 of the Fourth AML/CFT Directive transposed by Article 124 of the AML Law of 18 September 2017 [97] Mutual assistance under Regulation 515/97 and the Naples II Convention [98] Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises - Services for everyone | SPF Economie [99] General information on finding beneficial owners | European e-Justice Portal [100] At the end of the on-site visit (14 February 2025), the UBO register was not yet connected to the central European Beneficial Ownership Register Interconnection System (BORIS)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="FIs under BNB supervision 326. FIs supervised by the BNB generally demonstrate a good understanding of ML/TF risks, particularly those most at risk, namely credit institutions (CIs) and payment institutions (PIs) and, to a lesser extent, electronic money institutions (EMIs). However, this understanding varies more among certain FIs that have adopted innovative business models, particularly those using virtual IBANs, as the BNB’s inspections have also found. In these cases, commercial imperatives seem to take precedence over ML/TF risks, which remain insufficiently controlled. These products enable customers located in countries with varying AML/CFT regulations to make payments via a Belgian IBAN, giving them the appearance of a presence in the EU, which represents a high inherent ML/TF risk. 327. FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks is based on several sources, such as the SRAs, CTIF’s annual report and the internal assessment they are required to carry out. However, this understanding remains partial. Due to their limited dissemination (see IO.1), ML and TF NRAs are not well known by FIs, which limits their ability to develop a comprehensive view of external threats. Furthermore, the BNB’s current approach in its SRA, which focuses on internal vulnerabilities rather than on the explicit assessment of external threats (see section 3.2), further reduces the scope of a comprehensive and integrated view of ML/TF risks and hinders FIs’ understanding of the overall context of their risks. 328. The BNB verifies understanding of the risks by asking FIs to submit their updated internal assessments annually, except for exempt entities (see 5.2.1). Some FIs go beyond analysing existing risks and identify risks that are insufficiently or not at all covered by the SRA, such as high-risk situations in the context of basic banking services for businesses, correspondent banking, or certain high-risk customer profiles (e.g. fake bookshops, betting centres). This capacity for independent analysis demonstrates that the FIs supervised by the BNB are, on the whole, capable of identifying and assessing their own risks. 329. Finally, some FIs consider that the SRA remains too theoretical and not very practical (as it is not very operational), and highlight the lack of sufficiently concrete analyses to help them implement their AML/CFT measures effectively. FIs under FSMA supervision 330. The FSMA notes an increase in the number of FIs that have individually carried out an ORA and an improvement in their quality: the ORAs also appear to be better documented and regularly updated. However, in general, the FIs under FSMA supervision have varying levels of understanding of the risks. Bureaux de change , for example, do not seem to have a good understanding of their risks, which compromises the effectiveness of their vigilance measures. 331. Supervision shows that insurance intermediaries have a more variable understanding of ML/TF risks. In 2024, 74% of them had carried out an ORA, but some shortcomings may persist, particularly in their ability to identify, document and update these risks, despite support from the FSMA and their professional association, which compromises the effectiveness of their AML/CFT measures. 332. Other categories of FI do not yet seem to have fully identified all the risks to which they are exposed. For example, one lender had to belatedly regularise a significant number of STRs involving unsubstantiated early repayments and cash payments via third parties, in particular via Bpost. Similarly, the risks of TF via consumer loans remain underestimated by some of these operators, highlighting the need for greater awareness and monitoring in these sectors. 333. Furthermore, the FSMA does not systematically require FIs to update their ORAs, which raises questions about their ongoing understanding of risks and also reduces the FSMA’s ability to ascertain the actual level of understanding of risks by these players, with an indirect impact on genuinely risk-based supervision. SPF Finance – Treasury 334. Bpost carried out a risk assessment with the help of a third-party auditor in 2021. This assessment is reviewed annually and is also discussed with the Treasury." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="FIs under BNB supervision 326. FIs supervised by the BNB generally demonstrate a good understanding of ML/TF risks, particularly those most at risk, namely credit institutions (CIs) and payment institutions (PIs) and, to a lesser extent, electronic money institutions (EMIs). However, this understanding varies more among certain FIs that have adopted innovative business models, particularly those using virtual IBANs, as the BNB’s inspections have also found. In these cases, commercial imperatives seem to take precedence over ML/TF risks, which remain insufficiently controlled. These products enable customers located in countries with varying AML/CFT regulations to make payments via a Belgian IBAN, giving them the appearance of a presence in the EU, which represents a high inherent ML/TF risk. 327. FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks is based on several sources, such as the SRAs, CTIF’s annual report and the internal assessment they are required to carry out. However, this understanding remains partial. Due to their limited dissemination (see IO.1), ML and TF NRAs are not well known by FIs, which limits their ability to develop a comprehensive view of external threats. Furthermore, the BNB’s current approach in its SRA, which focuses on internal vulnerabilities rather than on the explicit assessment of external threats (see section 3.2), further reduces the scope of a comprehensive and integrated view of ML/TF risks and hinders FIs’ understanding of the overall context of their risks. 328. The BNB verifies understanding of the risks by asking FIs to submit their updated internal assessments annually, except for exempt entities (see 5.2.1). Some FIs go beyond analysing existing risks and identify risks that are insufficiently or not at all covered by the SRA, such as high-risk situations in the context of basic banking services for businesses, correspondent banking, or certain high-risk customer profiles (e.g. fake bookshops, betting centres). This capacity for independent analysis demonstrates that the FIs supervised by the BNB are, on the whole, capable of identifying and assessing their own risks. 329. Finally, some FIs consider that the SRA remains too theoretical and not very practical (as it is not very operational), and highlight the lack of sufficiently concrete analyses to help them implement their AML/CFT measures effectively. FIs under FSMA supervision 330. The FSMA notes an increase in the number of FIs that have individually carried out an ORA and an improvement in their quality: the ORAs also appear to be better documented and regularly updated. However, in general, the FIs under FSMA supervision have varying levels of understanding of the risks. Bureaux de change , for example, do not seem to have a good understanding of their risks, which compromises the effectiveness of their vigilance measures. 331. Supervision shows that insurance intermediaries have a more variable understanding of ML/TF risks. In 2024, 74% of them had carried out an ORA, but some shortcomings may persist, particularly in their ability to identify, document and update these risks, despite support from the FSMA and their professional association, which compromises the effectiveness of their AML/CFT measures. 332. Other categories of FI do not yet seem to have fully identified all the risks to which they are exposed. For example, one lender had to belatedly regularise a significant number of STRs involving unsubstantiated early repayments and cash payments via third parties, in particular via Bpost. Similarly, the risks of TF via consumer loans remain underestimated by some of these operators, highlighting the need for greater awareness and monitoring in these sectors. 333. Furthermore, the FSMA does not systematically require FIs to update their ORAs, which raises questions about their ongoing understanding of risks and also reduces the FSMA’s ability to ascertain the actual level of understanding of risks by these players, with an indirect impact on genuinely risk-based supervision. SPF Finance – Treasury 334. Bpost carried out a risk assessment with the help of a third-party auditor in 2021. This assessment is reviewed annually and is also discussed with the Treasury." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="426. The limited understanding of ML/TF risks by DNFBPs, including those considered high risk, is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. Most do not conduct a comprehensive risk assessment within their organisations. In the absence of such assessments, these entities do not fully understand their own exposure to ML/TF threats (which they perceive as low) and, as a result, do not adopt appropriate due diligence measures. This significantly reduces their ability to detect and report suspicious transactions, thereby weakening the effectiveness of due diligence measures. 427. The fact that the majority of DNFBPs consider their sector to be low risk, despite the vulnerabilities identified by the authorities, reflects a discrepancy between the risk perceived by the reporting entities and the reality of the ML/TF methods and typologies observed. This lack of awareness compromises the effective implementation of due diligence obligations, particularly with regard to suspicious transaction reporting and training for relevant staff. 428. The conclusions and results of national ML/TF risk analyses have not been assimilated or integrated by the majority of DNFBPs. Although some have had access to a recent SRA, these analyses usually simply repeat the conclusions of the NRA, without providing an in-depth and contextualised assessment of the specific vulnerabilities of each sector. This partial or insufficient dissemination of risk analyses limits the ability of reporting entities to improve their compliance and develop internal assessments of their own risks. 429. Diamond dealers’ understanding of ML/TF risks is very limited, despite their high exposure to such risks. While some are aware of their AML/CFT obligations, risk assessment within companies remains inadequate, and awareness of ML risk is virtually non-existent. Diamond dealers generally limit themselves to an initial customer assessment when establishing a relationship, but this is rarely reviewed over time, as diamond dealers consider themselves to be “well acquainted” with their customers. They do not carry out an overall analysis of their company’s ML/TF risks. This static approach considerably limits their ability to detect possible changes in customer behaviour or unusual transactions. 430. The supervision carried out by SPF Economy between 2020 and 2023 confirms major shortcomings in the implementation of AML/CFT obligations (see next section). Of the 17 entities supervised, 12 were found to have shortcomings in relation to the absence of risk assessment. Although an AML Policy was drawn up in 2020 and updated regularly (most recently in June 2024) by the professional organisation Antwerp World Diamonds Center (AWDC) in collaboration with SPF Economy to help identify risks, its adoption by the entities subject to the obligations remains limited, despite outreach efforts aimed at professionals. Furthermore, shortcomings in the AWDC’s understanding of the risks give cause for concern. 431. Real estate agents also have very limited understanding of the risks, particularly those operating in the residential real estate sector. These professionals have fragmented knowledge of the risks and struggle to articulate them accurately. They tend to underestimate their exposure, considering that their business mainly involves local customers and few suspicious transactions. This misperception reduces the effectiveness of AML/CFT obligations and weakens the detection of ML schemes in real estate. Furthermore, the ML NRA and the ORIS tool (see above) are largely unknown or are not used by real estate agents, which limits their integration into industry practices. 432. When real estate agents carry out a risk assessment, it is limited to a summary analysis of the customer. A survey conducted by SPF Economy in 2021 highlighted significant shortcomings in risk identification for 42% of the real estate agents inspected. SPF Economy has not clearly defined the profile of high-risk real estate agents who should be subject to a more systematic and in-depth ML/TF risk assessment. In the absence of a structured methodology for risk assessment and its effective adoption, improving ML/TF risk management in the real estate sector remains difficult to achieve. 433. Business centres’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains very low, despite their significant exposure to ML schemes. The general survey carried out in 2022 by SPF Economy highlighted major shortcomings: 66% of business centres have no procedures in place to screen high-risk transactions, meaning they are unable to identify suspicious transactions; and 57% have not carried out individual risk assessments, revealing a lack of understanding of the vulnerabilities specific to each entity and customer. These results reflect a systemic lack of structure in the application of AML/CFT obligations, leaving the sector vulnerable to the use of shell companies and opaque structures for ML purposes. SPF Economy has also noted that many business centres consider that they face no ML/TF risk. This misperception hinders the implementation of appropriate due diligence measures and the adoption of good practice in risk assessment. Some service providers are risk-averse and avoid working with clients with dubious profiles. These divergent practices show that a significant proportion of players do not take any protective measures against potential abuse by criminals. 434. Notaries are highly aware of the ML/TF risks associated with their activities, particularly in company creation and property transactions. Both small and large notary firms have a good understanding of the risks associated with opaque structures and multiple transactions, which enables them to implement adequate risk analyses. The support of the National Chamber of Notaries, the 2021 SRA and the typologies are seen as essential resources in their compliance efforts. Notaries express an increased need for up-to-date information on emerging risks. 435. Lawyers ’ understanding of risk varies. Some firms, particularly medium-sized and small ones, demonstrate a good understanding of the risks and incorporate systematic analysis into their practices. However, some large, high-risk firms demonstrate insufficient understanding, focusing more on anonymous transactions and reputational risks while underestimating ML/TF indicators and typologies. AML/CFT supervision reveals significant shortcomings (see below), including a lack of firm-wide risk assessment and individual risk assessment for clients or files, which is a significant weakness for a profession exposed to complex transactions. 436. Chartered accountants have a limited understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities specific to their profession. Although the sector has a good theoretical understanding of the high-risk areas it supports (hospitality, construction, etc.) and professionals have tools to consolidate this knowledge, including SRAs and risk identification models prepared by the ITAA, the analysis of ML/TF schemes related to their services does not appear to be sufficiently thorough. 437. Statutory auditors have a better understanding of the risks thanks to more detailed internal analyses. The sector also carries out in-depth risk analyses at the individual level, particularly in large and medium-sized firms where IT tools are used to ensure that clients are monitored on an ongoing basis. 438. Gambling operators (casinos) demonstrate an excellent understanding of ML/TF risks and are attuned to the vulnerabilities identified in the NRA, even though they have not yet received the official version. Casinos have extensive experience in risk management, with most operating for more than 20 years. They use detailed risk analysis, taking into account new technologies (deepfakes, AI) and their implications for fraud, suspicious behaviour, particularly non-betting or interconnected players, and specific profiles of high-risk customers, such as PEPs and certain foreign players. Casinos benefit from automated risk assessment tools, which strengthen their ability to identify and monitor high-risk customers. Some operators have indicated that they maintain active monitoring based on information published by financial and supervisory authorities, such as the BNB and the CTIF, as well as regulatory practices in other jurisdictions. In addition, some have adopted proactive measures to mitigate risks, including prioritising card payments and limiting the use of cash. However, it is not clear whether these good practices are widespread across the sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="426. The limited understanding of ML/TF risks by DNFBPs, including those considered high risk, is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system. Most do not conduct a comprehensive risk assessment within their organisations. In the absence of such assessments, these entities do not fully understand their own exposure to ML/TF threats (which they perceive as low) and, as a result, do not adopt appropriate due diligence measures. This significantly reduces their ability to detect and report suspicious transactions, thereby weakening the effectiveness of due diligence measures. 427. The fact that the majority of DNFBPs consider their sector to be low risk, despite the vulnerabilities identified by the authorities, reflects a discrepancy between the risk perceived by the reporting entities and the reality of the ML/TF methods and typologies observed. This lack of awareness compromises the effective implementation of due diligence obligations, particularly with regard to suspicious transaction reporting and training for relevant staff. 428. The conclusions and results of national ML/TF risk analyses have not been assimilated or integrated by the majority of DNFBPs. Although some have had access to a recent SRA, these analyses usually simply repeat the conclusions of the NRA, without providing an in-depth and contextualised assessment of the specific vulnerabilities of each sector. This partial or insufficient dissemination of risk analyses limits the ability of reporting entities to improve their compliance and develop internal assessments of their own risks. 429. Diamond dealers’ understanding of ML/TF risks is very limited, despite their high exposure to such risks. While some are aware of their AML/CFT obligations, risk assessment within companies remains inadequate, and awareness of ML risk is virtually non-existent. Diamond dealers generally limit themselves to an initial customer assessment when establishing a relationship, but this is rarely reviewed over time, as diamond dealers consider themselves to be “well acquainted” with their customers. They do not carry out an overall analysis of their company’s ML/TF risks. This static approach considerably limits their ability to detect possible changes in customer behaviour or unusual transactions. 430. The supervision carried out by SPF Economy between 2020 and 2023 confirms major shortcomings in the implementation of AML/CFT obligations (see next section). Of the 17 entities supervised, 12 were found to have shortcomings in relation to the absence of risk assessment. Although an AML Policy was drawn up in 2020 and updated regularly (most recently in June 2024) by the professional organisation Antwerp World Diamonds Center (AWDC) in collaboration with SPF Economy to help identify risks, its adoption by the entities subject to the obligations remains limited, despite outreach efforts aimed at professionals. Furthermore, shortcomings in the AWDC’s understanding of the risks give cause for concern. 431. Real estate agents also have very limited understanding of the risks, particularly those operating in the residential real estate sector. These professionals have fragmented knowledge of the risks and struggle to articulate them accurately. They tend to underestimate their exposure, considering that their business mainly involves local customers and few suspicious transactions. This misperception reduces the effectiveness of AML/CFT obligations and weakens the detection of ML schemes in real estate. Furthermore, the ML NRA and the ORIS tool (see above) are largely unknown or are not used by real estate agents, which limits their integration into industry practices. 432. When real estate agents carry out a risk assessment, it is limited to a summary analysis of the customer. A survey conducted by SPF Economy in 2021 highlighted significant shortcomings in risk identification for 42% of the real estate agents inspected. SPF Economy has not clearly defined the profile of high-risk real estate agents who should be subject to a more systematic and in-depth ML/TF risk assessment. In the absence of a structured methodology for risk assessment and its effective adoption, improving ML/TF risk management in the real estate sector remains difficult to achieve. 433. Business centres’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains very low, despite their significant exposure to ML schemes. The general survey carried out in 2022 by SPF Economy highlighted major shortcomings: 66% of business centres have no procedures in place to screen high-risk transactions, meaning they are unable to identify suspicious transactions; and 57% have not carried out individual risk assessments, revealing a lack of understanding of the vulnerabilities specific to each entity and customer. These results reflect a systemic lack of structure in the application of AML/CFT obligations, leaving the sector vulnerable to the use of shell companies and opaque structures for ML purposes. SPF Economy has also noted that many business centres consider that they face no ML/TF risk. This misperception hinders the implementation of appropriate due diligence measures and the adoption of good practice in risk assessment. Some service providers are risk-averse and avoid working with clients with dubious profiles. These divergent practices show that a significant proportion of players do not take any protective measures against potential abuse by criminals. 434. Notaries are highly aware of the ML/TF risks associated with their activities, particularly in company creation and property transactions. Both small and large notary firms have a good understanding of the risks associated with opaque structures and multiple transactions, which enables them to implement adequate risk analyses. The support of the National Chamber of Notaries, the 2021 SRA and the typologies are seen as essential resources in their compliance efforts. Notaries express an increased need for up-to-date information on emerging risks. 435. Lawyers ’ understanding of risk varies. Some firms, particularly medium-sized and small ones, demonstrate a good understanding of the risks and incorporate systematic analysis into their practices. However, some large, high-risk firms demonstrate insufficient understanding, focusing more on anonymous transactions and reputational risks while underestimating ML/TF indicators and typologies. AML/CFT supervision reveals significant shortcomings (see below), including a lack of firm-wide risk assessment and individual risk assessment for clients or files, which is a significant weakness for a profession exposed to complex transactions. 436. Chartered accountants have a limited understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities specific to their profession. Although the sector has a good theoretical understanding of the high-risk areas it supports (hospitality, construction, etc.) and professionals have tools to consolidate this knowledge, including SRAs and risk identification models prepared by the ITAA, the analysis of ML/TF schemes related to their services does not appear to be sufficiently thorough. 437. Statutory auditors have a better understanding of the risks thanks to more detailed internal analyses. The sector also carries out in-depth risk analyses at the individual level, particularly in large and medium-sized firms where IT tools are used to ensure that clients are monitored on an ongoing basis. 438. Gambling operators (casinos) demonstrate an excellent understanding of ML/TF risks and are attuned to the vulnerabilities identified in the NRA, even though they have not yet received the official version. Casinos have extensive experience in risk management, with most operating for more than 20 years. They use detailed risk analysis, taking into account new technologies (deepfakes, AI) and their implications for fraud, suspicious behaviour, particularly non-betting or interconnected players, and specific profiles of high-risk customers, such as PEPs and certain foreign players. Casinos benefit from automated risk assessment tools, which strengthen their ability to identify and monitor high-risk customers. Some operators have indicated that they maintain active monitoring based on information published by financial and supervisory authorities, such as the BNB and the CTIF, as well as regulatory practices in other jurisdictions. In addition, some have adopted proactive measures to mitigate risks, including prioritising card payments and limiting the use of cash. However, it is not clear whether these good practices are widespread across the sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="518. The competent authorities have timely access to the data held in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and UBO registers. However, the current systems do not always guarantee access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date information by the competent authorities. 5.3.1. Basic information 519. Belgium gives an important weight to the role of notaries in ensuring the reliability of basic information registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises (see section5.2 and Rec. 24 of the TC Annex). However, in practice, their involvement does not constitute a sufficiently effective filter to ensure the reliability of basic information. Notaries are required to collect certain information as part of their due diligence obligations, which improves the reliability of this data. However, notaries only carry out formal checks on the basic information provided to them. They are required to accept the deed requested by the client – except in exceptional cases where the deed is contrary to public order – and do not carry out independent checks on the information provided by their clients (see section 5.2). In practice, notaries submit a limited number of STRs to the CTIF relating to the creation or modification of companies, contributing to a small extent to the identification of potential shell companies. The cross-sectoral assessment of legal persons reveals that notaries are sometimes used without their knowledge in ML schemes involving legal persons and that in some cases notaries have played an active and intentional role in these practices. During the period covered by this assessment, one notary was suspended by the Chamber of Notaries and received an administrative fine for failing to comply with the obligation to report suspicions in relation to allegations concerning his involvement in the successive creation of dozens of shell companies. These various factors raise questions about the ability of notaries to identify and report potential signs of legal persons established for the purpose of ML. 520. The clerks of the commercial courts and approved business registration offices ( guichets d’entreprises ) [145] , which are also involved in registering newly created entities, have a mainly administrative role and do not carry out independent checks. Only formal inspections are carried out when the data is entered, with the exception of checks on the prohibitions from acting as a director via the JustBan register, which have been in place since 2023. For example, the legal representative is not required to provide proof of the registered office, which allows the use of fictitious or fraudulent addresses for registered offices. As a result, no verification measures are taken for the five types of legal person created by private deed, some of which present high ML risks, apart from the vigilance measures taken by FIs. A circular issued by SPF Justice in October 2023 requires registries to check certain elements, in particular the identity and proof of residence of natural persons (see Rec.24, TC Annex). However, this circular only concerns the filing of paper documents, not electronic files. The practical effects of this circular have not yet been demonstrated. 521. Once the information is recorded by these parties in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, it is not verified by SPF Economy, which is responsible for the register, nor are requests for additional information made in the event of doubts about the information received before it is made public, unless SPF Economy is informed of a discrepancy. In such cases, Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises may verify, correct or, where necessary, delete the incorrect data. 522. Subsequent changes to the information recorded in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register follow the same procedure as for the creation of a legal person and is subject to the same shortcomings. The Belgian authorities also note that a number of changes are not notified to the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register due to practical constraints and the cost of updating the information. These factors do not encourage legal administrators to complete these legal formalities, which undermines the accuracy of the data recorded. This can result in obsolete data remaining in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register without being proactively identified by the Belgian authorities. As a result, there is insufficient assurance that the data is accurate and up to date. 523. A 2020 report by Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises highlighted problems with the quality and accuracy of the information, as well as it being kept up-to-date. In particular, it noted the impact of the lack of accuracy of certain basic information, in particular information relating to the addresses of entities’ registered offices. 524. The Belgian authorities rely mainly on notifications received from other administrations, such as the tax authorities, and professions, such as company service providers, and from the police to identify the existence of incorrect data in the register. Between 2020 and 2024, 27 033 discrepancies were notified to Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and 48 918 addresses were deleted. Incorrect addresses are the main reason for discrepancies reported. 525. In addition, technical problems with encoding information in the register affect the accuracy of information and access to it by the competent authorities. [146] Encoding errors can be made and delays are sometimes observed in the entry of information by the registry. [147] Finally, the accuracy of information recorded is also affected by delays in adjusting statutes and converting the legal forms of certain companies following the entry into force of the CSA. At the end of the on-site visit (February 2024), approximately 13.55% of the entities concerned by such a change had not yet taken the necessary steps. 526. The Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register is interconnected with other registers, in particular the UBO register, in accordance with the Only Once principle, which stems from the Law of 5 May 2014 stipulating that a person is only required to provide information to the administration once. This information is then accessible to other administrations through interconnections, with each administration being responsible for the information it collects. Information recorded once is therefore repeated in other databases, ensuring consistency between them. Notifications of discrepancies submitted by reporting entities and competent authorities via the UBO register and the administrative formalities associated with registration in the UBO register have made it possible to identify obsolete data or inconsistencies relating to the basic data of legal persons. However, the lack of verification of data accuracy prior to its recording into the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register is a major vulnerability of the system, creating the risk of duplicating errors and inaccuracies in interconnected databases. 527. In conclusion, the competent authorities have timely access to basic information on legal persons recorded in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and in the Moniteur belge . The weakness of the ab initio verification measures leads to an increased need for ex post controls, which do not ensure the accuracy of the data, especially in a context of a significant increase in the number of new entities since the entry into force of the CSA. The competent authorities therefore do not have a reliable tool for accessing basic information about legal persons. In the 2024 cross-sectoral assessment, Belgium identified the need to establish a systematic mechanism at the stage of setting up new companies to prevent the creation of companies by criminals. This shortcoming had already been the subject of a recommendation to Belgium by the FATF in its 2015 evaluation report. [148] 5.3.2. Information on beneficial owners 528. The competent authorities have timely access to information on beneficial ownership via the UBO register. The register has a robust architecture and is interconnected with other national databases [149] , which allows for cross-checking of the information provided. The SPF Finance carries out close monitoring to ensure that legal persons declare their beneficial owners and conducts monthly checks to verify the registration of beneficial owners by newly created entities. Registration rates are very high and only 2.21% of entities have not yet fulfilled their obligation to declare beneficial owners. SPF Finance estimates that out of 4 000 entities created each month, around 100 do not register their beneficial owner, which leads SPF Finance to take further action against them (see section 5.5). Foreign legal persons registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register are not required to provide information on beneficial owners and are therefore not registered in the UBO register, unless they are subsidiaries established in Belgium or if they hold shares or exercise control over entities subject to the obligation to register in the UBO register. 529. Information on beneficial owners is registered on a declarative basis, often through intermediaries (e.g. accountants, solicitors, notaries), without the SPF Finance, which is responsible for the register, verifying the accuracy of the data provided. Only technical restrictions are in place at the registration stage to avoid formal errors or certain structural inconsistencies in the data entered. The information recorded in the UBO register must be accompanied by supporting documents, which are accessible to the competent authorities. These documents are not subject to verification ab initio , but serve as support when any subsequent checks are carried out. This information must be confirmed each year, but this formality is not accompanied by a specific check by SPF Finance to ensure that it is actually completed and that the data provided is accurate. The impact of inaccurate information is important given that the competent authorities consult the register fairly systematically to obtain information on beneficial owners in the course of their duties. In this context, the data used in investigations and prosecutions is potentially inaccurate. Similarly, with the exception of large FIs that use other sources of information, FIs and DNFBPs rely primarily on UBO register data to fulfil their due diligence obligations (see IO. 3 and 4), which potentially increases the risk of dissemination and use of erroneous data if these entities do not carry out additional checks. 530. To address these shortcomings, since August 2024 the SPF Finance has been conducting individual checks on data already recorded, targeting primarily entities presenting risk factors such as: a complex structure, foreign control established or residing in a high-risk third country or tax haven, incomplete control information in the UBO register, the existence of at least two notifications of differences, etc. SPF Finance aims to carry out 1 000 inspections per year, which should be put into perspective with the annual number of new entities created, which is around 48 000 (or approx. 2% of newly created entities). The initiative to introduce risk- based checks is appropriate, although it is still too early to assess their effectiveness . The lack of verification of the accuracy of data ab initio automatically leads to an increased need for ex post verification, without the Belgian authorities having the necessary resources to check a sufficiently wide range of recorded data, especially given the growing number of legal persons created since the reform of the CSA. As a result, these checks remain insufficient to ensure the accuracy of the data. 531. In practice, a significant part of the burden of ensuring the accuracy of data on beneficial owners rests on the mechanism for reporting discrepancies to the SPF Finance, which certain entities and competent authorities have been required to do since 2021. The multi-pronged approach implemented by Belgium to access information on beneficial owners is based primarily on a combination of the UBO register and this mechanism for reporting discrepancies. Any discrepancies between the information reporting entities have as part of their due diligence measures and that in the UBO register must be reported. These reports of discrepancies mainly come from financial institutions. DNFBPs generally rely on information from the UBO register to identify beneficial owners. Some of them also have a limited understanding of the concept of beneficial owner (see section 5.2). Many of them are unaware of their obligation to report discrepancies. Notaries, lawyers, chartered accountants, statutory auditors and bailiffs are not required to report discrepancies they identify in certain cases, which may also explain the limited number of reports from these professions. [150] 532. On average, SPF Finance received 1 000 notifications of discrepancies per month in 2024 and a total of approximately 32 000 notifications between 2021 and early 2025, involving 12 848 legal persons. The number of notifications received reflects, in some respects, the dynamic nature of the process and allows, to a certain extent, for the information to be updated. However, the authorities in charge of the register do not have the capacity to process all notifications received within a reasonable time frame, with the result that more than half of the notifications received between 2021 and early 2025 are still being processed, contributing to the continued presence of erroneous data in the register. 533. The competent authorities have access to information on beneficial owners which they request from FIs and, to a lesser extent, from DNFPBs. It should be noted, however, that reporting entities report substantial difficulties in identifying beneficial owners in cases involving complex chains of ownership involving foreign legal persons [151] . The authorities also use information available within the PCC, which has been set up to give them easier access to centralised information on the various accounts and financial contracts held by legal persons with financial institutions, and thus to trace the chain of persons acting as agents for accounts held by legal persons, who can also be identified as beneficial owners. 534. In conclusion, the competent authorities have timely access to information on beneficial owners via the UBO register. However, the mechanisms in place do not sufficiently ensure that the information is accurate. The absence of measures to check the accuracy of the information ab initio by the authority in charge of the register is a key issue which cannot be compensated for by the use of complementary mechanisms, such as notifications of discrepancies and targeted ex post checks. In this context, the UBO register is not a sufficiently reliable tool for the competent authorities to access accurate and current information on beneficial owners. Footnotes [145] The registries of the commercial courts are responsible for recording the data in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register and for publication in the Moniteur belge . Approved business registration offices complete the registration in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, recording certain data such as contact details, the activities carried out and the bank account. These offices are the only points of contact for registering simple companies in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. Foreign legal entities must register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises in some cases, this registration is also finalised by an approved business registration office. [146] Foreign legal persons and foreign trusts and legal arrangements are also registered under a single category, “foreign entities”, which does not allow any distinction to be made between them. [147] NRA of legal persons page 54. [148] FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (2015), section 7.4, p.145. [149] The UBO register automatically retrieves certain data from the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, the National Register of Natural Persons and the Banque-Carrefour de la Sécurité Sociale (BCSS). Supporting documents must be provided at the time of registration, unless they have been published in the Moniteur belge . [150] Article 74/1 § 1 of the AML Law. These professions are not required to report discrepancies when the information and intelligence has been received from or obtained about a client during the assessment of that client’s legal situation or in the course of their duties of defending or representing the client in or concerning legal proceedings, including in the context of advice on how to initiate or avoid proceedings, whether such information or intelligence is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings, unless the entities concerned have participated in money laundering or terrorist financing activities, have provided legal advice for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, or know that the client has sought legal advice for such purposes. [151] Since 9 April 2024, Belgium has been connected to BORIS, the European platform providing access to the various national registers of beneficial owners. However, access at the Belgian level for entities subject to the legislation and the competent Belgian authorities is not yet operational. Foreign authorities in EU countries already connected to BORIS can consult data from the Belgian UBO register via BORIS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="518. The competent authorities have timely access to the data held in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and UBO registers. However, the current systems do not always guarantee access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date information by the competent authorities. 5.3.1. Basic information 519. Belgium gives an important weight to the role of notaries in ensuring the reliability of basic information registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises (see section5.2 and Rec. 24 of the TC Annex). However, in practice, their involvement does not constitute a sufficiently effective filter to ensure the reliability of basic information. Notaries are required to collect certain information as part of their due diligence obligations, which improves the reliability of this data. However, notaries only carry out formal checks on the basic information provided to them. They are required to accept the deed requested by the client – except in exceptional cases where the deed is contrary to public order – and do not carry out independent checks on the information provided by their clients (see section 5.2). In practice, notaries submit a limited number of STRs to the CTIF relating to the creation or modification of companies, contributing to a small extent to the identification of potential shell companies. The cross-sectoral assessment of legal persons reveals that notaries are sometimes used without their knowledge in ML schemes involving legal persons and that in some cases notaries have played an active and intentional role in these practices. During the period covered by this assessment, one notary was suspended by the Chamber of Notaries and received an administrative fine for failing to comply with the obligation to report suspicions in relation to allegations concerning his involvement in the successive creation of dozens of shell companies. These various factors raise questions about the ability of notaries to identify and report potential signs of legal persons established for the purpose of ML. 520. The clerks of the commercial courts and approved business registration offices ( guichets d’entreprises ) [145] , which are also involved in registering newly created entities, have a mainly administrative role and do not carry out independent checks. Only formal inspections are carried out when the data is entered, with the exception of checks on the prohibitions from acting as a director via the JustBan register, which have been in place since 2023. For example, the legal representative is not required to provide proof of the registered office, which allows the use of fictitious or fraudulent addresses for registered offices. As a result, no verification measures are taken for the five types of legal person created by private deed, some of which present high ML risks, apart from the vigilance measures taken by FIs. A circular issued by SPF Justice in October 2023 requires registries to check certain elements, in particular the identity and proof of residence of natural persons (see Rec.24, TC Annex). However, this circular only concerns the filing of paper documents, not electronic files. The practical effects of this circular have not yet been demonstrated. 521. Once the information is recorded by these parties in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, it is not verified by SPF Economy, which is responsible for the register, nor are requests for additional information made in the event of doubts about the information received before it is made public, unless SPF Economy is informed of a discrepancy. In such cases, Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises may verify, correct or, where necessary, delete the incorrect data. 522. Subsequent changes to the information recorded in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register follow the same procedure as for the creation of a legal person and is subject to the same shortcomings. The Belgian authorities also note that a number of changes are not notified to the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register due to practical constraints and the cost of updating the information. These factors do not encourage legal administrators to complete these legal formalities, which undermines the accuracy of the data recorded. This can result in obsolete data remaining in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register without being proactively identified by the Belgian authorities. As a result, there is insufficient assurance that the data is accurate and up to date. 523. A 2020 report by Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises highlighted problems with the quality and accuracy of the information, as well as it being kept up-to-date. In particular, it noted the impact of the lack of accuracy of certain basic information, in particular information relating to the addresses of entities’ registered offices. 524. The Belgian authorities rely mainly on notifications received from other administrations, such as the tax authorities, and professions, such as company service providers, and from the police to identify the existence of incorrect data in the register. Between 2020 and 2024, 27 033 discrepancies were notified to Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and 48 918 addresses were deleted. Incorrect addresses are the main reason for discrepancies reported. 525. In addition, technical problems with encoding information in the register affect the accuracy of information and access to it by the competent authorities. [146] Encoding errors can be made and delays are sometimes observed in the entry of information by the registry. [147] Finally, the accuracy of information recorded is also affected by delays in adjusting statutes and converting the legal forms of certain companies following the entry into force of the CSA. At the end of the on-site visit (February 2024), approximately 13.55% of the entities concerned by such a change had not yet taken the necessary steps. 526. The Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register is interconnected with other registers, in particular the UBO register, in accordance with the Only Once principle, which stems from the Law of 5 May 2014 stipulating that a person is only required to provide information to the administration once. This information is then accessible to other administrations through interconnections, with each administration being responsible for the information it collects. Information recorded once is therefore repeated in other databases, ensuring consistency between them. Notifications of discrepancies submitted by reporting entities and competent authorities via the UBO register and the administrative formalities associated with registration in the UBO register have made it possible to identify obsolete data or inconsistencies relating to the basic data of legal persons. However, the lack of verification of data accuracy prior to its recording into the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register is a major vulnerability of the system, creating the risk of duplicating errors and inaccuracies in interconnected databases. 527. In conclusion, the competent authorities have timely access to basic information on legal persons recorded in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and in the Moniteur belge . The weakness of the ab initio verification measures leads to an increased need for ex post controls, which do not ensure the accuracy of the data, especially in a context of a significant increase in the number of new entities since the entry into force of the CSA. The competent authorities therefore do not have a reliable tool for accessing basic information about legal persons. In the 2024 cross-sectoral assessment, Belgium identified the need to establish a systematic mechanism at the stage of setting up new companies to prevent the creation of companies by criminals. This shortcoming had already been the subject of a recommendation to Belgium by the FATF in its 2015 evaluation report. [148] 5.3.2. Information on beneficial owners 528. The competent authorities have timely access to information on beneficial ownership via the UBO register. The register has a robust architecture and is interconnected with other national databases [149] , which allows for cross-checking of the information provided. The SPF Finance carries out close monitoring to ensure that legal persons declare their beneficial owners and conducts monthly checks to verify the registration of beneficial owners by newly created entities. Registration rates are very high and only 2.21% of entities have not yet fulfilled their obligation to declare beneficial owners. SPF Finance estimates that out of 4 000 entities created each month, around 100 do not register their beneficial owner, which leads SPF Finance to take further action against them (see section 5.5). Foreign legal persons registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register are not required to provide information on beneficial owners and are therefore not registered in the UBO register, unless they are subsidiaries established in Belgium or if they hold shares or exercise control over entities subject to the obligation to register in the UBO register. 529. Information on beneficial owners is registered on a declarative basis, often through intermediaries (e.g. accountants, solicitors, notaries), without the SPF Finance, which is responsible for the register, verifying the accuracy of the data provided. Only technical restrictions are in place at the registration stage to avoid formal errors or certain structural inconsistencies in the data entered. The information recorded in the UBO register must be accompanied by supporting documents, which are accessible to the competent authorities. These documents are not subject to verification ab initio , but serve as support when any subsequent checks are carried out. This information must be confirmed each year, but this formality is not accompanied by a specific check by SPF Finance to ensure that it is actually completed and that the data provided is accurate. The impact of inaccurate information is important given that the competent authorities consult the register fairly systematically to obtain information on beneficial owners in the course of their duties. In this context, the data used in investigations and prosecutions is potentially inaccurate. Similarly, with the exception of large FIs that use other sources of information, FIs and DNFBPs rely primarily on UBO register data to fulfil their due diligence obligations (see IO. 3 and 4), which potentially increases the risk of dissemination and use of erroneous data if these entities do not carry out additional checks. 530. To address these shortcomings, since August 2024 the SPF Finance has been conducting individual checks on data already recorded, targeting primarily entities presenting risk factors such as: a complex structure, foreign control established or residing in a high-risk third country or tax haven, incomplete control information in the UBO register, the existence of at least two notifications of differences, etc. SPF Finance aims to carry out 1 000 inspections per year, which should be put into perspective with the annual number of new entities created, which is around 48 000 (or approx. 2% of newly created entities). The initiative to introduce risk- based checks is appropriate, although it is still too early to assess their effectiveness . The lack of verification of the accuracy of data ab initio automatically leads to an increased need for ex post verification, without the Belgian authorities having the necessary resources to check a sufficiently wide range of recorded data, especially given the growing number of legal persons created since the reform of the CSA. As a result, these checks remain insufficient to ensure the accuracy of the data. 531. In practice, a significant part of the burden of ensuring the accuracy of data on beneficial owners rests on the mechanism for reporting discrepancies to the SPF Finance, which certain entities and competent authorities have been required to do since 2021. The multi-pronged approach implemented by Belgium to access information on beneficial owners is based primarily on a combination of the UBO register and this mechanism for reporting discrepancies. Any discrepancies between the information reporting entities have as part of their due diligence measures and that in the UBO register must be reported. These reports of discrepancies mainly come from financial institutions. DNFBPs generally rely on information from the UBO register to identify beneficial owners. Some of them also have a limited understanding of the concept of beneficial owner (see section 5.2). Many of them are unaware of their obligation to report discrepancies. Notaries, lawyers, chartered accountants, statutory auditors and bailiffs are not required to report discrepancies they identify in certain cases, which may also explain the limited number of reports from these professions. [150] 532. On average, SPF Finance received 1 000 notifications of discrepancies per month in 2024 and a total of approximately 32 000 notifications between 2021 and early 2025, involving 12 848 legal persons. The number of notifications received reflects, in some respects, the dynamic nature of the process and allows, to a certain extent, for the information to be updated. However, the authorities in charge of the register do not have the capacity to process all notifications received within a reasonable time frame, with the result that more than half of the notifications received between 2021 and early 2025 are still being processed, contributing to the continued presence of erroneous data in the register. 533. The competent authorities have access to information on beneficial owners which they request from FIs and, to a lesser extent, from DNFPBs. It should be noted, however, that reporting entities report substantial difficulties in identifying beneficial owners in cases involving complex chains of ownership involving foreign legal persons [151] . The authorities also use information available within the PCC, which has been set up to give them easier access to centralised information on the various accounts and financial contracts held by legal persons with financial institutions, and thus to trace the chain of persons acting as agents for accounts held by legal persons, who can also be identified as beneficial owners. 534. In conclusion, the competent authorities have timely access to information on beneficial owners via the UBO register. However, the mechanisms in place do not sufficiently ensure that the information is accurate. The absence of measures to check the accuracy of the information ab initio by the authority in charge of the register is a key issue which cannot be compensated for by the use of complementary mechanisms, such as notifications of discrepancies and targeted ex post checks. In this context, the UBO register is not a sufficiently reliable tool for the competent authorities to access accurate and current information on beneficial owners. Footnotes [145] The registries of the commercial courts are responsible for recording the data in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register and for publication in the Moniteur belge . Approved business registration offices complete the registration in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, recording certain data such as contact details, the activities carried out and the bank account. These offices are the only points of contact for registering simple companies in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. Foreign legal entities must register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises in some cases, this registration is also finalised by an approved business registration office. [146] Foreign legal persons and foreign trusts and legal arrangements are also registered under a single category, “foreign entities”, which does not allow any distinction to be made between them. [147] NRA of legal persons page 54. [148] FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (2015), section 7.4, p.145. [149] The UBO register automatically retrieves certain data from the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register, the National Register of Natural Persons and the Banque-Carrefour de la Sécurité Sociale (BCSS). Supporting documents must be provided at the time of registration, unless they have been published in the Moniteur belge . [150] Article 74/1 § 1 of the AML Law. These professions are not required to report discrepancies when the information and intelligence has been received from or obtained about a client during the assessment of that client’s legal situation or in the course of their duties of defending or representing the client in or concerning legal proceedings, including in the context of advice on how to initiate or avoid proceedings, whether such information or intelligence is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings, unless the entities concerned have participated in money laundering or terrorist financing activities, have provided legal advice for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, or know that the client has sought legal advice for such purposes. [151] Since 9 April 2024, Belgium has been connected to BORIS, the European platform providing access to the various national registers of beneficial owners. However, access at the Belgian level for entities subject to the legislation and the competent Belgian authorities is not yet operational. Foreign authorities in EU countries already connected to BORIS can consult data from the Belgian UBO register via BORIS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 593. Cooperation between national authorities ensures that financial intelligence is shared efficiently. The CTIF plays a key role in this process by coordinating the sharing of information and contributing to strategic initiatives such as the development of NRAs (see IO.1). This collaboration extends to joint projects such as BELFI [158] (see IO.10) and the strategic counter-terrorism meetings (MONITOR) (see IO.9), which facilitate consultation between the CTIF and other competent authorities, both at an operational level and in the sharing of intelligence. 594. A well-established system of cooperation also exists with the federal police, through a police liaison officer (DGJ-DJSOC [159] ) seconded to the CTIF and through regular interaction with several specialised services, particularly in matters relating to drugs, corruption and organised crime. In practical terms, the use of this liaison officer has allowed the CTIF to broaden the scope of its operational analysis. In one case, for example, the officer helped the CTIF identify suspicious financial transactions abroad, enabling it to target its requests to a foreign FIU. 595. Close cooperation has been established between the CTIF and the police to make it easier to share strategic information, even though there are legal limits on sharing operational analysis directly. For example, the DGJ-DJSOC asked the CTIF to help map Italian mafia organisations in Belgium. As part of this effort, it put in place a special procedure and added an ‘Italian MAFIA’ file to its database, strengthening the analysis of financial flows linked to these criminal networks. This coordinated approach between the CTIF, the judicial authorities and specialised services is an example of effective action against the financial and criminal threats Belgium faces. 596. The CTIF also collaborates with the VSSE, SGRS and OCAM in combating terrorism and TF. In 2023, the CTIF shared 51 files with OCAM’s intelligence services, and over the last three years, this figure stood at 233 files, illustrating how important it is to share information under the AML/CFT framework. Since 2021, the CTIF has also been participating as a partner service in the Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism (TER) Strategy (see IO.9). The CTIF has access to OCAM’s shared database (see IO.9), enabling it to check whether certain entities are listed there. Over the last five years, it has carried out 205 searches to supplement its files. It can also add relevant information and has contributed to 126 files over the same period. 597. Since early 2022, the CTIF has been working with the judicial authorities and SPF Finance on a project to crack down on shell companies used by networks known as ‘Brazilian networks’, which are involved in various criminal activities, such as social security fraud, drug trafficking, scams and arms trafficking. These criminal networks operate using a particularly complex and constantly evolving model. They create, in a very short space of time, multiple shell companies designed to channel large flows of illegal funds without being detected by the authorities. To address this challenge, the CTIF has set up a specific alert mechanism, in the form of a ‘FB – Urgent Block’ report, which is systematically forwarded to the relevant prosecutor’s office so that it can take swift action. 598. However, the impact of this initiative is more significant for tax purposes than for money laundering, as it enables the recovery of tax debts based on the amounts seized and then transferred to the OCSC. In judicial terms, this initiative has led to the dismantling of criminal structures and the recovery of funds from the predicate offences. However, the focus is on tax fraud and recovery, with no consideration given to ML aspects. This approach demonstrates the importance of cooperation between the CTIF, the judicial authorities and the tax authorities in tax matters, which are not, however, being fully leveraged to maximise the impact of financial investigations and strengthen actions to combat ML. 599. The CTIF also works closely with supervisory authorities to support them in carrying out their duties. Its communications with these authorities fall into three main categories: feedback on the reporting activity of reporting entities (quantity and quality of STRs submitted), reporting of non-compliance with the obligations under the AML/CFT Law, and provision of specific information related to legal cases involving entities under their supervision. This cooperation helps to strengthen the effectiveness of supervision and improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations in the financial and non-financial sectors. See the subsection on the Dissemination of financial intelligence. 600. In addition, the CTIF attends, as an observer, the AML/CFT colleges of supervisors regularly organised by the BNB for Belgian financial institutions under its supervision that have subsidiaries, branches or other forms of establishments in at least two other EU Member States. The CTIF frequently prepares feedback on the reporting activity of the supervised member of the college. Furthermore, each year, the CTIF submits a report on the reporting activity of Bpost to the SPF Finance Treasury Administration. 601. The CTIF maintains close and effective cooperation with Belgian prosecutors from the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). A significant proportion of the case files handled by the EPPO are based on reports made by the CTIF, and the financial intelligence provided on request is considered to be of high quality. Working relations between the CTIF and the Belgian national prosecutor’s office are also smooth and constructive. The CTIF also cooperates with Europol within the framework of Europol’s public-private financial intelligence partnership. Box 6.6. Example of good cooperation between the CTIF and the EPPO Facts: As part of an investigation into correspondent banking operations, the EPPO requested assistance from the CTIF. The searches identified several matches in the database. After targeted discussions on the EPPO’s needs, a second request was made with additional details. Outcome: This collaborative effort resulted in the CTIF forwarding two files. The information provided added value to the investigation by identifying new operators, banking transactions transiting through Belgium and suspicious structures, thereby helping to broaden the scope of the investigation into a complex money laundering case. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 602. The CTIF applies strict technical and regulatory measures to guarantee that information is kept confidential. Access to its premises and systems is restricted, and security protocols are in place governing the use of databases, IT resources and documentation. Communications with other relevant organisations are routed through secure channels. 603. The CTIF has signed several memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with national authorities (e.g. BNB, FSMA) defining the procedures for exchanging information using secure systems. Information is forwarded to the intelligence services by a VSSE liaison officer, while information forwarded to the judicial authorities is still largely sent by unsecured means, by post or registered mail, depending on the prosecutor’s office. 604. At the international level, information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via FIU.NET and Egmont Secure Web. Footnotes [158] The BELFI project is a multidisciplinary project to combat fraud (tax, social security, financial, etc.) through closer collaboration between judicial, tax and administrative authorities. [159] Judicial Police Directorate-General – Directorate for the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 593. Cooperation between national authorities ensures that financial intelligence is shared efficiently. The CTIF plays a key role in this process by coordinating the sharing of information and contributing to strategic initiatives such as the development of NRAs (see IO.1). This collaboration extends to joint projects such as BELFI [158] (see IO.10) and the strategic counter-terrorism meetings (MONITOR) (see IO.9), which facilitate consultation between the CTIF and other competent authorities, both at an operational level and in the sharing of intelligence. 594. A well-established system of cooperation also exists with the federal police, through a police liaison officer (DGJ-DJSOC [159] ) seconded to the CTIF and through regular interaction with several specialised services, particularly in matters relating to drugs, corruption and organised crime. In practical terms, the use of this liaison officer has allowed the CTIF to broaden the scope of its operational analysis. In one case, for example, the officer helped the CTIF identify suspicious financial transactions abroad, enabling it to target its requests to a foreign FIU. 595. Close cooperation has been established between the CTIF and the police to make it easier to share strategic information, even though there are legal limits on sharing operational analysis directly. For example, the DGJ-DJSOC asked the CTIF to help map Italian mafia organisations in Belgium. As part of this effort, it put in place a special procedure and added an ‘Italian MAFIA’ file to its database, strengthening the analysis of financial flows linked to these criminal networks. This coordinated approach between the CTIF, the judicial authorities and specialised services is an example of effective action against the financial and criminal threats Belgium faces. 596. The CTIF also collaborates with the VSSE, SGRS and OCAM in combating terrorism and TF. In 2023, the CTIF shared 51 files with OCAM’s intelligence services, and over the last three years, this figure stood at 233 files, illustrating how important it is to share information under the AML/CFT framework. Since 2021, the CTIF has also been participating as a partner service in the Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism (TER) Strategy (see IO.9). The CTIF has access to OCAM’s shared database (see IO.9), enabling it to check whether certain entities are listed there. Over the last five years, it has carried out 205 searches to supplement its files. It can also add relevant information and has contributed to 126 files over the same period. 597. Since early 2022, the CTIF has been working with the judicial authorities and SPF Finance on a project to crack down on shell companies used by networks known as ‘Brazilian networks’, which are involved in various criminal activities, such as social security fraud, drug trafficking, scams and arms trafficking. These criminal networks operate using a particularly complex and constantly evolving model. They create, in a very short space of time, multiple shell companies designed to channel large flows of illegal funds without being detected by the authorities. To address this challenge, the CTIF has set up a specific alert mechanism, in the form of a ‘FB – Urgent Block’ report, which is systematically forwarded to the relevant prosecutor’s office so that it can take swift action. 598. However, the impact of this initiative is more significant for tax purposes than for money laundering, as it enables the recovery of tax debts based on the amounts seized and then transferred to the OCSC. In judicial terms, this initiative has led to the dismantling of criminal structures and the recovery of funds from the predicate offences. However, the focus is on tax fraud and recovery, with no consideration given to ML aspects. This approach demonstrates the importance of cooperation between the CTIF, the judicial authorities and the tax authorities in tax matters, which are not, however, being fully leveraged to maximise the impact of financial investigations and strengthen actions to combat ML. 599. The CTIF also works closely with supervisory authorities to support them in carrying out their duties. Its communications with these authorities fall into three main categories: feedback on the reporting activity of reporting entities (quantity and quality of STRs submitted), reporting of non-compliance with the obligations under the AML/CFT Law, and provision of specific information related to legal cases involving entities under their supervision. This cooperation helps to strengthen the effectiveness of supervision and improve compliance with AML/CFT obligations in the financial and non-financial sectors. See the subsection on the Dissemination of financial intelligence. 600. In addition, the CTIF attends, as an observer, the AML/CFT colleges of supervisors regularly organised by the BNB for Belgian financial institutions under its supervision that have subsidiaries, branches or other forms of establishments in at least two other EU Member States. The CTIF frequently prepares feedback on the reporting activity of the supervised member of the college. Furthermore, each year, the CTIF submits a report on the reporting activity of Bpost to the SPF Finance Treasury Administration. 601. The CTIF maintains close and effective cooperation with Belgian prosecutors from the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). A significant proportion of the case files handled by the EPPO are based on reports made by the CTIF, and the financial intelligence provided on request is considered to be of high quality. Working relations between the CTIF and the Belgian national prosecutor’s office are also smooth and constructive. The CTIF also cooperates with Europol within the framework of Europol’s public-private financial intelligence partnership. Box 6.6. Example of good cooperation between the CTIF and the EPPO Facts: As part of an investigation into correspondent banking operations, the EPPO requested assistance from the CTIF. The searches identified several matches in the database. After targeted discussions on the EPPO’s needs, a second request was made with additional details. Outcome: This collaborative effort resulted in the CTIF forwarding two files. The information provided added value to the investigation by identifying new operators, banking transactions transiting through Belgium and suspicious structures, thereby helping to broaden the scope of the investigation into a complex money laundering case. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 602. The CTIF applies strict technical and regulatory measures to guarantee that information is kept confidential. Access to its premises and systems is restricted, and security protocols are in place governing the use of databases, IT resources and documentation. Communications with other relevant organisations are routed through secure channels. 603. The CTIF has signed several memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with national authorities (e.g. BNB, FSMA) defining the procedures for exchanging information using secure systems. Information is forwarded to the intelligence services by a VSSE liaison officer, while information forwarded to the judicial authorities is still largely sent by unsecured means, by post or registered mail, depending on the prosecutor’s office. 604. At the international level, information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via FIU.NET and Egmont Secure Web. Footnotes [158] The BELFI project is a multidisciplinary project to combat fraud (tax, social security, financial, etc.) through closer collaboration between judicial, tax and administrative authorities. [159] Judicial Police Directorate-General – Directorate for the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="652. The lack of data on the sanctions imposed does not allow to provide a comprehensive view of the level of punishment and their deterrent effect, by type of ML (i.e. self-laundering, autonomous ML, ML by a third party and complex ML). However, the judgements provided by Belgium reveal certain trends in the nature and level of sanctions imposed in ML cases. 653. Based on these judgements, it appears that the majority of sanctions imposed are neither effective nor dissuasive. Prison sentences are generally in the range of a few months to two years. They are frequently suspended in whole or in part, or sentencing is deferred entirely, [182] and these are usually accompanied by fines that have little deterrent effect (below EUR10,000) and are also suspended. These sanctions are not commensurate with the significant aggravating circumstances generally noted by judges in these cases, such as the seriousness of the offences, the amounts involved, including in cases where a significant profit was made from the offence, the length of the period during which the offence was committed, the degree of harm caused to Belgian society, and the defendants’ lack of awareness of the seriousness of their actions. Exceeding the reasonable time limit also frequently affects the level of sanctions imposed. Box 7.5. Case B and G Case B In this case, the defendants were given suspended sentences with probation and independent community service orders instead of prison sentences, even though they were repeat offenders and the total amount laundered was estimated at over EUR 33 million. Case G. Impact of exceeding the reasonable time limit In this case, the defendant G., a natural person, was given an 18-month suspended prison sentence on the grounds that the reasonable time limit had been exceeded, as well as being barred from practising his profession, also suspended. However, the value of the illegal assets in this case amounted to more than EUR20 million in jewellery. 654. Cases in which prison sentences and higher fines have been handed down were mainly based on multiple offences committed by the defendants, for example human trafficking for economic gain. 655. Heavy sanctions have also been handed down in certain complex cases, including prison sentences (sometimes ranging from 7 to 10 years) and higher fines (see box on the Clown case and another case heard by the Namur Court of First Instance (November 2021) in which a fine of EUR600 000, together with a five-year suspension of half the fine, was handed down for ML of organised social security fraud). These heavier sanctions can be explained in part by the fact that the offences were deemed to constitute organised crime and by the number of offences for which the defendants were found guilty. 656. The sanctions imposed on the 130 legal persons convicted between 2019 and 2024 are unknown. The Belgian authorities provided two judgements in which legal persons were convicted of ML. The fines in these two cases are at the lower end of the applicable range (see Rec. 3 in the TC Annex). The fines range from EUR 72 000 to EUR 120 000, while the legal maximum is EUR 960 000, which has little deterrent effect in itself. These fines are also accompanied by a three-year suspension of half of the fine. However, the limited information provided does not allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and dissuasive effect of the sanctions imposed on legal persons found guilty of ML. 657. The enforcement of criminal fines in general is also problematic in Belgium, according to a report published in July 2023 by the Court of Auditors, [183] which also reduces the deterrent effect of the fines imposed. The report highlights the lack of tools to monitor the process of enforcing criminal fines and the risk of incomplete enforcement of judgements resulting from insufficient automation. The collection rates for fines imposed are low. The same challenges apply to the actual recovery of confiscated assets, the amounts of which are also frequently reduced by the courts. (see IO.8). Given these circumstances, the very prospect of being convicted does not act as a deterrent. Footnotes [182] Deferred sentencing means that the judge considers the charges against the defendants proven but defers pronouncing the sentence for a period of one to five years depending on the facts (probationary period). If the defendants commit new offences during this period that result in conviction, the initial deferral may be revoked (i.e. the judge will then also impose a sentence for the original offence). [183] Court of Auditors Report (July 2023) Enforcement of criminal fines – Follow-up in 2021 and 2023 of the recommendations of the 2019 audit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="652. The lack of data on the sanctions imposed does not allow to provide a comprehensive view of the level of punishment and their deterrent effect, by type of ML (i.e. self-laundering, autonomous ML, ML by a third party and complex ML). However, the judgements provided by Belgium reveal certain trends in the nature and level of sanctions imposed in ML cases. 653. Based on these judgements, it appears that the majority of sanctions imposed are neither effective nor dissuasive. Prison sentences are generally in the range of a few months to two years. They are frequently suspended in whole or in part, or sentencing is deferred entirely, [182] and these are usually accompanied by fines that have little deterrent effect (below EUR10,000) and are also suspended. These sanctions are not commensurate with the significant aggravating circumstances generally noted by judges in these cases, such as the seriousness of the offences, the amounts involved, including in cases where a significant profit was made from the offence, the length of the period during which the offence was committed, the degree of harm caused to Belgian society, and the defendants’ lack of awareness of the seriousness of their actions. Exceeding the reasonable time limit also frequently affects the level of sanctions imposed. Box 7.5. Case B and G Case B In this case, the defendants were given suspended sentences with probation and independent community service orders instead of prison sentences, even though they were repeat offenders and the total amount laundered was estimated at over EUR 33 million. Case G. Impact of exceeding the reasonable time limit In this case, the defendant G., a natural person, was given an 18-month suspended prison sentence on the grounds that the reasonable time limit had been exceeded, as well as being barred from practising his profession, also suspended. However, the value of the illegal assets in this case amounted to more than EUR20 million in jewellery. 654. Cases in which prison sentences and higher fines have been handed down were mainly based on multiple offences committed by the defendants, for example human trafficking for economic gain. 655. Heavy sanctions have also been handed down in certain complex cases, including prison sentences (sometimes ranging from 7 to 10 years) and higher fines (see box on the Clown case and another case heard by the Namur Court of First Instance (November 2021) in which a fine of EUR600 000, together with a five-year suspension of half the fine, was handed down for ML of organised social security fraud). These heavier sanctions can be explained in part by the fact that the offences were deemed to constitute organised crime and by the number of offences for which the defendants were found guilty. 656. The sanctions imposed on the 130 legal persons convicted between 2019 and 2024 are unknown. The Belgian authorities provided two judgements in which legal persons were convicted of ML. The fines in these two cases are at the lower end of the applicable range (see Rec. 3 in the TC Annex). The fines range from EUR 72 000 to EUR 120 000, while the legal maximum is EUR 960 000, which has little deterrent effect in itself. These fines are also accompanied by a three-year suspension of half of the fine. However, the limited information provided does not allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and dissuasive effect of the sanctions imposed on legal persons found guilty of ML. 657. The enforcement of criminal fines in general is also problematic in Belgium, according to a report published in July 2023 by the Court of Auditors, [183] which also reduces the deterrent effect of the fines imposed. The report highlights the lack of tools to monitor the process of enforcing criminal fines and the risk of incomplete enforcement of judgements resulting from insufficient automation. The collection rates for fines imposed are low. The same challenges apply to the actual recovery of confiscated assets, the amounts of which are also frequently reduced by the courts. (see IO.8). Given these circumstances, the very prospect of being convicted does not act as a deterrent. Footnotes [182] Deferred sentencing means that the judge considers the charges against the defendants proven but defers pronouncing the sentence for a period of one to five years depending on the facts (probationary period). If the defendants commit new offences during this period that result in conviction, the initial deferral may be revoked (i.e. the judge will then also impose a sentence for the original offence). [183] Court of Auditors Report (July 2023) Enforcement of criminal fines – Follow-up in 2021 and 2023 of the recommendations of the 2019 audit." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 696. Belgium has a legal framework based on the European framework supporting the obligation to declare cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs) outside the EU. Failure to comply with this obligation is a customs offence and is enforced by the Belgian customs authorities. Belgium has adopted national provisions governing intra-EU cross-border transports, which are enforced by customs and the police (see TC Annex, R 32). 8.3.1. Identification and confiscation of cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments that are falsely declared/undeclared 697. The ML NRA identifies international trafficking in cash as a major risk for Belgium (see IO.1). However, the risk of unaccompanied transport of cash and BNIs, including through the port of Antwerp, is not taken into account in the implementation of checks on cross-border movements of cash and BNI. 698. Checks on flows outside the EU – Customs checks on cash movements and BNIs outside the EU are based on the results of supranational risk assessments carried out by the European Commission (most recently in October 2022). Belgium has not developed its own criteria and follows the common criteria established at European level. However, Belgium’s specific context and the position of the port of Antwerp as a major gateway to the EU call for Belgium to develop specific criteria. At present, the authorities carry out checks on cash accompanied to and from non-EU countries at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi-Gosselies international airports, but these are not carried out in a sufficiently targeted manner . The Belgian Passenger Information Unit (BelPIU) database, which collects and analyses data on passengers travelling internationally to, from or through Belgium, cannot be used to target customs checks on cash and BNI movements. [196] 699. Customs officers were nevertheless able to detect a relatively high number of breaches (see table below). Between 2021 and 2024, they recorded a total of 4 291 declarations involving a total of EUR98.8 million. During the same period, customs authorities identified 1888 offences involving a total of EUR28.1 million. At Brussels Midi international railway station, a total of EUR 1.8 million was seized by the Belgian Railway Police between 2021 and 2024. However, Belgium has not provided the total amounts seized and confiscated, nor any information on any legal action taken in relation to these offences. Table 8.8. Number of declarations and offences detected (2021–2024) outside the EU 2021* 2022 2023 2024 Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Total airports 497 308 1 282 721 1 125 597 537 257 Total international station (Brussels) 4 1 9 1 5 3 0 0 Total ships’ crew cash 137 0 226 0 311 0 152 0 Other (public roads/parcels) 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 TOTAL 638 309 1 520 722 1 444 600 689 257 Total (EUR millions) [197] 14.4 5.3 34.2 10.6 33.8 8.5 16.4 3.7 Note: *Data for the period from 03/06/2021 (entry into force of the new Regulation 2018/1672) to 31/12/2021. Source: Customs data on declarations and offences relating to movements of funds outside the EU. Last updated on 10 June 2024. 700. Checks on intra-EU flows – Checks carried out by customs authorities and the police on cross-border movements of funds and BNI within the EU led to identifying a limited number of falsely declared or undeclared movements of cash and BNIs. Between 2021 and 2024, 342 disclosures of funds transported exceeding EUR10,000 were recorded, involving a total of EUR9 million. During the same period, customs authorities detected 60 offences involving a total of EUR1.1 million (see table 8.8 below). Confiscations obtained as a result are not known. These amounts are low given the high risk of cash-related ML and the high threat of drug trafficking to which Belgium is exposed. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of customs and police checks at Belgium’s land borders, as the Belgian authorities suspect organised criminal groups of repatriating, by land and through countries bordering Belgium, some of the illegal proceeds that are then transferred out of the EU to their members’ countries of origin (e.g. Albania, Turkey) via low-level couriers. Given Belgium’s risks in terms of cash laundering, the lack of a national strategy for intra-EU border checks tailored to the particular characteristics of the Belgian context is penalising. Table 8.9. Number of declarations and offences detected (2021–2024) within the EU 2021 2022 2023 2024 Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Total airports 11 1 41 1 68 30 43 28 Total international station (Brussels) 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Total ships’ crew cash 25 0 47 0 67 0 28 0 Other (public roads/parcels) 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 TOTAL 39 1 95 1 137 30 71 28 Amount (EUR millions) [198] 0.9 0 2.8 0 3.6 0.5 1.7 0.6 Source: Customs data on declarations and offences relating to movements of funds within the EU. Last updated on 10 June 2024. 701. Unaccompanied cash and BNIs – Belgium has set up systems to detect illegal goods (drugs, weapons, protected species, counterfeit goods, etc.) at its main logistics hubs (airports and freight ports), but there are no specific checks on cross-border movements of unaccompanied cash and BNIs upon leaving the country, which is a weakness in the system. In any case, the checks carried out are not adequate for identifying movements of unaccompanied cash and BNIs. Belgium has not provided figures on the number of customs offences identified and amounts seized in connection with the transport of unaccompanied cash and BNIs (by air freight, cargo freight or land courier). 8.3.2. Confiscation of cash and negotiable bearer instruments related to ML/TF or predicate offences 702. When a customs offence is detected, the customs authorities draw up a report which is sent to the prosecutor’s office. The CTIF has access to this information via the Customs Information System (CIS) database. The customs authorities also send regular reports to the prosecutor’s office when no customs offence has been detected but there is a suspicion of criminal activity, even if the sums transported are below the declaration thresholds. In both cases, customs may temporarily retain the funds. The onus is on the suspect to justify the origin and destination of the funds. Between 2021 and 2024, the total amount of falsely declared or undeclared cash movements and BNIs identified by customs amounted to EUR 29.2 million. Amounts actually confiscated as a result are not known. 703. In addition, the confiscation of cash and BNI movements appears to be used to a limited extent to identify potential cases of ML or TF. The customs authorities reported a relatively low number of suspected ML/TF offences based on non-compliance with declaration or reporting requirements. Between 2019 and October 2024, they sent a total of 149 reports to prosecutor’s offices for suspected ML following the discovery of customs offences relating to cash transport declarations during checks carried out at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi international airports. Belgium also provided examples where large sums of cash were detected in passengers’ luggage, some of which were confiscated. The Halle Vilvoorde prosecutor’s office opened investigations into 79 cases and closed 43 of them, i.e. more than half of the reports received. The number of ML investigations opened by the Charleroi prosecutor’s office is not known. The number of cases submitted to these two prosecutor’s offices each year is decreasing, from 52 in 2019 to 23 in 2021 [199] and then 15 in 2024. [200] 704. However, prosecutors in some districts have indicated that they are unable to investigate all suspected offences referred to them by the customs authorities, mainly due to a lack of resources. Intelligence from customs authorities and the police on cash trafficking and ML is limited considering the level of risk in Belgium. 705. In this context, one major case stands out (see box on the Pondjes case, IO. 7). In this case, customs officials detected non-compliance with the obligation to declare cash movements, which led to the discovery of a significant money laundering network operating offsetting schemes and the confiscation of EUR 26.5 million, in addition to the undeclared cash. The significant resources deployed were crucial to the handling of this case, and the prosecutors responsible stated that they were unable to take on any more cases of this magnitude due to a lack of resources. 8.3.3. Sanctions 706. Belgium has a range of sanctions applicable to falsely declared/non-declared cross-border movements of cash and BNIs outside the EU (between EUR 125 and EUR 1 250). Taken in isolation, these amounts are not sufficiently proportionate or dissuasive in view of the amounts of undeclared cash seized that Belgium has brought to the attention of the evaluation team (see R 32). In practice, customs authorities mainly resort to out-of-court settlements for the vast majority of offences. Belgium has not provided information on the number of settlements and sanctions imposed. 707. Failure to comply with the obligation to declare cross-border transfers of funds within the EU does not constitute a customs offence and falls within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s office. Belgium has not provided information demonstrating its ability to impose sanctions for such failures. Footnotes [196] Regulation (EU) 2025/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818. [197] The largest customs seizures recorded between June 2021 and June 2024 at Zaventem International Airport amounted to between €102,300 and €609,975 and involved cash exports to Turkey, China and the UAE, and cash imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel and Thailand. [198] The largest customs seizures recorded between June 2021 and June 2024 at Zaventem International Airport amounted to between €102,300 and €609,975 and involved cash exports to Turkey, China and the UAE, and cash imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel and Thailand. [199] The introduction of the new European system for declaring cash movements, which came into force in 2021, has had an impact on the number of cash movement declarations made to customs. [200] The statistics do not make a distinction between files referred for failure to declare and those referred for incorrect declarations. Nor is it possible to distinguish between cases relating to cross-border movements of funds within the EU and movements outside the EU." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 696. Belgium has a legal framework based on the European framework supporting the obligation to declare cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs) outside the EU. Failure to comply with this obligation is a customs offence and is enforced by the Belgian customs authorities. Belgium has adopted national provisions governing intra-EU cross-border transports, which are enforced by customs and the police (see TC Annex, R 32). 8.3.1. Identification and confiscation of cross-border movements of cash and bearer negotiable instruments that are falsely declared/undeclared 697. The ML NRA identifies international trafficking in cash as a major risk for Belgium (see IO.1). However, the risk of unaccompanied transport of cash and BNIs, including through the port of Antwerp, is not taken into account in the implementation of checks on cross-border movements of cash and BNI. 698. Checks on flows outside the EU – Customs checks on cash movements and BNIs outside the EU are based on the results of supranational risk assessments carried out by the European Commission (most recently in October 2022). Belgium has not developed its own criteria and follows the common criteria established at European level. However, Belgium’s specific context and the position of the port of Antwerp as a major gateway to the EU call for Belgium to develop specific criteria. At present, the authorities carry out checks on cash accompanied to and from non-EU countries at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi-Gosselies international airports, but these are not carried out in a sufficiently targeted manner . The Belgian Passenger Information Unit (BelPIU) database, which collects and analyses data on passengers travelling internationally to, from or through Belgium, cannot be used to target customs checks on cash and BNI movements. [196] 699. Customs officers were nevertheless able to detect a relatively high number of breaches (see table below). Between 2021 and 2024, they recorded a total of 4 291 declarations involving a total of EUR98.8 million. During the same period, customs authorities identified 1888 offences involving a total of EUR28.1 million. At Brussels Midi international railway station, a total of EUR 1.8 million was seized by the Belgian Railway Police between 2021 and 2024. However, Belgium has not provided the total amounts seized and confiscated, nor any information on any legal action taken in relation to these offences. Table 8.8. Number of declarations and offences detected (2021–2024) outside the EU 2021* 2022 2023 2024 Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Total airports 497 308 1 282 721 1 125 597 537 257 Total international station (Brussels) 4 1 9 1 5 3 0 0 Total ships’ crew cash 137 0 226 0 311 0 152 0 Other (public roads/parcels) 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 TOTAL 638 309 1 520 722 1 444 600 689 257 Total (EUR millions) [197] 14.4 5.3 34.2 10.6 33.8 8.5 16.4 3.7 Note: *Data for the period from 03/06/2021 (entry into force of the new Regulation 2018/1672) to 31/12/2021. Source: Customs data on declarations and offences relating to movements of funds outside the EU. Last updated on 10 June 2024. 700. Checks on intra-EU flows – Checks carried out by customs authorities and the police on cross-border movements of funds and BNI within the EU led to identifying a limited number of falsely declared or undeclared movements of cash and BNIs. Between 2021 and 2024, 342 disclosures of funds transported exceeding EUR10,000 were recorded, involving a total of EUR9 million. During the same period, customs authorities detected 60 offences involving a total of EUR1.1 million (see table 8.8 below). Confiscations obtained as a result are not known. These amounts are low given the high risk of cash-related ML and the high threat of drug trafficking to which Belgium is exposed. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of customs and police checks at Belgium’s land borders, as the Belgian authorities suspect organised criminal groups of repatriating, by land and through countries bordering Belgium, some of the illegal proceeds that are then transferred out of the EU to their members’ countries of origin (e.g. Albania, Turkey) via low-level couriers. Given Belgium’s risks in terms of cash laundering, the lack of a national strategy for intra-EU border checks tailored to the particular characteristics of the Belgian context is penalising. Table 8.9. Number of declarations and offences detected (2021–2024) within the EU 2021 2022 2023 2024 Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Declarations Offences Total airports 11 1 41 1 68 30 43 28 Total international station (Brussels) 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Total ships’ crew cash 25 0 47 0 67 0 28 0 Other (public roads/parcels) 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 TOTAL 39 1 95 1 137 30 71 28 Amount (EUR millions) [198] 0.9 0 2.8 0 3.6 0.5 1.7 0.6 Source: Customs data on declarations and offences relating to movements of funds within the EU. Last updated on 10 June 2024. 701. Unaccompanied cash and BNIs – Belgium has set up systems to detect illegal goods (drugs, weapons, protected species, counterfeit goods, etc.) at its main logistics hubs (airports and freight ports), but there are no specific checks on cross-border movements of unaccompanied cash and BNIs upon leaving the country, which is a weakness in the system. In any case, the checks carried out are not adequate for identifying movements of unaccompanied cash and BNIs. Belgium has not provided figures on the number of customs offences identified and amounts seized in connection with the transport of unaccompanied cash and BNIs (by air freight, cargo freight or land courier). 8.3.2. Confiscation of cash and negotiable bearer instruments related to ML/TF or predicate offences 702. When a customs offence is detected, the customs authorities draw up a report which is sent to the prosecutor’s office. The CTIF has access to this information via the Customs Information System (CIS) database. The customs authorities also send regular reports to the prosecutor’s office when no customs offence has been detected but there is a suspicion of criminal activity, even if the sums transported are below the declaration thresholds. In both cases, customs may temporarily retain the funds. The onus is on the suspect to justify the origin and destination of the funds. Between 2021 and 2024, the total amount of falsely declared or undeclared cash movements and BNIs identified by customs amounted to EUR 29.2 million. Amounts actually confiscated as a result are not known. 703. In addition, the confiscation of cash and BNI movements appears to be used to a limited extent to identify potential cases of ML or TF. The customs authorities reported a relatively low number of suspected ML/TF offences based on non-compliance with declaration or reporting requirements. Between 2019 and October 2024, they sent a total of 149 reports to prosecutor’s offices for suspected ML following the discovery of customs offences relating to cash transport declarations during checks carried out at Brussels-Zaventem and Charleroi international airports. Belgium also provided examples where large sums of cash were detected in passengers’ luggage, some of which were confiscated. The Halle Vilvoorde prosecutor’s office opened investigations into 79 cases and closed 43 of them, i.e. more than half of the reports received. The number of ML investigations opened by the Charleroi prosecutor’s office is not known. The number of cases submitted to these two prosecutor’s offices each year is decreasing, from 52 in 2019 to 23 in 2021 [199] and then 15 in 2024. [200] 704. However, prosecutors in some districts have indicated that they are unable to investigate all suspected offences referred to them by the customs authorities, mainly due to a lack of resources. Intelligence from customs authorities and the police on cash trafficking and ML is limited considering the level of risk in Belgium. 705. In this context, one major case stands out (see box on the Pondjes case, IO. 7). In this case, customs officials detected non-compliance with the obligation to declare cash movements, which led to the discovery of a significant money laundering network operating offsetting schemes and the confiscation of EUR 26.5 million, in addition to the undeclared cash. The significant resources deployed were crucial to the handling of this case, and the prosecutors responsible stated that they were unable to take on any more cases of this magnitude due to a lack of resources. 8.3.3. Sanctions 706. Belgium has a range of sanctions applicable to falsely declared/non-declared cross-border movements of cash and BNIs outside the EU (between EUR 125 and EUR 1 250). Taken in isolation, these amounts are not sufficiently proportionate or dissuasive in view of the amounts of undeclared cash seized that Belgium has brought to the attention of the evaluation team (see R 32). In practice, customs authorities mainly resort to out-of-court settlements for the vast majority of offences. Belgium has not provided information on the number of settlements and sanctions imposed. 707. Failure to comply with the obligation to declare cross-border transfers of funds within the EU does not constitute a customs offence and falls within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s office. Belgium has not provided information demonstrating its ability to impose sanctions for such failures. Footnotes [196] Regulation (EU) 2025/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818. [197] The largest customs seizures recorded between June 2021 and June 2024 at Zaventem International Airport amounted to between €102,300 and €609,975 and involved cash exports to Turkey, China and the UAE, and cash imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel and Thailand. [198] The largest customs seizures recorded between June 2021 and June 2024 at Zaventem International Airport amounted to between €102,300 and €609,975 and involved cash exports to Turkey, China and the UAE, and cash imports from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel and Thailand. [199] The introduction of the new European system for declaring cash movements, which came into force in 2021, has had an impact on the number of cash movement declarations made to customs. [200] The statistics do not make a distinction between files referred for failure to declare and those referred for incorrect declarations. Nor is it possible to distinguish between cases relating to cross-border movements of funds within the EU and movements outside the EU." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="740. In cases combining T and TF, the sanction is a single blanket sentence, making it difficult to distinguish between the specific sanction for TF and that related to terrorism. This approach is pragmatic but may raise issues in terms of assessing the proportionality of sanctions in relation to the specific seriousness of the financial offence. The prevention of terrorism appears to be a priority when applying sanctions, which may mean that the TF aspect is integrated into a broader response rather than being punished individually. The primary goal is therefore to neutralise the overall threat rather than to distinguish between offences on strictly financial grounds. 741. The main sentence (imprisonment) almost always includes a probationary period for part of the prison term. In practical terms, the accused serves part of their sentence in prison (usually half), while the remainder is suspended subject to certain conditions. During the probationary period, they must comply with certain obligations defined by the judge, such as a ban on reoffending, judicial supervision or financial restrictions. If these conditions are not met, the suspended part of the sentence may be reinstated and enforced. Additional measures may be imposed, such as limiting banking access to a single account in Belgium, thereby preventing suspicious transactions abroad and reducing the likelihood of reoffending. 742. Where recovering the funds is possible, they are confiscated to prevent them from being used to finance other criminal or terrorist networks (see IO.8). The fines imposed remain proportionate. See the T Spasorti case below. Box 9.4. T SPASORTI case IO.9 relevance: This case highlights the challenges of investigating TF, especially when clandestine payment methods such as hawala are used. Despite late detection and technological obstacles, the investigation successfully dismantled a structured and clandestine network involved not only in money laundering but also in terrorist financing, in this case for Islamic State. Facts: This case highlighted the use of a hawala network to finance the escape of female members of Islamic State detained in camps in northern Syria, enabling them to rejoin the terrorist organisation. This case was not detected by the CTIF, but was indirectly uncovered as part of an investigation into the financing of the escape of these female members of Islamic State, which also resulted in a conviction. The investigation, which lasted nearly four years, involved significant resources, including financial analysis, phone tapping and a year of active surveillance. The arrest of the suspects marked a turning point, revealing a large amount of evidence, including messages confirming the financial transactions. However, the lack of appropriate IT tools posed a challenge in analysing the data due to the volume of data recovered from the seized devices and the need for translation. Conviction: The case followed the JIC/JDC procedure, resulting in the opening of a judicial file in 2020. The final judgement was handed down in November 2024 – six defendants were prosecuted for operating a hawala system in the form of payment services, constituting an offence under banking law. All six defendants were convicted: The court upheld all charges against them. These included violation of banking law, ML offence (Art. 505(1) of the Penal Code), participation in a criminal organisation, terrorist financing (Art. 140/141 of the Penal Code), tax evasion and social security and tax fraud. The judge established that some of the defendants were not just low-level operatives (‘small fry’), but key players in the system. They were found to be co-perpetrators of TF and ML offences due to their active role in organising and facilitating transactions without authorisation or supervision. The ruling is based on a form of objective liability, demonstrating knowledge of and conscious involvement in the illegal system. Confiscation and sanctions: The court upheld the confiscation of approximately €973,000 (out of the €4 million requested by the Public Prosecutor’s Office). Main prison sentence (with partial probation) Fine Subsidiary (alternative) sentence for non-payment Confiscation Defendant 1 8 years without parole €80,000 3 months’ subsidiary imprisonment €472,184.83 Defendant 2 5 years, including 3 years without parole and 2 years suspended for 5 years €40,000 3 months’ subsidiary imprisonment €472,184.83 Defendant 3 4 years, including 2 years without parole and 2 years suspended for 5 years €8,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment, suspended for 3 years for half of the subsidiary sentence [211] €19,674.37 Defendant 4 3 years, including 18 months without parole and 18 months suspended for 5 years €4,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment, suspended for 3 years for half of the subsidiary sentence €9,837.18 Defendant 5 3 years €8,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment / Defendant 6 200 hours (failing which, 20 months’ subsidiary imprisonment) €1,600 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment / 743. The imposition of prison sentences and confiscation orders combined with probation measures ensures that convicted offenders are monitored on a long-term basis. However, its effectiveness depends on the proper monitoring of probation conditions and on the ability of the authorities to identify and confiscate misappropriated funds, which often requires international cooperation. 744. This type of sentence combines a tough stance with an incentive for rehabilitation. A prison sentence ensures immediate punishment and acts as a deterrent. In practice, imprisonment may occur either during the investigation (through pre-trial detention ordered by the investigating judge) or when the judgement becomes final. Furthermore, although statistical data on reoffending in relation to TF is limited, no cases of reoffending have been recorded in Belgium to date. Probation provides offenders with a chance of reintegration, while maintaining judicial pressure on them. A fine is a financial penalty, with an alternative prison sentence if they do not pay, thereby reinforcing the coercive nature of the sentence. 745. The enforcement of the sentence is the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in particular with regard to the confiscation of assets derived from TF. Confiscation is a major challenge, as it often requires international cooperation. In practice, confiscation measures are only effective to a limited degree, as in many cases (with the T Sparsori case being somewhat of an exception), the funds have already been transferred abroad, particularly to jurisdictions that are not especially cooperative (see IO.2). 746. However, the judge may sometimes impose a simple suspension of sentencing - a measure in which the judge acknowledges the defendant’s guilt, but postpones the pronouncement of the sentence. This is neither an acquittal nor a formal conviction. In this case, no conviction appears on the criminal record, provided that the defendant do not reoffend within a specified period. This suspension may also be subject to specific conditions, in which case it is referred to as a probationary suspension of sentencing . If these conditions are not met, the judge may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence. This measure is rarely handed down for TF offences (nine times between 2020 and 2024, or 11.5% of cases – see table in section 9.2). In a very specific and isolated instance, the judge deferred sentencing in a case where there were clear TF indicators, including proven facts, large amounts transferred over a long period, the use of clandestine channels and aggravating circumstances (explicit intention to support the rise through the ranks of an active member of Islamic State). See the Loute case in the box below. The decision to impose a simple suspension of sentencing in this case, without conviction or effective sanction, may be perceived as conveying a weak signal regarding the combat the TF. Such a decision seems at odds with the sustained efforts made by the police and judicial authorities between 2017 and 2023. It does not constitute a response that has sufficient dissuasive effect in terms of CFT and could potentially undermine the credibility of the entire judicial system in this area. Box 9.5. Loute (V.L.) case Background : Between 2013 and 2015, V.L. transferred a total of €63,039 to her son, a member of Islamic State (IS) linked to the Paris attacks, through money collectors, bank loans (consumer credit), the sale of shares she had inherited and the sale of her house. The case was opened in 2017, triggered by a referral from the Paris National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office. The investigation, supported by searches, phone tapping and a letter of request to Turkey, revealed that V.L. was aware of the legal risks and was deliberately financing her son to help him rise through the IS’s ranks. Conversations with another mother and information from the CTIF confirmed that her motives were not humanitarian. Outcome: On 18 January 2023, the Brussels Court of Appeal found V.L. guilty of TF, but granted a simple suspension of sentencing for three years. The decision took into account mitigating circumstances (family ties, no previous convictions, involvement in community work), despite aggravating factors that were not punished (explicit desire to support her son within the IS hierarchy that went beyond humanitarian purposes, conscious knowledge of the legal risks and the impact of the funds sent). 747. While Belgium refuses to accept any form of plea bargaining in TF cases, it does have a case management tool available called judicial probation (probation prétorienne) , which is an alternative to prosecution. Unlike a plea bargain, this is not based on an agreement between the accused and the prosecutor’s office, but on a unilateral decision by the prosecutor not to refer the case to the investigating judge. It is akin to a dismissal of the case subject to conditions. However, in practice, the suspect’s consent is essential, given the probationary period involved in this mechanism. The suspect is summoned, cautioned, informed of legal obligations, and placed on probation. It therefore acts more as a warning signal than a real criminal sanction. 748. Between 2018 and 2024, judicial probation was used on eight occasions in TF cases, making it a relatively uncommon measure (see box below for some examples). The decision to grant conditional suspensions is based on a range of mitigating factors, including active cooperation or confessions by suspects to investigators, family circumstances where the funds are intended for relatives, small amounts, an isolated offence without a structured pattern, and, lastly, the desire to avoid disproportionate consequences associated with a criminal conviction. The humanitarian argument appears to be key in these cases, particularly to avoid a strictly punitive response when criminal intent is ambiguous. Table 9.4. TF cases closed by judicial probation (TF type and amounts) (2018–2024) Date TF type and amounts Motives October 2018 Money sent to a family member (niece) in the region (in 2016) Amounts: €2,902 (1 month between the 2 transfers) ‒ Acknowledgement of the offence and active cooperation ‒ Specific family circumstances (sending to niece and her children) ‒ One-time, non-recurring offence ‒ Negative impact of a conviction for TF Sept. 2020 (Detected as part of the Syrian Wallet project) Money sent to a family member (son) in the region (2016–2017) Amounts: €2,140 (over 5 month in 3 transfers) ‒ Small amounts ‒ Acknowledgement of the offence/cooperation ‒ Specific family circumstances ‒ Negative impact of a conviction for TF March 2021 Funds sent to the region Amounts: €1,900 (in 4 transfers) ‒ Humanitarian motivation, no ideological intention to support terrorism May 2021 Money sent to a family member (brother) in the region in 2017 Amounts: €1,642 (in several transfers over one month) ‒ Small amount ‒ No ‘terrorist’ ideology ‒ Specific family and personal circumstances ‒ Collaboration June 2024 Money sent to a family member (brother) in the region in 2015 Amounts: €1,570 (single transfer) ‒ Small amount ‒ No ‘terrorist’ ideology ‒ Specific family and personal circumstances ‒ Collaboration Source: Federal Prosecutor’s Office 749. However, taking small amounts into account as a mitigating factor is more debatable. In the case of terrorist financing (TF), even modest sums can have a significant operational impact, particularly when the beneficiary is affiliated with a terrorist group. While judicial probation is a useful mechanism in certain emotionally sensitive situations, it must not be applied to TF in such a way as to inadvertently create a loophole that could be exploited by malicious actors. Strict controls must therefore be maintained on the use of this procedure. In practice, in the eight cases where this measure was used, the judicial authorities did not identify any repeat offences. However, its effectiveness – like that of the suspension of the sentence – depends on rigorous monitoring. 750. However, it is worth noting that automatic referral to court if an ideological element is detected, regardless of the amount involved, contributes to the dissuasive effect, provided that this element is clearly identifiable, which is not always the case. Furthermore, as long as the case is not time-barred, it can be reopened at any time. This provides an additional guarantee in that probation does not mean permanent impunity and prosecution can be reactivated in the event of new suspicious behaviour, subject once again to active monitoring and the ability to detect any repeat offences. 751. In some cases, closing a case with judicial probation provides an opportunity to carry out surveillance, identify networks, map suspicious financial flows and observe changes in the suspect’s behaviour before considering more decisive action, if necessary. However, this practice appears to contradict the stated, albeit informal, principle of ‘zero tolerance’, which seems to be the repressive message advocated by the authorities in relation to TF. Footnotes [211] If the fine is not paid, the defendant faces two months in prison as an alternative. However, half of this additional sentence (one month) is suspended for three years. If the defendant does not pay the fine, they will serve one month in prison immediately. The other month of imprisonment will be suspended, provided that they comply with certain obligations for three years (e.g. no reoffending, compliance with the rules imposed)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="740. In cases combining T and TF, the sanction is a single blanket sentence, making it difficult to distinguish between the specific sanction for TF and that related to terrorism. This approach is pragmatic but may raise issues in terms of assessing the proportionality of sanctions in relation to the specific seriousness of the financial offence. The prevention of terrorism appears to be a priority when applying sanctions, which may mean that the TF aspect is integrated into a broader response rather than being punished individually. The primary goal is therefore to neutralise the overall threat rather than to distinguish between offences on strictly financial grounds. 741. The main sentence (imprisonment) almost always includes a probationary period for part of the prison term. In practical terms, the accused serves part of their sentence in prison (usually half), while the remainder is suspended subject to certain conditions. During the probationary period, they must comply with certain obligations defined by the judge, such as a ban on reoffending, judicial supervision or financial restrictions. If these conditions are not met, the suspended part of the sentence may be reinstated and enforced. Additional measures may be imposed, such as limiting banking access to a single account in Belgium, thereby preventing suspicious transactions abroad and reducing the likelihood of reoffending. 742. Where recovering the funds is possible, they are confiscated to prevent them from being used to finance other criminal or terrorist networks (see IO.8). The fines imposed remain proportionate. See the T Spasorti case below. Box 9.4. T SPASORTI case IO.9 relevance: This case highlights the challenges of investigating TF, especially when clandestine payment methods such as hawala are used. Despite late detection and technological obstacles, the investigation successfully dismantled a structured and clandestine network involved not only in money laundering but also in terrorist financing, in this case for Islamic State. Facts: This case highlighted the use of a hawala network to finance the escape of female members of Islamic State detained in camps in northern Syria, enabling them to rejoin the terrorist organisation. This case was not detected by the CTIF, but was indirectly uncovered as part of an investigation into the financing of the escape of these female members of Islamic State, which also resulted in a conviction. The investigation, which lasted nearly four years, involved significant resources, including financial analysis, phone tapping and a year of active surveillance. The arrest of the suspects marked a turning point, revealing a large amount of evidence, including messages confirming the financial transactions. However, the lack of appropriate IT tools posed a challenge in analysing the data due to the volume of data recovered from the seized devices and the need for translation. Conviction: The case followed the JIC/JDC procedure, resulting in the opening of a judicial file in 2020. The final judgement was handed down in November 2024 – six defendants were prosecuted for operating a hawala system in the form of payment services, constituting an offence under banking law. All six defendants were convicted: The court upheld all charges against them. These included violation of banking law, ML offence (Art. 505(1) of the Penal Code), participation in a criminal organisation, terrorist financing (Art. 140/141 of the Penal Code), tax evasion and social security and tax fraud. The judge established that some of the defendants were not just low-level operatives (‘small fry’), but key players in the system. They were found to be co-perpetrators of TF and ML offences due to their active role in organising and facilitating transactions without authorisation or supervision. The ruling is based on a form of objective liability, demonstrating knowledge of and conscious involvement in the illegal system. Confiscation and sanctions: The court upheld the confiscation of approximately €973,000 (out of the €4 million requested by the Public Prosecutor’s Office). Main prison sentence (with partial probation) Fine Subsidiary (alternative) sentence for non-payment Confiscation Defendant 1 8 years without parole €80,000 3 months’ subsidiary imprisonment €472,184.83 Defendant 2 5 years, including 3 years without parole and 2 years suspended for 5 years €40,000 3 months’ subsidiary imprisonment €472,184.83 Defendant 3 4 years, including 2 years without parole and 2 years suspended for 5 years €8,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment, suspended for 3 years for half of the subsidiary sentence [211] €19,674.37 Defendant 4 3 years, including 18 months without parole and 18 months suspended for 5 years €4,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment, suspended for 3 years for half of the subsidiary sentence €9,837.18 Defendant 5 3 years €8,000 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment / Defendant 6 200 hours (failing which, 20 months’ subsidiary imprisonment) €1,600 2 months’ subsidiary imprisonment / 743. The imposition of prison sentences and confiscation orders combined with probation measures ensures that convicted offenders are monitored on a long-term basis. However, its effectiveness depends on the proper monitoring of probation conditions and on the ability of the authorities to identify and confiscate misappropriated funds, which often requires international cooperation. 744. This type of sentence combines a tough stance with an incentive for rehabilitation. A prison sentence ensures immediate punishment and acts as a deterrent. In practice, imprisonment may occur either during the investigation (through pre-trial detention ordered by the investigating judge) or when the judgement becomes final. Furthermore, although statistical data on reoffending in relation to TF is limited, no cases of reoffending have been recorded in Belgium to date. Probation provides offenders with a chance of reintegration, while maintaining judicial pressure on them. A fine is a financial penalty, with an alternative prison sentence if they do not pay, thereby reinforcing the coercive nature of the sentence. 745. The enforcement of the sentence is the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in particular with regard to the confiscation of assets derived from TF. Confiscation is a major challenge, as it often requires international cooperation. In practice, confiscation measures are only effective to a limited degree, as in many cases (with the T Sparsori case being somewhat of an exception), the funds have already been transferred abroad, particularly to jurisdictions that are not especially cooperative (see IO.2). 746. However, the judge may sometimes impose a simple suspension of sentencing - a measure in which the judge acknowledges the defendant’s guilt, but postpones the pronouncement of the sentence. This is neither an acquittal nor a formal conviction. In this case, no conviction appears on the criminal record, provided that the defendant do not reoffend within a specified period. This suspension may also be subject to specific conditions, in which case it is referred to as a probationary suspension of sentencing . If these conditions are not met, the judge may revoke the suspension and impose a sentence. This measure is rarely handed down for TF offences (nine times between 2020 and 2024, or 11.5% of cases – see table in section 9.2). In a very specific and isolated instance, the judge deferred sentencing in a case where there were clear TF indicators, including proven facts, large amounts transferred over a long period, the use of clandestine channels and aggravating circumstances (explicit intention to support the rise through the ranks of an active member of Islamic State). See the Loute case in the box below. The decision to impose a simple suspension of sentencing in this case, without conviction or effective sanction, may be perceived as conveying a weak signal regarding the combat the TF. Such a decision seems at odds with the sustained efforts made by the police and judicial authorities between 2017 and 2023. It does not constitute a response that has sufficient dissuasive effect in terms of CFT and could potentially undermine the credibility of the entire judicial system in this area. Box 9.5. Loute (V.L.) case Background : Between 2013 and 2015, V.L. transferred a total of €63,039 to her son, a member of Islamic State (IS) linked to the Paris attacks, through money collectors, bank loans (consumer credit), the sale of shares she had inherited and the sale of her house. The case was opened in 2017, triggered by a referral from the Paris National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office. The investigation, supported by searches, phone tapping and a letter of request to Turkey, revealed that V.L. was aware of the legal risks and was deliberately financing her son to help him rise through the IS’s ranks. Conversations with another mother and information from the CTIF confirmed that her motives were not humanitarian. Outcome: On 18 January 2023, the Brussels Court of Appeal found V.L. guilty of TF, but granted a simple suspension of sentencing for three years. The decision took into account mitigating circumstances (family ties, no previous convictions, involvement in community work), despite aggravating factors that were not punished (explicit desire to support her son within the IS hierarchy that went beyond humanitarian purposes, conscious knowledge of the legal risks and the impact of the funds sent). 747. While Belgium refuses to accept any form of plea bargaining in TF cases, it does have a case management tool available called judicial probation (probation prétorienne) , which is an alternative to prosecution. Unlike a plea bargain, this is not based on an agreement between the accused and the prosecutor’s office, but on a unilateral decision by the prosecutor not to refer the case to the investigating judge. It is akin to a dismissal of the case subject to conditions. However, in practice, the suspect’s consent is essential, given the probationary period involved in this mechanism. The suspect is summoned, cautioned, informed of legal obligations, and placed on probation. It therefore acts more as a warning signal than a real criminal sanction. 748. Between 2018 and 2024, judicial probation was used on eight occasions in TF cases, making it a relatively uncommon measure (see box below for some examples). The decision to grant conditional suspensions is based on a range of mitigating factors, including active cooperation or confessions by suspects to investigators, family circumstances where the funds are intended for relatives, small amounts, an isolated offence without a structured pattern, and, lastly, the desire to avoid disproportionate consequences associated with a criminal conviction. The humanitarian argument appears to be key in these cases, particularly to avoid a strictly punitive response when criminal intent is ambiguous. Table 9.4. TF cases closed by judicial probation (TF type and amounts) (2018–2024) Date TF type and amounts Motives October 2018 Money sent to a family member (niece) in the region (in 2016) Amounts: €2,902 (1 month between the 2 transfers) ‒ Acknowledgement of the offence and active cooperation ‒ Specific family circumstances (sending to niece and her children) ‒ One-time, non-recurring offence ‒ Negative impact of a conviction for TF Sept. 2020 (Detected as part of the Syrian Wallet project) Money sent to a family member (son) in the region (2016–2017) Amounts: €2,140 (over 5 month in 3 transfers) ‒ Small amounts ‒ Acknowledgement of the offence/cooperation ‒ Specific family circumstances ‒ Negative impact of a conviction for TF March 2021 Funds sent to the region Amounts: €1,900 (in 4 transfers) ‒ Humanitarian motivation, no ideological intention to support terrorism May 2021 Money sent to a family member (brother) in the region in 2017 Amounts: €1,642 (in several transfers over one month) ‒ Small amount ‒ No ‘terrorist’ ideology ‒ Specific family and personal circumstances ‒ Collaboration June 2024 Money sent to a family member (brother) in the region in 2015 Amounts: €1,570 (single transfer) ‒ Small amount ‒ No ‘terrorist’ ideology ‒ Specific family and personal circumstances ‒ Collaboration Source: Federal Prosecutor’s Office 749. However, taking small amounts into account as a mitigating factor is more debatable. In the case of terrorist financing (TF), even modest sums can have a significant operational impact, particularly when the beneficiary is affiliated with a terrorist group. While judicial probation is a useful mechanism in certain emotionally sensitive situations, it must not be applied to TF in such a way as to inadvertently create a loophole that could be exploited by malicious actors. Strict controls must therefore be maintained on the use of this procedure. In practice, in the eight cases where this measure was used, the judicial authorities did not identify any repeat offences. However, its effectiveness – like that of the suspension of the sentence – depends on rigorous monitoring. 750. However, it is worth noting that automatic referral to court if an ideological element is detected, regardless of the amount involved, contributes to the dissuasive effect, provided that this element is clearly identifiable, which is not always the case. Furthermore, as long as the case is not time-barred, it can be reopened at any time. This provides an additional guarantee in that probation does not mean permanent impunity and prosecution can be reactivated in the event of new suspicious behaviour, subject once again to active monitoring and the ability to detect any repeat offences. 751. In some cases, closing a case with judicial probation provides an opportunity to carry out surveillance, identify networks, map suspicious financial flows and observe changes in the suspect’s behaviour before considering more decisive action, if necessary. However, this practice appears to contradict the stated, albeit informal, principle of ‘zero tolerance’, which seems to be the repressive message advocated by the authorities in relation to TF. Footnotes [211] If the fine is not paid, the defendant faces two months in prison as an alternative. However, half of this additional sentence (one month) is suspended for three years. If the defendant does not pay the fine, they will serve one month in prison immediately. The other month of imprisonment will be suspended, provided that they comply with certain obligations for three years (e.g. no reoffending, compliance with the rules imposed)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="782. In 2019, the reform of the legal framework applicable to non-profit organisations (NPOs) harmonised the obligations of NPOs with those of companies, strengthening their financial transparency and governance (see the Introduction). However, the assessment of Belgium’s compliance with R 8 reveals persistent challenges in identifying and managing TF risks related to NPOs (see TC Annex). 10.3.1. Identification of at-risk NPOs 783. The Belgian non-profit sector comprises approximately 135,828 NPOs (February 2025). [220] These organisations cover a wide range of fields, including social, cultural, educational and health-related activities. Some are active internationally, particularly in humanitarian aid and development cooperation. There are 2,493 NPOs that fall within the FATF definition (see R 8). These are mainly NPOs that have applied for tax approval for tax reduction purposes. Among these, 93 receive government subsidies for development cooperation projects, particularly in conflict areas. Belgium does not have accurate data on NPOs operating in at-risk areas without public funding. 784. These 2,493 NPOs appear to cover the vast majority of Belgian entities falling within the FATF definition. However, some organisations at risk of TF (despite falling within the FATF definition) may voluntarily waive approval to avoid transparency requirements and official supervision. This weakens the effectiveness of the current system, which relies on a voluntary approach motivated by tax advantages rather than a structured and proactive mechanism for detecting TF risks among NPOs (see R 8). 785. Belgium conducted a risk assessment specific to NPOs in 2019, updated in 2024, based on an inter-institutional approach. [221] This assessment identified several categories of NPOs considered to be most at risk of TF: · 93 NPOs active abroad, particularly in humanitarian aid and conflict zones, are particularly vulnerable, as the aid they provide could be diverted for terrorist or TF purposes. These are NPOs receiving public funding. · Religious NPOs (local religious communities or non-profit associations under the Belgian Companies and Associations Code, see IO.5) may pose a significant risk of TF when they support or promote extremist ideologies or serve as a direct or indirect channel of funding for radical networks. [222] There is no census of the number of religious NPOs in Belgium, but at the end of 2024, there were 3,866 recognised local religious communities (places of worship). · Inactive or dormant NPOs that can be reactivated to transfer funds without going through regulated banking systems. · NPOs excluded from the regulated financial system due to abusive de-risking practices, which may lead them to resort to unregulated money transfer channels, such as hawala. They are mainly detected by the intelligence services and through judicial and police investigations. In 2023, 46 NPOs applied for basic banking services; in 2024, 36 did so. These channels are not generally monitored by the banking sector, limiting the ability to detect TF risks at an early stage. 786. The 2019 risk assessment is based primarily on the analysis of suspicious financial transactions reported to the CTIF, as well as on cross-referencing data between intelligence, police and judicial services. It also takes account of trends observed in other at-risk sectors and information from development cooperation for NPOs operating abroad. It also provides a clear understanding of the main TF risk factors, such as international operations (particularly those carried out in conflict zones), sources of funding and jurisdictional risks. The assessment also highlights the risks associated with NPOs active in conflict zones and the risks associated with NPOs involved in hawala or other informal money transfer systems. The authorities pay particular attention to these financial flows. 787. Despite the efforts made to assess risk factors, significant limitations remain in identifying NPOs at risk of TF. These assessments do not provide a quantitative mapping by type of NPO, area of operation or funding method, which makes it impossible to quantify precisely the number of at-risk NPOs and to measure the vulnerability levels specific to each organisational profile (see c.8.1b). This lack of granular analysis reduces the authorities’ ability to target prevention measures in a proportionate and effective way. The current assessment is based mainly on STRs submitted to the CTIF and tax approval procedures. However, this approach is report-based and reactive, and fails to take advantage of several opportunities to proactively identify at-risk NPOs. Several identifying sources, such as data from the UBO register and on dissolutions of dormant NPOs, are available, but they are not used to their full potential. The authorities make up for this with information from the intelligence and police services obtained in connection with efforts to combat terrorism, extremism and radicalisation. However, these sources do not systematically cover all NPOs operating in Belgium and abroad. At the judicial level, legal proceedings have been brought against certain NPOs for TF offences, confirming that there are actual cases in the sector. 788. As a result, some NPOs at high risk of TF may potentially slip through the monitoring net, especially those that have not applied for tax approval and those operating in areas that do not receive public funding. 10.3.2. Monitoring mechanisms 789. Belgium has introduced financial and administrative monitoring mechanisms for NPOs. These include enhanced supervision for subsidised NPOs, including mandatory audits for large organisations and the administrative deregistration of ‘dormant’ (inactive) NPOs. 790. For example, NPOs that want to operate internationally and be eligible for Belgian public funding must get official accreditation, [223] valid for ten years. This accreditation process is rigorous and demanding: it involves an external assessment conducted by a private company appointed by the DGD, which examines risk management, personnel management, financial transparency and several cross-cutting issues (integrity, gender, governance, etc.). Furthermore, to issue tax certificates entitling them to tax relief, NPOs must obtain approval from SPF Finance. However, although these tax procedures are well regulated, they are unable to detect NPOs that deliberately choose to evade any form of monitoring. These NPOs may, however, be subject to targeted checks by the police and intelligence services. 791. Enhanced supervision for subsidised NPOs is applied uniformly, without differentiation based on TF risk level (as Belgium does not classify NPOs based on their exposure to TF). As a result, even NPOs with links to high-risk jurisdictions or operating in conflict zones are not systematically subject to enhanced supervision. 792. Monitoring measures are in place for religious NPOs that support or promote extremist ideologies, or serve as a direct or indirect channel of funding for radical networks identified as at risk in national assessments (see previous subsection). These measures include checks carried out by the intelligence services and the police on individuals managing NPOs linked to recognised local religious communities, [224] although there are no figures available to measure the extent of this. Checks are also carried out on ministers of religion and delegates of non-denominational philosophical organisations paid by SPF Justice. Indirectly, NPOs linked to this sector are also subject to the obligations laid down by the Companies and Associations Code and the UBO register. 793. Although not strictly speaking a monitoring measure, the BELFI project (see box below) is an interesting initiative that can be used to monitor this category of at-risk NPOs. Initially focused on NPOs linked to radicalism, its scope has since been broadened. It has led to the closure of 277 organisations. While this project had the potential to identify organisations that could be at risk of TF, the results obtained are not directly linked to the detection or prevention of TF. The most frequently observed offences relate to illegal residence, social security fraud, drugs, weapons and false documents. This mechanism is therefore not a targeted or continuous monitoring mechanism specifically focused on NPOs at high risk of TF. Box 10.1. BELFI project Context : launched in 2014, this pluri-dimensional project arose from the observation that nearly 90% of Belgian foreign terrorist fighters were receiving public funding. Objectives: One of the objectives of the ‘police’ component of this plan is to combat the illegal economy. BELFI aims in particular to detect and control fraud associated with security risks, targeting both natural and legal persons. It focuses in particular on NPOs (NPAs) suspected of providing logistical, financial or organisational support for radicalisation or terrorism. BELFI is not an investigation unit but a detection and monitoring structure. When a case requires further investigation, it is referred to the competent investigation services. The monitoring results are systematically entered into police databases. Outcome: A total of 1,876 entities were audited, resulting in the closure of 277 structures, 20 arrests and 482 detentions of illegal immigrants. The most common offences were illegal residence, social security fraud, drugs, weapons and forged documents. 794. For dormant NPOs, Belgium has also strengthened its monitoring mechanisms for the sector since 2024 by launching a campaign to deregister and dissolve inactive NPOs, with a view to cleaning up the UBO register and preventing abuse, particularly from a CFT perspective: k) Automatic administrative deregistration, provided for by the law of December 2023, targets entities that do not comply with certain fundamental obligations, such as failure to register in the UBO register and/or to update their articles of association in the Belgian Official Journal for more than seven years. If the NPO fails to regularise its situation after receiving a formal notice, it will be automatically deregistered, with the possibility of reinstatement if it returns to compliance. On this basis, 35,897 NPOs had been deregistered as of 14 February 2025. l) Judicial dissolutions, carried out since 2019 by certain commercial courts, target dormant NPOs based on objective criteria (e.g. failure to file accounts, have directors or publish statutory documents). A total of 13,186 NPOs have been dissolved since the launch of this initiative, including 2,422 between 2023 and 2024. 795. While these measures have reduced the number of dormant entities that could be reactivated to transfer funds for TF purposes, deregistrations and dissolutions are triggered by formal administrative criteria (non-publication of accounts, failure to update UBOs, etc.) and do not result from an assessment based on specific TF risks. This is neither a risk-based approach, nor does it involve proportionate targeting based on NPOs’ actual TF risk exposure. It may leave active but at-risk NPOs off the radar if they are administratively compliant. Furthermore, without a support mechanism, active NPOs that are not well structured or simply do not comply with certain reporting requirements could be wrongly removed from the list. 796. For the last category of NPOs identified as being at risk of TF, the BNB’s supervision of the de-risking practices of financial institutions helps to identify and prevent abusive exclusion practices (see IO.3). However, it is difficult to fully assess the scope of this supervision without figures or concrete evidence. 797. However, overall, monitoring measures – such as enhanced transparency requirements, financial flow justification requirements or high compliance expectations imposed by financial institutions as part of AML/CFT – are applied fairly consistently across the entire non-profit sector, without any differentiation based on actual exposure to TF. This generic approach, which is not based on the actual risk of TF, has several consequences: · It imposes the same accounting, administrative and governance obligations on all NPOs, including those whose activities have no connection with sensitive areas or channels. · It creates a disproportionate burden, particularly for small humanitarian or social organisations seeking public funding, which struggle to meet requirements designed for much more exposed entities. Some NPOs have reported the practical difficulties that this regulatory burden places on their day-to-day operations. · It may dilute the resources available to authorities, preventing them from focusing their efforts on NPOs that are genuinely at risk of TF. · It undermines access to financial services for some legitimate NPOs. There have been reports of account freezing and delays in subsidy payments. They may also be denied the right to open an account if no individual risk assessment is carried out. This cautious but blanket approach may encourage financial institutions to engage in de-risking practices, preferring to exclude certain NPOs rather than manage a risk they perceive as complex. Between 2023 and 2024, 82 NPOs applied for basic banking services, accounting for 15.3% of the total 536 applications – a significant proportion that indicates their partial exclusion from the banking system. Although the BNB has not observed any widespread de-risking in the sector, tangible effects are evident on the ground. Some association federations have also entered into dialogue with Febelfin to prevent unjustified exclusion. This type of measure, which is more about mitigation than monitoring, can help prevent certain NPOs from being marginalised. 798. Furthermore, monitoring of the is fragmented across several authorities (SPF Justice, CTIF, OCAM, VSSE, federal police), with no central body dedicated to supervising TF risk in NPOs, which limits coordination and responsiveness. 10.3.3. Measures to mitigate the risk of terrorist financing 799. At the same time, Belgium has introduced several measures aimed at reducing the risks of TF in the non-profit sector. In general, NPOs must comply with strict financial transparency requirements, including the obligation to register beneficial owners in the UBO register, file annual accounts and, for some, undergo mandatory external audits, particularly those receiving public funding or operating internationally. Large NPOs must also comply with IATI standards (see R 8), ensuring full traceability of funds to their final destination, which is good practice in TF risk management. However, these measures are mainly geared towards protecting the integrity of the non-profit sector, rather than specifically designed to target NPOs at risk of TF, thus reducing their effectiveness in detecting possible suspicious activities. 800. Numerous measures have also been taken for the religious sector identified as at risk in national risk assessments, although not all of these are monitoring measures. The 3,866 religious communities recognised in Belgium, which are public institutions, may be linked to non-profit associations subject to the Companies and Associations Code and to accounting and UBO obligations. They are also subject to checks by the police and intelligence services (statistical data not provided). 801. Belgium also relies on several inter-institutional cooperation mechanisms to support the exchange of information between authorities involved in combating TF, including the judicial authorities, the CTIF, OCAM, the State Security Service, the SGRS and the federal police. These exchanges facilitate the cross-referencing of information from STRs, judicial investigations and intelligence. The information is also integrated into the Banque de données communes (BDC) (see IO.9), thereby centralising data collected on NPOs reported as potentially at risk of TF. Lastly, this cooperation involves occasional meetings between the authorities and representatives of the non-profit sector, aimed at raising awareness of the risks and strengthening supervision without hindering the legitimate activities of NPOs. However, these mechanisms are limited due to the absence of a central entity dedicated to monitoring at-risk NPOs and the lack of a standard framework for coordinating the monitoring and implementation of mitigation measures. 802. Some mitigation measures are implemented by the sector itself. For example, NPOs working in international development cooperation tend to have internal mechanisms for monitoring funds, although the extent of these mechanisms varies depending on the organisation. Some have developed structured internal control systems, including tools for evaluating their local partners, particularly with regard to the use of funds. Supervising the use of funds in the field often relies on the involvement of local teams. These processes ensure that funds can be traced to their destination to a certain extent. NPOs receiving public funding are also subject to structured monitoring by SPF Foreign Affairs, covering annual reports, strategic dialogues, field missions and mandatory audits carried out by an auditor, regardless of their size. However, this monitoring remains largely internal or dependent on the donor, with no harmonised mechanism at the national level. Furthermore, as it ultimately relies on local partners and organisations, full and effective traceability of the final use of funds cannot be completely guaranteed. This limitation, which is not unique to Belgium, reflects a structural difficulty in ensuring full supervision of the use of funds in operational settings. 10.3.4. Awareness-raising and capacity building for NPOs 803. Belgium has launched a number of awareness-raising initiatives aimed at NPOs, in collaboration with federations in the sector. In 2024, training courses and webinars were organised by SPF Economy, SPF Justice and SPF Finance, focusing on UBO obligations, financial sanctions, TF risks and applicable regulations. A one-to-one written campaign was also sent to NPOs falling within the FATF definition. The sector itself plays an active role in promoting good governance, including among small organisations. 804. Some NPOs have also implemented internal measures, such as mandatory training on TF risks or the appointment of internal control officers. These steps are often motivated by donor requirements and reflect a commitment to professionalisation. At the same time, an ‘Impact’ coalition has been created to give structure to the dialogue between the voluntary sector and the authorities, making it easier for the sector to accept certain obligations that are seen as restrictive (particularly UBO). 805. Despite these efforts, the dissemination of information has been patchy. Small organisations and NPOs with limited connections to umbrella networks often receive less exposure to awareness-raising initiatives. The content of these initiatives is also considered to be too general and not sufficiently aligned with the sector’s specific risk profiles, particularly for NPOs operating in conflict zones or receiving funds that are difficult to trace. The sector is pressing for more practical awareness-raising, using real-life examples and case studies. 806. Discussions take place between the authorities and the sector, in particular with SPF Finance, SPF Economy and SPF Justice, but these remain sporadic and informal, with the exception of the Dialogue Council. [225] The implementation of a more structured framework for consultation, such as a memorandum of understanding, would lead to more regular and systematic meetings, allow more formal feedback from the authorities and ensure better collective monitoring of compliance issues, particularly where humanitarian or international efforts are concerned. Footnotes [220] This sector includes non-profit associations (NPAs), international non-profit associations (INPAs), public utility foundations (PUFs) and private foundations (PFs). [221] Involving, in particular, SPF Justice, the CTIF, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM), intelligence services (VSSE and SGRS) and the federal police. [222] This also includes the 1,876 entities audited as part of the BELFI project. [223] Accreditation issued by the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD) of SPF Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. [224] That is, local religious communities or non-profit associations falling within the remit of the Companies and Associations Code, as part of the procedure for recognising local religious communities, pursuant to the circular of 21 October 2024. [225] The Dialogue Council is a body for official discussions between SPF Justice, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and representative bodies of recognised religions and non-denominational philosophical organisations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="782. In 2019, the reform of the legal framework applicable to non-profit organisations (NPOs) harmonised the obligations of NPOs with those of companies, strengthening their financial transparency and governance (see the Introduction). However, the assessment of Belgium’s compliance with R 8 reveals persistent challenges in identifying and managing TF risks related to NPOs (see TC Annex). 10.3.1. Identification of at-risk NPOs 783. The Belgian non-profit sector comprises approximately 135,828 NPOs (February 2025). [220] These organisations cover a wide range of fields, including social, cultural, educational and health-related activities. Some are active internationally, particularly in humanitarian aid and development cooperation. There are 2,493 NPOs that fall within the FATF definition (see R 8). These are mainly NPOs that have applied for tax approval for tax reduction purposes. Among these, 93 receive government subsidies for development cooperation projects, particularly in conflict areas. Belgium does not have accurate data on NPOs operating in at-risk areas without public funding. 784. These 2,493 NPOs appear to cover the vast majority of Belgian entities falling within the FATF definition. However, some organisations at risk of TF (despite falling within the FATF definition) may voluntarily waive approval to avoid transparency requirements and official supervision. This weakens the effectiveness of the current system, which relies on a voluntary approach motivated by tax advantages rather than a structured and proactive mechanism for detecting TF risks among NPOs (see R 8). 785. Belgium conducted a risk assessment specific to NPOs in 2019, updated in 2024, based on an inter-institutional approach. [221] This assessment identified several categories of NPOs considered to be most at risk of TF: · 93 NPOs active abroad, particularly in humanitarian aid and conflict zones, are particularly vulnerable, as the aid they provide could be diverted for terrorist or TF purposes. These are NPOs receiving public funding. · Religious NPOs (local religious communities or non-profit associations under the Belgian Companies and Associations Code, see IO.5) may pose a significant risk of TF when they support or promote extremist ideologies or serve as a direct or indirect channel of funding for radical networks. [222] There is no census of the number of religious NPOs in Belgium, but at the end of 2024, there were 3,866 recognised local religious communities (places of worship). · Inactive or dormant NPOs that can be reactivated to transfer funds without going through regulated banking systems. · NPOs excluded from the regulated financial system due to abusive de-risking practices, which may lead them to resort to unregulated money transfer channels, such as hawala. They are mainly detected by the intelligence services and through judicial and police investigations. In 2023, 46 NPOs applied for basic banking services; in 2024, 36 did so. These channels are not generally monitored by the banking sector, limiting the ability to detect TF risks at an early stage. 786. The 2019 risk assessment is based primarily on the analysis of suspicious financial transactions reported to the CTIF, as well as on cross-referencing data between intelligence, police and judicial services. It also takes account of trends observed in other at-risk sectors and information from development cooperation for NPOs operating abroad. It also provides a clear understanding of the main TF risk factors, such as international operations (particularly those carried out in conflict zones), sources of funding and jurisdictional risks. The assessment also highlights the risks associated with NPOs active in conflict zones and the risks associated with NPOs involved in hawala or other informal money transfer systems. The authorities pay particular attention to these financial flows. 787. Despite the efforts made to assess risk factors, significant limitations remain in identifying NPOs at risk of TF. These assessments do not provide a quantitative mapping by type of NPO, area of operation or funding method, which makes it impossible to quantify precisely the number of at-risk NPOs and to measure the vulnerability levels specific to each organisational profile (see c.8.1b). This lack of granular analysis reduces the authorities’ ability to target prevention measures in a proportionate and effective way. The current assessment is based mainly on STRs submitted to the CTIF and tax approval procedures. However, this approach is report-based and reactive, and fails to take advantage of several opportunities to proactively identify at-risk NPOs. Several identifying sources, such as data from the UBO register and on dissolutions of dormant NPOs, are available, but they are not used to their full potential. The authorities make up for this with information from the intelligence and police services obtained in connection with efforts to combat terrorism, extremism and radicalisation. However, these sources do not systematically cover all NPOs operating in Belgium and abroad. At the judicial level, legal proceedings have been brought against certain NPOs for TF offences, confirming that there are actual cases in the sector. 788. As a result, some NPOs at high risk of TF may potentially slip through the monitoring net, especially those that have not applied for tax approval and those operating in areas that do not receive public funding. 10.3.2. Monitoring mechanisms 789. Belgium has introduced financial and administrative monitoring mechanisms for NPOs. These include enhanced supervision for subsidised NPOs, including mandatory audits for large organisations and the administrative deregistration of ‘dormant’ (inactive) NPOs. 790. For example, NPOs that want to operate internationally and be eligible for Belgian public funding must get official accreditation, [223] valid for ten years. This accreditation process is rigorous and demanding: it involves an external assessment conducted by a private company appointed by the DGD, which examines risk management, personnel management, financial transparency and several cross-cutting issues (integrity, gender, governance, etc.). Furthermore, to issue tax certificates entitling them to tax relief, NPOs must obtain approval from SPF Finance. However, although these tax procedures are well regulated, they are unable to detect NPOs that deliberately choose to evade any form of monitoring. These NPOs may, however, be subject to targeted checks by the police and intelligence services. 791. Enhanced supervision for subsidised NPOs is applied uniformly, without differentiation based on TF risk level (as Belgium does not classify NPOs based on their exposure to TF). As a result, even NPOs with links to high-risk jurisdictions or operating in conflict zones are not systematically subject to enhanced supervision. 792. Monitoring measures are in place for religious NPOs that support or promote extremist ideologies, or serve as a direct or indirect channel of funding for radical networks identified as at risk in national assessments (see previous subsection). These measures include checks carried out by the intelligence services and the police on individuals managing NPOs linked to recognised local religious communities, [224] although there are no figures available to measure the extent of this. Checks are also carried out on ministers of religion and delegates of non-denominational philosophical organisations paid by SPF Justice. Indirectly, NPOs linked to this sector are also subject to the obligations laid down by the Companies and Associations Code and the UBO register. 793. Although not strictly speaking a monitoring measure, the BELFI project (see box below) is an interesting initiative that can be used to monitor this category of at-risk NPOs. Initially focused on NPOs linked to radicalism, its scope has since been broadened. It has led to the closure of 277 organisations. While this project had the potential to identify organisations that could be at risk of TF, the results obtained are not directly linked to the detection or prevention of TF. The most frequently observed offences relate to illegal residence, social security fraud, drugs, weapons and false documents. This mechanism is therefore not a targeted or continuous monitoring mechanism specifically focused on NPOs at high risk of TF. Box 10.1. BELFI project Context : launched in 2014, this pluri-dimensional project arose from the observation that nearly 90% of Belgian foreign terrorist fighters were receiving public funding. Objectives: One of the objectives of the ‘police’ component of this plan is to combat the illegal economy. BELFI aims in particular to detect and control fraud associated with security risks, targeting both natural and legal persons. It focuses in particular on NPOs (NPAs) suspected of providing logistical, financial or organisational support for radicalisation or terrorism. BELFI is not an investigation unit but a detection and monitoring structure. When a case requires further investigation, it is referred to the competent investigation services. The monitoring results are systematically entered into police databases. Outcome: A total of 1,876 entities were audited, resulting in the closure of 277 structures, 20 arrests and 482 detentions of illegal immigrants. The most common offences were illegal residence, social security fraud, drugs, weapons and forged documents. 794. For dormant NPOs, Belgium has also strengthened its monitoring mechanisms for the sector since 2024 by launching a campaign to deregister and dissolve inactive NPOs, with a view to cleaning up the UBO register and preventing abuse, particularly from a CFT perspective: k) Automatic administrative deregistration, provided for by the law of December 2023, targets entities that do not comply with certain fundamental obligations, such as failure to register in the UBO register and/or to update their articles of association in the Belgian Official Journal for more than seven years. If the NPO fails to regularise its situation after receiving a formal notice, it will be automatically deregistered, with the possibility of reinstatement if it returns to compliance. On this basis, 35,897 NPOs had been deregistered as of 14 February 2025. l) Judicial dissolutions, carried out since 2019 by certain commercial courts, target dormant NPOs based on objective criteria (e.g. failure to file accounts, have directors or publish statutory documents). A total of 13,186 NPOs have been dissolved since the launch of this initiative, including 2,422 between 2023 and 2024. 795. While these measures have reduced the number of dormant entities that could be reactivated to transfer funds for TF purposes, deregistrations and dissolutions are triggered by formal administrative criteria (non-publication of accounts, failure to update UBOs, etc.) and do not result from an assessment based on specific TF risks. This is neither a risk-based approach, nor does it involve proportionate targeting based on NPOs’ actual TF risk exposure. It may leave active but at-risk NPOs off the radar if they are administratively compliant. Furthermore, without a support mechanism, active NPOs that are not well structured or simply do not comply with certain reporting requirements could be wrongly removed from the list. 796. For the last category of NPOs identified as being at risk of TF, the BNB’s supervision of the de-risking practices of financial institutions helps to identify and prevent abusive exclusion practices (see IO.3). However, it is difficult to fully assess the scope of this supervision without figures or concrete evidence. 797. However, overall, monitoring measures – such as enhanced transparency requirements, financial flow justification requirements or high compliance expectations imposed by financial institutions as part of AML/CFT – are applied fairly consistently across the entire non-profit sector, without any differentiation based on actual exposure to TF. This generic approach, which is not based on the actual risk of TF, has several consequences: · It imposes the same accounting, administrative and governance obligations on all NPOs, including those whose activities have no connection with sensitive areas or channels. · It creates a disproportionate burden, particularly for small humanitarian or social organisations seeking public funding, which struggle to meet requirements designed for much more exposed entities. Some NPOs have reported the practical difficulties that this regulatory burden places on their day-to-day operations. · It may dilute the resources available to authorities, preventing them from focusing their efforts on NPOs that are genuinely at risk of TF. · It undermines access to financial services for some legitimate NPOs. There have been reports of account freezing and delays in subsidy payments. They may also be denied the right to open an account if no individual risk assessment is carried out. This cautious but blanket approach may encourage financial institutions to engage in de-risking practices, preferring to exclude certain NPOs rather than manage a risk they perceive as complex. Between 2023 and 2024, 82 NPOs applied for basic banking services, accounting for 15.3% of the total 536 applications – a significant proportion that indicates their partial exclusion from the banking system. Although the BNB has not observed any widespread de-risking in the sector, tangible effects are evident on the ground. Some association federations have also entered into dialogue with Febelfin to prevent unjustified exclusion. This type of measure, which is more about mitigation than monitoring, can help prevent certain NPOs from being marginalised. 798. Furthermore, monitoring of the is fragmented across several authorities (SPF Justice, CTIF, OCAM, VSSE, federal police), with no central body dedicated to supervising TF risk in NPOs, which limits coordination and responsiveness. 10.3.3. Measures to mitigate the risk of terrorist financing 799. At the same time, Belgium has introduced several measures aimed at reducing the risks of TF in the non-profit sector. In general, NPOs must comply with strict financial transparency requirements, including the obligation to register beneficial owners in the UBO register, file annual accounts and, for some, undergo mandatory external audits, particularly those receiving public funding or operating internationally. Large NPOs must also comply with IATI standards (see R 8), ensuring full traceability of funds to their final destination, which is good practice in TF risk management. However, these measures are mainly geared towards protecting the integrity of the non-profit sector, rather than specifically designed to target NPOs at risk of TF, thus reducing their effectiveness in detecting possible suspicious activities. 800. Numerous measures have also been taken for the religious sector identified as at risk in national risk assessments, although not all of these are monitoring measures. The 3,866 religious communities recognised in Belgium, which are public institutions, may be linked to non-profit associations subject to the Companies and Associations Code and to accounting and UBO obligations. They are also subject to checks by the police and intelligence services (statistical data not provided). 801. Belgium also relies on several inter-institutional cooperation mechanisms to support the exchange of information between authorities involved in combating TF, including the judicial authorities, the CTIF, OCAM, the State Security Service, the SGRS and the federal police. These exchanges facilitate the cross-referencing of information from STRs, judicial investigations and intelligence. The information is also integrated into the Banque de données communes (BDC) (see IO.9), thereby centralising data collected on NPOs reported as potentially at risk of TF. Lastly, this cooperation involves occasional meetings between the authorities and representatives of the non-profit sector, aimed at raising awareness of the risks and strengthening supervision without hindering the legitimate activities of NPOs. However, these mechanisms are limited due to the absence of a central entity dedicated to monitoring at-risk NPOs and the lack of a standard framework for coordinating the monitoring and implementation of mitigation measures. 802. Some mitigation measures are implemented by the sector itself. For example, NPOs working in international development cooperation tend to have internal mechanisms for monitoring funds, although the extent of these mechanisms varies depending on the organisation. Some have developed structured internal control systems, including tools for evaluating their local partners, particularly with regard to the use of funds. Supervising the use of funds in the field often relies on the involvement of local teams. These processes ensure that funds can be traced to their destination to a certain extent. NPOs receiving public funding are also subject to structured monitoring by SPF Foreign Affairs, covering annual reports, strategic dialogues, field missions and mandatory audits carried out by an auditor, regardless of their size. However, this monitoring remains largely internal or dependent on the donor, with no harmonised mechanism at the national level. Furthermore, as it ultimately relies on local partners and organisations, full and effective traceability of the final use of funds cannot be completely guaranteed. This limitation, which is not unique to Belgium, reflects a structural difficulty in ensuring full supervision of the use of funds in operational settings. 10.3.4. Awareness-raising and capacity building for NPOs 803. Belgium has launched a number of awareness-raising initiatives aimed at NPOs, in collaboration with federations in the sector. In 2024, training courses and webinars were organised by SPF Economy, SPF Justice and SPF Finance, focusing on UBO obligations, financial sanctions, TF risks and applicable regulations. A one-to-one written campaign was also sent to NPOs falling within the FATF definition. The sector itself plays an active role in promoting good governance, including among small organisations. 804. Some NPOs have also implemented internal measures, such as mandatory training on TF risks or the appointment of internal control officers. These steps are often motivated by donor requirements and reflect a commitment to professionalisation. At the same time, an ‘Impact’ coalition has been created to give structure to the dialogue between the voluntary sector and the authorities, making it easier for the sector to accept certain obligations that are seen as restrictive (particularly UBO). 805. Despite these efforts, the dissemination of information has been patchy. Small organisations and NPOs with limited connections to umbrella networks often receive less exposure to awareness-raising initiatives. The content of these initiatives is also considered to be too general and not sufficiently aligned with the sector’s specific risk profiles, particularly for NPOs operating in conflict zones or receiving funds that are difficult to trace. The sector is pressing for more practical awareness-raising, using real-life examples and case studies. 806. Discussions take place between the authorities and the sector, in particular with SPF Finance, SPF Economy and SPF Justice, but these remain sporadic and informal, with the exception of the Dialogue Council. [225] The implementation of a more structured framework for consultation, such as a memorandum of understanding, would lead to more regular and systematic meetings, allow more formal feedback from the authorities and ensure better collective monitoring of compliance issues, particularly where humanitarian or international efforts are concerned. Footnotes [220] This sector includes non-profit associations (NPAs), international non-profit associations (INPAs), public utility foundations (PUFs) and private foundations (PFs). [221] Involving, in particular, SPF Justice, the CTIF, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM), intelligence services (VSSE and SGRS) and the federal police. [222] This also includes the 1,876 entities audited as part of the BELFI project. [223] Accreditation issued by the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD) of SPF Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. [224] That is, local religious communities or non-profit associations falling within the remit of the Companies and Associations Code, as part of the procedure for recognising local religious communities, pursuant to the circular of 21 October 2024. [225] The Dialogue Council is a body for official discussions between SPF Justice, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and representative bodies of recognised religions and non-denominational philosophical organisations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="828. Belgium primarily relies on European legislation to implement obligations relating to PF related TFS. [231] The mechanisms that apply to implementing TF related TFS established at the UN and EU levels also apply to PF (see IO.10). PF related TFS are implemented without delay (see Technical Compliance Annex R 7 and IO.10 on notification mechanisms, in particular via the consolidated national list). 829. To date, Belgium has not submitted any proposals for listing or delisting designations on sanctions lists related to UNSCRs 1718, or at the European level. This is consistent with the level of PF risk identified by Belgium. It has also not received any requests from other countries. An exemption was granted in 2019 by the SPF Finance-Treasury to allow funds transfers for three humanitarian projects in the DPRK. These transfers were monitored to ensure that the funds were not used for PF purposes. Footnotes [231] All UNSCRs that impose targeted financial sanctions associated with financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are transposed into European law and apply directly in Belgium." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="828. Belgium primarily relies on European legislation to implement obligations relating to PF related TFS. [231] The mechanisms that apply to implementing TF related TFS established at the UN and EU levels also apply to PF (see IO.10). PF related TFS are implemented without delay (see Technical Compliance Annex R 7 and IO.10 on notification mechanisms, in particular via the consolidated national list). 829. To date, Belgium has not submitted any proposals for listing or delisting designations on sanctions lists related to UNSCRs 1718, or at the European level. This is consistent with the level of PF risk identified by Belgium. It has also not received any requests from other countries. An exemption was granted in 2019 by the SPF Finance-Treasury to allow funds transfers for three humanitarian projects in the DPRK. These transfers were monitored to ensure that the funds were not used for PF purposes. Footnotes [231] All UNSCRs that impose targeted financial sanctions associated with financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are transposed into European law and apply directly in Belgium." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="194. The Belgian authorities take account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country to a certain extent, but their activities are not systematically guided by or focused on the major ML risks. The AML Action plan was adopted in March 2024 so it is difficult to assess its impact on changes in the authorities' activities. With regard to TF, the nature of the risks identified and the operational approach currently implemented by Belgium (see section 1.2 above) have led to greater consistency between the risks and the authorities’ activities. 1.4.1. Alignment of AML objectives and activities 195. The CTIF relies on the conclusions of the ML and TF NRAs to identify the reports and cases to be addressed as a priority, and to carry out its strategic activities. Transmissions to the judicial authorities correspond largely to the major risks identified by Belgium, with a possible over-representation of suspicions linked to risks to which the attention of the reporting entities is especially drawn (see IO.6). The CTIF is also proactive in making proposals to adapt the AML framework and procedures to the modus operandi of criminals. For example, in response to the spread of the offsetting phenomenon, particularly to Brazilian networks, the CTIF and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office started collaborating with SPF Finance in 2022 to develop a more effective response to the misuse of legal persons in support of polycriminal activities involving social fraud, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. The CTIF also launched a project with the Brussels Prosecutor’s Office that led to a simplified procedure for the urgent freezing of transactions outside the framework of a criminal investigation with a view to enabling the Prosecutor’s Office to seize and recover the maximum amount of funds (see IO.8). In 2023, these activities also prompted the CTIF to issue a report to the AML Ministerial Committee (see section 1.5 below) on improving the transparency of legal entities and preventing their abuse, notably by introducing measures to simplify and speed up the procedure for the judicial winding-up of shelf structures. The formalisation of these procedures is included in the AML action plan but has not yet been put into practice (see IO.5). 196. The CTIF’s strategic analyses, which include operational elements, use the NRAs’ conclusions to identify trends and typologies and to develop a more detailed understanding of them (see IO. 6). They reflect the main risks identified in the country, such as ML linked to illicit drug trafficking (2019, 2023), ML linked to Brazilian networks (2022) and the use of professional money launderers (2024). 197. The investigating and prosecuting authorities take action in reaction to criminal activities and do not adopt a proactive approach to aligning their activities with the main ML risks. The Police do not apply a detection strategy that specifically targets the predicate offences most frequently associated with ML, or ML itself (see IO.7). However, strong foundations have been laid to improve adaptation to the challenges posed by financial crime: the National Security Plan 2022/2025 [79] explicitly recognises ML as a key cross-cutting pattern in organised crime and calls for the greater mobilisation of police forces. In response, the police have consolidated their capacity to tackle financial and economic crime, based on the use of specialist investigators. However, they are constrained by limited resources and apply the principle of the “TRIM” criteria restrictively when setting priorities (see IO.7). Therefore, further progress needs to be made in implementing a national security policy that takes full account of the challenges posed by financial crime. 198. Regarding the customs authorities, the absence of a strategic approach to the supervision of cross-border cash movements and the reduced amounts detected or confiscated (see IO.8) reflect a lack of prioritisation of this field by the Belgian authorities, which is at odds with the significant ML/TF risk posed by international cash trafficking, identified in the 2023 NRA and in the previous NRA. 199. The activities of the financial sector supervisory authorities (BNB and FSMA) generally take account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country. The level of (residual) risk in the financial sectors is assigned on the basis of certain key risk factors in the ML and TF NRAs. High-risk financial activities are therefore the priority for AML/CFT supervision (see IO.3). The thematic activities undertaken by the BNB in recent years concern risk areas recognised as being important for ML/TF – de-risking, repatriation of funds and correspondent banking – even if they have not been identified as such in the NRAs. In this respect, it is also important for the sectoral assessments to inform the NRAs in order to develop coherent approaches to the sectors examined. Finally, certain risks identified as major in the NRAs – notably e-IBANs – have given rise to thematic measures by the supervisory authorities. For example, the main e-IBAN player on the Belgian market has been subject to reinforced supervision and various on-site and off-site inspection activities have been carried out by the BNB. The BNB has also developed a systematic approach to supervising FIs whose business model is based on e-IBAN activity. It has also contributed to the work undertaken at European and FATF levels on this subject. 200. Concerning virtual asset services, the FSMA [80] has carried out AML/CFT awareness-raising activities and inspections as part of the transitional regime for entities that were already operating as service providers prior to the extension of the AML Law’s provisions to certain virtual asset service providers, and also when examining applications for registration (see IO.3). No applications for registration have been approved and no VASPs are currently registered, recorded or licensed in Belgium. 201. SPF Economy takes proper account of the risks posed in the NRAs when identifying the risks posed by diamond dealers, estate agents and business centres. The same applies to the ITAA for chartered accountants. The other supervisory authorities and SRBs do not take effective account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country for their activities (see IO.4). In this respect, the ML and TF NRAs must be systematically disseminated and communicated to all supervisory authorities and reporting entities. 1.4.2. Alignment of CFT objectives and activities 202. The activities of the Belgian authorities involved in the operational handling of TF are aligned with the main TF risks identified in the country (see section 1.2). The individualised handling of the targets primarily focuses on terrorism aspects, and more incidentally on the TF component (see IO.9). In addition, Belgium’s lack of prioritisation of the detection of TF microfinancing risks linked to alternative financial networks, such as hawalas (see section 1.1), is likely to affect the country's ability to ensure the effective management of all TF risks. Footnotes [79] The National Security Plan | Federal Police [80] Supervisory authority for VASPs until 30 December 2024, see IO.3." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="194. The Belgian authorities take account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country to a certain extent, but their activities are not systematically guided by or focused on the major ML risks. The AML Action plan was adopted in March 2024 so it is difficult to assess its impact on changes in the authorities' activities. With regard to TF, the nature of the risks identified and the operational approach currently implemented by Belgium (see section 1.2 above) have led to greater consistency between the risks and the authorities’ activities. 1.4.1. Alignment of AML objectives and activities 195. The CTIF relies on the conclusions of the ML and TF NRAs to identify the reports and cases to be addressed as a priority, and to carry out its strategic activities. Transmissions to the judicial authorities correspond largely to the major risks identified by Belgium, with a possible over-representation of suspicions linked to risks to which the attention of the reporting entities is especially drawn (see IO.6). The CTIF is also proactive in making proposals to adapt the AML framework and procedures to the modus operandi of criminals. For example, in response to the spread of the offsetting phenomenon, particularly to Brazilian networks, the CTIF and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office started collaborating with SPF Finance in 2022 to develop a more effective response to the misuse of legal persons in support of polycriminal activities involving social fraud, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. The CTIF also launched a project with the Brussels Prosecutor’s Office that led to a simplified procedure for the urgent freezing of transactions outside the framework of a criminal investigation with a view to enabling the Prosecutor’s Office to seize and recover the maximum amount of funds (see IO.8). In 2023, these activities also prompted the CTIF to issue a report to the AML Ministerial Committee (see section 1.5 below) on improving the transparency of legal entities and preventing their abuse, notably by introducing measures to simplify and speed up the procedure for the judicial winding-up of shelf structures. The formalisation of these procedures is included in the AML action plan but has not yet been put into practice (see IO.5). 196. The CTIF’s strategic analyses, which include operational elements, use the NRAs’ conclusions to identify trends and typologies and to develop a more detailed understanding of them (see IO. 6). They reflect the main risks identified in the country, such as ML linked to illicit drug trafficking (2019, 2023), ML linked to Brazilian networks (2022) and the use of professional money launderers (2024). 197. The investigating and prosecuting authorities take action in reaction to criminal activities and do not adopt a proactive approach to aligning their activities with the main ML risks. The Police do not apply a detection strategy that specifically targets the predicate offences most frequently associated with ML, or ML itself (see IO.7). However, strong foundations have been laid to improve adaptation to the challenges posed by financial crime: the National Security Plan 2022/2025 [79] explicitly recognises ML as a key cross-cutting pattern in organised crime and calls for the greater mobilisation of police forces. In response, the police have consolidated their capacity to tackle financial and economic crime, based on the use of specialist investigators. However, they are constrained by limited resources and apply the principle of the “TRIM” criteria restrictively when setting priorities (see IO.7). Therefore, further progress needs to be made in implementing a national security policy that takes full account of the challenges posed by financial crime. 198. Regarding the customs authorities, the absence of a strategic approach to the supervision of cross-border cash movements and the reduced amounts detected or confiscated (see IO.8) reflect a lack of prioritisation of this field by the Belgian authorities, which is at odds with the significant ML/TF risk posed by international cash trafficking, identified in the 2023 NRA and in the previous NRA. 199. The activities of the financial sector supervisory authorities (BNB and FSMA) generally take account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country. The level of (residual) risk in the financial sectors is assigned on the basis of certain key risk factors in the ML and TF NRAs. High-risk financial activities are therefore the priority for AML/CFT supervision (see IO.3). The thematic activities undertaken by the BNB in recent years concern risk areas recognised as being important for ML/TF – de-risking, repatriation of funds and correspondent banking – even if they have not been identified as such in the NRAs. In this respect, it is also important for the sectoral assessments to inform the NRAs in order to develop coherent approaches to the sectors examined. Finally, certain risks identified as major in the NRAs – notably e-IBANs – have given rise to thematic measures by the supervisory authorities. For example, the main e-IBAN player on the Belgian market has been subject to reinforced supervision and various on-site and off-site inspection activities have been carried out by the BNB. The BNB has also developed a systematic approach to supervising FIs whose business model is based on e-IBAN activity. It has also contributed to the work undertaken at European and FATF levels on this subject. 200. Concerning virtual asset services, the FSMA [80] has carried out AML/CFT awareness-raising activities and inspections as part of the transitional regime for entities that were already operating as service providers prior to the extension of the AML Law’s provisions to certain virtual asset service providers, and also when examining applications for registration (see IO.3). No applications for registration have been approved and no VASPs are currently registered, recorded or licensed in Belgium. 201. SPF Economy takes proper account of the risks posed in the NRAs when identifying the risks posed by diamond dealers, estate agents and business centres. The same applies to the ITAA for chartered accountants. The other supervisory authorities and SRBs do not take effective account of the ML/TF risks identified in the country for their activities (see IO.4). In this respect, the ML and TF NRAs must be systematically disseminated and communicated to all supervisory authorities and reporting entities. 1.4.2. Alignment of CFT objectives and activities 202. The activities of the Belgian authorities involved in the operational handling of TF are aligned with the main TF risks identified in the country (see section 1.2). The individualised handling of the targets primarily focuses on terrorism aspects, and more incidentally on the TF component (see IO.9). In addition, Belgium’s lack of prioritisation of the detection of TF microfinancing risks linked to alternative financial networks, such as hawalas (see section 1.1), is likely to affect the country's ability to ensure the effective management of all TF risks. Footnotes [79] The National Security Plan | Federal Police [80] Supervisory authority for VASPs until 30 December 2024, see IO.3." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. 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No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 335. The analysis of the results of FI supervision, on one hand, and interviews conducted during the on-site inspection, on the other hand, showed that FIs generally have adequate customer due diligence measures in place at the time of entering into the business relationship and on an ongoing basis during the relationship. In the banking sector, FIs apply due diligence measures when entering into business relationships and monitor transactions appropriately. CIs sometimes adopt a cautious approach, limiting their exposure to risk by refusing certain customers. There is strong reluctance towards transactions involving virtual assets. De-risking practices exist, particularly for categories of customers considered high-risk, such as diamond dealers. In response to this trend, the public authorities reacted by imposing an obligation to provide basic banking services, initially in 2003 for individuals and then extended to legal entities in 2021, in order to limit exclusion from the banking system. 336. With regard to digital onboarding , the FIs are generally aware of the specific challenges and requirements on the subject. PIs and EMIs routinely develop remote business relationships using identity verification tools. However, these processes often involve the use of numerous external service providers offering advanced technological solutions (e.g. facial recognition), thereby increasing the risk of faults. PIs and EMIs also frequently use agents who are in direct contact with customers. For these agents, PIs and EMIs seek to limit risks by imposing strict procedures, making all transactions conditional on compliance with these procedures. However, these agents remain exposed to document fraud, particularly due to the optional nature of tools for verifying the authenticity of identity documents. In addition, their large number and their ability to work for several payment institutions increases the vulnerability of the model, making it more difficult to monitor the quality of the checks carried out. 337. In the insurance sector, when an insurance company uses regulated insurance intermediaries, due diligence is often delegated to them, as they are the first point of contact with the customer. This outsourcing can create vulnerability in this sector, which is exacerbated by shortcomings in the application of due diligence measures by intermediaries, despite the ‘sectoral code on the distribution of financial products’ drawn up in consultation with Assuralia, [110] and by the regular use of non-reporting agents. To address these shortcomings, some operators have introduced dual supervision involving both the intermediary and the insurer. However, this approach carries the risk of diluting responsibilities, as each party may rely on the other to assume the burden of supervision. 338. Due diligence measures are applied more inconsistently among FIs supervised by the FSMA. While some currency exchange offices have strengthened their compliance thanks to FSMA supervision, others remain deficient, particularly with regard to the distinction between occasional customers and business relationships, customer scoring and data retention. Among insurance intermediaries, shortcomings persist in terms of customer knowledge and document retention. Asset management companies (alternative OPCAs/OPCVMOPCVM) find it difficult to define the notion of customer, and the application of procedures remains variable. It has not been possible to assess the implementation of their ongoing CDD obligations by “small” alternative OPCAs, which present higher risks. 339. Some business models, such as those of insurance intermediaries or lenders, rely on non-reporting agents, which complicates the implementation of due diligence obligations. Intermediaries, acting on behalf of insurers, are not always fully aware of their responsibilities. In general, FIs do not enter into business relationships without being able to apply due diligence measures. Good practice is observed among some payment institutions, currency exchange offices and lenders, which use tools to detect false documents, and this could be extended to other sectors. 340. Bpost implements due diligence measures tailored to its customer base, which consists solely of individuals acting for their personal needs, and to its operations, which are limited to Belgium. Bpost refuses to enter into a business relationship if these measures cannot be implemented. Transactions are constantly monitored using the Fiserv tool. In addition, if the validity date of the document provided for identity verification has expired, the customer cannot carry out any transactions until a valid document has been provided. A limit of EUR 1,000 is applied to each cash transaction (and EUR 2,500 by bank card), with a monthly limit of EUR 2,000. These limits are an improvement on the 2015 MER. However, shortcomings have been identified by Bpost’s independent audit function with regard to the implementation of preventive measures and financial sanctions such as embargoes. Topping up the Bpaid card with cash has been subject to stricter conditions since 2022. However, the storage limit remains high (EUR 8,000) and a customer can have up to three cards. 341. The identification of BOs is generally based on the regulatory threshold of 25% of the capital of a legal entity (direct or indirect). Among the FIs under FSMA supervision in particular, and mainly among some of the smaller insurance intermediaries, the definition of BO is often poorly understood, being limited to the mere holding of shares without taking control into account. Most of these FIs include this criterion as a starting point in their procedures, without always taking into account other forms of effective control, such as the ability to appoint or dismiss directors. Consistency checks (verification of corporate purpose, signing authority, etc.) are not systematically included. Very few entities carry out an in-depth analysis of the holding chain in order to identify the natural person exercising effective control. In addition, the level of documentation required varies significantly from one entity to another. 342. With the exception of large FIs that have their own sources of information, most FIs use the BO register as their main source of information for verifying the identity of beneficial owners. However, frequent discrepancies are found between internal data and the data recorded in this register, and are generally reported to SPF Finance/Treasury (see IO.5). In some cases, especially for FIs under FSMA supervision, consultation of the register is the only means of identification, which limits the reliability of the analysis and hinders the detection and reporting of any discrepancies. 343. The identification of BOs is particularly difficult in complex structures, especially those involving foreign entities. The documents collected are systematically retained. If a customer or their BO cannot be identified, the institution will not enter into a business relationship. However, discrepancies with the BO register do not have a direct impact on this relationship, which would appear to be proportionate. 344. With regard to ongoing CDD , various CIs use AI to monitor and analyse transactions, particularly cash transactions or potential misuse involving legal persons. The BNB supports this development by organising workshops on AI. Credit institutions developing private banking activities adequately monitor fund repatriation transactions, particularly with regard to the origin of these funds. Shortcomings in monitoring persist among insurance intermediaries and lenders. 345. The BNB identified cases of non-compliance with the requirements on information accompanying fund transfers, including serious breaches at two credit institutions in Belgium in the context of Brexit. For PIs and EMIs, transaction monitoring varies according to the business model adopted, in particular depending on the involvement of agents or marketing under white labelling. A common feature emerges, namely the outsourcing of transaction monitoring and the extensive use of subsidiaries or branches located outside Belgium to prepare STRs for the CTIF, which, in the absence of real involvement by the FI located in Belgium, may increase the risk of STRs being sent that are irrelevant, automated or of poorer quality because they are prepared by staff who only have a theoretical knowledge of the Belgian context, thus complicating internal control. When agents are involved, their monitoring is based on strict procedures. However, in the context of fund transfers, these measures remain insufficient to ensure effective traceability of the origin of funds for a large proportion of transactions, thus exposing the system to significant vulnerabilities. 346. In the interests of profitability and speed, some payment institutions fragment fund transfers to avoid reporting requirements. By circumventing AML/CFT reporting requirements for information accompanying these transactions, these payment institutions significantly weaken the effectiveness of their transaction monitoring systems. This model exposes these PIs to an increased risk of non-compliance, thereby compromising the objectives of financial regulation and the prevention of illegal activities. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 347. The FIs under BNB supervision generally have a good understanding of the concepts of PEP and high-risk third countries, with appropriate measures in place, including the setting of acceptance limits for transfers from certain countries by certain banks. However, the BNB has identified shortcomings in the hierarchical approval process when establishing or maintaining business relationships with customers residing in high-risk third countries. By contrast, enhanced transaction monitoring is generally well implemented. 348. For FIs under FSMA supervision, the definition of PEPs often remains vague, sometimes excluding close relations or, conversely, extending the definition excessively, leading to the unjustified application of enhanced due diligence measures. The detection of PEPs still relies mainly on manual searches or self-certification, due to the lack of automated screening tools. Although the measures applied are generally appropriate, they sometimes need to be adjusted to the size of small FIs. The number of PEPs among customers is perceived as low, but insufficient understanding of the concept of PEPs may lead to an underestimation of their number, resulting in inadequate due diligence and, in some cases, excessive mistrust, which encourages de-risking. Similarly, the low number of customers residing in high-risk third countries may partly reflect ongoing confusion between these countries and those under embargo or blacklisted. Finally, only 61% of insurance intermediaries that have carried out an ORA apply enhanced measures to high risks, revealing a lack of consistency in risk management. 349. Bpost has a customer base of PEPs, which are detected using an automated tool and systematically classified as high-risk. The AML compliance team decides whether or not to accept these customers. The list of high-risk countries is updated every month. A customer residing in such a country is identified as presenting a higher risk. Bpost’s transactions do not appear to be particularly exposed to this risk, as operations are limited to Belgium. Nevertheless, Bpaid cardholders can withdraw the cash loaded on their cards from an ATM located abroad, which constitutes a risk that does not appear to be sufficiently mitigated. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 350. The FIs under BNB supervision have a good understanding of their reporting obligations (96% of STRs originate from FIs, almost equally divided between credit institutions and payment institutions) – see box below. However, in the absence of legal clarification or precise guidance on reporting deadlines, these vary considerably, ranging from 1 to 90 days (see c 20.1). Table 3.1. FI reporting activity (2019-2024) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Credit institutions 11 237 17 678 21 624 28 379 40 129 39 894 Payment institutions 5 814 62 63 16 016 16 425 25 141 41 938 Electronic money institutions 90 654 774 520 5 442 2 733 Life insurance 309 661 749 1 172 2 374 1 244 Mortgage lenders 83 166 671 1 188 699 652 Consumer credit lenders 132 151 117 183 244 228 Bpost 1 470 897 1 082 583 643 631 Currency exchange offices 117 106 23 82 44 37 Investment companies 2 70 10 19 13 7 Investment management and investment advisory companies - 3 7 12 10 6 VASPs - - - 10 7 0 Insurance intermediaries 4 5 6 4 3 5 Source: CTIF 351. Some CIs and EMIs are major contributors of STRs to the CTIF because of their location in Belgium, but a large proportion of these STRs are redirected to other European FIUs with which suspicious transactions have closer links. The CTIF’s frequent collaboration with its European partners improves the quality and speed of STRs. Box 3.1. Factors explaining the increase in STRs from CIs, PIs and EMIs - For CIs, this is explained, among other things, by a new approach to and organisation of the CI compliance function and, more generally, by retrospective reviews (“lookbacks”) initiated by CIs at the request of the BNB on various topics such as money mules and correspondent banking. The BNB circular of 8 June 2021 on the repatriation of funds from abroad also had an impact on CIs and life insurance companies. This measure led to increased due diligence and, as a result, to an increase in reports of financial flows considered atypical or suspicious. - The PI sector has undergone significant changes following Brexit, with several payment service providers benefiting from the European passport moving to Belgium. This expansion has led to an increase in the volume of transactions processed in Belgium and, in turn, to an increase in STRs. - Finally, in the EMI sector, a remediation plan implemented at the instigation of the BNB has strengthened the reporting obligations for at least one of the operators concerned, thereby contributing to the increase in the volume of STRs originating from this sector. 352. For FIs under FSMA supervision, reporting times remain excessive. The periodic questionnaire does not contain any questions on this subject, but checks carried out by the FSMA reveal that some STRs are submitted two to three months after the detection of a suspicious transaction (see c 20.1). Feedback from the CTIF indicates that the overall quality of reports is improving, although customer information is sometimes incomplete. The CTIF also notes very low reporting activity among insurance intermediaries. Among the FIs most at risk, it should be noted that in 2022, one bureau de change was responsible for the majority of STRs received (60 out of 82), which contributed to pushing up the overall figures for that year. However, some other bureaux – particularly those that had been inspected by the FSMA – had significantly reduced their reporting activity. In its feedback to the FSMA in 2023, the CTIF also noted the insufficient quality of the reports issued by this sector. In response to these findings, the FSMA launched a thematic supervisory initiative in 2023 focusing on the reporting activity of currency exchange offices (see section3.5). The GoAML tool already appears to be improving the quality of reports, but some operators have yet to finalise their registration. In 2024, entities under FSMA supervision accounted for only 0.8% of the STRs sent to the public prosecutor by the CTIF. Reporting activity is mainly carried out by lenders and bureaux de change, while other sectors report very little. 353. The number of STRs sent by Bpost to the CTIF has fallen (1,082 STRs in 2021, 583 STRs in 2022, 643 STRs in 2023), reflecting the decline in its activity due to the termination of its collaboration with a major European public entity at the beginning of 2020 and the new rules imposed on payments to third-party accounts. The transmission time is around 30 days, which remains quite long. The CTIF forwards 6 to 8% of these STRs to the public prosecutor. The quality of the STRs would appear to be satisfactory and they are sufficiently documented. Certain information, such as the originator and their account number in the case of fund transfers and the postcode of the post office where the transaction was carried out, is not yet systematically provided. The difficulty or even impossibility of determining the origin of the funds, due to the business model, often gives rise to suspicion. 354. The ban on disclosure is well understood and applied. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 355. CIs generally have structured and effective internal controls. However, there are some persistent shortcomings: for FIs belonging to a European group, particularly those established in Belgium after Brexit, the conduct of due diligence checks by intra-group entities is sometimes poorly supervised, which can weaken the control system. Small and medium-sized FIs often lack clarity in the organisation of the three lines of defence, and have limited resources. This can lead to overlapping responsibilities: for example, the second line takes on tasks that fall within the remit of the first line, which results in the loss of one level of supervision. 356. Among the entities under FSMA supervision, a lack of internal control is a recurring weakness, noted in particular during on-site inspections. 357. Bpost has first and second level internal controls. 358. The audit function is generally adequate in CIs, although it is sometimes affected by the same shortcomings as the internal control systems mentioned above (particularly in international groups or small FIs). However, the internal audit of credit institutions is considered effective. Belgian regulations stipulate that the independent audit function depends on the nature and size of the FI (R. 18 in the TC Annex), which allows for some flexibility in how this function is organised but requires that a minimum mechanism be in place, which does not seem to be the case in all small or less well-resourced FIs under FSMA supervision. Bpost has an independent audit function which appears adequate. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 359. The evaluation team did not identify any legal or regulatory obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. 3.4.6. Footnotes [110] The Belgian professional association of insurance companies" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 335. The analysis of the results of FI supervision, on one hand, and interviews conducted during the on-site inspection, on the other hand, showed that FIs generally have adequate customer due diligence measures in place at the time of entering into the business relationship and on an ongoing basis during the relationship. In the banking sector, FIs apply due diligence measures when entering into business relationships and monitor transactions appropriately. CIs sometimes adopt a cautious approach, limiting their exposure to risk by refusing certain customers. There is strong reluctance towards transactions involving virtual assets. De-risking practices exist, particularly for categories of customers considered high-risk, such as diamond dealers. In response to this trend, the public authorities reacted by imposing an obligation to provide basic banking services, initially in 2003 for individuals and then extended to legal entities in 2021, in order to limit exclusion from the banking system. 336. With regard to digital onboarding , the FIs are generally aware of the specific challenges and requirements on the subject. PIs and EMIs routinely develop remote business relationships using identity verification tools. However, these processes often involve the use of numerous external service providers offering advanced technological solutions (e.g. facial recognition), thereby increasing the risk of faults. PIs and EMIs also frequently use agents who are in direct contact with customers. For these agents, PIs and EMIs seek to limit risks by imposing strict procedures, making all transactions conditional on compliance with these procedures. However, these agents remain exposed to document fraud, particularly due to the optional nature of tools for verifying the authenticity of identity documents. In addition, their large number and their ability to work for several payment institutions increases the vulnerability of the model, making it more difficult to monitor the quality of the checks carried out. 337. In the insurance sector, when an insurance company uses regulated insurance intermediaries, due diligence is often delegated to them, as they are the first point of contact with the customer. This outsourcing can create vulnerability in this sector, which is exacerbated by shortcomings in the application of due diligence measures by intermediaries, despite the ‘sectoral code on the distribution of financial products’ drawn up in consultation with Assuralia, [110] and by the regular use of non-reporting agents. To address these shortcomings, some operators have introduced dual supervision involving both the intermediary and the insurer. However, this approach carries the risk of diluting responsibilities, as each party may rely on the other to assume the burden of supervision. 338. Due diligence measures are applied more inconsistently among FIs supervised by the FSMA. While some currency exchange offices have strengthened their compliance thanks to FSMA supervision, others remain deficient, particularly with regard to the distinction between occasional customers and business relationships, customer scoring and data retention. Among insurance intermediaries, shortcomings persist in terms of customer knowledge and document retention. Asset management companies (alternative OPCAs/OPCVMOPCVM) find it difficult to define the notion of customer, and the application of procedures remains variable. It has not been possible to assess the implementation of their ongoing CDD obligations by “small” alternative OPCAs, which present higher risks. 339. Some business models, such as those of insurance intermediaries or lenders, rely on non-reporting agents, which complicates the implementation of due diligence obligations. Intermediaries, acting on behalf of insurers, are not always fully aware of their responsibilities. In general, FIs do not enter into business relationships without being able to apply due diligence measures. Good practice is observed among some payment institutions, currency exchange offices and lenders, which use tools to detect false documents, and this could be extended to other sectors. 340. Bpost implements due diligence measures tailored to its customer base, which consists solely of individuals acting for their personal needs, and to its operations, which are limited to Belgium. Bpost refuses to enter into a business relationship if these measures cannot be implemented. Transactions are constantly monitored using the Fiserv tool. In addition, if the validity date of the document provided for identity verification has expired, the customer cannot carry out any transactions until a valid document has been provided. A limit of EUR 1,000 is applied to each cash transaction (and EUR 2,500 by bank card), with a monthly limit of EUR 2,000. These limits are an improvement on the 2015 MER. However, shortcomings have been identified by Bpost’s independent audit function with regard to the implementation of preventive measures and financial sanctions such as embargoes. Topping up the Bpaid card with cash has been subject to stricter conditions since 2022. However, the storage limit remains high (EUR 8,000) and a customer can have up to three cards. 341. The identification of BOs is generally based on the regulatory threshold of 25% of the capital of a legal entity (direct or indirect). Among the FIs under FSMA supervision in particular, and mainly among some of the smaller insurance intermediaries, the definition of BO is often poorly understood, being limited to the mere holding of shares without taking control into account. Most of these FIs include this criterion as a starting point in their procedures, without always taking into account other forms of effective control, such as the ability to appoint or dismiss directors. Consistency checks (verification of corporate purpose, signing authority, etc.) are not systematically included. Very few entities carry out an in-depth analysis of the holding chain in order to identify the natural person exercising effective control. In addition, the level of documentation required varies significantly from one entity to another. 342. With the exception of large FIs that have their own sources of information, most FIs use the BO register as their main source of information for verifying the identity of beneficial owners. However, frequent discrepancies are found between internal data and the data recorded in this register, and are generally reported to SPF Finance/Treasury (see IO.5). In some cases, especially for FIs under FSMA supervision, consultation of the register is the only means of identification, which limits the reliability of the analysis and hinders the detection and reporting of any discrepancies. 343. The identification of BOs is particularly difficult in complex structures, especially those involving foreign entities. The documents collected are systematically retained. If a customer or their BO cannot be identified, the institution will not enter into a business relationship. However, discrepancies with the BO register do not have a direct impact on this relationship, which would appear to be proportionate. 344. With regard to ongoing CDD , various CIs use AI to monitor and analyse transactions, particularly cash transactions or potential misuse involving legal persons. The BNB supports this development by organising workshops on AI. Credit institutions developing private banking activities adequately monitor fund repatriation transactions, particularly with regard to the origin of these funds. Shortcomings in monitoring persist among insurance intermediaries and lenders. 345. The BNB identified cases of non-compliance with the requirements on information accompanying fund transfers, including serious breaches at two credit institutions in Belgium in the context of Brexit. For PIs and EMIs, transaction monitoring varies according to the business model adopted, in particular depending on the involvement of agents or marketing under white labelling. A common feature emerges, namely the outsourcing of transaction monitoring and the extensive use of subsidiaries or branches located outside Belgium to prepare STRs for the CTIF, which, in the absence of real involvement by the FI located in Belgium, may increase the risk of STRs being sent that are irrelevant, automated or of poorer quality because they are prepared by staff who only have a theoretical knowledge of the Belgian context, thus complicating internal control. When agents are involved, their monitoring is based on strict procedures. However, in the context of fund transfers, these measures remain insufficient to ensure effective traceability of the origin of funds for a large proportion of transactions, thus exposing the system to significant vulnerabilities. 346. In the interests of profitability and speed, some payment institutions fragment fund transfers to avoid reporting requirements. By circumventing AML/CFT reporting requirements for information accompanying these transactions, these payment institutions significantly weaken the effectiveness of their transaction monitoring systems. This model exposes these PIs to an increased risk of non-compliance, thereby compromising the objectives of financial regulation and the prevention of illegal activities. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 347. The FIs under BNB supervision generally have a good understanding of the concepts of PEP and high-risk third countries, with appropriate measures in place, including the setting of acceptance limits for transfers from certain countries by certain banks. However, the BNB has identified shortcomings in the hierarchical approval process when establishing or maintaining business relationships with customers residing in high-risk third countries. By contrast, enhanced transaction monitoring is generally well implemented. 348. For FIs under FSMA supervision, the definition of PEPs often remains vague, sometimes excluding close relations or, conversely, extending the definition excessively, leading to the unjustified application of enhanced due diligence measures. The detection of PEPs still relies mainly on manual searches or self-certification, due to the lack of automated screening tools. Although the measures applied are generally appropriate, they sometimes need to be adjusted to the size of small FIs. The number of PEPs among customers is perceived as low, but insufficient understanding of the concept of PEPs may lead to an underestimation of their number, resulting in inadequate due diligence and, in some cases, excessive mistrust, which encourages de-risking. Similarly, the low number of customers residing in high-risk third countries may partly reflect ongoing confusion between these countries and those under embargo or blacklisted. Finally, only 61% of insurance intermediaries that have carried out an ORA apply enhanced measures to high risks, revealing a lack of consistency in risk management. 349. Bpost has a customer base of PEPs, which are detected using an automated tool and systematically classified as high-risk. The AML compliance team decides whether or not to accept these customers. The list of high-risk countries is updated every month. A customer residing in such a country is identified as presenting a higher risk. Bpost’s transactions do not appear to be particularly exposed to this risk, as operations are limited to Belgium. Nevertheless, Bpaid cardholders can withdraw the cash loaded on their cards from an ATM located abroad, which constitutes a risk that does not appear to be sufficiently mitigated. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 350. The FIs under BNB supervision have a good understanding of their reporting obligations (96% of STRs originate from FIs, almost equally divided between credit institutions and payment institutions) – see box below. However, in the absence of legal clarification or precise guidance on reporting deadlines, these vary considerably, ranging from 1 to 90 days (see c 20.1). Table 3.1. FI reporting activity (2019-2024) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Credit institutions 11 237 17 678 21 624 28 379 40 129 39 894 Payment institutions 5 814 62 63 16 016 16 425 25 141 41 938 Electronic money institutions 90 654 774 520 5 442 2 733 Life insurance 309 661 749 1 172 2 374 1 244 Mortgage lenders 83 166 671 1 188 699 652 Consumer credit lenders 132 151 117 183 244 228 Bpost 1 470 897 1 082 583 643 631 Currency exchange offices 117 106 23 82 44 37 Investment companies 2 70 10 19 13 7 Investment management and investment advisory companies - 3 7 12 10 6 VASPs - - - 10 7 0 Insurance intermediaries 4 5 6 4 3 5 Source: CTIF 351. Some CIs and EMIs are major contributors of STRs to the CTIF because of their location in Belgium, but a large proportion of these STRs are redirected to other European FIUs with which suspicious transactions have closer links. The CTIF’s frequent collaboration with its European partners improves the quality and speed of STRs. Box 3.1. Factors explaining the increase in STRs from CIs, PIs and EMIs - For CIs, this is explained, among other things, by a new approach to and organisation of the CI compliance function and, more generally, by retrospective reviews (“lookbacks”) initiated by CIs at the request of the BNB on various topics such as money mules and correspondent banking. The BNB circular of 8 June 2021 on the repatriation of funds from abroad also had an impact on CIs and life insurance companies. This measure led to increased due diligence and, as a result, to an increase in reports of financial flows considered atypical or suspicious. - The PI sector has undergone significant changes following Brexit, with several payment service providers benefiting from the European passport moving to Belgium. This expansion has led to an increase in the volume of transactions processed in Belgium and, in turn, to an increase in STRs. - Finally, in the EMI sector, a remediation plan implemented at the instigation of the BNB has strengthened the reporting obligations for at least one of the operators concerned, thereby contributing to the increase in the volume of STRs originating from this sector. 352. For FIs under FSMA supervision, reporting times remain excessive. The periodic questionnaire does not contain any questions on this subject, but checks carried out by the FSMA reveal that some STRs are submitted two to three months after the detection of a suspicious transaction (see c 20.1). Feedback from the CTIF indicates that the overall quality of reports is improving, although customer information is sometimes incomplete. The CTIF also notes very low reporting activity among insurance intermediaries. Among the FIs most at risk, it should be noted that in 2022, one bureau de change was responsible for the majority of STRs received (60 out of 82), which contributed to pushing up the overall figures for that year. However, some other bureaux – particularly those that had been inspected by the FSMA – had significantly reduced their reporting activity. In its feedback to the FSMA in 2023, the CTIF also noted the insufficient quality of the reports issued by this sector. In response to these findings, the FSMA launched a thematic supervisory initiative in 2023 focusing on the reporting activity of currency exchange offices (see section3.5). The GoAML tool already appears to be improving the quality of reports, but some operators have yet to finalise their registration. In 2024, entities under FSMA supervision accounted for only 0.8% of the STRs sent to the public prosecutor by the CTIF. Reporting activity is mainly carried out by lenders and bureaux de change, while other sectors report very little. 353. The number of STRs sent by Bpost to the CTIF has fallen (1,082 STRs in 2021, 583 STRs in 2022, 643 STRs in 2023), reflecting the decline in its activity due to the termination of its collaboration with a major European public entity at the beginning of 2020 and the new rules imposed on payments to third-party accounts. The transmission time is around 30 days, which remains quite long. The CTIF forwards 6 to 8% of these STRs to the public prosecutor. The quality of the STRs would appear to be satisfactory and they are sufficiently documented. Certain information, such as the originator and their account number in the case of fund transfers and the postcode of the post office where the transaction was carried out, is not yet systematically provided. The difficulty or even impossibility of determining the origin of the funds, due to the business model, often gives rise to suspicion. 354. The ban on disclosure is well understood and applied. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 355. CIs generally have structured and effective internal controls. However, there are some persistent shortcomings: for FIs belonging to a European group, particularly those established in Belgium after Brexit, the conduct of due diligence checks by intra-group entities is sometimes poorly supervised, which can weaken the control system. Small and medium-sized FIs often lack clarity in the organisation of the three lines of defence, and have limited resources. This can lead to overlapping responsibilities: for example, the second line takes on tasks that fall within the remit of the first line, which results in the loss of one level of supervision. 356. Among the entities under FSMA supervision, a lack of internal control is a recurring weakness, noted in particular during on-site inspections. 357. Bpost has first and second level internal controls. 358. The audit function is generally adequate in CIs, although it is sometimes affected by the same shortcomings as the internal control systems mentioned above (particularly in international groups or small FIs). However, the internal audit of credit institutions is considered effective. Belgian regulations stipulate that the independent audit function depends on the nature and size of the FI (R. 18 in the TC Annex), which allows for some flexibility in how this function is organised but requires that a minimum mechanism be in place, which does not seem to be the case in all small or less well-resourced FIs under FSMA supervision. Bpost has an independent audit function which appears adequate. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 359. The evaluation team did not identify any legal or regulatory obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. 3.4.6. Footnotes [110] The Belgian professional association of insurance companies" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 439. DNFBPs have a basic understanding of their due diligence obligations. However, there are still significant gaps in their implementation, particularly in high-risk sectors such as for diamond dealers, real estate agents, business centres and certain legal and accounting professionals. The application of due diligence measures varies considerably across sectors, in terms of the scope of supervision, the degree of monitoring and the nature of the documents collected. 440. In most cases, DNFBPs simply check the customer’s identity card using a questionnaire, the content of which varies greatly from one sector to another. However, many professionals simply fill in the questionnaire without carrying out in-depth checks on the information provided, which weakens the effectiveness of the AML/CFT due diligence and risk detection system. 441. The majority of diamond dealers have a limited understanding of their AML/CFT obligations. Although they are aware of certain requirements, particularly those relating to customer information, their implementation remains inadequate and does not always result in effective compliance. When checks are carried out, they are often limited and not always documented, which compromises the traceability and effectiveness of the due diligence system. 442. Diamond dealers focus their due diligence efforts primarily on establishing relationships, verifying the purpose and nature of business relationships, the identity of business partners, and in some cases, the source of funds. These verifications are generally more rigorous in large international companies, while smaller structures often apply less stringent due diligence. In practice, some choose not to work with unknown or high-risk partners, particularly in the absence of referrals or connections. However, this due diligence diminishes considerably once the relationship has been established: long-standing customers and partners are rarely subject to reassessment, as they are perceived as low-risk. This static approach, based on long-standing trust rather than continuous reassessment, is a significant weakness in the implementation of due diligence obligations, limiting the ability to detect atypical behaviour or changes in profile over time. 443. SPF Economy has identified major shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT obligations by diamond dealers in the supervised companies selected on the basis of risk. These shortcomings include the systematic failure to identify and verify customers, agents and BOs, as well as a lack of documentation on the purpose and nature of business relationships. In addition, SPF Economy has identified cases of evasion of sanctions, illustrating the sector’s vulnerability to illicit financial flows and criminal networks. To address these shortcomings, an AML Policy was drawn up in 2020 and updated in 2024, incorporating detailed guidance and an operational checklist. However, its effective adoption and impact on practices remain to be seen, requiring rigorous monitoring of its implementation. 444. Business centres have limited knowledge of their AML/CFT obligations, and show major shortcomings in their implementation. SPF Economy confirmed this during its inspections, which revealed a particularly high non-compliance rate – nearly 71% – in the application of due diligence measures (see next section). The most critical shortcomings concern the lack of verification of clients (41%), agents and BOs (45%), as well as insufficient documentation of business relationships and transactions (45%). Furthermore, the absence or incompleteness of transaction analyses and file monitoring prevents effective monitoring of high-risk financial flows. Service providers that use tools such as ORIS – approximately 6.8% – generally implement their due diligence obligations appropriately. This disparity shows that the use of technological means improves compliance, but that their use remains too marginal to have a significant impact on the sector as a whole. Table 4.3. Shortcomings noted in the 2022 general survey of business centres Topic of inspection No. of entities inspected Shortcomings noted Number % Registration 147 89 60.5% AML/ CFT obligations 147 104 70.6% Source: SPF Economy 445. Real estate agents are making progress in their understanding of AML/CFT obligations, but this progress remains highly variable and depends on the tools used. The ORIS tool, when used, significantly improves compliance: a general survey by SPF Economy in 2021 revealed that 94% of agents using ORIS complied with basic obligations. However, this tool remains underused in the sector, limiting its overall impact on improving practices. 446. Structural shortcomings remain a concern, particularly with regard to verification of customers and analysis of transactions. Real estate agents have a superficial understanding of AML/CFT obligations, often limited to formal customer identification. In practice, they generally rely on standardised lists of questions, without really investigating or verifying the identity of customers and BOs. Transaction analysis, although carried out, is often insufficient, as understanding of ML schemes specific to the real estate sector remains too superficial. This increases the sector’s vulnerability to illicit financial flows, particularly through the undervaluation or overvaluation of property and purchases by nominees. 447. Legal and accounting professionals implement vigilance measures which, although generally compliant, vary in terms of effectiveness and systematic application. On the whole, they identify customers and BOs, often by consulting the BO register, although they recognise its shortcomings (see IO 5). Some operators, in particular notaries, chartered accountants and statutory auditors, supplement this verification by cross-checking information with third-party tools and targeted questions on the purpose of transactions and the origin of funds. Chartered accountants and auditors, who have dedicated IT solutions at their disposal, regularly monitor and update client information, although the use of these tools is sometimes perceived as complex. If the risk is deemed too high, some (chartered accountants, statutory auditors [123] and lawyers) may refuse to enter into a business relationship, an approach that helps mitigate risks but is applied to varying degrees across professions. 448. However, there are significant disparities between professions and between different sizes of firms. While notaries and accountants appear to take a proactive approach, lawyers in small and medium-sized firms have shortcomings in customer identification and the implementation of AML/CFT obligations. Some do not systematically verify the identity of repeat clients and do not always have clear procedures for accepting cases. 449. Since 1 January 2025, it has been easier for lawyers to check that a separate third-party account is held for all transactions involving funds belonging to third parties, thanks to an automatic detection system for atypical payments. This system enables risk situations to be identified in real time and makes it easier to declare or report them to the relevant authorities. No figures are available to date, as the system is too new to allow a quantitative assessment. 450. Finally, notaries , who are required to perform certain acts that they cannot refuse, [124] such as the creation of companies, send notifications to the CTIF in case of suspicion, which helps to strengthen the CTIF’s analysis in detecting ML. The effectiveness of reports by legal professionals depends largely on their ability to identify ML/TF patterns, a challenge that persists and requires ongoing outreach and awareness-raising efforts by all stakeholders. 451. The casino sector benefits from a rigorous framework, supported by a sophisticated automated system ( itsme ) that facilitates the identification, verification and registration of customers. This system enables real-time monitoring of players, identifying links between them and helping to detect potential ML strategies based on cross-transactions. Operators also have advanced control mechanisms at their disposal, enabling them to carry out additional checks and automatically block access to players who do not meet the compliance criteria, in particular PEPs whose identity has not been properly verified. Casinos also ensure that BOs are identified where necessary. However, without regular supervision and thorough assessment by the supervisory authority, it is impossible to ensure that the AML/CFT measures put in place by the sector are rigorous and adequate. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 452. Although DNFBPs are aware of their enhanced due diligence obligations, their understanding and implementation remain largely inadequate. Most do not understand the distinction between the different categories of due diligence, particularly with regard to PEPs, high-risk countries and international sanctions, which leads to misinterpretation and partial implementation of obligations. 453. High-risk sectors, including diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, have significant shortcomings in their understanding of PEPs. As a result, verification of the PEP status of the customer or its BO is rarely updated after entering into a business relationship, exposing these sectors to the risk of not detecting a change in status. Furthermore, although these professionals have access to the FATF’s lists of high-risk countries, the lack of regular updates and the inconsistent application of supervision limit their effectiveness. 454. Casinos show better integration of specific measures, thanks to automated screening of PEPs and sanctioned countries via the EPIS database. However, the many false positives generated by the system make checks more complex, which could undermine the effectiveness of the system. 455. The legal and accounting professions have a good understanding of the obligations relating to PEPs and high-risk countries, but their ability to identify these profiles remains limited, mainly due to a lack of structured access to reliable databases. Many of them rely on manual research, particularly via the internet, which affects the accuracy and consistency of their verifications. Large and medium-sized statutory audit firms correctly identify the existence of PEPs, although appropriate due diligence is not always carried out. This issue has been subject to checks by the BAOB and remedial measures have been ordered. 456. The adoption of new technologies is virtually non-existent in all the sectors assessed. Real estate agents, business centres and diamond dealers in particular have little exposure to virtual assets and digital transaction methods, and some reject these innovations as a precautionary measure, rather than developing the capacity to analyse the risks specific to these new tools. Table 4.4. Summary of findings on the implementation of due diligence obligations by DNFBPs Sector Understanding of PEP risks Verification of at-risk countries Continuous monitoring Use of new technologies Diamond dealers Limited (checks on entry into the business relationship only, no updates) Access to FATF lists but updating and application varied Very limited and irregular (after the initial relationship) Non-existent (low tolerance of digital innovations) Real estate agents Very limited (customer declarations not checked) Confusion over obligations; few checks. Virtually non-existent (no follow-up after entry into the business relationship) Non-existent (few international customers, lack of knowledge of new tools) Business centres Low (only those using ORIS carry out checks) Rarely applied None, except for companies using ORIS Very limited (rejection of new technologies as a precaution) Casinos Good (automatic filtering via EPIS but false positives) Systematic via EPIS but cases of false positives Present but affected by false positives Good (but needs improvement) Legal and accounting professions Fair but incomplete (lack of access to reliable databases) Good understanding but limited use of specialist tools Irregular (mainly manual) Rare (mainly manual checks via the Internet) Source: Evaluation team 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 457. Reporting activity, although stable, varies greatly from one sector to another, with relatively high reporting levels among auditors, notaries, chartered accountants and casinos (these four sectors accounted for more than 90% of all reports in 2024). However, it remains very low among lawyers (14 STRs) and in sectors classified as higher risk, particularly estate agents (31), diamond dealers (1) and business centres (14). 458. The situation is particularly concerning for diamond dealers, whose number of STRs was already very low in the previous assessment and has continued to fall over the last five years due to a general decline in transactions caused by COVID-19, G7 sanctions affecting certain diamond-producing countries and the transfer of activities to other international centres. In addition, reports from a number of sectors, including high-risk sectors such as diamond dealers, but also real estate agents and business centres, lack relevance and precision, which limits their added value in detecting suspicious transactions. Even in sectors where reporting activity is higher, such as notaries, the majority of STRs are not based on genuine ML/TF suspicion, but on a legal obligation to report objective information (use of cash in a real estate transaction; absence of the financial account from which the sum was or will be transferred; identity of the account holders in the preliminary sale agreement or deed of sale). Table 4.5. DNFBP reporting activity (2020– 2024) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Notaries 1.177 1.214 1.653 1.150 824 Gambling establishments 157 191 291 322 173 Accounting and tax professions 254 314 319 317 337 Statutory auditors 38 86 84 88 69 Real estate agents 37 48 51 39 31 Business centres 27 19 25 21 14 Lawyers 17 8 14 14 14 Diamond dealers 4 5 3 2 1 Other DNFBPs [125] 43 63 145 106 85 Total 1548 Source: CTIF 459. The case of lawyers raises a specific issue related to the reporting formalities imposed by law, which require that STRs be sent to the president of the bar, who then forwards them to the CTIF [126] . These formalities, which mainly involve verifying that the suspicion falls within the scope of AML/CFT and that the STRs drawn up by lawyers do not relate to information covered by professional secrecy, add an intermediate step, and associated delays. Presidents of the bar are required to inform the lawyer when the report has been forwarded, but this requirement is not always enforced. This lack of transparency (or feedback to reporting lawyers) may weaken the system, as reporting lawyers do not know whether they benefit from legal protection, which may discourage them from submitting STRs. Furthermore, as in 2015, the reporting rate to the CTIF remains extremely low, despite the potential for identifying high-risk transactions, particularly in the context of complex financial arrangements and real estate transactions. These arrangements are compounded by the absence of any obligation for lawyers to report attempted suspicious transactions (see R. 23 in the TC Annex). 460. The reporting activity of chartered accountants is generally satisfactory. 461. In general, and across all sectors, a lack of feedback from the authorities, particularly from the CTIF and SPF Economy, is a factor that weakens the reporting system (see RA d) of IO.6). DNFBPs receive very little feedback on the relevance of their reports, which limits their ability to refine their detection criteria (see IO.6). DNFBPs that have never submitted a STR do not seem to be familiar with information protection measures when transmitting a report to the CTIF. This lack of knowledge, out of fear of compromising confidentiality or exposing themselves to reprisals, can be a significant obstacle to reporting. Some DNFBPs express fears for their safety if they report and seem to misunderstand the existing protection mechanisms. 462. Furthermore, the application of proportionate and dissuasive disciplinary sanctions for breaches of reporting obligations is a major concern (see section 4.6 for more details). 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 463. The effectiveness of internal controls and compliance procedures varies considerably between different sectors of DNFBPs. While some sectors have structured their compliance systems, particularly large firms, casinos and certain legal and accounting professions, others have major shortcomings. The mutual evaluation recognises the need to take into account the scale of DNFBPs’ activities and the size of reporting entities in the organisational and supervision requirements of the AML/CFT system. 464. Among the sectors showing high compliance, casinos have internal procedures to ensure the diligence of their employees, but the actual effectiveness of these procedures has not been verified by the supervisory authorities. The accounting and legal professions are better structured, with an AMLCO generally appointed, at least in the largest entities, updated compliance procedures and more systematic training. Some notaries have strengthened their compliance by appointing an independent individual dedicated to AML/CFT. Policies and procedures are also more robust. Chartered accountants , for example, have detailed policies and procedures, although some note that they are too long, too complex and difficult to apply. In some law firms, double validation of financial transactions has been introduced, and procedures are updated annually, with increasing efforts towards computerisation to enhance their effectiveness. 465. However, in most sectors with a high risk of ML/TF, including diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, internal controls are weak or non-existent. Few formal policies and procedures are in place, updates are rare, and training remains inadequate. While recognising the need for a degree of flexibility to take account of the size of the entities subject to regulation, business centres present a particularly concerning level of compliance, with a lack of coordination of the compliance function (only the largest have an AMLCO), while their procedures are often absent and their purpose misunderstood, despite the high level of risk. Real estate agents, with the exception of those using the ORIS tool, apply partial and informal supervision, often reduced to simple questionnaires provided by the IPI, which appear to be poorly understood (see section 4.1). 466. Many sectors do not provide regular, in-depth AML/CFT training, which hampers the effectiveness of their systems. Others appear to offer several training courses, but these do not always seem to meet customer needs, as several sectors continue to have great difficulty understanding AML/CFT obligations. 467. Furthermore, the supervisory authorities do not always systematically assess the actual implementation of internal controls (on the contrary, it would appear that the BAOB always takes internal controls into account in its approach). This lack of monitoring increases uncertainty as to the compliance of entities and limits the possibilities of correcting identified shortcomings. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 468. The evaluation team did not identify any major obstacles to the implementation of obligations and mitigating measures. Footnotes [123] In 2023, auditors refused 638 prospective clients for a variety of reasons, including 100 for reasons at least partly related to AML/CFT and 60 (of the 100) for reasons exclusively related to AML/CFT. The significance of ML/TF risks clearly increased following BAOB inspections, coupled with outreach measures (see, for example, publications on the BAOB website such as the 2022 supervision results and the 2023 supervision results ). [124] Notaries, who are public officers bound by an obligation to lend their services, may refuse to perform a deed only in exceptional cases, which do not apply when they have suspicions of ML/TF in a transaction, without prejudice to their duty to report to CTIF. [126] Art. 5, 28° and 53 2017 AML Law" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 439. DNFBPs have a basic understanding of their due diligence obligations. However, there are still significant gaps in their implementation, particularly in high-risk sectors such as for diamond dealers, real estate agents, business centres and certain legal and accounting professionals. The application of due diligence measures varies considerably across sectors, in terms of the scope of supervision, the degree of monitoring and the nature of the documents collected. 440. In most cases, DNFBPs simply check the customer’s identity card using a questionnaire, the content of which varies greatly from one sector to another. However, many professionals simply fill in the questionnaire without carrying out in-depth checks on the information provided, which weakens the effectiveness of the AML/CFT due diligence and risk detection system. 441. The majority of diamond dealers have a limited understanding of their AML/CFT obligations. Although they are aware of certain requirements, particularly those relating to customer information, their implementation remains inadequate and does not always result in effective compliance. When checks are carried out, they are often limited and not always documented, which compromises the traceability and effectiveness of the due diligence system. 442. Diamond dealers focus their due diligence efforts primarily on establishing relationships, verifying the purpose and nature of business relationships, the identity of business partners, and in some cases, the source of funds. These verifications are generally more rigorous in large international companies, while smaller structures often apply less stringent due diligence. In practice, some choose not to work with unknown or high-risk partners, particularly in the absence of referrals or connections. However, this due diligence diminishes considerably once the relationship has been established: long-standing customers and partners are rarely subject to reassessment, as they are perceived as low-risk. This static approach, based on long-standing trust rather than continuous reassessment, is a significant weakness in the implementation of due diligence obligations, limiting the ability to detect atypical behaviour or changes in profile over time. 443. SPF Economy has identified major shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT obligations by diamond dealers in the supervised companies selected on the basis of risk. These shortcomings include the systematic failure to identify and verify customers, agents and BOs, as well as a lack of documentation on the purpose and nature of business relationships. In addition, SPF Economy has identified cases of evasion of sanctions, illustrating the sector’s vulnerability to illicit financial flows and criminal networks. To address these shortcomings, an AML Policy was drawn up in 2020 and updated in 2024, incorporating detailed guidance and an operational checklist. However, its effective adoption and impact on practices remain to be seen, requiring rigorous monitoring of its implementation. 444. Business centres have limited knowledge of their AML/CFT obligations, and show major shortcomings in their implementation. SPF Economy confirmed this during its inspections, which revealed a particularly high non-compliance rate – nearly 71% – in the application of due diligence measures (see next section). The most critical shortcomings concern the lack of verification of clients (41%), agents and BOs (45%), as well as insufficient documentation of business relationships and transactions (45%). Furthermore, the absence or incompleteness of transaction analyses and file monitoring prevents effective monitoring of high-risk financial flows. Service providers that use tools such as ORIS – approximately 6.8% – generally implement their due diligence obligations appropriately. This disparity shows that the use of technological means improves compliance, but that their use remains too marginal to have a significant impact on the sector as a whole. Table 4.3. Shortcomings noted in the 2022 general survey of business centres Topic of inspection No. of entities inspected Shortcomings noted Number % Registration 147 89 60.5% AML/ CFT obligations 147 104 70.6% Source: SPF Economy 445. Real estate agents are making progress in their understanding of AML/CFT obligations, but this progress remains highly variable and depends on the tools used. The ORIS tool, when used, significantly improves compliance: a general survey by SPF Economy in 2021 revealed that 94% of agents using ORIS complied with basic obligations. However, this tool remains underused in the sector, limiting its overall impact on improving practices. 446. Structural shortcomings remain a concern, particularly with regard to verification of customers and analysis of transactions. Real estate agents have a superficial understanding of AML/CFT obligations, often limited to formal customer identification. In practice, they generally rely on standardised lists of questions, without really investigating or verifying the identity of customers and BOs. Transaction analysis, although carried out, is often insufficient, as understanding of ML schemes specific to the real estate sector remains too superficial. This increases the sector’s vulnerability to illicit financial flows, particularly through the undervaluation or overvaluation of property and purchases by nominees. 447. Legal and accounting professionals implement vigilance measures which, although generally compliant, vary in terms of effectiveness and systematic application. On the whole, they identify customers and BOs, often by consulting the BO register, although they recognise its shortcomings (see IO 5). Some operators, in particular notaries, chartered accountants and statutory auditors, supplement this verification by cross-checking information with third-party tools and targeted questions on the purpose of transactions and the origin of funds. Chartered accountants and auditors, who have dedicated IT solutions at their disposal, regularly monitor and update client information, although the use of these tools is sometimes perceived as complex. If the risk is deemed too high, some (chartered accountants, statutory auditors [123] and lawyers) may refuse to enter into a business relationship, an approach that helps mitigate risks but is applied to varying degrees across professions. 448. However, there are significant disparities between professions and between different sizes of firms. While notaries and accountants appear to take a proactive approach, lawyers in small and medium-sized firms have shortcomings in customer identification and the implementation of AML/CFT obligations. Some do not systematically verify the identity of repeat clients and do not always have clear procedures for accepting cases. 449. Since 1 January 2025, it has been easier for lawyers to check that a separate third-party account is held for all transactions involving funds belonging to third parties, thanks to an automatic detection system for atypical payments. This system enables risk situations to be identified in real time and makes it easier to declare or report them to the relevant authorities. No figures are available to date, as the system is too new to allow a quantitative assessment. 450. Finally, notaries , who are required to perform certain acts that they cannot refuse, [124] such as the creation of companies, send notifications to the CTIF in case of suspicion, which helps to strengthen the CTIF’s analysis in detecting ML. The effectiveness of reports by legal professionals depends largely on their ability to identify ML/TF patterns, a challenge that persists and requires ongoing outreach and awareness-raising efforts by all stakeholders. 451. The casino sector benefits from a rigorous framework, supported by a sophisticated automated system ( itsme ) that facilitates the identification, verification and registration of customers. This system enables real-time monitoring of players, identifying links between them and helping to detect potential ML strategies based on cross-transactions. Operators also have advanced control mechanisms at their disposal, enabling them to carry out additional checks and automatically block access to players who do not meet the compliance criteria, in particular PEPs whose identity has not been properly verified. Casinos also ensure that BOs are identified where necessary. However, without regular supervision and thorough assessment by the supervisory authority, it is impossible to ensure that the AML/CFT measures put in place by the sector are rigorous and adequate. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 452. Although DNFBPs are aware of their enhanced due diligence obligations, their understanding and implementation remain largely inadequate. Most do not understand the distinction between the different categories of due diligence, particularly with regard to PEPs, high-risk countries and international sanctions, which leads to misinterpretation and partial implementation of obligations. 453. High-risk sectors, including diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, have significant shortcomings in their understanding of PEPs. As a result, verification of the PEP status of the customer or its BO is rarely updated after entering into a business relationship, exposing these sectors to the risk of not detecting a change in status. Furthermore, although these professionals have access to the FATF’s lists of high-risk countries, the lack of regular updates and the inconsistent application of supervision limit their effectiveness. 454. Casinos show better integration of specific measures, thanks to automated screening of PEPs and sanctioned countries via the EPIS database. However, the many false positives generated by the system make checks more complex, which could undermine the effectiveness of the system. 455. The legal and accounting professions have a good understanding of the obligations relating to PEPs and high-risk countries, but their ability to identify these profiles remains limited, mainly due to a lack of structured access to reliable databases. Many of them rely on manual research, particularly via the internet, which affects the accuracy and consistency of their verifications. Large and medium-sized statutory audit firms correctly identify the existence of PEPs, although appropriate due diligence is not always carried out. This issue has been subject to checks by the BAOB and remedial measures have been ordered. 456. The adoption of new technologies is virtually non-existent in all the sectors assessed. Real estate agents, business centres and diamond dealers in particular have little exposure to virtual assets and digital transaction methods, and some reject these innovations as a precautionary measure, rather than developing the capacity to analyse the risks specific to these new tools. Table 4.4. Summary of findings on the implementation of due diligence obligations by DNFBPs Sector Understanding of PEP risks Verification of at-risk countries Continuous monitoring Use of new technologies Diamond dealers Limited (checks on entry into the business relationship only, no updates) Access to FATF lists but updating and application varied Very limited and irregular (after the initial relationship) Non-existent (low tolerance of digital innovations) Real estate agents Very limited (customer declarations not checked) Confusion over obligations; few checks. Virtually non-existent (no follow-up after entry into the business relationship) Non-existent (few international customers, lack of knowledge of new tools) Business centres Low (only those using ORIS carry out checks) Rarely applied None, except for companies using ORIS Very limited (rejection of new technologies as a precaution) Casinos Good (automatic filtering via EPIS but false positives) Systematic via EPIS but cases of false positives Present but affected by false positives Good (but needs improvement) Legal and accounting professions Fair but incomplete (lack of access to reliable databases) Good understanding but limited use of specialist tools Irregular (mainly manual) Rare (mainly manual checks via the Internet) Source: Evaluation team 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 457. Reporting activity, although stable, varies greatly from one sector to another, with relatively high reporting levels among auditors, notaries, chartered accountants and casinos (these four sectors accounted for more than 90% of all reports in 2024). However, it remains very low among lawyers (14 STRs) and in sectors classified as higher risk, particularly estate agents (31), diamond dealers (1) and business centres (14). 458. The situation is particularly concerning for diamond dealers, whose number of STRs was already very low in the previous assessment and has continued to fall over the last five years due to a general decline in transactions caused by COVID-19, G7 sanctions affecting certain diamond-producing countries and the transfer of activities to other international centres. In addition, reports from a number of sectors, including high-risk sectors such as diamond dealers, but also real estate agents and business centres, lack relevance and precision, which limits their added value in detecting suspicious transactions. Even in sectors where reporting activity is higher, such as notaries, the majority of STRs are not based on genuine ML/TF suspicion, but on a legal obligation to report objective information (use of cash in a real estate transaction; absence of the financial account from which the sum was or will be transferred; identity of the account holders in the preliminary sale agreement or deed of sale). Table 4.5. DNFBP reporting activity (2020– 2024) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Notaries 1.177 1.214 1.653 1.150 824 Gambling establishments 157 191 291 322 173 Accounting and tax professions 254 314 319 317 337 Statutory auditors 38 86 84 88 69 Real estate agents 37 48 51 39 31 Business centres 27 19 25 21 14 Lawyers 17 8 14 14 14 Diamond dealers 4 5 3 2 1 Other DNFBPs [125] 43 63 145 106 85 Total 1548 Source: CTIF 459. The case of lawyers raises a specific issue related to the reporting formalities imposed by law, which require that STRs be sent to the president of the bar, who then forwards them to the CTIF [126] . These formalities, which mainly involve verifying that the suspicion falls within the scope of AML/CFT and that the STRs drawn up by lawyers do not relate to information covered by professional secrecy, add an intermediate step, and associated delays. Presidents of the bar are required to inform the lawyer when the report has been forwarded, but this requirement is not always enforced. This lack of transparency (or feedback to reporting lawyers) may weaken the system, as reporting lawyers do not know whether they benefit from legal protection, which may discourage them from submitting STRs. Furthermore, as in 2015, the reporting rate to the CTIF remains extremely low, despite the potential for identifying high-risk transactions, particularly in the context of complex financial arrangements and real estate transactions. These arrangements are compounded by the absence of any obligation for lawyers to report attempted suspicious transactions (see R. 23 in the TC Annex). 460. The reporting activity of chartered accountants is generally satisfactory. 461. In general, and across all sectors, a lack of feedback from the authorities, particularly from the CTIF and SPF Economy, is a factor that weakens the reporting system (see RA d) of IO.6). DNFBPs receive very little feedback on the relevance of their reports, which limits their ability to refine their detection criteria (see IO.6). DNFBPs that have never submitted a STR do not seem to be familiar with information protection measures when transmitting a report to the CTIF. This lack of knowledge, out of fear of compromising confidentiality or exposing themselves to reprisals, can be a significant obstacle to reporting. Some DNFBPs express fears for their safety if they report and seem to misunderstand the existing protection mechanisms. 462. Furthermore, the application of proportionate and dissuasive disciplinary sanctions for breaches of reporting obligations is a major concern (see section 4.6 for more details). 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 463. The effectiveness of internal controls and compliance procedures varies considerably between different sectors of DNFBPs. While some sectors have structured their compliance systems, particularly large firms, casinos and certain legal and accounting professions, others have major shortcomings. The mutual evaluation recognises the need to take into account the scale of DNFBPs’ activities and the size of reporting entities in the organisational and supervision requirements of the AML/CFT system. 464. Among the sectors showing high compliance, casinos have internal procedures to ensure the diligence of their employees, but the actual effectiveness of these procedures has not been verified by the supervisory authorities. The accounting and legal professions are better structured, with an AMLCO generally appointed, at least in the largest entities, updated compliance procedures and more systematic training. Some notaries have strengthened their compliance by appointing an independent individual dedicated to AML/CFT. Policies and procedures are also more robust. Chartered accountants , for example, have detailed policies and procedures, although some note that they are too long, too complex and difficult to apply. In some law firms, double validation of financial transactions has been introduced, and procedures are updated annually, with increasing efforts towards computerisation to enhance their effectiveness. 465. However, in most sectors with a high risk of ML/TF, including diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, internal controls are weak or non-existent. Few formal policies and procedures are in place, updates are rare, and training remains inadequate. While recognising the need for a degree of flexibility to take account of the size of the entities subject to regulation, business centres present a particularly concerning level of compliance, with a lack of coordination of the compliance function (only the largest have an AMLCO), while their procedures are often absent and their purpose misunderstood, despite the high level of risk. Real estate agents, with the exception of those using the ORIS tool, apply partial and informal supervision, often reduced to simple questionnaires provided by the IPI, which appear to be poorly understood (see section 4.1). 466. Many sectors do not provide regular, in-depth AML/CFT training, which hampers the effectiveness of their systems. Others appear to offer several training courses, but these do not always seem to meet customer needs, as several sectors continue to have great difficulty understanding AML/CFT obligations. 467. Furthermore, the supervisory authorities do not always systematically assess the actual implementation of internal controls (on the contrary, it would appear that the BAOB always takes internal controls into account in its approach). This lack of monitoring increases uncertainty as to the compliance of entities and limits the possibilities of correcting identified shortcomings. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 468. The evaluation team did not identify any major obstacles to the implementation of obligations and mitigating measures. Footnotes [123] In 2023, auditors refused 638 prospective clients for a variety of reasons, including 100 for reasons at least partly related to AML/CFT and 60 (of the 100) for reasons exclusively related to AML/CFT. The significance of ML/TF risks clearly increased following BAOB inspections, coupled with outreach measures (see, for example, publications on the BAOB website such as the 2022 supervision results and the 2023 supervision results ). [124] Notaries, who are public officers bound by an obligation to lend their services, may refuse to perform a deed only in exceptional cases, which do not apply when they have suspicions of ML/TF in a transaction, without prejudice to their duty to report to CTIF. [126] Art. 5, 28° and 53 2017 AML Law" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="535. Belgian law does not authorise the creation of trusts or similar legal arrangements. It nevertheless requires foreign trustees and fiduciaries who meet certain conditions to register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and to declare their beneficial owners, if they have not already been declared in another EU Member State, which is an improvement on the findings of the 2015 MER (see Rec. 25 TC Annex). 536. However, the Belgian authorities do not have sufficiently satisfactory information about foreign legal arrangements with a link to Belgium. There is no effective mechanism for systematically identifying foreign legal arrangements administered from Belgium. Access by the competent authorities to information held by the Cadastral Administration of SPF Finance makes it possible to identify trustees or fiduciaries who own real estate in Belgium. The information held by the tax authorities should make it possible to identify trustees, fiduciaries or beneficial owners linked to legal arrangements when they are resident in Belgium, but this information is not yet fully exploited for the purposes of identifying beneficial owners or ML/TF. At the end of January 2025, the tax authorities provided information on natural persons residing in Belgium who had declared themselves to be founders or beneficial owners of one or more trusts or similar foreign legal arrangements. This information is currently being analysed by SPF Finance to verify compliance with the requirements for registration in the UBO register. 537. Only 24 trusts and similar legal arrangements have been identified by SPF Finance as being required to provide information to the UBO register. Fourteen of these are in addition to the 732 trusts and similar legal structures that appear in the UBO register as intermediary entities of Belgian legal persons, but it has not yet been verified whether these entities also meet the definition of entities required to report information to the UBO register. In addition, more than 200 foreign entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register are subject to supervision, as their names include words such as “trust” or “ fiducie ” without their legal form being known. Finally, external sources, such as the Panama Papers, are occasionally used to carry out additional checks. 538. Consequently, Belgium is unable to ensure that trusts and similar legal arrangements effectively fulfil their transparency obligations, in particular because it is unable to reliably identify the trusts and legal arrangements subject to these obligations if they do not declare themselves or are not identified by an obliged entity in the context of a business relationship. In this context, the Belgian authorities have limited access to accurate and up-to-date information on foreign legal arrangements. The limitations identified in section 5.3 also apply to foreign entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and UBO registers concerning legal arrangements (see section 5.3)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="535. Belgian law does not authorise the creation of trusts or similar legal arrangements. It nevertheless requires foreign trustees and fiduciaries who meet certain conditions to register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and to declare their beneficial owners, if they have not already been declared in another EU Member State, which is an improvement on the findings of the 2015 MER (see Rec. 25 TC Annex). 536. However, the Belgian authorities do not have sufficiently satisfactory information about foreign legal arrangements with a link to Belgium. There is no effective mechanism for systematically identifying foreign legal arrangements administered from Belgium. Access by the competent authorities to information held by the Cadastral Administration of SPF Finance makes it possible to identify trustees or fiduciaries who own real estate in Belgium. The information held by the tax authorities should make it possible to identify trustees, fiduciaries or beneficial owners linked to legal arrangements when they are resident in Belgium, but this information is not yet fully exploited for the purposes of identifying beneficial owners or ML/TF. At the end of January 2025, the tax authorities provided information on natural persons residing in Belgium who had declared themselves to be founders or beneficial owners of one or more trusts or similar foreign legal arrangements. This information is currently being analysed by SPF Finance to verify compliance with the requirements for registration in the UBO register. 537. Only 24 trusts and similar legal arrangements have been identified by SPF Finance as being required to provide information to the UBO register. Fourteen of these are in addition to the 732 trusts and similar legal structures that appear in the UBO register as intermediary entities of Belgian legal persons, but it has not yet been verified whether these entities also meet the definition of entities required to report information to the UBO register. In addition, more than 200 foreign entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register are subject to supervision, as their names include words such as “trust” or “ fiducie ” without their legal form being known. Finally, external sources, such as the Panama Papers, are occasionally used to carry out additional checks. 538. Consequently, Belgium is unable to ensure that trusts and similar legal arrangements effectively fulfil their transparency obligations, in particular because it is unable to reliably identify the trusts and legal arrangements subject to these obligations if they do not declare themselves or are not identified by an obliged entity in the context of a business relationship. In this context, the Belgian authorities have limited access to accurate and up-to-date information on foreign legal arrangements. The limitations identified in section 5.3 also apply to foreign entities registered in the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and UBO registers concerning legal arrangements (see section 5.3)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Use of financial information/intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 605. In general, the investigative and prosecuting authorities incorporate financial intelligence provided by CTIF into their investigations, in addition to other sources of information. This data is essential for gathering evidence, locating the proceeds of crime and understanding financial flows linked to ML, TF and predicate offences. The combined use of sources from the CTIF, national databases, conventional investigative techniques (searches, phone tapping and surveillance) and specialised resources (virtual asset tracing, decryption) strengthens case files and broadens the scope of investigations. However, other sources of financial intelligence (e.g. from CAF and Customs) are not used to their full potential in ML investigations. Financial intelligence from CTIF has helped identify new players, establish operational links and substantiate charges. The examples in section 6.2 demonstrate this added value in complex cases such as those involving shell company structures, suspicious flows in offsetting and TBML schemes, or to support investigations conducted by the various federal judicial police units nationally and partners such as the EPPO. Box 6.7. Role of the CTIF in the Sky ECC case (Limit and Edge Operations) Facts: In March 2021, the press revealed that SKY ECC, an encrypted communication system used by criminal networks, had been hacked. Two major judicial investigations followed: Operation Limit, targeting the service provider, and Operation Edge, targeting the criminal organisations identified by the DGJ-DJSOC. CTIF role: Since July-August 2021, the CTIF has been actively collaborating with the Edge unit, the Antwerp federal judicial police unit and the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General to coordinate the financial analysis. It received lists of identified users from August 2021 to June 2024. The CTIF adds its own data (files transmitted, known entities) to this database and makes additional requests (ref. Art. 80 of the AML/CFT Law). Results: The CTIF adds strategic value to investigations by identifying links between SKY ECC users and its own ML files. It helps prioritise cases according to the seriousness of the offence and supplements the police’s Edge database. This facilitates coordinated processing and effective information sharing. This collaboration strengthens the judicial and financial investigation of a very large, organised crime case in Belgium. 606. From this perspective, the CTIF is a key support for BC investigations, especially as a regular point of contact for the specialised units of the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General (DGJ). The DGJ liaison officer seconded to the CTIF can, at the request of the judicial authorities, check whether the CTIF has information on the natural and/or legal persons targeted by the investigation and, if so, supplement the investigation with additional financial intelligence, including using the option of requesting information from foreign FIUs. The CTIF cannot make use of this option if it does not already have related information based on the STRs received and its analyses. This condition limits rapid access to certain information that is useful for strengthening international investigations, particularly when urgent action is required (see IO.7 and IO.2). The judicial authorities can also send information directly to the CTIF and highlight the high quality of the information provided in response. This information is regularly used by law enforcement agencies to support and strengthen ongoing investigations or initiate new ones. It provides valuable insight into suspicious financial flows, connections between actors and complex structures, thereby strengthening the case for prosecution. Although the judicial authorities have not provided detailed statistics on the requests made to the CTIF, case studies demonstrate that this information is frequently used and provides real added value in terms of evidence, traceability of criminal flows and identification of ML structures (see IO.7). 607. Belgium also provided examples demonstrating how financial intelligence generated by the CTIF was used by judicial authorities and the police in TF investigations (see IO.9). 608. However, this effectiveness is hampered by certain organisational constraints. The increasing complexity of ML/TF cases often requires the use of new analytical tools, particularly when dealing with transnational structures or the use of virtual assets. While judicial authorities praise the quality of investigators’ work and the information they produce, they also point to a lack of police resources, both human and in terms of equipment and IT. The shortage of investigators trained in financial matters, cybercrime and the traceability of crypto-assets prevents financial intelligence from being used to its full potential. Similarly, the IT tools available are sometimes considered obsolete or unsuitable (see IO.7). Although the DGJ has set up certain ad hoc programmes and bilateral cooperation initiatives, in particular with France, these efforts are still too limited to fully meet operational needs. With regard to TF, a financial investigation is conducted as part of each investigation to gain an understanding of the financing of terrorist activities, and the CTIF is systematically asked for any information it holds and for information from its foreign counterparts. A full bank investigation is carried out as standard, including interviews with money transfer operator managers, in order to obtain an overview of the suspects’ financial flows. If there are indications that the suspects have used cryptocurrencies, a search is also carried out on these exchange platforms. In addition, the judicial authority systematically requests technical assistance from the intelligence services in each new judicial case opened concerning terrorism and TF (see IO.9, circular COL 9/2012). 609. Furthermore, the financial intelligence obtained from cash movement reports available to the customs authorities is generally not used effectively by the investigative and prosecuting authorities. Despite this information being detailed (see section 6.3), it is still raw data that has not been refined through additional analysis, as customs authorities do not have investigative powers and are limited to recording incidents of non-compliance with reporting requirements. The number of ML investigations initiated as a result of customs offences is low (see IO.8). Given the prevalence of cash in ML/TF cases, the underutilisation of customs information by the judicial authorities is a significant shortcoming. 6.4.2. Use of financial information/intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 610. Judicial and law enforcement authorities work closely together to identify and locate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, building this into the early stages of investigations. However, the approach focuses on immediately available assets, which limits the broader identification of proceeds generated by ML activities. In-depth asset investigations are not conducted frequently enough, with the judicial authorities concentrating their investigations on the predicate offences without considering the ML aspects. This is due to insufficient resources (see IO.7 and IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Use of financial information/intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 605. In general, the investigative and prosecuting authorities incorporate financial intelligence provided by CTIF into their investigations, in addition to other sources of information. This data is essential for gathering evidence, locating the proceeds of crime and understanding financial flows linked to ML, TF and predicate offences. The combined use of sources from the CTIF, national databases, conventional investigative techniques (searches, phone tapping and surveillance) and specialised resources (virtual asset tracing, decryption) strengthens case files and broadens the scope of investigations. However, other sources of financial intelligence (e.g. from CAF and Customs) are not used to their full potential in ML investigations. Financial intelligence from CTIF has helped identify new players, establish operational links and substantiate charges. The examples in section 6.2 demonstrate this added value in complex cases such as those involving shell company structures, suspicious flows in offsetting and TBML schemes, or to support investigations conducted by the various federal judicial police units nationally and partners such as the EPPO. Box 6.7. Role of the CTIF in the Sky ECC case (Limit and Edge Operations) Facts: In March 2021, the press revealed that SKY ECC, an encrypted communication system used by criminal networks, had been hacked. Two major judicial investigations followed: Operation Limit, targeting the service provider, and Operation Edge, targeting the criminal organisations identified by the DGJ-DJSOC. CTIF role: Since July-August 2021, the CTIF has been actively collaborating with the Edge unit, the Antwerp federal judicial police unit and the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General to coordinate the financial analysis. It received lists of identified users from August 2021 to June 2024. The CTIF adds its own data (files transmitted, known entities) to this database and makes additional requests (ref. Art. 80 of the AML/CFT Law). Results: The CTIF adds strategic value to investigations by identifying links between SKY ECC users and its own ML files. It helps prioritise cases according to the seriousness of the offence and supplements the police’s Edge database. This facilitates coordinated processing and effective information sharing. This collaboration strengthens the judicial and financial investigation of a very large, organised crime case in Belgium. 606. From this perspective, the CTIF is a key support for BC investigations, especially as a regular point of contact for the specialised units of the Federal Judicial Police Directorate-General (DGJ). The DGJ liaison officer seconded to the CTIF can, at the request of the judicial authorities, check whether the CTIF has information on the natural and/or legal persons targeted by the investigation and, if so, supplement the investigation with additional financial intelligence, including using the option of requesting information from foreign FIUs. The CTIF cannot make use of this option if it does not already have related information based on the STRs received and its analyses. This condition limits rapid access to certain information that is useful for strengthening international investigations, particularly when urgent action is required (see IO.7 and IO.2). The judicial authorities can also send information directly to the CTIF and highlight the high quality of the information provided in response. This information is regularly used by law enforcement agencies to support and strengthen ongoing investigations or initiate new ones. It provides valuable insight into suspicious financial flows, connections between actors and complex structures, thereby strengthening the case for prosecution. Although the judicial authorities have not provided detailed statistics on the requests made to the CTIF, case studies demonstrate that this information is frequently used and provides real added value in terms of evidence, traceability of criminal flows and identification of ML structures (see IO.7). 607. Belgium also provided examples demonstrating how financial intelligence generated by the CTIF was used by judicial authorities and the police in TF investigations (see IO.9). 608. However, this effectiveness is hampered by certain organisational constraints. The increasing complexity of ML/TF cases often requires the use of new analytical tools, particularly when dealing with transnational structures or the use of virtual assets. While judicial authorities praise the quality of investigators’ work and the information they produce, they also point to a lack of police resources, both human and in terms of equipment and IT. The shortage of investigators trained in financial matters, cybercrime and the traceability of crypto-assets prevents financial intelligence from being used to its full potential. Similarly, the IT tools available are sometimes considered obsolete or unsuitable (see IO.7). Although the DGJ has set up certain ad hoc programmes and bilateral cooperation initiatives, in particular with France, these efforts are still too limited to fully meet operational needs. With regard to TF, a financial investigation is conducted as part of each investigation to gain an understanding of the financing of terrorist activities, and the CTIF is systematically asked for any information it holds and for information from its foreign counterparts. A full bank investigation is carried out as standard, including interviews with money transfer operator managers, in order to obtain an overview of the suspects’ financial flows. If there are indications that the suspects have used cryptocurrencies, a search is also carried out on these exchange platforms. In addition, the judicial authority systematically requests technical assistance from the intelligence services in each new judicial case opened concerning terrorism and TF (see IO.9, circular COL 9/2012). 609. Furthermore, the financial intelligence obtained from cash movement reports available to the customs authorities is generally not used effectively by the investigative and prosecuting authorities. Despite this information being detailed (see section 6.3), it is still raw data that has not been refined through additional analysis, as customs authorities do not have investigative powers and are limited to recording incidents of non-compliance with reporting requirements. The number of ML investigations initiated as a result of customs offences is low (see IO.8). Given the prevalence of cash in ML/TF cases, the underutilisation of customs information by the judicial authorities is a significant shortcoming. 6.4.2. Use of financial information/intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 610. Judicial and law enforcement authorities work closely together to identify and locate proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, building this into the early stages of investigations. However, the approach focuses on immediately available assets, which limits the broader identification of proceeds generated by ML activities. In-depth asset investigations are not conducted frequently enough, with the judicial authorities concentrating their investigations on the predicate offences without considering the ML aspects. This is due to insufficient resources (see IO.7 and IO.8)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Belgium has not demonstrated its use of other criminal justice measures in cases where an ML investigation has been conducted but where a conviction for ML is not possible. 7.4.1. Use of non-trial resolution mechanism (the transaction procedure) 659. Belgium frequently uses the non-trial resolution mechanism – transaction procedure - for ML offences, as provided for in its Code of Criminal Procedure (Art. 216bis) and whose framework and conditions are set out in a circular issued by the College of Prosecutors General in 2018. [184] [185] Between 2019 and 2024, 390 transactions were agreed in ML cases at the preliminary investigative stage (simple transactions, not included in the person’s criminal record). In practice, the majority of transactions are struck after criminal proceedings have been initiated (known as extended transactions), either when the proceedings are settled at the end of the investigation or when the case is brought before the court of first instance. Belgium was unable to provide the number of transactions agreed after criminal proceedings had begun. 660. The use of such transactions compensates for the limited resources allocated to the judicial system and allows decisions to be reached more quickly than when cases are referred to the courts. However, this approach to dealing with ML cases raises a number of questions of principle, as these transactions do not involve an admission of guilt or result in a conviction. Only extended agreement are entered in defendants’ criminal records, but extracts from these records are only accessible to the judicial authorities and the police. 661. Furthermore, the option of resorting to such transactions even when the case has already been referred to a trial judge is no longer justified at this point in the proceedings in terms of usefulness and savings in investigative resources. The use of these transactions also raises a problem regarding its deterrent effect, as the terms of the agreement are not made public except during the public hearing at which the trial judge approves it. A judge does check to some extent that the amounts proposed in the transaction are sufficient, but only when such transactions takes place after the defendants have been charged. 662. One court has already refused to approve a transaction agreement on the grounds that the measures proposed by the Federal Prosecutor were not proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and did not act as a deterrent, as the agreement did not require the defendant to pay any money, even though their motive for committing the offences was financial. 663. The arrangements for using this non-trial resolution mechanism also raise questions about its use as an alternative means of settling ML cases. The increase in the use of the transaction procedure raises concerns that this mechanism may become a preferred means of settling ML cases and, ultimately, replace court proceedings, without the specific circumstances of the case justifying this. Footnotes [184] Circular COL 08/2018 [185] Where the prosecutor considers that the offence does not appear to be of a nature that would warrant a custodial sentence of more than two years or a more severe penalty, and where it does not involve serious bodily harm." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Belgium has not demonstrated its use of other criminal justice measures in cases where an ML investigation has been conducted but where a conviction for ML is not possible. 7.4.1. Use of non-trial resolution mechanism (the transaction procedure) 659. Belgium frequently uses the non-trial resolution mechanism – transaction procedure - for ML offences, as provided for in its Code of Criminal Procedure (Art. 216bis) and whose framework and conditions are set out in a circular issued by the College of Prosecutors General in 2018. [184] [185] Between 2019 and 2024, 390 transactions were agreed in ML cases at the preliminary investigative stage (simple transactions, not included in the person’s criminal record). In practice, the majority of transactions are struck after criminal proceedings have been initiated (known as extended transactions), either when the proceedings are settled at the end of the investigation or when the case is brought before the court of first instance. Belgium was unable to provide the number of transactions agreed after criminal proceedings had begun. 660. The use of such transactions compensates for the limited resources allocated to the judicial system and allows decisions to be reached more quickly than when cases are referred to the courts. However, this approach to dealing with ML cases raises a number of questions of principle, as these transactions do not involve an admission of guilt or result in a conviction. Only extended agreement are entered in defendants’ criminal records, but extracts from these records are only accessible to the judicial authorities and the police. 661. Furthermore, the option of resorting to such transactions even when the case has already been referred to a trial judge is no longer justified at this point in the proceedings in terms of usefulness and savings in investigative resources. The use of these transactions also raises a problem regarding its deterrent effect, as the terms of the agreement are not made public except during the public hearing at which the trial judge approves it. A judge does check to some extent that the amounts proposed in the transaction are sufficient, but only when such transactions takes place after the defendants have been charged. 662. One court has already refused to approve a transaction agreement on the grounds that the measures proposed by the Federal Prosecutor were not proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and did not act as a deterrent, as the agreement did not require the defendant to pay any money, even though their motive for committing the offences was financial. 663. The arrangements for using this non-trial resolution mechanism also raise questions about its use as an alternative means of settling ML cases. The increase in the use of the transaction procedure raises concerns that this mechanism may become a preferred means of settling ML cases and, ultimately, replace court proceedings, without the specific circumstances of the case justifying this. Footnotes [184] Circular COL 08/2018 [185] Where the prosecutor considers that the offence does not appear to be of a nature that would warrant a custodial sentence of more than two years or a more severe penalty, and where it does not involve serious bodily harm." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.4.Consistency of confiscation results with ML/TF risks and national AML/TF policies and priorities 708. The confiscation results in ML cases are generally not in line with national AML and asset recovery policies and priorities. They also do not correlate with the ML risks to which Belgium is exposed. In comparison, the confiscation results in TF cases are more aligned with national TF policies and the TF risks to which Belgium is exposed. 709. The statistics available do not provide a comprehensive picture of the results obtained by type of predicate criminal offence. However, they are sufficient to establish the lack of correlation between the results of seizures and confiscations for the offences generating the highest profits in the country. The lack of police resources impacts the authorities’ ability to identify and confiscate ML proceeds and to achieve results commensurate with the risks to which Belgium is exposed. As a result, criminals continue to enjoy the illicit financial gains derived from ML offences. The shortcomings in the judicial response described in IO.7 have an impact on confiscation results. 710. In light of the increased threat of ML linked to cash trafficking, seizures related to cash trafficking are not commensurate with Belgium’s identified risk profile. This constitutes a significant vulnerability in the Belgian scenario, where risks associated with illegal cash flows are significant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.4.Consistency of confiscation results with ML/TF risks and national AML/TF policies and priorities 708. The confiscation results in ML cases are generally not in line with national AML and asset recovery policies and priorities. They also do not correlate with the ML risks to which Belgium is exposed. In comparison, the confiscation results in TF cases are more aligned with national TF policies and the TF risks to which Belgium is exposed. 709. The statistics available do not provide a comprehensive picture of the results obtained by type of predicate criminal offence. However, they are sufficient to establish the lack of correlation between the results of seizures and confiscations for the offences generating the highest profits in the country. The lack of police resources impacts the authorities’ ability to identify and confiscate ML proceeds and to achieve results commensurate with the risks to which Belgium is exposed. As a result, criminals continue to enjoy the illicit financial gains derived from ML offences. The shortcomings in the judicial response described in IO.7 have an impact on confiscation results. 710. In light of the increased threat of ML linked to cash trafficking, seizures related to cash trafficking are not commensurate with Belgium’s identified risk profile. This constitutes a significant vulnerability in the Belgian scenario, where risks associated with illegal cash flows are significant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="752. Belgium does not currently have a national strategy specifically focused on TF. Combating TF is part of the broader operational framework for combating terrorism (TER Strategy), which guides actions in the areas of prevention, detection and prosecution (see IO.1). 753. In terms of criminal policy, the Public Prosecutor’s Office nevertheless advocates a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to TF, even though this position is not formalised in a strategic document. While this approach is mainly aimed at excluding discretionary decisions not to prosecute, it does not exclude alternatives to prosecution, such as praetorian probation, which is discussed in more detail in the previous section. 754. The CTIF plays a unique role in Belgium’s CFT system, taking a similar approach to that used for ML. It produces analytical reports that can be shared with intelligence services or, if needed, with prosecutor’s offices. Although it is not a permanent member of the Intelligence and Security Coordination Committee (CCRS), which assists the National Security Committee responsible for strategic coordination of the national response to terrorism and TF (see IO.1), the CTIF has presented the TF NRA to the CCRS, thereby contributing to strategic thinking. The CTIF also chairs the TF platform, which brings together the intelligence services, the police, OCAM and other stakeholders to assess risks and coordinate TF-related actions. Although the CTIF also helps to coordinate CFT-related actions, political and strategic decisions are taken within the CCRS. 755. The sharing and use of information is a central pillar of Belgium’s response to terrorism. A structured ecosystem around OCAM, which acts as a fusion centre, ensures that information from the police, the intelligence services, prosecutor’s offices, the CTIF and other stakeholders is centralised, cross-checked and used in a coordinated way. This structure not only provides an up-to-date picture of the T and TF threat, but also ensures rapid and concerted action, in particular through TF platforms, local task forces and JIC/JDC meetings (see section 9.1). Consequently, the lack of a strategic document specific to TF does not appear to have any impact on the implementation of TF objectives and activities at operational level. 756. Although cooperation channels exist at all levels – strategic, operational and judicial – the effectiveness of the system depends above all on the quality, speed and contextualisation of the information provided. Efforts are still needed to improve the accuracy of analyses, particularly given the current academic nature of national TF risk analysis (see IO.1), and to take better account of certain weak signals, particularly those of a financial or informal nature. A more proactive approach, made possible in particular by increasing the number of investigators and augmenting their expertise in emerging areas such as informal channels and virtual assets, would further strengthen the operational T/TF framework. 757.  The involvement of the private sector, in particular certain financial institutions and digital platforms with advanced monitoring, behavioural analysis and anomaly detection capabilities useful for the early detection of TF, is still limited in Belgium. The lack of structured public-private partnerships is currently slowing down efforts to adapt Belgium’s response to emerging terrorism- and TF-related threats." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="752. Belgium does not currently have a national strategy specifically focused on TF. Combating TF is part of the broader operational framework for combating terrorism (TER Strategy), which guides actions in the areas of prevention, detection and prosecution (see IO.1). 753. In terms of criminal policy, the Public Prosecutor’s Office nevertheless advocates a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to TF, even though this position is not formalised in a strategic document. While this approach is mainly aimed at excluding discretionary decisions not to prosecute, it does not exclude alternatives to prosecution, such as praetorian probation, which is discussed in more detail in the previous section. 754. The CTIF plays a unique role in Belgium’s CFT system, taking a similar approach to that used for ML. It produces analytical reports that can be shared with intelligence services or, if needed, with prosecutor’s offices. Although it is not a permanent member of the Intelligence and Security Coordination Committee (CCRS), which assists the National Security Committee responsible for strategic coordination of the national response to terrorism and TF (see IO.1), the CTIF has presented the TF NRA to the CCRS, thereby contributing to strategic thinking. The CTIF also chairs the TF platform, which brings together the intelligence services, the police, OCAM and other stakeholders to assess risks and coordinate TF-related actions. Although the CTIF also helps to coordinate CFT-related actions, political and strategic decisions are taken within the CCRS. 755. The sharing and use of information is a central pillar of Belgium’s response to terrorism. A structured ecosystem around OCAM, which acts as a fusion centre, ensures that information from the police, the intelligence services, prosecutor’s offices, the CTIF and other stakeholders is centralised, cross-checked and used in a coordinated way. This structure not only provides an up-to-date picture of the T and TF threat, but also ensures rapid and concerted action, in particular through TF platforms, local task forces and JIC/JDC meetings (see section 9.1). Consequently, the lack of a strategic document specific to TF does not appear to have any impact on the implementation of TF objectives and activities at operational level. 756. Although cooperation channels exist at all levels – strategic, operational and judicial – the effectiveness of the system depends above all on the quality, speed and contextualisation of the information provided. Efforts are still needed to improve the accuracy of analyses, particularly given the current academic nature of national TF risk analysis (see IO.1), and to take better account of certain weak signals, particularly those of a financial or informal nature. A more proactive approach, made possible in particular by increasing the number of investigators and augmenting their expertise in emerging areas such as informal channels and virtual assets, would further strengthen the operational T/TF framework. 757.  The involvement of the private sector, in particular certain financial institutions and digital platforms with advanced monitoring, behavioural analysis and anomaly detection capabilities useful for the early detection of TF, is still limited in Belgium. The lack of structured public-private partnerships is currently slowing down efforts to adapt Belgium’s response to emerging terrorism- and TF-related threats." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="807. All natural and legal persons in Belgium are required to freeze the funds of persons or entities included on the UN, EU and national lists (Art. 8, §1, 3° of the AML Law and as described above). 10.4.1. Financial institutions 808. Financial institutions (FIs) demonstrate varying levels of understanding. Banks generally have a good understanding of their TFS obligations. The results of a horizontal review conducted by the BNB, reported in December 2024, show that credit institutions comply with their screening obligations for domestic and international transactions, although some shortcomings were found in domestic transactions. Some FIs do not necessarily carry out periodic and/or continuous re-screening of their customer databases. 809. The currency exchange offices and lenders visited during the on-site visit demonstrated a lower level of knowledge. The shortcomings relate in particular to the procedures and frequency of checks against the TFS lists. For example, one major lender indicated that it screens the lists once a month, but not at the start of a business relationship. The FSMA often has to remind institutions that TFS obligations are not risk-based but must be applied consistently to all customers. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 810. With the exception of a few legal professionals (notaries in particular), DNFBPs demonstrate a very low level of understanding of their TFS obligations. This is a vulnerability for implementing TF related TFS effectively and without delay. In general, DNFBPs of all sizes and across all sectors seem to be unfamiliar with the actual purpose of TFS, screening procedures, the frequency of checks and the authorities who must be notified of freezing measures. Some DNFBPs confuse the lists of high-risk countries with the lists of persons and entities subject to TFS. Even among DNFBPs that consult the SPF Finance-Treasury sanctions lists, there are significant shortcomings in understanding the mechanisms and objectives of TFS, which is particularly worrying. However, little support and very few tools are made available to DNFBPs, whose role in applying TFS is no less important." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="807. All natural and legal persons in Belgium are required to freeze the funds of persons or entities included on the UN, EU and national lists (Art. 8, §1, 3° of the AML Law and as described above). 10.4.1. Financial institutions 808. Financial institutions (FIs) demonstrate varying levels of understanding. Banks generally have a good understanding of their TFS obligations. The results of a horizontal review conducted by the BNB, reported in December 2024, show that credit institutions comply with their screening obligations for domestic and international transactions, although some shortcomings were found in domestic transactions. Some FIs do not necessarily carry out periodic and/or continuous re-screening of their customer databases. 809. The currency exchange offices and lenders visited during the on-site visit demonstrated a lower level of knowledge. The shortcomings relate in particular to the procedures and frequency of checks against the TFS lists. For example, one major lender indicated that it screens the lists once a month, but not at the start of a business relationship. The FSMA often has to remind institutions that TFS obligations are not risk-based but must be applied consistently to all customers. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 810. With the exception of a few legal professionals (notaries in particular), DNFBPs demonstrate a very low level of understanding of their TFS obligations. This is a vulnerability for implementing TF related TFS effectively and without delay. In general, DNFBPs of all sizes and across all sectors seem to be unfamiliar with the actual purpose of TFS, screening procedures, the frequency of checks and the authorities who must be notified of freezing measures. Some DNFBPs confuse the lists of high-risk countries with the lists of persons and entities subject to TFS. Even among DNFBPs that consult the SPF Finance-Treasury sanctions lists, there are significant shortcomings in understanding the mechanisms and objectives of TFS, which is particularly worrying. However, little support and very few tools are made available to DNFBPs, whose role in applying TFS is no less important." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="830. The SPF Finance/Treasury was first notified in 2024 of a bank freezing assets that may be indirectly linked to the DPRK. Three transactions were identified in a case of false positives where two individuals and one non-customer entity shared the same name of designated persons, for a total amount of EUR 1 116. Verification measures by the SPF Finance are still ongoing, pending information from the Netherlands. These freezing measures, although recent and limited, appear to be consistent with the level of PF risk identified by Belgium. 831. The CTIF states that it has not received any suspicious transaction reports (STRs) on individuals targeted by PF related TFS. No cases relating to proliferation and its financing are being dealt with by the judicial authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="830. The SPF Finance/Treasury was first notified in 2024 of a bank freezing assets that may be indirectly linked to the DPRK. Three transactions were identified in a case of false positives where two individuals and one non-customer entity shared the same name of designated persons, for a total amount of EUR 1 116. Verification measures by the SPF Finance are still ongoing, pending information from the Netherlands. These freezing measures, although recent and limited, appear to be consistent with the level of PF risk identified by Belgium. 831. The CTIF states that it has not received any suspicious transaction reports (STRs) on individuals targeted by PF related TFS. No cases relating to proliferation and its financing are being dealt with by the judicial authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="203. Belgium has established institutional cooperation and coordination platforms on AML and CFT: the Ministerial Committee for Coordinating Measures Against Laundering Money from Illegal Sources ( Comité ministériel de coordination de la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux d’origine illicite - Ministerial ML Committee) in 2013, and the National Security Council ( Conseil national de sécurité – CNS) in 2015 (see the Introduction and R. 2 in the TC Annex), respectively. 1.5.1. Institutional AML coordination and cooperation 204. The Ministerial ML Committee, chaired by the Minister for Justice, is responsible for establishing the general AML policy. It is assisted by a technical body – the AML Coordination College (Collège de coordination de la LBC d’origine illicite) – consisting of public-sector experts within an Assembly of Partners, on the one hand, and a Judicial Platform, on the other. One of the AML Coordination College’s tasks is to develop and update the ML NRA. Following the adoption of the ML NRA in September 2023, an AML action plan was endorsed by the Ministerial Committee in March 2024 and transcribed into national AML policy. This institutional architecture for the coordination and cooperation of the competent AML authorities fulfils its remit of bringing together the authorities directly involved in AML, whose expertise is required to define a national AML policy. However, it has not yet led to the adoption of a sufficiently ambitious AML strategy (see the Introduction). 205. Furthermore, the Assembly of Partners of the AML Coordination College does not appear to include representatives of the SRBs of non-financial activities, and especially of sectors identified as being subject to the highest ML risk. Although they are apparently invited to contribute on an ad hoc basis, notably for the ML NRA, they need to be directly involved to ensure the representation of all authorities in charge of the sectors subject to AML obligations. The same applies to a certain number of private sectors, with a view to raising their awareness of AML issues and priorities (see IO.4). 206. In addition, and given the risk context in Belgium, the Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations (Office central des saisies et confiscations) should also be included in the Assembly of Partners. This additional member would reinforce the main priorities that Belgium should develop to improve its national AML policy (see sections 1.1 and 1.2 and IO.8). 1.5.2. Institutional CFT coordination and cooperation 207. The National Security Council (CNS), chaired by the Prime Minister, is responsible for overall intelligence and security policy in the country, including the strategic coordination of measures to counter terrorism and the financing of terrorism. It is assisted by a political body, the Strategic Committee (Intelligence and Security), which prepares for the CNS’ meetings and ensures the coordinated implementation of its decisions, and a technical body, the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security), which is responsible for coordination, collaboration and exchanges of information between the members. 208. The CNS has not defined a standalone national policy on TF. The reference framework is the 2021 Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism Strategy (TER Strategy), which sets out national counter-terrorism policy. While the TER Strategy does not explicitly target TF, the operational approach adopted covers TF aspects (see 1.2 above) and is conducted within the framework of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security) . 209. The composition of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security) and the Strategic Committee reflects the operational and individualised approach adopted in these bodies, and the emphasis placed on enforcement aspects. Despite their expertise in the TF field and their combined information resources, which can further enrich the knowledge of the risks and their trends at national level, the CTIF, customs authorities and SPF Finance (Treasury) in charge of implementing asset freezes of listed entities, the supervisory authorities and the tax authorities are not permanent members of the Coordination Committee and the Strategic Committee (see R.2 in the TC Annex). However, the CTIF has chaired the Coordination Committee’s TF platform and carried out the work on the TF NRA. 210. In this respect, the CTIF's role in the Belgian AML/CFT architecture should be reconsidered. It drives the development of the ML and TF NRAs, co-chairs and coordinates the work of the ML Coordination College and chairs the TF Coordination Committee’s TF Platform. It is therefore identified as the main pillar of AML/CFT activities by both the competent authorities and reporting entities. It also ensures de facto coordination between the ML Coordination College and the Coordination Committee (TF). In 2023 Belgium embarked on a project to reorganise national AML/CFT coordination, as set out in the AML action plan, with the aim of entrusting AML/CFT coordination to a single authority with no operational mandate. This approach should be continued and put into practice as soon as possible to optimise institutional cooperation and coordination with a view to providing a national response to the ML/TF risks identified, and to enable the CTIF to focus on its operational activities which are critical to the effectiveness of AML/CFT measures in Belgium." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="203. Belgium has established institutional cooperation and coordination platforms on AML and CFT: the Ministerial Committee for Coordinating Measures Against Laundering Money from Illegal Sources ( Comité ministériel de coordination de la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux d’origine illicite - Ministerial ML Committee) in 2013, and the National Security Council ( Conseil national de sécurité – CNS) in 2015 (see the Introduction and R. 2 in the TC Annex), respectively. 1.5.1. Institutional AML coordination and cooperation 204. The Ministerial ML Committee, chaired by the Minister for Justice, is responsible for establishing the general AML policy. It is assisted by a technical body – the AML Coordination College (Collège de coordination de la LBC d’origine illicite) – consisting of public-sector experts within an Assembly of Partners, on the one hand, and a Judicial Platform, on the other. One of the AML Coordination College’s tasks is to develop and update the ML NRA. Following the adoption of the ML NRA in September 2023, an AML action plan was endorsed by the Ministerial Committee in March 2024 and transcribed into national AML policy. This institutional architecture for the coordination and cooperation of the competent AML authorities fulfils its remit of bringing together the authorities directly involved in AML, whose expertise is required to define a national AML policy. However, it has not yet led to the adoption of a sufficiently ambitious AML strategy (see the Introduction). 205. Furthermore, the Assembly of Partners of the AML Coordination College does not appear to include representatives of the SRBs of non-financial activities, and especially of sectors identified as being subject to the highest ML risk. Although they are apparently invited to contribute on an ad hoc basis, notably for the ML NRA, they need to be directly involved to ensure the representation of all authorities in charge of the sectors subject to AML obligations. The same applies to a certain number of private sectors, with a view to raising their awareness of AML issues and priorities (see IO.4). 206. In addition, and given the risk context in Belgium, the Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations (Office central des saisies et confiscations) should also be included in the Assembly of Partners. This additional member would reinforce the main priorities that Belgium should develop to improve its national AML policy (see sections 1.1 and 1.2 and IO.8). 1.5.2. Institutional CFT coordination and cooperation 207. The National Security Council (CNS), chaired by the Prime Minister, is responsible for overall intelligence and security policy in the country, including the strategic coordination of measures to counter terrorism and the financing of terrorism. It is assisted by a political body, the Strategic Committee (Intelligence and Security), which prepares for the CNS’ meetings and ensures the coordinated implementation of its decisions, and a technical body, the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security), which is responsible for coordination, collaboration and exchanges of information between the members. 208. The CNS has not defined a standalone national policy on TF. The reference framework is the 2021 Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalism Strategy (TER Strategy), which sets out national counter-terrorism policy. While the TER Strategy does not explicitly target TF, the operational approach adopted covers TF aspects (see 1.2 above) and is conducted within the framework of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security) . 209. The composition of the Coordination Committee (Intelligence and Security) and the Strategic Committee reflects the operational and individualised approach adopted in these bodies, and the emphasis placed on enforcement aspects. Despite their expertise in the TF field and their combined information resources, which can further enrich the knowledge of the risks and their trends at national level, the CTIF, customs authorities and SPF Finance (Treasury) in charge of implementing asset freezes of listed entities, the supervisory authorities and the tax authorities are not permanent members of the Coordination Committee and the Strategic Committee (see R.2 in the TC Annex). However, the CTIF has chaired the Coordination Committee’s TF platform and carried out the work on the TF NRA. 210. In this respect, the CTIF's role in the Belgian AML/CFT architecture should be reconsidered. It drives the development of the ML and TF NRAs, co-chairs and coordinates the work of the ML Coordination College and chairs the TF Coordination Committee’s TF Platform. It is therefore identified as the main pillar of AML/CFT activities by both the competent authorities and reporting entities. It also ensures de facto coordination between the ML Coordination College and the Coordination Committee (TF). In 2023 Belgium embarked on a project to reorganise national AML/CFT coordination, as set out in the AML action plan, with the aim of entrusting AML/CFT coordination to a single authority with no operational mandate. This approach should be continued and put into practice as soon as possible to optimise institutional cooperation and coordination with a view to providing a national response to the ML/TF risks identified, and to enable the CTIF to focus on its operational activities which are critical to the effectiveness of AML/CFT measures in Belgium." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BNB 360. Since January 2020, the BNB has applied a risk-based supervisory policy to monitor the implementation of AML/CFT measures at 209 institutions, including the four largest banks representing 87% of assets. Although late, this approach has strengthened the maturity of the system thanks to a four-pillar framework and risk scoring. Created in 2016, the AML/CFT Group has almost tripled its staff to 18.4 FTE in 2024 (including 12.95 FTE dedicated to off-site supervision), with a ramp-up in off-site supervision and a tripling of resources dedicated to inspection (from 3 FTEs in 2016 to 10.5 FTEs in 2024). These developments are a clear improvement on the findings of the 2015 MER. The BNB does not have inspectors dedicated exclusively to AML/CFT; all inspectors can work on all of the BNB’s supervisory areas. AML/CFT is the primary or secondary area of expertise of several inspectors, but this has not yet been formalised in order to ensure its continuity, development and the maintenance of the quality of inspection reports. 361. The BNB deploys a wide range of AML/CFT supervisory tools, both off-site and on-site, including thematic reviews, inspections, flash missions and special audits entrusted to statutory auditors. Each of these tools has a specific objective: · thematic reviews enable the BNB to take stock of practices across a sector in a specific area; · inspections provide comprehensive, detailed and in-depth knowledge of the effectiveness of an FI’s AML/CFT system; · “flash” missions aim to obtain targeted information on the effectiveness of an FI’s AML/CFT system, often as part of the follow-up to a remediation plan; and finally · special audits entrusted by the BNB to the approved auditor provide a more accurate picture of the effectiveness of the measures in place as part of the follow-up to a remediation plan. 362. These control tools are used appropriately and with a view to improving FI compliance. Off-site inspections are based, among other things, on an analysis of the AML questionnaire, EGR, AMLCO annual report, information received from the CTIF, as well as interviews and targeted tests (sample client files, monitoring alerts, review of internal procedures). For FIs with major deficiencies, an intensive monitoring procedure is put in place, allowing for close supervision, an approach that is considered effective. 363. At the end of each year, the AML/CFT Group draws up a list of FIs eligible for inspection for the coming year, based on their level of residual risk, the SRA, and internal (from off-site supervision) and external information, among other factors. Since this list of eligible FIs is, by definition, longer than the number of inspections that can actually be carried out in the coming year, the AML/CFT Group also ranks the desired inspections in order of priority. This list is discussed with the inspection teams within the prudential departments. However, the final schedule is decided by the inspection teams, in consultation with the AML/CFT Group. The number of inspections actually carried out depends on the resources allocated to AML/CFT inspections by the BNB Management Committee. Due to the need to set priorities, around half of the eligible inspections are rejected because the number of requests far exceeds the available inspection capacity. This circumstance may result in the postponement of eligible inspections by the AML/CFT Group, with some inspections deemed to be of lower priority being postponed for one year or more. In this case, and if deemed appropriate, the AML/CFT Group will incorporate specific supervisory actions into its off-site supervision programme. No margin is provided for additional inspections, thereby limiting the responsiveness and flexibility of the system. The emergence of a critical risk or a desired change to the inspection plan can only be incorporated by postponing an inspection included in the inspection plan (this was the case for the first two de-risking inspections). 364. Supervision of the information accompanying fund transfers, which is integrated into inspections, is considered adequate. However, cash-related risks do not appear to be sufficiently taken into account in the planning of inspections for certain exposed institutions (as identified in the BNB’s NRA and SRA, in particular CIs). 365. In 2023, the BNB supervised 183 of the 209 institutions through off-site inspections, covering 100% of high-risk entities and 85% of medium-high risk entities. This coverage appears to be robust and targeted, in line with effective risk management, ensuring satisfactory monitoring. Off-site actions and inspections may lead to administrative measures, severe or otherwise, or to sanctions, giving the AML/CFT Group greater flexibility and responsiveness. However, the real impact of this monitoring depends on the ability to intervene and respond to problematic cases. In practice, only inspections with the lowest score (4/4) or with a score of 3/4 and at least one critical recommendation are discussed with a view to the possible application of an administrative measure, severe or otherwise, and/or a sanction. In practice, the majority of administrative measures, severe or otherwise, were imposed on FIs on the basis of a prior inspection. 366. Inspections carried out by the BNB are lengthy and require significant resources. Their average duration is 8.3 calendar months, [111] with some lasting more than a year and others being shorter (3 to 6 months). They involve 2 to 4 inspectors and represent a significant time commitment. The quality and detail of the inspection reports are to be commended: they are based on observations, ratings and recommendations, with a criticality rating (“critical”, “high”, “medium”), and are scored out of 4 (4 being the lowest score). Thanks to their level of detail and clarity, they are a key tool for the BNB and FIs, facilitating the understanding of shortcomings and the implementation of effective corrective measures. 367. The BNB applies a lighter off-site supervision regime for certain FIs classified as medium/low risk or low risk, which are pooled together. Three members of the AML/CFT Group are primarily assigned to the supervision of these 35 FIs (as of 31 July 2024), 14 of which are exempt from certain reporting requirements to the BNB (see section 3.1). This system is designed to respond when necessary and to verify the relevance of the risk score every two to three years. This approach is subject to regular assessment to ensure that this lighter supervision remains adequate, which the BNB undertakes. One case illustrated this need: a Belgian branch of a PI authorised in Greece, initially classified as purely commercial, was ultimately identified as involved in establishing business relationships, leading to an adjustment of its supervision by the BNB. 368. Exchanges between the BNB and its counterparts, particularly in Europe, are regular and appropriate for AML/CFT supervision of groups. The active participation of the CTIF in oversight boards, with the sharing of analytical information, is good practice. 369. The monitoring of entities authorised post-Brexit is considered effective, with several inspections carried out and corrective measures applied. The EMIs and PIs inspected were appropriately selected from among those presenting the highest risks and/or materiality. However, supervision of EMIs and PIs remains insufficient: only one EMI was inspected in 2019, compared with 13 in 2020 and 7 in 2023; for PIs, only five inspections were carried out between 2020 and 2023 (one in 2020, two in 2022 and two in 2023), out of a total of 53 PIs. This low coverage rate, despite the risks presented by these categories of FIs, increases the risk of prolonged non-compliance. FSMA 370. In general, the FSMA has strengthened its risk-based approach with several areas of progress since the 2015 MER: introduction of a periodic questionnaire and individual risk assessments (since 2018), creation of an AML/CFT centre of expertise (2022), formalised cooperation with the CTIF (2022) and other European authorities (from 2019), and publication of its first SRA (2024). 371. The AML centre of expertise handles a reasonable number of cases per year. The annual supervision plan follows a risk-based approach, incorporating the SRA and the documents submitted by the FIs. The FSMA combines off-site and on-site supervision, with the latter mainly carried out in the most high-risk sectors. Off-site supervision includes interviews with the AMLCO, review of the AMLCO’s annual reports, analysis of audit reports and mandates given to statutory auditors, and a spot check of responses to periodic questionnaires on the implementation of risk mitigation measures. Thematic inspections covering several FIs on specific aspects may be carried out (e.g. an analysis of the monthly reports sent by all bureaux de change). Some of these inspections are primarily aimed at improving the FSMA’s understanding of a sector. 372. The FSMA may also decide to carry out an off-site inspection of the existence and adequacy of policies and procedures. These more in-depth inspections aim to assess the existence and completeness of a financial institution’s AML/CFT system (see section 3.6). 373. These off-site inspections, which are formal, appear to be appropriate for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of a sector or for ensuring the existence and completeness of policies and procedures. However, given the large number of FIs supervised by the FSMA and the relatively limited number of inspections scheduled, the formal nature of these off-site inspections limits their effectiveness. Their impact is reduced by the absence, in some instances, of more operational data, such as analysis of transactions and customer files, which would enable a concrete assessment of the implementation of risk mitigating measures. Off-site controls are quick with a 1-2 month turnaround time for analysis and 2-3 months for remediation. Inspection reports are deemed to be of good quality, providing sufficient level of detail to enable the FI to understand its deficiencies and improve. 374. The FSMA has AML inspectors who, together with the AML centre of expertise, carry out on-site inspections. These inspections, which may be announced or unannounced, take one to two days, rarely longer, with an in-depth analysis and cross-checking phase upstream and downstream. They assess the formal compliance of policies and procedures and their effectiveness by examining a selection of customer files and transactions. However, they do not always check whether the mitigating measures implemented are actually appropriate for the risks presented by the FI. 375. The FSMA has the flexibility to carry out ad hoc inspections, i.e. unscheduled inspections, which may be conducted on or off-site, announced or unannounced, as required (e.g. following an off-site inspection, an event or press articles). Its inspection procedure is quick and effective, particularly for currency exchange offices, for which the inspection plan would appear to be appropriate: over the years 2023-2024, all eight currency exchange offices were inspected. These on-site inspections followed a thematic action carried out in 2023 on reporting activity. They revealed an initial improvement in the quality of STRs, which are now based on concrete analyses rather than quantitative thresholds. However, the findings for three currency exchange offices still point to insufficient or late reporting. 376. Certain categories of FIs are not sufficiently supervised, particularly through on-site inspections (see table below). This is particularly the case for managers of small OPCAs, which are identified as being of the highest risk in their category, but for which no on-site inspections have been carried out since 2019. Supervision is also limited for insurance intermediaries (no on-site inspections since 2021, despite concerning findings during the last inspections) and lenders (10 on-site inspections in six years and 8 remote inspections, all carried out in 2019), despite the existence of specific risks. Priority is given to consumer credit lenders, which are considered the highest risk, while mortgage and social lenders remain largely overlooked. However, the latter also have vulnerabilities that call for an assessment of the effective implementation of mitigating measures – an assessment that cannot be carried out through the FSMA’s off-site inspections. Table 3.2. FSMA inspections (2019-2024) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total On-site inspections Lenders 5 0 4 0 0 1 10 Insurance intermediaries 88 0 36 0 0 0 124 Small alternative OPCA 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 Off-site inspections Lenders 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 Insurance intermediaries 98 240* 0 0 40 22 400 Small alternative OPCA 0 0 20 0 0 57* 77 Note: * These inspections were carried out on an ad hoc basis, for information purposes only, to gain a better understanding of how the sector operates. No findings or orders were issued following these inspections. For follow-up, refer to table 3.4 in section 3.6. Source: FSMA 377. The nine VASPs issued with provisional authorisation were subject to on-site inspections, for those assessed as higher risk (two VASPs), or off-site inspections (seven VASPs) (see below for the results of these inspections). SPF Finance – Treasury 378. The 2015 MER recommended that Bpost implement AML/CFT supervision. SPF Finance has been supervising Bpost since 2016. The last inspection was carried out in 2020 and was followed by an action plan that was completed in 2023. Given the ML/TF risks posed by the financial services offered by Bpost, particularly in relation to the predominant use of cash and the relative anonymity of Bpaid cards, the frequency of inspections would appear to be insufficient. Footnotes [111] This duration takes into account the unforeseeable circumstances associated with inspections and includes five “full programme” inspections of large banks carried out between 2020 and 2022." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BNB 360. Since January 2020, the BNB has applied a risk-based supervisory policy to monitor the implementation of AML/CFT measures at 209 institutions, including the four largest banks representing 87% of assets. Although late, this approach has strengthened the maturity of the system thanks to a four-pillar framework and risk scoring. Created in 2016, the AML/CFT Group has almost tripled its staff to 18.4 FTE in 2024 (including 12.95 FTE dedicated to off-site supervision), with a ramp-up in off-site supervision and a tripling of resources dedicated to inspection (from 3 FTEs in 2016 to 10.5 FTEs in 2024). These developments are a clear improvement on the findings of the 2015 MER. The BNB does not have inspectors dedicated exclusively to AML/CFT; all inspectors can work on all of the BNB’s supervisory areas. AML/CFT is the primary or secondary area of expertise of several inspectors, but this has not yet been formalised in order to ensure its continuity, development and the maintenance of the quality of inspection reports. 361. The BNB deploys a wide range of AML/CFT supervisory tools, both off-site and on-site, including thematic reviews, inspections, flash missions and special audits entrusted to statutory auditors. Each of these tools has a specific objective: · thematic reviews enable the BNB to take stock of practices across a sector in a specific area; · inspections provide comprehensive, detailed and in-depth knowledge of the effectiveness of an FI’s AML/CFT system; · “flash” missions aim to obtain targeted information on the effectiveness of an FI’s AML/CFT system, often as part of the follow-up to a remediation plan; and finally · special audits entrusted by the BNB to the approved auditor provide a more accurate picture of the effectiveness of the measures in place as part of the follow-up to a remediation plan. 362. These control tools are used appropriately and with a view to improving FI compliance. Off-site inspections are based, among other things, on an analysis of the AML questionnaire, EGR, AMLCO annual report, information received from the CTIF, as well as interviews and targeted tests (sample client files, monitoring alerts, review of internal procedures). For FIs with major deficiencies, an intensive monitoring procedure is put in place, allowing for close supervision, an approach that is considered effective. 363. At the end of each year, the AML/CFT Group draws up a list of FIs eligible for inspection for the coming year, based on their level of residual risk, the SRA, and internal (from off-site supervision) and external information, among other factors. Since this list of eligible FIs is, by definition, longer than the number of inspections that can actually be carried out in the coming year, the AML/CFT Group also ranks the desired inspections in order of priority. This list is discussed with the inspection teams within the prudential departments. However, the final schedule is decided by the inspection teams, in consultation with the AML/CFT Group. The number of inspections actually carried out depends on the resources allocated to AML/CFT inspections by the BNB Management Committee. Due to the need to set priorities, around half of the eligible inspections are rejected because the number of requests far exceeds the available inspection capacity. This circumstance may result in the postponement of eligible inspections by the AML/CFT Group, with some inspections deemed to be of lower priority being postponed for one year or more. In this case, and if deemed appropriate, the AML/CFT Group will incorporate specific supervisory actions into its off-site supervision programme. No margin is provided for additional inspections, thereby limiting the responsiveness and flexibility of the system. The emergence of a critical risk or a desired change to the inspection plan can only be incorporated by postponing an inspection included in the inspection plan (this was the case for the first two de-risking inspections). 364. Supervision of the information accompanying fund transfers, which is integrated into inspections, is considered adequate. However, cash-related risks do not appear to be sufficiently taken into account in the planning of inspections for certain exposed institutions (as identified in the BNB’s NRA and SRA, in particular CIs). 365. In 2023, the BNB supervised 183 of the 209 institutions through off-site inspections, covering 100% of high-risk entities and 85% of medium-high risk entities. This coverage appears to be robust and targeted, in line with effective risk management, ensuring satisfactory monitoring. Off-site actions and inspections may lead to administrative measures, severe or otherwise, or to sanctions, giving the AML/CFT Group greater flexibility and responsiveness. However, the real impact of this monitoring depends on the ability to intervene and respond to problematic cases. In practice, only inspections with the lowest score (4/4) or with a score of 3/4 and at least one critical recommendation are discussed with a view to the possible application of an administrative measure, severe or otherwise, and/or a sanction. In practice, the majority of administrative measures, severe or otherwise, were imposed on FIs on the basis of a prior inspection. 366. Inspections carried out by the BNB are lengthy and require significant resources. Their average duration is 8.3 calendar months, [111] with some lasting more than a year and others being shorter (3 to 6 months). They involve 2 to 4 inspectors and represent a significant time commitment. The quality and detail of the inspection reports are to be commended: they are based on observations, ratings and recommendations, with a criticality rating (“critical”, “high”, “medium”), and are scored out of 4 (4 being the lowest score). Thanks to their level of detail and clarity, they are a key tool for the BNB and FIs, facilitating the understanding of shortcomings and the implementation of effective corrective measures. 367. The BNB applies a lighter off-site supervision regime for certain FIs classified as medium/low risk or low risk, which are pooled together. Three members of the AML/CFT Group are primarily assigned to the supervision of these 35 FIs (as of 31 July 2024), 14 of which are exempt from certain reporting requirements to the BNB (see section 3.1). This system is designed to respond when necessary and to verify the relevance of the risk score every two to three years. This approach is subject to regular assessment to ensure that this lighter supervision remains adequate, which the BNB undertakes. One case illustrated this need: a Belgian branch of a PI authorised in Greece, initially classified as purely commercial, was ultimately identified as involved in establishing business relationships, leading to an adjustment of its supervision by the BNB. 368. Exchanges between the BNB and its counterparts, particularly in Europe, are regular and appropriate for AML/CFT supervision of groups. The active participation of the CTIF in oversight boards, with the sharing of analytical information, is good practice. 369. The monitoring of entities authorised post-Brexit is considered effective, with several inspections carried out and corrective measures applied. The EMIs and PIs inspected were appropriately selected from among those presenting the highest risks and/or materiality. However, supervision of EMIs and PIs remains insufficient: only one EMI was inspected in 2019, compared with 13 in 2020 and 7 in 2023; for PIs, only five inspections were carried out between 2020 and 2023 (one in 2020, two in 2022 and two in 2023), out of a total of 53 PIs. This low coverage rate, despite the risks presented by these categories of FIs, increases the risk of prolonged non-compliance. FSMA 370. In general, the FSMA has strengthened its risk-based approach with several areas of progress since the 2015 MER: introduction of a periodic questionnaire and individual risk assessments (since 2018), creation of an AML/CFT centre of expertise (2022), formalised cooperation with the CTIF (2022) and other European authorities (from 2019), and publication of its first SRA (2024). 371. The AML centre of expertise handles a reasonable number of cases per year. The annual supervision plan follows a risk-based approach, incorporating the SRA and the documents submitted by the FIs. The FSMA combines off-site and on-site supervision, with the latter mainly carried out in the most high-risk sectors. Off-site supervision includes interviews with the AMLCO, review of the AMLCO’s annual reports, analysis of audit reports and mandates given to statutory auditors, and a spot check of responses to periodic questionnaires on the implementation of risk mitigation measures. Thematic inspections covering several FIs on specific aspects may be carried out (e.g. an analysis of the monthly reports sent by all bureaux de change). Some of these inspections are primarily aimed at improving the FSMA’s understanding of a sector. 372. The FSMA may also decide to carry out an off-site inspection of the existence and adequacy of policies and procedures. These more in-depth inspections aim to assess the existence and completeness of a financial institution’s AML/CFT system (see section 3.6). 373. These off-site inspections, which are formal, appear to be appropriate for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of a sector or for ensuring the existence and completeness of policies and procedures. However, given the large number of FIs supervised by the FSMA and the relatively limited number of inspections scheduled, the formal nature of these off-site inspections limits their effectiveness. Their impact is reduced by the absence, in some instances, of more operational data, such as analysis of transactions and customer files, which would enable a concrete assessment of the implementation of risk mitigating measures. Off-site controls are quick with a 1-2 month turnaround time for analysis and 2-3 months for remediation. Inspection reports are deemed to be of good quality, providing sufficient level of detail to enable the FI to understand its deficiencies and improve. 374. The FSMA has AML inspectors who, together with the AML centre of expertise, carry out on-site inspections. These inspections, which may be announced or unannounced, take one to two days, rarely longer, with an in-depth analysis and cross-checking phase upstream and downstream. They assess the formal compliance of policies and procedures and their effectiveness by examining a selection of customer files and transactions. However, they do not always check whether the mitigating measures implemented are actually appropriate for the risks presented by the FI. 375. The FSMA has the flexibility to carry out ad hoc inspections, i.e. unscheduled inspections, which may be conducted on or off-site, announced or unannounced, as required (e.g. following an off-site inspection, an event or press articles). Its inspection procedure is quick and effective, particularly for currency exchange offices, for which the inspection plan would appear to be appropriate: over the years 2023-2024, all eight currency exchange offices were inspected. These on-site inspections followed a thematic action carried out in 2023 on reporting activity. They revealed an initial improvement in the quality of STRs, which are now based on concrete analyses rather than quantitative thresholds. However, the findings for three currency exchange offices still point to insufficient or late reporting. 376. Certain categories of FIs are not sufficiently supervised, particularly through on-site inspections (see table below). This is particularly the case for managers of small OPCAs, which are identified as being of the highest risk in their category, but for which no on-site inspections have been carried out since 2019. Supervision is also limited for insurance intermediaries (no on-site inspections since 2021, despite concerning findings during the last inspections) and lenders (10 on-site inspections in six years and 8 remote inspections, all carried out in 2019), despite the existence of specific risks. Priority is given to consumer credit lenders, which are considered the highest risk, while mortgage and social lenders remain largely overlooked. However, the latter also have vulnerabilities that call for an assessment of the effective implementation of mitigating measures – an assessment that cannot be carried out through the FSMA’s off-site inspections. Table 3.2. FSMA inspections (2019-2024) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total On-site inspections Lenders 5 0 4 0 0 1 10 Insurance intermediaries 88 0 36 0 0 0 124 Small alternative OPCA 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 Off-site inspections Lenders 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 Insurance intermediaries 98 240* 0 0 40 22 400 Small alternative OPCA 0 0 20 0 0 57* 77 Note: * These inspections were carried out on an ad hoc basis, for information purposes only, to gain a better understanding of how the sector operates. No findings or orders were issued following these inspections. For follow-up, refer to table 3.4 in section 3.6. Source: FSMA 377. The nine VASPs issued with provisional authorisation were subject to on-site inspections, for those assessed as higher risk (two VASPs), or off-site inspections (seven VASPs) (see below for the results of these inspections). SPF Finance – Treasury 378. The 2015 MER recommended that Bpost implement AML/CFT supervision. SPF Finance has been supervising Bpost since 2016. The last inspection was carried out in 2020 and was followed by an action plan that was completed in 2023. Given the ML/TF risks posed by the financial services offered by Bpost, particularly in relation to the predominant use of cash and the relative anonymity of Bpaid cards, the frequency of inspections would appear to be insufficient. Footnotes [111] This duration takes into account the unforeseeable circumstances associated with inspections and includes five “full programme” inspections of large banks carried out between 2020 and 2022." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. The authorities supervise all sectors, with the exception of casinos, where supervision is not effective (see section 4.1). However, for most sectors, this supervision is superficial, often limited to formal checks of documentation, without assessing the practical implementation or effectiveness of the measures put in place to prevent ML/TF. 470. SPF Economy (the “ML/TF prevention” unit) is responsible for supervising more than 15,000 DNFBPs, including high-risk and high-importance sectors such as diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, in addition to monitoring compliance with cash payment limits in all businesses in Belgium (see IO 1). Yet it only has 16 FTEs, including three vacant posts in 2023 and part of 2024. Although this unit is supported by a few regional inspectors, human resources remain very insufficient given the supervisory requirements of such a large and high-risk area. The majority of reporting entities do not sufficiently understand their AML/CFT obligations (see section 4.4), making rigorous follow-up all the more crucial. Although staff numbers have doubled since 2015, new control measures have been introduced and new sectors have been made subject to supervision (notably business centres in 2019), as well as a number of other sectors not covered by the FATF Recommendations, such as tax advisers, professional football, art and antique dealers, art and antique storage facilities and safe deposit box rental companies (see the Introduction and IO 1). In addition, the tasks of SPF Economy’s AML/CFT prevention unit go well beyond the scope of AML/CFT and include areas as diverse as the supervision of subsidies in the context of military and aeronautical contracts, the supervision of the sale of explosives precursors and the import of conflict minerals, as well as assisting the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) with its supervision on Belgian territory. This dispersion of resources prevents the unit from focusing all its efforts on supervising DNFBPs, which are already under-resourced. Finally, although SPF Economy is attempting to adopt a risk-based supervisory approach, this varies from sector to sector and is not yet fully developed. 471. For diamond dealers - the monitoring approach uses a sophisticated scoring tool to identify the highest-risk entities. In 2024, nearly one-third of entities are classified as medium or high risk, confirming the sector’s significant exposure to ML/TF risks, while 114 diamond dealers (approximately 8%) are considered high-risk, requiring increased vigilance and enhanced supervision. The frequency of on-site inspections is irregular, with a marked decline in 2022. Only four inspections are carried out per year on average, which is insufficient in this high-risk sector, especially since 76% of the entities inspected present AML/CFT shortcomings. Table 4.6. AML/CFT supervision among diamond dealers 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 4 7 1 5 4 21 Number of entities with breaches 1 5 1 5 4 16 i.e. 76% Source: SPF Economy 472. Supervision is performed by specialised inspectors and frequently reveals major shortcomings, which systematically result in financial penalties. The authorities conduct in-depth preliminary analyses (of transactions and networks), making inspections particularly demanding, ranging from three to six months depending on the complexity of the cases. Supervision revealed major shortcomings (see previous section), including a lack of risk analysis, no AML/CFT officer and inadequate customer and BO verification. Due to a lack of resources, no follow-up supervision was carried out and no random inspections of medium- or low-risk entities were conducted. This partial coverage of a high-risk sector limits SPF Economy’s ability to ensure effective AML/CFT compliance by diamond dealers. 473. Faced with a lack of resources and in the interests of efficiency, SPF Economy combined its supervision of real estate agents’ AML/CFT obligations with the supervision of consumer protection obligations and other legislation falling within its remit as part of a sector inquiry in 2021 and open source research. However, this approach remains insufficient to ensure systematic and in-depth monitoring of ML/TF risks. In 2019, targeted action on luxury real estate, commercial real estate and second homes abroad revealed a non-compliance rate of 78%, but was not followed up systematically due to a lack of resources In 2021, a general survey showed that 44% of the 334 agents inspected presented at least one AML/CFT breach. Although supervision carried out between 2020 and 2021 confirmed weaknesses, it did not systematically target the most at-risk entities. Between 2020 and 2023, only 37 AML/CFT inspections were carried out, excluding the general survey (see table). Of these inspections, 26 revealed at least one breach, representing a non-compliance rate of nearly 70%; and 7 of the 37 were follow-up inspections in B2B, which is insufficient given the persistent weaknesses in the sector. These figures confirm the significant shortcomings in the sector and highlight a lack of effective coverage, given the scale of the risks identified. Table 4.7. Supervision of real estate agents (excluding general survey) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 5 18 7 7 x 37 Of which with breaches 3 12 4 7 x 26 i.e. 70% x:data not provided Source: SPF Economy 474. The supervision of business centres has evolved towards a more risk-based approach, particularly since 2021. SPF Economy determines which entities to supervise on the basis of fixed criteria, including the concentration of companies at the same address, risky activities, their profile and the frequency of address changes. These elements are supplemented by information from other authorities, including the public prosecutor’s office, the judicial police (see Company Dumping project, IO 5), the Special Tax Inspectorate (ISI) and other inspection services and authorities with which the Inspection Department of SPF Economy is in contact. A supervision plan is drawn up at the beginning of the year, adjusted according to available resources, with enhanced follow-up for large service providers. 475. In 2022, SPF Economy conducted a sectoral survey of 165 entities, with the main aim of checking unregistered business centres. The results give cause for concern: 57% were not registered and nearly 69% had serious shortcomings (lack of risk analysis, superficial customer checks and poor understanding of AML/CFT obligations). These results demonstrated SPF Economy’s ability to detect and sanction unregistered business centres. The pace of inspections has since slowed, with eight inspections carried out in 2024. The low volume of inspections and the high rate of non-compliance detected demonstrate that there is still insufficient understanding of AML/CFT obligations within the sector (see section 4.3). Furthermore, the growing importance of ensuring that business centres are registered and apply appropriate AML/CFT measures is putting additional pressure on SPF Economy, which is already under-resourced, further limiting its ability to supervise the sector. 476. The provincial chambers of notaries apply partially risk-based controls, targeting the high-risk activities of each notary (a sample of real estate files and files relating to the incorporation of companies). All notaries are supervised on a three-year cycle by supervisors from within the profession, using a standardised form focusing on customer identification and unusual transactions. However, these inspections are brief (1 to 2 hours), which raises questions about their actual depth. They are rarely announced, which ensures that they are carried out in real-life situations. Finally, in some smaller provinces or districts of Belgium where notaries are more closely connected and professional ties may exist, it might be useful to consider entrusting supervision to notaries from another province or district in order to ensure the necessary neutrality. Furthermore, although supervision did not systematically result in formal reports of breaches, shortcomings in the understanding and application of AML/CFT obligations among notaries were identified, particularly with regard to enhanced due diligence measures (see section 4.4). 477. For lawyers , AML/CFT supervision varies across bars, with differing approaches: some rely on risk-based questionnaires, others on random inspections or inspections proportional to the size of the bar. A single law firm may be registered with several bars, which complicates compliance and supervision. Risk-based AML/CFT supervision, which is still recent (since 2023), is often linked to supervision of quality accounts. For the rest, inspectors check for the existence of measures such as AML/CFT policies and procedures, but focus little on their effective implementation. The resources allocated are generally sufficient, but support from the bars remains variable, with some failing to make recommendations following their inspections. Large firms are generally better prepared, although shortcomings are sometimes noted, while small and medium-sized firms more frequently present shortcomings, particularly in preventive measures and understanding ML/TF risks. 478. The ITAA carries out rigorous AML/CFT supervision of accountants, combining document-based and on-site inspections through several mechanisms: AML investigations, quality reviews, thematic inspections and additional reviews. With 92 inspectors, the ITAA has strong supervisory capacity, enabling it to carry out a large number of supervisory activities. In 2024, it carried out 549 quality reviews, which are conducted every seven years and include a comprehensive AML/CFT component. These activities are complemented by thematic and follow-up inspections. Before each inspection, a document analysis is carried out to identify high-risk firms. On-site visits take an average of 1.5 days, longer for larger structures. In the event of a major breach, follow-up is planned within three to six months. While serious breaches are rare, recurring shortcomings mainly concern information on BOs (incomplete information). 479. The BAOB conducts rigorous supervision of statutory auditors, with robust on-site inspections every three or six years depending on the type of engagement, including a risk-based AML/CFT component. This supervision is combined with thematic inspections that examine how well auditors apply the standards based on the BAOB’s risk assessment and the individual risk profiles for each auditor that the BAOB sets up and updates every year. Thematic inspections tailored to the risks are also carried out. With extensive powers comparable to those of the FSMA, the BAOB can intervene effectively in the event of breaches and works closely with other authorities, including the CTIF, particularly when an auditor is deemed insufficiently qualified for certain tasks, such as the verification of virtual asset service providers or in cases of fraud. 480. The CJH does not have the autonomy to hire its own staff, as this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. It employs just five people to oversee a sector comprising some 7,000 establishments (casinos and gambling venues). This structural shortcoming limits the CJH’s ability to carry out effective AML/CFT supervision in casinos and gambling establishments, which are inherently exposed to a high risk of laundering." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. The authorities supervise all sectors, with the exception of casinos, where supervision is not effective (see section 4.1). However, for most sectors, this supervision is superficial, often limited to formal checks of documentation, without assessing the practical implementation or effectiveness of the measures put in place to prevent ML/TF. 470. SPF Economy (the “ML/TF prevention” unit) is responsible for supervising more than 15,000 DNFBPs, including high-risk and high-importance sectors such as diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres, in addition to monitoring compliance with cash payment limits in all businesses in Belgium (see IO 1). Yet it only has 16 FTEs, including three vacant posts in 2023 and part of 2024. Although this unit is supported by a few regional inspectors, human resources remain very insufficient given the supervisory requirements of such a large and high-risk area. The majority of reporting entities do not sufficiently understand their AML/CFT obligations (see section 4.4), making rigorous follow-up all the more crucial. Although staff numbers have doubled since 2015, new control measures have been introduced and new sectors have been made subject to supervision (notably business centres in 2019), as well as a number of other sectors not covered by the FATF Recommendations, such as tax advisers, professional football, art and antique dealers, art and antique storage facilities and safe deposit box rental companies (see the Introduction and IO 1). In addition, the tasks of SPF Economy’s AML/CFT prevention unit go well beyond the scope of AML/CFT and include areas as diverse as the supervision of subsidies in the context of military and aeronautical contracts, the supervision of the sale of explosives precursors and the import of conflict minerals, as well as assisting the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) with its supervision on Belgian territory. This dispersion of resources prevents the unit from focusing all its efforts on supervising DNFBPs, which are already under-resourced. Finally, although SPF Economy is attempting to adopt a risk-based supervisory approach, this varies from sector to sector and is not yet fully developed. 471. For diamond dealers - the monitoring approach uses a sophisticated scoring tool to identify the highest-risk entities. In 2024, nearly one-third of entities are classified as medium or high risk, confirming the sector’s significant exposure to ML/TF risks, while 114 diamond dealers (approximately 8%) are considered high-risk, requiring increased vigilance and enhanced supervision. The frequency of on-site inspections is irregular, with a marked decline in 2022. Only four inspections are carried out per year on average, which is insufficient in this high-risk sector, especially since 76% of the entities inspected present AML/CFT shortcomings. Table 4.6. AML/CFT supervision among diamond dealers 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 4 7 1 5 4 21 Number of entities with breaches 1 5 1 5 4 16 i.e. 76% Source: SPF Economy 472. Supervision is performed by specialised inspectors and frequently reveals major shortcomings, which systematically result in financial penalties. The authorities conduct in-depth preliminary analyses (of transactions and networks), making inspections particularly demanding, ranging from three to six months depending on the complexity of the cases. Supervision revealed major shortcomings (see previous section), including a lack of risk analysis, no AML/CFT officer and inadequate customer and BO verification. Due to a lack of resources, no follow-up supervision was carried out and no random inspections of medium- or low-risk entities were conducted. This partial coverage of a high-risk sector limits SPF Economy’s ability to ensure effective AML/CFT compliance by diamond dealers. 473. Faced with a lack of resources and in the interests of efficiency, SPF Economy combined its supervision of real estate agents’ AML/CFT obligations with the supervision of consumer protection obligations and other legislation falling within its remit as part of a sector inquiry in 2021 and open source research. However, this approach remains insufficient to ensure systematic and in-depth monitoring of ML/TF risks. In 2019, targeted action on luxury real estate, commercial real estate and second homes abroad revealed a non-compliance rate of 78%, but was not followed up systematically due to a lack of resources In 2021, a general survey showed that 44% of the 334 agents inspected presented at least one AML/CFT breach. Although supervision carried out between 2020 and 2021 confirmed weaknesses, it did not systematically target the most at-risk entities. Between 2020 and 2023, only 37 AML/CFT inspections were carried out, excluding the general survey (see table). Of these inspections, 26 revealed at least one breach, representing a non-compliance rate of nearly 70%; and 7 of the 37 were follow-up inspections in B2B, which is insufficient given the persistent weaknesses in the sector. These figures confirm the significant shortcomings in the sector and highlight a lack of effective coverage, given the scale of the risks identified. Table 4.7. Supervision of real estate agents (excluding general survey) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 5 18 7 7 x 37 Of which with breaches 3 12 4 7 x 26 i.e. 70% x:data not provided Source: SPF Economy 474. The supervision of business centres has evolved towards a more risk-based approach, particularly since 2021. SPF Economy determines which entities to supervise on the basis of fixed criteria, including the concentration of companies at the same address, risky activities, their profile and the frequency of address changes. These elements are supplemented by information from other authorities, including the public prosecutor’s office, the judicial police (see Company Dumping project, IO 5), the Special Tax Inspectorate (ISI) and other inspection services and authorities with which the Inspection Department of SPF Economy is in contact. A supervision plan is drawn up at the beginning of the year, adjusted according to available resources, with enhanced follow-up for large service providers. 475. In 2022, SPF Economy conducted a sectoral survey of 165 entities, with the main aim of checking unregistered business centres. The results give cause for concern: 57% were not registered and nearly 69% had serious shortcomings (lack of risk analysis, superficial customer checks and poor understanding of AML/CFT obligations). These results demonstrated SPF Economy’s ability to detect and sanction unregistered business centres. The pace of inspections has since slowed, with eight inspections carried out in 2024. The low volume of inspections and the high rate of non-compliance detected demonstrate that there is still insufficient understanding of AML/CFT obligations within the sector (see section 4.3). Furthermore, the growing importance of ensuring that business centres are registered and apply appropriate AML/CFT measures is putting additional pressure on SPF Economy, which is already under-resourced, further limiting its ability to supervise the sector. 476. The provincial chambers of notaries apply partially risk-based controls, targeting the high-risk activities of each notary (a sample of real estate files and files relating to the incorporation of companies). All notaries are supervised on a three-year cycle by supervisors from within the profession, using a standardised form focusing on customer identification and unusual transactions. However, these inspections are brief (1 to 2 hours), which raises questions about their actual depth. They are rarely announced, which ensures that they are carried out in real-life situations. Finally, in some smaller provinces or districts of Belgium where notaries are more closely connected and professional ties may exist, it might be useful to consider entrusting supervision to notaries from another province or district in order to ensure the necessary neutrality. Furthermore, although supervision did not systematically result in formal reports of breaches, shortcomings in the understanding and application of AML/CFT obligations among notaries were identified, particularly with regard to enhanced due diligence measures (see section 4.4). 477. For lawyers , AML/CFT supervision varies across bars, with differing approaches: some rely on risk-based questionnaires, others on random inspections or inspections proportional to the size of the bar. A single law firm may be registered with several bars, which complicates compliance and supervision. Risk-based AML/CFT supervision, which is still recent (since 2023), is often linked to supervision of quality accounts. For the rest, inspectors check for the existence of measures such as AML/CFT policies and procedures, but focus little on their effective implementation. The resources allocated are generally sufficient, but support from the bars remains variable, with some failing to make recommendations following their inspections. Large firms are generally better prepared, although shortcomings are sometimes noted, while small and medium-sized firms more frequently present shortcomings, particularly in preventive measures and understanding ML/TF risks. 478. The ITAA carries out rigorous AML/CFT supervision of accountants, combining document-based and on-site inspections through several mechanisms: AML investigations, quality reviews, thematic inspections and additional reviews. With 92 inspectors, the ITAA has strong supervisory capacity, enabling it to carry out a large number of supervisory activities. In 2024, it carried out 549 quality reviews, which are conducted every seven years and include a comprehensive AML/CFT component. These activities are complemented by thematic and follow-up inspections. Before each inspection, a document analysis is carried out to identify high-risk firms. On-site visits take an average of 1.5 days, longer for larger structures. In the event of a major breach, follow-up is planned within three to six months. While serious breaches are rare, recurring shortcomings mainly concern information on BOs (incomplete information). 479. The BAOB conducts rigorous supervision of statutory auditors, with robust on-site inspections every three or six years depending on the type of engagement, including a risk-based AML/CFT component. This supervision is combined with thematic inspections that examine how well auditors apply the standards based on the BAOB’s risk assessment and the individual risk profiles for each auditor that the BAOB sets up and updates every year. Thematic inspections tailored to the risks are also carried out. With extensive powers comparable to those of the FSMA, the BAOB can intervene effectively in the event of breaches and works closely with other authorities, including the CTIF, particularly when an auditor is deemed insufficiently qualified for certain tasks, such as the verification of virtual asset service providers or in cases of fraud. 480. The CJH does not have the autonomy to hire its own staff, as this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. It employs just five people to oversee a sector comprising some 7,000 establishments (casinos and gambling venues). This structural shortcoming limits the CJH’s ability to carry out effective AML/CFT supervision in casinos and gambling establishments, which are inherently exposed to a high risk of laundering." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="539. Belgium has administrative and criminal sanctions in place to punish breaches of obligations relating to the transparency of legal persons and entities, but these do not always appear to be dissuasive. 540. Criminal fines are applicable to legal persons who fail to comply with their obligations to register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and to update certain data. However, these fines do not apply for data requiring the filing of a deed with the clerks of the commercial courts, which are subject to a specific regime governed by the CSA. For example, there are no administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the obligation to file the resignation of a director with the registry. In this case, only a civil sanction of unenforceability against third parties is possible, the effects of which do not appear to be sufficiently dissuasive in the context of frequent use of straw men. Between 2020 and 2024, the SPF Economy carried out an average of 9 074 annual checks on companies’ compliance with their obligations to report information to Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. During this period, 1 492 reports were drawn up by the Directorate-General for Economic Inspection (DGIE) of the SPF Economy, which generally prefers to issue warnings and deregister incorrect data rather than impose sanctions. Deregistration is an administrative measure that has no impact on the legal existence of the company or its rights and obligations, but it can nevertheless hinder its administrative and economic activity (e.g. its relations with its bank, notary, accountant, etc.) and is therefore quite effective in this respect. It takes the form of a visible note on the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises file of the entity concerned, which is removed as soon as the identified breaches have been remedied. 541. Failure to comply with the obligation to declare beneficial owners triggers the application of progressive measures (reminders as a preliminary formality prior to the application of an administrative fine), which generally appear to be proportionate and dissuasive. A one-year transitional period was granted to allow compliance following the introduction of the register in 2018. Regular reminder campaigns were carried out to encourage entities to voluntarily comply with this new obligation. Nearly 17 880 persons (26% of legal persons subject to reminder measures) received an administrative fine of EUR 250 or EUR 500 between July 2022 and June 2024, for a total amount of EUR 8.5 million, of which 75% has been collected. In addition, 55 703 legal persons were deregistered from Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises as a result of breaches of the obligations to register in the UBO register. Finally, in the event of failure to identify and communicate accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial owners, the directors of the legal person are liable to an administrative fine of between EUR 250 and EUR 50 000. 542. The Belgian authorities mainly use deregistration measures [153] and dissolution of “inactive” entities. These measures make it possible to target shelf companies and inactive non-profit organisations, whose frequent use has been clearly identified in ML/TF schemes. Around 10 000 non-profit organisations have been dissolved by the commercial courts of Hainaut and Liège as part of a project led by the SPF Economy (DGIE) aimed at dissolving dormant non-profit associations. The Brussels Commercial Court has dissolved 7 500 companies since 2018 as part of the “company dumping” project aimed at dissolving “ghost companies”. Between 2014 and 2023, 336 judicial dissolutions were also ordered following inspections carried out as part of the BELFI project (see IO 9) in relation to the FT, mainly on the grounds of fictitious registered offices. Such dissolution measures are not provided for in the case of breaches of information obligations by active companies. 543. Failure to file annual accounts, which certain entities are required [154] to do for three consecutive financial years, has also led to the automatic deregistration of 23 028 entities from the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. 544. Automatic deregistration for non-compliance with the obligation to submit information to the UBO register began in January 2024, with a total of more than 50 000 entities deregistered in January 2025, nearly 75% of which were non-profit associations. As with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, deregistration is an administrative measure that has no impact on the legal existence of the company or its rights and obligations, but which can hinder its administrative and economic activity and is therefore somewhat effective. [155] Footnotes [153] SPF Finance is authorised to request the automatic deregistration of entities that have not submitted the required information to the register and have not published any documents in the Moniteur belge for seven years, as well as those that have not registered information about their beneficial owners despite an administrative fine imposing the sanction for non-compliance. A third reason for deregistration is provided for but has not yet been implemented: failure to confirm data with the UBO register on an annual basis. The Belgian authorities estimate that this concerns more than 139,000 legal persons. [154] Companies with limited liability, large non-profit associations and foundations are required to publish their accounts with the BNB. Small associations and foundations must file their annual accounts with the registry of the relevant commercial court. General partnerships and limited partnerships are only required to publish their annual accounts if certain criteria or thresholds are exceeded. Ordinary simple partnerships are entirely exempt from this obligation, as they have no legal personality. [155] On the basis of the deregistration criteria related to non-compliance with UBO obligations, the failure to publish a deed in the Moniteur belge for seven years, and therefore the failure to update the basic information registered with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, also leads to automatic deregistration if the entity also fails to provide the required information on its beneficial owners." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="539. Belgium has administrative and criminal sanctions in place to punish breaches of obligations relating to the transparency of legal persons and entities, but these do not always appear to be dissuasive. 540. Criminal fines are applicable to legal persons who fail to comply with their obligations to register with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises and to update certain data. However, these fines do not apply for data requiring the filing of a deed with the clerks of the commercial courts, which are subject to a specific regime governed by the CSA. For example, there are no administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with the obligation to file the resignation of a director with the registry. In this case, only a civil sanction of unenforceability against third parties is possible, the effects of which do not appear to be sufficiently dissuasive in the context of frequent use of straw men. Between 2020 and 2024, the SPF Economy carried out an average of 9 074 annual checks on companies’ compliance with their obligations to report information to Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises. During this period, 1 492 reports were drawn up by the Directorate-General for Economic Inspection (DGIE) of the SPF Economy, which generally prefers to issue warnings and deregister incorrect data rather than impose sanctions. Deregistration is an administrative measure that has no impact on the legal existence of the company or its rights and obligations, but it can nevertheless hinder its administrative and economic activity (e.g. its relations with its bank, notary, accountant, etc.) and is therefore quite effective in this respect. It takes the form of a visible note on the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises file of the entity concerned, which is removed as soon as the identified breaches have been remedied. 541. Failure to comply with the obligation to declare beneficial owners triggers the application of progressive measures (reminders as a preliminary formality prior to the application of an administrative fine), which generally appear to be proportionate and dissuasive. A one-year transitional period was granted to allow compliance following the introduction of the register in 2018. Regular reminder campaigns were carried out to encourage entities to voluntarily comply with this new obligation. Nearly 17 880 persons (26% of legal persons subject to reminder measures) received an administrative fine of EUR 250 or EUR 500 between July 2022 and June 2024, for a total amount of EUR 8.5 million, of which 75% has been collected. In addition, 55 703 legal persons were deregistered from Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises as a result of breaches of the obligations to register in the UBO register. Finally, in the event of failure to identify and communicate accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial owners, the directors of the legal person are liable to an administrative fine of between EUR 250 and EUR 50 000. 542. The Belgian authorities mainly use deregistration measures [153] and dissolution of “inactive” entities. These measures make it possible to target shelf companies and inactive non-profit organisations, whose frequent use has been clearly identified in ML/TF schemes. Around 10 000 non-profit organisations have been dissolved by the commercial courts of Hainaut and Liège as part of a project led by the SPF Economy (DGIE) aimed at dissolving dormant non-profit associations. The Brussels Commercial Court has dissolved 7 500 companies since 2018 as part of the “company dumping” project aimed at dissolving “ghost companies”. Between 2014 and 2023, 336 judicial dissolutions were also ordered following inspections carried out as part of the BELFI project (see IO 9) in relation to the FT, mainly on the grounds of fictitious registered offices. Such dissolution measures are not provided for in the case of breaches of information obligations by active companies. 543. Failure to file annual accounts, which certain entities are required [154] to do for three consecutive financial years, has also led to the automatic deregistration of 23 028 entities from the Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises register. 544. Automatic deregistration for non-compliance with the obligation to submit information to the UBO register began in January 2024, with a total of more than 50 000 entities deregistered in January 2025, nearly 75% of which were non-profit associations. As with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, deregistration is an administrative measure that has no impact on the legal existence of the company or its rights and obligations, but which can hinder its administrative and economic activity and is therefore somewhat effective. [155] Footnotes [153] SPF Finance is authorised to request the automatic deregistration of entities that have not submitted the required information to the register and have not published any documents in the Moniteur belge for seven years, as well as those that have not registered information about their beneficial owners despite an administrative fine imposing the sanction for non-compliance. A third reason for deregistration is provided for but has not yet been implemented: failure to confirm data with the UBO register on an annual basis. The Belgian authorities estimate that this concerns more than 139,000 legal persons. [154] Companies with limited liability, large non-profit associations and foundations are required to publish their accounts with the BNB. Small associations and foundations must file their annual accounts with the registry of the relevant commercial court. General partnerships and limited partnerships are only required to publish their annual accounts if certain criteria or thresholds are exceeded. Ordinary simple partnerships are entirely exempt from this obligation, as they have no legal personality. [155] On the basis of the deregistration criteria related to non-compliance with UBO obligations, the failure to publish a deed in the Moniteur belge for seven years, and therefore the failure to update the basic information registered with Banque-Carrefour des Entreprises, also leads to automatic deregistration if the entity also fails to provide the required information on its beneficial owners." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="758. In some TF cases, such as those where hawala is used as a payment system, Belgian courts sometimes adopt a cumulative approach to offences (see table in section 9.2). In these cases, the judge generally charges the defendant with multiple offences, demonstrating that hawala is not limited to a simple breach of the requirements applicable to authorising financial institutions, but is often a vehicle for wider criminal activity. The offences charged include: i) Offence under the Payment Services (PSD2) Law [212] on payment institutions (Art. 149, 1º): Hawala operates as an unregulated payment service, in direct violation of the PSD2 and AML/CFT laws. j) ML offence (Art. 505 para. 1 PC): This type of system is often used to integrate money of illegal origin into the mainstream economy. k) Criminal organisation (Art. 324bis PC): When a structure is set up to facilitate clandestine financial flows, it is classified as an organised criminal structure, which carries heavier sanctions. l) Tax and social security fraud: Due to the clandestine nature of hawala, the income generated by these activities is not declared, leading to prosecutions for tax fraud and often also for social security fraud, particularly in relation to undeclared workers or undeclared self-employment. 759. The judge may not uphold the charge of TF (Art. 140 and 141 of the Penal Code) in TF cases where neither terrorist intent nor the final destination of the funds can be clearly proven. If the investigation fails to establish that the money actually financed terrorist activities, then the TF classification becomes legally fragile. In these cases, the judge will instead consider reclassifying the offence under the PSD2 or AML laws, where offences are easier to establish based on the available evidence and a conviction is more likely. The judge may also consider that the money transferred came from an illegal or undeclared source, without needing to establish an explicit link to terrorism. This approach makes it possible to punish those involved in clandestine financial systems, even when there is insufficient evidence of a direct link to terrorism. 760. Other non-criminal measures may also be used as alternatives, such as freezing assets in the country (see IO.10) or procedures for withdrawing or invalidating identity documents, such as passports. The law also allows for the administrative dissolution of non-profit organisations (NPOs) when they are involved in TF or activities contributing to radicalisation. However, these cases are still very rare. The competent authorities have identified very few cases of NPOs being directly involved in TF. There are therefore very few cases where this measure has been used. In the few cases identified, the NPO’s involvement and the financial sector’s preventive blocking of banking transactions generally result in these entities quickly becoming dormant entities. Footnotes [212] Law of 11 March 2018 on the status and supervision of payment institutions and electronic money institutions, imposing prudential obligations on them in terms of governance, internal control and compliance. Article 149 1° imposes criminal sanctions for carrying out payment institution or electronic money institution activities without the required authorisation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="758. In some TF cases, such as those where hawala is used as a payment system, Belgian courts sometimes adopt a cumulative approach to offences (see table in section 9.2). In these cases, the judge generally charges the defendant with multiple offences, demonstrating that hawala is not limited to a simple breach of the requirements applicable to authorising financial institutions, but is often a vehicle for wider criminal activity. The offences charged include: i) Offence under the Payment Services (PSD2) Law [212] on payment institutions (Art. 149, 1º): Hawala operates as an unregulated payment service, in direct violation of the PSD2 and AML/CFT laws. j) ML offence (Art. 505 para. 1 PC): This type of system is often used to integrate money of illegal origin into the mainstream economy. k) Criminal organisation (Art. 324bis PC): When a structure is set up to facilitate clandestine financial flows, it is classified as an organised criminal structure, which carries heavier sanctions. l) Tax and social security fraud: Due to the clandestine nature of hawala, the income generated by these activities is not declared, leading to prosecutions for tax fraud and often also for social security fraud, particularly in relation to undeclared workers or undeclared self-employment. 759. The judge may not uphold the charge of TF (Art. 140 and 141 of the Penal Code) in TF cases where neither terrorist intent nor the final destination of the funds can be clearly proven. If the investigation fails to establish that the money actually financed terrorist activities, then the TF classification becomes legally fragile. In these cases, the judge will instead consider reclassifying the offence under the PSD2 or AML laws, where offences are easier to establish based on the available evidence and a conviction is more likely. The judge may also consider that the money transferred came from an illegal or undeclared source, without needing to establish an explicit link to terrorism. This approach makes it possible to punish those involved in clandestine financial systems, even when there is insufficient evidence of a direct link to terrorism. 760. Other non-criminal measures may also be used as alternatives, such as freezing assets in the country (see IO.10) or procedures for withdrawing or invalidating identity documents, such as passports. The law also allows for the administrative dissolution of non-profit organisations (NPOs) when they are involved in TF or activities contributing to radicalisation. However, these cases are still very rare. The competent authorities have identified very few cases of NPOs being directly involved in TF. There are therefore very few cases where this measure has been used. In the few cases identified, the NPO’s involvement and the financial sector’s preventive blocking of banking transactions generally result in these entities quickly becoming dormant entities. Footnotes [212] Law of 11 March 2018 on the status and supervision of payment institutions and electronic money institutions, imposing prudential obligations on them in terms of governance, internal control and compliance. Article 149 1° imposes criminal sanctions for carrying out payment institution or electronic money institution activities without the required authorisation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="811. The SPF Finance-Treasury, which is responsible for implementing asset freezing measures, also monitors compliance with the obligations of reporting entities. [226] It receives asset-freezing declarations, and reporting entities are required to report to it whether or not they hold funds on behalf of the persons and entities targeted by each new designation. [227] The SPF Finance then carries out its own checks, for example by regularly monitoring the Belgian bank accounts register. Failure to comply with targeted financial measures is punishable by an administrative fine of between EUR 25 and EUR 250 000. The SPF Finance may also pass the information on to the Prosecutor’s Office, in which case offenders are liable to a criminal sanction of imprisonment for between eight days and five years and/or a fine of between EUR 250 and EUR 25 000. [228] To date, the SPF Finance has not identified any serious breach of the freezing obligations and has therefore not imposed any administrative sanctions or referred any cases to the Prosecutor’s Office. Only one warning was issued to an FI in 2018 for failing to carry out checks on the freezing measures targeting two persons on the national list. 812. The AML/CFT supervisory authorities for FIs and DNFBPs are responsible for ensuring that reporting entities have developed and implemented effective internal control procedures and measures to comply with TFS obligations. Generally, compliance with targeted financial sanctions obligations is monitored alongside AML/CFT obligations. 813. The FI supervisory authorities carried out supervisory and awareness-raising activities among their reporting entities to ensure that FIs had put in place the necessary frameworks for implementing TF related TFS. These activities were relatively effective, particularly with regard to credit institutions. The BNB also carried out remote horizontal reviews based on questionnaires sent to credit institutions regarding their compliance with their TFS obligations in 2022 and 2024. [229] The BNB notes that credit institutions generally comply with their obligations for international transactions and observed an improvement between 2022 and 2024 in the screening measures adopted for domestic transactions, which the BNB now considers to be generally adequate and satisfactory. These reviews resulted in the BNB identifying a serious breach by one FI in its screening of sanctions lists following an inspection in December 2022. The Auditor is currently investigating this case. In December 2024, the BNB issued a communication to FIs reminding them of their internal control requirements. These various supervisory activities led the BNB to refine the granularity of questions relating to TFS obligations in the periodic questionnaires sent to FIs. 814. The FSMA uses periodic questionnaires and inspections to verify whether FIs are fulfilling their TF related TFS obligations. The FSMA has stated that it often has to remind FIs that TFS obligations are not risk-based and that checks must be carried out on an ongoing basis. In January 2025, it published the findings of a currency exchange offices inspection campaign, in which it identified room for improvement for the sector as a whole with regard to implementing TFS. 815. The DNFBP supervisory authorities have a limited understanding of TFS obligations, with the exception of SPF Economy, which has a very good understanding and, as part of its supervisory role over some DNFBPs, carries out the screening of several sanctions lists. During their inspections, the DNFBP supervisory authorities often check that a checklist exits on which the reporting entities must indicate that they have carried out a check of the UN, EU and national lists, or that screening procedures in place. However, they do not check whether these requirements are actually met or whether the reporting entities understand them. 816. Supervisory authorities offer little guidance and undertake few awareness-raising initiatives, with the exception of the accounting supervisory authority (ITAA), which proactively distributes changes to sanctions lists as soon as it receives them from SPF Finance and offers awareness-raising opportunities to its members, such as training courses and printed materials. Detailed TFS guidance for diamond traders were developed in 2021, but these appear to be rarely used and out of date. Footnotes [226] Art. 7 of the law of 13 May 2003. [227] The duty to notify SPF Finance of freezing measures is limited by the professional secrecy to which lawyers are subject. [228] Art. 4 of the law of 11 May 1995. [229] Communication BNB_2024_19 / Results of the horizontal supervisory review of credit institutions’ compliance with their obligations relating to targeted financial sanctions and domestic transactions | BNB.be" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="811. The SPF Finance-Treasury, which is responsible for implementing asset freezing measures, also monitors compliance with the obligations of reporting entities. [226] It receives asset-freezing declarations, and reporting entities are required to report to it whether or not they hold funds on behalf of the persons and entities targeted by each new designation. [227] The SPF Finance then carries out its own checks, for example by regularly monitoring the Belgian bank accounts register. Failure to comply with targeted financial measures is punishable by an administrative fine of between EUR 25 and EUR 250 000. The SPF Finance may also pass the information on to the Prosecutor’s Office, in which case offenders are liable to a criminal sanction of imprisonment for between eight days and five years and/or a fine of between EUR 250 and EUR 25 000. [228] To date, the SPF Finance has not identified any serious breach of the freezing obligations and has therefore not imposed any administrative sanctions or referred any cases to the Prosecutor’s Office. Only one warning was issued to an FI in 2018 for failing to carry out checks on the freezing measures targeting two persons on the national list. 812. The AML/CFT supervisory authorities for FIs and DNFBPs are responsible for ensuring that reporting entities have developed and implemented effective internal control procedures and measures to comply with TFS obligations. Generally, compliance with targeted financial sanctions obligations is monitored alongside AML/CFT obligations. 813. The FI supervisory authorities carried out supervisory and awareness-raising activities among their reporting entities to ensure that FIs had put in place the necessary frameworks for implementing TF related TFS. These activities were relatively effective, particularly with regard to credit institutions. The BNB also carried out remote horizontal reviews based on questionnaires sent to credit institutions regarding their compliance with their TFS obligations in 2022 and 2024. [229] The BNB notes that credit institutions generally comply with their obligations for international transactions and observed an improvement between 2022 and 2024 in the screening measures adopted for domestic transactions, which the BNB now considers to be generally adequate and satisfactory. These reviews resulted in the BNB identifying a serious breach by one FI in its screening of sanctions lists following an inspection in December 2022. The Auditor is currently investigating this case. In December 2024, the BNB issued a communication to FIs reminding them of their internal control requirements. These various supervisory activities led the BNB to refine the granularity of questions relating to TFS obligations in the periodic questionnaires sent to FIs. 814. The FSMA uses periodic questionnaires and inspections to verify whether FIs are fulfilling their TF related TFS obligations. The FSMA has stated that it often has to remind FIs that TFS obligations are not risk-based and that checks must be carried out on an ongoing basis. In January 2025, it published the findings of a currency exchange offices inspection campaign, in which it identified room for improvement for the sector as a whole with regard to implementing TFS. 815. The DNFBP supervisory authorities have a limited understanding of TFS obligations, with the exception of SPF Economy, which has a very good understanding and, as part of its supervisory role over some DNFBPs, carries out the screening of several sanctions lists. During their inspections, the DNFBP supervisory authorities often check that a checklist exits on which the reporting entities must indicate that they have carried out a check of the UN, EU and national lists, or that screening procedures in place. However, they do not check whether these requirements are actually met or whether the reporting entities understand them. 816. Supervisory authorities offer little guidance and undertake few awareness-raising initiatives, with the exception of the accounting supervisory authority (ITAA), which proactively distributes changes to sanctions lists as soon as it receives them from SPF Finance and offers awareness-raising opportunities to its members, such as training courses and printed materials. Detailed TFS guidance for diamond traders were developed in 2021, but these appear to be rarely used and out of date. Footnotes [226] Art. 7 of the law of 13 May 2003. [227] The duty to notify SPF Finance of freezing measures is limited by the professional secrecy to which lawyers are subject. [228] Art. 4 of the law of 11 May 1995. [229] Communication BNB_2024_19 / Results of the horizontal supervisory review of credit institutions’ compliance with their obligations relating to targeted financial sanctions and domestic transactions | BNB.be" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="832. The findings regarding reporting entities’ understanding of and compliance with TF related TFS also apply to PF related TFS (see IO.10). In general, reporting entities’ understanding of PF related TFS is limited to identifying potential cases of breach or non-implementation of TFS, rather than identifying more sophisticated ways of evading PF related TFS. FIs have a level of understanding of their obligations on PF related TFS that is comparable with that of TF related TFS. However, DNFBPs have a very limited understanding of their obligations and some have only a partial understanding of the definition of beneficial owner (see IO.5), which may reduce their ability to identify more sophisticated methods of evading TFS for PF, for example when non-designated persons act on behalf of or exercise indirect control over designated persons or entities. Furthermore, failures in checking the beneficial owners of DNFBPs (see IO.4) and relating to the reliability of data on beneficial ownership (see IO.5) are potential loopholes that designated persons could exploit. Only diamond dealers are aware to some extent that they can be used to evade sanctions regimes, particularly those affecting some countries from which diamonds originate. To date, DNFBPs have not frozen any financial or non-financial assets or property in relation to TFS for PF. 833. There is little support and communication from supervisory authorities specifically aimed at raising awareness and training reporting entities specifically on PF risks. The resources available focus on TFS in general or are limited to AML/CFT aspects. The ITAA has published specific guidance on counter-proliferation financing for accountants on its website (December 2023), while the National Chamber of Notaries provides similar guidance on its eNotariat intranet site. The CTIF publishes a summary of the main conclusions of the PF risk analysis on its website , to which the bar associations refer. The BNB and the FSMA do not have any specific materials to raise awareness among reporting entities PF related TFS, other than materials on due diligence and screening of sanctions lists in general." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="832. The findings regarding reporting entities’ understanding of and compliance with TF related TFS also apply to PF related TFS (see IO.10). In general, reporting entities’ understanding of PF related TFS is limited to identifying potential cases of breach or non-implementation of TFS, rather than identifying more sophisticated ways of evading PF related TFS. FIs have a level of understanding of their obligations on PF related TFS that is comparable with that of TF related TFS. However, DNFBPs have a very limited understanding of their obligations and some have only a partial understanding of the definition of beneficial owner (see IO.5), which may reduce their ability to identify more sophisticated methods of evading TFS for PF, for example when non-designated persons act on behalf of or exercise indirect control over designated persons or entities. Furthermore, failures in checking the beneficial owners of DNFBPs (see IO.4) and relating to the reliability of data on beneficial ownership (see IO.5) are potential loopholes that designated persons could exploit. Only diamond dealers are aware to some extent that they can be used to evade sanctions regimes, particularly those affecting some countries from which diamonds originate. To date, DNFBPs have not frozen any financial or non-financial assets or property in relation to TFS for PF. 833. There is little support and communication from supervisory authorities specifically aimed at raising awareness and training reporting entities specifically on PF risks. The resources available focus on TFS in general or are limited to AML/CFT aspects. The ITAA has published specific guidance on counter-proliferation financing for accountants on its website (December 2023), while the National Chamber of Notaries provides similar guidance on its eNotariat intranet site. The CTIF publishes a summary of the main conclusions of the PF risk analysis on its website , to which the bar associations refer. The BNB and the FSMA do not have any specific materials to raise awareness among reporting entities PF related TFS, other than materials on due diligence and screening of sanctions lists in general." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="211. Belgium has many formal and informal channels for operational cooperation between competent authorities, which promote concerted action between competent authorities in areas linked to the main ML and TF risks. 1.6.1. Operational coordination and cooperation for AML purposes 212. As far as the supervisory authorities are concerned, the CTIF and the BNB, on the one hand, and the FSMA on the other, interact on a regular basis to examine risk-related developments and to discuss the reporting policy for obliged entities and the quality of the reports received (on the basis of MoUs defining the interaction procedures). Tripartite meetings between the CTIF/BNB/FSMA also help to improve the understanding of the risks and emerging trends affecting the financial sectors. The CTIF and the FSMA have also cooperated with the Polish FIU in connection with a licence application from a Polish company wishing to operate virtual asset distributors (BTMs) in Belgium (see IO.3). The BNB and the FSMA also cooperate, especially on the supervision of FIs that simultaneously fall within their remit (i.e. institutions with multiple statuses such as credit institutions that are also registered as insurance intermediaries subject to the AML Law (brokers and non-exclusive agents operating in life insurance), or lenders that are subsidiaries of credit institutions or insurance undertakings). SPF Economy, which oversees several non-financial sectors, also maintains a productive dialogue with CTIF, mainly on risks and raising awareness among reporting entities. 213. Regarding investigations and prosecutions, the “Ecofin” network of experts in the fight against economic, financial and tax crime and corruption has been in place since 2015, bringing together the judicial authorities, the police and the CTIF, and supporting the public prosecutor's office in the conduct of criminal policy. It gives rise to useful exchanges of expertise, particularly on the modus operandi of criminals. The joint multi-disciplinary investigation teams (MOTEMs), established for tax matters in 2023 and based on the model of the existing MOTEMs for social matters, are another example of cooperation. These teams enable tax officials to collaborate directly on tax fraud investigations, reinforcing the expertise available for investigations. The number of tax MOTEMs remains limited at this stage and should enable the adoption of a more integrated approach to the fight against fraud. These initiatives generally improve the consideration of ML aspects, even though the surveys still effectively prioritise tax aspects (see IO.7). 214. More generally, the Belgian authorities frequently host liaison officers from other agencies involved in AML in order to facilitate operational cooperation and notably to obtain direct, real-time access to restricted information. For example, liaison officers from the Federal Police and Customs are appointed for the CTIF, and can access databases or other information (reports), which are useful for rapidly obtaining additional data on persons or companies mentioned in suspicious transactions and for enriching the reports received from reporting entities. The CTIF also uses liaison officers to gain access to sensitive information from civil and military intelligence services. The Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations also hosts police liaison officers to assist with asset-tracing investigations, magistrates to facilitate collaboration with the public prosecutor's office and liaison officers from the SPF Finance to improve collaboration with the revenue collectors responsible for collecting criminal fines and enforcing court rulings. 1.6.2. Operational coordination and cooperation for CFT purposes 215. The handling of TF is based on an operational strategy revolving around multi-disciplinary consultation and decision-making platforms (see section1.2 above and IO.9). These platforms involve the police, including the central counter-terrorism service, intelligence services (civil and military) and the Threat Analysis Coordination Body ( Organe de coordination pour l'analyse de la menace – OCAM). The judicial phase also gives rise to operational cooperation within MONITOR meetings at which information and investigations into terrorism handled by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office are shared (see IO.9). They are attended by the judicial authorities – the judges in the anti-terrorism section at the Federal Prosecutor's Office – along with the intelligence services, OCAM, the police and the CTIF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="211. Belgium has many formal and informal channels for operational cooperation between competent authorities, which promote concerted action between competent authorities in areas linked to the main ML and TF risks. 1.6.1. Operational coordination and cooperation for AML purposes 212. As far as the supervisory authorities are concerned, the CTIF and the BNB, on the one hand, and the FSMA on the other, interact on a regular basis to examine risk-related developments and to discuss the reporting policy for obliged entities and the quality of the reports received (on the basis of MoUs defining the interaction procedures). Tripartite meetings between the CTIF/BNB/FSMA also help to improve the understanding of the risks and emerging trends affecting the financial sectors. The CTIF and the FSMA have also cooperated with the Polish FIU in connection with a licence application from a Polish company wishing to operate virtual asset distributors (BTMs) in Belgium (see IO.3). The BNB and the FSMA also cooperate, especially on the supervision of FIs that simultaneously fall within their remit (i.e. institutions with multiple statuses such as credit institutions that are also registered as insurance intermediaries subject to the AML Law (brokers and non-exclusive agents operating in life insurance), or lenders that are subsidiaries of credit institutions or insurance undertakings). SPF Economy, which oversees several non-financial sectors, also maintains a productive dialogue with CTIF, mainly on risks and raising awareness among reporting entities. 213. Regarding investigations and prosecutions, the “Ecofin” network of experts in the fight against economic, financial and tax crime and corruption has been in place since 2015, bringing together the judicial authorities, the police and the CTIF, and supporting the public prosecutor's office in the conduct of criminal policy. It gives rise to useful exchanges of expertise, particularly on the modus operandi of criminals. The joint multi-disciplinary investigation teams (MOTEMs), established for tax matters in 2023 and based on the model of the existing MOTEMs for social matters, are another example of cooperation. These teams enable tax officials to collaborate directly on tax fraud investigations, reinforcing the expertise available for investigations. The number of tax MOTEMs remains limited at this stage and should enable the adoption of a more integrated approach to the fight against fraud. These initiatives generally improve the consideration of ML aspects, even though the surveys still effectively prioritise tax aspects (see IO.7). 214. More generally, the Belgian authorities frequently host liaison officers from other agencies involved in AML in order to facilitate operational cooperation and notably to obtain direct, real-time access to restricted information. For example, liaison officers from the Federal Police and Customs are appointed for the CTIF, and can access databases or other information (reports), which are useful for rapidly obtaining additional data on persons or companies mentioned in suspicious transactions and for enriching the reports received from reporting entities. The CTIF also uses liaison officers to gain access to sensitive information from civil and military intelligence services. The Central Office for Seizures and Confiscations also hosts police liaison officers to assist with asset-tracing investigations, magistrates to facilitate collaboration with the public prosecutor's office and liaison officers from the SPF Finance to improve collaboration with the revenue collectors responsible for collecting criminal fines and enforcing court rulings. 1.6.2. Operational coordination and cooperation for CFT purposes 215. The handling of TF is based on an operational strategy revolving around multi-disciplinary consultation and decision-making platforms (see section1.2 above and IO.9). These platforms involve the police, including the central counter-terrorism service, intelligence services (civil and military) and the Threat Analysis Coordination Body ( Organe de coordination pour l'analyse de la menace – OCAM). The judicial phase also gives rise to operational cooperation within MONITOR meetings at which information and investigations into terrorism handled by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office are shared (see IO.9). They are attended by the judicial authorities – the judges in the anti-terrorism section at the Federal Prosecutor's Office – along with the intelligence services, OCAM, the police and the CTIF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BNB 379. BNB plays a key role in raising awareness among FIs, in particular through its regularly updated website, which is commended by the private sector and contributes to a better understanding of AML/CFT obligations. BNB is recognised for its availability and interaction with FIs. Raising awareness among FIs also relies heavily on professional associations (Febelfin, Assuralia, PayBelgium), whose work is essential but needs to be supplemented by more direct communication from the BNB to FIs. The lack of regular dialogue with FIs (e.g. AMLCO of large banks, payment institutions and electronic money institutions) and professional associations limits the direct reporting of their issues, which slows down the adjustment of supervisory priorities and hinders a more optimal mutual understanding and more appropriate supervision. 380. The AML platform was launched in 2021 and promotes public-private cooperation by bringing together the BNB, the FSMA, SPF Finance/Treasury, the CTIF, SPF Justice, the police and professional associations. Although it has been holding regular meetings since June 2021, it remains little known among FIs, and its concrete impact on FIs’ understanding of risks remains limited in the absence of accessible publications or conferences. 381. The BNB communicates regularly with FIs through thematic circulars, which serve as guidelines and reflect the analysis of sectoral practices (e.g. de-risking, repatriation of assets, fund transfers). This approach helps to clarify regulatory expectations and harmonise practices, thereby strengthening FI compliance. Nevertheless, FIs still express a need for guidance in other areas that they consider to be insufficiently explored by the BNB at present (e.g. management of basic banking services). There is also a need for more operational guidance. 382. Finally, the training efforts organised by the BNB remain limited: only two AMLCO meetings have been held since 2019. However, the BNB regularly participates in seminars and training courses organised by in-service training providers. FSMA 383. The FSMA organises several outreach initiatives, including an AMLCO Day, focusing on topics identified during supervision (see example in box below) and feedback from the CTIF. For example, the issue of suspicious transaction reports (their importance and the quality of the information provided) was the subject of a specific presentation during the first AMLCO Day. The FSMA also publishes newsletters dedicated to AML/CFT, which are well known and consulted by FIs, but whose frequency remains limited in view of the needs of the sector. The FSMA also organises regular meetings with professional associations. It also participates in conferences organised by private operators in particular. Box 3.2. Example of an inspection followed by outreach actions Facts: In December 2022, an on-site inspection of an OPCA and OPCVM management company revealed shortcomings in the understanding of the concept of “customer”. A remediation plan was implemented to address these shortcomings. Actions taken : The FSMA subsequently conducted a survey in 2023 among the AMLCOs of a number of OPCVM management companies. The aim of the survey was to identify the difficulties encountered in practice. It revealed that the interpretation of the concept of “customer” was a widespread problem in the sector. Outcome : Given the scale of the issue, the FSMA included this topic on the agenda of its AMLCO Day 2023 in order to clarify the concept of customer for the entire sector, not just for the entity initially inspected. 384. The FSMA supervises FIs with very diverse profiles in terms of size, risks and business models. However, its outreach actions often remain general in nature, which limits their relevance for certain players with specific business models, such as alternative OPCA/OPCVM management companies, which are not always covered by content that is tailored to insurance intermediaries or bureaux de change, which have a more direct relationship with customers. 385. Some FIs, such as insurance intermediaries, receive sector-specific support through professional associations. In particular, a sectoral code relating to the distribution of financial products has been developed with Assuralia. 386. Supervision feedback was published after certain inspections, notably in January 2025 for the currency exchange sector, and in 2020 for insurance intermediaries, bank brokers and lenders. However, the frequency of this feedback remains irregular. Short outreach films produced in 2021 were well received. 387. With regard to VASPs, the FSMA has created a section on its website dedicated to VASPs, which contains answers to frequently asked questions, useful for this sector, which is unfamiliar with AML/CFT requirements. It has expanded this information based on its review of registration applications submitted during the transitional period (see above). For example, it has clarified the FSMA’s expectations regarding the measures to be taken by VASPs when AML/CFT obligations are fulfilled by third parties, such as Fintech or RegTech companies. SPF Finance – Treasury 388. Guidelines have been developed, but the evaluation team was unable to evaluate them. 3.6.1. Impact of controls, administrative measures and sanctions BNB 389. FIs under BNB supervision generally implement remedial measures in a spirit of cooperation and compliance. Follow-up is mainly carried out through regular meetings and the submission of documents, with re-inspections being less frequent. However, remediation times are often long (see box), as the BNB favours an educational and graduated approach, using orders without penalties, which are sometimes extended formally or de facto. Table 3.3. Examples of remediation pathways for CIs under BNB supervision Credit institution A) [one of the four main Belgian CIs] Credit institution B) Inspection 10 months (between March and November 2021) 1 year (October 2019 to October 2020) Shortcomings identified Score 3 out of 4 (significant - serious breaches) Score 3 out of 4 (significant - serious breaches), including critical breaches in correspondent banking and vigilance with regard to non-resident customers. Remediation time The report was published in May 2022, but the implementation monitoring was not completed until April 2024 (23 months later), which is considered a long time to ensure effective remediation. The action plan was adopted late, in January 2021, followed by an enhanced inspection that was only completed in February 2023 (over two years later), illustrating the prolonged implementation of corrective measures. Follow-up The time between identifying the shortcomings and validating the corrective measures was also considered excessive. Work still in progress: internal audit requested for inspection, indicating that corrective measures remain to be finalised. Source: BNB 390. More severe administrative measures (e.g. temporary suspension of activity), although proven to be effective, are used only sparingly. 391. The BNB rarely publishes its administrative measures and, when it does, it does so anonymously, limiting their deterrent effect. One case illustrates this trend, where an FI obtained a waiver of publication of its name following the exercise of its right to be heard prior to the adoption of the measure by the BNB. 392. The BNB favours “indirect deterrence” (hearsay, press), which is considered insufficient. In several cases, the shortcomings identified called for measures more proportionate to the seriousness of the facts (such as, for example, two successive inspections resulting in the most severe score of 4/4; lack of screening of SFC lists when entering into a business relationship). Box 3.3. Credit institution c) This case illustrates the legal constraints and excessive caution limiting the use of sanctions by the BNB. In the same case, that of CI c), the BNB considered disciplinary action three times before deciding not to proceed on each occasion: 2020: referral of the case to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, where the investigation is still ongoing. This referral was accompanied by a decision to wait for the outcome of the criminal proceedings before considering the application of sanctions, so as not to interfere with them. 2021: CI c) terminated 468 business relationships without complying with its due diligence obligations, despite the measures imposed by the BNB in 2020 and a significant risk of transactions not being reported to the CTIF. The sanction was dropped due to the ambiguous wording of the original measure. 2023: Despite late remediation, the BNB considered that failure to meet a remediation deadline did not in itself justify a sanction. 393. Several factors hinder the implementation and effectiveness of the overall process leading to the application of administrative sanctions: the complexity of the sanctioning procedure [112] , the lack of dedicated resources (particularly legal and auditing resources), excessive caution, fear of appeals and the requirement for the AML/CFT Group to demonstrate the underlying causes of the breaches in order to justify disciplinary action. This results in paralysis of the BNB’s action, thus depriving it of the use of a fundamental part of its powers. When sanction procedures are initiated, the length of the overall sanctioning process (several years, sometimes at the auditor stage alone) reduces its deterrent effect and may even influence the amount of the fine. As a result, the number of fines issued by the BNB is extremely low (only one in ten years). 394. The lack of resources dedicated to legal advice and guidance significantly hinders the effectiveness of the system. Since 2016, the number of FTEs allocated to these functions has remained virtually unchanged, and is considered to be clearly insufficient: 0.5 FTE for legal advice (0.3 in 2016) and 1.5 FTE for administrative sanctions (1.35 in 2016). The sanctioning process is long and complex (see previous paragraph). Due in particular to the limited resources allocated to the auditor, this mechanism remains unproductive, with an average of 1.2 cases handled per year, a rate considered highly insufficient to ensure that sanctions have a dissuasive and responsive effect, being intended to address the most serious failures. At present, only a few cases are under investigation, despite some having been referred some time ago (see table below), which reflects in particular the complexity of the cases and the lack of human resources, and contributes to the slowness of the process. Box 3.4. Examples of the time taken for the supervisory process and follow-up These cases illustrate the slowness and shortcomings in the handling of serious infringements (score 4/4) by the NBB, particularly the late referral to the auditor and the fact that remedial action takes several years. Excessive delays between inspection and referral to the auditor: · FI 1: Belgian CI. Inspection at the end of 2020-beginning of 2021, referral not until March 2022 (+1 year), investigation still in progress · FI 2: Belgian CI. Inspection between July 2020 and March 2021; December 2022: notification to the FI of the serious nature of these shortcomings; auditor not notified until the end of July 2023 (+18 months after notification of the shortcomings), investigation still in progress. · FI 3: Inspection in 2021, referral in September 2022 (+1 year), investigation still in progress. Very long action and remediation plans: · FI4: One of the four main Belgian CIs. Inspection between November 2021 and October 2022, score 4/4, auditor appointed in July 2023, investigation still in progress and compliance is also still being checked as of 14 February 2025 (end of on-site visit). · FI5: Inspection from Q3 2021 to Q2 2022, referral in June 2023 (+1 year), investigation still in progress, remediation not completed until summer 2024. 395. Another negative effect of this lack of regular sanction procedures is the lack of case law, depriving the BNB and the private sector of a stable frame of reference for interpreting and applying the regulations. In comparison, frequent and clear decisions by a sanctions committee would clarify the practical application of the regulatory framework and provide better guidance for FI practices. FSMA 396. As explained in section 3.5, some of the FSMA’s off-site inspections are primarily informative in nature (improving the FSMA’s understanding of a sector or entity). These inspections have limited effectiveness in terms of FI compliance, as they do not include verification of the AML/CFT system or any remediation orders. By contrast, off-site compliance inspections result in corrective measures, although these remain formal (e.g. updating policies and procedures) (see box below), as these off-site inspections are designed to check the formal compliance of FIs. Verification of follow-up mainly concerns the analysis of documents provided by the FI, while on-site visits, which are the most effective means of ensuring effective and thorough remediation, are rarely used. Table 3.4. Results of thematic or ad hoc and off-site inspections by the FSMA Thematic or ad hoc inspections not resulting in remedial orders: 2020: 240 insurance intermediaries (“ad hoc” inspections) →no orders. 2021: 20 small alternative OPCAs (thematic inspection) →no orders. 2022: 31 branches of alternative OPCAs (thematic inspection) → no orders. Off-site inspections (compliance checks) resulting in corrective measures: 2019: 98 insurance intermediaries inspected → 251 offences detected. 2023: 40 insurance intermediaries inspected → 61 offences detected. 397. Delays in remediation are not usually sanctioned immediately, as the FSMA favours support and additional time is often granted. However, a clear refusal to comply leads to more severe measures. 398. The FSMA has an administrative sanction procedure, which can also lead to a settlement agreement. This procedure is rarely used in AML/CFT matters. In 10 years, only two administrative sanctions relating to AML/CFT have been applied by the FSMA’s sanctions committee. Several factors may explain this shortcoming: insufficient (or incomplete) understanding of the role of administrative sanctions: the usefulness of their punitive function in the most serious cases, either alone or in addition to an administrative measure; their deterrent effect, both for the institution concerned and for the sector as a whole; and their educational value, as the reasoned decisions of the sanctions committee contribute to the development of a body of case law. In addition, as in the case of the BNB, there is a fear of appeals and the slowness of the process, which involves, in particular, referral to an auditor to investigate the cases. This shortcoming is partly offset by the occasional use of serious administrative measures, such as temporary suspension of activity or deregistration, the financial consequences of which act as a dissuasive. For example, one bureau de change was suspended following an inspection carried out by the FSMA between late 2024 and early 2025. After a one-month suspension, the bureau de change confirmed to the FSMA in April 2025 that it had taken the expected measures. These measures are published by name on the “Actualités et mises en garde” (news and warnings) web page and on the public record of the FI concerned, increasing their visibility. Creation of a web page dedicated to publishing serious administrative measures by name and increased use of sanctions are desirable. 399.  Supervisory measures are largely perceived as a tool for outreach and guidance. They focus mainly on the formal compliance of FIs, with findings regularly resulting in orders being sent to non-compliant FIs. These actions have a positive effect, particularly on the compliance of currency exchange offices and, to a lesser extent, insurance intermediaries. Nevertheless, they still appear insufficient to ensure the adequate and effective implementation of mitigating measures by FIs. SPF Finance – Treasury 400. Bpost has met the deadlines for remedying the shortcomings identified during supervision in 2020. Quarterly meetings enable Bpost to continue improving its compliance over time. Footnotes [112] Summary of the process leading to the application of a sanction by the BNB sanctions committee: After an initial decision on the appropriateness of taking action, the AML/CFT Group submits a written report to an assessment committee. If the committee decides to proceed, the AML/CFT Group drafts a referral to the auditor and compiles a file of evidence, which is submitted to the BNB management committee. The auditor, who manages all matters audited by the BNB, examines the evidence for and against. The auditor then submits their conclusions to the management committee, which decides whether to continue the sanction procedure and whether to refer the matter to the sanctions committee or propose a settlement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BNB 379. BNB plays a key role in raising awareness among FIs, in particular through its regularly updated website, which is commended by the private sector and contributes to a better understanding of AML/CFT obligations. BNB is recognised for its availability and interaction with FIs. Raising awareness among FIs also relies heavily on professional associations (Febelfin, Assuralia, PayBelgium), whose work is essential but needs to be supplemented by more direct communication from the BNB to FIs. The lack of regular dialogue with FIs (e.g. AMLCO of large banks, payment institutions and electronic money institutions) and professional associations limits the direct reporting of their issues, which slows down the adjustment of supervisory priorities and hinders a more optimal mutual understanding and more appropriate supervision. 380. The AML platform was launched in 2021 and promotes public-private cooperation by bringing together the BNB, the FSMA, SPF Finance/Treasury, the CTIF, SPF Justice, the police and professional associations. Although it has been holding regular meetings since June 2021, it remains little known among FIs, and its concrete impact on FIs’ understanding of risks remains limited in the absence of accessible publications or conferences. 381. The BNB communicates regularly with FIs through thematic circulars, which serve as guidelines and reflect the analysis of sectoral practices (e.g. de-risking, repatriation of assets, fund transfers). This approach helps to clarify regulatory expectations and harmonise practices, thereby strengthening FI compliance. Nevertheless, FIs still express a need for guidance in other areas that they consider to be insufficiently explored by the BNB at present (e.g. management of basic banking services). There is also a need for more operational guidance. 382. Finally, the training efforts organised by the BNB remain limited: only two AMLCO meetings have been held since 2019. However, the BNB regularly participates in seminars and training courses organised by in-service training providers. FSMA 383. The FSMA organises several outreach initiatives, including an AMLCO Day, focusing on topics identified during supervision (see example in box below) and feedback from the CTIF. For example, the issue of suspicious transaction reports (their importance and the quality of the information provided) was the subject of a specific presentation during the first AMLCO Day. The FSMA also publishes newsletters dedicated to AML/CFT, which are well known and consulted by FIs, but whose frequency remains limited in view of the needs of the sector. The FSMA also organises regular meetings with professional associations. It also participates in conferences organised by private operators in particular. Box 3.2. Example of an inspection followed by outreach actions Facts: In December 2022, an on-site inspection of an OPCA and OPCVM management company revealed shortcomings in the understanding of the concept of “customer”. A remediation plan was implemented to address these shortcomings. Actions taken : The FSMA subsequently conducted a survey in 2023 among the AMLCOs of a number of OPCVM management companies. The aim of the survey was to identify the difficulties encountered in practice. It revealed that the interpretation of the concept of “customer” was a widespread problem in the sector. Outcome : Given the scale of the issue, the FSMA included this topic on the agenda of its AMLCO Day 2023 in order to clarify the concept of customer for the entire sector, not just for the entity initially inspected. 384. The FSMA supervises FIs with very diverse profiles in terms of size, risks and business models. However, its outreach actions often remain general in nature, which limits their relevance for certain players with specific business models, such as alternative OPCA/OPCVM management companies, which are not always covered by content that is tailored to insurance intermediaries or bureaux de change, which have a more direct relationship with customers. 385. Some FIs, such as insurance intermediaries, receive sector-specific support through professional associations. In particular, a sectoral code relating to the distribution of financial products has been developed with Assuralia. 386. Supervision feedback was published after certain inspections, notably in January 2025 for the currency exchange sector, and in 2020 for insurance intermediaries, bank brokers and lenders. However, the frequency of this feedback remains irregular. Short outreach films produced in 2021 were well received. 387. With regard to VASPs, the FSMA has created a section on its website dedicated to VASPs, which contains answers to frequently asked questions, useful for this sector, which is unfamiliar with AML/CFT requirements. It has expanded this information based on its review of registration applications submitted during the transitional period (see above). For example, it has clarified the FSMA’s expectations regarding the measures to be taken by VASPs when AML/CFT obligations are fulfilled by third parties, such as Fintech or RegTech companies. SPF Finance – Treasury 388. Guidelines have been developed, but the evaluation team was unable to evaluate them. 3.6.1. Impact of controls, administrative measures and sanctions BNB 389. FIs under BNB supervision generally implement remedial measures in a spirit of cooperation and compliance. Follow-up is mainly carried out through regular meetings and the submission of documents, with re-inspections being less frequent. However, remediation times are often long (see box), as the BNB favours an educational and graduated approach, using orders without penalties, which are sometimes extended formally or de facto. Table 3.3. Examples of remediation pathways for CIs under BNB supervision Credit institution A) [one of the four main Belgian CIs] Credit institution B) Inspection 10 months (between March and November 2021) 1 year (October 2019 to October 2020) Shortcomings identified Score 3 out of 4 (significant - serious breaches) Score 3 out of 4 (significant - serious breaches), including critical breaches in correspondent banking and vigilance with regard to non-resident customers. Remediation time The report was published in May 2022, but the implementation monitoring was not completed until April 2024 (23 months later), which is considered a long time to ensure effective remediation. The action plan was adopted late, in January 2021, followed by an enhanced inspection that was only completed in February 2023 (over two years later), illustrating the prolonged implementation of corrective measures. Follow-up The time between identifying the shortcomings and validating the corrective measures was also considered excessive. Work still in progress: internal audit requested for inspection, indicating that corrective measures remain to be finalised. Source: BNB 390. More severe administrative measures (e.g. temporary suspension of activity), although proven to be effective, are used only sparingly. 391. The BNB rarely publishes its administrative measures and, when it does, it does so anonymously, limiting their deterrent effect. One case illustrates this trend, where an FI obtained a waiver of publication of its name following the exercise of its right to be heard prior to the adoption of the measure by the BNB. 392. The BNB favours “indirect deterrence” (hearsay, press), which is considered insufficient. In several cases, the shortcomings identified called for measures more proportionate to the seriousness of the facts (such as, for example, two successive inspections resulting in the most severe score of 4/4; lack of screening of SFC lists when entering into a business relationship). Box 3.3. Credit institution c) This case illustrates the legal constraints and excessive caution limiting the use of sanctions by the BNB. In the same case, that of CI c), the BNB considered disciplinary action three times before deciding not to proceed on each occasion: 2020: referral of the case to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, where the investigation is still ongoing. This referral was accompanied by a decision to wait for the outcome of the criminal proceedings before considering the application of sanctions, so as not to interfere with them. 2021: CI c) terminated 468 business relationships without complying with its due diligence obligations, despite the measures imposed by the BNB in 2020 and a significant risk of transactions not being reported to the CTIF. The sanction was dropped due to the ambiguous wording of the original measure. 2023: Despite late remediation, the BNB considered that failure to meet a remediation deadline did not in itself justify a sanction. 393. Several factors hinder the implementation and effectiveness of the overall process leading to the application of administrative sanctions: the complexity of the sanctioning procedure [112] , the lack of dedicated resources (particularly legal and auditing resources), excessive caution, fear of appeals and the requirement for the AML/CFT Group to demonstrate the underlying causes of the breaches in order to justify disciplinary action. This results in paralysis of the BNB’s action, thus depriving it of the use of a fundamental part of its powers. When sanction procedures are initiated, the length of the overall sanctioning process (several years, sometimes at the auditor stage alone) reduces its deterrent effect and may even influence the amount of the fine. As a result, the number of fines issued by the BNB is extremely low (only one in ten years). 394. The lack of resources dedicated to legal advice and guidance significantly hinders the effectiveness of the system. Since 2016, the number of FTEs allocated to these functions has remained virtually unchanged, and is considered to be clearly insufficient: 0.5 FTE for legal advice (0.3 in 2016) and 1.5 FTE for administrative sanctions (1.35 in 2016). The sanctioning process is long and complex (see previous paragraph). Due in particular to the limited resources allocated to the auditor, this mechanism remains unproductive, with an average of 1.2 cases handled per year, a rate considered highly insufficient to ensure that sanctions have a dissuasive and responsive effect, being intended to address the most serious failures. At present, only a few cases are under investigation, despite some having been referred some time ago (see table below), which reflects in particular the complexity of the cases and the lack of human resources, and contributes to the slowness of the process. Box 3.4. Examples of the time taken for the supervisory process and follow-up These cases illustrate the slowness and shortcomings in the handling of serious infringements (score 4/4) by the NBB, particularly the late referral to the auditor and the fact that remedial action takes several years. Excessive delays between inspection and referral to the auditor: · FI 1: Belgian CI. Inspection at the end of 2020-beginning of 2021, referral not until March 2022 (+1 year), investigation still in progress · FI 2: Belgian CI. Inspection between July 2020 and March 2021; December 2022: notification to the FI of the serious nature of these shortcomings; auditor not notified until the end of July 2023 (+18 months after notification of the shortcomings), investigation still in progress. · FI 3: Inspection in 2021, referral in September 2022 (+1 year), investigation still in progress. Very long action and remediation plans: · FI4: One of the four main Belgian CIs. Inspection between November 2021 and October 2022, score 4/4, auditor appointed in July 2023, investigation still in progress and compliance is also still being checked as of 14 February 2025 (end of on-site visit). · FI5: Inspection from Q3 2021 to Q2 2022, referral in June 2023 (+1 year), investigation still in progress, remediation not completed until summer 2024. 395. Another negative effect of this lack of regular sanction procedures is the lack of case law, depriving the BNB and the private sector of a stable frame of reference for interpreting and applying the regulations. In comparison, frequent and clear decisions by a sanctions committee would clarify the practical application of the regulatory framework and provide better guidance for FI practices. FSMA 396. As explained in section 3.5, some of the FSMA’s off-site inspections are primarily informative in nature (improving the FSMA’s understanding of a sector or entity). These inspections have limited effectiveness in terms of FI compliance, as they do not include verification of the AML/CFT system or any remediation orders. By contrast, off-site compliance inspections result in corrective measures, although these remain formal (e.g. updating policies and procedures) (see box below), as these off-site inspections are designed to check the formal compliance of FIs. Verification of follow-up mainly concerns the analysis of documents provided by the FI, while on-site visits, which are the most effective means of ensuring effective and thorough remediation, are rarely used. Table 3.4. Results of thematic or ad hoc and off-site inspections by the FSMA Thematic or ad hoc inspections not resulting in remedial orders: 2020: 240 insurance intermediaries (“ad hoc” inspections) →no orders. 2021: 20 small alternative OPCAs (thematic inspection) →no orders. 2022: 31 branches of alternative OPCAs (thematic inspection) → no orders. Off-site inspections (compliance checks) resulting in corrective measures: 2019: 98 insurance intermediaries inspected → 251 offences detected. 2023: 40 insurance intermediaries inspected → 61 offences detected. 397. Delays in remediation are not usually sanctioned immediately, as the FSMA favours support and additional time is often granted. However, a clear refusal to comply leads to more severe measures. 398. The FSMA has an administrative sanction procedure, which can also lead to a settlement agreement. This procedure is rarely used in AML/CFT matters. In 10 years, only two administrative sanctions relating to AML/CFT have been applied by the FSMA’s sanctions committee. Several factors may explain this shortcoming: insufficient (or incomplete) understanding of the role of administrative sanctions: the usefulness of their punitive function in the most serious cases, either alone or in addition to an administrative measure; their deterrent effect, both for the institution concerned and for the sector as a whole; and their educational value, as the reasoned decisions of the sanctions committee contribute to the development of a body of case law. In addition, as in the case of the BNB, there is a fear of appeals and the slowness of the process, which involves, in particular, referral to an auditor to investigate the cases. This shortcoming is partly offset by the occasional use of serious administrative measures, such as temporary suspension of activity or deregistration, the financial consequences of which act as a dissuasive. For example, one bureau de change was suspended following an inspection carried out by the FSMA between late 2024 and early 2025. After a one-month suspension, the bureau de change confirmed to the FSMA in April 2025 that it had taken the expected measures. These measures are published by name on the “Actualités et mises en garde” (news and warnings) web page and on the public record of the FI concerned, increasing their visibility. Creation of a web page dedicated to publishing serious administrative measures by name and increased use of sanctions are desirable. 399.  Supervisory measures are largely perceived as a tool for outreach and guidance. They focus mainly on the formal compliance of FIs, with findings regularly resulting in orders being sent to non-compliant FIs. These actions have a positive effect, particularly on the compliance of currency exchange offices and, to a lesser extent, insurance intermediaries. Nevertheless, they still appear insufficient to ensure the adequate and effective implementation of mitigating measures by FIs. SPF Finance – Treasury 400. Bpost has met the deadlines for remedying the shortcomings identified during supervision in 2020. Quarterly meetings enable Bpost to continue improving its compliance over time. Footnotes [112] Summary of the process leading to the application of a sanction by the BNB sanctions committee: After an initial decision on the appropriateness of taking action, the AML/CFT Group submits a written report to an assessment committee. If the committee decides to proceed, the AML/CFT Group drafts a referral to the auditor and compiles a file of evidence, which is submitted to the BNB management committee. The auditor, who manages all matters audited by the BNB, examines the evidence for and against. The auditor then submits their conclusions to the management committee, which decides whether to continue the sanction procedure and whether to refer the matter to the sanctions committee or propose a settlement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="481. The authorities have a number of remedial measures and sanctions at their disposal, but often favour an educational approach focused on support rather than sanction. However, awareness remains insufficient, as many reporting entities do not fully understand the importance of implementing effective AML/CFT measures and are not familiar with their obligations. In general, the supervision and follow-up carried out by the authorities remain limited or do not sufficiently target AML/CFT issues. The impact of these actions varies across sectors but remains superficial overall. 482. SPF Economy has stepped up its application of administrative fines since 2019, targeting in particular diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres. Their impact on compliance in these sectors is significant for the entities sanctioned, but limited for the sector as a whole, due to the low number of sanctions and their lack of visibility. Between 2022 and 2024, nine administrative fines (for AML/CFT breaches) totalling EUR 539 226 were issued to diamond dealers . These amounts are deemed proportionate. However, their deterrent effect remains limited, as the sanctions were published anonymously and the diamond dealers themselves do not appear to be aware of them, thereby reducing the impact on compliance in the sector. 483. SPF Economy notes an improvement thanks to the AML Policy for the sector updated in 2024 and training conducted with the AWDC, but these initiatives remain poorly integrated, including among sanctioned diamond dealers. Shortcomings in the understanding of AML/CFT obligations within the AWDC also limit its outreach role. 484. Following the 2021 supervision campaign among real estate agents, SPF Economy issued 53 warnings and 95 fines, which constitutes very significant supervisory action. These proportionate and dissuasive sanctions have prompted some real estate agents to strengthen their compliance, particularly in high-risk sectors (e.g. three agencies operating in the B2B sector, inspected in 2019 and re-inspected in 2023, had improved their compliance). However, these sanctions had only a one-off effect and did not have a structural impact on the sector as a whole. Real estate agents’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains very limited, and levels of non-compliance remain high in the sector (see section4.4). The tools available, such as ORIS, are only rarely used, which limits their impact on improving practices in the sector. 485. The impact of SPF Economy measures on the business centre sector is more difficult to measure. The 2022 survey revealed that 57% of the entities inspected presented breaches, leading to numerous warnings and administrative fines. These sanctions prompted some service providers to improve their compliance and, in one specific case, to completely overhaul their business model and management tools following supervision. However, major shortcomings persist, particularly in the areas of risk analysis, customer identification and supervision of transactions. As mentioned above, the number of breaches identified in 2022 was particularly high (nearly 69%) and resulted in warnings and administrative fines, some of which were imposed the following year. However, the number of fines remains limited. The sharp increase in warnings in 2022 (94) (see table below) is a useful approach to encourage compliance. However, an increase in the number of sanctions in significant cases of non-compliance would help to raise the level of compliance in this sector. The guidance published in 2022 provides a useful framework for the sector, but its implementation remains variable. Difficulties in implementing AML/CFT obligations remain widespread, and supervisory efforts, which are still limited, have not led to significant change across the sector. Table 4.8. Number of AML/CFT inspections and results concerning compliance with AML/CFT obligations in the business centre sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 7 ** 20 165 13 10 215 including those with AML shortcomings 7 (100%) 6 (30%) 114 (69%) 6 (46%) 9 (90%) 142 (66%) Warning 1 3 (15%) 94 ** (57%) 2 (6.5%) 0 (0%) 102 Report x 3 (15%) 20 (12%) 4 (31%) 9 (90%) 33 AML* administrative fines 6 3 2 23 3 37 Total amount of AML fines (€) 2590 3540 2065 43164 2450 57859 Note: Administrative fines are calculated according to the year of the decision, not the year of supervision. As a decision may be made in the year following the start of the inspection, this may explain the significant differences between the number of inspections carried out and the number of fines issued in the same year. Five proceedings were still ongoing at the end of 2024. x: data not provided ** In 2020, SPF Economy introduced a new follow-up system for cases. Extracting data from the old system is proving difficult, which means that the figures for 2020 are incomplete. Some of the inspections carried out that year were only recorded in the old system. Source: SPF Economy 486. The supervisory authorities for the legal and accounting professions can apply disciplinary and sometimes financial penalties. With regard to the legal professions, the authorities favour an educational approach focused on support rather than coercive measures. Although this strategy aims to improve compliance by reporting entities, it limits the deterrent effect of sanctions and does not always seem to guarantee effective implementation of AML/CFT obligations. 487. The provincial chambers of notaries have disciplinary sanctions, but no data could be consulted, making it difficult to assess the sanctions. Since 2023, they have been published anonymously, which means that notaries can now access them. However, anonymity reduces the positive impact. The National Chamber of Notaries has the power to apply sanctions and administrative measures. These sanctions are published in a non-anonymised form but are rarely used and have little deterrent effect. One example is a notary who was fined EUR 15,000 in 2022 for serious offences, including disclosure of a STR submitted to the CTIF and breaches of due diligence obligations. Despite this sanction, he continues to practise and his case has been referred to the public prosecutor’s office, raising questions about the effectiveness of the disciplinary system. 488. The bars have never issued financial penalties against lawyers and very few disciplinary investigations are carried out. Some investigations have been ongoing for several years in some bars, while other bars have not recorded any cases. The limited number of corrective measures issued, combined with the absence of recommendations in monitoring reports (a shortcoming identified in the previous section), contrasts with the shortcomings observed in the sector’s understanding of AML/CFT obligations, which is a cause for concern. Although the authorities report that breaches are generally corrected within the required time frame, the rarity and slowness of proceedings raise questions about the effectiveness of the supervisory system. 489. The ITAA applies disciplinary sanctions (reprimands, suspensions, deregistration) to members who fail to comply with their obligations, including ML prevention measures, which are published on its website. [127] In recent years, it has mainly imposed suspensions of up to three months. It can also impose fines on chartered accountants, but does not have a clear methodology provided for by law for applying and collecting them. This weakens the deterrent effect of the system. 490. The BAOB has good administrative measures in place. For example, the following measures were applied by the Board in 2023 for AML/CFT breaches identified during periodic inspections. For auditors supervising PIEs, 22 measures were taken (reminders, orders, deadlines for corrective action, recommendations and points for attention), and for auditors supervising non-PIEs, 29 measures were taken. 491. The authorities consider that their awareness-raising efforts have an overall positive effect, particularly on customer identification and record keeping. However, shortcomings remain and call for further action. Among notaries , the authorities have observed improvements over the past three to four years: better structured internal procedures and more systematic training; some firms have even created a dedicated AML/CFT function to ensure more rigorous and independent verifications and thus prevent notaries who have known their clients for a long time from limiting their verifications. Notaries say they appreciate the publications on the eNotariat intranet and those of the National Chamber. 492. However, shortcomings remain, particularly in the application of enhanced due diligence measures (see section 4.4). Notaries are calling for more practical tools and targeted training. For lawyers , the Bar Associations have provided a range of training and compliance support tools, including workshops, webinars and practical tools (such as the Fil Blanc), which are considered useful. They also provide templates that reporting entities can use to implement AML/CFT measures. Some bars, depending on their size, also organise their own training or call on their Bar Association to provide on-site training. The impact of this training remains limited as significant shortcomings persist in the understanding of AML/CFT obligations. 493. Chartered accountants receive good support, particularly through the BE EXCELLENT tool (which is highly appreciated) and active support from the ITAA. The ITAA assists small firms, in particular by allowing the internal whistleblowing channel in small firms (which cannot guarantee the anonymity of the complainant) to be replaced by the use of the ITAA’s external whistleblowing channel by the firm’s employees. As regards training, firm employees must undergo AML training at least once every three years and, in the case of new employees, within six months of taking up their duties. However, small firms express a need for additional training and more appropriate tools to improve their compliance. 494. For auditors , the IRE provides useful information and training to its members. The BAOB provides general guidance and notes a gradual improvement, although small firms still express specific needs for training and appropriate tools. The BAOB has also informed the sector of the information resources available to help identify types of ML. 495. Finally, in the casino sector, the BAOB is carrying out outreach activities, but due to a lack of sufficient human resources and effective monitoring, their impact cannot be fully assessed. Footnotes [127] https://www.itaa.be/fr/mesures-art118-lab/" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="481. The authorities have a number of remedial measures and sanctions at their disposal, but often favour an educational approach focused on support rather than sanction. However, awareness remains insufficient, as many reporting entities do not fully understand the importance of implementing effective AML/CFT measures and are not familiar with their obligations. In general, the supervision and follow-up carried out by the authorities remain limited or do not sufficiently target AML/CFT issues. The impact of these actions varies across sectors but remains superficial overall. 482. SPF Economy has stepped up its application of administrative fines since 2019, targeting in particular diamond dealers, real estate agents and business centres. Their impact on compliance in these sectors is significant for the entities sanctioned, but limited for the sector as a whole, due to the low number of sanctions and their lack of visibility. Between 2022 and 2024, nine administrative fines (for AML/CFT breaches) totalling EUR 539 226 were issued to diamond dealers . These amounts are deemed proportionate. However, their deterrent effect remains limited, as the sanctions were published anonymously and the diamond dealers themselves do not appear to be aware of them, thereby reducing the impact on compliance in the sector. 483. SPF Economy notes an improvement thanks to the AML Policy for the sector updated in 2024 and training conducted with the AWDC, but these initiatives remain poorly integrated, including among sanctioned diamond dealers. Shortcomings in the understanding of AML/CFT obligations within the AWDC also limit its outreach role. 484. Following the 2021 supervision campaign among real estate agents, SPF Economy issued 53 warnings and 95 fines, which constitutes very significant supervisory action. These proportionate and dissuasive sanctions have prompted some real estate agents to strengthen their compliance, particularly in high-risk sectors (e.g. three agencies operating in the B2B sector, inspected in 2019 and re-inspected in 2023, had improved their compliance). However, these sanctions had only a one-off effect and did not have a structural impact on the sector as a whole. Real estate agents’ understanding of ML/TF risks remains very limited, and levels of non-compliance remain high in the sector (see section4.4). The tools available, such as ORIS, are only rarely used, which limits their impact on improving practices in the sector. 485. The impact of SPF Economy measures on the business centre sector is more difficult to measure. The 2022 survey revealed that 57% of the entities inspected presented breaches, leading to numerous warnings and administrative fines. These sanctions prompted some service providers to improve their compliance and, in one specific case, to completely overhaul their business model and management tools following supervision. However, major shortcomings persist, particularly in the areas of risk analysis, customer identification and supervision of transactions. As mentioned above, the number of breaches identified in 2022 was particularly high (nearly 69%) and resulted in warnings and administrative fines, some of which were imposed the following year. However, the number of fines remains limited. The sharp increase in warnings in 2022 (94) (see table below) is a useful approach to encourage compliance. However, an increase in the number of sanctions in significant cases of non-compliance would help to raise the level of compliance in this sector. The guidance published in 2022 provides a useful framework for the sector, but its implementation remains variable. Difficulties in implementing AML/CFT obligations remain widespread, and supervisory efforts, which are still limited, have not led to significant change across the sector. Table 4.8. Number of AML/CFT inspections and results concerning compliance with AML/CFT obligations in the business centre sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of inspections 7 ** 20 165 13 10 215 including those with AML shortcomings 7 (100%) 6 (30%) 114 (69%) 6 (46%) 9 (90%) 142 (66%) Warning 1 3 (15%) 94 ** (57%) 2 (6.5%) 0 (0%) 102 Report x 3 (15%) 20 (12%) 4 (31%) 9 (90%) 33 AML* administrative fines 6 3 2 23 3 37 Total amount of AML fines (€) 2590 3540 2065 43164 2450 57859 Note: Administrative fines are calculated according to the year of the decision, not the year of supervision. As a decision may be made in the year following the start of the inspection, this may explain the significant differences between the number of inspections carried out and the number of fines issued in the same year. Five proceedings were still ongoing at the end of 2024. x: data not provided ** In 2020, SPF Economy introduced a new follow-up system for cases. Extracting data from the old system is proving difficult, which means that the figures for 2020 are incomplete. Some of the inspections carried out that year were only recorded in the old system. Source: SPF Economy 486. The supervisory authorities for the legal and accounting professions can apply disciplinary and sometimes financial penalties. With regard to the legal professions, the authorities favour an educational approach focused on support rather than coercive measures. Although this strategy aims to improve compliance by reporting entities, it limits the deterrent effect of sanctions and does not always seem to guarantee effective implementation of AML/CFT obligations. 487. The provincial chambers of notaries have disciplinary sanctions, but no data could be consulted, making it difficult to assess the sanctions. Since 2023, they have been published anonymously, which means that notaries can now access them. However, anonymity reduces the positive impact. The National Chamber of Notaries has the power to apply sanctions and administrative measures. These sanctions are published in a non-anonymised form but are rarely used and have little deterrent effect. One example is a notary who was fined EUR 15,000 in 2022 for serious offences, including disclosure of a STR submitted to the CTIF and breaches of due diligence obligations. Despite this sanction, he continues to practise and his case has been referred to the public prosecutor’s office, raising questions about the effectiveness of the disciplinary system. 488. The bars have never issued financial penalties against lawyers and very few disciplinary investigations are carried out. Some investigations have been ongoing for several years in some bars, while other bars have not recorded any cases. The limited number of corrective measures issued, combined with the absence of recommendations in monitoring reports (a shortcoming identified in the previous section), contrasts with the shortcomings observed in the sector’s understanding of AML/CFT obligations, which is a cause for concern. Although the authorities report that breaches are generally corrected within the required time frame, the rarity and slowness of proceedings raise questions about the effectiveness of the supervisory system. 489. The ITAA applies disciplinary sanctions (reprimands, suspensions, deregistration) to members who fail to comply with their obligations, including ML prevention measures, which are published on its website. [127] In recent years, it has mainly imposed suspensions of up to three months. It can also impose fines on chartered accountants, but does not have a clear methodology provided for by law for applying and collecting them. This weakens the deterrent effect of the system. 490. The BAOB has good administrative measures in place. For example, the following measures were applied by the Board in 2023 for AML/CFT breaches identified during periodic inspections. For auditors supervising PIEs, 22 measures were taken (reminders, orders, deadlines for corrective action, recommendations and points for attention), and for auditors supervising non-PIEs, 29 measures were taken. 491. The authorities consider that their awareness-raising efforts have an overall positive effect, particularly on customer identification and record keeping. However, shortcomings remain and call for further action. Among notaries , the authorities have observed improvements over the past three to four years: better structured internal procedures and more systematic training; some firms have even created a dedicated AML/CFT function to ensure more rigorous and independent verifications and thus prevent notaries who have known their clients for a long time from limiting their verifications. Notaries say they appreciate the publications on the eNotariat intranet and those of the National Chamber. 492. However, shortcomings remain, particularly in the application of enhanced due diligence measures (see section 4.4). Notaries are calling for more practical tools and targeted training. For lawyers , the Bar Associations have provided a range of training and compliance support tools, including workshops, webinars and practical tools (such as the Fil Blanc), which are considered useful. They also provide templates that reporting entities can use to implement AML/CFT measures. Some bars, depending on their size, also organise their own training or call on their Bar Association to provide on-site training. The impact of this training remains limited as significant shortcomings persist in the understanding of AML/CFT obligations. 493. Chartered accountants receive good support, particularly through the BE EXCELLENT tool (which is highly appreciated) and active support from the ITAA. The ITAA assists small firms, in particular by allowing the internal whistleblowing channel in small firms (which cannot guarantee the anonymity of the complainant) to be replaced by the use of the ITAA’s external whistleblowing channel by the firm’s employees. As regards training, firm employees must undergo AML training at least once every three years and, in the case of new employees, within six months of taking up their duties. However, small firms express a need for additional training and more appropriate tools to improve their compliance. 494. For auditors , the IRE provides useful information and training to its members. The BAOB provides general guidance and notes a gradual improvement, although small firms still express specific needs for training and appropriate tools. The BAOB has also informed the sector of the information resources available to help identify types of ML. 495. Finally, in the casino sector, the BAOB is carrying out outreach activities, but due to a lack of sufficient human resources and effective monitoring, their impact cannot be fully assessed. Footnotes [127] https://www.itaa.be/fr/mesures-art118-lab/" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="834. As with TF, SPF Finance is responsible for implementing freezing measures related to PF and monitoring compliance with the obligations of reporting entities. The AML/CFT supervisors for FIs and DNFBPs are responsible for ensuring that reporting entities have developed and implemented effective internal control procedures to comply with TFS obligations. The supervision carried out in this regard generally focuses on compliance with TFS and does not specifically target TF sanctions (see IO.10). 835. Information on the frequency and nature of supervision specifically relating to how financial institutions apply PF related TFS is not available. However, the examples that Belgium provided show that the supervision carried out by the FIs supervisors is fairly satisfactory. 836. DNFBPs supervisors have not detected breaches or non-implementation of the sanctions regime imposed on the DPRK. [232] Footnotes [232] The SPF Economy identified several cases of diamond dealers being involved in evading another sanctions regime in 2023 and 2024. These examples were reviewed by the evaluation team but do not fall within the scope of UNSCR 1718 and its subsequent resolutions. They are therefore not taken into account in the evaluation of Belgium’s effectiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="834. As with TF, SPF Finance is responsible for implementing freezing measures related to PF and monitoring compliance with the obligations of reporting entities. The AML/CFT supervisors for FIs and DNFBPs are responsible for ensuring that reporting entities have developed and implemented effective internal control procedures to comply with TFS obligations. The supervision carried out in this regard generally focuses on compliance with TFS and does not specifically target TF sanctions (see IO.10). 835. Information on the frequency and nature of supervision specifically relating to how financial institutions apply PF related TFS is not available. However, the examples that Belgium provided show that the supervision carried out by the FIs supervisors is fairly satisfactory. 836. DNFBPs supervisors have not detected breaches or non-implementation of the sanctions regime imposed on the DPRK. [232] Footnotes [232] The SPF Economy identified several cases of diamond dealers being involved in evading another sanctions regime in 2023 and 2024. These examples were reviewed by the evaluation team but do not fall within the scope of UNSCR 1718 and its subsequent resolutions. They are therefore not taken into account in the evaluation of Belgium’s effectiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML/TF risks 103. Singapore has a reasonably sound understanding of its ML and TF risks, as consolidated in the 2024 ML and TF NRAs and various risk products over the intervening period between the 2014 NRA and the 2024 updates. [15] Singapore was not able to provide a definition of the dynamic approach during the Assessment Team’s onsite visit, but the approach is generally understood by the competent authorities as ongoing risk surveillance and monitoring, and deep dive reviews into specific risk areas and/or emerging risks as co-ordinated by RTIG. The Assessment Team understands the dynamic approach is an iterative, co-ordinated and agile method of identifying and assessing risks, thereby developing and updating the national ML/TF risk understanding. Risks are considered as competent authorities identify them to various inter-agency committees, notably RTIG, that ultimately report to the AML/CFT SC. 104. Under the dynamic approach, Singapore has various approaches/channels to assess risks, including (i) regular engagements of industry experts and practitioners (including through ACIP), (ii) data analysis on STRs and crime information from LEAs, (iii) monitoring international developments, trends and typologies through international and regional reports, and (iv) engagements and surveys of its key foreign law enforcement and FIU partners. Singapore provided a few examples where authorities (e.g. STRO) deployed the above approaches to assess risks associated with particular sectors (e.g. real estate sector) or typologies (e.g. misuse of legal persons), but mechanisms for horizon scanning, forward-looking modelling or scenario analysis for future risks can be improved. The dynamic approach allows Singapore to respond quickly to emerging new risks by convening the RTIG and discussing the relevant issue with all relevant parties, whether it is new threats, geopolitical shifts, or changes in macro customer behaviours. It is, however, an approach that identifies and assesses individual risks on a case-by-case basis as they arise in the environment. For instance, when the RTIG/IAC reviewed and rerated the ML risk of the real estate sector considering the rising threat in relation to real estate market and size of the sector, the assessment seemed to focus primarily on real estate agents and developers. While risks of the legal sector in relation to conveyancing services were considered, the rating was not amended as the sector was considered to have more mature AML/CFT regime and stronger risk awareness. As revealed from the 3B$ case, several LPEs were involved in and sanctioned for the purchase of real estate properties in question. The AT considers this was a missed opportunity to holistically consider the risk implications on different sectors when assessing the rising threat related to the real estate sector. 105. While RTIG/IAC has had discussions on sectoral risk ratings and key threats at different intervals during the assessment period, such discussions did not result in any regular and comprehensive update on overview of risks facing Singapore. Singapore brings to bear data and expertise available to assess risks, but there is scope to adopt a more systematic and better documented approach to risk reviews conducted by RTIG to ensure clear communication of a consistent risk overview to all relevant stakeholders. There is no identification of the relative importance of ML/TF risks in Singapore’s environment when particular risks are identified, assessed and mitigation plans put into place. Singapore has not committed to updating the ML or TF NRAs in a particular time period and will rely on the discussions at RTIG to ensure its risk understanding is comprehensive and up to date. 106. The 2024 ML and TF NRAs are a synthesis of the findings made through the dynamic approach , bringing together the various risk assessments from the 10-year period for the ML NRA and 4-year period for the TF NRA into consolidated public documents. These documents synthesise the findings made through the dynamic approach and give relative criticality to the risks. Singapore identifies its ML and TF risks in its 2024 NRAs as follows: Table 1.1. 2024 ML and TF NRA Findings ML NRA TF NRA Overall Finding Key ML Threats: Fraud (particular CEF) Organised Crime (especially illegal gambling with foreign organised criminal groups) Corruption Tax Crimes TBML Other Notable ML Threats: Environmental crime Cyber-crime Drug-related offences Overall National TF Risk: Medium-Low Sector Risk Rating Sectors (ML) Sectors (TF) High Risk Banks Money remittances, including: - Unlicensed money remittances - Cross-border online payments Medium-High Risk DPTSPs PSPs with CBMT Services EAMs LTCs CSPs EAs/RES/ Developers Casinos PSMDs Banks, including: - New cross-border fast payment systems DPTSPs Medium-Low Risk Fund Management Companies (excluding EAMs) Money Changers PSPs without CBMT Services Broker Dealers and Corporate Finance Advisory Firms Moneylenders Lawyers Accountants Non-profit organisations, including - Online fundraising Cross-border cash movement PSMDs Low Risk Non-Bank Credit Card Companies Approved Trustees Finance Companies Direct Life and Composite Insurers Securities Depository Financial Advisers (including insurance brokers) Pawnbrokers Other AML/CFT regulated sectors not featured in the TF NRA report 107. Singapore’s ML and TF NRAs assessed sectoral risks based on a function of threats (taking into account consequences and impact), vulnerabilities and controls. Singapore adopted a residual risk model across all sectors but decided to place greater emphasis on threats and vulnerabilities, while less emphasis is accorded to the mitigating effect of controls where they are assessed to be strong. Where controls are assessed to be weak, the sector’s residual vulnerability would be heightened due to the lack of effective risk mitigation. All sectors with AML/CFT obligations are assessed in the NRA, as are all serious crimes. 108. For the ML NRA, ML threats are assessed using five guiding parameters: domestic and foreign crime landscape, materialised ML activity, Singapore’s inherent exposure to crime, propensity for laundering proceeds in Singapore, and perspectives from foreign partners. Indicators considered includes convictions of predicate offences, quantum of proceeds of crime involved, STRs tagged to predicate offences, as well as formal and informal international co-operation requests. While investigation and prosecution of predicate offences are taken into consideration, Singapore placed a higher focus on predicate convictions. Sectoral vulnerabilities are evaluated based on (i) exposure to identified threats, (ii) likelihood of threat materialisation, and (iii) the maturity of AML/CFT controls. 109. The TF NRA evaluates the likelihood of TF activities and Singapore’s use as a transit point, based on indicators such as regional terrorism/TF activity, terrorism/TF requests for assistance, MLA requests, and TF investigations. Sectoral TF vulnerabilities are analysed through collaboration with regulators and supervisors, considering product and service risks, industry feedback, and Singapore’s contextual factors such as its financial hub status, migrant population, and digital economy. Insights from FATF and international partners further enhance the understanding of TF typologies and risks. 110. Although Singapore draws on insights from FATF and international partners to strengthen its understanding of TF typologies and risks, these insights can be better contextualised within its own framework to integrate them into a dynamic and adaptive approach. In particular, organisational TF has not been adequately considered in the context of Singapore’s role as a global financial centre. [16] 111. While authorities have taken steps to mitigate risks associated with the misuse of legal persons and have sought to gauge potential exploitation of their financial centre through global feedback, further measures are needed. Specifically, Singapore should investigate organised TF networks and concealed income, given its global significance as a hub for finance, trade, and company formation. 112. The Secretariat of the RTIG (comprising MAS and MHA), co-ordinates the review of risks and leads the drafting of the NRAs. Both NRAs have a generally justified scoring matrix and framework that sits beneath it, which is structured, data-driven and prioritised. The conclusions of the NRAs are clear and agreed across different competent authorities. The findings from the ML and TF NRAs and other risk assessments are communicated across government agencies and private entities through publication on websites and issuance of guidance. FIs/VASPs interviewed onsite generally showed reasonable knowledge of the NRAs, with an uneven understanding of ML/TF and PF risks in some DNFBP sectors. This WoG approach is a key strength of Singapore’s ML and TF NRA processes. 113. The 2024 ML and TF NRAs reach appropriate conclusions in most cases. However, some methodological adjustments could be made for sharper assessment of risks. For example, while Singapore’s understanding of geographic risk in relation to ML/TF is reasonable, it could be enhanced by more granular analysis of geographic risks mapped against predicate crime types and contextualised for Singapore. In particular, the private sector reported that they use their own geographic lists that are more detailed and extensive than the advice provided by the Singaporean authorities. 114. For example, it is well acknowledged from Singaporean authorities that most illicit funds are foreign-sourced, but the NRA lacks detailed mapping of high-risk jurisdictions and transaction patterns specific to cross border flow of funds. There is scope for Singapore to enhance its understanding of risks from cross border transactions, especially in relation to cash transactions by money mules. TBML is acknowledged as a key ML threat, but there is limited empirical data on its scale and typologies in Singapore’s massive trade ecosystem. There is also no detailed mapping of high-risk trade routes, commodity vulnerabilities, or financial instruments used in TBML schemes. 115. Singapore indicated that quantitative data and qualitative indicators are accorded equal weights in risk assessments, though there does not appear to be a systematic and clearly communicated mechanism on how these different sources are weighed or reconciled. In practice, it appears that qualitative indicators may sometimes take precedence over quantitative and operational information, and result in a higher threat rating even if the number of cases may not be significant. Singapore has made good efforts to address previously identified gaps, particularly by incorporating more international typologies and foreign requests for assistance. However, this may have come at the cost of a lesser focus on understanding of domestic risks, for example the risk posed by complex legal arrangement/person structures, and risks within the legal sector. 116. While Singapore takes into consideration quantitative, operational data in its formulation of NRA findings, the TF NRA is heavily reliant on international and regional typologies and their applicability to Singapore’s risk and context. Singapore has made concerted efforts to consider the risks associated with “unknown unknowns”, such as external organisational terrorist financing, through its 2024 TF Risk Perception Survey conducted with 41 FATF members, regional, and high TF risk jurisdictions. The overall TF risk ratings are justified. 117. While Singaporean agencies and private sector representatives demonstrated a reasonably sound risk understanding that aligned with, and in some cases, went beyond, the findings of the ML and TF NRAs, there remained some inadequacies in comprehensiveness and granularity as well as consolidated documentation for communication of a common understanding in Singapore’s dynamic approach to risk understanding. Footnotes [15] This includes the thematic risk assessments developed by the RTIG, including: (i) Legal Persons (2019, refreshed in 2024); (ii) Virtual assets (2020, refreshed in 2024); (iii) Environmental Crime ML (2024); (iv) Legal Arrangements (2024); and TF NPO Risk Assessment (2019). [16] FATF – Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks, see Sections 7 and 8 (hyperlinked from the contents), particularly paragraphs 237 and 396." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML/TF risks 103. Singapore has a reasonably sound understanding of its ML and TF risks, as consolidated in the 2024 ML and TF NRAs and various risk products over the intervening period between the 2014 NRA and the 2024 updates. [15] Singapore was not able to provide a definition of the dynamic approach during the Assessment Team’s onsite visit, but the approach is generally understood by the competent authorities as ongoing risk surveillance and monitoring, and deep dive reviews into specific risk areas and/or emerging risks as co-ordinated by RTIG. The Assessment Team understands the dynamic approach is an iterative, co-ordinated and agile method of identifying and assessing risks, thereby developing and updating the national ML/TF risk understanding. Risks are considered as competent authorities identify them to various inter-agency committees, notably RTIG, that ultimately report to the AML/CFT SC. 104. Under the dynamic approach, Singapore has various approaches/channels to assess risks, including (i) regular engagements of industry experts and practitioners (including through ACIP), (ii) data analysis on STRs and crime information from LEAs, (iii) monitoring international developments, trends and typologies through international and regional reports, and (iv) engagements and surveys of its key foreign law enforcement and FIU partners. Singapore provided a few examples where authorities (e.g. STRO) deployed the above approaches to assess risks associated with particular sectors (e.g. real estate sector) or typologies (e.g. misuse of legal persons), but mechanisms for horizon scanning, forward-looking modelling or scenario analysis for future risks can be improved. The dynamic approach allows Singapore to respond quickly to emerging new risks by convening the RTIG and discussing the relevant issue with all relevant parties, whether it is new threats, geopolitical shifts, or changes in macro customer behaviours. It is, however, an approach that identifies and assesses individual risks on a case-by-case basis as they arise in the environment. For instance, when the RTIG/IAC reviewed and rerated the ML risk of the real estate sector considering the rising threat in relation to real estate market and size of the sector, the assessment seemed to focus primarily on real estate agents and developers. While risks of the legal sector in relation to conveyancing services were considered, the rating was not amended as the sector was considered to have more mature AML/CFT regime and stronger risk awareness. As revealed from the 3B$ case, several LPEs were involved in and sanctioned for the purchase of real estate properties in question. The AT considers this was a missed opportunity to holistically consider the risk implications on different sectors when assessing the rising threat related to the real estate sector. 105. While RTIG/IAC has had discussions on sectoral risk ratings and key threats at different intervals during the assessment period, such discussions did not result in any regular and comprehensive update on overview of risks facing Singapore. Singapore brings to bear data and expertise available to assess risks, but there is scope to adopt a more systematic and better documented approach to risk reviews conducted by RTIG to ensure clear communication of a consistent risk overview to all relevant stakeholders. There is no identification of the relative importance of ML/TF risks in Singapore’s environment when particular risks are identified, assessed and mitigation plans put into place. Singapore has not committed to updating the ML or TF NRAs in a particular time period and will rely on the discussions at RTIG to ensure its risk understanding is comprehensive and up to date. 106. The 2024 ML and TF NRAs are a synthesis of the findings made through the dynamic approach , bringing together the various risk assessments from the 10-year period for the ML NRA and 4-year period for the TF NRA into consolidated public documents. These documents synthesise the findings made through the dynamic approach and give relative criticality to the risks. Singapore identifies its ML and TF risks in its 2024 NRAs as follows: Table 1.1. 2024 ML and TF NRA Findings ML NRA TF NRA Overall Finding Key ML Threats: Fraud (particular CEF) Organised Crime (especially illegal gambling with foreign organised criminal groups) Corruption Tax Crimes TBML Other Notable ML Threats: Environmental crime Cyber-crime Drug-related offences Overall National TF Risk: Medium-Low Sector Risk Rating Sectors (ML) Sectors (TF) High Risk Banks Money remittances, including: - Unlicensed money remittances - Cross-border online payments Medium-High Risk DPTSPs PSPs with CBMT Services EAMs LTCs CSPs EAs/RES/ Developers Casinos PSMDs Banks, including: - New cross-border fast payment systems DPTSPs Medium-Low Risk Fund Management Companies (excluding EAMs) Money Changers PSPs without CBMT Services Broker Dealers and Corporate Finance Advisory Firms Moneylenders Lawyers Accountants Non-profit organisations, including - Online fundraising Cross-border cash movement PSMDs Low Risk Non-Bank Credit Card Companies Approved Trustees Finance Companies Direct Life and Composite Insurers Securities Depository Financial Advisers (including insurance brokers) Pawnbrokers Other AML/CFT regulated sectors not featured in the TF NRA report 107. Singapore’s ML and TF NRAs assessed sectoral risks based on a function of threats (taking into account consequences and impact), vulnerabilities and controls. Singapore adopted a residual risk model across all sectors but decided to place greater emphasis on threats and vulnerabilities, while less emphasis is accorded to the mitigating effect of controls where they are assessed to be strong. Where controls are assessed to be weak, the sector’s residual vulnerability would be heightened due to the lack of effective risk mitigation. All sectors with AML/CFT obligations are assessed in the NRA, as are all serious crimes. 108. For the ML NRA, ML threats are assessed using five guiding parameters: domestic and foreign crime landscape, materialised ML activity, Singapore’s inherent exposure to crime, propensity for laundering proceeds in Singapore, and perspectives from foreign partners. Indicators considered includes convictions of predicate offences, quantum of proceeds of crime involved, STRs tagged to predicate offences, as well as formal and informal international co-operation requests. While investigation and prosecution of predicate offences are taken into consideration, Singapore placed a higher focus on predicate convictions. Sectoral vulnerabilities are evaluated based on (i) exposure to identified threats, (ii) likelihood of threat materialisation, and (iii) the maturity of AML/CFT controls. 109. The TF NRA evaluates the likelihood of TF activities and Singapore’s use as a transit point, based on indicators such as regional terrorism/TF activity, terrorism/TF requests for assistance, MLA requests, and TF investigations. Sectoral TF vulnerabilities are analysed through collaboration with regulators and supervisors, considering product and service risks, industry feedback, and Singapore’s contextual factors such as its financial hub status, migrant population, and digital economy. Insights from FATF and international partners further enhance the understanding of TF typologies and risks. 110. Although Singapore draws on insights from FATF and international partners to strengthen its understanding of TF typologies and risks, these insights can be better contextualised within its own framework to integrate them into a dynamic and adaptive approach. In particular, organisational TF has not been adequately considered in the context of Singapore’s role as a global financial centre. [16] 111. While authorities have taken steps to mitigate risks associated with the misuse of legal persons and have sought to gauge potential exploitation of their financial centre through global feedback, further measures are needed. Specifically, Singapore should investigate organised TF networks and concealed income, given its global significance as a hub for finance, trade, and company formation. 112. The Secretariat of the RTIG (comprising MAS and MHA), co-ordinates the review of risks and leads the drafting of the NRAs. Both NRAs have a generally justified scoring matrix and framework that sits beneath it, which is structured, data-driven and prioritised. The conclusions of the NRAs are clear and agreed across different competent authorities. The findings from the ML and TF NRAs and other risk assessments are communicated across government agencies and private entities through publication on websites and issuance of guidance. FIs/VASPs interviewed onsite generally showed reasonable knowledge of the NRAs, with an uneven understanding of ML/TF and PF risks in some DNFBP sectors. This WoG approach is a key strength of Singapore’s ML and TF NRA processes. 113. The 2024 ML and TF NRAs reach appropriate conclusions in most cases. However, some methodological adjustments could be made for sharper assessment of risks. For example, while Singapore’s understanding of geographic risk in relation to ML/TF is reasonable, it could be enhanced by more granular analysis of geographic risks mapped against predicate crime types and contextualised for Singapore. In particular, the private sector reported that they use their own geographic lists that are more detailed and extensive than the advice provided by the Singaporean authorities. 114. For example, it is well acknowledged from Singaporean authorities that most illicit funds are foreign-sourced, but the NRA lacks detailed mapping of high-risk jurisdictions and transaction patterns specific to cross border flow of funds. There is scope for Singapore to enhance its understanding of risks from cross border transactions, especially in relation to cash transactions by money mules. TBML is acknowledged as a key ML threat, but there is limited empirical data on its scale and typologies in Singapore’s massive trade ecosystem. There is also no detailed mapping of high-risk trade routes, commodity vulnerabilities, or financial instruments used in TBML schemes. 115. Singapore indicated that quantitative data and qualitative indicators are accorded equal weights in risk assessments, though there does not appear to be a systematic and clearly communicated mechanism on how these different sources are weighed or reconciled. In practice, it appears that qualitative indicators may sometimes take precedence over quantitative and operational information, and result in a higher threat rating even if the number of cases may not be significant. Singapore has made good efforts to address previously identified gaps, particularly by incorporating more international typologies and foreign requests for assistance. However, this may have come at the cost of a lesser focus on understanding of domestic risks, for example the risk posed by complex legal arrangement/person structures, and risks within the legal sector. 116. While Singapore takes into consideration quantitative, operational data in its formulation of NRA findings, the TF NRA is heavily reliant on international and regional typologies and their applicability to Singapore’s risk and context. Singapore has made concerted efforts to consider the risks associated with “unknown unknowns”, such as external organisational terrorist financing, through its 2024 TF Risk Perception Survey conducted with 41 FATF members, regional, and high TF risk jurisdictions. The overall TF risk ratings are justified. 117. While Singaporean agencies and private sector representatives demonstrated a reasonably sound risk understanding that aligned with, and in some cases, went beyond, the findings of the ML and TF NRAs, there remained some inadequacies in comprehensiveness and granularity as well as consolidated documentation for communication of a common understanding in Singapore’s dynamic approach to risk understanding. Footnotes [15] This includes the thematic risk assessments developed by the RTIG, including: (i) Legal Persons (2019, refreshed in 2024); (ii) Virtual assets (2020, refreshed in 2024); (iii) Environmental Crime ML (2024); (iv) Legal Arrangements (2024); and TF NPO Risk Assessment (2019). [16] FATF – Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks, see Sections 7 and 8 (hyperlinked from the contents), particularly paragraphs 237 and 396." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="157. Singapore has a sound system in place to provide constructive and timely MLA and extradition requests, including for asset recovery purposes. MACMA allows Singapore to provide a wide range of assistance on the basis of reciprocity, although the high legal requirement to execute some requests may affect the timeliness of assistance provided. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 158. To a reasonable extent, Singapore provides constructive, timely and quality MLA in response to requests on ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Singapore received 988 MLA requests. As the breakdown in Table 2.1 shows: a) Thirty-nine per cent of MLA requests were executed in a timely manner. b) Thirty-four per cent of MLA requests remain pending and are at different stages of execution. Singapore considers an MLA request, which may encompass multiple requests for assistance, as pending if (1) at least one category of requested assistance remains outstanding, or (2) Singapore is clarifying and/or substantiating the request with the requestor. 28% of the pending MLA requests are partially executed, where some assistance has been provided, whereas assistance is still pending in 72% of those requests, including where Singapore is actively engaging with the requesting jurisdiction. c) Twenty-six per cent of MLA requests received during the time period were closed due to inactivity or withdrawals. The requests were closed either after six months of inactivity where the requesting jurisdiction no longer responds to Singapore’s follow-up or by withdrawal by the requesting state. This six-month timeframe is short, considering that requesting states may need time to follow-up on requests, but Singapore can re-open the request at any time if the requesting jurisdiction responds to a request past the deadline. d) One per cent of MLA requests were formally declined by Singapore, typically due to unmet requirements under MACMA (including dual criminality, or where there are ongoing domestic investigations or court proceedings). Table 2.1. – Incoming MLA requests (per type of predicate offence and status) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Total Requests 189 219 183 170 227 988 (100) ML 75 86 67 58 72 358 TF 1 1 2 0 2 6 PF 0 1 1 1 0 3 Corruption and bribery 5 6 11 7 9 38 Counterfeiting 1 0 1 3 1 6 Environmental crime 2 1 0 1 0 4 Extortion 4 6 3 4 6 23 Forgery 6 11 5 8 10 40 Fraud 65 83 69 64 86 367 Illicit trafficking in drugs 6 5 3 5 2 21 Insider trading and manipulation 1 0 0 1 1 3 Kidnapping 3 0 1 1 2 7 Murder, grievous bodily injury 4 9 2 3 8 26 Organised criminal group/racketeering 2 2 0 1 4 9 Robbery or theft 14 18 9 12 7 60 Sexual exploitation 8 2 9 12 16 47 Smuggling 4 8 4 1 7 24 Tax crimes 19 12 15 7 17 70 Terrorism 1 2 2 3 4 12 Status Number of requests executed 112 105 63 54 47 381 (39) Number of requests declined 3 3 6 1 0 13 (1) Number of requests closed due to inactivity or withdrawals 61 84 46 37 25 253 (26) Number of requests pending/partially executed 13 27 68 78 155 341 (34) Note : a single MLA request may involve multiple types of assistance therefore the total number of requests per predicate offence does not match the number of requests received 159. Most formal assistance is provided through exercising powers under MACMA. A much more limited amount was provided through exercising CPC powers or even on a voluntary basis. The nature of requests varies and concerns both simple and more complex requests, such as enforcing confiscation orders. A majority are for coercive measures, particularly production orders (e.g. records from FIs and the restraining of financial assets) which require court orders under S22(3-4) MACMA). Seeking information/evidence that requires coercive measures partly explains delays in executing requests as competent authorities may need to seek a court order to execute the request. Singapore does not maintain statistics on BO information sought by requesting parties (Table 2.2). Table 2.2. Type of request received [18] Legal provision # requests % total Witness statement &amp; taking of evidence (video-link) Non-MACMA 299 19 Government records Non-MACMA 245 15 Taking of evidence for criminal proceedings MACMA (S21) 63 4 Records from FI or other natural/legal persons MACMA (S21)/others 773 49 Restrain/enforcement of confiscation order MACMA (S29-30) and CPC 73 5 Search and seizure MACMA (S33) 15 1 Location/Identifying persons MACMA (S 37) 16 1 Service of process MACMA (S38) 65 4 Others Non-MACMA 41 3 Total 1 590 100 160. Case studies, statistics and discussions with the authorities demonstrate that Singapore generally provides timely assistance. Complex MLA requests are executed within an average of ten weeks, and simpler ones, such as providing video-link evidence, can be completed in as little as three days. Case studies and feedback provided by the Global Network generally indicates that assistance provided by Singapore is comprehensive. 161. Applications for production orders under Section 22 of the MACMA (to share documentation, records and ‘other things’) and search warrants under Section 34 (for requests to obtain things by search and seizure) can be granted upon several conditions being met. Authorities must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a specified person has carried on or benefited from a foreign offence. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the documents or records sought through production orders are likely to be of ‘substantial value’ to the criminal matter, are not legally privileged and the provision of documents is not contrary to public interest. This is a much higher bar than is required by domestic authorities. It may be very difficult for a foreign investigator to know in advance whether information sought will provide value, much less substantial value, to their investigation. The term ‘substantial value’ is undefined in the legislation or in SOPs [19] . Singapore have indicated that they interpret ‘substantial value’ to mean ‘relevant’. The Assessment Team assesses that these are very different thresholds. As a result, there remains some ambiguity in operationalising this threshold. The qualifier ‘substantial’ adds to the requirement to be of value, which may hamper timeliness. 162. In practice, upon receiving a request, the CA will check that these requirements are met by seeking clarifications from requesting jurisdictions (where necessary). This clarificatory process typically involves verifying property or account details, the nexus between the offence and underlying investigation in the requesting jurisdiction and the property or records of interest in Singapore, assessing whether the conduct constitutes an offence under Singaporean law and establishing the value of the requested information for the criminal matter in the requesting jurisdiction. This can be time-consuming, especially in complex cases involving multiple accounts and/or legal persons/arrangements. Moreover, some feedback from the Global Network highlighted concerns that excessive requests for clarifications by Singapore may result in delays due to procedural complexities. 108 MLA requests (31.6% of the pending MLA requests) have been pending for over two years because of these requests for clarifications. Singapore has made efforts to reduce the need for clarifications by making available on the CA’s publicly accessible website detailed templates for common types of assistance and maintaining close relationships with foreign counterparts to assist when they make requests. 163. Requests are generally in line with risks and relate overwhelmingly to ML and fraud (Table 7.1). The nature of these requests aligns with known typologies (e.g. TBML, misuse of legal persons and arrangements, etc.). Most requests emanate from regional partners (Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia), as well as other materially relevant jurisdictions (USA, India, Australia etc.). Some other jurisdictions (e.g. China, Hong Kong China, Cambodia etc.) make fewer requests to Singapore despite trading links and cross-border ML/TF risk. 2.1.2. Extradition 164. Singapore has an appropriate operational and legislative framework in place to provide extradition, including simplified extradition, and to act on urgent cases. Under the Extradition Act, urgent applications for provisional arrest can be made by the requesting country, pending the receipt of the formal extradition request. Singapore also has bilateral extradition requests with key partners and a special arrangement with Malaysia and Brunei simplifying the process to extradite each other’s fugitives without a formal extradition request. Where either of these countries requires the arrest of persons in Singapore, they make a request to Singaporean LEA directly, who will apply to the courts for endorsement of the warrant in Singapore before executing the warrant. 165. Singapore generally provides good and timely assistance in response to the limited number of extradition requests received (21). These primarily relate to predicate offences and originate from important partners like the United States, European and Asian Countries, which aligns with risks reasonably well. Of these, 43% were executed, while 19% were declined, 14% were closed due to inactivity by the requesting state, and 24% remain pending. Five cases are pending subject to clarifications concerning dual criminality and other legal checks including the involvement of the individual in domestic criminal proceedings or where the individual contests extradition. The declined cases largely involve situations where the fugitive was not located in Singapore or was only transiting through, leaving insufficient time for Singapore’s competent authorities to act. 166. Although simplified extradition procedures exist, Singapore typically executes requests within an average of three months, which is appropriate given the legal complexities involved. This timeframe includes cases where the defendant appeals the extradition (in one instance, extradition was granted nearly two years after the initial request). During the reporting period, Singapore received 14 expedited extradition requests from Brunei/Malaysia, and executed all of these, unless withdrawn by the countries or warrants for execution were not submitted to Singapore. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 167.  Singapore is equipped to assist requesting jurisdictions in asset recovery by enforcing freezing, seizure, and confiscation orders across a wide range of assets. Its legal framework allows for co-operation in civil confiscation proceedings and enables enforcement even without a foreign confiscation order. MACMA amendments in 2024 further strengthened this framework by allowing LEAs to physically transfer confiscated items, rather than only returning realised assets. These changes permit Singapore to enforce foreign confiscation orders issued by competent authorities beyond the courts, enhancing its flexibility and responsiveness in cross-border asset recovery efforts (see R. 38). 168. As indicated in Table 2.3, the authorities received 73 MLA requests on asset recovery, which includes a mix of request to freeze, seize and confiscate assets, including enforcement of foreign confiscation orders. These requests are risk-aligned and mainly relate to ML and fraud, totalling at least SGD 1.14 billion (USD 844 million) in assets, such as bank accounts and real estate. LEAs may use such MLA requests to open a domestic investigation (for example, 27 ML investigations were started during the reporting period using CPC powers to freeze/seize assets). 169. Singapore executed 36 MLA requests (49% of total), recovering SGD 778 million (USD 576 million) and other assets for foreign jurisdictions. Singapore considers that MLAs are executed even where no assets are ultimately identified, This can include situations such as where bank accounts that were the subject of the foreign request were closed, the assets had been dissipated by the time Singapore received the request, the assets that were the subject of the foreign request did not exist, where other forms of assistance were provided instead, or the assets (such as virtual assets) were not located within Singapore. Of the 37 remaining requests to facilitate asset recovery (51% of total), 14 are still pending (19%), six were declined (8%) and 17 requests (23%) were closed due to inactivity or withdrawal by the requesting jurisdiction. 170. As discussed above, the thresholds under MACMA may cause variable processes for execution resulting in delays with executing requests or potentially non-responses for requesting jurisdictions. In every MLA request that seek asset recovery assistance, Singapore also considers if informal assistance outside the MACMA framework, such as under CPC powers, can be provided to prevent asset dissipation. Exercising such powers outside the MACMA framework requires a suspicion that under Singapore law, an offence has occurred. In the case of MLA requests that seek asset recovery assistance, this would typically be an ML offence. Obtaining the facts from the requesting jurisdiction to determine if such a suspicion can be formed may take time and may also create a risk of asset dissipation, especially liquid assets such as bank accounts, which account for a significant number of requests. Upon receiving an MLA request, the relevant LEA conducts informal checks to verify whether the bank account is still active, whether it holds funds, and whether there is suspicion of a domestic ML offence. If all conditions are met, the LEA may use its powers under the CPC to seize the funds without requiring a court order under MACMA. This process may affect the timeliness of co-operation that Singapore provides. 171. 26 of the 73 asset recovery-related MLA requests concern enforcing a foreign judgement [20] (Table 2.3). These requests are not executed by Singapore in only a few instances. Three requests were declined: (i) two because the foreign court order did not satisfy the relevant MACMA requirements; and (ii) one request was declined so as not to prejudice ongoing domestic investigations / court proceedings. Three requests are pending execution as the requesting jurisdiction failed to provide all relevant documentation for the Court to approve the requests. Singapore executed five MLA requests to enforce a foreign judgement leading to the repatriation of SGD 13.5 million (USD 10 million) (see IO.8). Nine cases are ongoing with no assets yet repatriated, either because Singapore is addressing procedural and legal requirements under the MACMA, because notices of registration must be served in third jurisdictions, or where responses or additional documentation from those jurisdictions are pending. There are a small number of cases where the clarificatory process to ensure that MACMA conditions are met led to delays of more than 2 years. In one instance, despite frequent communication between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction, assets were repatriated to the requesting jurisdiction four and half year after Singapore received the request. This exceptional situation related to the unknown situation of the accused’s whereabouts, and time was needed to effect substituted service in the jurisdiction where the accused’s last known address was, in compliance with the domestic laws of the requesting jurisdiction. Table 2.3. MLA (asset recovery and enforcement of foreign confiscation orders) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) 1. Total MLA requests 14 23 11 13 12 73 (100) ML 11 12 6 8 8 45 (62) Corruption and bribery 0 2 1 1 0 4 (5) Extortion 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1) Forgery 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1) Fraud 1 7 4 3 3 18 (25) Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1) Robbery and theft 0 2 0 0 1 3 (4) Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 2. Status of requests Executed (amounts frozen, seized, confiscated and repatriated where applicable) 9 SGD 30.4m 10 SGD 732.9m + others 3 SGD 0.7m 6 SGD 0.5m + others 8 SGD 14.4m 36 Closed due to inactivity/withdrawal by requesting State 4 7 4 2 0 17 Declined 1 4 0 0 1 6 Pending 0 2 4 5 3 14 3. Enforcement of Foreign Confiscation Orders (FCO) Received [21] 6 8 4 2 6 26 Assets repatriated 4 1 0 0 0 5 Assets frozen but not repatriated 0 0 3 2 2 7 FCO registered but assets not repatriated 1 0 0 0 1 2 Requests closed due to inactivity/ withdrawal 0 2 1 0 0 3 Request not executed 0 2 0 0 1 3 Requests declined under MACMA conditions 1 1 0 0 0 2 Request declined (ongoing domestic investigation) 0 1 0 0 0 1 Requests pending 0 1 0 0 2 3 Box 2.1. Provision of International Co-operation MLA request to share bank records, restrain and repatriate funds Singapore received various requests from two foreign counterparts to restraint bank accounts belonging to a former government official from a Southeast Asian State who was accused of receiving bribes in exchange for awarding government contracts (equivalent to approximately USD 1.8 million). LEAs commenced domestic investigations and froze bank accounts in line with CPC powers to prevent the dissipation of assets. LEAs subsequently obtained restraint orders in respect of the bank accounts and production orders under MACMA to share bank account information. One foreign counterpart sent an MLA request in June 2021, seeking the restraint of one bank account on the basis that civil forfeiture proceedings had been instituted in that counterpart’s country. In August 2021, Singapore obtained MACMA restraint orders for that bank account. Enforcement of a foreign confiscation order In January 2020, Singapore received a request from an East Asian State to register and enforce a confiscation order for over USD 500 000 in corrupt proceeds laundered through a Singapore FI. The CA obtained a High Court order to register and enforce the foreign confiscation order in October 2020. Under MACMA, notice of registration of a foreign confiscation order must be served on the accused. As the accused’s whereabouts were unknown, substituted service was effected in February 2022 which required the approval of the requesting state’s courts. Singapore applied to realise the assets in April 2023, with service in the requesting Sate confirmed in January 2024. A High Court order was granted in February 2024, and the proceeds were repatriated in July 2024. Footnotes [18] Some assistance is provided through MACMA powers, non-MACMA (e.g. CPC), or both MACMA/CPC. [19] Assistance may be provided on the basis of reciprocity in the absence of an MLA Treaty (MLAT). See c 37.1 [20] This figure excludes 12 requests Singapore received for both freezing/seizing and enforcement of foreign confiscation orders. Although a detailed breakdown is unavailable, figures for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders are likely higher. [21] A request for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders may include requests to freeze/seize assets as well." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="157. Singapore has a sound system in place to provide constructive and timely MLA and extradition requests, including for asset recovery purposes. MACMA allows Singapore to provide a wide range of assistance on the basis of reciprocity, although the high legal requirement to execute some requests may affect the timeliness of assistance provided. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 158. To a reasonable extent, Singapore provides constructive, timely and quality MLA in response to requests on ML, associated predicate offences and TF. Singapore received 988 MLA requests. As the breakdown in Table 2.1 shows: a) Thirty-nine per cent of MLA requests were executed in a timely manner. b) Thirty-four per cent of MLA requests remain pending and are at different stages of execution. Singapore considers an MLA request, which may encompass multiple requests for assistance, as pending if (1) at least one category of requested assistance remains outstanding, or (2) Singapore is clarifying and/or substantiating the request with the requestor. 28% of the pending MLA requests are partially executed, where some assistance has been provided, whereas assistance is still pending in 72% of those requests, including where Singapore is actively engaging with the requesting jurisdiction. c) Twenty-six per cent of MLA requests received during the time period were closed due to inactivity or withdrawals. The requests were closed either after six months of inactivity where the requesting jurisdiction no longer responds to Singapore’s follow-up or by withdrawal by the requesting state. This six-month timeframe is short, considering that requesting states may need time to follow-up on requests, but Singapore can re-open the request at any time if the requesting jurisdiction responds to a request past the deadline. d) One per cent of MLA requests were formally declined by Singapore, typically due to unmet requirements under MACMA (including dual criminality, or where there are ongoing domestic investigations or court proceedings). Table 2.1. – Incoming MLA requests (per type of predicate offence and status) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Total Requests 189 219 183 170 227 988 (100) ML 75 86 67 58 72 358 TF 1 1 2 0 2 6 PF 0 1 1 1 0 3 Corruption and bribery 5 6 11 7 9 38 Counterfeiting 1 0 1 3 1 6 Environmental crime 2 1 0 1 0 4 Extortion 4 6 3 4 6 23 Forgery 6 11 5 8 10 40 Fraud 65 83 69 64 86 367 Illicit trafficking in drugs 6 5 3 5 2 21 Insider trading and manipulation 1 0 0 1 1 3 Kidnapping 3 0 1 1 2 7 Murder, grievous bodily injury 4 9 2 3 8 26 Organised criminal group/racketeering 2 2 0 1 4 9 Robbery or theft 14 18 9 12 7 60 Sexual exploitation 8 2 9 12 16 47 Smuggling 4 8 4 1 7 24 Tax crimes 19 12 15 7 17 70 Terrorism 1 2 2 3 4 12 Status Number of requests executed 112 105 63 54 47 381 (39) Number of requests declined 3 3 6 1 0 13 (1) Number of requests closed due to inactivity or withdrawals 61 84 46 37 25 253 (26) Number of requests pending/partially executed 13 27 68 78 155 341 (34) Note : a single MLA request may involve multiple types of assistance therefore the total number of requests per predicate offence does not match the number of requests received 159. Most formal assistance is provided through exercising powers under MACMA. A much more limited amount was provided through exercising CPC powers or even on a voluntary basis. The nature of requests varies and concerns both simple and more complex requests, such as enforcing confiscation orders. A majority are for coercive measures, particularly production orders (e.g. records from FIs and the restraining of financial assets) which require court orders under S22(3-4) MACMA). Seeking information/evidence that requires coercive measures partly explains delays in executing requests as competent authorities may need to seek a court order to execute the request. Singapore does not maintain statistics on BO information sought by requesting parties (Table 2.2). Table 2.2. Type of request received [18] Legal provision # requests % total Witness statement &amp; taking of evidence (video-link) Non-MACMA 299 19 Government records Non-MACMA 245 15 Taking of evidence for criminal proceedings MACMA (S21) 63 4 Records from FI or other natural/legal persons MACMA (S21)/others 773 49 Restrain/enforcement of confiscation order MACMA (S29-30) and CPC 73 5 Search and seizure MACMA (S33) 15 1 Location/Identifying persons MACMA (S 37) 16 1 Service of process MACMA (S38) 65 4 Others Non-MACMA 41 3 Total 1 590 100 160. Case studies, statistics and discussions with the authorities demonstrate that Singapore generally provides timely assistance. Complex MLA requests are executed within an average of ten weeks, and simpler ones, such as providing video-link evidence, can be completed in as little as three days. Case studies and feedback provided by the Global Network generally indicates that assistance provided by Singapore is comprehensive. 161. Applications for production orders under Section 22 of the MACMA (to share documentation, records and ‘other things’) and search warrants under Section 34 (for requests to obtain things by search and seizure) can be granted upon several conditions being met. Authorities must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a specified person has carried on or benefited from a foreign offence. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the documents or records sought through production orders are likely to be of ‘substantial value’ to the criminal matter, are not legally privileged and the provision of documents is not contrary to public interest. This is a much higher bar than is required by domestic authorities. It may be very difficult for a foreign investigator to know in advance whether information sought will provide value, much less substantial value, to their investigation. The term ‘substantial value’ is undefined in the legislation or in SOPs [19] . Singapore have indicated that they interpret ‘substantial value’ to mean ‘relevant’. The Assessment Team assesses that these are very different thresholds. As a result, there remains some ambiguity in operationalising this threshold. The qualifier ‘substantial’ adds to the requirement to be of value, which may hamper timeliness. 162. In practice, upon receiving a request, the CA will check that these requirements are met by seeking clarifications from requesting jurisdictions (where necessary). This clarificatory process typically involves verifying property or account details, the nexus between the offence and underlying investigation in the requesting jurisdiction and the property or records of interest in Singapore, assessing whether the conduct constitutes an offence under Singaporean law and establishing the value of the requested information for the criminal matter in the requesting jurisdiction. This can be time-consuming, especially in complex cases involving multiple accounts and/or legal persons/arrangements. Moreover, some feedback from the Global Network highlighted concerns that excessive requests for clarifications by Singapore may result in delays due to procedural complexities. 108 MLA requests (31.6% of the pending MLA requests) have been pending for over two years because of these requests for clarifications. Singapore has made efforts to reduce the need for clarifications by making available on the CA’s publicly accessible website detailed templates for common types of assistance and maintaining close relationships with foreign counterparts to assist when they make requests. 163. Requests are generally in line with risks and relate overwhelmingly to ML and fraud (Table 7.1). The nature of these requests aligns with known typologies (e.g. TBML, misuse of legal persons and arrangements, etc.). Most requests emanate from regional partners (Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia), as well as other materially relevant jurisdictions (USA, India, Australia etc.). Some other jurisdictions (e.g. China, Hong Kong China, Cambodia etc.) make fewer requests to Singapore despite trading links and cross-border ML/TF risk. 2.1.2. Extradition 164. Singapore has an appropriate operational and legislative framework in place to provide extradition, including simplified extradition, and to act on urgent cases. Under the Extradition Act, urgent applications for provisional arrest can be made by the requesting country, pending the receipt of the formal extradition request. Singapore also has bilateral extradition requests with key partners and a special arrangement with Malaysia and Brunei simplifying the process to extradite each other’s fugitives without a formal extradition request. Where either of these countries requires the arrest of persons in Singapore, they make a request to Singaporean LEA directly, who will apply to the courts for endorsement of the warrant in Singapore before executing the warrant. 165. Singapore generally provides good and timely assistance in response to the limited number of extradition requests received (21). These primarily relate to predicate offences and originate from important partners like the United States, European and Asian Countries, which aligns with risks reasonably well. Of these, 43% were executed, while 19% were declined, 14% were closed due to inactivity by the requesting state, and 24% remain pending. Five cases are pending subject to clarifications concerning dual criminality and other legal checks including the involvement of the individual in domestic criminal proceedings or where the individual contests extradition. The declined cases largely involve situations where the fugitive was not located in Singapore or was only transiting through, leaving insufficient time for Singapore’s competent authorities to act. 166. Although simplified extradition procedures exist, Singapore typically executes requests within an average of three months, which is appropriate given the legal complexities involved. This timeframe includes cases where the defendant appeals the extradition (in one instance, extradition was granted nearly two years after the initial request). During the reporting period, Singapore received 14 expedited extradition requests from Brunei/Malaysia, and executed all of these, unless withdrawn by the countries or warrants for execution were not submitted to Singapore. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 167.  Singapore is equipped to assist requesting jurisdictions in asset recovery by enforcing freezing, seizure, and confiscation orders across a wide range of assets. Its legal framework allows for co-operation in civil confiscation proceedings and enables enforcement even without a foreign confiscation order. MACMA amendments in 2024 further strengthened this framework by allowing LEAs to physically transfer confiscated items, rather than only returning realised assets. These changes permit Singapore to enforce foreign confiscation orders issued by competent authorities beyond the courts, enhancing its flexibility and responsiveness in cross-border asset recovery efforts (see R. 38). 168. As indicated in Table 2.3, the authorities received 73 MLA requests on asset recovery, which includes a mix of request to freeze, seize and confiscate assets, including enforcement of foreign confiscation orders. These requests are risk-aligned and mainly relate to ML and fraud, totalling at least SGD 1.14 billion (USD 844 million) in assets, such as bank accounts and real estate. LEAs may use such MLA requests to open a domestic investigation (for example, 27 ML investigations were started during the reporting period using CPC powers to freeze/seize assets). 169. Singapore executed 36 MLA requests (49% of total), recovering SGD 778 million (USD 576 million) and other assets for foreign jurisdictions. Singapore considers that MLAs are executed even where no assets are ultimately identified, This can include situations such as where bank accounts that were the subject of the foreign request were closed, the assets had been dissipated by the time Singapore received the request, the assets that were the subject of the foreign request did not exist, where other forms of assistance were provided instead, or the assets (such as virtual assets) were not located within Singapore. Of the 37 remaining requests to facilitate asset recovery (51% of total), 14 are still pending (19%), six were declined (8%) and 17 requests (23%) were closed due to inactivity or withdrawal by the requesting jurisdiction. 170. As discussed above, the thresholds under MACMA may cause variable processes for execution resulting in delays with executing requests or potentially non-responses for requesting jurisdictions. In every MLA request that seek asset recovery assistance, Singapore also considers if informal assistance outside the MACMA framework, such as under CPC powers, can be provided to prevent asset dissipation. Exercising such powers outside the MACMA framework requires a suspicion that under Singapore law, an offence has occurred. In the case of MLA requests that seek asset recovery assistance, this would typically be an ML offence. Obtaining the facts from the requesting jurisdiction to determine if such a suspicion can be formed may take time and may also create a risk of asset dissipation, especially liquid assets such as bank accounts, which account for a significant number of requests. Upon receiving an MLA request, the relevant LEA conducts informal checks to verify whether the bank account is still active, whether it holds funds, and whether there is suspicion of a domestic ML offence. If all conditions are met, the LEA may use its powers under the CPC to seize the funds without requiring a court order under MACMA. This process may affect the timeliness of co-operation that Singapore provides. 171. 26 of the 73 asset recovery-related MLA requests concern enforcing a foreign judgement [20] (Table 2.3). These requests are not executed by Singapore in only a few instances. Three requests were declined: (i) two because the foreign court order did not satisfy the relevant MACMA requirements; and (ii) one request was declined so as not to prejudice ongoing domestic investigations / court proceedings. Three requests are pending execution as the requesting jurisdiction failed to provide all relevant documentation for the Court to approve the requests. Singapore executed five MLA requests to enforce a foreign judgement leading to the repatriation of SGD 13.5 million (USD 10 million) (see IO.8). Nine cases are ongoing with no assets yet repatriated, either because Singapore is addressing procedural and legal requirements under the MACMA, because notices of registration must be served in third jurisdictions, or where responses or additional documentation from those jurisdictions are pending. There are a small number of cases where the clarificatory process to ensure that MACMA conditions are met led to delays of more than 2 years. In one instance, despite frequent communication between Singapore and a foreign jurisdiction, assets were repatriated to the requesting jurisdiction four and half year after Singapore received the request. This exceptional situation related to the unknown situation of the accused’s whereabouts, and time was needed to effect substituted service in the jurisdiction where the accused’s last known address was, in compliance with the domestic laws of the requesting jurisdiction. Table 2.3. MLA (asset recovery and enforcement of foreign confiscation orders) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) 1. Total MLA requests 14 23 11 13 12 73 (100) ML 11 12 6 8 8 45 (62) Corruption and bribery 0 2 1 1 0 4 (5) Extortion 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1) Forgery 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1) Fraud 1 7 4 3 3 18 (25) Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs 0 0 0 1 0 1 (1) Robbery and theft 0 2 0 0 1 3 (4) Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1) 2. Status of requests Executed (amounts frozen, seized, confiscated and repatriated where applicable) 9 SGD 30.4m 10 SGD 732.9m + others 3 SGD 0.7m 6 SGD 0.5m + others 8 SGD 14.4m 36 Closed due to inactivity/withdrawal by requesting State 4 7 4 2 0 17 Declined 1 4 0 0 1 6 Pending 0 2 4 5 3 14 3. Enforcement of Foreign Confiscation Orders (FCO) Received [21] 6 8 4 2 6 26 Assets repatriated 4 1 0 0 0 5 Assets frozen but not repatriated 0 0 3 2 2 7 FCO registered but assets not repatriated 1 0 0 0 1 2 Requests closed due to inactivity/ withdrawal 0 2 1 0 0 3 Request not executed 0 2 0 0 1 3 Requests declined under MACMA conditions 1 1 0 0 0 2 Request declined (ongoing domestic investigation) 0 1 0 0 0 1 Requests pending 0 1 0 0 2 3 Box 2.1. Provision of International Co-operation MLA request to share bank records, restrain and repatriate funds Singapore received various requests from two foreign counterparts to restraint bank accounts belonging to a former government official from a Southeast Asian State who was accused of receiving bribes in exchange for awarding government contracts (equivalent to approximately USD 1.8 million). LEAs commenced domestic investigations and froze bank accounts in line with CPC powers to prevent the dissipation of assets. LEAs subsequently obtained restraint orders in respect of the bank accounts and production orders under MACMA to share bank account information. One foreign counterpart sent an MLA request in June 2021, seeking the restraint of one bank account on the basis that civil forfeiture proceedings had been instituted in that counterpart’s country. In August 2021, Singapore obtained MACMA restraint orders for that bank account. Enforcement of a foreign confiscation order In January 2020, Singapore received a request from an East Asian State to register and enforce a confiscation order for over USD 500 000 in corrupt proceeds laundered through a Singapore FI. The CA obtained a High Court order to register and enforce the foreign confiscation order in October 2020. Under MACMA, notice of registration of a foreign confiscation order must be served on the accused. As the accused’s whereabouts were unknown, substituted service was effected in February 2022 which required the approval of the requesting state’s courts. Singapore applied to realise the assets in April 2023, with service in the requesting Sate confirmed in January 2024. A High Court order was granted in February 2024, and the proceeds were repatriated in July 2024. Footnotes [18] Some assistance is provided through MACMA powers, non-MACMA (e.g. CPC), or both MACMA/CPC. [19] Assistance may be provided on the basis of reciprocity in the absence of an MLA Treaty (MLAT). See c 37.1 [20] This figure excludes 12 requests Singapore received for both freezing/seizing and enforcement of foreign confiscation orders. Although a detailed breakdown is unavailable, figures for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders are likely higher. [21] A request for the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders may include requests to freeze/seize assets as well." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 208. Singapore has a robust process for licensing and approval of FIs and VASPs. MAS is responsible for licensing and approval for FIs and VASPs except for moneylenders [23] , which are under the purview of MinLaw. All FIs and VASPs, including foreign legal persons, must be licensed before they can carry on activities in Singapore, in addition to being registered with ACRA as a legal person (see IO.5). 209. MAS undertakes rigorous licensing assessments for FIs and VASPs through open sources, applicant submissions including AML/CFT policies and procedures and, where relevant, strength of home country supervision. MAS may reject the application or require additional mitigation actions within an agreed timeframe. Examples of such mitigation actions include independent audits, directives to bolster the AML/CFT compliance function and the appointment of independent directors to enhance the governance framework. Applicants may choose to withdraw their application if they anticipate rejection or considered the additional mitigation measures too stringent for their business. The withdrawal/rejection rate vary significantly by sector, largely based on the maturity of the sector, with banks seeing very few and the DPTSP sector witnessing an 80% withdrawal/rejection rate over the evaluation period. Box 3.1. Risk Surveillance leads to Voluntary Withdrawal of License Application In October 2022, MAS reviewed nine STRs filed by a DPTSP licence applicant (DPTSP A) on its customers. MAS noted these customers had no clear nexus to Singapore (foreign companies with foreign authorised signatories/BOs/directors), a majority were only incorporated recently and were not in VA-related business. Most of their suspicious transactions occurred shortly after onboarding/change of BO, and large and/or pass-through transactions were not detected in a timely manner. MAS assessed that there were weaknesses in DPTSP A’s onboarding processes, risk assessment, ongoing account and transaction monitoring, and STR filing controls. Despite repeated queries, DPTSP A maintained that postmortem reviews on its processes were not required as it had performed thorough investigations prior to the filing of each STR and the relevant accounts had been closed. Given MAS’ feedback that DPTSP A was unable to demonstrate the ability to meet the AML/CFT requirements and other licensing criteria, DPTSP A subsequently withdrew its application in September 2023 and ceased regulated business activities in Singapore. As per MAS’ process, DPTSP A was required to provide a comprehensive wind-down plan upon withdrawal, that was subject to monthly monitoring by MAS to ensure implementation. This includes clear communications to clients and stakeholders on its cessation in Singapore, taking down of its Singapore website and return of client assets and monies. 210. MAS conducts high quality fit and proper checks for required personnel, including controllers, substantial shareholders (20%+ in direct or indirect ownership), directors, and senior management at the licensing step and upon any changes. The Guideline on Fit and Proper Criteria is published on MAS website and updated regularly. Fit and proper checks take into account criminal records checks, screening with STRO/LEAs, screening on STRs, sanctions screening and open-source news checks, background checks with foreign supervisors, amongst other sources. MAS may still approve individuals if their past convictions are evaluated to not have impact on their fitness and/or propriety on a person-by-person evaluation basis (e.g. unrelated offence, significant amount of time elapsed). 211. MAS rejects applicants or informs applicants to withdraw their applications when they believe relevant individuals are not suitable for the position. During the assessment period (2020-2024), 84 and 24 applications were rejected and withdrawn respectively, due to concerns over AML/CFT related factors. [24] Noting risks associated with VASPs as an emerging sector, MAS applied more stringent measures on fit and proper for relevant individuals and these more stringent measures resulted in a higher rejection/withdrawn rate. 212. FIs and VASPs are required to inform MAS of any matter that would affect the fitness and/or propriety of the required personnel. If they are found to no longer be fit and proper, they will have to dispose of shares or relinquish their position. MAS also conducts checks on required personnel where there is adverse news or STRs that implicate an individual, or where there are changes for business reasons such as through takeovers or other changes to ownership structures. 213. Singapore put in place a moratorium on new moneylender licenses in 2012. Since the six new licenses granted in 2018-19 for testing new business models, there were no license applications during the review period. Moneylenders are required to seek approval from Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office under MinLaw to (i) employ or engage any person to assist in the moneylending business; (ii) appoint a director / a person taking part in the management of the business; or (iii) make changes concerning substantial shareholders. These individuals are screened at the time of any change and at least annually against police records, sanctions lists and open-source information. If individuals are found to no longer be fit and proper, then they will be disqualified from involvement in the moneylending business and in the case of substantial shareholders, be required to reduce their substantial shareholding to a level required by the Registrar. 214. Overall, the licensing framework in Singapore, including market entry and ongoing monitoring, is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning controlling or holding key management positions in FIs and VASPs to a very large extent. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 215. Unlicensed activities most often occur for businesses illegally conducting virtual asset services provision and effecting remittance, i.e., individuals/entities that would fit in the DPTSP and PSP with CBMT sectors, if licensed. MAS uses multiple tools to detect and address unlicensed operators in these sectors as a priority, and in other sectors under its purview more generally. This includes analysing STRs, querying corporate registry information, whistleblowing channels, the use of blockchain analytics providers and other open-source information. Upon detection, MAS alerts the public of individuals/entities that may be conducting regulated activities without licences on their Investor Alert List, where there were 78 new entries during the review period, many of which were providing DPTSP-type services. MAS ensures that the public is warned of potential unlicensed operators and there is appropriate enforcement against unlicensed activities. MinLaw relies on complaints from the public to commence actions into potential unlicensed moneylenders. 216. Where there are breaches of licensing requirements, MAS and MinLaw refer the cases to the SPF for enforcement. The SPF pursues cases when referred and cases are brought to conviction in a good number of instances. From 2020-24, SPF opened 4 695 investigations into individuals and entities suspected of conducting unlicensed moneylending, and payment services such as remittance and DPTSP services. 292 persons were convicted for unlicensed moneylending and payment services in the same period. The sentences meted out were up to 78 months’ imprisonment, fines up to SGD 700 000 (USD 542 000) for those convicted for unlicensed moneylending, and up to 12 months’ imprisonment and fines of up to SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) for unlicensed payment services. While Singapore has recently stepped-up sanctions meted out for persons conducting unlicensed payment services, the sanctions given remain not proportionate or dissuasive to the crimes committed, for example in the case of Zin Nwe Nyunt who was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment in July 2025 for conducting over SGD 640 million (USD 454 million) in unlicensed remittances. Footnotes [23] The Central Depository Limited (CDP) is subject to a designation regime (akin to licensing) in line with the Securities and Futures Act 2001. [24] Singapore indicated that it did not capture rejection/withdrawal statistics for some sectors, hence the numbers quoted here are based on Singapore’s record collected on a best effort basis and not exhaustive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 208. Singapore has a robust process for licensing and approval of FIs and VASPs. MAS is responsible for licensing and approval for FIs and VASPs except for moneylenders [23] , which are under the purview of MinLaw. All FIs and VASPs, including foreign legal persons, must be licensed before they can carry on activities in Singapore, in addition to being registered with ACRA as a legal person (see IO.5). 209. MAS undertakes rigorous licensing assessments for FIs and VASPs through open sources, applicant submissions including AML/CFT policies and procedures and, where relevant, strength of home country supervision. MAS may reject the application or require additional mitigation actions within an agreed timeframe. Examples of such mitigation actions include independent audits, directives to bolster the AML/CFT compliance function and the appointment of independent directors to enhance the governance framework. Applicants may choose to withdraw their application if they anticipate rejection or considered the additional mitigation measures too stringent for their business. The withdrawal/rejection rate vary significantly by sector, largely based on the maturity of the sector, with banks seeing very few and the DPTSP sector witnessing an 80% withdrawal/rejection rate over the evaluation period. Box 3.1. Risk Surveillance leads to Voluntary Withdrawal of License Application In October 2022, MAS reviewed nine STRs filed by a DPTSP licence applicant (DPTSP A) on its customers. MAS noted these customers had no clear nexus to Singapore (foreign companies with foreign authorised signatories/BOs/directors), a majority were only incorporated recently and were not in VA-related business. Most of their suspicious transactions occurred shortly after onboarding/change of BO, and large and/or pass-through transactions were not detected in a timely manner. MAS assessed that there were weaknesses in DPTSP A’s onboarding processes, risk assessment, ongoing account and transaction monitoring, and STR filing controls. Despite repeated queries, DPTSP A maintained that postmortem reviews on its processes were not required as it had performed thorough investigations prior to the filing of each STR and the relevant accounts had been closed. Given MAS’ feedback that DPTSP A was unable to demonstrate the ability to meet the AML/CFT requirements and other licensing criteria, DPTSP A subsequently withdrew its application in September 2023 and ceased regulated business activities in Singapore. As per MAS’ process, DPTSP A was required to provide a comprehensive wind-down plan upon withdrawal, that was subject to monthly monitoring by MAS to ensure implementation. This includes clear communications to clients and stakeholders on its cessation in Singapore, taking down of its Singapore website and return of client assets and monies. 210. MAS conducts high quality fit and proper checks for required personnel, including controllers, substantial shareholders (20%+ in direct or indirect ownership), directors, and senior management at the licensing step and upon any changes. The Guideline on Fit and Proper Criteria is published on MAS website and updated regularly. Fit and proper checks take into account criminal records checks, screening with STRO/LEAs, screening on STRs, sanctions screening and open-source news checks, background checks with foreign supervisors, amongst other sources. MAS may still approve individuals if their past convictions are evaluated to not have impact on their fitness and/or propriety on a person-by-person evaluation basis (e.g. unrelated offence, significant amount of time elapsed). 211. MAS rejects applicants or informs applicants to withdraw their applications when they believe relevant individuals are not suitable for the position. During the assessment period (2020-2024), 84 and 24 applications were rejected and withdrawn respectively, due to concerns over AML/CFT related factors. [24] Noting risks associated with VASPs as an emerging sector, MAS applied more stringent measures on fit and proper for relevant individuals and these more stringent measures resulted in a higher rejection/withdrawn rate. 212. FIs and VASPs are required to inform MAS of any matter that would affect the fitness and/or propriety of the required personnel. If they are found to no longer be fit and proper, they will have to dispose of shares or relinquish their position. MAS also conducts checks on required personnel where there is adverse news or STRs that implicate an individual, or where there are changes for business reasons such as through takeovers or other changes to ownership structures. 213. Singapore put in place a moratorium on new moneylender licenses in 2012. Since the six new licenses granted in 2018-19 for testing new business models, there were no license applications during the review period. Moneylenders are required to seek approval from Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office under MinLaw to (i) employ or engage any person to assist in the moneylending business; (ii) appoint a director / a person taking part in the management of the business; or (iii) make changes concerning substantial shareholders. These individuals are screened at the time of any change and at least annually against police records, sanctions lists and open-source information. If individuals are found to no longer be fit and proper, then they will be disqualified from involvement in the moneylending business and in the case of substantial shareholders, be required to reduce their substantial shareholding to a level required by the Registrar. 214. Overall, the licensing framework in Singapore, including market entry and ongoing monitoring, is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning controlling or holding key management positions in FIs and VASPs to a very large extent. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 215. Unlicensed activities most often occur for businesses illegally conducting virtual asset services provision and effecting remittance, i.e., individuals/entities that would fit in the DPTSP and PSP with CBMT sectors, if licensed. MAS uses multiple tools to detect and address unlicensed operators in these sectors as a priority, and in other sectors under its purview more generally. This includes analysing STRs, querying corporate registry information, whistleblowing channels, the use of blockchain analytics providers and other open-source information. Upon detection, MAS alerts the public of individuals/entities that may be conducting regulated activities without licences on their Investor Alert List, where there were 78 new entries during the review period, many of which were providing DPTSP-type services. MAS ensures that the public is warned of potential unlicensed operators and there is appropriate enforcement against unlicensed activities. MinLaw relies on complaints from the public to commence actions into potential unlicensed moneylenders. 216. Where there are breaches of licensing requirements, MAS and MinLaw refer the cases to the SPF for enforcement. The SPF pursues cases when referred and cases are brought to conviction in a good number of instances. From 2020-24, SPF opened 4 695 investigations into individuals and entities suspected of conducting unlicensed moneylending, and payment services such as remittance and DPTSP services. 292 persons were convicted for unlicensed moneylending and payment services in the same period. The sentences meted out were up to 78 months’ imprisonment, fines up to SGD 700 000 (USD 542 000) for those convicted for unlicensed moneylending, and up to 12 months’ imprisonment and fines of up to SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) for unlicensed payment services. While Singapore has recently stepped-up sanctions meted out for persons conducting unlicensed payment services, the sanctions given remain not proportionate or dissuasive to the crimes committed, for example in the case of Zin Nwe Nyunt who was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment in July 2025 for conducting over SGD 640 million (USD 454 million) in unlicensed remittances. Footnotes [23] The Central Depository Limited (CDP) is subject to a designation regime (akin to licensing) in line with the Securities and Futures Act 2001. [24] Singapore indicated that it did not capture rejection/withdrawal statistics for some sectors, hence the numbers quoted here are based on Singapore’s record collected on a best effort basis and not exhaustive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 280. Singapore has robust licensing frameworks in place for all DNFBPs. DNFBP sector supervisors generally assess and screen prospective DNFBP persons, entities and their key personnel (i.e. substantial shareholders, board of directors and key appointment holders), where relevant, to ensure that only fit and proper DNFBP entities are licensed, and that only fit and proper persons control or manage DNFBPs. Criminal background checks are also conducted on DNFBP applicants. The number of rejected applications is generally low across all sectors except for PSMDs and Singapore-qualified lawyers. 281. MAS is the regulator and supervisor of LTCs, which are regulated as FIs in Singapore and subject to same process and standard of AML/CFT supervision. Please refer to IO.3 for relevant analysis applicable to LTCs. During the assessment period, three new LTC applications were withdrawn, while none were rejected. PTCs are exempt from licensing requirement. Notwithstanding, given that the PTCs serve high net worth individuals, PTCs are (i) subject to MAS’ AML/CFT requirements, and (ii) are required to engage an LTC to carry out trust administration services for the purposes of conducting the necessary checks and ensuring its compliance with MAS’ requirements on AML/CFT, and (iii) are regulated/supervised indirectly via the LTC to mitigate the risks. 282. ACRA licenses and supervises CSPs since 2015 when the regulatory regime was set up. Prior to the CSP Act effective in June 2025, CSPs were regulated under the ACRA Act and the ACRA (Filing Agents and Qualified Individuals) Regulations 2015 which set out the AML/CFT regime for Registered Filing Agents. The CSP Act came into effect on 9 June 2025, requiring all entities that carry on a business in Singapore of providing any corporate service must register as CSPs and submit declarations to ACRA confirming fulfilment of registration and fit and proper criteria. Prior to the CSP Act, Singapore-based entities that provide corporate services to overseas clients and do not transact with ACRA were not licensed nor regulated. This recent legislative amendment is an important policy step that Singapore has taken to address a previous regulatory gap in relation to the potential exposure to the misuse of legal persons outside of Singapore. More time is required before effectiveness of this measure can be demonstrated. 283. ACRA conducts fit and proper checks on all CSP applicants including their directors, beneficial owners and RQIs [26] . This includes the evaluation of all material including government and commercial databases, to ascertain if the CSP applicant is fit and proper. ACRA conducts fit and proper checks upon renewal applications, which occurs every two years. While ACRA does not specifically conduct fit and proper checks when there are changes in ownership, ACRA monitors for material/adverse news on an on-going basis, and key officers related to a CSP (e.g. Directors/RQIs) who do not meet the fitness and propriety requirement would not be allowed to continue their registration (see Box 4.1). Box 4.1. Cancellation of CSP registration and subsequent denial of RQI registration Individual A working at CSP A came under ACRA’s scrutiny for incorrectly filing information in the Register of Registrable Controllers of one of the CSP's clients with ACRA. While denying having made the filing, Individual A admitted to sharing the SingPass credentials with other workers of CSP A. These workers used the credentials to submit filings for clients of CSP A. As these workers were not registered employees of CSP A, they were not authorised to make filings with the Registrar. CSP A's registration was cancelled following the investigation. Individual A subsequently attempted to register as an RQI. According to the Regulations, an RQI must be fit and proper and is responsible for supervising employees of the CSPs for transactions filed on the electronic transaction system. ACRA considered Individual A’s past conduct and determined that the individual was not fit and proper for registration and denied the registration. 284. ACRA requires applicants of accountants to satisfy prescribed requirements relating to qualifications, practical experience, continuing professional education, etc., and considers factors including whether the applicant has a criminal record or is under investigation for offences involving dishonesty. All applicants for registration of PAs should have obtained the Chartered Accountant (Singapore) designation. The Singapore Chartered Accountant Qualification Programme administered by ISCA is subject to annual renewal, completion of continuing professional education requirements and compliance with the Ethics Pronouncement 200 (EP200) containing AML/CFT requirements. If found to be not fit and proper, ACRA will reject the application. ACRA also regularly screen accountants with screening software and against adverse news, etc. During the assessment period, there were no cases of such rejection. 285. MinLaw conducts criminal record and open-source checks, and checks whether applicants are on UN sanctions lists for licensees, controllers and substantial shareholders for PSMDs, pawnbrokers, and LPEs. Applicants may be rejected if found guilty of a ML/TF/PF offence or an offence involving fraud or dishonesty punishable with imprisonment for three months or more. MinLaw rechecks all persons and entities subject to fit and proper checks on an annual basis, where there is adverse news or where there are notification requirements (i.e., changing ownership). MinLaw took a range of actions in handling registrations with fit and proper concerns (e.g. refusal, withdrawal or impose of conditions for new registrations; suspension or cancellation for existing registration) (see Table 4.1). In 1H 2025, MinLaw further cancelled another two registrations and imposed conditions on another three PSMDs. Table 4.1. Statistics on registration (including refusals, withdrawals, impose of conditions, suspensions and cancellations) by the Registrar of Regulated Dealers on MinLaw Registration Refused Withdrawn Conditions Imposed Suspended Cancelled Number 73 95 14 1 4 286. GRA was established in August 2022 as the single regulator for all forms of gambling in Singapore, including the two existing casinos, taking over responsibility from its predecessor the Casino Regulatory Authority. GRA conducts extensive probity and financial investigations to ascertain the suitability of casino applicants and performs suitability assessment through screening with LEAs and overseas regulators (if applicable), conducting background checks of controllers (including beneficial owners), reviewing their business associations, and assessing the applicant’s financial position and source of funds. In the last five years, GRA rejected the renewal of an application for a special employee, an employee working in a managerial role, and approved three new controllers. The requirements of fit and proper controllers are monitored by GRA. Statutorily, there is a re-examination of the propriety of controllers if there is a change in ownership or if they are involved in material litigation, under criminal investigation subject to ongoing monitoring under S63 of the Casino Control Act 2006. 287. CEA conducts background checks on all applicants and key executive officers for EAs/RESs, including criminal record checks and open-source checks. Licenses and registrations must be periodically renewed, and fit and proper checks are conducted again upon renewal. URA conducts criminal and open-source checks on all licence applicants including their directors, substantial shareholders, and beneficial owners. URA would not issue a licence to developers who have been convicted of ML/TF/PF offences, and/or fraud or dishonesty offences in the past five years. In addition to ongoing monitoring, fit and proper checks are re-done when new information is received from STRs, updates to sanction lists, adverse news, intelligence from other agencies, and whistleblowing. From 2020-2024, CEA and URA rejected five (out of 187 applications) and three (out of 156 applications) licence applications respectively, mostly due to reasons other than fit and proper concerns (e.g. applicants not having met the minimum experience requirement or absence of planning permission). 288. Market entry controls and fit and proper tests prevent criminals and their associates from being the beneficial owner or holding a controller position in DNFBPs in Singapore to a large extent. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 289. DNFBP supervisors implement certain measures to detect and address unlicensed activities. Supervisors generally detect breaches and business carrying out unlicensed activities through proactive monitoring during license and registration renewals, supervisory activities (both on-site and off-site), ongoing surveillance, complaints and whistleblowing channels, and other channels (e.g. referrals from other authorities). Some supervisors maintain public registers and online reporting tools, which help the public and industry participants identify and report unlicensed entities. Some supervisors also put in place measures to mitigate the harm that could be caused by an unlicensed provider. For example, an unlicensed CSP would not be able to file transactions (e.g. incorporating an entity) on ACRA’s system on behalf of others without the necessary credentials. 290. When unregistered dealing is detected or reported, supervisors commence an investigation, apply escalation protocols and take enforcement actions where warranted. Enforcement actions range from advisories and warnings to cancellation of licence and composition penalties. Stronger enforcement action is taken for more severe offences and where the circumstances of the case warrant it (e.g. deliberate commitment of the offence). There have been some instances of the detection of unlicensed activities and, where addressed, penalties are sometimes not proportionate to the offence committed. Some sectors (e.g. PSMDs) saw a gradual increase in imposition of compositions from 0 case in 2020 and 2021 to a total of 36 cases from 2022 to 1H 2025. This demonstrates a slightly more enforcement-oriented posture, with a total of SGD 330 000 (USD 244 200) in 36 composition penalties imposed, but the level of penalties remains not dissuasive. 291. The SPF has taken proactive efforts such as public information monitoring and AI analytic information to identify illicit gambling activities, which generally are manifest as websites offering gambling services in Singapore. These websites may be legal and regulated in other jurisdictions, but they do not have the appropriate licensing authority to offer services to Singaporeans or those in Singapore. Over the course of the assessment period, more than 4 000 illicit gambling websites were blocked. The SPF takes some intelligence and investigation measures when blocking the websites to establish actionable leads for further investigation. Footnotes [26] If a person wishes to apply to be an CSP, the person will need to first employ, appoint, or engage at least one Registered Qualified Individual (RQI)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 280. Singapore has robust licensing frameworks in place for all DNFBPs. DNFBP sector supervisors generally assess and screen prospective DNFBP persons, entities and their key personnel (i.e. substantial shareholders, board of directors and key appointment holders), where relevant, to ensure that only fit and proper DNFBP entities are licensed, and that only fit and proper persons control or manage DNFBPs. Criminal background checks are also conducted on DNFBP applicants. The number of rejected applications is generally low across all sectors except for PSMDs and Singapore-qualified lawyers. 281. MAS is the regulator and supervisor of LTCs, which are regulated as FIs in Singapore and subject to same process and standard of AML/CFT supervision. Please refer to IO.3 for relevant analysis applicable to LTCs. During the assessment period, three new LTC applications were withdrawn, while none were rejected. PTCs are exempt from licensing requirement. Notwithstanding, given that the PTCs serve high net worth individuals, PTCs are (i) subject to MAS’ AML/CFT requirements, and (ii) are required to engage an LTC to carry out trust administration services for the purposes of conducting the necessary checks and ensuring its compliance with MAS’ requirements on AML/CFT, and (iii) are regulated/supervised indirectly via the LTC to mitigate the risks. 282. ACRA licenses and supervises CSPs since 2015 when the regulatory regime was set up. Prior to the CSP Act effective in June 2025, CSPs were regulated under the ACRA Act and the ACRA (Filing Agents and Qualified Individuals) Regulations 2015 which set out the AML/CFT regime for Registered Filing Agents. The CSP Act came into effect on 9 June 2025, requiring all entities that carry on a business in Singapore of providing any corporate service must register as CSPs and submit declarations to ACRA confirming fulfilment of registration and fit and proper criteria. Prior to the CSP Act, Singapore-based entities that provide corporate services to overseas clients and do not transact with ACRA were not licensed nor regulated. This recent legislative amendment is an important policy step that Singapore has taken to address a previous regulatory gap in relation to the potential exposure to the misuse of legal persons outside of Singapore. More time is required before effectiveness of this measure can be demonstrated. 283. ACRA conducts fit and proper checks on all CSP applicants including their directors, beneficial owners and RQIs [26] . This includes the evaluation of all material including government and commercial databases, to ascertain if the CSP applicant is fit and proper. ACRA conducts fit and proper checks upon renewal applications, which occurs every two years. While ACRA does not specifically conduct fit and proper checks when there are changes in ownership, ACRA monitors for material/adverse news on an on-going basis, and key officers related to a CSP (e.g. Directors/RQIs) who do not meet the fitness and propriety requirement would not be allowed to continue their registration (see Box 4.1). Box 4.1. Cancellation of CSP registration and subsequent denial of RQI registration Individual A working at CSP A came under ACRA’s scrutiny for incorrectly filing information in the Register of Registrable Controllers of one of the CSP's clients with ACRA. While denying having made the filing, Individual A admitted to sharing the SingPass credentials with other workers of CSP A. These workers used the credentials to submit filings for clients of CSP A. As these workers were not registered employees of CSP A, they were not authorised to make filings with the Registrar. CSP A's registration was cancelled following the investigation. Individual A subsequently attempted to register as an RQI. According to the Regulations, an RQI must be fit and proper and is responsible for supervising employees of the CSPs for transactions filed on the electronic transaction system. ACRA considered Individual A’s past conduct and determined that the individual was not fit and proper for registration and denied the registration. 284. ACRA requires applicants of accountants to satisfy prescribed requirements relating to qualifications, practical experience, continuing professional education, etc., and considers factors including whether the applicant has a criminal record or is under investigation for offences involving dishonesty. All applicants for registration of PAs should have obtained the Chartered Accountant (Singapore) designation. The Singapore Chartered Accountant Qualification Programme administered by ISCA is subject to annual renewal, completion of continuing professional education requirements and compliance with the Ethics Pronouncement 200 (EP200) containing AML/CFT requirements. If found to be not fit and proper, ACRA will reject the application. ACRA also regularly screen accountants with screening software and against adverse news, etc. During the assessment period, there were no cases of such rejection. 285. MinLaw conducts criminal record and open-source checks, and checks whether applicants are on UN sanctions lists for licensees, controllers and substantial shareholders for PSMDs, pawnbrokers, and LPEs. Applicants may be rejected if found guilty of a ML/TF/PF offence or an offence involving fraud or dishonesty punishable with imprisonment for three months or more. MinLaw rechecks all persons and entities subject to fit and proper checks on an annual basis, where there is adverse news or where there are notification requirements (i.e., changing ownership). MinLaw took a range of actions in handling registrations with fit and proper concerns (e.g. refusal, withdrawal or impose of conditions for new registrations; suspension or cancellation for existing registration) (see Table 4.1). In 1H 2025, MinLaw further cancelled another two registrations and imposed conditions on another three PSMDs. Table 4.1. Statistics on registration (including refusals, withdrawals, impose of conditions, suspensions and cancellations) by the Registrar of Regulated Dealers on MinLaw Registration Refused Withdrawn Conditions Imposed Suspended Cancelled Number 73 95 14 1 4 286. GRA was established in August 2022 as the single regulator for all forms of gambling in Singapore, including the two existing casinos, taking over responsibility from its predecessor the Casino Regulatory Authority. GRA conducts extensive probity and financial investigations to ascertain the suitability of casino applicants and performs suitability assessment through screening with LEAs and overseas regulators (if applicable), conducting background checks of controllers (including beneficial owners), reviewing their business associations, and assessing the applicant’s financial position and source of funds. In the last five years, GRA rejected the renewal of an application for a special employee, an employee working in a managerial role, and approved three new controllers. The requirements of fit and proper controllers are monitored by GRA. Statutorily, there is a re-examination of the propriety of controllers if there is a change in ownership or if they are involved in material litigation, under criminal investigation subject to ongoing monitoring under S63 of the Casino Control Act 2006. 287. CEA conducts background checks on all applicants and key executive officers for EAs/RESs, including criminal record checks and open-source checks. Licenses and registrations must be periodically renewed, and fit and proper checks are conducted again upon renewal. URA conducts criminal and open-source checks on all licence applicants including their directors, substantial shareholders, and beneficial owners. URA would not issue a licence to developers who have been convicted of ML/TF/PF offences, and/or fraud or dishonesty offences in the past five years. In addition to ongoing monitoring, fit and proper checks are re-done when new information is received from STRs, updates to sanction lists, adverse news, intelligence from other agencies, and whistleblowing. From 2020-2024, CEA and URA rejected five (out of 187 applications) and three (out of 156 applications) licence applications respectively, mostly due to reasons other than fit and proper concerns (e.g. applicants not having met the minimum experience requirement or absence of planning permission). 288. Market entry controls and fit and proper tests prevent criminals and their associates from being the beneficial owner or holding a controller position in DNFBPs in Singapore to a large extent. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 289. DNFBP supervisors implement certain measures to detect and address unlicensed activities. Supervisors generally detect breaches and business carrying out unlicensed activities through proactive monitoring during license and registration renewals, supervisory activities (both on-site and off-site), ongoing surveillance, complaints and whistleblowing channels, and other channels (e.g. referrals from other authorities). Some supervisors maintain public registers and online reporting tools, which help the public and industry participants identify and report unlicensed entities. Some supervisors also put in place measures to mitigate the harm that could be caused by an unlicensed provider. For example, an unlicensed CSP would not be able to file transactions (e.g. incorporating an entity) on ACRA’s system on behalf of others without the necessary credentials. 290. When unregistered dealing is detected or reported, supervisors commence an investigation, apply escalation protocols and take enforcement actions where warranted. Enforcement actions range from advisories and warnings to cancellation of licence and composition penalties. Stronger enforcement action is taken for more severe offences and where the circumstances of the case warrant it (e.g. deliberate commitment of the offence). There have been some instances of the detection of unlicensed activities and, where addressed, penalties are sometimes not proportionate to the offence committed. Some sectors (e.g. PSMDs) saw a gradual increase in imposition of compositions from 0 case in 2020 and 2021 to a total of 36 cases from 2022 to 1H 2025. This demonstrates a slightly more enforcement-oriented posture, with a total of SGD 330 000 (USD 244 200) in 36 composition penalties imposed, but the level of penalties remains not dissuasive. 291. The SPF has taken proactive efforts such as public information monitoring and AI analytic information to identify illicit gambling activities, which generally are manifest as websites offering gambling services in Singapore. These websites may be legal and regulated in other jurisdictions, but they do not have the appropriate licensing authority to offer services to Singaporeans or those in Singapore. Over the course of the assessment period, more than 4 000 illicit gambling websites were blocked. The SPF takes some intelligence and investigation measures when blocking the websites to establish actionable leads for further investigation. Footnotes [26] If a person wishes to apply to be an CSP, the person will need to first employ, appoint, or engage at least one Registered Qualified Individual (RQI)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="345. Singapore completed separate ML/TF risk assessments of legal persons (LPRA) and legal arrangements (LARA) in 2024, which supplements and updates the 2019 Legal Persons Risk Assessment and follow on from the 2024 National Risk Assessment. The LPRA and LARA were developed concurrently under the auspices of the RTIG; as such understanding of risk is supported by the other work of the inter-agency RTIG platform, which oversees the identification and assessment of ML/TF/PF risks at the whole-of government level. Singapore’s risk assessment process included reference to qualitative and quantitative information from competent authorities and a range of other sources. Further, competent authorities have a good level of engagement with industry, including through the ACIP’s Legal Persons and Arrangements Working Group (LPAWG). Risk Posed by Legal Persons 346. The 2024 LPRA assessed the ML/TF risks associated with the types of legal persons operating in Singapore. Table 5.1. Residual ML/TF Risks for Legal Persons in Singapore Legal Person ML Risk TF Risk Companies High Medium low Unregistered foreign companies High Medium low Limited liability partnerships Medium high Low Sole proprietorships/General partnerships Medium low Low Limited partnerships Medium low Low Variable capital companies Medium low Low Societies Low Low Co-operative societies Low Low Mutual benefit organisations Low Low 347. The risk assessment process is substantially similar to the NRA processes described in IO.1. Accordingly, it has the same positives and negatives as seen in the dynamic risk assessment process and NRA. In addition, the risk assessments did not conduct proper analysis of vulnerabilities. This includes how well the controls are working, in particular whether reporting entities are correctly identifying the BO in response to their AML/CFT obligations; and did not present fulsome analysis of the extent and operations/transactions of Unregistered Foreign Companies holding bank accounts in Singapore. 348. Singapore established a legal framework for the creation of Variable Capital Companies (VCCs) during the assessment period with the intended use of operating as a Collective Investment Scheme (CIS). Many VCCs in Singapore are not being used as a CIS. The LPRA assessment did consider the misuse of VCCs for ML/TF purposes (in terms of the structure and intended use of VCC) but does not consider how VCCs may be used outside of their intended use as a CIS. It did not consider SFOs and their formation as, and use of, legal persons. 349. The risk assessment appropriately considered the characteristics of the legal persons and arrangements separately, but did not adequately analyse the structures involving multiple interconnected legal persons and/or arrangement, which occurs in practice. The risk assessments do not sufficiently analyse the increased ML/TF risk in structuring various legal persons and arrangements together. In particular, the risk assessments do not analyse the various possible ways in which structures can and are being used, nor how they are most commonly used in Singapore. For example, Singapore provides substantial wealth management services for HNWI and UHNWI individuals. Singapore has not considered the vulnerabilities of complex structuring involving SFOs which attract these customers. Box 5.1. Single Family Offices (SFOs) in Singapore SFOs refer to an entity (with separate legal personality) which manages wealth for, or on behalf of one family and is wholly owned or controlled by members of the same family. SFOs generally involve a complex structure of legal persons and arrangements underneath the overarching legal person that is the SFO. SFOs are an attractive mechanism for wealth management amongst HNWIs and UHNWIs, and Singapore has seen an increase in demand for wealth management using SFOs with 43% year-on-year growth (totalling over 2 000 in number). This growth is driven by favourable tax treatment and Singapore’s reputation as a wealth management centre. Many SFOs are also looking to use VCCs to hold and manage assets of HNWIs or UHNWIs, furthering the complexity of legal persons and arrangements used. Six SFOs have been linked to individuals convicted in the 3B$ Case; and at least two in the Prince Group case. Where a single family and connected persons (extended family) seeks to set up and manage a trust for wealth management purposes, they may use a Private Trust Company (PTC) or LTC. A PTC does not need a license but has to engage an LTC to discharge its AML/CFT obligations set out by MAS associated with the legal arrangements. In the case of a PTC, it does not need to be licensed by MAS because it is managing its own trust assets but is subject to MAS’ AML/CFT requirements and are required to engage an LTC (see IO.4). LTCs are required to conduct checks on the PTC to ensure that the PTC complies with the full suite of AML/CFT obligations in MAS Notice TCA-N03. The PTC may act as trustee for multiple trusts for the one family. As at end 2024, there were a total of 65 regulated LTCs in Singapore, of which 33 serve PTCs. Approximately 11% of the assets under trusteeship by the LTCs in Singapore are managed within an PTC. Going forward, SFOs will be required to form as a company but prior to this could have been formed as any legal person to qualify for an exemption from licensing by MAS. SFOs will also have to open and maintain a bank account with an MAS-licensed bank. 350. Competent authorities generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the risks stemming from Singapore incorporated companies; primarily the abuse of nominee directors, Unregistered Foreign Companies and, more recently, abuse of natural persons through gaining access to a Singapore national's SINGPASS. Competent authorities showed a lesser understanding of the more complex situations posing risk, which are common in Singapore’s context. Risk Posed by Legal Arrangements 351. Singapore’s 2024 risk assessment for legal arrangements covers all legal arrangements operating in Singapore and takes into account several factors such as the number of trusts, the total assets under trusteeship, and limited law enforcement data regarding trusts. Singapore assessed that there is a lack of data surrounding the misuse of legal arrangements for ML/TF risks, with only four ML investigations involving trusts. Singapore took steps to overcome this lack of central information by engagements with the private sector and using international typologies and risk indicators. The results of the risk assessment are largely reflective of the ML/TF risk environment in Singapore (see Table 5.2 below), however, Singaporean authorities provided differing views on the risks of misuse of legal arrangements in Singapore. 352. As with the LPRA, the same process as the NRA was used so the positive and negatives also apply here. As with the LPRA, there was insufficient analysis of the extent to which related controls are working: for LA, this particularly relates to the CDD obligations of LTCs and FIs. The analysis of use of trusts in complex structures was also lacking and did not include consideration that the risk is different depending on whether the legal arrangement is in a complex structure. Singapore’s analysis post on-site showed that trusts involved in complex structures were all sole shareholders of companies and did not hold the assets themselves/have financial transactions occurring in their name, whereas for trusts not in a complex structure the trust itself held the assets. 353. Lastly, the LARA differentiates and assigns significantly different risk ratings to trusts where a trustee is a trust company, and those where a non-professional is the trustee. While reasonably plausible to be true in most cases, there is also evidence of some trusts with a non-professional trustee being used in wealth management. Most importantly, the LARA had limited evidence for this differentiation, despite very significantly differing mitigation measures applied to these two types of trusts. Table 5.2. Residual ML/TF Risks for Legal Arrangements in Singapore Legal Arrangement ML Risk TF Risk Express trusts where the trustee is a trust company Medium High Low Foreign Legal Arrangements with links in Singapore Medium High Medium Low Registered business trusts Low Low Collective investment schemes (including real estate investment trusts) Low Low Securities depository Low Low Express trusts covered by Part 7 of the Trustees Act and Trustees (Transparency and Effective Control) Regulations 2017 Low Low Charitable purpose trusts Low Medium Low 354. Singapore’s competent authorities demonstrated a lesser understanding of the ML/TF risks of legal arrangements. Competent authorities generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the risks stemming from legal arrangements created through LTCs and wakafs. They demonstrated a weaker grasp of the risk posed by complex legal arrangement/person structures, foreign trusts operating in Singapore and trusts not formed through an LTC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="345. Singapore completed separate ML/TF risk assessments of legal persons (LPRA) and legal arrangements (LARA) in 2024, which supplements and updates the 2019 Legal Persons Risk Assessment and follow on from the 2024 National Risk Assessment. The LPRA and LARA were developed concurrently under the auspices of the RTIG; as such understanding of risk is supported by the other work of the inter-agency RTIG platform, which oversees the identification and assessment of ML/TF/PF risks at the whole-of government level. Singapore’s risk assessment process included reference to qualitative and quantitative information from competent authorities and a range of other sources. Further, competent authorities have a good level of engagement with industry, including through the ACIP’s Legal Persons and Arrangements Working Group (LPAWG). Risk Posed by Legal Persons 346. The 2024 LPRA assessed the ML/TF risks associated with the types of legal persons operating in Singapore. Table 5.1. Residual ML/TF Risks for Legal Persons in Singapore Legal Person ML Risk TF Risk Companies High Medium low Unregistered foreign companies High Medium low Limited liability partnerships Medium high Low Sole proprietorships/General partnerships Medium low Low Limited partnerships Medium low Low Variable capital companies Medium low Low Societies Low Low Co-operative societies Low Low Mutual benefit organisations Low Low 347. The risk assessment process is substantially similar to the NRA processes described in IO.1. Accordingly, it has the same positives and negatives as seen in the dynamic risk assessment process and NRA. In addition, the risk assessments did not conduct proper analysis of vulnerabilities. This includes how well the controls are working, in particular whether reporting entities are correctly identifying the BO in response to their AML/CFT obligations; and did not present fulsome analysis of the extent and operations/transactions of Unregistered Foreign Companies holding bank accounts in Singapore. 348. Singapore established a legal framework for the creation of Variable Capital Companies (VCCs) during the assessment period with the intended use of operating as a Collective Investment Scheme (CIS). Many VCCs in Singapore are not being used as a CIS. The LPRA assessment did consider the misuse of VCCs for ML/TF purposes (in terms of the structure and intended use of VCC) but does not consider how VCCs may be used outside of their intended use as a CIS. It did not consider SFOs and their formation as, and use of, legal persons. 349. The risk assessment appropriately considered the characteristics of the legal persons and arrangements separately, but did not adequately analyse the structures involving multiple interconnected legal persons and/or arrangement, which occurs in practice. The risk assessments do not sufficiently analyse the increased ML/TF risk in structuring various legal persons and arrangements together. In particular, the risk assessments do not analyse the various possible ways in which structures can and are being used, nor how they are most commonly used in Singapore. For example, Singapore provides substantial wealth management services for HNWI and UHNWI individuals. Singapore has not considered the vulnerabilities of complex structuring involving SFOs which attract these customers. Box 5.1. Single Family Offices (SFOs) in Singapore SFOs refer to an entity (with separate legal personality) which manages wealth for, or on behalf of one family and is wholly owned or controlled by members of the same family. SFOs generally involve a complex structure of legal persons and arrangements underneath the overarching legal person that is the SFO. SFOs are an attractive mechanism for wealth management amongst HNWIs and UHNWIs, and Singapore has seen an increase in demand for wealth management using SFOs with 43% year-on-year growth (totalling over 2 000 in number). This growth is driven by favourable tax treatment and Singapore’s reputation as a wealth management centre. Many SFOs are also looking to use VCCs to hold and manage assets of HNWIs or UHNWIs, furthering the complexity of legal persons and arrangements used. Six SFOs have been linked to individuals convicted in the 3B$ Case; and at least two in the Prince Group case. Where a single family and connected persons (extended family) seeks to set up and manage a trust for wealth management purposes, they may use a Private Trust Company (PTC) or LTC. A PTC does not need a license but has to engage an LTC to discharge its AML/CFT obligations set out by MAS associated with the legal arrangements. In the case of a PTC, it does not need to be licensed by MAS because it is managing its own trust assets but is subject to MAS’ AML/CFT requirements and are required to engage an LTC (see IO.4). LTCs are required to conduct checks on the PTC to ensure that the PTC complies with the full suite of AML/CFT obligations in MAS Notice TCA-N03. The PTC may act as trustee for multiple trusts for the one family. As at end 2024, there were a total of 65 regulated LTCs in Singapore, of which 33 serve PTCs. Approximately 11% of the assets under trusteeship by the LTCs in Singapore are managed within an PTC. Going forward, SFOs will be required to form as a company but prior to this could have been formed as any legal person to qualify for an exemption from licensing by MAS. SFOs will also have to open and maintain a bank account with an MAS-licensed bank. 350. Competent authorities generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the risks stemming from Singapore incorporated companies; primarily the abuse of nominee directors, Unregistered Foreign Companies and, more recently, abuse of natural persons through gaining access to a Singapore national's SINGPASS. Competent authorities showed a lesser understanding of the more complex situations posing risk, which are common in Singapore’s context. Risk Posed by Legal Arrangements 351. Singapore’s 2024 risk assessment for legal arrangements covers all legal arrangements operating in Singapore and takes into account several factors such as the number of trusts, the total assets under trusteeship, and limited law enforcement data regarding trusts. Singapore assessed that there is a lack of data surrounding the misuse of legal arrangements for ML/TF risks, with only four ML investigations involving trusts. Singapore took steps to overcome this lack of central information by engagements with the private sector and using international typologies and risk indicators. The results of the risk assessment are largely reflective of the ML/TF risk environment in Singapore (see Table 5.2 below), however, Singaporean authorities provided differing views on the risks of misuse of legal arrangements in Singapore. 352. As with the LPRA, the same process as the NRA was used so the positive and negatives also apply here. As with the LPRA, there was insufficient analysis of the extent to which related controls are working: for LA, this particularly relates to the CDD obligations of LTCs and FIs. The analysis of use of trusts in complex structures was also lacking and did not include consideration that the risk is different depending on whether the legal arrangement is in a complex structure. Singapore’s analysis post on-site showed that trusts involved in complex structures were all sole shareholders of companies and did not hold the assets themselves/have financial transactions occurring in their name, whereas for trusts not in a complex structure the trust itself held the assets. 353. Lastly, the LARA differentiates and assigns significantly different risk ratings to trusts where a trustee is a trust company, and those where a non-professional is the trustee. While reasonably plausible to be true in most cases, there is also evidence of some trusts with a non-professional trustee being used in wealth management. Most importantly, the LARA had limited evidence for this differentiation, despite very significantly differing mitigation measures applied to these two types of trusts. Table 5.2. Residual ML/TF Risks for Legal Arrangements in Singapore Legal Arrangement ML Risk TF Risk Express trusts where the trustee is a trust company Medium High Low Foreign Legal Arrangements with links in Singapore Medium High Medium Low Registered business trusts Low Low Collective investment schemes (including real estate investment trusts) Low Low Securities depository Low Low Express trusts covered by Part 7 of the Trustees Act and Trustees (Transparency and Effective Control) Regulations 2017 Low Low Charitable purpose trusts Low Medium Low 354. Singapore’s competent authorities demonstrated a lesser understanding of the ML/TF risks of legal arrangements. Competent authorities generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the risks stemming from legal arrangements created through LTCs and wakafs. They demonstrated a weaker grasp of the risk posed by complex legal arrangement/person structures, foreign trusts operating in Singapore and trusts not formed through an LTC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="402. Singapore places priority on cross-government data integration. As a result, competent authorities have access to a broad spectrum of reports, data and information. This integrated access provides accurate and timely information, supports intelligence gathering and facilitates the investigation of ML/TF and predicate offences. 6.1.1. By the FIU 403. Singapore’s FIU, STRO, has access to a broad range of information including reports submitted by REs and governmental data to perform its functions. STRO is responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating STRs, cash transaction reports (CTRs) and cash movement reports (CMRs) (see R.29). These are filed electronically using standardised fields on the STRO Online Notices and Reporting Platform (SONAR). This platform allows for direct interaction between STRO and REs, who can track their STR’s utility on the platform. 404. STRO received 282 354 STRs since 2020 (Table 6.1), representing a 154% increase over the reporting period and a significant uptick in later years due to increased awareness-raising conducted by the FIU. In line with risks, the majority (82%) were submitted by FIs, primarily banks, followed by payment institutions offering money transfer services. STRs submitted by DNFBPs are comparatively lower (15%), notably from higher-risk sectors such as CSPs, LTCs, PSMDs and real estate agents/developers. As stated in IO.4, some of this discrepancy in reporting between DNFBP sectors can be attributed to the higher volume and transactional nature of casino activities over other DNFBPs. Table 6.1. STR submission by reporting entity Sector ML NRA risk 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (% of total) Financial Institutions -- 28 817 39 313 39 524 51 532 71 710 230 896 (82%) Banks High 19 651 27 584 28 799 40 815 59 945 176 794 Brokers dealers and corporate finance adv. Firms Medium-Low 496 403 370 470 1 137 2 876 Direct life and composite insurers Low 1 151 1 166 1 334 1 131 1 611 6 393 EAMs Medium-High 30 23 19 51 46 169 Finance companies Low 22 16 21 29 37 125 Financial advisers Medium-Low 84 106 56 96 67 409 Fund management companies Medium-Low 42 20 25 37 56 180 Moneychangers Medium-Low 507 169 342 783 988 2 789 Non-bank credit card companies Low 51 56 25 53 123 308 PSPs Medium-High 6 082 9 202 7 367 7 676 6 881 37 208 Other FIs -- 701 568 1 166 391 819 3 645 DPTSPs Medium-High 265 1 372 1 591 1 335 1 872 6 435 (2%) DNFBPs -- 4 467 4 634 8 109 12 634 11 347 41 191 (15%) Casinos Medium-High 3 598 3 752 7 389 11 158 10 261 36 158 PSMDs / (incl. pawnbrokers) Medium-High (PSMDs) 11 24 19 158 53 265 Low CSPs Medium-High 456 488 442 335 331 2 052 LTCs Medium-High 145 100 82 92 115 534 Real Estate Agents/Developers Medium-High 124 122 61 280 305 892 Lawyers Medium-Low 107 117 98 556 207 1 085 Public and Professional accountants Medium-Low 26 31 18 55 75 205 Others (non-REs) -- 333 578 622 1 240 1 059 3 832 (1%) Total -- 33 882 45 897 49 846 66 741 85 988 282 354 (100%) 405. STRs are generally of good quality, largely due to the electronic submission process via SONAR. The system validates entry fields and prompts filers to correct errors prior to submission, which improves data accuracy and timeliness. STRO does not track STR quality metrics or statistics on clarifications sought from REs. However, STRO only rejected a negligible number of STRs during the reporting period. STRO does receive a high number of STRs without a clear offence, which is understandable as it is reasonable that REs do not always know the offence suspected of being committed, and this has a limited impact on STR useability in practice. Over the reporting period, 28% of STRs did not have an indication of the underlying offence (these are branded as “untagged STRs”). The numbers of untagged STRs have halved over the course of the reporting period due to ongoing outreach to REs and overall better reporting practices over time. STRO re-categorises the underlying offence associated to STRs once received, taking into account their broader information holdings. Detailed statistics on this re-categorisation process are unavailable, but case studies suggest that LEAs find value in untagged STR disseminations once re-categorised. 406. STRs by crime type somewhat align with risks identified in the NRA. STRO receives a high volume of reports related to fraud, organised crime and tax offences (Table 6.2). Conversely, STRs concerning some high-risk offences such as corruption, TBML and other notable ML threats such as environmental crime are comparatively lower given Singapore’s risk and context. The limited volume of STRs on specific high-risk offences/methodologies constrains STRO’s ability to produce financial intelligence on these higher risk offences. 407. A significant proportion of STRs concerning medium-high risk sectors were initiated by adverse news or were filed reactively in follow-up to ACIP meetings. This includes 94% of corruption-related STRs (2021-2022) and 45% of STRs in relation to PSMDs and pawnbrokers (2020-2024). This indicates that red flag indicators are not fully systematised by some REs and may result in delayed reporting as suspicions arise only after public allegations emerge. This limits the operational value of these STRs. Table 6.2. STR submission by crime type STR by crime type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (% of total) Corruption 610 779 668 793 884 3 734 (3%) Counterfeiting and piracy of products 56 81 81 75 43 336 Counterfeiting currency 5 6 2 6 14 33 Environmental crime 12 11 12 24 57 116 Extortion 13 28 11 24 90 166 Forgery 516 576 684 927 926 3 629 (3%) Fraud 6 050 8 212 12 162 15 553 21 845 63 822 (45%) Human trafficking and migrant smuggling 32 40 106 60 78 316 Illicit arms trafficking 10 13 21 40 23 107 Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 97 72 110 189 202 670 Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods 9 20 11 15 10 65 Insider trading and market manipulation 337 361 303 343 476 1820 (1%) Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 3 1 9 3 32 48 Murder, grievous bodily injury 5 6 9 5 22 47 Organised crime and racketeering 2 297 2 973 2 826 6 444 14 434 28 974 (20%) Piracy - - - 1 - 1 Proliferation Financing 37 17 25 70 33 182 Robbery or theft 43 125 126 50 78 422 Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children 10 13 9 20 30 82 Smuggling (incl. in relation to customs/excise duties &amp; tax) 32 39 37 59 21 188 Tax crimes (related to direct/indirect taxes) 2 083 2 200 1 634 1 788 1 568 9 273 (7%) Terrorism and TF 94 113 176 329 323 1 035 (1%) TBML 206 158 120 171 216 871 (1%) Other offences (1) 3 280 4 141 5 676 6 363 6 796 26 256 (18%) Total 15 837 19 985 24 818 33 352 48 201 142 193 (100%) Note: The total number in this table is different than in Table 3.1 as filers can tag more than one offence to each STR filed. Untagged STRs are excluded from this table. (1) These offences – which include regulatory-type offences – refer to 25 different offences, including sanctions-related offences, offences under the Casino Control Act, Payment Services Act, etc. 408. STRs are submitted in a timely manner. To ensure prompt reporting, STRO introduced a time-stamp feature on SONAR in 2018 to track how long REs take to file STRs after a suspicion arises. This mechanism has incentivised timely submission, with data showing that STRs are typically filed within five business days. To improve STR submission, quality and timeliness, STRO conducts regular outreach to REs, in co-ordination with supervisors. Information on the frequency of the outreach to REs is unavailable. 409. In addition to STRs, STRO benefits from a growing range of data points to enrich its analysis and support both operational and strategic analyses. This information, which can be accessed in a timely manner, includes CTRs and CMRs (a majority of which involve high-value cash declarations above SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000), databases and other closed sources of information (SPF’s CRIMES3 case management system and administrative and tax records) (Table 6.3). STRO can also request additional information from REs via Section 5(3) CDSA powers, or ACIP to enrich its analysis, though statistics on such requests are unavailable. Singapore has introduced several legislative amendments since the last MER to broaden the range of available data points. Since 2024, for instance, STRO has been able to access trade data on a pre-emptive and direct basis, where previously this was only available upon request. This shift reflects a positive move toward a more proactive and automated approach to enriching information. 410. Singapore has yet to fully implement a 2016 MER recommended action to secure strategically important data like international electronic fund transfer reports. STRO does have some access to information relating to cross-border money flows and is able to develop broad macro understanding of these flows through the ACIP Risk Surveillance Workgroup. However, given that Singapore’s greatest ML/TF risks originate from abroad, it is particularly important that Singapore can detect these criminal funds entering their financial system. Requiring REs to submit cross-border wire transfer reports would improve early detection of illicit funds into Singapore and support strategic analysis by enabling early detection of anomalies in cross-border transactions and facilitate periodic reviews of transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions. 411. STRO is equipped with advanced IT tools to hold and analyse information it collects and perform its functions. WINGS X analyses STRO’s holdings through enriching various data-points (CTRs, STRs, CMRs) and cross-analysing this enriched information with external information, intelligence and data from both STRO and other databases (e.g. CRIME3, World Check, etc.). This is done with a view to establishing links between potential investigative targets and possible proceeds of crime, ML, predicate offences or TF. Table 6.3. Data and other information available to STRO Direct access CMRs Total (% increase over reporting period) 220 834 (332%) CTRs Total (% increase over reporting period) 1.6 million (140%) Database information and Owner INTERPOL data SPF BO registry ACRA Trade information Singapore Customs COSMIC information MAS STR, CMR and CTR data STRO Bankruptcy records Insolvency &amp; Public Trustee's Office (IPTO) Criminal records SPF Household particulars ICA Ownership of cars Land Transport Authority (LTA) Ownership of land and private properties Singapore Land Authority (SLA) Travel records ICA Indirect Access Work pass details Ministry of Manpower (MOM) Tax information IRAS Employment details MOM / Central Provident Fund (CPF) Family records Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) / ICA Ownership of public housing Housing &amp; Development Board (HDB) Ownership of shares and securities Singapore Exchange (SGX) 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 412. Competent authorities spoke highly of their ability to access STR, CMR and CTR information from STRO. This information is either accessed through self-screening or ‘Machine Analysed Spontaneous Disseminations’ (MASDs). 413. Self-screening by competent authorities, which has increased 65% over the reporting period, is done through direct access to WINGS X. Competent authorities have used self-screening over 11 000 times over the assessment period. Some agencies were only onboarded in 2025, but Singapore’s major investigative and regulatory bodies, such as SPF, ICA, ISD, CPIB and MAS, are the biggest users. While competent authorities may occasionally request STRO to conduct additional analysis based on this self-screening (Analysis on Request), the frequency is unknown. In respect of TF, STRO makes available self-screening and MASDs to both ISD and CFTB, ensuring that they have prompt access to financial information. 414.  Singapore has invested significant human and financial resources into the creation and dissemination of MASDs (201 000 disseminations, primarily to LEAs such as SPF). WINGS X performs analysis of the FIU’s and government’s holdings to enrich the financial information received by STRO. Based on human designed rules, the result of this machine analysis is automatically disseminated to LEAs as MASDs. This is a product that identifies potential targets, their linkages, associated financial transactions and may include network visualisations where necessary. This process is entirely machine-led. The only human intervention is in developing/calibrating the system, defining the dissemination triggers [31] (co-developed with LEAs) and periodic audits of the results by the FIU’s staff of some MASDs months after they are disseminated to ensure they are relevant. 415. While the technology is impressive, the AT therefore considers MASDs to be financial information rather than financial intelligence, with more limited actionable value in comparison to financial intelligence packages. Moreover, there are no detailed statistics on the breakdown of MASDs by risk area given the pre-set dissemination triggers, nor on the outcomes of disseminations, which hinders the AT’s ability to assess whether MASDs fully support operational needs of LEAs in line with risks. However, interviews with the authorities and case studies indicate that despite the high volume of disseminations which could impede effective prioritisation, LEAs use MASDs to perform their functions. (see section 6.4). 416. Beyond STRO data, LEAs have direct access to a wide range of databases to support intelligence and investigations. These include administrative and tax records (e.g. income tax and GST returns), trader declarations relating to imports, exports and transhipments, travel history, telecom data, employment records, etc. SPF’s case management system integrates with other databases to retrieve biodata and asset details (e.g. telephone numbers, vehicle and property details, etc.). The launch of ‘Project POET’ (Production Order Electronic Transmission project) in 2019 enables LEAs to electronically request information from dedicated FIs, hence accelerating asset tracing. As highlighted in Box 6.1, the NAVIGATE initiative reflects Singapore’s ongoing efforts towards greater data integration across agencies, including LEAs, STRO and financial supervisors. Box 6.1. WoG co-operation through ‘NAVIGATE’ platform NAVIGATE is a data-sharing project launched by the IMC-AML in 2024 enabling competent authorities to access each other’s information (such as database information on individuals or entities of concern) and take appropriate supervisory or law enforcement action. Agencies involved include SPF, STRO, ACRA, MAS, URA, MinLaw, CEA, MOM. 417. As indicated in IO.5, while BO information for legal persons is largely accessible to competent authorities, gaps remain in the verification to ensure that data is accurate. Further, there are instances where data would sit outside the central registry (e.g., trusts, UFCs, VCCs or when legal persons are the beneficial owner) affecting timely accessibility from other sources. Overall, these challenges hinder the ability of the FIU to perform analysis and LEAs to conduct effective investigations. 418. Overall, STRO and Singapore’s competent authorities have access to a wide range of reports, data, and information to investigate ML/TF and predicate offences. Singapore has demonstrated great efforts in enhancing data integration across government. Direct electronic access has enabled STRO and competent authorities’ timely access to financial information in a consistent and up-to-date manner from the data sources of the FIU and competent authorities. LEAs have direct access to WINGS X and obtain a substantial volume of MASDs from STRO, however the extent to which these disseminations help other competent authorities perform their function and are commensurate with risks cannot be meaningfully assessed given the current limitations in statistical data. Furthermore, some challenges remain in the availability of a sufficient volume of STRs, especially from DNFBPs in higher-risk sectors and high-risk threats (other than fraud and organised crime) and access to BO information. The lack of systemic use of red-flag indicators utilised by REs operating in medium-high threats/sectors could lead to delayed reporting and timely detection of criminality. Footnotes [31] Disseminations occurs if the report matches: i) the suspect of an ongoing criminal investigation involving serious offences listed under the Second Schedule of the CDSA 1992; ii) previous screening conducted by competent authorities; and iii) other pre-agreed criteria/thematic rules." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="402. Singapore places priority on cross-government data integration. As a result, competent authorities have access to a broad spectrum of reports, data and information. This integrated access provides accurate and timely information, supports intelligence gathering and facilitates the investigation of ML/TF and predicate offences. 6.1.1. By the FIU 403. Singapore’s FIU, STRO, has access to a broad range of information including reports submitted by REs and governmental data to perform its functions. STRO is responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating STRs, cash transaction reports (CTRs) and cash movement reports (CMRs) (see R.29). These are filed electronically using standardised fields on the STRO Online Notices and Reporting Platform (SONAR). This platform allows for direct interaction between STRO and REs, who can track their STR’s utility on the platform. 404. STRO received 282 354 STRs since 2020 (Table 6.1), representing a 154% increase over the reporting period and a significant uptick in later years due to increased awareness-raising conducted by the FIU. In line with risks, the majority (82%) were submitted by FIs, primarily banks, followed by payment institutions offering money transfer services. STRs submitted by DNFBPs are comparatively lower (15%), notably from higher-risk sectors such as CSPs, LTCs, PSMDs and real estate agents/developers. As stated in IO.4, some of this discrepancy in reporting between DNFBP sectors can be attributed to the higher volume and transactional nature of casino activities over other DNFBPs. Table 6.1. STR submission by reporting entity Sector ML NRA risk 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (% of total) Financial Institutions -- 28 817 39 313 39 524 51 532 71 710 230 896 (82%) Banks High 19 651 27 584 28 799 40 815 59 945 176 794 Brokers dealers and corporate finance adv. Firms Medium-Low 496 403 370 470 1 137 2 876 Direct life and composite insurers Low 1 151 1 166 1 334 1 131 1 611 6 393 EAMs Medium-High 30 23 19 51 46 169 Finance companies Low 22 16 21 29 37 125 Financial advisers Medium-Low 84 106 56 96 67 409 Fund management companies Medium-Low 42 20 25 37 56 180 Moneychangers Medium-Low 507 169 342 783 988 2 789 Non-bank credit card companies Low 51 56 25 53 123 308 PSPs Medium-High 6 082 9 202 7 367 7 676 6 881 37 208 Other FIs -- 701 568 1 166 391 819 3 645 DPTSPs Medium-High 265 1 372 1 591 1 335 1 872 6 435 (2%) DNFBPs -- 4 467 4 634 8 109 12 634 11 347 41 191 (15%) Casinos Medium-High 3 598 3 752 7 389 11 158 10 261 36 158 PSMDs / (incl. pawnbrokers) Medium-High (PSMDs) 11 24 19 158 53 265 Low CSPs Medium-High 456 488 442 335 331 2 052 LTCs Medium-High 145 100 82 92 115 534 Real Estate Agents/Developers Medium-High 124 122 61 280 305 892 Lawyers Medium-Low 107 117 98 556 207 1 085 Public and Professional accountants Medium-Low 26 31 18 55 75 205 Others (non-REs) -- 333 578 622 1 240 1 059 3 832 (1%) Total -- 33 882 45 897 49 846 66 741 85 988 282 354 (100%) 405. STRs are generally of good quality, largely due to the electronic submission process via SONAR. The system validates entry fields and prompts filers to correct errors prior to submission, which improves data accuracy and timeliness. STRO does not track STR quality metrics or statistics on clarifications sought from REs. However, STRO only rejected a negligible number of STRs during the reporting period. STRO does receive a high number of STRs without a clear offence, which is understandable as it is reasonable that REs do not always know the offence suspected of being committed, and this has a limited impact on STR useability in practice. Over the reporting period, 28% of STRs did not have an indication of the underlying offence (these are branded as “untagged STRs”). The numbers of untagged STRs have halved over the course of the reporting period due to ongoing outreach to REs and overall better reporting practices over time. STRO re-categorises the underlying offence associated to STRs once received, taking into account their broader information holdings. Detailed statistics on this re-categorisation process are unavailable, but case studies suggest that LEAs find value in untagged STR disseminations once re-categorised. 406. STRs by crime type somewhat align with risks identified in the NRA. STRO receives a high volume of reports related to fraud, organised crime and tax offences (Table 6.2). Conversely, STRs concerning some high-risk offences such as corruption, TBML and other notable ML threats such as environmental crime are comparatively lower given Singapore’s risk and context. The limited volume of STRs on specific high-risk offences/methodologies constrains STRO’s ability to produce financial intelligence on these higher risk offences. 407. A significant proportion of STRs concerning medium-high risk sectors were initiated by adverse news or were filed reactively in follow-up to ACIP meetings. This includes 94% of corruption-related STRs (2021-2022) and 45% of STRs in relation to PSMDs and pawnbrokers (2020-2024). This indicates that red flag indicators are not fully systematised by some REs and may result in delayed reporting as suspicions arise only after public allegations emerge. This limits the operational value of these STRs. Table 6.2. STR submission by crime type STR by crime type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (% of total) Corruption 610 779 668 793 884 3 734 (3%) Counterfeiting and piracy of products 56 81 81 75 43 336 Counterfeiting currency 5 6 2 6 14 33 Environmental crime 12 11 12 24 57 116 Extortion 13 28 11 24 90 166 Forgery 516 576 684 927 926 3 629 (3%) Fraud 6 050 8 212 12 162 15 553 21 845 63 822 (45%) Human trafficking and migrant smuggling 32 40 106 60 78 316 Illicit arms trafficking 10 13 21 40 23 107 Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 97 72 110 189 202 670 Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods 9 20 11 15 10 65 Insider trading and market manipulation 337 361 303 343 476 1820 (1%) Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 3 1 9 3 32 48 Murder, grievous bodily injury 5 6 9 5 22 47 Organised crime and racketeering 2 297 2 973 2 826 6 444 14 434 28 974 (20%) Piracy - - - 1 - 1 Proliferation Financing 37 17 25 70 33 182 Robbery or theft 43 125 126 50 78 422 Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children 10 13 9 20 30 82 Smuggling (incl. in relation to customs/excise duties &amp; tax) 32 39 37 59 21 188 Tax crimes (related to direct/indirect taxes) 2 083 2 200 1 634 1 788 1 568 9 273 (7%) Terrorism and TF 94 113 176 329 323 1 035 (1%) TBML 206 158 120 171 216 871 (1%) Other offences (1) 3 280 4 141 5 676 6 363 6 796 26 256 (18%) Total 15 837 19 985 24 818 33 352 48 201 142 193 (100%) Note: The total number in this table is different than in Table 3.1 as filers can tag more than one offence to each STR filed. Untagged STRs are excluded from this table. (1) These offences – which include regulatory-type offences – refer to 25 different offences, including sanctions-related offences, offences under the Casino Control Act, Payment Services Act, etc. 408. STRs are submitted in a timely manner. To ensure prompt reporting, STRO introduced a time-stamp feature on SONAR in 2018 to track how long REs take to file STRs after a suspicion arises. This mechanism has incentivised timely submission, with data showing that STRs are typically filed within five business days. To improve STR submission, quality and timeliness, STRO conducts regular outreach to REs, in co-ordination with supervisors. Information on the frequency of the outreach to REs is unavailable. 409. In addition to STRs, STRO benefits from a growing range of data points to enrich its analysis and support both operational and strategic analyses. This information, which can be accessed in a timely manner, includes CTRs and CMRs (a majority of which involve high-value cash declarations above SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000), databases and other closed sources of information (SPF’s CRIMES3 case management system and administrative and tax records) (Table 6.3). STRO can also request additional information from REs via Section 5(3) CDSA powers, or ACIP to enrich its analysis, though statistics on such requests are unavailable. Singapore has introduced several legislative amendments since the last MER to broaden the range of available data points. Since 2024, for instance, STRO has been able to access trade data on a pre-emptive and direct basis, where previously this was only available upon request. This shift reflects a positive move toward a more proactive and automated approach to enriching information. 410. Singapore has yet to fully implement a 2016 MER recommended action to secure strategically important data like international electronic fund transfer reports. STRO does have some access to information relating to cross-border money flows and is able to develop broad macro understanding of these flows through the ACIP Risk Surveillance Workgroup. However, given that Singapore’s greatest ML/TF risks originate from abroad, it is particularly important that Singapore can detect these criminal funds entering their financial system. Requiring REs to submit cross-border wire transfer reports would improve early detection of illicit funds into Singapore and support strategic analysis by enabling early detection of anomalies in cross-border transactions and facilitate periodic reviews of transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions. 411. STRO is equipped with advanced IT tools to hold and analyse information it collects and perform its functions. WINGS X analyses STRO’s holdings through enriching various data-points (CTRs, STRs, CMRs) and cross-analysing this enriched information with external information, intelligence and data from both STRO and other databases (e.g. CRIME3, World Check, etc.). This is done with a view to establishing links between potential investigative targets and possible proceeds of crime, ML, predicate offences or TF. Table 6.3. Data and other information available to STRO Direct access CMRs Total (% increase over reporting period) 220 834 (332%) CTRs Total (% increase over reporting period) 1.6 million (140%) Database information and Owner INTERPOL data SPF BO registry ACRA Trade information Singapore Customs COSMIC information MAS STR, CMR and CTR data STRO Bankruptcy records Insolvency &amp; Public Trustee's Office (IPTO) Criminal records SPF Household particulars ICA Ownership of cars Land Transport Authority (LTA) Ownership of land and private properties Singapore Land Authority (SLA) Travel records ICA Indirect Access Work pass details Ministry of Manpower (MOM) Tax information IRAS Employment details MOM / Central Provident Fund (CPF) Family records Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) / ICA Ownership of public housing Housing &amp; Development Board (HDB) Ownership of shares and securities Singapore Exchange (SGX) 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 412. Competent authorities spoke highly of their ability to access STR, CMR and CTR information from STRO. This information is either accessed through self-screening or ‘Machine Analysed Spontaneous Disseminations’ (MASDs). 413. Self-screening by competent authorities, which has increased 65% over the reporting period, is done through direct access to WINGS X. Competent authorities have used self-screening over 11 000 times over the assessment period. Some agencies were only onboarded in 2025, but Singapore’s major investigative and regulatory bodies, such as SPF, ICA, ISD, CPIB and MAS, are the biggest users. While competent authorities may occasionally request STRO to conduct additional analysis based on this self-screening (Analysis on Request), the frequency is unknown. In respect of TF, STRO makes available self-screening and MASDs to both ISD and CFTB, ensuring that they have prompt access to financial information. 414.  Singapore has invested significant human and financial resources into the creation and dissemination of MASDs (201 000 disseminations, primarily to LEAs such as SPF). WINGS X performs analysis of the FIU’s and government’s holdings to enrich the financial information received by STRO. Based on human designed rules, the result of this machine analysis is automatically disseminated to LEAs as MASDs. This is a product that identifies potential targets, their linkages, associated financial transactions and may include network visualisations where necessary. This process is entirely machine-led. The only human intervention is in developing/calibrating the system, defining the dissemination triggers [31] (co-developed with LEAs) and periodic audits of the results by the FIU’s staff of some MASDs months after they are disseminated to ensure they are relevant. 415. While the technology is impressive, the AT therefore considers MASDs to be financial information rather than financial intelligence, with more limited actionable value in comparison to financial intelligence packages. Moreover, there are no detailed statistics on the breakdown of MASDs by risk area given the pre-set dissemination triggers, nor on the outcomes of disseminations, which hinders the AT’s ability to assess whether MASDs fully support operational needs of LEAs in line with risks. However, interviews with the authorities and case studies indicate that despite the high volume of disseminations which could impede effective prioritisation, LEAs use MASDs to perform their functions. (see section 6.4). 416. Beyond STRO data, LEAs have direct access to a wide range of databases to support intelligence and investigations. These include administrative and tax records (e.g. income tax and GST returns), trader declarations relating to imports, exports and transhipments, travel history, telecom data, employment records, etc. SPF’s case management system integrates with other databases to retrieve biodata and asset details (e.g. telephone numbers, vehicle and property details, etc.). The launch of ‘Project POET’ (Production Order Electronic Transmission project) in 2019 enables LEAs to electronically request information from dedicated FIs, hence accelerating asset tracing. As highlighted in Box 6.1, the NAVIGATE initiative reflects Singapore’s ongoing efforts towards greater data integration across agencies, including LEAs, STRO and financial supervisors. Box 6.1. WoG co-operation through ‘NAVIGATE’ platform NAVIGATE is a data-sharing project launched by the IMC-AML in 2024 enabling competent authorities to access each other’s information (such as database information on individuals or entities of concern) and take appropriate supervisory or law enforcement action. Agencies involved include SPF, STRO, ACRA, MAS, URA, MinLaw, CEA, MOM. 417. As indicated in IO.5, while BO information for legal persons is largely accessible to competent authorities, gaps remain in the verification to ensure that data is accurate. Further, there are instances where data would sit outside the central registry (e.g., trusts, UFCs, VCCs or when legal persons are the beneficial owner) affecting timely accessibility from other sources. Overall, these challenges hinder the ability of the FIU to perform analysis and LEAs to conduct effective investigations. 418. Overall, STRO and Singapore’s competent authorities have access to a wide range of reports, data, and information to investigate ML/TF and predicate offences. Singapore has demonstrated great efforts in enhancing data integration across government. Direct electronic access has enabled STRO and competent authorities’ timely access to financial information in a consistent and up-to-date manner from the data sources of the FIU and competent authorities. LEAs have direct access to WINGS X and obtain a substantial volume of MASDs from STRO, however the extent to which these disseminations help other competent authorities perform their function and are commensurate with risks cannot be meaningfully assessed given the current limitations in statistical data. Furthermore, some challenges remain in the availability of a sufficient volume of STRs, especially from DNFBPs in higher-risk sectors and high-risk threats (other than fraud and organised crime) and access to BO information. The lack of systemic use of red-flag indicators utilised by REs operating in medium-high threats/sectors could lead to delayed reporting and timely detection of criminality. Footnotes [31] Disseminations occurs if the report matches: i) the suspect of an ongoing criminal investigation involving serious offences listed under the Second Schedule of the CDSA 1992; ii) previous screening conducted by competent authorities; and iii) other pre-agreed criteria/thematic rules." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="7.1.1. Staffing, resourcing and collaboration 450. Singapore established a robust legal framework to combat ML (see R.3), which is regularly updated to address emerging risks. Recent amendments have enhanced information sharing and expanded intelligence sources available to LEAs. The three primary LEAs responsible for investigating ML linked to predicate offences within their respective mandates are the SPF, the CNB, and the CPIB. In practice, SPF’s Financial Investigation Group (FIG) within the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) is the investigative lead for ML and takes on the most complex ML investigations (see R.30 and R.31). LEAs are well-resourced and trained and leverage a wide range of tools and platforms for investigations, including NAVIGATE and POET (Box 6.1). LEAs also co-operate well together, either bilaterally or through multilateral platforms such as AC3N, ACIP and RTIG. 451. Singapore has enhanced its ability to detect and investigate ML, especially in response to emerging and increasingly prominent threats like CEF. SPF established the Anti-Scam Centre (ASC) in June 2019, and the Anti-Scam Investigation Division within CAD in 2021, expanded to the Anti-Scam Command (ASCom) in 2022. ASCom embeds bank representatives with SPF to enable timely information sharing and rapid responses for freezing and seizing assets. Since 2023, AGC also has a team of specialised Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs) within CAD to provide early-stage and quick legal advice to CAD. CAD set up a satellite office at IRAS in 2021 to support the early detection and referral of tax-related ML investigations and to build IRAS’ internal ML detection capabilities. 452. LEAs operate under the National AML Strategy and the LEA Strategy to Combat ML, which define operational priorities and promote inter-agency co-operation. ‘Predicate agencies’ (such as HSA, ICA, MOH, MOM, NEA, NParks, SC, etc.) conduct financial investigations through basic inquiries to establish the presence of proceeds of crime. According to a referral mechanism based on complexity, predicate agencies may refer potential ML activity to CAD where estimated proceeds are above SGD 20 000 (USD 14 800), or where other specific conditions are met (e.g., more in-depth investigations requiring asset-tracing). Where that is not the case, the pursuit of an ML investigation is discontinued. 7.1.2. Identification of ML investigations 453. Singapore faces significant ML risk from foreign predicate offences, particularly CEF, targeting Singaporeans, and subsequent ML from these offences in Singapore, and to criminals misusing Singapore’s large and connected financial sector to launder the proceeds of crime. The majority of investigations are reactive, triggered by police reports. While inter-agency co-ordination is a positive measure in detecting ML, there is ample room for improvement to diversify the range of sources to detect ML. 454. ML investigations are largely reactive with 82% triggered by police reports filed by CEF victims, predominantly based in Singapore, which are the domestic component of scam operations with a foreign nexus (Table 7.1). The nearly four-fold increase in ML investigations triggered largely by CEF victim complaints over the years since the previous MER reflects the increasing risk posed by CEF. It also demonstrates growing public awareness due to the efforts of the Singaporean authorities. Singapore does not sufficiently rely on an intelligence-led ML identification and investigation system and the over-reliance on victims’ complaints diverts LEAs’ attention and resources from more complex ML activities, such as those involving professional enablers, corruption, and complex cross-border structures. Table 7.1. ML investigations per source (domestic vs. foreign predicates) Domestic ML investigations Foreign ML investigations Total ML investigations % of total ML investigations Complaints from victims 8861 302 9163 82 Referrals from other agencies / Predicate investigation 1496 17 1513 14 Foreign counterparts (1) 2 247 249 2 Financial / other intelligence sources 77 187 264 2 Total 10 436 753 11 189 100 Note: Information identified through a fusion of sources, such as with public-private partnership or inter-agency mechanisms, have been subsumed in the most appropriate of the four headers above, to avoid double-counting. (1) this includes cases opened based both on formal and informal co-operation. 455. There is ample room for improvement to diversify the range of sources to detect ML, since referrals from predicate agencies, financial intelligence (from STRO and LEAs), and international co-operation play a limited role. Financial and other intelligence sources, including STRO disseminations, play an insignificant role in identifying ML compared to the total volume of investigations. Only two percent of ML investigations are triggered by financial intelligence, indicating Singapore can be much more intelligence-led in their approach. The contribution of financial intelligence is more pronounced for detecting ML involving foreign predicate cases (25%), but this case number remains modest relative to the overall ML caseload. This disproportion of domestic vs foreign cases is also misaligned with Singapore’s heightened exposure to foreign predicate offences. 456. Inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms like AC3N and ACIP are key strengths in Singapore’s detection approach. 18 ML investigations were initiated and another 154 investigations advanced through ACIP, while 19 ML investigations were initiated through AC3N. These instances of ML were identified through STRO and LEAs sharing leads with ACIP banks, which then analysed information and submitted new leads or STRs. While these are positive developments, and the AC3N and ACIP models prioritise high value investigations, the overall number of instances that they have collectively resulted in ML investigations (37) is insignificant in comparison to the total number of ML investigations (11 189), showing clear room for improvement. 457. ASCom works together with banks to detect ML, sharing targeted information on leads and leveraging their in-house data analytics models and network detection capabilities. This collaborative approach enables ASCom to identify ML operations orchestrated by criminal syndicates, freeze the associated bank accounts, and effectively disrupt the laundering networks (see Box 7.1). ASCom has resulted in very significant positive results and is the driver behind substantial investigations into ML from CEF. 7.1.3. ML Investigations 458. Singapore opens an overwhelming amount of ML investigations into CEF cases (primarily money mules) and primarily involving domestic predicate offences. This only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context. While authorities investigate complex cases, there are challenges using international co-operation in order to follow the trail of criminal proceeds. A case prioritisation model is in place to prioritise CEF cases, which has had limited success. 459. LEAs conducted 11 189 ML investigations, a 141% increase overall in the reporting period, although growth has recently plateaued. S17 of the CPC sets out a low threshold for initiating investigations and is also the legislative trigger to be able to use LEA powers. This results in a systematic approach to opening ML investigations whenever there is suspicion of a predicate offence followed by laundering, or when a standalone ML case is opened, which is generally the circumstance for foreign fraud investigations with victims in Singapore. Accordingly, SPF pursues standalone ML investigations for every CEF report, and ML investigations arising from CEF investigations are over-represented as compared to other key threats (discussed further below). 460. 93% of ML investigations involve domestic predicate offences where both the crime and laundering occur in Singapore (Table 7.2). While many of these domestic predicate ML investigations have a foreign nexus due to CEF syndicates operating in a foreign jurisdiction, these are distinctly different from foreign predicate ML in which Singapore as an IFC is misused for laundering. The heavy emphasis on ML investigations into domestic predicates suggests that LEAs focus on targeting domestically generated crimes. This only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context, since the NRA highlights foreign predicate offences and cross-border ML as higher-risk areas. As an IFC, Singapore is exposed to foreign predicate offences by syndicates operating abroad, targeting victims abroad, but laundering proceeds through Singapore’s financial system. 461. The pursuit of laundering of the proceeds from fraud, Singapore’s highest ML risk predicate offence, is done to an overly appropriate extent and accounts for over 91% of all investigations (Table 7.2). However, these investigations involving laundering the proceeds of fraud predominantly target domestic money mules (MMs) rather than professional enablers or the controlling minds of the criminal enterprise, who are typically abroad). ML from other higher-risk offences (i.e., tax crimes and corruption) is investigated to a limited extent , which is only in line with Singapore’s risks and context to some extent. There were dramatically fewer ML investigations related to the proceeds generated from other higher-risk offences such as tax crimes (34 investigations or less than 1% of all ML investigations) and corruption (100 investigations or approximately 1% of all ML investigations). Further, there were few investigations into higher risk ML methods like TBML, including SBML (49 investigations or less than 1% of all ML investigations). Other potentially significant sources of information on laundered proceeds are underutilised. For example, 1 820 STRs relating to insider trading and market manipulation received by STRO during the review period (Table 6.2) generally did not lead to starting a ML investigation. Overall, the focus on ML from CEF overweighs Singapore’s investigative resources into one high risk offence at the expense of others , and the approach to these cases puts resources into predominantly simpler cases targeting MM. Table 7.2. Investigations (per predicate offence) Predicate Offence Domestic ML investigations (% of total) Foreign ML investigations (% of total) Total ML investigations (% of total) Fraud 9 007 (85) 639 (6) 9 646 (91) TBML 24 (0) 25 (0) 49 (0) Organised Crime 63 (1) 36 (0) 99 (1) Tax 18 (0) 16 (0) 34 (0) Corruption 68 (1) 32 (0) 100 (1) Drugs 419 (4) 8 (0) 427 (4) Others 183 (2) 22 (0) 205 (2) Total 9 782 (93) 778 (7) 10 560 (100) Note : The total figures in this Table do not tally with Table 7.1 as an investigation may relate to more than one category of threat (e.g. TBML and organised crime). Additionally, statistics from SPF's land divisions for 2020 to 2022 cannot be further broken down into threat type due to data migration issues. 462. The authorities demonstrate sophistication and skills in conducting complex ML investigations, including those involving ML from foreign predicate offences. Case studies highlight LEA’s ability to dismantle sophisticated organised crime networks (e.g. 3B$ case), with investigations involving a range of asset types (e.g. real estate, virtual assets), legal entities, professional intermediaries, and jurisdictions (see Box 7.1). LEAs are well co-ordinated and make effective use of domestic tools, inter-agency mechanisms and international co-operation channels (e.g. FIU-to-FIU channels and informal (police-to-police) networks, EGMONT, INTERPOL, ARIN-AP, etc.). 463. However, case studies and interviews with the authorities also indicate challenges linking ML to foreign predicate offence. Greater efforts are needed to follow the trail of criminal proceeds through various layers using international co-operation, especially in complex investigations. Singapore’s ability to pursue ML cases involving foreign-based criminals is constrained by challenges in international co-operation, such as uncooperative partners, and difficulties in obtaining evidence from abroad. Although recent legislative amendments (discussed below) intend to ease this burden by removing the need for prosecution to prove that the property in Singapore was in fact benefits from criminal conduct, these changes are too recent to assess their effectiveness. As discussed in IO.8, asset tracing in cross-border cases also remains a significant operational challenge. 464. Singapore has made some operational adjustments to better handle the volume of ML investigations, particularly CEF cases. Specifically, SPF introduced a case prioritisation model (co-developed with AGC) with limited success to process the high number of CEF investigations and identify those cases that should be prosecuted. Singapore applies a two-tier approach to prioritise CEF cases and separate out those ‘non-egregious’ cases, wherein those assessed to fulfil specific offender-specific and offence-specific conditions (about 32%, or 3 595 cases) will be eligible for an ‘Advisory’ (administrative measure) in lieu of prosecution. Although driven by an assessment of whether available evidence does not meet the evidential thresholds required to prove ML (discussed below), the deprioritisation framework also accounts for few risk factors, and this approach helps Singapore manage the heavy case inventory to an extent. In total, authorities conducted 11 189 ML investigations but prioritised 7 594 cases (submitted for prosecution). 465. Overall, Singapore has well-resourced, capable LEAs to identify and investigate ML. They primarily use ML laws to investigate all CEF cases (which drive the majority of ML cases), irrespective of the value of fraud proceeds. This results in a high volume of investigations, which are usually low in value but high in volume, instead of complex, high-value ML involving professional enablers or controlling minds of the criminal syndicates. Authorities concentrate on domestic elements of ML offences (where they can better control outcomes) and rely heavily on victim complaints. This approach has also diminished resources available to pursue ML from other crime types identified as higher risk by Singapore’s NRA. Box 7.1. ML investigations 3B$ case (2023) In 2021, authorities noted a surge in luxury property purchases in Singapore, prompting STRO to conduct a thematic review of STRs filed between 2019 and 2021 on high net worth individuals. This showed STRs reporting large inflows into Singapore without any apparent links to criminal proceeds. Several STRs also raised concerns abouts source of wealth, including dubious support documentation. A multi-agency taskforce (SPF, AGC, STRO) coordinated intelligence and investigations. SPF sent 33 informal requests to 10 jurisdictions, while STRO engaged at least 10 FIUs. Asset tracing was hindered by overseas MVTS, suspected unlicensed PSPs, and complex cross-border fund flows, with insufficient evidence to recover assets abroad. SPF also investigated over 20 companies linked to 10 suspects of interested and six professional intermediaries, including bankers, CSPs, and real estate agents. After an 18-month covert investigation, 10 individuals linked to foreign organised crime were arrested in August 2023 and charged with forgery, falsification, and ML linked to foreign remote gambling offences. 2 former relationship managers were also prosecuted for abetting the creation of forged documents and ML offences. ML investigation from a victim’s complaint CAD received complaints from eight Singapore-based victims of love scams, with losses exceeding SGD 380 000 (USD 281 000). Two overseas culprits had instructed three Singaporean women to open bank accounts to receive the proceeds. Fund flow analysis showed a further SGD 370 000 (USD 274 000) from foreign sources passed through these accounts in Singapore. The culprits were arrested abroad, extradited, and charged in Singapore, and some funds in Singapore had dissipated. In December 2021, one offender received five years’ imprisonment for ML involving over SGD 550 000 (USD 407 000) and another received four years and two months for ML involving SGD150 000 (USD 111 000). The three women were convicted under S44 CDSA and sentenced to between 3.5 and 15-months imprisonment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="7.1.1. Staffing, resourcing and collaboration 450. Singapore established a robust legal framework to combat ML (see R.3), which is regularly updated to address emerging risks. Recent amendments have enhanced information sharing and expanded intelligence sources available to LEAs. The three primary LEAs responsible for investigating ML linked to predicate offences within their respective mandates are the SPF, the CNB, and the CPIB. In practice, SPF’s Financial Investigation Group (FIG) within the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) is the investigative lead for ML and takes on the most complex ML investigations (see R.30 and R.31). LEAs are well-resourced and trained and leverage a wide range of tools and platforms for investigations, including NAVIGATE and POET (Box 6.1). LEAs also co-operate well together, either bilaterally or through multilateral platforms such as AC3N, ACIP and RTIG. 451. Singapore has enhanced its ability to detect and investigate ML, especially in response to emerging and increasingly prominent threats like CEF. SPF established the Anti-Scam Centre (ASC) in June 2019, and the Anti-Scam Investigation Division within CAD in 2021, expanded to the Anti-Scam Command (ASCom) in 2022. ASCom embeds bank representatives with SPF to enable timely information sharing and rapid responses for freezing and seizing assets. Since 2023, AGC also has a team of specialised Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs) within CAD to provide early-stage and quick legal advice to CAD. CAD set up a satellite office at IRAS in 2021 to support the early detection and referral of tax-related ML investigations and to build IRAS’ internal ML detection capabilities. 452. LEAs operate under the National AML Strategy and the LEA Strategy to Combat ML, which define operational priorities and promote inter-agency co-operation. ‘Predicate agencies’ (such as HSA, ICA, MOH, MOM, NEA, NParks, SC, etc.) conduct financial investigations through basic inquiries to establish the presence of proceeds of crime. According to a referral mechanism based on complexity, predicate agencies may refer potential ML activity to CAD where estimated proceeds are above SGD 20 000 (USD 14 800), or where other specific conditions are met (e.g., more in-depth investigations requiring asset-tracing). Where that is not the case, the pursuit of an ML investigation is discontinued. 7.1.2. Identification of ML investigations 453. Singapore faces significant ML risk from foreign predicate offences, particularly CEF, targeting Singaporeans, and subsequent ML from these offences in Singapore, and to criminals misusing Singapore’s large and connected financial sector to launder the proceeds of crime. The majority of investigations are reactive, triggered by police reports. While inter-agency co-ordination is a positive measure in detecting ML, there is ample room for improvement to diversify the range of sources to detect ML. 454. ML investigations are largely reactive with 82% triggered by police reports filed by CEF victims, predominantly based in Singapore, which are the domestic component of scam operations with a foreign nexus (Table 7.1). The nearly four-fold increase in ML investigations triggered largely by CEF victim complaints over the years since the previous MER reflects the increasing risk posed by CEF. It also demonstrates growing public awareness due to the efforts of the Singaporean authorities. Singapore does not sufficiently rely on an intelligence-led ML identification and investigation system and the over-reliance on victims’ complaints diverts LEAs’ attention and resources from more complex ML activities, such as those involving professional enablers, corruption, and complex cross-border structures. Table 7.1. ML investigations per source (domestic vs. foreign predicates) Domestic ML investigations Foreign ML investigations Total ML investigations % of total ML investigations Complaints from victims 8861 302 9163 82 Referrals from other agencies / Predicate investigation 1496 17 1513 14 Foreign counterparts (1) 2 247 249 2 Financial / other intelligence sources 77 187 264 2 Total 10 436 753 11 189 100 Note: Information identified through a fusion of sources, such as with public-private partnership or inter-agency mechanisms, have been subsumed in the most appropriate of the four headers above, to avoid double-counting. (1) this includes cases opened based both on formal and informal co-operation. 455. There is ample room for improvement to diversify the range of sources to detect ML, since referrals from predicate agencies, financial intelligence (from STRO and LEAs), and international co-operation play a limited role. Financial and other intelligence sources, including STRO disseminations, play an insignificant role in identifying ML compared to the total volume of investigations. Only two percent of ML investigations are triggered by financial intelligence, indicating Singapore can be much more intelligence-led in their approach. The contribution of financial intelligence is more pronounced for detecting ML involving foreign predicate cases (25%), but this case number remains modest relative to the overall ML caseload. This disproportion of domestic vs foreign cases is also misaligned with Singapore’s heightened exposure to foreign predicate offences. 456. Inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms like AC3N and ACIP are key strengths in Singapore’s detection approach. 18 ML investigations were initiated and another 154 investigations advanced through ACIP, while 19 ML investigations were initiated through AC3N. These instances of ML were identified through STRO and LEAs sharing leads with ACIP banks, which then analysed information and submitted new leads or STRs. While these are positive developments, and the AC3N and ACIP models prioritise high value investigations, the overall number of instances that they have collectively resulted in ML investigations (37) is insignificant in comparison to the total number of ML investigations (11 189), showing clear room for improvement. 457. ASCom works together with banks to detect ML, sharing targeted information on leads and leveraging their in-house data analytics models and network detection capabilities. This collaborative approach enables ASCom to identify ML operations orchestrated by criminal syndicates, freeze the associated bank accounts, and effectively disrupt the laundering networks (see Box 7.1). ASCom has resulted in very significant positive results and is the driver behind substantial investigations into ML from CEF. 7.1.3. ML Investigations 458. Singapore opens an overwhelming amount of ML investigations into CEF cases (primarily money mules) and primarily involving domestic predicate offences. This only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context. While authorities investigate complex cases, there are challenges using international co-operation in order to follow the trail of criminal proceeds. A case prioritisation model is in place to prioritise CEF cases, which has had limited success. 459. LEAs conducted 11 189 ML investigations, a 141% increase overall in the reporting period, although growth has recently plateaued. S17 of the CPC sets out a low threshold for initiating investigations and is also the legislative trigger to be able to use LEA powers. This results in a systematic approach to opening ML investigations whenever there is suspicion of a predicate offence followed by laundering, or when a standalone ML case is opened, which is generally the circumstance for foreign fraud investigations with victims in Singapore. Accordingly, SPF pursues standalone ML investigations for every CEF report, and ML investigations arising from CEF investigations are over-represented as compared to other key threats (discussed further below). 460. 93% of ML investigations involve domestic predicate offences where both the crime and laundering occur in Singapore (Table 7.2). While many of these domestic predicate ML investigations have a foreign nexus due to CEF syndicates operating in a foreign jurisdiction, these are distinctly different from foreign predicate ML in which Singapore as an IFC is misused for laundering. The heavy emphasis on ML investigations into domestic predicates suggests that LEAs focus on targeting domestically generated crimes. This only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context, since the NRA highlights foreign predicate offences and cross-border ML as higher-risk areas. As an IFC, Singapore is exposed to foreign predicate offences by syndicates operating abroad, targeting victims abroad, but laundering proceeds through Singapore’s financial system. 461. The pursuit of laundering of the proceeds from fraud, Singapore’s highest ML risk predicate offence, is done to an overly appropriate extent and accounts for over 91% of all investigations (Table 7.2). However, these investigations involving laundering the proceeds of fraud predominantly target domestic money mules (MMs) rather than professional enablers or the controlling minds of the criminal enterprise, who are typically abroad). ML from other higher-risk offences (i.e., tax crimes and corruption) is investigated to a limited extent , which is only in line with Singapore’s risks and context to some extent. There were dramatically fewer ML investigations related to the proceeds generated from other higher-risk offences such as tax crimes (34 investigations or less than 1% of all ML investigations) and corruption (100 investigations or approximately 1% of all ML investigations). Further, there were few investigations into higher risk ML methods like TBML, including SBML (49 investigations or less than 1% of all ML investigations). Other potentially significant sources of information on laundered proceeds are underutilised. For example, 1 820 STRs relating to insider trading and market manipulation received by STRO during the review period (Table 6.2) generally did not lead to starting a ML investigation. Overall, the focus on ML from CEF overweighs Singapore’s investigative resources into one high risk offence at the expense of others , and the approach to these cases puts resources into predominantly simpler cases targeting MM. Table 7.2. Investigations (per predicate offence) Predicate Offence Domestic ML investigations (% of total) Foreign ML investigations (% of total) Total ML investigations (% of total) Fraud 9 007 (85) 639 (6) 9 646 (91) TBML 24 (0) 25 (0) 49 (0) Organised Crime 63 (1) 36 (0) 99 (1) Tax 18 (0) 16 (0) 34 (0) Corruption 68 (1) 32 (0) 100 (1) Drugs 419 (4) 8 (0) 427 (4) Others 183 (2) 22 (0) 205 (2) Total 9 782 (93) 778 (7) 10 560 (100) Note : The total figures in this Table do not tally with Table 7.1 as an investigation may relate to more than one category of threat (e.g. TBML and organised crime). Additionally, statistics from SPF's land divisions for 2020 to 2022 cannot be further broken down into threat type due to data migration issues. 462. The authorities demonstrate sophistication and skills in conducting complex ML investigations, including those involving ML from foreign predicate offences. Case studies highlight LEA’s ability to dismantle sophisticated organised crime networks (e.g. 3B$ case), with investigations involving a range of asset types (e.g. real estate, virtual assets), legal entities, professional intermediaries, and jurisdictions (see Box 7.1). LEAs are well co-ordinated and make effective use of domestic tools, inter-agency mechanisms and international co-operation channels (e.g. FIU-to-FIU channels and informal (police-to-police) networks, EGMONT, INTERPOL, ARIN-AP, etc.). 463. However, case studies and interviews with the authorities also indicate challenges linking ML to foreign predicate offence. Greater efforts are needed to follow the trail of criminal proceeds through various layers using international co-operation, especially in complex investigations. Singapore’s ability to pursue ML cases involving foreign-based criminals is constrained by challenges in international co-operation, such as uncooperative partners, and difficulties in obtaining evidence from abroad. Although recent legislative amendments (discussed below) intend to ease this burden by removing the need for prosecution to prove that the property in Singapore was in fact benefits from criminal conduct, these changes are too recent to assess their effectiveness. As discussed in IO.8, asset tracing in cross-border cases also remains a significant operational challenge. 464. Singapore has made some operational adjustments to better handle the volume of ML investigations, particularly CEF cases. Specifically, SPF introduced a case prioritisation model (co-developed with AGC) with limited success to process the high number of CEF investigations and identify those cases that should be prosecuted. Singapore applies a two-tier approach to prioritise CEF cases and separate out those ‘non-egregious’ cases, wherein those assessed to fulfil specific offender-specific and offence-specific conditions (about 32%, or 3 595 cases) will be eligible for an ‘Advisory’ (administrative measure) in lieu of prosecution. Although driven by an assessment of whether available evidence does not meet the evidential thresholds required to prove ML (discussed below), the deprioritisation framework also accounts for few risk factors, and this approach helps Singapore manage the heavy case inventory to an extent. In total, authorities conducted 11 189 ML investigations but prioritised 7 594 cases (submitted for prosecution). 465. Overall, Singapore has well-resourced, capable LEAs to identify and investigate ML. They primarily use ML laws to investigate all CEF cases (which drive the majority of ML cases), irrespective of the value of fraud proceeds. This results in a high volume of investigations, which are usually low in value but high in volume, instead of complex, high-value ML involving professional enablers or controlling minds of the criminal syndicates. Authorities concentrate on domestic elements of ML offences (where they can better control outcomes) and rely heavily on victim complaints. This approach has also diminished resources available to pursue ML from other crime types identified as higher risk by Singapore’s NRA. Box 7.1. ML investigations 3B$ case (2023) In 2021, authorities noted a surge in luxury property purchases in Singapore, prompting STRO to conduct a thematic review of STRs filed between 2019 and 2021 on high net worth individuals. This showed STRs reporting large inflows into Singapore without any apparent links to criminal proceeds. Several STRs also raised concerns abouts source of wealth, including dubious support documentation. A multi-agency taskforce (SPF, AGC, STRO) coordinated intelligence and investigations. SPF sent 33 informal requests to 10 jurisdictions, while STRO engaged at least 10 FIUs. Asset tracing was hindered by overseas MVTS, suspected unlicensed PSPs, and complex cross-border fund flows, with insufficient evidence to recover assets abroad. SPF also investigated over 20 companies linked to 10 suspects of interested and six professional intermediaries, including bankers, CSPs, and real estate agents. After an 18-month covert investigation, 10 individuals linked to foreign organised crime were arrested in August 2023 and charged with forgery, falsification, and ML linked to foreign remote gambling offences. 2 former relationship managers were also prosecuted for abetting the creation of forged documents and ML offences. ML investigation from a victim’s complaint CAD received complaints from eight Singapore-based victims of love scams, with losses exceeding SGD 380 000 (USD 281 000). Two overseas culprits had instructed three Singaporean women to open bank accounts to receive the proceeds. Fund flow analysis showed a further SGD 370 000 (USD 274 000) from foreign sources passed through these accounts in Singapore. The culprits were arrested abroad, extradited, and charged in Singapore, and some funds in Singapore had dissipated. In December 2021, one offender received five years’ imprisonment for ML involving over SGD 550 000 (USD 407 000) and another received four years and two months for ML involving SGD150 000 (USD 111 000). The three women were convicted under S44 CDSA and sentenced to between 3.5 and 15-months imprisonment." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Singapore places high priority on asset recovery, supported by regular reviews of its regime. Strong agency structures and co-operation frameworks enable the use of government data, public-private partnerships, and international co-operation to facilitate broad and effective information exchange. Competent authorities have sufficient structures, resources, and specialised expertise for pursuing asset recovery. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 493. Singapore has demonstrated a high-level political commitment to asset recovery, which is integrated into national policy documents, such as the National Asset Recovery Strategy (NARS) and the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Money Laundering. NARS, which has received high-level political support, focuses on four operational pillars: detect, deprive, deliver and deter. Aside from confiscation, it also highlights the importance of tax recovery measures and voluntary restitution. Singapore has operationalised these frameworks into strategic objectives which prioritise the pursuit of criminal assets (including virtual assets) moved out of Singapore and the enforcement of a cross-border cash reporting regime (CBCRR). This is reflected in a Whole of Government (WoG) approach to asset recovery and agency-specific SOPs, ensuring that all relevant agencies prioritise and operationalise asset recovery in their work plans. 494. The prioritisation of asset recovery is also perceptible from various innovative measures Singapore has taken, such as Project POET (see IO.6) and PPP initiatives, particularly the co-location of private sector personnel at the ASC, and the ACIP CSIs (see Box 6.3). These initiatives allow LEAs to rapidly freeze and intercept illicit transfers while also leveraging on private sector’s resources. STRO’s upgrade to Wings X in 2022 has also led to more timely asset tracing through better data-integration. Finally, IRAS is making increasing use of tax clawbacks to recover assets through tax assessments, creating additional pathways for asset recovery when dealing with tax crimes. 495. Additionally, Singapore utilises bilateral agreements and multilateral channels to support its asset recovery efforts. For example, Singapore is an active member of ARIN-AP (it joined its Steering Committee in 2024), INTERPOL’s regional body (AseanPol) and dedicated taskforces (e.g. INTERPOL Global Rapid Intervention of Payments, I-GRIP) (see IO.2) 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 496. Singapore leverages on operational experience to regularly review its asset recovery regime. The GST Amendment Act in 2020 enhances IRAS’ ability to swiftly identify criminal property and seize instrumentalities of crime to prevent asset dissipation. The 2024 Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act amendments increase cross-government data sharing, enabling STRO to develop richer financial intelligence and improve asset tracing. These amendments also allow courts to order the pre-confiscation sale of seized or restrained properties under consent from interested parties, or in situations of likely depreciation of property value or high maintenance costs. In 2025, Singapore also took part as a pilot country in INTERPOL’s ‘Silver Notice’ programme, which seeks to facilitate international co-operation for asset tracing and recovery. Considering the cross-border nature of most threats, the review of systemic obstacles in cross-border asset recovery has helped Singapore in identifying weaknesses and take corrective actions on a timely basis. The prioritisation of returning confiscated property to victims is reinforced by enhancements to the victim compensation regime under section 359 of the CPC implemented in 2024, allowing victim participation in compensation proceedings and requiring judicial explanation when compensation is not granted. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 497. Strong institutional frameworks for co-operation in asset recovery are in place, such as RTIG, ISTRA/AC3N, and ACIP (Box 8.1). Singapore also maintains a well-resourced and trained operational capacity for pursuing asset recovery at the agency level. Dedicated units have clear organisational responsibility and tools for ML investigations and asset recovery. This includes FIG within the CAD, whose staff count has more than doubled since the 2016 MER. Within FIG is the Asset Confiscation Branch, which focuses on unexplained wealth confiscation proceedings and undertakes Concealed Income Analysis (CIA, discussed below). The ASC is another strong feature to help Singapore address CEF. Other LEAs (like CNB and CPIB) also have dedicated and trained teams which target proceeds of crime for seizure and confiscation. Agencies send officers on secondment to other relevant agencies to foster greater operational level co-operation. Beyond these dedicated asset recovery teams, all Investigation Officers across LEAs are involved in asset recovery in the entire life cycle of investigations, guided by the WoG Guidelines on Asset Management and WoG Guidelines on Management of Cryptocurrencies. 498. IRAS and other competent authorities have mechanisms to co-operate in asset recovery in tax predicate offences. CAD has an SOP with IRAS to detect and investigate ML from tax offences, and a satellite office in IRAS with a seconded CAD officer to enhance the detection of tax-related ML activity for parallel ML investigations. STRO has also been cooperating with IRAS since December 2023 on cases involving foreign predicate ML cases with a suspected tax angle. Further, IRAS can refer to and receive information from relevant LEAs, including CAD, concerning suspected commission of serious non-tax offences, in accordance with the “Guidelines for LEAs and STRO to request for information from IRAS”. Box 8.1. Use of WoG approaches and PPPs for Asset Recovery In 2020, CAD uncovered a large network of over 3 000 Singapore incorporated shell companies – created by CSPs – linked to Business Email Compromise scams. A joint probe by CAD, MAS and relevant ACIP banks (within the framework of RTIG), led Singapore to blocking SGD 21 million (USD 15.5 million)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Singapore places high priority on asset recovery, supported by regular reviews of its regime. Strong agency structures and co-operation frameworks enable the use of government data, public-private partnerships, and international co-operation to facilitate broad and effective information exchange. Competent authorities have sufficient structures, resources, and specialised expertise for pursuing asset recovery. 8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 493. Singapore has demonstrated a high-level political commitment to asset recovery, which is integrated into national policy documents, such as the National Asset Recovery Strategy (NARS) and the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Money Laundering. NARS, which has received high-level political support, focuses on four operational pillars: detect, deprive, deliver and deter. Aside from confiscation, it also highlights the importance of tax recovery measures and voluntary restitution. Singapore has operationalised these frameworks into strategic objectives which prioritise the pursuit of criminal assets (including virtual assets) moved out of Singapore and the enforcement of a cross-border cash reporting regime (CBCRR). This is reflected in a Whole of Government (WoG) approach to asset recovery and agency-specific SOPs, ensuring that all relevant agencies prioritise and operationalise asset recovery in their work plans. 494. The prioritisation of asset recovery is also perceptible from various innovative measures Singapore has taken, such as Project POET (see IO.6) and PPP initiatives, particularly the co-location of private sector personnel at the ASC, and the ACIP CSIs (see Box 6.3). These initiatives allow LEAs to rapidly freeze and intercept illicit transfers while also leveraging on private sector’s resources. STRO’s upgrade to Wings X in 2022 has also led to more timely asset tracing through better data-integration. Finally, IRAS is making increasing use of tax clawbacks to recover assets through tax assessments, creating additional pathways for asset recovery when dealing with tax crimes. 495. Additionally, Singapore utilises bilateral agreements and multilateral channels to support its asset recovery efforts. For example, Singapore is an active member of ARIN-AP (it joined its Steering Committee in 2024), INTERPOL’s regional body (AseanPol) and dedicated taskforces (e.g. INTERPOL Global Rapid Intervention of Payments, I-GRIP) (see IO.2) 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 496. Singapore leverages on operational experience to regularly review its asset recovery regime. The GST Amendment Act in 2020 enhances IRAS’ ability to swiftly identify criminal property and seize instrumentalities of crime to prevent asset dissipation. The 2024 Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act amendments increase cross-government data sharing, enabling STRO to develop richer financial intelligence and improve asset tracing. These amendments also allow courts to order the pre-confiscation sale of seized or restrained properties under consent from interested parties, or in situations of likely depreciation of property value or high maintenance costs. In 2025, Singapore also took part as a pilot country in INTERPOL’s ‘Silver Notice’ programme, which seeks to facilitate international co-operation for asset tracing and recovery. Considering the cross-border nature of most threats, the review of systemic obstacles in cross-border asset recovery has helped Singapore in identifying weaknesses and take corrective actions on a timely basis. The prioritisation of returning confiscated property to victims is reinforced by enhancements to the victim compensation regime under section 359 of the CPC implemented in 2024, allowing victim participation in compensation proceedings and requiring judicial explanation when compensation is not granted. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and co-operation frameworks 497. Strong institutional frameworks for co-operation in asset recovery are in place, such as RTIG, ISTRA/AC3N, and ACIP (Box 8.1). Singapore also maintains a well-resourced and trained operational capacity for pursuing asset recovery at the agency level. Dedicated units have clear organisational responsibility and tools for ML investigations and asset recovery. This includes FIG within the CAD, whose staff count has more than doubled since the 2016 MER. Within FIG is the Asset Confiscation Branch, which focuses on unexplained wealth confiscation proceedings and undertakes Concealed Income Analysis (CIA, discussed below). The ASC is another strong feature to help Singapore address CEF. Other LEAs (like CNB and CPIB) also have dedicated and trained teams which target proceeds of crime for seizure and confiscation. Agencies send officers on secondment to other relevant agencies to foster greater operational level co-operation. Beyond these dedicated asset recovery teams, all Investigation Officers across LEAs are involved in asset recovery in the entire life cycle of investigations, guided by the WoG Guidelines on Asset Management and WoG Guidelines on Management of Cryptocurrencies. 498. IRAS and other competent authorities have mechanisms to co-operate in asset recovery in tax predicate offences. CAD has an SOP with IRAS to detect and investigate ML from tax offences, and a satellite office in IRAS with a seconded CAD officer to enhance the detection of tax-related ML activity for parallel ML investigations. STRO has also been cooperating with IRAS since December 2023 on cases involving foreign predicate ML cases with a suspected tax angle. Further, IRAS can refer to and receive information from relevant LEAs, including CAD, concerning suspected commission of serious non-tax offences, in accordance with the “Guidelines for LEAs and STRO to request for information from IRAS”. Box 8.1. Use of WoG approaches and PPPs for Asset Recovery In 2020, CAD uncovered a large network of over 3 000 Singapore incorporated shell companies – created by CSPs – linked to Business Email Compromise scams. A joint probe by CAD, MAS and relevant ACIP banks (within the framework of RTIG), led Singapore to blocking SGD 21 million (USD 15.5 million)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 543. Terrorist financing is criminalised under Singapore’s Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2002 (TSOFA) which also provides for asset confiscation. 544. As noted in IO.1, Singaporean agencies and private sector representatives demonstrated a reasonably sound understanding of TF risk that aligned with the findings of the TF NRAs. Overall, Singapore’s NRAs conclude that the TF risk in Singapore is medium-low. Singapore’s key TF threats are primarily related to regional terrorist organisations, and radicalised individuals supporting terrorist activities in jurisdictions distant from Singapore, including: a) terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda (AQ), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI); b) potential spillovers from the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and tensions in the Middle East; and c) radicalised individuals who are sympathetic towards the cause of these terrorist groups, particularly ISIS. 545. Singapore’s identified vulnerabilities reflect its status as an IFC and its geographical proximity to countries with active terrorist organisations. Given the predominant typology of assets raised in Singapore and send abroad or assets transiting Singapore, banks, PSPs with international remittance and DPTSPs pose the greatest risk for exploitation. 546. From their investigations, case studies and other data, Singapore has identified the main typology for TF in their jurisdiction involves provision of financial support to overseas terrorist groups or causes, or affiliated persons, by self-radicalised individuals or terrorist sympathisers based in Singapore. The typology is unsophisticated; the sums involved are small and sourced from individuals’ own legitimate salaries or savings which are generally transferred via licensed money remittance services. 547. In both its 2020 and 2024 TF NRAs, Singapore noted its status as a transit hub as relevant to its TF risk and context: “our status as an international financial, business, and transport hub, coupled with robust connectivity, a substantial number of transient visitors, and geographical proximity to countries harbouring active terrorist groups, heightens our vulnerability to TF threats.” Notably, the majority of respondents to Singapore’s TF risk perception survey (totalling 41 jurisdictions) [37] did not observe a TF nexus with Singapore as a transit hub. Nevertheless, this remains an important aspect of Singapore’s context. The TF risk perception survey contributed to Singapore’s 2024 TF NRA which identifies Singapore-based individuals utilising their legitimate salaries to fund overseas terrorist groups as one of Singapore’s primary sources of TF risk. 548. The identification and investigation of TF is carried out by three agencies (ISD, CFTB and STRO) which co-ordinate closely and cooperatively, using guidelines and SOPs which clearly delineate their respective roles and responsibilities. 549. The Internal Security Department (ISD) is Singapore’s domestic security and intelligence agency and Singapore’s lead agency for investigating terrorism cases. All terrorism investigations consider TF, and all officers in ISD’s Counter-Terrorism (CT) Division are simultaneously involved in TF-related work, which includes identification of TF leads. ISD has sufficient resources. ISD has dedicated liaison officers located in countries with a regional TF nexus, supporting the exchange of information with foreign counterparts, and participates in various multilateral CFT and CT forums involving regional intelligence and security agencies. As well as all ISD officers incorporating a TF component into terrorism investigation, ISD has a dedicated team of officers in the TF investigation section of the CT Division. These officers focus on the identification of credible TF leads through preliminary financial examinations in parallel with their counter-terrorism investigations, including liaising with both domestic and foreign partners on potential TF leads. They use a broad array of information and techniques to identify potential TF including the use of Singapore’s information/databases, technical investigation techniques and intelligence information. Upon detection of any potential TF elements, ISD refers information to CAD/CFTB for deeper parallel TF investigations. Referrals from ISD account for approximately 60% of TF investigations for CFTB. 550. The Counter-Financing of Terrorism Branch (CFTB) is a dedicated branch within SPF/CAD with the core responsibility for conducting TF investigations, following disseminations of financial intelligence from STRO and referrals from ISD through their investigation of Terrorism matters. CFTB serves as Singapore’s lead CFT investigation and enforcement agency. CFTB is sufficiently resourced to investigate Singapore’s TF threats with officers who are experienced in conducting complex financial investigations. This includes the use of a variety of techniques to identify and investigate TF including the use of financial intelligence, the use of domestic law enforcement tools and undertaking international co-operation. As SPF officers, CFTB officers may exercise powers under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 to order the production of any document or thing for TF investigations. Through POET, a digital interface between local LEAs and banks, CFTB is able to expeditiously (within 24 hours) access and retrieve banking and financial information for TF investigations. CFTB officers engage with AGC early in TF investigations to obtain guidance in relation to admissible evidence gathering and exploration of leads to achieve positive conviction rates. 551. STRO has a dedicated team of analysts reviewing and analysing potential TF STRs and enhancing financial information with other sources of information to produce TF-related financial intelligence bundles. STRO prioritises TF-related bundles and promptly disseminates financial intelligence bundles to both CFTB and ISD upon detection of suspicious TF-related transactions. This dual dissemination enables triangulation of analyses and collaboration between all three agencies as to the course of investigation. STRO makes available automatic dissemination and self-screening to both ISD and CFTB ensuring that they have prompt access to financial information. During 2020-2024, STRO received 1 034 T/TF STRs (1% of total STRs). STRO has not kept statistics for the entire assessment period so it is unclear how many financial intelligence bundles have been disseminated during this entire time period (see IO.6) but, from 2023-24 statistics STRO disseminated 35 financial intelligence packages to CFTB and ISD. Of these 35 packages, four were used to initiate investigations while ten (10) supported ongoing investigations. 48 of the 126 TF investigations in Singapore 2020-2024 were the result of financial intelligence, showing Singapore’s dedication to using financial intelligence to combat TF. This demonstrates a good use of financial intelligence to initiate and support investigations. Table 9.1. Terrorist Financing Investigation Initiators Initiator 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Generated from a domestic terrorism investigation 6 13 11 10 10 50 Financial intelligence 10 5 9 10 14 48 Foreign referral (via ISD) 5 10 1 3 3 22 Foreign referral (via CAD) 4 0 0 0 2 6 Total 25 28 21 23 29 126 Box 9.1. T/TF STR-initiated TF investigation into donations to Al-Qaeda-linked fundraiser In 2021, STRO concurrently referred T/TF financial intelligence to CFTB and ISD on a Singaporean, Person H, for making two payment transfers to Person I of Country A, for TF and terrorism investigations respectively. CFTB provided information on Person H and the monetary transfers to Country A’s FIU and relevant law enforcement authorities through STRO; and concurrently requested for their assistance to provide all available information on Person I. Country A’s FIU provided adverse information which helped to confirm Person I as an Al-Qaeda-linked fund raiser, who was arrested in Country A in 2020 for attempting to aid Al-Qaeda. Based on the actionable financial intelligence from STRO, CFTB conducted a deeper parallel TF investigation to assess if there was a prima facie offence made out under TSOFA. Concurrently, ISD conducted a parallel terrorism investigation, supported by various sources of information such as confidential sources and social media analysis to assess if Person H posed a security threat. CFTB also interviewed Person H, who confirmed that she had sent the two payments to Person I as a form of charity relief. Person H claimed to be unaware of Person I’s background or if she had harboured any undesirable ideologies. In line with the extensive nature of TF investigations by CFTB, further checks were conducted on Person H, which revealed that she had also donated to various other Muslim charities not known to be linked to terrorist entities. CFTB did not recommend tendering any TF charges against Person H upon the conclusion of its TF investigations and ISD’s terrorism investigations, as there was no information or conclusive court-admissible evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Person H knew or reasonably believed of Person I’s involvement with Al-Qaeda. Person H continues to be closely monitored by the security agencies. The information provided by STRO also enriched ISD’s database intelligence on a third person, Person J (father of Person H’s who was already under monitoring by ISD), and Person I. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 552. Singapore initiated 126 TF investigations on 213 natural and legal persons during the reporting period and, at the time of the onsite, had 26 active TF investigations (see table 9.3). While this number may seem high compared to Singapore’s assessed risk profile, it reflects a proactive and comprehensive approach to national security. Given the seriousness of TF offences and Singapore’s commitment to investigating all intelligence that could relate to TF, this level of activity demonstrates a strong and reasonable stance in safeguarding against potential threats 553. In terms of the role of the TF financier, investigations opened in Singapore since 2020 show that the subject has been the financier for a variety of terrorist organisations. Case studies outlined that the role of the TF financier had been identified along with identification of terrorist financiers in terrorism offences. TF investigations are in line with the risks identified by Singapore in their NRA. 554. Whilst Singapore has identified existing and emerging vulnerabilities, has taken steps to screen potential use of legal persons for TF and has also sought an international perspective and feedback on their exposure to TF exploitation, there is little evidence that Singapore has undertaken proactive investigation to identify organised TF and concealed income. There is also very limited identification and investigation into funds transiting Singapore, for example through across banks and DPTSPs, which pose a medium high risk in the 2024 TF risk assessment. Table 9.2. Breakdown of TF Investigations by TF Fund Flow Type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total No. of TF Investigations 25 28 21 23 29 Type 1 : Global TF funds transiting through Singapore for global terrorism activities 0 0 0 0 1 Type 2 : Global TF Funds supporting domestic terrorism activities 0 1 0 0 2 Type 3 : Domestic TF funds supporting global terrorism activities (possible links to UNSC-designated entities/individuals) 16 (4) 23 (11) 6 (1) 4 (1) 10 (2) Type 4 : Domestic TF funds supporting domestic terrorism activities 0 0 0 0 0 Type 5 : Cases involving fund flows through licensed intermediary money remittances disbursing funds to beneficiary institutions (e.g., FIs) in foreign jurisdictions 3 1 4 10 9 Type 6 : No funds flow observed 6 3 11 9 7 555. Overall, Singaporean authorities are adept at identifying and investigating TF in line with their understanding of risks. TF investigations are systematically opened when there is a terrorism investigation, financial intelligence and other investigative tools are leveraged, and international information is used appropriately. Singapore’s three responsible agencies are able to share intelligence, evidence and information and have the specialised skills to undertake complex financial analysis and investigation. However, there are opportunities to enhance financial investigations to broaden the scope for potential identification of organisational terrorist financing and concealed income. Footnotes [37] Other key high TF risk jurisdictions are defined as non-FATF members in Singapore’s immediate Southeast Asian region with active terrorists and terrorist groups." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 543. Terrorist financing is criminalised under Singapore’s Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act 2002 (TSOFA) which also provides for asset confiscation. 544. As noted in IO.1, Singaporean agencies and private sector representatives demonstrated a reasonably sound understanding of TF risk that aligned with the findings of the TF NRAs. Overall, Singapore’s NRAs conclude that the TF risk in Singapore is medium-low. Singapore’s key TF threats are primarily related to regional terrorist organisations, and radicalised individuals supporting terrorist activities in jurisdictions distant from Singapore, including: a) terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda (AQ), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI); b) potential spillovers from the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and tensions in the Middle East; and c) radicalised individuals who are sympathetic towards the cause of these terrorist groups, particularly ISIS. 545. Singapore’s identified vulnerabilities reflect its status as an IFC and its geographical proximity to countries with active terrorist organisations. Given the predominant typology of assets raised in Singapore and send abroad or assets transiting Singapore, banks, PSPs with international remittance and DPTSPs pose the greatest risk for exploitation. 546. From their investigations, case studies and other data, Singapore has identified the main typology for TF in their jurisdiction involves provision of financial support to overseas terrorist groups or causes, or affiliated persons, by self-radicalised individuals or terrorist sympathisers based in Singapore. The typology is unsophisticated; the sums involved are small and sourced from individuals’ own legitimate salaries or savings which are generally transferred via licensed money remittance services. 547. In both its 2020 and 2024 TF NRAs, Singapore noted its status as a transit hub as relevant to its TF risk and context: “our status as an international financial, business, and transport hub, coupled with robust connectivity, a substantial number of transient visitors, and geographical proximity to countries harbouring active terrorist groups, heightens our vulnerability to TF threats.” Notably, the majority of respondents to Singapore’s TF risk perception survey (totalling 41 jurisdictions) [37] did not observe a TF nexus with Singapore as a transit hub. Nevertheless, this remains an important aspect of Singapore’s context. The TF risk perception survey contributed to Singapore’s 2024 TF NRA which identifies Singapore-based individuals utilising their legitimate salaries to fund overseas terrorist groups as one of Singapore’s primary sources of TF risk. 548. The identification and investigation of TF is carried out by three agencies (ISD, CFTB and STRO) which co-ordinate closely and cooperatively, using guidelines and SOPs which clearly delineate their respective roles and responsibilities. 549. The Internal Security Department (ISD) is Singapore’s domestic security and intelligence agency and Singapore’s lead agency for investigating terrorism cases. All terrorism investigations consider TF, and all officers in ISD’s Counter-Terrorism (CT) Division are simultaneously involved in TF-related work, which includes identification of TF leads. ISD has sufficient resources. ISD has dedicated liaison officers located in countries with a regional TF nexus, supporting the exchange of information with foreign counterparts, and participates in various multilateral CFT and CT forums involving regional intelligence and security agencies. As well as all ISD officers incorporating a TF component into terrorism investigation, ISD has a dedicated team of officers in the TF investigation section of the CT Division. These officers focus on the identification of credible TF leads through preliminary financial examinations in parallel with their counter-terrorism investigations, including liaising with both domestic and foreign partners on potential TF leads. They use a broad array of information and techniques to identify potential TF including the use of Singapore’s information/databases, technical investigation techniques and intelligence information. Upon detection of any potential TF elements, ISD refers information to CAD/CFTB for deeper parallel TF investigations. Referrals from ISD account for approximately 60% of TF investigations for CFTB. 550. The Counter-Financing of Terrorism Branch (CFTB) is a dedicated branch within SPF/CAD with the core responsibility for conducting TF investigations, following disseminations of financial intelligence from STRO and referrals from ISD through their investigation of Terrorism matters. CFTB serves as Singapore’s lead CFT investigation and enforcement agency. CFTB is sufficiently resourced to investigate Singapore’s TF threats with officers who are experienced in conducting complex financial investigations. This includes the use of a variety of techniques to identify and investigate TF including the use of financial intelligence, the use of domestic law enforcement tools and undertaking international co-operation. As SPF officers, CFTB officers may exercise powers under the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 to order the production of any document or thing for TF investigations. Through POET, a digital interface between local LEAs and banks, CFTB is able to expeditiously (within 24 hours) access and retrieve banking and financial information for TF investigations. CFTB officers engage with AGC early in TF investigations to obtain guidance in relation to admissible evidence gathering and exploration of leads to achieve positive conviction rates. 551. STRO has a dedicated team of analysts reviewing and analysing potential TF STRs and enhancing financial information with other sources of information to produce TF-related financial intelligence bundles. STRO prioritises TF-related bundles and promptly disseminates financial intelligence bundles to both CFTB and ISD upon detection of suspicious TF-related transactions. This dual dissemination enables triangulation of analyses and collaboration between all three agencies as to the course of investigation. STRO makes available automatic dissemination and self-screening to both ISD and CFTB ensuring that they have prompt access to financial information. During 2020-2024, STRO received 1 034 T/TF STRs (1% of total STRs). STRO has not kept statistics for the entire assessment period so it is unclear how many financial intelligence bundles have been disseminated during this entire time period (see IO.6) but, from 2023-24 statistics STRO disseminated 35 financial intelligence packages to CFTB and ISD. Of these 35 packages, four were used to initiate investigations while ten (10) supported ongoing investigations. 48 of the 126 TF investigations in Singapore 2020-2024 were the result of financial intelligence, showing Singapore’s dedication to using financial intelligence to combat TF. This demonstrates a good use of financial intelligence to initiate and support investigations. Table 9.1. Terrorist Financing Investigation Initiators Initiator 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Generated from a domestic terrorism investigation 6 13 11 10 10 50 Financial intelligence 10 5 9 10 14 48 Foreign referral (via ISD) 5 10 1 3 3 22 Foreign referral (via CAD) 4 0 0 0 2 6 Total 25 28 21 23 29 126 Box 9.1. T/TF STR-initiated TF investigation into donations to Al-Qaeda-linked fundraiser In 2021, STRO concurrently referred T/TF financial intelligence to CFTB and ISD on a Singaporean, Person H, for making two payment transfers to Person I of Country A, for TF and terrorism investigations respectively. CFTB provided information on Person H and the monetary transfers to Country A’s FIU and relevant law enforcement authorities through STRO; and concurrently requested for their assistance to provide all available information on Person I. Country A’s FIU provided adverse information which helped to confirm Person I as an Al-Qaeda-linked fund raiser, who was arrested in Country A in 2020 for attempting to aid Al-Qaeda. Based on the actionable financial intelligence from STRO, CFTB conducted a deeper parallel TF investigation to assess if there was a prima facie offence made out under TSOFA. Concurrently, ISD conducted a parallel terrorism investigation, supported by various sources of information such as confidential sources and social media analysis to assess if Person H posed a security threat. CFTB also interviewed Person H, who confirmed that she had sent the two payments to Person I as a form of charity relief. Person H claimed to be unaware of Person I’s background or if she had harboured any undesirable ideologies. In line with the extensive nature of TF investigations by CFTB, further checks were conducted on Person H, which revealed that she had also donated to various other Muslim charities not known to be linked to terrorist entities. CFTB did not recommend tendering any TF charges against Person H upon the conclusion of its TF investigations and ISD’s terrorism investigations, as there was no information or conclusive court-admissible evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Person H knew or reasonably believed of Person I’s involvement with Al-Qaeda. Person H continues to be closely monitored by the security agencies. The information provided by STRO also enriched ISD’s database intelligence on a third person, Person J (father of Person H’s who was already under monitoring by ISD), and Person I. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 552. Singapore initiated 126 TF investigations on 213 natural and legal persons during the reporting period and, at the time of the onsite, had 26 active TF investigations (see table 9.3). While this number may seem high compared to Singapore’s assessed risk profile, it reflects a proactive and comprehensive approach to national security. Given the seriousness of TF offences and Singapore’s commitment to investigating all intelligence that could relate to TF, this level of activity demonstrates a strong and reasonable stance in safeguarding against potential threats 553. In terms of the role of the TF financier, investigations opened in Singapore since 2020 show that the subject has been the financier for a variety of terrorist organisations. Case studies outlined that the role of the TF financier had been identified along with identification of terrorist financiers in terrorism offences. TF investigations are in line with the risks identified by Singapore in their NRA. 554. Whilst Singapore has identified existing and emerging vulnerabilities, has taken steps to screen potential use of legal persons for TF and has also sought an international perspective and feedback on their exposure to TF exploitation, there is little evidence that Singapore has undertaken proactive investigation to identify organised TF and concealed income. There is also very limited identification and investigation into funds transiting Singapore, for example through across banks and DPTSPs, which pose a medium high risk in the 2024 TF risk assessment. Table 9.2. Breakdown of TF Investigations by TF Fund Flow Type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total No. of TF Investigations 25 28 21 23 29 Type 1 : Global TF funds transiting through Singapore for global terrorism activities 0 0 0 0 1 Type 2 : Global TF Funds supporting domestic terrorism activities 0 1 0 0 2 Type 3 : Domestic TF funds supporting global terrorism activities (possible links to UNSC-designated entities/individuals) 16 (4) 23 (11) 6 (1) 4 (1) 10 (2) Type 4 : Domestic TF funds supporting domestic terrorism activities 0 0 0 0 0 Type 5 : Cases involving fund flows through licensed intermediary money remittances disbursing funds to beneficiary institutions (e.g., FIs) in foreign jurisdictions 3 1 4 10 9 Type 6 : No funds flow observed 6 3 11 9 7 555. Overall, Singaporean authorities are adept at identifying and investigating TF in line with their understanding of risks. TF investigations are systematically opened when there is a terrorism investigation, financial intelligence and other investigative tools are leveraged, and international information is used appropriately. Singapore’s three responsible agencies are able to share intelligence, evidence and information and have the specialised skills to undertake complex financial analysis and investigation. However, there are opportunities to enhance financial investigations to broaden the scope for potential identification of organisational terrorist financing and concealed income. Footnotes [37] Other key high TF risk jurisdictions are defined as non-FATF members in Singapore’s immediate Southeast Asian region with active terrorists and terrorist groups." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. The IMC-TD is the competent authority responsible for proposing designations to the 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation, and for designations under UNSCR 1373. Singapore has made active use of terrorist designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373. All relevant agencies are included in the process of proposing designations and this domestic process is used effectively to address the domestic terrorism risk faced by Singapore. 576. Singapore did not submit any designation proposals to the relevant UN Committees or co-sponsor any designations. No requests for co-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 were made or received by Singapore in the period under review. This is in line with Singapore’s risk and context. 577. All UNSC 1267 designations are automatically included in the First Schedule of the TSOFA; however, to take into account the time difference between Singapore and New York, the law only takes effect in Singapore on the date immediately following the date of addition to the UN list. For domestic 1373 designations, the freezing obligation takes immediate effect after gazetting. 578. Singapore’s mission at the UN relays listings and changes to the MFA, and these are then transmitted to all agencies and sector supervisors. Singapore’s primary mechanism to disseminate information on changes to UNSC lists is via updating the MAS website (for publicly available information) and disseminating to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. Through checks during supervisory engagement, MAS has confirmed that all FIs and VASPs are subscribers to the relevant MAS website. Most DNFBP sectors had full subscription to the MAS website, but not all sector supervisors could confirm that the totality of sector their subscribed or used the MAS website. As such, for some sectors, dissemination beyond FIs and VASPs occurs through relevant sector supervisors email alerts to their sector, once they are notified of the designation. 579. MAS has a SOP in place that includes coverage for dissemination over the weekend and a 24-hour work pattern. However, challenges exist in disseminations to other sector supervisors and DNFBPs when the designation is on a Friday due to the time difference. Based on spot checks, there have been instances where Singapore has not disseminated updates on TF TFS without delay, i.e. within 24 hours. Some examples below: Figure 10.1. Some instances of delays in implementation for Listings/De-listings [38] Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 580. There are a few intermediaries between a designation from the UNSC and dissemination by Singaporean authorities to reporting entities within the DNFBP sectors created potential points of failure to communicate designations and have caused delays in transmission beyond 24 hours in some instances. Singapore did also provide examples of disseminations to FI and VASP sectors which took place within the 24 hours. 581. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 are initiated by the relevant IMC-TD agencies, and the proposal is then considered by the IMC-TD prior to the Minister for Home Affairs’ approval. Once the designation is made, REs are informed via a gazette on the public-facing Singapore Statutes Online website, and email advisories/alerts by MAS and supervisory authorities of DNFBPs within 24 hours. The IMC-TD SOP sets out mechanisms for identifying targets for designation that is based on the designation criteria set out in UNSCR 1373. Under this SOP foreign countries may make requests to Singapore for persons/entities to be designated under UNSCR 1373. Singapore makes good use of domestic sanction legislation under UNSCR 1373 with the system used robustly. To date, Singapore has not received any in-coming designation requests from other countries. 582. The designation process is used as a tool once a person is convicted of TF under TSOFA or detained under the ISA if they are assessed to pose an imminent terrorist threat. Any agency that is part of the IMC-TD will propose a 1373 designation with case facts and evidence of criteria being fulfilled. JOG (as secretariat) will circulate proposal to all agencies for input and the proposal will be authorised by MHA. Whilst this process takes two weeks from receipt of proposal from the originating agency, the person is in custody and to that extent their assets are not accessible by them. Security agencies monitor any movement in their assets during this period. As at September 2024, 46 individuals have been designated and subjected to targeted financial sanctions under the TSOFA pursuant to UNSCR 1373. [39] 583. ISD periodically reviews individuals for delisting based on their rehabilitation progress and threat of relapse into T/TF activities. Listed individuals who are rehabilitated and assessed to no longer pose a threat will be recommended to the Minister for Home Affairs (through the IMC-TD) for delisting. A list of persons will be disseminated to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on a confidential basis through which they would be subjected to continued supervision. 584. In the latest round of updates in September 2024, 20 individuals were delisted from the First Schedule of the TSOFA and placed on a list of persons disseminated to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on a confidential basis. Box 10.1. Freezing of assets to prevent their use for T/TF purposes Individual A, a licensed money changer working in Singapore, was arrested and detained under the ISA in May 2019. ISD was alerted to his activities by a foreign partner. Terrorism investigations conducted by ISD found that he was a follower of an overseas radical preacher, Individual B. Individual B was believed to be part of a militant group in his country and had ties with an internationally designated terror group. He was also identified to be the mastermind of a major terror attack in his country. Investigation established that Individual A had visited Individual B overseas on multiple occasions and donated funds to Individual B and his group. Individual A also harboured a desire to undertake armed conflict overseas. Upon the discovery of a possible TF element, ISD promptly referred the case to CFTB for deeper parallel TF investigations within three weeks of the commencement of its terrorism investigations. Through detailed deeper parallel TF investigations, CFTB was able to trace his funds and assets and determined that none of the funds/assets were linked to T/TF. Individual A was subsequently listed on the First Schedule of the TSOFA in May 2020 – assets and accounts amounting to SGD 1.9 million (as at end 2023) were frozen and he was prevented from making any further transactions to Individual B or in support of any terrorism-related causes. Footnotes [38] With respect to the delay in relaying the information to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs in February 2025, Singapore noted that this was due to several glitches, e.g. MAS officers did not receive UN alerts despite having subscribed to the UN mailing list, delay in dissemination of updates by the UN to MFA. [39] Approximately SGD 3.97.million (USD 2.9 million) worth of TF assets belonging to 16 individuals listed in the first schedule of the TSOFA, comprising different asset types, have been frozen. This figure represents funds that have been frozen across all time, earlier than 2019 and remain frozen." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="575. The IMC-TD is the competent authority responsible for proposing designations to the 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation, and for designations under UNSCR 1373. Singapore has made active use of terrorist designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373. All relevant agencies are included in the process of proposing designations and this domestic process is used effectively to address the domestic terrorism risk faced by Singapore. 576. Singapore did not submit any designation proposals to the relevant UN Committees or co-sponsor any designations. No requests for co-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 were made or received by Singapore in the period under review. This is in line with Singapore’s risk and context. 577. All UNSC 1267 designations are automatically included in the First Schedule of the TSOFA; however, to take into account the time difference between Singapore and New York, the law only takes effect in Singapore on the date immediately following the date of addition to the UN list. For domestic 1373 designations, the freezing obligation takes immediate effect after gazetting. 578. Singapore’s mission at the UN relays listings and changes to the MFA, and these are then transmitted to all agencies and sector supervisors. Singapore’s primary mechanism to disseminate information on changes to UNSC lists is via updating the MAS website (for publicly available information) and disseminating to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. Through checks during supervisory engagement, MAS has confirmed that all FIs and VASPs are subscribers to the relevant MAS website. Most DNFBP sectors had full subscription to the MAS website, but not all sector supervisors could confirm that the totality of sector their subscribed or used the MAS website. As such, for some sectors, dissemination beyond FIs and VASPs occurs through relevant sector supervisors email alerts to their sector, once they are notified of the designation. 579. MAS has a SOP in place that includes coverage for dissemination over the weekend and a 24-hour work pattern. However, challenges exist in disseminations to other sector supervisors and DNFBPs when the designation is on a Friday due to the time difference. Based on spot checks, there have been instances where Singapore has not disseminated updates on TF TFS without delay, i.e. within 24 hours. Some examples below: Figure 10.1. Some instances of delays in implementation for Listings/De-listings [38] Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 580. There are a few intermediaries between a designation from the UNSC and dissemination by Singaporean authorities to reporting entities within the DNFBP sectors created potential points of failure to communicate designations and have caused delays in transmission beyond 24 hours in some instances. Singapore did also provide examples of disseminations to FI and VASP sectors which took place within the 24 hours. 581. Designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 are initiated by the relevant IMC-TD agencies, and the proposal is then considered by the IMC-TD prior to the Minister for Home Affairs’ approval. Once the designation is made, REs are informed via a gazette on the public-facing Singapore Statutes Online website, and email advisories/alerts by MAS and supervisory authorities of DNFBPs within 24 hours. The IMC-TD SOP sets out mechanisms for identifying targets for designation that is based on the designation criteria set out in UNSCR 1373. Under this SOP foreign countries may make requests to Singapore for persons/entities to be designated under UNSCR 1373. Singapore makes good use of domestic sanction legislation under UNSCR 1373 with the system used robustly. To date, Singapore has not received any in-coming designation requests from other countries. 582. The designation process is used as a tool once a person is convicted of TF under TSOFA or detained under the ISA if they are assessed to pose an imminent terrorist threat. Any agency that is part of the IMC-TD will propose a 1373 designation with case facts and evidence of criteria being fulfilled. JOG (as secretariat) will circulate proposal to all agencies for input and the proposal will be authorised by MHA. Whilst this process takes two weeks from receipt of proposal from the originating agency, the person is in custody and to that extent their assets are not accessible by them. Security agencies monitor any movement in their assets during this period. As at September 2024, 46 individuals have been designated and subjected to targeted financial sanctions under the TSOFA pursuant to UNSCR 1373. [39] 583. ISD periodically reviews individuals for delisting based on their rehabilitation progress and threat of relapse into T/TF activities. Listed individuals who are rehabilitated and assessed to no longer pose a threat will be recommended to the Minister for Home Affairs (through the IMC-TD) for delisting. A list of persons will be disseminated to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on a confidential basis through which they would be subjected to continued supervision. 584. In the latest round of updates in September 2024, 20 individuals were delisted from the First Schedule of the TSOFA and placed on a list of persons disseminated to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs on a confidential basis. Box 10.1. Freezing of assets to prevent their use for T/TF purposes Individual A, a licensed money changer working in Singapore, was arrested and detained under the ISA in May 2019. ISD was alerted to his activities by a foreign partner. Terrorism investigations conducted by ISD found that he was a follower of an overseas radical preacher, Individual B. Individual B was believed to be part of a militant group in his country and had ties with an internationally designated terror group. He was also identified to be the mastermind of a major terror attack in his country. Investigation established that Individual A had visited Individual B overseas on multiple occasions and donated funds to Individual B and his group. Individual A also harboured a desire to undertake armed conflict overseas. Upon the discovery of a possible TF element, ISD promptly referred the case to CFTB for deeper parallel TF investigations within three weeks of the commencement of its terrorism investigations. Through detailed deeper parallel TF investigations, CFTB was able to trace his funds and assets and determined that none of the funds/assets were linked to T/TF. Individual A was subsequently listed on the First Schedule of the TSOFA in May 2020 – assets and accounts amounting to SGD 1.9 million (as at end 2023) were frozen and he was prevented from making any further transactions to Individual B or in support of any terrorism-related causes. Footnotes [38] With respect to the delay in relaying the information to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs in February 2025, Singapore noted that this was due to several glitches, e.g. MAS officers did not receive UN alerts despite having subscribed to the UN mailing list, delay in dissemination of updates by the UN to MFA. [39] Approximately SGD 3.97.million (USD 2.9 million) worth of TF assets belonging to 16 individuals listed in the first schedule of the TSOFA, comprising different asset types, have been frozen. This figure represents funds that have been frozen across all time, earlier than 2019 and remain frozen." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="628. Singapore’s legal framework for PF TFS has largely remained the same since the previous ME. Singapore uses the same approach to monitor and ensure that FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs comply with their obligations related to PF TFS as it does for TF TFS (see IO.10). Singapore has maintained the relevant Regulations (applicable to FIs, DNFBPs, VASPs and all other persons) relating to the DPRK. While outside the reporting period for the ME, Singapore imposed a complete ban on trade with the DPRK in 2017. This trade ban (which goes beyond the DPRK UNSCRs) covers trade with the DPRK, any person in the DPRK and any DPRK national. The DPRK trade ban has lessened Singapore’s FIs’, VASPs’ and DNFBPs’ exposure to the DPRK but Singapore remains as having a relatively high level of PF risk. 629. In 2024, Singapore published a PF NRA with an associated CPF Strategy. Singapore has a number of contextual factors and attributes which make it one of the jurisdictions most vulnerable to PF: its geographical position, and its status as an IFC, and a hub for trade, transport, maritime and virtual assets. 11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 630. The AML/CFT SC is the main co-operation and co-ordination body for the development and implementation of AML/CFT/CPF policy in Singapore, alongside their subsidiary committees, IAC and RTIG. Specifically for PF, these committees work closely with the IMC-EC, the key policy and operational co-ordination mechanism for the implementation of the UNSCRs pertaining to PF. The IMC-EC, through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations in New York, is also Singapore's focal point for sanctions-related engagements with the UNSC, including the relevant UNSC Panels of Experts. 631. The AML/CFT SC is the principal CPF policy lead, with the IMC-EC responsible for Singapore's export controls framework. The IMC-EC is chaired by the MFA and comprises the AGC, CAD, MPA, MINDEF, MHA, MinLaw, MTI, MAS and Singapore Customs. The IMC-EC has met annually to plan and discuss key strategic issues for the year ahead, and in practice, also meets more regularly on an ad hoc basis to discuss specific issues (including policy issues and cases); for instance, it had 21 ad hoc meetings in 2024 and 12 in the first half of 2025. 632. CPF policy issues are discussed through the same mechanisms as AML and CFT policy issues, and robust co-operation and co-ordination methods are one of Singapore's key strengths (see IO.1). For CPF, Singapore has co-ordinated well in relation to the 2024 PF NRA with respect to emerging sanctions risks and in the development of its CPF Strategy. The RTIG has discussed PF once per year, on average, particularly in relation to the misuse of legal persons and virtual assets, which have been identified as key PF threats in Singapore's PF NRA. PF has also been discussed at the ACIP and identified as one of three priority areas under COSMIC which facilitates private-to-private information sharing among six major commercial banks in Singapore. COSMIC enables these FIs to securely share information on customers that exhibit multiple red flags which may indicate possible PF concerns. Singapore has explained that it had limited changes in its CPF policies relating to the DPRK during the reporting period as it has given largely compliant effect to TFS in relevant UNSCRs through its domestic legislation and has imposed the DPRK trade ban in 2017. In 2021, key policy decisions were taken to cover PF under COSMIC, and for sector supervisors to explicitly require FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs to conduct PF risk assessments and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures (despite these already being covered by existing AML requirements). The mechanisms described above have shown an ability to convene quickly and co-ordinate as needed to discuss PF issues and develop and implement policy as needed. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 633. The IMC-EC and AC3N are the key CPF co-ordination bodies for operational purposes. The IMC-EC co-ordinates interagency follow-ups (including enforcement action by law enforcement) when Singapore receives information or intelligence from foreign counterparts relating to the proliferation of WMD and its associated financing. When the IMC-EC comes across information that relates to CPF policy issues and PF risks, it can refer the information to the IAC or RTIG respectively. 634. Over the reporting period, the IMC-EC has met on a number of occasions to discuss proliferation and PF issues. The AC3N may also deal with non-export control PF cases surfaced by AC3N agencies, and it (or its predecessor, ISTRA) has considered PF cases throughout the reporting period. SGD 33.4 million (USD 24.7 million) of assets (to-date) have been frozen in Singapore, with SGD 22.3 million (USD 16.2million) in the reporting period (see Box 11.2), demonstrating operational co-ordination among MAS, Customs, LEAs and relevant authorities when needed. 635. As evidenced by Table 11.3, Singapore authorities have increasingly prioritised regular engagements with private sector stakeholders to enhance their awareness and compliance, including non-reporting entities such as those from the maritime sector. MPA and MAS have only recently begun engaging representation offices of foreign flag States in Singapore to raise their awareness of and compliance with their obligations. 636. Overall, as with AML/CFT, co-operation and co-ordination for operational and policy issues related to PF in Singapore is a strength." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="628. Singapore’s legal framework for PF TFS has largely remained the same since the previous ME. Singapore uses the same approach to monitor and ensure that FIs, DNFBPs, and VASPs comply with their obligations related to PF TFS as it does for TF TFS (see IO.10). Singapore has maintained the relevant Regulations (applicable to FIs, DNFBPs, VASPs and all other persons) relating to the DPRK. While outside the reporting period for the ME, Singapore imposed a complete ban on trade with the DPRK in 2017. This trade ban (which goes beyond the DPRK UNSCRs) covers trade with the DPRK, any person in the DPRK and any DPRK national. The DPRK trade ban has lessened Singapore’s FIs’, VASPs’ and DNFBPs’ exposure to the DPRK but Singapore remains as having a relatively high level of PF risk. 629. In 2024, Singapore published a PF NRA with an associated CPF Strategy. Singapore has a number of contextual factors and attributes which make it one of the jurisdictions most vulnerable to PF: its geographical position, and its status as an IFC, and a hub for trade, transport, maritime and virtual assets. 11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 630. The AML/CFT SC is the main co-operation and co-ordination body for the development and implementation of AML/CFT/CPF policy in Singapore, alongside their subsidiary committees, IAC and RTIG. Specifically for PF, these committees work closely with the IMC-EC, the key policy and operational co-ordination mechanism for the implementation of the UNSCRs pertaining to PF. The IMC-EC, through the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations in New York, is also Singapore's focal point for sanctions-related engagements with the UNSC, including the relevant UNSC Panels of Experts. 631. The AML/CFT SC is the principal CPF policy lead, with the IMC-EC responsible for Singapore's export controls framework. The IMC-EC is chaired by the MFA and comprises the AGC, CAD, MPA, MINDEF, MHA, MinLaw, MTI, MAS and Singapore Customs. The IMC-EC has met annually to plan and discuss key strategic issues for the year ahead, and in practice, also meets more regularly on an ad hoc basis to discuss specific issues (including policy issues and cases); for instance, it had 21 ad hoc meetings in 2024 and 12 in the first half of 2025. 632. CPF policy issues are discussed through the same mechanisms as AML and CFT policy issues, and robust co-operation and co-ordination methods are one of Singapore's key strengths (see IO.1). For CPF, Singapore has co-ordinated well in relation to the 2024 PF NRA with respect to emerging sanctions risks and in the development of its CPF Strategy. The RTIG has discussed PF once per year, on average, particularly in relation to the misuse of legal persons and virtual assets, which have been identified as key PF threats in Singapore's PF NRA. PF has also been discussed at the ACIP and identified as one of three priority areas under COSMIC which facilitates private-to-private information sharing among six major commercial banks in Singapore. COSMIC enables these FIs to securely share information on customers that exhibit multiple red flags which may indicate possible PF concerns. Singapore has explained that it had limited changes in its CPF policies relating to the DPRK during the reporting period as it has given largely compliant effect to TFS in relevant UNSCRs through its domestic legislation and has imposed the DPRK trade ban in 2017. In 2021, key policy decisions were taken to cover PF under COSMIC, and for sector supervisors to explicitly require FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs to conduct PF risk assessments and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures (despite these already being covered by existing AML requirements). The mechanisms described above have shown an ability to convene quickly and co-ordinate as needed to discuss PF issues and develop and implement policy as needed. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 633. The IMC-EC and AC3N are the key CPF co-ordination bodies for operational purposes. The IMC-EC co-ordinates interagency follow-ups (including enforcement action by law enforcement) when Singapore receives information or intelligence from foreign counterparts relating to the proliferation of WMD and its associated financing. When the IMC-EC comes across information that relates to CPF policy issues and PF risks, it can refer the information to the IAC or RTIG respectively. 634. Over the reporting period, the IMC-EC has met on a number of occasions to discuss proliferation and PF issues. The AC3N may also deal with non-export control PF cases surfaced by AC3N agencies, and it (or its predecessor, ISTRA) has considered PF cases throughout the reporting period. SGD 33.4 million (USD 24.7 million) of assets (to-date) have been frozen in Singapore, with SGD 22.3 million (USD 16.2million) in the reporting period (see Box 11.2), demonstrating operational co-ordination among MAS, Customs, LEAs and relevant authorities when needed. 635. As evidenced by Table 11.3, Singapore authorities have increasingly prioritised regular engagements with private sector stakeholders to enhance their awareness and compliance, including non-reporting entities such as those from the maritime sector. MPA and MAS have only recently begun engaging representation offices of foreign flag States in Singapore to raise their awareness of and compliance with their obligations. 636. Overall, as with AML/CFT, co-operation and co-ordination for operational and policy issues related to PF in Singapore is a strength." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 118. Singapore demonstrates strong political commitment, as well as strong co-ordination and governance mechanisms to co-ordinate policy and activities to address what it identifies as the highest ML/TF risks, found through its dynamic approach. These policies and mechanisms are overseen by the AML/CFT SC, which is chaired by PS of the MHA, PS of the MOF and Managing Director of the MAS. 119. In 2024, Singapore released national-level AML/CFT strategy documents (the Strategies) together with the respective NRAs. As the NRAs are aggregations of the risks assessed through the dynamic approach, the Strategies set out the key high-level prongs of the mitigation measures that have been implemented. Singapore tracks progress against the mitigation measures (including those highlighted in the Strategies) through the RTIG and AML/CFT SC/IAC mechanism. The National AML Strategy highlights a three pillar, three building block approach to prevent, detect and enforce ML (see Box 1.1). Box 1.1. Singapore’s National AML Strategy Singapore published the National AML Strategy on 30 October 2024 to set out its ongoing approach to addressing ML risks. Singapore’s National AML Strategy, which expands upon Singapore’s 2016 National Policy Statement on ML/TF, comprises three key pillars: · Prevent – to deter proceeds of crime from entering Singapore’s system and prevent the misuse of Singapore’s system by criminals; · Detect – to identify illicit flows and activities and ensure timely and effective mitigation, disruption and enforcement actions; and · Enforce – to take firm and dissuasive actions against persons who abuse Singapore’s system for ML. These three pillars are in turn supported by three inter-dependent building blocks of (i) Whole-of-Society Co-ordination and Collaboration; (ii) Legal and Regulatory Framework; and (iii) International Co-operation, which form the foundation of Singapore’s AML framework. 120. The National AML Strategy sets out non-specific actions for Singapore that were in train or have been implemented to address risks that were identified in the dynamic approach. More than half of the actions begin with the term ‘continue’ and are non-specific, i.e., “continue to leverage on international co-operation and provide timely and quality assistance to actively tackle ML activities” or “continue to enhance effectiveness of risk-based supervision”, and do not draw specific linkages to the risk findings in the NRA. 121. The National CFT Strategy also highlights a three pillar, five prong approach, as summarised in Box 1.2: Box 1.2. Singapore’s National Strategy for CFT Singapore refreshed its National Strategy for CFT, alongside a refresh of Singapore’s TF NRA on 1 July 2024, to underpin Singapore’s national approach towards addressing its TF risks. Like the National AML Strategy, the National Strategy for CFT comprises three thrusts: · Prevent : Proactively deter prospective terrorists, terrorist organisations, and sympathisers from exploiting Singapore’s open economy for TF activities; · Detect : Promptly identify and trace TF activities through robust monitoring and tracking of red flag indicators, especially in high-risk sectors, and emerging TF typologies of concern; and · Disrupt : Take strong and resolute actions against terrorists, terrorist organisations, and sympathisers seeking to raise, move and use funds for terrorism activities, both locally and abroad. Singapore achieves these objectives through its five-pronged National Strategy for CFT: · Co-ordinated and Comprehensive Risk Identification; · Strong Legal and Sanctions Framework; · Robust Regulatory Regime and Risk Targeted Supervisory Framework; · Decisive Law Enforcement Actions; and · International Partnerships and Co-operation. 122. As with the National AML Strategy, the National CTF Strategy demonstrates a general strategy already in action through initiatives that were undertaken since the last publication of the National CFT Strategy in 2022. It also sets out forward looking non-specific actions for Singapore that, largely, they were already undertaking prior to the development of the strategy. 123. The Strategies do not illustrate any direct connection between the mitigation measures that are put into place and the relative level of risks in Singapore. The dynamic approach considers mitigation measures when individual risks arise, and there can be better consideration of the entire risk landscape or environment in Singapore. The holistic risk picture and landscape and/or future risks may not be adequately identified or mitigated, unless raised by a relevant agency. Singapore applies a very high level of resources, expertise and mitigation measures against fraud (particularly CEF), as compared to other higher threats (e.g. corruption, tax ML, etc.). Singapore explained the differences was due to the pervasive and fast-evolving nature of fraud and exponentially growing cases, whereas other threats, though considered high risk, have more stable typologies and are addressed through targeted measures. 124. There is no consolidated document that maps out the measures for different threats under the prevent, detect and enforce pillars to set out the timelines, agency responsibilities, specific deliverables. Singapore relies on regular discussions at RTIG, IAC and SC for deciding actions for responsible agencies and/or specific deliverables to mitigate the ML/TF risks identified. Based on the high-level principles in the Strategies, individual agencies develop risk mitigation measures and action plans which are discussed and approved by RTIG, IAC and SC. Agencies report to the RTIG, IAC and SC on progress of actions they are taking to address risk, but there is no centralised reporting timescale. 125. Although national policies and activities in Singapore are not systematically driven by identified ML/TF risks at all times, there is no indication of Singapore having an inadequate response to one of its highest ML/TF risks, CEF. Competent authorities demonstrated strong alignment and commitment to achieving collective AML/CFT objectives and Singapore has implemented very strong national policies and activities. To mitigate the very high level of risk of ML from CEF, Singapore is taking an innovative, WoG approach (see Box 1.3). Box 1.3. Singapore’s monitoring and mitigation of risks related to CEF In response to the surge in CEF cases, Singapore set up the IMC-Scams in April 2020. Chaired by the Minister for Digital Development and Information and the Minister of State for Home Affairs, the IMC-Scams comprises a range of agencies including MHA, SPF, and regulatory agencies of the financial and the telecommunication sectors. The IMC-Scams meets regularly to discuss the latest scam trends and typologies, as well as strategies to combat CEF and associated ML activities. Through this channel, Singapore released its anti-scams strategy, which aims to: (i) prevent and block syndicates from abusing its telecommunications infrastructure, financial systems and online spaces to target scam victims; (ii) facilitate the reporting and detection of scams; (iii) take enforcement action against scammers and ML enablers; and (iv) recover scam proceeds. Singapore combats online scams through strong legislation, industry collaboration, and real-time enforcement. The 2023 Online Criminal Harms Act empowers authorities to block criminal content and requires scam mitigation measures, such as user verification. MAS and IMDA work with banks and telecommunication companies to deploy tools like “Kill Switch”, which allows banking customers to suspend their accounts quickly if compromised, “Money Lock”, which allows bank customers to set aside an amount in their bank accounts which cannot be transferred out digitally, and scam call blocking. The 2025 Protection from Scams Act further empowers LEAs by allowing them to issue Restriction Orders (i.e. limiting legitimate use of a person’s bank account when he/she is suspected of being a scam victim). Reporting has improved through ScamShield mobile application, which allows the public to report suspected scam calls and messages, and a 24/7 anti-scam hotline. Agencies also consolidated advisories on the latest scam trends, steps to take if someone has been scammed, and preventive measures to avoid being scammed into a ScamShield website. Enhanced fraud detection systems help reporting entities identify suspicious transactions using insights from SPF. Amendments to CDSA and the Computer Misuse Act 1993 in 2023 expanded authorities’ toolkit for dealing with ML suspects who wilfully claim ignorance and to criminalise actions of scammers who abuse SingPass to perpetrate scams and other crimes introduced offences against those aiding ML and recommended stiffer sentences. In August 2024, the Sentencing Advisory Panel also recommended harsher imprisonment sentences for those who hand over control of their payment accounts or SingPass credentials to scammers to facilitate ML from scams. To recover stolen funds, SPF’s Anti-Scam Centre and Project Frontier swiftly freeze compromised accounts. In the first half of 2024, over 10 300 bank accounts and mobile lines were blocked, recovering SGD 54 million (USD 39.9 million). 126. The focus on ML from fraud, particularly CEF (see IO.7) is partly aligned with Singapore’s context and risk environment and shows the strength of the dynamic approach. CEF is a fast-moving crime where methods and money movements are changing week-to-week. The iterative nature of the dynamic approach has led to a full suite of policies, legislative amendments and activities (as outlined in Box 1.3 above) to combat CEF that were built over time as the risk was changing and becoming more prominent. However, while significant focus is given to CEF, these policies and activities have not yet shown full effectiveness, with scam losses from CEF in Singapore rising dramatically over the reporting period. The measures Singapore has implemented will logically mitigate fraud, particularly CEF and ML risks. As reported at the onsite visit, the 2025 scam loss figures appear to have stabilised from 2024 for the first time in the reporting period after an exponential rise. It is expected that efficacy of these measures will increase with time. 127. Singapore has an established, comprehensive framework for the implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities administered through the AML/CFT SC that is supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework uses the dynamic approach to risk understanding and mitigation. This dynamic approach is strong in that it can very quickly react to emerging and/or changing risks, but policies and activities appeared to be implemented on a risk-specific basis without a systematic and regularly updated overview of risk landscape or future forward planning. Connection between the high risk areas identified through the NRAs and the strategy documents can be improved." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 118. Singapore demonstrates strong political commitment, as well as strong co-ordination and governance mechanisms to co-ordinate policy and activities to address what it identifies as the highest ML/TF risks, found through its dynamic approach. These policies and mechanisms are overseen by the AML/CFT SC, which is chaired by PS of the MHA, PS of the MOF and Managing Director of the MAS. 119. In 2024, Singapore released national-level AML/CFT strategy documents (the Strategies) together with the respective NRAs. As the NRAs are aggregations of the risks assessed through the dynamic approach, the Strategies set out the key high-level prongs of the mitigation measures that have been implemented. Singapore tracks progress against the mitigation measures (including those highlighted in the Strategies) through the RTIG and AML/CFT SC/IAC mechanism. The National AML Strategy highlights a three pillar, three building block approach to prevent, detect and enforce ML (see Box 1.1). Box 1.1. Singapore’s National AML Strategy Singapore published the National AML Strategy on 30 October 2024 to set out its ongoing approach to addressing ML risks. Singapore’s National AML Strategy, which expands upon Singapore’s 2016 National Policy Statement on ML/TF, comprises three key pillars: · Prevent – to deter proceeds of crime from entering Singapore’s system and prevent the misuse of Singapore’s system by criminals; · Detect – to identify illicit flows and activities and ensure timely and effective mitigation, disruption and enforcement actions; and · Enforce – to take firm and dissuasive actions against persons who abuse Singapore’s system for ML. These three pillars are in turn supported by three inter-dependent building blocks of (i) Whole-of-Society Co-ordination and Collaboration; (ii) Legal and Regulatory Framework; and (iii) International Co-operation, which form the foundation of Singapore’s AML framework. 120. The National AML Strategy sets out non-specific actions for Singapore that were in train or have been implemented to address risks that were identified in the dynamic approach. More than half of the actions begin with the term ‘continue’ and are non-specific, i.e., “continue to leverage on international co-operation and provide timely and quality assistance to actively tackle ML activities” or “continue to enhance effectiveness of risk-based supervision”, and do not draw specific linkages to the risk findings in the NRA. 121. The National CFT Strategy also highlights a three pillar, five prong approach, as summarised in Box 1.2: Box 1.2. Singapore’s National Strategy for CFT Singapore refreshed its National Strategy for CFT, alongside a refresh of Singapore’s TF NRA on 1 July 2024, to underpin Singapore’s national approach towards addressing its TF risks. Like the National AML Strategy, the National Strategy for CFT comprises three thrusts: · Prevent : Proactively deter prospective terrorists, terrorist organisations, and sympathisers from exploiting Singapore’s open economy for TF activities; · Detect : Promptly identify and trace TF activities through robust monitoring and tracking of red flag indicators, especially in high-risk sectors, and emerging TF typologies of concern; and · Disrupt : Take strong and resolute actions against terrorists, terrorist organisations, and sympathisers seeking to raise, move and use funds for terrorism activities, both locally and abroad. Singapore achieves these objectives through its five-pronged National Strategy for CFT: · Co-ordinated and Comprehensive Risk Identification; · Strong Legal and Sanctions Framework; · Robust Regulatory Regime and Risk Targeted Supervisory Framework; · Decisive Law Enforcement Actions; and · International Partnerships and Co-operation. 122. As with the National AML Strategy, the National CTF Strategy demonstrates a general strategy already in action through initiatives that were undertaken since the last publication of the National CFT Strategy in 2022. It also sets out forward looking non-specific actions for Singapore that, largely, they were already undertaking prior to the development of the strategy. 123. The Strategies do not illustrate any direct connection between the mitigation measures that are put into place and the relative level of risks in Singapore. The dynamic approach considers mitigation measures when individual risks arise, and there can be better consideration of the entire risk landscape or environment in Singapore. The holistic risk picture and landscape and/or future risks may not be adequately identified or mitigated, unless raised by a relevant agency. Singapore applies a very high level of resources, expertise and mitigation measures against fraud (particularly CEF), as compared to other higher threats (e.g. corruption, tax ML, etc.). Singapore explained the differences was due to the pervasive and fast-evolving nature of fraud and exponentially growing cases, whereas other threats, though considered high risk, have more stable typologies and are addressed through targeted measures. 124. There is no consolidated document that maps out the measures for different threats under the prevent, detect and enforce pillars to set out the timelines, agency responsibilities, specific deliverables. Singapore relies on regular discussions at RTIG, IAC and SC for deciding actions for responsible agencies and/or specific deliverables to mitigate the ML/TF risks identified. Based on the high-level principles in the Strategies, individual agencies develop risk mitigation measures and action plans which are discussed and approved by RTIG, IAC and SC. Agencies report to the RTIG, IAC and SC on progress of actions they are taking to address risk, but there is no centralised reporting timescale. 125. Although national policies and activities in Singapore are not systematically driven by identified ML/TF risks at all times, there is no indication of Singapore having an inadequate response to one of its highest ML/TF risks, CEF. Competent authorities demonstrated strong alignment and commitment to achieving collective AML/CFT objectives and Singapore has implemented very strong national policies and activities. To mitigate the very high level of risk of ML from CEF, Singapore is taking an innovative, WoG approach (see Box 1.3). Box 1.3. Singapore’s monitoring and mitigation of risks related to CEF In response to the surge in CEF cases, Singapore set up the IMC-Scams in April 2020. Chaired by the Minister for Digital Development and Information and the Minister of State for Home Affairs, the IMC-Scams comprises a range of agencies including MHA, SPF, and regulatory agencies of the financial and the telecommunication sectors. The IMC-Scams meets regularly to discuss the latest scam trends and typologies, as well as strategies to combat CEF and associated ML activities. Through this channel, Singapore released its anti-scams strategy, which aims to: (i) prevent and block syndicates from abusing its telecommunications infrastructure, financial systems and online spaces to target scam victims; (ii) facilitate the reporting and detection of scams; (iii) take enforcement action against scammers and ML enablers; and (iv) recover scam proceeds. Singapore combats online scams through strong legislation, industry collaboration, and real-time enforcement. The 2023 Online Criminal Harms Act empowers authorities to block criminal content and requires scam mitigation measures, such as user verification. MAS and IMDA work with banks and telecommunication companies to deploy tools like “Kill Switch”, which allows banking customers to suspend their accounts quickly if compromised, “Money Lock”, which allows bank customers to set aside an amount in their bank accounts which cannot be transferred out digitally, and scam call blocking. The 2025 Protection from Scams Act further empowers LEAs by allowing them to issue Restriction Orders (i.e. limiting legitimate use of a person’s bank account when he/she is suspected of being a scam victim). Reporting has improved through ScamShield mobile application, which allows the public to report suspected scam calls and messages, and a 24/7 anti-scam hotline. Agencies also consolidated advisories on the latest scam trends, steps to take if someone has been scammed, and preventive measures to avoid being scammed into a ScamShield website. Enhanced fraud detection systems help reporting entities identify suspicious transactions using insights from SPF. Amendments to CDSA and the Computer Misuse Act 1993 in 2023 expanded authorities’ toolkit for dealing with ML suspects who wilfully claim ignorance and to criminalise actions of scammers who abuse SingPass to perpetrate scams and other crimes introduced offences against those aiding ML and recommended stiffer sentences. In August 2024, the Sentencing Advisory Panel also recommended harsher imprisonment sentences for those who hand over control of their payment accounts or SingPass credentials to scammers to facilitate ML from scams. To recover stolen funds, SPF’s Anti-Scam Centre and Project Frontier swiftly freeze compromised accounts. In the first half of 2024, over 10 300 bank accounts and mobile lines were blocked, recovering SGD 54 million (USD 39.9 million). 126. The focus on ML from fraud, particularly CEF (see IO.7) is partly aligned with Singapore’s context and risk environment and shows the strength of the dynamic approach. CEF is a fast-moving crime where methods and money movements are changing week-to-week. The iterative nature of the dynamic approach has led to a full suite of policies, legislative amendments and activities (as outlined in Box 1.3 above) to combat CEF that were built over time as the risk was changing and becoming more prominent. However, while significant focus is given to CEF, these policies and activities have not yet shown full effectiveness, with scam losses from CEF in Singapore rising dramatically over the reporting period. The measures Singapore has implemented will logically mitigate fraud, particularly CEF and ML risks. As reported at the onsite visit, the 2025 scam loss figures appear to have stabilised from 2024 for the first time in the reporting period after an exponential rise. It is expected that efficacy of these measures will increase with time. 127. Singapore has an established, comprehensive framework for the implementation of AML/CFT policies and activities administered through the AML/CFT SC that is supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework uses the dynamic approach to risk understanding and mitigation. This dynamic approach is strong in that it can very quickly react to emerging and/or changing risks, but policies and activities appeared to be implemented on a risk-specific basis without a systematic and regularly updated overview of risk landscape or future forward planning. Connection between the high risk areas identified through the NRAs and the strategy documents can be improved." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="172. Singapore seeks international co-operation in a timely manner as well as to facilitate asset recovery. Authorities understand the value of international co-operation and proactively seek MLA to pursue ML and associated predicate offences with transnational elements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 173. Singapore uses MLA to some extent, having issued 234 MLA requests during the reporting period, averaging approximately 46 requests per year (Table 2.4). There was a notable increase in 2024 followed the implementation of SOPs that clarified when LEAs should initiate MLA requests. The overall number of requests remains modest when considered against the country’s risk and context and the high number of ML investigations (11 000), an even higher figure when accounting for all predicate offences. This is notable given Singapore’s cross-border risk exposure. While use of formal co-operation through MLA must be considered alongside the use of informal co-operation channels, Singapore could have made better use of MLA requests over the assessment period. 174. Requests are initiated by a range of competent authorities and are managed by the CA. The SPF-CAD accounts for 71% of requests. MLA requests are primarily directed to key international partners, including Hong Kong, China, UAE, US, UK, and neighbouring countries. Fewer requests are sent to jurisdictions such as Cambodia, despite typologies and case studies indicating a clear fraud/ML nexus. Most MLA requests concern relatively straightforward matters, such as obtaining government records (39%) or the taking of witness statements or evidence (83%). MLA has been used for asset recovery purposes with 47% of requests relating to the restraint or enforcement of a confiscation order. 175. Of the total MLA requests, 47% have been executed by the requested states, while 42% remain pending and 12% have been withdrawn by Singapore. Notably, no requests have been refused. 67% of the pending requests were issued in 2023 and 2024 (see Table 2.4), suggesting a potential time lag in execution. Onsite interviews and statistics show that Singapore proactively follows up on outstanding requests, typically every two months, and provides clarifications to facilitate execution. This proactive approach reflects the generally high quality of Singapore’s MLA requests, a view supported by feedback from the Global Network. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA requests by Singapore (per type of offence and status) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Requests per predicate offence 50 53 32 32 67 234 ML 8 7 7 3 7 32 (14) TF 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) PF 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Corruption and bribery 1 4 0 1 2 8 (3) Counterfeiting 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Environmental crime 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Extortion 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Forgery 3 8 2 3 5 21 (9) Fraud 26 24 19 28 45 142 (61) Illicit trafficking in drugs 2 1 1 3 2 9 (4) Insider trading and manipulation 2 1 1 0 0 4 (2) Kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 2 0 1 1 5 (2) Organised criminal group/racketeering 0 1 0 0 0 1 (0 Robbery or theft 2 1 0 0 1 4 (2) Sexual exploitation 6 5 3 2 2 18 (8) Smuggling 0 1 0 0 1 2 (1) Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 2 3 (1) Status of requests Number of requests executed 32 33 17 13 13 108 (46) Number of requests declined 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Number of requests withdrawn by Singapore 5 10 6 2 5 28 (12) Number of requests pending 13 10 9 17 49 98 (42) Note: a single MLA request may involve multiple types of assistance, which explains that the total of request per predicate offence does not match the number of requests received 176. Requests are aligned with risks to some extent and some higher risk areas are insufficiently pursued. Most formal requests are directed toward combating CEF, which represents 61% of total requests and has shown steady annual growth demonstrating Singapore’s focus on its highest risk predicate crime. Only 14% of formal requests relate to ML, despite Singapore’s significant international risk profile. When considering the overall number of ML investigations, fewer than 1% result in authorities sending MLA requests. MLAs are used less frequently in other areas identified by Singapore as being of higher risk, including drug trafficking, corruption, organized criminal groups, and tax crimes. No request was made concerning TF, which is considered appropriate given Singapore’s risk and context. While Singapore indicates this can be attributed to LEAs primarily relying on informal co-operation (exemplified in Box 2.4), quantitative information does not fully support this, and there is scope for to improve alignment of both formal and informal channels with risks. 2.2.2. Extradition 177. Almost all extradition requests (103) sent by Singapore use the simplified process with Malaysia and Brunei (Table 2.5). As for incoming extradition requests from these countries, this expedited process is done between LEAs without involvement of the CA. Separate from this, Singapore only sent six extradition requests. One example was provided of Singapore working with the requested state to execute an urgent request in the absence of an extradition treaty, which suggests that co-operation in this area can be timely and appropriate, even in the absence of an extradition treaty (see R.37). Where required, Singapore also uses other informal mechanisms (e.g. INTERPOL’s red and blue notices) to support its extradition requests. 178. No extradition requests were made for CEF or ML related to CEF. As discussed in IO.7, there are some legal challenges to doing so, but this is a missed opportunity given the volume of cases, foreign perpetrators and the dissuasive effect of targeting Singaporeans that would be brought by doing so. 179. A relatively high number of extradition requests (including ‘expedited’ requests to Malaysia/Brunei) are declined, withdrawn or pending, with some pending requests dating as far back to 2022. Singapore notes that requests were declined by jurisdictions due to reasons such as offences being time-barred in local laws, fugitives having left the jurisdiction, or insufficient information provided in the request. For expedited requests to Malaysia/Brunei, cancellations were mainly due to arrests in Singapore, the subject’s death, or the case no longer being pursued. Pending requests remain due to subjects being untraceable, having left the jurisdiction, or being imprisoned. Where cases are pending, Singapore continues to engage with the relevant jurisdictions to secure arrests and extraditions. These reasons are considered reasonable. Table 2.5. Outgoing extradition requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) No of requests sent (excluding Brunei/Malysia) 2 0 2 1 1 6 (100) Executed 0 0 1 0 0 1 (17) Declined 1 0 1 0 1 3 (50) Pending 1 0 0 1 0 2 (33) Withdrawn by Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 Requests to Brunei/Malaysia 4 14 28 23 34 103 (100) Executed 4 13 19 10 20 66 (65) Pending or withdrawn 0 1 9 13 14 37 (35) 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 180. While SOPs and NARS encourage LEAs to pursue international co-operation for asset recovery in serious cases through both formal and informal channels, more could be done to utilise formal international co-operation to secure better outcomes. 181. As a standard practice, all MLA requests include basic and BO information, which facilitates asset tracing. Forty-seven per cent of all outgoing MLA requests (110) concern the restraint of assets, enforcement of foreign confiscation orders, or request for assistance to seize any proceeds traced to the fraudulent transaction for the purpose of returning the sums to the victim. Singapore pursued the seizure, restraint and/or confiscation of SGD 144 million (USD 107 million) (including 3 properties) and secured the return of SGD 52 million (USD 38.5 million). Close to 60% of MLAs were executed by the requested country, but most (51%) were executed without any assets found for seizure/confiscation and repatriation (e.g. in situations where assets dissipated in the foreign country). Thirty-seven per cent of cases remain pending, including from the early 2020’s, which shows limitations in securing international co-operation (See Table 2.6). As stated in IO.8, Singapore does not seek to enforce its foreign confiscation orders abroad, which hampers final confiscation/repatriation of assets to Singapore. Table 2.6. MLA requests (asset recovery [22] ) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) # MLAs 24 18 17 12 39 110 Assets sought for recovery (millions) SGD 10.7m + 2 properties SGD 23.2m + 1 property SGD 32.8m SGD 89.3m -- SGD 144.5m + 3 properties Total Executed 17 12 12 7 17 65 (60%) # Executed &amp; assets (1) 1 (2 properties) 1 (1 property) 1 ($0.3m) 0 5 (SGD 51.3m) 8(7%) (SGD 51.6m + 3 properties) Executed without assets recovered 16 11 11 7 12 57(51%) Withdrawn by Singapore 1 1 1 0 1 4 Declined 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pending execution by requested jurisdiction 6 5 4 5 21 41 (37%) Note: (1) this includes amounts that are frozen, seized, confiscated and repatriated where applicable. 182. Eighty-nine per cent of these outgoing MLA requests relate to fraud, while 11% concern ML. This distribution is in line with Singapore’s risk and context to some extent and reflects its focus on addressing the growing threat of CEF. It is a missed opportunity not to have sought MLA for recovering assets related to any offence outside of fraud and ML, including the numerous offences designated as higher risk by Singapore. Box 2.2. Seeking International Co-operation Request for assistance to restrain a real estate property acquired using proceeds of crime Between 2014 and 2018, employees of a Singaporean oil refinery, including the accused, misappropriated gasoil via unauthorised transfers to complicit vessels. The accused was convicted on 40 charges (under different provisions) and was sentenced on 2 August 2024, with over USD 800 000 in assets forfeited and funds returned to the refinery owner. Investigations revealed the accused had purchased a property (registered to him and his wife) in a Pacific State using the criminal proceeds. To prevent asset dissipation, Singapore obtained a restraint order under S16, CDSA and sent an MLA requests in August 2021 to have the order registered (acted upon by the Pacific State in December 2021). In January 2025, following a plea bargain, the restraint order in Singapore was lifted to allow the property’s sale, with proceeds returned to the victim. Singapore also asked the Pacific State to lift the restraint order accordingly. Extradition on basis of reciprocity A remisier at a FI in Singapore misappropriated over SGD 13 million (USD 9.6 million) from 15 victims over two years, using forged trading records and false entries to deceive them. The funds were used for personal expenses. The fugitive fled Singapore in January 2022 before police reports were filed. A warrant of arrest and INTERPOL Red Notice were issued, and with the help of multiple jurisdictions, she was located and arrested in a European State. Despite no formal extradition treaty, the European State accepted Singapore’s assurance that it will use its best efforts to comply with a future request by the European State for the return of a suspect involving a similar criminal offence and circumstances, subject to the laws of Singapore. The fugitive initially expressed intent to surrender but later sought asylum, which was denied. The person was extradited in July 2023 and the prosecution is ongoing. Footnotes [22] See Table 8.6, IO.8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="172. Singapore seeks international co-operation in a timely manner as well as to facilitate asset recovery. Authorities understand the value of international co-operation and proactively seek MLA to pursue ML and associated predicate offences with transnational elements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 173. Singapore uses MLA to some extent, having issued 234 MLA requests during the reporting period, averaging approximately 46 requests per year (Table 2.4). There was a notable increase in 2024 followed the implementation of SOPs that clarified when LEAs should initiate MLA requests. The overall number of requests remains modest when considered against the country’s risk and context and the high number of ML investigations (11 000), an even higher figure when accounting for all predicate offences. This is notable given Singapore’s cross-border risk exposure. While use of formal co-operation through MLA must be considered alongside the use of informal co-operation channels, Singapore could have made better use of MLA requests over the assessment period. 174. Requests are initiated by a range of competent authorities and are managed by the CA. The SPF-CAD accounts for 71% of requests. MLA requests are primarily directed to key international partners, including Hong Kong, China, UAE, US, UK, and neighbouring countries. Fewer requests are sent to jurisdictions such as Cambodia, despite typologies and case studies indicating a clear fraud/ML nexus. Most MLA requests concern relatively straightforward matters, such as obtaining government records (39%) or the taking of witness statements or evidence (83%). MLA has been used for asset recovery purposes with 47% of requests relating to the restraint or enforcement of a confiscation order. 175. Of the total MLA requests, 47% have been executed by the requested states, while 42% remain pending and 12% have been withdrawn by Singapore. Notably, no requests have been refused. 67% of the pending requests were issued in 2023 and 2024 (see Table 2.4), suggesting a potential time lag in execution. Onsite interviews and statistics show that Singapore proactively follows up on outstanding requests, typically every two months, and provides clarifications to facilitate execution. This proactive approach reflects the generally high quality of Singapore’s MLA requests, a view supported by feedback from the Global Network. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA requests by Singapore (per type of offence and status) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Requests per predicate offence 50 53 32 32 67 234 ML 8 7 7 3 7 32 (14) TF 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) PF 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Corruption and bribery 1 4 0 1 2 8 (3) Counterfeiting 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Environmental crime 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Extortion 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Forgery 3 8 2 3 5 21 (9) Fraud 26 24 19 28 45 142 (61) Illicit trafficking in drugs 2 1 1 3 2 9 (4) Insider trading and manipulation 2 1 1 0 0 4 (2) Kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 2 0 1 1 5 (2) Organised criminal group/racketeering 0 1 0 0 0 1 (0 Robbery or theft 2 1 0 0 1 4 (2) Sexual exploitation 6 5 3 2 2 18 (8) Smuggling 0 1 0 0 1 2 (1) Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 2 3 (1) Status of requests Number of requests executed 32 33 17 13 13 108 (46) Number of requests declined 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) Number of requests withdrawn by Singapore 5 10 6 2 5 28 (12) Number of requests pending 13 10 9 17 49 98 (42) Note: a single MLA request may involve multiple types of assistance, which explains that the total of request per predicate offence does not match the number of requests received 176. Requests are aligned with risks to some extent and some higher risk areas are insufficiently pursued. Most formal requests are directed toward combating CEF, which represents 61% of total requests and has shown steady annual growth demonstrating Singapore’s focus on its highest risk predicate crime. Only 14% of formal requests relate to ML, despite Singapore’s significant international risk profile. When considering the overall number of ML investigations, fewer than 1% result in authorities sending MLA requests. MLAs are used less frequently in other areas identified by Singapore as being of higher risk, including drug trafficking, corruption, organized criminal groups, and tax crimes. No request was made concerning TF, which is considered appropriate given Singapore’s risk and context. While Singapore indicates this can be attributed to LEAs primarily relying on informal co-operation (exemplified in Box 2.4), quantitative information does not fully support this, and there is scope for to improve alignment of both formal and informal channels with risks. 2.2.2. Extradition 177. Almost all extradition requests (103) sent by Singapore use the simplified process with Malaysia and Brunei (Table 2.5). As for incoming extradition requests from these countries, this expedited process is done between LEAs without involvement of the CA. Separate from this, Singapore only sent six extradition requests. One example was provided of Singapore working with the requested state to execute an urgent request in the absence of an extradition treaty, which suggests that co-operation in this area can be timely and appropriate, even in the absence of an extradition treaty (see R.37). Where required, Singapore also uses other informal mechanisms (e.g. INTERPOL’s red and blue notices) to support its extradition requests. 178. No extradition requests were made for CEF or ML related to CEF. As discussed in IO.7, there are some legal challenges to doing so, but this is a missed opportunity given the volume of cases, foreign perpetrators and the dissuasive effect of targeting Singaporeans that would be brought by doing so. 179. A relatively high number of extradition requests (including ‘expedited’ requests to Malaysia/Brunei) are declined, withdrawn or pending, with some pending requests dating as far back to 2022. Singapore notes that requests were declined by jurisdictions due to reasons such as offences being time-barred in local laws, fugitives having left the jurisdiction, or insufficient information provided in the request. For expedited requests to Malaysia/Brunei, cancellations were mainly due to arrests in Singapore, the subject’s death, or the case no longer being pursued. Pending requests remain due to subjects being untraceable, having left the jurisdiction, or being imprisoned. Where cases are pending, Singapore continues to engage with the relevant jurisdictions to secure arrests and extraditions. These reasons are considered reasonable. Table 2.5. Outgoing extradition requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) No of requests sent (excluding Brunei/Malysia) 2 0 2 1 1 6 (100) Executed 0 0 1 0 0 1 (17) Declined 1 0 1 0 1 3 (50) Pending 1 0 0 1 0 2 (33) Withdrawn by Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 Requests to Brunei/Malaysia 4 14 28 23 34 103 (100) Executed 4 13 19 10 20 66 (65) Pending or withdrawn 0 1 9 13 14 37 (35) 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 180. While SOPs and NARS encourage LEAs to pursue international co-operation for asset recovery in serious cases through both formal and informal channels, more could be done to utilise formal international co-operation to secure better outcomes. 181. As a standard practice, all MLA requests include basic and BO information, which facilitates asset tracing. Forty-seven per cent of all outgoing MLA requests (110) concern the restraint of assets, enforcement of foreign confiscation orders, or request for assistance to seize any proceeds traced to the fraudulent transaction for the purpose of returning the sums to the victim. Singapore pursued the seizure, restraint and/or confiscation of SGD 144 million (USD 107 million) (including 3 properties) and secured the return of SGD 52 million (USD 38.5 million). Close to 60% of MLAs were executed by the requested country, but most (51%) were executed without any assets found for seizure/confiscation and repatriation (e.g. in situations where assets dissipated in the foreign country). Thirty-seven per cent of cases remain pending, including from the early 2020’s, which shows limitations in securing international co-operation (See Table 2.6). As stated in IO.8, Singapore does not seek to enforce its foreign confiscation orders abroad, which hampers final confiscation/repatriation of assets to Singapore. Table 2.6. MLA requests (asset recovery [22] ) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) # MLAs 24 18 17 12 39 110 Assets sought for recovery (millions) SGD 10.7m + 2 properties SGD 23.2m + 1 property SGD 32.8m SGD 89.3m -- SGD 144.5m + 3 properties Total Executed 17 12 12 7 17 65 (60%) # Executed &amp; assets (1) 1 (2 properties) 1 (1 property) 1 ($0.3m) 0 5 (SGD 51.3m) 8(7%) (SGD 51.6m + 3 properties) Executed without assets recovered 16 11 11 7 12 57(51%) Withdrawn by Singapore 1 1 1 0 1 4 Declined 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pending execution by requested jurisdiction 6 5 4 5 21 41 (37%) Note: (1) this includes amounts that are frozen, seized, confiscated and repatriated where applicable. 182. Eighty-nine per cent of these outgoing MLA requests relate to fraud, while 11% concern ML. This distribution is in line with Singapore’s risk and context to some extent and reflects its focus on addressing the growing threat of CEF. It is a missed opportunity not to have sought MLA for recovering assets related to any offence outside of fraud and ML, including the numerous offences designated as higher risk by Singapore. Box 2.2. Seeking International Co-operation Request for assistance to restrain a real estate property acquired using proceeds of crime Between 2014 and 2018, employees of a Singaporean oil refinery, including the accused, misappropriated gasoil via unauthorised transfers to complicit vessels. The accused was convicted on 40 charges (under different provisions) and was sentenced on 2 August 2024, with over USD 800 000 in assets forfeited and funds returned to the refinery owner. Investigations revealed the accused had purchased a property (registered to him and his wife) in a Pacific State using the criminal proceeds. To prevent asset dissipation, Singapore obtained a restraint order under S16, CDSA and sent an MLA requests in August 2021 to have the order registered (acted upon by the Pacific State in December 2021). In January 2025, following a plea bargain, the restraint order in Singapore was lifted to allow the property’s sale, with proceeds returned to the victim. Singapore also asked the Pacific State to lift the restraint order accordingly. Extradition on basis of reciprocity A remisier at a FI in Singapore misappropriated over SGD 13 million (USD 9.6 million) from 15 victims over two years, using forged trading records and false entries to deceive them. The funds were used for personal expenses. The fugitive fled Singapore in January 2022 before police reports were filed. A warrant of arrest and INTERPOL Red Notice were issued, and with the help of multiple jurisdictions, she was located and arrested in a European State. Despite no formal extradition treaty, the European State accepted Singapore’s assurance that it will use its best efforts to comply with a future request by the European State for the return of a suspect involving a similar criminal offence and circumstances, subject to the laws of Singapore. The fugitive initially expressed intent to surrender but later sought asylum, which was denied. The person was extradited in July 2023 and the prosecution is ongoing. Footnotes [22] See Table 8.6, IO.8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 217. MAS has a reasonably sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks as informed by the RTIG process (see IO.1) but their way of identifying, assessing and understanding of the residual ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs can be improved. 218. MAS’ country-level understanding has been developed through the dynamic approach of identifying risks using an iterative process as a major contributor to Singapore’s RTIG and various risk assessments. While MAS published a range of guidance, standalone sector risk assessment documents are not produced outside of the NRA. Based on the outcome of ML NRA, MAS categorised regulated financial sectors into four tiers in accordance with risks associated with each sector (See Table 5.3). MAS would also consider the TF and PF NRA’s findings and risk ratings to further calibrate its supervisory approach for the respective sectors. For example, as PSPs with CBMT were assessed to be of highest TF risk, MAS had subjected higher risk entities in this sector to a shorter supervisory baseline compared to other Tier 2 entities and had focused on more PSPs with CBMT as part of its TF thematic review. 219. MAS adopts a multi-layered and dynamic approach to identify and assess the ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs in Singapore, specifically through three components: (i) inherent risks assessment (FIRA), (ii) controls information, and (iii) risk surveillance insights. Their understanding of residual risks at institutional level is established through daily co-ordination between the AMLD and the nine prudential supervisory departments, with AMLD primarily accountable for inherent risk assessment (i.e. FIRA) and risk surveillance insights, and the nine supervisory departments and AMLD responsible for controls information. The process to bring this information together to drive work planning twice yearly is not thoroughly systematised and documented. 220. FIRA is a tool that measures inherent ML/TF risk through information provided by FIs/VASPs to AMLD through periodic questionnaires and other materials. FIRA focuses on six risk areas: (i) business risk, (ii) cross-border risk, (iii) tax risks, (iv) corruption risk, (v) TBML risk, (vi) TF/PF risk. These factors cover most but not all major risks identified in NRAs. While risks on fraud and organised crime are the most prominent threats identified in Singapore, they have not been assigned as any dedicated contributing factor in FIRA but are accounted for indirectly via indicators for other existing risk areas. FIRA’s methodology is periodically reviewed and updated, with the last major review having been completed in 2020. 221. The periodicity of FIRA questionnaires is driven by the sector risk rating from the NRA, with the highest risk sector (banks) being required to submit information annually while the lowest risk sectors being required to update information every four years. FIRA contributes to understand ML/TF risks of individual FIs and VASPs over time but only considers inherent risk. The FIRA process rates each FI and VASP as being a high risk, medium-high risk, medium-low risk or low risk. Table 3.1. Breakdown of FIs and VASPs under MAS supervision by Inherent ML/TF Risk Rating Sector NRA Risk Rating Sector High Medium-High Medium-Low Low Tier 1 Banks 19 (12%) 18 (11.4%) 32 (20.3%) 89 (56.3%) Tier 2 DPTSPs 7 (24%) 7 (24%) 15 (52%) 0 PSPs with CBMT services 13 (7%) 55(28%) 97 (48%) 34(17%) EAMs 6 (3.6%) 13 (7.7%) 33(19.6%) 116 (69%) Tier 3 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) 1 (0%) 3 (0%) 188 (20%) 752 (80%) Money changers 0 0 0 246 (100%) PSPs without CBMT services 0 0 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) Broker dealers 4 (3%) 7 (5%) 47 (33%) 85 (59%) Corporate finance advisers 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 36 (28%) 91 (70%) Tier 4 Approved Trustees 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 13 (76%) Direct life insurance companies 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 7 (27%) 17 (65%) Securities depository 0 0 0 1 (100%) Financial advisers 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 28 (20%) 111 (78%) Finance companies 0 0 0 3 (100%) 222. The FIRA results are, in most cases, aligned with NRA sector risk ratings. There is a misalignment of the FIRA results with the NRA sector ratings with regard to the DPTSP sector. MAS has decided to identify a higher proportion of high-risk entities in DPTSP sector and apply closer oversight for this sector, a medium-high risk sector, than it does for its high-risk sector (banks) as it considered DPTSPs to be less familiar with AML/CFT requirements and less risk-aware than more mature sectors (see also Table 3.2). MAS did not reflect this view in their risk assessment for the sector accordingly or update FIRA. This yields a logical result but demonstrates that MAS’ risk understanding for the sector is not consistent with its own FIRA risk model or with the actual changes in the risk environment, even when acknowledged by MAS. 223. Completely separately from the FIRA assessment, MAS, employs its second component whereby its nine prudential supervisory departments and AMLD carry out day-to-day controls-based supervision with a view to assessing the robustness of AML/CFT controls at the institutional level. MAS reported that AMLD, as the ‘control tower’ on AML/CFT matters, coordinates with the nine supervisory departments on day-to-day manner to assess, understand the residual risk at institutional level. However, this process for assessing residual institutional level risk is not thoroughly conducted in a systematised and documented manner(i.e., there is no residual risk scoring per institution). 224. MAS had been focusing more of its recent efforts on its risk surveillance programme, its third component, which identifies and monitors ML/TF/PF risks in MAS’ regulated sectors using data analytics and information/intelligence from both domestic and foreign sources. The data is analysed to identify networks of suspicious activity through network analysis as well as broader emerging risk themes and concerns identified through RTIG. Higher risk networks are identified, from which specific institutional risks or accounts are sifted out for further supervisory follow-up. Thematic risks identified are consolidated into reports which are disseminated to relevant supervisory departments within MAS helping them improve understanding of key risks and planning of supervisory activities. Higher risk thematic areas covered recently based on risk surveillance includes, for example, wealth management, SFOs, DPTSPs and VCC sectors. 225. MAS is also continually enhancing its surveillance capabilities. As an example, Singapore launched COSMIC (see Box 3.3) in 2024 with six participating FIs and the insights/data gained through COSMIC contributes to MAS’ risk surveillance capabilities. COSMIC identifies material networks of high-risk actors for further analysis and follow-up. The risk surveillance programme complements the FIRA and controls-based assessments, and MAS has a process to override the FIRA inherent risk ratings where these do not align with supervisors’ risk understanding from risk surveillance. However, this overriding process is implemented on an individual case-by-case basis and operated as a separate line of work. Further, risk information gained through risk surveillance does not join up with the controls information in a systematic manner. 226. Overall, MAS has a reasonably sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks. Their understanding of residual ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs is varied due to the lack of a systematised mechanism for consolidating risk information across its three risk assessment components. MAS already has all the appropriate risk assessment components but has not yet brought all of these together in a systematic manner to form a net residual risk understanding for individual FIs and VASPs. FIRA considers only inherent risks despite MAS having substantial information on controls implemented by FIs and VASPs. Insights from risk surveillance are not built into a residual risk calculation. These components can be combined in a more systematised manner to enhance MAS’ understanding of risk at institution-level. Further, there is a lack of proper documentation of the net residual risks on an institutional level, it is merely a perceived understanding across MAS from daily interaction. It is crucial for MAS to develop, agree and maintain a shared risk understanding which could be accessed, understood, and utilised to guide the planning of AML/CFT supervisory activities across AMLD and the nine supervisory departments. 227. MinLaw has a reasonable understanding of ML/TF risks affecting the country and relies on the NRA for their country-level and sector-level understanding. MinLaw develops an understanding of the risks facing moneylenders during examinations, surveys, quarterly returns, feedback from the Credit Association of Singapore and the moneylenders themselves. This risk assessment process is less developed than MAS’ efforts to understand t he risk facing their covered entities and has led to consequently, a less in-depth understanding of ML/TF risk on an individual moneylender basis. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 228. MAS’ work to ensure that FIs and VASPs understand their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations is a strength of Singapore’s system. MAS conducts four lines of activity to ensure that FIs and VASPs are informed: supervisory uplift, guidance papers to set supervisory expectations, partnerships with industry and industry engagement. 229. Supervisory Uplift : In 2022, MAS launched the supervisory uplift programme which comprises intensive bilateral engagement with Singapore’s domestic systematically important banks (DSIBs) and digital banks, making up 90% of market share of retail and small and medium enterprise banking in Singapore. The banks are required to develop multi-year roadmaps with measurable action plans for each bank to elevate its AML/CFT controls, to address the following key focus areas: governance, risk surveillance and execution of AML/CFT requirements. This programme has generated outcomes, including a significantly increased number of STRs and exited customers following the use of data analytics (270 STRs and 318 exits in Q2 2022, compared to 2 694 STRs and 2 676 exits in Q2 2024), and the detection of a customer potentially facilitating sanctions evasion. 230. Guidance Papers : MAS regularly issues guidance papers to raise risk awareness and assist FIs and VASPs in complying with their AML/CFT obligations. During the past five years, MAS has issued 58 guidance papers, nearly one per month. Case studies and best practices are often included in guidance papers, which serve as practical guidance for AML/CFT practitioners within the industry. Reporting entities are expected to benchmark themselves against the recommended practices and supervisory expectations set out in the guidance and conduct a gap analysis against their own controls, which MAS also reviews during interventions on the FIs. Reporting entities met while onsite appreciated the frequency and depth of guidance issued by MAS. 231. Partnerships : One of ACIP’s main tasks is to co-develop and promote a mutual understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations between Singapore’s competent authorities and Singapore’s private sector. This includes the development of best practices and information papers to recommend measures that FIs can take to identify, prevent and disrupt money laundering in priority areas, such as the misuse of legal persons for corruption/tax-ML and trade-based ML. ACIP Advisories were introduced in April 2019 to enable quick dissemination of risk information on significant cases and typologies observed by MAS, CAD, other government agencies or ACIP members to the industry. The advisories alert industry to new and/or emerging risks, including those relating to legal persons and complex structures, tax fraud, etc., so that industry (not only ACIP members) can take swift measures to mitigate these risk concerns (including the filing of more pertinent STRs to enrich our intelligence database). ACIP has issued four best practice papers and five advisories since 2020. Box 3.2. Singapore’s AML/CFT Industry Partnership (ACIP) ACIP, Singapore’s public-private partnership, was initially set up in 2017, is co-chaired by SPF/CAD and MAS and supported by a Steering Group comprising nine banks and the Association of Banks in Singapore. ACIP brings together stakeholders from industry and government to collectively identify, assess and mitigate key and emerging ML/TF risks facing Singapore, and promulgate best practices to strengthen industry AML/CFT controls. Through ACIP, Singapore’s competent authorities have been working with the private sector to raise industry ML/TF risk awareness and mitigate those risks. 232. Industry Engagements : During the last five years, MAS has held or participated in 73 industry engagements, including general engagements and industry-wide townhalls to reach out to obliged entities on their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. These engagement sessions have been positively received by the industry. 233. MinLaw has taken some measures to promote industry awareness, but these are less developed than the measures undertaken by MAS. These include an information guide, newsletters and quizzes to raise awareness of their ML/TF/PF risks, and dissemination of updates to FATF black/grey lists. Over the past five years, MinLaw has conducted ten outreach events to moneylenders, including industry engagement webinars, and has issued 21 guidance papers and eight circulars/documents, primarily concerning the outcomes of various national and thematic risk assessments, and guidance on source of wealth/source of funds checks, ongoing monitoring and STR filing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 217. MAS has a reasonably sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks as informed by the RTIG process (see IO.1) but their way of identifying, assessing and understanding of the residual ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs can be improved. 218. MAS’ country-level understanding has been developed through the dynamic approach of identifying risks using an iterative process as a major contributor to Singapore’s RTIG and various risk assessments. While MAS published a range of guidance, standalone sector risk assessment documents are not produced outside of the NRA. Based on the outcome of ML NRA, MAS categorised regulated financial sectors into four tiers in accordance with risks associated with each sector (See Table 5.3). MAS would also consider the TF and PF NRA’s findings and risk ratings to further calibrate its supervisory approach for the respective sectors. For example, as PSPs with CBMT were assessed to be of highest TF risk, MAS had subjected higher risk entities in this sector to a shorter supervisory baseline compared to other Tier 2 entities and had focused on more PSPs with CBMT as part of its TF thematic review. 219. MAS adopts a multi-layered and dynamic approach to identify and assess the ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs in Singapore, specifically through three components: (i) inherent risks assessment (FIRA), (ii) controls information, and (iii) risk surveillance insights. Their understanding of residual risks at institutional level is established through daily co-ordination between the AMLD and the nine prudential supervisory departments, with AMLD primarily accountable for inherent risk assessment (i.e. FIRA) and risk surveillance insights, and the nine supervisory departments and AMLD responsible for controls information. The process to bring this information together to drive work planning twice yearly is not thoroughly systematised and documented. 220. FIRA is a tool that measures inherent ML/TF risk through information provided by FIs/VASPs to AMLD through periodic questionnaires and other materials. FIRA focuses on six risk areas: (i) business risk, (ii) cross-border risk, (iii) tax risks, (iv) corruption risk, (v) TBML risk, (vi) TF/PF risk. These factors cover most but not all major risks identified in NRAs. While risks on fraud and organised crime are the most prominent threats identified in Singapore, they have not been assigned as any dedicated contributing factor in FIRA but are accounted for indirectly via indicators for other existing risk areas. FIRA’s methodology is periodically reviewed and updated, with the last major review having been completed in 2020. 221. The periodicity of FIRA questionnaires is driven by the sector risk rating from the NRA, with the highest risk sector (banks) being required to submit information annually while the lowest risk sectors being required to update information every four years. FIRA contributes to understand ML/TF risks of individual FIs and VASPs over time but only considers inherent risk. The FIRA process rates each FI and VASP as being a high risk, medium-high risk, medium-low risk or low risk. Table 3.1. Breakdown of FIs and VASPs under MAS supervision by Inherent ML/TF Risk Rating Sector NRA Risk Rating Sector High Medium-High Medium-Low Low Tier 1 Banks 19 (12%) 18 (11.4%) 32 (20.3%) 89 (56.3%) Tier 2 DPTSPs 7 (24%) 7 (24%) 15 (52%) 0 PSPs with CBMT services 13 (7%) 55(28%) 97 (48%) 34(17%) EAMs 6 (3.6%) 13 (7.7%) 33(19.6%) 116 (69%) Tier 3 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) 1 (0%) 3 (0%) 188 (20%) 752 (80%) Money changers 0 0 0 246 (100%) PSPs without CBMT services 0 0 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) Broker dealers 4 (3%) 7 (5%) 47 (33%) 85 (59%) Corporate finance advisers 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 36 (28%) 91 (70%) Tier 4 Approved Trustees 1 (6%) 0 (0%) 3 (18%) 13 (76%) Direct life insurance companies 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 7 (27%) 17 (65%) Securities depository 0 0 0 1 (100%) Financial advisers 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 28 (20%) 111 (78%) Finance companies 0 0 0 3 (100%) 222. The FIRA results are, in most cases, aligned with NRA sector risk ratings. There is a misalignment of the FIRA results with the NRA sector ratings with regard to the DPTSP sector. MAS has decided to identify a higher proportion of high-risk entities in DPTSP sector and apply closer oversight for this sector, a medium-high risk sector, than it does for its high-risk sector (banks) as it considered DPTSPs to be less familiar with AML/CFT requirements and less risk-aware than more mature sectors (see also Table 3.2). MAS did not reflect this view in their risk assessment for the sector accordingly or update FIRA. This yields a logical result but demonstrates that MAS’ risk understanding for the sector is not consistent with its own FIRA risk model or with the actual changes in the risk environment, even when acknowledged by MAS. 223. Completely separately from the FIRA assessment, MAS, employs its second component whereby its nine prudential supervisory departments and AMLD carry out day-to-day controls-based supervision with a view to assessing the robustness of AML/CFT controls at the institutional level. MAS reported that AMLD, as the ‘control tower’ on AML/CFT matters, coordinates with the nine supervisory departments on day-to-day manner to assess, understand the residual risk at institutional level. However, this process for assessing residual institutional level risk is not thoroughly conducted in a systematised and documented manner(i.e., there is no residual risk scoring per institution). 224. MAS had been focusing more of its recent efforts on its risk surveillance programme, its third component, which identifies and monitors ML/TF/PF risks in MAS’ regulated sectors using data analytics and information/intelligence from both domestic and foreign sources. The data is analysed to identify networks of suspicious activity through network analysis as well as broader emerging risk themes and concerns identified through RTIG. Higher risk networks are identified, from which specific institutional risks or accounts are sifted out for further supervisory follow-up. Thematic risks identified are consolidated into reports which are disseminated to relevant supervisory departments within MAS helping them improve understanding of key risks and planning of supervisory activities. Higher risk thematic areas covered recently based on risk surveillance includes, for example, wealth management, SFOs, DPTSPs and VCC sectors. 225. MAS is also continually enhancing its surveillance capabilities. As an example, Singapore launched COSMIC (see Box 3.3) in 2024 with six participating FIs and the insights/data gained through COSMIC contributes to MAS’ risk surveillance capabilities. COSMIC identifies material networks of high-risk actors for further analysis and follow-up. The risk surveillance programme complements the FIRA and controls-based assessments, and MAS has a process to override the FIRA inherent risk ratings where these do not align with supervisors’ risk understanding from risk surveillance. However, this overriding process is implemented on an individual case-by-case basis and operated as a separate line of work. Further, risk information gained through risk surveillance does not join up with the controls information in a systematic manner. 226. Overall, MAS has a reasonably sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks. Their understanding of residual ML/TF risk facing individual FIs and VASPs is varied due to the lack of a systematised mechanism for consolidating risk information across its three risk assessment components. MAS already has all the appropriate risk assessment components but has not yet brought all of these together in a systematic manner to form a net residual risk understanding for individual FIs and VASPs. FIRA considers only inherent risks despite MAS having substantial information on controls implemented by FIs and VASPs. Insights from risk surveillance are not built into a residual risk calculation. These components can be combined in a more systematised manner to enhance MAS’ understanding of risk at institution-level. Further, there is a lack of proper documentation of the net residual risks on an institutional level, it is merely a perceived understanding across MAS from daily interaction. It is crucial for MAS to develop, agree and maintain a shared risk understanding which could be accessed, understood, and utilised to guide the planning of AML/CFT supervisory activities across AMLD and the nine supervisory departments. 227. MinLaw has a reasonable understanding of ML/TF risks affecting the country and relies on the NRA for their country-level and sector-level understanding. MinLaw develops an understanding of the risks facing moneylenders during examinations, surveys, quarterly returns, feedback from the Credit Association of Singapore and the moneylenders themselves. This risk assessment process is less developed than MAS’ efforts to understand t he risk facing their covered entities and has led to consequently, a less in-depth understanding of ML/TF risk on an individual moneylender basis. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 228. MAS’ work to ensure that FIs and VASPs understand their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations is a strength of Singapore’s system. MAS conducts four lines of activity to ensure that FIs and VASPs are informed: supervisory uplift, guidance papers to set supervisory expectations, partnerships with industry and industry engagement. 229. Supervisory Uplift : In 2022, MAS launched the supervisory uplift programme which comprises intensive bilateral engagement with Singapore’s domestic systematically important banks (DSIBs) and digital banks, making up 90% of market share of retail and small and medium enterprise banking in Singapore. The banks are required to develop multi-year roadmaps with measurable action plans for each bank to elevate its AML/CFT controls, to address the following key focus areas: governance, risk surveillance and execution of AML/CFT requirements. This programme has generated outcomes, including a significantly increased number of STRs and exited customers following the use of data analytics (270 STRs and 318 exits in Q2 2022, compared to 2 694 STRs and 2 676 exits in Q2 2024), and the detection of a customer potentially facilitating sanctions evasion. 230. Guidance Papers : MAS regularly issues guidance papers to raise risk awareness and assist FIs and VASPs in complying with their AML/CFT obligations. During the past five years, MAS has issued 58 guidance papers, nearly one per month. Case studies and best practices are often included in guidance papers, which serve as practical guidance for AML/CFT practitioners within the industry. Reporting entities are expected to benchmark themselves against the recommended practices and supervisory expectations set out in the guidance and conduct a gap analysis against their own controls, which MAS also reviews during interventions on the FIs. Reporting entities met while onsite appreciated the frequency and depth of guidance issued by MAS. 231. Partnerships : One of ACIP’s main tasks is to co-develop and promote a mutual understanding of risks and AML/CFT obligations between Singapore’s competent authorities and Singapore’s private sector. This includes the development of best practices and information papers to recommend measures that FIs can take to identify, prevent and disrupt money laundering in priority areas, such as the misuse of legal persons for corruption/tax-ML and trade-based ML. ACIP Advisories were introduced in April 2019 to enable quick dissemination of risk information on significant cases and typologies observed by MAS, CAD, other government agencies or ACIP members to the industry. The advisories alert industry to new and/or emerging risks, including those relating to legal persons and complex structures, tax fraud, etc., so that industry (not only ACIP members) can take swift measures to mitigate these risk concerns (including the filing of more pertinent STRs to enrich our intelligence database). ACIP has issued four best practice papers and five advisories since 2020. Box 3.2. Singapore’s AML/CFT Industry Partnership (ACIP) ACIP, Singapore’s public-private partnership, was initially set up in 2017, is co-chaired by SPF/CAD and MAS and supported by a Steering Group comprising nine banks and the Association of Banks in Singapore. ACIP brings together stakeholders from industry and government to collectively identify, assess and mitigate key and emerging ML/TF risks facing Singapore, and promulgate best practices to strengthen industry AML/CFT controls. Through ACIP, Singapore’s competent authorities have been working with the private sector to raise industry ML/TF risk awareness and mitigate those risks. 232. Industry Engagements : During the last five years, MAS has held or participated in 73 industry engagements, including general engagements and industry-wide townhalls to reach out to obliged entities on their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. These engagement sessions have been positively received by the industry. 233. MinLaw has taken some measures to promote industry awareness, but these are less developed than the measures undertaken by MAS. These include an information guide, newsletters and quizzes to raise awareness of their ML/TF/PF risks, and dissemination of updates to FATF black/grey lists. Over the past five years, MinLaw has conducted ten outreach events to moneylenders, including industry engagement webinars, and has issued 21 guidance papers and eight circulars/documents, primarily concerning the outcomes of various national and thematic risk assessments, and guidance on source of wealth/source of funds checks, ongoing monitoring and STR filing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 292. DNFBPs supervisors generally have a reasonable understanding of country-level and sector-level risks, largely informed through discussions at the RTIG which oversees the identification and assessment of ML, TF and PF risks at the WoG level. CAD and STRO in particular, provide DNFBP supervisors with updates on new ML/TF trends or information from STRs, ML/TF cases and the global FIU community. Feedback and inputs from MAS and other DNFBP supervisors are fed into RTIG’s ML/TF/PF risk assessments. At sectoral level, most DNFBP supervisors have developed sector-specific methodology to identify higher-risk institutions and activities, with a varying level of maturity and understanding. Table 4.2. Breakdown of DNFBPs by ML/TF Risk Rating Sector ML NRA Risk Rating Sector TF NRA Risk Rating Sector High Medium-High Medium-Low Low Medium-High Low LTCs 1 (1.67%) 5 (8.33%) 29 (48.33%) 25 (41.67%) Medium-High Low CSPs 21 (0.70%) 1 090 (36.15%) 1 463 (48.52%) 451 (14.96%) Medium-Low Low PAEs 18 (2.52%) 42 (5.89%) 152 (21.32%) 501 (70.27%) Medium-High Medium-Low PSMDs 206 (10.47%) 579 (29.43%) 400 (20.34%) 782 (39.76%) Low Low Pawnbrokers 38 (15.77%) 43 (17.84%) 134 (55.60%) 26 (10.79%) Medium-Low Low LPEs 112 (9.65%) 311 (26.79%) 204 (17.57%) 534 (45.99%) Medium-High Low Casinos 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) Medium-High Low EAs 14 (1.27%) 65 (5.91%) 192 (17.47%) 828 (75.34%) Medium-High Low Developers 8 (4.32%) 15 (8.11%) 47 (25.41%) 115 (62.16%) Note: Pawnbrokers are rated as “medium” risk level rather than “medium-low”. 293. Singapore, for the purpose of fitness and propriety and making basic and BO information available, has relied on LTCs (who are responsible for the creation of most trusts in Singapore, operate as the trustee for most trusts in Singapore, and must be engaged in the case of a PTC) and CSPs (who form the majority of companies in Singapore and have a legal duty to ensure the accuracy of basic and BO information). Given the reliance on these institutions, compliance failures would result in both AML/CFT failures, as well as failures in making basic and BO information available ( see IO5) . 294. LTCs are regulated and supervised by MAS which considers them FIs. As detailed in IO.3, MAS’ understanding of residual risks at institutional level was established through daily co-ordination between the AMLD and the nine prudential supervisory departments. AMLD conducts an inherent risk assessment (FIRA) and the risk surveillance programme, and both AMLD and the nine supervisory departments look into controls information. These three components are conducted separately, and the assessment is not done in a systematised manner or resulting in a documented institutional level risk rating. Overall, MAS has a sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks, but concerns remain over the process of MAS’ understanding of institutional level residuals risk of LTCs due to the lack of a systematised mechanism for consolidation of the three supervisory components and the lack of proper documentation of the residual risk. Please also refer to the more detailed analysis on MAS’ approach to risk supervisory approaches in IO.3. ACRA produces risk ratings for each DNFBP under their purview based on factors including customer profile, jurisdiction where they are operating, services offered, as well as STRs filed against it. Risk ratings are periodically updated according to the findings from LEA intelligence, adverse news, review and inspection outcomes, etc. ACRA regularly reviews and updates its risk assessment framework to ensure it remains relevant and effective, and leveraged data analytics to focus on key risks such as the misuse of shell companies and nominee directorship arrangements. Based on these activities, ACRA has developed a reasonably sound understanding of their supervised population at the institutional level. 295. At institutional level, MinLaw collects information from PSMDs and pawnbrokers to assess risk profile of each entity, considering customer, product and service, and delivery channel risks. MinLaw assesses the risks of individual PSMDs based on a Compliance Risk Scoring Framework which takes into consideration PSMDs’ risk profile, key threats and existing and emerging typologies in the sector. MinLaw reviews and recalibrates the risk ratings on a regular basis (at least once every 18 months) or when there is a material event, taking into consideration supervisory findings, audit reports, LEA intelligence or referrals, etc. For PSMDs and pawnbrokers, MinLaw has a reasonably sound understanding of their supervised population’s institutional level risk. 296. MinLaw had taken over the supervision for LPEs from LawSoc in 2024. During the onsite visit, both MinLaw and LawSoc provided explanations on understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with lawyers and LPEs, which were limited, and were not able to provide details on the methodology used to develop the sectoral or institutional risk assessments. MinLaw indicated that it is still developing a framework to systematically assess sectoral risks. MinLaw subsequently clarified that it had been closely engaging with LawSoc on supervision of LPEs since 2021 and had refined its understanding of the sectoral and institutional risks leveraging data collected through a sector-wide request for information exercise in 2024. MinLaw also clarified after the onsite visit that the data collected in 2024 was analysed in January 2025 to update the risk-rating of each LPE, which it used to prioritise inspections carried out from April to June 2025. Overall, MinLaw demonstrated limited understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with lawyers and LPEs. 297. GRA has a high-level understanding of ML/TF risks of the gambling sector through environmental scans, monitoring of local and international typologies, participation in RTIG discussions and international events, and bilateral engagement with domestic and foreign counterparts, etc., which assisted GRA in designing mitigative strategies. GRA also demonstrated clear understanding of institutional risks through close supervision of the two industry players. 298. CEA implements a risk assessment model that incorporates factors that reflect ML/TF risks in the sector, including outcome of previous supervisory examinations, client base, etc. CEA classifies EAs/RESs into four risk categories and reviews the categorisation every three years or when there is a material event or LEA intelligence. URA adopts a risk assessment matrix which considers various factors including market segments of the properties sold, proportion of foreigner purchase, country of origin of developer, as well as adverse news and intelligence from LEAs. The risk factors will be updated if new risk typologies surfaced, and each developer is assigned with a risk rating that will be reviewed every 3 years or when new intelligence is provided by LEAs. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 299. DNFBP sector supervisors have been active in promoting DNFBPs’ understanding of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations by (i) publishing guidance, best practices and circulars; (ii) partnership with industry associations; (iii) face-to-face outreach, including townhall events, briefings, consultations; and (iv) distribution of national and thematic risk assessments, as well as updated red-flag indicators [27] for the various sectors to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity. These various efforts have collectively promoted a clear understanding of ML/TF risks and obligations in the respective sectors. This is a strength of Singapore’s regime. 300. In particular, MAS collaborates with the Singapore Trustees Association to publish best practice papers and hosts regular industry engagements for LTCs. ACRA has also introduced mandatory AML/CFT training and proficiency tests for CSP registration and renewal. For accountants, ACRA works with ISCA to deliver targeted training and practical tools, such as CDD templates and sanctions resources. MinLaw has made significant efforts to support the relatively new regulated sector of PSMDs, including digital training via the myPal portal and developing infographic and video training materials. LawSoc provides lawyers with comprehensive AML/CFT resources via a dedicated portal and regular seminars. GRA maintains close communication with casino operators through monthly engagements to clarify expectations. In the real estate sector, CEA and URA promote AML/CFT compliance through consultations, examinations and training. These co-ordinated efforts reflect Singapore’s commitment to fostering a strong culture of compliance across all DNFBP sectors. Footnotes [27] www.police.gov.sg/Advisories/Commercial-Crimes/Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting-Office/Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 292. DNFBPs supervisors generally have a reasonable understanding of country-level and sector-level risks, largely informed through discussions at the RTIG which oversees the identification and assessment of ML, TF and PF risks at the WoG level. CAD and STRO in particular, provide DNFBP supervisors with updates on new ML/TF trends or information from STRs, ML/TF cases and the global FIU community. Feedback and inputs from MAS and other DNFBP supervisors are fed into RTIG’s ML/TF/PF risk assessments. At sectoral level, most DNFBP supervisors have developed sector-specific methodology to identify higher-risk institutions and activities, with a varying level of maturity and understanding. Table 4.2. Breakdown of DNFBPs by ML/TF Risk Rating Sector ML NRA Risk Rating Sector TF NRA Risk Rating Sector High Medium-High Medium-Low Low Medium-High Low LTCs 1 (1.67%) 5 (8.33%) 29 (48.33%) 25 (41.67%) Medium-High Low CSPs 21 (0.70%) 1 090 (36.15%) 1 463 (48.52%) 451 (14.96%) Medium-Low Low PAEs 18 (2.52%) 42 (5.89%) 152 (21.32%) 501 (70.27%) Medium-High Medium-Low PSMDs 206 (10.47%) 579 (29.43%) 400 (20.34%) 782 (39.76%) Low Low Pawnbrokers 38 (15.77%) 43 (17.84%) 134 (55.60%) 26 (10.79%) Medium-Low Low LPEs 112 (9.65%) 311 (26.79%) 204 (17.57%) 534 (45.99%) Medium-High Low Casinos 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) Medium-High Low EAs 14 (1.27%) 65 (5.91%) 192 (17.47%) 828 (75.34%) Medium-High Low Developers 8 (4.32%) 15 (8.11%) 47 (25.41%) 115 (62.16%) Note: Pawnbrokers are rated as “medium” risk level rather than “medium-low”. 293. Singapore, for the purpose of fitness and propriety and making basic and BO information available, has relied on LTCs (who are responsible for the creation of most trusts in Singapore, operate as the trustee for most trusts in Singapore, and must be engaged in the case of a PTC) and CSPs (who form the majority of companies in Singapore and have a legal duty to ensure the accuracy of basic and BO information). Given the reliance on these institutions, compliance failures would result in both AML/CFT failures, as well as failures in making basic and BO information available ( see IO5) . 294. LTCs are regulated and supervised by MAS which considers them FIs. As detailed in IO.3, MAS’ understanding of residual risks at institutional level was established through daily co-ordination between the AMLD and the nine prudential supervisory departments. AMLD conducts an inherent risk assessment (FIRA) and the risk surveillance programme, and both AMLD and the nine supervisory departments look into controls information. These three components are conducted separately, and the assessment is not done in a systematised manner or resulting in a documented institutional level risk rating. Overall, MAS has a sound understanding of country-level and sector-level ML/TF risks, but concerns remain over the process of MAS’ understanding of institutional level residuals risk of LTCs due to the lack of a systematised mechanism for consolidation of the three supervisory components and the lack of proper documentation of the residual risk. Please also refer to the more detailed analysis on MAS’ approach to risk supervisory approaches in IO.3. ACRA produces risk ratings for each DNFBP under their purview based on factors including customer profile, jurisdiction where they are operating, services offered, as well as STRs filed against it. Risk ratings are periodically updated according to the findings from LEA intelligence, adverse news, review and inspection outcomes, etc. ACRA regularly reviews and updates its risk assessment framework to ensure it remains relevant and effective, and leveraged data analytics to focus on key risks such as the misuse of shell companies and nominee directorship arrangements. Based on these activities, ACRA has developed a reasonably sound understanding of their supervised population at the institutional level. 295. At institutional level, MinLaw collects information from PSMDs and pawnbrokers to assess risk profile of each entity, considering customer, product and service, and delivery channel risks. MinLaw assesses the risks of individual PSMDs based on a Compliance Risk Scoring Framework which takes into consideration PSMDs’ risk profile, key threats and existing and emerging typologies in the sector. MinLaw reviews and recalibrates the risk ratings on a regular basis (at least once every 18 months) or when there is a material event, taking into consideration supervisory findings, audit reports, LEA intelligence or referrals, etc. For PSMDs and pawnbrokers, MinLaw has a reasonably sound understanding of their supervised population’s institutional level risk. 296. MinLaw had taken over the supervision for LPEs from LawSoc in 2024. During the onsite visit, both MinLaw and LawSoc provided explanations on understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with lawyers and LPEs, which were limited, and were not able to provide details on the methodology used to develop the sectoral or institutional risk assessments. MinLaw indicated that it is still developing a framework to systematically assess sectoral risks. MinLaw subsequently clarified that it had been closely engaging with LawSoc on supervision of LPEs since 2021 and had refined its understanding of the sectoral and institutional risks leveraging data collected through a sector-wide request for information exercise in 2024. MinLaw also clarified after the onsite visit that the data collected in 2024 was analysed in January 2025 to update the risk-rating of each LPE, which it used to prioritise inspections carried out from April to June 2025. Overall, MinLaw demonstrated limited understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with lawyers and LPEs. 297. GRA has a high-level understanding of ML/TF risks of the gambling sector through environmental scans, monitoring of local and international typologies, participation in RTIG discussions and international events, and bilateral engagement with domestic and foreign counterparts, etc., which assisted GRA in designing mitigative strategies. GRA also demonstrated clear understanding of institutional risks through close supervision of the two industry players. 298. CEA implements a risk assessment model that incorporates factors that reflect ML/TF risks in the sector, including outcome of previous supervisory examinations, client base, etc. CEA classifies EAs/RESs into four risk categories and reviews the categorisation every three years or when there is a material event or LEA intelligence. URA adopts a risk assessment matrix which considers various factors including market segments of the properties sold, proportion of foreigner purchase, country of origin of developer, as well as adverse news and intelligence from LEAs. The risk factors will be updated if new risk typologies surfaced, and each developer is assigned with a risk rating that will be reviewed every 3 years or when new intelligence is provided by LEAs. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 299. DNFBP sector supervisors have been active in promoting DNFBPs’ understanding of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations by (i) publishing guidance, best practices and circulars; (ii) partnership with industry associations; (iii) face-to-face outreach, including townhall events, briefings, consultations; and (iv) distribution of national and thematic risk assessments, as well as updated red-flag indicators [27] for the various sectors to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity. These various efforts have collectively promoted a clear understanding of ML/TF risks and obligations in the respective sectors. This is a strength of Singapore’s regime. 300. In particular, MAS collaborates with the Singapore Trustees Association to publish best practice papers and hosts regular industry engagements for LTCs. ACRA has also introduced mandatory AML/CFT training and proficiency tests for CSP registration and renewal. For accountants, ACRA works with ISCA to deliver targeted training and practical tools, such as CDD templates and sanctions resources. MinLaw has made significant efforts to support the relatively new regulated sector of PSMDs, including digital training via the myPal portal and developing infographic and video training materials. LawSoc provides lawyers with comprehensive AML/CFT resources via a dedicated portal and regular seminars. GRA maintains close communication with casino operators through monthly engagements to clarify expectations. In the real estate sector, CEA and URA promote AML/CFT compliance through consultations, examinations and training. These co-ordinated efforts reflect Singapore’s commitment to fostering a strong culture of compliance across all DNFBP sectors. Footnotes [27] www.police.gov.sg/Advisories/Commercial-Crimes/Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting-Office/Suspicious-Transaction-Reporting" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="355. Singapore has implemented several measures to mitigate the risks of LPs and LAs being used for ML/TF purposes. These mitigation measures are: a) requirements to register with ACRA as the Registrar of Companies; b) measures in relation to transparency (in relation to legal persons, Unregistered Foreign Companies and legal arrangements); and c) supervision of reporting entities (see IO4; supervision as it relates to BO information and its accuracy is assessed in core issues 5.3 and 5.4 below). 356. Overall, Singapore has put a number of mitigation measures across the three limbs of mitigation. These three limbs of mitigation measures have all been implemented and do provide some risk mitigation, but all face challenges in their effective implementation either due to the recency of their application or insufficient investment into their application. There are areas of higher risk, such as Unregistered Foreign Companies and trusts, where there are not sufficient mitigation measures in place. 357. These mitigations do not cover all identified higher risk areas. Requirements to Register with ACRA as the Registrar of Companies 358. The requirement for domestic and registered foreign companies, LLPs and VCCs to be registered with ACRA provides for a central registry of basic information on legal persons in Singapore but there are some gaps (see R.24). The deficiencies are minor and technical and as such do not appear to be hamper the effectiveness of Singapore’s system with respect to basic information. 359. In 2020, Singapore instituted of a central BO registry held at ACRA, the RORC, and an obligation on most legal persons to hold a Register of Registrable Controllers (internal RORC). The BO information on both these registers is identical, is largely unverified or audited, and allows legal persons to be listed as beneficial owner without corresponding controls in place (see R.24 and Core Issue 5.3 for more details). Measures in relation to transparency Legal Persons 360. Information on the different types, forms and basic features of legal persons and the processes for creating legal persons is publicly available. Basic information held at ACRA is publicly available, BO information in the RORC is not publicly available. 361. Singapore requires that each foreign company operating a business in Singapore has a local nominee director, i.e., a responsible person residing in Singapore. Since 2017 and 2022, domestic and foreign companies operating a business in Singapore have been required to maintain registers of nominee directors and shareholders respectively. As of July 2025, these companies are now required to also maintain their registers of nominee directors and shareholders through ACRA’s ROND and RONS, Singapore’s central databases for nominee directors and shareholders. The creation of these registries is positive, but they were in effect for only days prior to the onsite visit; their implementation and contribution to ensuring transparency in Singapore cannot be evaluated. These transparency measures on nominee directors may be of limited value as Singapore has had difficulties in attributing liability to local nominee directors when a legal person is party to criminal conduct (see IO.7). 362. Bearer shares and bearer share warrants are prohibited in Singapore. Supervision of reporting entities 363. For Unregistered Foreign Companies and legal arrangements, the only mitigations in place are the AML/CFT programs of FIs and DNFBPs. As such, the supervision of those FIs and DNFBPs are an important determination of whether the mitigation works in practice. As noted in IO 3, the supervision of FIs is not done on the basis of ML/TF risks assessed in a systematised manner. Further, there is insufficient coverage and intensity for high and medium high-risk entities, including for BO obligations. Similarly, concerns are noted in IO 4 for LTCs as they have the same supervisor. Higher risk areas without sufficient mitigations Unregistered Foreign Companies 364. Unregistered Foreign Companies are those companies that are not regarded as carrying on business in Singapore and who only have specified activities in Singapore, such as: maintaining any bank account, conducting isolated transactions, investing any of their funds or hold any property in Singapore. Singapore’s LPRA identifies Unregistered Foreign Companies as High Risk for ML and there is a high volume of STRs filed in relation to Unregistered Foreign Companies. Table 5.3. STRs Relating to Legal Persons and Arrangements in Singapore Legal Person/ Arrangement 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Companies 5 182 6 575 5 415 6 395 7 267 30 834 Unregistered Foreign Companies 1 608 1 870 1 560 1 822 2 392 9 252 Trusts 266 202 170 229 257 1 124 LLPs 30 55 28 31 37 181 VCCs - 4 8 14 27 53 365. Unregistered Foreign Companies are not subject to any transparency measures with ACRA. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs have obligations to identify and verify customers that are legal persons and identify their beneficial owners. This acts as the only real mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by Unregistered Foreign Companies. 366. Being exempt from the category of companies “carrying on business” in Singapore carves out these foreign companies from critical mitigation measures related to minimum information requirement (see c24.3). The exemption allowing Unregistered Foreign Companies to access and use the Singaporean financial system, without an assessment of the nature of ML/TF risks posed by these activities, is concerning. Singapore did not consider whether registration could mitigate risks from financial transactions and relationships involving Unregistered Foreign Companies. 367. Overall, what constitutes a substantial link to business in Singapore has not been considered on the basis of ML/TF risk. This is particularly concerning in light of the international, large and connected nature of Singapore’s financial system. While MAS conducted a survey of some FIs to determine the nature and extent of activities of Unregistered Foreign Companies in Singapore, at the time of the onsite, there was not a comprehensive understanding of how many are operating in Singapore, nor what their activities are. Legal arrangements 368. Singapore relies on the information obtained and held by the relevant trustees and trustee-equivalent of a trust, and information collected by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, to determine BO of legal arrangements. As noted in R.25, there are deficiencies in relation to risk assessment, mitigation and access to timely, accurate and up-to-date information in Singapore. In the absence of a public authority that holds this information, and the lack of verification requirements in relation to some trusts, it cannot be concluded that transparency through information requirements offers strong mitigation in relation to legal arrangements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="355. Singapore has implemented several measures to mitigate the risks of LPs and LAs being used for ML/TF purposes. These mitigation measures are: a) requirements to register with ACRA as the Registrar of Companies; b) measures in relation to transparency (in relation to legal persons, Unregistered Foreign Companies and legal arrangements); and c) supervision of reporting entities (see IO4; supervision as it relates to BO information and its accuracy is assessed in core issues 5.3 and 5.4 below). 356. Overall, Singapore has put a number of mitigation measures across the three limbs of mitigation. These three limbs of mitigation measures have all been implemented and do provide some risk mitigation, but all face challenges in their effective implementation either due to the recency of their application or insufficient investment into their application. There are areas of higher risk, such as Unregistered Foreign Companies and trusts, where there are not sufficient mitigation measures in place. 357. These mitigations do not cover all identified higher risk areas. Requirements to Register with ACRA as the Registrar of Companies 358. The requirement for domestic and registered foreign companies, LLPs and VCCs to be registered with ACRA provides for a central registry of basic information on legal persons in Singapore but there are some gaps (see R.24). The deficiencies are minor and technical and as such do not appear to be hamper the effectiveness of Singapore’s system with respect to basic information. 359. In 2020, Singapore instituted of a central BO registry held at ACRA, the RORC, and an obligation on most legal persons to hold a Register of Registrable Controllers (internal RORC). The BO information on both these registers is identical, is largely unverified or audited, and allows legal persons to be listed as beneficial owner without corresponding controls in place (see R.24 and Core Issue 5.3 for more details). Measures in relation to transparency Legal Persons 360. Information on the different types, forms and basic features of legal persons and the processes for creating legal persons is publicly available. Basic information held at ACRA is publicly available, BO information in the RORC is not publicly available. 361. Singapore requires that each foreign company operating a business in Singapore has a local nominee director, i.e., a responsible person residing in Singapore. Since 2017 and 2022, domestic and foreign companies operating a business in Singapore have been required to maintain registers of nominee directors and shareholders respectively. As of July 2025, these companies are now required to also maintain their registers of nominee directors and shareholders through ACRA’s ROND and RONS, Singapore’s central databases for nominee directors and shareholders. The creation of these registries is positive, but they were in effect for only days prior to the onsite visit; their implementation and contribution to ensuring transparency in Singapore cannot be evaluated. These transparency measures on nominee directors may be of limited value as Singapore has had difficulties in attributing liability to local nominee directors when a legal person is party to criminal conduct (see IO.7). 362. Bearer shares and bearer share warrants are prohibited in Singapore. Supervision of reporting entities 363. For Unregistered Foreign Companies and legal arrangements, the only mitigations in place are the AML/CFT programs of FIs and DNFBPs. As such, the supervision of those FIs and DNFBPs are an important determination of whether the mitigation works in practice. As noted in IO 3, the supervision of FIs is not done on the basis of ML/TF risks assessed in a systematised manner. Further, there is insufficient coverage and intensity for high and medium high-risk entities, including for BO obligations. Similarly, concerns are noted in IO 4 for LTCs as they have the same supervisor. Higher risk areas without sufficient mitigations Unregistered Foreign Companies 364. Unregistered Foreign Companies are those companies that are not regarded as carrying on business in Singapore and who only have specified activities in Singapore, such as: maintaining any bank account, conducting isolated transactions, investing any of their funds or hold any property in Singapore. Singapore’s LPRA identifies Unregistered Foreign Companies as High Risk for ML and there is a high volume of STRs filed in relation to Unregistered Foreign Companies. Table 5.3. STRs Relating to Legal Persons and Arrangements in Singapore Legal Person/ Arrangement 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Companies 5 182 6 575 5 415 6 395 7 267 30 834 Unregistered Foreign Companies 1 608 1 870 1 560 1 822 2 392 9 252 Trusts 266 202 170 229 257 1 124 LLPs 30 55 28 31 37 181 VCCs - 4 8 14 27 53 365. Unregistered Foreign Companies are not subject to any transparency measures with ACRA. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs have obligations to identify and verify customers that are legal persons and identify their beneficial owners. This acts as the only real mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by Unregistered Foreign Companies. 366. Being exempt from the category of companies “carrying on business” in Singapore carves out these foreign companies from critical mitigation measures related to minimum information requirement (see c24.3). The exemption allowing Unregistered Foreign Companies to access and use the Singaporean financial system, without an assessment of the nature of ML/TF risks posed by these activities, is concerning. Singapore did not consider whether registration could mitigate risks from financial transactions and relationships involving Unregistered Foreign Companies. 367. Overall, what constitutes a substantial link to business in Singapore has not been considered on the basis of ML/TF risk. This is particularly concerning in light of the international, large and connected nature of Singapore’s financial system. While MAS conducted a survey of some FIs to determine the nature and extent of activities of Unregistered Foreign Companies in Singapore, at the time of the onsite, there was not a comprehensive understanding of how many are operating in Singapore, nor what their activities are. Legal arrangements 368. Singapore relies on the information obtained and held by the relevant trustees and trustee-equivalent of a trust, and information collected by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, to determine BO of legal arrangements. As noted in R.25, there are deficiencies in relation to risk assessment, mitigation and access to timely, accurate and up-to-date information in Singapore. In the absence of a public authority that holds this information, and the lack of verification requirements in relation to some trusts, it cannot be concluded that transparency through information requirements offers strong mitigation in relation to legal arrangements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="419. STRO is a well-resourced FIU that operates within SPF’s Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) Intelligence and Administration Group, with a staff of 50, a 10% increase from the 2016 MER. Staff are distributed across three teams: analysis (23 staff), which handles operational and strategic work, systems development (15 staff) and FIU policy and international co-operation (12 staff). STRO has made significant investments in digitalisation, data analytics and automation, leveraging advanced IT systems to produce financial intelligence, trace assets and develop evidence. This includes SONAR and WINGS X, a customised analytical tool that was upgraded in 2022 to accommodate a growing number of reports and which allows for the analysis of large volumes of data. 420. STRO’s operational independence and autonomy is legislatively enshrined within the CDSA. The Head of STRO is also the Director of SPF CAD, the principal investigative body for ML in Singapore. A Deputy Director (DD) sits under the Head of STRO, and according to STRO’s SOPs is responsible for strategic workplan and operational decisions on the exchange and dissemination of financial intelligence. The DD is assisted by two Assistant Directors (ADs), who are responsible for (1) FIU Policy and International Co-operation, and (2) STRO Analysis and Disseminations. Decision-making of all operational matters, including financial intelligence disseminations is the purview of the operational staff themselves. Where necessary, dissemination decisions are escalated to the AD and/or DD. There is some ambiguity as the delegation of authority is not formalised or clearly identified in any policy/procedure. Furthermore, in practice, Singapore has indicated that certain complex and high-profile cases are escalated to the Head of STRO for information only. The absence of a formal delegation of authority implies that legal responsibility for STRO lies with the Head of STRO and additional safeguards in this regard would be useful. This is, however, seen as a Technical Compliance issue (see R.29 ) as the AT has not observed this ambiguity affecting STRO’s operations in practice. 6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 421. STRO produces two types of financial intelligence products, which based on onsite discussions and samples consulted, are generally of good quality: (1) Financial intelligence packages (‘packages’) and (2) strategic analysis reports disseminated to competent authorities and REs. A ‘Fin-IR’ is an STR that has been analysed and augmented with other reports such as CTRs, CMRs, and is subsequently disseminated. Multiple Fin-IRs can be part of a single package. 422. The upgrade to WINGS X resulted in enhanced operational analysis capabilities and significantly reduced the need for manual assessment and prioritisation of reports. Upon receiving an STR, WINGS X will automatically overlay the STR with relevant information from secondary datasets. The system then prioritises STRs using thematic rules based on risks and typologies, NRA information, and customised rules pre-agreed with other competent authorities. These thematic rules are periodically updated through consultations with other authorities (e.g. through RTIG) to reflect the evolving typologies and the operational landscape. WINGS X automatically identifies entities mentioned in STRs and visualises their relationships in network diagrams highlighting links between individuals/entities. Based on this automated triage, WINGS X escalates STRs to staff for further analysis to identify links between targets and possible ML, TF or associated predicate offences. The volume of prioritised STRs to analyse further is unknown. 423. As many cases in Singapore contain international elements, STRO plays an active role seeking international co-operation to produce financial intelligence and disseminating these to competent authorities in Singapore. During the reporting period, STRO issued 1 465 Request for Analysis (RFAs) through the Egmont channel (an average of 293 per year), 88% of which were addressed (see IO.2). In respect of TF, STRO has a dedicated team of analysts reviewing and analysing potential TF STRs and enhancing financial information with other sources of information to produce TF-related packages. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 424. Historically, Singapore has tracked the dissemination of Fin-IRs. Statistics on the dissemination of packages are only available for 2023-2024 and the lack of longer-term statistics on these undermines the AT’s ability to determine to what extent they support the needs of competent authorities. While the AT relied on statistics for both packages and FIN-IRs, figures for packages should not be aggregated with the numbers for FIN-IRs since packages consist of Fin-IRs and would be double counted. 425. As shown in table 6.4, STRO disseminates both Fin-IRs and packages. STRO also disseminates financial intelligence to its counterparts in response to the 1 744 Requests for Assistance (RFAs) it received, with a 97% response rate. STRO also spontaneously disseminated financial intelligence to its counterparts in 823 instances (see IO.2). Table 6.4. STRO’s disseminations Type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fin-IRs 9 428 4 833 3 382 6 139 7 136 30 918 Financial Intelligence Packages -- -- -- 236 233 469 RFA Executed 368 342 332 347 355 1 744 Spontaneous Exchange of Information 301 158 141 109 114 823 426. In addition to this, STRO also produces strategic intelligence reports and various guidance documents which aim to enhance understanding of the crimes/emerging risks and inform the development of red flag indicators. These are shared with competent authorities and REs. Since 2020, STRO produced 13 strategic reports on a range of topics: scams, tax crimes, BEC, corruption, and sector-specific reports e.g. legal practitioners, DPTSPs, PSMDs, etc. Strategic analysis focuses primarily on reviewing and evaluating submitted STRs, particularly the initiates for filing and indicators of suspicious financial activity. However, these strategic intelligence products make use of CTRs, CMRs, data from other competent authorities to a lesser extent than STRs. STRO also does not have complete access to data on cross border money flows (noted above), which affects its ability to undertake strategic analysis notably to identify and anticipate emerging ML/TF with a cross-border dimension. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 427. STRO’s financial intelligence generally supports the needs of competent authorities (Box 6.2) and is broadly risk-aligned. 82% of Fin-IRs and 92% of financial intelligence packages are destined for LEAs, a large majority to the SPF, with the remaining going to supervisors. STRO prioritises TF-related packages and promptly disseminates these to both CFTB and ISD upon detection of suspicious TF-related transactions. This dual dissemination enables triangulation of analyses and collaboration between all three agencies as to the course of investigation. Table 6.5. Categorised Disseminations of Fin-IRs and Financial Intelligence Packages Fin-IRs (2022-2024) (% of total) Packages (2023-2024) (% total) ML from fraud 2 075 (9.4%) 106 (18%) ML from corruption and bribery 2 005 (9.1%) 28 (5%) ML from tax crimes 1 581 (7.2%) 18 (3%) ML from organised crime 720 (3.3%) 17 (3%) TBML 308 (1.4%) 16 (3%) Standalone ML (other ML’) 3 728 (17%) 198 (33%) ML from other predicate offences 6 422 (29.2%) 73 (12%) Terrorism and Terrorism-financing 1 404 (6.4%) 35 (6%) Proliferation financing 1 145 (5.2%) 34 (6%) Other (i.e., UN sanctions, regulatory offences and unlicensed money-changing / remittances) 2 588 (11.8%) 77 (13%) Total 21 976 (100%) 602 (100%) Note: Total Fin-IR and Packages figures in this Table do not align with those in Table 6.4 (Fin-IRs: 30 918; Packages: 469), as each package may be tagged to multiple offence types. 428. Disseminations align with risks to a good extent (Table 6.5). A good number of packages (64%) relate to high-risk offences. Most disseminations (33%) are made in respect of suspected standalone ML cases involving undefined foreign predicate offences, which aligns with Singapore’s NRA that indicates that Singapore is exposed to potential ML activities arising from foreign predicate offences. The second most frequent type of dissemination by category relates to ML from fraud (18%). There are significantly fewer disseminations in respect of other high-risk offences such as bribery and corruption, TBML and, organised crime and more could be done to ensure disseminations are better aligned with risks (Table 6.5). 429. STRO received 282 354 STRs during the reporting period and disseminated 30 918 STRs as Fin-IRs (11%) or 6 184 Fin-IRs on average per year. In light of the significant volume and generally good quality of STRs received, improving the dissemination of Fin-IRs/packages in a way that is better aligned with risks would ensure STRO’s disseminations more effectively support the operational needs of LEAs. 430. STRO systematically solicits qualitative feedback from all recipients of financial intelligence products on a twice-yearly basis. Co-ordination with other competent authorities via RTIG or bilateral channels also facilitates feedback on the usefulness of STRO products and case-specific information. STRO has six seconded officers to various competent authorities, both supervisors and LEAs, which has helped it develop a better understanding of operational needs of different competent authorities and tailor disseminations to their needs. Interviews with the competent authorities and case studies suggest that they find value in the FIU’s disseminations (Box 6.2 and 6.4). However, statistics on the quality of financial intelligence, on the LEA’s assessment of the relevance and usefulness of financial intelligence, and the extent to which it meets LEA’s operational needs are not available. For example, there is no data on frequency of requests for additional information from STRO after receiving financial intelligence. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 431. Other competent authorities also generate financial intelligence resulting from the analysis of available information to support their operational needs. LEAs use in-house analytical tools to aggregate financial intelligence packages disseminated by STRO and other financial information, enabling data mining and visualisations (Table 6.6). They also conduct independent intelligence probes, including database reviews, background checks, analysing financial records, and consultations with domestic or foreign partners. All AML/CFT supervisors have direct access to STRs filed by their respective REs, which supports network analyses and helps detect patterns relevant to supervisory activities. Box 6.2. Production and use of financial intelligence STRO disseminations supporting a drug ML investigation A Singaporean national was arrested abroad and repatriated to Singapore in 2023, whereupon he was charged for drug-trafficking offences by CNB, who led the case. At CNB’s request, STRO conducted an analysis of the entities and accounts of interest to CNB. STRO identified transaction flows and detected a pattern involving multiple large transfers from the syndicate’s bank accounts to common counterparties in other jurisdictions within a similar time period. The analysis also identified up to 34 counterparts (e.g. money mules) transacting with the person of interest. STRO sent an Egmont RFAs to foreign FIUs (on behalf of CNB) seeking information on known subjects of interest. ACIP banks were also requested to provide additional information of relevant transactions (see Box 6.3). STRO disseminated within two months 37 Fin-IRs to CNB as well as information obtained from foreign counterparts, which supported its ongoing investigations. CNB pressed charges against the accused and two co-accused persons for drug trafficking and ML offences. The main accused person was convicted in December 2024 to 28 years’ and 9 months’ imprisonment (under appeal). Spontaneous dissemination to foreign FIU STRO received STRs on Person J, suspected of laundering proceeds from foreign tax fraud, with links to Person G, a hedge fund manager at Company C. STRO’s analysis revealed Company C’s account may have facilitated transfers tied to a €22 million tax fraud involving dividend withholding refunds in Country U. STRO spontaneously disseminated intelligence to foreign FIUs and CAD, which resulted in CAD initiating a ML investigation and the seizure of GBP 12.9 million and USD 7.9 million (respectively SGD 21.9 and 10.5 million) from Person J’s account in Singapore. Table 6.6. Financial information and intelligence available to competent authorities Financial Information Financial Intelligence Self-screening Requests (2020-2024) MASDs (2020-2024) Fin-IRs (2020-2024) Packages (2023-2024) LEAs 11 312 200 990 25 469 433 SPF 5 248 189 872 14 357 329 CNB 238 259 662 21 CPIB 1 076 899 3 076 18 IRAS 439 5 094 2 615 7 SC 161 273 124 10 ISD 1 191 915 3 856 43 ICA 2 648 3 664 756 2 HSA 12 - 2 - NParks 21 1 4 1 MOM 278 13 17 2 Supervisors 197 169 1 238 36 ACRA 11 - 309 9 MAS 25 76 392 17 Charities Unit 7 2 25 3 MinLaw 86 58 499 7 GRA 29 4 1 2 CEA 2 - 11 - URA 37 29 - - Law Society - - 1 - Others 8 4 48 - Foreign FIUs - - 4 163 - Total 11 517 201 163 30 918 469 432. In conclusion, as a well-resourced FIU, STRO produces financial information, generally good quality financial intelligence, and strategic intelligence reports. Disseminations generally support the risks of competent authorities and are broadly risk aligned. Other competent authorities generate some financial intelligence, but this is weighted much lower compared to STRO’s role." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="419. STRO is a well-resourced FIU that operates within SPF’s Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) Intelligence and Administration Group, with a staff of 50, a 10% increase from the 2016 MER. Staff are distributed across three teams: analysis (23 staff), which handles operational and strategic work, systems development (15 staff) and FIU policy and international co-operation (12 staff). STRO has made significant investments in digitalisation, data analytics and automation, leveraging advanced IT systems to produce financial intelligence, trace assets and develop evidence. This includes SONAR and WINGS X, a customised analytical tool that was upgraded in 2022 to accommodate a growing number of reports and which allows for the analysis of large volumes of data. 420. STRO’s operational independence and autonomy is legislatively enshrined within the CDSA. The Head of STRO is also the Director of SPF CAD, the principal investigative body for ML in Singapore. A Deputy Director (DD) sits under the Head of STRO, and according to STRO’s SOPs is responsible for strategic workplan and operational decisions on the exchange and dissemination of financial intelligence. The DD is assisted by two Assistant Directors (ADs), who are responsible for (1) FIU Policy and International Co-operation, and (2) STRO Analysis and Disseminations. Decision-making of all operational matters, including financial intelligence disseminations is the purview of the operational staff themselves. Where necessary, dissemination decisions are escalated to the AD and/or DD. There is some ambiguity as the delegation of authority is not formalised or clearly identified in any policy/procedure. Furthermore, in practice, Singapore has indicated that certain complex and high-profile cases are escalated to the Head of STRO for information only. The absence of a formal delegation of authority implies that legal responsibility for STRO lies with the Head of STRO and additional safeguards in this regard would be useful. This is, however, seen as a Technical Compliance issue (see R.29 ) as the AT has not observed this ambiguity affecting STRO’s operations in practice. 6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 421. STRO produces two types of financial intelligence products, which based on onsite discussions and samples consulted, are generally of good quality: (1) Financial intelligence packages (‘packages’) and (2) strategic analysis reports disseminated to competent authorities and REs. A ‘Fin-IR’ is an STR that has been analysed and augmented with other reports such as CTRs, CMRs, and is subsequently disseminated. Multiple Fin-IRs can be part of a single package. 422. The upgrade to WINGS X resulted in enhanced operational analysis capabilities and significantly reduced the need for manual assessment and prioritisation of reports. Upon receiving an STR, WINGS X will automatically overlay the STR with relevant information from secondary datasets. The system then prioritises STRs using thematic rules based on risks and typologies, NRA information, and customised rules pre-agreed with other competent authorities. These thematic rules are periodically updated through consultations with other authorities (e.g. through RTIG) to reflect the evolving typologies and the operational landscape. WINGS X automatically identifies entities mentioned in STRs and visualises their relationships in network diagrams highlighting links between individuals/entities. Based on this automated triage, WINGS X escalates STRs to staff for further analysis to identify links between targets and possible ML, TF or associated predicate offences. The volume of prioritised STRs to analyse further is unknown. 423. As many cases in Singapore contain international elements, STRO plays an active role seeking international co-operation to produce financial intelligence and disseminating these to competent authorities in Singapore. During the reporting period, STRO issued 1 465 Request for Analysis (RFAs) through the Egmont channel (an average of 293 per year), 88% of which were addressed (see IO.2). In respect of TF, STRO has a dedicated team of analysts reviewing and analysing potential TF STRs and enhancing financial information with other sources of information to produce TF-related packages. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 424. Historically, Singapore has tracked the dissemination of Fin-IRs. Statistics on the dissemination of packages are only available for 2023-2024 and the lack of longer-term statistics on these undermines the AT’s ability to determine to what extent they support the needs of competent authorities. While the AT relied on statistics for both packages and FIN-IRs, figures for packages should not be aggregated with the numbers for FIN-IRs since packages consist of Fin-IRs and would be double counted. 425. As shown in table 6.4, STRO disseminates both Fin-IRs and packages. STRO also disseminates financial intelligence to its counterparts in response to the 1 744 Requests for Assistance (RFAs) it received, with a 97% response rate. STRO also spontaneously disseminated financial intelligence to its counterparts in 823 instances (see IO.2). Table 6.4. STRO’s disseminations Type 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fin-IRs 9 428 4 833 3 382 6 139 7 136 30 918 Financial Intelligence Packages -- -- -- 236 233 469 RFA Executed 368 342 332 347 355 1 744 Spontaneous Exchange of Information 301 158 141 109 114 823 426. In addition to this, STRO also produces strategic intelligence reports and various guidance documents which aim to enhance understanding of the crimes/emerging risks and inform the development of red flag indicators. These are shared with competent authorities and REs. Since 2020, STRO produced 13 strategic reports on a range of topics: scams, tax crimes, BEC, corruption, and sector-specific reports e.g. legal practitioners, DPTSPs, PSMDs, etc. Strategic analysis focuses primarily on reviewing and evaluating submitted STRs, particularly the initiates for filing and indicators of suspicious financial activity. However, these strategic intelligence products make use of CTRs, CMRs, data from other competent authorities to a lesser extent than STRs. STRO also does not have complete access to data on cross border money flows (noted above), which affects its ability to undertake strategic analysis notably to identify and anticipate emerging ML/TF with a cross-border dimension. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 427. STRO’s financial intelligence generally supports the needs of competent authorities (Box 6.2) and is broadly risk-aligned. 82% of Fin-IRs and 92% of financial intelligence packages are destined for LEAs, a large majority to the SPF, with the remaining going to supervisors. STRO prioritises TF-related packages and promptly disseminates these to both CFTB and ISD upon detection of suspicious TF-related transactions. This dual dissemination enables triangulation of analyses and collaboration between all three agencies as to the course of investigation. Table 6.5. Categorised Disseminations of Fin-IRs and Financial Intelligence Packages Fin-IRs (2022-2024) (% of total) Packages (2023-2024) (% total) ML from fraud 2 075 (9.4%) 106 (18%) ML from corruption and bribery 2 005 (9.1%) 28 (5%) ML from tax crimes 1 581 (7.2%) 18 (3%) ML from organised crime 720 (3.3%) 17 (3%) TBML 308 (1.4%) 16 (3%) Standalone ML (other ML’) 3 728 (17%) 198 (33%) ML from other predicate offences 6 422 (29.2%) 73 (12%) Terrorism and Terrorism-financing 1 404 (6.4%) 35 (6%) Proliferation financing 1 145 (5.2%) 34 (6%) Other (i.e., UN sanctions, regulatory offences and unlicensed money-changing / remittances) 2 588 (11.8%) 77 (13%) Total 21 976 (100%) 602 (100%) Note: Total Fin-IR and Packages figures in this Table do not align with those in Table 6.4 (Fin-IRs: 30 918; Packages: 469), as each package may be tagged to multiple offence types. 428. Disseminations align with risks to a good extent (Table 6.5). A good number of packages (64%) relate to high-risk offences. Most disseminations (33%) are made in respect of suspected standalone ML cases involving undefined foreign predicate offences, which aligns with Singapore’s NRA that indicates that Singapore is exposed to potential ML activities arising from foreign predicate offences. The second most frequent type of dissemination by category relates to ML from fraud (18%). There are significantly fewer disseminations in respect of other high-risk offences such as bribery and corruption, TBML and, organised crime and more could be done to ensure disseminations are better aligned with risks (Table 6.5). 429. STRO received 282 354 STRs during the reporting period and disseminated 30 918 STRs as Fin-IRs (11%) or 6 184 Fin-IRs on average per year. In light of the significant volume and generally good quality of STRs received, improving the dissemination of Fin-IRs/packages in a way that is better aligned with risks would ensure STRO’s disseminations more effectively support the operational needs of LEAs. 430. STRO systematically solicits qualitative feedback from all recipients of financial intelligence products on a twice-yearly basis. Co-ordination with other competent authorities via RTIG or bilateral channels also facilitates feedback on the usefulness of STRO products and case-specific information. STRO has six seconded officers to various competent authorities, both supervisors and LEAs, which has helped it develop a better understanding of operational needs of different competent authorities and tailor disseminations to their needs. Interviews with the competent authorities and case studies suggest that they find value in the FIU’s disseminations (Box 6.2 and 6.4). However, statistics on the quality of financial intelligence, on the LEA’s assessment of the relevance and usefulness of financial intelligence, and the extent to which it meets LEA’s operational needs are not available. For example, there is no data on frequency of requests for additional information from STRO after receiving financial intelligence. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 431. Other competent authorities also generate financial intelligence resulting from the analysis of available information to support their operational needs. LEAs use in-house analytical tools to aggregate financial intelligence packages disseminated by STRO and other financial information, enabling data mining and visualisations (Table 6.6). They also conduct independent intelligence probes, including database reviews, background checks, analysing financial records, and consultations with domestic or foreign partners. All AML/CFT supervisors have direct access to STRs filed by their respective REs, which supports network analyses and helps detect patterns relevant to supervisory activities. Box 6.2. Production and use of financial intelligence STRO disseminations supporting a drug ML investigation A Singaporean national was arrested abroad and repatriated to Singapore in 2023, whereupon he was charged for drug-trafficking offences by CNB, who led the case. At CNB’s request, STRO conducted an analysis of the entities and accounts of interest to CNB. STRO identified transaction flows and detected a pattern involving multiple large transfers from the syndicate’s bank accounts to common counterparties in other jurisdictions within a similar time period. The analysis also identified up to 34 counterparts (e.g. money mules) transacting with the person of interest. STRO sent an Egmont RFAs to foreign FIUs (on behalf of CNB) seeking information on known subjects of interest. ACIP banks were also requested to provide additional information of relevant transactions (see Box 6.3). STRO disseminated within two months 37 Fin-IRs to CNB as well as information obtained from foreign counterparts, which supported its ongoing investigations. CNB pressed charges against the accused and two co-accused persons for drug trafficking and ML offences. The main accused person was convicted in December 2024 to 28 years’ and 9 months’ imprisonment (under appeal). Spontaneous dissemination to foreign FIU STRO received STRs on Person J, suspected of laundering proceeds from foreign tax fraud, with links to Person G, a hedge fund manager at Company C. STRO’s analysis revealed Company C’s account may have facilitated transfers tied to a €22 million tax fraud involving dividend withholding refunds in Country U. STRO spontaneously disseminated intelligence to foreign FIUs and CAD, which resulted in CAD initiating a ML investigation and the seizure of GBP 12.9 million and USD 7.9 million (respectively SGD 21.9 and 10.5 million) from Person J’s account in Singapore. Table 6.6. Financial information and intelligence available to competent authorities Financial Information Financial Intelligence Self-screening Requests (2020-2024) MASDs (2020-2024) Fin-IRs (2020-2024) Packages (2023-2024) LEAs 11 312 200 990 25 469 433 SPF 5 248 189 872 14 357 329 CNB 238 259 662 21 CPIB 1 076 899 3 076 18 IRAS 439 5 094 2 615 7 SC 161 273 124 10 ISD 1 191 915 3 856 43 ICA 2 648 3 664 756 2 HSA 12 - 2 - NParks 21 1 4 1 MOM 278 13 17 2 Supervisors 197 169 1 238 36 ACRA 11 - 309 9 MAS 25 76 392 17 Charities Unit 7 2 25 3 MinLaw 86 58 499 7 GRA 29 4 1 2 CEA 2 - 11 - URA 37 29 - - Law Society - - 1 - Others 8 4 48 - Foreign FIUs - - 4 163 - Total 11 517 201 163 30 918 469 432. In conclusion, as a well-resourced FIU, STRO produces financial information, generally good quality financial intelligence, and strategic intelligence reports. Disseminations generally support the risks of competent authorities and are broadly risk aligned. Other competent authorities generate some financial intelligence, but this is weighted much lower compared to STRO’s role." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Singapore has introduced a case prioritisation model with limited success to process the high number of CEF cases that should be prosecuted. A small fraction of CEF-related investigations leads to prosecutions, which indicate challenges with the prioritisation approach. Evidential challenges with proving mens rea for ML offences has undermined the ability to successfully prosecute cases. While Singapore has put in place measures to address these challenges, they are recent and it is too early to assess their impact on effectiveness. Prosecutions are in line with risks to some extent. Overall, while Singapore pursues different types of ML, most cases involve low-level and low-value MM cases. Singapore insufficiently pursues legal persons and professional intermediaries and does not sufficiently prioritise major ML prosecutions, which is not in line with risks. Further, Singapore prioritises prosecutions that are more likely to result in guilty pleas rather than those posing the greatest risk. 7.2.1. Prosecutions 467. The AGC, which is responsible for prosecutions, is led by the Attorney-General, who is also the Public Prosecutor and the legal advisor to the Government. AGC’s specialised prosecutors (‘Deputy Public Prosecutors’) are responsible for prosecuting ML investigations. Since the 2016 MER, there has been one additional head count for prosecutors compared to a four-fold rise in ML investigations. The AGC uses discretion when deciding which case to take on for prosecution. This includes considerations about sufficiency and credibility of the evidence, and whether the prosecution would be in the ‘public interest’, a term which is loosely defined and refers to common welfare and benefits of the society as a whole. Where prosecutions are discontinued, Singapore pursues alternative measures to some extent (see 7.4). Table 7.3. Prosecutions and Convictions for ML (natural persons) # of people 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) No of ML Investigations 1 089 2 289 2 322 2 854 2 635 11 189 # natural persons prosecuted 87 152 119 123 201 682 # natural persons convicted (% of prosecutions) 53 (61) 101 (66) 95 (80) 105 (85) 125 (62) 479 (70) Note: investigations prosecuted in one year may be convicted in the next. 468. Since 2020, Singapore prosecuted 682 natural persons (Table 7.3). Only a small fraction of ML investigations progress to prosecutions. While this may reflect challenges in LEA prioritisation, two other main factors explain the low conversion of investigations into prosecutions: a) Under S17 CPC, LEAs must open an investigation whenever there is ‘ reason to suspect ’ an arrestable offence, even if the case involves low-level criminality or fails to meet prosecutorial thresholds. Singapore opens standalone ML investigations for all CEF cases, typically involving money mules in Singapore acting for foreign syndicates, provide access to their bank accounts or help conceal and move illicit funds. Singapore has maintained that it invariably opens standalone ML investigations in response to victim complaints as only the ML networks and mules exist in Singapore while the ultimate criminal perpetrators (i.e. the subject of any predicate investigation) are overwhelmingly based overseas. In reality, these cases often concern small sums already moved abroad, making them hard to prosecute and inflating investigation numbers. Singapore indicates these cases (when pursued) may generate some investigative leads to open new cases, but there is no evidence this strategy helps systematically disrupt overseas criminal syndicates. b) Many ML cases have a foreign nexus, making evidence collection on overseas suspects difficult. Proving mens rea for local MMs, professional intermediaries and nominee directors is also challenging. These challenges are not unique to Singapore, since highly effective AML/CFT systems routinely prosecute such complex cases. Although Singapore recognises the need for international co-operation, formal channels are rarely pursued and authorities often rely on informal co-operation instead (see IO.2). 469. Singapore has recognised some of the abovementioned systematic weaknesses and introduced major legislative amendments to better pursue these investigations (summarised below). While these reforms are promising and appear to mitigate many of the challenges, they are recent and their full impact cannot yet be assessed. Specifically, Singapore: a) Added section S55A to the CDSA in February 2024 which contains two offences targeting MM. Singapore has branded these offences as ML offences and pursues them as such. o S55A(1) (the Money Mule Offence), under which investigations have been prosecuted, criminalises certain conduct that is typical of ML activity, such as entering into or facilitating an arrangement with another person to allow the use of their bank account. While this offence contains many of the elements of an ML offence, and ultimately targets ML activity, it is not a ML offence. The Money Mule Offence does not require the prosecution to prove that the accused had the knowledge that the property represents the proceeds of crime or that they intended to acquire, conceal or use criminal property. Rather, it targets arrangements facilitated by the accused that enable the transfer of funds, but the accused person does not have to have any knowledge that the funds were criminal property. However, the accused person has a defence to the offence in S55A(3) if he can prove that he did not know and had no reasonable ground to believe that the property represents proceeds of crime. Singapore has used this offence extensively since its enactment (and is detailed as an alternative measure in 3.2.4). o S55A(2), which is a ML offence and is designed to ease the burden required to prove that an individual is an accessory to an ML offence. Very limited prosecutions have been mounted under S55(A)(2) to date with no resolved cases. b) Added sections S50(1A), 51(1A), 53(3A) and 54(3A) of the CDSA in February 2024 to pursue investigations where there is insufficient evidence that the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the person he is assisting has engaged in criminal conduct. It is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the person had acted rashly or negligently. c) Amended S56 of the CDSA in November 2024 to deal with the evidentiary challenge of proving predicate offences committed abroad. This provision in effect introduces a rebuttable presumption as it removes the requirement for the prosecution to prove this element of the offence but allows an accused person to prove that the property in question are not proceeds of a foreign drug dealing or serious offence. This amendment was operationalised in November 2024 and had not been used to mount prosecution by the time of onsite. 470. As with ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions are in line with risks to some extent, and only when it comes to fraud, rather than for other higher risk offences (Table 7.4). Following prosecutions related to CEF, Singapore’s authorities mainly pursue prosecutions relating to ML in corruption investigations. ML prosecutions related to other higher risk offences and notable ML threats such as organised crime, tax crime and drugs are not prosecuted as regularly in line with risk. Table 7.4. Prosecutions per predicate offence Agency Domestic ML Prosecution (as a % of total for the predicate offence) Foreign ML Prosecutions (as a % of total for the predicate offence) Total (% of total) Fraud (CEF) 326 (92) 29 (8) 355 (52) Fraud (non-CEF) 50 (75) 17 (25) 67 (10) Corruption (incl. breach of trust) 60(98) 0 (0) 60 (9) Unlicensed Money Lending 24 (100) 0 (0) 24 (3) Cybercrime 19 (100) 0 (0) 19 (3) Drugs 41 (100) 0 (0) 41 (6) Organised Crime 10 (50) 10 (50) 20 (3) Tax Crimes 9 (64) 5 (36) 14 (2) Illicit Wildlife Trade 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (0) Others 87 (99) 1 (1) 88 (13) Total 626 (91) 63 (8) 689 (100) Note: Each prosecution may involve more than one predicate offence, and totals may therefore differ from above tables. 471. Singapore prosecutes and achieves convictions for different types of ML activity, including third party and standalone investigations (for example against transnational syndicates perpetrating CEF) (Table 7.5). Yet, most of the third-party laundering and standalone ML investigations arising from domestic predicate offences represent prosecutions involving MM rather than sophisticated ML schemes involving foreign perpetrators, syndicates, intermediaries and nominee directors. Table 7.5. Types of ML prosecuted and convicted (natural persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prosecutions (Total for self and/or third-party laundering) 87 152 119 123 201 682 Self-laundering 23 (26) 35 (23) 25 (21) 36 (29) 60 (30) 179 (26) Third-Party laundering 64 (74) 110 (72) 90 (76) 85 (69) 138 (69) 487 (72) Both (Self-laundering and Third-Party Laundering) 0 (0) 7 (5) 4 (3) 2 (2) 3 (1) 16 (2) Standalone investigations (1) 44 60 49 72 68 293 Convictions (Total for self and/or third-party laundering) 53 101 95 105 125 479 Self-laundering 12 (23) 23 (23) 26 (27) 22 (21) 35(28) 118 (25) Third-Party laundering 41 (77) 76 (75) 68 (72) 80 (76) 85 (68) 350 (73) Self-laundering and Third-Party Laundering 0 2 (2) 1(1) 3 (3) 5(4) 11(2) Standalone investigations 33 41 36 63 63 236 Note: (1) As per the FATF Methodology, Standalone ML is a not a type of laundering but rather refers to the prosecution of ML offences independently, without the need to prosecute the predicate offence. These include for example CEF investigations or investigations involving foreign predicate offences. 472. Only 25 Singapore-based nominee directors were prosecuted during the reporting period, which is not in line with its risks and context. As noted in IO.5, Singapore requires legal persons to have at least one local director as a risk mitigation measure. However, authorities face challenges in proving that they are the directing mind behind the ML activity or have the requisite mens rea to pursue ML prosecutions. In these cases, Singapore pursues some alternative measures against local directors (see 7.4). These rare prosecutions of nominee directors mitigate the effectiveness of the reason for the requirement to have a local director that is responsible for the legal person. Singapore has pursued legal persons for prosecution (only eight prosecutions and two convictions) despite typologies showing the use of legal persons to launder funds in Singapore. Even though legal persons may be used as pass-throughs with no assets to recover, making prosecutions less worthwhile, they still represent a point of connection with Singapore that should be pursued. 473. Similarly, the AGC prosecuted only 12 professional intermediaries (such as lawyers and TCSPs) who are the key access points to Singapore’s economy for foreign criminals. As noted, Singapore is facing an issue where the controlling minds of their highest risk predicate offence are, generally, located outside of the country. Singapore is taking measures to hold more of those contributing to laundering the proceeds of fraud within its borders to account, such as targeting MM. Singapore could do more to pursue local directors and professional intermediaries within its borders when party or accessory to laundering proceeds as they are generally within Singapore’s borders. Table 7.6. Prosecutions and Convictions for Natural and Legal Persons 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prosecutions 88 152 121 127 203 691 Natural Persons 87 152 119 123 201 682 (99) Legal Persons 1 0 2 4 2 9 (1) Convictions 53 101 95 106 126 481 Natural Persons 53 101 95 105 125 479 (99) Legal Persons 0 0 0 1 1 2 (1) 7.2.2. Convictions 474. Singapore has shown a capacity to prosecute and secure convictions into some of the complex ML activities, including in relation to threats such as organised crime ( 3B$ case ), corruption and tax crimes, some involving a transnational nexus. AGC had also secured convictions involving virtual assets as shown in Box 7.2. This is supported by an increasing number of standalone ML prosecutions, for which authorities are generally able to secure a good conviction rate. Singapore secured only two convictions for legal persons, which is not in line with risks. 475. Singapore has a good prosecution to conviction rate (82%), largely driven by guilty pleas, including those made through plea bargaining. As previously noted, AGC pursues prosecutions only when it believes the evidentiary threshold can be met and when it is in the public interest. This explains the very low rate of discharged investigations with acquittal (2%) and discharged investigations without acquittal (4%). Across all criminal offences, 92% of convictions result from guilty pleas, including plea bargaining, rather than a trial, indicating Singapore’s dependence on this approach. 476. While data on guilty pleas for ML prosecutions is unknown, authorities indicated that only a minority involve plea deals [33] . Singapore explained that offenders generally elect to plead guilty earlier in the criminal process due to the quality of evidence and to obtain lighter sentences, and plea deals may be offered in a minority of cases where evidence is weaker. Nonetheless, AGC frequently secures guilty pleas or plea deals, as in the 3B$ case . 477. In conclusion, Singapore’s case-prioritisation model has had limited impact, with few ML investigations progressing to prosecution. Most ML prosecutions still involve low-level money mule cases, with insufficient focus on complex cross-border cases, legal persons and professional intermediaries. Prosecutors prioritise cases more likely to result in guilty pleas rather than those posing the highest ML risks, which undermines the deterrence effect. Box 7.2. ML prosecutions and convictions Conviction of a transnational syndicate This was an intelligence-led investigation into a transnational CEF syndicate laundering proceeds through a ML network in Singapore, led by Person A. Introduced to the criminal enterprise by Person B, Person A procured over 50 bank accounts, mainly from foreigners via Telegram and online ads, and received more than SGD 800 000 (USD 592 000) to convert into USDT. Person A recruited crypto traders and ATM runners to withdraw over SGD 640 000 (USD 474 000) using ATM cards he supplied. He also gave Person B internet banking access to a Singapore bank account which was then used to receive and dissipate another SGD 570 000 (USD 422 000). In February 2024, Person A was convicted and sentenced to 4.5 years’ imprisonment for ML offences and other offences under Computer Misuse Act (CMA). Two crypto traders were also convicted and sentenced to 13 and 20 months respectively. Despite the large number of bank accounts misused, only 3 bank account holders were found to remain in Singapore and are currently under investigation. Additional investigations on the fund flow are still underway to uncover further links to criminal syndicates. Charges against a legal entity In July 2023, a director of a Singapore-registered company was charged in Court for ML offences, among other offences, for providing his SingPass credentials to unknown third parties for incorporating a company. The director also conspired to deceive a local bank into opening a corporate bank account for the company, by falsely declaring himself as the ultimate BO of the bank account. Investigations revealed that two overseas victims were defrauded into transferring approximately USD 300 000 (SGD 405 500) to the company’s bank account in 2021. As a separate legal entity, the company was charged with ML offences as well for possessing property reasonably suspected to be benefits of criminal conduct under the CDSA. Court proceedings against the company and its director are currently ongoing. Footnotes [33] In Singapore, “plea deals” relates to situations involving negotiations between the defence and the prosecution, with the latter preferring lesser or lower charges or seeking a lower sentence than it would otherwise have." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Singapore has introduced a case prioritisation model with limited success to process the high number of CEF cases that should be prosecuted. A small fraction of CEF-related investigations leads to prosecutions, which indicate challenges with the prioritisation approach. Evidential challenges with proving mens rea for ML offences has undermined the ability to successfully prosecute cases. While Singapore has put in place measures to address these challenges, they are recent and it is too early to assess their impact on effectiveness. Prosecutions are in line with risks to some extent. Overall, while Singapore pursues different types of ML, most cases involve low-level and low-value MM cases. Singapore insufficiently pursues legal persons and professional intermediaries and does not sufficiently prioritise major ML prosecutions, which is not in line with risks. Further, Singapore prioritises prosecutions that are more likely to result in guilty pleas rather than those posing the greatest risk. 7.2.1. Prosecutions 467. The AGC, which is responsible for prosecutions, is led by the Attorney-General, who is also the Public Prosecutor and the legal advisor to the Government. AGC’s specialised prosecutors (‘Deputy Public Prosecutors’) are responsible for prosecuting ML investigations. Since the 2016 MER, there has been one additional head count for prosecutors compared to a four-fold rise in ML investigations. The AGC uses discretion when deciding which case to take on for prosecution. This includes considerations about sufficiency and credibility of the evidence, and whether the prosecution would be in the ‘public interest’, a term which is loosely defined and refers to common welfare and benefits of the society as a whole. Where prosecutions are discontinued, Singapore pursues alternative measures to some extent (see 7.4). Table 7.3. Prosecutions and Convictions for ML (natural persons) # of people 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) No of ML Investigations 1 089 2 289 2 322 2 854 2 635 11 189 # natural persons prosecuted 87 152 119 123 201 682 # natural persons convicted (% of prosecutions) 53 (61) 101 (66) 95 (80) 105 (85) 125 (62) 479 (70) Note: investigations prosecuted in one year may be convicted in the next. 468. Since 2020, Singapore prosecuted 682 natural persons (Table 7.3). Only a small fraction of ML investigations progress to prosecutions. While this may reflect challenges in LEA prioritisation, two other main factors explain the low conversion of investigations into prosecutions: a) Under S17 CPC, LEAs must open an investigation whenever there is ‘ reason to suspect ’ an arrestable offence, even if the case involves low-level criminality or fails to meet prosecutorial thresholds. Singapore opens standalone ML investigations for all CEF cases, typically involving money mules in Singapore acting for foreign syndicates, provide access to their bank accounts or help conceal and move illicit funds. Singapore has maintained that it invariably opens standalone ML investigations in response to victim complaints as only the ML networks and mules exist in Singapore while the ultimate criminal perpetrators (i.e. the subject of any predicate investigation) are overwhelmingly based overseas. In reality, these cases often concern small sums already moved abroad, making them hard to prosecute and inflating investigation numbers. Singapore indicates these cases (when pursued) may generate some investigative leads to open new cases, but there is no evidence this strategy helps systematically disrupt overseas criminal syndicates. b) Many ML cases have a foreign nexus, making evidence collection on overseas suspects difficult. Proving mens rea for local MMs, professional intermediaries and nominee directors is also challenging. These challenges are not unique to Singapore, since highly effective AML/CFT systems routinely prosecute such complex cases. Although Singapore recognises the need for international co-operation, formal channels are rarely pursued and authorities often rely on informal co-operation instead (see IO.2). 469. Singapore has recognised some of the abovementioned systematic weaknesses and introduced major legislative amendments to better pursue these investigations (summarised below). While these reforms are promising and appear to mitigate many of the challenges, they are recent and their full impact cannot yet be assessed. Specifically, Singapore: a) Added section S55A to the CDSA in February 2024 which contains two offences targeting MM. Singapore has branded these offences as ML offences and pursues them as such. o S55A(1) (the Money Mule Offence), under which investigations have been prosecuted, criminalises certain conduct that is typical of ML activity, such as entering into or facilitating an arrangement with another person to allow the use of their bank account. While this offence contains many of the elements of an ML offence, and ultimately targets ML activity, it is not a ML offence. The Money Mule Offence does not require the prosecution to prove that the accused had the knowledge that the property represents the proceeds of crime or that they intended to acquire, conceal or use criminal property. Rather, it targets arrangements facilitated by the accused that enable the transfer of funds, but the accused person does not have to have any knowledge that the funds were criminal property. However, the accused person has a defence to the offence in S55A(3) if he can prove that he did not know and had no reasonable ground to believe that the property represents proceeds of crime. Singapore has used this offence extensively since its enactment (and is detailed as an alternative measure in 3.2.4). o S55A(2), which is a ML offence and is designed to ease the burden required to prove that an individual is an accessory to an ML offence. Very limited prosecutions have been mounted under S55(A)(2) to date with no resolved cases. b) Added sections S50(1A), 51(1A), 53(3A) and 54(3A) of the CDSA in February 2024 to pursue investigations where there is insufficient evidence that the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the person he is assisting has engaged in criminal conduct. It is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the person had acted rashly or negligently. c) Amended S56 of the CDSA in November 2024 to deal with the evidentiary challenge of proving predicate offences committed abroad. This provision in effect introduces a rebuttable presumption as it removes the requirement for the prosecution to prove this element of the offence but allows an accused person to prove that the property in question are not proceeds of a foreign drug dealing or serious offence. This amendment was operationalised in November 2024 and had not been used to mount prosecution by the time of onsite. 470. As with ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions are in line with risks to some extent, and only when it comes to fraud, rather than for other higher risk offences (Table 7.4). Following prosecutions related to CEF, Singapore’s authorities mainly pursue prosecutions relating to ML in corruption investigations. ML prosecutions related to other higher risk offences and notable ML threats such as organised crime, tax crime and drugs are not prosecuted as regularly in line with risk. Table 7.4. Prosecutions per predicate offence Agency Domestic ML Prosecution (as a % of total for the predicate offence) Foreign ML Prosecutions (as a % of total for the predicate offence) Total (% of total) Fraud (CEF) 326 (92) 29 (8) 355 (52) Fraud (non-CEF) 50 (75) 17 (25) 67 (10) Corruption (incl. breach of trust) 60(98) 0 (0) 60 (9) Unlicensed Money Lending 24 (100) 0 (0) 24 (3) Cybercrime 19 (100) 0 (0) 19 (3) Drugs 41 (100) 0 (0) 41 (6) Organised Crime 10 (50) 10 (50) 20 (3) Tax Crimes 9 (64) 5 (36) 14 (2) Illicit Wildlife Trade 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (0) Others 87 (99) 1 (1) 88 (13) Total 626 (91) 63 (8) 689 (100) Note: Each prosecution may involve more than one predicate offence, and totals may therefore differ from above tables. 471. Singapore prosecutes and achieves convictions for different types of ML activity, including third party and standalone investigations (for example against transnational syndicates perpetrating CEF) (Table 7.5). Yet, most of the third-party laundering and standalone ML investigations arising from domestic predicate offences represent prosecutions involving MM rather than sophisticated ML schemes involving foreign perpetrators, syndicates, intermediaries and nominee directors. Table 7.5. Types of ML prosecuted and convicted (natural persons) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prosecutions (Total for self and/or third-party laundering) 87 152 119 123 201 682 Self-laundering 23 (26) 35 (23) 25 (21) 36 (29) 60 (30) 179 (26) Third-Party laundering 64 (74) 110 (72) 90 (76) 85 (69) 138 (69) 487 (72) Both (Self-laundering and Third-Party Laundering) 0 (0) 7 (5) 4 (3) 2 (2) 3 (1) 16 (2) Standalone investigations (1) 44 60 49 72 68 293 Convictions (Total for self and/or third-party laundering) 53 101 95 105 125 479 Self-laundering 12 (23) 23 (23) 26 (27) 22 (21) 35(28) 118 (25) Third-Party laundering 41 (77) 76 (75) 68 (72) 80 (76) 85 (68) 350 (73) Self-laundering and Third-Party Laundering 0 2 (2) 1(1) 3 (3) 5(4) 11(2) Standalone investigations 33 41 36 63 63 236 Note: (1) As per the FATF Methodology, Standalone ML is a not a type of laundering but rather refers to the prosecution of ML offences independently, without the need to prosecute the predicate offence. These include for example CEF investigations or investigations involving foreign predicate offences. 472. Only 25 Singapore-based nominee directors were prosecuted during the reporting period, which is not in line with its risks and context. As noted in IO.5, Singapore requires legal persons to have at least one local director as a risk mitigation measure. However, authorities face challenges in proving that they are the directing mind behind the ML activity or have the requisite mens rea to pursue ML prosecutions. In these cases, Singapore pursues some alternative measures against local directors (see 7.4). These rare prosecutions of nominee directors mitigate the effectiveness of the reason for the requirement to have a local director that is responsible for the legal person. Singapore has pursued legal persons for prosecution (only eight prosecutions and two convictions) despite typologies showing the use of legal persons to launder funds in Singapore. Even though legal persons may be used as pass-throughs with no assets to recover, making prosecutions less worthwhile, they still represent a point of connection with Singapore that should be pursued. 473. Similarly, the AGC prosecuted only 12 professional intermediaries (such as lawyers and TCSPs) who are the key access points to Singapore’s economy for foreign criminals. As noted, Singapore is facing an issue where the controlling minds of their highest risk predicate offence are, generally, located outside of the country. Singapore is taking measures to hold more of those contributing to laundering the proceeds of fraud within its borders to account, such as targeting MM. Singapore could do more to pursue local directors and professional intermediaries within its borders when party or accessory to laundering proceeds as they are generally within Singapore’s borders. Table 7.6. Prosecutions and Convictions for Natural and Legal Persons 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prosecutions 88 152 121 127 203 691 Natural Persons 87 152 119 123 201 682 (99) Legal Persons 1 0 2 4 2 9 (1) Convictions 53 101 95 106 126 481 Natural Persons 53 101 95 105 125 479 (99) Legal Persons 0 0 0 1 1 2 (1) 7.2.2. Convictions 474. Singapore has shown a capacity to prosecute and secure convictions into some of the complex ML activities, including in relation to threats such as organised crime ( 3B$ case ), corruption and tax crimes, some involving a transnational nexus. AGC had also secured convictions involving virtual assets as shown in Box 7.2. This is supported by an increasing number of standalone ML prosecutions, for which authorities are generally able to secure a good conviction rate. Singapore secured only two convictions for legal persons, which is not in line with risks. 475. Singapore has a good prosecution to conviction rate (82%), largely driven by guilty pleas, including those made through plea bargaining. As previously noted, AGC pursues prosecutions only when it believes the evidentiary threshold can be met and when it is in the public interest. This explains the very low rate of discharged investigations with acquittal (2%) and discharged investigations without acquittal (4%). Across all criminal offences, 92% of convictions result from guilty pleas, including plea bargaining, rather than a trial, indicating Singapore’s dependence on this approach. 476. While data on guilty pleas for ML prosecutions is unknown, authorities indicated that only a minority involve plea deals [33] . Singapore explained that offenders generally elect to plead guilty earlier in the criminal process due to the quality of evidence and to obtain lighter sentences, and plea deals may be offered in a minority of cases where evidence is weaker. Nonetheless, AGC frequently secures guilty pleas or plea deals, as in the 3B$ case . 477. In conclusion, Singapore’s case-prioritisation model has had limited impact, with few ML investigations progressing to prosecution. Most ML prosecutions still involve low-level money mule cases, with insufficient focus on complex cross-border cases, legal persons and professional intermediaries. Prosecutors prioritise cases more likely to result in guilty pleas rather than those posing the highest ML risks, which undermines the deterrence effect. Box 7.2. ML prosecutions and convictions Conviction of a transnational syndicate This was an intelligence-led investigation into a transnational CEF syndicate laundering proceeds through a ML network in Singapore, led by Person A. Introduced to the criminal enterprise by Person B, Person A procured over 50 bank accounts, mainly from foreigners via Telegram and online ads, and received more than SGD 800 000 (USD 592 000) to convert into USDT. Person A recruited crypto traders and ATM runners to withdraw over SGD 640 000 (USD 474 000) using ATM cards he supplied. He also gave Person B internet banking access to a Singapore bank account which was then used to receive and dissipate another SGD 570 000 (USD 422 000). In February 2024, Person A was convicted and sentenced to 4.5 years’ imprisonment for ML offences and other offences under Computer Misuse Act (CMA). Two crypto traders were also convicted and sentenced to 13 and 20 months respectively. Despite the large number of bank accounts misused, only 3 bank account holders were found to remain in Singapore and are currently under investigation. Additional investigations on the fund flow are still underway to uncover further links to criminal syndicates. Charges against a legal entity In July 2023, a director of a Singapore-registered company was charged in Court for ML offences, among other offences, for providing his SingPass credentials to unknown third parties for incorporating a company. The director also conspired to deceive a local bank into opening a corporate bank account for the company, by falsely declaring himself as the ultimate BO of the bank account. Investigations revealed that two overseas victims were defrauded into transferring approximately USD 300 000 (SGD 405 500) to the company’s bank account in 2021. As a separate legal entity, the company was charged with ML offences as well for possessing property reasonably suspected to be benefits of criminal conduct under the CDSA. Court proceedings against the company and its director are currently ongoing. Footnotes [33] In Singapore, “plea deals” relates to situations involving negotiations between the defence and the prosecution, with the latter preferring lesser or lower charges or seeking a lower sentence than it would otherwise have." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="499. LEAs take a proactive approach at identifying and tracing criminal property, including virtual assets. Singapore routinely conducts financial investigations without obstacles related to resourcing or adequacy of legal or investigative tools or techniques. NARS instructs LEAs to pursue asset recovery in all cases, irrespective of the amounts involved, although some prioritisation happens based on the nature of the case (e.g. complexity and assets involved). However, several practical constraints limit Singapore’s effectiveness in identifying and tracing a broad scope of property. 500. LEAs benefit from a strong legislative framework and operational powers to identify and trace assets. The CPC and CDSA give LEAs broad powers to compel the production of financial information from individuals, entities, FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs. LEAs are guided by SOPs which place priority on the identification of assets for seizure and confiscation. Singapore also leverages several tools to trace criminal assets, including initiatives like Project POET, the ACIP and COSMIC frameworks. Authorities have also shown an ability to exploit a wide array of information, cross-government data integration (i.e. NAVIGATE) and international co-operation for asset recovery purposes, using both formal and informal channels to prevent asset dissipation. 501. Case studies and discussions with Singaporean authorities show that LEAs routinely identify and trace assets without any major issues. However, as identified in IO.7, there are challenges in ML investigations which affect the identification of criminal property and may result in some assets going unidentified (compounded to an extent by the limited accuracy of BO information, see IO.5): a) IO.7 shows that over 80% of Singapore’s ML investigations involve low-level money mule cases related to CEF. LEAs are understandably targeting fraud, an important threat area. However, by nature, these money mule-related fraud cases typically involve minimal asset values and small-value transactions. While Singapore has seized SGD 590 million (USD 452 million) linked to CEF (which only aligns with risk to some extent, as detailed below), this operational focus limits the pursuit of higher-value and more complex ML networks, and the recovery of more substantial criminal assets connected to transnational actors. b) For much of the reporting period, LEAs experienced challenges in mounting ML prosecutions for foreign predicate offences and proving mens rea , a key risk factor for Singapore. By extension, this also makes it difficult to link assets to such criminal conduct and prevent their dissipation, especially when funds are quickly moved or passed through Singapore’s financial system. Still, while this poses challenges in identifying assets, there are case studies ( e.g. 3B$ case) showing Singapore can identify significant assets linked to foreign predicate offence s. c) Considering Singapore’s status as a wealth management destination, successful attempts to trace criminal assets through complex structures and trusts could not be adequately demonstrated. In the review period, there has been only one case of seizure of assets held in trusts (SGD 256 million or USD 196 million in assets), which was initiated on the basis of STRO’s analysis. d) Limited targeting of ML involving professional intermediaries and local directors weakens asset tracing efforts (as was observed also in respect of one high-profile case). These actors may receive a portion of criminal proceeds in exchange for facilitating laundering or providing access to payment accounts. By failing to focus on identifying these illicit gains and the proceeds laundered, authorities miss opportunities to pursue recovery of assets laundered systematically (including those directly linked to the predicate offences) and across several cases and different crime types. 502. Singapore’s main ML threat is fraud and, as detailed in IO.7, many of these investigations end up being categorised as standalone ML. In these cases, assets are identified and investigated as a matter of course. Conversely, there is a lack of comprehensive data quantifying the number of predicate crime cases where competent authorities pursue the recovery of criminal assets. Thus, it is challenging to assess how frequently and how well LEAs routinely identify and investigate assets for potential confiscation stemming from non-ML cases. This is occurring in some instances, as shown by Table 8.1 below. 503. Supported by SOPs, the focus of LEAs is primarily to identify and seize in the investigative stage. Beyond typical investigative techniques, Singapore also uses concealed income analysis (CIA) to examine the totality of an accused’s hidden or undisclosed assets, liabilities and expenses. This is done with a view to finding wealth that is disproportionate to known legitimate income which can be confiscated. This analysis allows LEAs to come to a better understanding of the quantum of criminal proceeds of the individual(s) under investigation. In these instances, courts can order the seizure and confiscation against the defendant, which extends to property that is not shown to be directly linked to an offence and is disproportionate to the defendant’s known sources of income when the defendant cannot explain a legitimate source of wealth to the satisfaction of the Court. While Singapore has shown some very limited success using CIA by seizing SGD 20.9 million (USD 16 million) through 173 analyses, this intensive analysis is used infrequently when compared to the 11 000 ML investigations as well as the unknown but much higher number of predicate investigations. There are missed opportunities to identify additional criminal assets. 504. In conclusion, LEAs proactively identify and trace criminal property drawing on a strong legislative framework and operational powers, but few ML investigations uncover significant criminal property. Challenges for the identification of assets include a higher focus on money mule-related fraud over complex ML networks, proving mens rea , pursuing assets tied to foreign predicate offences, and the pursuit of assets through complex structures and limited targeting of professional intermediaries. Box 8.2. Identification and tracing of assets 3B$ case [34] SPF conducted an 18-month investigation tracing the networks and holdings of the suspects and their associates, their criminal activities and their assets. A joint workgroup comprising SPF, STRO and AGC was formed. SPF worked with STRO to identify instances of foreign nationals submitting forged documents to banks to substantiate their importation of funds into Singapore. Pre-raid preparations included collaborations with banks via MAS and digital forensics, including in-house virtual asset tracing and support from a private sector expert. Authorities identified assets linked to 27 persons of interest. SPF arrested 10 foreign nationals and issued prohibition orders on assets tied to 17 others who had left Singapore before the investigation began. Over SGD 3 billion (USD 2.2 billion) in assets were seized or issued with prohibition orders, including bank funds (over SGD 1.45 billion/USD 1 billion), cash (over SGD 76 million/USD 56.2 million), cryptocurrencies (over SGD 38 million/USD 28.1 million), real estate, vehicles, luxury bags, luxury watches, jewellery, alcohol, and other high-value collectibles. Use of CIA MOM investigated Person A, a town council conservancy manager suspected of collecting kickbacks from foreign workers between 2016 and 2020. Upon further investigations, MOM seized SGD 326 305 (USD 241 465) in cash from Person A’s home and alerted CAD, prompting concurrent financial investigations and a CIA. These revealed that Person A had accumulated about SGD 1.4 million (USD 1 million) in wealth despite declaring only SGD 588 000 (USD 435 120), leaving over SGD 706 000 (USD 522 440) of unexplained wealth. Although no ML offences were established due to the cash-based nature of transactions and lack of admissible evidence, MOM recommended 61 charges for collecting kickbacks. Person A was sentenced in November 2024 to 24 weeks’ imprisonment and ordered to return SGD 395 440 (USD 293 000) to 57 migrant workers. Confiscation proceedings for the remaining unexplained wealth of SGD 311 119 (USD 230 000) are ongoing. Footnotes [34] See Box 7.1" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="499. LEAs take a proactive approach at identifying and tracing criminal property, including virtual assets. Singapore routinely conducts financial investigations without obstacles related to resourcing or adequacy of legal or investigative tools or techniques. NARS instructs LEAs to pursue asset recovery in all cases, irrespective of the amounts involved, although some prioritisation happens based on the nature of the case (e.g. complexity and assets involved). However, several practical constraints limit Singapore’s effectiveness in identifying and tracing a broad scope of property. 500. LEAs benefit from a strong legislative framework and operational powers to identify and trace assets. The CPC and CDSA give LEAs broad powers to compel the production of financial information from individuals, entities, FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs. LEAs are guided by SOPs which place priority on the identification of assets for seizure and confiscation. Singapore also leverages several tools to trace criminal assets, including initiatives like Project POET, the ACIP and COSMIC frameworks. Authorities have also shown an ability to exploit a wide array of information, cross-government data integration (i.e. NAVIGATE) and international co-operation for asset recovery purposes, using both formal and informal channels to prevent asset dissipation. 501. Case studies and discussions with Singaporean authorities show that LEAs routinely identify and trace assets without any major issues. However, as identified in IO.7, there are challenges in ML investigations which affect the identification of criminal property and may result in some assets going unidentified (compounded to an extent by the limited accuracy of BO information, see IO.5): a) IO.7 shows that over 80% of Singapore’s ML investigations involve low-level money mule cases related to CEF. LEAs are understandably targeting fraud, an important threat area. However, by nature, these money mule-related fraud cases typically involve minimal asset values and small-value transactions. While Singapore has seized SGD 590 million (USD 452 million) linked to CEF (which only aligns with risk to some extent, as detailed below), this operational focus limits the pursuit of higher-value and more complex ML networks, and the recovery of more substantial criminal assets connected to transnational actors. b) For much of the reporting period, LEAs experienced challenges in mounting ML prosecutions for foreign predicate offences and proving mens rea , a key risk factor for Singapore. By extension, this also makes it difficult to link assets to such criminal conduct and prevent their dissipation, especially when funds are quickly moved or passed through Singapore’s financial system. Still, while this poses challenges in identifying assets, there are case studies ( e.g. 3B$ case) showing Singapore can identify significant assets linked to foreign predicate offence s. c) Considering Singapore’s status as a wealth management destination, successful attempts to trace criminal assets through complex structures and trusts could not be adequately demonstrated. In the review period, there has been only one case of seizure of assets held in trusts (SGD 256 million or USD 196 million in assets), which was initiated on the basis of STRO’s analysis. d) Limited targeting of ML involving professional intermediaries and local directors weakens asset tracing efforts (as was observed also in respect of one high-profile case). These actors may receive a portion of criminal proceeds in exchange for facilitating laundering or providing access to payment accounts. By failing to focus on identifying these illicit gains and the proceeds laundered, authorities miss opportunities to pursue recovery of assets laundered systematically (including those directly linked to the predicate offences) and across several cases and different crime types. 502. Singapore’s main ML threat is fraud and, as detailed in IO.7, many of these investigations end up being categorised as standalone ML. In these cases, assets are identified and investigated as a matter of course. Conversely, there is a lack of comprehensive data quantifying the number of predicate crime cases where competent authorities pursue the recovery of criminal assets. Thus, it is challenging to assess how frequently and how well LEAs routinely identify and investigate assets for potential confiscation stemming from non-ML cases. This is occurring in some instances, as shown by Table 8.1 below. 503. Supported by SOPs, the focus of LEAs is primarily to identify and seize in the investigative stage. Beyond typical investigative techniques, Singapore also uses concealed income analysis (CIA) to examine the totality of an accused’s hidden or undisclosed assets, liabilities and expenses. This is done with a view to finding wealth that is disproportionate to known legitimate income which can be confiscated. This analysis allows LEAs to come to a better understanding of the quantum of criminal proceeds of the individual(s) under investigation. In these instances, courts can order the seizure and confiscation against the defendant, which extends to property that is not shown to be directly linked to an offence and is disproportionate to the defendant’s known sources of income when the defendant cannot explain a legitimate source of wealth to the satisfaction of the Court. While Singapore has shown some very limited success using CIA by seizing SGD 20.9 million (USD 16 million) through 173 analyses, this intensive analysis is used infrequently when compared to the 11 000 ML investigations as well as the unknown but much higher number of predicate investigations. There are missed opportunities to identify additional criminal assets. 504. In conclusion, LEAs proactively identify and trace criminal property drawing on a strong legislative framework and operational powers, but few ML investigations uncover significant criminal property. Challenges for the identification of assets include a higher focus on money mule-related fraud over complex ML networks, proving mens rea , pursuing assets tied to foreign predicate offences, and the pursuit of assets through complex structures and limited targeting of professional intermediaries. Box 8.2. Identification and tracing of assets 3B$ case [34] SPF conducted an 18-month investigation tracing the networks and holdings of the suspects and their associates, their criminal activities and their assets. A joint workgroup comprising SPF, STRO and AGC was formed. SPF worked with STRO to identify instances of foreign nationals submitting forged documents to banks to substantiate their importation of funds into Singapore. Pre-raid preparations included collaborations with banks via MAS and digital forensics, including in-house virtual asset tracing and support from a private sector expert. Authorities identified assets linked to 27 persons of interest. SPF arrested 10 foreign nationals and issued prohibition orders on assets tied to 17 others who had left Singapore before the investigation began. Over SGD 3 billion (USD 2.2 billion) in assets were seized or issued with prohibition orders, including bank funds (over SGD 1.45 billion/USD 1 billion), cash (over SGD 76 million/USD 56.2 million), cryptocurrencies (over SGD 38 million/USD 28.1 million), real estate, vehicles, luxury bags, luxury watches, jewellery, alcohol, and other high-value collectibles. Use of CIA MOM investigated Person A, a town council conservancy manager suspected of collecting kickbacks from foreign workers between 2016 and 2020. Upon further investigations, MOM seized SGD 326 305 (USD 241 465) in cash from Person A’s home and alerted CAD, prompting concurrent financial investigations and a CIA. These revealed that Person A had accumulated about SGD 1.4 million (USD 1 million) in wealth despite declaring only SGD 588 000 (USD 435 120), leaving over SGD 706 000 (USD 522 440) of unexplained wealth. Although no ML offences were established due to the cash-based nature of transactions and lack of admissible evidence, MOM recommended 61 charges for collecting kickbacks. Person A was sentenced in November 2024 to 24 weeks’ imprisonment and ordered to return SGD 395 440 (USD 293 000) to 57 migrant workers. Confiscation proceedings for the remaining unexplained wealth of SGD 311 119 (USD 230 000) are ongoing. Footnotes [34] See Box 7.1" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. Prosecution of TF (and terrorism) offences in Singapore is the responsibility of the AGC, who is well-resourced with competent prosecutors for the volume of TF cases who have demonstrated an ability to prosecute TF cases. AGC works closely with CFTB to ensure that there is sufficient and credible court-admissible evidence before prosecuting individuals involved in TF. This ensures that, by the time charges are tendered in court, there is sufficient admissible evidence to make out the TF offences against the individuals concerned, thereby maximising the chances of successful TF prosecutions and convictions. Table 9.3. Prosecutions and Convictions of TF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of TF Investigations Opened 25 28 21 23 29 126 Number of Natural and Legal Persons Investigated for TF 57 62 26 30 38 213 Number of Ongoing Investigations 5 21 Number of Natural Persons Prosecutions 4 1 1 6 Number of Natural Persons Convictions 4 1 1 6 557. Since 2020, Singapore has prosecuted six natural persons for TF. Whilst this is a low number considering that 213 natural and legal persons were the subject of a TF investigation since 2020 it is due to the low threshold for opening TF cases given the national security implications of T/TF. AGC has a robust internal threshold for bringing a TF prosecution and Singapore has secured a conviction in all six cases, including extra-territorial cases, with five convictions from guilty pleas and one conviction after a full trial where the subject contested the offence before the courts. The facts of a small number of cases were reviewed and the decision to prosecute or not seemed reasonable in those cases. An overwhelming number of cases are resolved through a guilty plea (five out of six). Singapore’s approach to bringing prosecutions is viewed as conservative as there likely are some cases where Singapore’s AGC has decided that there is insufficient mens rea to proceed where they may have succeeded in court. This approach results in fewer potential criminals facing criminal justice. 558. All of Singapore’s prosecutions and convictions involve individuals sending small amounts of their salary overseas to support global terrorist activities. The typology for TF in each of these cases is essentially the same but the methods used were slightly different. Each case involved small amounts of money (generally SGD 20 to 100 or USD 15-74) transmitted by individuals residing in Singapore (either Singaporeans or resident workers), from their salaries via legitimate channels (PSPs), to overseas terrorist actors, entities, or sympathisers. Box 9.2. Case Study: Mens Rea in prosecuting TF In December 2021, Person A (male Country Z national) was charged in Singapore for providing monies (SGD 891.98) to Entity A and another &quot;charity&quot; campaign in Country S &quot;having reasonable grounds to believe&quot; that the monies would, in part, benefit members of Entity B, a terrorist group in Country S. The money was provided through a remittance service in October 2014. During TF investigations, Person A consistently took the position that he had no knowledge and did not &quot;know&quot; that the monies he had donated would benefit the terrorist entity (i.e. Entity B). Given Person A's denials, and bearing in mind the objective-subjective standard for &quot;reasonable grounds to believe&quot;, CAD/CFTB worked closely with AGC and conducted investigations focused on demonstrating that Person A possessed the requisite mens rea by establishing the following : · Person A originally supported the goals of ISIS to establish an Islamic caliphate in Syria. Around mid-2019, Person A changed his allegiance to support Entity B. · Person A made multiple social media accounts and pages to spread his own views (which involved violence and war). He created multiple social media accounts using temporary email addresses and phone numbers to evade deletion by the social media company. · Person A bought kitchen knives, pen knives, foldable knives to be “ready for jihad” if religious clashes broke out. He had not conceived any specific plans at the time of his arrest, nor had he intended specific consequences for his actions. · Person A followed the social media posts of Person B, which publicised (1) that Entity A’s hospital purportedly provided medical treatment to all persons in the area; and (2) a purported charity campaign contributing to homebuilding efforts in Country S. · Person A knew (1) the area the hospital was located in, and (2) the area where the homebuilding efforts were located, were controlled by Entity B and its fighters. AGC successfully persuaded the court that Person A had &quot;reasonable grounds to believe&quot; that the monies would benefit members of Entity B. Person A ultimately pled guilty to the charges and was convicted on five counts under section 4(1)(b) TSOFA and sentenced to 32 months' imprisonment. Box 9.3. Case Study: TF trial to sentencing This is the only trial under TSOFA during the assessment period from 2020 to 2024. The accused (Person A) is a Singaporean who, on 31 October 2014, remitted moneys amounting to SGD 450, through a money remittance service, to an individual in Country X for his publication of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) propaganda. Person A did this knowing that the moneys would benefit the ISIS by, amongst other things, garnering more support for ISIS and raising awareness for ISIS. Person A repeatedly stated throughout the trial that he did not recognise Singapore law. After hearing submissions from AGC, the court convicted Person A. Even though Person A had donated only SGD 450, the court considered the fact that Person A was not remorseful for committing the offence. The court sentenced Person A to a sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment. Table 9.4. Typology of TF Convictions in Singapore Person Source of Funds Typology Salary Use of PSP Social Media Appeal for Funding Foreign Charitable Appeals Front NPOs Person A X X X Person B X X X Person C X X X Person D X X X Person E X X X Person F X X X 559. Singapore has not yet prosecuted any cases of other TF typologies, such as funds transiting Singapore, that have been highlighted in the TF NRA. As identified above, the TF methods that have been detected in Singapore are fairly unsophisticated and conventional. Singapore is yet to prosecute different types of TF activity. This approach does not fully account for Singapore’s risk profile. 560. Overall, Singapore brings few of its TF investigations for prosecution (less than 5%). Whilst the AGC’s internal threshold is effective in converting prosecutions to conviction, with a 100% success rate, which leads to the conclusion that the robustness of evidential threshold applied internally by the AGC prior to going to court is impacting on the number of prosecutions that are undertaken. TF activity prosecuted and convicted is relatively unsophisticated, and only partially reflective of Singapore’s risk and context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. Prosecution of TF (and terrorism) offences in Singapore is the responsibility of the AGC, who is well-resourced with competent prosecutors for the volume of TF cases who have demonstrated an ability to prosecute TF cases. AGC works closely with CFTB to ensure that there is sufficient and credible court-admissible evidence before prosecuting individuals involved in TF. This ensures that, by the time charges are tendered in court, there is sufficient admissible evidence to make out the TF offences against the individuals concerned, thereby maximising the chances of successful TF prosecutions and convictions. Table 9.3. Prosecutions and Convictions of TF 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of TF Investigations Opened 25 28 21 23 29 126 Number of Natural and Legal Persons Investigated for TF 57 62 26 30 38 213 Number of Ongoing Investigations 5 21 Number of Natural Persons Prosecutions 4 1 1 6 Number of Natural Persons Convictions 4 1 1 6 557. Since 2020, Singapore has prosecuted six natural persons for TF. Whilst this is a low number considering that 213 natural and legal persons were the subject of a TF investigation since 2020 it is due to the low threshold for opening TF cases given the national security implications of T/TF. AGC has a robust internal threshold for bringing a TF prosecution and Singapore has secured a conviction in all six cases, including extra-territorial cases, with five convictions from guilty pleas and one conviction after a full trial where the subject contested the offence before the courts. The facts of a small number of cases were reviewed and the decision to prosecute or not seemed reasonable in those cases. An overwhelming number of cases are resolved through a guilty plea (five out of six). Singapore’s approach to bringing prosecutions is viewed as conservative as there likely are some cases where Singapore’s AGC has decided that there is insufficient mens rea to proceed where they may have succeeded in court. This approach results in fewer potential criminals facing criminal justice. 558. All of Singapore’s prosecutions and convictions involve individuals sending small amounts of their salary overseas to support global terrorist activities. The typology for TF in each of these cases is essentially the same but the methods used were slightly different. Each case involved small amounts of money (generally SGD 20 to 100 or USD 15-74) transmitted by individuals residing in Singapore (either Singaporeans or resident workers), from their salaries via legitimate channels (PSPs), to overseas terrorist actors, entities, or sympathisers. Box 9.2. Case Study: Mens Rea in prosecuting TF In December 2021, Person A (male Country Z national) was charged in Singapore for providing monies (SGD 891.98) to Entity A and another &quot;charity&quot; campaign in Country S &quot;having reasonable grounds to believe&quot; that the monies would, in part, benefit members of Entity B, a terrorist group in Country S. The money was provided through a remittance service in October 2014. During TF investigations, Person A consistently took the position that he had no knowledge and did not &quot;know&quot; that the monies he had donated would benefit the terrorist entity (i.e. Entity B). Given Person A's denials, and bearing in mind the objective-subjective standard for &quot;reasonable grounds to believe&quot;, CAD/CFTB worked closely with AGC and conducted investigations focused on demonstrating that Person A possessed the requisite mens rea by establishing the following : · Person A originally supported the goals of ISIS to establish an Islamic caliphate in Syria. Around mid-2019, Person A changed his allegiance to support Entity B. · Person A made multiple social media accounts and pages to spread his own views (which involved violence and war). He created multiple social media accounts using temporary email addresses and phone numbers to evade deletion by the social media company. · Person A bought kitchen knives, pen knives, foldable knives to be “ready for jihad” if religious clashes broke out. He had not conceived any specific plans at the time of his arrest, nor had he intended specific consequences for his actions. · Person A followed the social media posts of Person B, which publicised (1) that Entity A’s hospital purportedly provided medical treatment to all persons in the area; and (2) a purported charity campaign contributing to homebuilding efforts in Country S. · Person A knew (1) the area the hospital was located in, and (2) the area where the homebuilding efforts were located, were controlled by Entity B and its fighters. AGC successfully persuaded the court that Person A had &quot;reasonable grounds to believe&quot; that the monies would benefit members of Entity B. Person A ultimately pled guilty to the charges and was convicted on five counts under section 4(1)(b) TSOFA and sentenced to 32 months' imprisonment. Box 9.3. Case Study: TF trial to sentencing This is the only trial under TSOFA during the assessment period from 2020 to 2024. The accused (Person A) is a Singaporean who, on 31 October 2014, remitted moneys amounting to SGD 450, through a money remittance service, to an individual in Country X for his publication of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) propaganda. Person A did this knowing that the moneys would benefit the ISIS by, amongst other things, garnering more support for ISIS and raising awareness for ISIS. Person A repeatedly stated throughout the trial that he did not recognise Singapore law. After hearing submissions from AGC, the court convicted Person A. Even though Person A had donated only SGD 450, the court considered the fact that Person A was not remorseful for committing the offence. The court sentenced Person A to a sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment. Table 9.4. Typology of TF Convictions in Singapore Person Source of Funds Typology Salary Use of PSP Social Media Appeal for Funding Foreign Charitable Appeals Front NPOs Person A X X X Person B X X X Person C X X X Person D X X X Person E X X X Person F X X X 559. Singapore has not yet prosecuted any cases of other TF typologies, such as funds transiting Singapore, that have been highlighted in the TF NRA. As identified above, the TF methods that have been detected in Singapore are fairly unsophisticated and conventional. Singapore is yet to prosecute different types of TF activity. This approach does not fully account for Singapore’s risk profile. 560. Overall, Singapore brings few of its TF investigations for prosecution (less than 5%). Whilst the AGC’s internal threshold is effective in converting prosecutions to conviction, with a 100% success rate, which leads to the conclusion that the robustness of evidential threshold applied internally by the AGC prior to going to court is impacting on the number of prosecutions that are undertaken. TF activity prosecuted and convicted is relatively unsophisticated, and only partially reflective of Singapore’s risk and context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. During the assessed period, no assets have been identified or frozen under UNSCR 1267. Singapore has provided information on one false positive being reported by a FI in 2024 after the September 2024 update to the First Schedule of TSOFA. Given Singapore’s status as an IFC the volume of transactions with assets under management around SGD 8.2 trillion (USD 6 trillion) and annual transaction values around SGD 98.2 trillion (USD 72.6 trillion), it is implausible that there are no positive matches and only one negative match. The lack of funds or assets identified under TF TFS is not in line with the risk and context of Singapore. 586. All reporting entities are required to identify funds or assets held by UNSC-designated individuals/entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or under their direction, and report directly to the SPF (S8 and 10 of TSOFA), as well as file an STR on the frozen assets. During the assessment period there were 11 STRs lodged by reporting entities on TF TFS under the UNSCR-regime related to Al-Qaida. In all 11 cases, the reporting entity had suspended the transaction, requested additional information from the customer and also filed an STR and informed the authorities accordingly. The STRs were promptly reviewed and referred by STRO to ISD and CFTB but following investigations, there was insufficient identifiers/information to take any further action. These instances highlight areas for improvement where LEAs could be using a wider range of information and skill sets to identify beneficial owners, or undertake complex network analysis where appropriate, to ensure the funds and assets of natural and legal persons subject to TF TFS are identified. Table 10.1. Designations and Net Change in Assets Frozen Under Domestic Regime 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Net change in aggregate value of assets frozen from previous year (SGD, rounded to nearest dollar) +155 857 +588 118 +122 229 +193 789 -$1 809 079 Number of individuals added/removed from the 1st schedule 8 individuals added 4 individuals added No change in number of individuals in First Schedule. [NB: the increased value of assets of the listed individuals is due to COVID-related government payouts to all Singaporeans.] 3 individuals added 20 individuals removed from 1 st Schedule 587. During the assessment period, Singapore froze a net value of SGD 1.3 million (USD 962 000) of assets listed under Singapore’s domestic TFS regime (i.e. UNSCR 1373). Singapore currently has frozen approximately SGD 3.97 million (USD 2.9 million) of assets belonging to 16 individuals listed in the first schedule of the TSOFA. Singapore has shown itself adept at identifying and freezing funds and other assets. The value and types of assets frozen under UNSCR 1373 are in line with Singapore’s risk profile. Table 10.2. Assets Frozen Under UNSCR 1373 at 31 December 2024 by Asset Type Type of Asset Value of Assets (SGD, rounded to nearest dollar) CPF (social security scheme) 793 606 Bank Account Balance 233 776 Property 1 709 888 Investment 926 000 Insurance 303 664 Total 3 966 934 588. ISD is the competent authority with responsibility for oversight on frozen assets. ISD is also responsible for any applications for exemptions from freezing. During the assessed period, an average of 240 exemption orders were processed annually. Within ISD there is a team responsible for the rehabilitation of persons designated under TSOFA who continue to monitor and engage with the person and their family as part of their re-integration process. This process is observed to be effective. 589. Individuals under investigation by ISD are provisionally detained as a national security measure. Whilst a person is detained by ISD they are physically prevented from accessing any funds or assets and communication with others is tightly controlled. Their funds and assets, however, remain unencumbered, meaning that those acting on their behalf or at their direction could still have access to the funds/assets while the individual under investigation is provisionally detained. Competent authorities acknowledge that funds and assets could be accessed by third persons, including those acting on behalf of or at the direction of financiers, but there are no known instances of this happening. Should an instance happen, it would be investigated by ISD. Notwithstanding that, this is a significant shortcoming." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. During the assessed period, no assets have been identified or frozen under UNSCR 1267. Singapore has provided information on one false positive being reported by a FI in 2024 after the September 2024 update to the First Schedule of TSOFA. Given Singapore’s status as an IFC the volume of transactions with assets under management around SGD 8.2 trillion (USD 6 trillion) and annual transaction values around SGD 98.2 trillion (USD 72.6 trillion), it is implausible that there are no positive matches and only one negative match. The lack of funds or assets identified under TF TFS is not in line with the risk and context of Singapore. 586. All reporting entities are required to identify funds or assets held by UNSC-designated individuals/entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or under their direction, and report directly to the SPF (S8 and 10 of TSOFA), as well as file an STR on the frozen assets. During the assessment period there were 11 STRs lodged by reporting entities on TF TFS under the UNSCR-regime related to Al-Qaida. In all 11 cases, the reporting entity had suspended the transaction, requested additional information from the customer and also filed an STR and informed the authorities accordingly. The STRs were promptly reviewed and referred by STRO to ISD and CFTB but following investigations, there was insufficient identifiers/information to take any further action. These instances highlight areas for improvement where LEAs could be using a wider range of information and skill sets to identify beneficial owners, or undertake complex network analysis where appropriate, to ensure the funds and assets of natural and legal persons subject to TF TFS are identified. Table 10.1. Designations and Net Change in Assets Frozen Under Domestic Regime 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24 Net change in aggregate value of assets frozen from previous year (SGD, rounded to nearest dollar) +155 857 +588 118 +122 229 +193 789 -$1 809 079 Number of individuals added/removed from the 1st schedule 8 individuals added 4 individuals added No change in number of individuals in First Schedule. [NB: the increased value of assets of the listed individuals is due to COVID-related government payouts to all Singaporeans.] 3 individuals added 20 individuals removed from 1 st Schedule 587. During the assessment period, Singapore froze a net value of SGD 1.3 million (USD 962 000) of assets listed under Singapore’s domestic TFS regime (i.e. UNSCR 1373). Singapore currently has frozen approximately SGD 3.97 million (USD 2.9 million) of assets belonging to 16 individuals listed in the first schedule of the TSOFA. Singapore has shown itself adept at identifying and freezing funds and other assets. The value and types of assets frozen under UNSCR 1373 are in line with Singapore’s risk profile. Table 10.2. Assets Frozen Under UNSCR 1373 at 31 December 2024 by Asset Type Type of Asset Value of Assets (SGD, rounded to nearest dollar) CPF (social security scheme) 793 606 Bank Account Balance 233 776 Property 1 709 888 Investment 926 000 Insurance 303 664 Total 3 966 934 588. ISD is the competent authority with responsibility for oversight on frozen assets. ISD is also responsible for any applications for exemptions from freezing. During the assessed period, an average of 240 exemption orders were processed annually. Within ISD there is a team responsible for the rehabilitation of persons designated under TSOFA who continue to monitor and engage with the person and their family as part of their re-integration process. This process is observed to be effective. 589. Individuals under investigation by ISD are provisionally detained as a national security measure. Whilst a person is detained by ISD they are physically prevented from accessing any funds or assets and communication with others is tightly controlled. Their funds and assets, however, remain unencumbered, meaning that those acting on their behalf or at their direction could still have access to the funds/assets while the individual under investigation is provisionally detained. Competent authorities acknowledge that funds and assets could be accessed by third persons, including those acting on behalf of or at the direction of financiers, but there are no known instances of this happening. Should an instance happen, it would be investigated by ISD. Notwithstanding that, this is a significant shortcoming." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="637. PF risks are monitored through the RTIG, overseen by the AML/CFT SC. Singapore recently published its first PF NRA report and an accompanying National CPF Strategy in 2024. Singapore’s PF NRA built on existing guidance and industry engagements, and covered the risks of breaches, non-implementation and evasion of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK and Iran, including activity-based sanctions (i.e. broader than the scope of the FATF Standards). The NRA process involved all relevant competent authorities, including ACRA, AGC, CAD, MFA, MHA, MinLaw, MAS and Customs, overseen by the RTIG. The ACIP was also consulted, with a specific CPF Working Group gathering feedback from financial and non-financial sectors. 638. Singapore’s PF NRA assessed risks based on threats, vulnerabilities (with reference to possible exploitation) and consequences. Key data included PF investigations, proliferation investigations, PF-related and sanctions evasion-related STRs, PF-related intelligence, PF-related requests for formal and informal international co-operation and international typologies (including those from the UNSC Panel of Experts). Singapore conducted sectoral vulnerability assessments, factoring in CPF controls and industry feedback, and consulted international partners. The NRA was shared with private sector stakeholders through existing supervisor communication mechanisms, including alerts, circulars and industry outreach. 639. Singapore’s PF NRA methodology is reasonable. Although the PF NRA does not use the same terminology as the ML and TF NRAs, Singapore explained that the terms used in the PF NRA (i.e. “Higher PF risks”, “Some PF risks” and “Sector to watch” as set out in Box 11.1 below) correspond to “High”, “Medium-High” and “Medium-Low” in the ML and TF NRAs respectively. Singapore explained that a different approach was taken to better support industry’s focus on the substance of the PF NRA since assessing PF risks is a relatively new obligation. Singapore is credited with trying to support the private sector’s implementation of a new obligation but these differences in terminology make it less likely for the private sector to be able to implement a risk-based approach and the language used did not appear reflective of the risk situation (e.g. labelling a sector as “exposed to some PF risks” sends a different signal from labelling it as “Medium-High risk”). Singapore has conveyed that based on industry engagements post-publication of the PF NRA, there was no indication that the private sector had misunderstood the PF NRA findings including the risk ratings or how each sector stands relative to other sectors. 640. While the PF threats, vulnerabilities and risk areas set out below have been appropriately identified, further granularity and context-specific insights are needed to strengthen the assessment. This is particularly the case for capturing nuanced risk scenarios and applying these to Singapore’s context rather than relying on international typologies. As noted in IO.1, Singapore’s PF risk identification and assessment process also does not bring any proportionality to the risks identified. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Box 11.1. Summary of Key Findings from Singapore’s PF NRA (2024) 641. There is misalignment in Singapore’s PF NRA that downplays Singapore’s PF risk exposure. For example, DPTSPs are considered “exposed to some PF risks” when the misuse of virtual assets has been identified as a key PF threat. CSPs are also considered “exposed to some PF risks” while the misuse of legal persons has been identified as another key PF threat. Overall, Singapore’s assessment of PF risk lacks alignment and the language used downplays the country’s exposure to PF risk. Interviews with Singapore’s competent authorities indicated that there is an uneven understanding of the risks of potential breaches, non-implementation or evasion of PF TFS obligations, with key RTIG agencies (like MAS and CAD) and MFA having a stronger understanding. 642. There is no mechanism or part of Singapore’s risk identification and assessment process that identifies, assesses and attempts to understand lower PF threats, vulnerabilities and risks. Singapore’s one-page CPF Strategy was released in 2024 within the PF NRA report and comprises five generic actions that are largely already being undertaken: (1) maintain strong national and international co-operation, (2) remain alert to evolving PF risks, (3) keep regulatory instruments up-to-date and compliant with relevant UNSCRs, (4) engage industry to raise and strengthen industry’s PF risk awareness and understanding, and (5) monitor for compliance and take proportionate and effective enforcement action. Singapore’s strategies and actions to be undertaken (as set out in the CPF Strategy) are high-level, lack specificity and are already underway. Further, they do not appear to directly address the threats, vulnerabilities or risks that have been identified as part of the PF NRA process. Lastly, while there is proportionality to the risks identified, there is no proportionality to the risk mitigation responses in the CPF Strategy. These actions do not adequately or specifically mitigate Singapore’s risks, threats, or vulnerabilities, and are not measurable quantitatively or time bound. Singapore mainly monitors and reviews its CPF efforts via the AML/CFT SC, IAC and RTIG interagency co-ordination mechanisms. 643. During the reporting period, Singapore has issued a range of CPF guidance materials across AML/CFT-obliged sectors. However, there are key context-specific threats and vulnerabilities that are not included in the guidance materials. Aside from outreach by Singapore authorities, there are limited mitigation measures applicable to the Singaporean entities that export luxury goods and those that provide goods or services to the maritime industry, including to representation offices of foreign flag States operating in Singapore offering flags of convenience (e.g. Liberia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands), where outreach was conducted very recently. As detailed below, Singapore relies heavily on its trade ban with the DPRK as a mitigation measure without specific attention to PF issues. For example, while misuse of legal persons is a key PF threat identified by Singapore, there is negligible evidence of targeted mitigation measures undertaken in relation to CSPs on PF, for example in relation to verification of BO information that might obfuscate identities of designated persons (see IO.5). 644. Given Singapore’s status as a hub for trade, transport and maritime, Singapore Customs has in place measures to monitor and enforce the DPRK trade ban. The MPA also has in place systems and controls to ensure that Singapore does not register ships that are owned by UNSC-designated persons, and that Singapore-registered ships comply with Singapore’s regulations. Further, MPA has in place controls to ensure that UNSC-designated ships and those ships owned or controlled by the DPRK are not able to call at Singapore’s port. As stated above, Singapore recently engaged the representation offices of foreign flag States. There is scope for Singapore to further engage these offices as the representation offices that the AT met in Singapore demonstrated a negligible understanding of the PF TFS obligations. Given that the changes to incorporate PF into the scope of the FATF Recommendations occurred in 2020, the scale of Singapore’s vulnerability and the findings of the PF NRA, it is unclear why these industries were not prioritised throughout the reporting period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="637. PF risks are monitored through the RTIG, overseen by the AML/CFT SC. Singapore recently published its first PF NRA report and an accompanying National CPF Strategy in 2024. Singapore’s PF NRA built on existing guidance and industry engagements, and covered the risks of breaches, non-implementation and evasion of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK and Iran, including activity-based sanctions (i.e. broader than the scope of the FATF Standards). The NRA process involved all relevant competent authorities, including ACRA, AGC, CAD, MFA, MHA, MinLaw, MAS and Customs, overseen by the RTIG. The ACIP was also consulted, with a specific CPF Working Group gathering feedback from financial and non-financial sectors. 638. Singapore’s PF NRA assessed risks based on threats, vulnerabilities (with reference to possible exploitation) and consequences. Key data included PF investigations, proliferation investigations, PF-related and sanctions evasion-related STRs, PF-related intelligence, PF-related requests for formal and informal international co-operation and international typologies (including those from the UNSC Panel of Experts). Singapore conducted sectoral vulnerability assessments, factoring in CPF controls and industry feedback, and consulted international partners. The NRA was shared with private sector stakeholders through existing supervisor communication mechanisms, including alerts, circulars and industry outreach. 639. Singapore’s PF NRA methodology is reasonable. Although the PF NRA does not use the same terminology as the ML and TF NRAs, Singapore explained that the terms used in the PF NRA (i.e. “Higher PF risks”, “Some PF risks” and “Sector to watch” as set out in Box 11.1 below) correspond to “High”, “Medium-High” and “Medium-Low” in the ML and TF NRAs respectively. Singapore explained that a different approach was taken to better support industry’s focus on the substance of the PF NRA since assessing PF risks is a relatively new obligation. Singapore is credited with trying to support the private sector’s implementation of a new obligation but these differences in terminology make it less likely for the private sector to be able to implement a risk-based approach and the language used did not appear reflective of the risk situation (e.g. labelling a sector as “exposed to some PF risks” sends a different signal from labelling it as “Medium-High risk”). Singapore has conveyed that based on industry engagements post-publication of the PF NRA, there was no indication that the private sector had misunderstood the PF NRA findings including the risk ratings or how each sector stands relative to other sectors. 640. While the PF threats, vulnerabilities and risk areas set out below have been appropriately identified, further granularity and context-specific insights are needed to strengthen the assessment. This is particularly the case for capturing nuanced risk scenarios and applying these to Singapore’s context rather than relying on international typologies. As noted in IO.1, Singapore’s PF risk identification and assessment process also does not bring any proportionality to the risks identified. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Box 11.1. Summary of Key Findings from Singapore’s PF NRA (2024) 641. There is misalignment in Singapore’s PF NRA that downplays Singapore’s PF risk exposure. For example, DPTSPs are considered “exposed to some PF risks” when the misuse of virtual assets has been identified as a key PF threat. CSPs are also considered “exposed to some PF risks” while the misuse of legal persons has been identified as another key PF threat. Overall, Singapore’s assessment of PF risk lacks alignment and the language used downplays the country’s exposure to PF risk. Interviews with Singapore’s competent authorities indicated that there is an uneven understanding of the risks of potential breaches, non-implementation or evasion of PF TFS obligations, with key RTIG agencies (like MAS and CAD) and MFA having a stronger understanding. 642. There is no mechanism or part of Singapore’s risk identification and assessment process that identifies, assesses and attempts to understand lower PF threats, vulnerabilities and risks. Singapore’s one-page CPF Strategy was released in 2024 within the PF NRA report and comprises five generic actions that are largely already being undertaken: (1) maintain strong national and international co-operation, (2) remain alert to evolving PF risks, (3) keep regulatory instruments up-to-date and compliant with relevant UNSCRs, (4) engage industry to raise and strengthen industry’s PF risk awareness and understanding, and (5) monitor for compliance and take proportionate and effective enforcement action. Singapore’s strategies and actions to be undertaken (as set out in the CPF Strategy) are high-level, lack specificity and are already underway. Further, they do not appear to directly address the threats, vulnerabilities or risks that have been identified as part of the PF NRA process. Lastly, while there is proportionality to the risks identified, there is no proportionality to the risk mitigation responses in the CPF Strategy. These actions do not adequately or specifically mitigate Singapore’s risks, threats, or vulnerabilities, and are not measurable quantitatively or time bound. Singapore mainly monitors and reviews its CPF efforts via the AML/CFT SC, IAC and RTIG interagency co-ordination mechanisms. 643. During the reporting period, Singapore has issued a range of CPF guidance materials across AML/CFT-obliged sectors. However, there are key context-specific threats and vulnerabilities that are not included in the guidance materials. Aside from outreach by Singapore authorities, there are limited mitigation measures applicable to the Singaporean entities that export luxury goods and those that provide goods or services to the maritime industry, including to representation offices of foreign flag States operating in Singapore offering flags of convenience (e.g. Liberia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands), where outreach was conducted very recently. As detailed below, Singapore relies heavily on its trade ban with the DPRK as a mitigation measure without specific attention to PF issues. For example, while misuse of legal persons is a key PF threat identified by Singapore, there is negligible evidence of targeted mitigation measures undertaken in relation to CSPs on PF, for example in relation to verification of BO information that might obfuscate identities of designated persons (see IO.5). 644. Given Singapore’s status as a hub for trade, transport and maritime, Singapore Customs has in place measures to monitor and enforce the DPRK trade ban. The MPA also has in place systems and controls to ensure that Singapore does not register ships that are owned by UNSC-designated persons, and that Singapore-registered ships comply with Singapore’s regulations. Further, MPA has in place controls to ensure that UNSC-designated ships and those ships owned or controlled by the DPRK are not able to call at Singapore’s port. As stated above, Singapore recently engaged the representation offices of foreign flag States. There is scope for Singapore to further engage these offices as the representation offices that the AT met in Singapore demonstrated a negligible understanding of the PF TFS obligations. Given that the changes to incorporate PF into the scope of the FATF Recommendations occurred in 2020, the scale of Singapore’s vulnerability and the findings of the PF NRA, it is unclear why these industries were not prioritised throughout the reporting period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Simplified Measures and Exemptions 128. Singapore adopts a very cautious approach to simplified measures and exemptions. 129. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs do not have to perform certain BO checks in specific lower risk scenarios. Examples of such customers include Singapore and foreign government entities, and an entity listed on the Singapore Exchange. FIs can apply the exemption unless there are doubts over the veracity of the CDD information or if the FI has ML or TF suspicions. 130. Singapore has also put in place provisions for simplified CDD measures that may be applied in relation to a customer, any natural person appointed to act on behalf of the customer and any BO of the customer if it is satisfied that the risks of ML/TF are low and when the assessment is supported by adequate information. The simplified CDD measures must continue to be commensurate with the level of risk, based on the risk factors identified by the FI/VASPs/DNFBPs. Simplified CDD measures are prohibited in higher risk scenarios, including where there is a suspicion of ML/TF. 131. Singapore has a very limited number of exemptions in place. Singapore considers exemptions when raised by the private sector through the RTIG. The following entities were exempted from AML/CFT requirements following RTIG discussions. · PSPs if they only offer products that meet certain low risk criteria for ML/TF [17] , and · trustee-managers of business trusts. 132. The exemption applies in relation to CDD, foreign currency exchange transactions, issuance of bearer negotiable instruments and cash payouts, agency arrangements, and wire transfers. Singapore identified these scenarios following an RTIG risk discussion and a ML/TF Risk Assessment. These exemptions are not in line with the findings of the ML NRA in relation to cross border money transfers as higher risks for Singapore, but notes that such exemptions are only allowed in very limited circumstances. 133. MAS has also encouraged FIs to conduct SDD when appropriate, for instance through issuance of circular on SDD measures for remittance services to foreign workers under isolation during Covid-19 period. However, there is no systematic mechanism to proactively and consistently monitor and identify scenarios for possible exemptions or simplified measures. Singapore indicated that the private sector may and has in fact raised the issue of exemptions, which was subject to rigorous discussion at the RTIG and approval by the AML/CFT SC. Singapore has focused its attentions on higher risk areas but could have better utilised its dynamic approach to more systematically consider and justify exemptions and simplified measures. In view of the process barriers and the low number of exemptions/simplified measures implemented, which is reasonable. Singapore does not effectively use its understanding of ML/TF risk to systematically justify exemptions and simplified measures. 1.3.2. Enhanced measures 134. Singapore has effective enhanced measures provisions in law and has applied them in practice in line with risks. Singapore requires EDD for FIs dealing with higher risk legal persons, with specific indicators that may indicate higher risks, including where the FI is not able to establish if the legal person has (a) any ongoing/apparent business activities, (b) economic or business purposes for its corporate structure, or (c) substantive financial activity. 135. Singapore has also applied enhanced measures to DPTSPs, including requiring CDD for all customers (a) that the DPTSP establishes business relations with, or (b) for whom the DPTSP undertakes or intends to undertake any transaction without an account being opened. FIs are also required to perform enhanced risk ongoing monitoring measures where a transaction involves a transfer of a digital token to, or receipt of a digital token, from an entity other than a MAS-regulated FI (or FIs subject to AML/CFT requirements consistent with FATF standards, where the FI is incorporated or established outside of Singapore). 136. Singapore also requires EDD for FIs engaging in transactions with higher risk countries or jurisdictions, including those identified by the FATF. MAS engages with FIs to ensure that they remain alert to risks resulting from geopolitical developments, including sanctions evasion risks. Relevant private sector institutions also noted they had their own geographic considerations and took enhanced measures as a result of risk advisory guidance. Singaporean authorities also demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of geographic risks and maintain their own lists of higher risk countries. This understanding of geographic risk could be better communicated to the private sector and used to inform the application of enhanced measures. 137. Overall, the results of Singapore’s assessments of ML/TF risks informs and supports the application of enhanced measures for higher risk scenarios. Footnotes [17] MAS defined low risk activities. These relate to account issuance services, domestic money transfer services, and CBMT services that meet certain low risk criteria, such as payment that is strictly only for goods or services and that payment is funded from an identifiable source (i.e. from a FI that is subject to and supervised for AML/CFT requirements)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Simplified Measures and Exemptions 128. Singapore adopts a very cautious approach to simplified measures and exemptions. 129. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs do not have to perform certain BO checks in specific lower risk scenarios. Examples of such customers include Singapore and foreign government entities, and an entity listed on the Singapore Exchange. FIs can apply the exemption unless there are doubts over the veracity of the CDD information or if the FI has ML or TF suspicions. 130. Singapore has also put in place provisions for simplified CDD measures that may be applied in relation to a customer, any natural person appointed to act on behalf of the customer and any BO of the customer if it is satisfied that the risks of ML/TF are low and when the assessment is supported by adequate information. The simplified CDD measures must continue to be commensurate with the level of risk, based on the risk factors identified by the FI/VASPs/DNFBPs. Simplified CDD measures are prohibited in higher risk scenarios, including where there is a suspicion of ML/TF. 131. Singapore has a very limited number of exemptions in place. Singapore considers exemptions when raised by the private sector through the RTIG. The following entities were exempted from AML/CFT requirements following RTIG discussions. · PSPs if they only offer products that meet certain low risk criteria for ML/TF [17] , and · trustee-managers of business trusts. 132. The exemption applies in relation to CDD, foreign currency exchange transactions, issuance of bearer negotiable instruments and cash payouts, agency arrangements, and wire transfers. Singapore identified these scenarios following an RTIG risk discussion and a ML/TF Risk Assessment. These exemptions are not in line with the findings of the ML NRA in relation to cross border money transfers as higher risks for Singapore, but notes that such exemptions are only allowed in very limited circumstances. 133. MAS has also encouraged FIs to conduct SDD when appropriate, for instance through issuance of circular on SDD measures for remittance services to foreign workers under isolation during Covid-19 period. However, there is no systematic mechanism to proactively and consistently monitor and identify scenarios for possible exemptions or simplified measures. Singapore indicated that the private sector may and has in fact raised the issue of exemptions, which was subject to rigorous discussion at the RTIG and approval by the AML/CFT SC. Singapore has focused its attentions on higher risk areas but could have better utilised its dynamic approach to more systematically consider and justify exemptions and simplified measures. In view of the process barriers and the low number of exemptions/simplified measures implemented, which is reasonable. Singapore does not effectively use its understanding of ML/TF risk to systematically justify exemptions and simplified measures. 1.3.2. Enhanced measures 134. Singapore has effective enhanced measures provisions in law and has applied them in practice in line with risks. Singapore requires EDD for FIs dealing with higher risk legal persons, with specific indicators that may indicate higher risks, including where the FI is not able to establish if the legal person has (a) any ongoing/apparent business activities, (b) economic or business purposes for its corporate structure, or (c) substantive financial activity. 135. Singapore has also applied enhanced measures to DPTSPs, including requiring CDD for all customers (a) that the DPTSP establishes business relations with, or (b) for whom the DPTSP undertakes or intends to undertake any transaction without an account being opened. FIs are also required to perform enhanced risk ongoing monitoring measures where a transaction involves a transfer of a digital token to, or receipt of a digital token, from an entity other than a MAS-regulated FI (or FIs subject to AML/CFT requirements consistent with FATF standards, where the FI is incorporated or established outside of Singapore). 136. Singapore also requires EDD for FIs engaging in transactions with higher risk countries or jurisdictions, including those identified by the FATF. MAS engages with FIs to ensure that they remain alert to risks resulting from geopolitical developments, including sanctions evasion risks. Relevant private sector institutions also noted they had their own geographic considerations and took enhanced measures as a result of risk advisory guidance. Singaporean authorities also demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of geographic risks and maintain their own lists of higher risk countries. This understanding of geographic risk could be better communicated to the private sector and used to inform the application of enhanced measures. 137. Overall, the results of Singapore’s assessments of ML/TF risks informs and supports the application of enhanced measures for higher risk scenarios. Footnotes [17] MAS defined low risk activities. These relate to account issuance services, domestic money transfer services, and CBMT services that meet certain low risk criteria, such as payment that is strictly only for goods or services and that payment is funded from an identifiable source (i.e. from a FI that is subject to and supervised for AML/CFT requirements)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="183. Competent authorities actively use informal channels as a means to an end and to support formal co-operation mechanisms, although greater alignment with risk could be achieved. This is appropriate and a positive feature of Singapore’s approach to international co-operation, but as noted above, it cannot replace formal co-operation channels when needed. Singapore leverages on various mechanisms such as multi-lateral networks, bilateral and diagonal co-operation, and joint analysis and investigations to provide a wide range of information, such as criminal records and intelligence, information on the identity of a suspect, financial information and intelligence. There are limitations to the provision of basic and BO information, which has a minor impact on this type of co-operation. 184. Despite guidelines and SOPs highlighting the importance for LEAs to seek international co-operation, informal co-operation aligns with risks to some extent. The number of requests made by some competent authorities (e.g. STRO, IRAS, CPIB) in respect of several high-risk offences (such as corruption and tax crimes) is much lower in comparison to those made in respect of fraud. This is similar to trends identified in respect of formal co-operation request (MLA issued by Singapore – see Table 7.4), indicating that informal co-operation in this area is ineffective and not sufficiently supportive of formal co-operation channels. 2.3.1. FIU 185. STRO is used in an appropriate and timely manner to seek and provide information to foreign counterparts, either to support its own purposes or those of other competent authorities. 186. STRO plays a central role in international co-operation, using Egmont Secure Web and other secure channels to exchange information with foreign FIUs, including non-Egmont members, on a reciprocal basis. It sent 1 465 RFAs (predominantly on SPF’s behalf), receiving responses to 86%. Most (73.5%) were submitted on behalf of LEAs, predominantly SPF, and according to authorities, these generally support investigations, asset tracing and provisional measures, highlighting STRO’s role in asset recovery (see Box 2.3). RFAs broadly align with risks, focusing on fraud/CEF (46%) and ML (37%). However, fewer requests target tax crimes (4%), T/TF (3%), and corruption (2%), suggesting underuse of international co-operation to pursue some higher-risk areas. 187. STRO provides appropriate and prompt assistance where requested, having received 1 744 RFAs and responded to 97%. In line with Egmont Standards, STRO responds to urgent requests within 7 days (per SOPs) and over 98% of non-urgent requests within 60 days. This timing is due to the need for STRO to verify the nature of the offence, and whether assistance can be provided under Singapore’s legislation. Around 30% of RFAs involved financial institution data, which should be quicker to obtain and share. Although STRO does not keep detailed statistics on assistance provided, RFAs typically involve (i) information from STRO’s databases, (ii) other information (e.g. bank or transaction records) obtained from REs (used in approximately 23% of requests) (iii) BO information and (iv) STRO’s own analysis. STRO may also consult other competent authorities – e.g. ACRA on BO information – when responding to RFAs. STRO also shares information spontaneously, sending 834 Spontaneous Exchange of Information (SEI), (mainly to USA, UK, Australia) on corruption and bribery, fraud, and ML, which generally aligns with risks. 188. Statistics on requests to freeze or recover funds are limited (but Singapore indicates STRO receives these). STRO cannot directly suspend transactions (this power lies with LEAs following the initiation of a domestic investigation, which can increase the risk of asset dissipation (see R.38). Case studies, however, show that STRO and LEAs generally act quickly when such requests arise (Box 2.3). 189. While feedback from the Global Network indicates that STRO’s assistance is generally satisfactory, some jurisdictions noted gaps in transaction details and limited information on financial flows, and a few delegations highlighted that responses could be timelier. Box 2.3. International co-operation by STRO Use of RFA in domestic investigations STRO received an RFA from a North American counterpart in November 2023 regarding a person who was suspected of a fraud offence and transferring fraudulent funds to a Singaporean investment account. In response, STRO conducted further inquiries (including checks with the financial institution) and shared information to the foreign counterpart within three weeks, indicating the possible presence of proceeds of crime. STRO received consent from the counterpart to share this information with SPF, which promptly seized SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) on the accounts. The case – including efforts to repatriate the assets – is ongoing. Application of provisional measures (suspension of transactions) and timely assistance provided In 2022, STRO received a RFA from a foreign FIU via the Egmont Group’s BEC Rapid Response channel regarding a BEC scam involving approximately USD 7.5 million transferred to Singapore. Leveraging on the ACIP mechanism, STRO immediately alerted the receiving bank and CAD through established ACIP channels. The receiving bank temporarily held the funds to allow CAD to investigate. Close co-ordination allowed the full amount to be recovered and returned to the victim within the same week. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 190. LEAs regularly use international co-operation to detect offences, advance investigations, and to trace and recover assets, providing timely assistance overall (Box 2.4). 191. Singapore has robust operational systems, supported by SOPs and MOUs, ensuring confidentiality and timely responses: LEAs should generally respond within three working days for interim acknowledgment, seven working days for simpler cases, and one month in more complex ones. Dedicated units manage cross-border engagement, such as the International Co-operation Department (SPF-ICD) for INTERPOL-related matters (e.g. screening against Red Notices and INTERPOL’s databases). The dedicated units handling international co-operation within the respective LEAs are the International Co-operation Branch for SPF-CAD, the International Operations Desk and Investigation Division for CNB, and the International Affairs &amp; Liaison Branch and Intelligence Division for CPIB. Also, within SPF, the ASC and CID’s Cyber Crime Command play key roles in facilitating co-operation, particularly in CEF cases. ASC operates a 24/7 service to enable rapid seizure of suspected criminal proceeds and direct engagement with foreign counterparts. 192. LEAs generally share a wide range of information, apart from BO information concerning Unregistered Foreign Companies. Even in the absence of domestic investigations, LEAs may share property valuations and land titles. Information typically sought by LEAs includes witness statements, criminal records, involvement in foreign investigations, and BO or company data, all of which support effective cross-border enforcement. Where coercive powers are required, foreign authorities must submit formal MLA requests. 193. Operational liaison channels – such as attachés in China and Indonesia, accredited officers in Singapore, and seconded officers at INTERPOL – enhance co-operation. Singapore engages bilaterally under MoUs or reciprocity and multilaterally through INTERPOL, ARIN-AP, WCO, IACCC, and the GLOBE Network, complemented by joint investigations (which has led to successful repatriation of funds), regular visits and training to strengthen relationships. 194. Singapore demonstrates active international engagement. LEAs received 3 741 INTERPOL requests, mainly on fraud (36%), ML (8%), cybercrime (7%), and corruption (1%), executing 84% (based on 2023–2024 data), and rejecting only 2% (usually where no offence was apparent or coercive powers – requiring an MLA – are required). SPF also plays a significant role seeking co-operation, sending approximately 11 975 requests to 152 jurisdictions, mainly targeting regional and material counterparts (such as Malaysia, China, Hong Kong China, Philippines, Thailand, UK and USA). These requests focus on fraud, ML, and cybercrime, reflecting Singapore’s risk exposure to a good extent. While comprehensive statistics are not available for the entire period (nor on the status of the requests), the volume and thematic focus of requests suggest a good alignment with risk and operational priorities. 195. Singapore does not maintain statistics on TF for confidential reasons, but case studies (see IO.9) and onsite discussions show that ISD and SPF both use informal channels as required. As noted in IO.9, it is a point of strength that Singapore shares pertinent information on TF investigations with international counterparts, through formal and informal channels. 196. Singapore also does not maintain statistics on whether each outgoing MLA request follows informal co-operation. Interviews with the authorities and some case studies suggest LEAs routinely rely on informal channels to obtain preliminary information. These channels are sometimes used to trace assets, including BO and bank account information, which can subsequently support formal actions such as asset seizure and confiscation. Most asset recovery requests target regional and materially significant partners and focus on fraud and ML offences. SPF plays a central role in asset recovery, successfully recovering over SGD 102 million (USD 75 million) through these channels. Where credible and actionable information exists that property in Singapore is linked to criminality, Singapore is able to assist foreign authorities in seizing property without delay with assistance having been provided in some cases within a day of receiving a request. 197. As identified in IO.5, the basic and BO information of Unregistered Foreign Companies is held only by the reporting entity. Unregistered foreign companies are those that are not regarded as carrying on business in Singapore and which only carry on activities in Singapore such as maintaining any bank account, investing any of their funds, or holding any property in Singapore . Given that LEAs require reason to suspect the commission of an arrestable offence to open an investigation and seek basic and BO information in relation to such companies, there may be delays or an inability in providing assistance where a threshold to open an investigation cannot be met. However, where LEAs detect information in STRO's database that is relevant to the foreign LEA's investigations, they will alert STRO, which may then send a spontaneous exchange of information (SEI) to the relevant foreign FIU, with explicit consent to share the information with the relevant foreign LEA. Box 2.4. International co-operation by LEAs 3B$ case SPF actively engaged with foreign authorities, sending 33 requests to 10 jurisdictions for information to, among others, trace assets and the whereabouts of suspects placed on INTERPOL notices (27 accused were investigated). In parallel, SPF received 63 requests from 18 jurisdictions. STRO also collaborated with at least 10 foreign FIUs to exchange financial intelligence supporting foreign investigations. LEAs shared detailed case findings, forensic data, and/or banking information with some jurisdictions. SPF worked closely with counterparts in two jurisdictions to facilitate their submission of MLAs seeking financial and court records. Provision of timely assistance to foreign jurisdictions (Anti Scam Centre) Upon the receipt of a police report lodged by a European conglomerate alleging embezzlement by its staff, CAD took immediate steps to work with the Anti-Scam Centre and various banks to expeditiously seize these accounts by the following day. About USD 70 million was recovered in Singapore across 15 bank accounts held by 12 shell companies and one individual. CAD also actively pursued the funds after dissipation from the Singapore bank accounts. CAD reached out to 26 jurisdictions through INTERPOL and FIU counterparts to share relevant information and trace the funds. This resulted in an additional USD156 000 being returned to Singapore, which was subsequently seized and returned to the victim, along with the rest of the seized funds. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 198. MAS regularly co-operates with foreign counterparts, either on a bilateral basis, during forums and conferences (Table 2.7). MAS can share information both upon request and spontaneously. Limited statistics show that MAS co-operates mainly with regional counterparts, other international financial centres and established partners (USA, Australia, Hong Kong, etc.). 199. Most of the information MAS seeks from counterparts concerns fit and proper checks, licensing and regulatory information, which help it conduct its supervisory functions (Box 2.5). There are limited instances of MAS seeking inspection reports. Where requested, MAS provides timely information to counterparts when all the confidentiality requirements are met. These requests overwhelmingly concern fit and proper information where feedback from the Global Network is generally positive). MAS granted 20 AML/CFT examinations on FIs in Singapore by foreign counterparts, out of which one was a joint inspection in 2023 and spontaneously shared six inspection reports to foreign counterparts. Table 2.7. International co-operation by MAS 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Outgoing requests by MAS 790 849 659 692 721 3 711 Fit and proper checks 310 314 305 278 295 1 502 (40) Regulatory information 229 252 163 171 168 983 (26) Exchange of inspection reports 0 1 0 0 1 2 (0) Licensing information 229 251 163 168 168 979 (26) IOSCO 22 31 28 75 89 245 (7) Incoming requests by MAS 102 88 111 134 133 568 Fit and proper checks 88 77 79 90 104 438 (77) Regulatory information 3 6 13 21 15 58 (10) Exchange of inspection reports 4 1 2 0 0 7 (1) Joint examinations 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Licensing information 3 3 11 18 13 48 (8) IOSCO 0 0 1 0 1 2 (0) Others (on-site examination/supervisory visit) 4 1 5 4 0 14 (2) Information requests executed by MAS 100 83 92 102 111 488 200. DNFBP supervisors appear to engage with foreign counterparts to exchange supervisory and regulatory information to a reasonable extent and for various purposes, although there is no detailed information. For example, ACRA has shared information with audit regulators from two neighbouring countries pertaining to registration of Singapore’s PAs and public accounting entities (PAEs) (collectively referred to as accountants) in those States, including the dates and results of audit examinations and information on any disciplinary proceedings. Between 2020 and 2024, GRA also exchanged information in over 180 outgoing and 40 incoming requests pertaining to the suitability of applicants with its nine MOU partners. Such requests are generally sent for higher-risk applicants to gather information on suitability, including their compliance records and any licence rejections by the foreign gambling regulators. Box 2.5. International co-operation for supervisory purposes Sharing Fit and proper information In 2021, MAS received requests from a foreign supervisor for fit and proper information concerning an entity incorporated in Singapore. This was triggered further to inquiries conducted by the foreign Supervisor into a parent company of the entity in Singapore. MAS provided information concerning both the entity in Singapore and relevant information concerning its parent company. The foreign counterpart ordered the entity to cease operations due to its inability to meet pre-licensing conditions. MAS also used this information when deciding not to renew the entity’s Singaporean license. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 201. Singapore demonstrates a proactive approach to international co-operation for customs and tax purposes, which is appropriate considering Singapore’s risk and context as an IFC. 202. With respect to customs, SC leverages SOPs when requesting information from foreign LEAs to investigate customs offences, detailing the case background, verification steps, and specific information sought, which may be linked to asset recovery. SC has received 109 spontaneous alerts from foreign administrations and acts on them where relevant and made 179 exchanges of information (EOI) requests to foreign counterparts in the assessed period. SC also provides assistance to counterparts in response to 551 EOI requests received (none were refused), for example to provide information on goods transhipping through Singapore which are suspected to be intended to be smuggled to foreign jurisdictions. This assistance is generally provided within one month, or quicker if the request is urgent. Based on its surveillance and operational activities, SC sent 182 spontaneous disseminations about suspicious activity with counterparts, either bilaterally or through the World Customs Organisations, which has helped in their enforcement activities. 203. With respect of tax, IRAS leverages a broad network of EOI arrangements with 156 jurisdictions to support enforcement, including in tax evasion cases. Requests are managed by a dedicated EOI team within IRAS’s International Tax and Relations Division, ensuring compliance with international standards and domestic legal requirements. All outbound requests are tracked, with follow-ups initiated if responses are delayed beyond 90 days (which is the international standard), and complex cases are escalated through direct engagement. Between 2020 and 2024, IRAS sent 90 tax-related requests in relation to suspected tax evasion cases and sent a total of 4 375 spontaneous EOIs to foreign partners. IRAS received 1 800 information requests from foreign partners and executed 98.2% of these (the remainder were withdrawn, with only a fraction declined by Singapore where they do not meet the EOIR standards)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="183. Competent authorities actively use informal channels as a means to an end and to support formal co-operation mechanisms, although greater alignment with risk could be achieved. This is appropriate and a positive feature of Singapore’s approach to international co-operation, but as noted above, it cannot replace formal co-operation channels when needed. Singapore leverages on various mechanisms such as multi-lateral networks, bilateral and diagonal co-operation, and joint analysis and investigations to provide a wide range of information, such as criminal records and intelligence, information on the identity of a suspect, financial information and intelligence. There are limitations to the provision of basic and BO information, which has a minor impact on this type of co-operation. 184. Despite guidelines and SOPs highlighting the importance for LEAs to seek international co-operation, informal co-operation aligns with risks to some extent. The number of requests made by some competent authorities (e.g. STRO, IRAS, CPIB) in respect of several high-risk offences (such as corruption and tax crimes) is much lower in comparison to those made in respect of fraud. This is similar to trends identified in respect of formal co-operation request (MLA issued by Singapore – see Table 7.4), indicating that informal co-operation in this area is ineffective and not sufficiently supportive of formal co-operation channels. 2.3.1. FIU 185. STRO is used in an appropriate and timely manner to seek and provide information to foreign counterparts, either to support its own purposes or those of other competent authorities. 186. STRO plays a central role in international co-operation, using Egmont Secure Web and other secure channels to exchange information with foreign FIUs, including non-Egmont members, on a reciprocal basis. It sent 1 465 RFAs (predominantly on SPF’s behalf), receiving responses to 86%. Most (73.5%) were submitted on behalf of LEAs, predominantly SPF, and according to authorities, these generally support investigations, asset tracing and provisional measures, highlighting STRO’s role in asset recovery (see Box 2.3). RFAs broadly align with risks, focusing on fraud/CEF (46%) and ML (37%). However, fewer requests target tax crimes (4%), T/TF (3%), and corruption (2%), suggesting underuse of international co-operation to pursue some higher-risk areas. 187. STRO provides appropriate and prompt assistance where requested, having received 1 744 RFAs and responded to 97%. In line with Egmont Standards, STRO responds to urgent requests within 7 days (per SOPs) and over 98% of non-urgent requests within 60 days. This timing is due to the need for STRO to verify the nature of the offence, and whether assistance can be provided under Singapore’s legislation. Around 30% of RFAs involved financial institution data, which should be quicker to obtain and share. Although STRO does not keep detailed statistics on assistance provided, RFAs typically involve (i) information from STRO’s databases, (ii) other information (e.g. bank or transaction records) obtained from REs (used in approximately 23% of requests) (iii) BO information and (iv) STRO’s own analysis. STRO may also consult other competent authorities – e.g. ACRA on BO information – when responding to RFAs. STRO also shares information spontaneously, sending 834 Spontaneous Exchange of Information (SEI), (mainly to USA, UK, Australia) on corruption and bribery, fraud, and ML, which generally aligns with risks. 188. Statistics on requests to freeze or recover funds are limited (but Singapore indicates STRO receives these). STRO cannot directly suspend transactions (this power lies with LEAs following the initiation of a domestic investigation, which can increase the risk of asset dissipation (see R.38). Case studies, however, show that STRO and LEAs generally act quickly when such requests arise (Box 2.3). 189. While feedback from the Global Network indicates that STRO’s assistance is generally satisfactory, some jurisdictions noted gaps in transaction details and limited information on financial flows, and a few delegations highlighted that responses could be timelier. Box 2.3. International co-operation by STRO Use of RFA in domestic investigations STRO received an RFA from a North American counterpart in November 2023 regarding a person who was suspected of a fraud offence and transferring fraudulent funds to a Singaporean investment account. In response, STRO conducted further inquiries (including checks with the financial institution) and shared information to the foreign counterpart within three weeks, indicating the possible presence of proceeds of crime. STRO received consent from the counterpart to share this information with SPF, which promptly seized SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) on the accounts. The case – including efforts to repatriate the assets – is ongoing. Application of provisional measures (suspension of transactions) and timely assistance provided In 2022, STRO received a RFA from a foreign FIU via the Egmont Group’s BEC Rapid Response channel regarding a BEC scam involving approximately USD 7.5 million transferred to Singapore. Leveraging on the ACIP mechanism, STRO immediately alerted the receiving bank and CAD through established ACIP channels. The receiving bank temporarily held the funds to allow CAD to investigate. Close co-ordination allowed the full amount to be recovered and returned to the victim within the same week. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 190. LEAs regularly use international co-operation to detect offences, advance investigations, and to trace and recover assets, providing timely assistance overall (Box 2.4). 191. Singapore has robust operational systems, supported by SOPs and MOUs, ensuring confidentiality and timely responses: LEAs should generally respond within three working days for interim acknowledgment, seven working days for simpler cases, and one month in more complex ones. Dedicated units manage cross-border engagement, such as the International Co-operation Department (SPF-ICD) for INTERPOL-related matters (e.g. screening against Red Notices and INTERPOL’s databases). The dedicated units handling international co-operation within the respective LEAs are the International Co-operation Branch for SPF-CAD, the International Operations Desk and Investigation Division for CNB, and the International Affairs &amp; Liaison Branch and Intelligence Division for CPIB. Also, within SPF, the ASC and CID’s Cyber Crime Command play key roles in facilitating co-operation, particularly in CEF cases. ASC operates a 24/7 service to enable rapid seizure of suspected criminal proceeds and direct engagement with foreign counterparts. 192. LEAs generally share a wide range of information, apart from BO information concerning Unregistered Foreign Companies. Even in the absence of domestic investigations, LEAs may share property valuations and land titles. Information typically sought by LEAs includes witness statements, criminal records, involvement in foreign investigations, and BO or company data, all of which support effective cross-border enforcement. Where coercive powers are required, foreign authorities must submit formal MLA requests. 193. Operational liaison channels – such as attachés in China and Indonesia, accredited officers in Singapore, and seconded officers at INTERPOL – enhance co-operation. Singapore engages bilaterally under MoUs or reciprocity and multilaterally through INTERPOL, ARIN-AP, WCO, IACCC, and the GLOBE Network, complemented by joint investigations (which has led to successful repatriation of funds), regular visits and training to strengthen relationships. 194. Singapore demonstrates active international engagement. LEAs received 3 741 INTERPOL requests, mainly on fraud (36%), ML (8%), cybercrime (7%), and corruption (1%), executing 84% (based on 2023–2024 data), and rejecting only 2% (usually where no offence was apparent or coercive powers – requiring an MLA – are required). SPF also plays a significant role seeking co-operation, sending approximately 11 975 requests to 152 jurisdictions, mainly targeting regional and material counterparts (such as Malaysia, China, Hong Kong China, Philippines, Thailand, UK and USA). These requests focus on fraud, ML, and cybercrime, reflecting Singapore’s risk exposure to a good extent. While comprehensive statistics are not available for the entire period (nor on the status of the requests), the volume and thematic focus of requests suggest a good alignment with risk and operational priorities. 195. Singapore does not maintain statistics on TF for confidential reasons, but case studies (see IO.9) and onsite discussions show that ISD and SPF both use informal channels as required. As noted in IO.9, it is a point of strength that Singapore shares pertinent information on TF investigations with international counterparts, through formal and informal channels. 196. Singapore also does not maintain statistics on whether each outgoing MLA request follows informal co-operation. Interviews with the authorities and some case studies suggest LEAs routinely rely on informal channels to obtain preliminary information. These channels are sometimes used to trace assets, including BO and bank account information, which can subsequently support formal actions such as asset seizure and confiscation. Most asset recovery requests target regional and materially significant partners and focus on fraud and ML offences. SPF plays a central role in asset recovery, successfully recovering over SGD 102 million (USD 75 million) through these channels. Where credible and actionable information exists that property in Singapore is linked to criminality, Singapore is able to assist foreign authorities in seizing property without delay with assistance having been provided in some cases within a day of receiving a request. 197. As identified in IO.5, the basic and BO information of Unregistered Foreign Companies is held only by the reporting entity. Unregistered foreign companies are those that are not regarded as carrying on business in Singapore and which only carry on activities in Singapore such as maintaining any bank account, investing any of their funds, or holding any property in Singapore . Given that LEAs require reason to suspect the commission of an arrestable offence to open an investigation and seek basic and BO information in relation to such companies, there may be delays or an inability in providing assistance where a threshold to open an investigation cannot be met. However, where LEAs detect information in STRO's database that is relevant to the foreign LEA's investigations, they will alert STRO, which may then send a spontaneous exchange of information (SEI) to the relevant foreign FIU, with explicit consent to share the information with the relevant foreign LEA. Box 2.4. International co-operation by LEAs 3B$ case SPF actively engaged with foreign authorities, sending 33 requests to 10 jurisdictions for information to, among others, trace assets and the whereabouts of suspects placed on INTERPOL notices (27 accused were investigated). In parallel, SPF received 63 requests from 18 jurisdictions. STRO also collaborated with at least 10 foreign FIUs to exchange financial intelligence supporting foreign investigations. LEAs shared detailed case findings, forensic data, and/or banking information with some jurisdictions. SPF worked closely with counterparts in two jurisdictions to facilitate their submission of MLAs seeking financial and court records. Provision of timely assistance to foreign jurisdictions (Anti Scam Centre) Upon the receipt of a police report lodged by a European conglomerate alleging embezzlement by its staff, CAD took immediate steps to work with the Anti-Scam Centre and various banks to expeditiously seize these accounts by the following day. About USD 70 million was recovered in Singapore across 15 bank accounts held by 12 shell companies and one individual. CAD also actively pursued the funds after dissipation from the Singapore bank accounts. CAD reached out to 26 jurisdictions through INTERPOL and FIU counterparts to share relevant information and trace the funds. This resulted in an additional USD156 000 being returned to Singapore, which was subsequently seized and returned to the victim, along with the rest of the seized funds. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 198. MAS regularly co-operates with foreign counterparts, either on a bilateral basis, during forums and conferences (Table 2.7). MAS can share information both upon request and spontaneously. Limited statistics show that MAS co-operates mainly with regional counterparts, other international financial centres and established partners (USA, Australia, Hong Kong, etc.). 199. Most of the information MAS seeks from counterparts concerns fit and proper checks, licensing and regulatory information, which help it conduct its supervisory functions (Box 2.5). There are limited instances of MAS seeking inspection reports. Where requested, MAS provides timely information to counterparts when all the confidentiality requirements are met. These requests overwhelmingly concern fit and proper information where feedback from the Global Network is generally positive). MAS granted 20 AML/CFT examinations on FIs in Singapore by foreign counterparts, out of which one was a joint inspection in 2023 and spontaneously shared six inspection reports to foreign counterparts. Table 2.7. International co-operation by MAS 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Outgoing requests by MAS 790 849 659 692 721 3 711 Fit and proper checks 310 314 305 278 295 1 502 (40) Regulatory information 229 252 163 171 168 983 (26) Exchange of inspection reports 0 1 0 0 1 2 (0) Licensing information 229 251 163 168 168 979 (26) IOSCO 22 31 28 75 89 245 (7) Incoming requests by MAS 102 88 111 134 133 568 Fit and proper checks 88 77 79 90 104 438 (77) Regulatory information 3 6 13 21 15 58 (10) Exchange of inspection reports 4 1 2 0 0 7 (1) Joint examinations 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0) Licensing information 3 3 11 18 13 48 (8) IOSCO 0 0 1 0 1 2 (0) Others (on-site examination/supervisory visit) 4 1 5 4 0 14 (2) Information requests executed by MAS 100 83 92 102 111 488 200. DNFBP supervisors appear to engage with foreign counterparts to exchange supervisory and regulatory information to a reasonable extent and for various purposes, although there is no detailed information. For example, ACRA has shared information with audit regulators from two neighbouring countries pertaining to registration of Singapore’s PAs and public accounting entities (PAEs) (collectively referred to as accountants) in those States, including the dates and results of audit examinations and information on any disciplinary proceedings. Between 2020 and 2024, GRA also exchanged information in over 180 outgoing and 40 incoming requests pertaining to the suitability of applicants with its nine MOU partners. Such requests are generally sent for higher-risk applicants to gather information on suitability, including their compliance records and any licence rejections by the foreign gambling regulators. Box 2.5. International co-operation for supervisory purposes Sharing Fit and proper information In 2021, MAS received requests from a foreign supervisor for fit and proper information concerning an entity incorporated in Singapore. This was triggered further to inquiries conducted by the foreign Supervisor into a parent company of the entity in Singapore. MAS provided information concerning both the entity in Singapore and relevant information concerning its parent company. The foreign counterpart ordered the entity to cease operations due to its inability to meet pre-licensing conditions. MAS also used this information when deciding not to renew the entity’s Singaporean license. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 201. Singapore demonstrates a proactive approach to international co-operation for customs and tax purposes, which is appropriate considering Singapore’s risk and context as an IFC. 202. With respect to customs, SC leverages SOPs when requesting information from foreign LEAs to investigate customs offences, detailing the case background, verification steps, and specific information sought, which may be linked to asset recovery. SC has received 109 spontaneous alerts from foreign administrations and acts on them where relevant and made 179 exchanges of information (EOI) requests to foreign counterparts in the assessed period. SC also provides assistance to counterparts in response to 551 EOI requests received (none were refused), for example to provide information on goods transhipping through Singapore which are suspected to be intended to be smuggled to foreign jurisdictions. This assistance is generally provided within one month, or quicker if the request is urgent. Based on its surveillance and operational activities, SC sent 182 spontaneous disseminations about suspicious activity with counterparts, either bilaterally or through the World Customs Organisations, which has helped in their enforcement activities. 203. With respect of tax, IRAS leverages a broad network of EOI arrangements with 156 jurisdictions to support enforcement, including in tax evasion cases. Requests are managed by a dedicated EOI team within IRAS’s International Tax and Relations Division, ensuring compliance with international standards and domestic legal requirements. All outbound requests are tracked, with follow-ups initiated if responses are delayed beyond 90 days (which is the international standard), and complex cases are escalated through direct engagement. Between 2020 and 2024, IRAS sent 90 tax-related requests in relation to suspected tax evasion cases and sent a total of 4 375 spontaneous EOIs to foreign partners. IRAS received 1 800 information requests from foreign partners and executed 98.2% of these (the remainder were withdrawn, with only a fraction declined by Singapore where they do not meet the EOIR standards)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="234. FIs and VASPs met onsite have a solid understanding of ML/TF risks and have developed AML/CFT programmes that are appropriately designed to mitigate ML/TF risks to ensure that the financial system is not misused to facilitate financial crime. 235. FIs and VASPs in Singapore are required to assess and understand their ML/TF risks through conducting an Enterprise-Wide Risk Assessment (EWRA) to identify and understand ML/TF risks associated with their business lines, customer base, operating jurisdictions, products, and other factors on an annual basis. The EWRA must be reassessed when significant changes occur in risks or the operating environment, when new products/services are introduced, or when triggering events arise (e.g., the issuance of new guidelines). MAS verifies the integrity of the EWRA process through their supervisory activities and examinations, and where they find weakness in properly conducting EWRA they impose remedial measures, including sanctions. Good practices and common weaknesses observed during MAS’ supervisory activities of FIs/VASPs are communicated to the industry through guidance papers and through industry engagement sessions. These measures have collectively improved financial institutions' understanding of ML/TF risks and application of mitigation measures. As an example, the number of STRs filed by major banks arising from detection of front/shell companies using data analytics has increased significantly from 236 in 2020 to 2086 in 2024. 236. Six major FIs in Singapore have been engaged in COSMIC to share information on existing and evolving ML/TF risks. This is a positive development to allow the private sector to share information and should be expanded to other reporting entities, and across more risk areas. Box 3.3. Collaborative Sharing of ML/TF Information &amp; Cases (COSMIC) COSMIC was co-developed by MAS and six major commercial banks in Singapore - DBS, OCBC, UOB, Citibank, HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank. COSMIC allows FIs in Singapore to securely share information with one another on customers who exhibit multiple “red flags” that may indicate potential financial crime concerns, if stipulated thresholds are met. This makes it easier for FIs to detect and thereby deter criminal activity. Information sharing is currently voluntary and focused on three key financial crime risks in commercial banking, namely: (i) misuse of legal persons; (ii) misuse of trade finance for illicit purposes; and (iii) proliferation financing. COSMIC has significantly improved the participant banks’ ability to detect bad actors. In the first year since its launch, COSMIC resulted in an additional 461 STRs filed with total value exceeding SGD 1.6 billion (USD 1.18 billion) and 1 152 suspicious customer accounts closed. Two suspicious networks were also detected as a direct result of COSMIC sharing, and several more through additional checks by MAS and the participant banks. MAS will consider expanding COSMIC to more FIs and risk areas in subsequent phases. 237. Moneylenders have an adequate understanding of the ML/TF risks facing their business, which is established by MinLaw during its examinations of moneylenders. Other than CDD, record keeping and STR filing requirements, MinLaw also requires moneylenders to establish internal policies, procedures, and controls to enable their AML/CFT requirements. This demonstrates awareness of ML/TF risks by compliance staff." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="234. FIs and VASPs met onsite have a solid understanding of ML/TF risks and have developed AML/CFT programmes that are appropriately designed to mitigate ML/TF risks to ensure that the financial system is not misused to facilitate financial crime. 235. FIs and VASPs in Singapore are required to assess and understand their ML/TF risks through conducting an Enterprise-Wide Risk Assessment (EWRA) to identify and understand ML/TF risks associated with their business lines, customer base, operating jurisdictions, products, and other factors on an annual basis. The EWRA must be reassessed when significant changes occur in risks or the operating environment, when new products/services are introduced, or when triggering events arise (e.g., the issuance of new guidelines). MAS verifies the integrity of the EWRA process through their supervisory activities and examinations, and where they find weakness in properly conducting EWRA they impose remedial measures, including sanctions. Good practices and common weaknesses observed during MAS’ supervisory activities of FIs/VASPs are communicated to the industry through guidance papers and through industry engagement sessions. These measures have collectively improved financial institutions' understanding of ML/TF risks and application of mitigation measures. As an example, the number of STRs filed by major banks arising from detection of front/shell companies using data analytics has increased significantly from 236 in 2020 to 2086 in 2024. 236. Six major FIs in Singapore have been engaged in COSMIC to share information on existing and evolving ML/TF risks. This is a positive development to allow the private sector to share information and should be expanded to other reporting entities, and across more risk areas. Box 3.3. Collaborative Sharing of ML/TF Information &amp; Cases (COSMIC) COSMIC was co-developed by MAS and six major commercial banks in Singapore - DBS, OCBC, UOB, Citibank, HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank. COSMIC allows FIs in Singapore to securely share information with one another on customers who exhibit multiple “red flags” that may indicate potential financial crime concerns, if stipulated thresholds are met. This makes it easier for FIs to detect and thereby deter criminal activity. Information sharing is currently voluntary and focused on three key financial crime risks in commercial banking, namely: (i) misuse of legal persons; (ii) misuse of trade finance for illicit purposes; and (iii) proliferation financing. COSMIC has significantly improved the participant banks’ ability to detect bad actors. In the first year since its launch, COSMIC resulted in an additional 461 STRs filed with total value exceeding SGD 1.6 billion (USD 1.18 billion) and 1 152 suspicious customer accounts closed. Two suspicious networks were also detected as a direct result of COSMIC sharing, and several more through additional checks by MAS and the participant banks. MAS will consider expanding COSMIC to more FIs and risk areas in subsequent phases. 237. Moneylenders have an adequate understanding of the ML/TF risks facing their business, which is established by MinLaw during its examinations of moneylenders. Other than CDD, record keeping and STR filing requirements, MinLaw also requires moneylenders to establish internal policies, procedures, and controls to enable their AML/CFT requirements. This demonstrates awareness of ML/TF risks by compliance staff." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="301. DNFBPs met during the onsite have varying yet improving understanding of ML/TF risks they face. All demonstrated a reasonable level of understanding of ML/TF risk and have an AML/CFT regime in place to mitigate those risks. This understanding is usually more mature in DNFBP sectors that have been subject to AML/CFT regulations for longer time (e.g. LTCs, CSPs, accountants, and casinos, etc.). DNFBPs interviewed are generally aware of risk identified in the ML and TF NRAs and considered the NRAs useful in understanding risks facing their institutions. DNFBPs are required to assess and understand their ML/TF risks, implement measures to mitigate identified risks, and document relevant assessments and procedures for inspection by supervisors. Such requirements are applied to varying extent in different sectors, with more mature sectors such as casinos having the highest level of risk understanding. PSMDs demonstrated a less granular and mature understanding as a relatively newly regulated and supervised sector. 302. Similar to FIs covered under IO.3, LTCs are subject to the requirement to conduct and review EWRA to identify and understand their risks in relation to their trust business, trust relevant parties (TRP), trust structures, countries where the TRPs are from, and where trust assets are located. MAS found LTCs to have established AML/CFT policies and procedures and good risk understanding. 303. CSPs and accountants are required to take steps to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks, and document such risk assessments, which will be subject to ACRA’s review as part of inspection. They are also required to develop and implement internal policies, procedures and controls (IPPCs) to manage and mitigate identified risks. ACRA has observed significant progress in risk awareness in CSP sector and good understanding of nature and level of ML/TF risks in accounting sector. 304. PSMDs and pawnbrokers are similarly required to assess and document ML/TF risks and implement IPPCs to mitigate these risks. MinLaw monitors compliance through examinations, guidance and enforcement actions, leading to improved sector-wide AML/CFT awareness and practices. PSMDs are also required to submit risk assessments and IPPCs to MinLaw in semi-annual returns. PSMDs as a relatively newly regulated and supervised sector witnessed a relatively high number of breaches (205 instances in 2020-24) in relation to risk understanding, but the number of breaches is in a sharp downward trend from 120 instances in 2021 to 24 instances in 2024. 305. LPEs are also required to identify and assess their ML/TF risks and put in place AML/CFT controls to mitigate those risks. LawSoc has found that the number of LPEs which were observed to have put in place steps to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks stayed relatively consistent over time, with an average of 91% between 2019 and 2024 having done so in a satisfactory manner. 306. Casino operators in Singapore have demonstrated a structured and evolving approach to understanding and mitigating ML/TF risks through their “prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing framework. These frameworks are endorsed at the Board level and reviewed annually to incorporate emerging risks, regulatory updates, and global best practices. Casino operators take into consideration profile risks, transactional risks relating to the country which the patron is transacting from, as well as the patron’s behavioural risks. Overall, the procedure in place demonstrates effectiveness in identifying, assessing, and adapting to ML/TF risks in the casino sector. 307. EAs/ RESs are required to perform and document their risk assessments of their real estate agency business, keep these assessments updated, and furnish them to CEA during examinations. CEA reviews the risk assessments and notes that EAs/RESs are aware of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. URA has implemented AML/CFT requirements for developers since June 2023, requiring them to conduct risk assessments, implement IPPCs, and perform CDD/ECDD checks. Large developers have shown strong compliance, with senior management-approved frameworks, staff training, and independent audits." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="301. DNFBPs met during the onsite have varying yet improving understanding of ML/TF risks they face. All demonstrated a reasonable level of understanding of ML/TF risk and have an AML/CFT regime in place to mitigate those risks. This understanding is usually more mature in DNFBP sectors that have been subject to AML/CFT regulations for longer time (e.g. LTCs, CSPs, accountants, and casinos, etc.). DNFBPs interviewed are generally aware of risk identified in the ML and TF NRAs and considered the NRAs useful in understanding risks facing their institutions. DNFBPs are required to assess and understand their ML/TF risks, implement measures to mitigate identified risks, and document relevant assessments and procedures for inspection by supervisors. Such requirements are applied to varying extent in different sectors, with more mature sectors such as casinos having the highest level of risk understanding. PSMDs demonstrated a less granular and mature understanding as a relatively newly regulated and supervised sector. 302. Similar to FIs covered under IO.3, LTCs are subject to the requirement to conduct and review EWRA to identify and understand their risks in relation to their trust business, trust relevant parties (TRP), trust structures, countries where the TRPs are from, and where trust assets are located. MAS found LTCs to have established AML/CFT policies and procedures and good risk understanding. 303. CSPs and accountants are required to take steps to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks, and document such risk assessments, which will be subject to ACRA’s review as part of inspection. They are also required to develop and implement internal policies, procedures and controls (IPPCs) to manage and mitigate identified risks. ACRA has observed significant progress in risk awareness in CSP sector and good understanding of nature and level of ML/TF risks in accounting sector. 304. PSMDs and pawnbrokers are similarly required to assess and document ML/TF risks and implement IPPCs to mitigate these risks. MinLaw monitors compliance through examinations, guidance and enforcement actions, leading to improved sector-wide AML/CFT awareness and practices. PSMDs are also required to submit risk assessments and IPPCs to MinLaw in semi-annual returns. PSMDs as a relatively newly regulated and supervised sector witnessed a relatively high number of breaches (205 instances in 2020-24) in relation to risk understanding, but the number of breaches is in a sharp downward trend from 120 instances in 2021 to 24 instances in 2024. 305. LPEs are also required to identify and assess their ML/TF risks and put in place AML/CFT controls to mitigate those risks. LawSoc has found that the number of LPEs which were observed to have put in place steps to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks stayed relatively consistent over time, with an average of 91% between 2019 and 2024 having done so in a satisfactory manner. 306. Casino operators in Singapore have demonstrated a structured and evolving approach to understanding and mitigating ML/TF risks through their “prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing framework. These frameworks are endorsed at the Board level and reviewed annually to incorporate emerging risks, regulatory updates, and global best practices. Casino operators take into consideration profile risks, transactional risks relating to the country which the patron is transacting from, as well as the patron’s behavioural risks. Overall, the procedure in place demonstrates effectiveness in identifying, assessing, and adapting to ML/TF risks in the casino sector. 307. EAs/ RESs are required to perform and document their risk assessments of their real estate agency business, keep these assessments updated, and furnish them to CEA during examinations. CEA reviews the risk assessments and notes that EAs/RESs are aware of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. URA has implemented AML/CFT requirements for developers since June 2023, requiring them to conduct risk assessments, implement IPPCs, and perform CDD/ECDD checks. Large developers have shown strong compliance, with senior management-approved frameworks, staff training, and independent audits." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="369. Singapore has put measures in place to ensure that competent authorities have timely access to basic and BO information for most legal persons but have limited mechanisms to ensure this information is accurate. For the emerging VCC sector, access is less timely as VCCs do not have to file their BO with the central register and thus it can be more difficult to locate the keeper of such information. Unregistered Foreign Companies only have to make basic and BO information available for CDD processes when engaging reporting entities. Basic information 370. Basic information on legal persons is filed centrally with ACRA, while only some of the information needs to be separately maintained by the legal persons. This does not appear to impact effectiveness. The public can access this information for a small fee, and the information is audited by ACRA as part of the audit of the BO register. Companies and LLPs are required to submit annual returns. There is a 78% compliance rate, on average for the assessment period, with the annual returns. The information submitted is used to update basic information held by ACRA. ACRA has conducted about 2 000 examinations over the assessment period to support the accuracy of registered office addresses. 371. Singapore nationals forming a legal person must verify their identity with ACRA using SINGPASS. SINGPASS provides secure direct access to government digital services to incorporate a company. Foreign nationals without SINGPASS may only form a Singaporean company through a CSP and must further engage a local resident to act as a local nominee director on an ongoing basis. During the on-site, the legal requirement has been imposed requiring CSPs to conduct “fit and proper” testing on the nominee director. Prior to that date, there were no checks for fitness and propriety that were legally required. 372. LEAs and the private sector are regularly using this basic information for their investigation and CDD work respectively. Legal persons are not permitted to have other legal persons as directors. BO Information Central BO registry (RORC) 373. Singapore implemented a central BO registry though ACRA for most legal persons in 2020. These legal persons are required to both maintain a register of registrable controllers (BOs) and file that information into a central BO register maintained by ACRA. Approximately 91% of companies and LLPs have filed their BO information with ACRA to populate this registry. Competent authorities have direct and immediate access to the central BO registry but it is not publicly available. 374. There are shortcomings in the mechanisms in place to ensure BO information is accurate under the private RORC, and ACRA central register: a) Companies may be listed as controller without a corresponding natural person (even though this is not permitted under legislation); b) No substantive verification (via audits) is done post incorporation or filing; and, c) Inadequate supervisory interventions to check the BO determined by CSPs and thus filed into the registry. 375. Companies, foreign companies and LLPs are required to ensure that the particulars in their private RORC are accurate and up to date by sending a notice at least annually to every registrable controller and promptly updating the RORC with any changes. There is no need to update the RORC information lodged with ACRA annually if there are no changes to the existing RORC information, as changes are lodged as and when they occur. Domestic companies, foreign registered companies and LPPs are not required to verify the identity of the registrable controllers or identify the ultimate BO of a legal entity that has a significant interest in, or significant control over, the company. 376. In limited circumstances, legal persons are permitted to be listed as a controller. For domestic legal persons, competent authorities can follow through the relevant profiles to identify the natural person for any Singaporean legal person. However, the situation is less helpful where foreign legal persons are listed as controllers. Information provided by Singapore shows that in ACRA’s central BO registry, a natural person is not always listed as a controller. As a recent example, at December 2024, 4 165 companies (1% of registry) had listed only foreign corporations as its beneficial owners into the RORC without identifying any other individuals. This also leaves the RORC vulnerable to ‘corporate loops’ being formed. 377. There is a significant limitation to the ability for LEAs to access timely and accurate BO information when a foreign corporation has been listed as the BO. The Assessment Team was not provided with information on how many corporations, foreign and domestic, have been listed as the BO but understand that approximately 10% of legal persons on the central BO registry have a company listed as the majority shareholder, suggesting this is a significant deficiency. 378. Singapore does not verify this BO information before it is published on the registry; they instead rely, at the point of incorporation, on the CSPs conducting proper CDD to identify the BO and ensure that information is accurately filed to ACRA's registry, as is their legal obligation. Most, but not all, legal persons engage a CSP to assist with formation. See IO4 for more details on ACRA’s supervision of CSPs: whilst adequate for general AML/CFT supervision purposes, a large portion of CSPs (45% of all CSPs, who are of medium-low to low risk), were not inspected over the review period) do not receive a regular intervention, meaning their BO collection and filing goes unchecked by ACRA, the supervisor. 379. In addition to CSP supervision, ACRA conducts limited registrar audits to check accuracy of BO information after the information is made available on the RORC. ACRA has conducted audits for less than 1% of legal persons (domestic companies, foreign companies and LLPs) on the registry. Further, ACRA’s audits are activity-agnostic; as such they do not target legal persons operating higher-risk business (such as maritime services) for their audits. 380. Overall, there are concerns around the accuracy of information in the RORC due to legal persons being listed as BO on the RORC, a significant number of CSPs not being subject to a supervisory activity in the last five years, and the extremely limited coverage of audits of BO information requirement for the central ACRA registry. Other BO information 381. VCCs must maintain an up to date register of BOs and verify the accuracy of the information obtained for the register. This information would only be made available through the use of law enforcement powers, and they have been rarely used in Singapore for these purposes. 382. VCCs are not required to submit information on BO to the central BO registry. BO information would be accessed through the Eligible Financial Institution (EFI) of the VCC, but it may not be known to the requesting LEA who the EFI is to make that request. Singapore maintains that the close interagency co-ordination in Singapore, means this alternative mechanism has not hampered the availability and timeliness of such information. In 2025, Singapore conducted an exercise asking the top 50 VCCs through their respective EFIs to provide the BO information of the VCCs within two business days, which was satisfactorily complied with. EFIs have shown that they are able to provide VCCs’ BO information in a timely manner if it is known which EFI has been engaged for a particular VCC, but the EFI may be unknown to the investigating LEA. This is currently a minor issue but would become more of an issue as the VCC sector continues to grow. 383. Unregistered Foreign Companies are not required to register with ACRA or file their BO information with the central register. Singapore would only be able to access BO information for these companies by requesting the information from the reporting entity where the Unregistered Foreign Company is a customer. The CDD done by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is the key mechanism for Singaporean authorities to access BO information on Unregistered Foreign Companies. In addition, Singapore is also able to seek BO information on Unregistered Foreign Companies from its international counterparts or foreign BO registries (where available). In turn, supervision of these FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is therefore a key check for Singaporean authorities to ensure the accuracy of this information. The risk-based supervision of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs for compliance with these obligations is in varying stages of implementation (see IO3 and IO.4) and checks of BO information are done during supervisory activities. 384. STRO has access to all of ACRA’s registries, and as such can pass information obtained from these registries to share information with foreign counterparts. As noted above, Singapore authorities would have to request for BO information on an Unregistered Foreign Company from a reporting entity (or via international co-operation/tapping on overseas BO registries). 385. Overall, in Singapore, basic information is publicly available. BO information is largely available to competent authorities through the central ACRA registry but there are some instances (Unregistered Foreign Companies) where it is unavailable, and other instances (VCCs) or circumstances (where legal persons are the beneficial owner) where the information is not available in a timely manner in all cases. The basic and BO information is largely unverified beyond CDD, making the accuracy of the information questionable. Where information is not available through the RORC, there are alternative mechanisms that can make information available if LEAs are aware the reporting entity to ask." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="369. Singapore has put measures in place to ensure that competent authorities have timely access to basic and BO information for most legal persons but have limited mechanisms to ensure this information is accurate. For the emerging VCC sector, access is less timely as VCCs do not have to file their BO with the central register and thus it can be more difficult to locate the keeper of such information. Unregistered Foreign Companies only have to make basic and BO information available for CDD processes when engaging reporting entities. Basic information 370. Basic information on legal persons is filed centrally with ACRA, while only some of the information needs to be separately maintained by the legal persons. This does not appear to impact effectiveness. The public can access this information for a small fee, and the information is audited by ACRA as part of the audit of the BO register. Companies and LLPs are required to submit annual returns. There is a 78% compliance rate, on average for the assessment period, with the annual returns. The information submitted is used to update basic information held by ACRA. ACRA has conducted about 2 000 examinations over the assessment period to support the accuracy of registered office addresses. 371. Singapore nationals forming a legal person must verify their identity with ACRA using SINGPASS. SINGPASS provides secure direct access to government digital services to incorporate a company. Foreign nationals without SINGPASS may only form a Singaporean company through a CSP and must further engage a local resident to act as a local nominee director on an ongoing basis. During the on-site, the legal requirement has been imposed requiring CSPs to conduct “fit and proper” testing on the nominee director. Prior to that date, there were no checks for fitness and propriety that were legally required. 372. LEAs and the private sector are regularly using this basic information for their investigation and CDD work respectively. Legal persons are not permitted to have other legal persons as directors. BO Information Central BO registry (RORC) 373. Singapore implemented a central BO registry though ACRA for most legal persons in 2020. These legal persons are required to both maintain a register of registrable controllers (BOs) and file that information into a central BO register maintained by ACRA. Approximately 91% of companies and LLPs have filed their BO information with ACRA to populate this registry. Competent authorities have direct and immediate access to the central BO registry but it is not publicly available. 374. There are shortcomings in the mechanisms in place to ensure BO information is accurate under the private RORC, and ACRA central register: a) Companies may be listed as controller without a corresponding natural person (even though this is not permitted under legislation); b) No substantive verification (via audits) is done post incorporation or filing; and, c) Inadequate supervisory interventions to check the BO determined by CSPs and thus filed into the registry. 375. Companies, foreign companies and LLPs are required to ensure that the particulars in their private RORC are accurate and up to date by sending a notice at least annually to every registrable controller and promptly updating the RORC with any changes. There is no need to update the RORC information lodged with ACRA annually if there are no changes to the existing RORC information, as changes are lodged as and when they occur. Domestic companies, foreign registered companies and LPPs are not required to verify the identity of the registrable controllers or identify the ultimate BO of a legal entity that has a significant interest in, or significant control over, the company. 376. In limited circumstances, legal persons are permitted to be listed as a controller. For domestic legal persons, competent authorities can follow through the relevant profiles to identify the natural person for any Singaporean legal person. However, the situation is less helpful where foreign legal persons are listed as controllers. Information provided by Singapore shows that in ACRA’s central BO registry, a natural person is not always listed as a controller. As a recent example, at December 2024, 4 165 companies (1% of registry) had listed only foreign corporations as its beneficial owners into the RORC without identifying any other individuals. This also leaves the RORC vulnerable to ‘corporate loops’ being formed. 377. There is a significant limitation to the ability for LEAs to access timely and accurate BO information when a foreign corporation has been listed as the BO. The Assessment Team was not provided with information on how many corporations, foreign and domestic, have been listed as the BO but understand that approximately 10% of legal persons on the central BO registry have a company listed as the majority shareholder, suggesting this is a significant deficiency. 378. Singapore does not verify this BO information before it is published on the registry; they instead rely, at the point of incorporation, on the CSPs conducting proper CDD to identify the BO and ensure that information is accurately filed to ACRA's registry, as is their legal obligation. Most, but not all, legal persons engage a CSP to assist with formation. See IO4 for more details on ACRA’s supervision of CSPs: whilst adequate for general AML/CFT supervision purposes, a large portion of CSPs (45% of all CSPs, who are of medium-low to low risk), were not inspected over the review period) do not receive a regular intervention, meaning their BO collection and filing goes unchecked by ACRA, the supervisor. 379. In addition to CSP supervision, ACRA conducts limited registrar audits to check accuracy of BO information after the information is made available on the RORC. ACRA has conducted audits for less than 1% of legal persons (domestic companies, foreign companies and LLPs) on the registry. Further, ACRA’s audits are activity-agnostic; as such they do not target legal persons operating higher-risk business (such as maritime services) for their audits. 380. Overall, there are concerns around the accuracy of information in the RORC due to legal persons being listed as BO on the RORC, a significant number of CSPs not being subject to a supervisory activity in the last five years, and the extremely limited coverage of audits of BO information requirement for the central ACRA registry. Other BO information 381. VCCs must maintain an up to date register of BOs and verify the accuracy of the information obtained for the register. This information would only be made available through the use of law enforcement powers, and they have been rarely used in Singapore for these purposes. 382. VCCs are not required to submit information on BO to the central BO registry. BO information would be accessed through the Eligible Financial Institution (EFI) of the VCC, but it may not be known to the requesting LEA who the EFI is to make that request. Singapore maintains that the close interagency co-ordination in Singapore, means this alternative mechanism has not hampered the availability and timeliness of such information. In 2025, Singapore conducted an exercise asking the top 50 VCCs through their respective EFIs to provide the BO information of the VCCs within two business days, which was satisfactorily complied with. EFIs have shown that they are able to provide VCCs’ BO information in a timely manner if it is known which EFI has been engaged for a particular VCC, but the EFI may be unknown to the investigating LEA. This is currently a minor issue but would become more of an issue as the VCC sector continues to grow. 383. Unregistered Foreign Companies are not required to register with ACRA or file their BO information with the central register. Singapore would only be able to access BO information for these companies by requesting the information from the reporting entity where the Unregistered Foreign Company is a customer. The CDD done by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is the key mechanism for Singaporean authorities to access BO information on Unregistered Foreign Companies. In addition, Singapore is also able to seek BO information on Unregistered Foreign Companies from its international counterparts or foreign BO registries (where available). In turn, supervision of these FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs is therefore a key check for Singaporean authorities to ensure the accuracy of this information. The risk-based supervision of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs for compliance with these obligations is in varying stages of implementation (see IO3 and IO.4) and checks of BO information are done during supervisory activities. 384. STRO has access to all of ACRA’s registries, and as such can pass information obtained from these registries to share information with foreign counterparts. As noted above, Singapore authorities would have to request for BO information on an Unregistered Foreign Company from a reporting entity (or via international co-operation/tapping on overseas BO registries). 385. Overall, in Singapore, basic information is publicly available. BO information is largely available to competent authorities through the central ACRA registry but there are some instances (Unregistered Foreign Companies) where it is unavailable, and other instances (VCCs) or circumstances (where legal persons are the beneficial owner) where the information is not available in a timely manner in all cases. The basic and BO information is largely unverified beyond CDD, making the accuracy of the information questionable. Where information is not available through the RORC, there are alternative mechanisms that can make information available if LEAs are aware the reporting entity to ask." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="433. STRO and competent authorities regularly and proactively co-operate with each other. They exchange financial intelligence and information, strategic intelligence and co-ordinate on joint operational planning and responses, through a variety of channels and platforms using secure and confidential mechanisms. 6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 434. As noted in IO.1, inter-agency co-operation is a strength of Singapore’s AML/CFT regime. Singapore has been, and continues to be, actively exploring more effective avenues for co-operation, including to consider ways of better exchanging and exploiting financial intelligence. 435. STRO is a key participant in RTIG and AC3N. Within these platforms, STRO shares financial intelligence with MAS, ACRA, CAD and CPIB and other AML/CFT agencies. There is free exchange of financial information to prioritise and co-ordinate investigative or regulatory action, for example MAS shares financial information and intelligence with STRO emerging from its supervisory activities. Moreover, STRO uses RTIG to share information from its strategic analysis and exchange typological information on key trends in order to plan for and co-ordinate cross-government responses. AC3N provides competent authorities an opportunity to overlay financial intelligence with information from other sources, held by different agencies, such as business registration information, transactional data, and intelligence leads from LEAs. Between 2020-2024, 26 cases were initiated through AC3N, demonstrating the effectiveness of this mechanism. 436. Singapore’s public-private partnership (ACIP) has proven to be a highly effective mechanism for fostering collaborative operational and tactical support between competent authorities and a limited number of REs (see IO.3). ACIP was set up in 2017 to collaboratively identify and assess key transnational ML risks confronting Singapore’s financial and non-financial sectors, as well as measures to mitigate the risks and enhance the AML/ CFT regime. STRO co-operates closely with other LEAs and financial supervisors within ACIP, both in sharing strategic analysis through advisories to raise awareness about growing risks, as well as tactical financial intelligence sharing to facilitate case-specific responses (there have been six specific ACIP projects to share tactical information). This co-ordination has resulted in detecting, investigating and successfully prosecuting cases (see IO.1). Box 6.3. Information Exchange within ACIP Established in April 2017, ACIP fosters public-private collaboration between leading banks, LEAs, and authorities to address transnational ML risks. ACIP is co-chaired by MAS and CAD and supported by a steering group of senior compliance officers from major banks. ACIP issues advisories, alerts, and best practice papers that enhance risk understanding and STR quality. Since 2019, tactical information-sharing has enabled case-specific intelligence exchange, leading to successful investigations in TBML and misuse of legal persons, leveraging private sector data to uncover previously undetected ML networks. 437. Legislative amendments introduced in 2019 allows STRO to proactively exchange information with all foreign FIUs without a need for an MoU or LoU. STRO can also exchange information with over 170 FIUs through Egmont’s Secure Channel (ESC) and encrypted email with non-Egmont members. See IO.2 for more information. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 438. STRO is located within the SPF’s premises, which are secured, restricted to the FIU’s staff and separate from other SPF branches. Security and confidentiality are also an important feature of STRO’s hiring practices. Various legislative provisions within CDSA and the Official Secrets Act ensure that competent authorities exchange information in a confidential manner, including when interacting with foreign partners. STRO has SOPs guiding the handling and dissemination of sensitive and confidential information and to ensure the secure dissemination of financial intelligence to both domestic and foreign counterparts. According to guidelines, LEAs must seek consent from STRO to further disseminate information. 439. Reports are submitted by REs on SONAR, which has appropriate information security safeguards. STRO’s IT systems capture and disseminate information in an electronic and encrypted manner and is audited regularly for security purposes. Information exchanged with foreign FIUs also benefit from the same level of security and confidentiality. STRO’s database is accessible to relevant competent authorities, with appropriate information security safeguards." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="433. STRO and competent authorities regularly and proactively co-operate with each other. They exchange financial intelligence and information, strategic intelligence and co-ordinate on joint operational planning and responses, through a variety of channels and platforms using secure and confidential mechanisms. 6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 434. As noted in IO.1, inter-agency co-operation is a strength of Singapore’s AML/CFT regime. Singapore has been, and continues to be, actively exploring more effective avenues for co-operation, including to consider ways of better exchanging and exploiting financial intelligence. 435. STRO is a key participant in RTIG and AC3N. Within these platforms, STRO shares financial intelligence with MAS, ACRA, CAD and CPIB and other AML/CFT agencies. There is free exchange of financial information to prioritise and co-ordinate investigative or regulatory action, for example MAS shares financial information and intelligence with STRO emerging from its supervisory activities. Moreover, STRO uses RTIG to share information from its strategic analysis and exchange typological information on key trends in order to plan for and co-ordinate cross-government responses. AC3N provides competent authorities an opportunity to overlay financial intelligence with information from other sources, held by different agencies, such as business registration information, transactional data, and intelligence leads from LEAs. Between 2020-2024, 26 cases were initiated through AC3N, demonstrating the effectiveness of this mechanism. 436. Singapore’s public-private partnership (ACIP) has proven to be a highly effective mechanism for fostering collaborative operational and tactical support between competent authorities and a limited number of REs (see IO.3). ACIP was set up in 2017 to collaboratively identify and assess key transnational ML risks confronting Singapore’s financial and non-financial sectors, as well as measures to mitigate the risks and enhance the AML/ CFT regime. STRO co-operates closely with other LEAs and financial supervisors within ACIP, both in sharing strategic analysis through advisories to raise awareness about growing risks, as well as tactical financial intelligence sharing to facilitate case-specific responses (there have been six specific ACIP projects to share tactical information). This co-ordination has resulted in detecting, investigating and successfully prosecuting cases (see IO.1). Box 6.3. Information Exchange within ACIP Established in April 2017, ACIP fosters public-private collaboration between leading banks, LEAs, and authorities to address transnational ML risks. ACIP is co-chaired by MAS and CAD and supported by a steering group of senior compliance officers from major banks. ACIP issues advisories, alerts, and best practice papers that enhance risk understanding and STR quality. Since 2019, tactical information-sharing has enabled case-specific intelligence exchange, leading to successful investigations in TBML and misuse of legal persons, leveraging private sector data to uncover previously undetected ML networks. 437. Legislative amendments introduced in 2019 allows STRO to proactively exchange information with all foreign FIUs without a need for an MoU or LoU. STRO can also exchange information with over 170 FIUs through Egmont’s Secure Channel (ESC) and encrypted email with non-Egmont members. See IO.2 for more information. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 438. STRO is located within the SPF’s premises, which are secured, restricted to the FIU’s staff and separate from other SPF branches. Security and confidentiality are also an important feature of STRO’s hiring practices. Various legislative provisions within CDSA and the Official Secrets Act ensure that competent authorities exchange information in a confidential manner, including when interacting with foreign partners. STRO has SOPs guiding the handling and dissemination of sensitive and confidential information and to ensure the secure dissemination of financial intelligence to both domestic and foreign counterparts. According to guidelines, LEAs must seek consent from STRO to further disseminate information. 439. Reports are submitted by REs on SONAR, which has appropriate information security safeguards. STRO’s IT systems capture and disseminate information in an electronic and encrypted manner and is audited regularly for security purposes. Information exchanged with foreign FIUs also benefit from the same level of security and confidentiality. STRO’s database is accessible to relevant competent authorities, with appropriate information security safeguards." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. Despite an appropriate legislative framework to sanction ML (see R.3), ML sanctions for natural persons are proportionate but not effective or dissuasive. There have been few convictions for legal persons, due to which it is not possible to assess their effectiveness. 7.3.1. Sanctions for natural persons 479. When considering the overall quantum of penalties meted out, ML sanctions are proportionate but not effective or dissuasive. Under the law (see R.3), ML committed by natural persons attracts a maximum 10 years and/or a fine of SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), which is proportionate to other comparable offences. However, a majority of the actual penalties for ML convictions, including prison sentences, are on the lower end of the spectrum. 480. These low penalties are a result of Singapore’s sentencing guidelines and framework (Huang Ying-Chun). The Sentencing Advisory Panel has issued guidance for ML offences under Sections 51 and 55 of the CDSA, requiring courts to assess investigations based on harm and culpability. One of the factors limiting the deterrent effect of penalising ML is the recommendation to impose monetary fines for lower harm and culpability offences rather than imprisonment (which is reserved for offences involving higher levels of harm and culpability). However, there are still situations in which offenders involved in less serious, but still harmful laundering schemes, may face only financial penalties. 481. In response to the prevalence of CEF, Singapore introduced tailored sentencing guidelines in 2024 for scam-related ML convictions. These guidelines propose a baseline sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, with adjustments for aggravating factors (e.g. large sums, vulnerable victims, multiple accounts, abuse of position) and mitigating factors (e.g. guilty pleas). 482. Singapore applies the ‘one transaction’ and ‘totality’ principles to penalties. The one transaction principle means that sentences for offences committed in the course of a single transaction should generally run concurrently, which is relevant when predicate offences generate proceeds, and they are laundered immediately or shortly thereafter. In turn, the totality principle is applied at the end of the sentencing process to ensure that the total sentence is what Singapore’s courts consider to be just and proportionate with the overall seriousness of the offender’s criminal behaviour when all the offences are considered together (i.e., a predicate offence and ML offence, or multiple ML offences). Singapore therefore metes out concurrent and consecutive sentences for different offences. While Singapore believes that these are common law principles applied by the courts to ensure deterrent yet proportional sentences, in effect these principles, taken together, lower penalties. When ML sentences run concurrently with predicate offences, the proportionality and deterrent effect of ML sanctions is reduced, as ML is a distinct offence. It is seen from a number of case studies provided that the penalty for the ML offence is lower than the predicate offence, meaning that, in the cases where there is a concurrent sentence, no extra time is served in addition to the sentence for the predicate crime. While Singapore provided examples where the ML and predicate offences can run consecutively, 19% of convictions had sentences that were applied concurrently where those found guilty do not spend extra time incarcerated beyond the term of their imprisonment for the predicate offence. 483. The high incidence of guilty pleas (including plea deals) (92%, as noted above) leads to sanctions that are significantly lower than in convictions after trial which undermines the dissuasiveness and effectiveness of sanctions. This is illustrated with the 3B$ case, where 10 of the 27 accused were found guilty mostly through plea deals. Singapore sought plea deals because they felt they had evidentiary difficulties owing to the fact most activities were conducted overseas and evidence was not available from foreign jurisdictions. Despite the very significant proceeds involved in the 3B$ case, one of the largest ML investigations in the entire world , due to evidentiary difficulties, the 10 guilty persons were charged with lower ML charges and sentenced to 13 to 17 months prison term each. 15 of the other accused who absconded overseas agreed for their assets being confiscated without conviction with the INTERPOL notice against them withdrawn and they being barred from entering Singapore (Singapore was unable to prosecute them for ML charged due to similar evidential limitations and since they were out of jurisdiction). While the sanctions were not dissuasive, as discussed in IO.8, this case is a success from an asset recovery standpoint. 484. On average, natural persons receive a 13 months’ imprisonment sentence (in line with other comparable offences in Singapore, such as corruption, cheating or forgery), and 72% of individuals convicted of ML received a prison sentence of less than a year (Table 7.7). The significant number of prison sentences on the lower end of the spectrum (some as short as one week) arises out of the large number of prosecutions mounted against low-level MM, where the sentences imposed remain commensurate with their conduct and roles in the ML activities. Prison sentences of more than four years were used only in 5% of convictions in the review period. Overall, Singapore’s approach results in very limited application of dissuasive sentences for even very serious and aggravated ML offences, which is not effective in penalising ML. Table 7.7. ML Sanctions # of convictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prison Sentences = 48 months 1 7 3 5 7 23 (5) 36 to &lt; 48 months 1 5 0 4 7 17 (4) 24 to &lt; 36 months 5 7 6 7 4 29 (7) 12 to &lt; 24 months 7 10 8 13 11 49 (12) &lt; 12 months 36 55 63 62 86 302 (72) Total 50 84 80 91 115 420 (100) Fines Persons fined 2 3* 2 0 2* 9 Total amount fined 9 000 63 590 7 000 0 5 000 84 590 Average fine 4 500 21 197 3 500 0 2 500 9 399 Note: Some individuals – not accounted for in this table - received probationary sentences and/or fines, mainly due to their ages. (*) Includes accused persons who were sentenced to both fines and imprisonment. 7.3.2. Sanctions for legal persons 485. Due to the few convictions for legal persons, it is not possible to assess their full effectiveness. The four sanctions secured against legal persons, while proportionate, do not help the AT make any conclusions on their effectiveness or whether they are in line with risks. In these four investigations, fines ranged from SGD 10 000 (USD 7 400) to SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), the maximum being SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) or twice the value of the property involved/benefit of criminal conduct, whichever is highest. In two of the investigations, the courts did not provide a reasoning in passing a sentence. The other two investigations reflect situations in which the courts considered culpability to be higher. In one the court applied an SGD 10 000 fine (USD 7 400) against a shell company, which did not have any assets. In the remaining case, the court found the harm to be moderate and culpability high and imposed an aggregate fine for ML of SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. Despite an appropriate legislative framework to sanction ML (see R.3), ML sanctions for natural persons are proportionate but not effective or dissuasive. There have been few convictions for legal persons, due to which it is not possible to assess their effectiveness. 7.3.1. Sanctions for natural persons 479. When considering the overall quantum of penalties meted out, ML sanctions are proportionate but not effective or dissuasive. Under the law (see R.3), ML committed by natural persons attracts a maximum 10 years and/or a fine of SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), which is proportionate to other comparable offences. However, a majority of the actual penalties for ML convictions, including prison sentences, are on the lower end of the spectrum. 480. These low penalties are a result of Singapore’s sentencing guidelines and framework (Huang Ying-Chun). The Sentencing Advisory Panel has issued guidance for ML offences under Sections 51 and 55 of the CDSA, requiring courts to assess investigations based on harm and culpability. One of the factors limiting the deterrent effect of penalising ML is the recommendation to impose monetary fines for lower harm and culpability offences rather than imprisonment (which is reserved for offences involving higher levels of harm and culpability). However, there are still situations in which offenders involved in less serious, but still harmful laundering schemes, may face only financial penalties. 481. In response to the prevalence of CEF, Singapore introduced tailored sentencing guidelines in 2024 for scam-related ML convictions. These guidelines propose a baseline sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, with adjustments for aggravating factors (e.g. large sums, vulnerable victims, multiple accounts, abuse of position) and mitigating factors (e.g. guilty pleas). 482. Singapore applies the ‘one transaction’ and ‘totality’ principles to penalties. The one transaction principle means that sentences for offences committed in the course of a single transaction should generally run concurrently, which is relevant when predicate offences generate proceeds, and they are laundered immediately or shortly thereafter. In turn, the totality principle is applied at the end of the sentencing process to ensure that the total sentence is what Singapore’s courts consider to be just and proportionate with the overall seriousness of the offender’s criminal behaviour when all the offences are considered together (i.e., a predicate offence and ML offence, or multiple ML offences). Singapore therefore metes out concurrent and consecutive sentences for different offences. While Singapore believes that these are common law principles applied by the courts to ensure deterrent yet proportional sentences, in effect these principles, taken together, lower penalties. When ML sentences run concurrently with predicate offences, the proportionality and deterrent effect of ML sanctions is reduced, as ML is a distinct offence. It is seen from a number of case studies provided that the penalty for the ML offence is lower than the predicate offence, meaning that, in the cases where there is a concurrent sentence, no extra time is served in addition to the sentence for the predicate crime. While Singapore provided examples where the ML and predicate offences can run consecutively, 19% of convictions had sentences that were applied concurrently where those found guilty do not spend extra time incarcerated beyond the term of their imprisonment for the predicate offence. 483. The high incidence of guilty pleas (including plea deals) (92%, as noted above) leads to sanctions that are significantly lower than in convictions after trial which undermines the dissuasiveness and effectiveness of sanctions. This is illustrated with the 3B$ case, where 10 of the 27 accused were found guilty mostly through plea deals. Singapore sought plea deals because they felt they had evidentiary difficulties owing to the fact most activities were conducted overseas and evidence was not available from foreign jurisdictions. Despite the very significant proceeds involved in the 3B$ case, one of the largest ML investigations in the entire world , due to evidentiary difficulties, the 10 guilty persons were charged with lower ML charges and sentenced to 13 to 17 months prison term each. 15 of the other accused who absconded overseas agreed for their assets being confiscated without conviction with the INTERPOL notice against them withdrawn and they being barred from entering Singapore (Singapore was unable to prosecute them for ML charged due to similar evidential limitations and since they were out of jurisdiction). While the sanctions were not dissuasive, as discussed in IO.8, this case is a success from an asset recovery standpoint. 484. On average, natural persons receive a 13 months’ imprisonment sentence (in line with other comparable offences in Singapore, such as corruption, cheating or forgery), and 72% of individuals convicted of ML received a prison sentence of less than a year (Table 7.7). The significant number of prison sentences on the lower end of the spectrum (some as short as one week) arises out of the large number of prosecutions mounted against low-level MM, where the sentences imposed remain commensurate with their conduct and roles in the ML activities. Prison sentences of more than four years were used only in 5% of convictions in the review period. Overall, Singapore’s approach results in very limited application of dissuasive sentences for even very serious and aggravated ML offences, which is not effective in penalising ML. Table 7.7. ML Sanctions # of convictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) Prison Sentences = 48 months 1 7 3 5 7 23 (5) 36 to &lt; 48 months 1 5 0 4 7 17 (4) 24 to &lt; 36 months 5 7 6 7 4 29 (7) 12 to &lt; 24 months 7 10 8 13 11 49 (12) &lt; 12 months 36 55 63 62 86 302 (72) Total 50 84 80 91 115 420 (100) Fines Persons fined 2 3* 2 0 2* 9 Total amount fined 9 000 63 590 7 000 0 5 000 84 590 Average fine 4 500 21 197 3 500 0 2 500 9 399 Note: Some individuals – not accounted for in this table - received probationary sentences and/or fines, mainly due to their ages. (*) Includes accused persons who were sentenced to both fines and imprisonment. 7.3.2. Sanctions for legal persons 485. Due to the few convictions for legal persons, it is not possible to assess their full effectiveness. The four sanctions secured against legal persons, while proportionate, do not help the AT make any conclusions on their effectiveness or whether they are in line with risks. In these four investigations, fines ranged from SGD 10 000 (USD 7 400) to SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), the maximum being SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) or twice the value of the property involved/benefit of criminal conduct, whichever is highest. In two of the investigations, the courts did not provide a reasoning in passing a sentence. The other two investigations reflect situations in which the courts considered culpability to be higher. In one the court applied an SGD 10 000 fine (USD 7 400) against a shell company, which did not have any assets. In the remaining case, the court found the harm to be moderate and culpability high and imposed an aggregate fine for ML of SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="505. LEAs use a range of legal powers to seize and prevent the dissipation of criminal property, supported by WoG strategies and SOPs specific to each agency. The primary tool used is Section 35(1) of CPC, which allows LEAs to freeze and seize suspected criminal property without a court order. Seized property must be reported to the court either upon conclusion of the investigation or within one year, whichever comes first. Additional powers under Sections 18 and 21 of the CDSA enable restraint orders to prevent asset disposal, while Section 19, CDSA allows ex parte orders prohibiting dealing with realisable property. CPIB and CNB have additional seizure powers under PCA and MDA, respectively. Examples of these provisional measures are provided in Box 8.3 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 506. LEAs make active use of provisional measures to secure assets identified as a result of financial investigations, including in complex cases. Overall, authorities recorded seizures in a nearly 20 000 cases, concerning values of SGD 6.3 billion [35] (USD 4.7 billion). As shown in Table 8.1, seizure results are significant in value. However, only 5% of these cases (962) involved ML-related seizures, while accounting for 92% of the total seizure amounts. Conversely, the remaining 95% non-ML cases yielded more modest values, contributing to 8% of the total seized amounts. This follows on from the analysis of Singapore’s investigation and prosecution of ML (see IO.7), which shows how Singapore’s LEAs investigate very significant numbers of smaller cases. The few ML-related cases (typically involving foreign predicate offences) are high-value cases and generate most of the seizure amounts, while the majority of domestic predicate cases are more numerous and average out to be lower in value, and unaccompanied by ML investigations. For example, the 2023 3B$ case, in effect a combination of cases given the extensive networks and large numbers of subjects and funds involved, accounts for 47% of total seizures. Table 8.1. Amount Seized (in SGD Million) Seizure 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML seizures % non-ML seizures Foreign predicate offences (including tax crime) 100.1 836.1 289 3 532.60 320 5 077.8 (79.5%) 100 0 Domestic predicate offences (including CEF) 139.8 505.2 217.9 154.1 291.7 1 308.7 (20.5%) 45.2 54.8 Total number of cases (including tax crimes, but excluding CEF) (2) 4 287 4 411 3 338 4 108 3 627 19 771 5 95 # cases (ML seizures, excluding CEF) 209 242 178 191 142 962 n/a n/a # cases (non-ML, usually domestic predicates) 4 078 4 169 3 160 3 917 3 485 18 809 n/a n/a Total seizure amounts (including tax crime and CEF) 239.9 1 341.3 506.8 3 686.7 611.7 6 386.4 (100%) 1 92 8 Note: (1) the total is the sum of lines 1 and 2. 507. Singapore has seized a wide variety of assets constituting criminal property including real estate, cash, vehicles, vessels, luxury items such as watches and handbags, precious stones and metals, securities, virtual assets, casino chips, and club memberships. Funds in bank accounts and real estate represent the largest asset categories by value seized. 508.  Singapore’s risk and context makes it essential to use international co-operation effectively to pursue asset recovery, particularly in the early phases of investigations. Singapore actively applies provisional measures, including stop-payment mechanisms, for example through INTERPOL’s I-GRIP, the Egmont Group, ARIN-AP, and the rapid-response powers of ASC, which operates 24/7 to trace and freeze cross-border criminal proceeds. LEAs made a limited number of MLA requests in relation to provisional measures when considering the volume of ML investigations they conduct. However, as discussed further in IO.2, LEAs often use informal channels to trace assets and seek the imposition of provisional measures, followed by formal MLA requests when needed. While initial outreach often succeeds in restraining proceeds abroad, which is positive, subsequent MLA requests rarely follow to build on this progress. This is typically due to the absence of assets available for seizure, confiscation or repatriation . Singapore has also demonstrated responsiveness to foreign requests, executing urgent measures within seven days or by the requested deadline, and handling the majority of cases within 60 days. 509. Seizures of proceeds and instrumentalities are aligned with risks to a reasonable extent and concentrate in a few predicate offence types (Table 8.2). Over 61% of seizures relate to organised crime, mainly driven by the 3B$ case in 2023 (involving fraud, and forgery). ML seizures in respect of some high-risk predicates such as corruption, tax crimes, TBML and drugs (a notable ML threat according to the NRA) are modest and result from the lower number of ML cases investigated for these predicate crimes in comparison to fraud. There were no TF seizures during the reporting period, which aligns with risks. The ASC has seized SGD 590 million (USD 436.6 million) in proceeds related to CEF, which is in line with risks only to some extent (see 3.4.2). While seizures are high in real terms, this is not in keeping with the significance and increase in fraud-related cases. Table 8.2. Seizures per predicate offence (in SGD Millions) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML seizures % non-ML seizures Organised crime 0 13.3 254.7 3 378.5 272.2 3 918.7 (61.4%) 100% 0 Fraud (excluding domestic CEF) 58.7 895.1 38.3 7.3 20.5 1 019.9 (16%) 99.6% 0.4 Domestic CEF 57.6 102 146.6 100.3 182.8 589.3 (9.2%) 100% 0 Corruption 14.7 2.4 12.4 150.9 12.8 193.2 (3%) 93% 7 Tax (including Tax ML and tax crimes) 54.6 14.5 14.4 25.5 34.4 143.4 (2.2%) 25.6% 74.4 TBML 0 0.7 0 0.6 0 1.3 (0%) 100% 0 Drug-related offences 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 7.7 (0.1%) 85.7% 14.3 Others (such as robbery, theft, remote gambling) 51.4 310.8 42 22.9 87.1 514.2 (8.1%) 0% 100 Total seizures 239.9 1 341.3 506.8 3 686.7 611.7 6 386.4 92% 8% 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 510. As shown in Box 8.3, Singapore can act swiftly to freeze assets, mainly through S35 CPC powers and coordinating with international counterparts. Case studies show that LEAs can suspend transactions in a timely manner by freezing assets moved to or through Singapore, and FIs/VASPs sometimes apply temporary suspensions (“credit freezes”) proactively, reporting them to LEAs afterwards via STRs. However, the systematic use of such suspension measures is unclear, and no statistics exist on how often SPF exercises this power or on the frequency of requests made by STRO (such as from other countries seeking suspension). Singapore would benefit from a more coordinated response to the temporary suspension activities of FIs and VASPs, including by affirming them after the fact as CPC S35 suspensions. This would also guard against unintended consequences on genuine accountholders. This is because seizure powers pursuant to S35 CPC can apply for up to one year, at which time LEAs need to apply to the Courts for continued seizure of the assets (or release of the seized assets before the one-year mark). The Courts will generally grant shorter renewals for continued seizure of the assets. A maximum duration of one year for such freezes is not consistent with a truly provisional and expeditious measure intended to buy time for more intensive LEA action. Moreover, suspensions in Singapore are essentially restraints that can last a year (or more after a court review), so the length of time that passes without court review is considered somewhat problematic. This is a minor issue dealt in the TC analysis (see R.4). Box 8.3. Provisional measures [36] Recovery of funds by Singapore through various informal channels and MLA In July 2024, a company that was a victim of a BEC scam lodged a complaint with the SPF stating that it had been tricked into sending USD 42.3 million to a fraudulent bank account in Timor-Leste. Some of the funds were also found to be further transferred to bank accounts in Indonesia. SPF sought assistance from authorities in Timor-Leste and Indonesia to provisionally freeze the said illicit proceeds in their countries. By leveraging on INTERPOL I-GRIP’s mechanism, ARIN-AP, LEA to LEA, FIU to FIU and MLA channels, Timor-Leste repatriated USD 39.3 million to Singapore. Steps are being taken for the remaining USD 2 million to be repatriated from Timor-Leste and Indonesia. 511. In conclusion, LEAs actively use provisional measures, primarily through S35 CPC, to secure assets and prevent dissipation, including in complex, high-value cases. Overall, a small number of ML cases (including the 3B$ case) generate the overwhelming majority of seized assets. Cases involving seizures from predicate offence investigations account for 95% of all instances of seizures, but a low average value. Seizures from ML cases generally involve foreign predicate offences, with domestic predicate cases representing only 11% of ML-related seizures by value. Seizures are aligned with risks to a reasonable extent, and authorities should enhance efforts to better address the severity of the CEF threat while more actively seeking opportunities for seizure related to some higher risk predicates, such as drug crimes. Footnotes [36] See also Box 2.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="505. LEAs use a range of legal powers to seize and prevent the dissipation of criminal property, supported by WoG strategies and SOPs specific to each agency. The primary tool used is Section 35(1) of CPC, which allows LEAs to freeze and seize suspected criminal property without a court order. Seized property must be reported to the court either upon conclusion of the investigation or within one year, whichever comes first. Additional powers under Sections 18 and 21 of the CDSA enable restraint orders to prevent asset disposal, while Section 19, CDSA allows ex parte orders prohibiting dealing with realisable property. CPIB and CNB have additional seizure powers under PCA and MDA, respectively. Examples of these provisional measures are provided in Box 8.3 8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 506. LEAs make active use of provisional measures to secure assets identified as a result of financial investigations, including in complex cases. Overall, authorities recorded seizures in a nearly 20 000 cases, concerning values of SGD 6.3 billion [35] (USD 4.7 billion). As shown in Table 8.1, seizure results are significant in value. However, only 5% of these cases (962) involved ML-related seizures, while accounting for 92% of the total seizure amounts. Conversely, the remaining 95% non-ML cases yielded more modest values, contributing to 8% of the total seized amounts. This follows on from the analysis of Singapore’s investigation and prosecution of ML (see IO.7), which shows how Singapore’s LEAs investigate very significant numbers of smaller cases. The few ML-related cases (typically involving foreign predicate offences) are high-value cases and generate most of the seizure amounts, while the majority of domestic predicate cases are more numerous and average out to be lower in value, and unaccompanied by ML investigations. For example, the 2023 3B$ case, in effect a combination of cases given the extensive networks and large numbers of subjects and funds involved, accounts for 47% of total seizures. Table 8.1. Amount Seized (in SGD Million) Seizure 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML seizures % non-ML seizures Foreign predicate offences (including tax crime) 100.1 836.1 289 3 532.60 320 5 077.8 (79.5%) 100 0 Domestic predicate offences (including CEF) 139.8 505.2 217.9 154.1 291.7 1 308.7 (20.5%) 45.2 54.8 Total number of cases (including tax crimes, but excluding CEF) (2) 4 287 4 411 3 338 4 108 3 627 19 771 5 95 # cases (ML seizures, excluding CEF) 209 242 178 191 142 962 n/a n/a # cases (non-ML, usually domestic predicates) 4 078 4 169 3 160 3 917 3 485 18 809 n/a n/a Total seizure amounts (including tax crime and CEF) 239.9 1 341.3 506.8 3 686.7 611.7 6 386.4 (100%) 1 92 8 Note: (1) the total is the sum of lines 1 and 2. 507. Singapore has seized a wide variety of assets constituting criminal property including real estate, cash, vehicles, vessels, luxury items such as watches and handbags, precious stones and metals, securities, virtual assets, casino chips, and club memberships. Funds in bank accounts and real estate represent the largest asset categories by value seized. 508.  Singapore’s risk and context makes it essential to use international co-operation effectively to pursue asset recovery, particularly in the early phases of investigations. Singapore actively applies provisional measures, including stop-payment mechanisms, for example through INTERPOL’s I-GRIP, the Egmont Group, ARIN-AP, and the rapid-response powers of ASC, which operates 24/7 to trace and freeze cross-border criminal proceeds. LEAs made a limited number of MLA requests in relation to provisional measures when considering the volume of ML investigations they conduct. However, as discussed further in IO.2, LEAs often use informal channels to trace assets and seek the imposition of provisional measures, followed by formal MLA requests when needed. While initial outreach often succeeds in restraining proceeds abroad, which is positive, subsequent MLA requests rarely follow to build on this progress. This is typically due to the absence of assets available for seizure, confiscation or repatriation . Singapore has also demonstrated responsiveness to foreign requests, executing urgent measures within seven days or by the requested deadline, and handling the majority of cases within 60 days. 509. Seizures of proceeds and instrumentalities are aligned with risks to a reasonable extent and concentrate in a few predicate offence types (Table 8.2). Over 61% of seizures relate to organised crime, mainly driven by the 3B$ case in 2023 (involving fraud, and forgery). ML seizures in respect of some high-risk predicates such as corruption, tax crimes, TBML and drugs (a notable ML threat according to the NRA) are modest and result from the lower number of ML cases investigated for these predicate crimes in comparison to fraud. There were no TF seizures during the reporting period, which aligns with risks. The ASC has seized SGD 590 million (USD 436.6 million) in proceeds related to CEF, which is in line with risks only to some extent (see 3.4.2). While seizures are high in real terms, this is not in keeping with the significance and increase in fraud-related cases. Table 8.2. Seizures per predicate offence (in SGD Millions) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML seizures % non-ML seizures Organised crime 0 13.3 254.7 3 378.5 272.2 3 918.7 (61.4%) 100% 0 Fraud (excluding domestic CEF) 58.7 895.1 38.3 7.3 20.5 1 019.9 (16%) 99.6% 0.4 Domestic CEF 57.6 102 146.6 100.3 182.8 589.3 (9.2%) 100% 0 Corruption 14.7 2.4 12.4 150.9 12.8 193.2 (3%) 93% 7 Tax (including Tax ML and tax crimes) 54.6 14.5 14.4 25.5 34.4 143.4 (2.2%) 25.6% 74.4 TBML 0 0.7 0 0.6 0 1.3 (0%) 100% 0 Drug-related offences 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 7.7 (0.1%) 85.7% 14.3 Others (such as robbery, theft, remote gambling) 51.4 310.8 42 22.9 87.1 514.2 (8.1%) 0% 100 Total seizures 239.9 1 341.3 506.8 3 686.7 611.7 6 386.4 92% 8% 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 510. As shown in Box 8.3, Singapore can act swiftly to freeze assets, mainly through S35 CPC powers and coordinating with international counterparts. Case studies show that LEAs can suspend transactions in a timely manner by freezing assets moved to or through Singapore, and FIs/VASPs sometimes apply temporary suspensions (“credit freezes”) proactively, reporting them to LEAs afterwards via STRs. However, the systematic use of such suspension measures is unclear, and no statistics exist on how often SPF exercises this power or on the frequency of requests made by STRO (such as from other countries seeking suspension). Singapore would benefit from a more coordinated response to the temporary suspension activities of FIs and VASPs, including by affirming them after the fact as CPC S35 suspensions. This would also guard against unintended consequences on genuine accountholders. This is because seizure powers pursuant to S35 CPC can apply for up to one year, at which time LEAs need to apply to the Courts for continued seizure of the assets (or release of the seized assets before the one-year mark). The Courts will generally grant shorter renewals for continued seizure of the assets. A maximum duration of one year for such freezes is not consistent with a truly provisional and expeditious measure intended to buy time for more intensive LEA action. Moreover, suspensions in Singapore are essentially restraints that can last a year (or more after a court review), so the length of time that passes without court review is considered somewhat problematic. This is a minor issue dealt in the TC analysis (see R.4). Box 8.3. Provisional measures [36] Recovery of funds by Singapore through various informal channels and MLA In July 2024, a company that was a victim of a BEC scam lodged a complaint with the SPF stating that it had been tricked into sending USD 42.3 million to a fraudulent bank account in Timor-Leste. Some of the funds were also found to be further transferred to bank accounts in Indonesia. SPF sought assistance from authorities in Timor-Leste and Indonesia to provisionally freeze the said illicit proceeds in their countries. By leveraging on INTERPOL I-GRIP’s mechanism, ARIN-AP, LEA to LEA, FIU to FIU and MLA channels, Timor-Leste repatriated USD 39.3 million to Singapore. Steps are being taken for the remaining USD 2 million to be repatriated from Timor-Leste and Indonesia. 511. In conclusion, LEAs actively use provisional measures, primarily through S35 CPC, to secure assets and prevent dissipation, including in complex, high-value cases. Overall, a small number of ML cases (including the 3B$ case) generate the overwhelming majority of seized assets. Cases involving seizures from predicate offence investigations account for 95% of all instances of seizures, but a low average value. Seizures from ML cases generally involve foreign predicate offences, with domestic predicate cases representing only 11% of ML-related seizures by value. Seizures are aligned with risks to a reasonable extent, and authorities should enhance efforts to better address the severity of the CEF threat while more actively seeking opportunities for seizure related to some higher risk predicates, such as drug crimes. Footnotes [36] See also Box 2.4." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="561. Singapore introduced amendments to enhance the sanctions under the TSOFA in 2018.The maximum penalties for natural persons under the TSOFA are a term of imprisonment up to 10 years or a fine of up to SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), or both. This is comparable to the maximum penalties for other serious offences in Singapore such as corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering, cheating, and human trafficking. Legal persons or entities found to be facilitating TF may be subject to a fine not exceeding the higher of SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) or twice the value of the property involved, whichever is higher. 562. There have been six convictions in the assessed period and all convicted persons received a term of imprisonment upon sentencing, as can be seen in the table below. The Singaporean courts apply general deterrence principles when sentencing TF offenders which results in substantially longer jail terms for offending involving very small sums contrasted with sentencing for much higher value for offences not involving TF. Table 9.5. Sanctions Applied Amount of TF Prison Term Person A SGD 140 18 months Person B SGD 130 24 months Person C SGD 450 33 months Person D SGD 1 216.73 45 months Person E SGD 1 026 46 months Person F SGD 891.98 32 months 563. Any foreign persons convicted of terrorist financing offence are deported back to their home jurisdiction once their sentence has been served and the relevant authorities in the home jurisdiction are informed of Singapore’s actions. 564. Singapore widely publicises all TF convictions and the corresponding sentences imposed to send a clear message to the public about the consequences of participating in TF. 565. All persons convicted of TF offences and/or detained under the Internal Security Act are designated in the public-facing First Schedule of the TSOFA. A gazette is published (i.e. names published in the First Schedule of the TSOFA) after the issuance of an Order of Detention under the Internal Security Act or conviction under TSOFA, to effect the designation. Consequently, FIs, DNFBPs, and NPOs are prohibited from having financial dealings with these persons and their associates without permission from Singapore’s authorities. 566. Singapore’s legal framework provides for proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for natural and legal persons involved in TF activity. The small sample of convictions for individuals reflect a good level of intended deterrence in the sentences imposed. Effectiveness and the deterrent (dissuasive) impact upon legal persons is unable to be measured without examples of convictions to consider." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="561. Singapore introduced amendments to enhance the sanctions under the TSOFA in 2018.The maximum penalties for natural persons under the TSOFA are a term of imprisonment up to 10 years or a fine of up to SGD 500 000 (USD 370 000), or both. This is comparable to the maximum penalties for other serious offences in Singapore such as corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering, cheating, and human trafficking. Legal persons or entities found to be facilitating TF may be subject to a fine not exceeding the higher of SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) or twice the value of the property involved, whichever is higher. 562. There have been six convictions in the assessed period and all convicted persons received a term of imprisonment upon sentencing, as can be seen in the table below. The Singaporean courts apply general deterrence principles when sentencing TF offenders which results in substantially longer jail terms for offending involving very small sums contrasted with sentencing for much higher value for offences not involving TF. Table 9.5. Sanctions Applied Amount of TF Prison Term Person A SGD 140 18 months Person B SGD 130 24 months Person C SGD 450 33 months Person D SGD 1 216.73 45 months Person E SGD 1 026 46 months Person F SGD 891.98 32 months 563. Any foreign persons convicted of terrorist financing offence are deported back to their home jurisdiction once their sentence has been served and the relevant authorities in the home jurisdiction are informed of Singapore’s actions. 564. Singapore widely publicises all TF convictions and the corresponding sentences imposed to send a clear message to the public about the consequences of participating in TF. 565. All persons convicted of TF offences and/or detained under the Internal Security Act are designated in the public-facing First Schedule of the TSOFA. A gazette is published (i.e. names published in the First Schedule of the TSOFA) after the issuance of an Order of Detention under the Internal Security Act or conviction under TSOFA, to effect the designation. Consequently, FIs, DNFBPs, and NPOs are prohibited from having financial dealings with these persons and their associates without permission from Singapore’s authorities. 566. Singapore’s legal framework provides for proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for natural and legal persons involved in TF activity. The small sample of convictions for individuals reflect a good level of intended deterrence in the sentences imposed. Effectiveness and the deterrent (dissuasive) impact upon legal persons is unable to be measured without examples of convictions to consider." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. The NPO sector in Singapore comprises charities, a number of companies limited by guarantee (CLG) and societies, as well as mosques, madrasahs and Wakaf Masyarakat Singapura (WMS), a community wakaf. The Singapore TF NRAs 2020 and 2024 conclude that NPOs pose a medium-low risk of TF abuse. 591. There are four regulatory bodies in Singapore responsible for the supervision for the NPO sector, COC, ACRA, MUIS and ROS. These bodies collaborate well, with COC taking the lead in engagement matters. 592. In line with its risk and context, Singapore uses a strong programme of guidance and outreach to mitigate risk of TF abuse of those in the NPO sector that fit within the FATF definition. The approach is focused, proportionate and not unduly disruptive to the legitimate activities of NPOs in Singapore. Table 10.3. Breakdown of the number of NPOs by regulator (as of 31 December 2023) NPO regulator COC ACRA MUIS ROS Total Type of NPO Charities CLGs (NPO)* Mosque Madrasah WMS Societies (NPO)* 2 659 Number of NPOs 2 398 122 70 6 1 62* Note: Comprise CLGs and societies that fall within the FATF definition of NPO, but not registered as a charity under the Charities Act 1994 (Charities Act) 593. As of 31 December 2023, there are 2 659 entities falling within the FATF definition of NPO of which approximately 200 have been identified as the high-risk subset. During the assessment period, there were no cases of NPOs in Singapore being misused for TF. Factors taken into account in determining vulnerability of NPOs in the charity sector are: a) involvement in overseas operations and activities; b) awareness of risks of abuse for TF; c) implementation of due diligence measures; d) implementation of monitoring mechanisms to maintain and promote accountability and transparency; and, e) use of regulated financial channels. 594. The identified high-risk subset could be categorised as one that is providing humanitarian aid and religious groups based in high-risk jurisdictions, conflict zones or neighbouring jurisdictions. 595. The NPO sector in Singapore is domestically focused, and within the NPO sector, the charity sector (under the purview of the COC) with relatively higher exposure to overseas activities is assessed to be more vulnerable to TF abuse with a medium-low vulnerability. The remaining NPOs under ACRA, MUIS and ROS are assessed to be of low vulnerability of TF abuse. 596. Singapore adopts a risk-based approach to regulating and monitoring the NPO sector, in which higher-risk NPOs are subjected to focused measures such as additional disclosure requirements, screening and targeted outreach. 597. All NPOs are subjected to baseline regulatory requirements to promote accountability and integrity in the administration and management of NPOs, which include the need to apply for registration and file annual submissions. NPOs are also required to notify their regulators of any changes in information related to their entities, such as changes in the constitution, place of operation and composition of their key office bearers. In addition, the accounts of NPOs are required to be audited or independently examined in accordance with the statutory requirements under the relevant legislation to promote credibility of the financial information presented by the NPOs. Regulators also conduct background screening on all key office bearers of NPOs, including against the list of designated/sanctioned individuals pursuant to TF. 598. Singapore’s monitoring and oversight of NPOs is risk-based, focusing on activities that have factors creating vulnerability of TF abuse in NPOs. Primarily this relates to activities by charities that are fundraising to spend, remit or disburse funds to locations outside Singapore. Charities fundraising for foreign charitable purposes are required to apply for a Fundraising for Foreign Charitable Purposes (FRFCP) permit, disclose information regarding the quantum and countries where such funds are applied, as part of their annual submissions. 599. The administration of the FRFCP is risk-based, with greater scrutiny placed on applications which involve foreign beneficiaries, partners and/or foreign NPOs located in high-risk jurisdictions and conflict zones/regions. All persons or entities raising monies for any foreign charitable purpose, must apply for FRFCP permits. Approximately 70 permits per year are approved once the COC has completed due diligence on beneficiaries utilising relevant competent authorities. During the assessed period only one application was refused, due to deficiencies in the documentation submitted. Box 10.2. Case Study: Targeted measures for the protection of charities that may be deemed at higher risk of TF In November 2023, MHA alerted COC to a fund-raising appeal conducted by a registered charity (“Charity A”) to provide humanitarian relief to the affected victims of an ongoing conflict in the Middle East, through an overseas partner entity. MHA highlighted that the social media post of Charity A contained information that appeared to suggest that part of the donations from the appeal would be used to support a foreign party to the conflict. The COC found that Charity A had failed to apply for FRFCP permit prior the fund-raising appeal. In response to inquiries from MHA and COC, Charity A removed all social media posts related to the appeal. Charity A agreed to work with the COC to rectify its non-compliance before resuming further disbursement of donations. In due course, an appropriate FRFCP permit was issued to Charity A to continue its fundraising activities. 600. The COC adopts a pro-active approach in uplifting the capabilities of charities to mitigate the risks of TF abuse and has dedicated additional resources to provide guidance and targeted outreach, particularly, for identified higher-risk charities. 601. Guidance materials are produced in a co-operative manner with formal partnerships established via MOUs, whilst collaboration with other partners is established through goodwill arrangements. 602. Partnerships and collaboration in place with other sectors such as lawyers and accountants to enable the guidance materials to be targeted and relevant. Material produced is innovative and timely including the use of webinars and YouTube to ensure they are targeted at as wide an audience as possible. Panel discussions take place with experts to discuss best practice, again aimed at reaching a wide audience. Box 10.3. COC guidance to higher-risk charities In December 2024, COC designated a small group of charities for a pilot scheme to encourage charitable giving towards foreign charitable causes beyond Singapore. Tax deductions are granted for qualifying overseas cash donations that have been made through these designated charities towards emergency humanitarian assistance. Given the increased inherent risks of operating in disaster-stricken and/or conflict regions, these designated charities were required to furnish documented policies and procedures to demonstrate that they have implemented mitigating measures against illicit fund flows. During the assessment process, the COC guided charities on areas of improvement in their policies and procedures to better safeguard their organisations against the risks of TF abuse, through targeted engagement. 603. MUIS conducts periodic updates for Mosque Management Board (MMB) and school leaders on mosques and madrasahs financial policies and procedures, including matters relating to TF risks and abuse. MMBs attend such trainings regularly at the start of each term of appointment and during re-appointments. 604. ROS has published a Code of Governance for Registered Societies that provides best practices to societies in carrying out their duties, managing society funds and properties, and a Guidance Note - Protecting Your Society against Money Laundering &amp; Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT Guidance Note for Societies) on its website since June 2015. Annually, ROS also issues email advisories to the societies about AML/CFT resources and encourages the societies to circulate such information to its members, staff, and volunteers to create awareness. 605. The diagram, below outlines the risk-based approach, providing an overview of the baseline statutory requirements that apply to all NPOs and the additional measures that are targeted at higher-risk NPOs. Figure 10.2. Oversight and Monitoring of NPOs Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Box 10.4. COC’s Terrorist Financing Risk Mitigation Toolkit for Charities (2023) In February 2023, the COC launched a Terrorist Financing Risk Mitigation Toolkit for Charities (the Toolkit), which comprises a step-by-step risk assessment framework and recommended mitigating measures, to guide charities in identifying TF risks, assessing the level of risks, prioritising and mitigating the identified risks in a systematic manner. The Toolkit was co-developed with charities and industry professionals, where the COC engaged the higher risk charities through focus group discussions. These charities were guided by a team of consultants to complete a mock risk assessment based on the draft Toolkit and they also provided feedback to enhance the utility of the Toolkit. The COC adopted some of the feedback from the participants, one of which is the inclusion of checklists in the Toolkit to provide additional guidance on the key considerations that charities should take note of when conducting their risk assessments. Following the launch of the Toolkit, the COC rolled out training sessions that were targeted at higher risk charities, in particular the religious charities that conduct and support overseas activities and charitable causes, and charities that facilitate humanitarian and disaster relief work, in high-risk jurisdictions and/or near conflict zones. 606. COC conducts annual Safer Giving campaigns targeting the donor community, including material on verifying the beneficiary and purpose of donations educating the public on TF risks and how to donate safely to NPOs. 607. NPOs with high, medium and low risk profiles indicated that they had limited concerns about Singapore’s regulations being overly onerous or preventing them from conducting legitimate charitable activities. NPOs provided positive feedback on the outreach of the COC and the collaborative approach employed by regulators. There was, however, some concern in relation to the delay for FRFCP permits where funds were needed urgently for foreign charitable purposes (e.g. in natural disaster events)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. The NPO sector in Singapore comprises charities, a number of companies limited by guarantee (CLG) and societies, as well as mosques, madrasahs and Wakaf Masyarakat Singapura (WMS), a community wakaf. The Singapore TF NRAs 2020 and 2024 conclude that NPOs pose a medium-low risk of TF abuse. 591. There are four regulatory bodies in Singapore responsible for the supervision for the NPO sector, COC, ACRA, MUIS and ROS. These bodies collaborate well, with COC taking the lead in engagement matters. 592. In line with its risk and context, Singapore uses a strong programme of guidance and outreach to mitigate risk of TF abuse of those in the NPO sector that fit within the FATF definition. The approach is focused, proportionate and not unduly disruptive to the legitimate activities of NPOs in Singapore. Table 10.3. Breakdown of the number of NPOs by regulator (as of 31 December 2023) NPO regulator COC ACRA MUIS ROS Total Type of NPO Charities CLGs (NPO)* Mosque Madrasah WMS Societies (NPO)* 2 659 Number of NPOs 2 398 122 70 6 1 62* Note: Comprise CLGs and societies that fall within the FATF definition of NPO, but not registered as a charity under the Charities Act 1994 (Charities Act) 593. As of 31 December 2023, there are 2 659 entities falling within the FATF definition of NPO of which approximately 200 have been identified as the high-risk subset. During the assessment period, there were no cases of NPOs in Singapore being misused for TF. Factors taken into account in determining vulnerability of NPOs in the charity sector are: a) involvement in overseas operations and activities; b) awareness of risks of abuse for TF; c) implementation of due diligence measures; d) implementation of monitoring mechanisms to maintain and promote accountability and transparency; and, e) use of regulated financial channels. 594. The identified high-risk subset could be categorised as one that is providing humanitarian aid and religious groups based in high-risk jurisdictions, conflict zones or neighbouring jurisdictions. 595. The NPO sector in Singapore is domestically focused, and within the NPO sector, the charity sector (under the purview of the COC) with relatively higher exposure to overseas activities is assessed to be more vulnerable to TF abuse with a medium-low vulnerability. The remaining NPOs under ACRA, MUIS and ROS are assessed to be of low vulnerability of TF abuse. 596. Singapore adopts a risk-based approach to regulating and monitoring the NPO sector, in which higher-risk NPOs are subjected to focused measures such as additional disclosure requirements, screening and targeted outreach. 597. All NPOs are subjected to baseline regulatory requirements to promote accountability and integrity in the administration and management of NPOs, which include the need to apply for registration and file annual submissions. NPOs are also required to notify their regulators of any changes in information related to their entities, such as changes in the constitution, place of operation and composition of their key office bearers. In addition, the accounts of NPOs are required to be audited or independently examined in accordance with the statutory requirements under the relevant legislation to promote credibility of the financial information presented by the NPOs. Regulators also conduct background screening on all key office bearers of NPOs, including against the list of designated/sanctioned individuals pursuant to TF. 598. Singapore’s monitoring and oversight of NPOs is risk-based, focusing on activities that have factors creating vulnerability of TF abuse in NPOs. Primarily this relates to activities by charities that are fundraising to spend, remit or disburse funds to locations outside Singapore. Charities fundraising for foreign charitable purposes are required to apply for a Fundraising for Foreign Charitable Purposes (FRFCP) permit, disclose information regarding the quantum and countries where such funds are applied, as part of their annual submissions. 599. The administration of the FRFCP is risk-based, with greater scrutiny placed on applications which involve foreign beneficiaries, partners and/or foreign NPOs located in high-risk jurisdictions and conflict zones/regions. All persons or entities raising monies for any foreign charitable purpose, must apply for FRFCP permits. Approximately 70 permits per year are approved once the COC has completed due diligence on beneficiaries utilising relevant competent authorities. During the assessed period only one application was refused, due to deficiencies in the documentation submitted. Box 10.2. Case Study: Targeted measures for the protection of charities that may be deemed at higher risk of TF In November 2023, MHA alerted COC to a fund-raising appeal conducted by a registered charity (“Charity A”) to provide humanitarian relief to the affected victims of an ongoing conflict in the Middle East, through an overseas partner entity. MHA highlighted that the social media post of Charity A contained information that appeared to suggest that part of the donations from the appeal would be used to support a foreign party to the conflict. The COC found that Charity A had failed to apply for FRFCP permit prior the fund-raising appeal. In response to inquiries from MHA and COC, Charity A removed all social media posts related to the appeal. Charity A agreed to work with the COC to rectify its non-compliance before resuming further disbursement of donations. In due course, an appropriate FRFCP permit was issued to Charity A to continue its fundraising activities. 600. The COC adopts a pro-active approach in uplifting the capabilities of charities to mitigate the risks of TF abuse and has dedicated additional resources to provide guidance and targeted outreach, particularly, for identified higher-risk charities. 601. Guidance materials are produced in a co-operative manner with formal partnerships established via MOUs, whilst collaboration with other partners is established through goodwill arrangements. 602. Partnerships and collaboration in place with other sectors such as lawyers and accountants to enable the guidance materials to be targeted and relevant. Material produced is innovative and timely including the use of webinars and YouTube to ensure they are targeted at as wide an audience as possible. Panel discussions take place with experts to discuss best practice, again aimed at reaching a wide audience. Box 10.3. COC guidance to higher-risk charities In December 2024, COC designated a small group of charities for a pilot scheme to encourage charitable giving towards foreign charitable causes beyond Singapore. Tax deductions are granted for qualifying overseas cash donations that have been made through these designated charities towards emergency humanitarian assistance. Given the increased inherent risks of operating in disaster-stricken and/or conflict regions, these designated charities were required to furnish documented policies and procedures to demonstrate that they have implemented mitigating measures against illicit fund flows. During the assessment process, the COC guided charities on areas of improvement in their policies and procedures to better safeguard their organisations against the risks of TF abuse, through targeted engagement. 603. MUIS conducts periodic updates for Mosque Management Board (MMB) and school leaders on mosques and madrasahs financial policies and procedures, including matters relating to TF risks and abuse. MMBs attend such trainings regularly at the start of each term of appointment and during re-appointments. 604. ROS has published a Code of Governance for Registered Societies that provides best practices to societies in carrying out their duties, managing society funds and properties, and a Guidance Note - Protecting Your Society against Money Laundering &amp; Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT Guidance Note for Societies) on its website since June 2015. Annually, ROS also issues email advisories to the societies about AML/CFT resources and encourages the societies to circulate such information to its members, staff, and volunteers to create awareness. 605. The diagram, below outlines the risk-based approach, providing an overview of the baseline statutory requirements that apply to all NPOs and the additional measures that are targeted at higher-risk NPOs. Figure 10.2. Oversight and Monitoring of NPOs Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Box 10.4. COC’s Terrorist Financing Risk Mitigation Toolkit for Charities (2023) In February 2023, the COC launched a Terrorist Financing Risk Mitigation Toolkit for Charities (the Toolkit), which comprises a step-by-step risk assessment framework and recommended mitigating measures, to guide charities in identifying TF risks, assessing the level of risks, prioritising and mitigating the identified risks in a systematic manner. The Toolkit was co-developed with charities and industry professionals, where the COC engaged the higher risk charities through focus group discussions. These charities were guided by a team of consultants to complete a mock risk assessment based on the draft Toolkit and they also provided feedback to enhance the utility of the Toolkit. The COC adopted some of the feedback from the participants, one of which is the inclusion of checklists in the Toolkit to provide additional guidance on the key considerations that charities should take note of when conducting their risk assessments. Following the launch of the Toolkit, the COC rolled out training sessions that were targeted at higher risk charities, in particular the religious charities that conduct and support overseas activities and charitable causes, and charities that facilitate humanitarian and disaster relief work, in high-risk jurisdictions and/or near conflict zones. 606. COC conducts annual Safer Giving campaigns targeting the donor community, including material on verifying the beneficiary and purpose of donations educating the public on TF risks and how to donate safely to NPOs. 607. NPOs with high, medium and low risk profiles indicated that they had limited concerns about Singapore’s regulations being overly onerous or preventing them from conducting legitimate charitable activities. NPOs provided positive feedback on the outreach of the COC and the collaborative approach employed by regulators. There was, however, some concern in relation to the delay for FRFCP permits where funds were needed urgently for foreign charitable purposes (e.g. in natural disaster events)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="645. Singapore has a sound legal framework for the implementation of PF-related TFS, with the IMC-EC overseeing this implementation. PF TFS have automatic effect in Singapore with no need for further transposition into the relevant Regulations; however, the law takes effect the next day after addition to the UNSC TFS list (to account for the time difference between New York and Singapore). The MAS and UN DPRK Regulations apply to any person in Singapore and any Singapore citizen outside Singapore, including FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. This includes TCSPs, legal persons, shipping companies, companies that provide shipping registration and/or administration services outside Singapore and representation offices of foreign flag States in Singapore. The powers, communication mechanisms and obligations are identical to what is described under IO.10. There are minor gaps in relation to exemptions (see R.7); however, Singapore has a solid framework to implement PF TFS. 646. The Regulations are available publicly on multiple Singapore websites. Where there is a change in the Regulations or any UNSC TFS list, an alert will be sent to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs that are subscribed to the MAS website. Many entities also subscribe directly to commercial sanctions information service providers. Subscription to the website is checked as part of supervisory engagements. Some DNFBP sector supervisors also pass along these alerts, which, in some instances, can result in delay between receipt and onforwarding to regulated entities if the entity is not directly subscribed to the MAS website. As per IO.10, communication of new listings, updates and de-listings did not always occur without delay during the reporting period. 647. PF TFS screening is conducted on potential or new customers (and their BOs) at the time of onboarding and before the provision of any services or undertaking of any transactions for the customer. Ongoing screening is also conducted on existing customers by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. Most reporting entities have appropriate screening systems and mechanisms in place although some deficiencies have been revealed in supervisory activities. 648. As noted above, there are entities operating within Singapore (outside of the traditional AML/CFT regime) that are exposed to higher proliferation and PF risks (e.g. representation offices of foreign flag States). The AT met such offices during the onsite and found very low levels of awareness of the PF TFS obligations. The AT could not conclude that these offices are complying with PF TFS obligations without delay. 649. At the time of the onsite visit, Singapore had not proposed nor co-sponsored any proposals for designation pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. This is consistent with the global approach to UNSCR 1718." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="645. Singapore has a sound legal framework for the implementation of PF-related TFS, with the IMC-EC overseeing this implementation. PF TFS have automatic effect in Singapore with no need for further transposition into the relevant Regulations; however, the law takes effect the next day after addition to the UNSC TFS list (to account for the time difference between New York and Singapore). The MAS and UN DPRK Regulations apply to any person in Singapore and any Singapore citizen outside Singapore, including FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. This includes TCSPs, legal persons, shipping companies, companies that provide shipping registration and/or administration services outside Singapore and representation offices of foreign flag States in Singapore. The powers, communication mechanisms and obligations are identical to what is described under IO.10. There are minor gaps in relation to exemptions (see R.7); however, Singapore has a solid framework to implement PF TFS. 646. The Regulations are available publicly on multiple Singapore websites. Where there is a change in the Regulations or any UNSC TFS list, an alert will be sent to FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs that are subscribed to the MAS website. Many entities also subscribe directly to commercial sanctions information service providers. Subscription to the website is checked as part of supervisory engagements. Some DNFBP sector supervisors also pass along these alerts, which, in some instances, can result in delay between receipt and onforwarding to regulated entities if the entity is not directly subscribed to the MAS website. As per IO.10, communication of new listings, updates and de-listings did not always occur without delay during the reporting period. 647. PF TFS screening is conducted on potential or new customers (and their BOs) at the time of onboarding and before the provision of any services or undertaking of any transactions for the customer. Ongoing screening is also conducted on existing customers by FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. Most reporting entities have appropriate screening systems and mechanisms in place although some deficiencies have been revealed in supervisory activities. 648. As noted above, there are entities operating within Singapore (outside of the traditional AML/CFT regime) that are exposed to higher proliferation and PF risks (e.g. representation offices of foreign flag States). The AT met such offices during the onsite and found very low levels of awareness of the PF TFS obligations. The AT could not conclude that these offices are complying with PF TFS obligations without delay. 649. At the time of the onsite visit, Singapore had not proposed nor co-sponsored any proposals for designation pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. This is consistent with the global approach to UNSCR 1718." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="138. Singapore’s competent authorities are part of the dynamic approach and were closely involved in the NRA development process. Objectives and activities are generally in line with the findings of the risk assessment processes and aligned with the Strategies. All relevant agencies reported prioritisation of CEF, in line with the NRA findings. However, not all key high ML/TF risks are given comparable priority (see section 2.2.2). The lack of specific actions and deliverables against the Strategies has some impact on the objectives and activities of competent authorities. 139. From a resourcing perspective, agencies are allocated dedicated resources through a central mechanism and individual agencies can each identify needs for additional resources , based on guidance provided at the SC and IAC. This resource application is submitted at the agency level and considered on a case-by-case basis. At isolated junctures, the SC/IAC have also reviewed the resource of AML/CFT agencies and guided agencies to consider if more sources across the government are needed for AML/CFT work. The SC and IAC would benefit from having a more regular full overview of the number of AML/CFT resources across the system, although no competent authorities in Singapore reported resourcing issues. 140. The lack of regular overview has led to resource allocation differences in practice. Resource allocation across different supervisors covering DNFBP sectors does not appear proportionate to the sectoral risks identified, with high intensity controls applied to relatively lower risk sectors or products (for example, pawnbrokers, accountants or wakafs). Singapore attributed this to the fact that their supervisors are able to include AML/CFT examinations as part of their broader regulatory oversight beyond AML/CFT concerns (e.g. for social and prudential reasons), but there appears no overarching mechanism to ensure consistency and proportionality of supervisory efforts across different sectors on a regular basis. 141. In addition, STRO is well resourced while relying on automation and technology to prioritise, analyse and disseminate STRs. Financial intelligence produced and disseminated by STRO aligns with the country’s risk profile to a good extent, as discussed further in section 6.2. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to some extent: 26% of financial intelligence packages and 17% of Fin-IRs disseminated by STRO are used to initiate investigations, while 14% of packages and Fin-IRs supported investigations (see Section 6.4). 142. LEAs demonstrated a risk understanding that is aligned with the findings of the NRAs and was more nuanced in some areas with a reasonably sound understanding of the data that underpinned the analysis. As part of the RTIG mechanism, competent authorities were alive to existing risks and trends and authorities reported that the dynamic approach to risk monitoring was very effective. In particular, authorities saw it as a positive that Singapore could remain agile and not be bound by bound by a fixed NRA cycle. In practice, 93% of Singapore’s ML investigations involve domestic predicate offences, which only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context. 143. Singapore has focused attention on its highest risk (i.e. fraud), as compared to the other key high ML/TF risks and has generally not taken decisions to de-prioritise lower risk areas. There are fewer investigations into other higher-risk areas (i.e., tax crimes, corruption and TBML). The focus on ML from CEF overweighs Singapore’s investigative resources into one high risk offence at the expense of others, with the majority of the CEF cases being relatively low value CEF, initiated by Singaporean victim complaints. Competent authority actions often fall short in addressing the risk of foreign actors using Singapore’s economy to channel CEF proceeds. Singapore’s dynamic approach is a strong approach to risk monitoring and assessment in theory, but the lack of an updated and comprehensive overview has resulted in some mismatch in operational alignment and supervisory coverage." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="138. Singapore’s competent authorities are part of the dynamic approach and were closely involved in the NRA development process. Objectives and activities are generally in line with the findings of the risk assessment processes and aligned with the Strategies. All relevant agencies reported prioritisation of CEF, in line with the NRA findings. However, not all key high ML/TF risks are given comparable priority (see section 2.2.2). The lack of specific actions and deliverables against the Strategies has some impact on the objectives and activities of competent authorities. 139. From a resourcing perspective, agencies are allocated dedicated resources through a central mechanism and individual agencies can each identify needs for additional resources , based on guidance provided at the SC and IAC. This resource application is submitted at the agency level and considered on a case-by-case basis. At isolated junctures, the SC/IAC have also reviewed the resource of AML/CFT agencies and guided agencies to consider if more sources across the government are needed for AML/CFT work. The SC and IAC would benefit from having a more regular full overview of the number of AML/CFT resources across the system, although no competent authorities in Singapore reported resourcing issues. 140. The lack of regular overview has led to resource allocation differences in practice. Resource allocation across different supervisors covering DNFBP sectors does not appear proportionate to the sectoral risks identified, with high intensity controls applied to relatively lower risk sectors or products (for example, pawnbrokers, accountants or wakafs). Singapore attributed this to the fact that their supervisors are able to include AML/CFT examinations as part of their broader regulatory oversight beyond AML/CFT concerns (e.g. for social and prudential reasons), but there appears no overarching mechanism to ensure consistency and proportionality of supervisory efforts across different sectors on a regular basis. 141. In addition, STRO is well resourced while relying on automation and technology to prioritise, analyse and disseminate STRs. Financial intelligence produced and disseminated by STRO aligns with the country’s risk profile to a good extent, as discussed further in section 6.2. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to some extent: 26% of financial intelligence packages and 17% of Fin-IRs disseminated by STRO are used to initiate investigations, while 14% of packages and Fin-IRs supported investigations (see Section 6.4). 142. LEAs demonstrated a risk understanding that is aligned with the findings of the NRAs and was more nuanced in some areas with a reasonably sound understanding of the data that underpinned the analysis. As part of the RTIG mechanism, competent authorities were alive to existing risks and trends and authorities reported that the dynamic approach to risk monitoring was very effective. In particular, authorities saw it as a positive that Singapore could remain agile and not be bound by bound by a fixed NRA cycle. In practice, 93% of Singapore’s ML investigations involve domestic predicate offences, which only partly aligns with Singapore’s risk and context. 143. Singapore has focused attention on its highest risk (i.e. fraud), as compared to the other key high ML/TF risks and has generally not taken decisions to de-prioritise lower risk areas. There are fewer investigations into other higher-risk areas (i.e., tax crimes, corruption and TBML). The focus on ML from CEF overweighs Singapore’s investigative resources into one high risk offence at the expense of others, with the majority of the CEF cases being relatively low value CEF, initiated by Singaporean victim complaints. Competent authority actions often fall short in addressing the risk of foreign actors using Singapore’s economy to channel CEF proceeds. Singapore’s dynamic approach is a strong approach to risk monitoring and assessment in theory, but the lack of an updated and comprehensive overview has resulted in some mismatch in operational alignment and supervisory coverage." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="238. Interviewed FIs and VASPs generally demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of AML/CFT obligations and risk control measures, recognising the need to implement enhanced due diligence and other risk mitigation measures when dealing with high-risk scenarios such as PEPs or clients from high-risk jurisdictions. However, the number of STRs reported in some higher risk sectors (e.g. DPTSPs) and for some ML methodologies that Singapore is highly exposed to (e.g. TBML) are not proportional to the risks identified. 239. Singapore distinguishes between deficiencies and breaches, where deficiency refers to weaknesses in the FI’s or VASP’s AML/CFT controls (which does not amount to a breach of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation); and breach refers to a breach of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation. Moreover, supervisors report deficiencies/breaches based on the number of regulatory requirements/areas affected, rather than the actual number of individual instances (e.g. an entity found to have failed to perform enhanced customer due diligence (EDD) measures for five customer accounts in one inspection is counted as one deficiency/breach instead of five). Taking these into account, the number of deficiencies/breaches reported by Singapore is understated. 3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 240. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures to successfully undertake these obligations and requirements. Singapore’s FI and VASP ecosystem is concentrated in a number of globally operating, sophisticated FIs and VASPs and systematically important local banks that have significant resources dedicated to AML/CFT, including employing globally consistent policies and procedures, the use advanced systems and third-party service providers. MAS does occasionally find errors in CDD and record keeping. Supervisory activities conducted by MAS between 2020 and 2024 identified 25 deficiencies and 103 CDD breaches generally involving the relevance and timeliness of CDD documentation. These failures are instance-specific and isolated and rarely related to systematic issues. 241. FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for on-boarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. For individuals, Singapore’s national identity card (NRIC) system includes a population register available to government with key elements of personal identity, such as biometric identification data, date of birth, gender and photo biometric data. The NRIC is complemented by SINGPASS, Singapore’s digital identity available to all citizens and permanent residents above the age of 15. These provide a strong element of customer verification during CDD processes. Non-residents in Singapore may open a bank account. FIs and VASPs generally require passport verification to open an account for non-residents. 242. For legal persons, Singapore’s FIs and VASPs rely on basic information in ACRA’s database or commercial sources, such as shareholder list and article of incorporation, to verify their beneficial owners. Singapore’s BO registry is only available to competent authorities. Foreign-created legal persons can hold accounts in Singapore and FIs and VASPs generally rely on commercial providers or publicly available BO information in their home jurisdiction to verify information. For legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs also use commercial software to track chains of ownership, but these might not always provide adequate information. The larger FIs met during the onsite demonstrated their effectiveness in identifying beneficial owners including for foreign legal and arrangements persons by using commercial databases to track all beneficial owners, while some smaller FIs reported that it was, in some instances too costly or there was a lack of reliable information to track beneficial owners. When beneficial owners cannot be confirmed or is too costly to maintain, FIs and VASPs in Singapore do not proceed with opening an account. MAS identified 1 deficiency and 13 breaches in relation to BO between 2020 and 2024. 243. FIs and VASPs give risk ratings to their customers based on the factors such as their individual characteristics, the products and services that they use and geographic exposure, amongst other characteristics. The frequency of review of customer profile corresponds to the risk ratings. Typically, high risk customers are subject to annual review, medium risk customers every two to three years and low risk customers every three to five years. Customer activity is monitored and examined when there is a trigger to do so. Where information is requested by FIs and VASPs as part of ongoing CDD, FIs and VASPs place limitations on customers’ accounts, until the information is received. MAS has identified 25 deficiencies and 36 breaches related to ongoing monitoring between 2020 and 2024. These deficiencies are in relation to lapses in ongoing monitoring of business relations, including ensuring that CDD data, documents and information are relevant and kept up-to-date, and monitoring and detecting suspicious, complex, unusually large or unusual patterns of transactions. 244. There is limited reliance on third parties to conduct CDD in Singapore. FIs and VASPs with international operations leverage their group to gather CDD or BO information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD processes by themselves. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 245. PEPs - Singapore has a broad definition of a politically exposed person, their family and their associates, including both domestic and foreign PEPs. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through self-declaration by the customers and checks against commercial databases. PEPs self-identify when entering into a business relationship and FIs/VASPs scan open source information to identify clients who are PEPs. FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and track their source of funds/wealth. Once an individual is considered a PEP, they would typically be always considered a PEP by the FI and VASP in Singapore. Overall, FIs and VASPs in Singapore apply strong measures for PEPs. 246. Correspondent Banking - Banks are required to develop a comprehensive understanding of the respondent bank and generally use questionnaires to conduct due diligence on respondent banks. Banks in Singapore have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. These relationships are subject to senior management approval and subject to periodic reviews. MAS has not observed any compliance deficiencies in correspondent banking. 247. New Technologies – MAS actively encourages FIs’ and VASPs’ use of new technologies. FIs and VASPs are required to identify and assess the ML/TF risks arising from new products, practices and technologies in advance of their implementation. Some FIs in Singapore do not take on business related to new technologies when they are perceived to be of high risk, such as virtual assets. Where FIs and VASPs do conduct business involving VAs, they conduct a risk assessment in advance of listing or doing business involving a particular VA. 248. Wire and Virtual Asset Transfer Rules – Relevant FIs comply with MAS’ requirements for identification, submission and recording of information of both incoming and outgoing wire transfers. Wire transfers with incomplete information are scrutinised and rejected if the originator is unable to provide complete information. STRs would also be filed in appropriate cases. From 2020 to 2024, MAS had observed zero deficiency and six breaches in relation to wire transfer requirements. MAS had also taken supervisory/enforcement actions against 6 FIs for non-compliance with the wire transfer requirements. When sending or receiving virtual assets, FIs and VASPs are required to abide by the ‘travel rule’ to collect, securely transmits and documents the requisite originator and beneficiary information. Limited interoperability between solutions has led to challenges in implementing the ‘travel rule’ in Singapore and globally. In such cases, VASPs have implemented additional risk mitigating measures for transfers that were not compliant with the ‘travel rule’, such as restricting transfers to only first party transfers or ceasing to facilitate such transfers entirely. These mitigation measures are not consistently applied. Overall, FIs and VASPs generally apply wire and virtual asset transfer rules effectively and are aware of their obligations in this area, with some difficulty observed in implementing the ‘travel rule’ and mitigating risk of incomplete virtual asset transfer information. 249. High-risk Countries Identified by the FATF - FIs and VASPs have generally put in place clear policies for dealing with customers from FATF high risk jurisdictions, including the application of EDD. FIs and VASPs, met during the onsite were able to explain enhanced processes, which included requiring senior management approval to enter into commercial relationships with high-risk customers. FIs and VASPs generally showed a much more nuanced understanding of geographic risk beyond high-risk countries identified by the FATF and measures were more specific and far reaching than limiting geographic risk to consideration of jurisdictions identified by the FATF. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 250. Overall, FIs and VASPs adequately understood their reporting obligations (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector). The trend in reporting is positive with a doubling in annual STR submission over the course of the assessment period. More than 90% of the STRs have been filed by banks and PSPs with 10 banks representing over half of all STRs filed in Singapore. This is generally consistent with the fact that these two sectors are material and identified to have high and medium-high ML risk respectively. In addition, the number of STRs reported by some higher risk financial sectors (e.g. DPTSPs) does not seem proportional to the identified risk. Some lower risk sectors including direct life and composite insurers, broker dealer, finance advisory firms and money changers, rated as medium-low or low risks, reported a relatively large number of STRs every year. This could possibly be the result of defensive reporting or an incorrect understanding of risks against these sectors in NRA. A number of sectors have reported a low number of STRs, including moneylenders. There are also limited STRs reported on key ML methodologies that Singapore is exposed to, such as TBML. More needs to be done by the authorities to ensure the suspicious transaction reporting of the financial sector is contributing to intelligence and supporting LEA objectives in these areas. MAS identified only single digit deficiencies and breaches related to STR filing across all sectors between 2020 and 2024. 251. FIs and VASPs generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities. VASPs generally subscribe to blockchain analytic tools for on-chain transaction monitoring as well as screening. Most FIs indicated that their primary trigger for submitting an STR is through adverse news reports and/or outreach from competent authorities in Singapore, though some FIs have started leveraging data analytics and network analytical tools to improve their detection of suspicious activities, entities and networks. There is still room for improvement in FIs and VASPs proactively detecting suspicious transactions rather than reactive and retrospective reporting following adverse news. 252. MAS and STRO supports the private sector quality and quantity of reporting through the publication of sector-specific red flag indicators and providing feedback on STR trends and STRs submitted to major reporters. From 2020 to 2024, MAS had observed one deficiency and seven breaches in relation to STR filing. MAS had taken supervisory/enforcement actions against eight FIs for failure to promptly submit STRs to STRO. 253. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations regarding tipping off and can explain processes to prevent this happening in practice. This understanding is consistent with supervisory findings. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 254. FIs and VASPs in Singapore generally have internal controls and procedures in place to ensure compliance with their AML/CFT requirements. These controls and procedures include management oversight, dedicated, well-resourced compliance functions, staff training, and independent audit functions to check regularly for the effectiveness of the FI/VASP’s AML/CFT measures. FIs’ AML/CFT policies and procedures are reviewed and approved by senior management and communicated to staff via regular training by the FI. FIs/VASPs are subject to annual audit which covers AML/CFT requirements. However, MAS has observed 37 deficiencies and 29 breaches from 2020 to 2024, which resulted in remedial actions/sanctions against 20 FIs. 255. AML/CFT compliance is generally prioritised at an appropriate level in Singapore. Regular reports on key AML compliance matters are presented to the Board and Senior Management. FIs generally have put in place and maintained an appropriate audit function by establishing an internal audit function or outsourcing the audit function to suitable external service providers. MAS requires that all FIs submit an annual external audit report. The audits are focused on assessing the effectiveness of measures that the FI has taken to prevent ML/TF, including determining the adequacy of the FI’s AML/CFT policies, procedures and controls and the extent of staff’s compliance with established AML/CFT policies and procedures. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 256. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Singapore." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="238. Interviewed FIs and VASPs generally demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of AML/CFT obligations and risk control measures, recognising the need to implement enhanced due diligence and other risk mitigation measures when dealing with high-risk scenarios such as PEPs or clients from high-risk jurisdictions. However, the number of STRs reported in some higher risk sectors (e.g. DPTSPs) and for some ML methodologies that Singapore is highly exposed to (e.g. TBML) are not proportional to the risks identified. 239. Singapore distinguishes between deficiencies and breaches, where deficiency refers to weaknesses in the FI’s or VASP’s AML/CFT controls (which does not amount to a breach of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation); and breach refers to a breach of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation. Moreover, supervisors report deficiencies/breaches based on the number of regulatory requirements/areas affected, rather than the actual number of individual instances (e.g. an entity found to have failed to perform enhanced customer due diligence (EDD) measures for five customer accounts in one inspection is counted as one deficiency/breach instead of five). Taking these into account, the number of deficiencies/breaches reported by Singapore is understated. 3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 240. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures to successfully undertake these obligations and requirements. Singapore’s FI and VASP ecosystem is concentrated in a number of globally operating, sophisticated FIs and VASPs and systematically important local banks that have significant resources dedicated to AML/CFT, including employing globally consistent policies and procedures, the use advanced systems and third-party service providers. MAS does occasionally find errors in CDD and record keeping. Supervisory activities conducted by MAS between 2020 and 2024 identified 25 deficiencies and 103 CDD breaches generally involving the relevance and timeliness of CDD documentation. These failures are instance-specific and isolated and rarely related to systematic issues. 241. FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for on-boarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. For individuals, Singapore’s national identity card (NRIC) system includes a population register available to government with key elements of personal identity, such as biometric identification data, date of birth, gender and photo biometric data. The NRIC is complemented by SINGPASS, Singapore’s digital identity available to all citizens and permanent residents above the age of 15. These provide a strong element of customer verification during CDD processes. Non-residents in Singapore may open a bank account. FIs and VASPs generally require passport verification to open an account for non-residents. 242. For legal persons, Singapore’s FIs and VASPs rely on basic information in ACRA’s database or commercial sources, such as shareholder list and article of incorporation, to verify their beneficial owners. Singapore’s BO registry is only available to competent authorities. Foreign-created legal persons can hold accounts in Singapore and FIs and VASPs generally rely on commercial providers or publicly available BO information in their home jurisdiction to verify information. For legal arrangements, including foreign legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs also use commercial software to track chains of ownership, but these might not always provide adequate information. The larger FIs met during the onsite demonstrated their effectiveness in identifying beneficial owners including for foreign legal and arrangements persons by using commercial databases to track all beneficial owners, while some smaller FIs reported that it was, in some instances too costly or there was a lack of reliable information to track beneficial owners. When beneficial owners cannot be confirmed or is too costly to maintain, FIs and VASPs in Singapore do not proceed with opening an account. MAS identified 1 deficiency and 13 breaches in relation to BO between 2020 and 2024. 243. FIs and VASPs give risk ratings to their customers based on the factors such as their individual characteristics, the products and services that they use and geographic exposure, amongst other characteristics. The frequency of review of customer profile corresponds to the risk ratings. Typically, high risk customers are subject to annual review, medium risk customers every two to three years and low risk customers every three to five years. Customer activity is monitored and examined when there is a trigger to do so. Where information is requested by FIs and VASPs as part of ongoing CDD, FIs and VASPs place limitations on customers’ accounts, until the information is received. MAS has identified 25 deficiencies and 36 breaches related to ongoing monitoring between 2020 and 2024. These deficiencies are in relation to lapses in ongoing monitoring of business relations, including ensuring that CDD data, documents and information are relevant and kept up-to-date, and monitoring and detecting suspicious, complex, unusually large or unusual patterns of transactions. 244. There is limited reliance on third parties to conduct CDD in Singapore. FIs and VASPs with international operations leverage their group to gather CDD or BO information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD processes by themselves. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 245. PEPs - Singapore has a broad definition of a politically exposed person, their family and their associates, including both domestic and foreign PEPs. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through self-declaration by the customers and checks against commercial databases. PEPs self-identify when entering into a business relationship and FIs/VASPs scan open source information to identify clients who are PEPs. FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and track their source of funds/wealth. Once an individual is considered a PEP, they would typically be always considered a PEP by the FI and VASP in Singapore. Overall, FIs and VASPs in Singapore apply strong measures for PEPs. 246. Correspondent Banking - Banks are required to develop a comprehensive understanding of the respondent bank and generally use questionnaires to conduct due diligence on respondent banks. Banks in Singapore have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. These relationships are subject to senior management approval and subject to periodic reviews. MAS has not observed any compliance deficiencies in correspondent banking. 247. New Technologies – MAS actively encourages FIs’ and VASPs’ use of new technologies. FIs and VASPs are required to identify and assess the ML/TF risks arising from new products, practices and technologies in advance of their implementation. Some FIs in Singapore do not take on business related to new technologies when they are perceived to be of high risk, such as virtual assets. Where FIs and VASPs do conduct business involving VAs, they conduct a risk assessment in advance of listing or doing business involving a particular VA. 248. Wire and Virtual Asset Transfer Rules – Relevant FIs comply with MAS’ requirements for identification, submission and recording of information of both incoming and outgoing wire transfers. Wire transfers with incomplete information are scrutinised and rejected if the originator is unable to provide complete information. STRs would also be filed in appropriate cases. From 2020 to 2024, MAS had observed zero deficiency and six breaches in relation to wire transfer requirements. MAS had also taken supervisory/enforcement actions against 6 FIs for non-compliance with the wire transfer requirements. When sending or receiving virtual assets, FIs and VASPs are required to abide by the ‘travel rule’ to collect, securely transmits and documents the requisite originator and beneficiary information. Limited interoperability between solutions has led to challenges in implementing the ‘travel rule’ in Singapore and globally. In such cases, VASPs have implemented additional risk mitigating measures for transfers that were not compliant with the ‘travel rule’, such as restricting transfers to only first party transfers or ceasing to facilitate such transfers entirely. These mitigation measures are not consistently applied. Overall, FIs and VASPs generally apply wire and virtual asset transfer rules effectively and are aware of their obligations in this area, with some difficulty observed in implementing the ‘travel rule’ and mitigating risk of incomplete virtual asset transfer information. 249. High-risk Countries Identified by the FATF - FIs and VASPs have generally put in place clear policies for dealing with customers from FATF high risk jurisdictions, including the application of EDD. FIs and VASPs, met during the onsite were able to explain enhanced processes, which included requiring senior management approval to enter into commercial relationships with high-risk customers. FIs and VASPs generally showed a much more nuanced understanding of geographic risk beyond high-risk countries identified by the FATF and measures were more specific and far reaching than limiting geographic risk to consideration of jurisdictions identified by the FATF. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 250. Overall, FIs and VASPs adequately understood their reporting obligations (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector). The trend in reporting is positive with a doubling in annual STR submission over the course of the assessment period. More than 90% of the STRs have been filed by banks and PSPs with 10 banks representing over half of all STRs filed in Singapore. This is generally consistent with the fact that these two sectors are material and identified to have high and medium-high ML risk respectively. In addition, the number of STRs reported by some higher risk financial sectors (e.g. DPTSPs) does not seem proportional to the identified risk. Some lower risk sectors including direct life and composite insurers, broker dealer, finance advisory firms and money changers, rated as medium-low or low risks, reported a relatively large number of STRs every year. This could possibly be the result of defensive reporting or an incorrect understanding of risks against these sectors in NRA. A number of sectors have reported a low number of STRs, including moneylenders. There are also limited STRs reported on key ML methodologies that Singapore is exposed to, such as TBML. More needs to be done by the authorities to ensure the suspicious transaction reporting of the financial sector is contributing to intelligence and supporting LEA objectives in these areas. MAS identified only single digit deficiencies and breaches related to STR filing across all sectors between 2020 and 2024. 251. FIs and VASPs generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities. VASPs generally subscribe to blockchain analytic tools for on-chain transaction monitoring as well as screening. Most FIs indicated that their primary trigger for submitting an STR is through adverse news reports and/or outreach from competent authorities in Singapore, though some FIs have started leveraging data analytics and network analytical tools to improve their detection of suspicious activities, entities and networks. There is still room for improvement in FIs and VASPs proactively detecting suspicious transactions rather than reactive and retrospective reporting following adverse news. 252. MAS and STRO supports the private sector quality and quantity of reporting through the publication of sector-specific red flag indicators and providing feedback on STR trends and STRs submitted to major reporters. From 2020 to 2024, MAS had observed one deficiency and seven breaches in relation to STR filing. MAS had taken supervisory/enforcement actions against eight FIs for failure to promptly submit STRs to STRO. 253. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations regarding tipping off and can explain processes to prevent this happening in practice. This understanding is consistent with supervisory findings. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 254. FIs and VASPs in Singapore generally have internal controls and procedures in place to ensure compliance with their AML/CFT requirements. These controls and procedures include management oversight, dedicated, well-resourced compliance functions, staff training, and independent audit functions to check regularly for the effectiveness of the FI/VASP’s AML/CFT measures. FIs’ AML/CFT policies and procedures are reviewed and approved by senior management and communicated to staff via regular training by the FI. FIs/VASPs are subject to annual audit which covers AML/CFT requirements. However, MAS has observed 37 deficiencies and 29 breaches from 2020 to 2024, which resulted in remedial actions/sanctions against 20 FIs. 255. AML/CFT compliance is generally prioritised at an appropriate level in Singapore. Regular reports on key AML compliance matters are presented to the Board and Senior Management. FIs generally have put in place and maintained an appropriate audit function by establishing an internal audit function or outsourcing the audit function to suitable external service providers. MAS requires that all FIs submit an annual external audit report. The audits are focused on assessing the effectiveness of measures that the FI has taken to prevent ML/TF, including determining the adequacy of the FI’s AML/CFT policies, procedures and controls and the extent of staff’s compliance with established AML/CFT policies and procedures. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 256. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Singapore." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="308. Singapore have taken efforts to promote a good understanding of AML/CFT obligations across the DNFBP sectors, but the implementation by DNFBPs for the newer sectors could be further improved. Interviewed DNFBPs generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of AML/CFT obligations and risk control measures and AML/CFT requirements are implemented to various extent in different sectors. PSMDs, as a relatively newly regulated sector and with large number of players in the industry, had relatively higher number of breaches identified during supervisory activities than other sectors, with the number dropping in the later years. For developers where supervisory regime was put in place recently, awareness and implementation of risk mitigation are gradually levelling up. All DNFBP sectors submitted STRs, but the vast majority were submitted by casino operators and the number of STRs submitted by some higher risk sectors (e.g. PSMDs) is lower but has been gradually increasing. 309. As with the case of financial institutions, Singapore distinguishes between deficiencies and breaches, where deficiency refers to weaknesses in AML/CFT controls (but is not itself a violation of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation); and breach refers to a violation of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation. Moreover, supervisors report deficiencies/breaches based on the number of regulatory requirements/areas affected, rather than the actual number of individual instances. Taking these into account, the number of deficiencies/breaches reported by Singapore would be understated. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 310. All DNFBPs are required by AML/CFT regulations to conduct CDD measures, identify and verify BO information and conduct ongoing monitoring of business relationships. In practice, basic CDD requirements are consistently implemented across most DNFBPs, and interviewed entities generally indicated sufficient guidance from supervisors on supervisory expectations. Supervisors do occasionally find errors in CDD, especially in real estate sector. 311. From the results of MAS’s supervisory activities, as well as the onsite interviews, LTCs understand and apply their AML/CFT obligations in relation to CDD, BO information and ongoing monitoring appropriately and generally have strong AML/CFT internal controls. MAS has identified 2 deficiencies and 9 breaches in 2020-24 from 70 supervisory activities and acknowledged that LTCs’ monitoring of higher risk TRPs, particularly in relation to source of wealth checks and scrutiny of their transactions, could be further strengthened. 312. CSPs generally complies with their AML/CFT obligations to conduct CDD and have procedures to address cases where client identity or background information is insufficient, including terminating transactions, rejecting clients, and filing STRs in line with regulatory obligations. ACRA verifies CSPs’ compliance by reviewing files from long-standing business relationships to confirm that ongoing monitoring is conducted, and relevant records are retained. That said, ACRA still identified a limited number (20 cases from 1572 examinations) of breaches related to CDD or BO information over the past five years. Accountants are subjected to similar requirements and were found to be compliant with no breaches identified. 313. MinLaw and LawSoc’s supervisory activities showed that most PSMDs, pawnbrokers, and lawyers have implemented core AML/CFT obligations such as CDD, record-keeping, and BO information requirements. While PSMDs recorded a higher number of deficiencies (25) and breaches (93) from 1125 examinations, there was also an observed reduction in the number of breaches from 2021 to more stable numbers in 2022 to 2024, reflecting the sector’s recent regulatory inclusion. On the other hand, pawnbrokers and lawyers demonstrated stronger compliance, with only single-digit breaches (three for pawnbrokers and six for lawyers) and 49 deficiencies (for lawyers) identified. Where high risk factors exist and a client is unable to provide an adequate, satisfactory and credible explanation in response to enquiries, the lawyer would consider whether a STR needs to be filed (see Box 4.2). Box 4.2. Prospective Client rejected by lawyer due to ML/TF concerns detected when conducting CDD A lawyer was approached by a company in Feb 2021 to offer legal services relating to the sale of a yacht. Screening conducted by the lawyer revealed that the company was owned by an individual under investigation in a foreign country for investment fraud. The lawyer noted that victims of the investment fraud had alleged that the individual used a yacht to demonstrate his wealth, as part of his marketing tactic to convince victims to invest. The lawyer suspected that the yacht for sale is the one used in the fraudulent scheme and may be proceeds of crime. The lawyer declined to provide legal services to the company and filed an STR with the name and owner of the yacht. 314. Casino operators in Singapore apply robust CDD and monitoring measures commensurate with the sector’s ML/TF risks. The casinos conduct identity checks at entry and BO information are obtained and verified prior to establishing patron accounts or conducting transactions above the SGD 4 000 (USD 3 000) threshold. Ongoing monitoring includes income and occupation-based profiling and assessing third-party relationships to detect inconsistencies between patrons’ gaming activity and known financial profiles and ensure lawful entitlement to usage of funds. GRA examinations confirm that operators maintain adequate records and apply CDD measures effectively, with three deficiencies and no relevant breach detected in 135 examinations conducted in the past five years. 315. EAs/RESs and developers demonstrated a basic understanding of CDD obligations before facilitating or accepting any property transactions when interviewed onsite. However, the number of breaches by EAs/RESs in relation to CDD, BO information and record keeping is relatively high (zero deficiency and 128 breaches from 62 examinations in 2020-24). The supervisory regime for developers is relatively new and all eight developers assessed to be of high risk and one developer of medium-high risk (which are mainly of larger scale) had been inspected, with no relevant deficiencies nor breaches identified. During onsite interviews, the sectors also observed lack of AML/CFT awareness and co-operation from buyers as key difficulties in complying with CDD and BO requirements but reported that they are bound by contract to complete the property transaction despite incomplete CDD/BO process. This reflected gaps in understanding and implementation of AML/CFT obligations by real estate sectors. Singapore has very recently taken measures to address gaps in the technical framework for some DNFBPs, for example, mandating EAs/ RESs and developers to conduct CDD on unrepresented counterparties involved in property transactions, but it is premature to assess the effectiveness of these measures. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 316. DNFBPs apply EDD to customers (or BO of customers) that is a PEP or a family member or close associate of a PEP, as well as those linked to high-risk jurisdictions identified by FATF or supervisors. On top of normal CDD, EDD includes verifying source of wealth and source of funds, senior management approval, and ongoing monitoring. To assist DNFBPs in establishing SoW of customers, some supervisors published guidance documents and information papers to set out regulatory expectations and best practices. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers who are PEPs or are from higher-risk jurisdictions. Examinations by DNFBP supervisors also identified single-digit deficiencies and breaches in this regard for most sectors, except for PSMDs (six deficiencies and 12 breaches) and lawyers (54 deficiencies and 15 breaches). 317. DNFBPs are also required to identify and assess the ML/TF risks arising from new product, business practice or technologies, and put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures, before their implementation. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 318. DNFBPs met onsite generally understood their reporting obligations and all DNFBP sectors had filed STRs during the assessment period (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector). There was an overall positive trend in the number of STRs filed by DNFBPs, increasing by approximately 250% since 2020. However, the vast majority of all STRs reported by DNFBPs continue to be reported by the two casinos (88%), and the number of STRs reported by other sectors remain at relatively lower levels. This raises concerns on the ability of medium-high risk DNFBP sectors, such as LTCs, CSPs, PSMDs, EAs/RESs and developers, to detect and report suspicious transactions, but it is also noted that the differences in discrepancies in number of STRs submitted across different sectors could in part be attributed to the higher volume and transactional nature of casino activities over the rest of the DNFBPs. 319. Some DNFBP sectors (e.g. PSMDs and pawnbrokers) reported a relatively large number of STRs (45%) that were initiated by adverse news, showing that their knowledge of ML/TF typologies to proactively detect suspicious transactions, may not be fully developed. (see also IO.6). Interviews with real estate agents and developers also indicated that there is room for improvement in understanding detailed ML/TF typologies in Singapore’s risk environment. Most DNFBP supervisors identified only single-digit deficiencies and zero breaches in STR filing over the assessment period, with the exception of MinLaw in regards of deficiencies found among PSMDs. MinLaw advised that the near 400 deficiencies were mostly related to failures in setting up SONAR accounts to facilitate the timely filing of STRs electronically. Such deficiencies were considered minor in nature as it is an administrative issue and straightforward to set up a SONAR account with STRO. These deficiencies do not constitute formal breaches of applicable AML/CFT requirements. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 320. All DNFBP sectors are required to implement IPPCs to ensure AML/CFT compliance. These procedures typically cover risk assessments, CDD, record-keeping, STR, staff training, compliance oversight, and audit functions. Casino operators are required to submit the IPPCs to GRA for formal approval, while other sectors such as LTCs, CSPs and LPEs generally validate adequacy of IPPCs via supervisory activities. PSMDs as a relatively newly regulated sector identified higher number of deficiencies (463) and breaches (172), although the numbers have declined since 2021, while limited breaches and deficiencies were observed in some sectors, such as LTCs, CSPs, lawyers/LPEs and EAs/RES. 321. Internal audits are widely used in LTCs, PSMDs, casinos, and developers, either through in-house teams or external providers. These audits focus on assessing the effectiveness of AML/CFT measures, adequacy of controls, and staff adherence to established procedures. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 322. There are no legal or regulatory requirements impeding the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. Confidentiality and privacy requirements are lifted for the combating of ML/TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="308. Singapore have taken efforts to promote a good understanding of AML/CFT obligations across the DNFBP sectors, but the implementation by DNFBPs for the newer sectors could be further improved. Interviewed DNFBPs generally demonstrated a reasonable understanding of AML/CFT obligations and risk control measures and AML/CFT requirements are implemented to various extent in different sectors. PSMDs, as a relatively newly regulated sector and with large number of players in the industry, had relatively higher number of breaches identified during supervisory activities than other sectors, with the number dropping in the later years. For developers where supervisory regime was put in place recently, awareness and implementation of risk mitigation are gradually levelling up. All DNFBP sectors submitted STRs, but the vast majority were submitted by casino operators and the number of STRs submitted by some higher risk sectors (e.g. PSMDs) is lower but has been gradually increasing. 309. As with the case of financial institutions, Singapore distinguishes between deficiencies and breaches, where deficiency refers to weaknesses in AML/CFT controls (but is not itself a violation of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation); and breach refers to a violation of AML/CFT requirements set out in legislation. Moreover, supervisors report deficiencies/breaches based on the number of regulatory requirements/areas affected, rather than the actual number of individual instances. Taking these into account, the number of deficiencies/breaches reported by Singapore would be understated. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 310. All DNFBPs are required by AML/CFT regulations to conduct CDD measures, identify and verify BO information and conduct ongoing monitoring of business relationships. In practice, basic CDD requirements are consistently implemented across most DNFBPs, and interviewed entities generally indicated sufficient guidance from supervisors on supervisory expectations. Supervisors do occasionally find errors in CDD, especially in real estate sector. 311. From the results of MAS’s supervisory activities, as well as the onsite interviews, LTCs understand and apply their AML/CFT obligations in relation to CDD, BO information and ongoing monitoring appropriately and generally have strong AML/CFT internal controls. MAS has identified 2 deficiencies and 9 breaches in 2020-24 from 70 supervisory activities and acknowledged that LTCs’ monitoring of higher risk TRPs, particularly in relation to source of wealth checks and scrutiny of their transactions, could be further strengthened. 312. CSPs generally complies with their AML/CFT obligations to conduct CDD and have procedures to address cases where client identity or background information is insufficient, including terminating transactions, rejecting clients, and filing STRs in line with regulatory obligations. ACRA verifies CSPs’ compliance by reviewing files from long-standing business relationships to confirm that ongoing monitoring is conducted, and relevant records are retained. That said, ACRA still identified a limited number (20 cases from 1572 examinations) of breaches related to CDD or BO information over the past five years. Accountants are subjected to similar requirements and were found to be compliant with no breaches identified. 313. MinLaw and LawSoc’s supervisory activities showed that most PSMDs, pawnbrokers, and lawyers have implemented core AML/CFT obligations such as CDD, record-keeping, and BO information requirements. While PSMDs recorded a higher number of deficiencies (25) and breaches (93) from 1125 examinations, there was also an observed reduction in the number of breaches from 2021 to more stable numbers in 2022 to 2024, reflecting the sector’s recent regulatory inclusion. On the other hand, pawnbrokers and lawyers demonstrated stronger compliance, with only single-digit breaches (three for pawnbrokers and six for lawyers) and 49 deficiencies (for lawyers) identified. Where high risk factors exist and a client is unable to provide an adequate, satisfactory and credible explanation in response to enquiries, the lawyer would consider whether a STR needs to be filed (see Box 4.2). Box 4.2. Prospective Client rejected by lawyer due to ML/TF concerns detected when conducting CDD A lawyer was approached by a company in Feb 2021 to offer legal services relating to the sale of a yacht. Screening conducted by the lawyer revealed that the company was owned by an individual under investigation in a foreign country for investment fraud. The lawyer noted that victims of the investment fraud had alleged that the individual used a yacht to demonstrate his wealth, as part of his marketing tactic to convince victims to invest. The lawyer suspected that the yacht for sale is the one used in the fraudulent scheme and may be proceeds of crime. The lawyer declined to provide legal services to the company and filed an STR with the name and owner of the yacht. 314. Casino operators in Singapore apply robust CDD and monitoring measures commensurate with the sector’s ML/TF risks. The casinos conduct identity checks at entry and BO information are obtained and verified prior to establishing patron accounts or conducting transactions above the SGD 4 000 (USD 3 000) threshold. Ongoing monitoring includes income and occupation-based profiling and assessing third-party relationships to detect inconsistencies between patrons’ gaming activity and known financial profiles and ensure lawful entitlement to usage of funds. GRA examinations confirm that operators maintain adequate records and apply CDD measures effectively, with three deficiencies and no relevant breach detected in 135 examinations conducted in the past five years. 315. EAs/RESs and developers demonstrated a basic understanding of CDD obligations before facilitating or accepting any property transactions when interviewed onsite. However, the number of breaches by EAs/RESs in relation to CDD, BO information and record keeping is relatively high (zero deficiency and 128 breaches from 62 examinations in 2020-24). The supervisory regime for developers is relatively new and all eight developers assessed to be of high risk and one developer of medium-high risk (which are mainly of larger scale) had been inspected, with no relevant deficiencies nor breaches identified. During onsite interviews, the sectors also observed lack of AML/CFT awareness and co-operation from buyers as key difficulties in complying with CDD and BO requirements but reported that they are bound by contract to complete the property transaction despite incomplete CDD/BO process. This reflected gaps in understanding and implementation of AML/CFT obligations by real estate sectors. Singapore has very recently taken measures to address gaps in the technical framework for some DNFBPs, for example, mandating EAs/ RESs and developers to conduct CDD on unrepresented counterparties involved in property transactions, but it is premature to assess the effectiveness of these measures. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 316. DNFBPs apply EDD to customers (or BO of customers) that is a PEP or a family member or close associate of a PEP, as well as those linked to high-risk jurisdictions identified by FATF or supervisors. On top of normal CDD, EDD includes verifying source of wealth and source of funds, senior management approval, and ongoing monitoring. To assist DNFBPs in establishing SoW of customers, some supervisors published guidance documents and information papers to set out regulatory expectations and best practices. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers who are PEPs or are from higher-risk jurisdictions. Examinations by DNFBP supervisors also identified single-digit deficiencies and breaches in this regard for most sectors, except for PSMDs (six deficiencies and 12 breaches) and lawyers (54 deficiencies and 15 breaches). 317. DNFBPs are also required to identify and assess the ML/TF risks arising from new product, business practice or technologies, and put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures, before their implementation. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 318. DNFBPs met onsite generally understood their reporting obligations and all DNFBP sectors had filed STRs during the assessment period (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector). There was an overall positive trend in the number of STRs filed by DNFBPs, increasing by approximately 250% since 2020. However, the vast majority of all STRs reported by DNFBPs continue to be reported by the two casinos (88%), and the number of STRs reported by other sectors remain at relatively lower levels. This raises concerns on the ability of medium-high risk DNFBP sectors, such as LTCs, CSPs, PSMDs, EAs/RESs and developers, to detect and report suspicious transactions, but it is also noted that the differences in discrepancies in number of STRs submitted across different sectors could in part be attributed to the higher volume and transactional nature of casino activities over the rest of the DNFBPs. 319. Some DNFBP sectors (e.g. PSMDs and pawnbrokers) reported a relatively large number of STRs (45%) that were initiated by adverse news, showing that their knowledge of ML/TF typologies to proactively detect suspicious transactions, may not be fully developed. (see also IO.6). Interviews with real estate agents and developers also indicated that there is room for improvement in understanding detailed ML/TF typologies in Singapore’s risk environment. Most DNFBP supervisors identified only single-digit deficiencies and zero breaches in STR filing over the assessment period, with the exception of MinLaw in regards of deficiencies found among PSMDs. MinLaw advised that the near 400 deficiencies were mostly related to failures in setting up SONAR accounts to facilitate the timely filing of STRs electronically. Such deficiencies were considered minor in nature as it is an administrative issue and straightforward to set up a SONAR account with STRO. These deficiencies do not constitute formal breaches of applicable AML/CFT requirements. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 320. All DNFBP sectors are required to implement IPPCs to ensure AML/CFT compliance. These procedures typically cover risk assessments, CDD, record-keeping, STR, staff training, compliance oversight, and audit functions. Casino operators are required to submit the IPPCs to GRA for formal approval, while other sectors such as LTCs, CSPs and LPEs generally validate adequacy of IPPCs via supervisory activities. PSMDs as a relatively newly regulated sector identified higher number of deficiencies (463) and breaches (172), although the numbers have declined since 2021, while limited breaches and deficiencies were observed in some sectors, such as LTCs, CSPs, lawyers/LPEs and EAs/RES. 321. Internal audits are widely used in LTCs, PSMDs, casinos, and developers, either through in-house teams or external providers. These audits focus on assessing the effectiveness of AML/CFT measures, adequacy of controls, and staff adherence to established procedures. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 322. There are no legal or regulatory requirements impeding the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. Confidentiality and privacy requirements are lifted for the combating of ML/TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="386. Singapore accesses basic and BO information on trusts through LTCs, PTCs and FIs. These methods can provide adequate and accurate information, but there is little verification on the quality of information and the decentralised holding of information may result in information not being available in a timely manner. Also, where basic information of LTCs, trustee managers or PTCs (as regulated agents of legal arrangements) is required, competent authorities are able to access it through the ACRA registry for legal persons. 387. While Singapore does not maintain statistics on the number of requests that LEAs send to reporting entities to obtain information, Singapore demonstrated a number of cases where LEAs had requested and successfully obtained information on legal arrangements from FIs and LTCs for the purposes of ML investigations. Singapore has had only four ML investigations involving legal arrangements. In these instances, CAD sought BO information from LTCs in two of the investigations, whilst in the other two ML investigations, CAD obtained the BO information on the legal arrangements in question from FIs. 388. Singapore considered implementation of additional prongs to support timely access to accurate information on legal arrangements and decided against implementing any additional prongs (namely a trust registry). This consideration was not documented and relied on the premise that information was available from LTCs (and to a lesser degree other relevant FIs and DNFBPs that conduct CDD). Singapore’s consideration of which limbs of the multi-pronged approach to adopt did not properly take into account its context and materiality. In particular it did not adequately take into account trusts formed in Singapore but not by an LTC. Further, Singapore does not routinely check whether the information received from LTCs is accurate, particularly as the information provided by the LTC would be limited to the information provided by trust parties themselves. Lastly, in light of issues with verification mechanisms (see c25.8), the multi-pronged approach would allow a triangulation or double-check mechanism to ensure accuracy of information that would assist Singaporean authorities to identify networks (such as back-office data). Singapore acknowledged the risk understanding of trusts is limited by little data, but did not consider whether additional prongs would provide new and more comprehensive data to build their risk understanding or ultimately prevent and detect misuse. 389. The supervision of LTCs can be better systematised on the basis of ML/TF risks. Further, there is insufficient coverage and intensity for high and medium high-risk entities, including for BO obligations. Importantly, many LTCs went without a supervisory engagement during the review period, meaning their CDD and determination of BO has not been checked for accuracy by a supervisor. Many medium-high risk LTCs received just one supervisory engagement in the review period. 390. The LARA identified wakafs to be of low ML risk and medium-low TF risk, and Singapore. Despite these identifications that wakafs are of lower risk, Singapore will be auditing all wakafs for their BO information in 2025, which is overburdensome for these lower risk entities, particularly in contrast to the lack of auditing of other legal arrangements. 391. Overall Singapore relies on requesting BO information from an LTC, PTC, MUIS or other reporting entity in order to provide basic and/or BO information to the requesting jurisdiction. There are no mechanisms in place to ensure the information provided is accurate, and no other ‘prongs’ are in place. These are significant deficiencies given trusts managed by an LTC and foreign trusts are rated as medium-high risk by Singapore. The issue of competent authorities not being able to quickly identify the holder of the information can prevent timely responses in cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="386. Singapore accesses basic and BO information on trusts through LTCs, PTCs and FIs. These methods can provide adequate and accurate information, but there is little verification on the quality of information and the decentralised holding of information may result in information not being available in a timely manner. Also, where basic information of LTCs, trustee managers or PTCs (as regulated agents of legal arrangements) is required, competent authorities are able to access it through the ACRA registry for legal persons. 387. While Singapore does not maintain statistics on the number of requests that LEAs send to reporting entities to obtain information, Singapore demonstrated a number of cases where LEAs had requested and successfully obtained information on legal arrangements from FIs and LTCs for the purposes of ML investigations. Singapore has had only four ML investigations involving legal arrangements. In these instances, CAD sought BO information from LTCs in two of the investigations, whilst in the other two ML investigations, CAD obtained the BO information on the legal arrangements in question from FIs. 388. Singapore considered implementation of additional prongs to support timely access to accurate information on legal arrangements and decided against implementing any additional prongs (namely a trust registry). This consideration was not documented and relied on the premise that information was available from LTCs (and to a lesser degree other relevant FIs and DNFBPs that conduct CDD). Singapore’s consideration of which limbs of the multi-pronged approach to adopt did not properly take into account its context and materiality. In particular it did not adequately take into account trusts formed in Singapore but not by an LTC. Further, Singapore does not routinely check whether the information received from LTCs is accurate, particularly as the information provided by the LTC would be limited to the information provided by trust parties themselves. Lastly, in light of issues with verification mechanisms (see c25.8), the multi-pronged approach would allow a triangulation or double-check mechanism to ensure accuracy of information that would assist Singaporean authorities to identify networks (such as back-office data). Singapore acknowledged the risk understanding of trusts is limited by little data, but did not consider whether additional prongs would provide new and more comprehensive data to build their risk understanding or ultimately prevent and detect misuse. 389. The supervision of LTCs can be better systematised on the basis of ML/TF risks. Further, there is insufficient coverage and intensity for high and medium high-risk entities, including for BO obligations. Importantly, many LTCs went without a supervisory engagement during the review period, meaning their CDD and determination of BO has not been checked for accuracy by a supervisor. Many medium-high risk LTCs received just one supervisory engagement in the review period. 390. The LARA identified wakafs to be of low ML risk and medium-low TF risk, and Singapore. Despite these identifications that wakafs are of lower risk, Singapore will be auditing all wakafs for their BO information in 2025, which is overburdensome for these lower risk entities, particularly in contrast to the lack of auditing of other legal arrangements. 391. Overall Singapore relies on requesting BO information from an LTC, PTC, MUIS or other reporting entity in order to provide basic and/or BO information to the requesting jurisdiction. There are no mechanisms in place to ensure the information provided is accurate, and no other ‘prongs’ are in place. These are significant deficiencies given trusts managed by an LTC and foreign trusts are rated as medium-high risk by Singapore. The issue of competent authorities not being able to quickly identify the holder of the information can prevent timely responses in cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 440. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations into ML, associated predicate offences and TF to a good extent but more could be done to leverage financial intelligence for higher risk offences (except fraud). Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Use of financial information 441. As illustrated by case studies, statistics and discussions with authorities, competent authorities regularly use self-screening to support investigations and develop evidenc e. There is limited information on the use of MASDs, or on the outcomes of the use of financial information through the course of investigations. 442. LEAs leverage self-screening requests through WINGS X to support their ongoing investigations. During the reporting period, competent authorities submitted 11 517 requests, covering over 70 000 entities. The information obtained from these screenings helps LEAs trace financial flows and identify assets linked to specific entities or individuals. This may include details such as bank account information, criminal history and other relevant data, enabling investigators to build a comprehensive picture of potential illicit activity (see Box 6.4). It is difficult to extrapolate the usefulness of self-screening information in aggregate given limited statistics on how the information was used. However, that these requests are being performed by investigators at a high volume of requests (over 2 000/year) indicates that competent authorities find this information useful to contribute to developing evidence and tracing criminal proceeds. 443. MASDs overwhelmingly benefit LEAs, particularly SPF, which is appropriate considering its main role investigating ML, associated predicate offences, and TF (Table 6.6). Onsite discussions and case studies indicate that competent authorities use MASDs in investigations to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF (Box 6.4). MASDs can enhance investigations by corroborating suspicious transactions, hence enabling investigators to strengthen evidence and progress a case. Despite the substantial volume of disseminations, there is no statistics on how the MASDs were used and the AT cannot conclude on their usefulness. Use of financial intelligence 444. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to a good extent : 26% of financial intelligence packages and 17% of Fin-IRs led LEAs to initiating an investigation, while 14% of packages and Fin-IRs supported investigations. Packages have a higher level of actionability (the summation of their use in initiating or supporting investigations) at 40%, compared to 31% for Fin-IRs. Overall: a) Case studies indicate that financial intelligence is used to initiate and support ML investigations but plays a negligible role overall in initiating ML cases as only 2% of all the ML investigations conducted by LEAs have been initiated by financial intelligence (see table 7.1). The AT has weighted this accordingly under IO.7. b) Case studies and discussions with LEAs indicate that financial intelligence is used in investigations and to develop evidence into a range of predicate offences. Data on the ‘actionability’ of STRO’s financial intelligence (Table 6.8) indicates that Fin-IRs and packages help initiate investigations to a reasonable extent. However, as discussed in Section 6.2, financial intelligence produced and disseminated by STRO aligns with the country’s risks to a good extent. c) Singapore makes good use of financial intelligence to initiate and support TF investigations. 11% of TF-related financial intelligence packages initiated a TF investigations while packages supported 28% of ongoing investigations. The AT has weighted this accordingly under IO.9. Table 6.7. Breakdown of financial intelligence from STRO to initiate and support investigations 2020 (% total) 2021 (% total) 2022 (% total) 2023 (% total) 2024 (% total) Total (% total) Fin-IRs 9 428 4 833 3 382 6 139 7 136 21 490 Of which initiated investigations (% of total) 298 (3) 411 (9) 588 (17) 1 148 (19) 1 450 (20) 3 597 (17) Of which supported investigations (% of total) 1 047 (11) 783 (16) 244 (7) 1 441 (24) 595 (8) 3 063 (14) Financial intelligence packages - - - 236 233 469 Of which initiated investigations (% total) - - - 53 (22) 68 (29) 121 (26) Of which supported investigations (% of total) - - - 31 (13) 35 (15) 66 (14) Note: For years where both financial intelligence packages and Fin-IRs are reported, there is a risk of double counting and figures should therefore not be aggregated. (packages contain Fin-IRs). Figures from 2020 are excluded from the Totals, as Fin-IR figures for 2020 include MASDs. Totals are therefore for 2021 to 2024 only. Table 6.8. Impact of Fin-IRs and packages on investigations (by type of offence) Fin-IRs Packages Type of offence Dissmn’t (2022-2024) Inv. initiated (% dissmn’t) Inv. supported (% of dissmn’t) Dissmn’t (2023-2024) Inv. initiated (% dissmn’t) Inv. supported (% dissmn’t) Fraud and related ML 2 075 874 (42%) 125 (6%) 106 31 (29.2%) 13 (12.3%) Corruption and bribery, and related ML 2 005 51 (2.5%) 19 (1%) 28 4 (14.3%) 4 (14.3%) Tax crimes and related ML 1 581 134 (8.5%) 48 (3%) 18 11 (61%) 1 (5.6%) Organised crime and related ML 720 239 (33%) 56 (8%) 17 3 (17.6%) 2 (11.8%) TBML 308 84 (27%) 10 (3.2%) 16 5 (31%) 1 (6.3%) ‘Other ML’ (suspected domestic ML cases related to foreign predicate offences) 6 422 1 880 (29%) 1 776 (27.6%) 198 60 (30%) 24 (12%) All other predicate offences and related ML 3 728 932 (25%) 1 666 (44.7%) 73 24 (32.9%) 14 (19.2%) Terrorism and Terrorist Financing 1 404 71 (5%) 58 (4.1%) 35 4 (11.4%) 10 (28.6%) Proliferation Financing 1 145 2 (0.2%) 13 (1.1%) 34 1 (3%) 2 (5.9%) Other sanctions, regulatory offences and unlicensed money-changing / remittances 2 588 379 (14.6%) 160 (6.2%) 77 16 (20.8%) 7 (9.1%) Total 21 976 4 646 3 931 602 159 78 Note: Totals may be different than the above Tables, as Fin-IRs and financial intelligence packages may involve multiple offences. Each row accounts for both the predicate offence, and the related ML investigations. Use of financial information/intelligence by other competent authorities 445. While there are some issues with STRO’s disseminations in respect of ML, case studies and onsite discussions indicate that competent authorities regularly use financial information and financial intelligence for investigations , developing evidence and tracing assets. They use a broad range of data points (see 6.2.2) and information (e.g. disseminations from STRO, database information, searches, human intelligence, and information from international counterparts – the latter two are especially used in TF cases) to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. For example, CNB utilises link charting software to visualise money flows between entities, uncover relationships and identify nodes of interest. CPIB has similarly incorporated new technologies to review financial statements and automate the digitisation of bank statements into structured data, thus facilitating data mining and visualization. LEAs also leverage private sector capabilities in data analytics (ACIP) to improve the detection of ML networks. Other sources of information include PPPs (e.g. ACIP) and information gathered from foreign counterparts. STRO sent 1 465 RFAs to foreign FIUs, with an 86% response rate, mostly on behalf of SPF. This is further highlighted in case studies below (Box 6.4). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 446. Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Most high-value seizures undertaken by LEAs involve investigations that used financial information and/or intelligence, amounting to SGD 5 billion (USD 3.7 billion), showing that there is increased likelihood of using financial information and intelligence in larger cases. 447. As case studies demonstrate (Box 6.4), both STRO disseminations and financial intelligence undertaken by competent authorities are used to identify and trace assets, where necessary through a co-ordinated process both domestically and abroad (via EGMONT). STRO also contributed to tracing assets and determining financial connections, both proactively and upon request, in some high-level cases (such as the 3B$ case in 2023, Singapore’s largest ML case). Box 6.4. Using of financial information and financial intelligence MASDs supporting the needs of CAD In 2021, STRO supported IRAS in reviewing four GST-registered PSMDs suspected of gold-related Missing Trader Fraud (MTF) by conducting fund tracing and network analysis, identifying red flags such as circular trading . IRAS uncovered a GST fraud scheme involving the purchase of Investment Precious Metal (IPM) gold and referred the case to CAD for ML investigations. CAD traced over SGD 250 000 (USD 185 000) in illicit funds through cash withdrawals and remittances to Country X, linking back to the dealers, after screening STRO’s database, linked suspicious gold sales and bank transactions. In August 2024, STRO automatically disseminated three new STRs linked to the initial screening conducted by CAD, confirming GST evasion and fund flows. This helped corroborate evidence and support ongoing investigations. Asset tracing, whole of government response and international co-operation In late 2020, CAD uncovered a large BEC fraud scheme involving over 3 000 Singaporean shell companies used to receive fraudulent payments from overseas victims, totalling over USD 107.6 million (SGD 144 million). Funds were then quickly moved to accounts in another country. The syndicate behind this operation used Singaporean CSPs to incorporate companies, set up bank accounts and recruit nominee directors in Singapore. A joint RTIG–ACIP project generated 990 STRs, 40 RFAs, and Fin-IRs from STRO, enabling the seizure of USD 33 million and blocking USD 20 million (respectively SGD 44.2 and 26.8 million). 12 individuals were charged for offences related to directorship and CSP roles. As of February 2025, seven were convicted and sentenced to fines and imprisonment. Supervisory actions were also taken, including examinations by ACRA and advisories issued by MAS. 448. In conclusion, financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to a good extent but more could be done to leverage financial intelligence for higher risk offences (except fraud). Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Both financial information and financial intelligence are used more often in larger cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 440. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations into ML, associated predicate offences and TF to a good extent but more could be done to leverage financial intelligence for higher risk offences (except fraud). Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Use of financial information 441. As illustrated by case studies, statistics and discussions with authorities, competent authorities regularly use self-screening to support investigations and develop evidenc e. There is limited information on the use of MASDs, or on the outcomes of the use of financial information through the course of investigations. 442. LEAs leverage self-screening requests through WINGS X to support their ongoing investigations. During the reporting period, competent authorities submitted 11 517 requests, covering over 70 000 entities. The information obtained from these screenings helps LEAs trace financial flows and identify assets linked to specific entities or individuals. This may include details such as bank account information, criminal history and other relevant data, enabling investigators to build a comprehensive picture of potential illicit activity (see Box 6.4). It is difficult to extrapolate the usefulness of self-screening information in aggregate given limited statistics on how the information was used. However, that these requests are being performed by investigators at a high volume of requests (over 2 000/year) indicates that competent authorities find this information useful to contribute to developing evidence and tracing criminal proceeds. 443. MASDs overwhelmingly benefit LEAs, particularly SPF, which is appropriate considering its main role investigating ML, associated predicate offences, and TF (Table 6.6). Onsite discussions and case studies indicate that competent authorities use MASDs in investigations to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF (Box 6.4). MASDs can enhance investigations by corroborating suspicious transactions, hence enabling investigators to strengthen evidence and progress a case. Despite the substantial volume of disseminations, there is no statistics on how the MASDs were used and the AT cannot conclude on their usefulness. Use of financial intelligence 444. Financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to a good extent : 26% of financial intelligence packages and 17% of Fin-IRs led LEAs to initiating an investigation, while 14% of packages and Fin-IRs supported investigations. Packages have a higher level of actionability (the summation of their use in initiating or supporting investigations) at 40%, compared to 31% for Fin-IRs. Overall: a) Case studies indicate that financial intelligence is used to initiate and support ML investigations but plays a negligible role overall in initiating ML cases as only 2% of all the ML investigations conducted by LEAs have been initiated by financial intelligence (see table 7.1). The AT has weighted this accordingly under IO.7. b) Case studies and discussions with LEAs indicate that financial intelligence is used in investigations and to develop evidence into a range of predicate offences. Data on the ‘actionability’ of STRO’s financial intelligence (Table 6.8) indicates that Fin-IRs and packages help initiate investigations to a reasonable extent. However, as discussed in Section 6.2, financial intelligence produced and disseminated by STRO aligns with the country’s risks to a good extent. c) Singapore makes good use of financial intelligence to initiate and support TF investigations. 11% of TF-related financial intelligence packages initiated a TF investigations while packages supported 28% of ongoing investigations. The AT has weighted this accordingly under IO.9. Table 6.7. Breakdown of financial intelligence from STRO to initiate and support investigations 2020 (% total) 2021 (% total) 2022 (% total) 2023 (% total) 2024 (% total) Total (% total) Fin-IRs 9 428 4 833 3 382 6 139 7 136 21 490 Of which initiated investigations (% of total) 298 (3) 411 (9) 588 (17) 1 148 (19) 1 450 (20) 3 597 (17) Of which supported investigations (% of total) 1 047 (11) 783 (16) 244 (7) 1 441 (24) 595 (8) 3 063 (14) Financial intelligence packages - - - 236 233 469 Of which initiated investigations (% total) - - - 53 (22) 68 (29) 121 (26) Of which supported investigations (% of total) - - - 31 (13) 35 (15) 66 (14) Note: For years where both financial intelligence packages and Fin-IRs are reported, there is a risk of double counting and figures should therefore not be aggregated. (packages contain Fin-IRs). Figures from 2020 are excluded from the Totals, as Fin-IR figures for 2020 include MASDs. Totals are therefore for 2021 to 2024 only. Table 6.8. Impact of Fin-IRs and packages on investigations (by type of offence) Fin-IRs Packages Type of offence Dissmn’t (2022-2024) Inv. initiated (% dissmn’t) Inv. supported (% of dissmn’t) Dissmn’t (2023-2024) Inv. initiated (% dissmn’t) Inv. supported (% dissmn’t) Fraud and related ML 2 075 874 (42%) 125 (6%) 106 31 (29.2%) 13 (12.3%) Corruption and bribery, and related ML 2 005 51 (2.5%) 19 (1%) 28 4 (14.3%) 4 (14.3%) Tax crimes and related ML 1 581 134 (8.5%) 48 (3%) 18 11 (61%) 1 (5.6%) Organised crime and related ML 720 239 (33%) 56 (8%) 17 3 (17.6%) 2 (11.8%) TBML 308 84 (27%) 10 (3.2%) 16 5 (31%) 1 (6.3%) ‘Other ML’ (suspected domestic ML cases related to foreign predicate offences) 6 422 1 880 (29%) 1 776 (27.6%) 198 60 (30%) 24 (12%) All other predicate offences and related ML 3 728 932 (25%) 1 666 (44.7%) 73 24 (32.9%) 14 (19.2%) Terrorism and Terrorist Financing 1 404 71 (5%) 58 (4.1%) 35 4 (11.4%) 10 (28.6%) Proliferation Financing 1 145 2 (0.2%) 13 (1.1%) 34 1 (3%) 2 (5.9%) Other sanctions, regulatory offences and unlicensed money-changing / remittances 2 588 379 (14.6%) 160 (6.2%) 77 16 (20.8%) 7 (9.1%) Total 21 976 4 646 3 931 602 159 78 Note: Totals may be different than the above Tables, as Fin-IRs and financial intelligence packages may involve multiple offences. Each row accounts for both the predicate offence, and the related ML investigations. Use of financial information/intelligence by other competent authorities 445. While there are some issues with STRO’s disseminations in respect of ML, case studies and onsite discussions indicate that competent authorities regularly use financial information and financial intelligence for investigations , developing evidence and tracing assets. They use a broad range of data points (see 6.2.2) and information (e.g. disseminations from STRO, database information, searches, human intelligence, and information from international counterparts – the latter two are especially used in TF cases) to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities related to ML, associated predicate offences and TF. For example, CNB utilises link charting software to visualise money flows between entities, uncover relationships and identify nodes of interest. CPIB has similarly incorporated new technologies to review financial statements and automate the digitisation of bank statements into structured data, thus facilitating data mining and visualization. LEAs also leverage private sector capabilities in data analytics (ACIP) to improve the detection of ML networks. Other sources of information include PPPs (e.g. ACIP) and information gathered from foreign counterparts. STRO sent 1 465 RFAs to foreign FIUs, with an 86% response rate, mostly on behalf of SPF. This is further highlighted in case studies below (Box 6.4). 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 446. Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Most high-value seizures undertaken by LEAs involve investigations that used financial information and/or intelligence, amounting to SGD 5 billion (USD 3.7 billion), showing that there is increased likelihood of using financial information and intelligence in larger cases. 447. As case studies demonstrate (Box 6.4), both STRO disseminations and financial intelligence undertaken by competent authorities are used to identify and trace assets, where necessary through a co-ordinated process both domestically and abroad (via EGMONT). STRO also contributed to tracing assets and determining financial connections, both proactively and upon request, in some high-level cases (such as the 3B$ case in 2023, Singapore’s largest ML case). Box 6.4. Using of financial information and financial intelligence MASDs supporting the needs of CAD In 2021, STRO supported IRAS in reviewing four GST-registered PSMDs suspected of gold-related Missing Trader Fraud (MTF) by conducting fund tracing and network analysis, identifying red flags such as circular trading . IRAS uncovered a GST fraud scheme involving the purchase of Investment Precious Metal (IPM) gold and referred the case to CAD for ML investigations. CAD traced over SGD 250 000 (USD 185 000) in illicit funds through cash withdrawals and remittances to Country X, linking back to the dealers, after screening STRO’s database, linked suspicious gold sales and bank transactions. In August 2024, STRO automatically disseminated three new STRs linked to the initial screening conducted by CAD, confirming GST evasion and fund flows. This helped corroborate evidence and support ongoing investigations. Asset tracing, whole of government response and international co-operation In late 2020, CAD uncovered a large BEC fraud scheme involving over 3 000 Singaporean shell companies used to receive fraudulent payments from overseas victims, totalling over USD 107.6 million (SGD 144 million). Funds were then quickly moved to accounts in another country. The syndicate behind this operation used Singaporean CSPs to incorporate companies, set up bank accounts and recruit nominee directors in Singapore. A joint RTIG–ACIP project generated 990 STRs, 40 RFAs, and Fin-IRs from STRO, enabling the seizure of USD 33 million and blocking USD 20 million (respectively SGD 44.2 and 26.8 million). 12 individuals were charged for offences related to directorship and CSP roles. As of February 2025, seven were convicted and sentenced to fines and imprisonment. Supervisory actions were also taken, including examinations by ACRA and advisories issued by MAS. 448. In conclusion, financial intelligence from STRO is being used to initiate and support investigations to a good extent but more could be done to leverage financial intelligence for higher risk offences (except fraud). Competent authorities regularly use financial information to support investigations, develop evidence, identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities, including high-value and significant ML cases, but do not use financial intelligence to support investigations to the same degree. Both financial information and financial intelligence are used more often in larger cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="486. To some extent, Singapore employs a combination of criminal, administrative and regulatory approaches as alternative measures when it is not possible to secure ML convictions. These ensure that offenders are still held accountable and subject to legal consequences in the absence of a formal ML charge. However, there is a low use of alternative measures when compared to the number of cases where a conviction cannot be secured. Moreover, evidence from recent years indicates that Singapore is becoming increasingly reliant on alternative measures, particularly the Money Mule Offence, rather than the potential pursuit of ML convictions. 487. AGC prosecutes offenders under a range of offences when it is not feasible to obtain an ML conviction (Table 7.8). This includes charging individuals under alternative offences including but not limited to: Penal Code, Computer Misuse Act (CMA), breach of director’s duties under the Companies Act (CA) for nominee directors, Payment Services Act (PSA). Asset confiscation and forfeiture as well as administrative and regulatory actions are also considered. Singapore maintains limited statistics on all alternative measures used, but it does attempt to pursue robust and pragmatic enforcement where ML evidence thresholds are difficult to meet. Based on the limited data available (Table 7.8) and qualitative information provided, Singapore applies these alternative measures to some extent when considering the number of ML convictions. Table 7.8. Alternative measures # Number of persons convicted 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total S55A(1), CDSA (1) Operationalized in 2024 15 15 S157, Companies Act 7 10 15 16 16 64 S5, PSA 4 14 20 15 28 81 Total 11 24 35 31 59 160 Note: (1) S55A was operationalised in February 2024. Statistics exclude ongoing prosecutions. 488. As described above, the codification of the Money Mule Offence constitutes a significant, albeit recent, alternative measure that complements Singapore’s core ML offences and strengthens LEA’s capacity to pursue ML activity. While Singapore is credited for identifying mechanisms to pursue its high-risk predicates, this amendment is recent. So far, the use of the Money Mule Offence has proven useful in a limited number of prosecutions. Between its operationalisation in February 2024 and May 2025, Singapore’s authorities have mounted 286 prosecutions demonstrating its high usage. 489. Singapore is praised for identifying mechanisms to address ML activity from CEF (its highest ML risk area) when ML convictions are not possible. Singapore’s authorities have a clearly stated goal of ML prosecution and asset recovery at the commencement of a ML investigation, but Singapore considers the pursuit of the Money Mule Offence as an ML offence. Given the low rate of conversion from ML investigations to prosecutions, there is a risk that investigators and prosecutors may be inclined to systematically prioritise investigations which can be prosecuted under the Money Mule Offence, rather than for ML. It is too early to assess whether the slight downturn in ML investigations during the time period of the enactment of this offence is as a result of Singapore relying on this alternative measure. 490. Other alternative measures taken by Singapore include administrative and regulatory actions. For instance, ACRA helps prevent the misuse of legal entities for ML by screening new companies, striking off illicit shell companies, and taking regulatory action when prosecution is not possible, via proactive sharing of information by CAD. ACRA can also make debarment orders against directors if there is information to suggest that any company under their directorship is in default of relevant regulatory requirements. It can also sanction CSPs and Registered Qualified Individuals (RQIs) for serious AML/CFT breaches. Similarly, MAS has broad enforcement powers to address breaches of AML/CFT obligations. MAS can require FIs to remediate areas of weaknesses, impose financial penalties, revoke or restrict licenses, and issue reprimands. MAS can also impose fines against finance professionals, issue prohibition orders to bar them from taking up specified roles, activities and functions in the financial sector, and issuing reprimands to these individuals. 491. In conclusion, Singapore has applied alternate measures with success and is credited for this approach where justified. With the creation of the Money Mule Offence, Singapore has positioned itself for an approach more heavily relying on alternative measures in the future. However, as Singapore considers this offence to be an ML offence, it is systematically pursuing this offence as a policy objective where it may be more appropriate to pursue ML convictions instead. Considering the volume of ML investigations that are not pursued by the AGC (i.e., multi-thousands), the application of these alternative measures remains limited at this time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="486. To some extent, Singapore employs a combination of criminal, administrative and regulatory approaches as alternative measures when it is not possible to secure ML convictions. These ensure that offenders are still held accountable and subject to legal consequences in the absence of a formal ML charge. However, there is a low use of alternative measures when compared to the number of cases where a conviction cannot be secured. Moreover, evidence from recent years indicates that Singapore is becoming increasingly reliant on alternative measures, particularly the Money Mule Offence, rather than the potential pursuit of ML convictions. 487. AGC prosecutes offenders under a range of offences when it is not feasible to obtain an ML conviction (Table 7.8). This includes charging individuals under alternative offences including but not limited to: Penal Code, Computer Misuse Act (CMA), breach of director’s duties under the Companies Act (CA) for nominee directors, Payment Services Act (PSA). Asset confiscation and forfeiture as well as administrative and regulatory actions are also considered. Singapore maintains limited statistics on all alternative measures used, but it does attempt to pursue robust and pragmatic enforcement where ML evidence thresholds are difficult to meet. Based on the limited data available (Table 7.8) and qualitative information provided, Singapore applies these alternative measures to some extent when considering the number of ML convictions. Table 7.8. Alternative measures # Number of persons convicted 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total S55A(1), CDSA (1) Operationalized in 2024 15 15 S157, Companies Act 7 10 15 16 16 64 S5, PSA 4 14 20 15 28 81 Total 11 24 35 31 59 160 Note: (1) S55A was operationalised in February 2024. Statistics exclude ongoing prosecutions. 488. As described above, the codification of the Money Mule Offence constitutes a significant, albeit recent, alternative measure that complements Singapore’s core ML offences and strengthens LEA’s capacity to pursue ML activity. While Singapore is credited for identifying mechanisms to pursue its high-risk predicates, this amendment is recent. So far, the use of the Money Mule Offence has proven useful in a limited number of prosecutions. Between its operationalisation in February 2024 and May 2025, Singapore’s authorities have mounted 286 prosecutions demonstrating its high usage. 489. Singapore is praised for identifying mechanisms to address ML activity from CEF (its highest ML risk area) when ML convictions are not possible. Singapore’s authorities have a clearly stated goal of ML prosecution and asset recovery at the commencement of a ML investigation, but Singapore considers the pursuit of the Money Mule Offence as an ML offence. Given the low rate of conversion from ML investigations to prosecutions, there is a risk that investigators and prosecutors may be inclined to systematically prioritise investigations which can be prosecuted under the Money Mule Offence, rather than for ML. It is too early to assess whether the slight downturn in ML investigations during the time period of the enactment of this offence is as a result of Singapore relying on this alternative measure. 490. Other alternative measures taken by Singapore include administrative and regulatory actions. For instance, ACRA helps prevent the misuse of legal entities for ML by screening new companies, striking off illicit shell companies, and taking regulatory action when prosecution is not possible, via proactive sharing of information by CAD. ACRA can also make debarment orders against directors if there is information to suggest that any company under their directorship is in default of relevant regulatory requirements. It can also sanction CSPs and Registered Qualified Individuals (RQIs) for serious AML/CFT breaches. Similarly, MAS has broad enforcement powers to address breaches of AML/CFT obligations. MAS can require FIs to remediate areas of weaknesses, impose financial penalties, revoke or restrict licenses, and issue reprimands. MAS can also impose fines against finance professionals, issue prohibition orders to bar them from taking up specified roles, activities and functions in the financial sector, and issuing reprimands to these individuals. 491. In conclusion, Singapore has applied alternate measures with success and is credited for this approach where justified. With the creation of the Money Mule Offence, Singapore has positioned itself for an approach more heavily relying on alternative measures in the future. However, as Singapore considers this offence to be an ML offence, it is systematically pursuing this offence as a policy objective where it may be more appropriate to pursue ML convictions instead. Considering the volume of ML investigations that are not pursued by the AGC (i.e., multi-thousands), the application of these alternative measures remains limited at this time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. Asset management is a strength in Singapore’s asset recovery regime. There is no central asset management office. Rather, each LEA is responsible for overseeing the upkeep and value preservation of the seized assets, guided by the 2024 ‘Whole-of-Government (WoG) Guidelines on Asset Management’ which was introduced in furtherance of the NARS. This document ensures consistent and effective asset management across all LEAs, incorporating the objective of value preservation into all procedures. The Guidelines are operationalised by LEAs through SOPs that offer flexibility to accommodate various asset classes ranging from vessels to fine art and exotic animals, while ensuring accountability and transparency. Recognising the rise of virtual assets in criminal activity, Singapore also introduced the WoG Guidelines on Management of Crypto-assets, which standardise procedures to swiftly secure and – where appropriate – liquidate seized virtual assets to preserve their (potentially volatile) value. This decentralised approach to asset management does not pose effectiveness issues and does not undermine effective resource allocation within LEAs. 513. Moreover, in practice, Singapore has demonstrated a proactive and structured approach in managing frozen or seized criminal properties to preserve their value, including through timely pre-confiscation sale or disposal where appropriate. This highlights LEA’s emphasis on maximising returns for the state, legitimate owners, or victims of crime as appropriate. This is also apparent from Singapore's mature approach to managing atypical assets. For instance, in a tax evasion case involving scrap gold, IRAS quickly disposed of 27 kg of seized gold via public auction to mitigate the volatility of gold prices, recovering SGD 2.3 million (USD 1.7 million) which was then used to offset outstanding taxes. In the 3B$ case, SPF managed an unprecedented volume of luxury goods including purses and cars by contracting professional asset managers and secure storage facilities, ensuring both evidentiary integrity and value preservation. Authorities have also safely managed one seized oil tanker, which was later auctioned off." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. Asset management is a strength in Singapore’s asset recovery regime. There is no central asset management office. Rather, each LEA is responsible for overseeing the upkeep and value preservation of the seized assets, guided by the 2024 ‘Whole-of-Government (WoG) Guidelines on Asset Management’ which was introduced in furtherance of the NARS. This document ensures consistent and effective asset management across all LEAs, incorporating the objective of value preservation into all procedures. The Guidelines are operationalised by LEAs through SOPs that offer flexibility to accommodate various asset classes ranging from vessels to fine art and exotic animals, while ensuring accountability and transparency. Recognising the rise of virtual assets in criminal activity, Singapore also introduced the WoG Guidelines on Management of Crypto-assets, which standardise procedures to swiftly secure and – where appropriate – liquidate seized virtual assets to preserve their (potentially volatile) value. This decentralised approach to asset management does not pose effectiveness issues and does not undermine effective resource allocation within LEAs. 513. Moreover, in practice, Singapore has demonstrated a proactive and structured approach in managing frozen or seized criminal properties to preserve their value, including through timely pre-confiscation sale or disposal where appropriate. This highlights LEA’s emphasis on maximising returns for the state, legitimate owners, or victims of crime as appropriate. This is also apparent from Singapore's mature approach to managing atypical assets. For instance, in a tax evasion case involving scrap gold, IRAS quickly disposed of 27 kg of seized gold via public auction to mitigate the volatility of gold prices, recovering SGD 2.3 million (USD 1.7 million) which was then used to offset outstanding taxes. In the 3B$ case, SPF managed an unprecedented volume of luxury goods including purses and cars by contracting professional asset managers and secure storage facilities, ensuring both evidentiary integrity and value preservation. Authorities have also safely managed one seized oil tanker, which was later auctioned off." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 567. As a small, connected law enforcement circle, there is almost complete overlap in Singapore with respect to agencies or teams dealing with CFT and CT. This brings cohesion between CTF efforts, including investigations, prosecutions and convictions, and the formulation of national counter-terrorism strategies. 568. The Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) is the Ministerial-level Committee that reviews national security policies, including CT and CFT policies. Singapore’s TF NRA and National Strategy for Countering the Financing of Terrorism (NSCFT) complement Singapore’s larger National CT Strategy. 569. The AML/CFT SC is co-chaired by the PSs of the MHA, MOF and MAS, with membership of senior representatives from the security and intelligence, law enforcement, financial intelligence and regulatory agencies, and sectoral supervisors. The common membership of the SC and the SPRC, in particular the role of MHA and STRO in each, contributes to TF risks and CFT strategies being aligned with CT strategies with information from investigations being used to augment Singapore national CT efforts. 570. The inaugural 2020 TF NRA and 2022 NSCFT were reviewed and endorsed by the AML/CFT SC before publication on the MHA, MOF and MAS websites. Both the refreshed TF NRA and NSCFT were similarly reviewed and endorsed by the AML/CFT SC before publication on the MHA, MOF and MAS websites on 1 July 2024. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 571. Integration across CFT and CT activity at the operational level occurs through the ISD’s CT Division, which is also involved in TF-related work (see core issue 9.2). While Singapore has provided evidence of information sharing, across competent authorities and with the private sector, on TF risks generally, there is less evidence that TF investigations and prosecutions are being used to build a deeper understanding of TF networks and organisations, albeit the context of the investigations were used for the NRA and TF threat assessments. In relation to international co-operation, Singapore has demonstrated strength through the sharing of results, where relevant, of its financial intelligence, investigations and prosecutions with international counterparts, through formal and informal channels, and by actively participating and presenting at international fora. Table 9.6. Singapore’s International CFT Information Exchange 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total T/TF information exchanges with foreign counterparts 1 224 1 467 1 595 2 579 2 353 1a. No. of incoming T/TF Information exchanges (UNSCR 1267-designated individuals / entities) NA 675 (8) 808 (3) 1 430 (2) 1 481 (13) 1b. No. of outgoing T/TF Information exchanges (UNSCR 1267-designated individuals / entities) NA 792 (17) 787 (5) 1 149 (2) 872 (59) 2. Total TF Information exchanges with foreign counterparts 18 42 26 129 121 2a. No. of incoming TF Information exchanges (Related to legal persons) 9 (0) 18 (0) 20 (0) 47 (0) 33 (3) 2b. No. of outgoing TF Information exchanges (Related to legal persons) 9 (4) 24 (1) 6 (0) 82 (0) 88 (10)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 567. As a small, connected law enforcement circle, there is almost complete overlap in Singapore with respect to agencies or teams dealing with CFT and CT. This brings cohesion between CTF efforts, including investigations, prosecutions and convictions, and the formulation of national counter-terrorism strategies. 568. The Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) is the Ministerial-level Committee that reviews national security policies, including CT and CFT policies. Singapore’s TF NRA and National Strategy for Countering the Financing of Terrorism (NSCFT) complement Singapore’s larger National CT Strategy. 569. The AML/CFT SC is co-chaired by the PSs of the MHA, MOF and MAS, with membership of senior representatives from the security and intelligence, law enforcement, financial intelligence and regulatory agencies, and sectoral supervisors. The common membership of the SC and the SPRC, in particular the role of MHA and STRO in each, contributes to TF risks and CFT strategies being aligned with CT strategies with information from investigations being used to augment Singapore national CT efforts. 570. The inaugural 2020 TF NRA and 2022 NSCFT were reviewed and endorsed by the AML/CFT SC before publication on the MHA, MOF and MAS websites. Both the refreshed TF NRA and NSCFT were similarly reviewed and endorsed by the AML/CFT SC before publication on the MHA, MOF and MAS websites on 1 July 2024. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 571. Integration across CFT and CT activity at the operational level occurs through the ISD’s CT Division, which is also involved in TF-related work (see core issue 9.2). While Singapore has provided evidence of information sharing, across competent authorities and with the private sector, on TF risks generally, there is less evidence that TF investigations and prosecutions are being used to build a deeper understanding of TF networks and organisations, albeit the context of the investigations were used for the NRA and TF threat assessments. In relation to international co-operation, Singapore has demonstrated strength through the sharing of results, where relevant, of its financial intelligence, investigations and prosecutions with international counterparts, through formal and informal channels, and by actively participating and presenting at international fora. Table 9.6. Singapore’s International CFT Information Exchange 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total T/TF information exchanges with foreign counterparts 1 224 1 467 1 595 2 579 2 353 1a. No. of incoming T/TF Information exchanges (UNSCR 1267-designated individuals / entities) NA 675 (8) 808 (3) 1 430 (2) 1 481 (13) 1b. No. of outgoing T/TF Information exchanges (UNSCR 1267-designated individuals / entities) NA 792 (17) 787 (5) 1 149 (2) 872 (59) 2. Total TF Information exchanges with foreign counterparts 18 42 26 129 121 2a. No. of incoming TF Information exchanges (Related to legal persons) 9 (0) 18 (0) 20 (0) 47 (0) 33 (3) 2b. No. of outgoing TF Information exchanges (Related to legal persons) 9 (4) 24 (1) 6 (0) 82 (0) 88 (10)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 608. FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team in Singapore demonstrated a sound understanding of their obligations in relation to TF TFS, including to freeze assets without delay. FIs and VASPs actively screen for designated individuals and entities and freeze immediately where required. FIs and VASPs have developed their understanding through guidance, tools and outreach/engagement events. Box 10.5. Case Study: Virtual Asset donation to campaign of terror group On 30 August 2023, Company A, a DPTSP, detected a cryptocurrency transfer of more than USD 4 000 by a Singaporean account holder (Person T) to a wallet associated with donation campaigns to a terror group designated by many countries. The wallet allegedly belonged to a foreign national who was being investigated by a foreign counter-terrorism agency (Agency X) for TF offences. Foreign Agency X had, through an Administrative Order dated 30 June 2021, sanctioned and seized the wallet. These transactions were flagged by a blockchain analysis firm engaged by Company A to monitor third-party transactions on their platform. Company A immediately suspended the transaction on the same day and filed an STR the following day, on 31 August 2023. 609. MAS and MinLaw have provided extensive guidance products to all FIs and VASPs. The reporting entities were readily able to provide details on the guidance and how they implemented it into their systems. This demonstrates that the reporting entities understand and, in general, comply with their obligations. 610. All FIs and VASPs are subscribed to MAS’ webpage, which provides updates on 1267 and successor resolution designations. In addition to subscribing to the MAS webpage and using it as a source of reference, FI and VASPs also rely on updates directly from the UN website of consolidated lists and/or are subscribed to various commercial databases to enable them to perform screening against updates to the relevant UNSCR lists. All FIs and VASPs indicated that they are subscribed to mailing lists by their supervisor that provides them with updates on national designations. The AT cannot conclude that those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated persons and entities are being captured by screening practices. 611. Outreach has been conducted by the supervisors, and this are in line with the risk and context of Singapore. These outreach sessions, including as webinars to provide accessibility, are aimed at supporting the reporting entities in understanding their obligations in relation to TFS. Outreach has increased greatly in the last two years. Table 10.4. Outreach Sessions (Including but not limited to TF TFS) FI/VASP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks 11 5 10 17 25 DPTSPs 9 2 12 13 24 PSPs with CBMT services 7 1 12 13 24 Other FIs 73 17 113 176 297 612. Overall, the number of STRs in relation to TF TFS have increased across the sectors which would suggest that the outreach efforts that are taking place are making a positive impact. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 613. DNFBPs in Singapore demonstrated an uneven understanding of their obligations in relation to TF TFS, including to freeze assets without delay. Some DNFBPs actively screen for designated individuals and entities and freeze immediately where required, while others, which became apparent during interviews with entities at the onsite, were unsure of their obligations and what to do if there was a positive match. 614. All DNFBP sectors have been provided with sector-specific guidance, but the degree of familiarity with the guidance varied from entity-to-entity. Singapore has been gradually conducting more outreach activities, which DNFBPs viewed as positively contributing to their awareness. Table 10.5. Outreach Sessions (Including but not limited to TF TFS) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos 2 0 2 0 6 EAs/Developers 11 4 3 11 2 PSMDs 21 38 24 21 27 Law Firms 10 8 11 16 27 CSPs 3 6 4 4 9 Accountants 2 2 3 2 5 Moneylenders 2 2 0 3 10 Pawnbrokers 3 2 4 3 9 615. Overall, the number of STRs in relation to TFS have increased across the sectors which would suggest that the outreach efforts that are taking place are making a positive impact. For example, following MinLaw’s industry engagement session in May 2024 and regular outreach, authorities noted an increase in understanding of TF risk and TFS preventive measures amongst the PSMD sector (from 81% to 93%) and 9% increase for both the moneylending (from 87% to 96%) and pawn-broking sector (from 84% to 93%), as assessed through questionnaires administered prior to and after the outreach session. 99% of PSMDs, and 100% of pawnbrokers and moneylenders found the sessions useful. 616. In the period under review, all reporting entities combined to lodge 111 STRs (4% of total T/TF-related STRs filed) relating to TF TFS under UNSC sanctions regimes. When making such an STR submission, FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs will place a hold on these accounts/transactions. STRO has in place mechanisms to pick up such STRs through the STR form’s structured fields that indicate whether measures have been taken in relation to the account/transaction. The mechanism for reporting a potential match through an STR is flawed as it does not always result in timely action. The process of reporting entities lodging STRs may involve a longer time than is ideal for TFS match confirmation. Further, it is not clear that in instances of unconfirmed matches by DNFBPs the assets are being frozen while veracity of the identify is confirmed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 608. FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team in Singapore demonstrated a sound understanding of their obligations in relation to TF TFS, including to freeze assets without delay. FIs and VASPs actively screen for designated individuals and entities and freeze immediately where required. FIs and VASPs have developed their understanding through guidance, tools and outreach/engagement events. Box 10.5. Case Study: Virtual Asset donation to campaign of terror group On 30 August 2023, Company A, a DPTSP, detected a cryptocurrency transfer of more than USD 4 000 by a Singaporean account holder (Person T) to a wallet associated with donation campaigns to a terror group designated by many countries. The wallet allegedly belonged to a foreign national who was being investigated by a foreign counter-terrorism agency (Agency X) for TF offences. Foreign Agency X had, through an Administrative Order dated 30 June 2021, sanctioned and seized the wallet. These transactions were flagged by a blockchain analysis firm engaged by Company A to monitor third-party transactions on their platform. Company A immediately suspended the transaction on the same day and filed an STR the following day, on 31 August 2023. 609. MAS and MinLaw have provided extensive guidance products to all FIs and VASPs. The reporting entities were readily able to provide details on the guidance and how they implemented it into their systems. This demonstrates that the reporting entities understand and, in general, comply with their obligations. 610. All FIs and VASPs are subscribed to MAS’ webpage, which provides updates on 1267 and successor resolution designations. In addition to subscribing to the MAS webpage and using it as a source of reference, FI and VASPs also rely on updates directly from the UN website of consolidated lists and/or are subscribed to various commercial databases to enable them to perform screening against updates to the relevant UNSCR lists. All FIs and VASPs indicated that they are subscribed to mailing lists by their supervisor that provides them with updates on national designations. The AT cannot conclude that those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated persons and entities are being captured by screening practices. 611. Outreach has been conducted by the supervisors, and this are in line with the risk and context of Singapore. These outreach sessions, including as webinars to provide accessibility, are aimed at supporting the reporting entities in understanding their obligations in relation to TFS. Outreach has increased greatly in the last two years. Table 10.4. Outreach Sessions (Including but not limited to TF TFS) FI/VASP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks 11 5 10 17 25 DPTSPs 9 2 12 13 24 PSPs with CBMT services 7 1 12 13 24 Other FIs 73 17 113 176 297 612. Overall, the number of STRs in relation to TF TFS have increased across the sectors which would suggest that the outreach efforts that are taking place are making a positive impact. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 613. DNFBPs in Singapore demonstrated an uneven understanding of their obligations in relation to TF TFS, including to freeze assets without delay. Some DNFBPs actively screen for designated individuals and entities and freeze immediately where required, while others, which became apparent during interviews with entities at the onsite, were unsure of their obligations and what to do if there was a positive match. 614. All DNFBP sectors have been provided with sector-specific guidance, but the degree of familiarity with the guidance varied from entity-to-entity. Singapore has been gradually conducting more outreach activities, which DNFBPs viewed as positively contributing to their awareness. Table 10.5. Outreach Sessions (Including but not limited to TF TFS) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos 2 0 2 0 6 EAs/Developers 11 4 3 11 2 PSMDs 21 38 24 21 27 Law Firms 10 8 11 16 27 CSPs 3 6 4 4 9 Accountants 2 2 3 2 5 Moneylenders 2 2 0 3 10 Pawnbrokers 3 2 4 3 9 615. Overall, the number of STRs in relation to TFS have increased across the sectors which would suggest that the outreach efforts that are taking place are making a positive impact. For example, following MinLaw’s industry engagement session in May 2024 and regular outreach, authorities noted an increase in understanding of TF risk and TFS preventive measures amongst the PSMD sector (from 81% to 93%) and 9% increase for both the moneylending (from 87% to 96%) and pawn-broking sector (from 84% to 93%), as assessed through questionnaires administered prior to and after the outreach session. 99% of PSMDs, and 100% of pawnbrokers and moneylenders found the sessions useful. 616. In the period under review, all reporting entities combined to lodge 111 STRs (4% of total T/TF-related STRs filed) relating to TF TFS under UNSC sanctions regimes. When making such an STR submission, FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs will place a hold on these accounts/transactions. STRO has in place mechanisms to pick up such STRs through the STR form’s structured fields that indicate whether measures have been taken in relation to the account/transaction. The mechanism for reporting a potential match through an STR is flawed as it does not always result in timely action. The process of reporting entities lodging STRs may involve a longer time than is ideal for TFS match confirmation. Further, it is not clear that in instances of unconfirmed matches by DNFBPs the assets are being frozen while veracity of the identify is confirmed." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 650. All reporting entities are required to identify funds or assets held by UNSC-designated individuals/entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or under their direction, report to MAS (for freezing pursuant to the FSM DPRK Regulations) or the SPF (for freezing pursuant to the UN DPRK Regulations), as well as file an STR on the frozen assets. This requirement is outlined in guidance to reporting entities. During the reporting period, as of July 2025, FIs in Singapore have frozen assets in one case totalling SGD 22.3 million/USD 16.2 million (in 2019), pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions. 651. Reporting entities met during the onsite emphasised the importance of PF sanctions screening and STR reporting in complying with their AML/CFT/CPF obligations. However, based on discussions during the onsite visit, aside from FIs/VASPs, their understanding appears to be focused on the requirement of detecting positive matches against sanctioned individuals and entities through screening, with significantly less consideration given to the analysis of complex sanctions evasion techniques and the implementation of risk-based mitigation measures. The AT is concerned that in Singapore’s PF context, reliance on screening software may not result in the identification of persons acting on behalf of or at the direction of DPRK-related designated persons and entities. As seen in Table 11.2, PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions relating to the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations and other export control regulations, there were incidences where law enforcement discovered activities in connection with Singapore’s DPRK trade ban and or designated persons. 652. Singapore makes BO information accessible to competent authorities through its central ACRA registry and through CDD conducted by reporting entities. As identified in IO.5, there are deficiencies in measures to ensure the accuracy of BO information. The lack of access to accurate BO information for legal persons and arrangements undermines the implementation of PF TFS in Singapore, particularly given that one of Singapore’s key PF threats relates to the misuse of legal persons. 653. Over the reporting period, Singapore received around 1900 STRs related to PF, with 732 related to the DPRK. These are high numbers of STRs relating to the DPRK. Singapore was able to confirm that of these 732 STRs, 165 STRs related to UNSC DPRK sanctions. Table 11.1. PF-related STRs (which include STRs filed in connection with UNSC sanctions against the DPRK and PF-related sanctions imposed by any other country) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks 222 269 121 275 249 1 136 DPTSPs 4 5 4 71 266 350 Remittance agents 1 3 15 28 22 69 Insurers 33 33 34 53 61 214 CSPs 1 3 1 7 4 16 Lawyers/LPEs 0 4 2 0 0 6 Other sectors 21 13 8 45 27 114 Total 282 330 185 479 629 1 905 Note: Statistics are based on STRO's profiling of STRs filed i.e. reporting entities may have filed on other suspicions. 654. Singapore provided information dissemination statistics for 2023-24 - there were five UNSC sanctions proliferation/PF-related financial intelligence packages disseminated to relevant competent authorities in 2023. [41] Each of these related to entities involved in an investigation under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. 655. From 2020 to 1H 2025, Singapore’s AGC successfully prosecuted 22 natural persons and eight legal persons for PF-related/proliferation-related breaches of Singapore’s laws. Nineteen of these prosecutions proceeded under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations, with the remainder prosecuted under the DPRK trade ban control offences. No natural or legal person has been prosecuted for PF TFS breaches. Please see Table 11.2 for the 30 prosecutions, which provide an insight into the PF exposure of Singapore. It is also notable that the sanctions applied to those prosecuted range from 8 days to 12 months’ imprisonment and fines ranging from SGD 3 500 to SGD 311 000. These sanctions are not in line with the gravity of offences and are not appropriately dissuasive. The assessment team saw very limited evidence that the cases below attracted supervisory penalties although the YTE case had accompanying MAS intervention (via the imposition of a financial sanction on an FI) to the prosecution. Table 11.2. PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions related to UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations and other export control regulations Case / Year Convicted Description Penalty 1 Li Hyon (T-Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd / SCN Singapore Pte Ltd) / 2020 Li Hyon, on his father’s instructions, placed orders for prohibited luxury items with T-Specialist and SCN, checked on shipment status and facilitated payments for goods. 4 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations 4 weeks’ imprisonment 2 Sherly Muliawan (T-Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd) / 2020 Shipping manager and purchaser in T-Specialist - failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 5 counts of failing to provide the Police with information about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 10 000 3 Lam Hon Lan (SCN Singapore Pte Ltd) / 2020 Secretary in SCN - failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 3 counts of failing to provide the Police with information about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. Fine of SGD 6 000 4 Lim Cheng Hwee (SINSMS Pte Ltd) / 2020 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK through SINSMS. 3 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (4 other similar charges, and 2 charges of abetment by intentional aiding in commercial trade with the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 months’ imprisonment 5 Hong Leng Ooi (SINSMS Pte Ltd) / 2020 Wife of Lim Cheng Hwee -assisted with administrative operations of SINSMS. Failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 2 counts of failing to provide the Police within formation about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 4 000 6 SINSMS Pte Ltd / 2020 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK. 3 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (4 other similar charges, and 2 charges of engaging in commercial trade with the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). Fine of SGD 30 000 7 Tan Wee Beng (Wee Tiong Pte Ltd) (WTPL) / 2021 Managing director and shareholder of WTPL, who had carried on business with entities linked to the DPRK, including selling sugar and other goods to two DPRK persons. Trading ceased before the embargo on trade with the DPRK was put in place. However, Tan Wee Beng falsified invoices to conceal the fact of trading from banks out of concern that banks would terminate the banking relationship. 7 counts of falsification of accounts under the Penal Code. Fine of SGD 210 000; in default, 7 months’ imprisonment 8 Bong Hui Ping (WTPL) / 2021 Shipping manager of WTPL and main staff assisting Tan Wee Beng with DPRK business. Intentionally aided Tan Wee Beng to falsify invoices submitted to the ban. 7counts of abetting Tan Wee Beng’s offences under the Penal Code. Fine of SGD 59 000; in default, 14 weeks’ imprisonment 9 Chong Hock Yen / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK through the three companies listed in this page. 8 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (35 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 6 weeks’ imprisonment 10 SCN Singapore Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 6 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (33 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). Fine of SGD 311 000 11 Laurich International Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 1 count of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. Fine of SGD 30 000 12 Sindok Trading Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 1 count of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (2 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 23 000 13 Phua Sze Hee (Pokka) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka strawberry milk) to the DPRK. 4 counts of abetment of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (24 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 5 weeks’ imprisonment 14 Manfred Low Cheng Jing (Yuk Tung Energy Pte Ltd) (YTE) / 2022 The accused was a director and shareholder of YTE. YTE had been allegedly involved in a ship-to-ship transfer of gasoil to a DPRK-flagged vessel. The accused disposed of his iMac computer, which contained bank documents, payment vouchers and claims. The disposal frustrated CAD’s ability to fully investigate YTE’s alleged contravention of the UN DPRK Regulations. 1 count of intentionally obstructing the course of justice under the Penal Code (a similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 15 weeks’ imprisonment 15 Vladlen Amtchentsev (Velmur Management Pte Ltd) / 2022 Following receipt of intelligence that Velmur had allegedly facilitated business activities on behalf of a UNSC-sanctioned DPRK entity, CAD commenced an investigation into potential breaches of the UN DPRK Regulations. Due to the lack of evidence, Singapore eventually proceeded on ancillary charges of forgery as Vladlen had forged statements of financial institutions to create a misimpression that he had deposited monies in the said accounts. 2 counts of forgery under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge under the Penal Code and 2 charges under the Companies Act were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 4 weeks’ imprisonment 16 Tay Kiong Chiak (A-Linkz Marketing Pte Ltd) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka premium milk coffee and Pokka strawberry milk) to the DPRK. 1 count of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (2 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 12 days’ imprisonment 17 Sim Swee Wah (Hock Seng Food Pte Ltd) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., various food and beverage products belonging to brands under the Hosen Group) to the DPRK. 1 count of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (2 other similar charges was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 8 days’ imprisonment 18 Benny Tan Chun Kiat (MT Sea Tanker II) / 2023 In relation to an investigation into MT Sea Tanker II allegedly engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels, MPA requested for documents from Sea Hub Tankers, including MT Sea Tanker II’s official logbook, oil record book, charter party agreement(s) and bill(s) of lading. The accused and accomplices rewrote the records and discarded documents to create a false narrative about the movement and cargo activity of MT Sea Tanker II, which frustrated CAD’s ability to fully investigate Sea Hub Tankers’ alleged contravention of the UN DPRK Regulations. 1 count of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 months’ imprisonment 19 Ong Chou Hong (Sea Hub Tankers Pte Ltd) / 2023 In addition to the above, Ong and another accomplice, Jeremy Koh disposed of the computer CPU on MT Sea Tanker II containing information relating to MT Sea Tanker II’s activities. Ong was traced to a previous offence of obstructing the course of justice in 2019. 2 counts of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 9 months’ imprisonment 20 Koh Renfeng Jeremy (MT Sea Tanker II) / 2023 Similar to the above, Koh and Ong disposed of the computer CPU on MT Sea Tanker II containing information relating to MT Sea Tanker II’s activities. 2 counts of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar count was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 months’ imprisonment 21 Loh Mun Sang (Rejo Beverages Pte Ltd) / 2023 Sole directing mind of Rejo - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK via Rejo. 4 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (13 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 weeks’ imprisonment 22 Rejo Beverages Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK. 4 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (13 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 160 000 23 Koh Kuan Jiu (Xu Kuanrou) (Muller and Partner (Singapore) Private Limited) / 2023 General manager of Muller - provided freight forwarding services to a company, Eluva International Pte Ltd, which shipped prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 7 000; in default, 6 weeks' imprisonment 24 123 Holdings Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 2 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 60 000 25 123 Duty Free Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 30 000 26 Wang Jung Chung (123 Holdings Pte Ltd/123 Duty Free Pte Ltd) / 2023 Joint director of 123 Holdings (together with siblings) and sole director for 123 Duty Free - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) and prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 8 weeks’ imprisonment 27 See Swee Hian (123 Holdings Pte Ltd/123 Duty Free Pte Ltd) / 2023 Export director employed by 123 Holdings who reported to Wang - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) and prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 4 weeks’ imprisonment 28 Koh Poh Choo (Skyline Shipping Private Limited) / 2024 General manager of Skyline - provided freight forwarding services to a company, Eluva International Pte Ltd, which shipped prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 1 count of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges, and 2 charges of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 3 500 29 Low Eng Yeow Justin / 1H 2025 Caused ISA Energy (Asia) to effect transfers of monies to Hin Leong Trading Pte Ltd for the purchase of refined petroleum products (RPP), knowing that the transfers would contribute to the transfer of RPP to persons in the DPRK. 3 counts of indirectly transferring financial assets that may contribute to a prohibited activity under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (6 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Global imprisonment term of 12 months and 3 weeks 30 ISA Energy (Asia) Pte Ltd / 1H 2025 Effected transfers of monies to Hin Leong Trading Pte Ltd for the purchase of RPP, knowing that the transfers would contribute to the transfer of RPP to persons in the DPRK. 3 counts of directly transferring financial assets that may contribute to a prohibited activity the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (6 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Global fine of SGD 280 000 656. Given the very high number of DPRK PF-related STRs filed in Singapore during the assessment period, and the PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions of 22 natural persons and eight legal persons for involvement in or provision of luxury goods, it is unlikely that there were only funds in one case and no other assets to freeze. Singapore could make better use of financial intelligence and investigative capacity to better identify funds and assets in these cases. 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 657. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs are required to freeze assets, and transactions related to designated persons or entities are prohibited. When MAS or other supervisors receive specific and credible intelligence via the IMC-EC or RTIG mechanism, or bilaterally from foreign counterparts, MAS will alert the relevant FIs/VASPs and ask them to review and report any relationship with the names cited in the intelligence so as to ascertain: (i) the exposure of and risks to Singapore’s financial system; and (ii) whether there had been any breach of the FSM DPRK Regulations and AML/CFT requirements which FIs/VASPs have to comply with. Footnotes [41] In 2023-24, there were 34 proliferation/PF-related financial intelligence packages related to a wider range of PF-related concerns such as cases involving OFAC and other unilateral sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 650. All reporting entities are required to identify funds or assets held by UNSC-designated individuals/entities, as well as those acting on their behalf or under their direction, report to MAS (for freezing pursuant to the FSM DPRK Regulations) or the SPF (for freezing pursuant to the UN DPRK Regulations), as well as file an STR on the frozen assets. This requirement is outlined in guidance to reporting entities. During the reporting period, as of July 2025, FIs in Singapore have frozen assets in one case totalling SGD 22.3 million/USD 16.2 million (in 2019), pursuant to UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions. 651. Reporting entities met during the onsite emphasised the importance of PF sanctions screening and STR reporting in complying with their AML/CFT/CPF obligations. However, based on discussions during the onsite visit, aside from FIs/VASPs, their understanding appears to be focused on the requirement of detecting positive matches against sanctioned individuals and entities through screening, with significantly less consideration given to the analysis of complex sanctions evasion techniques and the implementation of risk-based mitigation measures. The AT is concerned that in Singapore’s PF context, reliance on screening software may not result in the identification of persons acting on behalf of or at the direction of DPRK-related designated persons and entities. As seen in Table 11.2, PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions relating to the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations and other export control regulations, there were incidences where law enforcement discovered activities in connection with Singapore’s DPRK trade ban and or designated persons. 652. Singapore makes BO information accessible to competent authorities through its central ACRA registry and through CDD conducted by reporting entities. As identified in IO.5, there are deficiencies in measures to ensure the accuracy of BO information. The lack of access to accurate BO information for legal persons and arrangements undermines the implementation of PF TFS in Singapore, particularly given that one of Singapore’s key PF threats relates to the misuse of legal persons. 653. Over the reporting period, Singapore received around 1900 STRs related to PF, with 732 related to the DPRK. These are high numbers of STRs relating to the DPRK. Singapore was able to confirm that of these 732 STRs, 165 STRs related to UNSC DPRK sanctions. Table 11.1. PF-related STRs (which include STRs filed in connection with UNSC sanctions against the DPRK and PF-related sanctions imposed by any other country) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks 222 269 121 275 249 1 136 DPTSPs 4 5 4 71 266 350 Remittance agents 1 3 15 28 22 69 Insurers 33 33 34 53 61 214 CSPs 1 3 1 7 4 16 Lawyers/LPEs 0 4 2 0 0 6 Other sectors 21 13 8 45 27 114 Total 282 330 185 479 629 1 905 Note: Statistics are based on STRO's profiling of STRs filed i.e. reporting entities may have filed on other suspicions. 654. Singapore provided information dissemination statistics for 2023-24 - there were five UNSC sanctions proliferation/PF-related financial intelligence packages disseminated to relevant competent authorities in 2023. [41] Each of these related to entities involved in an investigation under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. 655. From 2020 to 1H 2025, Singapore’s AGC successfully prosecuted 22 natural persons and eight legal persons for PF-related/proliferation-related breaches of Singapore’s laws. Nineteen of these prosecutions proceeded under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations, with the remainder prosecuted under the DPRK trade ban control offences. No natural or legal person has been prosecuted for PF TFS breaches. Please see Table 11.2 for the 30 prosecutions, which provide an insight into the PF exposure of Singapore. It is also notable that the sanctions applied to those prosecuted range from 8 days to 12 months’ imprisonment and fines ranging from SGD 3 500 to SGD 311 000. These sanctions are not in line with the gravity of offences and are not appropriately dissuasive. The assessment team saw very limited evidence that the cases below attracted supervisory penalties although the YTE case had accompanying MAS intervention (via the imposition of a financial sanction on an FI) to the prosecution. Table 11.2. PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions related to UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations and other export control regulations Case / Year Convicted Description Penalty 1 Li Hyon (T-Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd / SCN Singapore Pte Ltd) / 2020 Li Hyon, on his father’s instructions, placed orders for prohibited luxury items with T-Specialist and SCN, checked on shipment status and facilitated payments for goods. 4 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations 4 weeks’ imprisonment 2 Sherly Muliawan (T-Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd) / 2020 Shipping manager and purchaser in T-Specialist - failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 5 counts of failing to provide the Police with information about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 10 000 3 Lam Hon Lan (SCN Singapore Pte Ltd) / 2020 Secretary in SCN - failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 3 counts of failing to provide the Police with information about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. Fine of SGD 6 000 4 Lim Cheng Hwee (SINSMS Pte Ltd) / 2020 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK through SINSMS. 3 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (4 other similar charges, and 2 charges of abetment by intentional aiding in commercial trade with the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 months’ imprisonment 5 Hong Leng Ooi (SINSMS Pte Ltd) / 2020 Wife of Lim Cheng Hwee -assisted with administrative operations of SINSMS. Failed to inform Police about the prohibited supply of prohibited luxury items to the DPRK. 2 counts of failing to provide the Police within formation about prohibited transactions under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 4 000 6 SINSMS Pte Ltd / 2020 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK. 3 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (4 other similar charges, and 2 charges of engaging in commercial trade with the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). Fine of SGD 30 000 7 Tan Wee Beng (Wee Tiong Pte Ltd) (WTPL) / 2021 Managing director and shareholder of WTPL, who had carried on business with entities linked to the DPRK, including selling sugar and other goods to two DPRK persons. Trading ceased before the embargo on trade with the DPRK was put in place. However, Tan Wee Beng falsified invoices to conceal the fact of trading from banks out of concern that banks would terminate the banking relationship. 7 counts of falsification of accounts under the Penal Code. Fine of SGD 210 000; in default, 7 months’ imprisonment 8 Bong Hui Ping (WTPL) / 2021 Shipping manager of WTPL and main staff assisting Tan Wee Beng with DPRK business. Intentionally aided Tan Wee Beng to falsify invoices submitted to the ban. 7counts of abetting Tan Wee Beng’s offences under the Penal Code. Fine of SGD 59 000; in default, 14 weeks’ imprisonment 9 Chong Hock Yen / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK through the three companies listed in this page. 8 counts of abetment by conspiracy to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions –DPRK) Regulations (35 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 6 weeks’ imprisonment 10 SCN Singapore Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 6 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (33 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). Fine of SGD 311 000 11 Laurich International Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 1 count of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations. Fine of SGD 30 000 12 Sindok Trading Pte Ltd / 2022 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., perfumes, cosmetics, watches and musical instruments) to the DPRK. 1 count of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (2 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 23 000 13 Phua Sze Hee (Pokka) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka strawberry milk) to the DPRK. 4 counts of abetment of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (24 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 5 weeks’ imprisonment 14 Manfred Low Cheng Jing (Yuk Tung Energy Pte Ltd) (YTE) / 2022 The accused was a director and shareholder of YTE. YTE had been allegedly involved in a ship-to-ship transfer of gasoil to a DPRK-flagged vessel. The accused disposed of his iMac computer, which contained bank documents, payment vouchers and claims. The disposal frustrated CAD’s ability to fully investigate YTE’s alleged contravention of the UN DPRK Regulations. 1 count of intentionally obstructing the course of justice under the Penal Code (a similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 15 weeks’ imprisonment 15 Vladlen Amtchentsev (Velmur Management Pte Ltd) / 2022 Following receipt of intelligence that Velmur had allegedly facilitated business activities on behalf of a UNSC-sanctioned DPRK entity, CAD commenced an investigation into potential breaches of the UN DPRK Regulations. Due to the lack of evidence, Singapore eventually proceeded on ancillary charges of forgery as Vladlen had forged statements of financial institutions to create a misimpression that he had deposited monies in the said accounts. 2 counts of forgery under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge under the Penal Code and 2 charges under the Companies Act were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 4 weeks’ imprisonment 16 Tay Kiong Chiak (A-Linkz Marketing Pte Ltd) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka premium milk coffee and Pokka strawberry milk) to the DPRK. 1 count of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (2 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 12 days’ imprisonment 17 Sim Swee Wah (Hock Seng Food Pte Ltd) / 2022 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., various food and beverage products belonging to brands under the Hosen Group) to the DPRK. 1 count of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (2 other similar charges was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 8 days’ imprisonment 18 Benny Tan Chun Kiat (MT Sea Tanker II) / 2023 In relation to an investigation into MT Sea Tanker II allegedly engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged vessels, MPA requested for documents from Sea Hub Tankers, including MT Sea Tanker II’s official logbook, oil record book, charter party agreement(s) and bill(s) of lading. The accused and accomplices rewrote the records and discarded documents to create a false narrative about the movement and cargo activity of MT Sea Tanker II, which frustrated CAD’s ability to fully investigate Sea Hub Tankers’ alleged contravention of the UN DPRK Regulations. 1 count of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 months’ imprisonment 19 Ong Chou Hong (Sea Hub Tankers Pte Ltd) / 2023 In addition to the above, Ong and another accomplice, Jeremy Koh disposed of the computer CPU on MT Sea Tanker II containing information relating to MT Sea Tanker II’s activities. Ong was traced to a previous offence of obstructing the course of justice in 2019. 2 counts of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar charge was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 9 months’ imprisonment 20 Koh Renfeng Jeremy (MT Sea Tanker II) / 2023 Similar to the above, Koh and Ong disposed of the computer CPU on MT Sea Tanker II containing information relating to MT Sea Tanker II’s activities. 2 counts of abetment by conspiracy to intentionally obstruct the course of justice under the Penal Code (1 other similar count was taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 months’ imprisonment 21 Loh Mun Sang (Rejo Beverages Pte Ltd) / 2023 Sole directing mind of Rejo - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK via Rejo. 4 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (13 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 6 weeks’ imprisonment 22 Rejo Beverages Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., wine and spirits) to the DPRK. 4 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (13 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 160 000 23 Koh Kuan Jiu (Xu Kuanrou) (Muller and Partner (Singapore) Private Limited) / 2023 General manager of Muller - provided freight forwarding services to a company, Eluva International Pte Ltd, which shipped prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations Fine of SGD 7 000; in default, 6 weeks' imprisonment 24 123 Holdings Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 2 counts of supplying designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 60 000 25 123 Duty Free Pte Ltd / 2023 Supplied prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of exporting prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 30 000 26 Wang Jung Chung (123 Holdings Pte Ltd/123 Duty Free Pte Ltd) / 2023 Joint director of 123 Holdings (together with siblings) and sole director for 123 Duty Free - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) and prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 8 weeks’ imprisonment 27 See Swee Hian (123 Holdings Pte Ltd/123 Duty Free Pte Ltd) / 2023 Export director employed by 123 Holdings who reported to Wang - supplied prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) and prohibited goods (i.e., Pokka assorted drinks) to the DPRK. 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing). 2 counts of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) 4 weeks’ imprisonment 28 Koh Poh Choo (Skyline Shipping Private Limited) / 2024 General manager of Skyline - provided freight forwarding services to a company, Eluva International Pte Ltd, which shipped prohibited luxury items (i.e., spirits) to the DPRK. 1 count of abetment by intentional aiding to supply designated luxury items under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (3 other similar charges, and 2 charges of abetment by intentional aiding to export prohibited goods to the DPRK under the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations (3 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Fine of SGD 3 500 29 Low Eng Yeow Justin / 1H 2025 Caused ISA Energy (Asia) to effect transfers of monies to Hin Leong Trading Pte Ltd for the purchase of refined petroleum products (RPP), knowing that the transfers would contribute to the transfer of RPP to persons in the DPRK. 3 counts of indirectly transferring financial assets that may contribute to a prohibited activity under the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (6 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Global imprisonment term of 12 months and 3 weeks 30 ISA Energy (Asia) Pte Ltd / 1H 2025 Effected transfers of monies to Hin Leong Trading Pte Ltd for the purchase of RPP, knowing that the transfers would contribute to the transfer of RPP to persons in the DPRK. 3 counts of directly transferring financial assets that may contribute to a prohibited activity the UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations (6 other similar charges were taken into consideration for the purpose of sentencing) Global fine of SGD 280 000 656. Given the very high number of DPRK PF-related STRs filed in Singapore during the assessment period, and the PF-related/proliferation-related prosecutions of 22 natural persons and eight legal persons for involvement in or provision of luxury goods, it is unlikely that there were only funds in one case and no other assets to freeze. Singapore could make better use of financial intelligence and investigative capacity to better identify funds and assets in these cases. 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 657. FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs are required to freeze assets, and transactions related to designated persons or entities are prohibited. When MAS or other supervisors receive specific and credible intelligence via the IMC-EC or RTIG mechanism, or bilaterally from foreign counterparts, MAS will alert the relevant FIs/VASPs and ask them to review and report any relationship with the names cited in the intelligence so as to ascertain: (i) the exposure of and risks to Singapore’s financial system; and (ii) whether there had been any breach of the FSM DPRK Regulations and AML/CFT requirements which FIs/VASPs have to comply with. Footnotes [41] In 2023-24, there were 34 proliferation/PF-related financial intelligence packages related to a wider range of PF-related concerns such as cases involving OFAC and other unilateral sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="144. The strength of Singapore’s AML/CFT/CPF system lies in its robust domestic co-ordination and co-operation on AML/CFT issues at the policy level. Singapore has strong and clear national co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms to develop and implement policies, through the AML/CFT SC, the IAC and RTIG mechanisms, supported by subject matter-specific Inter-Ministry Committees (see Figure 2.1 below). These co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms include representation from all relevant ministries and agencies in Singapore. Figure 1.1. Singapore’s WoG co-ordination structures and collaboration mechanisms within government and with the private sector Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 145. The AML/CFT SC develops and co-ordinates the implementation of Singapore’s AML/CFT/CPF policies. The AML/CFT SC is comprised of the most senior public servants from the MHA (PS), MOF (PS) and the MAS (Managing Director). 146. The IAC is one level below the AML/CFT SC and is co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of MHA and the Deputy Managing Director of MAS. The IAC’s membership comprises all relevant competent authorities for AML/CFT purposes. The IAC provides a forum for agencies to share information such as emerging threats and trends, FATF typologies, best practices and other developments, and makes recommendations to the AML/CFT SC on policy initiatives. 147. Singapore’s RTIG is co-chaired by the Senior Director of MHA and the Executive Director of MAS and is the main working-level body tasked with identifying, assessing and understanding ML/TF risks at the WoG level. RTIG is responsible for the development of Singapore’s NRAs. RTIG meets quarterly, reporting into the AML/CFT SC as needed. 148. In addition to the AML/CFT SC, IAC and RTIG, Singapore has a number of subject matter-specific interministerial committees (IMC). The IAC and RTIG works closely with these committees to ensure a consistent and coherent approach in policy making. Some examples include: · The IMC-TD is the mechanism responsible for proposing terrorist designations under UNSCR 1267/1989, UNSCR 1988, and UNSCR 1373 (see IO.9/10). · The IMC-EC oversees Singapore’s export controls framework, including relevant policy and operational issues relating to the proliferation of WMD and UNSC sanctions (see IO.11). · The IMC-Scams brings together a range of agencies covering law enforcement and regulatory agencies in relation to the financial and telecommunication sectors to work with the private sector partners to co-ordinate efforts to combat CEF, including the threat of ML offences (see IO.7). 149. Agencies interviewed during the onsite were very aware of the various co-ordination mechanisms and actively use them to resolve issues or highlight emerging threats. Agencies reported a collaborative and a ‘One Singapore’ approach in these committees, noting that they can normally resolve policy issues at the working level and only need to deconflict or set out major policy initiatives at the most senior level. There is a regular and clear framework for policy co-ordination and co-operation amongst government departments. This is reflective of Singapore’s WoG approach in AML/CFT and is one of Singapore’s key strengths. 150. Co-operation between MAS, other supervisory authorities, SRBs, and industry associations is key to developing and implementing AML/CFT policies for FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. MAS, SRBs and industry associations have held multiple engagements to discuss risks, policy impacts, and implementation issues. These include sharing common gaps, best practices, and enforcement actions. Topics such as risks, STR expectations, and TFS implementation are regularly addressed. SRBs and industry associations play a key role in raising awareness of identified risks and mitigation measures among their members." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="144. The strength of Singapore’s AML/CFT/CPF system lies in its robust domestic co-ordination and co-operation on AML/CFT issues at the policy level. Singapore has strong and clear national co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms to develop and implement policies, through the AML/CFT SC, the IAC and RTIG mechanisms, supported by subject matter-specific Inter-Ministry Committees (see Figure 2.1 below). These co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms include representation from all relevant ministries and agencies in Singapore. Figure 1.1. Singapore’s WoG co-ordination structures and collaboration mechanisms within government and with the private sector Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 145. The AML/CFT SC develops and co-ordinates the implementation of Singapore’s AML/CFT/CPF policies. The AML/CFT SC is comprised of the most senior public servants from the MHA (PS), MOF (PS) and the MAS (Managing Director). 146. The IAC is one level below the AML/CFT SC and is co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of MHA and the Deputy Managing Director of MAS. The IAC’s membership comprises all relevant competent authorities for AML/CFT purposes. The IAC provides a forum for agencies to share information such as emerging threats and trends, FATF typologies, best practices and other developments, and makes recommendations to the AML/CFT SC on policy initiatives. 147. Singapore’s RTIG is co-chaired by the Senior Director of MHA and the Executive Director of MAS and is the main working-level body tasked with identifying, assessing and understanding ML/TF risks at the WoG level. RTIG is responsible for the development of Singapore’s NRAs. RTIG meets quarterly, reporting into the AML/CFT SC as needed. 148. In addition to the AML/CFT SC, IAC and RTIG, Singapore has a number of subject matter-specific interministerial committees (IMC). The IAC and RTIG works closely with these committees to ensure a consistent and coherent approach in policy making. Some examples include: · The IMC-TD is the mechanism responsible for proposing terrorist designations under UNSCR 1267/1989, UNSCR 1988, and UNSCR 1373 (see IO.9/10). · The IMC-EC oversees Singapore’s export controls framework, including relevant policy and operational issues relating to the proliferation of WMD and UNSC sanctions (see IO.11). · The IMC-Scams brings together a range of agencies covering law enforcement and regulatory agencies in relation to the financial and telecommunication sectors to work with the private sector partners to co-ordinate efforts to combat CEF, including the threat of ML offences (see IO.7). 149. Agencies interviewed during the onsite were very aware of the various co-ordination mechanisms and actively use them to resolve issues or highlight emerging threats. Agencies reported a collaborative and a ‘One Singapore’ approach in these committees, noting that they can normally resolve policy issues at the working level and only need to deconflict or set out major policy initiatives at the most senior level. There is a regular and clear framework for policy co-ordination and co-operation amongst government departments. This is reflective of Singapore’s WoG approach in AML/CFT and is one of Singapore’s key strengths. 150. Co-operation between MAS, other supervisory authorities, SRBs, and industry associations is key to developing and implementing AML/CFT policies for FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs. MAS, SRBs and industry associations have held multiple engagements to discuss risks, policy impacts, and implementation issues. These include sharing common gaps, best practices, and enforcement actions. Topics such as risks, STR expectations, and TFS implementation are regularly addressed. SRBs and industry associations play a key role in raising awareness of identified risks and mitigation measures among their members." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="257. MAS implements an AML/CFT supervisory approach which selects and scopes supervisory activities based on three components (i) FIRA (i.e. inherent risk assessment) and (ii) risk surveillance managed by the AMLD, and (iii) AML/CFT controls managed by the nine supervisory departments and AMLD as part of their daily prudential supervision. These three components each have positive characteristics that contribute to conducting supervision on a risk-basis, but risk insights from these three components are not systematically consolidated into an integrated risk assessment on individual entities (see Section 3.2), which limits Singapore’s ability to implement a risk-based approach to supervision. 258. Under the FIRA component (see Section 3.2 above), AMLD buckets each sector into one of four risk tiers in line with the ML/TF risk that sector was deemed to pose by the NRA (see Table 3.2 below). Within each sector, each individual FI or VASP is placed on an inherent risk spectrum from ‘high’ to ‘medium-high’ to ‘medium-low’ to ‘low’ risk based on their responses to the FIRA questionnaire and MAS’ internal information. FIRA has some weaknesses if used as a stand-alone risk assessment tool, as it only focuses on inherent risks. Based on their placement in the inherent risk spectrum, institutions receive a full scope supervisory activity on a cycle intended to be commensurate with their inherent ML/TF risk. FIs under Tier 3 and Tier 4 sectors are not subject to cycle-based supervisory activities. Table 3.2. FIRA-driven Supervisory Approach Risk Tier Sector Supervisory Approach Tier 1 – High Risk Banks High risk institutions examined every 3-4 years and medium-high institutions every 5-6 years Other institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Tier 2 – Medium-High Risk DPTSPs High and medium-high risk DPTSPs and PSPs examined every 1-5 years High-risk EAMs examined every 4-6 years and medium-high every 6-8 years Other institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. PSPs with CBMT services EAMs Tier 3 – Medium-Low Risk Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) All institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Money changers PSPs without CBMT services Broker dealers Tier 4 – Low Risk Corporate finance advisers All institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Approved Trustees Direct life insurance companies Securities depository Financial advisers Finance companies 259. The FIRA component of MAS’ supervisory approach is inconsistent with the risks identified. For instance, the DPTSPs and PSPs with CBMT sectors, which are both Tier 2 sectors, are identified to be examined more frequently than banks, the only Tier 1 risk sector. MAS explained the increased frequency for the two sectors were due to (i) recency and unfamiliarity of regulatory scheme; (ii) variety in business model across the sector; and (iii) high TF risk posed by PSPs with CBMT services. While these explanations are logical, this highlights a flaw in the baseline risk model, where the basis for cycle-based supervisory activities is overridden for other factors rather than building those factors into a holistic risk understanding which underpins the coverage, selection and scoping of supervisory activities. 260. The number of FIRA-driven supervisory activities conducted by AMLD is very limited (73 across all sectors in 2020-24, see Table 3.3 below). This number of supervisory activities is also not in line with FIRA’s recommended supervisory cycle. The FIRA process indicates that high-risk banks are subject to 3-4-year examination cycle, while high and medium-high risk DPTSPs and PSPs with CBMT services should be examined every 1-5 years. In reality, the number of FIRA-driven examinations conducted by MAS is much lower. For instance, for the five-year period from 2020-2024, MAS conducted 17 FIRA-driven examinations on the 19 high-risk banks identified, two FIRA-driven examinations on the seven high-risk DPTSPs and eight FIRA-driven examinations on the 13 high-risk PSPs with CBMT services. The FIRA-driven supervisory cycles are not met in practice. MAS indicated that the supervisory coverage has been complemented by other supervisory activities driven by the other two components, which is factual, but those activities are triggered by specific control issues or risk surveillance findings and are of narrower scope and vary in scope and intensity. Table 3.3. Number of Supervisory Activities Driven by (i) FIRA and (ii) Risk Surveillance by Year Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) Banks (155) Onsite 3 4 3 7 4 0 11 20 7 0 28 31 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DPTSPs (29) Onsite 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs with CBMT services (199) Onsite 2 0 0 0 0 0 21 3 18 3 41 6 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EAMs (197) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) (1023) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Money changers (291) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs without CBMT services (8) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Broker dealers (180) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corporate finance advisers (27) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Approved Trustees (16) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Direct life insurance companies (25) Onsite 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Securities depository (1) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial advisers (70) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Finance companies (3) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 261. The second component driving MAS’ supervisory activities is risk surveillance. AMLD selects and scopes supervisory activities from MAS’ periodic and trigger-based meta-analysis of information including STRs filed by FIs/VASPs, intelligence from domestic and foreign counterparts, whistleblowers and adverse media reports, to detect evolving/emerging risk trends and typologies for targeted supervisory activities. This method is in part reactive, where MAS conducts ‘for cause’ supervisory examinations when they are already aware of a compliance issue from the information they have received, or in response to adverse media reports or supervisory/law enforcement actions taken by foreign counterparts. The approach is also partly proactive, where MAS follows up with supervised FIs/VASPs that exhibit a theme, trend or typology that has been observed in the environment, or control issues which are identified through MAS’ analysis. Over the five-year period from 2020-24, AMLD conducted 51 risk surveillance-driven supervisory activities across all sectors (see Table 3.3 above), again a small number, with the majority focusing on banks and covering some sectors that would otherwise not be subjected to supervisory activities under the FIRA approach. This supervisory approach intends to respond to the emerging or key risks as they develop. Box 3.4. MAS’ Risk Surveillance - DPTSP sector In parallel with the introduction of AML/CFT requirements to DPTSPs in 2020, MAS focused significant surveillance resources on the DPTSP sector. MAS utilised a range of information sources, such as STRs, blockchain analysis tools, commissioning proprietary research and confidential intelligence to derive surveillance insights that have complemented and enhanced DPTSP supervision by (i) detecting unlicensed DPTSPs; and (ii) identifying DPTSPs with potential control weaknesses for earlier supervisory scrutiny. On (i), MAS identified 32 entities to be assessed for listing on the Investor Alert List, with seven referred to law enforcement. On (ii), MAS referred nine licensed DPTSPs for closer scrutiny due to control weaknesses, leading to examinations, supervisory warnings, and mandated remediation. MAS also conducted deeper reviews on 22 notified entities, resulting in actions on 19 entities, including one DPTSP that withdrew its application after failing to meet AML/CFT standards. For example, in April 2023, MAS’ surveillance uncovered that a licensed DPTSP had onboarded three customers despite inconsistent information provided during onboarding and being unable to verify the legitimacy of the customer’s business. In addition, large value and pass-through transactions that occurred in 2020 were only detected by that DPTSP in 2023. These observations helped inform MAS’ inspection of this DPTSP, where the examiners found that the DPTSP’s customer risk assessment framework and ongoing monitoring controls were inadequate. Following the inspection, MAS issued a supervisory warning to the DPTSP; and required it to put in place a remediation plan and appoint an independent auditor to validate the effectiveness of its remediation. Apart from directly sharing probative findings with supervisors and LEAs (law enforcement agencies), MAS also consolidated its insights into a series of thematic surveillance reports issued from 2023 to 2025. 262. Risk surveillance is a good development in MAS’ supervisory programme as it allows MAS to be dynamic and adapt to the risk environment, but MAS could further benefit from the approach if the risk factors considered could be systematically integrated into the other methods to arrive at a comprehensive risk understanding on institutional level to select and scope supervisory activities. 263. Finally, controls-based supervisory activities are conducted by MAS’ nine supervisory departments and AMLD as part of their daily prudential supervision, and account for the vast majority (92%) of MAS’ supervisory activities (see Table 3.4 below). For some of these activities, MAS’ supervisory departments place a great reliance on the review of annual independent external audit and biannual internal audit reports. MAS reviews of external and internal audit reports are conducted for all institutions in all sectors under MAS’ supervision as the baseline to identify any AML/CFT controls deficiencies for follow-up to ensure that any systemic deficiencies are appropriately addressed. MAS conducts controls-based supervisory activities of varying intensity including (i) reviews of findings of external or internal audit reports that had led to supervisory or remedial actions with the institution (offsite); (ii) follow-up with FIs/VASPs to assess AML/CFT/CPF breaches noted from review of STRs and voluntary disclosure by FIs/VASPs (offsite); (iii) physical or virtual meetings with FIs/VASPs on AML/CFT matters (onsite); and (iv) supervisory activities arising from offsite control factor assessments conducted on specific sectors (e.g. LTC and EAM sectors in 2020) and onsite supervisory activities to ascertain the state of controls and raise industry analysis/awareness. Table 3.4. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities by Year Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) Onsite 56 115 77 63 63 374 Offsite 135 352 393 1 068 785 2 733 DPTSPs (29) Onsite 0 6 8 18 18 50 Offsite 5 3 3 0 6 17 PSPs with CBMT services (199) Onsite 18 32 18 39 57 164 Offsite 5 0 4 3 1 13 EAMs (197) Onsite 3 0 3 1 1 8 Offsite 59 2 5 5 10 81 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) (1023) Onsite 0 3 2 1 0 6 Offsite 1 16 1 6 6 30 Money changers (291) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 7 2 1 3 2 15 PSPs without CBMT (8) Onsite 13 26 11 11 9 70 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Broker dealers (180) Onsite 1 2 0 0 4 7 Offsite 36 16 3 10 11 76 Corporate finance advisers (27) Onsite 1 0 1 0 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Approved Trustees (16) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Direct life insurance companies (25) Onsite 1 3 5 7 10 26 Offsite 20 14 65 37 104 240 Securities depository (1) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial advisers (70) Onsite 0 2 0 0 0 2 Offsite 2 0 0 3 4 9 Finance companies (3) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 1 Offsite 1 1 2 2 3 9 264. These controls-based supervisory activities account for almost all of MAS’ supervisory activities. There is a good level of coverage of regulated institutions in terms of frequency. However, they vary in scope and intensity significantly. Some examples of controls-based supervisory activities provided by Singapore were in reference to documentation related to a single account, while others were considering much more full scope compliance obligations and analogous to a classical compliance examination. Controls-based supervisory activities are also focused on controlling and remedying known or suspected deficiencies but not planned with reference to institutional residual ML/TF risks. Singapore provided examples where controls deficiencies were successfully remedied through these controls-based supervisory activities. In addition, examples were also provided where these supervisory activities resulted in remedial measures and sanctions. While Singapore does not track complete statistics of what these activities scoped in or found, Singapore demonstrated the rigour of these activities through case studies. Accordingly, the Assessment Team attributes them some weight given their broad coverage and demonstration of remediations. 265. These three components are brought together through MAS’ annual work planning process. At the end of each year, MAS establishes the annual supervisory workplan for the coming year, guided by baseline cycle examinations informed by inherent risk from the FIRA model and foreseen risk surveillance-driven supervisory activities to address key emerging risks. Controls-based supervisory activities are triggered by and conducted through daily supervision of the nine supervisory departments, and hence there is no planning of such activities. The annual workplan is reviewed and updated on a half-yearly basis to identify FIs/VASPs warranting additional supervisory activities through additional risk surveillance insights and/or escalating compliance issues. The baseline cycle supervisory activities are not met for a number of sectors. MAS is prioritising controls/surveillance-driven activities over FIRA-driven supervisory activities, though MAS indicates that it is well-resourced to implement their annual supervisory plan, both with internal resources and contracted external providers. Table 3.5. Breaches Identified for High and Medium-High Risk Sectors by Year Sector Breach 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks CDD 18 5 5 4 7 BO 4 2 0 0 0 EDD 6 7 3 2 4 Sanctions 6 4 2 3 4 Policy/Training 0 0 0 0 1 Record Keeping 0 0 1 1 0 EWRA 1 0 0 0 1 STR 1 1 0 0 0 DPTSPs CDD 0 0 0 2 0 BO 0 0 0 0 0 EDD 0 0 1 1 0 Sanctions 0 0 0 1 0 Policy/Training 0 0 2 1 0 Record Keeping 0 0 0 0 0 EWRA 0 0 0 1 0 STR 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs with CBMT CDD 0 0 0 0 0 BO 0 0 0 0 0 EDD 0 0 0 0 0 Sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 Policy/Training 0 0 0 0 0 Record Keeping 0 0 0 0 0 EWRA 0 0 0 0 0 STR 0 0 0 0 0 EAMs CDD 2 1 2 1 1 BO 1 1 0 0 0 EDD 5 1 0 2 1 Sanctions 1 0 0 3 0 Policy/Training 1 1 0 3 0 Record Keeping 0 0 1 1 0 EWRA 2 0 0 1 1 STR 1 1 0 0 1 Note: This chart identifies the number of requirements that were breached, not the instances of the breach, so the numbers are understated. 266. Overall, MAS undertakes a range of supervisory activities of varying intensity and scope across its three components. The number of FIRA-based supervisory activities, as the most intensive and widest scoped supervisory activities, is limited, and the planned cycles are not met. Risk surveillance allows MAS to be dynamic and adapt to emerging threats, but the number of these targeted scope supervisory activities is equally limited. The controls-based component compensates for the frequency of supervisory activities and is targeted at improving AML/CFT controls where there are known deficiencies but such focus on treating observed deficiencies is not risk-based. While there is limited statistics on the scope and results of the controls-based activities, Singapore has demonstrated the rigour of such activities through case studies. The intensity of supervisory activities overall for particular sectors seems to lack depth as they rarely find breaches (e.g. zero deficiency identified in PSPs with CBMT services during the 224 supervisory activities in 2020-24; but 20 breaches in 1H 2025). Overall, Singapore has the components of an effective programme to mitigate ML/TF risk through supervision; however, these components can be better combined in a more systematised manner to mitigate institutional ML/TF residual risks. 267. Moneylenders assessed to pose higher risk are inspected more frequently than the lower risk entities. During the assessment period, MinLaw carried out 80 examinations on annual basis by checking records on implementation of CDD requirement, sanction screening, risk assessment, training, etc. There was near 100% coverage of annual examinations for high risk and medium-high risk moneylenders, and around 50% coverage for medium and low risk moneylenders. The significant coverage appeared out of proportion to the risk identified in the sector, yet MinLaw advised that the AML/CFT supervisory examinations are conducted as part of its examinations for other prudential requirements for efficient use of supervisory resources. Overall, there is room to align supervision more proportionately with the lower ML/TF risks posed by the sector. Table 3.6. Moneylender Onsite Supervisory Activities by Institutional Risk Level by Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 High (22) 45 8 11 19 22 Medium-High (11) 6 9 12 11 11 Medium (65) 11 31 29 25 26 Low (56) 18 32 28 25 21" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="257. MAS implements an AML/CFT supervisory approach which selects and scopes supervisory activities based on three components (i) FIRA (i.e. inherent risk assessment) and (ii) risk surveillance managed by the AMLD, and (iii) AML/CFT controls managed by the nine supervisory departments and AMLD as part of their daily prudential supervision. These three components each have positive characteristics that contribute to conducting supervision on a risk-basis, but risk insights from these three components are not systematically consolidated into an integrated risk assessment on individual entities (see Section 3.2), which limits Singapore’s ability to implement a risk-based approach to supervision. 258. Under the FIRA component (see Section 3.2 above), AMLD buckets each sector into one of four risk tiers in line with the ML/TF risk that sector was deemed to pose by the NRA (see Table 3.2 below). Within each sector, each individual FI or VASP is placed on an inherent risk spectrum from ‘high’ to ‘medium-high’ to ‘medium-low’ to ‘low’ risk based on their responses to the FIRA questionnaire and MAS’ internal information. FIRA has some weaknesses if used as a stand-alone risk assessment tool, as it only focuses on inherent risks. Based on their placement in the inherent risk spectrum, institutions receive a full scope supervisory activity on a cycle intended to be commensurate with their inherent ML/TF risk. FIs under Tier 3 and Tier 4 sectors are not subject to cycle-based supervisory activities. Table 3.2. FIRA-driven Supervisory Approach Risk Tier Sector Supervisory Approach Tier 1 – High Risk Banks High risk institutions examined every 3-4 years and medium-high institutions every 5-6 years Other institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Tier 2 – Medium-High Risk DPTSPs High and medium-high risk DPTSPs and PSPs examined every 1-5 years High-risk EAMs examined every 4-6 years and medium-high every 6-8 years Other institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. PSPs with CBMT services EAMs Tier 3 – Medium-Low Risk Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) All institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Money changers PSPs without CBMT services Broker dealers Tier 4 – Low Risk Corporate finance advisers All institutions subject to controls-based supervisory engagements and risk surveillance-based examinations. Approved Trustees Direct life insurance companies Securities depository Financial advisers Finance companies 259. The FIRA component of MAS’ supervisory approach is inconsistent with the risks identified. For instance, the DPTSPs and PSPs with CBMT sectors, which are both Tier 2 sectors, are identified to be examined more frequently than banks, the only Tier 1 risk sector. MAS explained the increased frequency for the two sectors were due to (i) recency and unfamiliarity of regulatory scheme; (ii) variety in business model across the sector; and (iii) high TF risk posed by PSPs with CBMT services. While these explanations are logical, this highlights a flaw in the baseline risk model, where the basis for cycle-based supervisory activities is overridden for other factors rather than building those factors into a holistic risk understanding which underpins the coverage, selection and scoping of supervisory activities. 260. The number of FIRA-driven supervisory activities conducted by AMLD is very limited (73 across all sectors in 2020-24, see Table 3.3 below). This number of supervisory activities is also not in line with FIRA’s recommended supervisory cycle. The FIRA process indicates that high-risk banks are subject to 3-4-year examination cycle, while high and medium-high risk DPTSPs and PSPs with CBMT services should be examined every 1-5 years. In reality, the number of FIRA-driven examinations conducted by MAS is much lower. For instance, for the five-year period from 2020-2024, MAS conducted 17 FIRA-driven examinations on the 19 high-risk banks identified, two FIRA-driven examinations on the seven high-risk DPTSPs and eight FIRA-driven examinations on the 13 high-risk PSPs with CBMT services. The FIRA-driven supervisory cycles are not met in practice. MAS indicated that the supervisory coverage has been complemented by other supervisory activities driven by the other two components, which is factual, but those activities are triggered by specific control issues or risk surveillance findings and are of narrower scope and vary in scope and intensity. Table 3.3. Number of Supervisory Activities Driven by (i) FIRA and (ii) Risk Surveillance by Year Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii) Banks (155) Onsite 3 4 3 7 4 0 11 20 7 0 28 31 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DPTSPs (29) Onsite 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs with CBMT services (199) Onsite 2 0 0 0 0 0 21 3 18 3 41 6 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EAMs (197) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) (1023) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Money changers (291) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs without CBMT services (8) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Broker dealers (180) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corporate finance advisers (27) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Approved Trustees (16) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Direct life insurance companies (25) Onsite 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Securities depository (1) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial advisers (70) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Finance companies (3) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 261. The second component driving MAS’ supervisory activities is risk surveillance. AMLD selects and scopes supervisory activities from MAS’ periodic and trigger-based meta-analysis of information including STRs filed by FIs/VASPs, intelligence from domestic and foreign counterparts, whistleblowers and adverse media reports, to detect evolving/emerging risk trends and typologies for targeted supervisory activities. This method is in part reactive, where MAS conducts ‘for cause’ supervisory examinations when they are already aware of a compliance issue from the information they have received, or in response to adverse media reports or supervisory/law enforcement actions taken by foreign counterparts. The approach is also partly proactive, where MAS follows up with supervised FIs/VASPs that exhibit a theme, trend or typology that has been observed in the environment, or control issues which are identified through MAS’ analysis. Over the five-year period from 2020-24, AMLD conducted 51 risk surveillance-driven supervisory activities across all sectors (see Table 3.3 above), again a small number, with the majority focusing on banks and covering some sectors that would otherwise not be subjected to supervisory activities under the FIRA approach. This supervisory approach intends to respond to the emerging or key risks as they develop. Box 3.4. MAS’ Risk Surveillance - DPTSP sector In parallel with the introduction of AML/CFT requirements to DPTSPs in 2020, MAS focused significant surveillance resources on the DPTSP sector. MAS utilised a range of information sources, such as STRs, blockchain analysis tools, commissioning proprietary research and confidential intelligence to derive surveillance insights that have complemented and enhanced DPTSP supervision by (i) detecting unlicensed DPTSPs; and (ii) identifying DPTSPs with potential control weaknesses for earlier supervisory scrutiny. On (i), MAS identified 32 entities to be assessed for listing on the Investor Alert List, with seven referred to law enforcement. On (ii), MAS referred nine licensed DPTSPs for closer scrutiny due to control weaknesses, leading to examinations, supervisory warnings, and mandated remediation. MAS also conducted deeper reviews on 22 notified entities, resulting in actions on 19 entities, including one DPTSP that withdrew its application after failing to meet AML/CFT standards. For example, in April 2023, MAS’ surveillance uncovered that a licensed DPTSP had onboarded three customers despite inconsistent information provided during onboarding and being unable to verify the legitimacy of the customer’s business. In addition, large value and pass-through transactions that occurred in 2020 were only detected by that DPTSP in 2023. These observations helped inform MAS’ inspection of this DPTSP, where the examiners found that the DPTSP’s customer risk assessment framework and ongoing monitoring controls were inadequate. Following the inspection, MAS issued a supervisory warning to the DPTSP; and required it to put in place a remediation plan and appoint an independent auditor to validate the effectiveness of its remediation. Apart from directly sharing probative findings with supervisors and LEAs (law enforcement agencies), MAS also consolidated its insights into a series of thematic surveillance reports issued from 2023 to 2025. 262. Risk surveillance is a good development in MAS’ supervisory programme as it allows MAS to be dynamic and adapt to the risk environment, but MAS could further benefit from the approach if the risk factors considered could be systematically integrated into the other methods to arrive at a comprehensive risk understanding on institutional level to select and scope supervisory activities. 263. Finally, controls-based supervisory activities are conducted by MAS’ nine supervisory departments and AMLD as part of their daily prudential supervision, and account for the vast majority (92%) of MAS’ supervisory activities (see Table 3.4 below). For some of these activities, MAS’ supervisory departments place a great reliance on the review of annual independent external audit and biannual internal audit reports. MAS reviews of external and internal audit reports are conducted for all institutions in all sectors under MAS’ supervision as the baseline to identify any AML/CFT controls deficiencies for follow-up to ensure that any systemic deficiencies are appropriately addressed. MAS conducts controls-based supervisory activities of varying intensity including (i) reviews of findings of external or internal audit reports that had led to supervisory or remedial actions with the institution (offsite); (ii) follow-up with FIs/VASPs to assess AML/CFT/CPF breaches noted from review of STRs and voluntary disclosure by FIs/VASPs (offsite); (iii) physical or virtual meetings with FIs/VASPs on AML/CFT matters (onsite); and (iv) supervisory activities arising from offsite control factor assessments conducted on specific sectors (e.g. LTC and EAM sectors in 2020) and onsite supervisory activities to ascertain the state of controls and raise industry analysis/awareness. Table 3.4. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities by Year Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) Onsite 56 115 77 63 63 374 Offsite 135 352 393 1 068 785 2 733 DPTSPs (29) Onsite 0 6 8 18 18 50 Offsite 5 3 3 0 6 17 PSPs with CBMT services (199) Onsite 18 32 18 39 57 164 Offsite 5 0 4 3 1 13 EAMs (197) Onsite 3 0 3 1 1 8 Offsite 59 2 5 5 10 81 Fund management companies (excluding EAMs) (1023) Onsite 0 3 2 1 0 6 Offsite 1 16 1 6 6 30 Money changers (291) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 7 2 1 3 2 15 PSPs without CBMT (8) Onsite 13 26 11 11 9 70 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Broker dealers (180) Onsite 1 2 0 0 4 7 Offsite 36 16 3 10 11 76 Corporate finance advisers (27) Onsite 1 0 1 0 0 2 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Approved Trustees (16) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Direct life insurance companies (25) Onsite 1 3 5 7 10 26 Offsite 20 14 65 37 104 240 Securities depository (1) Onsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial advisers (70) Onsite 0 2 0 0 0 2 Offsite 2 0 0 3 4 9 Finance companies (3) Onsite 0 1 0 0 0 1 Offsite 1 1 2 2 3 9 264. These controls-based supervisory activities account for almost all of MAS’ supervisory activities. There is a good level of coverage of regulated institutions in terms of frequency. However, they vary in scope and intensity significantly. Some examples of controls-based supervisory activities provided by Singapore were in reference to documentation related to a single account, while others were considering much more full scope compliance obligations and analogous to a classical compliance examination. Controls-based supervisory activities are also focused on controlling and remedying known or suspected deficiencies but not planned with reference to institutional residual ML/TF risks. Singapore provided examples where controls deficiencies were successfully remedied through these controls-based supervisory activities. In addition, examples were also provided where these supervisory activities resulted in remedial measures and sanctions. While Singapore does not track complete statistics of what these activities scoped in or found, Singapore demonstrated the rigour of these activities through case studies. Accordingly, the Assessment Team attributes them some weight given their broad coverage and demonstration of remediations. 265. These three components are brought together through MAS’ annual work planning process. At the end of each year, MAS establishes the annual supervisory workplan for the coming year, guided by baseline cycle examinations informed by inherent risk from the FIRA model and foreseen risk surveillance-driven supervisory activities to address key emerging risks. Controls-based supervisory activities are triggered by and conducted through daily supervision of the nine supervisory departments, and hence there is no planning of such activities. The annual workplan is reviewed and updated on a half-yearly basis to identify FIs/VASPs warranting additional supervisory activities through additional risk surveillance insights and/or escalating compliance issues. The baseline cycle supervisory activities are not met for a number of sectors. MAS is prioritising controls/surveillance-driven activities over FIRA-driven supervisory activities, though MAS indicates that it is well-resourced to implement their annual supervisory plan, both with internal resources and contracted external providers. Table 3.5. Breaches Identified for High and Medium-High Risk Sectors by Year Sector Breach 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks CDD 18 5 5 4 7 BO 4 2 0 0 0 EDD 6 7 3 2 4 Sanctions 6 4 2 3 4 Policy/Training 0 0 0 0 1 Record Keeping 0 0 1 1 0 EWRA 1 0 0 0 1 STR 1 1 0 0 0 DPTSPs CDD 0 0 0 2 0 BO 0 0 0 0 0 EDD 0 0 1 1 0 Sanctions 0 0 0 1 0 Policy/Training 0 0 2 1 0 Record Keeping 0 0 0 0 0 EWRA 0 0 0 1 0 STR 0 0 0 0 0 PSPs with CBMT CDD 0 0 0 0 0 BO 0 0 0 0 0 EDD 0 0 0 0 0 Sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 Policy/Training 0 0 0 0 0 Record Keeping 0 0 0 0 0 EWRA 0 0 0 0 0 STR 0 0 0 0 0 EAMs CDD 2 1 2 1 1 BO 1 1 0 0 0 EDD 5 1 0 2 1 Sanctions 1 0 0 3 0 Policy/Training 1 1 0 3 0 Record Keeping 0 0 1 1 0 EWRA 2 0 0 1 1 STR 1 1 0 0 1 Note: This chart identifies the number of requirements that were breached, not the instances of the breach, so the numbers are understated. 266. Overall, MAS undertakes a range of supervisory activities of varying intensity and scope across its three components. The number of FIRA-based supervisory activities, as the most intensive and widest scoped supervisory activities, is limited, and the planned cycles are not met. Risk surveillance allows MAS to be dynamic and adapt to emerging threats, but the number of these targeted scope supervisory activities is equally limited. The controls-based component compensates for the frequency of supervisory activities and is targeted at improving AML/CFT controls where there are known deficiencies but such focus on treating observed deficiencies is not risk-based. While there is limited statistics on the scope and results of the controls-based activities, Singapore has demonstrated the rigour of such activities through case studies. The intensity of supervisory activities overall for particular sectors seems to lack depth as they rarely find breaches (e.g. zero deficiency identified in PSPs with CBMT services during the 224 supervisory activities in 2020-24; but 20 breaches in 1H 2025). Overall, Singapore has the components of an effective programme to mitigate ML/TF risk through supervision; however, these components can be better combined in a more systematised manner to mitigate institutional ML/TF residual risks. 267. Moneylenders assessed to pose higher risk are inspected more frequently than the lower risk entities. During the assessment period, MinLaw carried out 80 examinations on annual basis by checking records on implementation of CDD requirement, sanction screening, risk assessment, training, etc. There was near 100% coverage of annual examinations for high risk and medium-high risk moneylenders, and around 50% coverage for medium and low risk moneylenders. The significant coverage appeared out of proportion to the risk identified in the sector, yet MinLaw advised that the AML/CFT supervisory examinations are conducted as part of its examinations for other prudential requirements for efficient use of supervisory resources. Overall, there is room to align supervision more proportionately with the lower ML/TF risks posed by the sector. Table 3.6. Moneylender Onsite Supervisory Activities by Institutional Risk Level by Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 High (22) 45 8 11 19 22 Medium-High (11) 6 9 12 11 11 Medium (65) 11 31 29 25 26 Low (56) 18 32 28 25 21" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="323. The supervisory framework for DNFBPs varies in terms of maturity, with some sectors (e.g. casinos, LTCs) subject to long-established supervisory framework, and some sectors having been brought into AML/CFT regime more recently. All DNFBP supervisors have put in place frameworks to implement risk-based supervision, with a varying levels of sophistication and levels of coverage and intensity. Table 4.3. Number of Onsite and Offsite Supervisory Activities in Each DNFBP Sector by Year Sector (No. of entities) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total LTCs (65) Onsite 5 2 1 1 2 11 Offsite 39 6 1 6 7 59 CSPs (2 883) Onsite 109 379 367 300 417 1572 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Accountants (4 347) / PAEs (713) Onsite 32 55 14 10 20 131 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSMDs (1 967) Onsite 218 136 209 241 191 995 Offsite 5 46 50 19 10 130 Pawnbrokers (241) Onsite 61 60 78 60 60 319 Offsite 1 3 2 3 8 17 Lawyers (7 400)/ LPEs (1161) [28] Onsite 50 50 50 52 0 202 Offsite 0 0 0 0 26 26 Casinos (2) Onsite 26 24 24 26 20 120 Offsite 3 2 3 2 5 15 EAs/ RESs (1 135) Onsite 12 0 0 2 14 28 Offsite 0 24 0 0 10 34 Developers (208) Onsite NA NA NA NA 9 9 Offsite NA NA NA NA 0 0 324. LTCs are regulated as FIs and subject to the MAS’ supervisory approach comprising three components: (i) FIRA (i.e. inherent risk assessment) and (ii) risk surveillance managed by the AMLD, and (iii) AML/CFT controls managed primarily by the nine supervisory departments as part of their daily prudential supervision (please refer to Section 3.5 for detailed description and assessment on the different components of the approach). LTCs are considered as a Tier 2 (medium-high risk) sector, with high risk LTCs being subjected to a four-to-six-year baseline supervisory examination cycle; and medium high risk LTCs are subject to a six-to-eight-year baseline examination supervisory cycle. On top of baseline supervisory cycles, insights from ongoing controls assessment and risk surveillance, allows supervisors to mobilise resources to address key and emerging ML/TF risks. These supervisory activities are not planned considering institutional level residual ML/TF risks, which is of particular importance given LTCs’ gatekeeper role for legal arrangements. 325. Supervisory coverage for LTCs is limited for FIRA and risk surveillance supervisory activities, but there is much broader coverage of controls-based supervisory activities. There are 65 LTCs in Singapore and from 2020-2024, MAS has conducted 70 supervisory activities, which covers 100% of high risk and 80% of medium high-risk LTCs. As identified in IO.3, there is a good level of coverage for these controls-based activities, in terms of frequency. However, they vary in scope and intensity significantly and Singapore does not track complete statistics of their scope and/or findings to develop an understanding of the effect that supervisors are having on their supervised population. Together, these supervisory activities have identified 21 breaches in LTCs, resulting in eight remedial actions and sanctions, and appointment of independent parties to closely monitor the completion of remediation in four LTCs. 326. For CSPs, ACRA similarly adopts a multi-prong approach to supervision of CSP sector. ACRA regularly assesses risk profile of individual CSPs and subjects high-risk and medium-high risk CSPs to two-year and three-year examination cycles respectively. The CSP’s risk rating evolves continuously and can change in view of trigger events including intelligence reports or adverse media coverage, as well as review and inspection outcomes. In line with this approach, all high risk CSPs and medium high risk CSPs were examined over the course of 2023 and 2024. Since 2023, on top of the fixed cycle approach, ACRA has also introduced the risk surveillance approach to conduct focused or thematic examinations, as well as examinations to address key concerns or allegations of AML/CFT lapses. Findings from examinations are fed into the risk rating of inspected CSPs and the examination cycle would be adjusted accordingly. Where deficiencies are identified, CSPs are required to prepare and submit a detailed remediation plan demonstrating the steps taken to address them, along with evidence of rectification within two months of receiving the inspection outcome. Of the 1 572 examinations conducted by ACRA on 2 883 CSPs over the past five years, 72 CSPs were selected for follow-up examinations. These examinations have identified 69 breaches in CSPs, resulting in 46 remedial actions and sanctions. This approach is appropriate given the importance of CSPs to the creation of legal persons in Singapore. 327. For accountants, ACRA conducted wide examination coverage in earlier years to obtain a broader understanding of the level of compliance across the sector. Since 2020, ACRA moved towards a risk-based supervisory approach, focusing examinations on higher-risk accountants based on factors such as services offered, client profiles, and jurisdictional risks. The risk assessment was refreshed in 2023. High-risk accountants are inspected every two years, while medium-high risk ones follow a three-year cycle, with additional examinations triggered by complaints, adverse media, or intelligence from LEAs. ACRA conducts ongoing risk profiling through regular surveys and ISCA complements with compliance monitoring and follow-up remediation. ACRA did not identify any breach warranting sanctions in its 131 examinations of 713 PAEs. 328. There could be a potential issue with double supervisory coverage, where a single person or entity provides different services covered by FATF Recommendations (e.g. around 45% and 15% of CSPs are also practicing as accountants and lawyers) and therefore falls under the regulation and supervision regime of different DNFBP supervisors (or separate teams of the same supervisor). Indeed, ACRA provided a case of PAE being selected for follow up inspection in respect of the work in the capacity of a CSP. However, relevant authorities are committed to co-ordinate examinations on institutions that perform multiple roles and have in place a discussion arrangement to avoid duplication and an overly burdensome approach to these people/entities. MinLaw and ACRA also share supervisory findings, e.g., examination reports for CSPs inspected by ACRA that are also LPEs. 329. MinLaw adopts a risk-based supervisory approach for PSMDs, using semi-annual data submissions and analytics to classify entities into risk tiers and prioritise oversight accordingly. High-risk PSMDs are examined at least once every three years, with medium-high and medium-low risk entities inspected every four to eight years. Supervision includes supervisory engagement, off-site monitoring of returns and CTRs, and targeted examinations triggered by intelligence, adverse news, or suspicious transaction reports. Examinations assess compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations, and PSMDs must submit remediation plans for any deficiencies, which are verified through follow-up examinations. From 2020 to 2024, MinLaw has conducted 1125 examinations on 1967 PSMDs, covering all 207 high risk and 611 medium-high risk PSMDs, while maintaining a coverage rate of 18.5% on medium-low risk and 13.2% on low-risk entities. Examinations were also triggered by risk insights received from FIU (see Box 4.3). These examinations have identified 760 breaches among PSMDs, together with sanctions taken due to tip-offs and other sources, resulted in 1114 remedial actions and sanctions, amongst which 308 supervisory reminders and 117 advisories were issued due to a one-off review in 2023. Box 4.3. Follow-up on PSMD-related intelligence received from FIU In 2020, as part of the PSMD Workgroup under the RTIG, STRO conducted a comprehensive analysis on the PSMD sector. STRO reviewed STRs filed on high risk PSMDs and over 7 000 CTRs filed by the PSMDs and identified a number of red flags. STRO provided its findings to MinLaw, which then initiated examinations on 10 PSMDs to assess their compliance with the requirements under the PSPM Act and PSPM (PMLTF) Regulations. With information obtained from its examinations and received from STRO, MinLaw successfully identified instances where some registered dealers failed to file CTRs or failed to comply with CDD/ECDD requirements. The examinations resulted in multiple sanctions, including composition penalties totalling over SGD 250 000 (USD 185 000), stern warnings, and cancellation of registrations for several PSMDs due to failures in conducting CDD/ECDD, filing accurate CTRs, and other regulatory breaches. The examinations also uncovered potential offences where dealers are suspected to be operating a GST Missing Trader Fraud (MTF) using precious metals. The information was further analysed by STRO and MinLaw and subsequently referred to IRAS for follow-up. This referral has led to IRAS focusing on MTF involving precious metals and the issuance of IRAS’ guidance on MTF typology in the PSMD sector which was shared with the PSMDs in September 2023. 330. MinLaw adopts a similar supervision approach for pawnbrokers, but there is not a fixed examination cycle applicable to the sector. MinLaw conducts around 60 examinations each year covering entities under all four risk categories, but in general with a higher coverage on high and medium high-risk entities. The 336 examinations on 241 pawnbrokers have identified three breaches among pawnbrokers, together with sanctions taken due to tip-offs and other sources, resulted in 29 remedial actions and sanctions. 331. Prior to 2024, LawSoc supervised lawyers and LPEs, categorising them into four risk clusters based on factors such as client profiles, transaction types, STR history, training records, and intelligence from LEAs, and higher-risk entities were prioritised for examinations with a fixed budget of 50 examinations per year. MinLaw has taken over the supervision for LPEs in 2024, conducting 24 offsite examinations on entities involved in the 3B$ case. As explained above, MinLaw did not provide any risk-based supervisory methodology at the time of onsite visit. MinLaw subsequently provided its supervisory framework and inspection plan approved in early 2025 and used to guide the examinations on LPEs from April to June 2025 and advised that it is refining the plan. From 2020 to 2024, 228 examinations on 1161 LPEs by MinLaw/LawSoc have identified 27 breaches among lawyers/LPEs, which did not result in sanctions within the period. 26 of the breaches identified were related to lawyers/LPEs implicated in the 3B$ case, for which sanctions were taken in July 2025. 332. GRA has applied stringent supervision against casinos. Given the limited number of operators and their similar risk exposure and clientele, GRA applies a consistent and rigorous supervisory approach to both casino operators in Singapore. It uses a mix of on-site and off-site tools, including examinations, review of internal audit reports and data submissions, with focused examinations conducted within each three-year license cycle. From 2020 to 2024, GRA has conducted 16 examinations against two casinos covering themes including CDD, ongoing monitoring, STR reporting, etc. Following each examination, GRA will issue a report highlighting instances of deficiencies with the regulatory requirements or areas of weakness and recommending areas for improvement. GRA does not maintain a dedicated team solely for AML/CFT supervision, however indicated they have relevant capacity and there is no issue with resources. 333. CEA adopted a risk-based supervision methodology in 2023. From 2020 to 2022, examinations by CEA were not planned under a risk-based approach. CEA used a simple methodology based on the number of RESs engaged by the estate agent to determine risk ratings, under which no estate agents were identified as high risk before 2023, and most examinations were focused on lower risk entities. There was a pause of examinations during 2022 to 2023 for reviewing and revising its risk-based supervision framework, and since 2024 has followed a risk-based approach, where the majority of examinations (75%) focused on high-risk entities. CEA now applies a cycle based supervisory approach aiming to cover high risk entities on yearly basis, medium high-risk entities every 3 years, while remaining coverage against other lower risk entities. CEA employs various supervisory tools including routine supervision, off-site monitoring, and on-site examinations. The supervisory frequency and intensity is largely in line with risk ratings. From 2020-24, 62 examinations on 1135 EAs/RESs by CEA have identified 153 breaches in EA/RESs, resulting in 140 remedial actions. 334. URA’s supervision against real estate developers began in 2024. In 1H2025, URA completed examinations against all eight high risk entities and one medium-high risk entity (out of 208 entities in the industry), which did not identify any breaches for remedial actions. Given the relatively recent implementation of the regime, there remains room for improvement in their understanding of risk and application of the risk-based approach, particularly in assessing the risks of regulated entities and planning supervisory activities commensurate to the identified risk. During the supervisory checks, property purchases by foreigners, foreign legal entities and trusts, as well as purchases made via intermediary agents will be selected for scrutiny to ensure that the developers perform the necessary due diligence. 335. Overall, all DNFBP supervisors implement risk-based supervision to ensure DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements to varying degrees. Under Singapore’s centralised mechanism for resources allocation by MoF, individual agencies will review if their current resources are sufficient to implement risk mitigation measures and to conduct supervisory activities. If additional resources are required, agencies can submit applications for additional resources to MOF. SC/IAC’s provided guidance for higher risk DNFBP sectors (except LTCs which is subject to MAS’ approach) to achieve good supervisory coverage (around 90%) for high risk entities and adequate coverage (around 70%) for medium-high risk entities over a period of 2 to 4 years. At the supervisor level, the risk-based approaches adopted by respective DNFBP supervisors could be more consistent across sectors. Some lower risk sectors (e.g. pawnbrokers) are subject to more intense supervision than some higher risk sectors (e.g. LTCs, EAs/RESs etc.). This more intense coverage for the lower risk sectors is in part due to the fact that supervisors leverage on their resources and range of supervisory activities which serve a broader regulatory remit to include checks on compliance with AML/CFT requirements. When supervisory activities are conducted, supervisors implement a reasonable quality of supervision, but the consistency of application and resources attributed across sectors could be further improved. Footnotes [28] Lawyers are covered during LPE examinations as lawyers can only practise through LPEs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="323. The supervisory framework for DNFBPs varies in terms of maturity, with some sectors (e.g. casinos, LTCs) subject to long-established supervisory framework, and some sectors having been brought into AML/CFT regime more recently. All DNFBP supervisors have put in place frameworks to implement risk-based supervision, with a varying levels of sophistication and levels of coverage and intensity. Table 4.3. Number of Onsite and Offsite Supervisory Activities in Each DNFBP Sector by Year Sector (No. of entities) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total LTCs (65) Onsite 5 2 1 1 2 11 Offsite 39 6 1 6 7 59 CSPs (2 883) Onsite 109 379 367 300 417 1572 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 Accountants (4 347) / PAEs (713) Onsite 32 55 14 10 20 131 Offsite 0 0 0 0 0 0 PSMDs (1 967) Onsite 218 136 209 241 191 995 Offsite 5 46 50 19 10 130 Pawnbrokers (241) Onsite 61 60 78 60 60 319 Offsite 1 3 2 3 8 17 Lawyers (7 400)/ LPEs (1161) [28] Onsite 50 50 50 52 0 202 Offsite 0 0 0 0 26 26 Casinos (2) Onsite 26 24 24 26 20 120 Offsite 3 2 3 2 5 15 EAs/ RESs (1 135) Onsite 12 0 0 2 14 28 Offsite 0 24 0 0 10 34 Developers (208) Onsite NA NA NA NA 9 9 Offsite NA NA NA NA 0 0 324. LTCs are regulated as FIs and subject to the MAS’ supervisory approach comprising three components: (i) FIRA (i.e. inherent risk assessment) and (ii) risk surveillance managed by the AMLD, and (iii) AML/CFT controls managed primarily by the nine supervisory departments as part of their daily prudential supervision (please refer to Section 3.5 for detailed description and assessment on the different components of the approach). LTCs are considered as a Tier 2 (medium-high risk) sector, with high risk LTCs being subjected to a four-to-six-year baseline supervisory examination cycle; and medium high risk LTCs are subject to a six-to-eight-year baseline examination supervisory cycle. On top of baseline supervisory cycles, insights from ongoing controls assessment and risk surveillance, allows supervisors to mobilise resources to address key and emerging ML/TF risks. These supervisory activities are not planned considering institutional level residual ML/TF risks, which is of particular importance given LTCs’ gatekeeper role for legal arrangements. 325. Supervisory coverage for LTCs is limited for FIRA and risk surveillance supervisory activities, but there is much broader coverage of controls-based supervisory activities. There are 65 LTCs in Singapore and from 2020-2024, MAS has conducted 70 supervisory activities, which covers 100% of high risk and 80% of medium high-risk LTCs. As identified in IO.3, there is a good level of coverage for these controls-based activities, in terms of frequency. However, they vary in scope and intensity significantly and Singapore does not track complete statistics of their scope and/or findings to develop an understanding of the effect that supervisors are having on their supervised population. Together, these supervisory activities have identified 21 breaches in LTCs, resulting in eight remedial actions and sanctions, and appointment of independent parties to closely monitor the completion of remediation in four LTCs. 326. For CSPs, ACRA similarly adopts a multi-prong approach to supervision of CSP sector. ACRA regularly assesses risk profile of individual CSPs and subjects high-risk and medium-high risk CSPs to two-year and three-year examination cycles respectively. The CSP’s risk rating evolves continuously and can change in view of trigger events including intelligence reports or adverse media coverage, as well as review and inspection outcomes. In line with this approach, all high risk CSPs and medium high risk CSPs were examined over the course of 2023 and 2024. Since 2023, on top of the fixed cycle approach, ACRA has also introduced the risk surveillance approach to conduct focused or thematic examinations, as well as examinations to address key concerns or allegations of AML/CFT lapses. Findings from examinations are fed into the risk rating of inspected CSPs and the examination cycle would be adjusted accordingly. Where deficiencies are identified, CSPs are required to prepare and submit a detailed remediation plan demonstrating the steps taken to address them, along with evidence of rectification within two months of receiving the inspection outcome. Of the 1 572 examinations conducted by ACRA on 2 883 CSPs over the past five years, 72 CSPs were selected for follow-up examinations. These examinations have identified 69 breaches in CSPs, resulting in 46 remedial actions and sanctions. This approach is appropriate given the importance of CSPs to the creation of legal persons in Singapore. 327. For accountants, ACRA conducted wide examination coverage in earlier years to obtain a broader understanding of the level of compliance across the sector. Since 2020, ACRA moved towards a risk-based supervisory approach, focusing examinations on higher-risk accountants based on factors such as services offered, client profiles, and jurisdictional risks. The risk assessment was refreshed in 2023. High-risk accountants are inspected every two years, while medium-high risk ones follow a three-year cycle, with additional examinations triggered by complaints, adverse media, or intelligence from LEAs. ACRA conducts ongoing risk profiling through regular surveys and ISCA complements with compliance monitoring and follow-up remediation. ACRA did not identify any breach warranting sanctions in its 131 examinations of 713 PAEs. 328. There could be a potential issue with double supervisory coverage, where a single person or entity provides different services covered by FATF Recommendations (e.g. around 45% and 15% of CSPs are also practicing as accountants and lawyers) and therefore falls under the regulation and supervision regime of different DNFBP supervisors (or separate teams of the same supervisor). Indeed, ACRA provided a case of PAE being selected for follow up inspection in respect of the work in the capacity of a CSP. However, relevant authorities are committed to co-ordinate examinations on institutions that perform multiple roles and have in place a discussion arrangement to avoid duplication and an overly burdensome approach to these people/entities. MinLaw and ACRA also share supervisory findings, e.g., examination reports for CSPs inspected by ACRA that are also LPEs. 329. MinLaw adopts a risk-based supervisory approach for PSMDs, using semi-annual data submissions and analytics to classify entities into risk tiers and prioritise oversight accordingly. High-risk PSMDs are examined at least once every three years, with medium-high and medium-low risk entities inspected every four to eight years. Supervision includes supervisory engagement, off-site monitoring of returns and CTRs, and targeted examinations triggered by intelligence, adverse news, or suspicious transaction reports. Examinations assess compliance with AML/CFT/CPF obligations, and PSMDs must submit remediation plans for any deficiencies, which are verified through follow-up examinations. From 2020 to 2024, MinLaw has conducted 1125 examinations on 1967 PSMDs, covering all 207 high risk and 611 medium-high risk PSMDs, while maintaining a coverage rate of 18.5% on medium-low risk and 13.2% on low-risk entities. Examinations were also triggered by risk insights received from FIU (see Box 4.3). These examinations have identified 760 breaches among PSMDs, together with sanctions taken due to tip-offs and other sources, resulted in 1114 remedial actions and sanctions, amongst which 308 supervisory reminders and 117 advisories were issued due to a one-off review in 2023. Box 4.3. Follow-up on PSMD-related intelligence received from FIU In 2020, as part of the PSMD Workgroup under the RTIG, STRO conducted a comprehensive analysis on the PSMD sector. STRO reviewed STRs filed on high risk PSMDs and over 7 000 CTRs filed by the PSMDs and identified a number of red flags. STRO provided its findings to MinLaw, which then initiated examinations on 10 PSMDs to assess their compliance with the requirements under the PSPM Act and PSPM (PMLTF) Regulations. With information obtained from its examinations and received from STRO, MinLaw successfully identified instances where some registered dealers failed to file CTRs or failed to comply with CDD/ECDD requirements. The examinations resulted in multiple sanctions, including composition penalties totalling over SGD 250 000 (USD 185 000), stern warnings, and cancellation of registrations for several PSMDs due to failures in conducting CDD/ECDD, filing accurate CTRs, and other regulatory breaches. The examinations also uncovered potential offences where dealers are suspected to be operating a GST Missing Trader Fraud (MTF) using precious metals. The information was further analysed by STRO and MinLaw and subsequently referred to IRAS for follow-up. This referral has led to IRAS focusing on MTF involving precious metals and the issuance of IRAS’ guidance on MTF typology in the PSMD sector which was shared with the PSMDs in September 2023. 330. MinLaw adopts a similar supervision approach for pawnbrokers, but there is not a fixed examination cycle applicable to the sector. MinLaw conducts around 60 examinations each year covering entities under all four risk categories, but in general with a higher coverage on high and medium high-risk entities. The 336 examinations on 241 pawnbrokers have identified three breaches among pawnbrokers, together with sanctions taken due to tip-offs and other sources, resulted in 29 remedial actions and sanctions. 331. Prior to 2024, LawSoc supervised lawyers and LPEs, categorising them into four risk clusters based on factors such as client profiles, transaction types, STR history, training records, and intelligence from LEAs, and higher-risk entities were prioritised for examinations with a fixed budget of 50 examinations per year. MinLaw has taken over the supervision for LPEs in 2024, conducting 24 offsite examinations on entities involved in the 3B$ case. As explained above, MinLaw did not provide any risk-based supervisory methodology at the time of onsite visit. MinLaw subsequently provided its supervisory framework and inspection plan approved in early 2025 and used to guide the examinations on LPEs from April to June 2025 and advised that it is refining the plan. From 2020 to 2024, 228 examinations on 1161 LPEs by MinLaw/LawSoc have identified 27 breaches among lawyers/LPEs, which did not result in sanctions within the period. 26 of the breaches identified were related to lawyers/LPEs implicated in the 3B$ case, for which sanctions were taken in July 2025. 332. GRA has applied stringent supervision against casinos. Given the limited number of operators and their similar risk exposure and clientele, GRA applies a consistent and rigorous supervisory approach to both casino operators in Singapore. It uses a mix of on-site and off-site tools, including examinations, review of internal audit reports and data submissions, with focused examinations conducted within each three-year license cycle. From 2020 to 2024, GRA has conducted 16 examinations against two casinos covering themes including CDD, ongoing monitoring, STR reporting, etc. Following each examination, GRA will issue a report highlighting instances of deficiencies with the regulatory requirements or areas of weakness and recommending areas for improvement. GRA does not maintain a dedicated team solely for AML/CFT supervision, however indicated they have relevant capacity and there is no issue with resources. 333. CEA adopted a risk-based supervision methodology in 2023. From 2020 to 2022, examinations by CEA were not planned under a risk-based approach. CEA used a simple methodology based on the number of RESs engaged by the estate agent to determine risk ratings, under which no estate agents were identified as high risk before 2023, and most examinations were focused on lower risk entities. There was a pause of examinations during 2022 to 2023 for reviewing and revising its risk-based supervision framework, and since 2024 has followed a risk-based approach, where the majority of examinations (75%) focused on high-risk entities. CEA now applies a cycle based supervisory approach aiming to cover high risk entities on yearly basis, medium high-risk entities every 3 years, while remaining coverage against other lower risk entities. CEA employs various supervisory tools including routine supervision, off-site monitoring, and on-site examinations. The supervisory frequency and intensity is largely in line with risk ratings. From 2020-24, 62 examinations on 1135 EAs/RESs by CEA have identified 153 breaches in EA/RESs, resulting in 140 remedial actions. 334. URA’s supervision against real estate developers began in 2024. In 1H2025, URA completed examinations against all eight high risk entities and one medium-high risk entity (out of 208 entities in the industry), which did not identify any breaches for remedial actions. Given the relatively recent implementation of the regime, there remains room for improvement in their understanding of risk and application of the risk-based approach, particularly in assessing the risks of regulated entities and planning supervisory activities commensurate to the identified risk. During the supervisory checks, property purchases by foreigners, foreign legal entities and trusts, as well as purchases made via intermediary agents will be selected for scrutiny to ensure that the developers perform the necessary due diligence. 335. Overall, all DNFBP supervisors implement risk-based supervision to ensure DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements to varying degrees. Under Singapore’s centralised mechanism for resources allocation by MoF, individual agencies will review if their current resources are sufficient to implement risk mitigation measures and to conduct supervisory activities. If additional resources are required, agencies can submit applications for additional resources to MOF. SC/IAC’s provided guidance for higher risk DNFBP sectors (except LTCs which is subject to MAS’ approach) to achieve good supervisory coverage (around 90%) for high risk entities and adequate coverage (around 70%) for medium-high risk entities over a period of 2 to 4 years. At the supervisor level, the risk-based approaches adopted by respective DNFBP supervisors could be more consistent across sectors. Some lower risk sectors (e.g. pawnbrokers) are subject to more intense supervision than some higher risk sectors (e.g. LTCs, EAs/RESs etc.). This more intense coverage for the lower risk sectors is in part due to the fact that supervisors leverage on their resources and range of supervisory activities which serve a broader regulatory remit to include checks on compliance with AML/CFT requirements. When supervisory activities are conducted, supervisors implement a reasonable quality of supervision, but the consistency of application and resources attributed across sectors could be further improved. Footnotes [28] Lawyers are covered during LPE examinations as lawyers can only practise through LPEs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="392. ACRA has a robust and automatic enforcement regime for non-compliance with annual report obligations which contain basic information. Enforcement for breaches of BO information requirements is relatively more nascent although penalty caps have recently increased to SGD 25 000 (USD 18 500) per offence. Singapore has shown willingness and ability to enforce against natural persons as well as legal persons. 393. Enforcement in regard to trusts usually against the LTC is negligible when considering the risk and materiality of the sector. From 2019-2024 MAS has taken nine supervisory actions against LTCs; three of these are in relation to breaches of BO obligations. 394. Singapore has progressively increased its enforcement efforts, concentrated on non-compliance with annual returns lodgements. ACRA records showed 70% compliance after the issuance of a fine or commencement of prosecutorial action. The fines imposed are comparatively low in value. More recent enforcement in relation to the RORC involve the pursuit of custodial sentencing to create a more dissuasive environment to criminal non-compliance. There is also a recent increase in the level of penalties applied. Overall enforcement is strongest for non-compliance in annual returns lodgement, and weaker in other areas. Non-compliance with annual report obligations 395. Singapore has demonstrated a comprehensive approach to enforcement for non-compliance relating to basic information obligations. This is done through sanctions for late and non-filing of annual returns. 396. Legal persons that fail to file annual returns (containing basic information) are automatically tracked by ACRA systems. They will be charged an SGD 300-600 (USD 222-444) late filing penalty, and if automated enforcement (prosecution of the criminal offence of non-filing annual return) commenced, an additional composition fine of SGD 500 (USD 370) may be offered, in lieu of prosecution, to errant companies provided it files its annual returns. Companies can be and are prosecuted for a criminal offence of non-filing, and upon conviction by the State Courts, fined between SGD 600-1500 per charge (USD 444-1 110) in addition to the late filing, and additional fine. It is positive that ACRA is systematically pursuing these cases, but the sanctions administered are not dissuasive. Table 5.4. Enforcement actions taken for annual returns non-compliance Enforcement Actions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of cases 425 1 899 3 214 14 432 4 795 Late filing penalties collected SGD 4 662 050 SGD 10 520 855 SGD 10 864 525 SGD 17 726 110 SGD 19 553 940 Composition sum collected SGD 111 900 SGD 366 870 SGD 687 770 SGD 2 686 690 SGD 3 253 060 Number of prosecutions 0 162 270 642 969 397. Approximately 70% of companies ACRA have enforced against for non-compliance of the requirement to file annual returns in 2022-2024 (totalling 22 441 cases), were found to be fully compliant with their subsequent annual return filing obligations as of 31 December 2024. This leaves 30% in continued non-compliance and such companies may be subjected to other sanctions and mitigating measures such as striking off (data provided on occurrence of this does not support a view that this always occurs). However, there still remains approximately one quarter of all legal persons not filing annual returns per year. Directors are disqualified if they have three or more companies struck off by ACRA within a five-year period. Companies are struck off after two years of non-filing of annual returns. Directors are also prosecuted if their companies are not compliant with the requirement to file annual returns. Non-compliance with BO 398. Singapore's approach to enforcement for BO information is much more nascent as it corresponds to the introduction of the central BO register in 2020. In 2024 ACRA commenced prosecutions against 312 companies for the non-filing of BO information. Box 5.2. Enforcement Actions for False Information In 2021, ACRA received information that an Individual’s identity had been misused to be appointed as a nominee director of more than 200 Singapore-incorporated companies. Investigations conducted by ACRA into the CSP revealed that RQI (Natural Person T) had authorised staff of her CSP to lodge with ACRA various incorporations and company documents which falsely appointed the Individual as the director, shareholder and/or beneficial owner of the companies. Investigations also revealed that the companies to which the individual was appointed to without the Individual’s consent or awareness were primarily owned by foreign nationals. As a result of the breaches, ACRA cancelled the registrations of the CSP and its associated RQI in 2021. The companies involved have either been struck off from the Register of Companies or have updated their BO information with ACRA. This case remains in Singapore’s courts after being commenced on 23 May 2023. 399. ACRA has taken stringent action against individuals and CSPs for knowingly filing inaccurate BO information. From 2021 to 2024, the registration of six CSPs has been cancelled by ACRA for knowingly submitting inaccurate BO filings. To date, six individuals have also been prosecuted of which five were convicted and fined with fines ranging from SGD 2400 (USD 1800) to SGD 27 000 (USD 20 000) and disqualified from acting as a director for five years. It is positive that Singapore is pursuing liability against individuals knowingly submitting inaccurate or false BO information; however, this is not yet systematic and there are opportunities to pursue more of such individuals and create a more dissuasive environment against such criminal activity. Table 5.5. Number of enforcement actions taken against FIs, VASP and DNFBPs for failure to collect basic or BO information of customers that are Legal Persons AML/CFT obligated parties 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 FIs 3 2 4 7 - CSPs - 11 2 - 10 PSMDs - 12 4 4 10 REAs 3 1 - 2 1 400. There have been no sanctions applied for reporting obligations of wakafs. 401. Overall, Singapore’s authorities are working to apply sanctions against persons who do not comply with the information requirements and have shown progress over the reporting period. The sanctions implemented, however, are not yet dissuasive as the legislative change to increase sanctions was recent and those sanctions have not yet been systematically applied)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="392. ACRA has a robust and automatic enforcement regime for non-compliance with annual report obligations which contain basic information. Enforcement for breaches of BO information requirements is relatively more nascent although penalty caps have recently increased to SGD 25 000 (USD 18 500) per offence. Singapore has shown willingness and ability to enforce against natural persons as well as legal persons. 393. Enforcement in regard to trusts usually against the LTC is negligible when considering the risk and materiality of the sector. From 2019-2024 MAS has taken nine supervisory actions against LTCs; three of these are in relation to breaches of BO obligations. 394. Singapore has progressively increased its enforcement efforts, concentrated on non-compliance with annual returns lodgements. ACRA records showed 70% compliance after the issuance of a fine or commencement of prosecutorial action. The fines imposed are comparatively low in value. More recent enforcement in relation to the RORC involve the pursuit of custodial sentencing to create a more dissuasive environment to criminal non-compliance. There is also a recent increase in the level of penalties applied. Overall enforcement is strongest for non-compliance in annual returns lodgement, and weaker in other areas. Non-compliance with annual report obligations 395. Singapore has demonstrated a comprehensive approach to enforcement for non-compliance relating to basic information obligations. This is done through sanctions for late and non-filing of annual returns. 396. Legal persons that fail to file annual returns (containing basic information) are automatically tracked by ACRA systems. They will be charged an SGD 300-600 (USD 222-444) late filing penalty, and if automated enforcement (prosecution of the criminal offence of non-filing annual return) commenced, an additional composition fine of SGD 500 (USD 370) may be offered, in lieu of prosecution, to errant companies provided it files its annual returns. Companies can be and are prosecuted for a criminal offence of non-filing, and upon conviction by the State Courts, fined between SGD 600-1500 per charge (USD 444-1 110) in addition to the late filing, and additional fine. It is positive that ACRA is systematically pursuing these cases, but the sanctions administered are not dissuasive. Table 5.4. Enforcement actions taken for annual returns non-compliance Enforcement Actions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of cases 425 1 899 3 214 14 432 4 795 Late filing penalties collected SGD 4 662 050 SGD 10 520 855 SGD 10 864 525 SGD 17 726 110 SGD 19 553 940 Composition sum collected SGD 111 900 SGD 366 870 SGD 687 770 SGD 2 686 690 SGD 3 253 060 Number of prosecutions 0 162 270 642 969 397. Approximately 70% of companies ACRA have enforced against for non-compliance of the requirement to file annual returns in 2022-2024 (totalling 22 441 cases), were found to be fully compliant with their subsequent annual return filing obligations as of 31 December 2024. This leaves 30% in continued non-compliance and such companies may be subjected to other sanctions and mitigating measures such as striking off (data provided on occurrence of this does not support a view that this always occurs). However, there still remains approximately one quarter of all legal persons not filing annual returns per year. Directors are disqualified if they have three or more companies struck off by ACRA within a five-year period. Companies are struck off after two years of non-filing of annual returns. Directors are also prosecuted if their companies are not compliant with the requirement to file annual returns. Non-compliance with BO 398. Singapore's approach to enforcement for BO information is much more nascent as it corresponds to the introduction of the central BO register in 2020. In 2024 ACRA commenced prosecutions against 312 companies for the non-filing of BO information. Box 5.2. Enforcement Actions for False Information In 2021, ACRA received information that an Individual’s identity had been misused to be appointed as a nominee director of more than 200 Singapore-incorporated companies. Investigations conducted by ACRA into the CSP revealed that RQI (Natural Person T) had authorised staff of her CSP to lodge with ACRA various incorporations and company documents which falsely appointed the Individual as the director, shareholder and/or beneficial owner of the companies. Investigations also revealed that the companies to which the individual was appointed to without the Individual’s consent or awareness were primarily owned by foreign nationals. As a result of the breaches, ACRA cancelled the registrations of the CSP and its associated RQI in 2021. The companies involved have either been struck off from the Register of Companies or have updated their BO information with ACRA. This case remains in Singapore’s courts after being commenced on 23 May 2023. 399. ACRA has taken stringent action against individuals and CSPs for knowingly filing inaccurate BO information. From 2021 to 2024, the registration of six CSPs has been cancelled by ACRA for knowingly submitting inaccurate BO filings. To date, six individuals have also been prosecuted of which five were convicted and fined with fines ranging from SGD 2400 (USD 1800) to SGD 27 000 (USD 20 000) and disqualified from acting as a director for five years. It is positive that Singapore is pursuing liability against individuals knowingly submitting inaccurate or false BO information; however, this is not yet systematic and there are opportunities to pursue more of such individuals and create a more dissuasive environment against such criminal activity. Table 5.5. Number of enforcement actions taken against FIs, VASP and DNFBPs for failure to collect basic or BO information of customers that are Legal Persons AML/CFT obligated parties 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 FIs 3 2 4 7 - CSPs - 11 2 - 10 PSMDs - 12 4 4 10 REAs 3 1 - 2 1 400. There have been no sanctions applied for reporting obligations of wakafs. 401. Overall, Singapore’s authorities are working to apply sanctions against persons who do not comply with the information requirements and have shown progress over the reporting period. The sanctions implemented, however, are not yet dissuasive as the legislative change to increase sanctions was recent and those sanctions have not yet been systematically applied)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="514. Singapore confiscates the proceeds of both domestic and foreign predicates primarily through the use of domestic powers, and to a limited degree, uses international co-operation where assets are located abroad. Singapore has confiscated large amounts of criminal property leveraging on various legislative provisions to confiscate criminal assets (CDSA, CPC, OCA, PCA, and MDA) and through various approaches (NCBC, conviction-based confiscation (CBC) for ML offences, and unexplained wealth confiscations). Overall, seizures lead to confiscation to a good extent, but the minor shortcomings for seizures (discussed in 8.3) flow through to final confiscation outcomes. There are some weaknesses in seizure and subsequent confiscation in respect of predicate offences related to fraud, corruption, and TBML. 8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 515. During the reporting period, Singapore confiscated SGD 3.9 billion (USD 2.9 billion) from ML and predicate offences which reflects a good (61%) seizure to confiscation ratio (including criminal tax recoveries). Excluding the top five asset recovery cases, the seizure/confiscation ratio is lower, at only 40%. However, in keeping with the trend seen with seizure figures, most confiscations were achieved in a small number of ML cases involving foreign predicate offences. In 93% of cases, the confiscation involved small values (approximately SGD 38 000 or USD 28 120 on average), linked to predicate offences investigations (see Table 8.3). Table 8.3. Confiscations (in SGD millions) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML conf. % non-ML conf. Foreign predicate (including tax crimes) 32.1 43.3 25 3 262.7 105.7 3 468.8 (89.4%) 100% 0 Domestic predicate (excluding CEF) 31.1 302.3 24.8 25.9 25.4 409.5 (10.6%) 4.7% 95.3 Total number of confiscation cases (including tax crimes and excluding CEF) 2 090 2 108 2 514 2852 1 304 10 868 7.2% 92.8 # of ML cases (excluding CEF) 179 182 162 172 90 785 n/a n/a # of non-ML cases 1 911 1 926 2 352 2 680 1 214 10 083 n/a n/a Total Confiscations (including tax crimes and excluding CEF) 63.2 345.5 50.1 3 288.8 131 3 878.6 90% 10% Note: SGD 590 million or USD 436.6 million of seized funds from scams / domestic CEF are excluded from this table, as Singapore does not track the amount confiscated, given that the seized funds may not be directly co-related to the crimes committed in the same year. The number of domestic CEF cases leading to confiscation is not available. 516. Singapore confiscates a wide array of assets, both proceeds and instrumentalities, including residential and non-residential property, cash and bank accounts, shares and companies’ assets, vehicles and luxury goods, drugs, illicit wildlife products and virtual assets. Real estate and bank accounts are the most frequent confiscated assets in ML cases, while virtual assets, securities and bank accounts represent the biggest share of confiscated assets in non-ML cases. 517. Authorities rely on a range of measures to recover assets. Approximately 33% (around SGD 1.3 billion or USD 1 billion) of confiscation results from conviction-based confiscation (CBC), and 67% (approx. SGD 2.6 billion or USD 1.9 billion) from non-conviction-based (NCBC) proceedings (these figures exclude criminal tax recoveries). For example, 72% of all confiscated assets result from NCBC proceedings in the 3B$ case. As indicated in IO.7, a large majority of ML convictions are cases where the accused pleaded guilty (including through plea deals), and consequently, confiscation results in these cases are often achieved through plea deals followed by court orders (which are still counted among CBC figures). These involve situations where the accused agree to withdraw their claim to the assets (such as in the 3B$ case). SGD 7.9 million (USD 5.8 million) was confiscated during the reporting period through CIA. Singapore has also recovered approximately SGD 87 million (USD 64.3 million) in tax (from criminal cases) across 433 cases and an additional SGD 81 million (USD 60 million) through penalties and fines from criminal cases. There are also instances of default confiscations of unclaimed funds where sums are forfeited to the State. Overall, when they are issued by Courts, confiscation orders are enforced (and as outlined below, property returned to the victims/forfeited to the state as appropriate). There is no evidence of unfulfilled court orders or amounts ‘ordered’ for confiscation which are not actually “taken in” or realised by the State. This is positive and ensures that criminals are permanently deprived of ill-gotten assets. 518. Singapore has shown it is able to prioritise the pursuit of complex and cross-border cases with a significant amount of criminal assets involved, including related to high-risk predicates, in some circumstances. LEAs successfully achieved confiscation of more than 90% of the seized assets within a year in the 3B$ case as some involved pleas and there were little/no challenges, and within 2-4 years in the other two larger cases. This is reasonable given the cross-border nature of the case and the need for international collaboration, involvement of complex ownership structures, and multiple predicate offences. Notwithstanding the considerations laid out in section 3.4.4, these three largest confiscations by value (Table 8.3 and 8.4) demonstrate the effectiveness of Singapore’s confiscation regime and show that authorities are capable of securing high-value confiscations when such cases arise. Table 8.4. High-value confiscation cases Case Amount Seized (SGD/Year) Amount Confiscated (SGD/Year) Remarks 3B$ case ~ 3 billion (2023)/ USD 2.2 billion ~ 2.8 billion/ USD 2 billion (2024) Assets related to 2 out of 27 individuals are still pending the conclusion of proceedings under Singapore’s laws. A significant portion of proceeds were confiscated through NCBC and CBC. Case S ~ 233.7 million/ USD 173 million (2021) ~ 233.4 million /USD 172.7 million (2023-24) The case pertains to a regulatory offence under the Securities and Futures Act for operating without a capital market services license and potential fraudulent activity. ML investigations relating to the fraudulent activity are ongoing. 99% of assets seized through the financial investigation were confiscated. Case E ~ 144.3 million/ USD 106.7 million (2020) ~ 55.2 million/ USD 40.8 million (2021-23) A case of investment fraud in which 38% of assets seized have been confiscated thus far. Proceedings are ongoing. 519. Overall confiscations align with risks to a reasonable extent (Table 8.5). There is a reasonable correlation between the value of confiscation and the main proceeds-generating crimes. Singapore primarily confiscates assets in relation to a low number of organised crime cases (owing to the 3B$ case ), fraud and tax crime. Almost all organised crime proceeds seized were confiscated, while there is room to improve the confiscation rate for corruption, TBML and fraud (for which only 10% of seized assets are confiscated). The absence of TF confiscations is in line with the risk and context of Singapore. Table 8.5. Confiscations per predicate offence (in SGD Million) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML conf. % non-ML conf. Organised crime 0 4.4 0 3 253.9 101.8 3 360.1 (86.6%) 100 0 Fraud (excluding domestic CEF) 38.2 91.1 25.3 6.3 3.8 164.7 (4.2%) 66.3 33.7 Corruption 1.1 0.7 0.2 2.4 0.1 4.5 (0.1%) 68.9 31.1 Tax (including Tax ML and tax crimes) 17.9 14.5 14.4 23.0 17.5 87.3 (2.3%) 0 100 TBML 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%) 0 0 Drug-related offences 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.3 (0%) 90.7 9.3 Others (such as Robbery, theft, remote gambling) 5.7 232 12.3 5.4 4.5 259.9 (6.7%) 0 100 Total confiscations 63.2 345.5 50.1 3 288.8 131 3 878.6 90 10 Note: SGD 590 million (452 million) of seized funds from domestic CEF are excluded from this table as Singapore does not track the amount confiscated in this respect. The funds are ultimately restituted to identifiable victims or forfeiture to the State following the completion of the criminal justice process. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 520. Case examples and discussions with the authorities show LEAs are aware of the need to pursue assets abroad and proactively seek assistance from foreign counterparts to this end, both through formal and informal channels. As a matter of practice, LEAs commence domestic ML investigations into cases triggered by foreign counterparts with a view to identifying a possible nexus to Singapore. Where applicable, SPF also proactively engages its foreign counterparts to alert them to the presence of criminal proceeds and conducts joint investigations when such a nexus is established as necessary. Authorities also routinely use informal channels to improve confiscation outcomes (especially in cases with a foreign nexus) and actively follow-up on requests (over 900 informal requests have been made through ARIN-AP, Egmont, INTERPOL and other channels, and SGD 102 million (USD 75.5 million) has been seized as a result of informal co-operation. SOPs instruct LEAs to use informal networks to obtain early indications of cross-border elements in an investigation (such as bank account details, BO data, or criminal records). Where appropriate, LEAs are required to seek both informal and formal assistance concurrently. This approach narrows down the scope of subsequent MLA requests that may be issued in case foreign counterparts provide positive responses or viable leads. Case studies (see IO.2) and discussions with the authorities indicate that informal co-operation has helped speed up MLA and ease co-operation overall. 521. Singapore is credited for utilising informal channels to support confiscations, but there is still scope to improve the pursuit of formal co-operation, since MLAs are required in some instances to pursue assets located abroad and are seldom used. Despite the good results that can be obtained through informal co-operation, MLA is often necessary at the later stages of assistance (e.g. to finalise confiscation or enforce an order for assets located abroad). Over five years, Singapore sent 110 MLA requests for the freezing, seizing confiscation and enforcement of confiscation orders pertaining to criminal property (Table 8.6). Singapore sought the recovery of SGD 144 million or USD 106.5 million (and 3 properties) (USD 106.5 million) and actually secured the recovery of SGD 52 million (USD 38.5 million) and 3 properties (mainly in 2024). 51% of MLA requests were executed without any assets found/repatriated by the requested state. It is also notable that Singapore did not seek enforcement of any of its own confiscation orders abroad. This indicates that more could be done to pursue assets located outside Singapore, especially considering the country’s risk and context as a transit hub and the outward flow of funds from fraud victims in Singapore. 522. MLA requests are infrequent considering the volume of predicate and ML investigations (11 189 in the reporting period). MLA requests related to asset recovery were made in fewer than 1% of ML investigations, including many with transnational elements and involving high-value cases. This is modest when considered against Singapore’s risk and context. While not every ML investigation would necessarily warrant an MLA request, there is scope to increase alignment of the use of MLA requests with Singapore’s risks, considering that – as stated above – a formal request is often needed to conclude a case, such as when confiscations progress to the final stages of judicial procedures and/or repatriation is sought. 523. In turn, Singapore receives a significant number of asset recovery requests from counterparts concerning an estimated SGD 1.1 billion or USD 814 million (such as bank accounts and properties). Singapore generally responds proactively to these requests. As discussed further in IO.2, the scope of assistance provided is somewhat hindered by procedural issues, and only five in 26 foreign confiscation orders led to the repatriation of assets. This indicates that there may be a an even stronger need to identify and investigate ML related to foreign predicates in Singapore, and that Singapore may be able to do even more to pursue foreign-linked proceeds within its own borders directly. Table 8.6. Outgoing/Incoming MLA requests (Asset Recovery) (SGD million) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Total Outgoing # MLAs 24 18 17 12 39 110 Assets sought for recovery SGD 10.7m + 2 properties SGD 23.2m + 1 property SGD 32.8m SGD 89.3m -- SGD 144.5m + 3 properties Total Incoming MLAs 14 23 11 13 12 73 Assets sought for recovery SGD 22.7m + 35 bank accounts + properties SGD 7m + 55 bank accounts + 3 properties + virtual asset accounts + others SGD 107.6m + 7 bank accounts + 1 property + others (e.g., stocks) SGD 152.6m + 29 bank accounts + 1 property + virtual asset accounts + others SGD 824.3m + 12 bank accounts + 2 properties, + others (virtual asset account and gold bars) SGD 1.11b + 138 bank accounts + 7 properties + others 524. In conclusion, Singapore achieves good results converting seizures into confiscations, confiscating close to SGD 3.9 billion (USD 2.9 billion), mainly from ML and some predicate offences. The vast majority of asset recovery is secured from high-profile cases, involving an array of assets and through a combination of CBC and NCBC. There is a good seizure/confiscation ratio (61%), which varies according to certain predicate offences. Overall confiscations align with risks to a reasonable extent, with room to improve confiscation in respect of corruption, TBML and fraud. While Singapore understands the value of pursuing assets located abroad, there is scope to improve the use of formal international co-operation. Box 8.4. Confiscations 3B$ Case (NCBC) Over 90% of the assets seized from the 10 main persons of interests (approximately SGD 944 million) or USD 698.6 million) were forfeited to the State. Their remaining assets were returned due to evidentiary challenges in proving criminal origin. SPF seized and issued prohibition of disposal orders on assets amounting to about SGD 2 billion (USD 1.4 billion) linked to 17 foreign nationals who had left Singapore. 15 of them agreed to forfeit about SGD 1.85 billion (USD 1.4 billion) worth of assets, or 98.6% of their seized and prohibited assets, to the State. Court orders were made pursuant to Section 370(2)(d) of the CPC for the forfeiture of assets, in the absence of convictions (i.e. NCBC). The assets of the two remaining absconded persons are being dealt with in accordance with the new absconded persons provisions in the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act 2024, and Sections 370(3A) and 372(1) of the CPC. To preserve asset value, a dedicated SPF team was formed to manage the storage, upkeep, and maintenance of the wide range of seized items, leveraging expertise and specialised services from industry partners. Tax fraud case IRAS was alerted to a tax fraud scheme involving abuse of the government-run Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC) scheme. Investigations by IRAS revealed that the director of a company had orchestrated a scheme to inflate sales and fraudulently claim higher PIC cash payouts. IRAS uncovered a network of claimants and, considering the presence of ML indicators, referred the case to SPF(CAD) to open a PFI. CAD charged the director with ML for abetting fraudulent claims. In lieu of confiscation, tax assessments were raised to recover the fraudulent PIC cash payouts and bonuses obtained SGD 5.7 million. Unable to pay the full amount, he served an additional 31.5 months in prison." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="514. Singapore confiscates the proceeds of both domestic and foreign predicates primarily through the use of domestic powers, and to a limited degree, uses international co-operation where assets are located abroad. Singapore has confiscated large amounts of criminal property leveraging on various legislative provisions to confiscate criminal assets (CDSA, CPC, OCA, PCA, and MDA) and through various approaches (NCBC, conviction-based confiscation (CBC) for ML offences, and unexplained wealth confiscations). Overall, seizures lead to confiscation to a good extent, but the minor shortcomings for seizures (discussed in 8.3) flow through to final confiscation outcomes. There are some weaknesses in seizure and subsequent confiscation in respect of predicate offences related to fraud, corruption, and TBML. 8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 515. During the reporting period, Singapore confiscated SGD 3.9 billion (USD 2.9 billion) from ML and predicate offences which reflects a good (61%) seizure to confiscation ratio (including criminal tax recoveries). Excluding the top five asset recovery cases, the seizure/confiscation ratio is lower, at only 40%. However, in keeping with the trend seen with seizure figures, most confiscations were achieved in a small number of ML cases involving foreign predicate offences. In 93% of cases, the confiscation involved small values (approximately SGD 38 000 or USD 28 120 on average), linked to predicate offences investigations (see Table 8.3). Table 8.3. Confiscations (in SGD millions) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML conf. % non-ML conf. Foreign predicate (including tax crimes) 32.1 43.3 25 3 262.7 105.7 3 468.8 (89.4%) 100% 0 Domestic predicate (excluding CEF) 31.1 302.3 24.8 25.9 25.4 409.5 (10.6%) 4.7% 95.3 Total number of confiscation cases (including tax crimes and excluding CEF) 2 090 2 108 2 514 2852 1 304 10 868 7.2% 92.8 # of ML cases (excluding CEF) 179 182 162 172 90 785 n/a n/a # of non-ML cases 1 911 1 926 2 352 2 680 1 214 10 083 n/a n/a Total Confiscations (including tax crimes and excluding CEF) 63.2 345.5 50.1 3 288.8 131 3 878.6 90% 10% Note: SGD 590 million or USD 436.6 million of seized funds from scams / domestic CEF are excluded from this table, as Singapore does not track the amount confiscated, given that the seized funds may not be directly co-related to the crimes committed in the same year. The number of domestic CEF cases leading to confiscation is not available. 516. Singapore confiscates a wide array of assets, both proceeds and instrumentalities, including residential and non-residential property, cash and bank accounts, shares and companies’ assets, vehicles and luxury goods, drugs, illicit wildlife products and virtual assets. Real estate and bank accounts are the most frequent confiscated assets in ML cases, while virtual assets, securities and bank accounts represent the biggest share of confiscated assets in non-ML cases. 517. Authorities rely on a range of measures to recover assets. Approximately 33% (around SGD 1.3 billion or USD 1 billion) of confiscation results from conviction-based confiscation (CBC), and 67% (approx. SGD 2.6 billion or USD 1.9 billion) from non-conviction-based (NCBC) proceedings (these figures exclude criminal tax recoveries). For example, 72% of all confiscated assets result from NCBC proceedings in the 3B$ case. As indicated in IO.7, a large majority of ML convictions are cases where the accused pleaded guilty (including through plea deals), and consequently, confiscation results in these cases are often achieved through plea deals followed by court orders (which are still counted among CBC figures). These involve situations where the accused agree to withdraw their claim to the assets (such as in the 3B$ case). SGD 7.9 million (USD 5.8 million) was confiscated during the reporting period through CIA. Singapore has also recovered approximately SGD 87 million (USD 64.3 million) in tax (from criminal cases) across 433 cases and an additional SGD 81 million (USD 60 million) through penalties and fines from criminal cases. There are also instances of default confiscations of unclaimed funds where sums are forfeited to the State. Overall, when they are issued by Courts, confiscation orders are enforced (and as outlined below, property returned to the victims/forfeited to the state as appropriate). There is no evidence of unfulfilled court orders or amounts ‘ordered’ for confiscation which are not actually “taken in” or realised by the State. This is positive and ensures that criminals are permanently deprived of ill-gotten assets. 518. Singapore has shown it is able to prioritise the pursuit of complex and cross-border cases with a significant amount of criminal assets involved, including related to high-risk predicates, in some circumstances. LEAs successfully achieved confiscation of more than 90% of the seized assets within a year in the 3B$ case as some involved pleas and there were little/no challenges, and within 2-4 years in the other two larger cases. This is reasonable given the cross-border nature of the case and the need for international collaboration, involvement of complex ownership structures, and multiple predicate offences. Notwithstanding the considerations laid out in section 3.4.4, these three largest confiscations by value (Table 8.3 and 8.4) demonstrate the effectiveness of Singapore’s confiscation regime and show that authorities are capable of securing high-value confiscations when such cases arise. Table 8.4. High-value confiscation cases Case Amount Seized (SGD/Year) Amount Confiscated (SGD/Year) Remarks 3B$ case ~ 3 billion (2023)/ USD 2.2 billion ~ 2.8 billion/ USD 2 billion (2024) Assets related to 2 out of 27 individuals are still pending the conclusion of proceedings under Singapore’s laws. A significant portion of proceeds were confiscated through NCBC and CBC. Case S ~ 233.7 million/ USD 173 million (2021) ~ 233.4 million /USD 172.7 million (2023-24) The case pertains to a regulatory offence under the Securities and Futures Act for operating without a capital market services license and potential fraudulent activity. ML investigations relating to the fraudulent activity are ongoing. 99% of assets seized through the financial investigation were confiscated. Case E ~ 144.3 million/ USD 106.7 million (2020) ~ 55.2 million/ USD 40.8 million (2021-23) A case of investment fraud in which 38% of assets seized have been confiscated thus far. Proceedings are ongoing. 519. Overall confiscations align with risks to a reasonable extent (Table 8.5). There is a reasonable correlation between the value of confiscation and the main proceeds-generating crimes. Singapore primarily confiscates assets in relation to a low number of organised crime cases (owing to the 3B$ case ), fraud and tax crime. Almost all organised crime proceeds seized were confiscated, while there is room to improve the confiscation rate for corruption, TBML and fraud (for which only 10% of seized assets are confiscated). The absence of TF confiscations is in line with the risk and context of Singapore. Table 8.5. Confiscations per predicate offence (in SGD Million) Predicate offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (%) % ML conf. % non-ML conf. Organised crime 0 4.4 0 3 253.9 101.8 3 360.1 (86.6%) 100 0 Fraud (excluding domestic CEF) 38.2 91.1 25.3 6.3 3.8 164.7 (4.2%) 66.3 33.7 Corruption 1.1 0.7 0.2 2.4 0.1 4.5 (0.1%) 68.9 31.1 Tax (including Tax ML and tax crimes) 17.9 14.5 14.4 23.0 17.5 87.3 (2.3%) 0 100 TBML 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%) 0 0 Drug-related offences 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.3 (0%) 90.7 9.3 Others (such as Robbery, theft, remote gambling) 5.7 232 12.3 5.4 4.5 259.9 (6.7%) 0 100 Total confiscations 63.2 345.5 50.1 3 288.8 131 3 878.6 90 10 Note: SGD 590 million (452 million) of seized funds from domestic CEF are excluded from this table as Singapore does not track the amount confiscated in this respect. The funds are ultimately restituted to identifiable victims or forfeiture to the State following the completion of the criminal justice process. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 520. Case examples and discussions with the authorities show LEAs are aware of the need to pursue assets abroad and proactively seek assistance from foreign counterparts to this end, both through formal and informal channels. As a matter of practice, LEAs commence domestic ML investigations into cases triggered by foreign counterparts with a view to identifying a possible nexus to Singapore. Where applicable, SPF also proactively engages its foreign counterparts to alert them to the presence of criminal proceeds and conducts joint investigations when such a nexus is established as necessary. Authorities also routinely use informal channels to improve confiscation outcomes (especially in cases with a foreign nexus) and actively follow-up on requests (over 900 informal requests have been made through ARIN-AP, Egmont, INTERPOL and other channels, and SGD 102 million (USD 75.5 million) has been seized as a result of informal co-operation. SOPs instruct LEAs to use informal networks to obtain early indications of cross-border elements in an investigation (such as bank account details, BO data, or criminal records). Where appropriate, LEAs are required to seek both informal and formal assistance concurrently. This approach narrows down the scope of subsequent MLA requests that may be issued in case foreign counterparts provide positive responses or viable leads. Case studies (see IO.2) and discussions with the authorities indicate that informal co-operation has helped speed up MLA and ease co-operation overall. 521. Singapore is credited for utilising informal channels to support confiscations, but there is still scope to improve the pursuit of formal co-operation, since MLAs are required in some instances to pursue assets located abroad and are seldom used. Despite the good results that can be obtained through informal co-operation, MLA is often necessary at the later stages of assistance (e.g. to finalise confiscation or enforce an order for assets located abroad). Over five years, Singapore sent 110 MLA requests for the freezing, seizing confiscation and enforcement of confiscation orders pertaining to criminal property (Table 8.6). Singapore sought the recovery of SGD 144 million or USD 106.5 million (and 3 properties) (USD 106.5 million) and actually secured the recovery of SGD 52 million (USD 38.5 million) and 3 properties (mainly in 2024). 51% of MLA requests were executed without any assets found/repatriated by the requested state. It is also notable that Singapore did not seek enforcement of any of its own confiscation orders abroad. This indicates that more could be done to pursue assets located outside Singapore, especially considering the country’s risk and context as a transit hub and the outward flow of funds from fraud victims in Singapore. 522. MLA requests are infrequent considering the volume of predicate and ML investigations (11 189 in the reporting period). MLA requests related to asset recovery were made in fewer than 1% of ML investigations, including many with transnational elements and involving high-value cases. This is modest when considered against Singapore’s risk and context. While not every ML investigation would necessarily warrant an MLA request, there is scope to increase alignment of the use of MLA requests with Singapore’s risks, considering that – as stated above – a formal request is often needed to conclude a case, such as when confiscations progress to the final stages of judicial procedures and/or repatriation is sought. 523. In turn, Singapore receives a significant number of asset recovery requests from counterparts concerning an estimated SGD 1.1 billion or USD 814 million (such as bank accounts and properties). Singapore generally responds proactively to these requests. As discussed further in IO.2, the scope of assistance provided is somewhat hindered by procedural issues, and only five in 26 foreign confiscation orders led to the repatriation of assets. This indicates that there may be a an even stronger need to identify and investigate ML related to foreign predicates in Singapore, and that Singapore may be able to do even more to pursue foreign-linked proceeds within its own borders directly. Table 8.6. Outgoing/Incoming MLA requests (Asset Recovery) (SGD million) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Total Outgoing # MLAs 24 18 17 12 39 110 Assets sought for recovery SGD 10.7m + 2 properties SGD 23.2m + 1 property SGD 32.8m SGD 89.3m -- SGD 144.5m + 3 properties Total Incoming MLAs 14 23 11 13 12 73 Assets sought for recovery SGD 22.7m + 35 bank accounts + properties SGD 7m + 55 bank accounts + 3 properties + virtual asset accounts + others SGD 107.6m + 7 bank accounts + 1 property + others (e.g., stocks) SGD 152.6m + 29 bank accounts + 1 property + virtual asset accounts + others SGD 824.3m + 12 bank accounts + 2 properties, + others (virtual asset account and gold bars) SGD 1.11b + 138 bank accounts + 7 properties + others 524. In conclusion, Singapore achieves good results converting seizures into confiscations, confiscating close to SGD 3.9 billion (USD 2.9 billion), mainly from ML and some predicate offences. The vast majority of asset recovery is secured from high-profile cases, involving an array of assets and through a combination of CBC and NCBC. There is a good seizure/confiscation ratio (61%), which varies according to certain predicate offences. Overall confiscations align with risks to a reasonable extent, with room to improve confiscation in respect of corruption, TBML and fraud. While Singapore understands the value of pursuing assets located abroad, there is scope to improve the use of formal international co-operation. Box 8.4. Confiscations 3B$ Case (NCBC) Over 90% of the assets seized from the 10 main persons of interests (approximately SGD 944 million) or USD 698.6 million) were forfeited to the State. Their remaining assets were returned due to evidentiary challenges in proving criminal origin. SPF seized and issued prohibition of disposal orders on assets amounting to about SGD 2 billion (USD 1.4 billion) linked to 17 foreign nationals who had left Singapore. 15 of them agreed to forfeit about SGD 1.85 billion (USD 1.4 billion) worth of assets, or 98.6% of their seized and prohibited assets, to the State. Court orders were made pursuant to Section 370(2)(d) of the CPC for the forfeiture of assets, in the absence of convictions (i.e. NCBC). The assets of the two remaining absconded persons are being dealt with in accordance with the new absconded persons provisions in the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act 2024, and Sections 370(3A) and 372(1) of the CPC. To preserve asset value, a dedicated SPF team was formed to manage the storage, upkeep, and maintenance of the wide range of seized items, leveraging expertise and specialised services from industry partners. Tax fraud case IRAS was alerted to a tax fraud scheme involving abuse of the government-run Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC) scheme. Investigations by IRAS revealed that the director of a company had orchestrated a scheme to inflate sales and fraudulently claim higher PIC cash payouts. IRAS uncovered a network of claimants and, considering the presence of ML indicators, referred the case to SPF(CAD) to open a PFI. CAD charged the director with ML for abetting fraudulent claims. In lieu of confiscation, tax assessments were raised to recover the fraudulent PIC cash payouts and bonuses obtained SGD 5.7 million. Unable to pay the full amount, he served an additional 31.5 months in prison." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="572. Singapore makes limited use of alternative criminal justice and regulatory measures to disrupt TF activity where securing a TF conviction is not practical. 573. Most examples of alternative measures provided by Singapore related to border control measures to prevent terrorists from entering Singapore, deporting foreigners suspected or convicted of TF offences once their sentence is served and implementing counter radicalisation programs rather than disrupting TF activity where a TF prosecution is not practicable. 574. Singapore has used its Internal Security Act (ISA) for preventive detention or restriction of individuals suspected to be involved in TF and terrorism activities if the individual is assessed to present an imminent national security threat to Singapore. Such detentions or restrictions are subject to yearly review by an Advisory Board, chaired by a Supreme Court Judge. Table 9.7. Number of persons subjected to detention or restriction under the ISA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 # of Persons 5 4 5 2 8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="572. Singapore makes limited use of alternative criminal justice and regulatory measures to disrupt TF activity where securing a TF conviction is not practical. 573. Most examples of alternative measures provided by Singapore related to border control measures to prevent terrorists from entering Singapore, deporting foreigners suspected or convicted of TF offences once their sentence is served and implementing counter radicalisation programs rather than disrupting TF activity where a TF prosecution is not practicable. 574. Singapore has used its Internal Security Act (ISA) for preventive detention or restriction of individuals suspected to be involved in TF and terrorism activities if the individual is assessed to present an imminent national security threat to Singapore. Such detentions or restrictions are subject to yearly review by an Advisory Board, chaired by a Supreme Court Judge. Table 9.7. Number of persons subjected to detention or restriction under the ISA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 # of Persons 5 4 5 2 8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="617. Singapore’s framework for monitoring regulated entities’ compliance with TFS is built into its broader supervisory settings. Supervisors monitor compliance with TF TFS as part of onsite and offsite supervisory activities on a rules-based approach, including by reviewing data submissions from reporting entities. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 618. As identified in IO.3, MAS supervises the implementation of TF TFS through supervisory activities that are initiated by three approaches: (1) controls-based, (2) FIRA-based or (3) risk surveillance-based. 619. Controls-based supervisory activities are targeted scope supervisory activities where MAS has become aware of a compliance issue through the review of internal/external audit reports, the review of STRs etc. In these cases, MAS promptly follows-up with the FI/VASP to rectify the issue. Table 10.6. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 401 469 394 463 440 2167 DPTSPs (29) 0 6 9 23 20 58 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 20 25 22 67 89 223 Other FIs (2139) 386 339 296 314 219 1 554 620. Singapore places great reliance on controls-based supervisory activities – they represent approximately 95% of total supervisory activities. However, given the targeted and less formal nature of these supervisory activities, there are no statistics on exactly what scope these supervisory activities covered. It is known that these activities took place, and if there was a compliance issue it was generally either rectified or escalated to a more intensive supervisory activity. There is no information to demonstrate how, and to what extent, these controls-based supervisory engagements incorporated TF TFS obligations. Some credit must be given to Singapore for the supervision of TF TFS requirements through these controls-based supervisory activities but because of the unknown scope, the assessment team must be conservative in taking these into account. 621. As outlined in IO3 Singapore also conducts full scope or more intrusive examinations through its other two supervisory approaches, FIRA-based or risk surveillance-based supervisory activities. These include vetting policies and procedures, reviewing sanctions screening activities, testing alerts, checking freezing/blocking requirements, overseeing transaction monitoring and reporting of matches. Table 10.7. Number of Intensive Supervisory Activities (Including but not limited to TF TFS) FI/VASP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 5 9 2 10 0 26 DPTSPs (29) 0 0 3 5 0 8 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 2 5 0 38 43 88 Other FIs (2139) 11 4 2 3 3 23 622. Over the course of the assessment period, there was limited known coverage of intensive supervisory activities related to TF TFS for FI and VASP sectors. Where there were intensive supervisory activities, there was a reasonably high deficiency rate with 56 TFS-related deficiencies (for the period 2020 to 2024) from those 141 examinations. The large majority of deficiencies were uncovered by MAS through its risk surveillance approach. The deficiencies mostly related to more specific AML/CFT control and process failures which include screening of clients against sanction lists. Table 10.8. No of TF TFS-related Compliance Deficiencies (number of sanctions) Year FIs DPTSPs Casinos EAs/Developers PSMDs LPEs CSPs PAEs Money-lenders Pawn-brokers Total 2020 22(7) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24(7) 2021 15(1) 0 5(4) 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 21(6) 2022 8(1) 0 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 9(2) 2023 5 0 3(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8(2) 2024 5(1) 1 1 6(1) 1 0 7(7) 0 0 0 21(9) Total 55(10) 1 11(6) 6(1) 1 0 9(9) 0 0 0 83(26) 623. In response to this level of deficiency, MAS conducted a series of thematic reviews in 2021 and 2022 to assess reporting entities’ TF risk understanding and examine the effectiveness of their CFT-related controls. Following which, MAS published a guidance paper (“Strengthening Financial Institutions’ CFT Controls”) in May 2023, to set out MAS’ key observations and supervisory expectations of CFT controls. In addition, MAS also conducted thematic examinations on FIs’ (including banks) name screening processes in 2021 and issued an information paper to FIs on “Strengthening AML/CFT Name Screening Practices” in April 2022. 624. Supervisors have largely addressed detections of TF TFS-related deficiencies (83 in the period under review) through lighter, non-punitive remedial measures (e.g. reprimands), though punitive sanctions (e.g. fines or suspension or revocation of licenses) have also been meted in 10 cases involving more serious offences, including non-compliance with TF TFS-related obligations. This is reflective of Singapore’s lighter approach preferring remedial measures to sanctions (see IO.3 and IO.4). 625. Overall, Singapore’s FI and VASP supervisors do not have appropriate supervisory coverage for TF TFS obligations but identify a reasonably significant amount of non-compliance regardless. Supervisors are addressing deficiencies generally with non-punitive remedial measures. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 626. As identified in IO.4, all DNFBP supervisors implement risk-based supervision to ensure DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements. SC/IAC’s guidance on supervisory coverage indicates that all high risk DNFBPs (around 90%) and medium-high risk DNFBPs (around 70%) should be subject to a supervisory activity over a period of two to four years – 90% were in the case of high risk and 70% were in the case of medium-high risk. Where examinations are undertaken by supervisors, they generally include an element on TF TFS. As noted above and in IO.3/IO.4, there are deficiencies in the risk-basis of the approaches adopted by MAS and MinLaw, and gaps in the supervisory coverage of MAS, URA and CEA. When conducting supervisory activities, supervisors generally seek confirmation that the reporting entity has registered with MAS and have other commercial software to be alerted to changes in TF TFS. Supervisors were not able to confirm that DNFBPs had ready means to ensure compliance with TF TFS. Table 10.9. Number of Supervisory Activities (including but not limited to TF TFS) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos (2) 6 2 2 4 2 EAs/Developers (1243) 12 24 2 3 33 PSMDs (1967) 218 136 209 241 191 Lawyers (7400)/LPEs (1161) [40] 50 50 50 52 24 CSPs (2883) 109 379 367 300 417 Accountants (4465) 32 55 14 10 10 Pawnbrokers (241) 61 60 60 60 60 627. Supervisors are addressing deficiencies generally with remedial measures although there are other stronger measures available to them. Overall, despite obligations having been in place for decades, a sophisticated audience of reporting entities, and comprehensive guidance, compliance deficiencies persist, but relatively weak enforcement action is evident. Box 10.6. DNFBP STR filing at sanctions hit In 2023, a PSMD filed an STR as its internal screening, post-transaction, detected that a customer (Person A) was designated under the 1st schedule of the TSOFA. In this case the PSMD did not screen the customer prior to the transaction, and as such did not identify the match or refuse the transaction. After the transaction, the PSMD lodged an STR. MinLaw deemed this to an appropriate response as the entity recorded the customer’s particulars; and conducting post-transaction screening in line with its internal procedures. Footnotes [40] Lawyers are covered through LPE examinations as lawyers can only practice through LPEs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="617. Singapore’s framework for monitoring regulated entities’ compliance with TFS is built into its broader supervisory settings. Supervisors monitor compliance with TF TFS as part of onsite and offsite supervisory activities on a rules-based approach, including by reviewing data submissions from reporting entities. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 618. As identified in IO.3, MAS supervises the implementation of TF TFS through supervisory activities that are initiated by three approaches: (1) controls-based, (2) FIRA-based or (3) risk surveillance-based. 619. Controls-based supervisory activities are targeted scope supervisory activities where MAS has become aware of a compliance issue through the review of internal/external audit reports, the review of STRs etc. In these cases, MAS promptly follows-up with the FI/VASP to rectify the issue. Table 10.6. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 401 469 394 463 440 2167 DPTSPs (29) 0 6 9 23 20 58 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 20 25 22 67 89 223 Other FIs (2139) 386 339 296 314 219 1 554 620. Singapore places great reliance on controls-based supervisory activities – they represent approximately 95% of total supervisory activities. However, given the targeted and less formal nature of these supervisory activities, there are no statistics on exactly what scope these supervisory activities covered. It is known that these activities took place, and if there was a compliance issue it was generally either rectified or escalated to a more intensive supervisory activity. There is no information to demonstrate how, and to what extent, these controls-based supervisory engagements incorporated TF TFS obligations. Some credit must be given to Singapore for the supervision of TF TFS requirements through these controls-based supervisory activities but because of the unknown scope, the assessment team must be conservative in taking these into account. 621. As outlined in IO3 Singapore also conducts full scope or more intrusive examinations through its other two supervisory approaches, FIRA-based or risk surveillance-based supervisory activities. These include vetting policies and procedures, reviewing sanctions screening activities, testing alerts, checking freezing/blocking requirements, overseeing transaction monitoring and reporting of matches. Table 10.7. Number of Intensive Supervisory Activities (Including but not limited to TF TFS) FI/VASP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 5 9 2 10 0 26 DPTSPs (29) 0 0 3 5 0 8 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 2 5 0 38 43 88 Other FIs (2139) 11 4 2 3 3 23 622. Over the course of the assessment period, there was limited known coverage of intensive supervisory activities related to TF TFS for FI and VASP sectors. Where there were intensive supervisory activities, there was a reasonably high deficiency rate with 56 TFS-related deficiencies (for the period 2020 to 2024) from those 141 examinations. The large majority of deficiencies were uncovered by MAS through its risk surveillance approach. The deficiencies mostly related to more specific AML/CFT control and process failures which include screening of clients against sanction lists. Table 10.8. No of TF TFS-related Compliance Deficiencies (number of sanctions) Year FIs DPTSPs Casinos EAs/Developers PSMDs LPEs CSPs PAEs Money-lenders Pawn-brokers Total 2020 22(7) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24(7) 2021 15(1) 0 5(4) 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 21(6) 2022 8(1) 0 0 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 0 9(2) 2023 5 0 3(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8(2) 2024 5(1) 1 1 6(1) 1 0 7(7) 0 0 0 21(9) Total 55(10) 1 11(6) 6(1) 1 0 9(9) 0 0 0 83(26) 623. In response to this level of deficiency, MAS conducted a series of thematic reviews in 2021 and 2022 to assess reporting entities’ TF risk understanding and examine the effectiveness of their CFT-related controls. Following which, MAS published a guidance paper (“Strengthening Financial Institutions’ CFT Controls”) in May 2023, to set out MAS’ key observations and supervisory expectations of CFT controls. In addition, MAS also conducted thematic examinations on FIs’ (including banks) name screening processes in 2021 and issued an information paper to FIs on “Strengthening AML/CFT Name Screening Practices” in April 2022. 624. Supervisors have largely addressed detections of TF TFS-related deficiencies (83 in the period under review) through lighter, non-punitive remedial measures (e.g. reprimands), though punitive sanctions (e.g. fines or suspension or revocation of licenses) have also been meted in 10 cases involving more serious offences, including non-compliance with TF TFS-related obligations. This is reflective of Singapore’s lighter approach preferring remedial measures to sanctions (see IO.3 and IO.4). 625. Overall, Singapore’s FI and VASP supervisors do not have appropriate supervisory coverage for TF TFS obligations but identify a reasonably significant amount of non-compliance regardless. Supervisors are addressing deficiencies generally with non-punitive remedial measures. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 626. As identified in IO.4, all DNFBP supervisors implement risk-based supervision to ensure DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements. SC/IAC’s guidance on supervisory coverage indicates that all high risk DNFBPs (around 90%) and medium-high risk DNFBPs (around 70%) should be subject to a supervisory activity over a period of two to four years – 90% were in the case of high risk and 70% were in the case of medium-high risk. Where examinations are undertaken by supervisors, they generally include an element on TF TFS. As noted above and in IO.3/IO.4, there are deficiencies in the risk-basis of the approaches adopted by MAS and MinLaw, and gaps in the supervisory coverage of MAS, URA and CEA. When conducting supervisory activities, supervisors generally seek confirmation that the reporting entity has registered with MAS and have other commercial software to be alerted to changes in TF TFS. Supervisors were not able to confirm that DNFBPs had ready means to ensure compliance with TF TFS. Table 10.9. Number of Supervisory Activities (including but not limited to TF TFS) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos (2) 6 2 2 4 2 EAs/Developers (1243) 12 24 2 3 33 PSMDs (1967) 218 136 209 241 191 Lawyers (7400)/LPEs (1161) [40] 50 50 50 52 24 CSPs (2883) 109 379 367 300 417 Accountants (4465) 32 55 14 10 10 Pawnbrokers (241) 61 60 60 60 60 627. Supervisors are addressing deficiencies generally with remedial measures although there are other stronger measures available to them. Overall, despite obligations having been in place for decades, a sophisticated audience of reporting entities, and comprehensive guidance, compliance deficiencies persist, but relatively weak enforcement action is evident. Box 10.6. DNFBP STR filing at sanctions hit In 2023, a PSMD filed an STR as its internal screening, post-transaction, detected that a customer (Person A) was designated under the 1st schedule of the TSOFA. In this case the PSMD did not screen the customer prior to the transaction, and as such did not identify the match or refuse the transaction. After the transaction, the PSMD lodged an STR. MinLaw deemed this to an appropriate response as the entity recorded the customer’s particulars; and conducting post-transaction screening in line with its internal procedures. Footnotes [40] Lawyers are covered through LPE examinations as lawyers can only practice through LPEs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Singapore’s FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of their obligations to comply with PF TFS. For the most part, the understanding is analogous to the understanding of compliance with TF TFS (see IO.10). DNFBPs demonstrated an uneven understanding of obligations, with some DNFBPs demonstrating active screening for designated individuals and entities and immediate freezing, while others were less sure of their obligations and what to do if a positive match was identified. DNFBPs demonstrated much less consideration given to the analysis of complex sanctions evasion techniques and the implementation of risk-based mitigation measures. It is also not clear that reporting entities’ use of screening software is appropriately capturing transactions or assets that are conducted/held on behalf of or at the direction of persons or entities designated by the UNSC in relation to PF. 659. Singapore has prioritised outreach and awareness raising to assist reporting entities in their understanding of their PF TFS obligations. Over the reporting period, Singapore has conducted and issued a substantial number of CPF-related outreach events and guidance products. DNFBP sectors have been provided with sector-specific guidance, but the degree of understanding of the guidance varied across sectors and entities. Such outreach and awareness raising are largely in line with Singapore’s PF risks; however, there is a lack of outreach for CSPs generally, a sector providing higher risk services. This is somewhat mitigated by ACRA’s examinations of CSPs that consider CPF-related controls. Table 11.3. CPF-related Outreach 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks 11 5 10 17 25 68 DPTSPs 9 2 12 13 24 60 PSPs with CBMT services 7 1 12 13 24 57 Insurers 6 1 8 13 23 51 CSPs 3 4 3 3 6 19 PSMDs 1 31 4 5 11 52 Lawyers/LPEs 4 6 3 5 10 28 Total 41 50 52 69 123 335 660. Most FIs, VASPs and larger DNFBPs rely on commercial software to screen against TFS lists and conduct ongoing and real-time screening of client lists and transactions. Smaller entities reported good engagement by their sector supervisor to assist them with their obligations. In particular, MinLaw had developed a standalone screening database for the PSMD sector to assist them with the obligations. These entities are aware of their obligations to report to their supervisor and authorities, and to terminate relationships, and know where to seek further guidance and information as needed. 661. Customers are screened at onboarding and periodically against lists at a pre-defined frequency that aligns with a customer’s risk profile, when there are changes to the lists or when there are wire transfers involving a customer that has not otherwise established business relations (no threshold for domestic wire transfers and a threshold of at least SGD 1 500 or USD 1 110 for cross-border wire transfers). Checks are also conducted on customers and transactions where red flags may be present. For wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions on conducting transactions with designated persons. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems which do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanctions screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytics tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify that they are not on sanctions lists, and to detect any exposure to wallet addresses with a sanctions nexus at onboarding and on an ongoing basis. PSPs have a variety of different processes to comply with this requirement. 662. Singapore has received a large number of PF-related STRs over the reporting period demonstrating reporting entities’ awareness of PF-related risks and CPF obligations. However, the lack of STRs from lawyers, PSMDs, DPTSPs (up to 2022) and CSPs does not accord with Singapore’s risk profile. This may be reflective of an uneven understanding of TFS obligations. It is noticeable that there have been around 1 900 PF related STRs, but limited funds or other assets frozen or false positives registered during the assessment period, indicating a possible disconnect between reporting and freezing actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Singapore’s FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of their obligations to comply with PF TFS. For the most part, the understanding is analogous to the understanding of compliance with TF TFS (see IO.10). DNFBPs demonstrated an uneven understanding of obligations, with some DNFBPs demonstrating active screening for designated individuals and entities and immediate freezing, while others were less sure of their obligations and what to do if a positive match was identified. DNFBPs demonstrated much less consideration given to the analysis of complex sanctions evasion techniques and the implementation of risk-based mitigation measures. It is also not clear that reporting entities’ use of screening software is appropriately capturing transactions or assets that are conducted/held on behalf of or at the direction of persons or entities designated by the UNSC in relation to PF. 659. Singapore has prioritised outreach and awareness raising to assist reporting entities in their understanding of their PF TFS obligations. Over the reporting period, Singapore has conducted and issued a substantial number of CPF-related outreach events and guidance products. DNFBP sectors have been provided with sector-specific guidance, but the degree of understanding of the guidance varied across sectors and entities. Such outreach and awareness raising are largely in line with Singapore’s PF risks; however, there is a lack of outreach for CSPs generally, a sector providing higher risk services. This is somewhat mitigated by ACRA’s examinations of CSPs that consider CPF-related controls. Table 11.3. CPF-related Outreach 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks 11 5 10 17 25 68 DPTSPs 9 2 12 13 24 60 PSPs with CBMT services 7 1 12 13 24 57 Insurers 6 1 8 13 23 51 CSPs 3 4 3 3 6 19 PSMDs 1 31 4 5 11 52 Lawyers/LPEs 4 6 3 5 10 28 Total 41 50 52 69 123 335 660. Most FIs, VASPs and larger DNFBPs rely on commercial software to screen against TFS lists and conduct ongoing and real-time screening of client lists and transactions. Smaller entities reported good engagement by their sector supervisor to assist them with their obligations. In particular, MinLaw had developed a standalone screening database for the PSMD sector to assist them with the obligations. These entities are aware of their obligations to report to their supervisor and authorities, and to terminate relationships, and know where to seek further guidance and information as needed. 661. Customers are screened at onboarding and periodically against lists at a pre-defined frequency that aligns with a customer’s risk profile, when there are changes to the lists or when there are wire transfers involving a customer that has not otherwise established business relations (no threshold for domestic wire transfers and a threshold of at least SGD 1 500 or USD 1 110 for cross-border wire transfers). Checks are also conducted on customers and transactions where red flags may be present. For wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions on conducting transactions with designated persons. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems which do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanctions screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytics tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify that they are not on sanctions lists, and to detect any exposure to wallet addresses with a sanctions nexus at onboarding and on an ongoing basis. PSPs have a variety of different processes to comply with this requirement. 662. Singapore has received a large number of PF-related STRs over the reporting period demonstrating reporting entities’ awareness of PF-related risks and CPF obligations. However, the lack of STRs from lawyers, PSMDs, DPTSPs (up to 2022) and CSPs does not accord with Singapore’s risk profile. This may be reflective of an uneven understanding of TFS obligations. It is noticeable that there have been around 1 900 PF related STRs, but limited funds or other assets frozen or false positives registered during the assessment period, indicating a possible disconnect between reporting and freezing actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="151. Singapore has established strong co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms for operational purposes. Singapore’s primary operational co-operation mechanism is the AC3N, formerly known as the ISTRA. Formed in 2018 under RTIG, the ISTRA was made up of representation from all relevant competent authorities in Singapore’s AML/CFT regime. The ISTRA reviews and prioritises STRs and conducts network analysis for the identification of significant ML activity for possible regulatory and/or enforcement actions. Since its establishment, ISTRA was used to escalate 34 cases for inter-agency co-ordination, which resulted in supervisory follow-ups by sector supervisors and/or investigations by LEAs. ISTRA was reformed into AC3N in September 2024, with a broadened membership and a direct reporting line to the AML/CFT SC with a view to enabling more comprehensive and timelier co-ordination. In addition to these formal collaboration channels, working level collaboration is also enhanced by measures such as secondment of staff. 152. Singapore also has a public private partnership, the ACIP, which brings together nine materially significant banks with all relevant competent authorities in Singapore. This venue facilitates open discussion on actual cases and trends (see IO.3 and IO.6 for more on ACIP). ACIP also creates ACIP Case-Specific Information (ACIP CSI) taskforces to detect and develop priority cases. Through these taskforces, tactical information is shared with members through a hub-and-spoke model, which conduct further analytics on their information holdings to surface new leads. Such sharing has resulted in positive outcomes, as well as enhancements in the relevant FIs’ risk understanding which in turn leads to better risk mitigation and AML/CFT controls. These taskforces are also used to co-ordinate actions during major investigations. These ACIP-CSI taskforces go beyond the membership of the nine permanent FI members to other FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, as needed. There was positive feedback from ACIP members and government authorities indicating that the ACIP was leading to real world results. Box 1.4. Collaboration between private sector and authorities to take action in relation to Trade-Based ML Given Singapore’s position as an international trade hub, Singapore is susceptible to the threat of trade-based ML. Through ACIP, an industry best practices paper was published in 2018 highlighting common trade-based ML red flags, typologies and best practices for identification and mitigation of trade-based ML risks. On an ongoing basis, ACIP monitors the trade-based ML risks and typologies, and banks regularly share their observations and measures adopted to mitigate risks. These efforts have produced tangible and significant results. In 2019, an ACIP bank alerted CAD to Company A’s under-invoicing, phantom shipments and suspected use of shell companies. CAD worked with banks to share information and intelligence through the ACIP case information sharing mechanism, and banks filed STRs relating to Company A. STRO subsequently analysed the STRs and disseminated relevant information to CAD, allowing CAD to take swift and effective enforcement action. With the financial information and multiple reports lodged by banks and finance companies who had extended credit facilities to Company A for the purposes of trade financing, CAD commenced investigations into the former Chief Financial Officer of Company A in January 2020, was convicted of 11 counts of cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code 1871 (Penal Code) and one count of falsification of accounts under Section 477A of the Penal Code in January 2023. She was sentenced to imprisonment of 20 years for deceiving 16 FIs of more than USD 469 million. 153. Singapore has developed a number of technical solutions to assist in its co-ordination and co-operation efforts. Competent authorities have developed the NAVIGATE platform in 2024 for WoG data sharing, to enable agencies to screen against one another’s databases and expeditiously assess persons and entities of concern. In addition, in 2024, Singapore launched COSMIC, a centralised platform enabling tactical private-to-private information sharing amongst six major commercial banks in Singapore. 154. During the assessment process, Singapore presented a number of case studies demonstrating effective collaboration between STRO and LEAs in combating ML, TF, and predicate offences. Interviews with authorities reaffirmed that both LEAs and the FIU exhibit strong commitment to inter-agency co-operation, demonstrating a clear understanding of their collective critical role in financial crime enforcement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="151. Singapore has established strong co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms for operational purposes. Singapore’s primary operational co-operation mechanism is the AC3N, formerly known as the ISTRA. Formed in 2018 under RTIG, the ISTRA was made up of representation from all relevant competent authorities in Singapore’s AML/CFT regime. The ISTRA reviews and prioritises STRs and conducts network analysis for the identification of significant ML activity for possible regulatory and/or enforcement actions. Since its establishment, ISTRA was used to escalate 34 cases for inter-agency co-ordination, which resulted in supervisory follow-ups by sector supervisors and/or investigations by LEAs. ISTRA was reformed into AC3N in September 2024, with a broadened membership and a direct reporting line to the AML/CFT SC with a view to enabling more comprehensive and timelier co-ordination. In addition to these formal collaboration channels, working level collaboration is also enhanced by measures such as secondment of staff. 152. Singapore also has a public private partnership, the ACIP, which brings together nine materially significant banks with all relevant competent authorities in Singapore. This venue facilitates open discussion on actual cases and trends (see IO.3 and IO.6 for more on ACIP). ACIP also creates ACIP Case-Specific Information (ACIP CSI) taskforces to detect and develop priority cases. Through these taskforces, tactical information is shared with members through a hub-and-spoke model, which conduct further analytics on their information holdings to surface new leads. Such sharing has resulted in positive outcomes, as well as enhancements in the relevant FIs’ risk understanding which in turn leads to better risk mitigation and AML/CFT controls. These taskforces are also used to co-ordinate actions during major investigations. These ACIP-CSI taskforces go beyond the membership of the nine permanent FI members to other FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs, as needed. There was positive feedback from ACIP members and government authorities indicating that the ACIP was leading to real world results. Box 1.4. Collaboration between private sector and authorities to take action in relation to Trade-Based ML Given Singapore’s position as an international trade hub, Singapore is susceptible to the threat of trade-based ML. Through ACIP, an industry best practices paper was published in 2018 highlighting common trade-based ML red flags, typologies and best practices for identification and mitigation of trade-based ML risks. On an ongoing basis, ACIP monitors the trade-based ML risks and typologies, and banks regularly share their observations and measures adopted to mitigate risks. These efforts have produced tangible and significant results. In 2019, an ACIP bank alerted CAD to Company A’s under-invoicing, phantom shipments and suspected use of shell companies. CAD worked with banks to share information and intelligence through the ACIP case information sharing mechanism, and banks filed STRs relating to Company A. STRO subsequently analysed the STRs and disseminated relevant information to CAD, allowing CAD to take swift and effective enforcement action. With the financial information and multiple reports lodged by banks and finance companies who had extended credit facilities to Company A for the purposes of trade financing, CAD commenced investigations into the former Chief Financial Officer of Company A in January 2020, was convicted of 11 counts of cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code 1871 (Penal Code) and one count of falsification of accounts under Section 477A of the Penal Code in January 2023. She was sentenced to imprisonment of 20 years for deceiving 16 FIs of more than USD 469 million. 153. Singapore has developed a number of technical solutions to assist in its co-ordination and co-operation efforts. Competent authorities have developed the NAVIGATE platform in 2024 for WoG data sharing, to enable agencies to screen against one another’s databases and expeditiously assess persons and entities of concern. In addition, in 2024, Singapore launched COSMIC, a centralised platform enabling tactical private-to-private information sharing amongst six major commercial banks in Singapore. 154. During the assessment process, Singapore presented a number of case studies demonstrating effective collaboration between STRO and LEAs in combating ML, TF, and predicate offences. Interviews with authorities reaffirmed that both LEAs and the FIU exhibit strong commitment to inter-agency co-operation, demonstrating a clear understanding of their collective critical role in financial crime enforcement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="268. MAS can impose several types of remedial actions and sanctions depending on a number of factors including the nature/seriousness of the misconduct (e.g. the extent of weaknesses in an FI’s/VASP’s AML/CFT controls) and the severity of the breaches. In less severe cases, remedial actions such as supervisory reminders or sanctions such as private reprimands and supervisory warnings may be issued to the FIs/VASPs and/or the individuals concerned. MAS has the power to impose more serious sanctions, including financial sanctions (maximum SGD 1 million or USD 740 000 per offence), prohibition orders (POs), curtailment of business, as well as revocation or suspension of licence. In 2024, MAS expanded the scope of its POs to allow MAS to ban persons who are responsible for AML/CFT non-compliance from the financial sector. 269. MAS tracks the rectification of breaches identified. MAS requires FIs to submit regular updates (e.g. monthly or quarterly) on the progress of remediation (refer to “reports requiring remediation” as set out in Table 3.7) and monitor FIs and VASPs’ progress until all issues are satisfactorily addressed. Where required follow-up actions are incomplete or late, a deeper supervisory action is conducted. MAS may also take other measures, such as appointing independent auditors to monitor completion of remediation actions, which MAS has done in 19 instances over the last five years. When a supervisory activity finds systemic AML/CFT failings, it makes a recommendation to MAS’ Enforcement Department to determine the appropriate actions to be taken. Most proposals made to the Enforcement Department result in the imposition of an enforcement action. Table 3.7. Remedial Actions and Sanctions applied by MAS across all FIs/VASPs (Except Moneylenders) Combined Remedial Actions/Sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Reports requiring remediation 133 40 20 90 67 Supervisory reminders 3 5 3 4 4 Supervisory warnings 14 12 10 7 9 Private reprimands 3 4 0 0 3 Financial sanctions in lieu of prosecution 5 (SGD 2.3mm) 2 (SGD 2.1mm) 2 (SGD 3.3mm) 4 (SGD 3.8mm) 2 (SGD 4.4mm) Others (e.g., curtailment of business, license revocation) 2 0 2 1 0 Note: Figure on reports requiring remediation includes instances of all other remedial actions and sanctions imposed. 270. MAS’ Penalty Framework has a gradated consideration for remedial measures and sanctions. The maximum prescribed fine is SGD 1 million or USD 740 000 per offence. MAS also applies a composition framework where financial sanctions statutorily capped at 50% of the maximum offence amount can be paid in lieu of prosecution. From that much lower statutory cap, MAS, in consultation with the AGC, would compound some of the breaches which are of a similar nature or which arose from similar circumstances or were part of the same transaction or incident. Collectively, the much lower statutory cap for composition and the decisions to compound breaches resulted in significantly lower numbers and amounts of financial sanctions in practice. Apart from financial sanctions, MAS applies other serious sanctions against severe breaches, including revocation of licence of one fund management company in 2020. 271. MAS has used financial sanctions (15 financial sanctions from 2020 to 2024), and other serious penalties on FIs including curtailment of business or revocation of licenses (five from 2020 to 2024), etc. Since its last mutual evaluation, the average number of sanctions applied annually have significantly increased (16.4 vs 24.4), but the absolute number remains low. In 2025, MAS has further stepped up its sanction efforts, with a total of 33 sanctions taken as of July 2025, comprising 15 financial sanctions and 18 supervisory reminders/warnings and private reprimands. On 4 July 2025 (during onsite visit), sanctions amounting to SGD 27.45 million (USD 20.3 million) were imposed against nine FIs in relation to the 3B$ case; in addition, POs were issued against four individuals for failing to raise red flags when they were aware of information that should raise suspicion and failure to perform EDD for multiple persons of interests related to the case, and reprimands were issued against 14 individuals for failure to conduct or ensure proper due diligence of persons of interest related to the case. This progress is encouraging but the value of financial sanctions remains not commensurate with the nature of the breaches, the size/scale of FIs/VASPs in Singapore or Singapore’s risk and context. Table 3.8. Actions by MAS against Individuals Action 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Letter of Advice 2 2 0 0 0 Supervisory Warning 0 0 0 0 0 Reprimand 2 0 0 0 3 Prohibition Order 1 0 1 1 0 Financial Sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 Others (e.g., individual’s investigation findings recorded in MAS’ internal licensing database) 1 0 0 0 0 272. Apart from institutions, MAS also holds senior managers and employees accountable for their part in the FI’s/VASPs’ failings. MAS has taken a range of actions against individuals proportionate to their misconduct, including reprimands and prohibition orders (upwards of a lifetime ban). Between 2020 and 2024, MAS took actions against 13 individuals including three prohibition orders, with 21 additional actions taken in the first seven months of 2025 (including four prohibition orders and two financial sanctions). This is a key area that MAS had stepped up since its last mutual evaluation. MAS’ sanctions against FIs and individuals are also published to achieve deterrent effect. 273.  MAS’ sanctions are complemented by pro-active and close follow-up with FIs and VASPs to ensure implementation of remedial actions, including monitoring internal and external audit reports, examinations, or appointing independent auditors, etc. For example, FIs/VASPs would be required to put together a comprehensive plan to address MAS’ concerns, including commitments to increase ML/TF headcount and technology investment, re-organisation of institutional set-ups, conduct wider remedial measures, etc. Following these actions, MAS observed that FIs/VASPs had increased AML/CFT related resources and committed significant technology investments to enhance controls, as well as strengthened front office accountability and elevated the level of management oversight. 274. MAS’ supervisory initiatives also serve to strengthen the overall compliance culture. For instance, under MAS’ intensive Supervisory Uplift programme, MAS requires FIs to develop effectiveness indicators (e.g. number of STRs filed, customers exited in relation to key risks identified) and monitors these indicators to ensure effectiveness of FIs’ controls on a sustained basis. The financial industry was proactive in improving sector-level AML/CFT resilience, including industry-led best practice papers, sharing of experiences at industry-led workshops, and proactive sharing of risk information through COSMIC. Specifically, even though sharing on COSMIC has yet to become mandatory, participating banks have filed an additional 461 STRs involving a total of SGD1.6 billion (USD 1.2 billion) and 1 152 suspicious customer accounts were closed in the first year of COSMIC operations. An additional 91 customers were subjected to enhanced monitoring by the banks as their profile or behaviour did not yet warrant the filing of an STR. 275. MinLaw will require the moneylenders to rectify the deficiencies within a required timeline where AML/CFT deficiencies are identified during on-site examinations. MinLaw's Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office is empowered to impose administrative penalties (e.g., license revocation/suspension or forfeiture of security deposits) or criminal enforcement actions (e.g., warnings, composition penalties, and prosecution) on moneylenders non-compliant with AML/CFT/CPF rules. During the assessment period, MinLaw has issued one warning to a moneylender. No other remedial measures or sanctions have been applied. 276. Overall, Singapore needs to strike a better balance between supporting reporting entities and preventing non-compliance. MAS has made progress in the application of sanctions although the number of remedial actions and sanctions remains relatively low and the level of financial sanctions remains not proportionate or dissuasive when considering the size of FIs/VASPs, the serious nature of breaches as well as Singapore’s risk and context. Singapore has stepped up sanctions and held individuals to account for their lapses in recent cases, and such actions are generally published for deterrent effect. That said, sanctions are complemented by Singapore’s extensive remedial measures and close monitoring, strong industry engagement and public-private partnership, which is observed to have fostered a stronger compliance culture amongst FIs/VASPs and drive improvements in AML/CFT controls amongst FIs/ VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="268. MAS can impose several types of remedial actions and sanctions depending on a number of factors including the nature/seriousness of the misconduct (e.g. the extent of weaknesses in an FI’s/VASP’s AML/CFT controls) and the severity of the breaches. In less severe cases, remedial actions such as supervisory reminders or sanctions such as private reprimands and supervisory warnings may be issued to the FIs/VASPs and/or the individuals concerned. MAS has the power to impose more serious sanctions, including financial sanctions (maximum SGD 1 million or USD 740 000 per offence), prohibition orders (POs), curtailment of business, as well as revocation or suspension of licence. In 2024, MAS expanded the scope of its POs to allow MAS to ban persons who are responsible for AML/CFT non-compliance from the financial sector. 269. MAS tracks the rectification of breaches identified. MAS requires FIs to submit regular updates (e.g. monthly or quarterly) on the progress of remediation (refer to “reports requiring remediation” as set out in Table 3.7) and monitor FIs and VASPs’ progress until all issues are satisfactorily addressed. Where required follow-up actions are incomplete or late, a deeper supervisory action is conducted. MAS may also take other measures, such as appointing independent auditors to monitor completion of remediation actions, which MAS has done in 19 instances over the last five years. When a supervisory activity finds systemic AML/CFT failings, it makes a recommendation to MAS’ Enforcement Department to determine the appropriate actions to be taken. Most proposals made to the Enforcement Department result in the imposition of an enforcement action. Table 3.7. Remedial Actions and Sanctions applied by MAS across all FIs/VASPs (Except Moneylenders) Combined Remedial Actions/Sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Reports requiring remediation 133 40 20 90 67 Supervisory reminders 3 5 3 4 4 Supervisory warnings 14 12 10 7 9 Private reprimands 3 4 0 0 3 Financial sanctions in lieu of prosecution 5 (SGD 2.3mm) 2 (SGD 2.1mm) 2 (SGD 3.3mm) 4 (SGD 3.8mm) 2 (SGD 4.4mm) Others (e.g., curtailment of business, license revocation) 2 0 2 1 0 Note: Figure on reports requiring remediation includes instances of all other remedial actions and sanctions imposed. 270. MAS’ Penalty Framework has a gradated consideration for remedial measures and sanctions. The maximum prescribed fine is SGD 1 million or USD 740 000 per offence. MAS also applies a composition framework where financial sanctions statutorily capped at 50% of the maximum offence amount can be paid in lieu of prosecution. From that much lower statutory cap, MAS, in consultation with the AGC, would compound some of the breaches which are of a similar nature or which arose from similar circumstances or were part of the same transaction or incident. Collectively, the much lower statutory cap for composition and the decisions to compound breaches resulted in significantly lower numbers and amounts of financial sanctions in practice. Apart from financial sanctions, MAS applies other serious sanctions against severe breaches, including revocation of licence of one fund management company in 2020. 271. MAS has used financial sanctions (15 financial sanctions from 2020 to 2024), and other serious penalties on FIs including curtailment of business or revocation of licenses (five from 2020 to 2024), etc. Since its last mutual evaluation, the average number of sanctions applied annually have significantly increased (16.4 vs 24.4), but the absolute number remains low. In 2025, MAS has further stepped up its sanction efforts, with a total of 33 sanctions taken as of July 2025, comprising 15 financial sanctions and 18 supervisory reminders/warnings and private reprimands. On 4 July 2025 (during onsite visit), sanctions amounting to SGD 27.45 million (USD 20.3 million) were imposed against nine FIs in relation to the 3B$ case; in addition, POs were issued against four individuals for failing to raise red flags when they were aware of information that should raise suspicion and failure to perform EDD for multiple persons of interests related to the case, and reprimands were issued against 14 individuals for failure to conduct or ensure proper due diligence of persons of interest related to the case. This progress is encouraging but the value of financial sanctions remains not commensurate with the nature of the breaches, the size/scale of FIs/VASPs in Singapore or Singapore’s risk and context. Table 3.8. Actions by MAS against Individuals Action 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Letter of Advice 2 2 0 0 0 Supervisory Warning 0 0 0 0 0 Reprimand 2 0 0 0 3 Prohibition Order 1 0 1 1 0 Financial Sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 Others (e.g., individual’s investigation findings recorded in MAS’ internal licensing database) 1 0 0 0 0 272. Apart from institutions, MAS also holds senior managers and employees accountable for their part in the FI’s/VASPs’ failings. MAS has taken a range of actions against individuals proportionate to their misconduct, including reprimands and prohibition orders (upwards of a lifetime ban). Between 2020 and 2024, MAS took actions against 13 individuals including three prohibition orders, with 21 additional actions taken in the first seven months of 2025 (including four prohibition orders and two financial sanctions). This is a key area that MAS had stepped up since its last mutual evaluation. MAS’ sanctions against FIs and individuals are also published to achieve deterrent effect. 273.  MAS’ sanctions are complemented by pro-active and close follow-up with FIs and VASPs to ensure implementation of remedial actions, including monitoring internal and external audit reports, examinations, or appointing independent auditors, etc. For example, FIs/VASPs would be required to put together a comprehensive plan to address MAS’ concerns, including commitments to increase ML/TF headcount and technology investment, re-organisation of institutional set-ups, conduct wider remedial measures, etc. Following these actions, MAS observed that FIs/VASPs had increased AML/CFT related resources and committed significant technology investments to enhance controls, as well as strengthened front office accountability and elevated the level of management oversight. 274. MAS’ supervisory initiatives also serve to strengthen the overall compliance culture. For instance, under MAS’ intensive Supervisory Uplift programme, MAS requires FIs to develop effectiveness indicators (e.g. number of STRs filed, customers exited in relation to key risks identified) and monitors these indicators to ensure effectiveness of FIs’ controls on a sustained basis. The financial industry was proactive in improving sector-level AML/CFT resilience, including industry-led best practice papers, sharing of experiences at industry-led workshops, and proactive sharing of risk information through COSMIC. Specifically, even though sharing on COSMIC has yet to become mandatory, participating banks have filed an additional 461 STRs involving a total of SGD1.6 billion (USD 1.2 billion) and 1 152 suspicious customer accounts were closed in the first year of COSMIC operations. An additional 91 customers were subjected to enhanced monitoring by the banks as their profile or behaviour did not yet warrant the filing of an STR. 275. MinLaw will require the moneylenders to rectify the deficiencies within a required timeline where AML/CFT deficiencies are identified during on-site examinations. MinLaw's Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office is empowered to impose administrative penalties (e.g., license revocation/suspension or forfeiture of security deposits) or criminal enforcement actions (e.g., warnings, composition penalties, and prosecution) on moneylenders non-compliant with AML/CFT/CPF rules. During the assessment period, MinLaw has issued one warning to a moneylender. No other remedial measures or sanctions have been applied. 276. Overall, Singapore needs to strike a better balance between supporting reporting entities and preventing non-compliance. MAS has made progress in the application of sanctions although the number of remedial actions and sanctions remains relatively low and the level of financial sanctions remains not proportionate or dissuasive when considering the size of FIs/VASPs, the serious nature of breaches as well as Singapore’s risk and context. Singapore has stepped up sanctions and held individuals to account for their lapses in recent cases, and such actions are generally published for deterrent effect. That said, sanctions are complemented by Singapore’s extensive remedial measures and close monitoring, strong industry engagement and public-private partnership, which is observed to have fostered a stronger compliance culture amongst FIs/VASPs and drive improvements in AML/CFT controls amongst FIs/ VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="336. Supervisors work with DNFBPs to rectify deficiencies identified in a timely manner through active follow-up on remediation. DNFBP supervisors would engage senior management of DNFBPs to communicate the remedial actions and sanctions to be taken by DNFBPs when AML/CFT obligations are breached. Actions taken against DNFBPs and individuals for severe AML/CFT breaches are generally published to shape industry compliance and public awareness of AML/CFT requirements. 337. DNFBP supervisors have various powers to impose financial penalties in combination with a broad range of administrative sanctions, such as imposing additional conditions on business activities, issuing written directions, revoking, suspension or refusal of renewal of registration or license. Since last ME, Singapore has reviewed and further enhanced the penalty frameworks for DNFBP sectors to bring penalty levels to a baseline of SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) per breach in most instances, except for lawyers and legal practice entities where the baseline sanction remains as SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) per case. The technical framework for sanctioning breaches is in place, however the implementation varies among each sector. 338. For LTCs, sanctions against LTCs and their senior management by MAS are guided by the AML/CFT Penalty Framework and Senior Management Accountability Framework respectively. Under the FSMA, MAS can impose criminal penalties of up to SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) per offence and hold individuals personally liable. MAS also has a range of non-criminal sanctions at its disposal, such as financial penalties (up to SGD 500 000 per offence or USD 370 000), prohibition orders, licence suspensions, and supervisory warnings, often accompanied by proactive supervisory follow-up to ensure implementation of remedial actions. The frameworks make clear when financial penalties should be imposed vis-à-vis other sanctions, and ensure such actions are proportionate and consistent. MAS tracks the rectification of lapses through audits, supervisory activities and appointment of independent auditors, and may impose a restriction on new business until remediation is completed. Between 2020 and 2024, MAS meted out remedial actions and sanctions, including imposing SGD 2.4 million (USD 1.8 million) in financial penalties against three LTCs, imposed a moratorium of new business activities to two LTCs as well as issued supervisory warnings against three LTCs. In addition to requiring LTCs to submit regular updates on the progress of remediation and monitoring closely the LTCs’ progress until all issues are satisfactorily addressed, MAS also required four LTCs to appoint an independent auditor to monitor the completion of remediation actions. MAS has stepped up efforts in remedial actions and sanctions in 1H 2025, with SGD 2.6 million (USD 1.9 million) in financial penalties imposed against two LTCs, two supervisory warnings issued and an LTC required to appoint an independent auditor to monitor the completion of remediation actions. 339. Since the CSP Act came into effect in June 2025, the financial penalty for CSPs has increased from SGD 25 000 (USD 18 500) to SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000). ACRA has also reported to adopt more stringent enforcement stance against AML/CFT breaches since 2021, issuing warnings and financial penalties for more minor deficiencies and applying suspension or cancellation of registration for more severe breaches and higher risk CSPs. During the assessment period, ACRA imposed 15 financial penalties totalling SGD 80 200 (USD 59 000), 36 cancellations of registration and one suspension of registration against CSPs. For accountants, while ACRA has a range of sanctions, the sector has overall demonstrated good compliance and there were no findings warranting sanctions. Accountants are also subject to strict fulfilment of annual renewal criteria and requirements to complete Continuing Professional Education hours that includes AML/CFT as compulsory content. 340. In regards of PSMDs, from 2020-24, MinLaw issued a total 584 warning letters, 48 composition fines totalling SGD 628 000 (USD 464 000), seven cancellations of registrations and 1 suspension of registration for breaches of AML/CFT requirements. MinLaw has also actively taken actions against senior management and key personnel of PSMDs for breaches and issued five compositions fines totalling SGD 119 500 (USD 88 400) against them in 2020-24. MinLaw has stepped up efforts in its sanctions in 1H 2025, with 22 composition fines totalling SGD 1 054 000 (USD 780 000) and two cancellations of registrations issued against breaches by PSMDs, and three composition fines totalling SGD 376 000 (USD 278 200) issued against senior management and key personnel. Regarding pawnbrokers, MinLaw has an internal penalty framework that guides sanctions depending on circumstances of the case. MinLaw would inform pawnbrokers to rectify deficiencies identified during onsite examinations within a required timeline and reported that all deficiencies observed have been promptly rectified. MinLaw has issued 21 warning letters, eight compositions totalling SGD 69 000 (USD 51 000). 341. Regarding lawyers and LPEs, LawSoc, as the SRB, promotes understanding of AML/CFT obligations through guidance materials and trainings, and can impose disciplinary actions ranging from financial penalties or suspension from practice or revocation of license. MinLaw/LawSoc would follow up remediation of deficiencies through re-examinations and indicated that re-inspection results demonstrate positive outcomes. For breaches, stronger sanctions are taken where warranted, and LawSoc can convene a disciplinary tribunal to hear cases of professional misconduct. However, LawSoc had very rarely used its disciplinary power against breaches by lawyers, with no disciplinary action taken between 2020-2024. Following the 3B$ case, MinLaw imposed financial penalties of a total of SGD 130 000 (USD 96 200) against two LPEs and reprimanded one LPE, which included the meting out of the maximum financial penalty to one of the LPEs. MinLaw also referred one lawyer to LawSoc for disciplinary action in July 2025, the investigation of which is ongoing. 342. GRA has applied intensive supervision against casino operators and promoted a strong compliance mindset among casino operators and licensed Special Employees through issuance of directions and guidance. GRA actively used various sanction tools against breaches of AML/CFT requirements, and casino operators engaged external consultants to review and improve their AML/CFT frameworks. Where deficiencies are observed, GRA requires casino operators to take remedial measures within a stipulated timeline. During the assessment period, GRA has imposed a total of nine warning letters, six financial penalties totalling SGD 2 695 000 (USD 2 million) relating to breaches of AML/CFT controls against the two casino operators. Interviewed casino operators expressed that GRA’s intensive supervision has brought pressure and resulted into a stronger compliance culture. 343. For EAs and RESs, legislative amendments took effect in July 2025 to apply the financial penalties on a “per breach” basis, with a view to fostering a culture of compliance in the sector. Where CEA finds breaches during examinations, it takes a range of actions to address the breaches. During the assessment period, CEA has issued a total of 27 letters of warning/censure, seven financial penalties totalling SGD 24 000 (USD 17 800), and three suspensions of registration regarding EAs and RESs. For developers, URA introduced composition of offence for AML/CFT breaches and increased composition amount through the legislative amendments effective July 2025, but there has not been any case of application as there had not been any breach identified through the limited number of examinations conducted for this newly regulated sector. Table 4.4. Remedial and Sanctions applied by DNFBP Supervisors across all DNFBP Sectors Combined Remedial Actions/Sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Reports requiring remediation 75 273 223 218 201 Supervisory reminders 82 18 0 309 19 Supervisory warnings 6 151 74 84 99 Private reprimands 2 0 0 0 0 Financial penalties (total amount of penalties imposed) 3 (SGD 1.3mm) 16 (SGD 1.5mm) 5 (SGD 0.1mm) 10 (SGD 2.5mm) 15 (SGD 0.4mm) Others (e.g., curtailment of business, license revocation) 1 2 5 6 9 344. Overall, DNFBP supervisors have undertaken 1 906 remedial and sanctions in five years against almost 12 600 DNFBPs in Singapore, with the vast majority taking the form of reports requiring remediation, supervisory reminders or warnings. There have been 49 cases of financial penalties, and 23 cases of business curtailment or licence revocation. Supervisors have observed improvements in the overall compliance culture and number of AML/CFT breaches. Stronger sanctions have been applied through the period, but there remains a reliance on remedial measures. While there are limited number of sanctions throughout the assessment period, particularly apparent in sectors such as LTCs, EAs/RESs, lawyers and LPEs, DNFBP supervisors have demonstrated stronger stance against AML/CFT breaches and taken stronger actions, especially in relation to the 3B$ case. Where sanctions were applied, the level of penalty is usually not dissuasive. That said, taking into consideration the various sanctions imposed complemented by remedial actions, some positive outcomes were observed as DNFBP sectors have demonstrated improvements in risk understanding and some newly regulated sectors (e.g. PSMDs) showed gradual improvements in execution of AML/CFT controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="336. Supervisors work with DNFBPs to rectify deficiencies identified in a timely manner through active follow-up on remediation. DNFBP supervisors would engage senior management of DNFBPs to communicate the remedial actions and sanctions to be taken by DNFBPs when AML/CFT obligations are breached. Actions taken against DNFBPs and individuals for severe AML/CFT breaches are generally published to shape industry compliance and public awareness of AML/CFT requirements. 337. DNFBP supervisors have various powers to impose financial penalties in combination with a broad range of administrative sanctions, such as imposing additional conditions on business activities, issuing written directions, revoking, suspension or refusal of renewal of registration or license. Since last ME, Singapore has reviewed and further enhanced the penalty frameworks for DNFBP sectors to bring penalty levels to a baseline of SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) per breach in most instances, except for lawyers and legal practice entities where the baseline sanction remains as SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000) per case. The technical framework for sanctioning breaches is in place, however the implementation varies among each sector. 338. For LTCs, sanctions against LTCs and their senior management by MAS are guided by the AML/CFT Penalty Framework and Senior Management Accountability Framework respectively. Under the FSMA, MAS can impose criminal penalties of up to SGD 1 million (USD 740 000) per offence and hold individuals personally liable. MAS also has a range of non-criminal sanctions at its disposal, such as financial penalties (up to SGD 500 000 per offence or USD 370 000), prohibition orders, licence suspensions, and supervisory warnings, often accompanied by proactive supervisory follow-up to ensure implementation of remedial actions. The frameworks make clear when financial penalties should be imposed vis-à-vis other sanctions, and ensure such actions are proportionate and consistent. MAS tracks the rectification of lapses through audits, supervisory activities and appointment of independent auditors, and may impose a restriction on new business until remediation is completed. Between 2020 and 2024, MAS meted out remedial actions and sanctions, including imposing SGD 2.4 million (USD 1.8 million) in financial penalties against three LTCs, imposed a moratorium of new business activities to two LTCs as well as issued supervisory warnings against three LTCs. In addition to requiring LTCs to submit regular updates on the progress of remediation and monitoring closely the LTCs’ progress until all issues are satisfactorily addressed, MAS also required four LTCs to appoint an independent auditor to monitor the completion of remediation actions. MAS has stepped up efforts in remedial actions and sanctions in 1H 2025, with SGD 2.6 million (USD 1.9 million) in financial penalties imposed against two LTCs, two supervisory warnings issued and an LTC required to appoint an independent auditor to monitor the completion of remediation actions. 339. Since the CSP Act came into effect in June 2025, the financial penalty for CSPs has increased from SGD 25 000 (USD 18 500) to SGD 100 000 (USD 74 000). ACRA has also reported to adopt more stringent enforcement stance against AML/CFT breaches since 2021, issuing warnings and financial penalties for more minor deficiencies and applying suspension or cancellation of registration for more severe breaches and higher risk CSPs. During the assessment period, ACRA imposed 15 financial penalties totalling SGD 80 200 (USD 59 000), 36 cancellations of registration and one suspension of registration against CSPs. For accountants, while ACRA has a range of sanctions, the sector has overall demonstrated good compliance and there were no findings warranting sanctions. Accountants are also subject to strict fulfilment of annual renewal criteria and requirements to complete Continuing Professional Education hours that includes AML/CFT as compulsory content. 340. In regards of PSMDs, from 2020-24, MinLaw issued a total 584 warning letters, 48 composition fines totalling SGD 628 000 (USD 464 000), seven cancellations of registrations and 1 suspension of registration for breaches of AML/CFT requirements. MinLaw has also actively taken actions against senior management and key personnel of PSMDs for breaches and issued five compositions fines totalling SGD 119 500 (USD 88 400) against them in 2020-24. MinLaw has stepped up efforts in its sanctions in 1H 2025, with 22 composition fines totalling SGD 1 054 000 (USD 780 000) and two cancellations of registrations issued against breaches by PSMDs, and three composition fines totalling SGD 376 000 (USD 278 200) issued against senior management and key personnel. Regarding pawnbrokers, MinLaw has an internal penalty framework that guides sanctions depending on circumstances of the case. MinLaw would inform pawnbrokers to rectify deficiencies identified during onsite examinations within a required timeline and reported that all deficiencies observed have been promptly rectified. MinLaw has issued 21 warning letters, eight compositions totalling SGD 69 000 (USD 51 000). 341. Regarding lawyers and LPEs, LawSoc, as the SRB, promotes understanding of AML/CFT obligations through guidance materials and trainings, and can impose disciplinary actions ranging from financial penalties or suspension from practice or revocation of license. MinLaw/LawSoc would follow up remediation of deficiencies through re-examinations and indicated that re-inspection results demonstrate positive outcomes. For breaches, stronger sanctions are taken where warranted, and LawSoc can convene a disciplinary tribunal to hear cases of professional misconduct. However, LawSoc had very rarely used its disciplinary power against breaches by lawyers, with no disciplinary action taken between 2020-2024. Following the 3B$ case, MinLaw imposed financial penalties of a total of SGD 130 000 (USD 96 200) against two LPEs and reprimanded one LPE, which included the meting out of the maximum financial penalty to one of the LPEs. MinLaw also referred one lawyer to LawSoc for disciplinary action in July 2025, the investigation of which is ongoing. 342. GRA has applied intensive supervision against casino operators and promoted a strong compliance mindset among casino operators and licensed Special Employees through issuance of directions and guidance. GRA actively used various sanction tools against breaches of AML/CFT requirements, and casino operators engaged external consultants to review and improve their AML/CFT frameworks. Where deficiencies are observed, GRA requires casino operators to take remedial measures within a stipulated timeline. During the assessment period, GRA has imposed a total of nine warning letters, six financial penalties totalling SGD 2 695 000 (USD 2 million) relating to breaches of AML/CFT controls against the two casino operators. Interviewed casino operators expressed that GRA’s intensive supervision has brought pressure and resulted into a stronger compliance culture. 343. For EAs and RESs, legislative amendments took effect in July 2025 to apply the financial penalties on a “per breach” basis, with a view to fostering a culture of compliance in the sector. Where CEA finds breaches during examinations, it takes a range of actions to address the breaches. During the assessment period, CEA has issued a total of 27 letters of warning/censure, seven financial penalties totalling SGD 24 000 (USD 17 800), and three suspensions of registration regarding EAs and RESs. For developers, URA introduced composition of offence for AML/CFT breaches and increased composition amount through the legislative amendments effective July 2025, but there has not been any case of application as there had not been any breach identified through the limited number of examinations conducted for this newly regulated sector. Table 4.4. Remedial and Sanctions applied by DNFBP Supervisors across all DNFBP Sectors Combined Remedial Actions/Sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Reports requiring remediation 75 273 223 218 201 Supervisory reminders 82 18 0 309 19 Supervisory warnings 6 151 74 84 99 Private reprimands 2 0 0 0 0 Financial penalties (total amount of penalties imposed) 3 (SGD 1.3mm) 16 (SGD 1.5mm) 5 (SGD 0.1mm) 10 (SGD 2.5mm) 15 (SGD 0.4mm) Others (e.g., curtailment of business, license revocation) 1 2 5 6 9 344. Overall, DNFBP supervisors have undertaken 1 906 remedial and sanctions in five years against almost 12 600 DNFBPs in Singapore, with the vast majority taking the form of reports requiring remediation, supervisory reminders or warnings. There have been 49 cases of financial penalties, and 23 cases of business curtailment or licence revocation. Supervisors have observed improvements in the overall compliance culture and number of AML/CFT breaches. Stronger sanctions have been applied through the period, but there remains a reliance on remedial measures. While there are limited number of sanctions throughout the assessment period, particularly apparent in sectors such as LTCs, EAs/RESs, lawyers and LPEs, DNFBP supervisors have demonstrated stronger stance against AML/CFT breaches and taken stronger actions, especially in relation to the 3B$ case. Where sanctions were applied, the level of penalty is usually not dissuasive. That said, taking into consideration the various sanctions imposed complemented by remedial actions, some positive outcomes were observed as DNFBP sectors have demonstrated improvements in risk understanding and some newly regulated sectors (e.g. PSMDs) showed gradual improvements in execution of AML/CFT controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="525. Singapore prioritises the return of assets to victims and rightful owners when they are identifiable and forfeits criminal assets to the State when they are not (which also serves to cover costs of asset preservation). Restitution is a process carried out post-confiscation and not a separate form of asset recovery that precludes confiscation in Singapore. Authorities have taken many proactive steps to implement a victim-cantered approach, such as: seeking court-ordered compensation; adopting early seizure and value-preservation practices to maximise funds available for restitution; and engaging in upstream harm prevention, particularly in CEF cases. Where necessary, Singapore proactively reaches out to foreign partners to return recovered assets to other jurisdictions, which it achieves especially through informal channels. Box 8.5 demonstrates the effectiveness of rapid cross-border collaboration in preventing asset dissipation and securing victim restitution, both in Singapore and abroad. 526. Singapore returned approximately SGD 403 million (USD 298 million) in confiscated assets to victims during the reporting period, or about 10% of the SGD 4 billion (USD 2.96 billion) confiscated in the same period. This includes SGD 115.9 million (USD 85.8 million) of restitution in ML cases, with about 90% linked to foreign predicates (primarily fraud and corruption) and SGD 291.6 million (USD 215.7 million) of restitution in associated predicate offence cases, largely stemming from domestic predicate offences such as illegal gambling, robbery, and fraud. This outcome is largely in line with Singapore’s risk profile as an IFI, with most confiscated assets stemming from ML cases involving foreign predicates and unknown victims. Box 8.5. Asset Repatriation 1 MDB (Malaysia) Since the high-profile embezzlement of the 1MDB investment fund in Malaysia (starting in 2015), SPF and AGC have obtained orders from Singapore courts to release about SGD 124 million (USD 91.7 million) in seized assets and return these to Malaysia. In the review period, SGD 92.1 million (USD 68.1 million) in assets have been repatriated, and Singaporean authorities are engaging with their Malaysian counterparts to secure the repatriation of the remaining amount. Scam victims In April 2024, swift co-ordination between Singapore and authorities in foreign jurisdictions led to the successful recovery of SGD 370 000 (USD 273 800) in scam proceeds and their repatriation to the victim in Singapore. After a bank in Singapore detected suspicious transfers involving an older victim’s account to a flagged account in the foreign jurisdiction, ASC promptly alerted its counterpart. Further investigation revealed additional losses from a second bank, which were also traced to the same foreign account. With strong co-operation between banks, LEAs, and international partners, including proactive community engagement by Singapore’s police, the funds were frozen and returned to Singapore." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="525. Singapore prioritises the return of assets to victims and rightful owners when they are identifiable and forfeits criminal assets to the State when they are not (which also serves to cover costs of asset preservation). Restitution is a process carried out post-confiscation and not a separate form of asset recovery that precludes confiscation in Singapore. Authorities have taken many proactive steps to implement a victim-cantered approach, such as: seeking court-ordered compensation; adopting early seizure and value-preservation practices to maximise funds available for restitution; and engaging in upstream harm prevention, particularly in CEF cases. Where necessary, Singapore proactively reaches out to foreign partners to return recovered assets to other jurisdictions, which it achieves especially through informal channels. Box 8.5 demonstrates the effectiveness of rapid cross-border collaboration in preventing asset dissipation and securing victim restitution, both in Singapore and abroad. 526. Singapore returned approximately SGD 403 million (USD 298 million) in confiscated assets to victims during the reporting period, or about 10% of the SGD 4 billion (USD 2.96 billion) confiscated in the same period. This includes SGD 115.9 million (USD 85.8 million) of restitution in ML cases, with about 90% linked to foreign predicates (primarily fraud and corruption) and SGD 291.6 million (USD 215.7 million) of restitution in associated predicate offence cases, largely stemming from domestic predicate offences such as illegal gambling, robbery, and fraud. This outcome is largely in line with Singapore’s risk profile as an IFI, with most confiscated assets stemming from ML cases involving foreign predicates and unknown victims. Box 8.5. Asset Repatriation 1 MDB (Malaysia) Since the high-profile embezzlement of the 1MDB investment fund in Malaysia (starting in 2015), SPF and AGC have obtained orders from Singapore courts to release about SGD 124 million (USD 91.7 million) in seized assets and return these to Malaysia. In the review period, SGD 92.1 million (USD 68.1 million) in assets have been repatriated, and Singaporean authorities are engaging with their Malaysian counterparts to secure the repatriation of the remaining amount. Scam victims In April 2024, swift co-ordination between Singapore and authorities in foreign jurisdictions led to the successful recovery of SGD 370 000 (USD 273 800) in scam proceeds and their repatriation to the victim in Singapore. After a bank in Singapore detected suspicious transfers involving an older victim’s account to a flagged account in the foreign jurisdiction, ASC promptly alerted its counterpart. Further investigation revealed additional losses from a second bank, which were also traced to the same foreign account. With strong co-operation between banks, LEAs, and international partners, including proactive community engagement by Singapore’s police, the funds were frozen and returned to Singapore." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 663. The approach to monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). The review of reporting entities’ compliance with PF TFS obligations is integrated into the overall scope of supervisory activities. As identified in IO.3, MAS supervises and monitors FIs’ and VASPs’ implementation of PF TFS through supervisory activities that are initiated by three approaches: (1) controls-based, (2) FIRA-based or (3) risk surveillance-based. 664. Controls-based supervisory engagements are targeted scope supervisory activities where MAS has become aware of a compliance issue through the review of internal/external audit reports, the review of STRs, etc. In these cases, MAS promptly follows up with the FI/VASP to rectify the issue. Table 11.4. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 408 484 394 473 446 2205 DPTSPs (29) 0 6 12 26 22 66 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 21 25 21 67 89 223 Insurers (105) 33 39 44 50 59 236 Note: See Table 11.5 below for supervisory examinations related to CSPs, PSMDs and Lawyers/LPEs 665. Singapore places great reliance on controls-based supervisory activities – they represent approximately 95% of total supervisory activities. However, given the targeted and less formal nature of these supervisory activities, there are no statistics on exactly what scope these supervisory activities covered. It is known that these activities took place, and if there was a compliance issue it was generally either rectified or escalated to a more intensive supervisory activity. There is no information to demonstrate how, and to what extent, these controls-based supervisory engagements incorporated PF TFS obligations. Some credit must be given to Singapore for the supervision of PF TFS requirements through these controls-based supervisory activities but because of the unknown scope, the assessment team must be conservative in taking these into account. 666. As outlined in IO3 Singapore also conducts full scope or more intrusive examinations through its other two supervisory approaches, FIRA-based or risk surveillance-based. These include vetting policies and procedures, reviewing sanctions screening activities, testing alerts, checking freezing/blocking requirements, overseeing transaction monitoring and reporting of matches. Considering the number of REs, and the risk and context of Singapore, few supervisory activities are known to scope in ensuring compliance with PF TFS. Table 11.5. CPF-related Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 5 9 2 10 0 26 DPTSPs (29) 0 0 3 5 0 8 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 2 5 0 38 43 88 Insurers (105) 1 0 0 0 0 1 CSPs (3093) 109 379 367 300 417 1572 PSMDs (1967) 218 136 209 241 191 995 Lawyers/LPEs (1161) 50 50 50 52 24 226 Total 385 579 631 646 675 2916 667. Over the course of the assessment period, there was limited known coverage of supervisory activities related to PF TFS for FI and VASP sectors. The number of supervisory examinations scoped to include PF TFS for PSMDs and lawyers/LPEs is quite significant when compared to more material and higher risk sectors. There does not seem to be a risk-based approach to ensuring compliance with PF TFS obligations. Box 11.2. Case Study – Imposition of financial penalty for failure to maintain freeze on the funds of individuals acting on behalf of UNSC-designated entity In response to intelligence from a foreign counterpart, in 2018, CAD investigated a Singapore based UNSC-designated YTE (Yuk Tung Energy, an oil trading and bunkering company). The company was involved in oil trading, bunkering, and marine engineering consultancy work. CAD seized a sum of approximately SGD 22.3 million (USD 16.2 million) in another company’s bank account (PITSPL). YTE had paid PITSPL this amount after agreeing to purchase gasoil. In March 2021, Courts ordered the funds to be released back to PITSPL’s account with Bank A. Bank A subsequently informed MAS that it had assessed that the funds were beneficially owned by YTE and were thus subject to the asset freezing provisions in the FSM DPRK Regulations. In November 2020, MAS imposed a financial penalty of SGD 200 000 (USD 148 000) on Bank D for breaching the FSM DPRK Regulations by closing three accounts belonging to two individuals, MLCJ and ABY, and unfreezing and releasing the funds within to them - an amount of about SGD 9 000 (USD 6 660) was released to MLCJ and an amount of about SGD 30 000 (USD 22 200) was released to ABY. Given that MLCJ and ABY were the shareholders and directors of UNSC-designated YTE, they were assessed to be acting on behalf of YTE. This penalty was applied almost two years after the YTE’s oil transactions with DPRK were brought to Singapore’s attention by another jurisdiction and the UNSC. The bank had voluntarily reported the lapse to MAS and has since enhanced and tightened its controls to prevent a recurrence. In 2022, a Director of YTE pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice charges related to an illegal ship-to-ship gasoil transaction in 2018 between a YTE-owned vessel and a DPRK-registered vessel. 668. Where there were breaches of CPF requirements detected, remedial actions and sanctions were applied. However, these penalties are relatively low. 17 remedial measures and sanctions were imposed against banks, nine against CSPs, six against insurers and two against DPTSPs. Remedial measures and sanctions ranged from lighter actions such as a supervisory reminder, private reprimand or supervisory warning to stronger actions such as imposition of financial penalty, curtailment of business or revocation of licence. During this same period, MAS also took action against two FIs for breaches of the FSM DPRK Regulations (i.e. imposition of financial penalty and private reprimand). Penalties for failure to comply with PF-related obligations are relatively low when considering the breaches and are not proportionate and dissuasive in all cases. In addition to the actions taken for breaches, MAS regularly gets FIs/VASPs to take remedial actions to address findings identified in its supervisory engagements and examinations. Box 11.3. Case Study – Singaporean persons trading with the DPRK In 2020, MAS detected an STR network involving a Singapore citizen, JC, who, according to the UNSC Panel of Experts on the DPRK, allegedly shipped vodka to the DPRK. The entities of which JC was a shareholder, or a director were also allegedly involved. Based on the STRs filed, JC appeared to be attempting to circumvent a number of banks’ controls by using an alias to facilitate the payments for the vodka purchases. MAS escalated this case to ISTRA in November 2020 and followed up with the banks involved. MAS’ follow-up did not uncover assets that the banks should have frozen pursuant to the FSM DPRK Regulations or any breach of the FSM DPRK Regulations or major weaknesses. There were instances where some of the banks’ name screening checks could be further enhanced (i.e. they should not just screen against sanctions lists but also against names identified within the UNSC Panel of Experts’ reports), and MAS requested these banks to do so. Separately, Customs carried out an investigation into JC and his entities, and charges have since been brought against them for exporting prohibited items pursuant to the UN DPRK Regulations and the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 663. The approach to monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). The review of reporting entities’ compliance with PF TFS obligations is integrated into the overall scope of supervisory activities. As identified in IO.3, MAS supervises and monitors FIs’ and VASPs’ implementation of PF TFS through supervisory activities that are initiated by three approaches: (1) controls-based, (2) FIRA-based or (3) risk surveillance-based. 664. Controls-based supervisory engagements are targeted scope supervisory activities where MAS has become aware of a compliance issue through the review of internal/external audit reports, the review of STRs, etc. In these cases, MAS promptly follows up with the FI/VASP to rectify the issue. Table 11.4. Number of Controls-based Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 408 484 394 473 446 2205 DPTSPs (29) 0 6 12 26 22 66 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 21 25 21 67 89 223 Insurers (105) 33 39 44 50 59 236 Note: See Table 11.5 below for supervisory examinations related to CSPs, PSMDs and Lawyers/LPEs 665. Singapore places great reliance on controls-based supervisory activities – they represent approximately 95% of total supervisory activities. However, given the targeted and less formal nature of these supervisory activities, there are no statistics on exactly what scope these supervisory activities covered. It is known that these activities took place, and if there was a compliance issue it was generally either rectified or escalated to a more intensive supervisory activity. There is no information to demonstrate how, and to what extent, these controls-based supervisory engagements incorporated PF TFS obligations. Some credit must be given to Singapore for the supervision of PF TFS requirements through these controls-based supervisory activities but because of the unknown scope, the assessment team must be conservative in taking these into account. 666. As outlined in IO3 Singapore also conducts full scope or more intrusive examinations through its other two supervisory approaches, FIRA-based or risk surveillance-based. These include vetting policies and procedures, reviewing sanctions screening activities, testing alerts, checking freezing/blocking requirements, overseeing transaction monitoring and reporting of matches. Considering the number of REs, and the risk and context of Singapore, few supervisory activities are known to scope in ensuring compliance with PF TFS. Table 11.5. CPF-related Supervisory Activities Sector 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Banks (155) 5 9 2 10 0 26 DPTSPs (29) 0 0 3 5 0 8 PSPs with CBMT services (199) 2 5 0 38 43 88 Insurers (105) 1 0 0 0 0 1 CSPs (3093) 109 379 367 300 417 1572 PSMDs (1967) 218 136 209 241 191 995 Lawyers/LPEs (1161) 50 50 50 52 24 226 Total 385 579 631 646 675 2916 667. Over the course of the assessment period, there was limited known coverage of supervisory activities related to PF TFS for FI and VASP sectors. The number of supervisory examinations scoped to include PF TFS for PSMDs and lawyers/LPEs is quite significant when compared to more material and higher risk sectors. There does not seem to be a risk-based approach to ensuring compliance with PF TFS obligations. Box 11.2. Case Study – Imposition of financial penalty for failure to maintain freeze on the funds of individuals acting on behalf of UNSC-designated entity In response to intelligence from a foreign counterpart, in 2018, CAD investigated a Singapore based UNSC-designated YTE (Yuk Tung Energy, an oil trading and bunkering company). The company was involved in oil trading, bunkering, and marine engineering consultancy work. CAD seized a sum of approximately SGD 22.3 million (USD 16.2 million) in another company’s bank account (PITSPL). YTE had paid PITSPL this amount after agreeing to purchase gasoil. In March 2021, Courts ordered the funds to be released back to PITSPL’s account with Bank A. Bank A subsequently informed MAS that it had assessed that the funds were beneficially owned by YTE and were thus subject to the asset freezing provisions in the FSM DPRK Regulations. In November 2020, MAS imposed a financial penalty of SGD 200 000 (USD 148 000) on Bank D for breaching the FSM DPRK Regulations by closing three accounts belonging to two individuals, MLCJ and ABY, and unfreezing and releasing the funds within to them - an amount of about SGD 9 000 (USD 6 660) was released to MLCJ and an amount of about SGD 30 000 (USD 22 200) was released to ABY. Given that MLCJ and ABY were the shareholders and directors of UNSC-designated YTE, they were assessed to be acting on behalf of YTE. This penalty was applied almost two years after the YTE’s oil transactions with DPRK were brought to Singapore’s attention by another jurisdiction and the UNSC. The bank had voluntarily reported the lapse to MAS and has since enhanced and tightened its controls to prevent a recurrence. In 2022, a Director of YTE pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice charges related to an illegal ship-to-ship gasoil transaction in 2018 between a YTE-owned vessel and a DPRK-registered vessel. 668. Where there were breaches of CPF requirements detected, remedial actions and sanctions were applied. However, these penalties are relatively low. 17 remedial measures and sanctions were imposed against banks, nine against CSPs, six against insurers and two against DPTSPs. Remedial measures and sanctions ranged from lighter actions such as a supervisory reminder, private reprimand or supervisory warning to stronger actions such as imposition of financial penalty, curtailment of business or revocation of licence. During this same period, MAS also took action against two FIs for breaches of the FSM DPRK Regulations (i.e. imposition of financial penalty and private reprimand). Penalties for failure to comply with PF-related obligations are relatively low when considering the breaches and are not proportionate and dissuasive in all cases. In addition to the actions taken for breaches, MAS regularly gets FIs/VASPs to take remedial actions to address findings identified in its supervisory engagements and examinations. Box 11.3. Case Study – Singaporean persons trading with the DPRK In 2020, MAS detected an STR network involving a Singapore citizen, JC, who, according to the UNSC Panel of Experts on the DPRK, allegedly shipped vodka to the DPRK. The entities of which JC was a shareholder, or a director were also allegedly involved. Based on the STRs filed, JC appeared to be attempting to circumvent a number of banks’ controls by using an alias to facilitate the payments for the vodka purchases. MAS escalated this case to ISTRA in November 2020 and followed up with the banks involved. MAS’ follow-up did not uncover assets that the banks should have frozen pursuant to the FSM DPRK Regulations or any breach of the FSM DPRK Regulations or major weaknesses. There were instances where some of the banks’ name screening checks could be further enhanced (i.e. they should not just screen against sanctions lists but also against names identified within the UNSC Panel of Experts’ reports), and MAS requested these banks to do so. Separately, Customs carried out an investigation into JC and his entities, and charges have since been brought against them for exporting prohibited items pursuant to the UN DPRK Regulations and the Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 527. Singapore has recently strengthened its institutional and operational framework to identify and seize non-declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI. Some gaps have been observed with the detection of CBCRR cases, with 439 violations detected over five years, out of 220 834 declarations and 576 million border crossings (travellers). Singapore has sought to remedy gaps with detection from 2024, but the effectiveness of these recent measures cannot be fully determined at this time. Authorities are aware of the risks related to cross-border transportation of cash/BNI and have made some seizures, although the number of seizures is low considering Singapore’s status as an IFI and transit/transportation hub. There has only been one confiscation in relation to ML. 528. Singapore’s declaration system, which was fully digitised since 2024, requires any person moving cash in and out of the country in excess of SGD 20 000 to (approx. USD 14 000) to make an online declaration. These declarations are automatically ingested into STRO’s IT systems. ICA and SPF/CAD utilise various means to detect false/under-declarations, including conducting risk profiling and targeting of passengers at checkpoints for passengers from jurisdictions identified by Singapore as high-risk countries for CBCRR breaches. LEAs also consult STRO’s and SPF’s databases for relevant STR, CTR and CMR information filed by casinos, money changers and remittance services. LEAs also leverage on foreign sources and search criminal backgrounds, screen against intelligence databases and review advance passenger information from airlines. Crucially, however, ICA lacks advanced screening machines that can specifically detect cash by scanning postal articles, cargo, shipments, and luggage moving through checkpoints. This creates a vulnerability, particularly considering Singapore’s position as a transit/transportation hub. ICA would benefit from the use of new technologies to enhance its cash detection capabilities for both travellers and cargo. 529. Singapore’s NRA does not identify bulk cash smuggling as a significant risk. Singapore has one of the highest levels of financial inclusion in the world and is mainly a cashless society, meaning that substantial amounts of cash would be more out of place in Singapore than elsewhere. However, cash-based ML has proven persistent even in highly banked jurisdictions, and among some of Singapore’s closest neighbouring countries. The NRA acknowledges there is a risk associated with money mules transporting cash in/out of the country. 530. Notwithstanding, some limitations were observed in the risk-profiling system and detection practices, which undermines LEA’s ability to identify potential breaches of CBCRR in a timely and effective manner. For example, the risk profiling system did not regularly target persons carrying cash. There have been cases in which ICA found out post facto about false or non-declarations, with some passenger found traveling through Singapore with cash over the reporting threshold (see example in Box 8.6). Authorities attribute these lapses to the absence of electronic submission mechanism prior to 2024. 531. Singapore has since 2024 taken steps to improve detection of CBCRR breaches and better adapt to observed typologies, including geographical risks. For example, in early 2025, authorities conducted additional checks on passengers from a neighbouring country prone to CEF activities to better understand ML/TF/predicate offence risks associated with large cash inflows. Moreover, CAD now shares CBCRR breaches detected during ML or predicate offence investigations with ICA on a quarterly basis. These are combined with other data points to improve ICA’s risk profiling and identification of CBCRR breaches. ICA officers have received dedicated training to spot suspicious traveller behaviour. Since 2025, ICA enforces CBCRR breaches above the declaration threshold without ML/TF suspicion, while complex cases are escalated to CAD’s FIG for detailed financial investigation. While positive, it is too early to determine whether these measures will lessen the number of undetected instances of CBCRR violations and mitigate the risk of cross-border cash smuggling. Box 8.6. Breach in CBCRR declaration Cross-border BEC case (2020) A Western health products company was defrauded into transferring EUR 6.6 million to a Singapore corporate account for fake Personal Protective Equipment purchases. Swift action by SPF and seven banks led to freezing over EUR 6.4 million the same day. Investigations revealed the Singapore company’s director knowingly facilitated laundering for a foreign fraud syndicate. Over SGD 10.2 million (USD 7.5 million) was moved through multiple accounts. He submitted two CMRs (SGD 1 million/USD 740 000 each) but later admitted under-declaring cash amounts hand-carried out of Singapore. Investigators matched CMRs, withdrawals, and travel records to trace fund flows. The director was convicted of seven ML counts and two CBCRR breaches. He received 8 years and 8 months’ imprisonment. He is currently appealing the conviction Detection of undeclared amount (2025) ICA officers intercepted a man from Country X at a ferry terminal with undeclared cash amounting to SGD 26 260 (USD 20 000). CAD investigations revealed his involvement in advertising illegal online gambling websites based out of Country Y. Evidence from his phone showed draft and final advertisement materials used on social media. He admitted the cash was payment from gambling operators to fund further advertising. CAD found no links to ML, TF, or predicate offences upon inquiring in SPF and STRO databases. Information was shared with Country Y authorities and INTERPOL. He was charged 10 days later under Sections 60 and 54 of the CDSA and convicted in March to 3 months and 2 weeks’ jail. The full cash amount was forfeited under Section 364 CPC. After serving his sentence, he was deported and barred from re-entering Singapore. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 532. The authorities have shown they can confiscate currency in case of CBCRR breaches where they consider there is a link to ML/TF or predicate offences, but there has only been one confiscation in relation to ML despite 439 instances of false or non-declaration. 533. In the review period, incoming passengers submitted a majority of CBCRR declarations (the majority of travel in/out of Singapore occurs by land over the border with Malaysia), which is foreseeable given Singapore’s role as a transit/transportation hub. A small number of passengers submit CBCRR when compared to the overall traffic flow (0.115% of incoming passengers and 0.05% of outgoing passengers), as seen in Table 8.7. 534. While 439 instances of false or non-declarations were detected (mainly at air checkpoints), only 7% of the SGD 30.4 million (USD 22.5 million) in undeclared or falsely declared cash detected was confiscated. Further, 13.7% of the SGD 16.1 million (USD 12 million) seized from investigations was confiscated. All false or non-declaration amounts linked to ML/TF or predicate offences were fully confiscated, but this accounts for only one case with a prosecution ongoing for another case detected in 2025 and some BNIs have also been seized and no breaches detected through mail/cargo. 535. Detection of violations and amounts seized and confiscated are low, largely due to the abovementioned weaknesses in risk-profiling and detection (the low number of CBCRR breaches detected in 2020 to 2022 can be attributed to drop in passenger travel due to Covid-19). Singapore is likely not detecting a sizeable proportion of non/false declarations, considering evidence of prior missed cases and the high number of passengers crossing the land border with Malaysia, which Singapore considers are principally daily commuters (economic workers) that travel to/from both countries. As reported in its 2025 Mutual Evaluation, Malaysia has detected EUR 16.58 billion worth of cash/BNI (SGD 25 billion or USD 18.5 billion), and an assessment by Malaysia’s FIU shows the Singapore dollar is the most common currency declared entering Malaysia (notwithstanding that there is no breakdown of the source countries and the foreign currencies of the EUR 16.58 billion worth of cash/BNI that might have entered Malaysia through other countries with much longer land borders with Malaysia such as Thailand, Brunei and Indonesia). 536. Singapore attributes a majority of CBCRR breaches to first time offenders who are not linked to criminality and who had misunderstood, lacked awareness of or mistakenly reported on the CBCRR obligation (e.g. due to language barriers). These reporting obligations are implemented in virtually every country in the world, and such a massive proportion of significant cash carrying travellers (438/439) having simply misunderstood the obligation while making a false or non-declaration does not stand to reason. This inability to link such significant volumes of cash entering the country through travellers making false or mis-declarations shows weaknesses in the process for fully investigating these travellers (especially in a largely non-cash society). Table 8.7. False/non declarations and sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Passenger traffic 42 189 542 5 923 363 104 880 094 192 845 557 230 398 931 576 237 487 incoming 21 118 566 2 838 084 52 344 484 96 026 060 114 850 300 287 177 494 outgoing 21 070 976 3 085 279 52 535 610 96 819 497 115 548 631 289 059 993 Total # CMRs 19 785 6 432 37 180 71 964 85 473 220 834 incoming 12 695 3 267 22 954 43 762 53 417 136 095 (62%) outgoing 7 090 3 165 14 226 28 202 32 056 84 739 (38%) Number of false and non-declaration cases detected 28 14 46 120 231 439 CBNI detected (Million SGD) 4.0 0.8 2.9 10.3 12.4 30.4 Value of CBNI seized for further investigations (Million SGD) 3.2 0.5 0.7 6.9 4.8 16.1 CBNI confiscated (Million SGD)/number of cases 1.1 (2) - - 1 (8) 0.1 (7) 2.2 (17) Amount of Court fines (in SGD)/number of cases 39 000 (3) 5 000 (1) 14 000 (2) 96 500 (15) 53 000 (11) 207 500 (32) Number of travelers issued composition notices 18 7 32 59 155 271 Amount of composition collected (in SGD) 27 000 16 000 41 000 102 000 645 000 831 000 Note: the value of declarations is not tracked. 8.7.3. Sanctions 537. Singapore has a range of sanctions available to enforce the CBCRR regime, which are calibrated to the degree of culpability of the offender (see R.32): a warning for minor infractions (if detected CBNI is lower than SGD 25 000 or USD 18 500 and not linked to ML/TF or associated predicate offences), a composition sum (i.e. financial penalty in lieu of prosecution) for detected CBNI below SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000, court fines, imprisonment for ML/TF offences and/or confiscation (a larger percentage of the detected infraction is confiscated for larger false or non-declared amounts). The composition framework only applies for first time offenders with detected physical cash/BNI below SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000 and which is unrelated to ML/TF or predicate offences. 538. When dealing with false or non-declarations, LEAs seize the cash pending an investigation to ascertain whether the funds are linked to ML, TF or associated predicate offences. If they are, a prosecution for breaches to the CBCRR regime is pursued, leading to confiscation calibrated to the amount of the breach or if the traveller cannot reasonably explain provenance of the funds. 100% of the value is confiscated if a ML/TF or associated predicate offence is found or the passenger exhibits a high level of culpability, in addition to imprisonment. 539. There are some challenges which could undermine the application of the abovementioned sanctions framework. As discussed in IO.7, Singapore's competent authorities acknowledge that investigators and prosecutors face a persistent challenge linking funds to offences that takes place overseas. This is more pronounced when dealing with cash because of the lack of clear trail linking it to a specific source or offence. As a result, investigators generally rely on intelligence inputs, antecedents and case history of the passenger to determine if ML /TF or associated predicate offence has occurred, and this explains the low number of cases. 540. Of the two cases linked to ML/TF or associate predicate offence, one is still in the prosecution stage and the other case resulted in a conviction within which all CBNI amounts that were detected were fully confiscated (and the culprit handed a prison sentence) (see Box 8.7). These sanctions appear effective, but it is challenging to draw systematic conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions from one case. 541. The remainder of cases are dealt with through a composition scheme, which is not fully dissuasive. SGD 179 500 or USD 132 830 in court fines were meted out (an average of SGD 660 or USD 485 per instance) and a composition amount of SGD 831 000 or USD 614 940 (an average of SGD 3 000/USD 2 220 per composition) was collected from passengers, see Table 8.7). Singapore explains the low amounts by pointing to the fact that 98% of infractions for non-declared amounts involved first-time offenders not known to be linked to ML, TF, or predicate offences. However, money mules, being disposable enablers of ML, would never be sent to smuggle cash if they had already been found to have made a false or non-declaration. In cases of false or non-declaration, the passenger would have had knowledge of the declaration requirement and thus a certain level of knowledge and culpability can be inferred. The number of false declarations detected is an unknown percent of the 439 cases. 542. In conclusion, Singapore has a solid legal framework for CBCRR, though there is scope for improvement in risk-profiling to enhance the detection of breaches. The amounts declared and violations detected reflect Singapore’s risk profile or context to some extent. This is notable given its largely cashless domestic economy, high traveller volumes, significant numbers of non-resident Singaporeans, its role as a major transit and transportation hub, and when compared to its closest neighbour. Most offenders are not filing or falsely file CBCRRs are reportedly first-time offenders, and Singapore cannot link the vast majority (438/439) of offenders to criminality. Money mules, too, are usually first-time offenders. This indicates that there are likely issues in follow-up investigations. Singapore recognises these gaps and has enhanced its CBCRR in 2024, though it is too early to assess its effectiveness. When offenders are linked to ML, TF or predicate offences, the sanctions meted out are proportionate and dissuasive. When they are not, the sanctions meted out are not. Box 8.7. CBCRR violations Inbound violation (2023, Changi Airport) ICA flagged an arriving passenger for suspicious behaviour and after alerts from his luggage screening. He made two CBCRR declarations for SGD 505 500 and SGD 1.96 million (respectively USD 375 000 and 1.4 million) but was carrying SGD 1.98 million (USD 1.4 million). SPFCAD seized the cash, detained the passenger, and upon investigations found that he had previously falsely declared SGD 1 million (or USD 740 000). Checks showed no criminal links, that he worked for a money-changing firm, acted as a cash courier, and that funds were legitimate. He was convicted under Section 60 of CDSA and Section 108B of the PC for conspiring to move undeclared cash in excess of the threshold without a full and accurate report. The court imposed a confiscation order of SGD 400 000 or USD 296 000 and a fine of SGD 30 000 or USD 22 000, (about 26% of the undeclared funds). SPF shared case details with his home country, though the follow-up remains unknown. Outbound violation A person attempted to leave Changi airport in 2023 without making a CBCRR declaration on the movement of SGD 508 925 (USD 376 604), aided by two accomplices who split the cash amount. The three individuals were profiled by ICA for checks which revealed that cash was not declared, and CAD seized the cash. Further investigations by CAD showed that the main culprit had companies in Singapore from which the seized cash originated, but no sign of criminality was involved. The main culprit was convicted of a CBCRR offence under S60(2) CDSA. He was sentenced to a SGD 10 000 fine or USD 7 400 (SGD 5 000 each for the accomplices, or USD 3 700) and the full amount seized was forfeited to the State under S364 CPC due to the high degree of culpability of the offender who showed intent to conceal the cash to avoid detection by the authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 527. Singapore has recently strengthened its institutional and operational framework to identify and seize non-declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI. Some gaps have been observed with the detection of CBCRR cases, with 439 violations detected over five years, out of 220 834 declarations and 576 million border crossings (travellers). Singapore has sought to remedy gaps with detection from 2024, but the effectiveness of these recent measures cannot be fully determined at this time. Authorities are aware of the risks related to cross-border transportation of cash/BNI and have made some seizures, although the number of seizures is low considering Singapore’s status as an IFI and transit/transportation hub. There has only been one confiscation in relation to ML. 528. Singapore’s declaration system, which was fully digitised since 2024, requires any person moving cash in and out of the country in excess of SGD 20 000 to (approx. USD 14 000) to make an online declaration. These declarations are automatically ingested into STRO’s IT systems. ICA and SPF/CAD utilise various means to detect false/under-declarations, including conducting risk profiling and targeting of passengers at checkpoints for passengers from jurisdictions identified by Singapore as high-risk countries for CBCRR breaches. LEAs also consult STRO’s and SPF’s databases for relevant STR, CTR and CMR information filed by casinos, money changers and remittance services. LEAs also leverage on foreign sources and search criminal backgrounds, screen against intelligence databases and review advance passenger information from airlines. Crucially, however, ICA lacks advanced screening machines that can specifically detect cash by scanning postal articles, cargo, shipments, and luggage moving through checkpoints. This creates a vulnerability, particularly considering Singapore’s position as a transit/transportation hub. ICA would benefit from the use of new technologies to enhance its cash detection capabilities for both travellers and cargo. 529. Singapore’s NRA does not identify bulk cash smuggling as a significant risk. Singapore has one of the highest levels of financial inclusion in the world and is mainly a cashless society, meaning that substantial amounts of cash would be more out of place in Singapore than elsewhere. However, cash-based ML has proven persistent even in highly banked jurisdictions, and among some of Singapore’s closest neighbouring countries. The NRA acknowledges there is a risk associated with money mules transporting cash in/out of the country. 530. Notwithstanding, some limitations were observed in the risk-profiling system and detection practices, which undermines LEA’s ability to identify potential breaches of CBCRR in a timely and effective manner. For example, the risk profiling system did not regularly target persons carrying cash. There have been cases in which ICA found out post facto about false or non-declarations, with some passenger found traveling through Singapore with cash over the reporting threshold (see example in Box 8.6). Authorities attribute these lapses to the absence of electronic submission mechanism prior to 2024. 531. Singapore has since 2024 taken steps to improve detection of CBCRR breaches and better adapt to observed typologies, including geographical risks. For example, in early 2025, authorities conducted additional checks on passengers from a neighbouring country prone to CEF activities to better understand ML/TF/predicate offence risks associated with large cash inflows. Moreover, CAD now shares CBCRR breaches detected during ML or predicate offence investigations with ICA on a quarterly basis. These are combined with other data points to improve ICA’s risk profiling and identification of CBCRR breaches. ICA officers have received dedicated training to spot suspicious traveller behaviour. Since 2025, ICA enforces CBCRR breaches above the declaration threshold without ML/TF suspicion, while complex cases are escalated to CAD’s FIG for detailed financial investigation. While positive, it is too early to determine whether these measures will lessen the number of undetected instances of CBCRR violations and mitigate the risk of cross-border cash smuggling. Box 8.6. Breach in CBCRR declaration Cross-border BEC case (2020) A Western health products company was defrauded into transferring EUR 6.6 million to a Singapore corporate account for fake Personal Protective Equipment purchases. Swift action by SPF and seven banks led to freezing over EUR 6.4 million the same day. Investigations revealed the Singapore company’s director knowingly facilitated laundering for a foreign fraud syndicate. Over SGD 10.2 million (USD 7.5 million) was moved through multiple accounts. He submitted two CMRs (SGD 1 million/USD 740 000 each) but later admitted under-declaring cash amounts hand-carried out of Singapore. Investigators matched CMRs, withdrawals, and travel records to trace fund flows. The director was convicted of seven ML counts and two CBCRR breaches. He received 8 years and 8 months’ imprisonment. He is currently appealing the conviction Detection of undeclared amount (2025) ICA officers intercepted a man from Country X at a ferry terminal with undeclared cash amounting to SGD 26 260 (USD 20 000). CAD investigations revealed his involvement in advertising illegal online gambling websites based out of Country Y. Evidence from his phone showed draft and final advertisement materials used on social media. He admitted the cash was payment from gambling operators to fund further advertising. CAD found no links to ML, TF, or predicate offences upon inquiring in SPF and STRO databases. Information was shared with Country Y authorities and INTERPOL. He was charged 10 days later under Sections 60 and 54 of the CDSA and convicted in March to 3 months and 2 weeks’ jail. The full cash amount was forfeited under Section 364 CPC. After serving his sentence, he was deported and barred from re-entering Singapore. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 532. The authorities have shown they can confiscate currency in case of CBCRR breaches where they consider there is a link to ML/TF or predicate offences, but there has only been one confiscation in relation to ML despite 439 instances of false or non-declaration. 533. In the review period, incoming passengers submitted a majority of CBCRR declarations (the majority of travel in/out of Singapore occurs by land over the border with Malaysia), which is foreseeable given Singapore’s role as a transit/transportation hub. A small number of passengers submit CBCRR when compared to the overall traffic flow (0.115% of incoming passengers and 0.05% of outgoing passengers), as seen in Table 8.7. 534. While 439 instances of false or non-declarations were detected (mainly at air checkpoints), only 7% of the SGD 30.4 million (USD 22.5 million) in undeclared or falsely declared cash detected was confiscated. Further, 13.7% of the SGD 16.1 million (USD 12 million) seized from investigations was confiscated. All false or non-declaration amounts linked to ML/TF or predicate offences were fully confiscated, but this accounts for only one case with a prosecution ongoing for another case detected in 2025 and some BNIs have also been seized and no breaches detected through mail/cargo. 535. Detection of violations and amounts seized and confiscated are low, largely due to the abovementioned weaknesses in risk-profiling and detection (the low number of CBCRR breaches detected in 2020 to 2022 can be attributed to drop in passenger travel due to Covid-19). Singapore is likely not detecting a sizeable proportion of non/false declarations, considering evidence of prior missed cases and the high number of passengers crossing the land border with Malaysia, which Singapore considers are principally daily commuters (economic workers) that travel to/from both countries. As reported in its 2025 Mutual Evaluation, Malaysia has detected EUR 16.58 billion worth of cash/BNI (SGD 25 billion or USD 18.5 billion), and an assessment by Malaysia’s FIU shows the Singapore dollar is the most common currency declared entering Malaysia (notwithstanding that there is no breakdown of the source countries and the foreign currencies of the EUR 16.58 billion worth of cash/BNI that might have entered Malaysia through other countries with much longer land borders with Malaysia such as Thailand, Brunei and Indonesia). 536. Singapore attributes a majority of CBCRR breaches to first time offenders who are not linked to criminality and who had misunderstood, lacked awareness of or mistakenly reported on the CBCRR obligation (e.g. due to language barriers). These reporting obligations are implemented in virtually every country in the world, and such a massive proportion of significant cash carrying travellers (438/439) having simply misunderstood the obligation while making a false or non-declaration does not stand to reason. This inability to link such significant volumes of cash entering the country through travellers making false or mis-declarations shows weaknesses in the process for fully investigating these travellers (especially in a largely non-cash society). Table 8.7. False/non declarations and sanctions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Passenger traffic 42 189 542 5 923 363 104 880 094 192 845 557 230 398 931 576 237 487 incoming 21 118 566 2 838 084 52 344 484 96 026 060 114 850 300 287 177 494 outgoing 21 070 976 3 085 279 52 535 610 96 819 497 115 548 631 289 059 993 Total # CMRs 19 785 6 432 37 180 71 964 85 473 220 834 incoming 12 695 3 267 22 954 43 762 53 417 136 095 (62%) outgoing 7 090 3 165 14 226 28 202 32 056 84 739 (38%) Number of false and non-declaration cases detected 28 14 46 120 231 439 CBNI detected (Million SGD) 4.0 0.8 2.9 10.3 12.4 30.4 Value of CBNI seized for further investigations (Million SGD) 3.2 0.5 0.7 6.9 4.8 16.1 CBNI confiscated (Million SGD)/number of cases 1.1 (2) - - 1 (8) 0.1 (7) 2.2 (17) Amount of Court fines (in SGD)/number of cases 39 000 (3) 5 000 (1) 14 000 (2) 96 500 (15) 53 000 (11) 207 500 (32) Number of travelers issued composition notices 18 7 32 59 155 271 Amount of composition collected (in SGD) 27 000 16 000 41 000 102 000 645 000 831 000 Note: the value of declarations is not tracked. 8.7.3. Sanctions 537. Singapore has a range of sanctions available to enforce the CBCRR regime, which are calibrated to the degree of culpability of the offender (see R.32): a warning for minor infractions (if detected CBNI is lower than SGD 25 000 or USD 18 500 and not linked to ML/TF or associated predicate offences), a composition sum (i.e. financial penalty in lieu of prosecution) for detected CBNI below SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000, court fines, imprisonment for ML/TF offences and/or confiscation (a larger percentage of the detected infraction is confiscated for larger false or non-declared amounts). The composition framework only applies for first time offenders with detected physical cash/BNI below SGD 100 000 or USD 74 000 and which is unrelated to ML/TF or predicate offences. 538. When dealing with false or non-declarations, LEAs seize the cash pending an investigation to ascertain whether the funds are linked to ML, TF or associated predicate offences. If they are, a prosecution for breaches to the CBCRR regime is pursued, leading to confiscation calibrated to the amount of the breach or if the traveller cannot reasonably explain provenance of the funds. 100% of the value is confiscated if a ML/TF or associated predicate offence is found or the passenger exhibits a high level of culpability, in addition to imprisonment. 539. There are some challenges which could undermine the application of the abovementioned sanctions framework. As discussed in IO.7, Singapore's competent authorities acknowledge that investigators and prosecutors face a persistent challenge linking funds to offences that takes place overseas. This is more pronounced when dealing with cash because of the lack of clear trail linking it to a specific source or offence. As a result, investigators generally rely on intelligence inputs, antecedents and case history of the passenger to determine if ML /TF or associated predicate offence has occurred, and this explains the low number of cases. 540. Of the two cases linked to ML/TF or associate predicate offence, one is still in the prosecution stage and the other case resulted in a conviction within which all CBNI amounts that were detected were fully confiscated (and the culprit handed a prison sentence) (see Box 8.7). These sanctions appear effective, but it is challenging to draw systematic conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions from one case. 541. The remainder of cases are dealt with through a composition scheme, which is not fully dissuasive. SGD 179 500 or USD 132 830 in court fines were meted out (an average of SGD 660 or USD 485 per instance) and a composition amount of SGD 831 000 or USD 614 940 (an average of SGD 3 000/USD 2 220 per composition) was collected from passengers, see Table 8.7). Singapore explains the low amounts by pointing to the fact that 98% of infractions for non-declared amounts involved first-time offenders not known to be linked to ML, TF, or predicate offences. However, money mules, being disposable enablers of ML, would never be sent to smuggle cash if they had already been found to have made a false or non-declaration. In cases of false or non-declaration, the passenger would have had knowledge of the declaration requirement and thus a certain level of knowledge and culpability can be inferred. The number of false declarations detected is an unknown percent of the 439 cases. 542. In conclusion, Singapore has a solid legal framework for CBCRR, though there is scope for improvement in risk-profiling to enhance the detection of breaches. The amounts declared and violations detected reflect Singapore’s risk profile or context to some extent. This is notable given its largely cashless domestic economy, high traveller volumes, significant numbers of non-resident Singaporeans, its role as a major transit and transportation hub, and when compared to its closest neighbour. Most offenders are not filing or falsely file CBCRRs are reportedly first-time offenders, and Singapore cannot link the vast majority (438/439) of offenders to criminality. Money mules, too, are usually first-time offenders. This indicates that there are likely issues in follow-up investigations. Singapore recognises these gaps and has enhanced its CBCRR in 2024, though it is too early to assess its effectiveness. When offenders are linked to ML, TF or predicate offences, the sanctions meted out are proportionate and dissuasive. When they are not, the sanctions meted out are not. Box 8.7. CBCRR violations Inbound violation (2023, Changi Airport) ICA flagged an arriving passenger for suspicious behaviour and after alerts from his luggage screening. He made two CBCRR declarations for SGD 505 500 and SGD 1.96 million (respectively USD 375 000 and 1.4 million) but was carrying SGD 1.98 million (USD 1.4 million). SPFCAD seized the cash, detained the passenger, and upon investigations found that he had previously falsely declared SGD 1 million (or USD 740 000). Checks showed no criminal links, that he worked for a money-changing firm, acted as a cash courier, and that funds were legitimate. He was convicted under Section 60 of CDSA and Section 108B of the PC for conspiring to move undeclared cash in excess of the threshold without a full and accurate report. The court imposed a confiscation order of SGD 400 000 or USD 296 000 and a fine of SGD 30 000 or USD 22 000, (about 26% of the undeclared funds). SPF shared case details with his home country, though the follow-up remains unknown. Outbound violation A person attempted to leave Changi airport in 2023 without making a CBCRR declaration on the movement of SGD 508 925 (USD 376 604), aided by two accomplices who split the cash amount. The three individuals were profiled by ICA for checks which revealed that cash was not declared, and CAD seized the cash. Further investigations by CAD showed that the main culprit had companies in Singapore from which the seized cash originated, but no sign of criminality was involved. The main culprit was convicted of a CBCRR offence under S60(2) CDSA. He was sentenced to a SGD 10 000 fine or USD 7 400 (SGD 5 000 each for the accomplices, or USD 3 700) and the full amount seized was forfeited to the State under S364 CPC due to the high degree of culpability of the offender who showed intent to conceal the cash to avoid detection by the authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 89. Latvia has a well-developed understanding of its historic risks (“risk profile one”), the main current risk tied to domestic offences (“risk profile two”), as well as risks emanating from criminal offences committed abroad and imported into Latvia (“risk profile three”). Latvia has conducted two NRAs within the assessment period: NRA 2017-2019 (NRA1) and NRA 2020-2022 (NRA2). 90. Both of these reports are publicly available. Procedures applied, involvement of relevant authorities, the way the NRAs findings and results were disseminated and subsequent efforts to communicate them to all REs present a matter of good practice which enabled Latvia’s key players in the AML/CFT/CPF field to profoundly analyse, acknowledge and understand the relevant risks and their underlying factors. 91. Latvia goes beyond the requirements of the FATF standards in assessing its risk, and this is particularly the case with the PF related risks. NRA reports are supplemented with a number of annual assessments on emerging risks and on virtual assets, as well as with targeted risk assessments. Both NRAs used the World Bank methodology, with additions on a number of areas to reflect local risk and context. Approximately 30 different entities and agencies were involved in NRA2, with an average of two to four persons for each entity. Prior to the publication of the NRA all entities involved must sign-off on the content of the report. 92. Authorities demonstrated clear improvements in the NRA process between NRA1 and NRA2. The main procedural change between the two has been a greater devolvement in responsibility and leadership for analysis from the FIU to individual LEAs, and to the SCAs for sectoral risk assessments. NRA2 was driven forward by 11 WGs. Divisions of the WG responsibilities/competencies were based on different criteria. The first criterion set up the basis for creation of five WGs, that focused on the nature of threats/predicate crime that each WG would discuss and analyse. [19] The evolving nature of approaching and analysing threats, vulnerabilities and overall risks for purposes of NRA2, have clearly added value to the process as it led to a stronger engagement by the competent authorities, ultimately leading to a better understanding and ability to mitigate the emerging risks. Private sector representatives were also included in some of these WGs, as participants. For example, the authorities referred to the participation and contributions made by the Latvian branch of Transparency International (organisation “DELNA”) to the WG on corruption related criminal offences. 93. A second group of three WGs focused on sectoral risk assessments. [20] The authorities emphasised that NRA2 included only brief summaries of each sector’s risk assessment, whilst each SCA conducted a more comprehensive sectoral risk assessment periodically (in a one to three-years period), with participation of the private sector. 94. The remaining three WGs dealt with (i) NPO and legal persons’ risk assessments, (ii) TF and PF risk assessments, and (iii) ML risk scenarios. The latter WG was atypical, with the relevant sections of the NRA composed based on the work of all other WGs. 95. The above list of areas examined for identifying ML/TF risks is not exhaustive. Authorities continuously strengthen their risk understanding; examples include the (i) FIU’s assessment of ML/TF risks posed by virtual assets and (ii) the annual report on overall trends in criminality and the associated risk levels, compiled by the State Police, but featuring insights from all LEAs, FIU, and the PO. These assessments were also examined as part of NRA2 and their relevant findings feature therein. 96. The distribution of responsibilities and inclusive approach positively contributed to the NRA process. The process effectively harnessed the leadership and subject-matter expertise of different institutions and enabled a more comprehensive and holistic assessment of risks. This has been demonstrated throughout the on-site discussions encompassing not only the issues relevant for IO1, but also other IOs (such as IO3, IO7, and IO8). Authorities also outlined that this devolvement of responsibility made the overall NRA process more efficient - significantly reducing the time taken to produce NRA2. This has been supported by a move away from manual data collection to automated data collection across a number of data points. The CPCB, State Police, the SRS and Latvijas Banka demonstrated a consistent methodology amongst the WGs for identifying the data to collect, which is supported by a codified guidance document on producing the NRA. 97. Risk assessment processes confirm that the main ML risks have shifted from the laundering of foreign proceeds of crime to domestically generated proceeds. This conclusion is further supported by a general trend in the reduction of banking and other services for non-resident natural and legal persons. For example, there has been a reduction in non-EU deposits within Latvian FIs of 87%, from EUR 7.17 billion to EUR 0.93 billion during the assessment period. This is mirrored in the nature of STRs being received, which indicates that the primary risks are now domestically generated. At the time of the last MER, 50% of STRs were for stand-alone ML (which included cross-border transfers), and this has now reduced to 22% of STRs, with almost 80% of STRs referring to specific predicate offences. 98. As noted above, authorities identify three risk profiles: - Risk profile 1: the risks Latvia faced prior to 2018. As a regional financial centre, Latvia provided financial and to some extent non-financial services to non-resident clients, with a high volume of non-resident deposits. - Risk profile 2: the risks emanating from Latvia’s current economy which is largely domestically and regionally focused and predominantly serves domestic and resident clients. In this risk profile the main risks emanate from the shadow economy (tax and excise related offences, drugs related offences), fraud, and corruption. - Risk profile 3: the risk of ML generated as a result of criminal offences committed abroad, mainly fraud and stand-alone ML which are imported into Latvia or transferred to the Latvian financial system. 99. Risk assessments draw on a wide variety of sources of information, including financial intelligence, existing risk assessments, external and public reporting, as well as interviews with competent authorities, market participants, civil society and representative groups. Authorities outlined a holistic approach in using both qualitative and quantitative data and demonstrated that they could identify areas where conclusions drawn from statistical data did not align with the qualitative information gathered from law enforcement and SCAs. For example, the CPCB noted that investigative and prosecutorial data related to ML associated with corruption did not align with the STR data. Authorities drew reasonable conclusions to explain this and summarised that the majority of domestically generated proceeds of corruption were being laundered overseas. This resulted in an action item within the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for authorities to further develop their understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption. Similarly, authorities demonstrated that where data collected during the NRA process indicates an anomaly, this is identified, and additional work is undertaken to understand the context before determining risk ratings. For example, during NRA2 authorities enquired on an unexpectedly high volume of donations to a Latvian NPO from a higher risk country. Consequently, the relevant supervisor examined the specific transaction, determined it to be low-risk, and the authorities’ overall finding that the NPO sector is low risk was not challenged. 100. NRA2 identified that the ML threats primarily relate to tax offences, with excise offences (including smuggling), drug offences, corruption and fraud also being material. Domestically generated proceeds now pose a considerably higher threat than foreign generated proceeds. NRA2 identified a reduction in national vulnerability to ML, mainly driven by increases in investigative and prosecutorial capacity as well as increases in domestic co-operation and access to BO information. Sectors identified as posing the highest ML risk (medium-high) are investment firms, accountants, lottery and gambling operators, real estate agents, and tax advisors. Notably, credit institutions are identified as presenting only medium risk (see also IO.3). Assessment and ratings attached to these risks appear reasonable and well grounded. The NRA includes a detailed list of sectors’ vulnerabilities with the highest risk sectors being analysed in detail in terms of their business models, types of transactions, and STR reporting. The analysis also includes risks posed by five free trade zones (three special economic zones and two freeports). The import, store, trade, production, and re-export of various goods and services were thus analysed with respect to key ML threats and vulnerabilities. Data was gathered on cargo volumes and turnover to better identify ML risks. The quality of analysis and mitigating measures applied confirms that the authorities properly understand the risks posed by free trade zones. They also ensured that the risks posed by free trade zones are properly monitored given the possible changes in this specific risk environment. 101. Furthermore, developments related to a Bank A under liquidation also informed Latvia’s evolving understanding of risks. The liquidation process resulted in increased supervisory controls and interagency co-operation. The FCMC (now Latvijas Banka) required liquidators to develop the AML/CFT/CPF methodology for the AML/CFT compliance monitoring process of the bank’s creditors. The measures of the methodology included enhanced due diligence (EDD), independent audit reviews, transaction monitoring, and sample testing of client files. The FCMC imposed strict requirements for payouts from the deposit guarantee fund, disbursements to creditors and asset sales. 102. The FIU acquired data on all transactions within the bank covering the period from 2013 which resulted in creating tailored datasets for the 25 most affected jurisdictions demonstrating the financial flows originating from and coming to the bank under liquidation accounts, beneficiaries from these countries and other data. The most prevalent typology observed was the use of shell companies in the United Kingdom and Canada when effecting transfers. The actions taken by the authorities in response to these risks are further discussed (through case studies and related analysis) under IOs 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. 103. Authorities outlined that the results of the NRA2 were broadly as expected. Authorities attribute this to a more proactive and continuous risk identification process, the utilisation of automatically collected data that underpins the production of NRAs, as well as greater day-to-day inter-agency engagement. One example of more routine examinations of data is the monitoring of cross-border flows by Latvijas Banka, which was previously undertaken annually but is now monitored monthly. Authorities provided a range of examples demonstrating how they had used this data to identify anomalies that indicated new or increased risk. This information was then used to inform greater awareness in the private sector, and to ensure EDD was undertaken in relevant circumstances. 104. Authorities demonstrated that during the assessment period they have been able to identify areas where their risk understanding is less well developed and the steps that have been taken to address these gaps in risk understanding and put in place risk mitigation measures. For example, following increased scrutiny of residency by investment schemes within the EU, authorities undertook a standalone assessment of Latvia’s residency by investment scheme (outside of the NRA process). This included a review by the FIU of all applicants between 2019-2024 and a review of operational cases involving real estate purchases made by those who had obtained residence through investment in real estate. As a result of this assessment additional controls were put in place, including the FIU becoming an authority with responsibility to review proposed investments by applicants. 105. In relation to this, it is worth mentioning that the construction sector consistently ranks as the economic sector with the highest share of the shadow economy. Risks related to high cash turnover and unreported activity in construction business as well as threats posed in terms of tax evasion by those involved in construction and real estate business are well recognised and articulated in the NRA2. Notwithstanding this and facts and trends discussed in NRA2, it appears that both the private sector and the competent investigative authorities would further benefit from the presentation of these risks through practical examples and lessons learnt from them. 106. From an overall perspective of risk analysis and their understanding, information and sources provided to the AT, it can be concluded that Latvian authorities demonstrate an agile and proactive approach to identifying emerging risks, as well as working with key international partners to understand regional risks (risk profile 2). For example, in 2023, the FIU partnered with the Estonian and Lithuanian FIUs to examine regional cross-border cash flows, documenting a number of key risks as well as recommendations for mitigation measures. 107. Risks assessment processes covered a broad range of areas to identify the country’s key ML threats and vulnerabilities. The analyses presented in the NRAs are comprehensive and detailed enough, with reasonable and well-grounded conclusions on key risk areas. Taking into account the methodology applied in carrying out the NRA exercises, level of involvement of competent authorities, the multi-agency approach, quality and quantity of data analysed and cross cutting nature of some specific analysis (such as the one in relation to the liquidation of Bank A), it is apparent that the NRAs result from a thorough and far-reaching understanding of ML/TF risks by the Latvian authorities. 108. Private sector representatives from across FIs and DNFBPs broadly agreed with the findings of the NRA and understood how the identified risks impacted their business areas. There was some disagreement in the real estate sector, accounting and gambling sectors about the medium-high risk rating assigned to the sectors, taking account of vulnerabilities that have reduced since completion of NRA2. Estate agents noted the change in risk profile over the assessment period, including a reduction in property purchased by foreign nationals, and a significant reduction in the purchase of property for the purposes of gaining residency through Latvia’s investment programme. The medium-high risk rating in NRA2 is reflective of the legacy risks in the real estate sector, and that there is still a comparable level of foreign national investment into real estate: EUR 152 million in 2023 compared to EUR 209 million in 2018. Despite the 98% reduction of property purchased through the residency by investment scheme between 2014 and 2023 and the mitigating measures put in place since 2022 in relation to both the residency by investment programme and the real estate sector as a whole, Latvian authorities should maintain their heightened focus on these areas and continue to periodically reassess related ML risks. 1.1.2. TF Risks 109. In NRA2, Latvia assessed the threat of terrorism to be low and TF threat as also low. To reach this conclusion, authorities carried out detailed analysis and considered the nexus between international terrorist organisations and Latvian nationals, domestic data on asylum seekers from high-risk countries and illegal border crossings, the vulnerability of the financial services sector by analysing cross border payments both by volume and specifically related to higher risk countries, as well as a range of other typologies associated with TF. In addition, authorities undertook an extensive analysis of all NPOs financial activity. Overall, the AT found the TF risk rating to be justified and well grounded. 110. Authorities conducted a large-scale exercise to identify and understand TF risks. Competent authorities used a wide range of quantitative data – STRs, statistics gathered by supervisors (inflows and outflows to high-risk countries (including neighbouring countries)), BO details, and information from the State Security Service on their threat assessments on topics such as the radicalisation of individuals, migrants entering Latvia, and activities of terrorist organisations (such as Al Qaida and Daesh) and their eventual connections with individuals, groups or entities in Latvia. 111. In support to this process and with the aim to further strengthen inter-institutional co-operation, a specialised CFT Task Force has been established under the CCG. Under the leadership of the FIU, other relevant agencies (State Security Service, Latvijas Banka, Customs and SRS) form a part of the Task Force. Its activities include (i) analyses of cross-border payments to high-risk jurisdictions and identification (ii) monitoring of activities of Latvian legal persons with BOs from these countries; and (iii) examination of suspicions on TF and their referral to criminal investigation or other regulatory action. In addition, it co-ordinates the monitoring of NPOs that fall within the FATF definition and applies risk-based mitigation measures to them. 112. Authorities also confirmed their proactive engagement and analysis on the private sector when assessing TF risks; the sector’s TF related reporting against inflows and outflows related to high-risk jurisdictions was analysed. Given the Latvian context, this analysis also included reporting on sanctions evasions and was then further used to inform guidance for private sector reporting on cross-border flows. Notwithstanding, STR reporting for TF has been very limited: seven reports between 2021-2022, covering on average 20 transactions. Whilst the low TF risk profile and limited exposure to higher risk countries and typologies could justify the low number of STRs, this area needs ongoing attention and timely action by the competent authorities in case of any changes in the TF risk environment. Discussions held on-site confirmed that the competent authorities, and mostly the State Security Service and the FIU, remain vigilant and are aware of this, as also evidenced through the work of CFT Task Force. Footnotes [19]. (i) threats and ability to combat corruption; (ii) threats posed by tax offences and ability to combat that phenomenon; (iii) threats posed by drug trafficking offences and capacities to combat them; (iv) threats posed by property offences and ability to combat them; and (v) threats posed by autonomous ML, including risks posed by cash transactions. [20]. (i) credit institutions, (ii) financial institutions and (iii) the non-financial sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 89. Latvia has a well-developed understanding of its historic risks (“risk profile one”), the main current risk tied to domestic offences (“risk profile two”), as well as risks emanating from criminal offences committed abroad and imported into Latvia (“risk profile three”). Latvia has conducted two NRAs within the assessment period: NRA 2017-2019 (NRA1) and NRA 2020-2022 (NRA2). 90. Both of these reports are publicly available. Procedures applied, involvement of relevant authorities, the way the NRAs findings and results were disseminated and subsequent efforts to communicate them to all REs present a matter of good practice which enabled Latvia’s key players in the AML/CFT/CPF field to profoundly analyse, acknowledge and understand the relevant risks and their underlying factors. 91. Latvia goes beyond the requirements of the FATF standards in assessing its risk, and this is particularly the case with the PF related risks. NRA reports are supplemented with a number of annual assessments on emerging risks and on virtual assets, as well as with targeted risk assessments. Both NRAs used the World Bank methodology, with additions on a number of areas to reflect local risk and context. Approximately 30 different entities and agencies were involved in NRA2, with an average of two to four persons for each entity. Prior to the publication of the NRA all entities involved must sign-off on the content of the report. 92. Authorities demonstrated clear improvements in the NRA process between NRA1 and NRA2. The main procedural change between the two has been a greater devolvement in responsibility and leadership for analysis from the FIU to individual LEAs, and to the SCAs for sectoral risk assessments. NRA2 was driven forward by 11 WGs. Divisions of the WG responsibilities/competencies were based on different criteria. The first criterion set up the basis for creation of five WGs, that focused on the nature of threats/predicate crime that each WG would discuss and analyse. [19] The evolving nature of approaching and analysing threats, vulnerabilities and overall risks for purposes of NRA2, have clearly added value to the process as it led to a stronger engagement by the competent authorities, ultimately leading to a better understanding and ability to mitigate the emerging risks. Private sector representatives were also included in some of these WGs, as participants. For example, the authorities referred to the participation and contributions made by the Latvian branch of Transparency International (organisation “DELNA”) to the WG on corruption related criminal offences. 93. A second group of three WGs focused on sectoral risk assessments. [20] The authorities emphasised that NRA2 included only brief summaries of each sector’s risk assessment, whilst each SCA conducted a more comprehensive sectoral risk assessment periodically (in a one to three-years period), with participation of the private sector. 94. The remaining three WGs dealt with (i) NPO and legal persons’ risk assessments, (ii) TF and PF risk assessments, and (iii) ML risk scenarios. The latter WG was atypical, with the relevant sections of the NRA composed based on the work of all other WGs. 95. The above list of areas examined for identifying ML/TF risks is not exhaustive. Authorities continuously strengthen their risk understanding; examples include the (i) FIU’s assessment of ML/TF risks posed by virtual assets and (ii) the annual report on overall trends in criminality and the associated risk levels, compiled by the State Police, but featuring insights from all LEAs, FIU, and the PO. These assessments were also examined as part of NRA2 and their relevant findings feature therein. 96. The distribution of responsibilities and inclusive approach positively contributed to the NRA process. The process effectively harnessed the leadership and subject-matter expertise of different institutions and enabled a more comprehensive and holistic assessment of risks. This has been demonstrated throughout the on-site discussions encompassing not only the issues relevant for IO1, but also other IOs (such as IO3, IO7, and IO8). Authorities also outlined that this devolvement of responsibility made the overall NRA process more efficient - significantly reducing the time taken to produce NRA2. This has been supported by a move away from manual data collection to automated data collection across a number of data points. The CPCB, State Police, the SRS and Latvijas Banka demonstrated a consistent methodology amongst the WGs for identifying the data to collect, which is supported by a codified guidance document on producing the NRA. 97. Risk assessment processes confirm that the main ML risks have shifted from the laundering of foreign proceeds of crime to domestically generated proceeds. This conclusion is further supported by a general trend in the reduction of banking and other services for non-resident natural and legal persons. For example, there has been a reduction in non-EU deposits within Latvian FIs of 87%, from EUR 7.17 billion to EUR 0.93 billion during the assessment period. This is mirrored in the nature of STRs being received, which indicates that the primary risks are now domestically generated. At the time of the last MER, 50% of STRs were for stand-alone ML (which included cross-border transfers), and this has now reduced to 22% of STRs, with almost 80% of STRs referring to specific predicate offences. 98. As noted above, authorities identify three risk profiles: - Risk profile 1: the risks Latvia faced prior to 2018. As a regional financial centre, Latvia provided financial and to some extent non-financial services to non-resident clients, with a high volume of non-resident deposits. - Risk profile 2: the risks emanating from Latvia’s current economy which is largely domestically and regionally focused and predominantly serves domestic and resident clients. In this risk profile the main risks emanate from the shadow economy (tax and excise related offences, drugs related offences), fraud, and corruption. - Risk profile 3: the risk of ML generated as a result of criminal offences committed abroad, mainly fraud and stand-alone ML which are imported into Latvia or transferred to the Latvian financial system. 99. Risk assessments draw on a wide variety of sources of information, including financial intelligence, existing risk assessments, external and public reporting, as well as interviews with competent authorities, market participants, civil society and representative groups. Authorities outlined a holistic approach in using both qualitative and quantitative data and demonstrated that they could identify areas where conclusions drawn from statistical data did not align with the qualitative information gathered from law enforcement and SCAs. For example, the CPCB noted that investigative and prosecutorial data related to ML associated with corruption did not align with the STR data. Authorities drew reasonable conclusions to explain this and summarised that the majority of domestically generated proceeds of corruption were being laundered overseas. This resulted in an action item within the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for authorities to further develop their understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption. Similarly, authorities demonstrated that where data collected during the NRA process indicates an anomaly, this is identified, and additional work is undertaken to understand the context before determining risk ratings. For example, during NRA2 authorities enquired on an unexpectedly high volume of donations to a Latvian NPO from a higher risk country. Consequently, the relevant supervisor examined the specific transaction, determined it to be low-risk, and the authorities’ overall finding that the NPO sector is low risk was not challenged. 100. NRA2 identified that the ML threats primarily relate to tax offences, with excise offences (including smuggling), drug offences, corruption and fraud also being material. Domestically generated proceeds now pose a considerably higher threat than foreign generated proceeds. NRA2 identified a reduction in national vulnerability to ML, mainly driven by increases in investigative and prosecutorial capacity as well as increases in domestic co-operation and access to BO information. Sectors identified as posing the highest ML risk (medium-high) are investment firms, accountants, lottery and gambling operators, real estate agents, and tax advisors. Notably, credit institutions are identified as presenting only medium risk (see also IO.3). Assessment and ratings attached to these risks appear reasonable and well grounded. The NRA includes a detailed list of sectors’ vulnerabilities with the highest risk sectors being analysed in detail in terms of their business models, types of transactions, and STR reporting. The analysis also includes risks posed by five free trade zones (three special economic zones and two freeports). The import, store, trade, production, and re-export of various goods and services were thus analysed with respect to key ML threats and vulnerabilities. Data was gathered on cargo volumes and turnover to better identify ML risks. The quality of analysis and mitigating measures applied confirms that the authorities properly understand the risks posed by free trade zones. They also ensured that the risks posed by free trade zones are properly monitored given the possible changes in this specific risk environment. 101. Furthermore, developments related to a Bank A under liquidation also informed Latvia’s evolving understanding of risks. The liquidation process resulted in increased supervisory controls and interagency co-operation. The FCMC (now Latvijas Banka) required liquidators to develop the AML/CFT/CPF methodology for the AML/CFT compliance monitoring process of the bank’s creditors. The measures of the methodology included enhanced due diligence (EDD), independent audit reviews, transaction monitoring, and sample testing of client files. The FCMC imposed strict requirements for payouts from the deposit guarantee fund, disbursements to creditors and asset sales. 102. The FIU acquired data on all transactions within the bank covering the period from 2013 which resulted in creating tailored datasets for the 25 most affected jurisdictions demonstrating the financial flows originating from and coming to the bank under liquidation accounts, beneficiaries from these countries and other data. The most prevalent typology observed was the use of shell companies in the United Kingdom and Canada when effecting transfers. The actions taken by the authorities in response to these risks are further discussed (through case studies and related analysis) under IOs 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. 103. Authorities outlined that the results of the NRA2 were broadly as expected. Authorities attribute this to a more proactive and continuous risk identification process, the utilisation of automatically collected data that underpins the production of NRAs, as well as greater day-to-day inter-agency engagement. One example of more routine examinations of data is the monitoring of cross-border flows by Latvijas Banka, which was previously undertaken annually but is now monitored monthly. Authorities provided a range of examples demonstrating how they had used this data to identify anomalies that indicated new or increased risk. This information was then used to inform greater awareness in the private sector, and to ensure EDD was undertaken in relevant circumstances. 104. Authorities demonstrated that during the assessment period they have been able to identify areas where their risk understanding is less well developed and the steps that have been taken to address these gaps in risk understanding and put in place risk mitigation measures. For example, following increased scrutiny of residency by investment schemes within the EU, authorities undertook a standalone assessment of Latvia’s residency by investment scheme (outside of the NRA process). This included a review by the FIU of all applicants between 2019-2024 and a review of operational cases involving real estate purchases made by those who had obtained residence through investment in real estate. As a result of this assessment additional controls were put in place, including the FIU becoming an authority with responsibility to review proposed investments by applicants. 105. In relation to this, it is worth mentioning that the construction sector consistently ranks as the economic sector with the highest share of the shadow economy. Risks related to high cash turnover and unreported activity in construction business as well as threats posed in terms of tax evasion by those involved in construction and real estate business are well recognised and articulated in the NRA2. Notwithstanding this and facts and trends discussed in NRA2, it appears that both the private sector and the competent investigative authorities would further benefit from the presentation of these risks through practical examples and lessons learnt from them. 106. From an overall perspective of risk analysis and their understanding, information and sources provided to the AT, it can be concluded that Latvian authorities demonstrate an agile and proactive approach to identifying emerging risks, as well as working with key international partners to understand regional risks (risk profile 2). For example, in 2023, the FIU partnered with the Estonian and Lithuanian FIUs to examine regional cross-border cash flows, documenting a number of key risks as well as recommendations for mitigation measures. 107. Risks assessment processes covered a broad range of areas to identify the country’s key ML threats and vulnerabilities. The analyses presented in the NRAs are comprehensive and detailed enough, with reasonable and well-grounded conclusions on key risk areas. Taking into account the methodology applied in carrying out the NRA exercises, level of involvement of competent authorities, the multi-agency approach, quality and quantity of data analysed and cross cutting nature of some specific analysis (such as the one in relation to the liquidation of Bank A), it is apparent that the NRAs result from a thorough and far-reaching understanding of ML/TF risks by the Latvian authorities. 108. Private sector representatives from across FIs and DNFBPs broadly agreed with the findings of the NRA and understood how the identified risks impacted their business areas. There was some disagreement in the real estate sector, accounting and gambling sectors about the medium-high risk rating assigned to the sectors, taking account of vulnerabilities that have reduced since completion of NRA2. Estate agents noted the change in risk profile over the assessment period, including a reduction in property purchased by foreign nationals, and a significant reduction in the purchase of property for the purposes of gaining residency through Latvia’s investment programme. The medium-high risk rating in NRA2 is reflective of the legacy risks in the real estate sector, and that there is still a comparable level of foreign national investment into real estate: EUR 152 million in 2023 compared to EUR 209 million in 2018. Despite the 98% reduction of property purchased through the residency by investment scheme between 2014 and 2023 and the mitigating measures put in place since 2022 in relation to both the residency by investment programme and the real estate sector as a whole, Latvian authorities should maintain their heightened focus on these areas and continue to periodically reassess related ML risks. 1.1.2. TF Risks 109. In NRA2, Latvia assessed the threat of terrorism to be low and TF threat as also low. To reach this conclusion, authorities carried out detailed analysis and considered the nexus between international terrorist organisations and Latvian nationals, domestic data on asylum seekers from high-risk countries and illegal border crossings, the vulnerability of the financial services sector by analysing cross border payments both by volume and specifically related to higher risk countries, as well as a range of other typologies associated with TF. In addition, authorities undertook an extensive analysis of all NPOs financial activity. Overall, the AT found the TF risk rating to be justified and well grounded. 110. Authorities conducted a large-scale exercise to identify and understand TF risks. Competent authorities used a wide range of quantitative data – STRs, statistics gathered by supervisors (inflows and outflows to high-risk countries (including neighbouring countries)), BO details, and information from the State Security Service on their threat assessments on topics such as the radicalisation of individuals, migrants entering Latvia, and activities of terrorist organisations (such as Al Qaida and Daesh) and their eventual connections with individuals, groups or entities in Latvia. 111. In support to this process and with the aim to further strengthen inter-institutional co-operation, a specialised CFT Task Force has been established under the CCG. Under the leadership of the FIU, other relevant agencies (State Security Service, Latvijas Banka, Customs and SRS) form a part of the Task Force. Its activities include (i) analyses of cross-border payments to high-risk jurisdictions and identification (ii) monitoring of activities of Latvian legal persons with BOs from these countries; and (iii) examination of suspicions on TF and their referral to criminal investigation or other regulatory action. In addition, it co-ordinates the monitoring of NPOs that fall within the FATF definition and applies risk-based mitigation measures to them. 112. Authorities also confirmed their proactive engagement and analysis on the private sector when assessing TF risks; the sector’s TF related reporting against inflows and outflows related to high-risk jurisdictions was analysed. Given the Latvian context, this analysis also included reporting on sanctions evasions and was then further used to inform guidance for private sector reporting on cross-border flows. Notwithstanding, STR reporting for TF has been very limited: seven reports between 2021-2022, covering on average 20 transactions. Whilst the low TF risk profile and limited exposure to higher risk countries and typologies could justify the low number of STRs, this area needs ongoing attention and timely action by the competent authorities in case of any changes in the TF risk environment. Discussions held on-site confirmed that the competent authorities, and mostly the State Security Service and the FIU, remain vigilant and are aware of this, as also evidenced through the work of CFT Task Force. Footnotes [19]. (i) threats and ability to combat corruption; (ii) threats posed by tax offences and ability to combat that phenomenon; (iii) threats posed by drug trafficking offences and capacities to combat them; (iv) threats posed by property offences and ability to combat them; and (v) threats posed by autonomous ML, including risks posed by cash transactions. [20]. (i) credit institutions, (ii) financial institutions and (iii) the non-financial sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 130. Latvia has a robust legal framework for MLA, which enables the authorities to provide a broad range of assistance (see Recommendations 36, 37 and 38 in the TC annexe for more information on the legal framework). Latvia actively engages in effective international co-operation, [21] and co-operates with foreign counterparts in a constructive manner as confirmed by the feedback received from the global community, which highlighted the good quality and timeliness of assistance provided by Latvia. Responses to incoming requests are comprehensive and the information provided is well-regarded by the requesting competent authorities. 131. The State Police, the PO, and the MoJ are the main actors in formal international co-operation. The PO handles requests during investigations and prosecutions, forwarding them to relevant LEAs. The State Police manages co-operation on investigations within its capabilities. The MoJ oversees co-operation during trials. [22] All authorities in Latvia are well-resourced for international co-operation and have good internal co-ordination. If an MLA request is received by an incorrect authority, it is quickly transferred to the appropriate one, with immediate communication via phone or mail. 132. All central authorities in Latvia have clear procedures for prioritising MLA requests. However, the manual case management system currently in use does not systematically track the execution time of these requests, making management and prioritisation of requests challenging. An automated system is planned as part of broader judicial reforms to be completed by 2029. Despite the high volume of international co-operation requests, Latvia's international partners have not provided negative feedback and are generally satisfied with Latvia's responsiveness. 133. In the period reviewed, authorities received 4 230 EU requests and 2 668 non-EU requests for MLA, handled on average within 60 days and 73 days respectively. Following the closure of Latvian banks involved in laundromat schemes and Latvia’s shift away from being a regional financial centre, financial flows with all countries, including higher-risk non-EU jurisdictions, have declined. This reduction, coupled with geopolitical and security developments, has led to decreased co-operation with these countries throughout the review period. 134.  The authorities demonstrated that in urgent or simple cases, requests are handled faster. Breaking the requests down, roughly 60% of all requests are from EU countries. The remaining 40% are from other non-EU jurisdictions and have seen a steady decline since 2021, with around half as many requests as the previous period. Table 2.1. Incoming MLA/EIO requests for all central authorities (2018-2023) Year Received during the year Of which pending at the end of the year** Refused Executed Average time of execution in days MLA EIO* MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA*** EIO Yearly Average 444 705 15 25 7 14 423 666 70 59 Total 2 668 4 230 90 151 44 82 2 538 3 996 70 59 Combined 6 898 241 126 6 534 64 Note: *Information available for PO and State Police; **Information available for PO; ***Average time of execution measured during one month period of year (30 days) as sample 135. There have been no cases of unsubstantiated refusals of MLAR/EIO and no such cases were mentioned in the international co-operation feedback. One refusal involved retaining seized assets needed as evidence in ongoing proceedings in Latvia. As indicated in the previous report, the dual criminality is required for the Special investigative actions (Sec. 853 CPL); however, there have been no refusals on this ground. 136. Incoming MLARs and EIOs are related most frequently to fraud and ML, followed by OCG, tax crime, corruption and bribery, as well as drug trafficking. Two TF related MLAs were received. [23] MLARs/EIOs are also reviewed regarding any circumstances for initiating criminal proceedings in Latvia. For example, a large-scale stand-alone ML case was investigated based on the findings in the execution of a MLA request, which led to the NCBC confiscation of approximately 10 million EURs. 137. Latvian authorities regularly use requests of information to trigger domestic investigations. Often, requests for information include provisions of evidence to Latvia on a spontaneous basis (i.e. without a prior request), and thus, Latvian authorities proactively initiate investigations into persons and activities in Latvia. The authorities also presented a recent case study showing the ability to pursue asset recovery based on evidence provided by an international partner (see box 7.1 below). Box 2.1. Initiating a criminal investigation based on an incoming MLA request from the USA In 2018, a US MLA linked to a corruption and ML case involving telecommunication Company T was sent to Latvia. Company T admitted to paying approximately USD 331 million in bribes to Person G, an associate of a former Central Asian president in 2017. The bribes were funnelled through offshore shell Company M, which received USD 11.9 million in its Latvian bank account from a Liechtenstein bank. Latvia investigated domestic accounts of the suspects and seized USD 14 029 346, EUR 1 059 423, GBP 999, and CHF 1 000 as suspects could not explain the origin of the funds. Legal co-operation with Liechtenstein and the United States of America was implemented. In 2021 approximately EUR 12.5 million were confiscated in NCBC procedure, and criminal proceedings were terminated in December 2021. 2.1.2. European Arrest Warrants and Extradition 138. Extradition requests and European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) are generally executed promptly. From 2018 to 2023, Latvia received 390 requests: 306 EAWs and 84 extradition requests, mostly from EU countries. From 2021 to 2023, 78% of extradition requests came from EU members. Extradition requests take an average of 263 days, while EAWs take 36 days. High-profile cases, including dual-use goods and EU sanctions violations, are also included. Latvia refused to execute 30 extraditions and 60 EAWs out of 84 and 306 requests, respectively. In cases where requests are refused, the refusals were substantiated. [24] Table 2.2. Incoming extradition requests and European arrest warrants (2018-2023) Received during the year Of which pending at end of the year Refused Executed Avg. Time to execute (days, weighted) Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Yearly average 14 51 7 7 5 10 8 35 263 36 Total 84 306 43 39 30 60 45 207 263 36 Combined 390 82 90 252 76 2.1.3. Identifying, freezing, seizing, confiscating and sharing criminal assets 139. Although all authorities have powers to identify and trace assets, the ARO of the State Police is the main authority to handle requests on asset identification. 14 asset recovery requests were received during the reporting period. The table below shows the statistics on confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets based on incoming requests. These sums are quite low; however, this is due to the small number of incoming requests on asset recovery, sharing and repatriation. Table 2.3. Value of confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets requests (2018-2023, EUR) Confiscation Recovery Repatriation Sharing Average yearly 258 019 89 208 75 572 9 340 Total 1 548 112 535 244 453 434 56 044 Footnotes [21]. Main partners include Estonia, Lithuania, and other EU counties such as Poland, Czechia, Austria, and Germany, as well as the United States of America. [22]. All central authorities make use of other channels of co-operation to foster formal international co-operation. Namely, MoJ is also serving as European Justice Network contact point, frequently used to resolve problems regarding judicial co-operation within EU jurisdictions. Eurojust is actively used by the PO and one of the prosecutors of International Cooperation Division is performing the duties of a seconded expert at Eurojust. The State Police makes use of all possible channels such as the Europol (through liaison officers stationed in Europol), Interpol, CARIN, and one liaison officer stationed in the United Kingdom. [23]. In relation to the TF cases, Latvia’s involvement was limited, and the country did not play a central role in any TF scheme. The requests pertained mainly to ancillary information to advance TF cases in other countries. [24]. Most refusals of extradition/EAW requests are due to the request being withdrawn, the person dying or leaving the country, or the requesting country failing to provide further documentation. Additionally, requests are refused if they aim to prosecute the person based on race, religion, nationality, or political views, or if there are grounds to believe the person's rights may be violated for these reasons (e.g., extradition was denied for a political opposition member facing repression)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 130. Latvia has a robust legal framework for MLA, which enables the authorities to provide a broad range of assistance (see Recommendations 36, 37 and 38 in the TC annexe for more information on the legal framework). Latvia actively engages in effective international co-operation, [21] and co-operates with foreign counterparts in a constructive manner as confirmed by the feedback received from the global community, which highlighted the good quality and timeliness of assistance provided by Latvia. Responses to incoming requests are comprehensive and the information provided is well-regarded by the requesting competent authorities. 131. The State Police, the PO, and the MoJ are the main actors in formal international co-operation. The PO handles requests during investigations and prosecutions, forwarding them to relevant LEAs. The State Police manages co-operation on investigations within its capabilities. The MoJ oversees co-operation during trials. [22] All authorities in Latvia are well-resourced for international co-operation and have good internal co-ordination. If an MLA request is received by an incorrect authority, it is quickly transferred to the appropriate one, with immediate communication via phone or mail. 132. All central authorities in Latvia have clear procedures for prioritising MLA requests. However, the manual case management system currently in use does not systematically track the execution time of these requests, making management and prioritisation of requests challenging. An automated system is planned as part of broader judicial reforms to be completed by 2029. Despite the high volume of international co-operation requests, Latvia's international partners have not provided negative feedback and are generally satisfied with Latvia's responsiveness. 133. In the period reviewed, authorities received 4 230 EU requests and 2 668 non-EU requests for MLA, handled on average within 60 days and 73 days respectively. Following the closure of Latvian banks involved in laundromat schemes and Latvia’s shift away from being a regional financial centre, financial flows with all countries, including higher-risk non-EU jurisdictions, have declined. This reduction, coupled with geopolitical and security developments, has led to decreased co-operation with these countries throughout the review period. 134.  The authorities demonstrated that in urgent or simple cases, requests are handled faster. Breaking the requests down, roughly 60% of all requests are from EU countries. The remaining 40% are from other non-EU jurisdictions and have seen a steady decline since 2021, with around half as many requests as the previous period. Table 2.1. Incoming MLA/EIO requests for all central authorities (2018-2023) Year Received during the year Of which pending at the end of the year** Refused Executed Average time of execution in days MLA EIO* MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA*** EIO Yearly Average 444 705 15 25 7 14 423 666 70 59 Total 2 668 4 230 90 151 44 82 2 538 3 996 70 59 Combined 6 898 241 126 6 534 64 Note: *Information available for PO and State Police; **Information available for PO; ***Average time of execution measured during one month period of year (30 days) as sample 135. There have been no cases of unsubstantiated refusals of MLAR/EIO and no such cases were mentioned in the international co-operation feedback. One refusal involved retaining seized assets needed as evidence in ongoing proceedings in Latvia. As indicated in the previous report, the dual criminality is required for the Special investigative actions (Sec. 853 CPL); however, there have been no refusals on this ground. 136. Incoming MLARs and EIOs are related most frequently to fraud and ML, followed by OCG, tax crime, corruption and bribery, as well as drug trafficking. Two TF related MLAs were received. [23] MLARs/EIOs are also reviewed regarding any circumstances for initiating criminal proceedings in Latvia. For example, a large-scale stand-alone ML case was investigated based on the findings in the execution of a MLA request, which led to the NCBC confiscation of approximately 10 million EURs. 137. Latvian authorities regularly use requests of information to trigger domestic investigations. Often, requests for information include provisions of evidence to Latvia on a spontaneous basis (i.e. without a prior request), and thus, Latvian authorities proactively initiate investigations into persons and activities in Latvia. The authorities also presented a recent case study showing the ability to pursue asset recovery based on evidence provided by an international partner (see box 7.1 below). Box 2.1. Initiating a criminal investigation based on an incoming MLA request from the USA In 2018, a US MLA linked to a corruption and ML case involving telecommunication Company T was sent to Latvia. Company T admitted to paying approximately USD 331 million in bribes to Person G, an associate of a former Central Asian president in 2017. The bribes were funnelled through offshore shell Company M, which received USD 11.9 million in its Latvian bank account from a Liechtenstein bank. Latvia investigated domestic accounts of the suspects and seized USD 14 029 346, EUR 1 059 423, GBP 999, and CHF 1 000 as suspects could not explain the origin of the funds. Legal co-operation with Liechtenstein and the United States of America was implemented. In 2021 approximately EUR 12.5 million were confiscated in NCBC procedure, and criminal proceedings were terminated in December 2021. 2.1.2. European Arrest Warrants and Extradition 138. Extradition requests and European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) are generally executed promptly. From 2018 to 2023, Latvia received 390 requests: 306 EAWs and 84 extradition requests, mostly from EU countries. From 2021 to 2023, 78% of extradition requests came from EU members. Extradition requests take an average of 263 days, while EAWs take 36 days. High-profile cases, including dual-use goods and EU sanctions violations, are also included. Latvia refused to execute 30 extraditions and 60 EAWs out of 84 and 306 requests, respectively. In cases where requests are refused, the refusals were substantiated. [24] Table 2.2. Incoming extradition requests and European arrest warrants (2018-2023) Received during the year Of which pending at end of the year Refused Executed Avg. Time to execute (days, weighted) Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Yearly average 14 51 7 7 5 10 8 35 263 36 Total 84 306 43 39 30 60 45 207 263 36 Combined 390 82 90 252 76 2.1.3. Identifying, freezing, seizing, confiscating and sharing criminal assets 139. Although all authorities have powers to identify and trace assets, the ARO of the State Police is the main authority to handle requests on asset identification. 14 asset recovery requests were received during the reporting period. The table below shows the statistics on confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets based on incoming requests. These sums are quite low; however, this is due to the small number of incoming requests on asset recovery, sharing and repatriation. Table 2.3. Value of confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets requests (2018-2023, EUR) Confiscation Recovery Repatriation Sharing Average yearly 258 019 89 208 75 572 9 340 Total 1 548 112 535 244 453 434 56 044 Footnotes [21]. Main partners include Estonia, Lithuania, and other EU counties such as Poland, Czechia, Austria, and Germany, as well as the United States of America. [22]. All central authorities make use of other channels of co-operation to foster formal international co-operation. Namely, MoJ is also serving as European Justice Network contact point, frequently used to resolve problems regarding judicial co-operation within EU jurisdictions. Eurojust is actively used by the PO and one of the prosecutors of International Cooperation Division is performing the duties of a seconded expert at Eurojust. The State Police makes use of all possible channels such as the Europol (through liaison officers stationed in Europol), Interpol, CARIN, and one liaison officer stationed in the United Kingdom. [23]. In relation to the TF cases, Latvia’s involvement was limited, and the country did not play a central role in any TF scheme. The requests pertained mainly to ancillary information to advance TF cases in other countries. [24]. Most refusals of extradition/EAW requests are due to the request being withdrawn, the person dying or leaving the country, or the requesting country failing to provide further documentation. Additionally, requests are refused if they aim to prosecute the person based on race, religion, nationality, or political views, or if there are grounds to believe the person's rights may be violated for these reasons (e.g., extradition was denied for a political opposition member facing repression)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 173. Generally, legislative requirements are not broad enough to cover all types of criminality and criminal associations. The AML/CFT/CPF Law lists only a limited number of crimes to be considered at the market entry stage and these crimes cease to be considered for criminality criteria purposes once a criminal record is annulled or cleared (expiration of punishment, amnesty, etc.). [35] The narrow criminality approach is expanded in the sectorial laws applicable to FIs under Latvijas Banka supervision, however, not to a full extent. Notwithstanding, the Latvijas Banka has a regulation in place that set outs additional requirements (please see below). Latvijas Banka 174. Fitness and propriety checks by the Latvijas Banka are conducted under a regulation, [36] according to which BOs and controllers have to have an impeccable reputation. The Latvijas Banka informs that - in practice - all aspects of criminal activity are considered under good repute criteria, [37] including any administrative records. As part of consideration of the good repute of an applicant, the reputation of a person having close family ties or a business relationship with the person are considered. This covers criminal associations. Latvijas Banka demonstrated through a case study that it was able to refuse market entry (acquisition of a qualifying holding) on the basis of criteria of “impeccable reputation” despite absence of a criminal record. 175. Generally, Latvijas Banka applies a unified approach to licensing and/or approval checks (change of shareholding, management position and qualifying holding), [38] however, scrutiny of checks may vary depending on materiality and risk. All applicants are commonly required to present a criminal record certificate from all countries they have been residing in which is further verified. Criminal associations are checked through various databases, negative media searches, using information submitted by the applicant on its professional and business affiliations. Additional relevant checks include source of wealth and funds used to provide capital (supportive documentation required on this, such as tax declarations, audited statements or similar), as well as the assessment of business model and related ML/TF risks. [39] 176. Licence applications processed per year vary between one and five. No licence applications have been refused over the assessment period as the Latvijas Banka tends to have a dialogue with the applicant which leads to withdrawal by the applicant. Two cases appealing decisions on refusal to approve an acquisition of qualifying holdings were brought to court. Both claims were dismissed, and proceedings terminated and Latvijas Banka decisions remained in force. As for managerial role assessments, reasons for withdrawal have been related to insufficient competence; there were no refusals. 177. Within the assessment period, three banking failures occurred that were closely related to improper conduct or handling of business operations by BOs and/or controllers. While investigations are ongoing, and thus more detail cannot be revealed at this stage, these events nevertheless call into question potential gaps in assessing the suitability and good repute of BOs and managers and/or related decisions on refusals. SRS and CRPC 178. The SRS applies controls to prevent criminals from entering the regulated market (based on the requirements of the AML/CFT/CPF Law which are somewhat narrow as regards crimes to be considered - see above), however, processes need further improvement. FIs supervised by the SRS are required to submit a report to the authority following registration within the ER. Further criminality checks by the SRS are conducted in the post-registration stage (approximately within 2 weeks after the report is submitted) and during routine on-site examinations. Whilst the SRS consults national databases regarding criminality of BOs and managers, there are no established requirements for foreign managers and BOs to present conviction certificates to the registration authority. This shortcoming is currently not material, as there are no non-resident VASP BOs, as confirmed by the SRS. The SRS does not have explicit legal powers to prevent registration of newcomers if the authority does not consider them to be fit and proper, neither to dismiss BOs or managers after registration. Limitations concerning narrow scope of criminality and coverage of criminal associations as explained above equally apply here. 179. CRPC’s internal regulations allow broader criminality to be considered than the SRS, however, shareholders and BOs are subject to a significantly lesser degree of criminality requirements than managers and are limited to ML/TF/PF offences only. Whilst the CRPC suggests that an all-crimes approach can be considered under good repute criteria, consistency of application of this approach cannot be evidenced as no formalised rules exist. The CRPC has refused one application due to concerns relating to the source of wealth invested as capital. BOs are additionally checked during on-site visits. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 180. Latvijas Banka has established internal processes for detecting unlicensed service providers through the following means: customer complaints, media monitoring, whistleblowers, information from the State Police or other authorities. Latvijas Banka has several tools to fulfil its monitoring tasks. [40] In the review period, Latvijas Banka has identified four instances of foreign investment service providers offering services in Latvia without authorisation which resulted in blocking their websites. The SRS has identified two unregistered VASPs that were subject to administrative fines and suspension of business activity. Footnotes [35]. The AML/CFT/CPF Law states that the BO of the FI may not have been sentenced for committing intentional crime against the State, property or administrative order, committing intentional crime in the national economy or service of State authorities or for committing such crime which is related to terrorism, unless the criminal record is set aside or extinguished; unless it is otherwise provided for in other laws and regulations (AML/CFT/CFP Law, Section 101(11)). [36]. Regulation on acquiring or increasing qualifying holding in financial institutions (applicable at the primary licensing and subsequent changes). [37]. Or impeccable reputation criteria. [38]. Some differences exist, e.g., different registration and licensing thresholds for EMIs and registration of AIFs. Latvijas Banka has prepared amendments to the law that would require stricter market entry controls for the whole AIF sector (see more at R.26). [39]. From an AML/CFT perspective, assessment of a business model is used to understand the applicant’s operations, including the products and services to be offered, business complexity, geographic footprint, expected customer base, and delivery channels. This understanding helps in identification of potential ML/TF risks inherent to the business model. The analysis is further used to evaluate the applicant’s AML/CFT risk assessment, policies and control procedures thereby ensuring that the AML/CFT documentation is appropriately tailored to the specific characteristics of the business model. [40]. A specific programme for monitoring the resources available on the Internet, which, inter alia, provides analysis of the resources available on the Internet by keywords about specific service providers; programme LETA station.lv for media monitoring where information on Latvijas Banka, the financial sector, payment services etc. is selected by keywords; several public databases (e.g., Lursoft) that are used for the monitoring framework." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 173. Generally, legislative requirements are not broad enough to cover all types of criminality and criminal associations. The AML/CFT/CPF Law lists only a limited number of crimes to be considered at the market entry stage and these crimes cease to be considered for criminality criteria purposes once a criminal record is annulled or cleared (expiration of punishment, amnesty, etc.). [35] The narrow criminality approach is expanded in the sectorial laws applicable to FIs under Latvijas Banka supervision, however, not to a full extent. Notwithstanding, the Latvijas Banka has a regulation in place that set outs additional requirements (please see below). Latvijas Banka 174. Fitness and propriety checks by the Latvijas Banka are conducted under a regulation, [36] according to which BOs and controllers have to have an impeccable reputation. The Latvijas Banka informs that - in practice - all aspects of criminal activity are considered under good repute criteria, [37] including any administrative records. As part of consideration of the good repute of an applicant, the reputation of a person having close family ties or a business relationship with the person are considered. This covers criminal associations. Latvijas Banka demonstrated through a case study that it was able to refuse market entry (acquisition of a qualifying holding) on the basis of criteria of “impeccable reputation” despite absence of a criminal record. 175. Generally, Latvijas Banka applies a unified approach to licensing and/or approval checks (change of shareholding, management position and qualifying holding), [38] however, scrutiny of checks may vary depending on materiality and risk. All applicants are commonly required to present a criminal record certificate from all countries they have been residing in which is further verified. Criminal associations are checked through various databases, negative media searches, using information submitted by the applicant on its professional and business affiliations. Additional relevant checks include source of wealth and funds used to provide capital (supportive documentation required on this, such as tax declarations, audited statements or similar), as well as the assessment of business model and related ML/TF risks. [39] 176. Licence applications processed per year vary between one and five. No licence applications have been refused over the assessment period as the Latvijas Banka tends to have a dialogue with the applicant which leads to withdrawal by the applicant. Two cases appealing decisions on refusal to approve an acquisition of qualifying holdings were brought to court. Both claims were dismissed, and proceedings terminated and Latvijas Banka decisions remained in force. As for managerial role assessments, reasons for withdrawal have been related to insufficient competence; there were no refusals. 177. Within the assessment period, three banking failures occurred that were closely related to improper conduct or handling of business operations by BOs and/or controllers. While investigations are ongoing, and thus more detail cannot be revealed at this stage, these events nevertheless call into question potential gaps in assessing the suitability and good repute of BOs and managers and/or related decisions on refusals. SRS and CRPC 178. The SRS applies controls to prevent criminals from entering the regulated market (based on the requirements of the AML/CFT/CPF Law which are somewhat narrow as regards crimes to be considered - see above), however, processes need further improvement. FIs supervised by the SRS are required to submit a report to the authority following registration within the ER. Further criminality checks by the SRS are conducted in the post-registration stage (approximately within 2 weeks after the report is submitted) and during routine on-site examinations. Whilst the SRS consults national databases regarding criminality of BOs and managers, there are no established requirements for foreign managers and BOs to present conviction certificates to the registration authority. This shortcoming is currently not material, as there are no non-resident VASP BOs, as confirmed by the SRS. The SRS does not have explicit legal powers to prevent registration of newcomers if the authority does not consider them to be fit and proper, neither to dismiss BOs or managers after registration. Limitations concerning narrow scope of criminality and coverage of criminal associations as explained above equally apply here. 179. CRPC’s internal regulations allow broader criminality to be considered than the SRS, however, shareholders and BOs are subject to a significantly lesser degree of criminality requirements than managers and are limited to ML/TF/PF offences only. Whilst the CRPC suggests that an all-crimes approach can be considered under good repute criteria, consistency of application of this approach cannot be evidenced as no formalised rules exist. The CRPC has refused one application due to concerns relating to the source of wealth invested as capital. BOs are additionally checked during on-site visits. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 180. Latvijas Banka has established internal processes for detecting unlicensed service providers through the following means: customer complaints, media monitoring, whistleblowers, information from the State Police or other authorities. Latvijas Banka has several tools to fulfil its monitoring tasks. [40] In the review period, Latvijas Banka has identified four instances of foreign investment service providers offering services in Latvia without authorisation which resulted in blocking their websites. The SRS has identified two unregistered VASPs that were subject to administrative fines and suspension of business activity. Footnotes [35]. The AML/CFT/CPF Law states that the BO of the FI may not have been sentenced for committing intentional crime against the State, property or administrative order, committing intentional crime in the national economy or service of State authorities or for committing such crime which is related to terrorism, unless the criminal record is set aside or extinguished; unless it is otherwise provided for in other laws and regulations (AML/CFT/CFP Law, Section 101(11)). [36]. Regulation on acquiring or increasing qualifying holding in financial institutions (applicable at the primary licensing and subsequent changes). [37]. Or impeccable reputation criteria. [38]. Some differences exist, e.g., different registration and licensing thresholds for EMIs and registration of AIFs. Latvijas Banka has prepared amendments to the law that would require stricter market entry controls for the whole AIF sector (see more at R.26). [39]. From an AML/CFT perspective, assessment of a business model is used to understand the applicant’s operations, including the products and services to be offered, business complexity, geographic footprint, expected customer base, and delivery channels. This understanding helps in identification of potential ML/TF risks inherent to the business model. The analysis is further used to evaluate the applicant’s AML/CFT risk assessment, policies and control procedures thereby ensuring that the AML/CFT documentation is appropriately tailored to the specific characteristics of the business model. [40]. A specific programme for monitoring the resources available on the Internet, which, inter alia, provides analysis of the resources available on the Internet by keywords about specific service providers; programme LETA station.lv for media monitoring where information on Latvijas Banka, the financial sector, payment services etc. is selected by keywords; several public databases (e.g., Lursoft) that are used for the monitoring framework." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 228. Despite some remaining gaps in legislative provisions applying to the SRS, [49] licensing, registration and other controls effectively prevent criminals and their associates from holding or being the BO of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in DNFBPs. 229. Gambling operators, real estate agents and accountants are subject to upfront “fit and proper” checks which include: (i) a check that BOs and senior management have a clean criminal record; [50] and (ii) a more general review of reputation, which is sufficiently broad to cover offences not covered in legislation, source of funds for investment, criminal links, ongoing criminal investigations, and linked third parties. Checks are supported by reliable sources and cover foreigners. Whilst controls to prevent criminals and their associates from acquiring interests or being appointed to a management function in an independent legal professional or TCSP are not in place, supervisory powers can be used to affect change. 230. Subsequent changes to BOs and senior management of legal persons are generally notified ex post to the SRS by the ER within one day of the change. All owners and controllers are then checked (all crimes) by the SRS against reliable sources on a fortnightly basis. In practice, checks have not identified criminal links. Changes to BOs and senior management are notified ex post by the ER and gambling operator to the LGSI within five days of the change and, in addition, casino licences are renewed on an annual basis when any changes of ownership or control are again assessed. 231. Criminality precludes accreditation of individuals as advocates and notaries. Both SRBs obtain evidence of a clean criminal record, and the LCSA releases a pre-exam candidate list for advocates to flag any reputational concerns, e.g. links to criminals. Consent of the LCSA is needed also to register a firm of advocates as a partnership or LLC. Only an advocate may be a member or sit on the board of a partnership or LLC. Checks are subsequently performed on advocates at least once a year. Notaries may practice only as individuals. Checks on notaries are updated on an annual basis, but changes would be picked up sooner, e.g. through complaints. 232. All supervisors have presented examples of applications that have been refused and licences revoked due to criminality. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 233. Breaches of licensing and registration requirements are effectively detected and addressed. Public registers of DNFBPs make it possible to identify those that are conducting non-authorised business. 234. In order to identify unauthorised DNFBP activities, the SRS makes use of extensive data sources held to support tax collection and monitors social networks, adverts, and complaints. It also conducts on-site inspections where economic activity is detected without registration. Fines have been applied to real estate agents and accountants for unauthorised activities during the assessment period – averaging around EUR 2 333 for real estate agents and EUR 600 for accountants. The SRS has also suspended activities of unauthorised accountants until they have been authorised and other violations eliminated. The LGSI monitors media sites, land-based activities and other information in the public domain or held by other competent authorities to identify unauthorised activities and keeps a register of unlicensed operators. Neither the SRS nor LGSI have identified cases where unauthorised activities continued after breaches were initially identified. Footnotes [49]. Some of these are set out at c.28.4((b). Measures in place to prevent criminals from holding significant or controlling interests do not cover all criminal offences. Measures are not in place to prevent associates of criminals from holding a significant or controlling interest. [50]. For real estate agents, checks cover property-related offences, economic offences and offences related to terrorism. For accountants, checks cover criminal offences against the national economy or in the service of state institutions and offences related to terrorism." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 228. Despite some remaining gaps in legislative provisions applying to the SRS, [49] licensing, registration and other controls effectively prevent criminals and their associates from holding or being the BO of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in DNFBPs. 229. Gambling operators, real estate agents and accountants are subject to upfront “fit and proper” checks which include: (i) a check that BOs and senior management have a clean criminal record; [50] and (ii) a more general review of reputation, which is sufficiently broad to cover offences not covered in legislation, source of funds for investment, criminal links, ongoing criminal investigations, and linked third parties. Checks are supported by reliable sources and cover foreigners. Whilst controls to prevent criminals and their associates from acquiring interests or being appointed to a management function in an independent legal professional or TCSP are not in place, supervisory powers can be used to affect change. 230. Subsequent changes to BOs and senior management of legal persons are generally notified ex post to the SRS by the ER within one day of the change. All owners and controllers are then checked (all crimes) by the SRS against reliable sources on a fortnightly basis. In practice, checks have not identified criminal links. Changes to BOs and senior management are notified ex post by the ER and gambling operator to the LGSI within five days of the change and, in addition, casino licences are renewed on an annual basis when any changes of ownership or control are again assessed. 231. Criminality precludes accreditation of individuals as advocates and notaries. Both SRBs obtain evidence of a clean criminal record, and the LCSA releases a pre-exam candidate list for advocates to flag any reputational concerns, e.g. links to criminals. Consent of the LCSA is needed also to register a firm of advocates as a partnership or LLC. Only an advocate may be a member or sit on the board of a partnership or LLC. Checks are subsequently performed on advocates at least once a year. Notaries may practice only as individuals. Checks on notaries are updated on an annual basis, but changes would be picked up sooner, e.g. through complaints. 232. All supervisors have presented examples of applications that have been refused and licences revoked due to criminality. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 233. Breaches of licensing and registration requirements are effectively detected and addressed. Public registers of DNFBPs make it possible to identify those that are conducting non-authorised business. 234. In order to identify unauthorised DNFBP activities, the SRS makes use of extensive data sources held to support tax collection and monitors social networks, adverts, and complaints. It also conducts on-site inspections where economic activity is detected without registration. Fines have been applied to real estate agents and accountants for unauthorised activities during the assessment period – averaging around EUR 2 333 for real estate agents and EUR 600 for accountants. The SRS has also suspended activities of unauthorised accountants until they have been authorised and other violations eliminated. The LGSI monitors media sites, land-based activities and other information in the public domain or held by other competent authorities to identify unauthorised activities and keeps a register of unlicensed operators. Neither the SRS nor LGSI have identified cases where unauthorised activities continued after breaches were initially identified. Footnotes [49]. Some of these are set out at c.28.4((b). Measures in place to prevent criminals from holding significant or controlling interests do not cover all criminal offences. Measures are not in place to prevent associates of criminals from holding a significant or controlling interest. [50]. For real estate agents, checks cover property-related offences, economic offences and offences related to terrorism. For accountants, checks cover criminal offences against the national economy or in the service of state institutions and offences related to terrorism." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="289. Latvia has assessed the risk posed by legal persons and legal arrangements. Latvia’s NRA2 details the risk of domestic legal persons and the legacy risks (risk profile 1) of foreign legal persons with accounts with Latvian FIs. The NRA2 identified the risk posed by legal persons as: (i) Foreign “shell” companies using Latvian financial system (legacy risk); (ii) transfer of shell company activities from overseas to Latvia (legacy risk); (iii) criminals establishing a legal person that does not meet the definition of a shell company (legacy and present risk); and (iv) EU registered companies and companies in geographically proximate countries involved in transaction schemes to evade tax (present risk). 290. Of the 162 888 domestic legal persons in existence at the end of 2022, less than 3% were identified as having a “complex” structure. 90% of declared BOs were Latvian residents, and of the 10% of foreign national BOs, half were EEA residents. LEAs confirmed that the current risks emanating from domestic legal persons are the use of domestic legal persons to evade tax, in conjunction with the use of legal persons or financial accounts in EU Member States and/or geographically proximate countries. This professional judgement was supported by the provision of case studies and statistics. 291. The NRA2 contained detailed information on the historic risks posed by foreign legal persons, based primarily on analysis of STR data and the freezing of EUR 695.38 million between 2020-2022 of foreign legal persons with accounts in Latvian banks subject to liquidation. Given the change in economic profile and customer base in Latvia, as well as updates to the FATF’s Recommendation 24, in 2024 the FIU Latvia, together with the MoJ and the ER, undertook a standalone non-public assessment of the current risks posed by foreign legal persons based on defined criteria. The assessment focused on the jurisdictional risks, deposits held by foreign legal persons in the Latvian banking sector, while also considering publicly available information, including adverse media checks, sanction screening, and information from FIU Latvia internal systems. The assessment reached a broad conclusion that “given the fact, that these foreign-created legal persons hold accounts within Latvian FIs, they are subject to rigorous oversight from an AML/CFT perspective” and overall, currently existing mitigating measures are sufficient. The assessment does not demonstrate an in depth understanding of geographic risk relating to foreign legal persons, however there was a thorough analysis of the nature of deposits of foreign legal persons and the impact of mitigation and control mechanisms. While foreign legal persons still hold considerable assets in Latvia: just under EUR 1.4 billion as of 2023. Over 75% of these deposits belong to legal persons from EU Member States – among the countries with the largest deposits are neighbouring jurisdictions and Cyprus (second largest). Non-EU countries with largest deposits are the United Kingdom (83%), British Virgin Islands (8%), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (5%), Switzerland (2%) and US (2%). Of these a third of deposits with Latvian FIs were from foreign financial corporations. Latvian authorities broadly concluded that the risks of foreign legal persons are low due to the fact that business relationship with the Latvian FIs are mostly maintained with EU legal persons. The AT is of the opinion that the assessment would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the varying inherent geographical risks of foreign legal persons (e.g., non-EU and varying risk levels within the EU jurisdictions) and a more comprehensive analysis of significant investments by foreign legal persons and business activities that foreign legal persons having links with Latvia are engaged in would further benefit the assessment. 292. Latvian authorities have taken considerable action against foreign legal persons in regard to ML, freezing almost EUR 670 million in a three-year period, to address legacy risks from its historic risk profile, see table 6.1 below). Table 5.1. Frozen funds of foreign legal persons (million EUR) [55] 2020 2021 2022 Total Belize 1.64 6.51 18.4 26.55 British Virgin Islands 87.97 16.43 89.1 193.5 Canada X 6.29 13.6 19.89 Cyprus 37.51 21.44 14.9 73.85 Hong Kong X 2.06 5.9 7.96 Malta 10.15 X X 10.15 Marshall Islands 5.03 5.09 23 33.12 Panama X 7.38 7.8 15.18 Seychelles 13.04 17.61 16.3 46.95 Singapore X 13.96 X 13.96 UAE 40.82 2.52 X 43.34 United Kingdom 28.27 29.93 73.4 131.6 Other 10.52 2.74 37.6 50.86 668.91 Legal arrangements 293. Latvian law does not permit for the creation of Latvian legal arrangements, but foreign legal arrangements may operate within Latvia. Interviews with LEAs demonstrated that foreign legal arrangements have not been found to pose an ML threat in Latvia, either historically or presently. There has been some limited involvement of foreign legal arrangements in complex ownership structures that featured in Latvia’s historic ML risk profile. Authorities demonstrated that no foreign legal arrangements are registered as holding account with Latvian FIs. Supervisors articulated that Latvian REs would treat foreign legal arrangements as inherently high risk and as a result conduct EDD in such cases. 294. Exposure to foreign legal arrangements by Latvian DNFBPs is estimated to be low. Of the 2 031 DNFBPs sampled by Latvian authorities, only seven reported providing services to either a foreign legal arrangement or a foreign legal person with a legal arrangement in the ownership or control chain. However, given there is no explicit legal obligation for a trustee to declare that they are acting as a trustee when procuring services from a RE (see R.25), it is possible that the number of clients that are legal arrangements may be higher than assessed. The impact of the lack of legal requirement for trustees to declare that they are acting as a trustee when procuring services from a RE is considered minor due to low materiality. Footnotes [55]. The asset freezing outlined in the table primarily pertains to one credit institution under liquidation, the operations of which ceased in February 2018." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="289. Latvia has assessed the risk posed by legal persons and legal arrangements. Latvia’s NRA2 details the risk of domestic legal persons and the legacy risks (risk profile 1) of foreign legal persons with accounts with Latvian FIs. The NRA2 identified the risk posed by legal persons as: (i) Foreign “shell” companies using Latvian financial system (legacy risk); (ii) transfer of shell company activities from overseas to Latvia (legacy risk); (iii) criminals establishing a legal person that does not meet the definition of a shell company (legacy and present risk); and (iv) EU registered companies and companies in geographically proximate countries involved in transaction schemes to evade tax (present risk). 290. Of the 162 888 domestic legal persons in existence at the end of 2022, less than 3% were identified as having a “complex” structure. 90% of declared BOs were Latvian residents, and of the 10% of foreign national BOs, half were EEA residents. LEAs confirmed that the current risks emanating from domestic legal persons are the use of domestic legal persons to evade tax, in conjunction with the use of legal persons or financial accounts in EU Member States and/or geographically proximate countries. This professional judgement was supported by the provision of case studies and statistics. 291. The NRA2 contained detailed information on the historic risks posed by foreign legal persons, based primarily on analysis of STR data and the freezing of EUR 695.38 million between 2020-2022 of foreign legal persons with accounts in Latvian banks subject to liquidation. Given the change in economic profile and customer base in Latvia, as well as updates to the FATF’s Recommendation 24, in 2024 the FIU Latvia, together with the MoJ and the ER, undertook a standalone non-public assessment of the current risks posed by foreign legal persons based on defined criteria. The assessment focused on the jurisdictional risks, deposits held by foreign legal persons in the Latvian banking sector, while also considering publicly available information, including adverse media checks, sanction screening, and information from FIU Latvia internal systems. The assessment reached a broad conclusion that “given the fact, that these foreign-created legal persons hold accounts within Latvian FIs, they are subject to rigorous oversight from an AML/CFT perspective” and overall, currently existing mitigating measures are sufficient. The assessment does not demonstrate an in depth understanding of geographic risk relating to foreign legal persons, however there was a thorough analysis of the nature of deposits of foreign legal persons and the impact of mitigation and control mechanisms. While foreign legal persons still hold considerable assets in Latvia: just under EUR 1.4 billion as of 2023. Over 75% of these deposits belong to legal persons from EU Member States – among the countries with the largest deposits are neighbouring jurisdictions and Cyprus (second largest). Non-EU countries with largest deposits are the United Kingdom (83%), British Virgin Islands (8%), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (5%), Switzerland (2%) and US (2%). Of these a third of deposits with Latvian FIs were from foreign financial corporations. Latvian authorities broadly concluded that the risks of foreign legal persons are low due to the fact that business relationship with the Latvian FIs are mostly maintained with EU legal persons. The AT is of the opinion that the assessment would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the varying inherent geographical risks of foreign legal persons (e.g., non-EU and varying risk levels within the EU jurisdictions) and a more comprehensive analysis of significant investments by foreign legal persons and business activities that foreign legal persons having links with Latvia are engaged in would further benefit the assessment. 292. Latvian authorities have taken considerable action against foreign legal persons in regard to ML, freezing almost EUR 670 million in a three-year period, to address legacy risks from its historic risk profile, see table 6.1 below). Table 5.1. Frozen funds of foreign legal persons (million EUR) [55] 2020 2021 2022 Total Belize 1.64 6.51 18.4 26.55 British Virgin Islands 87.97 16.43 89.1 193.5 Canada X 6.29 13.6 19.89 Cyprus 37.51 21.44 14.9 73.85 Hong Kong X 2.06 5.9 7.96 Malta 10.15 X X 10.15 Marshall Islands 5.03 5.09 23 33.12 Panama X 7.38 7.8 15.18 Seychelles 13.04 17.61 16.3 46.95 Singapore X 13.96 X 13.96 UAE 40.82 2.52 X 43.34 United Kingdom 28.27 29.93 73.4 131.6 Other 10.52 2.74 37.6 50.86 668.91 Legal arrangements 293. Latvian law does not permit for the creation of Latvian legal arrangements, but foreign legal arrangements may operate within Latvia. Interviews with LEAs demonstrated that foreign legal arrangements have not been found to pose an ML threat in Latvia, either historically or presently. There has been some limited involvement of foreign legal arrangements in complex ownership structures that featured in Latvia’s historic ML risk profile. Authorities demonstrated that no foreign legal arrangements are registered as holding account with Latvian FIs. Supervisors articulated that Latvian REs would treat foreign legal arrangements as inherently high risk and as a result conduct EDD in such cases. 294. Exposure to foreign legal arrangements by Latvian DNFBPs is estimated to be low. Of the 2 031 DNFBPs sampled by Latvian authorities, only seven reported providing services to either a foreign legal arrangement or a foreign legal person with a legal arrangement in the ownership or control chain. However, given there is no explicit legal obligation for a trustee to declare that they are acting as a trustee when procuring services from a RE (see R.25), it is possible that the number of clients that are legal arrangements may be higher than assessed. The impact of the lack of legal requirement for trustees to declare that they are acting as a trustee when procuring services from a RE is considered minor due to low materiality. Footnotes [55]. The asset freezing outlined in the table primarily pertains to one credit institution under liquidation, the operations of which ceased in February 2018." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="332. The FIU and LEAs have access to, and use, various sources of information to conduct robust, risk-based, and useful analyses to identify and advance their pursuit of ML, TF, and associated predicate offences. 6.1.1. By the FIU 333. The FIU has extensive direct (and immediate) access to a broad range of reports and data including the national account register, the ER (includes BO information), cross-border cash declaration data, and taxation databases for both individuals and entities. The FIU also has direct access to all criminal justice databases including courts (court decisions and convictions) police (wanted/missing persons, crime reports), and customs/border control (border crossings, cash declarations). Any information on databases not directly accessible can be obtained upon request. In practice, both public and private sector agencies usually respond in a timely manner, often within hours. 334. Where available, data is accurate and up to date. As outlined in IO.3 and IO.4, STR submissions from FIs largely meet expectations in terms of timeliness, quantity and quality. However, certain parts of the DNFBP sector (specifically lawyers and legal professionals) require improvements (see IO.4 section on AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off). [63] The quality and relevance of STRs has been the subject of sector-specific guidance, and the FIU has conducted extensive outreach and training with FIs and DNFBPs to both improve the quality of STRs, and to reduce defensive reporting. 335. FIU analysts use a wide range of data and information from a variety of sources (financial and otherwise) to develop and refine their work. The information is also processed through a range of advanced IT tools, enabling the authorities to develop accurate and insightful products. This includes online and direct access to 16 public and private resources, with more than 120 subsystem data sets. For example, the FIU Latvia has direct access to the SRS database with 31 subsystems (tax declarations, VAT partners, corporate income tax, personal income tax, information on employees, taxpayer status, dossier on taxpayer, customs declarations etc). [64] 336. The FIU uses various information sources to develop intelligence, leading to complex investigations. In one such instance, they used tax data to confirm suspicions from STRs about tax offences, successfully sharing this information with tax and police authorities. 337. Since the previous MER, the Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) reporting system has been significantly amended and improved. [65] In October 2021 Latvia adopted a new reporting system (goAML) which replaced the previous case management, analysis and electronic reporting system. The revised reporting system supports the STRs, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and Threshold Reports (CTRs). The yearly number of STRs in the current period is under 6 000 a year (2018-2023); meanwhile, there are on average 76 000 CTRs yearly that are used in various forms of analysis. 338. The reduction and alignment of STRs with Latvia's evolving risk profile demonstrates significant progress in ensuring that reporting corresponds to the country's identified threats and vulnerabilities. The chart below highlights a clear transition from Latvia’s historical risk profile—from ML tied to foreign-originated criminal offences and schemes —to a focus on domestic predicate offences, particularly tax and property crimes. Indeed, the table below shows an increasing proportion of STRs linked to tax evasion (32% in 2022 and 2023) and other local offences (25%), which aligns with Latvia’s NRA and evolving threat and risk profiles. Figure 6.1. STRs and the suspected predicate offence indicated by reporting entity Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 339. STRs received are generally of high quality, evidenced by their use in disseminations to LEAs and in strategic and operational analysis. The quality of STRs is assessed by measuring a number of criteria, for example, number of STRs returned to REs for amendments; the transaction amount included in STRs; STR attachment size; indication of predicate offences; typologies or other supplementary indicators (for instance STR is filed following a CCG meeting). Overall, STR relevance to the risk profile is also monitored by such metrics as number of legal persons per STR; share of STRs indicating most relevant ML risks (like tax offences or fraud) and others. All STRs are used in one way or another (i.e. for broader strategic analysis). This includes strategic and tactical analysis products; NRA and other risk assessments; updating of STR priority matrix; and a substantial proportion are used in FIU operational disseminations to LEAs. Figure 6.2. STR use in FIU operational and strategic analysis Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 340. Regarding TF, FIU Latvia received 30 STRs linked to suspected TF during the review period, with the highest numbers reported in 2018 and 2019. All TF-related STRs are given the highest priority, in line with internal risk scoring system and procedures. Upon receipt, each report is promptly assessed and undergoes a detailed analysis using internal databases, open-source information, and co-operation with national and international partners. This high-priority treatment ensures timely sharing of intelligence with the appropriate authorities. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 341. State Police, SRS TCPD and the CPCB have direct and timely access to the same key databases that are available to the FIU (i.e. national account register, ER, and taxation databases). Overall, authorities have access to over 70 databases and their sub-systems. Their access is most often immediate, and the data is accurate and up-to-date. 342. The FIU has introduced a mechanism for LEAs to rapidly check and verify the availability of relevant data held by the FIU through an innovative electronic gateway known as the “Black-Box” system. This system minimizes unnecessary, speculative requests for financial information or analysis and allows LEAs to independently conduct preliminary checks of FIU databases to verify the presence of relevant information (such as SARs/STRs/CTRs) before submitting a request to the FIU for detailed reports. Out of the 1 926 searches conducted by LEAs using the Black-Box system from March 2024 to the start of the on-site visit, 324 or 17% resulted in a positive match. Fully operational from August 2024, this system has significantly increased searches and positive matches compared to the previous average of 266 information requests per year. The Black-Box system allows early-stage checks and should be seen as an example of best practice. All Latvian LEAs and competent authorities should be encouraged to make full use of the Black-Box system. All LEAs should embed this process into their standard operating procedures in all appropriate investigations. Footnotes [63]. Overall, the number of STRs made by DNFBPs is not commensurate with the size and risk exposure of the DNFBP sector, as measured through the NRA (see also Chapter 4, IO.4). This discrepancy could impact the FIU’s scope of access to, and use of relevant information. The FIU mitigates this impact to a large extent with additional strategic analysis and accessing and using multiple sources of information to develop intelligence. The FIU also engages with REs to enhance reporting quality. They disseminate comprehensive guidelines for reporting, such as goAML manuals and guidelines on suspicious transactions as well as various typology and indicator materials, often in collaboration with other institutions under the CCG format. [64]. There are many databases in Latvia where no additional agreements are necessary for access to data (such as Construction information system, Information on freight licenses, licenses for consumer credit services, registers of the state, etc.) As a result of wide access to outside databases in 2023 the FIU has sent only 14 written requests (1.80%) for information to public registers. Average response time to those has been 10.92 days. Other requests are made directly online – e.g., there have been 33 580 online searches in the ER in 2023. [65]. Latvia abolished UTR reporting and introduced threshold declarations (CTRs) in late 2019. The new reporting approach differentiates between STRs and CTRs and fewer defensive reports. The previous MER recommended that Latvia move away from the UTR reporting system. In the previous MER it was found that many of the REs did not understand the difference between “suspicious” and “unusual” transactions as these terms are not differentiated in the Latvian language. This led to significant over-reporting. Regulations, which entered into force in 2019, removed UTRs and introduced threshold declarations (CTRs). This type of reporting was determined to be more useful for conducting strategic analysis as it does not rely on suspicion as a trigger for reporting. Further changes in legislation took place in 2021." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="332. The FIU and LEAs have access to, and use, various sources of information to conduct robust, risk-based, and useful analyses to identify and advance their pursuit of ML, TF, and associated predicate offences. 6.1.1. By the FIU 333. The FIU has extensive direct (and immediate) access to a broad range of reports and data including the national account register, the ER (includes BO information), cross-border cash declaration data, and taxation databases for both individuals and entities. The FIU also has direct access to all criminal justice databases including courts (court decisions and convictions) police (wanted/missing persons, crime reports), and customs/border control (border crossings, cash declarations). Any information on databases not directly accessible can be obtained upon request. In practice, both public and private sector agencies usually respond in a timely manner, often within hours. 334. Where available, data is accurate and up to date. As outlined in IO.3 and IO.4, STR submissions from FIs largely meet expectations in terms of timeliness, quantity and quality. However, certain parts of the DNFBP sector (specifically lawyers and legal professionals) require improvements (see IO.4 section on AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off). [63] The quality and relevance of STRs has been the subject of sector-specific guidance, and the FIU has conducted extensive outreach and training with FIs and DNFBPs to both improve the quality of STRs, and to reduce defensive reporting. 335. FIU analysts use a wide range of data and information from a variety of sources (financial and otherwise) to develop and refine their work. The information is also processed through a range of advanced IT tools, enabling the authorities to develop accurate and insightful products. This includes online and direct access to 16 public and private resources, with more than 120 subsystem data sets. For example, the FIU Latvia has direct access to the SRS database with 31 subsystems (tax declarations, VAT partners, corporate income tax, personal income tax, information on employees, taxpayer status, dossier on taxpayer, customs declarations etc). [64] 336. The FIU uses various information sources to develop intelligence, leading to complex investigations. In one such instance, they used tax data to confirm suspicions from STRs about tax offences, successfully sharing this information with tax and police authorities. 337. Since the previous MER, the Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) reporting system has been significantly amended and improved. [65] In October 2021 Latvia adopted a new reporting system (goAML) which replaced the previous case management, analysis and electronic reporting system. The revised reporting system supports the STRs, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), and Threshold Reports (CTRs). The yearly number of STRs in the current period is under 6 000 a year (2018-2023); meanwhile, there are on average 76 000 CTRs yearly that are used in various forms of analysis. 338. The reduction and alignment of STRs with Latvia's evolving risk profile demonstrates significant progress in ensuring that reporting corresponds to the country's identified threats and vulnerabilities. The chart below highlights a clear transition from Latvia’s historical risk profile—from ML tied to foreign-originated criminal offences and schemes —to a focus on domestic predicate offences, particularly tax and property crimes. Indeed, the table below shows an increasing proportion of STRs linked to tax evasion (32% in 2022 and 2023) and other local offences (25%), which aligns with Latvia’s NRA and evolving threat and risk profiles. Figure 6.1. STRs and the suspected predicate offence indicated by reporting entity Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 339. STRs received are generally of high quality, evidenced by their use in disseminations to LEAs and in strategic and operational analysis. The quality of STRs is assessed by measuring a number of criteria, for example, number of STRs returned to REs for amendments; the transaction amount included in STRs; STR attachment size; indication of predicate offences; typologies or other supplementary indicators (for instance STR is filed following a CCG meeting). Overall, STR relevance to the risk profile is also monitored by such metrics as number of legal persons per STR; share of STRs indicating most relevant ML risks (like tax offences or fraud) and others. All STRs are used in one way or another (i.e. for broader strategic analysis). This includes strategic and tactical analysis products; NRA and other risk assessments; updating of STR priority matrix; and a substantial proportion are used in FIU operational disseminations to LEAs. Figure 6.2. STR use in FIU operational and strategic analysis Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 340. Regarding TF, FIU Latvia received 30 STRs linked to suspected TF during the review period, with the highest numbers reported in 2018 and 2019. All TF-related STRs are given the highest priority, in line with internal risk scoring system and procedures. Upon receipt, each report is promptly assessed and undergoes a detailed analysis using internal databases, open-source information, and co-operation with national and international partners. This high-priority treatment ensures timely sharing of intelligence with the appropriate authorities. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 341. State Police, SRS TCPD and the CPCB have direct and timely access to the same key databases that are available to the FIU (i.e. national account register, ER, and taxation databases). Overall, authorities have access to over 70 databases and their sub-systems. Their access is most often immediate, and the data is accurate and up-to-date. 342. The FIU has introduced a mechanism for LEAs to rapidly check and verify the availability of relevant data held by the FIU through an innovative electronic gateway known as the “Black-Box” system. This system minimizes unnecessary, speculative requests for financial information or analysis and allows LEAs to independently conduct preliminary checks of FIU databases to verify the presence of relevant information (such as SARs/STRs/CTRs) before submitting a request to the FIU for detailed reports. Out of the 1 926 searches conducted by LEAs using the Black-Box system from March 2024 to the start of the on-site visit, 324 or 17% resulted in a positive match. Fully operational from August 2024, this system has significantly increased searches and positive matches compared to the previous average of 266 information requests per year. The Black-Box system allows early-stage checks and should be seen as an example of best practice. All Latvian LEAs and competent authorities should be encouraged to make full use of the Black-Box system. All LEAs should embed this process into their standard operating procedures in all appropriate investigations. Footnotes [63]. Overall, the number of STRs made by DNFBPs is not commensurate with the size and risk exposure of the DNFBP sector, as measured through the NRA (see also Chapter 4, IO.4). This discrepancy could impact the FIU’s scope of access to, and use of relevant information. The FIU mitigates this impact to a large extent with additional strategic analysis and accessing and using multiple sources of information to develop intelligence. The FIU also engages with REs to enhance reporting quality. They disseminate comprehensive guidelines for reporting, such as goAML manuals and guidelines on suspicious transactions as well as various typology and indicator materials, often in collaboration with other institutions under the CCG format. [64]. There are many databases in Latvia where no additional agreements are necessary for access to data (such as Construction information system, Information on freight licenses, licenses for consumer credit services, registers of the state, etc.) As a result of wide access to outside databases in 2023 the FIU has sent only 14 written requests (1.80%) for information to public registers. Average response time to those has been 10.92 days. Other requests are made directly online – e.g., there have been 33 580 online searches in the ER in 2023. [65]. Latvia abolished UTR reporting and introduced threshold declarations (CTRs) in late 2019. The new reporting approach differentiates between STRs and CTRs and fewer defensive reports. The previous MER recommended that Latvia move away from the UTR reporting system. In the previous MER it was found that many of the REs did not understand the difference between “suspicious” and “unusual” transactions as these terms are not differentiated in the Latvian language. This led to significant over-reporting. Regulations, which entered into force in 2019, removed UTRs and introduced threshold declarations (CTRs). This type of reporting was determined to be more useful for conducting strategic analysis as it does not rely on suspicion as a trigger for reporting. Further changes in legislation took place in 2021." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="376. Latvia proactively identifies and investigates ML through a variety of sources. Authorities have made significant improvements since the previous evaluation and judicial authorities and LEAs use all tools at their disposal to identify and investigate ML cases. This has yielded results in identification and investigation of ML and associated predicate offences. Legal Framework and Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies 377. Latvia maintains a sound legal and institutional framework with clearly delegated authorities and responsibilities for identifying potential cases of ML and investigating these along a spectrum of importance and impact, and alignment with risk. Investigation and prosecution of a criminal offence is mandatory (Section 6, CPL, see also R. 30). Any LEA which identifies possible ML while investigating a predicate offence has a duty to investigate. As Latvia follows all-crimes approach, every crime that generates criminal proceeds can be the predicate offence for ML. In Latvia, there are nine LEAs (investigating authorities) with competence of investigating ML. [80] The vast majority of ML and predicate offences have been investigated by the following authorities: · State Police investigates a wide range of criminal activities nationwide, excluding tax crimes. It operates through a 3-level system - with the Main Criminal Police Department, [81] 5 regional departments, and local stations. The Economic Crime Enforcement Department (ECED) within the Main Criminal Police Department handles complex ML cases, especially those threatening national economic interests. Around 20% of ML cases are investigated by ECED at the highest level of priority. 70% of cases are investigated at the regional level, and the remaining 10% are conducted with local police. · SRS TCPD leads investigations into state revenue crimes (e.g., tax evasion, tax fraud) and customs offences (e.g., smuggling, illicit movement of narcotics, illegal production, storage, movement, or disposal of alcohol, and tobacco products). · CPCB leads investigations into corruption offences for public officials, including public procurements. Identification and Investigation 378. Identification of suspected ML is done effectively through various means, i.e., FIU disseminations, parallel financial investigations, formal or informal incoming foreign requests, criminal intelligence, cross-border currency and cash seizures, submissions by a person, supervisory and regulatory institutions, open-source information and others. LEAs have developed mechanisms to identify ML cases and new trends via strategic and tactical analysis and criminal intelligence. 379. In total, Latvian authorities identified and pursued 1 755 ML investigations between 2018-2023. This number of cases shows a significant improvement since the previous assessment period (2013-2017) which counted 466 ML cases. As outlined in IO.6 Latvia’s FIU co-ordinates closely with relevant authorities to ensure adequate understanding of the suspicions and the relevant financial elements of the cases it disseminates, which aides in the identification of ML and associated predicate offences. 898 cases, or 51%, have been initiated based on FIU disseminations, mostly tied to ML in banks undergoing liquidation procedure (first risk profile), while parallel financial investigations account for 435 cases, or 25%; and domestic open-source information (or information from other LEAs) accounts for 9% of cases. Others, such as supervisory authority submissions or tip-offs, [82] foreign intelligence and cash controls on borders account for the remaining 14% (see table below). LEAs’ capacity to identify ML, in addition to FIU disseminations, is reflected by the growing proportion of investigations from parallel financial investigations and domestic intelligence. Table 7.1. Number of ML investigations by source (2018-2023) Source 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Percentage FIU dissemination 74 119 219 157 243 86 898 51% Parallel financial investigations 34 54 62 107 90 88 435 25% Domestic intelligence, OSINT, other intel. 32 20 28 26 18 35 159 9% MLA and other foreign intelligence 0 2 2 1 3 6 14 1% Other sources* 20 27 20 42 17 12 138 8% Cash control on borders 1 42 17 26 19 7 112 6% Total 161 264 348 359 390 234 1 756 100% *This includes preliminary investigation, departmental examination, SCA, submissions by natural/legal persons 380. The three case studies below illustrate instances of ML identification from different sources. Box 7.1. Identification from various sources Case 1: ML case from incoming EIO In 2021, criminal proceedings for aggravated ML were initiated based on an incoming EIO. The State Police found large amounts of cash and two gold ingots. A parallel financial investigation led to the seizure of the suspects' movable and immovable property in Latvia. NCBC proceedings ensured timely confiscation of EUR 9 732 190, USD 877 500, RUB 385 400, and two gold ingots (valued at least EUR 100 000). The criminal investigation is ongoing. Case 2: Cash at the border In 2019, Person A crossed the Latvian border from the Russian Federation with USD 243 000 and EUR 36 000, declaring it as family savings for daily expenses. Suspicious of ML, authorities initiated a criminal proceeding. Investigations revealed forged loan agreements and discrepancies in declared income, identifying Person A as a money mule. On 21 April 2023, the Riga Regional Court found Person A guilty of aggravated ML, sentencing them to 5 years' imprisonment with 1 year probation. Cash totalling EUR 36 000 and USD 243 000 was seized and confiscated. Case 3: FIU identified professional fraud scheme In 2016, State Police initiated criminal proceedings based on operational analysis of the FIU in the form of a Conclusion of the Competent Authority. The report provided evidence of suspicious transactions linked to a professional fraud scheme outside Latvia, with ML stages occurring in Latvia using a Latvian bank and involving Latvian nationals. The subsequent investigation, lasting about 2.5 years, revealed a Ponzi scheme involving over 240 victims in 11 countries. Active international co-operation led to a parallel financial investigation and asset seizures in Latvia. In 2020, two individuals were charged; one was found guilty and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment in 2022, while the other was acquitted. Total confiscated assets amounted to EUR 1 014 342. 381. Authorities are well-aware of the country’s ML risks, and the threats stemming from the first and second risk profiles (see IO.1), as well as typologies (laundering and layering techniques) associated with these risks. Parallel financial investigations are conducted as a policy and LEAs use all available tools, resources, and special investigative techniques. ML cases are prioritized according to General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) Guidelines [83] and internal LEA guidelines, aligning with national policy directives. [84] Alignment with Risk 382. Latvia conducted around 78 000 criminal investigations in total. ML investigations represent around 2.3% of all investigations (1 756 ML). Given that Latvia follows a mandatory approach to criminal proceedings (under Section 6 of the CPL), and most of the criminal cases reflected in the table below involve low-proceeds-generating offenses (which do not suggest ML), this proportion is sufficiently high. Table 7.2. Total Predicate Offences Investigated in Latvia (ML and non-ML) Predicate Offence Total Percentage Robbery or theft 35 813 45.6% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 10 396 13.2% Fraud 7 090 9.0% Counterfeiting currency 5 421 6.9% Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 4 093 5.2% Forgery 2 312 2.9% Misappropriation 2 216 2.8% Environmental crime 1 943 2.5% Rape, Sexual Violence, Leading to Depravity 1 942 2.5% Illicit arms trafficking 1 819 2.3% ML 1 755 2.3% Other 3 737 4.8% Total 78 537 100% Table 7.3. Total ML related to criminal activity investigations by Sate Police, SRS TCPD and CPCB (2018-2023) Investigations of ML related to Criminal activity Investigations Percentage State Police investigations (all crimes) 1 419 83% ML stand-alone 813 47% Various crimes investigated in regional departments 356 21% Illegal activities with financial instruments 185 11% Fraud, misappropriation 31 2% Smuggling 9 1% Sexual exploitation, including of children 5 0.3% Human Trafficking 3 0.2% Illegal operations with excise goods 3 0.2% Counterfeiting and piracy of products 2 0.1% Prohibited entrepreneurial activity 2 0.1% Tax crime (excl. SRS) 2 0.1% Illegal acquisition and use of data 2 0.1% Murder 1 0.1% Robbery 1 0.1% Extortion 1 0.1% Illegal acts with cultural objects 1 0.1% Failure to act by a public official 1 0.1% Corruption and bribery (excl. CPCB) 1 0.1% SRS TCPD investigations (ML related to Tax crimes, fraud, cash smuggling) 249 15% CPCB investigations (corruption cases) 48 3% Total 1 716 100% Totals include identification from three main LEAs, or 1 716 of the 1 756 ML investigations cited in the previous table above 383.  A considerable number of Latvia’s investigations are conducted on stand-alone ML. Of the 1 419 investigations conducted by the State Police, 813 (or nearly 60%) are for stand-alone ML. 112 cases, or around 6% of investigations come from cash controls at the borders. This relatively low percentage is due to the lower risk of cross-border cash smuggling, the COVID era, and the use of administrative measures for sums below EUR 35 000, which mitigates the need for mandatory investigations for every cross-border case (where there is no suspicion of underlying offences such as cash smuggling or ML). The remaining 336 are conducted by other LEAs, including principally the SRS, which initiated 249 [85] criminal proceedings under the ML statute between 2018 and 2023. Although this proportion seems relatively small in comparison to the quantum of risk associated with tax evasion in Latvia in its second risk profile, [86] the first risk profile was dominant during the entire assessment period. Table 7.4. Types of ML Investigations by the State Police Investigations by the State Police 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total ML stand-alone 80 134 157 156 217 69 813 ML linked to predicate offences 53 43 130 126 121 133 606 Total 133 177 287 282 338 202 1 419 384. As outlined in IO.1, Latvia has faced an evolving set of ML risks. Nevertheless, investigations are broadly matching the shape of this changing risk profile. Stand-alone ML investigations linked to Latvia's first risk profile dropped from 217 in 2022, to 69 in 2023. ML investigations from domestic and foreign predicate offences rose from 53 in 2019 to 133 in 2023. [87] The yearly number of ML investigations has declined due to the finalization of FIU's work on ML cases involving credit institutions under liquidation, recent sanctions, and border restrictions. This trend is also reflective of the declining overall numbers of predicate offenses. As the risk profile evolves, authorities will need to increasingly identify and investigate ML in alignment with domestic predicate offences (i.e. tax, fraud, smuggling, corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking). Skills, Training and Tools 385. All relevant authorities have dedicated staff in place to investigate ML. Training of officers takes place regularly. Latvian authorities access information directly via automated systems and interface with foreign counterparts through Interpol, Europol, and other channels. Specialized authorities, like SRS TCPD among others, use databases such as cross-border currency reports, TLKAIS and SKLOIS, [88] and access registries such as the Account Register and the ER. LEAs also co-operate with the ARO for tracing assets domestically and internationally. 386. The ECED of the State Police counts over 80 specialised trained staff, including cybercrime analysts, to address complex ML cases and fulfils its mandate as a centre of knowledge, training and expertise for ML investigations. Currently, 22% of all posts are not filled across the Police Force, but because of prioritization, there do not appear to be issues in resourcing for ML offences. The State Police Cybercrime Enforcement Department was established to investigate complex cybercrime cases and predicate offences of ML committed in cyberspace, involving the use of digital technologies and online platforms. Regional branches of the State Police have also received training for the investigation of ML and regional State Police officers regularly investigate ML cases thanks to relevant trainings. 387. The SRS TCPD does not have a separate unit for ML related to tax crimes and smuggling. All eight units are trained to investigate ML alongside predicate offences, using various information sources, including customs, tax information and revenue data, alongside financial intelligence, and the Black-Box system. They face challenges obtaining reliable information from some neighbouring countries, hindering cross-border smuggling investigations and related tax crimes. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the consequent EU sanctions have also significantly increased the workload of Latvian authorities for enforcing these sanctions (SRS TCPD and State Security Service) and has displaced some of their capacities to investigate tax related offences and illicit movement of excise goods, including smuggling. To address this, the SRS TCPD has been allocated with additional staff during the last two years. [89] 388. For CPCB, ML investigation and parallel financial investigations into corruption are entrusted to 18 investigators and two directors, supported by 12 officers in the analytical department. Investigators regularly access case data in CPCB's record keeping system. 389. Co-operation among authorities is strong. Investigators use innovative tools like the Black-Box system (see IO.1 and IO.6 above), goAML, and OpCEN to identify leads. LEAs follow up with competent authorities and set up CCG meetings involving all relevant parties, including private sector entities like banks. Given the international aspect of ML cases, LEAs and the FIU seek co-operation through various channels, including Interpol, Europol, and ARO, to verify information and gather evidence. As noted in IO.2, Latvian authorities reported 12 ongoing JITs, a high number considering the risk and context. Box 7.2. Identifying large scale ML using NPO – co-operation between authorities Based on DCSSOC criminal intelligence and State Labour Inspectorate risk data, the State Police investigated an organized group of ten individuals exploiting vulnerable persons from January 2018 to July 2021. Under the guise of aid centres, they deceitfully recruited, transported, housed, and forced individuals to work, receiving over EUR 565 324 in compensation. The FIU and State Police convened a CCG meeting, monitored transactions, and froze funds abroad using MLA. Authorities seized two apartments, land, a new building, two luxurious watches, five vehicles, EUR 147 298 cash and EUR 38 206 deposited in FIs. Proceedings were also initiated against a legal person. The case, involving human trafficking and aggravated ML, was referred to the Economic Court on 22 May 2024, and is ongoing. 390. Investigating authorities receive strong support from the GPO, which has a specialized section for ML cases. This section accompanies LEAs in pre-trial investigations and provides expertise. Once an investigation is initiated, LEAs contact the GPO to supervise and guide investigators. The GPO appoints a supervising prosecutor within 48 hours and prioritizes [90] ML investigations. Authorities have shown considerable co-ordination and co-operation in pre-trial investigations of suspected ML cases. Footnotes [80]. There are also another six LEAs which are not mentioned here because they accounted for less than 1% of ML investigations. [81]. Which includes three criminal police sub-departments – for organised crime, cybercrime and economic crime. [82]. Person’s submission. [83] Such as the 22 July 2024 PO guideline: ‘ Order on Prioritising ML Investigations’ . [84]. For example, the Guidelines on Parallel Financial Investigations and the Prosecutor’s Order on Prioritization of ML investigations, Guidelines on Priorities for investigating criminal offences in the area of money laundering, Guidelines on Prioritisation of ML by GPO in 22-07-2024. [85]. State police undertook two ML investigations into tax offences during this period, highlighting that the role of investigating tax offences under the ML statute would typically fall to the SRS. [86]. The State Police is the main investigative LEA with the broadest range of criminal activities, while SRS investigates only tax crimes, an area highly regulated by administrative laws and penalties. [87]. Statistics on ML investigations per predicate offence were not provided. However, the statistics on the number of prosecutions and their alignment with risks is discussed further below (see core issue 7.2). [88]. TLKAIS: vehicle and container automatic identification system; SKLOIS: Information on arriving vessels. [89]. TCPD relies on OSINT, customs, tax information, and revenue data for investigations. They face challenges obtaining reliable information from some neighbouring countries, hindering cross-border smuggling investigations and related tax crimes. [90]. 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Latvia proactively identifies and investigates ML through a variety of sources. Authorities have made significant improvements since the previous evaluation and judicial authorities and LEAs use all tools at their disposal to identify and investigate ML cases. This has yielded results in identification and investigation of ML and associated predicate offences. Legal Framework and Relevant Law Enforcement Agencies 377. Latvia maintains a sound legal and institutional framework with clearly delegated authorities and responsibilities for identifying potential cases of ML and investigating these along a spectrum of importance and impact, and alignment with risk. Investigation and prosecution of a criminal offence is mandatory (Section 6, CPL, see also R. 30). Any LEA which identifies possible ML while investigating a predicate offence has a duty to investigate. As Latvia follows all-crimes approach, every crime that generates criminal proceeds can be the predicate offence for ML. In Latvia, there are nine LEAs (investigating authorities) with competence of investigating ML. [80] The vast majority of ML and predicate offences have been investigated by the following authorities: · State Police investigates a wide range of criminal activities nationwide, excluding tax crimes. It operates through a 3-level system - with the Main Criminal Police Department, [81] 5 regional departments, and local stations. The Economic Crime Enforcement Department (ECED) within the Main Criminal Police Department handles complex ML cases, especially those threatening national economic interests. Around 20% of ML cases are investigated by ECED at the highest level of priority. 70% of cases are investigated at the regional level, and the remaining 10% are conducted with local police. · SRS TCPD leads investigations into state revenue crimes (e.g., tax evasion, tax fraud) and customs offences (e.g., smuggling, illicit movement of narcotics, illegal production, storage, movement, or disposal of alcohol, and tobacco products). · CPCB leads investigations into corruption offences for public officials, including public procurements. Identification and Investigation 378. Identification of suspected ML is done effectively through various means, i.e., FIU disseminations, parallel financial investigations, formal or informal incoming foreign requests, criminal intelligence, cross-border currency and cash seizures, submissions by a person, supervisory and regulatory institutions, open-source information and others. LEAs have developed mechanisms to identify ML cases and new trends via strategic and tactical analysis and criminal intelligence. 379. In total, Latvian authorities identified and pursued 1 755 ML investigations between 2018-2023. This number of cases shows a significant improvement since the previous assessment period (2013-2017) which counted 466 ML cases. As outlined in IO.6 Latvia’s FIU co-ordinates closely with relevant authorities to ensure adequate understanding of the suspicions and the relevant financial elements of the cases it disseminates, which aides in the identification of ML and associated predicate offences. 898 cases, or 51%, have been initiated based on FIU disseminations, mostly tied to ML in banks undergoing liquidation procedure (first risk profile), while parallel financial investigations account for 435 cases, or 25%; and domestic open-source information (or information from other LEAs) accounts for 9% of cases. Others, such as supervisory authority submissions or tip-offs, [82] foreign intelligence and cash controls on borders account for the remaining 14% (see table below). LEAs’ capacity to identify ML, in addition to FIU disseminations, is reflected by the growing proportion of investigations from parallel financial investigations and domestic intelligence. Table 7.1. Number of ML investigations by source (2018-2023) Source 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Percentage FIU dissemination 74 119 219 157 243 86 898 51% Parallel financial investigations 34 54 62 107 90 88 435 25% Domestic intelligence, OSINT, other intel. 32 20 28 26 18 35 159 9% MLA and other foreign intelligence 0 2 2 1 3 6 14 1% Other sources* 20 27 20 42 17 12 138 8% Cash control on borders 1 42 17 26 19 7 112 6% Total 161 264 348 359 390 234 1 756 100% *This includes preliminary investigation, departmental examination, SCA, submissions by natural/legal persons 380. The three case studies below illustrate instances of ML identification from different sources. Box 7.1. Identification from various sources Case 1: ML case from incoming EIO In 2021, criminal proceedings for aggravated ML were initiated based on an incoming EIO. The State Police found large amounts of cash and two gold ingots. A parallel financial investigation led to the seizure of the suspects' movable and immovable property in Latvia. NCBC proceedings ensured timely confiscation of EUR 9 732 190, USD 877 500, RUB 385 400, and two gold ingots (valued at least EUR 100 000). The criminal investigation is ongoing. Case 2: Cash at the border In 2019, Person A crossed the Latvian border from the Russian Federation with USD 243 000 and EUR 36 000, declaring it as family savings for daily expenses. Suspicious of ML, authorities initiated a criminal proceeding. Investigations revealed forged loan agreements and discrepancies in declared income, identifying Person A as a money mule. On 21 April 2023, the Riga Regional Court found Person A guilty of aggravated ML, sentencing them to 5 years' imprisonment with 1 year probation. Cash totalling EUR 36 000 and USD 243 000 was seized and confiscated. Case 3: FIU identified professional fraud scheme In 2016, State Police initiated criminal proceedings based on operational analysis of the FIU in the form of a Conclusion of the Competent Authority. The report provided evidence of suspicious transactions linked to a professional fraud scheme outside Latvia, with ML stages occurring in Latvia using a Latvian bank and involving Latvian nationals. The subsequent investigation, lasting about 2.5 years, revealed a Ponzi scheme involving over 240 victims in 11 countries. Active international co-operation led to a parallel financial investigation and asset seizures in Latvia. In 2020, two individuals were charged; one was found guilty and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment in 2022, while the other was acquitted. Total confiscated assets amounted to EUR 1 014 342. 381. Authorities are well-aware of the country’s ML risks, and the threats stemming from the first and second risk profiles (see IO.1), as well as typologies (laundering and layering techniques) associated with these risks. Parallel financial investigations are conducted as a policy and LEAs use all available tools, resources, and special investigative techniques. ML cases are prioritized according to General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) Guidelines [83] and internal LEA guidelines, aligning with national policy directives. [84] Alignment with Risk 382. Latvia conducted around 78 000 criminal investigations in total. ML investigations represent around 2.3% of all investigations (1 756 ML). Given that Latvia follows a mandatory approach to criminal proceedings (under Section 6 of the CPL), and most of the criminal cases reflected in the table below involve low-proceeds-generating offenses (which do not suggest ML), this proportion is sufficiently high. Table 7.2. Total Predicate Offences Investigated in Latvia (ML and non-ML) Predicate Offence Total Percentage Robbery or theft 35 813 45.6% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 10 396 13.2% Fraud 7 090 9.0% Counterfeiting currency 5 421 6.9% Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 4 093 5.2% Forgery 2 312 2.9% Misappropriation 2 216 2.8% Environmental crime 1 943 2.5% Rape, Sexual Violence, Leading to Depravity 1 942 2.5% Illicit arms trafficking 1 819 2.3% ML 1 755 2.3% Other 3 737 4.8% Total 78 537 100% Table 7.3. Total ML related to criminal activity investigations by Sate Police, SRS TCPD and CPCB (2018-2023) Investigations of ML related to Criminal activity Investigations Percentage State Police investigations (all crimes) 1 419 83% ML stand-alone 813 47% Various crimes investigated in regional departments 356 21% Illegal activities with financial instruments 185 11% Fraud, misappropriation 31 2% Smuggling 9 1% Sexual exploitation, including of children 5 0.3% Human Trafficking 3 0.2% Illegal operations with excise goods 3 0.2% Counterfeiting and piracy of products 2 0.1% Prohibited entrepreneurial activity 2 0.1% Tax crime (excl. SRS) 2 0.1% Illegal acquisition and use of data 2 0.1% Murder 1 0.1% Robbery 1 0.1% Extortion 1 0.1% Illegal acts with cultural objects 1 0.1% Failure to act by a public official 1 0.1% Corruption and bribery (excl. CPCB) 1 0.1% SRS TCPD investigations (ML related to Tax crimes, fraud, cash smuggling) 249 15% CPCB investigations (corruption cases) 48 3% Total 1 716 100% Totals include identification from three main LEAs, or 1 716 of the 1 756 ML investigations cited in the previous table above 383.  A considerable number of Latvia’s investigations are conducted on stand-alone ML. Of the 1 419 investigations conducted by the State Police, 813 (or nearly 60%) are for stand-alone ML. 112 cases, or around 6% of investigations come from cash controls at the borders. This relatively low percentage is due to the lower risk of cross-border cash smuggling, the COVID era, and the use of administrative measures for sums below EUR 35 000, which mitigates the need for mandatory investigations for every cross-border case (where there is no suspicion of underlying offences such as cash smuggling or ML). The remaining 336 are conducted by other LEAs, including principally the SRS, which initiated 249 [85] criminal proceedings under the ML statute between 2018 and 2023. Although this proportion seems relatively small in comparison to the quantum of risk associated with tax evasion in Latvia in its second risk profile, [86] the first risk profile was dominant during the entire assessment period. Table 7.4. Types of ML Investigations by the State Police Investigations by the State Police 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total ML stand-alone 80 134 157 156 217 69 813 ML linked to predicate offences 53 43 130 126 121 133 606 Total 133 177 287 282 338 202 1 419 384. As outlined in IO.1, Latvia has faced an evolving set of ML risks. Nevertheless, investigations are broadly matching the shape of this changing risk profile. Stand-alone ML investigations linked to Latvia's first risk profile dropped from 217 in 2022, to 69 in 2023. ML investigations from domestic and foreign predicate offences rose from 53 in 2019 to 133 in 2023. [87] The yearly number of ML investigations has declined due to the finalization of FIU's work on ML cases involving credit institutions under liquidation, recent sanctions, and border restrictions. This trend is also reflective of the declining overall numbers of predicate offenses. As the risk profile evolves, authorities will need to increasingly identify and investigate ML in alignment with domestic predicate offences (i.e. tax, fraud, smuggling, corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking). Skills, Training and Tools 385. All relevant authorities have dedicated staff in place to investigate ML. Training of officers takes place regularly. Latvian authorities access information directly via automated systems and interface with foreign counterparts through Interpol, Europol, and other channels. Specialized authorities, like SRS TCPD among others, use databases such as cross-border currency reports, TLKAIS and SKLOIS, [88] and access registries such as the Account Register and the ER. LEAs also co-operate with the ARO for tracing assets domestically and internationally. 386. The ECED of the State Police counts over 80 specialised trained staff, including cybercrime analysts, to address complex ML cases and fulfils its mandate as a centre of knowledge, training and expertise for ML investigations. Currently, 22% of all posts are not filled across the Police Force, but because of prioritization, there do not appear to be issues in resourcing for ML offences. The State Police Cybercrime Enforcement Department was established to investigate complex cybercrime cases and predicate offences of ML committed in cyberspace, involving the use of digital technologies and online platforms. Regional branches of the State Police have also received training for the investigation of ML and regional State Police officers regularly investigate ML cases thanks to relevant trainings. 387. The SRS TCPD does not have a separate unit for ML related to tax crimes and smuggling. All eight units are trained to investigate ML alongside predicate offences, using various information sources, including customs, tax information and revenue data, alongside financial intelligence, and the Black-Box system. They face challenges obtaining reliable information from some neighbouring countries, hindering cross-border smuggling investigations and related tax crimes. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the consequent EU sanctions have also significantly increased the workload of Latvian authorities for enforcing these sanctions (SRS TCPD and State Security Service) and has displaced some of their capacities to investigate tax related offences and illicit movement of excise goods, including smuggling. To address this, the SRS TCPD has been allocated with additional staff during the last two years. [89] 388. For CPCB, ML investigation and parallel financial investigations into corruption are entrusted to 18 investigators and two directors, supported by 12 officers in the analytical department. Investigators regularly access case data in CPCB's record keeping system. 389. Co-operation among authorities is strong. Investigators use innovative tools like the Black-Box system (see IO.1 and IO.6 above), goAML, and OpCEN to identify leads. LEAs follow up with competent authorities and set up CCG meetings involving all relevant parties, including private sector entities like banks. Given the international aspect of ML cases, LEAs and the FIU seek co-operation through various channels, including Interpol, Europol, and ARO, to verify information and gather evidence. As noted in IO.2, Latvian authorities reported 12 ongoing JITs, a high number considering the risk and context. Box 7.2. Identifying large scale ML using NPO – co-operation between authorities Based on DCSSOC criminal intelligence and State Labour Inspectorate risk data, the State Police investigated an organized group of ten individuals exploiting vulnerable persons from January 2018 to July 2021. Under the guise of aid centres, they deceitfully recruited, transported, housed, and forced individuals to work, receiving over EUR 565 324 in compensation. The FIU and State Police convened a CCG meeting, monitored transactions, and froze funds abroad using MLA. Authorities seized two apartments, land, a new building, two luxurious watches, five vehicles, EUR 147 298 cash and EUR 38 206 deposited in FIs. Proceedings were also initiated against a legal person. The case, involving human trafficking and aggravated ML, was referred to the Economic Court on 22 May 2024, and is ongoing. 390. Investigating authorities receive strong support from the GPO, which has a specialized section for ML cases. This section accompanies LEAs in pre-trial investigations and provides expertise. Once an investigation is initiated, LEAs contact the GPO to supervise and guide investigators. The GPO appoints a supervising prosecutor within 48 hours and prioritizes [90] ML investigations. Authorities have shown considerable co-ordination and co-operation in pre-trial investigations of suspected ML cases. Footnotes [80]. There are also another six LEAs which are not mentioned here because they accounted for less than 1% of ML investigations. [81]. Which includes three criminal police sub-departments – for organised crime, cybercrime and economic crime. [82]. Person’s submission. [83] Such as the 22 July 2024 PO guideline: ‘ Order on Prioritising ML Investigations’ . [84]. For example, the Guidelines on Parallel Financial Investigations and the Prosecutor’s Order on Prioritization of ML investigations, Guidelines on Priorities for investigating criminal offences in the area of money laundering, Guidelines on Prioritisation of ML by GPO in 22-07-2024. [85]. State police undertook two ML investigations into tax offences during this period, highlighting that the role of investigating tax offences under the ML statute would typically fall to the SRS. [86]. The State Police is the main investigative LEA with the broadest range of criminal activities, while SRS investigates only tax crimes, an area highly regulated by administrative laws and penalties. [87]. Statistics on ML investigations per predicate offence were not provided. However, the statistics on the number of prosecutions and their alignment with risks is discussed further below (see core issue 7.2). [88]. TLKAIS: vehicle and container automatic identification system; SKLOIS: Information on arriving vessels. [89]. TCPD relies on OSINT, customs, tax information, and revenue data for investigations. They face challenges obtaining reliable information from some neighbouring countries, hindering cross-border smuggling investigations and related tax crimes. [90]. This prioritisation is ensured through an order on the supervision of ML investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 410. Latvia prioritises the confiscation of proceeds of crime, as well as instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as a policy objective. Latvia's National Strategy and AML/CFT/CPF action plans specifically target asset recovery and confiscation. The 2020-2022 plan included objectives like collecting confiscation statistics, training, and improved pre-trial guidelines. In 2020 and 2021, MoJ conducted confidential reviews on the effectiveness of confiscation, which were used in 2022 to update the Handbook on Confiscation and Handling of Criminal Property, which provides guidance to investigators, prosecutors, and judges on CL and procedure for confiscation. 411. Asset recovery prioritization is evident at the operational level, with regular training for investigators, prosecutors and judges on asset seizure and confiscation, including cash controls at borders. The government has allocated necessary resources, leading to increased financial investigations and parallel financial investigations by LEAs, also by using international co-operation mechanisms, with the aim of identifying the proceeds of crime or instrumentalities or the laundering activities, including analysis of financial flows and assessment of unexplained wealth (extended confiscation). [99] 412. Latvia has also shown its commitment to asset recovery through institutional reforms, establishing a confiscation fund in 2018 and the Economic Affairs Court in March 2021, which is a specialised first instance court responsible for economic crimes, including ML and corruption with specialised judges. The Economic Affairs Court also reviews NCBC cases (see also IO.7). 413. With its latest Action Plan for 2024-2026 focusing on training, strengthening cash controls at borders, and increasing court rulings on conviction-based confiscation, Latvia is well positioned to continue prioritising the identification and recovery of the proceeds of crime. Footnotes [99]. Section 70.11 (2) (3) of the CL." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 410. Latvia prioritises the confiscation of proceeds of crime, as well as instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as a policy objective. Latvia's National Strategy and AML/CFT/CPF action plans specifically target asset recovery and confiscation. The 2020-2022 plan included objectives like collecting confiscation statistics, training, and improved pre-trial guidelines. In 2020 and 2021, MoJ conducted confidential reviews on the effectiveness of confiscation, which were used in 2022 to update the Handbook on Confiscation and Handling of Criminal Property, which provides guidance to investigators, prosecutors, and judges on CL and procedure for confiscation. 411. Asset recovery prioritization is evident at the operational level, with regular training for investigators, prosecutors and judges on asset seizure and confiscation, including cash controls at borders. The government has allocated necessary resources, leading to increased financial investigations and parallel financial investigations by LEAs, also by using international co-operation mechanisms, with the aim of identifying the proceeds of crime or instrumentalities or the laundering activities, including analysis of financial flows and assessment of unexplained wealth (extended confiscation). [99] 412. Latvia has also shown its commitment to asset recovery through institutional reforms, establishing a confiscation fund in 2018 and the Economic Affairs Court in March 2021, which is a specialised first instance court responsible for economic crimes, including ML and corruption with specialised judges. The Economic Affairs Court also reviews NCBC cases (see also IO.7). 413. With its latest Action Plan for 2024-2026 focusing on training, strengthening cash controls at borders, and increasing court rulings on conviction-based confiscation, Latvia is well positioned to continue prioritising the identification and recovery of the proceeds of crime. Footnotes [99]. Section 70.11 (2) (3) of the CL." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 451. In Latvia, different sources of information are used to identify and investigate potential TF cases and the authorities, during the assessment period, have undertaken a number of initiatives and measures in order to improve the understanding and the interpretation of TF offences. Several task forces and WGs have been created to improve and strengthen the system of TF identification and investigation. 452. The CFT Task Force was established in June 2024. Whilst its effectiveness at the operational level could not be fully assessed primarily due to its recent establishment, it structure, including the modus operandi it has put in place, present a useful mechanism for the identification of possible TF cases (see IO.1). 453. On an operational level, the Terrorist Financing Investigation Co-ordination WG (consisting of State Security Service, FIU, PO, SRS TCPD, State Police and Latvijas Banka), was created in December 2019 as a subgroup of the Council of Experts of the Counter-terrorism Centre. This WG serves as a solid platform to share information relevant for TF identifications and investigations. 454. Various sources are used to identify potential TF cases. These include FIU’s financial intelligence (stemming from STRs or other sources), information gathered during the process of the NPOs’ supervision, open sources, State Security Service’s own intelligence, information and requests received from foreign counterparts (formal and informal), criminal investigations related to terrorism, information from supervisory authorities, strategic and tactical analysis (including those in relation to cross-border financial flows to and from high risk jurisdictions), information on terrorism-related TFS hits, and other. 455. It is also possible to identify and initiate a TF case through specific measures applied by State Security Service which concern radicalised persons. These measures are carried out on a regular basis with the aim to prevent terrorism and the threat of its financing. This is done through preventive screening of individuals where there is a suspicion about their possible interest in terrorism or terrorism related ideologies. In practical terms, the process applied by the State Security Service includes the use of the Black-Box to determine whether the FIU Latvia has any information at its disposal on a suspect/radicalised person. If the Black-Box provides a positive match and confirms that the FIU has information about a suspect, the State Security Service then requests from the FIU further information and financial profiling of a suspect, including his/her connections to other natural and legal persons. The current practice of using Black-Box in terrorism related cases proves the ability of State Security Service to identify or contribute to the identification of a potential TF activity. 456. Additionally, the FIU of Latvia takes active part in two international WGs: the Counter Terrorist Financing Taskforce – Israel (CTFTI) and the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG). Through its participation in these groups, FIU Latvia gains crucial insights into global TF trends and investigative methods, significantly improving its ability to detect and combat TF more effectively. 457. To improve the detection of TF cases, in 2019 the FIU, in close collaboration with the State Security Service, issued guidelines on CFT/CPF for REs and SCAs. These guidelines were revised in 2024 outlining current trends and developments in Europe and Latvia and offering comprehensive information on TF indicators. In addition, the State Security Service has developed and updated Guidelines on Investigating TF, approved by the GPO in July 2024. The guidelines outline the concept of TF, its legal definition, and provide detailed information on the investigation process, including when to initiate an investigation and steps to take at the initial stage. They emphasise the use of circumstantial evidence and clarify that linking TF to a terrorist attack is not required. The guidelines also address the importance of seeking international co-operation in TF investigations. They serve as a practical tool for investigators and prosecutors, reflecting the latest trends and best practices in TF prevention and investigation. The AT considers that, despite the fact that the TF risk is low and there is an insignificant number of TF cases, the authorities are equipped with knowledge, tools and mechanism to timely and proactively tackle any possible TF case. 458. There were a few instances where possible TF activities were identified, based on the intelligence from the FIU and the State Security Service. One of these cases led to an investigation (see box 4.3), whilst for others the authorities advised that they had not found sufficient evidence of TF to proceed with investigations. 459. During the review period, the FIU received 30 TF-related STRs. Each STR was analysed with urgency, using various databases and information sources to verify details swiftly (see box 4.1). In cases where foreign links were identified, information from foreign counterparts was sought. In addition, the FIU received 23 foreign requests, and 21 spontaneous disseminations reports related to TF suspicion, which were analysed in the context of Latvia. In only 12 of these cases, links to Latvia were established. In all FIU cases, the information was thoroughly assessed, using analytical tools and various databases – cases were either disseminated to LEAs or foreign FIUs or archived if TF suspicions were not confirmed (for issues related to the FIU performance, please see IO.6). 460. Overall, the FIU disseminated 15 intelligence reports to the State Security Service and foreign FIUs following the receipt of TF-related STRs. Further to that, in 15 operational cases the FIU verified potential TF-related information by requesting further details from REs, foreign FIUs, or the State Security Service. Based on the requests and spontaneous dissemination reports received by the FIU concerning potential TF activities, 8 additional intelligence reports were disseminated to the State Security Service. As it is demonstrated by the case example (see box 4.1), it is evident that the FIU takes appropriate measures to identify potential TF suspicion and promptly disseminates the case to the LEA. Furthermore, the State Security Service, when conducting preliminary inquiries, demonstrates a high level of expertise and thoroughness in its work, ensuring that all relevant information is carefully assessed and acted upon. Box 9.1. TF STR dissemination to the State Security Service In November 2019, the FIU Latvia received a TF-related STR regarding a Latvian citizen who applied for a EUR 8 000 loan, claiming it was for apartment repairs. The citizen had already received loans from other institutions and transferred the funds abroad. When asked, the Latvian citizen explained that the loan would be sent to a Nigerian citizen in Country A, allegedly to help the person travel to Syria. Between May and September 2019, the Latvian citizen sent EUR 12 943 to an account held by the Nigerian citizen in Country A. In order to verify information, the FIU sent a request to the Country’s A FIU seeking banking information of the Nigerian citizen. The FIU disseminated the analysis carried out in this case together with the information received from the foreign counterparts. The State Security Service conducted an in-depth analysis during the pre-investigation stage and questioned the Latvian citizen. It was established that the citizen of Latvia had become the victim of financial fraud, and no indications of TF activities were identified. 461. In cases where STRs were not disseminated to LEAs, this was due to insufficient evidence of TF. The FIU determined that this was not a matter of STR quality but rather the result of requiring additional information, which, once obtained, confirmed the absence of TF grounds (see box 4.2). This process highlights Latvia’s commitment in combating TF, showcasing the FIU’s effectiveness in handling and sharing intelligence related to TF risks. Box 9.2. Analysis of TF STR without making further dissemination In November 2022, FIU Latvia received a TF-related STR concerning a Latvian resident born in a country ISIS-operated. Between January 2021 and October 2022, this individual made 50 cash deposits in the total amount of EUR 18 805 into an account at a Latvian credit institution. Additionally, between August 2022 and September 2022, the resident received 15 transfers amounting to EUR 9 440 from a non-EU citizen–some of which were sent immediately after the sender deposited cash into their own account. Similar transfers were also received from several Latvian citizens. The Latvian resident then transferred the funds further to his account in a foreign credit institution and occasionally used a foreign payment service provider. When asked, the Latvian resident mentioned another foreign payment service provider but was hesitant to provide his foreign account statement. FIU Latvia requested details from the foreign counterparts about the transactions conducted through the foreign payment service provider and analysed the submitted data alongside information from its databases. The analysis revealed that the Latvian resident was involved in several criminal cases relating to illegal immigration services. However, no links to TF were found, and as a result, the FIU did not proceed with a TF-related dissemination. 462. The authorities had one TF investigation during the assessment period, which was terminated due to the lack of evidence (see box 4.3). Looking solely at this investigation, and the way the investigative techniques were applied, it could be concluded that all relevant facts of the case were properly considered. Box 9.3. TF investigation In 2021 during the follow-up and monitoring activities of data, the State Security Service discovered that in 2015, a Latvian resident transferred in total EUR 3 757 to a person who was charged with TF and was listed in Country A. After collecting data and making an analysis, a criminal investigation was launched concerning possible TF activities. During the course of the investigation, information was sought from Country A, however, no information was provided regarding the suspicion of beneficiary in TF. The authorities undertook several investigative measures, including a search of the Latvian resident’s place of residence. It was discovered that, at the time of the search, the Latvian resident was in possession of terrorist propaganda materials. However, these were fairly recent and no terrorist propaganda materials from 2015 or other indications of TF or radicalisation in 2015 were discovered. The criminal investigation was terminated, since there was no evidence that the Latvian resident had transferred funds with the intention of financing terrorism or that the Latvian resident had been aware that the recipient of funds was involved in TF or terrorism. 463. Apart from analysing this case, the AT has held in-depth discussions on TF identification and observed that there is a strong and effective level of co-operation between the FIU, the State Security Service, and prosecutors in identifying potential TF cases, demonstrating a well-coordinated and collaborative approach. There are adequate necessary tools and guidelines on how to conduct TF probes and what evidence should be collected, including ones from foreign jurisdictions. In addition, measures applied after a TF investigation were terminated, again confirming the competent authorities’ ability to properly respond to possible challenges at any stage of a TF case. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 464. The authorities have demonstrated a versatile understanding of various specific roles that can be played by terrorist financiers. Despite there being only one criminal investigation into TF, the AT based its conclusions on two key sources; (i) the outcomes of investigations conducted by the State Security Service in terrorism-related cases, and (ii) discussions held with the relevant interlocutors. 465. There were nine criminal cases involving terrorism-related offences during the assessment period. In seven of these cases, parallel financial investigations into possible TF were conducted. As for the two cases where parallel financial investigation was not conducted, one of the cases was terminated at an early stage, and the other one did not include any suspicion on TF. As a result of the terrorism related investigations, seven cases were referred to the court, out of which four have been heard at the first instance. 466. With regard to the way parallel financial investigations into potential TF are carried out, it appears that FIU intelligence is critical for commencing such investigations. In all provided case examples of investigation of TF and terrorism-related offences, the State Security Service had required financial information from the FIU. 467. This notwithstanding, as part of their scrutiny of potential TF activity, the State Security Service is systematically conducting parallel financial investigations which serves as a good base to identify different roles that potential terrorist financiers could have. Whilst the key milestones of TF investigations are touched upon in the State Security Service’s guidelines, as discussed above, a wide range of operational tools, tactics and information are at the State Security Service’s disposal when investigating TF. Discussions held on-site confirm the State Security Service’s awareness and ability to identify different roles performed by terrorist financiers. Parallel financial investigations by the State Security Service take the form of general and special operational activities provided by the Operational Activities Law. These activities include investigatory inquiries to credit and FIs, investigatory acquisition, investigatory monitoring of transactions in an account of a client of the credit institution or financial institution, which may be performed during the operational phase. Application of these means is possible only upon approval by the Supreme Court. The practice from terrorism related investigations has proven that Supreme Court decisions on these matters are timely, and a wide range of financial information regarding the subject person, as well as persons involved in financial transactions, are thus gathered in the course of these investigations. 468. Furthermore, internal guidelines on conducting financial investigations further bolster these efforts, providing structured directions to authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 451. In Latvia, different sources of information are used to identify and investigate potential TF cases and the authorities, during the assessment period, have undertaken a number of initiatives and measures in order to improve the understanding and the interpretation of TF offences. Several task forces and WGs have been created to improve and strengthen the system of TF identification and investigation. 452. The CFT Task Force was established in June 2024. Whilst its effectiveness at the operational level could not be fully assessed primarily due to its recent establishment, it structure, including the modus operandi it has put in place, present a useful mechanism for the identification of possible TF cases (see IO.1). 453. On an operational level, the Terrorist Financing Investigation Co-ordination WG (consisting of State Security Service, FIU, PO, SRS TCPD, State Police and Latvijas Banka), was created in December 2019 as a subgroup of the Council of Experts of the Counter-terrorism Centre. This WG serves as a solid platform to share information relevant for TF identifications and investigations. 454. Various sources are used to identify potential TF cases. These include FIU’s financial intelligence (stemming from STRs or other sources), information gathered during the process of the NPOs’ supervision, open sources, State Security Service’s own intelligence, information and requests received from foreign counterparts (formal and informal), criminal investigations related to terrorism, information from supervisory authorities, strategic and tactical analysis (including those in relation to cross-border financial flows to and from high risk jurisdictions), information on terrorism-related TFS hits, and other. 455. It is also possible to identify and initiate a TF case through specific measures applied by State Security Service which concern radicalised persons. These measures are carried out on a regular basis with the aim to prevent terrorism and the threat of its financing. This is done through preventive screening of individuals where there is a suspicion about their possible interest in terrorism or terrorism related ideologies. In practical terms, the process applied by the State Security Service includes the use of the Black-Box to determine whether the FIU Latvia has any information at its disposal on a suspect/radicalised person. If the Black-Box provides a positive match and confirms that the FIU has information about a suspect, the State Security Service then requests from the FIU further information and financial profiling of a suspect, including his/her connections to other natural and legal persons. The current practice of using Black-Box in terrorism related cases proves the ability of State Security Service to identify or contribute to the identification of a potential TF activity. 456. Additionally, the FIU of Latvia takes active part in two international WGs: the Counter Terrorist Financing Taskforce – Israel (CTFTI) and the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG). Through its participation in these groups, FIU Latvia gains crucial insights into global TF trends and investigative methods, significantly improving its ability to detect and combat TF more effectively. 457. To improve the detection of TF cases, in 2019 the FIU, in close collaboration with the State Security Service, issued guidelines on CFT/CPF for REs and SCAs. These guidelines were revised in 2024 outlining current trends and developments in Europe and Latvia and offering comprehensive information on TF indicators. In addition, the State Security Service has developed and updated Guidelines on Investigating TF, approved by the GPO in July 2024. The guidelines outline the concept of TF, its legal definition, and provide detailed information on the investigation process, including when to initiate an investigation and steps to take at the initial stage. They emphasise the use of circumstantial evidence and clarify that linking TF to a terrorist attack is not required. The guidelines also address the importance of seeking international co-operation in TF investigations. They serve as a practical tool for investigators and prosecutors, reflecting the latest trends and best practices in TF prevention and investigation. The AT considers that, despite the fact that the TF risk is low and there is an insignificant number of TF cases, the authorities are equipped with knowledge, tools and mechanism to timely and proactively tackle any possible TF case. 458. There were a few instances where possible TF activities were identified, based on the intelligence from the FIU and the State Security Service. One of these cases led to an investigation (see box 4.3), whilst for others the authorities advised that they had not found sufficient evidence of TF to proceed with investigations. 459. During the review period, the FIU received 30 TF-related STRs. Each STR was analysed with urgency, using various databases and information sources to verify details swiftly (see box 4.1). In cases where foreign links were identified, information from foreign counterparts was sought. In addition, the FIU received 23 foreign requests, and 21 spontaneous disseminations reports related to TF suspicion, which were analysed in the context of Latvia. In only 12 of these cases, links to Latvia were established. In all FIU cases, the information was thoroughly assessed, using analytical tools and various databases – cases were either disseminated to LEAs or foreign FIUs or archived if TF suspicions were not confirmed (for issues related to the FIU performance, please see IO.6). 460. Overall, the FIU disseminated 15 intelligence reports to the State Security Service and foreign FIUs following the receipt of TF-related STRs. Further to that, in 15 operational cases the FIU verified potential TF-related information by requesting further details from REs, foreign FIUs, or the State Security Service. Based on the requests and spontaneous dissemination reports received by the FIU concerning potential TF activities, 8 additional intelligence reports were disseminated to the State Security Service. As it is demonstrated by the case example (see box 4.1), it is evident that the FIU takes appropriate measures to identify potential TF suspicion and promptly disseminates the case to the LEA. Furthermore, the State Security Service, when conducting preliminary inquiries, demonstrates a high level of expertise and thoroughness in its work, ensuring that all relevant information is carefully assessed and acted upon. Box 9.1. TF STR dissemination to the State Security Service In November 2019, the FIU Latvia received a TF-related STR regarding a Latvian citizen who applied for a EUR 8 000 loan, claiming it was for apartment repairs. The citizen had already received loans from other institutions and transferred the funds abroad. When asked, the Latvian citizen explained that the loan would be sent to a Nigerian citizen in Country A, allegedly to help the person travel to Syria. Between May and September 2019, the Latvian citizen sent EUR 12 943 to an account held by the Nigerian citizen in Country A. In order to verify information, the FIU sent a request to the Country’s A FIU seeking banking information of the Nigerian citizen. The FIU disseminated the analysis carried out in this case together with the information received from the foreign counterparts. The State Security Service conducted an in-depth analysis during the pre-investigation stage and questioned the Latvian citizen. It was established that the citizen of Latvia had become the victim of financial fraud, and no indications of TF activities were identified. 461. In cases where STRs were not disseminated to LEAs, this was due to insufficient evidence of TF. The FIU determined that this was not a matter of STR quality but rather the result of requiring additional information, which, once obtained, confirmed the absence of TF grounds (see box 4.2). This process highlights Latvia’s commitment in combating TF, showcasing the FIU’s effectiveness in handling and sharing intelligence related to TF risks. Box 9.2. Analysis of TF STR without making further dissemination In November 2022, FIU Latvia received a TF-related STR concerning a Latvian resident born in a country ISIS-operated. Between January 2021 and October 2022, this individual made 50 cash deposits in the total amount of EUR 18 805 into an account at a Latvian credit institution. Additionally, between August 2022 and September 2022, the resident received 15 transfers amounting to EUR 9 440 from a non-EU citizen–some of which were sent immediately after the sender deposited cash into their own account. Similar transfers were also received from several Latvian citizens. The Latvian resident then transferred the funds further to his account in a foreign credit institution and occasionally used a foreign payment service provider. When asked, the Latvian resident mentioned another foreign payment service provider but was hesitant to provide his foreign account statement. FIU Latvia requested details from the foreign counterparts about the transactions conducted through the foreign payment service provider and analysed the submitted data alongside information from its databases. The analysis revealed that the Latvian resident was involved in several criminal cases relating to illegal immigration services. However, no links to TF were found, and as a result, the FIU did not proceed with a TF-related dissemination. 462. The authorities had one TF investigation during the assessment period, which was terminated due to the lack of evidence (see box 4.3). Looking solely at this investigation, and the way the investigative techniques were applied, it could be concluded that all relevant facts of the case were properly considered. Box 9.3. TF investigation In 2021 during the follow-up and monitoring activities of data, the State Security Service discovered that in 2015, a Latvian resident transferred in total EUR 3 757 to a person who was charged with TF and was listed in Country A. After collecting data and making an analysis, a criminal investigation was launched concerning possible TF activities. During the course of the investigation, information was sought from Country A, however, no information was provided regarding the suspicion of beneficiary in TF. The authorities undertook several investigative measures, including a search of the Latvian resident’s place of residence. It was discovered that, at the time of the search, the Latvian resident was in possession of terrorist propaganda materials. However, these were fairly recent and no terrorist propaganda materials from 2015 or other indications of TF or radicalisation in 2015 were discovered. The criminal investigation was terminated, since there was no evidence that the Latvian resident had transferred funds with the intention of financing terrorism or that the Latvian resident had been aware that the recipient of funds was involved in TF or terrorism. 463. Apart from analysing this case, the AT has held in-depth discussions on TF identification and observed that there is a strong and effective level of co-operation between the FIU, the State Security Service, and prosecutors in identifying potential TF cases, demonstrating a well-coordinated and collaborative approach. There are adequate necessary tools and guidelines on how to conduct TF probes and what evidence should be collected, including ones from foreign jurisdictions. In addition, measures applied after a TF investigation were terminated, again confirming the competent authorities’ ability to properly respond to possible challenges at any stage of a TF case. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 464. The authorities have demonstrated a versatile understanding of various specific roles that can be played by terrorist financiers. Despite there being only one criminal investigation into TF, the AT based its conclusions on two key sources; (i) the outcomes of investigations conducted by the State Security Service in terrorism-related cases, and (ii) discussions held with the relevant interlocutors. 465. There were nine criminal cases involving terrorism-related offences during the assessment period. In seven of these cases, parallel financial investigations into possible TF were conducted. As for the two cases where parallel financial investigation was not conducted, one of the cases was terminated at an early stage, and the other one did not include any suspicion on TF. As a result of the terrorism related investigations, seven cases were referred to the court, out of which four have been heard at the first instance. 466. With regard to the way parallel financial investigations into potential TF are carried out, it appears that FIU intelligence is critical for commencing such investigations. In all provided case examples of investigation of TF and terrorism-related offences, the State Security Service had required financial information from the FIU. 467. This notwithstanding, as part of their scrutiny of potential TF activity, the State Security Service is systematically conducting parallel financial investigations which serves as a good base to identify different roles that potential terrorist financiers could have. Whilst the key milestones of TF investigations are touched upon in the State Security Service’s guidelines, as discussed above, a wide range of operational tools, tactics and information are at the State Security Service’s disposal when investigating TF. Discussions held on-site confirm the State Security Service’s awareness and ability to identify different roles performed by terrorist financiers. Parallel financial investigations by the State Security Service take the form of general and special operational activities provided by the Operational Activities Law. These activities include investigatory inquiries to credit and FIs, investigatory acquisition, investigatory monitoring of transactions in an account of a client of the credit institution or financial institution, which may be performed during the operational phase. Application of these means is possible only upon approval by the Supreme Court. The practice from terrorism related investigations has proven that Supreme Court decisions on these matters are timely, and a wide range of financial information regarding the subject person, as well as persons involved in financial transactions, are thus gathered in the course of these investigations. 468. Furthermore, internal guidelines on conducting financial investigations further bolster these efforts, providing structured directions to authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="482. Latvia implements TF-related TFS through the directly applicable EU regulations, Law on Sanctions and CoM Reg. No. 184. The Law on Sanctions provides for the direct and immediate implementation of all UNSCRs (including UNSCR 1373, 1267/1989 and its successor resolutions) together with the procedures provided for therein, which become binding from the moment of their adoption and ensures that TFS are implemented without delay by all natural and legal persons in Latvia. 483. All UNSCRs including changes thereto have legal effect in Latvia immediately and automatically, regardless of whether a notice has been published. Nevertheless, to raise awareness of the private sector and general public, Latvia employs a comprehensive and structured approach to communicating new or amended sanctions designations to FIs, VASPs, DNFBPs, and the public. 484. Latvia has a structured system for the communication of UNSCR-related TFS designations to relevant competent authorities and REs. Designations are disseminated without delay following UN notification, using the multiple channels: the MFA website, the Official Gazette, and the FIU Latvia’s sanctions search engine, which hosts a unified database of UNSCR, EU, and national sanctions. Updated at least twice daily and publicly accessible, the FIU search engine averaged 2,290 monthly users between April and October 2024. This multi-channel approach ensures that communication reaches a broad range of REs. 485. Proactive communication is supported by a MFA’s subscription-based email alert system (approx. 590 subscribers)- used to disseminate listings, de-listings, and updates immediately upon notification- and sectoral outreach by FIU Latvia, including training, guidance, and use of media. Supervisory authorities are expected to cascade designation information to the REs they oversee. Latvijas Banka and the LCSN have automated onward communication systems, enabling real-time dissemination of updates to their REs. Other supervisory authorities use manual processes in line with their internal procedures, which ensure that REs receive relevant information without undue delay. 486.  The MFA serves as the co-ordinating body responsible for proposing of persons or entities for designation and their removal under sanctions regimes, as decided and approved by the CoM. The designation process involves consultations with relevant state security institutions and the FIU Latvia, and the compilation of evidence to support proposals, which are submitted to the appropriate bodies for further consideration. 487.  Latvia has not identified individuals or entities to propose any designations to the UN Security Council Committees pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988, nor has it individually initiated designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at the domestic level and at the EU level, which is consistent with Latvia’s low TF risk level. The authorities met onsite were able to explain the process for proposing a terrorism designation and the criteria considered when assessing such proposals from foreign counterparts, demonstrating that the relevant procedures are likely to be implemented in practice when needed. 488. Latvia has demonstrated the capacity to implement UN TFS through its active participation in EU sanctions regimes, including co-sponsorship of TF-related listings. The same institutional framework, designated authorities, and co-ordination mechanisms are used for both EU and UN sanctions regimes, including TFS. This reflects Latvia’s operational readiness to take action under UNSCR 1373, should the need arise. 489. Latvia has progressively strengthened its sanctions implementation framework through a structured sequence of reforms. For the majority of reporting period (until early 2024), sanctions were implemented through a decentralized system involving 12 competent authorities, with overall co-ordination by the MFA as the policy maker. This model was supported by key institutional developments such as the creation of the Sanctions Division within the MFA and the establishment of the SCC, which facilitates inter-agency consultation, trend analysis, and policy co-ordination. In response to the increasing complexity and volume of sanctions- particularly following the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022- Latvia introduced significant operational and analytical enhancements across multiple authorities and reinforced co-operation using CCG in TFS matters. The reform process culminated in April 2024, with the designation of FIU Latvia as the national competent authority for the implementation of all international, EU, and national sanctions, supported by dedicated staffing and budgetary resources. These developments reflect Latvia’s adaptive and risk-responsive approach to sanctions governance. 490. The FIU Latvia now oversees all aspects of sanctions implementation, including maintaining the online sanctions search engine for designated persons, processing exemptions (derogations), issuing binding decisions to freeze or unfreeze assets, and providing detailed guidance and training to REs. However, this change was only initiated towards the end of the reporting period (April 2024) making a full assessment of its effectiveness over the longer term difficult. 491. Latvia has not received any request from foreign states for designation of persons or entities within the UN TFS framework within the reporting period. It also has not had any case where it was necessary to consider initiating delisting of persons or entities. Had it received a request, there is a clearly established delisting procedures with MFA as designated contact point for forwarding without delay the delisting applications to the relevant UN bodies (1988 Committee or the Ombudsman). The MFA’s “Information material (guidelines) for the effective implementation of sanctions in Latvia” offers additional detailed explanation on the applicable delisting procedure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="482. Latvia implements TF-related TFS through the directly applicable EU regulations, Law on Sanctions and CoM Reg. No. 184. The Law on Sanctions provides for the direct and immediate implementation of all UNSCRs (including UNSCR 1373, 1267/1989 and its successor resolutions) together with the procedures provided for therein, which become binding from the moment of their adoption and ensures that TFS are implemented without delay by all natural and legal persons in Latvia. 483. All UNSCRs including changes thereto have legal effect in Latvia immediately and automatically, regardless of whether a notice has been published. Nevertheless, to raise awareness of the private sector and general public, Latvia employs a comprehensive and structured approach to communicating new or amended sanctions designations to FIs, VASPs, DNFBPs, and the public. 484. Latvia has a structured system for the communication of UNSCR-related TFS designations to relevant competent authorities and REs. Designations are disseminated without delay following UN notification, using the multiple channels: the MFA website, the Official Gazette, and the FIU Latvia’s sanctions search engine, which hosts a unified database of UNSCR, EU, and national sanctions. Updated at least twice daily and publicly accessible, the FIU search engine averaged 2,290 monthly users between April and October 2024. This multi-channel approach ensures that communication reaches a broad range of REs. 485. Proactive communication is supported by a MFA’s subscription-based email alert system (approx. 590 subscribers)- used to disseminate listings, de-listings, and updates immediately upon notification- and sectoral outreach by FIU Latvia, including training, guidance, and use of media. Supervisory authorities are expected to cascade designation information to the REs they oversee. Latvijas Banka and the LCSN have automated onward communication systems, enabling real-time dissemination of updates to their REs. Other supervisory authorities use manual processes in line with their internal procedures, which ensure that REs receive relevant information without undue delay. 486.  The MFA serves as the co-ordinating body responsible for proposing of persons or entities for designation and their removal under sanctions regimes, as decided and approved by the CoM. The designation process involves consultations with relevant state security institutions and the FIU Latvia, and the compilation of evidence to support proposals, which are submitted to the appropriate bodies for further consideration. 487.  Latvia has not identified individuals or entities to propose any designations to the UN Security Council Committees pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988, nor has it individually initiated designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at the domestic level and at the EU level, which is consistent with Latvia’s low TF risk level. The authorities met onsite were able to explain the process for proposing a terrorism designation and the criteria considered when assessing such proposals from foreign counterparts, demonstrating that the relevant procedures are likely to be implemented in practice when needed. 488. Latvia has demonstrated the capacity to implement UN TFS through its active participation in EU sanctions regimes, including co-sponsorship of TF-related listings. The same institutional framework, designated authorities, and co-ordination mechanisms are used for both EU and UN sanctions regimes, including TFS. This reflects Latvia’s operational readiness to take action under UNSCR 1373, should the need arise. 489. Latvia has progressively strengthened its sanctions implementation framework through a structured sequence of reforms. For the majority of reporting period (until early 2024), sanctions were implemented through a decentralized system involving 12 competent authorities, with overall co-ordination by the MFA as the policy maker. This model was supported by key institutional developments such as the creation of the Sanctions Division within the MFA and the establishment of the SCC, which facilitates inter-agency consultation, trend analysis, and policy co-ordination. In response to the increasing complexity and volume of sanctions- particularly following the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022- Latvia introduced significant operational and analytical enhancements across multiple authorities and reinforced co-operation using CCG in TFS matters. The reform process culminated in April 2024, with the designation of FIU Latvia as the national competent authority for the implementation of all international, EU, and national sanctions, supported by dedicated staffing and budgetary resources. These developments reflect Latvia’s adaptive and risk-responsive approach to sanctions governance. 490. The FIU Latvia now oversees all aspects of sanctions implementation, including maintaining the online sanctions search engine for designated persons, processing exemptions (derogations), issuing binding decisions to freeze or unfreeze assets, and providing detailed guidance and training to REs. However, this change was only initiated towards the end of the reporting period (April 2024) making a full assessment of its effectiveness over the longer term difficult. 491. Latvia has not received any request from foreign states for designation of persons or entities within the UN TFS framework within the reporting period. It also has not had any case where it was necessary to consider initiating delisting of persons or entities. Had it received a request, there is a clearly established delisting procedures with MFA as designated contact point for forwarding without delay the delisting applications to the relevant UN bodies (1988 Committee or the Ombudsman). The MFA’s “Information material (guidelines) for the effective implementation of sanctions in Latvia” offers additional detailed explanation on the applicable delisting procedure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="521. The 2018 MER identified several areas where Latvia needed to strengthen its legal and regulatory framework to ensure effective implementation of TFS, particularly concerning PF. Recommended actions included reviewing and amending the legal framework governing TFS implementation, enhancing the identification and prevention of sanctions evasion by empowering the relevant authority to issue binding regulations on TFS, and improving supervision of compliance with PF-related TFS. Latvia was also advised to enhance outreach efforts to REs to better detect potential PF activities and improve co-ordination in sanctions enforcement. 522. Since 2018, Latvia has made significant progress in strengthening its sanctions compliance framework, particularly through amendments to the Law on Sanctions. Key measures include the establishment of clear reporting mechanisms, permanent freezing of funds without prior notice, and an enhanced regulatory environment to prevent sanctions evasion. Latvijas Banka (previously FCMC) has been empowered to issue binding regulations, while key agencies, including the FIU, have been incorporated into the SCC to ensure effective enforcement and co-ordination. Latvia's commitment to transparency in legal persons and ongoing training programmes further enhances its capacity to detect and prevent sanctions violations, including PF. 11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 523. Latvia has established a comprehensive inter-agency co-operation framework to combat PF, with clearly defined co-ordination mechanisms at both the policy and operational levels. The Committee for the Control of Goods of Strategic Significance (GSS Committee) [116] plays a central role in overseeing export control and dual-use goods regimes that intersect with PF risks. It brings together the MFA, FIU Latvia, SRS, Ministry of Defence, and meets regularly to assess the impact of international sanctions and update national control lists. The FSDB [117] provides high-level strategic oversight, ensuring that Latvia’s PF policy objectives remain aligned with national priorities and its international obligations. Both bodies were instrumental in drafting and guiding the recent amendments to the Law on Sanctions, and in shaping Latvia’s implementation of TFS to mitigate PF risks. 524. Latvia’s policy-level co-ordination has been key to mapping PF risks, notably during development of the NRA2 PF chapter. Led by FIU Latvia with input from SRS, the GSS Committee and Latvijas Banka, this effort analysed cross-border transaction flows, dual-use goods classification trends and identified priority threat actors. The SCC—chaired by the MFA—aligned policy priorities across agencies and integrated EU Dual-Use Regulation requirements and FATF guidance. These co-ordination structures are reinforced by standing WGs and operational platforms that facilitate rapid information-sharing and joint implementation. Importantly, authorities incorporate private-sector insights—engaging banks, logistics firms and others through structured SCC consultations—so that operational feedback continuously informs policy. Together, these mechanisms keep Latvia’s PF policy and practice tightly synchronized. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 525. Operational co-operation between the FIU Latvia, the SRS, LEAs and the SRS Customs Board, and other relevant authorities is well-established through Co-operation and Coordination Group (CCG) format. CCG is a flexible and multi-purpose co-operation mechanism which supports operational and strategic exchange between state authorities, including LEAs and SCAs. It enables information-sharing on suspicious transactions and goods related to proliferation. Joint operational task forces, including SRS Customs Department, State Security Service, SRS TCPD and the State Police, effectively target PF-related risks, particularly in high-risk sectors such as transportation and logistics. Authorities also engage with private sector stakeholders to enhance awareness and compliance. Although the CCG has not yet encountered PF-related TFS cases (reflecting Latvia’s medium low PF risk profile, with the prevalent threats arising from trade related sanctions rather than TFS), it has encountered trade related sanctions cases, and it is recognized as the appropriate mechanism should PF-related operational co-operation be required. 526. In July 2024, FIU Latvia, in co-operation with the State Security Service, issued updated guidelines on “Prevention of TF and PF.” These guidelines—distinct from existing indicators on sanctions circumvention—specifically address PF risks and controls and are tailored to the Latvian context. They incorporate international typologies, domestic and cross-border risk indicators, and anonymised case examples to help REs and supervisory authorities better understand PF threats and apply proportionate mitigating measures. The issuance of these guidelines is expected to enhance the practical implementation of PF-related obligations across both FIs and DNFBPs, by improving their ability to identify red flags, apply screening controls, and escalate suspicious activity. Footnotes [116]. The Committee for Control of GSS provides a forum for an interagency co-operation and co-ordination bringing together expertise from number of Latvian authorities: MFA, Ministry of Economy, MoF, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, State Environmental Service, State Police, State Security Service, Constitution Protection Bureau, SRS, FIU Latvia, Latvijas Banka. The Committee is chaired by the State Secretary of the MFA. [117]. See IO.1." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="521. The 2018 MER identified several areas where Latvia needed to strengthen its legal and regulatory framework to ensure effective implementation of TFS, particularly concerning PF. Recommended actions included reviewing and amending the legal framework governing TFS implementation, enhancing the identification and prevention of sanctions evasion by empowering the relevant authority to issue binding regulations on TFS, and improving supervision of compliance with PF-related TFS. Latvia was also advised to enhance outreach efforts to REs to better detect potential PF activities and improve co-ordination in sanctions enforcement. 522. Since 2018, Latvia has made significant progress in strengthening its sanctions compliance framework, particularly through amendments to the Law on Sanctions. Key measures include the establishment of clear reporting mechanisms, permanent freezing of funds without prior notice, and an enhanced regulatory environment to prevent sanctions evasion. Latvijas Banka (previously FCMC) has been empowered to issue binding regulations, while key agencies, including the FIU, have been incorporated into the SCC to ensure effective enforcement and co-ordination. Latvia's commitment to transparency in legal persons and ongoing training programmes further enhances its capacity to detect and prevent sanctions violations, including PF. 11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 523. Latvia has established a comprehensive inter-agency co-operation framework to combat PF, with clearly defined co-ordination mechanisms at both the policy and operational levels. The Committee for the Control of Goods of Strategic Significance (GSS Committee) [116] plays a central role in overseeing export control and dual-use goods regimes that intersect with PF risks. It brings together the MFA, FIU Latvia, SRS, Ministry of Defence, and meets regularly to assess the impact of international sanctions and update national control lists. The FSDB [117] provides high-level strategic oversight, ensuring that Latvia’s PF policy objectives remain aligned with national priorities and its international obligations. Both bodies were instrumental in drafting and guiding the recent amendments to the Law on Sanctions, and in shaping Latvia’s implementation of TFS to mitigate PF risks. 524. Latvia’s policy-level co-ordination has been key to mapping PF risks, notably during development of the NRA2 PF chapter. Led by FIU Latvia with input from SRS, the GSS Committee and Latvijas Banka, this effort analysed cross-border transaction flows, dual-use goods classification trends and identified priority threat actors. The SCC—chaired by the MFA—aligned policy priorities across agencies and integrated EU Dual-Use Regulation requirements and FATF guidance. These co-ordination structures are reinforced by standing WGs and operational platforms that facilitate rapid information-sharing and joint implementation. Importantly, authorities incorporate private-sector insights—engaging banks, logistics firms and others through structured SCC consultations—so that operational feedback continuously informs policy. Together, these mechanisms keep Latvia’s PF policy and practice tightly synchronized. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 525. Operational co-operation between the FIU Latvia, the SRS, LEAs and the SRS Customs Board, and other relevant authorities is well-established through Co-operation and Coordination Group (CCG) format. CCG is a flexible and multi-purpose co-operation mechanism which supports operational and strategic exchange between state authorities, including LEAs and SCAs. It enables information-sharing on suspicious transactions and goods related to proliferation. Joint operational task forces, including SRS Customs Department, State Security Service, SRS TCPD and the State Police, effectively target PF-related risks, particularly in high-risk sectors such as transportation and logistics. Authorities also engage with private sector stakeholders to enhance awareness and compliance. Although the CCG has not yet encountered PF-related TFS cases (reflecting Latvia’s medium low PF risk profile, with the prevalent threats arising from trade related sanctions rather than TFS), it has encountered trade related sanctions cases, and it is recognized as the appropriate mechanism should PF-related operational co-operation be required. 526. In July 2024, FIU Latvia, in co-operation with the State Security Service, issued updated guidelines on “Prevention of TF and PF.” These guidelines—distinct from existing indicators on sanctions circumvention—specifically address PF risks and controls and are tailored to the Latvian context. They incorporate international typologies, domestic and cross-border risk indicators, and anonymised case examples to help REs and supervisory authorities better understand PF threats and apply proportionate mitigating measures. The issuance of these guidelines is expected to enhance the practical implementation of PF-related obligations across both FIs and DNFBPs, by improving their ability to identify red flags, apply screening controls, and escalate suspicious activity. Footnotes [116]. The Committee for Control of GSS provides a forum for an interagency co-operation and co-ordination bringing together expertise from number of Latvian authorities: MFA, Ministry of Economy, MoF, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, State Environmental Service, State Police, State Security Service, Constitution Protection Bureau, SRS, FIU Latvia, Latvijas Banka. The Committee is chaired by the State Secretary of the MFA. [117]. See IO.1." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 113. Latvia has a well-functioning and clearly documented governance mechanism to co-ordinate its policy and operational activities, as well as to allocate budget and resources, in line with its ML and TF risks. At the conclusion of both NRA1 and NRA2, action plans with specific tasks and measures were developed to address the identified risks and priorities. These AML/CFT/CPF action plans were adopted by the CoM. The AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan is also used for setting funding and resources. Each agency and department must also have their own resulting action plan and report back to the MoI, which is tasked with monitoring the national AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan and reporting regularly to the FSDB. The FSDB meets no less than twice a year, but on average meets quarterly. 114. Whilst the AML/CFT/CPF action plans and governance framework provide clear priorities and lines of accountability, they do not constrain agencies and departments from being agile in risk identification and mitigation. 115. Latvia’s legislative programme supports national AML/CFT/CPF policies and implements measures to address identified risks. For example, sequential legislative amendments have extended BO reporting requirements over the review period, initially for domestic legal persons, then to certain foreign legal persons, and then to a further class of foreign legal persons in 2024. Similarly, in April 2024, Latvia established a dedicated function within the FIU to oversee the implementation of UN and non-UN sanctions, recognising its growing risk exposure (in relation to non-UN sanctions). 116. Monitoring of STRs when typology reports are published shows an upward trend in reporting, indicating that REs use information within reports as part of their risk understanding and direct resources towards identified risks. For example, following the publication of the “Indicators and case studies of corruption” report in 2021, related STRs increased by 64% (67 to 104). 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 117. Despite the risk from TF being assessed as low, authorities continuously deepen their understanding of actual and potential future TF risks, as well as develop their professional expertise on TF, as part of their 2024-26 Action Plan. This includes using the bi-annual meeting of the Expert Advisory Council of the Counterterrorism Centre to discuss developments in CFT and their application in the domestic context. Latvia also has a dedicated CFT Task Force under the CCG legal framework devised for both strategic and operational purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 113. Latvia has a well-functioning and clearly documented governance mechanism to co-ordinate its policy and operational activities, as well as to allocate budget and resources, in line with its ML and TF risks. At the conclusion of both NRA1 and NRA2, action plans with specific tasks and measures were developed to address the identified risks and priorities. These AML/CFT/CPF action plans were adopted by the CoM. The AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan is also used for setting funding and resources. Each agency and department must also have their own resulting action plan and report back to the MoI, which is tasked with monitoring the national AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan and reporting regularly to the FSDB. The FSDB meets no less than twice a year, but on average meets quarterly. 114. Whilst the AML/CFT/CPF action plans and governance framework provide clear priorities and lines of accountability, they do not constrain agencies and departments from being agile in risk identification and mitigation. 115. Latvia’s legislative programme supports national AML/CFT/CPF policies and implements measures to address identified risks. For example, sequential legislative amendments have extended BO reporting requirements over the review period, initially for domestic legal persons, then to certain foreign legal persons, and then to a further class of foreign legal persons in 2024. Similarly, in April 2024, Latvia established a dedicated function within the FIU to oversee the implementation of UN and non-UN sanctions, recognising its growing risk exposure (in relation to non-UN sanctions). 116. Monitoring of STRs when typology reports are published shows an upward trend in reporting, indicating that REs use information within reports as part of their risk understanding and direct resources towards identified risks. For example, following the publication of the “Indicators and case studies of corruption” report in 2021, related STRs increased by 64% (67 to 104). 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 117. Despite the risk from TF being assessed as low, authorities continuously deepen their understanding of actual and potential future TF risks, as well as develop their professional expertise on TF, as part of their 2024-26 Action Plan. This includes using the bi-annual meeting of the Expert Advisory Council of the Counterterrorism Centre to discuss developments in CFT and their application in the domestic context. Latvia also has a dedicated CFT Task Force under the CCG legal framework devised for both strategic and operational purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 140. Latvia proactively seeks international co-operation and frequently engage in EIOs, JIT and other forms of international co-operation to address transnational ML schemes. The same mechanisms and procedures are used for seeking international co-operation as described under the execution of incoming international requests. While co-operation is increasing in line with its risks of ML and associated predicate offences, some predicate offences (e.g. corruption) are still not adequately represented in respect to the overall international dimensions and risk profile of the cases reviewed. There are also difficulties in obtaining information from certain countries, hindering Latvia’s ability to pursue large-scale ML non-resident offenders, highlighting, inter alia, challenges and limitations to international co-operation. 141. Compared to its 2018 MER, Latvia now has more outgoing than incoming MLA requests. Investigators are trained on international requests to advance cases and achieve successful prosecutions. Recent statistics show Latvia seeks more co-operation from EU countries, with 5,730 EIOs in the reviewed period. This trend is in line with country’s risk profile, since international co-operation and financial flows have decreased with some non-EU jurisdictions, particularly those bordering Latvia, due to a range of geopolitical and security reasons. Requests to third countries (where vulnerabilities and risks connected to these countries remain potentially strong) are lower. 142. Latvia faces significant challenges in obtaining information from certain neighbouring countries. Major suspected ML offenders from abroad have exploited Latvia’s (now-defunct) banks (such as Bank A) to commit large-scale professionalised ML, activities for global laundromat schemes. Due to ineffective co-operation with these countries—characterized by unresponsive or low-quality replies— Latvian authorities struggle to pursue the individuals behind these major ML schemes. In response to lower levels of international co-operation, Latvia relies on domestic legal provisions for NCBC to pursue suspected proceeds of crime from ML committed in Latvia. This approach shows their commitment to a &quot;follow-the-money&quot; strategy and addresses poor responsiveness from international counterparts. However, it highlights a fundamental structural difficulty in international co-operation and co-ordination that is beyond Latvia's control. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA and EIO Requests (sent by Latvia) Sent during the year Of which pending at the end of the year** Refused** Executed** Average time of execution Year MLA EIO* MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA*** EIO* 2018 382 611 13 20 4 8 137 168 223 58 2019 455 744 20 13 7 6 269 271 226 56 2020 548 1 145 64 13 8 5 301 373 222 60 2021 285 1 041 27 8 4 2 254 260 233 66 2022 448 1 008 28 4 3 9 154 296 229 51 2023 420 1 181 29 17 6 2 159 275 215 55 Average 423 955 30 13 5 5 212 274 225 58 Total 2 538 5 730 - - 32 32 1 274 1 643 - - Note: *Information available for PO and State Police; **Information available for PO; ***Average time of execution measured during one month period of year (30 days) as sample 143. Most frequently, the outgoing requests are sent regarding tax crimes, ML and fraud. Given the modus operandi identified by the NRA regarding tax crimes the proceeds of which are laundered abroad, as well as ML threats identified, outgoing international requests on these cases are in line with Latvia’s risk profile. Box 7.2. Seeking international co-operation on a professional complex ML case Intelligence from the SRS TCPD in 2021 led to an investigation into a large-scale ML operation by a professional group in Latvia. The group controlled over 15 foreign companies registered to third-country nationals, along with their bank accounts in EU and non-EU countries, providing ML services to foreign entrepreneurs and concealing the origin, ownership, movement, and location of funds. TCPD reached out to Armenia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Azerbaijan, Singapore, the Russian Federation, Hong Kong, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan with MLAs. Seven EIOs were sent to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, and Austria, with additional requests to the AROs of Estonia and Ukraine. A Europol liaison officer facilitated legal assistance requests from the United Kingdom and Türkiye. Swift, positive co-operation with Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan provided valuable account information on foreign companies. The investigation was completed on 24 November 2022 with charges against 7 individuals. EUR 567 551, as well as 6 real estate properties with a value of EUR 1.5 million, 5 vehicles and the shares of one company were seized. 144. This trend is in line with country’s risk profile, since international co-operation and financial flows have decreased with some non-EU jurisdictions, particularly those bordering Latvia, due to a range of geopolitical and security reasons that have developed over the past times. Requests to third countries (where some vulnerabilities and risks connected to these countries remain potentially strong) are relatively lower. In regard to corruption, the most recent NRA and the Action Plan have emphasised the need for enhancing the understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption (see IO.1). While many corruption cases do not generate illicit proceeds, [25] there are instances where major, large-scale corruption cases have shown to have assets moved to foreign jurisdictions and involved foreign entities and persons. [26] CPCB sent 135 international requests in corruption cases abroad, but efforts have led to only one asset seizure and no repatriations. Authorities should continue seeking international co-operation with a focus on asset recovery. 145. Latvia regularly joins JITs for major cases like OCG and narcotics crimes, with 19 ongoing JITs with EU states (e.g., Lithuania, Estonia) and third countries (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, Republic of Moldova) by the end of 2023. Outgoing requests also have been used to trigger investigation by the receiving jurisdiction. Such examples were provided by the State Police, as well as PO of Latvia. 2.2.2. Extradition and EAWs 146. Latvian authorities seek both extradition and EAWs in any case when the subject person is known. Extradition requests are generally executed in a timely manner. In cases when it is not possible to identify persons subject to extradition, the cases are tackled by in rem procedure of NCBC. 147. Latvia sent an average 68 extradition requests, with 6 refused and 23 executed, taking about 269 days. For EAWs, Latvia sent 418 requests and 25 were refused, with 218 executions with an average of 43 days to receive the executed request (see table below). Table 2.5. Extradition requests received by Latvia (2018-2023) Received during the year Of which pending at the end of the year Refused Executed Average time of execution in days Year Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW 2018 4 100 2 51 1 8 1 43 288 48 2019 4 91 3 49 0 5 1 42 251 36 2020 2 61 2 29 0 4 0 28 0 44 2021 15 42 8 12 2 3 5 27 258 48 2022 24 76 13 23 2 4 9 49 283 42 2023 19 48 11 18 1 1 7 29 265 39 Total 68 418 39 182 6 25 23 218 269 43 Combined 486 221 31 241 64 (avg) Box 2.3. Extradition request from Latvia On 25 February 2020, the State Police launched a criminal case involving at least EUR 555 653 from frauds in Germany, Poland, France, and Spain. The funds were transferred to accounts of 92 clients at a Latvian bank. Following a bank’s report on suspicious transfers and withdrawals, special investigations uncovered a 10-member OCG led by suspect “DS”. An EAW was issued for “DS” in February 2022; he was arrested in May and extradited from Germany in July. All group members were convicted, with “DS”, sentenced to 5.5 years and ordered to pay EUR 115 275 to the Treasury; proceeds were confiscated from the others. 2.2.3. Seeking to identify, freeze, seize, confiscate and share criminal assets 148. The ARO supports asset tracing cases, with ARO-to-ARO requests typically executed within 15 days or even hours in urgent cases. Support to domestic LEAs rose from 49 cases in 2018 to 375 in 2023, tracing nearly EUR 100 million (2018–2023). While international co-operation in asset tracing is increasing, it mainly identifies funds abroad, with limited data on seizure, confiscation, and asset sharing. 149. Between 2018 and 2023, Latvia requested seizures in 126 cases, covering nearly EUR 20 million (including cryptocurrencies), vehicles, real estate, and investment certificates. It successfully secured confiscations abroad in five cases, mainly for tax offences and ML, totalling EUR 1.3 million. 150. Between 2018 and 2023, Latvia requested seizures in 126 cases, resulting in the seizure of nearly EUR 20 million (including cryptocurrencies), as well as vehicles, real estate, and investment certificates. Confiscations abroad were successfully requested in 5 cases, mainly involving tax offences, ML, fraud, and human trafficking, leading to the confiscation of EUR 1.3 million. However, the gap between the identification of almost EUR 100 million, seizure of EUR 20 million, and confiscation of EUR 1.3 million suggests that tracing assets abroad does not necessarily lead to recovery. This is a common challenge in many jurisdictions. Here, it is partly due to asset restitution to victims, empty bank accounts, the lifecycle of cases, and challenges in co-operating with certain neighbouring countries, representing a minor shortfall overall. Footnotes [25]. Of the 184 corruption cases identified, roughly 60% were known to generate illicit proceeds. Of the cases from 2019 to 2023, 36 ended with NCBC and 6 were pursued for prosecution for ML. [26]. As noted in IO.1, authorities summarised that the majority of domestically generated proceeds of corruption were being laundered overseas. This resulted in an action item within the Action Plan for authorities to further develop their understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 140. Latvia proactively seeks international co-operation and frequently engage in EIOs, JIT and other forms of international co-operation to address transnational ML schemes. The same mechanisms and procedures are used for seeking international co-operation as described under the execution of incoming international requests. While co-operation is increasing in line with its risks of ML and associated predicate offences, some predicate offences (e.g. corruption) are still not adequately represented in respect to the overall international dimensions and risk profile of the cases reviewed. There are also difficulties in obtaining information from certain countries, hindering Latvia’s ability to pursue large-scale ML non-resident offenders, highlighting, inter alia, challenges and limitations to international co-operation. 141. Compared to its 2018 MER, Latvia now has more outgoing than incoming MLA requests. Investigators are trained on international requests to advance cases and achieve successful prosecutions. Recent statistics show Latvia seeks more co-operation from EU countries, with 5,730 EIOs in the reviewed period. This trend is in line with country’s risk profile, since international co-operation and financial flows have decreased with some non-EU jurisdictions, particularly those bordering Latvia, due to a range of geopolitical and security reasons. Requests to third countries (where vulnerabilities and risks connected to these countries remain potentially strong) are lower. 142. Latvia faces significant challenges in obtaining information from certain neighbouring countries. Major suspected ML offenders from abroad have exploited Latvia’s (now-defunct) banks (such as Bank A) to commit large-scale professionalised ML, activities for global laundromat schemes. Due to ineffective co-operation with these countries—characterized by unresponsive or low-quality replies— Latvian authorities struggle to pursue the individuals behind these major ML schemes. In response to lower levels of international co-operation, Latvia relies on domestic legal provisions for NCBC to pursue suspected proceeds of crime from ML committed in Latvia. This approach shows their commitment to a &quot;follow-the-money&quot; strategy and addresses poor responsiveness from international counterparts. However, it highlights a fundamental structural difficulty in international co-operation and co-ordination that is beyond Latvia's control. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA and EIO Requests (sent by Latvia) Sent during the year Of which pending at the end of the year** Refused** Executed** Average time of execution Year MLA EIO* MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA EIO MLA*** EIO* 2018 382 611 13 20 4 8 137 168 223 58 2019 455 744 20 13 7 6 269 271 226 56 2020 548 1 145 64 13 8 5 301 373 222 60 2021 285 1 041 27 8 4 2 254 260 233 66 2022 448 1 008 28 4 3 9 154 296 229 51 2023 420 1 181 29 17 6 2 159 275 215 55 Average 423 955 30 13 5 5 212 274 225 58 Total 2 538 5 730 - - 32 32 1 274 1 643 - - Note: *Information available for PO and State Police; **Information available for PO; ***Average time of execution measured during one month period of year (30 days) as sample 143. Most frequently, the outgoing requests are sent regarding tax crimes, ML and fraud. Given the modus operandi identified by the NRA regarding tax crimes the proceeds of which are laundered abroad, as well as ML threats identified, outgoing international requests on these cases are in line with Latvia’s risk profile. Box 7.2. Seeking international co-operation on a professional complex ML case Intelligence from the SRS TCPD in 2021 led to an investigation into a large-scale ML operation by a professional group in Latvia. The group controlled over 15 foreign companies registered to third-country nationals, along with their bank accounts in EU and non-EU countries, providing ML services to foreign entrepreneurs and concealing the origin, ownership, movement, and location of funds. TCPD reached out to Armenia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Azerbaijan, Singapore, the Russian Federation, Hong Kong, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan with MLAs. Seven EIOs were sent to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Cyprus, Estonia, and Austria, with additional requests to the AROs of Estonia and Ukraine. A Europol liaison officer facilitated legal assistance requests from the United Kingdom and Türkiye. Swift, positive co-operation with Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan provided valuable account information on foreign companies. The investigation was completed on 24 November 2022 with charges against 7 individuals. EUR 567 551, as well as 6 real estate properties with a value of EUR 1.5 million, 5 vehicles and the shares of one company were seized. 144. This trend is in line with country’s risk profile, since international co-operation and financial flows have decreased with some non-EU jurisdictions, particularly those bordering Latvia, due to a range of geopolitical and security reasons that have developed over the past times. Requests to third countries (where some vulnerabilities and risks connected to these countries remain potentially strong) are relatively lower. In regard to corruption, the most recent NRA and the Action Plan have emphasised the need for enhancing the understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption (see IO.1). While many corruption cases do not generate illicit proceeds, [25] there are instances where major, large-scale corruption cases have shown to have assets moved to foreign jurisdictions and involved foreign entities and persons. [26] CPCB sent 135 international requests in corruption cases abroad, but efforts have led to only one asset seizure and no repatriations. Authorities should continue seeking international co-operation with a focus on asset recovery. 145. Latvia regularly joins JITs for major cases like OCG and narcotics crimes, with 19 ongoing JITs with EU states (e.g., Lithuania, Estonia) and third countries (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, Republic of Moldova) by the end of 2023. Outgoing requests also have been used to trigger investigation by the receiving jurisdiction. Such examples were provided by the State Police, as well as PO of Latvia. 2.2.2. Extradition and EAWs 146. Latvian authorities seek both extradition and EAWs in any case when the subject person is known. Extradition requests are generally executed in a timely manner. In cases when it is not possible to identify persons subject to extradition, the cases are tackled by in rem procedure of NCBC. 147. Latvia sent an average 68 extradition requests, with 6 refused and 23 executed, taking about 269 days. For EAWs, Latvia sent 418 requests and 25 were refused, with 218 executions with an average of 43 days to receive the executed request (see table below). Table 2.5. Extradition requests received by Latvia (2018-2023) Received during the year Of which pending at the end of the year Refused Executed Average time of execution in days Year Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW Extr. EAW 2018 4 100 2 51 1 8 1 43 288 48 2019 4 91 3 49 0 5 1 42 251 36 2020 2 61 2 29 0 4 0 28 0 44 2021 15 42 8 12 2 3 5 27 258 48 2022 24 76 13 23 2 4 9 49 283 42 2023 19 48 11 18 1 1 7 29 265 39 Total 68 418 39 182 6 25 23 218 269 43 Combined 486 221 31 241 64 (avg) Box 2.3. Extradition request from Latvia On 25 February 2020, the State Police launched a criminal case involving at least EUR 555 653 from frauds in Germany, Poland, France, and Spain. The funds were transferred to accounts of 92 clients at a Latvian bank. Following a bank’s report on suspicious transfers and withdrawals, special investigations uncovered a 10-member OCG led by suspect “DS”. An EAW was issued for “DS” in February 2022; he was arrested in May and extradited from Germany in July. All group members were convicted, with “DS”, sentenced to 5.5 years and ordered to pay EUR 115 275 to the Treasury; proceeds were confiscated from the others. 2.2.3. Seeking to identify, freeze, seize, confiscate and share criminal assets 148. The ARO supports asset tracing cases, with ARO-to-ARO requests typically executed within 15 days or even hours in urgent cases. Support to domestic LEAs rose from 49 cases in 2018 to 375 in 2023, tracing nearly EUR 100 million (2018–2023). While international co-operation in asset tracing is increasing, it mainly identifies funds abroad, with limited data on seizure, confiscation, and asset sharing. 149. Between 2018 and 2023, Latvia requested seizures in 126 cases, covering nearly EUR 20 million (including cryptocurrencies), vehicles, real estate, and investment certificates. It successfully secured confiscations abroad in five cases, mainly for tax offences and ML, totalling EUR 1.3 million. 150. Between 2018 and 2023, Latvia requested seizures in 126 cases, resulting in the seizure of nearly EUR 20 million (including cryptocurrencies), as well as vehicles, real estate, and investment certificates. Confiscations abroad were successfully requested in 5 cases, mainly involving tax offences, ML, fraud, and human trafficking, leading to the confiscation of EUR 1.3 million. However, the gap between the identification of almost EUR 100 million, seizure of EUR 20 million, and confiscation of EUR 1.3 million suggests that tracing assets abroad does not necessarily lead to recovery. This is a common challenge in many jurisdictions. Here, it is partly due to asset restitution to victims, empty bank accounts, the lifecycle of cases, and challenges in co-operating with certain neighbouring countries, representing a minor shortfall overall. Footnotes [25]. Of the 184 corruption cases identified, roughly 60% were known to generate illicit proceeds. Of the cases from 2019 to 2023, 36 ended with NCBC and 6 were pursued for prosecution for ML. [26]. As noted in IO.1, authorities summarised that the majority of domestically generated proceeds of corruption were being laundered overseas. This resulted in an action item within the Action Plan for authorities to further develop their understanding of overseas laundering methodologies linked to corruption." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs, and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 181. All supervisors are able to articulate sectorial risks, with Latvijas Banka having a more in depth understanding, which is especially well developed in the banking sector, in line with the materiality and risk exposure. Over the assessment period, following strategic structural reforms within the country, risk exposure of the financial sector has decreased significantly - largely due to the shift towards servicing predominantly Latvian residents (except for securities) and change of business models in the banking sector. The most material banking sector is rated as presenting a medium ML risk. The securities sector – second in terms of importance – is rated as presenting a medium-high ML risk predominantly due to complexity of business models (i.e., operation of investment platforms, activities in elevated risk regions and online delivery channels) and less robust controls compared to those adopted by the banking sector. All other financial sectors outside banking and securities are rated as presenting a medium ML risk, with the exception of insurance and credit unions (rated medium-low) and private pension funds and life insurance intermediaries (rated low). 182. There is no distinction between risk categorisation methods used for different types of FIs – entities in each sector are divided into four risk categories irrespective of the size, materiality (complexity) and/or risk of the sector (see table 5.1). This signals that the differentiation of risk across individual financial sectors can be further re-evaluated with a view to assessing the impact on efficient allocation of supervisory resources aimed at monitoring FIs’ compliance. 183. All supervisors have methodologies in place for conducting institutional risk assessments that take account of varying risk criteria. Whilst the methodological approach by Latvijas Banka is developed to a good degree and covers all necessary risk categories (client, service/operation, delivery channel, geography) for inherent risk assessment, as well as controls, [41] minor improvements would serve in deepening the institutional risk understanding. For example, the approach to inherent risk assessment of the banking sector could benefit from: (i) additionally looking at clients that have complex ownership structures, as well as clients that have nominee arrangements in their control and/or ownership chain; (ii) re-considering the approach to assessing “high risk clients” element under inherent risk as this criterion might not always objectively and directly mirror inherent risk exposure (especially if this is not tied to the controls’ assessment, which in these circumstances should provide an exhaustive list of criteria according to which client risk is assessed, and the approach to weighting those criteria); (iii) re-considering the approach to weighting some of the risk categories, e.g., delivery channel risk for the securities sector is weighted least heavily representing only 10% of total weight (same approach as for the banking sector), despite remote onboarding and remote delivery of services being one of the key determinants for securities ML risk being assessed as medium-high. Table 3.1. Institutional risk categorisation matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2023) Entity Risk rating Total number of entities Low Medium- low Medium- high High Banks 3 5 5 - 13 PIs 2 1 1 0 4 EMIs 3 3 1 0 7 Investment firms 2 5 2 0 9 Investment management companies 6 1 3 0 10 AIFMs 12 19 0 0 31 Life insurance companies 3 3 0 0 6 Currency exchange offices 0 10 5 0 15 Credit unions 27 2 0 0 29 Private pension funds 6 1 0 0 7 Life insurance intermediaries (insurance brokers) 33 0 0 0 33 Lenders/leasing (consumer credit service providers) (CRPC) 3 26 8 0 37 Other FIs – credit, including financial leasing (SRS) 266 0 23 21 310 VASPs 6 0 0 1 7 184. Processes for institutional risk assessments used by the SRS and CRPC has good elements in place aimed at measuring ML risk, however, need further improvement. Whilst risk matrices contain some data points (e.g., transactional activities and number of clients) that contribute to the ML risk assessment, they need to be further expanded to fully and specifically fit ML/TF risk assessment purposes; that would also mean taking out data points that are not relevant for ML/TF as they may water down the ML/TF risk level. Controls-related questions should be separated from inherent risk related questions for the same reasons. Additionally, there are no specific questions addressed to FIs or VASPs on data points that would serve measuring TF risk. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 185. Latvian authorities are active in promoting FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and preventative measures. This is achieved through several measures: training seminars and presentations, individual feedback and consultations, as well as various guidelines that assist in identification of suspicious behaviour, reporting and implementation of AML/CFT controls. Between 2019 and 2024, 83 training seminars were conducted by Latvijas Banka that predominantly focused on general internal controls, ML/TF risk prevention and sectorial risks. Whilst these efforts are commendable, it would also be beneficial to consider a more targeted outreach based on inherent risk exposure and control vulnerabilities identified through off-site and on-site means. 186. Supervisors issued a wide range of guidelines on various topics related to implementation of AML/CFT measures. A number of topical guidance papers aimed at identification of suspicious operations have been issued by the FIU including: (i) suspected corruption identifiers; (ii) suspicious real estate linked transactions; (iii) human trafficking identifiers; (iv) ML identifiers linked to payments and accounts, including correspondent accounts held by PIs/EMIs; (v) laundromat-type transactions; and (vi) TF indicators. Additionally, investment sector specific ML indicators have been issued (non-public document) and disseminated to FIs operating in this sector. 187. The FIU also manages a virtual training platform to further assist REs with implementation of reporting obligations. The FIU can be commended for its efforts in assisting FIs with reporting obligations which have proved to be effective. However, all sectors would benefit from sector-specific guidance on business-wide ML/TF risk assessments and some sectors (such as banking, payment sector, VASPs) from sector specific ML/TF indicators to identify suspicion. In addition, specific guidance to VASPs on implementation of AML/CFT controls would be beneficial. VASPs met on-site were open about the implementation challenges they are facing today (e.g., implementation of the travel rule), albeit this sector is not material in the context of Latvia. Footnotes [41]. Residual risk is calculated based on inherent risks and controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs, and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 181. All supervisors are able to articulate sectorial risks, with Latvijas Banka having a more in depth understanding, which is especially well developed in the banking sector, in line with the materiality and risk exposure. Over the assessment period, following strategic structural reforms within the country, risk exposure of the financial sector has decreased significantly - largely due to the shift towards servicing predominantly Latvian residents (except for securities) and change of business models in the banking sector. The most material banking sector is rated as presenting a medium ML risk. The securities sector – second in terms of importance – is rated as presenting a medium-high ML risk predominantly due to complexity of business models (i.e., operation of investment platforms, activities in elevated risk regions and online delivery channels) and less robust controls compared to those adopted by the banking sector. All other financial sectors outside banking and securities are rated as presenting a medium ML risk, with the exception of insurance and credit unions (rated medium-low) and private pension funds and life insurance intermediaries (rated low). 182. There is no distinction between risk categorisation methods used for different types of FIs – entities in each sector are divided into four risk categories irrespective of the size, materiality (complexity) and/or risk of the sector (see table 5.1). This signals that the differentiation of risk across individual financial sectors can be further re-evaluated with a view to assessing the impact on efficient allocation of supervisory resources aimed at monitoring FIs’ compliance. 183. All supervisors have methodologies in place for conducting institutional risk assessments that take account of varying risk criteria. Whilst the methodological approach by Latvijas Banka is developed to a good degree and covers all necessary risk categories (client, service/operation, delivery channel, geography) for inherent risk assessment, as well as controls, [41] minor improvements would serve in deepening the institutional risk understanding. For example, the approach to inherent risk assessment of the banking sector could benefit from: (i) additionally looking at clients that have complex ownership structures, as well as clients that have nominee arrangements in their control and/or ownership chain; (ii) re-considering the approach to assessing “high risk clients” element under inherent risk as this criterion might not always objectively and directly mirror inherent risk exposure (especially if this is not tied to the controls’ assessment, which in these circumstances should provide an exhaustive list of criteria according to which client risk is assessed, and the approach to weighting those criteria); (iii) re-considering the approach to weighting some of the risk categories, e.g., delivery channel risk for the securities sector is weighted least heavily representing only 10% of total weight (same approach as for the banking sector), despite remote onboarding and remote delivery of services being one of the key determinants for securities ML risk being assessed as medium-high. Table 3.1. Institutional risk categorisation matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2023) Entity Risk rating Total number of entities Low Medium- low Medium- high High Banks 3 5 5 - 13 PIs 2 1 1 0 4 EMIs 3 3 1 0 7 Investment firms 2 5 2 0 9 Investment management companies 6 1 3 0 10 AIFMs 12 19 0 0 31 Life insurance companies 3 3 0 0 6 Currency exchange offices 0 10 5 0 15 Credit unions 27 2 0 0 29 Private pension funds 6 1 0 0 7 Life insurance intermediaries (insurance brokers) 33 0 0 0 33 Lenders/leasing (consumer credit service providers) (CRPC) 3 26 8 0 37 Other FIs – credit, including financial leasing (SRS) 266 0 23 21 310 VASPs 6 0 0 1 7 184. Processes for institutional risk assessments used by the SRS and CRPC has good elements in place aimed at measuring ML risk, however, need further improvement. Whilst risk matrices contain some data points (e.g., transactional activities and number of clients) that contribute to the ML risk assessment, they need to be further expanded to fully and specifically fit ML/TF risk assessment purposes; that would also mean taking out data points that are not relevant for ML/TF as they may water down the ML/TF risk level. Controls-related questions should be separated from inherent risk related questions for the same reasons. Additionally, there are no specific questions addressed to FIs or VASPs on data points that would serve measuring TF risk. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 185. Latvian authorities are active in promoting FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and preventative measures. This is achieved through several measures: training seminars and presentations, individual feedback and consultations, as well as various guidelines that assist in identification of suspicious behaviour, reporting and implementation of AML/CFT controls. Between 2019 and 2024, 83 training seminars were conducted by Latvijas Banka that predominantly focused on general internal controls, ML/TF risk prevention and sectorial risks. Whilst these efforts are commendable, it would also be beneficial to consider a more targeted outreach based on inherent risk exposure and control vulnerabilities identified through off-site and on-site means. 186. Supervisors issued a wide range of guidelines on various topics related to implementation of AML/CFT measures. A number of topical guidance papers aimed at identification of suspicious operations have been issued by the FIU including: (i) suspected corruption identifiers; (ii) suspicious real estate linked transactions; (iii) human trafficking identifiers; (iv) ML identifiers linked to payments and accounts, including correspondent accounts held by PIs/EMIs; (v) laundromat-type transactions; and (vi) TF indicators. Additionally, investment sector specific ML indicators have been issued (non-public document) and disseminated to FIs operating in this sector. 187. The FIU also manages a virtual training platform to further assist REs with implementation of reporting obligations. The FIU can be commended for its efforts in assisting FIs with reporting obligations which have proved to be effective. However, all sectors would benefit from sector-specific guidance on business-wide ML/TF risk assessments and some sectors (such as banking, payment sector, VASPs) from sector specific ML/TF indicators to identify suspicion. In addition, specific guidance to VASPs on implementation of AML/CFT controls would be beneficial. VASPs met on-site were open about the implementation challenges they are facing today (e.g., implementation of the travel rule), albeit this sector is not material in the context of Latvia. Footnotes [41]. Residual risk is calculated based on inherent risks and controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs, and of individual DNFBPs over time 235. All supervisors, except for the LCSA, effectively collect information to identify ML/TF risks. Whilst the LGSI and LCSN have also demonstrated a good understanding of risk, results of institutional risk assessments conducted by the SRS – which are based on around 60 risk criteria (conditions) - are not considered by the AT to be consistent with national or sectoral risks. The LCSA has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it understands the institutional ML/TF risk presented by advocates that it supervises. 236. All DNFBP supervisors have prepared and published sectoral risk assessments during the period under assessment (most recently for the period from 2020 to 2022) and have taken part in preparation of the most recent NRA. Both national and sectoral assessments show how risks have changed over time. Based on internal regulations, risk assessments are also prepared at institutional level for DNFBPs and are periodically updated. 237. In the case of the SRS, institutional risk is calculated automatically (using the SAP HANA IT technology platform (SAPA HANA)) based on a combination of: (i) data held in information systems of the tax administration (on DNFBPs and their clients) to support tax compliance; (ii) external information systems; and (iii) around 60 wide-ranging risk conditions. Sources (i) and (ii) are updated bi-monthly which means that fortnightly assessments are conducted in “real time” and always based on up-to-date data. Risk conditions are reviewed at least annually – taking account of changing national and sectoral risks and findings from inspections. However, the results of institutional risk assessments do not align with national or sectoral risks. Whilst a large majority of DNFBPs have been assessed by the SRS as presenting a low risk (on average around 90% throughout the assessment period), this is in sectors identified as presenting a medium-high or medium ML risk in national and sectorial risk assessments, where risks identified apply irrespective of business size. The AT considers that this could be due to the risk-scoring system which gives a higher score to DNFBPs with the greatest number of higher risk clients - and so may not adequately recognise that DNFBPs with a small number of clients can also present an inherently higher ML risk. 238. The LGSI assesses institutional risk on an annual basis, or when new risks are identified. It does so using information that is: (i) collected on a quarterly and annual basis from gambling operators; (ii) held in the Unified Gaming Machine Control and Monitoring System (AKUS) which analyses statistical data; and (iii) available remotely from on-line operators on transactions. Institutional risk assessments also take into account the results of the NRA, financial information, market share, and information available from the SRS – tax administration. Matrices are then used by the LGSI to calculate institutional risk. Those operators with limited activities tend to be rated as presenting a low risk (around 25% on average during the assessment period), whereas others are rated as medium or high risk, which is in line with national and sectoral risk assessments. 239. The risk assessment for advocates focuses only on the extent to which activities are conducted that are within the scope of the FATF Recommendations (including those related to the creation, operation or management of legal persons) and so does not support the application of risk-based supervision. No additional information is requested to support an assessment of risk, apart from on internal control systems (October 2024). 240. In the case of notaries, the LCSN has access to: (i) the Register of Authorisations Certified by Sworn Notaries which records information on all notarised transactions; (ii) SRS – tax administration databases; (iii) STRs made by notaries; (iv) formal and informal complaints made about notaries; and (v) test results following training. Each year, notaries also submit a self-declaration to the LCSN in which they provide relevant information and a self-assessment of risk (risk score and mitigating factors). The risk level of each notary is assessed at least annually, based on eight risk factors. The majority of notaries are now assessed as presenting a low or medium risk (around 5% are high risk), which is in line with national and sectoral risk assessments. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 241. All supervisors have effectively promoted understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks and AML/CFT requirements, including to higher risk DNFBPs. 242. The authorities have taken extensive steps to ensure that the results of the NRA and SRAs are widely known, including amongst higher risk DNFBPs, and there is a high level of awareness of risks identified. Inter alia, they do so through co-operation with industry associations, participation in conferences and seminars, and use of webinars, including at the time of introduction of licensing requirements for accountants (medium-high risk sector). In support of these assessments, the authorities have also produced a number of helpful documents for all medium-high risk sectors (though at the end of the assessment period). 243. The SRS makes use of its EDS to send information, respond to questions and publish training materials. The LCSA has created a section on its website where all relevant information about ML/TF/PF prevention can be found. On an annual basis, the LCSN compiles the most important conclusions from its inspections, including most common errors and best practices observed, and presents a report to all notaries at a meeting organised for this purpose. 244. The SRS has developed a number of e-learning courses and made use of video seminars and social media to support compliance with AML/CFT requirements. E-learning courses are used only by a relatively small number of DNFBPs under supervision. The LGSI, LCSA and LCSN run different training events each year, which are well attended." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs, and of individual DNFBPs over time 235. All supervisors, except for the LCSA, effectively collect information to identify ML/TF risks. Whilst the LGSI and LCSN have also demonstrated a good understanding of risk, results of institutional risk assessments conducted by the SRS – which are based on around 60 risk criteria (conditions) - are not considered by the AT to be consistent with national or sectoral risks. The LCSA has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it understands the institutional ML/TF risk presented by advocates that it supervises. 236. All DNFBP supervisors have prepared and published sectoral risk assessments during the period under assessment (most recently for the period from 2020 to 2022) and have taken part in preparation of the most recent NRA. Both national and sectoral assessments show how risks have changed over time. Based on internal regulations, risk assessments are also prepared at institutional level for DNFBPs and are periodically updated. 237. In the case of the SRS, institutional risk is calculated automatically (using the SAP HANA IT technology platform (SAPA HANA)) based on a combination of: (i) data held in information systems of the tax administration (on DNFBPs and their clients) to support tax compliance; (ii) external information systems; and (iii) around 60 wide-ranging risk conditions. Sources (i) and (ii) are updated bi-monthly which means that fortnightly assessments are conducted in “real time” and always based on up-to-date data. Risk conditions are reviewed at least annually – taking account of changing national and sectoral risks and findings from inspections. However, the results of institutional risk assessments do not align with national or sectoral risks. Whilst a large majority of DNFBPs have been assessed by the SRS as presenting a low risk (on average around 90% throughout the assessment period), this is in sectors identified as presenting a medium-high or medium ML risk in national and sectorial risk assessments, where risks identified apply irrespective of business size. The AT considers that this could be due to the risk-scoring system which gives a higher score to DNFBPs with the greatest number of higher risk clients - and so may not adequately recognise that DNFBPs with a small number of clients can also present an inherently higher ML risk. 238. The LGSI assesses institutional risk on an annual basis, or when new risks are identified. It does so using information that is: (i) collected on a quarterly and annual basis from gambling operators; (ii) held in the Unified Gaming Machine Control and Monitoring System (AKUS) which analyses statistical data; and (iii) available remotely from on-line operators on transactions. Institutional risk assessments also take into account the results of the NRA, financial information, market share, and information available from the SRS – tax administration. Matrices are then used by the LGSI to calculate institutional risk. Those operators with limited activities tend to be rated as presenting a low risk (around 25% on average during the assessment period), whereas others are rated as medium or high risk, which is in line with national and sectoral risk assessments. 239. The risk assessment for advocates focuses only on the extent to which activities are conducted that are within the scope of the FATF Recommendations (including those related to the creation, operation or management of legal persons) and so does not support the application of risk-based supervision. No additional information is requested to support an assessment of risk, apart from on internal control systems (October 2024). 240. In the case of notaries, the LCSN has access to: (i) the Register of Authorisations Certified by Sworn Notaries which records information on all notarised transactions; (ii) SRS – tax administration databases; (iii) STRs made by notaries; (iv) formal and informal complaints made about notaries; and (v) test results following training. Each year, notaries also submit a self-declaration to the LCSN in which they provide relevant information and a self-assessment of risk (risk score and mitigating factors). The risk level of each notary is assessed at least annually, based on eight risk factors. The majority of notaries are now assessed as presenting a low or medium risk (around 5% are high risk), which is in line with national and sectoral risk assessments. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 241. All supervisors have effectively promoted understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks and AML/CFT requirements, including to higher risk DNFBPs. 242. The authorities have taken extensive steps to ensure that the results of the NRA and SRAs are widely known, including amongst higher risk DNFBPs, and there is a high level of awareness of risks identified. Inter alia, they do so through co-operation with industry associations, participation in conferences and seminars, and use of webinars, including at the time of introduction of licensing requirements for accountants (medium-high risk sector). In support of these assessments, the authorities have also produced a number of helpful documents for all medium-high risk sectors (though at the end of the assessment period). 243. The SRS makes use of its EDS to send information, respond to questions and publish training materials. The LCSA has created a section on its website where all relevant information about ML/TF/PF prevention can be found. On an annual basis, the LCSN compiles the most important conclusions from its inspections, including most common errors and best practices observed, and presents a report to all notaries at a meeting organised for this purpose. 244. The SRS has developed a number of e-learning courses and made use of video seminars and social media to support compliance with AML/CFT requirements. E-learning courses are used only by a relatively small number of DNFBPs under supervision. The LGSI, LCSA and LCSN run different training events each year, which are well attended." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="295. Latvia has taken a number of measures to mitigate the risks associated with legal persons and foreign legal arrangements. These include enhanced transparency and timely access of BO information by making current BO information publicly available through the ER, with historic information available upon authorisation or upon request. All LEAs in Latvia have direct and unhindered access to current and historical information. Domestic legal persons 296. Since 2018, Latvia has required domestic legal persons to register BO information with the ER. 89% of all registered legal persons have filed BO information (see core issue 5.3). A number of additional measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons have been taken, which primarily relate to increasing the accuracy of information on the ER (see core issue 5.3). LEAs and private sector representatives unanimously identified the ER and the public nature of the registry as a significant factor in the mitigation of risk emanating from domestic legal persons. LEAs also noted the proactive outreach and training provided to them by the ER, which enabled law enforcement to effectively understand, search and use the available information. 297. In 2017, Latvia extended the legal obligations relating to BO collection so that there is now a duty for BOs to disclose their status to the legal person, as well as an obligation on the legal persons to collect and submit information to the ER. Latvia enhanced the penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations to the ER, for example, in 2019, Latvia extended criminal liability for failure to provide information, and for supplying false information. Latvia has demonstrated through the provision of statistics and case studies that these penalties are being used (see core issue 5.5). 298. In July 2020, Latvia introduced an obligation for REs to report discrepancies between CDD information they have collected, and information held on the ER. This aims to further enhance the accuracy of information held on the ER and utilising the obligation for REs to conduct CDD independently of the information held on the ER. Supervisors demonstrated that they monitor discrepancy reporting in their supervised sectors. 299. In 2018, amendments to the AML/CFT/CPF Law prohibited credit institutions, PIs, EMIs, investment firms and investment management companies to have business relationship with shell companies. Following the amendments to the AML/CFT /CPF Law, horizontal examinations were carried out by Latvijas Banka to check compliance with these requirements. Latvian authorities’ data shows that: (i) since 2017, shell arrangements’ credit turnover has fallen by 99.6%; (ii) since 2015, incoming and outgoing payments of foreign customers have fallen by 84%; and (iii) since 2019, the number of customers with BO outside the EU has fallen by 68% in comparison to 2023. 300. Latvia introduced legal requirements to register bearer shares; the shares of legal persons failing to do so are annulled (see also R.24). 301. The SRS plays a significant role in risk mitigation for domestic legal persons (through tax related information, suspicious legal addresses, etc.), and SRS concerns about tax risks are the primary reason for refusal to incorporate domestic legal persons, with rejections rising from 50 in 2021, to 178 in 2022. 302. Overall, Latvia has allocated necessary resources to ensure transparency of basic and BO information. This includes increased staff, as well as their capacity and expertise, relevant training, financial resources, IT and other technical improvements concerning basic and BO information maintained at the ER. Nominee arrangements 303. Directors [56] must be natural persons, legal persons cannot act as directors of domestic legal persons. There is no express prohibition in law prohibiting nominee director and no express disclosure obligation for nominators and nominees (c.24.13(a)). However, a “nominator” who has another individual, the “nominee”, register themselves as the board member is still under a legal obligation to register themselves as a BO (due to exercising control by virtue of being able to appoint a board member) and this information is publicly available on the ER. The nominee would be committing a criminal offence of false declaration when they register themselves as the board member and as a BO. Authorities demonstrated the application of a criminal sanction in a case where nominee registered themselves to conceal the identity of the true director and BO. 304. Therefore, whilst there is a technical compliance deficiency for c.24.13 as there is no explicit obligation for a nominator to declare themselves specifically as a nominator the combination of the offence of false declaration for the nominee and the obligation for the nominator to register themselves as a BO and that BO information is publicly available, means that the technical deficiency is not considered to have a meaningful impact on effectiveness as the combination of requirements, the public availability of BO information and the criminal liability for false declaration mean that in practice nominee arrangements cannot lawfully take place. 305. Some CSPs (authorities estimate there are seven operational that seem to offer company formation services) can also offer nominee services and must be registered with the SRS to do so. Authorities informed the AT, that currently nominee services are not being offered in Latvia. This conclusion is based on analysis and field visits by authorities which conclusively demonstrated that the limited number of advertisements found online for nominee services are historic and outside of the evaluation period. However, no routine supervisory practices are established to monitor when the existing CSPs start and/or cease offering nominee services. Latvia has introduced enhanced checks and co-operation between the ER and SRS in certain higher risk scenarios that supports the identification of informal (sometimes referred to as “straw men”) nominee arrangements. For example, when an application is received to create a new legal person and a board member is already registered as a board member for several legal persons, or where a person is already registered as a BO of several legal persons, or where several companies are already registered at a physical address, this will be referred for investigation. 306. Board members can formally delegate some elements of their duties/powers to a procurator. In these circumstances both the board member and the procurator are recorded publicly on the register as is the nature of this appointment. This arrangement is not considered to meet the FATF glossary definition of a nominee arrangement (see paragraph 135 of beneficial ownership guidance). If a situation arose where this arrangement was within scope in the specific circumstances, the disclosure requirements meet c.24.13(a). Foreign legal persons 307. Latvia has in place registration requirements for foreign legal persons with the closest nexus to Latvia. At the end of 2023 a total of 735 foreign legal persons were registered with the ER and the SRS in different capacities: (i) 444 branches; (ii) 160 representative offices; (iii) 131 permanent establishments. Additionally, the ER takes note of foreign legal persons in the ownership capacity of domestic legal persons - as sole shareholders of domestic capital companies (3 627 identified foreign legal persons) and as parent companies and entities through which the BO of the domestic legal person exercises control (5 734 identified foreign legal persons). 308. Latvia has an account registry in place that encompasses information on all clients including foreign legal persons holding demand deposit, payment or investment accounts opened in a credit institution, savings and loan association or a provider of payment services. As part of this information, BOs are being recorded. This is also used to access BO information in addition to the ER information. 309. Between 2020 and 2022, Latvian authorities froze EUR 680 million in assets belonging to foreign legal persons holding accounts in Latvian FIs (see also, table 6.1 above, and IO.8). Latvian authorities demonstrated the use of international co-operation to request information from foreign authorities on foreign legal persons as well as the use of public information on foreign registries. Authorities also demonstrated their ability to identify BOs of foreign legal persons where international co-operation has not been provided, for example, through the use of CDD information, analysis of financial flows and transaction data and other methods. 310. Latvijas Banka took proactive measures to mitigate the risks of foreign legal persons. For example, when reporting requirements were introduced for domestic legal persons, Latvijas Banka identified the risk of individuals seeking to use foreign legal persons to circumvent domestic reporting requirement and access the Latvian financial system. This was mirrored by the former supervisor FCMC who undertook a series of targeted and full scope inspections relating to EDD undertaken by credit institutions on legal persons. See IO.3 for more information. 311. Authorities are not able to precisely determine the scale of foreign legal person customers of Latvian DNFBPs, however, DNFBPs interviewed during the onsite visit all outlined a very low number of foreign legal person clients. Footnotes [56]. There is no defined term “director” in Latvian law. The term “director” in this report is used to describe executive or supervisory board members of legal persons undertaken roles comparable to those of directors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="295. Latvia has taken a number of measures to mitigate the risks associated with legal persons and foreign legal arrangements. These include enhanced transparency and timely access of BO information by making current BO information publicly available through the ER, with historic information available upon authorisation or upon request. All LEAs in Latvia have direct and unhindered access to current and historical information. Domestic legal persons 296. Since 2018, Latvia has required domestic legal persons to register BO information with the ER. 89% of all registered legal persons have filed BO information (see core issue 5.3). A number of additional measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons have been taken, which primarily relate to increasing the accuracy of information on the ER (see core issue 5.3). LEAs and private sector representatives unanimously identified the ER and the public nature of the registry as a significant factor in the mitigation of risk emanating from domestic legal persons. LEAs also noted the proactive outreach and training provided to them by the ER, which enabled law enforcement to effectively understand, search and use the available information. 297. In 2017, Latvia extended the legal obligations relating to BO collection so that there is now a duty for BOs to disclose their status to the legal person, as well as an obligation on the legal persons to collect and submit information to the ER. Latvia enhanced the penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations to the ER, for example, in 2019, Latvia extended criminal liability for failure to provide information, and for supplying false information. Latvia has demonstrated through the provision of statistics and case studies that these penalties are being used (see core issue 5.5). 298. In July 2020, Latvia introduced an obligation for REs to report discrepancies between CDD information they have collected, and information held on the ER. This aims to further enhance the accuracy of information held on the ER and utilising the obligation for REs to conduct CDD independently of the information held on the ER. Supervisors demonstrated that they monitor discrepancy reporting in their supervised sectors. 299. In 2018, amendments to the AML/CFT/CPF Law prohibited credit institutions, PIs, EMIs, investment firms and investment management companies to have business relationship with shell companies. Following the amendments to the AML/CFT /CPF Law, horizontal examinations were carried out by Latvijas Banka to check compliance with these requirements. Latvian authorities’ data shows that: (i) since 2017, shell arrangements’ credit turnover has fallen by 99.6%; (ii) since 2015, incoming and outgoing payments of foreign customers have fallen by 84%; and (iii) since 2019, the number of customers with BO outside the EU has fallen by 68% in comparison to 2023. 300. Latvia introduced legal requirements to register bearer shares; the shares of legal persons failing to do so are annulled (see also R.24). 301. The SRS plays a significant role in risk mitigation for domestic legal persons (through tax related information, suspicious legal addresses, etc.), and SRS concerns about tax risks are the primary reason for refusal to incorporate domestic legal persons, with rejections rising from 50 in 2021, to 178 in 2022. 302. Overall, Latvia has allocated necessary resources to ensure transparency of basic and BO information. This includes increased staff, as well as their capacity and expertise, relevant training, financial resources, IT and other technical improvements concerning basic and BO information maintained at the ER. Nominee arrangements 303. Directors [56] must be natural persons, legal persons cannot act as directors of domestic legal persons. There is no express prohibition in law prohibiting nominee director and no express disclosure obligation for nominators and nominees (c.24.13(a)). However, a “nominator” who has another individual, the “nominee”, register themselves as the board member is still under a legal obligation to register themselves as a BO (due to exercising control by virtue of being able to appoint a board member) and this information is publicly available on the ER. The nominee would be committing a criminal offence of false declaration when they register themselves as the board member and as a BO. Authorities demonstrated the application of a criminal sanction in a case where nominee registered themselves to conceal the identity of the true director and BO. 304. Therefore, whilst there is a technical compliance deficiency for c.24.13 as there is no explicit obligation for a nominator to declare themselves specifically as a nominator the combination of the offence of false declaration for the nominee and the obligation for the nominator to register themselves as a BO and that BO information is publicly available, means that the technical deficiency is not considered to have a meaningful impact on effectiveness as the combination of requirements, the public availability of BO information and the criminal liability for false declaration mean that in practice nominee arrangements cannot lawfully take place. 305. Some CSPs (authorities estimate there are seven operational that seem to offer company formation services) can also offer nominee services and must be registered with the SRS to do so. Authorities informed the AT, that currently nominee services are not being offered in Latvia. This conclusion is based on analysis and field visits by authorities which conclusively demonstrated that the limited number of advertisements found online for nominee services are historic and outside of the evaluation period. However, no routine supervisory practices are established to monitor when the existing CSPs start and/or cease offering nominee services. Latvia has introduced enhanced checks and co-operation between the ER and SRS in certain higher risk scenarios that supports the identification of informal (sometimes referred to as “straw men”) nominee arrangements. For example, when an application is received to create a new legal person and a board member is already registered as a board member for several legal persons, or where a person is already registered as a BO of several legal persons, or where several companies are already registered at a physical address, this will be referred for investigation. 306. Board members can formally delegate some elements of their duties/powers to a procurator. In these circumstances both the board member and the procurator are recorded publicly on the register as is the nature of this appointment. This arrangement is not considered to meet the FATF glossary definition of a nominee arrangement (see paragraph 135 of beneficial ownership guidance). If a situation arose where this arrangement was within scope in the specific circumstances, the disclosure requirements meet c.24.13(a). Foreign legal persons 307. Latvia has in place registration requirements for foreign legal persons with the closest nexus to Latvia. At the end of 2023 a total of 735 foreign legal persons were registered with the ER and the SRS in different capacities: (i) 444 branches; (ii) 160 representative offices; (iii) 131 permanent establishments. Additionally, the ER takes note of foreign legal persons in the ownership capacity of domestic legal persons - as sole shareholders of domestic capital companies (3 627 identified foreign legal persons) and as parent companies and entities through which the BO of the domestic legal person exercises control (5 734 identified foreign legal persons). 308. Latvia has an account registry in place that encompasses information on all clients including foreign legal persons holding demand deposit, payment or investment accounts opened in a credit institution, savings and loan association or a provider of payment services. As part of this information, BOs are being recorded. This is also used to access BO information in addition to the ER information. 309. Between 2020 and 2022, Latvian authorities froze EUR 680 million in assets belonging to foreign legal persons holding accounts in Latvian FIs (see also, table 6.1 above, and IO.8). Latvian authorities demonstrated the use of international co-operation to request information from foreign authorities on foreign legal persons as well as the use of public information on foreign registries. Authorities also demonstrated their ability to identify BOs of foreign legal persons where international co-operation has not been provided, for example, through the use of CDD information, analysis of financial flows and transaction data and other methods. 310. Latvijas Banka took proactive measures to mitigate the risks of foreign legal persons. For example, when reporting requirements were introduced for domestic legal persons, Latvijas Banka identified the risk of individuals seeking to use foreign legal persons to circumvent domestic reporting requirement and access the Latvian financial system. This was mirrored by the former supervisor FCMC who undertook a series of targeted and full scope inspections relating to EDD undertaken by credit institutions on legal persons. See IO.3 for more information. 311. Authorities are not able to precisely determine the scale of foreign legal person customers of Latvian DNFBPs, however, DNFBPs interviewed during the onsite visit all outlined a very low number of foreign legal person clients. Footnotes [56]. There is no defined term “director” in Latvian law. The term “director” in this report is used to describe executive or supervisory board members of legal persons undertaken roles comparable to those of directors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="343. Latvia produces high-quality financial intelligence, greatly supporting competent authorities. LEAs praised the FIU’s analyses and reports, which were validated through detailed presentations and case reviews. These reports help identify new cases, including unknown persons and trends, and suspected TF activity. [66] Successful international co-operation also aids in tracing accounts and persons abroad. Disseminations align with risks. 344. Disseminated products are used to initiate and support investigations. The primary recipients of FIU Latvia’s disseminations are the State Police, SRS TCPD, CPCB, and the State Security Service. In six years (2018-2023) the FIU sent 2 778 disseminations to 9 different LEAs. [67] Almost 70% of all disseminations in the period are sent to the State Police. Of these, majority (close to 80%) are used in criminal proceedings- 57% led to new criminal proceedings and 43% were incorporated into existing cases. The FIU’s products include disseminations of both operational and strategic analysis to LEAs (both upon the FIU’s own initiative and upon LEA request), annual feedback of RE reporting trends and challenges, analysis done for SCAs prior to licencing a new RE or conducting supervisory inspections. 345. When a case is not initiated by the FIU, the FIU enhances LEAs’ own intelligence with reports from REs and authorities, providing actionable intelligence. By analysing and enriching this information, using multiple data sources and advanced tools, the FIU provides actionable intelligence that contributes to a broader understanding of potential criminal activity. Additionally, in many cases when ML investigations are initiated by an LEA’s own sources the FIU assists with information and financial intelligence prepared as a response to LEA information requests. The FIU has built robust Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) capabilities [68] to bolster their analytical capacity. 346. In 2023 alone, LEAs and PO sent 258 information requests to the FIU, 170 of which were from State Police. As an example, in 2020, FIU Latvia investigated a suspected professional ML scheme involving proceeds from an EU-based OCG laundered through Latvian bank accounts. Following extensive analysis, international co-operation, and CCG meetings, the FIU disseminated findings to the LEA and froze assets totalling approximately EUR 3.5 million, including those of a foreign electronic money transfer service and its BO. 347. The FIU's ability to support the operational needs of competent authorities has improved due to institutional reforms. [69] In 2019, the FIU of Latvia transitioned from being part of the Prosecutor General's Office to becoming an autonomous institution under the Prime Minister via the Minister of the Interior. Since then, the FIU has significantly grown in personnel and resources, from 36 positions with a budget of EUR 1.5 million to 91 personnel in 2023 with a budget of approximately EUR 7.8-8.9 million. [70] Since 2024, the FIU has deployed four analysts with specialisations on TF. This resourcing is in accordance with the volume and risk of TF-related reports across its divisions (including those handling initial analysis, strategic assessments, and international co-operation). The FIU has also made substantial investments in technological solutions, which analysts use daily. 348. The FIU has also made significant strides in enhancing the turnaround time [71] for processing STRs/SARs. Every received STR is prioritized on arrival based on the indicated criminal offence, the amount of potentially illicit funds, and other metrics (priority metrics are updated on an annual basis, at minimum). The median STR “turnaround time” for the FIU is 51 days. [72] The increasing turnaround time in more recent years in the table below (2022-2023) corresponds with the risk profile shift - moving from large number of STRs with “refraining” (suspension of transactions) characteristic of the 1st risk profile (see IO.1), to the more complex domestic cases involving public and private sector co-operation and ongoing information exchange (using the OpCEN and CCG mechanisms). The increased reporting of EU sanctions evasion has further heightened the importance of swift and accurate processing of STRs/SARs. The emergence of EU sanctions evasion as a key national risk has added complexity to the production and dissemination of financial intelligence. LEAs and the FIU report a growing volume of cases involving attempts to circumvent EU sanctions, often requiring detailed cross-border analysis. Table 6.1. Median STR turnaround time at the FIU Latvia 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average 44 days 45 days 45 days 46 days 46 days 69 days 63 days 51 days 349. Some complex cross-border cases (e.g., OpCEN cases) take several months for dissemination. These cases require ongoing interaction with relevant LEAs through CCG. The median figures don't capture small-scale fraud cases (fewer days) or large-scale tax evasion schemes involving more than 10 STRs per case (more days). 350. Around half (51.4%) of the country’s ML investigations to LEAs are initiated based on intelligence disseminated spontaneously by the FIU. [73] Spontaneous disseminations are largely aligned to the risk profile of Latvia. The table below outlines the number of disseminations per year, according to the major crime types. Table 6.2. STRs disseminated by FIU to LEAs by suspected offence (2020-2023) Crime Type Listed in Disseminated STR [74] 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Tax Crimes [75] 823 948 1 779 2 060 5 610 Standalone ML 1 675 1 356 960 234 4 225 Property Crimes (incl. Fraud) 200 324 142 141 807 Other Predicates [76] 139 132 354 127 752 Sanctions evasion 0 0 72 267 339 Corruption 18 31 72 40 161 TF 1 1 0 0 2 TOTAL 2 856 2 792 3 379 2 869 11 896 351. Both statistics of total STRs received and those disseminated clearly reflect the evolving risk profile of Latvia. The share and number of STRs with Standalone ML (that is mostly associated with 1st risk profile) disseminated have steadily decreased while STRs of relating to domestic predicate offences (such as tax crimes, fraud and sanctions evasion) now dominate in FIU disseminations. Table 6.3. ML Investigations initiated based on FIU intelligence disseminated spontaneously 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Total Number of ML Investigations 257 344 340 398 235 1 574 Number of ML Investigations initiated by FIU disseminations 119 219 155 243 86 822 Percentage of ML Investigations initiated by FIU disseminations 46% 64% 46% 61% 37% 52% 352. The FIU also conducts regular strategic analysis to enhance risk awareness, support policy development, and identify emerging trends and typologies related to ML and financial crime. This analysis helps stakeholders, including LEAs, SCA and REs to better understand the evolving risk landscape and adapt their approaches to mitigate these risks effectively. Strategic analysis often involves the examination of large datasets to detect patterns indicative of ML or other illicit activities. 353. An example of the FIU strategic analysis material is detailed below. This showcases how the FIU applies advanced analytical tools and expertise to uncover sophisticated ML methodologies. Box 6.1. FIU strategic analysis FIU strategic analysis material – for typologies of ML (3rd revised edition) In 2020, FIU Latvia developed methodological material on ML typologies and red flag indicators, updated in 2021 and 2024. It is widely used by REs, FIU, LEAs, and courts, summarizing ML typologies typical of schemes in Latvia. These typologies are identified through strategic analysis and practices of foreign FIUs and international institutions like FATF. The material is cited in FIU disseminations and used in investigations and prosecutions, supporting evidence evaluation in court for ML cases. For more examples of FIU strategic analyses, refer to IO1, and the FIU Latvia webpage ( https://fid.gov.lv/en/roles-and-responsibilities/strategic-analysis-and-guidelines ) 354. Prosecutors routinely rely on FIU analytical products referred to as “Conclusions of the Competent Authority.” These detailed, evidence-based reports are admissible in court and have been pivotal in securing convictions in complex cases, particularly in cases involving cross-border ML and fraud. 355. For suspected TF, the FIU produced 15 intelligence reports disseminated to the State Security Service and foreign FIUs and engaged in at least 15 operational cases requiring further information from REs, LEAs, and international counterparts. FIU Latvia actively participates in international task forces to stay aligned with global TF trends. 356. LEAs also carry out parallel financial investigations using their own intelligence. Between 2018 and 2023, 24% of ML investigations were initiated through such parallel investigations (alongside the 51.4% initiated through FIU disseminations). The State Police, TCPD, and State Security Service, have independent intelligence-gathering capabilities but rely heavily on the FIU for intelligence and analysis. The SRS TCPD has increased its analytical capacity with more analysts, IT upgrades, software purchases, and enhanced training, using advanced systems for data analysis. In 2021, the CPCB expanded its analytical team from 4 to 14 analysts by 2023 to support criminal cases and proactive data collection. These capabilities include human intelligence (HUMINT), communication interception, and covert surveillance, complemented by specialized financial investigators. Despite these efforts, the FIU remains the central point for financial intelligence expertise and co-ordination. 357. SCAs create their own financial analysis but this typically leads to administrative procedures rather than major ML investigations. Latvijas Banka's 2022 review found increased cross-border payments, prompting inspections and uncovering control deficiencies. Other SCAs aggregate data to identify violations. However, the FIU remains the main hub for financial intelligence, providing continuous feedback on emerging risks and strategic analysis. Footnotes [66]. The FIU has demonstrated a structured and proactive approach to handling STRs related to TF. Despite the national risk level for TF being low, FIU Latvia treats TF as a high-priority area. [67]. Includes the Internal Security Bureau, EPPO, The Defence Intelligence and Security Service and Internal Security Office by SRS. [68]. OSINT analysis leverages both commercially available tools and custom-designed resources to effectively search, compile, and analyse open-source data. This capability significantly enhances the FIU’s ability to add value to reports received from REs and other competent authorities. [69]. This change addressed an important shortfall identified in the previous MER, and today allows for greater administrative autonomy, including budget management and operational independence. [70]. Including 19 persons dedicated to sanctions enforcement. [71]. This refers to the time from receipt of a report by the FIU to its subsequent dissemination to one or more competent authorities. [72]. This represents the number of days between receiving of an STR into the FIU to its onward dissemination. [73]. Although the proportion of FIU-triggered investigations is lower in proportion than it was to the previous assessment period, the overall number of investigations has increased. Additionally, the lower ratio can be accounted for by higher numbers of investigations initiated by LEAs with stronger ML identification techniques. [74]. The yearly data was not synchronised before 2020, and therefore the data is only available for the past four years. [75]. Tax Crime STRs are sent automatically to SRS by the FIU and are additionally analysed by the FIU in regard to potential ML. This is a positive feature that enables both the SRS to utilise STRs for tax purposes and in parallel allows the FIU to utilise them to detect ML. [76]. Under “Other Predicates” are STRs with indications of corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="343. Latvia produces high-quality financial intelligence, greatly supporting competent authorities. LEAs praised the FIU’s analyses and reports, which were validated through detailed presentations and case reviews. These reports help identify new cases, including unknown persons and trends, and suspected TF activity. [66] Successful international co-operation also aids in tracing accounts and persons abroad. Disseminations align with risks. 344. Disseminated products are used to initiate and support investigations. The primary recipients of FIU Latvia’s disseminations are the State Police, SRS TCPD, CPCB, and the State Security Service. In six years (2018-2023) the FIU sent 2 778 disseminations to 9 different LEAs. [67] Almost 70% of all disseminations in the period are sent to the State Police. Of these, majority (close to 80%) are used in criminal proceedings- 57% led to new criminal proceedings and 43% were incorporated into existing cases. The FIU’s products include disseminations of both operational and strategic analysis to LEAs (both upon the FIU’s own initiative and upon LEA request), annual feedback of RE reporting trends and challenges, analysis done for SCAs prior to licencing a new RE or conducting supervisory inspections. 345. When a case is not initiated by the FIU, the FIU enhances LEAs’ own intelligence with reports from REs and authorities, providing actionable intelligence. By analysing and enriching this information, using multiple data sources and advanced tools, the FIU provides actionable intelligence that contributes to a broader understanding of potential criminal activity. Additionally, in many cases when ML investigations are initiated by an LEA’s own sources the FIU assists with information and financial intelligence prepared as a response to LEA information requests. The FIU has built robust Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) capabilities [68] to bolster their analytical capacity. 346. In 2023 alone, LEAs and PO sent 258 information requests to the FIU, 170 of which were from State Police. As an example, in 2020, FIU Latvia investigated a suspected professional ML scheme involving proceeds from an EU-based OCG laundered through Latvian bank accounts. Following extensive analysis, international co-operation, and CCG meetings, the FIU disseminated findings to the LEA and froze assets totalling approximately EUR 3.5 million, including those of a foreign electronic money transfer service and its BO. 347. The FIU's ability to support the operational needs of competent authorities has improved due to institutional reforms. [69] In 2019, the FIU of Latvia transitioned from being part of the Prosecutor General's Office to becoming an autonomous institution under the Prime Minister via the Minister of the Interior. Since then, the FIU has significantly grown in personnel and resources, from 36 positions with a budget of EUR 1.5 million to 91 personnel in 2023 with a budget of approximately EUR 7.8-8.9 million. [70] Since 2024, the FIU has deployed four analysts with specialisations on TF. This resourcing is in accordance with the volume and risk of TF-related reports across its divisions (including those handling initial analysis, strategic assessments, and international co-operation). The FIU has also made substantial investments in technological solutions, which analysts use daily. 348. The FIU has also made significant strides in enhancing the turnaround time [71] for processing STRs/SARs. Every received STR is prioritized on arrival based on the indicated criminal offence, the amount of potentially illicit funds, and other metrics (priority metrics are updated on an annual basis, at minimum). The median STR “turnaround time” for the FIU is 51 days. [72] The increasing turnaround time in more recent years in the table below (2022-2023) corresponds with the risk profile shift - moving from large number of STRs with “refraining” (suspension of transactions) characteristic of the 1st risk profile (see IO.1), to the more complex domestic cases involving public and private sector co-operation and ongoing information exchange (using the OpCEN and CCG mechanisms). The increased reporting of EU sanctions evasion has further heightened the importance of swift and accurate processing of STRs/SARs. The emergence of EU sanctions evasion as a key national risk has added complexity to the production and dissemination of financial intelligence. LEAs and the FIU report a growing volume of cases involving attempts to circumvent EU sanctions, often requiring detailed cross-border analysis. Table 6.1. Median STR turnaround time at the FIU Latvia 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average 44 days 45 days 45 days 46 days 46 days 69 days 63 days 51 days 349. Some complex cross-border cases (e.g., OpCEN cases) take several months for dissemination. These cases require ongoing interaction with relevant LEAs through CCG. The median figures don't capture small-scale fraud cases (fewer days) or large-scale tax evasion schemes involving more than 10 STRs per case (more days). 350. Around half (51.4%) of the country’s ML investigations to LEAs are initiated based on intelligence disseminated spontaneously by the FIU. [73] Spontaneous disseminations are largely aligned to the risk profile of Latvia. The table below outlines the number of disseminations per year, according to the major crime types. Table 6.2. STRs disseminated by FIU to LEAs by suspected offence (2020-2023) Crime Type Listed in Disseminated STR [74] 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Tax Crimes [75] 823 948 1 779 2 060 5 610 Standalone ML 1 675 1 356 960 234 4 225 Property Crimes (incl. Fraud) 200 324 142 141 807 Other Predicates [76] 139 132 354 127 752 Sanctions evasion 0 0 72 267 339 Corruption 18 31 72 40 161 TF 1 1 0 0 2 TOTAL 2 856 2 792 3 379 2 869 11 896 351. Both statistics of total STRs received and those disseminated clearly reflect the evolving risk profile of Latvia. The share and number of STRs with Standalone ML (that is mostly associated with 1st risk profile) disseminated have steadily decreased while STRs of relating to domestic predicate offences (such as tax crimes, fraud and sanctions evasion) now dominate in FIU disseminations. Table 6.3. ML Investigations initiated based on FIU intelligence disseminated spontaneously 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Total Number of ML Investigations 257 344 340 398 235 1 574 Number of ML Investigations initiated by FIU disseminations 119 219 155 243 86 822 Percentage of ML Investigations initiated by FIU disseminations 46% 64% 46% 61% 37% 52% 352. The FIU also conducts regular strategic analysis to enhance risk awareness, support policy development, and identify emerging trends and typologies related to ML and financial crime. This analysis helps stakeholders, including LEAs, SCA and REs to better understand the evolving risk landscape and adapt their approaches to mitigate these risks effectively. Strategic analysis often involves the examination of large datasets to detect patterns indicative of ML or other illicit activities. 353. An example of the FIU strategic analysis material is detailed below. This showcases how the FIU applies advanced analytical tools and expertise to uncover sophisticated ML methodologies. Box 6.1. FIU strategic analysis FIU strategic analysis material – for typologies of ML (3rd revised edition) In 2020, FIU Latvia developed methodological material on ML typologies and red flag indicators, updated in 2021 and 2024. It is widely used by REs, FIU, LEAs, and courts, summarizing ML typologies typical of schemes in Latvia. These typologies are identified through strategic analysis and practices of foreign FIUs and international institutions like FATF. The material is cited in FIU disseminations and used in investigations and prosecutions, supporting evidence evaluation in court for ML cases. For more examples of FIU strategic analyses, refer to IO1, and the FIU Latvia webpage ( https://fid.gov.lv/en/roles-and-responsibilities/strategic-analysis-and-guidelines ) 354. Prosecutors routinely rely on FIU analytical products referred to as “Conclusions of the Competent Authority.” These detailed, evidence-based reports are admissible in court and have been pivotal in securing convictions in complex cases, particularly in cases involving cross-border ML and fraud. 355. For suspected TF, the FIU produced 15 intelligence reports disseminated to the State Security Service and foreign FIUs and engaged in at least 15 operational cases requiring further information from REs, LEAs, and international counterparts. FIU Latvia actively participates in international task forces to stay aligned with global TF trends. 356. LEAs also carry out parallel financial investigations using their own intelligence. Between 2018 and 2023, 24% of ML investigations were initiated through such parallel investigations (alongside the 51.4% initiated through FIU disseminations). The State Police, TCPD, and State Security Service, have independent intelligence-gathering capabilities but rely heavily on the FIU for intelligence and analysis. The SRS TCPD has increased its analytical capacity with more analysts, IT upgrades, software purchases, and enhanced training, using advanced systems for data analysis. In 2021, the CPCB expanded its analytical team from 4 to 14 analysts by 2023 to support criminal cases and proactive data collection. These capabilities include human intelligence (HUMINT), communication interception, and covert surveillance, complemented by specialized financial investigators. Despite these efforts, the FIU remains the central point for financial intelligence expertise and co-ordination. 357. SCAs create their own financial analysis but this typically leads to administrative procedures rather than major ML investigations. Latvijas Banka's 2022 review found increased cross-border payments, prompting inspections and uncovering control deficiencies. Other SCAs aggregate data to identify violations. However, the FIU remains the main hub for financial intelligence, providing continuous feedback on emerging risks and strategic analysis. Footnotes [66]. The FIU has demonstrated a structured and proactive approach to handling STRs related to TF. Despite the national risk level for TF being low, FIU Latvia treats TF as a high-priority area. [67]. Includes the Internal Security Bureau, EPPO, The Defence Intelligence and Security Service and Internal Security Office by SRS. [68]. OSINT analysis leverages both commercially available tools and custom-designed resources to effectively search, compile, and analyse open-source data. This capability significantly enhances the FIU’s ability to add value to reports received from REs and other competent authorities. [69]. This change addressed an important shortfall identified in the previous MER, and today allows for greater administrative autonomy, including budget management and operational independence. [70]. Including 19 persons dedicated to sanctions enforcement. [71]. This refers to the time from receipt of a report by the FIU to its subsequent dissemination to one or more competent authorities. [72]. This represents the number of days between receiving of an STR into the FIU to its onward dissemination. [73]. Although the proportion of FIU-triggered investigations is lower in proportion than it was to the previous assessment period, the overall number of investigations has increased. Additionally, the lower ratio can be accounted for by higher numbers of investigations initiated by LEAs with stronger ML identification techniques. [74]. The yearly data was not synchronised before 2020, and therefore the data is only available for the past four years. [75]. Tax Crime STRs are sent automatically to SRS by the FIU and are additionally analysed by the FIU in regard to potential ML. This is a positive feature that enables both the SRS to utilise STRs for tax purposes and in parallel allows the FIU to utilise them to detect ML. [76]. Under “Other Predicates” are STRs with indications of corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="391. Latvian authorities are prosecuting and convicting different types of ML activity to a strong degree, with some weaknesses in the pursuit of legal persons and with the identification of persons or BOs for court convictions in major transnational ML schemes (aligned with their first risk profile). Types of Prosecution and alignment with Risk 392. Prosecutors have actively pursued ML cases tied to the initial risk profile (stand-alone ML linked to banks under liquidation and foreign predicate offenses like corruption and fraud) and the second risk profile (domestic crimes). Since the previous MER (2013-2017), Latvia has steadily progressed in prosecuting and convicting individuals linked to both profiles. Despite numerous investigations, Latvia has achieved a limited number of convictions for complex, professional ML schemes. While Latvia successfully achieved convictions of professional facilitators in one of the now-defunct banks, it has not achieved convictions of the professional actors, or companies involved in these major laundering schemes. This is largely due to challenges in pursuing international ML schemes, especially when perpetrators operate from non-cooperative jurisdictions. Latvia has also prosecuted banks and their management for facilitating ML, but to a small extent. 393.  In 2021, the Anti-Money Laundering Coordination Unit (AMLCU) was established within the Department of Criminal Justice of the GPO to provide guidance and close co-ordination to LEAs (such as State Police and others) for investigation of ML (see core issue 7.1 above). The AMLCU also issues Guidelines and methodological materials, training, co-ordination and expertise to other prosecutors, as well as investigators and judges. The investigators, prosecutors, judges, and representatives of other legal professions are trained in identification and recovery of criminally acquired property. 394. Latvia has steadily increased ML prosecutions, covering both stand-alone ML and ML related to domestic or foreign predicate offenses. Prosecutions followed Latvia's two risk periods, with stand-alone ML cases rising from 2018 but recently declining due to reduced risks from the first risk profile. Of all the ML cases being prosecuted during the years 2018-2021, 55-60% of them were stand-alone ML cases, which slightly decreased to 30% in 2023. As the table below highlights, domestic ML and ML linked to foreign predicates are growing as a proportion in recent years. Figure 7.1. Breakdown of prosecution of persons for stand-alone ML and ML linked to domestic and foreign predicate offences Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 395. Latvia is broadly prosecuting ML in line with its risks. Overall, from 2019 to 2023, Latvia prosecuted 885 persons for ML. Stand-alone ML accounts for 49% of all prosecutions (see table below). Aside from the significant number of stand-alone offences, Latvia prosecutes ML tied to predicate offences committed in Latvia and abroad, such as fraud, drug trafficking, misuse of financial instruments, misappropriation (including bribery and corruption), and tax related offences. The table immediately below also showcases the cases sent by State Police by the estimated severity of the offences. Table 7.5. Cases sent for prosecution by State Police with classification of ML offence (Section 195, CL) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Non-aggravated ML 8 10 18 32 25 16 109 Aggravated ML 3 13 21 50 46 32 165 Especially aggravated ML 19 27 27 24 25 23 145 Total: 30 50 66 106 96 71 419 Table 7.6. Prosecutions of persons for ML by predicate offence (natural and legal persons) Prosecutions Total Percentage ML stand-alone 435 49% ML linked to foreign predicate offence 82 9.3% ML linked to domestic predicate offence 368 41.6% Fraud (Art. 177, 177.1) 86 9.7% Tax Evasion (Art. 218) 64 7.2% Financial Fraud (Art.193) 48 5.4% Drug Trafficking 41 4.6% Misappropriation (Art. 179) 30 3.4% Illegal activities with excise goods 24 2.7% Human trafficking 14 1.6% Theft (Art. 175) 14 1.6% Organised crime, racketeering (Art. 184) 9 1% Abuse of Power (Art. 341) 9 1% Environmental crime (Chapter XI) 8 1% Corruption and bribery (Art. 320-323) 6 0.7% Other 15 1.7% Total 885 100% Table 7.7. Prosecutions by ML type (incl. natural and legal persons) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Percentage Self-laundering 31 51 58 78 82 74 374 42% Third party ML (including professional) 15 86 69 157 103 81 511 58% Total 46 137 127 235 185 155 885 100% Trials and timely prosecution of ML 396. In 2021, Latvia established the Economic Affairs Court to expedite justice for economic crimes, including ML and corruption, and to review NCBC cases. Despite a steady increase in ML cases and rising rates of the adjudicated ML cases in courts yearly, Latvia has managed to maintain average adjudication times between 2018 and 2023. Though an increase is noted at the cassation level, not posing significant risks yet. However, authorities have dedicated sufficient resource to address delays. Table 7.8. Average adjudication time for ML Cases (Sec. 195, CL) by court Average processing time in months 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 First instance 11.0 7.0 7.0 9.2 5.5 11.1 Appellate instance 8.8 12.2 6.3 3.4 2.3 8.6 Cassation instance 3.9 4.0 6.1 8.5 9.1 9.3 397. The case below highlights one of the major cases of the Economic Court in relation to a Bank under liquidation, and its owners. Box 7.3. Professional, complex and stand-alone ML scheme involving senior bankers of a bank under liquidation in an organised crime group Investigations into a bank under liquidation (Bank A) led to charges against eight senior bankers, including the owner and the bank itself, for facilitating a global laundromat scheme for high-risk foreign PEPs, shell companies, and clients in high-risk jurisdictions to commit ML in Latvia. Funds were transferred through accounts of various FIs in different jurisdictions opened for shell companies involved in a complex scheme. Employees of the financial service provider arranged the registration of shell companies and the opening of accounts with FIs. Large sums received at the bank originated from foreign accounts held by non-resident legal entities part of ML schemes. Many of the bank’s customers were shell companies with declared non-resident BOs. Proceedings against the bank (a legal person) for aggravated ML were initiated. In criminal proceedings, the prosecutors allege that the bank (as a legal person) and its employees used client settlement accounts and created offshore shell companies with the knowledge and intent to commit ML. Authorities also identified over EUR 414 million in alleged proceeds. The Prosecutors requested EIOs, MLAs were sent, and evidence was obtained from Luxembourg, Ukraine, Belarus, and the United Kingdom. The criminal case is in the Economic Court and evidence is being examined. At least 584 other criminal proceedings were launched, mostly involving foreign clients and potential ML and other predicate offences like tax fraud and tax evasion. These schemes used similar structures to commit ML offences in Latvia. 398. Regarding legal tools to achieve higher effectiveness of prosecutions and convictions, Latvia has transposed the provisions of EU Directives (2018/1673), which requires that ML can be inferred from factual circumstances (see also R.3 in TC Annex). Unlike previous evaluations, Latvia now regularly prosecutes stand-alone ML without knowledge of the underlying predicate offences (in line with Sec. 195 CL). [92] According to Supreme Court decisions from 2024, [93] and the Supreme Court summary of the case law in ML cases, the criminal origin of the funds may also be proved by indicative or circumstantial evidence, as well as on the basis of the facts established in each particular case. [94] The case above, among others, demonstrates Latvia's progress in developing jurisprudence for third-party ML cases and stand-alone ML prosecutions. Whilst this approach by the highest judicial authority is reflected in the data and case studies, and an advanced interpretation on assessing evidence in ML-related criminal proceedings was applied in certain cases, judges presiding these cases did not demonstrate strong awareness on application of this jurisprudence. Convictions have nevertheless achieved a significant rate of success, with an approximate conviction rate of 90% for ML cases when the prosecuted persons are identified in Latvia and are available to go to trial. [95] Conviction for ML 399. Latvia achieved 262 ML convictions between 2018 and 2023, involving 380 natural and 10 legal persons, mostly resolved in the first instance court. This is a significant increase from the previous period (2013-2018), which had 33 convictions for 55 natural persons. Many convictions are for stand-alone ML prosecutions initiated in past years (see figure below). Additionally, 42 persons received &quot;prosecution penalty orders&quot; for lower-level ML offences, such as money muling, involving out-of-court settlements in exchange for admission of guilt. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 7.2. Annual convictions for ML 400. The case study below highlights the Latvian authorities’ co-ordination to achieve convictions for ML. The below case involves high-level corruption and the President of Latvijas Banka. Box 7.4. Conviction for large scale ML from corruption In 2018, CPCB investigated a 2012 bribery case involving the President of Latvijas Banka, supported by the FIU. Authorities uncovered a EUR 250 000 bribe disguised as a real estate investment and conducted seizure of properties. Authorities co-ordinated with authorities in Germany on the status of immunity of the person and sent requests abroad via international co-operation channels to identify proceeds (but nothing was identified abroad). Two individuals – the bribe recipient and the member of the board (an official) of the legal person – were accused of committing ML (CL Section 195(3)). The trial lasted four years and involved a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights on the accused status’ in the ECB. The case also received input from the Court of Justice of the EU. First instance sentences: · Natural person 1 : 5 years' imprisonment, property confiscation (EUR 174 140 and USD 2 000). · Natural person 2 (President) : 6 years' imprisonment, property confiscation (EUR 20 319; GBP 2 320; EUR 3 900; and three real estates valued at EUR 207 562). · Legal person : EUR 3 500 000 fine, half of real estate confiscated (value EUR 120 072). The judgment is pending in the appellate court. On 20 December 2023, a court ruled on NCB confiscation of a real estate asset worth EUR 406 402. Half of the real estate was confiscated as criminally acquired property and the other half confiscated as a coercive measure. 401. Latvia has seen an increase in prosecutions and convictions due to cases uncovered by authorities, international partners, and the FIU. However, many major ML schemes remain unprosecuted because the perpetrators and BOs are often not in Latvia. For example, many of the 584 criminal proceedings related to a Latvian Bank under liquidation involve shell companies using Latvian banks for global laundromat schemes, but the accused cannot be prosecuted as they are not located in Latvia or remain unknown. [96] In such cases, investigators and prosecutors pursued NCBC (see IO.8 and Chapter 59, CL), securing criminal assets. This accounts for many of the 317 cases terminated after achieving NCBC. Latvia's inability to prosecute non-resident perpetrators or foreign shell companies stems from challenges in international co-operation involving certain jurisdictions, not operational deficiencies in Latvia’s system. Table 7.9. Rulings of first instance court on ML (2020-2023) Status of ML investigation and adjudication by year: Sec. 195 CL 2020 2021 2022 2023 Average Total ML investigations 344 340 398 235 329 1 317 Cases suspended 64 46 34 10 39 154 Cases terminated 39 216 256 187 175 698 Cases terminated after NCBC has been achieved 0 135 126 56 79 317 Cases prosecuted (charges brought against person) 73 133 110 84 100 400 Cases completed - sent to court 47 104 97 90 85 338 Note: Timeframe for the above cases is limited to 2020-2023 only (and, therefore, total number of investigations are not the same as tables above) Box 7.5. Case Study Box: Conviction for ML over circumstantial evidence On 7 December 2022, the Economic Affairs Court convicted two individuals for aggravated ML. Despite their denial, the court found that their testimony indicated awareness of the criminal origin of the funds. The court concluded that, based on the information and intended actions, the accused knew the funds were of criminal origin, proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 402. Convictions of legal persons are insufficient considering Latvia’s exposure to professional ML schemes facilitated by and involving legal persons. In the five-year period, Latvia achieved just ten convictions against legal persons. While this is an improvement from the previous assessment period (2013-201), the relatively low number of prosecutions and convictions of legal persons (10) remains an issue. However, this deficiency is lessened to some extent by the liquidation of legal persons after the initiation of criminal proceedings (once a legal person is dissolved, there is no longer a legal person to which criminal sanctions or coercive measures can be applied). Nevertheless, the number of legal persons pursued appears low, given the significant number of legal persons involved in suspected ML cases. [97] To ensure an effective application of criminal sanctions (coercive measures) to legal persons, in 2022 the Parliament introduced security measures which can be applied to legal persons during the pre-trial investigation. However, results have not yet been achieved. Footnotes [92]. In the case of autonomous or stand-alone laundering, the fact that it is not ascertainable from which offence the laundered funds of the accused were obtained is not an obstacle to finding a person guilty of the criminal offence provided (Sec 195, Paragraph 3, CL) (Paragraph 10.2.4 of the Senate Decision of 29 February 2024 in Case No SKK23/2024). [93]. Rendered in a case related to ML, the Court concluded that the fact that it is not known exactly from which criminal offense the financial means or other property used for money laundering were obtained does not prevent holding a person criminally liable. [94]. The case-law of the Senate recognises, in criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence to aid in proving the guilt of the accused alongside totality of evidence (so long as it does not raise a reasonable doubt of guilt). (Decision of the Senate of 13 May 2021 in the case No. SKK-89/2021, Paragraph 5.1). [95]. Over 400 of the earlier mentioned 885 prosecutions did not go to trial because the persons were not present in the territory of Latvia. In these cases, prosecutions were pursued to ensure a referral of suspected ML for NCBC. [96]. Often in non-co-operative jurisdictions or PEPs whose extradition or domestic investigation is sensitive or not possible. [97]. As outlined by the FIU during the assessment, there were over 1 000 cases involving 5 or more legal persons and over 500 cases involving 10 or more legal persons that were disseminated to competent authorities. This suggests a considerable number of legal persons involved in suspected ML." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="391. Latvian authorities are prosecuting and convicting different types of ML activity to a strong degree, with some weaknesses in the pursuit of legal persons and with the identification of persons or BOs for court convictions in major transnational ML schemes (aligned with their first risk profile). Types of Prosecution and alignment with Risk 392. Prosecutors have actively pursued ML cases tied to the initial risk profile (stand-alone ML linked to banks under liquidation and foreign predicate offenses like corruption and fraud) and the second risk profile (domestic crimes). Since the previous MER (2013-2017), Latvia has steadily progressed in prosecuting and convicting individuals linked to both profiles. Despite numerous investigations, Latvia has achieved a limited number of convictions for complex, professional ML schemes. While Latvia successfully achieved convictions of professional facilitators in one of the now-defunct banks, it has not achieved convictions of the professional actors, or companies involved in these major laundering schemes. This is largely due to challenges in pursuing international ML schemes, especially when perpetrators operate from non-cooperative jurisdictions. Latvia has also prosecuted banks and their management for facilitating ML, but to a small extent. 393.  In 2021, the Anti-Money Laundering Coordination Unit (AMLCU) was established within the Department of Criminal Justice of the GPO to provide guidance and close co-ordination to LEAs (such as State Police and others) for investigation of ML (see core issue 7.1 above). The AMLCU also issues Guidelines and methodological materials, training, co-ordination and expertise to other prosecutors, as well as investigators and judges. The investigators, prosecutors, judges, and representatives of other legal professions are trained in identification and recovery of criminally acquired property. 394. Latvia has steadily increased ML prosecutions, covering both stand-alone ML and ML related to domestic or foreign predicate offenses. Prosecutions followed Latvia's two risk periods, with stand-alone ML cases rising from 2018 but recently declining due to reduced risks from the first risk profile. Of all the ML cases being prosecuted during the years 2018-2021, 55-60% of them were stand-alone ML cases, which slightly decreased to 30% in 2023. As the table below highlights, domestic ML and ML linked to foreign predicates are growing as a proportion in recent years. Figure 7.1. Breakdown of prosecution of persons for stand-alone ML and ML linked to domestic and foreign predicate offences Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 395. Latvia is broadly prosecuting ML in line with its risks. Overall, from 2019 to 2023, Latvia prosecuted 885 persons for ML. Stand-alone ML accounts for 49% of all prosecutions (see table below). Aside from the significant number of stand-alone offences, Latvia prosecutes ML tied to predicate offences committed in Latvia and abroad, such as fraud, drug trafficking, misuse of financial instruments, misappropriation (including bribery and corruption), and tax related offences. The table immediately below also showcases the cases sent by State Police by the estimated severity of the offences. Table 7.5. Cases sent for prosecution by State Police with classification of ML offence (Section 195, CL) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Non-aggravated ML 8 10 18 32 25 16 109 Aggravated ML 3 13 21 50 46 32 165 Especially aggravated ML 19 27 27 24 25 23 145 Total: 30 50 66 106 96 71 419 Table 7.6. Prosecutions of persons for ML by predicate offence (natural and legal persons) Prosecutions Total Percentage ML stand-alone 435 49% ML linked to foreign predicate offence 82 9.3% ML linked to domestic predicate offence 368 41.6% Fraud (Art. 177, 177.1) 86 9.7% Tax Evasion (Art. 218) 64 7.2% Financial Fraud (Art.193) 48 5.4% Drug Trafficking 41 4.6% Misappropriation (Art. 179) 30 3.4% Illegal activities with excise goods 24 2.7% Human trafficking 14 1.6% Theft (Art. 175) 14 1.6% Organised crime, racketeering (Art. 184) 9 1% Abuse of Power (Art. 341) 9 1% Environmental crime (Chapter XI) 8 1% Corruption and bribery (Art. 320-323) 6 0.7% Other 15 1.7% Total 885 100% Table 7.7. Prosecutions by ML type (incl. natural and legal persons) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Percentage Self-laundering 31 51 58 78 82 74 374 42% Third party ML (including professional) 15 86 69 157 103 81 511 58% Total 46 137 127 235 185 155 885 100% Trials and timely prosecution of ML 396. In 2021, Latvia established the Economic Affairs Court to expedite justice for economic crimes, including ML and corruption, and to review NCBC cases. Despite a steady increase in ML cases and rising rates of the adjudicated ML cases in courts yearly, Latvia has managed to maintain average adjudication times between 2018 and 2023. Though an increase is noted at the cassation level, not posing significant risks yet. However, authorities have dedicated sufficient resource to address delays. Table 7.8. Average adjudication time for ML Cases (Sec. 195, CL) by court Average processing time in months 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 First instance 11.0 7.0 7.0 9.2 5.5 11.1 Appellate instance 8.8 12.2 6.3 3.4 2.3 8.6 Cassation instance 3.9 4.0 6.1 8.5 9.1 9.3 397. The case below highlights one of the major cases of the Economic Court in relation to a Bank under liquidation, and its owners. Box 7.3. Professional, complex and stand-alone ML scheme involving senior bankers of a bank under liquidation in an organised crime group Investigations into a bank under liquidation (Bank A) led to charges against eight senior bankers, including the owner and the bank itself, for facilitating a global laundromat scheme for high-risk foreign PEPs, shell companies, and clients in high-risk jurisdictions to commit ML in Latvia. Funds were transferred through accounts of various FIs in different jurisdictions opened for shell companies involved in a complex scheme. Employees of the financial service provider arranged the registration of shell companies and the opening of accounts with FIs. Large sums received at the bank originated from foreign accounts held by non-resident legal entities part of ML schemes. Many of the bank’s customers were shell companies with declared non-resident BOs. Proceedings against the bank (a legal person) for aggravated ML were initiated. In criminal proceedings, the prosecutors allege that the bank (as a legal person) and its employees used client settlement accounts and created offshore shell companies with the knowledge and intent to commit ML. Authorities also identified over EUR 414 million in alleged proceeds. The Prosecutors requested EIOs, MLAs were sent, and evidence was obtained from Luxembourg, Ukraine, Belarus, and the United Kingdom. The criminal case is in the Economic Court and evidence is being examined. At least 584 other criminal proceedings were launched, mostly involving foreign clients and potential ML and other predicate offences like tax fraud and tax evasion. These schemes used similar structures to commit ML offences in Latvia. 398. Regarding legal tools to achieve higher effectiveness of prosecutions and convictions, Latvia has transposed the provisions of EU Directives (2018/1673), which requires that ML can be inferred from factual circumstances (see also R.3 in TC Annex). Unlike previous evaluations, Latvia now regularly prosecutes stand-alone ML without knowledge of the underlying predicate offences (in line with Sec. 195 CL). [92] According to Supreme Court decisions from 2024, [93] and the Supreme Court summary of the case law in ML cases, the criminal origin of the funds may also be proved by indicative or circumstantial evidence, as well as on the basis of the facts established in each particular case. [94] The case above, among others, demonstrates Latvia's progress in developing jurisprudence for third-party ML cases and stand-alone ML prosecutions. Whilst this approach by the highest judicial authority is reflected in the data and case studies, and an advanced interpretation on assessing evidence in ML-related criminal proceedings was applied in certain cases, judges presiding these cases did not demonstrate strong awareness on application of this jurisprudence. Convictions have nevertheless achieved a significant rate of success, with an approximate conviction rate of 90% for ML cases when the prosecuted persons are identified in Latvia and are available to go to trial. [95] Conviction for ML 399. Latvia achieved 262 ML convictions between 2018 and 2023, involving 380 natural and 10 legal persons, mostly resolved in the first instance court. This is a significant increase from the previous period (2013-2018), which had 33 convictions for 55 natural persons. Many convictions are for stand-alone ML prosecutions initiated in past years (see figure below). Additionally, 42 persons received &quot;prosecution penalty orders&quot; for lower-level ML offences, such as money muling, involving out-of-court settlements in exchange for admission of guilt. Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. Figure 7.2. Annual convictions for ML 400. The case study below highlights the Latvian authorities’ co-ordination to achieve convictions for ML. The below case involves high-level corruption and the President of Latvijas Banka. Box 7.4. Conviction for large scale ML from corruption In 2018, CPCB investigated a 2012 bribery case involving the President of Latvijas Banka, supported by the FIU. Authorities uncovered a EUR 250 000 bribe disguised as a real estate investment and conducted seizure of properties. Authorities co-ordinated with authorities in Germany on the status of immunity of the person and sent requests abroad via international co-operation channels to identify proceeds (but nothing was identified abroad). Two individuals – the bribe recipient and the member of the board (an official) of the legal person – were accused of committing ML (CL Section 195(3)). The trial lasted four years and involved a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights on the accused status’ in the ECB. The case also received input from the Court of Justice of the EU. First instance sentences: · Natural person 1 : 5 years' imprisonment, property confiscation (EUR 174 140 and USD 2 000). · Natural person 2 (President) : 6 years' imprisonment, property confiscation (EUR 20 319; GBP 2 320; EUR 3 900; and three real estates valued at EUR 207 562). · Legal person : EUR 3 500 000 fine, half of real estate confiscated (value EUR 120 072). The judgment is pending in the appellate court. On 20 December 2023, a court ruled on NCB confiscation of a real estate asset worth EUR 406 402. Half of the real estate was confiscated as criminally acquired property and the other half confiscated as a coercive measure. 401. Latvia has seen an increase in prosecutions and convictions due to cases uncovered by authorities, international partners, and the FIU. However, many major ML schemes remain unprosecuted because the perpetrators and BOs are often not in Latvia. For example, many of the 584 criminal proceedings related to a Latvian Bank under liquidation involve shell companies using Latvian banks for global laundromat schemes, but the accused cannot be prosecuted as they are not located in Latvia or remain unknown. [96] In such cases, investigators and prosecutors pursued NCBC (see IO.8 and Chapter 59, CL), securing criminal assets. This accounts for many of the 317 cases terminated after achieving NCBC. Latvia's inability to prosecute non-resident perpetrators or foreign shell companies stems from challenges in international co-operation involving certain jurisdictions, not operational deficiencies in Latvia’s system. Table 7.9. Rulings of first instance court on ML (2020-2023) Status of ML investigation and adjudication by year: Sec. 195 CL 2020 2021 2022 2023 Average Total ML investigations 344 340 398 235 329 1 317 Cases suspended 64 46 34 10 39 154 Cases terminated 39 216 256 187 175 698 Cases terminated after NCBC has been achieved 0 135 126 56 79 317 Cases prosecuted (charges brought against person) 73 133 110 84 100 400 Cases completed - sent to court 47 104 97 90 85 338 Note: Timeframe for the above cases is limited to 2020-2023 only (and, therefore, total number of investigations are not the same as tables above) Box 7.5. Case Study Box: Conviction for ML over circumstantial evidence On 7 December 2022, the Economic Affairs Court convicted two individuals for aggravated ML. Despite their denial, the court found that their testimony indicated awareness of the criminal origin of the funds. The court concluded that, based on the information and intended actions, the accused knew the funds were of criminal origin, proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 402. Convictions of legal persons are insufficient considering Latvia’s exposure to professional ML schemes facilitated by and involving legal persons. In the five-year period, Latvia achieved just ten convictions against legal persons. While this is an improvement from the previous assessment period (2013-201), the relatively low number of prosecutions and convictions of legal persons (10) remains an issue. However, this deficiency is lessened to some extent by the liquidation of legal persons after the initiation of criminal proceedings (once a legal person is dissolved, there is no longer a legal person to which criminal sanctions or coercive measures can be applied). Nevertheless, the number of legal persons pursued appears low, given the significant number of legal persons involved in suspected ML cases. [97] To ensure an effective application of criminal sanctions (coercive measures) to legal persons, in 2022 the Parliament introduced security measures which can be applied to legal persons during the pre-trial investigation. However, results have not yet been achieved. Footnotes [92]. In the case of autonomous or stand-alone laundering, the fact that it is not ascertainable from which offence the laundered funds of the accused were obtained is not an obstacle to finding a person guilty of the criminal offence provided (Sec 195, Paragraph 3, CL) (Paragraph 10.2.4 of the Senate Decision of 29 February 2024 in Case No SKK23/2024). [93]. Rendered in a case related to ML, the Court concluded that the fact that it is not known exactly from which criminal offense the financial means or other property used for money laundering were obtained does not prevent holding a person criminally liable. [94]. The case-law of the Senate recognises, in criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence to aid in proving the guilt of the accused alongside totality of evidence (so long as it does not raise a reasonable doubt of guilt). (Decision of the Senate of 13 May 2021 in the case No. SKK-89/2021, Paragraph 5.1). [95]. Over 400 of the earlier mentioned 885 prosecutions did not go to trial because the persons were not present in the territory of Latvia. In these cases, prosecutions were pursued to ensure a referral of suspected ML for NCBC. [96]. Often in non-co-operative jurisdictions or PEPs whose extradition or domestic investigation is sensitive or not possible. [97]. As outlined by the FIU during the assessment, there were over 1 000 cases involving 5 or more legal persons and over 500 cases involving 10 or more legal persons that were disseminated to competent authorities. This suggests a considerable number of legal persons involved in suspected ML." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 414. Latvia has achieved significant results in identifying, tracing, freezing, and seizing suspected proceeds of crime. Confiscation values (EUR 317 million in total) are considerable. Nevertheless, the amount of assets pending adjudication is significant, thus affecting final confiscation figures. Provisional Measures 415. Latvia carries out provisional measures, identifying, freezing, and seizing to a large extent. As noted in IO.6 and IO.7, various agencies, including the FIU, State Police, ARO, [100] CPCB, SRS TCPD and the PO have the structures and tools in place to identify and trace assets and to carry out seizures. These actions prevent proceeds from circulating, disrupting criminal networks, and prevent proceeds of crime from being reintegrated. 416. LEAs effectively identify and seize suspected proceeds of crime early in investigations to prevent asset flight or dissipation. They conduct parallel financial investigations to trace financial flows from criminality to property and from suspicions of unexplained wealth to the origin of the funds used to acquire them. LEAs use information from credit institutions and public registers and conduct investigative activities (surveillance, searches, special investigative techniques) to identify assets. 417. All LEAs co-operate and seek information from the FIU and the Asset Recovery Office (ARO). The FIU supports tracing and identification of suspected proceeds of crime, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value located inside Latvia by providing LEAs with a broad overview of accounts, assets, transactions and analysis and conducts exchanges regarding intelligence on assets located abroad (see IO.6). The ARO typically conducts requests for asset tracing abroad using operational contact points across multiple agencies. 418. The FIU can temporarily freeze funds for 40 days, extendable by 45 days if assets subject to confiscation are identified. In exceptional cases, this period can be prolonged by up to 40 additional days with approval from the Prosecutor General. [101] The FIU can issue binding orders to REs to freeze funds if there are reasonable suspicions of criminal activity, including ML/TF/PF, based on reports, its own initiative, or requests from foreign authorized institutions. [102] 419. Authorities have the power to seize suspicious funds [103] during criminal proceedings for extended periods. In all cases where ML is investigated, assets are seized for up to 31 months maximum. By the end of this period, a criminal case or NCBC proceedings must be submitted to court to maintain the assets under seizure, otherwise seized assets should be released (in accordance with Chapter 59 of the CPL). 420.  Freezing and seizing statistics indicate a robust and well-functioning system of provisional measures. During the review period, FIU Latvia froze more than EUR 1.5 billion. Of note, FIU freezing actions account for most of the cases that involved banks under liquidation and the global laundromat schemes in Latvia (i.e., the first risk profile). Such stand-alone ML cases tied to credit institutions and Latvia’s prior role as a regional financial centre made up well above 90% of all frozen sums. More specifically, between 2021 and 2023, FIU Latvia froze EUR 2.3 to EUR 5.7 million annually in domestic cases (“second risk profile” and “third risk profile), and between EUR 92.2 and EUR 427 million annually in all cases (including “first risk profile” cases – such as bank liquidations). Of the temporarily frozen assets by the FIU, almost all of them (98%) are eventually seized by the investigative authorities and the PO to secure confiscations where appropriate and possible. The consolidated figures are below: Table 8.1. Freezing and seizing statistics (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Total Frozen by FIU (EUR) 92 211 661 348 503 269 427 883 210 202 525 662 356 942 812 92 235 277 1 520 301 891 Seized by LEA/Judicial Authority (EUR) 87 075 399 366 696 812 437 376 517 198 200 605 356 042 114 91 509 610 1 536 901 056 Note: Seizure figures are higher than freezing amounts as they may have occurred in a previous year 421. Since the last evaluation, Latvia’s asset recovery efforts have increased dramatically. In total, authorities have seized over EUR 3.2 billion from 2018-2023 (see table below). [104] It is noteworthy that 1.3 billion of the 3.2 billion refers to shares in a now-defunct bank. [105] 422. Foreign predicate offences make up just 40% of all seizure cases (971 out of 2 418), but account for 94% (EUR 3 billion of EUR 3.22 billion) of all funds seized (2018-2023). Most of the funds from foreign predicate offences are tied to large bank accounts in Latvia, investigated during bank liquidations and suspected laundromat schemes. Table 8.2. Value and number of seizures (2018-2023) Domestic Predicates Foreign Predicates [106] Total Year Cases Amounts Seized Cases Amounts seized Amounts Cases 2018 151 48 954 578 54 38 343 314 87 297 892 205 2019 225 40 155 961 125 293 058 727 333 214 689 350 2020 291 33 443 989 238 512 684 904 546 128 893 529 2021 275 15 426 753 174 1 530 745 580 1 546 172 334 449 2022 313 22 060 350 293 474 930 476 496 990 826 606 2023 192 19 538 653 87 192 829 622 212 368 276 279 Total 1,447 179 580 287 971 3 042 592 625 3 222 172 912 2 418 423. Seizures climbed from over EUR 333 million in 2019 to over EUR 1.5 billion in 2021 and nearly EUR 500 million in 2022 and then declined to around EUR 212 million in 2023 (see table further below). The recent decline in seizures is attributed to Latvia's shifting risk profile, where individual crimes generate less revenue, in addition to an overall drop in criminal activity (see IO.7). However, it is unclear how much of this decline is due to these factors, as estimates of proceeds from each crime type are unknown. Final Confiscation 424. Latvia has achieved strong results for final confiscation. Authorities have successfully confiscated close to EUR 317 million (see table below). When comparing figures to its previous MER, this figure represents a near three-fold increase [107] in the proceeds of crime recovered over a similar time period. This increased value of confiscations reflects the structural and institutional reforms to Latvia’s asset recovery framework, and the substantial efforts to ensure that asset recovery is pursued in line with Latvia’s risk and context. 425. Looking from seizures to confiscation, most of the seized assets that have undergone court adjudication have been ultimately confiscated. A smaller portion has been released. This success rate demonstrates effectiveness from both the investigative authorities and the judicial authorities in terms of investigation and finally proving the illegal origin of the assets. 426. Nevertheless, confiscations have not kept pace with the amounts seized, and at the time of the on-site visit, almost 90% of seized assets were still pending a judgement (EUR 3.2 billion seized vs EUR 317 million confiscated). [108] Although assets remained seized and secured, it is clear that there are moderate shortcomings that authorities can address to improve the overall rate of confiscation. Table 8.3. Seizures compared to confiscations (2019-2023) Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Average Seized Amount (EUR) 333 214 689 546 128 893 1 546 172 334 496 990 826 212 368 276 3 134 875 020 626 975 004 Confiscated Amount (EUR) 50 548 187 40 645 499 84 159 862 117 357 019 24 179 455 316 890 025 63 378 005 427. Part of the gap between confiscations and seizures can be attributed to legal delays and suspensions of major proceedings pending constitutional judicial decisions on NCBC regime that occurred from 2023 onwards (see discussion in paragraph below). Twenty-five cases challenging Latvia’s constitutional principles remained at the time of the on-site visit. [109] While this issue does not reflect a decrease in enforcement efforts of LEAs, the suspension nonetheless impacted the overall volume of recoveries. The impact of these suspensions can be seen in the table below. Figure 8.1. Confiscated assets and assets suspended in NCBC cases (EUR millions) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 428. Although the suspended cases account for just 6% of the total confiscation cases submitted since the constitutional challenges occurred, they represent significant sums, accounting for over 85% of the amounts under adjudication in 2023 and 39% of the total amounts that have proceeded to court since 2019 (EUR 317 million confiscated vs EUR 203 million suspended). Despite the significant value of the suspensions, the constitutional court challenges had a moderate (rather than a major) impact on Latvia’s overall asset recovery framework. 429. As outlined in the technical compliance annex, Latvia uses both conviction and NCBC (see R.4). The legal framework includes a presumption that, if the person involved cannot credibly explain the lawful origin of their assets, these assets may be presumed to be criminally acquired. [110] Consequently, in cases where the identity of the guilty person has not yet been determined or there is insufficient evidence to bring a possible suspect to criminal liability, or for objective reasons (e.g., the suspect has absconded or is abroad), the case cannot be transferred to court in the near future, it is only necessary to establish the illicit origin of the property without needing to prove an individual's guilt or a predicate offence. This allows for quicker and more focused decisions regarding property confiscation, streamlining the process and avoiding unnecessary delays in criminal trials. 430. NCBC has proven to be a valuable mechanism for resolving property-related issues promptly, especially given Latvia’s context and risks, with numerous cases involving foreign predicates and assets laundered in now-defunct banks. NCBC accounted for 73% of all cases where confiscation was applied and 98% of all assets recovered from 2018 to 2023. Overall, first-instance decisions on NCBCs are rarely changed, with only a few exceptions not exceeding 10%. 431. As Latvia’s prosecutors pursue more cases tied to asset seizures from the second risk profile, we are now seeing a greater number of conviction-based confiscation cases to proceed (but with fewer funds confiscated overall from conviction-based confiscations). Proceeds moved abroad 432. The ARO is the dedicated authority for seeking criminal intelligence for operational authorities and conducting unexplained wealth assessments for assets abroad. In instances of suspected proceeds of crime located abroad, Latvia relies on a well-established framework of international co-operation to identify and request seizing of assets. LEAs regularly contact the ARO and the FIU to trace and identify assets located abroad. The ARO has an international co-operation handbook with contact information of relevant counterparts and is an active member of the CARIN within the ARIN Network. It regularly participates in tracing and seizing requests. Latvia traced nearly EUR 100 million in assets to foreign jurisdiction (see table below and IO.2). Figure 8.2. ARO asset tracing [111] Total amounts (in EUR millions) traced in international asset tracing efforts Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 433. Of the near EUR 100 million in assets traced abroad, Latvian authorities have sent 126 seizure requests abroad totalling EUR 19.1 million. They have successfully achieved the final confiscation of just EUR 1.3 million in five cases. As also noted under IO.2, Latvia’s actions on tracing and identifying assets located abroad are not always followed by seizure, which in turn is not always followed by confiscation (and repatriation or sharing) requests. This demonstrates a minor deficiency in Latvia’s application of its asset recovery regime as the risk profile of Latvia suggests most illicit proceeds are held domestically. [112] 434. It is worth noting that assets traced from foreign LEA requests totalled only EUR 6 million. Despite few requests from counterparts, Latvia proactively traces suspected proceeds of foreign predicates domestically and engaged with foreign counterparts on foreign account holders in relation to these cases (see also IO.2). Managing seized assets, sharing and restitution 435. Most Latvia’s seized assets have been in the form of frozen funds located in bank accounts. In these instances, the assets are effectively seized and maintained through mechanisms that are robust, preventing tipping-off and guaranteeing a secure maintenance of the frozen accounts. The State Provision Agency manages and disposes of seized, frozen, or confiscated property, including converting seized virtual currencies to cash. The Provision Agency transfers funds from the sale of assets to an escrow account in the State Treasury until the final decision in the criminal case. Modest sums are disposed of and realized by the State Provision Agency (see table below). Table 8.4. Sums of disposed property and realised virtual currency 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Proceeds from the disposal of property 137 191 135 044 68 522 124 861 109 284 352 037 926 939 Proceeds from the realisation of virtual currency - - - - 420 325 1 455 716 1 876 041 Sums returned to victims (2019-2023) - 116 097 18 213 289 285 806 8 185 38 682 18 662 059 Other property returned (2019-2023) - 1 property, 3 vehicles 1 property, 1 vehicle 2 properties 10 vehicles, 74 sheep - - 436. Restitution to victims is being followed as a policy and all implicated authorities share this view. According to Section 70.11(4) of the CL, criminally acquired property shall be confiscated if it is not to be returned to the owner or lawful possessor. The procedure for restitution of property is regulated in Section 357 of the CPL. From 2019 to 2023, over EUR 18 million in sums and additional property was restituted to victims (see table above). Footnotes [100]. While located within the State Police, the ARO is worth mentioning separately here due to their differentiated role in the context of asset recovery. [101]. In exceptional cases for the receipt of significant requested information, including from abroad, a possibility exists to prolong this time, not longer than for additional 40 days, with acceptance by the Prosecutor General or his or her specially authorised prosecutor. [102]. This includes a) After receipt of the report of the subject of the Law on refraining from executing a transaction; b) Upon its own initiative; and c) upon a request of foreign authorised institutions referred to in Section 62, Paragraph one of this Law to freeze the funds (Sec 32.1(1) AML/CFT/CPF Law). [103]. Sec.70 et seq. of the CL provides for measures to confiscate both directly and indirectly criminally acquired property, laundered property and instrumentalities of crime, regardless of whether the property is held by criminal defendants or third parties. This includes any economic benefit as a direct or indirect result of committing a criminal offence, as well as any economic benefit derived from such proceeds. If such property has been alienated, destroyed, concealed, or disguised, and its confiscation is not possible, confiscation of corresponding value may be applied (R.4). [104]. The previous period accounted for around EUR 189 million seized in a similar time frame. [105]. This number represents the appraised value at the time of the freezing. [106]. This includes ML deriving from foreign predicates. [107]. The previous period saw confiscations of around 105 million in a similar timeframe. [108]. This rate includes the 1.3 billion in shares of a major bank liquidation from one single case. The value of these shares was estimated at the time of the seizure. Without considering this value, rate of seized assets pending adjudication drops to 82%. [109]. Between 2019 and 2023, the Constitutional Court of Latvia initiated 31 cases under the Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law. Six cases resolved in Latvia’s favour. The latest of these rulings involved five cases on the right of property owners to access case materials, referred to courts after the onsite visit of Latvia (which took place in November 2024). On 20 February 2025, the Constitutional Court published a judgement in the case in favour of Latvia, concluding that the legal provisions on the disclosure of case materials in NCB proceedings are compliant with the constitution. The remaining twenty-five cases at the time of the onsite included: Seven cases on the inability to appeal appellate court decisions when the court overturns a lower court’s ruling and orders NCBC. (hearings schedule to begin March 2025); Two cases on the submission of evidence during appeal and whether there are violations to the right to a fair trial and effective defence. (hearings which began January 2025); Fourteen cases on the burden of proof placed on defendants, particularly for ML cases. (hearings scheduled which began February 2025). The first of the challenges have been broadly addressed by amendments to the CPL, and therefore only apply to past rulings. However, the remaining final two challenges above were continuing to move through the courts at the time of the onsite visit. [110]. Section 126(6) of the CPL states that: “… the criminal origin of the property shall be considered proven if … that property is, most likely, of criminal rather than lawful origin .” [111]. Assets traced in national cases means that those are domestic investigations in which ARO has been asked to trace assets abroad. International cases refer to the foreign requests to trace assets in Latvia. Previously until 2020, AROs only requested information on assets, but now there are also requests on the ownership of accounts. [112]. The low final confiscation amounts may also be due to difficulties in co-ordination for international co-operation on asset recovery, particularly given low levels of co-operation from some neighbouring countries and from various offshore financial sectors where assets may be located." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 414. Latvia has achieved significant results in identifying, tracing, freezing, and seizing suspected proceeds of crime. Confiscation values (EUR 317 million in total) are considerable. Nevertheless, the amount of assets pending adjudication is significant, thus affecting final confiscation figures. Provisional Measures 415. Latvia carries out provisional measures, identifying, freezing, and seizing to a large extent. As noted in IO.6 and IO.7, various agencies, including the FIU, State Police, ARO, [100] CPCB, SRS TCPD and the PO have the structures and tools in place to identify and trace assets and to carry out seizures. These actions prevent proceeds from circulating, disrupting criminal networks, and prevent proceeds of crime from being reintegrated. 416. LEAs effectively identify and seize suspected proceeds of crime early in investigations to prevent asset flight or dissipation. They conduct parallel financial investigations to trace financial flows from criminality to property and from suspicions of unexplained wealth to the origin of the funds used to acquire them. LEAs use information from credit institutions and public registers and conduct investigative activities (surveillance, searches, special investigative techniques) to identify assets. 417. All LEAs co-operate and seek information from the FIU and the Asset Recovery Office (ARO). The FIU supports tracing and identification of suspected proceeds of crime, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value located inside Latvia by providing LEAs with a broad overview of accounts, assets, transactions and analysis and conducts exchanges regarding intelligence on assets located abroad (see IO.6). The ARO typically conducts requests for asset tracing abroad using operational contact points across multiple agencies. 418. The FIU can temporarily freeze funds for 40 days, extendable by 45 days if assets subject to confiscation are identified. In exceptional cases, this period can be prolonged by up to 40 additional days with approval from the Prosecutor General. [101] The FIU can issue binding orders to REs to freeze funds if there are reasonable suspicions of criminal activity, including ML/TF/PF, based on reports, its own initiative, or requests from foreign authorized institutions. [102] 419. Authorities have the power to seize suspicious funds [103] during criminal proceedings for extended periods. In all cases where ML is investigated, assets are seized for up to 31 months maximum. By the end of this period, a criminal case or NCBC proceedings must be submitted to court to maintain the assets under seizure, otherwise seized assets should be released (in accordance with Chapter 59 of the CPL). 420.  Freezing and seizing statistics indicate a robust and well-functioning system of provisional measures. During the review period, FIU Latvia froze more than EUR 1.5 billion. Of note, FIU freezing actions account for most of the cases that involved banks under liquidation and the global laundromat schemes in Latvia (i.e., the first risk profile). Such stand-alone ML cases tied to credit institutions and Latvia’s prior role as a regional financial centre made up well above 90% of all frozen sums. More specifically, between 2021 and 2023, FIU Latvia froze EUR 2.3 to EUR 5.7 million annually in domestic cases (“second risk profile” and “third risk profile), and between EUR 92.2 and EUR 427 million annually in all cases (including “first risk profile” cases – such as bank liquidations). Of the temporarily frozen assets by the FIU, almost all of them (98%) are eventually seized by the investigative authorities and the PO to secure confiscations where appropriate and possible. The consolidated figures are below: Table 8.1. Freezing and seizing statistics (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Total Frozen by FIU (EUR) 92 211 661 348 503 269 427 883 210 202 525 662 356 942 812 92 235 277 1 520 301 891 Seized by LEA/Judicial Authority (EUR) 87 075 399 366 696 812 437 376 517 198 200 605 356 042 114 91 509 610 1 536 901 056 Note: Seizure figures are higher than freezing amounts as they may have occurred in a previous year 421. Since the last evaluation, Latvia’s asset recovery efforts have increased dramatically. In total, authorities have seized over EUR 3.2 billion from 2018-2023 (see table below). [104] It is noteworthy that 1.3 billion of the 3.2 billion refers to shares in a now-defunct bank. [105] 422. Foreign predicate offences make up just 40% of all seizure cases (971 out of 2 418), but account for 94% (EUR 3 billion of EUR 3.22 billion) of all funds seized (2018-2023). Most of the funds from foreign predicate offences are tied to large bank accounts in Latvia, investigated during bank liquidations and suspected laundromat schemes. Table 8.2. Value and number of seizures (2018-2023) Domestic Predicates Foreign Predicates [106] Total Year Cases Amounts Seized Cases Amounts seized Amounts Cases 2018 151 48 954 578 54 38 343 314 87 297 892 205 2019 225 40 155 961 125 293 058 727 333 214 689 350 2020 291 33 443 989 238 512 684 904 546 128 893 529 2021 275 15 426 753 174 1 530 745 580 1 546 172 334 449 2022 313 22 060 350 293 474 930 476 496 990 826 606 2023 192 19 538 653 87 192 829 622 212 368 276 279 Total 1,447 179 580 287 971 3 042 592 625 3 222 172 912 2 418 423. Seizures climbed from over EUR 333 million in 2019 to over EUR 1.5 billion in 2021 and nearly EUR 500 million in 2022 and then declined to around EUR 212 million in 2023 (see table further below). The recent decline in seizures is attributed to Latvia's shifting risk profile, where individual crimes generate less revenue, in addition to an overall drop in criminal activity (see IO.7). However, it is unclear how much of this decline is due to these factors, as estimates of proceeds from each crime type are unknown. Final Confiscation 424. Latvia has achieved strong results for final confiscation. Authorities have successfully confiscated close to EUR 317 million (see table below). When comparing figures to its previous MER, this figure represents a near three-fold increase [107] in the proceeds of crime recovered over a similar time period. This increased value of confiscations reflects the structural and institutional reforms to Latvia’s asset recovery framework, and the substantial efforts to ensure that asset recovery is pursued in line with Latvia’s risk and context. 425. Looking from seizures to confiscation, most of the seized assets that have undergone court adjudication have been ultimately confiscated. A smaller portion has been released. This success rate demonstrates effectiveness from both the investigative authorities and the judicial authorities in terms of investigation and finally proving the illegal origin of the assets. 426. Nevertheless, confiscations have not kept pace with the amounts seized, and at the time of the on-site visit, almost 90% of seized assets were still pending a judgement (EUR 3.2 billion seized vs EUR 317 million confiscated). [108] Although assets remained seized and secured, it is clear that there are moderate shortcomings that authorities can address to improve the overall rate of confiscation. Table 8.3. Seizures compared to confiscations (2019-2023) Year 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Average Seized Amount (EUR) 333 214 689 546 128 893 1 546 172 334 496 990 826 212 368 276 3 134 875 020 626 975 004 Confiscated Amount (EUR) 50 548 187 40 645 499 84 159 862 117 357 019 24 179 455 316 890 025 63 378 005 427. Part of the gap between confiscations and seizures can be attributed to legal delays and suspensions of major proceedings pending constitutional judicial decisions on NCBC regime that occurred from 2023 onwards (see discussion in paragraph below). Twenty-five cases challenging Latvia’s constitutional principles remained at the time of the on-site visit. [109] While this issue does not reflect a decrease in enforcement efforts of LEAs, the suspension nonetheless impacted the overall volume of recoveries. The impact of these suspensions can be seen in the table below. Figure 8.1. Confiscated assets and assets suspended in NCBC cases (EUR millions) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 428. Although the suspended cases account for just 6% of the total confiscation cases submitted since the constitutional challenges occurred, they represent significant sums, accounting for over 85% of the amounts under adjudication in 2023 and 39% of the total amounts that have proceeded to court since 2019 (EUR 317 million confiscated vs EUR 203 million suspended). Despite the significant value of the suspensions, the constitutional court challenges had a moderate (rather than a major) impact on Latvia’s overall asset recovery framework. 429. As outlined in the technical compliance annex, Latvia uses both conviction and NCBC (see R.4). The legal framework includes a presumption that, if the person involved cannot credibly explain the lawful origin of their assets, these assets may be presumed to be criminally acquired. [110] Consequently, in cases where the identity of the guilty person has not yet been determined or there is insufficient evidence to bring a possible suspect to criminal liability, or for objective reasons (e.g., the suspect has absconded or is abroad), the case cannot be transferred to court in the near future, it is only necessary to establish the illicit origin of the property without needing to prove an individual's guilt or a predicate offence. This allows for quicker and more focused decisions regarding property confiscation, streamlining the process and avoiding unnecessary delays in criminal trials. 430. NCBC has proven to be a valuable mechanism for resolving property-related issues promptly, especially given Latvia’s context and risks, with numerous cases involving foreign predicates and assets laundered in now-defunct banks. NCBC accounted for 73% of all cases where confiscation was applied and 98% of all assets recovered from 2018 to 2023. Overall, first-instance decisions on NCBCs are rarely changed, with only a few exceptions not exceeding 10%. 431. As Latvia’s prosecutors pursue more cases tied to asset seizures from the second risk profile, we are now seeing a greater number of conviction-based confiscation cases to proceed (but with fewer funds confiscated overall from conviction-based confiscations). Proceeds moved abroad 432. The ARO is the dedicated authority for seeking criminal intelligence for operational authorities and conducting unexplained wealth assessments for assets abroad. In instances of suspected proceeds of crime located abroad, Latvia relies on a well-established framework of international co-operation to identify and request seizing of assets. LEAs regularly contact the ARO and the FIU to trace and identify assets located abroad. The ARO has an international co-operation handbook with contact information of relevant counterparts and is an active member of the CARIN within the ARIN Network. It regularly participates in tracing and seizing requests. Latvia traced nearly EUR 100 million in assets to foreign jurisdiction (see table below and IO.2). Figure 8.2. ARO asset tracing [111] Total amounts (in EUR millions) traced in international asset tracing efforts Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 433. Of the near EUR 100 million in assets traced abroad, Latvian authorities have sent 126 seizure requests abroad totalling EUR 19.1 million. They have successfully achieved the final confiscation of just EUR 1.3 million in five cases. As also noted under IO.2, Latvia’s actions on tracing and identifying assets located abroad are not always followed by seizure, which in turn is not always followed by confiscation (and repatriation or sharing) requests. This demonstrates a minor deficiency in Latvia’s application of its asset recovery regime as the risk profile of Latvia suggests most illicit proceeds are held domestically. [112] 434. It is worth noting that assets traced from foreign LEA requests totalled only EUR 6 million. Despite few requests from counterparts, Latvia proactively traces suspected proceeds of foreign predicates domestically and engaged with foreign counterparts on foreign account holders in relation to these cases (see also IO.2). Managing seized assets, sharing and restitution 435. Most Latvia’s seized assets have been in the form of frozen funds located in bank accounts. In these instances, the assets are effectively seized and maintained through mechanisms that are robust, preventing tipping-off and guaranteeing a secure maintenance of the frozen accounts. The State Provision Agency manages and disposes of seized, frozen, or confiscated property, including converting seized virtual currencies to cash. The Provision Agency transfers funds from the sale of assets to an escrow account in the State Treasury until the final decision in the criminal case. Modest sums are disposed of and realized by the State Provision Agency (see table below). Table 8.4. Sums of disposed property and realised virtual currency 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Proceeds from the disposal of property 137 191 135 044 68 522 124 861 109 284 352 037 926 939 Proceeds from the realisation of virtual currency - - - - 420 325 1 455 716 1 876 041 Sums returned to victims (2019-2023) - 116 097 18 213 289 285 806 8 185 38 682 18 662 059 Other property returned (2019-2023) - 1 property, 3 vehicles 1 property, 1 vehicle 2 properties 10 vehicles, 74 sheep - - 436. Restitution to victims is being followed as a policy and all implicated authorities share this view. According to Section 70.11(4) of the CL, criminally acquired property shall be confiscated if it is not to be returned to the owner or lawful possessor. The procedure for restitution of property is regulated in Section 357 of the CPL. From 2019 to 2023, over EUR 18 million in sums and additional property was restituted to victims (see table above). Footnotes [100]. While located within the State Police, the ARO is worth mentioning separately here due to their differentiated role in the context of asset recovery. [101]. In exceptional cases for the receipt of significant requested information, including from abroad, a possibility exists to prolong this time, not longer than for additional 40 days, with acceptance by the Prosecutor General or his or her specially authorised prosecutor. [102]. This includes a) After receipt of the report of the subject of the Law on refraining from executing a transaction; b) Upon its own initiative; and c) upon a request of foreign authorised institutions referred to in Section 62, Paragraph one of this Law to freeze the funds (Sec 32.1(1) AML/CFT/CPF Law). [103]. Sec.70 et seq. of the CL provides for measures to confiscate both directly and indirectly criminally acquired property, laundered property and instrumentalities of crime, regardless of whether the property is held by criminal defendants or third parties. This includes any economic benefit as a direct or indirect result of committing a criminal offence, as well as any economic benefit derived from such proceeds. If such property has been alienated, destroyed, concealed, or disguised, and its confiscation is not possible, confiscation of corresponding value may be applied (R.4). [104]. The previous period accounted for around EUR 189 million seized in a similar time frame. [105]. This number represents the appraised value at the time of the freezing. [106]. This includes ML deriving from foreign predicates. [107]. The previous period saw confiscations of around 105 million in a similar timeframe. [108]. This rate includes the 1.3 billion in shares of a major bank liquidation from one single case. The value of these shares was estimated at the time of the seizure. Without considering this value, rate of seized assets pending adjudication drops to 82%. [109]. Between 2019 and 2023, the Constitutional Court of Latvia initiated 31 cases under the Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law. Six cases resolved in Latvia’s favour. The latest of these rulings involved five cases on the right of property owners to access case materials, referred to courts after the onsite visit of Latvia (which took place in November 2024). On 20 February 2025, the Constitutional Court published a judgement in the case in favour of Latvia, concluding that the legal provisions on the disclosure of case materials in NCB proceedings are compliant with the constitution. The remaining twenty-five cases at the time of the onsite included: Seven cases on the inability to appeal appellate court decisions when the court overturns a lower court’s ruling and orders NCBC. (hearings schedule to begin March 2025); Two cases on the submission of evidence during appeal and whether there are violations to the right to a fair trial and effective defence. (hearings which began January 2025); Fourteen cases on the burden of proof placed on defendants, particularly for ML cases. (hearings scheduled which began February 2025). The first of the challenges have been broadly addressed by amendments to the CPL, and therefore only apply to past rulings. However, the remaining final two challenges above were continuing to move through the courts at the time of the onsite visit. [110]. Section 126(6) of the CPL states that: “… the criminal origin of the property shall be considered proven if … that property is, most likely, of criminal rather than lawful origin .” [111]. Assets traced in national cases means that those are domestic investigations in which ARO has been asked to trace assets abroad. International cases refer to the foreign requests to trace assets in Latvia. Previously until 2020, AROs only requested information on assets, but now there are also requests on the ownership of accounts. [112]. The low final confiscation amounts may also be due to difficulties in co-ordination for international co-operation on asset recovery, particularly given low levels of co-operation from some neighbouring countries and from various offshore financial sectors where assets may be located." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. In Latvia, there is a Specially Authorised Prosecutors’ Division within the GPO which is competent for the prosecution of terrorism and TF cases. There are six prosecutors in the division who demonstrated a good understanding of TF offences and expertise in dealing with such cases. Besides, they have all sufficient powers enabling them to collect lawful evidence suitable to corroborate TF offence before the court. 470. Prosecutors are involved in TF cases from the early stage of the identification, providing case-specific guidelines to the State Security Service in order to secure evidence properly and timely. As explained in the previous core issue, the prosecutors guided and approved general guidelines on TF investigation which are to be applied and followed by the State Security Service. 471. There has been no prosecution nor conviction for TF offence in Latvia and therefore no occasion for the prosecutors and courts to develop case law on the evidence needed to secure TF conviction. Notwithstanding, the authorities demonstrated that there is well established understanding that objective factual circumstances would be used to prove the intent and knowledge of the perpetrator of a TF offence. To corroborate their arguments, the authorities confirmed that the jurisprudence on assessing circumstantial evidence, as established by the Supreme Court, would be applied in TF cases equally. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decision discussed an ML case and assessment of circumstantial evidence thereof, but the principle it emphasised states that in criminal proceedings indicative or circumstantial evidence may also be used to confirm the existence or non-existence of the facts to be proved, which, by means of related facts, gives rise to an inference of the facts to be proved, and it is not decisive which evidence – direct or indicative or circumstantial – is used to prove the guilt of the accused, but what matters is whether the totality of the evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (Paragraph 5.1 of the decision of the Senate of 13 May 2021 in Case No SKK-89/2021). As a consequence, judicial and prosecutorial authorities would apply these principles in potential TF case trials. This understanding is further embodied into the guidelines on TF investigation, which also emphasise the importance of using objective factual circumstances when proving intent and knowledge by the perpetrator of a TF offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="469. In Latvia, there is a Specially Authorised Prosecutors’ Division within the GPO which is competent for the prosecution of terrorism and TF cases. There are six prosecutors in the division who demonstrated a good understanding of TF offences and expertise in dealing with such cases. Besides, they have all sufficient powers enabling them to collect lawful evidence suitable to corroborate TF offence before the court. 470. Prosecutors are involved in TF cases from the early stage of the identification, providing case-specific guidelines to the State Security Service in order to secure evidence properly and timely. As explained in the previous core issue, the prosecutors guided and approved general guidelines on TF investigation which are to be applied and followed by the State Security Service. 471. There has been no prosecution nor conviction for TF offence in Latvia and therefore no occasion for the prosecutors and courts to develop case law on the evidence needed to secure TF conviction. Notwithstanding, the authorities demonstrated that there is well established understanding that objective factual circumstances would be used to prove the intent and knowledge of the perpetrator of a TF offence. To corroborate their arguments, the authorities confirmed that the jurisprudence on assessing circumstantial evidence, as established by the Supreme Court, would be applied in TF cases equally. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decision discussed an ML case and assessment of circumstantial evidence thereof, but the principle it emphasised states that in criminal proceedings indicative or circumstantial evidence may also be used to confirm the existence or non-existence of the facts to be proved, which, by means of related facts, gives rise to an inference of the facts to be proved, and it is not decisive which evidence – direct or indicative or circumstantial – is used to prove the guilt of the accused, but what matters is whether the totality of the evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt (Paragraph 5.1 of the decision of the Senate of 13 May 2021 in Case No SKK-89/2021). As a consequence, judicial and prosecutorial authorities would apply these principles in potential TF case trials. This understanding is further embodied into the guidelines on TF investigation, which also emphasise the importance of using objective factual circumstances when proving intent and knowledge by the perpetrator of a TF offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Latvia has demonstrated that overall, the system in place would allow to freeze and deprive of TF assets and instrumentalities when identified within the scope of the UN TFS. 493.  Latvia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for TF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the low TF risk profile of the country. However, Latvian authorities and REs have effectively implemented TFS under EU regimes- freezing significant amount of funds and other assets under the Russian Federation linked EU sanctions, by involving the same institutional actors- namely, the FIU, MFA and supervisory authorities and operational processes used for implementing UN TFS, demonstrating Latvia’s capability to respond effectively if TF-related designations arise. 494. The majority of frozen funds and assets in Latvia in the reporting period belong to legal persons owned or controlled by designated persons under the Russian Federation and Belarus linked EU sanctions (159 out of 176), evidencing strong identification and screening practices by FIs and other REs, including through complex ownership structures. While engagement with authorities on TF-specific cases was limited, REs showed awareness of their obligations under the TFS regime and used automated screening tools, routinely identifying and reviewing false positives. These measures reflect a functional framework and operational capacity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="492. Latvia has demonstrated that overall, the system in place would allow to freeze and deprive of TF assets and instrumentalities when identified within the scope of the UN TFS. 493.  Latvia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for TF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the low TF risk profile of the country. However, Latvian authorities and REs have effectively implemented TFS under EU regimes- freezing significant amount of funds and other assets under the Russian Federation linked EU sanctions, by involving the same institutional actors- namely, the FIU, MFA and supervisory authorities and operational processes used for implementing UN TFS, demonstrating Latvia’s capability to respond effectively if TF-related designations arise. 494. The majority of frozen funds and assets in Latvia in the reporting period belong to legal persons owned or controlled by designated persons under the Russian Federation and Belarus linked EU sanctions (159 out of 176), evidencing strong identification and screening practices by FIs and other REs, including through complex ownership structures. While engagement with authorities on TF-specific cases was limited, REs showed awareness of their obligations under the TFS regime and used automated screening tools, routinely identifying and reviewing false positives. These measures reflect a functional framework and operational capacity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="527. Latvian authorities have conducted comprehensive assessments of PF risks, incorporating geographical and sectorial vulnerabilities. These assessments focus particularly on the movement and control of GSS, including dual-use and military goods, and reflect Latvia’s recognition that its role as a regional logistics and transit hub increases exposure to PF-related activity. However, authorities stated during the onsite that, if the assessment were limited strictly to the scope of UNSCR-related TFS the assessed PF risk would be low. This view is based on several factors, including the absence of any designated persons or entities under UNSCR PF-related sanctions holding assets or operating in Latvia, and the absence of related STRs or international information requests. Authorities also highlighted the extensive use of automated screening systems in the financial sector, the functionality of the FIU Latvia’s centralised sanctions search engine, and the lack of practical exposure to jurisdictions like DPRK. 528. The AT considers this assessment to be reasonable and supported by current exposure levels, particularly in the financial sector. However, continued attention to system testing, DNFBP supervision, and cross-sector outreach is warranted to ensure that the framework remains responsive should UNSCR-related exposure increase. 529. To address sector-specific risks, Latvia has implemented strict licensing and oversight mechanisms for GSS, including dual-use items and military-related materials that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. The Committee for the Control of GSS evaluates all applications for export, import, and transit of such goods. Applications are assessed against domestic controls, EU dual-use regulations, and relevant UNSCRs related to PF. In 2022, 183 licences were denied, demonstrating a proactive and risk-sensitive approach to mitigating PF risks by preventing the movement of goods with potential proliferation applications. These controls represent a key element in Latvia’s strategy to combat PF by addressing the material dimension of proliferation pathways. 530. In the NRA2 Latvian authorities assessed the risks of violation and circumvention of TFS (under all applicable sanctions regimes) as medium, with trade-based sanctions breaches rated as medium high/high. The increase in risk level is attributed to the broad scope of EU sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in 2022, Latvia’ geographical location bordering the Russian Federation and Belarus, and its historical economic relations with the Russian Federation. To address these risks, Latvia has prioritized sanctions implementation, enforcement, and supervision, established new co-operation mechanisms, centralized sanctions implementation under FIU Latvia, and allocated significant additional resources, demonstrating its capacity to adopt an RBA and respond swiftly to evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="527. Latvian authorities have conducted comprehensive assessments of PF risks, incorporating geographical and sectorial vulnerabilities. These assessments focus particularly on the movement and control of GSS, including dual-use and military goods, and reflect Latvia’s recognition that its role as a regional logistics and transit hub increases exposure to PF-related activity. However, authorities stated during the onsite that, if the assessment were limited strictly to the scope of UNSCR-related TFS the assessed PF risk would be low. This view is based on several factors, including the absence of any designated persons or entities under UNSCR PF-related sanctions holding assets or operating in Latvia, and the absence of related STRs or international information requests. Authorities also highlighted the extensive use of automated screening systems in the financial sector, the functionality of the FIU Latvia’s centralised sanctions search engine, and the lack of practical exposure to jurisdictions like DPRK. 528. The AT considers this assessment to be reasonable and supported by current exposure levels, particularly in the financial sector. However, continued attention to system testing, DNFBP supervision, and cross-sector outreach is warranted to ensure that the framework remains responsive should UNSCR-related exposure increase. 529. To address sector-specific risks, Latvia has implemented strict licensing and oversight mechanisms for GSS, including dual-use items and military-related materials that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. The Committee for the Control of GSS evaluates all applications for export, import, and transit of such goods. Applications are assessed against domestic controls, EU dual-use regulations, and relevant UNSCRs related to PF. In 2022, 183 licences were denied, demonstrating a proactive and risk-sensitive approach to mitigating PF risks by preventing the movement of goods with potential proliferation applications. These controls represent a key element in Latvia’s strategy to combat PF by addressing the material dimension of proliferation pathways. 530. In the NRA2 Latvian authorities assessed the risks of violation and circumvention of TFS (under all applicable sanctions regimes) as medium, with trade-based sanctions breaches rated as medium high/high. The increase in risk level is attributed to the broad scope of EU sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in 2022, Latvia’ geographical location bordering the Russian Federation and Belarus, and its historical economic relations with the Russian Federation. To address these risks, Latvia has prioritized sanctions implementation, enforcement, and supervision, established new co-operation mechanisms, centralized sanctions implementation under FIU Latvia, and allocated significant additional resources, demonstrating its capacity to adopt an RBA and respond swiftly to evolving risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="118. Latvia has a very limited number of AML relevant exemptions in place. The exemptions that are in place are aimed at avoiding dual reporting/registration requirements across EU Member States. For example, trusts that are subject to disclosure requirements in other EU members states are exempt from reporting requirements with the Latvian ER (see also IO.5). These exemptions are driven by the avoidance of dual reporting, rather than on the basis of a documented AML/CFT assessment. This is relevant given that Latvia’s NRAs identify foreign ML risks as primarily emanated from EU and geographically proximate countries. However, overall, the exemptions in place do not relate to areas identified nationally as presenting a higher risk and should have, at most, a minor impact on effectiveness. 119. NRA2 comprehensively outlines geographic links for each predicate offence. This is key given the nature of STR reporting and the specific risks that Latvia faces. However, despite a commendably clear and detailed documentation of geographic risk for each predicate offence, at the time of the onsite visit there was some unclear public articulation of risk outside of the NRA. At the time of the onsite the FIU publicly identified “jurisdictions of increased risk” (AML/CFT/CPF Law, Section 11(1) (3) point 2) as “high risk countries”, including: - The European Commission's list of third countries that are insufficiently combating ML and TF; - FATF determined high-risk jurisdictions and FATF jurisdictions under increased monitoring; - Countries with a high level of corruption identified (Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index); and - Countries specified in Latvian legal acts. 120. Collectively, these encompassed a large number of countries, and did not align with the geographic risks identified in NRA2. These lists were also used in non-public thematic assessments when determining geographic risk, for example in relation to foreign legal persons, and so assessments may not truly reflect Latvia’s specific geographic risk. The lists were also not reflective of the feedback received from authorities during onsite interviews that risks primarily emanate from within the EU and geographically proximate countries, few of which appear on any of these lists. Some authorities displayed a more nuanced understanding of geographic risk, and Latvijas Banka advised that it maintains its own independent list of geographic risks as a result of feedback from the private sector. The authorities are encouraged to draw on more detailed knowledge of geographic risk relating to predicate offences and related ML typologies in order to better communicate the specific geographic risks faced by Latvia and to inform the application of enhanced measures, such as EDD by REs. However, since the time of the onsite, the FIU has updated its external communications to more clearly articulate the nuances of the specific risks faced in Latvia, reducing the over reliance on these lists. This is a positive development, however as this occurred after the time of the onsite, it is not possible to assess the impact of this change." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="118. Latvia has a very limited number of AML relevant exemptions in place. The exemptions that are in place are aimed at avoiding dual reporting/registration requirements across EU Member States. For example, trusts that are subject to disclosure requirements in other EU members states are exempt from reporting requirements with the Latvian ER (see also IO.5). These exemptions are driven by the avoidance of dual reporting, rather than on the basis of a documented AML/CFT assessment. This is relevant given that Latvia’s NRAs identify foreign ML risks as primarily emanated from EU and geographically proximate countries. However, overall, the exemptions in place do not relate to areas identified nationally as presenting a higher risk and should have, at most, a minor impact on effectiveness. 119. NRA2 comprehensively outlines geographic links for each predicate offence. This is key given the nature of STR reporting and the specific risks that Latvia faces. However, despite a commendably clear and detailed documentation of geographic risk for each predicate offence, at the time of the onsite visit there was some unclear public articulation of risk outside of the NRA. At the time of the onsite the FIU publicly identified “jurisdictions of increased risk” (AML/CFT/CPF Law, Section 11(1) (3) point 2) as “high risk countries”, including: - The European Commission's list of third countries that are insufficiently combating ML and TF; - FATF determined high-risk jurisdictions and FATF jurisdictions under increased monitoring; - Countries with a high level of corruption identified (Transparency International - Corruption Perceptions Index); and - Countries specified in Latvian legal acts. 120. Collectively, these encompassed a large number of countries, and did not align with the geographic risks identified in NRA2. These lists were also used in non-public thematic assessments when determining geographic risk, for example in relation to foreign legal persons, and so assessments may not truly reflect Latvia’s specific geographic risk. The lists were also not reflective of the feedback received from authorities during onsite interviews that risks primarily emanate from within the EU and geographically proximate countries, few of which appear on any of these lists. Some authorities displayed a more nuanced understanding of geographic risk, and Latvijas Banka advised that it maintains its own independent list of geographic risks as a result of feedback from the private sector. The authorities are encouraged to draw on more detailed knowledge of geographic risk relating to predicate offences and related ML typologies in order to better communicate the specific geographic risks faced by Latvia and to inform the application of enhanced measures, such as EDD by REs. However, since the time of the onsite, the FIU has updated its external communications to more clearly articulate the nuances of the specific risks faced in Latvia, reducing the over reliance on these lists. This is a positive development, however as this occurred after the time of the onsite, it is not possible to assess the impact of this change." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 151. Latvia is actively engaged in non-MLA co-operation, which is regulated by international treaties, multilateral or bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) or take place on an ad hoc basis. Direct and informal international co-operation is a usual practice, especially with other Baltic countries and EU jurisdictions (e.g. Czechia, Estonia, Finland, and Lithuania). 152. The PO has signed MoUs with foreign partners to enhance non-MLA relationships and promote fluent international co-operation. Eurojust, Interpol and Europol networks are regularly used, and Latvia has liaison officers at these networks (e.g., liaison officers in Europol from SRS, State Security Service, and State Police) and also in third countries. There is limited information on the promptness of informal co-operation provided by Latvia, except for the FIU and the Latvijas Banka. 2.3.1. FIU 153. FIU Latvia actively exchanges information with foreign counterparts, regardless of co-operation agreements or MoUs. It has signed 46 MoUs with foreign FIUs and 1 MoU with a non‑counterpart on using the FIU.net information exchange platform. Co-operation typically occurs via the Egmont Secure Web, covering a broad range of information. [27] FIU Latvia uses various international co-operation mechanisms and develops new informal co-operation tools through forums like the Egmont Group, including the establishment of the IFIT. Box 2.4. International Financial Intelligence Task Force (IFIT) In February 2018, a notice identified Bank A as a primary ML concern. By June 2018, Bank A, (Latvia’s third largest), initiated voluntary liquidation, and its license was revoked, with EUR 2.4 billion still owed to creditors. Allegations included transactions for UN-designated entities, corrupt PEPs, and laundering billions through shell companies. The case's complexity highlighted the need for enhanced international co-operation. A specialized IFIT was formed under FIU Latvia's leadership, with support from the Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership (ECOFEL) and participation from 25 most affected jurisdictions. The IFIT kick-off meeting was held during the Egmont Group Plenary in The Hague in 2019, with FIUs from countries that had the most transactions with Bank A. FIU Latvia aimed to share and obtain operational information, provide partners with best practices for investigating global financial crimes, and enhance co-operation and information-sharing among FIUs. The goal was to increase awareness of ML exposure, foster a shared understanding of the issues, and co-ordinate cross-border actions. The IFIT served as a platform for both bilateral and multilateral financial, operational, and strategic intelligence sharing. Co-operation continued until 2022. While the IFIT was operational, FIU Latvia's international co-operation increased significantly, with over 2 000 requests and 446 spontaneous dissemination reports sent to IFIT FIUs over three years. The Task Force achieved notable results, including: · Over 360 reports disseminated to local LEAs. · EUR 120 million frozen; court fines in the tens of millions of euros. · Proposed amendments to national AML/CFT legislation. · Increased analytical staff and expanded database access. · New tools for analysing large transaction data volumes. · New ML typologies detected. · Expanded public-private partnerships (PPP). · Development of targeted training for REs. FIU Latvia also compiled a best practice paper on multilateral information exchange, presented at the Egmont Group Plenary in Riga in 2022 and received the Best Egmont Case Award for this case and the work of the IFIT. 154. From 2018 to 2020, FIU Latvia received an average of 483 requests per year. Only three FIU requests have been refused over the last six years. Due to the swift execution of incoming requests, averaging around 14 days, there are no pending requests to report. Table 2.6. Incoming Requests to FIU (2018-2023) Year Number of requests received Average time of execution in days Yearly average 483 14 Total 2 901 - 155. FIU Latvia also receives spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs, as well as cross-border disseminations (XBDs) and cross-border reports (XBRs) from EU FIUs. Incoming information is prioritised and analysed, sometimes leading to requests for further information and disseminations to LEAs. Due to the high volume of XBDs and XBRs, the FIU uses a semi-automated, risk-based approach with keyword searches. This process is common for both spontaneous disseminations and XBDs, often including relevant information for foreign FIUs. 156. Regarding outgoing requests, most requests (over 3 400 of the 4 542) sent by the FIU are aimed at enriching the FIU’s analysis, and a handful of requests involve requests for freezing. [28] The remaining requests (1 104) were sent on behalf of domestic LEAs (see table below). The FIU systematically and spontaneously disseminates information when there are suspected links with foreign jurisdictions. The high number of outgoing requests substantiates Latvia’s well-functioning system of informal co-operation. This is supported by numerous case studies and the FIU’s proactive outreach to counterparts via informal channels, including Egmont Secure Web, secure EU channels, and direct bilateral engagement. Table 2.7. Outgoing requests from FIU Number of requests sent Requests sent on behalf of domestic LEAs 2018 443 111 2019 900 272 2020 828 135 2021 1 022 170 2022 772 184 2023 577 232 Total 4 542 1 104 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 157. Latvia’s LEAs engage effectively and regularly in informal international co-operation. The below tables show the breakdown of the number of incoming informal requests (2 719) versus the number of outgoing requests (3 342). The State Police, SRS TCPD, and, to a lesser extent, the CPCB are the main purveyors and recipients of informal information requests to international counterparts. The State Security Service may occasionally seek information. 158. The SRS TCPD received most requests with 2 561 out of the 2 719 total incoming requests. These generally pertained to information requests on tax and customs matters on persons and companies residing or transiting through Latvia, and with some requests for participation in joint investigations. [29] A remaining number of requests went to the State Police (132) and CPCB (26). Overall, it does not appear that there have been any important delays or issues in agency responses to incoming requests. Table 2.8. Total number of incoming informal requests (2019-2023) Year State Police CPCB TCPD Yearly average 26 5 434 Total 132 26 2 172 159. Regarding outgoing requests, the State Police is actively sending requests, with 1 201 requests over the assessment period (2018-2023) (see table below). These exchanges are most often via police-to-police information exchange channels, ARO channels, and co-operation with liaisons of foreign LEAs. Europol also plays a significant role in establishing and maintaining these channels of co-operation. Meetings with liaison officers are also held to exchange information about modus operandi. The outgoing requests, assisted by the international co-operation department or ARO, can be for a wide range of information, such as tax information, residency, criminal records, travel information, etc. and represent a proactive approach to international cases. These requests pertain to all forms of inquiry, not only relating to ML, and reflect a strong level of informal co-operation among the State Police. 160. During this period, the CPCB sent a total of 19 requests (see table below). These requests typically sought information about personal property, vehicles, companies, addresses, positions held, means of communication, and more. Table 2.9. Total number of outgoing informal requests (2018-2023) Year State Police CPCB TCPD 2018 N/A N/A 245 2019 165 4 318 2020 345 3 427 2021 151 5 407 2022 198 3 331 2023 342 4 394 average 240 4 354 Total 1 201 19 2 122 161. Latvia’s State Police extensively uses JITs for large cases such as OCG and narcotics crimes across the EU and with close partners. Over the past five years, the number of JITs with other member states has steadily increased. These groups co-ordinate essential investigative activities and often execute joint action days for searches, arrests, and seizures. [30] Authorities indicated that they have participated in Eurojust’s co-ordination and co-operation meetings a number of times which led to successful international operations against crime. JITs are established with a wide range of countries. By the end of 2023, there were 19 ongoing JITs with EU Member States and third countries. One recent JIT led to joint action against a EUR 2 billion ML network via Lithuanian FIs, with Eurojust supporting operations in Italy, Latvia, and Lithuania, also addressing a EUR 15 million Italian public money fraud. [31] 162. Apart from actively seeking Police-to-Police co-operation, in 2021 the State Police together with partners from Lithuania, Estonia, and Europol launched “Development and application of innovative and proactive tools, fighting top level drug trafficking organisations in the EU” or “FIDR” Project to strengthen national capacities to fight drug trafficking, ML, and organised crime. Through their robust engagement with other jurisdictions, the State Police have participated in more than 50 cross-border operations over three years. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 163. Supervisors have sought and provided international co-operation to differing extents. Latvijas Banka regularly engages and exchanges, whereas supervisors of DNFBPs and other financial sector supervisors engage in practically no exchanges for international co-operation. Noting that Latvia’s banking sector represents the most material risk (for cross-border schemes in particular), these gaps are moderate. 164. Latvijas Banka directly co-operates with foreign counterparts and has MoUs in place with relevant foreign prudential supervisors. Latvijas Banka has more than 50 different agreements. [32] Latvijas Banka engages in international co-operation on market entry and supervisory issues. For AML/CFT supervision, it may request information on customers, beneficial ownership, account details, transactions, inspection results, and remediation actions. Latvijas Banka also co-operates with third countries, even without mutual or bilateral agreements. For example, Latvijas Banka recently co-operated with the Commonwealth of Dominica for information that it used to verify source of funds of a potential investor in a credit institution. 165.  Outgoing requests from Latvijas Banka mostly concern data and information required for supervision and sanctions compliance and assessment of key function holders. It sends on average 21 requests per year (total 105 requests over five years) to EU and third countries (see table below). Table 2.10. Outgoing Requests from Latvijas Banka (2019-2023) Fit and proper measures Of which EU countries Of which outside the EU Supervision and sanctions Of which EU countries Of which outside the EU Yearly total Average 12 10 2 9 8 1 21 Total 59 51 8 46 40 4 105 166. There have not been any refusals for outgoing requests for the purpose of AML/CFT supervision (2019-2023). Exceptionally, there has been one case with substantial delay due to one non-cooperative country, but all have been responded eventually. 167. Incoming requests mostly concern banks, although most recent requests have dealt with foreign partners usually requiring bank/customer related information, account statements, information of BOs of customers to support their investigations. From 2019 to 2023 Latvijas Banka received 228 requests, mainly pertaining to fit and proper measures, and mainly from EU countries. Table 2.11. Incoming Requests to Latvijas Banka (2019-2023) Incoming requests Fit and proper measures Of which EU countries Of which outside EU Supervision and sanctions Of which EU countries Of which outside EU Total Average 30 28 2 8 6 2 38 Total 179 167 13 49 38 11 228 168. As a minor shortfall, various other supervisors do not engage in international co-operation at all, and some engage to a very limited extent. No information has been provided regarding international co-operation on VASP sector supervision (although this sector currently has low materiality), which may change once Latvijas Banka takes over its supervision. [33] 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 169. The SRS TCPD sends a large volume of requests in relation to tax enquiries with 2 122 outgoing requests as seen from the statistics provided in the table above. Although most cases relate to tax and customs related (transaction) information, the TCPD also exchanges information on persons criminal records, professional activities, etc. Exchange of information with EU Member States related to alleged tax crimes can be conducted by using the Europol’s Secured information exchange application (SIENA). The SRS TCPD can also communicate with tax administrations of EU Member States by using the SCAC tax administrations information channel. Footnotes [27]. (E.g. origin or further trace of funds, BOs, bank account statements, bank account opening and closing dates, copies of CDD documents and contract correspondence, IP addresses used to access the bank account, existence of (other) bank accounts opened by the subject). [28]. During the assessment period, FIU Latvia sent a total of 76 requests for freezing bank accounts abroad. [29]. Requests to TCPD are responded to according to the level of urgency of the requester; urgent requests are treated as a matter of priority. [30]. Eurojust assists with setting up and financing the JITs. It has also organised co-ordination meetings to prepare for action days and set up a co-ordination centre to provide cross-border judicial assistance. [31]. See: Full-scale action against EUR 2 billion money laundering network via Lithuanian financial institution | Eurojust | European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation . [32]. Includes for bilateral, multilateral, for specific purpose, for general information exchange etc. Many agreements have been signed by the FCMC, but all counterparties have been informed that as of 1 January 2023, Latvijas Banka took over all the powers and functions of the FCMC and became successor of all the FCMC’s rights and liabilities. [33]. Latvijas Banka has established and functioning co-operation channels for information exchange that could (in principle) be used for VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 151. Latvia is actively engaged in non-MLA co-operation, which is regulated by international treaties, multilateral or bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) or take place on an ad hoc basis. Direct and informal international co-operation is a usual practice, especially with other Baltic countries and EU jurisdictions (e.g. Czechia, Estonia, Finland, and Lithuania). 152. The PO has signed MoUs with foreign partners to enhance non-MLA relationships and promote fluent international co-operation. Eurojust, Interpol and Europol networks are regularly used, and Latvia has liaison officers at these networks (e.g., liaison officers in Europol from SRS, State Security Service, and State Police) and also in third countries. There is limited information on the promptness of informal co-operation provided by Latvia, except for the FIU and the Latvijas Banka. 2.3.1. FIU 153. FIU Latvia actively exchanges information with foreign counterparts, regardless of co-operation agreements or MoUs. It has signed 46 MoUs with foreign FIUs and 1 MoU with a non‑counterpart on using the FIU.net information exchange platform. Co-operation typically occurs via the Egmont Secure Web, covering a broad range of information. [27] FIU Latvia uses various international co-operation mechanisms and develops new informal co-operation tools through forums like the Egmont Group, including the establishment of the IFIT. Box 2.4. International Financial Intelligence Task Force (IFIT) In February 2018, a notice identified Bank A as a primary ML concern. By June 2018, Bank A, (Latvia’s third largest), initiated voluntary liquidation, and its license was revoked, with EUR 2.4 billion still owed to creditors. Allegations included transactions for UN-designated entities, corrupt PEPs, and laundering billions through shell companies. The case's complexity highlighted the need for enhanced international co-operation. A specialized IFIT was formed under FIU Latvia's leadership, with support from the Egmont Centre of FIU Excellence and Leadership (ECOFEL) and participation from 25 most affected jurisdictions. The IFIT kick-off meeting was held during the Egmont Group Plenary in The Hague in 2019, with FIUs from countries that had the most transactions with Bank A. FIU Latvia aimed to share and obtain operational information, provide partners with best practices for investigating global financial crimes, and enhance co-operation and information-sharing among FIUs. The goal was to increase awareness of ML exposure, foster a shared understanding of the issues, and co-ordinate cross-border actions. The IFIT served as a platform for both bilateral and multilateral financial, operational, and strategic intelligence sharing. Co-operation continued until 2022. While the IFIT was operational, FIU Latvia's international co-operation increased significantly, with over 2 000 requests and 446 spontaneous dissemination reports sent to IFIT FIUs over three years. The Task Force achieved notable results, including: · Over 360 reports disseminated to local LEAs. · EUR 120 million frozen; court fines in the tens of millions of euros. · Proposed amendments to national AML/CFT legislation. · Increased analytical staff and expanded database access. · New tools for analysing large transaction data volumes. · New ML typologies detected. · Expanded public-private partnerships (PPP). · Development of targeted training for REs. FIU Latvia also compiled a best practice paper on multilateral information exchange, presented at the Egmont Group Plenary in Riga in 2022 and received the Best Egmont Case Award for this case and the work of the IFIT. 154. From 2018 to 2020, FIU Latvia received an average of 483 requests per year. Only three FIU requests have been refused over the last six years. Due to the swift execution of incoming requests, averaging around 14 days, there are no pending requests to report. Table 2.6. Incoming Requests to FIU (2018-2023) Year Number of requests received Average time of execution in days Yearly average 483 14 Total 2 901 - 155. FIU Latvia also receives spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs, as well as cross-border disseminations (XBDs) and cross-border reports (XBRs) from EU FIUs. Incoming information is prioritised and analysed, sometimes leading to requests for further information and disseminations to LEAs. Due to the high volume of XBDs and XBRs, the FIU uses a semi-automated, risk-based approach with keyword searches. This process is common for both spontaneous disseminations and XBDs, often including relevant information for foreign FIUs. 156. Regarding outgoing requests, most requests (over 3 400 of the 4 542) sent by the FIU are aimed at enriching the FIU’s analysis, and a handful of requests involve requests for freezing. [28] The remaining requests (1 104) were sent on behalf of domestic LEAs (see table below). The FIU systematically and spontaneously disseminates information when there are suspected links with foreign jurisdictions. The high number of outgoing requests substantiates Latvia’s well-functioning system of informal co-operation. This is supported by numerous case studies and the FIU’s proactive outreach to counterparts via informal channels, including Egmont Secure Web, secure EU channels, and direct bilateral engagement. Table 2.7. Outgoing requests from FIU Number of requests sent Requests sent on behalf of domestic LEAs 2018 443 111 2019 900 272 2020 828 135 2021 1 022 170 2022 772 184 2023 577 232 Total 4 542 1 104 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 157. Latvia’s LEAs engage effectively and regularly in informal international co-operation. The below tables show the breakdown of the number of incoming informal requests (2 719) versus the number of outgoing requests (3 342). The State Police, SRS TCPD, and, to a lesser extent, the CPCB are the main purveyors and recipients of informal information requests to international counterparts. The State Security Service may occasionally seek information. 158. The SRS TCPD received most requests with 2 561 out of the 2 719 total incoming requests. These generally pertained to information requests on tax and customs matters on persons and companies residing or transiting through Latvia, and with some requests for participation in joint investigations. [29] A remaining number of requests went to the State Police (132) and CPCB (26). Overall, it does not appear that there have been any important delays or issues in agency responses to incoming requests. Table 2.8. Total number of incoming informal requests (2019-2023) Year State Police CPCB TCPD Yearly average 26 5 434 Total 132 26 2 172 159. Regarding outgoing requests, the State Police is actively sending requests, with 1 201 requests over the assessment period (2018-2023) (see table below). These exchanges are most often via police-to-police information exchange channels, ARO channels, and co-operation with liaisons of foreign LEAs. Europol also plays a significant role in establishing and maintaining these channels of co-operation. Meetings with liaison officers are also held to exchange information about modus operandi. The outgoing requests, assisted by the international co-operation department or ARO, can be for a wide range of information, such as tax information, residency, criminal records, travel information, etc. and represent a proactive approach to international cases. These requests pertain to all forms of inquiry, not only relating to ML, and reflect a strong level of informal co-operation among the State Police. 160. During this period, the CPCB sent a total of 19 requests (see table below). These requests typically sought information about personal property, vehicles, companies, addresses, positions held, means of communication, and more. Table 2.9. Total number of outgoing informal requests (2018-2023) Year State Police CPCB TCPD 2018 N/A N/A 245 2019 165 4 318 2020 345 3 427 2021 151 5 407 2022 198 3 331 2023 342 4 394 average 240 4 354 Total 1 201 19 2 122 161. Latvia’s State Police extensively uses JITs for large cases such as OCG and narcotics crimes across the EU and with close partners. Over the past five years, the number of JITs with other member states has steadily increased. These groups co-ordinate essential investigative activities and often execute joint action days for searches, arrests, and seizures. [30] Authorities indicated that they have participated in Eurojust’s co-ordination and co-operation meetings a number of times which led to successful international operations against crime. JITs are established with a wide range of countries. By the end of 2023, there were 19 ongoing JITs with EU Member States and third countries. One recent JIT led to joint action against a EUR 2 billion ML network via Lithuanian FIs, with Eurojust supporting operations in Italy, Latvia, and Lithuania, also addressing a EUR 15 million Italian public money fraud. [31] 162. Apart from actively seeking Police-to-Police co-operation, in 2021 the State Police together with partners from Lithuania, Estonia, and Europol launched “Development and application of innovative and proactive tools, fighting top level drug trafficking organisations in the EU” or “FIDR” Project to strengthen national capacities to fight drug trafficking, ML, and organised crime. Through their robust engagement with other jurisdictions, the State Police have participated in more than 50 cross-border operations over three years. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 163. Supervisors have sought and provided international co-operation to differing extents. Latvijas Banka regularly engages and exchanges, whereas supervisors of DNFBPs and other financial sector supervisors engage in practically no exchanges for international co-operation. Noting that Latvia’s banking sector represents the most material risk (for cross-border schemes in particular), these gaps are moderate. 164. Latvijas Banka directly co-operates with foreign counterparts and has MoUs in place with relevant foreign prudential supervisors. Latvijas Banka has more than 50 different agreements. [32] Latvijas Banka engages in international co-operation on market entry and supervisory issues. For AML/CFT supervision, it may request information on customers, beneficial ownership, account details, transactions, inspection results, and remediation actions. Latvijas Banka also co-operates with third countries, even without mutual or bilateral agreements. For example, Latvijas Banka recently co-operated with the Commonwealth of Dominica for information that it used to verify source of funds of a potential investor in a credit institution. 165.  Outgoing requests from Latvijas Banka mostly concern data and information required for supervision and sanctions compliance and assessment of key function holders. It sends on average 21 requests per year (total 105 requests over five years) to EU and third countries (see table below). Table 2.10. Outgoing Requests from Latvijas Banka (2019-2023) Fit and proper measures Of which EU countries Of which outside the EU Supervision and sanctions Of which EU countries Of which outside the EU Yearly total Average 12 10 2 9 8 1 21 Total 59 51 8 46 40 4 105 166. There have not been any refusals for outgoing requests for the purpose of AML/CFT supervision (2019-2023). Exceptionally, there has been one case with substantial delay due to one non-cooperative country, but all have been responded eventually. 167. Incoming requests mostly concern banks, although most recent requests have dealt with foreign partners usually requiring bank/customer related information, account statements, information of BOs of customers to support their investigations. From 2019 to 2023 Latvijas Banka received 228 requests, mainly pertaining to fit and proper measures, and mainly from EU countries. Table 2.11. Incoming Requests to Latvijas Banka (2019-2023) Incoming requests Fit and proper measures Of which EU countries Of which outside EU Supervision and sanctions Of which EU countries Of which outside EU Total Average 30 28 2 8 6 2 38 Total 179 167 13 49 38 11 228 168. As a minor shortfall, various other supervisors do not engage in international co-operation at all, and some engage to a very limited extent. No information has been provided regarding international co-operation on VASP sector supervision (although this sector currently has low materiality), which may change once Latvijas Banka takes over its supervision. [33] 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 169. The SRS TCPD sends a large volume of requests in relation to tax enquiries with 2 122 outgoing requests as seen from the statistics provided in the table above. Although most cases relate to tax and customs related (transaction) information, the TCPD also exchanges information on persons criminal records, professional activities, etc. Exchange of information with EU Member States related to alleged tax crimes can be conducted by using the Europol’s Secured information exchange application (SIENA). The SRS TCPD can also communicate with tax administrations of EU Member States by using the SCAC tax administrations information channel. Footnotes [27]. (E.g. origin or further trace of funds, BOs, bank account statements, bank account opening and closing dates, copies of CDD documents and contract correspondence, IP addresses used to access the bank account, existence of (other) bank accounts opened by the subject). [28]. During the assessment period, FIU Latvia sent a total of 76 requests for freezing bank accounts abroad. [29]. Requests to TCPD are responded to according to the level of urgency of the requester; urgent requests are treated as a matter of priority. [30]. Eurojust assists with setting up and financing the JITs. It has also organised co-ordination meetings to prepare for action days and set up a co-ordination centre to provide cross-border judicial assistance. [31]. See: Full-scale action against EUR 2 billion money laundering network via Lithuanian financial institution | Eurojust | European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation . [32]. Includes for bilateral, multilateral, for specific purpose, for general information exchange etc. Many agreements have been signed by the FCMC, but all counterparties have been informed that as of 1 January 2023, Latvijas Banka took over all the powers and functions of the FCMC and became successor of all the FCMC’s rights and liabilities. [33]. Latvijas Banka has established and functioning co-operation channels for information exchange that could (in principle) be used for VASPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="188. FIs and VASPs commonly conduct business-wide ML/TF risk assessments (BRA) by taking into account supranational (EU), national (NRA), sectorial (SRA) and business-specific risks. For inherent risks, FIs typically look into clients, services (products), geographies and delivery channels – these risk categories are further differentiated to include more detailed data points (the comprehensiveness of which vary depending on the size of an FI and nature of its services; the same applies to internal controls’ (vulnerabilities) assessments). Sophistication of the technological solutions used for risk assessments largely depends on the size of an FI/VASP: large credit institutions and fintech-type FIs use more advanced data analytics solutions, Power BI, other IT tools, whilst smaller firms rely on MS Excel and other manual solutions. All supervisors uniformly agree that the level of compliance with the BRA requirements have considerably increased during the assessment period both in terms of documentation (including frequency of updates) and comprehensiveness (quality). These conclusions are largely based on reviews of BRAs during on-site activities or specific targeted off-site reviews. Latvijas Banka reports that in 2023 all supervised FIs documented their risk assessments, whereas in 2019 some smaller FIs did not have BRAs available (e.g., 45% of credit unions and 85% of AIFMs). The SRS and CRPC report that there were cases of failures by VASPs and credit services providers to conduct BRAs, however, both supervisors were able to follow up on the remediation of such deficiencies. Significant improvements have also been noted regarding quality; for example, in 2021 23% of banks had critical (very severe) deficiencies in their risk assessments, in comparison to 2023 where no critical deficiencies were identified, 10% required moderate improvement and 80% required minor improvements. A similar situation was observed in the securities sector, where the level of compliance has increased since 2019 with minor improvements required in most cases and moderate improvements in around 10% of cases. 189. Over the assessment period, following strategic structural reforms within the country, the risk exposure of the financial sector has decreased significantly largely due to the shift towards servicing predominantly residents; linked to this, many banks and securities market participants changed their business models. 190. Generally, and in line with the above, all FIs and VASPs met on-site were able to comprehensively articulate national and sectorial ML/TF risks and the impact of those on their business, as well as related mitigation techniques. Whilst FIs document their BRAs and supervisors do not consider that supporting methodologies need further improvement, it was noted by the AT that most entities met on-site overly rely on risks and threats outlined in the NRA and SRA - which translates into hypothetical threats appearing in their BRAs. Most FIs were less articulate on inherent ML risks relating to certain categories of high-risk clients and/or products/services. For example, some FIs highlighted corruption as one of the main risks to their business without being able to articulate exact reasons, as they had very little or no PEP clients. Geographical risks are well understood by all FIs/VASPs met on-site which in turn allows for a comprehensive understanding of TF risk components (clients, BOs, payments with geographical component). All REs can also be commended for having a very good grasp on how their businesses (products and services) can be abused for ML/TF purposes (threats perspective), which, in turn, translates into appropriate CDD controls and monitoring scenarios to prevent this. 191. These findings are supported by supervisory data which confirms that required improvements to existing BRAs largely relate to the comprehensiveness of data sets being considered for risk assessment purposes. These shortcomings might be partly attributed to insufficiently detailed guidance on BRAs. Whilst general requirements on conducting BRAs are outlined in the AML/CFT/CPF Law and Latvijas Banka and the CRPC make additional guidance available, these are not sufficiently detailed. In particular, FIs and VASPs would benefit from having: (i) a more comprehensive list of examples of criteria for assessing inherent risks (recognising sectorial differences); and (ii) further guidance on calculation methods (in combination with thresholds, weightings) and approach to assessing and weighting internal controls (vulnerabilities)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="188. FIs and VASPs commonly conduct business-wide ML/TF risk assessments (BRA) by taking into account supranational (EU), national (NRA), sectorial (SRA) and business-specific risks. For inherent risks, FIs typically look into clients, services (products), geographies and delivery channels – these risk categories are further differentiated to include more detailed data points (the comprehensiveness of which vary depending on the size of an FI and nature of its services; the same applies to internal controls’ (vulnerabilities) assessments). Sophistication of the technological solutions used for risk assessments largely depends on the size of an FI/VASP: large credit institutions and fintech-type FIs use more advanced data analytics solutions, Power BI, other IT tools, whilst smaller firms rely on MS Excel and other manual solutions. All supervisors uniformly agree that the level of compliance with the BRA requirements have considerably increased during the assessment period both in terms of documentation (including frequency of updates) and comprehensiveness (quality). These conclusions are largely based on reviews of BRAs during on-site activities or specific targeted off-site reviews. Latvijas Banka reports that in 2023 all supervised FIs documented their risk assessments, whereas in 2019 some smaller FIs did not have BRAs available (e.g., 45% of credit unions and 85% of AIFMs). The SRS and CRPC report that there were cases of failures by VASPs and credit services providers to conduct BRAs, however, both supervisors were able to follow up on the remediation of such deficiencies. Significant improvements have also been noted regarding quality; for example, in 2021 23% of banks had critical (very severe) deficiencies in their risk assessments, in comparison to 2023 where no critical deficiencies were identified, 10% required moderate improvement and 80% required minor improvements. A similar situation was observed in the securities sector, where the level of compliance has increased since 2019 with minor improvements required in most cases and moderate improvements in around 10% of cases. 189. Over the assessment period, following strategic structural reforms within the country, the risk exposure of the financial sector has decreased significantly largely due to the shift towards servicing predominantly residents; linked to this, many banks and securities market participants changed their business models. 190. Generally, and in line with the above, all FIs and VASPs met on-site were able to comprehensively articulate national and sectorial ML/TF risks and the impact of those on their business, as well as related mitigation techniques. Whilst FIs document their BRAs and supervisors do not consider that supporting methodologies need further improvement, it was noted by the AT that most entities met on-site overly rely on risks and threats outlined in the NRA and SRA - which translates into hypothetical threats appearing in their BRAs. Most FIs were less articulate on inherent ML risks relating to certain categories of high-risk clients and/or products/services. For example, some FIs highlighted corruption as one of the main risks to their business without being able to articulate exact reasons, as they had very little or no PEP clients. Geographical risks are well understood by all FIs/VASPs met on-site which in turn allows for a comprehensive understanding of TF risk components (clients, BOs, payments with geographical component). All REs can also be commended for having a very good grasp on how their businesses (products and services) can be abused for ML/TF purposes (threats perspective), which, in turn, translates into appropriate CDD controls and monitoring scenarios to prevent this. 191. These findings are supported by supervisory data which confirms that required improvements to existing BRAs largely relate to the comprehensiveness of data sets being considered for risk assessment purposes. These shortcomings might be partly attributed to insufficiently detailed guidance on BRAs. Whilst general requirements on conducting BRAs are outlined in the AML/CFT/CPF Law and Latvijas Banka and the CRPC make additional guidance available, these are not sufficiently detailed. In particular, FIs and VASPs would benefit from having: (i) a more comprehensive list of examples of criteria for assessing inherent risks (recognising sectorial differences); and (ii) further guidance on calculation methods (in combination with thresholds, weightings) and approach to assessing and weighting internal controls (vulnerabilities)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="245. In most cases, DNFBPs have demonstrated a good understanding of national, sectoral and institutional risks, and how these have changed over time, though the SRS continues to identify shortcomings in business-wide risk assessments and risk mitigation in sectors identified as presenting a medium-high ML risk (a declining trend). Gambling operators, real estate agents and accountants consider that the NRA and SRAs now overstate the level of ML risk, taking account of vulnerabilities that have reduced since completion of NRA2. Understanding of TF risk is sufficient, given that the risks of TF in Latvia are low. 246. Real estate agents and accountants demonstrated a very clear understanding of ML risks and how these had changed during the assessment period. Other than through company formation, independent legal professionals did not articulate well how they could be used in ML. Gambling operators, advocates and notaries demonstrated a good understanding of ML risk, which has changed significantly for advocates during the assessment period as cross border business has dried-up. 247. DNFBPs assess risk and develop risk assessments, which are reviewed at least every three years. Compliance with this requirement is assessed by the SRS as part of every on-site inspection. Inspections have identified some cases where institutional risk assessments have not been conducted, all risk factors have not been identified (including results of NRA) and assessments have not been documented (a declining trend). This includes sectors assessed as presenting a medium-high ML risk. Based on inspections, the LGSI, LCSA and LCSN have concluded that DNFBPs have properly identified risks and established internal control systems to address those risks, and no major shortcomings have been identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="245. In most cases, DNFBPs have demonstrated a good understanding of national, sectoral and institutional risks, and how these have changed over time, though the SRS continues to identify shortcomings in business-wide risk assessments and risk mitigation in sectors identified as presenting a medium-high ML risk (a declining trend). Gambling operators, real estate agents and accountants consider that the NRA and SRAs now overstate the level of ML risk, taking account of vulnerabilities that have reduced since completion of NRA2. Understanding of TF risk is sufficient, given that the risks of TF in Latvia are low. 246. Real estate agents and accountants demonstrated a very clear understanding of ML risks and how these had changed during the assessment period. Other than through company formation, independent legal professionals did not articulate well how they could be used in ML. Gambling operators, advocates and notaries demonstrated a good understanding of ML risk, which has changed significantly for advocates during the assessment period as cross border business has dried-up. 247. DNFBPs assess risk and develop risk assessments, which are reviewed at least every three years. Compliance with this requirement is assessed by the SRS as part of every on-site inspection. Inspections have identified some cases where institutional risk assessments have not been conducted, all risk factors have not been identified (including results of NRA) and assessments have not been documented (a declining trend). This includes sectors assessed as presenting a medium-high ML risk. Based on inspections, the LGSI, LCSA and LCSN have concluded that DNFBPs have properly identified risks and established internal control systems to address those risks, and no major shortcomings have been identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="The registry approach 312. Latvian authorities can obtain adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on domestic legal persons through the ER in the vast majority of cases through several sources: the ER and FIs/DNFBPs. Latvian authorities demonstrated through the use of numerous case studies the use of information held on the ER by competent authorities to investigate ML involving Latvian legal persons. This includes analysis across the entire ER data to identify any connections between companies or individuals or addresses linked to the identified companies. 313. All legal persons are required to submit basic and BO information to the ER. 89% of the legal persons have filed their BO information, while there is some level of non-filing amongst certain types of legal persons created prior to these obligations being introduced or who have not made any changes to their ownership or representation information since 2021 and are therefore not legally required to file information. At the end of 2023, just over 11% of legal persons had not filed BO information (representing over 18 000 legal persons). Filing rates amongst the highest risk legal persons LLCs and JSCs is 99.87% and 99.56% respectively. The deadline for JSCs to file shareholders information to publish in the Commercial Register was 30 September 2024. Data as of 5 November 2024 shows that 84.4% (748 firms) of the JSCs have filed shareholders information to the ER. The ER has sent out reminder notices to the remaining 138 JSCs. Filing levels are particularly low for Associations, where 15 912 Associations have not filed any BO information. An additional 5 238 Associations have filed that there is no natural person meeting the definition of a BO. Statistical analysis demonstrated that out of 16 763 legal persons that had not filed BO information at the time of the onsite, 62% had a Latvian bank account. Of the remaining 6 436 legal persons that have not filed any information and do not have a Latvian bank account, 98% are identified as essentially dormant, having not filed returns with the SRS since prior to 2021 and meet the requirements to be subject to simple liquidation procedure. The remaining circa 100 legal persons are filing annual returns with the SRS demonstrating that they have no, or almost no annual turnover. Non-filing of information on the ER by legal persons who maintain Latvian bank account is not considered a material deficiency due to the availability of CDD information, as well as the fact that in almost all cases for three types of legal persons the BOs will either correspond to the board, and this information is available on the ER already, or there will be no BOs due to the way control is dispersed for these types of legal persons. The lack of availability of information on the circa 6 436 legal persons that have not filed information and do not have a Latvian bank account is considered a minor deficiency due to the low risk of these types of legal persons for ML, the overall low rating for NPOs in Latvia for TF [57] and the demonstrated lack of economic activity of those legal persons. 314. Latvia identifies LLCs as having the highest inherent risk of misuse for ML. The compliance rate with reporting requirements is assessed to be at 99.87%, but with 1 627 legal persons declaring that they cannot identify their BOs. [58] The ER outlined that, where a legal person confirmed that it cannot identify its BO, that rational is checked by the ER to verify that there is no BO, for example, due to the disparate decision making of the legal person and spread of share ownership. This information is also shared with relevant LEAs. The controller (senior managing official) of a legal person is identified at all times. 315. The number of applications for new legal persons has remained broadly stable over the review period, averaging around 16 000 applications a year. There has been an uptick in refusals in 2022 and 2023 for the creation of new legal persons, though these remain only around 1% of applications. Refusals in relation to changes of information for existing information are considerably higher, averaging around 5% between 2017-23, though they have been steadily decreasing and in 2023 were at 3.7%. 316. Information submitted to the ER is subject to a range of checks that are being used effectively to ensure accurate information is contained on the register. The ER has postponed the creation in around a third of cases and postponed changes to existing information in around 20% of cases, on average. This can and has been done due to incomplete information or non-payment of fees. The ER has and continues to undertake research each year to understand the rational for refusals and postponements, based on sampling. From this research authorities conclude that postponements began to be made in 2018 in relation to failure to submit the required BO information, for example, on the nature of ownership or control. To date, refusals for the creation of new legal persons have largely been made based on tax risks identified by the SRS. However, examples were provided demonstrating refusals based on incomplete or insufficiently substantiated BO information. As part of checks, ownership structures are being checked by a state notary, including by checking foreign BO databases in case of need and asking additional supporting documents. Sanctions screening has taken place by the ER on all currently held information every time sanctions lists are changed and on all newly submitted information at the point that it is submitted. An automated digital solution is expected to be in place in June 2025 that will result in continuous screening in real time. In addition, domestic BOs (i.e., founders and executive board members) are checked for criminality (i.e., for deprivation of rights) by accessing relevant law enforcement databases on criminal records. Similar information linked to criminal records is not sought for foreign BOs. Whilst there is no mechanism to monitor how promptly legal persons or arrangements submit required information to the ER following the changes, the authorities rely on discrepancy reporting mechanism that up until now has not signalled delays in reporting required BO information. As a result of the checks undertaken, and the ongoing review of reasons for refusals and delays to incorporation and changes, the impact of discrepancy reporting (see below), information contained on the register is assessed to be sufficiently accurate. For more information on the adequacy and timeliness of reporting, refer to R.24 and R.25 in the TC Annex. 317. Whilst the overall process of obtaining and accessing adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the BO in a timely fashion has significantly improved, when compared to the start of the review period, authorities identify that challenges remain in verifying this information, especially for entities with complex ownership structures or those established in jurisdictions with differing regulatory standards. Authorities demonstrated how the ER assesses and records information on complex international ownership structures to determine the BOs of legal persons. Foreign legal persons 318. As noted above, foreign legal persons that perform taxable activities in Latvia are obliged to register branches or representative offices at the ER or SRS. Business activity without registration is monitored by the SRS and is subject to administrative penalties. Between March 2021and 13 February 2023, a total of 1 323 branches and representative offices that did not disclose BOs have been excluded (struck off) from the register. As of 14 February 2023, an impressive 99% of branches and representative offices, totalling 561 out of 568, had successfully registered information on their BOs, with the remaining 1% going through administrative procedures. Nominee shareholders and directors 319. There are no requirements for nominee directors and shareholders to disclose their status or to register or licence, except for registration requirements applicable to CSPs that might indirectly capture some providers of nominee services. However, this service is not explicitly disclosed when registering. As such, there are no explicit legal requirements for nominees’ information to appear in the ER or other relevant registries. However, failure to declare a BO constitutes a criminal offence, according to the CL. The introduced enhanced checks and co-operation between the ER and the SRS in certain higher risk scenarios, as well as the application of CDD measures by the REs, serve as additional means to identify nominee arrangements in practice and access such information. See Section 5.2 for further information on mitigants and materiality. Bearer shares 320. In June 2022, the Commercial Law was amended to prevent the issuance of new bearer shares and to require existing bearer shares to be dematerialised and registered in the central securities depository by July 2023. Any shares not registered by the deadline cease to have legal force. See also R.24. Information held by FIs and DNFBPs 321. Latvian authorities can access information held by REs, which typically takes between three to seven business days, however, the timeframe for disclosure can be legally specified by the requesting LEA. LEAs outlined that they will always use the ER to access BO information in every case involving a Latvian legal person, however, they might also compel the disclosure of information from FIs, mostly banks and to a lesser extent DNFBPs. 322. Deficiencies identified by supervisors typically relate to not properly documenting checks carried out on beneficial ownership rather than non-identification on BOs. Instances of serious BO failings have reduced over the reporting period. REs cited the imposition of EU Russian sanctions as a significant factor in increasing their focus on identification of BO information given Latvia’s risk and context. LEAs outlined that even in cases where criminality has been identified involving provisions of services to domestic and foreign legal persons serviced by Latvian REs, CDD information held by Latvian FIs and DNFBPs was found by LEAs to be sufficiently accurate. 323. As outlined in core issue 5.2, several measures are made to ensure the accuracy of information held both by the ER and by REs. The effectiveness of these two individual approaches is complemented by mandatory discrepancy reporting by REs, who as of July 2020, must report any discrepancies to the ER no later than three working days after identifying the discrepancy. Between July 2020 and December 2023, 1 641 discrepancies were reported to the ER. It is not clear whether the information held in the ER database is checked against that held on the Account Register. Table 6.2. shows the actions that have resulted from these reports. Over 90% of discrepancy reports were submitted by credit institutions, with DNFBPs responsible for only 13 reports. Table 5.2. Discrepancy reports made to the register between 2020-2023: further actions Total number of discrepancy reports: 1 641 No discrepancy found: 35 Reports to State Police: 1 606 Reports subject to analysis Departmental inspections 296 Joint departmental inspections 50 Criminal proceedings initiated 560 Added to pre-existing criminal proceedings 16 Refusal to commence criminal prosecution Refusal to start criminal proceedings 399 Criminal proceedings that have been terminated 115 No grounds to believe that BO information is false, warnings on the register subsequently deleted 165 Reports resulting in prosecution Handed to PO for initiation of criminal proceedings 7 Ongoing legal proceedings 6 Information held by legal persons themselves 324. Legal persons are legally required to maintain a register of their registered shareholders (Commercial Law) and keep and update information on BOs (AML/CFT/CPF Law, 18.1(4), see R.24). Latvian LEAs have necessary powers to compel this information and use it, when necessary. There are no routine monitoring mechanisms (e.g., checks at the physical premises) established, however, mandatory reporting to the ER combined with the discrepancy reporting by the REs and verification checks by the ER ensures accuracy of BO information, as discussed above. Footnotes [57]. Authorities provided a breakdown of the small number NPOs considered at a heightened risk for TF; amongst them, BO information was not declared for only 5 legal persons. [58]. Ownership-related data in this context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="The registry approach 312. Latvian authorities can obtain adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on domestic legal persons through the ER in the vast majority of cases through several sources: the ER and FIs/DNFBPs. Latvian authorities demonstrated through the use of numerous case studies the use of information held on the ER by competent authorities to investigate ML involving Latvian legal persons. This includes analysis across the entire ER data to identify any connections between companies or individuals or addresses linked to the identified companies. 313. All legal persons are required to submit basic and BO information to the ER. 89% of the legal persons have filed their BO information, while there is some level of non-filing amongst certain types of legal persons created prior to these obligations being introduced or who have not made any changes to their ownership or representation information since 2021 and are therefore not legally required to file information. At the end of 2023, just over 11% of legal persons had not filed BO information (representing over 18 000 legal persons). Filing rates amongst the highest risk legal persons LLCs and JSCs is 99.87% and 99.56% respectively. The deadline for JSCs to file shareholders information to publish in the Commercial Register was 30 September 2024. Data as of 5 November 2024 shows that 84.4% (748 firms) of the JSCs have filed shareholders information to the ER. The ER has sent out reminder notices to the remaining 138 JSCs. Filing levels are particularly low for Associations, where 15 912 Associations have not filed any BO information. An additional 5 238 Associations have filed that there is no natural person meeting the definition of a BO. Statistical analysis demonstrated that out of 16 763 legal persons that had not filed BO information at the time of the onsite, 62% had a Latvian bank account. Of the remaining 6 436 legal persons that have not filed any information and do not have a Latvian bank account, 98% are identified as essentially dormant, having not filed returns with the SRS since prior to 2021 and meet the requirements to be subject to simple liquidation procedure. The remaining circa 100 legal persons are filing annual returns with the SRS demonstrating that they have no, or almost no annual turnover. Non-filing of information on the ER by legal persons who maintain Latvian bank account is not considered a material deficiency due to the availability of CDD information, as well as the fact that in almost all cases for three types of legal persons the BOs will either correspond to the board, and this information is available on the ER already, or there will be no BOs due to the way control is dispersed for these types of legal persons. The lack of availability of information on the circa 6 436 legal persons that have not filed information and do not have a Latvian bank account is considered a minor deficiency due to the low risk of these types of legal persons for ML, the overall low rating for NPOs in Latvia for TF [57] and the demonstrated lack of economic activity of those legal persons. 314. Latvia identifies LLCs as having the highest inherent risk of misuse for ML. The compliance rate with reporting requirements is assessed to be at 99.87%, but with 1 627 legal persons declaring that they cannot identify their BOs. [58] The ER outlined that, where a legal person confirmed that it cannot identify its BO, that rational is checked by the ER to verify that there is no BO, for example, due to the disparate decision making of the legal person and spread of share ownership. This information is also shared with relevant LEAs. The controller (senior managing official) of a legal person is identified at all times. 315. The number of applications for new legal persons has remained broadly stable over the review period, averaging around 16 000 applications a year. There has been an uptick in refusals in 2022 and 2023 for the creation of new legal persons, though these remain only around 1% of applications. Refusals in relation to changes of information for existing information are considerably higher, averaging around 5% between 2017-23, though they have been steadily decreasing and in 2023 were at 3.7%. 316. Information submitted to the ER is subject to a range of checks that are being used effectively to ensure accurate information is contained on the register. The ER has postponed the creation in around a third of cases and postponed changes to existing information in around 20% of cases, on average. This can and has been done due to incomplete information or non-payment of fees. The ER has and continues to undertake research each year to understand the rational for refusals and postponements, based on sampling. From this research authorities conclude that postponements began to be made in 2018 in relation to failure to submit the required BO information, for example, on the nature of ownership or control. To date, refusals for the creation of new legal persons have largely been made based on tax risks identified by the SRS. However, examples were provided demonstrating refusals based on incomplete or insufficiently substantiated BO information. As part of checks, ownership structures are being checked by a state notary, including by checking foreign BO databases in case of need and asking additional supporting documents. Sanctions screening has taken place by the ER on all currently held information every time sanctions lists are changed and on all newly submitted information at the point that it is submitted. An automated digital solution is expected to be in place in June 2025 that will result in continuous screening in real time. In addition, domestic BOs (i.e., founders and executive board members) are checked for criminality (i.e., for deprivation of rights) by accessing relevant law enforcement databases on criminal records. Similar information linked to criminal records is not sought for foreign BOs. Whilst there is no mechanism to monitor how promptly legal persons or arrangements submit required information to the ER following the changes, the authorities rely on discrepancy reporting mechanism that up until now has not signalled delays in reporting required BO information. As a result of the checks undertaken, and the ongoing review of reasons for refusals and delays to incorporation and changes, the impact of discrepancy reporting (see below), information contained on the register is assessed to be sufficiently accurate. For more information on the adequacy and timeliness of reporting, refer to R.24 and R.25 in the TC Annex. 317. Whilst the overall process of obtaining and accessing adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the BO in a timely fashion has significantly improved, when compared to the start of the review period, authorities identify that challenges remain in verifying this information, especially for entities with complex ownership structures or those established in jurisdictions with differing regulatory standards. Authorities demonstrated how the ER assesses and records information on complex international ownership structures to determine the BOs of legal persons. Foreign legal persons 318. As noted above, foreign legal persons that perform taxable activities in Latvia are obliged to register branches or representative offices at the ER or SRS. Business activity without registration is monitored by the SRS and is subject to administrative penalties. Between March 2021and 13 February 2023, a total of 1 323 branches and representative offices that did not disclose BOs have been excluded (struck off) from the register. As of 14 February 2023, an impressive 99% of branches and representative offices, totalling 561 out of 568, had successfully registered information on their BOs, with the remaining 1% going through administrative procedures. Nominee shareholders and directors 319. There are no requirements for nominee directors and shareholders to disclose their status or to register or licence, except for registration requirements applicable to CSPs that might indirectly capture some providers of nominee services. However, this service is not explicitly disclosed when registering. As such, there are no explicit legal requirements for nominees’ information to appear in the ER or other relevant registries. However, failure to declare a BO constitutes a criminal offence, according to the CL. The introduced enhanced checks and co-operation between the ER and the SRS in certain higher risk scenarios, as well as the application of CDD measures by the REs, serve as additional means to identify nominee arrangements in practice and access such information. See Section 5.2 for further information on mitigants and materiality. Bearer shares 320. In June 2022, the Commercial Law was amended to prevent the issuance of new bearer shares and to require existing bearer shares to be dematerialised and registered in the central securities depository by July 2023. Any shares not registered by the deadline cease to have legal force. See also R.24. Information held by FIs and DNFBPs 321. Latvian authorities can access information held by REs, which typically takes between three to seven business days, however, the timeframe for disclosure can be legally specified by the requesting LEA. LEAs outlined that they will always use the ER to access BO information in every case involving a Latvian legal person, however, they might also compel the disclosure of information from FIs, mostly banks and to a lesser extent DNFBPs. 322. Deficiencies identified by supervisors typically relate to not properly documenting checks carried out on beneficial ownership rather than non-identification on BOs. Instances of serious BO failings have reduced over the reporting period. REs cited the imposition of EU Russian sanctions as a significant factor in increasing their focus on identification of BO information given Latvia’s risk and context. LEAs outlined that even in cases where criminality has been identified involving provisions of services to domestic and foreign legal persons serviced by Latvian REs, CDD information held by Latvian FIs and DNFBPs was found by LEAs to be sufficiently accurate. 323. As outlined in core issue 5.2, several measures are made to ensure the accuracy of information held both by the ER and by REs. The effectiveness of these two individual approaches is complemented by mandatory discrepancy reporting by REs, who as of July 2020, must report any discrepancies to the ER no later than three working days after identifying the discrepancy. Between July 2020 and December 2023, 1 641 discrepancies were reported to the ER. It is not clear whether the information held in the ER database is checked against that held on the Account Register. Table 6.2. shows the actions that have resulted from these reports. Over 90% of discrepancy reports were submitted by credit institutions, with DNFBPs responsible for only 13 reports. Table 5.2. Discrepancy reports made to the register between 2020-2023: further actions Total number of discrepancy reports: 1 641 No discrepancy found: 35 Reports to State Police: 1 606 Reports subject to analysis Departmental inspections 296 Joint departmental inspections 50 Criminal proceedings initiated 560 Added to pre-existing criminal proceedings 16 Refusal to commence criminal prosecution Refusal to start criminal proceedings 399 Criminal proceedings that have been terminated 115 No grounds to believe that BO information is false, warnings on the register subsequently deleted 165 Reports resulting in prosecution Handed to PO for initiation of criminal proceedings 7 Ongoing legal proceedings 6 Information held by legal persons themselves 324. Legal persons are legally required to maintain a register of their registered shareholders (Commercial Law) and keep and update information on BOs (AML/CFT/CPF Law, 18.1(4), see R.24). Latvian LEAs have necessary powers to compel this information and use it, when necessary. There are no routine monitoring mechanisms (e.g., checks at the physical premises) established, however, mandatory reporting to the ER combined with the discrepancy reporting by the REs and verification checks by the ER ensures accuracy of BO information, as discussed above. Footnotes [57]. Authorities provided a breakdown of the small number NPOs considered at a heightened risk for TF; amongst them, BO information was not declared for only 5 legal persons. [58]. Ownership-related data in this context." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="358. The FIU actively engages with relevant LEAs and SCAs through co-operative and proactive collaboration, which leads to strong co-operation and exchange of information and intelligence in Latvia. This includes sharing timely intelligence with LEAs, providing strategic insight and participating in joint operational planning to ensure that investigations are as effective as possible. 359. Co-operation and exchange of information and financial intelligence between relevant agencies occurs regularly and securely, ensuring effective collaboration while maintaining strict confidentiality. Latvia’s model for public-public and public-private information exchange, known as the CCG, has proven to be a highly effective mechanism for fostering collaborative operational and tactical support between public authorities and REs. This model allows any agency or RE to initiate information exchange through secure and encrypted communication channels, ensuring the integrity and protection of sensitive data during the sharing process. CCG meetings occurred at an increasing rate over the past years. With around 300 CCG meetings annually, they effectively develop information for financial investigations in a secure environment, leveraging extensive information and expertise. Authorities provided case examples of successful CCG use, leading to identification and dissemination of suspected ML and related offences. For instance, CCG co-ordinates with FIU, LEAs, and banks to issue freezing orders, avoiding tipping-off and ensuring success. [77] 360. For complex cases, the FIU established the &quot;Operational Centre&quot;(OpCEN), a secure office space for FIU and LEA analysts to collaborate. This setup ensures efficient intelligence sharing and investigation while maintaining security. Analysts can access their IT platforms temporarily, ensuring confidentiality and system integrity. OpCEN's infrastructure includes separate access credentials, encrypted data transfer, and strict information handling policies. Alongside the CCG model, these demonstrate Latvia's commitment to fostering innovative, secure, and effective mechanisms for tackling financial crime through co-operation between public and private stakeholders. [78] 361. Security and confidentiality are fundamental to the FIU’s systems, ensuring compliance with data protection laws and best practices. Agencies use secure IT platforms with access controls, encryption, and monitoring to prevent unauthorized access. FIU analysts and LEA personnel are trained in information security protocols to maintain data confidentiality. 362. The case of Bank A below illustrates Latvia's comprehensive response to professional, complex, stand-alone ML linked to its historical status as a regional financial centre (“first risk profile”). The bank was allegedly involved in the systematic laundering of funds involving EUR 300 billion worth of transactions through shell companies and non-resident accounts from 2013 to 2018, utilizing a professional ML service (&quot;laundromat&quot;) that facilitated the registration of shell entities and their accounts. Following international scrutiny, Latvia initiated a controlled liquidation process overseen by the FCMC (now Latvijas Banka) with targeted supervisory actions. [79] 363. The outcome of these targeted supervisory actions was that FIU Latvia was granted direct, comprehensive access to the bank's historical data. As a result, the FIU issued more than 1 000 disseminations to LEAs, resulting in the initiation of 584 criminal proceedings. In addition, EUR 1.18 billion was frozen and EUR 119 million has already been confiscated thus far. 364. International co-operation was pivotal. FIU Latvia co-ordinated with the IFIT, involving FIUs from 25 jurisdictions, exchanging data, and identifying ML typologies. The IFIT contributed to the freezing of EUR 120 million and confiscation of EUR 25 million globally in the IFIT countries abroad. It also fostered improvements in national AML/CFT legislation, enhanced analytical capacities, and the development of new tools and methodologies in the participating jurisdictions. (This case earned international recognition, including the Egmont Group’s Best Case Award in 2022). Box 6.2. FIU analysis of Bank A laundromat schemes In 2018, a Latvian bank (Bank A) was publicly identified by a foreign authority as central to a global laundromat scheme. Latvian authorities promptly suspended its licence, and the FIU launched an in-depth investigation. The FIU found that, since 2011, the bank had onboarded high-risk foreign clients—including shell companies, non-resident politically exposed persons (PEPs), and customers from CIS countries—without conducting proper due diligence. The FIU analysed over EUR 300 billion in transactions and received more than 3 000 STRs under a specialised analysis framework. It froze assets in over 1 100 accounts worth EUR 1.18 billion. Disseminations to the State Police, other LEAs, and the PO included over 1 000 operational analyses and risk assessments, identifying typologies such as TBML, fictitious business activity, foreign shell companies, and deviations from normal conduct. This intelligence led to at least 584 criminal proceedings against bank clients, with EUR 1.17 billion seized and over EUR 119 million already confiscated. Eight bank officials have been charged with ML for facilitating the scheme. The FIU’s role in exposing this laundromat operation was a catalyst for significant reform of Latvia’s AML legal and institutional framework. 365. FIU Latvia, along with the PO, SRS TCPD, and major credit institutions, developed a comprehensive list of tax crime typologies and indicators. While not publicly available, this document was shared with REs and LEAs, enhancing the quantity and quality of tax crime STRs received by FIU Latvia and subsequently disseminated to the SRS. Co-operation between relevant authorities on financial intelligence shows sustained co-operation and exchange of relevant information between authorities and even with the private sector. 366. The co-operation and exchange of information with supervisors is also substantial. The FIU meets regularly with the banks (credit institutions) in Latvia to exchange on developing improvements in their AML/CFT regime. For example, in April 2020, the FIU Latvia informed FCMC (Latvijas Banka) on the lower quality of some of the STRs submitted at the beginning of the process. After meetings, the FCMC used this information to supplement the methodology with additional provisions regarding reporting, thus improving the overall quality of STRs. As noted in Core Issue 6.1 above, some DNFBP reports are lacking in quality and quantity and to address this, the FIU provides regular (annual) feedback to several groups, such as the LCSN for notaries and LGSI for casinos on reporting quality and other relevant information. For example, in 2020 co-operation with the LCSN led to identification of discrepancies in CDD for property transactions and prompted targeted inspections. 367. Prosecutorial authorities are closely engaged in the use and development of financial intelligence. The Specialised Prosecutors’ Division provides early-stage guidance in TF and ML cases. Prosecutors also co-develop general investigative guidelines (e.g., for TF) with investigative agencies like the State Security Service. Footnotes [77]. Data is for the latest three years. For more precise numbers of CCG meetings by participant please see IO1. Banks regularly participate in CCG meetings (in 2023 banks participated in 93 or 33% of all CCG meetings). [78]. In straightforward cases, the FIU will transmit disclosures directly to the appropriate competent authority via the goAML platform. Corresponding requests for supplementary information from the competent authority are likewise submitted to the FIU through the same system. In instances where LEAs are independently developing financial intelligence based on their own operational intelligence, preliminary queries against FIU-held data are conducted through the secure “Black-Box” interface. [79]. The liquidation process was marked by increased supervisory controls and interagency co-operation. Measures included EDD, independent audit reviews, transaction monitoring, and sample testing of client files. The FCMC imposed strict requirements for payouts to creditors and asset sale." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="358. The FIU actively engages with relevant LEAs and SCAs through co-operative and proactive collaboration, which leads to strong co-operation and exchange of information and intelligence in Latvia. This includes sharing timely intelligence with LEAs, providing strategic insight and participating in joint operational planning to ensure that investigations are as effective as possible. 359. Co-operation and exchange of information and financial intelligence between relevant agencies occurs regularly and securely, ensuring effective collaboration while maintaining strict confidentiality. Latvia’s model for public-public and public-private information exchange, known as the CCG, has proven to be a highly effective mechanism for fostering collaborative operational and tactical support between public authorities and REs. This model allows any agency or RE to initiate information exchange through secure and encrypted communication channels, ensuring the integrity and protection of sensitive data during the sharing process. CCG meetings occurred at an increasing rate over the past years. With around 300 CCG meetings annually, they effectively develop information for financial investigations in a secure environment, leveraging extensive information and expertise. Authorities provided case examples of successful CCG use, leading to identification and dissemination of suspected ML and related offences. For instance, CCG co-ordinates with FIU, LEAs, and banks to issue freezing orders, avoiding tipping-off and ensuring success. [77] 360. For complex cases, the FIU established the &quot;Operational Centre&quot;(OpCEN), a secure office space for FIU and LEA analysts to collaborate. This setup ensures efficient intelligence sharing and investigation while maintaining security. Analysts can access their IT platforms temporarily, ensuring confidentiality and system integrity. OpCEN's infrastructure includes separate access credentials, encrypted data transfer, and strict information handling policies. Alongside the CCG model, these demonstrate Latvia's commitment to fostering innovative, secure, and effective mechanisms for tackling financial crime through co-operation between public and private stakeholders. [78] 361. Security and confidentiality are fundamental to the FIU’s systems, ensuring compliance with data protection laws and best practices. Agencies use secure IT platforms with access controls, encryption, and monitoring to prevent unauthorized access. FIU analysts and LEA personnel are trained in information security protocols to maintain data confidentiality. 362. The case of Bank A below illustrates Latvia's comprehensive response to professional, complex, stand-alone ML linked to its historical status as a regional financial centre (“first risk profile”). The bank was allegedly involved in the systematic laundering of funds involving EUR 300 billion worth of transactions through shell companies and non-resident accounts from 2013 to 2018, utilizing a professional ML service (&quot;laundromat&quot;) that facilitated the registration of shell entities and their accounts. Following international scrutiny, Latvia initiated a controlled liquidation process overseen by the FCMC (now Latvijas Banka) with targeted supervisory actions. [79] 363. The outcome of these targeted supervisory actions was that FIU Latvia was granted direct, comprehensive access to the bank's historical data. As a result, the FIU issued more than 1 000 disseminations to LEAs, resulting in the initiation of 584 criminal proceedings. In addition, EUR 1.18 billion was frozen and EUR 119 million has already been confiscated thus far. 364. International co-operation was pivotal. FIU Latvia co-ordinated with the IFIT, involving FIUs from 25 jurisdictions, exchanging data, and identifying ML typologies. The IFIT contributed to the freezing of EUR 120 million and confiscation of EUR 25 million globally in the IFIT countries abroad. It also fostered improvements in national AML/CFT legislation, enhanced analytical capacities, and the development of new tools and methodologies in the participating jurisdictions. (This case earned international recognition, including the Egmont Group’s Best Case Award in 2022). Box 6.2. FIU analysis of Bank A laundromat schemes In 2018, a Latvian bank (Bank A) was publicly identified by a foreign authority as central to a global laundromat scheme. Latvian authorities promptly suspended its licence, and the FIU launched an in-depth investigation. The FIU found that, since 2011, the bank had onboarded high-risk foreign clients—including shell companies, non-resident politically exposed persons (PEPs), and customers from CIS countries—without conducting proper due diligence. The FIU analysed over EUR 300 billion in transactions and received more than 3 000 STRs under a specialised analysis framework. It froze assets in over 1 100 accounts worth EUR 1.18 billion. Disseminations to the State Police, other LEAs, and the PO included over 1 000 operational analyses and risk assessments, identifying typologies such as TBML, fictitious business activity, foreign shell companies, and deviations from normal conduct. This intelligence led to at least 584 criminal proceedings against bank clients, with EUR 1.17 billion seized and over EUR 119 million already confiscated. Eight bank officials have been charged with ML for facilitating the scheme. The FIU’s role in exposing this laundromat operation was a catalyst for significant reform of Latvia’s AML legal and institutional framework. 365. FIU Latvia, along with the PO, SRS TCPD, and major credit institutions, developed a comprehensive list of tax crime typologies and indicators. While not publicly available, this document was shared with REs and LEAs, enhancing the quantity and quality of tax crime STRs received by FIU Latvia and subsequently disseminated to the SRS. Co-operation between relevant authorities on financial intelligence shows sustained co-operation and exchange of relevant information between authorities and even with the private sector. 366. The co-operation and exchange of information with supervisors is also substantial. The FIU meets regularly with the banks (credit institutions) in Latvia to exchange on developing improvements in their AML/CFT regime. For example, in April 2020, the FIU Latvia informed FCMC (Latvijas Banka) on the lower quality of some of the STRs submitted at the beginning of the process. After meetings, the FCMC used this information to supplement the methodology with additional provisions regarding reporting, thus improving the overall quality of STRs. As noted in Core Issue 6.1 above, some DNFBP reports are lacking in quality and quantity and to address this, the FIU provides regular (annual) feedback to several groups, such as the LCSN for notaries and LGSI for casinos on reporting quality and other relevant information. For example, in 2020 co-operation with the LCSN led to identification of discrepancies in CDD for property transactions and prompted targeted inspections. 367. Prosecutorial authorities are closely engaged in the use and development of financial intelligence. The Specialised Prosecutors’ Division provides early-stage guidance in TF and ML cases. Prosecutors also co-develop general investigative guidelines (e.g., for TF) with investigative agencies like the State Security Service. Footnotes [77]. Data is for the latest three years. For more precise numbers of CCG meetings by participant please see IO1. Banks regularly participate in CCG meetings (in 2023 banks participated in 93 or 33% of all CCG meetings). [78]. In straightforward cases, the FIU will transmit disclosures directly to the appropriate competent authority via the goAML platform. Corresponding requests for supplementary information from the competent authority are likewise submitted to the FIU through the same system. In instances where LEAs are independently developing financial intelligence based on their own operational intelligence, preliminary queries against FIU-held data are conducted through the secure “Black-Box” interface. [79]. The liquidation process was marked by increased supervisory controls and interagency co-operation. Measures included EDD, independent audit reviews, transaction monitoring, and sample testing of client files. The FCMC imposed strict requirements for payouts to creditors and asset sale." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Latvia’s custodial sanctions are broadly effective, proportionate and dissuasive. There are, however, some weaknesses in the pursuit of legal persons. 404. On average, the length of deprivation of liberty is 45 months (or just under 4 years). Sanctions are proportionate to other offences, and proportionate to the severity of the ML offence, with some persons serving community service and fines as a punishment for crimes such as acting as a money mule. As the chart below indicates, the number of instances of convictions involving prison terms and non-administrative sanctions has increased. Figure 7.3. Number of penalties for ML against natural persons with a conviction Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 405. The number of fines imposed for ML remains broadly steady (see figure above). This appears to be in contradiction with the principle to apply monetary punishments for economic crimes instead of imprisonment. When these fines are applied, their amount seems proportionate and dissuasive. A community service as a punishment is increasingly used, with over 68 penalties involving community service in 2023. These penalties apply to non-aggravated ML and aggravated ML and mostly for money mules, [98] where it is proved to be effective and proportionate. 406. Penalties against legal persons include fines, liquidation, deprivation of right to carry out activities and confiscation. With just 10 convictions of legal persons, it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of this system. Fines totalled just over EUR 3 million, which highlights a relatively light approach to sanctions of legal persons, given Latvia’s risk, context and materiality as a former regional financial centre where major ML laundromat schemes occurred (see table below). Table 7.10. Convictions of legal persons 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Number of convictions 1 2 3 4 10 Level of fine imposed (in EUR) 8 600 50 000 10 000 3 118 600 3 187 200 Liquidation 1 1 Deprivation of right to carry out activities 1 1 Deprivation of right to carry out activities (with prosecutor’s penal order) 2 2 Confiscation 1 1 2 Other measures 0 Footnotes [98]. Mostly young, unemployed students, who have no income and ability to pay." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="403. Latvia’s custodial sanctions are broadly effective, proportionate and dissuasive. There are, however, some weaknesses in the pursuit of legal persons. 404. On average, the length of deprivation of liberty is 45 months (or just under 4 years). Sanctions are proportionate to other offences, and proportionate to the severity of the ML offence, with some persons serving community service and fines as a punishment for crimes such as acting as a money mule. As the chart below indicates, the number of instances of convictions involving prison terms and non-administrative sanctions has increased. Figure 7.3. Number of penalties for ML against natural persons with a conviction Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 405. The number of fines imposed for ML remains broadly steady (see figure above). This appears to be in contradiction with the principle to apply monetary punishments for economic crimes instead of imprisonment. When these fines are applied, their amount seems proportionate and dissuasive. A community service as a punishment is increasingly used, with over 68 penalties involving community service in 2023. These penalties apply to non-aggravated ML and aggravated ML and mostly for money mules, [98] where it is proved to be effective and proportionate. 406. Penalties against legal persons include fines, liquidation, deprivation of right to carry out activities and confiscation. With just 10 convictions of legal persons, it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of this system. Fines totalled just over EUR 3 million, which highlights a relatively light approach to sanctions of legal persons, given Latvia’s risk, context and materiality as a former regional financial centre where major ML laundromat schemes occurred (see table below). Table 7.10. Convictions of legal persons 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Number of convictions 1 2 3 4 10 Level of fine imposed (in EUR) 8 600 50 000 10 000 3 118 600 3 187 200 Liquidation 1 1 Deprivation of right to carry out activities 1 1 Deprivation of right to carry out activities (with prosecutor’s penal order) 2 2 Confiscation 1 1 2 Other measures 0 Footnotes [98]. Mostly young, unemployed students, who have no income and ability to pay." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 437. Latvia is confiscating falsely and undeclared cash to a large extent. Thanks to additional resources and legal and regulatory reforms, authorities are targeting and identifying more cases at the border, which highlights important progress for interdicting currency/BNI at the borders. 438. The SRS Customs Administration officers carry out cash controls at the external and internal (EU) borders (declaration and disclosure, respectively). Latvia has borders with three EU Member States (Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden) as well as with Belarus and the Russian Federation. The country has one major international airport (Riga) and about nine sea harbours/ports. 439. Cash declarations must be made above EUR 10 000. Latvia applies a declaration system at external borders and a disclosure system for internal (EU) travellers and packages. As regards the declaration of cash entering or leaving the EU's external borders, Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 of the European Parliament and of the Council applies (see R.32). For amounts under EUR 35 000 [113] and when there is no suspicion of underlying offences such as cash smuggling or ML, authorities apply an administrative process and penalty worth up to 20% of the undeclared amount. For amounts more than this and for all amounts that are suspected of being proceeds of crime (or part of a broader smuggling or ML scheme), criminal liability applies (Sec. 195, CL). In total, there are 179 cases a year where the administrative sanctions are used for these amounts between EUR 10 000 and EUR 35 000. These cases led to administrative fines worth EUR 340 000 over the period assessed (see table below). 440. The initiation of criminal proceedings, and the confiscation of sums at the border shows an improvement over the last period (2013-2017) where authorities initiated no criminal proceedings or confiscations. This improvement has also occurred at a time when the risk from cross-border cash smuggling has decreased, with the near closure of several border crossings with the Russian Federation and Belarus (since 2020), and as Latvia has transitioned away from its role as a regional financial centre. Between 2018-2023, Latvian authorities received nearly 5 500 cash declarations, averaging 909 per year, with a drop during COVID-19 (2020-2022). In 2023, this increased to over 1 400. Authorities detected 256 undeclared cash declarations totalling EUR 9.5 million (around EUR 1.6 million per year). Over half (140) led to criminal proceedings for ML or non-declaration, resulting in 38 prosecutions and 8 confiscation orders worth EUR 1.67 million. Table 8.5. Annual declaration numbers and breaches (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Number of declarations/disclosures submitted 885 985 467 531 1 166 1 417 5 451 Number of false declaring 29 45 16 38 51 77 256 Number of cases where sanctions applied* (administrative violations) 36 27 3 12 28 66 172 Number of initiated criminal proceedings for ML and/or non-declaration or false declaration 7 47 20 28 27 11 140 Number of sent criminal proceedings for initiation of criminal prosecution for legalization of cash and/or non-declaration or false declaration - 5 5 4 13 11 38 Number of cases where confiscation applied (by TCPB) - - 2 2 2 2 8 Table 8.6. Annual value of disclosures and confiscations for cross-border currency (EUR, 2018-2023) Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Annual value of declared/disclosed assets in EUR 222 241 638 162 784 412 58 570 516 55 684 221 79 903 489 41 247 680 620 431 956 Annual value of undeclared/falsely declared assets in EUR 522 685 2 570 366 530 174 2 454 866 1 780 934 1 613 244 9 472 269 Annual value of fines in EUR 30 690 40 760 6 696 42 952 78 258 141 139 340 495 Annual value of confiscation orders in EUR (by TCPB) - - 42 538 271 934 116 915 1 241 822 1 673 208 441. In most cases, criminal proceedings initiated for moving cash across the border are for undeclared cash. These often involve citizens from neighbouring countries . Latvia’s legal framework does not require identification of a predicate offence. The number of administrative violations increased and consequently the total amount of fines imposed increased, too. However, the number of criminal prosecutions decreased compared to previous years. One factor that hinders effectiveness is that most of the possible predicate crimes and possible ML schemes take place in some neighbouring countries, where it is currently difficult to receive trusted information and in timely manner from those countries. As it is challenging to investigate the predicate offense that has occurred in these countries, cash movements are criminally investigated as stand-alone ML. 442. In response to undeclared assets and suspicions at the border, SRS TCPD initiated 140 criminal proceedings for non-declaration or false declaration of cash, of which 38 were sent to PO for prosecution and ten of these were for ML. In eight criminal proceedings, the court declared the seized funds to be the proceeds of crime and ordered the confiscation of the cash, totalling EUR 1 673 208. Figure 8.3. Initiated criminal proceedings regarding ML and/or non-declaration or false declaration Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 443. Overall, Latvia has implemented the EU framework to register cross-border cash and BNI declarations for external borders to a large extent. This is now starting to yield some criminal investigations into cross-border smuggling, and some limited number of ML investigations, with some confiscations. Noting that authorities may at any time trigger an investigation of suspected ML and criminal offences for non-declaration, authorities should nevertheless continue to systematically monitor threshold violations that fall under EUR 35 000 to carefully to ensure that cash smuggling is not occurring at or near these threshold amounts. Footnotes [113]. The amount corresponds to the amount of 50 times the minimum monthly wage of any given year." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 437. Latvia is confiscating falsely and undeclared cash to a large extent. Thanks to additional resources and legal and regulatory reforms, authorities are targeting and identifying more cases at the border, which highlights important progress for interdicting currency/BNI at the borders. 438. The SRS Customs Administration officers carry out cash controls at the external and internal (EU) borders (declaration and disclosure, respectively). Latvia has borders with three EU Member States (Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden) as well as with Belarus and the Russian Federation. The country has one major international airport (Riga) and about nine sea harbours/ports. 439. Cash declarations must be made above EUR 10 000. Latvia applies a declaration system at external borders and a disclosure system for internal (EU) travellers and packages. As regards the declaration of cash entering or leaving the EU's external borders, Regulation (EU) 2018/1672 of the European Parliament and of the Council applies (see R.32). For amounts under EUR 35 000 [113] and when there is no suspicion of underlying offences such as cash smuggling or ML, authorities apply an administrative process and penalty worth up to 20% of the undeclared amount. For amounts more than this and for all amounts that are suspected of being proceeds of crime (or part of a broader smuggling or ML scheme), criminal liability applies (Sec. 195, CL). In total, there are 179 cases a year where the administrative sanctions are used for these amounts between EUR 10 000 and EUR 35 000. These cases led to administrative fines worth EUR 340 000 over the period assessed (see table below). 440. The initiation of criminal proceedings, and the confiscation of sums at the border shows an improvement over the last period (2013-2017) where authorities initiated no criminal proceedings or confiscations. This improvement has also occurred at a time when the risk from cross-border cash smuggling has decreased, with the near closure of several border crossings with the Russian Federation and Belarus (since 2020), and as Latvia has transitioned away from its role as a regional financial centre. Between 2018-2023, Latvian authorities received nearly 5 500 cash declarations, averaging 909 per year, with a drop during COVID-19 (2020-2022). In 2023, this increased to over 1 400. Authorities detected 256 undeclared cash declarations totalling EUR 9.5 million (around EUR 1.6 million per year). Over half (140) led to criminal proceedings for ML or non-declaration, resulting in 38 prosecutions and 8 confiscation orders worth EUR 1.67 million. Table 8.5. Annual declaration numbers and breaches (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Number of declarations/disclosures submitted 885 985 467 531 1 166 1 417 5 451 Number of false declaring 29 45 16 38 51 77 256 Number of cases where sanctions applied* (administrative violations) 36 27 3 12 28 66 172 Number of initiated criminal proceedings for ML and/or non-declaration or false declaration 7 47 20 28 27 11 140 Number of sent criminal proceedings for initiation of criminal prosecution for legalization of cash and/or non-declaration or false declaration - 5 5 4 13 11 38 Number of cases where confiscation applied (by TCPB) - - 2 2 2 2 8 Table 8.6. Annual value of disclosures and confiscations for cross-border currency (EUR, 2018-2023) Year 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 total Annual value of declared/disclosed assets in EUR 222 241 638 162 784 412 58 570 516 55 684 221 79 903 489 41 247 680 620 431 956 Annual value of undeclared/falsely declared assets in EUR 522 685 2 570 366 530 174 2 454 866 1 780 934 1 613 244 9 472 269 Annual value of fines in EUR 30 690 40 760 6 696 42 952 78 258 141 139 340 495 Annual value of confiscation orders in EUR (by TCPB) - - 42 538 271 934 116 915 1 241 822 1 673 208 441. In most cases, criminal proceedings initiated for moving cash across the border are for undeclared cash. These often involve citizens from neighbouring countries . Latvia’s legal framework does not require identification of a predicate offence. The number of administrative violations increased and consequently the total amount of fines imposed increased, too. However, the number of criminal prosecutions decreased compared to previous years. One factor that hinders effectiveness is that most of the possible predicate crimes and possible ML schemes take place in some neighbouring countries, where it is currently difficult to receive trusted information and in timely manner from those countries. As it is challenging to investigate the predicate offense that has occurred in these countries, cash movements are criminally investigated as stand-alone ML. 442. In response to undeclared assets and suspicions at the border, SRS TCPD initiated 140 criminal proceedings for non-declaration or false declaration of cash, of which 38 were sent to PO for prosecution and ten of these were for ML. In eight criminal proceedings, the court declared the seized funds to be the proceeds of crime and ordered the confiscation of the cash, totalling EUR 1 673 208. Figure 8.3. Initiated criminal proceedings regarding ML and/or non-declaration or false declaration Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 443. Overall, Latvia has implemented the EU framework to register cross-border cash and BNI declarations for external borders to a large extent. This is now starting to yield some criminal investigations into cross-border smuggling, and some limited number of ML investigations, with some confiscations. Noting that authorities may at any time trigger an investigation of suspected ML and criminal offences for non-declaration, authorities should nevertheless continue to systematically monitor threshold violations that fall under EUR 35 000 to carefully to ensure that cash smuggling is not occurring at or near these threshold amounts. Footnotes [113]. The amount corresponds to the amount of 50 times the minimum monthly wage of any given year." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="472. In the absence of TF convictions, it is not possible to assess whether the criminal sanctions applied in practice are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 473. However, in order to assess the effectiveness, the AT considered sanctions imposed in terrorism related cases and sanctioning policy adopted by the authorities, which would be expected to be applied in TF criminal cases. Reasoning for this is further explained below. 474. The GPO issued updated Guidelines on Sanctioning in Criminal Proceedings Related to Threats to State Security (referred to as the &quot;Guidelines on Sanctioning&quot;). According to these guidelines, for criminal offenses that threaten national security (including terrorism and TF offences), prosecutors are required to recommend specific sentencing measures to the court, as follows: (i) If no mitigating circumstances are present- a sentence exceeding half of the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the Criminal Law; (ii) If one or more mitigating circumstances are present: a sentence of no less than half of the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the CL; (iii) In cases of recidivism or multiple aggravating circumstances: the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the CL. Furthermore, the Guidelines on Sanctioning provide for the possibility for the Chief Prosecutor of the Criminal Justice Department of the GPO, based on the arguments provided by the competent prosecutor, to agree with the prosecutor’s reasoning about the need to apply a different type or measure of punishment. 475. The AT finds that these guidelines would be beneficial for ensuring that sentences in TF cases are dissuasive and proportionate. Whilst prosecutors systematically follow the requirements of the guidance and suggest harsher penalties when presenting terrorism related indictments before the court, sentencing by judges in terrorism-related convictions did not reinforce prosecutors’ approach as expressed in the Guidelines. For example, a criminal case was recently concluded at the first instance with the penalty of 2 years and 2 months of deprivation of liberty for the offence of self-training for terrorism, whilst the CL foresees a maximum penalty of seven years for this offence. Although it is not up to the AT to comment a criminal sanction in individual cases, it can however conclude that the impact of the Guidelines and their application by prosecutors have so far had limited effect on final courts’ decision(s) regarding sentences." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="472. In the absence of TF convictions, it is not possible to assess whether the criminal sanctions applied in practice are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 473. However, in order to assess the effectiveness, the AT considered sanctions imposed in terrorism related cases and sanctioning policy adopted by the authorities, which would be expected to be applied in TF criminal cases. Reasoning for this is further explained below. 474. The GPO issued updated Guidelines on Sanctioning in Criminal Proceedings Related to Threats to State Security (referred to as the &quot;Guidelines on Sanctioning&quot;). According to these guidelines, for criminal offenses that threaten national security (including terrorism and TF offences), prosecutors are required to recommend specific sentencing measures to the court, as follows: (i) If no mitigating circumstances are present- a sentence exceeding half of the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the Criminal Law; (ii) If one or more mitigating circumstances are present: a sentence of no less than half of the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the CL; (iii) In cases of recidivism or multiple aggravating circumstances: the maximum custodial penalty prescribed by the relevant section of the Special Part of the CL. Furthermore, the Guidelines on Sanctioning provide for the possibility for the Chief Prosecutor of the Criminal Justice Department of the GPO, based on the arguments provided by the competent prosecutor, to agree with the prosecutor’s reasoning about the need to apply a different type or measure of punishment. 475. The AT finds that these guidelines would be beneficial for ensuring that sentences in TF cases are dissuasive and proportionate. Whilst prosecutors systematically follow the requirements of the guidance and suggest harsher penalties when presenting terrorism related indictments before the court, sentencing by judges in terrorism-related convictions did not reinforce prosecutors’ approach as expressed in the Guidelines. For example, a criminal case was recently concluded at the first instance with the penalty of 2 years and 2 months of deprivation of liberty for the offence of self-training for terrorism, whilst the CL foresees a maximum penalty of seven years for this offence. Although it is not up to the AT to comment a criminal sanction in individual cases, it can however conclude that the impact of the Guidelines and their application by prosecutors have so far had limited effect on final courts’ decision(s) regarding sentences." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="495. Latvia assessed the risks associated with NPOs [114] as part of its NRAs published in 2020 and 2023. These assessments identified certain NPOs as having heightened TF risks. These include NPOs operating in or delivering services to high-risk jurisdictions, those focused on international activities such as promoting cultural diversity, humanitarian aid, or human rights, those with unspecified or vague fields of activity that engage with high-risk jurisdictions, and those whose representative (BO, board members or executives) are residents of high TF risk countries. Nonetheless the overall risk rating for NPOs remains low, since less than 1% of NPO transactions in Latvia involve NPOs with a heightened TF risk, with most transactions occurring domestically and no links identified to individuals from conflict zones. 496. Further to the NRA2, FIU Latvia performed a strategic analysis of 2 084 NPOs that primarily rely on donations or gifts and identified 27 NPOs at heightened TF risk. The assessment incorporated a range of risk indicators, including foreign fundraising sources, links to high-risk jurisdictions, unspecified or vague operational purposes, and absence of Latvian bank account. All identified NPOs at heightened risk of TF hold accounts in Latvian credit institutions, which is treated as risk mitigating measure. 497. However, the scope of the risk assessment focuses predominantly on NPOs that raise funds and does not include organizations that only disburse funds, as required by FATF definition under R.8. While Latvian authorities argue that such entities are likely to be detected through other mechanisms—such as cross-border payment monitoring of all NPOs’ transactions—this tool operates reactively and is not integrated into the initial risk classification methodology. This results in a minor limitation as disbursing-only NPOs remain outside the scope of the initial risk classification and may not be subject to the same level of proactive scrutiny or tailored mitigation. 498. To further address identified risks, Latvian authorities have conducted targeted outreach to the identified higher-risk NPOs through the dissemination of an informative leaflet and a dedicated seminar on TF typologies, raising awareness about their potential exposure to TF abuse and encouraging stronger risk mitigation practices. In interviews with a selected cross-section of NPOs it was clear that this outreach has resulted in good understanding of the risks of TF abuse across the NPO community. Moreover, Latvia established the inter-institutional CFT Task Force [115] responsible for analysing cross-border payments to high-risk TF jurisdictions, identifying legal entities with BOs from high-risk TF jurisdictions, and applying risk-based mitigation measures in line with identified TF risks. 499.  All Latvian NPOs are required to register with the ER and to adhere to transparency and reporting standards, with Public Benefit Organizations (PBOs) facing even more stringent requirements due to their tax advantages. The SRS acts as the primary authority overseeing NPOs for tax-related matters and conducts targeted audits of associations and foundations, including PBOs. To ensure compliance, PBOs must provide detailed reports covering donors, donation amounts, expenditures, balance sheets, and other pertinent data, as part of their enhanced disclosure obligations under SRS supervision. While these broad governance and transparency measures are not TF-specific, they contribute to the overall mitigation of TF risk by improving sectoral transparency and enabling detection of unusual financial patterns. The authorities maintain a risk-based and proportionate approach, ensuring that these measures do not unduly disrupt legitimate NPO activities. Targeted TF-specific measures are applied only where elevated risk is identified through strategic analysis. 500. Outreach to NPOs has included published analyses of TF risks (NRA1, NRA2), publicly available guidance, and recognized best practices. NPOs have benefited from seminars, workshops, and interactive sessions organized by umbrella organization, financial industry associations, and regulatory bodies, all aiming to foster transparency, good governance, and ethical funding. These co-ordinated efforts have ensured that NPOs possess both the knowledge and practical tools to identify, understand, and mitigate TF vulnerabilities, which was confirmed by the NPOs met onsite. 501. The NPOs met onsite were aware of the potential TF threats to which they might be exposed. They demonstrated a good understanding of the measures required to protect themselves from TF abuse, with the most prevalent being the screening and verification of partner NPOs. It is common practice among NPOs to rely on publicly available databases, such as the FIU’s sanctions search engine, for screening against sanctions. 502. Latvia applies an RBA to monitoring NPOs, co-ordinated by the SRS and FIU Latvia. The SRS maintains a biannual NPO Risk List based on indicators such as foreign donations, cash-intensive transactions, links to foreign officials, unusual loan or real estate activities, and absence of Latvian bank accounts. NPOs exceeding a 30-point risk threshold undergo off-site reviews and possible escalation. Consequently, the SRS conducted 198 assessments in 2021, 42 in 2022, 103 in 2023, and 209 in the first half of 2024, resulting in 13 referrals to FIU Latvia and 14 referrals to the SRS TCPD (2021–2023). In parallel, FIU Latvia identified 27 NPOs at heightened TF risk, based on their cross-border activities and financial flows. Following this, the SRS carried out supervisory inspections of all 27, and the State Security Service prioritized them in its own risk matrix for ongoing monitoring. Although Latvia’s overall TF risk for NPOs remains low, these measures effectively prioritise scrutiny of higher-risk entities while proportionately applying broader governance requirements, avoiding unnecessary disruption to legitimate NPO activities. Footnotes [114]. As of the end of 2022 a total of 27 004 NPOs were registered in Latvia. The most frequently registered form of NPOs was associations, followed by foundations, religious organisations and other forms of NPOs. [115]. See IO.1 describing CFT Task Force." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="495. Latvia assessed the risks associated with NPOs [114] as part of its NRAs published in 2020 and 2023. These assessments identified certain NPOs as having heightened TF risks. These include NPOs operating in or delivering services to high-risk jurisdictions, those focused on international activities such as promoting cultural diversity, humanitarian aid, or human rights, those with unspecified or vague fields of activity that engage with high-risk jurisdictions, and those whose representative (BO, board members or executives) are residents of high TF risk countries. Nonetheless the overall risk rating for NPOs remains low, since less than 1% of NPO transactions in Latvia involve NPOs with a heightened TF risk, with most transactions occurring domestically and no links identified to individuals from conflict zones. 496. Further to the NRA2, FIU Latvia performed a strategic analysis of 2 084 NPOs that primarily rely on donations or gifts and identified 27 NPOs at heightened TF risk. The assessment incorporated a range of risk indicators, including foreign fundraising sources, links to high-risk jurisdictions, unspecified or vague operational purposes, and absence of Latvian bank account. All identified NPOs at heightened risk of TF hold accounts in Latvian credit institutions, which is treated as risk mitigating measure. 497. However, the scope of the risk assessment focuses predominantly on NPOs that raise funds and does not include organizations that only disburse funds, as required by FATF definition under R.8. While Latvian authorities argue that such entities are likely to be detected through other mechanisms—such as cross-border payment monitoring of all NPOs’ transactions—this tool operates reactively and is not integrated into the initial risk classification methodology. This results in a minor limitation as disbursing-only NPOs remain outside the scope of the initial risk classification and may not be subject to the same level of proactive scrutiny or tailored mitigation. 498. To further address identified risks, Latvian authorities have conducted targeted outreach to the identified higher-risk NPOs through the dissemination of an informative leaflet and a dedicated seminar on TF typologies, raising awareness about their potential exposure to TF abuse and encouraging stronger risk mitigation practices. In interviews with a selected cross-section of NPOs it was clear that this outreach has resulted in good understanding of the risks of TF abuse across the NPO community. Moreover, Latvia established the inter-institutional CFT Task Force [115] responsible for analysing cross-border payments to high-risk TF jurisdictions, identifying legal entities with BOs from high-risk TF jurisdictions, and applying risk-based mitigation measures in line with identified TF risks. 499.  All Latvian NPOs are required to register with the ER and to adhere to transparency and reporting standards, with Public Benefit Organizations (PBOs) facing even more stringent requirements due to their tax advantages. The SRS acts as the primary authority overseeing NPOs for tax-related matters and conducts targeted audits of associations and foundations, including PBOs. To ensure compliance, PBOs must provide detailed reports covering donors, donation amounts, expenditures, balance sheets, and other pertinent data, as part of their enhanced disclosure obligations under SRS supervision. While these broad governance and transparency measures are not TF-specific, they contribute to the overall mitigation of TF risk by improving sectoral transparency and enabling detection of unusual financial patterns. The authorities maintain a risk-based and proportionate approach, ensuring that these measures do not unduly disrupt legitimate NPO activities. Targeted TF-specific measures are applied only where elevated risk is identified through strategic analysis. 500. Outreach to NPOs has included published analyses of TF risks (NRA1, NRA2), publicly available guidance, and recognized best practices. NPOs have benefited from seminars, workshops, and interactive sessions organized by umbrella organization, financial industry associations, and regulatory bodies, all aiming to foster transparency, good governance, and ethical funding. These co-ordinated efforts have ensured that NPOs possess both the knowledge and practical tools to identify, understand, and mitigate TF vulnerabilities, which was confirmed by the NPOs met onsite. 501. The NPOs met onsite were aware of the potential TF threats to which they might be exposed. They demonstrated a good understanding of the measures required to protect themselves from TF abuse, with the most prevalent being the screening and verification of partner NPOs. It is common practice among NPOs to rely on publicly available databases, such as the FIU’s sanctions search engine, for screening against sanctions. 502. Latvia applies an RBA to monitoring NPOs, co-ordinated by the SRS and FIU Latvia. The SRS maintains a biannual NPO Risk List based on indicators such as foreign donations, cash-intensive transactions, links to foreign officials, unusual loan or real estate activities, and absence of Latvian bank accounts. NPOs exceeding a 30-point risk threshold undergo off-site reviews and possible escalation. Consequently, the SRS conducted 198 assessments in 2021, 42 in 2022, 103 in 2023, and 209 in the first half of 2024, resulting in 13 referrals to FIU Latvia and 14 referrals to the SRS TCPD (2021–2023). In parallel, FIU Latvia identified 27 NPOs at heightened TF risk, based on their cross-border activities and financial flows. Following this, the SRS carried out supervisory inspections of all 27, and the State Security Service prioritized them in its own risk matrix for ongoing monitoring. Although Latvia’s overall TF risk for NPOs remains low, these measures effectively prioritise scrutiny of higher-risk entities while proportionately applying broader governance requirements, avoiding unnecessary disruption to legitimate NPO activities. Footnotes [114]. As of the end of 2022 a total of 27 004 NPOs were registered in Latvia. The most frequently registered form of NPOs was associations, followed by foundations, religious organisations and other forms of NPOs. [115]. See IO.1 describing CFT Task Force." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="531. Latvia implements PF-related TFS without delay. Latvia relies on both, domestic (Law on Sanctions and CoM Reg. No. 184) and EU legislative frameworks. The framework ensures that UNSCRs on PF are implemented directly and immediately upon adoption by the UN, making the measures binding on all natural and legal persons. 532. Considering that the Law on Sanctions applies equally to TF and PF related UN TFS, the institutional framework and the powers are identical to what is described under IO.10. The MFA is a co-ordinating body for implementation of sanction regimes and the FIU Latvia is national competent authority for implementation of financial sanctions, and as such has the power to freeze the funds and economic resources of sanctioned persons autonomously. 533. Like for TF-related sanctions, designations and amendments to the UN TFS on PF are communicated to REs without delay via multiple channels—the MFA website, the FIU Latvia sanctions search engine, and the Official Gazette—and are automatically pushed through supervisory authorities’ onward-communication systems. Latvia also maintains a subscription-based email alert to ensure that all REs receive updates in real time. Further details regarding communication of designations are described under IO.10." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="531. Latvia implements PF-related TFS without delay. Latvia relies on both, domestic (Law on Sanctions and CoM Reg. No. 184) and EU legislative frameworks. The framework ensures that UNSCRs on PF are implemented directly and immediately upon adoption by the UN, making the measures binding on all natural and legal persons. 532. Considering that the Law on Sanctions applies equally to TF and PF related UN TFS, the institutional framework and the powers are identical to what is described under IO.10. The MFA is a co-ordinating body for implementation of sanction regimes and the FIU Latvia is national competent authority for implementation of financial sanctions, and as such has the power to freeze the funds and economic resources of sanctioned persons autonomously. 533. Like for TF-related sanctions, designations and amendments to the UN TFS on PF are communicated to REs without delay via multiple channels—the MFA website, the FIU Latvia sanctions search engine, and the Official Gazette—and are automatically pushed through supervisory authorities’ onward-communication systems. Latvia also maintains a subscription-based email alert to ensure that all REs receive updates in real time. Further details regarding communication of designations are described under IO.10." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="121. LEAs and other relevant authorities’ objectives are in line with the ML and TF risks identified in NRA2 and are consistent with the national AML and CFT policies outlined in the Action Plan. This is ensured by each agency and department having its own action plans, which implement the national Action Plan. 122. LEAs demonstrated a risk understanding consistent with NRA2, as well as a good knowledge of the specific data that underpinned the analysis and conclusions of the NRA and were clearly sensitive to evolving risks and emerging threats. This understanding supports LEAs in aligning their activities, including prioritisation and allocation of resources, in line with the risk areas identified. Authorities demonstrated that they adapt their resourcing and structures in line with the evolution in the risks faced by Latvia. For example, in April 2024, Latvia established a sanctions function within the FIU and created an internal sanctions taskforce in response to an increasing number of STRs on sanctions circumvention. 123. Supervisors’ objectives and activities are broadly consistent with national AML and CFT policies and the ML and TF risks identified. Their understanding of risk informed the NRAs, rather than being derived from it. Most supervisors’ view of ML and TF risk is aligned with NRA2 and supervisors generally apply more focus and resources to the areas of highest risk therein. Supervisors demonstrated changes to AML guidelines in line with identified risks. For example, following the 2022 Sectoral Risk Assessment, AML guidelines for AIFs were updated to reflect the increased risk rating for AIFMs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="121. LEAs and other relevant authorities’ objectives are in line with the ML and TF risks identified in NRA2 and are consistent with the national AML and CFT policies outlined in the Action Plan. This is ensured by each agency and department having its own action plans, which implement the national Action Plan. 122. LEAs demonstrated a risk understanding consistent with NRA2, as well as a good knowledge of the specific data that underpinned the analysis and conclusions of the NRA and were clearly sensitive to evolving risks and emerging threats. This understanding supports LEAs in aligning their activities, including prioritisation and allocation of resources, in line with the risk areas identified. Authorities demonstrated that they adapt their resourcing and structures in line with the evolution in the risks faced by Latvia. For example, in April 2024, Latvia established a sanctions function within the FIU and created an internal sanctions taskforce in response to an increasing number of STRs on sanctions circumvention. 123. Supervisors’ objectives and activities are broadly consistent with national AML and CFT policies and the ML and TF risks identified. Their understanding of risk informed the NRAs, rather than being derived from it. Most supervisors’ view of ML and TF risk is aligned with NRA2 and supervisors generally apply more focus and resources to the areas of highest risk therein. Supervisors demonstrated changes to AML guidelines in line with identified risks. For example, following the 2022 Sectoral Risk Assessment, AML guidelines for AIFs were updated to reflect the increased risk rating for AIFMs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 192. CDD, BO identification, verification and record keeping requirements are generally well understood and implemented by all FIs met onsite, however, the scale and depth of monitoring could be further expanded. 193. Latvijas Banka’s data confirms these findings, acknowledging that systemically important banks are largely compliant with CDD/EDD requirements, while less significant banks demonstrated a partial level of compliance until 2023 and were re-assessed as largely compliant in 2024. In the investment and payment (PIs and EMIs) sectors the level of compliance improved significantly. In 2021, 63% of investment firms were found not to comply with EDD/CDD requirements whilst mostly minor shortcomings were identified in 2023. Similarly, in 2019 50% of PIs/EMIs were found not to comply with CDD/EDD requirements, whereas in 2023 all achieved either full or substantial levels of compliance. Similar results were seen in compliance with transaction monitoring requirements. Overall, currently, no critical deficiencies have been detected across different sectors. 194. BO requirements are generally implemented in a satisfactory manner; mandatory discrepancy reporting aid better effectiveness. All supervisors confirmed that the level of compliance with BO verification requirements has increased over the assessment period with no systemic or severe deficiencies identified in 2023, although there were cases of severe/systemic breaches at the beginning of the reporting period. This is supported by interviews with FIs met on-site: all were able to clearly articulate processes designed for gathering and verifying BO data. With the exception of securities firms, FIs met on-site focused on servicing predominantly residents (some did not have cross border clients at all given significant changes in their business models since 2019). All acknowledged challenges in verifying BO information in complex structures but were able to explain verification sources and channels used. Some FIs displayed a sophisticated understanding of BO verification methods. Nevertheless, identification and verification of legal persons via on-line onboarding channels remains challenging, especially for some securities firms, e.g. those that operate investment platforms. Also see at IO.5. 195. Supervisory data by Latvijas Banka shows that all FIs significantly improved their transaction monitoring practices and STR reporting over the assessment period. Interviews with FIs support this view. The AT found that, generally, all FIs are good at identifying suspicious activities linked to geographical risk component, changes to client risk profile, fraud (main typology) and display a very good understanding of threats to their businesses; however, on-site interviews show that FIs’ efforts need to be intensified to identify a broader scope of suspicious activities linked to more diverse criminal typologies, high risk business, services and clients. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 196. FIs met on-site were well aware of the enhanced and specific measures and were able comprehensively explain implementation practices. All FIs demonstrated comprehensive knowledge of geographical risk and mitigation controls relating to high-risk countries, i.e., EDD on clients, BOs and transactions with high-risk countries. 197. PEP-related risk and mitigation techniques are well understood, however, overreliance on domestic PEP lists was noted with a lesser focus on handling close associates of PEPs. According to supervisory data, no serious breaches were identified in the area of PEP compliance and, in general, the volume of PEP-related transactions decreased significantly over the assessment period (e.g., in the banking sector from 1.9% in 2019 to 0.6% in 2023) due to foreign high-risk clients, including foreign PEPs, exiting Latvia’s financial market. 198. New technology-related risks typically relate to the use of commercial software (e.g., for negative media, sanctions, PEP screening, etc.), and remote onboarding solutions (predominantly in the securities and fast credits sector) are tested by FIs. The launch of new products or services is uncommon, which aligns with significant and conservative changes to business models (the securities sector being an exception). 199. Payment sector representatives are well aware of the wire transfer rules, with VASPs acknowledging implementation challenges. No compliance failures have been identified in this area except for a small rejection rate with insufficient information on outgoing payments (this is correlated with the specific design of payment systems). 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 200. Generally, compliance with STR reporting obligations is increasing, according to supervisory data. Typically, there are no tipping off concerns. The FIU is satisfied with the general quality of STR reports. Latvijas Banka’s data suggests that systemically important banks are largely compliant with STR reporting requirements, while less significant banks only achieved a partial level of compliance until 2023 with a recent improvement to largely compliant in 2024. Banks are the top reporting sector, however, reporting trends in some other sectors outside banking might need further improvement, for example, in the securities sector due to their cross-border exposure. Fulfilment of reporting obligations is directly linked to the appropriateness of monitoring scenarios which is a prerequisite for the identification of suspicion. See above. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 201. FIs have internal controls in place for the implementation of preventative measures. The scrutiny of such controls is largely attributed to the materiality of different financial sectors and size of individual FIs. FIs under Latvijas Banka supervision have internal policies and procedures in place, conduct training for employees and have periodic audits (be it internal or external, scope and frequency vary and are largely dependent on size and complexity). Latvijas Banka notes that over the assessment period, the overall level of compliance has increased in all sectors. However, the number of staff dedicated to AML/CFT is relatively low outside the banking sector. Latvijas Banka considers that staff resources are in line with risk exposure and encourages increasing the AML/CFT expertise of the existing staff. The AT found that some of the least material small FIs met on-site did not have fully functioning and separated “three lines of defence”, e.g., one credit union has a single employee responsible for all daily activities. Latvijas Banka considers that internal controls of less material FIs are proportionate to the size and risk profile of their business. In addition, external audit is often sought. 202. Lenders and VASPs, whilst generally less equipped to have comprehensive internal controls due to size of their business, have most basic elements in place: internal control documents, training, AML/CFT Officer, etc. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 203. There is nothing that would prove the existence of legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 192. CDD, BO identification, verification and record keeping requirements are generally well understood and implemented by all FIs met onsite, however, the scale and depth of monitoring could be further expanded. 193. Latvijas Banka’s data confirms these findings, acknowledging that systemically important banks are largely compliant with CDD/EDD requirements, while less significant banks demonstrated a partial level of compliance until 2023 and were re-assessed as largely compliant in 2024. In the investment and payment (PIs and EMIs) sectors the level of compliance improved significantly. In 2021, 63% of investment firms were found not to comply with EDD/CDD requirements whilst mostly minor shortcomings were identified in 2023. Similarly, in 2019 50% of PIs/EMIs were found not to comply with CDD/EDD requirements, whereas in 2023 all achieved either full or substantial levels of compliance. Similar results were seen in compliance with transaction monitoring requirements. Overall, currently, no critical deficiencies have been detected across different sectors. 194. BO requirements are generally implemented in a satisfactory manner; mandatory discrepancy reporting aid better effectiveness. All supervisors confirmed that the level of compliance with BO verification requirements has increased over the assessment period with no systemic or severe deficiencies identified in 2023, although there were cases of severe/systemic breaches at the beginning of the reporting period. This is supported by interviews with FIs met on-site: all were able to clearly articulate processes designed for gathering and verifying BO data. With the exception of securities firms, FIs met on-site focused on servicing predominantly residents (some did not have cross border clients at all given significant changes in their business models since 2019). All acknowledged challenges in verifying BO information in complex structures but were able to explain verification sources and channels used. Some FIs displayed a sophisticated understanding of BO verification methods. Nevertheless, identification and verification of legal persons via on-line onboarding channels remains challenging, especially for some securities firms, e.g. those that operate investment platforms. Also see at IO.5. 195. Supervisory data by Latvijas Banka shows that all FIs significantly improved their transaction monitoring practices and STR reporting over the assessment period. Interviews with FIs support this view. The AT found that, generally, all FIs are good at identifying suspicious activities linked to geographical risk component, changes to client risk profile, fraud (main typology) and display a very good understanding of threats to their businesses; however, on-site interviews show that FIs’ efforts need to be intensified to identify a broader scope of suspicious activities linked to more diverse criminal typologies, high risk business, services and clients. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 196. FIs met on-site were well aware of the enhanced and specific measures and were able comprehensively explain implementation practices. All FIs demonstrated comprehensive knowledge of geographical risk and mitigation controls relating to high-risk countries, i.e., EDD on clients, BOs and transactions with high-risk countries. 197. PEP-related risk and mitigation techniques are well understood, however, overreliance on domestic PEP lists was noted with a lesser focus on handling close associates of PEPs. According to supervisory data, no serious breaches were identified in the area of PEP compliance and, in general, the volume of PEP-related transactions decreased significantly over the assessment period (e.g., in the banking sector from 1.9% in 2019 to 0.6% in 2023) due to foreign high-risk clients, including foreign PEPs, exiting Latvia’s financial market. 198. New technology-related risks typically relate to the use of commercial software (e.g., for negative media, sanctions, PEP screening, etc.), and remote onboarding solutions (predominantly in the securities and fast credits sector) are tested by FIs. The launch of new products or services is uncommon, which aligns with significant and conservative changes to business models (the securities sector being an exception). 199. Payment sector representatives are well aware of the wire transfer rules, with VASPs acknowledging implementation challenges. No compliance failures have been identified in this area except for a small rejection rate with insufficient information on outgoing payments (this is correlated with the specific design of payment systems). 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 200. Generally, compliance with STR reporting obligations is increasing, according to supervisory data. Typically, there are no tipping off concerns. The FIU is satisfied with the general quality of STR reports. Latvijas Banka’s data suggests that systemically important banks are largely compliant with STR reporting requirements, while less significant banks only achieved a partial level of compliance until 2023 with a recent improvement to largely compliant in 2024. Banks are the top reporting sector, however, reporting trends in some other sectors outside banking might need further improvement, for example, in the securities sector due to their cross-border exposure. Fulfilment of reporting obligations is directly linked to the appropriateness of monitoring scenarios which is a prerequisite for the identification of suspicion. See above. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 201. FIs have internal controls in place for the implementation of preventative measures. The scrutiny of such controls is largely attributed to the materiality of different financial sectors and size of individual FIs. FIs under Latvijas Banka supervision have internal policies and procedures in place, conduct training for employees and have periodic audits (be it internal or external, scope and frequency vary and are largely dependent on size and complexity). Latvijas Banka notes that over the assessment period, the overall level of compliance has increased in all sectors. However, the number of staff dedicated to AML/CFT is relatively low outside the banking sector. Latvijas Banka considers that staff resources are in line with risk exposure and encourages increasing the AML/CFT expertise of the existing staff. The AT found that some of the least material small FIs met on-site did not have fully functioning and separated “three lines of defence”, e.g., one credit union has a single employee responsible for all daily activities. Latvijas Banka considers that internal controls of less material FIs are proportionate to the size and risk profile of their business. In addition, external audit is often sought. 202. Lenders and VASPs, whilst generally less equipped to have comprehensive internal controls due to size of their business, have most basic elements in place: internal control documents, training, AML/CFT Officer, etc. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 203. There is nothing that would prove the existence of legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="248. In most sectors, DNFBPs have demonstrated effective implementation of AML/CFT requirements. This is consistent with the rather modest number of supervisory inspections that have identified systemic AML/CFT infringements. Proactive work by the FIU has helped to increase the total number of STRs to the extent that under-reporting is now focussed in the legal sector. Notwithstanding, weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by accountants. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 249. Inspections by the SRS show that risk based CDD and record-keeping measures are in place in most cases. However, weaknesses remain in the application of CDD and ongoing monitoring by accountants. In 2019, the LGSI identified a number of infringements linked to the application of CDD, but this has improved since then. The LCSA has identified only two cases where advocates have failed to properly document the BO of a client, and LCSN inspections indicate “general success” in determining the scope of applicable CDD with no deficiencies having been identified. 250. In practice, customer identification questionnaires are used to collect CDD information, which is verified, BO is found out, and the source of funds collected (which may be verified in higher risk cases). Checks are made against public sources for adverse information. To develop client profiles, advocates also request information on tax status, independent legal professionals collect CDD through an interview with their potential client, and accountants and advocates request information on major partners and consider the management experience and economic substance of the potential client. 251. Where a customer is a legal person, then, inter alia, information collected on BO is compared to information held in the ER (or foreign equivalent where available) and consideration given to the possibility that persons other than the shareholder may have control. Changes in BO and control of legal persons are automatically picked up through subscription to databases of enterprises. Complex ownership structures are not common. 252. Upon entry to land-based casinos, customers (natural persons) must first register which is conditional upon providing proof of identity and some basic CDD information. As soon as bets placed or winnings cashed equal or exceed EUR 2 000, then further CDD information is collected, including source of funds (and may be verified for high-risk customers). Steps are taken to ensure that all activity at cash desks and gaming tables is linked to each customer. The same approach is applied in the case of slot machines. 253. All gambling operators use third party IT solutions to identify negative information, unusual activity (based on set parameters) and suspicious transactions (using “red flags”). All land-based operators have implemented IT solutions for monitoring of slot machines and identifying customer activity that passes the CDD threshold of EUR 2 000. Systems generated “hits” are handled within 24 hours. 254. Generally, estate agents, independent legal professionals, advocates and notaries perform individual transactions and so there is no need for ongoing monitoring. Based on risk, accountants monitor transactions in order to check that they align with the customer’s business and expected cash flows, looking for inconsistencies or potential irregularities. 255. Business has been refused or terminated by DNFBPs on the basis of the provision of incomplete CDD information. In the case of advocates, it is not common for business to be declined since potential clients tend to withdraw applications before this stage. 256. Records are held in line with, or for more than, the statutory requirement. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 257. SRS and LGSI inspections show that enhanced measures are generally in place to deal with higher risk customers. Weaknesses remain in the application of enhanced CDD measures by accountants, where the number of shortcomings identified in on-site examinations remains high compared to other sectors. LCSA inspections show that advocates have measures in place to identify and deal with customers that have connections to high-risk countries. No discrepancies have been detected by the LCSN in the application of enhanced measures, including to PEPs. 258. PEPs (including the customer and BO) are identified through self-certification and use of the PEP Register maintained by the SRS. Gambling operators, accountants and advocates also use third party IT solutions to identify PEP connections. Otherwise, reliance is placed on information held on the Internet to identify foreign PEPs. Extensive use is made of lists of high-risk countries provided by the FIU. PEPs and those with a connection to high risk third countries are subject to additional CDD. 259. Outside online gambling operators, little use is made of technology in the provision of services to customers by DNFBPs, and so the application of measures has not been assessed. In the case of gambling, new technological solutions have not been used or introduced in the provision of services to customers. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 260. Overall, low DNFBP reporting in terms of the total STR volume and number of entities reporting has been identified as a problem in the two most recent NRAs, and reporting levels during the assessment period have not been commensurate with the size and risk exposure of the DNFBP sector as assessed under national and sectoral assessments. Proactive work by the FIU has helped to increase both: (i) the total number of STRs; and (ii) the number of DNFBPs making reports (from around 20 in 2018 to around 140 in 2023), particularly accountants – to the extent that under-reporting is now focussed in the legal sector. Notwithstanding, weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by accountants, where the number of shortcomings identified in on-site examinations remains high compared to other sectors. 261. Whilst supervisory findings confirm that the majority of DNFBPs comply with reporting requirements, the SRS has identified 182 cases between 2019 and 2023 (4% of inspections) where an accountant failed to file the required STR to the FIU. This is a significant number relative to the total number of STRs made by accountants and DNFBPs more generally in the period under assessment. In addition, the SRS regularly reports suspected underlying criminality of DNFBP customers to the FIU (25 cases in 2023) in cases where an STR has not already been made by the private sector. The majority of these reports have related to accountants. 262. Based on examples of STRs and case studies presented, the AT concludes that DNFBPs are reporting activity that is useful for law enforcement. This is confirmed by the FIU. There have been no tipping off issues. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 263. Strong internal control systems are generally in place. Given the profile and size of DNFBPs, except for gambling operators, there is no independent testing of systems in place and owners usually act as responsible persons (compliance officer). DNFBPs do not operate through groups. 264. The SRS has found that most DNFBPs invest significant resources in internal control systems which reflect business risks. Nevertheless, inspections have identified shortcomings in the application of internal controls and procedures, including for sectors which present a medium-high ML risk, in particular accountants. According to statistics maintained by the LGSI, 88% or more of gambling operators have updated internal control procedures on an annual basis between 2020 and 2023. The LCSA considers that advocates carry out an updated risk assessment at least every three years in line with requirements. The LCSN considers that notaries have implemented an adequate internal control system. 265. Larger DNFBPs supervised by the SRS are screening staff before and during employment. The position for gambling operators has not been explained. 266. Findings from SRS inspections show that DNFBPs train their staff. According to statistics maintained by the LGSI, all staff were provided with AML/CFT training in 2023 (up from 77% in 2018). As noted above, the LGSI picked up shortcomings in the quality of training in its inspections of land-based casinos in 2023. Advocates generally record training and test the effectiveness thereof, though supervisory inspections in 2023 by the LCSA highlighted a small number of failures to attend or record training. They report to the LCSA on how much training has been provided. Employees of notaries are tested after training and the LCSN has detected only a few cases where staff have had insufficient knowledge on AML/CFT matters. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 267. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing requirements and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="248. In most sectors, DNFBPs have demonstrated effective implementation of AML/CFT requirements. This is consistent with the rather modest number of supervisory inspections that have identified systemic AML/CFT infringements. Proactive work by the FIU has helped to increase the total number of STRs to the extent that under-reporting is now focussed in the legal sector. Notwithstanding, weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by accountants. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 249. Inspections by the SRS show that risk based CDD and record-keeping measures are in place in most cases. However, weaknesses remain in the application of CDD and ongoing monitoring by accountants. In 2019, the LGSI identified a number of infringements linked to the application of CDD, but this has improved since then. The LCSA has identified only two cases where advocates have failed to properly document the BO of a client, and LCSN inspections indicate “general success” in determining the scope of applicable CDD with no deficiencies having been identified. 250. In practice, customer identification questionnaires are used to collect CDD information, which is verified, BO is found out, and the source of funds collected (which may be verified in higher risk cases). Checks are made against public sources for adverse information. To develop client profiles, advocates also request information on tax status, independent legal professionals collect CDD through an interview with their potential client, and accountants and advocates request information on major partners and consider the management experience and economic substance of the potential client. 251. Where a customer is a legal person, then, inter alia, information collected on BO is compared to information held in the ER (or foreign equivalent where available) and consideration given to the possibility that persons other than the shareholder may have control. Changes in BO and control of legal persons are automatically picked up through subscription to databases of enterprises. Complex ownership structures are not common. 252. Upon entry to land-based casinos, customers (natural persons) must first register which is conditional upon providing proof of identity and some basic CDD information. As soon as bets placed or winnings cashed equal or exceed EUR 2 000, then further CDD information is collected, including source of funds (and may be verified for high-risk customers). Steps are taken to ensure that all activity at cash desks and gaming tables is linked to each customer. The same approach is applied in the case of slot machines. 253. All gambling operators use third party IT solutions to identify negative information, unusual activity (based on set parameters) and suspicious transactions (using “red flags”). All land-based operators have implemented IT solutions for monitoring of slot machines and identifying customer activity that passes the CDD threshold of EUR 2 000. Systems generated “hits” are handled within 24 hours. 254. Generally, estate agents, independent legal professionals, advocates and notaries perform individual transactions and so there is no need for ongoing monitoring. Based on risk, accountants monitor transactions in order to check that they align with the customer’s business and expected cash flows, looking for inconsistencies or potential irregularities. 255. Business has been refused or terminated by DNFBPs on the basis of the provision of incomplete CDD information. In the case of advocates, it is not common for business to be declined since potential clients tend to withdraw applications before this stage. 256. Records are held in line with, or for more than, the statutory requirement. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 257. SRS and LGSI inspections show that enhanced measures are generally in place to deal with higher risk customers. Weaknesses remain in the application of enhanced CDD measures by accountants, where the number of shortcomings identified in on-site examinations remains high compared to other sectors. LCSA inspections show that advocates have measures in place to identify and deal with customers that have connections to high-risk countries. No discrepancies have been detected by the LCSN in the application of enhanced measures, including to PEPs. 258. PEPs (including the customer and BO) are identified through self-certification and use of the PEP Register maintained by the SRS. Gambling operators, accountants and advocates also use third party IT solutions to identify PEP connections. Otherwise, reliance is placed on information held on the Internet to identify foreign PEPs. Extensive use is made of lists of high-risk countries provided by the FIU. PEPs and those with a connection to high risk third countries are subject to additional CDD. 259. Outside online gambling operators, little use is made of technology in the provision of services to customers by DNFBPs, and so the application of measures has not been assessed. In the case of gambling, new technological solutions have not been used or introduced in the provision of services to customers. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 260. Overall, low DNFBP reporting in terms of the total STR volume and number of entities reporting has been identified as a problem in the two most recent NRAs, and reporting levels during the assessment period have not been commensurate with the size and risk exposure of the DNFBP sector as assessed under national and sectoral assessments. Proactive work by the FIU has helped to increase both: (i) the total number of STRs; and (ii) the number of DNFBPs making reports (from around 20 in 2018 to around 140 in 2023), particularly accountants – to the extent that under-reporting is now focussed in the legal sector. Notwithstanding, weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by accountants, where the number of shortcomings identified in on-site examinations remains high compared to other sectors. 261. Whilst supervisory findings confirm that the majority of DNFBPs comply with reporting requirements, the SRS has identified 182 cases between 2019 and 2023 (4% of inspections) where an accountant failed to file the required STR to the FIU. This is a significant number relative to the total number of STRs made by accountants and DNFBPs more generally in the period under assessment. In addition, the SRS regularly reports suspected underlying criminality of DNFBP customers to the FIU (25 cases in 2023) in cases where an STR has not already been made by the private sector. The majority of these reports have related to accountants. 262. Based on examples of STRs and case studies presented, the AT concludes that DNFBPs are reporting activity that is useful for law enforcement. This is confirmed by the FIU. There have been no tipping off issues. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 263. Strong internal control systems are generally in place. Given the profile and size of DNFBPs, except for gambling operators, there is no independent testing of systems in place and owners usually act as responsible persons (compliance officer). DNFBPs do not operate through groups. 264. The SRS has found that most DNFBPs invest significant resources in internal control systems which reflect business risks. Nevertheless, inspections have identified shortcomings in the application of internal controls and procedures, including for sectors which present a medium-high ML risk, in particular accountants. According to statistics maintained by the LGSI, 88% or more of gambling operators have updated internal control procedures on an annual basis between 2020 and 2023. The LCSA considers that advocates carry out an updated risk assessment at least every three years in line with requirements. The LCSN considers that notaries have implemented an adequate internal control system. 265. Larger DNFBPs supervised by the SRS are screening staff before and during employment. The position for gambling operators has not been explained. 266. Findings from SRS inspections show that DNFBPs train their staff. According to statistics maintained by the LGSI, all staff were provided with AML/CFT training in 2023 (up from 77% in 2018). As noted above, the LGSI picked up shortcomings in the quality of training in its inspections of land-based casinos in 2023. Advocates generally record training and test the effectiveness thereof, though supervisory inspections in 2023 by the LCSA highlighted a small number of failures to attend or record training. They report to the LCSA on how much training has been provided. Employees of notaries are tested after training and the LCSN has detected only a few cases where staff have had insufficient knowledge on AML/CFT matters. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 267. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing requirements and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="325. Latvia does not allow for the creation of Latvian legal arrangements. However, trustees of a foreign law trust can operate in Latvia and form business relations with a FI/DNFBP. 326. As of 2 January 2024, foreign legal arrangements that are created in non-EU countries are required to register with the ER within 14 days. This obligation covers: (i) a trustee that is a natural person resident in Latvia; (ii) a trustee that is a legal person registered in Latvia; (iii) a trustee that is a natural person residing outside of the EU and plans to start a business relationship or purchase real estate in Latvia; and (iv) a trustee that is a legal person registered outside of the EU and plans to start a business relationship or purchase real estate in Latvia. 327. At the time of the onsite, no registrations of non-EU trusts had been made to the ER. In addition, no companies with shareholders that are legal arrangements have been registered in the ER. This is consistent with a lack of exposure by Latvia to non-EU legal arrangements. No identified business relationship between Latvian FIs and foreign legal arrangements supports this conclusion and only a small number (seven in total) of clients/BOs legal arrangements of DNFBPs. However, as noted above, the lack of explicit legal obligation for natural persons acting in the capacity of a trustee to declare this to REs may potentially impact the visibility of persons acting as a non-professional trustee, however, this may be mitigated to some extent through CDD obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="325. Latvia does not allow for the creation of Latvian legal arrangements. However, trustees of a foreign law trust can operate in Latvia and form business relations with a FI/DNFBP. 326. As of 2 January 2024, foreign legal arrangements that are created in non-EU countries are required to register with the ER within 14 days. This obligation covers: (i) a trustee that is a natural person resident in Latvia; (ii) a trustee that is a legal person registered in Latvia; (iii) a trustee that is a natural person residing outside of the EU and plans to start a business relationship or purchase real estate in Latvia; and (iv) a trustee that is a legal person registered outside of the EU and plans to start a business relationship or purchase real estate in Latvia. 327. At the time of the onsite, no registrations of non-EU trusts had been made to the ER. In addition, no companies with shareholders that are legal arrangements have been registered in the ER. This is consistent with a lack of exposure by Latvia to non-EU legal arrangements. No identified business relationship between Latvian FIs and foreign legal arrangements supports this conclusion and only a small number (seven in total) of clients/BOs legal arrangements of DNFBPs. However, as noted above, the lack of explicit legal obligation for natural persons acting in the capacity of a trustee to declare this to REs may potentially impact the visibility of persons acting as a non-professional trustee, however, this may be mitigated to some extent through CDD obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="368. The use of financial information and intelligence by competent authorities in Latvia is extensive and forms a critical component of their investigative and prosecutorial processes. The integration of financial intelligence into these processes enhances the ability of competent authorities to trace illicit financial flows, identify hidden assets, and uncover networks of criminal actors. 369. Most FIU Latvia disseminations are relevant and of use to the LEAs. For example, most of the disseminations sent to State Police were used in criminal proceedings (see figure below). 57% of disseminations initiated new criminal proceedings and 43% were added to existing criminal proceedings. These high levels of use demonstrate the utility of financial intelligence to develop evidence and identify and trace criminal proceeds. Figure 6.3. Total number of disseminations to State Police and subsequent use Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 370. The FIU supports investigations and prosecutions by submitting &quot;Conclusions of the Competent Authority,&quot; which are detailed reports based on financial intelligence. These reports explain complex financial schemes, methods used by perpetrators, and links to broader criminal activities, aiding judges, prosecutors and investigators in securing convictions for sophisticated ML or financial fraud cases. This practice demonstrates the strong collaboration between the FIU, LEAs, and the judiciary. It also reflects the trust placed in the FIU’s analytical capabilities and the quality of its financial intelligence products, which have proven instrumental in achieving successful outcomes in challenging and high-profile cases. Box 6.3. FIU operational analysis supporting ongoing LEA investigation In September 2022, the State Police launched an investigation into a Latvia-Scandinavia-based OCG involved in drug trafficking and ML. In October 2023, FIU Latvia was requested to assist in tracing related financial flows. Over five months, FIU Latvia held CCG meetings, analysed over 100 financial accounts, and identified typologies including fictitious rentals, fraudulent documentation, and unexplained wealth exceeding declared income. The FIU’s analysis revealed the use of legal entities to launder proceeds through real estate, luxury goods, bank accounts, and cryptocurrencies. Findings were disseminated to law enforcement, contributing to the detention of 16 individuals and the seizure of significant assets in a co-ordinated EU action in September 2024. The case was referred to prosecution in December 2024. See also: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/one-of-latvia%E2%80%99s-most-notorious-criminals-arrested-europol%E2%80%99s-support 371.  Latvia's updated risk profile now prioritizes domestic crimes like tax evasion over historic financial centre-related risks. 372.  Analyses combine multiple STRs with OSINT, international data, and foreign FIU responses, especially in cases involving foreign shell companies and cross-border networks. The FIU has shifted focus to tax and property crime-related STRs, which have increased in volume, reflecting a better understanding of current national risks by authorities and REs. These enriched analyses have led to investigations by the SRS TCPD, including high-profile tax evasion cases. Between 2020 and 2023, SRS used STRs to carry out 2 286 control measures and conducted over 1 900 AML/CFT compliance checks, leading to numerous findings of law violations and the imposition of 97 penalties. Overall, this shows the use of financial intelligence in tackling tax crimes has become more targeted and strategic. 373. Available data and case examples show that authorities such as the State Police, CPCB, and PO make frequent and visible use of FIU Latvia’s analysis products. While fewer documented examples exist for the SRS, recent activity regarding tax crimes indicates increasing operational use of financial intelligence in line with Latvia’s risk profile. For instance, in 2022–2023, FIU Latvia conducted strategic and operational analysis linking multiple STRs and a foreign dissemination, uncovering a complex tax evasion and ML scheme involving over EUR 5 million in cross-border transactions. SRS TCPD used the resulting analysis to trigger a criminal investigation. This case demonstrates the SRS’s growing engagement with financial intelligence products in addressing serious tax-related ML threats. Given the SRS’s central role in addressing tax-related ML—one of Latvia’s key domestic risks—greater use of FIU analysis could enhance its ability to identify and respond to complex tax evasion and professional ML schemes. 374. The FIU plays a crucial role in identifying and tracing (and freezing criminal proceeds (see IO.8 for more information)). Box 6.4. FIU operational analysis identifying and tracing funds In 2018, FIU Latvia received an STR concerning a client of a Latvian credit institution— a non-EU company linked to a Maltese corruption case. FIU Latvia conducted in-depth operational analysis, collecting information from REs, public sources, and foreign FIUs. The investigation revealed that accounts held by third parties across multiple jurisdictions were used to obscure the origin of funds, involving non-EU entities controlled by suspected strawmen used to obscure beneficial ownership. The transactions lacked economic purpose, featured round-number transfers over short periods, and showed characteristics of transit activity. FIU Latvia ordered the freezing of EUR 28.1 million and referred the case to a Latvian LEA, which initiated criminal proceedings for large-scale ML. 375. Over time, the focus of FIU Latvia’s identification and tracing measures have evolved. Historically, actions were linked to Latvia's role as a regional financial centre, often involving high-risk international cases (“first risk profile”) recently, the emphasis has shifted toward tracing funds linked to domestic crimes such as tax evasion and property offenses (“second risk profile”) where the risk of illicit funds leaving law enforcement’s reach is lower. To identify assets, FIU Latvia relies on high-quality STRs, strategic and operational analysis, and referrals from foreign FIUs. Threshold declarations and cross-border cash declarations also play a role in uncovering suspicious activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="368. The use of financial information and intelligence by competent authorities in Latvia is extensive and forms a critical component of their investigative and prosecutorial processes. The integration of financial intelligence into these processes enhances the ability of competent authorities to trace illicit financial flows, identify hidden assets, and uncover networks of criminal actors. 369. Most FIU Latvia disseminations are relevant and of use to the LEAs. For example, most of the disseminations sent to State Police were used in criminal proceedings (see figure below). 57% of disseminations initiated new criminal proceedings and 43% were added to existing criminal proceedings. These high levels of use demonstrate the utility of financial intelligence to develop evidence and identify and trace criminal proceeds. Figure 6.3. Total number of disseminations to State Police and subsequent use Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 370. The FIU supports investigations and prosecutions by submitting &quot;Conclusions of the Competent Authority,&quot; which are detailed reports based on financial intelligence. These reports explain complex financial schemes, methods used by perpetrators, and links to broader criminal activities, aiding judges, prosecutors and investigators in securing convictions for sophisticated ML or financial fraud cases. This practice demonstrates the strong collaboration between the FIU, LEAs, and the judiciary. It also reflects the trust placed in the FIU’s analytical capabilities and the quality of its financial intelligence products, which have proven instrumental in achieving successful outcomes in challenging and high-profile cases. Box 6.3. FIU operational analysis supporting ongoing LEA investigation In September 2022, the State Police launched an investigation into a Latvia-Scandinavia-based OCG involved in drug trafficking and ML. In October 2023, FIU Latvia was requested to assist in tracing related financial flows. Over five months, FIU Latvia held CCG meetings, analysed over 100 financial accounts, and identified typologies including fictitious rentals, fraudulent documentation, and unexplained wealth exceeding declared income. The FIU’s analysis revealed the use of legal entities to launder proceeds through real estate, luxury goods, bank accounts, and cryptocurrencies. Findings were disseminated to law enforcement, contributing to the detention of 16 individuals and the seizure of significant assets in a co-ordinated EU action in September 2024. The case was referred to prosecution in December 2024. See also: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/one-of-latvia%E2%80%99s-most-notorious-criminals-arrested-europol%E2%80%99s-support 371.  Latvia's updated risk profile now prioritizes domestic crimes like tax evasion over historic financial centre-related risks. 372.  Analyses combine multiple STRs with OSINT, international data, and foreign FIU responses, especially in cases involving foreign shell companies and cross-border networks. The FIU has shifted focus to tax and property crime-related STRs, which have increased in volume, reflecting a better understanding of current national risks by authorities and REs. These enriched analyses have led to investigations by the SRS TCPD, including high-profile tax evasion cases. Between 2020 and 2023, SRS used STRs to carry out 2 286 control measures and conducted over 1 900 AML/CFT compliance checks, leading to numerous findings of law violations and the imposition of 97 penalties. Overall, this shows the use of financial intelligence in tackling tax crimes has become more targeted and strategic. 373. Available data and case examples show that authorities such as the State Police, CPCB, and PO make frequent and visible use of FIU Latvia’s analysis products. While fewer documented examples exist for the SRS, recent activity regarding tax crimes indicates increasing operational use of financial intelligence in line with Latvia’s risk profile. For instance, in 2022–2023, FIU Latvia conducted strategic and operational analysis linking multiple STRs and a foreign dissemination, uncovering a complex tax evasion and ML scheme involving over EUR 5 million in cross-border transactions. SRS TCPD used the resulting analysis to trigger a criminal investigation. This case demonstrates the SRS’s growing engagement with financial intelligence products in addressing serious tax-related ML threats. Given the SRS’s central role in addressing tax-related ML—one of Latvia’s key domestic risks—greater use of FIU analysis could enhance its ability to identify and respond to complex tax evasion and professional ML schemes. 374. The FIU plays a crucial role in identifying and tracing (and freezing criminal proceeds (see IO.8 for more information)). Box 6.4. FIU operational analysis identifying and tracing funds In 2018, FIU Latvia received an STR concerning a client of a Latvian credit institution— a non-EU company linked to a Maltese corruption case. FIU Latvia conducted in-depth operational analysis, collecting information from REs, public sources, and foreign FIUs. The investigation revealed that accounts held by third parties across multiple jurisdictions were used to obscure the origin of funds, involving non-EU entities controlled by suspected strawmen used to obscure beneficial ownership. The transactions lacked economic purpose, featured round-number transfers over short periods, and showed characteristics of transit activity. FIU Latvia ordered the freezing of EUR 28.1 million and referred the case to a Latvian LEA, which initiated criminal proceedings for large-scale ML. 375. Over time, the focus of FIU Latvia’s identification and tracing measures have evolved. Historically, actions were linked to Latvia's role as a regional financial centre, often involving high-risk international cases (“first risk profile”) recently, the emphasis has shifted toward tracing funds linked to domestic crimes such as tax evasion and property offenses (“second risk profile”) where the risk of illicit funds leaving law enforcement’s reach is lower. To identify assets, FIU Latvia relies on high-quality STRs, strategic and operational analysis, and referrals from foreign FIUs. Threshold declarations and cross-border cash declarations also play a role in uncovering suspicious activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="407. Latvian authorities apply other criminal justice measures in cases where a ML prosecution is not possible, for justifiable reasons. Such measures are fines for cross border cash non-declaration (below the threshold), penalties and prosecution for non-disclosure or false BO information, prosecutions for illegal activities with financial instruments and means of payment allowing the use of financial instrument, and going after violation of sanctions, fraud, bribery, tax crimes. 408. Latvian authorities have achieved several convictions of legal persons for other criminal offences in instances where ML may have occurred. For example, there were 77 convictions of legal persons for tax evasion (38); sanctions evasion (9); fraud (8); bribery (5); and other offences (17) from 2019 to June 2024. However, authorities should ensure the pursuit of ML in the future, as it is not clear to what extent an ML prosecution would have been possible. 409. Latvia includes confiscation of legally obtained property as punishment. The CL (Sec 36(2)) allows an additional penalty for ML convictions or as a coercive measure for legal persons. Though few cases applied this penalty, authorities should continue to use it under certain circumstances." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="407. Latvian authorities apply other criminal justice measures in cases where a ML prosecution is not possible, for justifiable reasons. Such measures are fines for cross border cash non-declaration (below the threshold), penalties and prosecution for non-disclosure or false BO information, prosecutions for illegal activities with financial instruments and means of payment allowing the use of financial instrument, and going after violation of sanctions, fraud, bribery, tax crimes. 408. Latvian authorities have achieved several convictions of legal persons for other criminal offences in instances where ML may have occurred. For example, there were 77 convictions of legal persons for tax evasion (38); sanctions evasion (9); fraud (8); bribery (5); and other offences (17) from 2019 to June 2024. However, authorities should ensure the pursuit of ML in the future, as it is not clear to what extent an ML prosecution would have been possible. 409. Latvia includes confiscation of legally obtained property as punishment. The CL (Sec 36(2)) allows an additional penalty for ML convictions or as a coercive measure for legal persons. Though few cases applied this penalty, authorities should continue to use it under certain circumstances." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 444. The amounts confiscated over the past years in Latvia highlight consistency with national ML/TF policy and identified risks. Latvia is pursuing illegal funds in Latvian banks under liquidation and prioritises the follow-the-money approach. The authorities are actively freezing, seizing, and confiscating illegal property, especially bank account assets, which resulted in some high-profile cases with considerable amounts of confiscated illegal property. Nevertheless, given the lifecycle of criminal proceedings, confiscation figures still reflect Latvia’s first risk profile (regional financial centre) which prevailed during the assessment period and are only somewhat aligned with Latvia’s changing risk profile (confiscations in relation to recent seizures may take some time to materialise). Still, the results achieved in freezing and seizing assets related to the second risk profile are encouraging. 445. Looking first at freezing statistics relative to risk, these figures show a shift that mirrors Latvia’s evolution from the first risk-profile (regional financial centre) towards the second risk profile with increasing shares of predicate offences such as fraud, tax crimes, and other offences (tied to the second risk profile) and fewer stand-alone cases (tied to the first risk-profile) in the freezing statistics. Table 8.7 Annual Breakdown of Seizure Cases (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Other predicates 39% 46% 38% 56% 41% 58% ML 61% 54% 62% 44% 59% 42% Table 8.8. Seizure cases and value by predicate offence (2018-2023) Predicate Total seizure cases Cases as % of total total assets seized Assets as % of total ML 1 849 54% 3 097 014 396 94% Drug related offences 547 16% 7 433 974 0.2% Tax crimes 326 10% 15 503 812 0.5% Illegal activities with excise goods 310 9% 5 643 992 0.2% Fraud 239 7% 92 764 192 2.8% Corruption related offences 90 3% 78 762 497 2.4% Smuggling 64 2% 1 621 270 0.05% Total 3 425 100% 3 298 744 133 100% 446. However, looking at the breakdown of final confiscations, these figures do not yet mirror Latvia’s changing risk profile to the same extent as the freezing and seizing statistics. As the table below shows, around 83% of all confiscated funds are tied to stand-alone ML, with the remaining connected to fraud (7.4%), corruption (3.4%), forgery (2.2%), tax evasion (1.9%) and sanctions violations (1.7%) and other offences (less than 1%). Given the quantum of value tied to Latvia’s first risk profile, it is not clear to what extent Latvia is conducting confiscations aligned with its second risk profile (e.g. fraud, tax evasion, smuggling, etc.). Table 8.9. Confiscation figures by predicate offence (2018-2023) Predicate offence percentage ML Stand-alone 82.9% Fraud 7.4% corruption (bribery, abuse of position, misappropriation, etc.) 3.4% Forgery of a Document 2.2% Tax evasion 1.9% Sanctions violation 1.7% Illegal production, sale, storage of Alcohol and Tobacco Products 0.2% Sexual violence 0.1% Extortion 0.1% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 0.1% Smuggling, Robbery, Theft 0.0% Other &lt;1% Total 100.0% Note: Figures under 1% are selected among a wider range of crime, whose total is less than 1%. Table 8.10. Confiscation cases by predicate offence Predicate offence percentage ML Stand-alone 45% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 17% Fraud, theft, robbery, misappropriation 10% Tax related crimes (tax evasion, tax fraud, etc.) 9% Illegal production, sale, storage of alcohol and tobacco products, including smuggling 6% Other (THB, corruption related crimes, etc.) 13% Total 100% 447. With the overwhelming percentage of confiscations tied to “stand-alone ML” and few figures attached to other offences such as smuggling, tax crime, fraud and others, it is clear that Latvia has confiscated assets in line with risks associated with major ML schemes and global laundromat schemes located in Latvia (their first risk profile), but it is less clear to what extent other major proceeds generating offences (particularly those in Latvia’s second risk profile) are subject to confiscation. However, considering the freezing and seizing results so far, Latvia shows consistency in pursuing seizures in line with ML/TF risks and policies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 444. The amounts confiscated over the past years in Latvia highlight consistency with national ML/TF policy and identified risks. Latvia is pursuing illegal funds in Latvian banks under liquidation and prioritises the follow-the-money approach. The authorities are actively freezing, seizing, and confiscating illegal property, especially bank account assets, which resulted in some high-profile cases with considerable amounts of confiscated illegal property. Nevertheless, given the lifecycle of criminal proceedings, confiscation figures still reflect Latvia’s first risk profile (regional financial centre) which prevailed during the assessment period and are only somewhat aligned with Latvia’s changing risk profile (confiscations in relation to recent seizures may take some time to materialise). Still, the results achieved in freezing and seizing assets related to the second risk profile are encouraging. 445. Looking first at freezing statistics relative to risk, these figures show a shift that mirrors Latvia’s evolution from the first risk-profile (regional financial centre) towards the second risk profile with increasing shares of predicate offences such as fraud, tax crimes, and other offences (tied to the second risk profile) and fewer stand-alone cases (tied to the first risk-profile) in the freezing statistics. Table 8.7 Annual Breakdown of Seizure Cases (2018-2023) 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Other predicates 39% 46% 38% 56% 41% 58% ML 61% 54% 62% 44% 59% 42% Table 8.8. Seizure cases and value by predicate offence (2018-2023) Predicate Total seizure cases Cases as % of total total assets seized Assets as % of total ML 1 849 54% 3 097 014 396 94% Drug related offences 547 16% 7 433 974 0.2% Tax crimes 326 10% 15 503 812 0.5% Illegal activities with excise goods 310 9% 5 643 992 0.2% Fraud 239 7% 92 764 192 2.8% Corruption related offences 90 3% 78 762 497 2.4% Smuggling 64 2% 1 621 270 0.05% Total 3 425 100% 3 298 744 133 100% 446. However, looking at the breakdown of final confiscations, these figures do not yet mirror Latvia’s changing risk profile to the same extent as the freezing and seizing statistics. As the table below shows, around 83% of all confiscated funds are tied to stand-alone ML, with the remaining connected to fraud (7.4%), corruption (3.4%), forgery (2.2%), tax evasion (1.9%) and sanctions violations (1.7%) and other offences (less than 1%). Given the quantum of value tied to Latvia’s first risk profile, it is not clear to what extent Latvia is conducting confiscations aligned with its second risk profile (e.g. fraud, tax evasion, smuggling, etc.). Table 8.9. Confiscation figures by predicate offence (2018-2023) Predicate offence percentage ML Stand-alone 82.9% Fraud 7.4% corruption (bribery, abuse of position, misappropriation, etc.) 3.4% Forgery of a Document 2.2% Tax evasion 1.9% Sanctions violation 1.7% Illegal production, sale, storage of Alcohol and Tobacco Products 0.2% Sexual violence 0.1% Extortion 0.1% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 0.1% Smuggling, Robbery, Theft 0.0% Other &lt;1% Total 100.0% Note: Figures under 1% are selected among a wider range of crime, whose total is less than 1%. Table 8.10. Confiscation cases by predicate offence Predicate offence percentage ML Stand-alone 45% Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 17% Fraud, theft, robbery, misappropriation 10% Tax related crimes (tax evasion, tax fraud, etc.) 9% Illegal production, sale, storage of alcohol and tobacco products, including smuggling 6% Other (THB, corruption related crimes, etc.) 13% Total 100% 447. With the overwhelming percentage of confiscations tied to “stand-alone ML” and few figures attached to other offences such as smuggling, tax crime, fraud and others, it is clear that Latvia has confiscated assets in line with risks associated with major ML schemes and global laundromat schemes located in Latvia (their first risk profile), but it is less clear to what extent other major proceeds generating offences (particularly those in Latvia’s second risk profile) are subject to confiscation. However, considering the freezing and seizing results so far, Latvia shows consistency in pursuing seizures in line with ML/TF risks and policies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities, as well as sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 476. In November 2021, Latvia adopted an overarching 2021-2026 Counter-terrorism strategy, also addressing TF issues. The strategy includes a chapter on TF that outlines the country’s legal framework for CFT and co-operation between the FIU and the State Security Service in TF cases. Given that there was only one TF investigation and no TF prosecutions so far, the AT was not able to assess to what extent the findings and lessons learnt from these are considered and used in the formulation of national counter-terrorism strategies. 477. It is also important to note, under this core issue that, cognisant of the importance of having an up-to-date assessment and mitigation of TF risks, and as noted under the core issue 9.1, Latvia established a specialised CFT Task Force, competencies and activities of which are presented under IO.1. State Security Service has also developed two CFT strategies which are based on the findings of NRAs and are focused on mitigation measures on the specific TF risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities, as well as sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 476. In November 2021, Latvia adopted an overarching 2021-2026 Counter-terrorism strategy, also addressing TF issues. The strategy includes a chapter on TF that outlines the country’s legal framework for CFT and co-operation between the FIU and the State Security Service in TF cases. Given that there was only one TF investigation and no TF prosecutions so far, the AT was not able to assess to what extent the findings and lessons learnt from these are considered and used in the formulation of national counter-terrorism strategies. 477. It is also important to note, under this core issue that, cognisant of the importance of having an up-to-date assessment and mitigation of TF risks, and as noted under the core issue 9.1, Latvia established a specialised CFT Task Force, competencies and activities of which are presented under IO.1. State Security Service has also developed two CFT strategies which are based on the findings of NRAs and are focused on mitigation measures on the specific TF risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 503. REs, including FIs and VASPs, demonstrate a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. Larger FIs and VASPs primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. Smaller FIs commonly rely on the FIU Latvia's online resources, such as the sanctions search engine, and commercial screening tools for compliance. These tools facilitate the identification of sanctioned persons or entities under UNSCRs, EU, and national sanctions regimes. Notably, REs do not differentiate between TFS related to TF and PF, applying screening and compliance measures uniformly across all sanctions’ regimes. 504. All credit institutions and other major FIs have dedicated sanctions officers responsible for assessing TF risks and implementing controls to ensure compliance with TFS relating to TF and PF. The entities met onsite had clear procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 505. The intensity of TFS checks varies based on the size, risk exposure, and operational scope of the entity. Larger FIs and VASPs typically implement advanced, real-time screening systems, ensuring continuous compliance during client onboarding and throughout the customer relationship. Smaller entities, while maintaining compliance, may rely on periodic or manual checks. SCAs provide guidance and oversight to ensure these entities meet their obligations effectively. 506. FIs employ ongoing, risk-based transaction monitoring systems and scenario-based alerts, including measures for high-risk jurisdictions. Internal policies and controls enable the timely identification, assessment, and reporting of suspicious transactions. While instances of TF-related suspicious transactions have been limited in the reporting period, monitoring efforts have also detected potential non-compliance with EU sanctions requirements. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 507. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a good awareness of risks and the importance of TFS compliance, particularly in higher-risk sectors identified in Latvia’s NRAs. DNFBPs subject clients to screening during onboarding or before conducting transactions and perform periodic reviews based on identified risks. 508. The following case demonstrates that the systems, processes, and guidance in place for implementing EU TFS measures—such as due diligence by private sector actors and prompt STR reporting—are functioning effectively and would also be well-positioned to identify and address potential breaches of UNSCR sanctions. The detection of a dual-listed individual highlights the interoperability of sanction screening mechanisms across both EU and UNSCR frameworks. Box 10.1. Qualitative accountant's STR on possible TFS case Person A, listed on both the EU TFS list and UNSCR 1267 (connected with Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Union), manipulated Person B, a self-employed female entrepreneur in Latvia, into sending him money under the guise of a romantic relationship. When Person B’s accountant conducted a due diligence check, they discovered Person A’s designation under EU sanctions and refused the transfer. The accountant then filed an STR with the State Security Service, which interviewed Person B and explained the sanctions implications and potential legal consequences. 509. DNFBPs, depending on factors such as their activity type, size, and client base, implement sanctions screening mechanisms tailored to their specific risk exposure. They may use automated screening tools or perform manual screening for TFS compliance. When conducting manual checks, DNFBPs rely extensively on the FIU Latvia sanctions search engine, along with commercial databases and other publicly available resources, including the UN sanctions search form, the EU Sanctions Map, and other public databases. 510. Entities met onsite lacked sufficient experience with genuine TFS hits related to TF, primarily dealing with false positives flagged by their internal systems. Despite their lower exposure to sanctions risk compared to more material sectors, they were aware of their obligation to immediately freeze accounts in the event of a positive match, with most indicating they would also notify the FIU. 511. During the reporting period, STR reporting from the legal sector was low. Sworn advocates submitted only seven STRs in total, while no STRs were submitted by other legal professionals. These figures include STRs related to TFS and sanctions evasion. Given the sector’s potential exposure to higher-risk activities—such as involvement in complex financial or property transactions—this minimal level of reporting raises concerns about the legal profession’s understanding of its obligations in relation to TFS. While FIU Latvia notes that the lower volume of STRs from independent legal service providers aligns with their relatively low risk exposure, the near absence of reporting nonetheless suggests a need for strengthened outreach, supervision, and guidance to ensure that TFS-related risks are appropriately identified and addressed across the sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 503. REs, including FIs and VASPs, demonstrate a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. Larger FIs and VASPs primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. Smaller FIs commonly rely on the FIU Latvia's online resources, such as the sanctions search engine, and commercial screening tools for compliance. These tools facilitate the identification of sanctioned persons or entities under UNSCRs, EU, and national sanctions regimes. Notably, REs do not differentiate between TFS related to TF and PF, applying screening and compliance measures uniformly across all sanctions’ regimes. 504. All credit institutions and other major FIs have dedicated sanctions officers responsible for assessing TF risks and implementing controls to ensure compliance with TFS relating to TF and PF. The entities met onsite had clear procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 505. The intensity of TFS checks varies based on the size, risk exposure, and operational scope of the entity. Larger FIs and VASPs typically implement advanced, real-time screening systems, ensuring continuous compliance during client onboarding and throughout the customer relationship. Smaller entities, while maintaining compliance, may rely on periodic or manual checks. SCAs provide guidance and oversight to ensure these entities meet their obligations effectively. 506. FIs employ ongoing, risk-based transaction monitoring systems and scenario-based alerts, including measures for high-risk jurisdictions. Internal policies and controls enable the timely identification, assessment, and reporting of suspicious transactions. While instances of TF-related suspicious transactions have been limited in the reporting period, monitoring efforts have also detected potential non-compliance with EU sanctions requirements. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 507. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a good awareness of risks and the importance of TFS compliance, particularly in higher-risk sectors identified in Latvia’s NRAs. DNFBPs subject clients to screening during onboarding or before conducting transactions and perform periodic reviews based on identified risks. 508. The following case demonstrates that the systems, processes, and guidance in place for implementing EU TFS measures—such as due diligence by private sector actors and prompt STR reporting—are functioning effectively and would also be well-positioned to identify and address potential breaches of UNSCR sanctions. The detection of a dual-listed individual highlights the interoperability of sanction screening mechanisms across both EU and UNSCR frameworks. Box 10.1. Qualitative accountant's STR on possible TFS case Person A, listed on both the EU TFS list and UNSCR 1267 (connected with Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Union), manipulated Person B, a self-employed female entrepreneur in Latvia, into sending him money under the guise of a romantic relationship. When Person B’s accountant conducted a due diligence check, they discovered Person A’s designation under EU sanctions and refused the transfer. The accountant then filed an STR with the State Security Service, which interviewed Person B and explained the sanctions implications and potential legal consequences. 509. DNFBPs, depending on factors such as their activity type, size, and client base, implement sanctions screening mechanisms tailored to their specific risk exposure. They may use automated screening tools or perform manual screening for TFS compliance. When conducting manual checks, DNFBPs rely extensively on the FIU Latvia sanctions search engine, along with commercial databases and other publicly available resources, including the UN sanctions search form, the EU Sanctions Map, and other public databases. 510. Entities met onsite lacked sufficient experience with genuine TFS hits related to TF, primarily dealing with false positives flagged by their internal systems. Despite their lower exposure to sanctions risk compared to more material sectors, they were aware of their obligation to immediately freeze accounts in the event of a positive match, with most indicating they would also notify the FIU. 511. During the reporting period, STR reporting from the legal sector was low. Sworn advocates submitted only seven STRs in total, while no STRs were submitted by other legal professionals. These figures include STRs related to TFS and sanctions evasion. Given the sector’s potential exposure to higher-risk activities—such as involvement in complex financial or property transactions—this minimal level of reporting raises concerns about the legal profession’s understanding of its obligations in relation to TFS. While FIU Latvia notes that the lower volume of STRs from independent legal service providers aligns with their relatively low risk exposure, the near absence of reporting nonetheless suggests a need for strengthened outreach, supervision, and guidance to ensure that TFS-related risks are appropriately identified and addressed across the sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 534. During the reporting period, there were no funds or assets frozen in Latvia pursuant to UN designations related to PF, which is consistent with Latvia’s PF risk profile. The FIU Latvia has not received any requests or spontaneous reports from foreign FIUs related to PF, and only one STR where credit institution suspected PF has been reported. 535. While no assets have been frozen under PF-related UNSCRs, Latvia’s system demonstrates that immediate identification and freezing of funds is ensured through implementation of TFS under the EU sanctions, mainly on the Russian Federation and Belarus-related sanctions. Latvia has successfully frozen significant amounts of funds and assets linked to EU sanctions. As of June 11, 2024, Latvia has frozen funds and assets linked to 176 sanctioned persons (17 directly designated and 159 owned or controlled by designated persons), totalling about EUR 109 million. [118] 536. Throughout the assessment period, Latvia’s licensing system for sanctions derogations- including those potentially related to UNSCR PF-related financial sanctions, transitioned from a multi-authority model into a centralised framework under the FIU Latvia. Effective April 2024, FIU Latvia became the sole competent authority for evaluating and issuing licences to use frozen assets under international and national sanctions regimes. While over 130 licenses were issued by various authorities prior to the reform, the FIU’s effectiveness under its new mandate remains to be fully assessed. The reform is directly relevant to PF, as derogation mechanisms—such as humanitarian exemptions—must ensure that frozen funds are not misused to support entities engaged in proliferation activity. FIU Latvia now assesses all licence applications against UNSCR obligations, EU and national sanctions criteria, and monitors compliance with any usage conditions. Further data on licence turnaround times, approval rates, and post-licence monitoring—and targeted testing of these procedures—will be necessary to determine whether centralization strengthens Latvia’s ability to detect and prevent the misuse of sanctioned assets for proliferation purposes. 537. Latvia has developed a multi-pronged system to ensure that accurate, up-to-date basic and BO information on legal persons is readily accessible. This framework starts with mandatory BO disclosure at the moment of registration with the ER and continues through ongoing verification mechanisms. Public and online access to the ER database, combined with free-of-charge availability, ensures that both the public and relevant authorities—such as the FIU Latvia, LEAs and SCAs—can quickly retrieve comprehensive data. In practice, authorities supplement this official information with multiple external private databases, enabling cross-checking and deeper analysis of potentially complex or opaque ownership structures, including those involving foreign elements. These measures significantly enhance the capacity of authorities to detect and investigate potential front companies and prevent misuse of Latvian legal entities for PF, and respond effectively to offences or breaches related to UNSCRs on PF. 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 538. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs are required to freeze assets and prohibit transactions related to designated persons or entities. Supervisory authorities actively monitor compliance, ensuring that FIs apply robust measures to prevent PF-related financial transactions. 539. Latvia applies TFS flexibly and thoroughly, looking beyond formal ownership to actual control. If a designated person appears to have merely shifted shares to close partners while still exerting influence, Latvian authorities and FIs continue freezing assets linked to those subsidiaries. This approach ensures that sanctions remain effective against attempts to circumvent them through complex ownership arrangements. This practice has been grounded in numerous case examples presented to the AT, including the case detailed below, which - although based on EU sanctions – illustrates the same practical mechanisms and operational readiness that would be needed in a PF context: collaboration between FIs, public-register authorities, and FIU Latvia, and the ability to determine who has direct control of a customer (including through complex structures such as foreign-registered trusts) and freeze assets without delay. The same legal basis, institutional co-ordination, and procedural mechanisms would apply to PF-related TFS under UNSCRs. Box 11.1. Example of effective identification of legal person controlled by designated person, ensuring freezing of funds and other assets without delay FIs and public-register authorities reported to FIU Latvia that LLC ABC’s assets—bank balances, insurance premiums, capital shares, two Riga properties, and ten vehicles—had been frozen once its indirect owner, D.A., was EU-designated. The day after D.A.’s designation, it emerged that 52% of D.A.’s shares in the non-EU parent company OOO LMN had been sold to A.B. and A.C., long-time senior employees of D.A.’s firms, with no evidence they could legitimately afford the purchase. FIU Latvia determined these transfers were a façade to reduce D.A.’s reported stake below 50% and evade TFS measures. Consequently, FIU Latvia concluded that D.A. still controlled LLC ABC and properly froze all its assets under the sanctions regulations. 540. Latvia’s enforcement framework builds on a system of proactive reporting, analytical follow-up, and robust inter-agency co-operation. One of the cases presented- effective action against a sanctions breach involving the export of luxury goods- demonstrated the system's capacity to detect and disrupt illicit trade involving restricted items. While the case concerned sectoral EU sanctions and did not involve a designated individual or entity under UNSCR PF-related sanctions, it nonetheless illustrated how Latvia’s enforcement mechanisms- particularly customs controls and law enforcement co-ordination- can address scenarios that are analogous to proliferation threats, such as the transit of GSS through Latvian territory. This type of enforcement infrastructure is relevant to R.7, as it could be applied in cases where designated persons or entities attempt to move funds or other assets through trade or financial channels, particularly in evasion contexts. Since 2022, LEAs have initiated a growing number of criminal proceedings for sanctions violations, indicating heightened enforcement capability and responsiveness to PF-related vulnerabilities, even where direct links to designated parties have not yet been identified. Footnotes [118]. Given that the value of frozen assets (e.g. bonds, securities) is variable and the funds are frozen in different currencies, the value of assets frozen in Latvia is approximate. By June 2024, the total value of other types of assets frozen in Latvia was approximately EUR 310 million. These other assets frozen included a range of economic resources, including both tangible assets (such as vehicles, real estate), as well as intangible assets (such as voting rights arising from frozen capital shares, and trademarks)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 534. During the reporting period, there were no funds or assets frozen in Latvia pursuant to UN designations related to PF, which is consistent with Latvia’s PF risk profile. The FIU Latvia has not received any requests or spontaneous reports from foreign FIUs related to PF, and only one STR where credit institution suspected PF has been reported. 535. While no assets have been frozen under PF-related UNSCRs, Latvia’s system demonstrates that immediate identification and freezing of funds is ensured through implementation of TFS under the EU sanctions, mainly on the Russian Federation and Belarus-related sanctions. Latvia has successfully frozen significant amounts of funds and assets linked to EU sanctions. As of June 11, 2024, Latvia has frozen funds and assets linked to 176 sanctioned persons (17 directly designated and 159 owned or controlled by designated persons), totalling about EUR 109 million. [118] 536. Throughout the assessment period, Latvia’s licensing system for sanctions derogations- including those potentially related to UNSCR PF-related financial sanctions, transitioned from a multi-authority model into a centralised framework under the FIU Latvia. Effective April 2024, FIU Latvia became the sole competent authority for evaluating and issuing licences to use frozen assets under international and national sanctions regimes. While over 130 licenses were issued by various authorities prior to the reform, the FIU’s effectiveness under its new mandate remains to be fully assessed. The reform is directly relevant to PF, as derogation mechanisms—such as humanitarian exemptions—must ensure that frozen funds are not misused to support entities engaged in proliferation activity. FIU Latvia now assesses all licence applications against UNSCR obligations, EU and national sanctions criteria, and monitors compliance with any usage conditions. Further data on licence turnaround times, approval rates, and post-licence monitoring—and targeted testing of these procedures—will be necessary to determine whether centralization strengthens Latvia’s ability to detect and prevent the misuse of sanctioned assets for proliferation purposes. 537. Latvia has developed a multi-pronged system to ensure that accurate, up-to-date basic and BO information on legal persons is readily accessible. This framework starts with mandatory BO disclosure at the moment of registration with the ER and continues through ongoing verification mechanisms. Public and online access to the ER database, combined with free-of-charge availability, ensures that both the public and relevant authorities—such as the FIU Latvia, LEAs and SCAs—can quickly retrieve comprehensive data. In practice, authorities supplement this official information with multiple external private databases, enabling cross-checking and deeper analysis of potentially complex or opaque ownership structures, including those involving foreign elements. These measures significantly enhance the capacity of authorities to detect and investigate potential front companies and prevent misuse of Latvian legal entities for PF, and respond effectively to offences or breaches related to UNSCRs on PF. 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 538. FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs are required to freeze assets and prohibit transactions related to designated persons or entities. Supervisory authorities actively monitor compliance, ensuring that FIs apply robust measures to prevent PF-related financial transactions. 539. Latvia applies TFS flexibly and thoroughly, looking beyond formal ownership to actual control. If a designated person appears to have merely shifted shares to close partners while still exerting influence, Latvian authorities and FIs continue freezing assets linked to those subsidiaries. This approach ensures that sanctions remain effective against attempts to circumvent them through complex ownership arrangements. This practice has been grounded in numerous case examples presented to the AT, including the case detailed below, which - although based on EU sanctions – illustrates the same practical mechanisms and operational readiness that would be needed in a PF context: collaboration between FIs, public-register authorities, and FIU Latvia, and the ability to determine who has direct control of a customer (including through complex structures such as foreign-registered trusts) and freeze assets without delay. The same legal basis, institutional co-ordination, and procedural mechanisms would apply to PF-related TFS under UNSCRs. Box 11.1. Example of effective identification of legal person controlled by designated person, ensuring freezing of funds and other assets without delay FIs and public-register authorities reported to FIU Latvia that LLC ABC’s assets—bank balances, insurance premiums, capital shares, two Riga properties, and ten vehicles—had been frozen once its indirect owner, D.A., was EU-designated. The day after D.A.’s designation, it emerged that 52% of D.A.’s shares in the non-EU parent company OOO LMN had been sold to A.B. and A.C., long-time senior employees of D.A.’s firms, with no evidence they could legitimately afford the purchase. FIU Latvia determined these transfers were a façade to reduce D.A.’s reported stake below 50% and evade TFS measures. Consequently, FIU Latvia concluded that D.A. still controlled LLC ABC and properly froze all its assets under the sanctions regulations. 540. Latvia’s enforcement framework builds on a system of proactive reporting, analytical follow-up, and robust inter-agency co-operation. One of the cases presented- effective action against a sanctions breach involving the export of luxury goods- demonstrated the system's capacity to detect and disrupt illicit trade involving restricted items. While the case concerned sectoral EU sanctions and did not involve a designated individual or entity under UNSCR PF-related sanctions, it nonetheless illustrated how Latvia’s enforcement mechanisms- particularly customs controls and law enforcement co-ordination- can address scenarios that are analogous to proliferation threats, such as the transit of GSS through Latvian territory. This type of enforcement infrastructure is relevant to R.7, as it could be applied in cases where designated persons or entities attempt to move funds or other assets through trade or financial channels, particularly in evasion contexts. Since 2022, LEAs have initiated a growing number of criminal proceedings for sanctions violations, indicating heightened enforcement capability and responsiveness to PF-related vulnerabilities, even where direct links to designated parties have not yet been identified. Footnotes [118]. Given that the value of frozen assets (e.g. bonds, securities) is variable and the funds are frozen in different currencies, the value of assets frozen in Latvia is approximate. By June 2024, the total value of other types of assets frozen in Latvia was approximately EUR 310 million. These other assets frozen included a range of economic resources, including both tangible assets (such as vehicles, real estate), as well as intangible assets (such as voting rights arising from frozen capital shares, and trademarks)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="124. The FSDB, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, is the ultimate body responsible for co-ordinating and implementing policies to combat ML and TF. The FSDB consists of the ministers of relevant departments and heads of relevant institutions as well as private sector representatives. The FSDB is underpinned by a range of co-ordination mechanisms. For example, the Advisory Board of the FIU is the body that would be used for co-ordinating strategic co-operation amongst state authorities and includes representatives from: the MoI, the MoJ, Latvijas Banka, Financial Sector Association, Latvia Insurers Association, Latvian Sworn Auditors Association, LCSN, LCSA, the Supreme Court and the PO. In 2023, a dedicated co-ordination platform for SCAs was handed over to the MoF, having previously operated under the FIU since 2018 (see also IO.4). 125. Policy co-operation is clearly documented through the national AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan. The 2024-2026 Acton Plan, which was adopted in May 2024 following the completion of NRA2, contains 97 detailed actions across 12 priority themes. The AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan is underpinned by an extremely detailed budgeting process which captures both ongoing costs and new funding requirements necessary to deliver the Action Plan." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="124. The FSDB, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, is the ultimate body responsible for co-ordinating and implementing policies to combat ML and TF. The FSDB consists of the ministers of relevant departments and heads of relevant institutions as well as private sector representatives. The FSDB is underpinned by a range of co-ordination mechanisms. For example, the Advisory Board of the FIU is the body that would be used for co-ordinating strategic co-operation amongst state authorities and includes representatives from: the MoI, the MoJ, Latvijas Banka, Financial Sector Association, Latvia Insurers Association, Latvian Sworn Auditors Association, LCSN, LCSA, the Supreme Court and the PO. In 2023, a dedicated co-ordination platform for SCAs was handed over to the MoF, having previously operated under the FIU since 2018 (see also IO.4). 125. Policy co-operation is clearly documented through the national AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan. The 2024-2026 Acton Plan, which was adopted in May 2024 following the completion of NRA2, contains 97 detailed actions across 12 priority themes. The AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan is underpinned by an extremely detailed budgeting process which captures both ongoing costs and new funding requirements necessary to deliver the Action Plan." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="204. All supervisors have internal control procedures in place specifying requirements for risk-based supervision. In practice, the extent to which supervision is risk-based varies across supervisors. Latvijas Banka 205. Over the assessment period, the supervisory capacity of Latvijas Banka has increased significantly, [42] resulting in more effective risk-based supervision where significant resources are dedicated to supervising systemically important higher risk banks. 26 staff members, including a head of department, are split into two divisions, where 15 are responsible for off-site supervisory matters (off-site reviews, guidance, enforcement, etc.) and the remaining 11 staff members are responsible for conducting onsite AML/CFT examinations. 206. Latvijas Banka’s approach to planning supervisory activities is largely risk driven. Off-site reporting and automated monitoring tools are used to detect risks at an early stage (including major changes in management and operations) and form a documented view on individual risks of supervised institutions (see also section 3.2). The frequency of off-site reporting depends on individual and sectorial FI risk scores and is revised annually. Horizontal or thematic off-site reviews are carried out - where frequency depends on sectorial risk level and scope is dependent on the specific elements of risk identified through off-site reporting and mandatory external audits (see below). 207. Planning of on-site examinations is largely risk-based (see section 3.2 on risk categorisation). The type, frequency and nature of supervisory actions is determined based on both sectoral and institutional risk. This means that higher risk and material sectors receive more intense on-site examinations, as compared to lower risk sectors, and the frequency and type of examination are tailored to FIs’ risks. Risk-based measures based upon residual risk levels are further adjusted for impact (materiality/size related considerations) and might change allocation of supervisory measures. An annual on-site inspection plan is prepared, but Latvijas Banka may conduct ad-hoc inspections beyond the planned frequency in response to identified risks. Periodically, the frequency and intensity of on-site inspections are reviewed to address changes in sectoral and individual risks. 208. FIs are subject to full scope and thematic or targeted examinations. For example, low risk banks are subject to full scope on-site visits every five years, moderately low risk – every three years, moderately high risk – every two years, and high-risk banks are subject to regular enhanced monitoring activities. In addition, a targeted review is performed on high-risk banks every six months if an inspection is not possible within one year’s time. A similar approach to examinations is followed for non-banking FIs with lower frequency of on-site examinations. 209. In addition to on-site examinations, FIs (banks, PIs, EMIs, and securities firms) are required to conduct independent audits aimed at testing AML/CFT systems. The frequency of such reviews depends on the risk profile of individual institutions. 210. Whilst Latvijas Banka’s focus on the banking sector is justified by risk, more attention needs to be paid to FIs outside the banking sector. The number of on-site visits to non-banking FIs is considerably lower. There were instances where planned inspections were not completed due to a necessity to carry out ad hoc inspections for higher risk FIs, changes in the market, delays in the implementation of remediation plans and temporary staffing challenges. Some lower risk sectors, e.g. insurance, have not received any on-site examinations over the entire review period (see table 5.2.). However, sectors with no or very low numbers of on-site visits have been covered by targeted reviews. [43] Table 3.2. On-site examinations 2018-2024 Segment Full scope Targeted/thematic Ad hoc Planned Completed Planned Completed Banks 34 27 21 19 38 PIs 6 6 - - 2 EMIs 3 3 - - 3 Investment firms 9 7 1 - - Investment management companies 5 5 - - 2 AIFMs - - 4 3 - Life insurance companies 1 - - - - Currency exchange offices 54 61 7 7 1 Credit unions 1 1 - - 1 VASPs 22 22 0 0 0 Credit, including financial leasing 215 215 0 0 0 211. Despite this, AML/CFT on-site examinations conducted by Latvijas Banka are of a good quality, with an average of 30 files sample-checked during each on-site visit. The number of sample files is adjusted in accordance with the risk-based approach and increased for higher risk entities. [44] A greater focus on monitoring scenarios aimed at detecting suspicious activities during on-site examinations would be beneficial, in particular with a view to concluding whether monitoring scenarios are comprehensive enough to capture varying types of threat and risk exposures (and whether the efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring scenarios are periodically reviewed and adjusted to needs and changing risk environments). 212. In addition to routine AML/CFT examinations, Latvijas Banka conducts thematic/targeted reviews. For example, upon introduction of a legal prohibition to service shell companies in 2018, the FCMC (former supervisor) conducted several types of supervisory activities after changes to the AML/CFT/CPF Law prohibited co-operation between FIs and certain types of shell companies. It: (i) designed specific off-site reporting; and (ii) conducted several on-site inspections in 2018 and 2019, of which seven were targeted and five full scope – all examining shell company-related controls and potential links between prohibited shell companies and newly onboarded legal persons. As a result, serious and systemic deficiencies were found (failure to apply EDD and to comply with the prohibition to terminate business relationship with shell companies) in five banks which led to fines. [45] Two of the fined banks have since ceased to exist - one left the market voluntarily and the licence for the other was revoked in 2022. The other three banks have made significant progress in reducing ML/TF risks and preventative measures. Targeted supervisory activities have not revealed any potential links between newly onboarded clients and shell companies with which business relationship were terminated. SRS and CRPC 213. The frequency of monitoring visits by the SRS and CRPC is dependent on calculated risk levels (see limitations concerning institutional risk assessment at 5.2.2 that also have an impact here), where high-risk entities are checked at least once a year, medium risk every three years and low risk based on trigger events. Ad-hoc examinations are carried out based on trigger events (e.g., negative information on market players, etc.). Both supervisors, however, tend to adopt a check list approach to conducting on-site examinations and, whilst it is positive that they look at internal controls and procedural matters, there should be more emphasis on implementation (and related sample testing). The number of on-site examinations by the SRS are generally high with a low number of shortcomings identified. 214. Providers of consumer and business loans may be licensed/registered and supervised by three different supervisors: Latvijas Banka (where loans are provided by licensed FIs) – banks and credit unions) and SRS and CRPC (registered providers). [46] The Central Bank supervises FIs that provide consumer and business loans as part of a broader set of services individually, However, registration and supervisory approaches by the SRS and CRPC may overlap. There are 20 loan providers that are registered by both the SRS and CRPC and thus supervised by the two authorities. The complexity of such registration and supervision regimes creates unnecessary difficulties and does not support full consistency in supervision and might negatively affect targeted and efficient use of supervisory resources. This view was supported by the consumer and business loan providers met on-site that were in favour of one single supervisor; with some pointing out that they would appreciate consistent application of supervisory measures and less intrusive supervision, e.g., two onsite visits around the same time from two different supervisors. One provider acknowledged already following the guidance issued by Latvijas Banka despite the fact that it is supervised by another authority. Footnotes [42]. Following legislative amendments, the Central Bank and the former financial supervisor - FCMC – have functioned as a single entity as of 1 January 2023 – the Latvijas Banka. All staff previously tasked with AML/CFT affairs at the FCMC were transferred to the Central Bank. [43]. Targeted reviews are desk-based assessments that revealed minor deficiencies in internal controls and resulted in mandatory remediation. Only one targeted review revealed moderate deficiencies (credit union) which resulted in an on-site examination. [44]. For example, CDD/EDD samples in on-site examinations conducted throughout 2024 range between 26 and 88; transaction monitoring alert samples range between 26 and 50. [45]. EUR 906 610; EUR 647 070; EUR 1 028 850; EUR 5 854 865; and EUR 1 556 046. [46]. Crediting, including financial leasing, where the provision of services is not subject to licensing is subject to the supervision of the SRS, while persons engaged in providing consumer credit services and to whom the CRPC issues a license for the provision of consumer credit services is subject to the supervision of CRPC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="204. All supervisors have internal control procedures in place specifying requirements for risk-based supervision. In practice, the extent to which supervision is risk-based varies across supervisors. Latvijas Banka 205. Over the assessment period, the supervisory capacity of Latvijas Banka has increased significantly, [42] resulting in more effective risk-based supervision where significant resources are dedicated to supervising systemically important higher risk banks. 26 staff members, including a head of department, are split into two divisions, where 15 are responsible for off-site supervisory matters (off-site reviews, guidance, enforcement, etc.) and the remaining 11 staff members are responsible for conducting onsite AML/CFT examinations. 206. Latvijas Banka’s approach to planning supervisory activities is largely risk driven. Off-site reporting and automated monitoring tools are used to detect risks at an early stage (including major changes in management and operations) and form a documented view on individual risks of supervised institutions (see also section 3.2). The frequency of off-site reporting depends on individual and sectorial FI risk scores and is revised annually. Horizontal or thematic off-site reviews are carried out - where frequency depends on sectorial risk level and scope is dependent on the specific elements of risk identified through off-site reporting and mandatory external audits (see below). 207. Planning of on-site examinations is largely risk-based (see section 3.2 on risk categorisation). The type, frequency and nature of supervisory actions is determined based on both sectoral and institutional risk. This means that higher risk and material sectors receive more intense on-site examinations, as compared to lower risk sectors, and the frequency and type of examination are tailored to FIs’ risks. Risk-based measures based upon residual risk levels are further adjusted for impact (materiality/size related considerations) and might change allocation of supervisory measures. An annual on-site inspection plan is prepared, but Latvijas Banka may conduct ad-hoc inspections beyond the planned frequency in response to identified risks. Periodically, the frequency and intensity of on-site inspections are reviewed to address changes in sectoral and individual risks. 208. FIs are subject to full scope and thematic or targeted examinations. For example, low risk banks are subject to full scope on-site visits every five years, moderately low risk – every three years, moderately high risk – every two years, and high-risk banks are subject to regular enhanced monitoring activities. In addition, a targeted review is performed on high-risk banks every six months if an inspection is not possible within one year’s time. A similar approach to examinations is followed for non-banking FIs with lower frequency of on-site examinations. 209. In addition to on-site examinations, FIs (banks, PIs, EMIs, and securities firms) are required to conduct independent audits aimed at testing AML/CFT systems. The frequency of such reviews depends on the risk profile of individual institutions. 210. Whilst Latvijas Banka’s focus on the banking sector is justified by risk, more attention needs to be paid to FIs outside the banking sector. The number of on-site visits to non-banking FIs is considerably lower. There were instances where planned inspections were not completed due to a necessity to carry out ad hoc inspections for higher risk FIs, changes in the market, delays in the implementation of remediation plans and temporary staffing challenges. Some lower risk sectors, e.g. insurance, have not received any on-site examinations over the entire review period (see table 5.2.). However, sectors with no or very low numbers of on-site visits have been covered by targeted reviews. [43] Table 3.2. On-site examinations 2018-2024 Segment Full scope Targeted/thematic Ad hoc Planned Completed Planned Completed Banks 34 27 21 19 38 PIs 6 6 - - 2 EMIs 3 3 - - 3 Investment firms 9 7 1 - - Investment management companies 5 5 - - 2 AIFMs - - 4 3 - Life insurance companies 1 - - - - Currency exchange offices 54 61 7 7 1 Credit unions 1 1 - - 1 VASPs 22 22 0 0 0 Credit, including financial leasing 215 215 0 0 0 211. Despite this, AML/CFT on-site examinations conducted by Latvijas Banka are of a good quality, with an average of 30 files sample-checked during each on-site visit. The number of sample files is adjusted in accordance with the risk-based approach and increased for higher risk entities. [44] A greater focus on monitoring scenarios aimed at detecting suspicious activities during on-site examinations would be beneficial, in particular with a view to concluding whether monitoring scenarios are comprehensive enough to capture varying types of threat and risk exposures (and whether the efficiency and effectiveness of monitoring scenarios are periodically reviewed and adjusted to needs and changing risk environments). 212. In addition to routine AML/CFT examinations, Latvijas Banka conducts thematic/targeted reviews. For example, upon introduction of a legal prohibition to service shell companies in 2018, the FCMC (former supervisor) conducted several types of supervisory activities after changes to the AML/CFT/CPF Law prohibited co-operation between FIs and certain types of shell companies. It: (i) designed specific off-site reporting; and (ii) conducted several on-site inspections in 2018 and 2019, of which seven were targeted and five full scope – all examining shell company-related controls and potential links between prohibited shell companies and newly onboarded legal persons. As a result, serious and systemic deficiencies were found (failure to apply EDD and to comply with the prohibition to terminate business relationship with shell companies) in five banks which led to fines. [45] Two of the fined banks have since ceased to exist - one left the market voluntarily and the licence for the other was revoked in 2022. The other three banks have made significant progress in reducing ML/TF risks and preventative measures. Targeted supervisory activities have not revealed any potential links between newly onboarded clients and shell companies with which business relationship were terminated. SRS and CRPC 213. The frequency of monitoring visits by the SRS and CRPC is dependent on calculated risk levels (see limitations concerning institutional risk assessment at 5.2.2 that also have an impact here), where high-risk entities are checked at least once a year, medium risk every three years and low risk based on trigger events. Ad-hoc examinations are carried out based on trigger events (e.g., negative information on market players, etc.). Both supervisors, however, tend to adopt a check list approach to conducting on-site examinations and, whilst it is positive that they look at internal controls and procedural matters, there should be more emphasis on implementation (and related sample testing). The number of on-site examinations by the SRS are generally high with a low number of shortcomings identified. 214. Providers of consumer and business loans may be licensed/registered and supervised by three different supervisors: Latvijas Banka (where loans are provided by licensed FIs) – banks and credit unions) and SRS and CRPC (registered providers). [46] The Central Bank supervises FIs that provide consumer and business loans as part of a broader set of services individually, However, registration and supervisory approaches by the SRS and CRPC may overlap. There are 20 loan providers that are registered by both the SRS and CRPC and thus supervised by the two authorities. The complexity of such registration and supervision regimes creates unnecessary difficulties and does not support full consistency in supervision and might negatively affect targeted and efficient use of supervisory resources. This view was supported by the consumer and business loan providers met on-site that were in favour of one single supervisor; with some pointing out that they would appreciate consistent application of supervisory measures and less intrusive supervision, e.g., two onsite visits around the same time from two different supervisors. One provider acknowledged already following the guidance issued by Latvijas Banka despite the fact that it is supervised by another authority. Footnotes [42]. Following legislative amendments, the Central Bank and the former financial supervisor - FCMC – have functioned as a single entity as of 1 January 2023 – the Latvijas Banka. All staff previously tasked with AML/CFT affairs at the FCMC were transferred to the Central Bank. [43]. Targeted reviews are desk-based assessments that revealed minor deficiencies in internal controls and resulted in mandatory remediation. Only one targeted review revealed moderate deficiencies (credit union) which resulted in an on-site examination. [44]. For example, CDD/EDD samples in on-site examinations conducted throughout 2024 range between 26 and 88; transaction monitoring alert samples range between 26 and 50. [45]. EUR 906 610; EUR 647 070; EUR 1 028 850; EUR 5 854 865; and EUR 1 556 046. [46]. Crediting, including financial leasing, where the provision of services is not subject to licensing is subject to the supervision of the SRS, while persons engaged in providing consumer credit services and to whom the CRPC issues a license for the provision of consumer credit services is subject to the supervision of CRPC." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="268. All DNFBP supervisors have internal regulations in place to support risk-based supervision and around 10% of DNFBPs are inspected each year. In addition to supervising compliance with preventive measures, the SRS conducts very detailed inspections of client transactions (recognising that it is an integral part of the tax administration). Whilst it is clear that supervision takes account of risk, SRS supervisory effort may not always be directed to where ML risk is highest. The LGSI effectively monitors compliance by gambling operators with AML/CFT requirements. The LCSN has applied elements of a risk-based approach which are considered to be sufficient, but the inspection model applied to advocates cannot be considered properly risk-based and is limited by the current level of LCSA resources. 269. On-site inspections by supervisors focus on understanding of risk, application of internal control systems, application of CDD measures, identification of BO and (where applicable) monitoring. Except for advocates, inspections take account of findings of the NRA and other risk assessments. However, it is not clear to what extent the intensity of inspections (i.e. duration and scope) takes account of risk. Table 4.1. Supervisory activity (excluding follow-ups) – all DBFBPs (including those outside the scope of FATF Standards) DNFBP* 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site Accountants (4 944) 730 536 429 41 247 22 358 3 365 40 Independent legal professionals (1 870) 176 0 147 35 120 29 295 3 151 28 Real estate agents (1 304) 61 230 76 29 124 31 159 4 101 27 TCSPs (628) 145 57 75 8 42 9 172 1 30 2 DPMS (110) 11 47 7 0 2 1 5 0 8 1 Gambling operators (20) 32 0 17 0 9 28 20 20 21 17 Advocates (490)** 131 1369 23 1 212 8 64 0 1179 0 0 Notaries (105) 107 0 9 8 103 0 15 6 5 0 *Number of DNFBPs as per 30 June 2024 in brackets (for advocates- only those within scope of FATF Standards). One inspection may cover more than one DNFBP sector. **For offsite inspections, except for 2021, reference is made here to the collection of information from advocates on activities conducted – to determine the extent to which those activities are covered by the scope of the FATF Standards. 270. The SRS is the largest DNFBP supervisor and, between 2019 and 2023, has conducted around 80 inspections over the course of each month, a commendable amount (around 10% of DNFBPs per year). However, not all of these inspections relate to DNFBPs within the scope of the FATF Standards, and some DNFBPs could have been inspected more than once during the course of a year. 271. Whilst it is clear that the basis for selecting DNFBPs to inspect takes account of risk, there is only a partial link between the results of SRS institutional risk assessments and its inspection plan. Each fortnight, SAP HANA identifies the 50 riskiest DNFBPs out of several hundred high risk DNFBPs, and this list is then reviewed by seven analysts in the AML Department. Given that the underlying data used to calculate risk is refreshed on a bi-monthly basis, the list of 50 DNFBPs changes from assessment to assessment but is reviewed by analysts in order to ensure that the same DNFBPs are not continually inspected. In finalising the fortnightly inspection plan, analysts also take account of: (i) current red flags, typologies and trends; and (ii) need for inspections to cover all DNFBP sectors. During the assessment period, inspection plans have covered: (i) real estate agents and accountants that have not registered in line with newly introduced licensing requirements; (ii) DNFBPs subject to higher risk of use in sanctions evasion (following the introduction of new TFS against the Russian Federation and Belarus); and (iii) DNFBPs assessed as presenting a medium or low risk – following detection of a risk event by SAP HANA, e.g. delivery of an STR or receipt of a complaint. The effect of this is that supervisory effort may not always be directed to where ML/TF risk is highest, e.g. where the focus is on unauthorised activities or non-TF related TFS. Notwithstanding, most on-site inspections have been focussed in those sectors identified as presenting a medium-high risk in the NRA and sectoral assessments. 272. On-site inspections by the SRS are all full-scope and are conducted by two inspectors and, in addition to testing application of preventive measures, inspections include detailed reviews of transactions of underlying customers (for AML/CFT purposes) using information available to support collection of taxes. Inspectors spend one day on-site. Off-site –supervision - also full scope - is used to support SRS inspections, focussing on entities that: (i) have registered erroneously; or (ii) are linked to isolated STRs but recently visited. Off-site checks are used also to follow-up on orders to remediate. 273. In the course of a year, all high-risk gambling operators, 50% of medium-risk operators and 20% of low-risk operators are inspected on-site by the LGSI, based on an inspection plan. Inspections focus on targeted areas and themes. After analysing statistical data and financial intelligence provided by the FIU, on-site inspections in 2023 included a review of training at nine land-based gambling venues of six different operators. As explained above, the LGSI also has off-site access to information on transactions conducted by online operators and through gaming machines (land-based operators) which are checked at random. Overall, the scope of inspections conducted by the LGSI is considered sufficiently broad. 274. Since 2020, the focus of on-site inspections by the LCSA has been on: (i) reviewing internal control systems for all new registrations; and (ii) dealing with complaints about violations of AML/CFT requirements. In the case of reviews of registrations of larger law firms, these have been followed up with an on-site inspection when issues have been identified. In practice, there have been three full scope on-site inspections (covering ten advocates) [51] between 2021 and 2024, though there were more inspections in the two preceding years. In 2021 and October 2024, the LCSA also collected and reviewed (off-site) policies and procedures – in the case of the former for three large offices of advocates (covering 64 advocates) and in the case of the latter for all offices of advocates. Taking account of all factors, inspection of activities within the scope of the FATF Standards is not properly risk-based and is limited by the current level of LCSA resources. 275. The LCSN agrees an annual inspection programme. With the exception of 2019 (when all notaries were subject to a full scope review) and 2022 (see below), LCSN on-site examinations have focussed on: (i) notaries presenting the highest risk; and/or (ii) those starting to practice as notaries – within one year of taking office. Taking into account the homogeneous nature of the sector, low assessment of ML risk, number of licensed notaries (just over 100), and full scope coverage of all notaries in 2019, the AT considers that such an approach is sufficient to mitigate risk and to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Footnotes [51]. One on-site inspection (covering eight advocates) between 2021 and 2023 and two inspections in 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="268. All DNFBP supervisors have internal regulations in place to support risk-based supervision and around 10% of DNFBPs are inspected each year. In addition to supervising compliance with preventive measures, the SRS conducts very detailed inspections of client transactions (recognising that it is an integral part of the tax administration). Whilst it is clear that supervision takes account of risk, SRS supervisory effort may not always be directed to where ML risk is highest. The LGSI effectively monitors compliance by gambling operators with AML/CFT requirements. The LCSN has applied elements of a risk-based approach which are considered to be sufficient, but the inspection model applied to advocates cannot be considered properly risk-based and is limited by the current level of LCSA resources. 269. On-site inspections by supervisors focus on understanding of risk, application of internal control systems, application of CDD measures, identification of BO and (where applicable) monitoring. Except for advocates, inspections take account of findings of the NRA and other risk assessments. However, it is not clear to what extent the intensity of inspections (i.e. duration and scope) takes account of risk. Table 4.1. Supervisory activity (excluding follow-ups) – all DBFBPs (including those outside the scope of FATF Standards) DNFBP* 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site Accountants (4 944) 730 536 429 41 247 22 358 3 365 40 Independent legal professionals (1 870) 176 0 147 35 120 29 295 3 151 28 Real estate agents (1 304) 61 230 76 29 124 31 159 4 101 27 TCSPs (628) 145 57 75 8 42 9 172 1 30 2 DPMS (110) 11 47 7 0 2 1 5 0 8 1 Gambling operators (20) 32 0 17 0 9 28 20 20 21 17 Advocates (490)** 131 1369 23 1 212 8 64 0 1179 0 0 Notaries (105) 107 0 9 8 103 0 15 6 5 0 *Number of DNFBPs as per 30 June 2024 in brackets (for advocates- only those within scope of FATF Standards). One inspection may cover more than one DNFBP sector. **For offsite inspections, except for 2021, reference is made here to the collection of information from advocates on activities conducted – to determine the extent to which those activities are covered by the scope of the FATF Standards. 270. The SRS is the largest DNFBP supervisor and, between 2019 and 2023, has conducted around 80 inspections over the course of each month, a commendable amount (around 10% of DNFBPs per year). However, not all of these inspections relate to DNFBPs within the scope of the FATF Standards, and some DNFBPs could have been inspected more than once during the course of a year. 271. Whilst it is clear that the basis for selecting DNFBPs to inspect takes account of risk, there is only a partial link between the results of SRS institutional risk assessments and its inspection plan. Each fortnight, SAP HANA identifies the 50 riskiest DNFBPs out of several hundred high risk DNFBPs, and this list is then reviewed by seven analysts in the AML Department. Given that the underlying data used to calculate risk is refreshed on a bi-monthly basis, the list of 50 DNFBPs changes from assessment to assessment but is reviewed by analysts in order to ensure that the same DNFBPs are not continually inspected. In finalising the fortnightly inspection plan, analysts also take account of: (i) current red flags, typologies and trends; and (ii) need for inspections to cover all DNFBP sectors. During the assessment period, inspection plans have covered: (i) real estate agents and accountants that have not registered in line with newly introduced licensing requirements; (ii) DNFBPs subject to higher risk of use in sanctions evasion (following the introduction of new TFS against the Russian Federation and Belarus); and (iii) DNFBPs assessed as presenting a medium or low risk – following detection of a risk event by SAP HANA, e.g. delivery of an STR or receipt of a complaint. The effect of this is that supervisory effort may not always be directed to where ML/TF risk is highest, e.g. where the focus is on unauthorised activities or non-TF related TFS. Notwithstanding, most on-site inspections have been focussed in those sectors identified as presenting a medium-high risk in the NRA and sectoral assessments. 272. On-site inspections by the SRS are all full-scope and are conducted by two inspectors and, in addition to testing application of preventive measures, inspections include detailed reviews of transactions of underlying customers (for AML/CFT purposes) using information available to support collection of taxes. Inspectors spend one day on-site. Off-site –supervision - also full scope - is used to support SRS inspections, focussing on entities that: (i) have registered erroneously; or (ii) are linked to isolated STRs but recently visited. Off-site checks are used also to follow-up on orders to remediate. 273. In the course of a year, all high-risk gambling operators, 50% of medium-risk operators and 20% of low-risk operators are inspected on-site by the LGSI, based on an inspection plan. Inspections focus on targeted areas and themes. After analysing statistical data and financial intelligence provided by the FIU, on-site inspections in 2023 included a review of training at nine land-based gambling venues of six different operators. As explained above, the LGSI also has off-site access to information on transactions conducted by online operators and through gaming machines (land-based operators) which are checked at random. Overall, the scope of inspections conducted by the LGSI is considered sufficiently broad. 274. Since 2020, the focus of on-site inspections by the LCSA has been on: (i) reviewing internal control systems for all new registrations; and (ii) dealing with complaints about violations of AML/CFT requirements. In the case of reviews of registrations of larger law firms, these have been followed up with an on-site inspection when issues have been identified. In practice, there have been three full scope on-site inspections (covering ten advocates) [51] between 2021 and 2024, though there were more inspections in the two preceding years. In 2021 and October 2024, the LCSA also collected and reviewed (off-site) policies and procedures – in the case of the former for three large offices of advocates (covering 64 advocates) and in the case of the latter for all offices of advocates. Taking account of all factors, inspection of activities within the scope of the FATF Standards is not properly risk-based and is limited by the current level of LCSA resources. 275. The LCSN agrees an annual inspection programme. With the exception of 2019 (when all notaries were subject to a full scope review) and 2022 (see below), LCSN on-site examinations have focussed on: (i) notaries presenting the highest risk; and/or (ii) those starting to practice as notaries – within one year of taking office. Taking into account the homogeneous nature of the sector, low assessment of ML risk, number of licensed notaries (just over 100), and full scope coverage of all notaries in 2019, the AT considers that such an approach is sufficient to mitigate risk and to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Footnotes [51]. One on-site inspection (covering eight advocates) between 2021 and 2023 and two inspections in 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="328. Latvia has demonstrated, through the provision of statistics, that sanctions are applied to natural persons for failure to comply with basic and BO information requirements. Between 2019 and 2023, 182 charges were brought against natural persons for failure to comply with basic and BO reporting requirements. In total, fines were imposed 12 times for the total amount of EUR 30 560, community service orders – 115 times for the total amount of 12 547 hours and 16 times the person was sentenced to a deprivation of liberty for a total amount of 24 months (see table 6.3. below). During the evaluation period, convictions through prosecutor’s penal orders were brought in 106 cases, with EUR 27 120 of fines imposed (roughly just over EUR 2 500 per fine) and just under 11 000 hours of community service. Given the nature of the non-compliance community, service orders are considered proportionate and dissuasive, potentially more so than financial penalties. In addition, for the 62 cases that had reached the court of first instance by the end of 2023, 36 [60] have resulted in the imposition of penalties, community service orders or a custodial sentence, which resulted in the application of fines averaging EUR 1 720, community service orders averaging just under 80 hours per case and custodial sentences averaging two months per case. In one case, where a strawman acting on behalf of true BO was found guilty of committing a criminal offense, a sentence of three years and six months in prison was applied. [61] These above are considered proportionate and dissuasive for the type of non-compliance identified in these cases. 329. Although a number of some types of legal persons have not filed BO information (see core issue 5.2), the obligation to file for these types of legal persons that existed before reporting requirements took effect in 2018 is only to file information at the point of which the ownership (membership), representation information or BO changes (rather than filing it by a specific date or as part of an annual return). [62] It is therefore not possible to conclude whether these entities are in compliance with BO reporting requirements. The lack of action against this population to date is considered a minor deficiency given the low risk presented by these entities. Authorities should, however, further prioritise action against these entities now that legal action against higher risk legal persons has concluded and this population is broadly in compliance with disclosure and reporting requirements. Table 5.3. Outcomes of criminal prosecutions for natural persons for non-provision of information and provision of false information 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Sanction -number of fines 3 - 3 2 4 Sanction – value of fines EUR 5 590 - 9 500 5 500 9 970 Sanction – community service orders (hours) 1 540 (15 cases) 1 380 (17 cases) 2 750 (28 cases) 4 247 (33 cases) 2 630 (22 cases) Sanction – deprivation of liberty 4 2 4 - 6 Sanction – deprivation of liberty value 2 months and 60 days 4 months 8 months - 16 months 330. Latvia has demonstrated that a large number of companies have been struck from the register(s) following the BO reporting requirements coming into effect. Companies can be liquidated due to economic inactivity, by virtue of a decision by the tax authority, non-communication, or non-submission of BO information. Authorities outlined that these powers to strike off have primarily been targeted at companies that are assessed to be inactive, rather than those that are active but refuse to comply with requirements. Liquidation is assessed to be a proportionate response to non-compliance in these situations. The overall numbers of non-compliance are decreasing overtime, in line with the requirement that new legal persons, irrespective of their type, must disclose their BOs at the time of creation, with lesser opportunity for non-compliance. Figure 5.1. Number of companies under liquidation Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 331. Latvia demonstrated that supervisors have detected failings across FI and DNFBP sectors relating to both basic and BO information. Supervisors commonly apply sanctions for cumulative number of AML/CFT breaches, where identification and verification of legal persons and BOs are checked during broader scope of AML/CFT examinations. The severity of the breaches detected has reduced since 2019 in the banking sector, as have the number of onsite inspections. For example, in 2019, nine onsite inspections found 5 cases of serious breaches, with no serious breaches found in 2022 or 2023. A good level of compliance with CDD/BO requirements is also supported by the on-site interviews with the banking sector. The trend varies across the DNFBP sector, e.g., of the 1 277 onsite inspections for accountants for 2018-2020 (inclusive) no failings were found relating to basic or BO information, whereas for the 970 on-site inspections between 2021-2023 (inclusive) 61 failings were found. A similar theme is evidenced from statistical data relating to estate agents and legal professionals. Footnotes [60]. The remining 26 cases were ongoing at the time of the onsite. [61]. The final sentence is a suspended sentence of four years with a probationary period of four years. [62]. Section 18.2(2) of the AML/CFT/CPF Law." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="328. Latvia has demonstrated, through the provision of statistics, that sanctions are applied to natural persons for failure to comply with basic and BO information requirements. Between 2019 and 2023, 182 charges were brought against natural persons for failure to comply with basic and BO reporting requirements. In total, fines were imposed 12 times for the total amount of EUR 30 560, community service orders – 115 times for the total amount of 12 547 hours and 16 times the person was sentenced to a deprivation of liberty for a total amount of 24 months (see table 6.3. below). During the evaluation period, convictions through prosecutor’s penal orders were brought in 106 cases, with EUR 27 120 of fines imposed (roughly just over EUR 2 500 per fine) and just under 11 000 hours of community service. Given the nature of the non-compliance community, service orders are considered proportionate and dissuasive, potentially more so than financial penalties. In addition, for the 62 cases that had reached the court of first instance by the end of 2023, 36 [60] have resulted in the imposition of penalties, community service orders or a custodial sentence, which resulted in the application of fines averaging EUR 1 720, community service orders averaging just under 80 hours per case and custodial sentences averaging two months per case. In one case, where a strawman acting on behalf of true BO was found guilty of committing a criminal offense, a sentence of three years and six months in prison was applied. [61] These above are considered proportionate and dissuasive for the type of non-compliance identified in these cases. 329. Although a number of some types of legal persons have not filed BO information (see core issue 5.2), the obligation to file for these types of legal persons that existed before reporting requirements took effect in 2018 is only to file information at the point of which the ownership (membership), representation information or BO changes (rather than filing it by a specific date or as part of an annual return). [62] It is therefore not possible to conclude whether these entities are in compliance with BO reporting requirements. The lack of action against this population to date is considered a minor deficiency given the low risk presented by these entities. Authorities should, however, further prioritise action against these entities now that legal action against higher risk legal persons has concluded and this population is broadly in compliance with disclosure and reporting requirements. Table 5.3. Outcomes of criminal prosecutions for natural persons for non-provision of information and provision of false information 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Sanction -number of fines 3 - 3 2 4 Sanction – value of fines EUR 5 590 - 9 500 5 500 9 970 Sanction – community service orders (hours) 1 540 (15 cases) 1 380 (17 cases) 2 750 (28 cases) 4 247 (33 cases) 2 630 (22 cases) Sanction – deprivation of liberty 4 2 4 - 6 Sanction – deprivation of liberty value 2 months and 60 days 4 months 8 months - 16 months 330. Latvia has demonstrated that a large number of companies have been struck from the register(s) following the BO reporting requirements coming into effect. Companies can be liquidated due to economic inactivity, by virtue of a decision by the tax authority, non-communication, or non-submission of BO information. Authorities outlined that these powers to strike off have primarily been targeted at companies that are assessed to be inactive, rather than those that are active but refuse to comply with requirements. Liquidation is assessed to be a proportionate response to non-compliance in these situations. The overall numbers of non-compliance are decreasing overtime, in line with the requirement that new legal persons, irrespective of their type, must disclose their BOs at the time of creation, with lesser opportunity for non-compliance. Figure 5.1. Number of companies under liquidation Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 331. Latvia demonstrated that supervisors have detected failings across FI and DNFBP sectors relating to both basic and BO information. Supervisors commonly apply sanctions for cumulative number of AML/CFT breaches, where identification and verification of legal persons and BOs are checked during broader scope of AML/CFT examinations. The severity of the breaches detected has reduced since 2019 in the banking sector, as have the number of onsite inspections. For example, in 2019, nine onsite inspections found 5 cases of serious breaches, with no serious breaches found in 2022 or 2023. A good level of compliance with CDD/BO requirements is also supported by the on-site interviews with the banking sector. The trend varies across the DNFBP sector, e.g., of the 1 277 onsite inspections for accountants for 2018-2020 (inclusive) no failings were found relating to basic or BO information, whereas for the 970 on-site inspections between 2021-2023 (inclusive) 61 failings were found. A similar theme is evidenced from statistical data relating to estate agents and legal professionals. Footnotes [60]. The remining 26 cases were ongoing at the time of the onsite. [61]. The final sentence is a suspended sentence of four years with a probationary period of four years. [62]. Section 18.2(2) of the AML/CFT/CPF Law." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. In Latvia, various alternative measures can be applied when securing TF conviction is not practicable, including monitoring of high-risk individuals and application of limitations to them, as well as pursuing other terrorism-related offences. 479. Given the country’s low TF risk, there have been few instances where these measures were needed. Nevertheless, one example illustrates how the authorities effectively understand and implement relevant TF disruptive measures: a detainee from another country, who had become radicalised during his time in prison, virtually married a Latvian national thus formally fulfilling a requirement to become a Latvian resident. This notwithstanding, the authorities did not permit him residence given his profile and the assumed threat he may pose in relation to terrorism and TF. Based on this, a decision was made to deport him to his country of origin. This case demonstrates positive and proactive approach by the authorities in addressing potential TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. In Latvia, various alternative measures can be applied when securing TF conviction is not practicable, including monitoring of high-risk individuals and application of limitations to them, as well as pursuing other terrorism-related offences. 479. Given the country’s low TF risk, there have been few instances where these measures were needed. Nevertheless, one example illustrates how the authorities effectively understand and implement relevant TF disruptive measures: a detainee from another country, who had become radicalised during his time in prison, virtually married a Latvian national thus formally fulfilling a requirement to become a Latvian resident. This notwithstanding, the authorities did not permit him residence given his profile and the assumed threat he may pose in relation to terrorism and TF. Based on this, a decision was made to deport him to his country of origin. This case demonstrates positive and proactive approach by the authorities in addressing potential TF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 512. SCAs provide guidance and conduct inspections on compliance with TFS as part of their broader AML/CFT/CPF frameworks. Supervisory activities are risk-based, focusing resources on higher-risk FIs and VASPs. Guidance materials and training sessions are regularly delivered to support compliance and address sector-specific vulnerabilities. 513. Latvijas Banka’s 2023 thematic review covered sanctions-screening systems at 22 institutions (13 banks, 5 investment firms, 3 payment/e-money firms, 1 pension fund), testing 45 in-house and third-party screening tools against 10 000 control and manipulated entries from UN, EU, OFAC, and other relevant sanctions lists. The assessment tested both customer and transaction screening processes, focusing on technical detection capacity, including the quality and quantity of generated alerts and false positives. While the majority of systems were found to operate effectively, some institutions showed deficiencies, particularly in responding to manipulated entries, documentation of screening outcomes, and timeliness of list integration. Following the review, Latvijas Banka issued updated guidelines in April 2024 and required remediation plans for the institutions concerned. 514. Inspections conducted by SCAs indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. These entities utilize advanced tools, including the FIU Latvia’s sanctions search engine, and commercial screening tools, for client screening during onboarding and on an ongoing basis. Between 2019 and 2023, Latvijas Banka imposed 11 financial penalties on credit institutions, totalling EUR 16.3 million, for breaches related to AML and TFS obligations, including a EUR 1.12 million fine for failing to freeze the assets of a sanctioned individual. Enforcement measures also included written warnings, onboarding restrictions, and in one instance, withdrawal of an operating licence. For non-bank FIs, supervisory, supervisory action was taken proportionally, including fines and supervisory follow-ups based on individual risk exposure. Generally, breaches identified are typically minor, such as delays in updating screening systems or incomplete records. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 515. DNFBPs’ supervisors integrate sanctions compliance checks into broader AML/CFT supervision. However, to date, no sanctions or remedial measures have been applied to any DNFBP for breaches or failures related to UNSCR TFS obligations. 516. The SRS, as the primary supervisor for DNFBPs, conducts frequent on-site inspections, particularly for higher-risk sectors such as real estate agents, and accountants. These inspections are supplemented by targeted outreach and training programmes, which improve understanding of TFS obligations. The SRS uses a consultative “consult-first” approach for minor compliance issues, fostering engagement with supervised entities while addressing non-compliance effectively. Nevertheless, inspection findings show accountants still account for a large proportion of TFS -related shortcomings compared to other DNFBPs. 517. The LCSA has not adopted a comprehensive risk-based approach to TFS compliance supervision. The LCSA’s institutional risk assessment is limited to the type of activity performed by sworn advocates, overlooking other key risk factors such as client profiles and transaction patterns. However, given the low TF risk and limited materiality of this sector for sanctions evasion, this narrow focus has not adversely affected overall TFS implementation. 518. Sanctions screening, as well as other aspects relevant to both TFS compliance and the overall AML/CFT/CPF compliance (such as risk understanding, application of internal control systems, identification of the BO, customer due diligence and (where applicable) transaction monitoring) are equally part of the scope of the SCAs non-thematic supervisory actions (most notably full-scope onsite inspections). 519. Internal inspection procedures at the SRS and other SCAs, with the exception of LCSA, outline risk-based supervision practices. Significant resources are devoted by SCAs as well as the FIU Latvia to regularly increase the awareness and competence of the REs, as well as other involved stakeholders on TF and TFS matters. All SCAs that supervise DNFBPs carry out inspections, targeted training and other supervisory activities in order to ensure that DNFBPs comply with and understand their TFS obligations. 520. However, outreach and training on TFS have largely focused on EU sanctions introduced in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Although FIU Latvia has assumed responsibility for all sanctions implementation and introduced guidance, UNSCR-specific TFS obligations have not been systematically prioritised in DNFBP-focused outreach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 512. SCAs provide guidance and conduct inspections on compliance with TFS as part of their broader AML/CFT/CPF frameworks. Supervisory activities are risk-based, focusing resources on higher-risk FIs and VASPs. Guidance materials and training sessions are regularly delivered to support compliance and address sector-specific vulnerabilities. 513. Latvijas Banka’s 2023 thematic review covered sanctions-screening systems at 22 institutions (13 banks, 5 investment firms, 3 payment/e-money firms, 1 pension fund), testing 45 in-house and third-party screening tools against 10 000 control and manipulated entries from UN, EU, OFAC, and other relevant sanctions lists. The assessment tested both customer and transaction screening processes, focusing on technical detection capacity, including the quality and quantity of generated alerts and false positives. While the majority of systems were found to operate effectively, some institutions showed deficiencies, particularly in responding to manipulated entries, documentation of screening outcomes, and timeliness of list integration. Following the review, Latvijas Banka issued updated guidelines in April 2024 and required remediation plans for the institutions concerned. 514. Inspections conducted by SCAs indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. These entities utilize advanced tools, including the FIU Latvia’s sanctions search engine, and commercial screening tools, for client screening during onboarding and on an ongoing basis. Between 2019 and 2023, Latvijas Banka imposed 11 financial penalties on credit institutions, totalling EUR 16.3 million, for breaches related to AML and TFS obligations, including a EUR 1.12 million fine for failing to freeze the assets of a sanctioned individual. Enforcement measures also included written warnings, onboarding restrictions, and in one instance, withdrawal of an operating licence. For non-bank FIs, supervisory, supervisory action was taken proportionally, including fines and supervisory follow-ups based on individual risk exposure. Generally, breaches identified are typically minor, such as delays in updating screening systems or incomplete records. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 515. DNFBPs’ supervisors integrate sanctions compliance checks into broader AML/CFT supervision. However, to date, no sanctions or remedial measures have been applied to any DNFBP for breaches or failures related to UNSCR TFS obligations. 516. The SRS, as the primary supervisor for DNFBPs, conducts frequent on-site inspections, particularly for higher-risk sectors such as real estate agents, and accountants. These inspections are supplemented by targeted outreach and training programmes, which improve understanding of TFS obligations. The SRS uses a consultative “consult-first” approach for minor compliance issues, fostering engagement with supervised entities while addressing non-compliance effectively. Nevertheless, inspection findings show accountants still account for a large proportion of TFS -related shortcomings compared to other DNFBPs. 517. The LCSA has not adopted a comprehensive risk-based approach to TFS compliance supervision. The LCSA’s institutional risk assessment is limited to the type of activity performed by sworn advocates, overlooking other key risk factors such as client profiles and transaction patterns. However, given the low TF risk and limited materiality of this sector for sanctions evasion, this narrow focus has not adversely affected overall TFS implementation. 518. Sanctions screening, as well as other aspects relevant to both TFS compliance and the overall AML/CFT/CPF compliance (such as risk understanding, application of internal control systems, identification of the BO, customer due diligence and (where applicable) transaction monitoring) are equally part of the scope of the SCAs non-thematic supervisory actions (most notably full-scope onsite inspections). 519. Internal inspection procedures at the SRS and other SCAs, with the exception of LCSA, outline risk-based supervision practices. Significant resources are devoted by SCAs as well as the FIU Latvia to regularly increase the awareness and competence of the REs, as well as other involved stakeholders on TF and TFS matters. All SCAs that supervise DNFBPs carry out inspections, targeted training and other supervisory activities in order to ensure that DNFBPs comply with and understand their TFS obligations. 520. However, outreach and training on TFS have largely focused on EU sanctions introduced in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Although FIU Latvia has assumed responsibility for all sanctions implementation and introduced guidance, UNSCR-specific TFS obligations have not been systematically prioritised in DNFBP-focused outreach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 541. Overall, the framework as already analysed in detail under IO.10 applies also here. Hence the strengths and weaknesses of the system identified are the same. 542. FIs and VASPs demonstrate a good level of understanding of PF-related TFS obligations. FIs conduct real-time and ongoing screening of clients and transactions using advanced systems that allow to detect PF-related evasion by integrating customer profiling, locational information, and sectoral characteristics into transactional screening criteria. However, smaller entities may require additional support and guidance to ensure consistent compliance across the sector. VASPs have evolved from using basic, free transaction monitoring tools to more sophisticated commercial providers, improving their ability to detect suspicious transactions patterns (e.g., use of mixers, darknet sources). 543. Most FIs and VASPs rely on commercial automated software to screen against TFS lists. Customer information is reviewed against these TFS-related lists during the onboarding process and periodically, based on a pre-defined frequency that aligns with the client's risk profile or updates to their CDD data. Additionally, checks are conducted during occasional transactions or ad-hoc when changes to sanctions lists are announced. The level of scrutiny of checks is correlated with the size and scope of activities of the given entity. 544. Entities met onsite were aware of the obligation to file sanctions compliance reports to the FIU in case of the need to report asset-freezing under the UN sanctions regimes. Although no funds have been frozen based un UNSCRs, which is consistent with the national low risk for violation of TFS on PF, FIs and other REs regularly report to FIU Latvia freezing of funds under EU sanctions, in particular the Russian Federation-related EU sanctions. As part of the NRA2, an analysis of the STRs received from 2020 to 2022 found that the low number of PF-related STRs aligns with Latvia’s assessed PF risk and threat. 545. SCAs, in carrying out their supervisory functions, have not identified any examples of un-reported PF-related activities or transactions, nor any instances of non-compliance with EU sanctions measures relevant to PF. Furthermore, an analysis of STRs received by FIU Latvia has not identified any STRs containing PF-related suspicions, but which have not been properly reported as PF-related STRs. 546. During the assessment period, cross-border financial flows with jurisdictions previously identified as posing heightened financial crime or sanctions evasion risks—such as certain CIS countries and offshore financial centres—decreased significantly, by 89% and 93% year-on-year, respectively. This trend reflects ongoing de-risking measures by Latvian FIs and supervisory action to reduce exposure to high-risk or non-transparent jurisdictions, as outlined in Latvia’s NRA2. While the CIS region as a whole is not assessed to pose a specific PF threat, the NRA notes that financial flows to certain CIS countries increased during 2022 and may indicate attempted circumvention of sanctions. [119] The significant reduction in such flows since then has lowered the likelihood that Latvian financial channels are being used to facilitate complex PF-related transaction chains. Notably, no cross-border financial flows involving the DPRK [120] were recorded during the reporting period. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 547. DNFBPs have strengthened their TFS compliance- particularly in screening clients and transactions against sanctions lists- but their overall understanding remains less mature than that of financial sector. While these entities meet the general requirement to conduct screening against sanctions list, there is room for further enhancement in structuring their processes regarding scope and frequency of screenings. 548. DNFBPs rely on various official resources for sanctions screening, including FIU’s website, EU/UN Sanctions Map and other available databases. They verify that neither their client, nor the BOs are on UN or EU sanctions lists. Entities met onsite were aware of their obligation to report to FIU Latvia and to terminate the relationship once they identify that client is a sanctioned person, or it is providing services or goods to a sanctioned person. 549. DNFBPs, particularly in higher-risk sectors such as real estate and legal services, have benefited from targeted training and outreach delivered by SCAs and FIU Latvia to enhance understanding of their obligations related to PF and TFS. These efforts have contributed to increased general awareness across the DNFBP sector. However, while some DNFBPs have submitted STRs concerning suspected sanctions circumvention, overall reporting volumes remain low, particularly from the legal sector. This limits the ability to fully assess the extent to which awareness is being translated into operational practice. Nevertheless, substantial asset freezes under TFS and only minor internal control issues identified during SCA inspections indicate some effective implementation within the sector. 550. While a small number of DNFBPs submitted STRs and reports related to EU TFS obligations, no DNFBPs submitted STRs or freezing reports relating to UNSCR TFS obligations concerning PF during the reporting period. This is broadly in line with Latvia’s assessed low exposure to such risks, although the limited level of reporting from sectors with potential exposure, such as legal professionals, suggests a need for continued outreach and supervisory attention to ensure risks are adequately understood and addressed. Footnotes [119]. NRA Paragraph 1.5.13 – noting increased payment flows to certain CIS jurisdictions in Q2 2022 potentially related to sanctions circumvention activity. [120]. As of 18 October 2023, TFS set out in UNSCR 2231 related to Iran ceased to apply. However, as they were in force for the majority of assessment period it should be indicated that there were no cross-border flows to or from Iran recorded for that period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 541. Overall, the framework as already analysed in detail under IO.10 applies also here. Hence the strengths and weaknesses of the system identified are the same. 542. FIs and VASPs demonstrate a good level of understanding of PF-related TFS obligations. FIs conduct real-time and ongoing screening of clients and transactions using advanced systems that allow to detect PF-related evasion by integrating customer profiling, locational information, and sectoral characteristics into transactional screening criteria. However, smaller entities may require additional support and guidance to ensure consistent compliance across the sector. VASPs have evolved from using basic, free transaction monitoring tools to more sophisticated commercial providers, improving their ability to detect suspicious transactions patterns (e.g., use of mixers, darknet sources). 543. Most FIs and VASPs rely on commercial automated software to screen against TFS lists. Customer information is reviewed against these TFS-related lists during the onboarding process and periodically, based on a pre-defined frequency that aligns with the client's risk profile or updates to their CDD data. Additionally, checks are conducted during occasional transactions or ad-hoc when changes to sanctions lists are announced. The level of scrutiny of checks is correlated with the size and scope of activities of the given entity. 544. Entities met onsite were aware of the obligation to file sanctions compliance reports to the FIU in case of the need to report asset-freezing under the UN sanctions regimes. Although no funds have been frozen based un UNSCRs, which is consistent with the national low risk for violation of TFS on PF, FIs and other REs regularly report to FIU Latvia freezing of funds under EU sanctions, in particular the Russian Federation-related EU sanctions. As part of the NRA2, an analysis of the STRs received from 2020 to 2022 found that the low number of PF-related STRs aligns with Latvia’s assessed PF risk and threat. 545. SCAs, in carrying out their supervisory functions, have not identified any examples of un-reported PF-related activities or transactions, nor any instances of non-compliance with EU sanctions measures relevant to PF. Furthermore, an analysis of STRs received by FIU Latvia has not identified any STRs containing PF-related suspicions, but which have not been properly reported as PF-related STRs. 546. During the assessment period, cross-border financial flows with jurisdictions previously identified as posing heightened financial crime or sanctions evasion risks—such as certain CIS countries and offshore financial centres—decreased significantly, by 89% and 93% year-on-year, respectively. This trend reflects ongoing de-risking measures by Latvian FIs and supervisory action to reduce exposure to high-risk or non-transparent jurisdictions, as outlined in Latvia’s NRA2. While the CIS region as a whole is not assessed to pose a specific PF threat, the NRA notes that financial flows to certain CIS countries increased during 2022 and may indicate attempted circumvention of sanctions. [119] The significant reduction in such flows since then has lowered the likelihood that Latvian financial channels are being used to facilitate complex PF-related transaction chains. Notably, no cross-border financial flows involving the DPRK [120] were recorded during the reporting period. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 547. DNFBPs have strengthened their TFS compliance- particularly in screening clients and transactions against sanctions lists- but their overall understanding remains less mature than that of financial sector. While these entities meet the general requirement to conduct screening against sanctions list, there is room for further enhancement in structuring their processes regarding scope and frequency of screenings. 548. DNFBPs rely on various official resources for sanctions screening, including FIU’s website, EU/UN Sanctions Map and other available databases. They verify that neither their client, nor the BOs are on UN or EU sanctions lists. Entities met onsite were aware of their obligation to report to FIU Latvia and to terminate the relationship once they identify that client is a sanctioned person, or it is providing services or goods to a sanctioned person. 549. DNFBPs, particularly in higher-risk sectors such as real estate and legal services, have benefited from targeted training and outreach delivered by SCAs and FIU Latvia to enhance understanding of their obligations related to PF and TFS. These efforts have contributed to increased general awareness across the DNFBP sector. However, while some DNFBPs have submitted STRs concerning suspected sanctions circumvention, overall reporting volumes remain low, particularly from the legal sector. This limits the ability to fully assess the extent to which awareness is being translated into operational practice. Nevertheless, substantial asset freezes under TFS and only minor internal control issues identified during SCA inspections indicate some effective implementation within the sector. 550. While a small number of DNFBPs submitted STRs and reports related to EU TFS obligations, no DNFBPs submitted STRs or freezing reports relating to UNSCR TFS obligations concerning PF during the reporting period. This is broadly in line with Latvia’s assessed low exposure to such risks, although the limited level of reporting from sectors with potential exposure, such as legal professionals, suggests a need for continued outreach and supervisory attention to ensure risks are adequately understood and addressed. Footnotes [119]. NRA Paragraph 1.5.13 – noting increased payment flows to certain CIS jurisdictions in Q2 2022 potentially related to sanctions circumvention activity. [120]. As of 18 October 2023, TFS set out in UNSCR 2231 related to Iran ceased to apply. However, as they were in force for the majority of assessment period it should be indicated that there were no cross-border flows to or from Iran recorded for that period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="126. In 2018, Latvia introduced a public-private partnership mechanism, the CCG. This mechanism is also used for public-public co-ordination and collaboration. The CCG is used for both operational and strategic analysis purposes. The CCG brings together the FIU, LEAs, PO, SRS, SCAs and REs, with the composition of each CCG varying depending on the specific issue. The FIU is the convening party for the CCG and has initiated 65% of meetings to date, though any agency can request the forming of a CCG and to date the FIU has granted all requests. Other than the FIU, LEAs and PO initiated approximately 20% of CCG meetings. The SCAs engage with the CCGs to a lesser extent, with their engagement primarily focussed on strategic rather than operational issues, but case studies demonstrate that SCAs have engaged with operational CCGs to achieve operational outcomes. Table 1.1. Number of CCG meetings Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 127. The CCG has proved a highly effective mechanism for co-ordinating operational and strategic analytical activity. In 2021 authorities introduced a specific indicator to show when an STR has been submitted following a CCG meeting. Authorities demonstrated STRs being submitted as a direct result of information shared through the CCG. The CCG has also resulted in a number of operational and strategic outcomes. Examples illustrating this practice are provided in the box below. Box 1.1. Strategic and operational co-operation Strategic co-operation in relation to a high-risk pllredicate In 2021 the FIU, within the CCG framework, gathered experts from the FIU, PO, CPCB as well as four largest Latvian credit institutions. The experts developed corruption and ML indicators and added to them relevant case study material. The material is to be used by credit institutions (as well as other REs) and LEAs in detecting and investigating corruption. The document includes a list of red flag indicators for transactions which may be corruption related and also other factors that may lead to a suspicion of corruption. As a result, a study was finalised and then published on FIU’s webpage . In the aftermath of the publishing of the study, there was a significant increase in STRs tied to the predicate of corruption (67 in 2021; 104 in 2022). Operational co-operation case: combatting human trafficking and ML Following an analysis of risk data provided by the State Labour Inspectorate and criminal intelligence, the State Police initiated an investigation on trafficking in human beings in 2020. To ensure a swift and co-ordinated response, a CCG meeting (via the FIUs tailor made online platform for secure communications) was immediately convened. State Police informed participants of the circumstances of the case and planned activities, while ensuring its confidentiality. The FIU issued orders via the secure channel of goAML to FIs (providing each FI only with information concerning their respective customers) to monitor transactions on the accounts of the persons suspected of the crime and rapid co-operation with foreign FIUs led to temporary freezing of funds abroad ahead of MLA. As a result, significant assets were seized and frozen. In May 2024, a criminal case indicting 10 natural persons and one legal person for trafficking in human beings and aggravated ML was brough before the Economic Crime Court where trial is underway. Policy level co-operation by the FSDB The FSDB plays a crucial role in ensuring high-level policy co-ordination and strategic oversight of AML/CFT/CPF efforts. In 2023, the drafting of NRA2 was finalised. The findings of the NRA were presented to the FSDB, providing an overview of the identified risks and recommendations for mitigating measures. Following the review, the FSDB adopted the NRA and tasked the MoI, in co-operation with relevant institutions, to develop proposals for actions to be included in the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for 2024–2026 based on the NRA’s conclusions and proposed risk mitigating measures. Consequently, the Government reviewed and adopted the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for 2024–2026 with the proposed risk mitigating measures and mandated the FSDB to oversee its implementation. This collaborative approach ensures the proper and regular co-operation and co-ordination at policy level resulting in proper implementation of AML/CFT/CPF measures. 128. Authorities were unanimous on the benefits of the CCG, highlighting the main benefit as the speed at which action can be taken. For example, authorities cited fraud cases where the speed of information sharing had led to the freezing of funds overseas that, but for the speed of collaboration and information sharing through the CCG, would not have occurred. Authorities also noted that the use of the CCG had allowed greater co-ordination and sequencing of administrative and criminal action. Case studies demonstrated that effective co-ordination between LEAs and Latvijas Banka to pursue criminal cases against individuals and legal persons as well as complementary action by Latvijas Banka related to administrative failings." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="126. In 2018, Latvia introduced a public-private partnership mechanism, the CCG. This mechanism is also used for public-public co-ordination and collaboration. The CCG is used for both operational and strategic analysis purposes. The CCG brings together the FIU, LEAs, PO, SRS, SCAs and REs, with the composition of each CCG varying depending on the specific issue. The FIU is the convening party for the CCG and has initiated 65% of meetings to date, though any agency can request the forming of a CCG and to date the FIU has granted all requests. Other than the FIU, LEAs and PO initiated approximately 20% of CCG meetings. The SCAs engage with the CCGs to a lesser extent, with their engagement primarily focussed on strategic rather than operational issues, but case studies demonstrate that SCAs have engaged with operational CCGs to achieve operational outcomes. Table 1.1. Number of CCG meetings Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 127. The CCG has proved a highly effective mechanism for co-ordinating operational and strategic analytical activity. In 2021 authorities introduced a specific indicator to show when an STR has been submitted following a CCG meeting. Authorities demonstrated STRs being submitted as a direct result of information shared through the CCG. The CCG has also resulted in a number of operational and strategic outcomes. Examples illustrating this practice are provided in the box below. Box 1.1. Strategic and operational co-operation Strategic co-operation in relation to a high-risk pllredicate In 2021 the FIU, within the CCG framework, gathered experts from the FIU, PO, CPCB as well as four largest Latvian credit institutions. The experts developed corruption and ML indicators and added to them relevant case study material. The material is to be used by credit institutions (as well as other REs) and LEAs in detecting and investigating corruption. The document includes a list of red flag indicators for transactions which may be corruption related and also other factors that may lead to a suspicion of corruption. As a result, a study was finalised and then published on FIU’s webpage . In the aftermath of the publishing of the study, there was a significant increase in STRs tied to the predicate of corruption (67 in 2021; 104 in 2022). Operational co-operation case: combatting human trafficking and ML Following an analysis of risk data provided by the State Labour Inspectorate and criminal intelligence, the State Police initiated an investigation on trafficking in human beings in 2020. To ensure a swift and co-ordinated response, a CCG meeting (via the FIUs tailor made online platform for secure communications) was immediately convened. State Police informed participants of the circumstances of the case and planned activities, while ensuring its confidentiality. The FIU issued orders via the secure channel of goAML to FIs (providing each FI only with information concerning their respective customers) to monitor transactions on the accounts of the persons suspected of the crime and rapid co-operation with foreign FIUs led to temporary freezing of funds abroad ahead of MLA. As a result, significant assets were seized and frozen. In May 2024, a criminal case indicting 10 natural persons and one legal person for trafficking in human beings and aggravated ML was brough before the Economic Crime Court where trial is underway. Policy level co-operation by the FSDB The FSDB plays a crucial role in ensuring high-level policy co-ordination and strategic oversight of AML/CFT/CPF efforts. In 2023, the drafting of NRA2 was finalised. The findings of the NRA were presented to the FSDB, providing an overview of the identified risks and recommendations for mitigating measures. Following the review, the FSDB adopted the NRA and tasked the MoI, in co-operation with relevant institutions, to develop proposals for actions to be included in the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for 2024–2026 based on the NRA’s conclusions and proposed risk mitigating measures. Consequently, the Government reviewed and adopted the AML/CFT/CPF Action Plan for 2024–2026 with the proposed risk mitigating measures and mandated the FSDB to oversee its implementation. This collaborative approach ensures the proper and regular co-operation and co-ordination at policy level resulting in proper implementation of AML/CFT/CPF measures. 128. Authorities were unanimous on the benefits of the CCG, highlighting the main benefit as the speed at which action can be taken. For example, authorities cited fraud cases where the speed of information sharing had led to the freezing of funds overseas that, but for the speed of collaboration and information sharing through the CCG, would not have occurred. Authorities also noted that the use of the CCG had allowed greater co-ordination and sequencing of administrative and criminal action. Case studies demonstrated that effective co-ordination between LEAs and Latvijas Banka to pursue criminal cases against individuals and legal persons as well as complementary action by Latvijas Banka related to administrative failings." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="215. All supervisory authorities demonstrated having a positive impact on FIs and VASP compliance through sanctioning, remedial measures and guidance. As evidenced above (this section needs to be read in conjunction with section 3.3 and 3.4 where compliance trends are discussed) levels of compliance with preventative measures have improved over the assessment period. This is demonstrated through supervisory data and interviews with FIs and VASPs. Sanctions and remedial actions 216. A wide range of remedial actions and sanctions have been applied by Latvijas Banka on banks with dissuasive fines for severe and systemic AML/CFT compliance failures. This includes dissuasive monetary fines, change of management, restriction of activities and license withdrawals (see table 5.3.). Sanctions for other sectors (except for VASPs) were only few, however, they seem to be proportionate to the size of business activities; and supervisors were able to demonstrate its positive impact on the level of compliance. Low number of on-site examinations as discussed at Chapter 3.5 also have an impact here. Table 3.3. Sanctions applied to FIs and VASPs for AML/CFT breaches in 2018-2023 No of written warnings No of fines Amount of fines (EUR) No of removal of manager/ compliance officer No of withdrawal of license No of operational restrictions Banks 4 14 20 232 424 1 2 7 PIs 3 3 36 754 2 - 2 EMIs 2 2 80 975 1 - 2 Investment firms - 3 58 177 1 - 1 Investment management companies - 2 70 932 - - 2 Credit unions - - - - 1 - Life insurance - - - - - - Currency exchange 8 27 77 065 1 4 4 [47] VASPs 0 7 105 450 0 0 2 Lenders/leasing 6 4 23 000 - 3 - 217. Whilst Latvijas Banka considers controls by securities firms to be less robust and overall risk to be higher than in banks, very few sanctions have been applied to the securities sector. Latvijas Banka explains that targeted supervisory actions, such as prescribed external audits, targeted inspections, awareness raising and remedial actions, have had a positive impact on the investment sector’s compliance. As for PIs and EMIs, sanctions applied were not significant in monetary terms, however, these sectors are small and the services they provide are present a lower risk. No sanctions have been applied to the insurance sector, however, its risk exposure and materiality is low. Box 3.1. Examples of sanctions applied by Latvijas Banka Change of a business model of a credit institution after supervisory intervention Several supervisory actions have been undertaken between 2018 and 2023 regarding a credit institution that resulted in the application of sanctions, such as a monetary fine and operational restrictions. As a result, the credit institution significantly reduced the ML/TF/PF risks linked to its customer base, and overall AML/CFT/CPF compliance has improved. Withdrawal of a credit institution’s licence Despite several supervisory interventions by Latvijas Banka, a high-risk profile bank continuously failed to comply with AML/CFT requirements. Therefore, a decision was adopted to withdraw the license of the credit institution. Several layers of AML/CFT exit controls were imposed, such as development of a specific AML/CFT methodology regarding payouts and asset sales, to ensure a transparent and controlled exit from the financial market. 218. Whilst occasionally sanctions are appealed, there were no instances where applied sanctions were annulled by the court. Latvijas Banka has a sanctioning policy in place to ensure that sanctions are proportionate to the level of severity of a breach (repeated, systemic nature of shortcomings, as well as aggravating factors are taken into account). Publication of sanctions adds to dissuasiveness of the sanctioning regime. 219. In addition to sanctions, remedial actions, such as an imposed requirement to remedy deficiencies within a specified timeframe and supervisory follow up, are applied as a routine practice. Latvijas Banka has the right to demand an external audit to test AML/CFT control systems (for some sectors, such as banking, this is a mandatory legal requirement) which is paid for by the FI and is frequently used as part of remediation. 220. The SRS and CRPC approach to sanctioning is considered less dissuasive due to the &quot;consult first&quot; [48] principle, however, both supervisors were able to prove that follow-up and remediation practices still have a positive effect. During the assessment period, all VASPs have been inspected with dissuasive and proportionate fines applied. A small number of fines have been applied to lenders which are considered to have limited dissuasiveness; however, lenders’ sector ML/TF risk exposure is limited. 221. All of the above measures had a proven effect on REs’ compliance, however, there is still room for further improvement (see Section 3.4 above – FIs’ and VASPs’ implementation of preventative measures). Guidance and training 222. AML/CFT knowledge and awareness raising efforts by supervisors are commendable (see Section 3.2) and add to increasing the level of compliance by REs. 170. Footnotes [47]. Suspension of licence. [48]. Supervisors initially take necessary actions to increase RE compliance through training, consultation, and mandatory remediation practices. Sanctions are applied as a secondary measure. “Consult first” is commonly applied to newcomers and it is not possible for repeated/severe breaches and/or follow up examinations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="215. All supervisory authorities demonstrated having a positive impact on FIs and VASP compliance through sanctioning, remedial measures and guidance. As evidenced above (this section needs to be read in conjunction with section 3.3 and 3.4 where compliance trends are discussed) levels of compliance with preventative measures have improved over the assessment period. This is demonstrated through supervisory data and interviews with FIs and VASPs. Sanctions and remedial actions 216. A wide range of remedial actions and sanctions have been applied by Latvijas Banka on banks with dissuasive fines for severe and systemic AML/CFT compliance failures. This includes dissuasive monetary fines, change of management, restriction of activities and license withdrawals (see table 5.3.). Sanctions for other sectors (except for VASPs) were only few, however, they seem to be proportionate to the size of business activities; and supervisors were able to demonstrate its positive impact on the level of compliance. Low number of on-site examinations as discussed at Chapter 3.5 also have an impact here. Table 3.3. Sanctions applied to FIs and VASPs for AML/CFT breaches in 2018-2023 No of written warnings No of fines Amount of fines (EUR) No of removal of manager/ compliance officer No of withdrawal of license No of operational restrictions Banks 4 14 20 232 424 1 2 7 PIs 3 3 36 754 2 - 2 EMIs 2 2 80 975 1 - 2 Investment firms - 3 58 177 1 - 1 Investment management companies - 2 70 932 - - 2 Credit unions - - - - 1 - Life insurance - - - - - - Currency exchange 8 27 77 065 1 4 4 [47] VASPs 0 7 105 450 0 0 2 Lenders/leasing 6 4 23 000 - 3 - 217. Whilst Latvijas Banka considers controls by securities firms to be less robust and overall risk to be higher than in banks, very few sanctions have been applied to the securities sector. Latvijas Banka explains that targeted supervisory actions, such as prescribed external audits, targeted inspections, awareness raising and remedial actions, have had a positive impact on the investment sector’s compliance. As for PIs and EMIs, sanctions applied were not significant in monetary terms, however, these sectors are small and the services they provide are present a lower risk. No sanctions have been applied to the insurance sector, however, its risk exposure and materiality is low. Box 3.1. Examples of sanctions applied by Latvijas Banka Change of a business model of a credit institution after supervisory intervention Several supervisory actions have been undertaken between 2018 and 2023 regarding a credit institution that resulted in the application of sanctions, such as a monetary fine and operational restrictions. As a result, the credit institution significantly reduced the ML/TF/PF risks linked to its customer base, and overall AML/CFT/CPF compliance has improved. Withdrawal of a credit institution’s licence Despite several supervisory interventions by Latvijas Banka, a high-risk profile bank continuously failed to comply with AML/CFT requirements. Therefore, a decision was adopted to withdraw the license of the credit institution. Several layers of AML/CFT exit controls were imposed, such as development of a specific AML/CFT methodology regarding payouts and asset sales, to ensure a transparent and controlled exit from the financial market. 218. Whilst occasionally sanctions are appealed, there were no instances where applied sanctions were annulled by the court. Latvijas Banka has a sanctioning policy in place to ensure that sanctions are proportionate to the level of severity of a breach (repeated, systemic nature of shortcomings, as well as aggravating factors are taken into account). Publication of sanctions adds to dissuasiveness of the sanctioning regime. 219. In addition to sanctions, remedial actions, such as an imposed requirement to remedy deficiencies within a specified timeframe and supervisory follow up, are applied as a routine practice. Latvijas Banka has the right to demand an external audit to test AML/CFT control systems (for some sectors, such as banking, this is a mandatory legal requirement) which is paid for by the FI and is frequently used as part of remediation. 220. The SRS and CRPC approach to sanctioning is considered less dissuasive due to the &quot;consult first&quot; [48] principle, however, both supervisors were able to prove that follow-up and remediation practices still have a positive effect. During the assessment period, all VASPs have been inspected with dissuasive and proportionate fines applied. A small number of fines have been applied to lenders which are considered to have limited dissuasiveness; however, lenders’ sector ML/TF risk exposure is limited. 221. All of the above measures had a proven effect on REs’ compliance, however, there is still room for further improvement (see Section 3.4 above – FIs’ and VASPs’ implementation of preventative measures). Guidance and training 222. AML/CFT knowledge and awareness raising efforts by supervisors are commendable (see Section 3.2) and add to increasing the level of compliance by REs. 170. Footnotes [47]. Suspension of licence. [48]. Supervisors initially take necessary actions to increase RE compliance through training, consultation, and mandatory remediation practices. Sanctions are applied as a secondary measure. “Consult first” is commonly applied to newcomers and it is not possible for repeated/severe breaches and/or follow up examinations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="276. Effective use is made of remedial actions by the SRS and LGSI, which are followed-up to ensure that particular shortcomings have been addressed. There has also been quite extensive use of fines by the SRS (over 1 000 applied between 2019 and 2023) and LGSI (ten applied between 2019 and 2023) and, together with the publicity given to enforcement action, can be considered sufficient to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by others. It has not been demonstrated that sanctions applied by the LCSA can be considered effective. Whilst there is an absence of analyses on trends in supervisory findings, there is a sufficient number of examples (apart from advocates) to show that supervisory action has had a positive impact on levels of compliance by DNFBPs over time. 277. Remedial measures are applied under the “consult first” principle - where shortcomings are minor and fully remedied during or immediately after an inspection. Notwithstanding, in line with guidelines for imposing sanctions, active use is made of fines (particularly for accountants and gambling operators). Decisions are also publicised by the SRS and LGSI on supervisory websites (within days of decision), including the name and registration number of the person. This is a strong feature in a country with a relatively small financial sector. 278. The SRS conducts follow-up inspections on a case-by-case basis to check on improvements linked to the application of remedial measures. It does so through specific off-site inspections or through full scope on-site inspections. The number of follow-up inspections conducted by the SRS has ranged from 10 in 2020 to 254 in 2022 (the latter inflated by follow-ups linked to EU sanctions against the Russian Federation and Belarus) and a good number of fines have been subsequently applied where a DNFBP has failed to address shortcomings originally identified by the supervisor. The LGSI undertakes follow-up checks only on an exceptional basis (five in the period under assessment). The LCSN also monitors application of remedial measures through off-site checks and the supervisor has found that there have been significant improvements. In the case of the LCSA, there has been no need to follow-up inspections since shortcomings are generally resolved during the inspection process. 279. SRS guidance recommends setting a fine of up to 10% of the latest “net turnover” or income from economic activity in the case of a significant infringement, [52] and a number of case studies have been presented to support this. However, there are other cases where the fine applied has been much lower than permitted and, overall, the value of fines applied is low taking into account average DNFBP turnover [53] (including non-regulated activities). Taking into account the publicity that is given to these fines, it is considered that the cumulative effect of sanctions is to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by others. The SRS has also used powers to suspend activities of DNFBPs and has done so on over 160 occasions between 2019 and 2024. 280. The LGSI makes use of warnings and fines. For serious and systematic infringements, the supervisor may impose a fine up to 5% of the operator’s turnover. In practice, the value of fines applied is higher than for other DNFBPs (three in excess of EUR 45 000) and considered to be effective in promoting future compliance. 281. Two sanctions (both written warnings) have been applied (in 2022) by the Disciplinary Commission against advocates for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements - both related to application of CDD. In addition, sanctions (mainly written warnings, but also one suspension of activities for a month and one exclusion from membership) have been applied against 15 advocates (between 2019 and 2024) for failing to co-operate with the supervisor. Given the predominant use of written warnings, it has not been demonstrated that the effect of sanctions has been to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by other advocates. The number of measures applied to notaries for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements has been low since most inspections have not revealed any breaches. 282. Section 4.2 highlights the many positive measures taken by supervisors to promote understanding of risk and AML/CFT requirements. 283. The percentage of SRS inspections without identified AML/CFT infringements has increased from 63% in 2019 to 86% in 2024. The SRS has also provided more detailed statistics on findings by sector, by year, by area examined, and by seriousness, and has seen improvements over time. Similar statistics and analyses have not been provided by other supervisors, except the number of significant breaches of CDD requirements by gambling operators which has fallen since 2019 and is attributed to effective supervisory action. Overall, whilst supervision has had a positive effect over time on DNFBP compliance with AML/CFT requirements, the extent and nature of improvements has not been tracked or recorded by supervisors. Footnotes [52]. A significant infringement is where at least one of the following is established: (i) an internal control system is not in place; or (ii) material requirements of regulatory enactments have been violated. [53]. According to the SRS, average turnover for DNFBPs (including non-DNFBP activities) is around EUR 50 000." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="276. Effective use is made of remedial actions by the SRS and LGSI, which are followed-up to ensure that particular shortcomings have been addressed. There has also been quite extensive use of fines by the SRS (over 1 000 applied between 2019 and 2023) and LGSI (ten applied between 2019 and 2023) and, together with the publicity given to enforcement action, can be considered sufficient to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by others. It has not been demonstrated that sanctions applied by the LCSA can be considered effective. Whilst there is an absence of analyses on trends in supervisory findings, there is a sufficient number of examples (apart from advocates) to show that supervisory action has had a positive impact on levels of compliance by DNFBPs over time. 277. Remedial measures are applied under the “consult first” principle - where shortcomings are minor and fully remedied during or immediately after an inspection. Notwithstanding, in line with guidelines for imposing sanctions, active use is made of fines (particularly for accountants and gambling operators). Decisions are also publicised by the SRS and LGSI on supervisory websites (within days of decision), including the name and registration number of the person. This is a strong feature in a country with a relatively small financial sector. 278. The SRS conducts follow-up inspections on a case-by-case basis to check on improvements linked to the application of remedial measures. It does so through specific off-site inspections or through full scope on-site inspections. The number of follow-up inspections conducted by the SRS has ranged from 10 in 2020 to 254 in 2022 (the latter inflated by follow-ups linked to EU sanctions against the Russian Federation and Belarus) and a good number of fines have been subsequently applied where a DNFBP has failed to address shortcomings originally identified by the supervisor. The LGSI undertakes follow-up checks only on an exceptional basis (five in the period under assessment). The LCSN also monitors application of remedial measures through off-site checks and the supervisor has found that there have been significant improvements. In the case of the LCSA, there has been no need to follow-up inspections since shortcomings are generally resolved during the inspection process. 279. SRS guidance recommends setting a fine of up to 10% of the latest “net turnover” or income from economic activity in the case of a significant infringement, [52] and a number of case studies have been presented to support this. However, there are other cases where the fine applied has been much lower than permitted and, overall, the value of fines applied is low taking into account average DNFBP turnover [53] (including non-regulated activities). Taking into account the publicity that is given to these fines, it is considered that the cumulative effect of sanctions is to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by others. The SRS has also used powers to suspend activities of DNFBPs and has done so on over 160 occasions between 2019 and 2024. 280. The LGSI makes use of warnings and fines. For serious and systematic infringements, the supervisor may impose a fine up to 5% of the operator’s turnover. In practice, the value of fines applied is higher than for other DNFBPs (three in excess of EUR 45 000) and considered to be effective in promoting future compliance. 281. Two sanctions (both written warnings) have been applied (in 2022) by the Disciplinary Commission against advocates for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements - both related to application of CDD. In addition, sanctions (mainly written warnings, but also one suspension of activities for a month and one exclusion from membership) have been applied against 15 advocates (between 2019 and 2024) for failing to co-operate with the supervisor. Given the predominant use of written warnings, it has not been demonstrated that the effect of sanctions has been to ensure future compliance and to be dissuasive of non-compliance by other advocates. The number of measures applied to notaries for failing to apply AML/CFT requirements has been low since most inspections have not revealed any breaches. 282. Section 4.2 highlights the many positive measures taken by supervisors to promote understanding of risk and AML/CFT requirements. 283. The percentage of SRS inspections without identified AML/CFT infringements has increased from 63% in 2019 to 86% in 2024. The SRS has also provided more detailed statistics on findings by sector, by year, by area examined, and by seriousness, and has seen improvements over time. Similar statistics and analyses have not been provided by other supervisors, except the number of significant breaches of CDD requirements by gambling operators which has fallen since 2019 and is attributed to effective supervisory action. Overall, whilst supervision has had a positive effect over time on DNFBP compliance with AML/CFT requirements, the extent and nature of improvements has not been tracked or recorded by supervisors. Footnotes [52]. A significant infringement is where at least one of the following is established: (i) an internal control system is not in place; or (ii) material requirements of regulatory enactments have been violated. [53]. According to the SRS, average turnover for DNFBPs (including non-DNFBP activities) is around EUR 50 000." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 551. Latvia’s supervisory framework integrates PF risk considerations into a broader AML/CFT/CPF compliance regime. SCAs do not distinguish between PF and TF related TFS for the purpose of their supervisory activities thus analysis and conclusions presented under IO.10 equally apply to PF-related TFS. No breaches of UNSCR-related PF TFS obligations were identified during the reporting period, including any cases of non-implementation or evasion. [121] 552. Supervisory authorities, including Latvijas Banka (previously FCMC) and SRS, conduct regular inspections of FIs and VASPs to ensure compliance with PF-related TFS obligations. SCAs use a risk-based approach, conducting both on-site and off-site inspections that reflect entities’ risk profiles. While not tailored exclusively to PF, these inspections include assessments of internal controls, sanctions screening practices, and the entities’ ability to detect and respond to potential sanctions violations, including in relation to TFS for PF. 553. Breaches identified are typically minor and are addressed through corrective measures. However, authorities aim to increase the use of dissuasive sanctions for more significant violations. 554. SCAs undertake extensive outreach, guidance, and training efforts. These initiatives, including specialized seminars, training sessions, and the publication of risk assessments, foster greater sector-wide awareness of PF-related TFS obligations. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 555. The SRS, as the primary DNFBP supervisor, focuses on high-risk sectors through frequent inspections and targeted guidance. For example, the SRS has developed the “Guidelines for the subjects of the AML/CFT/CPF Law to be supervised by the SRS”. 556. Despite conducting a large number of full-scope inspections annually, SRS has not identified specific PF breaches. Instead, it focuses on general AML/CFT/CPF compliance, offering guidance, consultation, and when necessary, sanctions—though none specifically for PF TFS violations to date. In addition, agencies (including the FIU Latvia) deliver training events designed to educate REs (and other key stakeholders) of the AML/CFT/CPF Law and the risks of ML/TF/PF. These events have included those specifically dedicated to PF risks. 557. The SRS engages in ongoing outreach and guidance through multiple channels: video seminars, e-learning platforms, and the Electronic Declaration System (EDS). Annual training materials are prepared and published, ensuring that entities have up-to-date instructions and best practices. 558. Outreach and training on TFS have primarily focused on EU sanctions introduced in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. While this focus reflects Latvia’s risk context and the practical relevance of EU sanctions- which also encompass proliferation-related elements- UNSCR-specific obligations have not been systematically prioritised in outreach to DNFBPs. However, this is considered proportionate to the country’s assessed PF risk and the comparatively lower exposure of DNFBPs to PF TFS. Footnotes [121]. In line with R.1, this refers specifically to the assessed risk of non-implementation or evasion of UNSCR-mandated TFS related to proliferation financing, such as attempts by designated persons or entities to circumvent freezing obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 551. Latvia’s supervisory framework integrates PF risk considerations into a broader AML/CFT/CPF compliance regime. SCAs do not distinguish between PF and TF related TFS for the purpose of their supervisory activities thus analysis and conclusions presented under IO.10 equally apply to PF-related TFS. No breaches of UNSCR-related PF TFS obligations were identified during the reporting period, including any cases of non-implementation or evasion. [121] 552. Supervisory authorities, including Latvijas Banka (previously FCMC) and SRS, conduct regular inspections of FIs and VASPs to ensure compliance with PF-related TFS obligations. SCAs use a risk-based approach, conducting both on-site and off-site inspections that reflect entities’ risk profiles. While not tailored exclusively to PF, these inspections include assessments of internal controls, sanctions screening practices, and the entities’ ability to detect and respond to potential sanctions violations, including in relation to TFS for PF. 553. Breaches identified are typically minor and are addressed through corrective measures. However, authorities aim to increase the use of dissuasive sanctions for more significant violations. 554. SCAs undertake extensive outreach, guidance, and training efforts. These initiatives, including specialized seminars, training sessions, and the publication of risk assessments, foster greater sector-wide awareness of PF-related TFS obligations. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 555. The SRS, as the primary DNFBP supervisor, focuses on high-risk sectors through frequent inspections and targeted guidance. For example, the SRS has developed the “Guidelines for the subjects of the AML/CFT/CPF Law to be supervised by the SRS”. 556. Despite conducting a large number of full-scope inspections annually, SRS has not identified specific PF breaches. Instead, it focuses on general AML/CFT/CPF compliance, offering guidance, consultation, and when necessary, sanctions—though none specifically for PF TFS violations to date. In addition, agencies (including the FIU Latvia) deliver training events designed to educate REs (and other key stakeholders) of the AML/CFT/CPF Law and the risks of ML/TF/PF. These events have included those specifically dedicated to PF risks. 557. The SRS engages in ongoing outreach and guidance through multiple channels: video seminars, e-learning platforms, and the Electronic Declaration System (EDS). Annual training materials are prepared and published, ensuring that entities have up-to-date instructions and best practices. 558. Outreach and training on TFS have primarily focused on EU sanctions introduced in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. While this focus reflects Latvia’s risk context and the practical relevance of EU sanctions- which also encompass proliferation-related elements- UNSCR-specific obligations have not been systematically prioritised in outreach to DNFBPs. However, this is considered proportionate to the country’s assessed PF risk and the comparatively lower exposure of DNFBPs to PF TFS. Footnotes [121]. In line with R.1, this refers specifically to the assessed risk of non-implementation or evasion of UNSCR-mandated TFS related to proliferation financing, such as attempts by designated persons or entities to circumvent freezing obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 62. Over the review period Serbia conducted three NRAs in 2018, 2021 and 2024. The 2021 and 2024 were more extensive in risk topics covered. Apart from national ML/TF vulnerabilities, threats and sectoral risks, they also specifically analysed the ML risks associated with VA/VASPs, legal persons and NPOs, as well as PF risks. The 2024 NRA constitutes a more detailed analysis and uses a wider pool of data and statistics. 63. The responsibility of adopting NRAs on a regular basis, rests with the NCB chaired by the Serbian first deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, led operationally by a senior official of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, and composed of representatives of all Serbian competent and relevant authorities (see R.1). The NCB is assisted by a working group specifically tasked with preparing the NRA (i.e. NRA WG). 64. The main participating authorities were the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, Supreme Court, Ministry of Interior (Police), BIA, National Security and Secret Information Council, Ministry of Justice, APML, NBS and Securities Commission. Other authorities were involved in specific working groups including the SBRA, Games of Chance Administration, Ministry of Information and Telecommunications, Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade, Higher, Basic and Appeal Courts, Tax Administration, Tax Police, Customs Administration, Notary Chamber, BAR Association and National Statistics Office among others. This ensured the involvement of the main AML/CFT competent authorities, and other relevant authorities that enhanced the pool of data and expertise contributing to this process. 65. The extensive participation of authorities and representatives (i.e. around 230 officials) is indicative of the commitment that the Serbian Government and the NCB put in this process. 66. Private sector representative bodies (i.e. Association of Serbian Banks, Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Association of Insurers, Factoring Association, Real Estate Cluster, and Association of Tourist Agencies) also took active part in working groups and drafting of specific chapters of the 2024 NRA, bringing to the table data and statistics obtained from operators as well as sectorial experience. 67. The World Bank methodology was used for most parts of the 2024 NRA chapters (ML/TF risk, legal persons and arrangements and NPO risk), while the CoE methodology was utilised for the VA risk assessment. For PF risk analysis Serbian authorities developed their own methodology drawing from previous experiences under the 2021 NRA. 68. The 2024 NRA exploited numerous data sources such as LEA data (reports, investigations, prosecutions and convictions), data on seized and confiscated property as well as estimated proceeds of crime (“dark figures”), SAR data, international cooperation data, cross-border cash movements, data on inflows and outflows of monies, ML typologies and modus operandi, supervisory risk data, data on products and services, business registry and BO data, and financial and client data from private sector entities. 69. The increased availability of statistical data resulted also from a coordinated approach to identify relevant risk data across all competent authorities and to streamline its collection. This led to the formulation of a uniform methodology for the tracking, recording and exchanging of ML/TF risk data and ML/TF cases launched in 2019, which all the relevant AML/CFT competent authorities were expected to align to. 70. More recently this was also followed by the launch of a Centralised ML Case Management System in November 2024 to centralise and enhance available of data on ML/TF cases, bringing together the inputs of APML, TA, Customs, Police, BIA, Prosecutors’ Offices, Courts, MOJ and Directorate for the Administration of Seized Assets. Apart from improving case management facility this system will further enhance the availability and sourcing of statistical data (e.g. sectors involved, featuring typologies, value of proceeds involved, associated predicates, linked jurisdictions etc) for risk assessment purposes. The NCB and other involved authorities are commended for these actions which have been improving available risk data and subsequently the quality of risk analysis and depth of risk understanding. 71. The AT noted some gaps in risk data availability or granularity. In particular, the inherent risk data for lawyers was very limited and undermined the depth of analysis under the 2024 NRA. This was mainly owed to the lack of compilation of NRA 2024 questionnaires (only 38 lawyers submitted risk data) as well as absence of systemic collection of risk data by the BAR Chamber for AML/CFT supervision purposes. In other material sectors (e.g. casinos, accountants, notaries, and real estate brokers) data on supervisory findings was not collected or else data collected was not granular enough to determine the seriousness of findings and consequentially the level of compliance. In the case of the latter material sectors the AT believes that the extent of these data gaps is not a major one. Besides, such gaps are compensated by qualitative data analysis and a good understanding of risks by the relevant authorities. In the case of lawyers, while the data gaps are more significant, the authorities are well aware of their impact and are planning to remediate them. Those gaps have significantly contributed to the high-risk rating allocated to the sector. 72. Overall, the AT is of the view that the latest 2024 NRA provides a detailed and robust analysis of the ML risks to which Serbia is exposed. It identifies the high-threat crimes (i.e. tax-crimes, private and public sector corruption, drug trafficking, organised crime and fraud), the high-risk sectors (i.e. real estate, accountants and lawyers), emerging risks (i.e. pawnshops, virtual currencies, crowd-funding and real-estate investors) and the main modalities of ML (i.e. simulated business activities, transfers via interlinked business entities, use of phantom companies and launderer companies and the misuse of entrepreneurs). It also concludes that the overall ML profile of Serbia is characterised by domestic proceeds of crime, with notable elements of laundering of crime proceeds from regional and third countries, mainly OCGs with an international dimension. 73. The AT also notes the depth of analysis when it comes to explaining the origin, context and main ML modalities associated with the high-threat crimes in particular organised crime, tax evasion, and drug trafficking. 74. The AT notes certain misalignments between the conclusions on ML risks and vulnerabilities related to corruption under the 2024 NRA, and the 2024-2028 Anti-Corruption Strategy. By way of example the latter strategy highlights how results in terms of investigations and prosecutions in the case of grand-corruption have been decreasing in the last five years, from 50 in 2017 to 21 in 2022 [28] . It is also concluded that Serbia’s strategy on anti-corruption has not achieved the desired level of effectiveness [29] . The anti-corruption strategy also highlights corruption risk in connection with promotion, transfer, and sanctioning of police officers, and the political deployment of police officers to the highest positions [30] . 75. These aspects and their impact on the AML/CFT regime are not assessed well enough under the 2024 NRA. The 2024 NRA limits itself to mention the various improvements that have occurred, actions taken and the fact that the police units responsible for investigating financial crime and ML have not reported experiencing any undue interference. The AT also notes that the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the analysis of corruption risks and impact on Police work, undertaken by the Internal Control Sector (Ministry of Interior), show clear awareness about these undue influence issues and set out a series of effective mitigation measures. It remains unclear why political interference with the allocation of human resources within the Police is not treated as a concern under the 2024 NRA and the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan (as opposed to other aspects e.g. bribery). 76. The AT also believes that the ML/TF vulnerabilities of certain sectors need to be analysed in more detail. This is particularly the case in relation to lawyers (owed also to the lack of relevant risk data mentioned above) and the level of AML/CFT controls within the DNFBP Sectors, and exchange offices. This should take into account elements such as the type of examinations conducted, the adequacy of the risk-based approach adopted, the impact of supervision and enforcement on compliance levels (including through the recording and monitoring of more granular data on the seriousness and systemic nature of findings). 77. The risk related to the legal persons and arrangements was specifically considered in the course of the 2021 and 2024 NRA. The analysis is robust and displays good quality conclusions with some aspects of moderate or minor concern that require further analysis (see section 7.2.2 under IO5). 78. The AT was pleased to note that the NRAs are complimented by various other ML/TF risk analysis that assess specific risk aspects. The most prominent ones include the (i) 2023 SOCTA providing detailed information on the operations, types of OCGs present in Serbia and identified ML modalities, (ii) the 2024 ML/TF Risk Assessment of the Real Estate Sector analysing numerous associated risks such as corruption, links with OCGs and extent of involvement of professionals in the sector, and (iii) the 2023 APML ML Typologies analysis. 79. Furthermore, over the review period, the NCB setup 11 expert teams some of which were tasked to study in more detail risks associated with particular services and sectors: (i) the legal framework governing the transposition of BNIs (2022), (ii) ML/TF cases to identify typologies (2022), (iii) TF risks associated with E-money and payment institutions (2022), (iv) ML/TF Risk Assessment of the Real Estate Sector (2024), (v) Review of BRAs undertaken by REs, (vi) Regional Risk Assessment of Legal Entities and Arrangement for the Balkans (2023), (vii) Cooperation of Authorities regulating NPOs. 80. From the engagement with the competent authorities during the on-site mission, as well as the written submissions provided, it was evident that the majority of and key authorities had a detailed understanding of the ML/TF risks to which Serbia is exposed. Citing some examples, the authorities were able to describe in detail the different types of OCGs operating in Serbia, the types of predicate offences they mainly deal in and the accompanying ML modalities. During the discussions the Serbian authorities were also able to explain (also providing statistical data) the extent of involvement of specific DNFBPs (i.e. lawyers, notaries and accountants) in formation of Serbian legal persons. This good level of risk understanding did not appear to be simply a result of the NRA process and other risk analysis conducted, but resulting also from the operational experiences of officials, and the good level of coordination (operational and policy) held between authorities (particularly investigatory and intelligence authorities) and facilitated by the NCB. 1.1.2. TF Risks 81. The last three NRAs included specific chapters dedicated to assessing the TF Risk. Besides assessing national TF vulnerabilities, the assessment identifies the main TF threats and the probability of them materialising. The assessment was developed by a WG made up of representatives from various ministries and competent authorities including BIA, APML, Customs, TA, NBS, Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Securities Commission, and SBRA. It also included representatives of private sector associations namely the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Travel Agencies. 82. The assessment concludes that Serbia is exposed to a medium level of TF risk and identifies a high TF threat in connection with self-radicalised individuals and use of social media, and a medium threat in respect of ethnically motivated terrorism, religious extremism and migratory movements. The analysis of the wider TF threat (i.e. not confined to potential terrorist activities in Serbia) was based on an analysis of financial inflows and outflows to countries with an active terrorist threat, SAR data, TF pre-investigations and intelligence. It concludes that the highest TF exposure arises from payment institutions which may be used for the systemic transfer of small-value transactions. The sectoral vulnerability analysis concludes that there are no highly vulnerable sectors and identifies as medium vulnerable sectors payment institutions, currency exchange operators and freelancers in the IT sector. 83. The AT considers the TF risk assessment to be a thorough one, considering a wide range of relevant data. Nonetheless the AT urges the authorities to expand further the analysis of potential TF connected with ethnically motivated terrorism in the region, in which Serbian individuals might be implicated. Between 2023-2024 there were two relevant incidents of potential terrorism and TF relevance [31] one of which allegedly involved organised groups of Serbian nationals. The authorities explained that they did not take these incidents into consideration when assessing TF risks under the 2024 NRA as they concluded that the acts were not classified as terrorism or TF, therefore irrelevant. While the AT is not disputing the Serbian authorities’ conclusion on these cases, the fact that no consideration and analysis of these featured in the 2024 NRA led the AT to question whether potential TF risks associated with ethnically motivated terrorism have been exhaustively explored. 84. Although a minor shortcoming (as the data provided to the AT did not indicate any notable use of Serbian legal persons for TF purposes), the TF risk exposure of the different types of legal persons (beyond foundations and associations acting as NPOs – see section 7.2.2. on IO5), and the effectiveness of CTF preventive and supervisory measures in place are lacking and need to be analysed. Dissemination of ML/TF Risk Conclusions &amp; REs’ Understanding of Risk 85. All NRAs have been published on the websites of various authorities including APML, NBS, Securities Commission, Notarial Chamber and SBRA. The classified version of the 2024 NRA was shared with relevant authorities (including all LEAs, all supervisory bodies, the TA, Customs, and the SBRA). Competent authorities that participated in the WGs were also privy to the analysis and discussions leading to the conclusion of the NRA and had access to the final drafts of the NRA. The majority of and key competent authorities provided detailed explanations and valuable insights throughout the on-site discussions, which proves their excellent level of understanding of the NRA conclusions, the analysis and context. 86. Upon the launch of the 2024 NRA project, an information session was held in July for all groups of REs (419 REs from most sectors attended), where they were introduced to the process, and informed how to assist and cooperate. The conclusions of the NRA were then communicated to the private sector entities in various ways. The NBS circulated the NRA documents via circulars sent to all REs under its supervisory remit (i.e. Banks, VASPs, Financial Leasing Providers, Insurance Companies, Payment Institutions and Pension Funds). Moreover, information sessions were organised on numerous occasions at the end of 2024 and in 2025 and in different regions of Serbia to explain the conclusions of the NRA. These targeted and were attended by both public and private sector representatives [32] from most of the material FI/DNFBP sectors. Almost all REs met on-site mentioned attending these information sessions. 87. There were various other outreach events focusing on national ML/TF risks and typologies. In April 2024 following the conclusion of the project on typologies by one of the 11 expert teams, an information session was held for public and private sector entities [33] Footnotes [28] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 12 [29] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 9 [30] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 32 [31] Ibar-Lepenac canal attack (November 2024) and Armed Attacks in Banjska, Kosovo* (2023). * All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this report shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo. [32] https://www.apml.gov.rs/english/news/article/presentation-of-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-and-proliferation-financing-national-risk-assessment [33] apml.gov.rs/vesti/clanak/tipologije-pranja-novca-i-modaliteti-i-trendovi-finansiranja-terorizma-info-sesija-za-predstavnike-drzavnog-i-privatnog-sektora-3-april-2024-godine" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 62. Over the review period Serbia conducted three NRAs in 2018, 2021 and 2024. The 2021 and 2024 were more extensive in risk topics covered. Apart from national ML/TF vulnerabilities, threats and sectoral risks, they also specifically analysed the ML risks associated with VA/VASPs, legal persons and NPOs, as well as PF risks. The 2024 NRA constitutes a more detailed analysis and uses a wider pool of data and statistics. 63. The responsibility of adopting NRAs on a regular basis, rests with the NCB chaired by the Serbian first deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, led operationally by a senior official of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, and composed of representatives of all Serbian competent and relevant authorities (see R.1). The NCB is assisted by a working group specifically tasked with preparing the NRA (i.e. NRA WG). 64. The main participating authorities were the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, Supreme Court, Ministry of Interior (Police), BIA, National Security and Secret Information Council, Ministry of Justice, APML, NBS and Securities Commission. Other authorities were involved in specific working groups including the SBRA, Games of Chance Administration, Ministry of Information and Telecommunications, Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade, Higher, Basic and Appeal Courts, Tax Administration, Tax Police, Customs Administration, Notary Chamber, BAR Association and National Statistics Office among others. This ensured the involvement of the main AML/CFT competent authorities, and other relevant authorities that enhanced the pool of data and expertise contributing to this process. 65. The extensive participation of authorities and representatives (i.e. around 230 officials) is indicative of the commitment that the Serbian Government and the NCB put in this process. 66. Private sector representative bodies (i.e. Association of Serbian Banks, Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Association of Insurers, Factoring Association, Real Estate Cluster, and Association of Tourist Agencies) also took active part in working groups and drafting of specific chapters of the 2024 NRA, bringing to the table data and statistics obtained from operators as well as sectorial experience. 67. The World Bank methodology was used for most parts of the 2024 NRA chapters (ML/TF risk, legal persons and arrangements and NPO risk), while the CoE methodology was utilised for the VA risk assessment. For PF risk analysis Serbian authorities developed their own methodology drawing from previous experiences under the 2021 NRA. 68. The 2024 NRA exploited numerous data sources such as LEA data (reports, investigations, prosecutions and convictions), data on seized and confiscated property as well as estimated proceeds of crime (“dark figures”), SAR data, international cooperation data, cross-border cash movements, data on inflows and outflows of monies, ML typologies and modus operandi, supervisory risk data, data on products and services, business registry and BO data, and financial and client data from private sector entities. 69. The increased availability of statistical data resulted also from a coordinated approach to identify relevant risk data across all competent authorities and to streamline its collection. This led to the formulation of a uniform methodology for the tracking, recording and exchanging of ML/TF risk data and ML/TF cases launched in 2019, which all the relevant AML/CFT competent authorities were expected to align to. 70. More recently this was also followed by the launch of a Centralised ML Case Management System in November 2024 to centralise and enhance available of data on ML/TF cases, bringing together the inputs of APML, TA, Customs, Police, BIA, Prosecutors’ Offices, Courts, MOJ and Directorate for the Administration of Seized Assets. Apart from improving case management facility this system will further enhance the availability and sourcing of statistical data (e.g. sectors involved, featuring typologies, value of proceeds involved, associated predicates, linked jurisdictions etc) for risk assessment purposes. The NCB and other involved authorities are commended for these actions which have been improving available risk data and subsequently the quality of risk analysis and depth of risk understanding. 71. The AT noted some gaps in risk data availability or granularity. In particular, the inherent risk data for lawyers was very limited and undermined the depth of analysis under the 2024 NRA. This was mainly owed to the lack of compilation of NRA 2024 questionnaires (only 38 lawyers submitted risk data) as well as absence of systemic collection of risk data by the BAR Chamber for AML/CFT supervision purposes. In other material sectors (e.g. casinos, accountants, notaries, and real estate brokers) data on supervisory findings was not collected or else data collected was not granular enough to determine the seriousness of findings and consequentially the level of compliance. In the case of the latter material sectors the AT believes that the extent of these data gaps is not a major one. Besides, such gaps are compensated by qualitative data analysis and a good understanding of risks by the relevant authorities. In the case of lawyers, while the data gaps are more significant, the authorities are well aware of their impact and are planning to remediate them. Those gaps have significantly contributed to the high-risk rating allocated to the sector. 72. Overall, the AT is of the view that the latest 2024 NRA provides a detailed and robust analysis of the ML risks to which Serbia is exposed. It identifies the high-threat crimes (i.e. tax-crimes, private and public sector corruption, drug trafficking, organised crime and fraud), the high-risk sectors (i.e. real estate, accountants and lawyers), emerging risks (i.e. pawnshops, virtual currencies, crowd-funding and real-estate investors) and the main modalities of ML (i.e. simulated business activities, transfers via interlinked business entities, use of phantom companies and launderer companies and the misuse of entrepreneurs). It also concludes that the overall ML profile of Serbia is characterised by domestic proceeds of crime, with notable elements of laundering of crime proceeds from regional and third countries, mainly OCGs with an international dimension. 73. The AT also notes the depth of analysis when it comes to explaining the origin, context and main ML modalities associated with the high-threat crimes in particular organised crime, tax evasion, and drug trafficking. 74. The AT notes certain misalignments between the conclusions on ML risks and vulnerabilities related to corruption under the 2024 NRA, and the 2024-2028 Anti-Corruption Strategy. By way of example the latter strategy highlights how results in terms of investigations and prosecutions in the case of grand-corruption have been decreasing in the last five years, from 50 in 2017 to 21 in 2022 [28] . It is also concluded that Serbia’s strategy on anti-corruption has not achieved the desired level of effectiveness [29] . The anti-corruption strategy also highlights corruption risk in connection with promotion, transfer, and sanctioning of police officers, and the political deployment of police officers to the highest positions [30] . 75. These aspects and their impact on the AML/CFT regime are not assessed well enough under the 2024 NRA. The 2024 NRA limits itself to mention the various improvements that have occurred, actions taken and the fact that the police units responsible for investigating financial crime and ML have not reported experiencing any undue interference. The AT also notes that the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the analysis of corruption risks and impact on Police work, undertaken by the Internal Control Sector (Ministry of Interior), show clear awareness about these undue influence issues and set out a series of effective mitigation measures. It remains unclear why political interference with the allocation of human resources within the Police is not treated as a concern under the 2024 NRA and the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan (as opposed to other aspects e.g. bribery). 76. The AT also believes that the ML/TF vulnerabilities of certain sectors need to be analysed in more detail. This is particularly the case in relation to lawyers (owed also to the lack of relevant risk data mentioned above) and the level of AML/CFT controls within the DNFBP Sectors, and exchange offices. This should take into account elements such as the type of examinations conducted, the adequacy of the risk-based approach adopted, the impact of supervision and enforcement on compliance levels (including through the recording and monitoring of more granular data on the seriousness and systemic nature of findings). 77. The risk related to the legal persons and arrangements was specifically considered in the course of the 2021 and 2024 NRA. The analysis is robust and displays good quality conclusions with some aspects of moderate or minor concern that require further analysis (see section 7.2.2 under IO5). 78. The AT was pleased to note that the NRAs are complimented by various other ML/TF risk analysis that assess specific risk aspects. The most prominent ones include the (i) 2023 SOCTA providing detailed information on the operations, types of OCGs present in Serbia and identified ML modalities, (ii) the 2024 ML/TF Risk Assessment of the Real Estate Sector analysing numerous associated risks such as corruption, links with OCGs and extent of involvement of professionals in the sector, and (iii) the 2023 APML ML Typologies analysis. 79. Furthermore, over the review period, the NCB setup 11 expert teams some of which were tasked to study in more detail risks associated with particular services and sectors: (i) the legal framework governing the transposition of BNIs (2022), (ii) ML/TF cases to identify typologies (2022), (iii) TF risks associated with E-money and payment institutions (2022), (iv) ML/TF Risk Assessment of the Real Estate Sector (2024), (v) Review of BRAs undertaken by REs, (vi) Regional Risk Assessment of Legal Entities and Arrangement for the Balkans (2023), (vii) Cooperation of Authorities regulating NPOs. 80. From the engagement with the competent authorities during the on-site mission, as well as the written submissions provided, it was evident that the majority of and key authorities had a detailed understanding of the ML/TF risks to which Serbia is exposed. Citing some examples, the authorities were able to describe in detail the different types of OCGs operating in Serbia, the types of predicate offences they mainly deal in and the accompanying ML modalities. During the discussions the Serbian authorities were also able to explain (also providing statistical data) the extent of involvement of specific DNFBPs (i.e. lawyers, notaries and accountants) in formation of Serbian legal persons. This good level of risk understanding did not appear to be simply a result of the NRA process and other risk analysis conducted, but resulting also from the operational experiences of officials, and the good level of coordination (operational and policy) held between authorities (particularly investigatory and intelligence authorities) and facilitated by the NCB. 1.1.2. TF Risks 81. The last three NRAs included specific chapters dedicated to assessing the TF Risk. Besides assessing national TF vulnerabilities, the assessment identifies the main TF threats and the probability of them materialising. The assessment was developed by a WG made up of representatives from various ministries and competent authorities including BIA, APML, Customs, TA, NBS, Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Securities Commission, and SBRA. It also included representatives of private sector associations namely the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Travel Agencies. 82. The assessment concludes that Serbia is exposed to a medium level of TF risk and identifies a high TF threat in connection with self-radicalised individuals and use of social media, and a medium threat in respect of ethnically motivated terrorism, religious extremism and migratory movements. The analysis of the wider TF threat (i.e. not confined to potential terrorist activities in Serbia) was based on an analysis of financial inflows and outflows to countries with an active terrorist threat, SAR data, TF pre-investigations and intelligence. It concludes that the highest TF exposure arises from payment institutions which may be used for the systemic transfer of small-value transactions. The sectoral vulnerability analysis concludes that there are no highly vulnerable sectors and identifies as medium vulnerable sectors payment institutions, currency exchange operators and freelancers in the IT sector. 83. The AT considers the TF risk assessment to be a thorough one, considering a wide range of relevant data. Nonetheless the AT urges the authorities to expand further the analysis of potential TF connected with ethnically motivated terrorism in the region, in which Serbian individuals might be implicated. Between 2023-2024 there were two relevant incidents of potential terrorism and TF relevance [31] one of which allegedly involved organised groups of Serbian nationals. The authorities explained that they did not take these incidents into consideration when assessing TF risks under the 2024 NRA as they concluded that the acts were not classified as terrorism or TF, therefore irrelevant. While the AT is not disputing the Serbian authorities’ conclusion on these cases, the fact that no consideration and analysis of these featured in the 2024 NRA led the AT to question whether potential TF risks associated with ethnically motivated terrorism have been exhaustively explored. 84. Although a minor shortcoming (as the data provided to the AT did not indicate any notable use of Serbian legal persons for TF purposes), the TF risk exposure of the different types of legal persons (beyond foundations and associations acting as NPOs – see section 7.2.2. on IO5), and the effectiveness of CTF preventive and supervisory measures in place are lacking and need to be analysed. Dissemination of ML/TF Risk Conclusions &amp; REs’ Understanding of Risk 85. All NRAs have been published on the websites of various authorities including APML, NBS, Securities Commission, Notarial Chamber and SBRA. The classified version of the 2024 NRA was shared with relevant authorities (including all LEAs, all supervisory bodies, the TA, Customs, and the SBRA). Competent authorities that participated in the WGs were also privy to the analysis and discussions leading to the conclusion of the NRA and had access to the final drafts of the NRA. The majority of and key competent authorities provided detailed explanations and valuable insights throughout the on-site discussions, which proves their excellent level of understanding of the NRA conclusions, the analysis and context. 86. Upon the launch of the 2024 NRA project, an information session was held in July for all groups of REs (419 REs from most sectors attended), where they were introduced to the process, and informed how to assist and cooperate. The conclusions of the NRA were then communicated to the private sector entities in various ways. The NBS circulated the NRA documents via circulars sent to all REs under its supervisory remit (i.e. Banks, VASPs, Financial Leasing Providers, Insurance Companies, Payment Institutions and Pension Funds). Moreover, information sessions were organised on numerous occasions at the end of 2024 and in 2025 and in different regions of Serbia to explain the conclusions of the NRA. These targeted and were attended by both public and private sector representatives [32] from most of the material FI/DNFBP sectors. Almost all REs met on-site mentioned attending these information sessions. 87. There were various other outreach events focusing on national ML/TF risks and typologies. In April 2024 following the conclusion of the project on typologies by one of the 11 expert teams, an information session was held for public and private sector entities [33] Footnotes [28] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 12 [29] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 9 [30] Serbia National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 – Pg. 32 [31] Ibar-Lepenac canal attack (November 2024) and Armed Attacks in Banjska, Kosovo* (2023). * All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this report shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo. [32] https://www.apml.gov.rs/english/news/article/presentation-of-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-and-proliferation-financing-national-risk-assessment [33] apml.gov.rs/vesti/clanak/tipologije-pranja-novca-i-modaliteti-i-trendovi-finansiranja-terorizma-info-sesija-za-predstavnike-drzavnog-i-privatnog-sektora-3-april-2024-godine" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals MLA 119. Serbia has a robust legal framework for MLA, which enables the authorities to provide a broad range of assistance (as noted in Recommendations 36-38 in the TC Annex). Serbia actively and constructively engages in effective international cooperation with foreign counterpart, as highlighted by the feedback received from the global community (including countries with whom intensive information exchange was noted), highlighting the good quality and timeliness of assistance provided by the country. Responses to incoming requests are comprehensive and the information provided is well-regarded by the requesting competent authorities. The Prosecutor’s Office and the MoJ are the main actors in formal international co-operation. The PO handles requests directly and by delegating activities to the LEA. The MoJ oversees cooperation during trials. The judicial authorities in Serbia have good internal coordination. If an MLA request is received by an incorrect authority, it is quickly transferred to the appropriate one, with immediate communication via phone or mail. 120. The MOJ is the contact point and records the letters rogatory which are then communicated to the competent prosecutor’s office, with the International Cooperation Department within the SPPO also keeping track of the activities. The specialized prosecutor’s offices for organized crime (JTOK) and corruption (POSK) have designated staff only for keeping track of the letters, the activities being distributed to all the prosecutors in accordance with the Rulebook On Internal Organisation and systematisation of workplaces in the prosecution. The authorities explained that they reached to the conclusion that this is the best approach, with all the prosecutors being also engaged in international activities, ensuring that all of them are aware of the international context. 121. Provision of MLA by Serbia is governed by international multi-lateral treaties [34] bilateral treaties [35] , or, in the absence of any international treaty, the MLA Law. As noted in the TC annex there are some shortcomings in the implementation of the Palermo, Vienna, Merida and FT Conventions, but the authorities confirmed that these have never posed an obstacle in practice, and none of the feedback received from other countries suggested otherwise. The agreements cover all countries identified as risk for ML/TF with a special attention being given to the neighbours and jurisdictions in the region. In addition to bilateral agreements, the European Convention on Extradition with Additional Protocols is applied. In specific situations related to international assistance connected to identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, provisions of the Law on Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime would be applied as lex specialis . 122. Seven civil servants based at MoJ, with special data protection certificates, obtained through extensive security clearance, handle confidential cases under the Law on Data Secrecy. They use password-protected, offline computers exclusively assigned. Confidential documents are transmitted via secure channels through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Serbia’s diplomatic-consular network. Responses to MLA requests are sent through protected domestic channels. The Ministry of Justice stores these cases in regulation-compliant safes. Authorities ensure information is used only for authorised purposes by stating usage limits and liability in cover letters for any breaches. Information from foreign countries is handled with the same confidentiality as domestic data. 123. The MoJ relies on a dedicated system for managing the MLA request, LURIS, which helps streamlining the process and allows for the tracking, recording, and prioritisation of incoming requests. Upon the receipt of requests, the MoJ assesses the legal grounds, ensuring that the request complies with national laws and international treaties or agreements. Requests are prioritized based on the severity [36] and urgency of a case. Requests related to the seizure of illicit assets are expedited if there is a risk of asset dissipation. Table 2.1 - Incoming MLA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Received 36 0 403 2 0 480 40 1 367 49 0 413 64 0 413 39 1 306 Pending* 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 7 3 0 12 10 0 52 25 1 54 Refused* 2 0 80 0 0 117 7 0 53 5 0 84 3 0 53 3 28 Executed* 34 0 324 2 0 368 28 0 298 43 1 298 47 0 303 11 1 224 Av.exec. time (days) 303 303 248 248 253 253 140 140 140 136 0 136 118 255 140 Ref. rate 5.5% 0.0% 19.8 % 0.0% 0.0% 24.3 % 17.5% 0.0% 14.4 % 10.2% 0.0% 20.3 % 4.6% 0% 12.8 % 7,7% 0 % 9,2 % * carried from last year 124. In the period under review, the authorities received 2 382 requests for MLA, with an average execution time constantly reduced from 303 in 2019 to 136 days in 2023, 216 days being the average execution time for the entire period). ML counted for considerable larger number of requests (191) when comparing to the previous evaluated period (35 requests) and TF counted 1 request (the same as in the previous round of evaluation). ML requests constitute approximately 10% of all the predicate category offences. The most common MLA offences in other categories relate to OCG, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, tax crime, robbery and theft. The case management system allows authorities to prioritise and coordinate MLA requests ensuring timely execution, taking into account the country’s exposure to ML/TF/PF risks. 125. Although in the entirety the refusal rate is still high for all the crimes, 435 requests were refused, regarding ML/TF requests the country shows a positive trend over the years, with a reasonable refusal rate of under 10% and an average time of execution constantly decreasing from 10 to 4 months in the last 6 years. The reduction in turnaround times confirms that in general requests are handled swiftly and within reasonable timeframes, enabling more effective cross-border cooperation. 126.  There have been no cases of unsubstantiated refusals of MLA requests and no such cases were mentioned in the international cooperation feedback. The judicial authorities have a proactive approach, all the aspects that can hinder or impede the cooperation are discussed with the international counterparts and solved. The example offered by the prosecutors underlined that when the dual criminality principle is applied, it is not mandatory that the crime should have an identical offence mentioned in the Serbian criminal legislation, being sufficient the existence of an offence that encompasses the main features of the crime. The authorities also explained that the majority of refusals relate to misdemeanours. Table 2.2: Incoming MLA Requests by predicate offences 2019 -2014 OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total Incoming MLA 250 226 693 13 85 208 396 81 177 74 1034 2382 The most common MLA offences in other categories relate to OCG, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, tax crime, robbery and theft .Taking into account the data above, referring to the high volume of requests targeting all the high/medium threat predicate offences matching the findings of the NRA, it MLA and extradition requests are in line with the country risk profile. 127. During the assessment period, a total of 120 investigations were triggered by MLA requests, out of which 27 related to ML, . The authorities need to strengthen the follow-up process to ensure systematic assessment and consistent action on MLA-triggered cases. Given the high volume of requests received, particularly those relating to the country’s high-threat crimes, procedures and coordination mechanisms are needed to ensure that information obtained through MLA channels is effectively translated into investigative and prosecutorial outcome. Table 2.3 No of investigations triggered by MLA Year ML TF Drug smuggling Tax evasion Fraud Abuse of the position person 227 CC High corruption, ML OC, drug smuggling and arms smuggling Other 2019 4 1 1 1 2020 1 2 4 1 4 2021 5 1 1 1 1 1 7 2 2022 8 1 1 9 10 2023 10 1 26 2024 3 2 3 7 1 Case Box 2.1. – Initiating ML criminal proceeds based on incoming MLA request An extradition request for an OCG leader accused of committing serious thefts abroad was received by Serbian authorities, Criminal proceedings were conducted for standalone ML against members of an OCG specialized in committing serious thefts abroad. When the court refused the extradition of the OCG leader, evidence was collected about the criminal activities committed abroad as well as evidence about the purchase of significant immovable and movable property in the Serbia and absence of the defendant’s legal income. An indictment was issued for 9 natural persons for laundering criminal proceeds in total amount of €2.5 milion, through buying luxury real estate and luxury cars using third parties and family members to dissimulate the origin of the proceeds, with all the properties being seized. The indictment was confirmed by the court, the preparatory hearings were conducted and the case is now on trial. 2.1.2. Extradition 128. In extradition cases, the MoJ assesses whether the requested individual meets the criteria for extradition under national laws and international agreements. After assessment, the MoJ coordinates with relevant national agencies to fulfil the request. 129. From 2019 - 2024, Serbia received 373 requests, out of which 37 were related to ML and 2 related to TF, others covering drug smuggling, organised crime etc. Extradition requests are generally executed promptly (maximum 5 months). 130. Extradition of Serbian nationals is generally prohibited but exceptions do exist. Five bilateral agreements were concluded with foreign jurisdictions that allow for the extradition of its own nationals under specific conditions, particularly for serious offences such as organised crime, corruption, and money laundering. Serbia strives to prosecute its nationals without undue delay in cases where extradition is not legally possible. In such cases Serbia would request criminal files from the requesting country to proceed with prosecution under the domestic legislation. 131. Approximately one quarter of requests were refused on common grounds such as the person’s absence from the country, death, withdrawal of the request, lack of documentation, or failure to meet legal conditions for extradition. Refusals also occurred due to concerns over discrimination or human rights violations. In both general and ML/TF cases, refusals mainly related to citizenship, lack of dual criminality, or insufficient evidence. While all refusals in ML/TF cases were duly substantiated, their relatively high number highlights the need to ensure that nationals involved in such offences are effectively prosecuted domestically when extradition is not possible. Table 2.4 - Incoming extradition requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Received 3 0 40 2 0 54 4 2 73 12 0 62 10 0 111 6 1 56 Pending* 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 6 0 0 10 4 1 28 Refused* 1 0 9 0 0 16 2 0 21 2 0 7 2 0 17 1 0 4 Executed* 0 0 29 2 0 38 2 2 50 9 0 40 8 0 70 1 0 40 Av.exec. time (days) 250 - 206 225 - 210 180 80 105 270 - 94 129 - 130 141 92 109 Ref. rate 33,3% 22,5% 0.0% 29.6% 50 % 0.0% 28.7% 16.6% 11.2% 20% 15.3% 16 % 0 % 7 % * carried from last year 132. With regard to the offences for which extradition was requested, the same conclusions drawn for MLA requests apply, as they concern similar types of crimes—primarily organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, tax crimes, robbery and theft—reflecting the country’s overall risk profile. Table 2.5. Incoming requests by the underlying criminality (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including customs and excise) Tax crimes: Forgery Other Total 93 25 121 0 0 51 35 9 15 10 120 396 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery Identifying, freezing, seizing, confiscating and sharing criminal assets 133. Under the Law on Recovery of Proceeds from Crime, the PFIU is authorised to trace and identify criminal assets, either ex officio or by order of a prosecutor or court. Its Property Restitution Office handles international cooperation requests for asset identification and confiscation. The Directorate for Management of Confiscated Assets, under the Ministry of Justice, assists in international legal cooperation and manages confiscated assets from foreign rulings. During the reporting period, 18 asset recovery requests were received, including 6 related to ML (3 carried from the previous round), and none for TF. 16 out of 18 were executed, with the remainder being still ongoing, indicating that country is generally effective in facilitating asset recovery. In urgent cases, the FIU may expedite MLA execution—such as provisional seizure or asset freezes—based on reciprocity, pending formal letters rogatory. This avoids delays caused by diplomatic procedures. 134. The statistics on freezing, confiscation, sharing of assets display rather low overall sums, this being due to the limited number of incoming requests on asset recovery and sharing and the relatively small volume of assets included in those requests. No data on recovered and repatriation were provided to AT, indicating that the country has had limited practical engagement in the effective recovery and return of confiscated proceeds, The AT was advised that assistance provided by the PFIU could in urgent cases, and subject to reciprocity, include an expedited execution of MLA request and the temporary seizure of assets or a ban on disposal with the assets in question. After the unit receives the request from abroad, through INTERPOL, it submits a request to the prosecutor’s office and then once the court authorises the request, the provisional measure can be executed. These requests then have to be followed up by an official letter rogatory but the expedited process prevents delays generated by the pending use of the diplomatic channel. Table 2.6 - Freezing/seizing, confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets on the basis of incoming requests Freezing/Seizure Confiscation Shared number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) 2019 0/0/2 (436.796 EUR) 2(1.350.000,00 -on-going + 102.196 EUR)/0/1 (78.353,86 EUR) 0/0/1 (1,287,015 EUR) 2020 0/0/1 (no data on value of assets in request) 2021 1/0/0 1(10.046,99 EUR)/0/0 2022 1(2,119,900 EUR)/0/0 1(28.838.379,83 EUR)/0/3( 2.350.356,58 EUR) 2023 1(102.520.290 EUR overall assets in multiple jurisdictions)/0/2(9.433.878,17 EUR and on-going 4.660,32 EUR) 2024 0/0/1(248,480 EUR) Total 5(2/0/3) 12(5/0/7) 1(0/0/1) Case Box 2.2. International cooperation on OCGs, drug trafficking resulting in confiscation and sharing of assets Based on parallel financial investigations conducted by the competent authorities of Serbia, Croatia and the Czech Republic, exchanging information at a coordination meeting in Eurojust, criminal proceedings were started in Serbia and Croatia that ended with the conviction of an OCG specialized in supplying and selling large quantities of cocaine imported from Central and South America on the territories Croatia, Serbia, Czech Republic, Belgium, Switzerland and other European Union member states. Three Serbian nationals part of the OCG were convicted by the Croatian authorities, after a transfer of prosecution operated by the Serbian judiciary. The County Court in Zagreb decided that, based on the provisions of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, a total of 8 expensive watches and seized money in the amount of 75,200 euro, shall become the property of the Republic of Serbia, given that these items were seized on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Footnotes [34] Multilateral treaties include: the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS no. 141); Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS no. 198); the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its two additional protocols; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols; the UN Convention against Corruption. [35] Serbia has concluded 61 bilateral agreements with 33 countries which regulate different forms of MLA in criminal matters [36] For example, requests related to serious crimes such as terrorism or organised crime are given higher priority." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals MLA 119. Serbia has a robust legal framework for MLA, which enables the authorities to provide a broad range of assistance (as noted in Recommendations 36-38 in the TC Annex). Serbia actively and constructively engages in effective international cooperation with foreign counterpart, as highlighted by the feedback received from the global community (including countries with whom intensive information exchange was noted), highlighting the good quality and timeliness of assistance provided by the country. Responses to incoming requests are comprehensive and the information provided is well-regarded by the requesting competent authorities. The Prosecutor’s Office and the MoJ are the main actors in formal international co-operation. The PO handles requests directly and by delegating activities to the LEA. The MoJ oversees cooperation during trials. The judicial authorities in Serbia have good internal coordination. If an MLA request is received by an incorrect authority, it is quickly transferred to the appropriate one, with immediate communication via phone or mail. 120. The MOJ is the contact point and records the letters rogatory which are then communicated to the competent prosecutor’s office, with the International Cooperation Department within the SPPO also keeping track of the activities. The specialized prosecutor’s offices for organized crime (JTOK) and corruption (POSK) have designated staff only for keeping track of the letters, the activities being distributed to all the prosecutors in accordance with the Rulebook On Internal Organisation and systematisation of workplaces in the prosecution. The authorities explained that they reached to the conclusion that this is the best approach, with all the prosecutors being also engaged in international activities, ensuring that all of them are aware of the international context. 121. Provision of MLA by Serbia is governed by international multi-lateral treaties [34] bilateral treaties [35] , or, in the absence of any international treaty, the MLA Law. As noted in the TC annex there are some shortcomings in the implementation of the Palermo, Vienna, Merida and FT Conventions, but the authorities confirmed that these have never posed an obstacle in practice, and none of the feedback received from other countries suggested otherwise. The agreements cover all countries identified as risk for ML/TF with a special attention being given to the neighbours and jurisdictions in the region. In addition to bilateral agreements, the European Convention on Extradition with Additional Protocols is applied. In specific situations related to international assistance connected to identification, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime, provisions of the Law on Recovery of the Proceeds of Crime would be applied as lex specialis . 122. Seven civil servants based at MoJ, with special data protection certificates, obtained through extensive security clearance, handle confidential cases under the Law on Data Secrecy. They use password-protected, offline computers exclusively assigned. Confidential documents are transmitted via secure channels through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Serbia’s diplomatic-consular network. Responses to MLA requests are sent through protected domestic channels. The Ministry of Justice stores these cases in regulation-compliant safes. Authorities ensure information is used only for authorised purposes by stating usage limits and liability in cover letters for any breaches. Information from foreign countries is handled with the same confidentiality as domestic data. 123. The MoJ relies on a dedicated system for managing the MLA request, LURIS, which helps streamlining the process and allows for the tracking, recording, and prioritisation of incoming requests. Upon the receipt of requests, the MoJ assesses the legal grounds, ensuring that the request complies with national laws and international treaties or agreements. Requests are prioritized based on the severity [36] and urgency of a case. Requests related to the seizure of illicit assets are expedited if there is a risk of asset dissipation. Table 2.1 - Incoming MLA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Received 36 0 403 2 0 480 40 1 367 49 0 413 64 0 413 39 1 306 Pending* 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 7 3 0 12 10 0 52 25 1 54 Refused* 2 0 80 0 0 117 7 0 53 5 0 84 3 0 53 3 28 Executed* 34 0 324 2 0 368 28 0 298 43 1 298 47 0 303 11 1 224 Av.exec. time (days) 303 303 248 248 253 253 140 140 140 136 0 136 118 255 140 Ref. rate 5.5% 0.0% 19.8 % 0.0% 0.0% 24.3 % 17.5% 0.0% 14.4 % 10.2% 0.0% 20.3 % 4.6% 0% 12.8 % 7,7% 0 % 9,2 % * carried from last year 124. In the period under review, the authorities received 2 382 requests for MLA, with an average execution time constantly reduced from 303 in 2019 to 136 days in 2023, 216 days being the average execution time for the entire period). ML counted for considerable larger number of requests (191) when comparing to the previous evaluated period (35 requests) and TF counted 1 request (the same as in the previous round of evaluation). ML requests constitute approximately 10% of all the predicate category offences. The most common MLA offences in other categories relate to OCG, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, tax crime, robbery and theft. The case management system allows authorities to prioritise and coordinate MLA requests ensuring timely execution, taking into account the country’s exposure to ML/TF/PF risks. 125. Although in the entirety the refusal rate is still high for all the crimes, 435 requests were refused, regarding ML/TF requests the country shows a positive trend over the years, with a reasonable refusal rate of under 10% and an average time of execution constantly decreasing from 10 to 4 months in the last 6 years. The reduction in turnaround times confirms that in general requests are handled swiftly and within reasonable timeframes, enabling more effective cross-border cooperation. 126.  There have been no cases of unsubstantiated refusals of MLA requests and no such cases were mentioned in the international cooperation feedback. The judicial authorities have a proactive approach, all the aspects that can hinder or impede the cooperation are discussed with the international counterparts and solved. The example offered by the prosecutors underlined that when the dual criminality principle is applied, it is not mandatory that the crime should have an identical offence mentioned in the Serbian criminal legislation, being sufficient the existence of an offence that encompasses the main features of the crime. The authorities also explained that the majority of refusals relate to misdemeanours. Table 2.2: Incoming MLA Requests by predicate offences 2019 -2014 OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total Incoming MLA 250 226 693 13 85 208 396 81 177 74 1034 2382 The most common MLA offences in other categories relate to OCG, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, tax crime, robbery and theft .Taking into account the data above, referring to the high volume of requests targeting all the high/medium threat predicate offences matching the findings of the NRA, it MLA and extradition requests are in line with the country risk profile. 127. During the assessment period, a total of 120 investigations were triggered by MLA requests, out of which 27 related to ML, . The authorities need to strengthen the follow-up process to ensure systematic assessment and consistent action on MLA-triggered cases. Given the high volume of requests received, particularly those relating to the country’s high-threat crimes, procedures and coordination mechanisms are needed to ensure that information obtained through MLA channels is effectively translated into investigative and prosecutorial outcome. Table 2.3 No of investigations triggered by MLA Year ML TF Drug smuggling Tax evasion Fraud Abuse of the position person 227 CC High corruption, ML OC, drug smuggling and arms smuggling Other 2019 4 1 1 1 2020 1 2 4 1 4 2021 5 1 1 1 1 1 7 2 2022 8 1 1 9 10 2023 10 1 26 2024 3 2 3 7 1 Case Box 2.1. – Initiating ML criminal proceeds based on incoming MLA request An extradition request for an OCG leader accused of committing serious thefts abroad was received by Serbian authorities, Criminal proceedings were conducted for standalone ML against members of an OCG specialized in committing serious thefts abroad. When the court refused the extradition of the OCG leader, evidence was collected about the criminal activities committed abroad as well as evidence about the purchase of significant immovable and movable property in the Serbia and absence of the defendant’s legal income. An indictment was issued for 9 natural persons for laundering criminal proceeds in total amount of €2.5 milion, through buying luxury real estate and luxury cars using third parties and family members to dissimulate the origin of the proceeds, with all the properties being seized. The indictment was confirmed by the court, the preparatory hearings were conducted and the case is now on trial. 2.1.2. Extradition 128. In extradition cases, the MoJ assesses whether the requested individual meets the criteria for extradition under national laws and international agreements. After assessment, the MoJ coordinates with relevant national agencies to fulfil the request. 129. From 2019 - 2024, Serbia received 373 requests, out of which 37 were related to ML and 2 related to TF, others covering drug smuggling, organised crime etc. Extradition requests are generally executed promptly (maximum 5 months). 130. Extradition of Serbian nationals is generally prohibited but exceptions do exist. Five bilateral agreements were concluded with foreign jurisdictions that allow for the extradition of its own nationals under specific conditions, particularly for serious offences such as organised crime, corruption, and money laundering. Serbia strives to prosecute its nationals without undue delay in cases where extradition is not legally possible. In such cases Serbia would request criminal files from the requesting country to proceed with prosecution under the domestic legislation. 131. Approximately one quarter of requests were refused on common grounds such as the person’s absence from the country, death, withdrawal of the request, lack of documentation, or failure to meet legal conditions for extradition. Refusals also occurred due to concerns over discrimination or human rights violations. In both general and ML/TF cases, refusals mainly related to citizenship, lack of dual criminality, or insufficient evidence. While all refusals in ML/TF cases were duly substantiated, their relatively high number highlights the need to ensure that nationals involved in such offences are effectively prosecuted domestically when extradition is not possible. Table 2.4 - Incoming extradition requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Received 3 0 40 2 0 54 4 2 73 12 0 62 10 0 111 6 1 56 Pending* 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 6 0 0 10 4 1 28 Refused* 1 0 9 0 0 16 2 0 21 2 0 7 2 0 17 1 0 4 Executed* 0 0 29 2 0 38 2 2 50 9 0 40 8 0 70 1 0 40 Av.exec. time (days) 250 - 206 225 - 210 180 80 105 270 - 94 129 - 130 141 92 109 Ref. rate 33,3% 22,5% 0.0% 29.6% 50 % 0.0% 28.7% 16.6% 11.2% 20% 15.3% 16 % 0 % 7 % * carried from last year 132. With regard to the offences for which extradition was requested, the same conclusions drawn for MLA requests apply, as they concern similar types of crimes—primarily organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, tax crimes, robbery and theft—reflecting the country’s overall risk profile. Table 2.5. Incoming requests by the underlying criminality (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including customs and excise) Tax crimes: Forgery Other Total 93 25 121 0 0 51 35 9 15 10 120 396 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery Identifying, freezing, seizing, confiscating and sharing criminal assets 133. Under the Law on Recovery of Proceeds from Crime, the PFIU is authorised to trace and identify criminal assets, either ex officio or by order of a prosecutor or court. Its Property Restitution Office handles international cooperation requests for asset identification and confiscation. The Directorate for Management of Confiscated Assets, under the Ministry of Justice, assists in international legal cooperation and manages confiscated assets from foreign rulings. During the reporting period, 18 asset recovery requests were received, including 6 related to ML (3 carried from the previous round), and none for TF. 16 out of 18 were executed, with the remainder being still ongoing, indicating that country is generally effective in facilitating asset recovery. In urgent cases, the FIU may expedite MLA execution—such as provisional seizure or asset freezes—based on reciprocity, pending formal letters rogatory. This avoids delays caused by diplomatic procedures. 134. The statistics on freezing, confiscation, sharing of assets display rather low overall sums, this being due to the limited number of incoming requests on asset recovery and sharing and the relatively small volume of assets included in those requests. No data on recovered and repatriation were provided to AT, indicating that the country has had limited practical engagement in the effective recovery and return of confiscated proceeds, The AT was advised that assistance provided by the PFIU could in urgent cases, and subject to reciprocity, include an expedited execution of MLA request and the temporary seizure of assets or a ban on disposal with the assets in question. After the unit receives the request from abroad, through INTERPOL, it submits a request to the prosecutor’s office and then once the court authorises the request, the provisional measure can be executed. These requests then have to be followed up by an official letter rogatory but the expedited process prevents delays generated by the pending use of the diplomatic channel. Table 2.6 - Freezing/seizing, confiscation, repatriation and sharing of assets on the basis of incoming requests Freezing/Seizure Confiscation Shared number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) number of requests/value of assets (ML/TF/Other) 2019 0/0/2 (436.796 EUR) 2(1.350.000,00 -on-going + 102.196 EUR)/0/1 (78.353,86 EUR) 0/0/1 (1,287,015 EUR) 2020 0/0/1 (no data on value of assets in request) 2021 1/0/0 1(10.046,99 EUR)/0/0 2022 1(2,119,900 EUR)/0/0 1(28.838.379,83 EUR)/0/3( 2.350.356,58 EUR) 2023 1(102.520.290 EUR overall assets in multiple jurisdictions)/0/2(9.433.878,17 EUR and on-going 4.660,32 EUR) 2024 0/0/1(248,480 EUR) Total 5(2/0/3) 12(5/0/7) 1(0/0/1) Case Box 2.2. International cooperation on OCGs, drug trafficking resulting in confiscation and sharing of assets Based on parallel financial investigations conducted by the competent authorities of Serbia, Croatia and the Czech Republic, exchanging information at a coordination meeting in Eurojust, criminal proceedings were started in Serbia and Croatia that ended with the conviction of an OCG specialized in supplying and selling large quantities of cocaine imported from Central and South America on the territories Croatia, Serbia, Czech Republic, Belgium, Switzerland and other European Union member states. Three Serbian nationals part of the OCG were convicted by the Croatian authorities, after a transfer of prosecution operated by the Serbian judiciary. The County Court in Zagreb decided that, based on the provisions of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, a total of 8 expensive watches and seized money in the amount of 75,200 euro, shall become the property of the Republic of Serbia, given that these items were seized on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Footnotes [34] Multilateral treaties include: the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS no. 141); Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS no. 198); the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its two additional protocols; the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols; the UN Convention against Corruption. [35] Serbia has concluded 61 bilateral agreements with 33 countries which regulate different forms of MLA in criminal matters [36] For example, requests related to serious crimes such as terrorism or organised crime are given higher priority." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 168. The frameworks governing the licensing of FIs and VASPs are comprehensive and show no identified technical compliance gaps. The two primary licensing authorities, the NBS and the SC, conduct fitness and propriety (“F&amp;P”) checks and have respective responsibilities for “authorised” banks and for VASPs, from both a licensing and supervisory perspective. The Ministry of Finance undertakes F&amp;P checks for factoring companies since 2018. National Bank of Serbia 169. The NBS is empowered to conduct F&amp;P checks and does so by following its Licensing Manual and sector-specific methodologies. Moreover, the NBS publishes specific Guidelines on its website since 2018, providing to the market additional information on the F&amp;P process and main expectations. While no new bank operating license was issued between 2019 and 2023, numerous F&amp;P checks have been performed on applications of changes in the banks’ ownership and management. 170. The various licensing methodologies developed by the NBS for each sector [40] extensively describe the F&amp;P checks at market entry level and on an on-going basis applicable to relevant persons, including board members, directors, shareholders, BOs and associates. The NBS generally follows a consistent approach for licensing and/or approval reviews, covering changes in management positions, ownership, and qualifying holdings, though the level of scrutiny may vary. In these regards, the licensing methodology for banks is the most developed, in line with the risk and materiality of this sector in Serbia. 171. At the licensing stage, a questionnaire must be filled by all applicants and submitted together with all required documents, which are verified. All applicants (including controllers and BOs) must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the NBS, and subject to its extensive checks, having (i) adequate qualifications and work experience as well as (ii) the absence of any criminal or administrative records, and of on-going procedures [41] . The NBS verifies all the information against a number of sources, including the SBRA, CRBO, records held by the Court and data provided by external commercial databases and open sources. The source of funds and/or wealth, as well the business model and related ML/TF/PF risks are also checked. If the application is filled by a proxy of the applicant, the power of attorney and its scope are reviewed. Moreover, F&amp;P checks also cover the assessment of the reputation of the personal or professional associates from a criminal record or on-going procedures perspective, limited to the last ten years. Examples of both refusals and revocations of the approval for appointment for F&amp;P reasons were provided. However, in view of the increasing foreign acquisition in banks over the referenced period, the number of outgoing requests regarding F&amp;P appear rather limited. 172. Every year, on average, the NBS processes between one and five applications [42] , with the exception of the exchange office sector, where the number of processed applications varies between 282 to 428. Out of an important number of rejections observed in the MVTS [43] sector, only one was rendered on F&amp;P grounds. With regards to VASPs, out of 9 licensing applications, the NBS granted only 2, with rejections being rendered for improper or lack of non-conviction evidence and evidence relating to associates. In relation to exchange offices, a very few numbers of rejections are observed. According to the NBS, this is explained by, on one hand, the guidance and support provided to businesses seeking authorisation to conduct foreign exchange operations, which helps reducing incomplete or non-compliant applications. On the other hand, the NBS also conducts specific training in relation to exchange office activity for potential employees as a pre-condition for authorisation. Overall, in terms of licensing, it remains unclear whether the number of resources allocated in some of the Licensing Departments, notably in the Exchange Offices sector, are sufficient to allow for proper F&amp;P checks to be conducted in view of the important number of applications. Securities Commission 173. Other than the legislative framework, which is adequate, the F&amp;P corpus of the SC is comprised by a Rulebook on granting authorisation for investment firms (July 2022), which was supplemented by an Instruction in January 2025. The SC conducts F&amp;P checks on controllers and BOs, which cover (i) criminal, administrative or misdemeanour background checks, including for close associates or related parties, (ii) professional suitability, including experience in the securities’ field, (iii) financial probity, including by verifying the source of funds, the fulfilment of tax obligations and lack of indebtedness. 174. All changes in ownership or management structure must be reported to the SC. In the case of acquiring or changing a qualifying holding, prior approval is required before implementing the changes. Through its supervisory engagement, the SC advises that for market participants, including on the management and ownership structures, any changes therein are also verified. 175. From an F&amp;P perspective, the SC cooperates with the NBS (mainly for supervisory data or other sources), with the APML (in order to verify whether the relevant person or legal entity has featured in SARs or is otherwise engaged in suspicious financial activity), and with the Ministry of Interior and Courts for cross-checking non-conviction proof submitted. The SC also cooperates with the SBRA, both in relation to granting operating licences to market participants and for its on-going checks. Examples of revocation of the approval for appointment for F&amp;P reasons, detected through on-going checks were provided. However, regarding cooperation with foreign counterparts, although there have been instances where an applicant had foreign nationality or resided abroad the SC has not yet sent information requests. The Ministry of Finance 176. The MoF receives two to three factoring company applications annually and has 2 FTEs dedicated to their processing. F&amp;P checks focus on founders’ and beneficial owners’ certificates of non-conviction (issued within six months). For legal entities, a certificate confirming absence of corporate criminal liability is also required. Licensed factoring companies must report ownership changes to the Ministry within 10 days. Through its supervision, the APML has found no discrepancies in the reported information. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 177. The NBS and the SC have internal processes for detecting unlicensed service providers and addressing breaches. In 2019, the NBS identified, through off-site supervision, a case where 13 natural persons misused the e-banking services of a commercial bank and provided unauthorised payment services. In this instance, NBS promptly obtained all requested data from the commercial bank, which was essential for conducting proceedings to establish unauthorized payment service provision and fines were imposed. 178. With regards to VASPs, the first license was granted in December 2022 and since then the NBS administers a publicly available register of VASPs. The NBS routinely conducts public source searches, and examines the information collected from private sector entities (most commonly banks), reports from citizens, media monitoring, as well as information from other competent authorities. The NBS identified and acted upon a case involving 29 entities providing unregistered virtual asset services. According to the NBS, most of these entities ceased their activities following the initiation of inspection procedures and sanctions were imposed on two of these entities. Footnotes [40] Methodologies for banks, exchange offices, FLC, insurance, MVTS and EMI, and VASPs. [41] Certificates that no criminal, misdemeanour or economic office proceedings have been instituted against the relevant persons must not be older than six months, including those issued by foreign authorities. [42] Over the reference period, no requests for new licenses were submitted in the banking and the insurance (for life insurance activities) sectors. [43] Including when such services are being provided through the Post Service" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 168. The frameworks governing the licensing of FIs and VASPs are comprehensive and show no identified technical compliance gaps. The two primary licensing authorities, the NBS and the SC, conduct fitness and propriety (“F&amp;P”) checks and have respective responsibilities for “authorised” banks and for VASPs, from both a licensing and supervisory perspective. The Ministry of Finance undertakes F&amp;P checks for factoring companies since 2018. National Bank of Serbia 169. The NBS is empowered to conduct F&amp;P checks and does so by following its Licensing Manual and sector-specific methodologies. Moreover, the NBS publishes specific Guidelines on its website since 2018, providing to the market additional information on the F&amp;P process and main expectations. While no new bank operating license was issued between 2019 and 2023, numerous F&amp;P checks have been performed on applications of changes in the banks’ ownership and management. 170. The various licensing methodologies developed by the NBS for each sector [40] extensively describe the F&amp;P checks at market entry level and on an on-going basis applicable to relevant persons, including board members, directors, shareholders, BOs and associates. The NBS generally follows a consistent approach for licensing and/or approval reviews, covering changes in management positions, ownership, and qualifying holdings, though the level of scrutiny may vary. In these regards, the licensing methodology for banks is the most developed, in line with the risk and materiality of this sector in Serbia. 171. At the licensing stage, a questionnaire must be filled by all applicants and submitted together with all required documents, which are verified. All applicants (including controllers and BOs) must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the NBS, and subject to its extensive checks, having (i) adequate qualifications and work experience as well as (ii) the absence of any criminal or administrative records, and of on-going procedures [41] . The NBS verifies all the information against a number of sources, including the SBRA, CRBO, records held by the Court and data provided by external commercial databases and open sources. The source of funds and/or wealth, as well the business model and related ML/TF/PF risks are also checked. If the application is filled by a proxy of the applicant, the power of attorney and its scope are reviewed. Moreover, F&amp;P checks also cover the assessment of the reputation of the personal or professional associates from a criminal record or on-going procedures perspective, limited to the last ten years. Examples of both refusals and revocations of the approval for appointment for F&amp;P reasons were provided. However, in view of the increasing foreign acquisition in banks over the referenced period, the number of outgoing requests regarding F&amp;P appear rather limited. 172. Every year, on average, the NBS processes between one and five applications [42] , with the exception of the exchange office sector, where the number of processed applications varies between 282 to 428. Out of an important number of rejections observed in the MVTS [43] sector, only one was rendered on F&amp;P grounds. With regards to VASPs, out of 9 licensing applications, the NBS granted only 2, with rejections being rendered for improper or lack of non-conviction evidence and evidence relating to associates. In relation to exchange offices, a very few numbers of rejections are observed. According to the NBS, this is explained by, on one hand, the guidance and support provided to businesses seeking authorisation to conduct foreign exchange operations, which helps reducing incomplete or non-compliant applications. On the other hand, the NBS also conducts specific training in relation to exchange office activity for potential employees as a pre-condition for authorisation. Overall, in terms of licensing, it remains unclear whether the number of resources allocated in some of the Licensing Departments, notably in the Exchange Offices sector, are sufficient to allow for proper F&amp;P checks to be conducted in view of the important number of applications. Securities Commission 173. Other than the legislative framework, which is adequate, the F&amp;P corpus of the SC is comprised by a Rulebook on granting authorisation for investment firms (July 2022), which was supplemented by an Instruction in January 2025. The SC conducts F&amp;P checks on controllers and BOs, which cover (i) criminal, administrative or misdemeanour background checks, including for close associates or related parties, (ii) professional suitability, including experience in the securities’ field, (iii) financial probity, including by verifying the source of funds, the fulfilment of tax obligations and lack of indebtedness. 174. All changes in ownership or management structure must be reported to the SC. In the case of acquiring or changing a qualifying holding, prior approval is required before implementing the changes. Through its supervisory engagement, the SC advises that for market participants, including on the management and ownership structures, any changes therein are also verified. 175. From an F&amp;P perspective, the SC cooperates with the NBS (mainly for supervisory data or other sources), with the APML (in order to verify whether the relevant person or legal entity has featured in SARs or is otherwise engaged in suspicious financial activity), and with the Ministry of Interior and Courts for cross-checking non-conviction proof submitted. The SC also cooperates with the SBRA, both in relation to granting operating licences to market participants and for its on-going checks. Examples of revocation of the approval for appointment for F&amp;P reasons, detected through on-going checks were provided. However, regarding cooperation with foreign counterparts, although there have been instances where an applicant had foreign nationality or resided abroad the SC has not yet sent information requests. The Ministry of Finance 176. The MoF receives two to three factoring company applications annually and has 2 FTEs dedicated to their processing. F&amp;P checks focus on founders’ and beneficial owners’ certificates of non-conviction (issued within six months). For legal entities, a certificate confirming absence of corporate criminal liability is also required. Licensed factoring companies must report ownership changes to the Ministry within 10 days. Through its supervision, the APML has found no discrepancies in the reported information. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 177. The NBS and the SC have internal processes for detecting unlicensed service providers and addressing breaches. In 2019, the NBS identified, through off-site supervision, a case where 13 natural persons misused the e-banking services of a commercial bank and provided unauthorised payment services. In this instance, NBS promptly obtained all requested data from the commercial bank, which was essential for conducting proceedings to establish unauthorized payment service provision and fines were imposed. 178. With regards to VASPs, the first license was granted in December 2022 and since then the NBS administers a publicly available register of VASPs. The NBS routinely conducts public source searches, and examines the information collected from private sector entities (most commonly banks), reports from citizens, media monitoring, as well as information from other competent authorities. The NBS identified and acted upon a case involving 29 entities providing unregistered virtual asset services. According to the NBS, most of these entities ceased their activities following the initiation of inspection procedures and sanctions were imposed on two of these entities. Footnotes [40] Methodologies for banks, exchange offices, FLC, insurance, MVTS and EMI, and VASPs. [41] Certificates that no criminal, misdemeanour or economic office proceedings have been instituted against the relevant persons must not be older than six months, including those issued by foreign authorities. [42] Over the reference period, no requests for new licenses were submitted in the banking and the insurance (for life insurance activities) sectors. [43] Including when such services are being provided through the Post Service" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 229. With the exception of lawyers, the licensing, registration and other controls generally prevent criminals and their associates from holding or being the BO of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in most DNFBP sectors. 230. The lawyers’ sector is the most material DNFBP sector. The admission to the Bar Chamber requires fulfilling a set of conditions, including related to fitness (professional education, a 3-year legal experience, successful completion of the Bar exam) and propriety (absence of a criminal conviction and, more widely, having “general worthiness to practice law”). However, in practice, the AT has not been provided with information on whether F&amp;P checks are conducted, including on an on-going basis. In the light of the importance attributed to this sector, the identified shortcomings are weighted more heavily. 231. Notaries are appointed by the Ministry of Justice, following an assessment and opinion from the Notarial Chamber regarding their fitness and propriety. The Notary Chamber checks whether the applicants hold Serbian citizenship, have adequate professional qualifications and experience and whether they are deemed “worthy of public trust [47] ”. Furthermore, the Chamber conducts ongoing monitoring of notaries’ F&amp;P through its supervisory engagement and shares any adverse findings with the Ministry of Justice, which formally appoints and may suspend a notary. The Chamber considers complaints from citizens, information from other authorities (including prosecutors, police and courts), and findings from its own supervisory engagements when assessing the integrity of notaries. While a number of applications were rejected, including on F&amp;P grounds, no licenses were revoked on the same grounds during the observation period. 232. Regarding casinos and on-line casinos, over the referenced period, 17 new licenses were granted, 16 of which to on-line casinos, with one application being rejected based on insufficient information provided. Retrospective F&amp;P checks were conducted on all relevant persons - founders, shareholders, BOs, senior management and associates - upon the entry into force of the new requirements in 2020 (a total of 84 natural and legal persons have undergone checks). These checks also extend to foreign individuals, although the GCA does not liaise with foreign competent authorities. On-going F&amp;P checks are conducted yearly and can be also triggered whenever information is received from other authorities or individuals, or when concerns are specifically noted during on-site engagements. Moreover, the obligation to provide information to the GCA on subsequent changes in the relevant persons was introduced in January 2025. However, the AT positively notes that, in practice, the GCA withdrew 5 licenses over the referenced period, one of which on F&amp;P grounds. The AT positively notes this proactive action, taken despite no legal obligation to report such changes at the time. 233. Real estate agents are required to obtain a prior approval from the Ministry of Internal and External Trade (hereinafter: “MIET”) and to be entered into the Registry of Real Estate Brokers in order to perform the activity of real estate intermediation. From the data held by the Register, 59.52% are legal entities. The sector has significantly grown since 2019 (+41.8%), generating a high number of applications, in addition to the noted ongoing changes of relevant persons in the sector. Real estate agents undergo F&amp;P checks at both the professional examination and registration stages, including: (i) minimum professional qualification, (ii) mandatory professional exam, and (iii) absence of criminal conviction in Serbia or abroad. Criminal background is verified twice (before and after the professional examination), with the MIET liaising with Courts and the Ministry of Interior (which liaise with foreign counterparts as needed). Open-source information is checked to verify criminal association. Real estate agents are bound to report any change in the data within seven days to the Register of Brokers and the Market Inspection checks whether the information is up-to-date in the course of inspections. 234. Since May 2024, the MIET has had direct electronic access to the criminal records system, which has streamlined the process and shortened the average verification time from 15 days to approximately 5 days, representing a reasonable efficiency gain. Examples of rejected applications include F&amp;P grounds, for instances forgery and tax evasion convictions. In a separate case, the application of a foreign entrepreneur was rejected on the grounds of criminal records identified in both his home country and an additional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, while the staffing levels dedicated to F&amp;P checks have increased, the AT considers it unclear whether the four staff resources are sufficient to sustain consistent scrutiny in practice (with the number of applications processed varying from 113 to 197 per year over the referenced period), despite efficiency gains from direct records access. 235. Accountancy licenses are granted indefinitely, and they require (i) a clean criminal record for directors, owners, BO, appointed person and associate, including any person employed and (ii) a professional certification. Over the referenced period, the Chamber of Auditors rejected 17 applications, including one based on the existence of a criminal record; 147 licenses were revoked, although not on F&amp;P grounds. The APML checks the overall population in the SRBA regularly to identify entities operating without an accounting license. As of June 2024, 5 672 legal entities appear in the Register of Accounting Service Providers kept by the SRBA, both entrepreneurs (around 4 000) and legal persons (around 1 600) who have received a license in accordance with the Law on Accounting. This constitutes a sharp increase since 2021 (where the total was 646), with no information being provided for the previous years. However, there is a difference of around 2 500 entities between the number of accountants currently registered in the Register of Accounting Service Providers and the number of legal persons and entrepreneurs that before the new licensing requirements were declared in the SRBA under the previous general activity code for auditing, accounting and tax advice. The APML explained that they actively check whether any of these 2500 entities conduct activities that render them subject to AML/CFT obligations. 236. Audit companies require a have a license from the Ministry of Finance to operate, which can be revoked by the SC for AML/CFT violations. However, auditors do not conduct AML/CFT covered activities in Serbia. In respect to AML/CFT obligations, DPMS will not be assessed given that there exists a cash limitation law and thus DPMSs cannot accept cash payments which would render them subject to AML/CFT obligations see 22.1. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 237. Competent authorities, with the exception of the Bar Association (for which no information has been provided), have procedures and mechanisms in place to identify and respond to breaches detected in licensing and registration requirements that have yielded results. Particularly, the GCA has put in place a robust mechanism of detecting unlicensed activity, by monitoring websites and responding to complaints received from individuals and legal entities; between 2020-2024, these efforts led to 1, 505 websites of unlicensed online operations being blocked upon the information transmitted by the GCA to competent authorities. In the real estate sector, unregistered brokers are usually identified through mystery shopping controls, online advertisements, register checks, or citizen reports, with some cases leading to removals or criminal referrals. Regarding accountants, the Supervision Department of the APML conducts checks to verify potential legal entities that are continuing to provide accountancy services without a license; upon identification of such cases, the APML follows up with on-site controls. In three instances, the APML filed criminal charges for unlicensed activity. Footnotes [47] Applicants are disqualified if they: (i) have criminal convictions for offences punishable by five or more years (until expunged), (ii) show behaviour inconsistent with the Chamber’s Code of Ethics, or (iii) have had their legal practice withdrawn within the past three years." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 229. With the exception of lawyers, the licensing, registration and other controls generally prevent criminals and their associates from holding or being the BO of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in most DNFBP sectors. 230. The lawyers’ sector is the most material DNFBP sector. The admission to the Bar Chamber requires fulfilling a set of conditions, including related to fitness (professional education, a 3-year legal experience, successful completion of the Bar exam) and propriety (absence of a criminal conviction and, more widely, having “general worthiness to practice law”). However, in practice, the AT has not been provided with information on whether F&amp;P checks are conducted, including on an on-going basis. In the light of the importance attributed to this sector, the identified shortcomings are weighted more heavily. 231. Notaries are appointed by the Ministry of Justice, following an assessment and opinion from the Notarial Chamber regarding their fitness and propriety. The Notary Chamber checks whether the applicants hold Serbian citizenship, have adequate professional qualifications and experience and whether they are deemed “worthy of public trust [47] ”. Furthermore, the Chamber conducts ongoing monitoring of notaries’ F&amp;P through its supervisory engagement and shares any adverse findings with the Ministry of Justice, which formally appoints and may suspend a notary. The Chamber considers complaints from citizens, information from other authorities (including prosecutors, police and courts), and findings from its own supervisory engagements when assessing the integrity of notaries. While a number of applications were rejected, including on F&amp;P grounds, no licenses were revoked on the same grounds during the observation period. 232. Regarding casinos and on-line casinos, over the referenced period, 17 new licenses were granted, 16 of which to on-line casinos, with one application being rejected based on insufficient information provided. Retrospective F&amp;P checks were conducted on all relevant persons - founders, shareholders, BOs, senior management and associates - upon the entry into force of the new requirements in 2020 (a total of 84 natural and legal persons have undergone checks). These checks also extend to foreign individuals, although the GCA does not liaise with foreign competent authorities. On-going F&amp;P checks are conducted yearly and can be also triggered whenever information is received from other authorities or individuals, or when concerns are specifically noted during on-site engagements. Moreover, the obligation to provide information to the GCA on subsequent changes in the relevant persons was introduced in January 2025. However, the AT positively notes that, in practice, the GCA withdrew 5 licenses over the referenced period, one of which on F&amp;P grounds. The AT positively notes this proactive action, taken despite no legal obligation to report such changes at the time. 233. Real estate agents are required to obtain a prior approval from the Ministry of Internal and External Trade (hereinafter: “MIET”) and to be entered into the Registry of Real Estate Brokers in order to perform the activity of real estate intermediation. From the data held by the Register, 59.52% are legal entities. The sector has significantly grown since 2019 (+41.8%), generating a high number of applications, in addition to the noted ongoing changes of relevant persons in the sector. Real estate agents undergo F&amp;P checks at both the professional examination and registration stages, including: (i) minimum professional qualification, (ii) mandatory professional exam, and (iii) absence of criminal conviction in Serbia or abroad. Criminal background is verified twice (before and after the professional examination), with the MIET liaising with Courts and the Ministry of Interior (which liaise with foreign counterparts as needed). Open-source information is checked to verify criminal association. Real estate agents are bound to report any change in the data within seven days to the Register of Brokers and the Market Inspection checks whether the information is up-to-date in the course of inspections. 234. Since May 2024, the MIET has had direct electronic access to the criminal records system, which has streamlined the process and shortened the average verification time from 15 days to approximately 5 days, representing a reasonable efficiency gain. Examples of rejected applications include F&amp;P grounds, for instances forgery and tax evasion convictions. In a separate case, the application of a foreign entrepreneur was rejected on the grounds of criminal records identified in both his home country and an additional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, while the staffing levels dedicated to F&amp;P checks have increased, the AT considers it unclear whether the four staff resources are sufficient to sustain consistent scrutiny in practice (with the number of applications processed varying from 113 to 197 per year over the referenced period), despite efficiency gains from direct records access. 235. Accountancy licenses are granted indefinitely, and they require (i) a clean criminal record for directors, owners, BO, appointed person and associate, including any person employed and (ii) a professional certification. Over the referenced period, the Chamber of Auditors rejected 17 applications, including one based on the existence of a criminal record; 147 licenses were revoked, although not on F&amp;P grounds. The APML checks the overall population in the SRBA regularly to identify entities operating without an accounting license. As of June 2024, 5 672 legal entities appear in the Register of Accounting Service Providers kept by the SRBA, both entrepreneurs (around 4 000) and legal persons (around 1 600) who have received a license in accordance with the Law on Accounting. This constitutes a sharp increase since 2021 (where the total was 646), with no information being provided for the previous years. However, there is a difference of around 2 500 entities between the number of accountants currently registered in the Register of Accounting Service Providers and the number of legal persons and entrepreneurs that before the new licensing requirements were declared in the SRBA under the previous general activity code for auditing, accounting and tax advice. The APML explained that they actively check whether any of these 2500 entities conduct activities that render them subject to AML/CFT obligations. 236. Audit companies require a have a license from the Ministry of Finance to operate, which can be revoked by the SC for AML/CFT violations. However, auditors do not conduct AML/CFT covered activities in Serbia. In respect to AML/CFT obligations, DPMS will not be assessed given that there exists a cash limitation law and thus DPMSs cannot accept cash payments which would render them subject to AML/CFT obligations see 22.1. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 237. Competent authorities, with the exception of the Bar Association (for which no information has been provided), have procedures and mechanisms in place to identify and respond to breaches detected in licensing and registration requirements that have yielded results. Particularly, the GCA has put in place a robust mechanism of detecting unlicensed activity, by monitoring websites and responding to complaints received from individuals and legal entities; between 2020-2024, these efforts led to 1, 505 websites of unlicensed online operations being blocked upon the information transmitted by the GCA to competent authorities. In the real estate sector, unregistered brokers are usually identified through mystery shopping controls, online advertisements, register checks, or citizen reports, with some cases leading to removals or criminal referrals. Regarding accountants, the Supervision Department of the APML conducts checks to verify potential legal entities that are continuing to provide accountancy services without a license; upon identification of such cases, the APML follows up with on-site controls. In three instances, the APML filed criminal charges for unlicensed activity. Footnotes [47] Applicants are disqualified if they: (i) have criminal convictions for offences punishable by five or more years (until expunged), (ii) show behaviour inconsistent with the Chamber’s Code of Ethics, or (iii) have had their legal practice withdrawn within the past three years." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="305. Serbian authorities have assessed ML risks related to Serbian legal persons in the 2021 and 2024 NRAs. The 2024 NRA is more detailed in terms of data and analysis and covers foreign legal persons with links to Serbia and foreign legal arrangements. ML Risk Assessment - Serbian Legal Persons 306. The 2024 NRA extensively assesses the ML risks for Serbian legal persons. It assesses their materiality (i.e. numbers, size, and types of activities), vulnerability (i.e. the different types and nature of legal persons, types and origin of ownership, availability of BO data, customer risk ratings allocated by Banks and other REs), and threats and typologies identified in ML convictions and prosecutions, SARs, tax evasion proceedings, MLAs and other forms of international cooperation. 307. The key Serbian authorities involved in detecting and preventing ML related to legal persons (NCB, LEAs, SBRA, TA, NBS, and APML) demonstrate a strong understanding of ML risks linked to Serbian legal persons and common typologies. This knowledge is also reflected in the tailored risk mitigation measures outlined in Serbia’s Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. 308. There remain risk aspects that are insufficiently analysed, and most notably the effectiveness of the multi-pronged approach to ensure the availability of adequate, accurate and current BO information for Serbian legal persons. For example, while the NRA 2024 analyses the CRBO population rates, it does not adequately assess the quality of BO verification controls at company incorporation or ongoing monitoring performed by the SBRA, TA/Tax Police and Market Inspection, particularly to deter the use of strawmen, and the effectiveness of sanctions. The analysis of compliance with BO obligations by banks and NBS supervision is adequate but needs improvement. These gaps are largely mitigated by the authorities’ deeper understanding of the adequacy of control measures, reflected in the tailored measures set out in the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan. 309. During the on-site mission, the SBRA also provided a valuable analysis of the involvement of lawyers, accountants, and notaries in company formation. This was not incorporated into the 2024 NRA to assess the effectiveness of Serbia’s multi-pronged approach to BO data availability. ML Risk Assessment - Foreign Legal Persons with sufficient links to Serbia 310. The 2024 NRA examines ML risks related to foreign legal persons with links to Serbia, including those having representative offices or branches in Serbia, foreign legal persons banking in Serbia, and those holding shares in Serbian legal persons. The analysis covers the extent of foreign entities’ presence, the jurisdictions of origin (for representative offices and branches), the types of Serbian legal persons with foreign legal entity shareholders (mostly LLCs), and the origin of BOs. 311. Limited ML exposure through foreign legal persons is identified, with risks primarily arising from foreign ownership of Serbian LLCs. This is corroborated by the limited number of foreign entities featuring in ML convictions and SARs and having business relationships with Serbian banks. While a significant number of foreign legal entities featured in incoming MLAs, the authorities explained that in most cases foreign legal entities were not the subject of the request and had no financial footprint in Serbia apart from having transacted with Serbian legal persons. 312. The assessment is overall appropriate for Serbia’s risk profile. The following aspects were however not appropriately assessed: (i) the purpose and risk of Serbian LLCs with corporate owners from countries without clear economic ties to Serbia and (ii) the effectiveness of basic and BO information controls for foreign legal persons. Moreover, the lack of use of immovable property ownership and unified taxpayer register data, limited the completeness of the analysis. ML Risk Assessment - Foreign Legal Arrangements 313. The 2024 NRA assesses the use of foreign trusts/arrangements in Serbia, based on an analysis of foreign trusts serviced by REs (i.e. Banks, FIs and Real Estate Brokers), trusts holding shares in Serbian or non-resident legal persons, SARs and ML cases. It concludes that their presence and ML risk is limited. 314. The assessment would benefit from an analysis of: (i) tax-payer data as well as data on property ownership, (ii) the effectiveness of controls impacting the availability of basic and BO data for foreign trusts/arrangements, and (iii) the potential provision of trust services by lawyers, accountants, and other persons, and ML/TF risk implications. TF Risk Assessment 315. The 2024 NRA analyses the TF risk exposure of Serbian foundations and endowments registered as NPOs. Although considered a minor gap, the TF risk exposure of other types of Serbian legal persons or foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Serbia was not examined." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="305. Serbian authorities have assessed ML risks related to Serbian legal persons in the 2021 and 2024 NRAs. The 2024 NRA is more detailed in terms of data and analysis and covers foreign legal persons with links to Serbia and foreign legal arrangements. ML Risk Assessment - Serbian Legal Persons 306. The 2024 NRA extensively assesses the ML risks for Serbian legal persons. It assesses their materiality (i.e. numbers, size, and types of activities), vulnerability (i.e. the different types and nature of legal persons, types and origin of ownership, availability of BO data, customer risk ratings allocated by Banks and other REs), and threats and typologies identified in ML convictions and prosecutions, SARs, tax evasion proceedings, MLAs and other forms of international cooperation. 307. The key Serbian authorities involved in detecting and preventing ML related to legal persons (NCB, LEAs, SBRA, TA, NBS, and APML) demonstrate a strong understanding of ML risks linked to Serbian legal persons and common typologies. This knowledge is also reflected in the tailored risk mitigation measures outlined in Serbia’s Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. 308. There remain risk aspects that are insufficiently analysed, and most notably the effectiveness of the multi-pronged approach to ensure the availability of adequate, accurate and current BO information for Serbian legal persons. For example, while the NRA 2024 analyses the CRBO population rates, it does not adequately assess the quality of BO verification controls at company incorporation or ongoing monitoring performed by the SBRA, TA/Tax Police and Market Inspection, particularly to deter the use of strawmen, and the effectiveness of sanctions. The analysis of compliance with BO obligations by banks and NBS supervision is adequate but needs improvement. These gaps are largely mitigated by the authorities’ deeper understanding of the adequacy of control measures, reflected in the tailored measures set out in the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan. 309. During the on-site mission, the SBRA also provided a valuable analysis of the involvement of lawyers, accountants, and notaries in company formation. This was not incorporated into the 2024 NRA to assess the effectiveness of Serbia’s multi-pronged approach to BO data availability. ML Risk Assessment - Foreign Legal Persons with sufficient links to Serbia 310. The 2024 NRA examines ML risks related to foreign legal persons with links to Serbia, including those having representative offices or branches in Serbia, foreign legal persons banking in Serbia, and those holding shares in Serbian legal persons. The analysis covers the extent of foreign entities’ presence, the jurisdictions of origin (for representative offices and branches), the types of Serbian legal persons with foreign legal entity shareholders (mostly LLCs), and the origin of BOs. 311. Limited ML exposure through foreign legal persons is identified, with risks primarily arising from foreign ownership of Serbian LLCs. This is corroborated by the limited number of foreign entities featuring in ML convictions and SARs and having business relationships with Serbian banks. While a significant number of foreign legal entities featured in incoming MLAs, the authorities explained that in most cases foreign legal entities were not the subject of the request and had no financial footprint in Serbia apart from having transacted with Serbian legal persons. 312. The assessment is overall appropriate for Serbia’s risk profile. The following aspects were however not appropriately assessed: (i) the purpose and risk of Serbian LLCs with corporate owners from countries without clear economic ties to Serbia and (ii) the effectiveness of basic and BO information controls for foreign legal persons. Moreover, the lack of use of immovable property ownership and unified taxpayer register data, limited the completeness of the analysis. ML Risk Assessment - Foreign Legal Arrangements 313. The 2024 NRA assesses the use of foreign trusts/arrangements in Serbia, based on an analysis of foreign trusts serviced by REs (i.e. Banks, FIs and Real Estate Brokers), trusts holding shares in Serbian or non-resident legal persons, SARs and ML cases. It concludes that their presence and ML risk is limited. 314. The assessment would benefit from an analysis of: (i) tax-payer data as well as data on property ownership, (ii) the effectiveness of controls impacting the availability of basic and BO data for foreign trusts/arrangements, and (iii) the potential provision of trust services by lawyers, accountants, and other persons, and ML/TF risk implications. TF Risk Assessment 315. The 2024 NRA analyses the TF risk exposure of Serbian foundations and endowments registered as NPOs. Although considered a minor gap, the TF risk exposure of other types of Serbian legal persons or foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Serbia was not examined." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 371. The APML is the central authority for receipt of ML/TF SARs and other information from obliged entities and other state authorities. The APML has access to a wide range of reports, data and other information needed for the performance of its analytical and dissemination functions. 372. The Analytical Department serves as the central operational unit within the APML, overseeing several specialized internal structures. Within this department, the Group for Pre-Analysis performs the initial screening and risk assessment of incoming reports to support targeted and effective case selection. The Section for SAR Analysis is responsible for in-depth examining suspicious transaction reports, while the Section for Interagency Cooperation facilitates information exchange with national competent authorities. The Counter-Terrorist Financing Team focuses specifically on identifying and analysing SARs linked to TF. 373. The APML has direct access to a wide range of databases (Business Registers Agency, Real Estate Register, Register of Financial Statements, Single Register of Current and Other Accounts of Legal and Natural Persons, Single Register of Safe-deposit Boxes, Single Register of Money Remittance Beneficiaries and Records of Virtual Currency Holders etc.) and indirect access to several other databases (Criminal record database, Border Crossing records, Records of import/export customs clearance, Database of foreign currency remittances carried out through payment institutions etc). In cases of indirect access, the information is obtained upon submission of a formal request to the competent authority, holding the respective database. The responses are timely delivered and the databases accurate and up to date. 374. The APML has wide powers to request and obtain additional information from reporting entities. Requests and responses are exchanged electronically via a secure document management application which ensures real-time delivery of APML requests and simultaneously sends notifications to the entity’s registered email address. It also sets response deadlines and issues reminders on the day the deadline expires, prompting the entity to comply. The responsible analyst is notified upon receipt of the response. Requests were also sent to reporting entities to respond to inquiries from foreign counterparts. 375. A key source of financial information are the SARs and CTRs submitted electronically through APML’s online platform. Reporting entities are required to indicate whether the report concerns suspected money laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF), or if it involves another type of criminal activity. Additionally, the report must include relevant details pertaining to the typology or risk indicator associated with the suspicious activity, as well as the type of financial product or service used in the transaction 376. During the period 2019–2024, the number of SARs, noted a fluctuation, a drop to 1,464 and 1,563 in 2022 and 2023 while reaching a peak of 2,277 in 2020. Several factors have influenced SAR submission rates among reporting entities. These include the introduction of the electronic SAR submission system for non-banking financial institutions and DNFBPs (previously this was available only for banks), the development of typologies, updated guidance on SAR submissions, and the continuous enhancement of suspicion indicator lists by supervisory authorities. The list of indicators provided to reporting entities is updated regularly - at least annually- by the APML and supervisory bodies. Importantly, reporting entities are not merely expected to reference an indicator; they must clearly articulate the reasoning and grounds behind their suspicions. The decline in 2022-2023 is linked to reduced submission of payment institutions influenced by the migrant crisis and border closures. 377. Regarding the source of SARs, the steady trend over 2019-2024 shows the prevalence of SARs submitted by banks (up to 44%) and payment institutions (up to 34%). DNFBPs, except for notaries, remain less active. The number of SARs reported by banks is broadly in line with the size and materiality of the sector, given the large volume of transactions and the dominant role of the banking sector in the financial system . By contrast, reporting from DNFBPs is disproportionately low when compared to the materiality of certain sectors, such as real estate and lawyers, which account for a significant proportion of economic activity but generate very few SARs. Table 6.1: Reported SARs (2019-2024) Reporting entities 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Banks 819 4 1026 3 866 5 782 1 791 1 1161 4 Broker-dealer companies 1 0 4 0 8 0 7 0 13 0 2 0 Real estate agents 2 0 3 1 1 0 15 0 1 0 8 0 Accounting services 6 0 6 0 20 0 14 0 1 0 12 0 Auditing companies 5 0 7 0 9 0 8 0 11 0 6 0 Payment institutions 891 17 962 14 805 18 336 33 279 29 145 40 Public postal operator 17 0 9 0 15 0 12 0 8 0 15 0 Insurance companies 58 0 39 0 27 0 13 0 15 0 12 0 Notaries 353 1 172 0 238 0 239 0 197 0 189 0 Attorneys 5 0 5 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Exchange offices 67 0 28 0 32 0 85 0 91 0 275 0 Games of chance in casinos 14 0 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 Organizers of online games of chance 7 0 0 0 6 0 26 0 33 0 85 0 Management companies 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial leasing 5 0 2 0 2 0 14 0 6 0 9 0 VASPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 18 0 18 0 Factoring companies 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 24 0 10 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 72 0 Total number 2274 22 2276 18 2053 24 1563 34 1464 30 2014 44 378. With regard to predicate offences reports, there is a steady tendency for banks of reporting mainly tax crimes, while the largest number of SARs potentially linked to corruption offenses were submitted by notaries public. A large number of SARs concern unknown sources of funds. Despite the expansion of the Serbian economy and the increased ML risks in the real estate sector, the number of SARs emanating from this category of RE remains very low (see Table 6.1). 379. The main providers of SARs are the medium-risk sector represented by banks and payment institutions. In contrast, for high-risk sectors such as real estate, accountants and lawyers, the volume of submitted STRs remains low. This indicates misalignment between sectoral risk levels and reporting activity and that entities operating in higher-risk areas may lack adequate capacity to identify and report suspicious transactions effectively. 380. APML received 172 TF related suspicions, out of which 119 were disseminated to the Service for Combating Terrorism (MoI) and BIA. Most of these SARs concerned small cross-border remittances, typically modest transfers from Serbian diaspora members working abroad to their relatives, which explains the number of such SARs filed by the payment institutions. While these transactions were initially flagged due to their geographical or thematic connection to high-risk areas (e.g., “foreign fighter” lists), subsequent analysis by law enforcement could not confirmed the initial suspicion (see IO9). Table 6.2: Reported CTRs (2019-2024) Number of reported CTRs by reporting entities 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Bank 261,654 263,095 324,855 411,359 425,405 454,899 Money exchangers 6,826 8,108 10,779 18,539 24,219 27,350 Payment institutions 710 1,171 2,086 3,379 7,086 10,346 Casinos 66 92 286 234 995 853 Pension Fund Management 22 4 - - - - 381. From 2019 to 2024, 116 cases were opened based on CTRs. Out of these, information from 19 cases were forwarded to Tax Administration and prosecution. 382. In addition, the CA submits to the APML cross-border threshold declaration reports (CBCTR) on declared and undeclared currency, bearer negotiable instruments (BNI), precious metals and precious stones worth EUR 10,000 or more within three days. Those reports are used in the course of the APML analysis, but they do not trigger a separate FIU case. 383. When Customs officers have grounds to suspect ML or TF, they are required file an SAR mentioning the reasons for suspicion. Between 2019 and 2023, CTR data show an overall increase in the number of declarations and the value of cash declared, particularly for incoming flows which is in line with the country risk profile. The data also reveal a significant disparity between incoming and outgoing flows in the favour of the previous, largely reflecting the high number of nationals working abroad who repatriate their earnings. 384. Turning to APML additional information requests to the RE and public administrations, the numbers are decreasing, due to access to new registries (mainly the Register of Accounts and Safes of Natural Persons and the Register of Beneficiaries of Money Remittances in early 2022), allowing for more targeted requests. In 2019, a total of 22,675 requests were recorded (20,955 related to ML and 1,720 to TF). By 2022, this number had declined by nearly 60% which is a positive development. Although a moderate increase was observed in 2023 (10,335 requests), this was followed by a decline in 2024 to 8,041, with volumes remaining significantly below 2019 levels. 385. Requests concerning both non-resident accounts and wire transfers with persons of interest are still sent to all banks. While this approach ensures comprehensive and timely access to intelligence, the practice remain less efficient and puts an unnecessary burden on the APML human resources. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 386. The Police has an integrated database with access to financial and cross-border records, and exchanges information through automated systems and via Interpol, Europol, and Carin secure networks. Key financial intelligence sources include taxpayer records from the Tax Administration, company and BO data from the SBRA, bank account and transaction records from the NBS and banks, customs declarations (including cash amounts above EUR 10,000), property tax data, and securities ownership from the Central Securities Depositary. Other accessible systems cover identity verification, criminal records, biometric data, civil registers, weapons, vehicles, border movements, social insurance, persons of interest, land and cadastre, public procurement, real estate transactions, and asset declarations of public officials. 387. The CA relies on 23 national databases and international platforms covering customs intelligence systems of including WCO systems (CEN, ENVIRONET, GLOBAL SHIELD), OLAF, regional data-exchange tools such as ZKA Balkan Info System and SEED and key domestic registers. These include systems from the Tax Administration, Agency for Business Registers, National Bank, multiple ministries, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Interior (border police and vehicle records) and national registers for import/export monitoring. 388. The Prosecutor’s Office has indirect access to key databases, such as those maintained by the Police and financial institutions, typically through formal requests. The Tax Police plays a key role in detecting ML related to tax crimes and VAT frauds, uses FISKALIS, BRITACOM, IOTA, TAIEX and CEF programs for training and knowledge exchange and has its own case management system for detecting ML. The Tax Administration and the Business Registers Agency provide essential information on taxpayers, company ownership, financial statements, and beneficial ownership." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 371. The APML is the central authority for receipt of ML/TF SARs and other information from obliged entities and other state authorities. The APML has access to a wide range of reports, data and other information needed for the performance of its analytical and dissemination functions. 372. The Analytical Department serves as the central operational unit within the APML, overseeing several specialized internal structures. Within this department, the Group for Pre-Analysis performs the initial screening and risk assessment of incoming reports to support targeted and effective case selection. The Section for SAR Analysis is responsible for in-depth examining suspicious transaction reports, while the Section for Interagency Cooperation facilitates information exchange with national competent authorities. The Counter-Terrorist Financing Team focuses specifically on identifying and analysing SARs linked to TF. 373. The APML has direct access to a wide range of databases (Business Registers Agency, Real Estate Register, Register of Financial Statements, Single Register of Current and Other Accounts of Legal and Natural Persons, Single Register of Safe-deposit Boxes, Single Register of Money Remittance Beneficiaries and Records of Virtual Currency Holders etc.) and indirect access to several other databases (Criminal record database, Border Crossing records, Records of import/export customs clearance, Database of foreign currency remittances carried out through payment institutions etc). In cases of indirect access, the information is obtained upon submission of a formal request to the competent authority, holding the respective database. The responses are timely delivered and the databases accurate and up to date. 374. The APML has wide powers to request and obtain additional information from reporting entities. Requests and responses are exchanged electronically via a secure document management application which ensures real-time delivery of APML requests and simultaneously sends notifications to the entity’s registered email address. It also sets response deadlines and issues reminders on the day the deadline expires, prompting the entity to comply. The responsible analyst is notified upon receipt of the response. Requests were also sent to reporting entities to respond to inquiries from foreign counterparts. 375. A key source of financial information are the SARs and CTRs submitted electronically through APML’s online platform. Reporting entities are required to indicate whether the report concerns suspected money laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF), or if it involves another type of criminal activity. Additionally, the report must include relevant details pertaining to the typology or risk indicator associated with the suspicious activity, as well as the type of financial product or service used in the transaction 376. During the period 2019–2024, the number of SARs, noted a fluctuation, a drop to 1,464 and 1,563 in 2022 and 2023 while reaching a peak of 2,277 in 2020. Several factors have influenced SAR submission rates among reporting entities. These include the introduction of the electronic SAR submission system for non-banking financial institutions and DNFBPs (previously this was available only for banks), the development of typologies, updated guidance on SAR submissions, and the continuous enhancement of suspicion indicator lists by supervisory authorities. The list of indicators provided to reporting entities is updated regularly - at least annually- by the APML and supervisory bodies. Importantly, reporting entities are not merely expected to reference an indicator; they must clearly articulate the reasoning and grounds behind their suspicions. The decline in 2022-2023 is linked to reduced submission of payment institutions influenced by the migrant crisis and border closures. 377. Regarding the source of SARs, the steady trend over 2019-2024 shows the prevalence of SARs submitted by banks (up to 44%) and payment institutions (up to 34%). DNFBPs, except for notaries, remain less active. The number of SARs reported by banks is broadly in line with the size and materiality of the sector, given the large volume of transactions and the dominant role of the banking sector in the financial system . By contrast, reporting from DNFBPs is disproportionately low when compared to the materiality of certain sectors, such as real estate and lawyers, which account for a significant proportion of economic activity but generate very few SARs. Table 6.1: Reported SARs (2019-2024) Reporting entities 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Banks 819 4 1026 3 866 5 782 1 791 1 1161 4 Broker-dealer companies 1 0 4 0 8 0 7 0 13 0 2 0 Real estate agents 2 0 3 1 1 0 15 0 1 0 8 0 Accounting services 6 0 6 0 20 0 14 0 1 0 12 0 Auditing companies 5 0 7 0 9 0 8 0 11 0 6 0 Payment institutions 891 17 962 14 805 18 336 33 279 29 145 40 Public postal operator 17 0 9 0 15 0 12 0 8 0 15 0 Insurance companies 58 0 39 0 27 0 13 0 15 0 12 0 Notaries 353 1 172 0 238 0 239 0 197 0 189 0 Attorneys 5 0 5 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Exchange offices 67 0 28 0 32 0 85 0 91 0 275 0 Games of chance in casinos 14 0 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 5 0 Organizers of online games of chance 7 0 0 0 6 0 26 0 33 0 85 0 Management companies 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Financial leasing 5 0 2 0 2 0 14 0 6 0 9 0 VASPs 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 18 0 18 0 Factoring companies 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 24 0 10 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 72 0 Total number 2274 22 2276 18 2053 24 1563 34 1464 30 2014 44 378. With regard to predicate offences reports, there is a steady tendency for banks of reporting mainly tax crimes, while the largest number of SARs potentially linked to corruption offenses were submitted by notaries public. A large number of SARs concern unknown sources of funds. Despite the expansion of the Serbian economy and the increased ML risks in the real estate sector, the number of SARs emanating from this category of RE remains very low (see Table 6.1). 379. The main providers of SARs are the medium-risk sector represented by banks and payment institutions. In contrast, for high-risk sectors such as real estate, accountants and lawyers, the volume of submitted STRs remains low. This indicates misalignment between sectoral risk levels and reporting activity and that entities operating in higher-risk areas may lack adequate capacity to identify and report suspicious transactions effectively. 380. APML received 172 TF related suspicions, out of which 119 were disseminated to the Service for Combating Terrorism (MoI) and BIA. Most of these SARs concerned small cross-border remittances, typically modest transfers from Serbian diaspora members working abroad to their relatives, which explains the number of such SARs filed by the payment institutions. While these transactions were initially flagged due to their geographical or thematic connection to high-risk areas (e.g., “foreign fighter” lists), subsequent analysis by law enforcement could not confirmed the initial suspicion (see IO9). Table 6.2: Reported CTRs (2019-2024) Number of reported CTRs by reporting entities 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Bank 261,654 263,095 324,855 411,359 425,405 454,899 Money exchangers 6,826 8,108 10,779 18,539 24,219 27,350 Payment institutions 710 1,171 2,086 3,379 7,086 10,346 Casinos 66 92 286 234 995 853 Pension Fund Management 22 4 - - - - 381. From 2019 to 2024, 116 cases were opened based on CTRs. Out of these, information from 19 cases were forwarded to Tax Administration and prosecution. 382. In addition, the CA submits to the APML cross-border threshold declaration reports (CBCTR) on declared and undeclared currency, bearer negotiable instruments (BNI), precious metals and precious stones worth EUR 10,000 or more within three days. Those reports are used in the course of the APML analysis, but they do not trigger a separate FIU case. 383. When Customs officers have grounds to suspect ML or TF, they are required file an SAR mentioning the reasons for suspicion. Between 2019 and 2023, CTR data show an overall increase in the number of declarations and the value of cash declared, particularly for incoming flows which is in line with the country risk profile. The data also reveal a significant disparity between incoming and outgoing flows in the favour of the previous, largely reflecting the high number of nationals working abroad who repatriate their earnings. 384. Turning to APML additional information requests to the RE and public administrations, the numbers are decreasing, due to access to new registries (mainly the Register of Accounts and Safes of Natural Persons and the Register of Beneficiaries of Money Remittances in early 2022), allowing for more targeted requests. In 2019, a total of 22,675 requests were recorded (20,955 related to ML and 1,720 to TF). By 2022, this number had declined by nearly 60% which is a positive development. Although a moderate increase was observed in 2023 (10,335 requests), this was followed by a decline in 2024 to 8,041, with volumes remaining significantly below 2019 levels. 385. Requests concerning both non-resident accounts and wire transfers with persons of interest are still sent to all banks. While this approach ensures comprehensive and timely access to intelligence, the practice remain less efficient and puts an unnecessary burden on the APML human resources. 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 386. The Police has an integrated database with access to financial and cross-border records, and exchanges information through automated systems and via Interpol, Europol, and Carin secure networks. Key financial intelligence sources include taxpayer records from the Tax Administration, company and BO data from the SBRA, bank account and transaction records from the NBS and banks, customs declarations (including cash amounts above EUR 10,000), property tax data, and securities ownership from the Central Securities Depositary. Other accessible systems cover identity verification, criminal records, biometric data, civil registers, weapons, vehicles, border movements, social insurance, persons of interest, land and cadastre, public procurement, real estate transactions, and asset declarations of public officials. 387. The CA relies on 23 national databases and international platforms covering customs intelligence systems of including WCO systems (CEN, ENVIRONET, GLOBAL SHIELD), OLAF, regional data-exchange tools such as ZKA Balkan Info System and SEED and key domestic registers. These include systems from the Tax Administration, Agency for Business Registers, National Bank, multiple ministries, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Interior (border police and vehicle records) and national registers for import/export monitoring. 388. The Prosecutor’s Office has indirect access to key databases, such as those maintained by the Police and financial institutions, typically through formal requests. The Tax Police plays a key role in detecting ML related to tax crimes and VAT frauds, uses FISKALIS, BRITACOM, IOTA, TAIEX and CEF programs for training and knowledge exchange and has its own case management system for detecting ML. The Tax Administration and the Business Registers Agency provide essential information on taxpayers, company ownership, financial statements, and beneficial ownership." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="419. Serbia’s institutional architecture dedicated to ML has clearly delegated authorities and responsibilities for identifying potential cases of ML and investigating them along a scale of importance, impact and alignment with risk. Pre-investigations and Investigations 420. Investigations are conducted by the MoI, Criminal Police Directorate, based on primary/initial checks conducted by all the authorities with responsibilities on countering ML. When finalizing an investigation, the police presents a formal report to the prosecutor, who analyses the data and decides whether there are sufficient grounds to start criminal proceedings in the form of a ML case (the statistics for this phase are presented in table 7.2).The range of sources into possible ML include: APML disseminations, parallel financial investigations into the predicate offences, gathering of formal or informal incoming foreign requests, domestic criminal intelligence (cooperation with Tax Administration, specialized intelligence authorities), cross-border currency and cash seizures (cooperation with Customs Administration(CA)), complaints by citizens, controlling and supervising institutions and open-source information. 421.  ML cases are identified and investigated mainly by the two divisions of the Criminal Police Directorate (CPD): the Service for Combating Organized Crime (SBPOK) and the Department for Combating Corruption (OBPK), the later having territorial units. The following sub-divisions of the Police are responsible for initiating a ML case: - the Section for Suppression of Money Laundering (10 staff) within the SBPOK responsible for ML investigations linked to: i) organised crime; ii) high corruption related ML; iii) ML linked to proceeds exceeding €1.7 million; - the OBPK territorial (233 staff) handles all other ML offences, including standalone ML, through its 8 territorial sections; - the Financial Investigation Unit (hereafter PFIU) – 66 total staff, with one department (13 staff) assigned to support the investigations conducted by the SBPOK and another (53 staff) to support OBPK in their ML investigations. 422. The PFIU is involved from the beginning of all ML cases, and it aims to trace, identify and determine if there is movable or immovable property within the scope of the investigation to be subject to seizure and assist in the investigation of the suspect and other aspects of the case [61] . 423. Other LEA (such as the Tax Police) or state administrations (CA) could seize the Prosecutorial services on ML cases. (see Table 7.1 below). 424. In addition, the Prosecution can open cases directly, based on various sources such as: information obtained from other criminal cases (including predicate cases); reports by the APML; reports from CA; reports from the Tax Administration and reports from supervisory bodies. While marginal in terms of numbers, this option incentivises the prosecutors to be alert, and examples of successful investigations linked to corruption (public procurement) were presented to the AT. 425. Third-party, stand-alone and professional ML are prioritised from the pre-investigation stage. This approach is implemented since 2018 - 2019 and was set up following country’s engagement with the ICRG process, which re-focused the attention of the system from self-laundering to third-party and stand-alone ML. 426. Several guidelines and requirements have been put in place for parallel financial investigations, including Instruction on Criminal Property (2022) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that determine the work of the police in this area are applicable to the detection and proof of ML offences. In addition, the Prosecutor’s Office has issued a General Mandatory Instruction on parallel financial investigations, which requires the prosecutors to undertake a parallel financial investigation and pursue criminal proceeds in proceeds generating case, as well as ML. From the on-site interviews and cases studies presented, the AT takes comfort that the LEA in Serbia have sufficient knowledge, resources and tools to handle financial investigations and more generally ML cases successfully. 427.   Parallel financial investigations are undertaken for all proceeds generating offences and are conducted by the respective police units of SBPOK and OBPK, with the involvement and assistance of officers from the PFIU and are the most productive source of ML cases. 428. In the assessed period (2019–2024) a total of 1 347 ML reports were submitted by the Police to the Prosecutor’ s Office which constitutes a significant increase since the previous period (2010 - 2015) which counted 135 such criminal reports. The contribution of each sub-division (SBPOK and OPOK) in the overall picture of ML investigations cannot be determined in the absence of statistics. Table 7.1 Number of ML reports submitted by the Police to the Prosecutors s Office (per source): Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total % Parallel financial investigations (by –PFIU) 99 77 256 197 168 48 845 61.5% APML 30 30 26 28 18 21 153 11.14% Open-source information 25 6 10 11 2 0 54 3.93% Domestic intelligence (CA, BIA etc) 9 9 20 34 32 37 141 10.26% MLA and other foreign intelligence 3 19 14 32 16 95 179 13,03 % Other sources 1 1 2 0.15% Total 166 141 327 302 236 202 1374 100% 429. The decision to initiate a ML case is taken by the Prosecution on the basis of submissions by Police or other authorities. In the period under review, between 169 and 260 ML formal investigations were initiated yearly (see Table 7.2 below), mainly triggered by parallel financial investigations into already opened files, and APML disseminations. When cases need to be complemented with formal evidentiary actions (database checks, police field investigations), prosecutor’s authorisation is needed. Table 7.2: Total number of persons investigated/indicted by the Prosecution Offices per source Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 MIA/Police 150 135 165 155 118 161 APML 30 30 57 14 14 16 International cooperation request (MLA) 0 6 5 10 12 8 Customs 0 6 5 5 3 6 Tax Police 18 27 28 35 20 52 Investigations launched by the Prosecution on its own materials 0 2 2 Total number of persons investigated 198 204 260 219 169 245 Total number of persons indicted 85 73 64 118 162 183 430. All relevant authorities have dedicated staff in place to investigate ML. Training of police officers takes place regularly, with CEPOL’s [62] , LEEd [63] online platform, and ILEA [64] training programs being a strong asset in parallel financial investigation techniques. The layout and structure of the specialized units within the police covering ML investigations ensure expertise on various typologies and territorial needs, with the PFIU supporting all the other units in detecting and investigating ML. 431. The Police have an integrated database with access to financial and cross border records, vital in detecting ML and exchanges information directly via automated systems and interface with foreign counterparts through Interpol, Europol and Carin [65] secure networks. The Tax Police plays a key role in detecting ML related to tax crimes and VAT frauds, uses FISKALIS [66] , BRITACOM [67] , IOTA [68] , TAIEX [69] and CEF [70] programs for training and knowledge exchange and has its own case management system for detecting ML. The CA use WCO [71] , OLAF [72] and SELEC [73] platforms for training and data exchange with effective staff in detecting cross border cash movements and smuggling offences. Footnotes [61] PFIU also plays the role of ARO, see IO8 [62] European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training [63] Law Enforcement Education Platform [64] International Law Enforcement Academy [65] Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network [66] Fiscalis Programme (EU-tax-cooperation and information-exchange programme) [67] Belt and Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Mechanism [68] Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations [69] Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument [70] Connecting Europe Facility [71] World Customs Organization [72] European Anti-Fraud Office [73] Southeast European Law Enforcement Center" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="419. Serbia’s institutional architecture dedicated to ML has clearly delegated authorities and responsibilities for identifying potential cases of ML and investigating them along a scale of importance, impact and alignment with risk. Pre-investigations and Investigations 420. Investigations are conducted by the MoI, Criminal Police Directorate, based on primary/initial checks conducted by all the authorities with responsibilities on countering ML. When finalizing an investigation, the police presents a formal report to the prosecutor, who analyses the data and decides whether there are sufficient grounds to start criminal proceedings in the form of a ML case (the statistics for this phase are presented in table 7.2).The range of sources into possible ML include: APML disseminations, parallel financial investigations into the predicate offences, gathering of formal or informal incoming foreign requests, domestic criminal intelligence (cooperation with Tax Administration, specialized intelligence authorities), cross-border currency and cash seizures (cooperation with Customs Administration(CA)), complaints by citizens, controlling and supervising institutions and open-source information. 421.  ML cases are identified and investigated mainly by the two divisions of the Criminal Police Directorate (CPD): the Service for Combating Organized Crime (SBPOK) and the Department for Combating Corruption (OBPK), the later having territorial units. The following sub-divisions of the Police are responsible for initiating a ML case: - the Section for Suppression of Money Laundering (10 staff) within the SBPOK responsible for ML investigations linked to: i) organised crime; ii) high corruption related ML; iii) ML linked to proceeds exceeding €1.7 million; - the OBPK territorial (233 staff) handles all other ML offences, including standalone ML, through its 8 territorial sections; - the Financial Investigation Unit (hereafter PFIU) – 66 total staff, with one department (13 staff) assigned to support the investigations conducted by the SBPOK and another (53 staff) to support OBPK in their ML investigations. 422. The PFIU is involved from the beginning of all ML cases, and it aims to trace, identify and determine if there is movable or immovable property within the scope of the investigation to be subject to seizure and assist in the investigation of the suspect and other aspects of the case [61] . 423. Other LEA (such as the Tax Police) or state administrations (CA) could seize the Prosecutorial services on ML cases. (see Table 7.1 below). 424. In addition, the Prosecution can open cases directly, based on various sources such as: information obtained from other criminal cases (including predicate cases); reports by the APML; reports from CA; reports from the Tax Administration and reports from supervisory bodies. While marginal in terms of numbers, this option incentivises the prosecutors to be alert, and examples of successful investigations linked to corruption (public procurement) were presented to the AT. 425. Third-party, stand-alone and professional ML are prioritised from the pre-investigation stage. This approach is implemented since 2018 - 2019 and was set up following country’s engagement with the ICRG process, which re-focused the attention of the system from self-laundering to third-party and stand-alone ML. 426. Several guidelines and requirements have been put in place for parallel financial investigations, including Instruction on Criminal Property (2022) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that determine the work of the police in this area are applicable to the detection and proof of ML offences. In addition, the Prosecutor’s Office has issued a General Mandatory Instruction on parallel financial investigations, which requires the prosecutors to undertake a parallel financial investigation and pursue criminal proceeds in proceeds generating case, as well as ML. From the on-site interviews and cases studies presented, the AT takes comfort that the LEA in Serbia have sufficient knowledge, resources and tools to handle financial investigations and more generally ML cases successfully. 427.   Parallel financial investigations are undertaken for all proceeds generating offences and are conducted by the respective police units of SBPOK and OBPK, with the involvement and assistance of officers from the PFIU and are the most productive source of ML cases. 428. In the assessed period (2019–2024) a total of 1 347 ML reports were submitted by the Police to the Prosecutor’ s Office which constitutes a significant increase since the previous period (2010 - 2015) which counted 135 such criminal reports. The contribution of each sub-division (SBPOK and OPOK) in the overall picture of ML investigations cannot be determined in the absence of statistics. Table 7.1 Number of ML reports submitted by the Police to the Prosecutors s Office (per source): Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total % Parallel financial investigations (by –PFIU) 99 77 256 197 168 48 845 61.5% APML 30 30 26 28 18 21 153 11.14% Open-source information 25 6 10 11 2 0 54 3.93% Domestic intelligence (CA, BIA etc) 9 9 20 34 32 37 141 10.26% MLA and other foreign intelligence 3 19 14 32 16 95 179 13,03 % Other sources 1 1 2 0.15% Total 166 141 327 302 236 202 1374 100% 429. The decision to initiate a ML case is taken by the Prosecution on the basis of submissions by Police or other authorities. In the period under review, between 169 and 260 ML formal investigations were initiated yearly (see Table 7.2 below), mainly triggered by parallel financial investigations into already opened files, and APML disseminations. When cases need to be complemented with formal evidentiary actions (database checks, police field investigations), prosecutor’s authorisation is needed. Table 7.2: Total number of persons investigated/indicted by the Prosecution Offices per source Source 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 MIA/Police 150 135 165 155 118 161 APML 30 30 57 14 14 16 International cooperation request (MLA) 0 6 5 10 12 8 Customs 0 6 5 5 3 6 Tax Police 18 27 28 35 20 52 Investigations launched by the Prosecution on its own materials 0 2 2 Total number of persons investigated 198 204 260 219 169 245 Total number of persons indicted 85 73 64 118 162 183 430. All relevant authorities have dedicated staff in place to investigate ML. Training of police officers takes place regularly, with CEPOL’s [62] , LEEd [63] online platform, and ILEA [64] training programs being a strong asset in parallel financial investigation techniques. The layout and structure of the specialized units within the police covering ML investigations ensure expertise on various typologies and territorial needs, with the PFIU supporting all the other units in detecting and investigating ML. 431. The Police have an integrated database with access to financial and cross border records, vital in detecting ML and exchanges information directly via automated systems and interface with foreign counterparts through Interpol, Europol and Carin [65] secure networks. The Tax Police plays a key role in detecting ML related to tax crimes and VAT frauds, uses FISKALIS [66] , BRITACOM [67] , IOTA [68] , TAIEX [69] and CEF [70] programs for training and knowledge exchange and has its own case management system for detecting ML. The CA use WCO [71] , OLAF [72] and SELEC [73] platforms for training and data exchange with effective staff in detecting cross border cash movements and smuggling offences. Footnotes [61] PFIU also plays the role of ARO, see IO8 [62] European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training [63] Law Enforcement Education Platform [64] International Law Enforcement Academy [65] Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network [66] Fiscalis Programme (EU-tax-cooperation and information-exchange programme) [67] Belt and Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Mechanism [68] Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations [69] Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument [70] Connecting Europe Facility [71] World Customs Organization [72] European Anti-Fraud Office [73] Southeast European Law Enforcement Center" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 469. The Serbian authorities formulate a number of AML/CFT and anti-corruption policy documents, based on various sources of information, including NRAs, experience gained from criminal cases, international cooperation, annual prosecutorial reports, and external analyses such as previous MERs and EU reports. For instance, 2020-2024 AML/CFT National Strategy, adopted as a high-level intersectoral policy, identifies the confiscation of criminal proceeds as a specific objective and its implementing Action Plan established some measures related to asset recovery (see R.4). Asset recovery is one of the axes of the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy. The General instruction n. 492/2022 of the JTOK emphasizes the importance to launch financial investigations in the framework of the investigations conducted. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 470. The conducted NRAs contain a section which analyses the asset recovery regime in Serbia and its effectiveness. Using the conclusions therein, Serbia has progressively strengthened its asset recovery system, focusing on both legal and institutional frameworks. 471. Nevertheless, asset recovery legal system (mainly, LoR) has not been reviewed since 2019 [83] , despite several deficiencies were identified under the 2021 and 2024 NRAs and the 2024-2028 Anti-Corruption Strategy: the procedure for asset forfeiture is not clearly defined [84] , the rules related to the enforcement of the resolutions confiscating assets should be improved and the standard operating procedures of the SPPO and the police for conducting financial operations should be also updated, etc. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 472. In addition to the APML, the Criminal Police Directorate (CPD) and JTOK are the main actors in asset recovery, since this is prioritized in practice mainly in relation to ML and organized crime. 473. The CPD is integrated, amongst other departments, by the SBPOK and the OBPK. The SBPOK is the competent police body to investigate organized crime and a great percentage of ML cases -including those related to corruption- and is integrated by (i) the PFIU responsible for trace, identify, detect and search proceeds of crime, acting also as the national asset recovery office; and (b) the Department for Suppression of Organized Financial Crime, with three different sections dealing with counterfeiting of currency and forgery, high corruption and ML. The OBPK is the competent police body to investigate corruption. Although the PFIU is organically established under the scope of the SBPOK, it is empowered to also assist other departments (see also IO7). 474. The SPPO is integrated by a number of sections, being the JTOK main responsible for proceeds-generating crimes. This Office is composed by the Group for Combating Corruption, the Group for Organized Crime and the Group for Combating terrorism. JTOK has also appointed two staff members as Service for financial forensics and one special prosecutor for financial investigation, seizure particularly oriented to extended confiscation cases. A lack of sufficient human resources was identified by the AT taking into account the number of cases and the (sometimes limited) scope of financial investigations 475. Different NRAs, as well as the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, concluded that human resources for ML and asset recovery were not fully satisfactory and needed to be strengthened. This situation was confirmed on-site, since the PFIU was staffed at approximately 80% of the projected level and the JTOK was composed by 19 prosecutors (and supporting staff), which is clearly insufficient based on the number and complexity of cases under their competence. 476. Additionally, several task forces have been established to deal with organized crime, money laundering and migrant smuggling that, in their fields, are also contributing to asset tracing and confiscation (see. IO7). 477. The previously identified multiplicity of national authorities with similar tasks was challenging in terms of coordination and the system would benefit from clearer rules for assignation of cases to the different bodies (the APML is sometimes used for investigative purposes such asset tracing). These challenges were also identified by the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (“ despite efforts made, challenges in coordination still exist and need to be overcome in order to achieve expected results, especially in the area of the fight against corruption and forfeiture of proceeds of crime ”). Footnotes [83] The AT was informed on-site that the amendment of the LoR was under consideration in relation to a number of topics, such as the scope of the LoR (i.e., expand the catalogue of crimes to which it is applicable), time limit of temporary measures, improvement of measures on virtual assets, legal powers and capacities of the Directorate for Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets of the MoJ, implementation of some provisions of the Warsaw Convention, etc. [84] An amendment of the LoR to expand the catalogue of criminal offences covered by the law, extend the maximum duration of seizing orders from 3 to 6 months, amend and introduce non-conviction based confiscation and regulate the management of digital assets, among others, is in progress. According to the provided information, the European Commission has already reviewed the draft and is expected to be adopted by the end of 2025." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 469. The Serbian authorities formulate a number of AML/CFT and anti-corruption policy documents, based on various sources of information, including NRAs, experience gained from criminal cases, international cooperation, annual prosecutorial reports, and external analyses such as previous MERs and EU reports. For instance, 2020-2024 AML/CFT National Strategy, adopted as a high-level intersectoral policy, identifies the confiscation of criminal proceeds as a specific objective and its implementing Action Plan established some measures related to asset recovery (see R.4). Asset recovery is one of the axes of the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy. The General instruction n. 492/2022 of the JTOK emphasizes the importance to launch financial investigations in the framework of the investigations conducted. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 470. The conducted NRAs contain a section which analyses the asset recovery regime in Serbia and its effectiveness. Using the conclusions therein, Serbia has progressively strengthened its asset recovery system, focusing on both legal and institutional frameworks. 471. Nevertheless, asset recovery legal system (mainly, LoR) has not been reviewed since 2019 [83] , despite several deficiencies were identified under the 2021 and 2024 NRAs and the 2024-2028 Anti-Corruption Strategy: the procedure for asset forfeiture is not clearly defined [84] , the rules related to the enforcement of the resolutions confiscating assets should be improved and the standard operating procedures of the SPPO and the police for conducting financial operations should be also updated, etc. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 472. In addition to the APML, the Criminal Police Directorate (CPD) and JTOK are the main actors in asset recovery, since this is prioritized in practice mainly in relation to ML and organized crime. 473. The CPD is integrated, amongst other departments, by the SBPOK and the OBPK. The SBPOK is the competent police body to investigate organized crime and a great percentage of ML cases -including those related to corruption- and is integrated by (i) the PFIU responsible for trace, identify, detect and search proceeds of crime, acting also as the national asset recovery office; and (b) the Department for Suppression of Organized Financial Crime, with three different sections dealing with counterfeiting of currency and forgery, high corruption and ML. The OBPK is the competent police body to investigate corruption. Although the PFIU is organically established under the scope of the SBPOK, it is empowered to also assist other departments (see also IO7). 474. The SPPO is integrated by a number of sections, being the JTOK main responsible for proceeds-generating crimes. This Office is composed by the Group for Combating Corruption, the Group for Organized Crime and the Group for Combating terrorism. JTOK has also appointed two staff members as Service for financial forensics and one special prosecutor for financial investigation, seizure particularly oriented to extended confiscation cases. A lack of sufficient human resources was identified by the AT taking into account the number of cases and the (sometimes limited) scope of financial investigations 475. Different NRAs, as well as the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, concluded that human resources for ML and asset recovery were not fully satisfactory and needed to be strengthened. This situation was confirmed on-site, since the PFIU was staffed at approximately 80% of the projected level and the JTOK was composed by 19 prosecutors (and supporting staff), which is clearly insufficient based on the number and complexity of cases under their competence. 476. Additionally, several task forces have been established to deal with organized crime, money laundering and migrant smuggling that, in their fields, are also contributing to asset tracing and confiscation (see. IO7). 477. The previously identified multiplicity of national authorities with similar tasks was challenging in terms of coordination and the system would benefit from clearer rules for assignation of cases to the different bodies (the APML is sometimes used for investigative purposes such asset tracing). These challenges were also identified by the 2024-2028 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (“ despite efforts made, challenges in coordination still exist and need to be overcome in order to achieve expected results, especially in the area of the fight against corruption and forfeiture of proceeds of crime ”). Footnotes [83] The AT was informed on-site that the amendment of the LoR was under consideration in relation to a number of topics, such as the scope of the LoR (i.e., expand the catalogue of crimes to which it is applicable), time limit of temporary measures, improvement of measures on virtual assets, legal powers and capacities of the Directorate for Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets of the MoJ, implementation of some provisions of the Warsaw Convention, etc. [84] An amendment of the LoR to expand the catalogue of criminal offences covered by the law, extend the maximum duration of seizing orders from 3 to 6 months, amend and introduce non-conviction based confiscation and regulate the management of digital assets, among others, is in progress. According to the provided information, the European Commission has already reviewed the draft and is expected to be adopted by the end of 2025." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. The Republic of Serbia has a legal system in place enabling them to investigate, prosecute and convict TF activities. 9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 513. TF is identified as a medium risk in Serbia according to the 2024 NRA, which establishes that the main TF risk is posed by self-radicalised individuals (rated as high TF probability ), religious and other extremisms (rated as medium TF probability ), and TF risks linked to armed conflicts in Middle East and North Africa (rated ad medium TF probability ). The conclusion is based on the observation that several self-radicalized individuals, supporters of terrorist ideologies such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda were identified in Serbia and some terrorism-related cases did exist during the period under assessment, including a terrorist attack in June 2024. 514. TF related to FTF was considered of low probability of TF (49 Serbian citizens travelled to conflict areas to join different terrorist organizations were identified and at least 4 of them have returned to Serbia). According to the explanations provided by Serbia’s authorities to the AT, this rating is low due to the fact that these travels occurred prior to 2019, and does not affect the risk in more recent years. Despite this argument, the 2024 NRA indicated that 27 FTF would still be in conflict zones and explicitly states that returnees from the battlefield still represent a category of exceptional importance and this situation &quot;still represent a threat&quot; . 515. Exposure to TF threats from neighbouring countries was rated as medium TF probability , mainly based on the estimation that more than 1 100 people from the Western Balkans travelled to conflict areas and could return to the region. The 2024 NRA took into consideration that some designated persons’ assets were frozen in Serbia between 2021 and 2023 (i.e., five cases related to FTF). The 2024 NRA also highlights that, between 2021 to 2023, 17 incoming MLA requests [85] related to terrorism and other related criminal offenses were received, including requests for extradition (4 [86] ), transfer of persons, interrogation of suspects, secret monitoring and recording, secret surveillance of communications, etc. 14 outgoing such MLA requests were noted. 516. Given the risk situation concerning terrorism and TF, Serbia’s resources for identifying and combat TF are concentrated in specialised units within the Service for Combating Terrorism of the MoI (SCT), the Security and Information Agency (BIA) and the APML, while the criminal prosecution is the exclusive responsibility of the JTOK (Group for combating terrorism). The overall TF risk understanding of these authorities and the APML was generally adequate. 517. In this context, various sources may trigger the identification of TF-related activities, including the APML, intelligence and other information gathered by the BIA, the activity of the Police and information coming from international cooperation. At the operational level, an Operational Working Group (OWG) has been established and is integrated by the JTOK, the SCT and the BIA and has decided that APML reports related to TF should be mainly disseminated to the SCT. However, the APML is not a formal member of this WG and rarely participate, on a case by case basis, when the members of the OWG consider that their data can improve the efficiency of financial intelligence gathering (for instance, the OWG provided to the APML a list of FTF potentially related to Serbia which was to reporting entities and, consequently, suspicious financial activities of their relatives were reported to the APML and disseminated to the SCT). 518.  Although Serbian authorities claimed that APML participates when “required or relevant” under the criteria of the OWG members, the APML did not participate in decision by the OWG about the disseminating strategy, and is not regularly informed of some of the cases under investigation or checks conducted by the members of the OWG (only when a financial component is considered by the members of the OWG). There are differences in treatment of cases between authorities (for example, joint or unique cases for SCT and BIA are considered several cases by APML). This exclusion also implies that the APML cannot integrate the intelligence and other information of the OWG which could potentially impact the analysis and the dissemination decision-process. 519. In the period under review, the APML received a total of 128 SARs related to TF (22 in 2019; 18 in 2020; 24 in 2021; 34 in 2022; 30 in 2023) and disseminated to other LEAs -mainly the SCT- 119 of them (21 in 2019; 35 in 2020; 20 in 2021; 33 in 2022; 27 in 2023 and 42 in 2024). 520. From the perspective of the SCT and the BIA, in the framework of the TF cases, different stages of the identification and investigation process are followed: Checks : on the basis of the APML reports, their own information and foreign intelligence, the SCT and the BIA are regularly conducting checks (94 in 2019; 73 in 2020; 68 in 2021; 73 in 2022, and; 40 in 2023). In the framework of these checks basic information is gathered through simple and non-intrusive actions by the SCT/BIA, with the regular support of the APML for financial analysis. Although some of these checks are usually discussed by the OWG, depending on the evidence collected, sometimes the SCT/BIA directly decide to not take any further actions without informing the JTOK or formally reporting it to the JTOK for a pre-investigation under its supervision/control. It should be noted that checks are not part of any formal criminal procedure, but intelligence-led actions. · Pre-investigation : a very limited number of APML disseminations and checks are translated into pre-investigations directed by the JTOK, more precisely, 5 in 2019 (meaning a 5,3 % of the checks), 3 in 2020 (4,1 %), 1 in 2021 (1,4 %), 2 in 2022 (2,7 %), 3 in 2023 (7,5 %) and 7 in 2024. Financial investigations were conducted and some special investigative techniques were used, but the full range of available investigative measures is only applied to a limited extent due to the nature of this stage of the process. · Formal investigation : when the JTOK considers that sufficient evidence has been obtained, a formal investigation is launched, which only happened once during the assessed period (in 2019). 521. While checks are regularly conducted by LEAs on the basis of different sources of information, which include domestic and foreign intelligence and MLA, showing commitment to fight TF, they are not sufficiently translated into pre-investigations and formal investigations. In summary, between 2019 and 2024, 178 disseminations were sent by the APML to the SCT and the BIA; 375 checks were conducted by the BIA and the SCT (23 of them based on APML disseminations); 21 pre-investigations were launched and only 1 formal investigation was initiated. According to provided statistics, open-source information was not used to launch any check or investigation. 522. The limited number of pre-investigations and formal investigations resulted from a combination of factors, namely, the relatively high level of incriminating elements required by the members of OWG in TF cases to initiate a formal pre-investigation or investigation, which is particularly restricting given the nature of an investigative stage. 523. The overall picture of the checks, pre-investigations, investigations, prosecutions and convictions during the assessment period is partly in line with the country’s medium TF risk profile. The Serbian authorities over-rely on the output of simple and non-intrusive actions ( checks ) and, therefore, do not systematically use of a full range of investigative techniques oriented to identify and detect TF. 524. Furthermore, excluding the APML as a regular member of the OWG has impeded Serbian authorities to adopt a fully comprehensive strategic approach from an operational perspective to identify and investigate TF. This has generated, to some extent, situations of a certain lack of coordination or homogeneous approach between different authorities, as referred above. 525. Human resources of the BIA and the SCT dedicated to TF cases was not provided to the AT based on confidential restrictions and, thus, its adequacy and sufficiency as a cause of the referred lack of formal investigations cannot be assessed. Case Box 9.1. Pre-investigation related to TF without launching a formal investigation During 2022, a designated person (Person A), previously convicted of committing terrorism-related crimes (participation in ISIL activities in Syria as a FTF) and who served a prison sentence in 2021, attempted to make a money transfer of a relatively low amount from Serbia to another individual (Person B) in a third country that faces high TF risk. Person A attempted to make a transaction through a payment institution that provides foreign exchange remittance services without opening an account, The operator refused to execute the transaction. The next day, from the same location, another person managed to make a transaction sending funds to Person B in the third country, in a similar amount, which raised suspicions that this person had made the transaction on behalf of Person A and the obliged entity reported the situation as suspicious to the APML. The APML requested the third country’s FIU regarding Person B, and was responded that they had received funds via MVTS from other countries as well. The APML forwarded the analysis based on the reported suspicious activity report to PPOOC, the BIA and the SCT and, despite some actions, it was concluded that no sufficient evidence of the TF exists, without launching a formal investigation. Footnotes [85] One for TF – see IO2 [86] None of the above were granted because there was no evidence -based on Serbian own check- of reasonable suspicion that the said persons had committed any criminal act or because the Serbian Ministry of Justice provided a negative opinion given that the extradition would affect security in Serbia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="512. The Republic of Serbia has a legal system in place enabling them to investigate, prosecute and convict TF activities. 9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 513. TF is identified as a medium risk in Serbia according to the 2024 NRA, which establishes that the main TF risk is posed by self-radicalised individuals (rated as high TF probability ), religious and other extremisms (rated as medium TF probability ), and TF risks linked to armed conflicts in Middle East and North Africa (rated ad medium TF probability ). The conclusion is based on the observation that several self-radicalized individuals, supporters of terrorist ideologies such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda were identified in Serbia and some terrorism-related cases did exist during the period under assessment, including a terrorist attack in June 2024. 514. TF related to FTF was considered of low probability of TF (49 Serbian citizens travelled to conflict areas to join different terrorist organizations were identified and at least 4 of them have returned to Serbia). According to the explanations provided by Serbia’s authorities to the AT, this rating is low due to the fact that these travels occurred prior to 2019, and does not affect the risk in more recent years. Despite this argument, the 2024 NRA indicated that 27 FTF would still be in conflict zones and explicitly states that returnees from the battlefield still represent a category of exceptional importance and this situation &quot;still represent a threat&quot; . 515. Exposure to TF threats from neighbouring countries was rated as medium TF probability , mainly based on the estimation that more than 1 100 people from the Western Balkans travelled to conflict areas and could return to the region. The 2024 NRA took into consideration that some designated persons’ assets were frozen in Serbia between 2021 and 2023 (i.e., five cases related to FTF). The 2024 NRA also highlights that, between 2021 to 2023, 17 incoming MLA requests [85] related to terrorism and other related criminal offenses were received, including requests for extradition (4 [86] ), transfer of persons, interrogation of suspects, secret monitoring and recording, secret surveillance of communications, etc. 14 outgoing such MLA requests were noted. 516. Given the risk situation concerning terrorism and TF, Serbia’s resources for identifying and combat TF are concentrated in specialised units within the Service for Combating Terrorism of the MoI (SCT), the Security and Information Agency (BIA) and the APML, while the criminal prosecution is the exclusive responsibility of the JTOK (Group for combating terrorism). The overall TF risk understanding of these authorities and the APML was generally adequate. 517. In this context, various sources may trigger the identification of TF-related activities, including the APML, intelligence and other information gathered by the BIA, the activity of the Police and information coming from international cooperation. At the operational level, an Operational Working Group (OWG) has been established and is integrated by the JTOK, the SCT and the BIA and has decided that APML reports related to TF should be mainly disseminated to the SCT. However, the APML is not a formal member of this WG and rarely participate, on a case by case basis, when the members of the OWG consider that their data can improve the efficiency of financial intelligence gathering (for instance, the OWG provided to the APML a list of FTF potentially related to Serbia which was to reporting entities and, consequently, suspicious financial activities of their relatives were reported to the APML and disseminated to the SCT). 518.  Although Serbian authorities claimed that APML participates when “required or relevant” under the criteria of the OWG members, the APML did not participate in decision by the OWG about the disseminating strategy, and is not regularly informed of some of the cases under investigation or checks conducted by the members of the OWG (only when a financial component is considered by the members of the OWG). There are differences in treatment of cases between authorities (for example, joint or unique cases for SCT and BIA are considered several cases by APML). This exclusion also implies that the APML cannot integrate the intelligence and other information of the OWG which could potentially impact the analysis and the dissemination decision-process. 519. In the period under review, the APML received a total of 128 SARs related to TF (22 in 2019; 18 in 2020; 24 in 2021; 34 in 2022; 30 in 2023) and disseminated to other LEAs -mainly the SCT- 119 of them (21 in 2019; 35 in 2020; 20 in 2021; 33 in 2022; 27 in 2023 and 42 in 2024). 520. From the perspective of the SCT and the BIA, in the framework of the TF cases, different stages of the identification and investigation process are followed: Checks : on the basis of the APML reports, their own information and foreign intelligence, the SCT and the BIA are regularly conducting checks (94 in 2019; 73 in 2020; 68 in 2021; 73 in 2022, and; 40 in 2023). In the framework of these checks basic information is gathered through simple and non-intrusive actions by the SCT/BIA, with the regular support of the APML for financial analysis. Although some of these checks are usually discussed by the OWG, depending on the evidence collected, sometimes the SCT/BIA directly decide to not take any further actions without informing the JTOK or formally reporting it to the JTOK for a pre-investigation under its supervision/control. It should be noted that checks are not part of any formal criminal procedure, but intelligence-led actions. · Pre-investigation : a very limited number of APML disseminations and checks are translated into pre-investigations directed by the JTOK, more precisely, 5 in 2019 (meaning a 5,3 % of the checks), 3 in 2020 (4,1 %), 1 in 2021 (1,4 %), 2 in 2022 (2,7 %), 3 in 2023 (7,5 %) and 7 in 2024. Financial investigations were conducted and some special investigative techniques were used, but the full range of available investigative measures is only applied to a limited extent due to the nature of this stage of the process. · Formal investigation : when the JTOK considers that sufficient evidence has been obtained, a formal investigation is launched, which only happened once during the assessed period (in 2019). 521. While checks are regularly conducted by LEAs on the basis of different sources of information, which include domestic and foreign intelligence and MLA, showing commitment to fight TF, they are not sufficiently translated into pre-investigations and formal investigations. In summary, between 2019 and 2024, 178 disseminations were sent by the APML to the SCT and the BIA; 375 checks were conducted by the BIA and the SCT (23 of them based on APML disseminations); 21 pre-investigations were launched and only 1 formal investigation was initiated. According to provided statistics, open-source information was not used to launch any check or investigation. 522. The limited number of pre-investigations and formal investigations resulted from a combination of factors, namely, the relatively high level of incriminating elements required by the members of OWG in TF cases to initiate a formal pre-investigation or investigation, which is particularly restricting given the nature of an investigative stage. 523. The overall picture of the checks, pre-investigations, investigations, prosecutions and convictions during the assessment period is partly in line with the country’s medium TF risk profile. The Serbian authorities over-rely on the output of simple and non-intrusive actions ( checks ) and, therefore, do not systematically use of a full range of investigative techniques oriented to identify and detect TF. 524. Furthermore, excluding the APML as a regular member of the OWG has impeded Serbian authorities to adopt a fully comprehensive strategic approach from an operational perspective to identify and investigate TF. This has generated, to some extent, situations of a certain lack of coordination or homogeneous approach between different authorities, as referred above. 525. Human resources of the BIA and the SCT dedicated to TF cases was not provided to the AT based on confidential restrictions and, thus, its adequacy and sufficiency as a cause of the referred lack of formal investigations cannot be assessed. Case Box 9.1. Pre-investigation related to TF without launching a formal investigation During 2022, a designated person (Person A), previously convicted of committing terrorism-related crimes (participation in ISIL activities in Syria as a FTF) and who served a prison sentence in 2021, attempted to make a money transfer of a relatively low amount from Serbia to another individual (Person B) in a third country that faces high TF risk. Person A attempted to make a transaction through a payment institution that provides foreign exchange remittance services without opening an account, The operator refused to execute the transaction. The next day, from the same location, another person managed to make a transaction sending funds to Person B in the third country, in a similar amount, which raised suspicions that this person had made the transaction on behalf of Person A and the obliged entity reported the situation as suspicious to the APML. The APML requested the third country’s FIU regarding Person B, and was responded that they had received funds via MVTS from other countries as well. The APML forwarded the analysis based on the reported suspicious activity report to PPOOC, the BIA and the SCT and, despite some actions, it was concluded that no sufficient evidence of the TF exists, without launching a formal investigation. Footnotes [85] One for TF – see IO2 [86] None of the above were granted because there was no evidence -based on Serbian own check- of reasonable suspicion that the said persons had committed any criminal act or because the Serbian Ministry of Justice provided a negative opinion given that the extradition would affect security in Serbia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Designations by Serbia (1267 and 1373) 538. Under the LFA UN designations are automatically effective in Serbia and asset freezes have immediate effect. With reference to UNSCR 1267, no proposals for designation have been made to the UN. With reference to UNSCR 1373, Serbia designated seven individuals in 2018. Since then, the overall approach has not changed but no other proposals for designation have been made. Proposals for domestic designation can be made to the Ministry of Finance by the APML, the Organised Crime Department of the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Securities Information Agency. In practice, proposals are taken to the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group (see I.O.9) for consideration. While the Working Group does not have legal authority to make recommendations for designation, it provides a forum for discussion and coordination. Notwithstanding the ability of several authorities to propose a designation, the AT was advised that it is understood that the APML would do this and administer the process in practice, with the final decision resting with the Government. 539. The LFA outlines information necessary for a designation proposal, namely details on the person proposed to be designated and information on the reasons to believe the person is a terrorist or terrorist financier and involved in the activities of a terrorist group or the commission of a terrorist act. Examples include criminal records, financial intelligence from counter-terrorism databases, assessments from the security services, and supporting documentation on financial assets and security risks. In the context of the 2018 designations, the APML assembled the information package for consideration by the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group. Potential future designations would be dealt with in a similar manner. In the event of more complex cases (than the existing designations) the APML is confident that it has capability, through this process, to provide input to the Ministry of Finance so that the Ministry would make appropriate decisions and, if a designation is made, successfully respond to any appeal. 540.  The BIA and Prosecutor's Office maintain a database of persons of interest, including potential terrorists/terrorist financiers. While there has not been a formal review, the AT was advised that none of the individuals on this list would have met the designation threshold for formal consideration. There would be merit in in considering the establishment of a process of formal review of persons relevant to terrorism/TF on the list as to whether or not a potential designation might be appropriate. 541. The AT was provided with an example of a reviewed case from another source. The decision was taken not to proceed with a proposal for designation on the basis that it was more important to gat her intelligence. 542. Serbia has not received any proposals for designation from another jurisdiction. The approach for administering and considering domestic designations mentioned above would apply to requests for designation by foreign jurisdictions. Notifications of designations 543. Information on designations is received from the UN by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which notifies legally specified authorities (including the APML) without delay. The APML also receives notifications from the UN and notifies all authorities with CFT responsibilities without delay. New designations or changes in the lists are automatically published and immediately made accessible via a link on the APML website. For almost all of the period under review the APML has manually issued emails or SMS to REs without delay. 544. This commendable system was upgraded further immediately before the AT’s visit so as to automatically generate alerts by email and SMS to REs without human intervention. No changes/new designations arose before the onsite visit for the new system to demonstrate its effectiveness, but the development is positive. Most of the entities met onsite were aware of this system of notification and indicated that, upon their receipt, the notification would usually trigger a re-screening of their customer base against the new designations and/or changes on top of their established screening processes. 545. Although an outage leading to a system problem is seen as virtually impossible, transactions cannot be completed without prior sanctions compliance checks. To ensure continuity, the APML advised it would fall back on, e.g., telephone or in-person delivery of notification of new/changed designations if necessary. Even so, there would be merit in considering a formal process for detecting and dealing with outages. Available information 546. Authorities have published the following information for REs on TF TFS: the LFA, a form for reporting designated persons available on the APML website, text on UNSCRs, the designation process in Serbia, and guidelines issued by the APML in August 2024 for searching and identifying designated persons and preventing terrorism financing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Designations by Serbia (1267 and 1373) 538. Under the LFA UN designations are automatically effective in Serbia and asset freezes have immediate effect. With reference to UNSCR 1267, no proposals for designation have been made to the UN. With reference to UNSCR 1373, Serbia designated seven individuals in 2018. Since then, the overall approach has not changed but no other proposals for designation have been made. Proposals for domestic designation can be made to the Ministry of Finance by the APML, the Organised Crime Department of the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Securities Information Agency. In practice, proposals are taken to the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group (see I.O.9) for consideration. While the Working Group does not have legal authority to make recommendations for designation, it provides a forum for discussion and coordination. Notwithstanding the ability of several authorities to propose a designation, the AT was advised that it is understood that the APML would do this and administer the process in practice, with the final decision resting with the Government. 539. The LFA outlines information necessary for a designation proposal, namely details on the person proposed to be designated and information on the reasons to believe the person is a terrorist or terrorist financier and involved in the activities of a terrorist group or the commission of a terrorist act. Examples include criminal records, financial intelligence from counter-terrorism databases, assessments from the security services, and supporting documentation on financial assets and security risks. In the context of the 2018 designations, the APML assembled the information package for consideration by the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group. Potential future designations would be dealt with in a similar manner. In the event of more complex cases (than the existing designations) the APML is confident that it has capability, through this process, to provide input to the Ministry of Finance so that the Ministry would make appropriate decisions and, if a designation is made, successfully respond to any appeal. 540.  The BIA and Prosecutor's Office maintain a database of persons of interest, including potential terrorists/terrorist financiers. While there has not been a formal review, the AT was advised that none of the individuals on this list would have met the designation threshold for formal consideration. There would be merit in in considering the establishment of a process of formal review of persons relevant to terrorism/TF on the list as to whether or not a potential designation might be appropriate. 541. The AT was provided with an example of a reviewed case from another source. The decision was taken not to proceed with a proposal for designation on the basis that it was more important to gat her intelligence. 542. Serbia has not received any proposals for designation from another jurisdiction. The approach for administering and considering domestic designations mentioned above would apply to requests for designation by foreign jurisdictions. Notifications of designations 543. Information on designations is received from the UN by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which notifies legally specified authorities (including the APML) without delay. The APML also receives notifications from the UN and notifies all authorities with CFT responsibilities without delay. New designations or changes in the lists are automatically published and immediately made accessible via a link on the APML website. For almost all of the period under review the APML has manually issued emails or SMS to REs without delay. 544. This commendable system was upgraded further immediately before the AT’s visit so as to automatically generate alerts by email and SMS to REs without human intervention. No changes/new designations arose before the onsite visit for the new system to demonstrate its effectiveness, but the development is positive. Most of the entities met onsite were aware of this system of notification and indicated that, upon their receipt, the notification would usually trigger a re-screening of their customer base against the new designations and/or changes on top of their established screening processes. 545. Although an outage leading to a system problem is seen as virtually impossible, transactions cannot be completed without prior sanctions compliance checks. To ensure continuity, the APML advised it would fall back on, e.g., telephone or in-person delivery of notification of new/changed designations if necessary. Even so, there would be merit in considering a formal process for detecting and dealing with outages. Available information 546. Authorities have published the following information for REs on TF TFS: the LFA, a form for reporting designated persons available on the APML website, text on UNSCRs, the designation process in Serbia, and guidelines issued by the APML in August 2024 for searching and identifying designated persons and preventing terrorism financing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 589. The framework for coordination and cooperation has been consistently improved over the review period, demonstrating Serbia's ongoing desire to establish an effective CPF framework. A Strategy for Combating Proliferation for 2021-2025 and an Action Plan for 2023-2025 are in place while the new strategic plan for AML/CFT/CPF, covering the period from 2025 to 2029, also includes CPF elements. 590. PF related cooperation and coordination has been largely effective at the policy level, with a new working group representing an enhancement. At operational level, the Coordinator within the Prosecutor's Office facilitates engagement and solutions between authorities, particularly where sensitive information is involved. The National AML/CFT Coordination Commission 591. The National Coordination Body on AML/CFT is one of two parallel strategic coordination fora which engage with CPF. The committee, chaired by the Ministry of Finance, comprises representatives from numerous Ministries, other authorities, and independent institutions [90] . Reflecting its capacity as the main decision-making committee, PF discussions cover risk assessment, implementation of the PF Action Plan, technical assistance and training. The National Coordination Body’s NRA Working Group and a sub-group of it develops PF risk assessments. The sub-group addresses supervision and outreach (e.g. guidelines for banks and exporters, sector-specific training). From a CPF perspective only technical assistance and training is covered in the mandate of the National Coordination Body; the mandate should therefore be strengthened to more assertively include CPF. 592. The PF Action Plan implementation is monitored by the authorities against deliverables, with specific milestones and timelines. All PF matters to date have been completed by the deadline. Consideration should be given to establishing priority actions for PF in the next Action Plan. 593. A new operational expert team has been established to enhance coordination of CPF case work and PF cooperation between authorities by establishing more formal processes for communication and cooperation. This new group has met once (April 2025). The National Coordinating Body for Combatting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 594. The second main strategic coordination forum is the National Coordinating Body for Combatting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprises senior representatives from key ministries [91] , national security and oversight institutions [92] , and scientific bodies. [93] This body focuses on proliferation, with PF being a minor, subsidiary aspect of its discussions. It meets approximately every two months to monitor the implementation of the Strategy for the Prevention of the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; coordinate activities regarding prevention and combatting of proliferation; ensure effective implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the Strategy and Action Plan; and propose legislative measures. It also evaluates cross-agency outreach, prepares the Strategy and Action Plan for proliferation, prepares guidance on dual-use goods and tracks proliferation-related deliverables. The mandate, Strategy and Action Plan address PF in small proportion. PF discussion has included initial consideration of the possibility of establishment of a PF offence in the Criminal Code. 595. The APML plays an important role in the CPF chain; while promoting the indicators in the NRA (e.g., unusual one-off transactions, shell companies, complex ownership), APML also separately published indicators in 2018, the original list being updated in light of increased understanding of risk. The list is derived from typology reports published by the FATF and other bodies; and cooperation with foreign partners, adapted to Serbia’s risk and context. Case studies on potential indirect transit threats have been incorporated in the NRA report to help banks and other REs detect and report patterns [94] , which is a positive development. Albeit providing information to REs on why the authorities suspected PF would be beneficial in maximising the value of the case studies. Bi-lateral co-ordination and co-operation 596. The APML is the NBS’s primary coordination partner for CPF issues; the NBS also cooperates regularly with the MOT and LEAs. The NBS requests input from the APML before onsite inspections of banks and provides a summary of its onsite findings to the APML. The NBS also shares key outcomes with the other FI supervisors. Each year, the NBS convenes a supervisory roundtable with the APML and banks to review emerging challenges, including those for TFS. Inter-supervisory dialogue has also included tariff code calibration, the effectiveness of sanctions screening, EDD for high-risk sectors, reporting protocols between the NBS and the APML and Ministry of Trade, training of inspectors and knowledge sharing. The aim is to ensure that learnings from experience translates into tighter licensing, better transaction monitoring and faster inter-agency collaboration. 597. The MOT provides information on export licences to other authorities. There is scope to circulate further information (including to supervisors) relevant to PF, as envisaged by the new expert team. Footnotes [90] Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Information and Telecommunication, Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue; Supreme Court of Cassation, Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, Security Information Agency, National Bank of Serbia, Securities Commission, Customs Administration, Tax Administration, Office of the National Security Council and Classified Information Protection, Registers Agency, Games of Chance Administration, and the Central Securities Depository and Clearing House; Chamber of Public Notaries and the Bar Association of Serbia, including technical secretary from the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering [91] Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, Finance, Justice, Health, Environment, Agriculture, Trade, and Science [92] Security Information Agency, Office of the National Security Council, Public Prosecutor’s Office, and Business Registers Agency [93] Vinča Institute, Institute of Physics, University of Novi Sad, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Commission [94] one case study from Customs deriving from a shipment of goods and two arising from SARs on ML from banks with to the intention of illustrating potential PF risks" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 589. The framework for coordination and cooperation has been consistently improved over the review period, demonstrating Serbia's ongoing desire to establish an effective CPF framework. A Strategy for Combating Proliferation for 2021-2025 and an Action Plan for 2023-2025 are in place while the new strategic plan for AML/CFT/CPF, covering the period from 2025 to 2029, also includes CPF elements. 590. PF related cooperation and coordination has been largely effective at the policy level, with a new working group representing an enhancement. At operational level, the Coordinator within the Prosecutor's Office facilitates engagement and solutions between authorities, particularly where sensitive information is involved. The National AML/CFT Coordination Commission 591. The National Coordination Body on AML/CFT is one of two parallel strategic coordination fora which engage with CPF. The committee, chaired by the Ministry of Finance, comprises representatives from numerous Ministries, other authorities, and independent institutions [90] . Reflecting its capacity as the main decision-making committee, PF discussions cover risk assessment, implementation of the PF Action Plan, technical assistance and training. The National Coordination Body’s NRA Working Group and a sub-group of it develops PF risk assessments. The sub-group addresses supervision and outreach (e.g. guidelines for banks and exporters, sector-specific training). From a CPF perspective only technical assistance and training is covered in the mandate of the National Coordination Body; the mandate should therefore be strengthened to more assertively include CPF. 592. The PF Action Plan implementation is monitored by the authorities against deliverables, with specific milestones and timelines. All PF matters to date have been completed by the deadline. Consideration should be given to establishing priority actions for PF in the next Action Plan. 593. A new operational expert team has been established to enhance coordination of CPF case work and PF cooperation between authorities by establishing more formal processes for communication and cooperation. This new group has met once (April 2025). The National Coordinating Body for Combatting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 594. The second main strategic coordination forum is the National Coordinating Body for Combatting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprises senior representatives from key ministries [91] , national security and oversight institutions [92] , and scientific bodies. [93] This body focuses on proliferation, with PF being a minor, subsidiary aspect of its discussions. It meets approximately every two months to monitor the implementation of the Strategy for the Prevention of the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; coordinate activities regarding prevention and combatting of proliferation; ensure effective implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the Strategy and Action Plan; and propose legislative measures. It also evaluates cross-agency outreach, prepares the Strategy and Action Plan for proliferation, prepares guidance on dual-use goods and tracks proliferation-related deliverables. The mandate, Strategy and Action Plan address PF in small proportion. PF discussion has included initial consideration of the possibility of establishment of a PF offence in the Criminal Code. 595. The APML plays an important role in the CPF chain; while promoting the indicators in the NRA (e.g., unusual one-off transactions, shell companies, complex ownership), APML also separately published indicators in 2018, the original list being updated in light of increased understanding of risk. The list is derived from typology reports published by the FATF and other bodies; and cooperation with foreign partners, adapted to Serbia’s risk and context. Case studies on potential indirect transit threats have been incorporated in the NRA report to help banks and other REs detect and report patterns [94] , which is a positive development. Albeit providing information to REs on why the authorities suspected PF would be beneficial in maximising the value of the case studies. Bi-lateral co-ordination and co-operation 596. The APML is the NBS’s primary coordination partner for CPF issues; the NBS also cooperates regularly with the MOT and LEAs. The NBS requests input from the APML before onsite inspections of banks and provides a summary of its onsite findings to the APML. The NBS also shares key outcomes with the other FI supervisors. Each year, the NBS convenes a supervisory roundtable with the APML and banks to review emerging challenges, including those for TFS. Inter-supervisory dialogue has also included tariff code calibration, the effectiveness of sanctions screening, EDD for high-risk sectors, reporting protocols between the NBS and the APML and Ministry of Trade, training of inspectors and knowledge sharing. The aim is to ensure that learnings from experience translates into tighter licensing, better transaction monitoring and faster inter-agency collaboration. 597. The MOT provides information on export licences to other authorities. There is scope to circulate further information (including to supervisors) relevant to PF, as envisaged by the new expert team. Footnotes [90] Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Information and Telecommunication, Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue; Supreme Court of Cassation, Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, Security Information Agency, National Bank of Serbia, Securities Commission, Customs Administration, Tax Administration, Office of the National Security Council and Classified Information Protection, Registers Agency, Games of Chance Administration, and the Central Securities Depository and Clearing House; Chamber of Public Notaries and the Bar Association of Serbia, including technical secretary from the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering [91] Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, Finance, Justice, Health, Environment, Agriculture, Trade, and Science [92] Security Information Agency, Office of the National Security Council, Public Prosecutor’s Office, and Business Registers Agency [93] Vinča Institute, Institute of Physics, University of Novi Sad, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Commission [94] one case study from Customs deriving from a shipment of goods and two arising from SARs on ML from banks with to the intention of illustrating potential PF risks" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 88. Serbia has an established mechanism for developing national strategies and action plans to respond to ML/TF risks identified. Over the review period the Government of Serbia adopted a National AML/CFT Strategy 2020-2024 accompanied by two action plans for 2020-2022 and 2022-2024. The strategy and two actions plans were informed by the outcomes of the 2018 and 2021 NRAs. These were then followed up by a Strategic Operational Plan covering the years 2025 – 2029 and which was adopted by the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance following the conclusion of the 2024 NRA. The AML/CFT Strategies and action plans are developed by the NCB. It brings together officials from the key ministries and competent authorities. The NCB met once in 2023 and twice in 2024, and further meetings are held within the dedicated expert teams. These expert teams met at a minimum 23 times in person between 2022-2024 and held various other exchanges via email. The expert teams then report back on their outcomes to the NCB. 89. The NRA outcomes and the 2020-2024 action plans led to the introduction of legislative and operational changes, such as: various measures to curb the misuse of legal entities (i.e. the establishment of a special registry of legal persons and entrepreneurs holding VA accounts in 2021 and the introduction of an e-registration system for incorporation of legal entities (2023)), a limitation on the use of cash for real-estate purchases and introduction of a special payment code for all real estate transactions for better tracking (November 2024) to mitigate the misuse of cash and the real estate sector for ML purposes, , and the establishment of various prosecutor led task-forces focusing on crimes considered to pose the highest ML threat i.e. OCGs, corruption and related ML (2022-2024). 90. The latest strategic operational plan 2025-2029 (adopted in April 2025) includes a list of actions, grouped under 15 risk areas each of which being linked to one or more chapters of the 2024 NRA. With respect to fighting grand-level corruption and minimising political influence on the operational activities of competent authorities, there should be a consolidation of the risk analysis undertaken as part of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024–2028, and by the Internal Control Sector of the Ministry of Interior. Drawing from this consolidated and enhanced understanding of the impact of high-level corruption on the AML/CFT regime (see sec. 2.2.1), the Strategic AML/CFT Operational Plan should consider taking on-board and prioritising relevant measures set out under the Anti-Corruption Strategy (in particular objective 4.4.3) and by the Internal Control Sector (Ministry of Interior) aimed at reducing the impact of corruption and interference on the operations of LEAs. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 91. The same coordination mechanism applies to TF policy making. Likewise in the area of TF the Serbian authorities implemented reforms to address gaps identified. Some examples include: (i) the implementation of a national register of remittance beneficiaries in 2021 to mitigate TF risks associated with payment institutions (one of the sectors most exposed to TF risks in Serbia), (ii) guidelines for obliged entities to recognize, detect and prevent terrorist financing (2024), and (iii) list of indicators for identifying TF suspicious activities passed by the Customs Administration in December 2024. 92. The 2025 strategic operational plan has a dedicated risk area (i.e. risk area 14) dedicated to CTF measures and aimed at addressing the outcomes of the TF chapter under the 2024 NRA. This apart from various other measures that are both of AML as well as CTF relevance. 93. The strategic operational plan requires the relevant authorities to integrate the measures into their own institutional work plans, and to allocate the necessary resources for their implementation. The NCB and competent authorities are commended for the level of coordination achieved in policy making and the good quality plans and strategies devised. The AT believes that the effective implementation of these plans would further strengthen the Serbian AML/CFT regime in a meaningful way." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 88. Serbia has an established mechanism for developing national strategies and action plans to respond to ML/TF risks identified. Over the review period the Government of Serbia adopted a National AML/CFT Strategy 2020-2024 accompanied by two action plans for 2020-2022 and 2022-2024. The strategy and two actions plans were informed by the outcomes of the 2018 and 2021 NRAs. These were then followed up by a Strategic Operational Plan covering the years 2025 – 2029 and which was adopted by the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance following the conclusion of the 2024 NRA. The AML/CFT Strategies and action plans are developed by the NCB. It brings together officials from the key ministries and competent authorities. The NCB met once in 2023 and twice in 2024, and further meetings are held within the dedicated expert teams. These expert teams met at a minimum 23 times in person between 2022-2024 and held various other exchanges via email. The expert teams then report back on their outcomes to the NCB. 89. The NRA outcomes and the 2020-2024 action plans led to the introduction of legislative and operational changes, such as: various measures to curb the misuse of legal entities (i.e. the establishment of a special registry of legal persons and entrepreneurs holding VA accounts in 2021 and the introduction of an e-registration system for incorporation of legal entities (2023)), a limitation on the use of cash for real-estate purchases and introduction of a special payment code for all real estate transactions for better tracking (November 2024) to mitigate the misuse of cash and the real estate sector for ML purposes, , and the establishment of various prosecutor led task-forces focusing on crimes considered to pose the highest ML threat i.e. OCGs, corruption and related ML (2022-2024). 90. The latest strategic operational plan 2025-2029 (adopted in April 2025) includes a list of actions, grouped under 15 risk areas each of which being linked to one or more chapters of the 2024 NRA. With respect to fighting grand-level corruption and minimising political influence on the operational activities of competent authorities, there should be a consolidation of the risk analysis undertaken as part of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024–2028, and by the Internal Control Sector of the Ministry of Interior. Drawing from this consolidated and enhanced understanding of the impact of high-level corruption on the AML/CFT regime (see sec. 2.2.1), the Strategic AML/CFT Operational Plan should consider taking on-board and prioritising relevant measures set out under the Anti-Corruption Strategy (in particular objective 4.4.3) and by the Internal Control Sector (Ministry of Interior) aimed at reducing the impact of corruption and interference on the operations of LEAs. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 91. The same coordination mechanism applies to TF policy making. Likewise in the area of TF the Serbian authorities implemented reforms to address gaps identified. Some examples include: (i) the implementation of a national register of remittance beneficiaries in 2021 to mitigate TF risks associated with payment institutions (one of the sectors most exposed to TF risks in Serbia), (ii) guidelines for obliged entities to recognize, detect and prevent terrorist financing (2024), and (iii) list of indicators for identifying TF suspicious activities passed by the Customs Administration in December 2024. 92. The 2025 strategic operational plan has a dedicated risk area (i.e. risk area 14) dedicated to CTF measures and aimed at addressing the outcomes of the TF chapter under the 2024 NRA. This apart from various other measures that are both of AML as well as CTF relevance. 93. The strategic operational plan requires the relevant authorities to integrate the measures into their own institutional work plans, and to allocate the necessary resources for their implementation. The NCB and competent authorities are commended for the level of coordination achieved in policy making and the good quality plans and strategies devised. The AT believes that the effective implementation of these plans would further strengthen the Serbian AML/CFT regime in a meaningful way." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 135. There are similar powers in place for requesting mutual legal assistance. Letters rogatory are issued by the MoJ upon applications by the national authorities. The overall number of MLA outgoing requests is relatively stable. Table 2.7 - Outgoing MLA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Sent 10 1 146 14 0 120 17 0 147 24 0 183 15 5 126 18 2 119 Pending* 2 1 2 0 0 4 3 0 14 4 0 8 7 0 40 10 1 40 Refused* 1 0 22 2 0 10 1 0 21 5 0 15 1 0 6 2 0 9 Executed* 0 1 121 12 0 103 13 0 112 18 0 118 14 5 80 8 1 70 Av.exec. time (days) 595 595 595 219 219 203 203 212 212 133 133 133 Ref. rate 10% 0.0% 15% 14.2% 0.0% 8.3% 5.8% 0.0% 14.2% 20.8% 0.0% 8.2% 6.6% 0.0% 4.7% * carried from last year 136. The statistics strictly related to ML/TF show a considerable increase in volume. Eighty MLA request were sent for ML (5 requests in the previous evaluated period) and 6 for TF (no requests sent in the previous evaluated period). The average execution time and refusal rates are comparable to the incoming MLA. 137. The authorities actively seek MLA and although some high threat predicate offences (e. g. corruption) are still not adequately represented, the underlying criminality is mostly in line with the risk and profile of the country, (outgoing requests mainly consisting of drug trafficking and also including tax crimes-given the modus operandi identified by the NRA regarding tax crimes in which proceeds are laundered abroad ML and participation in an OCG). Average overall time for execution by other countries of Serbia’s outgoing requests for ML is less than 5 months. Table 2.8: Outgoing requests by the underlying criminality (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total 66 44 291 10 42 39 149 7 91 28 74 841 Case Box 2.3. Seeking international cooperation - OCG dismantled through a JIT Following effective international police cooperation, the Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime and the country’s Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust established a Joint Investigation Team with counterparts from Spain to target an OCG involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. Investigations revealed that the OCG produced large quantities of marijuana in Spain and sold it across EU countries. Criminal proceeds were reinvested into production and laundered through real estate purchases. Five Serbian nationals were convicted by domestic authorities and sentenced to 3.6–5 years in prison. Over €500 000 in cash and assets was confiscated. Table 2.9 - Use of outgoing requests for domestic investigations and prosecutions Year MLA Investigation Prosecution 2019 1 (fraud) ongoing case 2020 2 ML, 4 smuggling cases initiated 2021 1 ML, 1 smuggling, 1 tax fraud cases initiated 1 (OCG) case initiated 1 (THB) case initiated 2022 6 ML 1 fraud 2 smuggling 1 tax fraud cases initiated 3 (ML) cases initiated 2023 5 ML 2 counterfeiting currency, 4 smuggling,1 forgery cases initiated 6 (ML) cases initiated 2 (OCG) cases initiated 2 (counterfeiting currency) cases initiated 1 (forgery) case initiated Total 31 (14 ML) cases initiated 17 (9 ML) cases initiated 138. Regarding the use of outgoing requests, the AT noted that in some instances, information obtained through these requests has revealed new links or evidence which have been used to initiate domestic cases. The authorities initiated a total of 31 cases (14 for ML) and 17 prosecutions (9 for ML). Compared to the last evaluation period, the country demonstrates significant improvements as well as a proactive use of international cooperation channels. 139. The country’s judicial authorities highlight the key role of Eurojust in facilitating both incoming and outgoing MLA, particularly in tackling serious organised and cross-border crime. Since March 2020, a Liaison Prosecutor has been seconded to Eurojust’s headquarters in The Hague, which enhanced cooperation with both EU and non-EU member states represented there. Between 2019 and 2023, 397 requests were handled via Eurojust, including 67 related to money laundering. During the reporting period, the country participated in 79 Eurojust coordination meetings (19 initiated by Serbia) and took part in 7 coordination centre operations within which simultaneous actions were implemented in several countries. 2.2.2. Joint Investigation Teams 140. From 2019 to 2024, the competent authorities of the Republic of Serbia participated as members in 12 Joint Investigation Teams (JITs). One of these JITs also dealt money laundering. 141. Ten of these Joint Investigation Teams focused on organized criminal groups with one related to ML. In addition to these JITs two more were established on the criminal offense of fraud. As a result of the work of nine JITs, criminal proceedings were initiated in Serbia. In the case of the other three JITs, criminal proceedings were initiated in other JIT member states. All JITs dealing with organized crime offenses received support from Eurojust. The traditional partners in JIT s are Spain, Germany, Romania, Finland, Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovak Republic, and the neighbouring countries. These initiatives typically follow criminal trends identified as risks in the National Risk Assessment (NRA). 2.2.3. Extradition 142. Serbian authorities seek extradition in all case where identity and location of the subject person is established (Serbian nationals and foreign citizens). From a total of 412 extradition outgoing requests in the evaluated period, 12 are subject to ML offence and 1 to TF (no extradition requests for ML/TF in the previous assessed period). Extradition requests are generally executed in a timely manner. Turning to underlying criminality, most frequently the outgoing extradition requests are sent for drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, and in fewer cases for tax crimes and participation in an OCG. The crime profile of the requests is largely in line with the country’s main threats as identified in the NRA, and focus on serious offences posing significant cross-border threats. Table 2.10 - Outgoing extradition requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Sent 0 0 98 1 0 107 0 0 70 5 0 59 6 0 66 4 0 108 Pending* 0 0 20 1 0 10 0 0 13 0 0 17 6 0 36 3 0 69 Refused* 0 0 17 1 0 10 0 0 17 0 0 6 0 0 7 1 0 5 Executed* 0 1 [37] 62 1 0 77 1 0 42 5 0 36 2 0 32 1 0 138 Av. exec. time (days) Ref. rate 0% 0% 17.3% 50% 0 % 9.3% 0% 0% 24.2% 0% 0% 10.1% 0% 0% ML * carried from last year. Case Box 2.4. Outgoing extradition request for criminal proceedings were conducted against the founders of an NPO involved in terrorism financing related to Syria. The case involved donations, property sales, provision of services and non-financial assets, misuse of NPOs, and abuse of social benefits. Seven individuals were convicted for terrorism-related offences, five of whom were also convicted for terrorism financing. One defendant was on the run until halfway through the main trial when he was extradited to Serbia through international cooperation with Turkey where he was convicted in his presence The effect of this case is disrupting a terrorist group that recruited around 20 people and enabled them to join the ISIS terrorist organization in Syria. Raising awareness among AML/CFT obliged entities, supervisory authorities and the NPO sector about the risks of their misuse for terrorist financing. Table 2.11: Outgoing extraditions requests broken down by predicate offences (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total 13 63 149 1 4 87 83 4 8 10 86 508 143. With regard to the offences for which extradition was sought, the same conclusions drawn for MLA requests apply, as they concern similar types of crimes—primarily drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, etc. mostly in line with the risk and profile of the country, Average overall time for execution by other countries of Serbia’s outgoing requests for ML is less than 5 months. 2.2.4. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 144. In extended asset confiscation proceedings abroad, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime submitted eight requests for international legal assistance to four jurisdictions, including two EU member states. These requests sought the freezing of assets belonging to four defendants and seven third parties, and were all granted, resulting in the restraint of property valued at approximately EUR 4.88 million. The frozen assets included residential and commercial properties, land, and business premises. In one case, assets valued at around EUR 2.53 million were frozen, while in others, assets worth EUR 1.28 million, EUR 682,000, EUR 250,000, and EUR 180,000 were restrained following mutual legal assistance requests. Following several foreign freezing orders, domestic courts also approved temporary seizure measures, later confirmed on appeal, covering additional assets valued at EUR 230,000.These results, obtained in the latter part of the assessed period by the JTOK, illustrate a good approach on asset recovery, which should be implemented by the authorities on all competent prosecutor’s offices. Footnotes [37] Although the outgoing request was executed earlier, the court decision sentencing the defendant was rendered in 2019" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 135. There are similar powers in place for requesting mutual legal assistance. Letters rogatory are issued by the MoJ upon applications by the national authorities. The overall number of MLA outgoing requests is relatively stable. Table 2.7 - Outgoing MLA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Sent 10 1 146 14 0 120 17 0 147 24 0 183 15 5 126 18 2 119 Pending* 2 1 2 0 0 4 3 0 14 4 0 8 7 0 40 10 1 40 Refused* 1 0 22 2 0 10 1 0 21 5 0 15 1 0 6 2 0 9 Executed* 0 1 121 12 0 103 13 0 112 18 0 118 14 5 80 8 1 70 Av.exec. time (days) 595 595 595 219 219 203 203 212 212 133 133 133 Ref. rate 10% 0.0% 15% 14.2% 0.0% 8.3% 5.8% 0.0% 14.2% 20.8% 0.0% 8.2% 6.6% 0.0% 4.7% * carried from last year 136. The statistics strictly related to ML/TF show a considerable increase in volume. Eighty MLA request were sent for ML (5 requests in the previous evaluated period) and 6 for TF (no requests sent in the previous evaluated period). The average execution time and refusal rates are comparable to the incoming MLA. 137. The authorities actively seek MLA and although some high threat predicate offences (e. g. corruption) are still not adequately represented, the underlying criminality is mostly in line with the risk and profile of the country, (outgoing requests mainly consisting of drug trafficking and also including tax crimes-given the modus operandi identified by the NRA regarding tax crimes in which proceeds are laundered abroad ML and participation in an OCG). Average overall time for execution by other countries of Serbia’s outgoing requests for ML is less than 5 months. Table 2.8: Outgoing requests by the underlying criminality (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total 66 44 291 10 42 39 149 7 91 28 74 841 Case Box 2.3. Seeking international cooperation - OCG dismantled through a JIT Following effective international police cooperation, the Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime and the country’s Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust established a Joint Investigation Team with counterparts from Spain to target an OCG involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. Investigations revealed that the OCG produced large quantities of marijuana in Spain and sold it across EU countries. Criminal proceeds were reinvested into production and laundered through real estate purchases. Five Serbian nationals were convicted by domestic authorities and sentenced to 3.6–5 years in prison. Over €500 000 in cash and assets was confiscated. Table 2.9 - Use of outgoing requests for domestic investigations and prosecutions Year MLA Investigation Prosecution 2019 1 (fraud) ongoing case 2020 2 ML, 4 smuggling cases initiated 2021 1 ML, 1 smuggling, 1 tax fraud cases initiated 1 (OCG) case initiated 1 (THB) case initiated 2022 6 ML 1 fraud 2 smuggling 1 tax fraud cases initiated 3 (ML) cases initiated 2023 5 ML 2 counterfeiting currency, 4 smuggling,1 forgery cases initiated 6 (ML) cases initiated 2 (OCG) cases initiated 2 (counterfeiting currency) cases initiated 1 (forgery) case initiated Total 31 (14 ML) cases initiated 17 (9 ML) cases initiated 138. Regarding the use of outgoing requests, the AT noted that in some instances, information obtained through these requests has revealed new links or evidence which have been used to initiate domestic cases. The authorities initiated a total of 31 cases (14 for ML) and 17 prosecutions (9 for ML). Compared to the last evaluation period, the country demonstrates significant improvements as well as a proactive use of international cooperation channels. 139. The country’s judicial authorities highlight the key role of Eurojust in facilitating both incoming and outgoing MLA, particularly in tackling serious organised and cross-border crime. Since March 2020, a Liaison Prosecutor has been seconded to Eurojust’s headquarters in The Hague, which enhanced cooperation with both EU and non-EU member states represented there. Between 2019 and 2023, 397 requests were handled via Eurojust, including 67 related to money laundering. During the reporting period, the country participated in 79 Eurojust coordination meetings (19 initiated by Serbia) and took part in 7 coordination centre operations within which simultaneous actions were implemented in several countries. 2.2.2. Joint Investigation Teams 140. From 2019 to 2024, the competent authorities of the Republic of Serbia participated as members in 12 Joint Investigation Teams (JITs). One of these JITs also dealt money laundering. 141. Ten of these Joint Investigation Teams focused on organized criminal groups with one related to ML. In addition to these JITs two more were established on the criminal offense of fraud. As a result of the work of nine JITs, criminal proceedings were initiated in Serbia. In the case of the other three JITs, criminal proceedings were initiated in other JIT member states. All JITs dealing with organized crime offenses received support from Eurojust. The traditional partners in JIT s are Spain, Germany, Romania, Finland, Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovak Republic, and the neighbouring countries. These initiatives typically follow criminal trends identified as risks in the National Risk Assessment (NRA). 2.2.3. Extradition 142. Serbian authorities seek extradition in all case where identity and location of the subject person is established (Serbian nationals and foreign citizens). From a total of 412 extradition outgoing requests in the evaluated period, 12 are subject to ML offence and 1 to TF (no extradition requests for ML/TF in the previous assessed period). Extradition requests are generally executed in a timely manner. Turning to underlying criminality, most frequently the outgoing extradition requests are sent for drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, and in fewer cases for tax crimes and participation in an OCG. The crime profile of the requests is largely in line with the country’s main threats as identified in the NRA, and focus on serious offences posing significant cross-border threats. Table 2.10 - Outgoing extradition requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences ML TF Predicate offences Sent 0 0 98 1 0 107 0 0 70 5 0 59 6 0 66 4 0 108 Pending* 0 0 20 1 0 10 0 0 13 0 0 17 6 0 36 3 0 69 Refused* 0 0 17 1 0 10 0 0 17 0 0 6 0 0 7 1 0 5 Executed* 0 1 [37] 62 1 0 77 1 0 42 5 0 36 2 0 32 1 0 138 Av. exec. time (days) Ref. rate 0% 0% 17.3% 50% 0 % 9.3% 0% 0% 24.2% 0% 0% 10.1% 0% 0% ML * carried from last year. Case Box 2.4. Outgoing extradition request for criminal proceedings were conducted against the founders of an NPO involved in terrorism financing related to Syria. The case involved donations, property sales, provision of services and non-financial assets, misuse of NPOs, and abuse of social benefits. Seven individuals were convicted for terrorism-related offences, five of whom were also convicted for terrorism financing. One defendant was on the run until halfway through the main trial when he was extradited to Serbia through international cooperation with Turkey where he was convicted in his presence The effect of this case is disrupting a terrorist group that recruited around 20 people and enabled them to join the ISIS terrorist organization in Syria. Raising awareness among AML/CFT obliged entities, supervisory authorities and the NPO sector about the risks of their misuse for terrorist financing. Table 2.11: Outgoing extraditions requests broken down by predicate offences (2019-2024) OCG and racketeering Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling Illicit trafficking in drugs Corruption and bribery Fraud Murder, grievous bodily injury Robbery or theft Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes): Forgery Other Total 13 63 149 1 4 87 83 4 8 10 86 508 143. With regard to the offences for which extradition was sought, the same conclusions drawn for MLA requests apply, as they concern similar types of crimes—primarily drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling, etc. mostly in line with the risk and profile of the country, Average overall time for execution by other countries of Serbia’s outgoing requests for ML is less than 5 months. 2.2.4. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 144. In extended asset confiscation proceedings abroad, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime submitted eight requests for international legal assistance to four jurisdictions, including two EU member states. These requests sought the freezing of assets belonging to four defendants and seven third parties, and were all granted, resulting in the restraint of property valued at approximately EUR 4.88 million. The frozen assets included residential and commercial properties, land, and business premises. In one case, assets valued at around EUR 2.53 million were frozen, while in others, assets worth EUR 1.28 million, EUR 682,000, EUR 250,000, and EUR 180,000 were restrained following mutual legal assistance requests. Following several foreign freezing orders, domestic courts also approved temporary seizure measures, later confirmed on appeal, covering additional assets valued at EUR 230,000.These results, obtained in the latter part of the assessed period by the JTOK, illustrate a good approach on asset recovery, which should be implemented by the authorities on all competent prosecutor’s offices. Footnotes [37] Although the outgoing request was executed earlier, the court decision sentencing the defendant was rendered in 2019" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 179. All supervisory authorities are able to articulate sectoral ML/TF risks, with the NBS demonstrating a particularly advanced understanding of such risks, especially within the banking sector, consistent with the level of materiality and risk exposure attributed to it. The SC and the APML possess a fairly well-developed and continuously evolving understanding of ML/TF risks, aligned with the materiality and risk exposure of the sectors under their respective mandates. 180. The 2024 NRA shows a reduction in ML/TF risk for the banking sector from high to medium-high due to stronger controls, while the risk for currency exchange offices has increased due to higher cash volumes and frequent changes in authorised currency offices. To address this, the NBS has been providing AML/CFT guidance at licensing and monitors exchange transactions in real time. For payment and e-money institutions, the risk increased to medium, driven by more business transactions, higher-risk agents, and links to crypto investments, though oversight has improved through new VASP licensing and reporting requirements. VASPs remain medium-high risk, despite the reduced size of the sector. 181. Regarding the institutional risks, the NBS and the SC have developed specific methodologies for conducting institutional risk assessment taking into account varying risk criteria, which are reflecting the distinct risk characteristics of sectors. Multiple quantitative and qualitative factors are considered, including the size and complexity of business operations, client structure (e.g., share of high-risk or non-resident clients), volume and nature of transactions (including cash, cross-border, and digital asset transactions), governance arrangements, internal controls, and the use of third parties. 182. The supervisory ML/TF risk understanding is informed by the sources of data described therein cover, which include but are not limited to, REs’ internal procedures, findings derived from supervisory engagement, transactions related to digital assets and the nature thereof, information from other national authorities (including the APML, the competent prosecutor’s offices and courts), information from specific questionnaires, and the NRA. The resulting risk scores inform the annual inspection planning, off-site monitoring, and broader supervisory resource allocation. 183. Regarding the NBS, its risk understanding is also derived from the information mandatorily submitted by MVTSs and EMIs, including on whether they enable payment transactions related to digital assets, the number and value of transactions related to digital assets and the nature thereof. In 2024, a special payment code was defined for payments associated with digital assets, the effects of which has yet to materialize further in facilitating institutions’ data collection and maintenance of these transactions. 184. The APML has good elements in place aimed at measuring the ML/TF institutional risks associated with the factoring companies, commensurate with the reduced materiality and risk of the sector. Table 3.1. Institutional risk categorization matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2024) Entity Risk rating Total number of entities Low Medium- low Medium- high High Banks 1 12 6 1 20 Financial leasing 4 11 1 0 16 MVTS 2 2 4 1 9 EMI 2 2 3 0 7 Factoring companies 3 18 0 0 21 Securities firms 4 low and 10 very low 0 0 0 14 Life insurance companies 8 2 0 0 10 Life insurance intermediaries 46 0 0 0 46 Exchange offices 936 1171 medium 159 2 266 VPFMC 4 0 0 4 VASPs 0 2 0 2 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 185. All supervisory authorities have taken some measures aimed at raising awareness and promoting the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations among reporting entities. Overall, the AT noted that outreach and awareness-raising efforts are conducted by the NBS and underway for the SC and the APML. 186. The NBS has provided general training, on a yearly basis, that mainly focused on internal controls, ML/TF risk prevention and sectorial risks. While the training was attended by representatives from all banks, with regards to other sectors, it is worth noting that only in 2024 the NBS started delivering training to MVTS, EMI and VASPs. Since 2021, the NBS holds a yearly presentation, together with representatives of the Serbian Banking Association, on the analysis of the responses to off-site questionnaires by banks. In relation to exchange offices, given their very large number, the NBS provides outreach by publishing significant information on its website and by forwarding information through the software for performing currency exchange operations. Training led by the NBS and SC (including regional events and publications under the Working Paper Series) have focused, albeit to a lesser extent, on the ML/TF threats associated with crypto-assets, customer profiling, and transaction monitoring. 187. Overall, the outreach efforts led by the NBS are commendable; however, the AT notes that a more targeted and tailored outreach by the NBS would be beneficial, based on inherent risk exposure and control vulnerabilities identified through off-site and on-site engagement, and notably by including representatives from sectors under its supervision other than banks (e.g. MVTS, EMI, VASPs). Moreover, outreach should also include the beneficial ownership identification and integrity of the bank employees [44] . 188. As regards the SC, from the data provided, and as identified in the 2024 NRA, outreach efforts are to be enhanced, notably in relation to AML/CFT reporting obligations. Regarding AML/CFT reporting obligations, the AT notes a limited frequency of APML’s (FIU) feedback to REs on SARs. Currently, feedback is mainly provided once a year during sector-wide meetings, with occasional case-by-case input. Footnotes [44] Also acknowledged in the NRA, page 184 and confirmed through discussions with the Serbian authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 179. All supervisory authorities are able to articulate sectoral ML/TF risks, with the NBS demonstrating a particularly advanced understanding of such risks, especially within the banking sector, consistent with the level of materiality and risk exposure attributed to it. The SC and the APML possess a fairly well-developed and continuously evolving understanding of ML/TF risks, aligned with the materiality and risk exposure of the sectors under their respective mandates. 180. The 2024 NRA shows a reduction in ML/TF risk for the banking sector from high to medium-high due to stronger controls, while the risk for currency exchange offices has increased due to higher cash volumes and frequent changes in authorised currency offices. To address this, the NBS has been providing AML/CFT guidance at licensing and monitors exchange transactions in real time. For payment and e-money institutions, the risk increased to medium, driven by more business transactions, higher-risk agents, and links to crypto investments, though oversight has improved through new VASP licensing and reporting requirements. VASPs remain medium-high risk, despite the reduced size of the sector. 181. Regarding the institutional risks, the NBS and the SC have developed specific methodologies for conducting institutional risk assessment taking into account varying risk criteria, which are reflecting the distinct risk characteristics of sectors. Multiple quantitative and qualitative factors are considered, including the size and complexity of business operations, client structure (e.g., share of high-risk or non-resident clients), volume and nature of transactions (including cash, cross-border, and digital asset transactions), governance arrangements, internal controls, and the use of third parties. 182. The supervisory ML/TF risk understanding is informed by the sources of data described therein cover, which include but are not limited to, REs’ internal procedures, findings derived from supervisory engagement, transactions related to digital assets and the nature thereof, information from other national authorities (including the APML, the competent prosecutor’s offices and courts), information from specific questionnaires, and the NRA. The resulting risk scores inform the annual inspection planning, off-site monitoring, and broader supervisory resource allocation. 183. Regarding the NBS, its risk understanding is also derived from the information mandatorily submitted by MVTSs and EMIs, including on whether they enable payment transactions related to digital assets, the number and value of transactions related to digital assets and the nature thereof. In 2024, a special payment code was defined for payments associated with digital assets, the effects of which has yet to materialize further in facilitating institutions’ data collection and maintenance of these transactions. 184. The APML has good elements in place aimed at measuring the ML/TF institutional risks associated with the factoring companies, commensurate with the reduced materiality and risk of the sector. Table 3.1. Institutional risk categorization matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2024) Entity Risk rating Total number of entities Low Medium- low Medium- high High Banks 1 12 6 1 20 Financial leasing 4 11 1 0 16 MVTS 2 2 4 1 9 EMI 2 2 3 0 7 Factoring companies 3 18 0 0 21 Securities firms 4 low and 10 very low 0 0 0 14 Life insurance companies 8 2 0 0 10 Life insurance intermediaries 46 0 0 0 46 Exchange offices 936 1171 medium 159 2 266 VPFMC 4 0 0 4 VASPs 0 2 0 2 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 185. All supervisory authorities have taken some measures aimed at raising awareness and promoting the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations among reporting entities. Overall, the AT noted that outreach and awareness-raising efforts are conducted by the NBS and underway for the SC and the APML. 186. The NBS has provided general training, on a yearly basis, that mainly focused on internal controls, ML/TF risk prevention and sectorial risks. While the training was attended by representatives from all banks, with regards to other sectors, it is worth noting that only in 2024 the NBS started delivering training to MVTS, EMI and VASPs. Since 2021, the NBS holds a yearly presentation, together with representatives of the Serbian Banking Association, on the analysis of the responses to off-site questionnaires by banks. In relation to exchange offices, given their very large number, the NBS provides outreach by publishing significant information on its website and by forwarding information through the software for performing currency exchange operations. Training led by the NBS and SC (including regional events and publications under the Working Paper Series) have focused, albeit to a lesser extent, on the ML/TF threats associated with crypto-assets, customer profiling, and transaction monitoring. 187. Overall, the outreach efforts led by the NBS are commendable; however, the AT notes that a more targeted and tailored outreach by the NBS would be beneficial, based on inherent risk exposure and control vulnerabilities identified through off-site and on-site engagement, and notably by including representatives from sectors under its supervision other than banks (e.g. MVTS, EMI, VASPs). Moreover, outreach should also include the beneficial ownership identification and integrity of the bank employees [44] . 188. As regards the SC, from the data provided, and as identified in the 2024 NRA, outreach efforts are to be enhanced, notably in relation to AML/CFT reporting obligations. Regarding AML/CFT reporting obligations, the AT notes a limited frequency of APML’s (FIU) feedback to REs on SARs. Currently, feedback is mainly provided once a year during sector-wide meetings, with occasional case-by-case input. Footnotes [44] Also acknowledged in the NRA, page 184 and confirmed through discussions with the Serbian authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 238. All DNFBP supervisors have taken part in the preparation of the most recent NRA. Both national and sectoral assessments show how risks have changed over time. All supervisors, except for the Bar Association, collect yearly information to identify individual ML/TF risks, via questionnaires. The AT noted that some lawyers provided risk-data as part of the NRA process, however the submission rates were low. For other DNFBP sectors, the response rates are high, varying between 85% (real estate intermediaries) to 92% (accountants) to 100% (casinos, notaries). 239. The Bar Association has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate current and maintained institutional ML/TF risk understanding associated with entities under its supervision; this gap is pondered more heavily given the importance attributed to this sector. For notaries and on-line casinos, considered also as heavily important sectors, sectoral and institutional risk ML/TF understanding by the Notary Chamber and the GCA is adequate and the most developed. The Market Inspection and the APML demonstrated a reasonably good understanding of sectoral and individual ML/TF and their evolution over time. 240. Bearing in mind that notaries became REs in April 2018, the sectoral overall ML/TF risk increased from medium in 2021 to medium-high in 2024. This increase is mainly justified by the growing materiality of the real estate sector and its associated high ML/TF risk, and the extensive involvement of notaries in property deals. The Notary Chamber has developed and annually updates the sectorial and individual risk understanding of the notarial sector, which is used to inform supervisory activities. The Chamber applies a risk matrix, which is regularly updated and informed by annual questionnaires and calibrated to reflect sectoral risks, for example by taking into account relevant and recent risk-data (e.g. volume of property deals and also the outcomes of specific risk assessments, see IO.1 for more details). 241. The GCA has developed its risk understanding through participation in the NRA and the integration of multiple data sources, most notably through the use of its IKS system, which enables real-time monitoring of all casino transactions. For land-based casinos, the residual ML risk identified in the 2024 NRA has remained medium-high while for on-line casinos, it decreased from high to medium-high (mainly due to their comparing to other sectors, such as lawyers and accountants and enhanced oversight framework). The GCA explained that the medium-high risk rating is significantly impacted by the fact that most on-line casinos are associated with land-based outlets (thus operating as a “mixed arrangement”), which allows for the use of cash to top up on-line gaming accounts. This is an important factor, considering that 78% of online casinos reported receiving cash deposits, with cash payments accounting for 33% of all total deposits. For non-mixed on-line operators, this risk is only partially mitigated, given that pre-paid cards may be used as a substitute for cash. 242. The AT positively notes that the GCA risk assessment matrix has been amended regularly since 2022 with new risk factors, including the overall scope of financial activity and number of transactions, the share of foreign capital, the types of games and mixed arrangement profile, and the percentage of cash transactions. These adjustments reflect efforts to tailor the framework to sectoral vulnerabilities. The GCA considers that the risk matrix is appropriately calibrated, although it remains unclear how in the 2024 NRA the ML risks associated with online casinos have decreased from high to medium-high, notwithstanding the numbers of high-risk rated entities drastically increased. The AT therefore considers that while the GCA’s institutional risk framework and understanding are well developed, the overall sectoral residual risk rating seems to be significantly impacted by the comparison to other DNFBPs (such as lawyers and accountants). 243. The GCA’s well developed risk understanding is mostly informed through the aforementioned electronic system (“IKS”) that was implemented in July 2021. This enabled the access, analysis and monitoring of transaction data in all casinos as well as direct exchange between the GCA and the REs. Since 2023, the IKS has been upgraded in order to enable real-time monitoring of transactions, analysis of player data and the possibility for the GCA to identify discrepancies in the monthly revenue declarations submitted by each RE. The latter also can serve as a trigger to the change in risk rating or as a source for supervisory planning and ad-hoc inspections. 244. The Market Inspection has participated in the NRA process and updates its SRA annually, using information collected through questionnaires and the government-run E-Inspector platform. For real estate intermediaries, the same risk rating increase as for notaries has been observed in the latest 2024 NRA, although as previously explained they are involved to a much lesser extent in property transactions than notaries. While the overall ML/TF risk rating for real estate increased in the 2024 NRA, the number of intermediaries classified as medium- or high-risk decreased since 2023. This could be owed to the fact that the risk matrix utilised by the Market Inspection, which analyses and weights the individual and sectorial risk understanding, has not been properly calibrated over time to factor in the latest risk factors. As a result, while the existence of a risk-based framework is positively noted, further evidence would be useful to demonstrate that the understanding of risks has evolved in line with the sector’s materiality and vulnerabilities. 245. Regarding accountants, there has a noticeable increase of the size of the sector over the referenced period, amounting to a level of high ML/TF risk in the 2024. However, at an entity level, 65% have been assessed as medium, 27% as low and only 8% of entities as high-risk. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 246. Overall, DNFBP supervisors have promoted to varying levels the understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks and AML/CFT requirements, including to higher risk DNFBPs. 247. While the Bar Chamber appears to have circulated general information [48] on AML/CFT obligations, there is no evidence of structured outreach or targeted engagement to raise awareness of ML/TF risks. This gap is pondered more heavily in view of the importance allocated to this sector. The other DNFBP supervisors have taken extensive steps to ensure that the results of national and sectoral risk assessments are widely known, including among higher risk DNFBPs. The Notarial Chamber conducts yearly training for notaries, which has included AML/CFT elements from 2022 onwards, with a focus on STR obligations and best practices, attended, on average, by almost the entirety of the sector. The Chamber also issues guidelines and develops and regularly updates a list of indicators to detect suspicious behaviour, which is disseminated to all notaries. These efforts have contributed to increased awareness and a positive trend in compliance. While notaries are the top reporting DNFBP sector in terms of numbers and value of transactions reported, the AT agrees with the 2024 NRA findings, according to which sustained efforts targeted to further enhancing the quality of SARs would be beneficial. 248. The GCA developed Guidelines for ML/TF risk assessment in cooperation with the REs, as well as a List of Indicators for on-line casinos and land-based casinos (available on the GCA and APML website) which have been disseminated to all entities. Moreover, training sessions and workshops are also organised mainly covering ML/TF typologies and indicators; as well as “ advisory visits ” that the GCA conducts in order to support the REs in the implementation of their obligation s(a total of 3 being conducted over the referenced period). Overall, casinos attended, between 2021 and 2023, a significant number of trainings (112 internal and 50 external trainings). 249. Regarding accountants, the APML and the Chamber of Auditors circulate guidance and organise regular training, and the APML Supervision Department sends instructions to all newly licensed accountants (1,786 over the last three years). For real estate intermediaries, the Market Inspection issues guidelines and a list of indicators, complemented by training and workshops held with APML support. These measures demonstrate a structured effort to raise awareness. However, the AT notes that effectiveness remains uneven: in both sectors, supervisory findings continue to reveal recurring shortcomings in BRAs and preventive measures, suggesting that outreach and guidance have not yet fully translated into stronger compliance in practice. These measures demonstrate a structured effort to raise awareness. However, the AT notes that effectiveness remains uneven: in both sectors, supervisory findings continue to reveal recurring shortcomings in BRAs and preventive measures, suggesting that outreach and guidance have not yet fully translated into stronger compliance in practice. Footnotes [48] 2024 NRA, page 256." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 238. All DNFBP supervisors have taken part in the preparation of the most recent NRA. Both national and sectoral assessments show how risks have changed over time. All supervisors, except for the Bar Association, collect yearly information to identify individual ML/TF risks, via questionnaires. The AT noted that some lawyers provided risk-data as part of the NRA process, however the submission rates were low. For other DNFBP sectors, the response rates are high, varying between 85% (real estate intermediaries) to 92% (accountants) to 100% (casinos, notaries). 239. The Bar Association has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate current and maintained institutional ML/TF risk understanding associated with entities under its supervision; this gap is pondered more heavily given the importance attributed to this sector. For notaries and on-line casinos, considered also as heavily important sectors, sectoral and institutional risk ML/TF understanding by the Notary Chamber and the GCA is adequate and the most developed. The Market Inspection and the APML demonstrated a reasonably good understanding of sectoral and individual ML/TF and their evolution over time. 240. Bearing in mind that notaries became REs in April 2018, the sectoral overall ML/TF risk increased from medium in 2021 to medium-high in 2024. This increase is mainly justified by the growing materiality of the real estate sector and its associated high ML/TF risk, and the extensive involvement of notaries in property deals. The Notary Chamber has developed and annually updates the sectorial and individual risk understanding of the notarial sector, which is used to inform supervisory activities. The Chamber applies a risk matrix, which is regularly updated and informed by annual questionnaires and calibrated to reflect sectoral risks, for example by taking into account relevant and recent risk-data (e.g. volume of property deals and also the outcomes of specific risk assessments, see IO.1 for more details). 241. The GCA has developed its risk understanding through participation in the NRA and the integration of multiple data sources, most notably through the use of its IKS system, which enables real-time monitoring of all casino transactions. For land-based casinos, the residual ML risk identified in the 2024 NRA has remained medium-high while for on-line casinos, it decreased from high to medium-high (mainly due to their comparing to other sectors, such as lawyers and accountants and enhanced oversight framework). The GCA explained that the medium-high risk rating is significantly impacted by the fact that most on-line casinos are associated with land-based outlets (thus operating as a “mixed arrangement”), which allows for the use of cash to top up on-line gaming accounts. This is an important factor, considering that 78% of online casinos reported receiving cash deposits, with cash payments accounting for 33% of all total deposits. For non-mixed on-line operators, this risk is only partially mitigated, given that pre-paid cards may be used as a substitute for cash. 242. The AT positively notes that the GCA risk assessment matrix has been amended regularly since 2022 with new risk factors, including the overall scope of financial activity and number of transactions, the share of foreign capital, the types of games and mixed arrangement profile, and the percentage of cash transactions. These adjustments reflect efforts to tailor the framework to sectoral vulnerabilities. The GCA considers that the risk matrix is appropriately calibrated, although it remains unclear how in the 2024 NRA the ML risks associated with online casinos have decreased from high to medium-high, notwithstanding the numbers of high-risk rated entities drastically increased. The AT therefore considers that while the GCA’s institutional risk framework and understanding are well developed, the overall sectoral residual risk rating seems to be significantly impacted by the comparison to other DNFBPs (such as lawyers and accountants). 243. The GCA’s well developed risk understanding is mostly informed through the aforementioned electronic system (“IKS”) that was implemented in July 2021. This enabled the access, analysis and monitoring of transaction data in all casinos as well as direct exchange between the GCA and the REs. Since 2023, the IKS has been upgraded in order to enable real-time monitoring of transactions, analysis of player data and the possibility for the GCA to identify discrepancies in the monthly revenue declarations submitted by each RE. The latter also can serve as a trigger to the change in risk rating or as a source for supervisory planning and ad-hoc inspections. 244. The Market Inspection has participated in the NRA process and updates its SRA annually, using information collected through questionnaires and the government-run E-Inspector platform. For real estate intermediaries, the same risk rating increase as for notaries has been observed in the latest 2024 NRA, although as previously explained they are involved to a much lesser extent in property transactions than notaries. While the overall ML/TF risk rating for real estate increased in the 2024 NRA, the number of intermediaries classified as medium- or high-risk decreased since 2023. This could be owed to the fact that the risk matrix utilised by the Market Inspection, which analyses and weights the individual and sectorial risk understanding, has not been properly calibrated over time to factor in the latest risk factors. As a result, while the existence of a risk-based framework is positively noted, further evidence would be useful to demonstrate that the understanding of risks has evolved in line with the sector’s materiality and vulnerabilities. 245. Regarding accountants, there has a noticeable increase of the size of the sector over the referenced period, amounting to a level of high ML/TF risk in the 2024. However, at an entity level, 65% have been assessed as medium, 27% as low and only 8% of entities as high-risk. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 246. Overall, DNFBP supervisors have promoted to varying levels the understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks and AML/CFT requirements, including to higher risk DNFBPs. 247. While the Bar Chamber appears to have circulated general information [48] on AML/CFT obligations, there is no evidence of structured outreach or targeted engagement to raise awareness of ML/TF risks. This gap is pondered more heavily in view of the importance allocated to this sector. The other DNFBP supervisors have taken extensive steps to ensure that the results of national and sectoral risk assessments are widely known, including among higher risk DNFBPs. The Notarial Chamber conducts yearly training for notaries, which has included AML/CFT elements from 2022 onwards, with a focus on STR obligations and best practices, attended, on average, by almost the entirety of the sector. The Chamber also issues guidelines and develops and regularly updates a list of indicators to detect suspicious behaviour, which is disseminated to all notaries. These efforts have contributed to increased awareness and a positive trend in compliance. While notaries are the top reporting DNFBP sector in terms of numbers and value of transactions reported, the AT agrees with the 2024 NRA findings, according to which sustained efforts targeted to further enhancing the quality of SARs would be beneficial. 248. The GCA developed Guidelines for ML/TF risk assessment in cooperation with the REs, as well as a List of Indicators for on-line casinos and land-based casinos (available on the GCA and APML website) which have been disseminated to all entities. Moreover, training sessions and workshops are also organised mainly covering ML/TF typologies and indicators; as well as “ advisory visits ” that the GCA conducts in order to support the REs in the implementation of their obligation s(a total of 3 being conducted over the referenced period). Overall, casinos attended, between 2021 and 2023, a significant number of trainings (112 internal and 50 external trainings). 249. Regarding accountants, the APML and the Chamber of Auditors circulate guidance and organise regular training, and the APML Supervision Department sends instructions to all newly licensed accountants (1,786 over the last three years). For real estate intermediaries, the Market Inspection issues guidelines and a list of indicators, complemented by training and workshops held with APML support. These measures demonstrate a structured effort to raise awareness. However, the AT notes that effectiveness remains uneven: in both sectors, supervisory findings continue to reveal recurring shortcomings in BRAs and preventive measures, suggesting that outreach and guidance have not yet fully translated into stronger compliance in practice. These measures demonstrate a structured effort to raise awareness. However, the AT notes that effectiveness remains uneven: in both sectors, supervisory findings continue to reveal recurring shortcomings in BRAs and preventive measures, suggesting that outreach and guidance have not yet fully translated into stronger compliance in practice. Footnotes [48] 2024 NRA, page 256." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="The SBRA Registration Procedure 316. Companies are incorporated electronically via the SBRA website. Applications for the allocation of a TIN (tax number), VAT and Social Insurance Registration are also received and processed concurrently with the entity registration which must occur within five days. Applicants and founders need an E-ID and may use a qualified certificate to electronically sign the registration documents (such as M&amp;A). Paper documents may still be scanned and uploaded but require third party certification (i.e. notary, lawyer or bank). 317. E-IDs are obtained, via the Government’s E-ID Portal, by resident and non-residents, and involve identity verification checks. A qualified electronic certificate is issued by a government entrusted Certification Body. It requires the signature of an agreement in person at which point the authority representative verifies the identity of the applicant. The use of these tools thus ensures the accuracy and adequacy of the applicant’s and other founders’ details. The identity of directors is also verified in this manner since directors required E-IDs to submit tax documentation and other company documentation throughout the lifetime of the entity. The identity of foreign resident founders, who do not possess a qualified electronic certificate, is verified by notaries certifying their signatures on the M&amp;A/statutory document, or lawyers presenting the applications on their behalf. 318. BO information must be separately registered with the SBRA within 15 days following the legal person’s registration or following any changes. Personal details of BOs are cross-checked against the Central Population Register (which covers Serbian residents). Thus, for those companies that have legal shareholders (i.e. no individual founders subject to the above-mentioned checks), and whose ultimate BOs are foreign residents, no BO identity verification checks are undertaken. This however impacts a fraction of the 12.6% companies that are multi-layered. 319. Several checks are performed at application stage. The AT considers these to be valuable and effective in preventing the misuse of legal persons (including as phantom companies) and ensuring that registered data is adequate and to a certain extent accurate. These involve checking: (i) that the applicant is a founder or a representative, (ii) that all necessary data and documents are provided, (iii) that the application data corresponds to that in the application documents, (iv) the personal details of involved residents (members/shareholders/BOs/directors/administrators) against the Central Population Register, (v) that prospective director/s, responsible person or founders are not subject to financial sanctions, (vi) that the prospective founder/s are not prohibited from owning shares or establishing new entities, (vii) that the legal representative or founder/s are not prohibited from undertaking economic activities or acting as company directors due to criminal convictions, (viii) that the founder (legal entity or entrepreneur) has not had its TIN revoked and (ix) that the registered address is not fictitious and is listed and verified by the Geodetic Authority. 320.  The SBRA does not undertake any risk-based checks to detect cases of incorrect founder/BO data (e.g. possible cases of frontman and BO concealment). This notwithstanding the valuable tools and data that the SBRA possesses [51] . This gap is deemed to be a moderate one considering the effective risk-based checks undertaken by the Tax Police and Banks’ CDD (see analysis below). Measures by the Tax Administration/Tax Police 321. The Tax Police play a very important role in preventing and mitigating the misuse of legal persons for tax evasion purposes, and ancillary criminal offences and ML. The TA is responsible for the allocation of TINs and the conduct of tax audits while the Tax Police, within the TA, is responsible for the detection of tax crimes. 322. Legal persons are allocated TINs concurrently with their registration and subject to the incorporation checks performed by the SBRA. Post incorporation and within 30 days the TA checks whether founders are involved in other companies which had their TINs suspended, and in such cases proceeds to also suspend the TIN of the newly incorporated companies. 323. TINs may also be suspended [52] in view of other reasons including non-compliance with tax law obligations (e.g. failure to submit tax documents due, companies who are unresponsive to the TA) and where potential tax evasion suspects are identified and subject to sporadic controls by the Tax Police. Between 2020-2024 71,528 TINs were suspended. In certain cases (e.g. repeat offenders or serious cases) the TA may, as a precautionary measure, temporarily prohibit the founders of the company from acquiring shares in companies and/or become owners of new business entities. Over the review period 396 individuals (founders) were temporarily prohibited from acquiring shares, with a significant increase in 2023 and 2024 (see Table 5.1), owed to more effective focus on preventing and mitigating the use of legal persons. Table 5.1 TIN Suspension of Companies and ancillary measures 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TIN Suspensions - Companies 14,156 13,344 13,884 15,112 15,032 Prohibition of founders from acquiring shares 63 70 51 95 117 324. TIN suspensions and share ownership prohibitions are effective measures. They are published in the Records of Temporary Restrictions by the SBRA, communicated instantly to the NBS (through the linking of registers) and a notification to this effect is published in the Unified Account Register. Banks are bound to block the use of company accounts where TINs are suspended. 325. More prominent to prevent and mitigate the misuse of legal persons are the actions undertaken by the Tax Police to detect legal persons (including phantoms and launderer companies) which are potentially used to evade taxes, or to carry out other criminal acts and ML. These are identified through the exploitation of various accessible data (e.g. database of e-invoices, database of financial statements) and through the use of IT tools filtering this data on the basis of set risk criteria (e.g. reported high-turnover, low payment of public revenues, newly formed companies raising large cash turnover, legal persons registered in same addresses). Risky companies are also detected based on intelligence shared by the APML and the Ministry of Interior (Police). 326. The Tax Police conduct sporadic controls on potential phantom and launderer companies (involving investigations, searches, evidence gathering and suspect interrogations amongst others). The Tax Police also explained the investigations they conduct to uncover ultimate owners and controllers of companies (e.g. interviewing involved parties, tracing people signing company documentation, bank account signatories and individuals withdrawing funds from company accounts and also tracking communication with founders/directors). Between 2020-2024, 726 phantom and/or launderer companies were identified. 494 resulted from the ongoing operational risk analysis undertaken by the Tax Police. These are reported to the Public Prosecutor. 327. The TA is commended for these measures which are effective in preventing and detecting the use of phantom companies and launderer companies and blocking them from moving funds and hence be misused for ML purposes. Transparency of Basic and BO information 328. The SBRA maintains numerous electronic registers including business entities and BO registers. This ensures uniformity of registration and also transparency and accessibility to basic and BO information. See section 5.3 for an analysis of the utility of these registers. Obligation to have a Serbian Bank Account 329. Legal persons must have an account at a Serbian Bank. This measure is very effective and ensures that Serbian legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. This requirement existed for several years; however, it was only in 2025 that Serbia stepped up measures to enforce this obligation. This by introducing forced liquidation for entities that remain without a bank account for more than 6 months and entrusting the NBS with monitoring that all companies hold a bank account. The NBS had at the time of the on-site mission already started identifying companies without a bank account (900 companies in May 2025) by reconciliating data held in the SBRA and data held in the Unified Account Register. These companies were known to the TA, and have had their TINs suspended, and will eventually be struck off the register. 330. The small percentage of companies identified without a Serbian bank account (i.e. 0.7%) indicates that this obligation was being complied with. This thus gives much more weight and relevance to the preventive measures and BO checks performed by Banks on companies. Involvement of other REs in servicing legal persons 331. Apart from banks, the involvement of other REs is limited, with lawyers being the most relevant (6.43% of all new company formations in 2023). As set out under IO4 the application of AML/CFT obligations by lawyers is not satisfactory, and in case of application of BO obligations the on-site meetings suggested that this is restricted to checking data in the CRBO. AML/CFT supervision for lawyers is also not considered effective and lacks a proper process to identify lawyers involved in company incorporations. The 2024 NRA likewise raises concerns with lawyers’ awareness and application of AML/CFT obligations and with their facilitating ML for OCG members. Investigation and Prosecution of Legal Persons for ML/TF 332. LEAs are well aware of the risks associated with legal persons and possess the capacity and willingness to investigate ML perpetrated via legal persons. Over the review period there were 353 ML convictions, which featured [53] the misuse of 130 legal persons, while 339 legal persons featured in ML prosecutions (mainly LLCs). In 2023-2024 there was a significant increase in ML prosecutions featuring legal persons. This indicates the more recent importance given to ML cases involving legal persons. In comparison very few legal persons are prosecuted for ML. The Prosecutors explained that they see no value in pursuing ML against legal persons with minimum or no assets. The AT still retains that, considering Serbia’s heightened ML risks linked to legal persons, the number of ML prosecutions of legal persons remains modest and is an area for improvement (see IO7). 333. The AT also notes that the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of sanctions imposed for ML offences, both for legal persons and involved persons are on the lower end (see IO7). Of a more deterrent effect are the court-imposed suspensions from undertaking economic activities or acting as company directors. These restrictions have been actively imposed over the review period (on a total of 305 individuals, 30 of which following ML convictions) for an average duration of 2 years. Table 5.2 ML Prosecutions involving legal persons 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Legal Persons Prosecuted 2 0 2 2 1 Legal Persons involved in ML Prosecutions 19 22 25 81 192 Footnotes [51] As from October 2025, applicants registering BO data must also submit to the SBRA the documents based on which the BO is determined (apart from BO information) [52] A TIN suspension and share ownership prohibition may be lifted only when the taxpayer provides proof that he eliminated all deficiencies, settlements are made and any penalties paid. In the case of phantom companies, the TIN suspension would be indefinite (since there would be no tax law matters to be rectified), and the company is eventually struck off the register. [53] I.e. Charges were not brought against legal persons; however, the ML case featured the misuse of legal persons." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="The SBRA Registration Procedure 316. Companies are incorporated electronically via the SBRA website. Applications for the allocation of a TIN (tax number), VAT and Social Insurance Registration are also received and processed concurrently with the entity registration which must occur within five days. Applicants and founders need an E-ID and may use a qualified certificate to electronically sign the registration documents (such as M&amp;A). Paper documents may still be scanned and uploaded but require third party certification (i.e. notary, lawyer or bank). 317. E-IDs are obtained, via the Government’s E-ID Portal, by resident and non-residents, and involve identity verification checks. A qualified electronic certificate is issued by a government entrusted Certification Body. It requires the signature of an agreement in person at which point the authority representative verifies the identity of the applicant. The use of these tools thus ensures the accuracy and adequacy of the applicant’s and other founders’ details. The identity of directors is also verified in this manner since directors required E-IDs to submit tax documentation and other company documentation throughout the lifetime of the entity. The identity of foreign resident founders, who do not possess a qualified electronic certificate, is verified by notaries certifying their signatures on the M&amp;A/statutory document, or lawyers presenting the applications on their behalf. 318. BO information must be separately registered with the SBRA within 15 days following the legal person’s registration or following any changes. Personal details of BOs are cross-checked against the Central Population Register (which covers Serbian residents). Thus, for those companies that have legal shareholders (i.e. no individual founders subject to the above-mentioned checks), and whose ultimate BOs are foreign residents, no BO identity verification checks are undertaken. This however impacts a fraction of the 12.6% companies that are multi-layered. 319. Several checks are performed at application stage. The AT considers these to be valuable and effective in preventing the misuse of legal persons (including as phantom companies) and ensuring that registered data is adequate and to a certain extent accurate. These involve checking: (i) that the applicant is a founder or a representative, (ii) that all necessary data and documents are provided, (iii) that the application data corresponds to that in the application documents, (iv) the personal details of involved residents (members/shareholders/BOs/directors/administrators) against the Central Population Register, (v) that prospective director/s, responsible person or founders are not subject to financial sanctions, (vi) that the prospective founder/s are not prohibited from owning shares or establishing new entities, (vii) that the legal representative or founder/s are not prohibited from undertaking economic activities or acting as company directors due to criminal convictions, (viii) that the founder (legal entity or entrepreneur) has not had its TIN revoked and (ix) that the registered address is not fictitious and is listed and verified by the Geodetic Authority. 320.  The SBRA does not undertake any risk-based checks to detect cases of incorrect founder/BO data (e.g. possible cases of frontman and BO concealment). This notwithstanding the valuable tools and data that the SBRA possesses [51] . This gap is deemed to be a moderate one considering the effective risk-based checks undertaken by the Tax Police and Banks’ CDD (see analysis below). Measures by the Tax Administration/Tax Police 321. The Tax Police play a very important role in preventing and mitigating the misuse of legal persons for tax evasion purposes, and ancillary criminal offences and ML. The TA is responsible for the allocation of TINs and the conduct of tax audits while the Tax Police, within the TA, is responsible for the detection of tax crimes. 322. Legal persons are allocated TINs concurrently with their registration and subject to the incorporation checks performed by the SBRA. Post incorporation and within 30 days the TA checks whether founders are involved in other companies which had their TINs suspended, and in such cases proceeds to also suspend the TIN of the newly incorporated companies. 323. TINs may also be suspended [52] in view of other reasons including non-compliance with tax law obligations (e.g. failure to submit tax documents due, companies who are unresponsive to the TA) and where potential tax evasion suspects are identified and subject to sporadic controls by the Tax Police. Between 2020-2024 71,528 TINs were suspended. In certain cases (e.g. repeat offenders or serious cases) the TA may, as a precautionary measure, temporarily prohibit the founders of the company from acquiring shares in companies and/or become owners of new business entities. Over the review period 396 individuals (founders) were temporarily prohibited from acquiring shares, with a significant increase in 2023 and 2024 (see Table 5.1), owed to more effective focus on preventing and mitigating the use of legal persons. Table 5.1 TIN Suspension of Companies and ancillary measures 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TIN Suspensions - Companies 14,156 13,344 13,884 15,112 15,032 Prohibition of founders from acquiring shares 63 70 51 95 117 324. TIN suspensions and share ownership prohibitions are effective measures. They are published in the Records of Temporary Restrictions by the SBRA, communicated instantly to the NBS (through the linking of registers) and a notification to this effect is published in the Unified Account Register. Banks are bound to block the use of company accounts where TINs are suspended. 325. More prominent to prevent and mitigate the misuse of legal persons are the actions undertaken by the Tax Police to detect legal persons (including phantoms and launderer companies) which are potentially used to evade taxes, or to carry out other criminal acts and ML. These are identified through the exploitation of various accessible data (e.g. database of e-invoices, database of financial statements) and through the use of IT tools filtering this data on the basis of set risk criteria (e.g. reported high-turnover, low payment of public revenues, newly formed companies raising large cash turnover, legal persons registered in same addresses). Risky companies are also detected based on intelligence shared by the APML and the Ministry of Interior (Police). 326. The Tax Police conduct sporadic controls on potential phantom and launderer companies (involving investigations, searches, evidence gathering and suspect interrogations amongst others). The Tax Police also explained the investigations they conduct to uncover ultimate owners and controllers of companies (e.g. interviewing involved parties, tracing people signing company documentation, bank account signatories and individuals withdrawing funds from company accounts and also tracking communication with founders/directors). Between 2020-2024, 726 phantom and/or launderer companies were identified. 494 resulted from the ongoing operational risk analysis undertaken by the Tax Police. These are reported to the Public Prosecutor. 327. The TA is commended for these measures which are effective in preventing and detecting the use of phantom companies and launderer companies and blocking them from moving funds and hence be misused for ML purposes. Transparency of Basic and BO information 328. The SBRA maintains numerous electronic registers including business entities and BO registers. This ensures uniformity of registration and also transparency and accessibility to basic and BO information. See section 5.3 for an analysis of the utility of these registers. Obligation to have a Serbian Bank Account 329. Legal persons must have an account at a Serbian Bank. This measure is very effective and ensures that Serbian legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. This requirement existed for several years; however, it was only in 2025 that Serbia stepped up measures to enforce this obligation. This by introducing forced liquidation for entities that remain without a bank account for more than 6 months and entrusting the NBS with monitoring that all companies hold a bank account. The NBS had at the time of the on-site mission already started identifying companies without a bank account (900 companies in May 2025) by reconciliating data held in the SBRA and data held in the Unified Account Register. These companies were known to the TA, and have had their TINs suspended, and will eventually be struck off the register. 330. The small percentage of companies identified without a Serbian bank account (i.e. 0.7%) indicates that this obligation was being complied with. This thus gives much more weight and relevance to the preventive measures and BO checks performed by Banks on companies. Involvement of other REs in servicing legal persons 331. Apart from banks, the involvement of other REs is limited, with lawyers being the most relevant (6.43% of all new company formations in 2023). As set out under IO4 the application of AML/CFT obligations by lawyers is not satisfactory, and in case of application of BO obligations the on-site meetings suggested that this is restricted to checking data in the CRBO. AML/CFT supervision for lawyers is also not considered effective and lacks a proper process to identify lawyers involved in company incorporations. The 2024 NRA likewise raises concerns with lawyers’ awareness and application of AML/CFT obligations and with their facilitating ML for OCG members. Investigation and Prosecution of Legal Persons for ML/TF 332. LEAs are well aware of the risks associated with legal persons and possess the capacity and willingness to investigate ML perpetrated via legal persons. Over the review period there were 353 ML convictions, which featured [53] the misuse of 130 legal persons, while 339 legal persons featured in ML prosecutions (mainly LLCs). In 2023-2024 there was a significant increase in ML prosecutions featuring legal persons. This indicates the more recent importance given to ML cases involving legal persons. In comparison very few legal persons are prosecuted for ML. The Prosecutors explained that they see no value in pursuing ML against legal persons with minimum or no assets. The AT still retains that, considering Serbia’s heightened ML risks linked to legal persons, the number of ML prosecutions of legal persons remains modest and is an area for improvement (see IO7). 333. The AT also notes that the effectiveness and dissuasiveness of sanctions imposed for ML offences, both for legal persons and involved persons are on the lower end (see IO7). Of a more deterrent effect are the court-imposed suspensions from undertaking economic activities or acting as company directors. These restrictions have been actively imposed over the review period (on a total of 305 individuals, 30 of which following ML convictions) for an average duration of 2 years. Table 5.2 ML Prosecutions involving legal persons 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Legal Persons Prosecuted 2 0 2 2 1 Legal Persons involved in ML Prosecutions 19 22 25 81 192 Footnotes [51] As from October 2025, applicants registering BO data must also submit to the SBRA the documents based on which the BO is determined (apart from BO information) [52] A TIN suspension and share ownership prohibition may be lifted only when the taxpayer provides proof that he eliminated all deficiencies, settlements are made and any penalties paid. In the case of phantom companies, the TIN suspension would be indefinite (since there would be no tax law matters to be rectified), and the company is eventually struck off the register. [53] I.e. Charges were not brought against legal persons; however, the ML case featured the misuse of legal persons." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 389. Since 2023 a risk Matrix integrated into the IT system is used to automatically score and prioritize SARs before submitting them to the Pre-analytical Group. The scores are numerical, with values ranging from 1 to 100, [57] assigning the SARs in low, medium and high priority ranks. The Matrix contains a good number of relevant risk criteria and constitutes a valuable tool for the APML in the SARs selection. Nevertheless, the AT notes the absence of: i) risk level for certain countries and ii) provisions on instances when the Matrix criteria shall be up-dated. 390. The pre-analyst receives the SARs in order of priority and adjusts manually the prioritisation level based on preliminary findings, before submitting it to the Analytical Department. In the pre-analysis phase only the priority level is seen by the analysts, not the underling scores. The elements considered in the “adjustment” process are not formalised and are based on analysts’ own experience, depending on the additional information acquired. The pre-analytical phase is limited to basic checks on databases the FIU has direct access to and public sources, and only the “high priority” SARs (after the adjustment) are sent to the Analytical Unit. The others get an “on-hold” status. From the statistics provided it results that more than a half of the SARs are dropped at the pre-analysis stage (see Table 6.3) and go in “ on hold ” status. In case of SARs which “clearly and unambiguously” indicate a criminal offence in another jurisdiction, the analysis will stop at the pre-analysis stage and the report is sent abroad without an in-depth analysis in Serbia. 391. All ML-related SARs undergo preliminary analysis, while TF-related SARs bypass this stage and are sent directly to the Prevention of Terrorism Financing unit as the Matrix assigns them automatically a special prioritisation level (highest). 392. The in-depth analytical phase (including dissemination) is done based on practice. In setting priorities, the highest urgency is assigned to SARs concerning TF/WMD financing, foreign FIU requests, and MLA cases. AT was advised by the authorities that the analysists use the IT tool “Business Intelligence” which allows a one-click search in the databases integrated into the APML's informational system. Additional information is requested from the private sector and other public authorities as needed, without any restrictions. 393. In March 2025, MONEYVAL Chair and the FATF President received a letter from a Serbian civil society organisation, which indicated possible misuse of the FIU’s power by a virtue of requesting details of five civil activists’ accounts from the reporting entities. In further correspondence, MONEYVAL committed to discuss and analyse this particular issue in the course of its on-going assessment of Serbia. The issue was also duly reflected in the scoping exercise and then discussed with the competent authorities. Within the remits of the FATF Methodology and MONEYVAL Rules of Procedure, the AT looked into this matter, seeking authorities’ point of view and explanation why the specific accounts were subject to their analysis. Authorities advised that these inquires by the FIU came as a consequence of LEA’s requests, which in turn was done in the framework of a pre-investigation looking into official statements of another country, suggesting abuse and misappropriation of its respective taxpayer funding in Serbia. The pre-investigative steps were carried out by Serbian competent authorities on NGOs, which were recipients of this foreign taxpayer funding. This included the NGOs with which the five civil society activists were affiliated. The inquires did not lead to any further procedural actions by competent authorities to date. Since no similar cases were observed in the period that followed, the AT did not find sufficient grounds to believe that such requests would become systematic. 394. The APML aims to finalize its analytical reports within 8 working days. In instances involving a higher volume or complexity of documentation - such as multiple high-value transactions, extensive account histories, or cross-border components - an extension of up to one additional week is typically applied. In exceptional cases, analysts may be granted up to 10 additional calendar days to complete the review. In practice, from the date a SAR is formally received to the final dissemination, the majority of analyses are concluded within a period ranging from 15 to 30 days. The time required to complete the analysis of a SAR, when considered in relation to the overall volume of received SARs and the number of staff assigned to the analytical function, appears to be disproportionate with a high workload per analyst. This workload may affect the timely and efficient processing of cases. 395. In 2024, some months before the on-site visit, the APML adopted a Directive on Procedures for Prioritising the Handling of Data in the Sector for Analytics and Prevention of Terrorist Financing. The adoption of this Directive represents a positive step toward a more structured approach to prioritisation and pre-analytical work, but detailed procedures are still needed in the APML to further describe the analytical process from STR receipt to disseminations, including the in-dept analytical procedures. 396. The use of the CTRs is not formalised. The AT was advised that in practice, APML conducts monthly queries on CTRs data base using a series of parameters which generate a list of individuals whose transactions meet specific criteria. The subsequent analytical process follows a similar approach to that applied for SARs. 397. The Pre-analytical (3), Analytical (6), TF prevention (4) and Cooperation Units (5)—comprise only 18 staff members tasked with analysis of SARs, CTRs, as well as requests from national authorities and foreign FIUs. In the Analytical Department, represented by 6 analysts, each analyst manages a minimum of 5 to 6 complex and high-priority cases. At the departmental level, there are currently over 100 active case files, many of which remain in a pending status due to the possibility of reactivation upon receipt of new intelligence or follow-up requests. This limited staffing level raises concerns about the APML’s ability to manage its analytical functions effectively and in a timely manner beyond an automated analytical product. Table 6.3: Number of SARs processed by APML Years Total number of SARs SARs relating to pre-existing cases SARs in which a new analytical case was opened Pre-analytical cases without elements to proceed further Pre-analytical cases turned to analytical files 2019 2.268 780 1.488 - - 2020 2.277 842 1.435 - - 2021 2.053 669 1.384 - - 2022 1.563 596 967 - - 2023 1.464 684 780 505 275 2024 2.014 851 1.163 769 394 398. Until 2022, about two-thirds of SARs led directly to new analytical cases, with the remainder related to existing cases. In 2022, with the introduction of the pre-analytical process, roughly half of SARs were further processed as in-depth analytical cases, and a quarter to just over a third were linked to existing cases. This pattern continued in the following years, even as SAR numbers increased, indicating that a growing share of SARs is being dropped at the pre-analytical stage rather than developed into in-depth analytical cases. Case Box 6.1. Conviction obtained on the basis of the APML analysis of a SAR The APML initiated an investigation based on a SAR filed by a commercial bank. The report concerned unusual transactions involving individuals X and Y, who received significant sums of money into their accounts, allegedly as payments for the purchase of secondary raw materials. The payments originated from several companies, most of which had minimal financial activity, no employees, and shared a common originator - Legal Entity A, owned by individual Z. The APML’s analysis revealed a typology involving fictitious purchases. Funds were transferred under the pretext of advance payments, then redirected through a network of individuals—primarily relatives of individual Y—who withdrew the amounts in cash and returned them, retaining a commission. These transactions were supported by false documentation, and no genuine business activity took place. The total amount transferred by Z was €653,000, of which €555,000 was transferred back through individual Y. Following the dissemination of findings by the APML, the case was taken up by the Prosecutor’s Office. Subsequently, 13 individuals were detained. A total of 6 convictions were issued. By the final court decision, individual Z was sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment, fined €855, and property in a total amount of €487,000 was confiscated. Strategic analysis 399. Strategic analysis is conducted by a dedicated subdivision within the Analytical Department. During the reference period, several strategic reports were produced and adopted by the APML, addressing key risks and emerging trends in ML and TF related to: misuse of secondary raw materials for the purpose of ML; transit transactions; re-export – risks and challenges; online casino analysis; general and individual risks of ML/TF through non-profit organizations; typologies of ML, modalities and trends of TF in the Republic of Serbia. Strategic analysis is carried out using information from SARs, CTRs, competent authorities’ requests and foreign FIUs requests. 400. The authorities advised that the scope of the strategic analysis is determined based on the necessity to address and understand specific vulnerabilities and threats, including evolving trends. However, this process is not regulated in any internal acts of APML, is conducted on ad hoc basis and lacks clarity on how the final decision on what topic to be tackled. As a result, it was not demonstrated that the strategic analysis is geared to address current trends, support LEA in their investigations or inform broader policy responses. The results of the strategic analysis were presented to the REs and depending on the subject matter, forwarded to the competent prosecutor’s offices, the Tax Administration, supervisory authorities, and the Coordinating Body for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Additionally, meetings were held with the Ministry of Interior to present specific findings. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 401. The dissemination process is not formalised, but the authorities have advised that once it has been determined that there are enough reasons to launch ML criminal proceedings, the APML files are disseminated to Prosecution. In case the analysis determines a lower level of suspicion, the reports are disseminated to the Police for further actions. Reports related to suspicions of tax irregularities (without a ML suspicion attached) are disseminated to the Tax Administration. Other analytical reports are disseminated to BIA in cases when criminal activity might be potentially linked to foreign nationals, weapons trading, and OCGs . Table 6.4: APML disseminations 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Prosecution 158 97 110 92 102 97 Police 85 39 36 39 31 33 Tax administration 119 91 84 106 93 99 BIA 74 47 57 29 30 28 TOTAL 436 274 287 266 256 257 402. The APML dissemination systems presents concerns on several levels: i) the process is not formalised, which makes it unstable and prone to subjective decisions; ii) the authorities informed the AT that the threshold for dissemination to Prosecution is “sufficient quality of the analytical product, which identifies the potential suspects, their ties and associates, suspicious patterns in their financial operations and any other supportive information that could be useful for law enforcement in a subsequent investigation” which raise questions about highly suspicious cases where one or several of the listed elements are not present iii) when speaking about the disseminations to the Police, the authorities evoke a “lower level of suspicion” which makes it unclear what is the “baseline” of suspicion to be considered; iv) the grounds to BIA disseminations, the “other analytical reports” (beyond FT), are also confusing, especially seeing that according to the statistics, this agency has never initiated a ML case (see IO7). 403. Data from 2019–2021 show a decline in SAR submissions by the private sector due to COVID-related factors, which led to a proportionate regression in disseminations to LEAs. In addition, the authorities explained that the decline was partly due to the introduction of a new practice of consolidating multiple STRs into a single report, which had not been applied prior to 2019. 404. From 2022, the dissemination rate of SARs dropped significantly 33 % in 2022; 27 % in 2023–2024). This reflects the more restrictive approach introduced by the pre-analysis stage, leading to the sharp decline in the share of cases advancing to full analytical ones (from around 50% in 2022 to 30% in 2023–2024). The dissemination rate of SARs is reasonable and confirms a generally good quality of SARs, with improvements needed in certain sectors, as acknowledged in the 2024 NRA (see IO3 and 4). Table 6.5: SARs use in FIU operational Year Total number of SARs SARs forwarded to the LEA % SARs with no elements to be forwarded to LEA % 2019 2 268 1223 54% 1 045 46% 2020 2 277 1 252 55% 1 025 45% 2021 2 053 1 108 54% 945 46% 2022 1 563 521 33% 1 042 67% 2023 1 464 397 27% 1 067 73% 2024 2 014 553 27% 1 461 73% 405. The APML operational value is evident as 60% [58] of Police-initiated ML cases include FIU intelligence and progressed to prosecution, although AT was not able to fully assess the complexity of these disseminations. Nevertheless, establishing robust internal procedures clearly defining workflows, and decision-making criteria for dissemination to the recipient authority is necessary to safeguard the FIU’s workstreams coherence, enhance consistency, and improve the overall effectiveness of its intelligence in supporting ML investigations and prosecutions. 406. In cases where ML investigations are initiated independently by the LEAs, the APML contributes by providing targeted information and financial intelligence in response to formal requests, thereby reinforcing the effectiveness of ongoing investigations. This suggests that cooperation remains strong and is being adapted to the evolving investigative needs of state authorities. Table 6.6: LEA requests to APML LEA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Prosecution 186 (64) 180 (58) 134 (48) 172 (61) 125 (44) 80 (28) Police 217 (70) 166 (51) 133 (42) 157 (49) 98 (31) 135 (39) Tax Administration 63 (19) 40 (15) 17 (6) 10 (3) 16 (4) 19 (6) Security Agency 54 (5) 63 (7) 77 (7) 50 (6) 45 (3) 30 (2) TOTAL: 520 (158) 449 (131) 361 (103) 389 (119) 284 (82) 264 (75) *Figures in brackets refer to requests linked to APML disseminations, including new suspects identified by LEAs or requests to foreign counterparts. 407. The APML may reject a request received from public authorities, but this remains marginal (3% of the total requests). The most frequent reasons for rejecting or requesting additional clarification from LEA relate to incomplete or unclear information provided in the initial request such as the absence of explanation regarding the suspicion of ML, or what concrete information or action is being sought from the APML. When the APML rejects requests from state authorities, it provides explanations for the rejection. Upon receiving these clarifications, the authorities correct the deficiencies and resubmit the requests to the APML. Footnotes [57] 1-20 Low priority, 21-40 medium priority, 41-100 high priority [58] between 2019 and 2023" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 389. Since 2023 a risk Matrix integrated into the IT system is used to automatically score and prioritize SARs before submitting them to the Pre-analytical Group. The scores are numerical, with values ranging from 1 to 100, [57] assigning the SARs in low, medium and high priority ranks. The Matrix contains a good number of relevant risk criteria and constitutes a valuable tool for the APML in the SARs selection. Nevertheless, the AT notes the absence of: i) risk level for certain countries and ii) provisions on instances when the Matrix criteria shall be up-dated. 390. The pre-analyst receives the SARs in order of priority and adjusts manually the prioritisation level based on preliminary findings, before submitting it to the Analytical Department. In the pre-analysis phase only the priority level is seen by the analysts, not the underling scores. The elements considered in the “adjustment” process are not formalised and are based on analysts’ own experience, depending on the additional information acquired. The pre-analytical phase is limited to basic checks on databases the FIU has direct access to and public sources, and only the “high priority” SARs (after the adjustment) are sent to the Analytical Unit. The others get an “on-hold” status. From the statistics provided it results that more than a half of the SARs are dropped at the pre-analysis stage (see Table 6.3) and go in “ on hold ” status. In case of SARs which “clearly and unambiguously” indicate a criminal offence in another jurisdiction, the analysis will stop at the pre-analysis stage and the report is sent abroad without an in-depth analysis in Serbia. 391. All ML-related SARs undergo preliminary analysis, while TF-related SARs bypass this stage and are sent directly to the Prevention of Terrorism Financing unit as the Matrix assigns them automatically a special prioritisation level (highest). 392. The in-depth analytical phase (including dissemination) is done based on practice. In setting priorities, the highest urgency is assigned to SARs concerning TF/WMD financing, foreign FIU requests, and MLA cases. AT was advised by the authorities that the analysists use the IT tool “Business Intelligence” which allows a one-click search in the databases integrated into the APML's informational system. Additional information is requested from the private sector and other public authorities as needed, without any restrictions. 393. In March 2025, MONEYVAL Chair and the FATF President received a letter from a Serbian civil society organisation, which indicated possible misuse of the FIU’s power by a virtue of requesting details of five civil activists’ accounts from the reporting entities. In further correspondence, MONEYVAL committed to discuss and analyse this particular issue in the course of its on-going assessment of Serbia. The issue was also duly reflected in the scoping exercise and then discussed with the competent authorities. Within the remits of the FATF Methodology and MONEYVAL Rules of Procedure, the AT looked into this matter, seeking authorities’ point of view and explanation why the specific accounts were subject to their analysis. Authorities advised that these inquires by the FIU came as a consequence of LEA’s requests, which in turn was done in the framework of a pre-investigation looking into official statements of another country, suggesting abuse and misappropriation of its respective taxpayer funding in Serbia. The pre-investigative steps were carried out by Serbian competent authorities on NGOs, which were recipients of this foreign taxpayer funding. This included the NGOs with which the five civil society activists were affiliated. The inquires did not lead to any further procedural actions by competent authorities to date. Since no similar cases were observed in the period that followed, the AT did not find sufficient grounds to believe that such requests would become systematic. 394. The APML aims to finalize its analytical reports within 8 working days. In instances involving a higher volume or complexity of documentation - such as multiple high-value transactions, extensive account histories, or cross-border components - an extension of up to one additional week is typically applied. In exceptional cases, analysts may be granted up to 10 additional calendar days to complete the review. In practice, from the date a SAR is formally received to the final dissemination, the majority of analyses are concluded within a period ranging from 15 to 30 days. The time required to complete the analysis of a SAR, when considered in relation to the overall volume of received SARs and the number of staff assigned to the analytical function, appears to be disproportionate with a high workload per analyst. This workload may affect the timely and efficient processing of cases. 395. In 2024, some months before the on-site visit, the APML adopted a Directive on Procedures for Prioritising the Handling of Data in the Sector for Analytics and Prevention of Terrorist Financing. The adoption of this Directive represents a positive step toward a more structured approach to prioritisation and pre-analytical work, but detailed procedures are still needed in the APML to further describe the analytical process from STR receipt to disseminations, including the in-dept analytical procedures. 396. The use of the CTRs is not formalised. The AT was advised that in practice, APML conducts monthly queries on CTRs data base using a series of parameters which generate a list of individuals whose transactions meet specific criteria. The subsequent analytical process follows a similar approach to that applied for SARs. 397. The Pre-analytical (3), Analytical (6), TF prevention (4) and Cooperation Units (5)—comprise only 18 staff members tasked with analysis of SARs, CTRs, as well as requests from national authorities and foreign FIUs. In the Analytical Department, represented by 6 analysts, each analyst manages a minimum of 5 to 6 complex and high-priority cases. At the departmental level, there are currently over 100 active case files, many of which remain in a pending status due to the possibility of reactivation upon receipt of new intelligence or follow-up requests. This limited staffing level raises concerns about the APML’s ability to manage its analytical functions effectively and in a timely manner beyond an automated analytical product. Table 6.3: Number of SARs processed by APML Years Total number of SARs SARs relating to pre-existing cases SARs in which a new analytical case was opened Pre-analytical cases without elements to proceed further Pre-analytical cases turned to analytical files 2019 2.268 780 1.488 - - 2020 2.277 842 1.435 - - 2021 2.053 669 1.384 - - 2022 1.563 596 967 - - 2023 1.464 684 780 505 275 2024 2.014 851 1.163 769 394 398. Until 2022, about two-thirds of SARs led directly to new analytical cases, with the remainder related to existing cases. In 2022, with the introduction of the pre-analytical process, roughly half of SARs were further processed as in-depth analytical cases, and a quarter to just over a third were linked to existing cases. This pattern continued in the following years, even as SAR numbers increased, indicating that a growing share of SARs is being dropped at the pre-analytical stage rather than developed into in-depth analytical cases. Case Box 6.1. Conviction obtained on the basis of the APML analysis of a SAR The APML initiated an investigation based on a SAR filed by a commercial bank. The report concerned unusual transactions involving individuals X and Y, who received significant sums of money into their accounts, allegedly as payments for the purchase of secondary raw materials. The payments originated from several companies, most of which had minimal financial activity, no employees, and shared a common originator - Legal Entity A, owned by individual Z. The APML’s analysis revealed a typology involving fictitious purchases. Funds were transferred under the pretext of advance payments, then redirected through a network of individuals—primarily relatives of individual Y—who withdrew the amounts in cash and returned them, retaining a commission. These transactions were supported by false documentation, and no genuine business activity took place. The total amount transferred by Z was €653,000, of which €555,000 was transferred back through individual Y. Following the dissemination of findings by the APML, the case was taken up by the Prosecutor’s Office. Subsequently, 13 individuals were detained. A total of 6 convictions were issued. By the final court decision, individual Z was sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment, fined €855, and property in a total amount of €487,000 was confiscated. Strategic analysis 399. Strategic analysis is conducted by a dedicated subdivision within the Analytical Department. During the reference period, several strategic reports were produced and adopted by the APML, addressing key risks and emerging trends in ML and TF related to: misuse of secondary raw materials for the purpose of ML; transit transactions; re-export – risks and challenges; online casino analysis; general and individual risks of ML/TF through non-profit organizations; typologies of ML, modalities and trends of TF in the Republic of Serbia. Strategic analysis is carried out using information from SARs, CTRs, competent authorities’ requests and foreign FIUs requests. 400. The authorities advised that the scope of the strategic analysis is determined based on the necessity to address and understand specific vulnerabilities and threats, including evolving trends. However, this process is not regulated in any internal acts of APML, is conducted on ad hoc basis and lacks clarity on how the final decision on what topic to be tackled. As a result, it was not demonstrated that the strategic analysis is geared to address current trends, support LEA in their investigations or inform broader policy responses. The results of the strategic analysis were presented to the REs and depending on the subject matter, forwarded to the competent prosecutor’s offices, the Tax Administration, supervisory authorities, and the Coordinating Body for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Additionally, meetings were held with the Ministry of Interior to present specific findings. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 401. The dissemination process is not formalised, but the authorities have advised that once it has been determined that there are enough reasons to launch ML criminal proceedings, the APML files are disseminated to Prosecution. In case the analysis determines a lower level of suspicion, the reports are disseminated to the Police for further actions. Reports related to suspicions of tax irregularities (without a ML suspicion attached) are disseminated to the Tax Administration. Other analytical reports are disseminated to BIA in cases when criminal activity might be potentially linked to foreign nationals, weapons trading, and OCGs . Table 6.4: APML disseminations 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Prosecution 158 97 110 92 102 97 Police 85 39 36 39 31 33 Tax administration 119 91 84 106 93 99 BIA 74 47 57 29 30 28 TOTAL 436 274 287 266 256 257 402. The APML dissemination systems presents concerns on several levels: i) the process is not formalised, which makes it unstable and prone to subjective decisions; ii) the authorities informed the AT that the threshold for dissemination to Prosecution is “sufficient quality of the analytical product, which identifies the potential suspects, their ties and associates, suspicious patterns in their financial operations and any other supportive information that could be useful for law enforcement in a subsequent investigation” which raise questions about highly suspicious cases where one or several of the listed elements are not present iii) when speaking about the disseminations to the Police, the authorities evoke a “lower level of suspicion” which makes it unclear what is the “baseline” of suspicion to be considered; iv) the grounds to BIA disseminations, the “other analytical reports” (beyond FT), are also confusing, especially seeing that according to the statistics, this agency has never initiated a ML case (see IO7). 403. Data from 2019–2021 show a decline in SAR submissions by the private sector due to COVID-related factors, which led to a proportionate regression in disseminations to LEAs. In addition, the authorities explained that the decline was partly due to the introduction of a new practice of consolidating multiple STRs into a single report, which had not been applied prior to 2019. 404. From 2022, the dissemination rate of SARs dropped significantly 33 % in 2022; 27 % in 2023–2024). This reflects the more restrictive approach introduced by the pre-analysis stage, leading to the sharp decline in the share of cases advancing to full analytical ones (from around 50% in 2022 to 30% in 2023–2024). The dissemination rate of SARs is reasonable and confirms a generally good quality of SARs, with improvements needed in certain sectors, as acknowledged in the 2024 NRA (see IO3 and 4). Table 6.5: SARs use in FIU operational Year Total number of SARs SARs forwarded to the LEA % SARs with no elements to be forwarded to LEA % 2019 2 268 1223 54% 1 045 46% 2020 2 277 1 252 55% 1 025 45% 2021 2 053 1 108 54% 945 46% 2022 1 563 521 33% 1 042 67% 2023 1 464 397 27% 1 067 73% 2024 2 014 553 27% 1 461 73% 405. The APML operational value is evident as 60% [58] of Police-initiated ML cases include FIU intelligence and progressed to prosecution, although AT was not able to fully assess the complexity of these disseminations. Nevertheless, establishing robust internal procedures clearly defining workflows, and decision-making criteria for dissemination to the recipient authority is necessary to safeguard the FIU’s workstreams coherence, enhance consistency, and improve the overall effectiveness of its intelligence in supporting ML investigations and prosecutions. 406. In cases where ML investigations are initiated independently by the LEAs, the APML contributes by providing targeted information and financial intelligence in response to formal requests, thereby reinforcing the effectiveness of ongoing investigations. This suggests that cooperation remains strong and is being adapted to the evolving investigative needs of state authorities. Table 6.6: LEA requests to APML LEA requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Prosecution 186 (64) 180 (58) 134 (48) 172 (61) 125 (44) 80 (28) Police 217 (70) 166 (51) 133 (42) 157 (49) 98 (31) 135 (39) Tax Administration 63 (19) 40 (15) 17 (6) 10 (3) 16 (4) 19 (6) Security Agency 54 (5) 63 (7) 77 (7) 50 (6) 45 (3) 30 (2) TOTAL: 520 (158) 449 (131) 361 (103) 389 (119) 284 (82) 264 (75) *Figures in brackets refer to requests linked to APML disseminations, including new suspects identified by LEAs or requests to foreign counterparts. 407. The APML may reject a request received from public authorities, but this remains marginal (3% of the total requests). The most frequent reasons for rejecting or requesting additional clarification from LEA relate to incomplete or unclear information provided in the initial request such as the absence of explanation regarding the suspicion of ML, or what concrete information or action is being sought from the APML. When the APML rejects requests from state authorities, it provides explanations for the rejection. Upon receiving these clarifications, the authorities correct the deficiencies and resubmit the requests to the APML. Footnotes [57] 1-20 Low priority, 21-40 medium priority, 41-100 high priority [58] between 2019 and 2023" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Prosecutions 432. Since the last MER, Serbia increased the number of ML prosecutions which now include both self-laundering and third-party cases. The ML cases prosecuted together with a domestic predicate offence remain the prevalent typology which is consistent with the country’s risk profile placing the internal threat as the biggest. The results on ML prosecuted together with a foreign predicate offence remain rare (see Figure 1 below), a sector which needs to be improved taking into consideration the external threat linked to OCGs as well as Serbian OCGs operating abroad (See also IO1). The results on indicting standalone ML are also notable, as they were absent on the last evaluation. 433. In the period under review, the Public Prosecutor’s Office reports 328 cases, involving 685 natural and legal persons. The prosecutions are conducted under the supervision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime (JTOK) which covers money laundering cases linked to OC, high-level corruption and large-scale economic crime (above €1.7 million), as counterpart for the police’s SBPOK with the following dedicated units: the Group for Organized Crime (9 public prosecutors/12 staff), the Group for Combating Corruption (8 public prosecutors, 10 assistants), the Service for financial investigations, seizure and confiscation of proceeds (1 public prosecutor, 2 assistants), the Service for financial forensics (2 staff). 434. Four Separate Units for Combating Corruption, including Financial Forensic Services (POSK) within the Higher Prosecutor’s Offices (VJT), with territorial jurisdiction, are dealing with all the other ML cases and engage with the OBPK of the Police in their ML investigative functions: POSK Belgrade (42 staff/18 public prosecutors), POSK Kraljevo (27 staff/12 public prosecutors), POSK Nis (28 staff/11 public prosecutors), POSK Novi Sad (39 staff/15 public prosecutors). Self-laundering/Third party laundering 435. Investigators de-prioritise self-laundering cases, in order to avoid a drain on resources, which are needed for complex high-priority cases. For predicate offences with a self-laundering component the priority is mainly to pursue confiscation, rather than expend on pursuing a simple ML offence. Where a predicate offence is identifiable and no third party is involved, and stand-alone ML is not necessary, prosecutor rarely add the ML self-laundering offence. Nevertheless, the self-laundering cases remain a substantial portion of the overall ML prosecutions, varying year by year between 18-76% with a period proportion of third-party ML of over 55% of the total [75] . Table 7.3: Type of ML Prosecutions [76] (persons) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Self-laundering 30 7 23 18 41 Third party ML 22 32 7 45 43 436. The third-party ML cases are on increasing trend since 2019 (with the exception of 2021), as a result of the application of the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office circular to all prosecutors’ offices informing them about the conclusions of the NRAs and setting out the priorities. From the Book of Cases presented to the AT it results that third-party cases can be autonomous ML cases, are sometimes combined with self-laundering (when the perpetrator of the predicate offence is also involved in the same scheme), or involve “professional laundering” in both forms described in the analysis below. The authorities do not encounter any difficulties in achieving indictments on third-party cases. Case Box 7.1. Third-party ML linked to public procurement corruption In 2019, Serbian authorities investigated a third-party ML scheme involving a high-ranking public official (X) who monitored a project funded by the Council of Europe Development Bank, including oversight of the Public Procurement Commission. X influenced procurement conditions to favour Company B, which was awarded two contracts worth RSD 300 million (approx. EUR 2.55 million). In return, X received a real estate gift from Company B and approximately EUR 159,000 in cash, delivered on several occasions. The investigation was initiated by the Police on suspicions related to public procurement procedures, with the involvement of the APML and the Tax Administration; the National Bank of Serbia was engaged regarding the bank employee involved. To conceal the transactions, X’s uncle (U) signed the purchase contract for the apartment, deposited the funds in cash with the collusion of a bank employee (E), and paid for the apartment actually owned by X. A fictitious loan agreement was drawn up to present the funds as a loan from X’s mother. A parallel financial investigation confirmed these facts. The case is currently in the indictment phase before the competent prosecutor. No convictions or sentences have been issued yet. ML prosecutions with predicate offence 437. From all 685 prosecuted persons (2019-2024), ML prosecuted with a domestic predicate accounts for 51.8% (see Table 7.4 below). The authorities are successful in indicting ML together with abuse of position of responsible person 14%, forgery of official documents (11%) and tax evasion plus tax fraud (together 16%). Lesser results are notable when it comes to ML with indictments for other high-risk threats such as: production and trafficking of narcotic drugs, corruption (other forms than abuse of position), OC, smuggling of persons, human trafficking, illicit trade. Although the predicates do not fully correspond to the main threats for the country, the AT positively notes that when looking at stand-alone ML cases, for the entire assessed period, 22 cases (with at least 31 indicted persons) are linked to transnational OC which are also dealing i.a in the crimes above. In addition, some of the cases where “forgery of documents” has been retained as predicate, the authorities explained that behind there are other, more relevant crimes, but the forgery was the act that could be proved. The cases linked to a foreign predicate indictment are almost exclusively drug trafficking related. These increase prosecutions’ consistency with the country’s risk profile (See table 7.5 below). Table 7.4: Number of persons prosecuted for Stand-alone vs with a predicate Prosecutions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total number of prosecutions 85 73 64 118 162 183 ML stand-alone 33 34 34 55 78 102 Linked to a predicate criminality 7 31 32 43 36 88 No link to any predicate 26 3 2 12 42 14 ML prosecuted with a domestic predicate offence 52 36 28 62 82 81 ML prosecuted with a foreign predicate offence 0 3 2 1 2 0 438. Turning to the profile of the “corruption and ML cases”, the AT team identified some relevant, aligned to risk prosecutions/convictions where medium-high public officials were involved and corruption proceeds were laundered. Nevertheless, some of the cases presented were not really linked to corruption assets, others are still under investigation amid historical acts, while in others, the suspected public official taking part in the laundering scheme was not indicted for ML. Another concern is that in almost all instances, the corruption related offences retained as predicates takes the form of “abuse of office” instead of giving or receiving bribe, although from the description of the case it clearly results that money has been paid. This conclusion is confirmed by the Serbia’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 which notes the significant drop in investigations and prosecutions in the case of grand corruption which naturally impacts the associated ML (see also IO1.5). Table 7.5: ML indictments and link to associated predicate criminality (includes stand-alone and non-stand-alone indictments) ML predicate offence/activity 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Organized crime: multiple offences (murder, drug trafficking, racketeering, abduction, arms trafficking) 2 11 5 Organised crime: drug trafficking 6 5 4 9 Organised crime: kidnapping 2 Organised crime: theft 2 10 Organised crime: human trafficking 2 Tax Crimes (tax evasion and tax fraud) 4 37 27 26 38 101 Corruption – public and private sector (including bribery, embezzlement and abuse of position of responsible person) 32 16 10 12 33 31 Embezzlement in business activities 5 5 2 Illicit trade 1 6 2 Illicit banking, crediting and issuance of payment cards, payment services, usury 8 Drug trafficking 6 2 3 1 15 Theft 4 2 1 Fraud 2 1 3 2 2 Smuggling of migrants 2 Terrorism/terrorism financing 1 Forgery of documents 15 4 6 36 23 Illicit operation of games of chance 1 Predicate criminality not identified 26 3 2 12 42 14 Total: 85 73 64 118 162 183 439. On the corruption risk, the prosecution reported developments since January 2025 with an extensive anti-corruption campaign, which include high level corruption investigations and the associated ML activity (154 individuals since the beginning of the year). Cases (at investigation stage) presented to the AT show promising results, more consistent with Serbia’s ML risk profile, and this progress should be sustained for the long-term. Stand-alone (or autonomous) ML 440. There are no procedural or interpretative difficulties in achieving standalone ML convictions, and the absence of a legitimate justification for the assets in question, where the defendant cannot provide substantiated explanation of the origin of his income, together with circumstantial evidence (such as typologies) is considered to be sufficient to prove their illegal origin, and obtain a conviction for ML. 441. This was achieved through a strategic shift in the prosecution’s approach towards the ML offence, followed by an intensive training programme dedicated to LEA, prosecution and judiciary. This is a commendable breakthrough in the judicial system mentality, which needs to continue being applied in practice, to ensure sustainable and consistent results, while enhancing the share of the cases of ML linked to high level corruption and serious criminality which are areas for improvement. Figure 7.1 Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 442. Stand-alone ML is mostly investigated/prosecuted in third party ML cases, when a predicate offence cannot be proven, or the predicate crime was committed abroad. In such cases, the prosecutor in his indictment does not have any obligation to demonstrate (or even mention) any link with any underlying predicate criminal activity (be it with conviction, prosecution or investigation for a predicate – see Table 7.4 above). The judicial authorities have indicated that current case law has reached the level where it allows to use typological patterns of ML (without a known link to predicate criminality) as sufficient circumstantial evidence to pursue and obtain a conviction for ML. Case Box 7.2. Third-party ML by professional accountants, including potential proceeds from corruption and embezzlement at municipal level Between February 2020 and 21 May 2022, Serbian authorities investigated a third-party ML scheme involving professional accountants and potential proceeds from corruption and embezzlement of municipal funds. Funds from legal entities, motorsport clubs, and municipal tourist organisations were transferred on fictitious grounds to the personal and business accounts of M.S., withdrawn in cash, and partially returned to originators, with commissions retained. The investigation was initiated by the APML, following a SAR from a bank, and by the Tax Administration through its risk analysis. The APML disseminated its findings to the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Niš, which established a task force including the APML, Police Anti-Corruption Division, and Tax Police. Banks provided transaction data, KYC documentation, and account information, enabling the tracing of illicit flows. A plea agreement was reached and confirmed by the Higher Court in Niš in January 2024, convicting M.S. under Art. 245(2) in relation to (1) CC, with aiding under Arts. 35 and 61. The natural person convicted received 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of RSD 100,000. No legal entities were convicted. In total, RSD 2,234,099.76 (approx. EUR 19,000) was confiscated. This case dismantled an organised ML structure using bookkeeping agencies to layer funds from public sources, and identified municipal tourist organisations, consulting agencies, and advertising agencies as high-risk sectors for similar schemes. 443. From the stand-alone cases, for the entire assessed period, the authorities reported 25 cases involving 44 persons with foreign suspected predicate activity. From those, 13 cases (31 individuals) were linked to OCG dealing with drug trafficking, arms trafficking, kidnapping and theft. In three cases the underling criminality was not determined but the money trail typologies (money mules) indicated illegal origin and ML. These cases contribute to a better alignment with the country risk profile. 444. As such cases have been adjudicated by courts and this is now an established practice in Serbia, prosecutors frequently go after stand-alone cases rather than to go after the predicate offence, if it is harder to prove, or the investigation on the predicate has been unsuccessful. Professional ML 445. Prosecutors take pride for having brought to investigation, prosecution and conviction “professional ML” committed either by groups specifically set up for ML purposes, or with the wilful involvement of obliged entities or their employees. Speaking of the former, the group is considered to be “professional launderer” when displaying a structure, logistic means (companies, bank accounts) as well as acting according to a certain typology. Some convictions are to be noted in this regard. 446. Professional ML committed with the involvement of obliged entities or their employees, constitutes a major priority that safeguards the integrity and effectiveness of the whole AML/CFT regime. This additional focus is based on best practices and guidance provided to Serbian authorities by foreign experts (European and US investigators and prosecutors). Investigations on gatekeepers and financial institutions employees have been reported by the authorities, with 14 accountants, 1 lawyer and 2 bank employees being indicted, and 6 accountants convicted for ML. Legal persons 447. Serbia achieved an overall number of 8 prosecutions of legal persons, which is an improvement from the previous assessment period. Nevertheless, this remain insufficient considering Serbia’s exposure to professional ML schemes facilitated by and involving legal persons. 448. The authorities explained that in the majority of ML cases where legal entities are used – these are so-called ’shell companies’ which do not hold any assets and are owned by “ straw men ”. Such companies do not engage in ML activities for the benefit of the economic entity itself, thus there is no qualification for a ML prosecution. The AT concur with this explanation and notes that in all cases where “straw men” were identified, the mastermind/organizers have also been investigated/prosecuted/convicted. In some cases, the conviction for the “ straw man ” is reached through a plea agreement earlier on in the process, then used strategically in the proceedings against the main organizers of the scheme. The AT was presented a case example in this regard. Case Box 7.3. Conviction of legal entities for ML from corruption and misuse of EU funds Between 2016 and 2018, Serbian authorities investigated a complex case of systematic fraud, abuse of official position, and ML linked to EU-funded projects. The case involved public procurement irregularities, with evaluation committees approving bids from companies that did not meet procurement requirements. These companies submitted fictitious invoices for unperformed services or goods, inflating costs to obtain illicit financial gains. The scheme diverted funds intended for disaster prevention and infrastructure improvements, causing significant financial harm to the municipalities. A total of 18 natural persons and 2 legal entities were implicated. Key participants included project coordinators, accounting agency owners, and company representatives, who collaborated to misappropriate public funds through false documentation, fraudulent invoices, and fictitious legal arrangements. Funds were channelled through multiple accounts, with commissions retained at various stages. The investigation was initiated by the Ministry of Finance’s Department for the Suppression of Irregularities and Fraud in the Handling of EU Funds (AFKOS) following audit findings, in cooperation with the SBPOK and under prosecutor oversight. ML convictions were pronounced against 2 legal entities and 2 individuals - the legal entities each received a conditional fine of RSD 5,000,000 (approx. EUR 42,687.66), and the individuals each received 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of RSD 200,000. Other defendants were convicted of related offences including document forgery, abuse of official position, negligence, and public procurement offences. An indictment remains pending. In total, EUR 15,000 and RSD 3,523,967 (approx. EUR 30,085.98) were confiscated. 449. Nevertheless, seeing the misuse of legal persons was identified as an important ML risk factor, in areas that represent a priority in the fight against ML (constructions; accounting, bookkeeping and audit work: tax consulting), the number of the legal persons subject to ML prosecutions remains modest. Trials and timely prosecution of ML 450. The criminal law system in Serbia is based on the principle of legality, which means that the prosecutor has an obligation to initiate proceedings whenever there is sufficient evidence. An exception is provided for crimes where the maximum prison sentence is up to 5 years. This means that the principle of prosecutorial opportunity may be applied for more serious forms of ML [77] . 451. To support prosecutors in the preparation of ML cases, forensic experts were hired to perform analysis and systematisation of information and documentation related to financial transactions and flows, provide assistance in formulating the tasks for expert witnesses, suggesting other sources of potential evidence, and any other expert support needed in the development of the case. 452. Four financial forensic experts are currently employed by the Prosecution in Serbia: two with the Public Prosecutor for Organised Crime, one by the Special Department for Suppression of Corruption of the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, and one with the Special Department for Suppression of Corruption in Novi Sad (temporary). The number of financial forensics is not commensurate with the volume of the ML cases, especially seeing their involvement in the course of the investigations and trials. Further difficulties relate to the limited resources of the Prosecution to competitively hire financial forensics to act as expert witnesses. 453. Not all ML cases reach the court with a judicial financial expertise conducted, but the prosecutors are constantly looking for resources to address this drawback, especially talking into consideration that the Courts establish a practice in having an independent forensic financial report when ruling a decision. Table 7.6: Conversion ratio in ML cases from investigation stage to conviction (cases) Number of cases of ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL Investigations 55 80 62 81 68 106 452 Conversion Rate 72.5% Indictments 42 54 37 35 44 116 328 Conversion Rate 83% Convictions 35 53 35 32 30 87 272 454. The conversion ratio from investigations to convictions (Table 7.6 above) is satisfactory and the judiciary confirmed the positive impact of the recent years jurisprudence in understanding the ML risks and setting the grounds for a more determined approach regarding complex cases. The training of judges with foreign counterparts and publications of guiding case laws played an important role and led to major changes especially regarding the standard of proof of the predicate and the adoption of practice in adjudicating standalone ML. Even if there are still difficulties on that front, the complexity of the ML cases is growing by the year. 455. Issues remain with the parties abusing procedural elements, various justifications to prolong a verdict (medical reports to justify postponements), with still limited legislative tools to prevent this type of behaviour. Other impediments to a swifter trial include the lack of technical means in some courts, which would require more equipment and proper rooms to accommodate more than 15 defendants [78] (which is often the case in ML trials). 456. The interagency cooperation in the area of ML is present at all levels and include dedicated interagency teams, working groups and task forces which are set-up [79] by the competent prosecutor to deal with complex cases in ML. These task forces usually involve a range of competent authorities, including police, tax police, APML, as well as, depending on the case profile, other authorities competent in a particular topic, including non-law enforcement bodies (11 task forces were enabled in the assessed period: 6 in Nis, 4 - Novi Sad, 1 in Belgrade). The examples provided display an active participation of the Customs Administration in several ML investigations, especially when cross-border transportation of case occures which is consistent with the cross-border related risks as assessed by the country in its NRA. The Customs Administration appears as well trained and willing to effectively pursue ML suspicions. 457. In June 2024 the JTOK established a permanent Task Force for identification and criminal prosecution of OCGs involved in ML activities. This task force involves in addition to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (2 public prosecutors and financial forensic expert), the respective police departments, APML, Tax police, Customs, Anti-Corruption Agency. This task force targets complex ML cases committed in organised groups, with a focus on cross-border threats and other high-risk areas. 458. In 2024, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office (SPPO) has developed a case management system that keeps track of all ML cases, accessed and fed by all the competent authorities. At the time of the on-site visit the system was being populated with data and the connections with different offices under development. Convictions 459. Serbia achieved 353 ML convictions between 2019 and 2024, involving 350 natural and 3 legal persons, mostly resolved in the first instance court. This is a significant increase from the previous assessed period, which had 35 natural persons convicted with only 4 for third party ML. The statistics in table 7.6 also include plea agreements, which between 2019 – 2023 are in total of 206. Table 7.7. ML convictions [80] (persons) Standalone ML ML with predicate crime [81] Self-laundering Third party ML - total Third party ML - Professional ML Total 2019 13 50 17 46 1 63 2020 19 35 21 33 9 54 2021 33 14 18 29 10 47 2022 28 12 9 31 8 40 2023 22 23 22 23 5 45 2024 87 17 13 91 63 104 Total 202 151 100 253 96 353 Percentage 57.2% 42.8% 28.3% 71.7% 37.9% 460. Between 2019 – 2024, from the total of 151 persons convicted for ML with domestic predicate offence, 67.1% were convicted for ML linked to forgery (47) and abuse of position of the responsible person (43), which is partly in line with the country’s risk profile, with more limited results when it comes to other high threat/medium threat crimes (such as drug and human trafficking). As in the case of the prosecutions, the authorities explained that some of those are involving more serious criminality, but the “forgery” was the crime they could prove. 461. The majority of ML convictions pertains to third party cases (71%), and autonomous ML cases, (57%) where, like in the case of the prosecutions (see Table 7.5), more serious underlying criminality is present. From the total number of autonomous ML cases, 18 cases concerning 20 individuals involved foreign criminality including forms of OCG. The same concerns related to the profile of the cases expressed in relation to the prosecutions apply. Footnotes [75] This number does not include stand-alone cases [76] Only cases where the distinction self-laundering vs third party could be made, (does not include stand-alone cases). The total number of prosecutions is to be found in Table 7.4 below. [77] Article 245, paragraphs 1 and 5 [78] The AT was informed that only one Court in Serbia can accommodate more than 15 defendants. [79] In accordance with the Law on Organisation Competencies of State Authorities in Fighting Organised Crime, Corruption and Terrorism [80] The standalone ML convictions are distributed between self-laundering and third-party to the extend that this could be approximated for each standalone case [81] Refers to cases where the predicate crime is prosecuted together with ML" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Prosecutions 432. Since the last MER, Serbia increased the number of ML prosecutions which now include both self-laundering and third-party cases. The ML cases prosecuted together with a domestic predicate offence remain the prevalent typology which is consistent with the country’s risk profile placing the internal threat as the biggest. The results on ML prosecuted together with a foreign predicate offence remain rare (see Figure 1 below), a sector which needs to be improved taking into consideration the external threat linked to OCGs as well as Serbian OCGs operating abroad (See also IO1). The results on indicting standalone ML are also notable, as they were absent on the last evaluation. 433. In the period under review, the Public Prosecutor’s Office reports 328 cases, involving 685 natural and legal persons. The prosecutions are conducted under the supervision of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime (JTOK) which covers money laundering cases linked to OC, high-level corruption and large-scale economic crime (above €1.7 million), as counterpart for the police’s SBPOK with the following dedicated units: the Group for Organized Crime (9 public prosecutors/12 staff), the Group for Combating Corruption (8 public prosecutors, 10 assistants), the Service for financial investigations, seizure and confiscation of proceeds (1 public prosecutor, 2 assistants), the Service for financial forensics (2 staff). 434. Four Separate Units for Combating Corruption, including Financial Forensic Services (POSK) within the Higher Prosecutor’s Offices (VJT), with territorial jurisdiction, are dealing with all the other ML cases and engage with the OBPK of the Police in their ML investigative functions: POSK Belgrade (42 staff/18 public prosecutors), POSK Kraljevo (27 staff/12 public prosecutors), POSK Nis (28 staff/11 public prosecutors), POSK Novi Sad (39 staff/15 public prosecutors). Self-laundering/Third party laundering 435. Investigators de-prioritise self-laundering cases, in order to avoid a drain on resources, which are needed for complex high-priority cases. For predicate offences with a self-laundering component the priority is mainly to pursue confiscation, rather than expend on pursuing a simple ML offence. Where a predicate offence is identifiable and no third party is involved, and stand-alone ML is not necessary, prosecutor rarely add the ML self-laundering offence. Nevertheless, the self-laundering cases remain a substantial portion of the overall ML prosecutions, varying year by year between 18-76% with a period proportion of third-party ML of over 55% of the total [75] . Table 7.3: Type of ML Prosecutions [76] (persons) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Self-laundering 30 7 23 18 41 Third party ML 22 32 7 45 43 436. The third-party ML cases are on increasing trend since 2019 (with the exception of 2021), as a result of the application of the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office circular to all prosecutors’ offices informing them about the conclusions of the NRAs and setting out the priorities. From the Book of Cases presented to the AT it results that third-party cases can be autonomous ML cases, are sometimes combined with self-laundering (when the perpetrator of the predicate offence is also involved in the same scheme), or involve “professional laundering” in both forms described in the analysis below. The authorities do not encounter any difficulties in achieving indictments on third-party cases. Case Box 7.1. Third-party ML linked to public procurement corruption In 2019, Serbian authorities investigated a third-party ML scheme involving a high-ranking public official (X) who monitored a project funded by the Council of Europe Development Bank, including oversight of the Public Procurement Commission. X influenced procurement conditions to favour Company B, which was awarded two contracts worth RSD 300 million (approx. EUR 2.55 million). In return, X received a real estate gift from Company B and approximately EUR 159,000 in cash, delivered on several occasions. The investigation was initiated by the Police on suspicions related to public procurement procedures, with the involvement of the APML and the Tax Administration; the National Bank of Serbia was engaged regarding the bank employee involved. To conceal the transactions, X’s uncle (U) signed the purchase contract for the apartment, deposited the funds in cash with the collusion of a bank employee (E), and paid for the apartment actually owned by X. A fictitious loan agreement was drawn up to present the funds as a loan from X’s mother. A parallel financial investigation confirmed these facts. The case is currently in the indictment phase before the competent prosecutor. No convictions or sentences have been issued yet. ML prosecutions with predicate offence 437. From all 685 prosecuted persons (2019-2024), ML prosecuted with a domestic predicate accounts for 51.8% (see Table 7.4 below). The authorities are successful in indicting ML together with abuse of position of responsible person 14%, forgery of official documents (11%) and tax evasion plus tax fraud (together 16%). Lesser results are notable when it comes to ML with indictments for other high-risk threats such as: production and trafficking of narcotic drugs, corruption (other forms than abuse of position), OC, smuggling of persons, human trafficking, illicit trade. Although the predicates do not fully correspond to the main threats for the country, the AT positively notes that when looking at stand-alone ML cases, for the entire assessed period, 22 cases (with at least 31 indicted persons) are linked to transnational OC which are also dealing i.a in the crimes above. In addition, some of the cases where “forgery of documents” has been retained as predicate, the authorities explained that behind there are other, more relevant crimes, but the forgery was the act that could be proved. The cases linked to a foreign predicate indictment are almost exclusively drug trafficking related. These increase prosecutions’ consistency with the country’s risk profile (See table 7.5 below). Table 7.4: Number of persons prosecuted for Stand-alone vs with a predicate Prosecutions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total number of prosecutions 85 73 64 118 162 183 ML stand-alone 33 34 34 55 78 102 Linked to a predicate criminality 7 31 32 43 36 88 No link to any predicate 26 3 2 12 42 14 ML prosecuted with a domestic predicate offence 52 36 28 62 82 81 ML prosecuted with a foreign predicate offence 0 3 2 1 2 0 438. Turning to the profile of the “corruption and ML cases”, the AT team identified some relevant, aligned to risk prosecutions/convictions where medium-high public officials were involved and corruption proceeds were laundered. Nevertheless, some of the cases presented were not really linked to corruption assets, others are still under investigation amid historical acts, while in others, the suspected public official taking part in the laundering scheme was not indicted for ML. Another concern is that in almost all instances, the corruption related offences retained as predicates takes the form of “abuse of office” instead of giving or receiving bribe, although from the description of the case it clearly results that money has been paid. This conclusion is confirmed by the Serbia’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 which notes the significant drop in investigations and prosecutions in the case of grand corruption which naturally impacts the associated ML (see also IO1.5). Table 7.5: ML indictments and link to associated predicate criminality (includes stand-alone and non-stand-alone indictments) ML predicate offence/activity 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Organized crime: multiple offences (murder, drug trafficking, racketeering, abduction, arms trafficking) 2 11 5 Organised crime: drug trafficking 6 5 4 9 Organised crime: kidnapping 2 Organised crime: theft 2 10 Organised crime: human trafficking 2 Tax Crimes (tax evasion and tax fraud) 4 37 27 26 38 101 Corruption – public and private sector (including bribery, embezzlement and abuse of position of responsible person) 32 16 10 12 33 31 Embezzlement in business activities 5 5 2 Illicit trade 1 6 2 Illicit banking, crediting and issuance of payment cards, payment services, usury 8 Drug trafficking 6 2 3 1 15 Theft 4 2 1 Fraud 2 1 3 2 2 Smuggling of migrants 2 Terrorism/terrorism financing 1 Forgery of documents 15 4 6 36 23 Illicit operation of games of chance 1 Predicate criminality not identified 26 3 2 12 42 14 Total: 85 73 64 118 162 183 439. On the corruption risk, the prosecution reported developments since January 2025 with an extensive anti-corruption campaign, which include high level corruption investigations and the associated ML activity (154 individuals since the beginning of the year). Cases (at investigation stage) presented to the AT show promising results, more consistent with Serbia’s ML risk profile, and this progress should be sustained for the long-term. Stand-alone (or autonomous) ML 440. There are no procedural or interpretative difficulties in achieving standalone ML convictions, and the absence of a legitimate justification for the assets in question, where the defendant cannot provide substantiated explanation of the origin of his income, together with circumstantial evidence (such as typologies) is considered to be sufficient to prove their illegal origin, and obtain a conviction for ML. 441. This was achieved through a strategic shift in the prosecution’s approach towards the ML offence, followed by an intensive training programme dedicated to LEA, prosecution and judiciary. This is a commendable breakthrough in the judicial system mentality, which needs to continue being applied in practice, to ensure sustainable and consistent results, while enhancing the share of the cases of ML linked to high level corruption and serious criminality which are areas for improvement. Figure 7.1 Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 442. Stand-alone ML is mostly investigated/prosecuted in third party ML cases, when a predicate offence cannot be proven, or the predicate crime was committed abroad. In such cases, the prosecutor in his indictment does not have any obligation to demonstrate (or even mention) any link with any underlying predicate criminal activity (be it with conviction, prosecution or investigation for a predicate – see Table 7.4 above). The judicial authorities have indicated that current case law has reached the level where it allows to use typological patterns of ML (without a known link to predicate criminality) as sufficient circumstantial evidence to pursue and obtain a conviction for ML. Case Box 7.2. Third-party ML by professional accountants, including potential proceeds from corruption and embezzlement at municipal level Between February 2020 and 21 May 2022, Serbian authorities investigated a third-party ML scheme involving professional accountants and potential proceeds from corruption and embezzlement of municipal funds. Funds from legal entities, motorsport clubs, and municipal tourist organisations were transferred on fictitious grounds to the personal and business accounts of M.S., withdrawn in cash, and partially returned to originators, with commissions retained. The investigation was initiated by the APML, following a SAR from a bank, and by the Tax Administration through its risk analysis. The APML disseminated its findings to the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office in Niš, which established a task force including the APML, Police Anti-Corruption Division, and Tax Police. Banks provided transaction data, KYC documentation, and account information, enabling the tracing of illicit flows. A plea agreement was reached and confirmed by the Higher Court in Niš in January 2024, convicting M.S. under Art. 245(2) in relation to (1) CC, with aiding under Arts. 35 and 61. The natural person convicted received 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of RSD 100,000. No legal entities were convicted. In total, RSD 2,234,099.76 (approx. EUR 19,000) was confiscated. This case dismantled an organised ML structure using bookkeeping agencies to layer funds from public sources, and identified municipal tourist organisations, consulting agencies, and advertising agencies as high-risk sectors for similar schemes. 443. From the stand-alone cases, for the entire assessed period, the authorities reported 25 cases involving 44 persons with foreign suspected predicate activity. From those, 13 cases (31 individuals) were linked to OCG dealing with drug trafficking, arms trafficking, kidnapping and theft. In three cases the underling criminality was not determined but the money trail typologies (money mules) indicated illegal origin and ML. These cases contribute to a better alignment with the country risk profile. 444. As such cases have been adjudicated by courts and this is now an established practice in Serbia, prosecutors frequently go after stand-alone cases rather than to go after the predicate offence, if it is harder to prove, or the investigation on the predicate has been unsuccessful. Professional ML 445. Prosecutors take pride for having brought to investigation, prosecution and conviction “professional ML” committed either by groups specifically set up for ML purposes, or with the wilful involvement of obliged entities or their employees. Speaking of the former, the group is considered to be “professional launderer” when displaying a structure, logistic means (companies, bank accounts) as well as acting according to a certain typology. Some convictions are to be noted in this regard. 446. Professional ML committed with the involvement of obliged entities or their employees, constitutes a major priority that safeguards the integrity and effectiveness of the whole AML/CFT regime. This additional focus is based on best practices and guidance provided to Serbian authorities by foreign experts (European and US investigators and prosecutors). Investigations on gatekeepers and financial institutions employees have been reported by the authorities, with 14 accountants, 1 lawyer and 2 bank employees being indicted, and 6 accountants convicted for ML. Legal persons 447. Serbia achieved an overall number of 8 prosecutions of legal persons, which is an improvement from the previous assessment period. Nevertheless, this remain insufficient considering Serbia’s exposure to professional ML schemes facilitated by and involving legal persons. 448. The authorities explained that in the majority of ML cases where legal entities are used – these are so-called ’shell companies’ which do not hold any assets and are owned by “ straw men ”. Such companies do not engage in ML activities for the benefit of the economic entity itself, thus there is no qualification for a ML prosecution. The AT concur with this explanation and notes that in all cases where “straw men” were identified, the mastermind/organizers have also been investigated/prosecuted/convicted. In some cases, the conviction for the “ straw man ” is reached through a plea agreement earlier on in the process, then used strategically in the proceedings against the main organizers of the scheme. The AT was presented a case example in this regard. Case Box 7.3. Conviction of legal entities for ML from corruption and misuse of EU funds Between 2016 and 2018, Serbian authorities investigated a complex case of systematic fraud, abuse of official position, and ML linked to EU-funded projects. The case involved public procurement irregularities, with evaluation committees approving bids from companies that did not meet procurement requirements. These companies submitted fictitious invoices for unperformed services or goods, inflating costs to obtain illicit financial gains. The scheme diverted funds intended for disaster prevention and infrastructure improvements, causing significant financial harm to the municipalities. A total of 18 natural persons and 2 legal entities were implicated. Key participants included project coordinators, accounting agency owners, and company representatives, who collaborated to misappropriate public funds through false documentation, fraudulent invoices, and fictitious legal arrangements. Funds were channelled through multiple accounts, with commissions retained at various stages. The investigation was initiated by the Ministry of Finance’s Department for the Suppression of Irregularities and Fraud in the Handling of EU Funds (AFKOS) following audit findings, in cooperation with the SBPOK and under prosecutor oversight. ML convictions were pronounced against 2 legal entities and 2 individuals - the legal entities each received a conditional fine of RSD 5,000,000 (approx. EUR 42,687.66), and the individuals each received 1 year’s imprisonment and a fine of RSD 200,000. Other defendants were convicted of related offences including document forgery, abuse of official position, negligence, and public procurement offences. An indictment remains pending. In total, EUR 15,000 and RSD 3,523,967 (approx. EUR 30,085.98) were confiscated. 449. Nevertheless, seeing the misuse of legal persons was identified as an important ML risk factor, in areas that represent a priority in the fight against ML (constructions; accounting, bookkeeping and audit work: tax consulting), the number of the legal persons subject to ML prosecutions remains modest. Trials and timely prosecution of ML 450. The criminal law system in Serbia is based on the principle of legality, which means that the prosecutor has an obligation to initiate proceedings whenever there is sufficient evidence. An exception is provided for crimes where the maximum prison sentence is up to 5 years. This means that the principle of prosecutorial opportunity may be applied for more serious forms of ML [77] . 451. To support prosecutors in the preparation of ML cases, forensic experts were hired to perform analysis and systematisation of information and documentation related to financial transactions and flows, provide assistance in formulating the tasks for expert witnesses, suggesting other sources of potential evidence, and any other expert support needed in the development of the case. 452. Four financial forensic experts are currently employed by the Prosecution in Serbia: two with the Public Prosecutor for Organised Crime, one by the Special Department for Suppression of Corruption of the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, and one with the Special Department for Suppression of Corruption in Novi Sad (temporary). The number of financial forensics is not commensurate with the volume of the ML cases, especially seeing their involvement in the course of the investigations and trials. Further difficulties relate to the limited resources of the Prosecution to competitively hire financial forensics to act as expert witnesses. 453. Not all ML cases reach the court with a judicial financial expertise conducted, but the prosecutors are constantly looking for resources to address this drawback, especially talking into consideration that the Courts establish a practice in having an independent forensic financial report when ruling a decision. Table 7.6: Conversion ratio in ML cases from investigation stage to conviction (cases) Number of cases of ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL Investigations 55 80 62 81 68 106 452 Conversion Rate 72.5% Indictments 42 54 37 35 44 116 328 Conversion Rate 83% Convictions 35 53 35 32 30 87 272 454. The conversion ratio from investigations to convictions (Table 7.6 above) is satisfactory and the judiciary confirmed the positive impact of the recent years jurisprudence in understanding the ML risks and setting the grounds for a more determined approach regarding complex cases. The training of judges with foreign counterparts and publications of guiding case laws played an important role and led to major changes especially regarding the standard of proof of the predicate and the adoption of practice in adjudicating standalone ML. Even if there are still difficulties on that front, the complexity of the ML cases is growing by the year. 455. Issues remain with the parties abusing procedural elements, various justifications to prolong a verdict (medical reports to justify postponements), with still limited legislative tools to prevent this type of behaviour. Other impediments to a swifter trial include the lack of technical means in some courts, which would require more equipment and proper rooms to accommodate more than 15 defendants [78] (which is often the case in ML trials). 456. The interagency cooperation in the area of ML is present at all levels and include dedicated interagency teams, working groups and task forces which are set-up [79] by the competent prosecutor to deal with complex cases in ML. These task forces usually involve a range of competent authorities, including police, tax police, APML, as well as, depending on the case profile, other authorities competent in a particular topic, including non-law enforcement bodies (11 task forces were enabled in the assessed period: 6 in Nis, 4 - Novi Sad, 1 in Belgrade). The examples provided display an active participation of the Customs Administration in several ML investigations, especially when cross-border transportation of case occures which is consistent with the cross-border related risks as assessed by the country in its NRA. The Customs Administration appears as well trained and willing to effectively pursue ML suspicions. 457. In June 2024 the JTOK established a permanent Task Force for identification and criminal prosecution of OCGs involved in ML activities. This task force involves in addition to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime (2 public prosecutors and financial forensic expert), the respective police departments, APML, Tax police, Customs, Anti-Corruption Agency. This task force targets complex ML cases committed in organised groups, with a focus on cross-border threats and other high-risk areas. 458. In 2024, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office (SPPO) has developed a case management system that keeps track of all ML cases, accessed and fed by all the competent authorities. At the time of the on-site visit the system was being populated with data and the connections with different offices under development. Convictions 459. Serbia achieved 353 ML convictions between 2019 and 2024, involving 350 natural and 3 legal persons, mostly resolved in the first instance court. This is a significant increase from the previous assessed period, which had 35 natural persons convicted with only 4 for third party ML. The statistics in table 7.6 also include plea agreements, which between 2019 – 2023 are in total of 206. Table 7.7. ML convictions [80] (persons) Standalone ML ML with predicate crime [81] Self-laundering Third party ML - total Third party ML - Professional ML Total 2019 13 50 17 46 1 63 2020 19 35 21 33 9 54 2021 33 14 18 29 10 47 2022 28 12 9 31 8 40 2023 22 23 22 23 5 45 2024 87 17 13 91 63 104 Total 202 151 100 253 96 353 Percentage 57.2% 42.8% 28.3% 71.7% 37.9% 460. Between 2019 – 2024, from the total of 151 persons convicted for ML with domestic predicate offence, 67.1% were convicted for ML linked to forgery (47) and abuse of position of the responsible person (43), which is partly in line with the country’s risk profile, with more limited results when it comes to other high threat/medium threat crimes (such as drug and human trafficking). As in the case of the prosecutions, the authorities explained that some of those are involving more serious criminality, but the “forgery” was the crime they could prove. 461. The majority of ML convictions pertains to third party cases (71%), and autonomous ML cases, (57%) where, like in the case of the prosecutions (see Table 7.5), more serious underlying criminality is present. From the total number of autonomous ML cases, 18 cases concerning 20 individuals involved foreign criminality including forms of OCG. The same concerns related to the profile of the cases expressed in relation to the prosecutions apply. Footnotes [75] This number does not include stand-alone cases [76] Only cases where the distinction self-laundering vs third party could be made, (does not include stand-alone cases). The total number of prosecutions is to be found in Table 7.4 below. [77] Article 245, paragraphs 1 and 5 [78] The AT was informed that only one Court in Serbia can accommodate more than 15 defendants. [79] In accordance with the Law on Organisation Competencies of State Authorities in Fighting Organised Crime, Corruption and Terrorism [80] The standalone ML convictions are distributed between self-laundering and third-party to the extend that this could be approximated for each standalone case [81] Refers to cases where the predicate crime is prosecuted together with ML" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. Serbia has established measures and approaches to identify and trace criminal property and assets of corresponding value. To target such property, competent authorities employ various methods, including parallel financial investigations, use of special investigative techniques, access to financial intelligence and beneficial ownership information, account monitoring, and both domestic and international cooperation. Tax information and property records/information are also used as relevant to identify and trace criminal property and assets of corresponding value. 479. In general terms, regular and parallel financial investigations are conducted by the SBPOK and OBPK police units (with the support of the PFIU) alongside criminal proceedings for all proceeds-generating crimes, aiming to identify criminal assets, gather evidence, and enable asset seizure. For those specific crimes under the scope of the LoR (Article 2, including ML and TF), the LoR establishes enhanced tools for identifying and tracing criminal property and property of corresponding value (see. R.4), and prosecutors are proactively ordering financial investigations (specially with the purpose to apply extended confiscation), which are executed by the PFIU jointly with other bodies, to trace and identify proceeds inconsistent with the perpetrator's legitimate income. According to the provided information, the number of such investigations conducted under the LoR in recent years was 317 in 2019, 264 in 2020, 305 in 2021, 584 in 2022, and 432 in 2023. Case Box 8.1. domestic asset tracing The JTOK, based on the information gathered jointly with the SBPOK, ordered the PFIU to collect data on the legal income of some defendants, as well as data on the property owned by them defendants and related third parties; and the police was also requested to trace potential criminal assets in cooperation with other national bodies. At the very beginning of the financial investigation, checks were carried out through existing police databases as well as through available databases of other state authorities. In this way, data on the property (movable and immovable) of persons covered by the order for the initiation of a financial investigation (database of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Republic Geodetic Authority – Real Estate Cadastre) were obtained, on the ownership, formal and actual, over the business entity or their participation in the ownership structure of a company (Business Registers Agency), as well as data on the insurance period and the amount of income generated (Republic Pension and Disability Insurance Fund and the Tax Administration). Following the JTOK orders, the police identified the legal income of the defendants, monitored the flow of money, determined the actual ownership of the property, compared the legal income of the defendants and the property of the defendants, after which an investigation was initiated and then an indictment was issued against the organizers and members of this group. It was also identified that some money was funneled to real estate properties (paid in cash), using for that purpose all the information gathered and information provided by commercial banks. Also, the JTOK asked the APML to obtain data from payment institutions and electronic money institutions on whether these individuals and legal entities use the services of payment systems. It was also requested to carry out checks on natural persons who appear in the database of suspicious and cash transactions related to cryptocurrency trading, i.e. to check with digital asset service providers whether the defendants appear as users of their services. In this context, checks covered 29 persons, with a total of 130 related persons, 100 letters/requests for collecting information were sent to institutions, checks were carried out by collecting data from competent state authorities (14), public institutions (6), commercial banks (2), through the CARIN network of international police cooperation (4), etc. 480. From an international perspective, Serbia pursues cooperation with its foreign counterparts in tracing and identifying criminal property to a limited extent. Although some MLA requests were sent and JITs were set up for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting crimes, its use for asset tracing seems to be limited. Based on the statistics provided, only a few numbers of the outgoing MLA requests were sent for asset tracing purposes. 481. Serbia has established the PFIU within the Police Department as the national Asset Recovery Office (ARO) and it participates in domestic investigations and actively pursue international operational police cooperation through received and sent requests for financial checks. Within this framework, data on the assets of natural and/or legal persons covered by the request for checks is exchanged (while the exchange of evidence takes place through MLA between competent judicial authorities). These checks , as referred by the Serbian authorities, relate to the identification of immovable (buildings, houses, apartments, business premises, garages, etc.) and movable property (vehicles, vessels, business entities, etc.) derived from criminal offense for the purpose of its temporary or permanent confiscation, and due to suspicion that the natural and/or legal persons subject to checks have obtained unlawful property benefits by committing criminal offenses and used the funds thus acquired to purchase movable and immovable property in another country. Additionally, the PFIU regularly act upon requests to gather necessary information and evidence on property derived from a criminal offense (e.g., based on a JTOK request) to execute foreign MLA requests. The ARO is also cooperating with its foreign counterparts through CARIN network and Interpol, but to limited extent. Table 8.1. Outgoing and incoming requests of the PFIU 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In INTERPOL 10 14 6 31 10 16 14 11 9 22 CARIN - 19 6 21 10 34 8 21 10 32 SIENA - 11 - 16 - 21 - 20 - 13 Liason officers - 13 - 11 - 4 - 2 - 2 482. It is noted that Serbian outgoing requests are significantly lower than incoming requests, which is not fully in line with the risk profile of the country. In any case, some cases were presented to the AT showing that Serbia was also able to trace criminal assets and its corresponding value in relation to international flows of illicit money. 483. Although the LoR mandates urgency in financial investigations, it does not specify prioritization criteria, investigators consider factors such as the seriousness of the crime, potential damage to property, involvement of organized crime groups, risk of suspect flight, and other relevant elements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="478. Serbia has established measures and approaches to identify and trace criminal property and assets of corresponding value. To target such property, competent authorities employ various methods, including parallel financial investigations, use of special investigative techniques, access to financial intelligence and beneficial ownership information, account monitoring, and both domestic and international cooperation. Tax information and property records/information are also used as relevant to identify and trace criminal property and assets of corresponding value. 479. In general terms, regular and parallel financial investigations are conducted by the SBPOK and OBPK police units (with the support of the PFIU) alongside criminal proceedings for all proceeds-generating crimes, aiming to identify criminal assets, gather evidence, and enable asset seizure. For those specific crimes under the scope of the LoR (Article 2, including ML and TF), the LoR establishes enhanced tools for identifying and tracing criminal property and property of corresponding value (see. R.4), and prosecutors are proactively ordering financial investigations (specially with the purpose to apply extended confiscation), which are executed by the PFIU jointly with other bodies, to trace and identify proceeds inconsistent with the perpetrator's legitimate income. According to the provided information, the number of such investigations conducted under the LoR in recent years was 317 in 2019, 264 in 2020, 305 in 2021, 584 in 2022, and 432 in 2023. Case Box 8.1. domestic asset tracing The JTOK, based on the information gathered jointly with the SBPOK, ordered the PFIU to collect data on the legal income of some defendants, as well as data on the property owned by them defendants and related third parties; and the police was also requested to trace potential criminal assets in cooperation with other national bodies. At the very beginning of the financial investigation, checks were carried out through existing police databases as well as through available databases of other state authorities. In this way, data on the property (movable and immovable) of persons covered by the order for the initiation of a financial investigation (database of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, Republic Geodetic Authority – Real Estate Cadastre) were obtained, on the ownership, formal and actual, over the business entity or their participation in the ownership structure of a company (Business Registers Agency), as well as data on the insurance period and the amount of income generated (Republic Pension and Disability Insurance Fund and the Tax Administration). Following the JTOK orders, the police identified the legal income of the defendants, monitored the flow of money, determined the actual ownership of the property, compared the legal income of the defendants and the property of the defendants, after which an investigation was initiated and then an indictment was issued against the organizers and members of this group. It was also identified that some money was funneled to real estate properties (paid in cash), using for that purpose all the information gathered and information provided by commercial banks. Also, the JTOK asked the APML to obtain data from payment institutions and electronic money institutions on whether these individuals and legal entities use the services of payment systems. It was also requested to carry out checks on natural persons who appear in the database of suspicious and cash transactions related to cryptocurrency trading, i.e. to check with digital asset service providers whether the defendants appear as users of their services. In this context, checks covered 29 persons, with a total of 130 related persons, 100 letters/requests for collecting information were sent to institutions, checks were carried out by collecting data from competent state authorities (14), public institutions (6), commercial banks (2), through the CARIN network of international police cooperation (4), etc. 480. From an international perspective, Serbia pursues cooperation with its foreign counterparts in tracing and identifying criminal property to a limited extent. Although some MLA requests were sent and JITs were set up for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting crimes, its use for asset tracing seems to be limited. Based on the statistics provided, only a few numbers of the outgoing MLA requests were sent for asset tracing purposes. 481. Serbia has established the PFIU within the Police Department as the national Asset Recovery Office (ARO) and it participates in domestic investigations and actively pursue international operational police cooperation through received and sent requests for financial checks. Within this framework, data on the assets of natural and/or legal persons covered by the request for checks is exchanged (while the exchange of evidence takes place through MLA between competent judicial authorities). These checks , as referred by the Serbian authorities, relate to the identification of immovable (buildings, houses, apartments, business premises, garages, etc.) and movable property (vehicles, vessels, business entities, etc.) derived from criminal offense for the purpose of its temporary or permanent confiscation, and due to suspicion that the natural and/or legal persons subject to checks have obtained unlawful property benefits by committing criminal offenses and used the funds thus acquired to purchase movable and immovable property in another country. Additionally, the PFIU regularly act upon requests to gather necessary information and evidence on property derived from a criminal offense (e.g., based on a JTOK request) to execute foreign MLA requests. The ARO is also cooperating with its foreign counterparts through CARIN network and Interpol, but to limited extent. Table 8.1. Outgoing and incoming requests of the PFIU 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In INTERPOL 10 14 6 31 10 16 14 11 9 22 CARIN - 19 6 21 10 34 8 21 10 32 SIENA - 11 - 16 - 21 - 20 - 13 Liason officers - 13 - 11 - 4 - 2 - 2 482. It is noted that Serbian outgoing requests are significantly lower than incoming requests, which is not fully in line with the risk profile of the country. In any case, some cases were presented to the AT showing that Serbia was also able to trace criminal assets and its corresponding value in relation to international flows of illicit money. 483. Although the LoR mandates urgency in financial investigations, it does not specify prioritization criteria, investigators consider factors such as the seriousness of the crime, potential damage to property, involvement of organized crime groups, risk of suspect flight, and other relevant elements." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="526. In the context of the risk profile of the country developed by the 2024 NRA and the aforementioned considerations, no indictments were issued during the assessment period and only one TF conviction was pronounced. Although this conviction considered crimes committed between 2013 and 2014 and was adopted by the first instance Court in April 2018, it was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Belgrade in January 2019 and, thus, falls under the assessment period. However, the considerable time elapsed since both the facts and the conviction -particularly given the risk profile of Serbia - makes its weight in the context of this assessment relative. Case Box 9.2. TF conviction Prominent members of the NPO based in Novi Pazar misused the organization by forming an informal religious community that was later used for inviting to, promoting, recruiting and, training for and funding terrorism. Some of the members travelled to Syria alone or with their families and joined the terrorist organization. TF involved donations, sale of movable and immovable property, provision of various services, provision of non-financial assets, misuse of NPOs and misuse of social benefits. The case was initially opened on the basis of data collected by the SCT and the BIA. Special evidentiary actions were conducted, such as secret surveillance of communications, searches of premises or secret monitoring and recording. An individual who joined ISIS through this group but soon left Syria cooperated as a protected witness (since this person did not take part in combat). During the investigation, the JTOK collected data from banks and payment institutions through the APML in order to obtain financial data from reporting entities. The financing of terrorism was uncovered by obtaining operational information that a person had received and withdrawn money in his own name on behalf of a member of a terrorist group, and immediately thereafter handed over the funds to that member. Four out of the six people accused for TF were finally convicted and two of them were acquitted of this crime. 527. According to the information provided by the Serbian authorities, within the referred resolution, the court required a relatively high standard of proof. While the authorities maintain that the court decision has no impact on the evidentiary level required by the SPPO for initiating formal TF investigation, there was only 1 formal TF investigation during the assessment period (2019-2024). This standard is the apparent reason for the two acquittals in the case above. 528. No seizing or freezing measures related to the criminal property of its equivalent value were adopted (domestically or abroad) in this case. 529. In furtherance of this case, no other types of TF (or other TF cases) have been prosecuted during the period under assessment which, jointly with the limited number of investigations, is not fully in line with the country’s medium TF risk profile. Nevertheless, Serbian authorities affirmed that the lack of TF investigations is due to a limited risk of TF in the country." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="526. In the context of the risk profile of the country developed by the 2024 NRA and the aforementioned considerations, no indictments were issued during the assessment period and only one TF conviction was pronounced. Although this conviction considered crimes committed between 2013 and 2014 and was adopted by the first instance Court in April 2018, it was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Belgrade in January 2019 and, thus, falls under the assessment period. However, the considerable time elapsed since both the facts and the conviction -particularly given the risk profile of Serbia - makes its weight in the context of this assessment relative. Case Box 9.2. TF conviction Prominent members of the NPO based in Novi Pazar misused the organization by forming an informal religious community that was later used for inviting to, promoting, recruiting and, training for and funding terrorism. Some of the members travelled to Syria alone or with their families and joined the terrorist organization. TF involved donations, sale of movable and immovable property, provision of various services, provision of non-financial assets, misuse of NPOs and misuse of social benefits. The case was initially opened on the basis of data collected by the SCT and the BIA. Special evidentiary actions were conducted, such as secret surveillance of communications, searches of premises or secret monitoring and recording. An individual who joined ISIS through this group but soon left Syria cooperated as a protected witness (since this person did not take part in combat). During the investigation, the JTOK collected data from banks and payment institutions through the APML in order to obtain financial data from reporting entities. The financing of terrorism was uncovered by obtaining operational information that a person had received and withdrawn money in his own name on behalf of a member of a terrorist group, and immediately thereafter handed over the funds to that member. Four out of the six people accused for TF were finally convicted and two of them were acquitted of this crime. 527. According to the information provided by the Serbian authorities, within the referred resolution, the court required a relatively high standard of proof. While the authorities maintain that the court decision has no impact on the evidentiary level required by the SPPO for initiating formal TF investigation, there was only 1 formal TF investigation during the assessment period (2019-2024). This standard is the apparent reason for the two acquittals in the case above. 528. No seizing or freezing measures related to the criminal property of its equivalent value were adopted (domestically or abroad) in this case. 529. In furtherance of this case, no other types of TF (or other TF cases) have been prosecuted during the period under assessment which, jointly with the limited number of investigations, is not fully in line with the country’s medium TF risk profile. Nevertheless, Serbian authorities affirmed that the lack of TF investigations is due to a limited risk of TF in the country." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="547. Serbia has a system that allows the identification, freezing and deprivation of TF assets and instrumentalities identified within the scope of TFS. 548. Serbia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR 1267, nor have funds been identified or frozen under this framework, which is consistent with Serbia’s TF risk profile. In 2018 Serbia identified and froze the assets of the individuals designated under UNSCR 1373 (under EUR 2000). The assets were identified within 24 hours of the designations. The freezing orders remain in force. During the period under review, following checks by REs of the lists of designated persons available through the APML website as part of their onboarding processes, two payment institutions identified links to two persons designated by Serbia and froze their assets, demonstrating that the system for identification works. 549. Following reports made by the two FIs to the APML, the Minister of Finance signed formal freezing orders well within the statutory deadline of 7 days. Handling of cases involving freezing (and therefore deprivation of terrorist funds) was carried out urgently by the authorities. Operational coordination of the use of the intelligence and criminal justice framework on the freezing and deprivation of assets destined for terrorism is undertaken by the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group. 550. The requirement for legal persons to open a bank account in Serbia ensures Serbian legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. Most banks are able to detect cases of BO concealment and are actively identifying and reporting cases to the APML. This is beneficial in the context of identification of terrorist assets given the possibility that designated persons might conceal their control of legal persons. IO.3 notes that, during 2022 to 2024, there were a limited number of breaches of CDD-related gaps (including some BO identification issues and ongoing monitoring) at banks. The APML complements banks’ SARs by identifying those that include suspicion of BO concealment, providing further opportunity to identify terrorist assts through its checks. Other FIs need more consistency of implementation than banks with regard to CDD and ongoing monitoring. IO.4 notes that EDD measures are generally applied to varying extents across DNFBP sectors, with no information being available for lawyers, which is a sector pondered more heavily in terms of importance. For the two other highly important sectors, notaries and on-line casinos, no major EDD-related concerns have been noted. The NRA raises concerns about lawyers’ awareness and application of AML/CFT obligations and, in light of this, the absence of supervision and lawyers’ role with legal persons, this is a limitation on effectiveness of identifying terrorist assets and their movement of funds. The involvement of REs other than banks regarding BO is, overall, limited compared with banks. 551. As indicated later in section 4.3.4, with the exception of the legal sector, REs respond quickly, without delay, to notifications of designations and check their databases for matches. False positives have been identified, particularly in the banking sector; in some onsite inspections of banks the NBS noted that banks have identified and reviewed several hundred false positives, which demonstrates the robustness of TFS processes within banks. The overall pattern of the number of false positives would seem to be consistent with the materiality of the banking sector. The degree of awareness and measures undertaken by REs reflect an ability by the overall system to identify terrorist funds and other assets (albeit that the legal sector’s approach to TFS is at an early stage of development and the sector is not yet subject to supervision). 552. There has been one TF conviction during the period (based on facts from 2013-2014) with no confiscation. Therefore, the criminal justice system has not been utilised to deprive terrorists and terrorist financiers of assets, and it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this system. The Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group would be involved in any case taken forward." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="547. Serbia has a system that allows the identification, freezing and deprivation of TF assets and instrumentalities identified within the scope of TFS. 548. Serbia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR 1267, nor have funds been identified or frozen under this framework, which is consistent with Serbia’s TF risk profile. In 2018 Serbia identified and froze the assets of the individuals designated under UNSCR 1373 (under EUR 2000). The assets were identified within 24 hours of the designations. The freezing orders remain in force. During the period under review, following checks by REs of the lists of designated persons available through the APML website as part of their onboarding processes, two payment institutions identified links to two persons designated by Serbia and froze their assets, demonstrating that the system for identification works. 549. Following reports made by the two FIs to the APML, the Minister of Finance signed formal freezing orders well within the statutory deadline of 7 days. Handling of cases involving freezing (and therefore deprivation of terrorist funds) was carried out urgently by the authorities. Operational coordination of the use of the intelligence and criminal justice framework on the freezing and deprivation of assets destined for terrorism is undertaken by the Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group. 550. The requirement for legal persons to open a bank account in Serbia ensures Serbian legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. Most banks are able to detect cases of BO concealment and are actively identifying and reporting cases to the APML. This is beneficial in the context of identification of terrorist assets given the possibility that designated persons might conceal their control of legal persons. IO.3 notes that, during 2022 to 2024, there were a limited number of breaches of CDD-related gaps (including some BO identification issues and ongoing monitoring) at banks. The APML complements banks’ SARs by identifying those that include suspicion of BO concealment, providing further opportunity to identify terrorist assts through its checks. Other FIs need more consistency of implementation than banks with regard to CDD and ongoing monitoring. IO.4 notes that EDD measures are generally applied to varying extents across DNFBP sectors, with no information being available for lawyers, which is a sector pondered more heavily in terms of importance. For the two other highly important sectors, notaries and on-line casinos, no major EDD-related concerns have been noted. The NRA raises concerns about lawyers’ awareness and application of AML/CFT obligations and, in light of this, the absence of supervision and lawyers’ role with legal persons, this is a limitation on effectiveness of identifying terrorist assets and their movement of funds. The involvement of REs other than banks regarding BO is, overall, limited compared with banks. 551. As indicated later in section 4.3.4, with the exception of the legal sector, REs respond quickly, without delay, to notifications of designations and check their databases for matches. False positives have been identified, particularly in the banking sector; in some onsite inspections of banks the NBS noted that banks have identified and reviewed several hundred false positives, which demonstrates the robustness of TFS processes within banks. The overall pattern of the number of false positives would seem to be consistent with the materiality of the banking sector. The degree of awareness and measures undertaken by REs reflect an ability by the overall system to identify terrorist funds and other assets (albeit that the legal sector’s approach to TFS is at an early stage of development and the sector is not yet subject to supervision). 552. There has been one TF conviction during the period (based on facts from 2013-2014) with no confiscation. Therefore, the criminal justice system has not been utilised to deprive terrorists and terrorist financiers of assets, and it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this system. The Anti-Terrorism Operational Working Group would be involved in any case taken forward." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Risk understanding 598. Serbia has carried out 2 PF risk assessments, the most recent in 2024, as part of the combined ML/TF/PF NRA report. The country drew upon the expertise of a range of experts in structuring and undertaking the PF assessment. The understanding of PF risk by the authorities is very good. 599. Three core vulnerabilities were analysed through qualitative evaluation alongside quantitative scoring: breach, non-implementation and evasion of PF controls. The vulnerability section includes an analysis of each sector, with banks having the most detailed analysis in light of the sector’s materiality. Each RE sector was reviewed from the perspective of ownership, problematic employees, non-implementation of TFS measures, evasion of TFS (through analysis of CDD controls, including in relation to beneficial ownership), internal controls, third-party reliance, and increased attention to high-risk jurisdictions. 600. There is some thoughtful variance in the comprehensiveness of the measures adopted by individual sectors in practice, albeit risk in the NRA is linked to FATF lists – this means that intermediary/transit countries which have featured in international case studies, which have financial and trading links with North Korea and which might be the subject of financial flows from Serbia and or intermediary/transit jurisdictions for flows are not the subject of focus and therefore REs are not provided with information on this. More generally, the assessment and articulation of PF risk management by REs should be intensified. 601. To capture broader trading patterns and dual-use flows that could mask PF, the NRA drew on Customs and MOT data, distinguishing between general trading companies on the one hand and re-exporters on the other. The NBS conducted an internal review of over 300 companies engaged in re-export operations. “Deep dive” discussions between authorities were held in connection with a number of trade themes, including industries which have complex supply chains and where dual-use goods might mask diversion to illicit programmes. This pattern of review meant that the APML was able to consider whether trade finance and payments represented real economic activity or whether there was any potential or actual PF linked to economic activity in Serbia, thus increasing understanding. 602. Private sector input was gathered from approximately 300 responses to a questionnaire distributed in 2024 by the Chamber of Commerce and supervisory authorities to REs, export/import traders, and manufacturers engaged in export activity. The questionnaire largely focusses on proliferation matters; there would be benefit in extending the PF element. 603. There would be a benefit in enhancing the coverage of assessment (e.g. persons from proliferation states (North Korea) who might be resident in Serbia, as well as the extent to which goods or funds are transmitted to/through intermediary/transit jurisdictions which feature in international case studies as being used by PF actors. In addition, there would benefit in articulating risk assessment in more detail to increase the substantiation of the thought which has been given to reach conclusions on PF risk. 604. Understanding by the private sector has been increased by various sets of PF indicators in APML guidance, first issued in 2018 with replacement guidance being issued in 2024, and in the NRA reports, and engagement by supervisory authorities, whose own understanding has in turn benefitted from that engagement. 605. The NRA report concludes that Serbia is not receptive, attractive or suitable for a large number of PF scenarios. Banks, real estate brokers, accountants, lawyers and casinos present medium residual risk, with other sectors presenting low residual risk. The banking sector is the most material with the key risk seen as one-off transactions by legal entities that engage in re-exports, use trade-based activity as camouflage, and conceal the identity of BOs. Contextual analysis in the report describes the materiality of financial services activity, including factors that affect the risk of proliferation and the strength of export controls, as well as other mitigation measures. 606. Although no PF related SARs were filed, the APML provided examples of reviews of ML SARs filed by banks which it had examined and developed to assess whether there might be PF, and potential PF threats drawn from its intelligence cooperation with other authorities, including the security services. In addition, six cases were analysed by the APML in which connections with PF were suspected but not substantiated. Strategic analysis by the APML identified two main overarching residual risk scenarios: the re-export of sensitive goods (direct threat) and the use of the country as a transit jurisdiction (transit threat). 607. There is no MLA involving PF. Future assessments could usefully draw upon input directly from foreign counterpart authorities. Mitigating measures 608. Every export or import of dual-use and controlled goods requires a licence from the MOT, with the Customs Administration processing applications, reviewing risk factors, providing views and liaising with trade exporters. Customs’ operational experience allows for understanding of legitimate trade and any indicators which might suggest PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Risk understanding 598. Serbia has carried out 2 PF risk assessments, the most recent in 2024, as part of the combined ML/TF/PF NRA report. The country drew upon the expertise of a range of experts in structuring and undertaking the PF assessment. The understanding of PF risk by the authorities is very good. 599. Three core vulnerabilities were analysed through qualitative evaluation alongside quantitative scoring: breach, non-implementation and evasion of PF controls. The vulnerability section includes an analysis of each sector, with banks having the most detailed analysis in light of the sector’s materiality. Each RE sector was reviewed from the perspective of ownership, problematic employees, non-implementation of TFS measures, evasion of TFS (through analysis of CDD controls, including in relation to beneficial ownership), internal controls, third-party reliance, and increased attention to high-risk jurisdictions. 600. There is some thoughtful variance in the comprehensiveness of the measures adopted by individual sectors in practice, albeit risk in the NRA is linked to FATF lists – this means that intermediary/transit countries which have featured in international case studies, which have financial and trading links with North Korea and which might be the subject of financial flows from Serbia and or intermediary/transit jurisdictions for flows are not the subject of focus and therefore REs are not provided with information on this. More generally, the assessment and articulation of PF risk management by REs should be intensified. 601. To capture broader trading patterns and dual-use flows that could mask PF, the NRA drew on Customs and MOT data, distinguishing between general trading companies on the one hand and re-exporters on the other. The NBS conducted an internal review of over 300 companies engaged in re-export operations. “Deep dive” discussions between authorities were held in connection with a number of trade themes, including industries which have complex supply chains and where dual-use goods might mask diversion to illicit programmes. This pattern of review meant that the APML was able to consider whether trade finance and payments represented real economic activity or whether there was any potential or actual PF linked to economic activity in Serbia, thus increasing understanding. 602. Private sector input was gathered from approximately 300 responses to a questionnaire distributed in 2024 by the Chamber of Commerce and supervisory authorities to REs, export/import traders, and manufacturers engaged in export activity. The questionnaire largely focusses on proliferation matters; there would be benefit in extending the PF element. 603. There would be a benefit in enhancing the coverage of assessment (e.g. persons from proliferation states (North Korea) who might be resident in Serbia, as well as the extent to which goods or funds are transmitted to/through intermediary/transit jurisdictions which feature in international case studies as being used by PF actors. In addition, there would benefit in articulating risk assessment in more detail to increase the substantiation of the thought which has been given to reach conclusions on PF risk. 604. Understanding by the private sector has been increased by various sets of PF indicators in APML guidance, first issued in 2018 with replacement guidance being issued in 2024, and in the NRA reports, and engagement by supervisory authorities, whose own understanding has in turn benefitted from that engagement. 605. The NRA report concludes that Serbia is not receptive, attractive or suitable for a large number of PF scenarios. Banks, real estate brokers, accountants, lawyers and casinos present medium residual risk, with other sectors presenting low residual risk. The banking sector is the most material with the key risk seen as one-off transactions by legal entities that engage in re-exports, use trade-based activity as camouflage, and conceal the identity of BOs. Contextual analysis in the report describes the materiality of financial services activity, including factors that affect the risk of proliferation and the strength of export controls, as well as other mitigation measures. 606. Although no PF related SARs were filed, the APML provided examples of reviews of ML SARs filed by banks which it had examined and developed to assess whether there might be PF, and potential PF threats drawn from its intelligence cooperation with other authorities, including the security services. In addition, six cases were analysed by the APML in which connections with PF were suspected but not substantiated. Strategic analysis by the APML identified two main overarching residual risk scenarios: the re-export of sensitive goods (direct threat) and the use of the country as a transit jurisdiction (transit threat). 607. There is no MLA involving PF. Future assessments could usefully draw upon input directly from foreign counterpart authorities. Mitigating measures 608. Every export or import of dual-use and controlled goods requires a licence from the MOT, with the Customs Administration processing applications, reviewing risk factors, providing views and liaising with trade exporters. Customs’ operational experience allows for understanding of legitimate trade and any indicators which might suggest PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="94. Serbia allows for CDD exemptions in the case of e-money issuers and digital asset service providers (see c.1.6). These exemptions are risk based and accompanied by several mitigation measures (e.g. transactional and use limitations, obligations for VASPs to notify the NBS and/or Securities Commission about the technical solutions utilised to effectively monitor transactions, and non-application of exemptions for VASP clients that are legal persons or entrepreneurs. 95. The authorities reported that there was one VASP who was applying these exemptions, and have confirmed that it had put in place the necessary client identification and transaction monitoring technical solutions. At the time of the on-site visit there was one e-money institution applying the CDD exemption (with very limited e-money value issued in terms of such exemptions) During the review period one e-money institution was applying the exemption however its license was revoked in July 2022 also partly owed to the misapplication of the exemption criteria. 96. The application and impact of these exemptions was analysed under the 2024 NRA which concluded that they are justified based on risk and identified certain limitations (e.g. non-applicability for legal persons/entrepreneurs using VASP services) to be applied considering Serbia’s risk and context. SDD &amp; EDD 97. As set out under the TCA (see. c.1.9), there exists a technical deficiency since SDD is permitted in certain ad-hoc scenarios which are not consistent with Serbia’s assessment of ML/TF risk. The most material FIs servicing other FIs have effective CRAs and risk mitigation processes. Moreover AML/CFT policies reviewed by the AT indicated that SDD on other FIs is only applied subject to low customer risk. Thus, the technical deficiency has limited impact on effectiveness. 98. The AML/CFT law requires EDD measures in cases of high risks (including those mandated by the FATF Standards) as well as in scenarios specific to Serbia, such as corporate clients which have offshore entities within their shareholding structure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="94. Serbia allows for CDD exemptions in the case of e-money issuers and digital asset service providers (see c.1.6). These exemptions are risk based and accompanied by several mitigation measures (e.g. transactional and use limitations, obligations for VASPs to notify the NBS and/or Securities Commission about the technical solutions utilised to effectively monitor transactions, and non-application of exemptions for VASP clients that are legal persons or entrepreneurs. 95. The authorities reported that there was one VASP who was applying these exemptions, and have confirmed that it had put in place the necessary client identification and transaction monitoring technical solutions. At the time of the on-site visit there was one e-money institution applying the CDD exemption (with very limited e-money value issued in terms of such exemptions) During the review period one e-money institution was applying the exemption however its license was revoked in July 2022 also partly owed to the misapplication of the exemption criteria. 96. The application and impact of these exemptions was analysed under the 2024 NRA which concluded that they are justified based on risk and identified certain limitations (e.g. non-applicability for legal persons/entrepreneurs using VASP services) to be applied considering Serbia’s risk and context. SDD &amp; EDD 97. As set out under the TCA (see. c.1.9), there exists a technical deficiency since SDD is permitted in certain ad-hoc scenarios which are not consistent with Serbia’s assessment of ML/TF risk. The most material FIs servicing other FIs have effective CRAs and risk mitigation processes. Moreover AML/CFT policies reviewed by the AT indicated that SDD on other FIs is only applied subject to low customer risk. Thus, the technical deficiency has limited impact on effectiveness. 98. The AML/CFT law requires EDD measures in cases of high risks (including those mandated by the FATF Standards) as well as in scenarios specific to Serbia, such as corporate clients which have offshore entities within their shareholding structure." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="145. The country actively engages in informal international cooperation, regulated by treaties, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and MoUs, as well as through ad hoc arrangements. Direct and informal exchanges are common, particularly with countries where organised crime groups are active, such as Spain, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, as well as with neighbouring countries. Law enforcement and other competent authorities regularly share information via secure channels such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, CARIN, EGMONT, and OECD networks, ensuring consistent cooperation in detecting and countering money laundering and related predicate offences 2.3.1. FIU 146. The APML cooperates with foreign counterparts, as well as with non-counterpart authorities. Pursuant to APML’s Directive on Prioritization, the APML is empowered both to request and disseminate information internationally on its own initiative as spontaneous disseminations. It can either request information for its own analysis or on behalf of other national authorities, mainly the LEAs, to support their activities. In addition, it is empowered to freeze the execution of a transaction on the basis of a written and grounded request of a state AML/CFT body of a foreign country. 147. Although it not required in order to exchange information, to further facilitate the information exchange with the counter-parts where the most numerous exchanges take place, the APML has entered into MoUs with 47 foreign FIUs, up to date. Foreign information requests are handled by the APML as high priority SARs (see IO6). 148. In the evaluated period a total of incoming 1 120 requests were received, 539 related to ML, 21 to TF and 560 to predicate offences (532 requests received in total, in the previous evaluated period). Practically all cases related to asset identification and asset tracing. Pursuant to APML’s Directive on Prioritization a high level of priority is assigned to cases related to requests from foreign FIUs. Such cases are processed immediately upon receipt. Although highly increased in volume, the quality of the responses remained appreciated by the foreign counterparts. The average response time for the incoming requests is 15 days and no unsolved refusal was reported by the international network. Regarding outgoing requests related to freezing of assets, only 1 case was reported. In relation to non-counterpart international requests the FIU uses diplomatic channels. Table 2.12 – Incoming/outgoing APML requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 1 120 ML 102 107 134 85 111 539 TF 3 8 3 3 21 Predicate offence 105 111 142 88 114 560 Outgoing requests 1 544 ML 223 169 173 105 98 768 TF 1 0 2 1 0 4 Predicate offence 224 169 175 106 98 772 149. Requests to foreign FIUs typically seek information on individuals' criminal records, property ownership, legal entity affiliations, bank accounts, authorised signatories, and account activity. For legal entities, beneficial ownership data is also requested. During the evaluation period, 1 544 requests were sent—768 for ML, 4 for TF, and 772 for predicate offences (compared to 789 in the previous period) that constitute the most significant threats in line with country’s risk profile. The APML exchanges information securely via the Egmont Secure Web with member FIUs, mainly in response to LEA and judiciary requests. The data is widely used by national authorities. Positive feedback from partners has helped APML better align with both domestic and international needs. Case Box 2.5. Temporary freezing triggered by foreign counterpart FIU request In 2021, APML received a SAR from a commercial bank regarding a newly opened non-resident account. The account belonged to a foreign-registered company that had received €5.5 million from a third-country entity as an alleged advance payment. When the company’s representative refused to provide supporting documentation, the bank flagged the transaction as suspicious. The APML found that the company was owned by a non-resident individual and had transferred over €1.8 million to the owner’s personal account and more than €2 million to another individual with account access, based on a loan agreement. Further inquiries revealed additional outgoing payments, including nearly €500 000 to a foreign personal account. The APML contacted the foreign FIU, which confirmed that the same €5.5 million had previously been transferred from the company to the sender abroad and later re-routed to Serbia. At the foreign FIU’s request, the APML froze the involved accounts for 72 hours, later extended by 48 hours, and notified the prosecutor’s office. The case proceeded to mutual legal assistance (MLA) proceedings. Ultimately, the APML froze over €3.2 million across the company and personal accounts, successfully disrupting a potentially illicit transaction. 150. Case examples provided to the AT demonstrate the APML’s proactive approach and effective use of international cooperation mechanisms to prevent the dissipation of suspicious funds. Timely coordination with foreign FIUs and domestic prosecutors enabled the temporary freezing of assets, leading to further criminal investigations and legal action. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 151. The Department for International Operational Police Cooperation (DIOPC) within the National Police acts as a contact point for the international police cooperation with the Organized Crime Unit also conducting direct police cooperation with the international counterparts. LEAs effectively use Interpol I24 channel, Europol l Sienna channel, SELEC network, with liaison officers appointed. The international cooperation is also enforced by the liaison officers appointed worldwide (Benelux, Germany, USA, North Macedonia) and by the foreign liaison officers present at the embassies in Belgrade. 152. DIOPC handles basic information requests. The more complex requests are forwarded to the specialized police units for in depth investigations. All the FT requests are handled exclusively by the specialized police unit. The asset recovery requests are handled by the PFIU which also uses the CARIN network for information exchange. All the units that are investigating serious crimes have trained investigators and use Europol’s Sienna channel. 153. The data resulted from the international cooperation is subject to monthly and annual reports (crime analysis, criminal trends) send to the national competent units to be exploited in investigations. Criminal analysis department is also implicated and delivers operational products to the operational police units. Monthly meetings are held by the operational units’ managers, overviewing the trends of the incoming requests. 154. There are no restrictions regarding the offences for which the LEA exchanges information, with ML and TF being treated with priority. Although there is no formal case management system, in practice there are certain criteria which are applied by the Police to prioritise specific cases: detention/arrest of suspect, assets need to be frozen to prevent their dissipation, gravity of the criminal offense, including the amount of assets involved, suspect escaped and there is a risk of destruction of evidence and traces. The active use of informal cooperation by the LEAs is generally in line with country risks and highlights its capacity to use international cooperation. In most cases informal cooperation is a prerequisite to formal cooperation. Table 2.13– Incoming requests for LEA Incoming requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 ML 364 387 404 538 495 TF 737 808 659 617 747 Predicate offence (Interpol_+ Europol) 7 406 7 689 9 810 1 032 7 872 Incoming requests of Financial Investigation Unit (Ministry of Interior) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 INTERPOL 14 31 16 11 22 CARIN 19 21 34 21 32 SIENA 11 16 21 20 13 Liason officers 13 11 4 2 2 Table 2.14– Outgoing requests from LEA Outgoing requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 ML Interpol-95 Europol-209 Interpol-85 Europol-240 Interpol-55 Europol-228 Interpol-53 Europol-239 Europol-165 TF Interpol-45 Europol-119 Interpol-39 Europol-114 Interpol-37 Europol-77 Interpol-19 Europol-181 Europol-86 Predicate offence Interpol- 1 633 Europol- 5 773 Interpol-1 790, Europol-5 899 Interpol-1 905 Europol-7 905 Interpol-1 489, Europol-8 543 Europol-7 872 Total 7 406 7 689 9 810 1 032 7 872 Outgoing requests of PFIU INTERPOL 10 6 10 14 9 CARIN 0 6 10 8 10 155. There is a high volume of LEA incoming and outgoing requests, offering a consistent pool of data for starting investigations. The police units are constantly involved in operational meetings coordinated by Europol, being also part of JITs concluded at police cooperation level. The response time for incoming/outgoing requests are in line with the international standards and no refusals for ML, TF or high threat offences have been reported by the international community or by the Serbian authorities. 156. No negative feedback from the international counterparts also in regard to TF information exchange, but the AT considers that the high volume of data exchanged, even if it arises from routine or simple checks, should trigger TF investigations/criminal proceedings. Case Box 2.6. International police cooperation on tracing and seizure of property in EU member states Successful cooperation between Serbian s SBPOK, Europol, Spain and Hellenic Republic Police led to the identification of an international OCG specialized in drug trafficking (cocaine) with Ecuador as place of origin and Europe, Asia (Hong Kong) and Australia as distribution markets. The criminal proceeds were used at the purchase of houses, apartments and luxury cars in Serbia and abroad, or invested in companies of the OCG members relatives. In the phase of criminal proceedings, through international cooperation with the European counterparts conducted with the help of Europol and Eurojust, SBPOK and the Serbian competent prosecutor identified and seized €180 000 in cash, 20 luxury watches, an apartment in Ibiza, valued at €620 000, one house and three apartments in Belgrade. In the two ongoing criminal cases launched (Greece and Spain), parallel financial investigations are conducted through international cooperation, aimed at tracing and confiscating all the illegally acquired property. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs National Bank of Serbia 157. The NBS has established extensive international cooperation, with 30 bilateral and 3 multilateral agreements covering banking, insurance, pension funds, MVTS/EMI, and VASP sectors, all focused on supervisory and AML/CFT information exchange. It participates in supervisory colleges and consults domestic and foreign regulators during licensing and ownership approvals to assess the business reputation of individuals, including any sanctions related to money laundering or terrorist financing. In 2021 NBS received and acted upon a request from a foreign central bank related to a ML case. Securities Commission 158. The Securities Commission is a member of IOSCO and its MoU, participating in 14 cooperation protocols and the IOSCO AML Network since 2024. It exchanges information on ownership, management, and transactions mainly for supervisory purposes, while AML/CFT aspects are included in all ‘fit and proper’ assessments. Table 2.15 – Incoming/outgoing Supervisory authorities requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 187 National Bank of Serbia: 176 fit and proper measures 4 18 30 32 22 106 supervision and sanctions 3 12 18 23 14 70 Securities Commission 11 fit and proper measures 0 1 0 1 1 3 supervision and sanctions 1 2 1 2 2 8 Outgoing requests 130 National Bank of Serbia: 110 fit and proper measures 14 20 3 7 13 57 supervision and sanctions 14 18 3 5 13 53 Securities Commission 20 fit and proper measures 0 0 0 0 0 0 supervision and sanctions 7 4 4 2 3 20 159. All NBS and Securities Commission employees involved in licensing procedures also contribute to correspondence with domestic and foreign regulators. Responses are provided promptly, and the overall capacity of both institutions to conduct international cooperation is assessed as very good. Supervisors of DNFBPs do not engage in exchanges for international co-operation, no relevant cases were provided to AT. The AT is inclined to conclude that mechanisms for collaboration and information sharing between DNFBP supervisors are not yet developed or operational, which limits the effectiveness of supervisory cooperation at the international level. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 160. Although not a law enforcement agency, the Tax Police, a specialised unit within the Tax Administration, plays a key role in detecting tax crimes and ML. The unit is staffed with trained personnel and operates a case management system that prioritises incoming and outgoing requests based on factors such as financial damage and OCG involvement. It received positive feedback from international partners, including key ones. The activities are in line with the country s risk and context, with good results on ML related to tax crimes The Tax Police uses an integrated tool with real-time access to all national databases, enabling rapid responses to international queries related to legal entities, tax returns, and income data. This constitutes a strength of the Serbian system. 161. Serbia is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. International information exchange is facilitated through multiple instruments, including 64 active double taxation agreements, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and bilateral cooperation agreements. Additional cooperation takes place through programs such as FISCALIS, BRITACOM, IOTA, TAIEX, and CEF. The Tax Police also exchanges data via the Interpol channel under a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior. Table 2.16– Incoming/outgoing Tax Police requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 43 59 51 43 85 281 Outgoing requests 0 22 28 23 51 124 162. The number of requests is constantly increasing in the evaluated period. The refusal rates are 4.6% for incoming requests and 1.6% for the outgoing requests with an average time of execution of 50 days for incoming and 82 days for outgoing requests. Taken together, these figures point to a well-functioning cooperation framework, demand is rising, refusal rates remain low, and counterparts are generally responsive—indicating growing trust and effective use of MLA channels as well as a good quality of cooperation in line with country’s risk profile. A. The Customs Administration 163. The Customs Administration’s Law Enforcement Division handles mutual administrative assistance under SAA Protocol 6 and is authorised to act on letters rogatory (Customs Code, Art. 4(16)). It has concluded 31 bilateral and one multilateral agreement on customs cooperation. A liaison officer at SELEC supports international data exchange. As a RILO member, the CA accesses secure communication and the CEN database. Since 2019, it has participated in 69 international operations, mostly multilateral, coordinated by WCO, OLAF, EUROPOL, INTERPOL, and SELEC. Table 2.17. Incoming/outgoing Customs requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 180 247 219 178 162 986 Outgoing requests 25 90 148 137 161 561 164. The volume of data exchanged is reasonable, with an average execution time of 20 days for the incoming requests and 60 days for the outgoing requests with no cases of refusal reported and no negative feedback noted. The good level of AML/CFT competences demonstrated by the CA positively impacts their ability to provide international co-operation in line with country’s risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="145. The country actively engages in informal international cooperation, regulated by treaties, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and MoUs, as well as through ad hoc arrangements. Direct and informal exchanges are common, particularly with countries where organised crime groups are active, such as Spain, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, as well as with neighbouring countries. Law enforcement and other competent authorities regularly share information via secure channels such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, CARIN, EGMONT, and OECD networks, ensuring consistent cooperation in detecting and countering money laundering and related predicate offences 2.3.1. FIU 146. The APML cooperates with foreign counterparts, as well as with non-counterpart authorities. Pursuant to APML’s Directive on Prioritization, the APML is empowered both to request and disseminate information internationally on its own initiative as spontaneous disseminations. It can either request information for its own analysis or on behalf of other national authorities, mainly the LEAs, to support their activities. In addition, it is empowered to freeze the execution of a transaction on the basis of a written and grounded request of a state AML/CFT body of a foreign country. 147. Although it not required in order to exchange information, to further facilitate the information exchange with the counter-parts where the most numerous exchanges take place, the APML has entered into MoUs with 47 foreign FIUs, up to date. Foreign information requests are handled by the APML as high priority SARs (see IO6). 148. In the evaluated period a total of incoming 1 120 requests were received, 539 related to ML, 21 to TF and 560 to predicate offences (532 requests received in total, in the previous evaluated period). Practically all cases related to asset identification and asset tracing. Pursuant to APML’s Directive on Prioritization a high level of priority is assigned to cases related to requests from foreign FIUs. Such cases are processed immediately upon receipt. Although highly increased in volume, the quality of the responses remained appreciated by the foreign counterparts. The average response time for the incoming requests is 15 days and no unsolved refusal was reported by the international network. Regarding outgoing requests related to freezing of assets, only 1 case was reported. In relation to non-counterpart international requests the FIU uses diplomatic channels. Table 2.12 – Incoming/outgoing APML requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 1 120 ML 102 107 134 85 111 539 TF 3 8 3 3 21 Predicate offence 105 111 142 88 114 560 Outgoing requests 1 544 ML 223 169 173 105 98 768 TF 1 0 2 1 0 4 Predicate offence 224 169 175 106 98 772 149. Requests to foreign FIUs typically seek information on individuals' criminal records, property ownership, legal entity affiliations, bank accounts, authorised signatories, and account activity. For legal entities, beneficial ownership data is also requested. During the evaluation period, 1 544 requests were sent—768 for ML, 4 for TF, and 772 for predicate offences (compared to 789 in the previous period) that constitute the most significant threats in line with country’s risk profile. The APML exchanges information securely via the Egmont Secure Web with member FIUs, mainly in response to LEA and judiciary requests. The data is widely used by national authorities. Positive feedback from partners has helped APML better align with both domestic and international needs. Case Box 2.5. Temporary freezing triggered by foreign counterpart FIU request In 2021, APML received a SAR from a commercial bank regarding a newly opened non-resident account. The account belonged to a foreign-registered company that had received €5.5 million from a third-country entity as an alleged advance payment. When the company’s representative refused to provide supporting documentation, the bank flagged the transaction as suspicious. The APML found that the company was owned by a non-resident individual and had transferred over €1.8 million to the owner’s personal account and more than €2 million to another individual with account access, based on a loan agreement. Further inquiries revealed additional outgoing payments, including nearly €500 000 to a foreign personal account. The APML contacted the foreign FIU, which confirmed that the same €5.5 million had previously been transferred from the company to the sender abroad and later re-routed to Serbia. At the foreign FIU’s request, the APML froze the involved accounts for 72 hours, later extended by 48 hours, and notified the prosecutor’s office. The case proceeded to mutual legal assistance (MLA) proceedings. Ultimately, the APML froze over €3.2 million across the company and personal accounts, successfully disrupting a potentially illicit transaction. 150. Case examples provided to the AT demonstrate the APML’s proactive approach and effective use of international cooperation mechanisms to prevent the dissipation of suspicious funds. Timely coordination with foreign FIUs and domestic prosecutors enabled the temporary freezing of assets, leading to further criminal investigations and legal action. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 151. The Department for International Operational Police Cooperation (DIOPC) within the National Police acts as a contact point for the international police cooperation with the Organized Crime Unit also conducting direct police cooperation with the international counterparts. LEAs effectively use Interpol I24 channel, Europol l Sienna channel, SELEC network, with liaison officers appointed. The international cooperation is also enforced by the liaison officers appointed worldwide (Benelux, Germany, USA, North Macedonia) and by the foreign liaison officers present at the embassies in Belgrade. 152. DIOPC handles basic information requests. The more complex requests are forwarded to the specialized police units for in depth investigations. All the FT requests are handled exclusively by the specialized police unit. The asset recovery requests are handled by the PFIU which also uses the CARIN network for information exchange. All the units that are investigating serious crimes have trained investigators and use Europol’s Sienna channel. 153. The data resulted from the international cooperation is subject to monthly and annual reports (crime analysis, criminal trends) send to the national competent units to be exploited in investigations. Criminal analysis department is also implicated and delivers operational products to the operational police units. Monthly meetings are held by the operational units’ managers, overviewing the trends of the incoming requests. 154. There are no restrictions regarding the offences for which the LEA exchanges information, with ML and TF being treated with priority. Although there is no formal case management system, in practice there are certain criteria which are applied by the Police to prioritise specific cases: detention/arrest of suspect, assets need to be frozen to prevent their dissipation, gravity of the criminal offense, including the amount of assets involved, suspect escaped and there is a risk of destruction of evidence and traces. The active use of informal cooperation by the LEAs is generally in line with country risks and highlights its capacity to use international cooperation. In most cases informal cooperation is a prerequisite to formal cooperation. Table 2.13– Incoming requests for LEA Incoming requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 ML 364 387 404 538 495 TF 737 808 659 617 747 Predicate offence (Interpol_+ Europol) 7 406 7 689 9 810 1 032 7 872 Incoming requests of Financial Investigation Unit (Ministry of Interior) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 INTERPOL 14 31 16 11 22 CARIN 19 21 34 21 32 SIENA 11 16 21 20 13 Liason officers 13 11 4 2 2 Table 2.14– Outgoing requests from LEA Outgoing requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 ML Interpol-95 Europol-209 Interpol-85 Europol-240 Interpol-55 Europol-228 Interpol-53 Europol-239 Europol-165 TF Interpol-45 Europol-119 Interpol-39 Europol-114 Interpol-37 Europol-77 Interpol-19 Europol-181 Europol-86 Predicate offence Interpol- 1 633 Europol- 5 773 Interpol-1 790, Europol-5 899 Interpol-1 905 Europol-7 905 Interpol-1 489, Europol-8 543 Europol-7 872 Total 7 406 7 689 9 810 1 032 7 872 Outgoing requests of PFIU INTERPOL 10 6 10 14 9 CARIN 0 6 10 8 10 155. There is a high volume of LEA incoming and outgoing requests, offering a consistent pool of data for starting investigations. The police units are constantly involved in operational meetings coordinated by Europol, being also part of JITs concluded at police cooperation level. The response time for incoming/outgoing requests are in line with the international standards and no refusals for ML, TF or high threat offences have been reported by the international community or by the Serbian authorities. 156. No negative feedback from the international counterparts also in regard to TF information exchange, but the AT considers that the high volume of data exchanged, even if it arises from routine or simple checks, should trigger TF investigations/criminal proceedings. Case Box 2.6. International police cooperation on tracing and seizure of property in EU member states Successful cooperation between Serbian s SBPOK, Europol, Spain and Hellenic Republic Police led to the identification of an international OCG specialized in drug trafficking (cocaine) with Ecuador as place of origin and Europe, Asia (Hong Kong) and Australia as distribution markets. The criminal proceeds were used at the purchase of houses, apartments and luxury cars in Serbia and abroad, or invested in companies of the OCG members relatives. In the phase of criminal proceedings, through international cooperation with the European counterparts conducted with the help of Europol and Eurojust, SBPOK and the Serbian competent prosecutor identified and seized €180 000 in cash, 20 luxury watches, an apartment in Ibiza, valued at €620 000, one house and three apartments in Belgrade. In the two ongoing criminal cases launched (Greece and Spain), parallel financial investigations are conducted through international cooperation, aimed at tracing and confiscating all the illegally acquired property. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs National Bank of Serbia 157. The NBS has established extensive international cooperation, with 30 bilateral and 3 multilateral agreements covering banking, insurance, pension funds, MVTS/EMI, and VASP sectors, all focused on supervisory and AML/CFT information exchange. It participates in supervisory colleges and consults domestic and foreign regulators during licensing and ownership approvals to assess the business reputation of individuals, including any sanctions related to money laundering or terrorist financing. In 2021 NBS received and acted upon a request from a foreign central bank related to a ML case. Securities Commission 158. The Securities Commission is a member of IOSCO and its MoU, participating in 14 cooperation protocols and the IOSCO AML Network since 2024. It exchanges information on ownership, management, and transactions mainly for supervisory purposes, while AML/CFT aspects are included in all ‘fit and proper’ assessments. Table 2.15 – Incoming/outgoing Supervisory authorities requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 187 National Bank of Serbia: 176 fit and proper measures 4 18 30 32 22 106 supervision and sanctions 3 12 18 23 14 70 Securities Commission 11 fit and proper measures 0 1 0 1 1 3 supervision and sanctions 1 2 1 2 2 8 Outgoing requests 130 National Bank of Serbia: 110 fit and proper measures 14 20 3 7 13 57 supervision and sanctions 14 18 3 5 13 53 Securities Commission 20 fit and proper measures 0 0 0 0 0 0 supervision and sanctions 7 4 4 2 3 20 159. All NBS and Securities Commission employees involved in licensing procedures also contribute to correspondence with domestic and foreign regulators. Responses are provided promptly, and the overall capacity of both institutions to conduct international cooperation is assessed as very good. Supervisors of DNFBPs do not engage in exchanges for international co-operation, no relevant cases were provided to AT. The AT is inclined to conclude that mechanisms for collaboration and information sharing between DNFBP supervisors are not yet developed or operational, which limits the effectiveness of supervisory cooperation at the international level. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 160. Although not a law enforcement agency, the Tax Police, a specialised unit within the Tax Administration, plays a key role in detecting tax crimes and ML. The unit is staffed with trained personnel and operates a case management system that prioritises incoming and outgoing requests based on factors such as financial damage and OCG involvement. It received positive feedback from international partners, including key ones. The activities are in line with the country s risk and context, with good results on ML related to tax crimes The Tax Police uses an integrated tool with real-time access to all national databases, enabling rapid responses to international queries related to legal entities, tax returns, and income data. This constitutes a strength of the Serbian system. 161. Serbia is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. International information exchange is facilitated through multiple instruments, including 64 active double taxation agreements, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and bilateral cooperation agreements. Additional cooperation takes place through programs such as FISCALIS, BRITACOM, IOTA, TAIEX, and CEF. The Tax Police also exchanges data via the Interpol channel under a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Interior. Table 2.16– Incoming/outgoing Tax Police requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 43 59 51 43 85 281 Outgoing requests 0 22 28 23 51 124 162. The number of requests is constantly increasing in the evaluated period. The refusal rates are 4.6% for incoming requests and 1.6% for the outgoing requests with an average time of execution of 50 days for incoming and 82 days for outgoing requests. Taken together, these figures point to a well-functioning cooperation framework, demand is rising, refusal rates remain low, and counterparts are generally responsive—indicating growing trust and effective use of MLA channels as well as a good quality of cooperation in line with country’s risk profile. A. The Customs Administration 163. The Customs Administration’s Law Enforcement Division handles mutual administrative assistance under SAA Protocol 6 and is authorised to act on letters rogatory (Customs Code, Art. 4(16)). It has concluded 31 bilateral and one multilateral agreement on customs cooperation. A liaison officer at SELEC supports international data exchange. As a RILO member, the CA accesses secure communication and the CEN database. Since 2019, it has participated in 69 international operations, mostly multilateral, coordinated by WCO, OLAF, EUROPOL, INTERPOL, and SELEC. Table 2.17. Incoming/outgoing Customs requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Incoming requests 180 247 219 178 162 986 Outgoing requests 25 90 148 137 161 561 164. The volume of data exchanged is reasonable, with an average execution time of 20 days for the incoming requests and 60 days for the outgoing requests with no cases of refusal reported and no negative feedback noted. The good level of AML/CFT competences demonstrated by the CA positively impacts their ability to provide international co-operation in line with country’s risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="189. FIs routinely carry out ML/TF business-wide risk assessments (BRA) that reflect the risks associated with the nature, scope, and complexity of their operations. These risk assessments are required to incorporate national, sectoral and business-specific risks. VASPs have also taken steps to understand and assess sector-specific risks and have begun integrating NRA findings and supervisory feedback into their internal assessments. 190. Supervisory feedback from the NBS and SC shows gradual improvement in compliance, especially among systemically important institutions. Since 2021, BRAs have been reviewed in all on-site inspections, following specific training delivered by the NBS. In 2023, irregularities were found in 2 of 6 inspected banks, while in 2024, only 2 of 9 inspections revealed inadequate BRAs, although the gaps were not deemed as severe by the NBS, who has ensured through its follow-up that remediation occurred in both banks. The APML has reported irregularities concerning the quality and timeliness of BRAs submitted by factoring companies, including serious deficiencies such as their complete absence in some cases; however, this shortcoming is pondered less heavily given the risks and materiality associated with the factoring sector. 191. Generally, bigger FIs and VASPs met on-site were able to comprehensively articulate national and sectorial ML/TF risks and how they may impact their business, as well as related mitigating actions undertaken. These typically include the use of internal risk databases, automated risk classification tools, and documented business-wide risk assessments updated periodically. Larger institutions particularly in the banking and payment sectors tend to implement more sophisticated solutions. In the banking sector, institutions appear to be increasingly attentive to a broader range of ML/TF risk typologies. Some banks have reportedly applied enhanced scrutiny to transactions involving non-resident clients and legal entities, particularly in response to supervisory feedback relating to geographic and ownership risks. Risk assessments in certain cases have also been expanded to include categories such as clients engaged in real estate, and those involved in gaming or similar activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="189. FIs routinely carry out ML/TF business-wide risk assessments (BRA) that reflect the risks associated with the nature, scope, and complexity of their operations. These risk assessments are required to incorporate national, sectoral and business-specific risks. VASPs have also taken steps to understand and assess sector-specific risks and have begun integrating NRA findings and supervisory feedback into their internal assessments. 190. Supervisory feedback from the NBS and SC shows gradual improvement in compliance, especially among systemically important institutions. Since 2021, BRAs have been reviewed in all on-site inspections, following specific training delivered by the NBS. In 2023, irregularities were found in 2 of 6 inspected banks, while in 2024, only 2 of 9 inspections revealed inadequate BRAs, although the gaps were not deemed as severe by the NBS, who has ensured through its follow-up that remediation occurred in both banks. The APML has reported irregularities concerning the quality and timeliness of BRAs submitted by factoring companies, including serious deficiencies such as their complete absence in some cases; however, this shortcoming is pondered less heavily given the risks and materiality associated with the factoring sector. 191. Generally, bigger FIs and VASPs met on-site were able to comprehensively articulate national and sectorial ML/TF risks and how they may impact their business, as well as related mitigating actions undertaken. These typically include the use of internal risk databases, automated risk classification tools, and documented business-wide risk assessments updated periodically. Larger institutions particularly in the banking and payment sectors tend to implement more sophisticated solutions. In the banking sector, institutions appear to be increasingly attentive to a broader range of ML/TF risk typologies. Some banks have reportedly applied enhanced scrutiny to transactions involving non-resident clients and legal entities, particularly in response to supervisory feedback relating to geographic and ownership risks. Risk assessments in certain cases have also been expanded to include categories such as clients engaged in real estate, and those involved in gaming or similar activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="250. Overall, DNFBPs, with the exception of lawyers, have demonstrated a reasonably good level of understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks, and their evolution over time. Generally, in view of the medium TF risk level in Serbia, the level of understanding thereof is considered sufficient among DNFBPs. Regarding lawyers, the AT notes that, while the Bar Chamber advised that there is an uneven level of understanding of the ML/TF risks, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks, given it met only one sector representative. This is pondered more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 251. Notaries met on-site displayed a reasonably good level of ML/TF risk understanding and risk assessment obligations. According to the Notary Chamber, all notaries have BRAs in place which are regularly updated. Although their quality varied, no major gaps were identified through the supervisory engagement conducted over the referenced period. Moreover, the Notary Chamber conducted a thematic BRA review on a sample of 10 notarial offices, representing different geographical profiles, for the period 2019-2024. The results were overall positive and while some concerns with the comprehensiveness and depth of BRAs were noted, none of the deficiencies were deemed serious. These positive aspects are weighted more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 252. The casinos and on-line casinos representatives met on-site demonstrated a clear understanding of ML/TF risks and their evolution over time. With respect to BRA obligations, the GCA identified irregularities in 100% of controls in 2021 and in 55% of controls conducted between 2022 and 2024, which remain significant but represent also a commendable decreasing trend in terms of numbers and in terms of the severity of the gaps identified. The AT notes the same situation regarding the real estate intermediaries met on-site, which also displayed a clear ML/TF risk understanding; nonetheless, the most frequent shortcoming identified through supervisory engagement remains related to the quality of BRAs, although this trend is decreasing. 253. Accountants met on-site demonstrated a good understanding of ML/TF risks and sector-specific vulnerabilities. Although the APML continues to identify instances where inadequate BRAs are performed, supervisory data shows a positive trend, with the proportion of entities conducting BRAs increasing from 64% to 87% over the reference period. This notwithstanding an increase in deficiencies related to the quality of these conducted BRAs observed in 2024. These shortcomings remain a concern but are pondered less heavily in the view of the importance allocated to this sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="250. Overall, DNFBPs, with the exception of lawyers, have demonstrated a reasonably good level of understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks, and their evolution over time. Generally, in view of the medium TF risk level in Serbia, the level of understanding thereof is considered sufficient among DNFBPs. Regarding lawyers, the AT notes that, while the Bar Chamber advised that there is an uneven level of understanding of the ML/TF risks, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks, given it met only one sector representative. This is pondered more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 251. Notaries met on-site displayed a reasonably good level of ML/TF risk understanding and risk assessment obligations. According to the Notary Chamber, all notaries have BRAs in place which are regularly updated. Although their quality varied, no major gaps were identified through the supervisory engagement conducted over the referenced period. Moreover, the Notary Chamber conducted a thematic BRA review on a sample of 10 notarial offices, representing different geographical profiles, for the period 2019-2024. The results were overall positive and while some concerns with the comprehensiveness and depth of BRAs were noted, none of the deficiencies were deemed serious. These positive aspects are weighted more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 252. The casinos and on-line casinos representatives met on-site demonstrated a clear understanding of ML/TF risks and their evolution over time. With respect to BRA obligations, the GCA identified irregularities in 100% of controls in 2021 and in 55% of controls conducted between 2022 and 2024, which remain significant but represent also a commendable decreasing trend in terms of numbers and in terms of the severity of the gaps identified. The AT notes the same situation regarding the real estate intermediaries met on-site, which also displayed a clear ML/TF risk understanding; nonetheless, the most frequent shortcoming identified through supervisory engagement remains related to the quality of BRAs, although this trend is decreasing. 253. Accountants met on-site demonstrated a good understanding of ML/TF risks and sector-specific vulnerabilities. Although the APML continues to identify instances where inadequate BRAs are performed, supervisory data shows a positive trend, with the proportion of entities conducting BRAs increasing from 64% to 87% over the reference period. This notwithstanding an increase in deficiencies related to the quality of these conducted BRAs observed in 2024. These shortcomings remain a concern but are pondered less heavily in the view of the importance allocated to this sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="334. Serbia utilises different mechanisms to ensure that basic and BO information on Serbian legal persons is available in an adequate, accurate and up-to-date manner (see TC Annex 24.5 &amp; 24.6). For BO information Serbia takes a multi-pronged approach, consisting in the availability of BO information via legal persons themselves, the CRBO and via REs (mainly Banks). The Business Registers and CRBO 335. Basic and shareholder data for all legal persons (with minor deficiencies in case of associations – see TC Annex R.24) is subject to registration with the SBRA. JSCs’ shareholder data is available through the Central Securities Register accessible to competent authorities. 336. At incorporation the SBRA undertakes numerous measures to verify basic and shareholder information (see section 5.2). Changes in basic and shareholder data must be registered in the SBR within 15 days. An additional registration fee of RSD6,000 (i.e. €55) is foreseen in case of late filing which is not considered an effective deterrent. This is mitigated by the fact that shareholding only takes effect upon registration. Moreover, late filing fees for basic and shareholding information have been slightly decreasing showing that compliance is improving (see section 5.6). 337. A BO Register (CRBO) has been in place since 2018, wherein BO data for all legal persons must be registered within 15 days of incorporation or any changes thereto. The CRBO is well populated for most material Serbian legal persons. The SBRA has been enforcing the obligation to register BO data through the initiation of misdemeanour proceedings (6622 proceedings between 2021-2023). These initiatives have positively contributed to increasing the availability of BO data in the CRBO over the years. 338. Some gaps remain in the availability of BO data via the CRBO for less material legal persons (i.e. cooperatives, associations, foundations, branches and representative offices). This is due to legal limitations. In case of cooperatives, associations and foundations since actions may not be taken on dormant entities without the minimum members required to administer them and hence file BO information. In the case of branches and representative offices there is no option to strike off defaulting entities. The AT however notes that the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan includes specific actions to address these gaps. Table 5.3. CRBO Population GP/LP LLC JSC Cooperatives Associations Endowments/ Foundations Branches Representative Offices 2020 84/84% 88% 87% 70% 77% 94/80% - - 2024 93/90% 95% 94% 72% 81% 96/84% 76% 31% 2025 April 94/91% 96% 94% 72% 82% 95/84% 78% 31% 339. At stage the SBRA checks the adequacy, and to some extent the accuracy of BO data. The most material gap is the fact that risk-based measures to detect incorrect BO information (including cases of BO concealment through use of strawmen) are not undertaken by the SBRA. Moreover, in case of companies that are multi-layered entities, and whose ultimate BOs are foreign residents, no BO identity verification checks are undertaken. This is less material considering that it effects a fraction of the 12.6% companies that are multi-layered. See section 6.2.2. for more details. 340. Changes in BO data are registered via the SBRA’s web application by the legal representative. The latter is legally obliged to do so, however there are no proactive measures undertaken by the SBRA to identify unregistered changes, and very limited enforcement to enforce the timely registration of changes. The same gaps with BO data verification, explained in the previous paragraph, also apply for BO changes. 341. These deficiencies in ensuring the adequacy of BO data, but more importantly that BO data is accurate (i.e. that the real owners are disclosed), and that changes are detected in a timely manner) are addressed to a large extent by the CDD and ongoing monitoring carried out by Banks (considered to be adequate) and the sporadic actions by the Tax Police. Nonetheless considering that the detection of discrepancies by banks improved more recently, and the fact that lapse of time and operational data is required for suspicious entities to be detected by the Tax Police, the limitations in checks by the SBRA have a moderate bearing. 342. Basic and BO information held within the SBR and CRBO are accessible in three main manners: (i) Access through the SBRA web portal : All registered basic and BO data is publicly accessible and free of charge. In the case of the CRBO this is accessible via E-IDs, also by foreign residents. The CRBO experiences 1,000 – 1,500 daily searches, mostly from domestic IP addresses (90%). Official registry excerpts may be requested against a fee. BO evidentiary documents will become accessible only to those demonstrating a legitimate interest. (ii) SBRA Data Delivery Web Service : Delivery of machine-readable data (API Service) from the registers which may be utilized for automated cross-checks against other databases. This tool is available to competent authorities and Banks. Banks are in fact obliged to utilise it, to identify discrepancies with and update CDD data. (iii) Data at a click : In 2023, the SBRA enabled the querying and delivery of data across all of its registers and records. This enables the identification of legal and natural persons, to which a subject is connected querying data from CRBO and other SRBA online databases. Data at a click is free of charge for competent authorities and available to general public for a fee. 343. All authorities met on-site, and private sector entities mentioned and provided examples of the extensive use of the SBRA portal and other services. The SBRA and Serbia are commended for the advanced tools they have put in place to ensure ease of access to basic and BO information. CDD performed by Banks and other REs 344. Banks are the main gatekeepers ensuring that BO data on Serbian legal persons is accurate, adequate and up-to-date. They are even more crucial role when it comes to foreign legal persons. This given the limitations in availability of BO data within the CRBO for branches and representatives, and the fact that foreign legal persons operating in Serbia not through a branch are not required to register BO data in the CRBO. 345. Banks have a good level of understanding and application of their AML/CFT obligations. They use multiple sources of information to identify the real BOs (i.e. company and BO registries (local and foreign), company statutory and financial documents, open sources of information, interview and on-site meetings performed by relationship managers). They were all aware of their discrepancy reporting obligations and emphasized the increased due diligence they perform when servicing companies with complex structures. 346. All Serbian banks are also subscribed to the SBRA’s data delivery webservice, which is a very useful tool to identity discrepancies between CDD records and the SBRA records for the company. 347. SAR statistics provided by the APML show that most banks [54] are detecting and reporting cases of BO concealment to the APML (Table 5.4). The APML explained these 1190 SARs led to 276 disseminations to the TA and Tax Police, and 255 to the prosecutors (following tax data analysis). Table 5.4. Bank SARs BO Concealment No. of SARs submitted by Banks Bank SARs - BO Concealment No. % 2020 1,026 246 24% 2021 866 211 26% 2022 782 186 24% 2023 791 153 19% 2024 1161 217 19% Total 5445 1190 22% 348. The role of lawyers in servicing prospective founders and companies is on the increase, but still marginal compared to Banks. Their level of CDD and the AML/CFT Supervision is not considered effective (see section 5.2). Discrepancy Reporting 349. REs have been required to identify BO discrepancies between CDD and CRBO data since 2021. Until 2024 only Banks have been doing so. Moreover, until March 2025, banks were not required to notify these discrepancies to the NBS or SBRA. They were required to ask the corporate client in question to explain the deficiency (and hence update CDD data) or else to update the CRBO records. Where clients failed to do so, banks were bound to consider submitting a SAR. No SARs have been raised as a direct result of identified discrepancies, as these were remedied. Table 5.5. BO Discrepancies Identified by Banks 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (end August) Discrepancies Identified 793 1412 1547 2788 851 Discrepancies Resolved 793 1412 1547 2788 722 350. The AT notes that the detection of discrepancies significantly improved recently (2024). The NBS and SBRA explained that this is due to the increased outreach and supervisory measures carried out on BO obligations. Following this spike, discrepancy numbers started to normalise, which is expected. Supervision and Audits by the NBS, Market Inspection and TA 351. AML/CFT supervision performed by the NBS is given much more weight considering the role that Banks have as main gatekeepers when it comes to legal persons’ transparency. On-site examinations performed by the NBS are of good quality (see IO3). Compliance with BO obligations is performed by examining the Banks’ procedure and testing their application through a sample of client files. Through sample testing NBS officials check whether the BOs have been identified, the manner how they have been identified (i.e. source of information utilised), and also scrutinise business documentation to analyse whether the correct BO has been identified. 352. Serious BO infringements have been identified in 2020 (although none of these were of the most serious type i.e. unknown BO). Since then both the number and seriousness of BO infringements has gone down significantly. The NBS explained that this is owed to the improved level of compliance, and various control measures that have been introduced since then (e.g. discrepancy reporting in 2021), and effective remedial and outreach initiatives undertaken. Table 5.6 BO Findings – Banks’ Supervision (NBS) On-Site Examinations Legal person files having identified breaches Type of BO infringement 2020 7 24 9 – Failure to verify BO data 8 – Failure to adequately verify BO data [55] 7 – Delays in CDD when BOs change 2021 6 0 N/A 2022 5 3 3 – Failure to adequately verify BO data 2023 6 2 1 - Failure to adequately verify BO data 1 – Delays in CDD when BOs change 2024 6 1 1 - Failure to adequately verify BO data 353. When supervising banks half of the client files sampled by the NBS usually pertain to legal entities. On average this translates into 41 corporate client files per examination (85% resident vs 15% non-resident). Between 2020-2024 the NBS inspected the client files of 1,235 Serbian legal persons. It is clearly demonstrated that the NBS’s supervisory approach is risk based and prioritises the monitoring of compliance in respect of clients that are resident legal entities. This notwithstanding the amount of Serbian legal persons’ files inspected over 5 years (i.e. 1,235) remains a small fraction of the entire population of LLCs (i.e. 1.3% thereof). 354. The Market Inspection (responsible for inspecting traders) and the TA (responsible for carrying out regular tax audits), carry out inspection on legal entities which also include an element of BO checks. BO checks conducted by these authorities (as part of the wider scope of their controls) involve verifying that the company has registered BO data, that registered data is up-to-date and accurate, and that the company keeps records of documents to evidence who the BOs. 355. While these checks are not as effective compared to the NBS’s, they still contribute to a limited extent in maintaining a reliable CRBO. The Market Inspection in 2024 conducted 1400 inspections, which involved BO checks, and which led to the identification of three cases of non-compliance, in relation to which warnings were issued (subsequent to misdemeanour proceedings) and BO inaccuracies remedied. 356. The SBRA and TA have access to extensive information about companies and can swiftly identify companies presenting certain typologies (e.g. registered at the same address, size of companies etc), which is a strong attribute of the system. Very recently the SBRA started exploiting available data to identify high-risk legal persons and share this with relevant supervisors. The AT commends the authorities for these and other improvements that are foreseen in the 2025 AML/CFT Strategic Operational Plan. The SBRA and other relevant supervisors (TA/Tax Police, NBS and Market Inspection), should build further on these positive steps and coordinate their BO related controls to target more effectively higher risk type of companies. 357. The AT considers the measures undertaken by SBRA, Banks, NBS and Tax Police to be cumulatively effective in ensuring the availability of adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and BO information. The noteworthy gaps that remain i.e.  (i) absence of risk-based checks by the SBRA to detect cases of incorrect founder/BO data (i.e. strawmen and BO concealment cases), (ii) the over reliance on Banks’ CDD to detect case of late registration or failure to register BO changes, (iii) lack of identity verification for foreign BOs involved in multi-layered structures, and (iii) the limitations in coordination of BO related controls performed by the NBS, Market Inspection and TA, are considered moderate in nature. If addressed the reliance on the Banks’ CDD process and Tax Police sporadic controls (with their limitations – see above) would be reduced and the quality of BO data available enhanced. Footnotes [54] The 217 SARs submitted in 2024 linked to BO concealment originated from 17 different Banks. [55] Not all personal details were verified, or else verification measure was not appropriate." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="334. Serbia utilises different mechanisms to ensure that basic and BO information on Serbian legal persons is available in an adequate, accurate and up-to-date manner (see TC Annex 24.5 &amp; 24.6). For BO information Serbia takes a multi-pronged approach, consisting in the availability of BO information via legal persons themselves, the CRBO and via REs (mainly Banks). The Business Registers and CRBO 335. Basic and shareholder data for all legal persons (with minor deficiencies in case of associations – see TC Annex R.24) is subject to registration with the SBRA. JSCs’ shareholder data is available through the Central Securities Register accessible to competent authorities. 336. At incorporation the SBRA undertakes numerous measures to verify basic and shareholder information (see section 5.2). Changes in basic and shareholder data must be registered in the SBR within 15 days. An additional registration fee of RSD6,000 (i.e. €55) is foreseen in case of late filing which is not considered an effective deterrent. This is mitigated by the fact that shareholding only takes effect upon registration. Moreover, late filing fees for basic and shareholding information have been slightly decreasing showing that compliance is improving (see section 5.6). 337. A BO Register (CRBO) has been in place since 2018, wherein BO data for all legal persons must be registered within 15 days of incorporation or any changes thereto. The CRBO is well populated for most material Serbian legal persons. The SBRA has been enforcing the obligation to register BO data through the initiation of misdemeanour proceedings (6622 proceedings between 2021-2023). These initiatives have positively contributed to increasing the availability of BO data in the CRBO over the years. 338. Some gaps remain in the availability of BO data via the CRBO for less material legal persons (i.e. cooperatives, associations, foundations, branches and representative offices). This is due to legal limitations. In case of cooperatives, associations and foundations since actions may not be taken on dormant entities without the minimum members required to administer them and hence file BO information. In the case of branches and representative offices there is no option to strike off defaulting entities. The AT however notes that the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan includes specific actions to address these gaps. Table 5.3. CRBO Population GP/LP LLC JSC Cooperatives Associations Endowments/ Foundations Branches Representative Offices 2020 84/84% 88% 87% 70% 77% 94/80% - - 2024 93/90% 95% 94% 72% 81% 96/84% 76% 31% 2025 April 94/91% 96% 94% 72% 82% 95/84% 78% 31% 339. At stage the SBRA checks the adequacy, and to some extent the accuracy of BO data. The most material gap is the fact that risk-based measures to detect incorrect BO information (including cases of BO concealment through use of strawmen) are not undertaken by the SBRA. Moreover, in case of companies that are multi-layered entities, and whose ultimate BOs are foreign residents, no BO identity verification checks are undertaken. This is less material considering that it effects a fraction of the 12.6% companies that are multi-layered. See section 6.2.2. for more details. 340. Changes in BO data are registered via the SBRA’s web application by the legal representative. The latter is legally obliged to do so, however there are no proactive measures undertaken by the SBRA to identify unregistered changes, and very limited enforcement to enforce the timely registration of changes. The same gaps with BO data verification, explained in the previous paragraph, also apply for BO changes. 341. These deficiencies in ensuring the adequacy of BO data, but more importantly that BO data is accurate (i.e. that the real owners are disclosed), and that changes are detected in a timely manner) are addressed to a large extent by the CDD and ongoing monitoring carried out by Banks (considered to be adequate) and the sporadic actions by the Tax Police. Nonetheless considering that the detection of discrepancies by banks improved more recently, and the fact that lapse of time and operational data is required for suspicious entities to be detected by the Tax Police, the limitations in checks by the SBRA have a moderate bearing. 342. Basic and BO information held within the SBR and CRBO are accessible in three main manners: (i) Access through the SBRA web portal : All registered basic and BO data is publicly accessible and free of charge. In the case of the CRBO this is accessible via E-IDs, also by foreign residents. The CRBO experiences 1,000 – 1,500 daily searches, mostly from domestic IP addresses (90%). Official registry excerpts may be requested against a fee. BO evidentiary documents will become accessible only to those demonstrating a legitimate interest. (ii) SBRA Data Delivery Web Service : Delivery of machine-readable data (API Service) from the registers which may be utilized for automated cross-checks against other databases. This tool is available to competent authorities and Banks. Banks are in fact obliged to utilise it, to identify discrepancies with and update CDD data. (iii) Data at a click : In 2023, the SBRA enabled the querying and delivery of data across all of its registers and records. This enables the identification of legal and natural persons, to which a subject is connected querying data from CRBO and other SRBA online databases. Data at a click is free of charge for competent authorities and available to general public for a fee. 343. All authorities met on-site, and private sector entities mentioned and provided examples of the extensive use of the SBRA portal and other services. The SBRA and Serbia are commended for the advanced tools they have put in place to ensure ease of access to basic and BO information. CDD performed by Banks and other REs 344. Banks are the main gatekeepers ensuring that BO data on Serbian legal persons is accurate, adequate and up-to-date. They are even more crucial role when it comes to foreign legal persons. This given the limitations in availability of BO data within the CRBO for branches and representatives, and the fact that foreign legal persons operating in Serbia not through a branch are not required to register BO data in the CRBO. 345. Banks have a good level of understanding and application of their AML/CFT obligations. They use multiple sources of information to identify the real BOs (i.e. company and BO registries (local and foreign), company statutory and financial documents, open sources of information, interview and on-site meetings performed by relationship managers). They were all aware of their discrepancy reporting obligations and emphasized the increased due diligence they perform when servicing companies with complex structures. 346. All Serbian banks are also subscribed to the SBRA’s data delivery webservice, which is a very useful tool to identity discrepancies between CDD records and the SBRA records for the company. 347. SAR statistics provided by the APML show that most banks [54] are detecting and reporting cases of BO concealment to the APML (Table 5.4). The APML explained these 1190 SARs led to 276 disseminations to the TA and Tax Police, and 255 to the prosecutors (following tax data analysis). Table 5.4. Bank SARs BO Concealment No. of SARs submitted by Banks Bank SARs - BO Concealment No. % 2020 1,026 246 24% 2021 866 211 26% 2022 782 186 24% 2023 791 153 19% 2024 1161 217 19% Total 5445 1190 22% 348. The role of lawyers in servicing prospective founders and companies is on the increase, but still marginal compared to Banks. Their level of CDD and the AML/CFT Supervision is not considered effective (see section 5.2). Discrepancy Reporting 349. REs have been required to identify BO discrepancies between CDD and CRBO data since 2021. Until 2024 only Banks have been doing so. Moreover, until March 2025, banks were not required to notify these discrepancies to the NBS or SBRA. They were required to ask the corporate client in question to explain the deficiency (and hence update CDD data) or else to update the CRBO records. Where clients failed to do so, banks were bound to consider submitting a SAR. No SARs have been raised as a direct result of identified discrepancies, as these were remedied. Table 5.5. BO Discrepancies Identified by Banks 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (end August) Discrepancies Identified 793 1412 1547 2788 851 Discrepancies Resolved 793 1412 1547 2788 722 350. The AT notes that the detection of discrepancies significantly improved recently (2024). The NBS and SBRA explained that this is due to the increased outreach and supervisory measures carried out on BO obligations. Following this spike, discrepancy numbers started to normalise, which is expected. Supervision and Audits by the NBS, Market Inspection and TA 351. AML/CFT supervision performed by the NBS is given much more weight considering the role that Banks have as main gatekeepers when it comes to legal persons’ transparency. On-site examinations performed by the NBS are of good quality (see IO3). Compliance with BO obligations is performed by examining the Banks’ procedure and testing their application through a sample of client files. Through sample testing NBS officials check whether the BOs have been identified, the manner how they have been identified (i.e. source of information utilised), and also scrutinise business documentation to analyse whether the correct BO has been identified. 352. Serious BO infringements have been identified in 2020 (although none of these were of the most serious type i.e. unknown BO). Since then both the number and seriousness of BO infringements has gone down significantly. The NBS explained that this is owed to the improved level of compliance, and various control measures that have been introduced since then (e.g. discrepancy reporting in 2021), and effective remedial and outreach initiatives undertaken. Table 5.6 BO Findings – Banks’ Supervision (NBS) On-Site Examinations Legal person files having identified breaches Type of BO infringement 2020 7 24 9 – Failure to verify BO data 8 – Failure to adequately verify BO data [55] 7 – Delays in CDD when BOs change 2021 6 0 N/A 2022 5 3 3 – Failure to adequately verify BO data 2023 6 2 1 - Failure to adequately verify BO data 1 – Delays in CDD when BOs change 2024 6 1 1 - Failure to adequately verify BO data 353. When supervising banks half of the client files sampled by the NBS usually pertain to legal entities. On average this translates into 41 corporate client files per examination (85% resident vs 15% non-resident). Between 2020-2024 the NBS inspected the client files of 1,235 Serbian legal persons. It is clearly demonstrated that the NBS’s supervisory approach is risk based and prioritises the monitoring of compliance in respect of clients that are resident legal entities. This notwithstanding the amount of Serbian legal persons’ files inspected over 5 years (i.e. 1,235) remains a small fraction of the entire population of LLCs (i.e. 1.3% thereof). 354. The Market Inspection (responsible for inspecting traders) and the TA (responsible for carrying out regular tax audits), carry out inspection on legal entities which also include an element of BO checks. BO checks conducted by these authorities (as part of the wider scope of their controls) involve verifying that the company has registered BO data, that registered data is up-to-date and accurate, and that the company keeps records of documents to evidence who the BOs. 355. While these checks are not as effective compared to the NBS’s, they still contribute to a limited extent in maintaining a reliable CRBO. The Market Inspection in 2024 conducted 1400 inspections, which involved BO checks, and which led to the identification of three cases of non-compliance, in relation to which warnings were issued (subsequent to misdemeanour proceedings) and BO inaccuracies remedied. 356. The SBRA and TA have access to extensive information about companies and can swiftly identify companies presenting certain typologies (e.g. registered at the same address, size of companies etc), which is a strong attribute of the system. Very recently the SBRA started exploiting available data to identify high-risk legal persons and share this with relevant supervisors. The AT commends the authorities for these and other improvements that are foreseen in the 2025 AML/CFT Strategic Operational Plan. The SBRA and other relevant supervisors (TA/Tax Police, NBS and Market Inspection), should build further on these positive steps and coordinate their BO related controls to target more effectively higher risk type of companies. 357. The AT considers the measures undertaken by SBRA, Banks, NBS and Tax Police to be cumulatively effective in ensuring the availability of adequate, accurate and up-to-date basic and BO information. The noteworthy gaps that remain i.e.  (i) absence of risk-based checks by the SBRA to detect cases of incorrect founder/BO data (i.e. strawmen and BO concealment cases), (ii) the over reliance on Banks’ CDD to detect case of late registration or failure to register BO changes, (iii) lack of identity verification for foreign BOs involved in multi-layered structures, and (iii) the limitations in coordination of BO related controls performed by the NBS, Market Inspection and TA, are considered moderate in nature. If addressed the reliance on the Banks’ CDD process and Tax Police sporadic controls (with their limitations – see above) would be reduced and the quality of BO data available enhanced. Footnotes [54] The 217 SARs submitted in 2024 linked to BO concealment originated from 17 different Banks. [55] Not all personal details were verified, or else verification measure was not appropriate." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="408. To facilitate prompt and efficient information exchange, since 2018 the APML has established a network of designated liaison officers within key public authorities [59] . This network enables real-time communication and enhances inter-institutional cooperation on matters related to ML, TF, and related predicate offences. The liaison officers serve as direct points of contact, allowing for the swift transmission of requests, responses, and updates while minimizing bureaucratic delays. These exchanges are conducted on a regular basis through secure and trusted channels, ensuring both the effectiveness of operational coordination and the preservation of data confidentiality. In situations where immediate access to financial information is required - such as to identify or seize assets in ongoing ML or TF investigations - the liaison officer plays a critical coordinating role. Case Box 6.2. The Customs authorities detained a suspect in possession of €3.4 million of undeclared cash and the prosecutor contacted the APML’s liaison officer directly to request urgent access to banking information. The liaison officer flagged the request as high priority, and within hours, the APML had confirmed the account freeze and provided the necessary account details to support the seizure. While the formal written request followed shortly thereafter, it was the liaison officer’s early intervention that enabled the rapid response. 409. From the ML investigations/prosecution presented to the AT, it is notable that often a variety of administrations are involved in the case alongside the Police APML, CA, TA, BIA. A common situation is when prosecutors or police exercise their legal powers to seize assets - either under formal investigative orders or pre-investigative measures - the APML is called to compile the relevant financial intelligence. 410. Courts, prosecutors, and other relevant institutions provide case-progress reports to the APML at least annually, and more frequently during periods of active investigation or prosecution. These reports contain essential updates, including whether the disseminated intelligence has been used in criminal proceedings, the outcomes of related investigations, assets identified or recovered, charges filed, and any newly uncovered evidence relating to predicate offences. 411. The APML organizes regular meetings with LEAs representatives on their own motion. They provide a platform for the timely exchange of operational and case-specific intelligence, help identify and prepare for upcoming procedural steps and ensure coordinated action in follow-up investigations or enforcement measures. Together, these mechanisms allow the APML to maintain an up-to-date understanding of how its disseminations are being used, and to adapt its operational support accordingly. 412. The APML is also involved in close cooperation with supervisory authorities. The officials organize formal and informal meetings to discuss new developments, existing cases and future plans. 6.3.1. Security and confidentiality 413. The APML has regulatory measures to guarantee that information is kept confidential. Access to its premises and systems is restricted, and security protocols are in place governing the use of databases, IT resources and documentation. Communications with other relevant organisations are routed through secure channels. Information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via Egmont Secure Web. Footnotes [59] The Tax Administration – the Tax Police, the Customs Administration, the National Bank of Serbia, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, the Business Registers Agency, the Central Securities Depository and Clearing House, the State Audit Institution, the Republic Geodetic Authority, the Anti-Corruption Agency, the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, the National Health Insurance Fund, the Republic Directorate for Property of the Republic of Serbia and the Public Procurement Office." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="408. To facilitate prompt and efficient information exchange, since 2018 the APML has established a network of designated liaison officers within key public authorities [59] . This network enables real-time communication and enhances inter-institutional cooperation on matters related to ML, TF, and related predicate offences. The liaison officers serve as direct points of contact, allowing for the swift transmission of requests, responses, and updates while minimizing bureaucratic delays. These exchanges are conducted on a regular basis through secure and trusted channels, ensuring both the effectiveness of operational coordination and the preservation of data confidentiality. In situations where immediate access to financial information is required - such as to identify or seize assets in ongoing ML or TF investigations - the liaison officer plays a critical coordinating role. Case Box 6.2. The Customs authorities detained a suspect in possession of €3.4 million of undeclared cash and the prosecutor contacted the APML’s liaison officer directly to request urgent access to banking information. The liaison officer flagged the request as high priority, and within hours, the APML had confirmed the account freeze and provided the necessary account details to support the seizure. While the formal written request followed shortly thereafter, it was the liaison officer’s early intervention that enabled the rapid response. 409. From the ML investigations/prosecution presented to the AT, it is notable that often a variety of administrations are involved in the case alongside the Police APML, CA, TA, BIA. A common situation is when prosecutors or police exercise their legal powers to seize assets - either under formal investigative orders or pre-investigative measures - the APML is called to compile the relevant financial intelligence. 410. Courts, prosecutors, and other relevant institutions provide case-progress reports to the APML at least annually, and more frequently during periods of active investigation or prosecution. These reports contain essential updates, including whether the disseminated intelligence has been used in criminal proceedings, the outcomes of related investigations, assets identified or recovered, charges filed, and any newly uncovered evidence relating to predicate offences. 411. The APML organizes regular meetings with LEAs representatives on their own motion. They provide a platform for the timely exchange of operational and case-specific intelligence, help identify and prepare for upcoming procedural steps and ensure coordinated action in follow-up investigations or enforcement measures. Together, these mechanisms allow the APML to maintain an up-to-date understanding of how its disseminations are being used, and to adapt its operational support accordingly. 412. The APML is also involved in close cooperation with supervisory authorities. The officials organize formal and informal meetings to discuss new developments, existing cases and future plans. 6.3.1. Security and confidentiality 413. The APML has regulatory measures to guarantee that information is kept confidential. Access to its premises and systems is restricted, and security protocols are in place governing the use of databases, IT resources and documentation. Communications with other relevant organisations are routed through secure channels. Information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via Egmont Secure Web. Footnotes [59] The Tax Administration – the Tax Police, the Customs Administration, the National Bank of Serbia, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, the Business Registers Agency, the Central Securities Depository and Clearing House, the State Audit Institution, the Republic Geodetic Authority, the Anti-Corruption Agency, the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, the National Health Insurance Fund, the Republic Directorate for Property of the Republic of Serbia and the Public Procurement Office." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="462. Serbia’s custodial sanctions are proportionate to the severity of crime, and broadly dissuasive and effective. The ratio between the prison sentences vs. the suspended verdicts varies year by year, with an overall increase of the proportion of prison sentences vs suspended sentences in the last 4 years. The ML prison penalties range from 42 months to 3 months which is proportionate to the severity of crime. The highest sentences applied in most serious cases are dissuasive. More generally, the penalties are within the range of other economic crimes and reflect the sanction policy in Serbia. Examples of similar minimum and maximum sentences for tax offences and corruption related offences have been presented to the AT. Table 7.8. Total penalties imposed for ML (natural persons) Types of imposed sanctions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of prisons sentences imposed 4 25 32 23 15 65 Average length of prison sentences imposed in months 10 12 6 10 18 10 Number of suspended custodial sentences 57 29 14 16 29 37 Ratio prison vs suspended 7% 86% 228% 168% 52% N/A Average length of suspended custodial sentences in months 8 7 9 7 10 6 Highest custodial sentence in months 12 30 12 12 42 12 Lowest custodial sentence in months 6 4 3 3 4 3 Number of fines imposed 35 38 42 25 30 65 Average level of fines imposed (in €) 366 688 1 503 5 863 4 864 1 813 Highest fine (in €) 1 667 8 333 16 858 33 333 25 000 33 333 Lowest fine (in €) 333 83 83 167 333 83 Number of deprivation of right to hold office or carry out certain activities 0 3 1 0 10 13 Number of other measures [82] 17 17 16 22 15 55 463. A substantial part of the ML convictions was achieved through plea agreements, which contributes to shortening the length of the proceedings and increases the effectiveness of the resources used in the ML prosecutions. 464. The Mandatory Instruction issued by the Prosecutor for Organized Crime provides guidelines regarding the conclusion of a plea agreement with the defendant, including the type and sanctioning measures proposed. The same guidelines instruct public prosecutors to file an appeal against the sanction decision if it imposes a minimum sentence, a sentence below the legal limit or a milder type of sentence compared to the required. 465. Only three convictions have been achieved on legal persons in 2019 and 2024 totalling fines of €83 334 (see case study 7.4) and one (liquidation). While the AT accepts the authorities’ explanations regarding the relevance of convicting legal persons seeing country’s risk profile as explained under the sub-chapter “Prosecutions” above, the number of legal persons convicted and the value of the fines is expected to increase. Footnotes [82] i.a. community service, prohibitions of entry for foreign citizens" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="462. Serbia’s custodial sanctions are proportionate to the severity of crime, and broadly dissuasive and effective. The ratio between the prison sentences vs. the suspended verdicts varies year by year, with an overall increase of the proportion of prison sentences vs suspended sentences in the last 4 years. The ML prison penalties range from 42 months to 3 months which is proportionate to the severity of crime. The highest sentences applied in most serious cases are dissuasive. More generally, the penalties are within the range of other economic crimes and reflect the sanction policy in Serbia. Examples of similar minimum and maximum sentences for tax offences and corruption related offences have been presented to the AT. Table 7.8. Total penalties imposed for ML (natural persons) Types of imposed sanctions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of prisons sentences imposed 4 25 32 23 15 65 Average length of prison sentences imposed in months 10 12 6 10 18 10 Number of suspended custodial sentences 57 29 14 16 29 37 Ratio prison vs suspended 7% 86% 228% 168% 52% N/A Average length of suspended custodial sentences in months 8 7 9 7 10 6 Highest custodial sentence in months 12 30 12 12 42 12 Lowest custodial sentence in months 6 4 3 3 4 3 Number of fines imposed 35 38 42 25 30 65 Average level of fines imposed (in €) 366 688 1 503 5 863 4 864 1 813 Highest fine (in €) 1 667 8 333 16 858 33 333 25 000 33 333 Lowest fine (in €) 333 83 83 167 333 83 Number of deprivation of right to hold office or carry out certain activities 0 3 1 0 10 13 Number of other measures [82] 17 17 16 22 15 55 463. A substantial part of the ML convictions was achieved through plea agreements, which contributes to shortening the length of the proceedings and increases the effectiveness of the resources used in the ML prosecutions. 464. The Mandatory Instruction issued by the Prosecutor for Organized Crime provides guidelines regarding the conclusion of a plea agreement with the defendant, including the type and sanctioning measures proposed. The same guidelines instruct public prosecutors to file an appeal against the sanction decision if it imposes a minimum sentence, a sentence below the legal limit or a milder type of sentence compared to the required. 465. Only three convictions have been achieved on legal persons in 2019 and 2024 totalling fines of €83 334 (see case study 7.4) and one (liquidation). While the AT accepts the authorities’ explanations regarding the relevance of convicting legal persons seeing country’s risk profile as explained under the sub-chapter “Prosecutions” above, the number of legal persons convicted and the value of the fines is expected to increase. Footnotes [82] i.a. community service, prohibitions of entry for foreign citizens" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="484. The total amount of proceeds of crimes in Serbia has been estimated by the 2024 NRA in approx. 357 million EUR per year, taking into account all reported-crimes and the “ dark figures ” of non-reported crimes as well. Table 8.2. Estimated value of frozen and seized property from 2019 to 2024 (million EUR): 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL 4.03 12.73 32.93 24.98 40.89 17.33 132.92 485. Although these numbers are relatively far from the total estimated amount of proceeds of crime, following the national policies and strategies, provisional measures are proactively sought by the SPPO and broadly applied to secure potential confiscations, particularly when a risk of frustrating does exist. Therefore, these figures follow an upward trend as a result of the more proactive approach or the Serbian authorities. No assets were frozen or seized related to TF despite a TF conviction was issued in 2019. 486. Freezing and seizing orders are applied mainly to the proceeds of crime but also cover instrumentalities of crime, such as vehicles. 487. Serbia presented to the AT some cases where freezing and seizing measures were requested to foreign countries in the framework of their domestic investigations and prosecutions, mainly related to extended confiscation cases (during the assessment period, 8 requests were sent by the JTOK for freezing purposes involving assets amounting a total of 4 876 000 EUR). Case Box 8.2. Freezing/seizing funds abroad Between 2015 and 2017 (final conviction dated on 2022), a criminal group registered four limited liability companies and used other already existing (but inactive) companies for the purpose of funnelling proceeds from crime, using false invoices, amongst others. Predicate crime involved the abuse of the position, use of forged invoices and tax evasion/fraud. Members of the criminal group converted the funds paid in this way in the amount of 511 795 725.49 RSD (4 264 964 EUR) into foreign currency, and then new business documentation was made and issued with false content, on the basis of which the money was paid to the non-resident account of a company from a third country. Serbian authorities (i.e. SBPOK and APML), requested from their counterparts in a third country information on persons who had opened non-resident accounts of a foreign company, on authorized persons to dispose of funds in these accounts, from the date of their opening, together with the accompanying documentation on the basis of which payments were made and requested (i.e. transfer of funds in accounts, current balance on accounts, etc.). Additionally, a request for international legal assistance was sent to the competent court of a third country to temporary freeze criminal funds in the amount of 20 000 EUR, which at that time was in the non-resident account of the company. 488. ML/TF as well as high and medium threat crimes already fall under the scope of the LoR. Nevertheless, some less serious crimes do not, limiting the capacity of the authorities to secure criminal assets on a timely basis in relation to these crimes. The limited time (3 months) of seizing orders issued by the SPPO is also affecting this capacity. 489. Finally, the APML has the authority to order the suspension of transactions in cases of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing, including the possibility of issuing oral orders in urgent cases. When such a suspension is ordered, the APML must notify other competent authorities so they can take appropriate measures, such as freezing or seizing assets. However, this power did not extend to suspicions of predicate offences until March 2025. Temporary suspensions ordered by the APML can last up to 72 hours, with an additional 48-hour extension if the deadline falls on non-working days." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="484. The total amount of proceeds of crimes in Serbia has been estimated by the 2024 NRA in approx. 357 million EUR per year, taking into account all reported-crimes and the “ dark figures ” of non-reported crimes as well. Table 8.2. Estimated value of frozen and seized property from 2019 to 2024 (million EUR): 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL 4.03 12.73 32.93 24.98 40.89 17.33 132.92 485. Although these numbers are relatively far from the total estimated amount of proceeds of crime, following the national policies and strategies, provisional measures are proactively sought by the SPPO and broadly applied to secure potential confiscations, particularly when a risk of frustrating does exist. Therefore, these figures follow an upward trend as a result of the more proactive approach or the Serbian authorities. No assets were frozen or seized related to TF despite a TF conviction was issued in 2019. 486. Freezing and seizing orders are applied mainly to the proceeds of crime but also cover instrumentalities of crime, such as vehicles. 487. Serbia presented to the AT some cases where freezing and seizing measures were requested to foreign countries in the framework of their domestic investigations and prosecutions, mainly related to extended confiscation cases (during the assessment period, 8 requests were sent by the JTOK for freezing purposes involving assets amounting a total of 4 876 000 EUR). Case Box 8.2. Freezing/seizing funds abroad Between 2015 and 2017 (final conviction dated on 2022), a criminal group registered four limited liability companies and used other already existing (but inactive) companies for the purpose of funnelling proceeds from crime, using false invoices, amongst others. Predicate crime involved the abuse of the position, use of forged invoices and tax evasion/fraud. Members of the criminal group converted the funds paid in this way in the amount of 511 795 725.49 RSD (4 264 964 EUR) into foreign currency, and then new business documentation was made and issued with false content, on the basis of which the money was paid to the non-resident account of a company from a third country. Serbian authorities (i.e. SBPOK and APML), requested from their counterparts in a third country information on persons who had opened non-resident accounts of a foreign company, on authorized persons to dispose of funds in these accounts, from the date of their opening, together with the accompanying documentation on the basis of which payments were made and requested (i.e. transfer of funds in accounts, current balance on accounts, etc.). Additionally, a request for international legal assistance was sent to the competent court of a third country to temporary freeze criminal funds in the amount of 20 000 EUR, which at that time was in the non-resident account of the company. 488. ML/TF as well as high and medium threat crimes already fall under the scope of the LoR. Nevertheless, some less serious crimes do not, limiting the capacity of the authorities to secure criminal assets on a timely basis in relation to these crimes. The limited time (3 months) of seizing orders issued by the SPPO is also affecting this capacity. 489. Finally, the APML has the authority to order the suspension of transactions in cases of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing, including the possibility of issuing oral orders in urgent cases. When such a suspension is ordered, the APML must notify other competent authorities so they can take appropriate measures, such as freezing or seizing assets. However, this power did not extend to suspicions of predicate offences until March 2025. Temporary suspensions ordered by the APML can last up to 72 hours, with an additional 48-hour extension if the deadline falls on non-working days." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="530. The penalties imposed in the cases described above varied between 9,5 and 11 years imprisonment for TF, terrorist association in connection with terrorism and recruitment and training for the commission of terrorist acts, or public incitement to commit terrorist acts. 531. Criminal penalties were jointly imposed for all committed crimes and there was no significant difference between the penalty imposed for TF committed jointly with other terrorism-related offenses and penalties imposed for other terrorism-related crimes (with no TF attached). Therefore, it is difficult to assess the extent to which autonomous TF penalties are proportionate, effective and dissuasive. In any case, ultimately, penalties imposed between 9.5 and 11 years of imprisonment were imposed to those individuals convicted for TF and, even if it was imposed also for other crimes, it is an overall dissuasive, proportionate and effective penalty. No confiscation of criminal property or property pf equivalent value was adopted (domestically of abroad) in this case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="530. The penalties imposed in the cases described above varied between 9,5 and 11 years imprisonment for TF, terrorist association in connection with terrorism and recruitment and training for the commission of terrorist acts, or public incitement to commit terrorist acts. 531. Criminal penalties were jointly imposed for all committed crimes and there was no significant difference between the penalty imposed for TF committed jointly with other terrorism-related offenses and penalties imposed for other terrorism-related crimes (with no TF attached). Therefore, it is difficult to assess the extent to which autonomous TF penalties are proportionate, effective and dissuasive. In any case, ultimately, penalties imposed between 9.5 and 11 years of imprisonment were imposed to those individuals convicted for TF and, even if it was imposed also for other crimes, it is an overall dissuasive, proportionate and effective penalty. No confiscation of criminal property or property pf equivalent value was adopted (domestically of abroad) in this case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="553. The NPO sector comprises associations (the most material type of NPO), endowments and foundations. At the end of 2023 there were 36,883 registered associations and 1,086 foundations and endowments. The NRA report states that most NPOs are small, with only 81 having two or more of the following three characteristics: more than 50 staff, operational income of more than EUR 8million or total assets of more than EUR 4million. 554. According to the NRA a very substantial proportion of NPOs provide general information on their goals to the SBRA, meaning that the SRBA cannot determine their actual objectives. Where more specific information is available, the prominent goals include (for associations) culture and art; sustainable development; and environmental protection. The more prominent specific goals for endowments and foundations include science and education; child and youth care; culture and public information; and social and health-care protection. 555. Local, regional and national government in Serbia provide significant financial support to a significant number of NPOs. Other bodies outside Serbia also provide grants. In the period 2021 to 2023 total financial inflows to NPOs were EUR 468 million. Some NPOs are active outside Serbia, with total outflows in the same period being EUR 29 million. Serbia has taken very positive steps since the beginning of the review period to understand the risks of TF abuse of NPOs. Risk based measures 556. Under the aegis of the NPO Working Group [87] the NPO sector has been risk assessed twice, with a discrete section on the sector and its oversight included in the 2024 NRA report. 557. The Serbian authorities have undertaken efforts to identify which NPOs fall within the FATF definition (see R.8) but are not in a position to be wholly successful. Therefore, the risk assessment considered the entire universe of registered organisations working in the non-for-profit realm of the country. The SBRA has developed software for the NPO Working Group to risk rate NPOs, with the NRA report specifying 7,545 NPOs as low risk, 5,737 as low-medium, 3,721 as medium, 1,226 as medium-high and 220 as high. Risk ratings are based on both general factors and TF-specific factors. 558. TF factors include the total funds flows to or from countries with an active threat; investigation for terrorism and TF related crimes; intelligence and APML data (reports on TF dating to 2019 and 2023); links or proximity terrorist entities; or high-risk border areas. A good quality questionnaire completed by 119 NPOs, and the results of outreach and onsite inspections contributed to the risk assessment. 559. General factors capture governance weaknesses, such as failure to submit financial statements, discrepancies or unrecorded changes in assets, missing or late BO information, and frequent changes of registered office. Inactive registered NPOs (see below) are most likely included in the two lowest-risk categories. Once the inaccuracies of the data registered at the SBRA have been resolved (see below) and further analysis is included in the NRA, the risk rating model could become more TF-focused. There were no TF SARs involving NPOs, and, following Police checks on some NPOs, no suggestion of potential TF abuse was found. The assessment of vulnerabilities included some analysis of the legal framework and highlighted significant shortfalls in the adequacy of the data held regarding registered NPOs. 560. The largest threat likelihood relating to the NPO sector was concluded as being use of NPOs to fund terrorist activities by self-radicalised individuals. Medium TF threat levels were concluded as attaching to ethically motivated terrorism, religious extremism, migratory movements and exposure to threats from neighbouring countries. NPOs were concluded as having a low threat likelihood for being used for FTFs and foreign armed conflicts. The overall TF risk of NPOs is rated as low to medium. 561. The NPO Working Group is the main coordination forum. It considers NRA information, progress against the Action Plan, resources and training, and which NPOs should be selected for inspection. Quarterly reports are provided to the Coordination Commission and the National Coordination Body for the Prevention of Terrorism. An expert team, including members from the Working Group, produced a thoughtful report in 2024 on legal changes which should improve the accuracy of data registered at the SBRA and more certain assessment, understanding and mitigation of TF risk. There would be benefit in the Working Group considering whether, in addition to existing dialogue between Working Group members and NPOs, there should be periodic formal dialogue by the Working Group with high risk NPOs. 562. Authorities in the Working Group showed a detailed knowledge of TF context and risks for NPOs and their subsequent experience confirmed that the NRA’s conclusions were accurate. The AT found no intelligence contradicting the NRA, and NPO sector representatives supported the assessed risk level. 563. Nevertheless, addressing inaccuracies of registered data (which, while acknowledged, cannot by their nature be fully explored) and more comprehensive assessment would contribute to an increased risk understanding: the impact of many inactive registered NPOs, with some 40% of NPOs being inactive (2023 - associations (11 604), endowments &amp; foundations (311); 2024 – the figures are likely to be similar); vague registered purposes; donor types (including government funding) and their implications; the risk implications of funding of umbrella organisations and onward funding of NPOs by those organisations; ; and the implications of the number of NPOs rated by banks as high risk compared with the number rated by the authorities as high risk. More responses from a wider variety of NPOs would also be helpful. 564. All NPOs in Serbia must be registered in the SBRA, which checks applications for completeness, discrepancies, and whether potential activities are legally permissible. Applications have been rejected based on these checks. The SBRA also checks the application (and changes after registration) against the lists of designated persons available through the APML’s website. 565. The SBRA (and the NPO Working Group) has endeavoured to improve accuracy of NPO data. NPOs are required to file notifications of inactivity, financial statements and changes to registered data to the SBRA within legally specified deadlines. These requirements, and publication of financial statements by the SBRA, are positive measures adopted by Serbia to improve transparency. Nevertheless, frequent delays and omissions in filings leave the Registry with incomplete or outdated data, which might hamper accurate TF risk identification, assessment and mitigation. 566. Late filing fees are levied by the SBRA. If the fee is not paid on time, the data is not registered. There might be merit in rebalancing the overall system to reduce any implications of this. Late filing of financial statements and notifications of inactivity are offences subject to a court process upon referral by the SBRA, which made more than 12,000 recommendations between 2019 and 2022. Penalties imposed by the court (which are not routinely subsequently communicated to the SBRA) have reduced from 856 in 2019 to 613 in 2024. The SBRA does not have sufficient powers to address deficiencies in data. 567. Outreach to NPOs is a key part of the NPO Working Group’s discussions; it has been provided under the auspices of the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue through 15 “in person” events since the beginning of 2019. The Ministry notifies the NPO sector by emailing all umbrella organisations [88] and NPOs on its database. In practice, to attract audience, the Ministry relies on the umbrella organisations to further cascade information to relevant member NPOs and, cover the costs of member NPOs who attend the events. Some of the NPOs in attendance were high risk. Events included discussion about deficiencies which had been identified through onsite inspections. Umbrella organisations are seen as a key facilitator of, and audience for, outreach in light of their role as key disbursers of funds and the internal control requirements they set for receipt of those funds. 568. While this programme is a positive step forward, this is not the same as having an explicit focus on higher risk NPOs. Consistent with suggestions from the NPO sector itself in response to the NRA questionnaire and when meeting the AT, there is merit in (a) enhancing outreach events, so they are more systematic, and focussed on higher risk NPOs (including events in the border regions); and (b) issuing guidance on governance, transparency, ethics and reporting. 569. Serbia has taken the positive step of introducing a 2019 donor guide, although this is general in its coverage of TF risk and what donors should do to avoid it; a new document that is context-specific to Serbia and its TF risks, more detailed and brought up to date, would be beneficial. 570. Onsite oversight is conducted by the Tax Administration, the Ministry of Public Administration, and the Ministry of Culture. These three bodies have 24, 16 and 5 inspectors available respectively in relation to NPOs; this seems to be sufficient. The selection of NPOs for inspections is based on clusters with geographical proximity to each other as this is the most practical approach for the inspectors. NPOs in these clusters are selected based on general factors, such as multiple changes of notified to the SBRA or NPOs having the same official representative or the same registered address. TF risk is relevant to a partial extent, as a secondary factor. A substantial proportion of NPOs inspected were close to the Serbian border and migrant centre locations [89] . There have also been NPOs selected on the basis of intelligence from authorities on the Working Group. In 2022, a targeted follow-up inspection occurred due to a terrorism and TF concern expressed by one of the authorities on the Working Group. The enhancement of the TF risk assessment and a recalibration of the approach to risk rating should in turn enable a more TF focussed approach to the selection of NPOs for inspection. 571. All inspections follow the same template and involve two tax inspectors reviewing finances and one ministry inspector reviewing governance. The primary focus of inspections is to review compliance with statutory obligations; beyond this, inspectors are mindful of TF risk. Inspectors assess NPO goals, any written material (eg leaflets and brochures) at the NPO suggesting TF risk, associated persons, decision-making, legal compliance, BO accuracy, financial records—including cash handling such as banking of donations and unusual cash withdrawals—and interview responsible persons. Inspection activities vary by TF risk level to some extent (e.g., large cash withdrawals scrutinized from the perspective of statutory obligations as well as TF risk). The authorities note that that a range of misdemeanours identified and remediated with regard to legal governance and control requirements have an important preventive role in relation to TF, in particular regarding use of funds. The NPO Working Group considers the TF aspects of each onsite inspection although the AT notes that the Working Group reports seen by the AT refer to the TF aspect very generally. Information considered by the Working Group is confidential and the AT cannot confirm that inspections fully address TF risks tailored to each NPO. Table 10.1. Consolidated NPO inspections NPOs 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Number of inspections of associations by the Tax Administration and Administrative Directorate of Ministry of Public Administration (all high risk) 41 27 28 14 22 19 2 Number of inspections of foundations by the Tax Administration and Ministry of Culture (low risk NPOs) 10 2 572. Enforcement action is taken for breaches of NPO or tax legislation identified during onsite inspections unless the breach is small and has been corrected. Breaches include cash withdrawals not in line with the NPO’s goals, cash withdrawals or use of payment cards without documents substantiating the payments, breaches around elections of the governing body, failure to publish a list of donors, meetings of members not in line with the statute. There are substantial delays within the court-based system and not all penalties imposed by the court are dissuasive. 573. The four NPO umbrella organisations met by the AT were aware of the TF threats to which they and NPOs might be exposed and had good quality due diligence and governance to protect themselves from TF abuse. They expressed a wish for greater cooperation and coordination from the authorities and for a more systematic and robust approach to education and outreach (see above). Footnotes [87] which includes the Ministry of Interior Service for Combatting Terrorism, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, the APML, the Tax Administration, the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Public Administration, the Ministry of Culture and the SBRA [88] organisations which act as promotors of standards for NPO sector and/or which act as a conduit for government funding to individual NPOs [89] more than a third of NPOs selected in 2021 to 2023" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="553. The NPO sector comprises associations (the most material type of NPO), endowments and foundations. At the end of 2023 there were 36,883 registered associations and 1,086 foundations and endowments. The NRA report states that most NPOs are small, with only 81 having two or more of the following three characteristics: more than 50 staff, operational income of more than EUR 8million or total assets of more than EUR 4million. 554. According to the NRA a very substantial proportion of NPOs provide general information on their goals to the SBRA, meaning that the SRBA cannot determine their actual objectives. Where more specific information is available, the prominent goals include (for associations) culture and art; sustainable development; and environmental protection. The more prominent specific goals for endowments and foundations include science and education; child and youth care; culture and public information; and social and health-care protection. 555. Local, regional and national government in Serbia provide significant financial support to a significant number of NPOs. Other bodies outside Serbia also provide grants. In the period 2021 to 2023 total financial inflows to NPOs were EUR 468 million. Some NPOs are active outside Serbia, with total outflows in the same period being EUR 29 million. Serbia has taken very positive steps since the beginning of the review period to understand the risks of TF abuse of NPOs. Risk based measures 556. Under the aegis of the NPO Working Group [87] the NPO sector has been risk assessed twice, with a discrete section on the sector and its oversight included in the 2024 NRA report. 557. The Serbian authorities have undertaken efforts to identify which NPOs fall within the FATF definition (see R.8) but are not in a position to be wholly successful. Therefore, the risk assessment considered the entire universe of registered organisations working in the non-for-profit realm of the country. The SBRA has developed software for the NPO Working Group to risk rate NPOs, with the NRA report specifying 7,545 NPOs as low risk, 5,737 as low-medium, 3,721 as medium, 1,226 as medium-high and 220 as high. Risk ratings are based on both general factors and TF-specific factors. 558. TF factors include the total funds flows to or from countries with an active threat; investigation for terrorism and TF related crimes; intelligence and APML data (reports on TF dating to 2019 and 2023); links or proximity terrorist entities; or high-risk border areas. A good quality questionnaire completed by 119 NPOs, and the results of outreach and onsite inspections contributed to the risk assessment. 559. General factors capture governance weaknesses, such as failure to submit financial statements, discrepancies or unrecorded changes in assets, missing or late BO information, and frequent changes of registered office. Inactive registered NPOs (see below) are most likely included in the two lowest-risk categories. Once the inaccuracies of the data registered at the SBRA have been resolved (see below) and further analysis is included in the NRA, the risk rating model could become more TF-focused. There were no TF SARs involving NPOs, and, following Police checks on some NPOs, no suggestion of potential TF abuse was found. The assessment of vulnerabilities included some analysis of the legal framework and highlighted significant shortfalls in the adequacy of the data held regarding registered NPOs. 560. The largest threat likelihood relating to the NPO sector was concluded as being use of NPOs to fund terrorist activities by self-radicalised individuals. Medium TF threat levels were concluded as attaching to ethically motivated terrorism, religious extremism, migratory movements and exposure to threats from neighbouring countries. NPOs were concluded as having a low threat likelihood for being used for FTFs and foreign armed conflicts. The overall TF risk of NPOs is rated as low to medium. 561. The NPO Working Group is the main coordination forum. It considers NRA information, progress against the Action Plan, resources and training, and which NPOs should be selected for inspection. Quarterly reports are provided to the Coordination Commission and the National Coordination Body for the Prevention of Terrorism. An expert team, including members from the Working Group, produced a thoughtful report in 2024 on legal changes which should improve the accuracy of data registered at the SBRA and more certain assessment, understanding and mitigation of TF risk. There would be benefit in the Working Group considering whether, in addition to existing dialogue between Working Group members and NPOs, there should be periodic formal dialogue by the Working Group with high risk NPOs. 562. Authorities in the Working Group showed a detailed knowledge of TF context and risks for NPOs and their subsequent experience confirmed that the NRA’s conclusions were accurate. The AT found no intelligence contradicting the NRA, and NPO sector representatives supported the assessed risk level. 563. Nevertheless, addressing inaccuracies of registered data (which, while acknowledged, cannot by their nature be fully explored) and more comprehensive assessment would contribute to an increased risk understanding: the impact of many inactive registered NPOs, with some 40% of NPOs being inactive (2023 - associations (11 604), endowments &amp; foundations (311); 2024 – the figures are likely to be similar); vague registered purposes; donor types (including government funding) and their implications; the risk implications of funding of umbrella organisations and onward funding of NPOs by those organisations; ; and the implications of the number of NPOs rated by banks as high risk compared with the number rated by the authorities as high risk. More responses from a wider variety of NPOs would also be helpful. 564. All NPOs in Serbia must be registered in the SBRA, which checks applications for completeness, discrepancies, and whether potential activities are legally permissible. Applications have been rejected based on these checks. The SBRA also checks the application (and changes after registration) against the lists of designated persons available through the APML’s website. 565. The SBRA (and the NPO Working Group) has endeavoured to improve accuracy of NPO data. NPOs are required to file notifications of inactivity, financial statements and changes to registered data to the SBRA within legally specified deadlines. These requirements, and publication of financial statements by the SBRA, are positive measures adopted by Serbia to improve transparency. Nevertheless, frequent delays and omissions in filings leave the Registry with incomplete or outdated data, which might hamper accurate TF risk identification, assessment and mitigation. 566. Late filing fees are levied by the SBRA. If the fee is not paid on time, the data is not registered. There might be merit in rebalancing the overall system to reduce any implications of this. Late filing of financial statements and notifications of inactivity are offences subject to a court process upon referral by the SBRA, which made more than 12,000 recommendations between 2019 and 2022. Penalties imposed by the court (which are not routinely subsequently communicated to the SBRA) have reduced from 856 in 2019 to 613 in 2024. The SBRA does not have sufficient powers to address deficiencies in data. 567. Outreach to NPOs is a key part of the NPO Working Group’s discussions; it has been provided under the auspices of the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue through 15 “in person” events since the beginning of 2019. The Ministry notifies the NPO sector by emailing all umbrella organisations [88] and NPOs on its database. In practice, to attract audience, the Ministry relies on the umbrella organisations to further cascade information to relevant member NPOs and, cover the costs of member NPOs who attend the events. Some of the NPOs in attendance were high risk. Events included discussion about deficiencies which had been identified through onsite inspections. Umbrella organisations are seen as a key facilitator of, and audience for, outreach in light of their role as key disbursers of funds and the internal control requirements they set for receipt of those funds. 568. While this programme is a positive step forward, this is not the same as having an explicit focus on higher risk NPOs. Consistent with suggestions from the NPO sector itself in response to the NRA questionnaire and when meeting the AT, there is merit in (a) enhancing outreach events, so they are more systematic, and focussed on higher risk NPOs (including events in the border regions); and (b) issuing guidance on governance, transparency, ethics and reporting. 569. Serbia has taken the positive step of introducing a 2019 donor guide, although this is general in its coverage of TF risk and what donors should do to avoid it; a new document that is context-specific to Serbia and its TF risks, more detailed and brought up to date, would be beneficial. 570. Onsite oversight is conducted by the Tax Administration, the Ministry of Public Administration, and the Ministry of Culture. These three bodies have 24, 16 and 5 inspectors available respectively in relation to NPOs; this seems to be sufficient. The selection of NPOs for inspections is based on clusters with geographical proximity to each other as this is the most practical approach for the inspectors. NPOs in these clusters are selected based on general factors, such as multiple changes of notified to the SBRA or NPOs having the same official representative or the same registered address. TF risk is relevant to a partial extent, as a secondary factor. A substantial proportion of NPOs inspected were close to the Serbian border and migrant centre locations [89] . There have also been NPOs selected on the basis of intelligence from authorities on the Working Group. In 2022, a targeted follow-up inspection occurred due to a terrorism and TF concern expressed by one of the authorities on the Working Group. The enhancement of the TF risk assessment and a recalibration of the approach to risk rating should in turn enable a more TF focussed approach to the selection of NPOs for inspection. 571. All inspections follow the same template and involve two tax inspectors reviewing finances and one ministry inspector reviewing governance. The primary focus of inspections is to review compliance with statutory obligations; beyond this, inspectors are mindful of TF risk. Inspectors assess NPO goals, any written material (eg leaflets and brochures) at the NPO suggesting TF risk, associated persons, decision-making, legal compliance, BO accuracy, financial records—including cash handling such as banking of donations and unusual cash withdrawals—and interview responsible persons. Inspection activities vary by TF risk level to some extent (e.g., large cash withdrawals scrutinized from the perspective of statutory obligations as well as TF risk). The authorities note that that a range of misdemeanours identified and remediated with regard to legal governance and control requirements have an important preventive role in relation to TF, in particular regarding use of funds. The NPO Working Group considers the TF aspects of each onsite inspection although the AT notes that the Working Group reports seen by the AT refer to the TF aspect very generally. Information considered by the Working Group is confidential and the AT cannot confirm that inspections fully address TF risks tailored to each NPO. Table 10.1. Consolidated NPO inspections NPOs 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Number of inspections of associations by the Tax Administration and Administrative Directorate of Ministry of Public Administration (all high risk) 41 27 28 14 22 19 2 Number of inspections of foundations by the Tax Administration and Ministry of Culture (low risk NPOs) 10 2 572. Enforcement action is taken for breaches of NPO or tax legislation identified during onsite inspections unless the breach is small and has been corrected. Breaches include cash withdrawals not in line with the NPO’s goals, cash withdrawals or use of payment cards without documents substantiating the payments, breaches around elections of the governing body, failure to publish a list of donors, meetings of members not in line with the statute. There are substantial delays within the court-based system and not all penalties imposed by the court are dissuasive. 573. The four NPO umbrella organisations met by the AT were aware of the TF threats to which they and NPOs might be exposed and had good quality due diligence and governance to protect themselves from TF abuse. They expressed a wish for greater cooperation and coordination from the authorities and for a more systematic and robust approach to education and outreach (see above). Footnotes [87] which includes the Ministry of Interior Service for Combatting Terrorism, the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, the APML, the Tax Administration, the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Public Administration, the Ministry of Culture and the SBRA [88] organisations which act as promotors of standards for NPO sector and/or which act as a conduit for government funding to individual NPOs [89] more than a third of NPOs selected in 2021 to 2023" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="609. The LFA and system for implementing PF TFS are the same as those described in section 4.3.1 in IO.10 Serbia has not identified any designated individual or entity under PF, nor have funds been identified or frozen under this framework, which is consistent with Serbia’s PF risk profile. The APML indicated that the urgent approach which has been used for TF freezing would also be followed for all potential freezing proposals, including PF. 610. With the exception of the legal sector, REs respond quickly, without delay, to notifications of designations and check their databases for matches. This is checked by supervisory authorities when undertaking onsite inspections." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="609. The LFA and system for implementing PF TFS are the same as those described in section 4.3.1 in IO.10 Serbia has not identified any designated individual or entity under PF, nor have funds been identified or frozen under this framework, which is consistent with Serbia’s PF risk profile. The APML indicated that the urgent approach which has been used for TF freezing would also be followed for all potential freezing proposals, including PF. 610. With the exception of the legal sector, REs respond quickly, without delay, to notifications of designations and check their databases for matches. This is checked by supervisory authorities when undertaking onsite inspections." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="99. Prosecutors and LEAs - Upon the conclusion of the 2024 NRA the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office circulated an official communication to all prosecutors’ offices informing them about the conclusions of the NRA and setting out the priorities that the prosecutors’ offices should pursue. This communication stresses the need to prioritise ML cases arising from the highest risk predicate offences namely, tax evasion and tax fraud, drug trafficking, organised crime, corruption and fraud, and ML cases involving the real estate sector. The communication also refers to the profile of LLCs which are more vulnerable for ML purposes. It also highlights the importance of targeting stand-alone and third-party ML with a particular focus on professional ML involving lawyers, accountants and notaries. The priorities identified are clearly aligned with the NRA outcomes. 100. Over the review period prosecutors and LEAs conducted several activities to target ML risks identified. In 2022 the Prosecutor for Organised Crime and the Public Prosecutor’s Special Departments for the Suppression of Corruption developed mandatory instructions and annual work programs which prioritise ML with a focus on stand-alone and third-party laundering. The results are notable in the figures of ML prosecutions/convictions for third-party ML, including the presence of “professional ML” cases. (see also IO7). 101. Other notable activities targeting OC and related ML included: the establishment of the Permanent Task Force formed and led by the Prosecutor for Organised Crime (JTOK) in 2024 to detect and prosecute OCG for ML; the development in 2024 of a joint handbook on financial investigations for JTOK, Police, APML and Tax Police; a guideline for necessary evidence (focusing on circumstantial evidence) required to prosecute for organised crime and ML and to recover proceeds of crime. When it comes to actual ML prosecutions linked to high-risk threats there is room for improvement (see IO7). It was also concerning to note that the asset recovery system has not been reviewed since 2019, and this despite several deficiencies being identified in the 2021 NRA (impacting level of effectiveness under IO8). It is however positive to note that going forward the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan includes a number of actions that are intended to rectify these deficiencies (see in particular action points 8.3 and 8.5) further reducing the weight of these deficiencies for the purposes of this IO1 analysis. AML/CFT Supervisors – 102. The effectiveness and risk alignment of activities and objectives of AML/CFT supervisors varied. NBS, Securities Commission and APML have taken a number of risk-based initiatives, which included updating of AML/CFT Risk Assessment Guidance for REs, the STR indicators, as well as updating the supervisory risk-assessment methodologies to align with the outcomes of the 2021 NRA. Some of these documents (except for the NBS’ documents which have already been aligned to the 2024 NRA) were in the process of being updated to align with the 2024 NRA conclusions. Of relevance was the licensing of the accountancy sector in 2021 and the increased supervisory coverage thereafter by the APML (see IO4). 103. While the Chamber of Notaries did demonstrate a good understanding of the risks to which the notarial sector was exposed, concerns with the application of risk-based supervision were identified. With regards to the BAR Chamber major improvements are needed to ensure that the supervisory coverage of lawyers is adequate and effective (see IO4 analysis). 104. APML – Following the conclusion of the 2021 NRA the APML created its pre-analytics department to better prioritise incoming STRs and ensure that priority was given to STRs and cases aligned within national vulnerabilities and risks. This was also achieved through the establishment of the prioritisation metric and system, which at the time of the on-site mission was being enhanced to reflect the conclusion of the 2024 NRA. Further efforts are necessary to align the prioritisation of incoming SARs and other intelligence to Serbia’s ML/TF risks, and to improve the quality and relevance of SARs (which shortcomings impact the level of effectiveness under IO6)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="99. Prosecutors and LEAs - Upon the conclusion of the 2024 NRA the Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office circulated an official communication to all prosecutors’ offices informing them about the conclusions of the NRA and setting out the priorities that the prosecutors’ offices should pursue. This communication stresses the need to prioritise ML cases arising from the highest risk predicate offences namely, tax evasion and tax fraud, drug trafficking, organised crime, corruption and fraud, and ML cases involving the real estate sector. The communication also refers to the profile of LLCs which are more vulnerable for ML purposes. It also highlights the importance of targeting stand-alone and third-party ML with a particular focus on professional ML involving lawyers, accountants and notaries. The priorities identified are clearly aligned with the NRA outcomes. 100. Over the review period prosecutors and LEAs conducted several activities to target ML risks identified. In 2022 the Prosecutor for Organised Crime and the Public Prosecutor’s Special Departments for the Suppression of Corruption developed mandatory instructions and annual work programs which prioritise ML with a focus on stand-alone and third-party laundering. The results are notable in the figures of ML prosecutions/convictions for third-party ML, including the presence of “professional ML” cases. (see also IO7). 101. Other notable activities targeting OC and related ML included: the establishment of the Permanent Task Force formed and led by the Prosecutor for Organised Crime (JTOK) in 2024 to detect and prosecute OCG for ML; the development in 2024 of a joint handbook on financial investigations for JTOK, Police, APML and Tax Police; a guideline for necessary evidence (focusing on circumstantial evidence) required to prosecute for organised crime and ML and to recover proceeds of crime. When it comes to actual ML prosecutions linked to high-risk threats there is room for improvement (see IO7). It was also concerning to note that the asset recovery system has not been reviewed since 2019, and this despite several deficiencies being identified in the 2021 NRA (impacting level of effectiveness under IO8). It is however positive to note that going forward the 2025 Strategic Operational Plan includes a number of actions that are intended to rectify these deficiencies (see in particular action points 8.3 and 8.5) further reducing the weight of these deficiencies for the purposes of this IO1 analysis. AML/CFT Supervisors – 102. The effectiveness and risk alignment of activities and objectives of AML/CFT supervisors varied. NBS, Securities Commission and APML have taken a number of risk-based initiatives, which included updating of AML/CFT Risk Assessment Guidance for REs, the STR indicators, as well as updating the supervisory risk-assessment methodologies to align with the outcomes of the 2021 NRA. Some of these documents (except for the NBS’ documents which have already been aligned to the 2024 NRA) were in the process of being updated to align with the 2024 NRA conclusions. Of relevance was the licensing of the accountancy sector in 2021 and the increased supervisory coverage thereafter by the APML (see IO4). 103. While the Chamber of Notaries did demonstrate a good understanding of the risks to which the notarial sector was exposed, concerns with the application of risk-based supervision were identified. With regards to the BAR Chamber major improvements are needed to ensure that the supervisory coverage of lawyers is adequate and effective (see IO4 analysis). 104. APML – Following the conclusion of the 2021 NRA the APML created its pre-analytics department to better prioritise incoming STRs and ensure that priority was given to STRs and cases aligned within national vulnerabilities and risks. This was also achieved through the establishment of the prioritisation metric and system, which at the time of the on-site mission was being enhanced to reflect the conclusion of the 2024 NRA. Further efforts are necessary to align the prioritisation of incoming SARs and other intelligence to Serbia’s ML/TF risks, and to improve the quality and relevance of SARs (which shortcomings impact the level of effectiveness under IO6)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 192. While FIs have a generally good level of understanding and implementation of obligations relating to CDD, record-keeping, BO information and ongoing monitoring, further improvements are required as identified through supervisory engagement. Regarding VASPs, the level of understanding and compliance with the aforementioned obligations is evolving in parallel with the development of the sector. 193. CDD practices appear to be generally well established in the banking sector. Interviews with the FIs met on-site and supervisory feedback confirmed that onboarding procedures incorporate identification, verification, and risk-based elements, including the collection of information on beneficial ownership and the source of funds. Banks apply cross-check BO information against internal databases, the SRBA or foreign company registries, and other sources where feasible. Ongoing monitoring mechanisms are embedded into core banking systems and are guided by customer risk rating models. 194. Supervisory statistics indicate that between 2019 and 2024, CDD and BO identification formed a part of every on-site inspection conducted in the banking sector. While no irregularities were identified in relation to record-keeping practices, some gaps were identified concerning the determination of BO and the implementation of CDD measures. In 2019 and 2020, several banks were found to have either failed to update the BO or had done so in a manner not aligned with the prescribed legal standards. Additional issues included insufficient information on the purpose or nature of business relationships, incomplete identification of legal representatives, and inadequate client monitoring. While no such irregularities were identified in 2021, from 2022 to 2024, a limited number of findings continued to surface, including BO identification issues in a small number of banks and occasional deficiencies in ongoing monitoring practices. Overall, the number and severity of CDD-related identified gaps appear to have declined over time and most identified issues were addressed promptly during or shortly after the supervisory process. 195. The FLC and insurance sectors also demonstrate a reasonable level of compliance with baseline CDD and record-keeping measures, in line with their risk and materiality levels. Supervisory reviews have noted gaps in documentation updates and ongoing client review cycles, particularly in smaller institutions. Most deficiencies identified during inspections were addressed through corrective actions ordered on-site, and supervisory authorities have applied both guidance and enforcement measures where necessary. Regarding factoring companies, irregularities in the application of the aforementioned obligations have been identified in relation to the application of CDD requirements, whose remediation have been followed up upon and confirmed by the APML. 196. Among VASPs, CDD implementation is evolving in parallel with the development of the sector. Since licensing requirements were introduced in December 2022, and especially following the first on-site inspections in 2023, supervisors have begun to assess the quality of BO identification and customer profiling procedures. Training and guidance issued by authorities have contributed to improving institutional understanding of obligations, although implementation is at an early stage and is expected to mature as supervisory experience deepens. 197. Overall, the AT observed that CDD, BO identification, and record keeping obligations are generally understood and implemented across sectors. Ongoing monitoring practices are supported by internal tools, though variability remains in the depth and frequency of reviews, particularly in sectors with lower levels of automation or supervisory maturity. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 198. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of the obligation to apply enhanced measures in higher-risk scenarios, such as involving high-risk countries, PEPs, non-face-to-face onboarding, complex legal structures, or products with elevated anonymity or cross-border exposure. However, gaps have been identified through supervisory engagement. 199. According to the NBS’ supervisory data, the application of EDD measures is covered in every on-site inspection. No irregularities in relation to EDD, including these applied to PEPs, were identified between 2019 and 2021. In 2022, one bank was found to have failed to apply EDD to high-risk clients in two instances. In 2023, irregularities were detected in two banks. In the first case, the bank failed to collect all the required data for four PEPs, as it did not verify the declared source of funds against other publicly and non-publicly available information. In the second case, the bank did not identify that a client had become a PEP during the course of the business relationship. The NBS followed up on these deficiencies until their remediation. 200. For the banks met on-site, EDD measures are routinely applied to clients assessed as high-risk. These include the collection of additional information on source of funds, purpose of the transaction or activity. Banks also reported applying additional transaction monitoring rules for non-resident clients and for clients operating in sectors identified as higher risk by the NRA (e.g., real estate, games of chance). MVTS and EMIs reported adopting sector-specific measures, including the application of threshold-based transaction reviews and limitations on certain products (e.g., prepaid cards). Some entities operating in areas near migrant centers or high cash-flow corridors reportedly introduced EDD for first-time customers and business clients, especially where the ownership structure is complex or cross-border links are involved. This reflects a degree of risk sensitivity in product-level controls. 201. In the insurance and FLC sectors, enhanced measures are reportedly applied in relation to high-value policies, PEPs, or clients with foreign beneficial owners. However, supervisory reviews have noted that the level of detail in documenting enhanced checks can vary, especially in smaller or less technically equipped institutions in the FLC sector. In most cases, identified gaps were addressed. 202. In the capital markets sector, the SC highlighted the importance of enhanced measures, particularly in relation to nominees, complex cross-border arrangements, and private portfolio management. While formal policies exist, interviews with smaller entities suggested that the implementation of enhanced measures is often event-driven (e.g., triggered by unusual transactions or red flags), rather than systematically applied. The APML reported that certain irregularities existed in the procedures and measures implemented by factoring companies to identify PEP clients. The deficiencies have been addressed, and enforcement actions have been taken. 203. While implementation practices are still evolving, the supervisory authorities indicated during interviews that VASPS had established internal risk classification procedures and adopted written policies addressing enhanced measures. These developments were reviewed as part of the initial on-site inspections that commenced in 2023. 204. Overall, enhanced and specific measures are in place across the main financial and VASP sectors, in line with their respective varying levels of maturity. Supervisory engagement has supported the progressive adoption of risk-based responses, although further consistency in implementation, particularly outside the banking sector, would strengthen the overall effectiveness of preventive measures. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 205. Generally, according to supervisory data, the compliance with AML/CFT reporting obligations is increasing. Concerns have been identified at the beginning of the reference period, mainly regarding unreported SARs, in one bank in 2020 and in two banks in 2022. Systemically important institutions, particularly banks and larger MVTS providers, remain the primary sources of SARs, and supervisory data suggest that the quality of reporting have improved in recent years. Regarding exchange offices and payment institutions, supervisory data identified an improvement in the SARs quality. Regarding factoring companies, only one instance of an unreported suspicion was noted through APML’s supervisory engagement over the referenced period. Authorities reported no concerns regarding tipping-off. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 206. Across most sectors, internal control frameworks are in place and broadly aligned with legal obligations. Supervisory methodologies for banks and FLCs place structured emphasis on internal governance and audit, and ML/TF risks management systems. These include formal procedures for informing management of policy deviations, scheduled internal audits, and mechanisms for rectifying identified irregularities within specified timeframes. However, according to supervisory data, in relation to internal procedures, irregularities have been found by NBS in almost every on-site inspection, with varying levels of importance. 207. In the VASP sector, internal controls are at an earlier stage of development given the recency of regulatory oversight. Institutions are expected to document how internal policies address sector-specific risk typologies, including controls over non-custodial wallets and crypto-to-crypto services. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 208. There are no significant legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and related mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 192. While FIs have a generally good level of understanding and implementation of obligations relating to CDD, record-keeping, BO information and ongoing monitoring, further improvements are required as identified through supervisory engagement. Regarding VASPs, the level of understanding and compliance with the aforementioned obligations is evolving in parallel with the development of the sector. 193. CDD practices appear to be generally well established in the banking sector. Interviews with the FIs met on-site and supervisory feedback confirmed that onboarding procedures incorporate identification, verification, and risk-based elements, including the collection of information on beneficial ownership and the source of funds. Banks apply cross-check BO information against internal databases, the SRBA or foreign company registries, and other sources where feasible. Ongoing monitoring mechanisms are embedded into core banking systems and are guided by customer risk rating models. 194. Supervisory statistics indicate that between 2019 and 2024, CDD and BO identification formed a part of every on-site inspection conducted in the banking sector. While no irregularities were identified in relation to record-keeping practices, some gaps were identified concerning the determination of BO and the implementation of CDD measures. In 2019 and 2020, several banks were found to have either failed to update the BO or had done so in a manner not aligned with the prescribed legal standards. Additional issues included insufficient information on the purpose or nature of business relationships, incomplete identification of legal representatives, and inadequate client monitoring. While no such irregularities were identified in 2021, from 2022 to 2024, a limited number of findings continued to surface, including BO identification issues in a small number of banks and occasional deficiencies in ongoing monitoring practices. Overall, the number and severity of CDD-related identified gaps appear to have declined over time and most identified issues were addressed promptly during or shortly after the supervisory process. 195. The FLC and insurance sectors also demonstrate a reasonable level of compliance with baseline CDD and record-keeping measures, in line with their risk and materiality levels. Supervisory reviews have noted gaps in documentation updates and ongoing client review cycles, particularly in smaller institutions. Most deficiencies identified during inspections were addressed through corrective actions ordered on-site, and supervisory authorities have applied both guidance and enforcement measures where necessary. Regarding factoring companies, irregularities in the application of the aforementioned obligations have been identified in relation to the application of CDD requirements, whose remediation have been followed up upon and confirmed by the APML. 196. Among VASPs, CDD implementation is evolving in parallel with the development of the sector. Since licensing requirements were introduced in December 2022, and especially following the first on-site inspections in 2023, supervisors have begun to assess the quality of BO identification and customer profiling procedures. Training and guidance issued by authorities have contributed to improving institutional understanding of obligations, although implementation is at an early stage and is expected to mature as supervisory experience deepens. 197. Overall, the AT observed that CDD, BO identification, and record keeping obligations are generally understood and implemented across sectors. Ongoing monitoring practices are supported by internal tools, though variability remains in the depth and frequency of reviews, particularly in sectors with lower levels of automation or supervisory maturity. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 198. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of the obligation to apply enhanced measures in higher-risk scenarios, such as involving high-risk countries, PEPs, non-face-to-face onboarding, complex legal structures, or products with elevated anonymity or cross-border exposure. However, gaps have been identified through supervisory engagement. 199. According to the NBS’ supervisory data, the application of EDD measures is covered in every on-site inspection. No irregularities in relation to EDD, including these applied to PEPs, were identified between 2019 and 2021. In 2022, one bank was found to have failed to apply EDD to high-risk clients in two instances. In 2023, irregularities were detected in two banks. In the first case, the bank failed to collect all the required data for four PEPs, as it did not verify the declared source of funds against other publicly and non-publicly available information. In the second case, the bank did not identify that a client had become a PEP during the course of the business relationship. The NBS followed up on these deficiencies until their remediation. 200. For the banks met on-site, EDD measures are routinely applied to clients assessed as high-risk. These include the collection of additional information on source of funds, purpose of the transaction or activity. Banks also reported applying additional transaction monitoring rules for non-resident clients and for clients operating in sectors identified as higher risk by the NRA (e.g., real estate, games of chance). MVTS and EMIs reported adopting sector-specific measures, including the application of threshold-based transaction reviews and limitations on certain products (e.g., prepaid cards). Some entities operating in areas near migrant centers or high cash-flow corridors reportedly introduced EDD for first-time customers and business clients, especially where the ownership structure is complex or cross-border links are involved. This reflects a degree of risk sensitivity in product-level controls. 201. In the insurance and FLC sectors, enhanced measures are reportedly applied in relation to high-value policies, PEPs, or clients with foreign beneficial owners. However, supervisory reviews have noted that the level of detail in documenting enhanced checks can vary, especially in smaller or less technically equipped institutions in the FLC sector. In most cases, identified gaps were addressed. 202. In the capital markets sector, the SC highlighted the importance of enhanced measures, particularly in relation to nominees, complex cross-border arrangements, and private portfolio management. While formal policies exist, interviews with smaller entities suggested that the implementation of enhanced measures is often event-driven (e.g., triggered by unusual transactions or red flags), rather than systematically applied. The APML reported that certain irregularities existed in the procedures and measures implemented by factoring companies to identify PEP clients. The deficiencies have been addressed, and enforcement actions have been taken. 203. While implementation practices are still evolving, the supervisory authorities indicated during interviews that VASPS had established internal risk classification procedures and adopted written policies addressing enhanced measures. These developments were reviewed as part of the initial on-site inspections that commenced in 2023. 204. Overall, enhanced and specific measures are in place across the main financial and VASP sectors, in line with their respective varying levels of maturity. Supervisory engagement has supported the progressive adoption of risk-based responses, although further consistency in implementation, particularly outside the banking sector, would strengthen the overall effectiveness of preventive measures. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 205. Generally, according to supervisory data, the compliance with AML/CFT reporting obligations is increasing. Concerns have been identified at the beginning of the reference period, mainly regarding unreported SARs, in one bank in 2020 and in two banks in 2022. Systemically important institutions, particularly banks and larger MVTS providers, remain the primary sources of SARs, and supervisory data suggest that the quality of reporting have improved in recent years. Regarding exchange offices and payment institutions, supervisory data identified an improvement in the SARs quality. Regarding factoring companies, only one instance of an unreported suspicion was noted through APML’s supervisory engagement over the referenced period. Authorities reported no concerns regarding tipping-off. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 206. Across most sectors, internal control frameworks are in place and broadly aligned with legal obligations. Supervisory methodologies for banks and FLCs place structured emphasis on internal governance and audit, and ML/TF risks management systems. These include formal procedures for informing management of policy deviations, scheduled internal audits, and mechanisms for rectifying identified irregularities within specified timeframes. However, according to supervisory data, in relation to internal procedures, irregularities have been found by NBS in almost every on-site inspection, with varying levels of importance. 207. In the VASP sector, internal controls are at an earlier stage of development given the recency of regulatory oversight. Institutions are expected to document how internal policies address sector-specific risk typologies, including controls over non-custodial wallets and crypto-to-crypto services. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 208. There are no significant legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and related mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="254. Most DNFBPs, with the exception of lawyers, have demonstrated a good level of understanding of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures, although the compliance therewith varied. The AT positively notes a relatively limited number of systemic AML/CFT violations uncovered through supervision. Awareness raising and training activities conducted by supervisors, often in cooperation with the APML (FIU) have contributed to an overall increase in STRs, though under-reporting persists mainly regarding lawyers. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 255. The Bar Association has not provided any information in these regards to the AT. Moreover, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures the sector, given it met only one representative on-site. This is pondered more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 256. In relation to notaries, over the referenced period, the AT notices that out of the significant number of examinations conducted, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Notary Chamber only in 9 instances. Record-keeping- related deficiencies were present in all these instances, while concerns related to client and BO identification and verification measures also featured, but to a lesser extent. In respect of client and BO identification and verification measures, the notaries met on-site provided details and explanations on the measures undertaken and public databases used to implement these obligations effectively. 257. The GCA supervisory data show that irregularities were found in 86% of controls regarding CDD obligations and in 36% regarding internal control and 36% record-keeping. The record-keeping gaps identified were considered as serious by the GCA; however, with respect to transactional data, this is mitigated through the IKS system, as data on all transactions is recorded and maintained by the GCA; this data is accessible to the APML and LEAs. On-going monitoring by online casinos was deemed adequate, considering the use of integrated IT solutions and the IKS irregularity detection module that enables real-time transaction monitoring and identification of unusual behaviour. On-line casinos use integrated IP address information to track and verify customers’ residence and also IT solutions for remote identity verification. The AT considers that while the technical tools are in place and represent progress, their impact on compliance is not yet commensurate with the sector’s risk profile and also considering the extensive number of breaches that keep being identified. 258. Through the on-site engagement carried out by the Market Inspection, gaps are still identified regarding the implementation of CDD obligations. The Market Inspection explained that they encounter instances where brokers rely on documents presented by clients without appropriate verification. Although this did not appear to be a widespread issue, further improvements are required with respect to client and BO verification considering the risk profile of the sector. Moreover, record-keeping practices are generally in place. On a more positive note, the AT notes that the number of client refusals in view of incomplete CDD information was on the increase since 2020. 259. Regarding accountants, the number of irregularities relating to the application of CDD measures increased in 2024, returning to the same level of 2019-2020. The APML explained that their seriousness has however decreased. Regarding BO information requirements, supervisory data shows that a number of cases where the BO has not been identified exist in approximatively 10% of the sector in 2023 (based on a broad sample test through off-site engagement). This is, however, significantly less than in 2019 (23%), thus demonstrating a decreasing trend. Similar results are demonstrated for in relation to internal controls. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 260. EDD measures are generally applied to varying extents across DNFBP sectors, with no information being available for lawyers, which is a sector pondered more heavily in terms of importance. For the two other highly important sectors, notaries and on-line casinos, no major EDD-related concerns have been noted. 261. Notaries and casinos undertake additional scrutiny in higher-risk scenarios, such as high-value or cross-border transactions. Among notaries, clear guidance materials and dedicated red-flag indicators exist, and the notaries met on-site reported adjusting documentation requirements in line with perceived risk. Regarding PEP-related EDD measures, supervisory findings over the referenced period indicate only two instances where gaps were identified. Moreover, the percentage of PEP clients, out of the total number of clients, are negligeable and reducing [49] . For casinos, additional checks are applied when transactions exceed specific thresholds. While these controls contribute to mitigating risk, they are generally threshold-driven and do not be fully integrated more behavioural and typology-related triggers. For PEP identification, casinos use IT tools and commercial databases and the Anti-Corruption Agency PEP and assets declarations data. Over the referenced period, irregularities in relation to EDD, including PEP, were identified, albeit in only 9% of controls. 262. The application of EDD measures by accountants and real estate agents is less developed. In the accounting and real estate sectors, enhanced measures do not appear to be applied systematically, including in contexts that may warrant additional scrutiny (e.g. offshore or complex structures or links to higher-risk jurisdictions). In some cases, preventive measures tend to follow standard CDD procedures, with limited differentiation based on customer or transaction risk. However, this gap is pondered less heavily in the light of the moderate importance allocated to these sectors. 263. Over the referenced period, the number of PEPs (including the customer and BO) serviced by most important DNFBPs decreased (e.g. for casinos, it went from 29 in 2019 to 9 in 2023; for notaries it went from 805 in 2021 to 407 in 2023), while for other DNFBPs, to which less importance was allocated, a slight increase can be noticed (e.g. for accountants, went from 4 in 2019 to 20 in 2023). 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 264. Reporting obligations are generally understood across the DNFBP sectors. The top DNFBP sector in terms of numbers and value of reported transactions is the notarial sector, being overall the most important reporting sector after banks. The level of compliance with AML/CFT reporting obligations improved among online casinos and accountants. However, significant weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by lawyers, followed by moderate weaknesses identified for real estate agents. 265. Most STRs were submitted by 93 notaries (40,5% of the sector), with suspicions mostly linked to source of funds or inconsistencies in the declared information, including in some instances relating to PEPs. The usefulness of SARs submitted by notaries is also recognized as being significant, in line with the 2024 NRA findings, and confirmed by the Serbian authorities. On the other hand, over the referenced period, lawyers submitted the lowest number of STRs: 5 STRs in 2019 (1 relating to corruption, 4 to suspicions around the intended purpose of a transaction), 5 in 2020 and 6 in 2021 (all relating to suspicions around the intended purpose of a transactions), 1 in 2022 (relating to cash operations) and none as from 2023. 266. The volume of SARs submitted by casinos has increased, notably for on-line casinos (from 7 STRs in 2019 to 85 STRs in 2024). The AT positively notes this progress, however, still believes that the numbers should be higher considering the increase in the transactions’ volume and the risks associated with the sector. Over the referenced period, the GCA checked AML/CFT reporting and tipping off obligations in every on-site inspection conducted. Regarding the quality, improvements are noted both by the GCA through supervisory findings and by the APML, while noting that a marginal issue remains regarding STRs still submitted not in relation to ML/TF suspicions, but to breach of game rules. Moreover, using the IKS data, the GCA is also able to detect and report suspicious transactions to the APML directly. The AT was provided with such examples showing cases of players that were reported in view of certain typologies detected (e.g. large cash deposits, large cash payments, deposits and withdrawals with limited gaming activity). 267. Accountants’ SARs submissions slightly increased over the referenced period, from 6 in 2019 to 13 in 2024; albeit a significant drop was noted in 2023, justified by the APML as due to the shift to a fully electronic reporting system which was remedied in 2024 through APML’s outreach. Only one reporting irregularity was identified through on-site supervisory engagement, while a further three cases of non-reporting were identified by the FIU from its available intelligence. Notwithstanding the low volume of SARs submitted by accountants, the majority have led to disseminations to the Prosecutor’s Office and/or the Tax Administration (74% between 2021-2023). 268. A low number of SARs were submitted by real estate agents, peaking at 15 in 2022, with only 1 in 2023 and 8 in 2024, and concerns around the quality have been identified by the Market Inspection. 269. Obliged entities across DNFBP sectors are legally prohibited from tipping off clients when filing a SAR. Supervisors confirmed that tipping-off obligations are included in training and on-site inspections, and casinos and notaries in particular indicated heightened awareness. The AT was not provided with evidence of breaches or sanctions imposed for tipping-off during the reference period. Based on examples of STRs and case studies presented, the AT concludes that most DNFBPs are reporting activity that is useful for law enforcement. This is confirmed by the FIU. There has been no tipping off issues. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 270. DNFBPs, except lawyers, generally maintain robust internal controls, commensurate to their profile and size. The Bar Association has not provided any information in these regards to the AT. Moreover, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures the sector, given it met only one representative on-site. No notable gaps have been identified in relation to internal controls by the Notary Chamber or the Market Inspection. 271. According to the GCA, REs perform AML/CFT internal audits once a year. Out of all the on-site engagement performed throughout the assessment period, the GCA identified gaps related to internal controls in 36% of on-site inspections. In terms of human resources allocated to AML/CFT, the supervisory data confirms they were adequate both for land-based casinos and on-line casinos, notably given the sophistication of the tools used. 272. In the case of accountants, annual reviewers to monitor the AML/CFT compliance function were carried out by 77% of accountants in 2019 and 82% in 2023, bearing in mind that 70% of accountants in Serbia are operating as entrepreneurs. In terms of irregularities identified, a declining trend is observed regarding the timely update of internal acts and provision of training. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 273. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing requirements and mitigating measures. Footnotes [49] NRA 2024, page 226" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="254. Most DNFBPs, with the exception of lawyers, have demonstrated a good level of understanding of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures, although the compliance therewith varied. The AT positively notes a relatively limited number of systemic AML/CFT violations uncovered through supervision. Awareness raising and training activities conducted by supervisors, often in cooperation with the APML (FIU) have contributed to an overall increase in STRs, though under-reporting persists mainly regarding lawyers. 4.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 255. The Bar Association has not provided any information in these regards to the AT. Moreover, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures the sector, given it met only one representative on-site. This is pondered more heavily given the importance allocated to this sector. 256. In relation to notaries, over the referenced period, the AT notices that out of the significant number of examinations conducted, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Notary Chamber only in 9 instances. Record-keeping- related deficiencies were present in all these instances, while concerns related to client and BO identification and verification measures also featured, but to a lesser extent. In respect of client and BO identification and verification measures, the notaries met on-site provided details and explanations on the measures undertaken and public databases used to implement these obligations effectively. 257. The GCA supervisory data show that irregularities were found in 86% of controls regarding CDD obligations and in 36% regarding internal control and 36% record-keeping. The record-keeping gaps identified were considered as serious by the GCA; however, with respect to transactional data, this is mitigated through the IKS system, as data on all transactions is recorded and maintained by the GCA; this data is accessible to the APML and LEAs. On-going monitoring by online casinos was deemed adequate, considering the use of integrated IT solutions and the IKS irregularity detection module that enables real-time transaction monitoring and identification of unusual behaviour. On-line casinos use integrated IP address information to track and verify customers’ residence and also IT solutions for remote identity verification. The AT considers that while the technical tools are in place and represent progress, their impact on compliance is not yet commensurate with the sector’s risk profile and also considering the extensive number of breaches that keep being identified. 258. Through the on-site engagement carried out by the Market Inspection, gaps are still identified regarding the implementation of CDD obligations. The Market Inspection explained that they encounter instances where brokers rely on documents presented by clients without appropriate verification. Although this did not appear to be a widespread issue, further improvements are required with respect to client and BO verification considering the risk profile of the sector. Moreover, record-keeping practices are generally in place. On a more positive note, the AT notes that the number of client refusals in view of incomplete CDD information was on the increase since 2020. 259. Regarding accountants, the number of irregularities relating to the application of CDD measures increased in 2024, returning to the same level of 2019-2020. The APML explained that their seriousness has however decreased. Regarding BO information requirements, supervisory data shows that a number of cases where the BO has not been identified exist in approximatively 10% of the sector in 2023 (based on a broad sample test through off-site engagement). This is, however, significantly less than in 2019 (23%), thus demonstrating a decreasing trend. Similar results are demonstrated for in relation to internal controls. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 260. EDD measures are generally applied to varying extents across DNFBP sectors, with no information being available for lawyers, which is a sector pondered more heavily in terms of importance. For the two other highly important sectors, notaries and on-line casinos, no major EDD-related concerns have been noted. 261. Notaries and casinos undertake additional scrutiny in higher-risk scenarios, such as high-value or cross-border transactions. Among notaries, clear guidance materials and dedicated red-flag indicators exist, and the notaries met on-site reported adjusting documentation requirements in line with perceived risk. Regarding PEP-related EDD measures, supervisory findings over the referenced period indicate only two instances where gaps were identified. Moreover, the percentage of PEP clients, out of the total number of clients, are negligeable and reducing [49] . For casinos, additional checks are applied when transactions exceed specific thresholds. While these controls contribute to mitigating risk, they are generally threshold-driven and do not be fully integrated more behavioural and typology-related triggers. For PEP identification, casinos use IT tools and commercial databases and the Anti-Corruption Agency PEP and assets declarations data. Over the referenced period, irregularities in relation to EDD, including PEP, were identified, albeit in only 9% of controls. 262. The application of EDD measures by accountants and real estate agents is less developed. In the accounting and real estate sectors, enhanced measures do not appear to be applied systematically, including in contexts that may warrant additional scrutiny (e.g. offshore or complex structures or links to higher-risk jurisdictions). In some cases, preventive measures tend to follow standard CDD procedures, with limited differentiation based on customer or transaction risk. However, this gap is pondered less heavily in the light of the moderate importance allocated to these sectors. 263. Over the referenced period, the number of PEPs (including the customer and BO) serviced by most important DNFBPs decreased (e.g. for casinos, it went from 29 in 2019 to 9 in 2023; for notaries it went from 805 in 2021 to 407 in 2023), while for other DNFBPs, to which less importance was allocated, a slight increase can be noticed (e.g. for accountants, went from 4 in 2019 to 20 in 2023). 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 264. Reporting obligations are generally understood across the DNFBP sectors. The top DNFBP sector in terms of numbers and value of reported transactions is the notarial sector, being overall the most important reporting sector after banks. The level of compliance with AML/CFT reporting obligations improved among online casinos and accountants. However, significant weaknesses remain in the application of reporting obligations by lawyers, followed by moderate weaknesses identified for real estate agents. 265. Most STRs were submitted by 93 notaries (40,5% of the sector), with suspicions mostly linked to source of funds or inconsistencies in the declared information, including in some instances relating to PEPs. The usefulness of SARs submitted by notaries is also recognized as being significant, in line with the 2024 NRA findings, and confirmed by the Serbian authorities. On the other hand, over the referenced period, lawyers submitted the lowest number of STRs: 5 STRs in 2019 (1 relating to corruption, 4 to suspicions around the intended purpose of a transaction), 5 in 2020 and 6 in 2021 (all relating to suspicions around the intended purpose of a transactions), 1 in 2022 (relating to cash operations) and none as from 2023. 266. The volume of SARs submitted by casinos has increased, notably for on-line casinos (from 7 STRs in 2019 to 85 STRs in 2024). The AT positively notes this progress, however, still believes that the numbers should be higher considering the increase in the transactions’ volume and the risks associated with the sector. Over the referenced period, the GCA checked AML/CFT reporting and tipping off obligations in every on-site inspection conducted. Regarding the quality, improvements are noted both by the GCA through supervisory findings and by the APML, while noting that a marginal issue remains regarding STRs still submitted not in relation to ML/TF suspicions, but to breach of game rules. Moreover, using the IKS data, the GCA is also able to detect and report suspicious transactions to the APML directly. The AT was provided with such examples showing cases of players that were reported in view of certain typologies detected (e.g. large cash deposits, large cash payments, deposits and withdrawals with limited gaming activity). 267. Accountants’ SARs submissions slightly increased over the referenced period, from 6 in 2019 to 13 in 2024; albeit a significant drop was noted in 2023, justified by the APML as due to the shift to a fully electronic reporting system which was remedied in 2024 through APML’s outreach. Only one reporting irregularity was identified through on-site supervisory engagement, while a further three cases of non-reporting were identified by the FIU from its available intelligence. Notwithstanding the low volume of SARs submitted by accountants, the majority have led to disseminations to the Prosecutor’s Office and/or the Tax Administration (74% between 2021-2023). 268. A low number of SARs were submitted by real estate agents, peaking at 15 in 2022, with only 1 in 2023 and 8 in 2024, and concerns around the quality have been identified by the Market Inspection. 269. Obliged entities across DNFBP sectors are legally prohibited from tipping off clients when filing a SAR. Supervisors confirmed that tipping-off obligations are included in training and on-site inspections, and casinos and notaries in particular indicated heightened awareness. The AT was not provided with evidence of breaches or sanctions imposed for tipping-off during the reference period. Based on examples of STRs and case studies presented, the AT concludes that most DNFBPs are reporting activity that is useful for law enforcement. This is confirmed by the FIU. There has been no tipping off issues. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 270. DNFBPs, except lawyers, generally maintain robust internal controls, commensurate to their profile and size. The Bar Association has not provided any information in these regards to the AT. Moreover, the AT was unable to ascertain the level of understanding and compliance with AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures the sector, given it met only one representative on-site. No notable gaps have been identified in relation to internal controls by the Notary Chamber or the Market Inspection. 271. According to the GCA, REs perform AML/CFT internal audits once a year. Out of all the on-site engagement performed throughout the assessment period, the GCA identified gaps related to internal controls in 36% of on-site inspections. In terms of human resources allocated to AML/CFT, the supervisory data confirms they were adequate both for land-based casinos and on-line casinos, notably given the sophistication of the tools used. 272. In the case of accountants, annual reviewers to monitor the AML/CFT compliance function were carried out by 77% of accountants in 2019 and 82% in 2023, bearing in mind that 70% of accountants in Serbia are operating as entrepreneurs. In terms of irregularities identified, a declining trend is observed regarding the timely update of internal acts and provision of training. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 273. There are no legal or regulatory impediments to implementing requirements and mitigating measures. Footnotes [49] NRA 2024, page 226" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="358. The use and ML/TF risk of foreign trusts and legal arrangements in Serbia is limited. In fact only one bank reported to the NBS having a trustee as a client. Thus, the weight of this core-issue is minimal in Serbia. 359. At the time of the on-site mission there were no legal obligations for trustees of foreign trusts to register their BO information in Serbia. Information on trust assets, involved parties and beneficiaries would be available to lawyers and other REs servicing them (mainly banks). The analysis of availability of basic and BO data for legal persons through REs (see sec. 5.3.) likewise applies to foreign trusts and similar legal arrangements. 360. Serbia is yet to assess the extent to which lawyers, accountants and other persons may be acting as trustees or providing trust administration services. However, the provision of such services is very limited and in fact only one case of a Serbian resident acting as trustee of a trust holding shares in Serbian legal persons was identified. 361.  Recently (March 2025) Serbia obliged trustees to disclose their status when establishing business relationships or carrying out occasional transactions with Serbian REs, and as from October 2025 resident trustees or other REs providing services to foreign trusts or similar legal arrangements have been obliged to register BO data for such trusts in the CRBO. This development occurred after the review period and hence the AT did not assess its effectiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="358. The use and ML/TF risk of foreign trusts and legal arrangements in Serbia is limited. In fact only one bank reported to the NBS having a trustee as a client. Thus, the weight of this core-issue is minimal in Serbia. 359. At the time of the on-site mission there were no legal obligations for trustees of foreign trusts to register their BO information in Serbia. Information on trust assets, involved parties and beneficiaries would be available to lawyers and other REs servicing them (mainly banks). The analysis of availability of basic and BO data for legal persons through REs (see sec. 5.3.) likewise applies to foreign trusts and similar legal arrangements. 360. Serbia is yet to assess the extent to which lawyers, accountants and other persons may be acting as trustees or providing trust administration services. However, the provision of such services is very limited and in fact only one case of a Serbian resident acting as trustee of a trust holding shares in Serbian legal persons was identified. 361.  Recently (March 2025) Serbia obliged trustees to disclose their status when establishing business relationships or carrying out occasional transactions with Serbian REs, and as from October 2025 resident trustees or other REs providing services to foreign trusts or similar legal arrangements have been obliged to register BO data for such trusts in the CRBO. This development occurred after the review period and hence the AT did not assess its effectiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="414. Investigative and prosecuting authorities actively use financial intelligence provided by the APML in their investigations, in addition to other sources of information. This data plays an important role in establishing evidence, tracing the proceeds of crime, and understanding the financial circuits linked to ML, FT, and predicate offenses. Table 6.7: Use of the APML disseminations Year Number of SARs received by the APML Number of disseminations forwarded to the LEA Investigations based on dissemination 2019 2,268 436 79 2020 2,277 274 101 2021 2,053 287 108 2022 1,563 266 82 2023 1,464 256 74 2024 2,014 257 75 415. From 2019 to 2024, the APML submitted 655 disseminations to prosecutors’ offices, supporting investigations into ML and related offences. While the number of investigations based directly on APML disseminations varied - peaking at 57 in 2021 and declining to 14 in subsequent years –the APML intelligence contributed to a important share of ML convictions. In total, 88 convictions were directly linked to APML-originated cases. Table 6.8. ML Investigations and convictions initiated based on FIU intelligence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Disseminations to prosecutors' offices 157 97 [60] 110 92 102 97 Investigations based on disseminations 30 30 57 14 14 16 ML convictions based on disseminations 15 14 7 19 10 23 416. During the reporting period, the Tax Police Sector conducted a total of 408 tax audits based on initiatives submitted by the APML. Of the total audits carried out, irregularities and newly assessed public revenues were identified in 283 cases, amounting to a total of EUR 52,680,140. During the same period of time, the Tax Police Sector handled a total of 74 cases initiated by the APML, with the total amount of damage being EUR 5,141,893.49. The APML disseminations have a notable impact on the Tax Police work. Table 6.9: Tax Authorities Feedback on APML disseminations Year Number of cases opened based on APML initiatives Number of completed subjects Number of criminal reports filed Amount of damage (in EUR) 2019 10 6 2 1,084,889.18 2020 32 41 16 2,147,936.57 2021 15 27 12 1.837.528.49 2022 6 11 1 9.085.50 2023 10 13 0 - 2024 3 8 1 62,453.75 Total: 74 106 32 5,141,893.49 · 417. Disseminations to the BIA are intended to alert the Intelligence Service about primarily foreign individuals who may be linked to organised crime and who have entered or are engaging in certain activities within the country’s financial system. Their purpose is to flag potential national security concerns rather than to support the development of a money laundering case. Although the APML made 265 disseminations to the BIA, (78 TF-related and 187 for ML), there is no evidence of follow-up action from the latter, thereby reducing their relevance and operational impact. Footnotes [60] Including Prosecution, Police, Tax Administration, Security Agency." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="414. Investigative and prosecuting authorities actively use financial intelligence provided by the APML in their investigations, in addition to other sources of information. This data plays an important role in establishing evidence, tracing the proceeds of crime, and understanding the financial circuits linked to ML, FT, and predicate offenses. Table 6.7: Use of the APML disseminations Year Number of SARs received by the APML Number of disseminations forwarded to the LEA Investigations based on dissemination 2019 2,268 436 79 2020 2,277 274 101 2021 2,053 287 108 2022 1,563 266 82 2023 1,464 256 74 2024 2,014 257 75 415. From 2019 to 2024, the APML submitted 655 disseminations to prosecutors’ offices, supporting investigations into ML and related offences. While the number of investigations based directly on APML disseminations varied - peaking at 57 in 2021 and declining to 14 in subsequent years –the APML intelligence contributed to a important share of ML convictions. In total, 88 convictions were directly linked to APML-originated cases. Table 6.8. ML Investigations and convictions initiated based on FIU intelligence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Disseminations to prosecutors' offices 157 97 [60] 110 92 102 97 Investigations based on disseminations 30 30 57 14 14 16 ML convictions based on disseminations 15 14 7 19 10 23 416. During the reporting period, the Tax Police Sector conducted a total of 408 tax audits based on initiatives submitted by the APML. Of the total audits carried out, irregularities and newly assessed public revenues were identified in 283 cases, amounting to a total of EUR 52,680,140. During the same period of time, the Tax Police Sector handled a total of 74 cases initiated by the APML, with the total amount of damage being EUR 5,141,893.49. The APML disseminations have a notable impact on the Tax Police work. Table 6.9: Tax Authorities Feedback on APML disseminations Year Number of cases opened based on APML initiatives Number of completed subjects Number of criminal reports filed Amount of damage (in EUR) 2019 10 6 2 1,084,889.18 2020 32 41 16 2,147,936.57 2021 15 27 12 1.837.528.49 2022 6 11 1 9.085.50 2023 10 13 0 - 2024 3 8 1 62,453.75 Total: 74 106 32 5,141,893.49 · 417. Disseminations to the BIA are intended to alert the Intelligence Service about primarily foreign individuals who may be linked to organised crime and who have entered or are engaging in certain activities within the country’s financial system. Their purpose is to flag potential national security concerns rather than to support the development of a money laundering case. Although the APML made 265 disseminations to the BIA, (78 TF-related and 187 for ML), there is no evidence of follow-up action from the latter, thereby reducing their relevance and operational impact. Footnotes [60] Including Prosecution, Police, Tax Administration, Security Agency." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Serbian authorities apply other criminal justice measures in cases where a money laundering (ML) prosecution is not possible, for justifiable reasons. Such measures are primarily decided by the prosecutor. These include re-qualification of the offence as concealment of criminal proceeds (“concealment”) under Article 221 of the Criminal Code, or crimes provided by the Law on Foreign Currency Operations. These offences carry a lower but still meaningful penalty and allows for the confiscation of assets. From 2019 to 2023, authorities initiated between 73 and 112 concealment cases annually. A case example of re-qualification as a crime under Art. 58 of the Law on Foreign Currency Operations and for concealment under Article 221 of Criminal Code were presented to the AT. 467. In addition, alternative measures include administrative or civil confiscation proceedings under extended-confiscation rules, which apply a lower standard of proof. These are used when circumstantial evidence of laundering behaviour exists but is insufficient for a criminal conviction. Table 7.9. Convictions on the basis of the Law on Registration Procedure in the SBRA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of cases opened 24 25 16 16 14 14 Convictions 3 3 0 1 0 1 468. The falsification offence may also be a backup solution for the authorities in case they cannot successfully prove that the “straw man” has actually committed a ML offence. This is applied only when the “straw man/front man” are merely an acquaintance of the main criminal perpetrator, a client of an accounting agency who was knowingly recruited them, a low-ranking associate of an organized crime group, or a person recruited off the street for compensation. In such cases, proceedings can be initiated under Article 45 of the Law on Registration Procedure in the SBRA or Article 13 of the Law on the Central Register of Beneficial Owners for falsification of records and data entered into the SBRA register. Such criminal proceedings have been launched against a total of 109 individuals in the period under review." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="466. Serbian authorities apply other criminal justice measures in cases where a money laundering (ML) prosecution is not possible, for justifiable reasons. Such measures are primarily decided by the prosecutor. These include re-qualification of the offence as concealment of criminal proceeds (“concealment”) under Article 221 of the Criminal Code, or crimes provided by the Law on Foreign Currency Operations. These offences carry a lower but still meaningful penalty and allows for the confiscation of assets. From 2019 to 2023, authorities initiated between 73 and 112 concealment cases annually. A case example of re-qualification as a crime under Art. 58 of the Law on Foreign Currency Operations and for concealment under Article 221 of Criminal Code were presented to the AT. 467. In addition, alternative measures include administrative or civil confiscation proceedings under extended-confiscation rules, which apply a lower standard of proof. These are used when circumstantial evidence of laundering behaviour exists but is insufficient for a criminal conviction. Table 7.9. Convictions on the basis of the Law on Registration Procedure in the SBRA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number of cases opened 24 25 16 16 14 14 Convictions 3 3 0 1 0 1 468. The falsification offence may also be a backup solution for the authorities in case they cannot successfully prove that the “straw man” has actually committed a ML offence. This is applied only when the “straw man/front man” are merely an acquaintance of the main criminal perpetrator, a client of an accounting agency who was knowingly recruited them, a low-ranking associate of an organized crime group, or a person recruited off the street for compensation. In such cases, proceedings can be initiated under Article 45 of the Law on Registration Procedure in the SBRA or Article 13 of the Law on the Central Register of Beneficial Owners for falsification of records and data entered into the SBRA register. Such criminal proceedings have been launched against a total of 109 individuals in the period under review." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="490. The Directorate for Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets of the MoJ (DMSCA), takes the lead in preserving the value of frozen or seized property and manage different types of property, such as money, financial assets, real estate, vehicles, companies/businesses, watches, jewels, animals, etc. 491. Some of these seized assets are regularly used in practice for rent, for public and humanitarian purposes (e.g., by the MoI, the BIA, local governments, NPOs, etc.) and, to a limited extent, are sold through public auctions, except for seized immovable property, given that pre-confiscation sales of these assets is not legally permitted; alternatively, immovable property is regularly rented at market value/price. 492. Management of businesses (e.g., hotels) is a challenging task of the DMSCA and, thus, a new manager of the seized business is appointed by the Directorate in order to conduct a legal and financial due diligence of the seized company. The appointment of this director is subject in practice to a fit and proper process and a range of safeguards to avoid conflict of interests and the misuse of the position (e.g. people not linked or related to the seized company, with no criminal records, analysis of the police background, etc.). Managing seized virtual assets is also particularly challenging, since they are not managed by the Directorate and remain stored by the Police (i.e., by the department on cybercrime) due to, amongst other, the lack of clear rules to manage virtual assets. This practical situation could result in high loses of value for the state/defendant, since virtual assets are never sold or converted into fiat currency. 493. The AT was informed that in case of very expensive seized vehicles, they are not sold nor used by public or humanitarian purposes, but simply stored by the DNSCA, which generates high cost of maintenance and opportunity. Serbian authorities stated that the main reason for this decision was that the number of high luxury vehicles in Serbia was very low and the new owner could be identified by the former (even if the registration plates were changed). However, this situation would be the same in case of confiscation and the consequence of this passive approach is the fast depreciation and deterioration of the vehicle. Therefore, a more proactive approach would be expected from the DMSCA in these cases (e.g., consider the possibility of international public and online auctions or other measures). Similar challenges would happen in relation to the seizure of expensive horses, therefore it was decided to store them with high costs of maintenance instead of sell them. 494. As identified in some strategic documents, there are no clear rules for the allocation of seized assets for their provisional public or humanitarian use, which is decided on a case-by-case basis by the DMSCA (i.e., some public administrations may compete between themselves, and the assignation criteria is discretional). 495. Adequate safeguards do exist for the owner of the seized assets in case the DMSCA does not manage them with due diligence, including the possibility to file a claim against the State to be compensated. In these cases, the burden of the proof is, as usual, on the plaintiff. Despite this general safeguard, the defendant (owner of the seized assets) does not intervene in the decision process of managing seized assets. 496. Although the DMSCA’s staffing resources are relatively modest, the deployment of a dedicated software system for tracking and managing seized assets has helped organize operations across the entire country. The system ensures assets are inventoried, maintained, and, when suitable, sold or otherwise utilized to prevent value loss until court proceedings conclude, as referred above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="490. The Directorate for Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets of the MoJ (DMSCA), takes the lead in preserving the value of frozen or seized property and manage different types of property, such as money, financial assets, real estate, vehicles, companies/businesses, watches, jewels, animals, etc. 491. Some of these seized assets are regularly used in practice for rent, for public and humanitarian purposes (e.g., by the MoI, the BIA, local governments, NPOs, etc.) and, to a limited extent, are sold through public auctions, except for seized immovable property, given that pre-confiscation sales of these assets is not legally permitted; alternatively, immovable property is regularly rented at market value/price. 492. Management of businesses (e.g., hotels) is a challenging task of the DMSCA and, thus, a new manager of the seized business is appointed by the Directorate in order to conduct a legal and financial due diligence of the seized company. The appointment of this director is subject in practice to a fit and proper process and a range of safeguards to avoid conflict of interests and the misuse of the position (e.g. people not linked or related to the seized company, with no criminal records, analysis of the police background, etc.). Managing seized virtual assets is also particularly challenging, since they are not managed by the Directorate and remain stored by the Police (i.e., by the department on cybercrime) due to, amongst other, the lack of clear rules to manage virtual assets. This practical situation could result in high loses of value for the state/defendant, since virtual assets are never sold or converted into fiat currency. 493. The AT was informed that in case of very expensive seized vehicles, they are not sold nor used by public or humanitarian purposes, but simply stored by the DNSCA, which generates high cost of maintenance and opportunity. Serbian authorities stated that the main reason for this decision was that the number of high luxury vehicles in Serbia was very low and the new owner could be identified by the former (even if the registration plates were changed). However, this situation would be the same in case of confiscation and the consequence of this passive approach is the fast depreciation and deterioration of the vehicle. Therefore, a more proactive approach would be expected from the DMSCA in these cases (e.g., consider the possibility of international public and online auctions or other measures). Similar challenges would happen in relation to the seizure of expensive horses, therefore it was decided to store them with high costs of maintenance instead of sell them. 494. As identified in some strategic documents, there are no clear rules for the allocation of seized assets for their provisional public or humanitarian use, which is decided on a case-by-case basis by the DMSCA (i.e., some public administrations may compete between themselves, and the assignation criteria is discretional). 495. Adequate safeguards do exist for the owner of the seized assets in case the DMSCA does not manage them with due diligence, including the possibility to file a claim against the State to be compensated. In these cases, the burden of the proof is, as usual, on the plaintiff. Despite this general safeguard, the defendant (owner of the seized assets) does not intervene in the decision process of managing seized assets. 496. Although the DMSCA’s staffing resources are relatively modest, the deployment of a dedicated software system for tracking and managing seized assets has helped organize operations across the entire country. The system ensures assets are inventoried, maintained, and, when suitable, sold or otherwise utilized to prevent value loss until court proceedings conclude, as referred above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="532. Serbia has adopted several documents as part of its national counter-terrorism strategy: Strategy for Preventing and Fighting Terrorism, Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, National Security Strategy, and different NRAs conducted during the period under assessment, with their corresponding Action Plans (e.g. Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing for 2020-2024). Following the latter strategy, some working groups were established: (i) at the operational level, the OWG integrated by the SPPO, the BIA and the SCT and (ii) at the strategic level, the National Coordinating Body for the Prevention and Combating Terrorism includes representatives of various ministries and agencies. 533. However, these strategies are not fully integrated in activities to combat TF, since the outcomes mentioned before do not show any improvement in terms of detection and identification of TF cases, even when the risk profile of Serbia has been considered to be at a medium TF risk. Although some measures were planned concerning TF by the Strategic Operational Plan for the Prevention of ML, TF and WMD PF in Serbia for the period 2025-2029, the majority of the planned measures are generic and focused on the preventive side. The operational perspective is not a matter subject to a deep analysis with clear concrete associated actions to improve the achieved results, based on the intervention and coordinated action of all relevant national authorities. From the repressive perspective, TF trainings for judiciary, prosecutors and LEAs were planned, as well as drafting a Handbook for the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Financing. 534. According to the information provided by Serbia, counter-terrorism national policy (particularly, the NRA) was informed by the inputs and information from the 2 terrorist attacks of June 2024 (see IO1). In this regard, during the 2024 NRA process TF was rated as a medium risk level due to, amongst others, to referred terrorist attacks, despite the 2021 NRA assigned to TF a medium-low risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="532. Serbia has adopted several documents as part of its national counter-terrorism strategy: Strategy for Preventing and Fighting Terrorism, Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, National Security Strategy, and different NRAs conducted during the period under assessment, with their corresponding Action Plans (e.g. Strategy against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing for 2020-2024). Following the latter strategy, some working groups were established: (i) at the operational level, the OWG integrated by the SPPO, the BIA and the SCT and (ii) at the strategic level, the National Coordinating Body for the Prevention and Combating Terrorism includes representatives of various ministries and agencies. 533. However, these strategies are not fully integrated in activities to combat TF, since the outcomes mentioned before do not show any improvement in terms of detection and identification of TF cases, even when the risk profile of Serbia has been considered to be at a medium TF risk. Although some measures were planned concerning TF by the Strategic Operational Plan for the Prevention of ML, TF and WMD PF in Serbia for the period 2025-2029, the majority of the planned measures are generic and focused on the preventive side. The operational perspective is not a matter subject to a deep analysis with clear concrete associated actions to improve the achieved results, based on the intervention and coordinated action of all relevant national authorities. From the repressive perspective, TF trainings for judiciary, prosecutors and LEAs were planned, as well as drafting a Handbook for the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Financing. 534. According to the information provided by Serbia, counter-terrorism national policy (particularly, the NRA) was informed by the inputs and information from the 2 terrorist attacks of June 2024 (see IO1). In this regard, during the 2024 NRA process TF was rated as a medium risk level due to, amongst others, to referred terrorist attacks, despite the 2021 NRA assigned to TF a medium-low risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="574. Regarding the effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions under this core issue, reference should be made to the findings under IO.3 and IO.4, which are also applicable here. 10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 575. FIs and VASPs met by the AT understand their obligations under the LFA; receive and respond quickly to notifications on designations by the APML; check lists of designated persons before customer take-on or making a transaction; have a high degree of awareness of the APML tool, UN lists, and Serbia’s list of designated persons; and undertake routine TFS training. All FIs and VASPs have been checked by supervisors as having procedures to meet the LFA and as having incorporated the APML’s screening tool in software. This is a good basis for the swift identification and freezing of terrorist assets. 576. Screening across non-bank FIs is mostly done through automated tools, namely a mixture of the APML tool and commercial tools. A number of firms incorporated both APML and UN sanctions lists within their IT systems. Firms review potential matches and red flags during onboarding and business relationships. There is additional screening based on risk. There is a significant degree of automation in the payment institution sector; this sector’s reporting to the APML of attempts to transfer assets to two persons designated by Serbia demonstrate the effectiveness of screening systems. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 577. DNFBPs understand their obligations, undertake screening and, with the exception of the legal sector, are able to swiftly identify terrorist assets. Within the DNFBP sectors, notaries have had the best level of compliance. The casino sector has recently significantly improved compliance, administered by compliance departments and assisted by investment in state-of-the art software. They undertake reviews where there is a red flag or other alert, and there are escalation paths within casinos to address them. Senior management (in some cases, a board committee) considers sanctions compliance at least monthly. 578. With regard to real estate brokers, there was awareness of the reporting form but also a little uncertainty about the distinction between the SAR form and the form used to report freezing actions or attempted transactions involving designated persons, and a perception that reporting should be made both to the APML and the supervisor, rather than solely to the APML. Senior management/management boards of real estate brokers engage with sanctions compliance but, overall, there remains scope for brokers to better understand TFS and reporting requirements. 579. With regard to lawyers, it is becoming standard practice across the profession for firms to embed sanctions screening—whether automatic or manual—into their onboarding processes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="574. Regarding the effectiveness of targeted financial sanctions under this core issue, reference should be made to the findings under IO.3 and IO.4, which are also applicable here. 10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 575. FIs and VASPs met by the AT understand their obligations under the LFA; receive and respond quickly to notifications on designations by the APML; check lists of designated persons before customer take-on or making a transaction; have a high degree of awareness of the APML tool, UN lists, and Serbia’s list of designated persons; and undertake routine TFS training. All FIs and VASPs have been checked by supervisors as having procedures to meet the LFA and as having incorporated the APML’s screening tool in software. This is a good basis for the swift identification and freezing of terrorist assets. 576. Screening across non-bank FIs is mostly done through automated tools, namely a mixture of the APML tool and commercial tools. A number of firms incorporated both APML and UN sanctions lists within their IT systems. Firms review potential matches and red flags during onboarding and business relationships. There is additional screening based on risk. There is a significant degree of automation in the payment institution sector; this sector’s reporting to the APML of attempts to transfer assets to two persons designated by Serbia demonstrate the effectiveness of screening systems. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 577. DNFBPs understand their obligations, undertake screening and, with the exception of the legal sector, are able to swiftly identify terrorist assets. Within the DNFBP sectors, notaries have had the best level of compliance. The casino sector has recently significantly improved compliance, administered by compliance departments and assisted by investment in state-of-the art software. They undertake reviews where there is a red flag or other alert, and there are escalation paths within casinos to address them. Senior management (in some cases, a board committee) considers sanctions compliance at least monthly. 578. With regard to real estate brokers, there was awareness of the reporting form but also a little uncertainty about the distinction between the SAR form and the form used to report freezing actions or attempted transactions involving designated persons, and a perception that reporting should be made both to the APML and the supervisor, rather than solely to the APML. Senior management/management boards of real estate brokers engage with sanctions compliance but, overall, there remains scope for brokers to better understand TFS and reporting requirements. 579. With regard to lawyers, it is becoming standard practice across the profession for firms to embed sanctions screening—whether automatic or manual—into their onboarding processes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 611. The process for the identification of assets specified in of IO.10 for TF TFS applies equally to PF TFS. 612. Notifications of all designations are circulated to REs without delay. REs (outside the legal sector) screen their databases, including BO. False positives have been identified, particularly in the banking sector; in some onsite inspections of banks the NBS has noted and reviewed several false positives, which demonstrates the robustness of TFS processes within banks. A few false positives have been identified and reviewed by other FIs. Although these false positives do not relate to PF sanctions, the degree of awareness and measures undertaken by REs reflect an ability by the overall system to identify proliferation funds and other assets. 613. The requirement for legal persons to open a bank account in Serbia ensures that legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. This is positive in allowing identification of assets relevant to PF. 614. For every designation the APML checks its databases and other databases, such as those held by the SBRA. Persons, including BO, for all new legal persons (and when there is a change of registered data) are checked by the SBRA against the APML’s sanctions tool. These checks by authorities of designated persons his provides an additional, beneficial check to identify possible PF. 615. The foregoing reduces the risk of PF actors hiding assets or operating indirectly. During the reporting period, no funds or other assets were frozen in Serbia under PF. This is consistent with Serbia’s risk profile. While no assets have been frozen under PF, the assets frozen under Serbia’s system for meeting UNSCR 1373, combined with notification of attempted transfers of additional assets to the designated individuals, demonstrate a working system for identifying assets that should be frozen. The courts have considered payments out of frozen assets under the TF framework- this is relevant to PF, as the process demonstrates that the use of funds is treated seriously to prevent assets from being used to support entities engaged in proliferation activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 611. The process for the identification of assets specified in of IO.10 for TF TFS applies equally to PF TFS. 612. Notifications of all designations are circulated to REs without delay. REs (outside the legal sector) screen their databases, including BO. False positives have been identified, particularly in the banking sector; in some onsite inspections of banks the NBS has noted and reviewed several false positives, which demonstrates the robustness of TFS processes within banks. A few false positives have been identified and reviewed by other FIs. Although these false positives do not relate to PF sanctions, the degree of awareness and measures undertaken by REs reflect an ability by the overall system to identify proliferation funds and other assets. 613. The requirement for legal persons to open a bank account in Serbia ensures that legal persons are subject to the ongoing scrutiny of banks. This is positive in allowing identification of assets relevant to PF. 614. For every designation the APML checks its databases and other databases, such as those held by the SBRA. Persons, including BO, for all new legal persons (and when there is a change of registered data) are checked by the SBRA against the APML’s sanctions tool. These checks by authorities of designated persons his provides an additional, beneficial check to identify possible PF. 615. The foregoing reduces the risk of PF actors hiding assets or operating indirectly. During the reporting period, no funds or other assets were frozen in Serbia under PF. This is consistent with Serbia’s risk profile. While no assets have been frozen under PF, the assets frozen under Serbia’s system for meeting UNSCR 1373, combined with notification of attempted transfers of additional assets to the designated individuals, demonstrate a working system for identifying assets that should be frozen. The courts have considered payments out of frozen assets under the TF framework- this is relevant to PF, as the process demonstrates that the use of funds is treated seriously to prevent assets from being used to support entities engaged in proliferation activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="105. The NCB, chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, is responsible for AML/CFT policy coordination and implementation. The NCB is assisted by coordinators and deputy coordinators that are tasked with monitoring specific areas of the national AML/CFT action plan, report on progress to the NCB and signal potential issues and/or bottlenecks. This system of coordinators was introduced in 2021 following the conclusion of the 2021 NRA. 106. Eight area coordinators (hailing from various competent authorities) have been appointed, who also led the respective 2021 NRA WGs. Five of these eight coordinators subsequently formed part of the 2024 NRA Coordination WG, which organised and led the development of the NRA and were responsible for leading specific NRA WGs. This not only ensured continuity when it comes to the NRA process but also ensured that people leading the NRA WGs had firsthand knowledge of operational developments that took place in between NRAs and were able to build on this in subsequent action plans. 107. As set out under section 2.2.3, Serbia adopted a National AML/CFT Strategy 2020-2024 (with two linked action plans) and a Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. Policy coordination is also facilitated through the setting up of expert teams to analyse specific ML/TF risks or vulnerabilities and identify legislative, policy and operational improvements, see section 2.2.1. The expert teams are composed and led by officials from the relevant competent authorities and report their findings and recommendations to the NCB for actioning. 108. The authorities explained that out of 108 measures envisaged in the 2020-2022 National Action Plan, 11 were not implemented and 5 remained partially implemented. These were included in the subsequent 2022-2024 National Action Plan. On April 2025 the NCB adopted a report on the status of implementation of the 2022-2024 action plan. This report detailed the status of implementation of each of the 168 measures set out under that action plan, and the reasons for delays or non-implementation of the 18 measures that were not implemented or fully implemented. 109. Of the 18 measures that remained pending, there were some crucial ones, especially those relating to the implementation and enforcement of the Law on Central Records of BOs. 110. These were due implementation at the end of 2024 and were taken onboard under the Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. 111. The AT concludes that Serbia has put in place an effective mechanism, through the NCB and the network of coordinators to monitor the implementation of the national AML/CFT action plans. During the on-site discussions the coordinators also mentioned case examples where they identified obstacles and or delays which were discussed and actioned." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="105. The NCB, chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, is responsible for AML/CFT policy coordination and implementation. The NCB is assisted by coordinators and deputy coordinators that are tasked with monitoring specific areas of the national AML/CFT action plan, report on progress to the NCB and signal potential issues and/or bottlenecks. This system of coordinators was introduced in 2021 following the conclusion of the 2021 NRA. 106. Eight area coordinators (hailing from various competent authorities) have been appointed, who also led the respective 2021 NRA WGs. Five of these eight coordinators subsequently formed part of the 2024 NRA Coordination WG, which organised and led the development of the NRA and were responsible for leading specific NRA WGs. This not only ensured continuity when it comes to the NRA process but also ensured that people leading the NRA WGs had firsthand knowledge of operational developments that took place in between NRAs and were able to build on this in subsequent action plans. 107. As set out under section 2.2.3, Serbia adopted a National AML/CFT Strategy 2020-2024 (with two linked action plans) and a Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. Policy coordination is also facilitated through the setting up of expert teams to analyse specific ML/TF risks or vulnerabilities and identify legislative, policy and operational improvements, see section 2.2.1. The expert teams are composed and led by officials from the relevant competent authorities and report their findings and recommendations to the NCB for actioning. 108. The authorities explained that out of 108 measures envisaged in the 2020-2022 National Action Plan, 11 were not implemented and 5 remained partially implemented. These were included in the subsequent 2022-2024 National Action Plan. On April 2025 the NCB adopted a report on the status of implementation of the 2022-2024 action plan. This report detailed the status of implementation of each of the 168 measures set out under that action plan, and the reasons for delays or non-implementation of the 18 measures that were not implemented or fully implemented. 109. Of the 18 measures that remained pending, there were some crucial ones, especially those relating to the implementation and enforcement of the Law on Central Records of BOs. 110. These were due implementation at the end of 2024 and were taken onboard under the Strategic Operational Plan 2025-2029. 111. The AT concludes that Serbia has put in place an effective mechanism, through the NCB and the network of coordinators to monitor the implementation of the national AML/CFT action plans. During the on-site discussions the coordinators also mentioned case examples where they identified obstacles and or delays which were discussed and actioned." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="209. All supervisory authorities have methodologies and procedures in place for risk-based supervision. In practice, the extent to which supervision is risk-based varies. 210. Since 2019, the supervisory capacity of the NBS has increased and its structure has become more specialised. Between 2019 and May 2025, staffing levels across AML/CFT-related functions have generally increased in the AML Supervision Centre (+15.8%) and the Payment Systems Department (supervision +100%; licensing +25%). However, resource allocation remains uneven. The Bank Licensing Unit has maintained the same staffing level since 2019 despite a higher volume of F&amp;P checks required due to sectoral mergers. Although staffing in the FLC and Life Insurance Units has improved, the partial (50% and 20%) dedication to licensing limits overall effectiveness. The AT is of the view that a targeted review of staffing adequacy would be beneficial to ensure resources are commensurate with operational demands and risk exposure. 211. Since 2019, SC staff allocated have increased for licensing (1 to 2 FTE) and off-site supervision (2 to 4 FTE), while on-site supervision slightly decreased (6 to 5 FTE). The AT considers existing resources insufficient, as also acknowledged by the 2024 NRA. For factoring companies, allocated resources are deemed to be sufficient both in terms of licensing (2 MoF staff) and supervision (5 APML staff). 212. The NBS takes a risk-based approach to planning its supervisory activities. The largest number of on-site controls are planned for banks (around 90%), while a smaller number are planned for FLC, life insurance and VPFMC (around 10%). In line with the NBS’ internal methodologies, all high and medium-high ML/TF risk rated banks are inspected annually, while medium-low and low-risk institutions are covered at least once every four years, ensuring an adequate coverage of the banking sector. The NBS prioritizes full-scope inspections for entities risk assessed as high and medium-high ML/TF risk. In addition, targeted inspections may also be undertaken for entities with lower overall ratings where risk factors at the sectoral or institutional level indicate heightened exposure or where particular activities or business segments present elevated ML/TF risks as identified through the NRA or sectoral risk assessments. Key factors include notably the proportion of high-risk customers, associated transaction volumes and the number of SARs submitted, the presence of legal entities with offshore, trust or PEP-linked ownership structures, the share of non-resident clients from high-risk or strategically deficient jurisdictions. The NBS methodology also provides for risk-based supervision of non-bank REs. Moreover, for exchange offices, the supervisory methodology also incorporates criteria such as new/long-uninspected institutions. 213. Off-site reporting and automated monitoring tools are employed by the NBS to identify risks, including significant changes in management and operations, and to develop a documented assessment of the individual risks associated with supervised institutions. The frequency of off-site engagement depends on the individual and sectorial FI risk scores and is revised annually. Moreover, for specific sectors, such as MVTS and currency exchange offices, the NBS has access to their daily operations, which informs in a dynamic manner both the engagement plans and the supervisory risk understanding. The supervisory methodology for VASPs includes specific risk factors such as anonymity-enhancing features, non-face-to-face onboarding, and third-party custodial arrangements. 214. On-site engagement, in terms of type, frequency and nature, is informed by sectoral and institutional risk. FIs are subject to full scope and targeted examinations. Between 2019 and 2024, the frequency of the on-site engagement varied across sectors, with patterns reflecting risk-based prioritisation. In the banking sector, on-site engagement is conducted annually; however, the total coverage slightly decreased over the referenced period from 38% to 30%. Moreover, whenever the annual engagement planned could not be fulfilled, the NBS did not replace it with thematic engagement until 2024. On the other hand, over 630 thematic on-site inspections were conducted in the currency exchange office sector, representing a significant concentration of thematic supervisory activity. Less on-site supervisory engagement is noted in relation to other non-bank FIs, such as the financial leasing sector, where the number of on-site inspections also decreased over the reference period, amounting to none in 2024. MVTS providers received limited full-scope coverage but more frequent targeted engagement, including thematic reviews. Entities issuing or managing payment instruments were subject to increasing oversight. 215. Regarding the VASP sector, four targeted on-site supervisory engagements have been recorded (2 led by the NBS and 2 led by the SC). To date, the NBS and the SC have conducted separate controls and, in line with their Cooperation Agreement, exchanged information in order to ensure a complete overview of the operations of these entities and the supervisory findings. In these regards, from an AML/CFT perspective, the AT notes that a joint NBS/SC inspection procedure would be beneficial. 216. In relation to the quality of inspections, the average sample of files checked during each on-site visit is adjusted based on the risk and increased for higher risk entities. With regards to the currency exchange sector, given the very high number of on-site inspections carried out over the referenced period and the number of resources allocated to on-site supervision, it is unclear whether this allows for an adequate quality thereof. Nonetheless, this is mitigated to a certain extent by the fact that the NBS has real-time access to all daily transactions, although this cannot substitute for a qualitative assessment of AML/CFT compliance at an institutional level. For EMI/PI, the on-site engagement plan only started being implemented in 2024, with only one targeted control in 2022. Table 3.2. On-site inspections conducted on FIs and VASPs (2019 – 2024) Sector Full scope Targeted/thematic Ad hoc Planned Completed Planned Completed Banks 43 39 3 2 Financial leasing 9 6 0 0 Life insurance companies 7 7 0 0 Life insurance intermediaries 2 3 1 1 Securities firms 15 13 0 0 2 Collective investment schemes 6 7 0 0 Exchange offices 1350 1094 634 200 MVTS 6 6 1 2 EMI/PI 4 2 2 1 VASPs 6 4 0 0 VPFMC 3 3 0 0 Factoring companies 7 3 3 3 3 (2021); 2 (2022) 217. Regarding the SC, the AT notes there are no high-risk rated OEs under its remit. Regular questionnaires are sent out twice a year, via the SC’s web portal. Between 2019 and 2024, the SC planned 32 inspections all of which were carried out. Compared to 2019, supervisory engagement in 2022 doubled, before declining by 42% in 2023. Between 2019 and 2021, for a total of 13 inspections conducted, irregularities have been identified in two entities; however, between 2022 and 2023, for a total of 19 inspections, 22 measures were ordered. In 2024, following deficiencies identified in 3 out of 4 inspections conducted, the SC issued one written warning and filed two charges for economic offences. 218. With regards to APML, while the off-site engagement has increased over the referenced period, the opposite is observed in relation to the on-site engagement, bearing in mind that it was inexistent between 2019 and 2020; 3 on-site inspections have been carried out in 2021, as opposed to 1 in 2023. 219. Overall, in addition to routine AML/CFT inspections, supervisors have increasingly employed thematic inspections as a complementary tool to full-scope reviews, particularly in sectors with elevated or evolving ML/TF risk profiles." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="209. All supervisory authorities have methodologies and procedures in place for risk-based supervision. In practice, the extent to which supervision is risk-based varies. 210. Since 2019, the supervisory capacity of the NBS has increased and its structure has become more specialised. Between 2019 and May 2025, staffing levels across AML/CFT-related functions have generally increased in the AML Supervision Centre (+15.8%) and the Payment Systems Department (supervision +100%; licensing +25%). However, resource allocation remains uneven. The Bank Licensing Unit has maintained the same staffing level since 2019 despite a higher volume of F&amp;P checks required due to sectoral mergers. Although staffing in the FLC and Life Insurance Units has improved, the partial (50% and 20%) dedication to licensing limits overall effectiveness. The AT is of the view that a targeted review of staffing adequacy would be beneficial to ensure resources are commensurate with operational demands and risk exposure. 211. Since 2019, SC staff allocated have increased for licensing (1 to 2 FTE) and off-site supervision (2 to 4 FTE), while on-site supervision slightly decreased (6 to 5 FTE). The AT considers existing resources insufficient, as also acknowledged by the 2024 NRA. For factoring companies, allocated resources are deemed to be sufficient both in terms of licensing (2 MoF staff) and supervision (5 APML staff). 212. The NBS takes a risk-based approach to planning its supervisory activities. The largest number of on-site controls are planned for banks (around 90%), while a smaller number are planned for FLC, life insurance and VPFMC (around 10%). In line with the NBS’ internal methodologies, all high and medium-high ML/TF risk rated banks are inspected annually, while medium-low and low-risk institutions are covered at least once every four years, ensuring an adequate coverage of the banking sector. The NBS prioritizes full-scope inspections for entities risk assessed as high and medium-high ML/TF risk. In addition, targeted inspections may also be undertaken for entities with lower overall ratings where risk factors at the sectoral or institutional level indicate heightened exposure or where particular activities or business segments present elevated ML/TF risks as identified through the NRA or sectoral risk assessments. Key factors include notably the proportion of high-risk customers, associated transaction volumes and the number of SARs submitted, the presence of legal entities with offshore, trust or PEP-linked ownership structures, the share of non-resident clients from high-risk or strategically deficient jurisdictions. The NBS methodology also provides for risk-based supervision of non-bank REs. Moreover, for exchange offices, the supervisory methodology also incorporates criteria such as new/long-uninspected institutions. 213. Off-site reporting and automated monitoring tools are employed by the NBS to identify risks, including significant changes in management and operations, and to develop a documented assessment of the individual risks associated with supervised institutions. The frequency of off-site engagement depends on the individual and sectorial FI risk scores and is revised annually. Moreover, for specific sectors, such as MVTS and currency exchange offices, the NBS has access to their daily operations, which informs in a dynamic manner both the engagement plans and the supervisory risk understanding. The supervisory methodology for VASPs includes specific risk factors such as anonymity-enhancing features, non-face-to-face onboarding, and third-party custodial arrangements. 214. On-site engagement, in terms of type, frequency and nature, is informed by sectoral and institutional risk. FIs are subject to full scope and targeted examinations. Between 2019 and 2024, the frequency of the on-site engagement varied across sectors, with patterns reflecting risk-based prioritisation. In the banking sector, on-site engagement is conducted annually; however, the total coverage slightly decreased over the referenced period from 38% to 30%. Moreover, whenever the annual engagement planned could not be fulfilled, the NBS did not replace it with thematic engagement until 2024. On the other hand, over 630 thematic on-site inspections were conducted in the currency exchange office sector, representing a significant concentration of thematic supervisory activity. Less on-site supervisory engagement is noted in relation to other non-bank FIs, such as the financial leasing sector, where the number of on-site inspections also decreased over the reference period, amounting to none in 2024. MVTS providers received limited full-scope coverage but more frequent targeted engagement, including thematic reviews. Entities issuing or managing payment instruments were subject to increasing oversight. 215. Regarding the VASP sector, four targeted on-site supervisory engagements have been recorded (2 led by the NBS and 2 led by the SC). To date, the NBS and the SC have conducted separate controls and, in line with their Cooperation Agreement, exchanged information in order to ensure a complete overview of the operations of these entities and the supervisory findings. In these regards, from an AML/CFT perspective, the AT notes that a joint NBS/SC inspection procedure would be beneficial. 216. In relation to the quality of inspections, the average sample of files checked during each on-site visit is adjusted based on the risk and increased for higher risk entities. With regards to the currency exchange sector, given the very high number of on-site inspections carried out over the referenced period and the number of resources allocated to on-site supervision, it is unclear whether this allows for an adequate quality thereof. Nonetheless, this is mitigated to a certain extent by the fact that the NBS has real-time access to all daily transactions, although this cannot substitute for a qualitative assessment of AML/CFT compliance at an institutional level. For EMI/PI, the on-site engagement plan only started being implemented in 2024, with only one targeted control in 2022. Table 3.2. On-site inspections conducted on FIs and VASPs (2019 – 2024) Sector Full scope Targeted/thematic Ad hoc Planned Completed Planned Completed Banks 43 39 3 2 Financial leasing 9 6 0 0 Life insurance companies 7 7 0 0 Life insurance intermediaries 2 3 1 1 Securities firms 15 13 0 0 2 Collective investment schemes 6 7 0 0 Exchange offices 1350 1094 634 200 MVTS 6 6 1 2 EMI/PI 4 2 2 1 VASPs 6 4 0 0 VPFMC 3 3 0 0 Factoring companies 7 3 3 3 3 (2021); 2 (2022) 217. Regarding the SC, the AT notes there are no high-risk rated OEs under its remit. Regular questionnaires are sent out twice a year, via the SC’s web portal. Between 2019 and 2024, the SC planned 32 inspections all of which were carried out. Compared to 2019, supervisory engagement in 2022 doubled, before declining by 42% in 2023. Between 2019 and 2021, for a total of 13 inspections conducted, irregularities have been identified in two entities; however, between 2022 and 2023, for a total of 19 inspections, 22 measures were ordered. In 2024, following deficiencies identified in 3 out of 4 inspections conducted, the SC issued one written warning and filed two charges for economic offences. 218. With regards to APML, while the off-site engagement has increased over the referenced period, the opposite is observed in relation to the on-site engagement, bearing in mind that it was inexistent between 2019 and 2020; 3 on-site inspections have been carried out in 2021, as opposed to 1 in 2023. 219. Overall, in addition to routine AML/CFT inspections, supervisors have increasingly employed thematic inspections as a complementary tool to full-scope reviews, particularly in sectors with elevated or evolving ML/TF risk profiles." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="274. DNFBP supervisors, with the exception of the Bar Chamber, have internal regulations and procedures in place to enable risk-based supervision, though the implementation thereof remains uneven. Regarding the Notary Chamber, while the supervisory coverage significantly increased over the reference period, supervisory effort has not been entirely focussing on higher risk entities. While it is clear that the GCA supervisory approach takes account of risk, the current sector coverage remains limited. Regarding the Market Inspection, elements of risk-based approach are applied, although the on-site supervisory engagement appears to be decreasing over the referenced period. The supervisory engagement of the APML has significantly increased over the referenced period and an adequate risk-based approach to supervision is applied. 275. Overall, the on-site supervisory engagement by supervisors primarily focuses on risk assessment obligations, internal controls, CDD and particularly BO obligations and monitoring where applicable. With the exception of lawyers, on-site control planning and implementation appears to take account of findings of the NRA and other risk assessments, although to varying levels. However, it is not clear to what extent the intensity of inspections, namely their duration and scope, is calibrated based on the assessed level of risk. Table 4.1. Supervisory activity (excluding follow-ups) – all DBFBPs DNFBP 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site Accountants (5 775) 6 208 6 169 24 254 42 324 42 315 21 175 Real estate agents (1203) 191 841 163 889 142 746 138 899 129 874 253 793 Casinos (25) 0 12 3 19 3 23 4 23 2 25 8 29 Lawyers (12 271) 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 Notaries (224) 13 197 5 197 3 225 67 226 51 224 61 224 Bar Chamber 276. The Bar Association supervises the highest number of DNFBPs. The AML/CFT Supervision Commission within the Bar Chamber seeks to establish its on-site supervision plan based on the following generic risk elements: (i) the size of the office, (ii) its location, (iii) the form in which it operates, (iv) the type of predominant activity, with a focus on real estate transactions, and (v) the responses provided to off-site questionnaires. Moreover, it is unclear how many resources have been or are dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. 277. In 2019, 60 on-site and 20 off-site inspections were planned, while only 16 on-site inspections were planned in 2023. No supervisory plans were developed for 2020 - 2022 and 2024. In terms of on-site supervision conducted, 10 on-site full scope and 10 on-site thematic controls were conducted in 2019, and 10 on-site thematic inspections in 2023. In terms of the quality of inspections, no information has been provided regarding the outcomes of these inspections, including on whether any deficiencies were identified. Supervisory engagement was completely discontinued between 2022-2022 and in 2024 . The AT notes that the approach to supervision taken by the Bar Chamber is not deemed sufficient, nor risk-based and weights this deficiency more heavily given the importance allocated to the lawyers’ sector in Serbia. Games of Chance Administration 278. The GCA annual engagement plans are informed by a wide range of information: (i) the returns to annual questionnaires of REs (100% response rate since 2021), (ii) the NRA findings, (iii) FIU feedback, (iv) LEAs information (v) public source data, and (vi) the continuous transactions monitoring through its IKS system. The individual risks are reviewed at least once a year; and more often as needed. More recently, the GCA adopted a strategic supervision plan for the period 2024-2028, setting out long-term priorities, which include increasing the number of inspectors, enhancing their professional competencies through training, and implementing the “e-Inspector information system”. The on-site supervision function of the GCA became fully operational in 2020; however, only 17% of the total number of on-site inspections cover AML/CFT aspects, which represents a total of 20 on-site controls over the referenced period. On average, each inspector had a workload of 2 AML/CFT inspections per year, which the AT considers to be very limited. In two instances (in 2022 and 2023), the on-site inspections were conducted on the request of the APML (FIU); the deficiencies identified therein were followed up upon by the GCA, which the APML was informed about. Regarding land-based casinos, no on-site inspections were conducted in 2021, 2023 and 2024, despite a high ML/TF sectoral risk level identified prior to 2024 NRA. In 2020 and 2022, the GCA supervised the two land-based casinos operating in Serbia, meaning that operators within this high-risk sector were only supervised once over the referenced period. For on-line casinos, 16 on-site inspections were conducted over the referenced period, with increased engagement as from 2023. Regarding the individual ML/TF risks, the GCA advises that over the referenced period, 68 % of the subject of inspections were high-risk obliged entities. Deficiencies have been identified in all examinations, including a number of serious ones. Moreover, an important number of irregularities have been detected through supervisory engagement ranging from 11 to 20 and warranting for fines ranging from around 2 000 EUR to 35 256 EUR for the legal entity, and ranging from 342 EUR to 3, 581 EUR for responsible persons. The AT is of the view that supervisory engagement by the GCA has been adequate and effective to uncover gaps; however, considering the risk and materiality of the sector, further risk-driven supervision is necessary. 279. The AT notes a commendable increase in staffing levels, with 3 non-FTE staff are assigned to off-site supervision (up from 1 in 2019), and 8 non-FTE staff are assigned to on-site supervision (up from 3 in 2019). The GCA is of the view that the limited number of staff allocated to AML/CFT is partially mitigated by the IKS system which allows to more easily target higher risk entities. Nonetheless, the fact that these resources are not fully dedicated to AML/CFT-related activities coupled with a number of vacancies remaining unfilled and the gaps indicated above regarding the approach to supervision by the GCA indicate a further need to increase human resources in order to allow adequate and risk-based coverage of the casino and on-line casino sectors. Notary Chamber 280. For notaries, an increase is noted in the on-site supervisory engagement since 2022. Over the referenced period, the Notary Chamber expanded its supervisory planning from 30 on-site full scope inspections for 2019-2020, to 40 in 2021 and reaching 112 for 2022-2024. However, the implementation thereof remained limited: in 2019 - 12 thematic and 1 ad hoc; in 2020 – 4 full scope, 1 thematic, 1 ad hoc; 2021 – only 3 full scope. This has been explained as due to COVID, when the Notary Chamber was forced to temporarily reduce its on-site supervisory engagement. Starting with 2022, the AT notes a significant increase in the supervisory engagement (67 full-scope and 2 ad hoc), which was maintained also for the years 2023 and 2024. While the supervisory coverage of the sector has significantly increased, the Notary Chamber does not appear to have an entirely risk-based approach, given that a significant number of the on-site inspections conducted targeted notaries classified as medium or low ML/TF risk. The Notary Chamber justified this choice as not necessarily based on risk but based on targeting the newly appointed notaries. Supervision over the work of a notary public is performed by at least two members of the Commission, from a different territorial office. Follow-up controls were conducted as well, although more limitedly (3 in 2023 and 1 in 2024). 281. The Notarial Chamber staff assigned to off-site supervision doubled from 3 in 2019 to 6 in May 2025 (these staff members are permanent employees in the Chamber, and they are not notaries, but legal experts), while for on-site supervision 20 staff are allocated since 2025 (as opposed to 15 in 2019). While these staff members are not fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision and conflicts or interest issues may arise given that supervision is conducted by peers, the AT found no concerns related to the quality and conduct of supervisory inspections, other the fact that the risk-based element could be improved. Market Inspection 282. Within the Market Inspection, 48 staff are assigned to AML/CFT (32 FTE and 16 on a part-time basis). Regarding the real-estate sector, the on-site engagement appears to be decreasing over the referenced period, with the coverage being limited to 153 inspections (less than 10% of the sector). The Market Inspection updated its on-site inspection checklist in 2020 and in 2025. The Market Inspection is running its entire supervisory process using the government E-Inspector Platform, which is an application built to streamline all inspections practices across government supervisory entities. Data on the distribution of inspections by risk level (high, medium, low) was not provided, which limits the ability to assess whether high-risk entities are being given priority. However, through the discussions held it emerged that the Market Inspection’s approach it informed by risk to some extent. Targeted inspections are mostly carried out on the basis of requests from other authorities (notably, the Public Prosecutor’s Office), regardless of risk. Off-site supervision consists mainly of processing questionnaires and reviewing online advertisements or complaints, but it is unclear how systematically these inputs are used to prioritise entities for onsite follow-up. While the number of identified irregularities has decreased over time, repeated breaches in key areas such as BRAs and reporting obligations suggest that off-site efforts, though useful for detecting non-registered brokers, are not yet fully effective in ensuring ongoing compliance of higher-risk entities. Regarding DPMS, the Market Inspection carries out inspections regarding their compliance with cash limitations obligations provided by the AML/CFT Law. APML 283. Over the referenced period, the on-site engagement carried out by the APML increased significantly in the accounting sector, from 6 inspections conducted in 2020, to 24 in 2021 and 42 in 2022 and 2023, with a corresponding rise in the off-site engagement, although it is not clear whether it is risk-based and entirely effective, considering that some gaps relating to CDD and BO obligations still persist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="274. DNFBP supervisors, with the exception of the Bar Chamber, have internal regulations and procedures in place to enable risk-based supervision, though the implementation thereof remains uneven. Regarding the Notary Chamber, while the supervisory coverage significantly increased over the reference period, supervisory effort has not been entirely focussing on higher risk entities. While it is clear that the GCA supervisory approach takes account of risk, the current sector coverage remains limited. Regarding the Market Inspection, elements of risk-based approach are applied, although the on-site supervisory engagement appears to be decreasing over the referenced period. The supervisory engagement of the APML has significantly increased over the referenced period and an adequate risk-based approach to supervision is applied. 275. Overall, the on-site supervisory engagement by supervisors primarily focuses on risk assessment obligations, internal controls, CDD and particularly BO obligations and monitoring where applicable. With the exception of lawyers, on-site control planning and implementation appears to take account of findings of the NRA and other risk assessments, although to varying levels. However, it is not clear to what extent the intensity of inspections, namely their duration and scope, is calibrated based on the assessed level of risk. Table 4.1. Supervisory activity (excluding follow-ups) – all DBFBPs DNFBP 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site On-site Off-site Accountants (5 775) 6 208 6 169 24 254 42 324 42 315 21 175 Real estate agents (1203) 191 841 163 889 142 746 138 899 129 874 253 793 Casinos (25) 0 12 3 19 3 23 4 23 2 25 8 29 Lawyers (12 271) 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 Notaries (224) 13 197 5 197 3 225 67 226 51 224 61 224 Bar Chamber 276. The Bar Association supervises the highest number of DNFBPs. The AML/CFT Supervision Commission within the Bar Chamber seeks to establish its on-site supervision plan based on the following generic risk elements: (i) the size of the office, (ii) its location, (iii) the form in which it operates, (iv) the type of predominant activity, with a focus on real estate transactions, and (v) the responses provided to off-site questionnaires. Moreover, it is unclear how many resources have been or are dedicated to AML/CFT supervision. 277. In 2019, 60 on-site and 20 off-site inspections were planned, while only 16 on-site inspections were planned in 2023. No supervisory plans were developed for 2020 - 2022 and 2024. In terms of on-site supervision conducted, 10 on-site full scope and 10 on-site thematic controls were conducted in 2019, and 10 on-site thematic inspections in 2023. In terms of the quality of inspections, no information has been provided regarding the outcomes of these inspections, including on whether any deficiencies were identified. Supervisory engagement was completely discontinued between 2022-2022 and in 2024 . The AT notes that the approach to supervision taken by the Bar Chamber is not deemed sufficient, nor risk-based and weights this deficiency more heavily given the importance allocated to the lawyers’ sector in Serbia. Games of Chance Administration 278. The GCA annual engagement plans are informed by a wide range of information: (i) the returns to annual questionnaires of REs (100% response rate since 2021), (ii) the NRA findings, (iii) FIU feedback, (iv) LEAs information (v) public source data, and (vi) the continuous transactions monitoring through its IKS system. The individual risks are reviewed at least once a year; and more often as needed. More recently, the GCA adopted a strategic supervision plan for the period 2024-2028, setting out long-term priorities, which include increasing the number of inspectors, enhancing their professional competencies through training, and implementing the “e-Inspector information system”. The on-site supervision function of the GCA became fully operational in 2020; however, only 17% of the total number of on-site inspections cover AML/CFT aspects, which represents a total of 20 on-site controls over the referenced period. On average, each inspector had a workload of 2 AML/CFT inspections per year, which the AT considers to be very limited. In two instances (in 2022 and 2023), the on-site inspections were conducted on the request of the APML (FIU); the deficiencies identified therein were followed up upon by the GCA, which the APML was informed about. Regarding land-based casinos, no on-site inspections were conducted in 2021, 2023 and 2024, despite a high ML/TF sectoral risk level identified prior to 2024 NRA. In 2020 and 2022, the GCA supervised the two land-based casinos operating in Serbia, meaning that operators within this high-risk sector were only supervised once over the referenced period. For on-line casinos, 16 on-site inspections were conducted over the referenced period, with increased engagement as from 2023. Regarding the individual ML/TF risks, the GCA advises that over the referenced period, 68 % of the subject of inspections were high-risk obliged entities. Deficiencies have been identified in all examinations, including a number of serious ones. Moreover, an important number of irregularities have been detected through supervisory engagement ranging from 11 to 20 and warranting for fines ranging from around 2 000 EUR to 35 256 EUR for the legal entity, and ranging from 342 EUR to 3, 581 EUR for responsible persons. The AT is of the view that supervisory engagement by the GCA has been adequate and effective to uncover gaps; however, considering the risk and materiality of the sector, further risk-driven supervision is necessary. 279. The AT notes a commendable increase in staffing levels, with 3 non-FTE staff are assigned to off-site supervision (up from 1 in 2019), and 8 non-FTE staff are assigned to on-site supervision (up from 3 in 2019). The GCA is of the view that the limited number of staff allocated to AML/CFT is partially mitigated by the IKS system which allows to more easily target higher risk entities. Nonetheless, the fact that these resources are not fully dedicated to AML/CFT-related activities coupled with a number of vacancies remaining unfilled and the gaps indicated above regarding the approach to supervision by the GCA indicate a further need to increase human resources in order to allow adequate and risk-based coverage of the casino and on-line casino sectors. Notary Chamber 280. For notaries, an increase is noted in the on-site supervisory engagement since 2022. Over the referenced period, the Notary Chamber expanded its supervisory planning from 30 on-site full scope inspections for 2019-2020, to 40 in 2021 and reaching 112 for 2022-2024. However, the implementation thereof remained limited: in 2019 - 12 thematic and 1 ad hoc; in 2020 – 4 full scope, 1 thematic, 1 ad hoc; 2021 – only 3 full scope. This has been explained as due to COVID, when the Notary Chamber was forced to temporarily reduce its on-site supervisory engagement. Starting with 2022, the AT notes a significant increase in the supervisory engagement (67 full-scope and 2 ad hoc), which was maintained also for the years 2023 and 2024. While the supervisory coverage of the sector has significantly increased, the Notary Chamber does not appear to have an entirely risk-based approach, given that a significant number of the on-site inspections conducted targeted notaries classified as medium or low ML/TF risk. The Notary Chamber justified this choice as not necessarily based on risk but based on targeting the newly appointed notaries. Supervision over the work of a notary public is performed by at least two members of the Commission, from a different territorial office. Follow-up controls were conducted as well, although more limitedly (3 in 2023 and 1 in 2024). 281. The Notarial Chamber staff assigned to off-site supervision doubled from 3 in 2019 to 6 in May 2025 (these staff members are permanent employees in the Chamber, and they are not notaries, but legal experts), while for on-site supervision 20 staff are allocated since 2025 (as opposed to 15 in 2019). While these staff members are not fully dedicated to AML/CFT supervision and conflicts or interest issues may arise given that supervision is conducted by peers, the AT found no concerns related to the quality and conduct of supervisory inspections, other the fact that the risk-based element could be improved. Market Inspection 282. Within the Market Inspection, 48 staff are assigned to AML/CFT (32 FTE and 16 on a part-time basis). Regarding the real-estate sector, the on-site engagement appears to be decreasing over the referenced period, with the coverage being limited to 153 inspections (less than 10% of the sector). The Market Inspection updated its on-site inspection checklist in 2020 and in 2025. The Market Inspection is running its entire supervisory process using the government E-Inspector Platform, which is an application built to streamline all inspections practices across government supervisory entities. Data on the distribution of inspections by risk level (high, medium, low) was not provided, which limits the ability to assess whether high-risk entities are being given priority. However, through the discussions held it emerged that the Market Inspection’s approach it informed by risk to some extent. Targeted inspections are mostly carried out on the basis of requests from other authorities (notably, the Public Prosecutor’s Office), regardless of risk. Off-site supervision consists mainly of processing questionnaires and reviewing online advertisements or complaints, but it is unclear how systematically these inputs are used to prioritise entities for onsite follow-up. While the number of identified irregularities has decreased over time, repeated breaches in key areas such as BRAs and reporting obligations suggest that off-site efforts, though useful for detecting non-registered brokers, are not yet fully effective in ensuring ongoing compliance of higher-risk entities. Regarding DPMS, the Market Inspection carries out inspections regarding their compliance with cash limitations obligations provided by the AML/CFT Law. APML 283. Over the referenced period, the on-site engagement carried out by the APML increased significantly in the accounting sector, from 6 inspections conducted in 2020, to 24 in 2021 and 42 in 2022 and 2023, with a corresponding rise in the off-site engagement, although it is not clear whether it is risk-based and entirely effective, considering that some gaps relating to CDD and BO obligations still persist." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="362. There are various sanctions in place for failure to comply with basic and BO information requirements. Sanctions for failure to register basic and BO information and to register in a timely manner Table 5.7 SBRA – Basic &amp; BO Information Sanctions Additional Fee (€55) - Late Filing of Basic Data Failure to Register BO Data -Misdemeanour Fines Failure to Register BO Data- Misdemeanour Warnings Responsible Person Legal Person Responsible Person Legal Person No. Value (€) No. Value (€) No. No. 2020 759 101 7,429 63 52,604 95 133 2021 822 227 29,484 135 120,711 308 395 2022 866 575 74,073 379 341,822 1310 1481 2023 757 494 61,119 353 279,994 1273 1042 2024 710 378 46,432 280 268,886 1157 1247 363. Late filing fees (€55) are imposed on legal persons for failure to register changes to basic and shareholder information on time. This sanction is not effective and dissuasive, however, the declining trend in fees imposed over the past 4 years denotes that compliance levels are improving. 364. For failures to register BO data, fines of between €427 to €4,273 or warnings were imposed by misdemeanour courts for legal persons, and €43 to €684 or warnings for responsible persons. The highest fines imposed (i.e. €4,273 for legal persons and €684 for responsible persons) are less than the maximums at law (i.e. €17,000 and €13000 respectively). This is impacted by the fact that such fines have been imposed on companies that upon incorporation failed to register BO information and hence had made little or no turnover. Very limited sanctions have been imposed for late or non-registration of BO information changes (i.e. 3 warnings). 365. Criminal sanctions are envisaged for the provision of false or fraudulent basic and BO information. Over the review period seven individuals were convicted for submitting false basic information, and two individuals for providing false BO information. A total of 60-months suspended imprisonment sentences were imposed (6-months on average per case). In one case an individual was also banned from holding managerial or representative functions in companies. ML Convictions for Strawmen and Masterminds 366. Prosecutors explained that they also initiate ML criminal action against strawmen. This depends on whether it would be more viable to have a plea agreement with the strawmen to get to the main organisers and also on the depth of involvement and criminal complicity of the strawmen. Over the review period 44 strawmen were convicted for ML. Prosecutors explained that when they do not proceed with an ML charge, they would seek to charge the strawmen for provision of false or fraudulent basic and BO information, however as explained above there were only two convictions for the provision of false BO information. 367. In connection with ML and other economic crimes convictions, between 2019 – August 2025 the court restricted 305 individuals from undertaking any economic activity and/or acting as company directors, for an average period of 2 years. As set out under section 5.2. this measure is an effective deterrent to mitigate the misuse of legal persons for criminal purposes, but it has only been used once to sanction the provision of false basic and/or BO information. Forced Liquidation Procedures Table 5.8 Forced Liquidation of Legal Persons (2021-2024) Legal basis for Liquidation 2021 2022 2023 2024 LLC failed to submit annual financial statements for two consecutive business years 2764 3699 3496 3610 LLC had no legal representative for 3 months 1703 1836 2252 2408 LLC’s activity, permit or license was banned 1 2 7 2 Inaccurate registered address is not corrected following court order 0 4 6 26 Court Ordered 0 1 0 1 368. The SBRA has been striking off the register companies that fail to submit financial statements or that do not have an appointed legal representative. The SBRA explained that such companies would typically involve dormant companies that had their TINs removed, in view of tax matters or other criminal wrongdoing, or else companies that have been abandoned. This is a very effective tool to clean up the register of entities and the CRBO. Sanctions on Banks for BO compliance failures 369. The analysis of sanctions and remedial actions taken in regard to BO failures by banks is an important component of this analysis, given the vital role that Banks play. As set out under section 5.6 the AML/CFT Supervisors’ (including NBS’s) enforcement and other measures have had a positive impact on compliance by FIs (including Banks). In the case of the NBS this is mainly attributed to the effective use of remedial actions which secure timely corrective action, as the use of monetary fines is not considered entirely effective, dissuasive and proportionate. 370. The above sanctions and measures had a positive impact on the availability of BO data, as seen from the rate of population of the CRBO (see Table 5.3) and the reduction in breaches for non-submission of BO data (see Table 5.7). Given the low number of criminal sanctions and prosecutions for the provision of false or fraudulent BO information, and the very limited number of sanctions (i.e. 3 warnings) for late or non-registration of BO information changes over the review period, the AT believes that Serbia could be more proactive in taking effective and dissuasive sanctions to safeguard the accuracy and currency of BO data available." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="362. There are various sanctions in place for failure to comply with basic and BO information requirements. Sanctions for failure to register basic and BO information and to register in a timely manner Table 5.7 SBRA – Basic &amp; BO Information Sanctions Additional Fee (€55) - Late Filing of Basic Data Failure to Register BO Data -Misdemeanour Fines Failure to Register BO Data- Misdemeanour Warnings Responsible Person Legal Person Responsible Person Legal Person No. Value (€) No. Value (€) No. No. 2020 759 101 7,429 63 52,604 95 133 2021 822 227 29,484 135 120,711 308 395 2022 866 575 74,073 379 341,822 1310 1481 2023 757 494 61,119 353 279,994 1273 1042 2024 710 378 46,432 280 268,886 1157 1247 363. Late filing fees (€55) are imposed on legal persons for failure to register changes to basic and shareholder information on time. This sanction is not effective and dissuasive, however, the declining trend in fees imposed over the past 4 years denotes that compliance levels are improving. 364. For failures to register BO data, fines of between €427 to €4,273 or warnings were imposed by misdemeanour courts for legal persons, and €43 to €684 or warnings for responsible persons. The highest fines imposed (i.e. €4,273 for legal persons and €684 for responsible persons) are less than the maximums at law (i.e. €17,000 and €13000 respectively). This is impacted by the fact that such fines have been imposed on companies that upon incorporation failed to register BO information and hence had made little or no turnover. Very limited sanctions have been imposed for late or non-registration of BO information changes (i.e. 3 warnings). 365. Criminal sanctions are envisaged for the provision of false or fraudulent basic and BO information. Over the review period seven individuals were convicted for submitting false basic information, and two individuals for providing false BO information. A total of 60-months suspended imprisonment sentences were imposed (6-months on average per case). In one case an individual was also banned from holding managerial or representative functions in companies. ML Convictions for Strawmen and Masterminds 366. Prosecutors explained that they also initiate ML criminal action against strawmen. This depends on whether it would be more viable to have a plea agreement with the strawmen to get to the main organisers and also on the depth of involvement and criminal complicity of the strawmen. Over the review period 44 strawmen were convicted for ML. Prosecutors explained that when they do not proceed with an ML charge, they would seek to charge the strawmen for provision of false or fraudulent basic and BO information, however as explained above there were only two convictions for the provision of false BO information. 367. In connection with ML and other economic crimes convictions, between 2019 – August 2025 the court restricted 305 individuals from undertaking any economic activity and/or acting as company directors, for an average period of 2 years. As set out under section 5.2. this measure is an effective deterrent to mitigate the misuse of legal persons for criminal purposes, but it has only been used once to sanction the provision of false basic and/or BO information. Forced Liquidation Procedures Table 5.8 Forced Liquidation of Legal Persons (2021-2024) Legal basis for Liquidation 2021 2022 2023 2024 LLC failed to submit annual financial statements for two consecutive business years 2764 3699 3496 3610 LLC had no legal representative for 3 months 1703 1836 2252 2408 LLC’s activity, permit or license was banned 1 2 7 2 Inaccurate registered address is not corrected following court order 0 4 6 26 Court Ordered 0 1 0 1 368. The SBRA has been striking off the register companies that fail to submit financial statements or that do not have an appointed legal representative. The SBRA explained that such companies would typically involve dormant companies that had their TINs removed, in view of tax matters or other criminal wrongdoing, or else companies that have been abandoned. This is a very effective tool to clean up the register of entities and the CRBO. Sanctions on Banks for BO compliance failures 369. The analysis of sanctions and remedial actions taken in regard to BO failures by banks is an important component of this analysis, given the vital role that Banks play. As set out under section 5.6 the AML/CFT Supervisors’ (including NBS’s) enforcement and other measures have had a positive impact on compliance by FIs (including Banks). In the case of the NBS this is mainly attributed to the effective use of remedial actions which secure timely corrective action, as the use of monetary fines is not considered entirely effective, dissuasive and proportionate. 370. The above sanctions and measures had a positive impact on the availability of BO data, as seen from the rate of population of the CRBO (see Table 5.3) and the reduction in breaches for non-submission of BO data (see Table 5.7). Given the low number of criminal sanctions and prosecutions for the provision of false or fraudulent BO information, and the very limited number of sanctions (i.e. 3 warnings) for late or non-registration of BO information changes over the review period, the AT believes that Serbia could be more proactive in taking effective and dissuasive sanctions to safeguard the accuracy and currency of BO data available." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 497. Overall, Serbian authorities actively pursue both confiscation of criminal property and, to a more limited extent, property of corresponding value. According to the information provided, a very high percentage of confiscated assets are recovered and the ratio between seized and confiscated/recovered property is significant. Table 8.3. Total amount of frozen/seized, confiscated and recovered property (in million EUR) Frozen/seized Confiscated Recovered 2019 4.03 4.96 5.42 2020 12.73 16.56 12.08 2021 32.93 33.40 25.06 2022 24.98 25.49 24.42 2023 40.89 19.75 17.88 2024 17.33 8.21 12.35 Total 132.92 108.69 97.23 498. Considering the relative interrelation between these numbers, it is observed that 81% of frozen/seized assets are confiscated and 73% are actually recovered (89% of confiscated assets). Although it could be perceived as a relatively effective system, the comparison between these numbers and the total amount of proceeds of crimes in Serbia (approx. 357 million EUR per year) shows that a 5% of them are actually confiscated. 499. Non-conviction based confiscation is not provided under the Serbian legislation and, thus, no results are achieved in this field which contributes to partly explain the gap between the total estimated criminal assets and confiscation numbers. The Serbian authorities informed the AT that a tax mechanism is being applied in relation to natural persons who are unable to prove/justify the origin of their assets and could lead to the imposition of a 75% special tax is applied (the total amount of this special tax collected under the assessment period is 1 390 659 EUR in 4 cases). Nevertheless, although credited to some extent this proceeding cannot be considered as a NCBC mechanism and cannot substitute it. 500. Extended confiscation provisions under the Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime already enable prosecutors to target assets linked to serious crimes, including ML and TF. Mainly for this purpose a special prosecutor has been assigned with these kind of confiscation procedures and a Service for financial forensics has been staffed with two financial experts. 501. Human resourced in these fields have been identified by the country as limited, as confirmed by data, and should be increased. Despite some efforts of the SPPO to hire competent additional financial experts, the AT has been informed that the success of these recruitment processes was limited due to the fact that the working conditions offered were not sufficiently in line with the required seniority of the positions required. 502. Confiscation of property of equivalent value is pursued by Serbian authorities when criminal assets are not found. This approach could be followed at any stage of the criminal procedure, including after a conviction-based confiscation when the assets could not be effectively recovered. While extended confiscation is pursued as a general policy objective, confiscation of property of equivalent value seems to be incidental and based on a case-by-case analysis with very few examples of this confiscation (specific statistics on this matter were not provided). No criminal property related to TF or property of equivalent value was confiscated despite a TF conviction was issued in 2019. Case Box 8.3. Confiscation of assets of equivalent value In criminal proceedings led by the Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime against 14 defendants, members of an organized criminal group, they were charged with the criminal offenses of criminal alliance, aggravated theft, and money laundering. Through these activities, they obtained “illicit gains” totalling 405 602.23 EUR. The judgments ordered the confiscation of the total amount of illicit gains from the defendants. The confiscation of illicit gains from one of the convicted members of the organized criminal group in the amount of 30 700 EUR was ordered, being recovered mainly in cash (19 475 EUR) and the rest by confiscation assets of equivalent value (a family residential building in Kraljevo and a used vehicle, with a total estimated market value of 11 225 euros). 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 503. Authorities appear committed to enforcing confiscation orders, regularly working with international counterparts to handle cross-border asset recovery, including recognition and execution of foreign confiscation requests. Statistics show that Serbian courts and enforcement agencies have confiscated some amounts of illicit assets, both domestically and in cooperation with other jurisdictions. 504. Outgoing confiscations requests to foreign counter-parts are very limited. Additionally, asset sharing and repatriation of confiscated assets is only possible under a previous international agreement and, according to statistics provided, no repatriation was adopted between 2019-2023. In practice, since asset sharing is not technically possible in the great majority of cases, criminal property located in Serbia is generally confiscated in favor of the Republic of Serbia and assets located abroad are confiscated by the jurisdictions where they were found. Case Box 8.4. International confiscation of criminal property Several luxury watches and different currencies of a total value of 80 000 EUR (i.e., CAD, USD, HKR) were confiscated in Serbia based on a foreign confiscation. This conviction-based confiscation was a result, amongst others, of the cooperation with a third country. Since the cases was initiated by the third country and some of the defendants were there, the SPPO decided to transfer the case to this third country. Despite the cooperation of Servia allowed the third country to confiscated large amounts of assets (approx. 1.2 million EUR), it should be observed that the assets found in Serbia were confiscated in Serbia totally in favor to Serbia (without sharing them with the third country). Finally, the County Court in Zagreb decided that, based on the provisions of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, a total of 8 expensive watches and seized money in the amount of approximately 13,000 euros, as well as the amount of 461,465 HRK (approximately 62,200 euros), shall become the property of the Republic of Serbia, given that these items were seized on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. 505. The 2024 NRA identifies tax-related crimes, drug trafficking, abuse of position, corruption in the public sector, fraud and OCGs as the main ML threats, jointly with other crimes rated as medium threat (e.g., smuggling of people, illegal trade). and accordingly, significant amounts of assets related to these crimes as predicate offences were confiscated. Based on statistics provided, excluding ML, the crimes with higher associated confiscated amounts in the period 2019-2023 are illicit trade (39 million EUR seized and 38 million EUR confiscated), abuse of position (2.8 million EUR seized and 15.6 million EUR confiscated), drug trafficking (18.8 million EUR seized and 11.1 million EUR confiscated), criminal alliance (11 million EUR seized and 3.2 million EUR confiscated), tax evasion (1.1 million EUR seized and 2.8 million EUR confiscated; additionally), illegal crossing the state border and human trafficking (3.5 million EUR seized and 1.7 million EUR confiscated), smuggling (1.3 million EUR seized and 1.1 million EUR confiscated), aggravated theft (0.8 million EUR seized and 0.9 million EUR confiscated), illegal production, possession, carrying and circulation of weapons and explosives (1.4 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated), fraud (0.5 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated), abuse of office (0.5 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated) etc. Therefore, Serbia’s results in terms of confiscation are broadly in line with the predominant ML threats and preventive measures are also applied in a commensurate manner." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 497. Overall, Serbian authorities actively pursue both confiscation of criminal property and, to a more limited extent, property of corresponding value. According to the information provided, a very high percentage of confiscated assets are recovered and the ratio between seized and confiscated/recovered property is significant. Table 8.3. Total amount of frozen/seized, confiscated and recovered property (in million EUR) Frozen/seized Confiscated Recovered 2019 4.03 4.96 5.42 2020 12.73 16.56 12.08 2021 32.93 33.40 25.06 2022 24.98 25.49 24.42 2023 40.89 19.75 17.88 2024 17.33 8.21 12.35 Total 132.92 108.69 97.23 498. Considering the relative interrelation between these numbers, it is observed that 81% of frozen/seized assets are confiscated and 73% are actually recovered (89% of confiscated assets). Although it could be perceived as a relatively effective system, the comparison between these numbers and the total amount of proceeds of crimes in Serbia (approx. 357 million EUR per year) shows that a 5% of them are actually confiscated. 499. Non-conviction based confiscation is not provided under the Serbian legislation and, thus, no results are achieved in this field which contributes to partly explain the gap between the total estimated criminal assets and confiscation numbers. The Serbian authorities informed the AT that a tax mechanism is being applied in relation to natural persons who are unable to prove/justify the origin of their assets and could lead to the imposition of a 75% special tax is applied (the total amount of this special tax collected under the assessment period is 1 390 659 EUR in 4 cases). Nevertheless, although credited to some extent this proceeding cannot be considered as a NCBC mechanism and cannot substitute it. 500. Extended confiscation provisions under the Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime already enable prosecutors to target assets linked to serious crimes, including ML and TF. Mainly for this purpose a special prosecutor has been assigned with these kind of confiscation procedures and a Service for financial forensics has been staffed with two financial experts. 501. Human resourced in these fields have been identified by the country as limited, as confirmed by data, and should be increased. Despite some efforts of the SPPO to hire competent additional financial experts, the AT has been informed that the success of these recruitment processes was limited due to the fact that the working conditions offered were not sufficiently in line with the required seniority of the positions required. 502. Confiscation of property of equivalent value is pursued by Serbian authorities when criminal assets are not found. This approach could be followed at any stage of the criminal procedure, including after a conviction-based confiscation when the assets could not be effectively recovered. While extended confiscation is pursued as a general policy objective, confiscation of property of equivalent value seems to be incidental and based on a case-by-case analysis with very few examples of this confiscation (specific statistics on this matter were not provided). No criminal property related to TF or property of equivalent value was confiscated despite a TF conviction was issued in 2019. Case Box 8.3. Confiscation of assets of equivalent value In criminal proceedings led by the Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime against 14 defendants, members of an organized criminal group, they were charged with the criminal offenses of criminal alliance, aggravated theft, and money laundering. Through these activities, they obtained “illicit gains” totalling 405 602.23 EUR. The judgments ordered the confiscation of the total amount of illicit gains from the defendants. The confiscation of illicit gains from one of the convicted members of the organized criminal group in the amount of 30 700 EUR was ordered, being recovered mainly in cash (19 475 EUR) and the rest by confiscation assets of equivalent value (a family residential building in Kraljevo and a used vehicle, with a total estimated market value of 11 225 euros). 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 503. Authorities appear committed to enforcing confiscation orders, regularly working with international counterparts to handle cross-border asset recovery, including recognition and execution of foreign confiscation requests. Statistics show that Serbian courts and enforcement agencies have confiscated some amounts of illicit assets, both domestically and in cooperation with other jurisdictions. 504. Outgoing confiscations requests to foreign counter-parts are very limited. Additionally, asset sharing and repatriation of confiscated assets is only possible under a previous international agreement and, according to statistics provided, no repatriation was adopted between 2019-2023. In practice, since asset sharing is not technically possible in the great majority of cases, criminal property located in Serbia is generally confiscated in favor of the Republic of Serbia and assets located abroad are confiscated by the jurisdictions where they were found. Case Box 8.4. International confiscation of criminal property Several luxury watches and different currencies of a total value of 80 000 EUR (i.e., CAD, USD, HKR) were confiscated in Serbia based on a foreign confiscation. This conviction-based confiscation was a result, amongst others, of the cooperation with a third country. Since the cases was initiated by the third country and some of the defendants were there, the SPPO decided to transfer the case to this third country. Despite the cooperation of Servia allowed the third country to confiscated large amounts of assets (approx. 1.2 million EUR), it should be observed that the assets found in Serbia were confiscated in Serbia totally in favor to Serbia (without sharing them with the third country). Finally, the County Court in Zagreb decided that, based on the provisions of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Warsaw Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, a total of 8 expensive watches and seized money in the amount of approximately 13,000 euros, as well as the amount of 461,465 HRK (approximately 62,200 euros), shall become the property of the Republic of Serbia, given that these items were seized on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. 505. The 2024 NRA identifies tax-related crimes, drug trafficking, abuse of position, corruption in the public sector, fraud and OCGs as the main ML threats, jointly with other crimes rated as medium threat (e.g., smuggling of people, illegal trade). and accordingly, significant amounts of assets related to these crimes as predicate offences were confiscated. Based on statistics provided, excluding ML, the crimes with higher associated confiscated amounts in the period 2019-2023 are illicit trade (39 million EUR seized and 38 million EUR confiscated), abuse of position (2.8 million EUR seized and 15.6 million EUR confiscated), drug trafficking (18.8 million EUR seized and 11.1 million EUR confiscated), criminal alliance (11 million EUR seized and 3.2 million EUR confiscated), tax evasion (1.1 million EUR seized and 2.8 million EUR confiscated; additionally), illegal crossing the state border and human trafficking (3.5 million EUR seized and 1.7 million EUR confiscated), smuggling (1.3 million EUR seized and 1.1 million EUR confiscated), aggravated theft (0.8 million EUR seized and 0.9 million EUR confiscated), illegal production, possession, carrying and circulation of weapons and explosives (1.4 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated), fraud (0.5 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated), abuse of office (0.5 million EUR seized and 0.8 million EUR confiscated) etc. Therefore, Serbia’s results in terms of confiscation are broadly in line with the predominant ML threats and preventive measures are also applied in a commensurate manner." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="535. In instances where a formal TF investigation is not conducted, mainly due to a lack of sufficient evidence, information gathered by the different LEAs is used to include these persons and their relatives in a monitoring list or, if needed, designate them for the purpose of the implementation of targeted sanctions or travel restrictions, particularly FTF. 536. Serbia has presented as examples of alternative measures used where TF conviction was not possible, but the assessors do not consider them as “alternative measures” in the acceptance of the FATF Methodology, although these cases have been positively considered by the AT. In one case the person was convicted for stand-alone ML without a financial investigation being conducted and only the property found with the defendant when crossing the border was considered. This case could be hardly considered as an “alternative measure” used when TF conviction is not possible, since a comprehensive financial investigation was not conducted, which supports the conclusions previously presented in the report. 537. In other case, it was detected that the legal representative of an NPO abused his position and enabled his relative with the purchase of an apartment owned by the NPO on preferential terms. According to the information provided, conducted financial investigations and monitoring of transactions revealed misuse of NPO funds for personal gain rather than TF and, thus, this case cannot be considered as an alternative measure used where TF conviction is not possible." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="535. In instances where a formal TF investigation is not conducted, mainly due to a lack of sufficient evidence, information gathered by the different LEAs is used to include these persons and their relatives in a monitoring list or, if needed, designate them for the purpose of the implementation of targeted sanctions or travel restrictions, particularly FTF. 536. Serbia has presented as examples of alternative measures used where TF conviction was not possible, but the assessors do not consider them as “alternative measures” in the acceptance of the FATF Methodology, although these cases have been positively considered by the AT. In one case the person was convicted for stand-alone ML without a financial investigation being conducted and only the property found with the defendant when crossing the border was considered. This case could be hardly considered as an “alternative measure” used when TF conviction is not possible, since a comprehensive financial investigation was not conducted, which supports the conclusions previously presented in the report. 537. In other case, it was detected that the legal representative of an NPO abused his position and enabled his relative with the purchase of an apartment owned by the NPO on preferential terms. According to the information provided, conducted financial investigations and monitoring of transactions revealed misuse of NPO funds for personal gain rather than TF and, thus, this case cannot be considered as an alternative measure used where TF conviction is not possible." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="General All supervisory authorities have arranged systematic training on TFS for REs, which has demonstrably improved compliance with TFS obligations. The staff resources described for authorities in IO3 and IO4. also apply to TFS supervision and enforcement. The NBS and APML have had power to impose penalties for TFS failures since before the review period, other supervisory authorities were provided with statutory authority to issue penalties at the end of 2024. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 580. The NBS’s approach to monitoring TFS compliance by banks is very good. It engages in offsite review and since 2019 has conducted full-scope onsite inspections which include TFS, as well as conducting thematic TFS onsite inspections since 2024. A good quality offsite questionnaire covering AML/CFT and sanctions compliance is issued at least twice a year to all banks. It contains a range of sanctions-related questions and goes beyond screening and the provisions of the LFA. 581. By combining offsite assessment together with onsite consideration of policies; procedures; and approaches to risk assessment, conducting file reviews and interviews, live system tests of screening and treatment of red flags and internal alerts, and reviewing internal audit and record-keeping, the NBS gains a very good knowledge of banks’ systems. Particular attention is paid to complex ownership structures and possible indirect links to designated persons. The same approach is taken by the NBS to other FIs and VASPs. Some enhancement of the TF risk rating methodologies to explicitly include TF TFS (e.g. adequacy of measures to identify sanctions evasion and adequacy of governance and controls for TFS risk management) may provide for an enhancement refinement of focus of supervisory engagement on TFS. The NBS has required remediation of the small number of shortfalls by REs in compliance directly relevant to TFS. Three REs have been penalised for an IT irregularity on sanctions screening (warning), not having appropriate procedures on screening (fine) and not having any procedure for designated persons (revocation of the licence). The later demonstrates that the NBS is willing to adopt strong enforcement measures when needed. 582. The SC issues a questionnaire to investment sector licensees every six months which, broadly links designated persons to wider TF considerations. During AML/CFT/CPF onsite inspections, internal procedures and training are reviewed to assess whether they consider TF TFS sanctions separately to PF, and staff understanding is tested. There are walk throughs of live trades and margin lending processes to verify that screening tools are used and red flags considered appropriately before executing a transaction. Particular attention is paid to complex ownership structures and possible indirect links to designated persons. TF TFS supervision by the SC is good. There have been only minor infringements (two REs not maintaining records of designated person checks) detected by the SC, which did not warrant penalties. As with other supervisory authorities it would be beneficial for the inspection reports to provide greater detail. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 583. The intensity of specific risk focus on TF TFS varies between the DNFBP supervisors, with the APML being best placed. The APML began offsite supervision for accountants in 2019. It issues an annual good quality questionnaire dedicated to sanctions compliance to a risk-based selection of accountants. Onsite inspections to accountants were extended in 2023 to cover TFS, including thematic inspections, with a dedicated TFS checklist. While the on-site reports focus on relationships with designated persons, the APML advised that TFS is also covered within the wider consideration of CFT. 584. In 2023 60% (22 cases) of onsite inspections to accountants found irregularities such as failures to conduct sanctions screening and incomplete records on screening undertaken. Breaches are automatically subject to penalties. To date, three accountants have been subject to fines – the levels are low and only partially dissuasive, and the court-based penalty system is subject to delays. Seven more firms were found to have committed breaches in 2024 and 2025; proceedings for the imposition of penalties have been initiated and decisions are awaited from the court. 585. Onsite inspections to the two most material DNFBP sectors, casinos and real estate brokers, began very recently and the system needs time to mature so that more licensees are subject to inspection. There is scope to enhance offsite questionnaires and improve onsite reports (which, as a generality, focus on screening) to better reflect onsite practice. See IO.11 for infringements found by the GCA; the MOT has detected no gaps directly relevant to TFS. Lawyers are not yet subject to TFS supervision. 586. Since 2019 the Chamber of Notaries has issued an annual questionnaire dedicated to TFS to notarial offices. Onsite inspections have included TF TFS since 2020 and incorporate review of the adequacy of customer risk assessment of sanctions risk. However, the Chamber’s risk matrix does not include TFS. The number of inspections undertaken is less than planned as the Chamber has found no breaches of TFS requirements. The onsite reports are limited to basic information on review of screening (and record keeping). 587. With regard to lawyers, the Bar Association plans to issue questionnaires covering TFS, as well as to undertake onsite inspections. 588. There is scope for VASPs, investment sector and DFNPBs to improve approaches to geographic risk. While the FATF’s “black and grey” lists are used for geographic risk purposes by these REs, and while VASPs and some other REs have automated systems which assist their CFT measures, the jurisdictions relevant to the specific TF (and TFS) risks faced by Serbia are different to the lists. For the investment sector and DNFBPs there is scope for supervisors to adopt more assertive and explicit risk driven approaches e.g. to specifically cover adequacy of measures against sanctions evasion and adequacy of governance and controls on TF TFS risk management." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="General All supervisory authorities have arranged systematic training on TFS for REs, which has demonstrably improved compliance with TFS obligations. The staff resources described for authorities in IO3 and IO4. also apply to TFS supervision and enforcement. The NBS and APML have had power to impose penalties for TFS failures since before the review period, other supervisory authorities were provided with statutory authority to issue penalties at the end of 2024. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 580. The NBS’s approach to monitoring TFS compliance by banks is very good. It engages in offsite review and since 2019 has conducted full-scope onsite inspections which include TFS, as well as conducting thematic TFS onsite inspections since 2024. A good quality offsite questionnaire covering AML/CFT and sanctions compliance is issued at least twice a year to all banks. It contains a range of sanctions-related questions and goes beyond screening and the provisions of the LFA. 581. By combining offsite assessment together with onsite consideration of policies; procedures; and approaches to risk assessment, conducting file reviews and interviews, live system tests of screening and treatment of red flags and internal alerts, and reviewing internal audit and record-keeping, the NBS gains a very good knowledge of banks’ systems. Particular attention is paid to complex ownership structures and possible indirect links to designated persons. The same approach is taken by the NBS to other FIs and VASPs. Some enhancement of the TF risk rating methodologies to explicitly include TF TFS (e.g. adequacy of measures to identify sanctions evasion and adequacy of governance and controls for TFS risk management) may provide for an enhancement refinement of focus of supervisory engagement on TFS. The NBS has required remediation of the small number of shortfalls by REs in compliance directly relevant to TFS. Three REs have been penalised for an IT irregularity on sanctions screening (warning), not having appropriate procedures on screening (fine) and not having any procedure for designated persons (revocation of the licence). The later demonstrates that the NBS is willing to adopt strong enforcement measures when needed. 582. The SC issues a questionnaire to investment sector licensees every six months which, broadly links designated persons to wider TF considerations. During AML/CFT/CPF onsite inspections, internal procedures and training are reviewed to assess whether they consider TF TFS sanctions separately to PF, and staff understanding is tested. There are walk throughs of live trades and margin lending processes to verify that screening tools are used and red flags considered appropriately before executing a transaction. Particular attention is paid to complex ownership structures and possible indirect links to designated persons. TF TFS supervision by the SC is good. There have been only minor infringements (two REs not maintaining records of designated person checks) detected by the SC, which did not warrant penalties. As with other supervisory authorities it would be beneficial for the inspection reports to provide greater detail. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 583. The intensity of specific risk focus on TF TFS varies between the DNFBP supervisors, with the APML being best placed. The APML began offsite supervision for accountants in 2019. It issues an annual good quality questionnaire dedicated to sanctions compliance to a risk-based selection of accountants. Onsite inspections to accountants were extended in 2023 to cover TFS, including thematic inspections, with a dedicated TFS checklist. While the on-site reports focus on relationships with designated persons, the APML advised that TFS is also covered within the wider consideration of CFT. 584. In 2023 60% (22 cases) of onsite inspections to accountants found irregularities such as failures to conduct sanctions screening and incomplete records on screening undertaken. Breaches are automatically subject to penalties. To date, three accountants have been subject to fines – the levels are low and only partially dissuasive, and the court-based penalty system is subject to delays. Seven more firms were found to have committed breaches in 2024 and 2025; proceedings for the imposition of penalties have been initiated and decisions are awaited from the court. 585. Onsite inspections to the two most material DNFBP sectors, casinos and real estate brokers, began very recently and the system needs time to mature so that more licensees are subject to inspection. There is scope to enhance offsite questionnaires and improve onsite reports (which, as a generality, focus on screening) to better reflect onsite practice. See IO.11 for infringements found by the GCA; the MOT has detected no gaps directly relevant to TFS. Lawyers are not yet subject to TFS supervision. 586. Since 2019 the Chamber of Notaries has issued an annual questionnaire dedicated to TFS to notarial offices. Onsite inspections have included TF TFS since 2020 and incorporate review of the adequacy of customer risk assessment of sanctions risk. However, the Chamber’s risk matrix does not include TFS. The number of inspections undertaken is less than planned as the Chamber has found no breaches of TFS requirements. The onsite reports are limited to basic information on review of screening (and record keeping). 587. With regard to lawyers, the Bar Association plans to issue questionnaires covering TFS, as well as to undertake onsite inspections. 588. There is scope for VASPs, investment sector and DFNPBs to improve approaches to geographic risk. While the FATF’s “black and grey” lists are used for geographic risk purposes by these REs, and while VASPs and some other REs have automated systems which assist their CFT measures, the jurisdictions relevant to the specific TF (and TFS) risks faced by Serbia are different to the lists. For the investment sector and DNFBPs there is scope for supervisors to adopt more assertive and explicit risk driven approaches e.g. to specifically cover adequacy of measures against sanctions evasion and adequacy of governance and controls on TF TFS risk management." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="616. Regarding the effectiveness of TFS under this core issue, reference should be made to the findings under I.O.3 and I.O.4, which are also applicable here. 11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 617. Banks comply with, and have a very good understanding of, their PF obligations. All banks now conduct PF business risk assessments and PF customer risk profiling, either within an overall ML/TF/PF analysis, or as separate PF assessments. Procedures and manuals include specific references to PF. All banks incorporate PF red flags and maintain separate PF indicators. When onboarding clients the PF aspect is considered through the prism of risk with PF scoring applied to counterparties in high-risk jurisdictions. There is a high level of awareness in dealing with customers who hold licences to trade in dual-use goods. Banks also engage in Customs document review, export/import licence verification, due diligence regarding transport chains, and service payment analysis. In general, CDD and EDD by banks for relationships which trigger a PF indicator are detailed. Banks apply EDD where there is potential PF exposure (e.g., shell company structures, complex ownership, high-risk jurisdictions). There is a strong adherence to screening, with payments being suspended or refused when required documentation is inconsistent or missing. Breaches relating to PF compliance found by the NBS have generally been minor, such as failure to cite guidance in manuals. 618. NBFIs supervised by NBS and VASPs demonstrate a good level of understanding of their obligations related to PF. They have established procedures, and most have integrated screening tools into their operational systems to review customer information in real time against TFS lists during both onboarding and periodic reviews. These tools incorporate the APML list as well as global sanctions lists, including through commercial providers. The checks conducted are generally proportionate to the size and scope of the entities' activities. Adverse media screening was used by some REs. There is awareness of the obligation to submit sanctions compliance reports to the APML relating to asset freezing under the UN sanctions regime. NBFIs have started to put in place the risk assessment and risk management expectations embodied in the Securities Commission 2021 guidelines and recently issued NBS guidance (Spring 2025). There is scope for NBFIs (supervised by NBS) and VASPs to improve approaches to consideration of jurisdictions which have featured as intermediary/transit jurisdictions. This same point applies to the investment sector (which, overall, demonstrated a good level of PF-related risk management to the AT). 11.5.2. DNFBPs 619. DNFBPs met generally assess PF risk and apply EDD where relevant. Casinos are updating their risk matrices to include PF and apply EDD to clients involved in cross-border trade. The recent preliminary onsite inspections by the GCA regarding CPF, which have led to its recommendation to the court to apply penalties for infringements in relation to training on TFS, indicate that there is room for improvement in the sector. Compliance levels with regard to DNFBPs is highest for notaries; supervisory findings confirm this. Notaries consider dual-use goods and military-related trade during onboarding and check for document forgeries and high-risk countries. The level of compliance by accountants is varied, with the APML having found some lack of screening and failure to check for updates of designated persons. The MOT’s offsite monitoring has shown there remains scope for brokers to better understand TFS and reporting requirements and improve compliance in the real estate sector; the commencement of supervisory onsite inspections in 2025 is expected to lead to improvements. The AT was advised of use of FIU PF indicators (such as sanctions, sensitive jurisdictions, and dual-use goods) to assess client risk in the legal sector and apply EDD, including verifying end users, but, overall, the sector is at an early stage in being able to demonstrate sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="616. Regarding the effectiveness of TFS under this core issue, reference should be made to the findings under I.O.3 and I.O.4, which are also applicable here. 11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 617. Banks comply with, and have a very good understanding of, their PF obligations. All banks now conduct PF business risk assessments and PF customer risk profiling, either within an overall ML/TF/PF analysis, or as separate PF assessments. Procedures and manuals include specific references to PF. All banks incorporate PF red flags and maintain separate PF indicators. When onboarding clients the PF aspect is considered through the prism of risk with PF scoring applied to counterparties in high-risk jurisdictions. There is a high level of awareness in dealing with customers who hold licences to trade in dual-use goods. Banks also engage in Customs document review, export/import licence verification, due diligence regarding transport chains, and service payment analysis. In general, CDD and EDD by banks for relationships which trigger a PF indicator are detailed. Banks apply EDD where there is potential PF exposure (e.g., shell company structures, complex ownership, high-risk jurisdictions). There is a strong adherence to screening, with payments being suspended or refused when required documentation is inconsistent or missing. Breaches relating to PF compliance found by the NBS have generally been minor, such as failure to cite guidance in manuals. 618. NBFIs supervised by NBS and VASPs demonstrate a good level of understanding of their obligations related to PF. They have established procedures, and most have integrated screening tools into their operational systems to review customer information in real time against TFS lists during both onboarding and periodic reviews. These tools incorporate the APML list as well as global sanctions lists, including through commercial providers. The checks conducted are generally proportionate to the size and scope of the entities' activities. Adverse media screening was used by some REs. There is awareness of the obligation to submit sanctions compliance reports to the APML relating to asset freezing under the UN sanctions regime. NBFIs have started to put in place the risk assessment and risk management expectations embodied in the Securities Commission 2021 guidelines and recently issued NBS guidance (Spring 2025). There is scope for NBFIs (supervised by NBS) and VASPs to improve approaches to consideration of jurisdictions which have featured as intermediary/transit jurisdictions. This same point applies to the investment sector (which, overall, demonstrated a good level of PF-related risk management to the AT). 11.5.2. DNFBPs 619. DNFBPs met generally assess PF risk and apply EDD where relevant. Casinos are updating their risk matrices to include PF and apply EDD to clients involved in cross-border trade. The recent preliminary onsite inspections by the GCA regarding CPF, which have led to its recommendation to the court to apply penalties for infringements in relation to training on TFS, indicate that there is room for improvement in the sector. Compliance levels with regard to DNFBPs is highest for notaries; supervisory findings confirm this. Notaries consider dual-use goods and military-related trade during onboarding and check for document forgeries and high-risk countries. The level of compliance by accountants is varied, with the APML having found some lack of screening and failure to check for updates of designated persons. The MOT’s offsite monitoring has shown there remains scope for brokers to better understand TFS and reporting requirements and improve compliance in the real estate sector; the commencement of supervisory onsite inspections in 2025 is expected to lead to improvements. The AT was advised of use of FIU PF indicators (such as sanctions, sensitive jurisdictions, and dual-use goods) to assess client risk in the legal sector and apply EDD, including verifying end users, but, overall, the sector is at an early stage in being able to demonstrate sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="112. Prosecutors, LEAs, APML and intelligence agencies - A number of prosecutor-led taskforces have been set up to target the highest threat ML predicates and namely those related to organised crime and corruption. Six task forces have been set up to fight corruption related ML. These have different territorial competencies covering Belgrade, Nis and Novi Sad and bring together the Public Prosecutor’s Departments for the Suppression of Corruption, Ministry of Interior (Police), APML, Tax Police, Customs and Ministry of Agriculture. 113. There are also another 4 Task Forces led by JTOK focused on combatting organised crime migrant smuggling, forgery and related ML. 114. These task forces serve the main purposes of facilitating the joint investigation of more complex type of ML cases. Most of these taskforces (with one exception) have enabled the successful prosecution of a number of ML cases (i.e. 11 prosecutions involving 300 individuals). These task forces also facilitate the sharing of operational information and intelligence especially on OCG members. 115. With respect to terrorism and TF operational coordination, the Prosecutors, Police and BIA have since 2017 been operating a permanent operational WG on T/TF. This WG meet on a weekly basis and facilitates the direct exchange of information and intelligence on persons and groups of interests and trends. Other authorities are invited for these meetings on a need and relevance basis. The AT is of the view that WG would benefit from the inclusion of the APML as a permanent regular member. 116. Another effective mechanism in place to facilitate information sharing and speed up the response in more serious type of cases is the liaison officer network that the Prosecutor’s office has in place with several competent authorities (i.e Tax Police, APML, Customs, NBS, Anti-Corruption Agency, SBRA, Public Procurement Agency). There are currently 12 liaison officers assisting the Prosecutors in their investigatory and prosecutorial work. 117. AML/CFT Supervisors – AML/CFT Supervisors (with the exception of the BAR Chamber), meet at least on an annual basis to discuss high-level overarching issues, share experiences and best practices and also engage in discussions with Prosecutors and APML officers on ML cases, trends and typologies. This framework was set in place in 2021 and since then has been meeting annually and biennially in 2024 (i.e. December 2021, November 2022, November 2023, June 2024 and November 2024. This is complemented by ad-hoc bilateral or multilateral meetings between supervisory authorities to coordinate more specific operational aspects. By way of example the NBS and the Securities Commission meet more regularly (at least bi-annually) to share information on supervisory examinations and plans involving VASPs and authorised banks given the shared supervisory competences. They also cooperate closely when licensing VASPs, sharing a common platform for the receipt of license applications, sharing useful information for fit and proper reviews and clearly determining the roles and input of each authority considering that both have a remit in the licensing process of VASPs emanating from the Law on Digital Assets and the Law on Capital Markets. 118. These initiatives are welcome and boosts coordination and synergies between supervisory authorities and other competent authorities. The AT however believes that there is need for more effective and systemic coordination, in particular between TA, Tax Police, NBS and SBRA to synchronise AML/CFT controls of LLCs (directly or indirectly through REs) – see section 7.2.3." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="112. Prosecutors, LEAs, APML and intelligence agencies - A number of prosecutor-led taskforces have been set up to target the highest threat ML predicates and namely those related to organised crime and corruption. Six task forces have been set up to fight corruption related ML. These have different territorial competencies covering Belgrade, Nis and Novi Sad and bring together the Public Prosecutor’s Departments for the Suppression of Corruption, Ministry of Interior (Police), APML, Tax Police, Customs and Ministry of Agriculture. 113. There are also another 4 Task Forces led by JTOK focused on combatting organised crime migrant smuggling, forgery and related ML. 114. These task forces serve the main purposes of facilitating the joint investigation of more complex type of ML cases. Most of these taskforces (with one exception) have enabled the successful prosecution of a number of ML cases (i.e. 11 prosecutions involving 300 individuals). These task forces also facilitate the sharing of operational information and intelligence especially on OCG members. 115. With respect to terrorism and TF operational coordination, the Prosecutors, Police and BIA have since 2017 been operating a permanent operational WG on T/TF. This WG meet on a weekly basis and facilitates the direct exchange of information and intelligence on persons and groups of interests and trends. Other authorities are invited for these meetings on a need and relevance basis. The AT is of the view that WG would benefit from the inclusion of the APML as a permanent regular member. 116. Another effective mechanism in place to facilitate information sharing and speed up the response in more serious type of cases is the liaison officer network that the Prosecutor’s office has in place with several competent authorities (i.e Tax Police, APML, Customs, NBS, Anti-Corruption Agency, SBRA, Public Procurement Agency). There are currently 12 liaison officers assisting the Prosecutors in their investigatory and prosecutorial work. 117. AML/CFT Supervisors – AML/CFT Supervisors (with the exception of the BAR Chamber), meet at least on an annual basis to discuss high-level overarching issues, share experiences and best practices and also engage in discussions with Prosecutors and APML officers on ML cases, trends and typologies. This framework was set in place in 2021 and since then has been meeting annually and biennially in 2024 (i.e. December 2021, November 2022, November 2023, June 2024 and November 2024. This is complemented by ad-hoc bilateral or multilateral meetings between supervisory authorities to coordinate more specific operational aspects. By way of example the NBS and the Securities Commission meet more regularly (at least bi-annually) to share information on supervisory examinations and plans involving VASPs and authorised banks given the shared supervisory competences. They also cooperate closely when licensing VASPs, sharing a common platform for the receipt of license applications, sharing useful information for fit and proper reviews and clearly determining the roles and input of each authority considering that both have a remit in the licensing process of VASPs emanating from the Law on Digital Assets and the Law on Capital Markets. 118. These initiatives are welcome and boosts coordination and synergies between supervisory authorities and other competent authorities. The AT however believes that there is need for more effective and systemic coordination, in particular between TA, Tax Police, NBS and SBRA to synchronise AML/CFT controls of LLCs (directly or indirectly through REs) – see section 7.2.3." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="220. All supervisory authorities have an array of supervisory and enforcement measures at their disposal applicable to AML/CFT breaches, including the imposition of remedial measures, ordering written warnings, monetary fines, temporary suspension of activity or permanent prohibition thereof. Overall, supervisors demonstrated having a positive impact on FIs and VASPs’ compliance, though to varying degrees, and through different measures. Overall, the level of compliance with AML/CFT obligations has increased over the referenced period, based on the supervisory data provided and interviews held with FIs and VASPs met on-site. 221. While the NBS and the SC have a solid approach to tackling AML/CFT shortcomings, it remains largely dependent on corrective actions. Both authorities make most use of the imposition of remedial measures, written warnings and monetary fines. For factoring companies, it is worth noting that ever since the APML took over, the number of remedial measures matches the number of written warnings, and additionally pecuniary fines have been imposed of amounts that are dissuasive, notably with regards to the reduced risk and materiality associated with this sector. Sanctions and remedial actions 222. Between 2019 and 2023, the NBS identified an important number of infringements, including in higher-risk sectors (e.g. for banks, out of 38 inspections, infringements were identified in 16). 223. The supervisory and enforcement measures most used by the NBS are the written warnings, through which the identified AML/CFT breaches are notified to the OE, as well as the remedial action that needs to be undertaken in a defined timeline. If the irregularities are less significant, a written warning is issued; while if they are deemed as more significant, an order is to remediate is issued. After the expiration of the specified deadlines, the NBS proceeds to a follow-up control where the compliance with the given orders is checked based on a new sample. Remedial actions and sanctions have been applied by the NBS mostly on banks, VASPs and exchange offices. Over the reference period, the NBS noted that, with the exception of one case, all banks remediated the identified deficiencies. In the case of the bank where remediation did not occur and new irregularities were also identified, the NBS repeated the measure and imposed a fine. 224. As illustrated in table 3.2 below, over the reference period, sanctions were applied across several sectors, notably in the banking and currency exchange sectors. Banks received both written warnings and pecuniary fines, with the 22 fines amounting to a total of approximately €229 000, including individual sanctions on members of management. Exchange offices accounted for the highest number of fines, though the total monetary value remained modest at around €34 650. In the VASP sector, where supervision began more recently, the NBS and SC issued a series of remedial measures and fines between 2023 and 2024, with total fines amounting to approximately €74 628. EMI, factoring companies and MVTS were also subject to remedial actions and fines, with one EMI license having been revoked and one MVTS case resulting in a temporary suspension of payment services in 2024. 225. These trends indicate a gradual increase in NBS’ enforcement activity, with sanctions being applied across a range of sectors. While the frequency and monetary value of fines vary, overall, the effectiveness, dissuasiveness and proportionality of sanctions applied could be further enhanced. Table 3.3. Number of remedial measures &amp; sanctions imposed on Fis and VASPs (2019-2024) Sector Remedial measures Number of written warnings Number of fines Fine amounts (in EUR) Number of removal of manager/CO Number of licenses withdrawn No of operational restrictions Banks 6 22 10 229 142 0 0 0 Authorised Banks (SC) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Credit institutions acting as depositories Financial leasing 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 Payment Institutions/ EMI 1 0 0 0 0 1 withdrawal in 2022 0 MVTS 4 2 1 700 0 1 Temporary suspension 2024 - still in force 0 Exchange offices 165 14 170 34 850 0 7 11 VASPs 11 0 2 78 588 0 0 0 Securities firms 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 Collective investment schemes 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Life insurance 2 2 1 6 240 0 0 0 VPFMC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Factoring companies [45] 6 6 3 13 100 0 0 0 226. Over the referenced period, the SC identified 8 irregularities and issued 8 decisions and 3 reports for economic offenses in AML/CFT, as well as 5 warnings for violations of less significant regulations. The irregularities related to the identification of the client, legal representative, beneficial owner (deficiencies in documentation), deficiencies in record-keeping (the entity did not maintain records with all prescribed data), lack of evidence that the entity had implemented all prescribed actions and measures, etc. With regards to factoring companies, 6 remedial measures and 3 fines have been imposed over the referenced period. 227. Overall, supervisory authorities apply a comprehensive set of risk-based tools, outreach, and enforcement actions that have led to tangible improvements in compliance across more material FIs and VASPs. Written warnings and remedial measures are commonly used and generally effective in securing timely corrective action, while pecuniary sanctions and other measures are applied where breaches are more serious or repeated. However, the monetary value of fines remains relatively modest, including in higher-risk sectors, and escalation has not always been demonstrated. Overall, continued efforts to ensure effective, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement action, especially in in higher-risk sectors, are needed. Footnotes [45] The sanctioning powers have been transferred to the APML in 2022. The sanctions indicated here have been imposed in 2023 and 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="220. All supervisory authorities have an array of supervisory and enforcement measures at their disposal applicable to AML/CFT breaches, including the imposition of remedial measures, ordering written warnings, monetary fines, temporary suspension of activity or permanent prohibition thereof. Overall, supervisors demonstrated having a positive impact on FIs and VASPs’ compliance, though to varying degrees, and through different measures. Overall, the level of compliance with AML/CFT obligations has increased over the referenced period, based on the supervisory data provided and interviews held with FIs and VASPs met on-site. 221. While the NBS and the SC have a solid approach to tackling AML/CFT shortcomings, it remains largely dependent on corrective actions. Both authorities make most use of the imposition of remedial measures, written warnings and monetary fines. For factoring companies, it is worth noting that ever since the APML took over, the number of remedial measures matches the number of written warnings, and additionally pecuniary fines have been imposed of amounts that are dissuasive, notably with regards to the reduced risk and materiality associated with this sector. Sanctions and remedial actions 222. Between 2019 and 2023, the NBS identified an important number of infringements, including in higher-risk sectors (e.g. for banks, out of 38 inspections, infringements were identified in 16). 223. The supervisory and enforcement measures most used by the NBS are the written warnings, through which the identified AML/CFT breaches are notified to the OE, as well as the remedial action that needs to be undertaken in a defined timeline. If the irregularities are less significant, a written warning is issued; while if they are deemed as more significant, an order is to remediate is issued. After the expiration of the specified deadlines, the NBS proceeds to a follow-up control where the compliance with the given orders is checked based on a new sample. Remedial actions and sanctions have been applied by the NBS mostly on banks, VASPs and exchange offices. Over the reference period, the NBS noted that, with the exception of one case, all banks remediated the identified deficiencies. In the case of the bank where remediation did not occur and new irregularities were also identified, the NBS repeated the measure and imposed a fine. 224. As illustrated in table 3.2 below, over the reference period, sanctions were applied across several sectors, notably in the banking and currency exchange sectors. Banks received both written warnings and pecuniary fines, with the 22 fines amounting to a total of approximately €229 000, including individual sanctions on members of management. Exchange offices accounted for the highest number of fines, though the total monetary value remained modest at around €34 650. In the VASP sector, where supervision began more recently, the NBS and SC issued a series of remedial measures and fines between 2023 and 2024, with total fines amounting to approximately €74 628. EMI, factoring companies and MVTS were also subject to remedial actions and fines, with one EMI license having been revoked and one MVTS case resulting in a temporary suspension of payment services in 2024. 225. These trends indicate a gradual increase in NBS’ enforcement activity, with sanctions being applied across a range of sectors. While the frequency and monetary value of fines vary, overall, the effectiveness, dissuasiveness and proportionality of sanctions applied could be further enhanced. Table 3.3. Number of remedial measures &amp; sanctions imposed on Fis and VASPs (2019-2024) Sector Remedial measures Number of written warnings Number of fines Fine amounts (in EUR) Number of removal of manager/CO Number of licenses withdrawn No of operational restrictions Banks 6 22 10 229 142 0 0 0 Authorised Banks (SC) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Credit institutions acting as depositories Financial leasing 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 Payment Institutions/ EMI 1 0 0 0 0 1 withdrawal in 2022 0 MVTS 4 2 1 700 0 1 Temporary suspension 2024 - still in force 0 Exchange offices 165 14 170 34 850 0 7 11 VASPs 11 0 2 78 588 0 0 0 Securities firms 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 Collective investment schemes 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Life insurance 2 2 1 6 240 0 0 0 VPFMC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 Factoring companies [45] 6 6 3 13 100 0 0 0 226. Over the referenced period, the SC identified 8 irregularities and issued 8 decisions and 3 reports for economic offenses in AML/CFT, as well as 5 warnings for violations of less significant regulations. The irregularities related to the identification of the client, legal representative, beneficial owner (deficiencies in documentation), deficiencies in record-keeping (the entity did not maintain records with all prescribed data), lack of evidence that the entity had implemented all prescribed actions and measures, etc. With regards to factoring companies, 6 remedial measures and 3 fines have been imposed over the referenced period. 227. Overall, supervisory authorities apply a comprehensive set of risk-based tools, outreach, and enforcement actions that have led to tangible improvements in compliance across more material FIs and VASPs. Written warnings and remedial measures are commonly used and generally effective in securing timely corrective action, while pecuniary sanctions and other measures are applied where breaches are more serious or repeated. However, the monetary value of fines remains relatively modest, including in higher-risk sectors, and escalation has not always been demonstrated. Overall, continued efforts to ensure effective, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement action, especially in in higher-risk sectors, are needed. Footnotes [45] The sanctioning powers have been transferred to the APML in 2022. The sanctions indicated here have been imposed in 2023 and 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="284. DNFBP supervisory authorities have an array of supervisory and enforcement measures applicable to AML/CFT breaches, including written warnings, the imposition of remedial measures, license suspension or withdrawal and the imposition of misdemeanour fines. 285. Steps have been taken to improve DNFBP compliance through outreach, supervision, remedial actions and sanctions. In several sectors, these activities have contributed to increased compliance with AML/CFT obligations. However, the overall impact of supervisory and enforcement actions on sustained compliance remains uneven, particularly in higher-risk sectors where sanctions are limited or not applied, and where follow-up mechanisms are underdeveloped. For instance, the Bar Association’s supervisory engagement across the referenced period was very limited and also discontinued, coupled with the absence of any sanctions or any other measures imposed for breaches of AML/CFT requirements. 286. In several cases authorities imposed warnings, fines, or temporary suspensions, and in the notary sector even license withdrawals, but recurring breaches indicate that corrective measures do not always translate into sustainable improvements. For accountants and real estate agents, repeated shortcomings in CDD, BO verification, and reporting suggest that while remedial tools are available, their use is limited or not sufficiently dissuasive. 287. In the casino sector, over the referenced period, only 11 out of 63 breaches identified were deemed as systemic or serious, in respect to which proceedings for pecuniary fines were initiated and granted. Between 2021 and 2023, for the gaps identified fines were imposed, ranging around 2 000 EUR to 35 256 EUR for the legal entity, and ranging from 342 EUR to 3, 581 EUR for responsible persons. The fact that serious gaps still persist is indicative that these measures undertaken are not sufficient in driving compliance. 288. In the notary sector, supervisory actions have resulted in administrative measures and, in the case of more serious breaches, referrals to other authorities. Sanctions include warnings, temporary suspensions, and fines. 7 fines were imposed between 2021 and 2024, with the amounts having increased on average from 1 000 EUR to 8 900 EUR in 2024; amounting overall to 56 500 EUR. In addition, two licenses were withdrawn. The AT commends these actions, in particular the willingness to remove licenses for more serious types of breaches. 289. Regarding real estate agents, the number of breaches identified has been declining (from 22- 2019 to 11 – 2024). However, in terms of seriousness or systemic nature, the Market Inspection noted instances of repeated breaches by REs, especially in relation to BRA and reporting obligations. Most of the measures taken to drive compliance consisted of written warnings. While fines have been imposed, these averaged at around EUR 200 per breach, which is not deemed to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, notably in the context of repeated breaches. 290. Between 2019 and 2024, the competent commercial court rules imposed fines of a total of 59 212 EUR in 31 cases, based on information submitted by the APML regarding accountants’ legal persons and a total of 10 514 EUR on responsible persons. When it comes to misdemeanour courts, 24 fines were imposed amounting to a total value of 19 799 EUR. Over the referenced period, the number of irregularities identified in on-site supervision went from 61 in 2019 and 81 in 2020 to 228 in 2021, reaching its peak in 2022 and 2023 to around 357 and only decreased in 2024 to 123. Based on the fines awarded in 2025, it can be concluded that the amounts in individual cases are significantly higher than the average from the previous period, with the total fines awarded in 2025 nearly matching the total imposed on legal entities over the entire five-year period (2019–2023). These are positive indications, which the APML should maintain in order to keep driving compliance in this sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="284. DNFBP supervisory authorities have an array of supervisory and enforcement measures applicable to AML/CFT breaches, including written warnings, the imposition of remedial measures, license suspension or withdrawal and the imposition of misdemeanour fines. 285. Steps have been taken to improve DNFBP compliance through outreach, supervision, remedial actions and sanctions. In several sectors, these activities have contributed to increased compliance with AML/CFT obligations. However, the overall impact of supervisory and enforcement actions on sustained compliance remains uneven, particularly in higher-risk sectors where sanctions are limited or not applied, and where follow-up mechanisms are underdeveloped. For instance, the Bar Association’s supervisory engagement across the referenced period was very limited and also discontinued, coupled with the absence of any sanctions or any other measures imposed for breaches of AML/CFT requirements. 286. In several cases authorities imposed warnings, fines, or temporary suspensions, and in the notary sector even license withdrawals, but recurring breaches indicate that corrective measures do not always translate into sustainable improvements. For accountants and real estate agents, repeated shortcomings in CDD, BO verification, and reporting suggest that while remedial tools are available, their use is limited or not sufficiently dissuasive. 287. In the casino sector, over the referenced period, only 11 out of 63 breaches identified were deemed as systemic or serious, in respect to which proceedings for pecuniary fines were initiated and granted. Between 2021 and 2023, for the gaps identified fines were imposed, ranging around 2 000 EUR to 35 256 EUR for the legal entity, and ranging from 342 EUR to 3, 581 EUR for responsible persons. The fact that serious gaps still persist is indicative that these measures undertaken are not sufficient in driving compliance. 288. In the notary sector, supervisory actions have resulted in administrative measures and, in the case of more serious breaches, referrals to other authorities. Sanctions include warnings, temporary suspensions, and fines. 7 fines were imposed between 2021 and 2024, with the amounts having increased on average from 1 000 EUR to 8 900 EUR in 2024; amounting overall to 56 500 EUR. In addition, two licenses were withdrawn. The AT commends these actions, in particular the willingness to remove licenses for more serious types of breaches. 289. Regarding real estate agents, the number of breaches identified has been declining (from 22- 2019 to 11 – 2024). However, in terms of seriousness or systemic nature, the Market Inspection noted instances of repeated breaches by REs, especially in relation to BRA and reporting obligations. Most of the measures taken to drive compliance consisted of written warnings. While fines have been imposed, these averaged at around EUR 200 per breach, which is not deemed to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, notably in the context of repeated breaches. 290. Between 2019 and 2024, the competent commercial court rules imposed fines of a total of 59 212 EUR in 31 cases, based on information submitted by the APML regarding accountants’ legal persons and a total of 10 514 EUR on responsible persons. When it comes to misdemeanour courts, 24 fines were imposed amounting to a total value of 19 799 EUR. Over the referenced period, the number of irregularities identified in on-site supervision went from 61 in 2019 and 81 in 2020 to 228 in 2021, reaching its peak in 2022 and 2023 to around 357 and only decreased in 2024 to 123. Based on the fines awarded in 2025, it can be concluded that the amounts in individual cases are significantly higher than the average from the previous period, with the total fines awarded in 2025 nearly matching the total imposed on legal entities over the entire five-year period (2019–2023). These are positive indications, which the APML should maintain in order to keep driving compliance in this sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="506. Serbia’s legal framework grants clear priority to compensating victims over the state’s right to confiscate assets. Under Article 252(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, confiscation only takes place if the value of the assets exceeds the amount necessary to satisfy victims’ claims, and Article 93 of the Criminal Code similarly stipulates that restitution, or compensation must occur before any confiscation can be enforced. As a result, victims’ rights are safeguarded through restitution or compensation measures, and the authorities typically proceed with confiscation only after ensuring that legitimate victim claims have been satisfied. Case Box 8.5. Domestic compensation of the victims The legal representative of the NPO abused his position and enabled his relative with the purchase of an apartment owned by the NPO on preferential terms, damaging the NPO by approximately 8 000 000 RSD (approximately 68 300 EUR), which were misappropriated by the defendant and his relatives. The restitution to the victim was sought by the public prosecutor and a plea agreement was signed under the prerequisite to fully compensate the damaged NPO, which effectively occurred. In this regard, the plea agreement seems to be a useful instrument for this purpose. 507. Compensation to the victims would also be possible where the victims are abroad. Nevertheless, an express claim from the damaged people is required, which could constitute an obstacle and hinder their effective compensation when victims are abroad (e.g., obstacles related to a lack of fully understanding of a foreign proceeding and to the economic cost associated to international procedures). Serbian authorities should consider easing this kind of proceedings. Case Box 8.6. Compensation to foreign victims A group integrated by Serbian nationals and nationals from other jurisdictions was accused of committing serious thefts in a third country. Several wealthy persons were affected, being the potential damaged caused of more than 25 million EUR. Part of the proceeds of this crime (approx. 2.4 million EUR) were brought and invested in Serbia. Although assets were seized, a confiscation of seized assets in favor of Serbia has been requested to the Court, since there were no claims from the foreign victims in Serbia (this situation could change if an express claim from any victim would be filed in Serbia)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="506. Serbia’s legal framework grants clear priority to compensating victims over the state’s right to confiscate assets. Under Article 252(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, confiscation only takes place if the value of the assets exceeds the amount necessary to satisfy victims’ claims, and Article 93 of the Criminal Code similarly stipulates that restitution, or compensation must occur before any confiscation can be enforced. As a result, victims’ rights are safeguarded through restitution or compensation measures, and the authorities typically proceed with confiscation only after ensuring that legitimate victim claims have been satisfied. Case Box 8.5. Domestic compensation of the victims The legal representative of the NPO abused his position and enabled his relative with the purchase of an apartment owned by the NPO on preferential terms, damaging the NPO by approximately 8 000 000 RSD (approximately 68 300 EUR), which were misappropriated by the defendant and his relatives. The restitution to the victim was sought by the public prosecutor and a plea agreement was signed under the prerequisite to fully compensate the damaged NPO, which effectively occurred. In this regard, the plea agreement seems to be a useful instrument for this purpose. 507. Compensation to the victims would also be possible where the victims are abroad. Nevertheless, an express claim from the damaged people is required, which could constitute an obstacle and hinder their effective compensation when victims are abroad (e.g., obstacles related to a lack of fully understanding of a foreign proceeding and to the economic cost associated to international procedures). Serbian authorities should consider easing this kind of proceedings. Case Box 8.6. Compensation to foreign victims A group integrated by Serbian nationals and nationals from other jurisdictions was accused of committing serious thefts in a third country. Several wealthy persons were affected, being the potential damaged caused of more than 25 million EUR. Part of the proceeds of this crime (approx. 2.4 million EUR) were brought and invested in Serbia. Although assets were seized, a confiscation of seized assets in favor of Serbia has been requested to the Court, since there were no claims from the foreign victims in Serbia (this situation could change if an express claim from any victim would be filed in Serbia)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 620. The approaches and the recommendations set out under core issue 10.5 apply. The text below provides additional analysis, which is complementary to IO.10. There has recently been more focus on PF TFS training and there is more demonstrable focus on PF TFS risk compared with TF TFS risk. As with TF TFS, the onsite visit reports do not reflect the detail of PF onsite supervision by supervisors. The NBS reports are the most detailed in terms of scope and include PF risk management as a separate section - this would be a good model for other supervisors to follow. While the NBS reports can be improved this would only be enhancement. 621. Guidance on PF has evolved progressively. The APML first issued guidance in 2018; it issued replacement guidance in August 2024. This guidance is very high level. Several supervisory authorities, including the NBS followed in Spring 2025 with their own guidance and PF indicator documents. The aim of the guidance is formally to establish treatment of CPF (e.g. risk assessment and risk management) by REs in a way which is consistent with AML/CFT. In some guidance documents, PF is integrated under the broader category of TF (such as the recommendations for reporting suspicious activity). While the guidance refers to financial sanctions, this is at a very high level only (with two useful typologies). The AT considers that the guidance would benefit from being reformulated into a more consistent and user-friendly format, while also providing more detail on the application of TFS—particularly in relation to North Korea—as well as clearer reasoning behind the PF indicators and additional typologies. 622. The red flag indicators across the various documents (including the NRA report) comprise a combination of general and specific indicators; the documents would benefit from expansion to demonstrate why they are relevant and how firms can effectively utilise them. In response to the AT’s view, the NBS has advised that its liaison with banks means there is no uncertainty by that sector on the understanding and use of indicators. 623. Time will be needed for supervisory authorities to assess to what extent the new guidance and indicators have been adopted by REs, and whether further amendments are needed. 624. To further strengthen the reporting framework, consideration should be given to introducing a separate SAR reporting requirement for PF. NBS 625. The NBS has engaged in a pro-active CPF supervision since 2019 and has now adopted a distinct PF risk rating methodology. It prioritises the professional development of its staff in emerging risks, which includes PF typologies. It has been responsive to APML input and initiated follow-up reviews at 5 banks selected based on APML reports or responses to supervisory questionnaires. In 2024, the NBS launched a comprehensive programme of thematic PF inspections, covering two banks, three payment institutions, and 79 currency exchange offices. This was extended in the first quarter of 2025 to include a further 13 banks and three NBFIs. The results were positive with only minor changes to business risk assessments being needed. 626. The NBS's approach to CPF during onsite inspections is detailed. The NBS examines the application of CPF measures in a range of ways, including the extent to which PF is embedded in CDD and EDD, as well as their broader systems. Risk scoring by banks is assessed to ensure it fully incorporates PF factors. Sample files are selected based on PF risk, e.g. customers with invoicing/export transactions with high-risk jurisdictions, non-resident customers from high-risk jurisdictions, and trade-finance with lines of credit linked to high-risk supply chains; the extent of measures and supporting documentation is reviewed, together with of red flags. Staff are interviewed to assess their understanding of PF. Dummy transactions involving designated persons are tested. Training by banks is reviewed to ensure it is sufficiently focused on PF. CPF is a key factor in determining the length and intensity of inspections and has become progressively more significant. 627. The NBS has also recently revised its procedures and introduced a risk assessment methodology for CPF. It is well placed to take the next steps in monitoring PF risk management by REs on a risk basis. Securities Commission 628. The SC has recently conducted a desk-based exercise to review the business risk assessments of a selection of licensees. Most firms reviewed are considered to have high-quality assessments, with a few needing changes at the level of detail. 629. During onsite inspections, the supervisor has conducted scenario testing by simulating complex trade-finance and securities-lending chains that could mask PF and has reviewed firms’ approach to non-financial sector clients, legal entities, and auditors, and whether EDD is undertaken for any customer involved in dual-use goods or cross-border import/export activities. No adverse findings relating to CPF have been found, which the SC sees as underscoring the low risk of PF and the outcome of supervisory engagement over several years. The Securities Commission issued PF indicators in spring of 2025. The next step is planned to be the publication of a PF risk roadmap, which will provide a chronological presentation of the integration of PF into licensee systems. There is also scope to focus internal procedures and the SC risk matrix more on CPF and to bolster the approach to CPF in onsite visit reports. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 630. DNFBPs (except lawyers) are subject to PF supervision by their respective authorities, with the APML being best placed of the DNFBP supervisors in demonstrating focus of supervisory engagement on PF risk. 631. The APML has expected firms subject to its supervision to undertake a PF business risk assessment since 2018. Inspections by APML cover PF risks, such as clients engaged in re-export activity and dual-use goods. In addition to the onsite inspections covering TFS in general, six firms were inspected in April 2025 to assess the adequacy of PF business risk assessment; one minor issue was identified. The APML has very recently developed a good quality dedicated onsite checklist for CPF and issued PF indicators. It is well placed to take the next steps in intensifying risk-based supervision. 632. The GCA demonstrated satisfactory knowledge on the PF risks faced by casinos and online casinos. Its questionnaire has covered TFS in general (and therefore CPF) since its introduction. Onsite inspection of PF TFS started in early 2025, with some deficiencies found. The GCA has recently issued PF indicators to casinos and is working on the inclusion of PF within its risk matrix for risk profiling; PF related supervision is under development and will need time to mature. 633. The dedicated TFS offsite questionnaire issued by the Chamber of Notaries covers TFS in general (and therefore CPF). Onsite inspections included CPF with AML/CFT from 2020. In 2024 there were eight inspections solely focused on PF, where screening software was tested, client files reviewed for TFS compliance, any re-export scenarios checked and staff interviewed on CPF. The Chamber’s onsite report described in I.O.10 does not refer to CPF explicitly. CPF TFS review during on-site inspections can be deepened and the onsite programme extended. Immediately before the AT’s visit, the Chamber issued a list of PF indicators and guidelines which incorporate PF for risk assessment purposes. The Chamber proposes to collect statistics on re-export activity, add PF indicators to its offsite questionnaire, enhance its staff training and training by offices with case studies on PF typologies, extend onsite inspections to analyse transaction contexts, and refine its risk matrix to include cross-border trade and high-risk jurisdictions, and target review of notarial offices handling cross-border transactions. 634. The MOT offsite questionnaire, onsite checklist and onsite visit reports do not explicitly refer to PF. It has recently issued PF indicators, which are a combination of general and specific indicators. Guidance on PF is planned. There would be merit in amending supervisory engagement tools to specifically reference PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1. FIs and VASPs 620. The approaches and the recommendations set out under core issue 10.5 apply. The text below provides additional analysis, which is complementary to IO.10. There has recently been more focus on PF TFS training and there is more demonstrable focus on PF TFS risk compared with TF TFS risk. As with TF TFS, the onsite visit reports do not reflect the detail of PF onsite supervision by supervisors. The NBS reports are the most detailed in terms of scope and include PF risk management as a separate section - this would be a good model for other supervisors to follow. While the NBS reports can be improved this would only be enhancement. 621. Guidance on PF has evolved progressively. The APML first issued guidance in 2018; it issued replacement guidance in August 2024. This guidance is very high level. Several supervisory authorities, including the NBS followed in Spring 2025 with their own guidance and PF indicator documents. The aim of the guidance is formally to establish treatment of CPF (e.g. risk assessment and risk management) by REs in a way which is consistent with AML/CFT. In some guidance documents, PF is integrated under the broader category of TF (such as the recommendations for reporting suspicious activity). While the guidance refers to financial sanctions, this is at a very high level only (with two useful typologies). The AT considers that the guidance would benefit from being reformulated into a more consistent and user-friendly format, while also providing more detail on the application of TFS—particularly in relation to North Korea—as well as clearer reasoning behind the PF indicators and additional typologies. 622. The red flag indicators across the various documents (including the NRA report) comprise a combination of general and specific indicators; the documents would benefit from expansion to demonstrate why they are relevant and how firms can effectively utilise them. In response to the AT’s view, the NBS has advised that its liaison with banks means there is no uncertainty by that sector on the understanding and use of indicators. 623. Time will be needed for supervisory authorities to assess to what extent the new guidance and indicators have been adopted by REs, and whether further amendments are needed. 624. To further strengthen the reporting framework, consideration should be given to introducing a separate SAR reporting requirement for PF. NBS 625. The NBS has engaged in a pro-active CPF supervision since 2019 and has now adopted a distinct PF risk rating methodology. It prioritises the professional development of its staff in emerging risks, which includes PF typologies. It has been responsive to APML input and initiated follow-up reviews at 5 banks selected based on APML reports or responses to supervisory questionnaires. In 2024, the NBS launched a comprehensive programme of thematic PF inspections, covering two banks, three payment institutions, and 79 currency exchange offices. This was extended in the first quarter of 2025 to include a further 13 banks and three NBFIs. The results were positive with only minor changes to business risk assessments being needed. 626. The NBS's approach to CPF during onsite inspections is detailed. The NBS examines the application of CPF measures in a range of ways, including the extent to which PF is embedded in CDD and EDD, as well as their broader systems. Risk scoring by banks is assessed to ensure it fully incorporates PF factors. Sample files are selected based on PF risk, e.g. customers with invoicing/export transactions with high-risk jurisdictions, non-resident customers from high-risk jurisdictions, and trade-finance with lines of credit linked to high-risk supply chains; the extent of measures and supporting documentation is reviewed, together with of red flags. Staff are interviewed to assess their understanding of PF. Dummy transactions involving designated persons are tested. Training by banks is reviewed to ensure it is sufficiently focused on PF. CPF is a key factor in determining the length and intensity of inspections and has become progressively more significant. 627. The NBS has also recently revised its procedures and introduced a risk assessment methodology for CPF. It is well placed to take the next steps in monitoring PF risk management by REs on a risk basis. Securities Commission 628. The SC has recently conducted a desk-based exercise to review the business risk assessments of a selection of licensees. Most firms reviewed are considered to have high-quality assessments, with a few needing changes at the level of detail. 629. During onsite inspections, the supervisor has conducted scenario testing by simulating complex trade-finance and securities-lending chains that could mask PF and has reviewed firms’ approach to non-financial sector clients, legal entities, and auditors, and whether EDD is undertaken for any customer involved in dual-use goods or cross-border import/export activities. No adverse findings relating to CPF have been found, which the SC sees as underscoring the low risk of PF and the outcome of supervisory engagement over several years. The Securities Commission issued PF indicators in spring of 2025. The next step is planned to be the publication of a PF risk roadmap, which will provide a chronological presentation of the integration of PF into licensee systems. There is also scope to focus internal procedures and the SC risk matrix more on CPF and to bolster the approach to CPF in onsite visit reports. 11.6.2. DNFBPs 630. DNFBPs (except lawyers) are subject to PF supervision by their respective authorities, with the APML being best placed of the DNFBP supervisors in demonstrating focus of supervisory engagement on PF risk. 631. The APML has expected firms subject to its supervision to undertake a PF business risk assessment since 2018. Inspections by APML cover PF risks, such as clients engaged in re-export activity and dual-use goods. In addition to the onsite inspections covering TFS in general, six firms were inspected in April 2025 to assess the adequacy of PF business risk assessment; one minor issue was identified. The APML has very recently developed a good quality dedicated onsite checklist for CPF and issued PF indicators. It is well placed to take the next steps in intensifying risk-based supervision. 632. The GCA demonstrated satisfactory knowledge on the PF risks faced by casinos and online casinos. Its questionnaire has covered TFS in general (and therefore CPF) since its introduction. Onsite inspection of PF TFS started in early 2025, with some deficiencies found. The GCA has recently issued PF indicators to casinos and is working on the inclusion of PF within its risk matrix for risk profiling; PF related supervision is under development and will need time to mature. 633. The dedicated TFS offsite questionnaire issued by the Chamber of Notaries covers TFS in general (and therefore CPF). Onsite inspections included CPF with AML/CFT from 2020. In 2024 there were eight inspections solely focused on PF, where screening software was tested, client files reviewed for TFS compliance, any re-export scenarios checked and staff interviewed on CPF. The Chamber’s onsite report described in I.O.10 does not refer to CPF explicitly. CPF TFS review during on-site inspections can be deepened and the onsite programme extended. Immediately before the AT’s visit, the Chamber issued a list of PF indicators and guidelines which incorporate PF for risk assessment purposes. The Chamber proposes to collect statistics on re-export activity, add PF indicators to its offsite questionnaire, enhance its staff training and training by offices with case studies on PF typologies, extend onsite inspections to analyse transaction contexts, and refine its risk matrix to include cross-border trade and high-risk jurisdictions, and target review of notarial offices handling cross-border transactions. 634. The MOT offsite questionnaire, onsite checklist and onsite visit reports do not explicitly refer to PF. It has recently issued PF indicators, which are a combination of general and specific indicators. Guidance on PF is planned. There would be merit in amending supervisory engagement tools to specifically reference PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 508. Serbia’s declaration system for cross-border movements of currency and BNI is mainly enforced by the Customs Administration. Retention of transported cash or BNI is only possible in case of non-declared cross border movements of cash and BNI, including also those cases where currency or BNI over the threshold is detected at the border when a declaration form was not previously submitted or the traveller entered the country through a green channel . In case of false declarations and in case of the identification of ML/TF suspicious by the Customs Administration, the information is forwarded to the SPPO and the APML and, then, the SPPO is the responsible authority to decide the possible measures to be applied. This domestic cooperation resulted in the detection of 37,719,095 EUR of undeclared cash and BNI being transported though the Serbian border between 2019 and 2023. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 509. In practice, Customs Administration is particularly active in the detection of non-declared transportation of cash through the Serbian borders and cooperates well with the police and the prosecutors on the basis of interagency agreements. This triggered some criminal investigations related to ML of tax fraud that have resulted in relevant confiscations of funds. Ten ML cases were launched on this basis in 2020, 3 in 2021, 1 in 2022 and 4 in 2023, with relevant amounts of seized (3.3 million EUR in 2020; 0.48 million EUR in 2021; 0.51 million EUR in 2022 and 15.63 million in 2023) and confiscated assets (1.2 million EUR in 2020; 0.07 million EUR un 2021; 0.41 million EUR in 2022 and 0.46 million in 2023) associated to the initiation of these criminal cases triggered by the Customs. Some of these cases were eventually qualified as non-criminal and subjected to the misdemeanour courts. Case Box 8.7. ML investigation following undeclared cash through the borders A foreign individual crossed the Serbian border without declaring the cash he was transporting in the amount of 562 805 EUR, that was hidden in his vehicle. Following the agreement signed between the Republic Public Prosecutor's Office and the Customs Administration, the prosecutor was informed about the findings at the border and, therefore, a ML formal investigation was launched, the person was arrested and the transported cash was seized. The defendant was convicted for ML following a plea agreement, which is a very useful instrument for Serbia, a fine in the amount of 400 000 RSD was imposed, the 562 805 EUR were confiscated and his vehicle was confiscated as the instrumentality of the crime, amongst others . 510. Although legal established sanctions would not by only by themselves sufficiently proportionate, effective and dissuasive, the combination between administrative confiscation of the non-declared assets and the imposed sanctions seems to be proportionate, effective and dissuasive. Table 8.4. Information on actions adopted by the misdemeanour courts related to breaches of the declaration system 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Number of actioned cases 68 130 143 174 164 679 Number of confiscations 54 116 153 170 166 659 Amount confiscated* 1.57 3.04 2.94 3.16 2.72 13.47 * Approximately, since different currencies were converted into million EUR. 511. Beyond criminal cases, the relevant authorities, including customs and misdemeanor courts, apply sanctions that are designed to be proportionate yet dissuasive, ensuring that undeclared or falsely declared funds linked to money laundering, terrorist financing, or predicate offences are subject to confiscation where appropriate. In practice, the relatively high total value of seized assets indicates that this system is actively identifying non-compliant travellers and confiscating illicitly obtained currency." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 508. Serbia’s declaration system for cross-border movements of currency and BNI is mainly enforced by the Customs Administration. Retention of transported cash or BNI is only possible in case of non-declared cross border movements of cash and BNI, including also those cases where currency or BNI over the threshold is detected at the border when a declaration form was not previously submitted or the traveller entered the country through a green channel . In case of false declarations and in case of the identification of ML/TF suspicious by the Customs Administration, the information is forwarded to the SPPO and the APML and, then, the SPPO is the responsible authority to decide the possible measures to be applied. This domestic cooperation resulted in the detection of 37,719,095 EUR of undeclared cash and BNI being transported though the Serbian border between 2019 and 2023. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 509. In practice, Customs Administration is particularly active in the detection of non-declared transportation of cash through the Serbian borders and cooperates well with the police and the prosecutors on the basis of interagency agreements. This triggered some criminal investigations related to ML of tax fraud that have resulted in relevant confiscations of funds. Ten ML cases were launched on this basis in 2020, 3 in 2021, 1 in 2022 and 4 in 2023, with relevant amounts of seized (3.3 million EUR in 2020; 0.48 million EUR in 2021; 0.51 million EUR in 2022 and 15.63 million in 2023) and confiscated assets (1.2 million EUR in 2020; 0.07 million EUR un 2021; 0.41 million EUR in 2022 and 0.46 million in 2023) associated to the initiation of these criminal cases triggered by the Customs. Some of these cases were eventually qualified as non-criminal and subjected to the misdemeanour courts. Case Box 8.7. ML investigation following undeclared cash through the borders A foreign individual crossed the Serbian border without declaring the cash he was transporting in the amount of 562 805 EUR, that was hidden in his vehicle. Following the agreement signed between the Republic Public Prosecutor's Office and the Customs Administration, the prosecutor was informed about the findings at the border and, therefore, a ML formal investigation was launched, the person was arrested and the transported cash was seized. The defendant was convicted for ML following a plea agreement, which is a very useful instrument for Serbia, a fine in the amount of 400 000 RSD was imposed, the 562 805 EUR were confiscated and his vehicle was confiscated as the instrumentality of the crime, amongst others . 510. Although legal established sanctions would not by only by themselves sufficiently proportionate, effective and dissuasive, the combination between administrative confiscation of the non-declared assets and the imposed sanctions seems to be proportionate, effective and dissuasive. Table 8.4. Information on actions adopted by the misdemeanour courts related to breaches of the declaration system 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Total Number of actioned cases 68 130 143 174 164 679 Number of confiscations 54 116 153 170 166 659 Amount confiscated* 1.57 3.04 2.94 3.16 2.72 13.47 * Approximately, since different currencies were converted into million EUR. 511. Beyond criminal cases, the relevant authorities, including customs and misdemeanor courts, apply sanctions that are designed to be proportionate yet dissuasive, ensuring that undeclared or falsely declared funds linked to money laundering, terrorist financing, or predicate offences are subject to confiscation where appropriate. In practice, the relatively high total value of seized assets indicates that this system is actively identifying non-compliant travellers and confiscating illicitly obtained currency." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="90. Since 2017 MER, Slovenia has made considerable efforts to improve its understanding of ML/TF risks through two successive NRAs completed in 2021 and 2025. Development of these NRAs through an inclusive process led by the OMLP with the participation of supervisory authorities, prosecutors, law-enforcement agencies and representatives of the private sector within the format of the permanent Interministerial Working Group (IWG) and its 7 subgroups has contributed to improved identification, assessment and understanding of risks. The findings of the EU SNRA being analysed and taken into consideration by the subgroups while developing the NRA also contributed to Slovenia’s risk understanding vis-à-vis the regional supranational context. 91. While NRAs remain the main mechanism for informing Slovenia’s understanding of ML/TF risks, the 2025 NRA marks a notable improvement over the 2021 NRA, offering greater granularity and a broader analytical scope. It covers different sectors and establishes clearer linkages between inherent threats and vulnerabilities across financial and non-financial sectors. The 2025 NRA aims to portray a more holistic picture of national risks by including a country vulnerability section, applying control environment scoring, and drawing residual risk conclusions, often with a comparison to the EU SNRA. Particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of a full assessment of cross border ML, cyber enabled fraud, and new activities such as virtual assets. 92. Notwithstanding these improvements, the robustness of Slovenia’s ML/TF risk assessment remains constrained by structural data limitations and uneven sectoral engagement. As a result, while the overall threat landscape is broadly identified, certain elements of the assessment lack sufficient depth and evidentiary support. 1.1.1. ML risks 93. Slovenia identifies its principal ML threats with reasonable accuracy and has demonstrated measurable improvement between successive NRAs. Both the 2021 and 2025 NRAs consistently identify economic and financial crime, tax evasion, corruption, organised crime, and increasingly cyber-enabled fraud and cross-border laundering as the main drivers of ML risk. The 2025 NRA reflects enhanced analytical depth, broader sectoral coverage and improved treatment of foreign predicate offences, virtual assets and cross-border vulnerabilities, indicating institutional learning and strengthened methodological capacity. 94. While the 2025 NRA represents a methodological improvement over the 2021 NRA, significant data limitations continue to undermine the reliability and depth of its risk assessment. Authorities acknowledged limitations in data, including inadequate record keeping by Prosecutors and LEAs or the lack of complete data from DNFBP sectors. The 2021 NRA relied on information from STRs, and other information provided by the police, and prosecutors’ office. While the 2025 NRA still relies heavily on these sources, it represents an improvement as it also includes additional data collected from the financial and non-financial sectors through targeted questionnaires. The use of targeted questionnaires for data collection from 12 non-financial sectors and professions was a major novelty of the 2025 NRA process aimed at exploring deeper the vulnerabilities of the DNFBPs. However, the reliability of the assessment derived from the data collected is questionable given the low response rate [15] and incomplete data received. Furthermore, the data collected for some DNFBP sectors was high level and insufficiently detailed to support comprehensive individual or sectoral risk understanding. 95. The use of data from STRs also has its limitations given the OMLP reported backlog in the review and analysis of STRs (see IO.6). This backlog, while delaying the timely dissemination of financial intelligence to competent authorities, creates a potential information gap to identify emerging trends or typologies, and may have affected the completeness of the NRA and the risk understanding derived from it. 96. For the purposes of analysing ML threats deriving from main predicate offences, including foreign predicate offences, a comparative analysis of the datasets for the 2025 NRA and the 2021 NRA was also carried out to identify any changes in trends. The 2025 NRA also relied on information on property gains and analysis of criminal cases conducted during the IWG subgroup discussions. Overall, while this is a positive approach that enabled the identification of relevant trends, in view of limitations of the datasets used, including gaps in the data kept by Prosecutors and LEAs, the broader threat picture associated with predicate offences may not have been fully captured. 97. The 2021 NRA established a baseline understanding of Slovenia’s ML threat environment and recognised that ML risks stem mainly from domestic economic and financial crime, corruption, organised crime and tax evasion. While the 2021 NRA does not explicitly use the term “foreign predicate offences”, it repeatedly incorporates the concept indirectly through its treatment of external risk, foreign proceeds, and foreign offenders. However, the analytical framework used for the 2021 NRA is narrow, descriptive, and insufficiently granular to fully satisfy a risk understanding of cross-border threats. 98. The 2025 NRA retained all previously identified threats and further recognised the growing significance of cyber-enabled fraud, online investment scams, and cross-border electronic transactions as emerging ML threats. While several of the 2021 vulnerabilities persisted, new structural weaknesses were also identified, including shortcomings in the oversight of the virtual asset sector, continuing resource and expertise gaps among DNFBP supervisors, low levels of compliance among DNFBPs, and inadequate information sharing concerning foreign beneficial ownership structures. The treatment of foreign predicate offences in the 2025 NRA is visible and substantive, and provides an improved understanding compared to the earlier NRA iteration. It reflects a realistic appreciation of Slovenia’s geographic and economic connectivity and the exposure to international organised crime networks, supported by factual operational data and investigative indicators. The overall ML risk for Slovenia was again assessed as medium to high, reflecting both enduring and evolving vulnerabilities despite a more complex risk environment. 99. The understanding of risks related to the use of cash has improved through the successive NRA processes. The 2021 NRA recognised cash as a major vulnerability, noting high reliance on physical currency within the country and limited restrictions on large cash transactions. The 2025 NRA utilised better cash related data, re-confirming that Slovenia is a cash-intensive economy. [16] While the domestic use of cash is seen as largely driven by economic habits rather than illicit activity, factoring in Slovenia’s geographical position as a transit country between the Balkans and Western Europe, the 2025 NRA identifies risks related to ongoing exposure to cross-border laundering through cash movements. Slovenia therefore considers that the overall ML threat from cash remains significant, assessed as medium-high. 100. In line with the 2025 NRA findings, LEAs demonstrated adequate understanding of the role of cash in criminal activities paired by the use of legal persons, citing cases involving the use of cash for the purchase of property, gold, or for cross-border transfers designed to avoid detection and reporting by Slovenian banks. However, DNFBPs representing the real estate sector, covered lawyers, accountants and notaries, did not fully recognise risks related to the use of cash or admit to accepting cash payments from customers, instead relying heavily on banks to perform CDD and monitor cash deposits. It is particularly concerning that while approximately 75% of all reported cash deposits over EUR 15,000 were made to legal entities’ accounts, as per the 2025 NRA, [17] sectors involved in company formation and management, such as covered lawyers, notaries, and accountants, have submitted very few STRs (see IO.6). The AT considers that this disconnect between the high volume of cash activity among legal entities and the minimal reporting by DNFBPs highlights a possible gap in the data for the detection of potential cash-related ML risks. 101. In the 2021 NRA, corruption was assessed as medium-low. The 2025 NRA identifies similar typologies and indicates some progress, reflected in Slovenia’s improvement on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (from rank 42 in 2023 to 36 in 2024), and stronger legislative and institutional frameworks. The 2025 NRA maintains that corruption-related offences (mostly lower-level bribery or abuse of official position) continue to represent an ongoing ML threat, albeit at a medium-low level. Overall, the 2025 NRA’s assessment of corruption risk is coherent and shows continuity with previous assessments. However, structural data limitations and the absence of more granular analysis constrain the ability to fully gauge the scale and evolution of corruption-driven threats. 102. LEAs, prosecutors, and financial sector representatives (both supervisors and OEs) demonstrated an adequate understanding of ML risks. Their views were broadly aligned with the risks identified in the NRAs and were generally consistent across competent authorities. In contrast, the AT observed a noticeably lower level of understanding among non-financial supervisors, who were less able to articulate sector-specific threats, vulnerabilities, and emerging trends with the FARS being the only supervisor demonstrating a more developed understanding. This discrepancy indicates that risk understanding is stronger and more developed within the financial sector than within the DNFBP supervisory landscape. 103. FIs supervised by the BoS generally demonstrated a good understanding of their ML risks, particularly banks and EMIs, which showed awareness of NRA findings and sector-specific vulnerabilities. Investment firms and fund sector operators were similarly aligned with the NRA. Insurance undertakings, pension companies, and intermediaries also articulated relevant sector-specific risks and mitigating measures, while leasing and lending companies demonstrated a satisfactory level of awareness. Overall, understanding of ML risks across financial sectors appears broadly consistent with the NRA and generally well-developed, with stronger awareness in sectors facing more complex or specialised risk exposures. 104. DNFBPs demonstrated a limited understanding of ML risks, including in sectors that Slovenia identifies as higher risk. Their understanding was largely confined to the contents of the 2025 NRA and they tended to repeat its conclusions rather than contextualising sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities. Risk awareness varied across sectors: covered lawyers, notaries and real estate agents did not recognise exposure within their own activities; DPMS could not articulate sector vulnerabilities; casinos showed comparatively higher awareness due to strong supervision by FARS; and accountants and auditors belonging to international groups demonstrated the most developed understanding. 105. While no other sectoral risk assessments have been conducted, other analytical activities, like Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) conducted by the police authorities, may contribute to the overall risk understanding. As it was completed after the 2025 NRA, SOCTA’s findings were not integrated in the NRA and they are yet to be shared with other authorities. 1.1.2. TF Risks 106. Slovenia’s understanding of TF risks derives from the same NRA processes as for ML since ML/TF risks were tackled simultaneously by the IWG and its subgroups. The 2025 NRA found no concrete evidence of systemic TF activity, thereby reaffirming Slovenia’s low exposure to TF threats. However, it did note a gradual increase in TF-related intelligence exchanges. 107. TF risk understanding has evolved through the two successive NRAs. In the 2021 NRA, Slovenia identified the main TF threats as cash couriers, the misuse of NPOs, and isolated instances of informal value transfer systems (hawala). The 2025 NRA further recognised additional emerging risks, including small-scale self-funding by radicalised individuals, the occasional use of online payment tools and virtual assets linked to conflict zones, and the potential abuse of NPOs. 108. When discussing TF, most authorities appeared to equate Slovenia’s TF risk with the absence of terrorism within Slovenia and the low level of risk identified in the NRAs. There was limited recognition of potential or inherent TF threats that may exist. LEAs, prosecutors and security service demonstrated a good understanding of inherent TF threats on the examples of cases discussed during the onsite visit. Their threat assessment takes into consideration both the country and regional context. They have also put in place mitigating measures such as monitoring of groups more susceptible to radicalisation as well as observing trends in criminality (e.g. monitoring links between organised crime groups and extremist groups to detect potential risks of TF). 109. Similarly, the BoS also demonstrated a good understanding of TF threats and risks, in comparison to other supervisory authorities and SRBs, and incorporated TF specific actions into its supervisory framework. The BoS acknowledged the higher risk of TF posed by sectors such as VASPs and MSBs and ensured that as part of its supervisory activities it analysed the transactional data within these sectors to identify any potential TF. Other FI supervisory authorities, and all DNFBP authorities, demonstrated a less developed understanding of TF risks. DNFBP supervisors viewed TF and ML vulnerabilities as largely identical, without differentiating between the two. The AT considers that this reflects a need to strengthen understanding of the unique vulnerabilities associated specifically with TF. The persistent shortage of specialised human resources further compounds this weakness. 110. The 2025 NRA demonstrates a clear advancement and improvement in Slovenia’s analysis of TF risks. Nonetheless, the authorities noted an inconsistent recordkeeping and sharing of TF-related information which limited the adequacy of an overall national risk assessment. Limited consideration of TF microfinancing risks associated with alternative financial networks, such as hawala systems, indicates that further refinement of the national TF risk picture would be beneficial. Similarly, while some NPO risk assessment has been carried out outside the NRA processes, it was not comprehensive enough for proper understanding of TF-related risks in this sector (see IO.10). Furthermore, there seems to be limited to no systematic information sharing among authorities regarding the TF risk landscape, further constraining the development of a coordinated and comprehensive national understanding of TF risks and the development of a shared TF risk understanding. 1.1.3. Dissemination of ML/TF Risk Conclusions 111. The full 2021 NRA report and summary of the 2025 NRA are publicly available. The authorities, supervisors, SRBs and private sector representatives confirmed to the AT that the 2025 NRA had been shared with them by the OMLP. Competent authorities also confirmed that the NRA is further shared with all staff within their relevant organisations. Footnotes [15] As the AT was informed by the Slovenian authorities, The response rate to the questionnaires varied considerably, ranging from 100% from registered attorneys (with the SBA) and casinos, to 53.5% from real estate agents, 43% from accountants and tax advisors collectively, and 38.9% from dealers in precious metals. No information on the response rate was provided for other DNFBP sectors. [16] 2025 NRA, p.93. While the share of cash payments at points of sale (POS) declined from 80% in 2016 to 64% in 2024, this still represents one of the highest levels of cash usage in the EU. The proportion of citizens considering cash as “very important” remains at 31%, indicating continued cultural use of cash despite the increasing digitisation of payments. [17] 2025 NRA, p.93. According to the 2025 NRA, out of over 400 000 reports relating to cash transactions exceeding EUR 15 000 received by the OMLP during 2020-2024, approximately 75% concerned cash deposits made to legal entities’ accounts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="90. Since 2017 MER, Slovenia has made considerable efforts to improve its understanding of ML/TF risks through two successive NRAs completed in 2021 and 2025. Development of these NRAs through an inclusive process led by the OMLP with the participation of supervisory authorities, prosecutors, law-enforcement agencies and representatives of the private sector within the format of the permanent Interministerial Working Group (IWG) and its 7 subgroups has contributed to improved identification, assessment and understanding of risks. The findings of the EU SNRA being analysed and taken into consideration by the subgroups while developing the NRA also contributed to Slovenia’s risk understanding vis-à-vis the regional supranational context. 91. While NRAs remain the main mechanism for informing Slovenia’s understanding of ML/TF risks, the 2025 NRA marks a notable improvement over the 2021 NRA, offering greater granularity and a broader analytical scope. It covers different sectors and establishes clearer linkages between inherent threats and vulnerabilities across financial and non-financial sectors. The 2025 NRA aims to portray a more holistic picture of national risks by including a country vulnerability section, applying control environment scoring, and drawing residual risk conclusions, often with a comparison to the EU SNRA. Particularly noteworthy is the inclusion of a full assessment of cross border ML, cyber enabled fraud, and new activities such as virtual assets. 92. Notwithstanding these improvements, the robustness of Slovenia’s ML/TF risk assessment remains constrained by structural data limitations and uneven sectoral engagement. As a result, while the overall threat landscape is broadly identified, certain elements of the assessment lack sufficient depth and evidentiary support. 1.1.1. ML risks 93. Slovenia identifies its principal ML threats with reasonable accuracy and has demonstrated measurable improvement between successive NRAs. Both the 2021 and 2025 NRAs consistently identify economic and financial crime, tax evasion, corruption, organised crime, and increasingly cyber-enabled fraud and cross-border laundering as the main drivers of ML risk. The 2025 NRA reflects enhanced analytical depth, broader sectoral coverage and improved treatment of foreign predicate offences, virtual assets and cross-border vulnerabilities, indicating institutional learning and strengthened methodological capacity. 94. While the 2025 NRA represents a methodological improvement over the 2021 NRA, significant data limitations continue to undermine the reliability and depth of its risk assessment. Authorities acknowledged limitations in data, including inadequate record keeping by Prosecutors and LEAs or the lack of complete data from DNFBP sectors. The 2021 NRA relied on information from STRs, and other information provided by the police, and prosecutors’ office. While the 2025 NRA still relies heavily on these sources, it represents an improvement as it also includes additional data collected from the financial and non-financial sectors through targeted questionnaires. The use of targeted questionnaires for data collection from 12 non-financial sectors and professions was a major novelty of the 2025 NRA process aimed at exploring deeper the vulnerabilities of the DNFBPs. However, the reliability of the assessment derived from the data collected is questionable given the low response rate [15] and incomplete data received. Furthermore, the data collected for some DNFBP sectors was high level and insufficiently detailed to support comprehensive individual or sectoral risk understanding. 95. The use of data from STRs also has its limitations given the OMLP reported backlog in the review and analysis of STRs (see IO.6). This backlog, while delaying the timely dissemination of financial intelligence to competent authorities, creates a potential information gap to identify emerging trends or typologies, and may have affected the completeness of the NRA and the risk understanding derived from it. 96. For the purposes of analysing ML threats deriving from main predicate offences, including foreign predicate offences, a comparative analysis of the datasets for the 2025 NRA and the 2021 NRA was also carried out to identify any changes in trends. The 2025 NRA also relied on information on property gains and analysis of criminal cases conducted during the IWG subgroup discussions. Overall, while this is a positive approach that enabled the identification of relevant trends, in view of limitations of the datasets used, including gaps in the data kept by Prosecutors and LEAs, the broader threat picture associated with predicate offences may not have been fully captured. 97. The 2021 NRA established a baseline understanding of Slovenia’s ML threat environment and recognised that ML risks stem mainly from domestic economic and financial crime, corruption, organised crime and tax evasion. While the 2021 NRA does not explicitly use the term “foreign predicate offences”, it repeatedly incorporates the concept indirectly through its treatment of external risk, foreign proceeds, and foreign offenders. However, the analytical framework used for the 2021 NRA is narrow, descriptive, and insufficiently granular to fully satisfy a risk understanding of cross-border threats. 98. The 2025 NRA retained all previously identified threats and further recognised the growing significance of cyber-enabled fraud, online investment scams, and cross-border electronic transactions as emerging ML threats. While several of the 2021 vulnerabilities persisted, new structural weaknesses were also identified, including shortcomings in the oversight of the virtual asset sector, continuing resource and expertise gaps among DNFBP supervisors, low levels of compliance among DNFBPs, and inadequate information sharing concerning foreign beneficial ownership structures. The treatment of foreign predicate offences in the 2025 NRA is visible and substantive, and provides an improved understanding compared to the earlier NRA iteration. It reflects a realistic appreciation of Slovenia’s geographic and economic connectivity and the exposure to international organised crime networks, supported by factual operational data and investigative indicators. The overall ML risk for Slovenia was again assessed as medium to high, reflecting both enduring and evolving vulnerabilities despite a more complex risk environment. 99. The understanding of risks related to the use of cash has improved through the successive NRA processes. The 2021 NRA recognised cash as a major vulnerability, noting high reliance on physical currency within the country and limited restrictions on large cash transactions. The 2025 NRA utilised better cash related data, re-confirming that Slovenia is a cash-intensive economy. [16] While the domestic use of cash is seen as largely driven by economic habits rather than illicit activity, factoring in Slovenia’s geographical position as a transit country between the Balkans and Western Europe, the 2025 NRA identifies risks related to ongoing exposure to cross-border laundering through cash movements. Slovenia therefore considers that the overall ML threat from cash remains significant, assessed as medium-high. 100. In line with the 2025 NRA findings, LEAs demonstrated adequate understanding of the role of cash in criminal activities paired by the use of legal persons, citing cases involving the use of cash for the purchase of property, gold, or for cross-border transfers designed to avoid detection and reporting by Slovenian banks. However, DNFBPs representing the real estate sector, covered lawyers, accountants and notaries, did not fully recognise risks related to the use of cash or admit to accepting cash payments from customers, instead relying heavily on banks to perform CDD and monitor cash deposits. It is particularly concerning that while approximately 75% of all reported cash deposits over EUR 15,000 were made to legal entities’ accounts, as per the 2025 NRA, [17] sectors involved in company formation and management, such as covered lawyers, notaries, and accountants, have submitted very few STRs (see IO.6). The AT considers that this disconnect between the high volume of cash activity among legal entities and the minimal reporting by DNFBPs highlights a possible gap in the data for the detection of potential cash-related ML risks. 101. In the 2021 NRA, corruption was assessed as medium-low. The 2025 NRA identifies similar typologies and indicates some progress, reflected in Slovenia’s improvement on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (from rank 42 in 2023 to 36 in 2024), and stronger legislative and institutional frameworks. The 2025 NRA maintains that corruption-related offences (mostly lower-level bribery or abuse of official position) continue to represent an ongoing ML threat, albeit at a medium-low level. Overall, the 2025 NRA’s assessment of corruption risk is coherent and shows continuity with previous assessments. However, structural data limitations and the absence of more granular analysis constrain the ability to fully gauge the scale and evolution of corruption-driven threats. 102. LEAs, prosecutors, and financial sector representatives (both supervisors and OEs) demonstrated an adequate understanding of ML risks. Their views were broadly aligned with the risks identified in the NRAs and were generally consistent across competent authorities. In contrast, the AT observed a noticeably lower level of understanding among non-financial supervisors, who were less able to articulate sector-specific threats, vulnerabilities, and emerging trends with the FARS being the only supervisor demonstrating a more developed understanding. This discrepancy indicates that risk understanding is stronger and more developed within the financial sector than within the DNFBP supervisory landscape. 103. FIs supervised by the BoS generally demonstrated a good understanding of their ML risks, particularly banks and EMIs, which showed awareness of NRA findings and sector-specific vulnerabilities. Investment firms and fund sector operators were similarly aligned with the NRA. Insurance undertakings, pension companies, and intermediaries also articulated relevant sector-specific risks and mitigating measures, while leasing and lending companies demonstrated a satisfactory level of awareness. Overall, understanding of ML risks across financial sectors appears broadly consistent with the NRA and generally well-developed, with stronger awareness in sectors facing more complex or specialised risk exposures. 104. DNFBPs demonstrated a limited understanding of ML risks, including in sectors that Slovenia identifies as higher risk. Their understanding was largely confined to the contents of the 2025 NRA and they tended to repeat its conclusions rather than contextualising sector-specific threats and vulnerabilities. Risk awareness varied across sectors: covered lawyers, notaries and real estate agents did not recognise exposure within their own activities; DPMS could not articulate sector vulnerabilities; casinos showed comparatively higher awareness due to strong supervision by FARS; and accountants and auditors belonging to international groups demonstrated the most developed understanding. 105. While no other sectoral risk assessments have been conducted, other analytical activities, like Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) conducted by the police authorities, may contribute to the overall risk understanding. As it was completed after the 2025 NRA, SOCTA’s findings were not integrated in the NRA and they are yet to be shared with other authorities. 1.1.2. TF Risks 106. Slovenia’s understanding of TF risks derives from the same NRA processes as for ML since ML/TF risks were tackled simultaneously by the IWG and its subgroups. The 2025 NRA found no concrete evidence of systemic TF activity, thereby reaffirming Slovenia’s low exposure to TF threats. However, it did note a gradual increase in TF-related intelligence exchanges. 107. TF risk understanding has evolved through the two successive NRAs. In the 2021 NRA, Slovenia identified the main TF threats as cash couriers, the misuse of NPOs, and isolated instances of informal value transfer systems (hawala). The 2025 NRA further recognised additional emerging risks, including small-scale self-funding by radicalised individuals, the occasional use of online payment tools and virtual assets linked to conflict zones, and the potential abuse of NPOs. 108. When discussing TF, most authorities appeared to equate Slovenia’s TF risk with the absence of terrorism within Slovenia and the low level of risk identified in the NRAs. There was limited recognition of potential or inherent TF threats that may exist. LEAs, prosecutors and security service demonstrated a good understanding of inherent TF threats on the examples of cases discussed during the onsite visit. Their threat assessment takes into consideration both the country and regional context. They have also put in place mitigating measures such as monitoring of groups more susceptible to radicalisation as well as observing trends in criminality (e.g. monitoring links between organised crime groups and extremist groups to detect potential risks of TF). 109. Similarly, the BoS also demonstrated a good understanding of TF threats and risks, in comparison to other supervisory authorities and SRBs, and incorporated TF specific actions into its supervisory framework. The BoS acknowledged the higher risk of TF posed by sectors such as VASPs and MSBs and ensured that as part of its supervisory activities it analysed the transactional data within these sectors to identify any potential TF. Other FI supervisory authorities, and all DNFBP authorities, demonstrated a less developed understanding of TF risks. DNFBP supervisors viewed TF and ML vulnerabilities as largely identical, without differentiating between the two. The AT considers that this reflects a need to strengthen understanding of the unique vulnerabilities associated specifically with TF. The persistent shortage of specialised human resources further compounds this weakness. 110. The 2025 NRA demonstrates a clear advancement and improvement in Slovenia’s analysis of TF risks. Nonetheless, the authorities noted an inconsistent recordkeeping and sharing of TF-related information which limited the adequacy of an overall national risk assessment. Limited consideration of TF microfinancing risks associated with alternative financial networks, such as hawala systems, indicates that further refinement of the national TF risk picture would be beneficial. Similarly, while some NPO risk assessment has been carried out outside the NRA processes, it was not comprehensive enough for proper understanding of TF-related risks in this sector (see IO.10). Furthermore, there seems to be limited to no systematic information sharing among authorities regarding the TF risk landscape, further constraining the development of a coordinated and comprehensive national understanding of TF risks and the development of a shared TF risk understanding. 1.1.3. Dissemination of ML/TF Risk Conclusions 111. The full 2021 NRA report and summary of the 2025 NRA are publicly available. The authorities, supervisors, SRBs and private sector representatives confirmed to the AT that the 2025 NRA had been shared with them by the OMLP. Competent authorities also confirmed that the NRA is further shared with all staff within their relevant organisations. Footnotes [15] As the AT was informed by the Slovenian authorities, The response rate to the questionnaires varied considerably, ranging from 100% from registered attorneys (with the SBA) and casinos, to 53.5% from real estate agents, 43% from accountants and tax advisors collectively, and 38.9% from dealers in precious metals. No information on the response rate was provided for other DNFBP sectors. [16] 2025 NRA, p.93. While the share of cash payments at points of sale (POS) declined from 80% in 2016 to 64% in 2024, this still represents one of the highest levels of cash usage in the EU. The proportion of citizens considering cash as “very important” remains at 31%, indicating continued cultural use of cash despite the increasing digitisation of payments. [17] 2025 NRA, p.93. According to the 2025 NRA, out of over 400 000 reports relating to cash transactions exceeding EUR 15 000 received by the OMLP during 2020-2024, approximately 75% concerned cash deposits made to legal entities’ accounts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1 Providing evidence and locating criminals 154. Slovenia provides constructive and timely mutual legal assistance both to EU and non-EU countries and jurisdictions, and the processes and results achieved over the assessment period are further explained. The conclusions are based on the: (i) available but sometimes limited statistics; (ii) case examples; (iii) interviews held with the competent authorities; (iv) positive feedback from the international counterparts. Providing mutual legal assistance to non-EU countries 155. All MLA and extradition requests from non-EU countries that are received by the MoJ are recorded in a case management system, with documents scanned and stored electronically. Case prioritisation is determined by the head of the unit within MoJ, with urgent matters (such as extradition, detention, searches and seizures, and transfers of sentenced persons) handled the same day. All MLA requests are forwarded to competent authorities for execution, typically within 1-2 days. The system allows extraction of statistics by case type, status, institution, and country, which is a clear improvement compared with the conclusions of the 2017 MER. Furthermore, the MoJ regularly tracks the execution of a request and undertakes follow up actions in case the request is not executed for a long time. 156. The MoJ provided statistics on the number of MLA requests received during 2020-2024 (See table 2.1). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA requests (from non-EU countries) Incoming MLA requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 6 3 6 6 4 25 Terrorism, including TF 0 0 0 1 0 1 Drug trafficking 15 9 10 4 6 44 Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering 3 1 1 0 1 6 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 7 2 2 2 3 16 Sexual exploitation, including of children 4 3 3 0 3 13 Illicit arms trafficking 2 1 0 2 0 5 Corruption and bribery 1 0 0 1 5 7 Fraud 11 18 10 5 8 52 Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 1 0 1 1 4 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 0 0 0 1 0 1 Robbery or theft 1 4 1 1 0 7 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 2 1 0 0 2 5 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 5 2 5 3 0 15 Extortion 0 1 0 0 0 1 Forgery 2 1 0 2 1 6 TOTAL 60 47 38 29 34 208 Source: Ministry of Justice 157. Over the period under review, the most common predicate offences for which MLA was requested were fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking, tax crimes, sexual exploitation, corruption and bribery, theft, and forgery. Only 1 MLA request was related to terrorist financing. These is closely in line with the country’s risk profile. 158. The positive feedback of the global network revealed that Slovenia consistently handles MLA requests, providing high quality assistance within reasonable time frame. Several countries noted improvements in Slovenia’s cooperation. In particular, improved response time in the recent years and the constructive and efficient cooperation in cases involving organised crime and corruption have yielded significant outcomes, underscoring Slovenia’s commitment to provide constructive assistance. 159. When it comes to MLA requests related to ML, all 25 of them received in the period under review were executed by Slovenia, except one from 2020, where assistance was refused on the grounds that the addressee of the documents to be served was not located within the territory of Slovenia. The predicate offences underlying money laundering in those requests included tax crimes, forgery, abuse of position or trust, fraud, smuggling, theft, corruption or bribery, and other related offences. 160. The average execution time ranged between 80 days (2020) to 110 days (2024). However, there are notable examples where assistance was rendered within just few days (see box 2.1). In addition, an MLA request involving terrorism financing received in 2020 was executed in only 30 days. 161. The duration usually depends on several factors, such as the urgency of the case, the complexity and scope of the specific request. Overall, the AT concludes that Slovenia ensures efficient execution of MLA requests, prioritise complex and urgent cases and is seen as a reliable partner in international cooperation. Case Box 2.1: Providing timely assistance Case example 1 On 5 January 2021, the Ministry of Justice received a request from a third state, under a bilateral treaty, to hear nine witnesses in a money laundering and organised crime case. The request was forwarded to the competent court the following day. Authorisation was granted for representatives of the requesting authority to attend the hearings, which were conducted by the Slovenian court on 9 February 2021 in the presence of the requesting state’s prosecutors. Case example 2 Late in 2022, prosecutors of Country Y submitted a MLA request to Slovenia, seeking the execution of covert investigative measures, including the acquisition of data from electronic communication networks, interception and recording of electronic communications, and covert surveillance. The case involved an organised criminal group engaged in the illicit production and trafficking of drugs across several countries, including neighbouring EU states and South America. Some suspects had temporarily resided in Slovenia, and one member was a Slovene national. A Slovenian court authorised the acquisition of electronic communications within seven days of the submission by foreign country. The SPO issued an order for covert surveillance of two suspects, with the police conducting operational activities under the SPO’s direction. The evidence obtained in Slovenia was significant and contributed to the prosecution of serious criminal offences in Country Y. 162. The most common requested measures and documents included: evidence gathering (such as bank information, documents from official records, etc.), hearing of defendant and/or witnesses, service of documents, surveillance of electronic communications including interception, providing reports on covert surveillance, locating suspects, seizing CCTV footage and other objects, identification of individuals and vehicles. MLA and directly received EIOs through which banking information is requested are referred to the competent courts for execution, as such matters fall within their jurisdiction. 163. In some cases, when national legislation does not entirely provide for the measure as requested by the foreign counterparts, the authorities seek to find the most suitable solution and render the assistance. For example, in Slovenia there are some legislative gaps in applying special investigative techniques – controlled delivery. Also, covert monitoring of a transport of goods can be carried only when it concerns restricted (weapons, pharmaceuticals, etc.) or prohibited (illicit drugs) goods. Despite this, Slovenian judicial authorities demonstrated willingness and creativity to find alternative measures to provide the requested assistance even in situations involving controlled delivery of ordinary goods intended for criminal activities. (See Box 2.2). This is clear evidence of the willingness, ability and commitment of the authorities to provide constructive mutual legal assistance. Case Box 2.2: Providing assistance in controlled delivery In 2024, the SPO received a MLA request from a non-EU country (country A) regarding the monitoring of two shipments of truck tire inner tubes. It was stated that members of an organised criminal group were allegedly using these inflatable tubes as flotation devices attached to small boats to smuggle migrants from country X across the sea passage through Slovenia into country A. In order to facilitate the provision of mutual legal assistance, Slovenian authorities informed country A of the applicable national legalisation and at the same time explored ways to render assistance (through ordering the surveillance of the individuals or transporters involved in the consignments). The prosecutor immediately issued an oral order for covert surveillance of the suspect, which was followed by a written order. In the end, this measure was not executed because both suspects had not entered the Slovenian territory. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates authorities’ willingness and swift engagement when cooperating with other countries. 164. The large majority of MLA requests are executed, with an average execution percentage of 90% during 2020-2024. Slovenian authorities presented several case examples, demonstrating their effective efforts to provide assistance in all instances unless the execution of the request would breach fundamental human rights or would prejudice the sovereignty and security of Slovenia. In instances where the MLAs were refused, it was based on the following grounds: (i) dual criminality when it comes to coercive measures, (ii) the requested measure could not be executed under national legislation, (iii) the execution of the request would have jeopardized a parallel pre-trial investigation in Slovenia (e.g. hearing of suspects), (iv) unavailability of evidence/addressee in Slovenia. The AT did not come across cases or instances where refusals were unreasonable. For example, for ML offence, only one MLA request was refused as the addressee of the documents to be served was not located in Slovenia. 165. The AT identified the most common challenges faced when providing MLA, namely poor translations, lack of clarity of the request or insufficient supporting documents. In such instances the competent authorities are proactive and seek further information from the requesting country to proceed with the execution of the request. The AT further examined the potential impact of the 2024 CPA amendments which raised the evidentiary threshold for ordering covert investigative measures and obtaining banking data (see IO.7 for further analysis) on the ability of Slovenian authorities to respond to foreign requests promptly. While the authorities did not conduct the comprehensive analysis, the information provided by the District Court in Ljubljana (the largest court in Slovenia with the highest case load of MLA requests and EIOs) for the years 2024 and 2025 demonstrates that EIOs and MLA seeking banking information are executed within the deadlines, without any refusals related to the increased threshold. In 2024-2025 only two requests were reasonably refused because the banks from which data was required were not located in Slovenia. Providing assistance to EU member states 166. EU member states account for the greater proportion of formal legal assistance requests, which corresponds with Slovenia’s assessed risks and geopolitical situation. Within the EU, mutual legal assistance requests are made directly between EU competent judicial authorities, through the EIOs. The Slovenian authorities provide timely and good quality assistance to their EU counterparts. This conclusion is based on the interviews, statistics and case examples. 167. The Slovenian authorities maintain statistics on incoming EIOs (see table 2.2), though the scope of the data is not fully comprehensive, as some EIOs initially received by the prosecution are forwarded to the courts for execution. In such cases, the processing status of these EIOs might not be fully captured within the available data, even when the requests have been executed. Despite this, the available data indicate that, between 2020 and 2024, Slovenian courts and prosecutors processed EIOs within an average of 2.5 months. This timeframe is considered efficient and demonstrates compliance with the deadlines prescribed by EU legislation. The data thus suggest that, overall, Slovenian authorities are able to execute EIOs in a timely manner, although efforts to improve the comprehensiveness and reliability of statistical recording would further enhance the effectiveness assessment. Table 2.2. Incoming EIOs Year Received Resolved Average duration (months) 2020 406 305 2.08 2021 446 339 2.55 2022 390 359 3.52 2023 357 309 2.66 2024 610 461 2.26 2025* 244 N/A N/A Total 2453 1773 2.61 (arithmetic mean) *Data available for the 1 st half of 2025 168. The feedback provided by the EU countries confirms Slovenian authorities are typically rapid to respond to EIOs and demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate, successfully executing the requested measures. This is especially evident from a number of case examples provided (see example in Box 2.3.). These cases demonstrate Slovenia’s operational capacity and willingness to cooperate promptly and effectively with foreign counterparts, both at the law enforcement and judicial levels. Also, it should be noted that that Slovenian judges take consistent and reasonable decisions when executing foreign requests for legal assistance, in accordance with the national laws, EU normative acts, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the ECHR and ECJ. This, coupled with the below statistics and the numerous case examples presented, shows that Slovenia successfully responds to most of the EIOs received in due time, reflecting a strong commitment to providing international legal assistance. 169. There are no precise statistics on the offences for which the EIOs are received, but the practice has shown that EIOs are most prevalent in cases of fraud, drug trafficking, and thefts. The type of the assistance varies and involves requests for different actions to be undertaken in the territory of Slovenia on behalf of other EU member states. In practice, the SPO frequently receives urgent EIOs requiring rapid application of the interception of telecommunications to be carried out in Slovenia. In such cases, SPO consistently provides favourable opinions (allowing the requesting state to carry the interception of telecommunications on Slovenian territory without the technical support of Slovenia) often within 24 hours or even on the same day. For example, in one case prosecutors issued a favourable opinion regarding a ML case involving a hawala (underground banking) operation, which handled about 2 million euros in just one month. This demonstrates the prosecutor’s ability to act swiftly and effectively in high stakes and time sensitive situations. Besides, Slovenian prosecutors participate in and are supported by Eurojust. This support is reflected in the quality of assistance provided through this mechanism. In some instances, the police forces of other EU member states take part together with the national police in the investigative actions undertaken in the territory of Slovenia which proved to be effective in facilitating activities against criminality. Box 2.3: Execution of EIOs by the Slovenian authorities In 2024, the security officer of the Port of Koper observed two individuals behaving suspiciously while diving under a moored vessel and promptly informed police. Police officers detained the two divers and conducted a thorough search. The search resulted in the discovery of several packages of cocaine clandestinely attached to the vessel’s structure. Criminal investigation was initiated for drug trafficking and subsequently it was revealed that the case had a transnational element: citizens of two other countries were also involved and the suspects had used vehicles registered in the neighbouring country and used for travel between Slovenia and that country. The Police requested and obtained additional information from the neighbouring counterparts, based on a bilateral police cross-border cooperation agreement. Following this exchange, the prosecutors from that country requested access to the information held by the Slovenian prosecution service through an EIO. Slovenian prosecutors cooperated effectively with their counterparts, providing relevant information and evidence. The information enabled the foreign authorities to initiate criminal proceedings against three individuals suspected of drug trafficking, committed as part of an organised criminal group. 170. Judicial authorities also collaborate with their foreign EU counterparts to address various issues, including jurisdictional conflicts, problems arising from requests of insufficient quality, identifying comparable measures under national law, and requesting additional explanations or information. Cooperation with European Judicial Network (EJN) contact points and Eurojust facilitates solution finding. Based on the received feedback, the authorities demonstrated willingness to provide guidance to prevent misunderstandings and delays in responses to EIOs. 171. While the lack of comprehensive statistics for this type of cooperation does not have direct impact on the quality and timeliness of the assistance provided, it does limit the country’s ability to fully monitor whether it is effectively providing and seeking international cooperation and prevents them from developing a full overview of crime trends. 2.1.2 Extradition 172. Slovenia receives on average 60 requests for extradition per year, most of which are coming from EU Member State as EAWs. 173. The authorities, similar as for the MLA requests, presented statistics on the number of extradition requests per predicate offences concerning those originating from non-EU member states. Based on the data, it can be concluded that majority of requests related to the predicate offences posing ML threat and refusal rate is reasonable. The AT identified that 9 requests (≈13%) were refused on the following grounds: (i) violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR; (ii) violation of the ne bis in idem principle; (iii) the person sought was not in Slovenia; (iv) statute of limitation or (v) the person sought was a Slovenian national. The authorities are commended for the gradual improvement of the average execution time of the extradition requests from 174 days in 2020 to 80 days in 2024. 174. Feedback from the global network indicate extradition requests were successfully executed by Slovenian authorities. 175. Slovenian MoJ provides feedback to foreign countries requesting extradition, for example in cases where there are concerns with respect to the fairness of proceedings. Table 2.3 . Incoming extradition requests (from non-EU countries) Incoming extradition requests (non-EU) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 2 2 TF 2 2 Drug trafficking 7 3 1 3 5 19 Participation in an OCG and racketeering 2 1 3 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 1 1 3 1 6 Sexual exploitation, including of children 2 2 Illicit arms trafficking 1 1 Corruption and bribery 2 1 1 4 Fraud 6 4 3 2 15 Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 1 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 1 1 Robbery or theft 2 2 1 2 2 9 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 1 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 1 1 Extortion 1 1 2 TOTAL 27 12 9 8 13 69 Source: MoJ 176. As stated above, the majority of requests for extradition are coming from EU Member States. The authorities were not able to provide statistics on the number of EAWs per predicate offences. Nevertheless, the AT was able to draw several conclusions: 177. Except for 2024 – for which limited data is available, in almost 90% of the cases, the sought persons were arrested, while in 67% of the cases the persons were effectively surrendered. Slovenia refused to execute 21 EAWs (≈ 8.8%) based on (i)violation of the ne bis in idem rule, (ii) territoriality overlap, (iii) statute of limitation or (iv) the persons being Slovenian nationals. In almost all cases, Slovenia respected the 90-day time limit for the decision on the execution of EAWs. 178. In cases where Slovenia refuses to extradite criminals because they are Slovenian nationals, the case files are handed over to prosecutors for them to explore if there are grounds to initiate domestic criminal proceedings. MoJ advised that in the evaluated period they had one successful case of prosecution of a Slovenian citizen whose extradition was refused. State Prosecutor’s Office advised that where the Criminal Code (CC) provisions on territorial applicability allow its application, the prosecution of a Slovenian national committing crimes abroad is required (under the same conditions as in domestic cases) if sufficient evidence exists to establish reasonable suspicion that crime has been committed. However, in practice, prosecution in Slovenia starts only if the country requesting extradition requests the commencement of prosecution in Slovenia, as prescribed by international agreements (e.g. Art. 6/II of the COE Convention on extradition). Table 2.4 . Incoming EAW Incoming European Arrest Warrants 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Received EAW 44 61 77 57 91 Arrested persons 39 51 73 51 N/A Effectively surrendered persons 29 36 60 36 N/A Refused 3 6 7 5 N/A Average execution time for the persons who consented the surrender (days) 4.5 7.8 18 17.6 N/A 2.1.3 Facilitate asset recovery 179. In Slovenia, the authorities execute requests concerning seizure of assets on behalf of other countries, irrespective of whether they are EU or non-EU member states. These requests are generally received as European freezing orders (EFOs) or through MLA requests if they originate from non-EU Member States. 180. Requests for seizing, freezing and confiscation of assets are referred to the competent courts for execution, as coercive measures fall within their jurisdiction. 181. The fact that there are no exact figures on the number of requests received from foreign countries for the freezing, seizure, confiscation, and sharing of criminal assets raises concerns over the authorities’ ability to properly analyse the level of criminality in the country and potentially apply some measures to mitigate the issue. However, when it comes to the execution of foreign requests, the authorities demonstrated the effectiveness and the commitment to act swiftly and decisively (see box 2.4). This is also supported by the feedback received from the global community which shows that Slovenia provided good quality and smooth cooperation, traced and identified assets, with no delays in responses. Case Box 2.4: Freezing of assets On 7 October 2024, the District Court of Ljubljana received an urgent request from an Austrian Court to temporarily freeze assets under Regulation (EU) 2018/1805. The request pertained to a case involving fraudulent misuse of data processing and money laundering, with Slovenian authorities asked to freeze assets totalling EUR 61 750 held in the bank accounts of two Slovenian individuals. The court granted the request on 11 October 2024, ensuring the assets were successfully frozen without delay, demonstrating efficient cross-border cooperation. Source: Supreme court 182. The ARO contact prosecutor, established within the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office, has access to SIENA communication platform since 2023 - where it exchanges information directly with other EU countries. This in practice facilitates the identification and seizure of assets when requested from foreign counterparts. 183. In order to facilitate asset recovery, when requested, prosecutors provide banking information. Slovenian prosecutors presented several EIOs and MLA requests for which they provided different types of evidence such as banking information to foreign counterparts, facilitating thus the identification and tracing of criminal assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1 Providing evidence and locating criminals 154. Slovenia provides constructive and timely mutual legal assistance both to EU and non-EU countries and jurisdictions, and the processes and results achieved over the assessment period are further explained. The conclusions are based on the: (i) available but sometimes limited statistics; (ii) case examples; (iii) interviews held with the competent authorities; (iv) positive feedback from the international counterparts. Providing mutual legal assistance to non-EU countries 155. All MLA and extradition requests from non-EU countries that are received by the MoJ are recorded in a case management system, with documents scanned and stored electronically. Case prioritisation is determined by the head of the unit within MoJ, with urgent matters (such as extradition, detention, searches and seizures, and transfers of sentenced persons) handled the same day. All MLA requests are forwarded to competent authorities for execution, typically within 1-2 days. The system allows extraction of statistics by case type, status, institution, and country, which is a clear improvement compared with the conclusions of the 2017 MER. Furthermore, the MoJ regularly tracks the execution of a request and undertakes follow up actions in case the request is not executed for a long time. 156. The MoJ provided statistics on the number of MLA requests received during 2020-2024 (See table 2.1). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA requests (from non-EU countries) Incoming MLA requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 6 3 6 6 4 25 Terrorism, including TF 0 0 0 1 0 1 Drug trafficking 15 9 10 4 6 44 Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering 3 1 1 0 1 6 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 7 2 2 2 3 16 Sexual exploitation, including of children 4 3 3 0 3 13 Illicit arms trafficking 2 1 0 2 0 5 Corruption and bribery 1 0 0 1 5 7 Fraud 11 18 10 5 8 52 Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 1 0 1 1 4 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 0 0 0 1 0 1 Robbery or theft 1 4 1 1 0 7 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 2 1 0 0 2 5 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 5 2 5 3 0 15 Extortion 0 1 0 0 0 1 Forgery 2 1 0 2 1 6 TOTAL 60 47 38 29 34 208 Source: Ministry of Justice 157. Over the period under review, the most common predicate offences for which MLA was requested were fraud, drug trafficking, human trafficking, tax crimes, sexual exploitation, corruption and bribery, theft, and forgery. Only 1 MLA request was related to terrorist financing. These is closely in line with the country’s risk profile. 158. The positive feedback of the global network revealed that Slovenia consistently handles MLA requests, providing high quality assistance within reasonable time frame. Several countries noted improvements in Slovenia’s cooperation. In particular, improved response time in the recent years and the constructive and efficient cooperation in cases involving organised crime and corruption have yielded significant outcomes, underscoring Slovenia’s commitment to provide constructive assistance. 159. When it comes to MLA requests related to ML, all 25 of them received in the period under review were executed by Slovenia, except one from 2020, where assistance was refused on the grounds that the addressee of the documents to be served was not located within the territory of Slovenia. The predicate offences underlying money laundering in those requests included tax crimes, forgery, abuse of position or trust, fraud, smuggling, theft, corruption or bribery, and other related offences. 160. The average execution time ranged between 80 days (2020) to 110 days (2024). However, there are notable examples where assistance was rendered within just few days (see box 2.1). In addition, an MLA request involving terrorism financing received in 2020 was executed in only 30 days. 161. The duration usually depends on several factors, such as the urgency of the case, the complexity and scope of the specific request. Overall, the AT concludes that Slovenia ensures efficient execution of MLA requests, prioritise complex and urgent cases and is seen as a reliable partner in international cooperation. Case Box 2.1: Providing timely assistance Case example 1 On 5 January 2021, the Ministry of Justice received a request from a third state, under a bilateral treaty, to hear nine witnesses in a money laundering and organised crime case. The request was forwarded to the competent court the following day. Authorisation was granted for representatives of the requesting authority to attend the hearings, which were conducted by the Slovenian court on 9 February 2021 in the presence of the requesting state’s prosecutors. Case example 2 Late in 2022, prosecutors of Country Y submitted a MLA request to Slovenia, seeking the execution of covert investigative measures, including the acquisition of data from electronic communication networks, interception and recording of electronic communications, and covert surveillance. The case involved an organised criminal group engaged in the illicit production and trafficking of drugs across several countries, including neighbouring EU states and South America. Some suspects had temporarily resided in Slovenia, and one member was a Slovene national. A Slovenian court authorised the acquisition of electronic communications within seven days of the submission by foreign country. The SPO issued an order for covert surveillance of two suspects, with the police conducting operational activities under the SPO’s direction. The evidence obtained in Slovenia was significant and contributed to the prosecution of serious criminal offences in Country Y. 162. The most common requested measures and documents included: evidence gathering (such as bank information, documents from official records, etc.), hearing of defendant and/or witnesses, service of documents, surveillance of electronic communications including interception, providing reports on covert surveillance, locating suspects, seizing CCTV footage and other objects, identification of individuals and vehicles. MLA and directly received EIOs through which banking information is requested are referred to the competent courts for execution, as such matters fall within their jurisdiction. 163. In some cases, when national legislation does not entirely provide for the measure as requested by the foreign counterparts, the authorities seek to find the most suitable solution and render the assistance. For example, in Slovenia there are some legislative gaps in applying special investigative techniques – controlled delivery. Also, covert monitoring of a transport of goods can be carried only when it concerns restricted (weapons, pharmaceuticals, etc.) or prohibited (illicit drugs) goods. Despite this, Slovenian judicial authorities demonstrated willingness and creativity to find alternative measures to provide the requested assistance even in situations involving controlled delivery of ordinary goods intended for criminal activities. (See Box 2.2). This is clear evidence of the willingness, ability and commitment of the authorities to provide constructive mutual legal assistance. Case Box 2.2: Providing assistance in controlled delivery In 2024, the SPO received a MLA request from a non-EU country (country A) regarding the monitoring of two shipments of truck tire inner tubes. It was stated that members of an organised criminal group were allegedly using these inflatable tubes as flotation devices attached to small boats to smuggle migrants from country X across the sea passage through Slovenia into country A. In order to facilitate the provision of mutual legal assistance, Slovenian authorities informed country A of the applicable national legalisation and at the same time explored ways to render assistance (through ordering the surveillance of the individuals or transporters involved in the consignments). The prosecutor immediately issued an oral order for covert surveillance of the suspect, which was followed by a written order. In the end, this measure was not executed because both suspects had not entered the Slovenian territory. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates authorities’ willingness and swift engagement when cooperating with other countries. 164. The large majority of MLA requests are executed, with an average execution percentage of 90% during 2020-2024. Slovenian authorities presented several case examples, demonstrating their effective efforts to provide assistance in all instances unless the execution of the request would breach fundamental human rights or would prejudice the sovereignty and security of Slovenia. In instances where the MLAs were refused, it was based on the following grounds: (i) dual criminality when it comes to coercive measures, (ii) the requested measure could not be executed under national legislation, (iii) the execution of the request would have jeopardized a parallel pre-trial investigation in Slovenia (e.g. hearing of suspects), (iv) unavailability of evidence/addressee in Slovenia. The AT did not come across cases or instances where refusals were unreasonable. For example, for ML offence, only one MLA request was refused as the addressee of the documents to be served was not located in Slovenia. 165. The AT identified the most common challenges faced when providing MLA, namely poor translations, lack of clarity of the request or insufficient supporting documents. In such instances the competent authorities are proactive and seek further information from the requesting country to proceed with the execution of the request. The AT further examined the potential impact of the 2024 CPA amendments which raised the evidentiary threshold for ordering covert investigative measures and obtaining banking data (see IO.7 for further analysis) on the ability of Slovenian authorities to respond to foreign requests promptly. While the authorities did not conduct the comprehensive analysis, the information provided by the District Court in Ljubljana (the largest court in Slovenia with the highest case load of MLA requests and EIOs) for the years 2024 and 2025 demonstrates that EIOs and MLA seeking banking information are executed within the deadlines, without any refusals related to the increased threshold. In 2024-2025 only two requests were reasonably refused because the banks from which data was required were not located in Slovenia. Providing assistance to EU member states 166. EU member states account for the greater proportion of formal legal assistance requests, which corresponds with Slovenia’s assessed risks and geopolitical situation. Within the EU, mutual legal assistance requests are made directly between EU competent judicial authorities, through the EIOs. The Slovenian authorities provide timely and good quality assistance to their EU counterparts. This conclusion is based on the interviews, statistics and case examples. 167. The Slovenian authorities maintain statistics on incoming EIOs (see table 2.2), though the scope of the data is not fully comprehensive, as some EIOs initially received by the prosecution are forwarded to the courts for execution. In such cases, the processing status of these EIOs might not be fully captured within the available data, even when the requests have been executed. Despite this, the available data indicate that, between 2020 and 2024, Slovenian courts and prosecutors processed EIOs within an average of 2.5 months. This timeframe is considered efficient and demonstrates compliance with the deadlines prescribed by EU legislation. The data thus suggest that, overall, Slovenian authorities are able to execute EIOs in a timely manner, although efforts to improve the comprehensiveness and reliability of statistical recording would further enhance the effectiveness assessment. Table 2.2. Incoming EIOs Year Received Resolved Average duration (months) 2020 406 305 2.08 2021 446 339 2.55 2022 390 359 3.52 2023 357 309 2.66 2024 610 461 2.26 2025* 244 N/A N/A Total 2453 1773 2.61 (arithmetic mean) *Data available for the 1 st half of 2025 168. The feedback provided by the EU countries confirms Slovenian authorities are typically rapid to respond to EIOs and demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate, successfully executing the requested measures. This is especially evident from a number of case examples provided (see example in Box 2.3.). These cases demonstrate Slovenia’s operational capacity and willingness to cooperate promptly and effectively with foreign counterparts, both at the law enforcement and judicial levels. Also, it should be noted that that Slovenian judges take consistent and reasonable decisions when executing foreign requests for legal assistance, in accordance with the national laws, EU normative acts, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the ECHR and ECJ. This, coupled with the below statistics and the numerous case examples presented, shows that Slovenia successfully responds to most of the EIOs received in due time, reflecting a strong commitment to providing international legal assistance. 169. There are no precise statistics on the offences for which the EIOs are received, but the practice has shown that EIOs are most prevalent in cases of fraud, drug trafficking, and thefts. The type of the assistance varies and involves requests for different actions to be undertaken in the territory of Slovenia on behalf of other EU member states. In practice, the SPO frequently receives urgent EIOs requiring rapid application of the interception of telecommunications to be carried out in Slovenia. In such cases, SPO consistently provides favourable opinions (allowing the requesting state to carry the interception of telecommunications on Slovenian territory without the technical support of Slovenia) often within 24 hours or even on the same day. For example, in one case prosecutors issued a favourable opinion regarding a ML case involving a hawala (underground banking) operation, which handled about 2 million euros in just one month. This demonstrates the prosecutor’s ability to act swiftly and effectively in high stakes and time sensitive situations. Besides, Slovenian prosecutors participate in and are supported by Eurojust. This support is reflected in the quality of assistance provided through this mechanism. In some instances, the police forces of other EU member states take part together with the national police in the investigative actions undertaken in the territory of Slovenia which proved to be effective in facilitating activities against criminality. Box 2.3: Execution of EIOs by the Slovenian authorities In 2024, the security officer of the Port of Koper observed two individuals behaving suspiciously while diving under a moored vessel and promptly informed police. Police officers detained the two divers and conducted a thorough search. The search resulted in the discovery of several packages of cocaine clandestinely attached to the vessel’s structure. Criminal investigation was initiated for drug trafficking and subsequently it was revealed that the case had a transnational element: citizens of two other countries were also involved and the suspects had used vehicles registered in the neighbouring country and used for travel between Slovenia and that country. The Police requested and obtained additional information from the neighbouring counterparts, based on a bilateral police cross-border cooperation agreement. Following this exchange, the prosecutors from that country requested access to the information held by the Slovenian prosecution service through an EIO. Slovenian prosecutors cooperated effectively with their counterparts, providing relevant information and evidence. The information enabled the foreign authorities to initiate criminal proceedings against three individuals suspected of drug trafficking, committed as part of an organised criminal group. 170. Judicial authorities also collaborate with their foreign EU counterparts to address various issues, including jurisdictional conflicts, problems arising from requests of insufficient quality, identifying comparable measures under national law, and requesting additional explanations or information. Cooperation with European Judicial Network (EJN) contact points and Eurojust facilitates solution finding. Based on the received feedback, the authorities demonstrated willingness to provide guidance to prevent misunderstandings and delays in responses to EIOs. 171. While the lack of comprehensive statistics for this type of cooperation does not have direct impact on the quality and timeliness of the assistance provided, it does limit the country’s ability to fully monitor whether it is effectively providing and seeking international cooperation and prevents them from developing a full overview of crime trends. 2.1.2 Extradition 172. Slovenia receives on average 60 requests for extradition per year, most of which are coming from EU Member State as EAWs. 173. The authorities, similar as for the MLA requests, presented statistics on the number of extradition requests per predicate offences concerning those originating from non-EU member states. Based on the data, it can be concluded that majority of requests related to the predicate offences posing ML threat and refusal rate is reasonable. The AT identified that 9 requests (≈13%) were refused on the following grounds: (i) violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR; (ii) violation of the ne bis in idem principle; (iii) the person sought was not in Slovenia; (iv) statute of limitation or (v) the person sought was a Slovenian national. The authorities are commended for the gradual improvement of the average execution time of the extradition requests from 174 days in 2020 to 80 days in 2024. 174. Feedback from the global network indicate extradition requests were successfully executed by Slovenian authorities. 175. Slovenian MoJ provides feedback to foreign countries requesting extradition, for example in cases where there are concerns with respect to the fairness of proceedings. Table 2.3 . Incoming extradition requests (from non-EU countries) Incoming extradition requests (non-EU) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 2 2 TF 2 2 Drug trafficking 7 3 1 3 5 19 Participation in an OCG and racketeering 2 1 3 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 1 1 3 1 6 Sexual exploitation, including of children 2 2 Illicit arms trafficking 1 1 Corruption and bribery 2 1 1 4 Fraud 6 4 3 2 15 Murder, grievous bodily injury 1 1 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 1 1 Robbery or theft 2 2 1 2 2 9 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 1 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 1 1 Extortion 1 1 2 TOTAL 27 12 9 8 13 69 Source: MoJ 176. As stated above, the majority of requests for extradition are coming from EU Member States. The authorities were not able to provide statistics on the number of EAWs per predicate offences. Nevertheless, the AT was able to draw several conclusions: 177. Except for 2024 – for which limited data is available, in almost 90% of the cases, the sought persons were arrested, while in 67% of the cases the persons were effectively surrendered. Slovenia refused to execute 21 EAWs (≈ 8.8%) based on (i)violation of the ne bis in idem rule, (ii) territoriality overlap, (iii) statute of limitation or (iv) the persons being Slovenian nationals. In almost all cases, Slovenia respected the 90-day time limit for the decision on the execution of EAWs. 178. In cases where Slovenia refuses to extradite criminals because they are Slovenian nationals, the case files are handed over to prosecutors for them to explore if there are grounds to initiate domestic criminal proceedings. MoJ advised that in the evaluated period they had one successful case of prosecution of a Slovenian citizen whose extradition was refused. State Prosecutor’s Office advised that where the Criminal Code (CC) provisions on territorial applicability allow its application, the prosecution of a Slovenian national committing crimes abroad is required (under the same conditions as in domestic cases) if sufficient evidence exists to establish reasonable suspicion that crime has been committed. However, in practice, prosecution in Slovenia starts only if the country requesting extradition requests the commencement of prosecution in Slovenia, as prescribed by international agreements (e.g. Art. 6/II of the COE Convention on extradition). Table 2.4 . Incoming EAW Incoming European Arrest Warrants 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Received EAW 44 61 77 57 91 Arrested persons 39 51 73 51 N/A Effectively surrendered persons 29 36 60 36 N/A Refused 3 6 7 5 N/A Average execution time for the persons who consented the surrender (days) 4.5 7.8 18 17.6 N/A 2.1.3 Facilitate asset recovery 179. In Slovenia, the authorities execute requests concerning seizure of assets on behalf of other countries, irrespective of whether they are EU or non-EU member states. These requests are generally received as European freezing orders (EFOs) or through MLA requests if they originate from non-EU Member States. 180. Requests for seizing, freezing and confiscation of assets are referred to the competent courts for execution, as coercive measures fall within their jurisdiction. 181. The fact that there are no exact figures on the number of requests received from foreign countries for the freezing, seizure, confiscation, and sharing of criminal assets raises concerns over the authorities’ ability to properly analyse the level of criminality in the country and potentially apply some measures to mitigate the issue. However, when it comes to the execution of foreign requests, the authorities demonstrated the effectiveness and the commitment to act swiftly and decisively (see box 2.4). This is also supported by the feedback received from the global community which shows that Slovenia provided good quality and smooth cooperation, traced and identified assets, with no delays in responses. Case Box 2.4: Freezing of assets On 7 October 2024, the District Court of Ljubljana received an urgent request from an Austrian Court to temporarily freeze assets under Regulation (EU) 2018/1805. The request pertained to a case involving fraudulent misuse of data processing and money laundering, with Slovenian authorities asked to freeze assets totalling EUR 61 750 held in the bank accounts of two Slovenian individuals. The court granted the request on 11 October 2024, ensuring the assets were successfully frozen without delay, demonstrating efficient cross-border cooperation. Source: Supreme court 182. The ARO contact prosecutor, established within the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office, has access to SIENA communication platform since 2023 - where it exchanges information directly with other EU countries. This in practice facilitates the identification and seizure of assets when requested from foreign counterparts. 183. In order to facilitate asset recovery, when requested, prosecutors provide banking information. Slovenian prosecutors presented several EIOs and MLA requests for which they provided different types of evidence such as banking information to foreign counterparts, facilitating thus the identification and tracing of criminal assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BoS 233. The BoS is licensing banks, EMIs, PSPs and foreign currency exchange offices. The same process is applied to authorise any such entity and approve individuals involved with the same (inc. qualifying shareholders and their BOs, members of the supervisory and management bodies). The main source of information with any application is the information and documents provided by the applicant itself, including a questionnaire completed by anyone that has been designated to sit on the management or supervisory board of the same, anyone that has to acquire a qualifying shareholding, and, where applicable, the shareholder’s BOs. The questionnaire is used to collect information on the education, professional experience and qualification, financial standing and character of the individual, including possible investigations, prosecutions and convictions the applicant is aware of. In all instances, supporting documents have to be provided, including an official record of the individual’s criminal conduct. In the case of qualifying shareholdings, information has also to be provided with regards to the source of funds to be used for the acquisition of the shareholding. 234. The BoS supplements the information and documents provided by the applicant through its own checks. These checks include open-source intelligence (OSINT), sanction lists and information from its domestic counterparts where the entity may already be licensed by another authority or the individual sets out in the questionnaire that it had been previously approved by another authority. Each application also triggers checks with the OMLP. The BoS also seeks information from the Police and the Prosecutors. These checks can be of significant importance to mitigate the chance of criminal associates infiltrating authorised entities. 235. In processing applications, the BoS seeks to make the widest possible use of information from its foreign counterparts. Examples were provided where the BoS sought information on entities and individuals that were seeking authorisation to acquire qualifying shareholdings and appointment to the management board respectively, including requests to supranational authorities like the ECB. Box 3. 1. BoS - Acquisition of a qualifying shareholding In 2022, a legal person sought to acquire a qualifying shareholding in a Slovenian bank. As part of its application process, the BoS requested information from a number of sources including the OMLP. On the basis of the intelligence obtained, the BoS was intent on refusing the application but in this case the actual authorisation had to be obtained at the supranational level, with the ECB considering that the information did not justify a refusal. A decision was taken to grant a conditional approval subject to regular reporting on how the applicant was meeting the conditions imposed by the ECB. 236. The BoS has also demonstrated its ability to analyse and identify potential issues with licensing applications when it comes to entities other than banks. In one case it rejected an application for an EMI authorisation on the basis that there were concerns about the reputation of the members of the management and supervisory board and also in relation to whether the BO of one of the qualifying shareholders was the actual owner or a strawman. The checks applied by the BoS are therefore considered sufficiently robust to identify possible criminal infiltrations, including through associates, into the FIs falling within its remit. 237. Over the years, there have been a series of withdrawal of applications. In such cases, the BoS still retains a record of these applications which can be made available to other authorities upon request. 238. As regards ensuring that licence-holders and/or individuals involved with the same remain fit and proper, the BoS relies on a series of triggering events, including information provided by the OE itself or the involved individuals, information obtained through supervisory activities and other information received from the public or other authorities, be they local or foreign, including supervisory colleges in the case of FIs having cross-border activities. 239. On the other hand, the BoS actively monitors a series of sources to ensure that no unauthorised activities are being carried out. These include checks related to requests to access the central credit register, whistleblowing reports and reports from foreign counterparts. By way of example, the BoS has carried out at least three (3) in-depth analyses on entities that were allegedly carrying out banking business. None of these resulted in any action as in two (2) cases the concerns were discarded whereas in one (1) case directions were given to stop unintentionally accepting deposits. On the other hand, two companies were placed into liquidation in 2019 due to their accepting deposits from the public without the necessary banking authorisation. 240. As to the possibility that the BO changes, someone acquires a qualifying shareholding or is appointed to the supervisory or management body without the BoS consent, the authorities advised that no such instances have been encountered so far. In the case of changes to the management or supervisory body, the registration of a change through the Court Register would require presenting the BoS’ approval for the said appointment. In the other cases, there is no similar limitation to the registration of a change in either BO or shareholder, other than the FI’s own obligation. The FI could very well proceed with the registration without the necessary checks having been carried out by the BoS, weakening the ability of authorities to limit criminal infiltration in the management of FIs. SMA 241. The SMA is licensing investment service providers and investment management companies for collective investment schemes. Collective investment schemes are also subject to licensing by the SMA but checks are focused on conduct of business and prudential requirements. Given the particular form that collective investment schemes take, i.e. either as contractual funds or as limited partnerships, the main party thereto would be the already licensed investment manager and therefore no additional checks would be necessary. The licensing process applied to investment service providers and investment management companies is quite similar, the main element consisting in the submission of a licence applications with relevant documents and the submission of a questionnaire for anyone designated to hold a qualifying shareholding and, where applicable, its BOs, or to sit on the management or supervisory board. In the case of the qualifying shareholder, there would also be checks carried out on the source of the funds to be used to acquire the said shareholding. 242. The authorisation of qualifying shareholders, its BOs (where applicable), and of members of the management or supervisory board heavily depends on the information OEs provide in their respective questionnaire as to whether they or, in the case of qualifying shareholders, their BOs have been subject to investigation, prosecution or conviction for specific criminal offences. Any applicant has to also present a record of one’s criminal conduct. The SMA has confirmed that it also seeks information from any domestic counterpart supervisory authorities indicated by the applicant, as well as from the OMLP. This approach can limit the possibility of both criminals and their associates being appointed to a licence-holder’s management or supervisory board, or being the BO of a qualifying shareholding. 243. The SMA also seeks to obtain information from its counterparts abroad. This was clearly illustrated in a case where to authorise an investment service provider, it sought information from seven (7) different authorities and only following the receipt and consideration of the same, did it consider that it was in a position to issue the necessary authorisation for the entity to carry out investment services and for different persons to acquire qualifying shareholdings in the same or take on their post on its supervisory and management boards. 244. The SMA, where necessary, requires further clarifications or additional documents from the applicant to supplement the original application. This has at times led to the application being withdrawn. Information on these cases is held by the SMA and is made available to other authorities and foreign counterparts should the need arise. 245. As regards ensuring that a licence holder and the persons involved with the same remain fit and proper, the SMA does not carry out any proactive checks itself but reacts to information brought to its attention. In this regard, it is to be noted that there have been occasions where the SMA took steps against persons that no longer met the conditions to be considered fit and proper. In one case, it prohibited two individuals from continuing acting as non-executive directors for one of its licensees after it resulted that these were subject to criminal investigation. 246. As to changes taking place after authorisation without the SMA being aware of them, any appointment to the management or supervisory board cannot be registered without the prior approval from the SMA. However, there appear to be no equivalent safeguards regarding the acquisition of qualifying shareholdings, or a change in BO, without the SMA’s consent. The SMA has however confirmed that no such instances have taken place during the assessment period. This does not mean that the SMA does not take action should there be situations where this circumstance materialises as is also demonstrated through the following case example. Box 3.2. SMA - acquisition of a qualifying shareholding An individual acquired additional shares in shareholder resulting in its total shareholding exceeding the threshold to be considered as a qualifying holding. No prior authorisation was sought from the SMA but the individual divested part of the holding again within four days, bringing the holding below the threshold for being considered as a qualifying holding. Upon being informed of the case, the SMA considered whether there were grounds to take supervisory and enforcement action. While no supervisory action was taken as the breach was not deemed to be very serious and it was quickly remedied, the SMA did initiate a misdemeanour procedure against the individual which resulted in a warning. ISA 247. ISA is authorising insurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, and pension schemes. With regards to insurance undertakings and pension schemes, this includes authorising anyone wanting to acquire a qualifying shareholding in any of the afore-mentioned OEs as well as the members of their management board. Members of the supervisory board are not scrutinised prior to their appointment, though they are then subject to on-going scrutiny as set out in the following paragraph. Where the acquirer of the qualifying shareholding is a legal entity or arrangement, the ISA also takes into account and checks the standing of its BOs. The process followed by ISA in this regard is similar to that of the SMA. In the case of insurance intermediaries, the ISA assesses the fitness and propriety of their management and only in the event that there is a negative outcome does it also assess any qualifying shareholder. In a number of instances the individuals responsible for the management of the intermediary’s activities would also be its BOs, limiting the negative impact of not looking at all qualifying shareholders, including their BOs. 248. Checks to ensure that fitness and propriety requirements are met on an on-going basis for insurance undertakings and pension schemes are carried out as part of the supervisory examinations held every three years. Between 2020 and 2024 it conducted on average six supervisory examinations a year where it also considered whether the members of the management and supervisory boards were still fit and proper. The frequency for checking qualifying shareholders and their BOs is however lower as this was only done in six visits, all carried out in 2022. While ISA licensees are expected to inform the ISA about changes in their status, the ISA can also react to information brought to its attention and carries annual off-site reviews to assess whether there were any changes to qualified shareholdings that were not notified to the ISA. 16 such checks are carried out annually, representing the total population of insurance, reinsurance and pension companies, on the basis of periodic reporting provided by the said FIs. Information on the current qualifying shareholders is also checked against the Slovenia Business Register, and an assessment of the shareholders’ financial stability is carried out, including any publicly available adverse information or information otherwise known to the ISA. This led to the detection of at least two cases where issues with qualifying shareholdings were identified. Similar on-going checks are applied with regards to members of the management and supervisory bodies of insurance and pension companies. 249. With regards to insurance intermediaries, any change to their qualifying shareholders, management or supervisory boards, and to its beneficial ownership is not subject to any prior checks and approval by ISA. Intermediaries are expected to report these changes themselves on a periodic basis and it is then at this stage that the ISA checks whether fitness and propriety checks are being met. ISA has confirmed that there have been occasions where changes have not been reported, in which case it contacted the intermediary to obtain the necessary information. To address possible shortfalls in this regard, the Business Register communicates to the ISA changes to insurance intermediary companies for it to double-check against data obtained from the intermediary or on its records. Box 3.3. ISA - acquisition of a qualifying shareholding The ISA was informed that the BO of a qualifying shareholding, residing in another EU Member State, had been arrested by the authorities of the said Member State. Following obtaining clarifications from all the parties involved and seeking additional information through the OMLP, the ISA initiated a procedure to withdraw its approval to the individual in question to remain the BO of the qualifying shareholding and issued an order to the qualifying shareholder to divest itself of the shares held in the insurance company within a set period of time. The BO missed the deadline and therefore the ISA suspended the ability of the BO, through his holding company, to exercise the voting rights associated with the shares. A series of proposals were made to the ISA for the shares to be transferred to new shareholders but due to various reasons their application could not be proceeded with and the insurance company was eventually put into liquidation. Ministry for the Economy 250. The Ministry for the Economy carries out some basic checks on individuals and entities that are to be involved with lending and leasing operators. While these checks are not exhaustive in nature, this is not considered as of major concern given the low materiality of these sectors. VASPs 251. Until 30 December 2024, VASPs were subject to a registration process in Slovenia, with the OMLP being responsible for ensuring that the conditions at law for registration were met. The conditions in question included checks on the good standing of the applicant itself as well as, where applicable, on its legal representatives, directors, and beneficial owners. The same checks would be carried out with respect to Slovenian and foreign residents. These checks were limited to confirming whether the individuals involved with the legal person rather than the entity itself, had been finally convicted of a wilful crime or of specific criminal offences occasioned through gross negligence. While these checks could assist in determining whether one was fit and proper, these were not equivalent to the checks carries out in the case of a fully-fledged licensing procedure and, as can be seen from the case-study quoted hereunder, it is possible that these more rudimentary checks did not always prevent dubious operators from entering the market. 252. During this period, the BoS undertook a series of activities to identify possible cases where VASPs operating in or from Slovenia had failed to register with the OMLP. It did so by analysing information it received along with other publicly accessible information (e.g. records within the Business Register) as well as websites of operators that might have been subject to registration and other information from the internet. This led to a number of cases being identified and notified to the OMLP – 4 cases in 2021, 1 case in 2022 and 3 cases in 2023. These included cases where the application of the VASP for registration with the OMLP may have been still subject to processing, indicating that communication between the two authorities may have required some fine-tuning. 253. Responsibility for authorising VASPs under Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) has, of 30 December 2024, been vested in the SMA, with the BoS being responsible to authorise any of the already licensed credit institutions who want to also carry out VA services and act as issuers of e-money or asset-backed tokens. The checks carried out by the SMA when processing an authorisation application are similar to those applied when licensing an investment service provider as already described hereabove. Any VASP previously registered with the OMLP had until 1 July 2025 to either file an application to be so authorised or to otherwise cease activities. Anyone who so filed an application with the SMA could only continue servicing existing customers until such time as the SMA decided on its application. Out of 35 entities present on the register as at end of 2024, only 3 took advantage of the transitory period, with two being eventually granted and one was refused. 254. The AT has been provided with the following case-study which shows the nature of the checks being carried out with respect to these applicants: Box 3.4. SMA – licensing the VASP The applicant was a VASP already operational in Slovenia on the basis of its registration with the OMLP, delivering its services through crypto-ATMs. The applicant filed its MiCAR authorisation application with the SMA one day before the lapse of the transitory period. Upon receipt the SMA formally notified that it could no longer on-board new customers. The SMA established that this was effectively being done through checks carried out on the applicant’s website, on-site checks on one of its ATMs and also through checks on third party websites indicating the status of the crypto-ATMs. In processing the application, the SMA sought information also from the BoS and the OMLP. Given that the main shareholder and the only director of the applicant was resident in another Member State, the SMA sought information from its counterpart in the said Member State which uncovered links between the said individual and criminal elements. On the basis of this information and on the basis that the individual in question was around eighty (80) years old, suggesting that he was acting as a strawman for someone else, the SMA refused the application. 255. Some minor concerns still persist as to whether enough is being done to ensure that anyone previously registered but who did not submit an application for a MiCAR authorisation has effectively ceased operations in or from Slovenia. The BoS has informed the SMA about possible cases where such VASPs may have ceased activities, and the SMA has carried out its own checks. Of the remaining 32, a number were already identified as not providing any services subject to MiCAR authorisation. This brough the total down to 26, with three being liquidated while a further 12 have not generated any revenue in the last years indicative of any on-going trading activity, 2 have moved their operations abroad while 1 has applied to also be authorised under MiCAR. 8 remain subject to further scrutiny by the SMA to determine their actual status, including some which are still showing signs of activity though this is not significant, and none had previously been rated as presenting a higher than medium level of risk. 256. In scrutinising potential VASPs the SMA is seeking information on already registered VASPs that applied for a MiCAR authorisation from different authorities, including the BoS and the OMLP as was also required in terms of the Action Plan following the 2025 NRA published this year. As also demonstrated by the case-study hereabove, the SMA is also running checks with its counterpart authorities abroad which is especially relevant within the context of a business that is not constrained by geographical boundaries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BoS 233. The BoS is licensing banks, EMIs, PSPs and foreign currency exchange offices. The same process is applied to authorise any such entity and approve individuals involved with the same (inc. qualifying shareholders and their BOs, members of the supervisory and management bodies). The main source of information with any application is the information and documents provided by the applicant itself, including a questionnaire completed by anyone that has been designated to sit on the management or supervisory board of the same, anyone that has to acquire a qualifying shareholding, and, where applicable, the shareholder’s BOs. The questionnaire is used to collect information on the education, professional experience and qualification, financial standing and character of the individual, including possible investigations, prosecutions and convictions the applicant is aware of. In all instances, supporting documents have to be provided, including an official record of the individual’s criminal conduct. In the case of qualifying shareholdings, information has also to be provided with regards to the source of funds to be used for the acquisition of the shareholding. 234. The BoS supplements the information and documents provided by the applicant through its own checks. These checks include open-source intelligence (OSINT), sanction lists and information from its domestic counterparts where the entity may already be licensed by another authority or the individual sets out in the questionnaire that it had been previously approved by another authority. Each application also triggers checks with the OMLP. The BoS also seeks information from the Police and the Prosecutors. These checks can be of significant importance to mitigate the chance of criminal associates infiltrating authorised entities. 235. In processing applications, the BoS seeks to make the widest possible use of information from its foreign counterparts. Examples were provided where the BoS sought information on entities and individuals that were seeking authorisation to acquire qualifying shareholdings and appointment to the management board respectively, including requests to supranational authorities like the ECB. Box 3. 1. BoS - Acquisition of a qualifying shareholding In 2022, a legal person sought to acquire a qualifying shareholding in a Slovenian bank. As part of its application process, the BoS requested information from a number of sources including the OMLP. On the basis of the intelligence obtained, the BoS was intent on refusing the application but in this case the actual authorisation had to be obtained at the supranational level, with the ECB considering that the information did not justify a refusal. A decision was taken to grant a conditional approval subject to regular reporting on how the applicant was meeting the conditions imposed by the ECB. 236. The BoS has also demonstrated its ability to analyse and identify potential issues with licensing applications when it comes to entities other than banks. In one case it rejected an application for an EMI authorisation on the basis that there were concerns about the reputation of the members of the management and supervisory board and also in relation to whether the BO of one of the qualifying shareholders was the actual owner or a strawman. The checks applied by the BoS are therefore considered sufficiently robust to identify possible criminal infiltrations, including through associates, into the FIs falling within its remit. 237. Over the years, there have been a series of withdrawal of applications. In such cases, the BoS still retains a record of these applications which can be made available to other authorities upon request. 238. As regards ensuring that licence-holders and/or individuals involved with the same remain fit and proper, the BoS relies on a series of triggering events, including information provided by the OE itself or the involved individuals, information obtained through supervisory activities and other information received from the public or other authorities, be they local or foreign, including supervisory colleges in the case of FIs having cross-border activities. 239. On the other hand, the BoS actively monitors a series of sources to ensure that no unauthorised activities are being carried out. These include checks related to requests to access the central credit register, whistleblowing reports and reports from foreign counterparts. By way of example, the BoS has carried out at least three (3) in-depth analyses on entities that were allegedly carrying out banking business. None of these resulted in any action as in two (2) cases the concerns were discarded whereas in one (1) case directions were given to stop unintentionally accepting deposits. On the other hand, two companies were placed into liquidation in 2019 due to their accepting deposits from the public without the necessary banking authorisation. 240. As to the possibility that the BO changes, someone acquires a qualifying shareholding or is appointed to the supervisory or management body without the BoS consent, the authorities advised that no such instances have been encountered so far. In the case of changes to the management or supervisory body, the registration of a change through the Court Register would require presenting the BoS’ approval for the said appointment. In the other cases, there is no similar limitation to the registration of a change in either BO or shareholder, other than the FI’s own obligation. The FI could very well proceed with the registration without the necessary checks having been carried out by the BoS, weakening the ability of authorities to limit criminal infiltration in the management of FIs. SMA 241. The SMA is licensing investment service providers and investment management companies for collective investment schemes. Collective investment schemes are also subject to licensing by the SMA but checks are focused on conduct of business and prudential requirements. Given the particular form that collective investment schemes take, i.e. either as contractual funds or as limited partnerships, the main party thereto would be the already licensed investment manager and therefore no additional checks would be necessary. The licensing process applied to investment service providers and investment management companies is quite similar, the main element consisting in the submission of a licence applications with relevant documents and the submission of a questionnaire for anyone designated to hold a qualifying shareholding and, where applicable, its BOs, or to sit on the management or supervisory board. In the case of the qualifying shareholder, there would also be checks carried out on the source of the funds to be used to acquire the said shareholding. 242. The authorisation of qualifying shareholders, its BOs (where applicable), and of members of the management or supervisory board heavily depends on the information OEs provide in their respective questionnaire as to whether they or, in the case of qualifying shareholders, their BOs have been subject to investigation, prosecution or conviction for specific criminal offences. Any applicant has to also present a record of one’s criminal conduct. The SMA has confirmed that it also seeks information from any domestic counterpart supervisory authorities indicated by the applicant, as well as from the OMLP. This approach can limit the possibility of both criminals and their associates being appointed to a licence-holder’s management or supervisory board, or being the BO of a qualifying shareholding. 243. The SMA also seeks to obtain information from its counterparts abroad. This was clearly illustrated in a case where to authorise an investment service provider, it sought information from seven (7) different authorities and only following the receipt and consideration of the same, did it consider that it was in a position to issue the necessary authorisation for the entity to carry out investment services and for different persons to acquire qualifying shareholdings in the same or take on their post on its supervisory and management boards. 244. The SMA, where necessary, requires further clarifications or additional documents from the applicant to supplement the original application. This has at times led to the application being withdrawn. Information on these cases is held by the SMA and is made available to other authorities and foreign counterparts should the need arise. 245. As regards ensuring that a licence holder and the persons involved with the same remain fit and proper, the SMA does not carry out any proactive checks itself but reacts to information brought to its attention. In this regard, it is to be noted that there have been occasions where the SMA took steps against persons that no longer met the conditions to be considered fit and proper. In one case, it prohibited two individuals from continuing acting as non-executive directors for one of its licensees after it resulted that these were subject to criminal investigation. 246. As to changes taking place after authorisation without the SMA being aware of them, any appointment to the management or supervisory board cannot be registered without the prior approval from the SMA. However, there appear to be no equivalent safeguards regarding the acquisition of qualifying shareholdings, or a change in BO, without the SMA’s consent. The SMA has however confirmed that no such instances have taken place during the assessment period. This does not mean that the SMA does not take action should there be situations where this circumstance materialises as is also demonstrated through the following case example. Box 3.2. SMA - acquisition of a qualifying shareholding An individual acquired additional shares in shareholder resulting in its total shareholding exceeding the threshold to be considered as a qualifying holding. No prior authorisation was sought from the SMA but the individual divested part of the holding again within four days, bringing the holding below the threshold for being considered as a qualifying holding. Upon being informed of the case, the SMA considered whether there were grounds to take supervisory and enforcement action. While no supervisory action was taken as the breach was not deemed to be very serious and it was quickly remedied, the SMA did initiate a misdemeanour procedure against the individual which resulted in a warning. ISA 247. ISA is authorising insurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, and pension schemes. With regards to insurance undertakings and pension schemes, this includes authorising anyone wanting to acquire a qualifying shareholding in any of the afore-mentioned OEs as well as the members of their management board. Members of the supervisory board are not scrutinised prior to their appointment, though they are then subject to on-going scrutiny as set out in the following paragraph. Where the acquirer of the qualifying shareholding is a legal entity or arrangement, the ISA also takes into account and checks the standing of its BOs. The process followed by ISA in this regard is similar to that of the SMA. In the case of insurance intermediaries, the ISA assesses the fitness and propriety of their management and only in the event that there is a negative outcome does it also assess any qualifying shareholder. In a number of instances the individuals responsible for the management of the intermediary’s activities would also be its BOs, limiting the negative impact of not looking at all qualifying shareholders, including their BOs. 248. Checks to ensure that fitness and propriety requirements are met on an on-going basis for insurance undertakings and pension schemes are carried out as part of the supervisory examinations held every three years. Between 2020 and 2024 it conducted on average six supervisory examinations a year where it also considered whether the members of the management and supervisory boards were still fit and proper. The frequency for checking qualifying shareholders and their BOs is however lower as this was only done in six visits, all carried out in 2022. While ISA licensees are expected to inform the ISA about changes in their status, the ISA can also react to information brought to its attention and carries annual off-site reviews to assess whether there were any changes to qualified shareholdings that were not notified to the ISA. 16 such checks are carried out annually, representing the total population of insurance, reinsurance and pension companies, on the basis of periodic reporting provided by the said FIs. Information on the current qualifying shareholders is also checked against the Slovenia Business Register, and an assessment of the shareholders’ financial stability is carried out, including any publicly available adverse information or information otherwise known to the ISA. This led to the detection of at least two cases where issues with qualifying shareholdings were identified. Similar on-going checks are applied with regards to members of the management and supervisory bodies of insurance and pension companies. 249. With regards to insurance intermediaries, any change to their qualifying shareholders, management or supervisory boards, and to its beneficial ownership is not subject to any prior checks and approval by ISA. Intermediaries are expected to report these changes themselves on a periodic basis and it is then at this stage that the ISA checks whether fitness and propriety checks are being met. ISA has confirmed that there have been occasions where changes have not been reported, in which case it contacted the intermediary to obtain the necessary information. To address possible shortfalls in this regard, the Business Register communicates to the ISA changes to insurance intermediary companies for it to double-check against data obtained from the intermediary or on its records. Box 3.3. ISA - acquisition of a qualifying shareholding The ISA was informed that the BO of a qualifying shareholding, residing in another EU Member State, had been arrested by the authorities of the said Member State. Following obtaining clarifications from all the parties involved and seeking additional information through the OMLP, the ISA initiated a procedure to withdraw its approval to the individual in question to remain the BO of the qualifying shareholding and issued an order to the qualifying shareholder to divest itself of the shares held in the insurance company within a set period of time. The BO missed the deadline and therefore the ISA suspended the ability of the BO, through his holding company, to exercise the voting rights associated with the shares. A series of proposals were made to the ISA for the shares to be transferred to new shareholders but due to various reasons their application could not be proceeded with and the insurance company was eventually put into liquidation. Ministry for the Economy 250. The Ministry for the Economy carries out some basic checks on individuals and entities that are to be involved with lending and leasing operators. While these checks are not exhaustive in nature, this is not considered as of major concern given the low materiality of these sectors. VASPs 251. Until 30 December 2024, VASPs were subject to a registration process in Slovenia, with the OMLP being responsible for ensuring that the conditions at law for registration were met. The conditions in question included checks on the good standing of the applicant itself as well as, where applicable, on its legal representatives, directors, and beneficial owners. The same checks would be carried out with respect to Slovenian and foreign residents. These checks were limited to confirming whether the individuals involved with the legal person rather than the entity itself, had been finally convicted of a wilful crime or of specific criminal offences occasioned through gross negligence. While these checks could assist in determining whether one was fit and proper, these were not equivalent to the checks carries out in the case of a fully-fledged licensing procedure and, as can be seen from the case-study quoted hereunder, it is possible that these more rudimentary checks did not always prevent dubious operators from entering the market. 252. During this period, the BoS undertook a series of activities to identify possible cases where VASPs operating in or from Slovenia had failed to register with the OMLP. It did so by analysing information it received along with other publicly accessible information (e.g. records within the Business Register) as well as websites of operators that might have been subject to registration and other information from the internet. This led to a number of cases being identified and notified to the OMLP – 4 cases in 2021, 1 case in 2022 and 3 cases in 2023. These included cases where the application of the VASP for registration with the OMLP may have been still subject to processing, indicating that communication between the two authorities may have required some fine-tuning. 253. Responsibility for authorising VASPs under Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) has, of 30 December 2024, been vested in the SMA, with the BoS being responsible to authorise any of the already licensed credit institutions who want to also carry out VA services and act as issuers of e-money or asset-backed tokens. The checks carried out by the SMA when processing an authorisation application are similar to those applied when licensing an investment service provider as already described hereabove. Any VASP previously registered with the OMLP had until 1 July 2025 to either file an application to be so authorised or to otherwise cease activities. Anyone who so filed an application with the SMA could only continue servicing existing customers until such time as the SMA decided on its application. Out of 35 entities present on the register as at end of 2024, only 3 took advantage of the transitory period, with two being eventually granted and one was refused. 254. The AT has been provided with the following case-study which shows the nature of the checks being carried out with respect to these applicants: Box 3.4. SMA – licensing the VASP The applicant was a VASP already operational in Slovenia on the basis of its registration with the OMLP, delivering its services through crypto-ATMs. The applicant filed its MiCAR authorisation application with the SMA one day before the lapse of the transitory period. Upon receipt the SMA formally notified that it could no longer on-board new customers. The SMA established that this was effectively being done through checks carried out on the applicant’s website, on-site checks on one of its ATMs and also through checks on third party websites indicating the status of the crypto-ATMs. In processing the application, the SMA sought information also from the BoS and the OMLP. Given that the main shareholder and the only director of the applicant was resident in another Member State, the SMA sought information from its counterpart in the said Member State which uncovered links between the said individual and criminal elements. On the basis of this information and on the basis that the individual in question was around eighty (80) years old, suggesting that he was acting as a strawman for someone else, the SMA refused the application. 255. Some minor concerns still persist as to whether enough is being done to ensure that anyone previously registered but who did not submit an application for a MiCAR authorisation has effectively ceased operations in or from Slovenia. The BoS has informed the SMA about possible cases where such VASPs may have ceased activities, and the SMA has carried out its own checks. Of the remaining 32, a number were already identified as not providing any services subject to MiCAR authorisation. This brough the total down to 26, with three being liquidated while a further 12 have not generated any revenue in the last years indicative of any on-going trading activity, 2 have moved their operations abroad while 1 has applied to also be authorised under MiCAR. 8 remain subject to further scrutiny by the SMA to determine their actual status, including some which are still showing signs of activity though this is not significant, and none had previously been rated as presenting a higher than medium level of risk. 256. In scrutinising potential VASPs the SMA is seeking information on already registered VASPs that applied for a MiCAR authorisation from different authorities, including the BoS and the OMLP as was also required in terms of the Action Plan following the 2025 NRA published this year. As also demonstrated by the case-study hereabove, the SMA is also running checks with its counterpart authorities abroad which is especially relevant within the context of a business that is not constrained by geographical boundaries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="332. Several competent authorities and SRBs share responsibility for market entry controls across the DNFBP sectors. However, there are no designated authorities responsible for DPMS (except for registration of dealers of precious metal products, excluding the traders dealing in raw materials), Tax Advisors or Accountants, and therefore there are no market entry controls for these sectors. 333. With the exception of the FARS, none of the other authorities or SRBs have internal documents outlining the procedures governing market entry controls to prevent criminals from entering the market. Instead, they rely solely on the legal provisions contained within the respective sectoral legal acts, which e.g., prescribe the information to be submitted by applicants and is largely limited to the submission of criminal history certificates. Furthermore, no authority or SRBs (except for FARS and the MoJ) conducts ongoing assessments to ensure that DNFBPs continue to meet fit and proper requirements. 334. As noted in R.28, Slovenia does not have any legal provisions to address the prevention of association to criminals. This results in the absence of specific market entry controls addressing this issue across all DNFBP sectors. 335. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs reported any cases in which a DNFBP licence or registration was rejected on grounds of ML/TF risks. Slovenian authorities explained that this was due to the explicit legal requirement that OEs must not have prior convictions, which likely deters ineligible applicants from applying in the first place. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 336. Real estate – The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future is responsible for Real Estate agents (licensed natural persons) market entry controls. Only natural persons may be licensed to carry out real estate activities, while Real Estate entities (business entities or licensed natural persons with sole proprietor status) are permitted to operate only if they employ at least one licensed real estate agent. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future maintains the official registry of the licensed Real Estate agents, whilst Real Estate entities register within Slovenia’s Business Registry. 337. Real Estate agent applicants are required to provide basic information on their identity, residence, education, and indicate whether the agent will be providing brokerage services for a real estate entity. This should be accompanied with information on their criminal background. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future independently verifies the criminal background information provided by applicants, including conducting checks with foreign counterparts, to identify or verify the criminal history of applicants who have previously resided outside Slovenia. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future does not conduct ongoing monitoring of the fitness and propriety of the registered licensed real estate agents. There are no market entry controls on real estate brokers registering with the Business Registry. 338. Covered Lawyers – The SBA is responsible for the registration of covered lawyers (attorneys registered with the SBA). Entry into the register is granted if the applicant meets the conditions set out in the Attorneys Act. One of the key conditions is that the person must be deemed trustworthy to practice law, and this is confirmed through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts. A person is considered untrustworthy if they have been convicted by a final judgment of a criminal offence that renders them morally unfit to perform their duties, or if their conduct warrants the reasonable conclusion that they will not practice law honestly and conscientiously. The registration process is based on self-certified information provided by the applicant, with no further independent checks conducted to identify any adverse information or other matters that could impact the fitness and properness of the applicant. If the SBA becomes aware that a covered lawyer has been convicted of a criminal offence, it may initiate appropriate proceedings to remove the individual from the register on the grounds of loss of trustworthiness. Otherwise, the SBA does not conduct ongoing monitoring of the fitness and propriety. 339. The SBA noted a number of examples where applicants voluntarily withdrew their application because the applicant realised throughout the process that it would not meet the “trustworthy” requirements. Furthermore, the SBA advised of 4 applications during the assessed period (2020-2024) that had been rejected. One example provided noted the receipt by the SBA of a negative opinion by a regional bar association, regarding the actions of a covered lawyer that was deemed to not be trustworthy following an investigation by the regional bar association, and the subsequent decision to disbar the covered lawyer. 340. DPMSs – The Metrology Institute is responsible for the registration of dealers of precious metals. There is no designated authority responsible for licensing of dealers in precious stones and in raw metals. Business entities operating as dealers in precious metals and stones are registered with the Business Register which is publicly available. Neither the Metrology Institute nor the Business Registry carry out any fit and proper checks. 341. Casinos – Concessions for the conduct of Games of Chance activities are granted by the Government of Slovenia, with support from the Ministry of Finance and FARS. A maximum of 62 concessions can be granted at any point in time, two for classic games of chance, 15 for special games of chance in Casinos, and 45 for the organisation of special games of chance in gaming salons. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for maintaining an accurate and up to date register of concessions granted, including data on the concession period and extensions granted. An applicant must provide information on its beneficial owners, shareholders, partners and management board, and CDD is thoroughly conducted on all parties. These checks require confirmation that none of the parties hold a criminal conviction. When conducting checks, information is verified independently using open-source data analysis tools and information may also verified with the OMLP. No checks are conducted to identify criminal associates. 342. Concessions shall be granted for a maximum of 10 years, although the FARS noted that the majority of concessions are granted for 5 years only. During the life of the concession contract, Casinos are required to obtain prior approval for any changes to its shareholding or beneficial ownership structure, or the removal and appointment of individuals within the management board. On receipt of an application for any of these events, the Ministry of Finance and the FARS will carry out comprehensive CDD to determine the fitness and properness of the individual(s). However, in the absence of such applications, no ongoing checks are done on BO or key individuals which may limit Slovenia’s ability to identify criminals holding key functions, or associated with criminals, within Casinos. Table 4.1. Applications processed by MoF and FARs on BOs and key individuals 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Received 256 347 483 463 518 Approved 250 325 469 448 507 Rejected 0 5 0 0 0 Withdrawn by applicant 6 17 14 15 11 343. Notaries - The Ministry of Justice, with support from the CNS, processes the registration of notaries under the provisions of the Notary Act. The Notary Act outlines specific eligibility and suitability requirements that applicants must meet. The registration process primarily focuses on assessing the applicant’s professional competence and integrity, with only limited consideration of AML/CFT obligations. Applicants must confirm that they have no prior criminal convictions through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts, and this is verified by the MoJ. However, no independent verification checks are carried out to identify any other adverse information that may impact the fitness and properness of the applicant, including conducting ongoing checks. 344. Auditors – The Agency for Public Oversight of Auditing (APOA) is responsible for registration of auditors under the provisions of the Auditing Act that outlines specific eligibility and suitability requirements that applicants must meet. The registration processes primarily focus on assessing the applicant’s professional competence and integrity, with only limited consideration of AML/CFT obligations. In most cases, the fit-and-proper assessment relies on self-declarations by applicants of no prior criminal convictions through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts. However, no independent verification checks are carried out to verify the information or identify any other adverse information that may impact the fitness and properness of the applicant, including conducting ongoing checks. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 345. With the exception of the FARS in relation to Casinos, none of the other supervisory authorities or SRBs have mechanisms in place to systemically and pro-actively monitor, identify or investigate DNFBP activity provided by unauthorised operators. 346. The FARS demonstrated pro-active and extensive efforts in detecting and disrupting illegal online casinos that operate in Slovenia. The FARS has clearly documented procedures outlining the steps taken, including issuing the operator with a written warning and the application to the Court for access restriction. Furthermore, FARS has established follow up procedures to confirm that that court-ordered access restrictions have been successfully enforced. 347. Whilst the MIRS does not have procedures to pro-actively identify unauthorised operators, it did provide an example that demonstrated its approach when information is received regarding such. The MIRS advised it received two complaints from the public against one real estate entity. The MIRS’ initial assessment suggested that the real estate entity was operating without a registered real estate agent, prompting the initiation of an inspection. The real estate entity remediated its position, and the MIRS issued a EUR 12,500 fine for the contravention. However, reliance on ad hoc complaints rather than proactive detection mechanisms does not constitute an effective supervisory approach and limits the authority’s ability to systematically identify and address unauthorised activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="332. Several competent authorities and SRBs share responsibility for market entry controls across the DNFBP sectors. However, there are no designated authorities responsible for DPMS (except for registration of dealers of precious metal products, excluding the traders dealing in raw materials), Tax Advisors or Accountants, and therefore there are no market entry controls for these sectors. 333. With the exception of the FARS, none of the other authorities or SRBs have internal documents outlining the procedures governing market entry controls to prevent criminals from entering the market. Instead, they rely solely on the legal provisions contained within the respective sectoral legal acts, which e.g., prescribe the information to be submitted by applicants and is largely limited to the submission of criminal history certificates. Furthermore, no authority or SRBs (except for FARS and the MoJ) conducts ongoing assessments to ensure that DNFBPs continue to meet fit and proper requirements. 334. As noted in R.28, Slovenia does not have any legal provisions to address the prevention of association to criminals. This results in the absence of specific market entry controls addressing this issue across all DNFBP sectors. 335. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs reported any cases in which a DNFBP licence or registration was rejected on grounds of ML/TF risks. Slovenian authorities explained that this was due to the explicit legal requirement that OEs must not have prior convictions, which likely deters ineligible applicants from applying in the first place. 4.1.1. Market entry controls 336. Real estate – The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future is responsible for Real Estate agents (licensed natural persons) market entry controls. Only natural persons may be licensed to carry out real estate activities, while Real Estate entities (business entities or licensed natural persons with sole proprietor status) are permitted to operate only if they employ at least one licensed real estate agent. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future maintains the official registry of the licensed Real Estate agents, whilst Real Estate entities register within Slovenia’s Business Registry. 337. Real Estate agent applicants are required to provide basic information on their identity, residence, education, and indicate whether the agent will be providing brokerage services for a real estate entity. This should be accompanied with information on their criminal background. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future independently verifies the criminal background information provided by applicants, including conducting checks with foreign counterparts, to identify or verify the criminal history of applicants who have previously resided outside Slovenia. The Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future does not conduct ongoing monitoring of the fitness and propriety of the registered licensed real estate agents. There are no market entry controls on real estate brokers registering with the Business Registry. 338. Covered Lawyers – The SBA is responsible for the registration of covered lawyers (attorneys registered with the SBA). Entry into the register is granted if the applicant meets the conditions set out in the Attorneys Act. One of the key conditions is that the person must be deemed trustworthy to practice law, and this is confirmed through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts. A person is considered untrustworthy if they have been convicted by a final judgment of a criminal offence that renders them morally unfit to perform their duties, or if their conduct warrants the reasonable conclusion that they will not practice law honestly and conscientiously. The registration process is based on self-certified information provided by the applicant, with no further independent checks conducted to identify any adverse information or other matters that could impact the fitness and properness of the applicant. If the SBA becomes aware that a covered lawyer has been convicted of a criminal offence, it may initiate appropriate proceedings to remove the individual from the register on the grounds of loss of trustworthiness. Otherwise, the SBA does not conduct ongoing monitoring of the fitness and propriety. 339. The SBA noted a number of examples where applicants voluntarily withdrew their application because the applicant realised throughout the process that it would not meet the “trustworthy” requirements. Furthermore, the SBA advised of 4 applications during the assessed period (2020-2024) that had been rejected. One example provided noted the receipt by the SBA of a negative opinion by a regional bar association, regarding the actions of a covered lawyer that was deemed to not be trustworthy following an investigation by the regional bar association, and the subsequent decision to disbar the covered lawyer. 340. DPMSs – The Metrology Institute is responsible for the registration of dealers of precious metals. There is no designated authority responsible for licensing of dealers in precious stones and in raw metals. Business entities operating as dealers in precious metals and stones are registered with the Business Register which is publicly available. Neither the Metrology Institute nor the Business Registry carry out any fit and proper checks. 341. Casinos – Concessions for the conduct of Games of Chance activities are granted by the Government of Slovenia, with support from the Ministry of Finance and FARS. A maximum of 62 concessions can be granted at any point in time, two for classic games of chance, 15 for special games of chance in Casinos, and 45 for the organisation of special games of chance in gaming salons. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for maintaining an accurate and up to date register of concessions granted, including data on the concession period and extensions granted. An applicant must provide information on its beneficial owners, shareholders, partners and management board, and CDD is thoroughly conducted on all parties. These checks require confirmation that none of the parties hold a criminal conviction. When conducting checks, information is verified independently using open-source data analysis tools and information may also verified with the OMLP. No checks are conducted to identify criminal associates. 342. Concessions shall be granted for a maximum of 10 years, although the FARS noted that the majority of concessions are granted for 5 years only. During the life of the concession contract, Casinos are required to obtain prior approval for any changes to its shareholding or beneficial ownership structure, or the removal and appointment of individuals within the management board. On receipt of an application for any of these events, the Ministry of Finance and the FARS will carry out comprehensive CDD to determine the fitness and properness of the individual(s). However, in the absence of such applications, no ongoing checks are done on BO or key individuals which may limit Slovenia’s ability to identify criminals holding key functions, or associated with criminals, within Casinos. Table 4.1. Applications processed by MoF and FARs on BOs and key individuals 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Received 256 347 483 463 518 Approved 250 325 469 448 507 Rejected 0 5 0 0 0 Withdrawn by applicant 6 17 14 15 11 343. Notaries - The Ministry of Justice, with support from the CNS, processes the registration of notaries under the provisions of the Notary Act. The Notary Act outlines specific eligibility and suitability requirements that applicants must meet. The registration process primarily focuses on assessing the applicant’s professional competence and integrity, with only limited consideration of AML/CFT obligations. Applicants must confirm that they have no prior criminal convictions through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts, and this is verified by the MoJ. However, no independent verification checks are carried out to identify any other adverse information that may impact the fitness and properness of the applicant, including conducting ongoing checks. 344. Auditors – The Agency for Public Oversight of Auditing (APOA) is responsible for registration of auditors under the provisions of the Auditing Act that outlines specific eligibility and suitability requirements that applicants must meet. The registration processes primarily focus on assessing the applicant’s professional competence and integrity, with only limited consideration of AML/CFT obligations. In most cases, the fit-and-proper assessment relies on self-declarations by applicants of no prior criminal convictions through the submission of a criminal background report provided by the Slovenian courts. However, no independent verification checks are carried out to verify the information or identify any other adverse information that may impact the fitness and properness of the applicant, including conducting ongoing checks. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 345. With the exception of the FARS in relation to Casinos, none of the other supervisory authorities or SRBs have mechanisms in place to systemically and pro-actively monitor, identify or investigate DNFBP activity provided by unauthorised operators. 346. The FARS demonstrated pro-active and extensive efforts in detecting and disrupting illegal online casinos that operate in Slovenia. The FARS has clearly documented procedures outlining the steps taken, including issuing the operator with a written warning and the application to the Court for access restriction. Furthermore, FARS has established follow up procedures to confirm that that court-ordered access restrictions have been successfully enforced. 347. Whilst the MIRS does not have procedures to pro-actively identify unauthorised operators, it did provide an example that demonstrated its approach when information is received regarding such. The MIRS advised it received two complaints from the public against one real estate entity. The MIRS’ initial assessment suggested that the real estate entity was operating without a registered real estate agent, prompting the initiation of an inspection. The real estate entity remediated its position, and the MIRS issued a EUR 12,500 fine for the contravention. However, reliance on ad hoc complaints rather than proactive detection mechanisms does not constitute an effective supervisory approach and limits the authority’s ability to systematically identify and address unauthorised activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Domestic Legal Persons 447. Slovenia has concluded its 2025 NRA. While the 2025 NRA does not analyse LPs, it does contain some insights into whether LPs are being abused for ML or FT purposes. Data provided by LEAs and included in the 2025 NRA on financial investigations show that these investigations often involve LPs and they are also at times referred to the State Prosecutor for further investigation. Indeed, Slovenia managed to obtain a conviction of an LP in 2021. A number of investigations into LPs and possible prosecution by the State Prosecutor are often stalled because the LP goes into liquidation due to bankruptcy. 448. However, these indications were somewhat limited as the 2025 NRA failed to analyse further the profile of LPs used in criminal activities – no consideration was given as to the main legal form that is encountered in the context of criminal activity, and neither was any attention given as to whether the BOs thereof were Slovenian or foreign residents. Equally, no consideration was given as to their ownership and control structure, whether they had any active trading activity on-going, and within the context of which criminal activity, or at what stage of the criminal activity, these LPs were being used. 449. The 2025 NRA also identifies possible vulnerabilities associated with LPs, including complex ownership structures intended to obfuscate the BO(s), the possible use of LPs as shell and shelf companies as well as the presence of nominee directors/shareholders. However, it is not clear whether these are actual characteristics of LPs registered in Slovenia or just a general description of vulnerabilities often associated with LPs when it comes to ML, as authorities did not always concur to what degree these phenomena present themselves. On the other hand, data provided to the AT suggests that complex ownership structures may not be that common. 450. This absence of in-depth analysis and consideration of key data sets regarding LPs is pervasive throughout the 2025 NRA as no use or analysis was made of data that could otherwise be provided by AJPES, including whether trends to liquidate significant number of LPs is symptomatic of something more. In addition, the 2025 NRA does not provide any analysis of the effectiveness of the RBO, of the SBR and of supervisory activities to ensure that LPs and OEs comply with their basic and BO disclosure obligations. 451. As regards any possible TF risks, the 2025 NRA does make passing reference to possible instances where LPs registered in Slovenia may have been involved in TF cases. However, the manner in which the LP may have been abused and whether it merits the undertaking of any mitigating measures was not analysed. This notwithstanding, the prevalent consideration by Slovenia is that the overall risk of TF is low throughout all sectors and areas. 452. The 2025 NRA did not identify any particular typology as to how LPs are being abused for ML/TF, nor is it currently supplemented by any sectoral risk assessment or other analysis focused on LPs. One exception is a series of analyses prepared by FARS between 2019-2023 on the basis of 2018 data, which did conclude that shell and shelf companies, together with strawmen were all phenomena that could be noticed from the data analysed, and there was an established trend to use LLCs within international VAT carousel schemes. Indeed, FARS use indicia like the lack of economic activity by LLCs, LLCs registered at the same address or having the same legal representative to identify LLCs that are more likely to be abused for tax evasion or fraud. In addition, the OMLP’s Annual Report does highlight ML/TF typologies associated with LPs, including the use of shell companies and the use of bank accounts held by LPs to channel possible proceeds of crime. 453. OMLP, FARS and LEAs referred to a number of typologies associated with LPs registered in Slovenia, where they would either be used directly in the commission of an offence or used to launder the proceeds of crime. Examples include the use of companies in VAT carousel schemes, in online fraud schemes, or the acquisition of immovable property through shell companies or companies fronted by strawmen financed with proceeds of crime. Another common typology involves companies beneficially owned by individuals of particular nationalities. In the latter case, the LP would be incorporated to circumvent local restrictions on the acquisition of immovable property or to channel funds into Slovenia for eventual withdrawal. However, AML/CFT supervisory authorities were of the view that these were no longer occurring as they were no longer detecting them through their activities. 454. While authorities all have a general understanding of the ML/TF risks generally associated with LPs, how these may manifest themselves and of possible trends and typologies, the depth of their understanding varies from one authority to another, underlying the absence of a shared understanding of the risks, threats and vulnerabilities presented by LPs in Slovenia. The absence of a data-driven exercise specifically focused on LPs is a further limitation in this regard. Foreign Legal Persons 455. The 2025 NRA did not draw any specific distinction between domestic and foreign LPs. It did consider the exposure of the FI sector to non-resident customers, including LPs, but the data was not sufficiently granular to come to any conclusion on the matter. In addition, most competent authorities did not provide any particular insights as to how foreign LPs can pose an ML/TF risk to the Slovenian financial system. The SPO did however refer to how companies from a third country within the Balkans region were used as part of criminal schemes targeting Slovenia or forming part of wider schemes and involving companies in Slovenia as well. Legal Arrangements 456. Legal arrangements were not considered in Slovenia’s 2025 NRA. Trusts and similar legal arrangements cannot be established under Slovenian law and it does not seem that foreign legal arrangements are active in Slovenia. Competent authorities and private sector representatives met during the on-site visit reported having encountered trusts or legal arrangements only rarely within corporate ownership structures. However, this does not eliminate any ML/TF risks that may arise from having Slovenian residents acting as trustees for trusts or similar legal arrangements which are active outside of Slovenia. The indications are therefore that this is not a material area for Slovenia, though it cannot be definitely concluded that this is the case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Domestic Legal Persons 447. Slovenia has concluded its 2025 NRA. While the 2025 NRA does not analyse LPs, it does contain some insights into whether LPs are being abused for ML or FT purposes. Data provided by LEAs and included in the 2025 NRA on financial investigations show that these investigations often involve LPs and they are also at times referred to the State Prosecutor for further investigation. Indeed, Slovenia managed to obtain a conviction of an LP in 2021. A number of investigations into LPs and possible prosecution by the State Prosecutor are often stalled because the LP goes into liquidation due to bankruptcy. 448. However, these indications were somewhat limited as the 2025 NRA failed to analyse further the profile of LPs used in criminal activities – no consideration was given as to the main legal form that is encountered in the context of criminal activity, and neither was any attention given as to whether the BOs thereof were Slovenian or foreign residents. Equally, no consideration was given as to their ownership and control structure, whether they had any active trading activity on-going, and within the context of which criminal activity, or at what stage of the criminal activity, these LPs were being used. 449. The 2025 NRA also identifies possible vulnerabilities associated with LPs, including complex ownership structures intended to obfuscate the BO(s), the possible use of LPs as shell and shelf companies as well as the presence of nominee directors/shareholders. However, it is not clear whether these are actual characteristics of LPs registered in Slovenia or just a general description of vulnerabilities often associated with LPs when it comes to ML, as authorities did not always concur to what degree these phenomena present themselves. On the other hand, data provided to the AT suggests that complex ownership structures may not be that common. 450. This absence of in-depth analysis and consideration of key data sets regarding LPs is pervasive throughout the 2025 NRA as no use or analysis was made of data that could otherwise be provided by AJPES, including whether trends to liquidate significant number of LPs is symptomatic of something more. In addition, the 2025 NRA does not provide any analysis of the effectiveness of the RBO, of the SBR and of supervisory activities to ensure that LPs and OEs comply with their basic and BO disclosure obligations. 451. As regards any possible TF risks, the 2025 NRA does make passing reference to possible instances where LPs registered in Slovenia may have been involved in TF cases. However, the manner in which the LP may have been abused and whether it merits the undertaking of any mitigating measures was not analysed. This notwithstanding, the prevalent consideration by Slovenia is that the overall risk of TF is low throughout all sectors and areas. 452. The 2025 NRA did not identify any particular typology as to how LPs are being abused for ML/TF, nor is it currently supplemented by any sectoral risk assessment or other analysis focused on LPs. One exception is a series of analyses prepared by FARS between 2019-2023 on the basis of 2018 data, which did conclude that shell and shelf companies, together with strawmen were all phenomena that could be noticed from the data analysed, and there was an established trend to use LLCs within international VAT carousel schemes. Indeed, FARS use indicia like the lack of economic activity by LLCs, LLCs registered at the same address or having the same legal representative to identify LLCs that are more likely to be abused for tax evasion or fraud. In addition, the OMLP’s Annual Report does highlight ML/TF typologies associated with LPs, including the use of shell companies and the use of bank accounts held by LPs to channel possible proceeds of crime. 453. OMLP, FARS and LEAs referred to a number of typologies associated with LPs registered in Slovenia, where they would either be used directly in the commission of an offence or used to launder the proceeds of crime. Examples include the use of companies in VAT carousel schemes, in online fraud schemes, or the acquisition of immovable property through shell companies or companies fronted by strawmen financed with proceeds of crime. Another common typology involves companies beneficially owned by individuals of particular nationalities. In the latter case, the LP would be incorporated to circumvent local restrictions on the acquisition of immovable property or to channel funds into Slovenia for eventual withdrawal. However, AML/CFT supervisory authorities were of the view that these were no longer occurring as they were no longer detecting them through their activities. 454. While authorities all have a general understanding of the ML/TF risks generally associated with LPs, how these may manifest themselves and of possible trends and typologies, the depth of their understanding varies from one authority to another, underlying the absence of a shared understanding of the risks, threats and vulnerabilities presented by LPs in Slovenia. The absence of a data-driven exercise specifically focused on LPs is a further limitation in this regard. Foreign Legal Persons 455. The 2025 NRA did not draw any specific distinction between domestic and foreign LPs. It did consider the exposure of the FI sector to non-resident customers, including LPs, but the data was not sufficiently granular to come to any conclusion on the matter. In addition, most competent authorities did not provide any particular insights as to how foreign LPs can pose an ML/TF risk to the Slovenian financial system. The SPO did however refer to how companies from a third country within the Balkans region were used as part of criminal schemes targeting Slovenia or forming part of wider schemes and involving companies in Slovenia as well. Legal Arrangements 456. Legal arrangements were not considered in Slovenia’s 2025 NRA. Trusts and similar legal arrangements cannot be established under Slovenian law and it does not seem that foreign legal arrangements are active in Slovenia. Competent authorities and private sector representatives met during the on-site visit reported having encountered trusts or legal arrangements only rarely within corporate ownership structures. However, this does not eliminate any ML/TF risks that may arise from having Slovenian residents acting as trustees for trusts or similar legal arrangements which are active outside of Slovenia. The indications are therefore that this is not a material area for Slovenia, though it cannot be definitely concluded that this is the case." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1 By the FIU 497. The OMLP is acting as the central authority for receiving STRs, CTRs, reports on wire transfers to higher-risk countries as well as on cross-border cash transport and BNIs. These reports are stored in OMLP’s own databases (ISUPPD). The OMLP also has extensive and timely access to a broad range of databases directly or indirectly upon request. 498. The OMLP makes regular use of information contained in databases for its operational analysis. They have direct access to a wide range of databases: evidence of persons suspected to commit criminal acts, cadastral evidence of real estate register, eCRP (central register of population), register of issued tax number, eTAX register, evidence of real estate including claims, employee databases, central register of trade with securities, ePRS (Slovenian Business Register), eRTR (Bank Account Register), JOLP (Annual reports of companies), RBO. Besides these, they can have timely indirect access to central register of convicted persons, central register of loans, vessels register, aircraft register. 499. The challenges relating to accurate and up-to-date information (see IO.5) in the RBO and SBR are applicable here and can hinder the OMLP’s ability to accurately identify the individuals who ultimately own or control legal entities. This, in turn, constrains its capacity to trace the flow of illicit funds, uncover links between seemingly unrelated entities, and detect complex criminal networks. Nevertheless, in specific cases where there are concerns on the reliability of BO information, the OMLP uses its powers conferred by the AML/CFT Law, seeking to address these challenges by requesting (via email) BO information from obliged entities, especially banks, to cross-check the data from the RBO and form a comprehensive understanding during its analysis. This happens on an ad-hoc basis and is not standard practice. Types of reports received 500. The OMLP is the central authority for receiving and analysing STRs from OEs. Between 2020 to 2024, the OMLP received 4799 STRs. During the assessment period, most STRs were submitted by financial institutions, with roughly 82% of STRs originating from banks. Most of the STRs relate to ML (4659 STRs or ~ 97%), while a small percentage is related to TF (140 or ~3%), which adequately reflects the country’s risk profile as set out in the NRAs (see table 6.1 below). 501. The number of ML-related STRs from OEs has increased significantly since 2023. No breakdown of full statistics for the past few years on predicate offences reported in STRs are available, as OEs are not required to identify the predicate offence when filing STRs. Moreover, the current STR template does not include a dedicated field for this information that would allow for generating the full statistics on predicate offences reported in STRs. However, based on the STR analysis carried out by the OMLP resulting in disseminations and feedback received from LEAs on disseminated cases the OMLP estimates that in the last years, the most frequent predicate offences associated to ML STRs were fraud, tax evasion, abuse of position of trust in economic activity. This is largely consistent with the 2025 NRA, which identified economic crime (including abuse of position of trust and tax evasion) as the main ML threat while classic property crime (which includes online fraud and attack on an information system) is the third main threat of ML. 502. The number of TF-related STRs has fluctuated in the reviewed period. Most of the STRs related to TF were submitted by payment service providers and by banks. No TF-related STRs have been submitted by DNFBPs. The low volume of STRs related to TF is consistent with the country’s low risk of TF and can be caused by the lower level of understanding of TF risks by some OEs (see IO.3 and IO.4). Table 6.1: Breakdown of STRs received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Banks 737 5 732 6 776 4 762 2 901 11 Savings institutions 87 1 57 102 1 143 2 Post Office 17 4 1 1 Brokerage companies and management companies of investment funds 4 3 1 Leasing 1 1 3 1 4 Auditors and accountants 1 3 Casinos 1 1 4 Other organisers of games of chance 1 3 6 Dealers with precious stones 1 4 2 2 Real estate agencies 1 Insurance companies 1 2 Virtual currencies 6 8 Payment service providers 38 45 23 13 32 30 32 16 25 4 Other obliged entities/EMIs 4 29 17 32 35 Notaries 1 1 1 2 Covered lawyers 1 2 1 STRs (total) 893 51 860 19 840 34 944 19 1122 17 503. Banks consistently submit the highest number of reports annually and the quality of their reports is assessed as high by the OMLP. In the absence of the dedicated field in the form, FIs usually describe the underlying crime in the narrative part of their STR and in the process of the analysis the OMLP checks if the categorisation is correct. When STRs lack sufficient information, the OMLP requests additional information from OEs via email and FIs usually reply within two days (i.e. well within the prescribed maximum time-limit of five days under APMLTF-2). Nevertheless, STRs submitted by banks rarely need additional information or clarification, in contrast with the ones received from other FIs and DNFBPs. Generally, the OMLP has the good practice of providing feedback to OEs: a) immediately after an STR is received to indicate possible deficiencies or missing information; b) when it concludes a case to inform the OE about the findings of its analysis; and c) once a year, as part of feedback to banks and savings banks. 504. DNFBPs, despite being exposed to ML/TF risks, report very few suspicious transactions, which seems to be linked to their insufficient understanding of ML/TF risks (see IO.4). The low number of STRs submitted by DNFBPs reduces the diversity of intelligence available to the OMLP and narrows its capacity to identify potential ML/TF cases, since their reports are essential for uncovering complex financial schemes that may not be visible through the banking system alone. Although between 2020 and 2024, the OMLP has delivered trainings to DNFBPs, including tax advisors and accountants, traders in gold and precious metals, real estate agencies, notaries and covered lawyers to raise their ML/FT awareness, these initiatives have not yet been reflected in increased STR reporting across DNFBP sectors. 505. The OMLP also receives information (“initiatives”) from state authorities that include the Police, the FARS, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Courts, and the SOVA. These are treated as STRs by the OMLP, although they can be rejected if they are not sufficiently substantiated or do not contain elements of ML or TF. Most initiatives come from the police and have been increasing because of growing number of online fraud cases detected by the police. In these instances, the police refer cases to the OMLP due to its powers to temporarily suspend transactions for 72 hours and its efficient access to banking and transaction data. The OMLP explained that while it was able to stop some fraudulent transactions because of police initiatives, the large volume of received online fraud-related initiatives is burdening the OMLP’s already limited resources and ability to review STRs in a timely manner. Some of the fraud initiatives are submitted with a delay to the OMLP, reducing the chances to stop transactions in time. Also, a significant proportion of them involve transactions of low value, that do not always justify the allocation of OMLP resources. 506. In attempt to reduce the number of online fraud initiatives referred to them which stretch their already limited resources, in the guidelines adopted in September 2025, the OMLP introduced certain criteria for rejecting initiatives. The criteria include a combination of the value of a suspicious transaction, the time lapse since the transaction and whether or not funds have been transferred abroad. As an example, initiatives related to transactions abroad that are below EUR 1,000 submitted three days after the transaction would be rejected. As a consequence, in 2025, out of 900 initiatives received, the OMLP rejected 130. Also, it should be noted that some of the online fraud-related initiatives are duplicated by STRs, since a victim first approaches the bank (which then submits the STR) and subsequently the Police (which then submits the initiative). While the OMLP and the police have made some co-ordinated efforts to avoid duplication, this still cannot be fully avoided. Table 6.2: Breakdown of cases initiated by OMLP based on received initiatives, foreign requests, etc. 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Initiatives from state authorities (total) 115 1 128 5 167 1 318 4 538 Ministry of the Interior, Criminal Police Directorate 70 99 3 142 289 2 509 State Prosecutor’s Office 17 9 6 6 6 FARS 4 Courts 3 4 2 11 14 Commission for the Prevention of Corruption 1 1 1 2 Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency 24 1 11 2 16 1 10 2 8 Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Budget Supervision 1 Reports from supervisory authorities 16 14 17 10 7 Securities Market Agency 1 FARS 1 Market Inspectorate 1 Bank of Slovenia 13 13 17 10 7 Insurance Supervision Agency 1 Cases initiated by OMLP on its own initiative or by other means 2 1 18 25 5. Foreign FIUs 58 55 4 74 3 44 1 42 2 507. The OMLP can request data from OEs and other state bodies when needed for the detection of ML/TF and predicate offences, which must be provided within 5 working days (by OEs) or 15 days (by other state authorities), unless indicated otherwise in OMLP’s request. 508. The OMLP also receives the following reports: on average 45,000 CTRs/year for cash transactions exceeding the threshold of EUR 15,000; 22,000 reports/year on transactions exceeding EUR 15,000 related to high-risk countries; 69 reports/year on cross-border transportation of cash exceeding EUR 10,000 from customs authorities (FARS) – in accordance with EU Regulation 2018/1672 on controls of cash entering or leaving the EU. This data is stored in the OMLP’s database (ISUPPD) and is used to support the analysis of STRs. Only in the first 3 years of the assessed period the OMLP opened 6 cases ex officio based on the data derived from CTRs, which is a modest number, given that Slovenia has a cash-intensive economy with a medium-high threat of ML derived from cash (the 2025 NRA). While the number of CTRs submitted by casinos may not seem fully in line with the medium-low risk level assigned to this sector under the 2025 NRA, as explained by the OMLP and the FARS, CTRs in question include all transactions during a single visit when the threshold of EUR 15,000 was exceeded either through a single or multiple transactions (cash ins and cash outs); in case of the latter, all transactions are reported. The AT considers that data from CTRs are not explored more in depth by the OMLP for both operational and strategic analysis. Table 6.3. CTRs received by the OMLP during 2021-2024 Obliged entity 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number Number Number Number Banks 35,358 43,451 39,998 37,963 Savings institutions 4,195 4,169 4,122 4,524 Casinos 3,410 3,875 3,856 2,308 Other 17 72 77 0 Total CTRs received 42,980 51,570 48,053 44,795 Total amount (EUR) 1,536,055,994 1,918,830,127 1,744,560,420 1,642,262,398 Source: OMLP’s Annual reports Table 6.4. Reported transactions over 15,000 EUR related to high-risk jurisdictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total no. of transactions reported 5,847 3,875 9,299* 35,548** 56,567** Total amount (EUR) 676,304,817 635,412,734 832,217,361 3,861,955,811 7,600,350,811 509. FARS submits cross-border declaration reports as well as information on undeclared and falsely declared cash and BNI. However, it is not known to what extent they have been used by the OMLP in their analysis or if they have ever been used to open ML/TF cases (see also IO.8). 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 510. LEAs, prosecution, and judicial authorities also have access to a significant number of databases, either directly or upon request. Their access is timely, and the data is generally adequate. However, since the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) in August 2024, LEAs and prosecutors’ access to the Bank Account Register for natural persons has been restricted, granting of which now requires a court order. The latter is contingent on demonstrating a higher evidentiary threshold – the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. While in cases involving potential ML/TF, LEAs and prosecutors can acquire banking information of natural persons via the OMLP, the changes in the CPA significantly limit the ability of LEAs to obtain intelligence at the pre-investigation stage of predicate offences (see IO.7). 511. The police have direct access to their own databases (information on previous cases, population register), SBR and RBO, databases of employment and health insurance services, criminal records, dangerous substances and non-scheduled transports, vehicles data in European registers. In addition, they have indirect access upon request to several other database, including those relating to vessels, ownership of aircrafts, tax data, and real estate." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1 By the FIU 497. The OMLP is acting as the central authority for receiving STRs, CTRs, reports on wire transfers to higher-risk countries as well as on cross-border cash transport and BNIs. These reports are stored in OMLP’s own databases (ISUPPD). The OMLP also has extensive and timely access to a broad range of databases directly or indirectly upon request. 498. The OMLP makes regular use of information contained in databases for its operational analysis. They have direct access to a wide range of databases: evidence of persons suspected to commit criminal acts, cadastral evidence of real estate register, eCRP (central register of population), register of issued tax number, eTAX register, evidence of real estate including claims, employee databases, central register of trade with securities, ePRS (Slovenian Business Register), eRTR (Bank Account Register), JOLP (Annual reports of companies), RBO. Besides these, they can have timely indirect access to central register of convicted persons, central register of loans, vessels register, aircraft register. 499. The challenges relating to accurate and up-to-date information (see IO.5) in the RBO and SBR are applicable here and can hinder the OMLP’s ability to accurately identify the individuals who ultimately own or control legal entities. This, in turn, constrains its capacity to trace the flow of illicit funds, uncover links between seemingly unrelated entities, and detect complex criminal networks. Nevertheless, in specific cases where there are concerns on the reliability of BO information, the OMLP uses its powers conferred by the AML/CFT Law, seeking to address these challenges by requesting (via email) BO information from obliged entities, especially banks, to cross-check the data from the RBO and form a comprehensive understanding during its analysis. This happens on an ad-hoc basis and is not standard practice. Types of reports received 500. The OMLP is the central authority for receiving and analysing STRs from OEs. Between 2020 to 2024, the OMLP received 4799 STRs. During the assessment period, most STRs were submitted by financial institutions, with roughly 82% of STRs originating from banks. Most of the STRs relate to ML (4659 STRs or ~ 97%), while a small percentage is related to TF (140 or ~3%), which adequately reflects the country’s risk profile as set out in the NRAs (see table 6.1 below). 501. The number of ML-related STRs from OEs has increased significantly since 2023. No breakdown of full statistics for the past few years on predicate offences reported in STRs are available, as OEs are not required to identify the predicate offence when filing STRs. Moreover, the current STR template does not include a dedicated field for this information that would allow for generating the full statistics on predicate offences reported in STRs. However, based on the STR analysis carried out by the OMLP resulting in disseminations and feedback received from LEAs on disseminated cases the OMLP estimates that in the last years, the most frequent predicate offences associated to ML STRs were fraud, tax evasion, abuse of position of trust in economic activity. This is largely consistent with the 2025 NRA, which identified economic crime (including abuse of position of trust and tax evasion) as the main ML threat while classic property crime (which includes online fraud and attack on an information system) is the third main threat of ML. 502. The number of TF-related STRs has fluctuated in the reviewed period. Most of the STRs related to TF were submitted by payment service providers and by banks. No TF-related STRs have been submitted by DNFBPs. The low volume of STRs related to TF is consistent with the country’s low risk of TF and can be caused by the lower level of understanding of TF risks by some OEs (see IO.3 and IO.4). Table 6.1: Breakdown of STRs received 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Banks 737 5 732 6 776 4 762 2 901 11 Savings institutions 87 1 57 102 1 143 2 Post Office 17 4 1 1 Brokerage companies and management companies of investment funds 4 3 1 Leasing 1 1 3 1 4 Auditors and accountants 1 3 Casinos 1 1 4 Other organisers of games of chance 1 3 6 Dealers with precious stones 1 4 2 2 Real estate agencies 1 Insurance companies 1 2 Virtual currencies 6 8 Payment service providers 38 45 23 13 32 30 32 16 25 4 Other obliged entities/EMIs 4 29 17 32 35 Notaries 1 1 1 2 Covered lawyers 1 2 1 STRs (total) 893 51 860 19 840 34 944 19 1122 17 503. Banks consistently submit the highest number of reports annually and the quality of their reports is assessed as high by the OMLP. In the absence of the dedicated field in the form, FIs usually describe the underlying crime in the narrative part of their STR and in the process of the analysis the OMLP checks if the categorisation is correct. When STRs lack sufficient information, the OMLP requests additional information from OEs via email and FIs usually reply within two days (i.e. well within the prescribed maximum time-limit of five days under APMLTF-2). Nevertheless, STRs submitted by banks rarely need additional information or clarification, in contrast with the ones received from other FIs and DNFBPs. Generally, the OMLP has the good practice of providing feedback to OEs: a) immediately after an STR is received to indicate possible deficiencies or missing information; b) when it concludes a case to inform the OE about the findings of its analysis; and c) once a year, as part of feedback to banks and savings banks. 504. DNFBPs, despite being exposed to ML/TF risks, report very few suspicious transactions, which seems to be linked to their insufficient understanding of ML/TF risks (see IO.4). The low number of STRs submitted by DNFBPs reduces the diversity of intelligence available to the OMLP and narrows its capacity to identify potential ML/TF cases, since their reports are essential for uncovering complex financial schemes that may not be visible through the banking system alone. Although between 2020 and 2024, the OMLP has delivered trainings to DNFBPs, including tax advisors and accountants, traders in gold and precious metals, real estate agencies, notaries and covered lawyers to raise their ML/FT awareness, these initiatives have not yet been reflected in increased STR reporting across DNFBP sectors. 505. The OMLP also receives information (“initiatives”) from state authorities that include the Police, the FARS, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Courts, and the SOVA. These are treated as STRs by the OMLP, although they can be rejected if they are not sufficiently substantiated or do not contain elements of ML or TF. Most initiatives come from the police and have been increasing because of growing number of online fraud cases detected by the police. In these instances, the police refer cases to the OMLP due to its powers to temporarily suspend transactions for 72 hours and its efficient access to banking and transaction data. The OMLP explained that while it was able to stop some fraudulent transactions because of police initiatives, the large volume of received online fraud-related initiatives is burdening the OMLP’s already limited resources and ability to review STRs in a timely manner. Some of the fraud initiatives are submitted with a delay to the OMLP, reducing the chances to stop transactions in time. Also, a significant proportion of them involve transactions of low value, that do not always justify the allocation of OMLP resources. 506. In attempt to reduce the number of online fraud initiatives referred to them which stretch their already limited resources, in the guidelines adopted in September 2025, the OMLP introduced certain criteria for rejecting initiatives. The criteria include a combination of the value of a suspicious transaction, the time lapse since the transaction and whether or not funds have been transferred abroad. As an example, initiatives related to transactions abroad that are below EUR 1,000 submitted three days after the transaction would be rejected. As a consequence, in 2025, out of 900 initiatives received, the OMLP rejected 130. Also, it should be noted that some of the online fraud-related initiatives are duplicated by STRs, since a victim first approaches the bank (which then submits the STR) and subsequently the Police (which then submits the initiative). While the OMLP and the police have made some co-ordinated efforts to avoid duplication, this still cannot be fully avoided. Table 6.2: Breakdown of cases initiated by OMLP based on received initiatives, foreign requests, etc. 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF ML TF Initiatives from state authorities (total) 115 1 128 5 167 1 318 4 538 Ministry of the Interior, Criminal Police Directorate 70 99 3 142 289 2 509 State Prosecutor’s Office 17 9 6 6 6 FARS 4 Courts 3 4 2 11 14 Commission for the Prevention of Corruption 1 1 1 2 Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency 24 1 11 2 16 1 10 2 8 Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Budget Supervision 1 Reports from supervisory authorities 16 14 17 10 7 Securities Market Agency 1 FARS 1 Market Inspectorate 1 Bank of Slovenia 13 13 17 10 7 Insurance Supervision Agency 1 Cases initiated by OMLP on its own initiative or by other means 2 1 18 25 5. Foreign FIUs 58 55 4 74 3 44 1 42 2 507. The OMLP can request data from OEs and other state bodies when needed for the detection of ML/TF and predicate offences, which must be provided within 5 working days (by OEs) or 15 days (by other state authorities), unless indicated otherwise in OMLP’s request. 508. The OMLP also receives the following reports: on average 45,000 CTRs/year for cash transactions exceeding the threshold of EUR 15,000; 22,000 reports/year on transactions exceeding EUR 15,000 related to high-risk countries; 69 reports/year on cross-border transportation of cash exceeding EUR 10,000 from customs authorities (FARS) – in accordance with EU Regulation 2018/1672 on controls of cash entering or leaving the EU. This data is stored in the OMLP’s database (ISUPPD) and is used to support the analysis of STRs. Only in the first 3 years of the assessed period the OMLP opened 6 cases ex officio based on the data derived from CTRs, which is a modest number, given that Slovenia has a cash-intensive economy with a medium-high threat of ML derived from cash (the 2025 NRA). While the number of CTRs submitted by casinos may not seem fully in line with the medium-low risk level assigned to this sector under the 2025 NRA, as explained by the OMLP and the FARS, CTRs in question include all transactions during a single visit when the threshold of EUR 15,000 was exceeded either through a single or multiple transactions (cash ins and cash outs); in case of the latter, all transactions are reported. The AT considers that data from CTRs are not explored more in depth by the OMLP for both operational and strategic analysis. Table 6.3. CTRs received by the OMLP during 2021-2024 Obliged entity 2021 2022 2023 2024 Number Number Number Number Banks 35,358 43,451 39,998 37,963 Savings institutions 4,195 4,169 4,122 4,524 Casinos 3,410 3,875 3,856 2,308 Other 17 72 77 0 Total CTRs received 42,980 51,570 48,053 44,795 Total amount (EUR) 1,536,055,994 1,918,830,127 1,744,560,420 1,642,262,398 Source: OMLP’s Annual reports Table 6.4. Reported transactions over 15,000 EUR related to high-risk jurisdictions 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total no. of transactions reported 5,847 3,875 9,299* 35,548** 56,567** Total amount (EUR) 676,304,817 635,412,734 832,217,361 3,861,955,811 7,600,350,811 509. FARS submits cross-border declaration reports as well as information on undeclared and falsely declared cash and BNI. However, it is not known to what extent they have been used by the OMLP in their analysis or if they have ever been used to open ML/TF cases (see also IO.8). 6.1.2. By other competent authorities 510. LEAs, prosecution, and judicial authorities also have access to a significant number of databases, either directly or upon request. Their access is timely, and the data is generally adequate. However, since the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) in August 2024, LEAs and prosecutors’ access to the Bank Account Register for natural persons has been restricted, granting of which now requires a court order. The latter is contingent on demonstrating a higher evidentiary threshold – the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. While in cases involving potential ML/TF, LEAs and prosecutors can acquire banking information of natural persons via the OMLP, the changes in the CPA significantly limit the ability of LEAs to obtain intelligence at the pre-investigation stage of predicate offences (see IO.7). 511. The police have direct access to their own databases (information on previous cases, population register), SBR and RBO, databases of employment and health insurance services, criminal records, dangerous substances and non-scheduled transports, vehicles data in European registers. In addition, they have indirect access upon request to several other database, including those relating to vessels, ownership of aircrafts, tax data, and real estate." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. In Slovenia, the police, as the responsible investigative authority, undertake pre-investigations at a local, regional, and central level. The National Bureau of Investigation is tasked with identification and pre-investigation of the most complex ML cases stemming from economic crime, corruption and organised crime. Some complex ML cases are also investigated at regional units. The local police units detect and pre-investigate minor ML cases stemming from fraud and online fraud. 557. Initial criminal reports are submitted to the prosecutor (SPO for complex cases and District Prosecutors for others) which is responsible for assessing the case, agreeing and preparing applications to the court for investigative orders. The prosecutor may where it is considered necessary establish and lead a joint investigative team with participants from the police and other competent authorities such as FARS. Upon the motion of the prosecutor, the Investigative judge is tasked with leading judicial investigation. Before initiating a judicial investigation, the judge will need to confirm that there is enough evidence to support the charges. Such decisions are subject to appeal. A number of check and balances available before confirming the charges serve as a gatekeeper for human rights. Nevertheless, the authorities stated that there are instances where such robust procedures are abused by defendants in order to prolong the process. Once the investigation is completed, the case is referred back to prosecutor who will further decide whether to prosecute the case or not. 558. Relevant training and support including upskilling sessions in identifying and conducting ML investigations are provided to the police, SPO and OMLP, with instances of international courses being attended by both prosecutors and the police that seeks to rectify the previously identified lack of expertise in fight against financial crime. Police training includes a centrally managed mandatory national syllabus to which Prosecutor’s actively contribute and includes modules dedicate to ML and asset recovery. Training for Prosecutors and the Judiciary consists of regular topic-based lectures and events, the subjects including ML being addressed regularly. The authorities desire to build their capabilities is further evident in the nascent specialist resource for the identification and tracing of crypto currencies and digital assets that is being developed by the police that includes a central resource that supports local and regional police. This confirms the authorities’ commitment to adapting their investigative tools and expertise to address the evolving challenges posed by digital financial crime. 559. Slovenia seeks to identify and investigate instances of self and third-party ML where predicate offending has been established. Conversely, autonomous ML offences cannot be effectively investigated without the predicate offending being identified and established. 560. ML is primarily identified through parallel financial investigations conducted alongside investigation of predicate offences. Parallel financial investigations are regularly conducted in all acquisitive crimes, with the aim to identify and trace the proceeds of crime and identify ML offence. ML investigations also originate from the OMLP disseminations, overseas requests and CTRs. The authorities prioritise offences that generate high levels of criminal proceeds, such as corruption, economic and organised crime. 561. The 2025 NRA identifies the highest risks of ML as being associated with economic crime, organized crime, classic property crimes (online frauds and attacks on online system) and corruption, with increases in instances of ML arising from on-line fraud offences. External threats associated with cross border crime and foreign perpetrators were deemed to be of medium risk. Notably the risk assessment identifies self-laundering as the principal type of ML. The risks identified reflect the status of Slovenia as a regional transit state for legitimate and illicit goods, such as illicit drugs and immigration, with internal land borders with four EU states Austria, Croatia, Italy and Hungary, as well as international airports and a containerised seaport. 562. Data supplied for predicate offending during the assessment period (2020-2024) indicates a total of 103 179 acquisitive offences being investigated by police, with the principal offending being theft (79 000) and drugs trafficking (5 887) and human trafficking offences (2 061), with recorded significant instances of all types of fraud (15 000), and bribery and corruption (1 231). The authorities note that between 2023 and 2024 there was an increase in the instances of fraud, in particular on-line fraud (610 cases in 2020 increasing to 2 064 in 2024), which has contributed to the increased number of ML investigations being conducted. 563. During the relevant period the police conducted pre-investigations in relation to ML offences in 378 cases against 934 natural persons and 99 legal persons, representing 2.90% of the reported predicate investigations. There is an increase of the number of pre-investigations in 2024 due to the surge of online frauds, as explained by the authorities. Majority of these cases are initiated as an outcome of the parallel financial investigations carried out within the investigation of predicate crime. 564. The authorities argued that a percentage is 6.8% based upon a number of domestic factors not immediately evident in the data provided. These include instances of multiple offences recorded in single cases and low-level offending typically not subject to ML investigations. Both metrics represent low instances of predicate offending being investigated as ML or with associated offending. 565. Several contributory factors impact on the ratio cited above, such as proportionality where sanctions for predicate offending exceed those for ML, where resourcing is not justified given the potential outcomes of a successful investigation, specifically the likelihood of ML investigations being adopted by Prosecutors for Judicial investigation. 566. The authorities are proficient in engaging with counterparts from other States, in particular regional jurisdictions with whom examples of JITs were established and co-ordinated action undertaken. The authorities’ capabilities regarding this aspect of investigations are particularly important given the complexity and nature of the predicate offending from which the ML risk identified in the NRA is derived. Table 7.1: No of pre-investigations conducted by police No. of cases (files) Natural persons Legal persons 2020 40 118 17 2021 53 103 22 2022 72 130 18 2023 85 237 24 2024 128 346 18 Total 378 934 99 567. The number of cases that are subsequently adopted for Judicial investigation reflect further attrition. Compared to the 378 police pre-investigation case, the number of Judicial investigations for the same period is 90, with the number of individuals and legal persons being investigated being 1 033 as opposed to 156. The most significant difference is in the number of cases for legal persons that constitute 99 of the police investigations in contrast to the 13 Judicial investigations, equivalent to 13.13% of the pre-trial cases. Table 7.2: ML Judicial Investigations conducted (State Prosecutor’s Office) No of cases No of persons Natural persons Legal persons Natural persons Legal persons 2020 19 1 35 6 2021 17 0 26 0 2022 17 0 26 0 2023 21 5 47 5 2024 8 2 9 2 Total 82 8 143 13 568. A number of potential reasons for the discrepancy between pre-trial investigations and judicial investigations have been identified including the time taken to reach decisions, prioritisation of predicate offences, the dismissal of complaints or their non referral due to a lack of evidence. A further factor, based on the discussion during the onsite, is the subjective interpretation of the likelihood that ML prosecutions will result in a conviction and that the conviction will make a difference if a predicate has also been successfully prosecuted. 569. The majority of ML investigations originate from fraud. However, the authorities demonstrated instances of ML investigations linked to other acquisitive predicate offences such as drug trafficking and human trafficking. These results are aligned to some extent with the identified risks, particularly that in the recent period number of ML cases increased due to the increase of the number of fraud offences. Nevertheless, the AT raised concern over the limited number of ML investigation stemming from human trafficking, particularly considering the high volume of investigations and MLA request related to this offence. While the AT acknowledges the authorities’ view that lack of cooperation from overseas countries hinders domestic investigation, it notes the lack of proactive approach to address these challenges. In one case study, the authorities engaged with other jurisdictions and utilise a range of investigative techniques to investigate ML and human trafficking. During the searches significant sums of cash were discovered and seized along with corroborating evidence that linked the specific notes to the offending, to different suspects and potential cash smuggling from Taiwan. The cash was subsequent forfeited solely as the proceeds of the human trafficking as the money laundering prosecution was not progressed due to the cross over with the predicate offending and difficulties obtaining evidence from other jurisdictions. 570. There are no statutory prohibitions on the use of the full range of investigative techniques and powers in ML cases, however following a Constitutional court ruling and amendments to Art.156 CPA in 2024, the legal basis for obtaining financial information changed. The amendments introduced stricter requirements for the issuance of judicial orders including a higher evidentiary threshold to suspect that a specific or identifiable person has committed or is committing a criminal offence. The amendments also affected requests for subscriber data, requiring court orders in cases of natural persons, with the authorities having to demonstrate a substantial inference that a criminal offence has or will be committed. In real terms this means that an investigative order is only available in instances where the investigator can already demonstrate high level of suspicion thereby limiting the use of such powers for proactive purposes to identify criminal activity. Given the nature of ML offence, such limitation coupled with high evidentiary threshold for autonomous ML offence hampers the possibility to timely identify ML activities. The authorities have noted that a statistical review conducted by the MoJ following the changes did not indicate increased difficulties, rather a transition to other methods of obtaining financial records. This does not appear to be consistent with the onsite feedback from practitioners, who identified the changes as having a significant impact on their ability to identify and develop predicate and ML investigations. 571. The authorities are proficient in engaging with counterparts from other States, in particular regional jurisdictions with whom examples of JITs were established and co-ordinated action undertaken. The authorities’ capabilities regarding this aspect of investigations are particularly important given the complexity and nature of the predicate offending from which the ML risk identified in the NRA is derived. 572. The authorities do not investigate autonomous ML without establishing a predicate offence as they believe it unlikely that the cases will be successfully prosecuted. This belief is supported by the interpretation of ML offence by the Supreme court ruling which found that ‘the offence of money laundering cannot exist without the so-called predicate offence. The perpetrator of money laundering cannot, by simultaneously carrying out the acts constituting the elements of the predicate offence, also be laundering money’. These finding were present in the 2017 MER. 573. The authorities clarified that several measures have been undertaken in order to rectify this deficiency. It should be commended that the prosecutors did use their legislative powers (extraordinary remedial measures) to challenge the court’s interpretation. Subsequent rulings have sought to clarify these provisions to some extent noting that a final verdict (conviction) in relation to the predicate is not required, nor is the perpetrator’s identity, it is sufficient that the objective facts of its commission are established. However, the authorities explained that the evidentiary threshold, as interpreted by the judiciary, is still high in relation to predicate offence to be proven which prevents them from initiating standalone ML case. 574. The requirement to establish the predicate limits the competent authority’s ability to disrupt ML activity, and to develop intelligence in relation to ML typologies beyond those linked to parochial offending, and to intercede in cross border money laundering. This deficiency is evident in consideration of typologies such as MVTS and cash smuggling, which is contrary to examples of both being identified within the jurisdiction by the police and Security Services. However, there are instances where the police went beyond the established interpretation of the ML offence by the judiciary (Box 7.1). In this case, the police were able to obtain a further detention to investigate a seizure linked to cross jurisdictional cash couriers even though the requirement of “reasonable ground to suspect” was not met as required by the jurisprudence. Case Box 7.1. Operation Seizure of 1.8 million EUR In April 2019 Slovenian authorities stopped a Hungarian registered freight vehicle transporting EUR 1 785 315.00 in cash. The driver and the passenger were unable to explain the origin of the funds, leading to their arrest and seizure of their mobile phones. The seized cash was secured and deposited in a special bank account and an investigation into suspected money laundering was initiated despite the predicate not being identified. The authorities initiated the creation of a JIT with several countries. Three further associated seizures were identified in France and Spain where cash totalling EUR 1 782 000.00 was being transported in vehicles owned or operated by Chinese nationals to Hungary. At the same time, OMLP enquiries further identified cash deposits totalling more than EUR 2 million made by the owner of the vehicle into a business account held in Slovenia that were subsequently transferred to a company in Hong Kong. Findings of the joint investigation identified links between Hungarian cash couriers and cash deposits by Chinese nationals. The analysis concluded that between 2017 and 2020, between EUR 70–100 million was brought into Hungary from Spain, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. This cash was deposited into company accounts and, in most cases, subsequently transferred to accounts in China, as well as to some EU accounts. Following the arrest of one of the subjects in Hungary, the police submitted the criminal complaint to the SPO, resulting in the court issuing orders for an investigation into 4 defendants for the offence of money laundering. The SPO filed an indictment and proceeding before the court is on-going. 575. The example demonstrates that it is feasible to initiate an investigation prior to a defined predicate offence being known despite the issues previously identified. The example further reflects the authorities’ capabilities in regard to engaging with regional colleagues and their successful use of cross jurisdictional investigative resources. 576. The authorities identify the issues associated with undertaking enquiries overseas and receiving evidence form other jurisdictions as a significant factor in this case that led to delays in the ML investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="556. In Slovenia, the police, as the responsible investigative authority, undertake pre-investigations at a local, regional, and central level. The National Bureau of Investigation is tasked with identification and pre-investigation of the most complex ML cases stemming from economic crime, corruption and organised crime. Some complex ML cases are also investigated at regional units. The local police units detect and pre-investigate minor ML cases stemming from fraud and online fraud. 557. Initial criminal reports are submitted to the prosecutor (SPO for complex cases and District Prosecutors for others) which is responsible for assessing the case, agreeing and preparing applications to the court for investigative orders. The prosecutor may where it is considered necessary establish and lead a joint investigative team with participants from the police and other competent authorities such as FARS. Upon the motion of the prosecutor, the Investigative judge is tasked with leading judicial investigation. Before initiating a judicial investigation, the judge will need to confirm that there is enough evidence to support the charges. Such decisions are subject to appeal. A number of check and balances available before confirming the charges serve as a gatekeeper for human rights. Nevertheless, the authorities stated that there are instances where such robust procedures are abused by defendants in order to prolong the process. Once the investigation is completed, the case is referred back to prosecutor who will further decide whether to prosecute the case or not. 558. Relevant training and support including upskilling sessions in identifying and conducting ML investigations are provided to the police, SPO and OMLP, with instances of international courses being attended by both prosecutors and the police that seeks to rectify the previously identified lack of expertise in fight against financial crime. Police training includes a centrally managed mandatory national syllabus to which Prosecutor’s actively contribute and includes modules dedicate to ML and asset recovery. Training for Prosecutors and the Judiciary consists of regular topic-based lectures and events, the subjects including ML being addressed regularly. The authorities desire to build their capabilities is further evident in the nascent specialist resource for the identification and tracing of crypto currencies and digital assets that is being developed by the police that includes a central resource that supports local and regional police. This confirms the authorities’ commitment to adapting their investigative tools and expertise to address the evolving challenges posed by digital financial crime. 559. Slovenia seeks to identify and investigate instances of self and third-party ML where predicate offending has been established. Conversely, autonomous ML offences cannot be effectively investigated without the predicate offending being identified and established. 560. ML is primarily identified through parallel financial investigations conducted alongside investigation of predicate offences. Parallel financial investigations are regularly conducted in all acquisitive crimes, with the aim to identify and trace the proceeds of crime and identify ML offence. ML investigations also originate from the OMLP disseminations, overseas requests and CTRs. The authorities prioritise offences that generate high levels of criminal proceeds, such as corruption, economic and organised crime. 561. The 2025 NRA identifies the highest risks of ML as being associated with economic crime, organized crime, classic property crimes (online frauds and attacks on online system) and corruption, with increases in instances of ML arising from on-line fraud offences. External threats associated with cross border crime and foreign perpetrators were deemed to be of medium risk. Notably the risk assessment identifies self-laundering as the principal type of ML. The risks identified reflect the status of Slovenia as a regional transit state for legitimate and illicit goods, such as illicit drugs and immigration, with internal land borders with four EU states Austria, Croatia, Italy and Hungary, as well as international airports and a containerised seaport. 562. Data supplied for predicate offending during the assessment period (2020-2024) indicates a total of 103 179 acquisitive offences being investigated by police, with the principal offending being theft (79 000) and drugs trafficking (5 887) and human trafficking offences (2 061), with recorded significant instances of all types of fraud (15 000), and bribery and corruption (1 231). The authorities note that between 2023 and 2024 there was an increase in the instances of fraud, in particular on-line fraud (610 cases in 2020 increasing to 2 064 in 2024), which has contributed to the increased number of ML investigations being conducted. 563. During the relevant period the police conducted pre-investigations in relation to ML offences in 378 cases against 934 natural persons and 99 legal persons, representing 2.90% of the reported predicate investigations. There is an increase of the number of pre-investigations in 2024 due to the surge of online frauds, as explained by the authorities. Majority of these cases are initiated as an outcome of the parallel financial investigations carried out within the investigation of predicate crime. 564. The authorities argued that a percentage is 6.8% based upon a number of domestic factors not immediately evident in the data provided. These include instances of multiple offences recorded in single cases and low-level offending typically not subject to ML investigations. Both metrics represent low instances of predicate offending being investigated as ML or with associated offending. 565. Several contributory factors impact on the ratio cited above, such as proportionality where sanctions for predicate offending exceed those for ML, where resourcing is not justified given the potential outcomes of a successful investigation, specifically the likelihood of ML investigations being adopted by Prosecutors for Judicial investigation. 566. The authorities are proficient in engaging with counterparts from other States, in particular regional jurisdictions with whom examples of JITs were established and co-ordinated action undertaken. The authorities’ capabilities regarding this aspect of investigations are particularly important given the complexity and nature of the predicate offending from which the ML risk identified in the NRA is derived. Table 7.1: No of pre-investigations conducted by police No. of cases (files) Natural persons Legal persons 2020 40 118 17 2021 53 103 22 2022 72 130 18 2023 85 237 24 2024 128 346 18 Total 378 934 99 567. The number of cases that are subsequently adopted for Judicial investigation reflect further attrition. Compared to the 378 police pre-investigation case, the number of Judicial investigations for the same period is 90, with the number of individuals and legal persons being investigated being 1 033 as opposed to 156. The most significant difference is in the number of cases for legal persons that constitute 99 of the police investigations in contrast to the 13 Judicial investigations, equivalent to 13.13% of the pre-trial cases. Table 7.2: ML Judicial Investigations conducted (State Prosecutor’s Office) No of cases No of persons Natural persons Legal persons Natural persons Legal persons 2020 19 1 35 6 2021 17 0 26 0 2022 17 0 26 0 2023 21 5 47 5 2024 8 2 9 2 Total 82 8 143 13 568. A number of potential reasons for the discrepancy between pre-trial investigations and judicial investigations have been identified including the time taken to reach decisions, prioritisation of predicate offences, the dismissal of complaints or their non referral due to a lack of evidence. A further factor, based on the discussion during the onsite, is the subjective interpretation of the likelihood that ML prosecutions will result in a conviction and that the conviction will make a difference if a predicate has also been successfully prosecuted. 569. The majority of ML investigations originate from fraud. However, the authorities demonstrated instances of ML investigations linked to other acquisitive predicate offences such as drug trafficking and human trafficking. These results are aligned to some extent with the identified risks, particularly that in the recent period number of ML cases increased due to the increase of the number of fraud offences. Nevertheless, the AT raised concern over the limited number of ML investigation stemming from human trafficking, particularly considering the high volume of investigations and MLA request related to this offence. While the AT acknowledges the authorities’ view that lack of cooperation from overseas countries hinders domestic investigation, it notes the lack of proactive approach to address these challenges. In one case study, the authorities engaged with other jurisdictions and utilise a range of investigative techniques to investigate ML and human trafficking. During the searches significant sums of cash were discovered and seized along with corroborating evidence that linked the specific notes to the offending, to different suspects and potential cash smuggling from Taiwan. The cash was subsequent forfeited solely as the proceeds of the human trafficking as the money laundering prosecution was not progressed due to the cross over with the predicate offending and difficulties obtaining evidence from other jurisdictions. 570. There are no statutory prohibitions on the use of the full range of investigative techniques and powers in ML cases, however following a Constitutional court ruling and amendments to Art.156 CPA in 2024, the legal basis for obtaining financial information changed. The amendments introduced stricter requirements for the issuance of judicial orders including a higher evidentiary threshold to suspect that a specific or identifiable person has committed or is committing a criminal offence. The amendments also affected requests for subscriber data, requiring court orders in cases of natural persons, with the authorities having to demonstrate a substantial inference that a criminal offence has or will be committed. In real terms this means that an investigative order is only available in instances where the investigator can already demonstrate high level of suspicion thereby limiting the use of such powers for proactive purposes to identify criminal activity. Given the nature of ML offence, such limitation coupled with high evidentiary threshold for autonomous ML offence hampers the possibility to timely identify ML activities. The authorities have noted that a statistical review conducted by the MoJ following the changes did not indicate increased difficulties, rather a transition to other methods of obtaining financial records. This does not appear to be consistent with the onsite feedback from practitioners, who identified the changes as having a significant impact on their ability to identify and develop predicate and ML investigations. 571. The authorities are proficient in engaging with counterparts from other States, in particular regional jurisdictions with whom examples of JITs were established and co-ordinated action undertaken. The authorities’ capabilities regarding this aspect of investigations are particularly important given the complexity and nature of the predicate offending from which the ML risk identified in the NRA is derived. 572. The authorities do not investigate autonomous ML without establishing a predicate offence as they believe it unlikely that the cases will be successfully prosecuted. This belief is supported by the interpretation of ML offence by the Supreme court ruling which found that ‘the offence of money laundering cannot exist without the so-called predicate offence. The perpetrator of money laundering cannot, by simultaneously carrying out the acts constituting the elements of the predicate offence, also be laundering money’. These finding were present in the 2017 MER. 573. The authorities clarified that several measures have been undertaken in order to rectify this deficiency. It should be commended that the prosecutors did use their legislative powers (extraordinary remedial measures) to challenge the court’s interpretation. Subsequent rulings have sought to clarify these provisions to some extent noting that a final verdict (conviction) in relation to the predicate is not required, nor is the perpetrator’s identity, it is sufficient that the objective facts of its commission are established. However, the authorities explained that the evidentiary threshold, as interpreted by the judiciary, is still high in relation to predicate offence to be proven which prevents them from initiating standalone ML case. 574. The requirement to establish the predicate limits the competent authority’s ability to disrupt ML activity, and to develop intelligence in relation to ML typologies beyond those linked to parochial offending, and to intercede in cross border money laundering. This deficiency is evident in consideration of typologies such as MVTS and cash smuggling, which is contrary to examples of both being identified within the jurisdiction by the police and Security Services. However, there are instances where the police went beyond the established interpretation of the ML offence by the judiciary (Box 7.1). In this case, the police were able to obtain a further detention to investigate a seizure linked to cross jurisdictional cash couriers even though the requirement of “reasonable ground to suspect” was not met as required by the jurisprudence. Case Box 7.1. Operation Seizure of 1.8 million EUR In April 2019 Slovenian authorities stopped a Hungarian registered freight vehicle transporting EUR 1 785 315.00 in cash. The driver and the passenger were unable to explain the origin of the funds, leading to their arrest and seizure of their mobile phones. The seized cash was secured and deposited in a special bank account and an investigation into suspected money laundering was initiated despite the predicate not being identified. The authorities initiated the creation of a JIT with several countries. Three further associated seizures were identified in France and Spain where cash totalling EUR 1 782 000.00 was being transported in vehicles owned or operated by Chinese nationals to Hungary. At the same time, OMLP enquiries further identified cash deposits totalling more than EUR 2 million made by the owner of the vehicle into a business account held in Slovenia that were subsequently transferred to a company in Hong Kong. Findings of the joint investigation identified links between Hungarian cash couriers and cash deposits by Chinese nationals. The analysis concluded that between 2017 and 2020, between EUR 70–100 million was brought into Hungary from Spain, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. This cash was deposited into company accounts and, in most cases, subsequently transferred to accounts in China, as well as to some EU accounts. Following the arrest of one of the subjects in Hungary, the police submitted the criminal complaint to the SPO, resulting in the court issuing orders for an investigation into 4 defendants for the offence of money laundering. The SPO filed an indictment and proceeding before the court is on-going. 575. The example demonstrates that it is feasible to initiate an investigation prior to a defined predicate offence being known despite the issues previously identified. The example further reflects the authorities’ capabilities in regard to engaging with regional colleagues and their successful use of cross jurisdictional investigative resources. 576. The authorities identify the issues associated with undertaking enquiries overseas and receiving evidence form other jurisdictions as a significant factor in this case that led to delays in the ML investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1 Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 593. The asset recovery regime has been prioritised by the competent authorities, with policy issued by the police and Prosecutors at the highest level to ensure a consistent approach to asset tracing and recovery. Supreme State Prosecutor’s issued 2024 Law Enforcement Policy obliging prosecutors to give priority to seizure of assets in order to secure confiscation and engage in the early stage of the pre-trail proceedings by providing to police guidelines including those related to tracing and seizing of assets. Ministry of interior issued policy addressing the issue of tracing and seizing of assets as priority. These documents emphasise that financial investigations are mandatory and should be carried out as early as possible. 594. Guidance has been produced by the police and SPO to support and prioritise asset tracing and recovery during the investigation stage of the proceedings, however similar guidance is not provided to Investigative and Trial Judges. 595. Furthermore, priority given to the confiscation regime has not been sufficiently supported at the higher level which has contributed to persistent and long running deficiencies in the regime. 8.1.2 Periodic review of asset recovery regime 596. No central strategy or review process of the asset recovery regime has been carried out. This is reflected in the inadequate institutional capacity to deal with asset recovery issues. Resourcing at all levels and in all competent authorities is an issue, that was raised during the onsite, in particular amongst prosecutors and the courts. An example of these limitations is the resources dedicated within the SPO to the implementation and use of ZOPNI, which currently has one dedicated resource to support all ZOPNI cases. This has led to a low level of engagement with the legislation in the wider SPO. There is a systemic issue of the legislative barriers to obtain court orders for some investigative measures (see IO 7), no action has been undertaken at the highest political level to analyse and address these practical issues. This is despite an impact assessment conducted by the Police following the Constitutional court’s ruling that identified the likely negative impact on investigations. 597. In addition, while seizure and confiscation results have been analysed within the 2025 NRA to some extent, none of the identified problems were reflected and captured by the 2025 NRA Action Plan, which raises concerns. 8.1.3 Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 598. The competent authorities effectively co-operate in order to prioritise asset recovery, in particular the police, and the SPO, who are responsible for ensuring that the parallel investigation is conducted in a timely and effective manner and appropriate orders obtained to secure assets. Both authorities have developed specialist teams responsible for complex economic crime, along with specialist crypto resources. Cooperation and information exchange between these authorities work very well in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1 Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 593. The asset recovery regime has been prioritised by the competent authorities, with policy issued by the police and Prosecutors at the highest level to ensure a consistent approach to asset tracing and recovery. Supreme State Prosecutor’s issued 2024 Law Enforcement Policy obliging prosecutors to give priority to seizure of assets in order to secure confiscation and engage in the early stage of the pre-trail proceedings by providing to police guidelines including those related to tracing and seizing of assets. Ministry of interior issued policy addressing the issue of tracing and seizing of assets as priority. These documents emphasise that financial investigations are mandatory and should be carried out as early as possible. 594. Guidance has been produced by the police and SPO to support and prioritise asset tracing and recovery during the investigation stage of the proceedings, however similar guidance is not provided to Investigative and Trial Judges. 595. Furthermore, priority given to the confiscation regime has not been sufficiently supported at the higher level which has contributed to persistent and long running deficiencies in the regime. 8.1.2 Periodic review of asset recovery regime 596. No central strategy or review process of the asset recovery regime has been carried out. This is reflected in the inadequate institutional capacity to deal with asset recovery issues. Resourcing at all levels and in all competent authorities is an issue, that was raised during the onsite, in particular amongst prosecutors and the courts. An example of these limitations is the resources dedicated within the SPO to the implementation and use of ZOPNI, which currently has one dedicated resource to support all ZOPNI cases. This has led to a low level of engagement with the legislation in the wider SPO. There is a systemic issue of the legislative barriers to obtain court orders for some investigative measures (see IO 7), no action has been undertaken at the highest political level to analyse and address these practical issues. This is despite an impact assessment conducted by the Police following the Constitutional court’s ruling that identified the likely negative impact on investigations. 597. In addition, while seizure and confiscation results have been analysed within the 2025 NRA to some extent, none of the identified problems were reflected and captured by the 2025 NRA Action Plan, which raises concerns. 8.1.3 Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 598. The competent authorities effectively co-operate in order to prioritise asset recovery, in particular the police, and the SPO, who are responsible for ensuring that the parallel investigation is conducted in a timely and effective manner and appropriate orders obtained to secure assets. Both authorities have developed specialist teams responsible for complex economic crime, along with specialist crypto resources. Cooperation and information exchange between these authorities work very well in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="640. Slovenia has a sound legal and institutional framework for combating TF, with security and law enforcement authorities having a good understanding of the country’s TF threats and TF techniques. 9.1.1 Identification and investigation of TF activity 641. The competent authorities for identification of TF in Slovenia are the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) and police being the primary law enforcement agency responsible for conducting TF pre-investigations. Once the cases are identified, prosecutors shall make a motion to the investigative judge to open a criminal investigation. 642. Slovenia uses variety of sources to identify TF activity including: FIU’s financial intelligence (stemming from STRs submitted by OEs), SOVA’s domestic intelligence, information and requests received from foreign counterparts and parallel financial investigations. Other sources – such as OSINT or information gathered through risk-based supervision of NPOs or tactical/strategic analysis of transactions involving cross-border payments to/from high-risk TF-related jurisdictions – have not been used in identification of TF cases. 643. Slovenian police take part in international and regional initiatives for combating TF, such as Europol Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and EU Counter Terrorist Financing Investigators Network. Such initiatives contribute to its ability to detect and combat TF more effectively. 644. The competent authorities (FIU, SOVA, the police and the SPO) have dedicated staff in place for counterterrorism or TF purposes. Most of them have received some specialised training on TF; however, the authorities are missing additional training on the evolving TF threats and trends, especially in relation to emerging global threats. In addition, the police and SPO noted that understaffing and departures of experienced staff members in the police in general (see more under IO.7) can also negatively impact the investigation of TF. 645. Since 2024 Police and prosecutors face legal impediments to obtain timely financial information and apply covert investigative measures which can have negative impact on the identification of TF offences (see more under IO.7). 646. There are no formal policies or procedures to govern the prioritisation of TF cases. Nevertheless, the competent authorities (FIU, Police and SOVA) demonstrated a good level of operational cooperation and prioritisation of TF cases in practice. For example, TF-related STRs are in practice prioritised by the FIU. 647. Case Box 9.1. demonstrates a case where an OE, the FIU, SOVA and the police cooperated effectively and prioritised a potential TF case. Case Box 9.1. TF identification and prioritisation In February 2024, a Bank in Slovenia identified noticeable signs of radicalisation of its customer, which triggered further due diligence of that customer. Consequently, the bank identified some suspicious outgoing transactions of that customer to various foreign NPOs. The next day after performing the due diligence, the bank informally notified the FIU it would submit a TF-related STR, and the bank proceeded to submit the STR without delay. Upon receipt of the STR, FIU prioritised it and initiated operational analysis, requesting further financial intelligence from OEs, 10 foreign FIUs, as well as promptly informed SOVA and the police. The FIU gathered a comprehensive financial intelligence file, encompassing over 200 suspicious outgoing transactions to foreign NPOs in 8 countries in an amount exceeding EUR 8 000. The FIU, SOVA and the police demonstrated a good level of cooperation. All authorities met onsite were familiar with the facts of the case and confirmed ongoing cooperation. The case is still ongoing. FIU continues to monitor financial transactions of the bank’s customer; SOVA continues monitoring the activities of the person exhibiting radicalisation signs. The police had opened a pre investigation, which was still ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. Source: Onsite interviews with FIU, SOVA and the police. 648. The competent authorities have demonstrated overall good level of understanding of inherent TF threats, theoretical understanding of the scope of TF offence and different roles that can be played by terrorist financers. Nevertheless, the absence of caselaw and therefore hands-on experience with judicial investigation and prosecution of TF may raise concerns if there is comprehensive practical understanding of elements of TF offences. For example, one key authority was not sure if sending weapons to a known terrorist organisation would constitute a TF offence. This raises concern regarding the level of understanding of the scope of TF offences among relevant authorities. 649. Since 2020, the Police has initiated 16 pre-investigations on TF (see breakdown by year in Table 9.1.), all based on FIU’s disseminations. 6 disseminations were based on information supplied by foreign FIUs. 3 disseminations were based on the information contained in the STRs submitted to the FIU by OEs. 7 of those disseminations had originated from domestic intelligence submitted to the FIU by either SOVA or police for the FIU to execute financial inquiries. After carrying out financial inquiries acting on the information supplied by SOVA or the police, the FIU compiled financial intelligence and disseminated it to the police for pre- investigations on TF. Table 9.1. Number of TF pre-investigations per year Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL FIU dissemination 7 1 2 2 4 16 Source: Police 650. The police, as the responsible investigative authority, undertakes pre-investigation of TF. Initial criminal reports are submitted to the prosecutor (SPO), which is responsible for assessing the case, agreeing and preparing applications to the court for investigative orders. 13 of the TF pre investigations were closed by the police because there were no reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a TF offence. Most of these pre-trial investigations involved suspicious transactions executed by Slovenia-registered legal persons with BOs from high-risk jurisdictions. Police employed appropriate measures in order to determine potential TF suspicion and found no grounds for suspicion of TF. 651. In 3 TF pre- investigations, the Police submitted reports to the SPO. All 3 cases were dismissed due to the lack of proof regarding relevant elements of the crime. However, the AT was not assured about the reasonableness of dismissing of one of those cases. Case Box 9.2. Dismissing TF investigation by the police and the SPO Based on information received from a foreign FIU, Slovenian FIU disseminated a case to the police in relation to suspicious transactions carried out from 5 June 2020 to 23 November 2022 in the amount of EUR 61 976.19, involving multiple persons and jurisdictions. The information noted that, among other transactions, a Slovenian citizen (Person A) and a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Person B) had carried out several suspicious monetary transactions via fictitious accounts in one foreign FI and one Slovenia-registered FI to a citizen of a foreign country (Person C), who was allegedly a member of a designated terrorist organisation The alleged purpose of these transactions was to recruit individuals from the Balkan region into terrorist groups. Persons A and B received suspicious funds via foreign FI into their accounts with the Slovenia-registered FI, which they subsequently partially withdrew in cash, partially converted into crypto assets, and partially transferred to accounts of suspicious user profiles in the foreign FI. The total amounts transferred by Persons A and B were in an amount less than EUR 1 000. SPO was notified of the case. SPO instructed that data be obtained from foreign security authorities to confirm whether Person C was indeed a member of a terrorist group or engaged in terrorist activities. Through the International Police Cooperation Sector, a request was sent to the authorities of a foreign country for operational information regarding all involved persons, including all operational data confirming the Person C’s membership in terrorist organisation and any record of criminal activity No responses had yet been received. Police and SPO had not conducted interviews with Persons A and B to prevent compromising the investigative operations of foreign security authorities. SPO dismissed the case on 5 September 2023, for, among other, citing the following reasons: (1) Person C’s terrorist activities had not been verified; (2) Most transactions by Persons A and B were sent to accounts of unknown users, and only a few accounts were allegedly linked to Person C, meaning it was not established that Person C actually received the funds; (3) There is no evidence that Persons A and B knew the funds would be used for terrorist acts or directed to terrorist organisations; (4) the amounts involved were minor, intended as family aid or cryptocurrency purchases, thus lacking the essential mens rea element for TF. Source: Onsite interviews and post onsite information provided by the police and SPO. 652. Looking solely at this pre-investigation (Case Box 9.2.), the dismissal of the TF investigation did not seem fully substantiated to the AT, as there were more avenues to pursue in order to comprehensively address the potential TF. The AT has concerns about the reasonableness of not conducting the interviews with the persons involved and citing low monetary value of potential TF transactions as a justification for dismissing the case. Overall, the importance of thorough investigation of any TF suspicion did not appear to be fully reflected in the SPO’ approach. 9.1.2 Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 653. The competent authorities are systematically conducting parallel financial investigations into potential TF. 7 of the 16 TF pre-investigations had originated from domestic intelligence submitted to the FIU to execute financial inquiries. Even though no formalised procedures exist in that regard, terrorism-related cases are always also referred to the FIU for parallel financial investigations, which can contribute to identifying the roles of terrorist financiers." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="640. Slovenia has a sound legal and institutional framework for combating TF, with security and law enforcement authorities having a good understanding of the country’s TF threats and TF techniques. 9.1.1 Identification and investigation of TF activity 641. The competent authorities for identification of TF in Slovenia are the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) and police being the primary law enforcement agency responsible for conducting TF pre-investigations. Once the cases are identified, prosecutors shall make a motion to the investigative judge to open a criminal investigation. 642. Slovenia uses variety of sources to identify TF activity including: FIU’s financial intelligence (stemming from STRs submitted by OEs), SOVA’s domestic intelligence, information and requests received from foreign counterparts and parallel financial investigations. Other sources – such as OSINT or information gathered through risk-based supervision of NPOs or tactical/strategic analysis of transactions involving cross-border payments to/from high-risk TF-related jurisdictions – have not been used in identification of TF cases. 643. Slovenian police take part in international and regional initiatives for combating TF, such as Europol Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and EU Counter Terrorist Financing Investigators Network. Such initiatives contribute to its ability to detect and combat TF more effectively. 644. The competent authorities (FIU, SOVA, the police and the SPO) have dedicated staff in place for counterterrorism or TF purposes. Most of them have received some specialised training on TF; however, the authorities are missing additional training on the evolving TF threats and trends, especially in relation to emerging global threats. In addition, the police and SPO noted that understaffing and departures of experienced staff members in the police in general (see more under IO.7) can also negatively impact the investigation of TF. 645. Since 2024 Police and prosecutors face legal impediments to obtain timely financial information and apply covert investigative measures which can have negative impact on the identification of TF offences (see more under IO.7). 646. There are no formal policies or procedures to govern the prioritisation of TF cases. Nevertheless, the competent authorities (FIU, Police and SOVA) demonstrated a good level of operational cooperation and prioritisation of TF cases in practice. For example, TF-related STRs are in practice prioritised by the FIU. 647. Case Box 9.1. demonstrates a case where an OE, the FIU, SOVA and the police cooperated effectively and prioritised a potential TF case. Case Box 9.1. TF identification and prioritisation In February 2024, a Bank in Slovenia identified noticeable signs of radicalisation of its customer, which triggered further due diligence of that customer. Consequently, the bank identified some suspicious outgoing transactions of that customer to various foreign NPOs. The next day after performing the due diligence, the bank informally notified the FIU it would submit a TF-related STR, and the bank proceeded to submit the STR without delay. Upon receipt of the STR, FIU prioritised it and initiated operational analysis, requesting further financial intelligence from OEs, 10 foreign FIUs, as well as promptly informed SOVA and the police. The FIU gathered a comprehensive financial intelligence file, encompassing over 200 suspicious outgoing transactions to foreign NPOs in 8 countries in an amount exceeding EUR 8 000. The FIU, SOVA and the police demonstrated a good level of cooperation. All authorities met onsite were familiar with the facts of the case and confirmed ongoing cooperation. The case is still ongoing. FIU continues to monitor financial transactions of the bank’s customer; SOVA continues monitoring the activities of the person exhibiting radicalisation signs. The police had opened a pre investigation, which was still ongoing at the time of the onsite visit. Source: Onsite interviews with FIU, SOVA and the police. 648. The competent authorities have demonstrated overall good level of understanding of inherent TF threats, theoretical understanding of the scope of TF offence and different roles that can be played by terrorist financers. Nevertheless, the absence of caselaw and therefore hands-on experience with judicial investigation and prosecution of TF may raise concerns if there is comprehensive practical understanding of elements of TF offences. For example, one key authority was not sure if sending weapons to a known terrorist organisation would constitute a TF offence. This raises concern regarding the level of understanding of the scope of TF offences among relevant authorities. 649. Since 2020, the Police has initiated 16 pre-investigations on TF (see breakdown by year in Table 9.1.), all based on FIU’s disseminations. 6 disseminations were based on information supplied by foreign FIUs. 3 disseminations were based on the information contained in the STRs submitted to the FIU by OEs. 7 of those disseminations had originated from domestic intelligence submitted to the FIU by either SOVA or police for the FIU to execute financial inquiries. After carrying out financial inquiries acting on the information supplied by SOVA or the police, the FIU compiled financial intelligence and disseminated it to the police for pre- investigations on TF. Table 9.1. Number of TF pre-investigations per year Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL FIU dissemination 7 1 2 2 4 16 Source: Police 650. The police, as the responsible investigative authority, undertakes pre-investigation of TF. Initial criminal reports are submitted to the prosecutor (SPO), which is responsible for assessing the case, agreeing and preparing applications to the court for investigative orders. 13 of the TF pre investigations were closed by the police because there were no reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a TF offence. Most of these pre-trial investigations involved suspicious transactions executed by Slovenia-registered legal persons with BOs from high-risk jurisdictions. Police employed appropriate measures in order to determine potential TF suspicion and found no grounds for suspicion of TF. 651. In 3 TF pre- investigations, the Police submitted reports to the SPO. All 3 cases were dismissed due to the lack of proof regarding relevant elements of the crime. However, the AT was not assured about the reasonableness of dismissing of one of those cases. Case Box 9.2. Dismissing TF investigation by the police and the SPO Based on information received from a foreign FIU, Slovenian FIU disseminated a case to the police in relation to suspicious transactions carried out from 5 June 2020 to 23 November 2022 in the amount of EUR 61 976.19, involving multiple persons and jurisdictions. The information noted that, among other transactions, a Slovenian citizen (Person A) and a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Person B) had carried out several suspicious monetary transactions via fictitious accounts in one foreign FI and one Slovenia-registered FI to a citizen of a foreign country (Person C), who was allegedly a member of a designated terrorist organisation The alleged purpose of these transactions was to recruit individuals from the Balkan region into terrorist groups. Persons A and B received suspicious funds via foreign FI into their accounts with the Slovenia-registered FI, which they subsequently partially withdrew in cash, partially converted into crypto assets, and partially transferred to accounts of suspicious user profiles in the foreign FI. The total amounts transferred by Persons A and B were in an amount less than EUR 1 000. SPO was notified of the case. SPO instructed that data be obtained from foreign security authorities to confirm whether Person C was indeed a member of a terrorist group or engaged in terrorist activities. Through the International Police Cooperation Sector, a request was sent to the authorities of a foreign country for operational information regarding all involved persons, including all operational data confirming the Person C’s membership in terrorist organisation and any record of criminal activity No responses had yet been received. Police and SPO had not conducted interviews with Persons A and B to prevent compromising the investigative operations of foreign security authorities. SPO dismissed the case on 5 September 2023, for, among other, citing the following reasons: (1) Person C’s terrorist activities had not been verified; (2) Most transactions by Persons A and B were sent to accounts of unknown users, and only a few accounts were allegedly linked to Person C, meaning it was not established that Person C actually received the funds; (3) There is no evidence that Persons A and B knew the funds would be used for terrorist acts or directed to terrorist organisations; (4) the amounts involved were minor, intended as family aid or cryptocurrency purchases, thus lacking the essential mens rea element for TF. Source: Onsite interviews and post onsite information provided by the police and SPO. 652. Looking solely at this pre-investigation (Case Box 9.2.), the dismissal of the TF investigation did not seem fully substantiated to the AT, as there were more avenues to pursue in order to comprehensively address the potential TF. The AT has concerns about the reasonableness of not conducting the interviews with the persons involved and citing low monetary value of potential TF transactions as a justification for dismissing the case. Overall, the importance of thorough investigation of any TF suspicion did not appear to be fully reflected in the SPO’ approach. 9.1.2 Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 653. The competent authorities are systematically conducting parallel financial investigations into potential TF. 7 of the 16 TF pre-investigations had originated from domestic intelligence submitted to the FIU to execute financial inquiries. Even though no formalised procedures exist in that regard, terrorism-related cases are always also referred to the FIU for parallel financial investigations, which can contribute to identifying the roles of terrorist financiers." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="665. Since 2022, Slovenia’s legal framework enables the immediate implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) for TF, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267/1989 and 1988. This compensates for delays in transposing UN designations at EU level. Slovenia also implements TF-related TFS through the directly applicable EU regulations and its Act on Restrictive Measures (RMA). 666. Slovenia has not proposed any designations pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988. It has not received any requests from other countries. Slovenia has also not individually initiated designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at the domestic level and at the EU level, which is consistent with Slovenia’s TF risk level, which is low. 667. The SCG – chaired by the MFEA – has adopted a procedure and mechanism for identifying targets for designation. Under this procedure, SCG’s Sanctions Lists Sub-Group considers duly reasoned proposals from members of the SCG or from foreign counterparts. The authorities demonstrated that the relevant procedures would be implemented in practice when needed. 668. In Slovenia, the MFEA is responsible for policymaking in the field of TFS and acts as the country-level co-ordinating body for implementation of TFS. There are two employees dedicated to implementation of TFS (not only UNSCRs, but also all autonomous EU sanctions regimes, the scope of which has significantly amplified during the reporting period), in addition to other responsibilities not related to the implementation of TFS. The MFEA, as well as other competent authorities and OEs noted understaffing and lack of resources in the MFEA as an impediment to effective functioning of the framework for implementation of TFS. 669. Slovenia has not introduced a mechanism for actively communicating designations to OEs and the general public in a timely manner. The only forms of communication of designations to OEs and the general public by the competent authorities is the availability of a link to the website of the UNSC, that is provided on the website of MFEA and in the TFS Implementation Guidelines. No other actions are taken by the competent authorities to make sure that OEs are aware of designations and to implement sanctions without delay. The absence of proactive communication was partly attributed to understaffing of the MFEA. 670. The competent authorities agreed that under such circumstances, failure to implement TF-related TFS without delay is possible, but improbable, since the FIs and VASPs employ commercial screening tools for compliance with TFS, which contain up to date information on designated persons and entities, and monitor transactions automatically, including over the non-working hours and weekends. Most of DNFBPs advised to check the customers against the TFS sanctions lists online. Also, DNFBPs generally do not work outside working hours. Nevertheless, even though the most material sectors are less exposed, the lack of proactive communication mechanism of designations to OEs in a timely manner is a major shortcoming. Even if FIs would be able to implement TF-related TFS without delay (e.g. ensure freezing of funds), there is a risk that other types of assets would not be identified efficiently and frozen without delay. MFEA – as the coordinating authority – could coordinate the identification of other assets of designated persons (and those acting on their behalf); however, the understaffing in the MFEA would also hamper its ability to do that effectively. 671. Slovenian authorities – Permanent Coordination Group on Restrictive Measures (also known as Sanctions Coordination Group or SCG) have developed “Guidelines for the effective implementation of restrictive measures” (TFS Implementation Guidelines) to provide guidance for the operational implementation of restrictive measures (i.e. sanctions, including TFS) in accordance with UN, EU and Slovenian regulations. TFS Implementation Guidelines were updated in February 2025. However, the TFS Implementation Guidelines have not been properly communicated to the OEs, except for FIs supervised by the BoS. This is due to a weak coordination among the competent authorities and also understaffing of the MFEA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="665. Since 2022, Slovenia’s legal framework enables the immediate implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS) for TF, pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267/1989 and 1988. This compensates for delays in transposing UN designations at EU level. Slovenia also implements TF-related TFS through the directly applicable EU regulations and its Act on Restrictive Measures (RMA). 666. Slovenia has not proposed any designations pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988. It has not received any requests from other countries. Slovenia has also not individually initiated designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373 at the domestic level and at the EU level, which is consistent with Slovenia’s TF risk level, which is low. 667. The SCG – chaired by the MFEA – has adopted a procedure and mechanism for identifying targets for designation. Under this procedure, SCG’s Sanctions Lists Sub-Group considers duly reasoned proposals from members of the SCG or from foreign counterparts. The authorities demonstrated that the relevant procedures would be implemented in practice when needed. 668. In Slovenia, the MFEA is responsible for policymaking in the field of TFS and acts as the country-level co-ordinating body for implementation of TFS. There are two employees dedicated to implementation of TFS (not only UNSCRs, but also all autonomous EU sanctions regimes, the scope of which has significantly amplified during the reporting period), in addition to other responsibilities not related to the implementation of TFS. The MFEA, as well as other competent authorities and OEs noted understaffing and lack of resources in the MFEA as an impediment to effective functioning of the framework for implementation of TFS. 669. Slovenia has not introduced a mechanism for actively communicating designations to OEs and the general public in a timely manner. The only forms of communication of designations to OEs and the general public by the competent authorities is the availability of a link to the website of the UNSC, that is provided on the website of MFEA and in the TFS Implementation Guidelines. No other actions are taken by the competent authorities to make sure that OEs are aware of designations and to implement sanctions without delay. The absence of proactive communication was partly attributed to understaffing of the MFEA. 670. The competent authorities agreed that under such circumstances, failure to implement TF-related TFS without delay is possible, but improbable, since the FIs and VASPs employ commercial screening tools for compliance with TFS, which contain up to date information on designated persons and entities, and monitor transactions automatically, including over the non-working hours and weekends. Most of DNFBPs advised to check the customers against the TFS sanctions lists online. Also, DNFBPs generally do not work outside working hours. Nevertheless, even though the most material sectors are less exposed, the lack of proactive communication mechanism of designations to OEs in a timely manner is a major shortcoming. Even if FIs would be able to implement TF-related TFS without delay (e.g. ensure freezing of funds), there is a risk that other types of assets would not be identified efficiently and frozen without delay. MFEA – as the coordinating authority – could coordinate the identification of other assets of designated persons (and those acting on their behalf); however, the understaffing in the MFEA would also hamper its ability to do that effectively. 671. Slovenian authorities – Permanent Coordination Group on Restrictive Measures (also known as Sanctions Coordination Group or SCG) have developed “Guidelines for the effective implementation of restrictive measures” (TFS Implementation Guidelines) to provide guidance for the operational implementation of restrictive measures (i.e. sanctions, including TFS) in accordance with UN, EU and Slovenian regulations. TFS Implementation Guidelines were updated in February 2025. However, the TFS Implementation Guidelines have not been properly communicated to the OEs, except for FIs supervised by the BoS. This is due to a weak coordination among the competent authorities and also understaffing of the MFEA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1 Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 703. Slovenia has established a Sanctions Coordination Group (SCG) to ensure uniform implementation of sanctions, chaired by a representative of the MFEA and encompassing a broad range of competent authorities – including Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, BoS, SOVA, FIU and others. Members are required to be at the level of State Secretaries or similar high-level officials to ensure high-level decisions to be taken. 704. For technical issues relating to implementation of TFS, the SCG established a sub-group on financial sanctions, on sanctions lists (see more in Chapter 4.3.1.), and on criminal law issues relating to sanctions. Members of the Subgroup on financial restrictive measures have not encountered any cases of proliferation or PF, therefore, the Sub-group on financial sanctions has not held any discussions on implementation of PF TFS. This is overall in line with the context of Slovenia considering absence of known trade and financial ties with North Korea. 705. The MFEA had issued the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in December 2024, which reinforces the commitment of the country to continue advocating for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Slovenia has not developed and implemented any CPF - specific policies. 11.1.2 Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 706. While the primary co-ordination framework established in Slovenia for PF matters is the SCG, the Ministry of Economy, Tourism and Sport (METS) is ensuring the co-operation and co-ordination of issues related to counter-proliferation matters being the ministry in charge of licensing of export of controlled and dual-use goods. It has its own standing group to support its decision-making process, in which the MFEA, Police and some other authorities are also represented. Where appropriate, through the shared members of the two standing groups, the METS may seek input from SCG members with expertise relevant to the specific sector concerned by the proposed export. These procedures demonstrate to some extent, the coordinated approach adopted by the Slovenian authorities in addressing CPF matters. 707. In addition, SOVA, Police and OMLP have demonstrated to have well-developed operational cooperation practices. These authorities exchange operational and intelligence information (including through licensing of cross-border movement of goods). While within the evaluated period Slovenia did not report to have cases engaging North Korea, the presented case example and co-ordinated operational measures taken would suggest that Slovenia has adequate operational mechanisms in place to respond to the threat of unauthorised movement of dual-use goods." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1 Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 703. Slovenia has established a Sanctions Coordination Group (SCG) to ensure uniform implementation of sanctions, chaired by a representative of the MFEA and encompassing a broad range of competent authorities – including Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, BoS, SOVA, FIU and others. Members are required to be at the level of State Secretaries or similar high-level officials to ensure high-level decisions to be taken. 704. For technical issues relating to implementation of TFS, the SCG established a sub-group on financial sanctions, on sanctions lists (see more in Chapter 4.3.1.), and on criminal law issues relating to sanctions. Members of the Subgroup on financial restrictive measures have not encountered any cases of proliferation or PF, therefore, the Sub-group on financial sanctions has not held any discussions on implementation of PF TFS. This is overall in line with the context of Slovenia considering absence of known trade and financial ties with North Korea. 705. The MFEA had issued the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in December 2024, which reinforces the commitment of the country to continue advocating for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Slovenia has not developed and implemented any CPF - specific policies. 11.1.2 Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 706. While the primary co-ordination framework established in Slovenia for PF matters is the SCG, the Ministry of Economy, Tourism and Sport (METS) is ensuring the co-operation and co-ordination of issues related to counter-proliferation matters being the ministry in charge of licensing of export of controlled and dual-use goods. It has its own standing group to support its decision-making process, in which the MFEA, Police and some other authorities are also represented. Where appropriate, through the shared members of the two standing groups, the METS may seek input from SCG members with expertise relevant to the specific sector concerned by the proposed export. These procedures demonstrate to some extent, the coordinated approach adopted by the Slovenian authorities in addressing CPF matters. 707. In addition, SOVA, Police and OMLP have demonstrated to have well-developed operational cooperation practices. These authorities exchange operational and intelligence information (including through licensing of cross-border movement of goods). While within the evaluated period Slovenia did not report to have cases engaging North Korea, the presented case example and co-ordinated operational measures taken would suggest that Slovenia has adequate operational mechanisms in place to respond to the threat of unauthorised movement of dual-use goods." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="112. As central authority for AML/CFT under the APMLTF-2, the OMLP is responsible for coordinating national policy. Slovenia has not adopted any formal national strategy. While both the 2021 and 2025 NRAs are accompanied by action plans intended to address higher or key risk areas, these do not amount to a comprehensive national strategy setting clear overarching priorities and objectives. The AT acknowledges that the action plans contribute to guiding national actions to some extent, however, they are largely task-focused and subject to limitations, as outlined below. As the 2025 NRA with its action plan was adopted shortly before the onsite visit, its impact on Slovenia’s overall response to ML/TF risks has yet to be observed. 113. The 2025 action plan represents a structured attempt to address the ML/TF risks identified in the NRA, setting out a range of measures across institutional, sectoral, and operational levels. It assigns responsibilities and timelines to competent authorities and reflects an intention to tackle key systemic issues, including weaknesses in data collection, the absence of systematic recording of predicate offences in ML, and limitations in asset recovery frameworks. Measures such as the planned introduction of a document management system by the State Prosecutor’s Office indicate recognition of important structural gaps. 114. Concerning the financial sectors, the plan targets weak CDD practices, insufficient information-sharing between the BoS and OMLP, and instances of unjustified “de-risking”. Planned responses, such as legislative amendments, updated guidance for life insurance products, and strengthened oversight of virtual asset and e-money providers, are broadly aligned with the risks identified. Similarly, the plan acknowledges persistent shortcomings in the DNFBP sectors, such as ongoing regulatory and awareness gaps, and proposes measures for addressing these. 115. While the 2025 action plan demonstrates a broad alignment with key ML/TF risks and reflects a degree of strategic commitment, it presents an uneven longer term framework. Some of the actions are formulated at a high level, with significant long completion timeframes, and a reliance on legislative amendments and inter-agency coordination which have historically faced delays. Notably, key risks identified over successive NRAs are addressed through measures with relatively long timeframes, indicating that the urgency of these risks may not be fully understood by Slovenian Authorities. For example, the regulation of accountants and tax advisors is foreseen only by 2028, despite longstanding vulnerabilities identified in these sectors since the 2021 NRA. The continued postponement of regulatory reforms for sectors already assessed as vulnerable indicates a degree of disconnect between the risks identified and the prioritisation and urgency reflected in the action plan. Taken together, the AT considers that while the action plan represents progress and demonstrates commitment, its level of specificity, sequencing, and timeliness may limit its capacity to effectively and promptly mitigate Slovenia’s most significant ML/TF risks. 116. Slovenia has no existing framework to monitor progress of the 2025 action plan. The OMLP advised that it is considering extending the mandate of the IWG to include oversight of the action plan implementation, however this has yet to be put into effect. Similarly, no monitoring mechanism was applied for the 2021 action plan, limiting the Slovenia’s ability to address risks in a timely and coordinated manner. 117. The AT has identified deficiencies in high-level policy coordination in Slovenia’s response to ML/TF risks, arising from the lack of a comprehensive national strategy. This reflects limited systemic support at Government level for the effective implementation of mitigating measures at national level. While the working groups are comprised of experienced and committed professionals, these are not vested with relevant and sufficient authority to ensure the coordinated cross-government actions or drive the implementation of national priorities. Furthermore, authorities have not been allocated adequate level of resources to effectively address the action points. Accordingly, the AT deems that commitment at the policymaking level to address AML/CFT issues in Slovenia requires significant strengthening. 118. There are no TF-specific strategies or coordinated national objectives. Besides the analysis under 1.2.1, it should be noted that the 2021 and 2025 action plans refer to ML and TF however do not include any specific TF-related measures, as the authorities consider the TF risk to be low and well mitigated. 119. The prosecution strategy and counterterrorism strategy (the latter was not provided to the AT, but authorities advised that the strategy contains a very brief reference to CFT and its action plan foresees some CFT actions) contain general references to CFT. Certain AML/CFT elements are included in the National Program of preventing and fighting against Crime 2019–2024 and 2024-2028." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="112. As central authority for AML/CFT under the APMLTF-2, the OMLP is responsible for coordinating national policy. Slovenia has not adopted any formal national strategy. While both the 2021 and 2025 NRAs are accompanied by action plans intended to address higher or key risk areas, these do not amount to a comprehensive national strategy setting clear overarching priorities and objectives. The AT acknowledges that the action plans contribute to guiding national actions to some extent, however, they are largely task-focused and subject to limitations, as outlined below. As the 2025 NRA with its action plan was adopted shortly before the onsite visit, its impact on Slovenia’s overall response to ML/TF risks has yet to be observed. 113. The 2025 action plan represents a structured attempt to address the ML/TF risks identified in the NRA, setting out a range of measures across institutional, sectoral, and operational levels. It assigns responsibilities and timelines to competent authorities and reflects an intention to tackle key systemic issues, including weaknesses in data collection, the absence of systematic recording of predicate offences in ML, and limitations in asset recovery frameworks. Measures such as the planned introduction of a document management system by the State Prosecutor’s Office indicate recognition of important structural gaps. 114. Concerning the financial sectors, the plan targets weak CDD practices, insufficient information-sharing between the BoS and OMLP, and instances of unjustified “de-risking”. Planned responses, such as legislative amendments, updated guidance for life insurance products, and strengthened oversight of virtual asset and e-money providers, are broadly aligned with the risks identified. Similarly, the plan acknowledges persistent shortcomings in the DNFBP sectors, such as ongoing regulatory and awareness gaps, and proposes measures for addressing these. 115. While the 2025 action plan demonstrates a broad alignment with key ML/TF risks and reflects a degree of strategic commitment, it presents an uneven longer term framework. Some of the actions are formulated at a high level, with significant long completion timeframes, and a reliance on legislative amendments and inter-agency coordination which have historically faced delays. Notably, key risks identified over successive NRAs are addressed through measures with relatively long timeframes, indicating that the urgency of these risks may not be fully understood by Slovenian Authorities. For example, the regulation of accountants and tax advisors is foreseen only by 2028, despite longstanding vulnerabilities identified in these sectors since the 2021 NRA. The continued postponement of regulatory reforms for sectors already assessed as vulnerable indicates a degree of disconnect between the risks identified and the prioritisation and urgency reflected in the action plan. Taken together, the AT considers that while the action plan represents progress and demonstrates commitment, its level of specificity, sequencing, and timeliness may limit its capacity to effectively and promptly mitigate Slovenia’s most significant ML/TF risks. 116. Slovenia has no existing framework to monitor progress of the 2025 action plan. The OMLP advised that it is considering extending the mandate of the IWG to include oversight of the action plan implementation, however this has yet to be put into effect. Similarly, no monitoring mechanism was applied for the 2021 action plan, limiting the Slovenia’s ability to address risks in a timely and coordinated manner. 117. The AT has identified deficiencies in high-level policy coordination in Slovenia’s response to ML/TF risks, arising from the lack of a comprehensive national strategy. This reflects limited systemic support at Government level for the effective implementation of mitigating measures at national level. While the working groups are comprised of experienced and committed professionals, these are not vested with relevant and sufficient authority to ensure the coordinated cross-government actions or drive the implementation of national priorities. Furthermore, authorities have not been allocated adequate level of resources to effectively address the action points. Accordingly, the AT deems that commitment at the policymaking level to address AML/CFT issues in Slovenia requires significant strengthening. 118. There are no TF-specific strategies or coordinated national objectives. Besides the analysis under 1.2.1, it should be noted that the 2021 and 2025 action plans refer to ML and TF however do not include any specific TF-related measures, as the authorities consider the TF risk to be low and well mitigated. 119. The prosecution strategy and counterterrorism strategy (the latter was not provided to the AT, but authorities advised that the strategy contains a very brief reference to CFT and its action plan foresees some CFT actions) contain general references to CFT. Certain AML/CFT elements are included in the National Program of preventing and fighting against Crime 2019–2024 and 2024-2028." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 184. Slovenian judicial authorities proactively seek assistance from foreign countries, including from EU and non-EU member states. The AT formed a conclusion on the effectiveness of this type of international cooperation based on the available data, interviews held onsite, international feedback, and a number of cases presented by different competent authorities. Feedback received from the global network reveals that Slovenia’s MLA requests meet the quality and the parameters required by international legal instruments. Also, it can be concluded that Slovenia seeks MLA from countries all over the world (e.g. Hong Kong), as well as from Western Balkans and Switzerland, but most often from EU countries, specifically from Germany, Italy, Malta, Poland or Latvia, in which instances they use EIOs. This is broadly in line with country’s risk profile. 185. As explained under the previous core issue, only MoJ is able to provide statistics on the number of MLA requests sent for ML, TF and predicate offences. It can be concluded that the authorities actively and strategically seek international assistance from non-EU member states in both ML and predicate offences cases. During the assessed period, 61 outgoing MLA requests representing 3.8% of all outgoing requests were specifically related to ML offences. 186. When pursuing predicate offences, for instance, 34% of outgoing MLA requests relate to fraud, 34.5% to migrant smuggling, approximately 8% to drug trafficking, and 6.7% to sexual exploitation—reflecting the primary areas of ML risk identified for Slovenia. Table 2.5. Outgoing MLA requests Outgoing MLA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 11 16 11 15 8 61 TF - - - - - 0 Drug trafficking 22 15 24 37 28 126 Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering 1 1 3 1 3 9 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 68 74 95 125 187 549 Sexual exploitation, including of children 19 19 20 29 21 108 Illicit arms trafficking 5 2 3 4 5 19 Corruption and bribery 1 5 2 3 1 12 Fraud 103 122 141 95 81 542 Counterfeiting currency 1 1 3 5 10 Murder, grievous bodily injury 2 6 3 3 5 19 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking - 7 2 2 11 Robbery or theft 13 11 12 6 16 58 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 3 1 1 3 9 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 2 - - - - 2 Extortion 6 4 7 12 6 35 Forgery 5 4 2 2 13 TOTAL 262 284 333 341 371 1591 187. The figures per crimes for EIOs are not available and the AT used interviews and case examples to establish the extent to which the assistance is sought proactively and in line with country’s risk profile. Given that cooperation with EU is conducted in a decentralised manner, the Slovenian courts and prosecutors have separately provided statistics on the number of EIOs issued during 2020-2025. For example, courts issue on average 585 per year while prosecutors – on average 220 per year. A notable increase was observed in 2024 and 2025, with EIOs issued in 636 and 714 cases, respectively. This rise is attributed to the increase in fraud-related cases which also corelated with the risk trend in the country. Thus, in practice, the increase of the evidentiary threshold has not impacted on the level of assistance sought. 188. There are a number of case examples presented by the authorities, demonstrating that they proactively seek international cooperation from other EU Member States. Some statistics are available for the EIOs sent through the EUROJUST. Based on that, the most frequent offences, for which EIOs were sent, were: fraud (including business fraud), tax crimes, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, ML - which is largely in line with the risks identified under the NRA. 189. There were no outgoing MLA requests or EIOs related to TF between 2020-2024, which is also in line with the low TF risk in the country. Case Box 2.5: Gathering evidence abroad through EIO Case example 1 In 2022, a Slovenian court obtained banking information through an MLA request. The information was used to file an indictment with a request for the issuance of a penal order against a foreign national for aiding and abetting the commission of fraud. The judgement has become final. Case example 2 In 2021, in a case handled by SPO, related to drug trafficking, an EIO was submitted to the competent foreign authorities by email. Slovenian authorities sought obtaining SKY ECC evidence, which was already possessed by the authorities of the requested state. A response was received in the same day. 190. The most common requested measures related to information on previous criminal offences, convictions, banking data, telecommunications traffic data, data from official registers witness and suspect hearing, etc. 191. Slovenian authorities actively participate in JITs which are formed based on their initiative or are created by other countries. The authorities have presented a number of cases where JITs were established in order to dismantle complex ML, tax evasion or organised crime cases (See case box 7.1). Similarly in one case the SPO investigated, within the framework of a JIT, a large financial crime network in the region involving 64 suspects and multiple offences. 192. Overall, the statistical data and contextual information confirm that Slovenia is proactive and methodical in seeking assistance from foreign counterparts for both ML and predicate offence cases. By utilizing the full range of available legal instruments, Slovenian authorities effectively support the investigation and prosecution of cross-border financial crime in accordance with international standards. 2.2.2 Extradition 193. Slovenian authorities regularly ask for assistance from foreign countries to seeking criminals. Most of the extradition requests are directed to EU Member States using EAWs. 194. During 2020-2024, authorities mainly sought from non-EU jurisdictions extradition of offenders implicated in fraud, theft, human trafficking, drug trafficking, sexual exploitation, murder, counterfeiting currency and tax-crimes (See table 2.6). Some of these requests were addressed to Balkan countries, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk and context. Around 17.5% of all requests were refused on grounds of lack of dual criminality, the statute of limitations, or because the person sought was a national of the requested state. Table 2.6. Outgoing extradition requests Outgoing extradition  requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML 1 0 0 0 1 TF 0 0 0 Drug trafficking 1 1 1 1 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 0 0 2 0 3 Sexual exploitation, including of children 1 0 2 0 1 Fraud 4 3 3 1 1 Counterfeiting currency 1 0 0 0 Murder, grievous bodily injury 0 0 0 1 1 Robbery or theft 1 2 0 3 0 Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 0 195. During the 2020-2024, Slovenia issued 413 EAWs to EU-states. More than half of them were issued for the purpose of prosecution. The most common categories of predicate offences underlying the issuance of EAWs were fraud and corruption, theft, drug-related offences, sexual offences, counterfeiting of the euro, and other offences. No EAWs were issued in relation to terrorism or terrorist financing, which is consistent with the country’s risk profile. However, there is a lack of comprehensive statistics for EAW (see table 2.7). Table 2.7. Outgoing EAW Outgoing European Arrest Warrants 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 EAW Sent 90 93 85 70 97 EAW issued for the purpose of prosecution 56 62 49 40 N/A Effectively surrendered persons 21 24 42 N/A N/A Refused N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Case Box 2.6: Successful extradition to Slovenia A Slovenian fugitive was hiding in overseas Country X. The Slovenian MoJ sent the extradition request and documentation to the central authority of Country X for the purposes of execution of sentences and conducting criminal proceedings for the offences of robbery, fraud, and concealment. The requested authorities granted the extradition of the person in 2021. The surrender of the fugitive to Slovenian authorities took place during the Covid lockdown, at a time when they were flight disruptions. To facilitate the transfer, the authorities arranged a private jet to fly directly to Country X to retrieve the suspect. This example demonstrates the successful results achieved through close and effective cooperation between the Slovenian and authorities of Country X, despite the challenging circumstances. 2.2.3 Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 196. Slovenian authorities lack statistics regarding requests for mutual legal assistance relating to asset recovery matters. However, the competent authorities have provided some good case examples where their freezing orders were recognised and executed in foreign countries. Mostly, these freezing and confiscation orders were related to fraud offences, ML and abuse of position or trust in business activity, which is largely in line with the risk profile of the country. As an example, in 3 cases from 2020-2024, two neighbouring countries successfully froze funds totalling approx. EUR 285 000 at the request of Slovenian authorities. 197. A case where Slovenia cooperated with another EU country based on Warsaw Convention was presented to the AT as it led to the first asset-sharing agreement concluded in Slovenia. Initiated by Luxembourg and following coordination with Slovenia, the parties agreed to equally share crypto assets confiscated in Luxembourg, which were already converted to Euro. 198. However, there are some challenges in seeking property moved abroad. Namely, the high evidentiary threshold established by courts require authorities to demonstrate that assets are still available in the foreign accounts in order to acquire court order necessary to further request seizing these assets aboard. This seems to be particularly significant in the context of cybercrime, where authorities are required to act swiftly to prevent the dissipation of the crime proceeds." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 184. Slovenian judicial authorities proactively seek assistance from foreign countries, including from EU and non-EU member states. The AT formed a conclusion on the effectiveness of this type of international cooperation based on the available data, interviews held onsite, international feedback, and a number of cases presented by different competent authorities. Feedback received from the global network reveals that Slovenia’s MLA requests meet the quality and the parameters required by international legal instruments. Also, it can be concluded that Slovenia seeks MLA from countries all over the world (e.g. Hong Kong), as well as from Western Balkans and Switzerland, but most often from EU countries, specifically from Germany, Italy, Malta, Poland or Latvia, in which instances they use EIOs. This is broadly in line with country’s risk profile. 185. As explained under the previous core issue, only MoJ is able to provide statistics on the number of MLA requests sent for ML, TF and predicate offences. It can be concluded that the authorities actively and strategically seek international assistance from non-EU member states in both ML and predicate offences cases. During the assessed period, 61 outgoing MLA requests representing 3.8% of all outgoing requests were specifically related to ML offences. 186. When pursuing predicate offences, for instance, 34% of outgoing MLA requests relate to fraud, 34.5% to migrant smuggling, approximately 8% to drug trafficking, and 6.7% to sexual exploitation—reflecting the primary areas of ML risk identified for Slovenia. Table 2.5. Outgoing MLA requests Outgoing MLA 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TOTAL ML 11 16 11 15 8 61 TF - - - - - 0 Drug trafficking 22 15 24 37 28 126 Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering 1 1 3 1 3 9 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 68 74 95 125 187 549 Sexual exploitation, including of children 19 19 20 29 21 108 Illicit arms trafficking 5 2 3 4 5 19 Corruption and bribery 1 5 2 3 1 12 Fraud 103 122 141 95 81 542 Counterfeiting currency 1 1 3 5 10 Murder, grievous bodily injury 2 6 3 3 5 19 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking - 7 2 2 11 Robbery or theft 13 11 12 6 16 58 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 3 1 1 3 9 Tax crimes (related to direct and indirect taxes) 2 - - - - 2 Extortion 6 4 7 12 6 35 Forgery 5 4 2 2 13 TOTAL 262 284 333 341 371 1591 187. The figures per crimes for EIOs are not available and the AT used interviews and case examples to establish the extent to which the assistance is sought proactively and in line with country’s risk profile. Given that cooperation with EU is conducted in a decentralised manner, the Slovenian courts and prosecutors have separately provided statistics on the number of EIOs issued during 2020-2025. For example, courts issue on average 585 per year while prosecutors – on average 220 per year. A notable increase was observed in 2024 and 2025, with EIOs issued in 636 and 714 cases, respectively. This rise is attributed to the increase in fraud-related cases which also corelated with the risk trend in the country. Thus, in practice, the increase of the evidentiary threshold has not impacted on the level of assistance sought. 188. There are a number of case examples presented by the authorities, demonstrating that they proactively seek international cooperation from other EU Member States. Some statistics are available for the EIOs sent through the EUROJUST. Based on that, the most frequent offences, for which EIOs were sent, were: fraud (including business fraud), tax crimes, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, ML - which is largely in line with the risks identified under the NRA. 189. There were no outgoing MLA requests or EIOs related to TF between 2020-2024, which is also in line with the low TF risk in the country. Case Box 2.5: Gathering evidence abroad through EIO Case example 1 In 2022, a Slovenian court obtained banking information through an MLA request. The information was used to file an indictment with a request for the issuance of a penal order against a foreign national for aiding and abetting the commission of fraud. The judgement has become final. Case example 2 In 2021, in a case handled by SPO, related to drug trafficking, an EIO was submitted to the competent foreign authorities by email. Slovenian authorities sought obtaining SKY ECC evidence, which was already possessed by the authorities of the requested state. A response was received in the same day. 190. The most common requested measures related to information on previous criminal offences, convictions, banking data, telecommunications traffic data, data from official registers witness and suspect hearing, etc. 191. Slovenian authorities actively participate in JITs which are formed based on their initiative or are created by other countries. The authorities have presented a number of cases where JITs were established in order to dismantle complex ML, tax evasion or organised crime cases (See case box 7.1). Similarly in one case the SPO investigated, within the framework of a JIT, a large financial crime network in the region involving 64 suspects and multiple offences. 192. Overall, the statistical data and contextual information confirm that Slovenia is proactive and methodical in seeking assistance from foreign counterparts for both ML and predicate offence cases. By utilizing the full range of available legal instruments, Slovenian authorities effectively support the investigation and prosecution of cross-border financial crime in accordance with international standards. 2.2.2 Extradition 193. Slovenian authorities regularly ask for assistance from foreign countries to seeking criminals. Most of the extradition requests are directed to EU Member States using EAWs. 194. During 2020-2024, authorities mainly sought from non-EU jurisdictions extradition of offenders implicated in fraud, theft, human trafficking, drug trafficking, sexual exploitation, murder, counterfeiting currency and tax-crimes (See table 2.6). Some of these requests were addressed to Balkan countries, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk and context. Around 17.5% of all requests were refused on grounds of lack of dual criminality, the statute of limitations, or because the person sought was a national of the requested state. Table 2.6. Outgoing extradition requests Outgoing extradition  requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 ML 1 0 0 0 1 TF 0 0 0 Drug trafficking 1 1 1 1 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 0 0 2 0 3 Sexual exploitation, including of children 1 0 2 0 1 Fraud 4 3 3 1 1 Counterfeiting currency 1 0 0 0 Murder, grievous bodily injury 0 0 0 1 1 Robbery or theft 1 2 0 3 0 Tax crimes 1 0 0 0 0 195. During the 2020-2024, Slovenia issued 413 EAWs to EU-states. More than half of them were issued for the purpose of prosecution. The most common categories of predicate offences underlying the issuance of EAWs were fraud and corruption, theft, drug-related offences, sexual offences, counterfeiting of the euro, and other offences. No EAWs were issued in relation to terrorism or terrorist financing, which is consistent with the country’s risk profile. However, there is a lack of comprehensive statistics for EAW (see table 2.7). Table 2.7. Outgoing EAW Outgoing European Arrest Warrants 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 EAW Sent 90 93 85 70 97 EAW issued for the purpose of prosecution 56 62 49 40 N/A Effectively surrendered persons 21 24 42 N/A N/A Refused N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Case Box 2.6: Successful extradition to Slovenia A Slovenian fugitive was hiding in overseas Country X. The Slovenian MoJ sent the extradition request and documentation to the central authority of Country X for the purposes of execution of sentences and conducting criminal proceedings for the offences of robbery, fraud, and concealment. The requested authorities granted the extradition of the person in 2021. The surrender of the fugitive to Slovenian authorities took place during the Covid lockdown, at a time when they were flight disruptions. To facilitate the transfer, the authorities arranged a private jet to fly directly to Country X to retrieve the suspect. This example demonstrates the successful results achieved through close and effective cooperation between the Slovenian and authorities of Country X, despite the challenging circumstances. 2.2.3 Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 196. Slovenian authorities lack statistics regarding requests for mutual legal assistance relating to asset recovery matters. However, the competent authorities have provided some good case examples where their freezing orders were recognised and executed in foreign countries. Mostly, these freezing and confiscation orders were related to fraud offences, ML and abuse of position or trust in business activity, which is largely in line with the risk profile of the country. As an example, in 3 cases from 2020-2024, two neighbouring countries successfully froze funds totalling approx. EUR 285 000 at the request of Slovenian authorities. 197. A case where Slovenia cooperated with another EU country based on Warsaw Convention was presented to the AT as it led to the first asset-sharing agreement concluded in Slovenia. Initiated by Luxembourg and following coordination with Slovenia, the parties agreed to equally share crypto assets confiscated in Luxembourg, which were already converted to Euro. 198. However, there are some challenges in seeking property moved abroad. Namely, the high evidentiary threshold established by courts require authorities to demonstrate that assets are still available in the foreign accounts in order to acquire court order necessary to further request seizing these assets aboard. This seems to be particularly significant in the context of cybercrime, where authorities are required to act swiftly to prevent the dissipation of the crime proceeds." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1 Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 257. Overall, authorities had demonstrated an effective understanding of sectoral risks faced by FIs and VASPs which was developed through their participation in the NRA process. While all the main AML/CFT supervisors have a risk assessment process in place for their OEs, the depth of these varies, leading to more thorough risk comprehension in the material sectors BoS – Sectoral Risk Understanding 258. The BoS has developed a robust methodology for the carrying out of sectoral risk assessments, the last version of which was adopted in 2025. It has also developed PAMLS – Platform for AML Supervision – an advanced IT tool for, amongst other things, detecting new and emerging risks through the AI-led analysis of transactional data. This is intended to allow the detection of emerging risks, trends and typologies at the sectoral and entity level. For the time being, PAMLS is used only with regards to banks though the BoS has signalled that it is looking at extending its use to the non-banking sector as well. 259. As to the actual carrying out of a sectoral risk assessment, the BoS has only carried one in 2022. This does not provide an analysis and understanding of the main and/or emerging ML/TF risks within the different sectors falling under the BoS’ supervisory remit. It rather presents a summation of the results from the different entity-level risk assessments. Currently, this analysis lacks an adequate set of data sources and does not identify the possible threats. 260. This notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that the BoS has drafted the relative chapters in the NRA addressing the sectors falling within its supervisory remit and these can, to a large extent, be equated with sectoral risk assessments. However, given the lapse of time between the two NRAs (from 2020 to 2025), and the lapse of time since the data on which the respective NRA was based had been collected and the issue of the NRA, the trends identified through the respective NRA may not have been fully reflective of the actual threats and vulnerabilities within the sectors at the time of its finalisation. While this may be more relevant with reference to the banking sector, being the most sophisticated sector under the BoS’ supervisory remit, it has to be pointed out that the sector is also relatively static and limited in terms of both operators and the products and services offered. 261. In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the BoS has to internally justify its supervisory plans on the basis of a sectoral explanation of the ML/TF risks it is noticing so as to have them approved. And while this risk understanding would largely be based on information sourced and held by the BoS itself, it also makes use of the EU’s Supranational Risk Assessment and of the ML/TF Risk Opinion issued by the European Banking Authority to keep abreast of emerging threats and vulnerabilities which may not be currently noticeable within the Slovenian market but may eventually present themselves. BoS – Entity Level Risk Assessment 262. The data sources considered for the carrying out of the risk assessment at entity level are multiple, key amongst which is the annual questionnaire that FIs falling under the BoS’ remit have to complete. The BoS has advised that there is a 100% compliance rate in this regard. The questionnaires are quite thorough though there are aspects which are not explored or are only in part touched upon. This is especially true with regards to banks. 263. Given their key role within the Slovenian financial and AML/CFT system, the questionnaire would benefit from the inclusion of additional questions on legal persons and their BOs, the latter being an aspect that is only touched upon within the context of PEPs. There are no questions as to the presence of customers with complex ownership structures, the residence of BOs, how prevalent are certain types of legal persons amongst the customer base such as limited liability companies and NPOs. One has, however, to appreciate that most legal persons serviced by banks are locally registered or incorporated and have a mostly Slovenian beneficial ownership. Another aspect that is somewhat missing is that dealing with correspondent banking, a service in relation to which there are no questions in the annual questionnaire. And there are equally no questions on outsourcing, though this may not be particularly a feature within the Slovenian banking sector. In terms of controls and given the issues with backlog of flagged transactions to be scrutinised, the controls section of the questionnaire would benefit from questions as to the number of flagged transactions being produced by the transaction monitoring system, how many have been processed and how many actually eventually led to a report to the OMLP. This would enable the BoS to have a better understanding of individual banks’ effectiveness in this area. 264. The questionnaires for the non-banking sectors are equally good, enabling the BoS to obtain quite a range of data points that are of relevance in better understanding the different sectors. Questions on legal persons and BOs are equally missing from these questionnaires, though the incidence of legal persons in these sectors may actually be significantly less than within the banking sector. However, what has been stated previously with regards to outsourcing and flagged transactions would equally apply in this case. In addition, given the possible higher vulnerability of these sectors to TF, there might be the need to better distinguish between remittances or payments linked to jurisdictions considered to be exposed to higher TF risks as against those that are more exposed to ML risks. 265. Additional sources that complement and counter-balance information collected through the self-assessment questionnaire includes information available to the BoS through its different supervisory and prudential activities, information obtained from its counterparts, information from PAMLS (limitedly to banks) and information from the OMLP. The assessment process itself is partly automated as the questionnaire replies provided by the banking sector are collected through PAMLS and are then considered to see whether the additional information available to the BoS warrants an increase of the risk result produced by the said system. On the other hand, the non-banking sector’s risk assessment process is fully manual, thereby imposing further demands on the bank’s available resources. The subjectivity inherent in the use of supervisory judgement to finalise or revise the risk assessment in the circumstances referred to in para. 270 hereunder is mitigated through. 266. In the event of material changes occurring between risk assessment cycles, the BoS has a mechanism to revise the entity-level assessment to reflect the latest risk status. SMA 267. The SMA is in the process of adopting a methodology for the carrying out of a sectoral risk assessment and is still to carry out a proper sectoral risk assessment. While it has explained that it has a holistic overview of the different operators through the entity level risk assessment process and its supervisory processes, it is also true that there is no dedicated periodical exercise to systematically risk assess the whole sector. This is usually a key exercise to identify emerging trends and risks. As is the case with the BoS, the SMA is also responsible for carrying out the risk assessment of the sectors under its remit for NRA purposes. Thus, even in this case, the absence of a proper sectoral risk assessment is mitigated through the NRA analyses, which however present the same shortcomings referred to earlier for the BoS. 268. The SMA carries out an annual risk assessment for the different FIs under its remit, the basis of which is the risk assessment questionnaire which has to be completed by the different OEs. As for the BoS, the SMA has confirmed that it has a 100% compliance rate. The questionnaire in itself is quite comprehensive, though it would benefit from additional questions on beneficial ownership, as this is currently only an aspect considered when it comes to the reasons for classifying a customer as high risk, complexity of ownership structures, payment methods used, and whether any of the BOs are PEPs. Other sources of information are also used, including those available to the SMA itself, but the process is entirely entrusted to the supervisory judgement of the SMA without any direction or guidance as to the weight to be attributed to particular data sources. 269. In the event that additional relevant information is made available during the year, the SMA would not revise the risk score per se until the next risk assessment cycle, but it would take actions to mitigate any perceived increase in the ML/TF risk of the OE. ISA 270. The sectoral risk assessment for the insurance sector is based entirely on the NRA, which was carried out by the ISA itself. On the other hand, when it comes to the risk assessment at entity level, it carries out the same on the basis of a questionnaire that insurance undertakings and pension companies have to comply. In terms of the questions asked, the same issues as already highlighted for the BoS and the SMA arise. 271. It is to be noted that insurance intermediaries, i.e. agents and brokers, are not risk assessed as the ISA considers that they present the same risk as their principal. That could be argued with regards to insurance agents, but brokers are independent from single insurance undertakings. This notwithstanding, it is not considered that this impacts the risk understanding of the ISA, given the overall low risk of the insurance sector in general and the relative reliance on domestic insurance undertakings to source insurance products. Market Inspectorate 272. The Market Inspectorate is supervising lending and leasing operators. The Market Inspectorate has no methodology for risk assessing leasing and lending companies, and over the assessment period has not been collecting data and information in a systematic manner so as to allow it to develop a proper risk understanding of leasing or lending companies. However, given the size and risks of the sector, this is not considered to be a major shortcoming. 3.2.2 Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 273. In general, both FIs and VASPs confirmed that AML/CFT supervisory authorities are very accessible and willing to discuss practical difficulties that they encounter when it comes to the implementation of AML/CFT requirements. This serves as an additional channel through which the authorities enhance their guidance and outreach efforts. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there is a significant level of collaboration between authorities in both developing guidance and coordinating training events. BoS 274. The BoS has been especially active in providing guidance and training to the FIs falling under its remit. It has issued a comprehensive set of Guidelines on the application of AML/CFT obligations to its FIs, which it updates from time to time in consultation with the SMA, the OMLP and the private sector, and has also adapted a series of EBA Guidelines within the national framework, including guidelines on risk factors and associated mitigating measures, and guidelines on the implementation of the Travel Rule. The BoS also issues Circular Letters, summarising the results of the thematic examinations and good practices which may have emerged from the same. These have included but are not limited to a Circular Letter addressed to banks on the risks presented, and the mitigating measures to apply when dealing with VASPs or VA-related services (2021) and one addressed to VASPs offering ATM services on the prevention of anonymous transactions (2022). Thus, the BoS does regularly communicates its regulatory expectations in writing to OEs under its remit. 275. While the BoS does not organise its own training events, it is a regular participant to training sessions organised by the Banking Association, such as its annual conference. While primarily aimed at banks, these training sessions are also attended by representatives from other sectors. In addition, the BoS has over the assessment period held a series of meetings with FIs and VASPs, either upon request of the OE – 7 – or as part of its supervisory activities – 18. SMA 276. The SMA has issued a comprehensive Guidance Document on Risk Assessment and AML/CFT Obligations addressed to the sectors under its responsibility, which is updated from time to time whenever there are legislative changes and are accessible through its website. The SMA does not usually hold its own training events but is a regular participant in training events organised by industry representative bodies such as the annual conference organised by the Investment Firms Association and that organised by the Banking Association. This approach is understandable given the limited resources it has available to it for AML/CFT purposes. This notwithstanding, it is relevant to point out that the SMA has also held a training session for VASPs in 2024 in preparation for its assuming responsibility for this sector, as well as inviting anyone who files an application for authorisation as a VASP for a meeting where it also explains what its regulatory expectations are, including when it comes to AML/CFT. ISA 277. The ISA has not been particularly active in providing guidance to FIs falling within its remit. It has issued Guidelines for ML/TF Risk Assessment, which are also accessible through its website, but these focus especially on the carrying out of the enterprise-wide risk assessment and only minimally touch upon the other AML/CFT obligations. No training sessions have been held for the insurance sector due to the low-risk rating attributed to this sector. There is still an element of outreach through the interactions had with the insurance representative body and with the communication of supervisory aspects of interest at the beginning of the year. This can ultimately result in undermining the sector’s understanding of its AML/CFT obligations and lead to an uneven application of requirements. Market Inspectorate 278. The Market Inspectorate has issued revised guidelines in March 2024 for credit providers and credit intermediaries. It has not provided any additional material, nor has it held training or outreach initiatives for credit providers and intermediaries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1 Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 257. Overall, authorities had demonstrated an effective understanding of sectoral risks faced by FIs and VASPs which was developed through their participation in the NRA process. While all the main AML/CFT supervisors have a risk assessment process in place for their OEs, the depth of these varies, leading to more thorough risk comprehension in the material sectors BoS – Sectoral Risk Understanding 258. The BoS has developed a robust methodology for the carrying out of sectoral risk assessments, the last version of which was adopted in 2025. It has also developed PAMLS – Platform for AML Supervision – an advanced IT tool for, amongst other things, detecting new and emerging risks through the AI-led analysis of transactional data. This is intended to allow the detection of emerging risks, trends and typologies at the sectoral and entity level. For the time being, PAMLS is used only with regards to banks though the BoS has signalled that it is looking at extending its use to the non-banking sector as well. 259. As to the actual carrying out of a sectoral risk assessment, the BoS has only carried one in 2022. This does not provide an analysis and understanding of the main and/or emerging ML/TF risks within the different sectors falling under the BoS’ supervisory remit. It rather presents a summation of the results from the different entity-level risk assessments. Currently, this analysis lacks an adequate set of data sources and does not identify the possible threats. 260. This notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that the BoS has drafted the relative chapters in the NRA addressing the sectors falling within its supervisory remit and these can, to a large extent, be equated with sectoral risk assessments. However, given the lapse of time between the two NRAs (from 2020 to 2025), and the lapse of time since the data on which the respective NRA was based had been collected and the issue of the NRA, the trends identified through the respective NRA may not have been fully reflective of the actual threats and vulnerabilities within the sectors at the time of its finalisation. While this may be more relevant with reference to the banking sector, being the most sophisticated sector under the BoS’ supervisory remit, it has to be pointed out that the sector is also relatively static and limited in terms of both operators and the products and services offered. 261. In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the BoS has to internally justify its supervisory plans on the basis of a sectoral explanation of the ML/TF risks it is noticing so as to have them approved. And while this risk understanding would largely be based on information sourced and held by the BoS itself, it also makes use of the EU’s Supranational Risk Assessment and of the ML/TF Risk Opinion issued by the European Banking Authority to keep abreast of emerging threats and vulnerabilities which may not be currently noticeable within the Slovenian market but may eventually present themselves. BoS – Entity Level Risk Assessment 262. The data sources considered for the carrying out of the risk assessment at entity level are multiple, key amongst which is the annual questionnaire that FIs falling under the BoS’ remit have to complete. The BoS has advised that there is a 100% compliance rate in this regard. The questionnaires are quite thorough though there are aspects which are not explored or are only in part touched upon. This is especially true with regards to banks. 263. Given their key role within the Slovenian financial and AML/CFT system, the questionnaire would benefit from the inclusion of additional questions on legal persons and their BOs, the latter being an aspect that is only touched upon within the context of PEPs. There are no questions as to the presence of customers with complex ownership structures, the residence of BOs, how prevalent are certain types of legal persons amongst the customer base such as limited liability companies and NPOs. One has, however, to appreciate that most legal persons serviced by banks are locally registered or incorporated and have a mostly Slovenian beneficial ownership. Another aspect that is somewhat missing is that dealing with correspondent banking, a service in relation to which there are no questions in the annual questionnaire. And there are equally no questions on outsourcing, though this may not be particularly a feature within the Slovenian banking sector. In terms of controls and given the issues with backlog of flagged transactions to be scrutinised, the controls section of the questionnaire would benefit from questions as to the number of flagged transactions being produced by the transaction monitoring system, how many have been processed and how many actually eventually led to a report to the OMLP. This would enable the BoS to have a better understanding of individual banks’ effectiveness in this area. 264. The questionnaires for the non-banking sectors are equally good, enabling the BoS to obtain quite a range of data points that are of relevance in better understanding the different sectors. Questions on legal persons and BOs are equally missing from these questionnaires, though the incidence of legal persons in these sectors may actually be significantly less than within the banking sector. However, what has been stated previously with regards to outsourcing and flagged transactions would equally apply in this case. In addition, given the possible higher vulnerability of these sectors to TF, there might be the need to better distinguish between remittances or payments linked to jurisdictions considered to be exposed to higher TF risks as against those that are more exposed to ML risks. 265. Additional sources that complement and counter-balance information collected through the self-assessment questionnaire includes information available to the BoS through its different supervisory and prudential activities, information obtained from its counterparts, information from PAMLS (limitedly to banks) and information from the OMLP. The assessment process itself is partly automated as the questionnaire replies provided by the banking sector are collected through PAMLS and are then considered to see whether the additional information available to the BoS warrants an increase of the risk result produced by the said system. On the other hand, the non-banking sector’s risk assessment process is fully manual, thereby imposing further demands on the bank’s available resources. The subjectivity inherent in the use of supervisory judgement to finalise or revise the risk assessment in the circumstances referred to in para. 270 hereunder is mitigated through. 266. In the event of material changes occurring between risk assessment cycles, the BoS has a mechanism to revise the entity-level assessment to reflect the latest risk status. SMA 267. The SMA is in the process of adopting a methodology for the carrying out of a sectoral risk assessment and is still to carry out a proper sectoral risk assessment. While it has explained that it has a holistic overview of the different operators through the entity level risk assessment process and its supervisory processes, it is also true that there is no dedicated periodical exercise to systematically risk assess the whole sector. This is usually a key exercise to identify emerging trends and risks. As is the case with the BoS, the SMA is also responsible for carrying out the risk assessment of the sectors under its remit for NRA purposes. Thus, even in this case, the absence of a proper sectoral risk assessment is mitigated through the NRA analyses, which however present the same shortcomings referred to earlier for the BoS. 268. The SMA carries out an annual risk assessment for the different FIs under its remit, the basis of which is the risk assessment questionnaire which has to be completed by the different OEs. As for the BoS, the SMA has confirmed that it has a 100% compliance rate. The questionnaire in itself is quite comprehensive, though it would benefit from additional questions on beneficial ownership, as this is currently only an aspect considered when it comes to the reasons for classifying a customer as high risk, complexity of ownership structures, payment methods used, and whether any of the BOs are PEPs. Other sources of information are also used, including those available to the SMA itself, but the process is entirely entrusted to the supervisory judgement of the SMA without any direction or guidance as to the weight to be attributed to particular data sources. 269. In the event that additional relevant information is made available during the year, the SMA would not revise the risk score per se until the next risk assessment cycle, but it would take actions to mitigate any perceived increase in the ML/TF risk of the OE. ISA 270. The sectoral risk assessment for the insurance sector is based entirely on the NRA, which was carried out by the ISA itself. On the other hand, when it comes to the risk assessment at entity level, it carries out the same on the basis of a questionnaire that insurance undertakings and pension companies have to comply. In terms of the questions asked, the same issues as already highlighted for the BoS and the SMA arise. 271. It is to be noted that insurance intermediaries, i.e. agents and brokers, are not risk assessed as the ISA considers that they present the same risk as their principal. That could be argued with regards to insurance agents, but brokers are independent from single insurance undertakings. This notwithstanding, it is not considered that this impacts the risk understanding of the ISA, given the overall low risk of the insurance sector in general and the relative reliance on domestic insurance undertakings to source insurance products. Market Inspectorate 272. The Market Inspectorate is supervising lending and leasing operators. The Market Inspectorate has no methodology for risk assessing leasing and lending companies, and over the assessment period has not been collecting data and information in a systematic manner so as to allow it to develop a proper risk understanding of leasing or lending companies. However, given the size and risks of the sector, this is not considered to be a major shortcoming. 3.2.2 Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 273. In general, both FIs and VASPs confirmed that AML/CFT supervisory authorities are very accessible and willing to discuss practical difficulties that they encounter when it comes to the implementation of AML/CFT requirements. This serves as an additional channel through which the authorities enhance their guidance and outreach efforts. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there is a significant level of collaboration between authorities in both developing guidance and coordinating training events. BoS 274. The BoS has been especially active in providing guidance and training to the FIs falling under its remit. It has issued a comprehensive set of Guidelines on the application of AML/CFT obligations to its FIs, which it updates from time to time in consultation with the SMA, the OMLP and the private sector, and has also adapted a series of EBA Guidelines within the national framework, including guidelines on risk factors and associated mitigating measures, and guidelines on the implementation of the Travel Rule. The BoS also issues Circular Letters, summarising the results of the thematic examinations and good practices which may have emerged from the same. These have included but are not limited to a Circular Letter addressed to banks on the risks presented, and the mitigating measures to apply when dealing with VASPs or VA-related services (2021) and one addressed to VASPs offering ATM services on the prevention of anonymous transactions (2022). Thus, the BoS does regularly communicates its regulatory expectations in writing to OEs under its remit. 275. While the BoS does not organise its own training events, it is a regular participant to training sessions organised by the Banking Association, such as its annual conference. While primarily aimed at banks, these training sessions are also attended by representatives from other sectors. In addition, the BoS has over the assessment period held a series of meetings with FIs and VASPs, either upon request of the OE – 7 – or as part of its supervisory activities – 18. SMA 276. The SMA has issued a comprehensive Guidance Document on Risk Assessment and AML/CFT Obligations addressed to the sectors under its responsibility, which is updated from time to time whenever there are legislative changes and are accessible through its website. The SMA does not usually hold its own training events but is a regular participant in training events organised by industry representative bodies such as the annual conference organised by the Investment Firms Association and that organised by the Banking Association. This approach is understandable given the limited resources it has available to it for AML/CFT purposes. This notwithstanding, it is relevant to point out that the SMA has also held a training session for VASPs in 2024 in preparation for its assuming responsibility for this sector, as well as inviting anyone who files an application for authorisation as a VASP for a meeting where it also explains what its regulatory expectations are, including when it comes to AML/CFT. ISA 277. The ISA has not been particularly active in providing guidance to FIs falling within its remit. It has issued Guidelines for ML/TF Risk Assessment, which are also accessible through its website, but these focus especially on the carrying out of the enterprise-wide risk assessment and only minimally touch upon the other AML/CFT obligations. No training sessions have been held for the insurance sector due to the low-risk rating attributed to this sector. There is still an element of outreach through the interactions had with the insurance representative body and with the communication of supervisory aspects of interest at the beginning of the year. This can ultimately result in undermining the sector’s understanding of its AML/CFT obligations and lead to an uneven application of requirements. Market Inspectorate 278. The Market Inspectorate has issued revised guidelines in March 2024 for credit providers and credit intermediaries. It has not provided any additional material, nor has it held training or outreach initiatives for credit providers and intermediaries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 348. The FARS and OMPL, amongst other competent authorises, demonstrated to have better understanding of risk in their supervised sectors. Other supervisory authorities and SRBs demonstrated a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks within their supervised sectors. While all supervisory authorities and SRBs acknowledged the contents of the 2025 NRA, their levels of agreement with the findings varied considerably. 349. With the exception of the FARS and the OMLP, the other supervisory authorities or SRBs were unable to clearly articulate the ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities associated with the regulated DNFBP sectors under their supervision. Their understanding of risk did not align with the findings of the 2021 or 2025 NRA, which does identify inherent ML threats and vulnerabilities within several DNFBP activities. Instead, most authorities and SRBs primarily focused on risks arising in the unregulated market, rather than recognising or assessing threats and vulnerabilities within the regulated sectors. 350. Specifically, within the 2025 NRA the SBA acknowledges that criminals deliberately exploit the regulatory gap by using unregulated legal advisors instead of covered lawyers, and that the low volume of STRs arising from covered lawyers reflects a displacement of risk toward the unregulated legal advice sector. This issue had been previously raised within the 2021 NRA, however, no regulatory actions had been taken to address this risk. While this demonstrates awareness of risks outside the regulated activities, the SBA did not identify or articulate ML/TF risks inherent to the activities of covered lawyers, despite these being recognised in the NRA. 351. Similarly, the CNS highlighted that the biggest vulnerability arose from unregulated activities, namely from peer-to-peer real estate transactions which can be conducted without the involvement of a lawyer or notary to verify transaction details, demonstrating awareness of risks in unregulated channels. However, it did not recognise or articulate threats or vulnerabilities within the regulated sector itself, in line with the NRA. This suggests that while some DNFBP supervisors acknowledge displacement risks into unregulated areas, they tend to understate or dismiss threats and vulnerabilities within their own regulated sectors. 352. The FARS demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of its sector and its activities, and in turn were able to recognise risks. The OMLP perceived a higher risk in OEs who have clients based or associated with higher risk countries, and the role of professional enablers potentially facilitating or being abused by criminals to conceal beneficial ownership and structure fictitious transactions. 353. Regarding TF, all supervisory authorities and SRBs appeared to equate Slovenia’s TF threats and vulnerabilities with the absence of terrorism within Slovenia. Therefore, there has been no supervisory focus or targeted efforts to identify or address TF risks within their respective sectors. Nevertheless, it is not considered to be a serious deficiency given that the underlying TF risk is generally assessed as low. 354. Risk assessment activity across DNFBP supervisors appears to be confined to their participation in the preparation of the NRA. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs have conducted independent sectoral risk assessments to identify or assess ML/TF risks within their sectors. This extends to the identification and assessment of evolving or emerging risks, which remains largely unaddressed. 355. For the completion of the NRA, supervisory authorities and SRBs that participated in the NRA working groups, issued questionnaires to all OEs within their respective sectors. These questionnaires sought to collect information on sectoral characteristics and entity-specific risks. The scope and detail of information requested within the questionnaires varied across sectors. For instance, regarding accountants and tax advisors, information was requested on the services provided, types of customers, transactions involving high risk countries, risk scoring of the customer base, number and type of STRs, information on the exposure to virtual assets, the use of cash, the number of NPO customers, and sanctions related information. Similarly, the SBA requested information on the nature of the activities provided by covered lawyers, the risk profile of its customers, a breakdown on the type of CDD applied, number of PEPs, etc. In contrast, the questionnaires for the real estate and DPMS sectors were more limited, seeking only high level information on the number of customers, number and value of transactions, and confirmation that all policies and procedures had been implemented. 356. Overall, the reliability of those assessments are questionable given: (i) the insufficient scope and detail of collected data; (ii) an over-reliance on the information provided by OEs with no further verification conducted; and (iii) the low response rate (100% for covered lawyers and casinos, 53.5% for the real estate sector, 43% for accountants and tax advisors collectively, and 38.9% for dealers in precious metals, with no information for other DNFBP sectors). As a result, supervisory authorities and SRBs lack a clear and evidence-based understanding of ML/TF risks at a sectoral level. 357. With the exception of the FARS, other supervisory authorities and SRBs were unable to demonstrate instances where they had independently identified an ML/TF risk, threat, trend or typology. FARS noted an example of an emerging risk identified and addressed, relating to the proactive detection and blocking of illegal online providers. Moreover, there was no evidence of structured communication or coordination among competent authorities to share concerns or insights related to emerging risks, threats, or vulnerabilities. 358. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs have established a formal risk methodology to assess and determine the risk profile of their OEs. Risk ratings assigned to OEs are based on subjective judgment of supervisory authorities and SRBs rather than on objective risk indicators. In addition, given the lack of reliable data on the number of operators within some sectors, such as accountants and tax advisors, the OMLP is unable to determine the overall risk profile of the sectors. This leads to a lack or an inadequate level of ML/TF risk perception of the supervised OEs. The CoN and SBA consider all registered notaries and covered lawyers respectively as a low risk. While the FARS does conduct a periodic risk assessment of its entities on the renewal of concessions it still classifies all casinos as a low ML/TF risk. This classification applied by all competent authorities does not align with the 2021 or 2025 NRA and does not take into consideration internationally recognised ML/TF risks commonly associated with those sectors. 359. The AT concludes that the overall effectiveness of supervisory authorities and SRBs in identifying and understanding ML/TF risks is weak. This limited understanding reflects the nature of supervisory activities, which hinders supervisors’ ability to develop a comprehensive view of ML/TF risks within their respective sectors. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 360. All supervisory authorities and SRBs have taken some steps to promote ML/TF risk understanding across all DNFBP sectors though this is limited to the provision of generic guidelines and training. Nevertheless, the supervisors weak understanding of ML risks noted above, and basic level of performance demonstrated by the DNFBPs, is indicative of the necessity to substantially upscale the level of engagement on behalf of supervisory authorities and SRBs. 361. All DNFBPs were made aware of the NRA 2025 by means of publication, and some supervisors have disseminated the NRA directly to their respective sectors. 362. All supervisory authorities and SRBs have published sectoral guidelines on the application of AML/CFT measures, including ML/TF risk indicators. These guidelines have been updated to reflect amendments to the APMLTF-2 and were shared with all OEs. All OEs were aware of these guidelines and reported using them in practice. 363. The OMLP, in its capacity as the central authority for AML/CFT, the primary supervisory authority for tax advisors and accountants, and as secondary supervisor for all other DNFBP sectors, demonstrated the highest level of engagement in promoting and strengthening the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. The OMLP cooperates closely with all other DNFBP supervisors in drafting sectoral guidelines and delivery of training activities. The AT commends the OMLP’s AML/CFT team for its commitment and efforts despite significant resource constraints. However, these efforts remain insufficient to address the broader shortcomings in understanding and awareness of ML/TF risks among DNFBP sectors and their supervisors. 364. In addition to the guidelines the supervisors organise regular trainings for their supervised sectors covering topics related to implementation of AML/CFT measures (amendments to APMLTF-2, EU regulatory framework, CDD measures, case examples, etc.). In particular, the OMLP organises annual trainings for all DNFBPs; the SBA conducts annual trainings for its members; the FARS and CoN organise biannual trainings for casinos and notaries respectively; the OMLP organised a specific training for tax advisors. 365. It is commendable that most of the authorities place strong emphasis on regular engagement with their supervised sectors. However, these efforts have not translated into a demonstrable understanding by DNFBPs of ML/TF risks and their AML/CFT obligations, as noted further in the analysis below. Further efforts by supervisory authorities and SRBs are therefore required to enhance the depth and practical application of DNFBPs’ risk understanding, moving beyond high-level awareness towards a more targeted and risk-based approach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 348. The FARS and OMPL, amongst other competent authorises, demonstrated to have better understanding of risk in their supervised sectors. Other supervisory authorities and SRBs demonstrated a more limited understanding of ML/TF risks within their supervised sectors. While all supervisory authorities and SRBs acknowledged the contents of the 2025 NRA, their levels of agreement with the findings varied considerably. 349. With the exception of the FARS and the OMLP, the other supervisory authorities or SRBs were unable to clearly articulate the ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities associated with the regulated DNFBP sectors under their supervision. Their understanding of risk did not align with the findings of the 2021 or 2025 NRA, which does identify inherent ML threats and vulnerabilities within several DNFBP activities. Instead, most authorities and SRBs primarily focused on risks arising in the unregulated market, rather than recognising or assessing threats and vulnerabilities within the regulated sectors. 350. Specifically, within the 2025 NRA the SBA acknowledges that criminals deliberately exploit the regulatory gap by using unregulated legal advisors instead of covered lawyers, and that the low volume of STRs arising from covered lawyers reflects a displacement of risk toward the unregulated legal advice sector. This issue had been previously raised within the 2021 NRA, however, no regulatory actions had been taken to address this risk. While this demonstrates awareness of risks outside the regulated activities, the SBA did not identify or articulate ML/TF risks inherent to the activities of covered lawyers, despite these being recognised in the NRA. 351. Similarly, the CNS highlighted that the biggest vulnerability arose from unregulated activities, namely from peer-to-peer real estate transactions which can be conducted without the involvement of a lawyer or notary to verify transaction details, demonstrating awareness of risks in unregulated channels. However, it did not recognise or articulate threats or vulnerabilities within the regulated sector itself, in line with the NRA. This suggests that while some DNFBP supervisors acknowledge displacement risks into unregulated areas, they tend to understate or dismiss threats and vulnerabilities within their own regulated sectors. 352. The FARS demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of its sector and its activities, and in turn were able to recognise risks. The OMLP perceived a higher risk in OEs who have clients based or associated with higher risk countries, and the role of professional enablers potentially facilitating or being abused by criminals to conceal beneficial ownership and structure fictitious transactions. 353. Regarding TF, all supervisory authorities and SRBs appeared to equate Slovenia’s TF threats and vulnerabilities with the absence of terrorism within Slovenia. Therefore, there has been no supervisory focus or targeted efforts to identify or address TF risks within their respective sectors. Nevertheless, it is not considered to be a serious deficiency given that the underlying TF risk is generally assessed as low. 354. Risk assessment activity across DNFBP supervisors appears to be confined to their participation in the preparation of the NRA. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs have conducted independent sectoral risk assessments to identify or assess ML/TF risks within their sectors. This extends to the identification and assessment of evolving or emerging risks, which remains largely unaddressed. 355. For the completion of the NRA, supervisory authorities and SRBs that participated in the NRA working groups, issued questionnaires to all OEs within their respective sectors. These questionnaires sought to collect information on sectoral characteristics and entity-specific risks. The scope and detail of information requested within the questionnaires varied across sectors. For instance, regarding accountants and tax advisors, information was requested on the services provided, types of customers, transactions involving high risk countries, risk scoring of the customer base, number and type of STRs, information on the exposure to virtual assets, the use of cash, the number of NPO customers, and sanctions related information. Similarly, the SBA requested information on the nature of the activities provided by covered lawyers, the risk profile of its customers, a breakdown on the type of CDD applied, number of PEPs, etc. In contrast, the questionnaires for the real estate and DPMS sectors were more limited, seeking only high level information on the number of customers, number and value of transactions, and confirmation that all policies and procedures had been implemented. 356. Overall, the reliability of those assessments are questionable given: (i) the insufficient scope and detail of collected data; (ii) an over-reliance on the information provided by OEs with no further verification conducted; and (iii) the low response rate (100% for covered lawyers and casinos, 53.5% for the real estate sector, 43% for accountants and tax advisors collectively, and 38.9% for dealers in precious metals, with no information for other DNFBP sectors). As a result, supervisory authorities and SRBs lack a clear and evidence-based understanding of ML/TF risks at a sectoral level. 357. With the exception of the FARS, other supervisory authorities and SRBs were unable to demonstrate instances where they had independently identified an ML/TF risk, threat, trend or typology. FARS noted an example of an emerging risk identified and addressed, relating to the proactive detection and blocking of illegal online providers. Moreover, there was no evidence of structured communication or coordination among competent authorities to share concerns or insights related to emerging risks, threats, or vulnerabilities. 358. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs have established a formal risk methodology to assess and determine the risk profile of their OEs. Risk ratings assigned to OEs are based on subjective judgment of supervisory authorities and SRBs rather than on objective risk indicators. In addition, given the lack of reliable data on the number of operators within some sectors, such as accountants and tax advisors, the OMLP is unable to determine the overall risk profile of the sectors. This leads to a lack or an inadequate level of ML/TF risk perception of the supervised OEs. The CoN and SBA consider all registered notaries and covered lawyers respectively as a low risk. While the FARS does conduct a periodic risk assessment of its entities on the renewal of concessions it still classifies all casinos as a low ML/TF risk. This classification applied by all competent authorities does not align with the 2021 or 2025 NRA and does not take into consideration internationally recognised ML/TF risks commonly associated with those sectors. 359. The AT concludes that the overall effectiveness of supervisory authorities and SRBs in identifying and understanding ML/TF risks is weak. This limited understanding reflects the nature of supervisory activities, which hinders supervisors’ ability to develop a comprehensive view of ML/TF risks within their respective sectors. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 360. All supervisory authorities and SRBs have taken some steps to promote ML/TF risk understanding across all DNFBP sectors though this is limited to the provision of generic guidelines and training. Nevertheless, the supervisors weak understanding of ML risks noted above, and basic level of performance demonstrated by the DNFBPs, is indicative of the necessity to substantially upscale the level of engagement on behalf of supervisory authorities and SRBs. 361. All DNFBPs were made aware of the NRA 2025 by means of publication, and some supervisors have disseminated the NRA directly to their respective sectors. 362. All supervisory authorities and SRBs have published sectoral guidelines on the application of AML/CFT measures, including ML/TF risk indicators. These guidelines have been updated to reflect amendments to the APMLTF-2 and were shared with all OEs. All OEs were aware of these guidelines and reported using them in practice. 363. The OMLP, in its capacity as the central authority for AML/CFT, the primary supervisory authority for tax advisors and accountants, and as secondary supervisor for all other DNFBP sectors, demonstrated the highest level of engagement in promoting and strengthening the understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. The OMLP cooperates closely with all other DNFBP supervisors in drafting sectoral guidelines and delivery of training activities. The AT commends the OMLP’s AML/CFT team for its commitment and efforts despite significant resource constraints. However, these efforts remain insufficient to address the broader shortcomings in understanding and awareness of ML/TF risks among DNFBP sectors and their supervisors. 364. In addition to the guidelines the supervisors organise regular trainings for their supervised sectors covering topics related to implementation of AML/CFT measures (amendments to APMLTF-2, EU regulatory framework, CDD measures, case examples, etc.). In particular, the OMLP organises annual trainings for all DNFBPs; the SBA conducts annual trainings for its members; the FARS and CoN organise biannual trainings for casinos and notaries respectively; the OMLP organised a specific training for tax advisors. 365. It is commendable that most of the authorities place strong emphasis on regular engagement with their supervised sectors. However, these efforts have not translated into a demonstrable understanding by DNFBPs of ML/TF risks and their AML/CFT obligations, as noted further in the analysis below. Further efforts by supervisory authorities and SRBs are therefore required to enhance the depth and practical application of DNFBPs’ risk understanding, moving beyond high-level awareness towards a more targeted and risk-based approach." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="457. Slovenia has put in place a series of measures to mitigate the misuse of LPs. All LPs that can be set up in Slovenia, including branches of foreign LPs, have to be registered to be able to operate within Slovenia. Though the registration process differs from one LP to another, all LPs must ultimately be entered into a register. The companies and other LPs, who are registered into the Court Register (CR), must submit to relevant data and documents, including their statutory documents, with their registration application. Applications for registration can be made either through a notary or through SPOT, a government service which can assist anyone interested in establishing an LP in Slovenia. The different authorities responsible for registration of LPs have to establish whether the requirements set out in law for the registration of a particular kind of LP are met. The registers then feed into a centralised SBR administered and managed by AJPES. 458. Checks on the good standing of the founder of an LP are carried out in the case of companies and other LPs that are registered through the CR. These include all LPs, with exception of foundations and associations. These checks include whether the founder or the shareholder has been subject to a final conviction for a criminal offence against the economy, against employment relations and social security, against legal transactions, against property, against the environment, spatial planning and natural resources, and is registered in the criminal record of the MoJ. It also includes whether, the founder or the shareholder has been publicly listed in the last 12 months in one of the public lists indicating tax-related failures linked to the individual himself or a company in which he was directly or indirectly involved as a founder or a shareholder with more than 25% of the share capital. The failures in question include failure to submit tax declarations, failure to pay tax due, or termination of one’s VAT registration. Checks also include whether the person has been fined in the previous 3-year period in a final decision issued by the Labour Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia or FARS for an offence relating to payment for work or an offence relating to illegal employment. Checks also include whether a person had directly held a participation of more than 50% in the capital of an LLC that was struck off the CR without winding-up. Though these can be further strengthened, the aforementioned checks can act as a barrier to entry and limit the possible abuse of legal persons. Indeed, the CR did confirm that over the years there were a small number of applications for registrations that were turned down on this basis. 459. Checks with regards to sanctions are not carried out at this stage though authorities have advised the AT that there have been instances where these were then carried out by the Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs (MFEA). However, this does not appear to be done on a systematic basis. 460. Identity checks are carried out with regard to the founders when the LP is being established. Where the LP formation is carried out through a notary, the notary would be carrying out CDD on the founders whereas where the establishment of an LP takes place through SPOT, the founder needs to present an identification document and have the signature on the statutory documents presented with the application certified by a notary as well. Additionally, reliance is made also on the interconnection of the SBR with the Central Population Register (CPR) and the Tax Registry (TR) to ensure that details reported for involved parties are consistent, including for non-resident shareholders who are equally required to register with the tax authorities. 461. The SBR and CR thus provides users basic information and documents on the LP, including its statuary documents, its legal representatives and its members, though not on anyone acting as director or in a similar position who is not authorised to represent the legal person. The membership of joint stock companies (JSC) is represented in dematerialised form on the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (CSCC), the country’s Centralised Securities Depository, rather than being reported on the SBR. Membership information must be updated within set time frames whenever there are changes thereto. However, following registrations there are close to no proactive checks made to ensure the detection of either late submission of updated information or the non-submission of information that is no longer relevant. When cases are detected by being brought to the attention of the authorities, action is then taken by the Ministry for the Economy and by the Market Inspectorate. However, the data provided on their activities did not concern supervisory and enforcement measures related to changes in basic information. 462. LPs also have to submit an annual report to AJPES, the timely submission of which is also monitored by AJPES. Authorities have confirmed that the submission of the annual report is often a triggering event for LPs to seek to update their basic information. Apart from updates carried out in this manner, reliance is otherwise put on the CDD measures carried out by OEs at on-boarding and on an on-going basis. This is especially the case with banks, as in excess of 95% LPs hold a local bank account. While this may provide some reassurances that changes to LPs are being monitored, it means that the SBR is dependent on the quality and timeliness of OEs’ AML/CFT measures. This control is not particularly effective when it comes to foreign LPs present on the SBR as only roughly 60% of them retain a bank account in Slovenia. 463. Every LP established in Slovenia has to report information on its BOs to the RBO and keep it up-to-date. Information in this regard has to be communicated to the RBO within eight (8) days from registration and, once registered, within eight (8) days from when a change in BO information takes place. When the requirement of BO disclosure was introduced, authorities undertook a series of actions to ensure that the RBO would be fully and correctly populated, including training sessions for OEs by the OMLP and data analysis by FARS to identify possible defaulting LPs and informing them of the BO disclosure requirements. There were cases where authorities even undertook misdemeanour procedures against certain LPs that failed to comply with these requirements. 464. However, the RBO or AJPES have no powers to conduct checks to ensure that newly registered LPs are disclosing BO information to the RBO within the required timeframe, that they are making the right determination as to who is to be reported as BO, and that the latter’s identification is correct. These checks are left to be carried out by the OMLP and FARS through their supervisory activities. Identification-related issues are also mitigated through the interconnection with the CPR and the TR, but this would not necessarily entail that a non-resident identified as a BO would be covered. Considerable reliance is also put on OEs who, as part of their CDD, have to ascertain that the LP has effectively disclosed its BOs to the RBO, that it has done so correctly, and that it has kept the information up-to-date. The nature of the checks carried out do not fully ensure that BO disclosure obligations are effectively being adhered to. 465. OEs are to report identified discrepancies to the OMLP, and the latter, where it considers that it is justified, contacts the LP to remedy the reported discrepancies. While the OMLP has the powers to also carry out checks on the accuracy of the information disclosed to the RBO at its own initiative, such checks have been few and far in between due to the resource constraints the OMLP faces. Over the assessment period, overall the OMLP carried out 533 procedures to ascertain the accuracy of BO data reported to the RBO, and while the OMLP indicated that there were some carried out on its own initiative, the vast majority resulted from discrepancy reports submitted by OEs in the financial sector, primarily by banks. 466. The OMLP’s activities in this area are supplemented by checks carried out by FARS in the context of tax inspections, and by other supervisory authorities. However, this still results in limited coverage and does not ensure a risk-based approach to a proper review of the disclosures to the RBO. FARS has undertaken a total of 533 checks on LPs, the BoS through its sampling has considered additional 342 LPs, while the OMLP through its various supervisory roles has covered a total of 2 459 LPs. These would represent 4% of the LPs included in the RBO. 467. Moreover, the number of LPs currently present on the RBO do not tally with the number of LPs within the SBR. This mismatch can be partly attributable to the following: while some LPs are not required to register in the RBO, there is still a number of LPs, including single member companies, that are yet to be included in the RBO due to technical issues; at the same time, the SBR also features some LPs that need to be struck off due to their inactivity. With regards to the single member companies missing from the RBO, the respective information on the BO would still be accessible through the SBR but this would not include information on anyone else exercising control over the LP. 468. In addition to tax-related checks carried out at the pre-registration stage as referred to above, the inspections carried out by FARS as part of its tax-related mandate are another measure that limits the abuse of LPs. FARS seeks to identify possible LPs that may be involved in tax evasion and/or tax fraud on the basis of a series of indicia and data sets. By way of example, it takes into account whether an LP registered for tax purposes is carrying out any actual economic activity; whether there are abrupt or unexplained changes in ownership, management, activity or transaction volumes that are inconsistent with its economic activity; use of foreign legal representatives or foreign BOs, combined with a structure that limits transparency and traceability; etc. Of the circa 5,800 inspections carried out, it confirmed irregularities in 4,838 cases where it cancelled the VAT registration of the LPs concerned. The results of the checks carried out are communicated to the Ministry for Economy for possible action from their side. 469. Given the reliance on the OEs and LPs for the accuracy of information in the RBO, through its outreach activities, the AJPES and the OMLP have made efforts to educate both OEs and LPs as to the BO disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, given the instances of unreported discrepancies by OEs (see under Section 5.3), further awareness raising, especially among the OEs, would be advisable. 470. Nominee shareholders and nominee directors are not concepts recognised under Slovenian law. At the same time, shareholders of a public limited company who are entitled to participate in the general meeting have the right to authorise as a proxy a natural or a legal person with the capacity to contract, to participate in the general meeting in their name and exercise their voting rights (CA paragraph 6 Article 308). A proxy with a written authorisation may vote on behalf of an LLC member (CA 2. Paragraph, article 506). Shareholders of a public limited company who are entitled to participate in the general meeting have the right to authorise as a proxy a natural or a legal person with the capacity to contract, to participate in the general meeting in their name and exercise their voting rights (CA paragraph 6 Article 308). A proxy with a written authorisation may vote on behalf of an LLC member (CA 2. Paragraph, article 506). Allowance for nominee arrangements is made in the context of the CSCC where legal professionals are allowed to hold under escrow securities for a short period of time until they finalise particular transactions. However, the presence of strawmen was something that LEAs did comment about, and which is encountered in the course of their investigations. Thus, the provisions of law do not seem to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent such informal arrangements whereby one natural person formally acts as a director or shareholder on behalf of another person with no transparency as to who the shadow director or shareholder may be. 471. The SBR does allow for the detection of possible instances where several LPs share the same address or legal representatives. This notwithstanding, there have been very few sporadic instances where the analysis of the address and legal representatives data was undertaken to identify possible vulnerabilities and risks in the current system, or to inform the risk understanding of the authorities. The one exception is FARS which makes use of these checks as part of its mechanisms to identify possible cases of tax evasion as already referred to above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="457. Slovenia has put in place a series of measures to mitigate the misuse of LPs. All LPs that can be set up in Slovenia, including branches of foreign LPs, have to be registered to be able to operate within Slovenia. Though the registration process differs from one LP to another, all LPs must ultimately be entered into a register. The companies and other LPs, who are registered into the Court Register (CR), must submit to relevant data and documents, including their statutory documents, with their registration application. Applications for registration can be made either through a notary or through SPOT, a government service which can assist anyone interested in establishing an LP in Slovenia. The different authorities responsible for registration of LPs have to establish whether the requirements set out in law for the registration of a particular kind of LP are met. The registers then feed into a centralised SBR administered and managed by AJPES. 458. Checks on the good standing of the founder of an LP are carried out in the case of companies and other LPs that are registered through the CR. These include all LPs, with exception of foundations and associations. These checks include whether the founder or the shareholder has been subject to a final conviction for a criminal offence against the economy, against employment relations and social security, against legal transactions, against property, against the environment, spatial planning and natural resources, and is registered in the criminal record of the MoJ. It also includes whether, the founder or the shareholder has been publicly listed in the last 12 months in one of the public lists indicating tax-related failures linked to the individual himself or a company in which he was directly or indirectly involved as a founder or a shareholder with more than 25% of the share capital. The failures in question include failure to submit tax declarations, failure to pay tax due, or termination of one’s VAT registration. Checks also include whether the person has been fined in the previous 3-year period in a final decision issued by the Labour Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia or FARS for an offence relating to payment for work or an offence relating to illegal employment. Checks also include whether a person had directly held a participation of more than 50% in the capital of an LLC that was struck off the CR without winding-up. Though these can be further strengthened, the aforementioned checks can act as a barrier to entry and limit the possible abuse of legal persons. Indeed, the CR did confirm that over the years there were a small number of applications for registrations that were turned down on this basis. 459. Checks with regards to sanctions are not carried out at this stage though authorities have advised the AT that there have been instances where these were then carried out by the Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs (MFEA). However, this does not appear to be done on a systematic basis. 460. Identity checks are carried out with regard to the founders when the LP is being established. Where the LP formation is carried out through a notary, the notary would be carrying out CDD on the founders whereas where the establishment of an LP takes place through SPOT, the founder needs to present an identification document and have the signature on the statutory documents presented with the application certified by a notary as well. Additionally, reliance is made also on the interconnection of the SBR with the Central Population Register (CPR) and the Tax Registry (TR) to ensure that details reported for involved parties are consistent, including for non-resident shareholders who are equally required to register with the tax authorities. 461. The SBR and CR thus provides users basic information and documents on the LP, including its statuary documents, its legal representatives and its members, though not on anyone acting as director or in a similar position who is not authorised to represent the legal person. The membership of joint stock companies (JSC) is represented in dematerialised form on the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (CSCC), the country’s Centralised Securities Depository, rather than being reported on the SBR. Membership information must be updated within set time frames whenever there are changes thereto. However, following registrations there are close to no proactive checks made to ensure the detection of either late submission of updated information or the non-submission of information that is no longer relevant. When cases are detected by being brought to the attention of the authorities, action is then taken by the Ministry for the Economy and by the Market Inspectorate. However, the data provided on their activities did not concern supervisory and enforcement measures related to changes in basic information. 462. LPs also have to submit an annual report to AJPES, the timely submission of which is also monitored by AJPES. Authorities have confirmed that the submission of the annual report is often a triggering event for LPs to seek to update their basic information. Apart from updates carried out in this manner, reliance is otherwise put on the CDD measures carried out by OEs at on-boarding and on an on-going basis. This is especially the case with banks, as in excess of 95% LPs hold a local bank account. While this may provide some reassurances that changes to LPs are being monitored, it means that the SBR is dependent on the quality and timeliness of OEs’ AML/CFT measures. This control is not particularly effective when it comes to foreign LPs present on the SBR as only roughly 60% of them retain a bank account in Slovenia. 463. Every LP established in Slovenia has to report information on its BOs to the RBO and keep it up-to-date. Information in this regard has to be communicated to the RBO within eight (8) days from registration and, once registered, within eight (8) days from when a change in BO information takes place. When the requirement of BO disclosure was introduced, authorities undertook a series of actions to ensure that the RBO would be fully and correctly populated, including training sessions for OEs by the OMLP and data analysis by FARS to identify possible defaulting LPs and informing them of the BO disclosure requirements. There were cases where authorities even undertook misdemeanour procedures against certain LPs that failed to comply with these requirements. 464. However, the RBO or AJPES have no powers to conduct checks to ensure that newly registered LPs are disclosing BO information to the RBO within the required timeframe, that they are making the right determination as to who is to be reported as BO, and that the latter’s identification is correct. These checks are left to be carried out by the OMLP and FARS through their supervisory activities. Identification-related issues are also mitigated through the interconnection with the CPR and the TR, but this would not necessarily entail that a non-resident identified as a BO would be covered. Considerable reliance is also put on OEs who, as part of their CDD, have to ascertain that the LP has effectively disclosed its BOs to the RBO, that it has done so correctly, and that it has kept the information up-to-date. The nature of the checks carried out do not fully ensure that BO disclosure obligations are effectively being adhered to. 465. OEs are to report identified discrepancies to the OMLP, and the latter, where it considers that it is justified, contacts the LP to remedy the reported discrepancies. While the OMLP has the powers to also carry out checks on the accuracy of the information disclosed to the RBO at its own initiative, such checks have been few and far in between due to the resource constraints the OMLP faces. Over the assessment period, overall the OMLP carried out 533 procedures to ascertain the accuracy of BO data reported to the RBO, and while the OMLP indicated that there were some carried out on its own initiative, the vast majority resulted from discrepancy reports submitted by OEs in the financial sector, primarily by banks. 466. The OMLP’s activities in this area are supplemented by checks carried out by FARS in the context of tax inspections, and by other supervisory authorities. However, this still results in limited coverage and does not ensure a risk-based approach to a proper review of the disclosures to the RBO. FARS has undertaken a total of 533 checks on LPs, the BoS through its sampling has considered additional 342 LPs, while the OMLP through its various supervisory roles has covered a total of 2 459 LPs. These would represent 4% of the LPs included in the RBO. 467. Moreover, the number of LPs currently present on the RBO do not tally with the number of LPs within the SBR. This mismatch can be partly attributable to the following: while some LPs are not required to register in the RBO, there is still a number of LPs, including single member companies, that are yet to be included in the RBO due to technical issues; at the same time, the SBR also features some LPs that need to be struck off due to their inactivity. With regards to the single member companies missing from the RBO, the respective information on the BO would still be accessible through the SBR but this would not include information on anyone else exercising control over the LP. 468. In addition to tax-related checks carried out at the pre-registration stage as referred to above, the inspections carried out by FARS as part of its tax-related mandate are another measure that limits the abuse of LPs. FARS seeks to identify possible LPs that may be involved in tax evasion and/or tax fraud on the basis of a series of indicia and data sets. By way of example, it takes into account whether an LP registered for tax purposes is carrying out any actual economic activity; whether there are abrupt or unexplained changes in ownership, management, activity or transaction volumes that are inconsistent with its economic activity; use of foreign legal representatives or foreign BOs, combined with a structure that limits transparency and traceability; etc. Of the circa 5,800 inspections carried out, it confirmed irregularities in 4,838 cases where it cancelled the VAT registration of the LPs concerned. The results of the checks carried out are communicated to the Ministry for Economy for possible action from their side. 469. Given the reliance on the OEs and LPs for the accuracy of information in the RBO, through its outreach activities, the AJPES and the OMLP have made efforts to educate both OEs and LPs as to the BO disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, given the instances of unreported discrepancies by OEs (see under Section 5.3), further awareness raising, especially among the OEs, would be advisable. 470. Nominee shareholders and nominee directors are not concepts recognised under Slovenian law. At the same time, shareholders of a public limited company who are entitled to participate in the general meeting have the right to authorise as a proxy a natural or a legal person with the capacity to contract, to participate in the general meeting in their name and exercise their voting rights (CA paragraph 6 Article 308). A proxy with a written authorisation may vote on behalf of an LLC member (CA 2. Paragraph, article 506). Shareholders of a public limited company who are entitled to participate in the general meeting have the right to authorise as a proxy a natural or a legal person with the capacity to contract, to participate in the general meeting in their name and exercise their voting rights (CA paragraph 6 Article 308). A proxy with a written authorisation may vote on behalf of an LLC member (CA 2. Paragraph, article 506). Allowance for nominee arrangements is made in the context of the CSCC where legal professionals are allowed to hold under escrow securities for a short period of time until they finalise particular transactions. However, the presence of strawmen was something that LEAs did comment about, and which is encountered in the course of their investigations. Thus, the provisions of law do not seem to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent such informal arrangements whereby one natural person formally acts as a director or shareholder on behalf of another person with no transparency as to who the shadow director or shareholder may be. 471. The SBR does allow for the detection of possible instances where several LPs share the same address or legal representatives. This notwithstanding, there have been very few sporadic instances where the analysis of the address and legal representatives data was undertaken to identify possible vulnerabilities and risks in the current system, or to inform the risk understanding of the authorities. The one exception is FARS which makes use of these checks as part of its mechanisms to identify possible cases of tax evasion as already referred to above." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 512. The OMLP has operational independence and autonomy to carry out its functions. 513. The OMLP plays a key role in producing operational analyses, which it disseminates proactively or upon request to the competent national authorities and foreign FIUs. There are 28 staff members within the OMLP, 10 of which are employed in the Suspicious Transactions Sector ((STS), 9 analysts and the head of the Sector). Three analysts are specialised: one for international incoming requests, one for restrictive measures, and one for TF. The number of analysts, in the light of the number of STRs, is not sufficient, and the authorities are considering a new prioritisation mechanism under a revised methodology and a new STR template with more pre-defined fields allowing for increased automatisation of data analysis, which would enable them to handle the increasing caseload more efficiently. The OMLP advised the AT that they have requested two additional staff members to be hired in the STS, of which one is to be dedicated full-time to strategic analysis. However, the requested hirings are not yet confirmed, nor have they an impact on the effectiveness of the assessed period. 514. All STRs are electronically received by OMLP directly in its case management system (ISUPPD), which has been in place since 2017. Through a manual prioritisation process, the Head of the STS does an initial check of all received STRs, reading them one by one, which is not efficient. In practice, the Head of STS prioritises STRs if they require urgent action (e.g., in fraud cases where the proceeds could be recovered), are related to TF, if adverse media exists regarding the issue involved, are related to earlier received STRs (seen as indicative of increased probability of criminality) or if the amount involved exceeds EUR 200,000. Prioritised STRs are assigned to an analyst, while the STRs assessed with a low level of priority become dormant until they are subject to brief checks by analysts and concluded. 515. The aforementioned methodology, while used in practice throughout the period under review, has been formalised only in September 2025 through the adoption of the respective guidelines for the STS. The AT deems the prioritisation methodology not entirely effective, as it adopts a binary approach, with STRs or initiatives being treated either as urgent or low priority, without giving consideration to cases of normal priority. Moreover, the AT concludes that the manual prioritisation of STRs consumes already insufficient human resources and heavily relies on individual judgement and expertise, increasing the risk of delays, human error, biased case selection, or missed opportunities. 516. The average time to analyse an STR depends on the type of offence suspected, the urgency and the complexity of the case. The OMLP advised that urgent cases (e.g. related to TF or fraud) are analysed within 2 days and referred to competent authorities if sings of potential criminality are detected (See Case Box 9.1). Complex ML STRs are analysed within 1-2 months. During 2020-2024, the average lifecycle of an STR (from receipt to dissemination) was 6 months. As the authorities advised the AT, this partly resulted from the long duration of processing STRs under the previous management (in 2021-2022) and party from a longer duration of the average time needed to conclude low priority STRs. However, the average lifecycle has shortened since 2022 (overall average of about 3 months), with an average processing time of ML STRs disseminated to LEAs being 2.2 months. 517. At the time of the on-site visit, the OMLP indicated that the STS is facing a backlog of 850 STRs from 2024 and 2025, primarily as a result of insufficient resources. They advised that the backlog largely comprised of cases that had been deemed as low priority by the STS at the time of initial prioritisation done by the Head of STS as described above. Replicating the approach taken for processing the backlog from earlier years, the OMLP plans to allocate these cases to analysts to perform basic checks and conclude them as ad acta or notify the LEAs, as appropriate. The AT is of the view that OMLP lacks sufficient resources to simultaneously process both the backlog and increasing number of incoming reports, which limits their ability to produce high-quality and actionable financial intelligence in a timely manner. 518. Although case examples reflect that the OMLP has the ability to prioritise certain cases, the AT considers that the absence of an automated prioritisation mechanism with multiple priority levels – particularly as the number of STRs continues to increase each year – may heighten the risk of human error and delay the identification of high-priority cases. Moreover, the OMLP did not have a formalised analytical methodology to guide its operational analysis until September 2025. In the absence of such formalised framework, analytical outputs were largely driven by the individual knowledge, experience, and professional judgment of analysts. 519. In practice, as OMLP explained, when conducting operational analysis, every subject from an STR is checked through its database and all other databases to which it has access. If the case under analysis involves a transnational element such as foreign individuals, companies or accounts, OMLP proactively liaises with foreign FIUs to collect data needed for its operational analysis. During January 2020 - June 2025, OMLP sent approximately 2235 ML requests for information to foreign FIUs, and 19 requests related to TF (See IO.2). The number of requests has significantly risen since 2023, demonstrating that the OMLP increasingly and regularly sought international assistance from foreign FIUs to enrich its operational analysis or to identify fraudulent funds abroad. 520. When the analysis of an STR is concluded, the analyst proposes to the head of STS that the case be disseminated to the competent authorities or be concluded ad acta . If the head of STS is satisfied with the quality of the analysis, she approves the dissemination and passes on the case to the Director of the OMLP for the final approval. In case the analysis needs further information to substantiate the proposed conclusions, the case is given back to the analyst in charge to gather additional information and to enrich the analysis. Case box 6.1: The OMLP’s operational independence and autonomy There was a period during 2021 to 2022 when political developments temporarily affected the OMLP’s ability to function autonomously. The newly elected Government at the time appointed a new Director of the OMLP, which resulted in replacement of several key staff within the OMLP and alleged arbitrary collection (including from foreign FIUs) of information and intelligence against natural and legal persons for political ends. This allegedly affected the integrity of analytical and dissemination processes within the OMLP during his tenure. Following the election of new Government in 2022, the Director was dismissed and the new head of the OMLP was appointed through a transparent selection process for a standard five-year term. Steps were taken to address previous issues: an internal review was conducted and findings regarding detected irregularities shared with the NBI, which resulted in opening a criminal investigation against the former Director; disciplinary proceedings were brought against staff involved in the alleged misconduct; cases concluded in 2021 were reassessed and the annual report for 2021 was revised with corrected data; earlier practices of closing cases without prior analysis were discontinued; guidelines were developed for the OMLP’s analysts; and foreign counterparts were informed of any affected notifications. Discussions during the on-site visit confirmed to the AT that the OMLP presently functions with full operational independence and is not subject to undue influence. The AT concluded that this situation reflected an abuse of power rather than a systemic issue in the appointment of the head of the OMLP. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 521. The OMLP disseminates information to LEAs spontaneously or upon request. Based on the offences identified during its operational analysis, the OMLP can disseminate information to the following competent authorities: (i) Criminal Police Directorate (Economic Crime Unit), the Prosecutor’s Office and other NCAs –ML suspicions; (ii) the Criminal Police Directorate – for TF suspicions; (iii) other competent authorities (Criminal Police Directorate, FARS, etc.) – for suspicions on other criminal offences. Table 6.5. Cases opened and concluded by OMLP between 2020-2024 [23] Year Total no. of opened cases No. of ML/TF disseminated cases to the Police and Prosecutor’s Office No. of disseminated cases related to other offences No. of closed cases 2020 1 137 450 486 298 2021 1 103 493 872 516 2022 1 161 314 418 339 2023 1 340 599 258 303 2024 1 728 920 242 278 Total 6 469 2 776 2 276 1 734 522. The number of ML disseminations made by OMLP to LEAs has varied over the reviewed period, with a decrease in 2022 and a significant increase in 2024. This decrease in 2022 can be attributed to the changes in the management of the OMLP and related challenges as explained above (Box 6.1). Conversely, the OMLP explained that the increase in disseminations in 2024 is due to the considerable increase in ML cases related to less complex online frauds (stemming from both STRs and police initiatives), which were prioritised by the OMLP and disseminated in a swift manner. 523. Disseminations to LEAs thus predominately relate to online fraud. The OMLP’s 2023 annual report states that it identified fraud as the most prevalent predicate offence in 66% of notifications, while in the 2024 annual report this figure rose to 88%. Tax evasion accounted as predicate offence in 3% of the ML disseminations from 2023, but less than 2% in 2024. In 2024, the attack of an information system and the abuse of trust in economic power represented the predicate offences in 3.50% of ML notifications. This landscape suggests disseminations are supply-driven, frequently reactive to STR flows and fraud initiatives received from the Police rather than risk-based or strategically targeted. The AT believes that the lack of a strategic approach led to the small share of ML disseminations related to tax evasion and abuse of trust in economic power as predicate offences, which is not fully aligned with the country’s ML risk profile. 524. The AT observed issues in relation to confidentiality and security of the process for dissemination, which is done via the post. This is further described below. Strategic analysis 525. The OMLP carries out strategic analysis to a limited extent. During the period under review, the following strategic analyses have been produced: (i) the use of debit and credit cards to withdraw cash at Slovenian ATMs during 2023–2024, highlighting evolving new methods in the laundering of illicit funds through cash-out operations; (ii) cash usage in Slovenia. The OMLP also advised that once a year, the analysis of CTRs, transactions related to high risk-countries, cash transfers across EU borders, and ML/TF concluded cases is also carried out for the purpose of the OMLP’s annual report. There are no established methods how to choose topics for and conduct strategic analysis. The lack of STRs from DNFBPs and FIs besides banks limits the diversity of strategic analysis and detection of ML/TF typologies. 526. Currently, the OMLP does not have a fully dedicated analyst responsible for strategic analysis; the only analyst performing this function on the part-time basis also serves as an advisor to the OMLP’s management. This combined with the lack of data mining and analytical tools, restricts the OMLP’s capacity to systematically process large volumes of information, detect suspicious networks or patterns, identify emerging trends, and detect evolving ML/TF typologies. 527. The ISUPPD platform used by the OMLP enables the extraction of some Business Intelligence (BI) reports (such as: “the frequency of STR submissions by each bank”, “no. of cases concluded by each analyst”, “concluded cases segregated by type”), enhancing visualisation and supporting more effective management of existing workflows. The OMLP noted that 15 additional BI reports are currently under development, which have the potential to provide a broader overview of its activities. While their concrete contribution to strategic analysis cannot be evaluated, these reports represent a promising step toward enhancing the OMLP’s analytical capabilities. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 528. Financial intelligence produced by the OMLP supports the needs of competent authorities (police and prosecutors) to some extent, despite the fact that both authorities consider OMPL disseminations to be of good quality. The statistics provided in the table below indicate that most ML pre-investigations are initiated by the police based on their own investigative work. In contrast, the number of pre-investigations triggered by OMPL disseminations remains considerably lower. 529. Prosecutors receive OMLP’s reports only when they initiate a case, usually when they lead special investigative teams or when the OMLP has information that pre-trial proceedings are directed by prosecutors. In the latter case, the prosecutors may request necessary information from the OMLP directly. 530. The number of resulting ML investigations, prosecutions, and convictions is not proportionate to the number of ML disseminations made by the OMLP. The LEAs stated that this is largely because initiating stand-alone ML investigations requires demonstrating a link to a predicate criminal offence (see IO.7). 531. Annually, the OMLP receives data on how their financial intelligence has been used from the Prosecutor’s Office, Police, and FARS. Feedback received by the OMLP on its disseminations is provided to analysts – either in Excel format or through the case management system – and serves as a reference database for monitoring the status of proceedings and for improving future analysis. Table 6.6. Number of ML pre-investigations triggered by different sources of information Source of pre-investigation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 triggered without prior complaint 50 42 65 111 250 triggered by complained, including OMLP disseminations 19 18 28 53 60 532. The OMLP’s products are also used to support ongoing investigations whether domestic or cross-border. The authorities presented a particular case where the SPO and NPU used intelligence from the OMLP to enrich their cross-border ML investigation (See Case Box 7.2.). The Police use financial intelligence in various stages of ML/TF investigations, from initial case analysis to ongoing intelligence gathering. Authorities stated that cases disseminated by the OMLP have helped the police to identify connections between the suspicious transactions and known criminal activity, individuals, or criminal organisations. The OMLP’s intelligence has also been instrumental to investigate the ownership and control of assets, leading to freezing and seizing of criminal property. 533. TF-related disseminations are also sent to the Criminal Police Directorate, which examines and forwards them to the NBI. Based on OMLP’s findings, the police start pre-investigation and conduct further analysis, if needed (see IO.9). In some instances, the police have sent initiatives to the OMLP to initiate the collection of financial data and submit back enriched analysis. 534. The OMLP supports the operational needs of FARS by spontaneously disseminating reports on tax offences. A central unit within FARS receives OMLP’s reports and evaluates them, after which the reports are prioritised and audits are triggered. Most of OMLP’s reports relate to tax fraud and undeclared work. CTRs and transactions related to high-risk countries are also submitted by the OMLP to FARS on a monthly basis, according to an agreement concluded between them. These reports are used by FARS to perform risk analysis, financial investigations, supervision of taxpayers, supervision of cash declaration at border, supervision of compliance with the ban on cash payments exceeding EUR 5 000. The data is automatically inputted by FARS into a specially developed database (QlikView) to be analysed and used within tax risk mitigation strategies related to (i) transactions with offshore jurisdictions and (ii) high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs). 535. FARS also has the good practice of systematically reporting on the use of information received from the OMLP (see Table 6.7). Table 6.7. Use of OMLP reports received by FARS Year 2022 2023 2024 Total notifications received from OMLP 293 165 179 Audits triggered by OMLP notifications 201 127 101 Misdemeanour proceedings initiated against tax payers 206 126 112 Amount of fines imposed EUR 549 300 EUR 276 450 EUR 324 323 Criminal charges against taxpayers as a result of OMLP notifications 14 11 5 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 536. In addition to the information sent by the OMLP, the police actively use their own operative sources for financial intelligence, which mainly includes information gathered through special investigative techniques. The NBI possesses its own intelligence-gathering capabilities to effectively support operational and investigative work. Moreover, it receives support from special units established within the Criminal Police Directorate: a special analytical unit working to collect data and develop intelligence and the ICT – a unit that is dealing with crypto assets analysis. ICT also serves as the national coordinator for crypto assets, providing expertise to local police units. Footnotes [23] The table contains data per indicated year on the overall number of opened cases and those concluded by disseminations related to ML/TF, disseminations related to other offences, and cases closed without dissemination ( ad acta ). With respect to some years, the number of cases disseminated and closed is higher than the number of opened cases, which, as explained by the OMLP, is attributable to the following factors: in a given year, cases originating from earlier periods were also processed, including the disposal of the backlog; a single STR, depending on its content and elements of possible criminality indicated therein, may result in multiple disseminations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 512. The OMLP has operational independence and autonomy to carry out its functions. 513. The OMLP plays a key role in producing operational analyses, which it disseminates proactively or upon request to the competent national authorities and foreign FIUs. There are 28 staff members within the OMLP, 10 of which are employed in the Suspicious Transactions Sector ((STS), 9 analysts and the head of the Sector). Three analysts are specialised: one for international incoming requests, one for restrictive measures, and one for TF. The number of analysts, in the light of the number of STRs, is not sufficient, and the authorities are considering a new prioritisation mechanism under a revised methodology and a new STR template with more pre-defined fields allowing for increased automatisation of data analysis, which would enable them to handle the increasing caseload more efficiently. The OMLP advised the AT that they have requested two additional staff members to be hired in the STS, of which one is to be dedicated full-time to strategic analysis. However, the requested hirings are not yet confirmed, nor have they an impact on the effectiveness of the assessed period. 514. All STRs are electronically received by OMLP directly in its case management system (ISUPPD), which has been in place since 2017. Through a manual prioritisation process, the Head of the STS does an initial check of all received STRs, reading them one by one, which is not efficient. In practice, the Head of STS prioritises STRs if they require urgent action (e.g., in fraud cases where the proceeds could be recovered), are related to TF, if adverse media exists regarding the issue involved, are related to earlier received STRs (seen as indicative of increased probability of criminality) or if the amount involved exceeds EUR 200,000. Prioritised STRs are assigned to an analyst, while the STRs assessed with a low level of priority become dormant until they are subject to brief checks by analysts and concluded. 515. The aforementioned methodology, while used in practice throughout the period under review, has been formalised only in September 2025 through the adoption of the respective guidelines for the STS. The AT deems the prioritisation methodology not entirely effective, as it adopts a binary approach, with STRs or initiatives being treated either as urgent or low priority, without giving consideration to cases of normal priority. Moreover, the AT concludes that the manual prioritisation of STRs consumes already insufficient human resources and heavily relies on individual judgement and expertise, increasing the risk of delays, human error, biased case selection, or missed opportunities. 516. The average time to analyse an STR depends on the type of offence suspected, the urgency and the complexity of the case. The OMLP advised that urgent cases (e.g. related to TF or fraud) are analysed within 2 days and referred to competent authorities if sings of potential criminality are detected (See Case Box 9.1). Complex ML STRs are analysed within 1-2 months. During 2020-2024, the average lifecycle of an STR (from receipt to dissemination) was 6 months. As the authorities advised the AT, this partly resulted from the long duration of processing STRs under the previous management (in 2021-2022) and party from a longer duration of the average time needed to conclude low priority STRs. However, the average lifecycle has shortened since 2022 (overall average of about 3 months), with an average processing time of ML STRs disseminated to LEAs being 2.2 months. 517. At the time of the on-site visit, the OMLP indicated that the STS is facing a backlog of 850 STRs from 2024 and 2025, primarily as a result of insufficient resources. They advised that the backlog largely comprised of cases that had been deemed as low priority by the STS at the time of initial prioritisation done by the Head of STS as described above. Replicating the approach taken for processing the backlog from earlier years, the OMLP plans to allocate these cases to analysts to perform basic checks and conclude them as ad acta or notify the LEAs, as appropriate. The AT is of the view that OMLP lacks sufficient resources to simultaneously process both the backlog and increasing number of incoming reports, which limits their ability to produce high-quality and actionable financial intelligence in a timely manner. 518. Although case examples reflect that the OMLP has the ability to prioritise certain cases, the AT considers that the absence of an automated prioritisation mechanism with multiple priority levels – particularly as the number of STRs continues to increase each year – may heighten the risk of human error and delay the identification of high-priority cases. Moreover, the OMLP did not have a formalised analytical methodology to guide its operational analysis until September 2025. In the absence of such formalised framework, analytical outputs were largely driven by the individual knowledge, experience, and professional judgment of analysts. 519. In practice, as OMLP explained, when conducting operational analysis, every subject from an STR is checked through its database and all other databases to which it has access. If the case under analysis involves a transnational element such as foreign individuals, companies or accounts, OMLP proactively liaises with foreign FIUs to collect data needed for its operational analysis. During January 2020 - June 2025, OMLP sent approximately 2235 ML requests for information to foreign FIUs, and 19 requests related to TF (See IO.2). The number of requests has significantly risen since 2023, demonstrating that the OMLP increasingly and regularly sought international assistance from foreign FIUs to enrich its operational analysis or to identify fraudulent funds abroad. 520. When the analysis of an STR is concluded, the analyst proposes to the head of STS that the case be disseminated to the competent authorities or be concluded ad acta . If the head of STS is satisfied with the quality of the analysis, she approves the dissemination and passes on the case to the Director of the OMLP for the final approval. In case the analysis needs further information to substantiate the proposed conclusions, the case is given back to the analyst in charge to gather additional information and to enrich the analysis. Case box 6.1: The OMLP’s operational independence and autonomy There was a period during 2021 to 2022 when political developments temporarily affected the OMLP’s ability to function autonomously. The newly elected Government at the time appointed a new Director of the OMLP, which resulted in replacement of several key staff within the OMLP and alleged arbitrary collection (including from foreign FIUs) of information and intelligence against natural and legal persons for political ends. This allegedly affected the integrity of analytical and dissemination processes within the OMLP during his tenure. Following the election of new Government in 2022, the Director was dismissed and the new head of the OMLP was appointed through a transparent selection process for a standard five-year term. Steps were taken to address previous issues: an internal review was conducted and findings regarding detected irregularities shared with the NBI, which resulted in opening a criminal investigation against the former Director; disciplinary proceedings were brought against staff involved in the alleged misconduct; cases concluded in 2021 were reassessed and the annual report for 2021 was revised with corrected data; earlier practices of closing cases without prior analysis were discontinued; guidelines were developed for the OMLP’s analysts; and foreign counterparts were informed of any affected notifications. Discussions during the on-site visit confirmed to the AT that the OMLP presently functions with full operational independence and is not subject to undue influence. The AT concluded that this situation reflected an abuse of power rather than a systemic issue in the appointment of the head of the OMLP. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 521. The OMLP disseminates information to LEAs spontaneously or upon request. Based on the offences identified during its operational analysis, the OMLP can disseminate information to the following competent authorities: (i) Criminal Police Directorate (Economic Crime Unit), the Prosecutor’s Office and other NCAs –ML suspicions; (ii) the Criminal Police Directorate – for TF suspicions; (iii) other competent authorities (Criminal Police Directorate, FARS, etc.) – for suspicions on other criminal offences. Table 6.5. Cases opened and concluded by OMLP between 2020-2024 [23] Year Total no. of opened cases No. of ML/TF disseminated cases to the Police and Prosecutor’s Office No. of disseminated cases related to other offences No. of closed cases 2020 1 137 450 486 298 2021 1 103 493 872 516 2022 1 161 314 418 339 2023 1 340 599 258 303 2024 1 728 920 242 278 Total 6 469 2 776 2 276 1 734 522. The number of ML disseminations made by OMLP to LEAs has varied over the reviewed period, with a decrease in 2022 and a significant increase in 2024. This decrease in 2022 can be attributed to the changes in the management of the OMLP and related challenges as explained above (Box 6.1). Conversely, the OMLP explained that the increase in disseminations in 2024 is due to the considerable increase in ML cases related to less complex online frauds (stemming from both STRs and police initiatives), which were prioritised by the OMLP and disseminated in a swift manner. 523. Disseminations to LEAs thus predominately relate to online fraud. The OMLP’s 2023 annual report states that it identified fraud as the most prevalent predicate offence in 66% of notifications, while in the 2024 annual report this figure rose to 88%. Tax evasion accounted as predicate offence in 3% of the ML disseminations from 2023, but less than 2% in 2024. In 2024, the attack of an information system and the abuse of trust in economic power represented the predicate offences in 3.50% of ML notifications. This landscape suggests disseminations are supply-driven, frequently reactive to STR flows and fraud initiatives received from the Police rather than risk-based or strategically targeted. The AT believes that the lack of a strategic approach led to the small share of ML disseminations related to tax evasion and abuse of trust in economic power as predicate offences, which is not fully aligned with the country’s ML risk profile. 524. The AT observed issues in relation to confidentiality and security of the process for dissemination, which is done via the post. This is further described below. Strategic analysis 525. The OMLP carries out strategic analysis to a limited extent. During the period under review, the following strategic analyses have been produced: (i) the use of debit and credit cards to withdraw cash at Slovenian ATMs during 2023–2024, highlighting evolving new methods in the laundering of illicit funds through cash-out operations; (ii) cash usage in Slovenia. The OMLP also advised that once a year, the analysis of CTRs, transactions related to high risk-countries, cash transfers across EU borders, and ML/TF concluded cases is also carried out for the purpose of the OMLP’s annual report. There are no established methods how to choose topics for and conduct strategic analysis. The lack of STRs from DNFBPs and FIs besides banks limits the diversity of strategic analysis and detection of ML/TF typologies. 526. Currently, the OMLP does not have a fully dedicated analyst responsible for strategic analysis; the only analyst performing this function on the part-time basis also serves as an advisor to the OMLP’s management. This combined with the lack of data mining and analytical tools, restricts the OMLP’s capacity to systematically process large volumes of information, detect suspicious networks or patterns, identify emerging trends, and detect evolving ML/TF typologies. 527. The ISUPPD platform used by the OMLP enables the extraction of some Business Intelligence (BI) reports (such as: “the frequency of STR submissions by each bank”, “no. of cases concluded by each analyst”, “concluded cases segregated by type”), enhancing visualisation and supporting more effective management of existing workflows. The OMLP noted that 15 additional BI reports are currently under development, which have the potential to provide a broader overview of its activities. While their concrete contribution to strategic analysis cannot be evaluated, these reports represent a promising step toward enhancing the OMLP’s analytical capabilities. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 528. Financial intelligence produced by the OMLP supports the needs of competent authorities (police and prosecutors) to some extent, despite the fact that both authorities consider OMPL disseminations to be of good quality. The statistics provided in the table below indicate that most ML pre-investigations are initiated by the police based on their own investigative work. In contrast, the number of pre-investigations triggered by OMPL disseminations remains considerably lower. 529. Prosecutors receive OMLP’s reports only when they initiate a case, usually when they lead special investigative teams or when the OMLP has information that pre-trial proceedings are directed by prosecutors. In the latter case, the prosecutors may request necessary information from the OMLP directly. 530. The number of resulting ML investigations, prosecutions, and convictions is not proportionate to the number of ML disseminations made by the OMLP. The LEAs stated that this is largely because initiating stand-alone ML investigations requires demonstrating a link to a predicate criminal offence (see IO.7). 531. Annually, the OMLP receives data on how their financial intelligence has been used from the Prosecutor’s Office, Police, and FARS. Feedback received by the OMLP on its disseminations is provided to analysts – either in Excel format or through the case management system – and serves as a reference database for monitoring the status of proceedings and for improving future analysis. Table 6.6. Number of ML pre-investigations triggered by different sources of information Source of pre-investigation 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 triggered without prior complaint 50 42 65 111 250 triggered by complained, including OMLP disseminations 19 18 28 53 60 532. The OMLP’s products are also used to support ongoing investigations whether domestic or cross-border. The authorities presented a particular case where the SPO and NPU used intelligence from the OMLP to enrich their cross-border ML investigation (See Case Box 7.2.). The Police use financial intelligence in various stages of ML/TF investigations, from initial case analysis to ongoing intelligence gathering. Authorities stated that cases disseminated by the OMLP have helped the police to identify connections between the suspicious transactions and known criminal activity, individuals, or criminal organisations. The OMLP’s intelligence has also been instrumental to investigate the ownership and control of assets, leading to freezing and seizing of criminal property. 533. TF-related disseminations are also sent to the Criminal Police Directorate, which examines and forwards them to the NBI. Based on OMLP’s findings, the police start pre-investigation and conduct further analysis, if needed (see IO.9). In some instances, the police have sent initiatives to the OMLP to initiate the collection of financial data and submit back enriched analysis. 534. The OMLP supports the operational needs of FARS by spontaneously disseminating reports on tax offences. A central unit within FARS receives OMLP’s reports and evaluates them, after which the reports are prioritised and audits are triggered. Most of OMLP’s reports relate to tax fraud and undeclared work. CTRs and transactions related to high-risk countries are also submitted by the OMLP to FARS on a monthly basis, according to an agreement concluded between them. These reports are used by FARS to perform risk analysis, financial investigations, supervision of taxpayers, supervision of cash declaration at border, supervision of compliance with the ban on cash payments exceeding EUR 5 000. The data is automatically inputted by FARS into a specially developed database (QlikView) to be analysed and used within tax risk mitigation strategies related to (i) transactions with offshore jurisdictions and (ii) high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs). 535. FARS also has the good practice of systematically reporting on the use of information received from the OMLP (see Table 6.7). Table 6.7. Use of OMLP reports received by FARS Year 2022 2023 2024 Total notifications received from OMLP 293 165 179 Audits triggered by OMLP notifications 201 127 101 Misdemeanour proceedings initiated against tax payers 206 126 112 Amount of fines imposed EUR 549 300 EUR 276 450 EUR 324 323 Criminal charges against taxpayers as a result of OMLP notifications 14 11 5 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 536. In addition to the information sent by the OMLP, the police actively use their own operative sources for financial intelligence, which mainly includes information gathered through special investigative techniques. The NBI possesses its own intelligence-gathering capabilities to effectively support operational and investigative work. Moreover, it receives support from special units established within the Criminal Police Directorate: a special analytical unit working to collect data and develop intelligence and the ICT – a unit that is dealing with crypto assets analysis. ICT also serves as the national coordinator for crypto assets, providing expertise to local police units. Footnotes [23] The table contains data per indicated year on the overall number of opened cases and those concluded by disseminations related to ML/TF, disseminations related to other offences, and cases closed without dissemination ( ad acta ). With respect to some years, the number of cases disseminated and closed is higher than the number of opened cases, which, as explained by the OMLP, is attributable to the following factors: in a given year, cases originating from earlier periods were also processed, including the disposal of the backlog; a single STR, depending on its content and elements of possible criminality indicated therein, may result in multiple disseminations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="577. Slovenia can prosecute self-laundering and third-party ML cases whilst an autonomous offence will only be prosecuted if the predicate offence is established, as explained under the previous core issue. Case Box 7.2. Abuse of position &amp; Money laundering prosecution 2023 Between 2022 and 2023, the SSPO led a specialist investigative task force consisting of representatives of a number of competent authorities, including the OMLP, in relation to a large-scale pre-trail investigation into criminal offences against the economy. The OMLP analysed sophisticated financial schemes and contributed with comprehensive reports to the investigation, helping to uncover a ML network that operated transnationally in the region. The suspected offending crossed multiple jurisdictions, necessitating the establishment of a JIT that facilitated co-ordinated action including property searches. In 2023, indictments were filed, charging 3 individuals with offences of abusing a position of trust in economic activity, tax evasion and money laundering. The indictment alleged that the principal defendant operated a system of fictitious business transactions between 2017 and 2023, laundering large amounts of money together with the co-defendants. Among other acts, he laundered approximately EUR 3.2 million between 2017 and 2023 for three clients in Slovenia. He committed the offence of money laundering using at least five shell companies. He ensured the transfer of these companies to foreign nationals, who were formally recorded as the directors and owners. Seven plea agreements were agreed in 2024 that resulted in convictions for money laundering, abuse of position and tax evasion. The court imposed one custodial sentence of 2 ½ years, as well as suspended sentences and community service, fines up to EUR 720 000 and restitution up to EUR 1 195 000. 578. Prosecutors are required to prosecute without unnecessary delay, where there is a well-founded suspicion that a criminal offence has occurred. Cases filed by the state prosecutors may be prosecuted in any of the 11 District courts, those filed by the SSPO are referred to in one of the four designated specialist financial crime District courts located at the seat of the 4 higher courts (Ljubljana, Maribor, Celje, Koper). Judges assigned to hear the cases have received specialist training to ensure the efficient progression of the matter. Revised standards and procedures were introduced in 2024 that imposed improved case progression and to ensure timely resolutions. 579. Slovenia’s legal framework provides multiple opportunities for an individual to challenge or appeal prosecutorial and judicial decisions at various stages of the investigation and prosecution. Whilst offering a safeguard for individuals, the potential delays resulting from these appeals impact on the timely conclusion of prosecutions and adversely impact on resources and create trial backlogs. Further delays arise from general resourcing issues and unsuitable or outdated court facilities, which have led to instances of private venues having to be used with the associated security and practical issues impacting on the efficiency of the court. The authorities reported that some measures at the court level have been taken in order to resolve older criminal cases and meetings have been held with relevant courts and the Judicial Council to discuss the problems and possible solutions. While this is assessed as a positive step, the effectiveness of such measures are yet to be seen. 580. During the assessment period the data provided shows 151 prosecutions were undertaken against 236 legal and natural people, which resulted in 67 convictions in 56 of the cases for ML offences. There is no breakdown of different types of ML offences, but the majority of them are third party and self-laundering. Table 7.3: number of ML cases prosecuted, and convictions achieved Year Prosecutions cases (persons) Convictions cases (persons) % of prosecutions leading to conviction cases (persons) 2020 21 (39) 11 (14) 52 (36) 2021 25 (42) 13 (14) 52 (33) 2022 26 (46) 11 (12) 42 (26) 2023 33 (49) 9 (11) 27 (22) 2024 46 (60) 12 (16) 26 (27) Total 151 (236) 56 (67) 37 (28) 581. The ratio between successful convictions and prosecutions has decreased over the assessment period with a decline from 52% in 2020 to 26% in 2024. Similarly, the percentage of individuals convicted declined from 36% to 27%. The AT identified that undue delays in trials before the court and court backlogs are contributing factors. 582. The data relating to pre-trial police and Judicial ML investigations provides wider context. During the period, the number of pre-trial investigations compared to the prosecutions suggest that 39.9% of cases under police pre-investigation resulted in prosecutions, leading to convictions in 14% of cases, while the number of convictions compared to cases of Judicial investigations (Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) equalled 62%. These figures reflect the effect of the review process undertaken by Prosecutors on receipt of a referral and a high level of attrition between pre-investigation and Judicial investigation The variance in these figures and the process of investigations resulting in no further action is low. 583. Although legal persons are frequently used to facilitate money laundering activities, they are rarely investigated or prosecuted for the offence of money laundering. According to the authorities, this is mainly because such entities are often shell companies that cease to exist by the time proceedings are initiated. However, the AT came across several instances where legal persons, that were not shell companies, were not considered for ML investigations, which raises concerns. The authorities were not able to explain reasons behind such decisions. 584. There is insufficient data on the profile of ML cases that led to prosecutions and/or convictions. However, the cases reviewed indicate a consistent trend, with most being linked to fraud, mirroring the broader pattern observed in ML investigations. The AT concludes that these results are to some extent in line with country’s risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="577. Slovenia can prosecute self-laundering and third-party ML cases whilst an autonomous offence will only be prosecuted if the predicate offence is established, as explained under the previous core issue. Case Box 7.2. Abuse of position &amp; Money laundering prosecution 2023 Between 2022 and 2023, the SSPO led a specialist investigative task force consisting of representatives of a number of competent authorities, including the OMLP, in relation to a large-scale pre-trail investigation into criminal offences against the economy. The OMLP analysed sophisticated financial schemes and contributed with comprehensive reports to the investigation, helping to uncover a ML network that operated transnationally in the region. The suspected offending crossed multiple jurisdictions, necessitating the establishment of a JIT that facilitated co-ordinated action including property searches. In 2023, indictments were filed, charging 3 individuals with offences of abusing a position of trust in economic activity, tax evasion and money laundering. The indictment alleged that the principal defendant operated a system of fictitious business transactions between 2017 and 2023, laundering large amounts of money together with the co-defendants. Among other acts, he laundered approximately EUR 3.2 million between 2017 and 2023 for three clients in Slovenia. He committed the offence of money laundering using at least five shell companies. He ensured the transfer of these companies to foreign nationals, who were formally recorded as the directors and owners. Seven plea agreements were agreed in 2024 that resulted in convictions for money laundering, abuse of position and tax evasion. The court imposed one custodial sentence of 2 ½ years, as well as suspended sentences and community service, fines up to EUR 720 000 and restitution up to EUR 1 195 000. 578. Prosecutors are required to prosecute without unnecessary delay, where there is a well-founded suspicion that a criminal offence has occurred. Cases filed by the state prosecutors may be prosecuted in any of the 11 District courts, those filed by the SSPO are referred to in one of the four designated specialist financial crime District courts located at the seat of the 4 higher courts (Ljubljana, Maribor, Celje, Koper). Judges assigned to hear the cases have received specialist training to ensure the efficient progression of the matter. Revised standards and procedures were introduced in 2024 that imposed improved case progression and to ensure timely resolutions. 579. Slovenia’s legal framework provides multiple opportunities for an individual to challenge or appeal prosecutorial and judicial decisions at various stages of the investigation and prosecution. Whilst offering a safeguard for individuals, the potential delays resulting from these appeals impact on the timely conclusion of prosecutions and adversely impact on resources and create trial backlogs. Further delays arise from general resourcing issues and unsuitable or outdated court facilities, which have led to instances of private venues having to be used with the associated security and practical issues impacting on the efficiency of the court. The authorities reported that some measures at the court level have been taken in order to resolve older criminal cases and meetings have been held with relevant courts and the Judicial Council to discuss the problems and possible solutions. While this is assessed as a positive step, the effectiveness of such measures are yet to be seen. 580. During the assessment period the data provided shows 151 prosecutions were undertaken against 236 legal and natural people, which resulted in 67 convictions in 56 of the cases for ML offences. There is no breakdown of different types of ML offences, but the majority of them are third party and self-laundering. Table 7.3: number of ML cases prosecuted, and convictions achieved Year Prosecutions cases (persons) Convictions cases (persons) % of prosecutions leading to conviction cases (persons) 2020 21 (39) 11 (14) 52 (36) 2021 25 (42) 13 (14) 52 (33) 2022 26 (46) 11 (12) 42 (26) 2023 33 (49) 9 (11) 27 (22) 2024 46 (60) 12 (16) 26 (27) Total 151 (236) 56 (67) 37 (28) 581. The ratio between successful convictions and prosecutions has decreased over the assessment period with a decline from 52% in 2020 to 26% in 2024. Similarly, the percentage of individuals convicted declined from 36% to 27%. The AT identified that undue delays in trials before the court and court backlogs are contributing factors. 582. The data relating to pre-trial police and Judicial ML investigations provides wider context. During the period, the number of pre-trial investigations compared to the prosecutions suggest that 39.9% of cases under police pre-investigation resulted in prosecutions, leading to convictions in 14% of cases, while the number of convictions compared to cases of Judicial investigations (Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) equalled 62%. These figures reflect the effect of the review process undertaken by Prosecutors on receipt of a referral and a high level of attrition between pre-investigation and Judicial investigation The variance in these figures and the process of investigations resulting in no further action is low. 583. Although legal persons are frequently used to facilitate money laundering activities, they are rarely investigated or prosecuted for the offence of money laundering. According to the authorities, this is mainly because such entities are often shell companies that cease to exist by the time proceedings are initiated. However, the AT came across several instances where legal persons, that were not shell companies, were not considered for ML investigations, which raises concerns. The authorities were not able to explain reasons behind such decisions. 584. There is insufficient data on the profile of ML cases that led to prosecutions and/or convictions. However, the cases reviewed indicate a consistent trend, with most being linked to fraud, mirroring the broader pattern observed in ML investigations. The AT concludes that these results are to some extent in line with country’s risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="599. The authorities are able to use the full range of investigative powers when identifying and tracing criminal property and property of corresponding value and there are no barriers preventing the use of evidence in assets recovery. There are legislative provisions for both non-conviction and conviction-based recovery against legal and natural persons, with provisions for both extended confiscation as well as the seizure and confiscation of assets of corresponding value. 600. The police undertake regular training and upskilling courses to enhance their capabilities to trace assets including virtual assets. 601. Parallel financial investigations are mandatory and conducted by police under the supervision of prosecutor. They are always conducted alongside investigation of a predicate offence with the main purpose to identify and seize assets subject to confiscation. There are no legislative constraints on the use of investigative orders in the tracing of assets associated with a criminal investigation, nor are there any restrictions on the use of material obtained where the primary purposes of an enquiry were the criminal offence. However, the effectiveness of the parallel financial investigation is impacted by the issues noted in IO.7 of the increased evidential threshold for obtaining investigative orders (information on bank accounts) and restriction on utilising some existing data bases. The exception being publicly held records relating to corporate entities. The impact of these limitations is particularly relevant in instances where there is a risk of concealment or dissipation at an early stage of the pre-investigation. 602. The authorities have demonstrated an ability to engage with other jurisdictions, to obtain intelligence via the FIU, gather evidence and form JITs to trace criminal assets abroad. The authorities regularly participate in JITs which has been proven to contribute to the effective identification and tracing of assets. These JITs included EU and non-EU member states. During the onsite examples of cases provided by the authorities identified instances where assets had been identified in other jurisdictions (see IO.2). Case Box 8. 1 . Overseas crypto asset seizure In 2016 a JIT at the national level was established for the purpose of seizing of virtual currency Bitcoin that was believed to be linked to alleged drugs and money laundering offences. Within the JIT information was exchanged with the FIUs of Luxembourg, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Netherlands, and Lithuania. During house searches, electronic devices were seized and the data stored on them was analysed. It was established that the suspects held Bitcoin in foreign accounts (at Bitstamp in Luxembourg). The judicial authorities in Luxembourg executed the Slovenian court order from 2017 (which became final in 2020), seized the Bitcoins, and acting upon the Slovenian request converted them into euros (EUR) to preserve the value of seized assets. The conversion of the Bitcoin to fiat was undertaken by consent to preserve the value and supported by a court order for the sale of assets that had not previously been used for crypto assets. The court was further required to consider the most appropriate and effective means of realising the Bitcoin, which gain required an innovative approach to be adopted. Following the conviction in 2019 of the offenders a confiscation order for EUR 138 869.72 was issued by the court, this being in part the fiat value of the converted Bitcoin. Source: SPO Book of cases – No.11" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="599. The authorities are able to use the full range of investigative powers when identifying and tracing criminal property and property of corresponding value and there are no barriers preventing the use of evidence in assets recovery. There are legislative provisions for both non-conviction and conviction-based recovery against legal and natural persons, with provisions for both extended confiscation as well as the seizure and confiscation of assets of corresponding value. 600. The police undertake regular training and upskilling courses to enhance their capabilities to trace assets including virtual assets. 601. Parallel financial investigations are mandatory and conducted by police under the supervision of prosecutor. They are always conducted alongside investigation of a predicate offence with the main purpose to identify and seize assets subject to confiscation. There are no legislative constraints on the use of investigative orders in the tracing of assets associated with a criminal investigation, nor are there any restrictions on the use of material obtained where the primary purposes of an enquiry were the criminal offence. However, the effectiveness of the parallel financial investigation is impacted by the issues noted in IO.7 of the increased evidential threshold for obtaining investigative orders (information on bank accounts) and restriction on utilising some existing data bases. The exception being publicly held records relating to corporate entities. The impact of these limitations is particularly relevant in instances where there is a risk of concealment or dissipation at an early stage of the pre-investigation. 602. The authorities have demonstrated an ability to engage with other jurisdictions, to obtain intelligence via the FIU, gather evidence and form JITs to trace criminal assets abroad. The authorities regularly participate in JITs which has been proven to contribute to the effective identification and tracing of assets. These JITs included EU and non-EU member states. During the onsite examples of cases provided by the authorities identified instances where assets had been identified in other jurisdictions (see IO.2). Case Box 8. 1 . Overseas crypto asset seizure In 2016 a JIT at the national level was established for the purpose of seizing of virtual currency Bitcoin that was believed to be linked to alleged drugs and money laundering offences. Within the JIT information was exchanged with the FIUs of Luxembourg, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Netherlands, and Lithuania. During house searches, electronic devices were seized and the data stored on them was analysed. It was established that the suspects held Bitcoin in foreign accounts (at Bitstamp in Luxembourg). The judicial authorities in Luxembourg executed the Slovenian court order from 2017 (which became final in 2020), seized the Bitcoins, and acting upon the Slovenian request converted them into euros (EUR) to preserve the value of seized assets. The conversion of the Bitcoin to fiat was undertaken by consent to preserve the value and supported by a court order for the sale of assets that had not previously been used for crypto assets. The court was further required to consider the most appropriate and effective means of realising the Bitcoin, which gain required an innovative approach to be adopted. Following the conviction in 2019 of the offenders a confiscation order for EUR 138 869.72 was issued by the court, this being in part the fiat value of the converted Bitcoin. Source: SPO Book of cases – No.11" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="654. Slovenia has not prosecuted any TF cases. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the extent to which TF activities (including different types of TF cases) are prosecuted, and offenders convicted. However, the AT took a broader approach to assess the authorities’ capacity in the event of a TF case. The SPO is competent authority to prosecute TF offences. Within this unit, there are specialised prosecutors for terrorism and TF matters who receive regular training. While there is no training solely dedicated to TF offences, authorities provided evidence of various trainings attended by prosecutors and judges on terrorism-related matters, illicit use of crypto assets, including for TF purposes. 655. In addition, no formal or informal guidelines for SPO prosecutors exist in Slovenia exclusively for prosecuting TF offences. Nevertheless, measures are in place to ensure that TF cases receive additional scrutiny, if they were to occur. For example, decisions on the dismissal of a TF case or the submission of an indictment, must be submitted to the head of the SPO before they are finalised. The head of the SPO should review the case and may take over the case if they establish that there are deficiencies in handling the case by the prosecutor. The AT considers that these practices provide additional oversight, particularly over the dismissals of TF cases. 656. There are no specialised judges for TF cases in Slovenia. Nevertheless, judges undergo regular training on terrorism-related matters, which also covers issues related to TF offences. 657. Overall, the AT concludes that, due to the absence of practical cases, it is not possible to comprehensively assess Slovenia’s prosecution and conviction of TF offences. Nevertheless, the measures described above indicate that the authorities have the capacity to handle TF cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="654. Slovenia has not prosecuted any TF cases. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the extent to which TF activities (including different types of TF cases) are prosecuted, and offenders convicted. However, the AT took a broader approach to assess the authorities’ capacity in the event of a TF case. The SPO is competent authority to prosecute TF offences. Within this unit, there are specialised prosecutors for terrorism and TF matters who receive regular training. While there is no training solely dedicated to TF offences, authorities provided evidence of various trainings attended by prosecutors and judges on terrorism-related matters, illicit use of crypto assets, including for TF purposes. 655. In addition, no formal or informal guidelines for SPO prosecutors exist in Slovenia exclusively for prosecuting TF offences. Nevertheless, measures are in place to ensure that TF cases receive additional scrutiny, if they were to occur. For example, decisions on the dismissal of a TF case or the submission of an indictment, must be submitted to the head of the SPO before they are finalised. The head of the SPO should review the case and may take over the case if they establish that there are deficiencies in handling the case by the prosecutor. The AT considers that these practices provide additional oversight, particularly over the dismissals of TF cases. 656. There are no specialised judges for TF cases in Slovenia. Nevertheless, judges undergo regular training on terrorism-related matters, which also covers issues related to TF offences. 657. Overall, the AT concludes that, due to the absence of practical cases, it is not possible to comprehensively assess Slovenia’s prosecution and conviction of TF offences. Nevertheless, the measures described above indicate that the authorities have the capacity to handle TF cases." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="672. Slovenia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for TF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the low TF risk profile. 673. However, Slovenia demonstrated its governance framework for the implementation of TFS (and its ability to identify assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers and ability to prevent such persons and entities from raising, moving and using assets) to have a number of weaknesses. This, among others, is evidenced by the lack of: (i) clear channels of communication and the central authority for the receipt of reports on implementation of TFS; (ii) clarity on reporting obligations for the OEs and format for reporting; (iii) ability to maintain statistics and develop examples of reports received in regard to a (false positive) match with the UN TFS; (iv) ability to describe the undertaken steps where case of reporting and asset freezing or transaction rejection would occur. Therefore, in case funds subject to asset-freeze were identified and frozen by FI without delay, the AT was not assured about the effectiveness of follow-up steps taken by the competent authorities after receiving a report about the respective asset-freeze, e.g. if Slovenia would be able to identify and freeze, without delay, other types of assets of designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf or at their direction. 674. The competent authorities and OEs provided diverse information on the manner of reporting, and channels for communication. Some have mentioned the MFEA, some mentioning their supervisors and some – the OMLP. The authorities advised and the OEs confirmed that there is no developed template for reporting matches with designated persons and frozen assets or rejected transactions. The OEs would either use the STR form or draft a free-format e-mail. All those authorities have confirmed receiving sporadically reports on matches with designated persons (under autonomous EU sanctions regimes). As a result, none of the mentioned authorities gathered comprehensive data on implementation of TFS in the country. The authorities could not also explain the systemic approach applied to dealing with the received reports, creating gaps in understanding of the scope of assets frozen, data accessibility, its analysis and, therefore, hampering the effectiveness of implementation of TFS. 675. Therefore, Slovenia was not able to demonstrate operational readiness to effectively identify terrorists (including designated persons) and prevent them from raising, moving and using funds or other assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="672. Slovenia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for TF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the low TF risk profile. 673. However, Slovenia demonstrated its governance framework for the implementation of TFS (and its ability to identify assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers and ability to prevent such persons and entities from raising, moving and using assets) to have a number of weaknesses. This, among others, is evidenced by the lack of: (i) clear channels of communication and the central authority for the receipt of reports on implementation of TFS; (ii) clarity on reporting obligations for the OEs and format for reporting; (iii) ability to maintain statistics and develop examples of reports received in regard to a (false positive) match with the UN TFS; (iv) ability to describe the undertaken steps where case of reporting and asset freezing or transaction rejection would occur. Therefore, in case funds subject to asset-freeze were identified and frozen by FI without delay, the AT was not assured about the effectiveness of follow-up steps taken by the competent authorities after receiving a report about the respective asset-freeze, e.g. if Slovenia would be able to identify and freeze, without delay, other types of assets of designated persons and entities and those acting on their behalf or at their direction. 674. The competent authorities and OEs provided diverse information on the manner of reporting, and channels for communication. Some have mentioned the MFEA, some mentioning their supervisors and some – the OMLP. The authorities advised and the OEs confirmed that there is no developed template for reporting matches with designated persons and frozen assets or rejected transactions. The OEs would either use the STR form or draft a free-format e-mail. All those authorities have confirmed receiving sporadically reports on matches with designated persons (under autonomous EU sanctions regimes). As a result, none of the mentioned authorities gathered comprehensive data on implementation of TFS in the country. The authorities could not also explain the systemic approach applied to dealing with the received reports, creating gaps in understanding of the scope of assets frozen, data accessibility, its analysis and, therefore, hampering the effectiveness of implementation of TFS. 675. Therefore, Slovenia was not able to demonstrate operational readiness to effectively identify terrorists (including designated persons) and prevent them from raising, moving and using funds or other assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="708. Slovenia conducted its first PF risk assessment within NRA 2025. The NRA concluded on the overall national level the PF risk and risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF-related TFS in some OEs. Authorities and the OEs demonstrated uneven understanding of those risks, including in a global scale. This demonstrated that the comprehensiveness of the conducted PF risk assessment is limited which was also acknowledged by Slovenia. 709. NRA 2025 concludes that at the national level the PF risk is low. The AT does not challenge the conclusion on the level of the risk bearing in mind the context of the country, per se. Nevertheless, this conclusion was not supported by demonstration of specific methodology and information sources used to identify, assess and understand the PF risks at the national level. 710. In addition, Slovenia had also conducted analysis of some risks, threats and vulnerabilities for evasion of PF sanctions within specific sectors, such as banking sector, VASPs and DNFBPs. 711. While the base for analysis, depth and the scope are uneven, the NRA 2025 concludes that: (i) within the banking sector the IT tools used are adequate to detect transactions with designated persons or entities and freeze the assets in a timely manner; (ii) within the VASP sector the anonymity of ownership of VAs, the irreversibility of and the international dimension of transactions brought the sector to the level of medium-high PF threat; (iii) within the DNFBP sector due to absence in the customer base of designated persons or entities, transactions with designated persons or entities, reported matches and frozen assets, the inherent risks in terms of proliferation financing are low, and for some sectors are insignificant. Nevertheless, this analysis is also based on a limited data. 712. Slovenia did not demonstrate specific measures designed for mitigation of risks of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF. While no practical cases were detected, identifying potential evasion of PF related TFS may also be affected by certain shortcomings in identifying beneficial owners (see IO.5)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="708. Slovenia conducted its first PF risk assessment within NRA 2025. The NRA concluded on the overall national level the PF risk and risk of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF-related TFS in some OEs. Authorities and the OEs demonstrated uneven understanding of those risks, including in a global scale. This demonstrated that the comprehensiveness of the conducted PF risk assessment is limited which was also acknowledged by Slovenia. 709. NRA 2025 concludes that at the national level the PF risk is low. The AT does not challenge the conclusion on the level of the risk bearing in mind the context of the country, per se. Nevertheless, this conclusion was not supported by demonstration of specific methodology and information sources used to identify, assess and understand the PF risks at the national level. 710. In addition, Slovenia had also conducted analysis of some risks, threats and vulnerabilities for evasion of PF sanctions within specific sectors, such as banking sector, VASPs and DNFBPs. 711. While the base for analysis, depth and the scope are uneven, the NRA 2025 concludes that: (i) within the banking sector the IT tools used are adequate to detect transactions with designated persons or entities and freeze the assets in a timely manner; (ii) within the VASP sector the anonymity of ownership of VAs, the irreversibility of and the international dimension of transactions brought the sector to the level of medium-high PF threat; (iii) within the DNFBP sector due to absence in the customer base of designated persons or entities, transactions with designated persons or entities, reported matches and frozen assets, the inherent risks in terms of proliferation financing are low, and for some sectors are insignificant. Nevertheless, this analysis is also based on a limited data. 712. Slovenia did not demonstrate specific measures designed for mitigation of risks of breach, non-implementation or evasion of PF. While no practical cases were detected, identifying potential evasion of PF related TFS may also be affected by certain shortcomings in identifying beneficial owners (see IO.5)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="120. Article 14 of the APMLTF-2 sets out provisions for the use of the NRA to identify sectors or activities which require the application of stricter measures, as well as those presenting a negligible or increased ML/TF risk. 121. There are no specific exemptions, enhanced or simplified measures applied for TF. Exemptions 122. More specifically, Art.9 of the APMLTF-2 provides for exemptions allowing some organisers of classic games of chance to be fully or partially exempt from AML/CFT measures (See R.1.7). Such exemption may only be granted following a risk assessment carried out by the FARS and the OMLP, determining that the sector poses a low risk of ML/TF. 123. This exemption was implemented by Slovenia through the Decree on the Exemption of Organisers of Classic Games of Chance, which was first introduced in October 2018, and last ratified in January 2023. The initial adoption of the Decree was based on a comprehensive risk assessment conducted by the FARS in cooperation with the OMLP, which adequately substantiated that the activities are low risk and therefore warranted the exemption, and was subsequently ratified through the NRAs. 124. Slovenia has also established under the APMLTF-2 provisions allowing exemptions for legal entities, sole traders and self-employed persons that provide financial activities on an occasional basis or to a limited extent. This exemption is only applicable when a number of conditions are met, including that the activities are assessed as low risk. Furthermore, those seeking to benefit from the exemption must apply to the OMLP and demonstrate compliance with the conditions. The OMLP confirmed that it has not received any applications, and therefore no entities or individuals currently operate under this exemption. 125. There is also a conditional and limited exemption concerning the E-Money sector. E-Money Institutions may be exempt from certain CDD measures. Although Slovenia has not carried out a specific risk assessment to justify this exemption, it has relied on the assessment carried out under the EU Supernational Risk Assessment. Reliance on the EU Supranational Risk Assessment ensures alignment with broader EU risk findings and provides a reasonable basis for applying the exemptions. 126. Several deficiencies have been identified within R.22 whereby some activities currently may fall outside the scope of the APMLTF-2 and are therefore exempt from AML/CFT obligations. However, Slovenia has not demonstrated that it has carried out a risk assessment to substantiate these exclusions. Simplified and Enhanced Measures 127. Slovenia’s framework for enhanced and simplified measures is largely informed by the EU AML Directive, EU SNRA, and to a lesser extent from Slovenia’s NRAs. However, Slovenia has not introduced additional simplified or enhanced measures that extend beyond the requirements set out in the FATF Standards and the EU AML/CFT framework." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="120. Article 14 of the APMLTF-2 sets out provisions for the use of the NRA to identify sectors or activities which require the application of stricter measures, as well as those presenting a negligible or increased ML/TF risk. 121. There are no specific exemptions, enhanced or simplified measures applied for TF. Exemptions 122. More specifically, Art.9 of the APMLTF-2 provides for exemptions allowing some organisers of classic games of chance to be fully or partially exempt from AML/CFT measures (See R.1.7). Such exemption may only be granted following a risk assessment carried out by the FARS and the OMLP, determining that the sector poses a low risk of ML/TF. 123. This exemption was implemented by Slovenia through the Decree on the Exemption of Organisers of Classic Games of Chance, which was first introduced in October 2018, and last ratified in January 2023. The initial adoption of the Decree was based on a comprehensive risk assessment conducted by the FARS in cooperation with the OMLP, which adequately substantiated that the activities are low risk and therefore warranted the exemption, and was subsequently ratified through the NRAs. 124. Slovenia has also established under the APMLTF-2 provisions allowing exemptions for legal entities, sole traders and self-employed persons that provide financial activities on an occasional basis or to a limited extent. This exemption is only applicable when a number of conditions are met, including that the activities are assessed as low risk. Furthermore, those seeking to benefit from the exemption must apply to the OMLP and demonstrate compliance with the conditions. The OMLP confirmed that it has not received any applications, and therefore no entities or individuals currently operate under this exemption. 125. There is also a conditional and limited exemption concerning the E-Money sector. E-Money Institutions may be exempt from certain CDD measures. Although Slovenia has not carried out a specific risk assessment to justify this exemption, it has relied on the assessment carried out under the EU Supernational Risk Assessment. Reliance on the EU Supranational Risk Assessment ensures alignment with broader EU risk findings and provides a reasonable basis for applying the exemptions. 126. Several deficiencies have been identified within R.22 whereby some activities currently may fall outside the scope of the APMLTF-2 and are therefore exempt from AML/CFT obligations. However, Slovenia has not demonstrated that it has carried out a risk assessment to substantiate these exclusions. Simplified and Enhanced Measures 127. Slovenia’s framework for enhanced and simplified measures is largely informed by the EU AML Directive, EU SNRA, and to a lesser extent from Slovenia’s NRAs. However, Slovenia has not introduced additional simplified or enhanced measures that extend beyond the requirements set out in the FATF Standards and the EU AML/CFT framework." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1 FIU 199. The OMLP is committed to international cooperation, proactively requesting information from foreign FIUs through dedicated secure channels (ESW and FIU.net) when more information is needed to enhance their operational analysis in cross-border cases. The OMLP has the good practice of submitting feedback to its international counterparts. The quality and clarity of its requests have been recognised by the global network. Within the OMLP, a dedicated analyst handles the requests received from foreign counterparts. Besides, an international cooperation department is established within the FIU, supporting also the needs of the Suspicious Transactions Sector (operational analysis department). 200. In general, the number of outgoing requests is higher than the number of the incoming ones. Over the last 6 years, except for 2022, a significant increase in the number of requests transmitted by OMLP has been observed. This is due to the increase of ML cases stemming from fraud. The number of outgoing TF requests is low (19), which is in line with Slovenia’s low risk for TF. In none of the instances was an OMLP request refused, which is an indicator of the good quality of the outgoing requests and of OMLP’s engagement in international cooperation. The counterparts from which the OMLP most frequently requests information are the FIU of Germany and Italy, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk and context, given Slovenia’s strong economic and social ties with these countries. Table 2.8. OMLP outgoing requests OMLP outgoing requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 ML 344 354 257 467 583 230 TF 1 0 0 3 8 7 201. Although no statistics were provided on the number of requests sent by OMLP to foreign FIUs regarding freezing of funds, cases show that OMLP regularly seeks suspension of transactions. The authorities advised that the number of such requests increased significantly in the last years, as a result of an increasing trend in fraud cases, which almost always have an international element. 2.3.2 Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 202. The Police request information related to ML, associate predicate offences from foreign counterparts for both intelligence and pre-investigative purposes. Slovenian Police make use of its powers to cooperate both within and outside EU also through Europol-SIENA, Schengen Information System and Interpol I-24/7 dedicated channels. The police have developed internal guidance regarding international exchange of information as a tool to assist investigators in criminal investigations, which is accessible to all criminal investigators nationwide. A practical guide covering multiple countries is also available to police officers, providing clear, concise information on what data can be obtained from each country, the type of request required, expected timeframes, and the relevant foreign contact points. Also, internal guidelines on international cooperation matters are published on their intranet, covering areas such as extradition, cross-border covert surveillance, access to different databases, etc. 203. Slovenian Police officers from different units (Economic Crime Unit, National Bureau of Investigation and Regional units) demonstrate a high level of commitment for international cooperation, making regular and effective use of the available communication channels in the course of their operational activities to investigate criminal offences. For example, in the case described under IO.7 (see Box case 7.1), police used extensive cooperation mechanisms, including EUROPOL, which helped them identify suspects and start the investigation. 204. Additionally, Slovenian Police successfully request information based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, making efficient use of the available Europol and Interpol communication channels. Several fraud and ML cases with funds of significant value were presented, showcasing the ability of the Slovenian Police to identify, trace, freeze and recover fraudulent funds in EU and non-EU jurisdictions. 205. Under the coordination of state prosecutors, the Police participated in 2 JITs set by Slovenia, where cooperation was carried out swiftly between different national and foreign law enforcement authorities. This type of cooperation is appreciated by the Slovenian LEAs, as it allowed direct exchange of evidence between investigators from different countries. 206. During 2020 and the first half of 2025, the Police has sent 1945 ML requests (including additional requests) to foreign LEAs and 4 TF requests. The countries to which requests were most frequently forwarded via the Interpol channel were the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland, while requests submitted through Europol Siena were mostly forwarded to Germany, Italy, Croatia and Austria, which is largely in line the country’s transnational risk. 207. Slovenian prosecutors engage in informal cooperation with foreign counterpart via the Police given that investigation is conducted by the investigative judges. In urgent cases, direct contact and established professional networks are commonly used by prosecutors to coordinate with foreign authorities in advance on matters regarding the form and content of MLA requests, ensuring their timely and effective execution. 2.3.3 Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 208. The BoS regularly exchanges information with foreign supervisors, those of subsidiaries and branches located in Slovenia and Slovenian banks’ branches located abroad. Among other, the information relates to emerging risks, trends identified, licensing and relevant findings of inspections. Additionally, the BoS exchanges information in the framework of EBA and ECB supervisory colleges. In 2020 and 2024 BoS organised and hosted AML/CFT Supervisory Colleges, which served as a platform for cross-border information exchange and coordination among supervisory authorities overseeing FIs operating in the region. Table 2.9. BoS - Outgoing requests Outgoing requests 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 - Fit and proper, qualifying holding and extension of license procedures 19 22 13 4 - Supervision and sanctions 0 1 6 0 Total 19 23 19 4 209. In the fit and proper assessments conducted by BoS, many candidates have work experience solely within Slovenia, making inquiries to foreign supervisors unnecessary. For candidates with prior experience in entities supervised exclusively by the ECB, BoS requests complete suitability information only from the ECB, regardless of the MS where the institution is registered. 210. Additionally, as other EU financial supervisors, BoS has access to EuReCa database (managed by EBA), where it enters data on significant AML/CFT weaknesses identified during its supervision activities at FIs - together with the corrective measures/sanctions imposed. This kind of information is then directly available to BoS and other EU supervisors, removing the need for formal requests between authorities. 211. SMA seeks international assistance based on IOSCO and ESMA multilateral cooperation agreements. Obliged entities under SMA’s remit are mainly domestic entities, with insignificant international business scale. 212. ISA has legal powers to cooperate with foreign supervisory authorities. In 2020 and 2024 ISA sought assistance from a regional non-EU counterpart to obtain fit and proper information on a candidate for the Management Board of a Slovenian insurance company, with respect to licensing of specialised fund manager and alternative investment fund. The received information supported ISA’s decision . 213. Licensing and supervisory authorities for DNFBPs have little exposure to international cooperation due to predominantly domestic nature of the sectors covered. 2.3.4 Custom and tax authorities 214. In Slovenia, the FARS is the national tax and customs authority. It actively exchanges VAT information with other EU Member States, data on direct taxes, and customs with both EU and non-EU countries (see table 2.10). Since 2023, the volume of outgoing exchanges has almost tripled, which underlines the engagement of FARS in international cooperation. 215. FARS is well resourced, having a dedicated international cooperation unit established with 12 staff members dealing exclusively with international requests, and another unit of 10 staff members dealing with exchanges. Requests for information in the area of tax, excise duties and customs are received and sent daily to international counterparts. Most of the requests concern VAT issues and are sent within EU, Austria being one of the main recipients of their requests. 216. At the request of foreign counterparts, FARS initiates financial investigations according to the Tax Procedure Act. When international requests are received, FARS collects data from the tax database and other databases and performs a risk analysis and initiates tax audits in case risks are identified. Table 2.10. FARS – Outgoing requests and exchanges Outgoing exchanges and requests in the field of: 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 VAT 465 651 295 391 428 266 Direct taxes 351 221 310 917* 950* 551* Customs 50 19 16 39 43 25 * The data for 2023 -2025 deviates due to an increase in Requests for notification and Bulk service documents sent to Austria. 217. FARS presented a case that captures good cooperation with regional non-EU counterparts: a national of a Western Balkan country suspected of ML attempted to smuggle undeclared cash into Slovenia for subsequent transfer to another EU country. Based on a bilateral agreement, FARS requested and successfully obtained data on the suspect’s employment, bank accounts, registered business activity from the authorities of his country of origin. 218. According to the feedback from the international network, FARS often seeks assistance from foreign customs authorities, especially from Germany and neighbouring countries, which is in line with the country’s risk and context, particularly given its strong economic ties with neighbouring EU countries and its role as a transit country along the Balkan route towards the EU and the Schengen Area." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.3.1 FIU 199. The OMLP is committed to international cooperation, proactively requesting information from foreign FIUs through dedicated secure channels (ESW and FIU.net) when more information is needed to enhance their operational analysis in cross-border cases. The OMLP has the good practice of submitting feedback to its international counterparts. The quality and clarity of its requests have been recognised by the global network. Within the OMLP, a dedicated analyst handles the requests received from foreign counterparts. Besides, an international cooperation department is established within the FIU, supporting also the needs of the Suspicious Transactions Sector (operational analysis department). 200. In general, the number of outgoing requests is higher than the number of the incoming ones. Over the last 6 years, except for 2022, a significant increase in the number of requests transmitted by OMLP has been observed. This is due to the increase of ML cases stemming from fraud. The number of outgoing TF requests is low (19), which is in line with Slovenia’s low risk for TF. In none of the instances was an OMLP request refused, which is an indicator of the good quality of the outgoing requests and of OMLP’s engagement in international cooperation. The counterparts from which the OMLP most frequently requests information are the FIU of Germany and Italy, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk and context, given Slovenia’s strong economic and social ties with these countries. Table 2.8. OMLP outgoing requests OMLP outgoing requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 ML 344 354 257 467 583 230 TF 1 0 0 3 8 7 201. Although no statistics were provided on the number of requests sent by OMLP to foreign FIUs regarding freezing of funds, cases show that OMLP regularly seeks suspension of transactions. The authorities advised that the number of such requests increased significantly in the last years, as a result of an increasing trend in fraud cases, which almost always have an international element. 2.3.2 Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 202. The Police request information related to ML, associate predicate offences from foreign counterparts for both intelligence and pre-investigative purposes. Slovenian Police make use of its powers to cooperate both within and outside EU also through Europol-SIENA, Schengen Information System and Interpol I-24/7 dedicated channels. The police have developed internal guidance regarding international exchange of information as a tool to assist investigators in criminal investigations, which is accessible to all criminal investigators nationwide. A practical guide covering multiple countries is also available to police officers, providing clear, concise information on what data can be obtained from each country, the type of request required, expected timeframes, and the relevant foreign contact points. Also, internal guidelines on international cooperation matters are published on their intranet, covering areas such as extradition, cross-border covert surveillance, access to different databases, etc. 203. Slovenian Police officers from different units (Economic Crime Unit, National Bureau of Investigation and Regional units) demonstrate a high level of commitment for international cooperation, making regular and effective use of the available communication channels in the course of their operational activities to investigate criminal offences. For example, in the case described under IO.7 (see Box case 7.1), police used extensive cooperation mechanisms, including EUROPOL, which helped them identify suspects and start the investigation. 204. Additionally, Slovenian Police successfully request information based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, making efficient use of the available Europol and Interpol communication channels. Several fraud and ML cases with funds of significant value were presented, showcasing the ability of the Slovenian Police to identify, trace, freeze and recover fraudulent funds in EU and non-EU jurisdictions. 205. Under the coordination of state prosecutors, the Police participated in 2 JITs set by Slovenia, where cooperation was carried out swiftly between different national and foreign law enforcement authorities. This type of cooperation is appreciated by the Slovenian LEAs, as it allowed direct exchange of evidence between investigators from different countries. 206. During 2020 and the first half of 2025, the Police has sent 1945 ML requests (including additional requests) to foreign LEAs and 4 TF requests. The countries to which requests were most frequently forwarded via the Interpol channel were the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland, while requests submitted through Europol Siena were mostly forwarded to Germany, Italy, Croatia and Austria, which is largely in line the country’s transnational risk. 207. Slovenian prosecutors engage in informal cooperation with foreign counterpart via the Police given that investigation is conducted by the investigative judges. In urgent cases, direct contact and established professional networks are commonly used by prosecutors to coordinate with foreign authorities in advance on matters regarding the form and content of MLA requests, ensuring their timely and effective execution. 2.3.3 Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 208. The BoS regularly exchanges information with foreign supervisors, those of subsidiaries and branches located in Slovenia and Slovenian banks’ branches located abroad. Among other, the information relates to emerging risks, trends identified, licensing and relevant findings of inspections. Additionally, the BoS exchanges information in the framework of EBA and ECB supervisory colleges. In 2020 and 2024 BoS organised and hosted AML/CFT Supervisory Colleges, which served as a platform for cross-border information exchange and coordination among supervisory authorities overseeing FIs operating in the region. Table 2.9. BoS - Outgoing requests Outgoing requests 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 - Fit and proper, qualifying holding and extension of license procedures 19 22 13 4 - Supervision and sanctions 0 1 6 0 Total 19 23 19 4 209. In the fit and proper assessments conducted by BoS, many candidates have work experience solely within Slovenia, making inquiries to foreign supervisors unnecessary. For candidates with prior experience in entities supervised exclusively by the ECB, BoS requests complete suitability information only from the ECB, regardless of the MS where the institution is registered. 210. Additionally, as other EU financial supervisors, BoS has access to EuReCa database (managed by EBA), where it enters data on significant AML/CFT weaknesses identified during its supervision activities at FIs - together with the corrective measures/sanctions imposed. This kind of information is then directly available to BoS and other EU supervisors, removing the need for formal requests between authorities. 211. SMA seeks international assistance based on IOSCO and ESMA multilateral cooperation agreements. Obliged entities under SMA’s remit are mainly domestic entities, with insignificant international business scale. 212. ISA has legal powers to cooperate with foreign supervisory authorities. In 2020 and 2024 ISA sought assistance from a regional non-EU counterpart to obtain fit and proper information on a candidate for the Management Board of a Slovenian insurance company, with respect to licensing of specialised fund manager and alternative investment fund. The received information supported ISA’s decision . 213. Licensing and supervisory authorities for DNFBPs have little exposure to international cooperation due to predominantly domestic nature of the sectors covered. 2.3.4 Custom and tax authorities 214. In Slovenia, the FARS is the national tax and customs authority. It actively exchanges VAT information with other EU Member States, data on direct taxes, and customs with both EU and non-EU countries (see table 2.10). Since 2023, the volume of outgoing exchanges has almost tripled, which underlines the engagement of FARS in international cooperation. 215. FARS is well resourced, having a dedicated international cooperation unit established with 12 staff members dealing exclusively with international requests, and another unit of 10 staff members dealing with exchanges. Requests for information in the area of tax, excise duties and customs are received and sent daily to international counterparts. Most of the requests concern VAT issues and are sent within EU, Austria being one of the main recipients of their requests. 216. At the request of foreign counterparts, FARS initiates financial investigations according to the Tax Procedure Act. When international requests are received, FARS collects data from the tax database and other databases and performs a risk analysis and initiates tax audits in case risks are identified. Table 2.10. FARS – Outgoing requests and exchanges Outgoing exchanges and requests in the field of: 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 VAT 465 651 295 391 428 266 Direct taxes 351 221 310 917* 950* 551* Customs 50 19 16 39 43 25 * The data for 2023 -2025 deviates due to an increase in Requests for notification and Bulk service documents sent to Austria. 217. FARS presented a case that captures good cooperation with regional non-EU counterparts: a national of a Western Balkan country suspected of ML attempted to smuggle undeclared cash into Slovenia for subsequent transfer to another EU country. Based on a bilateral agreement, FARS requested and successfully obtained data on the suspect’s employment, bank accounts, registered business activity from the authorities of his country of origin. 218. According to the feedback from the international network, FARS often seeks assistance from foreign customs authorities, especially from Germany and neighbouring countries, which is in line with the country’s risk and context, particularly given its strong economic ties with neighbouring EU countries and its role as a transit country along the Balkan route towards the EU and the Schengen Area." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="279. All FIs and VASPs agreed with the analyses of their respective sectors in the NRA and the results of the said analyses. Understanding of ML/TF risks is generally well-developed, with stronger awareness in sectors facing more complex or specialised risk exposure. FIs under BoS Supervision 280. FIs supervised by the BoS generally demonstrated a good understanding of the ML/TF risks they are exposed to, especially when it comes to banks and EMIs. They were all aware of the results of the NRA and considered that there were no additional risks to be added. They all referred to potential risks like non-resident customers with no links to the jurisdiction, complex ownership structures with foreign BOs, and cash as possible risks to which they may find themselves exposed. Specialised banks offering trade finance services were particularly aware of the risks associated with their particular activities and have implemented mitigating measures associated with the same. EMIs were particularly aware of the risks associated with innovative products like Virtual IBANs, with the only EMI to offer the said product having discontinued doing so as the associated risks were not easily mitigated. Banks and EMIs were especially aware of how particular typologies that could be indicative of ML/TF can manifest themselves within their respective sectors. 281. The annual risk assessment questionnaire as well as the questionnaire circulated for NRA purposes further assists FIs to understand the ML/TF risks they are exposed to, though this may not be sufficiently detailed to allow a proper risk understanding by the FI compiling the same. As for the BRA, the main FIs could clearly articulate possible trigger events that would lead to a revision thereof, including the potential introduction of new products and/or services. BRAs are considered by the BoS in the context of its supervisory activities and were part of a thematic examination on four (4) banks undertaken between 2022 and 2023, the results of which were not in their majority considered serious enough to warrant enforcement action. FIs under SMA Supervision 282. Both investment services providers and operators within the funds sector were aware of the results of the 2025 NRA and were largely in agreement with the ML/TF risks resulting therefrom. Fund management companies were especially aware of how collective investment undertakings managed by them could be vulnerable to ML/TF, including through subscription in kind and the presence of nominee shareholders, which they do not accept. Cash in particular was not something they would entertain as a means to effect an investment operation. VASPs were well aware of their ML/TF risks arising from the use of VAs having privacy features and from unhosted wallets. FIs under ISA Supervision 283. Insurance undertakings and pension companies were very much aligned with the 2025 NRA when it comes to their risk understanding. They were able to articulate possible risks associated with their sector, including cash, the assignment of beneficiary rights etc. and provided a good explanation of how these can be mitigated. The same goes with the insurance intermediaries, though admittedly they are very much dependent on information provided by and mitigating measures communicated to them by their principal. FIs under Market Inspectorate Supervision 284. Leasing and lending companies demonstrated a satisfactory understanding of the ML/TF risks to which they are exposed to according to the NRA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="279. All FIs and VASPs agreed with the analyses of their respective sectors in the NRA and the results of the said analyses. Understanding of ML/TF risks is generally well-developed, with stronger awareness in sectors facing more complex or specialised risk exposure. FIs under BoS Supervision 280. FIs supervised by the BoS generally demonstrated a good understanding of the ML/TF risks they are exposed to, especially when it comes to banks and EMIs. They were all aware of the results of the NRA and considered that there were no additional risks to be added. They all referred to potential risks like non-resident customers with no links to the jurisdiction, complex ownership structures with foreign BOs, and cash as possible risks to which they may find themselves exposed. Specialised banks offering trade finance services were particularly aware of the risks associated with their particular activities and have implemented mitigating measures associated with the same. EMIs were particularly aware of the risks associated with innovative products like Virtual IBANs, with the only EMI to offer the said product having discontinued doing so as the associated risks were not easily mitigated. Banks and EMIs were especially aware of how particular typologies that could be indicative of ML/TF can manifest themselves within their respective sectors. 281. The annual risk assessment questionnaire as well as the questionnaire circulated for NRA purposes further assists FIs to understand the ML/TF risks they are exposed to, though this may not be sufficiently detailed to allow a proper risk understanding by the FI compiling the same. As for the BRA, the main FIs could clearly articulate possible trigger events that would lead to a revision thereof, including the potential introduction of new products and/or services. BRAs are considered by the BoS in the context of its supervisory activities and were part of a thematic examination on four (4) banks undertaken between 2022 and 2023, the results of which were not in their majority considered serious enough to warrant enforcement action. FIs under SMA Supervision 282. Both investment services providers and operators within the funds sector were aware of the results of the 2025 NRA and were largely in agreement with the ML/TF risks resulting therefrom. Fund management companies were especially aware of how collective investment undertakings managed by them could be vulnerable to ML/TF, including through subscription in kind and the presence of nominee shareholders, which they do not accept. Cash in particular was not something they would entertain as a means to effect an investment operation. VASPs were well aware of their ML/TF risks arising from the use of VAs having privacy features and from unhosted wallets. FIs under ISA Supervision 283. Insurance undertakings and pension companies were very much aligned with the 2025 NRA when it comes to their risk understanding. They were able to articulate possible risks associated with their sector, including cash, the assignment of beneficiary rights etc. and provided a good explanation of how these can be mitigated. The same goes with the insurance intermediaries, though admittedly they are very much dependent on information provided by and mitigating measures communicated to them by their principal. FIs under Market Inspectorate Supervision 284. Leasing and lending companies demonstrated a satisfactory understanding of the ML/TF risks to which they are exposed to according to the NRA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="366. The limited understanding of ML/TF risks among DNFBPs, including by those sectors identified by Slovenia as posing a higher risk, constitutes a major obstacle to the overall effectiveness of Slovenia’s AML/CFT system. 367. DNFBPs understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks was limited to the contents of the NRAs, specifically the 2025, that had been recently shared by supervisory authorities and SRBs. There was little awareness or acknowledgement of the 2021 NRA and its findings. 368. When discussing the ML/TF risks of the sectors, the OEs simply reiterated the conclusions of the 2025 NRA, without providing an in-depth and contextualised understanding of the specific threats and vulnerabilities relevant to their sectors or individual business activities. 369. The findings of the NRAs have not been assimilated or integrated into OEs risk assessments and internal controls. The majority of DNFBPs interviewed perceived their sector to be low risk, despite the threats and vulnerabilities identified by the NRAs. This reflects a discrepancy between the risks perceived by OEs and the reality of Slovenia’s ML/TF risk landscape. This lack of awareness undermines the effective implementation of AML/CFT controls by OEs, such as the application of EDD or STR reporting. 370. OEs tend to underestimate their exposure to ML/TF, often reasoning that their business activities primarily involve local customers, that they encounter few suspicious transactions, and that the customer’s use of the Slovenian banking system subjects them indirectly to the bank’s full AML/CFT controls. 371. Covered lawyers and real estate entities did not recognise any ML/TF risk exposure within their sector or their own business activities. Covered lawyers focused primarily on the activities of unregulated legal advisors, which they viewed as posing a greater ML risk. Real estate entities asserted that the risk exposure only arises in peer-to-peer real estate transactions where an OE is not involved. This observation was also noted by the SBA and by the CNS, respectively. 372. DPMS could not articulate the threats and vulnerabilities of its sector or its activities. 373. Casinos demonstrated comparatively greater awareness and understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks. The casinos were well informed about the rationale behind FARS imposed AML/CFT obligations and showed awareness of relevant trends and typologies associated with games of chance activities. This understanding reflects the proactive and comprehensive supervisory efforts adopted by the FARS. 374. Tax advisors, accountants and auditors that are part of an international group displayed a more advanced understanding of their ML threats and risks, including knowledge of common trends or typologies. Whilst domestic OEs’ understanding of risks was more limited. 375. All DNFBPs are obliged to complete an annual risk assessment. However, except for the entities which are part of an international group, such as tax advisors, accountants and auditors, these are largely carried out as an administrative exercise aligned with the Guidelines issued by the supervisory authorities and SRBs, and do not effectively consider their own individual risks. Furthermore, DNFBPs were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the assessments or how the results were used to amend or strengthen their internal controls. None of the sectors demonstrated forward-looking analysis to identify and assess emerging ML/TF risks arising from new activities, products, trends, technologies, etc. 376. With regard to TF, the understanding among DNFBPs was even more limited. The prevailing view, consistent with that of supervisory authorities and SRBs, was that TF does not happen in Slovenia. As a result, little attention has been devoted to these areas. The shortcomings identified within IO.1 regarding Slovenia’s TF assessment, negatively contribute to the DNFBPs limited understanding and awareness of TF threats and vulnerabilities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="366. The limited understanding of ML/TF risks among DNFBPs, including by those sectors identified by Slovenia as posing a higher risk, constitutes a major obstacle to the overall effectiveness of Slovenia’s AML/CFT system. 367. DNFBPs understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks was limited to the contents of the NRAs, specifically the 2025, that had been recently shared by supervisory authorities and SRBs. There was little awareness or acknowledgement of the 2021 NRA and its findings. 368. When discussing the ML/TF risks of the sectors, the OEs simply reiterated the conclusions of the 2025 NRA, without providing an in-depth and contextualised understanding of the specific threats and vulnerabilities relevant to their sectors or individual business activities. 369. The findings of the NRAs have not been assimilated or integrated into OEs risk assessments and internal controls. The majority of DNFBPs interviewed perceived their sector to be low risk, despite the threats and vulnerabilities identified by the NRAs. This reflects a discrepancy between the risks perceived by OEs and the reality of Slovenia’s ML/TF risk landscape. This lack of awareness undermines the effective implementation of AML/CFT controls by OEs, such as the application of EDD or STR reporting. 370. OEs tend to underestimate their exposure to ML/TF, often reasoning that their business activities primarily involve local customers, that they encounter few suspicious transactions, and that the customer’s use of the Slovenian banking system subjects them indirectly to the bank’s full AML/CFT controls. 371. Covered lawyers and real estate entities did not recognise any ML/TF risk exposure within their sector or their own business activities. Covered lawyers focused primarily on the activities of unregulated legal advisors, which they viewed as posing a greater ML risk. Real estate entities asserted that the risk exposure only arises in peer-to-peer real estate transactions where an OE is not involved. This observation was also noted by the SBA and by the CNS, respectively. 372. DPMS could not articulate the threats and vulnerabilities of its sector or its activities. 373. Casinos demonstrated comparatively greater awareness and understanding of existing and evolving ML/TF risks. The casinos were well informed about the rationale behind FARS imposed AML/CFT obligations and showed awareness of relevant trends and typologies associated with games of chance activities. This understanding reflects the proactive and comprehensive supervisory efforts adopted by the FARS. 374. Tax advisors, accountants and auditors that are part of an international group displayed a more advanced understanding of their ML threats and risks, including knowledge of common trends or typologies. Whilst domestic OEs’ understanding of risks was more limited. 375. All DNFBPs are obliged to complete an annual risk assessment. However, except for the entities which are part of an international group, such as tax advisors, accountants and auditors, these are largely carried out as an administrative exercise aligned with the Guidelines issued by the supervisory authorities and SRBs, and do not effectively consider their own individual risks. Furthermore, DNFBPs were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the assessments or how the results were used to amend or strengthen their internal controls. None of the sectors demonstrated forward-looking analysis to identify and assess emerging ML/TF risks arising from new activities, products, trends, technologies, etc. 376. With regard to TF, the understanding among DNFBPs was even more limited. The prevailing view, consistent with that of supervisory authorities and SRBs, was that TF does not happen in Slovenia. As a result, little attention has been devoted to these areas. The shortcomings identified within IO.1 regarding Slovenia’s TF assessment, negatively contribute to the DNFBPs limited understanding and awareness of TF threats and vulnerabilities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="472. Basic and BO information is available to all competent authorities in Slovenia through online access to the SBR and the RBO. Basic information on companies accessible through the SBR includes data and information allowing for the identification of the LP itself (e.g. name, registered office address, registration number), the individuals and entities that are its legal representatives and/or shareholders, as well as information on their basic powers. In the case of JSCs, information on membership is available through the CSCC. 473. The basic information should be kept current at all times but the absence of any timely and proactive oversight and the limited application of any sanctions for late or non-filing of updated information casts doubts about the accuracy of the information available through the SBR. For example, instances have been uncovered by FARS of 53 LPs allowed to remain active even though they do not have a legal representative. As regards the CSCC, in the case of nominee accounts held by legal professionals, much would depend on the CDD measures carried out by the legal professional concerned. 474. With respect to other LPs (i.e. associations, foundations, political parties, trade unions and religious organisations), the relevant laws do provide timeframes within which changes to their basic information is to be communicated to the respective register and, by implication, to the SBR. However, the absence of data on whether there were any late or non-submissions, and the corresponding actions taken, including the imposition of sanctions for any such failure, did not allow the AT to come to a conclusion about the effectiveness of the existing legal framework. 475. The information on BO available through the RBO is quite extensive, including information on the identity of the individual/s identified as BOs, information on the LPs involved, and information on how BO is being exercised. In addition, authorities can also access historical information on BO. All competent authorities have direct access to the RBO and its flexible search facilities allow them to search the RBO either by individual or by entity. 476. However, as acknowledged by LEAs, Prosecutors, and the private sector, the data obtained through the RBO is not considered fully reliable as there have been instances where the individuals identified as BOs did not coincide with those considered as such by the authorities or OEs. Concerning the accuracy and timeliness of information reflected in the RBO, the responsibility for providing and updating BO information, as well as for verifying its accuracy, rests with the LP. The fact that the RBO and AJPES have no powers to carry out checks to ascertain that this is actually done by LPs is a significant shortcoming in this regard. 477. As a means to ensure that all LPs comply with their BO information disclosure obligations, Slovenia requires OEs not to engage in business relationships with, or carry out transactions for, customers that cannot prove they have submitted their BO information to the RBO. In addition, where BO information has been provided, OEs are also obliged to report any discrepancies they come across between the BO information reported in the RBO and their own determination and identification of BO. Any such discrepancy is to be reported and acted upon by the OMLP. Not all discrepancies are communicated to the OMLP, as it informed the AT that they have directed OEs not to disclose minor discrepancies (e.g. an outdated address or typographical errors) as long as the situation is not high risk or there is no suspicion of BO concealment. 478. However, meetings with the private sector informed that discrepancies are not always reported independently of their severity. While this may equally result in the updating of information in the RBO where the OE insists on it to service the LP, it does not necessarily mean that this will be always the case, nor that it will be done within an acceptable time-frame. 479. The absence of any similar obligation on competent authorities is a further limitation on the safeguards in place to ensure the quality of the information in the RBO. As already indicated, LEAs state that they are encountering situations where the actual BO is someone other than the individual(s) indicated in the RBO. Apart from discrepancies they come across through their own activities, authorities also have access to information obtained from foreign counterparts which may also be used to carry out cross-checks with RBO data and ensure the accuracy of the data reported in the RBO. 480. Another possible source of BO information is the Bank Account Register (BAR). Data on accountholders would, where applicable, also include information on the BO(s) thereof. The BAR is linked to the RBO, limiting the possibility of any BO(s) being entered unless they correspond to those identified as such in the RBO. In the event of any discrepancy between the two, it is left to the reporting institution to seek the resolution of the issue and possibly report the discrepancy to the OMLP. 481. Competent authorities also rely on other sources of information on basic and BO information of LPs. Where necessary, LEAs obtain basic and BO information directly from the LPs, although no information has been provided on how frequent this is the case. However, the absence of any coordinated and proactive supervision as to how LPs abide by their obligations, together with cases where incorrect information was reported by the LPs to the RBO puts into question how reliable the BO information may be. 482. OEs constitute another useful source of basic and BO information. Most OEs, especially those in the more material sectors like banks, showed a good understanding of BO-related obligations and how they determine who is the actual BO, including by basing their conclusions not only on customer declarations, legal documents and searches in the registers, but also employing third-party RegTech solutions and open data sources. Besides reports on identified discrepancies submitted to the OMLP, OEs provide information on LPs to the OMLP upon the latter’s request. While the AT was not provided with any data as to how many requests for information it has submitted to OEs involving BO-related data during the period under review, the OMLP has confirmed that it has always received a reply to every request for information it has ever submitted to OEs. BO information is also provided by OEs when submitting STRs. LEAs can also obtain this information directly from OEs, but, similarly, there is no information on how often this information is sought from this source. Supervisors, when necessary, obtain BO and basic information on LPs from OEs as part of their supervisory activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="472. Basic and BO information is available to all competent authorities in Slovenia through online access to the SBR and the RBO. Basic information on companies accessible through the SBR includes data and information allowing for the identification of the LP itself (e.g. name, registered office address, registration number), the individuals and entities that are its legal representatives and/or shareholders, as well as information on their basic powers. In the case of JSCs, information on membership is available through the CSCC. 473. The basic information should be kept current at all times but the absence of any timely and proactive oversight and the limited application of any sanctions for late or non-filing of updated information casts doubts about the accuracy of the information available through the SBR. For example, instances have been uncovered by FARS of 53 LPs allowed to remain active even though they do not have a legal representative. As regards the CSCC, in the case of nominee accounts held by legal professionals, much would depend on the CDD measures carried out by the legal professional concerned. 474. With respect to other LPs (i.e. associations, foundations, political parties, trade unions and religious organisations), the relevant laws do provide timeframes within which changes to their basic information is to be communicated to the respective register and, by implication, to the SBR. However, the absence of data on whether there were any late or non-submissions, and the corresponding actions taken, including the imposition of sanctions for any such failure, did not allow the AT to come to a conclusion about the effectiveness of the existing legal framework. 475. The information on BO available through the RBO is quite extensive, including information on the identity of the individual/s identified as BOs, information on the LPs involved, and information on how BO is being exercised. In addition, authorities can also access historical information on BO. All competent authorities have direct access to the RBO and its flexible search facilities allow them to search the RBO either by individual or by entity. 476. However, as acknowledged by LEAs, Prosecutors, and the private sector, the data obtained through the RBO is not considered fully reliable as there have been instances where the individuals identified as BOs did not coincide with those considered as such by the authorities or OEs. Concerning the accuracy and timeliness of information reflected in the RBO, the responsibility for providing and updating BO information, as well as for verifying its accuracy, rests with the LP. The fact that the RBO and AJPES have no powers to carry out checks to ascertain that this is actually done by LPs is a significant shortcoming in this regard. 477. As a means to ensure that all LPs comply with their BO information disclosure obligations, Slovenia requires OEs not to engage in business relationships with, or carry out transactions for, customers that cannot prove they have submitted their BO information to the RBO. In addition, where BO information has been provided, OEs are also obliged to report any discrepancies they come across between the BO information reported in the RBO and their own determination and identification of BO. Any such discrepancy is to be reported and acted upon by the OMLP. Not all discrepancies are communicated to the OMLP, as it informed the AT that they have directed OEs not to disclose minor discrepancies (e.g. an outdated address or typographical errors) as long as the situation is not high risk or there is no suspicion of BO concealment. 478. However, meetings with the private sector informed that discrepancies are not always reported independently of their severity. While this may equally result in the updating of information in the RBO where the OE insists on it to service the LP, it does not necessarily mean that this will be always the case, nor that it will be done within an acceptable time-frame. 479. The absence of any similar obligation on competent authorities is a further limitation on the safeguards in place to ensure the quality of the information in the RBO. As already indicated, LEAs state that they are encountering situations where the actual BO is someone other than the individual(s) indicated in the RBO. Apart from discrepancies they come across through their own activities, authorities also have access to information obtained from foreign counterparts which may also be used to carry out cross-checks with RBO data and ensure the accuracy of the data reported in the RBO. 480. Another possible source of BO information is the Bank Account Register (BAR). Data on accountholders would, where applicable, also include information on the BO(s) thereof. The BAR is linked to the RBO, limiting the possibility of any BO(s) being entered unless they correspond to those identified as such in the RBO. In the event of any discrepancy between the two, it is left to the reporting institution to seek the resolution of the issue and possibly report the discrepancy to the OMLP. 481. Competent authorities also rely on other sources of information on basic and BO information of LPs. Where necessary, LEAs obtain basic and BO information directly from the LPs, although no information has been provided on how frequent this is the case. However, the absence of any coordinated and proactive supervision as to how LPs abide by their obligations, together with cases where incorrect information was reported by the LPs to the RBO puts into question how reliable the BO information may be. 482. OEs constitute another useful source of basic and BO information. Most OEs, especially those in the more material sectors like banks, showed a good understanding of BO-related obligations and how they determine who is the actual BO, including by basing their conclusions not only on customer declarations, legal documents and searches in the registers, but also employing third-party RegTech solutions and open data sources. Besides reports on identified discrepancies submitted to the OMLP, OEs provide information on LPs to the OMLP upon the latter’s request. While the AT was not provided with any data as to how many requests for information it has submitted to OEs involving BO-related data during the period under review, the OMLP has confirmed that it has always received a reply to every request for information it has ever submitted to OEs. BO information is also provided by OEs when submitting STRs. LEAs can also obtain this information directly from OEs, but, similarly, there is no information on how often this information is sought from this source. Supervisors, when necessary, obtain BO and basic information on LPs from OEs as part of their supervisory activities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1 Co-operation and exchange 537. The OMLP cooperates and exchanges information with the police, prosecutors, FARS and other competent authorities. The exchange of information is usually conducted through initiatives and requests from NCAs as well as disseminations from OMLP, which are sent by courier or post (see below). The OMLP is also part of special investigative teams created by prosecutors for the detection and investigation of ML, associated predicate offences, and TF. This enables real-time exchange of information and intelligence and enhances cooperation. During 2020-2024, the OMLP participated in more than 20 special investigative teams for conducting ML investigations and 14 special investigative teams for conducting financial investigations for asset recovery purposes. In some cases, as authorities advised, weekly meetings were held to agree upon the manner of conducting financial analysis and investigations, which proved to be a useful way of cooperation. 538. The OMLP exchanges information with the BoS mostly through initiatives submitted by BoS. The number of initiatives submitted by ISA and SMA to the OMLP throughout the period under evaluation is modest. The OMLP also provides supervisory bodies with the data needed for licensing and with opinions related to the applicants, and also data in relation to supervised entities such as the response time of an obliged entity to an OMLP request, timeliness and quality of reporting, which are subsequently used in supervisory activities. 539. The cooperation between the OMLP and the FARS primarily consists of disseminations from the OMLP relating to tax offences and abuse of economic power, while the number of requests for information or initiatives from the FARS remains limited. Case Box 6.2 Cooperation between the OMLP and the police In 2018, the Police initiated an investigation into a case involving a fraud scheme. Fraudsters initially contacted a branch office of a company pretending to be the director of the headquarters and instructed an employee to transfer money to a designated account, which were subsequently transferred abroad. The Police closely cooperated with the OMLP, which was involved throughout the pre-investigation and prepared over 60 financial intelligence reports for the Police, providing valuable insight and assistance to develop evidence. The analysis of the transactions involved in the case allowed the Police to identify several money mules in Slovenia. The evidence collected was sufficient to secure a conviction and impose a sanction of three years’ imprisonment. Source: Police 6.3.2 Security and confidentiality 540. The OMLP has measures in place to ensure confidentiality and secure storage of information kept in their premises. Employees handling confidential information have to undergo security checks at the time of employment, which are conducted periodically. Access to the premises and system is restricted and protocols are in place, governing the use of databases. 541. All information exchanged between the OMLP, LEAs, Prosecutors, and supervisory bodies is subject to classification under the Classified Information Act, at one of the following levels: Restricted, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. The OMLP uses the “Restricted” level of classification when disseminating information. 542. There are, however, some concerns regarding confidentiality of the information during the dissemination process. The OMLP sends financial intelligence and information to the Police in hard copies, either through authorised couriers or the Slovenian Post – in cases of disseminations addressed to local police units located outside Ljubljana. Although the OMLP advised that the Slovenian Post has authorisations to handle information classified as “Restricted”, the AT is not convinced that the information is protected accordingly to its classification level. Moreover, the OMLP could not assure the AT that such information is received exclusively by an authorised person/officer within these units, which raises concerns about the confidentiality and protection of data. Considering that ML/TF cases are generally time-sensitive and that physical dissemination process requires longer delivery time compared to electronic means, such delays may reduce the immediate operational value of the intelligence disseminated. 543. The Police stated they may send initiatives to the OMLP via electronic means, but classified and sensitive information is sent in hard copies by couriers. The AT concludes that the lack of an electronic secure channel affects the timeliness and poses risks in terms of confidentiality of data exchange. 544. By contrast, when exchanging information with foreign FIUs and Europol, the OMLP uses electronic secure channels, namely Egmont Secure Web and FIU.net." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1 Co-operation and exchange 537. The OMLP cooperates and exchanges information with the police, prosecutors, FARS and other competent authorities. The exchange of information is usually conducted through initiatives and requests from NCAs as well as disseminations from OMLP, which are sent by courier or post (see below). The OMLP is also part of special investigative teams created by prosecutors for the detection and investigation of ML, associated predicate offences, and TF. This enables real-time exchange of information and intelligence and enhances cooperation. During 2020-2024, the OMLP participated in more than 20 special investigative teams for conducting ML investigations and 14 special investigative teams for conducting financial investigations for asset recovery purposes. In some cases, as authorities advised, weekly meetings were held to agree upon the manner of conducting financial analysis and investigations, which proved to be a useful way of cooperation. 538. The OMLP exchanges information with the BoS mostly through initiatives submitted by BoS. The number of initiatives submitted by ISA and SMA to the OMLP throughout the period under evaluation is modest. The OMLP also provides supervisory bodies with the data needed for licensing and with opinions related to the applicants, and also data in relation to supervised entities such as the response time of an obliged entity to an OMLP request, timeliness and quality of reporting, which are subsequently used in supervisory activities. 539. The cooperation between the OMLP and the FARS primarily consists of disseminations from the OMLP relating to tax offences and abuse of economic power, while the number of requests for information or initiatives from the FARS remains limited. Case Box 6.2 Cooperation between the OMLP and the police In 2018, the Police initiated an investigation into a case involving a fraud scheme. Fraudsters initially contacted a branch office of a company pretending to be the director of the headquarters and instructed an employee to transfer money to a designated account, which were subsequently transferred abroad. The Police closely cooperated with the OMLP, which was involved throughout the pre-investigation and prepared over 60 financial intelligence reports for the Police, providing valuable insight and assistance to develop evidence. The analysis of the transactions involved in the case allowed the Police to identify several money mules in Slovenia. The evidence collected was sufficient to secure a conviction and impose a sanction of three years’ imprisonment. Source: Police 6.3.2 Security and confidentiality 540. The OMLP has measures in place to ensure confidentiality and secure storage of information kept in their premises. Employees handling confidential information have to undergo security checks at the time of employment, which are conducted periodically. Access to the premises and system is restricted and protocols are in place, governing the use of databases. 541. All information exchanged between the OMLP, LEAs, Prosecutors, and supervisory bodies is subject to classification under the Classified Information Act, at one of the following levels: Restricted, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. The OMLP uses the “Restricted” level of classification when disseminating information. 542. There are, however, some concerns regarding confidentiality of the information during the dissemination process. The OMLP sends financial intelligence and information to the Police in hard copies, either through authorised couriers or the Slovenian Post – in cases of disseminations addressed to local police units located outside Ljubljana. Although the OMLP advised that the Slovenian Post has authorisations to handle information classified as “Restricted”, the AT is not convinced that the information is protected accordingly to its classification level. Moreover, the OMLP could not assure the AT that such information is received exclusively by an authorised person/officer within these units, which raises concerns about the confidentiality and protection of data. Considering that ML/TF cases are generally time-sensitive and that physical dissemination process requires longer delivery time compared to electronic means, such delays may reduce the immediate operational value of the intelligence disseminated. 543. The Police stated they may send initiatives to the OMLP via electronic means, but classified and sensitive information is sent in hard copies by couriers. The AT concludes that the lack of an electronic secure channel affects the timeliness and poses risks in terms of confidentiality of data exchange. 544. By contrast, when exchanging information with foreign FIUs and Europol, the OMLP uses electronic secure channels, namely Egmont Secure Web and FIU.net." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. The sanctions applied to ML convictions remain insufficient and cannot be considered either dissuasive or effective. 586. During the assessment period, 44 custodial sentences were imposed for periods ranging between one and thirty months, of which 30 were suspended. Fines were imposed ranging from EUR 658 to EUR 100 000. There is a reliance on asset recovery as a means of resolving cases with confiscation of assets against legal persons and forfeiture of objects being applied in up to 125 instances, this reliance is not an acceptable substitute for effective sanctions. The number of sanctions recorded exceeds that of the number of outcomes. This anomaly may be due to different types of sanctions and custodial sentences being applied together against an offender, or that sentencing from an earlier period has been captured in the sentencing data. The use of multiple sanctions, such as suspended sentences and imposition of a fine, may be a rationale for not imposing custodial sentences, reducing the dissuasiveness of sanctions. 587. The low level of sanctions may be explained by the parallel nature of prosecutions, where sanctions are simultaneously applied for both the predicate and the ML. There is a clear rationale for this approach, ensuring dual sentencing is proportionate, and agreements ensure timely outcomes. A resource intensive trial can be avoided, while the defendant can expect a more lenient sentence and quicker resolution to the proceedings, which is consistent with the nature of domestic criminality where ML is an adjunct to the predicate offence, which will be subject to higher sanctions on conviction. It is also possible that the judicial view of ML as an accessory to the predicate impacts upon the priority and seriousness with which the court approaches ML matters and any sentencing following conviction. 588. A consequence of the low level of sanctions is the extent to which the investigation and prosecution of ML is incentivised and prioritised, given the general pressures on the police, prosecutors, and Investigative Judges, who are required to prioritise predicate offending over ML. This combined with the reluctance to prosecute autonomous ML supresses the volume of ML cases; in doing so it restricts the development of specialist skills amongst Investigators and prosecutors. 589. The ineffective nature of sanctions against both natural and legal persons was highlighted in the previous MER, the absence of any steps to resolve this matter implies, with other areas of continuing deficiencies, a low priority being given to an effective ML regime." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. The sanctions applied to ML convictions remain insufficient and cannot be considered either dissuasive or effective. 586. During the assessment period, 44 custodial sentences were imposed for periods ranging between one and thirty months, of which 30 were suspended. Fines were imposed ranging from EUR 658 to EUR 100 000. There is a reliance on asset recovery as a means of resolving cases with confiscation of assets against legal persons and forfeiture of objects being applied in up to 125 instances, this reliance is not an acceptable substitute for effective sanctions. The number of sanctions recorded exceeds that of the number of outcomes. This anomaly may be due to different types of sanctions and custodial sentences being applied together against an offender, or that sentencing from an earlier period has been captured in the sentencing data. The use of multiple sanctions, such as suspended sentences and imposition of a fine, may be a rationale for not imposing custodial sentences, reducing the dissuasiveness of sanctions. 587. The low level of sanctions may be explained by the parallel nature of prosecutions, where sanctions are simultaneously applied for both the predicate and the ML. There is a clear rationale for this approach, ensuring dual sentencing is proportionate, and agreements ensure timely outcomes. A resource intensive trial can be avoided, while the defendant can expect a more lenient sentence and quicker resolution to the proceedings, which is consistent with the nature of domestic criminality where ML is an adjunct to the predicate offence, which will be subject to higher sanctions on conviction. It is also possible that the judicial view of ML as an accessory to the predicate impacts upon the priority and seriousness with which the court approaches ML matters and any sentencing following conviction. 588. A consequence of the low level of sanctions is the extent to which the investigation and prosecution of ML is incentivised and prioritised, given the general pressures on the police, prosecutors, and Investigative Judges, who are required to prioritise predicate offending over ML. This combined with the reluctance to prosecute autonomous ML supresses the volume of ML cases; in doing so it restricts the development of specialist skills amongst Investigators and prosecutors. 589. The ineffective nature of sanctions against both natural and legal persons was highlighted in the previous MER, the absence of any steps to resolve this matter implies, with other areas of continuing deficiencies, a low priority being given to an effective ML regime." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="603. The prosecutors, upon the motion of the police, can request the court to freeze and seize assets subject to confiscation. This is systematically done in all instances related to predicate offences, including as a result of financial investigations. Nevertheless, in ML cases (particularly standalone) due to the high evidentiary threshold required for predicate criminality, these measures cannot be swiftly undertaken. The prosecutor shall provide enough evidence to support the existence of predicate criminality in order to substantiate suspicion for ML which is further necessary for the court to issue the order and seize funds. 604. As noted previously, there is no centralised comprehensive record of seized criminal property and property of corresponding value, the authorities have however provided SPO data compiled by the Competence and Information Centre (CIC) regarding the rates of referrals, seizure and orders obtained, as well as a breakdown of assets frozen and linked criminality. The CIC is required to record and retain SPO performance data, including that relating to organisational freezing and temporary seizing of assets. The referrals, seizure and orders obtained data set reproduce in Table 3.1 provides an indication of performance but is caveated as potentially being incomplete for a number of systematic reasons. 605. The data demonstrates an upward trend in the instances of referrals submitted to the SPO by the police, with corresponding increases in the numbers of applications to the court and freezing orders obtained during the assessment period. The figures further illustrate a general upward trend in relation to the percentage of successful applications made by the SPO. The data is derived from the ‘Joint annual reports of the prosecution offices’, which also reports that as of the 31st of December 2024 a total of 381 freezing orders were in place over assets with an estimated value of EUR 232 972 949. The amount seized and the positive trends in referrals and orders is commendable. Table 8.1. Number of seizure orders Year No. of police initiatives to secure assets for confiscation No. of proposals made by prosecutors for seizing assets No. of seizing orders obtained % of successful applications to seize Value of assets under provisional seizure (€) * 2020 155 72 55 76.4 224 153 330 2021 149 61 44 72.1 50 029 205 2022 204 132 115 87.1 108 090 254 2023 224 134 125 93.3 290 875 312 2024 259 185 167 90.3 232 972 949 Total 991 584 506 88.6 906 121 050 606. There is however a question as to the reason for the disparity between police initiatives and prosecutor proposals, with 407 initiatives not being progressed (see table 8.1). 607. The data supplied indicates a significant discrepancy between the number of police initiatives and the number of prosecutor’s proposals, with 407 initiatives not being progressed. The difference between these figures can be explained by a combination of factors, including the requirement to initiate parallel investigations in all matters irrespective of assets or losses being identified, the requirement for proposals to demonstrate reasonable grounds for suspicion for the predicate offence, and the criminal offence of money laundering, as well as the risk that the suspect or a third party will dispose of the property in such a way that it will no longer be possible to confiscate the proceeds of crime or assets. 608. Conversely, the rate of conversion of proposals to orders is significantly better, this could be interpreted as being demonstrative of prosecutor’s applying a proportionate and subjective review of evidence or alternatively may indicate a risk adverse approach to applications that seek only to advance those with a probability of being granted. 609. The data also suggests that there is an issue with the timely progression of these matters as a total of 381 orders, identified in the annual report, remained in place at the end of 2024, compared to the 506 that were obtained during the five-year assessment period. This means that 75.3% of the orders obtained during the five-year period remain extant, with resolutions in only 24.7% of cases. This is indicative of delays in proceeding due to challenges, court availability or realisation of assets following a final ruling in the matter. Table 8.2. No of seizure orders Year Real Estate No. measures ordered Movable Property No. measures ordered Money No. measures ordered Securities No. measures ordered Other No. measures ordered Total No. measures ordered 2020 27 22 60 6 7 122 2021 28 9 53 3 10 103 2022 37 11 69 2 5 124 2023 27 5 102 2 8 144 2024 24 12 144 3 6 189 Total 143 59 428 16 36 682 Table 8.3. Types of seized assets by value in EUR Year Real Estate value (€) ordered. Movable Property value (€) ordered. Money value (€) ordered. Securities value (€) ordered. Other value (€) ordered. Total value (€) ordered 2020 3 923 687 596 737 16 848 475 9 168 789 355 015 30 892 703 2021 3 674 256 195 556 9 498 523 5 260 032 1 070 582 19 698 949 2022 6 372 733 307 611 27 766 406 2 273 598 720 549 37 440 897 2023 6 049 564 89 251 194 402 023 2 273 598 4 303 262 207 117 698 2024 4 402 462 542 998 34 822 318 877 098 9 202 387 49 847 263 Total 24 422 702 1 732 153 283 337 745 19 853 115 15 651 795 344 997 510 610. The authorities are able to seize different type of property as it can be seen from tables 8.2 and 8.3. The types and nature of property subject to freezing measures ordered by the court, indicate that during the assessment period measures were applied in 682 instances for a combined value of EUR 344 997 510. Of the property types identified, 62.7% of measures were against money, and 21% in relation to real estate. The records also demonstrate the frequency and value of property by the nature of the criminality, with fraud being the most significant, accounting for 45.3% of all orders and 59.4% of the overall value. The fraud related instances are marked by a particular increase in 2023 and 2024. The volume of Fraud related activity is consistent with the NRA and overall risk understanding of the authorities. Table 8.4. No. of freezing measures ordered by predicate offence 2020 -2024 Offence type No of measures ordered Value of property (€) Abuse of position or trust in economic activities 104 9 7047 230 Causing bankruptcy through dishonest management 1 108 000 Corruption and bribery 13 1 458 015 Damage to creditors 14 4 512 679 Deception in obtaining and using a loan or benefit 3 118 250 Embezzlement and improper use of other people’s property 38 2 515 322 Forgery 36 4 089 763 Fraud 309 205 025 581 Illicit arms trafficking 7 635 876 Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 43 2 544 153 Robbery or theft 28 5 909 640 Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children 13 8 634 951 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 7 500 Tax crimes (related to direct taxes and indirect taxes) 66 11 919 310 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 6 471 240 Source: Slovenian authorities 611. These figures are helpful in understanding the frequency of different property types being frozen and the associated criminality. The value provided is given for the property not the criminal benefit determined, which is est. EUR 35 million less. There is an inconsistency between the different data sets which suggests a need for caution as they are significantly higher than those provided elsewhere. This can be explained by instances of the Investigative Judge or Trial Judge seeking or imposing measures separate to the SPO, assets subject to alternative recovery action, duplication of one person across multiple offences, or activity by other competent authorities not effectively captured in the data sets. 612. As noted previously, the ability of the police and prosecutors to act immediately or in a timely manner is hampered by the increased evidential threshold for obtaining banking material, and the restrictions on the use of some of the existing data bases which is particularly detrimental for standalone ML cases if not mitigated by active judicial co-operation. 613. The OMLP has the order suspension of transaction where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing When such a suspension is ordered, the APML must notify other competent authorities so they can take appropriate measures, such as freezing or seizing assets. 614. During the onsite it was noted by both police and prosecutors that a particular issue is their ability to effectively respond in instances where the FIU has imposed an initial 72 hr freeze on assets to enable initial enquiries. There are however examples of both domestic and international cases where the police/prosecutors were able to act immediately. The following case demonstrates commendable efforts of the authorities, such as effective early FIU intervention, timely judicial action, and constructive cross-border cooperation, resulting in the recovery of stolen assets for the victim. Case Box 8.2 The case originated from an FIU notification to the police, indicating suspicion that the director of a Slovenian company had laundered EUR 25 500 obtained through an online fraud against a Croatian company. Documentation from Croatia confirmed the predicate offence and traced the funds to a Slovenian bank account holding approximately EUR 17 000. Acting on the FIU’s order, the bank temporarily suspended all transactions. Following the prosecutor’s request, the District Court in Ljubljana issued a freezing order for EUR 25 500 and transferred the funds to a judicial deposit account. Evidence found during a search suggested that the suspect intended to dispose of the remaining funds. Upon the Croatian company’s request, the prosecution successfully moved for the restitution of the frozen assets, as they clearly belonged to the victim and were no longer required as evidence. The court lifted the freezing order, and the funds were returned to the injured party. An indictment was subsequently filed, and proceedings are ongoing. Source: VDT Book of cases – ODTLJ14" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="603. The prosecutors, upon the motion of the police, can request the court to freeze and seize assets subject to confiscation. This is systematically done in all instances related to predicate offences, including as a result of financial investigations. Nevertheless, in ML cases (particularly standalone) due to the high evidentiary threshold required for predicate criminality, these measures cannot be swiftly undertaken. The prosecutor shall provide enough evidence to support the existence of predicate criminality in order to substantiate suspicion for ML which is further necessary for the court to issue the order and seize funds. 604. As noted previously, there is no centralised comprehensive record of seized criminal property and property of corresponding value, the authorities have however provided SPO data compiled by the Competence and Information Centre (CIC) regarding the rates of referrals, seizure and orders obtained, as well as a breakdown of assets frozen and linked criminality. The CIC is required to record and retain SPO performance data, including that relating to organisational freezing and temporary seizing of assets. The referrals, seizure and orders obtained data set reproduce in Table 3.1 provides an indication of performance but is caveated as potentially being incomplete for a number of systematic reasons. 605. The data demonstrates an upward trend in the instances of referrals submitted to the SPO by the police, with corresponding increases in the numbers of applications to the court and freezing orders obtained during the assessment period. The figures further illustrate a general upward trend in relation to the percentage of successful applications made by the SPO. The data is derived from the ‘Joint annual reports of the prosecution offices’, which also reports that as of the 31st of December 2024 a total of 381 freezing orders were in place over assets with an estimated value of EUR 232 972 949. The amount seized and the positive trends in referrals and orders is commendable. Table 8.1. Number of seizure orders Year No. of police initiatives to secure assets for confiscation No. of proposals made by prosecutors for seizing assets No. of seizing orders obtained % of successful applications to seize Value of assets under provisional seizure (€) * 2020 155 72 55 76.4 224 153 330 2021 149 61 44 72.1 50 029 205 2022 204 132 115 87.1 108 090 254 2023 224 134 125 93.3 290 875 312 2024 259 185 167 90.3 232 972 949 Total 991 584 506 88.6 906 121 050 606. There is however a question as to the reason for the disparity between police initiatives and prosecutor proposals, with 407 initiatives not being progressed (see table 8.1). 607. The data supplied indicates a significant discrepancy between the number of police initiatives and the number of prosecutor’s proposals, with 407 initiatives not being progressed. The difference between these figures can be explained by a combination of factors, including the requirement to initiate parallel investigations in all matters irrespective of assets or losses being identified, the requirement for proposals to demonstrate reasonable grounds for suspicion for the predicate offence, and the criminal offence of money laundering, as well as the risk that the suspect or a third party will dispose of the property in such a way that it will no longer be possible to confiscate the proceeds of crime or assets. 608. Conversely, the rate of conversion of proposals to orders is significantly better, this could be interpreted as being demonstrative of prosecutor’s applying a proportionate and subjective review of evidence or alternatively may indicate a risk adverse approach to applications that seek only to advance those with a probability of being granted. 609. The data also suggests that there is an issue with the timely progression of these matters as a total of 381 orders, identified in the annual report, remained in place at the end of 2024, compared to the 506 that were obtained during the five-year assessment period. This means that 75.3% of the orders obtained during the five-year period remain extant, with resolutions in only 24.7% of cases. This is indicative of delays in proceeding due to challenges, court availability or realisation of assets following a final ruling in the matter. Table 8.2. No of seizure orders Year Real Estate No. measures ordered Movable Property No. measures ordered Money No. measures ordered Securities No. measures ordered Other No. measures ordered Total No. measures ordered 2020 27 22 60 6 7 122 2021 28 9 53 3 10 103 2022 37 11 69 2 5 124 2023 27 5 102 2 8 144 2024 24 12 144 3 6 189 Total 143 59 428 16 36 682 Table 8.3. Types of seized assets by value in EUR Year Real Estate value (€) ordered. Movable Property value (€) ordered. Money value (€) ordered. Securities value (€) ordered. Other value (€) ordered. Total value (€) ordered 2020 3 923 687 596 737 16 848 475 9 168 789 355 015 30 892 703 2021 3 674 256 195 556 9 498 523 5 260 032 1 070 582 19 698 949 2022 6 372 733 307 611 27 766 406 2 273 598 720 549 37 440 897 2023 6 049 564 89 251 194 402 023 2 273 598 4 303 262 207 117 698 2024 4 402 462 542 998 34 822 318 877 098 9 202 387 49 847 263 Total 24 422 702 1 732 153 283 337 745 19 853 115 15 651 795 344 997 510 610. The authorities are able to seize different type of property as it can be seen from tables 8.2 and 8.3. The types and nature of property subject to freezing measures ordered by the court, indicate that during the assessment period measures were applied in 682 instances for a combined value of EUR 344 997 510. Of the property types identified, 62.7% of measures were against money, and 21% in relation to real estate. The records also demonstrate the frequency and value of property by the nature of the criminality, with fraud being the most significant, accounting for 45.3% of all orders and 59.4% of the overall value. The fraud related instances are marked by a particular increase in 2023 and 2024. The volume of Fraud related activity is consistent with the NRA and overall risk understanding of the authorities. Table 8.4. No. of freezing measures ordered by predicate offence 2020 -2024 Offence type No of measures ordered Value of property (€) Abuse of position or trust in economic activities 104 9 7047 230 Causing bankruptcy through dishonest management 1 108 000 Corruption and bribery 13 1 458 015 Damage to creditors 14 4 512 679 Deception in obtaining and using a loan or benefit 3 118 250 Embezzlement and improper use of other people’s property 38 2 515 322 Forgery 36 4 089 763 Fraud 309 205 025 581 Illicit arms trafficking 7 635 876 Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 43 2 544 153 Robbery or theft 28 5 909 640 Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children 13 8 634 951 Smuggling (including in relation to customs and excise duties and taxes) 1 7 500 Tax crimes (related to direct taxes and indirect taxes) 66 11 919 310 Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling 6 471 240 Source: Slovenian authorities 611. These figures are helpful in understanding the frequency of different property types being frozen and the associated criminality. The value provided is given for the property not the criminal benefit determined, which is est. EUR 35 million less. There is an inconsistency between the different data sets which suggests a need for caution as they are significantly higher than those provided elsewhere. This can be explained by instances of the Investigative Judge or Trial Judge seeking or imposing measures separate to the SPO, assets subject to alternative recovery action, duplication of one person across multiple offences, or activity by other competent authorities not effectively captured in the data sets. 612. As noted previously, the ability of the police and prosecutors to act immediately or in a timely manner is hampered by the increased evidential threshold for obtaining banking material, and the restrictions on the use of some of the existing data bases which is particularly detrimental for standalone ML cases if not mitigated by active judicial co-operation. 613. The OMLP has the order suspension of transaction where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing When such a suspension is ordered, the APML must notify other competent authorities so they can take appropriate measures, such as freezing or seizing assets. 614. During the onsite it was noted by both police and prosecutors that a particular issue is their ability to effectively respond in instances where the FIU has imposed an initial 72 hr freeze on assets to enable initial enquiries. There are however examples of both domestic and international cases where the police/prosecutors were able to act immediately. The following case demonstrates commendable efforts of the authorities, such as effective early FIU intervention, timely judicial action, and constructive cross-border cooperation, resulting in the recovery of stolen assets for the victim. Case Box 8.2 The case originated from an FIU notification to the police, indicating suspicion that the director of a Slovenian company had laundered EUR 25 500 obtained through an online fraud against a Croatian company. Documentation from Croatia confirmed the predicate offence and traced the funds to a Slovenian bank account holding approximately EUR 17 000. Acting on the FIU’s order, the bank temporarily suspended all transactions. Following the prosecutor’s request, the District Court in Ljubljana issued a freezing order for EUR 25 500 and transferred the funds to a judicial deposit account. Evidence found during a search suggested that the suspect intended to dispose of the remaining funds. Upon the Croatian company’s request, the prosecution successfully moved for the restitution of the frozen assets, as they clearly belonged to the victim and were no longer required as evidence. The court lifted the freezing order, and the funds were returned to the injured party. An indictment was subsequently filed, and proceedings are ongoing. Source: VDT Book of cases – ODTLJ14" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Slovenia has not had any TF convictions. There are no specialised judges for TF cases in Slovenia and there are no sentencing guidelines for TF or similar offences. Very few existing terrorism convictions (most of which were outside the reporting period) do not provide for meaningful examples to conclude whether sanctions for TF would be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Therefore, it is not possible to assess to what extent the sanctions or measures applied against natural and legal persons convicted of TF offences are effective, proportionate and dissuasive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="658. Slovenia has not had any TF convictions. There are no specialised judges for TF cases in Slovenia and there are no sentencing guidelines for TF or similar offences. Very few existing terrorism convictions (most of which were outside the reporting period) do not provide for meaningful examples to conclude whether sanctions for TF would be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Therefore, it is not possible to assess to what extent the sanctions or measures applied against natural and legal persons convicted of TF offences are effective, proportionate and dissuasive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="676. In 2020, Slovenia conducted an analysis of NPOs’ TF risks. However, the risk assessment did not lead to proper identification of the subset of NPOs that fall under the FATF definition of NPO. NPO Strategic Analysis concluded that there are 17 NPOs that potentially pose higher TF risk. The NRA 2021 does not reflect on the exact number of those. The ongoing analysis suggests that there are some foundations and some association with status of humanitarian organisations to potentially pose higher TF risk. Consequently, these studies do not support each other’s findings and leave uncertainties on the nature of TF risks posed to NPOs. Authorities advised that they will need to further explore the subject. 677. Slovenia had also explored the risks related to abuse of NPOs for TF purposes within the scope of the NRA 2025. While the approach as also previously would not focus on the NPOs per the FATF definition, it gives and overall overview of the risk picture in the country. The analysis concludes that the threat of TF remains low in Slovenia, but it is potentially present, particularly through the abuse of NPOs. The NRA also explores the observed risks related to servicing the NPOs as customers by FIs and DNFBPs. It concludes that there were no specific cases of NPO misuse for TF purposes detected by the OEs servicing those organisations. While this does not amount for a comprehensive analysis of the risks of misuse of NPOs for TF purposes in Slovenia, this analysis would suggest that overall, the probability of happening so is rather low. 678. While, in general, the findings of the NRA 2021 and 2025 were shared with the OEs, the findings of the NPO TF risk assessment from 2020 were not communicated to competent authorities, OEs or to the NPO sector. Slovenian authorities have not conducted sustained outreach on the TF risks within the NPO sector and the donor community. The NPOs advised that there has been no guidance from the competent authorities in relation to addressing TF risks in the NPO sector. The NPOs themselves were generally not familiar with the TF risks in the NPO sector. 679. Slovenia applies multiple mechanisms to promote accountability, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs. This is done through multiple mechanisms, including the requirement for registration of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), regulatory framework for obtaining the status of an NPO, tax accountability, etc. 680. Slovenia advised also to implement a Strategy for the development of NGOs in the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023 that includes a strategic goal of promoting transparency, integrity, and accountability of NGOs. But this strategy was not informed by the NPO risk assessment. Nevertheless, Slovenia maintains a dialogue with the non-profit sector, and exchange on best practices through various means and channels. 681. Majority of Slovenian NPOs operate domestically, supporting their specific target groups. A number of NPOs were operating in the field of implementation of specific government projects, being funded by e.g. Ministry of Education, Health etc. There were two NPOs which are part of international organisations that were specifically collecting funds to support the vulnerable persons in one the ongoing conflict zones. Those had suggested that collected funds were not distributed by them directly, but these would be centralised in the headquarter and further distributed from there. 682. The governance framework for oversight and monitoring of NPOs is decentralised and fragmented, involves multiple competent authorities (see also c.8.3), with a coordination being an issue. Slovenia does not have in place focused, proportionate and risk-based measures to conduct monitoring of NPOs. The only available detailed information is available on the oversight carried out through tax audits. TF indicators are not assessed within tax audits of NPOs. Table 10.1 Number of tax inspections at non-profit organisations in the last 5 years (2020-2024) Tax audits/inspections at non-profit organisations (NPOs) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 institute 20 16 37 14 13 public economic institute 8 111 112 19 11 institution 1 0 1 0 0 associations 43 93 76 36 13 683. These inspections detected certain breaches which were all related to pure tax declaration/payment issues. No issues related to breach of legislation that would indicate TF risks were identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="676. In 2020, Slovenia conducted an analysis of NPOs’ TF risks. However, the risk assessment did not lead to proper identification of the subset of NPOs that fall under the FATF definition of NPO. NPO Strategic Analysis concluded that there are 17 NPOs that potentially pose higher TF risk. The NRA 2021 does not reflect on the exact number of those. The ongoing analysis suggests that there are some foundations and some association with status of humanitarian organisations to potentially pose higher TF risk. Consequently, these studies do not support each other’s findings and leave uncertainties on the nature of TF risks posed to NPOs. Authorities advised that they will need to further explore the subject. 677. Slovenia had also explored the risks related to abuse of NPOs for TF purposes within the scope of the NRA 2025. While the approach as also previously would not focus on the NPOs per the FATF definition, it gives and overall overview of the risk picture in the country. The analysis concludes that the threat of TF remains low in Slovenia, but it is potentially present, particularly through the abuse of NPOs. The NRA also explores the observed risks related to servicing the NPOs as customers by FIs and DNFBPs. It concludes that there were no specific cases of NPO misuse for TF purposes detected by the OEs servicing those organisations. While this does not amount for a comprehensive analysis of the risks of misuse of NPOs for TF purposes in Slovenia, this analysis would suggest that overall, the probability of happening so is rather low. 678. While, in general, the findings of the NRA 2021 and 2025 were shared with the OEs, the findings of the NPO TF risk assessment from 2020 were not communicated to competent authorities, OEs or to the NPO sector. Slovenian authorities have not conducted sustained outreach on the TF risks within the NPO sector and the donor community. The NPOs advised that there has been no guidance from the competent authorities in relation to addressing TF risks in the NPO sector. The NPOs themselves were generally not familiar with the TF risks in the NPO sector. 679. Slovenia applies multiple mechanisms to promote accountability, integrity and public confidence in the administration and management of NPOs. This is done through multiple mechanisms, including the requirement for registration of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), regulatory framework for obtaining the status of an NPO, tax accountability, etc. 680. Slovenia advised also to implement a Strategy for the development of NGOs in the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023 that includes a strategic goal of promoting transparency, integrity, and accountability of NGOs. But this strategy was not informed by the NPO risk assessment. Nevertheless, Slovenia maintains a dialogue with the non-profit sector, and exchange on best practices through various means and channels. 681. Majority of Slovenian NPOs operate domestically, supporting their specific target groups. A number of NPOs were operating in the field of implementation of specific government projects, being funded by e.g. Ministry of Education, Health etc. There were two NPOs which are part of international organisations that were specifically collecting funds to support the vulnerable persons in one the ongoing conflict zones. Those had suggested that collected funds were not distributed by them directly, but these would be centralised in the headquarter and further distributed from there. 682. The governance framework for oversight and monitoring of NPOs is decentralised and fragmented, involves multiple competent authorities (see also c.8.3), with a coordination being an issue. Slovenia does not have in place focused, proportionate and risk-based measures to conduct monitoring of NPOs. The only available detailed information is available on the oversight carried out through tax audits. TF indicators are not assessed within tax audits of NPOs. Table 10.1 Number of tax inspections at non-profit organisations in the last 5 years (2020-2024) Tax audits/inspections at non-profit organisations (NPOs) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 institute 20 16 37 14 13 public economic institute 8 111 112 19 11 institution 1 0 1 0 0 associations 43 93 76 36 13 683. These inspections detected certain breaches which were all related to pure tax declaration/payment issues. No issues related to breach of legislation that would indicate TF risks were identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="713. Since 2022, Slovenia’s legal framework prescribes direct and immediate applicability of PF-related UN TFS in the country. Slovenia is relying on its domestic and also European legislation to implement obligations relating to PF related TFS [25] . 714. Considering that Slovenia’s legal framework governing the implementation of TFS applies equally to TF and PF related UN TFS, the institutional framework and the powers are identical to what is described under IO.10. In Slovenia, the MFEA is responsible for policy-making in the field of TFS and acts as the central authority for the operational matters related to the implementation of PF-related TFS. Its understaffing and lack of resources is an impediment to effective functioning of the framework for implementation of TFS in Slovenia. 715. Similar to the framework for implementation of the TF-related sanctions, Slovenia has not introduced a mechanism for actively communicating designations to OEs in a timely manner, the only form of communication being the availability of a link to the website of the UNSC, that is provided on the website of MFEA. While overall considered to be an important shortcoming, this, does not affect the most material OE sectors. Footnotes [25]. All UNSCRs that impose targeted financial sanctions associated with financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are transposed into European law and apply directly in Slovenia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="713. Since 2022, Slovenia’s legal framework prescribes direct and immediate applicability of PF-related UN TFS in the country. Slovenia is relying on its domestic and also European legislation to implement obligations relating to PF related TFS [25] . 714. Considering that Slovenia’s legal framework governing the implementation of TFS applies equally to TF and PF related UN TFS, the institutional framework and the powers are identical to what is described under IO.10. In Slovenia, the MFEA is responsible for policy-making in the field of TFS and acts as the central authority for the operational matters related to the implementation of PF-related TFS. Its understaffing and lack of resources is an impediment to effective functioning of the framework for implementation of TFS in Slovenia. 715. Similar to the framework for implementation of the TF-related sanctions, Slovenia has not introduced a mechanism for actively communicating designations to OEs in a timely manner, the only form of communication being the availability of a link to the website of the UNSC, that is provided on the website of MFEA. While overall considered to be an important shortcoming, this, does not affect the most material OE sectors. Footnotes [25]. All UNSCRs that impose targeted financial sanctions associated with financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are transposed into European law and apply directly in Slovenia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="128. While Slovenian authorities advised that they had taken the identified ML/TF risks into account as part of their activities, the AT notes that this was not demonstrated in practice. With the exception of the OMLP, none of the competent authorities demonstrated that they had defined specific AML/CFT objectives, nor that the identified NRA risks had been systematically incorporated into their operational or strategic activities. As a result, authorities’ actions are not consistently prioritised or guided by the key ML/TF risks identified at national level. 129. This is compounded by the absence of national strategies or policies and the lack of follow up on the action plans during the assessed period. This has resulted in an inconsistent and fragmented approach among competent authorities, with no overarching framework to ensure a coordinated and risk-based national response. The AT acknowledges the adoption of the latest action plan in July 2025 but is unable to assess its impact on changes in the authorities’ operational activities. 130. The OMLP adopted its own strategy for the period 2021-2026 which included several objectives and related actions. However, the objectives are not aligned with or responsive to the key risks identified in the 2021 NRA, and the action plan derived from the OMLP’s strategy lacks measurable indicators and provides insufficient detail on expected outcomes. This issue was also highlighted by the IWG, though recommendations to strengthen and update the action plan were not implemented, further limiting its relevance and effectiveness. The OMLP has not fully addressed most objectives. It indicated that it had prioritised addressing technical deficiencies before proceeding with the drafting of the 2025 NRA. The AT understood that due to resource constraints, Slovenian authorities were required to prioritise actions and were unable to address objectives concurrently. However, Slovenia lacks a framework or mechanism to monitor progress against the NRA action plans. Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether measures taken and prioritised are effectively mitigating identified ML/TF risks. 131. The OMLP’s strategy has not been updated to reflect or align with the 2025 NRA, resulting in a continued disconnect between evolving risk understanding and strategic planning. The coexistence of multiple action plans without a clear mechanism for coordination or monitoring further contributes to a fragmented approach. 132. LEAs and judicial authorities generally act reactively in response to criminal activities and do not demonstrate a proactive approach to aligning their activities with the key ML/TF risks. The State Prosecutors office adopted an enforcement policy in December 2024 covering the period 2024-2028, which identifies all categories of predicate offences, including economic crime, corruption crimes, and terrorism. While the policy provides guidance on case prioritisation within each category it does not reference or appear to align with the NRAs. 133. The absence of a strategic approach on cross-border cash movements combined with the reduced amounts detected and confiscated, specifically by the customs authorities, reflects a lack of prioritisation of this area. This is inconsistent with Slovenia’s identification of high volume of cash use and with information provided by LEAs regarding the use of cash in ML cases. 134. Among the supervisory authorities, the BoS has the most developed supervisory framework and demonstrated an understanding of ML/TF risks consistent with the NRAs. However, other supervisory authorities and SRBs, while aware of the NRAs, did not incorporate the findings into their supervisory activities. Specifically regarding DNFBP supervisors, none demonstrated the application of a risk-based approach to supervision, whereby greater focus is expected to be placed on higher risk sectors and higher risk OEs, as defined by Slovenia’s NRAs. This would be reflective of the lack of integration of the NRA findings and inadequate understanding of the sectors risk profiles. 135. With respect to TF, there is generally an absence of defined objectives, national strategies or action plans. Slovenian authorities primarily focus on terrorism with limited and incidental attention given to the TF component. This approach reflects the national risk assessment that TF risk is low." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="128. While Slovenian authorities advised that they had taken the identified ML/TF risks into account as part of their activities, the AT notes that this was not demonstrated in practice. With the exception of the OMLP, none of the competent authorities demonstrated that they had defined specific AML/CFT objectives, nor that the identified NRA risks had been systematically incorporated into their operational or strategic activities. As a result, authorities’ actions are not consistently prioritised or guided by the key ML/TF risks identified at national level. 129. This is compounded by the absence of national strategies or policies and the lack of follow up on the action plans during the assessed period. This has resulted in an inconsistent and fragmented approach among competent authorities, with no overarching framework to ensure a coordinated and risk-based national response. The AT acknowledges the adoption of the latest action plan in July 2025 but is unable to assess its impact on changes in the authorities’ operational activities. 130. The OMLP adopted its own strategy for the period 2021-2026 which included several objectives and related actions. However, the objectives are not aligned with or responsive to the key risks identified in the 2021 NRA, and the action plan derived from the OMLP’s strategy lacks measurable indicators and provides insufficient detail on expected outcomes. This issue was also highlighted by the IWG, though recommendations to strengthen and update the action plan were not implemented, further limiting its relevance and effectiveness. The OMLP has not fully addressed most objectives. It indicated that it had prioritised addressing technical deficiencies before proceeding with the drafting of the 2025 NRA. The AT understood that due to resource constraints, Slovenian authorities were required to prioritise actions and were unable to address objectives concurrently. However, Slovenia lacks a framework or mechanism to monitor progress against the NRA action plans. Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether measures taken and prioritised are effectively mitigating identified ML/TF risks. 131. The OMLP’s strategy has not been updated to reflect or align with the 2025 NRA, resulting in a continued disconnect between evolving risk understanding and strategic planning. The coexistence of multiple action plans without a clear mechanism for coordination or monitoring further contributes to a fragmented approach. 132. LEAs and judicial authorities generally act reactively in response to criminal activities and do not demonstrate a proactive approach to aligning their activities with the key ML/TF risks. The State Prosecutors office adopted an enforcement policy in December 2024 covering the period 2024-2028, which identifies all categories of predicate offences, including economic crime, corruption crimes, and terrorism. While the policy provides guidance on case prioritisation within each category it does not reference or appear to align with the NRAs. 133. The absence of a strategic approach on cross-border cash movements combined with the reduced amounts detected and confiscated, specifically by the customs authorities, reflects a lack of prioritisation of this area. This is inconsistent with Slovenia’s identification of high volume of cash use and with information provided by LEAs regarding the use of cash in ML cases. 134. Among the supervisory authorities, the BoS has the most developed supervisory framework and demonstrated an understanding of ML/TF risks consistent with the NRAs. However, other supervisory authorities and SRBs, while aware of the NRAs, did not incorporate the findings into their supervisory activities. Specifically regarding DNFBP supervisors, none demonstrated the application of a risk-based approach to supervision, whereby greater focus is expected to be placed on higher risk sectors and higher risk OEs, as defined by Slovenia’s NRAs. This would be reflective of the lack of integration of the NRA findings and inadequate understanding of the sectors risk profiles. 135. With respect to TF, there is generally an absence of defined objectives, national strategies or action plans. Slovenian authorities primarily focus on terrorism with limited and incidental attention given to the TF component. This approach reflects the national risk assessment that TF risk is low." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1 FIU 219. OMLP is committed to promoting effective and high-quality international cooperation by ensuring that information and assistance are provided in a timely and efficient manner. Financial intelligence or information shared by OMLP, both spontaneously and upon request, is appreciated by its foreign counterparts. The availability of an adequate number of databases to which the FIU has access (see IO.6), including RBO, contributes significantly to the quality of its responses. Nevertheless, the shortcomings identified under IO.5 regarding the accuracy of BO information may limit the quality and reliability of the assistance provided by OMLP to its foreign counterparts. Nevertheless, no negative feedback on Slovenia’s ability to provide BO information was signalled by the global community. 220. At the request of a foreign counterpart, OMLP withholds suspicious transactions for 3 business days, facilitating thus the asset recovery process. 221. The volume of requests received by OMLP (562) in the last 6 years is significantly smaller than the volume of the ones sent. A decreasing trend was observed over the years in the incoming requests. Between 2020 and the first half of 2025, the OMLP responded to almost all the foreign requests (with one exception from 2025), in an average time of 24 days, which is reasonable. Spontaneous disseminations were regularly submitted to foreign FIUs when links to their jurisdictions were discovered during OMLP’s analyses. Table 2.11. OMLP - Incoming requests OMLP incoming requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 ML 139 134 99 84 69 33 TF 2 7 8 6 6 1 Total 141 141 107 74 65 34 Pending 1 (ML) Average response time (days) 23 35 10 23 29 23 Source: OMLP 222. In March 2025, OMLP sent a survey to 20 FIUs with which it most frequently exchanges information to evaluate the quality and timeliness of its assistance. The results indicated that 90% of respondents were highly satisfied with the promptness and usefulness of OMLP’s responses, and all confirmed that OMLP had addressed all their questions. 2.4.2 Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 223. Slovenia’s LEAs maintain frequent and effective informal international co-operation with foreign counterparts from EU and non-EU Member States, including through Europol and Interpol. Within the Slovenian Central Police Department, a special unit dealing with international cooperation is established, acting as a single 24/7 contact point for international requests, monitoring the execution of requests through a case management system. Incoming requests are promptly assigned to the relevant regional or local police units with the indication of the deadline for the response. The responses sent are generally complete, making use of the date from the available databases, and are provided in a timely manner. Between 2020 and the first half of 2025, the Police indicated that it received 2 548 ML requests (including additional requests and replies) from foreign LEAs and 14 requests related to TF. International cooperation feedback indicates that fraud, ML, robbery, constitution of criminal organisations and computer crimes are the most frequent offences they request assistance from Slovenia. 224. Prosecutors mainly provide information to foreign LEAs through MLA/EIO requests. They frequently initiate and take part in JITs, when necessary, involving the Police. 225. Slovenia regularly provides assistance related to asset recovery through the Slovenian ARO contact point – the prosecutor at the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, which has access to EUROPOL SIENA since 2023. It exchanges requests directly with other AROs of EU Member States. Foreign requests received by the ARO contact point are forwarded to the Criminal Police Directorate and to the OMLP for collecting necessary information. Once the requested information is gathered, a response is forwarded by the Slovenian ARO contact point to the requesting ARO. 2.4.3 Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 226. BoS provides assistance to foreign supervisors on a regular basis. The number of incoming requests has slightly increased over the period under review. The below statistics capture the engagement of BoS to provide assistance to all requests received in a prompt manner. The AT observes improvements in the response time of BoS in 2025, compared to the previous years. Table 2.12. BoS – Incoming requests Incoming requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 - Fit and proper measures 6 5 9 9 8 3 - Supervision and sanctions 1 2 2 1 1 0 Total 7 7 11 10 9 3 Requests responded: - Fit and proper measures 6 5 9 9 8 3 - Supervision and sanctions 1 2 2 1 1 Total 7 7 11 10 9 3 Requests pending 0 0 0 0 0 0 Requests refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 Average response time (days) 17 15 17 13 16 10 227. BoS presented examples of provided cooperation (upon request and spontaneously) to foreign NCAs relating to VASPs, demonstrating their ability to cooperate timely and effectively. Additionally, as mentioned under the previous section of this chapter, BoS informs EBA on the findings of its supervision activities through EuReCa (EBA’s AML/CFT database). 228. ISA did not provide statistics on the incoming requests related to fit and proper assessments, sanctions imposed or group supervision of obliged entities under its remit. Feedback from the international counterparts revealed, however, that in 2023 they promptly and successfully provided assistance to a regional non-EU counterpart on the suitability and reputation of several Slovenian insurance undertakings. 229. In respect to the medium-low risk profile of its supervised entities, SMA has sufficient resources to promptly exchange information with foreign supervisory authorities. An international cooperation section is established within SMA, consisting of two employees, responsible for international cooperation. In the period under review, eight requests have been received, all of them related to fit and proper checks, supervision and sanctions. Only one request regarding supervision and sanctions was refused. SMA advised that such refusals occur when the request is outside the scope of its competence or when it originates from third countries that have not signed a multilateral arrangement for the exchange of personal data. 2.4.4 Customs and tax authorities 230. FARS is efficiently cooperating and is engaged in daily exchanges with foreign counterparts, on AML/CFT matters, providing information on VAT, direct taxes, and customs both at request and in the framework of automatic exchanges. Most international exchanges take place with Slovenia’s neighbouring countries: Austria, Croatia, Italy which is in line with the country’s risk profile. FARS provided the statistics for the number of incoming requests regarding VAT, direct taxes and customs information for the period 2020 to the first half of 2025. Namely, 2 063 requests related to VAT, 522 – to direct taxes, and 512 to customs. When requests relate to AML/CFT, they are prioritised and handled in a more expedited way. 231. Some foreign counterparts consider the information provided by FARS to be useful, smooth and reliable, allowing them to initiate customs enforcement procedures and strengthen control measures. The most frequent requested information relates to the verification of invoices authenticity, cigarette smuggling or other excisable goods, and drug smuggling." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.4.1 FIU 219. OMLP is committed to promoting effective and high-quality international cooperation by ensuring that information and assistance are provided in a timely and efficient manner. Financial intelligence or information shared by OMLP, both spontaneously and upon request, is appreciated by its foreign counterparts. The availability of an adequate number of databases to which the FIU has access (see IO.6), including RBO, contributes significantly to the quality of its responses. Nevertheless, the shortcomings identified under IO.5 regarding the accuracy of BO information may limit the quality and reliability of the assistance provided by OMLP to its foreign counterparts. Nevertheless, no negative feedback on Slovenia’s ability to provide BO information was signalled by the global community. 220. At the request of a foreign counterpart, OMLP withholds suspicious transactions for 3 business days, facilitating thus the asset recovery process. 221. The volume of requests received by OMLP (562) in the last 6 years is significantly smaller than the volume of the ones sent. A decreasing trend was observed over the years in the incoming requests. Between 2020 and the first half of 2025, the OMLP responded to almost all the foreign requests (with one exception from 2025), in an average time of 24 days, which is reasonable. Spontaneous disseminations were regularly submitted to foreign FIUs when links to their jurisdictions were discovered during OMLP’s analyses. Table 2.11. OMLP - Incoming requests OMLP incoming requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 ML 139 134 99 84 69 33 TF 2 7 8 6 6 1 Total 141 141 107 74 65 34 Pending 1 (ML) Average response time (days) 23 35 10 23 29 23 Source: OMLP 222. In March 2025, OMLP sent a survey to 20 FIUs with which it most frequently exchanges information to evaluate the quality and timeliness of its assistance. The results indicated that 90% of respondents were highly satisfied with the promptness and usefulness of OMLP’s responses, and all confirmed that OMLP had addressed all their questions. 2.4.2 Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 223. Slovenia’s LEAs maintain frequent and effective informal international co-operation with foreign counterparts from EU and non-EU Member States, including through Europol and Interpol. Within the Slovenian Central Police Department, a special unit dealing with international cooperation is established, acting as a single 24/7 contact point for international requests, monitoring the execution of requests through a case management system. Incoming requests are promptly assigned to the relevant regional or local police units with the indication of the deadline for the response. The responses sent are generally complete, making use of the date from the available databases, and are provided in a timely manner. Between 2020 and the first half of 2025, the Police indicated that it received 2 548 ML requests (including additional requests and replies) from foreign LEAs and 14 requests related to TF. International cooperation feedback indicates that fraud, ML, robbery, constitution of criminal organisations and computer crimes are the most frequent offences they request assistance from Slovenia. 224. Prosecutors mainly provide information to foreign LEAs through MLA/EIO requests. They frequently initiate and take part in JITs, when necessary, involving the Police. 225. Slovenia regularly provides assistance related to asset recovery through the Slovenian ARO contact point – the prosecutor at the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, which has access to EUROPOL SIENA since 2023. It exchanges requests directly with other AROs of EU Member States. Foreign requests received by the ARO contact point are forwarded to the Criminal Police Directorate and to the OMLP for collecting necessary information. Once the requested information is gathered, a response is forwarded by the Slovenian ARO contact point to the requesting ARO. 2.4.3 Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 226. BoS provides assistance to foreign supervisors on a regular basis. The number of incoming requests has slightly increased over the period under review. The below statistics capture the engagement of BoS to provide assistance to all requests received in a prompt manner. The AT observes improvements in the response time of BoS in 2025, compared to the previous years. Table 2.12. BoS – Incoming requests Incoming requests 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 First half of 2025 - Fit and proper measures 6 5 9 9 8 3 - Supervision and sanctions 1 2 2 1 1 0 Total 7 7 11 10 9 3 Requests responded: - Fit and proper measures 6 5 9 9 8 3 - Supervision and sanctions 1 2 2 1 1 Total 7 7 11 10 9 3 Requests pending 0 0 0 0 0 0 Requests refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 Average response time (days) 17 15 17 13 16 10 227. BoS presented examples of provided cooperation (upon request and spontaneously) to foreign NCAs relating to VASPs, demonstrating their ability to cooperate timely and effectively. Additionally, as mentioned under the previous section of this chapter, BoS informs EBA on the findings of its supervision activities through EuReCa (EBA’s AML/CFT database). 228. ISA did not provide statistics on the incoming requests related to fit and proper assessments, sanctions imposed or group supervision of obliged entities under its remit. Feedback from the international counterparts revealed, however, that in 2023 they promptly and successfully provided assistance to a regional non-EU counterpart on the suitability and reputation of several Slovenian insurance undertakings. 229. In respect to the medium-low risk profile of its supervised entities, SMA has sufficient resources to promptly exchange information with foreign supervisory authorities. An international cooperation section is established within SMA, consisting of two employees, responsible for international cooperation. In the period under review, eight requests have been received, all of them related to fit and proper checks, supervision and sanctions. Only one request regarding supervision and sanctions was refused. SMA advised that such refusals occur when the request is outside the scope of its competence or when it originates from third countries that have not signed a multilateral arrangement for the exchange of personal data. 2.4.4 Customs and tax authorities 230. FARS is efficiently cooperating and is engaged in daily exchanges with foreign counterparts, on AML/CFT matters, providing information on VAT, direct taxes, and customs both at request and in the framework of automatic exchanges. Most international exchanges take place with Slovenia’s neighbouring countries: Austria, Croatia, Italy which is in line with the country’s risk profile. FARS provided the statistics for the number of incoming requests regarding VAT, direct taxes and customs information for the period 2020 to the first half of 2025. Namely, 2 063 requests related to VAT, 522 – to direct taxes, and 512 to customs. When requests relate to AML/CFT, they are prioritised and handled in a more expedited way. 231. Some foreign counterparts consider the information provided by FARS to be useful, smooth and reliable, allowing them to initiate customs enforcement procedures and strengthen control measures. The most frequent requested information relates to the verification of invoices authenticity, cigarette smuggling or other excisable goods, and drug smuggling." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1 CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 285. FIs seem to have a good grasp of their AML/CFT obligations. In terms of customer on-boarding, most FIs still rely on obtaining hard copies of identification documents, with just a few of them relying on electronic on-boarding solutions. There is generally a good understanding of BO-related obligations, taking into account not just shares and voting rights, but also control via other means. Most FIs, especially banks, did report that they do encounter issues in verifying ownership and control structures involving foreign elements and/or resulting in a foreign BO due to the absence of reliable means how to do so or, where they exist, the costs involved. There is in general a certain degree of reluctance in servicing non-resident customers. 286. Most FIs also have sound procedures when it comes to on-going monitoring, with banks and EMIs that process considerable volumes of transactions adopting automatic screening tools. These are usually reliant on scenarios developed by the supplier and complemented by additional ones that are more in line with the business trends of the particular FI. These scenarios are revised regularly to determine whether they are still current, especially where they are producing a significant volume of false positives. 3.4.2 Enhanced or specific measures 287. FIs have demonstrated that they have a good understanding of the EDD measures to be applied in specific cases like PEPs and correspondent banking relationships. They also adhere to the list of high-risk jurisdictions issued by the OMLP but do also carry out their own independent checks to establish whether non-listed jurisdictions present higher risks. 3.4.3 AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 288. Meetings with FIs and VASPs confirm that they have an understanding of their reporting obligations when it comes to suspicions of ML/TF. The overall reporting trend is aligned with the materiality of the respective sectors, with banks, PSPs and MVTS being responsible for the bulk of the reports received by OMLP. The exception is with VASPs where one would expect a higher number of submissions. While lower numbers are to be expected in less material sectors, it is still questionable whether the reports submitted by the investments and insurance sectors are reflective of their respective importance. However, when it comes to actual reporting the findings from supervisory engagement and the reports submitted to the OMLP show that there are practical issues in this regard. (See Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 289. The largest share of reporting is to be attributed to banks, followed by MVTS and PSPs, all of which are OEs falling under the BoS. This is not to say that these sectors do not present issues when it comes to reporting. Attempts have been made to tackle defensive reporting, especially when it comes to MVTS as most reports related to TF but were triggered due to possible negative connotations associated with particular names without there being any actual suspicion. Indeed, there were no further disseminations made by the OMLP on the basis of these reports. While numbers have decreased, TF-related STRs are still featuring heavily within this particular category. 290. On the other hand, reports submitted by banks seem to be of better quality though the volume of reporting has been somewhat constant over the years. BoS supervisory activity did uncover instances of failures to report or of significant backlogs of flagged transactions that were not scrutinised for possible indications of ML/TF. These were attributed to issues involving the monitoring tools used and the resources available, in terms of both number and quality, to scrutinise the alerts generated. These issues were noted over the period 2020–2024. While remedial actions have been undertaken and there has been an increase in reporting for 2025, not enough time has passed to assess whether the said remedial action has had lasting effects in this regard. In addition, it is not clear whether within the same sector there may instances of under-reporting by specific operators. 291. Reporting levels by the investment services sector and by the insurance sector are considerably low, though the 2025 NRA does contain statements that condone the said reporting levels. 292. All FIs were also aware of their tipping off obligations. Neither the FIs and VASPs met on-site nor the authorities could remember there having been any tipping off cases. 3.4.4 Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 293. All FIs indicated that they have some form of internal controls and procedure, though these do at times vary depending on the size of the OE in question. The more sophisticated FIs do recognise and carry out audits of their internal controls to ensure that they are suitable, having also clear procedures as to how findings resulting from the same are to be handled and what is to be the involvement of their respective managing and supervisory bodies within the whole process. 294. Insurance intermediaries are an exception as they do not have their own policies and procedures but rely instead on those of the insurance undertaking, they have a relationship with. This approach is understandable when it comes to insurance agents, as they are an extension of their insurance principal, but the independence that should characterise insurance brokers means that they should have their own policies and procedures. Equally, when it comes to internal audits, they do not carry out their own internal audits but rely instead on those carried out by their principal. 3.4.5 Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 295. The AT did not identify any legal or regulatory obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1 CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 285. FIs seem to have a good grasp of their AML/CFT obligations. In terms of customer on-boarding, most FIs still rely on obtaining hard copies of identification documents, with just a few of them relying on electronic on-boarding solutions. There is generally a good understanding of BO-related obligations, taking into account not just shares and voting rights, but also control via other means. Most FIs, especially banks, did report that they do encounter issues in verifying ownership and control structures involving foreign elements and/or resulting in a foreign BO due to the absence of reliable means how to do so or, where they exist, the costs involved. There is in general a certain degree of reluctance in servicing non-resident customers. 286. Most FIs also have sound procedures when it comes to on-going monitoring, with banks and EMIs that process considerable volumes of transactions adopting automatic screening tools. These are usually reliant on scenarios developed by the supplier and complemented by additional ones that are more in line with the business trends of the particular FI. These scenarios are revised regularly to determine whether they are still current, especially where they are producing a significant volume of false positives. 3.4.2 Enhanced or specific measures 287. FIs have demonstrated that they have a good understanding of the EDD measures to be applied in specific cases like PEPs and correspondent banking relationships. They also adhere to the list of high-risk jurisdictions issued by the OMLP but do also carry out their own independent checks to establish whether non-listed jurisdictions present higher risks. 3.4.3 AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 288. Meetings with FIs and VASPs confirm that they have an understanding of their reporting obligations when it comes to suspicions of ML/TF. The overall reporting trend is aligned with the materiality of the respective sectors, with banks, PSPs and MVTS being responsible for the bulk of the reports received by OMLP. The exception is with VASPs where one would expect a higher number of submissions. While lower numbers are to be expected in less material sectors, it is still questionable whether the reports submitted by the investments and insurance sectors are reflective of their respective importance. However, when it comes to actual reporting the findings from supervisory engagement and the reports submitted to the OMLP show that there are practical issues in this regard. (See Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 289. The largest share of reporting is to be attributed to banks, followed by MVTS and PSPs, all of which are OEs falling under the BoS. This is not to say that these sectors do not present issues when it comes to reporting. Attempts have been made to tackle defensive reporting, especially when it comes to MVTS as most reports related to TF but were triggered due to possible negative connotations associated with particular names without there being any actual suspicion. Indeed, there were no further disseminations made by the OMLP on the basis of these reports. While numbers have decreased, TF-related STRs are still featuring heavily within this particular category. 290. On the other hand, reports submitted by banks seem to be of better quality though the volume of reporting has been somewhat constant over the years. BoS supervisory activity did uncover instances of failures to report or of significant backlogs of flagged transactions that were not scrutinised for possible indications of ML/TF. These were attributed to issues involving the monitoring tools used and the resources available, in terms of both number and quality, to scrutinise the alerts generated. These issues were noted over the period 2020–2024. While remedial actions have been undertaken and there has been an increase in reporting for 2025, not enough time has passed to assess whether the said remedial action has had lasting effects in this regard. In addition, it is not clear whether within the same sector there may instances of under-reporting by specific operators. 291. Reporting levels by the investment services sector and by the insurance sector are considerably low, though the 2025 NRA does contain statements that condone the said reporting levels. 292. All FIs were also aware of their tipping off obligations. Neither the FIs and VASPs met on-site nor the authorities could remember there having been any tipping off cases. 3.4.4 Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 293. All FIs indicated that they have some form of internal controls and procedure, though these do at times vary depending on the size of the OE in question. The more sophisticated FIs do recognise and carry out audits of their internal controls to ensure that they are suitable, having also clear procedures as to how findings resulting from the same are to be handled and what is to be the involvement of their respective managing and supervisory bodies within the whole process. 294. Insurance intermediaries are an exception as they do not have their own policies and procedures but rely instead on those of the insurance undertaking, they have a relationship with. This approach is understandable when it comes to insurance agents, as they are an extension of their insurance principal, but the independence that should characterise insurance brokers means that they should have their own policies and procedures. Equally, when it comes to internal audits, they do not carry out their own internal audits but rely instead on those carried out by their principal. 3.4.5 Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 295. The AT did not identify any legal or regulatory obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="377. With the exception of Casinos and firms forming part of larger international groups, such as accountants, tax advisors, covered lawyers or auditors, the mitigating measures applied more generally by DNFBPs are confined to predetermined criteria set out in the supervisory authorities or SRBs guidelines, with no consideration given to their own individual risk exposures. The concept and practical application of a risk-based approach is non-existent. 378. Most DNFBPs across all sectors consider both their sector and their customer base to be low risk. This perception does not align with the findings of the 2021 or 2025 NRA and demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. These misconceptions undermine the effective implementation of AML/CFT controls by OEs, such as the application of EDD or STR reporting. 379. The absence of effective AML/CFT measures implemented by DNFBPs is particularly concerning, especially in sectors that Slovenia itself has identified as posing a higher ML/TF risk. 4.4.1 CDD , record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 380. The application of CDD, record-keeping, ongoing monitoring and BO identification varies across DNFBP sectors. With the exception of Casinos, DNFBPs advised that given the nature of their services the majority of their customers were considered one-off customers, an approach that aligns with common practice within DNFBP sectors. Consequently, where subsequent services are provided to the same customer, these are treated as a new business relationship, prompting the re-application of CDD each time. As a result, ongoing monitoring measures were largely not relevant to their business operations. Nevertheless, the repeated application of CDD ensures that customer identification and verification measures are refreshed for each engagement, which may contribute positively to maintaining up-to-date customer information. 381. Real estate agents and notaries generally collect only basic identification information. Where relevant, OEs referred to checks conducted through the Business Register and the BO register, however, they also reported challenges regarding data access and quality in the BO register. No other independent checks are conducted to assess the ML/TF risk of the customer or transaction. OEs do not examine the source of funds involved in transactions but rely solely on banks to carry out full CDD when processing payments. 382. Covered lawyers reported using onboarding questionnaires to collect initial information on customers, including details on the corporate structure, BO, and confirmation of the customer’s PEP status. Following receipt of this information, OEs carry out due diligence using both public and non-public sources, such as court and business registries. Covered lawyers that are part of larger international groups also utilise third party CDD providers to perform additional checks and identify if there is any adverse information on the customer. 383. Tax Advisors, Accountants and Auditors that are part of larger international groups [20] demonstrated a higher level of understanding and compliance with its AML/CFT obligations, as opposed to the domestic ones. These OEs were able to articulate their CDD procedures, BO identification processes, the use of independent verification measures, etc., including the use of third party CDD providers to perform additional checks and identify if there is any adverse information on the customer. 384. OEs that only trade domestically or are not part of a larger international group, collect only basic identification data and in many cases lack comprehensive understanding of the need to identify and verify the BO of legal persons and legal arrangements. Similarly, the application of source of funds verification was largely non-existent. 385. DPMSs generally collect only basic identification data. The ones that operate internationally and partner with other parties, such as international banks, were able to explain the need and process of identifying BO information as part of its AML/CFT controls. No other independent checks are conducted to assess the potential ML/TF risk of the customer or transaction. Other DPMSs collect only basic identification information and do not carry out independent checks either. 386. Casinos demonstrated the highest level of understanding and application of AML/CFT mitigating measures, appropriate to the nature and risk of their business activities. The proactive supervision and the comprehensive requirements imposed by the FARS are clearly reflected in the sector’s level of compliance and awareness. Casinos clearly articulated the CDD measures applied at the different stages, e.g., upon entering to Casino premises, and on pay out. 4.4.2 Enhanced or specific measures 387. All DNFBPs were aware of the legal obligations to apply EDD in higher risk scenarios. Nevertheless, the application of such measures in practice was not evident on all instances. Most of the DNFBPs demonstrated a limited understanding of the specific measures required for these cases, including those involving PEPs and high-risk countries, and could not articulate a clear distinction between the different categories of due diligence measures. 388. All DNFBPs demonstrated to be aware of the obligation to identify whether the customer or its BOs are PEP and the need to apply EDD measures to these individuals. Nevertheless, most DNFBPs across all sectors did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the specific measures that should be applied to PEPs. In particular, they did not always recognise the need to carry out source of wealth checks, often relied on banks for verification of source of funds, and some were unaware of the need to obtain senior management approval for these business relationships. This could be because of inadequate CDD or weak BO identification controls, or a low exposure to PEPs within the DNFBP sectors. The limited supervisory activity carried out by supervisory authorities and SRBs are not conducive to identify shortcomings in this area. 389. Accountants, tax advisors, and auditors that are part of larger international groups, demonstrated a stronger understanding of PEP requirements. This is primarily attributed to the implementation of group wide comprehensive CDD procedures, and structured access to reliable third-party databases that facilitate screening and verification. 390. All DNFBPs demonstrated the knowledge of the high-risk jurisdictions list issued and regularly updated by the OMLP. Understanding of obligations related to higher risk countries varied considerably across DNFBPs. Most OEs were able to articulate the legal requirement to apply EDD where a customer or transaction is linked to a higher risk country. However, with the exception of covered lawyers, tax advisors, accountants and auditors that form part of larger international groups, other DNFBPs across the other sectors or trading primarily domestically, were not able to describe the specific enhanced measures they would apply in practice and would refer to the guidance provided by their relevant supervisor if the case for EDD arose. When questioned regarding customers or transactions involving a neighbouring country that was until recently included within the FATF’s list of high-risk jurisdictions, the application of EDD, in accordance with Slovenia’s legal provisions under the APMLTF-2, varied considerably between sectors. Covered lawyers advised if a customer transaction involved a property outside of Slovenia, they would partner with a legal advisor in the relevant jurisdiction. The DPMS sector provided an example where they were transacting with a higher risk country, and it recognised the need to provide enhanced information to the Bank to conclude the business transaction. 4.4.3 AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 391. With the exception of Casinos, DNFBPs do not understand or apply their AML/CFT reporting obligations effectively. Reporting of STRs by other sectors did not reflect adequately on the ML/TF risk within the relevant sectors (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 392. Contrary to the FATF Standards and to the legal provisions within the APMLTF-2, the majority of OEs advised that in cases of a suspicious customers or transactions, they prefer to reject the customer rather than submit an STR to the OMLP. The few examples presented by OEs related primarily to cases of potential tax evasion, and where not reported to the OMLP. In one example, the OE advised that it had identified a customer who appeared to be structuring a transaction to avoid tax obligations, however when being asked why it was not reported the OE explained that it considered it was a simple mistake and that it had informed the customer about the possible consequences with the tax authorities. 393. OEs also reiterated their reliance on banks’ CDD measures, specifically regarding the verification of source of funds. Therefore, the significant shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT measures, combined with the over-reliance on bank AML/CFT measures, contribute to the low number of STRs. 394. No STRs have been submitted by DNFBPs in relation to TF. While the AT acknowledges Slovenia’s low TF risk and it has not identified a specific unreported case that could raise immediate concerns, the lack of STRs may be considered reflective of the low level of TF risk understanding among DNFBPs. 395. Most OEs were aware that STRs must be reported to the OMLP and had access to the reporting form published by the OMLP. However, many also advised that such reports would be simultaneously submitted to their supervisory authority or SRB, suggesting confusion regarding appropriate reporting channels. As a result, OEs generally opted to report to both authorities to ensure a correct submission. Furthermore, none of the OEs provided information on the process to follow if consent from the OMLP is required prior to proceeding with a transaction. 396. With respect to tipping off, the majority of OEs were able to articulate the legal prohibition but were unable to elaborate on what controls were in place or would be implemented to prevent inadvertent disclosure. Most OEs advised they would refer the matter to their designated AML/CFT compliance officer. 397. Neither the supervisory authorities, SRBs nor the OMLP (in its capacity as financial intelligence unit) have undertaken targeted training or outreach to address the deficiencies identified, particularly the lack of STR reporting. 4.4.4 Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 398. Few OEs have established formal policies and procedures tailored to their own specific risk profiles. Updates to these frameworks are infrequent, and training remains inadequate. 399. Among the sectors demonstrating stronger compliance, Casinos maintain internal procedures that demonstrate compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. Similarly, accountants, tax advisors, auditors, and covered lawyers which are part of larger international groups were able to demonstrate the implementation of effective and documented internal controls, including the application of a risk-based approach to its activities. 400. Other DNFBPs view internal controls as an administrative requirement, often treating the supervisory authorities or SRBs guidelines as a checklist rather than understanding the need to integrate effective AML/CFT measures into their operational processes. 401. Many OEs met during the onsite did not provide regular in-depth AML/CFT training to their staff, which hinders their understanding and level of AML/CFT compliance. Training efforts appear largely confined to attendance by AML/CFT compliance officers in the annual sessions organised by the OMLP, after which they are expected to train their staff. The AT considers this approach insufficient given the observed shortcomings in DNFBPs understanding of AML/CFT requirements and risks. 402. Accountants, tax advisors, and auditors that are part of a larger international group demonstrated comprehensive policies concerning the application of audit controls to their AML/CFT controls ranging from the use of external providers and internal audit functions. Casinos and real estate entities also acknowledged internal audit measures to some extent. None the other sectors provided comprehensive information on this matter. 4.4.5 Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 403. As noted within R1.7 and IO1, there are limitations in the scope of Slovenia’s AML/CFT framework for DNFBPs, given it is unclear if legal advisors are able to provide FATF defined activities in R22.1(d). Regarding the other DNFBPs that fall within the scope of the APMLTF-2, the AT did not identify any major obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. Footnotes [20]. Accountants and auditors part of a larger international group comprise of 30% and 69% of the market, respectively. No similar data is available for the Tax Advisors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="377. With the exception of Casinos and firms forming part of larger international groups, such as accountants, tax advisors, covered lawyers or auditors, the mitigating measures applied more generally by DNFBPs are confined to predetermined criteria set out in the supervisory authorities or SRBs guidelines, with no consideration given to their own individual risk exposures. The concept and practical application of a risk-based approach is non-existent. 378. Most DNFBPs across all sectors consider both their sector and their customer base to be low risk. This perception does not align with the findings of the 2021 or 2025 NRA and demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities. These misconceptions undermine the effective implementation of AML/CFT controls by OEs, such as the application of EDD or STR reporting. 379. The absence of effective AML/CFT measures implemented by DNFBPs is particularly concerning, especially in sectors that Slovenia itself has identified as posing a higher ML/TF risk. 4.4.1 CDD , record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 380. The application of CDD, record-keeping, ongoing monitoring and BO identification varies across DNFBP sectors. With the exception of Casinos, DNFBPs advised that given the nature of their services the majority of their customers were considered one-off customers, an approach that aligns with common practice within DNFBP sectors. Consequently, where subsequent services are provided to the same customer, these are treated as a new business relationship, prompting the re-application of CDD each time. As a result, ongoing monitoring measures were largely not relevant to their business operations. Nevertheless, the repeated application of CDD ensures that customer identification and verification measures are refreshed for each engagement, which may contribute positively to maintaining up-to-date customer information. 381. Real estate agents and notaries generally collect only basic identification information. Where relevant, OEs referred to checks conducted through the Business Register and the BO register, however, they also reported challenges regarding data access and quality in the BO register. No other independent checks are conducted to assess the ML/TF risk of the customer or transaction. OEs do not examine the source of funds involved in transactions but rely solely on banks to carry out full CDD when processing payments. 382. Covered lawyers reported using onboarding questionnaires to collect initial information on customers, including details on the corporate structure, BO, and confirmation of the customer’s PEP status. Following receipt of this information, OEs carry out due diligence using both public and non-public sources, such as court and business registries. Covered lawyers that are part of larger international groups also utilise third party CDD providers to perform additional checks and identify if there is any adverse information on the customer. 383. Tax Advisors, Accountants and Auditors that are part of larger international groups [20] demonstrated a higher level of understanding and compliance with its AML/CFT obligations, as opposed to the domestic ones. These OEs were able to articulate their CDD procedures, BO identification processes, the use of independent verification measures, etc., including the use of third party CDD providers to perform additional checks and identify if there is any adverse information on the customer. 384. OEs that only trade domestically or are not part of a larger international group, collect only basic identification data and in many cases lack comprehensive understanding of the need to identify and verify the BO of legal persons and legal arrangements. Similarly, the application of source of funds verification was largely non-existent. 385. DPMSs generally collect only basic identification data. The ones that operate internationally and partner with other parties, such as international banks, were able to explain the need and process of identifying BO information as part of its AML/CFT controls. No other independent checks are conducted to assess the potential ML/TF risk of the customer or transaction. Other DPMSs collect only basic identification information and do not carry out independent checks either. 386. Casinos demonstrated the highest level of understanding and application of AML/CFT mitigating measures, appropriate to the nature and risk of their business activities. The proactive supervision and the comprehensive requirements imposed by the FARS are clearly reflected in the sector’s level of compliance and awareness. Casinos clearly articulated the CDD measures applied at the different stages, e.g., upon entering to Casino premises, and on pay out. 4.4.2 Enhanced or specific measures 387. All DNFBPs were aware of the legal obligations to apply EDD in higher risk scenarios. Nevertheless, the application of such measures in practice was not evident on all instances. Most of the DNFBPs demonstrated a limited understanding of the specific measures required for these cases, including those involving PEPs and high-risk countries, and could not articulate a clear distinction between the different categories of due diligence measures. 388. All DNFBPs demonstrated to be aware of the obligation to identify whether the customer or its BOs are PEP and the need to apply EDD measures to these individuals. Nevertheless, most DNFBPs across all sectors did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the specific measures that should be applied to PEPs. In particular, they did not always recognise the need to carry out source of wealth checks, often relied on banks for verification of source of funds, and some were unaware of the need to obtain senior management approval for these business relationships. This could be because of inadequate CDD or weak BO identification controls, or a low exposure to PEPs within the DNFBP sectors. The limited supervisory activity carried out by supervisory authorities and SRBs are not conducive to identify shortcomings in this area. 389. Accountants, tax advisors, and auditors that are part of larger international groups, demonstrated a stronger understanding of PEP requirements. This is primarily attributed to the implementation of group wide comprehensive CDD procedures, and structured access to reliable third-party databases that facilitate screening and verification. 390. All DNFBPs demonstrated the knowledge of the high-risk jurisdictions list issued and regularly updated by the OMLP. Understanding of obligations related to higher risk countries varied considerably across DNFBPs. Most OEs were able to articulate the legal requirement to apply EDD where a customer or transaction is linked to a higher risk country. However, with the exception of covered lawyers, tax advisors, accountants and auditors that form part of larger international groups, other DNFBPs across the other sectors or trading primarily domestically, were not able to describe the specific enhanced measures they would apply in practice and would refer to the guidance provided by their relevant supervisor if the case for EDD arose. When questioned regarding customers or transactions involving a neighbouring country that was until recently included within the FATF’s list of high-risk jurisdictions, the application of EDD, in accordance with Slovenia’s legal provisions under the APMLTF-2, varied considerably between sectors. Covered lawyers advised if a customer transaction involved a property outside of Slovenia, they would partner with a legal advisor in the relevant jurisdiction. The DPMS sector provided an example where they were transacting with a higher risk country, and it recognised the need to provide enhanced information to the Bank to conclude the business transaction. 4.4.3 AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 391. With the exception of Casinos, DNFBPs do not understand or apply their AML/CFT reporting obligations effectively. Reporting of STRs by other sectors did not reflect adequately on the ML/TF risk within the relevant sectors (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 392. Contrary to the FATF Standards and to the legal provisions within the APMLTF-2, the majority of OEs advised that in cases of a suspicious customers or transactions, they prefer to reject the customer rather than submit an STR to the OMLP. The few examples presented by OEs related primarily to cases of potential tax evasion, and where not reported to the OMLP. In one example, the OE advised that it had identified a customer who appeared to be structuring a transaction to avoid tax obligations, however when being asked why it was not reported the OE explained that it considered it was a simple mistake and that it had informed the customer about the possible consequences with the tax authorities. 393. OEs also reiterated their reliance on banks’ CDD measures, specifically regarding the verification of source of funds. Therefore, the significant shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT measures, combined with the over-reliance on bank AML/CFT measures, contribute to the low number of STRs. 394. No STRs have been submitted by DNFBPs in relation to TF. While the AT acknowledges Slovenia’s low TF risk and it has not identified a specific unreported case that could raise immediate concerns, the lack of STRs may be considered reflective of the low level of TF risk understanding among DNFBPs. 395. Most OEs were aware that STRs must be reported to the OMLP and had access to the reporting form published by the OMLP. However, many also advised that such reports would be simultaneously submitted to their supervisory authority or SRB, suggesting confusion regarding appropriate reporting channels. As a result, OEs generally opted to report to both authorities to ensure a correct submission. Furthermore, none of the OEs provided information on the process to follow if consent from the OMLP is required prior to proceeding with a transaction. 396. With respect to tipping off, the majority of OEs were able to articulate the legal prohibition but were unable to elaborate on what controls were in place or would be implemented to prevent inadvertent disclosure. Most OEs advised they would refer the matter to their designated AML/CFT compliance officer. 397. Neither the supervisory authorities, SRBs nor the OMLP (in its capacity as financial intelligence unit) have undertaken targeted training or outreach to address the deficiencies identified, particularly the lack of STR reporting. 4.4.4 Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 398. Few OEs have established formal policies and procedures tailored to their own specific risk profiles. Updates to these frameworks are infrequent, and training remains inadequate. 399. Among the sectors demonstrating stronger compliance, Casinos maintain internal procedures that demonstrate compliance with all AML/CFT obligations. Similarly, accountants, tax advisors, auditors, and covered lawyers which are part of larger international groups were able to demonstrate the implementation of effective and documented internal controls, including the application of a risk-based approach to its activities. 400. Other DNFBPs view internal controls as an administrative requirement, often treating the supervisory authorities or SRBs guidelines as a checklist rather than understanding the need to integrate effective AML/CFT measures into their operational processes. 401. Many OEs met during the onsite did not provide regular in-depth AML/CFT training to their staff, which hinders their understanding and level of AML/CFT compliance. Training efforts appear largely confined to attendance by AML/CFT compliance officers in the annual sessions organised by the OMLP, after which they are expected to train their staff. The AT considers this approach insufficient given the observed shortcomings in DNFBPs understanding of AML/CFT requirements and risks. 402. Accountants, tax advisors, and auditors that are part of a larger international group demonstrated comprehensive policies concerning the application of audit controls to their AML/CFT controls ranging from the use of external providers and internal audit functions. Casinos and real estate entities also acknowledged internal audit measures to some extent. None the other sectors provided comprehensive information on this matter. 4.4.5 Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 403. As noted within R1.7 and IO1, there are limitations in the scope of Slovenia’s AML/CFT framework for DNFBPs, given it is unclear if legal advisors are able to provide FATF defined activities in R22.1(d). Regarding the other DNFBPs that fall within the scope of the APMLTF-2, the AT did not identify any major obstacles to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures. Footnotes [20]. Accountants and auditors part of a larger international group comprise of 30% and 69% of the market, respectively. No similar data is available for the Tax Advisors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="483. The ability of competent authorities to have timely access to basic and BO information of legal arrangements could not be assessed, as authorities do not consider legal arrangements as a phenomenon that is present in Slovenia with any regularity; the authorities very rarely encounter them in the carrying out of their functions. This was also corroborated through meetings with the private sector. 484. This notwithstanding, competent authorities would still be able to access BO information through the OEs as the latter have an obligation to obtain BO information when servicing trusts and similar legal arrangements, as do trustees (although their presence and that of TCSPs in general is not acknowledged by the authorities). Trustees have equal obligation to report BO data to the RBO. However, there are no such legal arrangements reported in the RBO." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="483. The ability of competent authorities to have timely access to basic and BO information of legal arrangements could not be assessed, as authorities do not consider legal arrangements as a phenomenon that is present in Slovenia with any regularity; the authorities very rarely encounter them in the carrying out of their functions. This was also corroborated through meetings with the private sector. 484. This notwithstanding, competent authorities would still be able to access BO information through the OEs as the latter have an obligation to obtain BO information when servicing trusts and similar legal arrangements, as do trustees (although their presence and that of TCSPs in general is not acknowledged by the authorities). Trustees have equal obligation to report BO data to the RBO. However, there are no such legal arrangements reported in the RBO." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1 Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 545. The Police use financial intelligence to conduct their pre-investigations or to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds related to ML, predicate offences, and TF. 546. The OMLP’s products are used to some extent to initiate criminal investigations. However, the majority of ML investigations are still triggered by the outcomes of the investigations of predicate offending due to the high evidentiary threshold (see IO.7). 547. In instances when the police have already opened preliminary investigations, the OMLP’s disseminations serve as valuable supplements, as the information therein can provide new leads, be used for cross-checking or to develop new evidence. The OMLP’s reports are used for critical insights into suspicious financial flows and help identify links between criminal organisations and illicit financial activities. The Police use data from the OMLP that originates from foreign FIUs to build and develop targeted requests for mutual legal assistance in order to obtain evidence needed for the criminal investigations. 548. In cases where the dissemination does not lead to a ML investigation, the data contained in the report functions as an analytical resource. It is utilised by the police to track potential financial crime trends, identify potential criminal networks, or monitor suspicious activities, even if it does not directly result in a formal criminal case. 549. Intelligence from the OMLP can be used to identify or support investigations into predicate offences. Nevertheless, the extent to which this has been used is unclear because the authorities were not able to provide information to substantiate a different conclusion. 550. Competent authorities can also make requests to the OMLP to determine whether a person is “known” to the OMLP, response to which entails a yes/no answer from the OMLP upon a simple search whether the person of interest to the authorities is traceable in the OMLP database. During 2020-2024, the OMLP received 42 such requests, majority of which came from the police (26 requests), whereas the rest – from prosecutors (12 requests) and courts (4 requests). 551. At the investigation stage of criminal proceedings involving ML/TF, prosecutors and courts can request the OMLP to supplement the ongoing investigation with additional data and information as needed. 6.4.2 Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 552. The OMLP plays an important role in the identification and tracing of criminal proceeds, particularly due to its unrestricted access to information on bank accounts and transactions. The OMLP also has the power to suspend transactions for up to three working days when there is a ML/TF suspicion. Over the past three years, the OMLP has exercised these powers in 104 cases. In most of the cases where suspicious transactions were withheld for 72 hours, the prosecutors were able to obtain temporary freezing orders from courts, managing to secure assets pending confiscation (see also IO.8). In some of the fraud-related cases referred by the Police, the OMLP successfully coordinated with foreign authorities to freeze accounts or suspend transactions. Table 6.8. Transactions suspended by the OMLP Year Cases Total value (EUR) 2020 10 817 371 2021 5 603 897 2022 19 1 147 562 2023 37 1 763 798 2024 48 1 467 339 Source: OMLP Annual report" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1 Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 545. The Police use financial intelligence to conduct their pre-investigations or to develop evidence, identify assets and trace criminal proceeds related to ML, predicate offences, and TF. 546. The OMLP’s products are used to some extent to initiate criminal investigations. However, the majority of ML investigations are still triggered by the outcomes of the investigations of predicate offending due to the high evidentiary threshold (see IO.7). 547. In instances when the police have already opened preliminary investigations, the OMLP’s disseminations serve as valuable supplements, as the information therein can provide new leads, be used for cross-checking or to develop new evidence. The OMLP’s reports are used for critical insights into suspicious financial flows and help identify links between criminal organisations and illicit financial activities. The Police use data from the OMLP that originates from foreign FIUs to build and develop targeted requests for mutual legal assistance in order to obtain evidence needed for the criminal investigations. 548. In cases where the dissemination does not lead to a ML investigation, the data contained in the report functions as an analytical resource. It is utilised by the police to track potential financial crime trends, identify potential criminal networks, or monitor suspicious activities, even if it does not directly result in a formal criminal case. 549. Intelligence from the OMLP can be used to identify or support investigations into predicate offences. Nevertheless, the extent to which this has been used is unclear because the authorities were not able to provide information to substantiate a different conclusion. 550. Competent authorities can also make requests to the OMLP to determine whether a person is “known” to the OMLP, response to which entails a yes/no answer from the OMLP upon a simple search whether the person of interest to the authorities is traceable in the OMLP database. During 2020-2024, the OMLP received 42 such requests, majority of which came from the police (26 requests), whereas the rest – from prosecutors (12 requests) and courts (4 requests). 551. At the investigation stage of criminal proceedings involving ML/TF, prosecutors and courts can request the OMLP to supplement the ongoing investigation with additional data and information as needed. 6.4.2 Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 552. The OMLP plays an important role in the identification and tracing of criminal proceeds, particularly due to its unrestricted access to information on bank accounts and transactions. The OMLP also has the power to suspend transactions for up to three working days when there is a ML/TF suspicion. Over the past three years, the OMLP has exercised these powers in 104 cases. In most of the cases where suspicious transactions were withheld for 72 hours, the prosecutors were able to obtain temporary freezing orders from courts, managing to secure assets pending confiscation (see also IO.8). In some of the fraud-related cases referred by the Police, the OMLP successfully coordinated with foreign authorities to freeze accounts or suspend transactions. Table 6.8. Transactions suspended by the OMLP Year Cases Total value (EUR) 2020 10 817 371 2021 5 603 897 2022 19 1 147 562 2023 37 1 763 798 2024 48 1 467 339 Source: OMLP Annual report" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. In Slovenia, when ML convictions are not feasible for justifiable reasons, the authorities pursue predicate offence and apply non-conviction based confiscation. 591. The non-conviction-based provisions of the Act on the Confiscation of Assets of Illegal Origins (ZOPNI) are considered by the authorities to be an alternative means by which autonomous ML offences can be resolved in the absence of a predicate conviction. This legislation includes provisions for investigative orders comparable to those under the criminal provisions and allows for a ‘financial investigation’ distinct from parallel investigations. It is not a substitute or an effective alternative to prosecutions. 592. Data provided by the authorities and the onsite narrative indicates that the use of ZOPNI is perceived by the authorities as an alternative to autonomous prosecutions. But its use in relation to ML appears to be low with 2 recorded outcomes totalling EUR 242 380. These figures do not include the case of a Slovenian Syrian national, who was investigated for drugs offences but not prosecuted, where ZOPNI was used to order the forfeiture of EUR 219 000 by means of charges placed on property held by the subject’s company. The effectiveness of ZOPNI as an alternative measure is being further challenged as a recent court ruling required the assets being recovered to have ‘undeniably originated from the commission of a criminal offence’ thereby potentially requiring the prosecutor to be able to evidence the predicate(s) and trace the proceeds." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="590. In Slovenia, when ML convictions are not feasible for justifiable reasons, the authorities pursue predicate offence and apply non-conviction based confiscation. 591. The non-conviction-based provisions of the Act on the Confiscation of Assets of Illegal Origins (ZOPNI) are considered by the authorities to be an alternative means by which autonomous ML offences can be resolved in the absence of a predicate conviction. This legislation includes provisions for investigative orders comparable to those under the criminal provisions and allows for a ‘financial investigation’ distinct from parallel investigations. It is not a substitute or an effective alternative to prosecutions. 592. Data provided by the authorities and the onsite narrative indicates that the use of ZOPNI is perceived by the authorities as an alternative to autonomous prosecutions. But its use in relation to ML appears to be low with 2 recorded outcomes totalling EUR 242 380. These figures do not include the case of a Slovenian Syrian national, who was investigated for drugs offences but not prosecuted, where ZOPNI was used to order the forfeiture of EUR 219 000 by means of charges placed on property held by the subject’s company. The effectiveness of ZOPNI as an alternative measure is being further challenged as a recent court ruling required the assets being recovered to have ‘undeniably originated from the commission of a criminal offence’ thereby potentially requiring the prosecutor to be able to evidence the predicate(s) and trace the proceeds." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="615. The management of frozen, seized or confiscated assets, including their realisation is the responsibility of the appropriate competent authorities, who are required to execute the court’s order in regard to their competency. In March 2025, this multi-agency approach manifested in 18 properties valued at EUR 1 229 759.00 being managed by the Ministry of Public Administration, a 100% shareholding in one corporate entity managed by the Slovenian Sovereign Holding d.d. (SDH d.d.) - and 8 vehicles held by FARS. 616. This multi-agency approach means that multiple authorities may be responsible for executing a single confiscation order. This approach does in theory ensure that management and recovery is undertaken by the most specialist teams, however the extent to which this function is appropriately resourced within each authority is unclear and at least one does not keep any relevant records. The siloing of responsibilities and absence of a co-ordinated approach constrains the effective enforcement and management of the overall order. 617. The authorities are not able to provide reliable consolidated data due to the absence of a central record. This issue was identified in the previous MER, and is an issue recognised by the authorities during the on-site. However, there have been no substantive steps taken to address the issue. The reason for this may be a matter of prioritisation or resourcing, however it remains and are requiring improvement. The current system is based upon each responsible authority in isolation creating and retaining their own records with no means of cross referencing or external review. As such, it is not possible for the authorities to access the effectiveness of the regime, or to ensure that the court orders are executed in their entirety and in a timely manner. 618. The Authorities are able to sell or dispose of assets subject to temporary seizure in instances where the market value may decrease over time, or whose continued storage is associated with disproportionate costs given the potential duration of proceedings, Safeguards exist to ensure that the beneficial owner of the property is consulted and is able to make appropriate representations to the court. In relation to real property, the authorities are required to ensure third party interests are protected and any maintenance costs are met. The AT have however not been provided with any examples to demonstrate the effectiveness or frequency of such actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="615. The management of frozen, seized or confiscated assets, including their realisation is the responsibility of the appropriate competent authorities, who are required to execute the court’s order in regard to their competency. In March 2025, this multi-agency approach manifested in 18 properties valued at EUR 1 229 759.00 being managed by the Ministry of Public Administration, a 100% shareholding in one corporate entity managed by the Slovenian Sovereign Holding d.d. (SDH d.d.) - and 8 vehicles held by FARS. 616. This multi-agency approach means that multiple authorities may be responsible for executing a single confiscation order. This approach does in theory ensure that management and recovery is undertaken by the most specialist teams, however the extent to which this function is appropriately resourced within each authority is unclear and at least one does not keep any relevant records. The siloing of responsibilities and absence of a co-ordinated approach constrains the effective enforcement and management of the overall order. 617. The authorities are not able to provide reliable consolidated data due to the absence of a central record. This issue was identified in the previous MER, and is an issue recognised by the authorities during the on-site. However, there have been no substantive steps taken to address the issue. The reason for this may be a matter of prioritisation or resourcing, however it remains and are requiring improvement. The current system is based upon each responsible authority in isolation creating and retaining their own records with no means of cross referencing or external review. As such, it is not possible for the authorities to access the effectiveness of the regime, or to ensure that the court orders are executed in their entirety and in a timely manner. 618. The Authorities are able to sell or dispose of assets subject to temporary seizure in instances where the market value may decrease over time, or whose continued storage is associated with disproportionate costs given the potential duration of proceedings, Safeguards exist to ensure that the beneficial owner of the property is consulted and is able to make appropriate representations to the court. In relation to real property, the authorities are required to ensure third party interests are protected and any maintenance costs are met. The AT have however not been provided with any examples to demonstrate the effectiveness or frequency of such actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1 Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 659. Slovenia has adopted the National Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. On TF issues, the strategy is brief: 660. “The legislation and system governing the prevention of ML are consistent with international legal acts and standards. The OEs comply consistently with their duties to report suspected TF detected on the basis of a list of indicators and adopt all the necessary measures in accordance with the AML/CFT Law. Considering the fact that the fight against terrorism, violent extremism, and TF is a global issue, international cooperation is important in the prevention of ML/TF. The Republic of Slovenia will continue to carry out, upgrade, and strengthen activities to prevent ML/TF.” 661. The AT concludes that the national policies in relation to TF prevention are formulated broadly and given little attention. Information and intelligence obtained in TF investigations, as well as information on TF risk assessment, TF trends and techniques was not used in the formulation of National Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. 9.4.2 Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 662. Information and intelligence obtained in TF investigations was not used to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities. One authority claimed that TF investigations yielded no information or intelligence that could be used to support national counterterrorism strategies and activities. Nevertheless, the AT was not assured that such information and intelligence would be used, even if it was available. The topic of TF investigations is largely overlooked in national counter-terrorism strategies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1 Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 659. Slovenia has adopted the National Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. On TF issues, the strategy is brief: 660. “The legislation and system governing the prevention of ML are consistent with international legal acts and standards. The OEs comply consistently with their duties to report suspected TF detected on the basis of a list of indicators and adopt all the necessary measures in accordance with the AML/CFT Law. Considering the fact that the fight against terrorism, violent extremism, and TF is a global issue, international cooperation is important in the prevention of ML/TF. The Republic of Slovenia will continue to carry out, upgrade, and strengthen activities to prevent ML/TF.” 661. The AT concludes that the national policies in relation to TF prevention are formulated broadly and given little attention. Information and intelligence obtained in TF investigations, as well as information on TF risk assessment, TF trends and techniques was not used in the formulation of National Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. 9.4.2 Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 662. Information and intelligence obtained in TF investigations was not used to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities. One authority claimed that TF investigations yielded no information or intelligence that could be used to support national counterterrorism strategies and activities. Nevertheless, the AT was not assured that such information and intelligence would be used, even if it was available. The topic of TF investigations is largely overlooked in national counter-terrorism strategies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1 FIs and VASPs 684. Most of the FIs and VASPs have established (in accordance with the requirements of the competent authorities) effective policies, procedures and controls to ensure compliance with UN TFS and timely detection of breaches of those measures. While certain deficiencies were observed in the smaller, non-material FIs, this was also confirmed by the findings of supervisory authorities. 685. The majority of FIs and VASPs, especially the most material ones, demonstrated a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. They primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. FIs and VASPs had procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 686. FIs and VASPs typically have advanced, real-time screening systems, ensuring TFS implementation upon customer onboarding and throughout the business relationship. Those checks are conducted on the customers, but also their BOs and transactions. Internal policies and controls enable timely identification and reporting of (false positive) matches. 687. None of the FIs/VASPs had a genuine TF-related TFS hit, which is in line with country’s risk profile. 10.4.2 DNFBPs 688. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a low level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS. 689. Most of the DNFBPs were familiar with the concepts of UNSCRs and sanctions screening obligations, except for casinos, the real estate entities, and DPMS. The DNFBPs were generally unaware of the existence of Sanctions Implementation Guidelines. In addition, the absence of a communication mechanism negatively impacted timely awareness of changes to UNSCRs and therefore their implementation without delay especially in the three mentioned sectors. 690. Checks conducted by the DNFBPs except for the ones that are part of an international groups (law firms, audit etc.) were basic. These checks were confined to verifying the name of the customer or the party directly involved in the transaction with the UN TFS as published online. The other parties, such as BOs, other directly or indirectly concerned entities and persons were not checked. 691. Many supervisors of DNFBP sectors agreed that the level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS in DNFBP sector is limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1 FIs and VASPs 684. Most of the FIs and VASPs have established (in accordance with the requirements of the competent authorities) effective policies, procedures and controls to ensure compliance with UN TFS and timely detection of breaches of those measures. While certain deficiencies were observed in the smaller, non-material FIs, this was also confirmed by the findings of supervisory authorities. 685. The majority of FIs and VASPs, especially the most material ones, demonstrated a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. They primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. FIs and VASPs had procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 686. FIs and VASPs typically have advanced, real-time screening systems, ensuring TFS implementation upon customer onboarding and throughout the business relationship. Those checks are conducted on the customers, but also their BOs and transactions. Internal policies and controls enable timely identification and reporting of (false positive) matches. 687. None of the FIs/VASPs had a genuine TF-related TFS hit, which is in line with country’s risk profile. 10.4.2 DNFBPs 688. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a low level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS. 689. Most of the DNFBPs were familiar with the concepts of UNSCRs and sanctions screening obligations, except for casinos, the real estate entities, and DPMS. The DNFBPs were generally unaware of the existence of Sanctions Implementation Guidelines. In addition, the absence of a communication mechanism negatively impacted timely awareness of changes to UNSCRs and therefore their implementation without delay especially in the three mentioned sectors. 690. Checks conducted by the DNFBPs except for the ones that are part of an international groups (law firms, audit etc.) were basic. These checks were confined to verifying the name of the customer or the party directly involved in the transaction with the UN TFS as published online. The other parties, such as BOs, other directly or indirectly concerned entities and persons were not checked. 691. Many supervisors of DNFBP sectors agreed that the level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS in DNFBP sector is limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1 Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 716. Slovenia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for PF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the Slovenia’s context. However, Slovenian authorities were not able to provide any statistics on reports from OEs on (false positive) matches with PF TFS lists or transactions rejected pursuant to PF TFS which could have evidenced the ability of OEs to potentially detect funds of designated persons. 717. Similarly to TF-related sanctions implementation, Slovenia’s governance framework for the implementation of PF-related TFS has a number of shortcomings, including lack of clear channels of communication and the central authority for the receipt of reports on identified assets, clarity on reporting obligations for the OEs and format for reporting; ability to maintain statistics and develop examples of reports received in regard to a (false positive) match with the UN TFS; ability to describe the undertaken steps where case of reporting and asset freezing would occur. These shortcomings can, to some extent, be attributed to the understaffing of the MFEA. 11.4.2 Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 718. In Slovenia any natural and legal person is prohibited from making funds, other assets or economic resources available to persons designated under UNSCRs. This prohibition is implemented through the EU legislative framework and the domestic one. Under the domestic framework the breach of this prohibition is sanctioned under the criminal law. There were no instances in Slovenia for authorising by a national competent authority or EU making the funds available to persons and entities designated by PF TFS. 719. The competent authorities were not able to provide information on application of prohibitions in practice. The competent authorities do not gather and analyse such data on transactions rejected." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1 Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 716. Slovenia has not identified any designated individual or entity under UNSCR-related TFS for PF, nor have funds been frozen under this framework, which is consistent with the Slovenia’s context. However, Slovenian authorities were not able to provide any statistics on reports from OEs on (false positive) matches with PF TFS lists or transactions rejected pursuant to PF TFS which could have evidenced the ability of OEs to potentially detect funds of designated persons. 717. Similarly to TF-related sanctions implementation, Slovenia’s governance framework for the implementation of PF-related TFS has a number of shortcomings, including lack of clear channels of communication and the central authority for the receipt of reports on identified assets, clarity on reporting obligations for the OEs and format for reporting; ability to maintain statistics and develop examples of reports received in regard to a (false positive) match with the UN TFS; ability to describe the undertaken steps where case of reporting and asset freezing would occur. These shortcomings can, to some extent, be attributed to the understaffing of the MFEA. 11.4.2 Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 718. In Slovenia any natural and legal person is prohibited from making funds, other assets or economic resources available to persons designated under UNSCRs. This prohibition is implemented through the EU legislative framework and the domestic one. Under the domestic framework the breach of this prohibition is sanctioned under the criminal law. There were no instances in Slovenia for authorising by a national competent authority or EU making the funds available to persons and entities designated by PF TFS. 719. The competent authorities were not able to provide information on application of prohibitions in practice. The competent authorities do not gather and analyse such data on transactions rejected." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="136. Overall, the AT considers that coordination structures lack the authority, formalisation, and strategic focus required to ensure that AML/CFT policies are coherent, risk-based, and effectively implemented across competent authorities. 137. As the central authority for AML/CFT under the APMLTF-2, the OMLP is responsible to coordinate national policy. However, Slovenia does not have formal mechanisms in place to ensure effective coordination and cooperation in the development and implementation of policy. In practice, no competent authority demonstrated that coordination arrangements are used to define national policies or to ensure that NRA findings are systematically reflected in national or sectoral actions. 138. The IWG did not have formalised governance arrangements defining the scope of its responsibilities, frequency of meetings, etc. This limits its ability to function as an effective coordination mechanism capable of driving a consistent and risk-based national response. The OMLP advised that the IWG will continue to operate in the future following the adoption of the 2025 NRA, with an expanded focus on overseeing the implementation of the action plan (the update of the terms of reference of the Group is planned). The OMLP also advised that it expects to establish additional bilateral or multilateral inter-agency groups to facilitate a more structured response to emerging developments. While these proposed enhancements represent a positive and constructive step, these initiatives have not yet been implemented and therefore its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed. 139. Slovenia has other working groups (see Section 1.6) that primarily focus on operational matters, although they may occasionally identify policy related matters. However, the participants in these groups do not have the authority to define or adopt national policy measures and such issues must therefore be escalated to higher senior officials for consideration." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="136. Overall, the AT considers that coordination structures lack the authority, formalisation, and strategic focus required to ensure that AML/CFT policies are coherent, risk-based, and effectively implemented across competent authorities. 137. As the central authority for AML/CFT under the APMLTF-2, the OMLP is responsible to coordinate national policy. However, Slovenia does not have formal mechanisms in place to ensure effective coordination and cooperation in the development and implementation of policy. In practice, no competent authority demonstrated that coordination arrangements are used to define national policies or to ensure that NRA findings are systematically reflected in national or sectoral actions. 138. The IWG did not have formalised governance arrangements defining the scope of its responsibilities, frequency of meetings, etc. This limits its ability to function as an effective coordination mechanism capable of driving a consistent and risk-based national response. The OMLP advised that the IWG will continue to operate in the future following the adoption of the 2025 NRA, with an expanded focus on overseeing the implementation of the action plan (the update of the terms of reference of the Group is planned). The OMLP also advised that it expects to establish additional bilateral or multilateral inter-agency groups to facilitate a more structured response to emerging developments. While these proposed enhancements represent a positive and constructive step, these initiatives have not yet been implemented and therefore its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed. 139. Slovenia has other working groups (see Section 1.6) that primarily focus on operational matters, although they may occasionally identify policy related matters. However, the participants in these groups do not have the authority to define or adopt national policy measures and such issues must therefore be escalated to higher senior officials for consideration." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BoS 296. The BoS has a risk-based supervisory strategy in place, setting out the frequency with which FIs falling within particular risk bands will be considered for supervisory examinations and the possible types of examination to be carried out. This varies also on the basis of the sector in question, with the frequency being higher in the case of banks. The overall cycle for the banking sector spans six years, during which all those institutions presenting a Moderate, Significant or Very High ML/TF risk should be subject to some form of on-site supervisory engagement at intervales of six, four and two years respectively. The cycle for the non-banking sector is somewhat longer as it spans a total of seven years for the same risk-categories at intervals of seven, five and three years respectively. In either case, FIs calling within the Low-Risk band, which would include all currency exchange offices, are only to be subject to supervisory engagements when considered necessary by the BoS. The duration of each cycle is judged to be somewhat too long, given that the majority of the FIs falling under the BoS’ supervision fall within the Low or Moderate categories. In addition, follow-up examinations are considered on a par with full-scope or thematic/targeted examinations, notwithstanding their more limited extent and focus. 297. The BoS has limited resources with which to supervise the FIs and, until July 2025, the VASPs falling within its supervisory remit. As at end of December 2024, it had only 3 FTEs to supervise a total of 30 FIs and 28 VASPs (though only 9 were active). The result is that the BoS is not managing to adhere to its supervisory plans, a vulnerability that was also identified in the 2025 NRA and in relation to which an action point was set out in the resulting Action Plan. 298. In the evaluation period, in total, BoS carried out full-scope and thematic on-site examinations on 73% of the banking population, representing approx. 96% of assets within the banking sector. The use of thematic examinations is especially visible when it comes to the banking sector, with 3 thematic on-site examinations having been carried out over the assessment period covering a total of 14 institutions, as against only four full-scope examinations having been carried out between 2020-2023 and none in 2024. These were not always the examinations carried out on the riskiest banks as in two instances there were banks with a higher risk profile that were subject to a thematic examination instead. However, in those cases a full-scope examination had just taken place while the other was undergoing remediation and was the subject of a follow-up examination. On the other hand, while thematic examinations can provide a good snapshot of what risks and mitigating measures an institution or sector is applying in a given area, they do not provide a comprehensive overview of the whole AML/CFT framework of the particular institution. Moreover, this tool has been used to mostly assess the implementation of requirements arising from recently introduced legislative or regulatory changes and does not seem to have taken into account high risk areas highlighted by the NRA (e.g. correspondent banking). 299. Indeed, the BoS preferred supervisory tool is the thematic examination, with a total of eight such examinations carried out between 2020–2024 covering institutions, banks and non-banks, having a moderate to a high-risk profile. It is interesting to note that within the non-banking sector, the thematic examinations are quite comprehensive and come close to full-scope examinations as they relate to how higher risk non-banking entities comply with the overall spectrum of their AML/CFT obligations. Three of these thematic examinations related to VASPs, which at the time fell under the BoS supervisory remit. 300. Intervals between examinations do not entail that there is no interaction between the OEs and the BoS as there are other touchpoints in place, including questionnaires and management meetings. 301. The procedure for the carrying out of on-site examinations is set out in the BoS’ Operational Guidelines, which set out what are the different supervisory tools available to the BoS and how they differ one from the other, and Rules of Procedure for Inspections. The Rules of Procedure for Inspections regulate in detail the actual procedure to be followed for the carrying out of on-site examinations. There is, therefore, in place a set procedure for the carrying out of supervisory examinations and these tend to be quite thorough and extensive as also informed by different OEs. In all instances, prior to the carrying out of supervisory engagements, the BoS seeks the input of the OMLP in terms of the level and quality of reporting by the particular FI or, until it was responsible for them, VASP. The results of the examination are communicated to the OE through Supervisory Letters or Orders to Comply and are quite detailed, setting out what was finding, the obligation concerned and also what is expected of the OE in terms of possible remediation. 302. Notwithstanding the difficulties and limitation highlighted above, the BoS also seeks to carry out group-wide supervision of FIs that have cross-border operations in cooperation and coordination with its counterparts in other jurisdictions. Indeed, it did have one such instance which it carried out in conjunction with its counterpart authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. In addition, it regularly shares its findings from its supervisory activities with other interested counterparts. SMA 303. The SMA had, at the end of 2024, 60 FIs under its supervision – 51 AIFMs, 5 UCITS management companies and 4 investment services firms. Actual supervisory activities on these FIs are carried out by 2 FTEs focused on the investment services firms and 2 FTEs focused on the fund management companies (and indirectly the collective investment schemes they manage). The SMA has, as of July 2025, been vested with responsibility also for the AML/CFT supervision of VASPs. While the number of eventual VASPs falling within its supervisory remit has still to be defined, no additional resources have been made available to cater for this new cohort of OEs. 304. The SMA has a general risk-based supervisory strategy which, while recognising that OEs that are assessed with a higher risk of ML and TF are subject to more frequent and in-depth supervision, does not set out which supervisory tools are to be used with respect to specific risk categories. It’s supervisory planning seems to be dictated more by the resources available to it as it seeks to carry out at least an on-site thematic examination on 1-2 investment services firms and on 1-2 collective investment schemes on an annual basis, independently of the level of risk they present. While thematic examinations allow a more focused approach to OEs’ risk control framework, they do not allow for a holistic appreciation of a control framework’s effectiveness. 305. In terms of the carried out supervisory activities, no full scope on-site examinations were held in 2020-2024 and 8 thematic on-site examinations were otherwise held during the review period. It has to be noted that these thematic examinations do not target a specific area of ML/TF risk or aspect of the AML/CFT control framework, but come close to being full scope examinations as they take into account the adequacy of the ML/TF risk assessment framework, CDD measures including transaction monitoring and reporting to the OMLP. None of the licence holders selected for on-site examinations, nine in total, were rated higher than Medium Low in terms of ML/TF risk, even though throughout the review period there were on average fourteen licence holders rated as presenting a Medium level of ML/TF risk and at least one licence-holder that was rated as Medium High. 2023 has seen a gradual escalation in terms of the level of ML/TF risks presented by licence holders compared to earlier years but this did not lead to full scope on-site examination in those entities. These higher risks rated OEs were instead the subject of off-site examinations, a less intrusive and intensive supervisory tool than the thematic or full-scope on-site examination. 306. The SMA also makes use of off-site thematic examinations, consisting in assessing whether there are any changes from one year to another as to the information provided through the annual risk questionnaire. However, it is questionable whether this is the best tool to assess compliance with AML/CFT obligations within the higher risk-rated (medium-high) categories. 307. As to the actual carrying out of any on-site examinations, these were described by both the SMA and the OEs as being quite intensive. ISA 308. The ISA does not seem to have a supervisory strategy in place. However, it has consistently risk rated insurance companies as low risk and, in practice, carried out full-scope examinations on the said companies once every three years. Insurance intermediaries are also subject to supervision, though there have been only 54 such examinations over the assessment period. Market Inspectorate 309. The Market Inspectorate does not have a supervisory strategy. The annual inspection planning is based on the available resources rather than other factors. Thus, the Market Inspectorate undertook 13 on-site supervisory interventions on non-bank lenders in 2022, in 2023 and 21 in 2024. Inspections are conducted per available guideline for supervision and do not differ from entity to entity. The onsite visit lasts from half to one day and consists of checking 3 customer files. Internal documents of the supervised entity are gathered and analysed at the inspector’s desk. The overall length of the inspection is not clear since the inspectors deal with multiple tasks at a time. It can be concluded that the shortage of resources hampers the abilities of the Market Inspectorate for an effective risk-based supervision. While infringements were noted in 6 of the supervisory engagements carried out, the absence of more granular statistical data for the period 2020–2024 does not allow the AT to make any assessment as to the adequacy of what supervisory activities are undertaken by the said authority. OMLP 310. The OMLP is a secondary supervisor for FIs and VASPs, and therefore carries out limited supervisory activities, albeit complementary to the supervisory activities carried out by the other main FI supervisors. Its supervisory activities are more targeted in nature, acting upon particular information it may receive internally from the other sections of the OMLP or from sources like the media. In total it has carried out four targeted examinations on banks and two more general on-site supervisory examinations on leasing companies. Considering the additional responsibilities that the OMLP’s supervisory team has to meet, this may be the best use of these additional but limited resources. Cooperation between Supervisors 311. The limited resources available to supervisors makes the need for cooperation and collaboration between the authorities more indispensable. To address this issue, a joint commission - Commission for Cooperation between Supervisory Authorities on the Planning of Joint Supervisory Procedures – has been established. Bringing together the BoS, the SMA and the ISA, representatives from the three (3) supervisors meet at the beginning of the year to discuss their intended plans for AML/CFT supervision and the supervision of other areas. Unlike what its name suggests, the said forum is more used to communicate information about possible supervisory plans but not to actually plan or revise plans to widen and deepen coverage of FIs falling within the supervisors’ respective remit. As to actual joint examinations, these are at times carried out between the SMA and the BoS on banks carrying out both banking and investment services. However, this is quite exceptional in nature." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="BoS 296. The BoS has a risk-based supervisory strategy in place, setting out the frequency with which FIs falling within particular risk bands will be considered for supervisory examinations and the possible types of examination to be carried out. This varies also on the basis of the sector in question, with the frequency being higher in the case of banks. The overall cycle for the banking sector spans six years, during which all those institutions presenting a Moderate, Significant or Very High ML/TF risk should be subject to some form of on-site supervisory engagement at intervales of six, four and two years respectively. The cycle for the non-banking sector is somewhat longer as it spans a total of seven years for the same risk-categories at intervals of seven, five and three years respectively. In either case, FIs calling within the Low-Risk band, which would include all currency exchange offices, are only to be subject to supervisory engagements when considered necessary by the BoS. The duration of each cycle is judged to be somewhat too long, given that the majority of the FIs falling under the BoS’ supervision fall within the Low or Moderate categories. In addition, follow-up examinations are considered on a par with full-scope or thematic/targeted examinations, notwithstanding their more limited extent and focus. 297. The BoS has limited resources with which to supervise the FIs and, until July 2025, the VASPs falling within its supervisory remit. As at end of December 2024, it had only 3 FTEs to supervise a total of 30 FIs and 28 VASPs (though only 9 were active). The result is that the BoS is not managing to adhere to its supervisory plans, a vulnerability that was also identified in the 2025 NRA and in relation to which an action point was set out in the resulting Action Plan. 298. In the evaluation period, in total, BoS carried out full-scope and thematic on-site examinations on 73% of the banking population, representing approx. 96% of assets within the banking sector. The use of thematic examinations is especially visible when it comes to the banking sector, with 3 thematic on-site examinations having been carried out over the assessment period covering a total of 14 institutions, as against only four full-scope examinations having been carried out between 2020-2023 and none in 2024. These were not always the examinations carried out on the riskiest banks as in two instances there were banks with a higher risk profile that were subject to a thematic examination instead. However, in those cases a full-scope examination had just taken place while the other was undergoing remediation and was the subject of a follow-up examination. On the other hand, while thematic examinations can provide a good snapshot of what risks and mitigating measures an institution or sector is applying in a given area, they do not provide a comprehensive overview of the whole AML/CFT framework of the particular institution. Moreover, this tool has been used to mostly assess the implementation of requirements arising from recently introduced legislative or regulatory changes and does not seem to have taken into account high risk areas highlighted by the NRA (e.g. correspondent banking). 299. Indeed, the BoS preferred supervisory tool is the thematic examination, with a total of eight such examinations carried out between 2020–2024 covering institutions, banks and non-banks, having a moderate to a high-risk profile. It is interesting to note that within the non-banking sector, the thematic examinations are quite comprehensive and come close to full-scope examinations as they relate to how higher risk non-banking entities comply with the overall spectrum of their AML/CFT obligations. Three of these thematic examinations related to VASPs, which at the time fell under the BoS supervisory remit. 300. Intervals between examinations do not entail that there is no interaction between the OEs and the BoS as there are other touchpoints in place, including questionnaires and management meetings. 301. The procedure for the carrying out of on-site examinations is set out in the BoS’ Operational Guidelines, which set out what are the different supervisory tools available to the BoS and how they differ one from the other, and Rules of Procedure for Inspections. The Rules of Procedure for Inspections regulate in detail the actual procedure to be followed for the carrying out of on-site examinations. There is, therefore, in place a set procedure for the carrying out of supervisory examinations and these tend to be quite thorough and extensive as also informed by different OEs. In all instances, prior to the carrying out of supervisory engagements, the BoS seeks the input of the OMLP in terms of the level and quality of reporting by the particular FI or, until it was responsible for them, VASP. The results of the examination are communicated to the OE through Supervisory Letters or Orders to Comply and are quite detailed, setting out what was finding, the obligation concerned and also what is expected of the OE in terms of possible remediation. 302. Notwithstanding the difficulties and limitation highlighted above, the BoS also seeks to carry out group-wide supervision of FIs that have cross-border operations in cooperation and coordination with its counterparts in other jurisdictions. Indeed, it did have one such instance which it carried out in conjunction with its counterpart authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. In addition, it regularly shares its findings from its supervisory activities with other interested counterparts. SMA 303. The SMA had, at the end of 2024, 60 FIs under its supervision – 51 AIFMs, 5 UCITS management companies and 4 investment services firms. Actual supervisory activities on these FIs are carried out by 2 FTEs focused on the investment services firms and 2 FTEs focused on the fund management companies (and indirectly the collective investment schemes they manage). The SMA has, as of July 2025, been vested with responsibility also for the AML/CFT supervision of VASPs. While the number of eventual VASPs falling within its supervisory remit has still to be defined, no additional resources have been made available to cater for this new cohort of OEs. 304. The SMA has a general risk-based supervisory strategy which, while recognising that OEs that are assessed with a higher risk of ML and TF are subject to more frequent and in-depth supervision, does not set out which supervisory tools are to be used with respect to specific risk categories. It’s supervisory planning seems to be dictated more by the resources available to it as it seeks to carry out at least an on-site thematic examination on 1-2 investment services firms and on 1-2 collective investment schemes on an annual basis, independently of the level of risk they present. While thematic examinations allow a more focused approach to OEs’ risk control framework, they do not allow for a holistic appreciation of a control framework’s effectiveness. 305. In terms of the carried out supervisory activities, no full scope on-site examinations were held in 2020-2024 and 8 thematic on-site examinations were otherwise held during the review period. It has to be noted that these thematic examinations do not target a specific area of ML/TF risk or aspect of the AML/CFT control framework, but come close to being full scope examinations as they take into account the adequacy of the ML/TF risk assessment framework, CDD measures including transaction monitoring and reporting to the OMLP. None of the licence holders selected for on-site examinations, nine in total, were rated higher than Medium Low in terms of ML/TF risk, even though throughout the review period there were on average fourteen licence holders rated as presenting a Medium level of ML/TF risk and at least one licence-holder that was rated as Medium High. 2023 has seen a gradual escalation in terms of the level of ML/TF risks presented by licence holders compared to earlier years but this did not lead to full scope on-site examination in those entities. These higher risks rated OEs were instead the subject of off-site examinations, a less intrusive and intensive supervisory tool than the thematic or full-scope on-site examination. 306. The SMA also makes use of off-site thematic examinations, consisting in assessing whether there are any changes from one year to another as to the information provided through the annual risk questionnaire. However, it is questionable whether this is the best tool to assess compliance with AML/CFT obligations within the higher risk-rated (medium-high) categories. 307. As to the actual carrying out of any on-site examinations, these were described by both the SMA and the OEs as being quite intensive. ISA 308. The ISA does not seem to have a supervisory strategy in place. However, it has consistently risk rated insurance companies as low risk and, in practice, carried out full-scope examinations on the said companies once every three years. Insurance intermediaries are also subject to supervision, though there have been only 54 such examinations over the assessment period. Market Inspectorate 309. The Market Inspectorate does not have a supervisory strategy. The annual inspection planning is based on the available resources rather than other factors. Thus, the Market Inspectorate undertook 13 on-site supervisory interventions on non-bank lenders in 2022, in 2023 and 21 in 2024. Inspections are conducted per available guideline for supervision and do not differ from entity to entity. The onsite visit lasts from half to one day and consists of checking 3 customer files. Internal documents of the supervised entity are gathered and analysed at the inspector’s desk. The overall length of the inspection is not clear since the inspectors deal with multiple tasks at a time. It can be concluded that the shortage of resources hampers the abilities of the Market Inspectorate for an effective risk-based supervision. While infringements were noted in 6 of the supervisory engagements carried out, the absence of more granular statistical data for the period 2020–2024 does not allow the AT to make any assessment as to the adequacy of what supervisory activities are undertaken by the said authority. OMLP 310. The OMLP is a secondary supervisor for FIs and VASPs, and therefore carries out limited supervisory activities, albeit complementary to the supervisory activities carried out by the other main FI supervisors. Its supervisory activities are more targeted in nature, acting upon particular information it may receive internally from the other sections of the OMLP or from sources like the media. In total it has carried out four targeted examinations on banks and two more general on-site supervisory examinations on leasing companies. Considering the additional responsibilities that the OMLP’s supervisory team has to meet, this may be the best use of these additional but limited resources. Cooperation between Supervisors 311. The limited resources available to supervisors makes the need for cooperation and collaboration between the authorities more indispensable. To address this issue, a joint commission - Commission for Cooperation between Supervisory Authorities on the Planning of Joint Supervisory Procedures – has been established. Bringing together the BoS, the SMA and the ISA, representatives from the three (3) supervisors meet at the beginning of the year to discuss their intended plans for AML/CFT supervision and the supervision of other areas. Unlike what its name suggests, the said forum is more used to communicate information about possible supervisory plans but not to actually plan or revise plans to widen and deepen coverage of FIs falling within the supervisors’ respective remit. As to actual joint examinations, these are at times carried out between the SMA and the BoS on banks carrying out both banking and investment services. However, this is quite exceptional in nature." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="404. All regulated sectors have a designated supervisory authority or SRB that holds responsibility to supervise compliance with APMLTF-2. In addition to the designated primary supervisory authority or SRB identified for each sector, the OMLP acts as the secondary supervisor for all DNFBPs. 405. For most sectors, supervisory activities are often limited to formal reviews of documents rather than a comprehensive assessment of the practical implementation or effectiveness of the AML/CFT measures implemented by OEs. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs demonstrated the application of a risk-based approach to supervision, whereby greater focus is expected to be placed on higher risk sectors and higher risk OEs. This could be reflective of the limited risk understanding of the sectors and OE risk profiles. 406. The absence of comprehensive information to identify the number and types of persons actively operating as real estate entities, tax advisors, accountants, and DPMSs, and a lack of information on legal professionals that are not registered with the SBA, renders effective supervision of these sectors impossible. This is particularly concerning because some of these sectors are identified within the NRA as posing a higher risk of ML. 407. Real estate entities and DPMSs – The MIRS conducts the AML/CFT supervision of real estate entities (business entities and registered real estate agents) and DPMSs. 408. The MIRS advised that it lacks sufficient human resources to implement an effective and sustainable supervisory framework. In addition to the supervision of real estate and DPMS sectors, the MIRS is responsible for several other financial and non-financial sectors. The AML/CFT team comprises of 8 inspectors though they are not dedicated exclusively to AML/CFT functions. 409. Whilst the Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future maintains a register of real estate agents, and the Metrology Institute registers DPMS (except for traders in precious stones and raw metals), the MIRS does not have access to reliable and up to date information on the number of Real Estate entities or DPMS’ actively operating within these sectors. It relies on the business register. However, MIRS advised that it is not a reliable source either as many persons register multiple activities irrespective of whether they are actually performed. The MIRS has identified numerous cases where the person has confirmed that they are in fact not carrying out these activities. In these cases, the MIRS does not verify that the person is actually not conducting regulated activities. 410. In 2024, the MIRS adopted a pro-active supervisory approach, and towards the end of the year, issued questionnaires to all 2 777 OEs registered with the Business Registry for real estate and DPMS activities. The questionnaire requested confirmation if the person was undertaking regulated activities and had complied with the various AML/CFT obligations and collected high level information on the number of customers. 411. The response rate from the real estate sector was 53.5% with at least 11% of responses incomplete. The response rate from DPMSs was even lower, at 38.9%, with at least 3% of responses incomplete. The MIRS does not have the legal powers, nor has it implemented practical procedures to follow up with non-respondents, and no supervisory actions were taken against entities that failed to respond. The absence of complete and reliable information from OEs undermines the implementation of effective supervisory measures. Table 4.2. Risk Rating (only for those entities that responded to the questionnaires) Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk Real estate entities 60% 39% 1% DPMS 71% 28% 1% 412. MIRS inspection procedures require that OEs provide inspectors with all relevant AML/CFT documents during the inspection visit that typically lasts half a day and includes the review of 3-5 client files to verify the application of the OEs policies and procedures. On completion of the inspection, the MIRS completes an inspection report detailing the actions taken by inspectors and the findings. Client files are randomly selected ranging in characteristics; however, inspections are not risk based or target the specific risks of the OE e.g. focus on higher risk customers or higher risk transactions. Inspections of such limited duration are not sufficient to allow for an in-depth and comprehensive assessment of an OE’s internal controls or the effective implementation of AML/CFT measures in practice. Moreso considering the limitations in the supervisory framework for real estate sectors and DPMS, and that these are considered as posing a higher risk in accordance with Slovenia’s NRAs. Furthermore, the MIRS does not risk assess the OE after an inspection, nor does it place it in a periodic supervisory programme. As a result, the inspection process lacks depth and continuity, limiting its effectiveness in identifying risks or the promotion of sustained compliance by OEs. 413. The MIRS does not apply a risk-based methodology to determine its supervisory activities. The annual supervisory plan is determined based on the availability of human resources rather than the sectors or individual OE risks. Between 2020-2024 the MIRS conducted a total of 183 inspections in the real estate sector, representing 13% of it. (See Table 4.3). No inspections have been carried out on DPMSs. 414. Covered Lawyers – The SBA is responsible for the AML/CFT supervision of covered lawyers. As of the end of 2024, there were 1 913 registered covered lawyers. 415. The SBA’s offsite supervisory efforts are comparatively more developed. At the end of 2024 the SBA issued questionnaires to all covered lawyers, requesting confirmation if the person was undertaking regulated activities, the nature of activities provided, the type of controls implemented, information of the risk profile of its customers, etc. The SBA carried out a comprehensive analysis of the result. However, given the lack of risk categorisation it results in an inadequate application of supervisory framework. 416. The SBA also lacks a methodology to determine its risk-based supervisory activities. The SBA noted that it is comprised by covered lawyers that carry out this function on a voluntary basis, with 5 Commission Members and only one dedicated resource to fulfil its supervisory obligations. As a result, supervision is largely limited to offsite reviews through the submission of annual questionnaires to verify or assess covered lawyers AML/CFT controls. 417. The SBA has established documented procedures for its supervisory activities, including inspections. Inspections are carried out by the dedicated professional and one Commission Member. The inspection is concluded in three parts; 1) request for review of general AML/CFT documents, including a written risk assessment of customers, control measures for risk management, CDD measures, training, list of indicators and thresholds for customers and transactions; 2) review of selected clients or transactions which includes a review of the 5 largest transactions; and 3) a sample review of transactions over €15,000 and review of at least one PEP business relationships (if relevant). On completion of the inspection, the SBA completes an inspection report detailing the actions taken by inspectors and the findings. 418. Tax Advisors and Accountants – The OMLP is the designated supervisory authority for tax advisors and accountants. 419. Due to the absence of registration or licensing regimes for tax advisors and accountants, the OMLP does not have reliable and up to date information on the number of OEs operating within these sectors. The OMLP relies on the business register to identify persons that have registered as providing these activities, though it acknowledges that this is not a reliable and accurate source as many persons register multiple activities regardless of whether they are actually performed. As a result, the OMLP also monitors how entities or individuals advertise their services through public sites and consults with AJPES regarding tax returns, that could identify if any entities or individuals carrying our regulated activities. The OMLP has identified a number of cases where the person confirmed that it did not conduct these activities. In these cases the OMLP does not verify that the person is in fact not conducting regulated activities. 420. The OMLP does not carry out any offsite supervision and relies solely on onsite inspections for its supervisory activities. 421. Furthermore, the OMLP does not apply a risk-based methodology to determine its supervisory activities. Its annual supervisory plan is driven by the human resources available, and within the resources available it determines the OEs selected based on its perceived risk profile (although this has not been provided to the AT to assess its effectiveness). The OMLP AML/CFT team is comprised of 6 inspectors and between 2020-2024, the OMLP conducted a total of 886 inspections on accountants and tax advisors, (see Table 4.3). 422. Following each inspection, the OMLP completes a detailed inspection report that outlines the actions of the inspector. Inspections typically last half a day, which the AT considers insufficient to conduct an in-depth exhaustive review of all policies and procedures and verify the effective application of AML/CFT controls. Furthermore, it does not risk assess the OE after an inspection, nor does it place it in a structured supervisory programme. 423. Given the large number of OEs under its supervision, its additional role as secondary supervisor of all other DNFBP sectors, and its broader mandate as Slovenia’s central authority for AML/CFT, the AT commends the team for maintaining this level of supervision despite being significantly under-resourced. However, when considered against the available staffing levels, the volume of inspections raises concerns as to whether these can be conducted with sufficient depth and effectiveness. 424. Casinos – The FARS is the designated supervisory authority for Casinos. As of the end of 2024, there were 35 registered operators providing games of chance activities. 425. The FARS has the most developed and operationally effective supervisory framework among the DNFBP supervisors, and demonstrated active, ongoing supervision of the Casino sector. Supervision is conducted through a combination of 1) transactional analysis – all Casinos have their transactions directly connected to the FARS monitoring system, 2) offsite supervision such as periodic questionnaires, and 3) inspections which cover the full scope of AML/CFT obligations or target specific areas. OEs interviewed also acknowledged the high frequency and thoroughness of FARS inspections. 426. The FARS has developed comprehensive internal procedures for the implementation and conduct of supervisory activities. 427. Notaries – Notaries are supervised for AML/CFT purposes by the CNS. As of the end of 2024, there were 86 registered notaries. 428. The CNS similarly lacks a risk-based approach to determine its supervisory activities. Its annual supervisory plan is determined solely on available human resources, with a focus to cover at least 15% of practicing notaries and does not consider the sectors or individual OE risks. Between 2020-2024, the CNS conducted a total of 33 inspections, covering 38% of the sector (see Table 4.3). Notaries are advised of an inspection visit 2 days in advance. All documents are obtained and reviewed during the onsite visit, including the review of 3-5 client files to verify the application of the OEs AML/CFT controls. Inspections typically last half a day, which the AT considers is insufficient to complete an in-depth exhaustive review of all policies and procedures and verify the effective application of AML/CFT controls. 429. The CNS does not have documented internal procedures for its supervisory activities but instead relies on the general provisions within Slovenian legislation, namely the Notary and Inspections Acts. While the Acts outlines the powers available to inspectors and provides a general framework for inspection procedures, it remains high level and lacks detail. This poses a risk of inconsistent practices among inspectors and does not represent a sound or effective approach to AML/CFT risk-based supervision. 430. Auditors – The APOA is the designated supervisory authority for auditors. As of the end of 2024, there were 167 registered auditors and 49 audit firms. 431. The APOA has not adopted a dedicated AML/CFT supervisory framework and lacks an AML/CFT specific risk assessment methodology. Instead, AML/CFT compliance is reviewed as an ancillary component within the broader audit and tax supervision framework. Inspections are conducted only when a regular audit or tax review is due, rather than on the basis of ML/TF risk. Nonetheless, the APOA demonstrated a satisfactory level of supervisory activity, conducting a total of 52 inspections between 2020-2024. This means that all audit firms have been subject to an onsite inspection during the assessed period. Table 4.3. Inspections undertaken 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real estate 32 1 95 1 53 Covered Lawyers 0 0 4 3 10 Accountants/tax advisors 163 133 255 186 149 DPMS 0 0 0 0 0 Casinos 74 38 87 70 87 Notaries 2 6 5 12 8 Auditors 10 9 12 13 8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="404. All regulated sectors have a designated supervisory authority or SRB that holds responsibility to supervise compliance with APMLTF-2. In addition to the designated primary supervisory authority or SRB identified for each sector, the OMLP acts as the secondary supervisor for all DNFBPs. 405. For most sectors, supervisory activities are often limited to formal reviews of documents rather than a comprehensive assessment of the practical implementation or effectiveness of the AML/CFT measures implemented by OEs. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs demonstrated the application of a risk-based approach to supervision, whereby greater focus is expected to be placed on higher risk sectors and higher risk OEs. This could be reflective of the limited risk understanding of the sectors and OE risk profiles. 406. The absence of comprehensive information to identify the number and types of persons actively operating as real estate entities, tax advisors, accountants, and DPMSs, and a lack of information on legal professionals that are not registered with the SBA, renders effective supervision of these sectors impossible. This is particularly concerning because some of these sectors are identified within the NRA as posing a higher risk of ML. 407. Real estate entities and DPMSs – The MIRS conducts the AML/CFT supervision of real estate entities (business entities and registered real estate agents) and DPMSs. 408. The MIRS advised that it lacks sufficient human resources to implement an effective and sustainable supervisory framework. In addition to the supervision of real estate and DPMS sectors, the MIRS is responsible for several other financial and non-financial sectors. The AML/CFT team comprises of 8 inspectors though they are not dedicated exclusively to AML/CFT functions. 409. Whilst the Ministry of Solidarity-Based Future maintains a register of real estate agents, and the Metrology Institute registers DPMS (except for traders in precious stones and raw metals), the MIRS does not have access to reliable and up to date information on the number of Real Estate entities or DPMS’ actively operating within these sectors. It relies on the business register. However, MIRS advised that it is not a reliable source either as many persons register multiple activities irrespective of whether they are actually performed. The MIRS has identified numerous cases where the person has confirmed that they are in fact not carrying out these activities. In these cases, the MIRS does not verify that the person is actually not conducting regulated activities. 410. In 2024, the MIRS adopted a pro-active supervisory approach, and towards the end of the year, issued questionnaires to all 2 777 OEs registered with the Business Registry for real estate and DPMS activities. The questionnaire requested confirmation if the person was undertaking regulated activities and had complied with the various AML/CFT obligations and collected high level information on the number of customers. 411. The response rate from the real estate sector was 53.5% with at least 11% of responses incomplete. The response rate from DPMSs was even lower, at 38.9%, with at least 3% of responses incomplete. The MIRS does not have the legal powers, nor has it implemented practical procedures to follow up with non-respondents, and no supervisory actions were taken against entities that failed to respond. The absence of complete and reliable information from OEs undermines the implementation of effective supervisory measures. Table 4.2. Risk Rating (only for those entities that responded to the questionnaires) Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk Real estate entities 60% 39% 1% DPMS 71% 28% 1% 412. MIRS inspection procedures require that OEs provide inspectors with all relevant AML/CFT documents during the inspection visit that typically lasts half a day and includes the review of 3-5 client files to verify the application of the OEs policies and procedures. On completion of the inspection, the MIRS completes an inspection report detailing the actions taken by inspectors and the findings. Client files are randomly selected ranging in characteristics; however, inspections are not risk based or target the specific risks of the OE e.g. focus on higher risk customers or higher risk transactions. Inspections of such limited duration are not sufficient to allow for an in-depth and comprehensive assessment of an OE’s internal controls or the effective implementation of AML/CFT measures in practice. Moreso considering the limitations in the supervisory framework for real estate sectors and DPMS, and that these are considered as posing a higher risk in accordance with Slovenia’s NRAs. Furthermore, the MIRS does not risk assess the OE after an inspection, nor does it place it in a periodic supervisory programme. As a result, the inspection process lacks depth and continuity, limiting its effectiveness in identifying risks or the promotion of sustained compliance by OEs. 413. The MIRS does not apply a risk-based methodology to determine its supervisory activities. The annual supervisory plan is determined based on the availability of human resources rather than the sectors or individual OE risks. Between 2020-2024 the MIRS conducted a total of 183 inspections in the real estate sector, representing 13% of it. (See Table 4.3). No inspections have been carried out on DPMSs. 414. Covered Lawyers – The SBA is responsible for the AML/CFT supervision of covered lawyers. As of the end of 2024, there were 1 913 registered covered lawyers. 415. The SBA’s offsite supervisory efforts are comparatively more developed. At the end of 2024 the SBA issued questionnaires to all covered lawyers, requesting confirmation if the person was undertaking regulated activities, the nature of activities provided, the type of controls implemented, information of the risk profile of its customers, etc. The SBA carried out a comprehensive analysis of the result. However, given the lack of risk categorisation it results in an inadequate application of supervisory framework. 416. The SBA also lacks a methodology to determine its risk-based supervisory activities. The SBA noted that it is comprised by covered lawyers that carry out this function on a voluntary basis, with 5 Commission Members and only one dedicated resource to fulfil its supervisory obligations. As a result, supervision is largely limited to offsite reviews through the submission of annual questionnaires to verify or assess covered lawyers AML/CFT controls. 417. The SBA has established documented procedures for its supervisory activities, including inspections. Inspections are carried out by the dedicated professional and one Commission Member. The inspection is concluded in three parts; 1) request for review of general AML/CFT documents, including a written risk assessment of customers, control measures for risk management, CDD measures, training, list of indicators and thresholds for customers and transactions; 2) review of selected clients or transactions which includes a review of the 5 largest transactions; and 3) a sample review of transactions over €15,000 and review of at least one PEP business relationships (if relevant). On completion of the inspection, the SBA completes an inspection report detailing the actions taken by inspectors and the findings. 418. Tax Advisors and Accountants – The OMLP is the designated supervisory authority for tax advisors and accountants. 419. Due to the absence of registration or licensing regimes for tax advisors and accountants, the OMLP does not have reliable and up to date information on the number of OEs operating within these sectors. The OMLP relies on the business register to identify persons that have registered as providing these activities, though it acknowledges that this is not a reliable and accurate source as many persons register multiple activities regardless of whether they are actually performed. As a result, the OMLP also monitors how entities or individuals advertise their services through public sites and consults with AJPES regarding tax returns, that could identify if any entities or individuals carrying our regulated activities. The OMLP has identified a number of cases where the person confirmed that it did not conduct these activities. In these cases the OMLP does not verify that the person is in fact not conducting regulated activities. 420. The OMLP does not carry out any offsite supervision and relies solely on onsite inspections for its supervisory activities. 421. Furthermore, the OMLP does not apply a risk-based methodology to determine its supervisory activities. Its annual supervisory plan is driven by the human resources available, and within the resources available it determines the OEs selected based on its perceived risk profile (although this has not been provided to the AT to assess its effectiveness). The OMLP AML/CFT team is comprised of 6 inspectors and between 2020-2024, the OMLP conducted a total of 886 inspections on accountants and tax advisors, (see Table 4.3). 422. Following each inspection, the OMLP completes a detailed inspection report that outlines the actions of the inspector. Inspections typically last half a day, which the AT considers insufficient to conduct an in-depth exhaustive review of all policies and procedures and verify the effective application of AML/CFT controls. Furthermore, it does not risk assess the OE after an inspection, nor does it place it in a structured supervisory programme. 423. Given the large number of OEs under its supervision, its additional role as secondary supervisor of all other DNFBP sectors, and its broader mandate as Slovenia’s central authority for AML/CFT, the AT commends the team for maintaining this level of supervision despite being significantly under-resourced. However, when considered against the available staffing levels, the volume of inspections raises concerns as to whether these can be conducted with sufficient depth and effectiveness. 424. Casinos – The FARS is the designated supervisory authority for Casinos. As of the end of 2024, there were 35 registered operators providing games of chance activities. 425. The FARS has the most developed and operationally effective supervisory framework among the DNFBP supervisors, and demonstrated active, ongoing supervision of the Casino sector. Supervision is conducted through a combination of 1) transactional analysis – all Casinos have their transactions directly connected to the FARS monitoring system, 2) offsite supervision such as periodic questionnaires, and 3) inspections which cover the full scope of AML/CFT obligations or target specific areas. OEs interviewed also acknowledged the high frequency and thoroughness of FARS inspections. 426. The FARS has developed comprehensive internal procedures for the implementation and conduct of supervisory activities. 427. Notaries – Notaries are supervised for AML/CFT purposes by the CNS. As of the end of 2024, there were 86 registered notaries. 428. The CNS similarly lacks a risk-based approach to determine its supervisory activities. Its annual supervisory plan is determined solely on available human resources, with a focus to cover at least 15% of practicing notaries and does not consider the sectors or individual OE risks. Between 2020-2024, the CNS conducted a total of 33 inspections, covering 38% of the sector (see Table 4.3). Notaries are advised of an inspection visit 2 days in advance. All documents are obtained and reviewed during the onsite visit, including the review of 3-5 client files to verify the application of the OEs AML/CFT controls. Inspections typically last half a day, which the AT considers is insufficient to complete an in-depth exhaustive review of all policies and procedures and verify the effective application of AML/CFT controls. 429. The CNS does not have documented internal procedures for its supervisory activities but instead relies on the general provisions within Slovenian legislation, namely the Notary and Inspections Acts. While the Acts outlines the powers available to inspectors and provides a general framework for inspection procedures, it remains high level and lacks detail. This poses a risk of inconsistent practices among inspectors and does not represent a sound or effective approach to AML/CFT risk-based supervision. 430. Auditors – The APOA is the designated supervisory authority for auditors. As of the end of 2024, there were 167 registered auditors and 49 audit firms. 431. The APOA has not adopted a dedicated AML/CFT supervisory framework and lacks an AML/CFT specific risk assessment methodology. Instead, AML/CFT compliance is reviewed as an ancillary component within the broader audit and tax supervision framework. Inspections are conducted only when a regular audit or tax review is due, rather than on the basis of ML/TF risk. Nonetheless, the APOA demonstrated a satisfactory level of supervisory activity, conducting a total of 52 inspections between 2020-2024. This means that all audit firms have been subject to an onsite inspection during the assessed period. Table 4.3. Inspections undertaken 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Real estate 32 1 95 1 53 Covered Lawyers 0 0 4 3 10 Accountants/tax advisors 163 133 255 186 149 DPMS 0 0 0 0 0 Casinos 74 38 87 70 87 Notaries 2 6 5 12 8 Auditors 10 9 12 13 8" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="485. Authorities have a number of measures available to them to sanction breaches of basic and BO disclosure requirements. The main sanctioning tools consist in fines which can be imposed by (i) the Ministry for the Economy when it comes to failures related to the disclosure of basic information under the Companies Act; (ii) FARS and OMLP under the APMLTF-2 in relation to failures related to the disclosure of beneficial ownership information; and (iii) AJPES when it comes to the specific failures related to the filing of the annual report. These fines can be imposed through the misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act, which also makes allowance for the imposition of warnings or reprimands instead of fines. In addition to the above, companies that are considered as inactive can be struck off. In the light of the data provided by Slovenia on the application of these sanctioning tools , it cannot be considered as evidence of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions as overall they have been limitedly applied. 486. As the main enforcement mechanism under the Companies Act (CA) to ensure adherence to basic information disclosure obligations, a company that fails to meet its reporting requirements may be subject to a misdemeanour procedure which may result in the imposition of a pecuniary penalty ranging from EUR 1 000 to EUR 45 000 (CA, Art. 685), depending on the particular classification of the company. Misdemeanour procedures in this case are administered by the Ministry for the Economy, which has had recourse to this procedure a number of times over the assessment period. However, the misdemeanour procedures undertaken did not relate to failures relating to the timely updating of basic information, including the 53 cases of LPs without a current legal representative referred to above, but mostly related to other requirements arising from the CA. 487. The above may be a consequence of there being no systematic mechanism to monitor adherence by companies with their information reporting requirements. By way of example, any public authority that comes across situations where official correspondence cannot be delivered to the company’s registered address are to highlight these cases to the Ministry for Economy for it to take enforcement action. The options available to it is to order remediation and undertake a misdemeanour procedure or, in the case of a company, refer the matter to the CR for the company’s eventual strike off. While the AT was informed that there were instances where misdemeanour procedures had been undertaken against LPs due to this particular issue, the only provided data related to two misdemeanour procedures undertaken following flagging by MIRS. No data on the total number or the actual value of pecuniary penalties and/or warnings that were imposed on the LPs concerned and their responsible persons was provided. 488. AJPES is also entrusted with administering misdemeanour procedures when it comes to LPs’ failure to file their annual report. The pecuniary penalties that can be imposed in this regard are lower than those described above, ranging from EUR 500 to EUR 30,000 in the case of companies (CA, Art. 686). Data provided for 2024 shows that there were 1 241 cases in which a misdemeanour procedure was carried out with regards failures related to the annual report, resulting in 462 pecuniary penalties and 799 official warnings. However, the data provided does not allow for any analysis on whether the resulting penalty was proportionate to the seriousness of the case in question as neither is a reference made to the value of the pecuniary penalty nor to the time lapse until the annual report was filed by the LP in question. 489. As regards the striking-off of LPs, a total of 3,370 legal entities were struck off under the Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act, out of which 3,194 were LLCs. The main reasons for the application of this procedure are related to the cessation of activities by the LP. While this can be an effective measure to keep the SBR (and consequently the RBO) as up-to-date as possible, the cessation of activities by LPs is not proactively monitored by authorities but depends on cases being brought to their attention. In addition, the data from any such striking off is only limitedly made use of through the checks carried out by the CR at the registration stage. 490. LPs that fail to meet their BO disclosure obligations are equally subject to pecuniary penalties which can be imposed by either the OMLP or FARS through the misdemeanour procedure, i.e. a procedure of a criminal nature undertaken in terms of the Minor Offences Act. Pecuniary penalties range from EUR to EUR 3, 000 to EUR 120, 000 for the LP and from EUR 400 to EUR 2,000 for the LP’s responsible person. 491. The extent to which the two authorities have exercised this power varies, depending also on the extent of the supervisory activities undertaken. In the case of the OMLP, there were 7 cases over the review period where it considered that recourse had to be had to the misdemeanour procedures resulting in the imposition of 1 decision, 7 warnings and one pecuniary penalty. The one instance where a pecuniary penalty was imposed – EUR 3 000 on the LP and EUR 400 on its legal representative – related to a failure to provide BO information to the OMLP. FARS had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure in 15 cases resulting in the imposition of 4 official warnings and a total of EUR 29 000 in pecuniary penalties. 492. The authorities’ exercise of their sanctioning power is therefore quite limited. While both the OMLP and FARS stated that there were other cases where BO discrepancies were detected, they also considered that the LP had remedied the discrepancy in the course of the supervisory process and therefore it was not considered that additional enforcement action was warranted. Authorities expressed a preference for remediation rather than sanctioning so as to ensure that the RBO would be properly populated. However, from the case-studies provided by FARS, it is clear that there were cases where serious BO discrepancies were identified, including cases where no BO or the wrong BO had been reported, but still no enforcement action was taken. 493. Even where the misdemeanour procedure was applied, the resulting pecuniary penalties imposed were not particularly high. Notwithstanding the absence of granular statistics on the matter, the deficiencies identified by FARS in 13 cases concern violations relative to the registering of the BO, updating the reported information, and filing incorrect information while the other two instances related to not responding to a request for information from competent authorities. However, the pecuniary penalty imposed for BO deficiencies would on average total EUR 1,934. 494. The authorities have signalled that they are now moving towards a more robust enforcement approach and in 2025 the OMLP imposed two pecuniary penalties for BO deficiencies, including a case where a nominee was disclosed as the BO. This change in the approach is also reflected in the revised guidelines issued by FARS to its inspectors in August 2025. While inspectors for both the OMLP and FARS enjoy considerable discretion as to how to approach issues that may be detected in the course of their work, FARS’ revised guidelines stress the importance of also making use of sanctioning measures rather than focusing mostly or only on the remediation of the issues identified. However, this change in approach is still in its early days, with the AT being unable to assess whether this will result in a better and more effective use of the enforcement powers available to the authorities. 495. The misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act may in itself prove to be an obstacle to proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctioning as it entails that anyone who decides not to appeal the authority’s decision and settles within eight days benefits from a 50% decrease and the possible implications of the four (4) year prescriptive period can result in cases involving serious breaches of one’s obligations going unpunished. One feature that can have a positive impact is that the misdemeanour procedure requires a responsible individual be identified and sanctioned, in order for the LP to be subjected to some form of enforcement action. However, the compulsory nature of this requirement can also inhibit the authorities from making a more robust use of the misdemeanour procedure against LPs. 496. As regards OEs, misdemeanour penalties are also applicable when AML/CFT obligations with respect to BO are not fulfilled. Although there have been some instances in respect of which penalties have been imposed for failures related to BO obligations, the number of breaches related to BO obligations arising from supervisory examinations is minimal. Additionally, as remarked under IO.3 and IO.4, the sanctioning system was not considered as resulting in the imposition of proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="485. Authorities have a number of measures available to them to sanction breaches of basic and BO disclosure requirements. The main sanctioning tools consist in fines which can be imposed by (i) the Ministry for the Economy when it comes to failures related to the disclosure of basic information under the Companies Act; (ii) FARS and OMLP under the APMLTF-2 in relation to failures related to the disclosure of beneficial ownership information; and (iii) AJPES when it comes to the specific failures related to the filing of the annual report. These fines can be imposed through the misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act, which also makes allowance for the imposition of warnings or reprimands instead of fines. In addition to the above, companies that are considered as inactive can be struck off. In the light of the data provided by Slovenia on the application of these sanctioning tools , it cannot be considered as evidence of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions as overall they have been limitedly applied. 486. As the main enforcement mechanism under the Companies Act (CA) to ensure adherence to basic information disclosure obligations, a company that fails to meet its reporting requirements may be subject to a misdemeanour procedure which may result in the imposition of a pecuniary penalty ranging from EUR 1 000 to EUR 45 000 (CA, Art. 685), depending on the particular classification of the company. Misdemeanour procedures in this case are administered by the Ministry for the Economy, which has had recourse to this procedure a number of times over the assessment period. However, the misdemeanour procedures undertaken did not relate to failures relating to the timely updating of basic information, including the 53 cases of LPs without a current legal representative referred to above, but mostly related to other requirements arising from the CA. 487. The above may be a consequence of there being no systematic mechanism to monitor adherence by companies with their information reporting requirements. By way of example, any public authority that comes across situations where official correspondence cannot be delivered to the company’s registered address are to highlight these cases to the Ministry for Economy for it to take enforcement action. The options available to it is to order remediation and undertake a misdemeanour procedure or, in the case of a company, refer the matter to the CR for the company’s eventual strike off. While the AT was informed that there were instances where misdemeanour procedures had been undertaken against LPs due to this particular issue, the only provided data related to two misdemeanour procedures undertaken following flagging by MIRS. No data on the total number or the actual value of pecuniary penalties and/or warnings that were imposed on the LPs concerned and their responsible persons was provided. 488. AJPES is also entrusted with administering misdemeanour procedures when it comes to LPs’ failure to file their annual report. The pecuniary penalties that can be imposed in this regard are lower than those described above, ranging from EUR 500 to EUR 30,000 in the case of companies (CA, Art. 686). Data provided for 2024 shows that there were 1 241 cases in which a misdemeanour procedure was carried out with regards failures related to the annual report, resulting in 462 pecuniary penalties and 799 official warnings. However, the data provided does not allow for any analysis on whether the resulting penalty was proportionate to the seriousness of the case in question as neither is a reference made to the value of the pecuniary penalty nor to the time lapse until the annual report was filed by the LP in question. 489. As regards the striking-off of LPs, a total of 3,370 legal entities were struck off under the Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act, out of which 3,194 were LLCs. The main reasons for the application of this procedure are related to the cessation of activities by the LP. While this can be an effective measure to keep the SBR (and consequently the RBO) as up-to-date as possible, the cessation of activities by LPs is not proactively monitored by authorities but depends on cases being brought to their attention. In addition, the data from any such striking off is only limitedly made use of through the checks carried out by the CR at the registration stage. 490. LPs that fail to meet their BO disclosure obligations are equally subject to pecuniary penalties which can be imposed by either the OMLP or FARS through the misdemeanour procedure, i.e. a procedure of a criminal nature undertaken in terms of the Minor Offences Act. Pecuniary penalties range from EUR to EUR 3, 000 to EUR 120, 000 for the LP and from EUR 400 to EUR 2,000 for the LP’s responsible person. 491. The extent to which the two authorities have exercised this power varies, depending also on the extent of the supervisory activities undertaken. In the case of the OMLP, there were 7 cases over the review period where it considered that recourse had to be had to the misdemeanour procedures resulting in the imposition of 1 decision, 7 warnings and one pecuniary penalty. The one instance where a pecuniary penalty was imposed – EUR 3 000 on the LP and EUR 400 on its legal representative – related to a failure to provide BO information to the OMLP. FARS had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure in 15 cases resulting in the imposition of 4 official warnings and a total of EUR 29 000 in pecuniary penalties. 492. The authorities’ exercise of their sanctioning power is therefore quite limited. While both the OMLP and FARS stated that there were other cases where BO discrepancies were detected, they also considered that the LP had remedied the discrepancy in the course of the supervisory process and therefore it was not considered that additional enforcement action was warranted. Authorities expressed a preference for remediation rather than sanctioning so as to ensure that the RBO would be properly populated. However, from the case-studies provided by FARS, it is clear that there were cases where serious BO discrepancies were identified, including cases where no BO or the wrong BO had been reported, but still no enforcement action was taken. 493. Even where the misdemeanour procedure was applied, the resulting pecuniary penalties imposed were not particularly high. Notwithstanding the absence of granular statistics on the matter, the deficiencies identified by FARS in 13 cases concern violations relative to the registering of the BO, updating the reported information, and filing incorrect information while the other two instances related to not responding to a request for information from competent authorities. However, the pecuniary penalty imposed for BO deficiencies would on average total EUR 1,934. 494. The authorities have signalled that they are now moving towards a more robust enforcement approach and in 2025 the OMLP imposed two pecuniary penalties for BO deficiencies, including a case where a nominee was disclosed as the BO. This change in the approach is also reflected in the revised guidelines issued by FARS to its inspectors in August 2025. While inspectors for both the OMLP and FARS enjoy considerable discretion as to how to approach issues that may be detected in the course of their work, FARS’ revised guidelines stress the importance of also making use of sanctioning measures rather than focusing mostly or only on the remediation of the issues identified. However, this change in approach is still in its early days, with the AT being unable to assess whether this will result in a better and more effective use of the enforcement powers available to the authorities. 495. The misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act may in itself prove to be an obstacle to proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctioning as it entails that anyone who decides not to appeal the authority’s decision and settles within eight days benefits from a 50% decrease and the possible implications of the four (4) year prescriptive period can result in cases involving serious breaches of one’s obligations going unpunished. One feature that can have a positive impact is that the misdemeanour procedure requires a responsible individual be identified and sanctioned, in order for the LP to be subjected to some form of enforcement action. However, the compulsory nature of this requirement can also inhibit the authorities from making a more robust use of the misdemeanour procedure against LPs. 496. As regards OEs, misdemeanour penalties are also applicable when AML/CFT obligations with respect to BO are not fulfilled. Although there have been some instances in respect of which penalties have been imposed for failures related to BO obligations, the number of breaches related to BO obligations arising from supervisory examinations is minimal. Additionally, as remarked under IO.3 and IO.4, the sanctioning system was not considered as resulting in the imposition of proportionate, effective and dissuasive sanctions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1 Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 619. As indicated above, the authorities are able to confiscate criminal property and property of corresponding value through conviction and non-conviction-based confiscation, with the latter being rarely used. 620. There is a lack of statistical data which hampers the ability to assess the overall level of confiscation in Slovenia. When it comes to confiscation there are even no estimation on the amount of confiscated property, but authorities were able to provide case examples of successful confiscations. 621. Nevertheless, the SPO produced some statistics, which relates to the number of confiscation orders obtained including those against third parties. The figures with minor variations in 2021 and 2022 are comparatively consistent amounting to 318 orders over the assessment period. The increased numbers in 2021 and 2022 were not maintained and may have been associated with a particular case or other short term anomalous factors, such as the impact of covid-19 in 2020 that restricted court proceedings to urgent cases only and a subsequent peak in confiscations once restrictions were lifted. 622. The actual volume of confiscations is low in the context of the volume of acquisitive crime being investigated, and figures pertaining to seizure and freezing orders for the same period. This discrepancy may be explained by the use of alternative means of restitution (returning the assets to the victims), delays in the prosecutorial process, case closures due to evidential reasons, or ineffective data collection. This data is also specific to those areas for which the SPO is competent, and as such may not represent the full extent of confiscation. It is also relevant to note that the data set does not include the value of orders, which may be due to the absent of a central record of assets subject to freezing or confiscation. Table 8.5. No. of Confiscation Orders Year No. of confiscations No. of confiscation against third parties 2020 55 4 2021 76 2 2022 65 1 2023 56 4 2024 53 2 Total 305 13 Source: Slovenian authorities 623. There are limited sanctions available to the court post-conviction to enforce confiscation orders, although the courts may impose a general sanction for failing to comply. This deficiency does not appear to be matter of concern to the authorities, which may reflect a focus at confiscation on the assets already identified. The ability of the courts to impose sanctions is also significantly restricted by the dispersal of asset realisation between the responsible authorities in accordance with the courts order. 624. The absence of data prevents the effectiveness of the enforcement being accessed; however, the issues identified regarding the management of assets and the ability of the court to both check if orders have been fully executed or top apply sanctions indicate that the enforcement of orders is not effective. 625. The investigative powers for non-conviction-based asset recovery provided by ZOPNI mirror criminal investigation powers. The use of ZOPNI remains low, however there is a clear desire by police and prosecutors to effectively utilise these recovery powers. They are aware and see the potential benefits of such regime which if effectively applied would bring added value in the deprivation of criminal property. It is evident through the presentation of the cases that there is specialist knowledge and enthusiasm amongst the dedicate resource, and prosecutors are being upskilled for the proper application of these powers. Nevertheless, there are certain challenges in the system preventing them to effectively apply NCBC. 626. Data provided by the authorities and the onsite narrative indicates that the use of ZOPNI has not been extensively used with two recorded cases totalling EUR 242 380. In these two cases, the authorities, due to the high evidentiary threshold could not prove ML and applied NCBC in order to deprive criminal property. In one additional case, a Slovenian Syrian national was investigated for drugs offences but not prosecuted. The authorities applied NCBC provisions to order the forfeiture of EUR 219 000 by means of charges placed on property held by the subject’s company. The effective implementation of NCBC is being further challenged as a recent court ruling required the assets being recovered to have ‘undeniably originated from the commission of a criminal offence’ thereby potentially requiring the prosecutor to be able to evidence the predicate(s) and trace the proceeds, which raises concern. 8.5.2 Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 627. There is no precise information provided by the authorities on the number or frequency of overseas confiscations or the enforcement of orders in other jurisdictions. As such, a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of oversea recoveries is not possible. The authorities have provided examples of cases where assets held overseas derived from criminality including drugs offences, fraud and money laundering were seized and subsequently made subject of a confiscation order. The examples demonstrate that the authorities are able to and have sought to recover assets from other jurisdictions, however it remains unclear if these examples are representative of a high number of cases or are unique." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1 Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 619. As indicated above, the authorities are able to confiscate criminal property and property of corresponding value through conviction and non-conviction-based confiscation, with the latter being rarely used. 620. There is a lack of statistical data which hampers the ability to assess the overall level of confiscation in Slovenia. When it comes to confiscation there are even no estimation on the amount of confiscated property, but authorities were able to provide case examples of successful confiscations. 621. Nevertheless, the SPO produced some statistics, which relates to the number of confiscation orders obtained including those against third parties. The figures with minor variations in 2021 and 2022 are comparatively consistent amounting to 318 orders over the assessment period. The increased numbers in 2021 and 2022 were not maintained and may have been associated with a particular case or other short term anomalous factors, such as the impact of covid-19 in 2020 that restricted court proceedings to urgent cases only and a subsequent peak in confiscations once restrictions were lifted. 622. The actual volume of confiscations is low in the context of the volume of acquisitive crime being investigated, and figures pertaining to seizure and freezing orders for the same period. This discrepancy may be explained by the use of alternative means of restitution (returning the assets to the victims), delays in the prosecutorial process, case closures due to evidential reasons, or ineffective data collection. This data is also specific to those areas for which the SPO is competent, and as such may not represent the full extent of confiscation. It is also relevant to note that the data set does not include the value of orders, which may be due to the absent of a central record of assets subject to freezing or confiscation. Table 8.5. No. of Confiscation Orders Year No. of confiscations No. of confiscation against third parties 2020 55 4 2021 76 2 2022 65 1 2023 56 4 2024 53 2 Total 305 13 Source: Slovenian authorities 623. There are limited sanctions available to the court post-conviction to enforce confiscation orders, although the courts may impose a general sanction for failing to comply. This deficiency does not appear to be matter of concern to the authorities, which may reflect a focus at confiscation on the assets already identified. The ability of the courts to impose sanctions is also significantly restricted by the dispersal of asset realisation between the responsible authorities in accordance with the courts order. 624. The absence of data prevents the effectiveness of the enforcement being accessed; however, the issues identified regarding the management of assets and the ability of the court to both check if orders have been fully executed or top apply sanctions indicate that the enforcement of orders is not effective. 625. The investigative powers for non-conviction-based asset recovery provided by ZOPNI mirror criminal investigation powers. The use of ZOPNI remains low, however there is a clear desire by police and prosecutors to effectively utilise these recovery powers. They are aware and see the potential benefits of such regime which if effectively applied would bring added value in the deprivation of criminal property. It is evident through the presentation of the cases that there is specialist knowledge and enthusiasm amongst the dedicate resource, and prosecutors are being upskilled for the proper application of these powers. Nevertheless, there are certain challenges in the system preventing them to effectively apply NCBC. 626. Data provided by the authorities and the onsite narrative indicates that the use of ZOPNI has not been extensively used with two recorded cases totalling EUR 242 380. In these two cases, the authorities, due to the high evidentiary threshold could not prove ML and applied NCBC in order to deprive criminal property. In one additional case, a Slovenian Syrian national was investigated for drugs offences but not prosecuted. The authorities applied NCBC provisions to order the forfeiture of EUR 219 000 by means of charges placed on property held by the subject’s company. The effective implementation of NCBC is being further challenged as a recent court ruling required the assets being recovered to have ‘undeniably originated from the commission of a criminal offence’ thereby potentially requiring the prosecutor to be able to evidence the predicate(s) and trace the proceeds, which raises concern. 8.5.2 Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 627. There is no precise information provided by the authorities on the number or frequency of overseas confiscations or the enforcement of orders in other jurisdictions. As such, a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of oversea recoveries is not possible. The authorities have provided examples of cases where assets held overseas derived from criminality including drugs offences, fraud and money laundering were seized and subsequently made subject of a confiscation order. The examples demonstrate that the authorities are able to and have sought to recover assets from other jurisdictions, however it remains unclear if these examples are representative of a high number of cases or are unique." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="663. In Slovenia, various alternative measures can be applied when securing TF conviction is not practicable, including monitoring of high-risk individuals, pursuing other terrorism-related offences or proposing a designation of a person under TFS regimes (see more under IO.10). 664. However, in line with Slovenia’s risk and context, the competent authorities of Slovenia have not thus far applied any other measures if securing a TF conviction was not practicable." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="663. In Slovenia, various alternative measures can be applied when securing TF conviction is not practicable, including monitoring of high-risk individuals, pursuing other terrorism-related offences or proposing a designation of a person under TFS regimes (see more under IO.10). 664. However, in line with Slovenia’s risk and context, the competent authorities of Slovenia have not thus far applied any other measures if securing a TF conviction was not practicable." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1 FIs and VASPs 692. BoS and ISA generally monitor the implementation of TF-related TFS within full scope on-site inspections; however, the authorities were not able to provide clear statistics on inspections carried out. BoS also performs certain outreach measures in the form of publishing information, issuing guidance and providing training. However, these activities are not targeted specifically to TF-related TFS. Employees of the BoS also have not received a separate training on TF-related TFS. 693. Inspections conducted by BoS indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. BoS has not detected any serious breaches in the banking sector. Within the carried-out examinations, BoS concluded that banks effectively screen their customers and transactions for TFS and identified only comparatively immaterial breaches (e.g. insufficiently detailed organizational procedures for implementation of TFS, lack of targeted trainings on TFS, inconsistencies regarding periodic checks). The follow-up inspection had confirmed that those breaches were rectified. 694. Within the exchanges office sector, BoS established that those performed the checks manually and frequently failed to maintain adequate records as required by their internal policies. Through subsequent follow-up procedures, BoS determined that these deficiencies had been effectively remedied. 695. BoS and ISA have not imposed any fines for infringement in relation to compliance with TF-related TFS. Case Box 10.1. BoS inspection on TFS implementation in a bank In line with the supervisory plan of BoS, in 2023 it conducted a targeted inspection focused on compliance of one bank with the TFS, including TF-related TFS. The particular bank was comparatively more exposed to sanctioned entities or persons to evade sanctions. Through sample testing, the BoS did not identify breaches, evasion or non-implementation of TF-related TFS. BoS found that bank complies with TFS binding in accordance with the RMA. Nevertheless, BoS recommended the bank to enhance and improve effectiveness of its sanctions policies, processes and controls, namely, including to implement IT support for timely sanctions screening of the customer database. The bank remediated all the shortcomings. 696. SMA and ISA advised to conduct a number of inspections to monitor the supervised OEs, but those were not related to the UN TFS framework. The FARS have not recorded any activities to monitor and ensure compliance with TF-TFS by the OEs under its supervision. Employees of ISA, SMA and FARS also have not received a separate training on TF-related TFS. 697. Competent authorities have informed FIs and VASPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines; however, no other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS has been provided to FIs and VASPs. 10.5.2 DNFBPs 698. Competent authorities do not systematically conduct monitoring and ensuring compliance with TF-related TFS. In the period under review, no such inspections have been carried out. 699. The perceived level of risk of DNFBPs being involved in breach, evasion or non-implementation of TFS, differs significantly among the supervisors of DNFBP sectors, ranging from low to medium-high. This discrepancy demonstrates that the risk is not fully understood and appreciated in the DNFBP sector. 700. Competent authorities had not informed DNFBPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines, which are available online. No other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS has been provided to DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1 FIs and VASPs 692. BoS and ISA generally monitor the implementation of TF-related TFS within full scope on-site inspections; however, the authorities were not able to provide clear statistics on inspections carried out. BoS also performs certain outreach measures in the form of publishing information, issuing guidance and providing training. However, these activities are not targeted specifically to TF-related TFS. Employees of the BoS also have not received a separate training on TF-related TFS. 693. Inspections conducted by BoS indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. BoS has not detected any serious breaches in the banking sector. Within the carried-out examinations, BoS concluded that banks effectively screen their customers and transactions for TFS and identified only comparatively immaterial breaches (e.g. insufficiently detailed organizational procedures for implementation of TFS, lack of targeted trainings on TFS, inconsistencies regarding periodic checks). The follow-up inspection had confirmed that those breaches were rectified. 694. Within the exchanges office sector, BoS established that those performed the checks manually and frequently failed to maintain adequate records as required by their internal policies. Through subsequent follow-up procedures, BoS determined that these deficiencies had been effectively remedied. 695. BoS and ISA have not imposed any fines for infringement in relation to compliance with TF-related TFS. Case Box 10.1. BoS inspection on TFS implementation in a bank In line with the supervisory plan of BoS, in 2023 it conducted a targeted inspection focused on compliance of one bank with the TFS, including TF-related TFS. The particular bank was comparatively more exposed to sanctioned entities or persons to evade sanctions. Through sample testing, the BoS did not identify breaches, evasion or non-implementation of TF-related TFS. BoS found that bank complies with TFS binding in accordance with the RMA. Nevertheless, BoS recommended the bank to enhance and improve effectiveness of its sanctions policies, processes and controls, namely, including to implement IT support for timely sanctions screening of the customer database. The bank remediated all the shortcomings. 696. SMA and ISA advised to conduct a number of inspections to monitor the supervised OEs, but those were not related to the UN TFS framework. The FARS have not recorded any activities to monitor and ensure compliance with TF-TFS by the OEs under its supervision. Employees of ISA, SMA and FARS also have not received a separate training on TF-related TFS. 697. Competent authorities have informed FIs and VASPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines; however, no other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS has been provided to FIs and VASPs. 10.5.2 DNFBPs 698. Competent authorities do not systematically conduct monitoring and ensuring compliance with TF-related TFS. In the period under review, no such inspections have been carried out. 699. The perceived level of risk of DNFBPs being involved in breach, evasion or non-implementation of TFS, differs significantly among the supervisors of DNFBP sectors, ranging from low to medium-high. This discrepancy demonstrates that the risk is not fully understood and appreciated in the DNFBP sector. 700. Competent authorities had not informed DNFBPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines, which are available online. No other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of TF-related TFS has been provided to DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1 FIs and VASPs 720. FIs and VASPs demonstrated a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. They primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. FIs and VASPs have procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 721. Competent authorities have informed FIs and VASPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines issued by the PCGRM. However, FIs and VASPs generally were not aware of prevalent PF evasion typologies and how their services can be exposed. None of the FIs/VASPs had a genuine PF-related TFS hit. 11.5.2 DNFBPs 722. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a low level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS. 723. Most of the DNFBPs were familiar with the concepts of UNSCRs and sanctions screening obligations, except for casinos, the real estate entities, and DPMS. However, DNFBPs were unaware of Sanctions Implementation Guidelines issued by the PCGRM, their sanctions compliance checks were confined to verifying the name of the customer or the party directly involved in the transaction with the UN TFS as published online. 724. Many supervisors of DNFBP sectors agreed that the level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS in DNFBP sector is limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1 FIs and VASPs 720. FIs and VASPs demonstrated a solid understanding of their TFS obligations and the requirement to freeze the assets of designated individuals or entities. They primarily use automated screening tools, which are kept up to date with the latest UNSCR listings. FIs and VASPs have procedures and sufficient resources to manage potential matches and discard false positives. 721. Competent authorities have informed FIs and VASPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines issued by the PCGRM. However, FIs and VASPs generally were not aware of prevalent PF evasion typologies and how their services can be exposed. None of the FIs/VASPs had a genuine PF-related TFS hit. 11.5.2 DNFBPs 722. DNFBPs generally demonstrate a low level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS. 723. Most of the DNFBPs were familiar with the concepts of UNSCRs and sanctions screening obligations, except for casinos, the real estate entities, and DPMS. However, DNFBPs were unaware of Sanctions Implementation Guidelines issued by the PCGRM, their sanctions compliance checks were confined to verifying the name of the customer or the party directly involved in the transaction with the UN TFS as published online. 724. Many supervisors of DNFBP sectors agreed that the level of understanding of and compliance with obligations in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS in DNFBP sector is limited." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="140. Despite the absence of comprehensive national strategies and policies, Slovenian authorities have established a number of mechanisms for coordination and cooperation at operational level primarily through various working groups. While these groups may address ML/TF issues as part of their broader mandates, none are specifically designed to ensure coordinated AML/CFT operational matters. 141. The Working Group of the State Prosecutor’s Office, LEAs and other competent authorities facilitates coordination and cooperation between the State Prosecutor´s office, the police and other competent state bodies in the detection and prosecution of offenders, resolving operational issues, establishing joint investigations teams, and addressing legislative matters. The work undertaken by the Group was acknowledged as particularly effective by both the State Prosecutor’s Office and the police. Overall, the Working Group represents a constructive coordination platform that has strengthened cooperation between key authorities in practice and facilitated the handling of complex cases. 142. Working Group between Supervisory Authorities was established in 2024 with the specific purpose of coordinating voting arrangements in light of the establishment of the EU AMLA. Its mandate does not extend beyond this issue and does not encompass domestic operational coordination. 143. Permanent Coordination Group for Prevention, Detection and Prosecution of ML/TF: Its main responsibility is to exchange experiences and discuss legal issues arising from Slovenian legislation in relation to the prevention, supervision, detection and prosecution of ML/TF; and compare Slovenian legislation and court practice with those of other countries. 144. Permanent group on restrictive measures is primarily tasked with co-ordinating actions for implementing targeted financial sanctions and demonstrates a more structured approach to operational coordination. Its mandate includes the coordinating and preparing proposals for restrictive measures, facilitating the exchange of information between authorities, monitoring the implementation of adopted decisions, reporting on the effectiveness of adopted measures, and addressing legal drafting matters. 145. The Interministerial Working Group on Counterterrorism (IWGC) main tasks involve terrorist threat assessment and facilitation of coordinated counter-terrorism actions by the authorities. Led by the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency, its members include the police, OMLP, FARS, MFEA, the Ministry of Justice as well as the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The group primarily serves as a forum for discussing emerging terrorism threats, trends and typologies, as well as exchanges of intelligence and information on concrete cases, including TF-related matters when those present themselves. 146. Besides these working groups, the OMLP has a formal signed cooperation agreement with the BoS. No formalised bilateral arrangements exist between other supervisory authorities. In practice, cooperation by the OMLP with other supervisory authorities occurs on an informal basis, primarily in relation to the joint delivery of industry training or issuance of guidance. 147. Overall, while there are some formal governance frameworks for the mentioned Working Groups, those related to their mandate, scope of responsibilities, reporting lines, decision making processes, frequency of meetings or mechanisms for monitoring implementation of agreed actions would benefit from further refining. Gaps in this respect limit Slovenia’s ability to demonstrate that coordination is systematic, sustainable and outcome orientated. In practice, coordination appears largely discussion-based rather than action-driven, with limited evidence of structured follow-up on identified policy gaps or operational issues. The absence of work plans, performance indicators, or formal reporting obligations reduced the ability of these mechanisms to drive tangible outcomes. Moreover, not all relevant competent authorities are consistently represented, and participation appears dependent on available resources rather than institutionalised arrangements. This creates a risk that coordination is reactive rather than embedded within a durable institutional framework. The AT considers that significant enhancements are required to establish the above working groups as effective cooperation and coordination mechanisms. 148. Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of regular and systematic sharing of information among competent authorities concerning typologies and emerging trends. While there have been some ad hoc exchanges on typologies among different authorities, the OMLP acknowledged that they lack systemic approach for identification of typologies and trends. This limited level of cooperation hinders the development of a collective understanding of ML/TF risks and reduces the overall effectiveness of efforts to identify and mitigate such risks. 149. The AT observed that the OMLP acts as the primary point of contact for AML/CFT related matters for other competent authorities, including providing advice on the interpretation and application of APMLTF-2. A similar dynamic was observed in the interaction between the OMLP and OEs. AML compliance officers of OEs maintain direct contact with the Head of the STR Department of the OMLP to coordinate actions in cases requiring potential temporary suspension of funds which are time-sensitive requiring quick action. The OMLP acknowledged that, as the suspension period for suspicious transactions is three working days, effective informal coordination has proven to be essential for rapid response from all relevant authorities to secure funds before judicial freezing measures can be applied as the latter take more time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="140. Despite the absence of comprehensive national strategies and policies, Slovenian authorities have established a number of mechanisms for coordination and cooperation at operational level primarily through various working groups. While these groups may address ML/TF issues as part of their broader mandates, none are specifically designed to ensure coordinated AML/CFT operational matters. 141. The Working Group of the State Prosecutor’s Office, LEAs and other competent authorities facilitates coordination and cooperation between the State Prosecutor´s office, the police and other competent state bodies in the detection and prosecution of offenders, resolving operational issues, establishing joint investigations teams, and addressing legislative matters. The work undertaken by the Group was acknowledged as particularly effective by both the State Prosecutor’s Office and the police. Overall, the Working Group represents a constructive coordination platform that has strengthened cooperation between key authorities in practice and facilitated the handling of complex cases. 142. Working Group between Supervisory Authorities was established in 2024 with the specific purpose of coordinating voting arrangements in light of the establishment of the EU AMLA. Its mandate does not extend beyond this issue and does not encompass domestic operational coordination. 143. Permanent Coordination Group for Prevention, Detection and Prosecution of ML/TF: Its main responsibility is to exchange experiences and discuss legal issues arising from Slovenian legislation in relation to the prevention, supervision, detection and prosecution of ML/TF; and compare Slovenian legislation and court practice with those of other countries. 144. Permanent group on restrictive measures is primarily tasked with co-ordinating actions for implementing targeted financial sanctions and demonstrates a more structured approach to operational coordination. Its mandate includes the coordinating and preparing proposals for restrictive measures, facilitating the exchange of information between authorities, monitoring the implementation of adopted decisions, reporting on the effectiveness of adopted measures, and addressing legal drafting matters. 145. The Interministerial Working Group on Counterterrorism (IWGC) main tasks involve terrorist threat assessment and facilitation of coordinated counter-terrorism actions by the authorities. Led by the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency, its members include the police, OMLP, FARS, MFEA, the Ministry of Justice as well as the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The group primarily serves as a forum for discussing emerging terrorism threats, trends and typologies, as well as exchanges of intelligence and information on concrete cases, including TF-related matters when those present themselves. 146. Besides these working groups, the OMLP has a formal signed cooperation agreement with the BoS. No formalised bilateral arrangements exist between other supervisory authorities. In practice, cooperation by the OMLP with other supervisory authorities occurs on an informal basis, primarily in relation to the joint delivery of industry training or issuance of guidance. 147. Overall, while there are some formal governance frameworks for the mentioned Working Groups, those related to their mandate, scope of responsibilities, reporting lines, decision making processes, frequency of meetings or mechanisms for monitoring implementation of agreed actions would benefit from further refining. Gaps in this respect limit Slovenia’s ability to demonstrate that coordination is systematic, sustainable and outcome orientated. In practice, coordination appears largely discussion-based rather than action-driven, with limited evidence of structured follow-up on identified policy gaps or operational issues. The absence of work plans, performance indicators, or formal reporting obligations reduced the ability of these mechanisms to drive tangible outcomes. Moreover, not all relevant competent authorities are consistently represented, and participation appears dependent on available resources rather than institutionalised arrangements. This creates a risk that coordination is reactive rather than embedded within a durable institutional framework. The AT considers that significant enhancements are required to establish the above working groups as effective cooperation and coordination mechanisms. 148. Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of regular and systematic sharing of information among competent authorities concerning typologies and emerging trends. While there have been some ad hoc exchanges on typologies among different authorities, the OMLP acknowledged that they lack systemic approach for identification of typologies and trends. This limited level of cooperation hinders the development of a collective understanding of ML/TF risks and reduces the overall effectiveness of efforts to identify and mitigate such risks. 149. The AT observed that the OMLP acts as the primary point of contact for AML/CFT related matters for other competent authorities, including providing advice on the interpretation and application of APMLTF-2. A similar dynamic was observed in the interaction between the OMLP and OEs. AML compliance officers of OEs maintain direct contact with the Head of the STR Department of the OMLP to coordinate actions in cases requiring potential temporary suspension of funds which are time-sensitive requiring quick action. The OMLP acknowledged that, as the suspension period for suspicious transactions is three working days, effective informal coordination has proven to be essential for rapid response from all relevant authorities to secure funds before judicial freezing measures can be applied as the latter take more time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="312. Authorities have a number of measures that they can apply where they detect shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT obligations. Measure of a supervisory nature include undertaking remedial actions with varying degrees of follow-up assessment, restrictive measures and, in more serious cases, the ability to withdraw authorisations to either conduct licensable activities and/or hold particular positions within FIs and VASPs. Remedial actions are tested through follow-up activities of varying degrees and overall seem to achieve the desired results. 313. Punitive measures consist in warnings and/or pecuniary penalties imposed through the misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act, i.e. an action of a criminal nature. It is to be remarked that the misdemeanour procedure presents a number of aspects that may not be conductive to sanctions that are in effect proportionate, effective or dissuasive, these being: a. The authorities can only undertake a misdemeanour procedure where they have also identified an officer of the FI or VASP who can be considered as liable, together with the FI or VASP, for the alleged breach. b. The payment of the pecuniary penalty imposed within eight days of its imposition without recourse to the law-courts results in an automatic 50% decrease in the penalty. c. A four-year prescriptive period is to be applied when supervisory authorities’ misdemeanour procedures are appealed from. This can result in the actions of the authorities being reduced to nought and quite serious breaches going unsanctioned. By way of example, in one particular instance the BoS had decided to impose a EUR 49 000 EUR fine on a bank, a EUR 1 300 fine on one of its responsible persons and a warning on another responsible person but in judicial review the court could not proceed further and had to strike down the BoS decision as the statute of limitations had run its course. 314. All misdemeanour procedures which result in the imposition of a pecuniary sanction and/or in a formal warning are published on the website of the authority in question. 315. Breaches of AML/CFT obligations are categorised by the APMLTF-2 according to their importance and severity, providing discretion to the authorities as to the pecuniary sanction to apply within a specific min. – max. range. All three authorities lack specific procedures laying down the criteria to be taken into account to determine the quantum of the pecuniary sanction and the actual quantum thereof, with authorities relying instead on past experience. Equally absent are detailed guidelines supplementing the general criteria set out in law for the determination of whether the misdemeanour procedure is to result in a warning or a pecuniary fine, though the BoS has indicated that warnings are mostly applied for first time offenders or less severe breaches. This provides for a degree of subjectivity which may not always lead to the imposition of proportionate, dissuasive and effective sanctions taking into account the breaches that would have occurred. 316. The absence of data as to the nature of the findings that were dealt with through informal and formal means of remediation acted as a limitation on the AT part to assess whether it was proportionate to deal with the said findings just through remedial measures without the need to also apply punitive measures. BoS 317. The supervisory activities of the BoS usually result in at least so-called Supervisory Letters, which are informal supervisory measures targeting findings that the BoS considers as being lesser shortcomings, i.e. findings that are less serious and in relation to which it would anyway have provided some form of recommendation. More serious findings are usually subject to an Order to Remediate, which is a formal supervisory measure. Table 3.1 Statistics on Supervisory Outcomes within the Banking Sector Year Supervisory Measures AML/CFT Infringements Remedial Measures Supervisory Letters Lesser shortcomings Recommendations 2020 3 10 6 8 17 25 2021 1 2 3 10 12 16 2022 2 4 12 3 5 6 2023 2 7 9 6 19 31 2024 0 0 0 3 8 13 Total 8 23 30 30 61 91 318. The statistical data provided does not allow to determine whether the findings resulting from supervisory activity are decreasing in terms of seriousness. On the other hand, Supervisory Letters and Orders to Remediate do allow an appreciation of how the BoS exercises its discretion as to which findings are to be addressed through one rather than the other. This determination is left to the discretion of the BoS’ AML Supervision Team, acting on the basis of past experience and generic criteria found in law. Factors taken into account include the seriousness of the obligation breached, the nature of the business carried out by the FI as well as its relative size, the systematic nature or otherwise of such breaches, and whether any remediation may have already been undertaken. 319. Independently of whether the remedial action ordered is formal or informal, the BoS requires the submission of a detailed remediation plan by the OE and the submission of a final declaration with evidence that the remediation has been completed. The BoS supplements the information provided by the OE with follow-up examinations. Remediation is usually carried out within the set timeframes. In those sporadic instances where this does not take place, the BoS applies ever more intrusive examinations. This can be seen in two cases as follows. In one case, a VASP was subject of thematic examination in 2021, two follow-up examinations in 2022 and 2023, and a full scope on-site in 2024 which revealed further serious issues. The case was concluded from a supervisory perspective due to the VASP notifying the BoS that it was intent on ceasing activities. In another case involving a bank, supervisory action was undertaken in 2021. The on-site inspection that identified shortcomings was carried out in 2022, with two follow-up examinations being carried out in 2023 and 2024 when the issues identified were finally resolved. 320. The BoS has also undertaken misdemeanour procedures against OEs where it considered that there were sufficiently serious findings. This has happened in eight instances, including in a case involving a VASP. In one case, a bank was imposed a EUR 900 000 fine for failure to report cash transactions and transactions linked to a high-risk jurisdiction in 223 instances, in another it imposed a fine for EUR 137 000 for systematic breaches of key AML/CFT obligations (adequacy of the reporting officer, of the risk management policies and procedures, application of EDD measures etc.). These two cases demonstrate the ability of the BoS to calibrate its pecuniary sanctions to the seriousness of the case, taking into account the nature and the number of breaches. 321. A factor that may be undermining the effectiveness of the BoS enforcement actions, is the possibility under the misdemeanour procedure to have any pecuniary penalty decreased by 50%. While one appreciates that this can avoid the process being further extended to take into account judicial proceedings and limit the burden on the law courts, the prescriptive nature of this measure results in the penalties being applied eventually not being proportionate, effective or dissuasive when considering the seriousness of the breaches for which they were imposed. Table 3.2 – Penalties vs Breaches Sector Breach Penalty Imposed Penalty Effectively Paid VASP Failure to provide information to the BoS EUR 6 000 EUR 3 000 Bank Failures related to the application of EDD and transaction monitoring EUR 137 000 EUR 68 500 Bank Failure to remedy deficiencies Failure to submit an STR in four instances EUR 78 000 EUR 39 000 322. As stated, the misdemeanour procedure requires that there be identified one or more officers to undertake the said procedure vis-à-vis the OE and the said officer as well. The BoS has indeed sanctioned such individuals, but the said procedure is conductive to higher degree of compliance only if it results in sanctions that are effective and dissuasive. Considering the amounts that can be imposed by way of fines and the amounts that are imposed, this is questionable at most. In one case, the OE was subjected to a EUR 900 000 fine but the responsible officers only received fines totalling EUR 3 000. In another instance the OE was subjected to fines amounting to EUR 218 000 whereas the responsible officers were subjected to fines totalling EUR 6 000 and a series of warnings. This is somewhat mitigated through the publication of the measures so undertaken. SMA 323. The SMA equally relies on informal remediation when it determines that there are findings which it classifies as not being of a serious nature. There have been only two instances over the review period where the SMA has imposed remediation by means of an order. However, the absence of any proper internal guidance and of statistical data on findings that resulted in formal and informal remediation does not allow any determination as to whether the remedial action is having the desired effect. 324. Both in the case of informal and formal remediation, the SMA requires the OE to provide it with evidence that it has completed the remediation required of it. However, there is no follow-up examination carried out to establish whether the necessary corrective actions have been implemented in practice, with the SMA preferring to then verify what actions had been taken once the OE is again chosen for a supervisory engagement. The only instance in which it would consider carrying out a follow-up examination is in case it has doubts about the veracity of the information provided. In the absence of statistical data on the issues that are usually addressed through informal remediation as against formal remediation, it is difficult to state whether this approach is justified or otherwise. 325. No misdemeanour procedures undertaken by the SMA over the period 2019–2024 resulted in pecuniary fines, though there were a number of warnings imposed on OEs and their responsible persons. Taken in isolation, the breaches identified would justify the course of action chosen by the SMA. Information on these warnings was published on the SMA’s website. ISA 326. The ISA has had even fewer occasions to exercise its sanctioning powers, there having been only one case where it effectively imposed remediation on an insurance company. Given that the case involved the absence of a system to determine whether a customer or, where applicable, its BO is a PEP, it can be questionable whether the absence of any misdemeanour procedure for a systematic breach can be considered as having been proportionate, effective and dissuasive. Market Inspectorate 327. The MI has indicated that there have been occasions where it has imposed both corrective actions as well as had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure. Table 3.3 Statistics on sanctions imposed by Market Inspectorate Year Number of undertaken inspections AML/CFT Infringements Remedial Measures Written Warnings Fines 2022 13 4 2 4 0 2023 1 0 0 0 0 2024 21 1 1 0 0 328. The MI also provided information on two cases where it had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure due to the infringements it noticed – in one case the FI was found not to have carried out its business risk assessment while in another it failed to prepare a training programme for its employees. In both cases it imposed a written warning even though one breach can be considered as more serious than the other. This raises questions as to whether the measures applied are actually proportionate to the severity of the infringements detected. On the other hand, the said infringements were remedied within less than a year." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="312. Authorities have a number of measures that they can apply where they detect shortcomings in the application of AML/CFT obligations. Measure of a supervisory nature include undertaking remedial actions with varying degrees of follow-up assessment, restrictive measures and, in more serious cases, the ability to withdraw authorisations to either conduct licensable activities and/or hold particular positions within FIs and VASPs. Remedial actions are tested through follow-up activities of varying degrees and overall seem to achieve the desired results. 313. Punitive measures consist in warnings and/or pecuniary penalties imposed through the misdemeanour procedure under the Minor Offences Act, i.e. an action of a criminal nature. It is to be remarked that the misdemeanour procedure presents a number of aspects that may not be conductive to sanctions that are in effect proportionate, effective or dissuasive, these being: a. The authorities can only undertake a misdemeanour procedure where they have also identified an officer of the FI or VASP who can be considered as liable, together with the FI or VASP, for the alleged breach. b. The payment of the pecuniary penalty imposed within eight days of its imposition without recourse to the law-courts results in an automatic 50% decrease in the penalty. c. A four-year prescriptive period is to be applied when supervisory authorities’ misdemeanour procedures are appealed from. This can result in the actions of the authorities being reduced to nought and quite serious breaches going unsanctioned. By way of example, in one particular instance the BoS had decided to impose a EUR 49 000 EUR fine on a bank, a EUR 1 300 fine on one of its responsible persons and a warning on another responsible person but in judicial review the court could not proceed further and had to strike down the BoS decision as the statute of limitations had run its course. 314. All misdemeanour procedures which result in the imposition of a pecuniary sanction and/or in a formal warning are published on the website of the authority in question. 315. Breaches of AML/CFT obligations are categorised by the APMLTF-2 according to their importance and severity, providing discretion to the authorities as to the pecuniary sanction to apply within a specific min. – max. range. All three authorities lack specific procedures laying down the criteria to be taken into account to determine the quantum of the pecuniary sanction and the actual quantum thereof, with authorities relying instead on past experience. Equally absent are detailed guidelines supplementing the general criteria set out in law for the determination of whether the misdemeanour procedure is to result in a warning or a pecuniary fine, though the BoS has indicated that warnings are mostly applied for first time offenders or less severe breaches. This provides for a degree of subjectivity which may not always lead to the imposition of proportionate, dissuasive and effective sanctions taking into account the breaches that would have occurred. 316. The absence of data as to the nature of the findings that were dealt with through informal and formal means of remediation acted as a limitation on the AT part to assess whether it was proportionate to deal with the said findings just through remedial measures without the need to also apply punitive measures. BoS 317. The supervisory activities of the BoS usually result in at least so-called Supervisory Letters, which are informal supervisory measures targeting findings that the BoS considers as being lesser shortcomings, i.e. findings that are less serious and in relation to which it would anyway have provided some form of recommendation. More serious findings are usually subject to an Order to Remediate, which is a formal supervisory measure. Table 3.1 Statistics on Supervisory Outcomes within the Banking Sector Year Supervisory Measures AML/CFT Infringements Remedial Measures Supervisory Letters Lesser shortcomings Recommendations 2020 3 10 6 8 17 25 2021 1 2 3 10 12 16 2022 2 4 12 3 5 6 2023 2 7 9 6 19 31 2024 0 0 0 3 8 13 Total 8 23 30 30 61 91 318. The statistical data provided does not allow to determine whether the findings resulting from supervisory activity are decreasing in terms of seriousness. On the other hand, Supervisory Letters and Orders to Remediate do allow an appreciation of how the BoS exercises its discretion as to which findings are to be addressed through one rather than the other. This determination is left to the discretion of the BoS’ AML Supervision Team, acting on the basis of past experience and generic criteria found in law. Factors taken into account include the seriousness of the obligation breached, the nature of the business carried out by the FI as well as its relative size, the systematic nature or otherwise of such breaches, and whether any remediation may have already been undertaken. 319. Independently of whether the remedial action ordered is formal or informal, the BoS requires the submission of a detailed remediation plan by the OE and the submission of a final declaration with evidence that the remediation has been completed. The BoS supplements the information provided by the OE with follow-up examinations. Remediation is usually carried out within the set timeframes. In those sporadic instances where this does not take place, the BoS applies ever more intrusive examinations. This can be seen in two cases as follows. In one case, a VASP was subject of thematic examination in 2021, two follow-up examinations in 2022 and 2023, and a full scope on-site in 2024 which revealed further serious issues. The case was concluded from a supervisory perspective due to the VASP notifying the BoS that it was intent on ceasing activities. In another case involving a bank, supervisory action was undertaken in 2021. The on-site inspection that identified shortcomings was carried out in 2022, with two follow-up examinations being carried out in 2023 and 2024 when the issues identified were finally resolved. 320. The BoS has also undertaken misdemeanour procedures against OEs where it considered that there were sufficiently serious findings. This has happened in eight instances, including in a case involving a VASP. In one case, a bank was imposed a EUR 900 000 fine for failure to report cash transactions and transactions linked to a high-risk jurisdiction in 223 instances, in another it imposed a fine for EUR 137 000 for systematic breaches of key AML/CFT obligations (adequacy of the reporting officer, of the risk management policies and procedures, application of EDD measures etc.). These two cases demonstrate the ability of the BoS to calibrate its pecuniary sanctions to the seriousness of the case, taking into account the nature and the number of breaches. 321. A factor that may be undermining the effectiveness of the BoS enforcement actions, is the possibility under the misdemeanour procedure to have any pecuniary penalty decreased by 50%. While one appreciates that this can avoid the process being further extended to take into account judicial proceedings and limit the burden on the law courts, the prescriptive nature of this measure results in the penalties being applied eventually not being proportionate, effective or dissuasive when considering the seriousness of the breaches for which they were imposed. Table 3.2 – Penalties vs Breaches Sector Breach Penalty Imposed Penalty Effectively Paid VASP Failure to provide information to the BoS EUR 6 000 EUR 3 000 Bank Failures related to the application of EDD and transaction monitoring EUR 137 000 EUR 68 500 Bank Failure to remedy deficiencies Failure to submit an STR in four instances EUR 78 000 EUR 39 000 322. As stated, the misdemeanour procedure requires that there be identified one or more officers to undertake the said procedure vis-à-vis the OE and the said officer as well. The BoS has indeed sanctioned such individuals, but the said procedure is conductive to higher degree of compliance only if it results in sanctions that are effective and dissuasive. Considering the amounts that can be imposed by way of fines and the amounts that are imposed, this is questionable at most. In one case, the OE was subjected to a EUR 900 000 fine but the responsible officers only received fines totalling EUR 3 000. In another instance the OE was subjected to fines amounting to EUR 218 000 whereas the responsible officers were subjected to fines totalling EUR 6 000 and a series of warnings. This is somewhat mitigated through the publication of the measures so undertaken. SMA 323. The SMA equally relies on informal remediation when it determines that there are findings which it classifies as not being of a serious nature. There have been only two instances over the review period where the SMA has imposed remediation by means of an order. However, the absence of any proper internal guidance and of statistical data on findings that resulted in formal and informal remediation does not allow any determination as to whether the remedial action is having the desired effect. 324. Both in the case of informal and formal remediation, the SMA requires the OE to provide it with evidence that it has completed the remediation required of it. However, there is no follow-up examination carried out to establish whether the necessary corrective actions have been implemented in practice, with the SMA preferring to then verify what actions had been taken once the OE is again chosen for a supervisory engagement. The only instance in which it would consider carrying out a follow-up examination is in case it has doubts about the veracity of the information provided. In the absence of statistical data on the issues that are usually addressed through informal remediation as against formal remediation, it is difficult to state whether this approach is justified or otherwise. 325. No misdemeanour procedures undertaken by the SMA over the period 2019–2024 resulted in pecuniary fines, though there were a number of warnings imposed on OEs and their responsible persons. Taken in isolation, the breaches identified would justify the course of action chosen by the SMA. Information on these warnings was published on the SMA’s website. ISA 326. The ISA has had even fewer occasions to exercise its sanctioning powers, there having been only one case where it effectively imposed remediation on an insurance company. Given that the case involved the absence of a system to determine whether a customer or, where applicable, its BO is a PEP, it can be questionable whether the absence of any misdemeanour procedure for a systematic breach can be considered as having been proportionate, effective and dissuasive. Market Inspectorate 327. The MI has indicated that there have been occasions where it has imposed both corrective actions as well as had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure. Table 3.3 Statistics on sanctions imposed by Market Inspectorate Year Number of undertaken inspections AML/CFT Infringements Remedial Measures Written Warnings Fines 2022 13 4 2 4 0 2023 1 0 0 0 0 2024 21 1 1 0 0 328. The MI also provided information on two cases where it had recourse to the misdemeanour procedure due to the infringements it noticed – in one case the FI was found not to have carried out its business risk assessment while in another it failed to prepare a training programme for its employees. In both cases it imposed a written warning even though one breach can be considered as more serious than the other. This raises questions as to whether the measures applied are actually proportionate to the severity of the infringements detected. On the other hand, the said infringements were remedied within less than a year." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="432. Supervisory authorities and SRBs have a range of remedial measures and sanctions provisions at their disposal. However, except for Casino, Accountant and Real Estate sectors, there were no enforcement measures applied since supervisors advised that no AML/CFT infringements were detected. Nonetheless, in case of AML/CFT infringements, supervisory authorities and SRBs advised to favour the application of remedial measures and warning notices, with little to no consideration taken of other types of sanctions such as penalty fees or withdrawal of individuals in management functions. None of the other supervisory authorities or SRBs have a documented sanctioning framework. 433. The shortcomings noted above regarding the ineffectiveness of the supervisory efforts by supervisory authorities and SRBs, is the primary factor of the lack of enforcement actions. Table 4.4. Summary of sanctions imposed 2020-2024 No. of inspections having identified AML/CFT infringements Remedial measures No. of written warnings Fines Real estate 49 23 46 0 Covered Lawyers 0 0 10 0 Accountants/Tax Advisors 122 122 9 6 EUR 10,310 DPMS 0 0 0 0 Casinos 591 3 4 4 EUR 12,894 Notaries 0 0 0 0 Auditors 19 19 0 0 434. Even within these three sectors where sanctions measures have been applied, they are still insufficient. 435. Real Estate entities – MIRS favours the issuance of written warnings and places the obligation on real estate entities to rectify the shortcomings identified. Following a remediation notice, MIRS advised that it carries out a follow up visit to verify that shortcomings have been adequately addressed. The follow up visit follows the same steps and process as a standard inspection visit e.g. documents are required prior to the visit for an initial desk-based review, and an inspection report noting the outcome of the inspections is completed and kept on record. 436. Casinos – The FARS is the most developed DNFBP supervisory authority. However, the number of sanctions imposed cannot be considered as effective, proportionate or dissuasive. From 591 inspections where deficiencies were identified (for which Slovenia has not clarified the reason for the high numbers and nature of infringements), only three entities were imposed remedial action (0.5%), only 4 were issued a written warning (0.7%), and only 4 were imposed a monetary fine (0.7%). The monetary fine on average per entity amounts to EUR 3,223 which is considered quite insignificant. The FARS considers that the low level of enforcement action is reflective of the comprehensive supervisory measures. However, the low volume of enforcement actions in comparison to the number of inspections identifying shortcomings (1.9%) is indicative of a lenient sanctioning approach. 437. Accountants and auditors – The OMLP and APOA favour the application of remedial measures and places the obligation on OEs to rectify the shortcomings identified. However, there is no supervisory follow up to verify that the findings have been adequately addressed. Only 6 accountants were imposed a monetary fine (4.9%), whilst no auditors were imposed any other sanctions measures. 438. The OMLP has established and documented procedures for the application of sanctions regarding the sectors it acts as primary supervisor i.e. tax advisors and accountants. The OMLP’s procedures defines that a warning is always issued as a first step instead of a sanction where the offence is of minor importance and where the inspector considers that a warning is a sufficient measure. The decision on whether to issue a warning or a fine, and the fine amount, falls with the inspector who carried out the inspection. However, the written procedures are not detailed enough to determine the methodology to sanctioning decision nor to ensure consistency in the application of these measures across inspectors. 439. Overall, the supervisory authorities and SRBs apply lenient sanctioning policies, and the lack of enforcement seriously undermines Slovenia’s effectiveness to mitigate ML/TF risks or address AML/CFT compliance concerns. 440. With the exception of published guidelines, and as noted in Chapter 4.3, the OMLP is the only supervisory authority to carry out outreach to raise OEs awareness of their obligations. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs were able to articulate or demonstrate how their supervisory actions positively impacted compliance by DNFBPs. This is largely due to the ineffective supervisory frameworks, lack of knowledge of the OEs, and lack of records maintained. 441. The AT observed that the DNFBPs awareness and understanding remains insufficient, as most do not fully understand the importance of implementing effective AML/CFT measures or are not fully familiar with their obligations. The lack of educational measures or enforcement action undermines efforts to address these significant concerns." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="432. Supervisory authorities and SRBs have a range of remedial measures and sanctions provisions at their disposal. However, except for Casino, Accountant and Real Estate sectors, there were no enforcement measures applied since supervisors advised that no AML/CFT infringements were detected. Nonetheless, in case of AML/CFT infringements, supervisory authorities and SRBs advised to favour the application of remedial measures and warning notices, with little to no consideration taken of other types of sanctions such as penalty fees or withdrawal of individuals in management functions. None of the other supervisory authorities or SRBs have a documented sanctioning framework. 433. The shortcomings noted above regarding the ineffectiveness of the supervisory efforts by supervisory authorities and SRBs, is the primary factor of the lack of enforcement actions. Table 4.4. Summary of sanctions imposed 2020-2024 No. of inspections having identified AML/CFT infringements Remedial measures No. of written warnings Fines Real estate 49 23 46 0 Covered Lawyers 0 0 10 0 Accountants/Tax Advisors 122 122 9 6 EUR 10,310 DPMS 0 0 0 0 Casinos 591 3 4 4 EUR 12,894 Notaries 0 0 0 0 Auditors 19 19 0 0 434. Even within these three sectors where sanctions measures have been applied, they are still insufficient. 435. Real Estate entities – MIRS favours the issuance of written warnings and places the obligation on real estate entities to rectify the shortcomings identified. Following a remediation notice, MIRS advised that it carries out a follow up visit to verify that shortcomings have been adequately addressed. The follow up visit follows the same steps and process as a standard inspection visit e.g. documents are required prior to the visit for an initial desk-based review, and an inspection report noting the outcome of the inspections is completed and kept on record. 436. Casinos – The FARS is the most developed DNFBP supervisory authority. However, the number of sanctions imposed cannot be considered as effective, proportionate or dissuasive. From 591 inspections where deficiencies were identified (for which Slovenia has not clarified the reason for the high numbers and nature of infringements), only three entities were imposed remedial action (0.5%), only 4 were issued a written warning (0.7%), and only 4 were imposed a monetary fine (0.7%). The monetary fine on average per entity amounts to EUR 3,223 which is considered quite insignificant. The FARS considers that the low level of enforcement action is reflective of the comprehensive supervisory measures. However, the low volume of enforcement actions in comparison to the number of inspections identifying shortcomings (1.9%) is indicative of a lenient sanctioning approach. 437. Accountants and auditors – The OMLP and APOA favour the application of remedial measures and places the obligation on OEs to rectify the shortcomings identified. However, there is no supervisory follow up to verify that the findings have been adequately addressed. Only 6 accountants were imposed a monetary fine (4.9%), whilst no auditors were imposed any other sanctions measures. 438. The OMLP has established and documented procedures for the application of sanctions regarding the sectors it acts as primary supervisor i.e. tax advisors and accountants. The OMLP’s procedures defines that a warning is always issued as a first step instead of a sanction where the offence is of minor importance and where the inspector considers that a warning is a sufficient measure. The decision on whether to issue a warning or a fine, and the fine amount, falls with the inspector who carried out the inspection. However, the written procedures are not detailed enough to determine the methodology to sanctioning decision nor to ensure consistency in the application of these measures across inspectors. 439. Overall, the supervisory authorities and SRBs apply lenient sanctioning policies, and the lack of enforcement seriously undermines Slovenia’s effectiveness to mitigate ML/TF risks or address AML/CFT compliance concerns. 440. With the exception of published guidelines, and as noted in Chapter 4.3, the OMLP is the only supervisory authority to carry out outreach to raise OEs awareness of their obligations. None of the supervisory authorities or SRBs were able to articulate or demonstrate how their supervisory actions positively impacted compliance by DNFBPs. This is largely due to the ineffective supervisory frameworks, lack of knowledge of the OEs, and lack of records maintained. 441. The AT observed that the DNFBPs awareness and understanding remains insufficient, as most do not fully understand the importance of implementing effective AML/CFT measures or are not fully familiar with their obligations. The lack of educational measures or enforcement action undermines efforts to address these significant concerns." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="628. In Slovenia, the victims are prioritised by competent authorities. However, no records are kept relating to the value or instances of property being returned to victims, it is therefore not possible to effectively assess the extent that this is done in a timely and effective manner. 629. Victims may, however, seek to recover their property prior to a conviction being obtained, where a proprietary interest can be demonstrated by the victim. the Prosecutor may seek the return of the property directly, thereby minimising the distress to victims and ensuring a timely resolution. During the onsite it was apparent that where possible Prosecutors consider this an effective and common approach to recovering property, which also negated the need to seek confiscation. It is unfortunately not possible to quantify the instances where this approach has been used during the assessment period. 630. Consideration of the means by which victims can recover the property has however resulted in an issue being identified. Currently there are no provisions to prevent an offender, who is a shareholder of a corporate entity they used for criminality, from asserting their victim rights to property recovered as a result of a confiscation order against the corporate. This creates a significant weakness in the asset recovery regime, which if exploited by criminals would negate the effectiveness of the regime. This issue is known to the authorities but has yet to be addressed. In one of the cases presented it was evident that companies were used in the criminality scheme and owned by the offenders. As a result of criminal proceeding, these companies were compensated as victims and the risk remains that the funds paid to them will be recovered by the perpetrators." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="628. In Slovenia, the victims are prioritised by competent authorities. However, no records are kept relating to the value or instances of property being returned to victims, it is therefore not possible to effectively assess the extent that this is done in a timely and effective manner. 629. Victims may, however, seek to recover their property prior to a conviction being obtained, where a proprietary interest can be demonstrated by the victim. the Prosecutor may seek the return of the property directly, thereby minimising the distress to victims and ensuring a timely resolution. During the onsite it was apparent that where possible Prosecutors consider this an effective and common approach to recovering property, which also negated the need to seek confiscation. It is unfortunately not possible to quantify the instances where this approach has been used during the assessment period. 630. Consideration of the means by which victims can recover the property has however resulted in an issue being identified. Currently there are no provisions to prevent an offender, who is a shareholder of a corporate entity they used for criminality, from asserting their victim rights to property recovered as a result of a confiscation order against the corporate. This creates a significant weakness in the asset recovery regime, which if exploited by criminals would negate the effectiveness of the regime. This issue is known to the authorities but has yet to be addressed. In one of the cases presented it was evident that companies were used in the criminality scheme and owned by the offenders. As a result of criminal proceeding, these companies were compensated as victims and the risk remains that the funds paid to them will be recovered by the perpetrators." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1 FIs and VASPs 725. BoS generally monitors the implementation of PF-related TFS within full scope on-site inspections. While BoS performs certain outreach measures in the form of publishing information, issuing guidance and providing training, these do not include PF-related TFS as a subject. Employees of the BoS also have not received a separate training on PF-related TFS. 726. Inspections conducted by BoS indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. BoS has not imposed any fines for infringement in relation to compliance with PF-related TFS. 727. Other supervisory authorities of FIs have not recorded any activities to monitor and ensure compliance with PF-TFS by the OEs under their supervision. 728. Competent authorities did not provide OEs with targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS that would include prevalent PF evasion typologies. 11.6.2 DNFBPs 729. Competent authorities do not conduct a regular monitoring and ensuring compliance with PF-related TFS. 730. Competent authorities had not informed DNFBPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines, which are available online. No other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS has been provided to DNFBPs. 731. Competent authorities did not provide OEs with targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS that would include prevalent PF evasion typologies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.6.1 FIs and VASPs 725. BoS generally monitors the implementation of PF-related TFS within full scope on-site inspections. While BoS performs certain outreach measures in the form of publishing information, issuing guidance and providing training, these do not include PF-related TFS as a subject. Employees of the BoS also have not received a separate training on PF-related TFS. 726. Inspections conducted by BoS indicate that most FIs and VASPs are generally compliant with TFS obligations. BoS has not imposed any fines for infringement in relation to compliance with PF-related TFS. 727. Other supervisory authorities of FIs have not recorded any activities to monitor and ensure compliance with PF-TFS by the OEs under their supervision. 728. Competent authorities did not provide OEs with targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS that would include prevalent PF evasion typologies. 11.6.2 DNFBPs 729. Competent authorities do not conduct a regular monitoring and ensuring compliance with PF-related TFS. 730. Competent authorities had not informed DNFBPs about the Sanctions Implementation Guidelines, which are available online. No other targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS has been provided to DNFBPs. 731. Competent authorities did not provide OEs with targeted guidance or outreach in relation to the implementation of PF-related TFS that would include prevalent PF evasion typologies." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1 Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 631. Slovenia has land borders with Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and Italy, as well as international (non-EU) entry points in the form of Ljubljana, Maribor and Portoroz airports and the containerised Port of Koper. As an EU member state, Slovenia applies the relevant EU Regulations in relation to cross border cash and BNI declarations for values over EUR 10 000 when cash is entering or leaving union. The same threshold applies when cash is carried through the EU member states, yet in these circumstances the disclosure system is applied. The system is administered by FARS, which is responsible for receiving and collating declarations, as well as seizing cash and BNI in instances of false or incorrect declarations. 632. At the port and airports there is clear signage that cash entering or leaving EU must be declared. The local custom offices are located at these entry points. Conversely, customs checks of cash and BNI movements within the EU are primarily conducted by mobile units, which are also tasked to respond to police detections if no criminality is suspected. Cash control functions may also be conducted by customs officers in the clearance departments located at air and seaports, as well as at postal facilities. 633. The mobile units are a limited general resource tasked with a range of FARS roles. There are no additional specialist cash detection resources. None of the authorities provided information on the specific instructions requiring them or guiding them to detect undeclared and falsely declared cash. FARS does have Guidelines for the implementation of supervision under AML law which provides for certain general procedures to be applied according to the legislation for both EU internal and external borders. The issue of lack of resources and equipment to detect cash raises concern given the examples of the cash detected and used in some criminal cases. 634. Once detected, undeclared and falsely declared cash or BNIs may be held for an initial period of up to 30 days, which can be extended to 60 where appropriate to do so. The FARS guidance includes post seizure procedures to ensure consistency including cross organisational and legal provisions that include alternative measures including tax enforcement provisions in instances of outstanding tax debts. Information relating to declarations is available to the FIU via the accessible Customs Information System. 635. Data provided by the authorities demonstrates comparatively low numbers of declarations, and correspondingly low instances of incorrect, false or no declaration of cash and BNIs. Between 2020 and 2024 there were 343 declarations (Table 8.6) in relation to EUR 17 030 051, and 9 instances of non-declaration totalling EUR 220 374, the were no instances of false declarations. During the period instances of non-declaration resulted in 9 instances of misdemeanour sanctions resulting in an average fine of EUR 800 and 1 case of the seizure of EUR 116 510 referred to the police. The status or outcome of this case is not known. 636. Despite an increase in the FARs cash control exercises from 117 in 2023 to 603 in 2024, the latter period resulting in all of the reported detections, the rates of detection remain low and have only resulted in a single case of suspected criminality that is inconsistent with the wider experience presented by the police during the onsite and in the case studies. Table 8.6 No of declarations or disclosures Incoming Outgoing Cash BNI Volume in EUR Cash BNI Volume in EUR 2020 17 1 036 580 34 640 836 2021 15 577 352 31 946 940 2022 37 4 178 224 20 3 1 810 797 2023 42 5 1 872 729 32 3 1 030 674 2024 86 3 3 160 587 29 1 775 332 8.7.2 Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 637. FARS have reported 1 instance of a suspected criminal detections of cash that occurred in 2024. As noted above the police cited several instances of cash detentions and seizures within the jurisdiction, and from Slovenian residents or registered vehicles in other member states. As such, it is unclear why FARS are only able to demonstrate limited effectiveness of the controls. The absence of a clear assessment relating to cash movements was mirrored by the FIU, who through consideration of CTRs did note significant cash deposits into Slovenian financial institutions that originated in other states including non-EU jurisdictions. The reason for this deficiency may be the priority given to cross-border cash and BNI movements by the authorities, and a reliance on internal EU controls. 638. In those instances, presented by the police, officers were able to seize the cash for a period of 72 hrs, to conduct initial enquiries. However, a concern raised by the authorities in relation to the effectiveness of the seizure provisions was the restrictions placed on investigative orders previously mentioned, which create significant barriers to obtaining sufficient evidence to seek an extension to the seizure from the court. 8.7.3 Sanctions 639. In instances of incorrect declarations FARs adopt an escalatory approach they describe as ‘minor offence proceedings or misdemeanours that start with the issuing of a warning, seizure of the entire sum, or imposition of an administrative fine. Where criminality is suspected, the matter is referred to the police. The data supplied for 2024 records the use of these sanctions in 9 instances, with an average fine imposed of EUR 800, with a single referral to the police. The data is not sufficient to provide a basis for a detailed assessment of effectiveness of the impact of sanctions, however as already noted, the inconsistency between detection by FARS, and the police clearly demonstrates that the controls are not effective in identifying cash and BNIs in transit. Equally, the sanctions are not dissuasive. If the average fine is compared to the average amount of undisclosed cash EUR 24 486 the fine represents a 3.26% penalty." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1 Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 631. Slovenia has land borders with Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and Italy, as well as international (non-EU) entry points in the form of Ljubljana, Maribor and Portoroz airports and the containerised Port of Koper. As an EU member state, Slovenia applies the relevant EU Regulations in relation to cross border cash and BNI declarations for values over EUR 10 000 when cash is entering or leaving union. The same threshold applies when cash is carried through the EU member states, yet in these circumstances the disclosure system is applied. The system is administered by FARS, which is responsible for receiving and collating declarations, as well as seizing cash and BNI in instances of false or incorrect declarations. 632. At the port and airports there is clear signage that cash entering or leaving EU must be declared. The local custom offices are located at these entry points. Conversely, customs checks of cash and BNI movements within the EU are primarily conducted by mobile units, which are also tasked to respond to police detections if no criminality is suspected. Cash control functions may also be conducted by customs officers in the clearance departments located at air and seaports, as well as at postal facilities. 633. The mobile units are a limited general resource tasked with a range of FARS roles. There are no additional specialist cash detection resources. None of the authorities provided information on the specific instructions requiring them or guiding them to detect undeclared and falsely declared cash. FARS does have Guidelines for the implementation of supervision under AML law which provides for certain general procedures to be applied according to the legislation for both EU internal and external borders. The issue of lack of resources and equipment to detect cash raises concern given the examples of the cash detected and used in some criminal cases. 634. Once detected, undeclared and falsely declared cash or BNIs may be held for an initial period of up to 30 days, which can be extended to 60 where appropriate to do so. The FARS guidance includes post seizure procedures to ensure consistency including cross organisational and legal provisions that include alternative measures including tax enforcement provisions in instances of outstanding tax debts. Information relating to declarations is available to the FIU via the accessible Customs Information System. 635. Data provided by the authorities demonstrates comparatively low numbers of declarations, and correspondingly low instances of incorrect, false or no declaration of cash and BNIs. Between 2020 and 2024 there were 343 declarations (Table 8.6) in relation to EUR 17 030 051, and 9 instances of non-declaration totalling EUR 220 374, the were no instances of false declarations. During the period instances of non-declaration resulted in 9 instances of misdemeanour sanctions resulting in an average fine of EUR 800 and 1 case of the seizure of EUR 116 510 referred to the police. The status or outcome of this case is not known. 636. Despite an increase in the FARs cash control exercises from 117 in 2023 to 603 in 2024, the latter period resulting in all of the reported detections, the rates of detection remain low and have only resulted in a single case of suspected criminality that is inconsistent with the wider experience presented by the police during the onsite and in the case studies. Table 8.6 No of declarations or disclosures Incoming Outgoing Cash BNI Volume in EUR Cash BNI Volume in EUR 2020 17 1 036 580 34 640 836 2021 15 577 352 31 946 940 2022 37 4 178 224 20 3 1 810 797 2023 42 5 1 872 729 32 3 1 030 674 2024 86 3 3 160 587 29 1 775 332 8.7.2 Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 637. FARS have reported 1 instance of a suspected criminal detections of cash that occurred in 2024. As noted above the police cited several instances of cash detentions and seizures within the jurisdiction, and from Slovenian residents or registered vehicles in other member states. As such, it is unclear why FARS are only able to demonstrate limited effectiveness of the controls. The absence of a clear assessment relating to cash movements was mirrored by the FIU, who through consideration of CTRs did note significant cash deposits into Slovenian financial institutions that originated in other states including non-EU jurisdictions. The reason for this deficiency may be the priority given to cross-border cash and BNI movements by the authorities, and a reliance on internal EU controls. 638. In those instances, presented by the police, officers were able to seize the cash for a period of 72 hrs, to conduct initial enquiries. However, a concern raised by the authorities in relation to the effectiveness of the seizure provisions was the restrictions placed on investigative orders previously mentioned, which create significant barriers to obtaining sufficient evidence to seek an extension to the seizure from the court. 8.7.3 Sanctions 639. In instances of incorrect declarations FARs adopt an escalatory approach they describe as ‘minor offence proceedings or misdemeanours that start with the issuing of a warning, seizure of the entire sum, or imposition of an administrative fine. Where criminality is suspected, the matter is referred to the police. The data supplied for 2024 records the use of these sanctions in 9 instances, with an average fine imposed of EUR 800, with a single referral to the police. The data is not sufficient to provide a basis for a detailed assessment of effectiveness of the impact of sanctions, however as already noted, the inconsistency between detection by FARS, and the police clearly demonstrates that the controls are not effective in identifying cash and BNIs in transit. Equally, the sanctions are not dissuasive. If the average fine is compared to the average amount of undisclosed cash EUR 24 486 the fine represents a 3.26% penalty." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 2. Armenia has to be commended for actively engaging in efforts to continuously improve the understanding of the landscape of risks, by conducting three NRAs since the last evaluation round. The country does not record any significant change in the ML risk landscape since the 2015 MER, which, seeing the global developments in the ML/TF risk environment in the last ten years, constitutes an area for concern. 3. The authorities’ understanding of risk is based on the NRA and is to some extent considered as generally good, with some areas for improvement. The strategic analyses carried out following the NRA (presented under core issue 1.2) are all driven from findings from the NRA, and in discussions during the on-site with both the law enforcement and the supervisory authorities, as well as with the reporting entities, the main focal point of risk understanding was always the NRA. 4. The most recent NRA was finalised in 2024 and conducted by a working group established under the auspices of the Interagency Committee, which included representatives from the law enforcement, supervisory authorities, representatives from key Ministries [22] as well as engagement of the private sector representatives. 5. The main ML threats identified stem from fraud, embezzlement, corruption, tax crimes, drug trafficking, and cybercrime. [23] The AT considers this conclusion as reasonable, especially when speaking about the domestic threat. 6. Based on the provided statistics and on-site discussions, the fraud category in most cases overlaps with embezzlement and cybercrime, therefore, for clarity and consistency throughout the report, these ML threats will be referred to as “fraud”. Compared to the 2015 MER findings, which indicated a lack of consensus among Armenian authorities regarding the most prevalent criminal activities for ML [24] , for the period under review, the perception on the main ML threats is now more unified. 7. A development from the previous MER is that the authorities have included an estimation of the magnitude and significance of the overall proceeds from criminal activity. Nevertheless, the estimation includes only reported crime and does not extend to unreported crime. A separate document was provided on the extent of unreported crime, which does not seem to have impacted the ML/TF threat level in the 2024 NRA. The analysis in the 2024 NRA does not look at incoming international co-operation requests by predicate offence, given that this data started being collected in 2023. 8. The AT notes that according to the NRA, there has been no change in the threat level despite global dynamics in the ML/TF risk landscape in the last ten years, and the economic and demographic developments in Armenia post 2022. Although the CBA demonstrated a better understanding of those changes, some concerns remain, mostly linked to the level and features of the external threat. The general conclusion of the 2024 NRA is that the “cross-border” predicate offences do not significantly impact the country’s ML/TF risk profile [25] , a view which was mirrored in general by the authorities’ understanding, who consider the ML threats to be almost exclusively local. 9. Nevertheless, the AT notes that according to the NRA, 59% [26] of the funds involved in ML STRs have a foreign nexus. The authorities maintain that some of these represent funds generated domestically, sent abroad and then returned, while others constitute proceeds from foreign predicates. There is no breakdown on the proportion of each of these two categories, nor on the underlying criminality. Recent and trending large-scale fraud cases linked to the so called “call centres” established in Armenia with foreign funds were noted, where the predicate offences (fraud) are committed in Armenia with the proceeds being laundered abroad (the authorities have not detected related returning funds). While accepting authorities’ explanation as reasonable, the AT considers that the foreign threat should be further explored by the analysis of recent trends, cases, their typologies, and international sources. 10. The AT also notes that the 2024 NRA found that the total number of customers of banks has shown an increasing trend, reaching an average growth of 4.25% against 1.5% in the 2021 NRA, an increase attributable to the non-resident natural persons. Additionally, findings in international reports [27] present that in 2024, 28% of the assets held by commercial banks were of foreign ownership. These two findings, albeit not presenting anything suspicious on their own, indicate however that the foreign involvement is increasing. 11. Armenian authorities uniformly reported that the threat emerging from transnational organised criminal networks dealing in drug trafficking and other major crimes is negligent. Most LEAs consider the threat of organized crime to be low, describing offences (mainly fraud and drug-trafficking) as small-scale and domestic in nature. The authorities acknowledge the existence of large-scale drug trafficking cases, which have been considered for the NRA purposes, but remain of the view that this does not constitute a trend and typology in the country. 12. The AT has concerns about the reasonableness of this conclusion, and  is of the view that the risk assessment should explore more the impact of the criminal activities carried out by transnational organised criminal groups (e.g. drugs), particularly in the context of increasing smuggling and illegal trade of non-renewable resources, such as gold and diamonds, involving both domestic and foreign organised criminal groups, and reports indicating Armenia as being used as a transit country for illicit drugs. [28] 13. Authorities assess ML/TF vulnerabilities of the legal, and the institutional systems taking into consideration the particularities of the FIU, LEAs, the judicial system, the supervisory bodies (FIs and DNFBPs), data reliability and usability, international cooperation, domestic cooperation, confiscation, and additional preventive measures to fight terrorism and TF. Higher ML/TF vulnerabilities are found in LEAs specifically in relation to the need for increased human and technical resources; the judiciary, in view of the delays in ML trials and absence of specialised courts; and the limited supervision in the gaming sector, notaries, and advocates. Although the AT is not challenging these conclusions, it is not clear how some of the conclusions were reached. For example, on the vulnerabilities of the preventive measures to combat terrorism and TF, no analysis is presented on what are mitigating measures by type of product and service, and how are these leading to a lower vulnerability. Additionally, in the assessment of the sectoral legislation, reference is made to legislative initiatives that are not yet in place, for example, in relation to the transparency of legal persons [29] . 14. Authorities also assessed ML/TF vulnerabilities of the financial institutions and the non-financial reporting entities, the legal persons and the non-profit organisations (NPOs). In the financial sector, the ML/TF vulnerabilities were rated as ‘medium’ (score 2 out of 4), with the main vulnerability lying in the product/service risk due to VAs, specifically due to the annual turnover in the sector [30] which authorities reported as difficult to assess especially in relation to the nine to ten VAs ATMs present in the country [31] . 15. In the non-financial sector, the highest vulnerability for ML/TF were detected to be in the gambling and the real estate sectors, namely because, in both sectors, between 2021 to 2023 the inspections and enforcement action taken were very low. The authorities see the risks related to the real estate transactions often linked to proceeds from corruption and fraud. In terms of ownership of real estate, natural persons outweigh legal persons, which however hold higher-end properties. Data collected by authorities shows that between 2021 to 2024, natural persons acquired 96% of the real estate vs 4% for legal persons. However, the average value of a legal person real estate contract is between 2,4 to 7 times higher than the average for a natural person [32] . It is not clear how this materiality aspect was reflected in the 2024 NRA or in the risk understanding by the authorities. 16. At the time of the on-site visit real estate transactions did not require the mandatory involvement of a notary. For the 2024 NRA, the authorities analysed the STRs and noted that the real estate associated amounts exceeded EUR 110 000. Aware of this vulnerability, the authorities made sure that the AML/CFT Strategy includes legislative amendments to introduce the obligation to notarise the real estate transactions above EUR 110 000, thus ensuring the implementation of CDD and the submission of STRs by this category of reporting entities. Although the authorities are to be commended for this relevant finding, this recommendation was not yet in place by the time of the on-site visit. The AT encourages the authorities to deepen the vulnerability analysis of the real estate sector to make sure it sufficiently encompassing the specific risks and laundering typologies. 17. Use of cash was identified as a vulnerability which the authorities addressed through a law on non-cash transactions, effective as from July 2022, and mandating non-cash payments for most of the transactions over approximately Eur700. No information was provided on the results of this mitigating measure (such as increased number of TTRs or STRs or others – see also IO5). 18. The risk understanding of the supervisory authority of the financial sector appears to be more developed than that of the supervisory authorities of the non-financial sector, especially with regards to ML typologies specific for their sectors. 19. On ML/TF vulnerabilities related to legal persons, authorities report that LLCs are the most material and considered to be more vulnerable in view of the organizational and legal form, and the ease of incorporation. [33] LLCs in Armenia increased from 6,768 new registrations in 2021 to 10,075 new registrations in 2023. Vulnerabilities in relation to all types of legal persons were found to be (i) the non-dissuasive penalty for failure to retain the accounting documents of a legal person, enabling criminals to dissimulate their traces, creating challenges for LEAs in gathering evidence; (ii) the challenge in identifying BOs of non-resident legal persons, and (iii) the absence of the necessary mechanisms for the effective operation of the BO disclosure system. Authorities conclude that the ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons are medium. While the identified vulnerabilities are reasonable, the AT has some reservations on the overall risk level, as explained under IO.5. 20. The 2024 NRA notes that vulnerabilities arising from VAs remain high, due to difficulties in assessing the entire volume of transactions related to VAs in Armenia [34] (materiality) as well as the absence of regulatory (supervisory) measures. The authorities acknowledge the main respective threats to be deriving from drug and fraud proceeds. Following the 2024 NRA, a strategic analysis of ML/TF/PF risks associated with VAs transactions was conducted in 2025 as well as a typology study in relation to the use of VAs in drug trafficking. 1.1.2. TF risks 21. TF risk was considered in all the iterations of the NRA. During the on-site, Armenia reported that there is a separate TF risk assessment besides the section in the 2024 NRA, however the document was not made available to the AT due to high confidentiality nature of the data. 22. TF threats are considered through the prism of conflicts driven by religious or ethnic movements, minority rights violations, extremist propaganda, the presence of terrorist organisations, instances of terrorism and TF, and connections with high-risk countries. 23. The authorities concluded that the threat level related to TF is low, given that: (i) there were no favourable preconditions for terrorism and TF in Armenia, (ii) competent authorities effectively prevented attempts by individuals associated with terrorist organisations, (iii) criminal proceedings were initiated in four cases related to terrorism and the preparation of terrorism, which are not significant in terms of TF, (iv) Armenia’s relations with high-risk countries that include money transfers, are limited to the natural ties it maintains with Armenian communities, and (v) no significant risks related to terrorism were identified and the hypothesis put forward regarding TF have been refuted. [35] 24. Authorities have developed a list of TF high-risk jurisdictions that is regularly revised based on various factors such as: the FATF list of high-risk jurisdictions, international indices, and intelligence data from the FMC and the NSS. This list is communicated to the financial institutions, and comprehensive data on these high-risk jurisdictions is collected regularly by the FMC every six months. Authorities reported that there were no new findings or new trends from the financial flows analysis. 25. The assessment of Armenia’s connections with high-risk countries included as well: i) individuals that moved to Armenia [36] , ii) the preventive measures taken by banks when opening bank accounts in Armenia to citizens of high-risk countries, and iii) the vulnerabilities of NPOs registering and operating in Armenia from the perspective of TF. Authorities reported that no data was received regarding any TF cases involving NPOs registered and operating in Armenia, thereby concluding that NPOs have a low TF vulnerability. 26. Authorities reported that a strategic analysis was carried out in 2025 on the TF risks of VAs which was considered to be low. However, this needs to be developed further in the next NRA by taking into consideration all the sectors that involve the use of VAs and distinguishing clearly for all the sectors between ML and TF risks. The AT notes that VAs are an emerging risk globally, while the VASPs sector in Armenia was not yet regulated at the time of the on-site. 27. The authorities looked at the 1 713 cash declarations between 2022 and 2023, (almost five times higher than the figures recorded in the 2017-2020 NRA), and saw no TF suspicions. 28. Authorities’ and reporting entities’ TF risk understanding mirrors the 2024 NRA, since they view TF risks as low because there were no TF cases in Armenia. 29. Turning to legal persons, authorities’ understanding is that the vulnerability is low on the basis of lack of TF cases (including criminal procedures) involving legal persons, their shareholders and BOs, and absence of international co-operation requests. 30. The AT notes that the authorities, specifically the financial supervisory authorities, have a good understanding of TF risks. Some areas for improvement that could lead to a better TF risk understanding include: a) Further analysis to ascertain the reasonableness of a low TF risk of abuse through VAs. b) An analysis on how TF threats take into consideration the origins of terrorist funding from illegitimate activities, such as organised crime, drug trafficking or similar, as well as the analysis of informal remittance services or any other unlicensed activity (see more in IO.9). c) More analysis on the threats, vulnerabilities, and effectiveness of mitigating measures regarding legal persons. d) TF controls and TF risk exposure by FIs and DNFBPs by product and services. Footnotes [22] This included representatives from the prosecutors’ office, the anti-corruption committee, the National Security Services, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the State Revenue Committee (SRC), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, the Judicial Department, Chamber of Advocates, Chamber of Auditors, Chamber of Auditors and Expert Accountants, and the Central Bank.as well as engagement of the private sector representatives. [23] 2024 NRA, para. 185-186. [24] 2015 MER, para. 94. [25] 2024 NRA. page 10. [26] The authorities explained that this conclusion was drawn on the basis of the entire population of STRs and not limited to those that triggered a dissemination to LEAs. Speaking of the latter, only 20% of the STRs would include a foreign nexus. [27] Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, peer review report on the exchange of information on request – Armenia, 2025 (second round, combined review), p. 29, par. 39. [28] Global Organised Crime Index, Report on Armenia, 2025, page 3, and United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1, March 2022, p. 81 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00767-INCSR-2022-Vol-1.pdf [29] 2024 NRA, par. 751-753 [30] About EUR 182 million to EUR 193 million [31] 2024 NRA, par. 662. [32] In 2023 natural persons totalled 47,770 contracts with an average contract value of circa EUR 40 300, and legal persons totalled 2,362 contracts with an average contract value of circa EUR 283 700 [33] 2024 NRA, par. 767. [34] 2024 NRA, par. 662. [35] 2024 NRA, par. 236. [36] Mostly ethnic Armenians citizens of Syria and Lebanon." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. ML risks 2. Armenia has to be commended for actively engaging in efforts to continuously improve the understanding of the landscape of risks, by conducting three NRAs since the last evaluation round. The country does not record any significant change in the ML risk landscape since the 2015 MER, which, seeing the global developments in the ML/TF risk environment in the last ten years, constitutes an area for concern. 3. The authorities’ understanding of risk is based on the NRA and is to some extent considered as generally good, with some areas for improvement. The strategic analyses carried out following the NRA (presented under core issue 1.2) are all driven from findings from the NRA, and in discussions during the on-site with both the law enforcement and the supervisory authorities, as well as with the reporting entities, the main focal point of risk understanding was always the NRA. 4. The most recent NRA was finalised in 2024 and conducted by a working group established under the auspices of the Interagency Committee, which included representatives from the law enforcement, supervisory authorities, representatives from key Ministries [22] as well as engagement of the private sector representatives. 5. The main ML threats identified stem from fraud, embezzlement, corruption, tax crimes, drug trafficking, and cybercrime. [23] The AT considers this conclusion as reasonable, especially when speaking about the domestic threat. 6. Based on the provided statistics and on-site discussions, the fraud category in most cases overlaps with embezzlement and cybercrime, therefore, for clarity and consistency throughout the report, these ML threats will be referred to as “fraud”. Compared to the 2015 MER findings, which indicated a lack of consensus among Armenian authorities regarding the most prevalent criminal activities for ML [24] , for the period under review, the perception on the main ML threats is now more unified. 7. A development from the previous MER is that the authorities have included an estimation of the magnitude and significance of the overall proceeds from criminal activity. Nevertheless, the estimation includes only reported crime and does not extend to unreported crime. A separate document was provided on the extent of unreported crime, which does not seem to have impacted the ML/TF threat level in the 2024 NRA. The analysis in the 2024 NRA does not look at incoming international co-operation requests by predicate offence, given that this data started being collected in 2023. 8. The AT notes that according to the NRA, there has been no change in the threat level despite global dynamics in the ML/TF risk landscape in the last ten years, and the economic and demographic developments in Armenia post 2022. Although the CBA demonstrated a better understanding of those changes, some concerns remain, mostly linked to the level and features of the external threat. The general conclusion of the 2024 NRA is that the “cross-border” predicate offences do not significantly impact the country’s ML/TF risk profile [25] , a view which was mirrored in general by the authorities’ understanding, who consider the ML threats to be almost exclusively local. 9. Nevertheless, the AT notes that according to the NRA, 59% [26] of the funds involved in ML STRs have a foreign nexus. The authorities maintain that some of these represent funds generated domestically, sent abroad and then returned, while others constitute proceeds from foreign predicates. There is no breakdown on the proportion of each of these two categories, nor on the underlying criminality. Recent and trending large-scale fraud cases linked to the so called “call centres” established in Armenia with foreign funds were noted, where the predicate offences (fraud) are committed in Armenia with the proceeds being laundered abroad (the authorities have not detected related returning funds). While accepting authorities’ explanation as reasonable, the AT considers that the foreign threat should be further explored by the analysis of recent trends, cases, their typologies, and international sources. 10. The AT also notes that the 2024 NRA found that the total number of customers of banks has shown an increasing trend, reaching an average growth of 4.25% against 1.5% in the 2021 NRA, an increase attributable to the non-resident natural persons. Additionally, findings in international reports [27] present that in 2024, 28% of the assets held by commercial banks were of foreign ownership. These two findings, albeit not presenting anything suspicious on their own, indicate however that the foreign involvement is increasing. 11. Armenian authorities uniformly reported that the threat emerging from transnational organised criminal networks dealing in drug trafficking and other major crimes is negligent. Most LEAs consider the threat of organized crime to be low, describing offences (mainly fraud and drug-trafficking) as small-scale and domestic in nature. The authorities acknowledge the existence of large-scale drug trafficking cases, which have been considered for the NRA purposes, but remain of the view that this does not constitute a trend and typology in the country. 12. The AT has concerns about the reasonableness of this conclusion, and  is of the view that the risk assessment should explore more the impact of the criminal activities carried out by transnational organised criminal groups (e.g. drugs), particularly in the context of increasing smuggling and illegal trade of non-renewable resources, such as gold and diamonds, involving both domestic and foreign organised criminal groups, and reports indicating Armenia as being used as a transit country for illicit drugs. [28] 13. Authorities assess ML/TF vulnerabilities of the legal, and the institutional systems taking into consideration the particularities of the FIU, LEAs, the judicial system, the supervisory bodies (FIs and DNFBPs), data reliability and usability, international cooperation, domestic cooperation, confiscation, and additional preventive measures to fight terrorism and TF. Higher ML/TF vulnerabilities are found in LEAs specifically in relation to the need for increased human and technical resources; the judiciary, in view of the delays in ML trials and absence of specialised courts; and the limited supervision in the gaming sector, notaries, and advocates. Although the AT is not challenging these conclusions, it is not clear how some of the conclusions were reached. For example, on the vulnerabilities of the preventive measures to combat terrorism and TF, no analysis is presented on what are mitigating measures by type of product and service, and how are these leading to a lower vulnerability. Additionally, in the assessment of the sectoral legislation, reference is made to legislative initiatives that are not yet in place, for example, in relation to the transparency of legal persons [29] . 14. Authorities also assessed ML/TF vulnerabilities of the financial institutions and the non-financial reporting entities, the legal persons and the non-profit organisations (NPOs). In the financial sector, the ML/TF vulnerabilities were rated as ‘medium’ (score 2 out of 4), with the main vulnerability lying in the product/service risk due to VAs, specifically due to the annual turnover in the sector [30] which authorities reported as difficult to assess especially in relation to the nine to ten VAs ATMs present in the country [31] . 15. In the non-financial sector, the highest vulnerability for ML/TF were detected to be in the gambling and the real estate sectors, namely because, in both sectors, between 2021 to 2023 the inspections and enforcement action taken were very low. The authorities see the risks related to the real estate transactions often linked to proceeds from corruption and fraud. In terms of ownership of real estate, natural persons outweigh legal persons, which however hold higher-end properties. Data collected by authorities shows that between 2021 to 2024, natural persons acquired 96% of the real estate vs 4% for legal persons. However, the average value of a legal person real estate contract is between 2,4 to 7 times higher than the average for a natural person [32] . It is not clear how this materiality aspect was reflected in the 2024 NRA or in the risk understanding by the authorities. 16. At the time of the on-site visit real estate transactions did not require the mandatory involvement of a notary. For the 2024 NRA, the authorities analysed the STRs and noted that the real estate associated amounts exceeded EUR 110 000. Aware of this vulnerability, the authorities made sure that the AML/CFT Strategy includes legislative amendments to introduce the obligation to notarise the real estate transactions above EUR 110 000, thus ensuring the implementation of CDD and the submission of STRs by this category of reporting entities. Although the authorities are to be commended for this relevant finding, this recommendation was not yet in place by the time of the on-site visit. The AT encourages the authorities to deepen the vulnerability analysis of the real estate sector to make sure it sufficiently encompassing the specific risks and laundering typologies. 17. Use of cash was identified as a vulnerability which the authorities addressed through a law on non-cash transactions, effective as from July 2022, and mandating non-cash payments for most of the transactions over approximately Eur700. No information was provided on the results of this mitigating measure (such as increased number of TTRs or STRs or others – see also IO5). 18. The risk understanding of the supervisory authority of the financial sector appears to be more developed than that of the supervisory authorities of the non-financial sector, especially with regards to ML typologies specific for their sectors. 19. On ML/TF vulnerabilities related to legal persons, authorities report that LLCs are the most material and considered to be more vulnerable in view of the organizational and legal form, and the ease of incorporation. [33] LLCs in Armenia increased from 6,768 new registrations in 2021 to 10,075 new registrations in 2023. Vulnerabilities in relation to all types of legal persons were found to be (i) the non-dissuasive penalty for failure to retain the accounting documents of a legal person, enabling criminals to dissimulate their traces, creating challenges for LEAs in gathering evidence; (ii) the challenge in identifying BOs of non-resident legal persons, and (iii) the absence of the necessary mechanisms for the effective operation of the BO disclosure system. Authorities conclude that the ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons are medium. While the identified vulnerabilities are reasonable, the AT has some reservations on the overall risk level, as explained under IO.5. 20. The 2024 NRA notes that vulnerabilities arising from VAs remain high, due to difficulties in assessing the entire volume of transactions related to VAs in Armenia [34] (materiality) as well as the absence of regulatory (supervisory) measures. The authorities acknowledge the main respective threats to be deriving from drug and fraud proceeds. Following the 2024 NRA, a strategic analysis of ML/TF/PF risks associated with VAs transactions was conducted in 2025 as well as a typology study in relation to the use of VAs in drug trafficking. 1.1.2. TF risks 21. TF risk was considered in all the iterations of the NRA. During the on-site, Armenia reported that there is a separate TF risk assessment besides the section in the 2024 NRA, however the document was not made available to the AT due to high confidentiality nature of the data. 22. TF threats are considered through the prism of conflicts driven by religious or ethnic movements, minority rights violations, extremist propaganda, the presence of terrorist organisations, instances of terrorism and TF, and connections with high-risk countries. 23. The authorities concluded that the threat level related to TF is low, given that: (i) there were no favourable preconditions for terrorism and TF in Armenia, (ii) competent authorities effectively prevented attempts by individuals associated with terrorist organisations, (iii) criminal proceedings were initiated in four cases related to terrorism and the preparation of terrorism, which are not significant in terms of TF, (iv) Armenia’s relations with high-risk countries that include money transfers, are limited to the natural ties it maintains with Armenian communities, and (v) no significant risks related to terrorism were identified and the hypothesis put forward regarding TF have been refuted. [35] 24. Authorities have developed a list of TF high-risk jurisdictions that is regularly revised based on various factors such as: the FATF list of high-risk jurisdictions, international indices, and intelligence data from the FMC and the NSS. This list is communicated to the financial institutions, and comprehensive data on these high-risk jurisdictions is collected regularly by the FMC every six months. Authorities reported that there were no new findings or new trends from the financial flows analysis. 25. The assessment of Armenia’s connections with high-risk countries included as well: i) individuals that moved to Armenia [36] , ii) the preventive measures taken by banks when opening bank accounts in Armenia to citizens of high-risk countries, and iii) the vulnerabilities of NPOs registering and operating in Armenia from the perspective of TF. Authorities reported that no data was received regarding any TF cases involving NPOs registered and operating in Armenia, thereby concluding that NPOs have a low TF vulnerability. 26. Authorities reported that a strategic analysis was carried out in 2025 on the TF risks of VAs which was considered to be low. However, this needs to be developed further in the next NRA by taking into consideration all the sectors that involve the use of VAs and distinguishing clearly for all the sectors between ML and TF risks. The AT notes that VAs are an emerging risk globally, while the VASPs sector in Armenia was not yet regulated at the time of the on-site. 27. The authorities looked at the 1 713 cash declarations between 2022 and 2023, (almost five times higher than the figures recorded in the 2017-2020 NRA), and saw no TF suspicions. 28. Authorities’ and reporting entities’ TF risk understanding mirrors the 2024 NRA, since they view TF risks as low because there were no TF cases in Armenia. 29. Turning to legal persons, authorities’ understanding is that the vulnerability is low on the basis of lack of TF cases (including criminal procedures) involving legal persons, their shareholders and BOs, and absence of international co-operation requests. 30. The AT notes that the authorities, specifically the financial supervisory authorities, have a good understanding of TF risks. Some areas for improvement that could lead to a better TF risk understanding include: a) Further analysis to ascertain the reasonableness of a low TF risk of abuse through VAs. b) An analysis on how TF threats take into consideration the origins of terrorist funding from illegitimate activities, such as organised crime, drug trafficking or similar, as well as the analysis of informal remittance services or any other unlicensed activity (see more in IO.9). c) More analysis on the threats, vulnerabilities, and effectiveness of mitigating measures regarding legal persons. d) TF controls and TF risk exposure by FIs and DNFBPs by product and services. Footnotes [22] This included representatives from the prosecutors’ office, the anti-corruption committee, the National Security Services, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry for Internal Affairs, the State Revenue Committee (SRC), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, the Judicial Department, Chamber of Advocates, Chamber of Auditors, Chamber of Auditors and Expert Accountants, and the Central Bank.as well as engagement of the private sector representatives. [23] 2024 NRA, para. 185-186. [24] 2015 MER, para. 94. [25] 2024 NRA. page 10. [26] The authorities explained that this conclusion was drawn on the basis of the entire population of STRs and not limited to those that triggered a dissemination to LEAs. Speaking of the latter, only 20% of the STRs would include a foreign nexus. [27] Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, peer review report on the exchange of information on request – Armenia, 2025 (second round, combined review), p. 29, par. 39. [28] Global Organised Crime Index, Report on Armenia, 2025, page 3, and United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1, March 2022, p. 81 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00767-INCSR-2022-Vol-1.pdf [29] 2024 NRA, par. 751-753 [30] About EUR 182 million to EUR 193 million [31] 2024 NRA, par. 662. [32] In 2023 natural persons totalled 47,770 contracts with an average contract value of circa EUR 40 300, and legal persons totalled 2,362 contracts with an average contract value of circa EUR 283 700 [33] 2024 NRA, par. 767. [34] 2024 NRA, par. 662. [35] 2024 NRA, par. 236. 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Providing evidence and locating criminals 71. Armenia has a sound legal framework for MLA, on the basis of which it provides mutual legal assistance to a variety of jurisdictions with which it has entered into multilateral (treaties) and bilateral agreements. Cooperation is most commonly provided on the basis of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention), UNTOC, UNCAC, the Minsk, Chisinau and Budapest Conventions. MLA or extradition can be provided on an ad hoc basis (without a prior agreement) subject to the principle of reciprocity. The authorities have used these principles to enter into cooperation with jurisdictions such as, inter alia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Hong Kong. 72. Armenia has established two central authorities responsible for overseeing the execution of MLA and extradition requests, in order to ensure their proper handling. The GPO is responsible for handling incoming MLARs and extradition requests in preliminary stage, whereas the MoJ has the capacity to process foreign inquiries for assistance associated with the trial stage. The GPO handling the bulk of incoming requests has 7 staff members dedicated to the task, while the MoJ has 11 people. The GPO also has within its structure the Department for Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin, with 10 prosecutors, who are in charge for ensuring international legal cooperation on civil forfeiture matters. 73. In the period under review, the GPO received a total of 963 MLARs, of which at least a total of 355 MLARs involving TF (1 request), standalone ML, ML together with associated predicate offences and sole predicate offences. The MoJ received altogether 414 requests, but no distinction concerning specific offences was made. In the case of both the GPO and MoJ, the overall number of incoming requests has been gradually increasing between 2020-2024. The MoJ keeps aggregated statistics on incoming MLAs but no break-down by predicate offences is available. 74. The vast majority of requests originate from the Russian Federation and Türkiye. Data on incoming MLA requests provided by the GPO indicates that the main underlying offences are various types of fraud, followed by corruption and tax evasion this in line with the country ML risk profile (see IO1). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA requests by offence (GPO) Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML Standalone 5 7 8 4 4 28 ML associated with [39] Fraud 2 1 2 0 0 5 Drug g Trafficking 1 0 0 0 0 1 Corruption 0 0 3 5 1 9 Tax evasion 0 1 0 1 0 2 Organised crime 0 0 1 0 0 1 Other TF 0 0 0 1 0 1 Terrorism 0 0 1 2 2 5 Other predicate offences Fraud (incl. cybercrime, forgery of documents) 37 33 36 46 58 210 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 14 0 14 Corruption 6 4 14 16 2 42 Tax evasion 6 7 3 2 2 20 Organised crime 0 0 2 6 2 10 Cash smuggling/breach of cross-border declaration obligation 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smuggling 0 0 2 1 2 5 Arms trafficking 0 0 0 2 0 2 75. Both the GPO and MoJ confirmed, that MLARs most often involve inquiries on financial information (financial flows, account statements), the possibility to interrogate witnesses and suspects, information about the organizations, beneficial ownership information, and the identification of assets. Table 2.2. Top MLA requesting countries GPO MoJ Country Number of incoming MLA requests Country Number of incoming MLA requests Russian Federation 671 Türkiye 225 Poland 22 Germany 83 Latvia 21 France 22 Germany 13 Greece 9 United States of America 8 Netherlands 9 France 5 Slovenia 9 76. Incoming MLAs originate to a large from extent jurisdictions possessing an Armenian diaspora, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk profile. The jurisdictions in the FATF Global Network gave positive feedback on the information or answers provided by Armenia in the framework of requests with, single responses suggesting a long timeframe needed to respond to MLARs. The oldest pending MLA dates back to 2021, which is due to the fact that there are criminal proceedings in Armenia, and the provision of international cooperation may impede domestic investigation of the cases. While detailed statistics are not aggregated, the MoJ indicates the average response time to be approximately 3 to 12 months, in the case of the GPO 4 to 6 months, which can be considered appropriate. 77. The identified longer response times in specific cases may be due to a series of factors. In some cases, additional information is also required from the requesting jurisdiction, which may take a long time to obtain. Representatives from GPO and MoJ highlighted, that they communicate the status of the inquiry to the senders and signal any need for additional information without delay. 78. In general, incoming requests are assessed for completeness, legal compliance, and relevance under the CPC and international agreements before they are sent to the responsible competent authority for execution. Both authorities have indicated different case management systems used to process and monitor the incoming requests. While both authorities have electronic case management systems in place, they would benefit from further enhancement, in the case of the MoJ, part of the efforts to monitor progress of executing requests is still done on paper. Prioritization of MLARs is not formalized in any procedure but based on the experience of the staff handling the request, which would pursue cases marked as urgent, suggesting a specific timeframe for execution or associated with cybercrime, which does not give consideration to the main ML/TF risks the jurisdiction faces or cases concerning asset recovery. 79. In the period under review there has been a steady transition from MLARs being received by the GPO using diplomatic channels to the use of email to transmit requests. This evolution was triggered by limitations introduced during the COVID 19 Pandemic and the development of lists of contact points for the purpose of cooperation under specific treaties. While the MoJ still receives a lot of inquiries via diplomatic post, urgent cases are now also transmitted via email, which has allowed to save time. 80. The execution of incoming requests on the domestic level is monitored by the central authorities. The GPO assigns a prosector responsible for handling the necessary activities. The MoJ verifies the status of the request every three months. 81. While the GPO and MoJ have indicated that each request is analysed with the view of the need of taking further action on the domestic level (outside the execution of the request), no cases have been provided to demonstrate proactively initiated investigations into persons and activities stemming from MLARs (see IO.7). 82. The AT did not identify cases of unreasonable refusals to MLA requests from other jurisdictions. The authorities engage with foreign counterparts through several platforms – both formal and informal in order to consult the process of obtaining legal assistance from Armenia. On several occasions consultation took place after receiving the requests in order to organize the execution of the proper part, prior to receiving additional documents. 83. Feedback from the global network indicated Armenia has on some occasions refused to provide mutual legal assistance to a foreign authority on grounds of the possible application of dual criminality (1 request) or the lack of a bilateral and multilateral agreement (one request). The authorities have provided explanations on the handling of these cases, which the AT finds legitimate. One jurisdiction noted that cooperation was refused on a basis that was not communicated properly. Further guidance and upfront communication with the sending authorities would allow the central authorities to mitigate such situations. 2.1.2. Extradition 84. In the period under review, Armenia has received in total 349 extradition requests, out of which around 30% were refused. Out of the 207 requests submitted to the GPO only 3 concerned ML and 2 TF. The refusals are primarily triggered by cases of dual criminality, and legislation forbidding the extradition of Armenian citizens. Other situations can concern the application of the statute of limitations and precautions as to protection of the rights of individual concerned. In case when the accused is the citizen of Armenia (who according to the law cannot be extradited), the GPO can initiate further criminal prosecution against the person on the basis of the relevant international treaties. The authorities noticed 100 such cases in the period 2020-2024. The authorities indicated that the average time for execution of extradition requests is 11 months, which is reasonable to the AT. The need to translate the document into Armenian (which can take at least 6 months) is a factor delaying the execution. To address this, in 2025 the Ministry of Justice concluded several service contracts with translation companies to streamline the provision of translation services in the field of international legal assistance. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests received and refused Year GPO MoJ received Refused received Refused 2020 20 2 13 9 2021 22 4 9 4 2022 38 5 19 13 2023 54 5 52 20 2024 73 11 49 26 Total 207 27 142 72 Box 2.1. Swift execution of extradition request In 2024 an extradition request for a person wanted for a “call-centre” fraud (recently widespread type of cybercrime) in especially large amount was received. The total amount of damage in the criminal proceedings was 23,793,000 euros, and 487 people were involved as victims. In just 8 months, the organization had earned (at that moment) 49,000,000 USD illegal income. By overcoming the complex extradition process and granting the petition in 8 months, the GPO supported foreign counterparts in fight against modern cybercrime, and the accused was extradited. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 85. Armenia receives requests facilitating potential asset recovery in ML cases, which highlights the transnational element in key ML risks identified by the jurisdiction. Data available from the GPO indicates Armenia has received at least 40 requests involving identification and tracking of assets (incl. 16 ML, 13 - fraud, 4 - drug trafficking, 2 - corruption, 1 – tax evasion) 4 requests concerning freezing/seizing of assets (2 concerning ML). 86. According to the GPO and MoJ, up till now the authorities have not identified assets in Armenia belonging to the individuals in question, that could be subject to seizure or confiscation. The same is applicable to requests involving civil asset forfeiture. The AT has no evidence to challenge this conclusion, however, the difficulties noted in LEAs’ capacity to perform financial analysis, and access to financial information (see IO6 and IO7) might impede the effective tracing and identification of assets located domestically. Footnotes [39] It should be noted that the discrepancy in the segregated figures is due to the fact that, within a single MLAR, several criminal offences were present simultaneously — for example, fraud, money laundering, and corruption-related offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 71. Armenia has a sound legal framework for MLA, on the basis of which it provides mutual legal assistance to a variety of jurisdictions with which it has entered into multilateral (treaties) and bilateral agreements. Cooperation is most commonly provided on the basis of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention), UNTOC, UNCAC, the Minsk, Chisinau and Budapest Conventions. MLA or extradition can be provided on an ad hoc basis (without a prior agreement) subject to the principle of reciprocity. The authorities have used these principles to enter into cooperation with jurisdictions such as, inter alia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Hong Kong. 72. Armenia has established two central authorities responsible for overseeing the execution of MLA and extradition requests, in order to ensure their proper handling. The GPO is responsible for handling incoming MLARs and extradition requests in preliminary stage, whereas the MoJ has the capacity to process foreign inquiries for assistance associated with the trial stage. The GPO handling the bulk of incoming requests has 7 staff members dedicated to the task, while the MoJ has 11 people. The GPO also has within its structure the Department for Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin, with 10 prosecutors, who are in charge for ensuring international legal cooperation on civil forfeiture matters. 73. In the period under review, the GPO received a total of 963 MLARs, of which at least a total of 355 MLARs involving TF (1 request), standalone ML, ML together with associated predicate offences and sole predicate offences. The MoJ received altogether 414 requests, but no distinction concerning specific offences was made. In the case of both the GPO and MoJ, the overall number of incoming requests has been gradually increasing between 2020-2024. The MoJ keeps aggregated statistics on incoming MLAs but no break-down by predicate offences is available. 74. The vast majority of requests originate from the Russian Federation and Türkiye. Data on incoming MLA requests provided by the GPO indicates that the main underlying offences are various types of fraud, followed by corruption and tax evasion this in line with the country ML risk profile (see IO1). Table 2.1. Incoming MLA requests by offence (GPO) Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML Standalone 5 7 8 4 4 28 ML associated with [39] Fraud 2 1 2 0 0 5 Drug g Trafficking 1 0 0 0 0 1 Corruption 0 0 3 5 1 9 Tax evasion 0 1 0 1 0 2 Organised crime 0 0 1 0 0 1 Other TF 0 0 0 1 0 1 Terrorism 0 0 1 2 2 5 Other predicate offences Fraud (incl. cybercrime, forgery of documents) 37 33 36 46 58 210 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 14 0 14 Corruption 6 4 14 16 2 42 Tax evasion 6 7 3 2 2 20 Organised crime 0 0 2 6 2 10 Cash smuggling/breach of cross-border declaration obligation 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smuggling 0 0 2 1 2 5 Arms trafficking 0 0 0 2 0 2 75. Both the GPO and MoJ confirmed, that MLARs most often involve inquiries on financial information (financial flows, account statements), the possibility to interrogate witnesses and suspects, information about the organizations, beneficial ownership information, and the identification of assets. Table 2.2. Top MLA requesting countries GPO MoJ Country Number of incoming MLA requests Country Number of incoming MLA requests Russian Federation 671 Türkiye 225 Poland 22 Germany 83 Latvia 21 France 22 Germany 13 Greece 9 United States of America 8 Netherlands 9 France 5 Slovenia 9 76. Incoming MLAs originate to a large from extent jurisdictions possessing an Armenian diaspora, which is broadly in line with the country’s risk profile. The jurisdictions in the FATF Global Network gave positive feedback on the information or answers provided by Armenia in the framework of requests with, single responses suggesting a long timeframe needed to respond to MLARs. The oldest pending MLA dates back to 2021, which is due to the fact that there are criminal proceedings in Armenia, and the provision of international cooperation may impede domestic investigation of the cases. While detailed statistics are not aggregated, the MoJ indicates the average response time to be approximately 3 to 12 months, in the case of the GPO 4 to 6 months, which can be considered appropriate. 77. The identified longer response times in specific cases may be due to a series of factors. In some cases, additional information is also required from the requesting jurisdiction, which may take a long time to obtain. Representatives from GPO and MoJ highlighted, that they communicate the status of the inquiry to the senders and signal any need for additional information without delay. 78. In general, incoming requests are assessed for completeness, legal compliance, and relevance under the CPC and international agreements before they are sent to the responsible competent authority for execution. Both authorities have indicated different case management systems used to process and monitor the incoming requests. While both authorities have electronic case management systems in place, they would benefit from further enhancement, in the case of the MoJ, part of the efforts to monitor progress of executing requests is still done on paper. Prioritization of MLARs is not formalized in any procedure but based on the experience of the staff handling the request, which would pursue cases marked as urgent, suggesting a specific timeframe for execution or associated with cybercrime, which does not give consideration to the main ML/TF risks the jurisdiction faces or cases concerning asset recovery. 79. In the period under review there has been a steady transition from MLARs being received by the GPO using diplomatic channels to the use of email to transmit requests. This evolution was triggered by limitations introduced during the COVID 19 Pandemic and the development of lists of contact points for the purpose of cooperation under specific treaties. While the MoJ still receives a lot of inquiries via diplomatic post, urgent cases are now also transmitted via email, which has allowed to save time. 80. The execution of incoming requests on the domestic level is monitored by the central authorities. The GPO assigns a prosector responsible for handling the necessary activities. The MoJ verifies the status of the request every three months. 81. While the GPO and MoJ have indicated that each request is analysed with the view of the need of taking further action on the domestic level (outside the execution of the request), no cases have been provided to demonstrate proactively initiated investigations into persons and activities stemming from MLARs (see IO.7). 82. The AT did not identify cases of unreasonable refusals to MLA requests from other jurisdictions. The authorities engage with foreign counterparts through several platforms – both formal and informal in order to consult the process of obtaining legal assistance from Armenia. On several occasions consultation took place after receiving the requests in order to organize the execution of the proper part, prior to receiving additional documents. 83. Feedback from the global network indicated Armenia has on some occasions refused to provide mutual legal assistance to a foreign authority on grounds of the possible application of dual criminality (1 request) or the lack of a bilateral and multilateral agreement (one request). The authorities have provided explanations on the handling of these cases, which the AT finds legitimate. One jurisdiction noted that cooperation was refused on a basis that was not communicated properly. Further guidance and upfront communication with the sending authorities would allow the central authorities to mitigate such situations. 2.1.2. Extradition 84. In the period under review, Armenia has received in total 349 extradition requests, out of which around 30% were refused. Out of the 207 requests submitted to the GPO only 3 concerned ML and 2 TF. The refusals are primarily triggered by cases of dual criminality, and legislation forbidding the extradition of Armenian citizens. Other situations can concern the application of the statute of limitations and precautions as to protection of the rights of individual concerned. In case when the accused is the citizen of Armenia (who according to the law cannot be extradited), the GPO can initiate further criminal prosecution against the person on the basis of the relevant international treaties. The authorities noticed 100 such cases in the period 2020-2024. The authorities indicated that the average time for execution of extradition requests is 11 months, which is reasonable to the AT. The need to translate the document into Armenian (which can take at least 6 months) is a factor delaying the execution. To address this, in 2025 the Ministry of Justice concluded several service contracts with translation companies to streamline the provision of translation services in the field of international legal assistance. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests received and refused Year GPO MoJ received Refused received Refused 2020 20 2 13 9 2021 22 4 9 4 2022 38 5 19 13 2023 54 5 52 20 2024 73 11 49 26 Total 207 27 142 72 Box 2.1. Swift execution of extradition request In 2024 an extradition request for a person wanted for a “call-centre” fraud (recently widespread type of cybercrime) in especially large amount was received. The total amount of damage in the criminal proceedings was 23,793,000 euros, and 487 people were involved as victims. In just 8 months, the organization had earned (at that moment) 49,000,000 USD illegal income. By overcoming the complex extradition process and granting the petition in 8 months, the GPO supported foreign counterparts in fight against modern cybercrime, and the accused was extradited. 2.1.3. Facilitate asset recovery 85. Armenia receives requests facilitating potential asset recovery in ML cases, which highlights the transnational element in key ML risks identified by the jurisdiction. Data available from the GPO indicates Armenia has received at least 40 requests involving identification and tracking of assets (incl. 16 ML, 13 - fraud, 4 - drug trafficking, 2 - corruption, 1 – tax evasion) 4 requests concerning freezing/seizing of assets (2 concerning ML). 86. According to the GPO and MoJ, up till now the authorities have not identified assets in Armenia belonging to the individuals in question, that could be subject to seizure or confiscation. The same is applicable to requests involving civil asset forfeiture. The AT has no evidence to challenge this conclusion, however, the difficulties noted in LEAs’ capacity to perform financial analysis, and access to financial information (see IO6 and IO7) might impede the effective tracing and identification of assets located domestically. Footnotes [39] It should be noted that the discrepancy in the segregated figures is due to the fact that, within a single MLAR, several criminal offences were present simultaneously — for example, fraud, money laundering, and corruption-related offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 130. The CBA, as licensing authority for all FIs, has controls in place to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the regulated market, with some entities such as non-public investment funds, their managers and VASPs only recently brought withing the licensing framework. Within the Financial Supervision and Licensing Department (FSLD), two specialized units comprising a total of 13 staff members (out of 96 staff members at the CBA in 2024.) are responsible for reviewing licensing applications and assessing the fitness and propriety of shareholders, beneficial owners and senior managers, including key function holders. Resources remained stable throughout the assessment period and are considered adequate by the AT in relation to the size of the financial sector. An increase of about 50% is projected by end of 2027, reflecting expanded supervisory responsibilities, including the recently approved licensing and supervision of VASPs. 131. While sectoral laws set out distinct licensing provisions, the CBA ensures consistency in practice through a formalized internal process set out in the Licensing Manual, which is applied uniformly across all FIs. The same fit and proper checks apply when approving changes of ownership, qualifying holding or management position. Each application involves verification of the criminal background of qualifying shareholders (10% or more direct or indirect interest), BOs and all managerial positions (see also R.26). The AT was also presented with a case involving scrutiny of an application for the acquisition of a stake of less than 10%. Although dating back to 2020, it illustrates the CBA’s proactive approach. 132. For residents, CBA obtains criminal records directly from the MoI, while non-residents must provide official criminal records issued by the competent foreign authority and dully apostilled. An all-crimes approach applies in the licensing process, including non-financial offences, which are assessed on a case-by-case basis where they may provide grounds for rejecting the application. In addition to criminal convictions (in particular those that have not been expunged or cancelled), intelligence information regarding potential involvement in criminal activity is also taken into account. 133. The CBA reviews ownership and control structures as part of the licensing process. In practice, most applicants have simple and transparent ownership chains with the most complex case presented to the AT involving a general insurance company [44] with four layers between the shareholder and the ultimate beneficial owner. 134. As part of integrity assessment of applicants, the CBA complements criminal background checks with open source and database analysis to identify potential associates or links to criminal activity. As most applicants are Armenian residents, a broad range of domestic databases is used, including those of Police of the MIA (for criminal records), Credit Registry, Citizen Identification System, Judicial Information System and the registry of companies, which allows, to some extent, the identification of potential links between applicants and criminals. For non-residents, Interpol inquiries are conducted, and applicants must provide a certificate issued by the competent authority in their country of residence. Box 3.1. Case Study – Fit and proper (criminal association identification) In 2020, the CBA received an application for the licensing of an MVTS with a single shareholder. During the verification process, it was identified that the applicant was involved in several other companies and had business associations with multiple individuals. One of these individuals was registered at the same residential address as a person known for a criminal background. This information was obtained through cross-checks of the judicial information system (criminal records) and the electoral system (residential address). On the basis of these findings, the CBA concluded that the applicant could not be granted a licence due to the unacceptable risk of association with a criminal. Source: CBA 135. The CBA also maintains close cooperation with FMC. Before granting a license, and at least annually thereafter, the CBA submits a list of individuals recorded in its licensing database to the FMC for screening against its databases, which include information from prosecutorial and pre-trial investigations This mechanism supports the identification of potential criminal associations. For non-resident applicants, commercial intelligence databases and other private sources are used to identify adverse information or criminal associations. Additional relevant checks include source of wealth and funds used for capitalisation, supported by audited financial statements, bank references or equivalent documentation, as well as the evaluation of applicant’s business model and internal risk control framework. 136. On-going monitoring of the fitness and propriety of ownership and management is conducted through a multi layered approach and constitutes the main post licensing control, as licenses are granted on an open-end basis [45] (there is no system for periodic license renewal). First, any changes to BOs, shareholders, or managers require prior CBA approval, and FIs must provide annual updates on their BOs. Second, a recent amendment of the Licensing Manual provides for annual re-evaluation by the CBA of shareholders, BOs and managers. In practice, a key tool used by the CBA is the annual screening of all key individuals against different databases, including the FMC’s databases, police information, other LEAs and commercial databases. 137. Third, FIs are also required to periodically verify compliance of their managers with fit and proper requirements. The depth and frequency of such analysis is not prescribed in CBA Regulations, and each FI must define these aspects in its internal acts. This is an important tool of ongoing monitoring, as about seven percent of all managers and board members of FIs in Armenia are non-residents, therefore, any criminal issues would likely not be captured by national Armenian databases used by the CBA or commercial databases. Although there is no direct requirement for FIs to include criminal record checks in this periodical monitoring, absence of convictions is one of the key components of the fit and proper test and is expected to be performed. Extracts from internal rules of banks presented to the AT show that, in practice, criminal records of key executive officials are periodically checked. 138. For BOs, FIs are required to conduct annual due diligence to identify the ultimate controller and to report any changes to the CBA, which then reviews this information and performs compliance analysis. 139. Lastly, the CBA relies on external information and triggers, including those identified during supervisory activities. 140. The AT was presented with a case in which the CBA identified an individual who attempted to conceal a significant controlling interest in an investment company by acquiring only 9.8% of shareholding while having a secret arrangement with the manager. This case was identified during the submission of a capital increase request, following which an on-site inspection was conducted that confirmed the suspicions. The individual was subsequently required to divest the holding. 141. Criminality issues are detected and addressed, but in practice findings predominantly concern smaller or less material institutions. During the assessment period, there were three cases identified of non-compliance due to criminal nature of managers or significant participants, which were subsequently removed from office. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 142. Statistics and case studies presented to the AT confirm that CBA’s powers to reject or revoke licenses are applied in practice when adverse information is identified or brought to its attention. Between 2020 and 2024, the CBA processed a total of 174 license applications across different sectors, with rejections occurring where fit-and proper issues were identified (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). This demonstrates that market-entry controls are operational and not applied in purely formal manner. Table 3.1. Licensing applications for FIs (2020-2024) Entity New licence for FI Approval of significant shareholders and BOs Entity Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Banks 1 0 1 0 36 1 35 0 MVTS 7 0 5 2 41 0 35 6 Investment companies 14 1 12 1 51 6 41 4 Credit organizations 7 0 7 0 56 4 52 0 Fund managers 65 7 58 0 12 6 6 0 Foreign exchange 75 1 71 3 205 4 195 6 Pawnshops 5 0 5 0 28 0 28 0 Table 3.2. Licensing applications of managerial positions (2020-2024) Entity Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Banks 348 17 331 0 MVTS 56 6 46 4 Investment companies 125 10 112 3 Credit organizations 273 8 264 1 Fund managers 37 8 29 0 Foreign exchange 85 1 81 3 Pawnshops 23 0 23 0 143. Detection of unlicensed activity falls under the responsibility of the CBA’s Business Conduct Division, which operates in accordance with an internal manual and uses automated monitoring system to scan public sources and selected online platforms. This includes the use of web crawlers, social media scanning and targeted webpage monitoring. During the assessment period, 146 cases of potential unlicensed activity were detected and referred to LEAs. The FMC also contributes to these efforts by identifying potential unlicensed activity and transmitting relevant information directly to LEAs. Footnotes [44] Although the example refers to a FI that does not fall under the FATF definition, the AT took it into consideration as benchmark for the analysis. [45] Only in case of banks, managers are subject to re-interview every five years (see c.26.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 130. The CBA, as licensing authority for all FIs, has controls in place to prevent criminals and their associates from entering the regulated market, with some entities such as non-public investment funds, their managers and VASPs only recently brought withing the licensing framework. Within the Financial Supervision and Licensing Department (FSLD), two specialized units comprising a total of 13 staff members (out of 96 staff members at the CBA in 2024.) are responsible for reviewing licensing applications and assessing the fitness and propriety of shareholders, beneficial owners and senior managers, including key function holders. Resources remained stable throughout the assessment period and are considered adequate by the AT in relation to the size of the financial sector. An increase of about 50% is projected by end of 2027, reflecting expanded supervisory responsibilities, including the recently approved licensing and supervision of VASPs. 131. While sectoral laws set out distinct licensing provisions, the CBA ensures consistency in practice through a formalized internal process set out in the Licensing Manual, which is applied uniformly across all FIs. The same fit and proper checks apply when approving changes of ownership, qualifying holding or management position. Each application involves verification of the criminal background of qualifying shareholders (10% or more direct or indirect interest), BOs and all managerial positions (see also R.26). The AT was also presented with a case involving scrutiny of an application for the acquisition of a stake of less than 10%. Although dating back to 2020, it illustrates the CBA’s proactive approach. 132. For residents, CBA obtains criminal records directly from the MoI, while non-residents must provide official criminal records issued by the competent foreign authority and dully apostilled. An all-crimes approach applies in the licensing process, including non-financial offences, which are assessed on a case-by-case basis where they may provide grounds for rejecting the application. In addition to criminal convictions (in particular those that have not been expunged or cancelled), intelligence information regarding potential involvement in criminal activity is also taken into account. 133. The CBA reviews ownership and control structures as part of the licensing process. In practice, most applicants have simple and transparent ownership chains with the most complex case presented to the AT involving a general insurance company [44] with four layers between the shareholder and the ultimate beneficial owner. 134. As part of integrity assessment of applicants, the CBA complements criminal background checks with open source and database analysis to identify potential associates or links to criminal activity. As most applicants are Armenian residents, a broad range of domestic databases is used, including those of Police of the MIA (for criminal records), Credit Registry, Citizen Identification System, Judicial Information System and the registry of companies, which allows, to some extent, the identification of potential links between applicants and criminals. For non-residents, Interpol inquiries are conducted, and applicants must provide a certificate issued by the competent authority in their country of residence. Box 3.1. Case Study – Fit and proper (criminal association identification) In 2020, the CBA received an application for the licensing of an MVTS with a single shareholder. During the verification process, it was identified that the applicant was involved in several other companies and had business associations with multiple individuals. One of these individuals was registered at the same residential address as a person known for a criminal background. This information was obtained through cross-checks of the judicial information system (criminal records) and the electoral system (residential address). On the basis of these findings, the CBA concluded that the applicant could not be granted a licence due to the unacceptable risk of association with a criminal. Source: CBA 135. The CBA also maintains close cooperation with FMC. Before granting a license, and at least annually thereafter, the CBA submits a list of individuals recorded in its licensing database to the FMC for screening against its databases, which include information from prosecutorial and pre-trial investigations This mechanism supports the identification of potential criminal associations. For non-resident applicants, commercial intelligence databases and other private sources are used to identify adverse information or criminal associations. Additional relevant checks include source of wealth and funds used for capitalisation, supported by audited financial statements, bank references or equivalent documentation, as well as the evaluation of applicant’s business model and internal risk control framework. 136. On-going monitoring of the fitness and propriety of ownership and management is conducted through a multi layered approach and constitutes the main post licensing control, as licenses are granted on an open-end basis [45] (there is no system for periodic license renewal). First, any changes to BOs, shareholders, or managers require prior CBA approval, and FIs must provide annual updates on their BOs. Second, a recent amendment of the Licensing Manual provides for annual re-evaluation by the CBA of shareholders, BOs and managers. In practice, a key tool used by the CBA is the annual screening of all key individuals against different databases, including the FMC’s databases, police information, other LEAs and commercial databases. 137. Third, FIs are also required to periodically verify compliance of their managers with fit and proper requirements. The depth and frequency of such analysis is not prescribed in CBA Regulations, and each FI must define these aspects in its internal acts. This is an important tool of ongoing monitoring, as about seven percent of all managers and board members of FIs in Armenia are non-residents, therefore, any criminal issues would likely not be captured by national Armenian databases used by the CBA or commercial databases. Although there is no direct requirement for FIs to include criminal record checks in this periodical monitoring, absence of convictions is one of the key components of the fit and proper test and is expected to be performed. Extracts from internal rules of banks presented to the AT show that, in practice, criminal records of key executive officials are periodically checked. 138. For BOs, FIs are required to conduct annual due diligence to identify the ultimate controller and to report any changes to the CBA, which then reviews this information and performs compliance analysis. 139. Lastly, the CBA relies on external information and triggers, including those identified during supervisory activities. 140. The AT was presented with a case in which the CBA identified an individual who attempted to conceal a significant controlling interest in an investment company by acquiring only 9.8% of shareholding while having a secret arrangement with the manager. This case was identified during the submission of a capital increase request, following which an on-site inspection was conducted that confirmed the suspicions. The individual was subsequently required to divest the holding. 141. Criminality issues are detected and addressed, but in practice findings predominantly concern smaller or less material institutions. During the assessment period, there were three cases identified of non-compliance due to criminal nature of managers or significant participants, which were subsequently removed from office. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 142. Statistics and case studies presented to the AT confirm that CBA’s powers to reject or revoke licenses are applied in practice when adverse information is identified or brought to its attention. Between 2020 and 2024, the CBA processed a total of 174 license applications across different sectors, with rejections occurring where fit-and proper issues were identified (see Table 3.1 and 3.2). This demonstrates that market-entry controls are operational and not applied in purely formal manner. Table 3.1. Licensing applications for FIs (2020-2024) Entity New licence for FI Approval of significant shareholders and BOs Entity Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Banks 1 0 1 0 36 1 35 0 MVTS 7 0 5 2 41 0 35 6 Investment companies 14 1 12 1 51 6 41 4 Credit organizations 7 0 7 0 56 4 52 0 Fund managers 65 7 58 0 12 6 6 0 Foreign exchange 75 1 71 3 205 4 195 6 Pawnshops 5 0 5 0 28 0 28 0 Table 3.2. Licensing applications of managerial positions (2020-2024) Entity Received Withdrawn Approved Rejected Banks 348 17 331 0 MVTS 56 6 46 4 Investment companies 125 10 112 3 Credit organizations 273 8 264 1 Fund managers 37 8 29 0 Foreign exchange 85 1 81 3 Pawnshops 23 0 23 0 143. Detection of unlicensed activity falls under the responsibility of the CBA’s Business Conduct Division, which operates in accordance with an internal manual and uses automated monitoring system to scan public sources and selected online platforms. This includes the use of web crawlers, social media scanning and targeted webpage monitoring. During the assessment period, 146 cases of potential unlicensed activity were detected and referred to LEAs. The FMC also contributes to these efforts by identifying potential unlicensed activity and transmitting relevant information directly to LEAs. Footnotes [44] Although the example refers to a FI that does not fall under the FATF definition, the AT took it into consideration as benchmark for the analysis. [45] Only in case of banks, managers are subject to re-interview every five years (see c.26.1)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 222. Market entry controls are applied in a more proactive manner in sectors subject to formal licensing regimes, such as casinos, notaries and advocates, where fit and proper checks are conducted systematically at entry, whereas for DNFBPs under FMC supervision, the approach was largely reactive during most of the assessment period, relying on post-hoc identification of entities and ad-hoc scrutiny in the absence of a comprehensive registration framework. MoF – Casinos and online gambling operators 223. For casinos and gambling operators the MoF performs fit-and proper checks of qualified shareholders, BOs and managers. Screening is checklist-based, aligned with legal requirements and includes scrutiny of the criminal record. During the assessment period all fit and proper reviews involved Armenian citizens only. Scrutiny is conducted at the market entry stage and there is no proactive ongoing monitoring. Following licensing the checks would only occur upon trigger events brought to the attention of MoF. 224. The understanding of beneficial ownership is limited and refers mostly to direct or indirect shareholding, as opposed to identifying the ultimate natural persons who own or control the entity. The market is small, and the authorities confirmed that the ownership structures are not complex. Accordingly, although BO scrutiny is basic, the authorities maintain a general overview of the sector ownership. There are only four land-based casinos and five online gambling operators, with all except one (which is part of an international group with a listed parent company) being controlled by Armenian residents. 225. Although appointed managers may perform their duties up to three months prior to receiving the official license, authorities confirmed that in practice the scrutiny checks are conducted much faster and any adverse information would be swiftly discovered. One example was provided to the AT of a CEO application rejected due to adverse information related to family-related bankruptcy proceedings. MoJ – Notaries 226. The MoJ is the licensing authority for notaries. As notaries operate only as sole practitioners, all market-entry scrutiny focuses on the applicant. The licensing process is comprehensive and includes evaluation of both professional competence and reputation, through formal examinations and document checks. 227. Criminal record checks are carried out through formal requests to the MoI, with responses received directly in hard copy. Where necessary, additional information can be requested from other competent authorities, such as the NSS, although this is done on an ad-hoc basis. 228. Eligibility for appointment as notary is restricted to Armenian citizens. While no applications have been received from individuals with foreign residency, the authorities indicated that, in such cases, criminal record information would be requested from the relevant foreign jurisdiction. 229. Ongoing monitoring is covered by legal provisions requiring notification to the MoJ whenever a criminal proceeding is initiated against a notary. No such cases occurred in the assessment period. FMC ( real estate agents, lawyers and legal firms, accountants, DPMS ) 230. For most of the assessment period, real estate agents, lawyers, accountants and DMPS providers were not subject to any registration or licensing requirements, meaning there was no effective market entry controls to prevent individuals or entities with criminal connections from operating in these sectors. 231. Following recent legislative changes, these DNFBPs are now required to register with the FMC. Given the availability of data in its own databases, FMC performs scrutiny on market participants, albeit there is no regulatory requirement for this and no legal powers to reject individuals if adverse data is identified. Upon assuming this role in 2023, and in the absence of automated verification tools or systematic triggers to identify entities falling within the scope of the AML/CFT framework, the FMC prioritised mapping the sector and determining which entities were required to register. To this end, the FMC relied on a range of ad-hoc measures, including targeted questionnaires, analysis of open-source and economic classification data (activity codes in the companies register), as well as reviews of available bank account data [58] . These measures constituted a one-off identification and entry-screening exercise for the newly regulated DNFBPs . To address the absence of automated detection mechanisms, a protocol is envisaged to introduce a dedicated trigger in the SRC system to flag companies whose activities indicate that they qualify as reporting entities under AML/CFT Law. 232. Fit and proper checks rely on open-source data, information received from banks, and intelligence available to the FMC in its capacity as the FIU. Given the predominantly local nature of the DNFBPs concerned and their generally simple ownership structures, this approach has been largely adequate to identity integrity concerns at the market entry-stage in straightforward cases. No adverse information was discovered through these checks, except in one case of a real estate agent colluding with a criminal. The matter was referred to LEAs and the manager was subsequently dismissed by the company. 233. However, the scope and preventative effect of these controls remain limited. There is no legal or regulatory fit‑and‑proper regime (no requirement for criminal checks) covering owners, BOs, controllers, or managers of DNFBPs supervised by the FMC. Any screening undertaken by the FMC is policy‑based and non‑binding, and the FMC lacks statutory powers to refuse, suspend, revoke, or otherwise restrict a DNFBP’s business on fitness grounds. Consequently, there is no mechanism to systematically prevent criminals or their associates from holding significant or controlling interests or exercising management functions in FMC‑supervised DNFBPs. ChoA - advocates 234. Criminality checks are performed for individuals applying to become advocates. Candidates are required to submit a criminal record certificate, although the ChoA is also empowered to request such information directly from the MoI. However, there are no effective mechanisms to verify criminal records issued outside Armenia, which limits the robustness of checks in cases involving foreign residency or prior activity abroad. 235. Given the relatively strict eligibility criteria for entering the profession, the ChoA reported that no cases of individuals with criminal convictions attempting to obtain an accreditation were identified during the assessment period. The AT was nevertheless presented with one case in which a candidate failed to provide the required criminal record certificate and was rejected at an early stage of the application process. This example demonstrates that basic integrity checks are applied in practice, although they remain largely document based. 236. In terms of ongoing controls, the ChoA reported two cases in 2025 where an advocate’s license was terminated. In one case, the termination followed automatically from a final court decision against the advocate. In the second case, the disciplinary committee revoked the license due to public statements of the advocate deemed incompatible with the professional and ethical requirements of the profession. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 237. In the gambling sector, there is no regular post-licensing monitoring and detection of breaches relies on specific triggers or external information. Nevertheless, mechanisms exist to address unlicensed activity: the SCR monitors online gambling activity and refers unlicensed websites to the competent authority for blocking, resulting in approximately 1 000 websites being blocked during the assessment period, while cases of unlicensed land-based gambling would be referred to LEAs (no such breaches identified in the assessment period). For notaries and advocates, ongoing controls are limited to event-driven mechanisms, such as mandatory notifications following criminal proceedings or final court decisions, rather than systematic periodic reviews. By contrast, for DNFBPs supervised by the FMC, detection of unregistered or unauthorised activity has been limited, reflecting the absence of systematic monitoring tools and the recent introduction of registration requirements. Overall, with the partial exception of online gambling, the approach to detecting and addressing breaches across DNFBPs remains predominantly reactive. Footnotes [58]. FMC has the power to request data from banks in its FIU capacity and communicates directly with the bank’s internal monitoring unit through the CBA.net system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 222. Market entry controls are applied in a more proactive manner in sectors subject to formal licensing regimes, such as casinos, notaries and advocates, where fit and proper checks are conducted systematically at entry, whereas for DNFBPs under FMC supervision, the approach was largely reactive during most of the assessment period, relying on post-hoc identification of entities and ad-hoc scrutiny in the absence of a comprehensive registration framework. MoF – Casinos and online gambling operators 223. For casinos and gambling operators the MoF performs fit-and proper checks of qualified shareholders, BOs and managers. Screening is checklist-based, aligned with legal requirements and includes scrutiny of the criminal record. During the assessment period all fit and proper reviews involved Armenian citizens only. Scrutiny is conducted at the market entry stage and there is no proactive ongoing monitoring. Following licensing the checks would only occur upon trigger events brought to the attention of MoF. 224. The understanding of beneficial ownership is limited and refers mostly to direct or indirect shareholding, as opposed to identifying the ultimate natural persons who own or control the entity. The market is small, and the authorities confirmed that the ownership structures are not complex. Accordingly, although BO scrutiny is basic, the authorities maintain a general overview of the sector ownership. There are only four land-based casinos and five online gambling operators, with all except one (which is part of an international group with a listed parent company) being controlled by Armenian residents. 225. Although appointed managers may perform their duties up to three months prior to receiving the official license, authorities confirmed that in practice the scrutiny checks are conducted much faster and any adverse information would be swiftly discovered. One example was provided to the AT of a CEO application rejected due to adverse information related to family-related bankruptcy proceedings. MoJ – Notaries 226. The MoJ is the licensing authority for notaries. As notaries operate only as sole practitioners, all market-entry scrutiny focuses on the applicant. The licensing process is comprehensive and includes evaluation of both professional competence and reputation, through formal examinations and document checks. 227. Criminal record checks are carried out through formal requests to the MoI, with responses received directly in hard copy. Where necessary, additional information can be requested from other competent authorities, such as the NSS, although this is done on an ad-hoc basis. 228. Eligibility for appointment as notary is restricted to Armenian citizens. While no applications have been received from individuals with foreign residency, the authorities indicated that, in such cases, criminal record information would be requested from the relevant foreign jurisdiction. 229. Ongoing monitoring is covered by legal provisions requiring notification to the MoJ whenever a criminal proceeding is initiated against a notary. No such cases occurred in the assessment period. FMC ( real estate agents, lawyers and legal firms, accountants, DPMS ) 230. For most of the assessment period, real estate agents, lawyers, accountants and DMPS providers were not subject to any registration or licensing requirements, meaning there was no effective market entry controls to prevent individuals or entities with criminal connections from operating in these sectors. 231. Following recent legislative changes, these DNFBPs are now required to register with the FMC. Given the availability of data in its own databases, FMC performs scrutiny on market participants, albeit there is no regulatory requirement for this and no legal powers to reject individuals if adverse data is identified. Upon assuming this role in 2023, and in the absence of automated verification tools or systematic triggers to identify entities falling within the scope of the AML/CFT framework, the FMC prioritised mapping the sector and determining which entities were required to register. To this end, the FMC relied on a range of ad-hoc measures, including targeted questionnaires, analysis of open-source and economic classification data (activity codes in the companies register), as well as reviews of available bank account data [58] . These measures constituted a one-off identification and entry-screening exercise for the newly regulated DNFBPs . To address the absence of automated detection mechanisms, a protocol is envisaged to introduce a dedicated trigger in the SRC system to flag companies whose activities indicate that they qualify as reporting entities under AML/CFT Law. 232. Fit and proper checks rely on open-source data, information received from banks, and intelligence available to the FMC in its capacity as the FIU. Given the predominantly local nature of the DNFBPs concerned and their generally simple ownership structures, this approach has been largely adequate to identity integrity concerns at the market entry-stage in straightforward cases. No adverse information was discovered through these checks, except in one case of a real estate agent colluding with a criminal. The matter was referred to LEAs and the manager was subsequently dismissed by the company. 233. However, the scope and preventative effect of these controls remain limited. There is no legal or regulatory fit‑and‑proper regime (no requirement for criminal checks) covering owners, BOs, controllers, or managers of DNFBPs supervised by the FMC. Any screening undertaken by the FMC is policy‑based and non‑binding, and the FMC lacks statutory powers to refuse, suspend, revoke, or otherwise restrict a DNFBP’s business on fitness grounds. Consequently, there is no mechanism to systematically prevent criminals or their associates from holding significant or controlling interests or exercising management functions in FMC‑supervised DNFBPs. ChoA - advocates 234. Criminality checks are performed for individuals applying to become advocates. Candidates are required to submit a criminal record certificate, although the ChoA is also empowered to request such information directly from the MoI. However, there are no effective mechanisms to verify criminal records issued outside Armenia, which limits the robustness of checks in cases involving foreign residency or prior activity abroad. 235. Given the relatively strict eligibility criteria for entering the profession, the ChoA reported that no cases of individuals with criminal convictions attempting to obtain an accreditation were identified during the assessment period. The AT was nevertheless presented with one case in which a candidate failed to provide the required criminal record certificate and was rejected at an early stage of the application process. This example demonstrates that basic integrity checks are applied in practice, although they remain largely document based. 236. In terms of ongoing controls, the ChoA reported two cases in 2025 where an advocate’s license was terminated. In one case, the termination followed automatically from a final court decision against the advocate. In the second case, the disciplinary committee revoked the license due to public statements of the advocate deemed incompatible with the professional and ethical requirements of the profession. 4.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 237. In the gambling sector, there is no regular post-licensing monitoring and detection of breaches relies on specific triggers or external information. Nevertheless, mechanisms exist to address unlicensed activity: the SCR monitors online gambling activity and refers unlicensed websites to the competent authority for blocking, resulting in approximately 1 000 websites being blocked during the assessment period, while cases of unlicensed land-based gambling would be referred to LEAs (no such breaches identified in the assessment period). For notaries and advocates, ongoing controls are limited to event-driven mechanisms, such as mandatory notifications following criminal proceedings or final court decisions, rather than systematic periodic reviews. By contrast, for DNFBPs supervised by the FMC, detection of unregistered or unauthorised activity has been limited, reflecting the absence of systematic monitoring tools and the recent introduction of registration requirements. Overall, with the partial exception of online gambling, the approach to detecting and addressing breaches across DNFBPs remains predominantly reactive. Footnotes [58]. FMC has the power to request data from banks in its FIU capacity and communicates directly with the bank’s internal monitoring unit through the CBA.net system." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="ML risks – Legal persons registered in Armenia 306. The ML/TF vulnerabilities of the legal persons were assessed in the 2024 NRA through a working group composed of the Ministry of Justice, the State Register Agency, the FMC, the prosecutors’ office, the NSS, the Investigative Committee, the State Revenue Committee (tax authority) and the anti-corruption committee. Various sources of information were used, such as i) statistics on registered legal persons and their features, ii) data received from reporting entities, iii) information from LEAs, iv) STRs received by the FMC, v) survey responses and notifications provided, and vi) strategic measures aimed at reducing the ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons. 307. The legal persons most frequently used in criminal activities are the LLCs, closed JSCs, and, in some cases, non-profit organisations (NPOs). [68] LLCs are the most exposed to ML, especially when a non-resident BO is involved. LLCs are also preferred due to their legal features, as criminals seek to avoid personal financial risks by exploiting the company’s limited liability. The closed JSCs’ ML/TF vulnerabilities are not explained in the NRA, and authorities did not present typologies in this sense. 308. During 2021 to 2023 a year-over-year increase in the number of legal persons involved in investigations was noted. [69] The involvement of legal persons in ML schemes was mainly linked to tax and corruption-related crime, including various forms of embezzlement, where legal persons were used to conceal the traceability of their criminal activities. LEAs have difficulties in holding the legal persons criminally liable as no investigations have been initiated against legal persons for ML or related offences, and no conviction of legal persons has been achieved as yet since the introduction of corporate criminal liability (in force since 2023). This vulnerability is still to be explored (see IO7). 309. The risk assessment features a number of typologies where “shell” companies LLCs, were used to open bank accounts, and where funds of unknown origin were transferred through these accounts to legal persons registered in offshore jurisdictions. [70] 310. Authorities report that although legal persons appear in STRs, FMC notifications, formal and informal requests for information, criminal cases, court proceedings, and convictions, the overall ML vulnerability remains at the level of moderate. 311. Turning to the foreign ownership of Armenian legal persons, the primary countries of origin of the owners/shareholders, and BOs of Armenian-registered entities include Russia, Iran, India, the UAE, the USA, and Georgia. [71] 312. The authorities cross-checked data from the State Registry and data from the reporting entities (mainly banks) and found that from the 15,234 LLCs registered in Armenia with a foreign BO or shareholder, only 7,135 (47%) performed at least one bank transaction during 2021-2023. Authorities concluded that this indicates that over 50% of the legal persons registered in Armenia with a foreign founder, manager or BO do not in practice conduct economic activity in the country and did not engage in transactions with reporting entities. 313. The 2024 NRA found that resident and non-resident legal persons are primarily used for both cross-border and domestic money transfers, with resident legal persons also engaging in cash transactions. [72] This finding shows that the effectiveness of the law on non-cash transactions in effect since July 2022 is questionable. The authorities should further explore the risks related to the use of cash by legal persons and the impact of the law on non-cash transactions. 314. Data presented by the authorities indicated that 63% of the total legal persons registered in Armenia are not active. Dormant legal persons retain legal personality and have no limitation in their registration. Most authorities reported that there are no ML/TF risks attached to these companies as they do not conduct any business activity [73] . Authorities also clarified that the reason for the existence of such high number of dormant (also called “inactive”) companies is that the liquidation procedures are legally complex, being easier and cheaper to leave a legal entity dormant than to apply for liquidation. Companies are given the status of dormant or inactive in the SRC’s (tax authority) database, and the State Register Agency has no visibility over the “dormant” status of the company unless it applies for liquidation or termination. 315. Following the on-site, Armenian authorities reported that they looked at the STRs received, requests from LEAs, informal and formal international requests, and criminal investigations and found no case involving dormant legal persons. Moreover, the FMC reported that they cross-checked the threshold transaction reports (TTRs) against the SRC database and learned that between January–September 2025, only 56 dormant legal persons conducted a total of 142 transactions via banks with the aim of repayment of loans. The AT commends the authorities for the efforts put into understanding the nature and the rationale behind the high number of dormant companies and recommends the State Register Agency to continue with the forced liquidation in order to address this vulnerability. 316. Nominees are not recognised by the Armenian legislation but in practice there are cases of “straw men” acting as managers/owners of legal persons. A form of “nominee” arrangement is possible in case of JSCs, in the form of custodians who are in the majority of the cases, reporting entities. Those are however licenced/certified but not monitored and not assessed in the NRA. Authorities are not aware of cases where such arrangements are used in practice. ML risks – foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Armenia 317. The authorities looked at the risk related to the foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia by requesting information from reporting entities, SRC (tax authority), CBA, and Cadaster Committee (real estate state registration). A wide range of criteria were considered to determine the sufficient links to Armenia: type of business activities, the existence of a business relationship with reporting entities, the existence of a local physical establishment (branches and agencies), real estate investments, country of origin of BOs, and the existence of BOs (or similar functions) of Armenian nationality. 318. Foreign companies that attain permanent establishment status in Armenia are required to register for tax purposes with SRC by providing their Articles of Association. Ownership information will be available therein to the extent that the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation so require. 319. The Cadastre committee, which is responsible for the real estate registration, collects basic information, including the country of registration when a foreign legal person acquires real estate properties in Armenia. BO information is not collected. 320. The authorities’ analysis concluded that the number of foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia stood at 1,586, of which 34 (2%) maintained a branch or representative office, 1,060 (66%) conducted economic activity in Armenia; 89 (5%) maintained ongoing business relationships with reporting entities; 91 (6%) owned real estate in Armenia; 258 (16%) owned investments in Armenia; and 102 (6%) had an Armenian BO or shareholder. Out of the 1,586 foreign legal persons, the most common type of companies were LLCs. 321. Main countries of registration of the foreign legal persons with a sufficient link to Armenia were Russia, Cyprus, Iran, UK, France, US and the UAE. Foreign legal persons registered in offshore jurisdictions accounted for 5% of the total foreign legal persons. 322. Authorities reported that that during 2021 to 2023, there were 12 criminal proceedings involving foreign legal persons including those with no sufficient link to Armenia. A key vulnerability identified by LEAs, which is also evident in the case studies presented to the AT, concerns the difficulties in identifying the BOs of foreign legal persons for both entities with and without sufficient links to Armenia. 323. Given the limited number of cases involving foreign legal persons, authorities reported a low ML/TF risk. Although the AT considers this analysis relevant and reasonable, there are some gaps that might impact its completeness in that: i) subsequent changes in ownership of the foreign legal persons that attain permanent establishment status in Armenia would not be available to the SRC (tax authority); ii) there is no register of BO data of foreign legal persons and (iii) no multi-pronged approach given that not all the legal persons have a bank account. All legal persons – ML risk assessment 324. The AT sees the sources of information used in the ML risk assessment as reasonable. However, there remain aspects that are not fully analysed, and that impact the vulnerabilities of legal persons: the impact of not having a fully populated BO registry, the accuracy of BO information given the absence of checks (at a minimum random or risk based), the number and rationale of having legal persons with no relationship with a reporting entity, as well as the minor deficiencies in the risk assessment of the foreign legal persons with links with Armenia. TF risk assessment 325. Authorities found the TF-related vulnerabilities of legal persons as low on the basis of the absence of cases of TF involving legal persons; low number of legal persons, their associates or BOs from jurisdictions assessed as high-risk from a TF perspective, and absence of international formal and informal requests related to TF, and criminal proceedings and convictions with TF offences. Nevertheless, the AT has concerns regarding this overall conclusion mainly because according to the geographical distribution, 6% of the domestic legal persons have owners or BOs, or are companies incorporated in a country blacklisted by the FATF. ML/TF risks – Legal arrangements 326. Legal arrangements cannot be created in Armenia. Reporting entities confirmed that there are no trusts or other form of legal arrangements among their clients. Therefore, together with the absence of trusts in formal and informal international requests, and in criminal cases, this led to a low ML/TF risk of legal arrangements. Footnotes [68] 2024 NRA, par. 754 [69] 2024 NRA, par. 757. [70] Armenia has a list of countries with special liberal taxation systems. [71] 2024 NRA, par. 738. [72] 2024 NRA, par. 756. [73] In later stages of the assessment, the authorities have presented statistics for 2025, showing that the SRC has flagged and subjected 391 inactive legal persons to supervisory actions. 167 taxpayers have been found to be in breach of tax obligations. No ML/TF risks have been identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="ML risks – Legal persons registered in Armenia 306. The ML/TF vulnerabilities of the legal persons were assessed in the 2024 NRA through a working group composed of the Ministry of Justice, the State Register Agency, the FMC, the prosecutors’ office, the NSS, the Investigative Committee, the State Revenue Committee (tax authority) and the anti-corruption committee. Various sources of information were used, such as i) statistics on registered legal persons and their features, ii) data received from reporting entities, iii) information from LEAs, iv) STRs received by the FMC, v) survey responses and notifications provided, and vi) strategic measures aimed at reducing the ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons. 307. The legal persons most frequently used in criminal activities are the LLCs, closed JSCs, and, in some cases, non-profit organisations (NPOs). [68] LLCs are the most exposed to ML, especially when a non-resident BO is involved. LLCs are also preferred due to their legal features, as criminals seek to avoid personal financial risks by exploiting the company’s limited liability. The closed JSCs’ ML/TF vulnerabilities are not explained in the NRA, and authorities did not present typologies in this sense. 308. During 2021 to 2023 a year-over-year increase in the number of legal persons involved in investigations was noted. [69] The involvement of legal persons in ML schemes was mainly linked to tax and corruption-related crime, including various forms of embezzlement, where legal persons were used to conceal the traceability of their criminal activities. LEAs have difficulties in holding the legal persons criminally liable as no investigations have been initiated against legal persons for ML or related offences, and no conviction of legal persons has been achieved as yet since the introduction of corporate criminal liability (in force since 2023). This vulnerability is still to be explored (see IO7). 309. The risk assessment features a number of typologies where “shell” companies LLCs, were used to open bank accounts, and where funds of unknown origin were transferred through these accounts to legal persons registered in offshore jurisdictions. [70] 310. Authorities report that although legal persons appear in STRs, FMC notifications, formal and informal requests for information, criminal cases, court proceedings, and convictions, the overall ML vulnerability remains at the level of moderate. 311. Turning to the foreign ownership of Armenian legal persons, the primary countries of origin of the owners/shareholders, and BOs of Armenian-registered entities include Russia, Iran, India, the UAE, the USA, and Georgia. [71] 312. The authorities cross-checked data from the State Registry and data from the reporting entities (mainly banks) and found that from the 15,234 LLCs registered in Armenia with a foreign BO or shareholder, only 7,135 (47%) performed at least one bank transaction during 2021-2023. Authorities concluded that this indicates that over 50% of the legal persons registered in Armenia with a foreign founder, manager or BO do not in practice conduct economic activity in the country and did not engage in transactions with reporting entities. 313. The 2024 NRA found that resident and non-resident legal persons are primarily used for both cross-border and domestic money transfers, with resident legal persons also engaging in cash transactions. [72] This finding shows that the effectiveness of the law on non-cash transactions in effect since July 2022 is questionable. The authorities should further explore the risks related to the use of cash by legal persons and the impact of the law on non-cash transactions. 314. Data presented by the authorities indicated that 63% of the total legal persons registered in Armenia are not active. Dormant legal persons retain legal personality and have no limitation in their registration. Most authorities reported that there are no ML/TF risks attached to these companies as they do not conduct any business activity [73] . Authorities also clarified that the reason for the existence of such high number of dormant (also called “inactive”) companies is that the liquidation procedures are legally complex, being easier and cheaper to leave a legal entity dormant than to apply for liquidation. Companies are given the status of dormant or inactive in the SRC’s (tax authority) database, and the State Register Agency has no visibility over the “dormant” status of the company unless it applies for liquidation or termination. 315. Following the on-site, Armenian authorities reported that they looked at the STRs received, requests from LEAs, informal and formal international requests, and criminal investigations and found no case involving dormant legal persons. Moreover, the FMC reported that they cross-checked the threshold transaction reports (TTRs) against the SRC database and learned that between January–September 2025, only 56 dormant legal persons conducted a total of 142 transactions via banks with the aim of repayment of loans. The AT commends the authorities for the efforts put into understanding the nature and the rationale behind the high number of dormant companies and recommends the State Register Agency to continue with the forced liquidation in order to address this vulnerability. 316. Nominees are not recognised by the Armenian legislation but in practice there are cases of “straw men” acting as managers/owners of legal persons. A form of “nominee” arrangement is possible in case of JSCs, in the form of custodians who are in the majority of the cases, reporting entities. Those are however licenced/certified but not monitored and not assessed in the NRA. Authorities are not aware of cases where such arrangements are used in practice. ML risks – foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Armenia 317. The authorities looked at the risk related to the foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia by requesting information from reporting entities, SRC (tax authority), CBA, and Cadaster Committee (real estate state registration). A wide range of criteria were considered to determine the sufficient links to Armenia: type of business activities, the existence of a business relationship with reporting entities, the existence of a local physical establishment (branches and agencies), real estate investments, country of origin of BOs, and the existence of BOs (or similar functions) of Armenian nationality. 318. Foreign companies that attain permanent establishment status in Armenia are required to register for tax purposes with SRC by providing their Articles of Association. Ownership information will be available therein to the extent that the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation so require. 319. The Cadastre committee, which is responsible for the real estate registration, collects basic information, including the country of registration when a foreign legal person acquires real estate properties in Armenia. BO information is not collected. 320. The authorities’ analysis concluded that the number of foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia stood at 1,586, of which 34 (2%) maintained a branch or representative office, 1,060 (66%) conducted economic activity in Armenia; 89 (5%) maintained ongoing business relationships with reporting entities; 91 (6%) owned real estate in Armenia; 258 (16%) owned investments in Armenia; and 102 (6%) had an Armenian BO or shareholder. Out of the 1,586 foreign legal persons, the most common type of companies were LLCs. 321. Main countries of registration of the foreign legal persons with a sufficient link to Armenia were Russia, Cyprus, Iran, UK, France, US and the UAE. Foreign legal persons registered in offshore jurisdictions accounted for 5% of the total foreign legal persons. 322. Authorities reported that that during 2021 to 2023, there were 12 criminal proceedings involving foreign legal persons including those with no sufficient link to Armenia. A key vulnerability identified by LEAs, which is also evident in the case studies presented to the AT, concerns the difficulties in identifying the BOs of foreign legal persons for both entities with and without sufficient links to Armenia. 323. Given the limited number of cases involving foreign legal persons, authorities reported a low ML/TF risk. Although the AT considers this analysis relevant and reasonable, there are some gaps that might impact its completeness in that: i) subsequent changes in ownership of the foreign legal persons that attain permanent establishment status in Armenia would not be available to the SRC (tax authority); ii) there is no register of BO data of foreign legal persons and (iii) no multi-pronged approach given that not all the legal persons have a bank account. All legal persons – ML risk assessment 324. The AT sees the sources of information used in the ML risk assessment as reasonable. However, there remain aspects that are not fully analysed, and that impact the vulnerabilities of legal persons: the impact of not having a fully populated BO registry, the accuracy of BO information given the absence of checks (at a minimum random or risk based), the number and rationale of having legal persons with no relationship with a reporting entity, as well as the minor deficiencies in the risk assessment of the foreign legal persons with links with Armenia. TF risk assessment 325. Authorities found the TF-related vulnerabilities of legal persons as low on the basis of the absence of cases of TF involving legal persons; low number of legal persons, their associates or BOs from jurisdictions assessed as high-risk from a TF perspective, and absence of international formal and informal requests related to TF, and criminal proceedings and convictions with TF offences. Nevertheless, the AT has concerns regarding this overall conclusion mainly because according to the geographical distribution, 6% of the domestic legal persons have owners or BOs, or are companies incorporated in a country blacklisted by the FATF. ML/TF risks – Legal arrangements 326. Legal arrangements cannot be created in Armenia. Reporting entities confirmed that there are no trusts or other form of legal arrangements among their clients. Therefore, together with the absence of trusts in formal and informal international requests, and in criminal cases, this led to a low ML/TF risk of legal arrangements. Footnotes [68] 2024 NRA, par. 754 [69] 2024 NRA, par. 757. [70] Armenia has a list of countries with special liberal taxation systems. [71] 2024 NRA, par. 738. [72] 2024 NRA, par. 756. [73] In later stages of the assessment, the authorities have presented statistics for 2025, showing that the SRC has flagged and subjected 391 inactive legal persons to supervisory actions. 167 taxpayers have been found to be in breach of tax obligations. No ML/TF risks have been identified." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 368. The FMC has access to a broad range of information for conducting operational and strategic analysis both via reports received in the form of STRs, TTRs, cash declarations and access to the relevant financial, administrative and law enforcement databases. Reports received 369. Since the previous MER the number of STRs slightly increased, from 254 in 2020 up to 366 in 2024 (44%). The significant majority of these (on average 77%) come from the banking sector, which is the most material. A further 8% originates from entities engaged in money (currency) transfer services. The rest of FIs have provided a handful of reports. With regard to DNFBPs, casinos have prepared in total 57 reports (3% of all disclosures), while notaries 184 (11% of all disclosures), with other sectors filing STRs rarely. The overall level of reporting by the private sector is an area for improvement. There are no STRs filed by real estate agents and VASPs. 370. Reports from FIs, which form the majority of received STRs, are partially in line with the risk and materiality but generally include the necessary content and suspicion reasoning. In order to improve the quality of submitted reports from the banking sector, the FIU has systematically provided both general and individual feedback, which was also shared with to the AML/CFT supervisory wing of the CBA (FSLD). The monitoring conducted by the FIU since 2021 show a gradual improvement of STRs, content-wise and form-wise. When STRs would benefit from additional information, the FMC staff can request the relevant information from REs to support analysis. 371. Looking at the source of reports disaggregated by sector, the reporting of non-bank FIs and DNFBPs (excluding notaries) has been declining. The authorities associate this with various factors, including limitation on use of cash in the economy and functional restrictions [76] . Another reason for the decreasing STR reporting is linked to the guidance provided by the FMC discouraging reporting from financial institutions, in the cases of potential proceeds of crime originating from small-scale fraud. This was done as in the perception of the FIU those STRs added limited value for the FIU intelligence. Such reports would go directly to the Police on the basis of a victim complaint. Turning to quality, the majority of DNFBP reports do not contain the relevant level of suspicion or information necessary for the FMC to develop intelligence products There is a need for continuous monitoring of suspicious transaction reporting behaviour and further engagement to guide the REs, in particular DNFBPs into increasing their reporting level and the quality of the STRs. Table 6.1. STR reporting trends Entities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks 196 224 209 268 273 Entities Engaged in Money (Currency) Transfer Services 32 27 25 24 12 Entities Providing Investment Services (Investment Companies) 1 2 0 1 7 The Central Depositary 3 1 0 1 2 Credit Organizations 3 2 3 0 0 Entities Engaged in Foreign Currency Exchange 0 0 0 1 0 Insurance (Including Reinsurance) Companies [77] 0 0 0 0 1 Casinos (Including, Organizers of Games of Chance and Lotteries) 18 6 17 4 12 Sole Practitioner Lawyers and Legal Firms 0 0 0 1 0 Notaries [78] 1 0 0 125 59 Total 254 262 254 425 366 372. The nature of the STRs varies considerably, particularly between sectors. Reports received from FIs are generally commensurate with the main ML risks highlighted in the NRA, although the number of reports involving potential drug trafficking identified by the FMC are limited. The authorities explained that this may be due to the fact that reporting entities are tying STRs with other crimes or have no indication on that the underlying predicate. The absence of regulation of VASPs is another reason. Table 6.2. STR from FIs by predicate offence STRs from Fis Total (ML/TF/ML &amp; predicate offences) TF Fraud Drug trafficking Corruption Tax evasion Other crimes No crime specified 2021 256 2 27 2 6 27 11 181 2022 237 1 29 1 6 12 5 183 2023 295 2 32 1 10 33 5 212 2024 295 0 69 3 16 44 13 150 373. The FMC provides complete feedback to RE annually, in form of i) general feedback, with an overall summary and evaluation of the reports submitted by the respective RE, supplemented by ii) individual feedback on each STR from the following perspectives: form, content, other contextual factors, priority, actions taken by the FMC, and descriptor of dissemination. In addition, the FMC assesses the submitted STRs in terms of their alignment with the characteristic indicators and risk profile of the respective RE. The RE is obliged to provide an explanation for the deficiencies identified in the feedback process, as well as the steps taken to improve the STRs. If necessary, face-to-face meetings and discussions are also organized with particular REs. Apart from annual feedback, the FMC may also provide ad-hoc targeted feedback on particular reports or specific groups of STRs (for example, STRs concerning cash transactions from a particular RE, which lacked detailed analysis).Since 2020, five TF-related STRs have been received, all relating to potential matches with lists of entities involved in possible terrorist or similar activities abroad. Ultimately, no connections with designated persons were confirmed in the course of FIU analysis. 374. In addition to receiving STRs, the FIU engages in a periodic TF strategic analysis codenamed “Regional level operation”, which envisages the collection of data on outgoing and incoming money transfers made from Armenia to a number of jurisdictions identified as being at relatively higher risk of TF through fast money value transfer systems via banks. The collection of this data (which usually deals with low volume and low intensity transfers) is then followed by a FIU analysis for the purposes of identifying any possible trends, tendencies or developments associated with jurisdictions identified as having heightened TF risks. Information on suspicious transfers to risk areas have been disseminated to the NSS. None of these transfers were previously reported as STRs (see IO.9). 375. The AML/CFT provisions govern strict rules on the timeframe for reporting suspicious transactions and activities. While the FMC has not identified many cases of delays in the transmission of STRs by the banking sector, limitations in the sphere of supervisory activity regarding non-banking financial sector and DNFBPs, negatively impact the quality and the quantity of the STRs emanating from this sector. Supervisory actions conducted on FIs identified cases of non-reported STRs gives the indication that the overall number of STRs is an area for improvement (see IO.3 and IO.4). 376. Apart from STRs, the FMC also receives other disclosures, such as threshold- reports based on objective criteria (TTRs – see table below) and declarations of cash and BNIs across the external border. During the period under review, a total of 3,770,154 TTRs were received by the FMC with banks accounting for 92% of them. The increase in TTRs submitted by notaries is due to legislative changes in November 2023, requiring submitting TTRs for donation transactions. As for cross border declarations, the FMC received around 4,700 reports (incoming and outgoing) along with around 100 reports concerning non-disclosures. Those reports contain relevant, accurate and up to date information, which is used in the operational and strategic analysis. Access to databases 377. Besides the reports described above, the FMC has access to a broad range of different information sources in order to perform its functions. Information directly accessible to the FIU: · ACMS, including data from FMC analytical cases (STRs, requests from counterparts, etc.), list of identified local and foreign VASPs, list of persons related to TF/PF, etc. · Centralized bank account register · Credit registry · Court decisions on LEA access to confidential banking information · Passport database · Database of State Revenue Committee (salary, workplace, position etc.) · Database of Social Security Service · BO register · State register of legal entities · Real estate database · Database of Civil Acts Registration Service · Administrative proceedings of Road Police · Compulsory Enforcement Service (confiscations) · Vehicle/ driving license database · Police database (criminal records) · Registry of licensed weapons · Database of disability benefits 378. The FMC has developed its Automated Case Management System (CMS) to allow one-click access to information administered by the FIU (STRs, TTRs, subjects in cases) and twelve other external sources, for example the State Register, real estate database, vehicle register or SRC database. This data is automatically collected in the course of a single inquiry made in the CMS. Other information sources, such as the centralized bank account register, have to be accessed using a separate interface. Open sources and commercial databases are checked on a regular basis. Other sources, such as border-crossing data, are verified in accordance with the nature of the case. 379. Information on request can also be obtained from reporting entities, even if they have not submitted a STR. According to the FIU operational manual, when sending additional information requests, a deadline for responding is set, which in practice is respected by the recipients. For example, in the case of banks, the deadline is one business day for urgent requests and three business days for non-urgent requests. The FIU can also request information from other intelligence bodies and supervisory authorities. This power is used only in particular cases due to the FIU’s wide access to law enforcement and supervisory information and can take several days (for example in case of the need to obtain tax declarations from the SRC). 6.1.2. Access by other competent authorities 380. Intelligence bodies (MIA, NSS, SRC, ACC in this capacity) and investigative authorities (ACC, IC) also have access to an array of databases, such as criminal records, the population register, legal entities register, income tax register, convictions database that are essential for their ML/TF intelligence activities and investigations. In the majority of cases the authorities’ access is direct and the information up-to-date. The IC has a database containing persons of interest in criminal cases in order to link investigations. When a new investigation is initiated, the intelligence authorities are informed about the natural persons and entities involved. The SRC (the unit dedicated to combatting tax offences) has also access to information subject to banking confidentiality regarding domestic legal persons. 381. The intelligence bodies do not collect statistics on the level of use of particular databases to perform their functions. The authorities interviewed indicated a standard set of databases is verified in every analysis, followed by a selection of information sources checked according to the needs of a particular case. For example, the SRC in every analysis involving potential ML (whether resulting from a notification from the FMC or stand-alone) verifies the real estate cadastre, data on movable property, the state registry, employment data, tax reports, information on related and dependant persons. Other sources, such as border-crossing data, customs declarations and cash declarations are verified when necessary, depending on the nature of the case. The lack of access to the central bank account register limits intelligence bodies’ visibility over financial matters in early stages of investigations, where proceeds of crime/TF could potentially be located in the jurisdiction. 382. Access to bank information for evidence purposes (for example, account statements) requires a court order, which may take a couple of days or more than one attempt to obtain (for details, see IO.7). The SRC has direct access to bank information related to domestic legal persons. In order to identify potential proceeds of crime/TF, intelligence bodies and investigative authorities primarily rely on the FMC to obtain financial information. This is used to establish necessary leads in a case, as the data provided by the FIU cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceeding. The need for access to financial information by competent authorities in the intelligence gathering stage created a strong dependence on the FMC for financial information, especially on the beginning of the period under review. 383. Vulnerabilities identified in IO.5 in relation to identifying the BO of foreign legal persons, and the fact that the State Registry is not fully populated, and the absence of a legal requirement for legal persons to hold a bank account, limit LEAs ability to determine BOs. However, as explained in IO.5, LEAs can also access BO data held by reporting entities (primarily banks, when the legal person has a bank account) mainly through the FMC. Footnotes [76] for example, an e-wallet cannot be funded with more than 1 million Armenian dram – around EUR 2,200 EUR – and e-wallets or gaming accounts can be funded only through cashless methods [77] Non-life insurers outside the scope of the Methodology [78] Notaries have filed a considerable number of reports, but when analysing their value, the authorities concluded that this category of STR were bearing little value for two reasons: on one hand the STRs were emanating mostly from two notarial offices located in a specific area of the country and, on the second hand the suspicions contained therein were not relevant (donations between family members or vague reason for suspicion)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.1.1. By the FIU 368. The FMC has access to a broad range of information for conducting operational and strategic analysis both via reports received in the form of STRs, TTRs, cash declarations and access to the relevant financial, administrative and law enforcement databases. Reports received 369. Since the previous MER the number of STRs slightly increased, from 254 in 2020 up to 366 in 2024 (44%). The significant majority of these (on average 77%) come from the banking sector, which is the most material. A further 8% originates from entities engaged in money (currency) transfer services. The rest of FIs have provided a handful of reports. With regard to DNFBPs, casinos have prepared in total 57 reports (3% of all disclosures), while notaries 184 (11% of all disclosures), with other sectors filing STRs rarely. The overall level of reporting by the private sector is an area for improvement. There are no STRs filed by real estate agents and VASPs. 370. Reports from FIs, which form the majority of received STRs, are partially in line with the risk and materiality but generally include the necessary content and suspicion reasoning. In order to improve the quality of submitted reports from the banking sector, the FIU has systematically provided both general and individual feedback, which was also shared with to the AML/CFT supervisory wing of the CBA (FSLD). The monitoring conducted by the FIU since 2021 show a gradual improvement of STRs, content-wise and form-wise. When STRs would benefit from additional information, the FMC staff can request the relevant information from REs to support analysis. 371. Looking at the source of reports disaggregated by sector, the reporting of non-bank FIs and DNFBPs (excluding notaries) has been declining. The authorities associate this with various factors, including limitation on use of cash in the economy and functional restrictions [76] . Another reason for the decreasing STR reporting is linked to the guidance provided by the FMC discouraging reporting from financial institutions, in the cases of potential proceeds of crime originating from small-scale fraud. This was done as in the perception of the FIU those STRs added limited value for the FIU intelligence. Such reports would go directly to the Police on the basis of a victim complaint. Turning to quality, the majority of DNFBP reports do not contain the relevant level of suspicion or information necessary for the FMC to develop intelligence products There is a need for continuous monitoring of suspicious transaction reporting behaviour and further engagement to guide the REs, in particular DNFBPs into increasing their reporting level and the quality of the STRs. Table 6.1. STR reporting trends Entities 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Banks 196 224 209 268 273 Entities Engaged in Money (Currency) Transfer Services 32 27 25 24 12 Entities Providing Investment Services (Investment Companies) 1 2 0 1 7 The Central Depositary 3 1 0 1 2 Credit Organizations 3 2 3 0 0 Entities Engaged in Foreign Currency Exchange 0 0 0 1 0 Insurance (Including Reinsurance) Companies [77] 0 0 0 0 1 Casinos (Including, Organizers of Games of Chance and Lotteries) 18 6 17 4 12 Sole Practitioner Lawyers and Legal Firms 0 0 0 1 0 Notaries [78] 1 0 0 125 59 Total 254 262 254 425 366 372. The nature of the STRs varies considerably, particularly between sectors. Reports received from FIs are generally commensurate with the main ML risks highlighted in the NRA, although the number of reports involving potential drug trafficking identified by the FMC are limited. The authorities explained that this may be due to the fact that reporting entities are tying STRs with other crimes or have no indication on that the underlying predicate. The absence of regulation of VASPs is another reason. Table 6.2. STR from FIs by predicate offence STRs from Fis Total (ML/TF/ML &amp; predicate offences) TF Fraud Drug trafficking Corruption Tax evasion Other crimes No crime specified 2021 256 2 27 2 6 27 11 181 2022 237 1 29 1 6 12 5 183 2023 295 2 32 1 10 33 5 212 2024 295 0 69 3 16 44 13 150 373. The FMC provides complete feedback to RE annually, in form of i) general feedback, with an overall summary and evaluation of the reports submitted by the respective RE, supplemented by ii) individual feedback on each STR from the following perspectives: form, content, other contextual factors, priority, actions taken by the FMC, and descriptor of dissemination. In addition, the FMC assesses the submitted STRs in terms of their alignment with the characteristic indicators and risk profile of the respective RE. The RE is obliged to provide an explanation for the deficiencies identified in the feedback process, as well as the steps taken to improve the STRs. If necessary, face-to-face meetings and discussions are also organized with particular REs. Apart from annual feedback, the FMC may also provide ad-hoc targeted feedback on particular reports or specific groups of STRs (for example, STRs concerning cash transactions from a particular RE, which lacked detailed analysis).Since 2020, five TF-related STRs have been received, all relating to potential matches with lists of entities involved in possible terrorist or similar activities abroad. Ultimately, no connections with designated persons were confirmed in the course of FIU analysis. 374. In addition to receiving STRs, the FIU engages in a periodic TF strategic analysis codenamed “Regional level operation”, which envisages the collection of data on outgoing and incoming money transfers made from Armenia to a number of jurisdictions identified as being at relatively higher risk of TF through fast money value transfer systems via banks. The collection of this data (which usually deals with low volume and low intensity transfers) is then followed by a FIU analysis for the purposes of identifying any possible trends, tendencies or developments associated with jurisdictions identified as having heightened TF risks. Information on suspicious transfers to risk areas have been disseminated to the NSS. None of these transfers were previously reported as STRs (see IO.9). 375. The AML/CFT provisions govern strict rules on the timeframe for reporting suspicious transactions and activities. While the FMC has not identified many cases of delays in the transmission of STRs by the banking sector, limitations in the sphere of supervisory activity regarding non-banking financial sector and DNFBPs, negatively impact the quality and the quantity of the STRs emanating from this sector. Supervisory actions conducted on FIs identified cases of non-reported STRs gives the indication that the overall number of STRs is an area for improvement (see IO.3 and IO.4). 376. Apart from STRs, the FMC also receives other disclosures, such as threshold- reports based on objective criteria (TTRs – see table below) and declarations of cash and BNIs across the external border. During the period under review, a total of 3,770,154 TTRs were received by the FMC with banks accounting for 92% of them. The increase in TTRs submitted by notaries is due to legislative changes in November 2023, requiring submitting TTRs for donation transactions. As for cross border declarations, the FMC received around 4,700 reports (incoming and outgoing) along with around 100 reports concerning non-disclosures. Those reports contain relevant, accurate and up to date information, which is used in the operational and strategic analysis. Access to databases 377. Besides the reports described above, the FMC has access to a broad range of different information sources in order to perform its functions. Information directly accessible to the FIU: · ACMS, including data from FMC analytical cases (STRs, requests from counterparts, etc.), list of identified local and foreign VASPs, list of persons related to TF/PF, etc. · Centralized bank account register · Credit registry · Court decisions on LEA access to confidential banking information · Passport database · Database of State Revenue Committee (salary, workplace, position etc.) · Database of Social Security Service · BO register · State register of legal entities · Real estate database · Database of Civil Acts Registration Service · Administrative proceedings of Road Police · Compulsory Enforcement Service (confiscations) · Vehicle/ driving license database · Police database (criminal records) · Registry of licensed weapons · Database of disability benefits 378. The FMC has developed its Automated Case Management System (CMS) to allow one-click access to information administered by the FIU (STRs, TTRs, subjects in cases) and twelve other external sources, for example the State Register, real estate database, vehicle register or SRC database. This data is automatically collected in the course of a single inquiry made in the CMS. Other information sources, such as the centralized bank account register, have to be accessed using a separate interface. Open sources and commercial databases are checked on a regular basis. Other sources, such as border-crossing data, are verified in accordance with the nature of the case. 379. Information on request can also be obtained from reporting entities, even if they have not submitted a STR. According to the FIU operational manual, when sending additional information requests, a deadline for responding is set, which in practice is respected by the recipients. For example, in the case of banks, the deadline is one business day for urgent requests and three business days for non-urgent requests. The FIU can also request information from other intelligence bodies and supervisory authorities. This power is used only in particular cases due to the FIU’s wide access to law enforcement and supervisory information and can take several days (for example in case of the need to obtain tax declarations from the SRC). 6.1.2. Access by other competent authorities 380. Intelligence bodies (MIA, NSS, SRC, ACC in this capacity) and investigative authorities (ACC, IC) also have access to an array of databases, such as criminal records, the population register, legal entities register, income tax register, convictions database that are essential for their ML/TF intelligence activities and investigations. In the majority of cases the authorities’ access is direct and the information up-to-date. The IC has a database containing persons of interest in criminal cases in order to link investigations. When a new investigation is initiated, the intelligence authorities are informed about the natural persons and entities involved. The SRC (the unit dedicated to combatting tax offences) has also access to information subject to banking confidentiality regarding domestic legal persons. 381. The intelligence bodies do not collect statistics on the level of use of particular databases to perform their functions. The authorities interviewed indicated a standard set of databases is verified in every analysis, followed by a selection of information sources checked according to the needs of a particular case. For example, the SRC in every analysis involving potential ML (whether resulting from a notification from the FMC or stand-alone) verifies the real estate cadastre, data on movable property, the state registry, employment data, tax reports, information on related and dependant persons. Other sources, such as border-crossing data, customs declarations and cash declarations are verified when necessary, depending on the nature of the case. The lack of access to the central bank account register limits intelligence bodies’ visibility over financial matters in early stages of investigations, where proceeds of crime/TF could potentially be located in the jurisdiction. 382. Access to bank information for evidence purposes (for example, account statements) requires a court order, which may take a couple of days or more than one attempt to obtain (for details, see IO.7). The SRC has direct access to bank information related to domestic legal persons. In order to identify potential proceeds of crime/TF, intelligence bodies and investigative authorities primarily rely on the FMC to obtain financial information. This is used to establish necessary leads in a case, as the data provided by the FIU cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceeding. The need for access to financial information by competent authorities in the intelligence gathering stage created a strong dependence on the FMC for financial information, especially on the beginning of the period under review. 383. Vulnerabilities identified in IO.5 in relation to identifying the BO of foreign legal persons, and the fact that the State Registry is not fully populated, and the absence of a legal requirement for legal persons to hold a bank account, limit LEAs ability to determine BOs. However, as explained in IO.5, LEAs can also access BO data held by reporting entities (primarily banks, when the legal person has a bank account) mainly through the FMC. Footnotes [76] for example, an e-wallet cannot be funded with more than 1 million Armenian dram – around EUR 2,200 EUR – and e-wallets or gaming accounts can be funded only through cashless methods [77] Non-life insurers outside the scope of the Methodology [78] Notaries have filed a considerable number of reports, but when analysing their value, the authorities concluded that this category of STR were bearing little value for two reasons: on one hand the STRs were emanating mostly from two notarial offices located in a specific area of the country and, on the second hand the suspicions contained therein were not relevant (donations between family members or vague reason for suspicion)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="423. Following the adoption of a new CPC in 2021, and its subsequent amendments, organisational reforms have reshaped the intelligence gathering and investigative system in Armenia. Various authorities have taken responsibility for investigating ML at different stages during the period under review. From 2015 until October 2021, the National Security Service (NSS) held exclusive authority over ML investigations. As of January 2023, the Investigative Committee (IC) has taken over as the primary body responsible for ML investigations, with the Anti-corruption Committee (ACC) having competence for ML investigations related to corruption. The National Security Service (NSS) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the State Revenue Committee (SRC) were divested of investigative powers and now function primarily as intelligence-gathering bodies. The results of the intelligence gathering conducted by the three bodies are referred to the IC and, where appropriate, may also be referred to the ACC. 424. As a result of organisational reforms, part of the existing LEAs’ staff prior to 2021 was reassigned to the newly establish investigative bodies (the IC and the ACC) and additional positions were created. Investigators within the IC and ACC are supported by specialised experts in financial forensic examinations (eight within the IC and four within the ACC), as well as digital forensic experts (6 within the IC and 1 within the ACC). None of the intelligence bodies have specialised experts in financial matters (see IO6). When necessary, additional expertise (eleven financial experts) can be drawn by the IC and ACC from laboratories under the MoJ and the National Academy of Science. Efforts to address remaining vacancies are undergoing. Apart from the SRC, other inquiry and investigative bodies seek to strengthen their capacity thorough the recruitment of additional staff, including investigators, financial experts and IT specialists. The MIA is also planning to create a specialised laboratory (CyberLaB) for digital and crypto-related forensics. 425. The intelligence and investigative bodies have trained staff to investigate ML. None have specialised staff or dedicated units focused exclusively on ML. The units responsible for intelligence gathering or investigating the predicate crimes also deal with associated ML. Case allocation is based on the experience and skills of individual analyst or investigator. ML activity identified 426. Most ML activity is identified in the context of investigations into predicate offences (see Table 7.1.). An increase in cases where ML was identified on the basis of the FMC dissemination has been observed only in last two years of the assessed period. This is a positive trend. There are no cases in which ML investigations originated from information related to cash seizures, incoming MLA requests, or foreign intelligence. While the authorities consider this to be consistent with the country’s risk profile, concerns remain as to whether the external threats and foreign nexus elements are being fully taken into account (see IO.1, IO.2 and IO.6). Table 7.1. ML investigations by source Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Parallel financial investigations 20 7 13 50 38 FIU disseminations 1 1 3 13 30 Domestic intelligence 0 0 3 8 11 Open-source information 0 1 1 1 0 MLA 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign intelligence 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 0 3 6 8 8 427. Based on interviews with LEAs and presented ML cases, the AT observed a system that is generally &quot;predicate-offence-driven&quot;. This may stem from the existing institutional set-up, in which intelligence-gathering and investigative bodies have competences focused on certain predicate crimes. At the same time, the AT noted overlapping responsibilities among intelligence bodies. For example, while the ACC and the Tax Department of the SRC have more clearly defined thematic areas (corruption and tax evasion), there are still cases where large-scale tax evasion are handled by other authorities (e.g. NSS or MIA). Similarly, drug-related offences may be handled by MIA, NSS or SRC. 428. There is no integrated database or platform for systematic information exchange among intelligence and investigative bodies. While cases can be discussed in Inter-Agency Committee meetings or ad-hoc as needed, there is no formal intelligence-sharing mechanisms among LEAs. Clarifying the division of responsibilities and establishing an integrated platform to facilitate information exchange between the intelligence units, investigative and prosecutorial bodies, as envisaged by the AC 2023-2026 Strategy, would be beneficial. Without such measures, this fragmentation may lead to diminished opportunities in detecting ML. 429. The IC mainly relies on the intelligence reports submitted by NSS, MIA, SRC and the ACC (in corruption-related cases). The ACC largely relies on its own intelligence gathering activities - approximately 50-60% of ACC investigations are initiated through its own intelligence. Most ML investigations are initiated only after certain investigative actions have already been carried out in relation to the predicate offence, which may indicate that ML is being overlooked at the earlier stages. Neither the IC nor the ACC could recall a case in which ML was included in the initial report submitted by intelligence bodies. No statistics are maintained to illustrate at which stage the ML component is most frequently added. In most complex or large-scale cases presented to the AT, ML charges were added by the GPO alongside the predicate offence, rather than by the investigative bodies. ML investigations 430. Over the reporting period, a total of 226 ML investigations were initiated, all involving natural persons. A significant increase is noticed in the last two years of the assessed period (2023-2024) indicating that recent reforms impact the system positively (see Table 7.2.). Overall, compared with the previous reporting period (2010-2014), during which 53 ML investigations were initiated, this reflects a positive trend. 431. Almost half of ML investigations are in relation to corruption (see Table 7.3). In some case, complex or large-scale cases, joint investigative groups may be established. Three examples have been provided in relation to jointly investigations by the IC and ACC. 432. ML investigations have also been initiated in connection with drug trafficking, tax evasion and fraud, which is consistent with the main ML threats identified by the country. The number of ML investigations connected to high-risk predicate offences (Table 7.3) appears to be relatively low when compared to the total number of investigations into these high-risk offences—particularly for fraud, drug trafficking, and tax evasion (Table 7.4). Authorities attribute this difference to the presence of &quot;petty crimes&quot; that are not having necessarily a ML component. However, while this explanation is acknowledged, it does not fully account for the observed gap. The AT has also noticed a strong emphasis on the domestic component of predicate offences, with limited consideration given to foreign or transnational organised crime nexus. This impacts the type and scale of cases pursued. 433. Since 2022, a total of 16 investigations were initiated in autonomous ML cases, which represents an improvement compared with the previous reporting period. Table 7.2. ML Investigations 2020–2024 Year Cases Natural persons Legal persons 2020 21 19 0 2021 12 20 0 2022 26 23 0 2023 80 68 0 2024 87 58 0 Table 7.3. ML investigations related to high-risk predicated offences Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud 1 1 2 5 4 13 Cyber fraud - 3 2 5 21 31 Embezzlement 1 2 3 5 4 15 Drug trafficking 2 4 1 14 10 31 Corruption 14 6 9 34 30 93 Tax crime 2 - 1 4 6 13 Stand-alone ML - - 2 7 7 16 Table 7.4. Investigations into high-risk predicate offences Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud 1713 1861 1997 2497 3060 11128 Drug trafficking 791 981 1450 3060 2357 8639 Corruption 1008 934 1022 1848 961 5773 Tax crime 164 275 579 234 207 1459 434. As mentioned above, almost half of the ML investigations are in relation to corruption. Armenia has made positive progress in anti-corruption reforms [83] , including through policy development, considerable legislative advancements, the enforcement of corruption offences, and the strengthening of the anti-corruption institutional framework, notably by the establishment of specialised institutions such as the ACC, a specialised department within the GPO dealing with cases from the ACC, and the Anti-Corruption Court. These developments have positively impacted the pursuit of ML cases linked to corruption. Most ML investigations initiated by the ACC remain originating from parallel financial investigations. Case examples demonstrate authority’s ability to investigate ML cases in relation to corruption, including high-profile cases (see cases examples in Box 7.1 and 7.2). Box 7.1. ML associated with corruption The criminal investigation of corruption was initiated in 2021 on the basis of a citizen’s complaint. The ML investigation was initiated following the preliminary investigation into corruption. The former Armenian Minister of Environmental Protection, with help from associates, accepted a particularly large USD 14 million bribe to facilitate obtaining mining licenses for a Resident Entrepreneur. Of this, USD 6 million was handed over in cash, while USD 8 million was routed through foreign bank accounts and laundered. Key elements of the scheme included: A UAE company buying an Armenian mining company for USD 40 million. The bribe was funnelled via companies in the BVI and Armenia, as well as bank accounts in Switzerland and the UAE linked to the Minister’s associates. Individuals affiliated with the Minister carried out instructions to disguise the bribe as legitimate business transactions. Through a parallel financial investigation, which included intelligence provided by the FMC, it was possible to uncover the entire transaction scheme and identify the real beneficial owners. Banking information from UAE and Switzerland was obtained within the framework of mutual legal assistance and was subsequently used as evidence in the course of the investigation. During the preliminary investigation, the bank accounts of the involved persons, the movable and immovable property belonging to them or available in their names were seized in the Republic of Armenia. Although no details were provided on the value of seized property, it is known that the value of assets subject to possible confiscation is USD 14 million. In 2023, the case was submitted to the court and currently in the stage of main court hearings. 435. Although the number of ML cases linked to tax crimes remains relatively low, tax evasion represented the primary predicate offence which triggered the investigation and prosecution of the most complex ML case in Armenia, involving tax evasion and high-profile corruption (see Box 7.2.). The SRC provided examples of cases involving transnational tax evasion schemes and potential ML, linked to companies registered abroad - Cyprus, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland. In one case, a domestic company transferred substantial funds to a Cypriot entity under a false trademark sale to evade taxes. Another case involved false invoicing in the petroleum sector by a domestic company, resulting in USD 14 million in cash withdrawals. According to authorities, these cases are currently under investigation by the IC, and the outcomes of the investigations are to be seen later. Box 7.2. Case study - ML associated with tax evasion and corruption This investigation concerns several serious offences, including money laundering, tax evasion (approx. USD 1 million), abuse of official authority, forgery, and illegal participation in entrepreneurial activity. The case originated from a parallel financial investigation in July 2018, initially focused on tax evasion, but subsequently expanded to uncover a network of corruption, money laundering, and other related crimes. The principle criminal case encompasses more than 20 additional cases and 76 distinct episodes. A PEP was identified as the ultimate beneficial owner of several legal entities used to carry out illicit financial transactions. Through mutual legal assistance requests sent to multiple countries (Italy, Latvia, Switzerland, BVI, Lithuania, Cyprus, UAE, etc.), authorities traced and identified criminal assets and activities organized and orchestrated by the PEP. A key component involved the sale in 2010 of a state-owned entity at a price well below market value – USD 1 million. The acquiring company transferred a total of USD 4.5 million to bank accounts in Armenia, including state budget and the accounts of the acquired entity, from its bank accounts in Latvia and mostly in Switzerland. Funds related to this sale, subsequent investments and resale, displayed suspicious patterns: use of multiple Armenian and foreign companies controlled by the PEP and his associates, rapid transfers among various accounts with no clear business purpose, large cash withdrawals, and no real change in ultimate ownership after the resale. Between 2011 and 2019, further multiple fund transfers were made by foreign and domestic legal entities controlled by the PEP, his associates, and family members to acquire shares in major Armenian companies (approximatively USD 8 million), or to make payments to major Armenian companies for various purposes (approximatively USD 50 million for various services, advanced payments, etc.). These activities indicated ongoing efforts to obfuscate and commingle illicit funds. The shares were repeatedly moved between individuals or companies owned, controlled or associated with the PEP through fraudulent agreements. In some cases, funds were withdrawn in cash from the accounts of legal entities and then deposited into the accounts of other entities or individuals associated with the PEP, with the aim of further investment. The estimated value of seized assets in Armenia and abroad is approximatively USD 350 million, including foreign bank accounts and shareholdings in foreign legal entities. Part of the criminally obtained property was voluntarily compensated by the accused persons. The investigation resulted in separation of the proceedings. Out of the 50 individuals subject to the investigations, 13 have been indicted. The investigations into the remaining individuals are ongoing. No details on whether all 13 indictments relate to ML or to other predicate offences or whether the ongoing investigations concern ML in all cases. 436. Fraud, in particular cyberfraud, is one of the emerging threats in the country. Many of the presented cases related to fraud, as well as drug-related offences, indicate that proceeds are laundered by transfers to crypto-wallets, followed by conversion into fiat currency, cash withdrawals or transfers via payment systems (see cases studies described in Box 7.3.). The MIA's Cybercrime Unit has developed expertise in tracing and analysing cryptocurrencies, supported by modern analytical tools. Example of cases were given where MIA’s experts successfully traced virtual assets linked to illicit funds. Nevertheless, intelligence and investigative activities in this area are perceived as challenging, due to its complexity and the fact that they rely cooperative relationships with virtual asset service providers which are not yet licenced. Box 7.3. Case study 1 - ML associated with cyberfraud The ML investigation was initiated as a result of the investigation into the predicate crime – computer fraud, illegal entrepreneurial activity and the establishment and management of a criminal organisation. A criminal organization led by one individual and involving about 30 members collaborated with foreign nationals to commit computer fraud and money laundering. They operated from rented offices in Armenia, contacting victims abroad and luring them into fake investment opportunities via fraudulent websites, resulting in financial losses. The estimated value of damages is USD 26 400. To hide their crimes, the group registered a number of companies in Armenia pretending to offer legitimate services like employment and software development. These companies were fronts to disguise the source of illicit funds. The illicit funds were also laundered through transfers to e-wallets, which were further moved to cryptocurrency wallets. During the investigation, with the assistance provided by the FIU, banking records for over 15 individuals and legal entities were obtained. Assets equivalent to approximatively 300 000 USD were seized/frozen in Armenia. The information obtained from European countries, notably Germany, facilitated the identification of similar criminal organizations and a total of 6 offices located in Armenia of similar criminal organisations were dismantled. Three criminal leaders were identified on which an international search was subsequently initiated. No indictments have been issued yet against the members of the criminal organisations. Case study 2 - ML associated with drug trafficking The ML investigation was initiated as a result of a preliminary investigation concerning narcotic drug sales. Person X organised and operated multiple Telegram-based shop platforms for the illegal sale of large quantities of narcotic drugs. He recruited numerous individuals into a well-structured criminal organization, assigning specific roles to each participant such as cultivation, production, transportation, sale of drugs, and money laundering. During 2021-2022, the criminal group used cryptocurrency accounts, particularly on the Binance platform, to receive and launder large sums (e.g., USD 780,000 of which USD 700,000 was transferred and exchanged) before distributing proceeds in cash among members. In some cases, the cryptocurrency was exchanged and provided to the members of the criminal organisations through both cash and electronic payments. The founder of the criminal organisation and other 9 individuals have been indicted (no details on whether all 10 indictments relate to ML). The case is currently pending before the court. The founder was located abroad based on an international search and arrested. Extradition proceedings are currently under way. The investigation was suspended in relation to one person based on a settlement agreement. Movable and immovable property belonging to three individuals was seized, although no details regarding the value of the seized property are available. 437. According to the authorities, parallel financial investigations are routinely conducted. It was confirmed during on-site interviews that such investigations are mandatory in each criminal case. This may impact the prioritisation of available resources and cases based on the threat or scale. 438. Another concern relates to the scope and depth of the financial investigations conducted. As mentioned above, there is an important emphasis on the domestic nature of the offences, with limited focus on the potential links to foreign elements or transnational organised crime. A case example discussed during on-site related to the seizure of large quantity of cocaine (~1 tone) imported from Ecuador via Panama, Italy and Georgia by an Armenian company whose owner and BO was a domestic PEP, revealed that the parallel investigative actions and MLA requests did not uncover any illicit proceeds or illicit conduct in relation with the involved company. Similarly, no tangible results were reported in another case discussed involving the seizure of massive quantity of cocaine (~2.7 tons) in Italy, intended to be imported into Armenia, nor in other cases of similar nature involving transnational elements. 439. Obtaining relevant financial intelligence is essential for effective financial investigations. In practice, intelligence and investigative authorities rely primarily on the FMC to obtain various types of financial intelligence, including data on active bank accounts, information available in the FMC’s database, information from reporting entities or foreign counterparts. A gradual decrease in the number of such requests, as indicated in Table 7.5, is attributed to the FMC’s efforts to streamline such inquiries. While the FMC’s support is important at the intelligence-gathering stage for establishing necessary leads, and the LEAs are satisfied with its quality, it can be observed that most of the inquiries relate to predicate offences rather than ML (see IO6). Table 7.5. Requests made by LEAs to the FMC Year Total number of requests by LEAs 2020 575 2021 630 2022 430 2023 340 2024 265 440. FMC intelligence cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceeding. For evidentiary purposes financial information (banking or related information) needs to be obtained through seizure measures based on a court decision. Based on interviews, there appears to be no uniform practice, and similar requests to access information under the same circumstances may be assessed differently by judges. On a positive note, the investigators reported that courts’ decisions are generally issued swiftly and there is always a possibility to appeal in case of refusal. There are no comprehensive statistics on the number of requests or court approval rates; according to the IC, approximatively 9.7% of such requests are rejected. When approved, the process to access banking and related information may take up to three to four days. These factors may impact the timeliness of access to necessary financial evidence. 441. One of the findings of the previous assessment concerned the complex legislative provisions which inhibited LEA’s ability to obtain the necessary financial evidence. The provision applied only to persons who were formally suspects or accused, and the 2015 MER recommended expanding these powers. Amendments adopted by Parliament in 2020 to broaden access to any financial information essential for investigations, were subject to review by the Constitutional Court, which found them not compliant with the constitutional principles. As a compromise solution, the new provisions of the CPC broadened LEAs’ powers, allowing access to banking and related information not only in relation to suspects or accused persons, but also in relation to their associates (where a direct connection exist), as well to legal persons managed or controlled by them. According to the NRA, LEAs have positively assessed the new provisions. While this is acknowledged, the scope of these powers remains limited and does not ensure the access to all necessary information necessary for the investigation of a ML or predicate offence (see R.31). Even if in practice, as explained by the authorities, some judges have been willing to interpret the legal framework flexibly, it remains open to different interpretation and legal challenges. 442. Beneficial ownership information is predominantly obtained by LEAs from the reporting entities. In such cases, obtaining BO data is subject to the same rules regulating the access to banking and related information, and the same limitations apply. This undermines the investigative bodies’ ability to efficiently determine the extent of criminal networks or the scale of criminality, in particular in third-party and autonomous ML cases. 443. As confirmed during the on-site interviews, investigations are often delayed due to limited forensic and commodity expertise, as well as delays in responses to MLA requests. Some ongoing court cases presented to the AT date back for more than six years. The country has acknowledged this deficiency and as outlined in the strategic steps (5.1 &amp; 5.2) of the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy, efforts are being made to reduce the time required for expert examinations and improve the training in MLA requests. 444. No investigations have been initiated against legal persons for ML or predicate offences. This is despite corporate liability provisions being in force since 2023. Although not a legal requirement, authorities indicated that legal person’s criminal liability depends on a prior conviction of a natural person. According to the explanations provided on-site, any investigation of a legal person can be carried out only after the conviction of the natural person. This raises concerns regarding LEAs’ ability to investigate ML in relation to legal persons. This is particularly relevant considering that the provided case examples and typologies associated with the main ML threats frequently indicate the involvement of legal persons. Footnotes [83] Armenia: Fifth round of anti-corruption monitoring follow-up report, OECD (2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="423. Following the adoption of a new CPC in 2021, and its subsequent amendments, organisational reforms have reshaped the intelligence gathering and investigative system in Armenia. Various authorities have taken responsibility for investigating ML at different stages during the period under review. From 2015 until October 2021, the National Security Service (NSS) held exclusive authority over ML investigations. As of January 2023, the Investigative Committee (IC) has taken over as the primary body responsible for ML investigations, with the Anti-corruption Committee (ACC) having competence for ML investigations related to corruption. The National Security Service (NSS) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the State Revenue Committee (SRC) were divested of investigative powers and now function primarily as intelligence-gathering bodies. The results of the intelligence gathering conducted by the three bodies are referred to the IC and, where appropriate, may also be referred to the ACC. 424. As a result of organisational reforms, part of the existing LEAs’ staff prior to 2021 was reassigned to the newly establish investigative bodies (the IC and the ACC) and additional positions were created. Investigators within the IC and ACC are supported by specialised experts in financial forensic examinations (eight within the IC and four within the ACC), as well as digital forensic experts (6 within the IC and 1 within the ACC). None of the intelligence bodies have specialised experts in financial matters (see IO6). When necessary, additional expertise (eleven financial experts) can be drawn by the IC and ACC from laboratories under the MoJ and the National Academy of Science. Efforts to address remaining vacancies are undergoing. Apart from the SRC, other inquiry and investigative bodies seek to strengthen their capacity thorough the recruitment of additional staff, including investigators, financial experts and IT specialists. The MIA is also planning to create a specialised laboratory (CyberLaB) for digital and crypto-related forensics. 425. The intelligence and investigative bodies have trained staff to investigate ML. None have specialised staff or dedicated units focused exclusively on ML. The units responsible for intelligence gathering or investigating the predicate crimes also deal with associated ML. Case allocation is based on the experience and skills of individual analyst or investigator. ML activity identified 426. Most ML activity is identified in the context of investigations into predicate offences (see Table 7.1.). An increase in cases where ML was identified on the basis of the FMC dissemination has been observed only in last two years of the assessed period. This is a positive trend. There are no cases in which ML investigations originated from information related to cash seizures, incoming MLA requests, or foreign intelligence. While the authorities consider this to be consistent with the country’s risk profile, concerns remain as to whether the external threats and foreign nexus elements are being fully taken into account (see IO.1, IO.2 and IO.6). Table 7.1. ML investigations by source Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Parallel financial investigations 20 7 13 50 38 FIU disseminations 1 1 3 13 30 Domestic intelligence 0 0 3 8 11 Open-source information 0 1 1 1 0 MLA 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign intelligence 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 0 3 6 8 8 427. Based on interviews with LEAs and presented ML cases, the AT observed a system that is generally &quot;predicate-offence-driven&quot;. This may stem from the existing institutional set-up, in which intelligence-gathering and investigative bodies have competences focused on certain predicate crimes. At the same time, the AT noted overlapping responsibilities among intelligence bodies. For example, while the ACC and the Tax Department of the SRC have more clearly defined thematic areas (corruption and tax evasion), there are still cases where large-scale tax evasion are handled by other authorities (e.g. NSS or MIA). Similarly, drug-related offences may be handled by MIA, NSS or SRC. 428. There is no integrated database or platform for systematic information exchange among intelligence and investigative bodies. While cases can be discussed in Inter-Agency Committee meetings or ad-hoc as needed, there is no formal intelligence-sharing mechanisms among LEAs. Clarifying the division of responsibilities and establishing an integrated platform to facilitate information exchange between the intelligence units, investigative and prosecutorial bodies, as envisaged by the AC 2023-2026 Strategy, would be beneficial. Without such measures, this fragmentation may lead to diminished opportunities in detecting ML. 429. The IC mainly relies on the intelligence reports submitted by NSS, MIA, SRC and the ACC (in corruption-related cases). The ACC largely relies on its own intelligence gathering activities - approximately 50-60% of ACC investigations are initiated through its own intelligence. Most ML investigations are initiated only after certain investigative actions have already been carried out in relation to the predicate offence, which may indicate that ML is being overlooked at the earlier stages. Neither the IC nor the ACC could recall a case in which ML was included in the initial report submitted by intelligence bodies. No statistics are maintained to illustrate at which stage the ML component is most frequently added. In most complex or large-scale cases presented to the AT, ML charges were added by the GPO alongside the predicate offence, rather than by the investigative bodies. ML investigations 430. Over the reporting period, a total of 226 ML investigations were initiated, all involving natural persons. A significant increase is noticed in the last two years of the assessed period (2023-2024) indicating that recent reforms impact the system positively (see Table 7.2.). Overall, compared with the previous reporting period (2010-2014), during which 53 ML investigations were initiated, this reflects a positive trend. 431. Almost half of ML investigations are in relation to corruption (see Table 7.3). In some case, complex or large-scale cases, joint investigative groups may be established. Three examples have been provided in relation to jointly investigations by the IC and ACC. 432. ML investigations have also been initiated in connection with drug trafficking, tax evasion and fraud, which is consistent with the main ML threats identified by the country. The number of ML investigations connected to high-risk predicate offences (Table 7.3) appears to be relatively low when compared to the total number of investigations into these high-risk offences—particularly for fraud, drug trafficking, and tax evasion (Table 7.4). Authorities attribute this difference to the presence of &quot;petty crimes&quot; that are not having necessarily a ML component. However, while this explanation is acknowledged, it does not fully account for the observed gap. The AT has also noticed a strong emphasis on the domestic component of predicate offences, with limited consideration given to foreign or transnational organised crime nexus. This impacts the type and scale of cases pursued. 433. Since 2022, a total of 16 investigations were initiated in autonomous ML cases, which represents an improvement compared with the previous reporting period. Table 7.2. ML Investigations 2020–2024 Year Cases Natural persons Legal persons 2020 21 19 0 2021 12 20 0 2022 26 23 0 2023 80 68 0 2024 87 58 0 Table 7.3. ML investigations related to high-risk predicated offences Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud 1 1 2 5 4 13 Cyber fraud - 3 2 5 21 31 Embezzlement 1 2 3 5 4 15 Drug trafficking 2 4 1 14 10 31 Corruption 14 6 9 34 30 93 Tax crime 2 - 1 4 6 13 Stand-alone ML - - 2 7 7 16 Table 7.4. Investigations into high-risk predicate offences Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud 1713 1861 1997 2497 3060 11128 Drug trafficking 791 981 1450 3060 2357 8639 Corruption 1008 934 1022 1848 961 5773 Tax crime 164 275 579 234 207 1459 434. As mentioned above, almost half of the ML investigations are in relation to corruption. Armenia has made positive progress in anti-corruption reforms [83] , including through policy development, considerable legislative advancements, the enforcement of corruption offences, and the strengthening of the anti-corruption institutional framework, notably by the establishment of specialised institutions such as the ACC, a specialised department within the GPO dealing with cases from the ACC, and the Anti-Corruption Court. These developments have positively impacted the pursuit of ML cases linked to corruption. Most ML investigations initiated by the ACC remain originating from parallel financial investigations. Case examples demonstrate authority’s ability to investigate ML cases in relation to corruption, including high-profile cases (see cases examples in Box 7.1 and 7.2). Box 7.1. ML associated with corruption The criminal investigation of corruption was initiated in 2021 on the basis of a citizen’s complaint. The ML investigation was initiated following the preliminary investigation into corruption. The former Armenian Minister of Environmental Protection, with help from associates, accepted a particularly large USD 14 million bribe to facilitate obtaining mining licenses for a Resident Entrepreneur. Of this, USD 6 million was handed over in cash, while USD 8 million was routed through foreign bank accounts and laundered. Key elements of the scheme included: A UAE company buying an Armenian mining company for USD 40 million. The bribe was funnelled via companies in the BVI and Armenia, as well as bank accounts in Switzerland and the UAE linked to the Minister’s associates. Individuals affiliated with the Minister carried out instructions to disguise the bribe as legitimate business transactions. Through a parallel financial investigation, which included intelligence provided by the FMC, it was possible to uncover the entire transaction scheme and identify the real beneficial owners. Banking information from UAE and Switzerland was obtained within the framework of mutual legal assistance and was subsequently used as evidence in the course of the investigation. During the preliminary investigation, the bank accounts of the involved persons, the movable and immovable property belonging to them or available in their names were seized in the Republic of Armenia. Although no details were provided on the value of seized property, it is known that the value of assets subject to possible confiscation is USD 14 million. In 2023, the case was submitted to the court and currently in the stage of main court hearings. 435. Although the number of ML cases linked to tax crimes remains relatively low, tax evasion represented the primary predicate offence which triggered the investigation and prosecution of the most complex ML case in Armenia, involving tax evasion and high-profile corruption (see Box 7.2.). The SRC provided examples of cases involving transnational tax evasion schemes and potential ML, linked to companies registered abroad - Cyprus, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland. In one case, a domestic company transferred substantial funds to a Cypriot entity under a false trademark sale to evade taxes. Another case involved false invoicing in the petroleum sector by a domestic company, resulting in USD 14 million in cash withdrawals. According to authorities, these cases are currently under investigation by the IC, and the outcomes of the investigations are to be seen later. Box 7.2. Case study - ML associated with tax evasion and corruption This investigation concerns several serious offences, including money laundering, tax evasion (approx. USD 1 million), abuse of official authority, forgery, and illegal participation in entrepreneurial activity. The case originated from a parallel financial investigation in July 2018, initially focused on tax evasion, but subsequently expanded to uncover a network of corruption, money laundering, and other related crimes. The principle criminal case encompasses more than 20 additional cases and 76 distinct episodes. A PEP was identified as the ultimate beneficial owner of several legal entities used to carry out illicit financial transactions. Through mutual legal assistance requests sent to multiple countries (Italy, Latvia, Switzerland, BVI, Lithuania, Cyprus, UAE, etc.), authorities traced and identified criminal assets and activities organized and orchestrated by the PEP. A key component involved the sale in 2010 of a state-owned entity at a price well below market value – USD 1 million. The acquiring company transferred a total of USD 4.5 million to bank accounts in Armenia, including state budget and the accounts of the acquired entity, from its bank accounts in Latvia and mostly in Switzerland. Funds related to this sale, subsequent investments and resale, displayed suspicious patterns: use of multiple Armenian and foreign companies controlled by the PEP and his associates, rapid transfers among various accounts with no clear business purpose, large cash withdrawals, and no real change in ultimate ownership after the resale. Between 2011 and 2019, further multiple fund transfers were made by foreign and domestic legal entities controlled by the PEP, his associates, and family members to acquire shares in major Armenian companies (approximatively USD 8 million), or to make payments to major Armenian companies for various purposes (approximatively USD 50 million for various services, advanced payments, etc.). These activities indicated ongoing efforts to obfuscate and commingle illicit funds. The shares were repeatedly moved between individuals or companies owned, controlled or associated with the PEP through fraudulent agreements. In some cases, funds were withdrawn in cash from the accounts of legal entities and then deposited into the accounts of other entities or individuals associated with the PEP, with the aim of further investment. The estimated value of seized assets in Armenia and abroad is approximatively USD 350 million, including foreign bank accounts and shareholdings in foreign legal entities. Part of the criminally obtained property was voluntarily compensated by the accused persons. The investigation resulted in separation of the proceedings. Out of the 50 individuals subject to the investigations, 13 have been indicted. The investigations into the remaining individuals are ongoing. No details on whether all 13 indictments relate to ML or to other predicate offences or whether the ongoing investigations concern ML in all cases. 436. Fraud, in particular cyberfraud, is one of the emerging threats in the country. Many of the presented cases related to fraud, as well as drug-related offences, indicate that proceeds are laundered by transfers to crypto-wallets, followed by conversion into fiat currency, cash withdrawals or transfers via payment systems (see cases studies described in Box 7.3.). The MIA's Cybercrime Unit has developed expertise in tracing and analysing cryptocurrencies, supported by modern analytical tools. Example of cases were given where MIA’s experts successfully traced virtual assets linked to illicit funds. Nevertheless, intelligence and investigative activities in this area are perceived as challenging, due to its complexity and the fact that they rely cooperative relationships with virtual asset service providers which are not yet licenced. Box 7.3. Case study 1 - ML associated with cyberfraud The ML investigation was initiated as a result of the investigation into the predicate crime – computer fraud, illegal entrepreneurial activity and the establishment and management of a criminal organisation. A criminal organization led by one individual and involving about 30 members collaborated with foreign nationals to commit computer fraud and money laundering. They operated from rented offices in Armenia, contacting victims abroad and luring them into fake investment opportunities via fraudulent websites, resulting in financial losses. The estimated value of damages is USD 26 400. To hide their crimes, the group registered a number of companies in Armenia pretending to offer legitimate services like employment and software development. These companies were fronts to disguise the source of illicit funds. The illicit funds were also laundered through transfers to e-wallets, which were further moved to cryptocurrency wallets. During the investigation, with the assistance provided by the FIU, banking records for over 15 individuals and legal entities were obtained. Assets equivalent to approximatively 300 000 USD were seized/frozen in Armenia. The information obtained from European countries, notably Germany, facilitated the identification of similar criminal organizations and a total of 6 offices located in Armenia of similar criminal organisations were dismantled. Three criminal leaders were identified on which an international search was subsequently initiated. No indictments have been issued yet against the members of the criminal organisations. Case study 2 - ML associated with drug trafficking The ML investigation was initiated as a result of a preliminary investigation concerning narcotic drug sales. Person X organised and operated multiple Telegram-based shop platforms for the illegal sale of large quantities of narcotic drugs. He recruited numerous individuals into a well-structured criminal organization, assigning specific roles to each participant such as cultivation, production, transportation, sale of drugs, and money laundering. During 2021-2022, the criminal group used cryptocurrency accounts, particularly on the Binance platform, to receive and launder large sums (e.g., USD 780,000 of which USD 700,000 was transferred and exchanged) before distributing proceeds in cash among members. In some cases, the cryptocurrency was exchanged and provided to the members of the criminal organisations through both cash and electronic payments. The founder of the criminal organisation and other 9 individuals have been indicted (no details on whether all 10 indictments relate to ML). The case is currently pending before the court. The founder was located abroad based on an international search and arrested. Extradition proceedings are currently under way. The investigation was suspended in relation to one person based on a settlement agreement. Movable and immovable property belonging to three individuals was seized, although no details regarding the value of the seized property are available. 437. According to the authorities, parallel financial investigations are routinely conducted. It was confirmed during on-site interviews that such investigations are mandatory in each criminal case. This may impact the prioritisation of available resources and cases based on the threat or scale. 438. Another concern relates to the scope and depth of the financial investigations conducted. As mentioned above, there is an important emphasis on the domestic nature of the offences, with limited focus on the potential links to foreign elements or transnational organised crime. A case example discussed during on-site related to the seizure of large quantity of cocaine (~1 tone) imported from Ecuador via Panama, Italy and Georgia by an Armenian company whose owner and BO was a domestic PEP, revealed that the parallel investigative actions and MLA requests did not uncover any illicit proceeds or illicit conduct in relation with the involved company. Similarly, no tangible results were reported in another case discussed involving the seizure of massive quantity of cocaine (~2.7 tons) in Italy, intended to be imported into Armenia, nor in other cases of similar nature involving transnational elements. 439. Obtaining relevant financial intelligence is essential for effective financial investigations. In practice, intelligence and investigative authorities rely primarily on the FMC to obtain various types of financial intelligence, including data on active bank accounts, information available in the FMC’s database, information from reporting entities or foreign counterparts. A gradual decrease in the number of such requests, as indicated in Table 7.5, is attributed to the FMC’s efforts to streamline such inquiries. While the FMC’s support is important at the intelligence-gathering stage for establishing necessary leads, and the LEAs are satisfied with its quality, it can be observed that most of the inquiries relate to predicate offences rather than ML (see IO6). Table 7.5. Requests made by LEAs to the FMC Year Total number of requests by LEAs 2020 575 2021 630 2022 430 2023 340 2024 265 440. FMC intelligence cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceeding. For evidentiary purposes financial information (banking or related information) needs to be obtained through seizure measures based on a court decision. Based on interviews, there appears to be no uniform practice, and similar requests to access information under the same circumstances may be assessed differently by judges. On a positive note, the investigators reported that courts’ decisions are generally issued swiftly and there is always a possibility to appeal in case of refusal. There are no comprehensive statistics on the number of requests or court approval rates; according to the IC, approximatively 9.7% of such requests are rejected. When approved, the process to access banking and related information may take up to three to four days. These factors may impact the timeliness of access to necessary financial evidence. 441. One of the findings of the previous assessment concerned the complex legislative provisions which inhibited LEA’s ability to obtain the necessary financial evidence. The provision applied only to persons who were formally suspects or accused, and the 2015 MER recommended expanding these powers. Amendments adopted by Parliament in 2020 to broaden access to any financial information essential for investigations, were subject to review by the Constitutional Court, which found them not compliant with the constitutional principles. As a compromise solution, the new provisions of the CPC broadened LEAs’ powers, allowing access to banking and related information not only in relation to suspects or accused persons, but also in relation to their associates (where a direct connection exist), as well to legal persons managed or controlled by them. According to the NRA, LEAs have positively assessed the new provisions. While this is acknowledged, the scope of these powers remains limited and does not ensure the access to all necessary information necessary for the investigation of a ML or predicate offence (see R.31). Even if in practice, as explained by the authorities, some judges have been willing to interpret the legal framework flexibly, it remains open to different interpretation and legal challenges. 442. Beneficial ownership information is predominantly obtained by LEAs from the reporting entities. In such cases, obtaining BO data is subject to the same rules regulating the access to banking and related information, and the same limitations apply. This undermines the investigative bodies’ ability to efficiently determine the extent of criminal networks or the scale of criminality, in particular in third-party and autonomous ML cases. 443. As confirmed during the on-site interviews, investigations are often delayed due to limited forensic and commodity expertise, as well as delays in responses to MLA requests. Some ongoing court cases presented to the AT date back for more than six years. The country has acknowledged this deficiency and as outlined in the strategic steps (5.1 &amp; 5.2) of the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy, efforts are being made to reduce the time required for expert examinations and improve the training in MLA requests. 444. No investigations have been initiated against legal persons for ML or predicate offences. This is despite corporate liability provisions being in force since 2023. Although not a legal requirement, authorities indicated that legal person’s criminal liability depends on a prior conviction of a natural person. According to the explanations provided on-site, any investigation of a legal person can be carried out only after the conviction of the natural person. This raises concerns regarding LEAs’ ability to investigate ML in relation to legal persons. This is particularly relevant considering that the provided case examples and typologies associated with the main ML threats frequently indicate the involvement of legal persons. Footnotes [83] Armenia: Fifth round of anti-corruption monitoring follow-up report, OECD (2025)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 456. The main policy frameworks addressing strategic objectives related to asset recovery are the Anti-corruption Strategies (AC) 2019-2022 and 2023-2026, and the AML/CFT/ PFT Strategy 2025-2028. 457. Under the 2019-2022 AC Strategy, several developments were made to strengthen the asset recovery system. These include the adoption of the Law on civil forfeiture of illegal assets (LCFIA) in 2020; the approval of the 2020 implementing Government Decision on the procedure for holding a tender for the management of property transferred to the state during confiscation proceeding; and the establishment of a new department within the GPO dedicated to the confiscation of property of illicit origin. 458. The actions planned based on the AC 2023-2026 Strategy aim to further enhance the mechanisms for the recovery and management of corruption proceeds and property of illicit origin. These include six priority actions, including (i) establishing an integrated platform to facilitate information exchange between intelligence units, investigative and prosecutorial bodies and asset recovery specialists; (ii) introducing further amendments to the legal framework on civil forfeiture; (iii) developing a methodology and guidelines for the confiscation of criminal proceeds; and (iv) improving mutual legal assistance mechanisms to facilitate the confiscation of illegal proceeds. While the proposed activities are important, the overall comprehensiveness of the envisaged measures related to asset recovery appears to be limited. Although the authorities acknowledge that the investigative bodies are essentially the main authorities responsible for tracing, seizure and preparing sufficient evidence for the confiscation of criminal property, they have not been assigned any role in the implementation of these actions. Furthermore, there appears to be a need for more comprehensive and precise budgeting to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for the effective implementation the AC Strategy and its Action Plan [91] . 459. The 2025-2028 AML/CFT/PFT Strategy includes a priority on efficient execution of confiscation. The Action Plan of the Strategy provides for several implementing actions (Actions 10.1 – 10.6). They include the goal to conduct parallel financial investigation, to identify, seize and confiscate criminal property generated by utilising telecommunications and information technologies or derived from drug related offences, corruption and tax crimes, as well as on increasing resources (staff, knowledge and expertise). However, the AT acknowledges that the actual acts based on these priority actions are under the responsibility of each authority and the result are to be seen later. For example, one of the actions from the previous Strategy (2022-2024) that remains unimplemented concerns the improvement of resources available to LEAs for conducting parallel financial investigations (see IO1). 460. The confiscation of criminal proceeds is considered as a policy objective through the above Strategies and action plans. However, the results obtained in terms of seizures, confiscations, are not fully convincing that asset recovery is proactively pursued as a policy objective. Adequate statistics are not kept or analysed to identify trends or gaps in the asset recovery regime. This creates a challenge not only for assessing the overall performance of the framework in place, but also for defining the actual recovery rate of confiscated assets. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 461. The country has a mechanism to periodically review the strategic steps of asset recovery on corruption crimes and action plan activity performance is verified semi-annually. The AC Strategy 2023 – 2026 is based on the assessment of the results of the previous one, including sections on improving mechanisms for the recovery and management of corruption proceeds and property of illicit origin. This demonstrates a continuous and coherent strategic approach. 462. The Action plan of the AML/CFT/PFT strategy is monitored by the FMC on a semi-annual basis, and, according to the strategy, some drawbacks of and achievements in implementation have already been identified. The commendable periodic reviews are hampered by the deficiencies in collecting up-to-date statistics on asset recovery, in their assessment and the absence of an authority responsible for the oversight of the asset recovery system besides the civil confiscation. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 463. GPO has responsibilities in co-ordinating and implementing the civil confiscation regime, which is a positive step in implementing an effective cooperation framework in the country. The GPO has clarified the responsibilities of agencies for asset recovery measures in this regard. 464. The rest of the LEAs are responsible to identify and take the necessary assets recovery actions during the investigation in their own cases. Although obligations and powers are regulated and guidance is provided, there are no asset recovery cooperation frameworks. These fragmented efforts may lead to missed opportunities and impair the results in terms of asset recovery. Footnotes [91] Armenia: Fifth round of Anti-corruption monitoring follow-up report, OECD (2025), pages 14-17." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.1.1. Prioritising asset recovery as a policy objective 456. The main policy frameworks addressing strategic objectives related to asset recovery are the Anti-corruption Strategies (AC) 2019-2022 and 2023-2026, and the AML/CFT/ PFT Strategy 2025-2028. 457. Under the 2019-2022 AC Strategy, several developments were made to strengthen the asset recovery system. These include the adoption of the Law on civil forfeiture of illegal assets (LCFIA) in 2020; the approval of the 2020 implementing Government Decision on the procedure for holding a tender for the management of property transferred to the state during confiscation proceeding; and the establishment of a new department within the GPO dedicated to the confiscation of property of illicit origin. 458. The actions planned based on the AC 2023-2026 Strategy aim to further enhance the mechanisms for the recovery and management of corruption proceeds and property of illicit origin. These include six priority actions, including (i) establishing an integrated platform to facilitate information exchange between intelligence units, investigative and prosecutorial bodies and asset recovery specialists; (ii) introducing further amendments to the legal framework on civil forfeiture; (iii) developing a methodology and guidelines for the confiscation of criminal proceeds; and (iv) improving mutual legal assistance mechanisms to facilitate the confiscation of illegal proceeds. While the proposed activities are important, the overall comprehensiveness of the envisaged measures related to asset recovery appears to be limited. Although the authorities acknowledge that the investigative bodies are essentially the main authorities responsible for tracing, seizure and preparing sufficient evidence for the confiscation of criminal property, they have not been assigned any role in the implementation of these actions. Furthermore, there appears to be a need for more comprehensive and precise budgeting to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for the effective implementation the AC Strategy and its Action Plan [91] . 459. The 2025-2028 AML/CFT/PFT Strategy includes a priority on efficient execution of confiscation. The Action Plan of the Strategy provides for several implementing actions (Actions 10.1 – 10.6). They include the goal to conduct parallel financial investigation, to identify, seize and confiscate criminal property generated by utilising telecommunications and information technologies or derived from drug related offences, corruption and tax crimes, as well as on increasing resources (staff, knowledge and expertise). However, the AT acknowledges that the actual acts based on these priority actions are under the responsibility of each authority and the result are to be seen later. For example, one of the actions from the previous Strategy (2022-2024) that remains unimplemented concerns the improvement of resources available to LEAs for conducting parallel financial investigations (see IO1). 460. The confiscation of criminal proceeds is considered as a policy objective through the above Strategies and action plans. However, the results obtained in terms of seizures, confiscations, are not fully convincing that asset recovery is proactively pursued as a policy objective. Adequate statistics are not kept or analysed to identify trends or gaps in the asset recovery regime. This creates a challenge not only for assessing the overall performance of the framework in place, but also for defining the actual recovery rate of confiscated assets. 8.1.2. Periodic review of asset recovery regime 461. The country has a mechanism to periodically review the strategic steps of asset recovery on corruption crimes and action plan activity performance is verified semi-annually. The AC Strategy 2023 – 2026 is based on the assessment of the results of the previous one, including sections on improving mechanisms for the recovery and management of corruption proceeds and property of illicit origin. This demonstrates a continuous and coherent strategic approach. 462. The Action plan of the AML/CFT/PFT strategy is monitored by the FMC on a semi-annual basis, and, according to the strategy, some drawbacks of and achievements in implementation have already been identified. The commendable periodic reviews are hampered by the deficiencies in collecting up-to-date statistics on asset recovery, in their assessment and the absence of an authority responsible for the oversight of the asset recovery system besides the civil confiscation. 8.1.3. Effective agency structures and cooperation frameworks 463. GPO has responsibilities in co-ordinating and implementing the civil confiscation regime, which is a positive step in implementing an effective cooperation framework in the country. The GPO has clarified the responsibilities of agencies for asset recovery measures in this regard. 464. The rest of the LEAs are responsible to identify and take the necessary assets recovery actions during the investigation in their own cases. Although obligations and powers are regulated and guidance is provided, there are no asset recovery cooperation frameworks. These fragmented efforts may lead to missed opportunities and impair the results in terms of asset recovery. Footnotes [91] Armenia: Fifth round of Anti-corruption monitoring follow-up report, OECD (2025), pages 14-17." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 498. Armenia has the necessary systems in place for the identification and investigation of TF, with clear delineation of responsibilities. The relevant authorities are the FMC and the NSS at an intelligence level, and the IC at the investigatory level. At the beginning of the assessment period, both the NSS and the IC were responsible for investigating TF, but following a government decree in 2024, the investigative arm of the NSS was absorbed into the IC, which now has sole responsibility for TF investigations. According to the authorities this did not lead to any noticeable loss of expertise, as most of the investigators from the NSS transferred into the IC. 499. The authorities appear to be structured, trained and resourced to an appropriate level to discharge their functions. The FMC has two analysts who are TF specialists, and other analysts also receive regular TF training so are able to deal with TF cases. Under the FMC’s STR Prioritisation Rules, all TF related STRs are treated as a very high priority, which is the top priority rating. For reasons of national security, the NSS did not provide information about how it is structured, trained and resourced, but stated that it had no concerns on these fronts. The authorities also confirmed that these issues are routinely reviewed and fine-tuned as required The IC’s central department is responsible for specialist matters such as TF. It has a total number of 39 investigators, including 5 who are specialists in terrorism and TF, although other investigators are also able to take on TF cases. All investigators take part in regular TF training, including under programmes organised by the Academy of Justice. 500. By way of example, the authorities in cooperation with the Council of Europe organised a workshop on Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Financing Cases in October 2023 attended by investigators, the FMC prosecutors and judges on, among other things, current/emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities; effective institutional structures, organisational roles and responsibilities among national institutions for countering TF; the importance of joint investigative teams; the terrorist financing cycle (including the differences between ML and TF); how terrorist groups raise and move funds; the best practices in investigating and prosecuting TF; and TF typologies. Identification of TF activity 501. Possible TF activity may be identified from investigations into suspected terrorism or other criminality. TF investigations may also be initiated by the IC on the basis of financial intelligence via referrals from the NSS. The referral process includes FMC input, as the FMC disseminates TF related intelligence from STRs or other sources (e.g. alerts from international partners) to the NSS. The NSS develops this intelligence and then considers whether to refer the case to the IC for investigation. The NSS and the IC may continue to liaise with the FMC as required during the progression of any matter. 502. Five TF related STRs were received by the FMC from the private sector in the assessment period, primarily arising from suspected matches with persons who had been identified in other jurisdictions as having terrorism links. The FMC carried out analysis and made disseminations to the NSS, which then made additional enquiries. However, no TF activity was identified in any of these cases. Box 9.1. Case Studies – STRs relating to possible TF Case 1 In 2021 a bank submitted an STR stating that Non-Resident Natural Person 1, accompanied by another individual, approached a branch of the bank and asked to open accounts on an urgent basis, explaining the haste by the need to leave the country on the same day. When asked about the purpose of opening the accounts, Non-Resident Natural Person 1 provided unreliable explanations. She further informed the Bank that her husband, Non-Resident Natural Person 2, would arrive in Armenia within a month. Adverse information was identified through Internet searches and the World-Check database, indicating that both Natural Person 1 and Natural Person 2 had been arrested in Turkey in 2017 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. The bank rejected the request to open bank accounts for Natural Person 1. Although no financial transactions were conducted by the individuals, due to the adverse information suggesting possible links to terrorism, the STR was classified as “Very High Priority.” The entire analysis — including detailed CDD information (e.g. phone number, address, Facebook profile, and copies of adverse media reports) — was disseminated to the NSS for appropriate action. Following activity by the NSS, no criminality was identified. Case 2 In 2023, a Non-Resident Natural Person approached a bank to obtain a personal bank card in Armenian drams and open a USD account for an entity registered in Armenia under his name. To substantiate his income, the individual presented a service contract between the entity and a foreign company under which specified payments would be made. However, the contract was dated after the attempted opening of the account and would not be finalised until after activation of the account. The bank declined to provide the bank card or to open the account, and submitted an STR. The FMC carried out analysis using information from both restricted-access databases and public information. This established that the individual had recently acquired the right to reside in Armenian and had been designated on the Russian FIU’s terrorist and extremist list following a conviction for participation in terrorist acts in Russia for which he had served a prison sentence. No further financial activity was identified in FMC databases or the Central Registry of Accounts. Findings of the analysis were disseminated to relevant Armenian law enforcement authorities, as well as to the Russian FIU. According to the feedback received following preventive measures carried out by law enforcement authorities, no high-risk indicators or issues of concern were identified. Given the individual’s terrorist designation in Russia and the suspicious timing and nature of his attempted engagement with Armenian banks, it was assessed that the primary motive was likely to be to circumvent restrictions on the Russian financial system. Source: FMC 509. To date the NSS has made no TF referrals to the IC, although it has made some referrals for terrorism cases. These referrals have resulted in 13 terrorism investigations, all of which have been overseen by specialist prosecutors. None involved legal persons. According to the IC and as confirmed by the GPO, TF has also been considered in each of these investigations. Financial flows of suspects, their relatives and associates have been looked at, with the assistance of the FMC. Applications have also made to the court to obtain access to banking information, and at the time of the onsite visit there were 6 such cases before the court. However, apart from the ongoing aspects of the TF investigation referred to below, all of the terrorism cases that have been investigated during the assessment period have involved self-funding, so no TF investigations were initiated. Box 9.2. Case Study – Financial Enquiries in a Terrorism Investigation Person A was under investigation for organizing a terrorist act with the intention of intimidating a political party and forcing the public authorities to carry out or refrain from certain actions. This involved arranging explosions near a petrol station and at a private residence. Person A also liaised with three associates who assisted with planting the explosive devices. Throughout the course of the investigation, financing aspects were also examined. In particular, the following actions were taken: · Banking information relating to all of the persons involved in the case was obtained; · Operational-intelligence bodies looked into the financial and property status of these persons and their sources of income; · The financial and property capabilities of persons associated with these persons were also checked, including through inquiries made to a number of state bodies. These enquiries established that the activities of Person A were self-funded and did not reveal any indications of financing by any other source. See also the case study about a terrorism investigation under IO10. Source: GPO 510. The AT was satisfied that where there are TF related STRs or terrorism investigations, the authorities take appropriate action to identify possible TF activity. The AT therefore has no reason to question the outcomes in these cases, which are in line with Armenia’s understanding of its risk profile for TF (although see issues around the assessment of TF risk identified under IO.1). 511. However, the very low number of TF related STRs calls into question the level of TF understanding and reporting by the private sector. This has a cascading effect that undermines the ability of the authorities to identify possible TF cases. The AT also has concerns about the identification of possible TF activity from other sources. According to the IC, TF is routinely considered in investigations into other offences such as drug trafficking that are recognised internationally as being linked to TF. An example was given of a large-scale drugs case. Box 9.3. Case Study – Actions Taken to Explore Potential TF in Drug Smuggling Case The police from the Ministry of Internal Affairs found that a group of individuals was involved in smuggling drugs into Armenia for sale within the country. It was found from phone communications that the profits were regularly cashed out and transferred to Person A. The Police referred the case to the IC, which opened a case on drug smuggling. Since some of the intercepted messages included vague phrases, and some of the transfers were made to people who did not appear to have any clear connection to the group; the IC decided to also examine whether there were any possible TF elements in the case, as part of a parallel financial investigation. Specifically, during the course of the investigation the following measures were taken in respect of Person A, the group and persons associated with the group: · Their financial transactions including cash movements, were analyzed · Their details (including all possible publicly available data) were cross-checked with specific TF-related databases and lists established in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. · Their possible links or association with any non-profit organizations were examined. · Their travel patterns were explored and when applicable were mapped, including with border crossing information. Ultimately, the probe into potential TF revealed that the communications were non-ideological, and that the transfers were basically settlements for internal debts within the network that the group participated in. The investigation, at the same time, established that: · There were no signals or any other type of indication of TF; whereby none of the funds were collected, provided, or intended for use for TF purposes of in support of terrorist groups. · None of the beneficiaries, the members of the group or persons associated with the had links with jurisdictions that were high-risk for TF. · No operational evidence supported the existence of a TF network behind the scheme. Consequently, the IC did not further consider the TF aspect of the case, while the main criminal proceeding continued in relation to drug smuggling. 512.  The AT was satisfied that in this case; appropriate steps were taken to look for possible TF. However, no other examples were provided of any case where possible TF was considered in relation to predicate criminality. Therefore, the extent to which Armenia is proactively looking to identify possible TF activity in non-terrorism investigations was not demonstrated. 513. Concerns about non-identification of TF also arise from an example provided to the AT of an intelligence report from the FMC to the NSS. This report was based on intelligence received by the FMC under the “Regional level operation” programme, through which FIUs in the CIS countries share data on cross -border money flows for strategic purposes. Further information provided by the authorities demonstrated that the intelligence concerned a total of 261 transfers to 5 jurisdictions that are high-risk from a terrorism /TF perspective from money services providers within Armenian banks. Preliminary analysis by the FMC on some of these transfers indicated that there was no obvious rationale for them. The proactive and collaborative approach taken by the FMC on receiving this information is commendable. However, none of the Armenian banks in question had made any STRs about these transfers. 514. The authorities clarified that in the case of one of the jurisdictions in question, three transfers to the same recipient were made from three separate Armenian banks, and as none of the individual banks were aware of the other transfers this would not necessarily have been seen as suspicious. The authorities also clarified that the NSS had looked into these transfers and confirmed that they appeared to be for legitimate business reasons. 515. While these further explanations are useful in allaying concerns about these particular transfers, they do not explain the lack of any STRs in relation to the remaining 258 transfers to high-risk jurisdictions. This therefore further calls into question the level of TF understanding and reporting by the private sector, which suggests that the list of jurisdictions that are high risk for TF which is regularly updated and communicated to reporting entities is not being fully utilised to identify possible TF links to the movement of funds involving those jurisdictions. Furthermore, no information was provided by Armenia about any action taken by the NSS in relation to any of those 258 transfers in response to the report from the FMC. This suggests that TF intelligence reports other than STRs are not fully used to identify TF activity. Investigation of TF 516. During the assessment period there was one TF investigation, which was carried out by the NSS. Although the case resulted in a conviction for terrorism related offences, no TF prosecution was brought because the evidence indicated that the suspects were self -funding. However, some other aspects of the TF investigation are ongoing, but for reasons of operational security no further details could be provided. 517. The FMC and the GPO have jointly produced a document entitled Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences which has been endorsed by the Interagency Committee. However, this document was only recently issued so had not yet been applied in practice at the time of the onsite visit. 518. The IC confirmed that it has a wide range of investigatory powers available to it, including the use of special investigative techniques, and all necessary measures are in place to enable the sharing of sensitive material of the kind that is likely to arise in TF cases. However, the limitations on powers to use compulsory measures for the production of records held by FIs, DNFBPs and other natural or legal persons identified under Recommendation 31 and further elaborated under Immediate Outcome 7 are also relevant to TF investigations, as are the potential restrictions on the capacity to investigate legal persons identified under Immediate Outcome 7. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 519. As explained above, there has only been one TF investigation in the assessment period, which cannot be further described as some aspects are ongoing. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the investigation has identified the specific role of terrorist financiers. However, taking into account the steps taken by the authorities to look for financial flows with third parties in terrorism investigations, the AT has no reason to doubt that this would be considered as part of a TF investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.1.1. Identification and investigation of TF activity 498. Armenia has the necessary systems in place for the identification and investigation of TF, with clear delineation of responsibilities. The relevant authorities are the FMC and the NSS at an intelligence level, and the IC at the investigatory level. At the beginning of the assessment period, both the NSS and the IC were responsible for investigating TF, but following a government decree in 2024, the investigative arm of the NSS was absorbed into the IC, which now has sole responsibility for TF investigations. According to the authorities this did not lead to any noticeable loss of expertise, as most of the investigators from the NSS transferred into the IC. 499. The authorities appear to be structured, trained and resourced to an appropriate level to discharge their functions. The FMC has two analysts who are TF specialists, and other analysts also receive regular TF training so are able to deal with TF cases. Under the FMC’s STR Prioritisation Rules, all TF related STRs are treated as a very high priority, which is the top priority rating. For reasons of national security, the NSS did not provide information about how it is structured, trained and resourced, but stated that it had no concerns on these fronts. The authorities also confirmed that these issues are routinely reviewed and fine-tuned as required The IC’s central department is responsible for specialist matters such as TF. It has a total number of 39 investigators, including 5 who are specialists in terrorism and TF, although other investigators are also able to take on TF cases. All investigators take part in regular TF training, including under programmes organised by the Academy of Justice. 500. By way of example, the authorities in cooperation with the Council of Europe organised a workshop on Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Financing Cases in October 2023 attended by investigators, the FMC prosecutors and judges on, among other things, current/emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities; effective institutional structures, organisational roles and responsibilities among national institutions for countering TF; the importance of joint investigative teams; the terrorist financing cycle (including the differences between ML and TF); how terrorist groups raise and move funds; the best practices in investigating and prosecuting TF; and TF typologies. Identification of TF activity 501. Possible TF activity may be identified from investigations into suspected terrorism or other criminality. TF investigations may also be initiated by the IC on the basis of financial intelligence via referrals from the NSS. The referral process includes FMC input, as the FMC disseminates TF related intelligence from STRs or other sources (e.g. alerts from international partners) to the NSS. The NSS develops this intelligence and then considers whether to refer the case to the IC for investigation. The NSS and the IC may continue to liaise with the FMC as required during the progression of any matter. 502. Five TF related STRs were received by the FMC from the private sector in the assessment period, primarily arising from suspected matches with persons who had been identified in other jurisdictions as having terrorism links. The FMC carried out analysis and made disseminations to the NSS, which then made additional enquiries. However, no TF activity was identified in any of these cases. Box 9.1. Case Studies – STRs relating to possible TF Case 1 In 2021 a bank submitted an STR stating that Non-Resident Natural Person 1, accompanied by another individual, approached a branch of the bank and asked to open accounts on an urgent basis, explaining the haste by the need to leave the country on the same day. When asked about the purpose of opening the accounts, Non-Resident Natural Person 1 provided unreliable explanations. She further informed the Bank that her husband, Non-Resident Natural Person 2, would arrive in Armenia within a month. Adverse information was identified through Internet searches and the World-Check database, indicating that both Natural Person 1 and Natural Person 2 had been arrested in Turkey in 2017 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. The bank rejected the request to open bank accounts for Natural Person 1. Although no financial transactions were conducted by the individuals, due to the adverse information suggesting possible links to terrorism, the STR was classified as “Very High Priority.” The entire analysis — including detailed CDD information (e.g. phone number, address, Facebook profile, and copies of adverse media reports) — was disseminated to the NSS for appropriate action. Following activity by the NSS, no criminality was identified. Case 2 In 2023, a Non-Resident Natural Person approached a bank to obtain a personal bank card in Armenian drams and open a USD account for an entity registered in Armenia under his name. To substantiate his income, the individual presented a service contract between the entity and a foreign company under which specified payments would be made. However, the contract was dated after the attempted opening of the account and would not be finalised until after activation of the account. The bank declined to provide the bank card or to open the account, and submitted an STR. The FMC carried out analysis using information from both restricted-access databases and public information. This established that the individual had recently acquired the right to reside in Armenian and had been designated on the Russian FIU’s terrorist and extremist list following a conviction for participation in terrorist acts in Russia for which he had served a prison sentence. No further financial activity was identified in FMC databases or the Central Registry of Accounts. Findings of the analysis were disseminated to relevant Armenian law enforcement authorities, as well as to the Russian FIU. According to the feedback received following preventive measures carried out by law enforcement authorities, no high-risk indicators or issues of concern were identified. Given the individual’s terrorist designation in Russia and the suspicious timing and nature of his attempted engagement with Armenian banks, it was assessed that the primary motive was likely to be to circumvent restrictions on the Russian financial system. Source: FMC 509. To date the NSS has made no TF referrals to the IC, although it has made some referrals for terrorism cases. These referrals have resulted in 13 terrorism investigations, all of which have been overseen by specialist prosecutors. None involved legal persons. According to the IC and as confirmed by the GPO, TF has also been considered in each of these investigations. Financial flows of suspects, their relatives and associates have been looked at, with the assistance of the FMC. Applications have also made to the court to obtain access to banking information, and at the time of the onsite visit there were 6 such cases before the court. However, apart from the ongoing aspects of the TF investigation referred to below, all of the terrorism cases that have been investigated during the assessment period have involved self-funding, so no TF investigations were initiated. Box 9.2. Case Study – Financial Enquiries in a Terrorism Investigation Person A was under investigation for organizing a terrorist act with the intention of intimidating a political party and forcing the public authorities to carry out or refrain from certain actions. This involved arranging explosions near a petrol station and at a private residence. Person A also liaised with three associates who assisted with planting the explosive devices. Throughout the course of the investigation, financing aspects were also examined. In particular, the following actions were taken: · Banking information relating to all of the persons involved in the case was obtained; · Operational-intelligence bodies looked into the financial and property status of these persons and their sources of income; · The financial and property capabilities of persons associated with these persons were also checked, including through inquiries made to a number of state bodies. These enquiries established that the activities of Person A were self-funded and did not reveal any indications of financing by any other source. See also the case study about a terrorism investigation under IO10. Source: GPO 510. The AT was satisfied that where there are TF related STRs or terrorism investigations, the authorities take appropriate action to identify possible TF activity. The AT therefore has no reason to question the outcomes in these cases, which are in line with Armenia’s understanding of its risk profile for TF (although see issues around the assessment of TF risk identified under IO.1). 511. However, the very low number of TF related STRs calls into question the level of TF understanding and reporting by the private sector. This has a cascading effect that undermines the ability of the authorities to identify possible TF cases. The AT also has concerns about the identification of possible TF activity from other sources. According to the IC, TF is routinely considered in investigations into other offences such as drug trafficking that are recognised internationally as being linked to TF. An example was given of a large-scale drugs case. Box 9.3. Case Study – Actions Taken to Explore Potential TF in Drug Smuggling Case The police from the Ministry of Internal Affairs found that a group of individuals was involved in smuggling drugs into Armenia for sale within the country. It was found from phone communications that the profits were regularly cashed out and transferred to Person A. The Police referred the case to the IC, which opened a case on drug smuggling. Since some of the intercepted messages included vague phrases, and some of the transfers were made to people who did not appear to have any clear connection to the group; the IC decided to also examine whether there were any possible TF elements in the case, as part of a parallel financial investigation. Specifically, during the course of the investigation the following measures were taken in respect of Person A, the group and persons associated with the group: · Their financial transactions including cash movements, were analyzed · Their details (including all possible publicly available data) were cross-checked with specific TF-related databases and lists established in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. · Their possible links or association with any non-profit organizations were examined. · Their travel patterns were explored and when applicable were mapped, including with border crossing information. Ultimately, the probe into potential TF revealed that the communications were non-ideological, and that the transfers were basically settlements for internal debts within the network that the group participated in. The investigation, at the same time, established that: · There were no signals or any other type of indication of TF; whereby none of the funds were collected, provided, or intended for use for TF purposes of in support of terrorist groups. · None of the beneficiaries, the members of the group or persons associated with the had links with jurisdictions that were high-risk for TF. · No operational evidence supported the existence of a TF network behind the scheme. Consequently, the IC did not further consider the TF aspect of the case, while the main criminal proceeding continued in relation to drug smuggling. 512.  The AT was satisfied that in this case; appropriate steps were taken to look for possible TF. However, no other examples were provided of any case where possible TF was considered in relation to predicate criminality. Therefore, the extent to which Armenia is proactively looking to identify possible TF activity in non-terrorism investigations was not demonstrated. 513. Concerns about non-identification of TF also arise from an example provided to the AT of an intelligence report from the FMC to the NSS. This report was based on intelligence received by the FMC under the “Regional level operation” programme, through which FIUs in the CIS countries share data on cross -border money flows for strategic purposes. Further information provided by the authorities demonstrated that the intelligence concerned a total of 261 transfers to 5 jurisdictions that are high-risk from a terrorism /TF perspective from money services providers within Armenian banks. Preliminary analysis by the FMC on some of these transfers indicated that there was no obvious rationale for them. The proactive and collaborative approach taken by the FMC on receiving this information is commendable. However, none of the Armenian banks in question had made any STRs about these transfers. 514. The authorities clarified that in the case of one of the jurisdictions in question, three transfers to the same recipient were made from three separate Armenian banks, and as none of the individual banks were aware of the other transfers this would not necessarily have been seen as suspicious. The authorities also clarified that the NSS had looked into these transfers and confirmed that they appeared to be for legitimate business reasons. 515. While these further explanations are useful in allaying concerns about these particular transfers, they do not explain the lack of any STRs in relation to the remaining 258 transfers to high-risk jurisdictions. This therefore further calls into question the level of TF understanding and reporting by the private sector, which suggests that the list of jurisdictions that are high risk for TF which is regularly updated and communicated to reporting entities is not being fully utilised to identify possible TF links to the movement of funds involving those jurisdictions. Furthermore, no information was provided by Armenia about any action taken by the NSS in relation to any of those 258 transfers in response to the report from the FMC. This suggests that TF intelligence reports other than STRs are not fully used to identify TF activity. Investigation of TF 516. During the assessment period there was one TF investigation, which was carried out by the NSS. Although the case resulted in a conviction for terrorism related offences, no TF prosecution was brought because the evidence indicated that the suspects were self -funding. However, some other aspects of the TF investigation are ongoing, but for reasons of operational security no further details could be provided. 517. The FMC and the GPO have jointly produced a document entitled Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences which has been endorsed by the Interagency Committee. However, this document was only recently issued so had not yet been applied in practice at the time of the onsite visit. 518. The IC confirmed that it has a wide range of investigatory powers available to it, including the use of special investigative techniques, and all necessary measures are in place to enable the sharing of sensitive material of the kind that is likely to arise in TF cases. However, the limitations on powers to use compulsory measures for the production of records held by FIs, DNFBPs and other natural or legal persons identified under Recommendation 31 and further elaborated under Immediate Outcome 7 are also relevant to TF investigations, as are the potential restrictions on the capacity to investigate legal persons identified under Immediate Outcome 7. 9.1.2. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 519. As explained above, there has only been one TF investigation in the assessment period, which cannot be further described as some aspects are ongoing. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the investigation has identified the specific role of terrorist financiers. However, taking into account the steps taken by the authorities to look for financial flows with third parties in terrorism investigations, the AT has no reason to doubt that this would be considered as part of a TF investigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="531. Under the AML/CFT Law, financial institutions and DNFBPs are obliged to freeze the assets of persons designated by the UN under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions without delay, and to prohibit the making of funds or economic resources available to them. The same applies designations made by Armenia under UNSCR 1373. Therefore, under Armenian law, designations and any changes to designations under these UNSCRS are immediately effective without the need for any additional measures to be taken by the authorities. 532. The FMC is responsible for communicating changes to designations to the reporting entities. Chapter 26 of the FMC’s Operational Manual, supported by an internal Order of the Head of the FMC, sets out the respective process. The International Relations Division of the FMC checks the UN sanctions lists every working day. Any changes are communicated immediately to FMC’s Information Systems Design and Development Division, which manually updates the FMC database of designated persons and posts an update on the news section of the FMC website. The FMC also sends electronic notifications of changes to all banks. Other reporting entities will only receive notifications if they subscribe to a mailing list. The authorities were unable to confirm the proportion of reporting entities that have subscribed, as both personal and professional personal email addresses may be used. 533. FMC notifications are usually sent out on the same day that a change occurs, as confirmed by examples provided to the AT. In addition, the FMC has recently issued a formal communication to instruct reporting entities to monitor UN lists independently of FMC notifications. To facilitate this, there is a dedicated page on the FMC website with a searchable interface that enables any person to check names against the UN sanctions lists. 534. There is a procedure in place for making designation recommendations to the UN under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, designations under UNSCR 1373 (whether autonomously or at the request of another jurisdiction), and designation requests to other jurisdictions. This procedure is set out in the Listing Rules (see R.6), which have been in place throughout the assessment period. The FMC has a central role in this procedure, which is formalized and governed by the FMC’s Operational Manual. The Listing Rules and the FMC Operational Manual between them extend to all of the activity necessary to make designation proposals, designations and designation requests. However, while the Listing Rules are publicly available and therefore accessible to other jurisdictions who might wish to make a designation request, the AT considers that additional guidance would be beneficial (e.g. by setting out the kind of information other jurisdictions should provide, communication channels and contact points etc.). 535. No request to freeze assets has been made to, or received from, another jurisdiction, so these aspects of the system have not been tested. However, Armenia made domestic designations on two occasions under UNSCR 1373 (December 2020 and October 2021), designating a total of 341 individuals and 13 entities. These designations remain in place. In both cases, the authorities acted quickly to obtain and assess information from a wide range of domestic and international sources. Once this had been done, the designations were made in a matter of days. Therefore, Armenia was able to demonstrate the ability to apply its procedures effectively in practice (as confirmed by redacted minutes of the relevant meeting of the Interagency Committee). In both cases, the designations were communicated to the reporting entities on the same day that they were made. These designations have not resulted in the identification of any relevant assets within Armenia, because according to the authorities, the designated persons have not used Armenia’s financial or non-financial systems and have not carried out any activity within the territory of Armenia. 536. The authorities had considered making designation proposals to the UN for persons designated domestically but concluded that the criteria under relevant UNSCRs were not met. The authorities also explained their reasons for not requesting any other jurisdiction to freeze the assets of the persons whom they had designated. While further details are not provided here on the grounds of sensitivity, the AT is satisfied that the reasons were valid. 537. Reporting entities are required to carry out sanctions screening and to report any matches to the FMC. These obligations are supported by Freezing Guidance issued by the FMC (see R.6), and by the template for making STRs referred to under IO.6 which includes a specific section for reporting sanctions matches. In addition, all STRs received by the FMC are systematically cross checked against UN lists for possible matches. The authorities advised that this independent secondary verification is carried out to ensure that any positive matches which may have been overlooked or misidentified are promptly detected. 538. To date, no assets have been frozen under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions. Armenia’s designations under UNSCR 1373 have also not resulted in the freezing of any assets. 539. However, Armenia’s systems for identifying assets linked to persons designated under other sanctions matches have been tested by examples of suspected matches under other regimes. As explained under IO.11, assets linked to persons designated under PF sanctions regimes have been identified and frozen. There has also been a case where a potential link to a designated person was reported and looked into by the authorities but turned out to be a false positive. Box 10.1. Case Study – Suspected Sanctions Match In 2023, Armenian resident Person A, using his own account held with Bank 1, attempted to make a transfer to the account of a foreign resident: Person B in Jurisdiction C. When conducting CDD, the internal system of Bank 1 identified a match with an individual subject to targeted financial sanctions established pursuant to a UNSCR. At that stage, the only information that Bank 1 had on Person B was: the name and last name, the bank details of Person B, and the justification of the attempted transaction, noted as “payment for design services”. Following the match, Bank 1 immediately froze the funds relating to the transfer and contacted the FMC. The FMC instructed Bank 1 to seek further information from Person A about Person B, including requesting copies of any documents available. Person A provided a copy of Person B’s passport to Bank 1, which then provided it to the FMC. The FMC decided to apply additional screening measures for gathering further information, namely by: · Quickly screening Person B against all available databases; · Initiating analysis on Person B using social media; · Quickly screened Person A, namely via the quick access to the designated database of the SRC. The additional screening measures employed by the FMC revealed the following: · The date of birth of Person B did not match with the date of birth of the individual subject to TFS established pursuant to a UNSCR. · Person B’s name and last name were very common both in Jurisdiction C, as well as in the wider region; and that Person B was indeed a moderately-known freelancer, who specialized in interior design. · Person A’s business activity was in line with the justification of the transaction, as main area or activity of Sole Proprietor A was “design and construction”. Consequently, it was quickly established that Person B did not have any relation to the individual subject to targeted financial sanctions established pursuant to a UNSCR, and the apparent match was a false positive. The entire process took only one hour. Bank 1 was then instructed to lift the freezing measure and not to file a formal STR. Source: FMC 540. These cases demonstrate that the reporting entities and the authorities are taking steps to identify assets that are linked to designated persons. Furthermore, according to the authorities, for commercial reasons Armenian banks decline to carry out transactions linked to persons designated under other international sanctions regimes implemented by OFAC and the EU, which was confirmed by the majority of banks met by the AT onsite. The fact that they are able to identify such links, despite having no legal obligation to apply EU and OFAC sanctions regimes, further demonstrates that the private sector has the necessary measures in place to enable them to identify assets linked to designated persons and therefore could identify assets linked to persons designated under the UNSCRs related to TF. The AT was therefore satisfied that the lack of any assets frozen under the relevant UNSCRs was not due to an inability of the jurisdiction to identify such links. 541. As no assets have been frozen under these UNSCRs Armenia has not received a request for access to frozen assets. It has also not received a request for unfreezing or delisting. While this is in line with Armenia’s risk profile, it means that the procedures for granting access to frozen funds, unfreezing and delisting as described under R.6 have not been used in practice, although Armenia has issued guidance on these issues." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="531. Under the AML/CFT Law, financial institutions and DNFBPs are obliged to freeze the assets of persons designated by the UN under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions without delay, and to prohibit the making of funds or economic resources available to them. The same applies designations made by Armenia under UNSCR 1373. Therefore, under Armenian law, designations and any changes to designations under these UNSCRS are immediately effective without the need for any additional measures to be taken by the authorities. 532. The FMC is responsible for communicating changes to designations to the reporting entities. Chapter 26 of the FMC’s Operational Manual, supported by an internal Order of the Head of the FMC, sets out the respective process. The International Relations Division of the FMC checks the UN sanctions lists every working day. Any changes are communicated immediately to FMC’s Information Systems Design and Development Division, which manually updates the FMC database of designated persons and posts an update on the news section of the FMC website. The FMC also sends electronic notifications of changes to all banks. Other reporting entities will only receive notifications if they subscribe to a mailing list. The authorities were unable to confirm the proportion of reporting entities that have subscribed, as both personal and professional personal email addresses may be used. 533. FMC notifications are usually sent out on the same day that a change occurs, as confirmed by examples provided to the AT. In addition, the FMC has recently issued a formal communication to instruct reporting entities to monitor UN lists independently of FMC notifications. To facilitate this, there is a dedicated page on the FMC website with a searchable interface that enables any person to check names against the UN sanctions lists. 534. There is a procedure in place for making designation recommendations to the UN under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, designations under UNSCR 1373 (whether autonomously or at the request of another jurisdiction), and designation requests to other jurisdictions. This procedure is set out in the Listing Rules (see R.6), which have been in place throughout the assessment period. The FMC has a central role in this procedure, which is formalized and governed by the FMC’s Operational Manual. The Listing Rules and the FMC Operational Manual between them extend to all of the activity necessary to make designation proposals, designations and designation requests. However, while the Listing Rules are publicly available and therefore accessible to other jurisdictions who might wish to make a designation request, the AT considers that additional guidance would be beneficial (e.g. by setting out the kind of information other jurisdictions should provide, communication channels and contact points etc.). 535. No request to freeze assets has been made to, or received from, another jurisdiction, so these aspects of the system have not been tested. However, Armenia made domestic designations on two occasions under UNSCR 1373 (December 2020 and October 2021), designating a total of 341 individuals and 13 entities. These designations remain in place. In both cases, the authorities acted quickly to obtain and assess information from a wide range of domestic and international sources. Once this had been done, the designations were made in a matter of days. Therefore, Armenia was able to demonstrate the ability to apply its procedures effectively in practice (as confirmed by redacted minutes of the relevant meeting of the Interagency Committee). In both cases, the designations were communicated to the reporting entities on the same day that they were made. These designations have not resulted in the identification of any relevant assets within Armenia, because according to the authorities, the designated persons have not used Armenia’s financial or non-financial systems and have not carried out any activity within the territory of Armenia. 536. The authorities had considered making designation proposals to the UN for persons designated domestically but concluded that the criteria under relevant UNSCRs were not met. The authorities also explained their reasons for not requesting any other jurisdiction to freeze the assets of the persons whom they had designated. While further details are not provided here on the grounds of sensitivity, the AT is satisfied that the reasons were valid. 537. Reporting entities are required to carry out sanctions screening and to report any matches to the FMC. These obligations are supported by Freezing Guidance issued by the FMC (see R.6), and by the template for making STRs referred to under IO.6 which includes a specific section for reporting sanctions matches. In addition, all STRs received by the FMC are systematically cross checked against UN lists for possible matches. The authorities advised that this independent secondary verification is carried out to ensure that any positive matches which may have been overlooked or misidentified are promptly detected. 538. To date, no assets have been frozen under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions. Armenia’s designations under UNSCR 1373 have also not resulted in the freezing of any assets. 539. However, Armenia’s systems for identifying assets linked to persons designated under other sanctions matches have been tested by examples of suspected matches under other regimes. As explained under IO.11, assets linked to persons designated under PF sanctions regimes have been identified and frozen. There has also been a case where a potential link to a designated person was reported and looked into by the authorities but turned out to be a false positive. Box 10.1. Case Study – Suspected Sanctions Match In 2023, Armenian resident Person A, using his own account held with Bank 1, attempted to make a transfer to the account of a foreign resident: Person B in Jurisdiction C. When conducting CDD, the internal system of Bank 1 identified a match with an individual subject to targeted financial sanctions established pursuant to a UNSCR. At that stage, the only information that Bank 1 had on Person B was: the name and last name, the bank details of Person B, and the justification of the attempted transaction, noted as “payment for design services”. Following the match, Bank 1 immediately froze the funds relating to the transfer and contacted the FMC. The FMC instructed Bank 1 to seek further information from Person A about Person B, including requesting copies of any documents available. Person A provided a copy of Person B’s passport to Bank 1, which then provided it to the FMC. The FMC decided to apply additional screening measures for gathering further information, namely by: · Quickly screening Person B against all available databases; · Initiating analysis on Person B using social media; · Quickly screened Person A, namely via the quick access to the designated database of the SRC. The additional screening measures employed by the FMC revealed the following: · The date of birth of Person B did not match with the date of birth of the individual subject to TFS established pursuant to a UNSCR. · Person B’s name and last name were very common both in Jurisdiction C, as well as in the wider region; and that Person B was indeed a moderately-known freelancer, who specialized in interior design. · Person A’s business activity was in line with the justification of the transaction, as main area or activity of Sole Proprietor A was “design and construction”. Consequently, it was quickly established that Person B did not have any relation to the individual subject to targeted financial sanctions established pursuant to a UNSCR, and the apparent match was a false positive. The entire process took only one hour. Bank 1 was then instructed to lift the freezing measure and not to file a formal STR. Source: FMC 540. These cases demonstrate that the reporting entities and the authorities are taking steps to identify assets that are linked to designated persons. Furthermore, according to the authorities, for commercial reasons Armenian banks decline to carry out transactions linked to persons designated under other international sanctions regimes implemented by OFAC and the EU, which was confirmed by the majority of banks met by the AT onsite. The fact that they are able to identify such links, despite having no legal obligation to apply EU and OFAC sanctions regimes, further demonstrates that the private sector has the necessary measures in place to enable them to identify assets linked to designated persons and therefore could identify assets linked to persons designated under the UNSCRs related to TF. The AT was therefore satisfied that the lack of any assets frozen under the relevant UNSCRs was not due to an inability of the jurisdiction to identify such links. 541. As no assets have been frozen under these UNSCRs Armenia has not received a request for access to frozen assets. It has also not received a request for unfreezing or delisting. While this is in line with Armenia’s risk profile, it means that the procedures for granting access to frozen funds, unfreezing and delisting as described under R.6 have not been used in practice, although Armenia has issued guidance on these issues." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 592. Armenia has well established cooperation and coordination mechanisms in place for the development and implementation of CPF policy. The Interagency Committee is responsible for high-level policy making and coordination in this area, as specified in a government regulation governing the functions of the Interagency Committee relation to CPF. This regulation states that the Interagency Committee is responsible for coordinating NRAs, including the PF NRA, for both creating a coordinated national policy in the field of CPF and developing an action plan for the implementation of that policy, and for developing legal acts in the field of CPF. As explained under IO.1, the membership of the Interagency Committee includes all of the key AML/CTF/CPF stakeholder agencies, including policy makers, the FMC, LEAs, supervisors, customs and tax authorities and the judiciary. Representatives of the banking association may also attend by specific invitation. On average the Interagency Committee meets twice a year. 593. The FMC performs the role of the Secretariat to the Interagency Committee. It coordinates organizational matters, facilitates communication among members, and monitors the implementation of decisions of the Interagency Committee, reporting progress and outstanding issues to the Chairman when required. 594. The Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division of the FMC is a dedicated unit responsible for the collection and analysis of information and drafting of the PF NRA. This is done with the support of other authorities, including those having law enforcement and supervisory functions in the area of PF, as well as the private sector. The Division is adequately staffed and equipped to perform these functions. 595. To facilitate secure and efficient communication between members of Interagency Committee and FMC, a specialized system known as the Unified Information Domain was established in 2014. This platform was modernized and renamed the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform in 2022. Continuous enhancements have been made to support its development, including the integration of new modules, such as a system for receiving statistical data from state institutions in 2023, and in 2024, a feedback mechanism enabling LEAs to report on the use of financial intelligence data provided by FMC. These information channels were used within the scope of the PF NRA process, for exchanging information between domestic stakeholder agencies involved. To further strengthen high-level cooperation and consensus, thematic working groups are also established. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 596. Measures are in place to enable cooperation and coordination for CPF operational purposes. A dedicated Working Group under the Interagency Committee provides a platform for operational level cooperation. Its members act as contact points for their respective bodies and communicate primarily through the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform, which enables secure exchange of information and includes a standardized feedback module allowing LEAs to report on the use of FMC disseminations. In addition, competent authorities exchange information through the 'Mulberry' document management system. 597. Operational coordination is reinforced through joint participation in guidance and awareness raising initiatives, which routinely involve the same authorities represented in the Working Group. These activities support a shared understanding of CPF obligations and operational requirements across agencies. 598. These mechanisms are further underpinned by bilateral MoUs between the FMC and other authorities which set out the specific roles and needs of parties as well as the framework for cooperation on specified matters, including exchange of information, organization of trainings, developments of handbooks and typologies etc. This includes an MoU between the FMC and the MoE for enhancing the effectiveness of control over circulation of PF-sensitive materials and ensuring more comprehensive cooperation. Under this arrangement, the MoE regularly provides the FMC with information on licences issued for export and import of dual-use goods, as well as on licence applications that have bene refused. 599. In line with Armenia’s PF risk profile described below, there has been limited need for the use of these mechanisms for CPF operational purposes. However, their effectiveness was demonstrated by actions taken by the authorities following the identification of assets linked to the Iran PF sanctions regime referred to below. An urgent meeting of the Working Group was convened, where measures were put in place to monitor the situation, to keep reporting entities informed and to remind them of their TFS obligations. The outcomes from these measures were discussed in subsequent meetings to ensure that all assets and property subject to restrictive measures were frozen without delay, and that access to property for sanctioned persons and entities was properly disrupted. In addition to this case, there have been instances where the authorities have collaborated over operational measures to identify possible PF links to the export of dual use goods." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 592. Armenia has well established cooperation and coordination mechanisms in place for the development and implementation of CPF policy. The Interagency Committee is responsible for high-level policy making and coordination in this area, as specified in a government regulation governing the functions of the Interagency Committee relation to CPF. This regulation states that the Interagency Committee is responsible for coordinating NRAs, including the PF NRA, for both creating a coordinated national policy in the field of CPF and developing an action plan for the implementation of that policy, and for developing legal acts in the field of CPF. As explained under IO.1, the membership of the Interagency Committee includes all of the key AML/CTF/CPF stakeholder agencies, including policy makers, the FMC, LEAs, supervisors, customs and tax authorities and the judiciary. Representatives of the banking association may also attend by specific invitation. On average the Interagency Committee meets twice a year. 593. The FMC performs the role of the Secretariat to the Interagency Committee. It coordinates organizational matters, facilitates communication among members, and monitors the implementation of decisions of the Interagency Committee, reporting progress and outstanding issues to the Chairman when required. 594. The Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division of the FMC is a dedicated unit responsible for the collection and analysis of information and drafting of the PF NRA. This is done with the support of other authorities, including those having law enforcement and supervisory functions in the area of PF, as well as the private sector. The Division is adequately staffed and equipped to perform these functions. 595. To facilitate secure and efficient communication between members of Interagency Committee and FMC, a specialized system known as the Unified Information Domain was established in 2014. This platform was modernized and renamed the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform in 2022. Continuous enhancements have been made to support its development, including the integration of new modules, such as a system for receiving statistical data from state institutions in 2023, and in 2024, a feedback mechanism enabling LEAs to report on the use of financial intelligence data provided by FMC. These information channels were used within the scope of the PF NRA process, for exchanging information between domestic stakeholder agencies involved. To further strengthen high-level cooperation and consensus, thematic working groups are also established. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 596. Measures are in place to enable cooperation and coordination for CPF operational purposes. A dedicated Working Group under the Interagency Committee provides a platform for operational level cooperation. Its members act as contact points for their respective bodies and communicate primarily through the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform, which enables secure exchange of information and includes a standardized feedback module allowing LEAs to report on the use of FMC disseminations. In addition, competent authorities exchange information through the 'Mulberry' document management system. 597. Operational coordination is reinforced through joint participation in guidance and awareness raising initiatives, which routinely involve the same authorities represented in the Working Group. These activities support a shared understanding of CPF obligations and operational requirements across agencies. 598. These mechanisms are further underpinned by bilateral MoUs between the FMC and other authorities which set out the specific roles and needs of parties as well as the framework for cooperation on specified matters, including exchange of information, organization of trainings, developments of handbooks and typologies etc. This includes an MoU between the FMC and the MoE for enhancing the effectiveness of control over circulation of PF-sensitive materials and ensuring more comprehensive cooperation. Under this arrangement, the MoE regularly provides the FMC with information on licences issued for export and import of dual-use goods, as well as on licence applications that have bene refused. 599. In line with Armenia’s PF risk profile described below, there has been limited need for the use of these mechanisms for CPF operational purposes. However, their effectiveness was demonstrated by actions taken by the authorities following the identification of assets linked to the Iran PF sanctions regime referred to below. An urgent meeting of the Working Group was convened, where measures were put in place to monitor the situation, to keep reporting entities informed and to remind them of their TFS obligations. The outcomes from these measures were discussed in subsequent meetings to ensure that all assets and property subject to restrictive measures were frozen without delay, and that access to property for sanctioned persons and entities was properly disrupted. In addition to this case, there have been instances where the authorities have collaborated over operational measures to identify possible PF links to the export of dual use goods." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 31. To address national ML/TF risks Armenian authorities developed: i) the National AML/CFT/CPF strategy (2022 to 2024) and a subsequent National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy (2025 to 2028), as well as a National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023 to 2026. Additionally, based on the outcomes of the NRA, the FMC carried out and completed 25 strategic analyses, in relation to a broad range of relevant topics such as significant international financial flows countries, possible TF-risky transactions (Regional level operation), banks and their non-resident customers; the internal monitoring of the reporting entities, etc. [37] These analyses, are being used by the reporting entities, by the law enforcement and the supervisory authorities. For example, the strategic analysis on laundering of funds obtained as a result of fraud was used by the reporting entities who revised their internal legal acts and strengthened onboarding and ongoing due diligence, LEAs used disseminations from the FMC as well as the typology in general to initiate or uncover criminal cases involving ML and/or fraud, and the supervisory authorities took the typologies identified into their inspection plans. 32. The 2022-2024 Strategy had three intermediate outcomes: i) understanding and mitigation of ML/TF/PF risks through domestic coordination of policies and international cooperation, prevention, ii) detection and reporting of proceeds of crime and funds in support of terrorism, and iii) detection and disruption of ML/TF threats where criminals are sanctioned and proceeds of crime and terrorist resources are confiscated. These outcomes included 75 actions, of which 36 were operational, 11 legislative, 5 institutional and 23 supportive. 33. Implementation of strategic goals largely focused on increasing resources (staff, knowledge and expertise) in law enforcement and investigative authorities, as well as increasing the understanding of ML/TF risks, strengthening AML/CFT supervision especially of the financial sector followed by assistance to the reporting entities to better implement AML/CFT measures. All the strategic goals were drawn on the basis of the identified vulnerabilities. 34. Authorities report that technically all actions linked to the 2022-2024 National Strategy have been addressed, except five. The unaddressed actions were followed up and included into the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy for 2025-2028 together with other actions. One of these five action points that is still unaddressed, for example, calls for improving resources available in the LEAs for conducting parallel financial investigations. 35. The 2025-2028 Strategy has five strategic priorities: i) understanding, assessment and mitigation of ML/TF/PF risks; ii) effective investigation of ML cases; iii) risk-based supervision; iv) execution of confiscation; and v) preventative measures. These strategic actions, similar to the previous strategy, broadly cover the AML spectrum. There are in all 18 strategic tasks with 67 actions, of which 34 actions are operational, 6 legislative, 2 institutional, and 25 supportive. The strategic action plan of the current strategy is being monitored semi-annually, through qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria. 36. All of the above actions are aligned with the ML risks, and are measurable, constituting important elements for improving AML/CFT landscape. 37. Authorities reported that priority in the actions is shown by the deadline. The AT noted that some of the actions with a deadline set as December 2025 and therefore of higher priority relate to legal persons which in the 2024 NRA have a medium ML residual risk. 38. The AT also notes that the qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria are rather general and not always linked to measurable outcomes. For example, when making reference to ‘high-quality requests’ in relation to MLAs, criteria need to be presented on what constitutes high-quality. 39. With regards to the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023-2026, Armenia is to be commended for its the political commitment and infrastructure development to fight this crime, in line with the AML/CFT risk assessment. This strategy has five goals: preventing corruption and strengthening integrity systems with 26 actions, improving legal and institutional systems for combating corruption with 21 actions, anti-corruption education and improving public awareness mechanisms with 15 actions, business integrity, protecting business rights and facilitating state-business administration with 15 actions, and enhancing anti-corruption monitoring and evaluation system with six actions. 40. The Anti-Corruption Strategy could use more clarity on how the action plan should be prioritised. For example, prioritise actions that involve large-scale corruption and allocate resources accordingly. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 41. In the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy, the majority of the strategic actions are presented as addressing jointly ML/TF. There are few action points directly targeting TF aspects, which are mainly the sub-actions of general ML/TF related actions [38] . The limited action points directly targeting TF mirror the lower residual risk in the 2024 NRA. 42. Similar to the policies and activities to address ML, the strategic action plan on the TF action points is being monitored semi-annually, through qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria. Given the improvements needed of the TF risk assessment and risk understanding explored in the previous section, more TF action points should be introduced. Footnotes [37] Strategic analysis carried out included: the ML/ preventive measures for cash transactions; three analysis on virtual assets that focused on the financial institutions’ performance of obligations related to money transfers, their involvement in virtual assets, and the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking through the use of virtual assets; ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons; card fraud cases, and the call-centre schemes; cash-based currency exchange transactions; on money mules and the detection of suspected money mules in the banking system; on cross border transportation of cash; analysis of ML/TF risks linked to transactions in the gambling sector, and in the real estate transactions, and customers of payment institutions. [38] These are: conducting parallel financial investigation when there are investigations of terrorist-related alerts or cases to identify or disclose TF cases; incorporating the technical guidance on investigations of TF offences in the training programs for LEAs, and one action with three sub-action points on NPOs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML risks 31. To address national ML/TF risks Armenian authorities developed: i) the National AML/CFT/CPF strategy (2022 to 2024) and a subsequent National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy (2025 to 2028), as well as a National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023 to 2026. Additionally, based on the outcomes of the NRA, the FMC carried out and completed 25 strategic analyses, in relation to a broad range of relevant topics such as significant international financial flows countries, possible TF-risky transactions (Regional level operation), banks and their non-resident customers; the internal monitoring of the reporting entities, etc. [37] These analyses, are being used by the reporting entities, by the law enforcement and the supervisory authorities. For example, the strategic analysis on laundering of funds obtained as a result of fraud was used by the reporting entities who revised their internal legal acts and strengthened onboarding and ongoing due diligence, LEAs used disseminations from the FMC as well as the typology in general to initiate or uncover criminal cases involving ML and/or fraud, and the supervisory authorities took the typologies identified into their inspection plans. 32. The 2022-2024 Strategy had three intermediate outcomes: i) understanding and mitigation of ML/TF/PF risks through domestic coordination of policies and international cooperation, prevention, ii) detection and reporting of proceeds of crime and funds in support of terrorism, and iii) detection and disruption of ML/TF threats where criminals are sanctioned and proceeds of crime and terrorist resources are confiscated. These outcomes included 75 actions, of which 36 were operational, 11 legislative, 5 institutional and 23 supportive. 33. Implementation of strategic goals largely focused on increasing resources (staff, knowledge and expertise) in law enforcement and investigative authorities, as well as increasing the understanding of ML/TF risks, strengthening AML/CFT supervision especially of the financial sector followed by assistance to the reporting entities to better implement AML/CFT measures. All the strategic goals were drawn on the basis of the identified vulnerabilities. 34. Authorities report that technically all actions linked to the 2022-2024 National Strategy have been addressed, except five. The unaddressed actions were followed up and included into the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy for 2025-2028 together with other actions. One of these five action points that is still unaddressed, for example, calls for improving resources available in the LEAs for conducting parallel financial investigations. 35. The 2025-2028 Strategy has five strategic priorities: i) understanding, assessment and mitigation of ML/TF/PF risks; ii) effective investigation of ML cases; iii) risk-based supervision; iv) execution of confiscation; and v) preventative measures. These strategic actions, similar to the previous strategy, broadly cover the AML spectrum. There are in all 18 strategic tasks with 67 actions, of which 34 actions are operational, 6 legislative, 2 institutional, and 25 supportive. The strategic action plan of the current strategy is being monitored semi-annually, through qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria. 36. All of the above actions are aligned with the ML risks, and are measurable, constituting important elements for improving AML/CFT landscape. 37. Authorities reported that priority in the actions is shown by the deadline. The AT noted that some of the actions with a deadline set as December 2025 and therefore of higher priority relate to legal persons which in the 2024 NRA have a medium ML residual risk. 38. The AT also notes that the qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria are rather general and not always linked to measurable outcomes. For example, when making reference to ‘high-quality requests’ in relation to MLAs, criteria need to be presented on what constitutes high-quality. 39. With regards to the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023-2026, Armenia is to be commended for its the political commitment and infrastructure development to fight this crime, in line with the AML/CFT risk assessment. This strategy has five goals: preventing corruption and strengthening integrity systems with 26 actions, improving legal and institutional systems for combating corruption with 21 actions, anti-corruption education and improving public awareness mechanisms with 15 actions, business integrity, protecting business rights and facilitating state-business administration with 15 actions, and enhancing anti-corruption monitoring and evaluation system with six actions. 40. The Anti-Corruption Strategy could use more clarity on how the action plan should be prioritised. For example, prioritise actions that involve large-scale corruption and allocate resources accordingly. 1.2.2. Policies and activities to address TF Risks 41. In the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy, the majority of the strategic actions are presented as addressing jointly ML/TF. There are few action points directly targeting TF aspects, which are mainly the sub-actions of general ML/TF related actions [38] . The limited action points directly targeting TF mirror the lower residual risk in the 2024 NRA. 42. Similar to the policies and activities to address ML, the strategic action plan on the TF action points is being monitored semi-annually, through qualitative and quantitative assessment criteria. Given the improvements needed of the TF risk assessment and risk understanding explored in the previous section, more TF action points should be introduced. Footnotes [37] Strategic analysis carried out included: the ML/ preventive measures for cash transactions; three analysis on virtual assets that focused on the financial institutions’ performance of obligations related to money transfers, their involvement in virtual assets, and the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking through the use of virtual assets; ML/TF vulnerabilities of legal persons; card fraud cases, and the call-centre schemes; cash-based currency exchange transactions; on money mules and the detection of suspected money mules in the banking system; on cross border transportation of cash; analysis of ML/TF risks linked to transactions in the gambling sector, and in the real estate transactions, and customers of payment institutions. [38] These are: conducting parallel financial investigation when there are investigations of terrorist-related alerts or cases to identify or disclose TF cases; incorporating the technical guidance on investigations of TF offences in the training programs for LEAs, and one action with three sub-action points on NPOs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="87. Armenia seeks international mutual legal assistance in ML and predicate offences with the assistance of the same central authorities as for processing incoming requests – the GPO and MoJ. The authorities were aware of the value added of international cooperation and provided examples of cases with positive outcomes, including in complex ML cases. Nevertheless, the AT is concerned with the ability to systematically seek information abroad in ML cases of a transnational nature (e.g. drug trafficking, illegal trade of non-renewable resources, see IO1). 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 88. The overall number of outgoing MLA requests has steadily declined throughout the period under review. The authorities point to the earlier practices, where MLAs contained requests for information that was publicly available, as well as situations, where such information could have been obtained through informal cooperation channels. Between 2020-2024 the GPO has sent out a total of 2235 MLARs and the MoJ a further 220 MLARs. These include (as available GPO statistics indicate) requests concerning standalone ML and ML associated with predicate offences, predominantly corruption and tax evasion. The AT notes the important proportion of ML related requests in the total number of MLAs as well as the fact that the potential predicates reflect to a large extent the country risk. The AT considers the outgoing requests generally aligned with the main ML/TF risk environment in the jurisdiction while acknowledging that efforts in international cooperation concerning ML linked with drug trafficking and organised crime, cannot be considered fully consistent with Armenia’s external threat (see IO1, 7 and 8). Table 2.4. Outgoing ML related MLAs sent by the GPO Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML Standalone 2 12 9 4 24 51 ML associated with [40] 49 25 11 9 15 109 Fraud 1 2 0 1 1 5 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corruption 31 22 3 5 4 65 Tax evasion 22 10 7 4 3 46 Other 8 9 1 1 7 26 TF 0 0 0 0 0 0 Terrorism 0 0 0 0 0 0 89. As reflected in Table 2.4, the number of outgoing MLARs relating to ML associated with a predicate offence has strong fluctuations over the reporting period, an increase in requests on standalone ML has been noticed, and no TF requests have been sent. However, there are concerns regarding the accuracy of this data, as it does not align with the number of ML investigations and prosecutions, both for standalone cases and those associated with the high-risk predicate crimes, which is significantly lower in some cases (see IO7). For example, the total number of standalone ML investigations over the reporting period is 16 (compared to 51 outgoing requests indicated in Table 2.4), with the first one initiated only in 2022; there were only 13 ML investigations associated with tax evasion (compared to 46 requests indicated in Table 2.4), with only 2 investigations in 2020. 90. The main criminal offences associated with MLARs (general) are fraud, smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, computer-based illegal taking and forgery of documents, which is largely in line with the country risk profile. The number of requests associated with the smuggling of narcotic drugs has diminished over the years to a handful of requests. The authorities indicate that this is caused by the fact, that the vast majority of these requests were sent to jurisdictions, where their purchase is legal, which resulted in no valuable information obtained. 91. The most common types of assistance sought under the MLA procedures are the collection and sharing of evidence (mostly bank records and financial documents), corporate and shareholder information, witness statements or testimonies and certified copies of official documents. The majority of MoJ requests are sent to France, whereas GPO processed MLARs are sent to the Russian Federation, USA, France, Georgia and Germany. No joint investigation teams (JITs) were assigned to ML matters. 92. The same dedicated teams in the MoJ and GPO ensure that all outgoing international cooperation requests are prepared in accordance with relevant legal frameworks, treaties, guidelines, and include clear, complete, and accurate information. The main initiators of outgoing requests are the investigative authorities – the ACC and IC. The investigator handling the case is the person who creates the draft MLAR. The GPO make sure that the requests contain necessary details such as legal qualifications, facts of the case, and supporting documents. As a good practice, formal requests are preceded by informal requests on the FIU or LEA level. Verification is made whether the contents of the request reflect the relevant multilateral and bilateral treaties Armenia is party to. Requests are being translated into the required language of the requested country. Close coordination with investigative bodies ensures factual accuracy and consistency. When needed, inter agency follow-up communication is maintained to provide clarifications and support execution. In complex and urgent cases – sending the request via Eurojust. 93. Members of the FATF Global network have highlighted the overall good quality of requests from Armenian authorities, with some room for improvement concerning their quality signalled by individual jurisdictions. Both the GPO and the MoJ have identified a gradual increase in the quality of outgoing mutual legal assistance requests, signalled by lower numbers of received follow ups from recipients. This is supported by available statistical data, which shows a gradual decrease of the number of requests subject to returns and refusals. 94. While no track is being kept of the average time to execute outgoing requests, the GPO and MoJ recall jurisdictions which are uncooperative or take a long time to respond. In such cases a reminder is sent, and the authorities try to contact their counterparts. In cases where there are no agreements (bilateral and multilateral) in place, the authorities try to establish formal ties. 2.2.2. Extradition 95. Armenia effectively seeks assistance to extradite criminals in ML and associated predicate offences. In the period under review Armenia reported 110 extradition requests, 7 of which concerned ML. Around 50% of the requests were granted while 30% refused or returned (remaining cases are still underway). In extradition matters, the authorities commonly seek assistance for the following: the location, arrest, and surrender of fugitives wanted for prosecution or execution of sentence. Extradition-related feedback is commonly provided, especially in cases where requests are delayed or refused. Partner countries typically clarify the grounds for refusal (e.g., dual criminality, procedural deficiencies, or human rights concerns). 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 96. According to the information provided by the GPO, the majority of asset recovery related requests sent by Armenia concerned ML cases with a total of 6 such requests issued for freezing/seizing of funds in criminal proceedings. A further 5 asset recovery MLARs concerned criminal proceedings concerning corruption and one involved fraud, which can be considered mostly in line with the country risk, given the modus operandi associated with the main ML risks in Armenia. At the same time, the AT is not convinced asset recovery is proactively pursued as a policy objective in all ML and proceeds generating cases with a cross-border nexus (see IO.8). 97. As in the case of incoming requests, MoJ does not gather detailed statistics in order to distinguish MLARs associated with asset recovery. 98. The authorities have demonstrated the ability to request assistance from foreign counterparts for freezing/seizing proceeds of crime in key ML cases. While none of the MLARs sent out have been finalized, there are indications that the authorities will be able to repatriate some of the illicit assets transferred abroad. 99. None of the requests concerning civil asset forfeiture ended with a positive response. Box 2.2. Seizure of assets abroad Person X, being the director of Company A and B, intentionally failed to pay particularly large amounts of taxes by entering obviously false data in the calculations submitted to the tax authority as a result of the entrepreneurial activities carried out by the aforementioned companies during 2004-2014. In addition, he organized the process of not paying taxes in particularly large amounts by entering obviously false data in the calculations submitted to the tax authority in 2006 as a result of the entrepreneurial activity carried out by the company C, which he actually owned since 2002, as a result of which he assisted officials in receiving bribes in particularly large amounts in order to carry out actions in favour of Person Y, assisted a high-ranking official in legalizing the money obtained through criminal means, and also committed money laundering in particularly large amounts within the group with prior consent. Based on the requests for legal assistance, the Slovak Republic seized funds of 380.000 € in 2022. Additionally, in 2023 Slovak Republic based upon Armenian request executed seizures of a car, real estate, parking lots and funds of 23.674 €. Box 2.3. Seizure of real estate abroad The case highlights how high-level corruption and abuse of official positions were facilitated through intricate schemes involving concealment, fictitious transactions, and the use of companies to launder the proceeds of crime. This case concerns large-scale embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, and money laundering involving a former high-ranking Armenian official and his close relatives. The criminal investigation was initiated based on information obtained during the course of a separate criminal proceeding and formalized through an investigator’s report. Throughout the investigation, extensive inquiries, interrogations, and analysis of financial data (including information protected by banking secrecy laws) revealed that the PEP and his relatives exercised de facto control over a network of companies in Armenia and foreign jurisdictions, while concealing their ownership through relatives and affiliated individuals. International cooperation played a crucial role in advancing the investigation. Numerous mutual legal assistance requests were sent to the United States, France, Austria, Germany, Cyprus, and other countries. In particular, collaboration with U.S. and Austrian authorities facilitated the retrieval of key financial documents. As a result, a mansion belonging to the PEP’s family, located in the United States and valued at approximately USD 36 million, was seized, sold at the highest market price, through a U.S.-initiated investigation and civil forfeiture action pursued before U.S. courts. Footnotes [40] It should be noted that the discrepancy in the segregated figures is due to the fact that, within a single MLAR, several criminal offences were present simultaneously — for example, fraud, money laundering, and corruption-related offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="87. Armenia seeks international mutual legal assistance in ML and predicate offences with the assistance of the same central authorities as for processing incoming requests – the GPO and MoJ. The authorities were aware of the value added of international cooperation and provided examples of cases with positive outcomes, including in complex ML cases. Nevertheless, the AT is concerned with the ability to systematically seek information abroad in ML cases of a transnational nature (e.g. drug trafficking, illegal trade of non-renewable resources, see IO1). 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 88. The overall number of outgoing MLA requests has steadily declined throughout the period under review. The authorities point to the earlier practices, where MLAs contained requests for information that was publicly available, as well as situations, where such information could have been obtained through informal cooperation channels. Between 2020-2024 the GPO has sent out a total of 2235 MLARs and the MoJ a further 220 MLARs. These include (as available GPO statistics indicate) requests concerning standalone ML and ML associated with predicate offences, predominantly corruption and tax evasion. The AT notes the important proportion of ML related requests in the total number of MLAs as well as the fact that the potential predicates reflect to a large extent the country risk. The AT considers the outgoing requests generally aligned with the main ML/TF risk environment in the jurisdiction while acknowledging that efforts in international cooperation concerning ML linked with drug trafficking and organised crime, cannot be considered fully consistent with Armenia’s external threat (see IO1, 7 and 8). Table 2.4. Outgoing ML related MLAs sent by the GPO Offence 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total ML Standalone 2 12 9 4 24 51 ML associated with [40] 49 25 11 9 15 109 Fraud 1 2 0 1 1 5 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corruption 31 22 3 5 4 65 Tax evasion 22 10 7 4 3 46 Other 8 9 1 1 7 26 TF 0 0 0 0 0 0 Terrorism 0 0 0 0 0 0 89. As reflected in Table 2.4, the number of outgoing MLARs relating to ML associated with a predicate offence has strong fluctuations over the reporting period, an increase in requests on standalone ML has been noticed, and no TF requests have been sent. However, there are concerns regarding the accuracy of this data, as it does not align with the number of ML investigations and prosecutions, both for standalone cases and those associated with the high-risk predicate crimes, which is significantly lower in some cases (see IO7). For example, the total number of standalone ML investigations over the reporting period is 16 (compared to 51 outgoing requests indicated in Table 2.4), with the first one initiated only in 2022; there were only 13 ML investigations associated with tax evasion (compared to 46 requests indicated in Table 2.4), with only 2 investigations in 2020. 90. The main criminal offences associated with MLARs (general) are fraud, smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, computer-based illegal taking and forgery of documents, which is largely in line with the country risk profile. The number of requests associated with the smuggling of narcotic drugs has diminished over the years to a handful of requests. The authorities indicate that this is caused by the fact, that the vast majority of these requests were sent to jurisdictions, where their purchase is legal, which resulted in no valuable information obtained. 91. The most common types of assistance sought under the MLA procedures are the collection and sharing of evidence (mostly bank records and financial documents), corporate and shareholder information, witness statements or testimonies and certified copies of official documents. The majority of MoJ requests are sent to France, whereas GPO processed MLARs are sent to the Russian Federation, USA, France, Georgia and Germany. No joint investigation teams (JITs) were assigned to ML matters. 92. The same dedicated teams in the MoJ and GPO ensure that all outgoing international cooperation requests are prepared in accordance with relevant legal frameworks, treaties, guidelines, and include clear, complete, and accurate information. The main initiators of outgoing requests are the investigative authorities – the ACC and IC. The investigator handling the case is the person who creates the draft MLAR. The GPO make sure that the requests contain necessary details such as legal qualifications, facts of the case, and supporting documents. As a good practice, formal requests are preceded by informal requests on the FIU or LEA level. Verification is made whether the contents of the request reflect the relevant multilateral and bilateral treaties Armenia is party to. Requests are being translated into the required language of the requested country. Close coordination with investigative bodies ensures factual accuracy and consistency. When needed, inter agency follow-up communication is maintained to provide clarifications and support execution. In complex and urgent cases – sending the request via Eurojust. 93. Members of the FATF Global network have highlighted the overall good quality of requests from Armenian authorities, with some room for improvement concerning their quality signalled by individual jurisdictions. Both the GPO and the MoJ have identified a gradual increase in the quality of outgoing mutual legal assistance requests, signalled by lower numbers of received follow ups from recipients. This is supported by available statistical data, which shows a gradual decrease of the number of requests subject to returns and refusals. 94. While no track is being kept of the average time to execute outgoing requests, the GPO and MoJ recall jurisdictions which are uncooperative or take a long time to respond. In such cases a reminder is sent, and the authorities try to contact their counterparts. In cases where there are no agreements (bilateral and multilateral) in place, the authorities try to establish formal ties. 2.2.2. Extradition 95. Armenia effectively seeks assistance to extradite criminals in ML and associated predicate offences. In the period under review Armenia reported 110 extradition requests, 7 of which concerned ML. Around 50% of the requests were granted while 30% refused or returned (remaining cases are still underway). In extradition matters, the authorities commonly seek assistance for the following: the location, arrest, and surrender of fugitives wanted for prosecution or execution of sentence. Extradition-related feedback is commonly provided, especially in cases where requests are delayed or refused. Partner countries typically clarify the grounds for refusal (e.g., dual criminality, procedural deficiencies, or human rights concerns). 2.2.3. Seeking to facilitate asset recovery 96. According to the information provided by the GPO, the majority of asset recovery related requests sent by Armenia concerned ML cases with a total of 6 such requests issued for freezing/seizing of funds in criminal proceedings. A further 5 asset recovery MLARs concerned criminal proceedings concerning corruption and one involved fraud, which can be considered mostly in line with the country risk, given the modus operandi associated with the main ML risks in Armenia. At the same time, the AT is not convinced asset recovery is proactively pursued as a policy objective in all ML and proceeds generating cases with a cross-border nexus (see IO.8). 97. As in the case of incoming requests, MoJ does not gather detailed statistics in order to distinguish MLARs associated with asset recovery. 98. The authorities have demonstrated the ability to request assistance from foreign counterparts for freezing/seizing proceeds of crime in key ML cases. While none of the MLARs sent out have been finalized, there are indications that the authorities will be able to repatriate some of the illicit assets transferred abroad. 99. None of the requests concerning civil asset forfeiture ended with a positive response. Box 2.2. Seizure of assets abroad Person X, being the director of Company A and B, intentionally failed to pay particularly large amounts of taxes by entering obviously false data in the calculations submitted to the tax authority as a result of the entrepreneurial activities carried out by the aforementioned companies during 2004-2014. In addition, he organized the process of not paying taxes in particularly large amounts by entering obviously false data in the calculations submitted to the tax authority in 2006 as a result of the entrepreneurial activity carried out by the company C, which he actually owned since 2002, as a result of which he assisted officials in receiving bribes in particularly large amounts in order to carry out actions in favour of Person Y, assisted a high-ranking official in legalizing the money obtained through criminal means, and also committed money laundering in particularly large amounts within the group with prior consent. Based on the requests for legal assistance, the Slovak Republic seized funds of 380.000 € in 2022. Additionally, in 2023 Slovak Republic based upon Armenian request executed seizures of a car, real estate, parking lots and funds of 23.674 €. Box 2.3. Seizure of real estate abroad The case highlights how high-level corruption and abuse of official positions were facilitated through intricate schemes involving concealment, fictitious transactions, and the use of companies to launder the proceeds of crime. This case concerns large-scale embezzlement, bribery, tax evasion, and money laundering involving a former high-ranking Armenian official and his close relatives. The criminal investigation was initiated based on information obtained during the course of a separate criminal proceeding and formalized through an investigator’s report. Throughout the investigation, extensive inquiries, interrogations, and analysis of financial data (including information protected by banking secrecy laws) revealed that the PEP and his relatives exercised de facto control over a network of companies in Armenia and foreign jurisdictions, while concealing their ownership through relatives and affiliated individuals. International cooperation played a crucial role in advancing the investigation. Numerous mutual legal assistance requests were sent to the United States, France, Austria, Germany, Cyprus, and other countries. In particular, collaboration with U.S. and Austrian authorities facilitated the retrieval of key financial documents. As a result, a mansion belonging to the PEP’s family, located in the United States and valued at approximately USD 36 million, was seized, sold at the highest market price, through a U.S.-initiated investigation and civil forfeiture action pursued before U.S. courts. Footnotes [40] It should be noted that the discrepancy in the segregated figures is due to the fact that, within a single MLAR, several criminal offences were present simultaneously — for example, fraud, money laundering, and corruption-related offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 144. Since 2020, the CBA has progressively strengthened its understanding of ML/TF risks across the financial sector, through the development of a risk-assessment model that now serves as the central tool for identifying both systemic and institutional ML/TF risks. The model combines inherent-risk and internal controls assessment based on data collected remotely through annual [46] risk evaluation questionnaires submitted by FIs. These questionnaires are embedded with data validation and automated ratio computation formulas and macros, which contribute to consistency and comparability of assessments across similar entities, and reduce human error. 145. Supplementary data on cash transactions and STRs is obtained from the FMC. The approach is formalised through two dedicated methodologies, one for banks and one for investment companies, MVTS providers and credit organizations. The Central Depository is also risk assessed annually. Other FIs, such as currency-exchange offices and investment funds and their managers, were assessed through supervisory judgement [47] , reflecting their lower materiality and limited systemic relevance. This differentiated approach is broadly commensurate with the risk profile and size of the respective sectors. 146. Institutional inherent risk assessment relies on specific quantitative criteria, including data on active [48] customers (the most complex set of data required), cross-border transfers, geographic exposure, delivery channels (face-to-face or non-face-to-face) and products/services offered. For each criterion, the CBA calculates ratios reflecting systemic risks (weighted by the FI’s market share) and, since 2023, also individual risk (specific to the institution). The combined results, which include at present 32 different risk ratios, determine the final inherent risk score for each FI. 147. For banks and other NBFIs, the datasets used are largely comparable, with adjustments for sector-specific activities. Institutions are required to submit granular information on their customer base and transactional profile, including the number of PEPs (foreign and domestic), high-net-worth individuals, legal entities with complex ownership structures, and customers from higher risk categories such as NGOs, casinos and gambling operators, or currency-exchange offices. The CBA defines complexity and risk categories centrally to ensure consistent reporting standard across all FIs. 148. The model incorporates selected NRA findings, for example by capturing the number of individual PEP customers, reflecting corruption as a key ML threat in the jurisdiction. 149. The inherent risk model applies a largely uniform ordinal scoring scale (1-3) for each criteria category, with only cash transactions benefiting from an expanded scale (1-4). The authorities advised that the division of categories to which those weights apply (for each ratio) is based on observations and risk analysis and can therefore be adjusted to capture shifts in the risk environment when needed. 150. The final design for calculating the overall final ML/TF score, on which on-site inspection frequency is based, incorporates both individual and systemic (market size adjusted) risk factors for each criterion, and this approach may reduce sensitivity to high-risk activities conducted by smaller institutions. According to the Methodologies, inspection plans should also consider the level of each individual risk score, but this is left to supervisory judgement. The AT is therefore of the opinion that several tailored benchmarks for selected high-impact risk factors could be defined, to support more targeted supervisory responses, horizontal analysis and thematic reviews. 151. Furthermore, this could also give greater emphasis to the distinction between ML and TF risks indicators (or risk scores), with TF-specific factors not limited to jurisdictional breakdown of cross-border transfers or customers and high risk NPOs. Nevertheless, given the low TF risk identified in the NRA, this limitation is not considered material. 152. Following the evaluation of inherent risk, the quality of the control environment is assessed based on responses to questions included in the risk evaluation questionnaire and on scrutiny of accompanying documents, including enterprise-wide risk assessments, transaction monitoring rules and procedures, risk classification methodologies, training records, board meeting minutes, management information, and internal audit reports. A sample of client files (approximately 25 files per institution) is also required by the supervisor to test the compliance with the internal controls. Based on the information submitted, the supervisor completes a separate internal questionnaire evaluating the FI’s control framework by thematic area and assigning an overall level of control effectiveness. The final residual risk, on which the on-site inspection frequency is based, is calculated as a combination of the two scores through a risk matrix. 153. At sectoral level, the CBA performs risk assessment using similar parameters, with internal controls assessed based on findings of CBA’s supervisory activity. The methodology for sectoral risk assessment was last updated in March 2025 [49] and the most recent comprehensive risk assessment was conducted using 2024 data (see Table 3.3). Professional judgement may be applied to adjust final sectoral scores by up to two points, which introduces a degree of flexibility. Table 3.3. Sectoral risk categorisation matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2024) Sector Risk Rating On-site inspection cycle prescribed by the institutional Methodology Banks high 1 to 4 years MVTS providers medium high 2 to 5 years Capital markets medium high 2 to 5 years [50] Credit Organizations medium low 3 to 6 years Central Depository medium low - Pawnshops low n.a. (will start in 2025) Currency exchange low n.a. (will start in 2025) Insurance companies and intermediaries / credit bureau very low n.a. 154. The outcomes of sectorial risk assessment were primarily intended to determine inspection cycles for different FIs. Higher risk sectors are subject to shorter maximum inspection cycles. For banks, which are assessed as high risk and are the most material sector, additional scrutiny is applied through quarterly data submissions for inherent risk calculation. This demonstrates a generally risk-sensitive allocation of supervisory resources. 155. The CBA’s understanding of risks is further informed by supervisory engagement and strategic analyses from the FMC. The FMC has conducted several thematic studies on cross border transfers, cash-based transactions, the effectiveness of Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) in banks, and compliance with obligations related to money transfers by FIs and has forwarded the final results to the CBA for their perusal. As a result, the CBA has conducted its own thematic or ad-hoc inspections, including on loan acquisition process in credit organizations and EDD compliance in banks. In practice, the overall high volume of data received permits the CBA to perform horizontal analysis of critical elements, such as the 2024 banking-sector review of ML/TF risk appetite, which resulted in the issuance of targeted supervisory guidance (Risk Appetite Guidance). 156. However, the CBA’s understanding of group-wide risks remained limited throughout the assessment period. The specific group risk assessment methodology relies on supervisory judgement and is dedicated to prudential and conduct elements, supplemented by analysis of intragroup transactions. Following the risk analysis conducted, all seven financial groups operating in Armenia [51] are currently assessed as low risk. Apart from this analysis, FIs are required to submit all procedures and controls to the CBA as part of the annual review process (including those at group level that were applicable to them), with recommendations to eliminate any identified deficiencies through the annual “Dear CEO” letters. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 157. Armenian authorities have undertaken extensive outreach to strengthen FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. Communication combines individualised feedback and sector-wide guidance. 158. For banks, credit organisation, investment firms and MVTS providers the CBA issues annual “Dear CEO letters”, highlighting deficiencies identified during off-site annual reviews, together with instructions and deadlines for remedial actions. These letters also incorporate the FMC’s assessment of the quality of STRs submitted by each bank. Follow-up meetings with bank management are held to ensure supervisory expectations are clearly understood. 159. The CBA also ensures public access to information through a dedicated AML/CFT section on its website (shared with FMC) which provides relevant legislation, guidance materials, FAQs, and analytical material. Guidance has been issued on a wide range of topics, including BO identification, indicators of suspicious activity, and typologies of fraud and pyramid schemes. Recent updates include typologies on laundering the proceeds of crime through virtual assets, and guidance on risk appetite developed following reviews conducted in 2024. 160. The CBA provides lists of domestic PEPs positions on its website, which especially smaller FIs met by the AT confirmed using regularly, and has delivered several training activities on supervisory findings and the results of the NRA. 161. The FMC complements the CBA’s outreach through analytical assignments aimed at improving the operational understanding of ML/TF risks. In coordination with the CBA, the FMC has issued numerous assignments between 2020 and 2025, directed mainly at banks, MVTS providers, credit organisations, and investment firms. 162. These assignments have addressed specific risk areas, such as cross-border transactions, enhanced due diligence for cash operations, internal monitoring unit independence, and recognition and reporting of suspicious transactions. Broader thematic exercises have also been undertaken on the strategic analysis of ML/TF and proliferation-financing risks and on PEP risk management. Additionally, the FMC developed an online training platform that provides self-learning modules and resources to strengthen compliance capacity across the sector. Footnotes [46]. Given the materiality of the banking sector, banks are required to submit the inherent risk questionnaire on a quarterly basis. [47]. During 2025, CBA has developed similar questionnaires and methodology for risk assessment for currency exchange offices, investment funds and fund managers, and is planning to apply to these entities the same approach of risk assessment. [48]. Only data on active customers is required and taken into consideration in the individual risk-based evaluation approach of CBA. [49]. Decision No. 1/50L of 14 February 2023 (amended 13 March 2025) of the Chairman of the CBA, and Decision No. 1/663L of 29 December 2023 (amended 13 March 2025) of the Chairman of the CBA [50]. For investment companies. [51]. In case of international groups, CBA is never the parent supervisor (there are no foreign branches of Armenian FIs)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 144. Since 2020, the CBA has progressively strengthened its understanding of ML/TF risks across the financial sector, through the development of a risk-assessment model that now serves as the central tool for identifying both systemic and institutional ML/TF risks. The model combines inherent-risk and internal controls assessment based on data collected remotely through annual [46] risk evaluation questionnaires submitted by FIs. These questionnaires are embedded with data validation and automated ratio computation formulas and macros, which contribute to consistency and comparability of assessments across similar entities, and reduce human error. 145. Supplementary data on cash transactions and STRs is obtained from the FMC. The approach is formalised through two dedicated methodologies, one for banks and one for investment companies, MVTS providers and credit organizations. The Central Depository is also risk assessed annually. Other FIs, such as currency-exchange offices and investment funds and their managers, were assessed through supervisory judgement [47] , reflecting their lower materiality and limited systemic relevance. This differentiated approach is broadly commensurate with the risk profile and size of the respective sectors. 146. Institutional inherent risk assessment relies on specific quantitative criteria, including data on active [48] customers (the most complex set of data required), cross-border transfers, geographic exposure, delivery channels (face-to-face or non-face-to-face) and products/services offered. For each criterion, the CBA calculates ratios reflecting systemic risks (weighted by the FI’s market share) and, since 2023, also individual risk (specific to the institution). The combined results, which include at present 32 different risk ratios, determine the final inherent risk score for each FI. 147. For banks and other NBFIs, the datasets used are largely comparable, with adjustments for sector-specific activities. Institutions are required to submit granular information on their customer base and transactional profile, including the number of PEPs (foreign and domestic), high-net-worth individuals, legal entities with complex ownership structures, and customers from higher risk categories such as NGOs, casinos and gambling operators, or currency-exchange offices. The CBA defines complexity and risk categories centrally to ensure consistent reporting standard across all FIs. 148. The model incorporates selected NRA findings, for example by capturing the number of individual PEP customers, reflecting corruption as a key ML threat in the jurisdiction. 149. The inherent risk model applies a largely uniform ordinal scoring scale (1-3) for each criteria category, with only cash transactions benefiting from an expanded scale (1-4). The authorities advised that the division of categories to which those weights apply (for each ratio) is based on observations and risk analysis and can therefore be adjusted to capture shifts in the risk environment when needed. 150. The final design for calculating the overall final ML/TF score, on which on-site inspection frequency is based, incorporates both individual and systemic (market size adjusted) risk factors for each criterion, and this approach may reduce sensitivity to high-risk activities conducted by smaller institutions. According to the Methodologies, inspection plans should also consider the level of each individual risk score, but this is left to supervisory judgement. The AT is therefore of the opinion that several tailored benchmarks for selected high-impact risk factors could be defined, to support more targeted supervisory responses, horizontal analysis and thematic reviews. 151. Furthermore, this could also give greater emphasis to the distinction between ML and TF risks indicators (or risk scores), with TF-specific factors not limited to jurisdictional breakdown of cross-border transfers or customers and high risk NPOs. Nevertheless, given the low TF risk identified in the NRA, this limitation is not considered material. 152. Following the evaluation of inherent risk, the quality of the control environment is assessed based on responses to questions included in the risk evaluation questionnaire and on scrutiny of accompanying documents, including enterprise-wide risk assessments, transaction monitoring rules and procedures, risk classification methodologies, training records, board meeting minutes, management information, and internal audit reports. A sample of client files (approximately 25 files per institution) is also required by the supervisor to test the compliance with the internal controls. Based on the information submitted, the supervisor completes a separate internal questionnaire evaluating the FI’s control framework by thematic area and assigning an overall level of control effectiveness. The final residual risk, on which the on-site inspection frequency is based, is calculated as a combination of the two scores through a risk matrix. 153. At sectoral level, the CBA performs risk assessment using similar parameters, with internal controls assessed based on findings of CBA’s supervisory activity. The methodology for sectoral risk assessment was last updated in March 2025 [49] and the most recent comprehensive risk assessment was conducted using 2024 data (see Table 3.3). Professional judgement may be applied to adjust final sectoral scores by up to two points, which introduces a degree of flexibility. Table 3.3. Sectoral risk categorisation matrix: residual ML/TF risks (2024) Sector Risk Rating On-site inspection cycle prescribed by the institutional Methodology Banks high 1 to 4 years MVTS providers medium high 2 to 5 years Capital markets medium high 2 to 5 years [50] Credit Organizations medium low 3 to 6 years Central Depository medium low - Pawnshops low n.a. (will start in 2025) Currency exchange low n.a. (will start in 2025) Insurance companies and intermediaries / credit bureau very low n.a. 154. The outcomes of sectorial risk assessment were primarily intended to determine inspection cycles for different FIs. Higher risk sectors are subject to shorter maximum inspection cycles. For banks, which are assessed as high risk and are the most material sector, additional scrutiny is applied through quarterly data submissions for inherent risk calculation. This demonstrates a generally risk-sensitive allocation of supervisory resources. 155. The CBA’s understanding of risks is further informed by supervisory engagement and strategic analyses from the FMC. The FMC has conducted several thematic studies on cross border transfers, cash-based transactions, the effectiveness of Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) in banks, and compliance with obligations related to money transfers by FIs and has forwarded the final results to the CBA for their perusal. As a result, the CBA has conducted its own thematic or ad-hoc inspections, including on loan acquisition process in credit organizations and EDD compliance in banks. In practice, the overall high volume of data received permits the CBA to perform horizontal analysis of critical elements, such as the 2024 banking-sector review of ML/TF risk appetite, which resulted in the issuance of targeted supervisory guidance (Risk Appetite Guidance). 156. However, the CBA’s understanding of group-wide risks remained limited throughout the assessment period. The specific group risk assessment methodology relies on supervisory judgement and is dedicated to prudential and conduct elements, supplemented by analysis of intragroup transactions. Following the risk analysis conducted, all seven financial groups operating in Armenia [51] are currently assessed as low risk. Apart from this analysis, FIs are required to submit all procedures and controls to the CBA as part of the annual review process (including those at group level that were applicable to them), with recommendations to eliminate any identified deficiencies through the annual “Dear CEO” letters. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 157. Armenian authorities have undertaken extensive outreach to strengthen FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. Communication combines individualised feedback and sector-wide guidance. 158. For banks, credit organisation, investment firms and MVTS providers the CBA issues annual “Dear CEO letters”, highlighting deficiencies identified during off-site annual reviews, together with instructions and deadlines for remedial actions. These letters also incorporate the FMC’s assessment of the quality of STRs submitted by each bank. Follow-up meetings with bank management are held to ensure supervisory expectations are clearly understood. 159. The CBA also ensures public access to information through a dedicated AML/CFT section on its website (shared with FMC) which provides relevant legislation, guidance materials, FAQs, and analytical material. Guidance has been issued on a wide range of topics, including BO identification, indicators of suspicious activity, and typologies of fraud and pyramid schemes. Recent updates include typologies on laundering the proceeds of crime through virtual assets, and guidance on risk appetite developed following reviews conducted in 2024. 160. The CBA provides lists of domestic PEPs positions on its website, which especially smaller FIs met by the AT confirmed using regularly, and has delivered several training activities on supervisory findings and the results of the NRA. 161. The FMC complements the CBA’s outreach through analytical assignments aimed at improving the operational understanding of ML/TF risks. In coordination with the CBA, the FMC has issued numerous assignments between 2020 and 2025, directed mainly at banks, MVTS providers, credit organisations, and investment firms. 162. These assignments have addressed specific risk areas, such as cross-border transactions, enhanced due diligence for cash operations, internal monitoring unit independence, and recognition and reporting of suspicious transactions. Broader thematic exercises have also been undertaken on the strategic analysis of ML/TF and proliferation-financing risks and on PEP risk management. Additionally, the FMC developed an online training platform that provides self-learning modules and resources to strengthen compliance capacity across the sector. Footnotes [46]. Given the materiality of the banking sector, banks are required to submit the inherent risk questionnaire on a quarterly basis. [47]. During 2025, CBA has developed similar questionnaires and methodology for risk assessment for currency exchange offices, investment funds and fund managers, and is planning to apply to these entities the same approach of risk assessment. [48]. Only data on active customers is required and taken into consideration in the individual risk-based evaluation approach of CBA. [49]. Decision No. 1/50L of 14 February 2023 (amended 13 March 2025) of the Chairman of the CBA, and Decision No. 1/663L of 29 December 2023 (amended 13 March 2025) of the Chairman of the CBA [50]. For investment companies. [51]. In case of international groups, CBA is never the parent supervisor (there are no foreign branches of Armenian FIs)" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 238. Overall, supervisors’ risk understanding in the DNFBP sector is closely tied to the NRA process. For each NRA exercise, supervisory authorities perform their own sectoral analysis and submit the result and underlaying data to the FMC for inclusion into the final report. This analysis forms the basis of the sectoral risk assessment, as no other standalone assessments or alternative methodologies are used to evaluate ML/TF risk at the sectoral level. Therefore, supervisors also reference the findings of the NRA when articulating the risks to which their sectors are exposed. SRC – Casinos and online gambling operators 239. The SRC’s understanding of ML/TF risks in the gambling sector broadly reflects the NRA findings, with internet gambling assessed as presenting the highest risk. However, the SRC does not have developed a dedicated AML/CFT risk-assessment methodology, and its risk analysis relies mainly on the tax-related data and information on large winnings published on the official websites. 240. Despite these limitations, the SRC demonstrated awareness of key sectoral threats and typologies. During the assessment period, several mitigating measures were introduced, including a requirement that all top-ups and pay-outs to be made through the same bank account held in the player’s name (October 2024), which contributes to mitigating anonymity and misuse risks. 241. TF risk in the gambling sector is considered low, reflecting legal requirements for all online gambling players, resident and non-residents, to use accounts with Armenian banks, as well as declining number of non-resident players. This assessment is consistent with the NRA and was supported by information provided to the AT. MoJ – notaries 242. The main activity of notaries relevant under FATF Methodology is the notarization) of real estate transactions [59] . While some information was provided to the AT on the existence of notaries that also engage in activities specified by R.22, let. d) points (iv) and (v), the MoJ could not confirm this aspect. 243. In late 2023, the MoJ adopted a methodology requiring an annual AML/CFT risk-assessment of notaries. The methodology categorises notaries into low, medium and high risk based on a limited set of predefined criteria, such as involvement of PEPs or parties linked to higher-risk jurisdictions. However, the framework remains basic and does not incorporate a broader range of risk indicators or criteria. [60] 244. In practice, the MoJ currently lacks the data necessary to apply this methodology effectively. Although notaries submit quarterly reports on transaction volumes, no systemic data is collected on the identity or characteristics of parties to transactions. As a result, the MoJ’s understanding of risks in the notarial sector remains largely based on aggregate transaction volumes and complaints received. Authorities have indicated that a new IT system is to be introduced, which would enable access to more granular data and support fuller implementation of the risk-assessment model. FMC - ( real estate agents, lawyers and legal firms, accountants, DPMS ) 245. Since assuming AML/CFT supervisory responsibilities in 2023, the FMC has taken initial steps to develop a risk-based understanding of ML/TF risks across the sectors it supervises. At sectoral level, the understanding of risk derives from the NRA findings, which point real estate agents as relatively higher risk entities among those supervised by the FMC. At individual level, the risk assessment methodology is prescribed in a Supervisory Manual and is based on structured questionnaires sent to reporting entities, collecting information on inherent risk factors (customers, services, delivery channels, geographic exposure) and on internal controls. The outcome is based on scores from 1 to 3 attributed to each criterion, which feed into a matrix [61] , providing a segmentation of DNFBPs into three final categories of residual risk: low, medium and high. In total, there are over 20 criteria for inherent risk and over 30 for internal control assessment. A significant proportion of criteria are assessed by supervisory judgement, including conclusions drawn upon interactions with DNFBP personnel at different training events, and calculated manually, thus offering the FMC a high level of flexibility in determining the final score. 246. This new approach has been officially introduced in the beginning of 2025, with one round of complete risk assessment guided by the Manual. Before that, FMC has piloted the questionnaires, with analysis based on requests of data covering 2021-2023 period. 247. The results placed the vast majority of DNFBPs (under FMC supervision) in the low-risk category, with only real estate agents having a relatively taller proportion of medium and high-risk entities in their overall population [62] , which is consistent with the NRA results. Under the individual methodology risk matrix, a low-risk category is only possible in case of effective internal controls, and these, as explained by authorities, are assessed proportionately to entity size. Smaller entities may be deemed compliant with basic measures while larger entities are expected to demonstrate more robust controls. However, this approach is not fully consistent with information obtained through interviews with the private sector, which indicate persistent deficiencies in the entities’ understanding of AML/CFT obligations. 248. The AT is of the opinion that this newly introduced system proved its effectiveness in setting up a structured foundation for developing an understanding of sectoral and institutional risks over time, particularly given the previously limited visibility over DNFBPs. However, there is need for further calibration and for automation, as the FMC (SASD) is highly under-resourced for the role of sustaining this process in parallel with the foreshadowed inspection activity. 249. During the assessment period, the FMC also produced several strategic analyses, including some with specific relevance to the DNFBP sector. [63] Topics were selected based on emerging cases, statistical trends, and supervisory judgement. These analyses have contributed to the FMC’s thematic understanding of risk. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 250. The promotion of ML/TF risks awareness and AML/CFT obligations among DNFBPs has been largely driven by the FMC, while other sectoral supervisors have played a more limited role in awareness-raising activities. 251. Since 2023, the FMC has significantly intensified its engagement with DNFBPs and actively focused on raising awareness and improving DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, with particular attention to higher-risk sectors such as real estate agents. Supervisory efforts have included dedicated training sessions, ad-hoc engagement with entities identified as having insufficient knowledge, and review of internal procedures of selected entities. The FMC has also issued guidance papers and typologies, published on its website, and developed an e-learning platform accessible to all reporting entities. 252. The FMC communicated the results of the ML/TF and PF NRAs to all DNFBPs and held meetings in May 2025 to present and discuss the findings, with broad participation among medium- and high-risk entities. 253. During 2024-2025, representatives from all DNFBP categories, including notaries and gambling operators, participated in training sessions organised by the FMC with the support of the CoE and delivered by national and international experts. DNFBP representatives confirmed their attendance to the AT and indicated that the training strengthened their understanding of ML/TF risks and their statutory obligations. 254. In addition, following repeated deficiencies in the timely submission of TTRs, the MoJ issued a circular to the Chamber of Notaries in 2025 reminding members of their reporting obligations. Footnotes [59] In Armenia, only transactions that involve real estate above AMD 50 million (approx. EUR 100 000) and donations have to be notarized. [60] Although the Methodology makes reference to quantitative criteria, it is not clear how this should be considered. [61] Inherent risk is weighted at 40%, while the level of adequacy of internal controls are weighted at 60%, thus reflecting its greater importance given. [62] Out of 196 realtors that underwent the risk assessment, 11 are considered high risk, 14 are considered medium risk while 171 are considered low risk. [63]. As mentioned under IO.3, the risk assessment activity of the FMC is not limited to the DNFBP sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 238. Overall, supervisors’ risk understanding in the DNFBP sector is closely tied to the NRA process. For each NRA exercise, supervisory authorities perform their own sectoral analysis and submit the result and underlaying data to the FMC for inclusion into the final report. This analysis forms the basis of the sectoral risk assessment, as no other standalone assessments or alternative methodologies are used to evaluate ML/TF risk at the sectoral level. Therefore, supervisors also reference the findings of the NRA when articulating the risks to which their sectors are exposed. SRC – Casinos and online gambling operators 239. The SRC’s understanding of ML/TF risks in the gambling sector broadly reflects the NRA findings, with internet gambling assessed as presenting the highest risk. However, the SRC does not have developed a dedicated AML/CFT risk-assessment methodology, and its risk analysis relies mainly on the tax-related data and information on large winnings published on the official websites. 240. Despite these limitations, the SRC demonstrated awareness of key sectoral threats and typologies. During the assessment period, several mitigating measures were introduced, including a requirement that all top-ups and pay-outs to be made through the same bank account held in the player’s name (October 2024), which contributes to mitigating anonymity and misuse risks. 241. TF risk in the gambling sector is considered low, reflecting legal requirements for all online gambling players, resident and non-residents, to use accounts with Armenian banks, as well as declining number of non-resident players. This assessment is consistent with the NRA and was supported by information provided to the AT. MoJ – notaries 242. The main activity of notaries relevant under FATF Methodology is the notarization) of real estate transactions [59] . While some information was provided to the AT on the existence of notaries that also engage in activities specified by R.22, let. d) points (iv) and (v), the MoJ could not confirm this aspect. 243. In late 2023, the MoJ adopted a methodology requiring an annual AML/CFT risk-assessment of notaries. The methodology categorises notaries into low, medium and high risk based on a limited set of predefined criteria, such as involvement of PEPs or parties linked to higher-risk jurisdictions. However, the framework remains basic and does not incorporate a broader range of risk indicators or criteria. [60] 244. In practice, the MoJ currently lacks the data necessary to apply this methodology effectively. Although notaries submit quarterly reports on transaction volumes, no systemic data is collected on the identity or characteristics of parties to transactions. As a result, the MoJ’s understanding of risks in the notarial sector remains largely based on aggregate transaction volumes and complaints received. Authorities have indicated that a new IT system is to be introduced, which would enable access to more granular data and support fuller implementation of the risk-assessment model. FMC - ( real estate agents, lawyers and legal firms, accountants, DPMS ) 245. Since assuming AML/CFT supervisory responsibilities in 2023, the FMC has taken initial steps to develop a risk-based understanding of ML/TF risks across the sectors it supervises. At sectoral level, the understanding of risk derives from the NRA findings, which point real estate agents as relatively higher risk entities among those supervised by the FMC. At individual level, the risk assessment methodology is prescribed in a Supervisory Manual and is based on structured questionnaires sent to reporting entities, collecting information on inherent risk factors (customers, services, delivery channels, geographic exposure) and on internal controls. The outcome is based on scores from 1 to 3 attributed to each criterion, which feed into a matrix [61] , providing a segmentation of DNFBPs into three final categories of residual risk: low, medium and high. In total, there are over 20 criteria for inherent risk and over 30 for internal control assessment. A significant proportion of criteria are assessed by supervisory judgement, including conclusions drawn upon interactions with DNFBP personnel at different training events, and calculated manually, thus offering the FMC a high level of flexibility in determining the final score. 246. This new approach has been officially introduced in the beginning of 2025, with one round of complete risk assessment guided by the Manual. Before that, FMC has piloted the questionnaires, with analysis based on requests of data covering 2021-2023 period. 247. The results placed the vast majority of DNFBPs (under FMC supervision) in the low-risk category, with only real estate agents having a relatively taller proportion of medium and high-risk entities in their overall population [62] , which is consistent with the NRA results. Under the individual methodology risk matrix, a low-risk category is only possible in case of effective internal controls, and these, as explained by authorities, are assessed proportionately to entity size. Smaller entities may be deemed compliant with basic measures while larger entities are expected to demonstrate more robust controls. However, this approach is not fully consistent with information obtained through interviews with the private sector, which indicate persistent deficiencies in the entities’ understanding of AML/CFT obligations. 248. The AT is of the opinion that this newly introduced system proved its effectiveness in setting up a structured foundation for developing an understanding of sectoral and institutional risks over time, particularly given the previously limited visibility over DNFBPs. However, there is need for further calibration and for automation, as the FMC (SASD) is highly under-resourced for the role of sustaining this process in parallel with the foreshadowed inspection activity. 249. During the assessment period, the FMC also produced several strategic analyses, including some with specific relevance to the DNFBP sector. [63] Topics were selected based on emerging cases, statistical trends, and supervisory judgement. These analyses have contributed to the FMC’s thematic understanding of risk. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 250. The promotion of ML/TF risks awareness and AML/CFT obligations among DNFBPs has been largely driven by the FMC, while other sectoral supervisors have played a more limited role in awareness-raising activities. 251. Since 2023, the FMC has significantly intensified its engagement with DNFBPs and actively focused on raising awareness and improving DNFBPs’ understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations, with particular attention to higher-risk sectors such as real estate agents. Supervisory efforts have included dedicated training sessions, ad-hoc engagement with entities identified as having insufficient knowledge, and review of internal procedures of selected entities. The FMC has also issued guidance papers and typologies, published on its website, and developed an e-learning platform accessible to all reporting entities. 252. The FMC communicated the results of the ML/TF and PF NRAs to all DNFBPs and held meetings in May 2025 to present and discuss the findings, with broad participation among medium- and high-risk entities. 253. During 2024-2025, representatives from all DNFBP categories, including notaries and gambling operators, participated in training sessions organised by the FMC with the support of the CoE and delivered by national and international experts. DNFBP representatives confirmed their attendance to the AT and indicated that the training strengthened their understanding of ML/TF risks and their statutory obligations. 254. In addition, following repeated deficiencies in the timely submission of TTRs, the MoJ issued a circular to the Chamber of Notaries in 2025 reminding members of their reporting obligations. Footnotes [59] In Armenia, only transactions that involve real estate above AMD 50 million (approx. EUR 100 000) and donations have to be notarized. [60] Although the Methodology makes reference to quantitative criteria, it is not clear how this should be considered. [61] Inherent risk is weighted at 40%, while the level of adequacy of internal controls are weighted at 60%, thus reflecting its greater importance given. [62] Out of 196 realtors that underwent the risk assessment, 11 are considered high risk, 14 are considered medium risk while 171 are considered low risk. [63]. As mentioned under IO.3, the risk assessment activity of the FMC is not limited to the DNFBP sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="327. The most significant development to prevent the misuse of legal persons to increase transparency of basic and BO information during the reporting period, was the setup of the electronic BO Registry that is being gradually populated with BO data since 2021. Additionally, the State Register Agency has started supervising compliance of the obligation to identify and provide the BO information, and as from 2023, the State Register Agency started initiating administrative proceedings for submitting incorrect or incomplete information in the BO declaration form. 328. At the time of the onsite there was no data or analysis related to tax audits conducted on dormant legal persons that were reactivated [74] . Authorities report that as a mitigating measure any domestic transactions of dormant companies would change the company status at the tax authority and trigger attention. Domestic legal persons Basic information 329. All domestic legal persons must be registered with the State Registry. Basic information must be provided by the chief of the executive body of the legal person or whoever this person so authorises. The applicant can complete the information independently or with the assistance of a representative of the state authority at an office of the State Register. There is no requirement on legal persons to hold basic information. 330. Basic information includes personal identification details, such as addresses, citizenship status, and birth/death records, along with company ownership, registration details, and tax status for businesses. The personal information of owners and executive directors is checked for accuracy upon registration by the State Register Agency using national databases in case of Armenian nationals and translations of identification documents in case of foreigners. The basic company information is publicly available and free of charge. 331. For JSCs, legal ownership information is inputted in the system by the Central Depository account operators, which are financial institutions, and includes at least the following information about each individual shareholder/legal owner: full name, father’s name, ID information, residence address, account reference, account type (whether securities or cash accounts), contacts, nationality, date of birth, bank account. In case the shareholder/ legal owner is a legal person: full trade name, state registration data, principal place of business (mailing address), personal name of the head or representative of the legal person and contact details. 332. The Central Depository as a reporting entity supervised by the CBA, verifies the information in line with its AML obligations. BO information 333. By 2023, BO information of all legal persons is submitted electronically through the online platform of the State Registry. At the stage of logging in, the platform verifies the identity of the person submitting information on behalf of the legal person. Information already contained in the State Registry (basic information) is auto filled by the system to avoid human negligence. The person is then prompted to fill-in required sections of the declaration. A section, as well as specific cells of the form may activate or deactivate based on data inputted by the user. Additionally, some cells are formatted and allow only limited types of input, and drop-down boxes are used, where possible, to avoid manual input of information. The legal person is obliged to declare the BO/s to the State Registry within 40 days of its registration, report any changes within 40 days and then confirm or make changes to the BO/s previously declared at least once a year. The BO data is automatically registered only if all the fields of the electronic form are completed. 334. Following the submission, the BO data is automatically recorded in the State Registry database. The BO declaration is automatically checked for apparent mistakes and is published within two working days. 335. The details to be provided include: (i) information on BOs: full name, citizenship, date of birth, address and contact details, (ii) details of the identity document (which are attached in case of foreign nationals), (iii) grounds for being a BO and details (percentage of shares, direct or indirect participation, other means of control, individual or joint control, or manager) and (iv) when there is a chain of ownership, information on all the intermediate legal persons (name, registration number, address, jurisdiction of registration, and name of head of the executive body). 336. The State Register Agency does not verify the accuracy of the information contained in the documents except to check that the documentation provided matches data included in the application form. 337. From the data that was presented, 49 per cent of the legal persons still did not provide BO information and the authorities explained that the non-declarations are predominantly related to the dormant legal persons. Following the on-site, authorities explained that they looked at the BO population through the prism of the active/inactive companies by cross-checking with the SRC (tax authority) and concluded that 82% of the active companies have declared their BO. 338. Reporting entities are obliged to identify the BO in their CDD process, and update data collected at a self-determined periodicity on a risk basis, which should be at least once a year, to ensure that it is up to date and relevant. The information stored therein is generally relevant and kept up to date, with the deficiencies identified in IO.3 and IO.4. While this constitutes a meaningful mitigating measure, it is be noted that there is no requirement for legal persons to have a bank account in Armenia, or to involve a reporting entity at incorporation stage or throughout the life of the business. This shortcoming is mitigated by the adoption of the Law on Non-Cash Transactions adopted in 2022, whereby all the transactions between legal persons concluded and/or paid in Armenia must be executed by non-cash means. This implies in practice that active legal persons should have a bank account, however this data was not provided during on-site. Certain exemptions exist, for example, payments below circa Eur700, and transactions for acquisition of goods formulated in a VAT return account, written off by foreign citizens and stateless persons. 339. During the on-site, supervisory authorities reported that there are several legal persons that declared as BO the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities, and they found nothing unreasonable about this. Authorities reported that it is expected and reasonable that state-owned enterprises and non-commercial legal persons to declare this type of BO. Post on-site, authorities clarified that as at October 2025 there were 42,442 BOs that may fall under this definition (the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities). It was then further provided that out of this figure, 7,067 declared exclusively as BO the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities. 340. While the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023-2026 and the National AML/CFT Strategy for 2025-2028 foresee the development of a discrepancy reporting mechanism, this has not been effectively implemented. 341. While noting that no guidance has been issued by the State Register Agency on how BOs should be identified, the Agency considers that the Central Bank Guidance [75] published in 2024, is of assistance to legal persons and reporting entities in determining the BO. This guidance explains that when reporting entities cross-check with the State Registry and detect inconsistencies in the BO data, they should “ provide an opportunity to make relevant alterations to the State Register within a reasonable but unspecified time limit, and in case of uncooperative behaviour of the legal person, it should, based on part 1 or 2 of Article 27 of the AML/CTF Law, reject the transaction and not approve (terminate) the business relationship” . The text of the Guidance is informative for the SRA in that they will be notified by the RE in case of an inconsistency detected but does not provide assistance in how to identify the BO by themselves. Also, the AT notes that there is no reference in the guidance document whether a suspicious report should be filed in cases where the transaction is rejected. During the on-site some of the reporting entities confirmed that they report the found discrepancies to the State Register Agency, but no statistics are kept in this regard to estimate the accuracy of BO information. Although no records are kept on the number of such instances, the authorities maintained that the discrepancies were negligent mistakes and not attempts to conceal the BO. 342. Legal persons are not subject to any type of oversight mechanism (i.e., on-site checks) to ensure that a company is not a shell company. 343. In public procurement, the legal persons bidding on state contracts must submit a BO declaration. Foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia 344. With regards to foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Armenia, basic and BO information can be sourced from reporting entities to the extent that they engage in business relationships or an occasional transaction with an FI or DNFBP. All legal persons and legal arrangements 345. Overall, Armenia took some key relevant mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes, such as the electronic register (State Registry) for both basic and BO information, the Central Depository and the obligation to identify the BO placed on the reporting entities. However, no systematic verifications were carried out by the State Register Agency on the accuracy of the BO information. When discrepancies were reported to the State Register Agency by the competent authorities, the Agency imposed nine administrative sanctions (6 in 2023 and 3 in 2024) for incomplete or incorrect information. There is no data on the same that were reported by the reporting entities as explained above. 346. Although reporting entities are requested to hold BO information on legal arrangements since only recently (prior to the legal amendments the definition in the law of what constitutes a trust was not in line with what is requested in c.25.4), these entities are of low materiality in Armenia. Footnotes [74] In later stages of the assessment, the authorities have presented statistics for 2025, showing that the SRC has flagged and subjected 391 inactive legal persons to supervisory actions. 167 taxpayers have been found to be in breach of tax obligations. No ML/TF risks have been identified. [75] 20241022_BO Guide_ENG.pdf" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="327. The most significant development to prevent the misuse of legal persons to increase transparency of basic and BO information during the reporting period, was the setup of the electronic BO Registry that is being gradually populated with BO data since 2021. Additionally, the State Register Agency has started supervising compliance of the obligation to identify and provide the BO information, and as from 2023, the State Register Agency started initiating administrative proceedings for submitting incorrect or incomplete information in the BO declaration form. 328. At the time of the onsite there was no data or analysis related to tax audits conducted on dormant legal persons that were reactivated [74] . Authorities report that as a mitigating measure any domestic transactions of dormant companies would change the company status at the tax authority and trigger attention. Domestic legal persons Basic information 329. All domestic legal persons must be registered with the State Registry. Basic information must be provided by the chief of the executive body of the legal person or whoever this person so authorises. The applicant can complete the information independently or with the assistance of a representative of the state authority at an office of the State Register. There is no requirement on legal persons to hold basic information. 330. Basic information includes personal identification details, such as addresses, citizenship status, and birth/death records, along with company ownership, registration details, and tax status for businesses. The personal information of owners and executive directors is checked for accuracy upon registration by the State Register Agency using national databases in case of Armenian nationals and translations of identification documents in case of foreigners. The basic company information is publicly available and free of charge. 331. For JSCs, legal ownership information is inputted in the system by the Central Depository account operators, which are financial institutions, and includes at least the following information about each individual shareholder/legal owner: full name, father’s name, ID information, residence address, account reference, account type (whether securities or cash accounts), contacts, nationality, date of birth, bank account. In case the shareholder/ legal owner is a legal person: full trade name, state registration data, principal place of business (mailing address), personal name of the head or representative of the legal person and contact details. 332. The Central Depository as a reporting entity supervised by the CBA, verifies the information in line with its AML obligations. BO information 333. By 2023, BO information of all legal persons is submitted electronically through the online platform of the State Registry. At the stage of logging in, the platform verifies the identity of the person submitting information on behalf of the legal person. Information already contained in the State Registry (basic information) is auto filled by the system to avoid human negligence. The person is then prompted to fill-in required sections of the declaration. A section, as well as specific cells of the form may activate or deactivate based on data inputted by the user. Additionally, some cells are formatted and allow only limited types of input, and drop-down boxes are used, where possible, to avoid manual input of information. The legal person is obliged to declare the BO/s to the State Registry within 40 days of its registration, report any changes within 40 days and then confirm or make changes to the BO/s previously declared at least once a year. The BO data is automatically registered only if all the fields of the electronic form are completed. 334. Following the submission, the BO data is automatically recorded in the State Registry database. The BO declaration is automatically checked for apparent mistakes and is published within two working days. 335. The details to be provided include: (i) information on BOs: full name, citizenship, date of birth, address and contact details, (ii) details of the identity document (which are attached in case of foreign nationals), (iii) grounds for being a BO and details (percentage of shares, direct or indirect participation, other means of control, individual or joint control, or manager) and (iv) when there is a chain of ownership, information on all the intermediate legal persons (name, registration number, address, jurisdiction of registration, and name of head of the executive body). 336. The State Register Agency does not verify the accuracy of the information contained in the documents except to check that the documentation provided matches data included in the application form. 337. From the data that was presented, 49 per cent of the legal persons still did not provide BO information and the authorities explained that the non-declarations are predominantly related to the dormant legal persons. Following the on-site, authorities explained that they looked at the BO population through the prism of the active/inactive companies by cross-checking with the SRC (tax authority) and concluded that 82% of the active companies have declared their BO. 338. Reporting entities are obliged to identify the BO in their CDD process, and update data collected at a self-determined periodicity on a risk basis, which should be at least once a year, to ensure that it is up to date and relevant. The information stored therein is generally relevant and kept up to date, with the deficiencies identified in IO.3 and IO.4. While this constitutes a meaningful mitigating measure, it is be noted that there is no requirement for legal persons to have a bank account in Armenia, or to involve a reporting entity at incorporation stage or throughout the life of the business. This shortcoming is mitigated by the adoption of the Law on Non-Cash Transactions adopted in 2022, whereby all the transactions between legal persons concluded and/or paid in Armenia must be executed by non-cash means. This implies in practice that active legal persons should have a bank account, however this data was not provided during on-site. Certain exemptions exist, for example, payments below circa Eur700, and transactions for acquisition of goods formulated in a VAT return account, written off by foreign citizens and stateless persons. 339. During the on-site, supervisory authorities reported that there are several legal persons that declared as BO the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities, and they found nothing unreasonable about this. Authorities reported that it is expected and reasonable that state-owned enterprises and non-commercial legal persons to declare this type of BO. Post on-site, authorities clarified that as at October 2025 there were 42,442 BOs that may fall under this definition (the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities). It was then further provided that out of this figure, 7,067 declared exclusively as BO the official carrying out the overall or current management of the legal entity’s activities. 340. While the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023-2026 and the National AML/CFT Strategy for 2025-2028 foresee the development of a discrepancy reporting mechanism, this has not been effectively implemented. 341. While noting that no guidance has been issued by the State Register Agency on how BOs should be identified, the Agency considers that the Central Bank Guidance [75] published in 2024, is of assistance to legal persons and reporting entities in determining the BO. This guidance explains that when reporting entities cross-check with the State Registry and detect inconsistencies in the BO data, they should “ provide an opportunity to make relevant alterations to the State Register within a reasonable but unspecified time limit, and in case of uncooperative behaviour of the legal person, it should, based on part 1 or 2 of Article 27 of the AML/CTF Law, reject the transaction and not approve (terminate) the business relationship” . The text of the Guidance is informative for the SRA in that they will be notified by the RE in case of an inconsistency detected but does not provide assistance in how to identify the BO by themselves. Also, the AT notes that there is no reference in the guidance document whether a suspicious report should be filed in cases where the transaction is rejected. During the on-site some of the reporting entities confirmed that they report the found discrepancies to the State Register Agency, but no statistics are kept in this regard to estimate the accuracy of BO information. Although no records are kept on the number of such instances, the authorities maintained that the discrepancies were negligent mistakes and not attempts to conceal the BO. 342. Legal persons are not subject to any type of oversight mechanism (i.e., on-site checks) to ensure that a company is not a shell company. 343. In public procurement, the legal persons bidding on state contracts must submit a BO declaration. Foreign legal persons with sufficient links with Armenia 344. With regards to foreign legal persons with sufficient links to Armenia, basic and BO information can be sourced from reporting entities to the extent that they engage in business relationships or an occasional transaction with an FI or DNFBP. All legal persons and legal arrangements 345. Overall, Armenia took some key relevant mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for ML/TF purposes, such as the electronic register (State Registry) for both basic and BO information, the Central Depository and the obligation to identify the BO placed on the reporting entities. However, no systematic verifications were carried out by the State Register Agency on the accuracy of the BO information. When discrepancies were reported to the State Register Agency by the competent authorities, the Agency imposed nine administrative sanctions (6 in 2023 and 3 in 2024) for incomplete or incorrect information. There is no data on the same that were reported by the reporting entities as explained above. 346. Although reporting entities are requested to hold BO information on legal arrangements since only recently (prior to the legal amendments the definition in the law of what constitutes a trust was not in line with what is requested in c.25.4), these entities are of low materiality in Armenia. Footnotes [74] In later stages of the assessment, the authorities have presented statistics for 2025, showing that the SRC has flagged and subjected 391 inactive legal persons to supervisory actions. 167 taxpayers have been found to be in breach of tax obligations. No ML/TF risks have been identified. [75] 20241022_BO Guide_ENG.pdf" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 384. Armenia has taken significant steps to develop FMC’s capacity to produce and disseminate financial intelligence. FIU staff has increased by 30% since the last evaluation and currently consists of 37 persons. In February 2023, a new Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division was established. The unit is divided into five divisions: Analyses (12 employees), Strategic Analysis and Supervision (5 employees), Legal Compliance (5 employees), International Relations (5 employees), and Information Systems Design and Development (6 employees). This increase of resources paired with other activities has resulted in the rising number of FMC spontaneous dissemination to competent authorities and the percentage of ML investigations being triggered by information from the FIU. 385. The FMC has implemented an CMS, which allows for the automated processing, secure storage, and structured handling of the entire volume of information received, analysed, and disseminated by the FMC. Thirteen government agency databases have been integrated into the CMS, accessible through a unified search window to speed up analysis. Nevertheless, the FIU would benefit from more sophisticated IT tools to perform financial analysis, including the visualisation of transactions and network analysis from various data sources and formats. These analytical IT tools would be useful, especially when conducting strategic analysis and operational analysis in more complex cases. Operational analysis 386. FMC conducts its operational work on the basis of a set of formalized procedures, including inter alia, an operational manual, case analysis guidance and STR prioritisation rules. FMC’s cases are primarily triggered on the basis of STRs, but it can also be triggered on the basis of information from foreign FIUs, domestic requests from LEA, open-source intelligence (OSINT) or findings of strategic analysis. 387. The STRs are submitted electronically. Each STR is looked at by an FMC analyst who decides if the STR will constitute the basis for a new case or will be connected to an on-going case. In order to effectively handle incoming reports and requests, each case is manually processed through a prioritization system, which assigns one of four categories: Very High, High, Medium, and Low. The prioritization mechanism identifies which cases should be analysed first by the analysis division. The priority level is proposed by the Head of the Analysis Division and confirmed by the Head of the FIU. The AT looked at the prioritisation criteria and was satisfied that they are relevant, commensurate with the risk and useful for the FIU work [79] . 388. Following the prioritisation, every case undergoes operational analysis. The assessment phase of the case can lead either to a comprehensive assessment or a rapid assessment (a simplified analytical procedure) in case of identified as non-essential or low risk STRs. Non-essential STRs can be reports which contain information already available to LEAs, share key characteristics with previously closed cases, have low transaction value or do not connect with other data in FMC databases. Approximately 35% of cases contain reports deemed non-essential and undergo rapid assessment, while the remaining 65% undergo comprehensive assessment. Cases subject to rapid assessment do not end in notifications to other authorities (unless circumstances change) but are used to support other cases of operational and strategic analysis. Cases comprehensively analysed can end either with a dissemination or with the closure of the case. 389. After the completion of the comprehensive assessment the analyst prepares a summary sheet together with a report addressed to the Head of the FMC. The cases are subject to a 10-point decision matrix based on the probability of occurrence, perception of public danger and potential for funds outflow. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis is more than 6 points, a notification shall be disseminated to competent LEAs. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis (hypotheses) is 4 or 5 points, the names/ titles of subjects of the case can be included in the FMC monitoring list (around contains around 100 natural and legal persons at a given moment), and subject for future review. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis (hypotheses) is 2 or 3 points, no further action shall be taken. The decision on the finalization of the case and eventual dissemination is ultimately taken by the Head of FMC, without any influence from parties outside the FIU. The formalized assessment of each case limits the potential for exerting undue influence on FIU staff. 390. The average time to process a case on the basis of an STR is mostly around 1-2 months and an operational analyst in the FMC normally handles 1-2 STRs per month, which is considered timely. Priority cases can be handled within single days, whereas particularly complex ML cases can take months to analyse and disseminate. Nevertheless, the FIU would benefit from more sophisticated IT tools as explained above. Table 6.3. Average time of STR turnover Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average number of days to process STR 40 days 42 days 36 days 37 days 35 days Strategic analysis 391. In February 2023, a new Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division was established within the FMC. The core function of the aforementioned division (5 staff members in total) is to conduct strategic analyses to identify ML/TF-related trends and patterns, assess national risks, and perform ML/TF risk-based supervision over REs that do not have a designated supervisory body in the field of AML/CFT. The FMC staff has attended strategic analysis courses and an in-house strategic intelligence assessment handbook has been developed to support the conduct of such analyses. 392. The FMC undertakes strategic (including thematic) analyses with the aim to a) deepen the understanding of evolving ML/TF risks by competent authorities b) identify unusual patterns of transactions or activities warranting further analysis by intelligence bodies c) produce typologies for reporting entities and d) produce reviews supporting AML/CFT supervisory activities. In the course of the period under review the FMC has carried out strategic analysis on a total of 33 themes (some of them repeatedly on a regular basis). Finalised strategic analyses include, inter alia: · Strategic analysis on cross border transportation of cash, · Strategic analysis on money transfers from Armenia to high-risk TF locations, · Strategic analysis on high-risk customers in the banking sector, · Typology reports on fraudulent activities, use of third-party intermediaries (money mules), pyramid schemes and drug trafficking, · Strategic analysis on crypto assets and entities offering such services. · Analysis of cross-border financial flows and related ML/FT risks connected with chosen jurisdictions. 393. The lack of dedicated analytical software connected with resource constraints (the division devoted to strategic analysis is also responsible for AML/CFT supervision) moderately limits the possibilities to develop more complex strategic products based on a broader set of data or interact more with other stakeholders. Despite these limitations, the outcomes of strategic analyses have been used inter alia in the NRA, ML typologies and indicators for REs, supervisory inspection plans, and notifications to LEAs. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 394. Throughout the period under review, the number of notifications sent by the FMC to competent authorities have been steadily increasing (from 50 in 2020 to 95 in 2024), which indicates the positive effect of recruiting new analysts, training and efforts aimed at increasing the effectiveness of cooperation with LEAs. The ratio of STRs received by the FMC vs notifications to LEAs based on such reports has risen from 14% in 2020 to 47% in 2024 which highlights the increased capacity of the FMC to share the relevant information with competent authorities coupled with an improvement in the quality of reporting. Table 6.4. Ratio of all STRs received by the FMC/ STRs used in notifications to LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All STRs received by the FMC 254 262 254 425 365 STRs used in notifications to LEAs [80] 35 68 58 140 171 Ratio 14% 26% 23% 33% 47% 395. Apart from disclosures on its own initiative, the FMC serves as an important source of information on request for the competent authorities, especially in the context of financial information subject to banking confidentiality requirements. Statistics indicate, that especially in the early years of the period subject to review, the FMC was heavily engaged in providing information to the law enforcement authorities. Table 6.5 FIU exchange with LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Notifications from the FMC to LEAs 50 80 66 106 95 Responses from the FMC to LEAs’ requests 558 555 407 330 243 6.2.3 FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 396. The FMC is the key source for financial intelligence for Armenian competent authorities, providing information both on its own initiative and on request. FMC notifications have a standardised structure and contain relevant information for further use on analysing ML/TF cases. Feedback collected by the FMC on the use of its spontaneous disseminations suggests, that the majority of the FIU notifications are further used by the competent authorities to trigger or supplement criminal investigations (see core issue 6.4). The FIU disseminates its intelligence products to a wide range of intelligence and investigative bodies. Table 6.6. FIU notifications to LEAs LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (per LEA) NSS 37 48 26 38 39 188 MIA 5 20 20 17 20 82 SRC 5 8 8 25 21 67 ACC 0 1 5 10 7 23 IC 1 1 4 13 3 22 GPO 1 2 3 3 5 14 MOJ 1 0 0 0 0 1 Total 50 80 66 106 95 397 397. The recipients of FIU notifications have varied in the period under review due to changes in the framework for conducting ML investigations. Until October 2021, the National Security Service (NSS), apart from its intelligence gathering capacity, held exclusive authority over ML investigations and was the primary recipient of FIU intelligence. In the following period, many authorities (NSS, MIA, SRC, IC) encompassed within their tasks both intelligence and investigative activities. Finally, in January 2023, the Investigative Committee (IC) has taken over as the primary body responsible for ML investigations, with the Anti-corruption Committee (ACC) having competence for ML investigations related to corruption (and – as the only remaining authority – possessing both an intelligence and investigative capacity). The current system is constructed in a manner where (in general) FIU information is first transferred to the intelligence bodies (NSS, MIA, SRC, ACC in this capacity) which enrich the data and (if there is adequate basis) transmit the outcomes in the form of a crime report to the investigative agencies (IC, ACC) to trigger criminal proceedings. The main recipient of FMC notification remains the NSS followed by the MIA (Police). 398. In general, the NSS should receive results of analysis of FT cases and those affecting national security. The SRC would be the recipient of analysis involving potential ML and/or tax evasion and the ACC (in its intelligence function) notifications concerning ML and/or potential corruption. The MIA should be the primary recipient of ML cases involving fraud. Nevertheless, the dissemination process is not fully transparent due to the overarching competence of some of the authorities (primarily the NSS and the MIA) in the field of counteracting money laundering and associated predicate offences. 399. In the beginning of the period under review, the FMC sent the same notification to multiple recipients in case of ML associated with predicate offences spanning across competences of several authorities. This practice was ultimately considered to be less efficient than sending to one authority who would manage further disclosures to other intelligence agencies (for example, in the case of tax evasion – to the SRC). In practice, similar cases (for example, ML associated with fraud or tax evasion) can often have different recipients, depending on the trigger for the analysis. The handling of similar ML cases by different authorities implies that the intelligence authorities need to have a broader range of expertise to effectively analyse disseminations received from the FIU. Limited coordination mechanisms between the intelligence bodies may lead to diminished opportunities for triggering ML investigations (see IO.7). 400. Notifications to the NSS concerning potential TF have been generated on the basis of requests and disclosures from foreign counterparts along with results of the “Regional level operation” (see IO.9). Table 6.7 Breakdown of FIU notifications to LEAs by underlying offence in the years 2020-2024 ML [81] TF** ML + other crime (specify the top 5 offences), including Fraud Drug trafficking Corruption Tax evasion other crimes 97 5 102 18 68 69 38 401. As indicated earlier, the FIU also notifications to the FSLD on potential breaches of AML/CFT obligations conducted by reporting entities. In particular 27 of these notifications involved the failure to file an STR. 402. The FMC is a vital source of information on request for the law enforcement authorities, in particular the intelligence bodies. Based on the interviews conducted by the AT, it seems the majority of these inquires would concern intelligence gathering activities regarding proceed generating crimes which could potentially lead to ML. 18% of all requests concern ML without reference to any predicate offence. The range of information to be obtained vary from basic data on active bank accounts, account statements, to the provision of information in the FIU database (for example STRs, TTRs) and requests for full FMC analysis. In many cases the FMC contacts reporting entities or foreign counterparts to gather the necessary data. In order to mitigate the number of requests, in cooperation with LEA, in 2020 the FMC developed the Principles for Inquiries, outlining several important elements including the characteristics of admissible and inadmissible inquiries. This led to a gradual decrease in the number of requests made by LEAs to the FMC (see table below). While this is a positive development, the number of requests outnumber by far the FIU notifications on its own initiative which raises concerns regarding the use of FMC resources especially in the context of the absence of more sophisticated analytical tools as explained above. Table 6.8. Requests by LEAs to the FMC Requests to FMC NSS MIA ACC SRC IC MoJ Interpol MoD Total 2020 275 74 27 46 134 11 8 0 575 2021 328 209 15 25 32 10 11 0 630 2022 240 105 31 28 19 4 3 0 430 2023 153 70 41 51 13 0 7 5 340 2024 147 36 6 58 15 2 0 1 265 403. In the period under review a total of 49 requests from the NSS concerned potential TF. The requests pertained to various hypotheses related to breaches of public order and extremist activities potentially terrorism related. In all instances, the FMC conducted thorough analyses, including requesting information from REs. No potential links to TF were identified in any of the cases. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 404. Notifications from the FMC to the SRC are analysed by the Investigation and Operational Intelligence Department. Data from the FIU is supplemented with information from inter alia tax databases, the real estate register, employment information, the corporate register which are studied in through operational-intelligence measures to identify signs of tax crimes under the Criminal Code where the damage exceeds 10 million AMD. The SRC uses more than 30 automated analytical risk tools for specific sectors of the economy, operating on the basis of over 500 risk profiles, including those aimed at detecting ML cases. 405. Information received from the FMC becomes the subject of the study of the NSS, within which complex operational-search measures are carried out to verify, substantiate the hypothesis/hypotheses put forward by the FMC. The employees of the NSS, in the course of their work, collect financial intelligence as well as other information relevant to the identification and investigation of ML cases. The employees utilize directly accessible databases, such as databases of the Cadastre Committee, the State Register Agency, etc. and a range of 16 operational intelligence activities). 406. In the case of MIA, once information about a possible ML case has been received, an in-depth analysis is conducted, primarily in the General Department of Criminal Police, to determine its reliability through the implementation of operational-intelligence measures, to assess the available resources and to plan the list, sequence and schedule of necessary measures. Ultimately, a preliminary legal assessment of the alleged crime is performed. In case of existence of reasonable grounds, a report on the alleged offense is sent to the relevant investigative body to discuss the initiation of criminal proceedings. 407. The ACC in its intelligence capacity uses the information available in the relevant electronic databases to verify information provided by the FMC. There are no special mechanisms for using the information contained in the electronic databases to develop operational and strategic analysis. Data provided by the FMC are considered operational data, which are verified by the body carrying out operational-intelligence activities. 408. The outcome of the activities of the intelligence bodies remains a concern for the AT. Limited statistical data is available on the number and nature of disseminations of the MIA, NSS and SRC to the IC and ACC. Interviews with the authorities indicate, that crime reports filed by the intelligence bodies rarely contain a suspicion or hypothesis of money laundering, focusing instead on justified suspicion of the predicate offence. The aforementioned case can be caused by several factors as explained below. 409. One aspect is the expectation that in practice the intelligence bodies would carry out their activities within a relatively short timeframe of a couple of months. This limits the possibility to substantiate a clear ML hypothesis to the investigative authorities. The investigative authorities do not perceive this as a deficiency, as the intelligence body filing the crime report is further involved in the criminal investigation, and ML charges can be added at a larger stage. 410. Another aspect is the resources available to the intelligence bodies. With the exemption of the NSS, none of the aforementioned authorities have designated a specialised unit or subdivision for the analysis of ML cases nor officers specialised in financial matters. While the majority of the staff involved in handling FMC disseminations has received general ML training, the financial aspect remains insufficiently explored at the intelligence level which demonstrate the need for enhanced expertise for the NSS, SRC, MIA and ACC, in order to be able to substantiate the ML hypothesis as a trigger for criminal investigations. Both the MIA and SRC lack dedicated experts in the field of digital and forensic financial examination, although both units have dedicated staff having better financial expertise and understanding of blockchain analysis. 411. The authorities acknowledge a growing trend of using FMC’s financial intelligence data by LEAs to investigate predicate offences, rather than focusing on ML crimes. Footnotes [79] e.g. the existence of a suspended transaction or business relationship, the underlying criminality – ML/TF, the identification of offences considered the top predicate crimes (ML threats) in Armenia, the value of potential proceeds of crime/TF or the existence of connections to other FIU cases [80] One notification can contain more than one STR [81] With no predicate attached" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 384. Armenia has taken significant steps to develop FMC’s capacity to produce and disseminate financial intelligence. FIU staff has increased by 30% since the last evaluation and currently consists of 37 persons. In February 2023, a new Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division was established. The unit is divided into five divisions: Analyses (12 employees), Strategic Analysis and Supervision (5 employees), Legal Compliance (5 employees), International Relations (5 employees), and Information Systems Design and Development (6 employees). This increase of resources paired with other activities has resulted in the rising number of FMC spontaneous dissemination to competent authorities and the percentage of ML investigations being triggered by information from the FIU. 385. The FMC has implemented an CMS, which allows for the automated processing, secure storage, and structured handling of the entire volume of information received, analysed, and disseminated by the FMC. Thirteen government agency databases have been integrated into the CMS, accessible through a unified search window to speed up analysis. Nevertheless, the FIU would benefit from more sophisticated IT tools to perform financial analysis, including the visualisation of transactions and network analysis from various data sources and formats. These analytical IT tools would be useful, especially when conducting strategic analysis and operational analysis in more complex cases. Operational analysis 386. FMC conducts its operational work on the basis of a set of formalized procedures, including inter alia, an operational manual, case analysis guidance and STR prioritisation rules. FMC’s cases are primarily triggered on the basis of STRs, but it can also be triggered on the basis of information from foreign FIUs, domestic requests from LEA, open-source intelligence (OSINT) or findings of strategic analysis. 387. The STRs are submitted electronically. Each STR is looked at by an FMC analyst who decides if the STR will constitute the basis for a new case or will be connected to an on-going case. In order to effectively handle incoming reports and requests, each case is manually processed through a prioritization system, which assigns one of four categories: Very High, High, Medium, and Low. The prioritization mechanism identifies which cases should be analysed first by the analysis division. The priority level is proposed by the Head of the Analysis Division and confirmed by the Head of the FIU. The AT looked at the prioritisation criteria and was satisfied that they are relevant, commensurate with the risk and useful for the FIU work [79] . 388. Following the prioritisation, every case undergoes operational analysis. The assessment phase of the case can lead either to a comprehensive assessment or a rapid assessment (a simplified analytical procedure) in case of identified as non-essential or low risk STRs. Non-essential STRs can be reports which contain information already available to LEAs, share key characteristics with previously closed cases, have low transaction value or do not connect with other data in FMC databases. Approximately 35% of cases contain reports deemed non-essential and undergo rapid assessment, while the remaining 65% undergo comprehensive assessment. Cases subject to rapid assessment do not end in notifications to other authorities (unless circumstances change) but are used to support other cases of operational and strategic analysis. Cases comprehensively analysed can end either with a dissemination or with the closure of the case. 389. After the completion of the comprehensive assessment the analyst prepares a summary sheet together with a report addressed to the Head of the FMC. The cases are subject to a 10-point decision matrix based on the probability of occurrence, perception of public danger and potential for funds outflow. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis is more than 6 points, a notification shall be disseminated to competent LEAs. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis (hypotheses) is 4 or 5 points, the names/ titles of subjects of the case can be included in the FMC monitoring list (around contains around 100 natural and legal persons at a given moment), and subject for future review. When the preliminary score of the proposed hypothesis (hypotheses) is 2 or 3 points, no further action shall be taken. The decision on the finalization of the case and eventual dissemination is ultimately taken by the Head of FMC, without any influence from parties outside the FIU. The formalized assessment of each case limits the potential for exerting undue influence on FIU staff. 390. The average time to process a case on the basis of an STR is mostly around 1-2 months and an operational analyst in the FMC normally handles 1-2 STRs per month, which is considered timely. Priority cases can be handled within single days, whereas particularly complex ML cases can take months to analyse and disseminate. Nevertheless, the FIU would benefit from more sophisticated IT tools as explained above. Table 6.3. Average time of STR turnover Year 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Average number of days to process STR 40 days 42 days 36 days 37 days 35 days Strategic analysis 391. In February 2023, a new Strategic Analysis and Supervision Division was established within the FMC. The core function of the aforementioned division (5 staff members in total) is to conduct strategic analyses to identify ML/TF-related trends and patterns, assess national risks, and perform ML/TF risk-based supervision over REs that do not have a designated supervisory body in the field of AML/CFT. The FMC staff has attended strategic analysis courses and an in-house strategic intelligence assessment handbook has been developed to support the conduct of such analyses. 392. The FMC undertakes strategic (including thematic) analyses with the aim to a) deepen the understanding of evolving ML/TF risks by competent authorities b) identify unusual patterns of transactions or activities warranting further analysis by intelligence bodies c) produce typologies for reporting entities and d) produce reviews supporting AML/CFT supervisory activities. In the course of the period under review the FMC has carried out strategic analysis on a total of 33 themes (some of them repeatedly on a regular basis). Finalised strategic analyses include, inter alia: · Strategic analysis on cross border transportation of cash, · Strategic analysis on money transfers from Armenia to high-risk TF locations, · Strategic analysis on high-risk customers in the banking sector, · Typology reports on fraudulent activities, use of third-party intermediaries (money mules), pyramid schemes and drug trafficking, · Strategic analysis on crypto assets and entities offering such services. · Analysis of cross-border financial flows and related ML/FT risks connected with chosen jurisdictions. 393. The lack of dedicated analytical software connected with resource constraints (the division devoted to strategic analysis is also responsible for AML/CFT supervision) moderately limits the possibilities to develop more complex strategic products based on a broader set of data or interact more with other stakeholders. Despite these limitations, the outcomes of strategic analyses have been used inter alia in the NRA, ML typologies and indicators for REs, supervisory inspection plans, and notifications to LEAs. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 394. Throughout the period under review, the number of notifications sent by the FMC to competent authorities have been steadily increasing (from 50 in 2020 to 95 in 2024), which indicates the positive effect of recruiting new analysts, training and efforts aimed at increasing the effectiveness of cooperation with LEAs. The ratio of STRs received by the FMC vs notifications to LEAs based on such reports has risen from 14% in 2020 to 47% in 2024 which highlights the increased capacity of the FMC to share the relevant information with competent authorities coupled with an improvement in the quality of reporting. Table 6.4. Ratio of all STRs received by the FMC/ STRs used in notifications to LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 All STRs received by the FMC 254 262 254 425 365 STRs used in notifications to LEAs [80] 35 68 58 140 171 Ratio 14% 26% 23% 33% 47% 395. Apart from disclosures on its own initiative, the FMC serves as an important source of information on request for the competent authorities, especially in the context of financial information subject to banking confidentiality requirements. Statistics indicate, that especially in the early years of the period subject to review, the FMC was heavily engaged in providing information to the law enforcement authorities. Table 6.5 FIU exchange with LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Notifications from the FMC to LEAs 50 80 66 106 95 Responses from the FMC to LEAs’ requests 558 555 407 330 243 6.2.3 FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 396. The FMC is the key source for financial intelligence for Armenian competent authorities, providing information both on its own initiative and on request. FMC notifications have a standardised structure and contain relevant information for further use on analysing ML/TF cases. Feedback collected by the FMC on the use of its spontaneous disseminations suggests, that the majority of the FIU notifications are further used by the competent authorities to trigger or supplement criminal investigations (see core issue 6.4). The FIU disseminates its intelligence products to a wide range of intelligence and investigative bodies. Table 6.6. FIU notifications to LEAs LEAs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total (per LEA) NSS 37 48 26 38 39 188 MIA 5 20 20 17 20 82 SRC 5 8 8 25 21 67 ACC 0 1 5 10 7 23 IC 1 1 4 13 3 22 GPO 1 2 3 3 5 14 MOJ 1 0 0 0 0 1 Total 50 80 66 106 95 397 397. The recipients of FIU notifications have varied in the period under review due to changes in the framework for conducting ML investigations. Until October 2021, the National Security Service (NSS), apart from its intelligence gathering capacity, held exclusive authority over ML investigations and was the primary recipient of FIU intelligence. In the following period, many authorities (NSS, MIA, SRC, IC) encompassed within their tasks both intelligence and investigative activities. Finally, in January 2023, the Investigative Committee (IC) has taken over as the primary body responsible for ML investigations, with the Anti-corruption Committee (ACC) having competence for ML investigations related to corruption (and – as the only remaining authority – possessing both an intelligence and investigative capacity). The current system is constructed in a manner where (in general) FIU information is first transferred to the intelligence bodies (NSS, MIA, SRC, ACC in this capacity) which enrich the data and (if there is adequate basis) transmit the outcomes in the form of a crime report to the investigative agencies (IC, ACC) to trigger criminal proceedings. The main recipient of FMC notification remains the NSS followed by the MIA (Police). 398. In general, the NSS should receive results of analysis of FT cases and those affecting national security. The SRC would be the recipient of analysis involving potential ML and/or tax evasion and the ACC (in its intelligence function) notifications concerning ML and/or potential corruption. The MIA should be the primary recipient of ML cases involving fraud. Nevertheless, the dissemination process is not fully transparent due to the overarching competence of some of the authorities (primarily the NSS and the MIA) in the field of counteracting money laundering and associated predicate offences. 399. In the beginning of the period under review, the FMC sent the same notification to multiple recipients in case of ML associated with predicate offences spanning across competences of several authorities. This practice was ultimately considered to be less efficient than sending to one authority who would manage further disclosures to other intelligence agencies (for example, in the case of tax evasion – to the SRC). In practice, similar cases (for example, ML associated with fraud or tax evasion) can often have different recipients, depending on the trigger for the analysis. The handling of similar ML cases by different authorities implies that the intelligence authorities need to have a broader range of expertise to effectively analyse disseminations received from the FIU. Limited coordination mechanisms between the intelligence bodies may lead to diminished opportunities for triggering ML investigations (see IO.7). 400. Notifications to the NSS concerning potential TF have been generated on the basis of requests and disclosures from foreign counterparts along with results of the “Regional level operation” (see IO.9). Table 6.7 Breakdown of FIU notifications to LEAs by underlying offence in the years 2020-2024 ML [81] TF** ML + other crime (specify the top 5 offences), including Fraud Drug trafficking Corruption Tax evasion other crimes 97 5 102 18 68 69 38 401. As indicated earlier, the FIU also notifications to the FSLD on potential breaches of AML/CFT obligations conducted by reporting entities. In particular 27 of these notifications involved the failure to file an STR. 402. The FMC is a vital source of information on request for the law enforcement authorities, in particular the intelligence bodies. Based on the interviews conducted by the AT, it seems the majority of these inquires would concern intelligence gathering activities regarding proceed generating crimes which could potentially lead to ML. 18% of all requests concern ML without reference to any predicate offence. The range of information to be obtained vary from basic data on active bank accounts, account statements, to the provision of information in the FIU database (for example STRs, TTRs) and requests for full FMC analysis. In many cases the FMC contacts reporting entities or foreign counterparts to gather the necessary data. In order to mitigate the number of requests, in cooperation with LEA, in 2020 the FMC developed the Principles for Inquiries, outlining several important elements including the characteristics of admissible and inadmissible inquiries. This led to a gradual decrease in the number of requests made by LEAs to the FMC (see table below). While this is a positive development, the number of requests outnumber by far the FIU notifications on its own initiative which raises concerns regarding the use of FMC resources especially in the context of the absence of more sophisticated analytical tools as explained above. Table 6.8. Requests by LEAs to the FMC Requests to FMC NSS MIA ACC SRC IC MoJ Interpol MoD Total 2020 275 74 27 46 134 11 8 0 575 2021 328 209 15 25 32 10 11 0 630 2022 240 105 31 28 19 4 3 0 430 2023 153 70 41 51 13 0 7 5 340 2024 147 36 6 58 15 2 0 1 265 403. In the period under review a total of 49 requests from the NSS concerned potential TF. The requests pertained to various hypotheses related to breaches of public order and extremist activities potentially terrorism related. In all instances, the FMC conducted thorough analyses, including requesting information from REs. No potential links to TF were identified in any of the cases. 6.2.4. Other competent authorities producing financial intelligence (where relevant) 404. Notifications from the FMC to the SRC are analysed by the Investigation and Operational Intelligence Department. Data from the FIU is supplemented with information from inter alia tax databases, the real estate register, employment information, the corporate register which are studied in through operational-intelligence measures to identify signs of tax crimes under the Criminal Code where the damage exceeds 10 million AMD. The SRC uses more than 30 automated analytical risk tools for specific sectors of the economy, operating on the basis of over 500 risk profiles, including those aimed at detecting ML cases. 405. Information received from the FMC becomes the subject of the study of the NSS, within which complex operational-search measures are carried out to verify, substantiate the hypothesis/hypotheses put forward by the FMC. The employees of the NSS, in the course of their work, collect financial intelligence as well as other information relevant to the identification and investigation of ML cases. The employees utilize directly accessible databases, such as databases of the Cadastre Committee, the State Register Agency, etc. and a range of 16 operational intelligence activities). 406. In the case of MIA, once information about a possible ML case has been received, an in-depth analysis is conducted, primarily in the General Department of Criminal Police, to determine its reliability through the implementation of operational-intelligence measures, to assess the available resources and to plan the list, sequence and schedule of necessary measures. Ultimately, a preliminary legal assessment of the alleged crime is performed. In case of existence of reasonable grounds, a report on the alleged offense is sent to the relevant investigative body to discuss the initiation of criminal proceedings. 407. The ACC in its intelligence capacity uses the information available in the relevant electronic databases to verify information provided by the FMC. There are no special mechanisms for using the information contained in the electronic databases to develop operational and strategic analysis. Data provided by the FMC are considered operational data, which are verified by the body carrying out operational-intelligence activities. 408. The outcome of the activities of the intelligence bodies remains a concern for the AT. Limited statistical data is available on the number and nature of disseminations of the MIA, NSS and SRC to the IC and ACC. Interviews with the authorities indicate, that crime reports filed by the intelligence bodies rarely contain a suspicion or hypothesis of money laundering, focusing instead on justified suspicion of the predicate offence. The aforementioned case can be caused by several factors as explained below. 409. One aspect is the expectation that in practice the intelligence bodies would carry out their activities within a relatively short timeframe of a couple of months. This limits the possibility to substantiate a clear ML hypothesis to the investigative authorities. The investigative authorities do not perceive this as a deficiency, as the intelligence body filing the crime report is further involved in the criminal investigation, and ML charges can be added at a larger stage. 410. Another aspect is the resources available to the intelligence bodies. With the exemption of the NSS, none of the aforementioned authorities have designated a specialised unit or subdivision for the analysis of ML cases nor officers specialised in financial matters. While the majority of the staff involved in handling FMC disseminations has received general ML training, the financial aspect remains insufficiently explored at the intelligence level which demonstrate the need for enhanced expertise for the NSS, SRC, MIA and ACC, in order to be able to substantiate the ML hypothesis as a trigger for criminal investigations. Both the MIA and SRC lack dedicated experts in the field of digital and forensic financial examination, although both units have dedicated staff having better financial expertise and understanding of blockchain analysis. 411. The authorities acknowledge a growing trend of using FMC’s financial intelligence data by LEAs to investigate predicate offences, rather than focusing on ML crimes. Footnotes [79] e.g. the existence of a suspended transaction or business relationship, the underlying criminality – ML/TF, the identification of offences considered the top predicate crimes (ML threats) in Armenia, the value of potential proceeds of crime/TF or the existence of connections to other FIU cases [80] One notification can contain more than one STR [81] With no predicate attached" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="445. Armenian legal system allows for pursuing all types of ML. During the assessment period, most prosecutions related to self-laundering, involving 124 individuals, with proceedings against 116 individuals remaining ongoing [85] . As noted in the previous assessment, the authorities appear to continue focusing on self-laundering cases involving mainly domestic predicate crimes. Only one prosecution involved a foreign predicate crime. There was a slight increase in third-party ML prosecutions in 2023, however, the overall number remains low, with very few prosecutions for autonomous ML cases. On the positive note, there was a noticeable increase, approximately fivefold, in the number of self-laundering prosecutions in 2023 and 2024. The authorities were also able to demonstrate few examples of prosecutions (resulted with indictment) in large-scale self-laundering and third-party ML cases (see case examples described under section 7.1.). On the other hand, there have been no prosecutions of legal persons, despite evidence of their involvement in the cases presented to the AT, including complex or large-scale ML cases. Table 7.6. Types of ML prosecutions and convictions (persons) Type of ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Self-laundering Prosecutions, of which: 2 10 12 51 49 124 - On-going 1 10 9 48 48 116 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 1 1 0 2 - Acquittals 0 0 0 2 1 3 Convictions 4 0 0 3 1 8 Third party ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 8 2 16 5 31 - On-going 0 5 2 14 5 26 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 3 0 2 0 5 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Standalone ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 2 0 5 2 9 - On-going 0 2 0 5 2 9 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign predicate crime ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 0 0 1 0 1 - On-going 0 0 0 1 0 1 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 446. The authorities did not provide a specific reasoning for the predominant focus on self-laundering cases and the limited number of autonomous ML prosecutions. There is a common understanding among the authorities that a prior conviction is not required to pursue a ML case, and that the intent and knowledge necessary to prove ML can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Consequently, the results may reflect the priorities of the investigative and prosecutorial authorities (see also the analysis under section 7.1 in relation to the institutional set-up of the inquiry and investigative bodies). On the other hand, the authorities referred to the difficulty in proving the intent to launder illicit proceeds, as one of the challenges. The latter may suggest a higher evidentiary standard. This is particularly relevant for ML offence committed through the “acquisition, possession or use of property”. These cases require proof of the intent to launder the property, which goes beyond the requirement established under the international standard (see R.3). 447. Most ML prosecutions are pursued jointly with predicate crimes. These primarily involve fraud, drug trafficking and corruption, including cases related to organised crime (Table 7.7). This is largely consistent with the identified main ML threats, with the exception of tax evasion, in relation to which there has been only one prosecution. However, the results are still not fully in line with the overall level of ML risks, both in terms of number or characteristics, given the relative low number of prosecutions compared with the level of predicate criminality and the limited understanding of risks related to foreign threats or transnational crime (see IO1). Table 7.7. ML prosecutions and convictions related to high-risk predicate offences ML associated with 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud Cases associated with the offence 1 3 4 5 6 19 Prosecuted persons 1 9 5 6 9 30 Cases where conviction was reached 2 0 0 2 1 5 Convicted persons 4 0 0 3 1 8 Drug trafficking Cases associated with the offence 0 0 1 8 15 24 Prosecuted persons 0 0 2 18 34 54 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corruption Cases associated with the offence 0 1 3 13 6 22 Prosecuted persons 0 1 6 34 8 49 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tax evasion Cases associated with the offence 0 1 0 0 0 1 Prosecuted persons 0 6 0 0 0 6 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Organised crime Cases associated with the offence 0 0 0 5 8 13 Prosecuted persons 0 0 0 13 17 30 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Cases associated with the offence 1 0 1 4 1 7 Prosecuted persons 1 0 1 4 1 7 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 448. Between 2020 and 2024, Armenian authorities initiated 226 ML investigations, which resulted in 80 prosecutions, representing an approximate prosecution rate of 35%. In some complex case examples, the prosecutorial oversight contributed to the inclusion of ML charges alongside the predicate offences. A slight increase in the number of ML prosecutions was noted in 2023 and 2024, particularly in connection with drug-related offences and corruption. Nevertheless, the overall number of ML prosecutions remains low when compared with the level of underlying predicate criminality [86] . The authorities explained that only part of the predicate crime investigations involve particularly large amounts of proceeds that would potentially lead to a decision to initiate a ML investigation. While this is noted, the resulting ratio of ML prosecutions remains low. For example, of the 931 tax evasion investigations involving “particularly large amounts”, only one resulted in an associated ML prosecution. 449. The number of convictions remains low. The previous MER presented data on 13 final convictions and 2 acquittals, whereas during this reporting period the number have decreased - only 7 final convictions, including 3 acquittals. The absence of any sentence imposed during 2021-2022 is considered by the authorities to result from the pandemic’s impact on the overall processes in the country. Authorities also indicated that many cases are still pending in the courts due to structural and legislative changes affecting the responsibilities of the courts [87] , resulting in delays. It was also noted that the courts face significant resource constraints and an increasing workload, particularly in complex financial cases. The MoJ has requested additional state resources for the judiciary, with limited results. The achieved convictions are not in line with the ML risk profile of the country, as they have been obtained exclusively in small-scale self-laundering cases associated with fraud. Footnotes [85] The statistics presented in Table 7.6. are based on the number of individuals charged, thus the actual number of ML prosecutions may be lower. [86] For example, ML prosecutions associated to drug trafficking account for approx. 0,3% of the total number of drug-related investigations (~8639); the ML prosecutions associated with corruption represent approx. 0,4% of the total number of corruption-related investigations (~5773), while the ML prosecutions associated with tax crime account for approx. 0,06% of the total number of tax evasion related offences (~1459). [87] E.g., the newly established Anti-corruption court was initially responsible for handling ML-related cases, but these responsibilities were later reassigned to ordinary courts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="445. Armenian legal system allows for pursuing all types of ML. During the assessment period, most prosecutions related to self-laundering, involving 124 individuals, with proceedings against 116 individuals remaining ongoing [85] . As noted in the previous assessment, the authorities appear to continue focusing on self-laundering cases involving mainly domestic predicate crimes. Only one prosecution involved a foreign predicate crime. There was a slight increase in third-party ML prosecutions in 2023, however, the overall number remains low, with very few prosecutions for autonomous ML cases. On the positive note, there was a noticeable increase, approximately fivefold, in the number of self-laundering prosecutions in 2023 and 2024. The authorities were also able to demonstrate few examples of prosecutions (resulted with indictment) in large-scale self-laundering and third-party ML cases (see case examples described under section 7.1.). On the other hand, there have been no prosecutions of legal persons, despite evidence of their involvement in the cases presented to the AT, including complex or large-scale ML cases. Table 7.6. Types of ML prosecutions and convictions (persons) Type of ML 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Self-laundering Prosecutions, of which: 2 10 12 51 49 124 - On-going 1 10 9 48 48 116 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 1 1 0 2 - Acquittals 0 0 0 2 1 3 Convictions 4 0 0 3 1 8 Third party ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 8 2 16 5 31 - On-going 0 5 2 14 5 26 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 3 0 2 0 5 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Standalone ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 2 0 5 2 9 - On-going 0 2 0 5 2 9 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign predicate crime ML Prosecutions, of which: 0 0 0 1 0 1 - On-going 0 0 0 1 0 1 - Discounted (statute of limitations or death) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - Acquittals 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 446. The authorities did not provide a specific reasoning for the predominant focus on self-laundering cases and the limited number of autonomous ML prosecutions. There is a common understanding among the authorities that a prior conviction is not required to pursue a ML case, and that the intent and knowledge necessary to prove ML can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Consequently, the results may reflect the priorities of the investigative and prosecutorial authorities (see also the analysis under section 7.1 in relation to the institutional set-up of the inquiry and investigative bodies). On the other hand, the authorities referred to the difficulty in proving the intent to launder illicit proceeds, as one of the challenges. The latter may suggest a higher evidentiary standard. This is particularly relevant for ML offence committed through the “acquisition, possession or use of property”. These cases require proof of the intent to launder the property, which goes beyond the requirement established under the international standard (see R.3). 447. Most ML prosecutions are pursued jointly with predicate crimes. These primarily involve fraud, drug trafficking and corruption, including cases related to organised crime (Table 7.7). This is largely consistent with the identified main ML threats, with the exception of tax evasion, in relation to which there has been only one prosecution. However, the results are still not fully in line with the overall level of ML risks, both in terms of number or characteristics, given the relative low number of prosecutions compared with the level of predicate criminality and the limited understanding of risks related to foreign threats or transnational crime (see IO1). Table 7.7. ML prosecutions and convictions related to high-risk predicate offences ML associated with 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud Cases associated with the offence 1 3 4 5 6 19 Prosecuted persons 1 9 5 6 9 30 Cases where conviction was reached 2 0 0 2 1 5 Convicted persons 4 0 0 3 1 8 Drug trafficking Cases associated with the offence 0 0 1 8 15 24 Prosecuted persons 0 0 2 18 34 54 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Corruption Cases associated with the offence 0 1 3 13 6 22 Prosecuted persons 0 1 6 34 8 49 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tax evasion Cases associated with the offence 0 1 0 0 0 1 Prosecuted persons 0 6 0 0 0 6 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Organised crime Cases associated with the offence 0 0 0 5 8 13 Prosecuted persons 0 0 0 13 17 30 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Cases associated with the offence 1 0 1 4 1 7 Prosecuted persons 1 0 1 4 1 7 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 448. Between 2020 and 2024, Armenian authorities initiated 226 ML investigations, which resulted in 80 prosecutions, representing an approximate prosecution rate of 35%. In some complex case examples, the prosecutorial oversight contributed to the inclusion of ML charges alongside the predicate offences. A slight increase in the number of ML prosecutions was noted in 2023 and 2024, particularly in connection with drug-related offences and corruption. Nevertheless, the overall number of ML prosecutions remains low when compared with the level of underlying predicate criminality [86] . The authorities explained that only part of the predicate crime investigations involve particularly large amounts of proceeds that would potentially lead to a decision to initiate a ML investigation. While this is noted, the resulting ratio of ML prosecutions remains low. For example, of the 931 tax evasion investigations involving “particularly large amounts”, only one resulted in an associated ML prosecution. 449. The number of convictions remains low. The previous MER presented data on 13 final convictions and 2 acquittals, whereas during this reporting period the number have decreased - only 7 final convictions, including 3 acquittals. The absence of any sentence imposed during 2021-2022 is considered by the authorities to result from the pandemic’s impact on the overall processes in the country. Authorities also indicated that many cases are still pending in the courts due to structural and legislative changes affecting the responsibilities of the courts [87] , resulting in delays. It was also noted that the courts face significant resource constraints and an increasing workload, particularly in complex financial cases. The MoJ has requested additional state resources for the judiciary, with limited results. The achieved convictions are not in line with the ML risk profile of the country, as they have been obtained exclusively in small-scale self-laundering cases associated with fraud. Footnotes [85] The statistics presented in Table 7.6. are based on the number of individuals charged, thus the actual number of ML prosecutions may be lower. [86] For example, ML prosecutions associated to drug trafficking account for approx. 0,3% of the total number of drug-related investigations (~8639); the ML prosecutions associated with corruption represent approx. 0,4% of the total number of corruption-related investigations (~5773), while the ML prosecutions associated with tax crime account for approx. 0,06% of the total number of tax evasion related offences (~1459). [87] E.g., the newly established Anti-corruption court was initially responsible for handling ML-related cases, but these responsibilities were later reassigned to ordinary courts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="465. Each intelligence and investigative body are responsible to identify and trace criminal property, as well as for preparing sufficient evidence for confiscation in their own cases. Authorities indicated during the on-site visit that investigators, as part of the parallel financial investigations, take mandatory steps to determine the volume of damages, and the availability of funds to ensure compensation. In general terms the investigative authorities confirmed that conducting parallel financial investigation is mandatory in each case with the main sources of information being FI (with court order) and the FMC. 466. Some case studies presented demonstrate the ability of intelligence agencies and investigative authorities to use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds. However, the onsite discussions as well as the results obtained so far are not convincing in that asset identification is systematically pursued in pre-trial investigations. In-depth asset investigations are not conducted on a systemic basis, and the competent authorities tend to focus on predicate offences and on swift closure of the cases which restricts detecting and analysing post-predicate offence financial flows, such as ML. 467. A key source of financial intelligence, including banking and BO information, assisting LEAs in identifying and tracing criminal property and property of criminal value, is the FMC. As this intelligence cannot be used as evidence, the access to banking and BO information requires a court order. The available powers are limited in scope and do not provide sufficiently broad access to all the necessary document and information to support the identification and tracing of criminal property.  Moreover, about 10% of the total requests to access banking information for evidentiary purposes are rejected by courts (see IO7). 468. One of the biggest challenges is identifying crypto assets, which are increasingly used in money laundering schemes, an emerging threat according to the LEAs met the on-site. While the authorities have presented examples of successfully tracing virtual assets, the only recent establishment of the virtual assets related regulatory framework significantly limits authorities’ capacity for their identification, tracing and seizure. 469. Most of the country’s crypto-tracing expertise resides within the MIA, which is an intelligence body, but a significant bottleneck is the limited resources available for financial experts in the crypto-field. 470. The competent LEAs have trained employees for asset recovery measures, mostly in certain specialised departments. The investigative bodies have dedicated experts to assist with the parallel financial investigations - IC has 8 experts in financial forensic examination and ACC has 4. Both the IC and ACC are seeking to strengthen their capacity through the recruitment of additional experts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="465. Each intelligence and investigative body are responsible to identify and trace criminal property, as well as for preparing sufficient evidence for confiscation in their own cases. Authorities indicated during the on-site visit that investigators, as part of the parallel financial investigations, take mandatory steps to determine the volume of damages, and the availability of funds to ensure compensation. In general terms the investigative authorities confirmed that conducting parallel financial investigation is mandatory in each case with the main sources of information being FI (with court order) and the FMC. 466. Some case studies presented demonstrate the ability of intelligence agencies and investigative authorities to use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds. However, the onsite discussions as well as the results obtained so far are not convincing in that asset identification is systematically pursued in pre-trial investigations. In-depth asset investigations are not conducted on a systemic basis, and the competent authorities tend to focus on predicate offences and on swift closure of the cases which restricts detecting and analysing post-predicate offence financial flows, such as ML. 467. A key source of financial intelligence, including banking and BO information, assisting LEAs in identifying and tracing criminal property and property of criminal value, is the FMC. As this intelligence cannot be used as evidence, the access to banking and BO information requires a court order. The available powers are limited in scope and do not provide sufficiently broad access to all the necessary document and information to support the identification and tracing of criminal property.  Moreover, about 10% of the total requests to access banking information for evidentiary purposes are rejected by courts (see IO7). 468. One of the biggest challenges is identifying crypto assets, which are increasingly used in money laundering schemes, an emerging threat according to the LEAs met the on-site. While the authorities have presented examples of successfully tracing virtual assets, the only recent establishment of the virtual assets related regulatory framework significantly limits authorities’ capacity for their identification, tracing and seizure. 469. Most of the country’s crypto-tracing expertise resides within the MIA, which is an intelligence body, but a significant bottleneck is the limited resources available for financial experts in the crypto-field. 470. The competent LEAs have trained employees for asset recovery measures, mostly in certain specialised departments. The investigative bodies have dedicated experts to assist with the parallel financial investigations - IC has 8 experts in financial forensic examination and ACC has 4. Both the IC and ACC are seeking to strengthen their capacity through the recruitment of additional experts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="520. In the absence of any concluded TF investigation to date, there have been no prosecutions or convictions for TF. However, there have been 8 terrorism prosecutions, which were taken forward by specialist prosecutors within the GPO. The prosecutors confirmed that in all of these cases possible TF had been considered. The AT was satisfied the GPO has the necessary expertise and training to conduct a TF prosecution if that should arise (and note that prosecutors also took part in the training event in October 2023 on TF investigation and prosecution described above). 521. There are no specialist judges for terrorism and TF cases, but all judges receive training on these topics (and as indicated above, the judiciary participated in the training event in October 2023). Armenia has no special courts or court procedures for dealing specifically with terrorism or TF, but the judiciary confirmed that there are procedures in place to enable closed hearings in cases involving matters of national security and the 8 terrorism prosecutions were dealt with in courts of general jurisdiction. The judiciary also confirmed that they did not believe there to be any legal obstacles to bringing a successful TF prosecution. The AT therefore has no reason to doubt that Armenia has the capacity to take forward TF prosecutions and achieve convictions (subject however to the limitations on court resources noted under Immediate Outcome 7)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="520. In the absence of any concluded TF investigation to date, there have been no prosecutions or convictions for TF. However, there have been 8 terrorism prosecutions, which were taken forward by specialist prosecutors within the GPO. The prosecutors confirmed that in all of these cases possible TF had been considered. The AT was satisfied the GPO has the necessary expertise and training to conduct a TF prosecution if that should arise (and note that prosecutors also took part in the training event in October 2023 on TF investigation and prosecution described above). 521. There are no specialist judges for terrorism and TF cases, but all judges receive training on these topics (and as indicated above, the judiciary participated in the training event in October 2023). Armenia has no special courts or court procedures for dealing specifically with terrorism or TF, but the judiciary confirmed that there are procedures in place to enable closed hearings in cases involving matters of national security and the 8 terrorism prosecutions were dealt with in courts of general jurisdiction. The judiciary also confirmed that they did not believe there to be any legal obstacles to bringing a successful TF prosecution. The AT therefore has no reason to doubt that Armenia has the capacity to take forward TF prosecutions and achieve convictions (subject however to the limitations on court resources noted under Immediate Outcome 7)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="542. Armenia’s legal framework enables the confiscation or forfeiture of assets and instrumentalities linked to terrorism and TF activities and the application of provisional measures, with or without a conviction. This is underpinned by investigatory powers and special investigative techniques. The competent authorities for these purposes are the FMC, the NSS, the IC and the GPO. 543. The AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024 envisaged the creation of a methodology for the confiscation of assets and instrumentalities related to TF activities. This has been completed and incorporated as an appendix to the Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences referred to under IO.9. However, as indicated under IO.9, this document has not yet been applied in practice, and therefore its operational effectiveness cannot be assessed. 544. Nevertheless, the GPO confirmed that in the course of the terrorism cases referred to under IO.9, property comprising instrumentalities was recovered and retained by the authorities. See the second case study under IO.9 for examples. 545. The NSS monitors international alerts about developments related to terrorist financing methods, and shares these with the other authorities to assist them in identifying assets linked to terrorists. However, to date no such assets have been identified outside the context of the terrorism cases referred to above. While this is broadly in line with Armenia’s risk profile, the concern identified under IO.9 about the extent to which the authorities consider the use of criminal proceeds for TF purposes is also a relevant factor, given that limitations on the identification of terrorist financing activity inevitably restrict the identification of terrorist assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="542. Armenia’s legal framework enables the confiscation or forfeiture of assets and instrumentalities linked to terrorism and TF activities and the application of provisional measures, with or without a conviction. This is underpinned by investigatory powers and special investigative techniques. The competent authorities for these purposes are the FMC, the NSS, the IC and the GPO. 543. The AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024 envisaged the creation of a methodology for the confiscation of assets and instrumentalities related to TF activities. This has been completed and incorporated as an appendix to the Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences referred to under IO.9. However, as indicated under IO.9, this document has not yet been applied in practice, and therefore its operational effectiveness cannot be assessed. 544. Nevertheless, the GPO confirmed that in the course of the terrorism cases referred to under IO.9, property comprising instrumentalities was recovered and retained by the authorities. See the second case study under IO.9 for examples. 545. The NSS monitors international alerts about developments related to terrorist financing methods, and shares these with the other authorities to assist them in identifying assets linked to terrorists. However, to date no such assets have been identified outside the context of the terrorism cases referred to above. While this is broadly in line with Armenia’s risk profile, the concern identified under IO.9 about the extent to which the authorities consider the use of criminal proceeds for TF purposes is also a relevant factor, given that limitations on the identification of terrorist financing activity inevitably restrict the identification of terrorist assets." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="600. In 2024 Armenia completed its second PF NRA (the first having been completed in 2021), which was coordinated by the Interagency Committee and took into account FATF guidance on assessing and mitigating the risks of PF. The report concluded that the jurisdiction’s residual PF risks are low. It is envisaged that this exercise will be repeated every three years. 601. As would be expected given Armenia’s geographical position, particular attention was given to border controls and possible PF links to the import or export of dual use goods, as well as to the measures in place for the implementation of TFS. The report identified that the residual PF risks for all FIS and DNFBPs was low, on the basis that they had appropriate measures in place to address their inherent vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, while in the view of the AT the overall conclusions of the PF NRA appear reasonable, there are some concerns about limitations on the analysis in the PF NRA report. In particular, the threat indicators are limited and while the PF NRA report adequately analyses the risks of breach or non-implementation of TFS relating to PF, it gives insufficient consideration to financial flows and the use of virtual assets for possible sanctions evasion. In addition, while the PF NRA report takes into account its links with Iran and the fact that it has no links with the DPRK, it does not identify PF hub countries, i.e. those through which assets may be routed to Iran or the DPRK, or assess the specific PF sanctions evasion risks presented by Armenia’s links with PF hub countries, including three countries in particular. 602. However, in onsite discussions on PF risks, the authorities demonstrated a greater understanding of these issues than appeared from the PF NRA report. They were familiar with FATF typologies on sanctions evasion, both generically and in their relevance to Armenia and showed a strongly developed awareness of the PF risks arising from their geographical position. They also provided details of the extensive engagement with the international community on this and other sanctions related issues that informed their view of PF risks. The authorities further explained that strategic analysis carried out by the FMC in respect of PF risks arising from crypto-asset activity work had informed the PF NRA, and this was confirmed in written material provided after the onsite visit. 603. Authorities also demonstrated awareness of the positions and reports of several jurisdictions and international organisations depicting PF hubs generally, including the three countries in particular mentioned above. As regards two of those countries, information was provided after the onsite visit about the way in which the potential use of outbound flows to the financial institutions under the jurisdiction of those countries for PF purposes had been considered. This involved looking at a range of factors identified in international typologies including, among other things, the use of shell companies and intermediary jurisdictions (including their financial systems, primarily via correspondent relationships), revenue generation via IT workers and front companies (possibly by persons and entities associated with the DPRK), the risks associated with foreign financial institutions potentially being used to bypass the obligations stemming from TFS established by the UNSCRs, the possible misuse of outflows resulting from legitimate trade for PF or PF-related evasion schemes, the possible misuse of exported goods, the fabrication of end-user documents relating to dual-use goods, possibly including false end-use statements and repackaging concealed military applications, the risks of diversion of licensed and dual-use goods for export for potential PF or PF-related evasion schemes and the possible involvement of crypto-asset service providers and crypto-assets for PF or PF-related evasion schemes. As regards the third country, the authorities advised that the FMC had carried out specific analysis on this. Although for reasons of security the analysis itself could not be shared with the AT, a summary was made available instead, and this confirmed that the authorities had looked into flows from Armenia to that country. 604. On the basis of this additional information, the AT was satisfied that the authorities have a sufficient understanding of the PF risks faced by Armenia. 605. As regards mitigating measures, a range of measures to address PF risks have been included in the 2025-2028 National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which was approved by the Interagency Committee in December 2024. These include measures to increase awareness of PF risks and to enhance risk-based supervision in this area. As would be expected given the time frame, some of these measures are still in progress. However, some measures have already been completed. In particular, targeted training has been organised for the authorities and the private sector, and guidance has been issued for reporting entities on red flags for PF-related targeted financial sanctions evasion schemes potentially associated with specific foreign jurisdictions that are seen as sensitive for PF purposes. According to the authorities, these are the mitigating measures which they regard as the most important. 606. The positive effect of these mitigating measures can be seen in the awareness of sanctions evasion and PF hub countries demonstrated by the banks and other reporting entities with cross border business that were met onsite (see below)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="600. In 2024 Armenia completed its second PF NRA (the first having been completed in 2021), which was coordinated by the Interagency Committee and took into account FATF guidance on assessing and mitigating the risks of PF. The report concluded that the jurisdiction’s residual PF risks are low. It is envisaged that this exercise will be repeated every three years. 601. As would be expected given Armenia’s geographical position, particular attention was given to border controls and possible PF links to the import or export of dual use goods, as well as to the measures in place for the implementation of TFS. The report identified that the residual PF risks for all FIS and DNFBPs was low, on the basis that they had appropriate measures in place to address their inherent vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, while in the view of the AT the overall conclusions of the PF NRA appear reasonable, there are some concerns about limitations on the analysis in the PF NRA report. In particular, the threat indicators are limited and while the PF NRA report adequately analyses the risks of breach or non-implementation of TFS relating to PF, it gives insufficient consideration to financial flows and the use of virtual assets for possible sanctions evasion. In addition, while the PF NRA report takes into account its links with Iran and the fact that it has no links with the DPRK, it does not identify PF hub countries, i.e. those through which assets may be routed to Iran or the DPRK, or assess the specific PF sanctions evasion risks presented by Armenia’s links with PF hub countries, including three countries in particular. 602. However, in onsite discussions on PF risks, the authorities demonstrated a greater understanding of these issues than appeared from the PF NRA report. They were familiar with FATF typologies on sanctions evasion, both generically and in their relevance to Armenia and showed a strongly developed awareness of the PF risks arising from their geographical position. They also provided details of the extensive engagement with the international community on this and other sanctions related issues that informed their view of PF risks. The authorities further explained that strategic analysis carried out by the FMC in respect of PF risks arising from crypto-asset activity work had informed the PF NRA, and this was confirmed in written material provided after the onsite visit. 603. Authorities also demonstrated awareness of the positions and reports of several jurisdictions and international organisations depicting PF hubs generally, including the three countries in particular mentioned above. As regards two of those countries, information was provided after the onsite visit about the way in which the potential use of outbound flows to the financial institutions under the jurisdiction of those countries for PF purposes had been considered. This involved looking at a range of factors identified in international typologies including, among other things, the use of shell companies and intermediary jurisdictions (including their financial systems, primarily via correspondent relationships), revenue generation via IT workers and front companies (possibly by persons and entities associated with the DPRK), the risks associated with foreign financial institutions potentially being used to bypass the obligations stemming from TFS established by the UNSCRs, the possible misuse of outflows resulting from legitimate trade for PF or PF-related evasion schemes, the possible misuse of exported goods, the fabrication of end-user documents relating to dual-use goods, possibly including false end-use statements and repackaging concealed military applications, the risks of diversion of licensed and dual-use goods for export for potential PF or PF-related evasion schemes and the possible involvement of crypto-asset service providers and crypto-assets for PF or PF-related evasion schemes. As regards the third country, the authorities advised that the FMC had carried out specific analysis on this. Although for reasons of security the analysis itself could not be shared with the AT, a summary was made available instead, and this confirmed that the authorities had looked into flows from Armenia to that country. 604. On the basis of this additional information, the AT was satisfied that the authorities have a sufficient understanding of the PF risks faced by Armenia. 605. As regards mitigating measures, a range of measures to address PF risks have been included in the 2025-2028 National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which was approved by the Interagency Committee in December 2024. These include measures to increase awareness of PF risks and to enhance risk-based supervision in this area. As would be expected given the time frame, some of these measures are still in progress. However, some measures have already been completed. In particular, targeted training has been organised for the authorities and the private sector, and guidance has been issued for reporting entities on red flags for PF-related targeted financial sanctions evasion schemes potentially associated with specific foreign jurisdictions that are seen as sensitive for PF purposes. According to the authorities, these are the mitigating measures which they regard as the most important. 606. The positive effect of these mitigating measures can be seen in the awareness of sanctions evasion and PF hub countries demonstrated by the banks and other reporting entities with cross border business that were met onsite (see below)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="43. Currently, there are no exemptions from the AML/CFT framework. SDD is applied in low risk scenarios, where reporting entities may take lighter measures for ongoing due diligence of the business relationship in the following cases: FIs, government bodies, local self-government bodies, state non-commercial organisations, community administrative institutions, life insurance policies below a certain threshold, insurance policies for pension schemes, payments relating to salaries, allowances, utility services, pensions, also payments to the state authorities. These scenarios appear to be reasonable and are not contradicted by the NRA, with the two caveats below. 44. Authorities maintained that FIs would fall under the category of ‘low risk’ only in cases when they have effective AML/CFT supervision, without this being spelled out in a legal or regulatory document. The reporting entities itself should satisfy themselves that supervision is “sufficient” as no further guidance is provided in this respect. Although the authorities reported that this is rarely used in practice, the AT considers that more regulation and guidance is needed on this front. 45. With regards to the government bodies, additional guidance and clarification would be needed on those domiciled abroad. 46. Enhanced due diligence (EDD) is applicable for certain higher risk situations and customers, both at onboarding stage and in the course of the business relationship, where such higher risk situations are politically exposed persons (PEPs), customers domiciled in FATF high-risk jurisdictions and countries identified as high risk for TF purposes, clients with complex or unusual large transactions or unusual transactions or business relationship with no apparent economic or other lawful purpose, private banking business, clients with non-face to face transactions or business relationships, legal persons or legal arrangements that are personal asset-holding vehicles, companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form, cash-intensive businesses and complex corporate structures. Correspondent banking relationships require additional measures under a different preventive regime. Although not all high-risk scenarios (for example legal persons or legal arrangements) are directly derived from the NRA results, the other enhanced measures directly target corruption or the highest national risks in Armenia such as the use of cash. 47. Some NRA driven higher risk criteria were included in the Guidance on Criteria on Suspicious Activities, as well as in the Guidance on Typologies (e.g. on VAs). Though these Guidelines do not require the application of EDD, any match with the criterion or typology requires consideration on reporting an STR supported with a comprehensive analysis, similar to EDD." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="43. Currently, there are no exemptions from the AML/CFT framework. SDD is applied in low risk scenarios, where reporting entities may take lighter measures for ongoing due diligence of the business relationship in the following cases: FIs, government bodies, local self-government bodies, state non-commercial organisations, community administrative institutions, life insurance policies below a certain threshold, insurance policies for pension schemes, payments relating to salaries, allowances, utility services, pensions, also payments to the state authorities. These scenarios appear to be reasonable and are not contradicted by the NRA, with the two caveats below. 44. Authorities maintained that FIs would fall under the category of ‘low risk’ only in cases when they have effective AML/CFT supervision, without this being spelled out in a legal or regulatory document. The reporting entities itself should satisfy themselves that supervision is “sufficient” as no further guidance is provided in this respect. Although the authorities reported that this is rarely used in practice, the AT considers that more regulation and guidance is needed on this front. 45. With regards to the government bodies, additional guidance and clarification would be needed on those domiciled abroad. 46. Enhanced due diligence (EDD) is applicable for certain higher risk situations and customers, both at onboarding stage and in the course of the business relationship, where such higher risk situations are politically exposed persons (PEPs), customers domiciled in FATF high-risk jurisdictions and countries identified as high risk for TF purposes, clients with complex or unusual large transactions or unusual transactions or business relationship with no apparent economic or other lawful purpose, private banking business, clients with non-face to face transactions or business relationships, legal persons or legal arrangements that are personal asset-holding vehicles, companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form, cash-intensive businesses and complex corporate structures. Correspondent banking relationships require additional measures under a different preventive regime. Although not all high-risk scenarios (for example legal persons or legal arrangements) are directly derived from the NRA results, the other enhanced measures directly target corruption or the highest national risks in Armenia such as the use of cash. 47. Some NRA driven higher risk criteria were included in the Guidance on Criteria on Suspicious Activities, as well as in the Guidance on Typologies (e.g. on VAs). Though these Guidelines do not require the application of EDD, any match with the criterion or typology requires consideration on reporting an STR supported with a comprehensive analysis, similar to EDD." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="100. Informal cooperation is regulated by international treaties, multilateral or bilateral agreements, MoUs. or conducted ad hoc. Direct and informal international cooperation is a usual practice before engaging in mutual legal assistance. Feedback received from the FATF Global Network on the provision of other forms of international cooperation was generally positive. 2.3.1. FIU Incoming 101. International cooperation requests in the FMC are handled by the Analysis Unit responsible also for conducting operational analysis and responses to domestic requests. The Unit has a total of 12 employees. The FMC uses two secure information channels – the ESW for cooperation within the Egmont Group and the CIS FIU network for cooperation between FIUs of the Commonwealth of independent states (CIS). The FIU has signed a total of 34 MoUs with foreign counterparts. 102. The international co-operation provided by the FMC is timely and effective. This conclusion is based on the analysis of both the information requests; the spontaneous disseminations and the feedback received from the Global Community. 103.  During the period under review the FMC received a total of 205 requests from foreign FIUs. The highest number of requests came from the Russian Federation, Latvia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine. These requests mainly related to the involvement of Armenian residents in various criminal schemes in the respective countries, including ML, tax abuse, drug trafficking, and fraud, as well as requests regarding different ML/TF or other higher risk criteria sent to all FIUs in the Egmont Group/CIS. The average response time was in general below 30 days. In urgent cases responses were provided within 5 days. The FIU has used the suspension mechanism on the request of a foreign FIU on at least one occasion. The sending FIUs usually request information on bank accounts and other assets held by the subjects of analysis, on the transactions through the bank account, STRs, ML investigations and/ or criminal records, data on movable/immovable property, etc. The quality of responses was considered good. General prioritisation mechanisms for operational analysis are used for cases opened on the basis of international requests. No refusals were noted. Table 2.5. Incoming requests to FIU Incoming requests to FIU 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 - ML 7 17 6 15 7 - TF 0 3 1 1 0 - Predicate offence Tax evasion 4 11 8 10 2 Fraud 5 7 5 4 9 Corruption 1 6 2 2 2 drug trafficking 3 4 2 4 0 ML/TF and other higher risk criteria 4 6 5 12 11 Other 2 8 4 4 1 Total 26 62 33 52 32 104. During the reporting period, the FMC also received 95 spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs. These disseminations generally fell into three main categories: notifications sent to a large group of FIUs simultaneously, without specific country context, follow-up notifications, where the FMC had previously submitted a request to a foreign FIU and notifications that contain negative information from media sources about Armenian residents, citizens, or individuals of Armenian ethnicity. 105. Particular requests and spontaneous disclosures have triggered FIU analysis, which further led to a total of 15 disseminations concerning potential ML/TF to domestic LEAs (see IO.6). Outgoing 106. Outgoing requests are triggered in the course of operational analysis when there is a need to substantiate the reliability of a particular hypotheses put forward as a result of a summary of the preliminary information in the case. To send a request to a foreign FIU, the analyst responsible for the case must first enter a draft letter into the CMS and submit it to the Head of the Analysis Division of the FMC for consent. If needed, the Head of the Analysis Division of the FMC will coordinate with the Head of the International Relations Division of the FMC before forwarding the draft to the Head of the FMC for final approval. Once approved, the Head of the FMC instructs the Head of the International Relations Division of the FMC to send the request. 107. The number of outgoing requests (88 requests in 70 cases between 2020-2024), while broadly in line with the jurisdiction’s risk profile, is relatively low. The impact of the low number of outgoing requests is even more evident when considering that 38 were triggered by LEAs. This can signal a potential reluctance to pursue the foreign element of the ML offence, where a notification to an intelligence body is already substantiated based on other information obtained domestically. 108. Given the number of STRs [41] involved transactions with a broadly defined “foreign nexus” where both residents and non-residents of Armenia were involved, a more proactive stance should be taken in seeking international co-operation. 109. The FIU has drafted guidelines for using FIU intelligence in drafting MLA requests. As a result, operational information received from foreign FIUs was incorporated into some MLAs. Table 2.6. Outgoing requests and disclosures to foreign FIUs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests to foreign FIUs 43 5 25 4 11 Disclosures to foreign FIUs 5 3 0 3 2 Box 2.4. International cooperation on cross-border ML scheme involving PEPs In a criminal proceeding investigated by the ACC, the PEP and his wife were involved as defendants under a ML case for legalizing approximately 2 million EUR obtained through criminal means. In 2020, the FMC received a request from the ACC concerning the PEP and affiliated subjects. According to information provided by the ACC, the former PEP, through affiliated natural and/or legal persons, conducted financial transactions potentially involving illicitly obtained assets, including the purchase of real estate abroad. The ACC requested financial transaction data for approximately 20 natural and/or legal persons. Based on the ACC request, the FMC conducted a comprehensive analysis of the PEP and affiliated subjects and presented a summary of the findings. Among the key elements revealed in this complex investigation were cross-border transactions with Greece. Consequently, the FMC made requests to the FIU of Greece. The combined analysis established the following regarding the PEP's spouse: · Approximately EUR 400,000 was deposited in her Armenian bank account and subsequently transferred to her Greek bank account; · The total turnover of the Greek bank account over a two-year period amounted to EUR 423,000, which were then transferred to two other bank accounts in Greece in order to purchase real estates; · She imported approximately EUR 250,000 in cash from abroad; · She purchased and/or held a total of five real estate properties in Greece. Detailed information on the identified assets (e.g., property addresses, purchase dates, related bank transactions, etc.) was transmitted to the ACC to support, among other actions, the submission of a mutual legal assistance request. The information was utilized to prepare a mutual legal assistance request sent to the competent authorities of the Republic of Greece. The case is currently subject to two parallel judicial proceedings: one criminal and one non-conviction-based forfeiture procedure. A decision to freeze real estate and personal accounts in Greece has been sent to Greece. 110. FIU requests were in general considered good quality. In the rare cases where additional information was requested regarding the request sent by the FMC, further assistance was swiftly provided (in one case - also via remote meeting organised) and the responses were obtained. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies 111. In the period under review, LEAs engaged in international cooperation to combat ML/TF crime in key cases. The limited availability of statistics on informal requests for some LEAs (NSS, MIA) makes it challenging to fully ascertain the level, to which assistance is regularly sought and provided, and meetings with the authorities onsite indicated, that international cooperation on ML, including asset recovery is not approached in a systemic manner. The authorities demonstrated the proactive approach on specific cases 112. LEAs, use a wide range of channels for cooperation, including INTERPOL, CARIN, UNODC GlobE Network, and OECD Law Enforcement Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, networks based on multilateral treaties and direct communication with foreign counterparts. The authorities have signed a series of MoUs with foreign authorities (inter alia US agencies, the European Union Drugs Agency and Europol), to facilitate cooperation and training. 113. Incoming requests mainly require basic information on bank accounts of individuals, legal entities and organizations, as well as information on beneficiaries, information on the availability of immovable and movable property. LEAs advise the use of formal channels (MLA) in order to be acquire information subject to banking confidentiality, due to the necessary judicial authorization. 114. Incoming requests received through Interpol channels are mostly addressed within a 30-day period. If the requests contain unclear or incomplete information (e.g., incorrect name of a person, legal inaccuracies), the relevant LEA seeks clarification through official or unofficial channels before acting. None of the requests received by LEAs through informal channels led to the triggering of a ML investigation (see IO.7). 115. Outgoing inquiries mainly request information on the availability of bank accounts, immovable and movable property of natural persons. In the case of investigative authorities (IC, ACC) long response times of foreign counterparts and silent refusals remain a challenge, which however does not remain on Armenia’s side. In such cases LEA representatives tend to engage in informal contacts and set up meetings to put emphasis on the execution of their requests. 116. Given the absence of detailed statistics for LEAs and deficiencies identified under IO.7 and IO.8, the AT cannot conclude that the informal co-operation carried out by the Armenian LEAs and is fully effective. Authority responsible for asset recovery 117. While there is no authority acting as dedicated asset recovery office in Armenia, the GPO has a special Department for the Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin with 10 prosecutors, which is responsible inter alia for ensuring international legal cooperation on civil forfeiture matters. Apart from MLAs, the Department also uses informal cooperation through the CARIN network. The Department received 19 requests and sent 46 such requests during 2020-2024, which appears to be commensurate with the MLA requests. However, no assets were traced or identified in Armenia or abroad. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 118. The CBA (FSLD) as the financial supervisor provides and requests assistance from its foreign counterparts. During the period from 2020 to 2024, the assistance requested primarily pertained to information relevant to conducting fit and proper assessments for supervisory purposes (27 cases), as well as to basic and beneficial ownership information (15 instances). In some requests, (4) account-related information was also included. Most requests are made through the IOSCO channel. The CBA has implemented a case management system, which is employed to monitor and track request handling. The average timeframe for response was 1 month. No refusals were noted. Where appropriate, the CBA engages in pre-response consultations or follow-up dialogue with the requesting authority to clarify any ambiguities in the request or to confirm the specific information needed. CBA has established formal relationships with the supervisory authorities of 17 jurisdictions through signed MoUs. The lack of a bilateral agreement does not exclude cooperation with foreign counterparts. A questionnaire was distributed to receive feedback from recipients of data from the CBA. 119. In the context of outgoing requests, the CBA mainly requests information necessary for fit and proper assessments in the context of supervision (14 instances), along with basic and beneficial ownership data concerning legal persons and legal arrangements (7 cases). 120. The SRC in its capacity as the supervisory authority responsible for monitoring gambling activities, casinos, and lotteries has in one case requested information regarding the volume of financial transactions, the methods of transfer—whether cash or cashless—and the documentation of services provided between a company registered and operating in Armenia and companies supplying it with gaming services in order to verify whether those companies are duly registered and to determine the volume and nature of the transactions conducted by the Armenian company. 121. In the case of the MoF (responsible for performing screening of qualified holders, BOs and managers, at the market entry stage of casinos and online gambling operators), due to the lack of necessity, no inquiries were made to foreign authorities. 122. Due to the FMC taking up its supervisory role of certain DNFBP sectors in 2023 and the fact that the sectors under FMC’s supervision did not have identified international exposure, the authority has not had any experience in conducting international cooperation so far. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 123. The SRC provides regular assistance and information to foreign competent authorities upon request. In the field of tax matters this includes inter alia: (i) tax information on individuals and legal entities, including income declarations, tax filings, and audit results; (ii) basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, in coordination with the State Registry and other competent authorities; (iii) account information and financial data (when available through domestic procedures) (iv) information on real estate and vehicles through interagency cooperation with cadastre and transport authorities; and (v) any other relevant documentation required for assessing tax liabilities or investigating tax evasion, within the limits of domestic law and applicable international agreements. In the area of customs cooperation, assistance is provided on reported or planned activities which constitute or may constitute an operation in breach of customs legislation. This includes, among others, information whether goods exported from the territory of the applicant have been duly imported into the territory of Armenia. Requested information frequently refers on individuals or legal persons activities, to exclude their involvedness in activities that violate customs legislation. The SRC has a formalized prioritization mechanism to handle the incoming requests. 124. In the period under review, the SRCs has received a total of 445 requests and sent out 501 requests (concerning both tax and customs violations). Requests on tax matters, on average can take around 180 days, in line with the OECD standard. The number of incoming requests concerning potential ML remains unknown, whereas 5 outgoing requests could be attributed to money laundering, which would be fairly low given the risk of ML stemming from tax evasion in Armenia. Discussions held with the representatives of the Customs branch of the SRC indicated, that they do not in all cases proactively cooperate with their counterparts in cases of identified smuggling of cash or trafficking of drugs coming into Armenia, leaving such actions to other authorities. Footnotes [41] 367 STRs in the period between 2021-2023 in accordance with the ML/TF NRA. These STRs represented about 59% of the total funds involved in all STRs in that period. 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Informal cooperation is regulated by international treaties, multilateral or bilateral agreements, MoUs. or conducted ad hoc. Direct and informal international cooperation is a usual practice before engaging in mutual legal assistance. Feedback received from the FATF Global Network on the provision of other forms of international cooperation was generally positive. 2.3.1. FIU Incoming 101. International cooperation requests in the FMC are handled by the Analysis Unit responsible also for conducting operational analysis and responses to domestic requests. The Unit has a total of 12 employees. The FMC uses two secure information channels – the ESW for cooperation within the Egmont Group and the CIS FIU network for cooperation between FIUs of the Commonwealth of independent states (CIS). The FIU has signed a total of 34 MoUs with foreign counterparts. 102. The international co-operation provided by the FMC is timely and effective. This conclusion is based on the analysis of both the information requests; the spontaneous disseminations and the feedback received from the Global Community. 103.  During the period under review the FMC received a total of 205 requests from foreign FIUs. The highest number of requests came from the Russian Federation, Latvia, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine. These requests mainly related to the involvement of Armenian residents in various criminal schemes in the respective countries, including ML, tax abuse, drug trafficking, and fraud, as well as requests regarding different ML/TF or other higher risk criteria sent to all FIUs in the Egmont Group/CIS. The average response time was in general below 30 days. In urgent cases responses were provided within 5 days. The FIU has used the suspension mechanism on the request of a foreign FIU on at least one occasion. The sending FIUs usually request information on bank accounts and other assets held by the subjects of analysis, on the transactions through the bank account, STRs, ML investigations and/ or criminal records, data on movable/immovable property, etc. The quality of responses was considered good. General prioritisation mechanisms for operational analysis are used for cases opened on the basis of international requests. No refusals were noted. Table 2.5. Incoming requests to FIU Incoming requests to FIU 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 - ML 7 17 6 15 7 - TF 0 3 1 1 0 - Predicate offence Tax evasion 4 11 8 10 2 Fraud 5 7 5 4 9 Corruption 1 6 2 2 2 drug trafficking 3 4 2 4 0 ML/TF and other higher risk criteria 4 6 5 12 11 Other 2 8 4 4 1 Total 26 62 33 52 32 104. During the reporting period, the FMC also received 95 spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs. These disseminations generally fell into three main categories: notifications sent to a large group of FIUs simultaneously, without specific country context, follow-up notifications, where the FMC had previously submitted a request to a foreign FIU and notifications that contain negative information from media sources about Armenian residents, citizens, or individuals of Armenian ethnicity. 105. Particular requests and spontaneous disclosures have triggered FIU analysis, which further led to a total of 15 disseminations concerning potential ML/TF to domestic LEAs (see IO.6). Outgoing 106. Outgoing requests are triggered in the course of operational analysis when there is a need to substantiate the reliability of a particular hypotheses put forward as a result of a summary of the preliminary information in the case. To send a request to a foreign FIU, the analyst responsible for the case must first enter a draft letter into the CMS and submit it to the Head of the Analysis Division of the FMC for consent. If needed, the Head of the Analysis Division of the FMC will coordinate with the Head of the International Relations Division of the FMC before forwarding the draft to the Head of the FMC for final approval. Once approved, the Head of the FMC instructs the Head of the International Relations Division of the FMC to send the request. 107. The number of outgoing requests (88 requests in 70 cases between 2020-2024), while broadly in line with the jurisdiction’s risk profile, is relatively low. The impact of the low number of outgoing requests is even more evident when considering that 38 were triggered by LEAs. This can signal a potential reluctance to pursue the foreign element of the ML offence, where a notification to an intelligence body is already substantiated based on other information obtained domestically. 108. Given the number of STRs [41] involved transactions with a broadly defined “foreign nexus” where both residents and non-residents of Armenia were involved, a more proactive stance should be taken in seeking international co-operation. 109. The FIU has drafted guidelines for using FIU intelligence in drafting MLA requests. As a result, operational information received from foreign FIUs was incorporated into some MLAs. Table 2.6. Outgoing requests and disclosures to foreign FIUs 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Requests to foreign FIUs 43 5 25 4 11 Disclosures to foreign FIUs 5 3 0 3 2 Box 2.4. International cooperation on cross-border ML scheme involving PEPs In a criminal proceeding investigated by the ACC, the PEP and his wife were involved as defendants under a ML case for legalizing approximately 2 million EUR obtained through criminal means. In 2020, the FMC received a request from the ACC concerning the PEP and affiliated subjects. According to information provided by the ACC, the former PEP, through affiliated natural and/or legal persons, conducted financial transactions potentially involving illicitly obtained assets, including the purchase of real estate abroad. The ACC requested financial transaction data for approximately 20 natural and/or legal persons. Based on the ACC request, the FMC conducted a comprehensive analysis of the PEP and affiliated subjects and presented a summary of the findings. Among the key elements revealed in this complex investigation were cross-border transactions with Greece. Consequently, the FMC made requests to the FIU of Greece. The combined analysis established the following regarding the PEP's spouse: · Approximately EUR 400,000 was deposited in her Armenian bank account and subsequently transferred to her Greek bank account; · The total turnover of the Greek bank account over a two-year period amounted to EUR 423,000, which were then transferred to two other bank accounts in Greece in order to purchase real estates; · She imported approximately EUR 250,000 in cash from abroad; · She purchased and/or held a total of five real estate properties in Greece. Detailed information on the identified assets (e.g., property addresses, purchase dates, related bank transactions, etc.) was transmitted to the ACC to support, among other actions, the submission of a mutual legal assistance request. The information was utilized to prepare a mutual legal assistance request sent to the competent authorities of the Republic of Greece. The case is currently subject to two parallel judicial proceedings: one criminal and one non-conviction-based forfeiture procedure. A decision to freeze real estate and personal accounts in Greece has been sent to Greece. 110. FIU requests were in general considered good quality. In the rare cases where additional information was requested regarding the request sent by the FMC, further assistance was swiftly provided (in one case - also via remote meeting organised) and the responses were obtained. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies 111. In the period under review, LEAs engaged in international cooperation to combat ML/TF crime in key cases. The limited availability of statistics on informal requests for some LEAs (NSS, MIA) makes it challenging to fully ascertain the level, to which assistance is regularly sought and provided, and meetings with the authorities onsite indicated, that international cooperation on ML, including asset recovery is not approached in a systemic manner. The authorities demonstrated the proactive approach on specific cases 112. LEAs, use a wide range of channels for cooperation, including INTERPOL, CARIN, UNODC GlobE Network, and OECD Law Enforcement Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, networks based on multilateral treaties and direct communication with foreign counterparts. The authorities have signed a series of MoUs with foreign authorities (inter alia US agencies, the European Union Drugs Agency and Europol), to facilitate cooperation and training. 113. Incoming requests mainly require basic information on bank accounts of individuals, legal entities and organizations, as well as information on beneficiaries, information on the availability of immovable and movable property. LEAs advise the use of formal channels (MLA) in order to be acquire information subject to banking confidentiality, due to the necessary judicial authorization. 114. Incoming requests received through Interpol channels are mostly addressed within a 30-day period. If the requests contain unclear or incomplete information (e.g., incorrect name of a person, legal inaccuracies), the relevant LEA seeks clarification through official or unofficial channels before acting. None of the requests received by LEAs through informal channels led to the triggering of a ML investigation (see IO.7). 115. Outgoing inquiries mainly request information on the availability of bank accounts, immovable and movable property of natural persons. In the case of investigative authorities (IC, ACC) long response times of foreign counterparts and silent refusals remain a challenge, which however does not remain on Armenia’s side. In such cases LEA representatives tend to engage in informal contacts and set up meetings to put emphasis on the execution of their requests. 116. Given the absence of detailed statistics for LEAs and deficiencies identified under IO.7 and IO.8, the AT cannot conclude that the informal co-operation carried out by the Armenian LEAs and is fully effective. Authority responsible for asset recovery 117. While there is no authority acting as dedicated asset recovery office in Armenia, the GPO has a special Department for the Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin with 10 prosecutors, which is responsible inter alia for ensuring international legal cooperation on civil forfeiture matters. Apart from MLAs, the Department also uses informal cooperation through the CARIN network. The Department received 19 requests and sent 46 such requests during 2020-2024, which appears to be commensurate with the MLA requests. However, no assets were traced or identified in Armenia or abroad. 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 118. The CBA (FSLD) as the financial supervisor provides and requests assistance from its foreign counterparts. During the period from 2020 to 2024, the assistance requested primarily pertained to information relevant to conducting fit and proper assessments for supervisory purposes (27 cases), as well as to basic and beneficial ownership information (15 instances). In some requests, (4) account-related information was also included. Most requests are made through the IOSCO channel. The CBA has implemented a case management system, which is employed to monitor and track request handling. The average timeframe for response was 1 month. No refusals were noted. Where appropriate, the CBA engages in pre-response consultations or follow-up dialogue with the requesting authority to clarify any ambiguities in the request or to confirm the specific information needed. CBA has established formal relationships with the supervisory authorities of 17 jurisdictions through signed MoUs. The lack of a bilateral agreement does not exclude cooperation with foreign counterparts. A questionnaire was distributed to receive feedback from recipients of data from the CBA. 119. In the context of outgoing requests, the CBA mainly requests information necessary for fit and proper assessments in the context of supervision (14 instances), along with basic and beneficial ownership data concerning legal persons and legal arrangements (7 cases). 120. The SRC in its capacity as the supervisory authority responsible for monitoring gambling activities, casinos, and lotteries has in one case requested information regarding the volume of financial transactions, the methods of transfer—whether cash or cashless—and the documentation of services provided between a company registered and operating in Armenia and companies supplying it with gaming services in order to verify whether those companies are duly registered and to determine the volume and nature of the transactions conducted by the Armenian company. 121. In the case of the MoF (responsible for performing screening of qualified holders, BOs and managers, at the market entry stage of casinos and online gambling operators), due to the lack of necessity, no inquiries were made to foreign authorities. 122. Due to the FMC taking up its supervisory role of certain DNFBP sectors in 2023 and the fact that the sectors under FMC’s supervision did not have identified international exposure, the authority has not had any experience in conducting international cooperation so far. 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 123. The SRC provides regular assistance and information to foreign competent authorities upon request. In the field of tax matters this includes inter alia: (i) tax information on individuals and legal entities, including income declarations, tax filings, and audit results; (ii) basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements, in coordination with the State Registry and other competent authorities; (iii) account information and financial data (when available through domestic procedures) (iv) information on real estate and vehicles through interagency cooperation with cadastre and transport authorities; and (v) any other relevant documentation required for assessing tax liabilities or investigating tax evasion, within the limits of domestic law and applicable international agreements. In the area of customs cooperation, assistance is provided on reported or planned activities which constitute or may constitute an operation in breach of customs legislation. This includes, among others, information whether goods exported from the territory of the applicant have been duly imported into the territory of Armenia. Requested information frequently refers on individuals or legal persons activities, to exclude their involvedness in activities that violate customs legislation. The SRC has a formalized prioritization mechanism to handle the incoming requests. 124. In the period under review, the SRCs has received a total of 445 requests and sent out 501 requests (concerning both tax and customs violations). Requests on tax matters, on average can take around 180 days, in line with the OECD standard. The number of incoming requests concerning potential ML remains unknown, whereas 5 outgoing requests could be attributed to money laundering, which would be fairly low given the risk of ML stemming from tax evasion in Armenia. Discussions held with the representatives of the Customs branch of the SRC indicated, that they do not in all cases proactively cooperate with their counterparts in cases of identified smuggling of cash or trafficking of drugs coming into Armenia, leaving such actions to other authorities. Footnotes [41] 367 STRs in the period between 2021-2023 in accordance with the ML/TF NRA. These STRs represented about 59% of the total funds involved in all STRs in that period. 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The level of understanding of ML/TF risks among FIs varies significantly by sector, size and complexity. Overall, banks demonstrate the most advanced understanding of how ML/TF risks materialise in their operations, while smaller regulated FIs, such as currency exchanges, exhibit a more basic and often generic appreciation of risks. 164. All FIs are required to conduct annual enterprise-wide risk assessments (EWRAs) proportionate to their size and activity, which are reviewed by CBA as part of the offsite inspections. Supervisory feedback since 2020 indicates notable improvement in the EWRA’s quality, structure, and analytical depth, particularly in the banking sector, resulting in more effective risk identification and mitigation frameworks. 165. Banks and major NBFI integrate customer, product, delivery-channel, and geographic elements into their EWRAs. By 2024, all banks had developed and board-approved EWRAs that comply with the CBA’s methodological requirements. These assessments combine quantitative data, such as customer profiles (including PEPs, NGOs, and clients with complex ownership structures), the volume and nature of cross-border transactions, and types of products and delivery channels—with qualitative analysis of business activities and internal controls. The data used largely mirrors that reported to the CBA through annual supervisory questionnaires and is complemented by information and typologies circulated by the FMC. 166. This integration of data-driven and judgement-based analysis has improved the consistency and comparability of inherent-risk assessments across the banking sector. Banks and larger NBFIs generally use automated systems to calculate and update risk scores on an ongoing basis, with adjustments triggered by material changes in customer profiles or transaction behaviour. The underlying risk-scoring methodologies—covering both risk criteria and assigned weightings—are typically reviewed and recalibrated on an annual basis to ensure continued relevance and alignment with evolving risk exposure and regulatory expectations. 167. Among other NBFIs, which generally exhibit lower ML/TF exposure and limited systemic relevance, EWRA frameworks are correspondingly less sophisticated but broadly proportionate to their risk profiles. Supervisory reviews indicate an improving understanding of ML/TF risks among several NBFIs, as reflected in the quality of EWRAs submitted to the CBA. Smaller securities market participants and MVTS providers tend to focus on compliance with national AML/CFT legislation, regulatory guidance, and supervisory instructions, which is commensurate with their limited operational scale and risk exposure. In this context, the absence of highly complex EWRA models does not indicate a deficiency, although the extent to which EWRA outputs are used to refine internal controls remains more developed in larger and higher-risk institutions. 168. However, the practical application of FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks into operational business management has been progressively strengthened and more thoroughly embedded in the latter part of the assessment period. A thematic review conducted in the banking sector in 2024 identified weaknesses in both the quantitative and qualitative indicators used to define banks’ risk appetite frameworks. Most banks lacked a comprehensive set of quantitative indicators covering all key ML risk components (customers, geography and products), while the use of risk-limiting thresholds, such as caps on the proportion of high-risk customers within the overall customer base, remained limited. In response, the CBA issued targeted guidance to strengthen banks’ risk appetite frameworks and enhance the operational integration of risk assessment. Follow-up reviews confirmed that improvements are under way, with a measurable strengthening of banks’ risk models observed by mid-2025. 169. Banks met onsite demonstrated a comparatively good understanding of ML/TF risks and were able to articulate the threats most relevant to their operations. The NRA findings are well known and broadly accepted across the sector. Banks identified the highest risk as relating to remote onboarding and different types of high-risk customers, particularly PEPs. 170. Banks’ customer bases are predominantly domestic and largely retail focused. Several banks reported adopting a more conservative risk appetite, including frequent refusal of high-risk customers and even de-risking certain segments [52] , which they perceive as reducing their exposure to ML/TF risk. 171. Smaller FIs, such as credit organisations, MVTS providers, and investment companies, generally demonstrate a less developed understanding of ML/TF risks. These institutions tend to describe broader national threats such as corruption, drug trafficking or tax evasion, with limited ability to articulate how such risks materialize in their specific business context. 172. During onsite discussions, most FIs demonstrated familiarity with customer risk classification and FMC-issued typologies. Larger FIs have incorporated these typologies into internal monitoring scenarios, and most institutions tailor parameters, such as thresholds, transaction limits, customers factors, to their specific business models and risk profiles. However, only some institutions develop additional risk typologies beyond those prescribed by authorities. This reliance on externally set typologies and standard scenarios, while helpful for sectoral consistency, can result in limited capacity to detect and manage new and emerging risks specific to the institution. 173. Across all sectors, the distinction between ML and TF risks remains weak. Most FIs consider TF risk to be low, reflecting the NRA conclusions, and do not identify substantive TF threats within their operations. Consequently, TF is often treated as a subset of ML risk and dedicated TF analysis, indicators or monitoring scenarios are rarely developed. Supervisory reviews confirm that while banks and several major NBFIs identify customers or transactions connected to higher-risk jurisdictions, few institutions have designed monitoring scenarios or controls specifically targeting the misuse of financial channels for TF purposes. Footnotes [52] Some banks have mentioned not onboarding clients from certain jurisdictions considered high risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="163. The level of understanding of ML/TF risks among FIs varies significantly by sector, size and complexity. Overall, banks demonstrate the most advanced understanding of how ML/TF risks materialise in their operations, while smaller regulated FIs, such as currency exchanges, exhibit a more basic and often generic appreciation of risks. 164. All FIs are required to conduct annual enterprise-wide risk assessments (EWRAs) proportionate to their size and activity, which are reviewed by CBA as part of the offsite inspections. Supervisory feedback since 2020 indicates notable improvement in the EWRA’s quality, structure, and analytical depth, particularly in the banking sector, resulting in more effective risk identification and mitigation frameworks. 165. Banks and major NBFI integrate customer, product, delivery-channel, and geographic elements into their EWRAs. By 2024, all banks had developed and board-approved EWRAs that comply with the CBA’s methodological requirements. These assessments combine quantitative data, such as customer profiles (including PEPs, NGOs, and clients with complex ownership structures), the volume and nature of cross-border transactions, and types of products and delivery channels—with qualitative analysis of business activities and internal controls. The data used largely mirrors that reported to the CBA through annual supervisory questionnaires and is complemented by information and typologies circulated by the FMC. 166. This integration of data-driven and judgement-based analysis has improved the consistency and comparability of inherent-risk assessments across the banking sector. Banks and larger NBFIs generally use automated systems to calculate and update risk scores on an ongoing basis, with adjustments triggered by material changes in customer profiles or transaction behaviour. The underlying risk-scoring methodologies—covering both risk criteria and assigned weightings—are typically reviewed and recalibrated on an annual basis to ensure continued relevance and alignment with evolving risk exposure and regulatory expectations. 167. Among other NBFIs, which generally exhibit lower ML/TF exposure and limited systemic relevance, EWRA frameworks are correspondingly less sophisticated but broadly proportionate to their risk profiles. Supervisory reviews indicate an improving understanding of ML/TF risks among several NBFIs, as reflected in the quality of EWRAs submitted to the CBA. Smaller securities market participants and MVTS providers tend to focus on compliance with national AML/CFT legislation, regulatory guidance, and supervisory instructions, which is commensurate with their limited operational scale and risk exposure. In this context, the absence of highly complex EWRA models does not indicate a deficiency, although the extent to which EWRA outputs are used to refine internal controls remains more developed in larger and higher-risk institutions. 168. However, the practical application of FIs’ understanding of ML/TF risks into operational business management has been progressively strengthened and more thoroughly embedded in the latter part of the assessment period. A thematic review conducted in the banking sector in 2024 identified weaknesses in both the quantitative and qualitative indicators used to define banks’ risk appetite frameworks. Most banks lacked a comprehensive set of quantitative indicators covering all key ML risk components (customers, geography and products), while the use of risk-limiting thresholds, such as caps on the proportion of high-risk customers within the overall customer base, remained limited. In response, the CBA issued targeted guidance to strengthen banks’ risk appetite frameworks and enhance the operational integration of risk assessment. Follow-up reviews confirmed that improvements are under way, with a measurable strengthening of banks’ risk models observed by mid-2025. 169. Banks met onsite demonstrated a comparatively good understanding of ML/TF risks and were able to articulate the threats most relevant to their operations. The NRA findings are well known and broadly accepted across the sector. Banks identified the highest risk as relating to remote onboarding and different types of high-risk customers, particularly PEPs. 170. Banks’ customer bases are predominantly domestic and largely retail focused. Several banks reported adopting a more conservative risk appetite, including frequent refusal of high-risk customers and even de-risking certain segments [52] , which they perceive as reducing their exposure to ML/TF risk. 171. Smaller FIs, such as credit organisations, MVTS providers, and investment companies, generally demonstrate a less developed understanding of ML/TF risks. These institutions tend to describe broader national threats such as corruption, drug trafficking or tax evasion, with limited ability to articulate how such risks materialize in their specific business context. 172. During onsite discussions, most FIs demonstrated familiarity with customer risk classification and FMC-issued typologies. Larger FIs have incorporated these typologies into internal monitoring scenarios, and most institutions tailor parameters, such as thresholds, transaction limits, customers factors, to their specific business models and risk profiles. However, only some institutions develop additional risk typologies beyond those prescribed by authorities. This reliance on externally set typologies and standard scenarios, while helpful for sectoral consistency, can result in limited capacity to detect and manage new and emerging risks specific to the institution. 173. Across all sectors, the distinction between ML and TF risks remains weak. Most FIs consider TF risk to be low, reflecting the NRA conclusions, and do not identify substantive TF threats within their operations. Consequently, TF is often treated as a subset of ML risk and dedicated TF analysis, indicators or monitoring scenarios are rarely developed. Supervisory reviews confirm that while banks and several major NBFIs identify customers or transactions connected to higher-risk jurisdictions, few institutions have designed monitoring scenarios or controls specifically targeting the misuse of financial channels for TF purposes. Footnotes [52] Some banks have mentioned not onboarding clients from certain jurisdictions considered high risk." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="255. Most DNFBPs demonstrate a good understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks, as well as how these risks evolved over time, although the depth of understanding varies significantly across sectors. Online casinos and gambling operators, as most material sector, demonstrated the most advanced understanding of how their services could be abused for ML. Remote onboarding is intensively used, and operators have implemented robust systems accordingly. Customers are risk assessed (usually there are no low-risk clients) and the representatives met by the AT were able to articulate several ML scenarios they monitor through different gaming activities, including systems to detect fragmentation of transactions. 256. Notaries and legal professionals also showed awareness of the main threats in their activities, although understanding varies. Advocates generally have limited recognition of how their professional activities could be misused for ML, citing professional confidentiality and the perception that FATF-relevant services are not commonly performed. 257. Following extensive training in recent years, real estate agents demonstrated awareness of the basic ML threats to which the sector has historically been exposed. Industry representatives highlighted that the introduction of the cashless law has substantially reduced ML exposure, as property transactions must now be conducted through the banking system rather than cash. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that prior to this measure, cash transactions presented a higher ML risk. 258. Accountants met by the AT largely do not recognize ML risks in their sector, consistent with NRA findings that these entities do not perform activities falling under FATF Methodology. DPMS showed the least awareness of ML risks, perceiving their activities outside the scope of threats due to legal limits on cash transactions (cash payments above EUR 700 prohibited). 259. Across the DNFBP sectors, awareness of TF risk is generally informed by the NRA findings, which identify TF risk as low. Most DNFBPs are familiar with the NRA conclusions and with their AML/CFT obligations, including those related to TF. However, beyond sanctions screening—primarily through lists provided by the CBA or commercial vendors—there is limited evidence that DNFBPs consider TF risk in a more substantive or sector-specific manner. In particular, DNFBPs do not demonstrate how TF risks could materialise in their activities or how such risks are factored into their internal risk assessments or controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="255. Most DNFBPs demonstrate a good understanding of national and sectoral ML/TF risks, as well as how these risks evolved over time, although the depth of understanding varies significantly across sectors. Online casinos and gambling operators, as most material sector, demonstrated the most advanced understanding of how their services could be abused for ML. Remote onboarding is intensively used, and operators have implemented robust systems accordingly. Customers are risk assessed (usually there are no low-risk clients) and the representatives met by the AT were able to articulate several ML scenarios they monitor through different gaming activities, including systems to detect fragmentation of transactions. 256. Notaries and legal professionals also showed awareness of the main threats in their activities, although understanding varies. Advocates generally have limited recognition of how their professional activities could be misused for ML, citing professional confidentiality and the perception that FATF-relevant services are not commonly performed. 257. Following extensive training in recent years, real estate agents demonstrated awareness of the basic ML threats to which the sector has historically been exposed. Industry representatives highlighted that the introduction of the cashless law has substantially reduced ML exposure, as property transactions must now be conducted through the banking system rather than cash. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that prior to this measure, cash transactions presented a higher ML risk. 258. Accountants met by the AT largely do not recognize ML risks in their sector, consistent with NRA findings that these entities do not perform activities falling under FATF Methodology. DPMS showed the least awareness of ML risks, perceiving their activities outside the scope of threats due to legal limits on cash transactions (cash payments above EUR 700 prohibited). 259. Across the DNFBP sectors, awareness of TF risk is generally informed by the NRA findings, which identify TF risk as low. Most DNFBPs are familiar with the NRA conclusions and with their AML/CFT obligations, including those related to TF. However, beyond sanctions screening—primarily through lists provided by the CBA or commercial vendors—there is limited evidence that DNFBPs consider TF risk in a more substantive or sector-specific manner. In particular, DNFBPs do not demonstrate how TF risks could materialise in their activities or how such risks are factored into their internal risk assessments or controls." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Domestic legal persons Basic information 347. Basic information in the State Registry is publicly available online. All documents submitted to the State Registry since 2012 are accessible electronically and those submitted before are in the process of being digitalised. The State Registry contains comprehensive basic information on the founders of all companies, partnerships and co‑operatives. 348. Changes to basic information take effect only after registration in the State Registry.  After registration, up-to-date legal ownership information is available with the State Registry for LLCs, co‑operatives and partnerships, and with the Central Depository or custodians for JSCs. A legal person is considered as established from the moment of state registration. 349. There is no direct requirement for updating of legal ownership information of legal persons in the State Registry, however the State Registry contains past and current basic information of (active) LLCs because any changes to capital compositions or shareholding acquire legal force vis-à-vis third persons from the moment of their state registration. 350. Information about founders and participators of JSCs is also recorded in the State Registry; however, all subsequent changes are not registered therein as there is no obligation to amend the articles of association when the membership changes. The changes in ownership of shares in JSCs (both open and closed) are registered with the Central Depository. 351. Information contained in the Central Depository is adequate, accurate and current and is available to the representatives of the JSCs, their shareholders, CBA (including FMC) and LEAs. Representatives of the JSCs and their shareholders can access the information by submitting a request to the CDA via the CDA account operators and the information is provided by the CDA within five days. BO information 352. Armenia uses a multi-pronged approach to access BO information through three main sources: (i) the data contained in the State Registry; (ii) the data held by the reporting entities; and (iii) as of June 2021 data held by the legal persons themselves. Information contained in the State Registry 353. Since 2021, the State Registry started to be populated with BO information which includes sufficient data for their identification. 354. Supervisory authorities and LEAs have direct access to the BO information in the State Register. However, in practice they appeal to the reporting entities to access BO information as the Registry is not fully populated. Information held by the reporting entities 355. LEAs (except SRC (Tax Unit)) have access to BO information kept by the reporting entities (mainly banks) on the basis of a court order. LEAs reported that this generally is not a lengthy process and addressed within a few days. 356. LEAs can also access BO data held by reporting entities (mainly banks if the legal person has a bank account) through the FMC, where the information was reported to be shared in three to four days. 357. No records are kept of the number of BO information requests made to the reporting entities or to the FMC, nor on the completeness and swiftness of the replies. 358.  Basic and BO information of foreign legal persons that have sufficient links to Armenia can be accessed only through the reporting entities who are obliged to identify them in the course of the CDD process. FMC and SRC have direct access to this information. The other competent authorities (mainly LEAs) have to appeal to a court order. Information held by legal persons 359. With the legal amendments in June 2021, legal persons are also subject to record-keeping obligations in relation to BO information and are required to make this information available within five days to the competent authorities. There is little use of this option in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Domestic legal persons Basic information 347. Basic information in the State Registry is publicly available online. All documents submitted to the State Registry since 2012 are accessible electronically and those submitted before are in the process of being digitalised. The State Registry contains comprehensive basic information on the founders of all companies, partnerships and co‑operatives. 348. Changes to basic information take effect only after registration in the State Registry.  After registration, up-to-date legal ownership information is available with the State Registry for LLCs, co‑operatives and partnerships, and with the Central Depository or custodians for JSCs. A legal person is considered as established from the moment of state registration. 349. There is no direct requirement for updating of legal ownership information of legal persons in the State Registry, however the State Registry contains past and current basic information of (active) LLCs because any changes to capital compositions or shareholding acquire legal force vis-à-vis third persons from the moment of their state registration. 350. Information about founders and participators of JSCs is also recorded in the State Registry; however, all subsequent changes are not registered therein as there is no obligation to amend the articles of association when the membership changes. The changes in ownership of shares in JSCs (both open and closed) are registered with the Central Depository. 351. Information contained in the Central Depository is adequate, accurate and current and is available to the representatives of the JSCs, their shareholders, CBA (including FMC) and LEAs. Representatives of the JSCs and their shareholders can access the information by submitting a request to the CDA via the CDA account operators and the information is provided by the CDA within five days. BO information 352. Armenia uses a multi-pronged approach to access BO information through three main sources: (i) the data contained in the State Registry; (ii) the data held by the reporting entities; and (iii) as of June 2021 data held by the legal persons themselves. Information contained in the State Registry 353. Since 2021, the State Registry started to be populated with BO information which includes sufficient data for their identification. 354. Supervisory authorities and LEAs have direct access to the BO information in the State Register. However, in practice they appeal to the reporting entities to access BO information as the Registry is not fully populated. Information held by the reporting entities 355. LEAs (except SRC (Tax Unit)) have access to BO information kept by the reporting entities (mainly banks) on the basis of a court order. LEAs reported that this generally is not a lengthy process and addressed within a few days. 356. LEAs can also access BO data held by reporting entities (mainly banks if the legal person has a bank account) through the FMC, where the information was reported to be shared in three to four days. 357. No records are kept of the number of BO information requests made to the reporting entities or to the FMC, nor on the completeness and swiftness of the replies. 358.  Basic and BO information of foreign legal persons that have sufficient links to Armenia can be accessed only through the reporting entities who are obliged to identify them in the course of the CDD process. FMC and SRC have direct access to this information. The other competent authorities (mainly LEAs) have to appeal to a court order. Information held by legal persons 359. With the legal amendments in June 2021, legal persons are also subject to record-keeping obligations in relation to BO information and are required to make this information available within five days to the competent authorities. There is little use of this option in practice." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 412. On the bilateral level, cooperation between the FMC and intelligence bodies, such as the NSS, SRC or MIA, is facilitated by signed bilateral MoUs which set out the specific roles and needs of parties as well as a more detailed framework for cooperation on specified matters, including exchange of information, organization of trainings, setup of bilateral discussions or meetings and the development of handbooks and typologies. These include arrangements to hold bilateral or multilateral discussions on potential cases or hypotheses of ML – within 5 working days and potential cases or hypotheses of TF or PF – without delay and in any case not later than within 1 working day. This power is used regularly by the FIU and inquiry bodies in top priority cases. While no formal cooperation mechanism is in place, meetings with the supervisors are initiated in the context of cases involving reporting entities and in the context of developing and providing typologies to the financial sector and non-financial sector. 413. The authorities use a dedicated Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform – a secure communication system specifically designed to support protected data exchange. This system ensures that sensitive information is transmitted in a secure, encrypted environment, accessible only to designated officials within authorized institutions. 414. In key ML/TF cases, where enhanced cooperation between REs, the FMC and LEAs are necessary to ensure effective analysis, the FIU can set up task forces and partnerships. In particular, such cooperation is exploited in particular grand corruption cases. This is a positive outcome, which allows to both speed up the analysis and facilitate broader collection of information. Box 6.1. FIU – LEA cooperation on ML and corruption case A PEP, with the assistance of others, received a particularly large bribe of 14 million USD in exchange for taking actions within the scope of his official powers to benefit a Resident Entrepreneur by facilitating the granting and extension of mining licenses. One part of the bribe was given in cash, while the other part was transferred through foreign bank accounts belonging to other individuals and was subsequently laundered. The scheme involved inter alia: a UAE Company which entered into an agreement with the Resident Entrepreneur to purchase a mining company in Armenia for 40 million USD; a close associate of the PEP and a prominent entrepreneur in Armenia; a BVI Company with a bank account in Switzerland beneficially owned by the associate; an Armenian Company - alcohol factory engaged in legitimate business activities in Armenia. Its beneficial owner is the associate of the PEP; a series of individuals affiliated with the PEP who conducted transactions based on his instructions. Among other extensive investigative activities, it was possible to uncover the entire transaction scheme and identify the real beneficial owners through a parallel financial investigation, which included intelligence provided by the FMC. Banking information related to the UAE and Switzerland was obtained from the respective countries within the framework of mutual legal assistance and was subsequently used as evidence in the course of the investigation. During the preliminary investigation, the bank accounts of the persons, movable and immovable property actually belonging to them or available in their names were frozen in the Republic of Armenia. In 2023, the case was submitted to the court and currently in the stage of main court hearings. 6.3.2 Security and confidentiality 415. The FMC’s network operates as a secure segment within the CBA network, benefiting from perimeter protections including firewalls located at the CBA network boundary. Although structurally part of the CBA, the FMC operates with a high degree of technical independence. It maintains its own dedicated IT division and infrastructure to support its functions. To further strengthen its internal control environment, the FMC established a dedicated IT Security Officer position in 2023. Technical independence is maintained internally, while cybersecurity oversight is provided in cooperation with the CBA’s cybersecurity unit. The FMC’s servers are completely separated from the CBA’s general IT infrastructure. Information that is maintained on servers, databases and applications is only accessible to FMC’s designated staff. 416. All data exchanged between the FMC and its domestic or international counterparts is transmitted through secure, encrypted channels to preserve confidentiality and data integrity. At the international level, information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via Egmont Secure Web and the CIS FIU network. 417. FMC analysts regularly request and receive information from FIs on a daily basis via secure channel (CBAnet). All sensitive data that is transferred between FMC and REs is encrypted using to prevent unauthorized access." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Co-operation and exchange 412. On the bilateral level, cooperation between the FMC and intelligence bodies, such as the NSS, SRC or MIA, is facilitated by signed bilateral MoUs which set out the specific roles and needs of parties as well as a more detailed framework for cooperation on specified matters, including exchange of information, organization of trainings, setup of bilateral discussions or meetings and the development of handbooks and typologies. These include arrangements to hold bilateral or multilateral discussions on potential cases or hypotheses of ML – within 5 working days and potential cases or hypotheses of TF or PF – without delay and in any case not later than within 1 working day. This power is used regularly by the FIU and inquiry bodies in top priority cases. While no formal cooperation mechanism is in place, meetings with the supervisors are initiated in the context of cases involving reporting entities and in the context of developing and providing typologies to the financial sector and non-financial sector. 413. The authorities use a dedicated Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform – a secure communication system specifically designed to support protected data exchange. This system ensures that sensitive information is transmitted in a secure, encrypted environment, accessible only to designated officials within authorized institutions. 414. In key ML/TF cases, where enhanced cooperation between REs, the FMC and LEAs are necessary to ensure effective analysis, the FIU can set up task forces and partnerships. In particular, such cooperation is exploited in particular grand corruption cases. This is a positive outcome, which allows to both speed up the analysis and facilitate broader collection of information. Box 6.1. FIU – LEA cooperation on ML and corruption case A PEP, with the assistance of others, received a particularly large bribe of 14 million USD in exchange for taking actions within the scope of his official powers to benefit a Resident Entrepreneur by facilitating the granting and extension of mining licenses. One part of the bribe was given in cash, while the other part was transferred through foreign bank accounts belonging to other individuals and was subsequently laundered. The scheme involved inter alia: a UAE Company which entered into an agreement with the Resident Entrepreneur to purchase a mining company in Armenia for 40 million USD; a close associate of the PEP and a prominent entrepreneur in Armenia; a BVI Company with a bank account in Switzerland beneficially owned by the associate; an Armenian Company - alcohol factory engaged in legitimate business activities in Armenia. Its beneficial owner is the associate of the PEP; a series of individuals affiliated with the PEP who conducted transactions based on his instructions. Among other extensive investigative activities, it was possible to uncover the entire transaction scheme and identify the real beneficial owners through a parallel financial investigation, which included intelligence provided by the FMC. Banking information related to the UAE and Switzerland was obtained from the respective countries within the framework of mutual legal assistance and was subsequently used as evidence in the course of the investigation. During the preliminary investigation, the bank accounts of the persons, movable and immovable property actually belonging to them or available in their names were frozen in the Republic of Armenia. In 2023, the case was submitted to the court and currently in the stage of main court hearings. 6.3.2 Security and confidentiality 415. The FMC’s network operates as a secure segment within the CBA network, benefiting from perimeter protections including firewalls located at the CBA network boundary. Although structurally part of the CBA, the FMC operates with a high degree of technical independence. It maintains its own dedicated IT division and infrastructure to support its functions. To further strengthen its internal control environment, the FMC established a dedicated IT Security Officer position in 2023. Technical independence is maintained internally, while cybersecurity oversight is provided in cooperation with the CBA’s cybersecurity unit. The FMC’s servers are completely separated from the CBA’s general IT infrastructure. Information that is maintained on servers, databases and applications is only accessible to FMC’s designated staff. 416. All data exchanged between the FMC and its domestic or international counterparts is transmitted through secure, encrypted channels to preserve confidentiality and data integrity. At the international level, information exchanged with foreign counterparts is secured via Egmont Secure Web and the CIS FIU network. 417. FMC analysts regularly request and receive information from FIs on a daily basis via secure channel (CBAnet). All sensitive data that is transferred between FMC and REs is encrypted using to prevent unauthorized access." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="450. The sanction for ML offence committed by a natural person is imprisonment. Depending on the severity of the offence, the custodial sentence ranges from a minimum of two years to a maximum of twelve years. Since January 2023, a broad range of criminal sanctions applies to legal persons for any offence, including ML, ranging from fines of up to 20% of the legal person’s gross income to temporary suspension of the right to exercise certain type of activity and compulsory liquidation. However, their application is subject to exemptions in certain circumstances (see R.3, c.3.10). 451. During the reporting period, eight custodial sentences were imposed on natural persons, seven of which are final. In all cases, the sentence was imposed for ML in conjunction with the predicate offence. Table 7.8: Range of custodial sentences imposed for ML (natural persons) Custodial sentences imposed 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of custodial sentences imposed 4 0 0 3 1 8 [88] Highest custodial sentence imposed (in months) 30 N/A N/A 96 84 - Lowest custodial sentence imposed (in months) 24 N/A N/A 29 84 - Average length of custodial sentences (in months) 27 N/A N/A 52 84 - Number of suspended custodial sentences 1 N/A N/A 2 0 3 452. There appears to be an increasing trend in the average length of custodial sentences over the period 2020-2024. However, drawing firm conclusions is difficult, given the absence of convictions in 2021 and 2022 and that the 2024 result is based on a single conviction. It was explained that, for six convictions, the custodial sentences were lower (two years on average) due to the small scale of the ML offences [89] . Other two comparatively larger-scale cases resulted in convictions of seven and eight years, indicating a proportionate approach to sentencing. 453. Nevertheless, overall, the results do not suggest that the sanctions applied against natural persons convicted of ML offences, are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Forty percent of the sanctions imposed on natural persons are suspended custodial sentences, while no sanctions have been applied to legal persons. The larger-scale and more complex ML cases presented to the AT remain pending with no convictions to date. This is despite the authorities’ general perception that ML charges have a deterrent effect when applied alongside predicate offenses [90] . Footnotes [88] According to the authorities, there are seven final convictions. One custodial sentence is being challenged in the Court of Appeals. [89] Laundered property did not exceed EUR 4000. [90] The maximum custodial penalty for ML (12 years) exceeds those for other serious financial crimes, such as fraud, embezzlement, or tax evasion." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="450. The sanction for ML offence committed by a natural person is imprisonment. Depending on the severity of the offence, the custodial sentence ranges from a minimum of two years to a maximum of twelve years. Since January 2023, a broad range of criminal sanctions applies to legal persons for any offence, including ML, ranging from fines of up to 20% of the legal person’s gross income to temporary suspension of the right to exercise certain type of activity and compulsory liquidation. However, their application is subject to exemptions in certain circumstances (see R.3, c.3.10). 451. During the reporting period, eight custodial sentences were imposed on natural persons, seven of which are final. In all cases, the sentence was imposed for ML in conjunction with the predicate offence. Table 7.8: Range of custodial sentences imposed for ML (natural persons) Custodial sentences imposed 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Number of custodial sentences imposed 4 0 0 3 1 8 [88] Highest custodial sentence imposed (in months) 30 N/A N/A 96 84 - Lowest custodial sentence imposed (in months) 24 N/A N/A 29 84 - Average length of custodial sentences (in months) 27 N/A N/A 52 84 - Number of suspended custodial sentences 1 N/A N/A 2 0 3 452. There appears to be an increasing trend in the average length of custodial sentences over the period 2020-2024. However, drawing firm conclusions is difficult, given the absence of convictions in 2021 and 2022 and that the 2024 result is based on a single conviction. It was explained that, for six convictions, the custodial sentences were lower (two years on average) due to the small scale of the ML offences [89] . Other two comparatively larger-scale cases resulted in convictions of seven and eight years, indicating a proportionate approach to sentencing. 453. Nevertheless, overall, the results do not suggest that the sanctions applied against natural persons convicted of ML offences, are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Forty percent of the sanctions imposed on natural persons are suspended custodial sentences, while no sanctions have been applied to legal persons. The larger-scale and more complex ML cases presented to the AT remain pending with no convictions to date. This is despite the authorities’ general perception that ML charges have a deterrent effect when applied alongside predicate offenses [90] . Footnotes [88] According to the authorities, there are seven final convictions. One custodial sentence is being challenged in the Court of Appeals. [89] Laundered property did not exceed EUR 4000. [90] The maximum custodial penalty for ML (12 years) exceeds those for other serious financial crimes, such as fraud, embezzlement, or tax evasion." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 471. Armenian legislation provides overall the necessary tools for detecting and restraining the proceeds of crime, whether from domestic or international criminal activity. As in the case of tracing, all LEAs are responsible for tracing and securing criminal assets in the context of their own investigations. 472. The authorities have been able to provide data on property seized during the pre-trial investigation on ML offences (by the IC and ACC) and corruption-related offences (by the ACC) only. Table 8.1. Property seized in ML cases (source IC) Year Number of ML cases where seizure was applied Value of property (correspondent value) (EUR) 2020 13 301 150 136 2021 15 60 699 2022 16 1 211 205 2023 35 7 044 035 2024 42 6 900 222 Total 121 316 366 297 Table 8.2. Property seized in ML and corruption cases (source ACC) Year Value of property (correspondent value) seized in ML cases (EUR) Value of property (correspondent value) seized in corruption cases (EUR) 2022 45 952 37 953 424 2023 0 386 235 2024 558 036 4 465 041 Total 603 988 37 953 424 473. While in some years the value of the seizures is commensurate with the risk (2020 for example), the value of seized property has varied significantly during the reporting period (see Tables 8.1. and 8.2. above). The authorities explained that this discrepancy results from the calculation method – the large amount seized is linked to a single large-scale case in which seizure measure were initiated in 2020, while most of the assets were in fact seized during 2021-2024. The lack of complete data on applied seizures, hampers the possibility to assess the effectiveness of the overall provisional measures and whether they are commensurate with the estimated volume of the criminal property [92] . Table 8.3. Provisional measures under NCBC (source GPO) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sept Total Value of total assets seized based on claims (EUR) 14 172 492 171 027 811 841 967 258 219 493 328 80 264 974 1 326 925 863 474. The exact value of seized assets under the civil confiscation regime was not provided, as according to the authorities, statistics are not maintained on the value of property seized. This was explained as in many cases, information on the market value of the restrained property is not available, and in certain instances, the court may lift or modify the applied provisional measure. Nevertheless, according to the authorities, the total included in the last column of Table 8.3. (the overall total for the period) may be considered as approximate amount of seized assets, since provisional measures have been applied in all cases. 475. The FMC has the power to suspend transactions or business relationships, which can also support tracing (as mentioned above), securing criminal property. During the period under review, the FMC used these powers in 14 cases, mostly based on FIs notifications but also on the basis of LEA request (1 case). This resulted in the seizure of criminal property worth approximately 2.14 million EUR (see table 8.4. below). While this power could substantially assist in securing funds for further seizure and confiscation (especially when applied at LEA request), it is rarely used in practice. Table 8.4. Property seized as a result of the FMC’s suspension powers (AMD) Number of suspension cases* Value of suspended property (in EUR) Number of notifications to LEAs Cases where transactions were unsuspended and notifications where not provided to LEAs Amount of seized property (in EUR) 2020 1 1,848,772 1 1,815,925 2021 0 - - - - 2022 9 9,925,675 8 619,743 2023 2 1,000,128 Result: 1 1 147,236 2024 2 301,425 2 74,463 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 476. To secure possible confiscation, compensation for damages or procedural costs, investigators can adopt a decision on the attachment (arrest) of property, which must be presented for verification to the court within three days [93] . While the process for freezing and seizing property during pre-trial investigations is timely and straightforward, investigative bodies noted that beyond the three days delay, the courts may refuse some requests or requiring difficult-to-obtain documents ( e.g. expert evaluations of property value). Although clear-cut statistics were not available, these procedural burdens limit the authorities’ ability to seize criminal property in a timely manner, especially in cases of electronic property, which can be moved quickly. Footnotes [92] For example, in 2024 alone, over 6,000 investigations were launched for crimes such as fraud, drug trafficking, and tax evasion—crimes that typically generate illicit proceeds. [93] Chapter 39 of the CPC" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.3.1. Active pursuit of provisional measures resulting from financial investigations 471. Armenian legislation provides overall the necessary tools for detecting and restraining the proceeds of crime, whether from domestic or international criminal activity. As in the case of tracing, all LEAs are responsible for tracing and securing criminal assets in the context of their own investigations. 472. The authorities have been able to provide data on property seized during the pre-trial investigation on ML offences (by the IC and ACC) and corruption-related offences (by the ACC) only. Table 8.1. Property seized in ML cases (source IC) Year Number of ML cases where seizure was applied Value of property (correspondent value) (EUR) 2020 13 301 150 136 2021 15 60 699 2022 16 1 211 205 2023 35 7 044 035 2024 42 6 900 222 Total 121 316 366 297 Table 8.2. Property seized in ML and corruption cases (source ACC) Year Value of property (correspondent value) seized in ML cases (EUR) Value of property (correspondent value) seized in corruption cases (EUR) 2022 45 952 37 953 424 2023 0 386 235 2024 558 036 4 465 041 Total 603 988 37 953 424 473. While in some years the value of the seizures is commensurate with the risk (2020 for example), the value of seized property has varied significantly during the reporting period (see Tables 8.1. and 8.2. above). The authorities explained that this discrepancy results from the calculation method – the large amount seized is linked to a single large-scale case in which seizure measure were initiated in 2020, while most of the assets were in fact seized during 2021-2024. The lack of complete data on applied seizures, hampers the possibility to assess the effectiveness of the overall provisional measures and whether they are commensurate with the estimated volume of the criminal property [92] . Table 8.3. Provisional measures under NCBC (source GPO) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Sept Total Value of total assets seized based on claims (EUR) 14 172 492 171 027 811 841 967 258 219 493 328 80 264 974 1 326 925 863 474. The exact value of seized assets under the civil confiscation regime was not provided, as according to the authorities, statistics are not maintained on the value of property seized. This was explained as in many cases, information on the market value of the restrained property is not available, and in certain instances, the court may lift or modify the applied provisional measure. Nevertheless, according to the authorities, the total included in the last column of Table 8.3. (the overall total for the period) may be considered as approximate amount of seized assets, since provisional measures have been applied in all cases. 475. The FMC has the power to suspend transactions or business relationships, which can also support tracing (as mentioned above), securing criminal property. During the period under review, the FMC used these powers in 14 cases, mostly based on FIs notifications but also on the basis of LEA request (1 case). This resulted in the seizure of criminal property worth approximately 2.14 million EUR (see table 8.4. below). While this power could substantially assist in securing funds for further seizure and confiscation (especially when applied at LEA request), it is rarely used in practice. Table 8.4. Property seized as a result of the FMC’s suspension powers (AMD) Number of suspension cases* Value of suspended property (in EUR) Number of notifications to LEAs Cases where transactions were unsuspended and notifications where not provided to LEAs Amount of seized property (in EUR) 2020 1 1,848,772 1 1,815,925 2021 0 - - - - 2022 9 9,925,675 8 619,743 2023 2 1,000,128 Result: 1 1 147,236 2024 2 301,425 2 74,463 8.3.2. Expeditious measures 476. To secure possible confiscation, compensation for damages or procedural costs, investigators can adopt a decision on the attachment (arrest) of property, which must be presented for verification to the court within three days [93] . While the process for freezing and seizing property during pre-trial investigations is timely and straightforward, investigative bodies noted that beyond the three days delay, the courts may refuse some requests or requiring difficult-to-obtain documents ( e.g. expert evaluations of property value). Although clear-cut statistics were not available, these procedural burdens limit the authorities’ ability to seize criminal property in a timely manner, especially in cases of electronic property, which can be moved quickly. Footnotes [92] For example, in 2024 alone, over 6,000 investigations were launched for crimes such as fraud, drug trafficking, and tax evasion—crimes that typically generate illicit proceeds. [93] Chapter 39 of the CPC" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="522. As there have been no TF convictions to date, no sanctions have been applied for this offence. However, the necessary sanctions are available to the courts, subject to some restrictions on the sanctions applicable to legal persons (see Recommendation 5). Although sanctions have been imposed in some terrorism cases, no details were provided so it was not possible to assess from this the way that the courts would be likely to treat terrorism related activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="522. As there have been no TF convictions to date, no sanctions have been applied for this offence. However, the necessary sanctions are available to the courts, subject to some restrictions on the sanctions applicable to legal persons (see Recommendation 5). Although sanctions have been imposed in some terrorism cases, no details were provided so it was not possible to assess from this the way that the courts would be likely to treat terrorism related activity." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of at -risk NPOs 546. As explained under R.8, in the context of the 2021- 2023 NRA, just over 1 000 entities (primarily non-governmental organisations, foundations and religious organisations) were identified as falling within the FATF definition of NPOs, and the TF risks of these NPOs were assessed as low. While Armenia identified 15 out of the 1 100 NPOs as having a higher TF risk than the others, this was relative only, as these 15 NPOs were still considered to present a low TF risk. 547. The 15 higher risk NPOs consist of 10 non-governmental organisations and five foundations. They are primarily engaged in various social, charitable, and socio-cultural programmes. Their activities focus on serving vulnerable groups in need of support, including children and vulnerable adults, displaced populations, and other at-risk communities, and funds are directed toward community development initiatives (e.g. road construction and renovation, educational and medical projects). 548. The NRA findings were supplemented by detailed analysis in a 2024 TF sectorial risk assessment, as reflected in a summary provided to the AT. Information for this assessment was obtained via a questionnaire to evaluate the TF threats to NPOs, the NPO sector’s awareness of TF risks and the effectiveness of their controls and internal risk management practices. The information obtained included data on links with high-risk countries and types of transactions. Data on transactions covered a wide range of factors such as cross-border aspects (especially transactions with high-risk countries), cash withdrawals and the use of crypto-assets and alternative transfer systems. In addition to the questionnaire responses, information contained in NPO reports and open-source studies on NPOs was also considered. 549. The information obtained showed that approximately 10% of all NPOs are engaged in international transfers. Between 2021 and 2023, transfers to other countries period amounted to approximately EUR 300 million and were primarily made to Armenian diaspora communities (particularly in the Russian Federation, the United States and various European countries, especially Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France) to support social, cultural, and educational purposes. Approximately EUR 2.2 million came from the 15 higher risk NPOs. The total volume of transfers to high-risk countries was just under EUR 2 million, with just over EUR 300 000 coming from two of the 15 higher risk NPOs. These transfers were primarily made to support Armenian cultural centres and, in some cases, individual beneficiaries under humanitarian aid programmes (strictly under charitable purposes). 550. Funds received from abroad in the same period amounted to just over EUR 400 million. This was a substantial increase on funds received in the period immediately before then and was largely due to contributions from Armenian diaspora communities (primarily in the Russian Federation, the United States and European countries including Switzerland, Germany, and France). 551. Fundraising is conducted primarily through bank transfers and online donations (via POS terminals and payment systems), with no indications of NPOs collecting or distributing funds through alternative transfer systems or using crypto assets. The financial transactions of NPOs typically do not involve complex or multi-layered intermediary chains. Most funds come from international and local donors, as well as individual donors, and are allocated directly to the implementation and maintenance of programs and events. 552. According to the authorities, a key factor in the assessment of the NPO sector as low risk for TF is that the activities of Armenian NPOs almost exclusively involve funds raised by Armenians for the benefit of other Armenians, whether Armenian residents or members of the Armenian diaspora. This was demonstrated by the information on cross-border transfers referred to above and was also confirmed by the NPOs who were met onsite, all of whom were among the 15 higher risk NPOs. 553. While the overall assessment of the NPO sector as low risk for TF appears to be in line with the underlying data referenced in the sectorial risk assessment, this is not consistent with the approach taken by the banking sector, as banks classify nearly 80% of their NPO clients as high risk. According to the authorities however, this classification is not a reliable indicator of TF risks and is primarily due to the banks taking a conservative approach for commercial reasons, as banks risk assess all NPOs, including those that do not meet the FATF definition, and classify them as high risk if they meet any one of the risk criteria. On the basis of the material provided, there was no reason to believe that the information held by the banks contradicted the overall findings of the assessment of the NPO sector as low risk. Mitigating measures 554. As explained under R.8, there are mitigating measures in place under the AML/CFT Law which require NPOs to maintain information on domestic and international transactions, identification data about their managing officials, foundation documents and records of management decisions, and documents on their financial and economic activities. These measures are not risk based, as they apply equally to all NPOs in the jurisdiction. 555. The position is different as regards enforcement of these measures. The AML/CFT Law provides that NPO supervisors are required upon request from the FMC to take measures to prevent the involvement or usage of NPOs in ML/TF. According to the authorities, this enables the oversight and enforcement of mitigation measures in practice to be targeted at those considered to have a higher risk of TF, and Armenia has taken steps to achieve this in practice. The FMC and the SRC (as the AML/CFT supervisor for NPOs that are non-governmental organisations and foundations) have created a formal programme of supervision for the 15 higher risk NPOs, which was appended as a table to the 2024 sectorial analysis summary. 556. The table classifies three of the 15 NPOs as relatively high-risk, with annual control measures assigned, and the remaining 12 NPOs as medium level risk and subject to control measures on a two-year cycle. However, it is expressly stated that this is not static and may change over time in line with changing circumstances. In all cases, offsite supervision is envisaged. 557. While these control measures appear to be focused and proportionate to the risk profiles of the NPOs in question, their effectiveness could not be fully assessed, as formal implementation has not begun yet. However, in 2025 the SRC carried out some preparatory engagement with the 15 NPOs, following issuing of the questionnaires referred to above. Based on the responses to the questionnaires, the SRC (and also the FMC in some cases) held follow up meetings with the NPOs in 2025 to discuss any issues of concern. Overall, these meetings demonstrated that appropriate controls were in place. This was in line with the information provided by the NPOs who were met onsite, who confirmed that records were kept on management officials and on all financial and economic activities, supported, as necessary, by desk-based and onsite checks to ensure that the use of funds was consistent with the NPO’s stated purposes. 558. Therefore, although there was no formal application of risk-based mitigation measures during the assessment period, some risk-based oversight of the NPO sector was introduced towards the end of the assessment period. This oversight involved reaching agreement with NPOs about the application of controls etc. rather than the authorities applying any enforcement. However, this is of limited significance in practice, given the overall finding by the authorities that appropriate controls were in place. Box 10.2. Case Study –Targeted engagement with NPO Following the issue of a targeted questionnaire in 2024, from the beginning of 2025 the SRC held individual meetings with representatives of NPOs identified as higher risk. In one of these meetings the NPO confirmed that although it did not have formal programmatic provisions specifically aimed at ensuring staff awareness of TF risks, employees were nevertheless informed about potential TF risks associated both with NPOs in general and with their organization’s specific activities. This awareness was raised in the context of the organization’s mission, geographic areas of operation, and the processes related to the fundraising and allocation of financial resources. Employees were instructed to exercise heightened vigilance in these matters. Certain issues were also identified regarding the regulation of internal processes, particularly those related to the collection and distribution of funds. This was observed despite the fact that, in practice, these activities are generally conducted in line with established rules. Following the recommendation of the SRC — and with its support, where necessary — the NPO agreed to develop and formalize documented procedures describing the regulated steps of these processes within a defined timeframe. As a result, an agreement was reached between the NPO and the SRC to carry out targeted work on the identified areas of concern and to fully implement the necessary steps for establishing processes that meet the required standards. The parties agreed to complete these actions within a one-year period, setting the first half of 2026 as the implementation deadline. Source: SRC 559. Armenia has taken other measures to develop the understanding of the NPO sector about TF issues. A number of guidance documents related to the TF risks for NPOs have been published on the FMC website, and information about the findings of the NRA on this issue has been presented to the NPOs considered to be at greater risk of TF. In addition, in 2024 there was a workshop jointly organised with the CoE where the topics covered included the ways in which NPOs could be abused for TF purposes. 560. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the guidance and outreach provided by Armenia, the NPOs that were met onsite displayed only a limited understanding of the ways in which NPOs can be abused for TF purposes. While they were generally aware of their obligations under the AML/CFT Law and had developed internal controls intended to mitigate TF risks, the limited depth of their understanding of TF abuse could affect the extent to which these controls can always be effectively applied in practice. The materiality of this is nonetheless limited, given the small number of higher risks NPOs and their risk profile, in particular their focus on Armenian residents and diaspora communities and the low volume of transfers they make to high-risk countries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="Identification of at -risk NPOs 546. As explained under R.8, in the context of the 2021- 2023 NRA, just over 1 000 entities (primarily non-governmental organisations, foundations and religious organisations) were identified as falling within the FATF definition of NPOs, and the TF risks of these NPOs were assessed as low. While Armenia identified 15 out of the 1 100 NPOs as having a higher TF risk than the others, this was relative only, as these 15 NPOs were still considered to present a low TF risk. 547. The 15 higher risk NPOs consist of 10 non-governmental organisations and five foundations. They are primarily engaged in various social, charitable, and socio-cultural programmes. Their activities focus on serving vulnerable groups in need of support, including children and vulnerable adults, displaced populations, and other at-risk communities, and funds are directed toward community development initiatives (e.g. road construction and renovation, educational and medical projects). 548. The NRA findings were supplemented by detailed analysis in a 2024 TF sectorial risk assessment, as reflected in a summary provided to the AT. Information for this assessment was obtained via a questionnaire to evaluate the TF threats to NPOs, the NPO sector’s awareness of TF risks and the effectiveness of their controls and internal risk management practices. The information obtained included data on links with high-risk countries and types of transactions. Data on transactions covered a wide range of factors such as cross-border aspects (especially transactions with high-risk countries), cash withdrawals and the use of crypto-assets and alternative transfer systems. In addition to the questionnaire responses, information contained in NPO reports and open-source studies on NPOs was also considered. 549. The information obtained showed that approximately 10% of all NPOs are engaged in international transfers. Between 2021 and 2023, transfers to other countries period amounted to approximately EUR 300 million and were primarily made to Armenian diaspora communities (particularly in the Russian Federation, the United States and various European countries, especially Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France) to support social, cultural, and educational purposes. Approximately EUR 2.2 million came from the 15 higher risk NPOs. The total volume of transfers to high-risk countries was just under EUR 2 million, with just over EUR 300 000 coming from two of the 15 higher risk NPOs. These transfers were primarily made to support Armenian cultural centres and, in some cases, individual beneficiaries under humanitarian aid programmes (strictly under charitable purposes). 550. Funds received from abroad in the same period amounted to just over EUR 400 million. This was a substantial increase on funds received in the period immediately before then and was largely due to contributions from Armenian diaspora communities (primarily in the Russian Federation, the United States and European countries including Switzerland, Germany, and France). 551. Fundraising is conducted primarily through bank transfers and online donations (via POS terminals and payment systems), with no indications of NPOs collecting or distributing funds through alternative transfer systems or using crypto assets. The financial transactions of NPOs typically do not involve complex or multi-layered intermediary chains. Most funds come from international and local donors, as well as individual donors, and are allocated directly to the implementation and maintenance of programs and events. 552. According to the authorities, a key factor in the assessment of the NPO sector as low risk for TF is that the activities of Armenian NPOs almost exclusively involve funds raised by Armenians for the benefit of other Armenians, whether Armenian residents or members of the Armenian diaspora. This was demonstrated by the information on cross-border transfers referred to above and was also confirmed by the NPOs who were met onsite, all of whom were among the 15 higher risk NPOs. 553. While the overall assessment of the NPO sector as low risk for TF appears to be in line with the underlying data referenced in the sectorial risk assessment, this is not consistent with the approach taken by the banking sector, as banks classify nearly 80% of their NPO clients as high risk. According to the authorities however, this classification is not a reliable indicator of TF risks and is primarily due to the banks taking a conservative approach for commercial reasons, as banks risk assess all NPOs, including those that do not meet the FATF definition, and classify them as high risk if they meet any one of the risk criteria. On the basis of the material provided, there was no reason to believe that the information held by the banks contradicted the overall findings of the assessment of the NPO sector as low risk. Mitigating measures 554. As explained under R.8, there are mitigating measures in place under the AML/CFT Law which require NPOs to maintain information on domestic and international transactions, identification data about their managing officials, foundation documents and records of management decisions, and documents on their financial and economic activities. These measures are not risk based, as they apply equally to all NPOs in the jurisdiction. 555. The position is different as regards enforcement of these measures. The AML/CFT Law provides that NPO supervisors are required upon request from the FMC to take measures to prevent the involvement or usage of NPOs in ML/TF. According to the authorities, this enables the oversight and enforcement of mitigation measures in practice to be targeted at those considered to have a higher risk of TF, and Armenia has taken steps to achieve this in practice. The FMC and the SRC (as the AML/CFT supervisor for NPOs that are non-governmental organisations and foundations) have created a formal programme of supervision for the 15 higher risk NPOs, which was appended as a table to the 2024 sectorial analysis summary. 556. The table classifies three of the 15 NPOs as relatively high-risk, with annual control measures assigned, and the remaining 12 NPOs as medium level risk and subject to control measures on a two-year cycle. However, it is expressly stated that this is not static and may change over time in line with changing circumstances. In all cases, offsite supervision is envisaged. 557. While these control measures appear to be focused and proportionate to the risk profiles of the NPOs in question, their effectiveness could not be fully assessed, as formal implementation has not begun yet. However, in 2025 the SRC carried out some preparatory engagement with the 15 NPOs, following issuing of the questionnaires referred to above. Based on the responses to the questionnaires, the SRC (and also the FMC in some cases) held follow up meetings with the NPOs in 2025 to discuss any issues of concern. Overall, these meetings demonstrated that appropriate controls were in place. This was in line with the information provided by the NPOs who were met onsite, who confirmed that records were kept on management officials and on all financial and economic activities, supported, as necessary, by desk-based and onsite checks to ensure that the use of funds was consistent with the NPO’s stated purposes. 558. Therefore, although there was no formal application of risk-based mitigation measures during the assessment period, some risk-based oversight of the NPO sector was introduced towards the end of the assessment period. This oversight involved reaching agreement with NPOs about the application of controls etc. rather than the authorities applying any enforcement. However, this is of limited significance in practice, given the overall finding by the authorities that appropriate controls were in place. Box 10.2. Case Study –Targeted engagement with NPO Following the issue of a targeted questionnaire in 2024, from the beginning of 2025 the SRC held individual meetings with representatives of NPOs identified as higher risk. In one of these meetings the NPO confirmed that although it did not have formal programmatic provisions specifically aimed at ensuring staff awareness of TF risks, employees were nevertheless informed about potential TF risks associated both with NPOs in general and with their organization’s specific activities. This awareness was raised in the context of the organization’s mission, geographic areas of operation, and the processes related to the fundraising and allocation of financial resources. Employees were instructed to exercise heightened vigilance in these matters. Certain issues were also identified regarding the regulation of internal processes, particularly those related to the collection and distribution of funds. This was observed despite the fact that, in practice, these activities are generally conducted in line with established rules. Following the recommendation of the SRC — and with its support, where necessary — the NPO agreed to develop and formalize documented procedures describing the regulated steps of these processes within a defined timeframe. As a result, an agreement was reached between the NPO and the SRC to carry out targeted work on the identified areas of concern and to fully implement the necessary steps for establishing processes that meet the required standards. The parties agreed to complete these actions within a one-year period, setting the first half of 2026 as the implementation deadline. Source: SRC 559. Armenia has taken other measures to develop the understanding of the NPO sector about TF issues. A number of guidance documents related to the TF risks for NPOs have been published on the FMC website, and information about the findings of the NRA on this issue has been presented to the NPOs considered to be at greater risk of TF. In addition, in 2024 there was a workshop jointly organised with the CoE where the topics covered included the ways in which NPOs could be abused for TF purposes. 560. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the guidance and outreach provided by Armenia, the NPOs that were met onsite displayed only a limited understanding of the ways in which NPOs can be abused for TF purposes. While they were generally aware of their obligations under the AML/CFT Law and had developed internal controls intended to mitigate TF risks, the limited depth of their understanding of TF abuse could affect the extent to which these controls can always be effectively applied in practice. The materiality of this is nonetheless limited, given the small number of higher risks NPOs and their risk profile, in particular their focus on Armenian residents and diaspora communities and the low volume of transfers they make to high-risk countries." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="607. TFS related to PF are implemented in the same way as TFS for TF, both as regards the legal framework and the process for providing information about changes to designations. The analysis under Core Issue 10.1 on this issue is therefore equally applicable here." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="607. TFS related to PF are implemented in the same way as TFS for TF, both as regards the legal framework and the process for providing information about changes to designations. The analysis under Core Issue 10.1 on this issue is therefore equally applicable here." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="48. According to the authorities, the national strategies are binding structural requirements with a clear deadline and identified responsible agencies for the integration of the national policy into internal work plans, where all relevant bodies (CBA, SRC, GPO, IC, ACC, NSS, MIA, MOJ, FMC) must provide annual programs of activities or relevant acts (a decision, order, recommendation, etc.) addressing the actions stipulated in this Strategy by June 2025. 49. As a result of the national strategies, in the period under review, the CBA strengthened its AML/CFT supervision, through various actions, such as the approval of the risk assessment methodologies for ML/TF/PF applicable to banks and non-bank financial institutions, or legal developments on VAs. New reporting templates were developed to enhance statistical monitoring of property confiscations based on court decisions. Resources at CBA remained stable throughout the assessment period and are considered adequate by the AT in relation to the size of the financial sector. An increase of about 50% is projected by end of 2027, reflecting expanded supervisory responsibilities, including the recently approved licensing and supervision of VASPs. (see IO.3) 50. Based on the findings of the 2024 NRA, the FMC took steps to strengthen the use and effectiveness of information provided to LEAs. This included an assessment of the outcomes resulting from the use of FMC data, as well as LEAs' evaluations regarding the quality of the information received. The findings have been submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister.  FMC took the first steps to oversee compliance by some DNFBPs. All these are positive developments. 51. LEAs report that three positions have been allocated within the anti-corruption committee for financial investigators. As of 1 January 2023, the Investigative Division of the SRC and, as of 1 January 2024, the Investigative Department of the NSS ceased their operations within these respective bodies and were fully transferred, along with their positions and functions, to the IC. The NSS and SRC have not provided any additional information regarding the involvement of individuals for the implementation of the financial investigation function. 52. Some authorities, for example, the CBA and the IC have explained how their own objectives and activities are largely consistent with the ML/TF risks identified in the 2024 NRA and with the actions envisaged in the AML/CTF National Strategy. Other authorities’ (GPO) objectives and activities were less aligned. 53. The issue of insufficient human resources in LEAs, although important, was unaddressed in the 2022-2024 AML/CFT Strategy, and was included as an action item in the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy. 54. For the first time, the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy has designated SRBs as responsible parties for strategic actions aimed at enhancing the supervision of the DNFBPs under their oversight. 55. To reduce vulnerabilities related to the judiciary, as identified in the 2024 NRA, the nomination of the Supreme Judicial Council as a member to the Interagency Committee was confirmed on 27 December 2024. Moreover, the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy outlines actions for the Supreme Judicial Council to adopt appropriate approaches aimed at reducing the time limits for ML proceedings pending trial. Little progress has been achieved on this front before the on-site visit. 56. The AT notes that the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy makes reference to the higher risk predicates that are in line with the 2024 NRA only for actions that fall under the remit of LEAs. Actions pertaining to supervisory authorities are not linked to higher materiality and risk areas, except for VAs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="48. According to the authorities, the national strategies are binding structural requirements with a clear deadline and identified responsible agencies for the integration of the national policy into internal work plans, where all relevant bodies (CBA, SRC, GPO, IC, ACC, NSS, MIA, MOJ, FMC) must provide annual programs of activities or relevant acts (a decision, order, recommendation, etc.) addressing the actions stipulated in this Strategy by June 2025. 49. As a result of the national strategies, in the period under review, the CBA strengthened its AML/CFT supervision, through various actions, such as the approval of the risk assessment methodologies for ML/TF/PF applicable to banks and non-bank financial institutions, or legal developments on VAs. New reporting templates were developed to enhance statistical monitoring of property confiscations based on court decisions. Resources at CBA remained stable throughout the assessment period and are considered adequate by the AT in relation to the size of the financial sector. An increase of about 50% is projected by end of 2027, reflecting expanded supervisory responsibilities, including the recently approved licensing and supervision of VASPs. (see IO.3) 50. Based on the findings of the 2024 NRA, the FMC took steps to strengthen the use and effectiveness of information provided to LEAs. This included an assessment of the outcomes resulting from the use of FMC data, as well as LEAs' evaluations regarding the quality of the information received. The findings have been submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister.  FMC took the first steps to oversee compliance by some DNFBPs. All these are positive developments. 51. LEAs report that three positions have been allocated within the anti-corruption committee for financial investigators. As of 1 January 2023, the Investigative Division of the SRC and, as of 1 January 2024, the Investigative Department of the NSS ceased their operations within these respective bodies and were fully transferred, along with their positions and functions, to the IC. The NSS and SRC have not provided any additional information regarding the involvement of individuals for the implementation of the financial investigation function. 52. Some authorities, for example, the CBA and the IC have explained how their own objectives and activities are largely consistent with the ML/TF risks identified in the 2024 NRA and with the actions envisaged in the AML/CTF National Strategy. Other authorities’ (GPO) objectives and activities were less aligned. 53. The issue of insufficient human resources in LEAs, although important, was unaddressed in the 2022-2024 AML/CFT Strategy, and was included as an action item in the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy. 54. For the first time, the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy has designated SRBs as responsible parties for strategic actions aimed at enhancing the supervision of the DNFBPs under their oversight. 55. To reduce vulnerabilities related to the judiciary, as identified in the 2024 NRA, the nomination of the Supreme Judicial Council as a member to the Interagency Committee was confirmed on 27 December 2024. Moreover, the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy outlines actions for the Supreme Judicial Council to adopt appropriate approaches aimed at reducing the time limits for ML proceedings pending trial. Little progress has been achieved on this front before the on-site visit. 56. The AT notes that the 2025-2028 AML/CFT Strategy makes reference to the higher risk predicates that are in line with the 2024 NRA only for actions that fall under the remit of LEAs. Actions pertaining to supervisory authorities are not linked to higher materiality and risk areas, except for VAs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 174. Most FIs have internal controls in place for implementation of preventative AML/CFT measures, although the complexity and robustness of these controls vary significantly depending on the materiality of the financial sectors and the size of individual FIs. 175. Larger FIs met by the AT, particularly banks and group-affiliated institutions, benefit from comprehensive CDD and transaction monitoring systems, including for remote onboarding, supported by automated alerts and escalation mechanisms, including the ability to halt transactions. These institutions generally have well-established processes for customer and BO identification, verification and record keeping. 176. The BO Registry is used mainly as a verification tool to corroborate BO information obtained through institutions’ own due diligence. Several FIs noted limitations in the accuracy and completeness of registry information and therefore rely primarily on internal CDD analysis, based on documents provided by clients or obtained from external sources, with registry checks serving as a supplementary source. 177. Based on the statistics provided, inability to properly identify the BO, including doubts concerning the authenticity or completeness of supporting documents, remains one of the main situations that triggers internal alerts in banks, with the situation confirmed by the representatives met onsite. 178. Apart from this, the bulk of main deficiencies related to improper application of EDD, BO identification, and STR related obligations [53] , particularly the lack of proper documentation of analysis for cases that did not result in submission of reports. This overview was supported by the cases presented to the AT, covering the entire assessment period. 179. Smaller FIs apply more simplified CDD measures and post transaction monitoring procedures, often developed internally and commensurate with their narrower product range and customer base. Given the bank-centered nature of Armenia’s financial sector, these institutions frequently consider the requirement of holding a bank account in order to become a customer as an important mitigating factor. While this requirement enhances the overall effectiveness of preventive measures, the AT considers that the supervisor needs to devote particular attention to how this is understood in practice, to ensure it does not translate into over-reliance on banks’ CDD measures, which may undermine smaller FIs’ own efforts to apply proper AML/CFT controls. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 180. FIs met onsite demonstrated a sound understanding of enhanced and specific measures and were able to explain how these are applied in practice. All institutions showed awareness of geographical risk factors, particularly in relation to high-risk jurisdictions, and described mitigation measures including EDD applied to clients, BOs and transactions linked to such countries. 181. PEP screening is carried out across all sectors. Banks and larger FIs rely extensively on commercial screening solutions, particularly for identifying foreign PEPs. During the latter part of the assessment period, due to geopolitical reasons, almost all banks underwent two thematic reviews of their screening systems (in 2023 and 2024). The first round identified deficiencies primarily operational in nature, including gaps in maintaining historical records of listings and de-listings, incomplete audit trails for match resolution, shortcomings in periodic testing, and insufficient documentation of system recalibrations. The second round confirmed that most of these deficiencies had been corrected. However, recent inspections still identify instances where automated screening outputs were not sufficiently complemented by additional verification or contextual analysis. 182. Smaller FIs, reflecting their predominantly domestic customer base and the particularities of their products focus predominantly on identifying domestic PEPs. Across sectors, a recurrent deficiency concerns the identification of PEP-associated persons, with most institutions considering only family members as associates of PEPs. This limited understanding can result in gaps in identifying true associates and associated risks, leading to potential vulnerabilities in the system, especially as the majority of, if not all, cases of ML derived from corruption presented to the AT, include the use of different types of associates outside the PEP’s family members (driver, former classmate, or close acquaintances). 183. Based on the cases presented to the AT, weaknesses were identified in the application of EDD measures, particularly in situations involving higher-risk customers and complex ownership structures. In these cases, deficiencies in the depth of enhanced scrutiny limited institutions’ ability to fully assess customer risk and detect potentially suspicious activity. 184. Technology-related risks primarily arise from reliance on third-party screening solutions (for sanctions, PEPs and adverse media), and from non-face-to-face onboarding processes. While larger FIs, particularly banks, regularly test and calibrate these tools and technologies, their use and validation remain less developed among smaller FIs. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 185. While the authorities indicated that extensive outreach and feedback have contributed to improvements in the quality of STRs, particularly in terms of analytical content and clarity, the AT considers that the overall level of reporting across the financial sector has remained modest throughout the assessment period (see Table 6.1). 186. This observation is particularly relevant for the banking sector, which represents the most material segment of the financial system. Data broken down by individual institutions shows no clear upward trend in STR reporting, with volumes varying considerably from year to year across banks. This pattern appears inconsistent with the rapid expansion of the financial sector, which has experienced substantial growth in total assets, as well as in the number of customers and the volume of transactions processed. A similar dynamic is observed among other types of FIs, notably MVTS providers and investment companies, where STR reporting levels have remained limited throughout the assessment period, despite their risk exposure and the rapid increase in their activities in recent years. 187. The explanation provided by the authorities, that some STRs are counted as one, even when multiple notifications are received, involving several clients in relation to the same scheme, can only partly explain this pattern. While this may account for some instances, the overall evolution of reporting is not commensurate with the expansion of the financial sector and the evolving risks presented by the country. 188. During on-site discussions, many FIs described a low-risk appetite both at onboarding and during ongoing monitoring, with a tendency to decline high-risk customers or products. At the same time, the AT observed a degree of reluctance to submit STRs in situations involving doubts about the legality of customers or transactions. Instead, institutions frequently relied on customer rejection, transaction refusal, or termination of business relationships as sufficient mitigating measures, without also filing an STR. While such actions can reduce immediate exposure, this practice limits the flow of actionable financial intelligence to the FMC and, in certain circumstances, may risk alerting customers to underlying concerns, potentially affecting future detection or investigative efforts . 189. Most of the inspections triggered by intelligence from the FMC included cases of evident suspicious activity that was either not identified, documented or not reported by the FI. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 190. All FIs met onsite confirmed that they have internal procedures and monitoring units in place to ensure effective ML/TF risk management. For the few FIs that are part of international financial groups, internal procedures are adapted to meet Armenian legal requirements while following group-level guidelines. 191. Larger FIs typically engage external auditors to test the effectiveness of their internal controls and systems, while smaller FIs rely on internal audit functions. The CBA has conducted reviews to evaluate monitoring systems of banks and larger FIs. These reviews indicate that larger FIs broadly align with international best practices, whereas smaller FIs continue to apply more limited and less risk-sensitive internal control frameworks. 192. During the review period, the CBA introduced qualification requirements for internal monitoring units in banks, mandating that the head and at least half of staff hold internationally recognized qualifications, which has strengthened institutional capacity in the banking sector. In line with the sectoral ML/TF risk assessment, this obligation is currently applied to banks as the most material and higher‑risk segment, while similar requirements are not mandated for smaller FIs. 193. Notwithstanding improvements in institutional frameworks, a recent on-site inspection identified one case in which deficiencies in the application of EDD measures resulted not from limited understanding, but from the voluntary non-application of internal rules by certain managers and staff. While this appears to be an isolated instance, it nevertheless highlights vulnerabilities in internal enforcement mechanisms and the importance of sustained supervisory engagement to support effective compliance culture. Following the internal investigation, the FI terminated the employment contracts of the employees involved. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 194. Until recent amendments to the AML/CFT Law (July 2025), the definition of financial groups covered only banks, investment companies, insurance companies and intermediaries, and the Central Depository. As a result, MVTS providers and other FIs faced limitations in sharing AML/CFT related data within group structures, as confirmed during onsite discussions. Recent legislative changes have addressed this gap, extending information sharing obligation and thereby strengthening group-wide risk mitigation. Footnotes [53] This information is also included in the official annual reports of FMC, where BO identification, EDD application and STR submission are the areas where deficiencies have been recurring in the review period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.4.1. CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 174. Most FIs have internal controls in place for implementation of preventative AML/CFT measures, although the complexity and robustness of these controls vary significantly depending on the materiality of the financial sectors and the size of individual FIs. 175. Larger FIs met by the AT, particularly banks and group-affiliated institutions, benefit from comprehensive CDD and transaction monitoring systems, including for remote onboarding, supported by automated alerts and escalation mechanisms, including the ability to halt transactions. These institutions generally have well-established processes for customer and BO identification, verification and record keeping. 176. The BO Registry is used mainly as a verification tool to corroborate BO information obtained through institutions’ own due diligence. Several FIs noted limitations in the accuracy and completeness of registry information and therefore rely primarily on internal CDD analysis, based on documents provided by clients or obtained from external sources, with registry checks serving as a supplementary source. 177. Based on the statistics provided, inability to properly identify the BO, including doubts concerning the authenticity or completeness of supporting documents, remains one of the main situations that triggers internal alerts in banks, with the situation confirmed by the representatives met onsite. 178. Apart from this, the bulk of main deficiencies related to improper application of EDD, BO identification, and STR related obligations [53] , particularly the lack of proper documentation of analysis for cases that did not result in submission of reports. This overview was supported by the cases presented to the AT, covering the entire assessment period. 179. Smaller FIs apply more simplified CDD measures and post transaction monitoring procedures, often developed internally and commensurate with their narrower product range and customer base. Given the bank-centered nature of Armenia’s financial sector, these institutions frequently consider the requirement of holding a bank account in order to become a customer as an important mitigating factor. While this requirement enhances the overall effectiveness of preventive measures, the AT considers that the supervisor needs to devote particular attention to how this is understood in practice, to ensure it does not translate into over-reliance on banks’ CDD measures, which may undermine smaller FIs’ own efforts to apply proper AML/CFT controls. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 180. FIs met onsite demonstrated a sound understanding of enhanced and specific measures and were able to explain how these are applied in practice. All institutions showed awareness of geographical risk factors, particularly in relation to high-risk jurisdictions, and described mitigation measures including EDD applied to clients, BOs and transactions linked to such countries. 181. PEP screening is carried out across all sectors. Banks and larger FIs rely extensively on commercial screening solutions, particularly for identifying foreign PEPs. During the latter part of the assessment period, due to geopolitical reasons, almost all banks underwent two thematic reviews of their screening systems (in 2023 and 2024). The first round identified deficiencies primarily operational in nature, including gaps in maintaining historical records of listings and de-listings, incomplete audit trails for match resolution, shortcomings in periodic testing, and insufficient documentation of system recalibrations. The second round confirmed that most of these deficiencies had been corrected. However, recent inspections still identify instances where automated screening outputs were not sufficiently complemented by additional verification or contextual analysis. 182. Smaller FIs, reflecting their predominantly domestic customer base and the particularities of their products focus predominantly on identifying domestic PEPs. Across sectors, a recurrent deficiency concerns the identification of PEP-associated persons, with most institutions considering only family members as associates of PEPs. This limited understanding can result in gaps in identifying true associates and associated risks, leading to potential vulnerabilities in the system, especially as the majority of, if not all, cases of ML derived from corruption presented to the AT, include the use of different types of associates outside the PEP’s family members (driver, former classmate, or close acquaintances). 183. Based on the cases presented to the AT, weaknesses were identified in the application of EDD measures, particularly in situations involving higher-risk customers and complex ownership structures. In these cases, deficiencies in the depth of enhanced scrutiny limited institutions’ ability to fully assess customer risk and detect potentially suspicious activity. 184. Technology-related risks primarily arise from reliance on third-party screening solutions (for sanctions, PEPs and adverse media), and from non-face-to-face onboarding processes. While larger FIs, particularly banks, regularly test and calibrate these tools and technologies, their use and validation remain less developed among smaller FIs. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 185. While the authorities indicated that extensive outreach and feedback have contributed to improvements in the quality of STRs, particularly in terms of analytical content and clarity, the AT considers that the overall level of reporting across the financial sector has remained modest throughout the assessment period (see Table 6.1). 186. This observation is particularly relevant for the banking sector, which represents the most material segment of the financial system. Data broken down by individual institutions shows no clear upward trend in STR reporting, with volumes varying considerably from year to year across banks. This pattern appears inconsistent with the rapid expansion of the financial sector, which has experienced substantial growth in total assets, as well as in the number of customers and the volume of transactions processed. A similar dynamic is observed among other types of FIs, notably MVTS providers and investment companies, where STR reporting levels have remained limited throughout the assessment period, despite their risk exposure and the rapid increase in their activities in recent years. 187. The explanation provided by the authorities, that some STRs are counted as one, even when multiple notifications are received, involving several clients in relation to the same scheme, can only partly explain this pattern. While this may account for some instances, the overall evolution of reporting is not commensurate with the expansion of the financial sector and the evolving risks presented by the country. 188. During on-site discussions, many FIs described a low-risk appetite both at onboarding and during ongoing monitoring, with a tendency to decline high-risk customers or products. At the same time, the AT observed a degree of reluctance to submit STRs in situations involving doubts about the legality of customers or transactions. Instead, institutions frequently relied on customer rejection, transaction refusal, or termination of business relationships as sufficient mitigating measures, without also filing an STR. While such actions can reduce immediate exposure, this practice limits the flow of actionable financial intelligence to the FMC and, in certain circumstances, may risk alerting customers to underlying concerns, potentially affecting future detection or investigative efforts . 189. Most of the inspections triggered by intelligence from the FMC included cases of evident suspicious activity that was either not identified, documented or not reported by the FI. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 190. All FIs met onsite confirmed that they have internal procedures and monitoring units in place to ensure effective ML/TF risk management. For the few FIs that are part of international financial groups, internal procedures are adapted to meet Armenian legal requirements while following group-level guidelines. 191. Larger FIs typically engage external auditors to test the effectiveness of their internal controls and systems, while smaller FIs rely on internal audit functions. The CBA has conducted reviews to evaluate monitoring systems of banks and larger FIs. These reviews indicate that larger FIs broadly align with international best practices, whereas smaller FIs continue to apply more limited and less risk-sensitive internal control frameworks. 192. During the review period, the CBA introduced qualification requirements for internal monitoring units in banks, mandating that the head and at least half of staff hold internationally recognized qualifications, which has strengthened institutional capacity in the banking sector. In line with the sectoral ML/TF risk assessment, this obligation is currently applied to banks as the most material and higher‑risk segment, while similar requirements are not mandated for smaller FIs. 193. Notwithstanding improvements in institutional frameworks, a recent on-site inspection identified one case in which deficiencies in the application of EDD measures resulted not from limited understanding, but from the voluntary non-application of internal rules by certain managers and staff. While this appears to be an isolated instance, it nevertheless highlights vulnerabilities in internal enforcement mechanisms and the importance of sustained supervisory engagement to support effective compliance culture. Following the internal investigation, the FI terminated the employment contracts of the employees involved. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 194. Until recent amendments to the AML/CFT Law (July 2025), the definition of financial groups covered only banks, investment companies, insurance companies and intermediaries, and the Central Depository. As a result, MVTS providers and other FIs faced limitations in sharing AML/CFT related data within group structures, as confirmed during onsite discussions. Recent legislative changes have addressed this gap, extending information sharing obligation and thereby strengthening group-wide risk mitigation. Footnotes [53] This information is also included in the official annual reports of FMC, where BO identification, EDD application and STR submission are the areas where deficiencies have been recurring in the review period." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1.CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 260. Online casinos and gambling operators demonstrate the most comprehensive application of CDD, monitoring and internal controls among DNFBPs. Significant human and especially technical resources are dedicated to compliance, supported by knowledgeable MLROs with relevant experience. Given the prevalence of remote onboarding, operators apply a range of mitigating measures to verify customer identity and keep client data accurate and up to date, including verification of social security numbers through national systems. The vast majority of customers are Armenian residents. While the systems described by the operators have been strengthen over time, supervisory testing during the assessment period has been limited, therefore, the AT cannot form a definitive conclusion on the sector’s level of compliance. Moreover, the few controls that had been performed by the SRC identified issues of CDD improper application (such as not performing on-going monitoring and updating identification data). 261. Real estate agents have a basic understanding of their AML/CFT obligations. In practice, CDD typically consists of recording customer identification data and retaining copies of identification documents of the parties involved. Most customers are Armenian natural persons, with non-residents rarely involved in property transactions and legal persons only occasionally. In such cases, incorporation documents are reviewed and checks performed against national databases. Since the entry into force of the cashless law (2022), transactions are increasingly channelled through the banking system, and real estate agents’ due diligence has increasingly relied on customers new obligation to open bank accounts and deposit purchase funds. In performing their own analysis, agents have, in effect, leveraged banks’ CDD by requiring customers to provide the same documents submitted to the bank for account opening or transfer. Prior to this, real estate agents met by the AT reported that most transactions were conducted in cash and that CDD application was limited. 262. Law firms generally apply CDD at onboarding stage for both natural and legal persons, motivated both by AML/CFT requirements and the need to protect their professional practice. 263. For donations of real estate, notarisation has been compulsory since 2023. Sale and purchase agreements of real estate are not required to be notarised, Notaries perform CDD by identifying the parties and conducting basic checks (e.g., review of past transactions). The vast majority of clients are Armenian individuals (residents and non-residents). In the limited cases involving legal entities, ownership structures are simple and BOs are readily identifiable. Some misunderstandings persist regarding record keeping, notably the failure to retain evidence of all checks performed even when no negative information has been identified). 264. DPMS apply only basic CDD, primarily for commercial rather than AML/CFT purposes. Monitoring is limited, and scenarios such as possible structuring are not actively considered, although representatives stated that unusual transaction patterns would be captured and escalated internally. 265. Deficiencies persist in record-keeping practices. Some real estate agents retain records for periods shorter than statutory requirement, and some advocates demonstrated misunderstandings regarding the scope of documents to be retained, notably by failing to keep records of CDD analyses and checks performed. This was confirmed by the FMC during its data-gathering exercise, which revealed that several DNFBPs experienced difficulties in providing complete and timely information for the period 2021–2023. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 266. Online casinos and gambling operators met by the AT apply EDD measures for high-risk customers, and were able to give details, including on increased scrutiny of accounts and transactions performed, verification of source of funds for large deposits and additional open-source checks. Non-residents are generally considered high risk and are screened using commercial solutions. Foreign PEPs are identified through daily or periodic automated screening against multiple databases. 267. In other DNFBP sectors, the application of enhanced measures is uneven. Law firms met by the AT apply heightened caution for higher-risk clients and apart from the official domestic PEP list, some have their own blacklist and do not engage with clients that have criminal records. Real estate agents primarily rely on high-risk country lists published by the CBA. Across DNFBPs, requests for SoF are common, typically through bank statements or sale-purchase contracts. 268. Notwithstanding these measures, there is a widespread misunderstanding across DNFBPs regarding the identification of PEP associates, with most entities limiting their consideration to immediate family members. While DNFBPs frequently referred to the small size of the country as facilitating identification of domestic PEPs, this does not substitute for systematic identification and application of enhanced measures. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 269. STR reporting across DNFBP sector remains below the level that would be expected given the ML/TF risks attributed to certain DNFBP sectors in the NRA, such as casinos and gambling operators and real estate agents. No TF-related STRs have been filed by DNFBPs during the assessment period. Table 4.1. STR Reporting in DNFBP sector (2020-2024) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos and gambling operators 11 1 12 4 12 Real estate agents 0 0 0 0 0 Law firms and legal practitioners 0 0 0 0 0 Notaries 1 0 0 125 [64] 59 Accountants and accounting firms 0 0 0 0 0 DPMS 0 0 0 0 0 Advocates 0 0 0 1 0 270. DNFBPs are generally aware of their reporting obligations; however, reporting practices suggest that suspicion is interpreted narrowly, with STRs typically filed only once alternative explanations have been largely excluded. In practice, entities often seek to resolve concerns internally reflecting a cautious approach, with a relatively high threshold before suspicions are escalated to the FIU. Several DNFBPs met by the AT, including law firms, indicated that the FMC has recently encouraged more active reporting. 271. The introduction of the cashless law in 2023 has influenced reporting patterns. Gambling operators noted that before the ban, a significant share of activity was cash-based and generated STRs linked to attempts to circumvent the banking system. Following the prohibition of cash transactions, reporting has shifted towards other indicators, such as coordinated betting behaviour, unusual wagering patterns, or the placement of large bets on highly favourable odds. 272. Advocates indicated that filling STRs is considered only in relation to potential clients (prospects) or activities falling outside the scope of professional legal representation. The sole STR example provided concerned a potential client whose declared business activity was inconsistent with information available to the reporting entity. Table 4.2. TTR* Reporting in DNFBP sector (2020-2024) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos and gambling operators 1 720 3 007 13 249 13 890 10 013 Notaries 8 973 9 754 8 312 3 597 19 164 * obligation for notaries and casino and gambling operators to report non-cash transactions above AMD 20 million (about EUR 48 000), except for transactions of buying and selling real estate and donations, which shall be reported if concluded at an amount above AMD 50 million AMD (approximately EUR 110 000). 273. While notaries account for noticeable increase in STR and TTR reporting during the assessment period, this development is largely linked to legislative changes introduced in November 2023, which extended reporting obligations to include donation transactions. Analysis of these reports indicates that a proportion were triggered by formal or objective criteria (such as the absence of a declared family relationship between parties), rather than by articulated suspicion. This indicates that, while awareness of reporting obligations has improved, further clarification and guidance would assist notaries in applying the suspicion-based reporting threshold in a more consistent manner. 274. Overall, the quality of STRs has increased recently, as confirmed by FIU representatives. In the gambling sector in particular, the volume and quality of STRs have improved over the past year, and reports are more comprehensive, with reporting entities frequently attaching the underlying analysis that led to submission. The quality of notaries’ STRs has also improved, and the FIU has confirmed that recent STRs have supported LEAs’ investigations. However, notwithstanding this positive trend, the volume and nature of reporting do not yet fully reflect the spectrum of ML/TF risks identified in national and sectoral risk assessments, particularly in sectors assessed as higher risk. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 275. All DNFBPs that are legal entities with more than 10 employees, as well as sole entrepreneurs employing more than 10 persons, are required to maintain internal AML/CFT procedures. This requirement captures the entire gambling and casinos sector. By contrast, in case of DNFBPs supervised by FMC, only about 3% reach this threshold. 276. Larger DNFBPs, such as casinos and gambling operators, generally have stronger internal controls, which are constantly updated in line with developments in the industry, and maintain internal and external audit functions. Smaller DNFBPs have more recently benefited from a review performed by the FMC of their internal acts, which incorporated recommendations and led to the improvement of those entities’ overall internal approach. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 277. There are no significant legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and related mitigating measures. Footnotes [64] The sharp increase in the number of reports send by notaries in 2023 was due to the overreporting of three notaries located within the same premises." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1.CDD, record-keeping, BO information, ongoing monitoring 260. Online casinos and gambling operators demonstrate the most comprehensive application of CDD, monitoring and internal controls among DNFBPs. Significant human and especially technical resources are dedicated to compliance, supported by knowledgeable MLROs with relevant experience. Given the prevalence of remote onboarding, operators apply a range of mitigating measures to verify customer identity and keep client data accurate and up to date, including verification of social security numbers through national systems. The vast majority of customers are Armenian residents. While the systems described by the operators have been strengthen over time, supervisory testing during the assessment period has been limited, therefore, the AT cannot form a definitive conclusion on the sector’s level of compliance. Moreover, the few controls that had been performed by the SRC identified issues of CDD improper application (such as not performing on-going monitoring and updating identification data). 261. Real estate agents have a basic understanding of their AML/CFT obligations. In practice, CDD typically consists of recording customer identification data and retaining copies of identification documents of the parties involved. Most customers are Armenian natural persons, with non-residents rarely involved in property transactions and legal persons only occasionally. In such cases, incorporation documents are reviewed and checks performed against national databases. Since the entry into force of the cashless law (2022), transactions are increasingly channelled through the banking system, and real estate agents’ due diligence has increasingly relied on customers new obligation to open bank accounts and deposit purchase funds. In performing their own analysis, agents have, in effect, leveraged banks’ CDD by requiring customers to provide the same documents submitted to the bank for account opening or transfer. Prior to this, real estate agents met by the AT reported that most transactions were conducted in cash and that CDD application was limited. 262. Law firms generally apply CDD at onboarding stage for both natural and legal persons, motivated both by AML/CFT requirements and the need to protect their professional practice. 263. For donations of real estate, notarisation has been compulsory since 2023. Sale and purchase agreements of real estate are not required to be notarised, Notaries perform CDD by identifying the parties and conducting basic checks (e.g., review of past transactions). The vast majority of clients are Armenian individuals (residents and non-residents). In the limited cases involving legal entities, ownership structures are simple and BOs are readily identifiable. Some misunderstandings persist regarding record keeping, notably the failure to retain evidence of all checks performed even when no negative information has been identified). 264. DPMS apply only basic CDD, primarily for commercial rather than AML/CFT purposes. Monitoring is limited, and scenarios such as possible structuring are not actively considered, although representatives stated that unusual transaction patterns would be captured and escalated internally. 265. Deficiencies persist in record-keeping practices. Some real estate agents retain records for periods shorter than statutory requirement, and some advocates demonstrated misunderstandings regarding the scope of documents to be retained, notably by failing to keep records of CDD analyses and checks performed. This was confirmed by the FMC during its data-gathering exercise, which revealed that several DNFBPs experienced difficulties in providing complete and timely information for the period 2021–2023. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 266. Online casinos and gambling operators met by the AT apply EDD measures for high-risk customers, and were able to give details, including on increased scrutiny of accounts and transactions performed, verification of source of funds for large deposits and additional open-source checks. Non-residents are generally considered high risk and are screened using commercial solutions. Foreign PEPs are identified through daily or periodic automated screening against multiple databases. 267. In other DNFBP sectors, the application of enhanced measures is uneven. Law firms met by the AT apply heightened caution for higher-risk clients and apart from the official domestic PEP list, some have their own blacklist and do not engage with clients that have criminal records. Real estate agents primarily rely on high-risk country lists published by the CBA. Across DNFBPs, requests for SoF are common, typically through bank statements or sale-purchase contracts. 268. Notwithstanding these measures, there is a widespread misunderstanding across DNFBPs regarding the identification of PEP associates, with most entities limiting their consideration to immediate family members. While DNFBPs frequently referred to the small size of the country as facilitating identification of domestic PEPs, this does not substitute for systematic identification and application of enhanced measures. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations, tipping off 269. STR reporting across DNFBP sector remains below the level that would be expected given the ML/TF risks attributed to certain DNFBP sectors in the NRA, such as casinos and gambling operators and real estate agents. No TF-related STRs have been filed by DNFBPs during the assessment period. Table 4.1. STR Reporting in DNFBP sector (2020-2024) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos and gambling operators 11 1 12 4 12 Real estate agents 0 0 0 0 0 Law firms and legal practitioners 0 0 0 0 0 Notaries 1 0 0 125 [64] 59 Accountants and accounting firms 0 0 0 0 0 DPMS 0 0 0 0 0 Advocates 0 0 0 1 0 270. DNFBPs are generally aware of their reporting obligations; however, reporting practices suggest that suspicion is interpreted narrowly, with STRs typically filed only once alternative explanations have been largely excluded. In practice, entities often seek to resolve concerns internally reflecting a cautious approach, with a relatively high threshold before suspicions are escalated to the FIU. Several DNFBPs met by the AT, including law firms, indicated that the FMC has recently encouraged more active reporting. 271. The introduction of the cashless law in 2023 has influenced reporting patterns. Gambling operators noted that before the ban, a significant share of activity was cash-based and generated STRs linked to attempts to circumvent the banking system. Following the prohibition of cash transactions, reporting has shifted towards other indicators, such as coordinated betting behaviour, unusual wagering patterns, or the placement of large bets on highly favourable odds. 272. Advocates indicated that filling STRs is considered only in relation to potential clients (prospects) or activities falling outside the scope of professional legal representation. The sole STR example provided concerned a potential client whose declared business activity was inconsistent with information available to the reporting entity. Table 4.2. TTR* Reporting in DNFBP sector (2020-2024) DNFBP 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Casinos and gambling operators 1 720 3 007 13 249 13 890 10 013 Notaries 8 973 9 754 8 312 3 597 19 164 * obligation for notaries and casino and gambling operators to report non-cash transactions above AMD 20 million (about EUR 48 000), except for transactions of buying and selling real estate and donations, which shall be reported if concluded at an amount above AMD 50 million AMD (approximately EUR 110 000). 273. While notaries account for noticeable increase in STR and TTR reporting during the assessment period, this development is largely linked to legislative changes introduced in November 2023, which extended reporting obligations to include donation transactions. Analysis of these reports indicates that a proportion were triggered by formal or objective criteria (such as the absence of a declared family relationship between parties), rather than by articulated suspicion. This indicates that, while awareness of reporting obligations has improved, further clarification and guidance would assist notaries in applying the suspicion-based reporting threshold in a more consistent manner. 274. Overall, the quality of STRs has increased recently, as confirmed by FIU representatives. In the gambling sector in particular, the volume and quality of STRs have improved over the past year, and reports are more comprehensive, with reporting entities frequently attaching the underlying analysis that led to submission. The quality of notaries’ STRs has also improved, and the FIU has confirmed that recent STRs have supported LEAs’ investigations. However, notwithstanding this positive trend, the volume and nature of reporting do not yet fully reflect the spectrum of ML/TF risks identified in national and sectoral risk assessments, particularly in sectors assessed as higher risk. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audit to ensure compliance 275. All DNFBPs that are legal entities with more than 10 employees, as well as sole entrepreneurs employing more than 10 persons, are required to maintain internal AML/CFT procedures. This requirement captures the entire gambling and casinos sector. By contrast, in case of DNFBPs supervised by FMC, only about 3% reach this threshold. 276. Larger DNFBPs, such as casinos and gambling operators, generally have stronger internal controls, which are constantly updated in line with developments in the industry, and maintain internal and external audit functions. Smaller DNFBPs have more recently benefited from a review performed by the FMC of their internal acts, which incorporated recommendations and led to the improvement of those entities’ overall internal approach. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 277. There are no significant legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and related mitigating measures. Footnotes [64] The sharp increase in the number of reports send by notaries in 2023 was due to the overreporting of three notaries located within the same premises." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="360. Since August 2025, with the legal amendments, that amongst others, clarified the definition of trusts, reporting entities have the legal obligation to keep basic and BO information of foreign legal arrangements that have business relationships with them. No such business relationships have been reported by the Armenian authorities, which is consistent with the conclusion of minimal low materiality in the country." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="360. Since August 2025, with the legal amendments, that amongst others, clarified the definition of trusts, reporting entities have the legal obligation to keep basic and BO information of foreign legal arrangements that have business relationships with them. No such business relationships have been reported by the Armenian authorities, which is consistent with the conclusion of minimal low materiality in the country." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 418. Feedback collected by the FMC on the use of its spontaneous disseminations suggests, that the majority of its notifications have led to opening an investigation or added value to existing cases in various ways [82] .On a less positive note, the majority of FMC notifications were not use in ML cases but in predicate offences investigations. While the FMC routinely highlights ML hypothesis in their disseminations, the investigative bodies often concentrate on the predicates and do not follow the ML aspect. As explained under 6.2, this may be due to several factors not directly related to the quality of FMC disseminations. 419. The FIU uses a feedback system to monitor the use of its spontaneous disseminations with a view to improve its quality. This includes cases which did not lead to criminal investigations. One of the results of feedback received from LEAs on card-fraud investigations, was the decision to widen the scope of analysis of the FMC to include more detailed information on the victims of crimes. Graph 6.1. Outcomes of the FMC notifications 420. Although the FMC information is considered essential for the work of the LEAs, in the period under review, the FIU did not play a key role as the trigger for ML investigations. This trend started to change in the recent years, due to more focus and resources being put in the increase of the number of disseminations along with simultaneous efforts to decrease the number of LEAs requests for banking confidentiality data. The FIU recently (2024) became one of the key triggers of information allowing to initiate ML investigations at a later stage. Table 6.8. ML investigations by source Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Parallel financial investigations 20 7 13 50 38 FIU disseminations 1 1 3 13 30 Domestic intelligence 0 0 3 8 11 Open-source information 0 1 1 1 0 MLA 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign intelligence 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 0 3 6 8 8 Total 21 12 26 80 87 421. In the majority of cases where ML investigations are initiated, the FIU was involved, primarily as a source of information on request. While shortcomings concerning the level of reporting from reporting entities to the FMC and further activities of LEAs may affect its ability to be able to trigger ML investigations, FMC data still remains a key source of data for LEAs to develop leads on financial flows. Table 6.9. FMC involvement in initiated ML investigations 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Initiated ML criminal proceedings 21 12 26 80 87 226 ML criminal proceedings where the FMC filed disseminations* 2 1 5 16 33 57 ML criminal proceedings where the FIU provided information on request of LEAs 18 9 12 47 24 110 * The numbers in this row are different from those under Table 6.8 as a single dissemination may lead to more than one ML investigation 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 422. The FMC supports LEAs by providing the relevant financial analysis on transactions and bank accounts allowing to identify proceeds. Case studies presented, especially those concerning laundering the proceeds of corruption and embezzlement by public officials, demonstrate the ability of intelligence agencies and investigative authorities to use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds. Each intelligence and investigative body is responsible to identify and trace criminal property and prepare sufficient evidence in their cases, with a view to confiscation. However, the results obtained so far are not convincing in that asset identification is systematically pursued in pre-trial investigations. The FIU has demonstrated the capability to apply suspension mechanisms on different occasions (see IO.8). Footnotes [82] Use for various purposes in connection to existing criminal cases, such as to support the seizure of property, the submission of MLA requests, the conduct of parallel financial investigations, the identification of illicit assets, the development of evidentiary material, etc." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Using information / financial intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 418. Feedback collected by the FMC on the use of its spontaneous disseminations suggests, that the majority of its notifications have led to opening an investigation or added value to existing cases in various ways [82] .On a less positive note, the majority of FMC notifications were not use in ML cases but in predicate offences investigations. While the FMC routinely highlights ML hypothesis in their disseminations, the investigative bodies often concentrate on the predicates and do not follow the ML aspect. As explained under 6.2, this may be due to several factors not directly related to the quality of FMC disseminations. 419. The FIU uses a feedback system to monitor the use of its spontaneous disseminations with a view to improve its quality. This includes cases which did not lead to criminal investigations. One of the results of feedback received from LEAs on card-fraud investigations, was the decision to widen the scope of analysis of the FMC to include more detailed information on the victims of crimes. Graph 6.1. Outcomes of the FMC notifications 420. Although the FMC information is considered essential for the work of the LEAs, in the period under review, the FIU did not play a key role as the trigger for ML investigations. This trend started to change in the recent years, due to more focus and resources being put in the increase of the number of disseminations along with simultaneous efforts to decrease the number of LEAs requests for banking confidentiality data. The FIU recently (2024) became one of the key triggers of information allowing to initiate ML investigations at a later stage. Table 6.8. ML investigations by source Source 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Parallel financial investigations 20 7 13 50 38 FIU disseminations 1 1 3 13 30 Domestic intelligence 0 0 3 8 11 Open-source information 0 1 1 1 0 MLA 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign intelligence 0 0 0 0 0 Other sources 0 3 6 8 8 Total 21 12 26 80 87 421. In the majority of cases where ML investigations are initiated, the FIU was involved, primarily as a source of information on request. While shortcomings concerning the level of reporting from reporting entities to the FMC and further activities of LEAs may affect its ability to be able to trigger ML investigations, FMC data still remains a key source of data for LEAs to develop leads on financial flows. Table 6.9. FMC involvement in initiated ML investigations 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Initiated ML criminal proceedings 21 12 26 80 87 226 ML criminal proceedings where the FMC filed disseminations* 2 1 5 16 33 57 ML criminal proceedings where the FIU provided information on request of LEAs 18 9 12 47 24 110 * The numbers in this row are different from those under Table 6.8 as a single dissemination may lead to more than one ML investigation 6.4.2. Using information / financial intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 422. The FMC supports LEAs by providing the relevant financial analysis on transactions and bank accounts allowing to identify proceeds. Case studies presented, especially those concerning laundering the proceeds of corruption and embezzlement by public officials, demonstrate the ability of intelligence agencies and investigative authorities to use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds. Each intelligence and investigative body is responsible to identify and trace criminal property and prepare sufficient evidence in their cases, with a view to confiscation. However, the results obtained so far are not convincing in that asset identification is systematically pursued in pre-trial investigations. The FIU has demonstrated the capability to apply suspension mechanisms on different occasions (see IO.8). Footnotes [82] Use for various purposes in connection to existing criminal cases, such as to support the seizure of property, the submission of MLA requests, the conduct of parallel financial investigations, the identification of illicit assets, the development of evidentiary material, etc." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="454. The authorities indicated that no cases were identified where alternative criminal justice measures were applied due to the impossibility of securing a ML conviction for justifiable reasons. 455. Although no alternative criminal measures have been applied, authorities informed about one case in which ML prosecution could not be pursued due to the absence of the accused (an international search is ongoing). As an alternative measure, a settlement agreement was reached with the representative of the respondent within civil confiscation proceedings, resulting in the transfer to state of real estate with an estimated market value of EUR 4.6 million." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="454. The authorities indicated that no cases were identified where alternative criminal justice measures were applied due to the impossibility of securing a ML conviction for justifiable reasons. 455. Although no alternative criminal measures have been applied, authorities informed about one case in which ML prosecution could not be pursued due to the absence of the accused (an international search is ongoing). As an alternative measure, a settlement agreement was reached with the representative of the respondent within civil confiscation proceedings, resulting in the transfer to state of real estate with an estimated market value of EUR 4.6 million." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="477. The management of criminally seized property is fragmented among multiple agencies, depending on the nature of the assets. Precious metals and stones, foreign currency and securities [94] are managed by the Treasury, while local currency is deposited into the bank account of the court dealing with the particular criminal proceeding. Objects other than voluminous property and real estate are managed either by the investigative body that decided on the seizure or by a representative of the local self-government body. Voluminous property is left under the management of the owner, the possessor, an adult family member, or a state authority. There is no designated authority, coordinated management framework or clear rules to ensure the effective preservation of the value of seized property. 478. Property seized under the civil confiscation procedure also falls under the competence of various bodies which may act as the “competent authority”. This includes state bodies, local self-government bodies, or state organisations. The legal framework on civil confiscation does not specify the responsible authorities, nor the circumstances under which such responsibilities are assigned. Where preservation of asset value is necessary, assets may be transferred to specialised trust managers. However, it was not in practice, as the necessary legal framework is under development. 479. As mentioned above, the regulatory framework on virtual assets has been introduced only recently and no procedures currently exist for the seizure or management of virtual assets. LEAs have sought assistance from foreign counterparts and discussed domestically to address these issues. Given the increasing use of cryptocurrencies in criminal activity affecting the country, as well as the nature and the fluctuations in value of virtual assets, there is a need for clear and comprehensive guidelines for virtual assets’ seizure, management and value preservation. Footnotes [94] Securities with a value exceeding two hundred times the minimum monthly wage" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="477. The management of criminally seized property is fragmented among multiple agencies, depending on the nature of the assets. Precious metals and stones, foreign currency and securities [94] are managed by the Treasury, while local currency is deposited into the bank account of the court dealing with the particular criminal proceeding. Objects other than voluminous property and real estate are managed either by the investigative body that decided on the seizure or by a representative of the local self-government body. Voluminous property is left under the management of the owner, the possessor, an adult family member, or a state authority. There is no designated authority, coordinated management framework or clear rules to ensure the effective preservation of the value of seized property. 478. Property seized under the civil confiscation procedure also falls under the competence of various bodies which may act as the “competent authority”. This includes state bodies, local self-government bodies, or state organisations. The legal framework on civil confiscation does not specify the responsible authorities, nor the circumstances under which such responsibilities are assigned. Where preservation of asset value is necessary, assets may be transferred to specialised trust managers. However, it was not in practice, as the necessary legal framework is under development. 479. As mentioned above, the regulatory framework on virtual assets has been introduced only recently and no procedures currently exist for the seizure or management of virtual assets. LEAs have sought assistance from foreign counterparts and discussed domestically to address these issues. Given the increasing use of cryptocurrencies in criminal activity affecting the country, as well as the nature and the fluctuations in value of virtual assets, there is a need for clear and comprehensive guidelines for virtual assets’ seizure, management and value preservation. Footnotes [94] Securities with a value exceeding two hundred times the minimum monthly wage" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 523. Armenia has enacted AML/CTF/CPF National Strategies for 2022-2024 and for 2025 - 2028, both of which are supported by action plans (see under PF). It also has a Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, although this was not available to the AT. There have been no TF prosecutions or convictions that could inform any of these strategies, but there have been TF investigations which could be used for this purpose. 524. The AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024 specifically envisaged the integration of TF investigations into the Action Plan deriving from the Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. However, no information was provided about any measures that were implemented to achieve this in practice. 525. The 2025 – 2028 AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy and action plan contain some measures that are specifically aimed at TF, namely the use of information on counter terrorism and related assets to support designations for TFS, conducting parallel financial in terrorism alerts or cases to identify TF, and incorporating technical guidance in the training programs for law enforcement bodies. 526. Nevertheless, as explained under Immediate Outcome 1 the overall focus on TF in both of the AML/CFT/CFP strategies is limited. TF is primarily referenced in conjunction with ML and there is little or no consideration of the ways in the strategic approach to TF should be different from that for ML or on ways to address specific TF threats or vulnerabilities disclosed by TF investigations. In addition, some key aspects are entirely focused on ML without reference to TF at all (e.g. the provisions in the 2025- 2028 strategy dealing with confiscation, which only address the proceeds of ML and predicate criminality and make no reference to terrorist assets). Furthermore, neither the 2022-2024 strategy nor the 2025- 2028 strategy addresses the use of information from non-terrorism cases to identify possible TF activity or terrorist assets. In the view of the AT, while the disparity in focus between ML and TF is in line with Armenia’s risk profile to some extent and the existing strategies and action plans provide a foundation for addressing TF at a national level, more needs to be done to develop a targeted approach in this area. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 527. Overall, the authorities demonstrated the effective sharing and use of information and intelligence in relation to terrorism investigations and prosecutions. Box 9.4. Case Study – Sharing and using information and intelligence in a terrorism case In 2023, the NSS initiated an investigation under the supervision of the GPO concerning 5 Armenian citizens suspected of organizing and preparing acts of terrorism within Armenia. The investigation established that the suspects were engaged in the illegal acquisition, transportation, storage, and carrying of firearms and ammunition, with the intention to use them for acts aimed at intimidation and an attack against a public building. The group also carried out recruitment activity in order to increase operational capability, procured or adapted equipment including firearms and munitions, military‑style clothing and accessories and communications apparatus, and developed methods to weaponize commercially‑produced unmanned aerial vehicles. The NSS carried out operational-search measures to prevent the potential terrorist act and to identify all of the individuals, which included the use of surveillance and interception of communications. The hypothesis of possible financing by third parties to the individuals, both from within Armenia and abroad, was also explored. However, this did not reveal any credible or likely indications of TF, as the individuals only utilized their own financial means. The NSS cooperated closely with the Investigative Committee and the GPO. These prompt and coordinated actions successfully prevented the realization of a potential terrorist act, and the collected evidence, including seized weapons and communications data, was transferred to the Investigative Committee for further procedural action. The coordination between security and judicial authorities enabled the full application of counter-terrorism procedures to ensure that no elements of organized terrorism, terrorist financing, or cross-border linkages existed. Source: NSS 528. In addition to the sharing and use of information and intelligence for the purposes of terrorism investigations, information obtained in the course of the 2020 TF investigation was used to support designations under UNSCR 1373 (see IO10). There was also effective collaboration between the GPO and the FMC in relation to the development of the Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences referred to under Core Issue 9.1, which was carried out to address Strategic Task 1.18 in the need identified in the AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024. 529. However, the failure to follow up on suspicious money flows to jurisdictions that are high risk for terrorism and TF and the fact that only one example was provided where TF links to predicate criminality were explored indicate that there is nonetheless scope for greater sharing and use of information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism efforts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.4.1. Formulating national counter-terrorism strategies and activities 523. Armenia has enacted AML/CTF/CPF National Strategies for 2022-2024 and for 2025 - 2028, both of which are supported by action plans (see under PF). It also has a Strategy for Combatting Terrorism, although this was not available to the AT. There have been no TF prosecutions or convictions that could inform any of these strategies, but there have been TF investigations which could be used for this purpose. 524. The AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024 specifically envisaged the integration of TF investigations into the Action Plan deriving from the Strategy for Combatting Terrorism. However, no information was provided about any measures that were implemented to achieve this in practice. 525. The 2025 – 2028 AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy and action plan contain some measures that are specifically aimed at TF, namely the use of information on counter terrorism and related assets to support designations for TFS, conducting parallel financial in terrorism alerts or cases to identify TF, and incorporating technical guidance in the training programs for law enforcement bodies. 526. Nevertheless, as explained under Immediate Outcome 1 the overall focus on TF in both of the AML/CFT/CFP strategies is limited. TF is primarily referenced in conjunction with ML and there is little or no consideration of the ways in the strategic approach to TF should be different from that for ML or on ways to address specific TF threats or vulnerabilities disclosed by TF investigations. In addition, some key aspects are entirely focused on ML without reference to TF at all (e.g. the provisions in the 2025- 2028 strategy dealing with confiscation, which only address the proceeds of ML and predicate criminality and make no reference to terrorist assets). Furthermore, neither the 2022-2024 strategy nor the 2025- 2028 strategy addresses the use of information from non-terrorism cases to identify possible TF activity or terrorist assets. In the view of the AT, while the disparity in focus between ML and TF is in line with Armenia’s risk profile to some extent and the existing strategies and action plans provide a foundation for addressing TF at a national level, more needs to be done to develop a targeted approach in this area. 9.4.2. Sharing and using information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism purposes and activities 527. Overall, the authorities demonstrated the effective sharing and use of information and intelligence in relation to terrorism investigations and prosecutions. Box 9.4. Case Study – Sharing and using information and intelligence in a terrorism case In 2023, the NSS initiated an investigation under the supervision of the GPO concerning 5 Armenian citizens suspected of organizing and preparing acts of terrorism within Armenia. The investigation established that the suspects were engaged in the illegal acquisition, transportation, storage, and carrying of firearms and ammunition, with the intention to use them for acts aimed at intimidation and an attack against a public building. The group also carried out recruitment activity in order to increase operational capability, procured or adapted equipment including firearms and munitions, military‑style clothing and accessories and communications apparatus, and developed methods to weaponize commercially‑produced unmanned aerial vehicles. The NSS carried out operational-search measures to prevent the potential terrorist act and to identify all of the individuals, which included the use of surveillance and interception of communications. The hypothesis of possible financing by third parties to the individuals, both from within Armenia and abroad, was also explored. However, this did not reveal any credible or likely indications of TF, as the individuals only utilized their own financial means. The NSS cooperated closely with the Investigative Committee and the GPO. These prompt and coordinated actions successfully prevented the realization of a potential terrorist act, and the collected evidence, including seized weapons and communications data, was transferred to the Investigative Committee for further procedural action. The coordination between security and judicial authorities enabled the full application of counter-terrorism procedures to ensure that no elements of organized terrorism, terrorist financing, or cross-border linkages existed. Source: NSS 528. In addition to the sharing and use of information and intelligence for the purposes of terrorism investigations, information obtained in the course of the 2020 TF investigation was used to support designations under UNSCR 1373 (see IO10). There was also effective collaboration between the GPO and the FMC in relation to the development of the Technical Guidance on Investigation into TF Offences referred to under Core Issue 9.1, which was carried out to address Strategic Task 1.18 in the need identified in the AML/CTF/CPF National Strategy for 2022-2024. 529. However, the failure to follow up on suspicious money flows to jurisdictions that are high risk for terrorism and TF and the fact that only one example was provided where TF links to predicate criminality were explored indicate that there is nonetheless scope for greater sharing and use of information and intelligence to support national counter-terrorism efforts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 561. According to the authorities, FIs are very well aware of their obligations to screen customers and transactions against lists of designated persons and have mechanisms in place for doing this. This was confirmed by the FIs met onsite, who demonstrated a good level of understanding of, and compliance with, their screening obligations. The authorities also advised that since 2022, FIs generally have made substantial investments in upgrading their sanctions screening frameworks to enhance operational efficiency and ensure timely identification of designated subjects. This has been done in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. As regards the most commonly identified TFS shortcomings, no data was provided about this but according to the authorities, these are the same shortcomings as those identified in the thematic inspections for banks looked at below. 562. As part of the CDD and transaction monitoring processes, FIs routinely screen client names, shareholders, UBOs, authorised signatories, directors, and associated addresses. With respect to transaction screening, FIs also screen the names and addresses of the transaction originator and beneficiary, as well as any other FIs involved in the payment chain. This is always carried out at the point of customer onboarding and prior to the execution of new transactions. 563. The banking sector is the most relevant in terms of materiality and transactional volume. It uses advanced and comprehensive screening solutions, which are typically sourced from well-known global providers. This enables screening to be conducted on a continuous basis, including by overnight batch screening of the entire customer base against the most recent updates to the UN Lists and the 1373 National List. Typically, the system will automatically block any account where a suspected sanction match has been found. Some of the larger non-bank FIs have automated screening systems similar to those of the banks. For others, screening is carried out manually. 564. The effectiveness of sanctions screening by a number of banks was assessed in thematic inspections carried out by the FSLD in 2023 and 2025 (see Core Issue 10.5 for further details). In all instances, the systems identified transactions or business relationships involving designated entities. This applied at every level within a structure, including within complex structures. The deficiencies observed were predominantly related to operational risk (e.g. institutions not retaining historical records of all listings and de-listings, issues related to audit trail in regard to resolving matches etc.). 565. These findings were in line with feedback from FIs met onsite. Banks and larger NBFIs demonstrated ability to screen through multi-layered ownership structures to the underlying natural person level. This was not an issue for smaller FIs, that generally only transact with legal persons that have simple ownership structures. 566. For those FIs that have automated systems, the continuous monitoring of their client database against UN lists and the 1373 National List means that any changes to designations are automatically picked up. Therefore, while all FIs met onsite were aware of the sanctions updates provided by the FMC and the search facility on its website, these resources are primarily relied on by smaller FIs that do not have automated systems and carry out manual searches. While these searches are usually done on the day that an update to a sanctions list is received, occasionally this may not be done until the following day. However, this not a material issue, given that the clients of smaller FIs are typically Armenian and where they are legal persons, they are not part of a complex structure and do not have foreign beneficial owners. 567. FIs are also aware of their obligation to make a report to the FMC in the event of any matches, and this has happened in practice as regards the banking sector, albeit not in relation to the TF related TFS (see under Core Issue 10.1). 568. The banks and other large FIs met onsite generally also demonstrated a good understanding of sanctions evasion. When asked how their products and services could be used to circumvent TFS, they were able to give examples of the type of activity involved in sanctions evasion in line with international typologies and identified the measures that they have in place to address this. This included looking at the use of shell companies, parties that might be acting on behalf of designated persons (e.g. associates or professional representatives such as trustees) and checking that transactions have a legitimate purpose. Understanding of sanctions evasion was less developed among smaller FIs. However, the materiality of this is limited as they typically carry out simple transactions for Armenia clients without any cross-border element. Furthermore, as indicated above, the customer base of non-bank FIs consists primarily of natural persons, with legal persons representing a negligible share (less than 0.01%). Where legal persons are present, they are predominantly characterized by simple ownership and control structures, with no apparent transparency issues, and therefore do not readily lend themselves to being abused for sanctions evasion purposes. 569. As explained under IO.3, at the time of the onsite visit there were no licensed VASPS as the regime was still being implemented, so VASPs were considered non-material for the purposes of the evaluation. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 570. According to the authorities, understanding of sanctions issues among DNFBPs is more varied than with FIs, but overall is still good. Some of the larger DNFBPs, primarily those that are part of large international groups, use automated screening tools comparable to those used by banks and larger FIs, but most DNFBPs rely on manual screening. 571. Screening is carried out at by DNFBPs at the point of customer onboarding and prior to the execution of new transactions as part of their CDD and transaction monitoring processes, in the same way as with FIs. All of the DNFBPs met onsite were aware of their obligations in this regard and confirmed that they have processes for meeting their obligations, although some stated that they would only do this in respect of non-Armenian clients. They were also aware of their obligation to report any matches to the FMC, although to date no such matches have been reported by any DNFBPs met onsite. This is in line with the fact that, as confirmed in the NRA, most of those DNFBPs have an exclusively Armenian client base and within that, the proportion of legal persons is small. 572. As DNFBPs with automated systems that carry out continuous screening are in a minority, most DNFBPs have to carry out manual screening against updates to UN lists and the 1373 National List. All the DNFBPs met onsite were aware of the sanctions updates provided by the FMC and the search facility on its website, and confirmed that they used these resources to carry out checks. In general, this is done as soon as an update is received, but for one entity in the gambling sector, this is only done on a weekly basis. However, given the client base of that particular DNFBP (Armenian citizens or non-citizens of Armenian origin), the risk of a sanctions breach arising from that delay in this singular case is not material. 573. DNFBPs involved in cross border transactions have good awareness of sanctions evasion risks. The understanding of sanctions evasion among DNFBPs not involved in cross border transactions is less developed. However, the materiality of this is limited, given the small size of the sector and its relatively limited market footprint. This, coupled with its domestic focus, relatively low volume of transactions its generally simple transaction activity, and very limited exposure to higher risk or cross-border clients, means that DNFBPs are unlikely to be abused for sanctions evasion purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 561. According to the authorities, FIs are very well aware of their obligations to screen customers and transactions against lists of designated persons and have mechanisms in place for doing this. This was confirmed by the FIs met onsite, who demonstrated a good level of understanding of, and compliance with, their screening obligations. The authorities also advised that since 2022, FIs generally have made substantial investments in upgrading their sanctions screening frameworks to enhance operational efficiency and ensure timely identification of designated subjects. This has been done in response to the evolving geopolitical landscape. As regards the most commonly identified TFS shortcomings, no data was provided about this but according to the authorities, these are the same shortcomings as those identified in the thematic inspections for banks looked at below. 562. As part of the CDD and transaction monitoring processes, FIs routinely screen client names, shareholders, UBOs, authorised signatories, directors, and associated addresses. With respect to transaction screening, FIs also screen the names and addresses of the transaction originator and beneficiary, as well as any other FIs involved in the payment chain. This is always carried out at the point of customer onboarding and prior to the execution of new transactions. 563. The banking sector is the most relevant in terms of materiality and transactional volume. It uses advanced and comprehensive screening solutions, which are typically sourced from well-known global providers. This enables screening to be conducted on a continuous basis, including by overnight batch screening of the entire customer base against the most recent updates to the UN Lists and the 1373 National List. Typically, the system will automatically block any account where a suspected sanction match has been found. Some of the larger non-bank FIs have automated screening systems similar to those of the banks. For others, screening is carried out manually. 564. The effectiveness of sanctions screening by a number of banks was assessed in thematic inspections carried out by the FSLD in 2023 and 2025 (see Core Issue 10.5 for further details). In all instances, the systems identified transactions or business relationships involving designated entities. This applied at every level within a structure, including within complex structures. The deficiencies observed were predominantly related to operational risk (e.g. institutions not retaining historical records of all listings and de-listings, issues related to audit trail in regard to resolving matches etc.). 565. These findings were in line with feedback from FIs met onsite. Banks and larger NBFIs demonstrated ability to screen through multi-layered ownership structures to the underlying natural person level. This was not an issue for smaller FIs, that generally only transact with legal persons that have simple ownership structures. 566. For those FIs that have automated systems, the continuous monitoring of their client database against UN lists and the 1373 National List means that any changes to designations are automatically picked up. Therefore, while all FIs met onsite were aware of the sanctions updates provided by the FMC and the search facility on its website, these resources are primarily relied on by smaller FIs that do not have automated systems and carry out manual searches. While these searches are usually done on the day that an update to a sanctions list is received, occasionally this may not be done until the following day. However, this not a material issue, given that the clients of smaller FIs are typically Armenian and where they are legal persons, they are not part of a complex structure and do not have foreign beneficial owners. 567. FIs are also aware of their obligation to make a report to the FMC in the event of any matches, and this has happened in practice as regards the banking sector, albeit not in relation to the TF related TFS (see under Core Issue 10.1). 568. The banks and other large FIs met onsite generally also demonstrated a good understanding of sanctions evasion. When asked how their products and services could be used to circumvent TFS, they were able to give examples of the type of activity involved in sanctions evasion in line with international typologies and identified the measures that they have in place to address this. This included looking at the use of shell companies, parties that might be acting on behalf of designated persons (e.g. associates or professional representatives such as trustees) and checking that transactions have a legitimate purpose. Understanding of sanctions evasion was less developed among smaller FIs. However, the materiality of this is limited as they typically carry out simple transactions for Armenia clients without any cross-border element. Furthermore, as indicated above, the customer base of non-bank FIs consists primarily of natural persons, with legal persons representing a negligible share (less than 0.01%). Where legal persons are present, they are predominantly characterized by simple ownership and control structures, with no apparent transparency issues, and therefore do not readily lend themselves to being abused for sanctions evasion purposes. 569. As explained under IO.3, at the time of the onsite visit there were no licensed VASPS as the regime was still being implemented, so VASPs were considered non-material for the purposes of the evaluation. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 570. According to the authorities, understanding of sanctions issues among DNFBPs is more varied than with FIs, but overall is still good. Some of the larger DNFBPs, primarily those that are part of large international groups, use automated screening tools comparable to those used by banks and larger FIs, but most DNFBPs rely on manual screening. 571. Screening is carried out at by DNFBPs at the point of customer onboarding and prior to the execution of new transactions as part of their CDD and transaction monitoring processes, in the same way as with FIs. All of the DNFBPs met onsite were aware of their obligations in this regard and confirmed that they have processes for meeting their obligations, although some stated that they would only do this in respect of non-Armenian clients. They were also aware of their obligation to report any matches to the FMC, although to date no such matches have been reported by any DNFBPs met onsite. This is in line with the fact that, as confirmed in the NRA, most of those DNFBPs have an exclusively Armenian client base and within that, the proportion of legal persons is small. 572. As DNFBPs with automated systems that carry out continuous screening are in a minority, most DNFBPs have to carry out manual screening against updates to UN lists and the 1373 National List. All the DNFBPs met onsite were aware of the sanctions updates provided by the FMC and the search facility on its website, and confirmed that they used these resources to carry out checks. In general, this is done as soon as an update is received, but for one entity in the gambling sector, this is only done on a weekly basis. However, given the client base of that particular DNFBP (Armenian citizens or non-citizens of Armenian origin), the risk of a sanctions breach arising from that delay in this singular case is not material. 573. DNFBPs involved in cross border transactions have good awareness of sanctions evasion risks. The understanding of sanctions evasion among DNFBPs not involved in cross border transactions is less developed. However, the materiality of this is limited, given the small size of the sector and its relatively limited market footprint. This, coupled with its domestic focus, relatively low volume of transactions its generally simple transaction activity, and very limited exposure to higher risk or cross-border clients, means that DNFBPs are unlikely to be abused for sanctions evasion purposes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 608. The analysis under IO.10 as regards the effectiveness of the systems in place for identification of assets linked to designated persons applies equally here. 609. The effectiveness of these systems in relation to PF in particular was demonstrated by the fact that during the assessment period there was an instance of a bank identifying and freezing funds linked to persons designated under the Iran PF sanctions regime. No assets linked to persons designated under the DPRK PF sanctions regimes have been identified, which is in line with Armenia’s PF risks. Box 11.1. Case Study – PF related asset freeze On Saturday 27 September 2025, the UN re-established the sanctions list relating to Iran under UNSCR 1737 (i.e. so -called snapback sanctions) and published a notice about this the following day. The automated overnight sanctions screening system of an Armenian bank identified links between persons designated under these sanctions and two accounts held by the bank and put an automatic block on each account. Both accounts were with banks under a corresponding banking relationship. The first was an Iranian bank whose account with the Armenian bank was empty as it had never been used. The second was a Malaysian bank owned by an Iranian bank and its account held approximately EUR 183 000. When the bank opened for business on the Monday morning, a report was made to the FMC. Both accounts remain frozen. Source: FMC 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 610. Armenia’s legal framework prohibits financial transactions that would involve dealing with the assets of a person designated under a PF sanctions regime or making funds or economic resources available to such a person. The authorities have the necessary powers and resources available to them to enable financial transactions with a PF link to be identified, and the prohibitions enforced. 611. To date there have been no instances of any financial transactions that would be captured by this prohibition. This is in line with Armenia’s PF risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.4.1. Identifying funds or assets held by designated persons/entities/persons acting on their behalf or at their direction 608. The analysis under IO.10 as regards the effectiveness of the systems in place for identification of assets linked to designated persons applies equally here. 609. The effectiveness of these systems in relation to PF in particular was demonstrated by the fact that during the assessment period there was an instance of a bank identifying and freezing funds linked to persons designated under the Iran PF sanctions regime. No assets linked to persons designated under the DPRK PF sanctions regimes have been identified, which is in line with Armenia’s PF risks. Box 11.1. Case Study – PF related asset freeze On Saturday 27 September 2025, the UN re-established the sanctions list relating to Iran under UNSCR 1737 (i.e. so -called snapback sanctions) and published a notice about this the following day. The automated overnight sanctions screening system of an Armenian bank identified links between persons designated under these sanctions and two accounts held by the bank and put an automatic block on each account. Both accounts were with banks under a corresponding banking relationship. The first was an Iranian bank whose account with the Armenian bank was empty as it had never been used. The second was a Malaysian bank owned by an Iranian bank and its account held approximately EUR 183 000. When the bank opened for business on the Monday morning, a report was made to the FMC. Both accounts remain frozen. Source: FMC 11.4.2. Prohibiting financial transactions related to proliferation 610. Armenia’s legal framework prohibits financial transactions that would involve dealing with the assets of a person designated under a PF sanctions regime or making funds or economic resources available to such a person. The authorities have the necessary powers and resources available to them to enable financial transactions with a PF link to be identified, and the prohibitions enforced. 611. To date there have been no instances of any financial transactions that would be captured by this prohibition. This is in line with Armenia’s PF risk profile." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="57. In Armenia, the Interagency Committee acts as the high-level policy making and coordination body charged with AML/CFT responsibilities. The committee is composed of 18 senior representatives of all relevant stakeholders, except for some SRBs (for example the Chamber of Advocates). Since the 2015 MER, the Deputy Minister of Economy, the Chairperson of the Anti-Corruption Chamber of the Court of Cassation, and the Member of the Supreme Judicial Council were appointed to the Interagency Committee, further strengthening its multidisciplinary capacity. The Interagency Committee is authorized to coordinate NRAs and strategy development activities. 58. The Interagency Committee is supported by a working group, whose members prepare the working materials and are in charge for the implementation of its decisions. The Interagency Committee meets on average twice annually; and can meet in an extraordinary session at the request of the Chairperson or of any member on any matter or topic pertaining to AML/CFT. In parallel, the Working Group meets on a periodic basis, particularly when preparatory work is required ahead of the Interagency Committee's sessions. Such preparatory work may include conducting studies, performing in-depth analyses, or collecting relevant information to ensure informed discussion of specific issues․ Minutes were provided of three Interagency Committee meetings, where issues in relation to NRA and issues of policy level were discussed. 59. When addressing issues that concern various sectors whether related to SRBs or other entities, the relevant parties were invited to participate in sessions of the Interagency Committee. For instance, in 2023, the Chamber of Advocates and the Chamber of Advocates and Expert Accountants were invited to take part in discussions regarding a study on the necessity of registering DNFBPs that currently lack supervisory authorities. In another case, in 2024, the Cadastre Committee was involved in the discussion concerning the analysis of risks associated with the real estate sector. 60. Based on the decision of the Interagency Committee, separate Working Groups are established in case thematic issues arise in the field of AML/CFT/CPF. 61. Guidance documents dealing with the investigation of ML and TF cases have been prepared by the FMC and prosecutors’ office and approved by the latter. FMC led an inter-institutional initiative to analyse the emerging and rapidly evolving risks associated with the VAs sector. This involved collaboration with the Police, the NSS, and the IC to identify VASPs mentioned in criminal reports, as well as the types of criminal activities commonly conducted through VAs. The FMC worked with the supervisory authority (FSLD) and financial institutions (banks, MVTS). Authorities reported that as a result of this strategic analysis there was an improved ML risk understanding in relation to the VAs sector, sharing of information about domestic (detected but unregistered) and foreign VASPs, with banks and LEAs. However, the AT notes that the findings of the study of transactions involving VAs through the financial system was not disclosed to private-sector representatives and it can be used by member agencies solely for official purposes. 62. The implementation of the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy for 2025 to 2028 and the action plan are being monitored semi-annually where the progress on implementation is discussed within the Interagency Committee." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="57. In Armenia, the Interagency Committee acts as the high-level policy making and coordination body charged with AML/CFT responsibilities. The committee is composed of 18 senior representatives of all relevant stakeholders, except for some SRBs (for example the Chamber of Advocates). Since the 2015 MER, the Deputy Minister of Economy, the Chairperson of the Anti-Corruption Chamber of the Court of Cassation, and the Member of the Supreme Judicial Council were appointed to the Interagency Committee, further strengthening its multidisciplinary capacity. The Interagency Committee is authorized to coordinate NRAs and strategy development activities. 58. The Interagency Committee is supported by a working group, whose members prepare the working materials and are in charge for the implementation of its decisions. The Interagency Committee meets on average twice annually; and can meet in an extraordinary session at the request of the Chairperson or of any member on any matter or topic pertaining to AML/CFT. In parallel, the Working Group meets on a periodic basis, particularly when preparatory work is required ahead of the Interagency Committee's sessions. Such preparatory work may include conducting studies, performing in-depth analyses, or collecting relevant information to ensure informed discussion of specific issues․ Minutes were provided of three Interagency Committee meetings, where issues in relation to NRA and issues of policy level were discussed. 59. When addressing issues that concern various sectors whether related to SRBs or other entities, the relevant parties were invited to participate in sessions of the Interagency Committee. For instance, in 2023, the Chamber of Advocates and the Chamber of Advocates and Expert Accountants were invited to take part in discussions regarding a study on the necessity of registering DNFBPs that currently lack supervisory authorities. In another case, in 2024, the Cadastre Committee was involved in the discussion concerning the analysis of risks associated with the real estate sector. 60. Based on the decision of the Interagency Committee, separate Working Groups are established in case thematic issues arise in the field of AML/CFT/CPF. 61. Guidance documents dealing with the investigation of ML and TF cases have been prepared by the FMC and prosecutors’ office and approved by the latter. FMC led an inter-institutional initiative to analyse the emerging and rapidly evolving risks associated with the VAs sector. This involved collaboration with the Police, the NSS, and the IC to identify VASPs mentioned in criminal reports, as well as the types of criminal activities commonly conducted through VAs. The FMC worked with the supervisory authority (FSLD) and financial institutions (banks, MVTS). Authorities reported that as a result of this strategic analysis there was an improved ML risk understanding in relation to the VAs sector, sharing of information about domestic (detected but unregistered) and foreign VASPs, with banks and LEAs. However, the AT notes that the findings of the study of transactions involving VAs through the financial system was not disclosed to private-sector representatives and it can be used by member agencies solely for official purposes. 62. The implementation of the National AML/CFT/CPF Strategy for 2025 to 2028 and the action plan are being monitored semi-annually where the progress on implementation is discussed within the Interagency Committee." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="195. Until 2020, AML/CFT supervision remained integrated within broader prudential oversight. A first acknowledgement of AML/CFT specific risks came in 2017, with the adoption of CBA’s Manual for Supervision for Banks and Insurance Companies, which included a dedicated section with ML/TF risks, feeding into the overall planning of supervisory actions. Since 2020, AML/CFT supervision of FIs has gradually been individualised, with the development and application of separate ML/TF risk assessment Methodologies, first for banks, and two years later for other material NBFIs. In addition, in 2020, a specialised AML risk analysis unit was established within the FSLD. 196. In practice, AML/CFT inspections are now performed separately from prudential supervision, except for very small FIs such as currency exchange offices. 197. The CBA’s risk-based approach to supervision is multi-pronged. First, at sectoral level, greater supervisory consideration is given to banks, due to their materiality and overall higher level of ML/TF risk. This translates into more detailed oversight, compared to other FIs. Second, the CBA uses thematic inspections to assess compliance of an entire sector or population in a specific area. Almost all banks have undergone scrutiny of their TF/PF monitoring systems and their level of compliance with transfer of funds regulations, twice during the last two years of the assessment period. Also, in 2024, banks’ engagement with VASPs was analysed and one bank with the highest exposure was selected for a targeted on-site inspection. 198. Third, at individual level, more in-depth and more frequent on-site inspections are envisaged for those FIs that show higher ML/TF risk scores. However, the rule for cyclical on-site inspections, which prescribes their frequency based on the overall risk of individual FIs, was introduced in practice starting in 2024 (with official adoption in 2025). Up to the end of the assessment period, two such on-site inspections had been finalised in the banking sector, with one under way, while five such cyclical on-site inspections have been performed in the non-banking financial sector. Recent inspection reports of this new approach reviewed by the AT, indicated a high level of comprehensiveness, covering CDD, transaction monitoring systems, correspondent banking relationships, and STR reporting. 199. As a consequence, during most of the assessment period, AML/CFT supervision relied primarily on off-site monitoring tools, and on inspections performed mostly in response to external triggers. 200. Off-site reviews are based on the annual questionnaires for risk assessment that also include supporting documentation enabling the CBA to develop a broad understanding of compliance practices of FIs included in the process. [54] This supervisory element of the questionnaires is complemented by off-site sampling of client files, that the CBA choses usually from the list of high-risk customers provided by the FI. Following the annual analysis, the CBA issues individual “Dear CEO” letters to material FIs, highlighting deficiencies identified along with recommended remedial actions and deadlines for correction. Higher risk FIs receive more detailed letters and recommendations. 201. Therefore, up until the introduction of full-scope on-site inspection cycles in 2024/2025, this off-site framework had been the central supervisory tool for AML/CFT risk-based supervision during most of the assessment period. The AT acknowledges that the off-site tool effectively captures a comprehensive view of the activities of each FI, superior to a simple supervisory questionnaire, through the fact that it entails a review of all internal documents and sampling of files. At the same time, the AT cannot consider this to be a full substitute for a risk-based supervisory approach. All institutions of a given type are subject to identical general information requests regardless of their individual risk profiles, and the off-site sampling of client files appears limited. Identified deficiencies are included in “Dear CEO” letters with recommendations for improvement which, although followed up upon by the CBA, are not to be considered enforcement measures. Conversely, the findings from the recent risk-based round of on-site full scope on-site inspections, which resulted in some of the highest sanctions of the last five years, indicate a relatively large number of serious breaches that had not been discovered before. 202. In practice, until the latter part of the review period, supervisory inspections, whether on-site or off-site, were mostly triggered by intelligence received and case referrals from third parties (particularly the FMC), targeting specific elements, such as the application of EDD for certain customers part of investigations, or verifying how the FIs had applied monitoring orders given by the CBA in regard to certain clients. A number of cases where inspections had been initiated due to internal triggers, such as a rise in activity or in the client base, were presented to the AT. This demonstrates that individual elements of the risk methodology are taken into consideration, but stronger and more formal use could be developed. 203. Cooperation between the CBA and FMC is close and institutionalised, supported by shared premises and a cooperation manual covering joint planning, information exchange, coordinated supervisory actions (including joint inspection teams), and training. Over 40 cases of potential AML/CFT breaches were referred by the FMC to the CBA during the assessment period for supervisory follow-up. Through its access to the bank account registry and customer-level data, the FMC identifies higher-risk cases and emerging compliance concerns, requests customer files from FIs, and transmits targeted findings to the CBA. This cooperation significantly informs supervisory prioritisation and enables earlier detection of compliance weaknesses. 204. While this mechanism effectively captures emerging risks, it remains predominantly reactive, concentrating supervisory efforts on FIs where risks have already materialised, and does not fully substitute for a proactive, preventive supervisory planning. As a consequence, in the banking sector alone, seven out of 18 banks had not been inspected during the assessment period outside of the annual off-site monitoring tool and the thematic inspections on TF/PF and compliance with transfer of funds regulations, although their risk level was situated in the upper part of the scale. Table 3.4. On-site and off-site examinations (2020-mid 26.09.2025) Sector 01.01.2020 – 31.05.2024 01.06.2024 – 26.09.2025 on-site off-site on-site off-site Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Banks 0 20 69 [55] 38 3 34 35 17 MVTS providers 0 0 11 17 3 6 21 14 Investment Firms 0 1 12 27 2 0 35 0 Credit Organizations 0 4 0 19 0 0 77 3 Currency exchange offices 0 39 0 34 0 0 1 21 Pawnshops 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 205. Since mid-2024, there has been a marked increase in on-site supervisory activity, largely due to thematic inspections and the operationalisation of the risk-based cyclical framework. Box 3.2. Case Study – Supervisory action informed by risk analysis and intelligence Case 1: Following identification by the FMC of weaknesses in EDD practices across several banks, the CBA conducted targeted follow-up inspections, confirmed the deficiencies, and applied escalating corrective measures, including fines, orders to strengthen internal control functions, and, in one case, removal of the MLRO. These actions demonstrate the CBA’s capacity to deploy a graduated supervisory response where significant compliance failures are identified. Case 2 : In early 2022, based on prudential data and intelligence from the FMC indicating sharp increases in currency exchange transactions, the CBA together with FMC conducted joint on-site inspections in five banks. These inspections identified deficiencies in customer risk classification, application of CDD/EDD measures, and transaction monitoring. All banks were issued formal remediation orders, accompanied by proportionate monetary sanctions Source: FMC 206. Smaller FIs are supervised through a more general approach by the CBA, although a methodology for risk assessment of currency exchange and pawnshops was also adopted in 2025, which should guide the supervisory response. Supervision for these entities also takes into account data related to their activity sent to the CBA or FMC (TTRs, general activity reports) and considers their particular characteristics. For example, in the case of currency exchange offices, mystery shopping is often used, as confirmed by the entities met by the AT, to check compliance with legal obligations. Video recordings are also mandatory and can be reviewed by the CBA. Entities met on-site pointed out that CBA’s inspections have become more rigorous in recent years. 207. While, technically, non-public investment funds were not under the CBA’s supervision due to lack of a proper legal framework, this shortcoming was partially addressed in 2018 when the CBA requested such entities to send quarterly reports, including information about their clients, and requested that all investments be channelled through bank accounts, thus indirectly covering CDD requirements. Although this allowed for some oversight, it cannot be considered sufficient to prevent misconduct. Though the materiality of such funds has been considered as relatively low, their activity has shown a sharp increase since 2023, with a total amount of investment of around EUR 350 million, similar to other financial subsectors. This vulnerability was considered in the most recent sectoral risk assessment (2024). Footnotes [54] Banks, investment companies, MVTS providers, credit organisations and Central Depository. [55] The number of off-site full scope inspections is represented by the number of questionnaires sent by the FIs and analysed by the CBA; therefore, their number is relatively constant through the years, and it is equal to the number of FIs targeted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="195. Until 2020, AML/CFT supervision remained integrated within broader prudential oversight. A first acknowledgement of AML/CFT specific risks came in 2017, with the adoption of CBA’s Manual for Supervision for Banks and Insurance Companies, which included a dedicated section with ML/TF risks, feeding into the overall planning of supervisory actions. Since 2020, AML/CFT supervision of FIs has gradually been individualised, with the development and application of separate ML/TF risk assessment Methodologies, first for banks, and two years later for other material NBFIs. In addition, in 2020, a specialised AML risk analysis unit was established within the FSLD. 196. In practice, AML/CFT inspections are now performed separately from prudential supervision, except for very small FIs such as currency exchange offices. 197. The CBA’s risk-based approach to supervision is multi-pronged. First, at sectoral level, greater supervisory consideration is given to banks, due to their materiality and overall higher level of ML/TF risk. This translates into more detailed oversight, compared to other FIs. Second, the CBA uses thematic inspections to assess compliance of an entire sector or population in a specific area. Almost all banks have undergone scrutiny of their TF/PF monitoring systems and their level of compliance with transfer of funds regulations, twice during the last two years of the assessment period. Also, in 2024, banks’ engagement with VASPs was analysed and one bank with the highest exposure was selected for a targeted on-site inspection. 198. Third, at individual level, more in-depth and more frequent on-site inspections are envisaged for those FIs that show higher ML/TF risk scores. However, the rule for cyclical on-site inspections, which prescribes their frequency based on the overall risk of individual FIs, was introduced in practice starting in 2024 (with official adoption in 2025). Up to the end of the assessment period, two such on-site inspections had been finalised in the banking sector, with one under way, while five such cyclical on-site inspections have been performed in the non-banking financial sector. Recent inspection reports of this new approach reviewed by the AT, indicated a high level of comprehensiveness, covering CDD, transaction monitoring systems, correspondent banking relationships, and STR reporting. 199. As a consequence, during most of the assessment period, AML/CFT supervision relied primarily on off-site monitoring tools, and on inspections performed mostly in response to external triggers. 200. Off-site reviews are based on the annual questionnaires for risk assessment that also include supporting documentation enabling the CBA to develop a broad understanding of compliance practices of FIs included in the process. [54] This supervisory element of the questionnaires is complemented by off-site sampling of client files, that the CBA choses usually from the list of high-risk customers provided by the FI. Following the annual analysis, the CBA issues individual “Dear CEO” letters to material FIs, highlighting deficiencies identified along with recommended remedial actions and deadlines for correction. Higher risk FIs receive more detailed letters and recommendations. 201. Therefore, up until the introduction of full-scope on-site inspection cycles in 2024/2025, this off-site framework had been the central supervisory tool for AML/CFT risk-based supervision during most of the assessment period. The AT acknowledges that the off-site tool effectively captures a comprehensive view of the activities of each FI, superior to a simple supervisory questionnaire, through the fact that it entails a review of all internal documents and sampling of files. At the same time, the AT cannot consider this to be a full substitute for a risk-based supervisory approach. All institutions of a given type are subject to identical general information requests regardless of their individual risk profiles, and the off-site sampling of client files appears limited. Identified deficiencies are included in “Dear CEO” letters with recommendations for improvement which, although followed up upon by the CBA, are not to be considered enforcement measures. Conversely, the findings from the recent risk-based round of on-site full scope on-site inspections, which resulted in some of the highest sanctions of the last five years, indicate a relatively large number of serious breaches that had not been discovered before. 202. In practice, until the latter part of the review period, supervisory inspections, whether on-site or off-site, were mostly triggered by intelligence received and case referrals from third parties (particularly the FMC), targeting specific elements, such as the application of EDD for certain customers part of investigations, or verifying how the FIs had applied monitoring orders given by the CBA in regard to certain clients. A number of cases where inspections had been initiated due to internal triggers, such as a rise in activity or in the client base, were presented to the AT. This demonstrates that individual elements of the risk methodology are taken into consideration, but stronger and more formal use could be developed. 203. Cooperation between the CBA and FMC is close and institutionalised, supported by shared premises and a cooperation manual covering joint planning, information exchange, coordinated supervisory actions (including joint inspection teams), and training. Over 40 cases of potential AML/CFT breaches were referred by the FMC to the CBA during the assessment period for supervisory follow-up. Through its access to the bank account registry and customer-level data, the FMC identifies higher-risk cases and emerging compliance concerns, requests customer files from FIs, and transmits targeted findings to the CBA. This cooperation significantly informs supervisory prioritisation and enables earlier detection of compliance weaknesses. 204. While this mechanism effectively captures emerging risks, it remains predominantly reactive, concentrating supervisory efforts on FIs where risks have already materialised, and does not fully substitute for a proactive, preventive supervisory planning. As a consequence, in the banking sector alone, seven out of 18 banks had not been inspected during the assessment period outside of the annual off-site monitoring tool and the thematic inspections on TF/PF and compliance with transfer of funds regulations, although their risk level was situated in the upper part of the scale. Table 3.4. On-site and off-site examinations (2020-mid 26.09.2025) Sector 01.01.2020 – 31.05.2024 01.06.2024 – 26.09.2025 on-site off-site on-site off-site Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Full scope Thematic /Ad-hoc Banks 0 20 69 [55] 38 3 34 35 17 MVTS providers 0 0 11 17 3 6 21 14 Investment Firms 0 1 12 27 2 0 35 0 Credit Organizations 0 4 0 19 0 0 77 3 Currency exchange offices 0 39 0 34 0 0 1 21 Pawnshops 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 205. Since mid-2024, there has been a marked increase in on-site supervisory activity, largely due to thematic inspections and the operationalisation of the risk-based cyclical framework. Box 3.2. Case Study – Supervisory action informed by risk analysis and intelligence Case 1: Following identification by the FMC of weaknesses in EDD practices across several banks, the CBA conducted targeted follow-up inspections, confirmed the deficiencies, and applied escalating corrective measures, including fines, orders to strengthen internal control functions, and, in one case, removal of the MLRO. These actions demonstrate the CBA’s capacity to deploy a graduated supervisory response where significant compliance failures are identified. Case 2 : In early 2022, based on prudential data and intelligence from the FMC indicating sharp increases in currency exchange transactions, the CBA together with FMC conducted joint on-site inspections in five banks. These inspections identified deficiencies in customer risk classification, application of CDD/EDD measures, and transaction monitoring. All banks were issued formal remediation orders, accompanied by proportionate monetary sanctions Source: FMC 206. Smaller FIs are supervised through a more general approach by the CBA, although a methodology for risk assessment of currency exchange and pawnshops was also adopted in 2025, which should guide the supervisory response. Supervision for these entities also takes into account data related to their activity sent to the CBA or FMC (TTRs, general activity reports) and considers their particular characteristics. For example, in the case of currency exchange offices, mystery shopping is often used, as confirmed by the entities met by the AT, to check compliance with legal obligations. Video recordings are also mandatory and can be reviewed by the CBA. Entities met on-site pointed out that CBA’s inspections have become more rigorous in recent years. 207. While, technically, non-public investment funds were not under the CBA’s supervision due to lack of a proper legal framework, this shortcoming was partially addressed in 2018 when the CBA requested such entities to send quarterly reports, including information about their clients, and requested that all investments be channelled through bank accounts, thus indirectly covering CDD requirements. Although this allowed for some oversight, it cannot be considered sufficient to prevent misconduct. Though the materiality of such funds has been considered as relatively low, their activity has shown a sharp increase since 2023, with a total amount of investment of around EUR 350 million, similar to other financial subsectors. This vulnerability was considered in the most recent sectoral risk assessment (2024). Footnotes [54] Banks, investment companies, MVTS providers, credit organisations and Central Depository. [55] The number of off-site full scope inspections is represented by the number of questionnaires sent by the FIs and analysed by the CBA; therefore, their number is relatively constant through the years, and it is equal to the number of FIs targeted." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="278. The risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is unevenly applied across sectors. For casinos and online gambling operators, which represent the most material sector, supervision- which was largely based on triggers and professional judgement decreased in intensity in the latter years of the assessment period. 279. Other authorities have only recently introduced basic frameworks or methodologies, and their implementation has been constrained by limited resources and data gaps, resulting in a reliance on ad-hoc judgement rather than systematic, risk-driven planning. Some sectors, such as advocates, remain outside proper AML/CFT oversight. Consequently, it has not been demonstrated that supervisory intensity and coverage are consistently aligned with ML/TF risks across DNFBP sectors. SRC – Casinos 280. Since 2018, the SRC has been responsible for supervising casinos and gambling operators. A specialized five-person unit oversees compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Supervision does not follow a risk-based methodology and relies on supervisory judgement informed by tax submissions, mandatory reporting under gaming legislation and publicly available information. There is no specific methodology, nor tools for SRC to oversee bets or payouts for AML/CFT purposes, beyond tax data and public announcements of large winnings. 281. The number of on-site inspections with an AML/CFT component remained very limited throughout the assessment period. Between 2020-2023, an average of two such inspections were conducted annually, and none took place in 2024, a year in which the authorities indicated that their supervisory approach shifted towards intelligence focused oversight, relying on third-party information. Gambling operators met onsite confirmed limited supervisory engagement in recent years, with some indicating no direct interaction since 2022 and others reporting only off-site review of periodic submissions (such as periodic reports on cash flow, winnings, and the number of players). Prior to 2024, operators met onsite confirmed that SRC inspections included the scrutiny of AML/CFT processes, including of monitoring systems. 282. This reduced supervisory activity coincided with the adoption in 2024 of new legal and structural frameworks, including the planned establishment of an Operating Centre to oversee gambling activities through an electronic monitoring system, as well as creation of a new department with 14 positions within the SRC. These reforms represent a positive enhancement of the supervisory framework; however, they were not operational during the assessment period, and their impact could not be assessed. 283. The lack of proper supervisory tools and resources within the SRC was partially mitigated by the cooperation with the FMC, including the use of FMC strategic analysis. For example, the FMC analysed data on individuals with large winnings and transmitted the results to the SRC for implementation of appropriate measures. Gambling operators also described on-going cooperation with the FMC, including participation in round table meetings. 284. Remedial measures applied by SRC were limited for most of the assessment period. Prior to mid-2025, fines imposed for failures to conduct ongoing due diligence were modest (totalling EUR 1 850). A more substantial fine of EUR 45 000 was imposed in Q3 2025 for failures related to risk-based customer assessment, mandatory reporting and record keeping, indicating a potential shift towards stronger enforcement. MoJ – Notaries 285. Supervisory activity of notaries is performed by the MoJ with three active inspectors responsible for all statutory oversight, including AML/CFT. Prior to 2023, inspections with AML/CFT component were rare. One case from 2021 was presented to the AT, involving delayed TTR reporting and resulting in disciplinary measures. 286. The new supervisory methodology introduced in 2023 provides for inspections on a three-year cycle. However, due to limited resources and absence of adequate data and analytical tools, this cyclicity has not yet been implemented in practice. 287. In 2023, under the National Strategy Action Plan, the MoJ requested transaction statistics from the Chamber of Notaries on all transactions legalized by notaries during 2022-2023. Based on this data, in particular the volumes of activity, coupled with the complaints received from the public, the MoJ selected three notaries for on-site inspection. These inspections identified deficiencies mainly related to late TTR reporting, and disciplinary measures were applied (reprimand). Additional inspections were conducted following a sharp increase in donation related STRs filed in 2023. These inspections identified misunderstandings of reporting obligations and no further actions were taken. 288. Notaries submit quarterly statistical data on the transactions they have legalized through an electronic system. However, the scope of data is limited to transaction volumes, and does not include information about parties involved. While additional information is occasionally requested from the FMC, the MoJ currently lacks systems and analytical tools necessary to apply a genuinely risk-based supervisory approach. Authorities indicated that a new IT system is envisaged to address these shortcomings. FMC 289. Although the legal basis for FMC supervision was in place since 2018, actual AML/CFT supervision activity commenced only in 2023, following the establishment of the Strategic Analysis and Supervisory Division (SASD). The unit is comprised of five people, of whom only two (together with the manager) carry out supervision activities; the remaining staff having the task of delivering strategic analysis. While strategic analysis has at times complemented supervisory work (including beyond FMC-supervised entities), this does not substitute for structured supervisory engagement. 290. Given the scope of supervised sectors and the breadth of supervisory responsibilities, FMC resourcing is assessed by the AT to be highly inadequate to support effective risk-based supervision. 291. As supervisory engagement with the sector had been largely absent prior to 2023, DNFBPs demonstrated a limited awareness of their AML/CFT obligations. In response, the newly established unit initiated a structured programme of engagement combining awareness-raising activities, systematic data collection to support institutional risk assessment, and targeted feedback on internal policies and procedures, which subsequently progressed into supervisory activities. 292. In 2025, the FMC formalized this approach and adopted a Supervisory Manual which, in addition to the risk methodology described in core issue 4.2, introduces a risk-based framework for supervision, providing for on-site inspections of high-risk DNFBPs and remote supervision for medium- and low-risk entities based. However, this new architecture has been applied for only two supervisory cycles: the first one focused on outreach and securing sector-wide compliance, with the second concentrated on assessing and identifying higher-risk entities and applying proportional oversight. While on-site monitoring has not been feasible, owing to the large number of entities and resource constrains within the FMC, the risk ratings attributed through the developed risk assessment model translated into more intensive off-site scrutiny for those higher risk entities. This has included additional engagements with those entities, in-depth analysis of their activities and enhanced expectations for, and scrutiny of, their internal controls. 293. The AT notes the strong start of the FMC in pursuing these activities in a short period of time, combining outreach with follow up on prescribed remedial measures, despite very limited resources, and acknowledges the overall improvement in entities’ level of awareness, as a first step in ensuring compliance. However, to demonstrate effectiveness, supervision requires further consolidation and fuller implementation, over an extended period to prove its robustness and usability in practice. 294. Given the relatively early stage of supervisory implementation and the relatively low materiality of the sectors under its supervision, the FMC has not prioritised the use of sanctions, instead seeking to secure compliance through collaborative engagement with reporting entities. Nevertheless, in two cases involving legal firms, enforcement proceedings were initiated due to deficiencies in internal procedures and failure to provide requested information. In one case, a warning was issued, while the other firm voluntarily rectified the violations and proceedings were closed. ChoA 295. The ChoA performs only limited oversight of advocates, based on monitoring compliance with rules of general conduct. Supervisory activities are carried out through disciplinary proceedings, as the ChoA maintains that client-attorney privilege constraints substantive AML/CFT supervision. As a result, supervision of AML/CFT compliance is not risk-based and remains limited in scope." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="278. The risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is unevenly applied across sectors. For casinos and online gambling operators, which represent the most material sector, supervision- which was largely based on triggers and professional judgement decreased in intensity in the latter years of the assessment period. 279. Other authorities have only recently introduced basic frameworks or methodologies, and their implementation has been constrained by limited resources and data gaps, resulting in a reliance on ad-hoc judgement rather than systematic, risk-driven planning. Some sectors, such as advocates, remain outside proper AML/CFT oversight. Consequently, it has not been demonstrated that supervisory intensity and coverage are consistently aligned with ML/TF risks across DNFBP sectors. SRC – Casinos 280. Since 2018, the SRC has been responsible for supervising casinos and gambling operators. A specialized five-person unit oversees compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Supervision does not follow a risk-based methodology and relies on supervisory judgement informed by tax submissions, mandatory reporting under gaming legislation and publicly available information. There is no specific methodology, nor tools for SRC to oversee bets or payouts for AML/CFT purposes, beyond tax data and public announcements of large winnings. 281. The number of on-site inspections with an AML/CFT component remained very limited throughout the assessment period. Between 2020-2023, an average of two such inspections were conducted annually, and none took place in 2024, a year in which the authorities indicated that their supervisory approach shifted towards intelligence focused oversight, relying on third-party information. Gambling operators met onsite confirmed limited supervisory engagement in recent years, with some indicating no direct interaction since 2022 and others reporting only off-site review of periodic submissions (such as periodic reports on cash flow, winnings, and the number of players). Prior to 2024, operators met onsite confirmed that SRC inspections included the scrutiny of AML/CFT processes, including of monitoring systems. 282. This reduced supervisory activity coincided with the adoption in 2024 of new legal and structural frameworks, including the planned establishment of an Operating Centre to oversee gambling activities through an electronic monitoring system, as well as creation of a new department with 14 positions within the SRC. These reforms represent a positive enhancement of the supervisory framework; however, they were not operational during the assessment period, and their impact could not be assessed. 283. The lack of proper supervisory tools and resources within the SRC was partially mitigated by the cooperation with the FMC, including the use of FMC strategic analysis. For example, the FMC analysed data on individuals with large winnings and transmitted the results to the SRC for implementation of appropriate measures. Gambling operators also described on-going cooperation with the FMC, including participation in round table meetings. 284. Remedial measures applied by SRC were limited for most of the assessment period. Prior to mid-2025, fines imposed for failures to conduct ongoing due diligence were modest (totalling EUR 1 850). A more substantial fine of EUR 45 000 was imposed in Q3 2025 for failures related to risk-based customer assessment, mandatory reporting and record keeping, indicating a potential shift towards stronger enforcement. MoJ – Notaries 285. Supervisory activity of notaries is performed by the MoJ with three active inspectors responsible for all statutory oversight, including AML/CFT. Prior to 2023, inspections with AML/CFT component were rare. One case from 2021 was presented to the AT, involving delayed TTR reporting and resulting in disciplinary measures. 286. The new supervisory methodology introduced in 2023 provides for inspections on a three-year cycle. However, due to limited resources and absence of adequate data and analytical tools, this cyclicity has not yet been implemented in practice. 287. In 2023, under the National Strategy Action Plan, the MoJ requested transaction statistics from the Chamber of Notaries on all transactions legalized by notaries during 2022-2023. Based on this data, in particular the volumes of activity, coupled with the complaints received from the public, the MoJ selected three notaries for on-site inspection. These inspections identified deficiencies mainly related to late TTR reporting, and disciplinary measures were applied (reprimand). Additional inspections were conducted following a sharp increase in donation related STRs filed in 2023. These inspections identified misunderstandings of reporting obligations and no further actions were taken. 288. Notaries submit quarterly statistical data on the transactions they have legalized through an electronic system. However, the scope of data is limited to transaction volumes, and does not include information about parties involved. While additional information is occasionally requested from the FMC, the MoJ currently lacks systems and analytical tools necessary to apply a genuinely risk-based supervisory approach. Authorities indicated that a new IT system is envisaged to address these shortcomings. FMC 289. Although the legal basis for FMC supervision was in place since 2018, actual AML/CFT supervision activity commenced only in 2023, following the establishment of the Strategic Analysis and Supervisory Division (SASD). The unit is comprised of five people, of whom only two (together with the manager) carry out supervision activities; the remaining staff having the task of delivering strategic analysis. While strategic analysis has at times complemented supervisory work (including beyond FMC-supervised entities), this does not substitute for structured supervisory engagement. 290. Given the scope of supervised sectors and the breadth of supervisory responsibilities, FMC resourcing is assessed by the AT to be highly inadequate to support effective risk-based supervision. 291. As supervisory engagement with the sector had been largely absent prior to 2023, DNFBPs demonstrated a limited awareness of their AML/CFT obligations. In response, the newly established unit initiated a structured programme of engagement combining awareness-raising activities, systematic data collection to support institutional risk assessment, and targeted feedback on internal policies and procedures, which subsequently progressed into supervisory activities. 292. In 2025, the FMC formalized this approach and adopted a Supervisory Manual which, in addition to the risk methodology described in core issue 4.2, introduces a risk-based framework for supervision, providing for on-site inspections of high-risk DNFBPs and remote supervision for medium- and low-risk entities based. However, this new architecture has been applied for only two supervisory cycles: the first one focused on outreach and securing sector-wide compliance, with the second concentrated on assessing and identifying higher-risk entities and applying proportional oversight. While on-site monitoring has not been feasible, owing to the large number of entities and resource constrains within the FMC, the risk ratings attributed through the developed risk assessment model translated into more intensive off-site scrutiny for those higher risk entities. This has included additional engagements with those entities, in-depth analysis of their activities and enhanced expectations for, and scrutiny of, their internal controls. 293. The AT notes the strong start of the FMC in pursuing these activities in a short period of time, combining outreach with follow up on prescribed remedial measures, despite very limited resources, and acknowledges the overall improvement in entities’ level of awareness, as a first step in ensuring compliance. However, to demonstrate effectiveness, supervision requires further consolidation and fuller implementation, over an extended period to prove its robustness and usability in practice. 294. Given the relatively early stage of supervisory implementation and the relatively low materiality of the sectors under its supervision, the FMC has not prioritised the use of sanctions, instead seeking to secure compliance through collaborative engagement with reporting entities. Nevertheless, in two cases involving legal firms, enforcement proceedings were initiated due to deficiencies in internal procedures and failure to provide requested information. In one case, a warning was issued, while the other firm voluntarily rectified the violations and proceedings were closed. ChoA 295. The ChoA performs only limited oversight of advocates, based on monitoring compliance with rules of general conduct. Supervisory activities are carried out through disciplinary proceedings, as the ChoA maintains that client-attorney privilege constraints substantive AML/CFT supervision. As a result, supervision of AML/CFT compliance is not risk-based and remains limited in scope." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="361. With the amendments in the State Registration law in June 2021, the registrant is liable for providing false information as well as for the subsequent consequences, with sanctions consisting in warnings and fines (refer to criterion 24.14). For submission of false information and concealment of information about BOs, the authorized person may be liable to warnings, fines, short-term detention or prohibition to perform certain activities for up to three years. Legal persons can also be forcibly liquidated by the court if they fail to provide their declarations for three years in a row. Criminal penalties may be applied (refer to criterion 24.14) on participants of the legal person or the BO for providing false information to the legal person, or concealing information subject to submission, or for the failure to respond to the inquiry of the legal person. 362. As a consequence of the supervisory actions undertaken by the State Register Agency as shown in the table below, during 2021 to 2024 1,903 administrative proceedings were initiated against legal persons, of which nine were for incorrect or incomplete information, and the rest for failure to submit BO information to the State Registry. 363. As a result of the Authorities’ initiative on the application of warnings, 39% led to remediation measures, which is a positive outcome. In the rest of the cases, it was not monitored whether the imposed sanctions (mainly warnings) were followed by remediation measures or not. The authorities reported that the fine imposed was that of around Eur70, which does not appear to be neither dissuasive nor effective. In fact, the 2024 NRA identified as a vulnerability the low penalty for failure by the legal persons to retain the accounting documents, which enables criminals to erase traces of their crimes, thus creating challenges for LEAs in gathering evidence in criminal cases. The amount of the penalty imposed is the same as that for legal persons not retaining BO information. 364. Armenia has also imposed forced liquidation in a one-off initiative in 2016, to approximately 30,000 dormant legal entities. Table 5.1: Administrative proceedings (2021-2024) 2021 2022 2023 2024 Initiated administrative proceedings 150 1118 435 200 Imposed sanctions 15 115 27 103 Terminations based on achieved compliance 130 300 221 91 365. The authorities recognise that more resources and capacities are required to conduct increased and effective administrative monitoring especially in view of the registered legal persons that still need to declare their BO. 366. In view of the above data and the amount of BO declarations that still need to be submitted, (even if considering only the active companies), Armenia should enhance its efforts in supervision and enforcement action taken to ensure the availability of BO information in all cases and continue with of forced liquidation of dormant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="361. With the amendments in the State Registration law in June 2021, the registrant is liable for providing false information as well as for the subsequent consequences, with sanctions consisting in warnings and fines (refer to criterion 24.14). For submission of false information and concealment of information about BOs, the authorized person may be liable to warnings, fines, short-term detention or prohibition to perform certain activities for up to three years. Legal persons can also be forcibly liquidated by the court if they fail to provide their declarations for three years in a row. Criminal penalties may be applied (refer to criterion 24.14) on participants of the legal person or the BO for providing false information to the legal person, or concealing information subject to submission, or for the failure to respond to the inquiry of the legal person. 362. As a consequence of the supervisory actions undertaken by the State Register Agency as shown in the table below, during 2021 to 2024 1,903 administrative proceedings were initiated against legal persons, of which nine were for incorrect or incomplete information, and the rest for failure to submit BO information to the State Registry. 363. As a result of the Authorities’ initiative on the application of warnings, 39% led to remediation measures, which is a positive outcome. In the rest of the cases, it was not monitored whether the imposed sanctions (mainly warnings) were followed by remediation measures or not. The authorities reported that the fine imposed was that of around Eur70, which does not appear to be neither dissuasive nor effective. In fact, the 2024 NRA identified as a vulnerability the low penalty for failure by the legal persons to retain the accounting documents, which enables criminals to erase traces of their crimes, thus creating challenges for LEAs in gathering evidence in criminal cases. The amount of the penalty imposed is the same as that for legal persons not retaining BO information. 364. Armenia has also imposed forced liquidation in a one-off initiative in 2016, to approximately 30,000 dormant legal entities. Table 5.1: Administrative proceedings (2021-2024) 2021 2022 2023 2024 Initiated administrative proceedings 150 1118 435 200 Imposed sanctions 15 115 27 103 Terminations based on achieved compliance 130 300 221 91 365. The authorities recognise that more resources and capacities are required to conduct increased and effective administrative monitoring especially in view of the registered legal persons that still need to declare their BO. 366. In view of the above data and the amount of BO declarations that still need to be submitted, (even if considering only the active companies), Armenia should enhance its efforts in supervision and enforcement action taken to ensure the availability of BO information in all cases and continue with of forced liquidation of dormant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 480. There are no available statistics on the value of confiscated criminal property. The authorities provided partial data on the results obtained in certain crimes: fraud, corruption and tax evasion (see Table 8.5. below), which are based on confiscation orders and on voluntary compensation of damage caused by crime [95] during the preliminary investigations in cases where natural persons were released from criminal liability. Although the results displayed in case of tax evasion appears to be commendable, discussions with the authorities indicate that, in most cases, these amounts represent voluntary compensations rather than property confiscated. A positive assessment on the overall confiscation regime cannot be made. Table 8.5. Value of property confiscated and voluntarily compensated for certain predicate offences (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud n/a n/a 242 857 369 296 105 000 717 153 Corruption n/a n/a 2 079 203 3 034 054 2 585 587 7 698 844 Tax evasion n/a n/a 55 204 258 71 784 444 87 555 555 214 544 257 481. On a more positive note, the introduction of the NCBC regime has started to show results and contributed to the improvement in the country’s ability to confiscate illicit assets. 482. The Department for the Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin (hereafter the Department) within the GPO works with prosecutors and investigative bodies, focusing on civil confiscation. The Department has 12 prosecutors, 2 administrative officers, and 5 financial experts. It initiates civil proceedings against property owners who cannot lawfully justify the origin of assets substantially disproportionate to their legal income. Table 8.6. Value of property confiscated and recovered based on settlement agreements under NCBC (EUR) Results of NCBC (EUR) 2023 2024 2025 Sept Total Total value confiscated NCBC 4.910.707 6.508.897 1.050.268 12.469.872 ML 4.562.549 1.050.268 5.612.817 Fraud 111.600 0 0 111.600 Drug trafficking 0 0 0 0 Corruption 0 0 0 0 Tax evasion 0 0 0 0 Organised crime 0 0 0 0 Other 4.799.107 1.946.348 0 6.745.455 Total value confiscated NCBC – final decisions 0 0 852.200 852.200 Value of recovered property through settlement agreements 4.973.052 6.508.898 198.068 11.680.018 Total value effectively recovered property NCBC 4.973.052 6.508.898 969.982 12.451.932 483. Through case examples the authorities demonstrated that in 2023, criminal property was recovered in four cases based on settlement agreements, while 163 civil forfeiture cases were reviewed in 2024. Approximately 150 civil forfeiture cases are currently pending before the Anti-Corruption Court, most of which are related to corruption offenses. 484. Statistics on the exact value of property seized in NCBC proceedings are not maintained, making it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of civil confiscation efforts. Most of the criminal property was recovered based on the settlement agreements, while only in one case the this was done based on a final court decision (Table 8.6.). The AT was not informed whether there are cases of extended confiscation under the civil confiscation regime. As indicated under R.4, the extended confiscation mechanism is subject to a technical limitation related to the threshold of 50 million AMD (approximately 120,000 USD) required for applying such measure. This may limit the pursuit of extended confiscation in cases involving assets below this threshold. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 485. According to the information provided by the GPO, international information exchange has been used to identify illicit assets linked to proceeds of corruption, fraud and ML, resulting in a total of 12 asset recovery-related requests. In two cases, this led to the seizure of assets (approximatively four years ago), including real estate located in the United States in a corruption case (valued at approximately USD 36 mil.), as well as funds and real estate in a tax related case located in Slovak Republik (valued at approximatively EUR 380 000). None of the seized assets have yet been repatriated (see IO2). This information is partial, as the MoJ does not maintain separate statistics on asset recovery-related requests. 486. During the reporting period, the Department made 46 international requests for identifying assets for recovery by using the CARIN network, but none of those resulted in tangible outcome. There were also 45 MLARs send within NCBC framework, but none ended with a positive response. 487. Based on this information, the AT team cannot conclude that criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad is effectively recovered. Footnotes [95] Voluntary compensation of damage – compensation of damage caused by a crime made by a natural person who is released from criminal liability in the event of active repentance, provided that the following conditions are met: i) the person has committed a criminal offence for the first time; ii) the offence is of minor or medium gravity; iii) the person admits the offence and cooperates with the authorities; iv) and compensates for the damage caused by the crime (CC, Article 81)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.5.1. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located domestically 480. There are no available statistics on the value of confiscated criminal property. The authorities provided partial data on the results obtained in certain crimes: fraud, corruption and tax evasion (see Table 8.5. below), which are based on confiscation orders and on voluntary compensation of damage caused by crime [95] during the preliminary investigations in cases where natural persons were released from criminal liability. Although the results displayed in case of tax evasion appears to be commendable, discussions with the authorities indicate that, in most cases, these amounts represent voluntary compensations rather than property confiscated. A positive assessment on the overall confiscation regime cannot be made. Table 8.5. Value of property confiscated and voluntarily compensated for certain predicate offences (EUR) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Fraud n/a n/a 242 857 369 296 105 000 717 153 Corruption n/a n/a 2 079 203 3 034 054 2 585 587 7 698 844 Tax evasion n/a n/a 55 204 258 71 784 444 87 555 555 214 544 257 481. On a more positive note, the introduction of the NCBC regime has started to show results and contributed to the improvement in the country’s ability to confiscate illicit assets. 482. The Department for the Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin (hereafter the Department) within the GPO works with prosecutors and investigative bodies, focusing on civil confiscation. The Department has 12 prosecutors, 2 administrative officers, and 5 financial experts. It initiates civil proceedings against property owners who cannot lawfully justify the origin of assets substantially disproportionate to their legal income. Table 8.6. Value of property confiscated and recovered based on settlement agreements under NCBC (EUR) Results of NCBC (EUR) 2023 2024 2025 Sept Total Total value confiscated NCBC 4.910.707 6.508.897 1.050.268 12.469.872 ML 4.562.549 1.050.268 5.612.817 Fraud 111.600 0 0 111.600 Drug trafficking 0 0 0 0 Corruption 0 0 0 0 Tax evasion 0 0 0 0 Organised crime 0 0 0 0 Other 4.799.107 1.946.348 0 6.745.455 Total value confiscated NCBC – final decisions 0 0 852.200 852.200 Value of recovered property through settlement agreements 4.973.052 6.508.898 198.068 11.680.018 Total value effectively recovered property NCBC 4.973.052 6.508.898 969.982 12.451.932 483. Through case examples the authorities demonstrated that in 2023, criminal property was recovered in four cases based on settlement agreements, while 163 civil forfeiture cases were reviewed in 2024. Approximately 150 civil forfeiture cases are currently pending before the Anti-Corruption Court, most of which are related to corruption offenses. 484. Statistics on the exact value of property seized in NCBC proceedings are not maintained, making it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of civil confiscation efforts. Most of the criminal property was recovered based on the settlement agreements, while only in one case the this was done based on a final court decision (Table 8.6.). The AT was not informed whether there are cases of extended confiscation under the civil confiscation regime. As indicated under R.4, the extended confiscation mechanism is subject to a technical limitation related to the threshold of 50 million AMD (approximately 120,000 USD) required for applying such measure. This may limit the pursuit of extended confiscation in cases involving assets below this threshold. 8.5.2. Criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad 485. According to the information provided by the GPO, international information exchange has been used to identify illicit assets linked to proceeds of corruption, fraud and ML, resulting in a total of 12 asset recovery-related requests. In two cases, this led to the seizure of assets (approximatively four years ago), including real estate located in the United States in a corruption case (valued at approximately USD 36 mil.), as well as funds and real estate in a tax related case located in Slovak Republik (valued at approximatively EUR 380 000). None of the seized assets have yet been repatriated (see IO2). This information is partial, as the MoJ does not maintain separate statistics on asset recovery-related requests. 486. During the reporting period, the Department made 46 international requests for identifying assets for recovery by using the CARIN network, but none of those resulted in tangible outcome. There were also 45 MLARs send within NCBC framework, but none ended with a positive response. 487. Based on this information, the AT team cannot conclude that criminal property and property of corresponding value located abroad is effectively recovered. Footnotes [95] Voluntary compensation of damage – compensation of damage caused by a crime made by a natural person who is released from criminal liability in the event of active repentance, provided that the following conditions are met: i) the person has committed a criminal offence for the first time; ii) the offence is of minor or medium gravity; iii) the person admits the offence and cooperates with the authorities; iv) and compensates for the damage caused by the crime (CC, Article 81)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="530. To date, no alternative measures have been used where a TF conviction is not possible. However, there is a range of such measures available to the authorities that could be used for this purpose. These include the withdrawal of passports or nationality, denying entry into the country, extradition and deportation. Furthermore, as explained under IO10, Armenia has made designations under UNSCR 1373." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="530. To date, no alternative measures have been used where a TF conviction is not possible. However, there is a range of such measures available to the authorities that could be used for this purpose. These include the withdrawal of passports or nationality, denying entry into the country, extradition and deportation. Furthermore, as explained under IO10, Armenia has made designations under UNSCR 1373." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 574. Competent authorities monitor and ensure compliance with TF-related TFS through (i) guidance and training provided to the financial sector as a whole, and (ii) supervisory engagements with individual FIs. 575. As regards guidance and training, the authorities have implemented a range of measures in this respect. The Freezing Guidance referred to under Core Issue 10.4, which has been in place throughout the assessment period, outlines freezing obligations, mechanisms for communication of listing decisions to reporting entities, guidance to parties holding frozen property and information on preventive measures to disrupt access to or use of property by persons related to terrorism. This has been recently supplemented by a “Guidance on Criteria for the high-risk and Suspicion of Terrorist Financing and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, which contains information about high-risk criteria and indicators of suspicion. 576. The authorities organised training events, including presentations and workshops, to further the understanding of the private sector. According to the authorities, information about TFS has been included in general AML/CFT training events that have been organised by the authorities throughout the assessment period. This has been supplemented by training events specifically focused on TFS. In January 2024 a workshop for reporting entities was organised in cooperation with representatives of the CoE. This workshop, which was attended by over 140 participants, covered the TFS risks applicable to each type of reporting entity, their obligations and duties; overview of the TFS lists, the types of sanctions and rules; the TFS mechanisms put in place by reporting entities, ongoing monitoring and practical guidance on identifying, preventing and reporting TF. Furthermore, following feedback in December 2023 from bank representatives about their wish for more advanced training on TFS (following a training event on trade sanctions), in October 2024 the FSLD organized a specialized training program focused on UN TFS, tailored for representatives of banks, investment firms, and MVTS providers. Extracts from the materials used at the events in January 2024 and October 2024 were provided to the AT, and they demonstrated that the scope of the events was comprehensive, and the information provided was of high quality. 577. The FIs that were met onsite were familiar with the guidance provided by the authorities on TFS and had attended the training events on this topic. All confirmed that they had found the guidance and training useful. 578. As regards supervisory engagement with individual FIs, this takes the form of off- site and on-site supervision. According to the authorities, the primary source of off-site data from a TFS perspective is the annual risk assessment of FIs. In particular, from the inherent risk assessment perspective, the TF risk levels of FIs are assessed by considering exposure to countries and clients that are high risk from a TF perspective. From an internal control assessment perspective, particular attention is paid to the adequacy of automated screening systems and customer due diligence (including risk assessment) in general. The authorities confirmed that TFS implementation is always included in full-scope on-site inspections and while designing inspection plans, consideration is given to TF residual risk profiles to determine the scope of inspection from a TFS perspective. 579. Supervision has primarily focused on the banking sector, which is understandable given that it is the most material from a TFS perspective. As referred to under Core Issue 10.4, the FSLD has carried out two thematic inspections in relation to the banking sector. The first, in 2023, involved 13 banks and comprised an evaluation of internal processes and controls, followed by the use of test data to verify that screening systems could successfully detect matches with designated persons. The conclusion from the inspection was that sanctions screening solutions deployed by all inspected banks were capable of effectively identifying matches with persons and entities listed by the UN. Nonetheless, several areas for improvement were identified, particularly concerning the need for periodic testing and fine-tuning of sanctions screening software to maintain optimal performance. As a result, the FSLD issued a circular to all banks outlining supervisory expectations regarding the sanctions screening process. 580. The second thematic inspection, in 2025, involved 18 banks and was carried out in conjunction with the FMC with the aim of reaffirming and following up on the findings of the 2023 inspection. A broader and more comprehensive set of test data was employed in this round to assess system responsiveness and detection capability. The results confirmed that all banks' sanctions screening systems were able to successfully detect matches with persons and entities included in the UN Lists. While there were no cases identified of deficiencies in the screening process, there were some related deficiencies (e.g. a bank did not maintain historic records of all listings and de-listings) which resulted in specific actions by the FSLD. As a result of the inspection, a document summarising the finding of the monitoring was compiled which contained the deficiency identified and recommendation for remedying the deficiency. Primarily banks were requested to develop concise action plan for remedying deficiencies. The FSLD continues to monitor the implementation of the developed action plans. 581. In the view of the AT, these two thematic inspections are impressive, both in terms of their scope and the positive outcomes, as described above. In addition, in 2024 the FSLD carried out a full review of TFS compliance by two banks as part of a full-scope AML/CFT inspection. One of these reviews resulted in some identified deficiencies and the imposition of a sanction. Box 10.3. Case Study – Identified Deficiency in Bank Screening Systems During a full-scope AML/CTF/CPF inspection in December 2024, a joint FSLD- FMC team reviewed Bank’s A implementation of TFS obligations. Although Bank A had integrated a sanctions screening module into its core banking system, to screen new customer information against the UN Lists and the 1373 National List, the inspection revealed a technical deficiency in the way the screening module operates within the customer onboarding workflow. Specifically, it was identified that the system performs sanctions screening at an early stage of the onboarding process but did not automatically re-screen customer data when it was manually edited (e.g., name or identification details) before final registration. As a result, there was a window of vulnerability during which altered customer information might be recorded into the system without being properly checked against the relevant sanctions lists. While other screening processes (e.g. transaction screening and periodic monitoring) were functional, this gap represented a compliance risk at the point of entry into the financial system, as a designated person could bypass detection if critical identifiers were changed after the initial check. This finding was considered a breach of Article 28 of the AML/CTF Law; and was reflected in the overall supervisory sanctions that were imposed for this and other breaches (namely a formal warning, an order to eliminate violations, an administrative fine for the entity of approximately EUR 340 000 and an administrative fine for the MLRO of approximately EUR 2 300). Source: CBA 582. As regards non-bank FIs, to date they have not been subject to any specific onsite inspections in relation to TFS. However, according to the FSLD issues of TFS compliance are considered within the context of general AML/CFT inspections (see under IO.3) and are routinely raised in the course of meetings between the FSLD and all FIs. This was confirmed by some of the FIs that were met onsite. 583. The FSLD also evaluates the adequacy of all FIs’ sanctions screening frameworks offsite as part of the annual risk assessment process. This requires FIs to submit detailed information regarding the screening solutions employed and the corresponding screening procedures. This information is subsequently reviewed by the FSLD and integrated into the institution’s overall risk profile. According to the authorities, any deficiencies identified during this process are communicated to the respective institutions through supervisory &quot;Dear CEO&quot; letters, and examples of such letters were provided. 584. No supervisory action has been taken to address possible delays in manual checks against updates to lists. However, as indicated above the risk of these delays leading to a sanctions breach is low. 585. Overall, the level of supervisory engagement of the FSLD for both banks and non-bank FIs regarding TFS appears to be in line with the risks of the sector. However, this engagement is focused very heavily on screening, with only limited coverage of the controls that FIs have in place to prevent sanctions evasion. In the view of the AT, there is scope for increased engagement on this topic, in particular in relation to typologies of sanctions evasion in TF cases. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 586. The DNFBPs met onsite were familiar with the TFS guidance issued by the authorities and almost all had attended training sessions on this topic. As with FIs, they confirmed that they had found the guidance and training useful. 587. According to the authorities, the monitoring of TFS compliance by DNFPBs primarily comprises off-site risk-based supervision, whereby DNFPBs fill-in a designated self-assessment questionnaire, which includes specific parts on the TFS framework that the entity has in place. Following this, the questionnaires as well as DNFBPs’ risk assessments are analysed and based on the results, if there are issues identified, proposals for enhancing specific processes, developing and implementing work plans, and addressing existing deficiencies are made. In terms of the identification of TFS-related infringements, a special form titled a “Protocol” is generated, which contains information on the supervision measures taken and the nature of the infringements. The DNFBP is also given a specific timeframe to report on the implementation of actions aimed at eliminating or rectifying the infringement. 588. There have been no thematic inspections of TFS compliance by DNFBPs. As regards lawyers, accountants, estate agents, and DPMS monitoring and compliance with TFS is specifically envisaged as part of general onsite and offsite supervisory engagement by provisions in the FMC’s DNFBP supervisory manual. However, as explained under IO.4 no onsite inspections have been carried out to date by the FMC, although the DNFBPs that were met onsite generally confirmed that questions about their screening processes were included in questionnaires from the FMC. 589. During onsite inspections the SRC evaluates the ability of gambling operators to comply with the requirements established by AML/CFT legislation, including TFS obligations. Some of the DNFBPs supervised by the SRC that were met onsite confirmed that the SRC had carried out checks on their screening systems. 590. The level of supervisory engagement appears to be in line with the TFS risks of the DNFBP sector overall. However, as with FIs, the focus on issues related to sanctions evasion appears limited, although this is less material for most DNFBPs given their customer profiles. 591. According to the information provided by Armenia, no deficiencies have been identified in relation to TFS compliance by any DNFBP. Consequently, no enforcement action has been taken. This indicates that the supervisory activity carried out in relation to DNFBPs has not identified the instance referred to above where a DNFBP reported taking a week to make checks against changes to UN lists. Although the materiality of this is low, this is still something which the AT would expect the supervisor to have picked up and addressed to ensure that all checks are made immediately." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 574. Competent authorities monitor and ensure compliance with TF-related TFS through (i) guidance and training provided to the financial sector as a whole, and (ii) supervisory engagements with individual FIs. 575. As regards guidance and training, the authorities have implemented a range of measures in this respect. The Freezing Guidance referred to under Core Issue 10.4, which has been in place throughout the assessment period, outlines freezing obligations, mechanisms for communication of listing decisions to reporting entities, guidance to parties holding frozen property and information on preventive measures to disrupt access to or use of property by persons related to terrorism. This has been recently supplemented by a “Guidance on Criteria for the high-risk and Suspicion of Terrorist Financing and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, which contains information about high-risk criteria and indicators of suspicion. 576. The authorities organised training events, including presentations and workshops, to further the understanding of the private sector. According to the authorities, information about TFS has been included in general AML/CFT training events that have been organised by the authorities throughout the assessment period. This has been supplemented by training events specifically focused on TFS. In January 2024 a workshop for reporting entities was organised in cooperation with representatives of the CoE. This workshop, which was attended by over 140 participants, covered the TFS risks applicable to each type of reporting entity, their obligations and duties; overview of the TFS lists, the types of sanctions and rules; the TFS mechanisms put in place by reporting entities, ongoing monitoring and practical guidance on identifying, preventing and reporting TF. Furthermore, following feedback in December 2023 from bank representatives about their wish for more advanced training on TFS (following a training event on trade sanctions), in October 2024 the FSLD organized a specialized training program focused on UN TFS, tailored for representatives of banks, investment firms, and MVTS providers. Extracts from the materials used at the events in January 2024 and October 2024 were provided to the AT, and they demonstrated that the scope of the events was comprehensive, and the information provided was of high quality. 577. The FIs that were met onsite were familiar with the guidance provided by the authorities on TFS and had attended the training events on this topic. All confirmed that they had found the guidance and training useful. 578. As regards supervisory engagement with individual FIs, this takes the form of off- site and on-site supervision. According to the authorities, the primary source of off-site data from a TFS perspective is the annual risk assessment of FIs. In particular, from the inherent risk assessment perspective, the TF risk levels of FIs are assessed by considering exposure to countries and clients that are high risk from a TF perspective. From an internal control assessment perspective, particular attention is paid to the adequacy of automated screening systems and customer due diligence (including risk assessment) in general. The authorities confirmed that TFS implementation is always included in full-scope on-site inspections and while designing inspection plans, consideration is given to TF residual risk profiles to determine the scope of inspection from a TFS perspective. 579. Supervision has primarily focused on the banking sector, which is understandable given that it is the most material from a TFS perspective. As referred to under Core Issue 10.4, the FSLD has carried out two thematic inspections in relation to the banking sector. The first, in 2023, involved 13 banks and comprised an evaluation of internal processes and controls, followed by the use of test data to verify that screening systems could successfully detect matches with designated persons. The conclusion from the inspection was that sanctions screening solutions deployed by all inspected banks were capable of effectively identifying matches with persons and entities listed by the UN. Nonetheless, several areas for improvement were identified, particularly concerning the need for periodic testing and fine-tuning of sanctions screening software to maintain optimal performance. As a result, the FSLD issued a circular to all banks outlining supervisory expectations regarding the sanctions screening process. 580. The second thematic inspection, in 2025, involved 18 banks and was carried out in conjunction with the FMC with the aim of reaffirming and following up on the findings of the 2023 inspection. A broader and more comprehensive set of test data was employed in this round to assess system responsiveness and detection capability. The results confirmed that all banks' sanctions screening systems were able to successfully detect matches with persons and entities included in the UN Lists. While there were no cases identified of deficiencies in the screening process, there were some related deficiencies (e.g. a bank did not maintain historic records of all listings and de-listings) which resulted in specific actions by the FSLD. As a result of the inspection, a document summarising the finding of the monitoring was compiled which contained the deficiency identified and recommendation for remedying the deficiency. Primarily banks were requested to develop concise action plan for remedying deficiencies. The FSLD continues to monitor the implementation of the developed action plans. 581. In the view of the AT, these two thematic inspections are impressive, both in terms of their scope and the positive outcomes, as described above. In addition, in 2024 the FSLD carried out a full review of TFS compliance by two banks as part of a full-scope AML/CFT inspection. One of these reviews resulted in some identified deficiencies and the imposition of a sanction. Box 10.3. Case Study – Identified Deficiency in Bank Screening Systems During a full-scope AML/CTF/CPF inspection in December 2024, a joint FSLD- FMC team reviewed Bank’s A implementation of TFS obligations. Although Bank A had integrated a sanctions screening module into its core banking system, to screen new customer information against the UN Lists and the 1373 National List, the inspection revealed a technical deficiency in the way the screening module operates within the customer onboarding workflow. Specifically, it was identified that the system performs sanctions screening at an early stage of the onboarding process but did not automatically re-screen customer data when it was manually edited (e.g., name or identification details) before final registration. As a result, there was a window of vulnerability during which altered customer information might be recorded into the system without being properly checked against the relevant sanctions lists. While other screening processes (e.g. transaction screening and periodic monitoring) were functional, this gap represented a compliance risk at the point of entry into the financial system, as a designated person could bypass detection if critical identifiers were changed after the initial check. This finding was considered a breach of Article 28 of the AML/CTF Law; and was reflected in the overall supervisory sanctions that were imposed for this and other breaches (namely a formal warning, an order to eliminate violations, an administrative fine for the entity of approximately EUR 340 000 and an administrative fine for the MLRO of approximately EUR 2 300). Source: CBA 582. As regards non-bank FIs, to date they have not been subject to any specific onsite inspections in relation to TFS. However, according to the FSLD issues of TFS compliance are considered within the context of general AML/CFT inspections (see under IO.3) and are routinely raised in the course of meetings between the FSLD and all FIs. This was confirmed by some of the FIs that were met onsite. 583. The FSLD also evaluates the adequacy of all FIs’ sanctions screening frameworks offsite as part of the annual risk assessment process. This requires FIs to submit detailed information regarding the screening solutions employed and the corresponding screening procedures. This information is subsequently reviewed by the FSLD and integrated into the institution’s overall risk profile. According to the authorities, any deficiencies identified during this process are communicated to the respective institutions through supervisory &quot;Dear CEO&quot; letters, and examples of such letters were provided. 584. No supervisory action has been taken to address possible delays in manual checks against updates to lists. However, as indicated above the risk of these delays leading to a sanctions breach is low. 585. Overall, the level of supervisory engagement of the FSLD for both banks and non-bank FIs regarding TFS appears to be in line with the risks of the sector. However, this engagement is focused very heavily on screening, with only limited coverage of the controls that FIs have in place to prevent sanctions evasion. In the view of the AT, there is scope for increased engagement on this topic, in particular in relation to typologies of sanctions evasion in TF cases. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 586. The DNFBPs met onsite were familiar with the TFS guidance issued by the authorities and almost all had attended training sessions on this topic. As with FIs, they confirmed that they had found the guidance and training useful. 587. According to the authorities, the monitoring of TFS compliance by DNFPBs primarily comprises off-site risk-based supervision, whereby DNFPBs fill-in a designated self-assessment questionnaire, which includes specific parts on the TFS framework that the entity has in place. Following this, the questionnaires as well as DNFBPs’ risk assessments are analysed and based on the results, if there are issues identified, proposals for enhancing specific processes, developing and implementing work plans, and addressing existing deficiencies are made. In terms of the identification of TFS-related infringements, a special form titled a “Protocol” is generated, which contains information on the supervision measures taken and the nature of the infringements. The DNFBP is also given a specific timeframe to report on the implementation of actions aimed at eliminating or rectifying the infringement. 588. There have been no thematic inspections of TFS compliance by DNFBPs. As regards lawyers, accountants, estate agents, and DPMS monitoring and compliance with TFS is specifically envisaged as part of general onsite and offsite supervisory engagement by provisions in the FMC’s DNFBP supervisory manual. However, as explained under IO.4 no onsite inspections have been carried out to date by the FMC, although the DNFBPs that were met onsite generally confirmed that questions about their screening processes were included in questionnaires from the FMC. 589. During onsite inspections the SRC evaluates the ability of gambling operators to comply with the requirements established by AML/CFT legislation, including TFS obligations. Some of the DNFBPs supervised by the SRC that were met onsite confirmed that the SRC had carried out checks on their screening systems. 590. The level of supervisory engagement appears to be in line with the TFS risks of the DNFBP sector overall. However, as with FIs, the focus on issues related to sanctions evasion appears limited, although this is less material for most DNFBPs given their customer profiles. 591. According to the information provided by Armenia, no deficiencies have been identified in relation to TFS compliance by any DNFBP. Consequently, no enforcement action has been taken. This indicates that the supervisory activity carried out in relation to DNFBPs has not identified the instance referred to above where a DNFBP reported taking a week to make checks against changes to UN lists. Although the materiality of this is low, this is still something which the AT would expect the supervisor to have picked up and addressed to ensure that all checks are made immediately." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 612. The overall understanding of and compliance with TFS obligations by FIs as described under IO.10 applies equally to TFS related to PF. 613. The authorities confirmed that all FIs have PF risk assessments in place. The experience of the supervisors is that FIs generally demonstrate a sound understanding of their inherent PF risks and have implemented controls that are broadly proportionate to their size, materiality, and risk profiles. FIs largely take into account the findings of the PF NRA, although the depth and granularity of such consideration vary across sectors, reflecting their relative materiality and exposure to PF risks. 614. This was confirmed by the FIs met onsite, who generally had a good awareness of the countries that are subject to PF sanctions regimes or are PF hubs, and of the risks involved in dealing with such countries. It was confirmed that they would not generally do business with jurisdictions that are identified as high risk for PF by the FATF and would take measures (e.g. additional due diligence) to address the risks of dealing with PF hub countries. 615. As would be expected, this awareness was stronger with banks and other large FIs, who also demonstrated familiarity with FATF typologies on PF. There was less awareness of specific PF issues among the smaller FIs that were met onsite, but this is not a material concern given the nature of their customers and activities as described under IO.10. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 616. As with FIs, the overall understanding of and compliance with TFS obligations by DNFBPs as described under IO.10 applies equally to TFS related to PF. 617. The authorities advised that while some larger DNFBPs (primarily in the gambling sector) had assessed their PF risks, most DNFBPs had not. This was in line with what the AT was told by DNFBPs met onsite. Some of them had the same awareness of PF issues and the need for mitigating measures as the banks and other large FIs, but for most of them this was not the case. However, as with smaller FIs, this is not a material deficiency given the profile of those DNFBPs as described under IO.10." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 612. The overall understanding of and compliance with TFS obligations by FIs as described under IO.10 applies equally to TFS related to PF. 613. The authorities confirmed that all FIs have PF risk assessments in place. The experience of the supervisors is that FIs generally demonstrate a sound understanding of their inherent PF risks and have implemented controls that are broadly proportionate to their size, materiality, and risk profiles. FIs largely take into account the findings of the PF NRA, although the depth and granularity of such consideration vary across sectors, reflecting their relative materiality and exposure to PF risks. 614. This was confirmed by the FIs met onsite, who generally had a good awareness of the countries that are subject to PF sanctions regimes or are PF hubs, and of the risks involved in dealing with such countries. It was confirmed that they would not generally do business with jurisdictions that are identified as high risk for PF by the FATF and would take measures (e.g. additional due diligence) to address the risks of dealing with PF hub countries. 615. As would be expected, this awareness was stronger with banks and other large FIs, who also demonstrated familiarity with FATF typologies on PF. There was less awareness of specific PF issues among the smaller FIs that were met onsite, but this is not a material concern given the nature of their customers and activities as described under IO.10. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 616. As with FIs, the overall understanding of and compliance with TFS obligations by DNFBPs as described under IO.10 applies equally to TFS related to PF. 617. The authorities advised that while some larger DNFBPs (primarily in the gambling sector) had assessed their PF risks, most DNFBPs had not. This was in line with what the AT was told by DNFBPs met onsite. Some of them had the same awareness of PF issues and the need for mitigating measures as the banks and other large FIs, but for most of them this was not the case. However, as with smaller FIs, this is not a material deficiency given the profile of those DNFBPs as described under IO.10." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="63. Armenia facilitates operational cooperation and coordination through the framework of a dedicated Working Group within the Interagency Committee as explained in the previous core issue. Authorities reported that the Committee can also meet at the request of the Chairperson or of any member of the Interagency Committee on any matter or topic pertaining to AML/CTF/CPF including operational matters. Authorities reported that in parallel, the Working Group can meet on a periodic basis, where the discussions held are in relation to the Interagency Committee's sessions. 64. MOUs are in place with domestic competent authorities to ensure the timely exchange of information. Sensitive data and information are exchanged through the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform which is a secured platform. FMC reported that information is routinely shared through this secured platform. 65. As a result of this cooperation several key documents were formulated that fed into operational activities. For example, a technical guidance on the investigation into TF offences was the result of an exercise initiated by the FMC together with the prosecutors’ office, and the NSS. These are all commendable results, that reflect the use of cooperation and coordination to fight ML/TF at the policy making level. However, the AT does not consider that this is a mechanism that ensures proper and regular cooperation and coordination at the operational level in ML and TF cases where interagency work is facilitated. 66. Based on the on-site discussions, authorities indicated that most of the operational cooperation is on a case-by-case basis with the FMC being the key player and cooperating with different LEAs, supervisory authorities, and the tax authority, and where such cooperation is done through working groups set up under the auspices of the Interagency Committee. 67. Operational cooperation among LEAs commonly focuses on investigative assistance depending on the cases. For example, Armenia reported that in large and complex criminal cases, joint investigative groups were formed for these specific cases that involved multiple LEAs. 68. Therefore, it appears there is an element of operational cooperation where the main trigger of the initiation of cooperation is the FMC. However, there are no formal typology or intelligence-sharing mechanisms to ensure systemic operational information exchange between LEAs and intelligence bodies. The interagency framework should be further enhanced to ensure that cases are jointly initiated, merged, or developed, where all the possible sources of information are exploited and synergies created (for example, exploiting the possibility to initiate a domestic investigation from incoming MLAs). This is necessary in order to ensure the proper detection and investigation of ML and TF and to avoid duplication of efforts and missed opportunities (as also explained under IO7)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="63. Armenia facilitates operational cooperation and coordination through the framework of a dedicated Working Group within the Interagency Committee as explained in the previous core issue. Authorities reported that the Committee can also meet at the request of the Chairperson or of any member of the Interagency Committee on any matter or topic pertaining to AML/CTF/CPF including operational matters. Authorities reported that in parallel, the Working Group can meet on a periodic basis, where the discussions held are in relation to the Interagency Committee's sessions. 64. MOUs are in place with domestic competent authorities to ensure the timely exchange of information. Sensitive data and information are exchanged through the Financial Intelligence Data Exchange Platform which is a secured platform. FMC reported that information is routinely shared through this secured platform. 65. As a result of this cooperation several key documents were formulated that fed into operational activities. For example, a technical guidance on the investigation into TF offences was the result of an exercise initiated by the FMC together with the prosecutors’ office, and the NSS. These are all commendable results, that reflect the use of cooperation and coordination to fight ML/TF at the policy making level. However, the AT does not consider that this is a mechanism that ensures proper and regular cooperation and coordination at the operational level in ML and TF cases where interagency work is facilitated. 66. Based on the on-site discussions, authorities indicated that most of the operational cooperation is on a case-by-case basis with the FMC being the key player and cooperating with different LEAs, supervisory authorities, and the tax authority, and where such cooperation is done through working groups set up under the auspices of the Interagency Committee. 67. Operational cooperation among LEAs commonly focuses on investigative assistance depending on the cases. For example, Armenia reported that in large and complex criminal cases, joint investigative groups were formed for these specific cases that involved multiple LEAs. 68. Therefore, it appears there is an element of operational cooperation where the main trigger of the initiation of cooperation is the FMC. However, there are no formal typology or intelligence-sharing mechanisms to ensure systemic operational information exchange between LEAs and intelligence bodies. The interagency framework should be further enhanced to ensure that cases are jointly initiated, merged, or developed, where all the possible sources of information are exploited and synergies created (for example, exploiting the possibility to initiate a domestic investigation from incoming MLAs). This is necessary in order to ensure the proper detection and investigation of ML and TF and to avoid duplication of efforts and missed opportunities (as also explained under IO7)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="208. Overall, the CBA’s supervisory activity has had a positive and measurable impact on the compliance behaviour of FIs, particularly banks, where repeated supervisory engagement, remedial measures and sanctions have led to improvements in internal controls, staff expertise, and reporting quality. 209. The CBA systematically monitors the implementation of remedial measures imposed on FIs and conducts follow-up actions or sanctions where non-compliance persists. The authorities provided several examples illustrating how supervisory interventions have led to improvements in AML/CFT compliance. One important tool is the review of internal controls in FIs as part of the annual risk assessment, which leads to “Dear CEO” letters highlighting deficiencies. Although these findings usually do not translate into sanctions, their proper remediation is followed up by the CBA. 210. One case arose from an FMC-led analysis. Following identification of weaknesses in CDD practices across several banks, the CBA conducted follow-up inspections, confirmed the deficiencies, and imposed a series of escalating sanctions to ensure full remediation (see Table 3.5). These included fines, orders to strengthen internal monitoring units, and ultimately the removal of non-compliant MLRO. The sequence of progressively applied sanctions demonstrated the CBA’s readiness to enforce corrective action until compliance was achieved (see Table 3.5). Banks concerned acknowledged that resource limitations had initially constrained implementation but subsequently enhanced their compliance capacity. Table 3.5. Escalating sanctions implementation example Entity Inspection 2021 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 1 2022 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 2 2023 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 3 2023 Bank 1 fine (EUR 5 000) Fine (EUR 10 000) ✓ n/a Bank 2 fine (EUR 25 000) Fine (EUR 15 000) Fine (EUR 40 000) ✓ Fine against MLRO (EUR 2 500) Bank 3 fine (EUR 75 000) Fine (EUR 150 000) Fine (EUR 220 000) ✓ Fine against MLRO (EUR 2 300) Removal of MLRO Limitation of activities with high-risk clients 211. The case also triggered sector-wide remedial measures, notably the CBA’s 2022 decision requiring all banks to strengthen their internal monitoring units and ensure that the MLRO and at least half of compliance staff obtain internationally recognised AML/CFT qualifications. As a result, the number of AML/CFT staff within banks increased from 82 in 2021 to 148 in 2024, with over 100 certified officers. The AT considers these developments as a key factor contributing to the improved risk understanding and compliance culture observed in the banking sector. 212. Although the content and analytical quality of STR reports have improved, particularly within the banking sector, overall STR volumes remained modest throughout the review period. 213. As mentioned above, in 2024, the CBA required all banks to document their risk appetite and introduce quantitative indicators within their internal risk assessment frameworks. An interim follow-up concluded that some of the banks have fully complied while others are in the process of implementation. These measures are expected to strengthen the alignment between business risk assessment and operational controls. 214. The CBA’s sanctions framework complements its remedial measures. The supervisor is empowered to impose a full range of sanctions and has increasingly used them in recent years. Statistics provided indicate growing enforcement activity, with the banking and currency exchange sectors accounting for the majority of actions (see Table 3.6). This increase has been particularly observed in the latter part of the assessment period, mirroring the expansion of on-site supervisory activity and in line with the rapid expansion of the financial sector. 215. Of the approximately EUR 1.5 million in fines imposed on banks during the review period, around one third was applied in the third quarter of 2025 alone, reflecting not only the increase in the sector, but also a more assertive enforcement stance in response to identified compliance deficiencies. 216. An increase in sanctioning followed the application of the cyclical on-site inspections prescribed in the Methodology, which demonstrated greater effectiveness of this tool in discovering and addressing breaches compared with the previous approach described in Core Issue 3.5. Table 3.6. Sanctions applied for FIs for AML/CFT breaches (2020-Q3 2025) Entity Warnings Fines MLRO removal License withdrawal License suspension No. Of which against MLRO Amount (EUR) Of which against MLRO Banks 38 35 4 1 485 902 9 664 1 MVTS 5 3 7 248 Investment companies 1 1 Credit organizations 13 11 242 818 2 Currency exchange 53 19 130 469 2 4 Pawnshops 1 217. While the sanctioning methodology lists factors to be considered, it does not provide for a quantitative formula for fine calculation, leaving significant discretion to the supervisor. 218. Only brief information on sanctioning is published on the CBA website, without details on the actual sanctions imposed or on deficiencies identified [56] , thus having limited impact on improving transparency and or having a deterrent effect. Although fines and administrative measures are applied more frequently, the CBA continues to view license restrictions or business limitations as an effective tool. Overall, the sanctions regime appears proportionate and dissuasive. Only five decisions of the CBA have been appealed in court, suggesting that FIs generally accept the supervisory findings and remedial measures imposed. Footnotes [56]. The announcements on the website only refer to the fact that a FI was sanctioned, not indicating the law or cluster of legal provisions that were breached or the level of sanction applied." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="208. Overall, the CBA’s supervisory activity has had a positive and measurable impact on the compliance behaviour of FIs, particularly banks, where repeated supervisory engagement, remedial measures and sanctions have led to improvements in internal controls, staff expertise, and reporting quality. 209. The CBA systematically monitors the implementation of remedial measures imposed on FIs and conducts follow-up actions or sanctions where non-compliance persists. The authorities provided several examples illustrating how supervisory interventions have led to improvements in AML/CFT compliance. One important tool is the review of internal controls in FIs as part of the annual risk assessment, which leads to “Dear CEO” letters highlighting deficiencies. Although these findings usually do not translate into sanctions, their proper remediation is followed up by the CBA. 210. One case arose from an FMC-led analysis. Following identification of weaknesses in CDD practices across several banks, the CBA conducted follow-up inspections, confirmed the deficiencies, and imposed a series of escalating sanctions to ensure full remediation (see Table 3.5). These included fines, orders to strengthen internal monitoring units, and ultimately the removal of non-compliant MLRO. The sequence of progressively applied sanctions demonstrated the CBA’s readiness to enforce corrective action until compliance was achieved (see Table 3.5). Banks concerned acknowledged that resource limitations had initially constrained implementation but subsequently enhanced their compliance capacity. Table 3.5. Escalating sanctions implementation example Entity Inspection 2021 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 1 2022 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 2 2023 (sanctions applied) Follow-up 3 2023 Bank 1 fine (EUR 5 000) Fine (EUR 10 000) ✓ n/a Bank 2 fine (EUR 25 000) Fine (EUR 15 000) Fine (EUR 40 000) ✓ Fine against MLRO (EUR 2 500) Bank 3 fine (EUR 75 000) Fine (EUR 150 000) Fine (EUR 220 000) ✓ Fine against MLRO (EUR 2 300) Removal of MLRO Limitation of activities with high-risk clients 211. The case also triggered sector-wide remedial measures, notably the CBA’s 2022 decision requiring all banks to strengthen their internal monitoring units and ensure that the MLRO and at least half of compliance staff obtain internationally recognised AML/CFT qualifications. As a result, the number of AML/CFT staff within banks increased from 82 in 2021 to 148 in 2024, with over 100 certified officers. The AT considers these developments as a key factor contributing to the improved risk understanding and compliance culture observed in the banking sector. 212. Although the content and analytical quality of STR reports have improved, particularly within the banking sector, overall STR volumes remained modest throughout the review period. 213. As mentioned above, in 2024, the CBA required all banks to document their risk appetite and introduce quantitative indicators within their internal risk assessment frameworks. An interim follow-up concluded that some of the banks have fully complied while others are in the process of implementation. These measures are expected to strengthen the alignment between business risk assessment and operational controls. 214. The CBA’s sanctions framework complements its remedial measures. The supervisor is empowered to impose a full range of sanctions and has increasingly used them in recent years. Statistics provided indicate growing enforcement activity, with the banking and currency exchange sectors accounting for the majority of actions (see Table 3.6). This increase has been particularly observed in the latter part of the assessment period, mirroring the expansion of on-site supervisory activity and in line with the rapid expansion of the financial sector. 215. Of the approximately EUR 1.5 million in fines imposed on banks during the review period, around one third was applied in the third quarter of 2025 alone, reflecting not only the increase in the sector, but also a more assertive enforcement stance in response to identified compliance deficiencies. 216. An increase in sanctioning followed the application of the cyclical on-site inspections prescribed in the Methodology, which demonstrated greater effectiveness of this tool in discovering and addressing breaches compared with the previous approach described in Core Issue 3.5. Table 3.6. Sanctions applied for FIs for AML/CFT breaches (2020-Q3 2025) Entity Warnings Fines MLRO removal License withdrawal License suspension No. Of which against MLRO Amount (EUR) Of which against MLRO Banks 38 35 4 1 485 902 9 664 1 MVTS 5 3 7 248 Investment companies 1 1 Credit organizations 13 11 242 818 2 Currency exchange 53 19 130 469 2 4 Pawnshops 1 217. While the sanctioning methodology lists factors to be considered, it does not provide for a quantitative formula for fine calculation, leaving significant discretion to the supervisor. 218. Only brief information on sanctioning is published on the CBA website, without details on the actual sanctions imposed or on deficiencies identified [56] , thus having limited impact on improving transparency and or having a deterrent effect. Although fines and administrative measures are applied more frequently, the CBA continues to view license restrictions or business limitations as an effective tool. Overall, the sanctions regime appears proportionate and dissuasive. Only five decisions of the CBA have been appealed in court, suggesting that FIs generally accept the supervisory findings and remedial measures imposed. Footnotes [56]. The announcements on the website only refer to the fact that a FI was sanctioned, not indicating the law or cluster of legal provisions that were breached or the level of sanction applied." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="296. Supervisory authorities provided examples of outreach activities, remedial measures and isolated enforcement actions; however, there is no systematic analysis of trends in supervisory findings and compliance outcomes across DNFBP sectors. Given that, with the exception of the gambling sector, AML/CFT oversight has only recently been applied in practice, authorities do not maintain consolidated statistics on the nature, frequency or severity of AML/CFT breaches identified during this time, nor on the impact of supervisory interventions on subsequent compliance. 297. In the gambling sector, deficiencies identified during onsite inspections primarily concerned failures to properly conduct on-going due diligence, including cases where accounts with expired identification documents remained actively used. Gambling operators have subsequently taken corrective actions, including cooperation with the e-government infrastructure agency (Ekenk LLC) to strengthen identity verification process. These measures indicate a capacity to address supervisory findings in practice. 298. Across the wider DNFBP sector, understanding of AML/CFT obligations was highly limited for most of the assessment period, reflecting the relatively recent introduction of supervisory responsibilities for the FMC. Since 2023, extensive training, outreach and guidance activities conducted by the FMC have had a positive impact, and most DNFBPs met by the AT demonstrated improved awareness of their obligations and confirmed that this was due to the recent interaction with the FMC. Nevertheless, the level of understanding remains uneven across sectors, and continued supervisory engagement and outreach are required to ensure consistent implementation in practice. 299. In the gambling sector, supervised by the SRC, enforcement action has been more visible, albeit limited, and supervisory findings indicate that identified deficiencies have been followed by remedial measures and improvements over time. By contrast, enforcement action across other DNFBP sectors has been largely absent. Since assuming its supervisory role, the FMC has applied only a small number of remedial measures; MoJ disciplinary action in relation to notaries has been modest; and the ChoA’s powers are limited to professional disciplinary measures. 300. While recent outreach activities by all authorities, in particular the FMC, appear to have improved overall understanding of DNFBPs, consistent enforcement actions to ensure compliance remain limited, including in the most material sectors. 301. The absence of consistent data, trend analysis and information on follow-up actions limits the ability to demonstrate a sustained and system-wide positive impact of supervision and sanctions on DNFBP compliance over time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="296. Supervisory authorities provided examples of outreach activities, remedial measures and isolated enforcement actions; however, there is no systematic analysis of trends in supervisory findings and compliance outcomes across DNFBP sectors. Given that, with the exception of the gambling sector, AML/CFT oversight has only recently been applied in practice, authorities do not maintain consolidated statistics on the nature, frequency or severity of AML/CFT breaches identified during this time, nor on the impact of supervisory interventions on subsequent compliance. 297. In the gambling sector, deficiencies identified during onsite inspections primarily concerned failures to properly conduct on-going due diligence, including cases where accounts with expired identification documents remained actively used. Gambling operators have subsequently taken corrective actions, including cooperation with the e-government infrastructure agency (Ekenk LLC) to strengthen identity verification process. These measures indicate a capacity to address supervisory findings in practice. 298. Across the wider DNFBP sector, understanding of AML/CFT obligations was highly limited for most of the assessment period, reflecting the relatively recent introduction of supervisory responsibilities for the FMC. Since 2023, extensive training, outreach and guidance activities conducted by the FMC have had a positive impact, and most DNFBPs met by the AT demonstrated improved awareness of their obligations and confirmed that this was due to the recent interaction with the FMC. Nevertheless, the level of understanding remains uneven across sectors, and continued supervisory engagement and outreach are required to ensure consistent implementation in practice. 299. In the gambling sector, supervised by the SRC, enforcement action has been more visible, albeit limited, and supervisory findings indicate that identified deficiencies have been followed by remedial measures and improvements over time. By contrast, enforcement action across other DNFBP sectors has been largely absent. Since assuming its supervisory role, the FMC has applied only a small number of remedial measures; MoJ disciplinary action in relation to notaries has been modest; and the ChoA’s powers are limited to professional disciplinary measures. 300. While recent outreach activities by all authorities, in particular the FMC, appear to have improved overall understanding of DNFBPs, consistent enforcement actions to ensure compliance remain limited, including in the most material sectors. 301. The absence of consistent data, trend analysis and information on follow-up actions limits the ability to demonstrate a sustained and system-wide positive impact of supervision and sanctions on DNFBP compliance over time." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="488. Returning confiscated property to victims constitutes a priority according to the Armenian authorities. In criminal proceedings, the rights of persons who have suffered material (property) damage are restored through filing a property claim and the full or partial satisfaction of that claim by the court. Notably, according to Article 163 of the CPC, when the victim is deprived of the opportunity to defend their property interests — due to dependence on the accused, being incapacitated or of limited capacity, having mental health issues, or for other reasons — the court has the authority, on its own initiative, to resolve the issue of compensating the damage caused by the crime in the final judicial act. 489. Property may also be returned to victims at the conclusion of a criminal investigation in cases where natural or legal persons are released from criminal liability and voluntary compensate for the damage caused by the crime (CC, Articles 81 and 125). Such measures have been applied in cases involving voluntary compensation by natural persons. As shown in Table 8.7, there is no breakdown by the means through which property was returned to victims. However, based on the discussions with authorities, it appears that the return of property through voluntary compensation of damages occurs frequently. There is no data on the total value of property claims, which prevents the assessment of the extent to which property is returned to victims. Table 8.7. Value of property returned to victims based on confiscation orders and voluntary compensation of damages (EUR) Year Natural persons Legal persons 2020 1,023,038 128,424 2021 739,184 232,947 2022 344,624 723,790 2023 1,373,737 772,304 2024 2,786,366 473,648" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="488. Returning confiscated property to victims constitutes a priority according to the Armenian authorities. In criminal proceedings, the rights of persons who have suffered material (property) damage are restored through filing a property claim and the full or partial satisfaction of that claim by the court. Notably, according to Article 163 of the CPC, when the victim is deprived of the opportunity to defend their property interests — due to dependence on the accused, being incapacitated or of limited capacity, having mental health issues, or for other reasons — the court has the authority, on its own initiative, to resolve the issue of compensating the damage caused by the crime in the final judicial act. 489. Property may also be returned to victims at the conclusion of a criminal investigation in cases where natural or legal persons are released from criminal liability and voluntary compensate for the damage caused by the crime (CC, Articles 81 and 125). Such measures have been applied in cases involving voluntary compensation by natural persons. As shown in Table 8.7, there is no breakdown by the means through which property was returned to victims. However, based on the discussions with authorities, it appears that the return of property through voluntary compensation of damages occurs frequently. There is no data on the total value of property claims, which prevents the assessment of the extent to which property is returned to victims. Table 8.7. Value of property returned to victims based on confiscation orders and voluntary compensation of damages (EUR) Year Natural persons Legal persons 2020 1,023,038 128,424 2021 739,184 232,947 2022 344,624 723,790 2023 1,373,737 772,304 2024 2,786,366 473,648" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="618. Generally speaking, the systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs and DNFBPs with TF related TFS described under IO.10 apply equally to PF related TFS. However, the guidance described under IO.10 differentiates between TF and PF issues, and this differentiation is also applied in the course of most supervisory engagements with specific FIs and DNFBPs. 619. The CBA assesses, on an annual basis, the quality of FIs’ internal control frameworks, including their approaches to identifying and mitigating PF risks. This is done through its internal risk assessment methodology. As part of this process, FIs are required to complete a risk evaluation questionnaire, which includes a dedicated section on their internal PF risk assessment. This was confirmed by copies of the questionnaires which were provided to the AT. In addition, FIs are required to submit their most recent PF risk assessment to the CBA for review. 620. As regards the DNFBPs supervised by the FMC, the annual questionnaire for evaluating ML/TF/PF risks contains specific questions requesting information on how the evaluation of the reporting entity’s PF risk is being carried out, how screenings with the lists established in accordance with the relevant PF UNSCRs are carried out, the level of understanding of their TFS obligations; and the level of integration of the PF risk understanding, within their internal AML/CTF/CPF rules and procedures. 621. The SRC currently employs on-site inspections as the primary instrument for assessing PF risks. During such inspections, the ability of gambling operators to comply with the requirements established by AML/CFT legislation, including the level of sophistication of the systems and procedures designed to comply with TFS obligations stemming from the PF UNSCRs, is evaluated. 622. However, there is insufficient emphasis on sanctions evasion and the particularities in typologies for evading TFS related to PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="618. Generally speaking, the systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance by FIs and DNFBPs with TF related TFS described under IO.10 apply equally to PF related TFS. However, the guidance described under IO.10 differentiates between TF and PF issues, and this differentiation is also applied in the course of most supervisory engagements with specific FIs and DNFBPs. 619. The CBA assesses, on an annual basis, the quality of FIs’ internal control frameworks, including their approaches to identifying and mitigating PF risks. This is done through its internal risk assessment methodology. As part of this process, FIs are required to complete a risk evaluation questionnaire, which includes a dedicated section on their internal PF risk assessment. This was confirmed by copies of the questionnaires which were provided to the AT. In addition, FIs are required to submit their most recent PF risk assessment to the CBA for review. 620. As regards the DNFBPs supervised by the FMC, the annual questionnaire for evaluating ML/TF/PF risks contains specific questions requesting information on how the evaluation of the reporting entity’s PF risk is being carried out, how screenings with the lists established in accordance with the relevant PF UNSCRs are carried out, the level of understanding of their TFS obligations; and the level of integration of the PF risk understanding, within their internal AML/CTF/CPF rules and procedures. 621. The SRC currently employs on-site inspections as the primary instrument for assessing PF risks. During such inspections, the ability of gambling operators to comply with the requirements established by AML/CFT legislation, including the level of sophistication of the systems and procedures designed to comply with TFS obligations stemming from the PF UNSCRs, is evaluated. 622. However, there is insufficient emphasis on sanctions evasion and the particularities in typologies for evading TFS related to PF." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 490. Armenia shares borders with Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Only the borders with Georgia and Iran are open, and there is one international airport operating from Yerevan. The smuggling department of the SRC has customs officials at all open border points, working with border control units to identify undeclared cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). X-ray technology and personal searches are used when necessary. 491. Armenia introduced a written declaration system in 2007, while new declaration requirements for the import and export of cash and BNIs across EAEU borders have been applicable under the new EAEU Customs Code since 2018. Cash declarations exceeding the USD 10,000 threshold, all declared BNIs, as well as the identified false/non declarations are communicated to the FMC on regular basis. Table 8.8. Cross border declarations and enforcement actions (EUR) Year Declarations Value Non-declarations False declarations Administrative enforcement actions Fines imposed (value) Investigations [96] Prosecutions Cash seized [97] Cash confiscated Voluntary compensation of damage 2020 310 25,907,307 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2021 42 2,479,727 7 0 3 350 4 3 - 0 48,896 2022 1,310 74,812,102 3 0 1 116 3 0 - 0 2, 222 2023 2,117 125,774,811 7 0 9 9483 7 0 - 158,053 986,040 2024 970 51,398,523 23 0 37 29348 21 7 - 45,444 41,120 492. According to the data provided (Table 8.8.), there are no cases of false declarations, while the number of non-declarations of cross-border cash remains relatively low, with a slight increase observed in 2024. Nonetheless, during the on-site, authorities gave a case example, investigated by the IC, of drugs smuggled from Iran to Armenia in an organised matter. The funds flow from Armenia to Iran was carried out through land border, by money mules transporting cash piles amounting USD 7 000 on each border crossing. The method, which was used to smuggle a total of 10 million USDs, was implemented to avoid the cash control and declaration system and potential seizure of the proceeds. Although Armenia is not regarded as a transit country for drug smuggling (according to the NRA), the above case example appears to indicate the opposite. The AT is not aware of any restrictive measures applied by the SRC in this particular case. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 493. The country has no technical obstacles to confiscate cash and BNI in criminal proceedings. As the Table 8.8. shows, during the period under review, there has been confiscations based on non-declaration of cash totalling 203 497 EUR. 494. The IC investigates most criminal cases triggered by cash/BNI false declarations or non-declarations which are qualified as “smuggling” . Out of those cases, during the reporting period, 40 – 50 % are closed investigations, after the owner of the cash was identified, admitted the incriminated act and the funds were voluntarily given to the state. In such a way the authorities were able to recover an additional 1 078 278 EUR. 495. No ML or TF cases were initiated on the basis of cash/BNI declarations. The authorities claim that the possibility of ML is considered and investigated, including through parallel financial analysis and that no ML/FT suspicions has been identified. Nevertheless, based on typologies presented, as well as some of the NRA conclusions, it is difficult to concur that there is no risk of funds generated by predicate offences transiting the border in the form of cash. 8.7.3. Sanctions 496. When undeclared cash/BNI is found, the SRC launches administrative proceedings (Law on Customs Regulation). During the period under review, 50 such proceedings were initiated, with an overall value of the fine imposed of 39 297 EURO. The value of the administrative sanctions cannot be considered neither effective, proportionate or dissuasive (see R.32). 497. If the amount of undeclared cash/BNI exceeds 20 000 USD, the case is subject to criminal proceedings and handed immediately to the IC. Information on the number of convictions and criminal sanctions imposed in the cash smuggling related cases was not made available to the AT. Footnotes [96] All investigations were initiated for cash smuggling. [97] Please note that there is no seizure applied in these cases, however the assets are secured as evidence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="8.7.1. Identifying and seizing non‑declared or falsely declared cross border movements of currency and BNI 490. Armenia shares borders with Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Only the borders with Georgia and Iran are open, and there is one international airport operating from Yerevan. The smuggling department of the SRC has customs officials at all open border points, working with border control units to identify undeclared cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs). X-ray technology and personal searches are used when necessary. 491. Armenia introduced a written declaration system in 2007, while new declaration requirements for the import and export of cash and BNIs across EAEU borders have been applicable under the new EAEU Customs Code since 2018. Cash declarations exceeding the USD 10,000 threshold, all declared BNIs, as well as the identified false/non declarations are communicated to the FMC on regular basis. Table 8.8. Cross border declarations and enforcement actions (EUR) Year Declarations Value Non-declarations False declarations Administrative enforcement actions Fines imposed (value) Investigations [96] Prosecutions Cash seized [97] Cash confiscated Voluntary compensation of damage 2020 310 25,907,307 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 2021 42 2,479,727 7 0 3 350 4 3 - 0 48,896 2022 1,310 74,812,102 3 0 1 116 3 0 - 0 2, 222 2023 2,117 125,774,811 7 0 9 9483 7 0 - 158,053 986,040 2024 970 51,398,523 23 0 37 29348 21 7 - 45,444 41,120 492. According to the data provided (Table 8.8.), there are no cases of false declarations, while the number of non-declarations of cross-border cash remains relatively low, with a slight increase observed in 2024. Nonetheless, during the on-site, authorities gave a case example, investigated by the IC, of drugs smuggled from Iran to Armenia in an organised matter. The funds flow from Armenia to Iran was carried out through land border, by money mules transporting cash piles amounting USD 7 000 on each border crossing. The method, which was used to smuggle a total of 10 million USDs, was implemented to avoid the cash control and declaration system and potential seizure of the proceeds. Although Armenia is not regarded as a transit country for drug smuggling (according to the NRA), the above case example appears to indicate the opposite. The AT is not aware of any restrictive measures applied by the SRC in this particular case. 8.7.2. Confiscation of currency or BNI related to ML/TF or predicate offences 493. The country has no technical obstacles to confiscate cash and BNI in criminal proceedings. As the Table 8.8. shows, during the period under review, there has been confiscations based on non-declaration of cash totalling 203 497 EUR. 494. The IC investigates most criminal cases triggered by cash/BNI false declarations or non-declarations which are qualified as “smuggling” . Out of those cases, during the reporting period, 40 – 50 % are closed investigations, after the owner of the cash was identified, admitted the incriminated act and the funds were voluntarily given to the state. In such a way the authorities were able to recover an additional 1 078 278 EUR. 495. No ML or TF cases were initiated on the basis of cash/BNI declarations. The authorities claim that the possibility of ML is considered and investigated, including through parallel financial analysis and that no ML/FT suspicions has been identified. Nevertheless, based on typologies presented, as well as some of the NRA conclusions, it is difficult to concur that there is no risk of funds generated by predicate offences transiting the border in the form of cash. 8.7.3. Sanctions 496. When undeclared cash/BNI is found, the SRC launches administrative proceedings (Law on Customs Regulation). During the period under review, 50 such proceedings were initiated, with an overall value of the fine imposed of 39 297 EURO. The value of the administrative sanctions cannot be considered neither effective, proportionate or dissuasive (see R.32). 497. If the amount of undeclared cash/BNI exceeds 20 000 USD, the case is subject to criminal proceedings and handed immediately to the IC. Information on the number of convictions and criminal sanctions imposed in the cash smuggling related cases was not made available to the AT. Footnotes [96] All investigations were initiated for cash smuggling. [97] Please note that there is no seizure applied in these cases, however the assets are secured as evidence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. General understanding of ML/TF risks 116. Overall, Malaysia has a sound understanding of its ML and TF risks. Since 2013, Malaysia has completed five ML/TF national risk assessments (NRAs) and continues to update and adapt its NRA methodology, considering the NRAs of other jurisdictions and available data. Malaysia updates its NRA every three years, with the latest iteration completed in 2023 (NRA 2023). The regular update of the NRA has helped ensure risk findings are informed by the latest financial crime landscape and emerging threats. 117. Malaysia’s NRA adopts a largely robust and well-defined assessment methodology as summarised in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”. The NRA is drafted in a coordinated effort by the NCC-designated team, led by BNM. Risk assessment findings and key recommendations are first discussed in various NCC sub-committee meetings, then reviewed by the NCC working group and high-level meetings for final endorsement. Results are reported to the highest levels of government, including the Prime Minister. 118. Malaysia has established a comprehensive ML/TF data collection mechanism to enhance risk understanding. Competent authorities submit data every four months using a standardised entry form, with all relevant stakeholders manually inputting and updating information. The NCC data team, led by BNM, consolidates this data, reflecting strong political commitment and inter-agency cooperation. A dictionary of terms ensures consistency across stakeholders, which the Assessment Team recognises as a best practice. Additionally, data is gathered from private sector reporting entities via e-platforms linked to supervisory activities. Relevant public and private sector representatives also contribute qualitative insights through focus groups. 119. The NCC plays an important role in proactively communicating risk findings to various stakeholders to ensure a consistent understanding of ML/TF risk. For example, detailed NRA findings are shared with all NCC members. Sector-specific industry engagement sessions are organised by BNM and other regulators to socialise the detailed findings with RIs and judiciary. An executive summary is also published online for public access. [45] The NRA findings are also integrated into training by LEAs and delivered to the private sector through platforms such as the Annual International Conference on Financial Crime and Terrorism Financing and the Compliance Officer Networking Group. 120. The following table summarises the overall findings of the most recent 2023 NRA. Table 1.1. 2023 NRA Findings on ML and TF Risks Crimes Sectors (ML) Sectors (TF) High Risk Fraud Corruption Drug trafficking Smuggling Organised Crime Banking institutions Lawyers DPMS Medium-High Risk Tax crimes Forgery Human Trafficking/Migrant Smuggling Sexual Exploitation Environmental Crimes Capital Market Intermediaries (CMIs) Labuan Money Brokers Casino Company Secretaries Registered Estate Agents (REAs) Accountants Banking institutions DPI Issuers MSBs Labuan Money Brokers DPMS Medium Risk Robbery/theft Extortion Illegal Remittances Insider Trading and Market Manipulation Counterfeiting and Piracy of Products Terrorism and TF Illicit trafficking in Stolen and Other Goods Illicit Arms Trafficking MSBs DPI Issuers Labuan Banking Institutions NBFIs Insurance and Takaful Operators (ITOs) Money Lenders Insurance Intermediaries Banking Intermediaries Leasing Factoring Labuan CMIs Labuan Trust Companies CMIs Insurance and Takaful Operators Insurance Intermediaries Banking Intermediaries Leasing Factoring Labuan CMIs Casino Company Secretaries Lawyers Registered Estate Agents Accountants Low Risk Murder, Grievous Bodily Injury Kidnapping Counterfeiting Currency Sea Robbery Pawnbrokers Labuan Insurance and Takaful Operators Trust Companies Licensed Gaming Outlets Pawnbrokers NBFIs Labuan Banking Institutions Labuan Insurance and Takaful Operators Moneylenders Trust Companies Licensed Gaming Outlets Labuan Trust Companies Note: While some sectors share the same risk rating, the underlying implications vary (e.g., materiality of banking institutions versus types of services provided by lawyers). 121. Moreover, as outlined in the table below, the NRA includes sectoral linkages with high-risk crimes. These linkages are based on case studies, focus groups, perception surveys, media articles, typology reports and STRs. Malaysia demonstrates an understanding of how the proceeds of different crimes might be laundered and which sectors are particularly vulnerable to specific predicate threats or TF. Table 1.2. Common sectors abused for ML originating from high-risk crimes High-Risk Crimes Common Sectors Abused Fraud Banks, ITOs, CMIs, DPIs, MSBs, Labuan Banks, Labuan Insurers, Labuan CMIs, Lawyers, Company Secretaries, Accountants, Trust Companies, DPMS, REAs, Labuan Trust Companies Corruption Banks, Lawyers, Company Secretaries, Labuan Trust Companies, Accountants, DPMS and REAs Drug Trafficking Banks, DPIs, CMIs, Digital Assets Exchanges (DAXs), MSBs, and Casino Smuggling Banks and DPMS Organised Crime Banks, DPIs, ITOs and Company Secretaries TF Banks and MSBs 122. Complementary to the NRA, Malaysia produces thematic risk assessments using a similar risk assessment methodology to the NRA, focusing on specific areas, including legal persons and arrangements, VAs, Labuan IBFC and NPOs. The specific parameters of these assessments are modified where relevant to better assess the unique characteristics of the different thematic areas. Malaysia has also engaged in regional TF (in 2016) and NPO (in 2017) risk assessments with neighbouring jurisdictions. These products have deepened Malaysia’s overall understanding of ML and TF risks. 123. For Labuan IBFC, the risk assessment methodology used in the 2022 Labuan IBFC risk assessment mirrored that used in the NRA. While this assessment did not explicitly examine the risks associated with certain sectors, such as leasing, factoring companies and company management, competent authorities and particularly the LFSA demonstrated an understanding of the ML risks in these sectors. More generally, apart from risk ratings of individual sub-sectors, the Labuan IBFC 2022 risk assessment only included high-level information on tax evasion, along with a comparison of the number and value of STRs submitted by Labuan RIs versus non-Labuan RIs. Risk understanding could therefore be improved by considering specific crime factors and the occurrence of predicate offenses linked specifically to Labuan IBFC. 1.1.2. ML risks 124. The above section and Table 1.1 above provide an overview of Malaysia’s assessment of its ML risks as summarised in NRA 2023. These assessments represent a snapshot in time, as ML risks evolve continuously. As of February 2025, Malaysia concludes that banking institutions, DPMS, and lawyers are assessed as having the highest ML risks. MSBs are considered to have lower inherent risks due to a decline in transaction volume and value, while supervision capabilities of the DPI issuers have been strengthened. As a result, these two sectors are assessed as having medium ML risks. Labuan money brokers and Labuan banking institutions, however, face elevated ML risks due to their exposure to increased international transaction volumes and a growing base of high-risk customers, leading to a rise in their sectoral inherent risks. The Assessment Team generally finds this assessment reasonably sound. 125. When assessing its ML risks, Malaysia also demonstrated an understanding of emerging risk areas, which include: (i) a shift to digital payment involving electronic fund transfer, e-wallets and VAs; (ii) decreasing cash intensity in money lending business; and (iii) the increasing use of professional enablers (such as lawyers and company secretaries) in ML activities. The 1MDB case has also shaped Malaysia’s evolving understanding of ML risks, particularly in relation to corruption. 126. Competent authorities, supervisory authorities and private sector representatives largely have a consistent understanding of Malaysia’s ML risks, as articulated in NRA 2023, other various risk assessments, and highlighted during interviews with the Assessment Team. Moreover, private sector representatives met by the Assessment Team reiterated BNM’s and competent authorities’ proactive efforts in communicating the NRA findings and promoting ML risk understanding across the sectors. 127. While Malaysia has a sound understanding of its ML risks and robust risk assessment methodology, there are some areas where this understanding could be further strengthened: · Malaysia has made substantial efforts to understand the ML risks related to foreign predicate offences and third-party ML , including the increasing use of professional enablers . Yet, as noted in IO7, Malaysia competent authorities face challenges in investigating and prosecuting standalone ML cases—where no clear predicate offense is identified. Authorities cited difficulties in meeting the high legal threshold required to connect illicit proceeds to criminal activities in court, which hinders effective enforcement. The limited investigation data (both qualitative and quantitative) by LEAs, which is partly attributed to the high threshold of pursuing ML prosecution in connection to foreign predicate offences and third-party ML—together with shortcomings in international cooperation, including a lack of proactive use of MLA (see IO.2)—may impact the comprehensive risk understanding of these areas. · Competent authorities’ understanding of cross-border ML risks could also be strengthened. The cross-border nature of Malaysia’s prevalent crimes, such as fraud, illicit drug trafficking, and smuggling, is notable. Malaysia’s geographic proximity to the “Golden Triangle”, and countries known to be major scam-operating hubs, combined with its status as a financial and commercial centre in the region, further underscores the potential for incoming illicit financial flows. Malaysia recognises its position as a transit point for drug and smuggling offences, while the focus on transnational laundering risks is more limited. Malaysia has been working to expand its risk understanding in this area, with specific work undertaken related to illegal remittances, foreign legal persons and arrangements, and human trafficking. Nonetheless, interviews with public and private sector stakeholders revealed inconsistencies in how this risk is perceived. · Malaysia would benefit from a more widespread understanding of trade-based ML (TBML) risks given its context as a trade-dependent economy and case studies and discussions with FIs pointing to risks in this area. TBML was covered in earlier risk assessments and Malaysia has contributed to regional studies in this area in the past decade, which provide a solid basis for building a consistent risk understanding. However, TBML is not clearly covered in the NRA 2023 and some competent authorities provided limited responses when questioned about current TBML risks. In contrast, private sector entities flagged this as a specific risk faced by Malaysia. · Finally, Malaysia could enhance competent authorities’ understanding of the ML risks associated with VAs , given the regional risks and context and their rapidly evolving nature. The 2024 VA risk assessment (data period covering 2020 and 2022) recognises the increasing risks posed by VA activity and increasing links to high-risk crimes like fraud. Nonetheless, onsite interviews revealed a disparity in understanding of these links. Since 2012, Malaysia has assessed its highest risk ML predicate offence as fraud (which includes scams). During onsite interviews, authorities asserted that, in fraud cases, most criminal proceeds are withdrawn via ATMs, and hence illicit funds generally remain within the country and have limited connection with VAs. While the Assessment Team acknowledges Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy, it raises concerns considering reports by international organisations linking fraud and VAs, particularly in Southeast Asia. For example, a 2024 report by the UNODC estimates financial losses between EUR 16.5 billion and 34 billion from scams targeting victims in East and Southeast Asia in 2023, with a high proportion of these losses attributed to scams committed by organised crime groups in Southeast Asia. The report further highlights the use of VAs and other online mechanisms to perpetrate the schemes. [46] Moreover, a 2024 report by INTERPOL noted the extensive use of VAs in investment and romance fraud and also highlighted the growing scam risks in Southeast Asia. [47] Malaysia reasonably assesses its current risks in this area as relatively low, based on its 2024 VA risk assessment and other information such as blockchain analytics reports. Nevertheless, given the rapidly evolving risks associated with fraud and scams in the region (including scam centres in neighbouring countries) and the borderless nature of VA, Malaysia should ensure its understanding of ML risks associated to VAs and VASPs remains current. 1.1.3. TF risks 128. Malaysia has a sound understanding of its TF risks, informed by five NRAs and various other assessments, including thematic and regional assessments. The NRA 2023 states that Malaysia is not a destination for TF. Most TF cases in Malaysia are self-financed or perpetrated by sympathisers or supporters who are influenced by terrorist groups ideologies. The Assessment Team finds that this conclusion is reasonable given the risk and context of Malaysia. 129. Since its 2015 MER, Malaysia’s TF risk profile has declined, particularly with the fall of ISIL and movement restrictions enforced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to 2020, Malaysia states that it was used as a source of TF and recruitment for foreign terrorist groups, including several cases where Malaysians were recruited to travel to Syria to join ISIL. [48] After 2020, Malaysia assessed its TF risk as “Medium-High” given the return of FTFs and the potential spread of associated radical ideologies and influence on terrorist-linked groups and sympathisers in the Southeast Asian region. In 2023, Malaysia reduced its TF risk assessment to “Medium” due to an observed downward trend of terrorism and TF cases, the further weakening of ISIL in Syria and the Philippines and its shifting influence towards Africa, and the emergence of lone-wolf and self-radicalised terrorist fighters. 130. Information outlining the latest terrorism and TF risk landscape is regularly shared with RIs and competent authorities through quarterly newsletters, primarily via FINS (see IO.6). Moreover, TF-related PPPs allow authorities to share privileged tactical information with Malaysia’s FIU and selected major banks and money services business with a higher risk of terrorism and TF (see IO.9). These efforts support an up-to-date and comprehensive understanding of TF risks across the country. Footnotes [45] See 2023 NRA Executive Summary here . [46] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Cyberfraud Industry Expands in Southeast Asia , UNODC ROSEAP , October 2024. [47]Interpol, Global Financial Fraud Assessment 2024 , March 2024. [48] During the rise of ISIL in 2014-2018, 122 Malaysians left for Syria, including children brought by their parents. Since 2018, Malaysia reports that no further departures of FTFs have been recorded." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.1.1. General understanding of ML/TF risks 116. Overall, Malaysia has a sound understanding of its ML and TF risks. Since 2013, Malaysia has completed five ML/TF national risk assessments (NRAs) and continues to update and adapt its NRA methodology, considering the NRAs of other jurisdictions and available data. Malaysia updates its NRA every three years, with the latest iteration completed in 2023 (NRA 2023). The regular update of the NRA has helped ensure risk findings are informed by the latest financial crime landscape and emerging threats. 117. Malaysia’s NRA adopts a largely robust and well-defined assessment methodology as summarised in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”. The NRA is drafted in a coordinated effort by the NCC-designated team, led by BNM. Risk assessment findings and key recommendations are first discussed in various NCC sub-committee meetings, then reviewed by the NCC working group and high-level meetings for final endorsement. Results are reported to the highest levels of government, including the Prime Minister. 118. Malaysia has established a comprehensive ML/TF data collection mechanism to enhance risk understanding. Competent authorities submit data every four months using a standardised entry form, with all relevant stakeholders manually inputting and updating information. The NCC data team, led by BNM, consolidates this data, reflecting strong political commitment and inter-agency cooperation. A dictionary of terms ensures consistency across stakeholders, which the Assessment Team recognises as a best practice. Additionally, data is gathered from private sector reporting entities via e-platforms linked to supervisory activities. Relevant public and private sector representatives also contribute qualitative insights through focus groups. 119. The NCC plays an important role in proactively communicating risk findings to various stakeholders to ensure a consistent understanding of ML/TF risk. For example, detailed NRA findings are shared with all NCC members. Sector-specific industry engagement sessions are organised by BNM and other regulators to socialise the detailed findings with RIs and judiciary. An executive summary is also published online for public access. [45] The NRA findings are also integrated into training by LEAs and delivered to the private sector through platforms such as the Annual International Conference on Financial Crime and Terrorism Financing and the Compliance Officer Networking Group. 120. The following table summarises the overall findings of the most recent 2023 NRA. Table 1.1. 2023 NRA Findings on ML and TF Risks Crimes Sectors (ML) Sectors (TF) High Risk Fraud Corruption Drug trafficking Smuggling Organised Crime Banking institutions Lawyers DPMS Medium-High Risk Tax crimes Forgery Human Trafficking/Migrant Smuggling Sexual Exploitation Environmental Crimes Capital Market Intermediaries (CMIs) Labuan Money Brokers Casino Company Secretaries Registered Estate Agents (REAs) Accountants Banking institutions DPI Issuers MSBs Labuan Money Brokers DPMS Medium Risk Robbery/theft Extortion Illegal Remittances Insider Trading and Market Manipulation Counterfeiting and Piracy of Products Terrorism and TF Illicit trafficking in Stolen and Other Goods Illicit Arms Trafficking MSBs DPI Issuers Labuan Banking Institutions NBFIs Insurance and Takaful Operators (ITOs) Money Lenders Insurance Intermediaries Banking Intermediaries Leasing Factoring Labuan CMIs Labuan Trust Companies CMIs Insurance and Takaful Operators Insurance Intermediaries Banking Intermediaries Leasing Factoring Labuan CMIs Casino Company Secretaries Lawyers Registered Estate Agents Accountants Low Risk Murder, Grievous Bodily Injury Kidnapping Counterfeiting Currency Sea Robbery Pawnbrokers Labuan Insurance and Takaful Operators Trust Companies Licensed Gaming Outlets Pawnbrokers NBFIs Labuan Banking Institutions Labuan Insurance and Takaful Operators Moneylenders Trust Companies Licensed Gaming Outlets Labuan Trust Companies Note: While some sectors share the same risk rating, the underlying implications vary (e.g., materiality of banking institutions versus types of services provided by lawyers). 121. Moreover, as outlined in the table below, the NRA includes sectoral linkages with high-risk crimes. These linkages are based on case studies, focus groups, perception surveys, media articles, typology reports and STRs. Malaysia demonstrates an understanding of how the proceeds of different crimes might be laundered and which sectors are particularly vulnerable to specific predicate threats or TF. Table 1.2. Common sectors abused for ML originating from high-risk crimes High-Risk Crimes Common Sectors Abused Fraud Banks, ITOs, CMIs, DPIs, MSBs, Labuan Banks, Labuan Insurers, Labuan CMIs, Lawyers, Company Secretaries, Accountants, Trust Companies, DPMS, REAs, Labuan Trust Companies Corruption Banks, Lawyers, Company Secretaries, Labuan Trust Companies, Accountants, DPMS and REAs Drug Trafficking Banks, DPIs, CMIs, Digital Assets Exchanges (DAXs), MSBs, and Casino Smuggling Banks and DPMS Organised Crime Banks, DPIs, ITOs and Company Secretaries TF Banks and MSBs 122. Complementary to the NRA, Malaysia produces thematic risk assessments using a similar risk assessment methodology to the NRA, focusing on specific areas, including legal persons and arrangements, VAs, Labuan IBFC and NPOs. The specific parameters of these assessments are modified where relevant to better assess the unique characteristics of the different thematic areas. Malaysia has also engaged in regional TF (in 2016) and NPO (in 2017) risk assessments with neighbouring jurisdictions. These products have deepened Malaysia’s overall understanding of ML and TF risks. 123. For Labuan IBFC, the risk assessment methodology used in the 2022 Labuan IBFC risk assessment mirrored that used in the NRA. While this assessment did not explicitly examine the risks associated with certain sectors, such as leasing, factoring companies and company management, competent authorities and particularly the LFSA demonstrated an understanding of the ML risks in these sectors. More generally, apart from risk ratings of individual sub-sectors, the Labuan IBFC 2022 risk assessment only included high-level information on tax evasion, along with a comparison of the number and value of STRs submitted by Labuan RIs versus non-Labuan RIs. Risk understanding could therefore be improved by considering specific crime factors and the occurrence of predicate offenses linked specifically to Labuan IBFC. 1.1.2. ML risks 124. The above section and Table 1.1 above provide an overview of Malaysia’s assessment of its ML risks as summarised in NRA 2023. These assessments represent a snapshot in time, as ML risks evolve continuously. As of February 2025, Malaysia concludes that banking institutions, DPMS, and lawyers are assessed as having the highest ML risks. MSBs are considered to have lower inherent risks due to a decline in transaction volume and value, while supervision capabilities of the DPI issuers have been strengthened. As a result, these two sectors are assessed as having medium ML risks. Labuan money brokers and Labuan banking institutions, however, face elevated ML risks due to their exposure to increased international transaction volumes and a growing base of high-risk customers, leading to a rise in their sectoral inherent risks. The Assessment Team generally finds this assessment reasonably sound. 125. When assessing its ML risks, Malaysia also demonstrated an understanding of emerging risk areas, which include: (i) a shift to digital payment involving electronic fund transfer, e-wallets and VAs; (ii) decreasing cash intensity in money lending business; and (iii) the increasing use of professional enablers (such as lawyers and company secretaries) in ML activities. The 1MDB case has also shaped Malaysia’s evolving understanding of ML risks, particularly in relation to corruption. 126. Competent authorities, supervisory authorities and private sector representatives largely have a consistent understanding of Malaysia’s ML risks, as articulated in NRA 2023, other various risk assessments, and highlighted during interviews with the Assessment Team. Moreover, private sector representatives met by the Assessment Team reiterated BNM’s and competent authorities’ proactive efforts in communicating the NRA findings and promoting ML risk understanding across the sectors. 127. While Malaysia has a sound understanding of its ML risks and robust risk assessment methodology, there are some areas where this understanding could be further strengthened: · Malaysia has made substantial efforts to understand the ML risks related to foreign predicate offences and third-party ML , including the increasing use of professional enablers . Yet, as noted in IO7, Malaysia competent authorities face challenges in investigating and prosecuting standalone ML cases—where no clear predicate offense is identified. Authorities cited difficulties in meeting the high legal threshold required to connect illicit proceeds to criminal activities in court, which hinders effective enforcement. The limited investigation data (both qualitative and quantitative) by LEAs, which is partly attributed to the high threshold of pursuing ML prosecution in connection to foreign predicate offences and third-party ML—together with shortcomings in international cooperation, including a lack of proactive use of MLA (see IO.2)—may impact the comprehensive risk understanding of these areas. · Competent authorities’ understanding of cross-border ML risks could also be strengthened. The cross-border nature of Malaysia’s prevalent crimes, such as fraud, illicit drug trafficking, and smuggling, is notable. Malaysia’s geographic proximity to the “Golden Triangle”, and countries known to be major scam-operating hubs, combined with its status as a financial and commercial centre in the region, further underscores the potential for incoming illicit financial flows. Malaysia recognises its position as a transit point for drug and smuggling offences, while the focus on transnational laundering risks is more limited. Malaysia has been working to expand its risk understanding in this area, with specific work undertaken related to illegal remittances, foreign legal persons and arrangements, and human trafficking. Nonetheless, interviews with public and private sector stakeholders revealed inconsistencies in how this risk is perceived. · Malaysia would benefit from a more widespread understanding of trade-based ML (TBML) risks given its context as a trade-dependent economy and case studies and discussions with FIs pointing to risks in this area. TBML was covered in earlier risk assessments and Malaysia has contributed to regional studies in this area in the past decade, which provide a solid basis for building a consistent risk understanding. However, TBML is not clearly covered in the NRA 2023 and some competent authorities provided limited responses when questioned about current TBML risks. In contrast, private sector entities flagged this as a specific risk faced by Malaysia. · Finally, Malaysia could enhance competent authorities’ understanding of the ML risks associated with VAs , given the regional risks and context and their rapidly evolving nature. The 2024 VA risk assessment (data period covering 2020 and 2022) recognises the increasing risks posed by VA activity and increasing links to high-risk crimes like fraud. Nonetheless, onsite interviews revealed a disparity in understanding of these links. Since 2012, Malaysia has assessed its highest risk ML predicate offence as fraud (which includes scams). During onsite interviews, authorities asserted that, in fraud cases, most criminal proceeds are withdrawn via ATMs, and hence illicit funds generally remain within the country and have limited connection with VAs. While the Assessment Team acknowledges Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy, it raises concerns considering reports by international organisations linking fraud and VAs, particularly in Southeast Asia. For example, a 2024 report by the UNODC estimates financial losses between EUR 16.5 billion and 34 billion from scams targeting victims in East and Southeast Asia in 2023, with a high proportion of these losses attributed to scams committed by organised crime groups in Southeast Asia. The report further highlights the use of VAs and other online mechanisms to perpetrate the schemes. [46] Moreover, a 2024 report by INTERPOL noted the extensive use of VAs in investment and romance fraud and also highlighted the growing scam risks in Southeast Asia. [47] Malaysia reasonably assesses its current risks in this area as relatively low, based on its 2024 VA risk assessment and other information such as blockchain analytics reports. Nevertheless, given the rapidly evolving risks associated with fraud and scams in the region (including scam centres in neighbouring countries) and the borderless nature of VA, Malaysia should ensure its understanding of ML risks associated to VAs and VASPs remains current. 1.1.3. TF risks 128. Malaysia has a sound understanding of its TF risks, informed by five NRAs and various other assessments, including thematic and regional assessments. The NRA 2023 states that Malaysia is not a destination for TF. Most TF cases in Malaysia are self-financed or perpetrated by sympathisers or supporters who are influenced by terrorist groups ideologies. The Assessment Team finds that this conclusion is reasonable given the risk and context of Malaysia. 129. Since its 2015 MER, Malaysia’s TF risk profile has declined, particularly with the fall of ISIL and movement restrictions enforced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to 2020, Malaysia states that it was used as a source of TF and recruitment for foreign terrorist groups, including several cases where Malaysians were recruited to travel to Syria to join ISIL. [48] After 2020, Malaysia assessed its TF risk as “Medium-High” given the return of FTFs and the potential spread of associated radical ideologies and influence on terrorist-linked groups and sympathisers in the Southeast Asian region. In 2023, Malaysia reduced its TF risk assessment to “Medium” due to an observed downward trend of terrorism and TF cases, the further weakening of ISIL in Syria and the Philippines and its shifting influence towards Africa, and the emergence of lone-wolf and self-radicalised terrorist fighters. 130. Information outlining the latest terrorism and TF risk landscape is regularly shared with RIs and competent authorities through quarterly newsletters, primarily via FINS (see IO.6). Moreover, TF-related PPPs allow authorities to share privileged tactical information with Malaysia’s FIU and selected major banks and money services business with a higher risk of terrorism and TF (see IO.9). These efforts support an up-to-date and comprehensive understanding of TF risks across the country. Footnotes [45] See 2023 NRA Executive Summary here . [46] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Cyberfraud Industry Expands in Southeast Asia , UNODC ROSEAP , October 2024. [47]Interpol, Global Financial Fraud Assessment 2024 , March 2024. [48] During the rise of ISIL in 2014-2018, 122 Malaysians left for Syria, including children brought by their parents. Since 2018, Malaysia reports that no further departures of FTFs have been recorded." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 163. Malaysia provides MLA to countries with which it has bilateral and/or multilateral agreements. It has bilateral agreements with 21 foreign states, including neighbouring jurisdictions and major trading counterparts. In the absence of agreements or treaties, MLA or extradition can be provided on the principle of reciprocity, subject to agreement from the Minister charged with responsibility for legal affairs on the recommendation of the Attorney General (AG) in the case of MLA and for extradition, subject to an order or direction from the Minister of Home Affairs. Most requests received by Malaysia are from treaty partners. 164. Most MLA sought from Malaysia is for the production of documents, witness statements, production of evidence and service of process. Malaysia also receives a limited number of requests for search and seizure, asset repatriation and asset confiscation. 165. Incoming requests for MLA are now managed through a case management system (i-AGC), which allocates requests to a case handler and establishes deadlines for the execution of requests (6-12 months for most requests, 1-2 years for more complex requests). This is a positive step and likely to contribute to efficiency in managing, tracking and prioritising requests. Prior to the launch of this system in December 2024, cases were handled and tracked manually via bi-weekly checks on the status of requests, monthly updates, quarterly progress meetings and quarterly reporting to the NCC Secretariat. Though these regular oversight meetings continue, given the i-AGC’s recency, the extent to which it has impacted the overall effectiveness of the MLA process is unclear at this stage. 166. The AG is the central authority for MLA matters, and the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) within the AGC is the unit responsible for managing incoming and outgoing MLA requests. TCU consists of eight DPPs and three support staff, one of which is responsible for handling correspondence between embassies and the MoFA. MLA requests are received through diplomatic channels. The 2024 amendments to MACMA allows for requests to be sent directly from the foreign embassy/consulate to the AG to accommodate certain circumstances. However, in part due to the recency of the change, requests are also often transmitted from the foreign embassy, to the MoFA, and then to the TCU. Upon receipt, the TCU case handler, a DPP, reviews the request to ensure all requirements are met, then forwards it to the appropriate competent authority for execution. From the date the MoFA or AGC receives the request, the process typically takes one to two weeks. 167. The TCU prioritises incoming MLA requests based on factors such as the severity of the offence, the risk of asset dissipation, whether the requesting country specifies it as urgent, or if the request is complex. The MLA SOPs do not provide clear instructions on how to assess the risk of asset dissipation when prioritising requests. Requests are then sent to the responsible competent authority for execution. For example, if the request relates to corruption, the TCU will allocate it to the MACC, for drugs to the RMP, etc. 168. Overall, Malaysia received broadly positive feedback from the FATF Global Network on formal cooperation, including from some of its major trading partners. Where delegations expressed concerns about delays in receiving responses—or not receiving responses at all—Malaysia acknowledged these delays but attributed them to incomplete requests and the need for additional information. Malaysia does not attribute the delays to deficiencies in its MLA handling process nor to a lack of resources within the TCU, which it considers adequately staffed. 169. If a request is incomplete or additional information or documents are needed, the TCU coordinates with the requesting country. The TCU has a policy of sending three reminders to the jurisdiction to provide the additional required information. If a response is not received after this date, the case is classified as not requiring further action but can be reopened upon receipt of full information. While the completeness of requests is largely outside of Malaysia’s control, in such instances, there does not appear to be a process to review the request to determine whether domestic action could be taken, for example, where there is an offence that touches on Malaysia or where criminal proceeds may be located within the jurisdiction. Box 2.1. Incoming MLA Case Study In March 2023, Malaysia received a request from Country Z to help locate a witness needed to testify via audio-visual link in a September 2023 conspiracy-to-defraud trial in Country Z. The RMP located the witness, who agreed to testify. Malaysia then coordinated with Country Z to arrange for the testimony to take place at a room in Country Z’s embassy. The witness successfully testified in October 2023. 170. Malaysia received 621 MLA requests between 2019 and February 2025. Incoming MLA requests are assessed and classified as viable (65%), closed because of insufficient information (24%), or because of their withdrawal by the requesting state (11%). Of the 404 viable requests, 202 were acceded, nine were denied and 193 are in progress (72 with Malaysia and 121 with the requesting country). Approximately 53% of these completed MLA requests were acceded to or denied within 12 months. Forty-six (46) requests took over two years to be executed and 56 requests are still in progress for more than two years (27 in progress with Malaysia and 29 with the requesting country) (see Table 2.2 below). Malaysia reports that the primary reasons for requests remaining pending for over two years are the inability to locate witnesses and the complexity of the requests. 171. Of the 17 1MDB related requests, 14 were fulfilled, one denied and two remain in progress. To promote quality requests, the AGC publishes a standard form for MLA requests and maintains a dedicated support email address on its website and staff regularly attend international meetings, regional forums, and workshops on MLA. Such forums and workshops are attended by LEAs and AGC staff who stated that they have noticed an increase in the quality of outgoing MLA requests in the last year. These are positive steps. Nonetheless, given the proportion of requests that are closed based on insufficient information, Malaysia could benefit from taking additional proactive steps to prevent incomplete requests (for example by providing guidance to foreign countries on Malaysia’s MLA requirements, publishing information on common issues encountered by requesting states, meeting with key partners to provide help on preparing MLA requests, or reviewing draft requests before they are submitted). Table 2.1. Most common offences underpinning MLA requests (2019-2025) Offence MLA Request Fraud 283 Other [50] 132 ML 97 Drug offences 27 Corruption 21 Computer crime 17 Tax crime 16 Terrorism 14 Smuggling 12 TF 2 Total 621 Table 2.2. Status of MLA requests received Status 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Total MLA Requests Received 102 72 117 115 103 109 3 621 Acceded 46 38 43 37 20 18 - 202 No further action (closed but reversible upon full receipt of information) 38 21 41 31 15 5 - 151 Withdrawn by requesting countries 13 9 17 12 13 2 - 66 In progress in Malaysia 2 4 5 14 18 27 2 72 In progress in requesting countries 2 - 10 16 36 56 1 121 Denied 1 - 1 5 1 1 - 9 2.1.2. Extradition (including backed warrants) 172. Malaysia executes incoming extradition requests through treaties and on the principle of reciprocity in a similar way as it executes MLA. Malaysia has 11 extradition treaties with foreign states that enable it to execute requests in line with the Extradition Act. Any extradition outside of treaties must be approved by the Minister of Home Affairs, on the recommendation of the AGC. 173. The MoHA is the central authority for incoming and outgoing extradition but in practice, the AGC examines requests and advises the MoHA on whether a request complies with the Extradition Act and can be executed. Following MoHA’s receipt of an extradition request, the request is managed by the TCU in the AGC according to the Extradition Manual. The TCU assesses the request to ensure all requirements are met, including whether there is sufficient evidence to support extradition. The request is then added to i-AGC and sent to the MoHA for consideration. Extradition requests are managed and tracked in the same way as MLA requests. 174. Of the 67 requests received between 2019 and 2025, 41 were assessed as viable, 11 were granted, four denied and 26 are in progress (eight with Malaysia and 18 with the requesting country). Of the 11 granted requests, five were processed within 12 months, three were processed between 12 and 24 months, and three took more than two years to complete. Malaysia notes that the main reasons for not meeting the Charter timelines include difficulties in locating fugitives and delays due to appeals reaching the apex court. Extradition was denied in four cases: one where the individual was still under investigation, two based on a lack of reciprocity, and one was refused at the discretion of the MoHA. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests and status 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Total Extradition requests received 9 9 12 16 16 5 - 67 Acceded 5 3 - 1 1 1 - 11 No further action (i.e. insufficient information, legal impediments, overtaken by event) 3 3 7 4 4 - - 21 Withdrawn by requesting countries 1 - 1 2 1 - - 5 In progress in Malaysia - 1 - 2 3 2 - 8 In progress in requesting countries - - 3 6 7 2 - 18 Denied - 2 1 1 - - - 4 175. Malaysia generally prioritises requests for extradition based on urgency, for example, where the requesting jurisdiction indicates the request is a priority. For requests relating to high-risk offences, 89% were responded to within two years. The MoHA can also direct the dispensation of the prima facie requirement for extradition requested by treaty partners, provided that such dispensations are expressly stipulated in the provisions of the Treaty. On 18 out of 58 possible occasions (i.e., requests from treaty partners), Malaysia has used this mechanism which allows for the extradition procedure to be executed expeditiously. Further, by using a provisional warrant apprehension, Malaysia can temporarily apprehend fugitives for 45 to 60 days without requiring a full extradition application. This mechanism enhances law enforcement capabilities by allowing for rapid arrest to prevent ongoing criminal activity and reduce the likelihood of the fugitive evading justice while formal extradition proceedings are underway. 176. Malaysia also operates an extradition process using backed warrants. Backed warrants provide for the reciprocal service of arrest warrants in Malaysia, Singapore or Brunei (i.e., can be executed without the need of a full extradition request). Malaysia received 122 backed warrants requests during the review period and executed 92 of these (75%). 177. The Extradition Act does not preclude Malaysia extraditing its own citizens. Between 2019 to 2025, Malaysia received nine extradition requests to extradite Malaysian citizens for offences relating to fraud (5), human trafficking (2), drug offences (1) and sexual offences (1). However, none of these requests have been executed. Insufficient information resulted in three cases being designated for no further action, four are in progress with the requesting countries and two were denied, one due to non-fulfilment of reciprocity and one because the person was required for an investigation and not for prosecution in the requesting state. 178. Malaysia has taken steps to improve extradition, including seeking feedback on quality of assistance and providing workshops to relevant competent authorities on the extradition process. Box 2.2. Example of fulfilment of an extradition request In 2022, Individuals A and B were sought by Country Y to stand trial for wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. Malaysia received requests for their provisional arrest warrants on 15 April 2022. Applications for these warrants were submitted to the Magistrates’ Court on 25 July 2022, and the warrants were issued on the same day. Full extradition requests were received by Malaysia on 12 September 2022. Individual A was surrendered to Country Y on 10 November 2022 after waiving his right to committal proceedings before the Sessions Court, thereby enabling his prompt surrender. In the case of Individual B, the Sessions Court ordered his surrender to Country Y following the conclusion of committal proceedings. 2.1.3. Identification, freezing, seizing and sharing of criminal assets 179. M alaysian authorities consider the risk of asset dissipation as one of several factors in determining the prioritisation of MLA requests. During the review period, Malaysia received four incoming MLA requests related to asset repatriation and confiscation; however, none resulted in successful confiscation. According to the authorities, these requests could not be executed due to the failure of requesting countries to provide additional information, despite repeated follow-ups. Additionally, Malaysia received 19 search and seizure requests, of which six were granted (32%). Of the remaining 13 (68%), three were withdrawn by the respective LEAs, four were classified as requiring no further action (due to non-responses from the requesting jurisdictions and the subject is not in Malaysia), one was refused, and five remain pending with the requesting authority awaiting additional information. 180. These outcomes highlight ongoing challenges and continue to undermine international asset recovery efforts. A large proportion of asset recovery related MLA requests are not executed due to a lack of information. While Malaysia is not responsible for the content of incoming requests, it would benefit from taking proactive steps to facilitate complete requests. Footnotes [50] “Other” corresponds to sexual offences, murder, traffic offences, human trafficking, kidnapping or abduction, crimes of violence, theft or robbery, counterfeiting, piracy, manslaughter and rape." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.1.1. Providing evidence and locating criminals 163. Malaysia provides MLA to countries with which it has bilateral and/or multilateral agreements. It has bilateral agreements with 21 foreign states, including neighbouring jurisdictions and major trading counterparts. In the absence of agreements or treaties, MLA or extradition can be provided on the principle of reciprocity, subject to agreement from the Minister charged with responsibility for legal affairs on the recommendation of the Attorney General (AG) in the case of MLA and for extradition, subject to an order or direction from the Minister of Home Affairs. Most requests received by Malaysia are from treaty partners. 164. Most MLA sought from Malaysia is for the production of documents, witness statements, production of evidence and service of process. Malaysia also receives a limited number of requests for search and seizure, asset repatriation and asset confiscation. 165. Incoming requests for MLA are now managed through a case management system (i-AGC), which allocates requests to a case handler and establishes deadlines for the execution of requests (6-12 months for most requests, 1-2 years for more complex requests). This is a positive step and likely to contribute to efficiency in managing, tracking and prioritising requests. Prior to the launch of this system in December 2024, cases were handled and tracked manually via bi-weekly checks on the status of requests, monthly updates, quarterly progress meetings and quarterly reporting to the NCC Secretariat. Though these regular oversight meetings continue, given the i-AGC’s recency, the extent to which it has impacted the overall effectiveness of the MLA process is unclear at this stage. 166. The AG is the central authority for MLA matters, and the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) within the AGC is the unit responsible for managing incoming and outgoing MLA requests. TCU consists of eight DPPs and three support staff, one of which is responsible for handling correspondence between embassies and the MoFA. MLA requests are received through diplomatic channels. The 2024 amendments to MACMA allows for requests to be sent directly from the foreign embassy/consulate to the AG to accommodate certain circumstances. However, in part due to the recency of the change, requests are also often transmitted from the foreign embassy, to the MoFA, and then to the TCU. Upon receipt, the TCU case handler, a DPP, reviews the request to ensure all requirements are met, then forwards it to the appropriate competent authority for execution. From the date the MoFA or AGC receives the request, the process typically takes one to two weeks. 167. The TCU prioritises incoming MLA requests based on factors such as the severity of the offence, the risk of asset dissipation, whether the requesting country specifies it as urgent, or if the request is complex. The MLA SOPs do not provide clear instructions on how to assess the risk of asset dissipation when prioritising requests. Requests are then sent to the responsible competent authority for execution. For example, if the request relates to corruption, the TCU will allocate it to the MACC, for drugs to the RMP, etc. 168. Overall, Malaysia received broadly positive feedback from the FATF Global Network on formal cooperation, including from some of its major trading partners. Where delegations expressed concerns about delays in receiving responses—or not receiving responses at all—Malaysia acknowledged these delays but attributed them to incomplete requests and the need for additional information. Malaysia does not attribute the delays to deficiencies in its MLA handling process nor to a lack of resources within the TCU, which it considers adequately staffed. 169. If a request is incomplete or additional information or documents are needed, the TCU coordinates with the requesting country. The TCU has a policy of sending three reminders to the jurisdiction to provide the additional required information. If a response is not received after this date, the case is classified as not requiring further action but can be reopened upon receipt of full information. While the completeness of requests is largely outside of Malaysia’s control, in such instances, there does not appear to be a process to review the request to determine whether domestic action could be taken, for example, where there is an offence that touches on Malaysia or where criminal proceeds may be located within the jurisdiction. Box 2.1. Incoming MLA Case Study In March 2023, Malaysia received a request from Country Z to help locate a witness needed to testify via audio-visual link in a September 2023 conspiracy-to-defraud trial in Country Z. The RMP located the witness, who agreed to testify. Malaysia then coordinated with Country Z to arrange for the testimony to take place at a room in Country Z’s embassy. The witness successfully testified in October 2023. 170. Malaysia received 621 MLA requests between 2019 and February 2025. Incoming MLA requests are assessed and classified as viable (65%), closed because of insufficient information (24%), or because of their withdrawal by the requesting state (11%). Of the 404 viable requests, 202 were acceded, nine were denied and 193 are in progress (72 with Malaysia and 121 with the requesting country). Approximately 53% of these completed MLA requests were acceded to or denied within 12 months. Forty-six (46) requests took over two years to be executed and 56 requests are still in progress for more than two years (27 in progress with Malaysia and 29 with the requesting country) (see Table 2.2 below). Malaysia reports that the primary reasons for requests remaining pending for over two years are the inability to locate witnesses and the complexity of the requests. 171. Of the 17 1MDB related requests, 14 were fulfilled, one denied and two remain in progress. To promote quality requests, the AGC publishes a standard form for MLA requests and maintains a dedicated support email address on its website and staff regularly attend international meetings, regional forums, and workshops on MLA. Such forums and workshops are attended by LEAs and AGC staff who stated that they have noticed an increase in the quality of outgoing MLA requests in the last year. These are positive steps. Nonetheless, given the proportion of requests that are closed based on insufficient information, Malaysia could benefit from taking additional proactive steps to prevent incomplete requests (for example by providing guidance to foreign countries on Malaysia’s MLA requirements, publishing information on common issues encountered by requesting states, meeting with key partners to provide help on preparing MLA requests, or reviewing draft requests before they are submitted). Table 2.1. Most common offences underpinning MLA requests (2019-2025) Offence MLA Request Fraud 283 Other [50] 132 ML 97 Drug offences 27 Corruption 21 Computer crime 17 Tax crime 16 Terrorism 14 Smuggling 12 TF 2 Total 621 Table 2.2. Status of MLA requests received Status 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Total MLA Requests Received 102 72 117 115 103 109 3 621 Acceded 46 38 43 37 20 18 - 202 No further action (closed but reversible upon full receipt of information) 38 21 41 31 15 5 - 151 Withdrawn by requesting countries 13 9 17 12 13 2 - 66 In progress in Malaysia 2 4 5 14 18 27 2 72 In progress in requesting countries 2 - 10 16 36 56 1 121 Denied 1 - 1 5 1 1 - 9 2.1.2. Extradition (including backed warrants) 172. Malaysia executes incoming extradition requests through treaties and on the principle of reciprocity in a similar way as it executes MLA. Malaysia has 11 extradition treaties with foreign states that enable it to execute requests in line with the Extradition Act. Any extradition outside of treaties must be approved by the Minister of Home Affairs, on the recommendation of the AGC. 173. The MoHA is the central authority for incoming and outgoing extradition but in practice, the AGC examines requests and advises the MoHA on whether a request complies with the Extradition Act and can be executed. Following MoHA’s receipt of an extradition request, the request is managed by the TCU in the AGC according to the Extradition Manual. The TCU assesses the request to ensure all requirements are met, including whether there is sufficient evidence to support extradition. The request is then added to i-AGC and sent to the MoHA for consideration. Extradition requests are managed and tracked in the same way as MLA requests. 174. Of the 67 requests received between 2019 and 2025, 41 were assessed as viable, 11 were granted, four denied and 26 are in progress (eight with Malaysia and 18 with the requesting country). Of the 11 granted requests, five were processed within 12 months, three were processed between 12 and 24 months, and three took more than two years to complete. Malaysia notes that the main reasons for not meeting the Charter timelines include difficulties in locating fugitives and delays due to appeals reaching the apex court. Extradition was denied in four cases: one where the individual was still under investigation, two based on a lack of reciprocity, and one was refused at the discretion of the MoHA. Table 2.3. Incoming extradition requests and status 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Total Extradition requests received 9 9 12 16 16 5 - 67 Acceded 5 3 - 1 1 1 - 11 No further action (i.e. insufficient information, legal impediments, overtaken by event) 3 3 7 4 4 - - 21 Withdrawn by requesting countries 1 - 1 2 1 - - 5 In progress in Malaysia - 1 - 2 3 2 - 8 In progress in requesting countries - - 3 6 7 2 - 18 Denied - 2 1 1 - - - 4 175. Malaysia generally prioritises requests for extradition based on urgency, for example, where the requesting jurisdiction indicates the request is a priority. For requests relating to high-risk offences, 89% were responded to within two years. The MoHA can also direct the dispensation of the prima facie requirement for extradition requested by treaty partners, provided that such dispensations are expressly stipulated in the provisions of the Treaty. On 18 out of 58 possible occasions (i.e., requests from treaty partners), Malaysia has used this mechanism which allows for the extradition procedure to be executed expeditiously. Further, by using a provisional warrant apprehension, Malaysia can temporarily apprehend fugitives for 45 to 60 days without requiring a full extradition application. This mechanism enhances law enforcement capabilities by allowing for rapid arrest to prevent ongoing criminal activity and reduce the likelihood of the fugitive evading justice while formal extradition proceedings are underway. 176. Malaysia also operates an extradition process using backed warrants. Backed warrants provide for the reciprocal service of arrest warrants in Malaysia, Singapore or Brunei (i.e., can be executed without the need of a full extradition request). Malaysia received 122 backed warrants requests during the review period and executed 92 of these (75%). 177. The Extradition Act does not preclude Malaysia extraditing its own citizens. Between 2019 to 2025, Malaysia received nine extradition requests to extradite Malaysian citizens for offences relating to fraud (5), human trafficking (2), drug offences (1) and sexual offences (1). However, none of these requests have been executed. Insufficient information resulted in three cases being designated for no further action, four are in progress with the requesting countries and two were denied, one due to non-fulfilment of reciprocity and one because the person was required for an investigation and not for prosecution in the requesting state. 178. Malaysia has taken steps to improve extradition, including seeking feedback on quality of assistance and providing workshops to relevant competent authorities on the extradition process. Box 2.2. Example of fulfilment of an extradition request In 2022, Individuals A and B were sought by Country Y to stand trial for wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. Malaysia received requests for their provisional arrest warrants on 15 April 2022. Applications for these warrants were submitted to the Magistrates’ Court on 25 July 2022, and the warrants were issued on the same day. Full extradition requests were received by Malaysia on 12 September 2022. Individual A was surrendered to Country Y on 10 November 2022 after waiving his right to committal proceedings before the Sessions Court, thereby enabling his prompt surrender. In the case of Individual B, the Sessions Court ordered his surrender to Country Y following the conclusion of committal proceedings. 2.1.3. Identification, freezing, seizing and sharing of criminal assets 179. M alaysian authorities consider the risk of asset dissipation as one of several factors in determining the prioritisation of MLA requests. During the review period, Malaysia received four incoming MLA requests related to asset repatriation and confiscation; however, none resulted in successful confiscation. According to the authorities, these requests could not be executed due to the failure of requesting countries to provide additional information, despite repeated follow-ups. Additionally, Malaysia received 19 search and seizure requests, of which six were granted (32%). Of the remaining 13 (68%), three were withdrawn by the respective LEAs, four were classified as requiring no further action (due to non-responses from the requesting jurisdictions and the subject is not in Malaysia), one was refused, and five remain pending with the requesting authority awaiting additional information. 180. These outcomes highlight ongoing challenges and continue to undermine international asset recovery efforts. A large proportion of asset recovery related MLA requests are not executed due to a lack of information. While Malaysia is not responsible for the content of incoming requests, it would benefit from taking proactive steps to facilitate complete requests. Footnotes [50] “Other” corresponds to sexual offences, murder, traffic offences, human trafficking, kidnapping or abduction, crimes of violence, theft or robbery, counterfeiting, piracy, manslaughter and rape." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 218. Malaysia has a robust process for the licensing and approval of most FIs and VASPs. Leasing and factoring companies are not subject to licensing or approval, but these represent a small number of entities, which are determined as low risk. The BNM and SC are responsible for the licensing and approval of onshore FIs, except for the pawnbroking and moneylending sectors, which are licensed by KPKT. The SC licenses onshore VASPs and the LFSA licenses all FIs and VASPs in Labuan. As VASPs are licensed as FIs (CMIs onshore and banking institutions, money brokers and payment system operators in Labuan), the licensing process is the same as for other FIs. 219. Almost all FIs and VASPs, including foreign legal persons, must be licensed or approved by the relevant supervisory authority (BNM, SC, LFSA or KPKT) before they can carry out activity in Malaysia. This is in addition to being registered with the CCM or LFSA as a legal person (see IO.5). 220. License applications to carry out FI or VASP activity include information on the qualifications and work experience of proposed candidates for shareholders and key management functions, including attestations that they have no criminal records or undischarged bankruptcy orders. Upon receipt of applications, the BNM, SC and LFSA carry out robust assessments to ensure the candidates wishing to own, control or hold a management function in the applicant FI are fit and proper. 221. For onshore FIs, fit and proper assessments are extended to those seeking to hold 5% or more in shares or wishing to become directors, chief executive officers and senior management of an FI. For Labuan FIs, fit and proper assessments for owners or controllers apply to those holding one third of votes attached to voting shares as well as directors, principal officers and trust officers. Fit and proper assessments draw on a range of internal and external information, including internally developed databases, open-source adverse news checks, sanctions screening, criminal records checks, and outreach to foreign authorities, particularly in relation to foreign ownership applications. Applicants are interviewed when they are higher risk, or any concerns are flagged when the application is being considered, but not generally as a matter of course. If adverse information on the candidates is found during the assessment process, the BNM, SC and LFSA add such findings to their own internal databases as a reference for consideration in future applications. Once individuals are included on the list, there is no way for them to appeal or be removed, although the authorities explained that being on the list did not automatically mean a future rejection decision and that a broader set of considerations were involved. 222. For onshore banks and ITOs, an additional step in the licensing process is a pre-application assessment by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) of the entity. The NRCs are required to conduct necessary due diligence and attest that the proposed candidates for key responsible person functions are fit and proper, ahead of consideration by the BNM. The SC introduced a pre-application step in 2022 for entities seeking to become licensed CMIs. This step includes fit and proper checks for key responsible persons and controllers, including shareholders with 15% shareholding or more, but this pre-application does not extend to applications for changes in such status by existing licensed CMIs. For Labuan FIs, all applications undergo due diligence check by Labuan Trust Companies prior to a formal submission to LFSA. These pre-application processes act as an important step in ensuring that applications are only submitted if the NRC, SC or trust company is confident that owners and shareholders are fit and proper. 223. The BNM and LFSA have reappointment processes for the persons holding key management functions and applicants for reappointment are subject to similar fit and proper assessments to those applied at the appointment stage. Although each authority suggests it determines the frequency for re-assessment according to risk, re-assessments in higher-risk sectors are not conducted more frequently than in other sectors. For example, key responsible persons in MSBs are subject to re-vetting on a one-to-three-year cycle depending on their risk category. All principal officers in Labuan are subject to re-vetting every two years. Other onshore FIs are subject to re-vetting based on certain triggers, including identification of adverse information submitted in compulsory annual fit and proper declarations, or ongoing surveillance. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of KRPs, the BNM, SC and LFSA also conduct periodic assessment of the BOs of FIs to ensure that they do not have any criminal convictions or ongoing lawsuits. 224. The BNM extended its reassessment process to key responsible persons in MSBs and e-money issuers (part of the DPI sector) in 2022. The initial reassessment was recently completed in 2024 for 458 Key Responsible Persons (KRPs) across these sectors and 43 of these identified with various concerns including potential involvement in criminal activity. Out of these, five were subjected to enforcement action (e.g., removal of approval and revocation of licences) and one being put forward for criminal investigation, including for ML. 21 individuals were still under investigation as of February 2025. Although the re-vetting exercise is a welcome exercise, the Assessment Team is concerned that criminals or their associates may have remained KRPs until this reassessment process took place. Other existing frameworks, such as the license renewal process at a maximum of 3-year intervals and ad hoc onsite examinations based on tip-offs from other parties including LEAs, are considered to have mitigated this risk to some extent. 225. Basic fit and proper assessment are carried out on directors and key responsible persons of moneylenders and pawnbrokers. These include criminal checks with LEAs. The assessment on the application of licensee is reviewed by the New License Selection Committee within KPKT, which was established in 2013 and comprises of a chairperson and two appointed members. The license is valid for a two-year period and re-assessment will be conducted upon any change to the licensee, including change in the directors. There are currently three non-bank FIs in Malaysia, which are credit unions or carry out similar functions. The licensing regime, including appointment of directors and key responsible persons, is governed under the respective Acts and is proportionate to the low risk presented by these entities. 226. Overall, the combined licensing framework in Malaysia, including pre-application checks and ongoing monitoring is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning, controlling or holding key management functions in FIs to some extent. Comprehensive guidance for applicants and the pre-application measures mentioned above explain why there are low numbers of rejected or withdrawn applications, as demonstrated by case studies provided by the authorities. Box 3.1. Rejection of application due to fit and proper concerns Prior to submitting a formal application, the SC conducted preliminary screening on an individual seeking to be a director of a securities dealing company. The SC discovered adverse media showing that the individual had been fined and jailed for assault in Singapore in 2021. During the pre-application consultation, the applicant confirmed the report was accurate. As a result, the prospective applicant withdrew their application as they were informed that they were not eligible to be licensed for failing to meet fit and proper criteria outlined in the Capital Markets and Services Act and the SC’s Licensing Handbook. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 227. The identification and disruption of unlicensed activity is a key policy objective for authorities and seen as essential in reducing and preventing fraud. The BNM and SC conduct surveillance to identify unlicensed activities by leveraging data analytics, onsite mystery shopping and agent provocateurs. Once unlicensed/illegal activity is identified, they take actions to disrupt and dismantle the illegal activities, such as by listing such entities in their own alert lists, referring the entities to internal/external stakeholders, blocking websites or issuing warning letters. As most illegal operators do not have a physical presence in Malaysia, authorities’ efforts are aimed at disruption of services rather than enforcement. 228. The BNM detected 40 cases of potential licensing breaches in 2024. As a result of close collaboration with FIU and RMP, ten illegal MSBs were charged with conducting illegal money service activity and nine of these were convicted. The SC received 1 957 complaints and enquiries in 2024 and investigated 394 websites and social media platforms for carrying on unlicensed activity. Social media interventions are the most frequent actions the SC takes to counter unlicensed and illegal activities. Box 3.2. Enforcement action against unlicensed activity The SC received enquiries and complaints from the public concerning “Individual L” who was allegedly providing investment advice to subscribers in a private Telegram group and charging subscription fees without obtaining a license. Following this complaint, the SC conducted an ‘agent provocateur’ exercise and confirmed that Individual L was providing investment advice. The SC also discovered that between a period of eight months, Individual L received approximately EUR 16 351 in subscription fees. The SC issued a Notice to Show Cause under the CMSA, imposed a public reprimand and a monetary penalty of EUR 65 378 on the individual in 2023. 229. The LFSA conducts desktop surveillance through regulatory submissions, web search and complaint or referral from other LEAs to detect illegal activities. The LFSA also provides a platform for the public to lodge complaints and seek clarification on whether third party entities are licensed by LFSA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.1.1. Market entry controls 218. Malaysia has a robust process for the licensing and approval of most FIs and VASPs. Leasing and factoring companies are not subject to licensing or approval, but these represent a small number of entities, which are determined as low risk. The BNM and SC are responsible for the licensing and approval of onshore FIs, except for the pawnbroking and moneylending sectors, which are licensed by KPKT. The SC licenses onshore VASPs and the LFSA licenses all FIs and VASPs in Labuan. As VASPs are licensed as FIs (CMIs onshore and banking institutions, money brokers and payment system operators in Labuan), the licensing process is the same as for other FIs. 219. Almost all FIs and VASPs, including foreign legal persons, must be licensed or approved by the relevant supervisory authority (BNM, SC, LFSA or KPKT) before they can carry out activity in Malaysia. This is in addition to being registered with the CCM or LFSA as a legal person (see IO.5). 220. License applications to carry out FI or VASP activity include information on the qualifications and work experience of proposed candidates for shareholders and key management functions, including attestations that they have no criminal records or undischarged bankruptcy orders. Upon receipt of applications, the BNM, SC and LFSA carry out robust assessments to ensure the candidates wishing to own, control or hold a management function in the applicant FI are fit and proper. 221. For onshore FIs, fit and proper assessments are extended to those seeking to hold 5% or more in shares or wishing to become directors, chief executive officers and senior management of an FI. For Labuan FIs, fit and proper assessments for owners or controllers apply to those holding one third of votes attached to voting shares as well as directors, principal officers and trust officers. Fit and proper assessments draw on a range of internal and external information, including internally developed databases, open-source adverse news checks, sanctions screening, criminal records checks, and outreach to foreign authorities, particularly in relation to foreign ownership applications. Applicants are interviewed when they are higher risk, or any concerns are flagged when the application is being considered, but not generally as a matter of course. If adverse information on the candidates is found during the assessment process, the BNM, SC and LFSA add such findings to their own internal databases as a reference for consideration in future applications. Once individuals are included on the list, there is no way for them to appeal or be removed, although the authorities explained that being on the list did not automatically mean a future rejection decision and that a broader set of considerations were involved. 222. For onshore banks and ITOs, an additional step in the licensing process is a pre-application assessment by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) of the entity. The NRCs are required to conduct necessary due diligence and attest that the proposed candidates for key responsible person functions are fit and proper, ahead of consideration by the BNM. The SC introduced a pre-application step in 2022 for entities seeking to become licensed CMIs. This step includes fit and proper checks for key responsible persons and controllers, including shareholders with 15% shareholding or more, but this pre-application does not extend to applications for changes in such status by existing licensed CMIs. For Labuan FIs, all applications undergo due diligence check by Labuan Trust Companies prior to a formal submission to LFSA. These pre-application processes act as an important step in ensuring that applications are only submitted if the NRC, SC or trust company is confident that owners and shareholders are fit and proper. 223. The BNM and LFSA have reappointment processes for the persons holding key management functions and applicants for reappointment are subject to similar fit and proper assessments to those applied at the appointment stage. Although each authority suggests it determines the frequency for re-assessment according to risk, re-assessments in higher-risk sectors are not conducted more frequently than in other sectors. For example, key responsible persons in MSBs are subject to re-vetting on a one-to-three-year cycle depending on their risk category. All principal officers in Labuan are subject to re-vetting every two years. Other onshore FIs are subject to re-vetting based on certain triggers, including identification of adverse information submitted in compulsory annual fit and proper declarations, or ongoing surveillance. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of KRPs, the BNM, SC and LFSA also conduct periodic assessment of the BOs of FIs to ensure that they do not have any criminal convictions or ongoing lawsuits. 224. The BNM extended its reassessment process to key responsible persons in MSBs and e-money issuers (part of the DPI sector) in 2022. The initial reassessment was recently completed in 2024 for 458 Key Responsible Persons (KRPs) across these sectors and 43 of these identified with various concerns including potential involvement in criminal activity. Out of these, five were subjected to enforcement action (e.g., removal of approval and revocation of licences) and one being put forward for criminal investigation, including for ML. 21 individuals were still under investigation as of February 2025. Although the re-vetting exercise is a welcome exercise, the Assessment Team is concerned that criminals or their associates may have remained KRPs until this reassessment process took place. Other existing frameworks, such as the license renewal process at a maximum of 3-year intervals and ad hoc onsite examinations based on tip-offs from other parties including LEAs, are considered to have mitigated this risk to some extent. 225. Basic fit and proper assessment are carried out on directors and key responsible persons of moneylenders and pawnbrokers. These include criminal checks with LEAs. The assessment on the application of licensee is reviewed by the New License Selection Committee within KPKT, which was established in 2013 and comprises of a chairperson and two appointed members. The license is valid for a two-year period and re-assessment will be conducted upon any change to the licensee, including change in the directors. There are currently three non-bank FIs in Malaysia, which are credit unions or carry out similar functions. The licensing regime, including appointment of directors and key responsible persons, is governed under the respective Acts and is proportionate to the low risk presented by these entities. 226. Overall, the combined licensing framework in Malaysia, including pre-application checks and ongoing monitoring is effective at preventing criminals and their associates from owning, controlling or holding key management functions in FIs to some extent. Comprehensive guidance for applicants and the pre-application measures mentioned above explain why there are low numbers of rejected or withdrawn applications, as demonstrated by case studies provided by the authorities. Box 3.1. Rejection of application due to fit and proper concerns Prior to submitting a formal application, the SC conducted preliminary screening on an individual seeking to be a director of a securities dealing company. The SC discovered adverse media showing that the individual had been fined and jailed for assault in Singapore in 2021. During the pre-application consultation, the applicant confirmed the report was accurate. As a result, the prospective applicant withdrew their application as they were informed that they were not eligible to be licensed for failing to meet fit and proper criteria outlined in the Capital Markets and Services Act and the SC’s Licensing Handbook. 3.1.2. Detecting and addressing breaches 227. The identification and disruption of unlicensed activity is a key policy objective for authorities and seen as essential in reducing and preventing fraud. The BNM and SC conduct surveillance to identify unlicensed activities by leveraging data analytics, onsite mystery shopping and agent provocateurs. Once unlicensed/illegal activity is identified, they take actions to disrupt and dismantle the illegal activities, such as by listing such entities in their own alert lists, referring the entities to internal/external stakeholders, blocking websites or issuing warning letters. As most illegal operators do not have a physical presence in Malaysia, authorities’ efforts are aimed at disruption of services rather than enforcement. 228. The BNM detected 40 cases of potential licensing breaches in 2024. As a result of close collaboration with FIU and RMP, ten illegal MSBs were charged with conducting illegal money service activity and nine of these were convicted. The SC received 1 957 complaints and enquiries in 2024 and investigated 394 websites and social media platforms for carrying on unlicensed activity. Social media interventions are the most frequent actions the SC takes to counter unlicensed and illegal activities. Box 3.2. Enforcement action against unlicensed activity The SC received enquiries and complaints from the public concerning “Individual L” who was allegedly providing investment advice to subscribers in a private Telegram group and charging subscription fees without obtaining a license. Following this complaint, the SC conducted an ‘agent provocateur’ exercise and confirmed that Individual L was providing investment advice. The SC also discovered that between a period of eight months, Individual L received approximately EUR 16 351 in subscription fees. The SC issued a Notice to Show Cause under the CMSA, imposed a public reprimand and a monetary penalty of EUR 65 378 on the individual in 2023. 229. The LFSA conducts desktop surveillance through regulatory submissions, web search and complaint or referral from other LEAs to detect illegal activities. The LFSA also provides a platform for the public to lodge complaints and seek clarification on whether third party entities are licensed by LFSA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 301. Most DNFBPs in the Malaysia are licensed or registered by the relevant competent authorities and SRBs as outlined in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”. There is no specific AML/CFT licensing requirement for the DPMS sector, although they must be registered as legal persons with CCM or registered as businesses under the relevant legislation. 302. There is only one casino license issued in Malaysia, and this is subject to renewal every three months. The MoF, as the licensing authority, assesses whether there have been any breaches of the terms and conditions by the casino operator during the three-month period before renewing the license application. The casino continues to have a stable ownership by a prominent publicly listed company, which gives a high degree of transparency of its beneficial ownership. The MoF also conducts checks with the MACC on the background of the casino’s KRPs, and with BNM supervisors to ensure that the casino continues to comply with its AML/CFT requirements. In the case of changes in directors, the casino conducts a first layer of assessment on the fitness propriety of new applicants, including internal and external character vetting, ahead of final approval by the MoF. Registration and fit and proper assessment of junkets by the casino has also been added to the casino’s terms and conditions to ensure better control and monitoring of junkets and ensure they are not operated by criminals or their associates. The casino has strict requirements for the junket operators it works with and reviews these relationships on a regular basis. 303. Onshore trust companies must be incorporated and listed in the CCM register prior to undertaking trust company activities. As part of the registration process, the CCM conducts background checks involving security vetting with relevant authorities. The CCM also conducts security vetting on applicants for key positions (directors and CEO of trust company), through checks with the RMP and its own Enforcement Division. 304. For Labuan trust companies, the LFSA assess the fitness and propriety of persons carrying out key functions. This includes security vetting with the RMP, financial vetting as well as an assessment to ensure they have appropriate expertise for the role they are undertaking within the organisation. The appointment of principal officers and key functionaries is subject to renewal/reassessment every two years when a new fit and proper assessment is conducted. The LFSA also conducts ongoing checks and validation of the fitness and propriety of senior management, directors and key functionaries of Labuan trust companies as part of their onsite examinations. The robust licensing approach for Labuan trust companies is a positive aspect of Malaysia’s AML/CFT/CPF framework and is important given the significant role they play in preventing criminals and their associates’ involvement in Labuan FIs. 305. Since MER 2015, any individual seeking to act as a company secretary must attain a requisite qualification and become a member of one of seven approved professional bodies. As members, all company secretaries must comply with their respective by-laws, code of ethics, fit and proper procedures and are subject to disciplinary procedures for any failure to do so. Once this step is complete, company secretaries must register with the CCM before they can carry out company secretary activity. Consequently, the CCM serves as the ultimate authority for the registration of company secretaries and has the power to refuse to renew, suspend or revoke a license. 306. All lawyers, notaries, accountants and registered estate agents must be accredited by respective SRBs before they can carry out activity in line with their professions. Laws regulating each of these sectors provide specific criteria for fit-and-proper tests and information required as part of the accreditation process. Most of the focus of these processes relate to the professional suitability of the applicant, but there are some elements relating to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. Fit and proper checks largely involve self-declaration from applicants stating that they have not been convicted of criminal activities. The MBC and MIA require members to submit annual statutory declarations on criminal backgrounds and fitness and propriety as part of reporting obligations and annual practising certificate renewal. Box 4.1.Revocation of practicing certificate Two company secretaries submitted false information to the CCM on the address of the foreign directors of legal persons. Local addresses were provided despite the foreign directors having never resided in Malaysia. Upon discovery of this, the CCM revoked the practising certificates of the two company secretaries and blacklisted them in CCM’s internal register in January 2025. They were also reported to relevant professional bodies for disciplinary action for false reporting and gross negligence in company secretarial duties. 4.1.2.  Detecting and addressing breaches 307. All licensing authorities have established systems for detecting businesses carrying out unlicensed DNFBP activities. This includes processes for reporting suspected unauthorised activity, unethical conduct or potential criminal activity; proactive monitoring of DNFBPs as part of license/registration renewal; and ongoing monitoring to identify any adverse findings on the DNFBPs that may affect their fitness and propriety. 308. In the event of the detection of adverse findings during the application stage or ongoing monitoring, licensing authorities and SRBs are guided by their respective escalation process for further assessment. Over the past five years, there have been several license application or renewal rejections across the DNFBP sectors for failure to meet the application or licensing criteria. For example, over 160 cases of new applications for Accountant Practicing Certificates and over 3 000 registered estate agents licence renewals were rejected since 2019. In addition, there were three refusals of registration for company secretaries due to convictions of criminal offences. 309. The LFSA has not refused any license application, revoked the license of any Labuan trust companies, or refused the renewal of a practicing certificate for trust officers for AML or fit and proper related licensing breaches." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.1.1. Market entry controls 301. Most DNFBPs in the Malaysia are licensed or registered by the relevant competent authorities and SRBs as outlined in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”. There is no specific AML/CFT licensing requirement for the DPMS sector, although they must be registered as legal persons with CCM or registered as businesses under the relevant legislation. 302. There is only one casino license issued in Malaysia, and this is subject to renewal every three months. The MoF, as the licensing authority, assesses whether there have been any breaches of the terms and conditions by the casino operator during the three-month period before renewing the license application. The casino continues to have a stable ownership by a prominent publicly listed company, which gives a high degree of transparency of its beneficial ownership. The MoF also conducts checks with the MACC on the background of the casino’s KRPs, and with BNM supervisors to ensure that the casino continues to comply with its AML/CFT requirements. In the case of changes in directors, the casino conducts a first layer of assessment on the fitness propriety of new applicants, including internal and external character vetting, ahead of final approval by the MoF. Registration and fit and proper assessment of junkets by the casino has also been added to the casino’s terms and conditions to ensure better control and monitoring of junkets and ensure they are not operated by criminals or their associates. The casino has strict requirements for the junket operators it works with and reviews these relationships on a regular basis. 303. Onshore trust companies must be incorporated and listed in the CCM register prior to undertaking trust company activities. As part of the registration process, the CCM conducts background checks involving security vetting with relevant authorities. The CCM also conducts security vetting on applicants for key positions (directors and CEO of trust company), through checks with the RMP and its own Enforcement Division. 304. For Labuan trust companies, the LFSA assess the fitness and propriety of persons carrying out key functions. This includes security vetting with the RMP, financial vetting as well as an assessment to ensure they have appropriate expertise for the role they are undertaking within the organisation. The appointment of principal officers and key functionaries is subject to renewal/reassessment every two years when a new fit and proper assessment is conducted. The LFSA also conducts ongoing checks and validation of the fitness and propriety of senior management, directors and key functionaries of Labuan trust companies as part of their onsite examinations. The robust licensing approach for Labuan trust companies is a positive aspect of Malaysia’s AML/CFT/CPF framework and is important given the significant role they play in preventing criminals and their associates’ involvement in Labuan FIs. 305. Since MER 2015, any individual seeking to act as a company secretary must attain a requisite qualification and become a member of one of seven approved professional bodies. As members, all company secretaries must comply with their respective by-laws, code of ethics, fit and proper procedures and are subject to disciplinary procedures for any failure to do so. Once this step is complete, company secretaries must register with the CCM before they can carry out company secretary activity. Consequently, the CCM serves as the ultimate authority for the registration of company secretaries and has the power to refuse to renew, suspend or revoke a license. 306. All lawyers, notaries, accountants and registered estate agents must be accredited by respective SRBs before they can carry out activity in line with their professions. Laws regulating each of these sectors provide specific criteria for fit-and-proper tests and information required as part of the accreditation process. Most of the focus of these processes relate to the professional suitability of the applicant, but there are some elements relating to AML/CFT/CPF obligations. Fit and proper checks largely involve self-declaration from applicants stating that they have not been convicted of criminal activities. The MBC and MIA require members to submit annual statutory declarations on criminal backgrounds and fitness and propriety as part of reporting obligations and annual practising certificate renewal. Box 4.1.Revocation of practicing certificate Two company secretaries submitted false information to the CCM on the address of the foreign directors of legal persons. Local addresses were provided despite the foreign directors having never resided in Malaysia. Upon discovery of this, the CCM revoked the practising certificates of the two company secretaries and blacklisted them in CCM’s internal register in January 2025. They were also reported to relevant professional bodies for disciplinary action for false reporting and gross negligence in company secretarial duties. 4.1.2.  Detecting and addressing breaches 307. All licensing authorities have established systems for detecting businesses carrying out unlicensed DNFBP activities. This includes processes for reporting suspected unauthorised activity, unethical conduct or potential criminal activity; proactive monitoring of DNFBPs as part of license/registration renewal; and ongoing monitoring to identify any adverse findings on the DNFBPs that may affect their fitness and propriety. 308. In the event of the detection of adverse findings during the application stage or ongoing monitoring, licensing authorities and SRBs are guided by their respective escalation process for further assessment. Over the past five years, there have been several license application or renewal rejections across the DNFBP sectors for failure to meet the application or licensing criteria. For example, over 160 cases of new applications for Accountant Practicing Certificates and over 3 000 registered estate agents licence renewals were rejected since 2019. In addition, there were three refusals of registration for company secretaries due to convictions of criminal offences. 309. The LFSA has not refused any license application, revoked the license of any Labuan trust companies, or refused the renewal of a practicing certificate for trust officers for AML or fit and proper related licensing breaches." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="364. Malaysia has a robust understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with domestic and offshore (Labuan) legal persons and arrangements. This understanding is based on the 2021 Legal Person Risk Assessment and the Legal Arrangements Risk Assessment, which were updated in 2024 to include an assessment of foreign-created legal persons and arrangements with sufficient links to Malaysia. Prior to 2021, Malaysia considered these ML/TF risks as part of its NRA process, which was more limited. The dedicated risk assessments for legal persons and arrangements represent an enhanced process, which provides more detailed understanding of the risks these entities present. 365. Both risk assessments consider the threats (inherent risks) of legal persons and arrangements being misused for ML/TF and the vulnerabilities, or control measures the authorities have put in place to ensure these threats are being managed. These two factors combined provide an overall assessment of the net ML/TF risk, as well as an assessment of the risk posed by specific types of entities. 366. These risk assessments were conducted by the Legal Persons/Legal Arrangements subcommittee of the NCC and included input from public and private sector representatives. A range of qualitative and quantitative inputs were considered including, focus group sessions with authorities, questionnaires, open-source reports, financial intelligence reports and investigations and convictions data. Factors that lead to vulnerabilities include companies with foreign directorships from high-risk countries, or the use of nominee arrangements. For LAs, inherent risks include foreign exposure, value and volume of the arrangement. Control measures for legal persons include whether supervisory activities include consistent oversight and compliance levels of legal persons. For legal arrangements, control measures or vulnerabilities include the AML/CFT regulatory framework and AML/CFT supervisory measures. 367. The current legal person risk assessment concludes that ML risk for onshore legal persons is “medium” and TF risk is “low”. The risk assessment notes cases of legal persons acting as ‘money mules’ facilitating pass-through accounts for corruption proceeds being used as shell and/or shelf companies, and to facilitate bribes, which contributed to the higher rating of ML risk. For offshore legal persons, the risk for ML and TF is low mainly due to their small number compared to onshore legal persons and their robust control measures. In terms of foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia, the authorities deem these to be low risk, mainly based on a low number of STRs concerning these entities and an absence of ML/TF convictions involving foreign legal persons and the small number of these entities in Malaysia (total foreign incorporated legal persons registered in Malaysia is approximately 0.2% of domestic incorporated legal persons). The 2024 risk assessment also concluded the inherent risk of foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia was low based on several other factors such as high registration costs, low cash intensity and their limited exposure to high-risk sectors, etc. 368. The current legal arrangement risk assessment concludes that the ML and TF risk for onshore and Labuan legal arrangements is medium while onshore foundations/incorporated trusts pose higher ML/TF risk given that the majority of STRs and CTRs related to legal arrangements are connected to the foundations/incorporated trusts formed by political parties. This rating has not changed since the previous 2021 assessment. In 2024, Malaysia considered the risks of legal arrangements with foreign links for the first time. This update did not impact the overall risk rating to any significant extent, due to the very small number of such entities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="364. Malaysia has a robust understanding of the ML/TF risks associated with domestic and offshore (Labuan) legal persons and arrangements. This understanding is based on the 2021 Legal Person Risk Assessment and the Legal Arrangements Risk Assessment, which were updated in 2024 to include an assessment of foreign-created legal persons and arrangements with sufficient links to Malaysia. Prior to 2021, Malaysia considered these ML/TF risks as part of its NRA process, which was more limited. The dedicated risk assessments for legal persons and arrangements represent an enhanced process, which provides more detailed understanding of the risks these entities present. 365. Both risk assessments consider the threats (inherent risks) of legal persons and arrangements being misused for ML/TF and the vulnerabilities, or control measures the authorities have put in place to ensure these threats are being managed. These two factors combined provide an overall assessment of the net ML/TF risk, as well as an assessment of the risk posed by specific types of entities. 366. These risk assessments were conducted by the Legal Persons/Legal Arrangements subcommittee of the NCC and included input from public and private sector representatives. A range of qualitative and quantitative inputs were considered including, focus group sessions with authorities, questionnaires, open-source reports, financial intelligence reports and investigations and convictions data. Factors that lead to vulnerabilities include companies with foreign directorships from high-risk countries, or the use of nominee arrangements. For LAs, inherent risks include foreign exposure, value and volume of the arrangement. Control measures for legal persons include whether supervisory activities include consistent oversight and compliance levels of legal persons. For legal arrangements, control measures or vulnerabilities include the AML/CFT regulatory framework and AML/CFT supervisory measures. 367. The current legal person risk assessment concludes that ML risk for onshore legal persons is “medium” and TF risk is “low”. The risk assessment notes cases of legal persons acting as ‘money mules’ facilitating pass-through accounts for corruption proceeds being used as shell and/or shelf companies, and to facilitate bribes, which contributed to the higher rating of ML risk. For offshore legal persons, the risk for ML and TF is low mainly due to their small number compared to onshore legal persons and their robust control measures. In terms of foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia, the authorities deem these to be low risk, mainly based on a low number of STRs concerning these entities and an absence of ML/TF convictions involving foreign legal persons and the small number of these entities in Malaysia (total foreign incorporated legal persons registered in Malaysia is approximately 0.2% of domestic incorporated legal persons). The 2024 risk assessment also concluded the inherent risk of foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia was low based on several other factors such as high registration costs, low cash intensity and their limited exposure to high-risk sectors, etc. 368. The current legal arrangement risk assessment concludes that the ML and TF risk for onshore and Labuan legal arrangements is medium while onshore foundations/incorporated trusts pose higher ML/TF risk given that the majority of STRs and CTRs related to legal arrangements are connected to the foundations/incorporated trusts formed by political parties. This rating has not changed since the previous 2021 assessment. In 2024, Malaysia considered the risks of legal arrangements with foreign links for the first time. This update did not impact the overall risk rating to any significant extent, due to the very small number of such entities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="415. Malaysia’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Department (FIED), is the country’s central authority for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of STRs (and CTRs). The FIU is set up as an independent and autonomous function within the BNM. The FIU has access to a wide range of financial intelligence and other relevant information via direct access or indirectly upon request, to conduct its operational and strategic analysis. 416. Malaysia’s FIU primarily relies on the FINS system, which was upgraded in December 2022 to FINS 2.0 (hereafter referred to as “FINS”) to receive and disseminate intelligence and other information. This electronic platform enables direct interaction between the FIU, RIs, and competent authorities. Through FINS, RIs submit STRs and CTRs, while financial intelligence can be shared between RIs, LEAs, and the FIU. The system also facilitates the dissemination of financial intelligence, enhancing coordination and information exchange amongst relevant entities. While not a legal requirement, Malaysia’s FIU notes that most FIs have FINS accounts. Larger DNFBPs, such as the casino, have access to the FINS system while most other DNFBPs submit STRs to the FIU manually via secured email. Additionally, information from supervisory authorities, obtained through onsite and offsite examinations is received by the FIU from the relevant supervisor and uploaded directly into FINS. From 2019 to February 2025, there were a total of 170 reports received by the FIU from supervisory authorities. 417. Since 2019, Malaysia’s FIU has received approximately 1.39 million STRs from FIs and DNFBPs, with most emanating from the banking sector (approximately 93%). In terms of quality, Malaysia’s FIU states that most STRs contain sufficient information to support their analytical functions. When STRs lack sufficient information, the FIU uses its powers to request additional information from RIs to support its analysis. STRs from FIs are generally more comprehensive and of higher quality due to the use of automated monitoring systems to detect suspicious transactions. The below table provides an overview of the STRs received from RIs since 2019. Table 6.1. STRs reported by FIs and DNFBPs by sector Sector Net ML Risk (NRA 2023) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) TOTAL FIs Banking Institutions High 94 966 120 951 178 214 229 380 301 369 321 321 45 108 1 291 309 Non-Bank Designated Payment Instrument (DPI) Issuers Medium 687 1 167 1 669 2 170 4 061 2 868 883 13 505 Money Services Businesses Medium 8 106 6 045 5 763 3 986 5 070 7 027 832 36 829 Insurance and Takaful Operators Medium 1 108 1 197 1 036 949 957 895 134 6 276 Capital Market Intermediaries Medium-High 229 352 875 584 510 887 98 3 535 Digital Asset Exchanges Medium-High 26 119 308 488 355 399 44 1 739 Non-Bank FIs Medium 2 542 515 1 892 1 203 534 2 454 462 9 602 Money-lenders Medium 4 5 12 9 14 43 5 92 Pawnbrokers Low 1 2 7 1 6 10 2 29 Leasing and Factoring Companies Medium 7 5 5 3 10 27 6 63 Labuan FIs Low to Medium-High 27 31 51 25 35 44 16 229 FI Sub-total 107 703 130 389 189 832 238 798 312 921 335 975 47 590 1 363 208 DNFBPs Casino Medium-High 5,460 3,480 1,438 4,217 4,204 5,312 669 24 780 DPMS High 5 9 29 14 57 118 9 241 Lawyers High 16 17 26 34 48 81 7 229 Company Secretaries Medium-High 5 21 9 3 31 113 1 183 Accountants Medium-High 5 - - 2 1 2 - 10 Registered Estate Agents Medium-High 1 - - 2 2 4 1 10 Licensed Gaming Outlets Low 85 48 42 89 131 90 15 500 Trust Companies Low 5 2 2 1 2 4 - 16 Labuan Trust Companies Medium 17 12 10 17 39 13 1 109 DNFBP Sub-total 5 599 3 589 1 556 4 379 4 515 5 737 703 26 078 Grand Total 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 317 436 341 712 48 293 1 389 286 418. The number of STRs received are generally in line with the findings of the NRA. However, all DNFBP sectors (except for the casino) consistently file a low number of STRs. This raises concerns about the understanding of ML/TF risks and the STR obligations within these sectors (see IO.4 on AML/CFT reporting obligations). 419. When submitting STRs, RIs can indicate the suspected underlying offence. As summarised in IO.1, Malaysia identifies fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime as the predicate offences posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia assesses TF risk as medium risk and its PF risks as medium-low. As outlined in the below table, the majority of STRs reported by RIs were denoted as possibly corresponding to ML, fraud, tax offences and organised crime. This aligns to some extent with Malaysia’s risk understanding. Table 6.2. Breakdown of STRs by possible underlying offence Suspected offence Risk profile 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total % of Total ML 39 599 43 902 68 076 113 433 152 522 167 489 23 449 608 470 43.80% Others [62] 28 777 31 803 49 954 46 403 56 532 30 724 2734 246 927 17.77% Fraud High 25 136 30 299 37 321 47 525 73 304 99 440 15 584 328 609 23.65% Tax Offences Medium-High 9 927 12 943 21 343 20 171 17 674 20 671 2 731 105 460 7.59% Organised Crime High 7 115 13 259 12 603 13 401 15 880 20 630 3 509 86 397 6.22% Corruption High 1 603 973 1 263 1 022 739 1443 144 7 187 0.52% Drug Trafficking High 222 246 241 485 157 239 19 1 609 0.12% Smuggling High 427 204 289 225 355 251 36 1 787 0.13% Terrorism/TF Medium 334 194 130 246 207 404 68 1 583 0.11% Human Trafficking/ Migrant Smuggling Medium-High 51 91 141 224 53 174 5 739 0.05% PF Medium-low 111 64 27 42 13 247 14 518 0.04% Total 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 31 7436 341 712 48293 138 9286 420. CTRs are also submitted by relevant RIs into FINS. [63] In 2019, due to the extensive use of cash in Malaysia, the CTR reporting threshold was reduced from RM 50 000 to RM 25 000 (approximately EUR 10 775 to EUR 5 388). From 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia received over 37 million CTRs from relevant RIs. Malaysia notes that this information has been invaluable for developing and enriching financial intelligence products and investigations. CTRs contain account and transaction information that help the FIU match data with records from other accessible databases. They are one of the key data sources used by FIU analysts to prioritise cases for review. For example, in analysing networks involved in illicit money flows, those with more recent CTRs and larger transaction amounts are typically assigned higher priority. 421. Other major data sources available to the FIU (either directly or indirectly) are outlined in the below table. Table 6.3. Direct and indirect information available to the FIU Information/Data Access Type FINS – various types of reports, including: · STRs and CTRs · Requests from LEAs · Investigation orders under s.48 of AMLA and s.21 of DDFOPA · Informal reports/public tip-off · Reports from supervisory authorities arising from on-site/off-site examinations of RIs Direct Cash Declaration System - Reports on cross-border movements of cash and BNIs Direct Money services businesses transactions (money changing and remittance) Direct Registry of companies or businesses Direct/Indirect Additional records e.g. · CDD information · Account statements · Fund transfers – international and domestic Indirect Foreign financial intelligence, incl. spontaneous sharing Direct/Indirect Fraud/scam reports from NSRC Direct Suspected mule accounts Direct National Financial Crime Intelligence System (NFIS) Direct Sanctions/ PEPs/Adverse news Direct Cryptocurrency transactions Direct Criminal records Direct/Indirect Registry of natural persons Indirect Immigration information and travel records Indirect Tax records Indirect Owners of phone numbers and call information Indirect Registry of vehicle owners Indirect 422. For databases to which the FIU has direct access, information can be retrieved instantly. For databases with indirect access, receipt typically takes six days on average. The FIU aims to improve the timeliness of data collection through inter-agency collaboration. For example, the secondment of IRBM officers to the FIU has streamlined access to tax-related records, allowing requests to be fulfilled within the same day via secure email. 6.1.1. By other competent authorities 423. Competent authorities have access to a wide range of data and information, including FINS and other records maintained by LEAs and government agencies, to support their intelligence and investigative functions. Most LEAs have direct access to FINS, allowing them to conduct searches off-site and retrieve timely and up-to-date financial intelligence. In this platform, LEAs can conduct searches and download results pertaining to STRs or CTRs using a subject’s name and identification details. At the time of Malaysia’s 2015 MER, only three LEAs were active users with direct access to FINS. As of February 2025, direct access has expanded to 11 agencies (where some agencies such as the RMP, MACC, RMCD, IRBM and SC have multiple departments with direct access). 424. Additionally, the “Request for Information” feature in FINS serves as a valuable tool enabling LEAs to request information from RIs through the FIU. During onsite discussions, LEAs provided positive feedback on their access to FINS, highlighting how it enables timely access to valuable financial information for intelligence development and investigative support. Box 6.1. LEAs requests for information via FINS LEAs can request intelligence from RIs by making requests through FINS. Information such as account opening documents transaction records, etc. would be provided by the RI to the FIU and subsequently disseminated to the requesting LEA via FINS for intelligence purposes only . The FIU reviews each request to ensure that it is aligned with this requirement before it is sent to the relevant RI. This enables LEAs to obtain intelligence from RIs in a swift manner to further support their investigations. Additionally, LEAs can quickly obtain financial information from RIs by issuing investigation orders through FINS. LEAs can directly issue these orders to relevant RIs under Section 48 of the AMLA and Section 21 of the DDFOPA, provided the Public Prosecutor deems it necessary for investigating ML or TF offences without the need for a court order. Since 2019, 4 788 such orders have been published to RIs via FINS. 425. The National Financial Crime Intelligence System (NFIS), managed by the NFCC, is another important information portal available to support LEAs in conducting investigations and integrated operations on financial crime, ML and TF cases. NFIS provides a platform for LEAs and the FIU to gather information from various data sources in a timely manner. Since its inception in 2023, the NFIS has supported multiple joint operations coordinated by the NFCC. As of February 2025, NFIS has 56 data sources. The below box outlines the types of reports generated by the NFCC based on the NFIS. Box 6.2.Types of intelligence reports provided by the NFCC There are currently six analysts in NFCC, with the role of disseminating NFIS information upon request by the FIU and LEAs, through two types of reports: 1. Profiling Report : consists of information on the subject (individual/entity) obtained from various data sources linked to NFIS. The information includes personal data, family tree, assets, e.g., vehicle, involvement in companies and associations, phone number, addresses, past criminal records, holder of licence/special permit. 2. Analysed Report : consists of linked data on the subjects obtained from (1) NFIS, (2) subscribed databases and (3) open-source intelligence obtained by analysts. The analysts enrich the report by providing their observations comments and recommendations in the report. 426. LEAs also have access to external databases and resources to obtain information to strengthen investigations alongside open-source intelligence. This includes direct access to the Cash Declaration System (CADS), which includes declarations and other information related to the cross-border CBNI. Since 2019, Malaysia received approximately 20 000 cash/BNI declarations. However, with the low enforcement response in relation to cross-border CBNI (see IO.8), it is not clear the extent to which LEAs use this information to support their investigations. 427. As noted in IO.5, LEAs generally have access to basic information on all legal persons including foreign-created legal persons that carry out business in Malaysia. The CCM and LFSA maintain BO information registries (e-BOS and PEARL). While LEAs do not have direct access to the registries, the CCM and LFSA provide them with BO information upon request, generally within three business days. Moreover, LEAs have timely access to basic and BO information of legal arrangements, but the quality of the information is not sufficiently verified for accuracy. The challenges related to accurate and up-to-date BO information can hinder the ability of the FIU and LEAs to conduct effective investigations. The FIU and LEAs can leverage and CDD information held by RIs to access BO information. Nevertheless, incomplete or outdated BO records can obstruct efforts to trace illicit financial flows, identify the true owners of assets, and uncover complex ML/TF/PF networks. 428. Overall, Malaysia’s FIU and competent authorities have access to a wide range of reports, data, and information to investigate ML/TF and predicate offenses. The country demonstrates great effort in enhancing data integration. Direct electronic access has enabled the FIU and competent authorities’ timely access to most data in a consistent and up-to-date manner from the data sources of the FIU and competent authorities. Nevertheless, areas for further improvement remain, particularly in relation to the availability of BO information and the use of cross-border CBNI information. Footnotes [62] “Others” primarily refers to cases where RIs identified red flags that could indicate multiple offences or were unable to determine a specific predicate offence due to limited information available at the time of submitting the STR. [63] As of February 2025, the CTR obligation of RM 25 000 and above in a day, pursuant to section 14(1)(a) of the AMLA, is applicable to banking institutions, prescribed development FIs, Lembaga Tabung Haji and the licensed casino." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="415. Malaysia’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Department (FIED), is the country’s central authority for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of STRs (and CTRs). The FIU is set up as an independent and autonomous function within the BNM. The FIU has access to a wide range of financial intelligence and other relevant information via direct access or indirectly upon request, to conduct its operational and strategic analysis. 416. Malaysia’s FIU primarily relies on the FINS system, which was upgraded in December 2022 to FINS 2.0 (hereafter referred to as “FINS”) to receive and disseminate intelligence and other information. This electronic platform enables direct interaction between the FIU, RIs, and competent authorities. Through FINS, RIs submit STRs and CTRs, while financial intelligence can be shared between RIs, LEAs, and the FIU. The system also facilitates the dissemination of financial intelligence, enhancing coordination and information exchange amongst relevant entities. While not a legal requirement, Malaysia’s FIU notes that most FIs have FINS accounts. Larger DNFBPs, such as the casino, have access to the FINS system while most other DNFBPs submit STRs to the FIU manually via secured email. Additionally, information from supervisory authorities, obtained through onsite and offsite examinations is received by the FIU from the relevant supervisor and uploaded directly into FINS. From 2019 to February 2025, there were a total of 170 reports received by the FIU from supervisory authorities. 417. Since 2019, Malaysia’s FIU has received approximately 1.39 million STRs from FIs and DNFBPs, with most emanating from the banking sector (approximately 93%). In terms of quality, Malaysia’s FIU states that most STRs contain sufficient information to support their analytical functions. When STRs lack sufficient information, the FIU uses its powers to request additional information from RIs to support its analysis. STRs from FIs are generally more comprehensive and of higher quality due to the use of automated monitoring systems to detect suspicious transactions. The below table provides an overview of the STRs received from RIs since 2019. Table 6.1. STRs reported by FIs and DNFBPs by sector Sector Net ML Risk (NRA 2023) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) TOTAL FIs Banking Institutions High 94 966 120 951 178 214 229 380 301 369 321 321 45 108 1 291 309 Non-Bank Designated Payment Instrument (DPI) Issuers Medium 687 1 167 1 669 2 170 4 061 2 868 883 13 505 Money Services Businesses Medium 8 106 6 045 5 763 3 986 5 070 7 027 832 36 829 Insurance and Takaful Operators Medium 1 108 1 197 1 036 949 957 895 134 6 276 Capital Market Intermediaries Medium-High 229 352 875 584 510 887 98 3 535 Digital Asset Exchanges Medium-High 26 119 308 488 355 399 44 1 739 Non-Bank FIs Medium 2 542 515 1 892 1 203 534 2 454 462 9 602 Money-lenders Medium 4 5 12 9 14 43 5 92 Pawnbrokers Low 1 2 7 1 6 10 2 29 Leasing and Factoring Companies Medium 7 5 5 3 10 27 6 63 Labuan FIs Low to Medium-High 27 31 51 25 35 44 16 229 FI Sub-total 107 703 130 389 189 832 238 798 312 921 335 975 47 590 1 363 208 DNFBPs Casino Medium-High 5,460 3,480 1,438 4,217 4,204 5,312 669 24 780 DPMS High 5 9 29 14 57 118 9 241 Lawyers High 16 17 26 34 48 81 7 229 Company Secretaries Medium-High 5 21 9 3 31 113 1 183 Accountants Medium-High 5 - - 2 1 2 - 10 Registered Estate Agents Medium-High 1 - - 2 2 4 1 10 Licensed Gaming Outlets Low 85 48 42 89 131 90 15 500 Trust Companies Low 5 2 2 1 2 4 - 16 Labuan Trust Companies Medium 17 12 10 17 39 13 1 109 DNFBP Sub-total 5 599 3 589 1 556 4 379 4 515 5 737 703 26 078 Grand Total 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 317 436 341 712 48 293 1 389 286 418. The number of STRs received are generally in line with the findings of the NRA. However, all DNFBP sectors (except for the casino) consistently file a low number of STRs. This raises concerns about the understanding of ML/TF risks and the STR obligations within these sectors (see IO.4 on AML/CFT reporting obligations). 419. When submitting STRs, RIs can indicate the suspected underlying offence. As summarised in IO.1, Malaysia identifies fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime as the predicate offences posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia assesses TF risk as medium risk and its PF risks as medium-low. As outlined in the below table, the majority of STRs reported by RIs were denoted as possibly corresponding to ML, fraud, tax offences and organised crime. This aligns to some extent with Malaysia’s risk understanding. Table 6.2. Breakdown of STRs by possible underlying offence Suspected offence Risk profile 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total % of Total ML 39 599 43 902 68 076 113 433 152 522 167 489 23 449 608 470 43.80% Others [62] 28 777 31 803 49 954 46 403 56 532 30 724 2734 246 927 17.77% Fraud High 25 136 30 299 37 321 47 525 73 304 99 440 15 584 328 609 23.65% Tax Offences Medium-High 9 927 12 943 21 343 20 171 17 674 20 671 2 731 105 460 7.59% Organised Crime High 7 115 13 259 12 603 13 401 15 880 20 630 3 509 86 397 6.22% Corruption High 1 603 973 1 263 1 022 739 1443 144 7 187 0.52% Drug Trafficking High 222 246 241 485 157 239 19 1 609 0.12% Smuggling High 427 204 289 225 355 251 36 1 787 0.13% Terrorism/TF Medium 334 194 130 246 207 404 68 1 583 0.11% Human Trafficking/ Migrant Smuggling Medium-High 51 91 141 224 53 174 5 739 0.05% PF Medium-low 111 64 27 42 13 247 14 518 0.04% Total 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 31 7436 341 712 48293 138 9286 420. CTRs are also submitted by relevant RIs into FINS. [63] In 2019, due to the extensive use of cash in Malaysia, the CTR reporting threshold was reduced from RM 50 000 to RM 25 000 (approximately EUR 10 775 to EUR 5 388). From 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia received over 37 million CTRs from relevant RIs. Malaysia notes that this information has been invaluable for developing and enriching financial intelligence products and investigations. CTRs contain account and transaction information that help the FIU match data with records from other accessible databases. They are one of the key data sources used by FIU analysts to prioritise cases for review. For example, in analysing networks involved in illicit money flows, those with more recent CTRs and larger transaction amounts are typically assigned higher priority. 421. Other major data sources available to the FIU (either directly or indirectly) are outlined in the below table. Table 6.3. Direct and indirect information available to the FIU Information/Data Access Type FINS – various types of reports, including: · STRs and CTRs · Requests from LEAs · Investigation orders under s.48 of AMLA and s.21 of DDFOPA · Informal reports/public tip-off · Reports from supervisory authorities arising from on-site/off-site examinations of RIs Direct Cash Declaration System - Reports on cross-border movements of cash and BNIs Direct Money services businesses transactions (money changing and remittance) Direct Registry of companies or businesses Direct/Indirect Additional records e.g. · CDD information · Account statements · Fund transfers – international and domestic Indirect Foreign financial intelligence, incl. spontaneous sharing Direct/Indirect Fraud/scam reports from NSRC Direct Suspected mule accounts Direct National Financial Crime Intelligence System (NFIS) Direct Sanctions/ PEPs/Adverse news Direct Cryptocurrency transactions Direct Criminal records Direct/Indirect Registry of natural persons Indirect Immigration information and travel records Indirect Tax records Indirect Owners of phone numbers and call information Indirect Registry of vehicle owners Indirect 422. For databases to which the FIU has direct access, information can be retrieved instantly. For databases with indirect access, receipt typically takes six days on average. The FIU aims to improve the timeliness of data collection through inter-agency collaboration. For example, the secondment of IRBM officers to the FIU has streamlined access to tax-related records, allowing requests to be fulfilled within the same day via secure email. 6.1.1. By other competent authorities 423. Competent authorities have access to a wide range of data and information, including FINS and other records maintained by LEAs and government agencies, to support their intelligence and investigative functions. Most LEAs have direct access to FINS, allowing them to conduct searches off-site and retrieve timely and up-to-date financial intelligence. In this platform, LEAs can conduct searches and download results pertaining to STRs or CTRs using a subject’s name and identification details. At the time of Malaysia’s 2015 MER, only three LEAs were active users with direct access to FINS. As of February 2025, direct access has expanded to 11 agencies (where some agencies such as the RMP, MACC, RMCD, IRBM and SC have multiple departments with direct access). 424. Additionally, the “Request for Information” feature in FINS serves as a valuable tool enabling LEAs to request information from RIs through the FIU. During onsite discussions, LEAs provided positive feedback on their access to FINS, highlighting how it enables timely access to valuable financial information for intelligence development and investigative support. Box 6.1. LEAs requests for information via FINS LEAs can request intelligence from RIs by making requests through FINS. Information such as account opening documents transaction records, etc. would be provided by the RI to the FIU and subsequently disseminated to the requesting LEA via FINS for intelligence purposes only . The FIU reviews each request to ensure that it is aligned with this requirement before it is sent to the relevant RI. This enables LEAs to obtain intelligence from RIs in a swift manner to further support their investigations. Additionally, LEAs can quickly obtain financial information from RIs by issuing investigation orders through FINS. LEAs can directly issue these orders to relevant RIs under Section 48 of the AMLA and Section 21 of the DDFOPA, provided the Public Prosecutor deems it necessary for investigating ML or TF offences without the need for a court order. Since 2019, 4 788 such orders have been published to RIs via FINS. 425. The National Financial Crime Intelligence System (NFIS), managed by the NFCC, is another important information portal available to support LEAs in conducting investigations and integrated operations on financial crime, ML and TF cases. NFIS provides a platform for LEAs and the FIU to gather information from various data sources in a timely manner. Since its inception in 2023, the NFIS has supported multiple joint operations coordinated by the NFCC. As of February 2025, NFIS has 56 data sources. The below box outlines the types of reports generated by the NFCC based on the NFIS. Box 6.2.Types of intelligence reports provided by the NFCC There are currently six analysts in NFCC, with the role of disseminating NFIS information upon request by the FIU and LEAs, through two types of reports: 1. Profiling Report : consists of information on the subject (individual/entity) obtained from various data sources linked to NFIS. The information includes personal data, family tree, assets, e.g., vehicle, involvement in companies and associations, phone number, addresses, past criminal records, holder of licence/special permit. 2. Analysed Report : consists of linked data on the subjects obtained from (1) NFIS, (2) subscribed databases and (3) open-source intelligence obtained by analysts. The analysts enrich the report by providing their observations comments and recommendations in the report. 426. LEAs also have access to external databases and resources to obtain information to strengthen investigations alongside open-source intelligence. This includes direct access to the Cash Declaration System (CADS), which includes declarations and other information related to the cross-border CBNI. Since 2019, Malaysia received approximately 20 000 cash/BNI declarations. However, with the low enforcement response in relation to cross-border CBNI (see IO.8), it is not clear the extent to which LEAs use this information to support their investigations. 427. As noted in IO.5, LEAs generally have access to basic information on all legal persons including foreign-created legal persons that carry out business in Malaysia. The CCM and LFSA maintain BO information registries (e-BOS and PEARL). While LEAs do not have direct access to the registries, the CCM and LFSA provide them with BO information upon request, generally within three business days. Moreover, LEAs have timely access to basic and BO information of legal arrangements, but the quality of the information is not sufficiently verified for accuracy. The challenges related to accurate and up-to-date BO information can hinder the ability of the FIU and LEAs to conduct effective investigations. The FIU and LEAs can leverage and CDD information held by RIs to access BO information. Nevertheless, incomplete or outdated BO records can obstruct efforts to trace illicit financial flows, identify the true owners of assets, and uncover complex ML/TF/PF networks. 428. Overall, Malaysia’s FIU and competent authorities have access to a wide range of reports, data, and information to investigate ML/TF and predicate offenses. The country demonstrates great effort in enhancing data integration. Direct electronic access has enabled the FIU and competent authorities’ timely access to most data in a consistent and up-to-date manner from the data sources of the FIU and competent authorities. Nevertheless, areas for further improvement remain, particularly in relation to the availability of BO information and the use of cross-border CBNI information. Footnotes [62] “Others” primarily refers to cases where RIs identified red flags that could indicate multiple offences or were unable to determine a specific predicate offence due to limited information available at the time of submitting the STR. [63] As of February 2025, the CTR obligation of RM 25 000 and above in a day, pursuant to section 14(1)(a) of the AMLA, is applicable to banking institutions, prescribed development FIs, Lembaga Tabung Haji and the licensed casino." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="457. Malaysia has a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to investigate and prosecute ML and the authorities identify and investigate ML cases to some extent. There are 12 LEAs with the authority to investigate predicate offences and ML. [66] Their resourcing and remit vary, along with their enabling legislation. Most ML investigations are carried out by the RMP and MACC, the latter of which investigates ML cases related to corruption. ML investigations are commenced based on suspicion, and where these are re-enforced, it will lead to criminal prosecution, as well as to detect and confiscate criminal proceeds. LEAs have a strong understanding of the NRA and work collaboratively towards progressive outcomes, including the increase of ML prosecution from MER 2015 (132 cases reported from 2009-2013 vs. 234 reported from 2019-February 2025). It should be noted that these results were attained within the context of the 1MDB scandal. Due to its scale and complexity, 1MDB has demanded significant attention from Malaysian law enforcement and judicial bodies, becoming a priority case that necessitated the reallocation of resources from other ML investigations. 458. Frequent and ongoing communications between predicate offence and ML investigators, as well as direct access to financial intelligence (including FINs) means that ML investigations are regularly commenced. ML investigations are pursued collaboratively, and joint investigations (between two or more LEAs) are frequently used to maximise investigative resources. 459. Malaysia asserts that its current resources are sufficient to conduct ML investigations in line with its risk profile and operational context. Malaysia has equipped its LEAs with financial expertise, ensuring that officers receive training to enhance their capabilities in ML investigations, including forensic accounting. However, during discussions with the Assessment Team, all LEAs recognised the need for additional training, to align with evolving risks and increasing complexity of ML cases. 460. The table below outlines the resources available across the 12 LEAs responsible for conducting ML investigations. Despite Malaysia’s recognition in the NRA 2023 that fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime present the highest ML threats—followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime—there appears to be a resource imbalance in key enforcement bodies. Notably, the IDM, MMEA, and PERHILITAN have a low number of ML investigators, which may contribute to the limited number of ML investigations related to human trafficking, migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia notes that the RMP is the primary enforcement body, and in practice, investigations are often conducted through interagency collaboration, which allows agencies to pool resources, share expertise and overcome individual capacity constraints. These joint efforts have led to tangible enforcement outcomes, primarily related to fraud, drug trafficking and corruption, despite apparent resource limitations within a single agency. Nevertheless, addressing resource challenges and potential imbalances between LEAs through enhanced training and prioritisation is crucial to ensuring Malaysia’s ML enforcement efforts align with its identified risk areas. Table 7.1. ML investigative resources LEA with ML Investigative Powers FTE Resources Dedicated to ML Investigations (as of February 2025) RMP AML Division: 23 ML investigators (out of 124 officers) Narcotics Crime Investigation Department (NCID): 51 investigators MACC AML Division: 55 ML investigators and 7 prosecutors RMCD 23 ML Investigators (out of 227 investigators) KPDN 12 ML investigators (out of 148 investigators) BNM 27 financial investigators SC 43 investigating officers to investigate securities offenses and ML. CCM 16 LFSA 3 IRBM 17 ML investigators (out of 268 investigators) Immigration Department of Malaysia 6 ML investigators (out of 27 officers) MMEA 1 ML investigator (out of 24 investigators) Department of Wildlife and National Parks Peninsular Malaysia 1 ML investigator (out of 16 investigators) 461. Malaysia identifies ML through a variety of means and sources, including predicate offence investigations and parallel financial investigations, financial intelligence from the FIU (spontaneous and reactive disclosures as outlined in IO.6), LEA intelligence, foreign counterparts, open-source information, and public complaints to LEAs. ML cases are most commonly identified during investigations into the underlying predicate offenses. 462. As outlined in IO.6, LEAs regularly use financial intelligence from the FIU to detect ML and trace illicit proceeds. This intelligence is used in the early detection and initiation of both predicate offence and ML investigations, as well as to support and expand ongoing investigations. 463. LEAs have direct access to the FIU’s FINS system where they can obtain financial intelligence to support their investigations. Through FINS, LEAs can obtain financial intelligence from FIs and other RIs, as well as from foreign jurisdictions. This is supported by the statistics provided in IO.6 on the use of FIU disclosures and FINS data requests by LEAs during their investigations. LEAs reported that their access to financial intelligence is relatively easy, especially within FINS, which has improved the timeliness and availability of intelligence and information to support their investigations. 464. Malaysia states that the selection of cases for ML investigation is guided by a “top-down approach”, which outlines specific criteria/thresholds to open ML investigations (such as financial thresholds [67] , complexity, nature/seriousness, loss of revenue, and evidentiary standard). As outlined in R.31, LEAs have a broad range of powers and authorities to investigate ML. All LEAs investigate ML offences based on the legislation associated with their remit (e.g., tax, securities, customs) and will collaborate with other LEAs based on the circumstances and evidence of the case. The AGC is also engaged at an early stage, which helps to augment the investigative process with appropriate legal advice and guidance. LEAs follow their own prioritisation processes, which are aligned with the NRA. These processes consider factors such as case complexity, the number of suspects, potential witnesses and required statements, the use of advanced laundering techniques, and any cross-border implications. As Malaysia emerges from 1MDB and the effects of COVID-19, which necessitated reallocation of resources across several years, especially during the assessment period, the Assessment Team sees an opportunity for Malaysia to re-assess its prioritisation process. This would help demonstrate progress in addressing key challenges identified in this report, such as pursuing stand-alone and foreign predicate ML prosecutions, and tackling Malaysia’s role as a transit point for illicit activity and ML (i.e. TBML). 465. Malaysia’s structure to combat ML was strengthened in the last several years by the addition of new coordination bodies as outlined in IO.1. For example, in 2020, Malaysia built on the National Revenue Recovery Enforcement Team (NRRET) by creating the NFCC, to act as a force multiplier through the coordination of joint analysis, communications, and investigations. Since its establishment, the NFCC has brought together multiple LEAs and the AGC to conduct joint investigations into ML associated with high-risk predicates, as well as lower risk criminal activity such as tax evasion and illegal investment schemes. Since its creation, the NFCC has coordinated 19 joint operations. [68] During the onsite, LEAs remarked on the NFCC’s positive effect on collaboration. The below case studies (Box 7.1) provide a summary of these joint investigations. Box 7.1. NFCC joint operation case studies Ops Reward This case was coordinated by the NFCC, with KPDN, BNM, and RMP, involving a company suspected of promoting pyramid schemes through online applications and package sales from 2019 to 2022. The company operated without a valid licence, offering commissions for recruiting new members and selling membership packages. They also promoted an e-wallet app with RM denominated vouchers, promising users that they could withdraw unused vouchers. Complaints arose when the company stopped allowing voucher withdrawals. Based on the spontaneous disclosure by the FIU, and the subsequent joint investigation, nine luxury vehicles, various luxury handbags and EUR 208 550 were seized. Following the investigation, seven individuals were arrested. The legal person and individuals were charged with ML and the predicate offence in October 2023. The cases are currently undergoing joint-trial. Ops Coin A multinational corporation operated a pyramid scheme that required members to invest and recruit new participants to earn returns. The company’s directors allegedly laundered the illicit proceeds through corporate bank accounts. Investors began filing complaints about unfulfilled returns. In July 2018, a joint task force—led by what was then the NRRET (now the NFCC)—raided 16 premises. In September 2020, the corporation was sentenced to a fine of EUR 1.51 million by the Sessions Court on three charges of ML offence. The directors were also charged with three counts of using the corporation’s bank accounts as instruments for ML. The cases are currently under trial. 7.1.1. ML investigations 466. The NFCC follows a two-phase approach to operational coordination. First, LEAs present potential cases to the NFCC, guided by the NRA. These cases are typically complex or involve multiple agencies, forming an initial broad list of investigations. In the second phase, the NFCC, in collaboration with relevant LEAs, the AGC and FIU, refines this list through criminal analysis, assessment, and discussion—ultimately developing a structured case pipeline. The NFCC is also guided by its standard operating procedure that outlines specific criteria to prioritise its integrated operations (i.e., cases with significant impact on national finances, public interest, etc.) While individual LEAs continue to cooperate on numerous joint investigations, there is an opportunity for improvement in ensuring other types of ML, including stand-alone and foreign predicate ML offences receive the force multiplier effect that is required to investigate these types of offences. 467. In addition to the NFCC, Malaysia established the National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) in 2022 to coordinate and respond to online scams and the MATF in 2023 to coordinate joint operations on high-risk predicate crimes. Since established, the NSRC has initiated 89 ML investigations related to online scams, with one case currently being prosecuted in court, and EUR 4.4 million have been forfeited. Since January 2023, the MATF has initiated five ML investigations, mostly pertaining to corruption, fraud and smuggling syndicates, and recovered proceeds under the AMLA and tax penalties totalling more than EUR 5.8 million. 468. As shown in the table below, LEAs regularly identify predicate offences, with nearly half of the investigations linked to high-risk predicate crimes for ML, as identified in the NRA (i.e., fraud, corruption, organised crime, smuggling, and drug trafficking). Between 2019 and 2025, LEAs opened approximately 488 682 investigation papers related to the high-risk predicates, and another 278 202 investigations into “other” predicate offences, primarily related to robbery. While these figures are high, the RMP confirms that its resources are sufficient to initiate predicate investigations, as well as an emerging capacity to conduct parallel financial investigations, which can lead to ML investigations. Figure 7.1. Investigations into High-Risk Predicate Offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 38 759 44 558 60 901 60 055 79 494 47 110 399 331 276 Organised Crime 21 186 20 523 25 335 23 101 21 061 10 105 0 121 311 Drug Trafficking 3 973 3 803 4 203 4 300 3 999 4 137 0 24 415 Smuggling 685 1 324 1 338 1256 1 471 630 1 6 705 Corruption 890 755 708 737 888 980 197 5 155 Total 65 493 70 963 92 485 89 449 106 913 62 962 597 488 862 469. When an ML case is identified during a predicate offence investigation, the LEA investigating ML obtains an initial briefing from the predicate offence investigator to understand the nature of the case and the property that might be involved, to conduct a parallel investigation. This initial briefing is a positive feature and sets the tone for future collaboration. The 2015 MER noted that there was insufficient coordination between predicate and ML investigators when conducting parallel investigations. However, authorities now report significant improvements in communication and collaboration, leading to more effective ML investigations. LEAs and the AGC emphasised that due to the strategy to bring joint (predicate and ML) cases to trial, it is beneficial for both the predicate and ML investigators to be engaged throughout the course of the investigation. According to Malaysia, approximately 700 officers have taken the Certified Financial Investigators Course, which is an encouraging sign that predicate investigators can initiate a parallel financial investigation early and can effectively brief the ML investigator. 470. The below high-profile case highlights the extensive use of parallel investigations in relation to 1MDB and SRC International, a 1MDB subsidiary (Box 7.2). Box 7.2. 1MDB and SRC International 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) 1MDB is a sovereign wealth fund incorporated in 2009. 1MDB case is a large-scale scandal where the former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance [Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Abd Razak (DSN)], his family, co-conspirators and other relatives and entities were charged with misappropriation of 1MDB funds. Investigations were initiated in 2015 by the Malaysian authorities concerning monies raised by 1MDB via its subsidiaries through debt financing between 2009 and 2014 totalling EUR 8.5 billion. These investigations are overseen by the 1MDB Taskforce, which coordinates efforts across multiple LEAs, including the MACC, RMP, BNM and the AGC. The investigations cover both corruption and ML offences, involving parallel investigations that require forensic accounting and international cooperation to track the movement of funds across multiple jurisdictions. Due to the global nature of the scandal, authorities are working closely with foreign financial regulators and enforcement agencies. DSN is alleged to had played a role in using his position to receive gratification into his personal bank accounts as well as by taking part in the decision making on behalf of the Government of Malaysia to provide the Malaysian government’s guarantee or support for 1MDB to secure financing. Trial proceedings are on-going at the Malaysian High Court and involve four corruption and 21 ML charges against DSN. Investigation against his co-conspirators and other involved entities are also on-going. SRC International The two SRC International cases relate to the misappropriation of approximately EUR 9 million and EUR 6 million from SRC International, a former subsidiary of 1MDB. In one of the cases, Malaysian authorities discovered that DSN had received funds into his personal accounts from this subsidiary, traceable to the debt raised by SRC amounting to approximately EUR 0.83 billion from the Retirement Fund Incorporated (or known as “Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan), KWAP” - the civil servants pension fund to pursue strategic investment plans). In 2020, DSN was convicted in court of three ML charges and four corruption offences and sentenced to 12 years in prison and fined EUR 45.3 million. His conviction was upheld by Malaysia’s Court of Appeal (2021) and Federal Court (2022). In February 2024, Malaysia’s Pardons Board commuted this sentence from 12 years to six years, and the fine was reduced from EUR 45 million to EUR 10.5 million. This case is the first 1MDB-related trial to reach a verdict, as the other cases are ongoing and involve numerous ML and corruption-related charges, which require complex parallel investigations. For information on asset recovery efforts in relation to these cases, see Case Study Box 8.1 in IO.8. 471. Since 2019, Malaysia has initiated 2 648 ML investigations, [69] with 2 331 relating to Malaysia’s five high-risk predicate offences and 317 for all other ML investigations (see below table). As a point of comparison, this is approximately triple the number of ML investigations reported in Malaysia’s 2015 MER (i.e., 821 ML investigations between 2009-2013). This demonstrates that authorities have taken a more proactive approach to identifying ML offences with the goal for criminal prosecution, as well as detection and confiscation of criminal proceeds. During the assessment period, most ML investigations related to drug trafficking, fraud and corruption (approximately 80%), in line with Malaysia’s assessment of risk. However, only 200 ML investigations are related to organised crime and smuggling, and four related to foreign predicate offences, which does not correspond to Malaysia’s assignment of “high-risk” to these offences and particularly given its risk and context as a stated transit country. This may suggest a need to reassess the prioritisation process. 472. Only a limited number of ML investigations have been initiated during the assessment period concerning medium-high risk predicate offences, including tax crimes (101), forgery (11), human trafficking and migrant smuggling (16), sexual exploitation (2), and environmental crime (2). This low volume of ML investigations may stem from a combination of factors, including the allocation of resources, training and specialised expertise necessary to effectively pursue such cases. The complexity and cross-border nature of several of these offences, particularly human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and environmental crime, further exacerbate investigative challenges. Strengthening investigative capabilities through targeted training, enhanced and focused inter-agency collaboration, and increased resource allocation could improve the effectiveness of ML enforcement in these areas. 473. The overall number of ML investigations (2 648) compared to predicate investigations (approximately 767 000) conducted between 2019 and February 2025 is low (0.4%). This significant gap suggests persistent shortcomings in the ability or willingness to pursue ML cases in parallel with predicate offenses. While factors such as case complexity, limited resources, and prioritisation of high-risk crimes may contribute, they do not fully explain the underutilisation of Malaysia’s financial investigation tools. Table 7.2. ML Investigations Related to High-Risk Predicate Offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 96 128 146 163 152 146 49 880 Drug Trafficking* 58 67 181 179 177 103 16 781 Corruption 140 35 43 49 75 67 24 433 Other [70] 74 49 49 42 44 49 10 317 Smuggling 31 21 16 10 18 34 6 136 Organised Crime 21 19 19 9 22 11 0 101 Total 420 319 454 452 488 410 105 2 648 Note: Drug trafficking investigations are conducted under AMLA and DDFOPA. 474. Furthermore, the identification of ML cases related to Labuan IBFC are extremely limited, with only two cases related to Labuan IBFC since 2019. This narrow case base does not adequately reflect or capture the potential risk profile and operational context of an offshore financial centre. The limited number of cases raises concerns about the comprehensiveness of detection efforts. As highlighted in IO.1, the understanding of ML risks associated with Labuan IBFC could be improved. A more robust risk assessment should incorporate an analysis of specific criminal threats, typologies, and predicate offenses that are likely to exploit offshore structures such as Labuan IBFC. 475. Malaysia has equipped its LEAs with financial expertise, ensuring that officers receive training to enhance their capabilities in ML investigations, including forensic accounting. The Assessment Team acknowledges that joint ML investigations, including those coordinated by the NFCC, showcase a high level of financial investigative expertise, particularly in forensic accounting. Additionally, some LEAs have access to specialised tools that improve their ability to analyse large volumes of electronic financial data efficiently. Notably, the RMP houses a Cryptocurrency Analysis Lab, which enhances the tracing and analysis of cryptocurrency-related transactions. Footnotes [66] RMP, MACC, RMCD, KPDN, BNM, SC, LFSA, CCM, IRBM, IDM, MMEA, and PERHILITAN. [67] The financial thresholds were reviewed by the Assessment Team but omitted from this report due to their sensitivity. [68] As of 21 February 2025, Malaysia reports that new legislation is pending which will further empower the NFCC, as it will transition to becoming the centralised asset management body. [69] Investigations refer to the submission of Investigative Papers (as opposed to Enquiry Papers). An investigation paper signifies the start of a formal investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="457. Malaysia has a comprehensive legal and institutional framework to investigate and prosecute ML and the authorities identify and investigate ML cases to some extent. There are 12 LEAs with the authority to investigate predicate offences and ML. [66] Their resourcing and remit vary, along with their enabling legislation. Most ML investigations are carried out by the RMP and MACC, the latter of which investigates ML cases related to corruption. ML investigations are commenced based on suspicion, and where these are re-enforced, it will lead to criminal prosecution, as well as to detect and confiscate criminal proceeds. LEAs have a strong understanding of the NRA and work collaboratively towards progressive outcomes, including the increase of ML prosecution from MER 2015 (132 cases reported from 2009-2013 vs. 234 reported from 2019-February 2025). It should be noted that these results were attained within the context of the 1MDB scandal. Due to its scale and complexity, 1MDB has demanded significant attention from Malaysian law enforcement and judicial bodies, becoming a priority case that necessitated the reallocation of resources from other ML investigations. 458. Frequent and ongoing communications between predicate offence and ML investigators, as well as direct access to financial intelligence (including FINs) means that ML investigations are regularly commenced. ML investigations are pursued collaboratively, and joint investigations (between two or more LEAs) are frequently used to maximise investigative resources. 459. Malaysia asserts that its current resources are sufficient to conduct ML investigations in line with its risk profile and operational context. Malaysia has equipped its LEAs with financial expertise, ensuring that officers receive training to enhance their capabilities in ML investigations, including forensic accounting. However, during discussions with the Assessment Team, all LEAs recognised the need for additional training, to align with evolving risks and increasing complexity of ML cases. 460. The table below outlines the resources available across the 12 LEAs responsible for conducting ML investigations. Despite Malaysia’s recognition in the NRA 2023 that fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime present the highest ML threats—followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime—there appears to be a resource imbalance in key enforcement bodies. Notably, the IDM, MMEA, and PERHILITAN have a low number of ML investigators, which may contribute to the limited number of ML investigations related to human trafficking, migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia notes that the RMP is the primary enforcement body, and in practice, investigations are often conducted through interagency collaboration, which allows agencies to pool resources, share expertise and overcome individual capacity constraints. These joint efforts have led to tangible enforcement outcomes, primarily related to fraud, drug trafficking and corruption, despite apparent resource limitations within a single agency. Nevertheless, addressing resource challenges and potential imbalances between LEAs through enhanced training and prioritisation is crucial to ensuring Malaysia’s ML enforcement efforts align with its identified risk areas. Table 7.1. ML investigative resources LEA with ML Investigative Powers FTE Resources Dedicated to ML Investigations (as of February 2025) RMP AML Division: 23 ML investigators (out of 124 officers) Narcotics Crime Investigation Department (NCID): 51 investigators MACC AML Division: 55 ML investigators and 7 prosecutors RMCD 23 ML Investigators (out of 227 investigators) KPDN 12 ML investigators (out of 148 investigators) BNM 27 financial investigators SC 43 investigating officers to investigate securities offenses and ML. CCM 16 LFSA 3 IRBM 17 ML investigators (out of 268 investigators) Immigration Department of Malaysia 6 ML investigators (out of 27 officers) MMEA 1 ML investigator (out of 24 investigators) Department of Wildlife and National Parks Peninsular Malaysia 1 ML investigator (out of 16 investigators) 461. Malaysia identifies ML through a variety of means and sources, including predicate offence investigations and parallel financial investigations, financial intelligence from the FIU (spontaneous and reactive disclosures as outlined in IO.6), LEA intelligence, foreign counterparts, open-source information, and public complaints to LEAs. ML cases are most commonly identified during investigations into the underlying predicate offenses. 462. As outlined in IO.6, LEAs regularly use financial intelligence from the FIU to detect ML and trace illicit proceeds. This intelligence is used in the early detection and initiation of both predicate offence and ML investigations, as well as to support and expand ongoing investigations. 463. LEAs have direct access to the FIU’s FINS system where they can obtain financial intelligence to support their investigations. Through FINS, LEAs can obtain financial intelligence from FIs and other RIs, as well as from foreign jurisdictions. This is supported by the statistics provided in IO.6 on the use of FIU disclosures and FINS data requests by LEAs during their investigations. LEAs reported that their access to financial intelligence is relatively easy, especially within FINS, which has improved the timeliness and availability of intelligence and information to support their investigations. 464. Malaysia states that the selection of cases for ML investigation is guided by a “top-down approach”, which outlines specific criteria/thresholds to open ML investigations (such as financial thresholds [67] , complexity, nature/seriousness, loss of revenue, and evidentiary standard). As outlined in R.31, LEAs have a broad range of powers and authorities to investigate ML. All LEAs investigate ML offences based on the legislation associated with their remit (e.g., tax, securities, customs) and will collaborate with other LEAs based on the circumstances and evidence of the case. The AGC is also engaged at an early stage, which helps to augment the investigative process with appropriate legal advice and guidance. LEAs follow their own prioritisation processes, which are aligned with the NRA. These processes consider factors such as case complexity, the number of suspects, potential witnesses and required statements, the use of advanced laundering techniques, and any cross-border implications. As Malaysia emerges from 1MDB and the effects of COVID-19, which necessitated reallocation of resources across several years, especially during the assessment period, the Assessment Team sees an opportunity for Malaysia to re-assess its prioritisation process. This would help demonstrate progress in addressing key challenges identified in this report, such as pursuing stand-alone and foreign predicate ML prosecutions, and tackling Malaysia’s role as a transit point for illicit activity and ML (i.e. TBML). 465. Malaysia’s structure to combat ML was strengthened in the last several years by the addition of new coordination bodies as outlined in IO.1. For example, in 2020, Malaysia built on the National Revenue Recovery Enforcement Team (NRRET) by creating the NFCC, to act as a force multiplier through the coordination of joint analysis, communications, and investigations. Since its establishment, the NFCC has brought together multiple LEAs and the AGC to conduct joint investigations into ML associated with high-risk predicates, as well as lower risk criminal activity such as tax evasion and illegal investment schemes. Since its creation, the NFCC has coordinated 19 joint operations. [68] During the onsite, LEAs remarked on the NFCC’s positive effect on collaboration. The below case studies (Box 7.1) provide a summary of these joint investigations. Box 7.1. NFCC joint operation case studies Ops Reward This case was coordinated by the NFCC, with KPDN, BNM, and RMP, involving a company suspected of promoting pyramid schemes through online applications and package sales from 2019 to 2022. The company operated without a valid licence, offering commissions for recruiting new members and selling membership packages. They also promoted an e-wallet app with RM denominated vouchers, promising users that they could withdraw unused vouchers. Complaints arose when the company stopped allowing voucher withdrawals. Based on the spontaneous disclosure by the FIU, and the subsequent joint investigation, nine luxury vehicles, various luxury handbags and EUR 208 550 were seized. Following the investigation, seven individuals were arrested. The legal person and individuals were charged with ML and the predicate offence in October 2023. The cases are currently undergoing joint-trial. Ops Coin A multinational corporation operated a pyramid scheme that required members to invest and recruit new participants to earn returns. The company’s directors allegedly laundered the illicit proceeds through corporate bank accounts. Investors began filing complaints about unfulfilled returns. In July 2018, a joint task force—led by what was then the NRRET (now the NFCC)—raided 16 premises. In September 2020, the corporation was sentenced to a fine of EUR 1.51 million by the Sessions Court on three charges of ML offence. The directors were also charged with three counts of using the corporation’s bank accounts as instruments for ML. The cases are currently under trial. 7.1.1. ML investigations 466. The NFCC follows a two-phase approach to operational coordination. First, LEAs present potential cases to the NFCC, guided by the NRA. These cases are typically complex or involve multiple agencies, forming an initial broad list of investigations. In the second phase, the NFCC, in collaboration with relevant LEAs, the AGC and FIU, refines this list through criminal analysis, assessment, and discussion—ultimately developing a structured case pipeline. The NFCC is also guided by its standard operating procedure that outlines specific criteria to prioritise its integrated operations (i.e., cases with significant impact on national finances, public interest, etc.) While individual LEAs continue to cooperate on numerous joint investigations, there is an opportunity for improvement in ensuring other types of ML, including stand-alone and foreign predicate ML offences receive the force multiplier effect that is required to investigate these types of offences. 467. In addition to the NFCC, Malaysia established the National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) in 2022 to coordinate and respond to online scams and the MATF in 2023 to coordinate joint operations on high-risk predicate crimes. Since established, the NSRC has initiated 89 ML investigations related to online scams, with one case currently being prosecuted in court, and EUR 4.4 million have been forfeited. Since January 2023, the MATF has initiated five ML investigations, mostly pertaining to corruption, fraud and smuggling syndicates, and recovered proceeds under the AMLA and tax penalties totalling more than EUR 5.8 million. 468. As shown in the table below, LEAs regularly identify predicate offences, with nearly half of the investigations linked to high-risk predicate crimes for ML, as identified in the NRA (i.e., fraud, corruption, organised crime, smuggling, and drug trafficking). Between 2019 and 2025, LEAs opened approximately 488 682 investigation papers related to the high-risk predicates, and another 278 202 investigations into “other” predicate offences, primarily related to robbery. While these figures are high, the RMP confirms that its resources are sufficient to initiate predicate investigations, as well as an emerging capacity to conduct parallel financial investigations, which can lead to ML investigations. Figure 7.1. Investigations into High-Risk Predicate Offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 38 759 44 558 60 901 60 055 79 494 47 110 399 331 276 Organised Crime 21 186 20 523 25 335 23 101 21 061 10 105 0 121 311 Drug Trafficking 3 973 3 803 4 203 4 300 3 999 4 137 0 24 415 Smuggling 685 1 324 1 338 1256 1 471 630 1 6 705 Corruption 890 755 708 737 888 980 197 5 155 Total 65 493 70 963 92 485 89 449 106 913 62 962 597 488 862 469. When an ML case is identified during a predicate offence investigation, the LEA investigating ML obtains an initial briefing from the predicate offence investigator to understand the nature of the case and the property that might be involved, to conduct a parallel investigation. This initial briefing is a positive feature and sets the tone for future collaboration. The 2015 MER noted that there was insufficient coordination between predicate and ML investigators when conducting parallel investigations. However, authorities now report significant improvements in communication and collaboration, leading to more effective ML investigations. LEAs and the AGC emphasised that due to the strategy to bring joint (predicate and ML) cases to trial, it is beneficial for both the predicate and ML investigators to be engaged throughout the course of the investigation. According to Malaysia, approximately 700 officers have taken the Certified Financial Investigators Course, which is an encouraging sign that predicate investigators can initiate a parallel financial investigation early and can effectively brief the ML investigator. 470. The below high-profile case highlights the extensive use of parallel investigations in relation to 1MDB and SRC International, a 1MDB subsidiary (Box 7.2). Box 7.2. 1MDB and SRC International 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) 1MDB is a sovereign wealth fund incorporated in 2009. 1MDB case is a large-scale scandal where the former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance [Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Abd Razak (DSN)], his family, co-conspirators and other relatives and entities were charged with misappropriation of 1MDB funds. Investigations were initiated in 2015 by the Malaysian authorities concerning monies raised by 1MDB via its subsidiaries through debt financing between 2009 and 2014 totalling EUR 8.5 billion. These investigations are overseen by the 1MDB Taskforce, which coordinates efforts across multiple LEAs, including the MACC, RMP, BNM and the AGC. The investigations cover both corruption and ML offences, involving parallel investigations that require forensic accounting and international cooperation to track the movement of funds across multiple jurisdictions. Due to the global nature of the scandal, authorities are working closely with foreign financial regulators and enforcement agencies. DSN is alleged to had played a role in using his position to receive gratification into his personal bank accounts as well as by taking part in the decision making on behalf of the Government of Malaysia to provide the Malaysian government’s guarantee or support for 1MDB to secure financing. Trial proceedings are on-going at the Malaysian High Court and involve four corruption and 21 ML charges against DSN. Investigation against his co-conspirators and other involved entities are also on-going. SRC International The two SRC International cases relate to the misappropriation of approximately EUR 9 million and EUR 6 million from SRC International, a former subsidiary of 1MDB. In one of the cases, Malaysian authorities discovered that DSN had received funds into his personal accounts from this subsidiary, traceable to the debt raised by SRC amounting to approximately EUR 0.83 billion from the Retirement Fund Incorporated (or known as “Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan), KWAP” - the civil servants pension fund to pursue strategic investment plans). In 2020, DSN was convicted in court of three ML charges and four corruption offences and sentenced to 12 years in prison and fined EUR 45.3 million. His conviction was upheld by Malaysia’s Court of Appeal (2021) and Federal Court (2022). In February 2024, Malaysia’s Pardons Board commuted this sentence from 12 years to six years, and the fine was reduced from EUR 45 million to EUR 10.5 million. This case is the first 1MDB-related trial to reach a verdict, as the other cases are ongoing and involve numerous ML and corruption-related charges, which require complex parallel investigations. For information on asset recovery efforts in relation to these cases, see Case Study Box 8.1 in IO.8. 471. Since 2019, Malaysia has initiated 2 648 ML investigations, [69] with 2 331 relating to Malaysia’s five high-risk predicate offences and 317 for all other ML investigations (see below table). As a point of comparison, this is approximately triple the number of ML investigations reported in Malaysia’s 2015 MER (i.e., 821 ML investigations between 2009-2013). This demonstrates that authorities have taken a more proactive approach to identifying ML offences with the goal for criminal prosecution, as well as detection and confiscation of criminal proceeds. During the assessment period, most ML investigations related to drug trafficking, fraud and corruption (approximately 80%), in line with Malaysia’s assessment of risk. However, only 200 ML investigations are related to organised crime and smuggling, and four related to foreign predicate offences, which does not correspond to Malaysia’s assignment of “high-risk” to these offences and particularly given its risk and context as a stated transit country. This may suggest a need to reassess the prioritisation process. 472. Only a limited number of ML investigations have been initiated during the assessment period concerning medium-high risk predicate offences, including tax crimes (101), forgery (11), human trafficking and migrant smuggling (16), sexual exploitation (2), and environmental crime (2). This low volume of ML investigations may stem from a combination of factors, including the allocation of resources, training and specialised expertise necessary to effectively pursue such cases. The complexity and cross-border nature of several of these offences, particularly human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and environmental crime, further exacerbate investigative challenges. Strengthening investigative capabilities through targeted training, enhanced and focused inter-agency collaboration, and increased resource allocation could improve the effectiveness of ML enforcement in these areas. 473. The overall number of ML investigations (2 648) compared to predicate investigations (approximately 767 000) conducted between 2019 and February 2025 is low (0.4%). This significant gap suggests persistent shortcomings in the ability or willingness to pursue ML cases in parallel with predicate offenses. While factors such as case complexity, limited resources, and prioritisation of high-risk crimes may contribute, they do not fully explain the underutilisation of Malaysia’s financial investigation tools. Table 7.2. ML Investigations Related to High-Risk Predicate Offences 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 96 128 146 163 152 146 49 880 Drug Trafficking* 58 67 181 179 177 103 16 781 Corruption 140 35 43 49 75 67 24 433 Other [70] 74 49 49 42 44 49 10 317 Smuggling 31 21 16 10 18 34 6 136 Organised Crime 21 19 19 9 22 11 0 101 Total 420 319 454 452 488 410 105 2 648 Note: Drug trafficking investigations are conducted under AMLA and DDFOPA. 474. Furthermore, the identification of ML cases related to Labuan IBFC are extremely limited, with only two cases related to Labuan IBFC since 2019. This narrow case base does not adequately reflect or capture the potential risk profile and operational context of an offshore financial centre. The limited number of cases raises concerns about the comprehensiveness of detection efforts. As highlighted in IO.1, the understanding of ML risks associated with Labuan IBFC could be improved. A more robust risk assessment should incorporate an analysis of specific criminal threats, typologies, and predicate offenses that are likely to exploit offshore structures such as Labuan IBFC. 475. Malaysia has equipped its LEAs with financial expertise, ensuring that officers receive training to enhance their capabilities in ML investigations, including forensic accounting. The Assessment Team acknowledges that joint ML investigations, including those coordinated by the NFCC, showcase a high level of financial investigative expertise, particularly in forensic accounting. Additionally, some LEAs have access to specialised tools that improve their ability to analyse large volumes of electronic financial data efficiently. Notably, the RMP houses a Cryptocurrency Analysis Lab, which enhances the tracing and analysis of cryptocurrency-related transactions. Footnotes [66] RMP, MACC, RMCD, KPDN, BNM, SC, LFSA, CCM, IRBM, IDM, MMEA, and PERHILITAN. [67] The financial thresholds were reviewed by the Assessment Team but omitted from this report due to their sensitivity. [68] As of 21 February 2025, Malaysia reports that new legislation is pending which will further empower the NFCC, as it will transition to becoming the centralised asset management body. [69] Investigations refer to the submission of Investigative Papers (as opposed to Enquiry Papers). An investigation paper signifies the start of a formal investigations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 505. At a policy and operational level, Malaysian authorities place a clear emphasis on asset recovery, especially through civil processes. This conclusion is based on the consideration of strategic documents, statistics, operational initiatives undertaken by the authorities in recent years, and interviews with relevant stakeholders during the onsite visit. 506. As noted under IO.1, a key strength of Malaysia’s AML/CFT system lies in its domestic cooperation and coordination, which extends to the tracing, seizure and recovery of assets. Pursuant to the NCC Roadmap, LEAs have targeted action plans in relation to seizure and forfeiture. LEAs and the AGC have specialised teams dealing with confiscation and asset recovery is a clear national priority and objective of all relevant authorities. Malaysia’s legal framework supports this priority through a solid foundation and a flexible set of tools, including CBF, NCBF, and administrative measures such as tax recovery. 507. Malaysia’s commitment to asset recovery is evident from its successful 1MDB asset recovery efforts. Since the 2015 MER, Malaysia has recovered approximately EUR 5.72 billion in misappropriated funds related to 1MDB (see Box 8.1 below for more information). While a significant portion of these assets was recovered through foreign civil forfeiture actions, international settlements, and repatriation efforts, these outcomes also underscore Malaysia’s ability to actively engage and cooperate with international partners in pursuing complex cross-border asset recovery. 508. The 1MDB Asset Recovery Task Force was established in 2023 to assist with confiscation and repatriation of illicit funds linked to the 1MDB investigations. This Task Force has been integral to the extensive collaboration with international partners to trace and repatriate stolen assets while pursuing civil and criminal cases against those involved. As of February 2025, efforts are ongoing, and the Task Force is actively pursuing the remaining misappropriated funds. Box 8.1. 1MDB Asset Recovery As of February 2025, Malaysian authorities have recovered approximately EUR 5.72 billion, as well as EUR 362.72 million in tax recovery on criminal proceeds. Malaysia is actively pursuing the remaining assets via a dedicated task force focusing on asset recovery. About 4.7% (EUR 252 million) of the total 1MDB-related assets recovered were executed under the AMLA (and related to domestic illegal proceeds). Most of these assets were forfeited via NCBF under the AMLA and related to domestic illegal proceeds. Malaysia has also entered into multiple settlement agreements with several entities. As certain settlements are still in progress, related information has been omitted from this report. Malaysia states that these settlements account for the large majority of all assets recovered related to 1MDB. As for foreign illegal proceeds, Malaysia has engaged international counterparts on various measures to repatriate the assets identified. This includes various arrangements, including formal and informal measures to seize, confiscate and repatriate such funds. In addition to the return of misappropriated funds, a superyacht purchased using 1MDB proceeds amounting to EUR 250 million was confiscated by Malaysia with the assistance of Indonesia. This superyacht was later successfully sold at EUR 116 million. The sale was part of the asset management effort, whereby EUR 3.12 million was incurred to maintain the vessel. 509. The extensive efforts to repatriate 1MDB assets transferred abroad has established a strong commitment to asset recovery amongst all Malaysian LEAs. During the onsite discussions, Malaysian competent authorities emphasised that asset recovery is a priority in criminal investigations. Despite the challenges faced by competent authorities in relation to ML prosecutions and convictions (see IO.7), Malaysia has prioritised asset recovery as a policy objective, making significant progress in areas such as corruption and fraud. 510. Asset recovery is prioritised as evidenced by the detailed SOPs and dedicated units established to achieve this goal. For example, the MACC has a dedicated unit to conduct investigations related to asset tracing, seizure, forfeiture and asset management related to corruption cases. The NCID of the RMP also has specific SOPs related to the tracing, seizure and forfeiture of assets, including cryptocurrency. The RMP has a dedicated Crypto Unit, and Malaysia provided several case studies demonstrating the effective seizure of VAs by this Unit. The NCID also has powers pursuant to the DDFOPA, enabling the swift seizure and forfeiture of criminal proceeds. 511. Malaysia has established several intra- and inter-agency structures and frameworks that build on the strong cooperative and collaborative elements of Malaysian law enforcement (see “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context” and IO.1). 512. The AGC, in collaboration with Malaysian LEAs, also prioritises asset recovery and leads asset recovery efforts for the country. During interviews, the AGC indicated that asset recovery is pursued based on a hierarchy of factors. The primary goal of asset recovery is to seek criminal forfeiture of assets, but the low number of ML prosecutions provides limited opportunity for this approach in ML cases (see IO.7 for additional information related to challenges related to ML prosecution). When criminal forfeiture is unlikely, the AGC’s second choice is civil forfeiture. In such cases, authorities employ a cost benefit calculation. If the amount is substantial, the AGC carefully considers the investigation’s findings before initiating a civil forfeiture process. Conversely, if the amount is relatively small, the AGC conducts an assessment to determine whether the cost of pursuing civil forfeiture outweighs the value of the assets. Ultimately, decisions are based on the material facts of the case, and the AGC pursues NCBF to a certain extent. To effectively manage the criminal justice system, Malaysian authorities frequently resort to the imposition of compound, which is a form of out-of-court settlement resulting in the application of non-criminal based monetary penalty (see IO.7 for additional information on compounds). During the onsite, Malaysia noted that compound penalties are often the more straightforward and effective method for funds, which may or may not represent illicit proceeds. While compounds may expedite resolution and resource management, their frequent use raises important concerns about whether they are being used disproportionately relative to more robust and punitive measures, such as criminal prosecution. 513. Furthermore, Malaysia places significant emphasis on tax recovery efforts led by the IRBM, alongside disgorgement actions pursued by the SC. [74] By integrating a combination of tax enforcement, regulatory disgorgement, and criminal and civil confiscation, Malaysia has established a robust and flexible asset recovery framework. This multi-agency approach reflects the country’s commitment to using both criminal and civil tools to combat financial crime and allows authorities to tailor their enforcement strategy based on the nature of each case, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of confiscation efforts. The use of the different powers is discussed below. Footnotes [74] Disgorgement by the SC is a civil remedy used to strip wrongdoers of unlawful gains obtained through violations of securities laws, such as insider trading, market manipulation, or misrepresentation. The SC can either bring a civil suit to the High Court or settle out of court, where disgorgement is negotiated as part of a regulatory settlement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 505. At a policy and operational level, Malaysian authorities place a clear emphasis on asset recovery, especially through civil processes. This conclusion is based on the consideration of strategic documents, statistics, operational initiatives undertaken by the authorities in recent years, and interviews with relevant stakeholders during the onsite visit. 506. As noted under IO.1, a key strength of Malaysia’s AML/CFT system lies in its domestic cooperation and coordination, which extends to the tracing, seizure and recovery of assets. Pursuant to the NCC Roadmap, LEAs have targeted action plans in relation to seizure and forfeiture. LEAs and the AGC have specialised teams dealing with confiscation and asset recovery is a clear national priority and objective of all relevant authorities. Malaysia’s legal framework supports this priority through a solid foundation and a flexible set of tools, including CBF, NCBF, and administrative measures such as tax recovery. 507. Malaysia’s commitment to asset recovery is evident from its successful 1MDB asset recovery efforts. Since the 2015 MER, Malaysia has recovered approximately EUR 5.72 billion in misappropriated funds related to 1MDB (see Box 8.1 below for more information). While a significant portion of these assets was recovered through foreign civil forfeiture actions, international settlements, and repatriation efforts, these outcomes also underscore Malaysia’s ability to actively engage and cooperate with international partners in pursuing complex cross-border asset recovery. 508. The 1MDB Asset Recovery Task Force was established in 2023 to assist with confiscation and repatriation of illicit funds linked to the 1MDB investigations. This Task Force has been integral to the extensive collaboration with international partners to trace and repatriate stolen assets while pursuing civil and criminal cases against those involved. As of February 2025, efforts are ongoing, and the Task Force is actively pursuing the remaining misappropriated funds. Box 8.1. 1MDB Asset Recovery As of February 2025, Malaysian authorities have recovered approximately EUR 5.72 billion, as well as EUR 362.72 million in tax recovery on criminal proceeds. Malaysia is actively pursuing the remaining assets via a dedicated task force focusing on asset recovery. About 4.7% (EUR 252 million) of the total 1MDB-related assets recovered were executed under the AMLA (and related to domestic illegal proceeds). Most of these assets were forfeited via NCBF under the AMLA and related to domestic illegal proceeds. Malaysia has also entered into multiple settlement agreements with several entities. As certain settlements are still in progress, related information has been omitted from this report. Malaysia states that these settlements account for the large majority of all assets recovered related to 1MDB. As for foreign illegal proceeds, Malaysia has engaged international counterparts on various measures to repatriate the assets identified. This includes various arrangements, including formal and informal measures to seize, confiscate and repatriate such funds. In addition to the return of misappropriated funds, a superyacht purchased using 1MDB proceeds amounting to EUR 250 million was confiscated by Malaysia with the assistance of Indonesia. This superyacht was later successfully sold at EUR 116 million. The sale was part of the asset management effort, whereby EUR 3.12 million was incurred to maintain the vessel. 509. The extensive efforts to repatriate 1MDB assets transferred abroad has established a strong commitment to asset recovery amongst all Malaysian LEAs. During the onsite discussions, Malaysian competent authorities emphasised that asset recovery is a priority in criminal investigations. Despite the challenges faced by competent authorities in relation to ML prosecutions and convictions (see IO.7), Malaysia has prioritised asset recovery as a policy objective, making significant progress in areas such as corruption and fraud. 510. Asset recovery is prioritised as evidenced by the detailed SOPs and dedicated units established to achieve this goal. For example, the MACC has a dedicated unit to conduct investigations related to asset tracing, seizure, forfeiture and asset management related to corruption cases. The NCID of the RMP also has specific SOPs related to the tracing, seizure and forfeiture of assets, including cryptocurrency. The RMP has a dedicated Crypto Unit, and Malaysia provided several case studies demonstrating the effective seizure of VAs by this Unit. The NCID also has powers pursuant to the DDFOPA, enabling the swift seizure and forfeiture of criminal proceeds. 511. Malaysia has established several intra- and inter-agency structures and frameworks that build on the strong cooperative and collaborative elements of Malaysian law enforcement (see “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context” and IO.1). 512. The AGC, in collaboration with Malaysian LEAs, also prioritises asset recovery and leads asset recovery efforts for the country. During interviews, the AGC indicated that asset recovery is pursued based on a hierarchy of factors. The primary goal of asset recovery is to seek criminal forfeiture of assets, but the low number of ML prosecutions provides limited opportunity for this approach in ML cases (see IO.7 for additional information related to challenges related to ML prosecution). When criminal forfeiture is unlikely, the AGC’s second choice is civil forfeiture. In such cases, authorities employ a cost benefit calculation. If the amount is substantial, the AGC carefully considers the investigation’s findings before initiating a civil forfeiture process. Conversely, if the amount is relatively small, the AGC conducts an assessment to determine whether the cost of pursuing civil forfeiture outweighs the value of the assets. Ultimately, decisions are based on the material facts of the case, and the AGC pursues NCBF to a certain extent. To effectively manage the criminal justice system, Malaysian authorities frequently resort to the imposition of compound, which is a form of out-of-court settlement resulting in the application of non-criminal based monetary penalty (see IO.7 for additional information on compounds). During the onsite, Malaysia noted that compound penalties are often the more straightforward and effective method for funds, which may or may not represent illicit proceeds. While compounds may expedite resolution and resource management, their frequent use raises important concerns about whether they are being used disproportionately relative to more robust and punitive measures, such as criminal prosecution. 513. Furthermore, Malaysia places significant emphasis on tax recovery efforts led by the IRBM, alongside disgorgement actions pursued by the SC. [74] By integrating a combination of tax enforcement, regulatory disgorgement, and criminal and civil confiscation, Malaysia has established a robust and flexible asset recovery framework. This multi-agency approach reflects the country’s commitment to using both criminal and civil tools to combat financial crime and allows authorities to tailor their enforcement strategy based on the nature of each case, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of confiscation efforts. The use of the different powers is discussed below. Footnotes [74] Disgorgement by the SC is a civil remedy used to strip wrongdoers of unlawful gains obtained through violations of securities laws, such as insider trading, market manipulation, or misrepresentation. The SC can either bring a civil suit to the High Court or settle out of court, where disgorgement is negotiated as part of a regulatory settlement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="566. TF activity is primarily identified through three main sources in Malaysia: (1) as a result of the SB’s consideration of the financial aspects of its terrorism investigations; (2) intelligence provided through the PPP established by the SB and the FIU; and (3) information sharing from domestic (e.g., FIU and LEAs) and foreign counterparts. 567. First, as Malaysia’s primary counterterrorism authority, the SB is well-equipped to assess and identify TF components in all terrorism investigations. Consequently, this is the most common method of detecting TF activity in the country. 568. Second, the TF PPP—established in January 2017—enables the SB to share privileged tactical information with Malaysia’s FIU and selected major banks and money services business with a higher risk of terrorism and TF. This has resulted in FIs submitting higher-quality and more targeted TF-related STRs while also providing strategic intelligence from the FIU on modus operandi, red flags, and intelligence reports to enhance the identification of TF transactions. Since 2017, the PPP has yielded several notable outcomes, including: (i) the arrest and prosecution of 21 individuals for TF activities, (ii) the arrest and deportation of two foreign nationals; and (iii) significant increase in the number of STRs related to TF. Case study box 4.3 demonstrates the successful use of the TF PPP. 569. Third, Malaysia identifies TF cases through domestic counterparts, including the FIU and other LEAs. Collaboration between the SB and FIU has been effective, enabling the SB to successfully trace funding activities linked to terrorism. The below table highlights the frequent requests and information the SB receives from the FIU to support its terrorism and TF investigations. The notable high number of formal requests in 2020 and 2021 is attributed to heightened monitoring of potential terrorism or TF activity arising from FTFs, plots by ISIL sympathisers, and the release of a Jemaah Islamiyah leader from imprisonment in Indonesia. Since 2023, the SB has direct access to FINS to inform its investigations. With direct access to STR and CTR information through FINS, the SB immediately obtains a suspect’s profile and performs an immediate assessment of a potential financing element in terrorism investigations. Table 9.1. Financial Intelligence Requested and Received by the SB from the FIU Information Requested/Received 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Formal Requests from SB to FIU 61 103 117 32 31 51 5 400 FINS Data Requests - - - - 30 222 21 273 Proactive Disclosures on T/TF from FIU to SB 47 27 8 10 21 19 4 136 570. As noted in the table above, since 2019, Malaysia’s FIU has sent 136 proactive disclosures to the SB related to terrorism and TF. Such disclosures contain comprehensive analyses of STRs, CTRs, remittance and money-changing records, cross-border cash declarations, other financial and background information and supporting documents (e.g. CDD document and bank statement). For analysis of complex terrorism or TF cases, the disclosure may also include network analysis. Generally, the FIU’s disclosures have helped to expedite terrorism and TF investigations, especially in the identification of sympathisers, financiers, facilitators, overseas recipients and the expansion of networks. 571. Regarding international cooperation, the SB frequently uses formal or informal channels to request and share information with foreign counterparts to identify and investigate terrorism and TF cases. These requests include information exchanged through INTERPOL channels. Most formal requests received or sent relate to tracing, profiling and transaction records. Where foreign elements are detected, the SB shares the information with relevant foreign counterparts between 24 hours to five working days via formal or informal channels. In practice, the response time from foreign counterparts vary depending on the available data. The below table (9.2) summarises the formal international requests received and sent by the SB in relation to terrorism and TF. Table 9.2. Formal information sharing between SB and foreign counterparts Year No. of Request Received No. of Request Sent 2019 289 66 2020 138 51 2021 220 65 2022 164 54 2023 161 45 2024 168 24 2025 (Feb) 6 21 Total 1 146 326 572. In addition to formal cooperation, the SB frequently exchanges information with counterterrorism authorities from neighbouring countries and regional partners through informal channels. The SB has close contacts with key personnel from other jurisdictions and leverages on the contacts, especially during time-sensitive investigations when rapid information exchange is necessary. For instance, the SB’s strong relationship with Indonesia’s Densus 88 has enabled information gathering for each terrorism and TF case involving Indonesia. The below case study outlines an example related to informal cooperation between Malaysia and foreign counterparts to conduct joint analysis, leading to the arrest and prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines in 2023 and 2024. Box 9.1. Informal international cooperation on TF Since 2016, several regional FIUs participated in an analyst exchange programme. In 2018, a case was initiated by this programme where financial intelligence analysts from Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia jointly analysed a TF network involving Malaysian subjects remitting funds to ISIL in the Philippines. In Malaysia, the case was discussed during in the PPP between the SB, FIU, and several RIs, including major banks and remittance service providers. Following the meeting, RIs submitted more than 70 STRs on the subjects. Malaysia’s FIU also produced proactive disclosures to the SB and the FIU in Philippines. The joint analysis resulted in the arrest and prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines in 2023 and 2024, domestic designation of the two main subjects on Malaysia’s MoHA list, and the freezing of approximately EUR 112 000. Following prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines, Malaysia arrested and prosecuted one of the listed subjects in Malaysia in 2024. [83] 573. In terms of the stages on TF investigations, a general file is opened followed by an investigation paper after assessing that the subject poses a security threat based on intelligence sources and security vetting, and when multiple reports indicate the same subject. Once sufficient intelligence has been gathered, an investigation paper is initiated. As noted above, the SB systematically initiates TF investigations when any financing element is identified during the investigation of terrorism. Therefore, most TF investigations arise from the network, connection and transaction tracing conducted on terrorism cases investigated, especially pertaining to financial intelligence gathered on immediate family members and associates of terrorism subjects. 574. Since Malaysia’s 2015 MER, there were a total of 33 TF cases investigated by the SB (and 179 terrorism investigations). As indicated in the table below, more recently, there have been 12 TF investigations (and 58 terrorism investigations) since 2019. For reference, the 2015 MER noted 40 TF investigations between 2010 and 2014. Table 9.3. Terrorism and TF Investigations Investigation Paper opened 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total TF 2 1 2 - 7 - - 12 Terrorism 30 4 1 1 4 18 [84] - 58 575. The number of TF investigations opened corresponds to the risks associated with the rise and subsequent decline of ISIL. Malaysia also faces regional TF risks linked to groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. Despite these risks, of the 12 TF investigations carried out since 2019, none pertain to Jemaah Islamiyah. Seven TF investigations conducted since 2019 relate to Abu Sayyaf (when not affiliated with ISIL) and five correspond to returning FTFs with ISIL links. Malaysia notes that other measures are used more often to disrupt terrorism and TF linked to regional groups (see the section below on alternative measures and IO.10 on use of TFS). 9.1.1. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 576. In terms of the role of TF financiers, investigations opened since 2016 largely involved individuals affiliated with ISIL as financiers. One individual was found to be both the financier and the recipient. To date, there have been no TF cases related to legal persons and the misuse of NPOs. Footnotes [83] The case was successfully convicted in March 2025, with 15 TF charges and one terrorism charge. [84] The surge in investigations in 2024 is linked to a lone-wolf attack on a police station in May, which resulted in the deaths of two police officers and the assailant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="566. TF activity is primarily identified through three main sources in Malaysia: (1) as a result of the SB’s consideration of the financial aspects of its terrorism investigations; (2) intelligence provided through the PPP established by the SB and the FIU; and (3) information sharing from domestic (e.g., FIU and LEAs) and foreign counterparts. 567. First, as Malaysia’s primary counterterrorism authority, the SB is well-equipped to assess and identify TF components in all terrorism investigations. Consequently, this is the most common method of detecting TF activity in the country. 568. Second, the TF PPP—established in January 2017—enables the SB to share privileged tactical information with Malaysia’s FIU and selected major banks and money services business with a higher risk of terrorism and TF. This has resulted in FIs submitting higher-quality and more targeted TF-related STRs while also providing strategic intelligence from the FIU on modus operandi, red flags, and intelligence reports to enhance the identification of TF transactions. Since 2017, the PPP has yielded several notable outcomes, including: (i) the arrest and prosecution of 21 individuals for TF activities, (ii) the arrest and deportation of two foreign nationals; and (iii) significant increase in the number of STRs related to TF. Case study box 4.3 demonstrates the successful use of the TF PPP. 569. Third, Malaysia identifies TF cases through domestic counterparts, including the FIU and other LEAs. Collaboration between the SB and FIU has been effective, enabling the SB to successfully trace funding activities linked to terrorism. The below table highlights the frequent requests and information the SB receives from the FIU to support its terrorism and TF investigations. The notable high number of formal requests in 2020 and 2021 is attributed to heightened monitoring of potential terrorism or TF activity arising from FTFs, plots by ISIL sympathisers, and the release of a Jemaah Islamiyah leader from imprisonment in Indonesia. Since 2023, the SB has direct access to FINS to inform its investigations. With direct access to STR and CTR information through FINS, the SB immediately obtains a suspect’s profile and performs an immediate assessment of a potential financing element in terrorism investigations. Table 9.1. Financial Intelligence Requested and Received by the SB from the FIU Information Requested/Received 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Formal Requests from SB to FIU 61 103 117 32 31 51 5 400 FINS Data Requests - - - - 30 222 21 273 Proactive Disclosures on T/TF from FIU to SB 47 27 8 10 21 19 4 136 570. As noted in the table above, since 2019, Malaysia’s FIU has sent 136 proactive disclosures to the SB related to terrorism and TF. Such disclosures contain comprehensive analyses of STRs, CTRs, remittance and money-changing records, cross-border cash declarations, other financial and background information and supporting documents (e.g. CDD document and bank statement). For analysis of complex terrorism or TF cases, the disclosure may also include network analysis. Generally, the FIU’s disclosures have helped to expedite terrorism and TF investigations, especially in the identification of sympathisers, financiers, facilitators, overseas recipients and the expansion of networks. 571. Regarding international cooperation, the SB frequently uses formal or informal channels to request and share information with foreign counterparts to identify and investigate terrorism and TF cases. These requests include information exchanged through INTERPOL channels. Most formal requests received or sent relate to tracing, profiling and transaction records. Where foreign elements are detected, the SB shares the information with relevant foreign counterparts between 24 hours to five working days via formal or informal channels. In practice, the response time from foreign counterparts vary depending on the available data. The below table (9.2) summarises the formal international requests received and sent by the SB in relation to terrorism and TF. Table 9.2. Formal information sharing between SB and foreign counterparts Year No. of Request Received No. of Request Sent 2019 289 66 2020 138 51 2021 220 65 2022 164 54 2023 161 45 2024 168 24 2025 (Feb) 6 21 Total 1 146 326 572. In addition to formal cooperation, the SB frequently exchanges information with counterterrorism authorities from neighbouring countries and regional partners through informal channels. The SB has close contacts with key personnel from other jurisdictions and leverages on the contacts, especially during time-sensitive investigations when rapid information exchange is necessary. For instance, the SB’s strong relationship with Indonesia’s Densus 88 has enabled information gathering for each terrorism and TF case involving Indonesia. The below case study outlines an example related to informal cooperation between Malaysia and foreign counterparts to conduct joint analysis, leading to the arrest and prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines in 2023 and 2024. Box 9.1. Informal international cooperation on TF Since 2016, several regional FIUs participated in an analyst exchange programme. In 2018, a case was initiated by this programme where financial intelligence analysts from Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia jointly analysed a TF network involving Malaysian subjects remitting funds to ISIL in the Philippines. In Malaysia, the case was discussed during in the PPP between the SB, FIU, and several RIs, including major banks and remittance service providers. Following the meeting, RIs submitted more than 70 STRs on the subjects. Malaysia’s FIU also produced proactive disclosures to the SB and the FIU in Philippines. The joint analysis resulted in the arrest and prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines in 2023 and 2024, domestic designation of the two main subjects on Malaysia’s MoHA list, and the freezing of approximately EUR 112 000. Following prosecution of the main subjects in the Philippines, Malaysia arrested and prosecuted one of the listed subjects in Malaysia in 2024. [83] 573. In terms of the stages on TF investigations, a general file is opened followed by an investigation paper after assessing that the subject poses a security threat based on intelligence sources and security vetting, and when multiple reports indicate the same subject. Once sufficient intelligence has been gathered, an investigation paper is initiated. As noted above, the SB systematically initiates TF investigations when any financing element is identified during the investigation of terrorism. Therefore, most TF investigations arise from the network, connection and transaction tracing conducted on terrorism cases investigated, especially pertaining to financial intelligence gathered on immediate family members and associates of terrorism subjects. 574. Since Malaysia’s 2015 MER, there were a total of 33 TF cases investigated by the SB (and 179 terrorism investigations). As indicated in the table below, more recently, there have been 12 TF investigations (and 58 terrorism investigations) since 2019. For reference, the 2015 MER noted 40 TF investigations between 2010 and 2014. Table 9.3. Terrorism and TF Investigations Investigation Paper opened 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total TF 2 1 2 - 7 - - 12 Terrorism 30 4 1 1 4 18 [84] - 58 575. The number of TF investigations opened corresponds to the risks associated with the rise and subsequent decline of ISIL. Malaysia also faces regional TF risks linked to groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. Despite these risks, of the 12 TF investigations carried out since 2019, none pertain to Jemaah Islamiyah. Seven TF investigations conducted since 2019 relate to Abu Sayyaf (when not affiliated with ISIL) and five correspond to returning FTFs with ISIL links. Malaysia notes that other measures are used more often to disrupt terrorism and TF linked to regional groups (see the section below on alternative measures and IO.10 on use of TFS). 9.1.1. Investigations identifying the specific role of terrorist financier 576. In terms of the role of TF financiers, investigations opened since 2016 largely involved individuals affiliated with ISIL as financiers. One individual was found to be both the financier and the recipient. To date, there have been no TF cases related to legal persons and the misuse of NPOs. Footnotes [83] The case was successfully convicted in March 2025, with 15 TF charges and one terrorism charge. [84] The surge in investigations in 2024 is linked to a lone-wolf attack on a police station in May, which resulted in the deaths of two police officers and the assailant." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.1.1. Designations under UNSCR 1267/1988 606. Targeted financial sanctions related to UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions are immediately enforceable in Malaysia upon a UN designation. The legal obligation to freeze assets takes effect automatically when the UNSCR 1267/1988 lists are updated, without the need for authorities to issue a separate domestic order to effectuate the freezing and prohibition requirements. Once a listing or update occurs, natural and legal persons in Malaysia (including RIs) are required to freeze and prohibit funds from benefiting the designated entities, directly or indirectly. RIs are then required to perform screening checks and report to the FIU, RMP and their supervisory authorities (who then report to MoHA) when a freeze of an account or a positive match occurs. RIs are required to report to MoHA the status of frozen funds or properties periodically at six-month intervals following any freezing measure. 607. The MoHA is the competent authority responsible to propose individuals or entities to the 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation. During the review period, Malaysia did not submit any designation proposals to the relevant UN Committees or co-sponsor any designations. Nor has Malaysia sought or received a request for co-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988. 10.1.2. Domestic designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 608. Malaysia has a robust framework and process for listing individuals and entities to their domestic designation list (the MoHA list), which has been in place since 2014. The MoHA coordinates and chairs the Committee for TF TFS, the interministerial process tasked with decisions on listing. The committee gathers when necessary and at least once every six months. All procedures and criteria for designation and de-listing are outlined in a single TF TFS guideline. 609. The Counter Terrorism Division of RMP’s Special Branch is responsible for identifying entities for potential listing if they commit, participate in, act on behalf of, or facilitate terrorist activities. The Committee for TF TFS reviews the SB’s recommendations with the final decisions made by the Minister of Home Affairs. Criminal proceedings are not required as a prerequisite for listing. If the proposal meets the legal threshold of “reason to believe,” the entity is designated as a “specified entity” and published in the Gazette. During this process, authorities engage closely with the private sector through the PPP platform to share information with the FIU and FIs to identify and preserve any assets before a designation is made public. 610. Malaysia has frequently used this tool to target financiers as a preventive measure against TF and terrorism. As of February 2025, Malaysia has listed over 100 names to their domestic list of specified entities of which 77 are individuals and 24 are groups. The most recent listings occurred in January 2025, demonstrating that Malaysia is actively utilising this tool to identify terrorist financiers and their supporters. Malaysia has mostly identified individuals located in Malaysia as well as foreign individuals from countries posing regional terrorism risks, including the Philippines, Indonesia and Syria. Malaysian authorities have proactively leveraged domestic designations as a tool to disrupt terrorist financiers and their supporters, enabling swift action to prevent terrorism and TF. This approach aligns closely with Malaysia’s evolving TF risk profile, ensuring a timely and effective CFT response. 611. Malaysia has not requested a foreign jurisdiction to cross-designate an individual/group in relation to its domestic list, but the FIU notifies their relevant foreign counterparts when a foreign national is designated to the MoHA list. There have been instances of the RMP receiving informal requests from a neighbouring country for information relating to designations, but Malaysia has not received a formal request for cross-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373. Considering the regional risk and the cross-border nature of TF in Malaysia, collaboration with foreign counterparts on cross designations should be prioritised. 10.1.3. Communication of designations 612. The AML/CFT/CPF Guidelines stipulate that sanctions screening, and the subsequent freezing of funds and assets should take place immediately when the Order is gazetted (for UNSCR 1373), or when the list is published on the UN website (for UNSCR 1267/1989, 1988 and their successor resolutions). 613. Domestic designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (the MoHA list) are communicated in several ways. The listing is published on the websites of the MoHA and BNM. New listings are also communicated to RIs through email notifications (RSS) by MoHA. While MoHA was unable to provide an estimate of the number of RIs that have subscribed to the RSS notifications, records show that the RSS feed was accessed more than 25 000 times in one month (mid-January to mid-February 2025). RIs are required to ensure their customer database is screened without delay once the listing is publicised and Malaysia’s guidance sets out the supervisory expectation that RIs proactively access the list directly. In practice, this process occurs consistently for most FIs and VASPs that utilise commercial software and automatic screenings procedures. 614. While direct notification processes exist, some RIs, particularly a significant number of smaller DNFBPs, rely on manual checks of the UN and MoHA websites. This can create challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are updated in a timely manner. While notifications from the FIU (e.g., FINS notifications) and supervisors (e.g., BNM Newsletters) can serve as complementary tools to highlight listed persons, these are distributed on an ad hoc basis. For example, Labuan supervisory authority’s communication to its RIs in one instance was issued several weeks after a MoHA listing. Some RIs explained that they had staff manually check the UN and MoHA websites once or twice a day, to make sure no listings were missed. Nevertheless, RIs could make better use of the notification measures available (e.g., the MoHA RSS feed)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.1.1. Designations under UNSCR 1267/1988 606. Targeted financial sanctions related to UNSCR 1267 and its successor resolutions are immediately enforceable in Malaysia upon a UN designation. The legal obligation to freeze assets takes effect automatically when the UNSCR 1267/1988 lists are updated, without the need for authorities to issue a separate domestic order to effectuate the freezing and prohibition requirements. Once a listing or update occurs, natural and legal persons in Malaysia (including RIs) are required to freeze and prohibit funds from benefiting the designated entities, directly or indirectly. RIs are then required to perform screening checks and report to the FIU, RMP and their supervisory authorities (who then report to MoHA) when a freeze of an account or a positive match occurs. RIs are required to report to MoHA the status of frozen funds or properties periodically at six-month intervals following any freezing measure. 607. The MoHA is the competent authority responsible to propose individuals or entities to the 1267/1989 and 1988 Committees for designation. During the review period, Malaysia did not submit any designation proposals to the relevant UN Committees or co-sponsor any designations. Nor has Malaysia sought or received a request for co-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988. 10.1.2. Domestic designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 608. Malaysia has a robust framework and process for listing individuals and entities to their domestic designation list (the MoHA list), which has been in place since 2014. The MoHA coordinates and chairs the Committee for TF TFS, the interministerial process tasked with decisions on listing. The committee gathers when necessary and at least once every six months. All procedures and criteria for designation and de-listing are outlined in a single TF TFS guideline. 609. The Counter Terrorism Division of RMP’s Special Branch is responsible for identifying entities for potential listing if they commit, participate in, act on behalf of, or facilitate terrorist activities. The Committee for TF TFS reviews the SB’s recommendations with the final decisions made by the Minister of Home Affairs. Criminal proceedings are not required as a prerequisite for listing. If the proposal meets the legal threshold of “reason to believe,” the entity is designated as a “specified entity” and published in the Gazette. During this process, authorities engage closely with the private sector through the PPP platform to share information with the FIU and FIs to identify and preserve any assets before a designation is made public. 610. Malaysia has frequently used this tool to target financiers as a preventive measure against TF and terrorism. As of February 2025, Malaysia has listed over 100 names to their domestic list of specified entities of which 77 are individuals and 24 are groups. The most recent listings occurred in January 2025, demonstrating that Malaysia is actively utilising this tool to identify terrorist financiers and their supporters. Malaysia has mostly identified individuals located in Malaysia as well as foreign individuals from countries posing regional terrorism risks, including the Philippines, Indonesia and Syria. Malaysian authorities have proactively leveraged domestic designations as a tool to disrupt terrorist financiers and their supporters, enabling swift action to prevent terrorism and TF. This approach aligns closely with Malaysia’s evolving TF risk profile, ensuring a timely and effective CFT response. 611. Malaysia has not requested a foreign jurisdiction to cross-designate an individual/group in relation to its domestic list, but the FIU notifies their relevant foreign counterparts when a foreign national is designated to the MoHA list. There have been instances of the RMP receiving informal requests from a neighbouring country for information relating to designations, but Malaysia has not received a formal request for cross-designation pursuant to UNSCR 1373. Considering the regional risk and the cross-border nature of TF in Malaysia, collaboration with foreign counterparts on cross designations should be prioritised. 10.1.3. Communication of designations 612. The AML/CFT/CPF Guidelines stipulate that sanctions screening, and the subsequent freezing of funds and assets should take place immediately when the Order is gazetted (for UNSCR 1373), or when the list is published on the UN website (for UNSCR 1267/1989, 1988 and their successor resolutions). 613. Domestic designations pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (the MoHA list) are communicated in several ways. The listing is published on the websites of the MoHA and BNM. New listings are also communicated to RIs through email notifications (RSS) by MoHA. While MoHA was unable to provide an estimate of the number of RIs that have subscribed to the RSS notifications, records show that the RSS feed was accessed more than 25 000 times in one month (mid-January to mid-February 2025). RIs are required to ensure their customer database is screened without delay once the listing is publicised and Malaysia’s guidance sets out the supervisory expectation that RIs proactively access the list directly. In practice, this process occurs consistently for most FIs and VASPs that utilise commercial software and automatic screenings procedures. 614. While direct notification processes exist, some RIs, particularly a significant number of smaller DNFBPs, rely on manual checks of the UN and MoHA websites. This can create challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are updated in a timely manner. While notifications from the FIU (e.g., FINS notifications) and supervisors (e.g., BNM Newsletters) can serve as complementary tools to highlight listed persons, these are distributed on an ad hoc basis. For example, Labuan supervisory authority’s communication to its RIs in one instance was issued several weeks after a MoHA listing. Some RIs explained that they had staff manually check the UN and MoHA websites once or twice a day, to make sure no listings were missed. Nevertheless, RIs could make better use of the notification measures available (e.g., the MoHA RSS feed)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 650. The STA governs Malaysia’s compliance with UNSCR 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The STA and its implementing orders also provide the legal basis for the implementation UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and is Malaysia’s primary legislation for export, transit, transhipment and brokering of controlled technologies (i.e., export control). 651. The NCC is the coordination body for the development of national policies, including PF. NCC’s mandate includes the development and implementation of national strategies, policies and measures to counter risks of ML, TF and, since 2012, PF (see IO.1). 652. The National AML/CFT Strategic Plan (2015-2020) included a direction across the government to strengthen PF risk understanding and awareness for PF TFS. In 2021, the NCC Roadmap 2021-2023 built upon this Plan to further CPF efforts by setting out action items such as improving compliance of PF TFS, assessing PF risk at RIs’ institutional level, and enhancing understanding of dual-use goods and PF trends. In 2024, the NCC Roadmap was updated for 2024-2026 based on the findings of Malaysia’s latest risk assessment. The 2024-2026 Roadmap includes a CPF item to target illegal and overstayed foreigners with PF risk exposure as well as assessing emerging ML/TF/PF risks. These three plans/roadmaps provide the basis for regular and consistent interagency cooperation by the NCC and Strategic Trade Action Committee (STAC)to monitor operational progress of the NCC Roadmap and ensure the CPF national policies are updated. 653. For example, the CPF item in the latest NCC Roadmap, which targets illegal and overstayed foreigners with PF risk exposure, reflects Malaysia’s strategy to address an emerging risk posed by dual nationals who may evade sanctions through third-party intermediaries or complex corporate structures. This demonstrates Malaysia’s evolving understanding of PF risks, based on the recommendations of the 2024 PFRA. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 654. The STAC, established in 2011, is chaired by the MITI, the authority responsible for the implementation of the Strategic Trade Act. In 2017, the STAC formally added PF TFS to the responsibilities of the STAC with the supervisory authorities: BNM, SC and LFSA being added as members, bringing the total membership to 13 authorities covering policy making, licensing, supervisory and enforcement (see Figure 11.1). STAC is mandated to meet twice a year and convenes as needed to discuss ongoing investigations, enforcement actions and developments on counter-proliferation and PF TFS. Figure 11.1. Structure of STAC Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 655. There is a complementary relationship between the STAC and NCC to ensure effective PF TFS implementation. The NCC focuses on illicit financial flows while the STAC has specialised knowledge and expertise of counter-proliferation and CPF issues. The 2021 and 2024 PFRAs were developed by the STAC members, and the outcomes were reported and discussed at the NCC for endorsement. 656. The SB is the primary authority responsible for investigation of PF, by gathering intelligence and information on individuals or entities suspected of involvement in PF activities. The BNM, SC and LFSA generally coordinate on CPF issues and PF TFS as members of the STAC and NCC. For example, in June 2024, the MITI issued a Directive on PF TFS, which provides guidance to RIs on PF TFS obligations and instructive measures that no funds or other assets and economic resources are made available. This Directive was developed in close cooperation with supervisory authorities. Overall, the cooperation amongst the NCC and the STAC bodies is positive and there are no legal or practical impediments to cooperating on PF. 657. All RIs in Malaysia are required to file STRs to the FIU if they identify transactions that could be linked to PF, not just risk tied to DPRK. This is in addition to the reporting of positive matches for PF TFS against the UN list (see the section below on the identification of funds held be designated persons). The following table illustrates information gathered by the FIU and RMP on possible PF-related activities. Between 2019 and February 2025, the FIU received 518 STRs linked to suspicious PF activities, with 23 linked to DPRK including instances where DPRK nationals or Malaysian person/entity were involved (see also Table 6.2 in IO.6). The Assessment Team observes that the spike in total STRs in 2024 of suspicious PF activities can be attributed to the amended Directive on PF TFS issued in 2024 and corresponding updates to supervisory Guidelines, coupled with the publication of the PFRA 2024, which increased awareness amongst RIs for PF related activities that could be DPRK-related or non-DPRK (i.e., unilateral sanctions). Table 11.1. Information gathering and actions taken by FIU and RMP on DPRK-related PF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total RMP Receiving Tip-off 12 7 8 4 1 0 0 32 Receiving Intel/Information sharing 8 6 8 3 1 0 1 27 Open Enquiry Paper 7 4 5 2 1 0 1 20 FIU STRs linked to PF 111 64 27 42 13 247 14 518 Of which DPRK-related reporting - DPRK-TFS related (Designated DPRK person/entity) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - DPRK-related (Non-designated DPRK person/entity) 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 - Local/Malaysian-related person/entity linked to DPRK 2 1 1 0 2 5 0 11 658. Malaysia shared several cases to highlight how LEAs and the FIU collaborate to identify the subjects and funds flows of possible PF activities. The MyFINet PPP also supports investigations of PF networks. The main purpose of MyFINet is systematic intelligence sharing on specific cases to prompt further STRs filings by targeted FIs (see IO.6). One of the six thematic working groups under MyFINet is for PF. Information shared through the MyFINet platform helps raise awareness amongst FIs and, in some cases, leads to additional disclosures or STR filings for authorities to analyse. Also, the FINS (see IO.6) is one of the channels for authorities to share publicly available information on PF, including sanctions issued by other countries to assist FIs in identifying PF risk and trends. Box 11.1. Case of PF-related investigation Person 1, a DPRK national, was suspected of moving funds related to front companies of two DPRK entities designated under UNSCR 1718. These entities allegedly used an extensive network of individuals, complex corporate structures, and offshore bank accounts in several countries, including Malaysia, to procure and market arms and related materials. In 2014, Malaysia arrested three DPRK nationals attempting to smuggle cash out of Malaysia. These suspects claimed that the funds belonged to the DPRK embassy in Malaysia. Malaysia undertook further surveillance and identified bank accounts related to the network. In 2019, Malaysia’s AGC received a request from the United States for the arrest and extradition of Person 1. Intelligence and banking information shared via MyFINet was instrumental in pinpointing Person 1’s location, ultimately leading to a successful arrest in Malaysia. Despite Person 1 challenging the arrest and applying for acquittal, Person 1 was successfully extradited in 2021. 659. Malaysia also cited an additional case study related to disrupting potential PF activities in the form of export control violations (see Box 11.2 below). Box 11.2. Investigation for violation of export controls The RMP received intelligence from Country A regarding a front company, acting on behalf of an agent of a procurement network, attempting to move a crew vessel located in Malaysian waters to Country B, before sending it to Country C for military use. Upon receiving the investigation outcome from RMP, the Strategic Trade Controller decided that the vessel should be prevented from moving. With the assistance from other STAC members including the Strategic Trade Secretariat, STRIDE, and MMEA, RMP conducted an inspection of the vessel. After its inspection, RMP issued a notice to the owner in October 2023, to prevent the vessel from being moved to Country B. During the investigation, RMP identified the modus operandi used by the procurement agent hiding behind the company in Country B and the risk of the vessel being diverted to Country C for military use, as well as in affirming the flow of funds channelled from the front company in Country B to the ship owner in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="1" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="11.1.1. Co-operation and co-ordination to develop and implement policy 650. The STA governs Malaysia’s compliance with UNSCR 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The STA and its implementing orders also provide the legal basis for the implementation UNSCR 1718 and its successor resolutions and is Malaysia’s primary legislation for export, transit, transhipment and brokering of controlled technologies (i.e., export control). 651. The NCC is the coordination body for the development of national policies, including PF. NCC’s mandate includes the development and implementation of national strategies, policies and measures to counter risks of ML, TF and, since 2012, PF (see IO.1). 652. The National AML/CFT Strategic Plan (2015-2020) included a direction across the government to strengthen PF risk understanding and awareness for PF TFS. In 2021, the NCC Roadmap 2021-2023 built upon this Plan to further CPF efforts by setting out action items such as improving compliance of PF TFS, assessing PF risk at RIs’ institutional level, and enhancing understanding of dual-use goods and PF trends. In 2024, the NCC Roadmap was updated for 2024-2026 based on the findings of Malaysia’s latest risk assessment. The 2024-2026 Roadmap includes a CPF item to target illegal and overstayed foreigners with PF risk exposure as well as assessing emerging ML/TF/PF risks. These three plans/roadmaps provide the basis for regular and consistent interagency cooperation by the NCC and Strategic Trade Action Committee (STAC)to monitor operational progress of the NCC Roadmap and ensure the CPF national policies are updated. 653. For example, the CPF item in the latest NCC Roadmap, which targets illegal and overstayed foreigners with PF risk exposure, reflects Malaysia’s strategy to address an emerging risk posed by dual nationals who may evade sanctions through third-party intermediaries or complex corporate structures. This demonstrates Malaysia’s evolving understanding of PF risks, based on the recommendations of the 2024 PFRA. 11.1.2. Co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination for operational purposes 654. The STAC, established in 2011, is chaired by the MITI, the authority responsible for the implementation of the Strategic Trade Act. In 2017, the STAC formally added PF TFS to the responsibilities of the STAC with the supervisory authorities: BNM, SC and LFSA being added as members, bringing the total membership to 13 authorities covering policy making, licensing, supervisory and enforcement (see Figure 11.1). STAC is mandated to meet twice a year and convenes as needed to discuss ongoing investigations, enforcement actions and developments on counter-proliferation and PF TFS. Figure 11.1. Structure of STAC Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 655. There is a complementary relationship between the STAC and NCC to ensure effective PF TFS implementation. The NCC focuses on illicit financial flows while the STAC has specialised knowledge and expertise of counter-proliferation and CPF issues. The 2021 and 2024 PFRAs were developed by the STAC members, and the outcomes were reported and discussed at the NCC for endorsement. 656. The SB is the primary authority responsible for investigation of PF, by gathering intelligence and information on individuals or entities suspected of involvement in PF activities. The BNM, SC and LFSA generally coordinate on CPF issues and PF TFS as members of the STAC and NCC. For example, in June 2024, the MITI issued a Directive on PF TFS, which provides guidance to RIs on PF TFS obligations and instructive measures that no funds or other assets and economic resources are made available. This Directive was developed in close cooperation with supervisory authorities. Overall, the cooperation amongst the NCC and the STAC bodies is positive and there are no legal or practical impediments to cooperating on PF. 657. All RIs in Malaysia are required to file STRs to the FIU if they identify transactions that could be linked to PF, not just risk tied to DPRK. This is in addition to the reporting of positive matches for PF TFS against the UN list (see the section below on the identification of funds held be designated persons). The following table illustrates information gathered by the FIU and RMP on possible PF-related activities. Between 2019 and February 2025, the FIU received 518 STRs linked to suspicious PF activities, with 23 linked to DPRK including instances where DPRK nationals or Malaysian person/entity were involved (see also Table 6.2 in IO.6). The Assessment Team observes that the spike in total STRs in 2024 of suspicious PF activities can be attributed to the amended Directive on PF TFS issued in 2024 and corresponding updates to supervisory Guidelines, coupled with the publication of the PFRA 2024, which increased awareness amongst RIs for PF related activities that could be DPRK-related or non-DPRK (i.e., unilateral sanctions). Table 11.1. Information gathering and actions taken by FIU and RMP on DPRK-related PF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total RMP Receiving Tip-off 12 7 8 4 1 0 0 32 Receiving Intel/Information sharing 8 6 8 3 1 0 1 27 Open Enquiry Paper 7 4 5 2 1 0 1 20 FIU STRs linked to PF 111 64 27 42 13 247 14 518 Of which DPRK-related reporting - DPRK-TFS related (Designated DPRK person/entity) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - DPRK-related (Non-designated DPRK person/entity) 11 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 - Local/Malaysian-related person/entity linked to DPRK 2 1 1 0 2 5 0 11 658. Malaysia shared several cases to highlight how LEAs and the FIU collaborate to identify the subjects and funds flows of possible PF activities. The MyFINet PPP also supports investigations of PF networks. The main purpose of MyFINet is systematic intelligence sharing on specific cases to prompt further STRs filings by targeted FIs (see IO.6). One of the six thematic working groups under MyFINet is for PF. Information shared through the MyFINet platform helps raise awareness amongst FIs and, in some cases, leads to additional disclosures or STR filings for authorities to analyse. Also, the FINS (see IO.6) is one of the channels for authorities to share publicly available information on PF, including sanctions issued by other countries to assist FIs in identifying PF risk and trends. Box 11.1. Case of PF-related investigation Person 1, a DPRK national, was suspected of moving funds related to front companies of two DPRK entities designated under UNSCR 1718. These entities allegedly used an extensive network of individuals, complex corporate structures, and offshore bank accounts in several countries, including Malaysia, to procure and market arms and related materials. In 2014, Malaysia arrested three DPRK nationals attempting to smuggle cash out of Malaysia. These suspects claimed that the funds belonged to the DPRK embassy in Malaysia. Malaysia undertook further surveillance and identified bank accounts related to the network. In 2019, Malaysia’s AGC received a request from the United States for the arrest and extradition of Person 1. Intelligence and banking information shared via MyFINet was instrumental in pinpointing Person 1’s location, ultimately leading to a successful arrest in Malaysia. Despite Person 1 challenging the arrest and applying for acquittal, Person 1 was successfully extradited in 2021. 659. Malaysia also cited an additional case study related to disrupting potential PF activities in the form of export control violations (see Box 11.2 below). Box 11.2. Investigation for violation of export controls The RMP received intelligence from Country A regarding a front company, acting on behalf of an agent of a procurement network, attempting to move a crew vessel located in Malaysian waters to Country B, before sending it to Country C for military use. Upon receiving the investigation outcome from RMP, the Strategic Trade Controller decided that the vessel should be prevented from moving. With the assistance from other STAC members including the Strategic Trade Secretariat, STRIDE, and MMEA, RMP conducted an inspection of the vessel. After its inspection, RMP issued a notice to the owner in October 2023, to prevent the vessel from being moved to Country B. During the investigation, RMP identified the modus operandi used by the procurement agent hiding behind the company in Country B and the risk of the vessel being diverted to Country C for military use, as well as in affirming the flow of funds channelled from the front company in Country B to the ship owner in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 131. Malaysia demonstrates strong political commitment to address ML/TF risks. Since 1999, the NCC is responsible for setting out national strategic directions and formulating AML/CFT policies in line with Malaysia’s risks. The NCC is chaired by the Deputy Governor of BNM, who reports directly to the Central Bank Governor. The Governor, in turn, serves as the designated Minister responsible for AML/CFT. Additionally, the Deputy Governor is appointed by the Minister of Finance, who also holds the position of Prime Minister of Malaysia. The below figure presents the structure of the NCC. Figure 1.1. NCC Structure Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 132. In 2021, as part of a comprehensive review of AML/CFT measures in Malaysia, the NCC approved the NCC Roadmap 2021-2023. This roadmap is built upon the previous National Strategic Plan 2015-2020 and incorporated recommendations from the 2020 NRA. Malaysia states that this Roadmap was concluded with an 88% completion rate. The remaining actions were incorporated into an updated Roadmap, which also incorporated the findings from the NRA 2023 and other risk assessments and covers the period 2024-2026. The NCC Roadmap 2024-2026 includes 21 actions aimed at addressing the ML/TF risks identified from the 2023 NRA. Examples of such initiatives include: amending legislation, developing systems to improve asset management, setting specific targets for LEAs to pursue ML associated to high-risk crimes, and launching a campaign aimed at vulnerable groups to enhance their awareness of mule accounts. 133. Various competent authorities are responsible for implementing these action plans. Their progress is monitored by the NCC’s five sub-committees, which meet at least biannually and report to the NCC Working Group. 134. During the onsite, competent authorities demonstrated strong alignment and commitment to achieving AML/CFT objectives, driven by BNM’s leadership and the whole-of-government approach to addressing identified ML and TF risks . After reviewing the NRA findings and engaging in in-depth discussions with Malaysian authorities, the Assessment Team concluded that the Action Plans are well-aligned with the NRA recommendations and effectively address the identified ML/TF risks. 135. In addition to the NCC Roadmaps, Malaysia has introduced and implemented other policies and activities to address its ML/TF risks. For example, since 2020, the country has introduced numerous anti-corruption measures, including the completion of the National Anti-Corruption Plan of 2019-2023 and launching the National Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2024-2028. In response to an increase in fraud (including cyber-enabled scams), in 2022, the National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) was established as a joint effort between the NFCC, RMP, BNM, and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), as well as FIs and telecommunication companies. The NSRC ensures swift responses to online financial scams and a more coordinated approach to aid the recovery of stolen funds (details of NSRC can be found below). In 2024, Malaysia launched the National Fraud Portal to further enhance the NSRC’s ability to detect, trace, and respond to financial fraud quickly and effectively. The key features of the National Fraud Portal include automating the tracing process to improve the recovery of stolen funds, supporting data-driven assessments for identifying mule account holders, and promoting the integration and sharing of transaction data amongst FIs for swift action against fraud. 136. Malaysia has also implemented legislative amendments to address its evolving ML/TF risks, for example: · Amendment of the Penal Code to combat online crimes using mule accounts for online fraud, by criminalising unauthorised possession, transfer and use of financial instruments or accounts. · Introducing BO discrepancy reporting mechanisms to improve the accuracy of BO information. · Inclusion of new offences into the AMLA to expand and align the scope of predicate offences with the FATF Standards. 137. Considering the above factors, Malaysia’s national policies and activities appropriately address its identified ML/TF risks. The country has established a comprehensive and robust framework, supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework includes a well-coordinated mechanism that ensures the consistent and efficient implementation of AML/CFT measures across various sectors. The whole-of-government approach, combined with strong institutional collaboration, ensures that these efforts are not only aligned with international standards but also adaptable to emerging risks. Additionally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes are in place to ensure the continued effectiveness and impact of the national strategy in mitigating ML/TF threats. That said, case studies and onsite interviews indicated that corruption remains a significant concern of the country. To address this challenge, it is essential to hasten the implementation of Malaysia’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy to continually mitigate the risk associated to corruption." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.2.1. Policies and activities to address ML/TF risks 131. Malaysia demonstrates strong political commitment to address ML/TF risks. Since 1999, the NCC is responsible for setting out national strategic directions and formulating AML/CFT policies in line with Malaysia’s risks. The NCC is chaired by the Deputy Governor of BNM, who reports directly to the Central Bank Governor. The Governor, in turn, serves as the designated Minister responsible for AML/CFT. Additionally, the Deputy Governor is appointed by the Minister of Finance, who also holds the position of Prime Minister of Malaysia. The below figure presents the structure of the NCC. Figure 1.1. NCC Structure Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 132. In 2021, as part of a comprehensive review of AML/CFT measures in Malaysia, the NCC approved the NCC Roadmap 2021-2023. This roadmap is built upon the previous National Strategic Plan 2015-2020 and incorporated recommendations from the 2020 NRA. Malaysia states that this Roadmap was concluded with an 88% completion rate. The remaining actions were incorporated into an updated Roadmap, which also incorporated the findings from the NRA 2023 and other risk assessments and covers the period 2024-2026. The NCC Roadmap 2024-2026 includes 21 actions aimed at addressing the ML/TF risks identified from the 2023 NRA. Examples of such initiatives include: amending legislation, developing systems to improve asset management, setting specific targets for LEAs to pursue ML associated to high-risk crimes, and launching a campaign aimed at vulnerable groups to enhance their awareness of mule accounts. 133. Various competent authorities are responsible for implementing these action plans. Their progress is monitored by the NCC’s five sub-committees, which meet at least biannually and report to the NCC Working Group. 134. During the onsite, competent authorities demonstrated strong alignment and commitment to achieving AML/CFT objectives, driven by BNM’s leadership and the whole-of-government approach to addressing identified ML and TF risks . After reviewing the NRA findings and engaging in in-depth discussions with Malaysian authorities, the Assessment Team concluded that the Action Plans are well-aligned with the NRA recommendations and effectively address the identified ML/TF risks. 135. In addition to the NCC Roadmaps, Malaysia has introduced and implemented other policies and activities to address its ML/TF risks. For example, since 2020, the country has introduced numerous anti-corruption measures, including the completion of the National Anti-Corruption Plan of 2019-2023 and launching the National Anti-Corruption Strategy of 2024-2028. In response to an increase in fraud (including cyber-enabled scams), in 2022, the National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) was established as a joint effort between the NFCC, RMP, BNM, and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), as well as FIs and telecommunication companies. The NSRC ensures swift responses to online financial scams and a more coordinated approach to aid the recovery of stolen funds (details of NSRC can be found below). In 2024, Malaysia launched the National Fraud Portal to further enhance the NSRC’s ability to detect, trace, and respond to financial fraud quickly and effectively. The key features of the National Fraud Portal include automating the tracing process to improve the recovery of stolen funds, supporting data-driven assessments for identifying mule account holders, and promoting the integration and sharing of transaction data amongst FIs for swift action against fraud. 136. Malaysia has also implemented legislative amendments to address its evolving ML/TF risks, for example: · Amendment of the Penal Code to combat online crimes using mule accounts for online fraud, by criminalising unauthorised possession, transfer and use of financial instruments or accounts. · Introducing BO discrepancy reporting mechanisms to improve the accuracy of BO information. · Inclusion of new offences into the AMLA to expand and align the scope of predicate offences with the FATF Standards. 137. Considering the above factors, Malaysia’s national policies and activities appropriately address its identified ML/TF risks. The country has established a comprehensive and robust framework, supported by a clear commitment from all levels of government. This framework includes a well-coordinated mechanism that ensures the consistent and efficient implementation of AML/CFT measures across various sectors. The whole-of-government approach, combined with strong institutional collaboration, ensures that these efforts are not only aligned with international standards but also adaptable to emerging risks. Additionally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes are in place to ensure the continued effectiveness and impact of the national strategy in mitigating ML/TF threats. That said, case studies and onsite interviews indicated that corruption remains a significant concern of the country. To address this challenge, it is essential to hasten the implementation of Malaysia’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy to continually mitigate the risk associated to corruption." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 181. Malaysia now uses i-AGC to manage outgoing MLA requests. To support LEAs in preparing these requests, the AGC has also published an MLA template and form on its website. Throughout the drafting process, the TCU works closely with LEAs, and once a final draft is submitted, the TCU ensures all requirements are met before transmitting the request. The table below summarises outgoing requests between 2019 and February 2025. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA requests by offence Categories 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total ML 16 12 6 16 5 9 - 64 Corruption 14 7 5 8 4 5 - 43 Fraud 2 5 1 2 1 3 - 14 Others - - - 6 - 1 - 7 Predicate Offence 9 8 9 6 8 3 - 43 Fraud 4 1 4 2 - 2 - 13 Corruption 1 2 3 1 4 - - 11 Murder - 2 1 - 1 - - 4 Terrorism 1 1 - - - -- - 2 Drug Offences 1 - - - - - - 1 Crimes of violence - 1 - - - - - 1 Sexual offences - - - 1 - - - 1 Computer crime - - - 1 - - - 1 Theft/robbery - - - - - 1 - 1 Rape 1 - - - - - - 1 Others 1 1 1 1 3 - - 7 TF - - - 2 - - - 2 Total 25 20 15 24 13 12 - 109 182. The successive National Strategic Plan and NCC roadmaps’ inclusion of international cooperation in action plans has seen outgoing MLA requests increase from 36 in the 2015 MER to 109 in the current review period (2019-2025). Malaysian authorities advised that they leverage, and prefer, informal international cooperation due to its efficiency; however, the Assessment Team notes that informal cooperation cannot be an effective substitute for MLA (e.g., where court evidence is required). The SOP on MLA in criminal matters does not cover how to prioritise outgoing MLA requests based on urgency and risk of asset dissipation, nor is there is any guideline or matrix on how to use MLA requests during investigations and prosecutions. Furthermore, the SOP does not refer to prioritisation based on Malaysia’s risks, including high/medium risk foreign predicate offences, or origin or destination countries for illicit proceeds. This is likely to impact the nature and likelihood of success of outgoing requests. 183. From 2019 to 2025, Malaysia made 109 outgoing MLA requests for an array of offences including ML (42 related to 1MDB) and TF. Requests included, production of evidence or documents, witness statements, seizure and recovery/confiscation of illegal proceeds. Consistent with the NRA, requests related to corruption (54) and fraud (27) (either alone or as an ML predicate) were most common. While these are higher risk offences for Malaysia, the overall number of requests related to fraud appears low in light of the regional risks and current trends. Moreover, there were few requests related to organised crime, drugs and smuggling, which is not in line with Malaysia’s risk and context. The 2023 NRA states that Malaysia remains an attractive location for drug syndicates—both as a transit hub for international distribution and as a destination for illicit drugs. Malaysia advised that LEAs pursue drug crimes and associated ML through joint operations and via treaties, as they face challenges in obtaining assistance through MLA from some jurisdictions where offences are punishable by the death penalty or corporal punishment (e.g., drug trafficking, criminal breach of trust). This is a reasonable approach but does not explain the lack of requests for ML relating to drug offending, which does not carry the death penalty. 184. Only two TF-related requests were made which is not in line with risk, particularly the risks related to terrorist organisations active in the region. 185. In total, 60% of Malaysia’s outgoing MLA requests either remain pending with the requested jurisdictions (35%) or have been subsequently withdrawn (25%) (see Table 2.5 below). Withdrawals typically occur in cases where the requested evidence is no longer required by LEAs. After accounting for withdrawn requests, only 46% of outgoing requests during the review period have been successfully executed. Malaysia does not attribute the low response rate to poor quality of its requests, and feedback from the FATF Global Network does not indicate that the quality of requests is an issue. Although outside Malaysia’s control, this low execution rate is concerning and is likely to substantially impact Malaysia’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and secure convictions in cases involving transnational elements. Table 2.5. Outgoing MLA requests by status Status of Outgoing 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Acceded 13 8 6 7 4 - - 38 Denied - 1 - - - - - 1 Withdrawn by Malaysia 10 4 5 4 3 1 - 27 In progress in Malaysia - 1 - 3 1 - - 5 In progress in requested countries 2 6 4 10 5 11 - 38 Total 25 20 15 24 13 12 - 109 2.2.2. Extradition (including backed warrants) 186. Outgoing extradition requests follow a similar process to outgoing MLA requests, however, MoHA considers the request and its adherence to the requirements of the Extradition Act and treaties. Malaysia’s use of extradition requests is not fully aligned with its risk profile. Since 2019, Malaysia sent 32 extradition requests (including 24 backed warrants), 31 related to predicate offences such as human trafficking, fraud, smuggling, computer crimes, murder and one related to ML linked to corruption (see table below for yearly breakdown). In terms of outcomes, two requests were rejected by the requested country, two were withdrawn by Malaysia and four requests were in progress as of February 2025. Of the 24 backed warrant requests, 19 were executed, and five remain pending. During the same period, Malaysia made 42 provisional arrest requests through the INTERPOL Red Notice system and advised this is an effective tool, but it is unclear how many of these resulted in successful arrests or ultimately led to extradition to Malaysia. The below case study demonstrates Malaysia’s efforts to pursue extradition when faced with legal impediments. Box 2.3. Extradition efforts by authorities In 2022, Malaysia sent a provisional arrest request for Person A to Country B for the offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property under section 420 of the Penal Code. However, the request was refused by Country B due to lack of dual criminality. In 2023, Malaysia made another effort to extradite Person A by sending a full extradition request for the offence under section 12 of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act. Concurrently, Country B also received an extradition request for Person A from Country C for a different offence. Country B has decided to surrender Person A to Country C. Table 2.6. Outgoing Extradition requests (including backing warrants) Categories 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total ML 1 - - - - - - 1 Predicate 9 2 3 10 2 5 - 31 Total 10 2 3 10 2 5 - 32 2.2.3. Identification, freezing, seizing, confiscation and sharing of criminal assets 187. During the review period, Malaysia sent nine MLA requests to trace, seize, confiscate and repatriate illicit assets that had moved abroad. Three were completed and the funds repatriated (one related to 1MDB through a voluntary return process for the value of EUR 926 000, one related to ML and fraud for EUR 699 286 and one related to ML and cheating for EUR 736 088). There are six ongoing MLA requests all related to 1MDB (of a significant value), which are pending with the requested jurisdictions. 188. Despite these successful recoveries, the total number of cases is very limited, particularly given Malaysia’s context as a transit country; its risks related to cross-border fraud and scams, and corruption; and the case studies provided which show proceeds being moved offshore. Competent authorities do not systemically pursue illicit proceeds that have been moved abroad in a manner that is fully commensurate with Malaysia’s risk profile. For instance, there is only one asset recovery-related request for fraud and no requests for other high-risk crimes (drug trafficking, organised crime or smuggling) or medium-high risk crimes (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/smuggling, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation) where there is likely an international element. This gap may be partly attributed to the absence of clear manuals or guidance for the FIU, LEAs, and the AGC on how to effectively trace, identify, seize, freeze, and repatriate assets located overseas during financial analysis, investigations, and prosecutions. Box 2.4. Tracing and repatriation (ML, fraud) In August 2021, the RMP initiated an investigation into ML and fraud involving assets transferred to Country X. The case concerned a business email compromise between Company F (the victim) and Company G. Company F had been in a legitimate transaction with Company G for the purchase of machinery worth EUR 1 million. In May 2021, Company F received an email—purportedly from Company G—attaching an invoice for EUR 700 000. Acting on this, Company F transferred the funds to the bank account specified in the email. It was later discovered that Company F’s business email had been compromised, and the correspondence had come from a suspicious address rather than Company G’s official email. This indicated that the invoice was fraudulent, and the funds had been sent to an unknown bank account in Country X. In January 2022, Malaysia requested Country X’s assistance in repatriating the assets. Country X identified and froze the relevant assets and asked Malaysia to obtain a restraint order from its courts. In March 2023, the Malaysian court granted the restraint order, and in April 2023, Malaysia submitted a supplemental request to Country X to restrain the assets under that order. This led to the repatriation of EUR 699 286 to Company F in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.2.1. Seeking evidence and locating criminals 181. Malaysia now uses i-AGC to manage outgoing MLA requests. To support LEAs in preparing these requests, the AGC has also published an MLA template and form on its website. Throughout the drafting process, the TCU works closely with LEAs, and once a final draft is submitted, the TCU ensures all requirements are met before transmitting the request. The table below summarises outgoing requests between 2019 and February 2025. Table 2.4. Outgoing MLA requests by offence Categories 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total ML 16 12 6 16 5 9 - 64 Corruption 14 7 5 8 4 5 - 43 Fraud 2 5 1 2 1 3 - 14 Others - - - 6 - 1 - 7 Predicate Offence 9 8 9 6 8 3 - 43 Fraud 4 1 4 2 - 2 - 13 Corruption 1 2 3 1 4 - - 11 Murder - 2 1 - 1 - - 4 Terrorism 1 1 - - - -- - 2 Drug Offences 1 - - - - - - 1 Crimes of violence - 1 - - - - - 1 Sexual offences - - - 1 - - - 1 Computer crime - - - 1 - - - 1 Theft/robbery - - - - - 1 - 1 Rape 1 - - - - - - 1 Others 1 1 1 1 3 - - 7 TF - - - 2 - - - 2 Total 25 20 15 24 13 12 - 109 182. The successive National Strategic Plan and NCC roadmaps’ inclusion of international cooperation in action plans has seen outgoing MLA requests increase from 36 in the 2015 MER to 109 in the current review period (2019-2025). Malaysian authorities advised that they leverage, and prefer, informal international cooperation due to its efficiency; however, the Assessment Team notes that informal cooperation cannot be an effective substitute for MLA (e.g., where court evidence is required). The SOP on MLA in criminal matters does not cover how to prioritise outgoing MLA requests based on urgency and risk of asset dissipation, nor is there is any guideline or matrix on how to use MLA requests during investigations and prosecutions. Furthermore, the SOP does not refer to prioritisation based on Malaysia’s risks, including high/medium risk foreign predicate offences, or origin or destination countries for illicit proceeds. This is likely to impact the nature and likelihood of success of outgoing requests. 183. From 2019 to 2025, Malaysia made 109 outgoing MLA requests for an array of offences including ML (42 related to 1MDB) and TF. Requests included, production of evidence or documents, witness statements, seizure and recovery/confiscation of illegal proceeds. Consistent with the NRA, requests related to corruption (54) and fraud (27) (either alone or as an ML predicate) were most common. While these are higher risk offences for Malaysia, the overall number of requests related to fraud appears low in light of the regional risks and current trends. Moreover, there were few requests related to organised crime, drugs and smuggling, which is not in line with Malaysia’s risk and context. The 2023 NRA states that Malaysia remains an attractive location for drug syndicates—both as a transit hub for international distribution and as a destination for illicit drugs. Malaysia advised that LEAs pursue drug crimes and associated ML through joint operations and via treaties, as they face challenges in obtaining assistance through MLA from some jurisdictions where offences are punishable by the death penalty or corporal punishment (e.g., drug trafficking, criminal breach of trust). This is a reasonable approach but does not explain the lack of requests for ML relating to drug offending, which does not carry the death penalty. 184. Only two TF-related requests were made which is not in line with risk, particularly the risks related to terrorist organisations active in the region. 185. In total, 60% of Malaysia’s outgoing MLA requests either remain pending with the requested jurisdictions (35%) or have been subsequently withdrawn (25%) (see Table 2.5 below). Withdrawals typically occur in cases where the requested evidence is no longer required by LEAs. After accounting for withdrawn requests, only 46% of outgoing requests during the review period have been successfully executed. Malaysia does not attribute the low response rate to poor quality of its requests, and feedback from the FATF Global Network does not indicate that the quality of requests is an issue. Although outside Malaysia’s control, this low execution rate is concerning and is likely to substantially impact Malaysia’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and secure convictions in cases involving transnational elements. Table 2.5. Outgoing MLA requests by status Status of Outgoing 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Acceded 13 8 6 7 4 - - 38 Denied - 1 - - - - - 1 Withdrawn by Malaysia 10 4 5 4 3 1 - 27 In progress in Malaysia - 1 - 3 1 - - 5 In progress in requested countries 2 6 4 10 5 11 - 38 Total 25 20 15 24 13 12 - 109 2.2.2. Extradition (including backed warrants) 186. Outgoing extradition requests follow a similar process to outgoing MLA requests, however, MoHA considers the request and its adherence to the requirements of the Extradition Act and treaties. Malaysia’s use of extradition requests is not fully aligned with its risk profile. Since 2019, Malaysia sent 32 extradition requests (including 24 backed warrants), 31 related to predicate offences such as human trafficking, fraud, smuggling, computer crimes, murder and one related to ML linked to corruption (see table below for yearly breakdown). In terms of outcomes, two requests were rejected by the requested country, two were withdrawn by Malaysia and four requests were in progress as of February 2025. Of the 24 backed warrant requests, 19 were executed, and five remain pending. During the same period, Malaysia made 42 provisional arrest requests through the INTERPOL Red Notice system and advised this is an effective tool, but it is unclear how many of these resulted in successful arrests or ultimately led to extradition to Malaysia. The below case study demonstrates Malaysia’s efforts to pursue extradition when faced with legal impediments. Box 2.3. Extradition efforts by authorities In 2022, Malaysia sent a provisional arrest request for Person A to Country B for the offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property under section 420 of the Penal Code. However, the request was refused by Country B due to lack of dual criminality. In 2023, Malaysia made another effort to extradite Person A by sending a full extradition request for the offence under section 12 of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act. Concurrently, Country B also received an extradition request for Person A from Country C for a different offence. Country B has decided to surrender Person A to Country C. Table 2.6. Outgoing Extradition requests (including backing warrants) Categories 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total ML 1 - - - - - - 1 Predicate 9 2 3 10 2 5 - 31 Total 10 2 3 10 2 5 - 32 2.2.3. Identification, freezing, seizing, confiscation and sharing of criminal assets 187. During the review period, Malaysia sent nine MLA requests to trace, seize, confiscate and repatriate illicit assets that had moved abroad. Three were completed and the funds repatriated (one related to 1MDB through a voluntary return process for the value of EUR 926 000, one related to ML and fraud for EUR 699 286 and one related to ML and cheating for EUR 736 088). There are six ongoing MLA requests all related to 1MDB (of a significant value), which are pending with the requested jurisdictions. 188. Despite these successful recoveries, the total number of cases is very limited, particularly given Malaysia’s context as a transit country; its risks related to cross-border fraud and scams, and corruption; and the case studies provided which show proceeds being moved offshore. Competent authorities do not systemically pursue illicit proceeds that have been moved abroad in a manner that is fully commensurate with Malaysia’s risk profile. For instance, there is only one asset recovery-related request for fraud and no requests for other high-risk crimes (drug trafficking, organised crime or smuggling) or medium-high risk crimes (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/smuggling, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation) where there is likely an international element. This gap may be partly attributed to the absence of clear manuals or guidance for the FIU, LEAs, and the AGC on how to effectively trace, identify, seize, freeze, and repatriate assets located overseas during financial analysis, investigations, and prosecutions. Box 2.4. Tracing and repatriation (ML, fraud) In August 2021, the RMP initiated an investigation into ML and fraud involving assets transferred to Country X. The case concerned a business email compromise between Company F (the victim) and Company G. Company F had been in a legitimate transaction with Company G for the purchase of machinery worth EUR 1 million. In May 2021, Company F received an email—purportedly from Company G—attaching an invoice for EUR 700 000. Acting on this, Company F transferred the funds to the bank account specified in the email. It was later discovered that Company F’s business email had been compromised, and the correspondence had come from a suspicious address rather than Company G’s official email. This indicated that the invoice was fraudulent, and the funds had been sent to an unknown bank account in Country X. In January 2022, Malaysia requested Country X’s assistance in repatriating the assets. Country X identified and froze the relevant assets and asked Malaysia to obtain a restraint order from its courts. In March 2023, the Malaysian court granted the restraint order, and in April 2023, Malaysia submitted a supplemental request to Country X to restrain the assets under that order. This led to the repatriation of EUR 699 286 to Company F in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 230. The supervisory authorities have a good understanding of the ML/TF risks to the financial sector. This is largely informed through involvement in the NRA process, periodic quantitative and qualitative data collection from FIs, meetings with foreign regulators (e.g., supervisory colleges) and engagement with LEAs, industry players and other authorities as part of the NCC. Sectoral risk analysis has been conducted and is reflected in the NRA (see IO.1). 231. In addition, supervisory authorities conduct standalone thematic risk assessments on certain sectors with significant ML/TF risks identified in the NRA (e.g., Labuan IBFC risk assessment). This is in addition to sectoral risk assessments, the outcomes of which are not disseminated outside the NRA process. 232. The SC and LFSA have a reasonable understanding of risk in the VA/VASP sector and contributed significantly to the 2024 VA risk assessment, which follows a similar methodology to other sectoral analysis, using qualitative and quantitative information and focussing on threats and controls. However, this assessment only covers the ML/TF and PF risks for the period between 2020 and 2022. Given the fast-moving nature of the VASP sector, this assessment should continue to be updated on a regular basis. 233. The supervisory authorities have robust systems in place for categorising the individual risks in most FIs and VASPs. Individual risk categorisation is driven by responses to periodic questionnaires, issued by each of the supervisors, focussing on inherent risks and the quality of controls in each entity. In terms of inherent risk, supervisors consider factors such as organisation structure, type of customers and products and service offered. This produces an overall inherent risk score, which is overlaid with a quality of controls score derived from previous observations and compliance failures identified through onsite examinations and thematic reviews. A final net risk rating is then produced for each entity based on these two factors (inherent risk and control measures). Each FI or VASP is placed into one of four risk categories based on their overall net rating: high, medium-high, medium and low. The net rating for most FIs and VASPs is reviewed annually or based on trigger events. The risk rating of MSBs and DPI issuers is reviewed quarterly due to their higher frequency of data they submit to the BNM (monthly transactional data submission). Periodic individual risk rating based on questionnaires was initially extended to other financial service providers and NBFIs, however, it was not deemed to be proportionate given the low risk they present. 234. Supervisory authorities are increasingly using supervisory technology solutions and dashboards to automate risk ratings for individual FIs and monitor significant changes in the overall risk environment. This approach has been particularly effective for the MSB sector, given BNM’s access to extensive transaction data. Box 3.3. Technology solutions for supervision of MSB and DPI issuers The BNM leverages various technology solutions to facilitate its understanding of ML/TF risk on industry, entity and customer level, as follows: (a) Statistics dashboard: Automated compilation and visualisation of payment statistics to help supervisors monitor industry trends and patterns (i.e., historical trends of transaction value and volume of each MSB and DPI issuer, materiality assessment of different payment products, etc.). (b) Algorithmic risk profiling: Algorithm-based analysis of the questionnaire submitted by the MSBs and DPI issuers to help supervisors assess inherent risks and control measures. (c) Audit financial statements analytics: Annual automated computation of financial ratios based on the audited financial statements data extracted with an OCR tool to help supervisors identify abnormal trends and understand the potential vulnerabilities and risk. (d) Remittance turnover modelling and forecasting: Automated detection of outlier trends in remittance value by comparing daily total value reported by remittance service providers against the forecasted trend using time-series modelling to help supervisors zoom into the outlier periods and identify any suspicious customers contributing to the outliers. (e) Geospatial analysis: Automated analysis of financial statistics quarterly submitted by MSBs to identify the normal range of gross profit margin for each business model and flag out abnormal entities and outlets by comparing with peers in the same vicinity. (f) CCTV video analytics: AI-based review of the CCTV footages of the MSB outlets to identify any suspicious activities. (g) MSB customer anomaly detection: Automated detection of MSB customers with outlier transaction behaviour based on quarterly analysis with machine learning models and rule-based parameters on monthly submitted transactional data to help supervisors monitor MSBs with an appropriate level of focus and refer suspicions to Malaysia’s FIU for further investigation and disclosures to other authorities. Between 2020 and 2024, technology solutions flagged 292 MSB licensees. One case identified through the “Remittance Turnover Modelling and Forecasting” tool revealed poor record-keeping, resulting in non-renewal of the license. In 2022, the “MSB Customer Anomaly Detection” tool flagged two MSBs for facilitating abnormal customer transactions; on-site examinations uncovered weaknesses in ongoing due diligence processes. 235. Nevertheless, the breakdown of individual FI risk ratings within sectors does not always align with overall sectoral risk assessment, which is agreed upon by the supervisory authorities and reflected in the NRA. This is because the data points used for sectoral risk assessment are different and more diverse than those used for individual FI ratings. In addition, the misalignment is likely a result of sectoral risk assessments focusing more on the control measures implemented by Malaysia and not reflecting the control measure deficiencies in individual FIs. 236.  Supervisors assign critical ratings for individual FIs to address such deficiencies. As the quality of control rating is reduced based on identified deficiencies, the overall net risk score for the institution is raised. This approach inflates the ML/TF risk ratings of individual FIs and may impact Malaysia’s decisions on effectively allocating resources. For example, the latest NRA concludes ML risk of the MSB sector is medium, yet the ML risk of approximately 70% (173 as of 2024) of MSB institutions within it is categorised as medium-high or high risk. There are 52 supervisors within the BNM, who conduct onsite examinations on medium-high or high-risk firms over a three-to-five-year cycle. 237. By contrast, more than 90% of CMI entities, supervised by the SC, whose sectoral risk is concluded as medium-high, are categorised as having medium or low net risk scores. The remaining 10% of CMIs (14 as of 2024) are categorised either as medium-high or high risk, largely arising from their contribution to more than 80% of market share. There is a total of 99 supervisors within SC and onsite examinations are conducted annually or more frequently for these medium-high or high-risk firms (i.e., much more frequently than medium-high or high risk MSBs supervised by BNM). 238.  Although individual FI risk ratings suggest less resources are allocated to the supervision of higher risk MSBs than of lower risk CMIs, Malaysia maintains that this is mitigated by supplementing the shortage of MSB supervisors with supervisory technology solutions, which BNM has embedded within its supervisory framework. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 239. The BNM, SC and LFSA frequently engage with FIs to promote awareness of ML/TF risks and their AML/CFT/CPF obligations. A significant component of this engagement happens through the Compliance Officer Networking Group (CONG). In addition, supervisory authorities also leverage one-to-one annual engagements conducted with individual institutions to discuss any possible changes to the institution’s ML/TF risk profile. This one-to-one engagement is conducted for all onshore banks, but only with higher-risk entities in most other sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="3.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of FIs and VASPs and of individual FIs and VASPs over time 230. The supervisory authorities have a good understanding of the ML/TF risks to the financial sector. This is largely informed through involvement in the NRA process, periodic quantitative and qualitative data collection from FIs, meetings with foreign regulators (e.g., supervisory colleges) and engagement with LEAs, industry players and other authorities as part of the NCC. Sectoral risk analysis has been conducted and is reflected in the NRA (see IO.1). 231. In addition, supervisory authorities conduct standalone thematic risk assessments on certain sectors with significant ML/TF risks identified in the NRA (e.g., Labuan IBFC risk assessment). This is in addition to sectoral risk assessments, the outcomes of which are not disseminated outside the NRA process. 232. The SC and LFSA have a reasonable understanding of risk in the VA/VASP sector and contributed significantly to the 2024 VA risk assessment, which follows a similar methodology to other sectoral analysis, using qualitative and quantitative information and focussing on threats and controls. However, this assessment only covers the ML/TF and PF risks for the period between 2020 and 2022. Given the fast-moving nature of the VASP sector, this assessment should continue to be updated on a regular basis. 233. The supervisory authorities have robust systems in place for categorising the individual risks in most FIs and VASPs. Individual risk categorisation is driven by responses to periodic questionnaires, issued by each of the supervisors, focussing on inherent risks and the quality of controls in each entity. In terms of inherent risk, supervisors consider factors such as organisation structure, type of customers and products and service offered. This produces an overall inherent risk score, which is overlaid with a quality of controls score derived from previous observations and compliance failures identified through onsite examinations and thematic reviews. A final net risk rating is then produced for each entity based on these two factors (inherent risk and control measures). Each FI or VASP is placed into one of four risk categories based on their overall net rating: high, medium-high, medium and low. The net rating for most FIs and VASPs is reviewed annually or based on trigger events. The risk rating of MSBs and DPI issuers is reviewed quarterly due to their higher frequency of data they submit to the BNM (monthly transactional data submission). Periodic individual risk rating based on questionnaires was initially extended to other financial service providers and NBFIs, however, it was not deemed to be proportionate given the low risk they present. 234. Supervisory authorities are increasingly using supervisory technology solutions and dashboards to automate risk ratings for individual FIs and monitor significant changes in the overall risk environment. This approach has been particularly effective for the MSB sector, given BNM’s access to extensive transaction data. Box 3.3. Technology solutions for supervision of MSB and DPI issuers The BNM leverages various technology solutions to facilitate its understanding of ML/TF risk on industry, entity and customer level, as follows: (a) Statistics dashboard: Automated compilation and visualisation of payment statistics to help supervisors monitor industry trends and patterns (i.e., historical trends of transaction value and volume of each MSB and DPI issuer, materiality assessment of different payment products, etc.). (b) Algorithmic risk profiling: Algorithm-based analysis of the questionnaire submitted by the MSBs and DPI issuers to help supervisors assess inherent risks and control measures. (c) Audit financial statements analytics: Annual automated computation of financial ratios based on the audited financial statements data extracted with an OCR tool to help supervisors identify abnormal trends and understand the potential vulnerabilities and risk. (d) Remittance turnover modelling and forecasting: Automated detection of outlier trends in remittance value by comparing daily total value reported by remittance service providers against the forecasted trend using time-series modelling to help supervisors zoom into the outlier periods and identify any suspicious customers contributing to the outliers. (e) Geospatial analysis: Automated analysis of financial statistics quarterly submitted by MSBs to identify the normal range of gross profit margin for each business model and flag out abnormal entities and outlets by comparing with peers in the same vicinity. (f) CCTV video analytics: AI-based review of the CCTV footages of the MSB outlets to identify any suspicious activities. (g) MSB customer anomaly detection: Automated detection of MSB customers with outlier transaction behaviour based on quarterly analysis with machine learning models and rule-based parameters on monthly submitted transactional data to help supervisors monitor MSBs with an appropriate level of focus and refer suspicions to Malaysia’s FIU for further investigation and disclosures to other authorities. Between 2020 and 2024, technology solutions flagged 292 MSB licensees. One case identified through the “Remittance Turnover Modelling and Forecasting” tool revealed poor record-keeping, resulting in non-renewal of the license. In 2022, the “MSB Customer Anomaly Detection” tool flagged two MSBs for facilitating abnormal customer transactions; on-site examinations uncovered weaknesses in ongoing due diligence processes. 235. Nevertheless, the breakdown of individual FI risk ratings within sectors does not always align with overall sectoral risk assessment, which is agreed upon by the supervisory authorities and reflected in the NRA. This is because the data points used for sectoral risk assessment are different and more diverse than those used for individual FI ratings. In addition, the misalignment is likely a result of sectoral risk assessments focusing more on the control measures implemented by Malaysia and not reflecting the control measure deficiencies in individual FIs. 236.  Supervisors assign critical ratings for individual FIs to address such deficiencies. As the quality of control rating is reduced based on identified deficiencies, the overall net risk score for the institution is raised. This approach inflates the ML/TF risk ratings of individual FIs and may impact Malaysia’s decisions on effectively allocating resources. For example, the latest NRA concludes ML risk of the MSB sector is medium, yet the ML risk of approximately 70% (173 as of 2024) of MSB institutions within it is categorised as medium-high or high risk. There are 52 supervisors within the BNM, who conduct onsite examinations on medium-high or high-risk firms over a three-to-five-year cycle. 237. By contrast, more than 90% of CMI entities, supervised by the SC, whose sectoral risk is concluded as medium-high, are categorised as having medium or low net risk scores. The remaining 10% of CMIs (14 as of 2024) are categorised either as medium-high or high risk, largely arising from their contribution to more than 80% of market share. There is a total of 99 supervisors within SC and onsite examinations are conducted annually or more frequently for these medium-high or high-risk firms (i.e., much more frequently than medium-high or high risk MSBs supervised by BNM). 238.  Although individual FI risk ratings suggest less resources are allocated to the supervision of higher risk MSBs than of lower risk CMIs, Malaysia maintains that this is mitigated by supplementing the shortage of MSB supervisors with supervisory technology solutions, which BNM has embedded within its supervisory framework. 3.2.2. Promoting FI and VASP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 239. The BNM, SC and LFSA frequently engage with FIs to promote awareness of ML/TF risks and their AML/CFT/CPF obligations. A significant component of this engagement happens through the Compliance Officer Networking Group (CONG). In addition, supervisory authorities also leverage one-to-one annual engagements conducted with individual institutions to discuss any possible changes to the institution’s ML/TF risk profile. This one-to-one engagement is conducted for all onshore banks, but only with higher-risk entities in most other sectors." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 310. The BNM and LFSA have a good understanding of risk in the DNFBP sectors. This is largely informed through comprehensive involvement in the development of the NRA. Analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative information, including supervisory data and engagement with LEAs on crimes relating to DNFBP sectors. 311. Supervisors have regular engagement with the licensing authorities, SRBs and industry associations on the risks and issues identified through NCC’s DNFBP Committees. Topics covered as part of this engagement include outcomes from supervision, NRA findings, thematic risk assessments and AML/CFT/CPF requirements and policy changes, which helps ensure risk understanding is kept up to date. 312. The BNM identifies higher-risk RIs through its DNFBP Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) process, which has been in operation since 2019. The framework identifies entities from each DNFBP sector that could be more vulnerable to ML/TF risk and warrant closer supervisory attention. The criteria that determine this includes identified/potential criminal links, financial intelligence reports, size and number of branches of the firms, and any public-sourced information on the possible involvement of firms in illegal activities or in facilitating ML/TF transactions. Each DNFBP is then assigned a risk ranking. Firms with higher risk rankings are prioritised for higher supervisory intensity, regardless of their sectoral risk. The list of higher-risk RIs is updated every two years to prioritise supervision, including onsite inspections. Certain RIs are excluded from the high-risk pool based on exclusion criteria, which includes firms that have had an on-site within the past two years. This approach applies to all DNFBP sectors and not only enables the identification of high-risk institutions within sectors but also allows the BNM to have a holistic view of higher risk entities across the DNFBP sector. The D’SuRF supervisory framework also enables the BNM to identify trends across sectors to determine if supervisory intervention is required. 313. LFSA leverages biannual data collection to risk assess the DNFBPs it supervises and is currently developing network analytic tools to generate alerts for any adverse news, to identify BO inter-connectivity and uncover unlicensed business activities. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 314. Supervisors conduct various activities to promote a clear understanding amongst DNFBPs of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. This includes: (i) seminars designed for various levels of staff (e.g., discussions on the outcomes of the NRA at the NCC’s DNFBP Committees, (ii) distribution of self-assessment checklist for all DNFBPs; (iii) distribution of red-flag and typologies indicators; and (iv) e-learning courses. 315. The supervisory authorities, in collaboration with SRBs and industry associations, have developed several training resources and delivered a significant number of awareness raising programmes (physically and online). Nevertheless, some of the smaller entities met during the onsite expressed that more in-person training on AML/CFT obligations would be helpful, particularly for RIs in rural regions with resource constraints. 316. LFSA leverages one-to-one engagements with Labuan trust companies, particularly with higher-risk entities, to ensure they are aware of their AML/CFT obligations. LFSA also conducts semi-annual engagement sessions with the Association of Labuan trust companies and sees this as an important supervisory measure, particularly given the sector’s role in company formation and as gatekeepers to the financial services sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.2.1. Identifying and maintaining an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the different sectors and types of DNFBPs and of individual DNFBPs over time 310. The BNM and LFSA have a good understanding of risk in the DNFBP sectors. This is largely informed through comprehensive involvement in the development of the NRA. Analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative information, including supervisory data and engagement with LEAs on crimes relating to DNFBP sectors. 311. Supervisors have regular engagement with the licensing authorities, SRBs and industry associations on the risks and issues identified through NCC’s DNFBP Committees. Topics covered as part of this engagement include outcomes from supervision, NRA findings, thematic risk assessments and AML/CFT/CPF requirements and policy changes, which helps ensure risk understanding is kept up to date. 312. The BNM identifies higher-risk RIs through its DNFBP Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) process, which has been in operation since 2019. The framework identifies entities from each DNFBP sector that could be more vulnerable to ML/TF risk and warrant closer supervisory attention. The criteria that determine this includes identified/potential criminal links, financial intelligence reports, size and number of branches of the firms, and any public-sourced information on the possible involvement of firms in illegal activities or in facilitating ML/TF transactions. Each DNFBP is then assigned a risk ranking. Firms with higher risk rankings are prioritised for higher supervisory intensity, regardless of their sectoral risk. The list of higher-risk RIs is updated every two years to prioritise supervision, including onsite inspections. Certain RIs are excluded from the high-risk pool based on exclusion criteria, which includes firms that have had an on-site within the past two years. This approach applies to all DNFBP sectors and not only enables the identification of high-risk institutions within sectors but also allows the BNM to have a holistic view of higher risk entities across the DNFBP sector. The D’SuRF supervisory framework also enables the BNM to identify trends across sectors to determine if supervisory intervention is required. 313. LFSA leverages biannual data collection to risk assess the DNFBPs it supervises and is currently developing network analytic tools to generate alerts for any adverse news, to identify BO inter-connectivity and uncover unlicensed business activities. 4.2.2. Promoting DNFBP understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations 314. Supervisors conduct various activities to promote a clear understanding amongst DNFBPs of their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations. This includes: (i) seminars designed for various levels of staff (e.g., discussions on the outcomes of the NRA at the NCC’s DNFBP Committees, (ii) distribution of self-assessment checklist for all DNFBPs; (iii) distribution of red-flag and typologies indicators; and (iv) e-learning courses. 315. The supervisory authorities, in collaboration with SRBs and industry associations, have developed several training resources and delivered a significant number of awareness raising programmes (physically and online). Nevertheless, some of the smaller entities met during the onsite expressed that more in-person training on AML/CFT obligations would be helpful, particularly for RIs in rural regions with resource constraints. 316. LFSA leverages one-to-one engagements with Labuan trust companies, particularly with higher-risk entities, to ensure they are aware of their AML/CFT obligations. LFSA also conducts semi-annual engagement sessions with the Association of Labuan trust companies and sees this as an important supervisory measure, particularly given the sector’s role in company formation and as gatekeepers to the financial services sector." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="369. Malaysia has implemented several measures during the evaluation period to mitigate the risks of legal persons and arrangements being used for ML/TF purposes. These measures are set out in relevant NCC Action Plans and largely driven by the findings from the various risk assessments and to address deficiencies identified by Malaysia’s 2015 MER. 370. Malaysia places significant emphasis on company secretaries and Labuan trust companies as gatekeepers for preventing the misuse of legal persons and Labuan LAs. All legal persons must be created with onshore company secretaries or Labuan trust companies and all Labuan legal arrangements are required to appoint Labuan trust companies as one of their trustees. 371. Company secretaries and Labuan trust companies are both RIs under the AMLA and play a pivotal role in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the legal persons and Labuan legal arrangement sectors. Their primary role is to: maintain accurate records; ensure timely submission of statutory documents; conduct due diligence during the establishment and the appointment of directors; screen legal persons and arrangements and their BOs against sanctions lists; and lodge all necessary information and documents with the CCM or LFSA. Box 5.1. Rejection of incorporation by a Labuan trust company Labuan trust company A received an application from a potential foreign Client X to set up two investment holding companies in Labuan IBFC. During the due diligence process under the relevant Guidelines, Labuan trust company A discovered that Client X was allegedly involved in defrauding investors in an illegal investment scheme. Given the increased client risk, Labuan trust company A held a physical meeting with Client X at their office in Labuan. Based on the findings from the due diligence process and information gathered at the meeting, Labuan trust Company A suspected that Client X might be setting up Labuan companies to conduct fraudulent activities. As a result, Labuan trust Company A decided not to proceed with client X’s application and filed an STR. 372. Based on the information provided by company secretaries and Labuan trust companies, the CCM and LFSA maintain registries of basic and BO information of legal persons and Labuan LAs. The CCM and LFSA provide competent authorities, including LEAs with direct or indirect access to those registries. The CCM also makes basic information of onshore legal persons publicly accessible via their portals with a payment of fee. While there are considerable number of subscribers to the portals, the RIs met during the onsite relied more on other commercial databases. 373. Bearer shares and bearer share warrants have been prohibited in Malaysia (since 1965 for onshore and since 2022 for Labuan) and such shares or warrants are no longer valid. All Labuan legal persons are required to submit nominee information to the LFSA. In line with their requirements, onshore legal persons submit information on nominee shareholders with 20% or more of voting shares, and information on natural persons that exercise significant control or influence over the directors or the management of the company, to CCM. However, there is no requirement for onshore companies to disclose information on their nominee directors. Partly due to the absence of such disclosure requirements, the CCM and other LEAs have observed some cases where informal nominees were misused for crimes and ML. In response, Malaysia has undertaken enforcement actions, including prosecution and forfeiture of illicit proceeds. To remediate these deficiencies, the CCM proposes to amend the Companies Act to introduce the requirements for every onshore company to maintain a register of nominee shareholders and nominee directors and report such information to the CCM. However, the proposal was still under the discussion at the time of the onsite. Although nominee arrangements are not common in Malaysia, such requirement would further reduce the ability of criminals to use sophisticated business structures for ML, a risk highlighted by the authorities. 374. Onshore legal arrangements can be managed by both professional and non-professional trustees. Professional trustees, such as trust companies and lawyers, are RIs under the AMLA and play a role as a gatekeeper for preventing the misuse of onshore LAs. 375. Trusts managed by non-professional trustees account for approximately 25.7% of the total value of Malaysia’s onshore legal arrangements. These legal arrangements, which are not managed by gatekeepers, are expected to engage RIs for any financial and professional services, such as opening bank accounts and having trust deeds prepared by lawyers, to fulfil the purpose of the legal arrangements. The RIs providing services to legal arrangements are required to identify and verify the identity of the legal arrangement clients, including their BOs. Hence, Malaysia believes the basic and BO information of all legal arrangements is consequently maintained by the RIs. 376. In alignment with their medium-high risk nature, BHEUU publishes basic and BO information on onshore foundations/incorporated trusts on their website. [59] Since July 2023, BHEUU started engaging with the RMP to conduct security vetting on all founders and trustees. As of January 2024, 248 individuals have been vetted by RMP, of whom 32 were not deemed appropriate to be founders and trustees, mainly due to past criminal records, resulting in application rejections. Furthermore, a list of dissolved onshore foundations/incorporated trusts is publicly available at BHEUU’s website. 377. From 2019 to December 2024, the CCM organised 61 training programmes for company secretaries to enhance awareness and understanding of BO reporting requirements. These sessions were attended by 13 220 participants. For Labuan, an awareness briefing session was conducted in December 2021 on newly created BO guidance. This was attended by 305 participants from multiple sectors, including compliance officers from Labuan trust companies and Labuan foundations. Footnotes [59] Semakan Status Yayasan . Government of Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="369. Malaysia has implemented several measures during the evaluation period to mitigate the risks of legal persons and arrangements being used for ML/TF purposes. These measures are set out in relevant NCC Action Plans and largely driven by the findings from the various risk assessments and to address deficiencies identified by Malaysia’s 2015 MER. 370. Malaysia places significant emphasis on company secretaries and Labuan trust companies as gatekeepers for preventing the misuse of legal persons and Labuan LAs. All legal persons must be created with onshore company secretaries or Labuan trust companies and all Labuan legal arrangements are required to appoint Labuan trust companies as one of their trustees. 371. Company secretaries and Labuan trust companies are both RIs under the AMLA and play a pivotal role in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the legal persons and Labuan legal arrangement sectors. Their primary role is to: maintain accurate records; ensure timely submission of statutory documents; conduct due diligence during the establishment and the appointment of directors; screen legal persons and arrangements and their BOs against sanctions lists; and lodge all necessary information and documents with the CCM or LFSA. Box 5.1. Rejection of incorporation by a Labuan trust company Labuan trust company A received an application from a potential foreign Client X to set up two investment holding companies in Labuan IBFC. During the due diligence process under the relevant Guidelines, Labuan trust company A discovered that Client X was allegedly involved in defrauding investors in an illegal investment scheme. Given the increased client risk, Labuan trust company A held a physical meeting with Client X at their office in Labuan. Based on the findings from the due diligence process and information gathered at the meeting, Labuan trust Company A suspected that Client X might be setting up Labuan companies to conduct fraudulent activities. As a result, Labuan trust Company A decided not to proceed with client X’s application and filed an STR. 372. Based on the information provided by company secretaries and Labuan trust companies, the CCM and LFSA maintain registries of basic and BO information of legal persons and Labuan LAs. The CCM and LFSA provide competent authorities, including LEAs with direct or indirect access to those registries. The CCM also makes basic information of onshore legal persons publicly accessible via their portals with a payment of fee. While there are considerable number of subscribers to the portals, the RIs met during the onsite relied more on other commercial databases. 373. Bearer shares and bearer share warrants have been prohibited in Malaysia (since 1965 for onshore and since 2022 for Labuan) and such shares or warrants are no longer valid. All Labuan legal persons are required to submit nominee information to the LFSA. In line with their requirements, onshore legal persons submit information on nominee shareholders with 20% or more of voting shares, and information on natural persons that exercise significant control or influence over the directors or the management of the company, to CCM. However, there is no requirement for onshore companies to disclose information on their nominee directors. Partly due to the absence of such disclosure requirements, the CCM and other LEAs have observed some cases where informal nominees were misused for crimes and ML. In response, Malaysia has undertaken enforcement actions, including prosecution and forfeiture of illicit proceeds. To remediate these deficiencies, the CCM proposes to amend the Companies Act to introduce the requirements for every onshore company to maintain a register of nominee shareholders and nominee directors and report such information to the CCM. However, the proposal was still under the discussion at the time of the onsite. Although nominee arrangements are not common in Malaysia, such requirement would further reduce the ability of criminals to use sophisticated business structures for ML, a risk highlighted by the authorities. 374. Onshore legal arrangements can be managed by both professional and non-professional trustees. Professional trustees, such as trust companies and lawyers, are RIs under the AMLA and play a role as a gatekeeper for preventing the misuse of onshore LAs. 375. Trusts managed by non-professional trustees account for approximately 25.7% of the total value of Malaysia’s onshore legal arrangements. These legal arrangements, which are not managed by gatekeepers, are expected to engage RIs for any financial and professional services, such as opening bank accounts and having trust deeds prepared by lawyers, to fulfil the purpose of the legal arrangements. The RIs providing services to legal arrangements are required to identify and verify the identity of the legal arrangement clients, including their BOs. Hence, Malaysia believes the basic and BO information of all legal arrangements is consequently maintained by the RIs. 376. In alignment with their medium-high risk nature, BHEUU publishes basic and BO information on onshore foundations/incorporated trusts on their website. [59] Since July 2023, BHEUU started engaging with the RMP to conduct security vetting on all founders and trustees. As of January 2024, 248 individuals have been vetted by RMP, of whom 32 were not deemed appropriate to be founders and trustees, mainly due to past criminal records, resulting in application rejections. Furthermore, a list of dissolved onshore foundations/incorporated trusts is publicly available at BHEUU’s website. 377. From 2019 to December 2024, the CCM organised 61 training programmes for company secretaries to enhance awareness and understanding of BO reporting requirements. These sessions were attended by 13 220 participants. For Labuan, an awareness briefing session was conducted in December 2021 on newly created BO guidance. This was attended by 305 participants from multiple sectors, including compliance officers from Labuan trust companies and Labuan foundations. Footnotes [59] Semakan Status Yayasan . Government of Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 429. Malaysia’s FIU consists of two divisions: (1) the Tactical Analysis and Intelligence Division; and (2) the Strategic Analysis, Data Science and Systems Division. The former has 33 staff collectively responsible for conducting case reviews, operational analysis, and responding to domestic and international requests. The latter has 17 staff responsible for developing strategic analysis (typologies, risk/threats assessments, etc.) and managing the various financial intelligence databases (e.g., FINS, CADs, etc.). In total, the FIU has a staff of 50 (as compared to 11 in Malaysia’s 2015 MER). [64] The FIU also leverages data scientists from the BNM. 430. Prior to April 2024, STRs received by RIs were reviewed by FIU analysts based on rule-based prioritisation criteria. At that time, the FIU aimed to review and analyse all individual STRs. Given the increase in STRs over the years, the sustainability of this process was reviewed, which led to a new model of STR prioritisation and analysis within the FIU that was launched in April 2024. Under this updated triage mechanism, instead of reviewing STRs individually, incoming reports are automatically grouped with related STRs and entities into a networked “case”. This approach provides a more comprehensive view of subjects and their connections. Cases that meet the distribution criteria are assigned to analysts daily. Distribution is guided by pre-defined priority indicators, which include: (1) qualitative concepts, using various indicators to identify the underlying offence linked to the case; and (2) a weighted score, assessing the case’s significance based on factors such as size, complexity, financial impact, and the recency of reports. 431. According to statistics provided, approximately 72% of STRs are assigned to analysts (see table below). This enhanced triage process has led to a more comprehensive view of subjects and their connections, resulting in more STRs disseminations since 2024. The scoring and tagging parameters used in STR triage, along with their respective weights in the algorithm, are determined internally by the FIU. This algorithm is reviewed on a bi-monthly basis via the Fintel Forum chaired by the Head of FIU and attended by Deputy Directors and managers from the tactical and strategic analysis and data science teams. While the algorithm is reasonable, the review process could be improved by incorporating input from other STR stakeholders and users—such as LEAs, RIs, and experts—particularly on aspects like parameters, weightings and the deployed model. This would help ensure the algorithm remains robust and aligned with the evolving risk landscape. Table 6.4. STRs received, analysed and disseminated 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total STRs received 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 317 436 341 712 48 293 1 389 286 STRs distributed to analysts 113 302 106 954 135 683 160 091 220 418 240 311 26 284 1 003 043 % of all STRs 100.0% 79.8% 70.9% 65.8% 69.4% 70.3% 54.4% 72.2 % STRs disseminated to LEAs and foreign FIUs 12 900 17 058 10 614 17 062 24 248 84 630 9 196 175 708 % of all STRs 11.4% 12.7% 5.5% 7.0% 7.6% 24.8% 19.0% 12.6% 432. The FIU’s standard operating procedure followed by all analysts, details the report review and financial intelligence production process. A standardised STR case review form is used to ensure analysts conduct reviews systematically and consistently. STRs or cases that meet high-priority indicators are typically reviewed within five working days. Analysts assess the available information to determine the level of analysis needed to establish suspicion or address time-sensitive matters. In practice, RIs also informally notify the FIU of urgent STRs submitted in FINS, allowing analysts to take immediate action when necessary. Progress of STR handling is monitored and discussed via the Fintel Forum. Malaysia’s FIU conducts an annual stocktake of outstanding cases to improve efficiency of STR analysis before dissemination, which is complemented by an annual internal audit by the BNM. Increase of data requests from LEAs through FINS and enhanced prioritisation of STR analysis have contributed to the recent increase in the percentage of the STRs disseminated to LEAs and foreign FIUs (see Table 6.4 above). 433. From a sample review of the STR review forms and strategic analysis products, the Assessment Team observes that FIU analysts have made use of various databases available and other information sources to identify patterns and trends, as well as collaborate with LEAs to gather case studies that demonstrate a variety of crime typologies. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 434. Malaysia’s FIU primarily produces two types of intelligence products: (a) spontaneous disclosures—cases identified and developed based on the FIU’s review (as outlined above); and (b) reactive disclosures–disseminations as a response to requests from LEAs and foreign counterparts. Each disclosure, whether spontaneous or reactive, may contain multiple STRs and CTRs, including reports submitted by RIs from previous years which are related to the subjects of the case. 435. Malaysia’s FIU proactively conducts strategic analysis to address emerging risk areas, such as corruption, the legal profession, and telecommunication scams. This analysis is supported by both qualitative and quantitative data. It includes guidance on red flags and indicators, providing stakeholders with practical tools to detect and mitigate potential risks. 436. Strategic analysis reports and thematic disclosures are shared with RIs—including those in the banking, MSB, and insurance and takaful operator sectors—as well as with LEAs and supervisory bodies through FINS and other channels. These reports aim to improve understanding of emerging risks and support the development of red flag indicators. 437. As a member of the Egmont Group, Malaysia’s FIU also exchanges and disseminates information with counterpart FIUs (see IO.2 for additional information). 438. FIU disclosures are broadly in line with NRA 2023 (see Figure 6.1 below). Most disclosures (including spontaneous and reactive) pertain to fraud and corruption (approximately 40%), which are considered as high-risk crimes for ML. However, the disclosures related to some high-risk ML predicate offences [e.g., smuggling (4%) and organised crime (5%)] are relatively small. Approximately 18% of all disclosures relate to terrorism and TF. The relatively high percentage of terrorism/TF disclosures, compared to those for high-risk ML crimes, is due to the prioritisation given to terrorism/TF and PF cases, as well as the active use of financial intelligence in related surveillance and investigations. The FIU also explained that the number of disclosures related to tax offences (8%) is attributed to the secondment of IRBM officers. Figure 6.1. Breakdown of FIU dissemination by offence (2019-February 2025) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 439. As summarised in the below table, between 2019 and February 2025, the main agencies that received disclosures from the FIU are RMP (59%), MACC (16%) and IRBM (11%). In terms of requests for data, the IRBM systematically seeks data from FINS to carry out its functions related to enforcing tax laws in Malaysia, amounting to 56% of all FINS data requests. Other competent authorities have shown an increasing use of FIU data and other information sources to produce financial intelligence to support their needs. Table 6.5. FIU disseminations to domestic agencies (2019-February 2025) Domestic Agency Spontaneous Disclosures Reactive Disclosures Total Disclosures (% Agency) FINS Data Request (% Agency) Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) 129 121 250 (10.7%) 53 321 (56.4%) Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) 171 202 373 (16.0%) 23 761 (25.1%) Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) 616 760 1376 (59.1%) 14 577 (15.4%) Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) 57 56 113 (4.8%) 740 (0.8%) Ministry of Domestic Trade and Cost of Living (KPDN) 23 4 27 (1.2%) 1 487 (1.6%) Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) 11 8 19 (0.8%) 318 (0.3%) Securities Commission (SC) 43 4 47 (2.0%) 157 (0.2%) Labuan Financial Services Authority (LFSA) 11 3 14 (0.6%) 93 (0.1%) BNM Investigation 50 18 68 (2.9%) 51 (0.1%) Immigration Department of Malaysia (IDM) 10 11 21 (0.9%) 13 (0.0%) Others (PERHILITAN, MMEA, DOF, MTIB) 4 18 22 (0.9%) 36 (0.0%) Note: ‘FINS Data Request’ is the number of subjects. 440. Disclosures on terrorism/TF are primarily disseminated to or requested by the RMP’s Special Branch (which accounts for 80% of all total terrorism/TF disseminations), followed by foreign counterparts. The SB regularly seeks information from the FIU and makes multiple requests on the same subjects to get updated information, which are promptly responded to by the FIU. In 2023, the SB was given direct access to FINS and is systematically using the system to access STR information when gathering intelligence or during investigations. The below case study highlights the timely dissemination of intelligence on urgent terrorism cases. Box 6.3. Prompt analysis of terrorism suspects In the May 2024 terrorism attack on the Ulu Tiram police station, the FIU provided preliminary findings on all suspects shared by the SB on the same day the incident occurred. A detailed analysis containing additional information from checks done with PPP members was provided to the SB within four days after their request. The information was used to cross-check with their foreign counterparts to establish any links with terrorism/TF activities. 441. Malaysia’s FIU monitors the quality of its intelligence products by proactively seeking feedback from LEAs. The FIU gathers feedback on its disseminations through the channels such as: (i) providing a QR code linking to a feedback form in every dissemination report; (ii) biannual surveys; (iii) formal and informal engagement with LEAs; and (iv) follow-up correspondence between LEAs and analysts regarding cases. Overall, the FIU has received positive feedback on the quality and usefulness of the FIU’s disclosures, as per the feedback statistics provided by Malaysia. During the onsite, all competent authorities noted the utility in the FIUs disseminations to perform their functions, particularly in supporting ongoing investigations. 442. There are designated liaison officers within the FIU for all LEAs to foster close collaboration and relationship with LEAs. There are frequent bilateral meetings to discuss cases, create awareness about the FIU’s role and sharing of information to support LEAs’ intelligence and investigations. Such interactions provide an avenue for LEAs to share feedback (see IO.1 for a list of the secondments in place at the FIU). Footnotes [64] Malaysia reports that, following a completed manpower audit in 2024, 15 additional vacancies have been identified and are currently in the process of being filled." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.2.1. Production of financial intelligence 429. Malaysia’s FIU consists of two divisions: (1) the Tactical Analysis and Intelligence Division; and (2) the Strategic Analysis, Data Science and Systems Division. The former has 33 staff collectively responsible for conducting case reviews, operational analysis, and responding to domestic and international requests. The latter has 17 staff responsible for developing strategic analysis (typologies, risk/threats assessments, etc.) and managing the various financial intelligence databases (e.g., FINS, CADs, etc.). In total, the FIU has a staff of 50 (as compared to 11 in Malaysia’s 2015 MER). [64] The FIU also leverages data scientists from the BNM. 430. Prior to April 2024, STRs received by RIs were reviewed by FIU analysts based on rule-based prioritisation criteria. At that time, the FIU aimed to review and analyse all individual STRs. Given the increase in STRs over the years, the sustainability of this process was reviewed, which led to a new model of STR prioritisation and analysis within the FIU that was launched in April 2024. Under this updated triage mechanism, instead of reviewing STRs individually, incoming reports are automatically grouped with related STRs and entities into a networked “case”. This approach provides a more comprehensive view of subjects and their connections. Cases that meet the distribution criteria are assigned to analysts daily. Distribution is guided by pre-defined priority indicators, which include: (1) qualitative concepts, using various indicators to identify the underlying offence linked to the case; and (2) a weighted score, assessing the case’s significance based on factors such as size, complexity, financial impact, and the recency of reports. 431. According to statistics provided, approximately 72% of STRs are assigned to analysts (see table below). This enhanced triage process has led to a more comprehensive view of subjects and their connections, resulting in more STRs disseminations since 2024. The scoring and tagging parameters used in STR triage, along with their respective weights in the algorithm, are determined internally by the FIU. This algorithm is reviewed on a bi-monthly basis via the Fintel Forum chaired by the Head of FIU and attended by Deputy Directors and managers from the tactical and strategic analysis and data science teams. While the algorithm is reasonable, the review process could be improved by incorporating input from other STR stakeholders and users—such as LEAs, RIs, and experts—particularly on aspects like parameters, weightings and the deployed model. This would help ensure the algorithm remains robust and aligned with the evolving risk landscape. Table 6.4. STRs received, analysed and disseminated 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total STRs received 113 302 133 978 191 388 243 177 317 436 341 712 48 293 1 389 286 STRs distributed to analysts 113 302 106 954 135 683 160 091 220 418 240 311 26 284 1 003 043 % of all STRs 100.0% 79.8% 70.9% 65.8% 69.4% 70.3% 54.4% 72.2 % STRs disseminated to LEAs and foreign FIUs 12 900 17 058 10 614 17 062 24 248 84 630 9 196 175 708 % of all STRs 11.4% 12.7% 5.5% 7.0% 7.6% 24.8% 19.0% 12.6% 432. The FIU’s standard operating procedure followed by all analysts, details the report review and financial intelligence production process. A standardised STR case review form is used to ensure analysts conduct reviews systematically and consistently. STRs or cases that meet high-priority indicators are typically reviewed within five working days. Analysts assess the available information to determine the level of analysis needed to establish suspicion or address time-sensitive matters. In practice, RIs also informally notify the FIU of urgent STRs submitted in FINS, allowing analysts to take immediate action when necessary. Progress of STR handling is monitored and discussed via the Fintel Forum. Malaysia’s FIU conducts an annual stocktake of outstanding cases to improve efficiency of STR analysis before dissemination, which is complemented by an annual internal audit by the BNM. Increase of data requests from LEAs through FINS and enhanced prioritisation of STR analysis have contributed to the recent increase in the percentage of the STRs disseminated to LEAs and foreign FIUs (see Table 6.4 above). 433. From a sample review of the STR review forms and strategic analysis products, the Assessment Team observes that FIU analysts have made use of various databases available and other information sources to identify patterns and trends, as well as collaborate with LEAs to gather case studies that demonstrate a variety of crime typologies. 6.2.2. Dissemination of financial intelligence 434. Malaysia’s FIU primarily produces two types of intelligence products: (a) spontaneous disclosures—cases identified and developed based on the FIU’s review (as outlined above); and (b) reactive disclosures–disseminations as a response to requests from LEAs and foreign counterparts. Each disclosure, whether spontaneous or reactive, may contain multiple STRs and CTRs, including reports submitted by RIs from previous years which are related to the subjects of the case. 435. Malaysia’s FIU proactively conducts strategic analysis to address emerging risk areas, such as corruption, the legal profession, and telecommunication scams. This analysis is supported by both qualitative and quantitative data. It includes guidance on red flags and indicators, providing stakeholders with practical tools to detect and mitigate potential risks. 436. Strategic analysis reports and thematic disclosures are shared with RIs—including those in the banking, MSB, and insurance and takaful operator sectors—as well as with LEAs and supervisory bodies through FINS and other channels. These reports aim to improve understanding of emerging risks and support the development of red flag indicators. 437. As a member of the Egmont Group, Malaysia’s FIU also exchanges and disseminates information with counterpart FIUs (see IO.2 for additional information). 438. FIU disclosures are broadly in line with NRA 2023 (see Figure 6.1 below). Most disclosures (including spontaneous and reactive) pertain to fraud and corruption (approximately 40%), which are considered as high-risk crimes for ML. However, the disclosures related to some high-risk ML predicate offences [e.g., smuggling (4%) and organised crime (5%)] are relatively small. Approximately 18% of all disclosures relate to terrorism and TF. The relatively high percentage of terrorism/TF disclosures, compared to those for high-risk ML crimes, is due to the prioritisation given to terrorism/TF and PF cases, as well as the active use of financial intelligence in related surveillance and investigations. The FIU also explained that the number of disclosures related to tax offences (8%) is attributed to the secondment of IRBM officers. Figure 6.1. Breakdown of FIU dissemination by offence (2019-February 2025) Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 6.2.3. FIU financial intelligence supporting needs of competent authorities 439. As summarised in the below table, between 2019 and February 2025, the main agencies that received disclosures from the FIU are RMP (59%), MACC (16%) and IRBM (11%). In terms of requests for data, the IRBM systematically seeks data from FINS to carry out its functions related to enforcing tax laws in Malaysia, amounting to 56% of all FINS data requests. Other competent authorities have shown an increasing use of FIU data and other information sources to produce financial intelligence to support their needs. Table 6.5. FIU disseminations to domestic agencies (2019-February 2025) Domestic Agency Spontaneous Disclosures Reactive Disclosures Total Disclosures (% Agency) FINS Data Request (% Agency) Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) 129 121 250 (10.7%) 53 321 (56.4%) Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) 171 202 373 (16.0%) 23 761 (25.1%) Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) 616 760 1376 (59.1%) 14 577 (15.4%) Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) 57 56 113 (4.8%) 740 (0.8%) Ministry of Domestic Trade and Cost of Living (KPDN) 23 4 27 (1.2%) 1 487 (1.6%) Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) 11 8 19 (0.8%) 318 (0.3%) Securities Commission (SC) 43 4 47 (2.0%) 157 (0.2%) Labuan Financial Services Authority (LFSA) 11 3 14 (0.6%) 93 (0.1%) BNM Investigation 50 18 68 (2.9%) 51 (0.1%) Immigration Department of Malaysia (IDM) 10 11 21 (0.9%) 13 (0.0%) Others (PERHILITAN, MMEA, DOF, MTIB) 4 18 22 (0.9%) 36 (0.0%) Note: ‘FINS Data Request’ is the number of subjects. 440. Disclosures on terrorism/TF are primarily disseminated to or requested by the RMP’s Special Branch (which accounts for 80% of all total terrorism/TF disseminations), followed by foreign counterparts. The SB regularly seeks information from the FIU and makes multiple requests on the same subjects to get updated information, which are promptly responded to by the FIU. In 2023, the SB was given direct access to FINS and is systematically using the system to access STR information when gathering intelligence or during investigations. The below case study highlights the timely dissemination of intelligence on urgent terrorism cases. Box 6.3. Prompt analysis of terrorism suspects In the May 2024 terrorism attack on the Ulu Tiram police station, the FIU provided preliminary findings on all suspects shared by the SB on the same day the incident occurred. A detailed analysis containing additional information from checks done with PPP members was provided to the SB within four days after their request. The information was used to cross-check with their foreign counterparts to establish any links with terrorism/TF activities. 441. Malaysia’s FIU monitors the quality of its intelligence products by proactively seeking feedback from LEAs. The FIU gathers feedback on its disseminations through the channels such as: (i) providing a QR code linking to a feedback form in every dissemination report; (ii) biannual surveys; (iii) formal and informal engagement with LEAs; and (iv) follow-up correspondence between LEAs and analysts regarding cases. Overall, the FIU has received positive feedback on the quality and usefulness of the FIU’s disclosures, as per the feedback statistics provided by Malaysia. During the onsite, all competent authorities noted the utility in the FIUs disseminations to perform their functions, particularly in supporting ongoing investigations. 442. There are designated liaison officers within the FIU for all LEAs to foster close collaboration and relationship with LEAs. There are frequent bilateral meetings to discuss cases, create awareness about the FIU’s role and sharing of information to support LEAs’ intelligence and investigations. Such interactions provide an avenue for LEAs to share feedback (see IO.1 for a list of the secondments in place at the FIU). Footnotes [64] Malaysia reports that, following a completed manpower audit in 2024, 15 additional vacancies have been identified and are currently in the process of being filled." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="476. While authorities have the tools in place to identify and investigate ML activity, the outcomes of these investigations often result in a prosecution of the predicate offence and alternative measures as opposed to the prosecution of ML. Although there have been notable advances since 2015, including in the number of ML investigations, the overall results still reflect the findings of Malaysia’s 2015 MER, which highlighted persistent challenges in securing ML prosecutions and convictions. The 2015 report noted difficulties in building strong ML cases, including issues related to evidence collection, legal complexities, and the need for better coordination between relevant authorities. While progress has been made with legislative tools, enhanced technology and improved inter-agency coordination, sustained challenges bringing ML cases to prosecution underscore the importance of continued efforts to enhance investigative techniques, build on inter-agency collaboration best practices, and maximise the use of financial intelligence to improve outcomes. 477. The AGC, which is responsible for prosecutions in Malaysia, employs a total of 722 Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs) across the country. Several DPPs are specialised ML prosecutors, including eleven located centrally. Given the volume of cases and the complexity of investigations and prosecutions involving high-risk predicate offences, the AGC recently launched an initiative to reallocate ML prosecutions to the regional level. The AGC has also developed a strategy to focus on improving prosecutorial capacity with respect to ML. A key feature of this initiative is a comprehensive training program for regional DPPs. As this initiative was launched in 2024, it is too early to assess its results, but it is an encouraging development. 478. In addition to central and regional DPPs, some LEAs have embedded prosecutors. MACC, SC, and BNM rely on in-house prosecutors to provide prosecutorial support from the initiation of an investigation. During the on-site interviews, both the AGC and the LEAs where prosecutors are embedded reported enhanced coordination across all stages of the investigative process. While this initiative has improved coordination, including some ongoing progress on the prosecutorial front, there is limited evidence to indicate that it has significantly improved prosecutorial results overall. Moreover, in LEAs without embedded prosecutors, prosecution and conviction rates for fraud, organised crime, smuggling and drug trafficking remain low, indicating room for improvement. 479. Between 2019 and early 2025, Malaysian authorities have conducted 2 648 ML investigations (cases), leading to 234 prosecutions (cases)—a conversion rate of approximately 10%. Of these 234 prosecutions, 213 involved high-risk predicate offences. During the same period, Malaysia secured 52 convictions in ML cases (resulting in 62 natural persons and five legal persons convicted of ML). Most of these prosecutions related to drug trafficking, fraud and corruption, which corresponds to three of the five high risk predicate offences for ML. However, between 2019 and 2025, there were only two ML prosecutions each for smuggling and organised crimes. Moreover, few convictions correspond to Malaysia’s medium-high ML risks (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation and environmental crimes). These prosecutions are not in line with Malaysia’s risks. 480. Regarding convictions, most related to corruption. Notably, there were 24 ML convictions related to corruption, 18 related to fraud, three related to drug trafficking, and seven related to “other”. No ML convictions were reported on two of the high-risk predicate offences for ML, namely smuggling and organised crime. These conviction numbers are low in absolute terms, particularly when weighed against the assessed risk and prevalence of corruption and fraud during the period. For example, the 24 corruption-related ML convictions average to only four per year. Thus, Malaysia’s overall ML convictions do not align with its assessed high and medium-high risks for ML. Table 7.3. ML Prosecutions [72] and Convictions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Drug Trafficking* Prosecutions 23 9 30 10 1 5 3 81 Convictions 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 Corruption Prosecutions 9 9 13 10 19 2 3 65 Convictions 4 4 4 1 11 0 0 24 Fraud Prosecutions 15 7 10 16 7 6 2 63 Convictions 8 2 2 2 3 1 0 18 Organised Crime Prosecutions 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smuggling Prosecutions 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Prosecutions 5 2 6 4 3 1 0 21 Convictions 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 Total Prosecutions 52 29 59 41 30 15 8 234 Total Convictions 18 8 7 3 15 1 0 52 Note: Drug trafficking convictions pursuant to DDFOPA. 481. Compared to Malaysia’s 2015 MER, ML prosecutions have increased (132 cases reported from 2009-2013 vs. 234 reported from 2019-February 2025). However, ML convictions have remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 56 in Malaysia’s 2015 MER to 52 between 2019-2025. The prosecution-to-conviction conversion rate for this period is 22%, similar to the rate reported in the 2015 MER. Between 2019 and 2025, there were also nine acquittals, and 798 cases classified as “no further action.” While the significant effort and resources invested in the 1MDB case—and its resulting outcomes as outlined in Box 7.2 and Box 8.1—are duly acknowledged, the overall low level of ML prosecutions and convictions remains a concern. 482. Rather than relying on the AMLA when prosecuting ML related to drug trafficking, Malaysian authorities also use the DDFOPA. Noting that in the 2015 MER there were zero drug trafficking/ML investigations or prosecutions, Malaysia has made progress with 81 ML prosecutions under the DDFOPA. However, only three cases have resulted in ML convictions to date. [73] While the challenges faced during the assessment period—including COVID-19 measures and 1MDB prioritisation—are acknowledged, the low number of ML convictions related to drug offences, organised crime, and smuggling, as well as other medium- to high-level threats (e.g., human trafficking and environmental crimes), does not appear to align with Malaysia’s risk profile. 483. During the on-site, Malaysian authorities consistently expressed the overarching national strategy to deprive criminals of their proceeds of crime. Malaysian authorities indicate that ML investigations are commenced with the goal of criminal prosecution, as well as asset recovery. Civil asset recovery was frequently cited as a more expedient and effective tool than prosecution for deterring criminal activity. While Malaysian authorities acknowledged the relative efficiency of asset recovery (and compounds), they emphasised that prosecution and criminal conviction remain the default objectives. Nonetheless, the evidentiary threshold for civil recovery is lower than that required for ML prosecution. In discussions with the AGC, authorities described how they assess the balance of probability of success in any given prosecution, noting that if they do not feel as though there is a prospect of a ML conviction, they will seek NCBF rather than prosecution (see IO.8 for results related to NCBF). While the value of NCBF in depriving criminals of the proceeds of crime is recognised, there is concern about its potential over-reliance. ML prosecutions not only serve a punitive function but also play a critical role in reinforcing the seriousness of financial crimes, establishing criminal accountability, and upholding the rule of law. Securing ML convictions sends a clear deterrent message that the abuse of the financial system will be met with meaningful legal consequences. Furthermore, the FATF Methodology underscores that “ultimately, the prospect of detection, conviction and punishment dissuades potential criminals from carrying out proceeds-generating crimes and money laundering.” 484. During onsite discussions, the Assessment Team queried Malaysian authorities regarding the low number of ML convictions (i.e., nearly nine ML convictions per year). Beyond the articulated national strategy regarding asset recovery, authorities also noted the legislative timeframes imposed on investigations. The timeframe for charges to be laid and forfeiture proceedings following seizure of property is 12 months under the AMLA. If this timeframe is not met, the property must be released to its original owner. This contrasts with the DDFOPA, where there is no stipulated time frame for seizure or the commencement of forfeiture proceedings. However, the DDFOPA only targets proceeds and property derived from drug-related offences. As such, LEAs are under pressure to balance the risk of dissipation of property versus collection of evidence. While Malaysian authorities have developed strategies to manage these types of legislative hurdles, including expediting charges and early inter-agency coordination, which are reflected in prosecutorial successes (notably 1MDB), the Assessment Team is concerned that the pressures associated with the timeframes may affect aggregate outcomes. 485. Linking the predicate to ML was also cited as a challenge from several agencies, prosecutors, and the judiciary. Malaysia’s legislation states that a conviction for the predicate offence is not required to pursue an ML conviction. The judiciary has also affirmed that it is unnecessary to prove who committed the predicate offence or whether anyone had been charged or convicted. However, in practice, judges have ruled that the predicate offence must still be proven to a prima facie standard. This practice stems more from judicial prudence or conservative interpretation, rather than a legal requirement. LEAs frequently lack sufficient evidence to establish a clear link between the proceeds of crime and the predicate offence. This further complicates ML prosecutions. Nevertheless, Malaysia has had some cases in which ML has been the stand-alone charge, including one recent case (i.e., the Sabah Water Case). As outlined below in Box 7.3, this case includes the prosecution of an individual for the possession of proceeds of crime even though this individual had no link to the predicate offence. Box 7.3. Sabah Water In October 2016, an investigation was carried out on the Sabah State Water Department (SSWD) involving federal project funds worth more than EUR 0.71 million. This fund is for the construction of basic infrastructure related to the distribution of clean water supply for Sabah. There was suspicion of abuse of power and misappropriation of funds for the project, involving the former Director and Deputy Director of SSWD. From 2016 to 2017, the FIU received spontaneous disclosures from foreign counterparts, on one of the subjects in the case and his spouse. This information was further disclosed to MACC. Information from the foreign FIUs helped in the tracing and seizure of assets, as well as financial analysis on layering of funds from illicit proceeds by the subjects. In 2016, MACC arrested a former Deputy Director of SSWD and seized assets belonging to the Director of SSWD and two others. In December 2016, charges were laid in the Sessions Court for eight charges for possession of money amounting to EUR 12.28 million in cash and four bank accounts, one charge for possession of six luxury cars, one charge for possession of 86 pieces of luxury watches and one charge involving transaction of EUR 3 000. In December 2016, the wife of the former Director was charged in the Sessions Court with 18 charges for possession of money amounting to EUR 0.48 million in 18 bank accounts and one charge for possession of 93 handbags. This person was not involved in the predicate offence of corruption but was charged for ML due to the possession of proceeds of crime. In December 2017, the former Deputy Director was charged in the Sessions Court with a total of 146 charges comprising 42 charges for possession of 78 pieces of land valued at EUR 2.54 million, 42 charges for possession of money in cash amounting to EUR 1.71 million and 62 charges involving a bank account amounting to EUR 2.65 million. In February 2022, the former Deputy Director was acquitted of all 146 charges. However, MACC issued a EUR 6.47 million compound. The trial for the other accused is ongoing. In this case, the investigation was completed, and the suspects were prosecuted within 90 days of the operation’s launch. However, due to multiple applications filed by the defendants’ lawyers, as well as delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the volume of evidence, the trial has been prolonged. 486. Evidence collection, analysis and prosecutorial expertise were cited by the authorities as other possible reasons for not pursuing ML prosecutions, particularly with respect to drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime where pursuing administrative forfeiture is much easier (as the burden shifts to the property owner). The AGC will not proceed with prosecution if the predicate offence has not been sufficiently investigated or if there is no clear path to securing a conviction. This underscores the need for LEAs to strengthen the quality and comprehensiveness of the evidence presented in support of ML cases. While acknowledging the improvements in investigative tools and resources since the 2015 MER, the Assessment Team concludes that ongoing improvements of the evidentiary foundation of ML prosecutions is critical to achieving higher conviction rates. As highlighted earlier, LEAs must ensure that investigations focus on gathering evidence to establish all elements of the ML offence, including proving the illicit origin of funds, the intent to conceal, and the link between the predicate crime and ML activities. Strengthening these aspects will enhance the likelihood of successful prosecutions and reinforce Malaysia’s enforcement efforts against financial crime. 487. The AGC’s role is key to prosecutorial success. In discussions with the judiciary, they indicated that in their experience, the charges presented to the court are often insufficient to secure a conviction. This could be due to inexperience or the complexity of ML investigations and evidence. The judiciary also indicated its expectation that ML charges are directly linked to a predicate offence, despite acknowledgement that Malaysian law allows for stand-alone ML charges. It was not clear to the Assessment Team the reason behind this judicial prudence or conservative interpretation of the law. However, AGC has demonstrated a willingness to appeal decisions related to the ML offence which indicates a proactive approach is being taken. Although the AGC has experienced significant challenges with respect to volume, capacity and experience in securing convictions over the assessment period, the move to regionalise some prosecutors (to provide necessary experience) and to provide more training is a positive step. Nevertheless, authorities noted the need for and would welcome more training for prosecutors and the judiciary. 488. Although there have been successful prosecutions, LEAs should continue to enhance and upgrade financial tracing skills and focus on gathering evidence of all elements of ML using all necessary powers including controlled operations, physical and electronic surveillance, search warrants, and other investigative powers to better establish the links between predicate offences and ML. These specialised investigative resources should also be better prioritised to the highest ML threats. 7.2.1. Types of ML cases prosecuted and convicted 489. Of the 234 ML prosecutions achieved between 2019 and 2025, 94% related to self-laundering, and no prosecutions were reported for standalone ML (see table 7.4 below). Malaysia conducted only four ML investigations related to foreign predicate offences between 2019 and 2025, with zero prosecutions or convictions. This demonstrates a lack of focus and resource allocation towards identifying and addressing ML linked to foreign predicates. While Malaysia has assessed that it is generally not a destination point for illegal proceeds but is a transit point for illegal drugs and other contraband, the Assessment Team has a significant concern that the lack of emphasis on stand-alone ML, third-party ML, TBML and foreign predicate offences suggests a disconnect that undermines the country’s ability to effectively combat transnational financial crime considering its risk and context. Table 7.4. ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions by type of laundering Types of ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Feb Total Self-Laundering Investigation 343 309 371 348 352 281 63 2 067 Prosecuted 52 24 58 38 28 12 8 220 Convicted 18 7 7 3 15 1 0 51 Acquitted 4 4 3 4 1 0 0 16 On-going Prosecutions 25 10 40 21 12 11 8 127 Third Party ML Investigation 75 7 77 101 135 122 41 558 Prosecuted 0 5 1 3 2 3 0 14 Convicted 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Acquitted 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 6 Standalone ML Investigation 2 0 6 3 1 6 1 19 Prosecuted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convicted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Acquitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign Predicate ML Investigation 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 Prosecuted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convicted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Acquitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 490. Moreover, the above figures do not align with the scale of investigations occurring per type of ML activity. For example, in over 500 investigations of third-party ML, there have only been 14 prosecutions and one conviction since 2019. This discrepancy suggests challenges in gathering sufficient evidence and that prosecutorial strategies require further improvement towards securing successful ML convictions. 491. Some LEAs have sought assistance from their foreign counterparts for ML investigations involving foreign predicates. For example, the RMP, MACC and RMCD have conducted joint operations and information exchanges with their foreign counterparts which resulted in positive outcomes. However, as noted under IO.2, Malaysia makes minimal use of outgoing MLA requests, which may further limit its ability to pursue ML cases linked to foreign offences or gather evidence outside of Malaysia. 492. Moreover, since 2019, Malaysia reports that only seven legal persons have been prosecuted for ML with five convictions, all taking place in 2019. This does not align with Malaysia’s risk profile, which includes exposure to corporate structures being misused for financial crime, particularly in areas such as fraud and corruption. While some cases involving legal persons were provided to the Assessment Team, the low prosecution and conviction rate for legal persons raises concerns about enforcement gaps and whether authorities are effectively holding corporations accountable for their role in ML schemes. Footnotes [72] As of September 2025, Malaysia report that there are 133 cases at the prosecution stage. [73] Malaysia notes that there are 67 cases still pending in court." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="476. While authorities have the tools in place to identify and investigate ML activity, the outcomes of these investigations often result in a prosecution of the predicate offence and alternative measures as opposed to the prosecution of ML. Although there have been notable advances since 2015, including in the number of ML investigations, the overall results still reflect the findings of Malaysia’s 2015 MER, which highlighted persistent challenges in securing ML prosecutions and convictions. The 2015 report noted difficulties in building strong ML cases, including issues related to evidence collection, legal complexities, and the need for better coordination between relevant authorities. While progress has been made with legislative tools, enhanced technology and improved inter-agency coordination, sustained challenges bringing ML cases to prosecution underscore the importance of continued efforts to enhance investigative techniques, build on inter-agency collaboration best practices, and maximise the use of financial intelligence to improve outcomes. 477. The AGC, which is responsible for prosecutions in Malaysia, employs a total of 722 Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs) across the country. Several DPPs are specialised ML prosecutors, including eleven located centrally. Given the volume of cases and the complexity of investigations and prosecutions involving high-risk predicate offences, the AGC recently launched an initiative to reallocate ML prosecutions to the regional level. The AGC has also developed a strategy to focus on improving prosecutorial capacity with respect to ML. A key feature of this initiative is a comprehensive training program for regional DPPs. As this initiative was launched in 2024, it is too early to assess its results, but it is an encouraging development. 478. In addition to central and regional DPPs, some LEAs have embedded prosecutors. MACC, SC, and BNM rely on in-house prosecutors to provide prosecutorial support from the initiation of an investigation. During the on-site interviews, both the AGC and the LEAs where prosecutors are embedded reported enhanced coordination across all stages of the investigative process. While this initiative has improved coordination, including some ongoing progress on the prosecutorial front, there is limited evidence to indicate that it has significantly improved prosecutorial results overall. Moreover, in LEAs without embedded prosecutors, prosecution and conviction rates for fraud, organised crime, smuggling and drug trafficking remain low, indicating room for improvement. 479. Between 2019 and early 2025, Malaysian authorities have conducted 2 648 ML investigations (cases), leading to 234 prosecutions (cases)—a conversion rate of approximately 10%. Of these 234 prosecutions, 213 involved high-risk predicate offences. During the same period, Malaysia secured 52 convictions in ML cases (resulting in 62 natural persons and five legal persons convicted of ML). Most of these prosecutions related to drug trafficking, fraud and corruption, which corresponds to three of the five high risk predicate offences for ML. However, between 2019 and 2025, there were only two ML prosecutions each for smuggling and organised crimes. Moreover, few convictions correspond to Malaysia’s medium-high ML risks (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation and environmental crimes). These prosecutions are not in line with Malaysia’s risks. 480. Regarding convictions, most related to corruption. Notably, there were 24 ML convictions related to corruption, 18 related to fraud, three related to drug trafficking, and seven related to “other”. No ML convictions were reported on two of the high-risk predicate offences for ML, namely smuggling and organised crime. These conviction numbers are low in absolute terms, particularly when weighed against the assessed risk and prevalence of corruption and fraud during the period. For example, the 24 corruption-related ML convictions average to only four per year. Thus, Malaysia’s overall ML convictions do not align with its assessed high and medium-high risks for ML. Table 7.3. ML Prosecutions [72] and Convictions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Drug Trafficking* Prosecutions 23 9 30 10 1 5 3 81 Convictions 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 Corruption Prosecutions 9 9 13 10 19 2 3 65 Convictions 4 4 4 1 11 0 0 24 Fraud Prosecutions 15 7 10 16 7 6 2 63 Convictions 8 2 2 2 3 1 0 18 Organised Crime Prosecutions 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smuggling Prosecutions 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Convictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other Prosecutions 5 2 6 4 3 1 0 21 Convictions 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 Total Prosecutions 52 29 59 41 30 15 8 234 Total Convictions 18 8 7 3 15 1 0 52 Note: Drug trafficking convictions pursuant to DDFOPA. 481. Compared to Malaysia’s 2015 MER, ML prosecutions have increased (132 cases reported from 2009-2013 vs. 234 reported from 2019-February 2025). However, ML convictions have remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 56 in Malaysia’s 2015 MER to 52 between 2019-2025. The prosecution-to-conviction conversion rate for this period is 22%, similar to the rate reported in the 2015 MER. Between 2019 and 2025, there were also nine acquittals, and 798 cases classified as “no further action.” While the significant effort and resources invested in the 1MDB case—and its resulting outcomes as outlined in Box 7.2 and Box 8.1—are duly acknowledged, the overall low level of ML prosecutions and convictions remains a concern. 482. Rather than relying on the AMLA when prosecuting ML related to drug trafficking, Malaysian authorities also use the DDFOPA. Noting that in the 2015 MER there were zero drug trafficking/ML investigations or prosecutions, Malaysia has made progress with 81 ML prosecutions under the DDFOPA. However, only three cases have resulted in ML convictions to date. [73] While the challenges faced during the assessment period—including COVID-19 measures and 1MDB prioritisation—are acknowledged, the low number of ML convictions related to drug offences, organised crime, and smuggling, as well as other medium- to high-level threats (e.g., human trafficking and environmental crimes), does not appear to align with Malaysia’s risk profile. 483. During the on-site, Malaysian authorities consistently expressed the overarching national strategy to deprive criminals of their proceeds of crime. Malaysian authorities indicate that ML investigations are commenced with the goal of criminal prosecution, as well as asset recovery. Civil asset recovery was frequently cited as a more expedient and effective tool than prosecution for deterring criminal activity. While Malaysian authorities acknowledged the relative efficiency of asset recovery (and compounds), they emphasised that prosecution and criminal conviction remain the default objectives. Nonetheless, the evidentiary threshold for civil recovery is lower than that required for ML prosecution. In discussions with the AGC, authorities described how they assess the balance of probability of success in any given prosecution, noting that if they do not feel as though there is a prospect of a ML conviction, they will seek NCBF rather than prosecution (see IO.8 for results related to NCBF). While the value of NCBF in depriving criminals of the proceeds of crime is recognised, there is concern about its potential over-reliance. ML prosecutions not only serve a punitive function but also play a critical role in reinforcing the seriousness of financial crimes, establishing criminal accountability, and upholding the rule of law. Securing ML convictions sends a clear deterrent message that the abuse of the financial system will be met with meaningful legal consequences. Furthermore, the FATF Methodology underscores that “ultimately, the prospect of detection, conviction and punishment dissuades potential criminals from carrying out proceeds-generating crimes and money laundering.” 484. During onsite discussions, the Assessment Team queried Malaysian authorities regarding the low number of ML convictions (i.e., nearly nine ML convictions per year). Beyond the articulated national strategy regarding asset recovery, authorities also noted the legislative timeframes imposed on investigations. The timeframe for charges to be laid and forfeiture proceedings following seizure of property is 12 months under the AMLA. If this timeframe is not met, the property must be released to its original owner. This contrasts with the DDFOPA, where there is no stipulated time frame for seizure or the commencement of forfeiture proceedings. However, the DDFOPA only targets proceeds and property derived from drug-related offences. As such, LEAs are under pressure to balance the risk of dissipation of property versus collection of evidence. While Malaysian authorities have developed strategies to manage these types of legislative hurdles, including expediting charges and early inter-agency coordination, which are reflected in prosecutorial successes (notably 1MDB), the Assessment Team is concerned that the pressures associated with the timeframes may affect aggregate outcomes. 485. Linking the predicate to ML was also cited as a challenge from several agencies, prosecutors, and the judiciary. Malaysia’s legislation states that a conviction for the predicate offence is not required to pursue an ML conviction. The judiciary has also affirmed that it is unnecessary to prove who committed the predicate offence or whether anyone had been charged or convicted. However, in practice, judges have ruled that the predicate offence must still be proven to a prima facie standard. This practice stems more from judicial prudence or conservative interpretation, rather than a legal requirement. LEAs frequently lack sufficient evidence to establish a clear link between the proceeds of crime and the predicate offence. This further complicates ML prosecutions. Nevertheless, Malaysia has had some cases in which ML has been the stand-alone charge, including one recent case (i.e., the Sabah Water Case). As outlined below in Box 7.3, this case includes the prosecution of an individual for the possession of proceeds of crime even though this individual had no link to the predicate offence. Box 7.3. Sabah Water In October 2016, an investigation was carried out on the Sabah State Water Department (SSWD) involving federal project funds worth more than EUR 0.71 million. This fund is for the construction of basic infrastructure related to the distribution of clean water supply for Sabah. There was suspicion of abuse of power and misappropriation of funds for the project, involving the former Director and Deputy Director of SSWD. From 2016 to 2017, the FIU received spontaneous disclosures from foreign counterparts, on one of the subjects in the case and his spouse. This information was further disclosed to MACC. Information from the foreign FIUs helped in the tracing and seizure of assets, as well as financial analysis on layering of funds from illicit proceeds by the subjects. In 2016, MACC arrested a former Deputy Director of SSWD and seized assets belonging to the Director of SSWD and two others. In December 2016, charges were laid in the Sessions Court for eight charges for possession of money amounting to EUR 12.28 million in cash and four bank accounts, one charge for possession of six luxury cars, one charge for possession of 86 pieces of luxury watches and one charge involving transaction of EUR 3 000. In December 2016, the wife of the former Director was charged in the Sessions Court with 18 charges for possession of money amounting to EUR 0.48 million in 18 bank accounts and one charge for possession of 93 handbags. This person was not involved in the predicate offence of corruption but was charged for ML due to the possession of proceeds of crime. In December 2017, the former Deputy Director was charged in the Sessions Court with a total of 146 charges comprising 42 charges for possession of 78 pieces of land valued at EUR 2.54 million, 42 charges for possession of money in cash amounting to EUR 1.71 million and 62 charges involving a bank account amounting to EUR 2.65 million. In February 2022, the former Deputy Director was acquitted of all 146 charges. However, MACC issued a EUR 6.47 million compound. The trial for the other accused is ongoing. In this case, the investigation was completed, and the suspects were prosecuted within 90 days of the operation’s launch. However, due to multiple applications filed by the defendants’ lawyers, as well as delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the volume of evidence, the trial has been prolonged. 486. Evidence collection, analysis and prosecutorial expertise were cited by the authorities as other possible reasons for not pursuing ML prosecutions, particularly with respect to drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime where pursuing administrative forfeiture is much easier (as the burden shifts to the property owner). The AGC will not proceed with prosecution if the predicate offence has not been sufficiently investigated or if there is no clear path to securing a conviction. This underscores the need for LEAs to strengthen the quality and comprehensiveness of the evidence presented in support of ML cases. While acknowledging the improvements in investigative tools and resources since the 2015 MER, the Assessment Team concludes that ongoing improvements of the evidentiary foundation of ML prosecutions is critical to achieving higher conviction rates. As highlighted earlier, LEAs must ensure that investigations focus on gathering evidence to establish all elements of the ML offence, including proving the illicit origin of funds, the intent to conceal, and the link between the predicate crime and ML activities. Strengthening these aspects will enhance the likelihood of successful prosecutions and reinforce Malaysia’s enforcement efforts against financial crime. 487. The AGC’s role is key to prosecutorial success. In discussions with the judiciary, they indicated that in their experience, the charges presented to the court are often insufficient to secure a conviction. This could be due to inexperience or the complexity of ML investigations and evidence. The judiciary also indicated its expectation that ML charges are directly linked to a predicate offence, despite acknowledgement that Malaysian law allows for stand-alone ML charges. It was not clear to the Assessment Team the reason behind this judicial prudence or conservative interpretation of the law. However, AGC has demonstrated a willingness to appeal decisions related to the ML offence which indicates a proactive approach is being taken. Although the AGC has experienced significant challenges with respect to volume, capacity and experience in securing convictions over the assessment period, the move to regionalise some prosecutors (to provide necessary experience) and to provide more training is a positive step. Nevertheless, authorities noted the need for and would welcome more training for prosecutors and the judiciary. 488. Although there have been successful prosecutions, LEAs should continue to enhance and upgrade financial tracing skills and focus on gathering evidence of all elements of ML using all necessary powers including controlled operations, physical and electronic surveillance, search warrants, and other investigative powers to better establish the links between predicate offences and ML. These specialised investigative resources should also be better prioritised to the highest ML threats. 7.2.1. Types of ML cases prosecuted and convicted 489. Of the 234 ML prosecutions achieved between 2019 and 2025, 94% related to self-laundering, and no prosecutions were reported for standalone ML (see table 7.4 below). Malaysia conducted only four ML investigations related to foreign predicate offences between 2019 and 2025, with zero prosecutions or convictions. This demonstrates a lack of focus and resource allocation towards identifying and addressing ML linked to foreign predicates. While Malaysia has assessed that it is generally not a destination point for illegal proceeds but is a transit point for illegal drugs and other contraband, the Assessment Team has a significant concern that the lack of emphasis on stand-alone ML, third-party ML, TBML and foreign predicate offences suggests a disconnect that undermines the country’s ability to effectively combat transnational financial crime considering its risk and context. Table 7.4. ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions by type of laundering Types of ML 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Feb Total Self-Laundering Investigation 343 309 371 348 352 281 63 2 067 Prosecuted 52 24 58 38 28 12 8 220 Convicted 18 7 7 3 15 1 0 51 Acquitted 4 4 3 4 1 0 0 16 On-going Prosecutions 25 10 40 21 12 11 8 127 Third Party ML Investigation 75 7 77 101 135 122 41 558 Prosecuted 0 5 1 3 2 3 0 14 Convicted 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Acquitted 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 6 Standalone ML Investigation 2 0 6 3 1 6 1 19 Prosecuted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convicted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Acquitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign Predicate ML Investigation 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 Prosecuted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Convicted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Acquitted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 On-going Prosecutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 490. Moreover, the above figures do not align with the scale of investigations occurring per type of ML activity. For example, in over 500 investigations of third-party ML, there have only been 14 prosecutions and one conviction since 2019. This discrepancy suggests challenges in gathering sufficient evidence and that prosecutorial strategies require further improvement towards securing successful ML convictions. 491. Some LEAs have sought assistance from their foreign counterparts for ML investigations involving foreign predicates. For example, the RMP, MACC and RMCD have conducted joint operations and information exchanges with their foreign counterparts which resulted in positive outcomes. However, as noted under IO.2, Malaysia makes minimal use of outgoing MLA requests, which may further limit its ability to pursue ML cases linked to foreign offences or gather evidence outside of Malaysia. 492. Moreover, since 2019, Malaysia reports that only seven legal persons have been prosecuted for ML with five convictions, all taking place in 2019. This does not align with Malaysia’s risk profile, which includes exposure to corporate structures being misused for financial crime, particularly in areas such as fraud and corruption. While some cases involving legal persons were provided to the Assessment Team, the low prosecution and conviction rate for legal persons raises concerns about enforcement gaps and whether authorities are effectively holding corporations accountable for their role in ML schemes. Footnotes [72] As of September 2025, Malaysia report that there are 133 cases at the prosecution stage. [73] Malaysia notes that there are 67 cases still pending in court." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 514. Asset freezing, seizure and forfeiture are carried out under various legal provisions. AMLA allows authorities to quickly trace, freeze (for 90 days), seize (for 12 months or beyond if prosecution has been brought), and forfeit assets linked to a wide range of criminal activities, including ML and TF. Regarding forfeiture, s.55 governs CBF, and s.56 governs NCBF. An investigation officer from an enforcement agency can issue a freezing or seizure order on movable property without court approval or a directive from the DPP. In contrast, the seizure of bank accounts or immovable property requires DPP involvement, enabling swift asset preservation. 515. In addition, Malaysia exclusively uses the DDFOPA for asset recovery related to drug offences. The DDFOPA also provides for both NCBF and CBF mechanisms. Other legislation with provisions for asset seizure and forfeiture include the MACC Act 2009 and the Customs Act 1967, which contain both provisional measures and forfeiture powers to support asset recovery. 516. Overall, Malaysia recovered a substantial amount—approximately EUR 8 billion—between 2019 and February 2025. The below table compares Malaysia’s seizure and asset recovery outcomes under all applicable legal procedures between the previous assessment period (2009-2013) and the current period (2019-2025). As indicated below, most of Malaysia’s asset recovery results during the current assessment period relate to 1MDB (approximately 75% of all recovery efforts), including tax recovery related to this case. 517. For asset recovery efforts excluding 1MDB, Malaysia makes regular use of tax remedies (88% of all asset recovery), as compared to NCBF or CBF mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency for using NCBF over CBF, primarily to overcome the prosecutorial challenges identified in IO.7 (i.e., 88% of all forfeitures are NCBF). Table 8.1. Overall IO.8 results compared to MER 2015 MER 2015 (2009-2013) 2019-2025 (February) % of Recovery Total 1. Total Value Seized EUR 163.92 M EUR 724.53 M 2. Total Forfeiture (with 1MDB) EUR 61.64 M EUR 660.08 M 2.1. Total NCBF (AMLA, DDFOPA and others) (data unavailable) EUR 172.52 M 2.2. Total CBF (MACCA, Customs Act, etc.) (data unavailable) EUR 23.82 M 2.3. Total Forfeiture for 1MDB (data unavailable) EUR 463.74 M 3. Total Recovery* EUR 8.09 B 3.1. Total Forfeited Assets Recovered (AMLA and other laws) (data unavailable) EUR 207.42 M 2.6% 3.2. IRBM: Tax Recovery (Tax offences including civil)** EUR 409.48 M EUR 1.78 B 22.2% 3.3. RMCD: Smuggling Predicate (Realised Commodities) EUR 148.99 M EUR 22.34 M 3.4. 1MDB asset recovery n/a EUR 5.72 B [75] 75.1% 3.5. 1MDB assets recovery via IRBM's Tax Recovery (Tax offences including civil) n/a EUR 362.72 M 4. Restitution (AMLA, CPC and SC’s disgorgement measures under CMSA) EUR 2.16 M EUR 18.59 M 0.2% Asset Recovery Results (without 1MDB) (Item 3.1-3.3 and 4 only) EUR 560.63 M EUR 2.03 B Grand Total of Asset Recovery Results (with 1MDB) (Item 3 and 4) n/a EUR 8.11 B Note: The total amounts seized excludes 1MDB figures as it occurred prior to 2019. Items 3.2 and 3.4 captures the value of recovery of 1MDB related cases. *Note: Total amount recovered is the value recovered from the execution of the forfeiture orders to which monetary funds, ownership or titles have been transferred to the Government. **Note: Tax recovery figures exclude fines/penalties. 518. While no official estimate of the total proceeds of crime in Malaysia is available, the UNODC estimates that globally, 2–5% of GDP is laundered annually (equivalent to about USD 2.1 trillion globally at 2% in 2023). Based on Malaysia’s nominal GDP of EUR 380.6 billion in 2023, 2% equates to roughly EUR 7.61 billion. From 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia recovered EUR 2.03 billion (about EUR 0.34 billion per year on average) excluding 1MDB-related efforts. This represents around 4.5% of the estimated 2% GDP laundering proxy per year. Including 1MDB, total recoveries of EUR 8.11 billion average about EUR 1.35 billion annually, or 17.7% of the proxy figure. 8.2.1. Tax Recovery 519. While these above overall results are positive, the Assessment Team is concerned about the reliance on tax recovery in contributing to the total amount recovered. 520. Any income, whether legally or criminally generated, is taxable in Malaysia. As noted above, the IRBM is empowered to use its tax assessment procedures and civil recovery mechanisms to recover proceeds linked to other criminal activities (beyond tax offences). This includes cases where illicit income has not been declared or where false information has been provided to conceal the origin of criminal proceeds. The IRBM assesses tax liabilities on illicit income discovered during criminal investigations (and proceeds seized by other LEAs during their criminal investigations). Where evidence suggests a link to criminal activity, the IRBM—acting under sections 112, 113, and 114 of the Income Tax Act—can assess tax liabilities on illicit income, impose tax assessments on undeclared earnings, investigate wilful evasion, and pursue civil action to recover unpaid taxes, including those related to criminal conduct. This approach allows the IRBM to contribute to asset recovery in parallel to criminal forfeiture, as well as in situations where criminal prosecution may be challenging due to evidentiary limitations or other procedural constraints (see IO.7). 521. Malaysia’s emphasis on tax recovery as an asset recovery tool raises concerns, particularly in light of its limited reliance on NCBF mechanisms. Both tax recovery and NCBF can be pursued without securing a criminal conviction and operate under similarly flexible evidentiary standards. While authorities indicated that there is a provision to use tax recovery for restitution, the use of this mechanism is at the discretion of the government and authorities did not provide examples of its implementation. Further, tax recovery does not allow for the seizure of instrumentalities of crime, or the full recovery of illicit gains—often capturing only a fraction of the proceeds, typically in the form of unpaid taxes. This imbalance suggests that Malaysia may not be fully leveraging the breadth of legal tools available. 522. The below case study (Box 8.2) illustrates the sequencing and application of Malaysia’s tax recovery mechanism. Box 8.2. Tax recovery example (Ops Pharma) In December 2023, a joint operation involving multiple LEAs was launched under the Trademarks Act and AMLA. The operation targeted a criminal syndicate involved in the distribution of suspected counterfeited and unregistered cough medicines. The joint operation was led by KPDN, coordinated by the NFCC and supported by the IRBM. As a result of the joint investigation, 56 bank accounts totalling EUR 2.25 million were frozen. Further investigation led to the seizure of 18 bank accounts amounting to EUR 1.70 million. In addition, two properties valued at EUR 560 300, along with movable assets located within the premises, were also seized. In December 2024, the owner and director of the company were charged under Section 4(1)(b) of the AMLA for receiving proceeds of unlawful activity. This charge related to three of the 18 seized bank accounts. The suspect was also charged under Section 4(1)(a) of the AMLA for directly engaging in transactions involving instrumentalities of an offence, specifically the two seized properties. The case is currently under trial. During the criminal investigation, the IRBM identified that illicit income generated from the counterfeit medicine operations had not been declared. Consequently, tax recovery proceedings were initiated, resulting in the recovery of EUR 1.08 million from the seized funds. This case illustrates the sequencing and combining powers under the AMLA and the Income Tax Act, enabling substantial recovery of proceeds as the remaining seized assets may still be subject to confiscation through CBF proceedings. 523. Tax recoveries are being achieved to a high extent, with a total of EUR 2.14 billion recovered between 2019 and 2024, including 1MDB tax recovery (or EUR 1.78 billion excluding 1MDB). Malaysia advises that all tax recoveries relate to tax or smuggling criminality, as opposed to administrative oversights or general tax debts. [76] The table below provides an annual breakdown of the reported figures. On average, the tax cases pursued by the IRBM involved amounts of approximately EUR 1.60 million per case (excluding penalties [77] ), indicating that the underlying offences were of a significant scale. These tax recovery efforts target both natural and legal persons, with approximately 62% of total recoveries applying to legal persons. Table 8.2. IRBM Tax Recovery by Year (EUR) (excluding 1MDB) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total IRBM 367.05 M 384.01 M 289.42 M 345.08 M 150.94 M 243.23 M 1.78 B # of cases 205 184 183 203 199 137 1 111 524. The below case study demonstrates tax recovery efforts related to the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Box 8.3. Additional tax recovery case study Ops Renjat, conducted in October 2022 and coordinated by NFCC with the Energy Commission, RMP, and IRBM, targeted illegal VA mining operations bypassing electricity meters in five unoccupied premises in Kajang, Selangor. The raids uncovered 349 mining machines operating on illicit electrical connections, resulting in estimated utility losses of EUR 280 150 and assets valued at over EUR 431 000. Enforcement teams seized mining rigs, including power supplies, wiring, fans, hard drives, and meter-tampering equipment, which were inventoried for evidence and disposal. Investigations remain ongoing, while tax recovery actions under sections 112 and 113 of the Income Tax Act have led to the collection of EUR 134 343 from illicit profits linked to the illegal VA mining activities. 525. In addition to the IRBM, the RMCD is empowered by the Customs Act 1967 and Excise Act 1976 to recover customs duties or tax owed on uncustomed or prohibited goods (i.e., goods imported or exported without approval or without payment of customs duty) through criminal investigations. During the current assessment period, the RMCD recovered EUR 22.34 million, primarily from the sale of auctioned vehicles whose owners had failed to obtain the required permits. This is a significant decrease from the EUR 148.99 million recovered in the previous MER, which Malaysia attributes to the movement restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. 8.2.2. Conviction and Non-Conviction-Based Forfeiture 526. While the FATF Methodology does not prescribe a preference for one form of asset recovery—civil or criminal—over another, compared to tax recovery, Malaysia uses NCBF and CBF to a lesser extent. Of the total forfeitures obtained during the assessment period, the majority are derived from NCBF cases. Based on discussions onsite, it was highlighted that NCBF not only serves as a method to deprive criminals of illicit proceeds when a conviction is not achievable but is also viewed as a strong mechanism to return lost revenue to the Malaysian government. Given the limited number of ML convictions, the Assessment Team has concerns about the overreliance on civil asset recovery mechanisms in place of robust evidence collection and prosecutions leading to ML convictions; however, this issue is assessed as a deficiency under IO.7. 527. Since 2019, Malaysia has recovered approximately EUR 150.46 million in relation to NCBF pursuant to the AMLA, across 545 cases. To prevent distortion of aggregate recovery figures, this amount excludes 1MDB data. CBF pursuant to the AMLA is pursued significantly less than NCBF. Since 2019, Malaysia has forfeited approximately EUR 8.79 million in CBF pursuant to the AMLA, of which EUR 34.57 million was recovered to the Government of Malaysia during the same assessment period. [78] Corruption and fraud were the most common predicate offences underlying both CBF and NCBF cases, which corresponds to Malaysia’s risk profile to some extent. 528. As noted in the TC Annex, Malaysia can confiscate direct instrumentalities of crime (for both CBF and NCBF), as well as property of equivalent value when the original assets cannot be located, have been transferred, or are otherwise unavailable. Malaysia provided case studies demonstrating the effective use of these powers. 529. The below table summarises all seizure, forfeiture and recovery figures pursuant to AMLA between 2019 and February 2025. Table 8.3. Forfeiture Results Pursuant to the AMLA (EUR in millions) AMLA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Overall Value Frozen (up to 90 days) 118.03 372.23 174.13 160.22 170.67 90.03 8.74 1 094.05 Overall Value Seized 102.80 76.79 115.65 86.98 73.79 26.98 2.83 485.82 NCBF Total Amount Forfeited (NCBF) 18.31 105.35 4.84 18.30 2.63 1.03 0 150.46 Fraud 13.20 4.99 1.56 8.09 0.15 0.05 0 28.05 Corruption 4.76 99.78 2.29 5.48 1.19 0.60 0 114.10 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Organised Crime 0.22 0.34 0.56 4.47 1.23 0.04 0 6.85 Smuggling** 0 0 0.08 0.26 0.01 0 0 0.34 Other 0.14 0.24 0.35 0 0.04 0.34 0 1.12 Total Amount Recovered (NCBF) 17.58 105.31 3.27 13.18 5.66 0.19 0.20 145.39 CBF Total Amount Forfeited (CBF) 0.12 0.32 0.64 2.91 4.75 0.04 0 8.78 Fraud 0 0 0.07 0 2.31 0 0 2.38 Corruption 0.02 0.32 0.55 2.91 0.14 0.04 0 3.97 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Organised Crime - - - - - - - - Smuggling** - - - - - - - - Other 0.11 0 0.02 0 2.31 0 0 2.44 Total Amount Recovered (CBF) 11.93 3.60 0.10 11.68 0.23 7.02 0.06 34.62 Grand Total Recovered (NCBF and CBF) 29.51 108.91 3.37 24.87 5.89 7.21 0.27 180.02 *Note: Confiscation measures for drug offences is pursued pursuant to the DDFOPA (see below table for results). **Note: Confiscation measures for smuggling is pursued pursuant to the Customs Act as predicate offences. Note: The number of forfeiture orders does not directly correspond to the amounts restrained or recovered as a forfeiture order is not necessarily realised in the same year it is made. Note: The spike in 2022 was due to the execution of forfeiture orders (102) obtained prior to COVID-19. Note: Total amount recovered is the value recovered from the execution of the forfeiture orders to which monetary funds, ownership or titles have been transferred to the Government. 530. The overall recovered amount (EUR 180 million) is positive for all AMLA forfeitures (approximately EUR 159 million). While it is difficult to determine whether all forfeiture orders are fully enforced—since restrained or recovered amounts are not always realised in the same year—this does not appear to be a significant issue. Nevertheless, there is a gap between the value seized (EUR 486 million) and the final amount recovered (EUR 180 million), which suggests potential challenges pertaining to evidence collection, case processing, and meeting legislated time limits for investigating seized assets. 531. Instead of using the AMLA to seize and confiscate for drug-related offences, Malaysia exclusively uses the DDFOPA (for both NCBF and CBF). Similarly, Malaysia uses other laws beyond the AMLA to seize, forfeit and recover assets related to other crimes. The below table summarises Malaysia’s seizure, forfeiture and recovery results related to the DDFOPA (and all other laws beyond the AMLA) since 2019. Table 8.4. Forfeiture Results Pursuant to Other Laws (EUR in millions) Other Laws, including DDFOPA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Overall Value Seized 21.82 108.23 36.17 26.94 22.42 12.40 10.67 238.65 NCBF Total Amount Forfeited (NCBF) 2.87 3.23 4.69 6.18 3.18 1.07 0.82 22.05 Corruption - - - - - - 0.18 0.18 Drugs Trafficking* 2.87 3.23 4.68 6.17 3.18 1.07 0.64 21.85 Others - - 0.01 0.01 - - - 0.02 Total Amount Recovered (NCBF) 2.87 3.23 4.68 6.18 3.18 1.07 0.64 21.86 CBF Total Amount Forfeited (CBF) 0.09 3.10 4.10 3.59 4.06 0.08 0.01 15.04 Corruption 0.00 1.78 2.14 2.53 3.98 0.00 0.01 10.44 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Others* 0.09 1.32 1.96 1.06 0.08 0.08 0.00 4.60 Total Amount Recovered (CBF) 0.11 1.36 2.03 1.45 0.46 0.12 0.00 5.53 Grand Total Forfeited (NCBF and CBF) 2.96 6.33 8.79 9.77 7.24 1.15 0.83 37.09 Grand Total Recovered (NCBF and CBF) 2.98 4.59 6.71 7.64 3.64 1.19 0.64 27.39 *Note: “Other” in CBF relates to illegal remittance and piracy of products. 532. As indicated in the above table, the total value of assets seized pursuant to all laws other than the AMLA is significantly higher (EUR 238.65 million) than the amounts forfeited (EUR 37.09 million) and recovered (EUR 27.39 million). This suggests that while the authorities are effective at identifying and seizing suspect assets, a smaller portion of these assets successfully progresses to formal forfeiture and recovery. The relatively lower figures for forfeiture and recovery compared to seizures may indicate challenges in legal processes, such as proving ownership or criminal linkage, or procedural delays that impact final asset disposition. According to statistics provided by Malaysia, most assets seized in connection with drug offences—including buildings, bank accounts, jewellery, and vehicles—are not ultimately forfeited. Only about 16% of these seized assets are successfully forfeited, raising concerns about the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts, particularly given that drug trafficking is assessed as a high-risk predicate in Malaysia. [79] 533. Moreover, for all legal frameworks outside of the AMLA, Malaysia continues to place a greater emphasis on NCBF, with recoveries totalling EUR 21.86 million, compared to just EUR 5.53 million through CBF. This disparity is particularly noteworthy given that no CBF outcomes were recorded for drug-related offences between 2019 and 2025. The absence of CBF in such cases—despite the known scale and proceeds of drug trafficking—raises concerns about the underutilisation of criminal asset recovery mechanisms for high-risk predicate offences. 534. The below table summarises total figures (AMLA and all other laws) for seizure, forfeiture and recovery, excluding 1MDB recovery. As indicated below, Malaysia’s overall figures have declined since 2020, which Malaysia attributes to COVID-19. Asset seizure, forfeiture, and recovery peaked in 2020 but have steadily declined through 2024. The significant gap between seized amounts and actual recoveries or forfeitures highlights ongoing challenges in converting enforcement actions into final asset recovery outcomes. Table 8.5. Results pursuant to the AMLA and Other Laws (EUR in million) All Seizure, Forfeiture and Recovery (all laws) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Seizure 124.62 185.02 151.82 113.93 96.21 39.38 13.5 724.48 Forfeiture (NCBF/CBF) 21.40 112.00 14.27 30.98 14.63 2.22 0.83 196.33 Recovery 32.49 113.50 10.09 32.50 9.53 8.40 0.90 207.41 535. Regarding overall results in line with Malaysia’s five high-risk predicate offences (fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling, organised crime), the highest value of asset forfeiture has been achieved in corruption cases (EUR 128.69 million) [80] , followed by fraud (EUR 30.43 million), drug trafficking (EUR 21.85 million), organised crime (EUR 6.85 million) and smuggling (EUR 0.34 million). While these figures demonstrate that Malaysia has made measurable progress in pursuing asset forfeiture since 2015, the relatively low forfeiture values for drug trafficking, organised crime, and smuggling are not commensurate with the country’s assessed risk exposure in these areas. Given that drug trafficking and organised crime are identified as major threats in Malaysia’s NRAs—and considering the transnational nature of many of these crimes—the modest forfeiture results raise concerns about the effectiveness and reach of asset recovery efforts in these high-risk sectors. 8.2.3. Foreign predicate offences 536. Confiscation for foreign predicate offences is not pursued at a level commensurate with Malaysia’s risks and context. Malaysia rates the risks relating to the laundering of proceeds of foreign offending as low, however the risks associated with smuggling, illegal drug trafficking and fraud are relevant, as is Malaysia’s geographical context. Malaysia’s NRA positions the country as a transit point for some illicit commodities such as drug smuggling from the Golden Triangle. While Malaysia is generally not a transit point for proceeds of crime, transnational proceeds laundering does exist, albeit less prevalent and in isolated cases. As such, the Assessment Team considers that Malaysian authorities should focus more efforts on confiscation related to foreign predicates. 537. Notwithstanding, Malaysia submitted eight case studies evidencing the identification, restraint, and forfeiture of assets—including bank accounts, vehicles, and high-value luxury items such as handbags and watches—with subsequent repatriation of proceeds to foreign fraud victims, in instances where illicit funds were laundered through Malaysia. In one case, involving a business email compromise scheme, a corporate victim was defrauded of EUR 0.91 million; the full amount was recovered and repatriated. In another 2023 case, LEAs initiated a parallel fraud and ML investigation linked to a foreign cryptocurrency investment scam, resulting in the seizure of 33 bank accounts, 18 vehicles, 67 luxury watches, and cryptocurrency assets with an aggregate value of EUR 0.73 million. This case remains ongoing; thus, no forfeiture or repatriation was reported. While these cases demonstrate that Malaysia possesses the legal and operational capability to trace, seize, and return assets linked to foreign predicate offences, confiscation in such cases is not pursued at a scale proportionate to the country’s exposure to transnational financial crime risks and its strategic position as a regional financial hub. 8.2.4. Illegal proceeds moved abroad 538. Malaysian authorities ‘follow the money’ offshore to some extent but they have not demonstrated that it is done sufficiently in line with risk and context. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia sent nine MLA requests to trace, seize, confiscate and repatriate illicit assets that had moved abroad. Three were completed and funds repatriated (one related to 1MDB for EUR 929 218 through a voluntary return process, one related to ML and fraud for EUR 699 286 and one related to ML and cheating for EUR 736 088). There are six ongoing MLA requests all related to 1MDB, which are pending with the requested jurisdictions. 539. While there are some positive cases of Malaysia LEAs utilising international cooperation to assist with investigations and prosecutions (e.g., 1MDB), these efforts do not reflect the risk and context of Malaysia. For instance, there is only one asset recovery-related request for fraud and no requests for other high-risk crimes (drug trafficking, organised crime or smuggling) or medium-high risk crimes (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/smuggling, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation) where there is likely an international element. In general, Malaysian authorities downplay the risks of illicit proceeds being moved offshore, asserting that Malaysia primarily serves as a transit country for illicit goods and funds. However, this assessment appears contradictory—if Malaysia is a transit point, then, illicit proceeds are likely to have foreign links and be moved across borders. Furthermore, several case studies provided by authorities demonstrate that property has, in fact, been transferred offshore, including, notably, in 1MDB itself. 540. While LEAs have the capacity to trace and recover assets moved abroad—and have demonstrated their ability to do so in relation to assets seized in the 1MDB scandal—they continue to face significant limitations. For example, in addition to the number of outgoing MLA in this regard, Malaysia has not assisted any foreign country in confiscating illicit assets originating from Malaysian crimes. The limited engagement in international cooperation, particularly through MLA, raises concerns about Malaysia’s effectiveness in pursuing cross-border asset recovery and a lack of proactivity. 541. Malaysian LEAs indicated that while there is no specific policy in place with respect to the confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value of illicit proceeds located abroad, they are engaged in discussions on how to increase efficiency. During the onsite, LEAs stated that more sophisticated tools are required to trace assets internationally, coupled with the ability to quickly freeze assets outside of Malaysia. While MLA has been used in limited cases to locate and recover assets moved abroad, the process is challenging and slow. Improvements in the MLA process, such as better prioritisation, could improve the tracing and seizing of criminal assets located abroad. Overall, aside from a few high-profile cases, Malaysia has shown limited outcomes in pursuing assets moved offshore, with one notable exception (see case study below, Box 8.4). Criminals who move their proceeds out of Malaysia do not appear to have been at serious risk of having it confiscated, which is not making crime unprofitable in these circumstances and is a vulnerability given the country’s risk profile. Box 8.4. Illicit proceeds moved abroad case study In November 2021, a foreign FIU shared information with Malaysia’s FIU regarding three Malaysian individuals. A foreign currency exchanger had raised concerns that VAs in the clients’ accounts were linked to a Ponzi scheme, citing significant transaction flows to a gambling website and involvement in a cryptocurrency investment scam. Following this disclosure, the RMP opened an investigation paper. Acting swiftly, the RMP submitted an MLA request and secured a court order to prohibit dealings with the properties under investigation. As a result, funds amounting to EUR 42.05 million were frozen in October 2021. RMP investigations confirmed that the VAs reported by the foreign FIU were connected to a fraudulent Ponzi scheme that had previously operated in Malaysia. The scheme was promoted via social media platforms, promising investors a daily return of 1%, along with a 10% referral commission for recruiting new participants. In June 2021, the RMP successfully confiscated assets worth EUR 1.06 million including bank accounts, vehicles, and bank drafts. However, at that time, no VAs were successfully seized. In May 2023, Malaysia submitted an MLA request seeking both the restraint of property dealings and the production of related documents. The foreign central authority for MLA subsequently informed Malaysia that the targeted properties had been restrained, and the requested documents had been transmitted. In November 2023, the foreign country enforced a Malaysian court order. The case led to an application for NCBF under AMLA. The VAs are currently the subject of a forfeiture application. 8.2.5. Repatriation, sharing and restitution 542. Under Malaysia’s confiscation regime, confiscated assets can either be returned to the victim or bona fide third party or vested in the Government of Malaysia, depending on the circumstances of the case. Assets may be repatriated to the rightful owners at any stage of a ML investigation (e.g., freezing, seizing or conclusion of ML investigation), if there is clear evidence of their ownership and the assets are not connected to the ML offence. If repatriation is not feasible (if illegal proceeds are co-mingled with legal assets, the rightful owners are unable to be identified, or claims exceeds the seized assets’ value) forfeiture will only proceed after third-party proceedings, to allow claimants to establish their legitimate rights against the assets in court. Should an asset be forfeited and vested in the Government of Malaysia, AMLA provides a legal avenue for bona fide third parties, who acted in good faith and were unaware of the asset’s illicit connection, to challenge the forfeiture in court. There are no statistics available regarding third-party remediation. 543. Malaysian authorities have established specific structures dedicated to asset recovery and repatriation of funds to victims. The NSRC is a joint effort between the NFCC, RMP, BNM, MCMC, supported by FIs and telecommunications companies, to address the growing number of cyber fraud cases in the country, including online financial fraud (phishing scams, phone scams, malware attack scams, parcel scams and love scams). Established in October 2022, the NSRC has achieved favourable results, including actions taken on 130 721 suspected mule accounts, 18 749 investigations opened on fraud with EUR 1.97 million seized under the Criminal Procedure Code and EUR 576 000 returned to victims, and 89 ML investigations, with EUR 16.93 million frozen and EUR 7.88 million seized. 544. Furthermore, between 2019 and June 2024, the SC disgorged (i.e., recovered) EUR 29.89 million—representing up to three times the value of illicit gains—pursuant to Sections 200 and 201 of the CMSA. Of these surrendered proceeds, EUR 2.37 million was allocated for restitution to 2 367 affected investors (primarily related to insider trading). 545. Since 2019, approximately EUR 18.59 million has been restituted to victims. From the data provided, the vast amount of restitution relates to fraud (including scams) within Malaysia and throughout the region. While Malaysia has recovered significant sums for victims of fraud, restitution has also been secured for various other crimes such as robbery and forgery. Despite some uneven results, the Assessment Team sees the implementation of the NSRC and the NFP as positive steps in continuing improvement of restitution results for victims of fraud/scams. Table 8.6 provides an overview of restitution since 2019. Table 8.6. Total Restitution by Year (EUR in Millions) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total AMLA Fraud 1.80 6.74 2.77 2.53 0.26 0.37 0.03 14.50 Organised Crime - - - 0.01 - - 0.00 0.01 Other 0.01 0.56 0.97 0.00 - - 0.00 1.54 Capital Markets and Services Act (i.e., SC Disgorgement) Other (Insider Trading) 0.27 0.83 0.59 0.33 0.06 0.40 0.05 2.54 Grand Total 2.07 8.13 4.33 2.87 0.33 0.78 0.08 18.59 Footnotes [75] As noted in Case Study Box 8.1, 4.1% (EUR 252 million) of the total 1MDB-related assets recovered were executed under the AMLA. Most of these assets were forfeited via NCBF under the AMLA and related to domestic illegal proceeds. [76] Malaysia reports that the IRBM collected nearly EUR 215 billion in direct taxes from 2019 to 2024. Tax recovered for the purpose of IO.8 (limited to tax recovered from assets tied to illicit activities during criminal investigations) is estimated to be 0.86% of this overall tax collection. [77] In Malaysia, a 15-45% penalty is imposed on tax recoveries for offenders (excluding civil settlements). This penalty is not reflected in the table above, as it is not considered ‘proceeds’. [78] The number of forfeiture orders does not directly correspond to the amounts restrained or recovered as a forfeiture order is not necessarily realised in the same year it is made. The amount recovered was due to intensified execution of forfeiture orders (approximately 100 orders) obtained prior to COVID-19. [79] Malaysia provided case studies demonstrating possible future forfeiture outcomes, but this could not be considered as the cases are ongoing. 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Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 514. Asset freezing, seizure and forfeiture are carried out under various legal provisions. AMLA allows authorities to quickly trace, freeze (for 90 days), seize (for 12 months or beyond if prosecution has been brought), and forfeit assets linked to a wide range of criminal activities, including ML and TF. Regarding forfeiture, s.55 governs CBF, and s.56 governs NCBF. An investigation officer from an enforcement agency can issue a freezing or seizure order on movable property without court approval or a directive from the DPP. In contrast, the seizure of bank accounts or immovable property requires DPP involvement, enabling swift asset preservation. 515. In addition, Malaysia exclusively uses the DDFOPA for asset recovery related to drug offences. The DDFOPA also provides for both NCBF and CBF mechanisms. Other legislation with provisions for asset seizure and forfeiture include the MACC Act 2009 and the Customs Act 1967, which contain both provisional measures and forfeiture powers to support asset recovery. 516. Overall, Malaysia recovered a substantial amount—approximately EUR 8 billion—between 2019 and February 2025. The below table compares Malaysia’s seizure and asset recovery outcomes under all applicable legal procedures between the previous assessment period (2009-2013) and the current period (2019-2025). As indicated below, most of Malaysia’s asset recovery results during the current assessment period relate to 1MDB (approximately 75% of all recovery efforts), including tax recovery related to this case. 517. For asset recovery efforts excluding 1MDB, Malaysia makes regular use of tax remedies (88% of all asset recovery), as compared to NCBF or CBF mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency for using NCBF over CBF, primarily to overcome the prosecutorial challenges identified in IO.7 (i.e., 88% of all forfeitures are NCBF). Table 8.1. Overall IO.8 results compared to MER 2015 MER 2015 (2009-2013) 2019-2025 (February) % of Recovery Total 1. Total Value Seized EUR 163.92 M EUR 724.53 M 2. Total Forfeiture (with 1MDB) EUR 61.64 M EUR 660.08 M 2.1. Total NCBF (AMLA, DDFOPA and others) (data unavailable) EUR 172.52 M 2.2. Total CBF (MACCA, Customs Act, etc.) (data unavailable) EUR 23.82 M 2.3. Total Forfeiture for 1MDB (data unavailable) EUR 463.74 M 3. Total Recovery* EUR 8.09 B 3.1. Total Forfeited Assets Recovered (AMLA and other laws) (data unavailable) EUR 207.42 M 2.6% 3.2. IRBM: Tax Recovery (Tax offences including civil)** EUR 409.48 M EUR 1.78 B 22.2% 3.3. RMCD: Smuggling Predicate (Realised Commodities) EUR 148.99 M EUR 22.34 M 3.4. 1MDB asset recovery n/a EUR 5.72 B [75] 75.1% 3.5. 1MDB assets recovery via IRBM's Tax Recovery (Tax offences including civil) n/a EUR 362.72 M 4. Restitution (AMLA, CPC and SC’s disgorgement measures under CMSA) EUR 2.16 M EUR 18.59 M 0.2% Asset Recovery Results (without 1MDB) (Item 3.1-3.3 and 4 only) EUR 560.63 M EUR 2.03 B Grand Total of Asset Recovery Results (with 1MDB) (Item 3 and 4) n/a EUR 8.11 B Note: The total amounts seized excludes 1MDB figures as it occurred prior to 2019. Items 3.2 and 3.4 captures the value of recovery of 1MDB related cases. *Note: Total amount recovered is the value recovered from the execution of the forfeiture orders to which monetary funds, ownership or titles have been transferred to the Government. **Note: Tax recovery figures exclude fines/penalties. 518. While no official estimate of the total proceeds of crime in Malaysia is available, the UNODC estimates that globally, 2–5% of GDP is laundered annually (equivalent to about USD 2.1 trillion globally at 2% in 2023). Based on Malaysia’s nominal GDP of EUR 380.6 billion in 2023, 2% equates to roughly EUR 7.61 billion. From 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia recovered EUR 2.03 billion (about EUR 0.34 billion per year on average) excluding 1MDB-related efforts. This represents around 4.5% of the estimated 2% GDP laundering proxy per year. Including 1MDB, total recoveries of EUR 8.11 billion average about EUR 1.35 billion annually, or 17.7% of the proxy figure. 8.2.1. Tax Recovery 519. While these above overall results are positive, the Assessment Team is concerned about the reliance on tax recovery in contributing to the total amount recovered. 520. Any income, whether legally or criminally generated, is taxable in Malaysia. As noted above, the IRBM is empowered to use its tax assessment procedures and civil recovery mechanisms to recover proceeds linked to other criminal activities (beyond tax offences). This includes cases where illicit income has not been declared or where false information has been provided to conceal the origin of criminal proceeds. The IRBM assesses tax liabilities on illicit income discovered during criminal investigations (and proceeds seized by other LEAs during their criminal investigations). Where evidence suggests a link to criminal activity, the IRBM—acting under sections 112, 113, and 114 of the Income Tax Act—can assess tax liabilities on illicit income, impose tax assessments on undeclared earnings, investigate wilful evasion, and pursue civil action to recover unpaid taxes, including those related to criminal conduct. This approach allows the IRBM to contribute to asset recovery in parallel to criminal forfeiture, as well as in situations where criminal prosecution may be challenging due to evidentiary limitations or other procedural constraints (see IO.7). 521. Malaysia’s emphasis on tax recovery as an asset recovery tool raises concerns, particularly in light of its limited reliance on NCBF mechanisms. Both tax recovery and NCBF can be pursued without securing a criminal conviction and operate under similarly flexible evidentiary standards. While authorities indicated that there is a provision to use tax recovery for restitution, the use of this mechanism is at the discretion of the government and authorities did not provide examples of its implementation. Further, tax recovery does not allow for the seizure of instrumentalities of crime, or the full recovery of illicit gains—often capturing only a fraction of the proceeds, typically in the form of unpaid taxes. This imbalance suggests that Malaysia may not be fully leveraging the breadth of legal tools available. 522. The below case study (Box 8.2) illustrates the sequencing and application of Malaysia’s tax recovery mechanism. Box 8.2. Tax recovery example (Ops Pharma) In December 2023, a joint operation involving multiple LEAs was launched under the Trademarks Act and AMLA. The operation targeted a criminal syndicate involved in the distribution of suspected counterfeited and unregistered cough medicines. The joint operation was led by KPDN, coordinated by the NFCC and supported by the IRBM. As a result of the joint investigation, 56 bank accounts totalling EUR 2.25 million were frozen. Further investigation led to the seizure of 18 bank accounts amounting to EUR 1.70 million. In addition, two properties valued at EUR 560 300, along with movable assets located within the premises, were also seized. In December 2024, the owner and director of the company were charged under Section 4(1)(b) of the AMLA for receiving proceeds of unlawful activity. This charge related to three of the 18 seized bank accounts. The suspect was also charged under Section 4(1)(a) of the AMLA for directly engaging in transactions involving instrumentalities of an offence, specifically the two seized properties. The case is currently under trial. During the criminal investigation, the IRBM identified that illicit income generated from the counterfeit medicine operations had not been declared. Consequently, tax recovery proceedings were initiated, resulting in the recovery of EUR 1.08 million from the seized funds. This case illustrates the sequencing and combining powers under the AMLA and the Income Tax Act, enabling substantial recovery of proceeds as the remaining seized assets may still be subject to confiscation through CBF proceedings. 523. Tax recoveries are being achieved to a high extent, with a total of EUR 2.14 billion recovered between 2019 and 2024, including 1MDB tax recovery (or EUR 1.78 billion excluding 1MDB). Malaysia advises that all tax recoveries relate to tax or smuggling criminality, as opposed to administrative oversights or general tax debts. [76] The table below provides an annual breakdown of the reported figures. On average, the tax cases pursued by the IRBM involved amounts of approximately EUR 1.60 million per case (excluding penalties [77] ), indicating that the underlying offences were of a significant scale. These tax recovery efforts target both natural and legal persons, with approximately 62% of total recoveries applying to legal persons. Table 8.2. IRBM Tax Recovery by Year (EUR) (excluding 1MDB) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total IRBM 367.05 M 384.01 M 289.42 M 345.08 M 150.94 M 243.23 M 1.78 B # of cases 205 184 183 203 199 137 1 111 524. The below case study demonstrates tax recovery efforts related to the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. Box 8.3. Additional tax recovery case study Ops Renjat, conducted in October 2022 and coordinated by NFCC with the Energy Commission, RMP, and IRBM, targeted illegal VA mining operations bypassing electricity meters in five unoccupied premises in Kajang, Selangor. The raids uncovered 349 mining machines operating on illicit electrical connections, resulting in estimated utility losses of EUR 280 150 and assets valued at over EUR 431 000. Enforcement teams seized mining rigs, including power supplies, wiring, fans, hard drives, and meter-tampering equipment, which were inventoried for evidence and disposal. Investigations remain ongoing, while tax recovery actions under sections 112 and 113 of the Income Tax Act have led to the collection of EUR 134 343 from illicit profits linked to the illegal VA mining activities. 525. In addition to the IRBM, the RMCD is empowered by the Customs Act 1967 and Excise Act 1976 to recover customs duties or tax owed on uncustomed or prohibited goods (i.e., goods imported or exported without approval or without payment of customs duty) through criminal investigations. During the current assessment period, the RMCD recovered EUR 22.34 million, primarily from the sale of auctioned vehicles whose owners had failed to obtain the required permits. This is a significant decrease from the EUR 148.99 million recovered in the previous MER, which Malaysia attributes to the movement restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. 8.2.2. Conviction and Non-Conviction-Based Forfeiture 526. While the FATF Methodology does not prescribe a preference for one form of asset recovery—civil or criminal—over another, compared to tax recovery, Malaysia uses NCBF and CBF to a lesser extent. Of the total forfeitures obtained during the assessment period, the majority are derived from NCBF cases. Based on discussions onsite, it was highlighted that NCBF not only serves as a method to deprive criminals of illicit proceeds when a conviction is not achievable but is also viewed as a strong mechanism to return lost revenue to the Malaysian government. Given the limited number of ML convictions, the Assessment Team has concerns about the overreliance on civil asset recovery mechanisms in place of robust evidence collection and prosecutions leading to ML convictions; however, this issue is assessed as a deficiency under IO.7. 527. Since 2019, Malaysia has recovered approximately EUR 150.46 million in relation to NCBF pursuant to the AMLA, across 545 cases. To prevent distortion of aggregate recovery figures, this amount excludes 1MDB data. CBF pursuant to the AMLA is pursued significantly less than NCBF. Since 2019, Malaysia has forfeited approximately EUR 8.79 million in CBF pursuant to the AMLA, of which EUR 34.57 million was recovered to the Government of Malaysia during the same assessment period. [78] Corruption and fraud were the most common predicate offences underlying both CBF and NCBF cases, which corresponds to Malaysia’s risk profile to some extent. 528. As noted in the TC Annex, Malaysia can confiscate direct instrumentalities of crime (for both CBF and NCBF), as well as property of equivalent value when the original assets cannot be located, have been transferred, or are otherwise unavailable. Malaysia provided case studies demonstrating the effective use of these powers. 529. The below table summarises all seizure, forfeiture and recovery figures pursuant to AMLA between 2019 and February 2025. Table 8.3. Forfeiture Results Pursuant to the AMLA (EUR in millions) AMLA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Overall Value Frozen (up to 90 days) 118.03 372.23 174.13 160.22 170.67 90.03 8.74 1 094.05 Overall Value Seized 102.80 76.79 115.65 86.98 73.79 26.98 2.83 485.82 NCBF Total Amount Forfeited (NCBF) 18.31 105.35 4.84 18.30 2.63 1.03 0 150.46 Fraud 13.20 4.99 1.56 8.09 0.15 0.05 0 28.05 Corruption 4.76 99.78 2.29 5.48 1.19 0.60 0 114.10 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Organised Crime 0.22 0.34 0.56 4.47 1.23 0.04 0 6.85 Smuggling** 0 0 0.08 0.26 0.01 0 0 0.34 Other 0.14 0.24 0.35 0 0.04 0.34 0 1.12 Total Amount Recovered (NCBF) 17.58 105.31 3.27 13.18 5.66 0.19 0.20 145.39 CBF Total Amount Forfeited (CBF) 0.12 0.32 0.64 2.91 4.75 0.04 0 8.78 Fraud 0 0 0.07 0 2.31 0 0 2.38 Corruption 0.02 0.32 0.55 2.91 0.14 0.04 0 3.97 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Organised Crime - - - - - - - - Smuggling** - - - - - - - - Other 0.11 0 0.02 0 2.31 0 0 2.44 Total Amount Recovered (CBF) 11.93 3.60 0.10 11.68 0.23 7.02 0.06 34.62 Grand Total Recovered (NCBF and CBF) 29.51 108.91 3.37 24.87 5.89 7.21 0.27 180.02 *Note: Confiscation measures for drug offences is pursued pursuant to the DDFOPA (see below table for results). **Note: Confiscation measures for smuggling is pursued pursuant to the Customs Act as predicate offences. Note: The number of forfeiture orders does not directly correspond to the amounts restrained or recovered as a forfeiture order is not necessarily realised in the same year it is made. Note: The spike in 2022 was due to the execution of forfeiture orders (102) obtained prior to COVID-19. Note: Total amount recovered is the value recovered from the execution of the forfeiture orders to which monetary funds, ownership or titles have been transferred to the Government. 530. The overall recovered amount (EUR 180 million) is positive for all AMLA forfeitures (approximately EUR 159 million). While it is difficult to determine whether all forfeiture orders are fully enforced—since restrained or recovered amounts are not always realised in the same year—this does not appear to be a significant issue. Nevertheless, there is a gap between the value seized (EUR 486 million) and the final amount recovered (EUR 180 million), which suggests potential challenges pertaining to evidence collection, case processing, and meeting legislated time limits for investigating seized assets. 531. Instead of using the AMLA to seize and confiscate for drug-related offences, Malaysia exclusively uses the DDFOPA (for both NCBF and CBF). Similarly, Malaysia uses other laws beyond the AMLA to seize, forfeit and recover assets related to other crimes. The below table summarises Malaysia’s seizure, forfeiture and recovery results related to the DDFOPA (and all other laws beyond the AMLA) since 2019. Table 8.4. Forfeiture Results Pursuant to Other Laws (EUR in millions) Other Laws, including DDFOPA 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Overall Value Seized 21.82 108.23 36.17 26.94 22.42 12.40 10.67 238.65 NCBF Total Amount Forfeited (NCBF) 2.87 3.23 4.69 6.18 3.18 1.07 0.82 22.05 Corruption - - - - - - 0.18 0.18 Drugs Trafficking* 2.87 3.23 4.68 6.17 3.18 1.07 0.64 21.85 Others - - 0.01 0.01 - - - 0.02 Total Amount Recovered (NCBF) 2.87 3.23 4.68 6.18 3.18 1.07 0.64 21.86 CBF Total Amount Forfeited (CBF) 0.09 3.10 4.10 3.59 4.06 0.08 0.01 15.04 Corruption 0.00 1.78 2.14 2.53 3.98 0.00 0.01 10.44 Drugs Trafficking* - - - - - - - - Others* 0.09 1.32 1.96 1.06 0.08 0.08 0.00 4.60 Total Amount Recovered (CBF) 0.11 1.36 2.03 1.45 0.46 0.12 0.00 5.53 Grand Total Forfeited (NCBF and CBF) 2.96 6.33 8.79 9.77 7.24 1.15 0.83 37.09 Grand Total Recovered (NCBF and CBF) 2.98 4.59 6.71 7.64 3.64 1.19 0.64 27.39 *Note: “Other” in CBF relates to illegal remittance and piracy of products. 532. As indicated in the above table, the total value of assets seized pursuant to all laws other than the AMLA is significantly higher (EUR 238.65 million) than the amounts forfeited (EUR 37.09 million) and recovered (EUR 27.39 million). This suggests that while the authorities are effective at identifying and seizing suspect assets, a smaller portion of these assets successfully progresses to formal forfeiture and recovery. The relatively lower figures for forfeiture and recovery compared to seizures may indicate challenges in legal processes, such as proving ownership or criminal linkage, or procedural delays that impact final asset disposition. According to statistics provided by Malaysia, most assets seized in connection with drug offences—including buildings, bank accounts, jewellery, and vehicles—are not ultimately forfeited. Only about 16% of these seized assets are successfully forfeited, raising concerns about the effectiveness of asset recovery efforts, particularly given that drug trafficking is assessed as a high-risk predicate in Malaysia. [79] 533. Moreover, for all legal frameworks outside of the AMLA, Malaysia continues to place a greater emphasis on NCBF, with recoveries totalling EUR 21.86 million, compared to just EUR 5.53 million through CBF. This disparity is particularly noteworthy given that no CBF outcomes were recorded for drug-related offences between 2019 and 2025. The absence of CBF in such cases—despite the known scale and proceeds of drug trafficking—raises concerns about the underutilisation of criminal asset recovery mechanisms for high-risk predicate offences. 534. The below table summarises total figures (AMLA and all other laws) for seizure, forfeiture and recovery, excluding 1MDB recovery. As indicated below, Malaysia’s overall figures have declined since 2020, which Malaysia attributes to COVID-19. Asset seizure, forfeiture, and recovery peaked in 2020 but have steadily declined through 2024. The significant gap between seized amounts and actual recoveries or forfeitures highlights ongoing challenges in converting enforcement actions into final asset recovery outcomes. Table 8.5. Results pursuant to the AMLA and Other Laws (EUR in million) All Seizure, Forfeiture and Recovery (all laws) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Seizure 124.62 185.02 151.82 113.93 96.21 39.38 13.5 724.48 Forfeiture (NCBF/CBF) 21.40 112.00 14.27 30.98 14.63 2.22 0.83 196.33 Recovery 32.49 113.50 10.09 32.50 9.53 8.40 0.90 207.41 535. Regarding overall results in line with Malaysia’s five high-risk predicate offences (fraud, corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling, organised crime), the highest value of asset forfeiture has been achieved in corruption cases (EUR 128.69 million) [80] , followed by fraud (EUR 30.43 million), drug trafficking (EUR 21.85 million), organised crime (EUR 6.85 million) and smuggling (EUR 0.34 million). While these figures demonstrate that Malaysia has made measurable progress in pursuing asset forfeiture since 2015, the relatively low forfeiture values for drug trafficking, organised crime, and smuggling are not commensurate with the country’s assessed risk exposure in these areas. Given that drug trafficking and organised crime are identified as major threats in Malaysia’s NRAs—and considering the transnational nature of many of these crimes—the modest forfeiture results raise concerns about the effectiveness and reach of asset recovery efforts in these high-risk sectors. 8.2.3. Foreign predicate offences 536. Confiscation for foreign predicate offences is not pursued at a level commensurate with Malaysia’s risks and context. Malaysia rates the risks relating to the laundering of proceeds of foreign offending as low, however the risks associated with smuggling, illegal drug trafficking and fraud are relevant, as is Malaysia’s geographical context. Malaysia’s NRA positions the country as a transit point for some illicit commodities such as drug smuggling from the Golden Triangle. While Malaysia is generally not a transit point for proceeds of crime, transnational proceeds laundering does exist, albeit less prevalent and in isolated cases. As such, the Assessment Team considers that Malaysian authorities should focus more efforts on confiscation related to foreign predicates. 537. Notwithstanding, Malaysia submitted eight case studies evidencing the identification, restraint, and forfeiture of assets—including bank accounts, vehicles, and high-value luxury items such as handbags and watches—with subsequent repatriation of proceeds to foreign fraud victims, in instances where illicit funds were laundered through Malaysia. In one case, involving a business email compromise scheme, a corporate victim was defrauded of EUR 0.91 million; the full amount was recovered and repatriated. In another 2023 case, LEAs initiated a parallel fraud and ML investigation linked to a foreign cryptocurrency investment scam, resulting in the seizure of 33 bank accounts, 18 vehicles, 67 luxury watches, and cryptocurrency assets with an aggregate value of EUR 0.73 million. This case remains ongoing; thus, no forfeiture or repatriation was reported. While these cases demonstrate that Malaysia possesses the legal and operational capability to trace, seize, and return assets linked to foreign predicate offences, confiscation in such cases is not pursued at a scale proportionate to the country’s exposure to transnational financial crime risks and its strategic position as a regional financial hub. 8.2.4. Illegal proceeds moved abroad 538. Malaysian authorities ‘follow the money’ offshore to some extent but they have not demonstrated that it is done sufficiently in line with risk and context. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia sent nine MLA requests to trace, seize, confiscate and repatriate illicit assets that had moved abroad. Three were completed and funds repatriated (one related to 1MDB for EUR 929 218 through a voluntary return process, one related to ML and fraud for EUR 699 286 and one related to ML and cheating for EUR 736 088). There are six ongoing MLA requests all related to 1MDB, which are pending with the requested jurisdictions. 539. While there are some positive cases of Malaysia LEAs utilising international cooperation to assist with investigations and prosecutions (e.g., 1MDB), these efforts do not reflect the risk and context of Malaysia. For instance, there is only one asset recovery-related request for fraud and no requests for other high-risk crimes (drug trafficking, organised crime or smuggling) or medium-high risk crimes (tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/smuggling, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation) where there is likely an international element. In general, Malaysian authorities downplay the risks of illicit proceeds being moved offshore, asserting that Malaysia primarily serves as a transit country for illicit goods and funds. However, this assessment appears contradictory—if Malaysia is a transit point, then, illicit proceeds are likely to have foreign links and be moved across borders. Furthermore, several case studies provided by authorities demonstrate that property has, in fact, been transferred offshore, including, notably, in 1MDB itself. 540. While LEAs have the capacity to trace and recover assets moved abroad—and have demonstrated their ability to do so in relation to assets seized in the 1MDB scandal—they continue to face significant limitations. For example, in addition to the number of outgoing MLA in this regard, Malaysia has not assisted any foreign country in confiscating illicit assets originating from Malaysian crimes. The limited engagement in international cooperation, particularly through MLA, raises concerns about Malaysia’s effectiveness in pursuing cross-border asset recovery and a lack of proactivity. 541. Malaysian LEAs indicated that while there is no specific policy in place with respect to the confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value of illicit proceeds located abroad, they are engaged in discussions on how to increase efficiency. During the onsite, LEAs stated that more sophisticated tools are required to trace assets internationally, coupled with the ability to quickly freeze assets outside of Malaysia. While MLA has been used in limited cases to locate and recover assets moved abroad, the process is challenging and slow. Improvements in the MLA process, such as better prioritisation, could improve the tracing and seizing of criminal assets located abroad. Overall, aside from a few high-profile cases, Malaysia has shown limited outcomes in pursuing assets moved offshore, with one notable exception (see case study below, Box 8.4). Criminals who move their proceeds out of Malaysia do not appear to have been at serious risk of having it confiscated, which is not making crime unprofitable in these circumstances and is a vulnerability given the country’s risk profile. Box 8.4. Illicit proceeds moved abroad case study In November 2021, a foreign FIU shared information with Malaysia’s FIU regarding three Malaysian individuals. A foreign currency exchanger had raised concerns that VAs in the clients’ accounts were linked to a Ponzi scheme, citing significant transaction flows to a gambling website and involvement in a cryptocurrency investment scam. Following this disclosure, the RMP opened an investigation paper. Acting swiftly, the RMP submitted an MLA request and secured a court order to prohibit dealings with the properties under investigation. As a result, funds amounting to EUR 42.05 million were frozen in October 2021. RMP investigations confirmed that the VAs reported by the foreign FIU were connected to a fraudulent Ponzi scheme that had previously operated in Malaysia. The scheme was promoted via social media platforms, promising investors a daily return of 1%, along with a 10% referral commission for recruiting new participants. In June 2021, the RMP successfully confiscated assets worth EUR 1.06 million including bank accounts, vehicles, and bank drafts. However, at that time, no VAs were successfully seized. In May 2023, Malaysia submitted an MLA request seeking both the restraint of property dealings and the production of related documents. The foreign central authority for MLA subsequently informed Malaysia that the targeted properties had been restrained, and the requested documents had been transmitted. In November 2023, the foreign country enforced a Malaysian court order. The case led to an application for NCBF under AMLA. The VAs are currently the subject of a forfeiture application. 8.2.5. Repatriation, sharing and restitution 542. Under Malaysia’s confiscation regime, confiscated assets can either be returned to the victim or bona fide third party or vested in the Government of Malaysia, depending on the circumstances of the case. Assets may be repatriated to the rightful owners at any stage of a ML investigation (e.g., freezing, seizing or conclusion of ML investigation), if there is clear evidence of their ownership and the assets are not connected to the ML offence. If repatriation is not feasible (if illegal proceeds are co-mingled with legal assets, the rightful owners are unable to be identified, or claims exceeds the seized assets’ value) forfeiture will only proceed after third-party proceedings, to allow claimants to establish their legitimate rights against the assets in court. Should an asset be forfeited and vested in the Government of Malaysia, AMLA provides a legal avenue for bona fide third parties, who acted in good faith and were unaware of the asset’s illicit connection, to challenge the forfeiture in court. There are no statistics available regarding third-party remediation. 543. Malaysian authorities have established specific structures dedicated to asset recovery and repatriation of funds to victims. The NSRC is a joint effort between the NFCC, RMP, BNM, MCMC, supported by FIs and telecommunications companies, to address the growing number of cyber fraud cases in the country, including online financial fraud (phishing scams, phone scams, malware attack scams, parcel scams and love scams). Established in October 2022, the NSRC has achieved favourable results, including actions taken on 130 721 suspected mule accounts, 18 749 investigations opened on fraud with EUR 1.97 million seized under the Criminal Procedure Code and EUR 576 000 returned to victims, and 89 ML investigations, with EUR 16.93 million frozen and EUR 7.88 million seized. 544. Furthermore, between 2019 and June 2024, the SC disgorged (i.e., recovered) EUR 29.89 million—representing up to three times the value of illicit gains—pursuant to Sections 200 and 201 of the CMSA. Of these surrendered proceeds, EUR 2.37 million was allocated for restitution to 2 367 affected investors (primarily related to insider trading). 545. Since 2019, approximately EUR 18.59 million has been restituted to victims. From the data provided, the vast amount of restitution relates to fraud (including scams) within Malaysia and throughout the region. While Malaysia has recovered significant sums for victims of fraud, restitution has also been secured for various other crimes such as robbery and forgery. Despite some uneven results, the Assessment Team sees the implementation of the NSRC and the NFP as positive steps in continuing improvement of restitution results for victims of fraud/scams. Table 8.6 provides an overview of restitution since 2019. Table 8.6. Total Restitution by Year (EUR in Millions) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total AMLA Fraud 1.80 6.74 2.77 2.53 0.26 0.37 0.03 14.50 Organised Crime - - - 0.01 - - 0.00 0.01 Other 0.01 0.56 0.97 0.00 - - 0.00 1.54 Capital Markets and Services Act (i.e., SC Disgorgement) Other (Insider Trading) 0.27 0.83 0.59 0.33 0.06 0.40 0.05 2.54 Grand Total 2.07 8.13 4.33 2.87 0.33 0.78 0.08 18.59 Footnotes [75] As noted in Case Study Box 8.1, 4.1% (EUR 252 million) of the total 1MDB-related assets recovered were executed under the AMLA. Most of these assets were forfeited via NCBF under the AMLA and related to domestic illegal proceeds. [76] Malaysia reports that the IRBM collected nearly EUR 215 billion in direct taxes from 2019 to 2024. Tax recovered for the purpose of IO.8 (limited to tax recovered from assets tied to illicit activities during criminal investigations) is estimated to be 0.86% of this overall tax collection. [77] In Malaysia, a 15-45% penalty is imposed on tax recoveries for offenders (excluding civil settlements). This penalty is not reflected in the table above, as it is not considered ‘proceeds’. [78] The number of forfeiture orders does not directly correspond to the amounts restrained or recovered as a forfeiture order is not necessarily realised in the same year it is made. The amount recovered was due to intensified execution of forfeiture orders (approximately 100 orders) obtained prior to COVID-19. [79] Malaysia provided case studies demonstrating possible future forfeiture outcomes, but this could not be considered as the cases are ongoing. [80] This figure excludes 1MDB results." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.2.1. TF prosecutions 577. Prosecution of TF (and terrorism) offences in Malaysia is the responsibility of the AGC, particularly the Serious Crimes Unit under the Prosecution Division due to their high profile, sensitive nature and need for security measures during trial. This contrasts with many other serious crimes such as drugs and other cases (with punishment of 10 years or more of imprisonment), where such cases are handled by the DPPs stationed across the country. 578. The Serious Crimes Unit currently has 12 DPPs and two support staff who are specialised in prosecuting serious crime cases, including terrorism and TF. The Unit provides legal advice to the SB to strengthen evidence for terrorism and TF prosecutions. The Unit collaborates with the SB before the suspect’s apprehension through to prosecution, ensuring a well-coordinated prosecution strategy. 579. In 2015, Malaysia’s MER reported no prosecutions or convictions for TF, and therefore, no sanctions were applied for the offense. However, in the years since, Malaysia has identified TF cases, conducted investigations, and successfully prosecuted and convicted offenders. Malaysia attributes this success to the centralisation of TF investigative responsibilities exclusively within the SB, which took place in 2016. 580. Since 2016, Malaysia has prosecuted 21 individuals for TF (and 177 individuals for terrorism). More recently, Malaysia has prosecuted four individuals for TF (and 48 individuals for terrorism). Table 9.4. TF and Terrorism Prosecutions Prosecutions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Terrorism Financing Individuals Charged 2 - - 1 - 1 - 4 No. of Charges* 2 - - 1 - 15** - 18 Terrorism Individuals Charged 21 4 - 1 - 21 1 48 No. of Charges* 45 - - - - 49 1 95 *Note: One individual may have multiple charges. **Note: One individual prosecuted in 2024 was convicted in March 2025 (after onsite). 581. As indicated in the above table, there were no TF prosecutions in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, which Malaysia attributes to the restriction on movement and activities; limited international cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms; and unintended delays and disruptions in judicial processes, including reduced court operations, and postponements of trials. 582. Prosecution of TF activities primarily focussed on the collection stage conducted directly by sympathisers, as well as by third parties. Information from the investigations into fund movements and usage was used as supporting evidence in the prosecutions. Key individuals in more complex networks were monitored, identified and prosecuted. Individuals charged for TF and terrorism were usually Malaysian citizens or permanent residents as the foreign nationals were deported or extradited. There were no TF prosecutions of natural persons that involved NPOs or legal persons. Of the 18 TF prosecutions secured since 2019, all related to the offence of dealing with terrorist property. Nearly all TF prosecutions relate to the financing of ISIL and for travel of FTFs to Syria. Those charged and convicted are supporters and sympathisers of FTFs located in Syria and Iraq, mainly in the form of family members in Malaysia sending small amounts through money remitters, in line with Malaysia’s key TF risk profile. Malaysia also faces regional TF risks linked to active terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines where this is active engagement with regional LEAs on terrorism and other disruption efforts. The nature and number of TF prosecutions has not reflected Malaysia’s role as a source and transit country for TF. 9.2.2. TF Convictions 583. In Malaysia’s 2015 MER, the country had no TF convictions as there were no prosecutions recorded during the assessment period. Since 2016, Malaysia reports 48 TF prosecutions, resulting in 20 individuals convicted for TF (including 33 TF charges). More recently, since 2019, there have been 18 TF prosecutions and seven TF convictions (compared to 33 convictions for terrorism). The below table (9.5) provides a yearly breakdown of TF and terrorism convictions secured since 2019. Table 9.5. TF and Terrorism Convictions Convictions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Terrorism Financing Individuals Convicted 4 - 2 1 - - 7 Terrorism Individuals Convicted 21 4 1 3 4 33 584. All TF cases prosecuted have resulted in successful convictions. Malaysia indicates that no acquittals were granted since 2019, and the high conviction rate is a result of robust evidentiary collection and inter-agency cooperation. A 100% conviction rate on TF could confirm the thorough work of the SB in gathering evidence and of prosecutors in presenting only persuasive cases. The Assessment Team could not determine any substantive reasons for the difference between the ML and TF conviction rates." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="9.2.1. TF prosecutions 577. Prosecution of TF (and terrorism) offences in Malaysia is the responsibility of the AGC, particularly the Serious Crimes Unit under the Prosecution Division due to their high profile, sensitive nature and need for security measures during trial. This contrasts with many other serious crimes such as drugs and other cases (with punishment of 10 years or more of imprisonment), where such cases are handled by the DPPs stationed across the country. 578. The Serious Crimes Unit currently has 12 DPPs and two support staff who are specialised in prosecuting serious crime cases, including terrorism and TF. The Unit provides legal advice to the SB to strengthen evidence for terrorism and TF prosecutions. The Unit collaborates with the SB before the suspect’s apprehension through to prosecution, ensuring a well-coordinated prosecution strategy. 579. In 2015, Malaysia’s MER reported no prosecutions or convictions for TF, and therefore, no sanctions were applied for the offense. However, in the years since, Malaysia has identified TF cases, conducted investigations, and successfully prosecuted and convicted offenders. Malaysia attributes this success to the centralisation of TF investigative responsibilities exclusively within the SB, which took place in 2016. 580. Since 2016, Malaysia has prosecuted 21 individuals for TF (and 177 individuals for terrorism). More recently, Malaysia has prosecuted four individuals for TF (and 48 individuals for terrorism). Table 9.4. TF and Terrorism Prosecutions Prosecutions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Terrorism Financing Individuals Charged 2 - - 1 - 1 - 4 No. of Charges* 2 - - 1 - 15** - 18 Terrorism Individuals Charged 21 4 - 1 - 21 1 48 No. of Charges* 45 - - - - 49 1 95 *Note: One individual may have multiple charges. **Note: One individual prosecuted in 2024 was convicted in March 2025 (after onsite). 581. As indicated in the above table, there were no TF prosecutions in 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, which Malaysia attributes to the restriction on movement and activities; limited international cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms; and unintended delays and disruptions in judicial processes, including reduced court operations, and postponements of trials. 582. Prosecution of TF activities primarily focussed on the collection stage conducted directly by sympathisers, as well as by third parties. Information from the investigations into fund movements and usage was used as supporting evidence in the prosecutions. Key individuals in more complex networks were monitored, identified and prosecuted. Individuals charged for TF and terrorism were usually Malaysian citizens or permanent residents as the foreign nationals were deported or extradited. There were no TF prosecutions of natural persons that involved NPOs or legal persons. Of the 18 TF prosecutions secured since 2019, all related to the offence of dealing with terrorist property. Nearly all TF prosecutions relate to the financing of ISIL and for travel of FTFs to Syria. Those charged and convicted are supporters and sympathisers of FTFs located in Syria and Iraq, mainly in the form of family members in Malaysia sending small amounts through money remitters, in line with Malaysia’s key TF risk profile. Malaysia also faces regional TF risks linked to active terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Philippines where this is active engagement with regional LEAs on terrorism and other disruption efforts. The nature and number of TF prosecutions has not reflected Malaysia’s role as a source and transit country for TF. 9.2.2. TF Convictions 583. In Malaysia’s 2015 MER, the country had no TF convictions as there were no prosecutions recorded during the assessment period. Since 2016, Malaysia reports 48 TF prosecutions, resulting in 20 individuals convicted for TF (including 33 TF charges). More recently, since 2019, there have been 18 TF prosecutions and seven TF convictions (compared to 33 convictions for terrorism). The below table (9.5) provides a yearly breakdown of TF and terrorism convictions secured since 2019. Table 9.5. TF and Terrorism Convictions Convictions 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Terrorism Financing Individuals Convicted 4 - 2 1 - - 7 Terrorism Individuals Convicted 21 4 1 3 4 33 584. All TF cases prosecuted have resulted in successful convictions. Malaysia indicates that no acquittals were granted since 2019, and the high conviction rate is a result of robust evidentiary collection and inter-agency cooperation. A 100% conviction rate on TF could confirm the thorough work of the SB in gathering evidence and of prosecutors in presenting only persuasive cases. The Assessment Team could not determine any substantive reasons for the difference between the ML and TF conviction rates." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="615. Malaysia has made use of its TF TFS framework to mitigate its TF risks, which was assessed as medium-high in its 2020 TF risk assessment and reassessed to medium in the 2023 TF risk assessment. Malaysia has identified a common trend in its TF activities, where lower-income sympathisers and family members provide small monetary contributions to FTFs in conflict zones, primarily in Syria. 616. Over the review period, Malaysia added over 100 new designations pursuant to its domestic designation regime (UNSCR 1373) with 85 individuals added in 2022 alone, while there were no new designations in 2020-2021. The large number of designations in 2022 were the result of RMP uncovering a significant TF network. The below case study provides a summary of designations made to the MoHA list following a regional TF investigation. Box 10.1. Case study of domestic designation The case involves five Malaysian subjects who were alleged to have remitted funds to an individual in the Philippines to finance IS activities in the Southern Philippines (“Islamic States Philippines” or “ISIS-P”). This case arose from the joint work of TF networking analysis of FIUs in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. Upon identification of the subjects, Malaysian authorities worked with the Philippines to gather financial intelligence of remittance records and other money trails. The individual in the Philippines was listed on the MoHA list in 2022 and five Malaysian subjects were listed in 2023. These domestic designations resulted in all their accounts and financial instruments being frozen (totalling over EUR 100 000). Malaysia is also pursuing a TF investigation in this case alongside the Philippines. [87] 617. A significant portion of the designated individuals on the MoHA list are Malaysian (34 out of 77), with a large number of individuals from Southeast Asian countries. There are also names of citizens from conflict zone countries that were identified as recipients of frequent transfers, likely due to their role as informal agents or hawaladars facilitating the movement of funds destined for Malaysian FTFs in such areas. 618. MoHA has domestically designated family members of FTFs (13 out of 77 listed persons) to prevent the financing of FTF activities that lack a humanitarian purpose. 619. Malaysian authorities concluded that designating FTFs alone would have limited practical impact, as they are not always directly named as beneficiaries or parties in financial transactions and are therefore unlikely to be detected by RIs. Instead, FTFs typically receive funds through intermediaries such as middlemen or hawaladars. While publicly identifying and designating FTF family members can act as a strong deterrent, freezing all their financial accounts and assets may lead to unintended consequences, including undue financial hardship. As a result, the Assessment Team has concerns about Malaysia’s use of this measure but note that Malaysian authorities view it as a last resort and relevant safeguards and due processes are in place. The AMLA sets out provisions including for allowing access to frozen assets and revocation of the designations by the review of the Committee for TF TFS at least every six months if there are no reasonable grounds to continue to apply the sanctions. According to the RMP, 90% of FTF family members belong to low-income groups, and their designation could undermine de-radicalisation efforts. Malaysia should periodically review existing safeguards to avoid unintended consequences and ensure that this approach continues to be used only where other measures would be ineffective or have been exhausted and should ensure this measure is used rarely. 620. As of February 2025, Malaysia has frozen a total of EUR 997 900 in relation to TFS implementation. These frozen assets include bank accounts, insurance, and e-wallets, as outlined in the below table. Most frozen assets relate to Malaysia’s implementation of UNSCR 1373 (EUR 965 800). Assets frozen in relation to UNSCR 1267 is EUR 32 100. 621. Malaysia’s efforts to identify assets have resulted in the freezing of accounts and assets not only owned directly by designated individuals, but those that are controlled by the designated individual, adding an additional value of EUR 14 800. These are accounts or assets belonging to the spouse or a minor of the designated entities and accounts of companies in which the designated entities are appointed as a signatory. 622. Overall, the Assessment Team finds that the total value and type of assets frozen in relation to TF TFS is in line with Malaysia’s risk profile. Table 10.1. Status of frozen assets as of February 2025 Sanctions Regime Type of Assets Owned by designated individuals/entities Controlled by designated individuals/entities No. Value (EUR’000) No. Value (EUR’000) UNSCR 1373 Bank accounts 277 83.0 11 2.2 Insurance* 336 842.2 7 10.6 Pilgrimage fund accounts 24 15.5 2 &lt;0.1 Investment/shares accounts 24 10.7 - - Prepaid cards, e-wallets 58 1.7 - - Sub-total 719 953.0 20 12.8 UNSCR 1267 &amp; 1988 Bank accounts 7 1.9 1 0 Insurance* 19 28.2 1 2.0 Pilgrimage fund accounts 4 0.1 - - Prepaid cards, e-wallets 19 0 - - Sub-total 49 30.1 2 2.0 Total 768 983.1 22 14.8 Grand Total 790 accounts, EUR 997 900 *Note: Insurance values consist of the sum assured/cash surrender value. 623. As for the requirements for access to funds and assets that are frozen, the process is outlined on MoHA’s website and in guidelines. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia received 15 requests for access to frozen assets. Eight were directly from designated persons and seven from family members or related parties linked to the designated persons. MoHA has not approved any of these requests, stating that they did not fall within the category of basic expenses and were instead related to business or travel. Footnotes [87] In March 2025, one individual was convicted of TF and terrorism and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Investigations are ongoing for the remaining individuals." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="615. Malaysia has made use of its TF TFS framework to mitigate its TF risks, which was assessed as medium-high in its 2020 TF risk assessment and reassessed to medium in the 2023 TF risk assessment. Malaysia has identified a common trend in its TF activities, where lower-income sympathisers and family members provide small monetary contributions to FTFs in conflict zones, primarily in Syria. 616. Over the review period, Malaysia added over 100 new designations pursuant to its domestic designation regime (UNSCR 1373) with 85 individuals added in 2022 alone, while there were no new designations in 2020-2021. The large number of designations in 2022 were the result of RMP uncovering a significant TF network. The below case study provides a summary of designations made to the MoHA list following a regional TF investigation. Box 10.1. Case study of domestic designation The case involves five Malaysian subjects who were alleged to have remitted funds to an individual in the Philippines to finance IS activities in the Southern Philippines (“Islamic States Philippines” or “ISIS-P”). This case arose from the joint work of TF networking analysis of FIUs in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. Upon identification of the subjects, Malaysian authorities worked with the Philippines to gather financial intelligence of remittance records and other money trails. The individual in the Philippines was listed on the MoHA list in 2022 and five Malaysian subjects were listed in 2023. These domestic designations resulted in all their accounts and financial instruments being frozen (totalling over EUR 100 000). Malaysia is also pursuing a TF investigation in this case alongside the Philippines. [87] 617. A significant portion of the designated individuals on the MoHA list are Malaysian (34 out of 77), with a large number of individuals from Southeast Asian countries. There are also names of citizens from conflict zone countries that were identified as recipients of frequent transfers, likely due to their role as informal agents or hawaladars facilitating the movement of funds destined for Malaysian FTFs in such areas. 618. MoHA has domestically designated family members of FTFs (13 out of 77 listed persons) to prevent the financing of FTF activities that lack a humanitarian purpose. 619. Malaysian authorities concluded that designating FTFs alone would have limited practical impact, as they are not always directly named as beneficiaries or parties in financial transactions and are therefore unlikely to be detected by RIs. Instead, FTFs typically receive funds through intermediaries such as middlemen or hawaladars. While publicly identifying and designating FTF family members can act as a strong deterrent, freezing all their financial accounts and assets may lead to unintended consequences, including undue financial hardship. As a result, the Assessment Team has concerns about Malaysia’s use of this measure but note that Malaysian authorities view it as a last resort and relevant safeguards and due processes are in place. The AMLA sets out provisions including for allowing access to frozen assets and revocation of the designations by the review of the Committee for TF TFS at least every six months if there are no reasonable grounds to continue to apply the sanctions. According to the RMP, 90% of FTF family members belong to low-income groups, and their designation could undermine de-radicalisation efforts. Malaysia should periodically review existing safeguards to avoid unintended consequences and ensure that this approach continues to be used only where other measures would be ineffective or have been exhausted and should ensure this measure is used rarely. 620. As of February 2025, Malaysia has frozen a total of EUR 997 900 in relation to TFS implementation. These frozen assets include bank accounts, insurance, and e-wallets, as outlined in the below table. Most frozen assets relate to Malaysia’s implementation of UNSCR 1373 (EUR 965 800). Assets frozen in relation to UNSCR 1267 is EUR 32 100. 621. Malaysia’s efforts to identify assets have resulted in the freezing of accounts and assets not only owned directly by designated individuals, but those that are controlled by the designated individual, adding an additional value of EUR 14 800. These are accounts or assets belonging to the spouse or a minor of the designated entities and accounts of companies in which the designated entities are appointed as a signatory. 622. Overall, the Assessment Team finds that the total value and type of assets frozen in relation to TF TFS is in line with Malaysia’s risk profile. Table 10.1. Status of frozen assets as of February 2025 Sanctions Regime Type of Assets Owned by designated individuals/entities Controlled by designated individuals/entities No. Value (EUR’000) No. Value (EUR’000) UNSCR 1373 Bank accounts 277 83.0 11 2.2 Insurance* 336 842.2 7 10.6 Pilgrimage fund accounts 24 15.5 2 &lt;0.1 Investment/shares accounts 24 10.7 - - Prepaid cards, e-wallets 58 1.7 - - Sub-total 719 953.0 20 12.8 UNSCR 1267 &amp; 1988 Bank accounts 7 1.9 1 0 Insurance* 19 28.2 1 2.0 Pilgrimage fund accounts 4 0.1 - - Prepaid cards, e-wallets 19 0 - - Sub-total 49 30.1 2 2.0 Total 768 983.1 22 14.8 Grand Total 790 accounts, EUR 997 900 *Note: Insurance values consist of the sum assured/cash surrender value. 623. As for the requirements for access to funds and assets that are frozen, the process is outlined on MoHA’s website and in guidelines. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia received 15 requests for access to frozen assets. Eight were directly from designated persons and seven from family members or related parties linked to the designated persons. MoHA has not approved any of these requests, stating that they did not fall within the category of basic expenses and were instead related to business or travel. Footnotes [87] In March 2025, one individual was convicted of TF and terrorism and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Investigations are ongoing for the remaining individuals." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="660. As noted in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”, Malaysia ended trade relations with DPRK in 2018 and imposed visa restrictions on DPRK nationals entering Malaysia. The extradition of a DPRK citizen to the United States in 2021 (see Box 11.1 above) resulted in the cessation of diplomatic relations with DPRK. As of June 2024, there were 12 remaining DPRK customers in Malaysia’s financial system, all of which are natural persons. These accounts were opened before the cessation of diplomatic ties and involved parent-child e-wallets for basic expenditures such as school, and vehicle insurance policies. By December 2024, Malaysia reports that there were only two DPRK customers remaining in the insurance and takaful sectors, both of which are currently inactive. 11.2.1. PF risk understanding 661. Malaysia conducted its first PFRA in 2021, which concluded that Malaysia’s exposure to proliferation activities and PF risks is medium-low. The second 2024 PFRA, an update to the 2021 version, maintained the medium-low risk rating. 662. Both PFRAs used a wide array of quantitative and qualitative data from ministries, LEAs, the FIU, supervisory authorities, private sector entities, and internal and external reports. The assessments took into consideration inherent risks and control measures to derive the final net risk. The analysis of inherent risks encompassed an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, while the analysis of control measures covered legal infrastructure, coordination and cooperation, sectoral oversight, and supervisory and enforcement actions. 663. PF risk understanding of competent authorities and RIs are supported by multiple resources. PFRAs provide overview of key findings including the analysis of DPRK-related PF activities with the information on potential breaches, non-implementation, or sanctions evasion techniques. Malaysian authorities have also undertaken efforts to deepen their understanding of PF trends and risks by actively hosting and participating in international conferences. Outreach activities and guidance have included cases in which DPRK entities used complex corporate structures to conduct PF activities. 664. Malaysia is currently investigating a case that demonstrates its awareness of increasingly complex PF sanctions evasion schemes used by DPRK IT workers known to generate revenue that possibly contributes to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The other case demonstrates a Malaysian RI identifying a potential client with indirect connections to a known DPRK entity identified in a UN Panel of Experts report but not listed by the UN. This demonstrates that Malaysian RIs cast a wider net beyond UNSCR 1718 listings based on the country’s PF risk profile. Box 11.3. RI detection of possible DPRK sanction evasion activity Remote IT Workers In 2024, Malaysia’s FIU received a suspicious report from a RI on a Malaysian individual facilitating remote IT workers with possible linkages to DPRK. Fund analysis conducted by the RI found that the Malaysian received funds from multiple IT companies mostly based in the Country Z, and the funds were subsequently sent to individuals with names originating from Country X and Country Y, bearing similarity to the modus operandi employed by DPRK remote IT workers’ scheme. Additionally, the report highlighted that the Malaysian individual was receiving money for employment by multiple companies. However, the deposits from the payroll provider had recipient name mismatches, leading to suspicion that the deposits were intended for another third party. This information also corroborates with a known PF typology highlighted in the UN Panel of Experts report, warning that DPRK IT workers tend to pose as non-DPRK nationals to obtain employment, with thousands of IT workers dispatched by the DPRK government to live primarily in Country X and Country Y. The FIU also received reports on the individual from other sectors which identified the shareholdings/ownerships of the Malaysian in multiple companies. This case is currently under investigation. E-wallet Application In January 2025, an RI received an online application to open an e-wallet account. During screening, the applicant’s name matched that of a director of a company mentioned in the UN Panel of Experts report on the DPRK in 2018. While the company and the individual are referenced in the report, neither is currently designated by the UN. The application was rejected, and the case was reported to the relevant supervisor and FIU. The RI was previously subject to supervisory TFS enforcement action in 2023. 665. According to the 2024 PFRA, the country’s strategic geographic location as a major transit hub with important shipping and port facilities, its ease of onsite and offsite corporate infrastructure both onshore and offshore, and weaknesses in BO compliance are specifically identified as posing vulnerabilities. Malaysia notes that these inherent vulnerabilities are mitigated to some extent. For example, the visa restrictions imposed on DPRK nationals and prohibitions on them holding a position of director or shareholder of a corporate entity in Malaysia (since 2018) has reduced the overall net PF risks faced by the country. Nonetheless, Malaysia’s strategic geographical position as a regional trade and transit hub significantly heightens its exposure to PF risks, particularly through sanctions evasion schemes that exploit legal persons and corporate structures. The misuse of front and shell companies, coupled with layered ownership and management structures, allow sanctioned entities to obscure their involvement in trade, financial transactions, and supply chains, making detection more challenging. This underscores the critical importance of improving access to timely and accurate access to BO information as highlighted in IO.5. 11.2.2. PF risk Mitigation 666. Malaysia has adopted some PF mitigation measures. CPF guidance has been issued to RIs with references to common schemes and transaction patterns associated with WMD proliferation and PF scenarios. For example, a 2018 FIU report provided information on emerging PF typologies and broad red flag indicators (e.g., presence of directors from PF TFS countries). 667. Malaysia has adopted certain other requirements that help mitigate PF. RIs are required to report STRs where PF is suspected. This requirement extends to PF suspicions more generally, beyond those linked to UNSCR breaches. When implementing PF TFS, RIs are required to consider not only designated persons or entities, but also whether funds or assets are held by related parties. 668. On 2 April 2018, CCM issued a circular prohibiting any nationals, individuals, or entities from the DPRK from becoming directors or shareholders of a company. This serves as an additional preventive step to help control DPRK-related financial activities in Malaysia. In addition, those engaging in export, transhipment, transit or brokering activities are subject to additional sanctions screening by MITI when they apply for necessary permits. 669. Considering Malaysia’s PF risks, it is important that authorities continue to raise awareness of specific red flags and PF typologies to strengthen risk understanding and mitigation. The finalisation of a red flags and typologies report in February 2025 marks a positive step forward. In the past, Malaysian companies have been misused for procuring dual-use goods under previous PF TFS regimes (e.g., Iran). While these regimes are no longer in force, this suggests RIs would benefit from stronger mitigation measures to ensure similar schemes are not used to evade current PF sanctions. Malaysia expects the PF risks emanating from DPRK to further decline based on the cessation of diplomatic relations, lack of presence of DPRK nationals in the financial system and the overall decrease of DPRK nationals in the country. The lack of trade between the two jurisdictions and the prohibition of DPRK nationals holding director or shareholder positions in Malaysian companies are additional considerations. The view that Malaysia’s PF risk is expected to decrease is understandable, however given the complexity of the PF risk involving DPRK, and the techniques employed by sanctions evaders, Malaysia should keep RIs’ understanding of PF sanctions evasion techniques current to ensure greater mitigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="2" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="660. As noted in “Introduction to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks and Context”, Malaysia ended trade relations with DPRK in 2018 and imposed visa restrictions on DPRK nationals entering Malaysia. The extradition of a DPRK citizen to the United States in 2021 (see Box 11.1 above) resulted in the cessation of diplomatic relations with DPRK. As of June 2024, there were 12 remaining DPRK customers in Malaysia’s financial system, all of which are natural persons. These accounts were opened before the cessation of diplomatic ties and involved parent-child e-wallets for basic expenditures such as school, and vehicle insurance policies. By December 2024, Malaysia reports that there were only two DPRK customers remaining in the insurance and takaful sectors, both of which are currently inactive. 11.2.1. PF risk understanding 661. Malaysia conducted its first PFRA in 2021, which concluded that Malaysia’s exposure to proliferation activities and PF risks is medium-low. The second 2024 PFRA, an update to the 2021 version, maintained the medium-low risk rating. 662. Both PFRAs used a wide array of quantitative and qualitative data from ministries, LEAs, the FIU, supervisory authorities, private sector entities, and internal and external reports. The assessments took into consideration inherent risks and control measures to derive the final net risk. The analysis of inherent risks encompassed an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, while the analysis of control measures covered legal infrastructure, coordination and cooperation, sectoral oversight, and supervisory and enforcement actions. 663. PF risk understanding of competent authorities and RIs are supported by multiple resources. PFRAs provide overview of key findings including the analysis of DPRK-related PF activities with the information on potential breaches, non-implementation, or sanctions evasion techniques. Malaysian authorities have also undertaken efforts to deepen their understanding of PF trends and risks by actively hosting and participating in international conferences. Outreach activities and guidance have included cases in which DPRK entities used complex corporate structures to conduct PF activities. 664. Malaysia is currently investigating a case that demonstrates its awareness of increasingly complex PF sanctions evasion schemes used by DPRK IT workers known to generate revenue that possibly contributes to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The other case demonstrates a Malaysian RI identifying a potential client with indirect connections to a known DPRK entity identified in a UN Panel of Experts report but not listed by the UN. This demonstrates that Malaysian RIs cast a wider net beyond UNSCR 1718 listings based on the country’s PF risk profile. Box 11.3. RI detection of possible DPRK sanction evasion activity Remote IT Workers In 2024, Malaysia’s FIU received a suspicious report from a RI on a Malaysian individual facilitating remote IT workers with possible linkages to DPRK. Fund analysis conducted by the RI found that the Malaysian received funds from multiple IT companies mostly based in the Country Z, and the funds were subsequently sent to individuals with names originating from Country X and Country Y, bearing similarity to the modus operandi employed by DPRK remote IT workers’ scheme. Additionally, the report highlighted that the Malaysian individual was receiving money for employment by multiple companies. However, the deposits from the payroll provider had recipient name mismatches, leading to suspicion that the deposits were intended for another third party. This information also corroborates with a known PF typology highlighted in the UN Panel of Experts report, warning that DPRK IT workers tend to pose as non-DPRK nationals to obtain employment, with thousands of IT workers dispatched by the DPRK government to live primarily in Country X and Country Y. The FIU also received reports on the individual from other sectors which identified the shareholdings/ownerships of the Malaysian in multiple companies. This case is currently under investigation. E-wallet Application In January 2025, an RI received an online application to open an e-wallet account. During screening, the applicant’s name matched that of a director of a company mentioned in the UN Panel of Experts report on the DPRK in 2018. While the company and the individual are referenced in the report, neither is currently designated by the UN. The application was rejected, and the case was reported to the relevant supervisor and FIU. The RI was previously subject to supervisory TFS enforcement action in 2023. 665. According to the 2024 PFRA, the country’s strategic geographic location as a major transit hub with important shipping and port facilities, its ease of onsite and offsite corporate infrastructure both onshore and offshore, and weaknesses in BO compliance are specifically identified as posing vulnerabilities. Malaysia notes that these inherent vulnerabilities are mitigated to some extent. For example, the visa restrictions imposed on DPRK nationals and prohibitions on them holding a position of director or shareholder of a corporate entity in Malaysia (since 2018) has reduced the overall net PF risks faced by the country. Nonetheless, Malaysia’s strategic geographical position as a regional trade and transit hub significantly heightens its exposure to PF risks, particularly through sanctions evasion schemes that exploit legal persons and corporate structures. The misuse of front and shell companies, coupled with layered ownership and management structures, allow sanctioned entities to obscure their involvement in trade, financial transactions, and supply chains, making detection more challenging. This underscores the critical importance of improving access to timely and accurate access to BO information as highlighted in IO.5. 11.2.2. PF risk Mitigation 666. Malaysia has adopted some PF mitigation measures. CPF guidance has been issued to RIs with references to common schemes and transaction patterns associated with WMD proliferation and PF scenarios. For example, a 2018 FIU report provided information on emerging PF typologies and broad red flag indicators (e.g., presence of directors from PF TFS countries). 667. Malaysia has adopted certain other requirements that help mitigate PF. RIs are required to report STRs where PF is suspected. This requirement extends to PF suspicions more generally, beyond those linked to UNSCR breaches. When implementing PF TFS, RIs are required to consider not only designated persons or entities, but also whether funds or assets are held by related parties. 668. On 2 April 2018, CCM issued a circular prohibiting any nationals, individuals, or entities from the DPRK from becoming directors or shareholders of a company. This serves as an additional preventive step to help control DPRK-related financial activities in Malaysia. In addition, those engaging in export, transhipment, transit or brokering activities are subject to additional sanctions screening by MITI when they apply for necessary permits. 669. Considering Malaysia’s PF risks, it is important that authorities continue to raise awareness of specific red flags and PF typologies to strengthen risk understanding and mitigation. The finalisation of a red flags and typologies report in February 2025 marks a positive step forward. In the past, Malaysian companies have been misused for procuring dual-use goods under previous PF TFS regimes (e.g., Iran). While these regimes are no longer in force, this suggests RIs would benefit from stronger mitigation measures to ensure similar schemes are not used to evade current PF sanctions. Malaysia expects the PF risks emanating from DPRK to further decline based on the cessation of diplomatic relations, lack of presence of DPRK nationals in the financial system and the overall decrease of DPRK nationals in the country. The lack of trade between the two jurisdictions and the prohibition of DPRK nationals holding director or shareholder positions in Malaysian companies are additional considerations. The view that Malaysia’s PF risk is expected to decrease is understandable, however given the complexity of the PF risk involving DPRK, and the techniques employed by sanctions evaders, Malaysia should keep RIs’ understanding of PF sanctions evasion techniques current to ensure greater mitigation." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions 138. As noted in the Technical Compliance Annex, Malaysia applies preventive measures to all categories of FIs and DNFBPs except custodian services in relation to capital markets. This is limited to banks, subsidiaries of banks and trust companies. Malaysia assesses these custodians to be low risk for ML/TF due to the financial activity being limited to clients of fund managers which are subjected to AML/CFT requirements. Additionally, custodians do not have direct interactions with the client of the fund managers, as their role is limited to the safekeeping of cash and liquid securities. Fund managers are expected to conduct CDD on individual investors who invest with fund managers. The Assessment Team considers Malaysia’s risk-based justification for this minor exemption to be reasonable . 1.3.2. Simplified and enhanced measures Simplified Measures to Promote Financial Inclusion 139. Financial inclusion is a governmental priority in Malaysia. In line with this agenda, Malaysia has introduced simplified measures to promote further financial inclusion. For example, RIs that are agent banks serving the unbanked/underbanked population are allowed to facilitate the opening of bank accounts with limited features without requiring customers to visit a bank branch. Malaysia ensures these measures are in line with risk by permitting delayed CDD only where limits are placed on the types and/or number of transactions that can be performed. 140. Malaysia also allows RIs to apply simplified measures where ML/TF risks are assessed as low. E-money accounts with a limit below RM 3 000 (EUR 647) may qualify for simplified CDD but can only be used for domestic purchases. To mitigate risk, these accounts do not support cash withdrawals or fund transfers. Simplified CDD can also be applied to e-money with account limits between RM 3 000 and RM 4 999 (EUR 1 077) when certain conditions are met. MSBs offering money-changing and currency services below RM 3 000 may also apply simplified CDD. Technological advancements and the introduction of e-KYC solutions in the financial sector have significantly enhanced the digitalisation of customer identification and verification processes, also becoming a key enabler for financial inclusion. In April 2024, the BNM revised its e-KYC policy to ensure the safe and secure application of e-KYC technology within the financial sector, while maintaining comprehensive AML/CFT control measures. Similarly, SC and LFSA have also outlined e-KYC requirements in their guidelines and circulars to ensure that RIs and specified entities effectively implement sufficient controls and a reliable e-KYC system for AML/CFT compliance. Enhanced Measures 141. RIs apply enhanced due diligence (EDD) based on relevant risk factors specified in the AML/CFT/CPF and TFS Guidelines, particularly those identified in the NRA and during institutional risk assessments. This includes a higher emphasis on suspected mule account holders, politically exposed persons (PEPs), residents of higher-risk jurisdictions, and customers from high-risk sectors, such as DPMS and DPI issuers. Further in 2019, several enhancements to address higher-risk scenarios were introduced as follows: Table 1.3. Enhanced measures imposed on RIs Higher Risk Scenarios Enhanced Measures Justification Receipts of Third-Party Deposits Requirement to assess the ML/TF risks associated with third-party deposits and prohibition of third-party payments from a customer’s account to a third-party account. To mitigate the risk of funds transferred to a person unknown to the reporting institution. Government-Linked Companies and State-Owned Corporations Removal of the exemption from full CDD requirements. To address risks stemming from legal entities influenced by public officials, considering corruption and abuse of power cases involving senior officers (e.g., 1MDB). Nominee Services Automatic EDD on customers who require nominee services for the gatekeepers. To mitigate risks from opaque relationships, especially for lawyers and company secretaries who are professional enablers, as identified under the NRA 2020. Money-changing and Wholesale Currency Transactions (by banks and MSB operators) Requirement to conduct specific CDD (six data points) on transactions between RM 3 000 and RM 10 000, while standard CDD is required for transactions above RM 10 000. To mitigate the higher risks of MSBs as identified under the NRA 2020. E-Money Products Standard CDD applies to account limits equivalent to RM 5 000 and above or have higher risk functionalities such as cross-border wire transfer and cash withdrawals. To mitigate risks arising from extensive use of cash in the sector. 142. In 2019, Malaysia reduced the CTR threshold from RM 50 000 (EUR 10 775) to RM 25 000 (EUR 5 388). These changes were introduced because of the 2017 NRA, which identified risks associated with cash transactions (e.g., corruption). Given Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy and the risks from large cash transactions, the country should continue mitigating these risks by implementing enhanced measures in high-risk sectors such as DPMS. Malaysia has identified DPMS as high risk due to the absence of a specific licensing or registration regime. The Assessment Team considers it necessary to review whether current risk-mitigation measures for this sector are adequate. 143. Overall, the Assessment Team finds that the results of Malaysia’s ML/TF risk assessments largely inform and support the application of enhanced measures for higher-risk scenarios, and simplified measures for lower-risk scenarios." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="1.3.1. Exemptions 138. As noted in the Technical Compliance Annex, Malaysia applies preventive measures to all categories of FIs and DNFBPs except custodian services in relation to capital markets. This is limited to banks, subsidiaries of banks and trust companies. Malaysia assesses these custodians to be low risk for ML/TF due to the financial activity being limited to clients of fund managers which are subjected to AML/CFT requirements. Additionally, custodians do not have direct interactions with the client of the fund managers, as their role is limited to the safekeeping of cash and liquid securities. Fund managers are expected to conduct CDD on individual investors who invest with fund managers. The Assessment Team considers Malaysia’s risk-based justification for this minor exemption to be reasonable . 1.3.2. Simplified and enhanced measures Simplified Measures to Promote Financial Inclusion 139. Financial inclusion is a governmental priority in Malaysia. In line with this agenda, Malaysia has introduced simplified measures to promote further financial inclusion. For example, RIs that are agent banks serving the unbanked/underbanked population are allowed to facilitate the opening of bank accounts with limited features without requiring customers to visit a bank branch. Malaysia ensures these measures are in line with risk by permitting delayed CDD only where limits are placed on the types and/or number of transactions that can be performed. 140. Malaysia also allows RIs to apply simplified measures where ML/TF risks are assessed as low. E-money accounts with a limit below RM 3 000 (EUR 647) may qualify for simplified CDD but can only be used for domestic purchases. To mitigate risk, these accounts do not support cash withdrawals or fund transfers. Simplified CDD can also be applied to e-money with account limits between RM 3 000 and RM 4 999 (EUR 1 077) when certain conditions are met. MSBs offering money-changing and currency services below RM 3 000 may also apply simplified CDD. Technological advancements and the introduction of e-KYC solutions in the financial sector have significantly enhanced the digitalisation of customer identification and verification processes, also becoming a key enabler for financial inclusion. In April 2024, the BNM revised its e-KYC policy to ensure the safe and secure application of e-KYC technology within the financial sector, while maintaining comprehensive AML/CFT control measures. Similarly, SC and LFSA have also outlined e-KYC requirements in their guidelines and circulars to ensure that RIs and specified entities effectively implement sufficient controls and a reliable e-KYC system for AML/CFT compliance. Enhanced Measures 141. RIs apply enhanced due diligence (EDD) based on relevant risk factors specified in the AML/CFT/CPF and TFS Guidelines, particularly those identified in the NRA and during institutional risk assessments. This includes a higher emphasis on suspected mule account holders, politically exposed persons (PEPs), residents of higher-risk jurisdictions, and customers from high-risk sectors, such as DPMS and DPI issuers. Further in 2019, several enhancements to address higher-risk scenarios were introduced as follows: Table 1.3. Enhanced measures imposed on RIs Higher Risk Scenarios Enhanced Measures Justification Receipts of Third-Party Deposits Requirement to assess the ML/TF risks associated with third-party deposits and prohibition of third-party payments from a customer’s account to a third-party account. To mitigate the risk of funds transferred to a person unknown to the reporting institution. Government-Linked Companies and State-Owned Corporations Removal of the exemption from full CDD requirements. To address risks stemming from legal entities influenced by public officials, considering corruption and abuse of power cases involving senior officers (e.g., 1MDB). Nominee Services Automatic EDD on customers who require nominee services for the gatekeepers. To mitigate risks from opaque relationships, especially for lawyers and company secretaries who are professional enablers, as identified under the NRA 2020. Money-changing and Wholesale Currency Transactions (by banks and MSB operators) Requirement to conduct specific CDD (six data points) on transactions between RM 3 000 and RM 10 000, while standard CDD is required for transactions above RM 10 000. To mitigate the higher risks of MSBs as identified under the NRA 2020. E-Money Products Standard CDD applies to account limits equivalent to RM 5 000 and above or have higher risk functionalities such as cross-border wire transfer and cash withdrawals. To mitigate risks arising from extensive use of cash in the sector. 142. In 2019, Malaysia reduced the CTR threshold from RM 50 000 (EUR 10 775) to RM 25 000 (EUR 5 388). These changes were introduced because of the 2017 NRA, which identified risks associated with cash transactions (e.g., corruption). Given Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy and the risks from large cash transactions, the country should continue mitigating these risks by implementing enhanced measures in high-risk sectors such as DPMS. Malaysia has identified DPMS as high risk due to the absence of a specific licensing or registration regime. The Assessment Team considers it necessary to review whether current risk-mitigation measures for this sector are adequate. 143. Overall, the Assessment Team finds that the results of Malaysia’s ML/TF risk assessments largely inform and support the application of enhanced measures for higher-risk scenarios, and simplified measures for lower-risk scenarios." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.3.1. FIU 189. The FIU has 47 MOUs with foreign FIUs. It also uses Egmont Group templates and Egmont Secure Web to exchange information with other Egmont members. For non-Egmont members, the FIU shares information upon receiving certain undertakings from the receiving FIU. The FIU requests information for its own analysis and on behalf of LEAs and feedback from foreign FIUs on the quality of its requests is generally positive. Outgoing requests are prioritised according to the five high-risk predicate offences identified in the NRA. 190. The FIU made 180 outgoing requests for information to foreign FIUs during the assessment period, with 42% of these requests made in 2024. Of these, 111 requests related to high-risk crime types (see table below). There were only 28 requests relating to ML and the low number of requests for drugs (3) is not in line with Malaysia’s risk profile. Most outgoing requests were made to neighbouring countries, or jurisdictions with strong ties to Malaysia. There were only three requests related to human trafficking and none for other medium-high risk crime types (tax crimes, forgery, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation). Noting the comparatively low number of formal MLA requests, it is not clear if and how requests for information are developed into MLA requests where necessary (e.g., to use evidence in court, to execute coercive measures, to arrest individuals, etc.). The FIU made 17 outgoing requests related to terrorism and TF. Most international requests relating to terrorism and TF are made directly by the RMP rather than the FIU (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Malaysia advised that, as identified in the NRA, terrorism and TF risk is declining due to the fall of ISIL, absence or death of prominent domestic ISIL leaders, effective enforcement and preventive measures, and because most TF cases are self-financed. Table 2.7. FIU outgoing requests by offence Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Feb (2025) Total Corruption 10 7 5 3 6 22 1 54 Fraud 5 1 8 5 11 8 - 38 ML 1 - 7 3 3 13 1 28 Terrorism and TF 5 4 2 2 1 3 - 17 Organised crimes 1 - - - - 15 - 16 Smuggling - - 1 2 - 10 1 14 PF - - - - - 5 - 5 Human trafficking 2 - - 1 - - - 3 Drug trafficking 1 - - 1 1 - - 3 Illegal remittance 1 - - - - - 1 2 Total 26 12 23 17 22 76 4 180 191. Since the FICG’s establishment in 2016, a regional body of FIUs, Malaysia’s FIU has actively participated in information sharing activities relating to projects such as unregistered and suspicious remittance, TF disruption, fraud, corruption and TBML. This provides an additional avenue to seek information from neighbouring jurisdictions to assist with specific analysis. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 192. Most informal forms of international cooperation (i.e. cooperation outside MLA and extradition) are conducted by the RMP (2019 requests during the reporting period), RMCD (161) and MACC (152). LEAs leverage a wide range of available tools/platforms to exchange information, including the National Central Bureau Unit (NCB)/INTERPOL, ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL) and Asset Recovery Interagency Network Asia Pacific (ARIN-AP). In addition, LEAs can exchange information with foreign counterparts on the basis of reciprocity. To facilitate international cooperation, RMP has 52 liaison officers strategically located in 10 consulates, embassies and organisations around the world. Different divisions within RMP regularly exchange information with foreign counterparts either via the centralised coordinator NCB/INTERPOL or directly via established contacts. Requests tend to be operational in nature and relate to intelligence-sharing, production of documents and requests for joint operations. Box 2.5. Example of joint operation on illegal gambling In June 2024, CID’s Gambling Prevention Unit conducted a joint operation with Country S Police Force to bust an illegal gambling syndicate operating in the Country S’s market. The syndicate operated at three different locations in Malaysia. The CID arrested four Country S citizens and two Malaysian citizens. Investigations have been conducted through three Investigation Papers. On 9 July 2024, six individuals were charged and convicted under section 6(1) of the Betting Act 1953. The accused were fined between EUR 521 to EUR 625 each. The four foreign individuals were handed over to Country S Police Force for further action. Table 2.8. RMP’s divisions outgoing requests (by offence) Department 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total TF 82 81 66 54 56 26 29 394 NCB INTERPOL 16 30 1 - 11 2 - 60 SB 66 51 65 54 45 24 29 334 ML 4 9 4 8 21 13 16 75 NCB INTERPOL - 1 - - - 7 2 10 AMLA 4 8 4 8 21 6 14 65 Human Trafficking 2 - 4 3 4 4 1 18 NCB INTERPOL 2 - 4 3 4 4 1 18 Fraud 29 68 432 324 311 232 5 1 401 NCB INTERPOL 26 68 430 323 311 232 - 1,390 CCID 3 - 2 1 - - 5 11 Drug Trafficking 7 34 45 12 8 18 7 131 NCB INTERPOL 4 31 40 10 3 10 4 102 NCID 3 3 5 2 5 8 3 29 Total 124 192 551 401 400 293 58 2 019 NCB INTERPOL 48 130 475 336 329 255 7 1 580 Respective RMP Department 76 62 76 65 71 38 51 439 Note: Anti-Money Laundering Act Unit (AMLA), Commercial Crime Investigation Department (CCID) and National Criminal Investigation Department (NCID). 193. RMP made more than 2 000 outgoing requests during the reporting period, leading to a number of positive outcomes, including the opening of 27 investigations on fraud cases. RMP demonstrated its effective use of informal cooperation, which resulted in the arrest of 261 individuals for fraud and 135 individuals for drug offences and the seizure of approximately EUR 76 million in drugs. The active use of informal cooperation by the RMP is generally in line with Malaysia’s risks and highlights its capacity to use international cooperation. 194. The MACC has five designated liaison officers responsible for exchanging information with foreign counterparts, including the Australian Federal Police, National Crime Agency United Kingdom, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Singapore, Commercial Affairs Department Singapore, Singapore Police Force, United States FBI, and United States Office of Attorney General. The MACC continues to devote significant resources to international cooperation for AML purposes in its ongoing 1MDB investigation. Since 2015, MACC formalised an additional 11 MOUs including with Uzbekistan, Egypt, China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Brunei Darussalam, for a total of 16 MOUs to enable mutual exchange of information. During the review period, MACC sent 152 requests on corruption and related ML to its foreign counterparts, resulting in the charging of customs officers, the CEO and president of a statutory body and the former Finance Minister. Table 2.9. Outgoing requests by MACC concerning corruption and related ML Outgoing requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total United Kingdom 7 1 4 6 6 22 5 51 Singapore - - 7 9 4 8 2 30 France 2 2 6 4 - 1 2 17 USA - - - 5 4 3 4 16 Switzerland - 3 4 3 1 - - 11 Australia - - - 5 4 - 1 10 Kuwait - 2 2 - 3 - - 7 Mauritius - - 3 - 1 - 1 5 Luxembourg - - - 3 - 1 - 4 Germany - - - - - 1 - 1 Total 9 8 26 35 23 36 15 152 195. NCB INTERPOL send requests on behalf of PERHILITAN, IDM and MMEA who use international requests and cooperate internationally to a moderate degree. International cooperation by the RMP and MMEA with neighbouring jurisdictions has led to the extradition of four individuals in 2023 (now on trial in Malaysia) and 21 arrests for human trafficking and smuggling offences in 2024. Table 2.10. Outgoing INTERPOL requests sent on behalf of other agencies 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total RMCD 245 216 203 165 156 115 60 1 160 Wildlife (PERHILITAN) - 2 3 1 2 9 1 18 Forestry - 1 - 6 2 2 - 11 MMEA - - 1 - 1 3 1 6 Total 245 219 207 172 161 129 62 1 195 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 196. The primary FI, DNFBP and VASPs supervisors actively engage with counterparts and regularly seek cooperation and exchange information as part of their enforcement and supervision activities. BNM, SC and LFSA maintain a number of MOUs. Malaysia is a signatory to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MMoU), and the SC became a signatory to the IOSCO Asia Pacific Regional Committee Multilateral MOU for Supervision Cooperation and became a member of IOSCO’s AML Network in 2024. In exercising its investigative powers, BNM made 16 outgoing enforcement requests for financial and BO information to 14 countries relating to illegal deposit-taking and remittances. As a supervisor, BNM seeks information to conduct fit and proper checks (137 requests), regularly participates in supervisory colleges or bilateral meetings, and requests information from jurisdictions that host branches or subsidiaries of Malaysian headquartered banks and considers this information as part of its supervisory approach (21 requests). 197. In exercising its investigative powers, the SC made 145 international cooperation requests to 28 jurisdictions to support investigations into fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and ML. The SC commonly seeks banking information and transaction records, trading records, BO information and other information. Documents can be requested through IOSCO’s platform. For its supervisory role, the SC conducted 417 fit and proper checks between 2019-2025. From 2019-2025, the LFSA’s investigation team made 17 requests relating to ML and predicate offences while supervisors made 85 requests to foreign counterparts for fit and proper vetting purposes. No information was provided on the efforts of other supervisors to seek international cooperation. Table 2.11. Outgoing requests relating to enforcement cases by supervisors 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total SC 28 17 36 18 30 15 1 145 LFSA 7 1 1 1 3 4 - 17 BNM 1 - 1 - 2 12 - 16 CCM - - - - - - - - Total 36 18 38 19 35 31 1 178 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 198. Since 2015, the RMCD has signed eight additional MOUs with foreign counterparts for customs cooperation, including intelligence and investigation information exchanges related to customs documents, (e.g., customs forms, import/export forms, transshipment documents and manifests). It has a number of liaison officers and staff posted to Belgium, Indonesia and China to assist with intelligence and enforcement-related exchanges of information. 199. Since 2019, RMCD sent 161 requests, to its foreign counterparts with most requests related to the smuggling of cigarettes (50), beer/liquor/wine (29) and drugs (20). Requests were made primarily to neighbouring countries and trading partners, and all have been fulfilled. RMCD also participates in a Malaysia-Indonesia Task Force on Narcotics and has participated in several operations with regional partners, mainly relating to drugs and smuggling activities. 200. The IRBM exchanges information with foreign counterparts based on double taxation agreements, tax information exchange agreements, and the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. IRBM introduced a case management system in 2019, and between 2019 and February 2025, it made 87 requests for information related to basic and BO information, financial records and other records (e.g., accounting). Of these, 85 were fulfilled and two are pending. Malaysia notes that 64 of 87 outgoing requests related to tax investigations, but none related to ML or any other ML predicate offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 2.3.1. FIU 189. The FIU has 47 MOUs with foreign FIUs. It also uses Egmont Group templates and Egmont Secure Web to exchange information with other Egmont members. For non-Egmont members, the FIU shares information upon receiving certain undertakings from the receiving FIU. The FIU requests information for its own analysis and on behalf of LEAs and feedback from foreign FIUs on the quality of its requests is generally positive. Outgoing requests are prioritised according to the five high-risk predicate offences identified in the NRA. 190. The FIU made 180 outgoing requests for information to foreign FIUs during the assessment period, with 42% of these requests made in 2024. Of these, 111 requests related to high-risk crime types (see table below). There were only 28 requests relating to ML and the low number of requests for drugs (3) is not in line with Malaysia’s risk profile. Most outgoing requests were made to neighbouring countries, or jurisdictions with strong ties to Malaysia. There were only three requests related to human trafficking and none for other medium-high risk crime types (tax crimes, forgery, environmental crimes and sexual exploitation). Noting the comparatively low number of formal MLA requests, it is not clear if and how requests for information are developed into MLA requests where necessary (e.g., to use evidence in court, to execute coercive measures, to arrest individuals, etc.). The FIU made 17 outgoing requests related to terrorism and TF. Most international requests relating to terrorism and TF are made directly by the RMP rather than the FIU (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Malaysia advised that, as identified in the NRA, terrorism and TF risk is declining due to the fall of ISIL, absence or death of prominent domestic ISIL leaders, effective enforcement and preventive measures, and because most TF cases are self-financed. Table 2.7. FIU outgoing requests by offence Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Feb (2025) Total Corruption 10 7 5 3 6 22 1 54 Fraud 5 1 8 5 11 8 - 38 ML 1 - 7 3 3 13 1 28 Terrorism and TF 5 4 2 2 1 3 - 17 Organised crimes 1 - - - - 15 - 16 Smuggling - - 1 2 - 10 1 14 PF - - - - - 5 - 5 Human trafficking 2 - - 1 - - - 3 Drug trafficking 1 - - 1 1 - - 3 Illegal remittance 1 - - - - - 1 2 Total 26 12 23 17 22 76 4 180 191. Since the FICG’s establishment in 2016, a regional body of FIUs, Malaysia’s FIU has actively participated in information sharing activities relating to projects such as unregistered and suspicious remittance, TF disruption, fraud, corruption and TBML. This provides an additional avenue to seek information from neighbouring jurisdictions to assist with specific analysis. 2.3.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 192. Most informal forms of international cooperation (i.e. cooperation outside MLA and extradition) are conducted by the RMP (2019 requests during the reporting period), RMCD (161) and MACC (152). LEAs leverage a wide range of available tools/platforms to exchange information, including the National Central Bureau Unit (NCB)/INTERPOL, ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL) and Asset Recovery Interagency Network Asia Pacific (ARIN-AP). In addition, LEAs can exchange information with foreign counterparts on the basis of reciprocity. To facilitate international cooperation, RMP has 52 liaison officers strategically located in 10 consulates, embassies and organisations around the world. Different divisions within RMP regularly exchange information with foreign counterparts either via the centralised coordinator NCB/INTERPOL or directly via established contacts. Requests tend to be operational in nature and relate to intelligence-sharing, production of documents and requests for joint operations. Box 2.5. Example of joint operation on illegal gambling In June 2024, CID’s Gambling Prevention Unit conducted a joint operation with Country S Police Force to bust an illegal gambling syndicate operating in the Country S’s market. The syndicate operated at three different locations in Malaysia. The CID arrested four Country S citizens and two Malaysian citizens. Investigations have been conducted through three Investigation Papers. On 9 July 2024, six individuals were charged and convicted under section 6(1) of the Betting Act 1953. The accused were fined between EUR 521 to EUR 625 each. The four foreign individuals were handed over to Country S Police Force for further action. Table 2.8. RMP’s divisions outgoing requests (by offence) Department 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total TF 82 81 66 54 56 26 29 394 NCB INTERPOL 16 30 1 - 11 2 - 60 SB 66 51 65 54 45 24 29 334 ML 4 9 4 8 21 13 16 75 NCB INTERPOL - 1 - - - 7 2 10 AMLA 4 8 4 8 21 6 14 65 Human Trafficking 2 - 4 3 4 4 1 18 NCB INTERPOL 2 - 4 3 4 4 1 18 Fraud 29 68 432 324 311 232 5 1 401 NCB INTERPOL 26 68 430 323 311 232 - 1,390 CCID 3 - 2 1 - - 5 11 Drug Trafficking 7 34 45 12 8 18 7 131 NCB INTERPOL 4 31 40 10 3 10 4 102 NCID 3 3 5 2 5 8 3 29 Total 124 192 551 401 400 293 58 2 019 NCB INTERPOL 48 130 475 336 329 255 7 1 580 Respective RMP Department 76 62 76 65 71 38 51 439 Note: Anti-Money Laundering Act Unit (AMLA), Commercial Crime Investigation Department (CCID) and National Criminal Investigation Department (NCID). 193. RMP made more than 2 000 outgoing requests during the reporting period, leading to a number of positive outcomes, including the opening of 27 investigations on fraud cases. RMP demonstrated its effective use of informal cooperation, which resulted in the arrest of 261 individuals for fraud and 135 individuals for drug offences and the seizure of approximately EUR 76 million in drugs. The active use of informal cooperation by the RMP is generally in line with Malaysia’s risks and highlights its capacity to use international cooperation. 194. The MACC has five designated liaison officers responsible for exchanging information with foreign counterparts, including the Australian Federal Police, National Crime Agency United Kingdom, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Singapore, Commercial Affairs Department Singapore, Singapore Police Force, United States FBI, and United States Office of Attorney General. The MACC continues to devote significant resources to international cooperation for AML purposes in its ongoing 1MDB investigation. Since 2015, MACC formalised an additional 11 MOUs including with Uzbekistan, Egypt, China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Brunei Darussalam, for a total of 16 MOUs to enable mutual exchange of information. During the review period, MACC sent 152 requests on corruption and related ML to its foreign counterparts, resulting in the charging of customs officers, the CEO and president of a statutory body and the former Finance Minister. Table 2.9. Outgoing requests by MACC concerning corruption and related ML Outgoing requests 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total United Kingdom 7 1 4 6 6 22 5 51 Singapore - - 7 9 4 8 2 30 France 2 2 6 4 - 1 2 17 USA - - - 5 4 3 4 16 Switzerland - 3 4 3 1 - - 11 Australia - - - 5 4 - 1 10 Kuwait - 2 2 - 3 - - 7 Mauritius - - 3 - 1 - 1 5 Luxembourg - - - 3 - 1 - 4 Germany - - - - - 1 - 1 Total 9 8 26 35 23 36 15 152 195. NCB INTERPOL send requests on behalf of PERHILITAN, IDM and MMEA who use international requests and cooperate internationally to a moderate degree. International cooperation by the RMP and MMEA with neighbouring jurisdictions has led to the extradition of four individuals in 2023 (now on trial in Malaysia) and 21 arrests for human trafficking and smuggling offences in 2024. Table 2.10. Outgoing INTERPOL requests sent on behalf of other agencies 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total RMCD 245 216 203 165 156 115 60 1 160 Wildlife (PERHILITAN) - 2 3 1 2 9 1 18 Forestry - 1 - 6 2 2 - 11 MMEA - - 1 - 1 3 1 6 Total 245 219 207 172 161 129 62 1 195 2.3.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 196. The primary FI, DNFBP and VASPs supervisors actively engage with counterparts and regularly seek cooperation and exchange information as part of their enforcement and supervision activities. BNM, SC and LFSA maintain a number of MOUs. Malaysia is a signatory to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MMoU), and the SC became a signatory to the IOSCO Asia Pacific Regional Committee Multilateral MOU for Supervision Cooperation and became a member of IOSCO’s AML Network in 2024. In exercising its investigative powers, BNM made 16 outgoing enforcement requests for financial and BO information to 14 countries relating to illegal deposit-taking and remittances. As a supervisor, BNM seeks information to conduct fit and proper checks (137 requests), regularly participates in supervisory colleges or bilateral meetings, and requests information from jurisdictions that host branches or subsidiaries of Malaysian headquartered banks and considers this information as part of its supervisory approach (21 requests). 197. In exercising its investigative powers, the SC made 145 international cooperation requests to 28 jurisdictions to support investigations into fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and ML. The SC commonly seeks banking information and transaction records, trading records, BO information and other information. Documents can be requested through IOSCO’s platform. For its supervisory role, the SC conducted 417 fit and proper checks between 2019-2025. From 2019-2025, the LFSA’s investigation team made 17 requests relating to ML and predicate offences while supervisors made 85 requests to foreign counterparts for fit and proper vetting purposes. No information was provided on the efforts of other supervisors to seek international cooperation. Table 2.11. Outgoing requests relating to enforcement cases by supervisors 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total SC 28 17 36 18 30 15 1 145 LFSA 7 1 1 1 3 4 - 17 BNM 1 - 1 - 2 12 - 16 CCM - - - - - - - - Total 36 18 38 19 35 31 1 178 2.3.4. Customs and tax authorities 198. Since 2015, the RMCD has signed eight additional MOUs with foreign counterparts for customs cooperation, including intelligence and investigation information exchanges related to customs documents, (e.g., customs forms, import/export forms, transshipment documents and manifests). It has a number of liaison officers and staff posted to Belgium, Indonesia and China to assist with intelligence and enforcement-related exchanges of information. 199. Since 2019, RMCD sent 161 requests, to its foreign counterparts with most requests related to the smuggling of cigarettes (50), beer/liquor/wine (29) and drugs (20). Requests were made primarily to neighbouring countries and trading partners, and all have been fulfilled. RMCD also participates in a Malaysia-Indonesia Task Force on Narcotics and has participated in several operations with regional partners, mainly relating to drugs and smuggling activities. 200. The IRBM exchanges information with foreign counterparts based on double taxation agreements, tax information exchange agreements, and the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. IRBM introduced a case management system in 2019, and between 2019 and February 2025, it made 87 requests for information related to basic and BO information, financial records and other records (e.g., accounting). Of these, 85 were fulfilled and two are pending. Malaysia notes that 64 of 87 outgoing requests related to tax investigations, but none related to ML or any other ML predicate offence." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="240. Most FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the level and nature of their ML/TF risk. Risk understanding in larger FIs is more sophisticated and generally well aligned with the main risks identified in the NRA, particularly fraud. Understanding of risk in smaller FIs is less developed, but commensurate with their more limited risk exposure. 241. FIs and VASPs have processes in place to conduct institutional risk assessments (IRAs) periodically. Many of the large banks’ IRAs link to group-wide/global risk assessments but also include a focus on the specific risks heavily weighted in Malaysia (e.g., corruption). This is particularly the case in Labuan, where most of the large FIs are branches or subsidiaries of global entities. 242. Most FIs and VASPs take account of factors such as customer, product, transaction channels and STRs as part of their IRAs. Most VASPs also rely on blockchain analytics to complement their understanding. Many of the FIs and VASPs contribute to the NRA, either by direct consultations or indirect data submission through the supervisory authorities. Most of the FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team recognised fraud, including money mules, as one of the most material risk factors their businesses face. Corruption was also highlighted to some extent and FIs were aware of the enforcement action taken by the authorities in relation to 1MDB. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of TF risks, but the cases where such risks materialise appear to be limited. 243. Malaysia amended the AMLA guidelines in 2022 to make it mandatory for FIs and VASPs to incorporate NRA findings into their own IRAs. The BNM confirmed that banks and ITOs comply with the guidelines and IRAs are suitably aligned with the NRA. For the other sectors, supervisors usually verify the IRAs are appropriate as a part of onsite examinations and regulatory failings relating to IRAs are low and mainly involved a small number of Labuan FIs, which had not fully aligned their IRAs with the latest NRA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="240. Most FIs and VASPs have a good understanding of the level and nature of their ML/TF risk. Risk understanding in larger FIs is more sophisticated and generally well aligned with the main risks identified in the NRA, particularly fraud. Understanding of risk in smaller FIs is less developed, but commensurate with their more limited risk exposure. 241. FIs and VASPs have processes in place to conduct institutional risk assessments (IRAs) periodically. Many of the large banks’ IRAs link to group-wide/global risk assessments but also include a focus on the specific risks heavily weighted in Malaysia (e.g., corruption). This is particularly the case in Labuan, where most of the large FIs are branches or subsidiaries of global entities. 242. Most FIs and VASPs take account of factors such as customer, product, transaction channels and STRs as part of their IRAs. Most VASPs also rely on blockchain analytics to complement their understanding. Many of the FIs and VASPs contribute to the NRA, either by direct consultations or indirect data submission through the supervisory authorities. Most of the FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team recognised fraud, including money mules, as one of the most material risk factors their businesses face. Corruption was also highlighted to some extent and FIs were aware of the enforcement action taken by the authorities in relation to 1MDB. FIs and VASPs are generally aware of TF risks, but the cases where such risks materialise appear to be limited. 243. Malaysia amended the AMLA guidelines in 2022 to make it mandatory for FIs and VASPs to incorporate NRA findings into their own IRAs. The BNM confirmed that banks and ITOs comply with the guidelines and IRAs are suitably aligned with the NRA. For the other sectors, supervisors usually verify the IRAs are appropriate as a part of onsite examinations and regulatory failings relating to IRAs are low and mainly involved a small number of Labuan FIs, which had not fully aligned their IRAs with the latest NRA." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="317. DNFBPs in most sectors met during the onsite generally have a basic understanding of the ML/TF risks they face and recognise the five highest risks identified in the NRA. This understanding is more mature in larger entities and those engaging with the financial services sector. 318. Although it is a regulatory requirement to have an IRA, some of the RIs met during the onsite had not met this obligation. Larger DNFBPs tend to have developed IRAs, which cover risks associated to products/services, customers, delivery channels, jurisdictions, etc. However, many DNFBPs across all sectors, particularly smaller firms, have not fully assessed the risk of their entity due to limited resources and expertise. 319. Labuan Trust Companies generally have robust IRAs and have implemented corresponding control measures to mitigate the identified risks. LFSA has also noted an increasing level of complexity in the IRAs conducted by Labuan Trust Companies in recent years, which is a positive trend. 320. Malaysian authorities recognise the need for ongoing improvements in risk understanding by smaller DNFBPs across all sectors, particularly in terms of conducting IRAs. This is regularly communicated to DNFBPs through onsite examinations, engagement sessions and guidance. Box 4.2. Good practice in the development of IRA by a lawyer BNM reviewed the IRA of a lawyer in 2024 and noted several aspects of good practice. These included: • the IRA framework providing clear guidance on risk factors, identified the firm’s higher risk business activities and an analysis of the firm’s risk profile and control measures • the IRA being based on a comprehensive exercise to identify, understand and assess ML and TF risks to the firm based on (i) an assessment of inherent risks; and (ii) an evaluation of the firm’s control measures. In terms of the inherent risks, the lawyer considered four categories: (i) Sectoral Risk –the latest NRA result (where both sectoral and threat risk assessment are considered). (ii) Customer Risk – Proportion of higher risk customers as compared to total customer base. Higher risk customers include those who pose sanctions risks, PEPs, and customers exposed to adverse news. (iii) Product and Services Risk – The nature of services offered and its vulnerabilities to be abused, e.g. nominee services. (iv) Delivery channel risks – Number of lawyers in the firm providing Gazetted Activities and location of branches, which determines the accessibility to the firm’s services." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="317. DNFBPs in most sectors met during the onsite generally have a basic understanding of the ML/TF risks they face and recognise the five highest risks identified in the NRA. This understanding is more mature in larger entities and those engaging with the financial services sector. 318. Although it is a regulatory requirement to have an IRA, some of the RIs met during the onsite had not met this obligation. Larger DNFBPs tend to have developed IRAs, which cover risks associated to products/services, customers, delivery channels, jurisdictions, etc. However, many DNFBPs across all sectors, particularly smaller firms, have not fully assessed the risk of their entity due to limited resources and expertise. 319. Labuan Trust Companies generally have robust IRAs and have implemented corresponding control measures to mitigate the identified risks. LFSA has also noted an increasing level of complexity in the IRAs conducted by Labuan Trust Companies in recent years, which is a positive trend. 320. Malaysian authorities recognise the need for ongoing improvements in risk understanding by smaller DNFBPs across all sectors, particularly in terms of conducting IRAs. This is regularly communicated to DNFBPs through onsite examinations, engagement sessions and guidance. Box 4.2. Good practice in the development of IRA by a lawyer BNM reviewed the IRA of a lawyer in 2024 and noted several aspects of good practice. These included: • the IRA framework providing clear guidance on risk factors, identified the firm’s higher risk business activities and an analysis of the firm’s risk profile and control measures • the IRA being based on a comprehensive exercise to identify, understand and assess ML and TF risks to the firm based on (i) an assessment of inherent risks; and (ii) an evaluation of the firm’s control measures. In terms of the inherent risks, the lawyer considered four categories: (i) Sectoral Risk –the latest NRA result (where both sectoral and threat risk assessment are considered). (ii) Customer Risk – Proportion of higher risk customers as compared to total customer base. Higher risk customers include those who pose sanctions risks, PEPs, and customers exposed to adverse news. (iii) Product and Services Risk – The nature of services offered and its vulnerabilities to be abused, e.g. nominee services. (iv) Delivery channel risks – Number of lawyers in the firm providing Gazetted Activities and location of branches, which determines the accessibility to the firm’s services." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="378. Malaysia’s main mechanism to ensure timely access to basic information on legal persons is through the CCM and LFSA registries, which is publicly available. In terms of accessing BO information for legal persons, which is not publicly available, there are three main sources that LEAs can consult: (1) information held by the legal persons themselves; (2) through the CCM and LFSA registries; and (3) by requesting information from RIs. While adequate and accurate BO information for Labuan legal persons is generally accessible through the LFSA registry in a timely manner, this is less the case for onshore legal persons. In addition, the Assessment Team does not consider that measures prior to 2024 were sufficient to ensure this information was adequate and accurate. 379. Foreign-created legal persons must register with CCM or LFSA to carry out business in Malaysia. Upon registration with CCM or LFSA, they are subjected to the same basic and BO information reporting requirements as domestic legal persons. Therefore, the basic information databases and the BO registries maintained by the CCM and LFSA include information on foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia. 5.3.1. Basic information 380. Relevant competent authorities generally have access to basic information on all legal persons through the company registries managed by CCM and LFSA. This includes foreign-created legal persons that carry out business in Malaysia. 381. Competent authorities made over 188 000 requests for basic information on legal persons in 2024 through online platforms for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. Box 5.2. CCM assisting LEAs uncover shell company network Company X was offering the public a “savings/share-partner” program where interested “investors” could join the scheme with a payment of an annual fee of EUR 50.60 and a ‘share-partnership’ investment of a minimum capital of EUR 10. The scheme was actively promoted on social media and through seminars held across Malaysia. BNM issued a Financial Consumer Alert on Company X in 2023 through surveillance activities. During an investigation, multiple shell companies incorporated with minimal or no active operations were found to be linked to the scheme and were used to manage or channel funds, either as collection points or pass-through accounts. To better understand the ownership and control structure, investigators obtained detailed information on the directors, shareholders, and controllers of Company X and its related entities from the CCM. The CCM data provided essential insights into the corporate structures that underpinned the scheme, revealing connections between seemingly disparate entities. To confirm the identity of the true controllers, investigators performed a meticulous bank statement analysis. They scrutinised the flow of funds related to the bank accounts of the main scheme company as well as those of the shell companies. This financial trail analysis allowed investigators to map the movement of money, highlighting irregularities and patterns that pointed toward a central control. A total of 12 premises were raided in 2024. All relevant items needed to assist the joint investigation were seized, along with assets comprising gold, cash amounting to more than EUR 1 045 175, including foreign currencies, cryptocurrency, and luxury vehicles and items. In addition, 92 bank accounts amounting to EUR 5.47 million and a safe deposit box were frozen. The investigation is ongoing. 5.3.2. Beneficial ownership information – (1) information held by legal persons 382. Since 2017, onshore legal persons have been required to obtain, maintain and update their BO information at entity level in a way that can be accessed by competent authorities in a timely manner. However, prior to 2020, the definition of a BO for onshore legal persons in Malaysia was not in line with the FATF Standards and was limited to ultimate direct owners of voting shares. This definition did not refer to natural persons on whose behalf a transaction was being conducted, or indirect control of shares such as nominee shareholders. 383. In 2020, the authorities issued guidelines to expand the definition of a BO to align it with the FATF Standards (i.e., to extend it beyond the definition of BO in the Companies Act), but the legislation continued to contain the previous partial definition. 384. To ensure the accuracy of BO information held at entity level, the CCM conducted inspections of 1 743 onshore companies between 2022 and 2024. These companies were selected on the following criteria: - Active companies that have failed to lodge annual returns and financial statements; - Company secretaries managing more than 200 companies simultaneously; - Company secretaries with the highest number of non-compliant companies under their management; and - Active companies and company secretaries which have complaints lodged against them. 385. This accounts for less than 0.3% of the total population of onshore legal persons. Malaysia stated that these inspections confirmed that approximately 70% of the sample were maintaining BO information at their premises in line with the guidelines (i.e., in line with the FATF definition of BOs). Nevertheless, it also suggests that approximately 30% were not following the requirements and definition of BO in the guidelines. The CCM issued reminder notices to the non-compliant entities. Although this compliance rate is for a small sample of higher risk companies and does not necessarily apply to all onshore legal persons, it suggests that a significant number of entities could have had inaccurate BO registers during this period. This may be a result of the differences in understanding of BO, due to inconsistent definitions in the Companies Act and guidance provided by the authorities. 386. Malaysia amended the Companies Act in 2024, so that the definition of BO aligns with the FATF definition and the 2020 guidance. 5.3.3. Beneficial ownership information – (2) registries 387. Since 2017, onshore legal persons have been required to lodge BO information with the CCM through the submission of an annual return. Malaysia conducts ongoing desk-based monitoring on the submission of annual returns and financial statements, but the focus of this exercise is to identify related late submissions, rather than test the accuracy of the BO information being submitted. 388. In April 2024, Malaysia introduced a new requirement for company secretaries of onshore companies to submit BO information on their companies to CCM via the electronic platform called e-BOS. This new measure enables any changes in BO information between annual returns (within 14 days from the date of the changes) to be submitted in a timely manner. Onshore companies were required to submit their latest BO information via e-BOS by September 2024. As of 31 January 2025, 87.5% of onshore companies had done so. 389. The accuracy of the BO information registered in e-BOS relies heavily on company secretaries as gatekeepers who are required to identify, verify and lodge with the CCM the BO information of onshore companies. While the CCM conducts joint onsite inspections with the BNM on company secretaries to ensure they comply with AML/CFT requirements, including CDD, the number of the inspections is very limited (11 in 2024). 390. At the time of the onsite, e-BOS did not include the BO information of LLPs, but their presence is not material and constitutes less than 5% of the total domestic population. Malaysia amended legislation in 2024 to introduce a new BO reporting framework for LLPs requiring them to submit BO information to the CCM by October 2025. This should further enhance the effectiveness of the registry and make it easier for competent authorities to access BO information on LLPs in a timely manner. 391. While competent authorities do not have direct access to e-BOS, the CCM generally provides requested information within three business days. However, currently there are limited cases where e-BOS has enabled the authorities to swiftly investigate ML/TF cases involving onshore legal persons, which reflects the nascency of this aspect of Malaysia’s BO information framework. 392. Since 2022, Labuan legal persons and arrangements are obliged to have their respective Labuan trust companies submit and update the BO information to the LFSA through an online platform called PEARL. The coverage ratio of PEARL reached 99.9% in November 2024, with only four companies remaining unregistered. The LFSA also requires Labuan trust companies to submit annual returns for the Labuan legal persons and arrangements they represent; 80% of Labuan trust companies comply with this obligation. From 2020 to 2024, LFSA received 53 requests for BO information from foreign authorities, but only eight from domestic authorities. The average time taken for the LFSA to respond to information requests is one to two business days. 393. The LFSA also conducts network analysis to establish links between BOs in multiple companies, based on the information held in its registry. This has helped supervisors uncover nested relationships, conduct risk-based sampling and identify possible ultimate BOs. Box 5.3. Network analysis on Labuan legal persons LFSA employs network analysis to identify Labuan entities that are connected, including indirectly linked through sharing common directors and to high-risk entities for which incorporation applications were rejected or enforcement actions were taken. This helps the LFSA to pay adequate levels of attention to entities during regular monitoring and the process of license application/renewal. It also helps the LFSA to select high risk client samples to conduct onsite examination. The network analysis also allows the LFSA to trace ownership structures to identify possible UBOs using information held in the corporate registry and PEARL database. 394. As part of its ongoing AML/CFT supervision, the LFSA conducted 112 onsite inspections across 56 Labuan trust companies between 2019 and 2024, covering 84% of the sector. Deficiencies related to BO compliance were identified in 18 companies. The LFSA selects inspection subjects based on institutional risk factors, such as the number of companies for which they act as secretaries. 395. Since 2022, the LFSA has not observed any instances where the BO information in the annual returns submitted by Labuan trust companies did not match the existing information in PEARL. This is because the BO information submitted in the annual returns is automatically populated on PEARL and verified for accuracy by the Labuan trust companies prior to submission. In cases where the automatically populated BO information is incorrect, Labuan trust companies are required to update the BO information in the PEARL registry before proceeding with the annual return submission. This process provides an opportunity for Labuan trust companies to annually verify PEARL BO information for the legal persons and arrangements they provide secretary services for or act as trustees. 396. While not a mandatory requirement under the FATF Standards, in January 2025, a new obligation was introduced for designated RIs to report discrepancies found between the BO information they hold and the information in the CCM or LFSA registries. The Assessment Team was not able to assess the effectiveness of this obligation due to its recency. Nevertheless, none of the RIs met during the onsite had submitted reports, including large FIs. Given that RIs do not have direct access to the BO registries maintained by the CCM or LFSA and typically rely on commercial databases for BO information during CDD, the effectiveness of this newly introduced measure remains unclear and should not replace verification checks by authorities. 397. The introduction of PEARL has reduced the time it takes for LFSA to retrieve and provide BO information for Labuan legal persons to the competent authorities. Nevertheless, the CCM BO registry was only recently introduced, it was not fully populated at the time of the onsite and mechanisms to ensure the accuracy of the information within it (e.g., discrepancy reporting) are nascent. 5.3.4.  Beneficial ownership information – (3) RIs 398. When legal persons seek to establish a business relationship with RIs, such as opening a bank account, the RIs are required to conduct CDD, including identifying the BOs. Malaysia has published clear guidelines for RIs on how to identify BO information. As set out in IO.3 and 4, supervisory activities are undertaken to ensure that RIs are fulfilling these requirements and are meeting their CDD obligations in line with the guidelines. The findings from these inspections and discussions with RIs during the onsite show that some RIs continue to face difficulties in identifying the BOs of companies with foreign owners or those that are part of complex structures. In particular, it is time consuming for RIs to identify and verify BO information due to a reliance on statutory documents provided by legal persons, basic information obtained through authorities or commercial databases and self-declaration. While this could impact availability of BO information for competent authorities, Malaysia notes that this has not been the case during the assessment period. Although 95% of domestic (onshore) legal persons and 94% of Labuan legal persons have single layer individual shareholders, for which RIs are not expected to have material difficulties with identifying BO, the Assessment Team is concerned about the increasing number of cases where complex business structures including shell companies are misused for ML, as described in the latest NRA. 399. FINS serves as a direct communication and information exchange hub among the FIU, RIs, and LEAs. Through FINS, LEAs make information requests to RIs, such as whether a company has a business relationship with the RI. Responses are generally received from FIs with positive matches within three business days (see IO.6 for additional information on FINS). The Assessment Team considers this to be a good mechanism for information exchange. 400. Authorities also presented a case example demonstrating that LEAs can identify BOs of the legal persons conducting suspicious activities referring to the basic information provided by the CCM and the BO information provided by company secretaries. However, it is not clear how accurately competent authorities can identify BOs of entities that have complex structures or have foreign owners based on the CDD information held by FIs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="378. Malaysia’s main mechanism to ensure timely access to basic information on legal persons is through the CCM and LFSA registries, which is publicly available. In terms of accessing BO information for legal persons, which is not publicly available, there are three main sources that LEAs can consult: (1) information held by the legal persons themselves; (2) through the CCM and LFSA registries; and (3) by requesting information from RIs. While adequate and accurate BO information for Labuan legal persons is generally accessible through the LFSA registry in a timely manner, this is less the case for onshore legal persons. In addition, the Assessment Team does not consider that measures prior to 2024 were sufficient to ensure this information was adequate and accurate. 379. Foreign-created legal persons must register with CCM or LFSA to carry out business in Malaysia. Upon registration with CCM or LFSA, they are subjected to the same basic and BO information reporting requirements as domestic legal persons. Therefore, the basic information databases and the BO registries maintained by the CCM and LFSA include information on foreign legal persons with links to Malaysia. 5.3.1. Basic information 380. Relevant competent authorities generally have access to basic information on all legal persons through the company registries managed by CCM and LFSA. This includes foreign-created legal persons that carry out business in Malaysia. 381. Competent authorities made over 188 000 requests for basic information on legal persons in 2024 through online platforms for the purpose of investigation and prosecution. Box 5.2. CCM assisting LEAs uncover shell company network Company X was offering the public a “savings/share-partner” program where interested “investors” could join the scheme with a payment of an annual fee of EUR 50.60 and a ‘share-partnership’ investment of a minimum capital of EUR 10. The scheme was actively promoted on social media and through seminars held across Malaysia. BNM issued a Financial Consumer Alert on Company X in 2023 through surveillance activities. During an investigation, multiple shell companies incorporated with minimal or no active operations were found to be linked to the scheme and were used to manage or channel funds, either as collection points or pass-through accounts. To better understand the ownership and control structure, investigators obtained detailed information on the directors, shareholders, and controllers of Company X and its related entities from the CCM. The CCM data provided essential insights into the corporate structures that underpinned the scheme, revealing connections between seemingly disparate entities. To confirm the identity of the true controllers, investigators performed a meticulous bank statement analysis. They scrutinised the flow of funds related to the bank accounts of the main scheme company as well as those of the shell companies. This financial trail analysis allowed investigators to map the movement of money, highlighting irregularities and patterns that pointed toward a central control. A total of 12 premises were raided in 2024. All relevant items needed to assist the joint investigation were seized, along with assets comprising gold, cash amounting to more than EUR 1 045 175, including foreign currencies, cryptocurrency, and luxury vehicles and items. In addition, 92 bank accounts amounting to EUR 5.47 million and a safe deposit box were frozen. The investigation is ongoing. 5.3.2. Beneficial ownership information – (1) information held by legal persons 382. Since 2017, onshore legal persons have been required to obtain, maintain and update their BO information at entity level in a way that can be accessed by competent authorities in a timely manner. However, prior to 2020, the definition of a BO for onshore legal persons in Malaysia was not in line with the FATF Standards and was limited to ultimate direct owners of voting shares. This definition did not refer to natural persons on whose behalf a transaction was being conducted, or indirect control of shares such as nominee shareholders. 383. In 2020, the authorities issued guidelines to expand the definition of a BO to align it with the FATF Standards (i.e., to extend it beyond the definition of BO in the Companies Act), but the legislation continued to contain the previous partial definition. 384. To ensure the accuracy of BO information held at entity level, the CCM conducted inspections of 1 743 onshore companies between 2022 and 2024. These companies were selected on the following criteria: - Active companies that have failed to lodge annual returns and financial statements; - Company secretaries managing more than 200 companies simultaneously; - Company secretaries with the highest number of non-compliant companies under their management; and - Active companies and company secretaries which have complaints lodged against them. 385. This accounts for less than 0.3% of the total population of onshore legal persons. Malaysia stated that these inspections confirmed that approximately 70% of the sample were maintaining BO information at their premises in line with the guidelines (i.e., in line with the FATF definition of BOs). Nevertheless, it also suggests that approximately 30% were not following the requirements and definition of BO in the guidelines. The CCM issued reminder notices to the non-compliant entities. Although this compliance rate is for a small sample of higher risk companies and does not necessarily apply to all onshore legal persons, it suggests that a significant number of entities could have had inaccurate BO registers during this period. This may be a result of the differences in understanding of BO, due to inconsistent definitions in the Companies Act and guidance provided by the authorities. 386. Malaysia amended the Companies Act in 2024, so that the definition of BO aligns with the FATF definition and the 2020 guidance. 5.3.3. Beneficial ownership information – (2) registries 387. Since 2017, onshore legal persons have been required to lodge BO information with the CCM through the submission of an annual return. Malaysia conducts ongoing desk-based monitoring on the submission of annual returns and financial statements, but the focus of this exercise is to identify related late submissions, rather than test the accuracy of the BO information being submitted. 388. In April 2024, Malaysia introduced a new requirement for company secretaries of onshore companies to submit BO information on their companies to CCM via the electronic platform called e-BOS. This new measure enables any changes in BO information between annual returns (within 14 days from the date of the changes) to be submitted in a timely manner. Onshore companies were required to submit their latest BO information via e-BOS by September 2024. As of 31 January 2025, 87.5% of onshore companies had done so. 389. The accuracy of the BO information registered in e-BOS relies heavily on company secretaries as gatekeepers who are required to identify, verify and lodge with the CCM the BO information of onshore companies. While the CCM conducts joint onsite inspections with the BNM on company secretaries to ensure they comply with AML/CFT requirements, including CDD, the number of the inspections is very limited (11 in 2024). 390. At the time of the onsite, e-BOS did not include the BO information of LLPs, but their presence is not material and constitutes less than 5% of the total domestic population. Malaysia amended legislation in 2024 to introduce a new BO reporting framework for LLPs requiring them to submit BO information to the CCM by October 2025. This should further enhance the effectiveness of the registry and make it easier for competent authorities to access BO information on LLPs in a timely manner. 391. While competent authorities do not have direct access to e-BOS, the CCM generally provides requested information within three business days. However, currently there are limited cases where e-BOS has enabled the authorities to swiftly investigate ML/TF cases involving onshore legal persons, which reflects the nascency of this aspect of Malaysia’s BO information framework. 392. Since 2022, Labuan legal persons and arrangements are obliged to have their respective Labuan trust companies submit and update the BO information to the LFSA through an online platform called PEARL. The coverage ratio of PEARL reached 99.9% in November 2024, with only four companies remaining unregistered. The LFSA also requires Labuan trust companies to submit annual returns for the Labuan legal persons and arrangements they represent; 80% of Labuan trust companies comply with this obligation. From 2020 to 2024, LFSA received 53 requests for BO information from foreign authorities, but only eight from domestic authorities. The average time taken for the LFSA to respond to information requests is one to two business days. 393. The LFSA also conducts network analysis to establish links between BOs in multiple companies, based on the information held in its registry. This has helped supervisors uncover nested relationships, conduct risk-based sampling and identify possible ultimate BOs. Box 5.3. Network analysis on Labuan legal persons LFSA employs network analysis to identify Labuan entities that are connected, including indirectly linked through sharing common directors and to high-risk entities for which incorporation applications were rejected or enforcement actions were taken. This helps the LFSA to pay adequate levels of attention to entities during regular monitoring and the process of license application/renewal. It also helps the LFSA to select high risk client samples to conduct onsite examination. The network analysis also allows the LFSA to trace ownership structures to identify possible UBOs using information held in the corporate registry and PEARL database. 394. As part of its ongoing AML/CFT supervision, the LFSA conducted 112 onsite inspections across 56 Labuan trust companies between 2019 and 2024, covering 84% of the sector. Deficiencies related to BO compliance were identified in 18 companies. The LFSA selects inspection subjects based on institutional risk factors, such as the number of companies for which they act as secretaries. 395. Since 2022, the LFSA has not observed any instances where the BO information in the annual returns submitted by Labuan trust companies did not match the existing information in PEARL. This is because the BO information submitted in the annual returns is automatically populated on PEARL and verified for accuracy by the Labuan trust companies prior to submission. In cases where the automatically populated BO information is incorrect, Labuan trust companies are required to update the BO information in the PEARL registry before proceeding with the annual return submission. This process provides an opportunity for Labuan trust companies to annually verify PEARL BO information for the legal persons and arrangements they provide secretary services for or act as trustees. 396. While not a mandatory requirement under the FATF Standards, in January 2025, a new obligation was introduced for designated RIs to report discrepancies found between the BO information they hold and the information in the CCM or LFSA registries. The Assessment Team was not able to assess the effectiveness of this obligation due to its recency. Nevertheless, none of the RIs met during the onsite had submitted reports, including large FIs. Given that RIs do not have direct access to the BO registries maintained by the CCM or LFSA and typically rely on commercial databases for BO information during CDD, the effectiveness of this newly introduced measure remains unclear and should not replace verification checks by authorities. 397. The introduction of PEARL has reduced the time it takes for LFSA to retrieve and provide BO information for Labuan legal persons to the competent authorities. Nevertheless, the CCM BO registry was only recently introduced, it was not fully populated at the time of the onsite and mechanisms to ensure the accuracy of the information within it (e.g., discrepancy reporting) are nascent. 5.3.4.  Beneficial ownership information – (3) RIs 398. When legal persons seek to establish a business relationship with RIs, such as opening a bank account, the RIs are required to conduct CDD, including identifying the BOs. Malaysia has published clear guidelines for RIs on how to identify BO information. As set out in IO.3 and 4, supervisory activities are undertaken to ensure that RIs are fulfilling these requirements and are meeting their CDD obligations in line with the guidelines. The findings from these inspections and discussions with RIs during the onsite show that some RIs continue to face difficulties in identifying the BOs of companies with foreign owners or those that are part of complex structures. In particular, it is time consuming for RIs to identify and verify BO information due to a reliance on statutory documents provided by legal persons, basic information obtained through authorities or commercial databases and self-declaration. While this could impact availability of BO information for competent authorities, Malaysia notes that this has not been the case during the assessment period. Although 95% of domestic (onshore) legal persons and 94% of Labuan legal persons have single layer individual shareholders, for which RIs are not expected to have material difficulties with identifying BO, the Assessment Team is concerned about the increasing number of cases where complex business structures including shell companies are misused for ML, as described in the latest NRA. 399. FINS serves as a direct communication and information exchange hub among the FIU, RIs, and LEAs. Through FINS, LEAs make information requests to RIs, such as whether a company has a business relationship with the RI. Responses are generally received from FIs with positive matches within three business days (see IO.6 for additional information on FINS). The Assessment Team considers this to be a good mechanism for information exchange. 400. Authorities also presented a case example demonstrating that LEAs can identify BOs of the legal persons conducting suspicious activities referring to the basic information provided by the CCM and the BO information provided by company secretaries. However, it is not clear how accurately competent authorities can identify BOs of entities that have complex structures or have foreign owners based on the CDD information held by FIs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Cooperation and exchange 443. As noted in IO.1, the establishment and use of robust domestic cooperation mechanisms is a key strength in Malaysia’s AML/CFT regime. Competent authorities have explored useful ways to cooperate and leverage financial intelligence and information to enhance investigations and AML/CFT compliance. 444. Malaysia’s FIU has leveraged the NFCC—a coordination platform for LEAs conducting joint investigations on high-impact financial crimes—to share relevant financial intelligence on joint operations. The financial intelligence shared by the FIU often supports the decision on whether to commence a joint operation. In the post-operations stage, the FIU works closely with the NFCC, and the LEAs involved to conduct further profiling and financial analysis, to identify accounts or assets to be seized. The below case study highlights the domestic cooperation and exchange of information within the NFCC. Box 6.4. Case study - Information exchange within the NFCC In 2024, a joint analysis team (comprising the RMP, FIU of BNM, IRBM, MCMC and NFCC) was established to gather and develop intelligence from various sources related to a fraudulent investment scheme. The team shared information from the FIU, tax and assets information from IRBM as well as monitoring of accounts by the FIU, which led to the opening of an investigation paper. The financial intelligence developed by the FIU was used by the analyst team in NFCC to further profile other subjects using NFIS open-source intelligence and a subscribed database/tool. In this case, 38 bank accounts were frozen totalling EUR 23 311. As of 21 February 2025, a total of 20 seized bank accounts have been successfully forfeited, amounting to EUR 49 148. Meanwhile, the total value of seized assets, including cash, cars, and jewellery, is EUR 218 827. 445. Supervisory authorities also regularly cooperate with the FIU to exchange information and financial intelligence. For example, supervisors use financial intelligence to support their risk-based supervision on RIs’ compliance to AML/CFT/CPF requirements, increase RIs’ awareness and drive improvements in the quantity and quality of STR submissions. In another example, the FIU conducted STR quality review on banking sector in cooperation with the BNM supervisors. Observations of the review fed into the STR Best Practices Guidance issued in June 2024. These findings were shared with RIs at various occasions such as Compliance Conferences, AML/CFT Workshops and industry-wide engagements with various sectors. 446. As the administrator of CADS, Malaysia’s FIU is also a member of the Subcommittee on Implementation and Enforcement of Cross Border Cash and Negotiable Instruments (see IO.8). During each meeting, Malaysia’s FIU presents statistics of currency and BNI declarations to improve members’ understanding and identify trends. In addition, the FIU has conducted several in-depth analyses of the declarations, which was shared with relevant competent authorities, as outlined below. Box 6.5. Analysis on currency and BNI declarations In 2024, the FIU conducted analysis focusing on currency and BNI declarations exceeding RM 1 million (EUR 215 500), which represented about 84% of total amount declared by travellers from 2019 to June 2024. The assessment showed the top declarations in a single currency exceeding RM 1 million was in Singapore Dollar, which mainly involved money changers, while declarations in Brunei Dollars were mainly by travellers departing Malaysia. 447. To strengthen PPP initiatives, Malaysia’s FIU set up the Malaysia Financial Intelligence Network (MyFINet) in 2017. There are six thematic working groups classed by crime type (Corruption, Smuggling, Securities Offences, Tax, TF and PF) under MyFINet. The main purpose of MyFINet is to facilitate a more systematic intelligence sharing on specific crime cases and topical issues between the FIU, LEAs and FIs. Between 2019 and February 2025, 61 cases were presented in the working groups meeting of MyFINet, and 44 disclosures by the FIU of financial intelligence information. The below case study provides an example of a case using MyFINet. Box 6.6. MyFINet case study In 2024, IRBM convened a MyFINet meeting by inviting Digital Asset Exchanges (DAXs) service providers to share information on subjects who were suspected to be depositing large sums of funds into their cryptocurrency accounts, which was not commensurate with their declared incomes. After the meeting, the DAXs reported information to the FIU, such as profile of customers, wallet details, summary of transactions and analysis of gains and losses for the period of interest. From the STR/CTR analysis, the FIU identified the subjects’ activities, including suspicion of trading cryptocurrencies without licence and using their cryptocurrency wallet to store funds from scamming activities. The FIU disseminated this information to IRBM, which expanded the scope of its investigation and helped identify the flow of illicit proceeds. As of the on-site, IRBM has identified undeclared income of EUR 1.8 million and recovered total taxes and penalties amounting EUR 575 780 from one subject. Investigations are still ongoing on the remaining subjects. 448. The National Scam Response Centre (see IO.1 for details) has also been utilised as a platform to convene the FIU, relevant competent authorities and private sector entities (FIs and telecommunication companies) to exchange financial intelligence, such as the information about mule account holders and transaction data. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 449. Malaysia’s FIU office resides within BNM premises, which is gazetted as a protected location and inaccessible to the public. It is also listed as critical national infrastructure by the MoHA. The FIU’s office is secured and restricted to FIU staff. Physical access into the office is subject to strict security requirements, which was confirmed by the Assessment Team. 450. The FIU adheres to BNM’s policies and procedures, including the Information Security Management Policy, IT and Risk Management Policies in preserving the data security and confidentiality of all financial intelligence received and maintained. 451. STRs and CTRs are submitted online via FINS and are kept in a secured environment, which can only be accessed by FIU analysts. Information stored in FINS is regulated by different access levels, depending on the role of the FIU analyst. Physical reports are classified accordingly and kept in a secured area and only accessible to FIU analysts. In September 2024, BNM implemented enhanced information technology solutions to further protect and safeguard the financial intelligence and data from any potential leaks or cyber-attacks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.3.1. Cooperation and exchange 443. As noted in IO.1, the establishment and use of robust domestic cooperation mechanisms is a key strength in Malaysia’s AML/CFT regime. Competent authorities have explored useful ways to cooperate and leverage financial intelligence and information to enhance investigations and AML/CFT compliance. 444. Malaysia’s FIU has leveraged the NFCC—a coordination platform for LEAs conducting joint investigations on high-impact financial crimes—to share relevant financial intelligence on joint operations. The financial intelligence shared by the FIU often supports the decision on whether to commence a joint operation. In the post-operations stage, the FIU works closely with the NFCC, and the LEAs involved to conduct further profiling and financial analysis, to identify accounts or assets to be seized. The below case study highlights the domestic cooperation and exchange of information within the NFCC. Box 6.4. Case study - Information exchange within the NFCC In 2024, a joint analysis team (comprising the RMP, FIU of BNM, IRBM, MCMC and NFCC) was established to gather and develop intelligence from various sources related to a fraudulent investment scheme. The team shared information from the FIU, tax and assets information from IRBM as well as monitoring of accounts by the FIU, which led to the opening of an investigation paper. The financial intelligence developed by the FIU was used by the analyst team in NFCC to further profile other subjects using NFIS open-source intelligence and a subscribed database/tool. In this case, 38 bank accounts were frozen totalling EUR 23 311. As of 21 February 2025, a total of 20 seized bank accounts have been successfully forfeited, amounting to EUR 49 148. Meanwhile, the total value of seized assets, including cash, cars, and jewellery, is EUR 218 827. 445. Supervisory authorities also regularly cooperate with the FIU to exchange information and financial intelligence. For example, supervisors use financial intelligence to support their risk-based supervision on RIs’ compliance to AML/CFT/CPF requirements, increase RIs’ awareness and drive improvements in the quantity and quality of STR submissions. In another example, the FIU conducted STR quality review on banking sector in cooperation with the BNM supervisors. Observations of the review fed into the STR Best Practices Guidance issued in June 2024. These findings were shared with RIs at various occasions such as Compliance Conferences, AML/CFT Workshops and industry-wide engagements with various sectors. 446. As the administrator of CADS, Malaysia’s FIU is also a member of the Subcommittee on Implementation and Enforcement of Cross Border Cash and Negotiable Instruments (see IO.8). During each meeting, Malaysia’s FIU presents statistics of currency and BNI declarations to improve members’ understanding and identify trends. In addition, the FIU has conducted several in-depth analyses of the declarations, which was shared with relevant competent authorities, as outlined below. Box 6.5. Analysis on currency and BNI declarations In 2024, the FIU conducted analysis focusing on currency and BNI declarations exceeding RM 1 million (EUR 215 500), which represented about 84% of total amount declared by travellers from 2019 to June 2024. The assessment showed the top declarations in a single currency exceeding RM 1 million was in Singapore Dollar, which mainly involved money changers, while declarations in Brunei Dollars were mainly by travellers departing Malaysia. 447. To strengthen PPP initiatives, Malaysia’s FIU set up the Malaysia Financial Intelligence Network (MyFINet) in 2017. There are six thematic working groups classed by crime type (Corruption, Smuggling, Securities Offences, Tax, TF and PF) under MyFINet. The main purpose of MyFINet is to facilitate a more systematic intelligence sharing on specific crime cases and topical issues between the FIU, LEAs and FIs. Between 2019 and February 2025, 61 cases were presented in the working groups meeting of MyFINet, and 44 disclosures by the FIU of financial intelligence information. The below case study provides an example of a case using MyFINet. Box 6.6. MyFINet case study In 2024, IRBM convened a MyFINet meeting by inviting Digital Asset Exchanges (DAXs) service providers to share information on subjects who were suspected to be depositing large sums of funds into their cryptocurrency accounts, which was not commensurate with their declared incomes. After the meeting, the DAXs reported information to the FIU, such as profile of customers, wallet details, summary of transactions and analysis of gains and losses for the period of interest. From the STR/CTR analysis, the FIU identified the subjects’ activities, including suspicion of trading cryptocurrencies without licence and using their cryptocurrency wallet to store funds from scamming activities. The FIU disseminated this information to IRBM, which expanded the scope of its investigation and helped identify the flow of illicit proceeds. As of the on-site, IRBM has identified undeclared income of EUR 1.8 million and recovered total taxes and penalties amounting EUR 575 780 from one subject. Investigations are still ongoing on the remaining subjects. 448. The National Scam Response Centre (see IO.1 for details) has also been utilised as a platform to convene the FIU, relevant competent authorities and private sector entities (FIs and telecommunication companies) to exchange financial intelligence, such as the information about mule account holders and transaction data. 6.3.2. Security and confidentiality 449. Malaysia’s FIU office resides within BNM premises, which is gazetted as a protected location and inaccessible to the public. It is also listed as critical national infrastructure by the MoHA. The FIU’s office is secured and restricted to FIU staff. Physical access into the office is subject to strict security requirements, which was confirmed by the Assessment Team. 450. The FIU adheres to BNM’s policies and procedures, including the Information Security Management Policy, IT and Risk Management Policies in preserving the data security and confidentiality of all financial intelligence received and maintained. 451. STRs and CTRs are submitted online via FINS and are kept in a secured environment, which can only be accessed by FIU analysts. Information stored in FINS is regulated by different access levels, depending on the role of the FIU analyst. Physical reports are classified accordingly and kept in a secured area and only accessible to FIU analysts. In September 2024, BNM implemented enhanced information technology solutions to further protect and safeguard the financial intelligence and data from any potential leaks or cyber-attacks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="493. Malaysia’s approach to sanctions for ML involves a combination of criminal penalties and civil measures. In practice, criminal sanctions may be imposed in the form of a fine and/or imprisonment, notwithstanding the conjunctive “and” used in the AMLA, which legally requires cumulative application of imprisonment and fines. Accordingly, this underscores the need for enhanced training for prosecutors and the judiciary on ML sanctions and sentencing. 494. The maximum penalty for ML is a term of imprisonment of 15 years. Fines can be up to five times the values of the proceeds of crime or RM 5 million (EUR 1.08 million), whichever is more. Malaysia has demonstrated instances where severe financial penalties had been imposed, particularly in high-value ML cases involving serious predicate crimes (such as fraud and corruption). For legal persons, the fine can increase up to a maximum 10% of the annual revenue. Sentences can be concurrent or consecutive, but consecutive sentences are rarely imposed. In concurrent cases, the judiciary will acknowledge the separate offences and the relative sanction for each offence, as well as the fine imposed. 495. Overall, the Assessment Team is concerned by the low level of ML sentences imposed in general (see below table). While there are some cases where the sentencing imposed was on the higher end but below the maximum (e.g., see SRC International case in Box 7.2), in general, the actual average of sanctions (sentences and fines) imposed to natural and legal persons is low. Since 2019, the average prison sentence imposed is one year and eight months. While this average can be partly explained by the higher volume of simple ML cases, the review of the case studies provided confirms that sanctions imposed in many complex and mixed cases are generally on the lower end of the scale and not necessarily dissuasive. 496. Furthermore, the application of fines to natural and legal persons may undermine the overall dissuasiveness of the sanction regime. Of the 52 convictions, fines were imposed in only 20 cases (applied to 21 natural persons and five legal persons). While the average fine was approximately EUR 1.78 million, this figure is heavily skewed by two exceptionally large fines of approximately EUR 66 million and EUR 33 million. These outliers suggest that most fines imposed were significantly lower. As a result, despite a few high-profile penalties, the limited use of fines—particularly when imposed as the sole sanction—may reduce the deterrent effect of enforcement outcomes overall. 497. Finally, of all the high-risk predicates where there were convictions, fines were only imposed in fraud and corruption cases, with a very small portion associated with “other” predicates. The Assessment Team also notes that in many cases provided by the authorities, many are still proceeding at the prosecutorial stage, and as such, sentencing had not been determined at the time of the on-site. Malaysia attributes these prosecutorial and trial delays to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reallocation of resources to 1MDB investigations and prosecutions. Table 7.5. Fines and imprisonment terms imposed for ML convictions Year ML Convictions Cases # of Natural Persons Convicted # of Legal Persons Convicted Average Imprisonment Terms Fines Imposed (EUR millions) 2019 18 26 5 &lt; 5 years 65.92 2020* 8 8 0 &lt; 10 years 32.69 2021 7 8 0 &lt; 5 years 0.11 2022 3 3 0 &lt; 5 years 1.08 2023 15 16 0 &lt; 5 years 1.51 2024 1 1 0 &lt; 1 year 0.09 2025 (Feb) 0 0 0 n/a n/a Total 52 62 5 Avg. 1 year 8 months 101.4 Note: 2020 figures include the fines related to the SRC case summarised in Box 7.2. 498. For the judiciary, there are no sentencing guidelines for ML, however, they exist for other offences (e.g., wildlife crimes). While the AGC does not propose sentencing recommendations to judges, it does provide data and sentencing trends to aid the judiciary in its sentencing discretion. Thus, presiding judges are supported in exercising their discretion and making the best-informed and consistent decision on each case, based on its common law framework. During the on-site discussions with representatives from the judiciary, it was clear that they understood the complex nature of ML and stressed that there was a limited capacity at the prosecutorial level in terms of the presentation of the ML charges. The judiciary, however, recognised that the AGC is in a transitional process by transferring some ML prosecutorial authorities to the regional level to increase the knowledge and capacity of prosecutors. 499. Overall, Malaysia’s ML sanctions appear neither sufficiently dissuasive nor effective in combating ML, given their low application. Despite the 2014 amendments to the AMLA , which introduced maximum penalties of 15 years in prison and fines up to five times the laundered amount , there has been no corresponding increase in the severity of imposed sanctions . The frequent use of alternative measures, while expedient, further weakens overall deterrent effects. Sanctions would also be expected to increase if Malaysia pursued larger and more complex ML cases . However, as noted in IO.8 , authorities often rely on NCBF, tax recovery or impose criminal and administrative penalties tied to predicate offences instead of securing ML convictions. While some of these measures have a deterrent effect, the overall criminal sanctions regime lacks dissuasiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="493. Malaysia’s approach to sanctions for ML involves a combination of criminal penalties and civil measures. In practice, criminal sanctions may be imposed in the form of a fine and/or imprisonment, notwithstanding the conjunctive “and” used in the AMLA, which legally requires cumulative application of imprisonment and fines. Accordingly, this underscores the need for enhanced training for prosecutors and the judiciary on ML sanctions and sentencing. 494. The maximum penalty for ML is a term of imprisonment of 15 years. Fines can be up to five times the values of the proceeds of crime or RM 5 million (EUR 1.08 million), whichever is more. Malaysia has demonstrated instances where severe financial penalties had been imposed, particularly in high-value ML cases involving serious predicate crimes (such as fraud and corruption). For legal persons, the fine can increase up to a maximum 10% of the annual revenue. Sentences can be concurrent or consecutive, but consecutive sentences are rarely imposed. In concurrent cases, the judiciary will acknowledge the separate offences and the relative sanction for each offence, as well as the fine imposed. 495. Overall, the Assessment Team is concerned by the low level of ML sentences imposed in general (see below table). While there are some cases where the sentencing imposed was on the higher end but below the maximum (e.g., see SRC International case in Box 7.2), in general, the actual average of sanctions (sentences and fines) imposed to natural and legal persons is low. Since 2019, the average prison sentence imposed is one year and eight months. While this average can be partly explained by the higher volume of simple ML cases, the review of the case studies provided confirms that sanctions imposed in many complex and mixed cases are generally on the lower end of the scale and not necessarily dissuasive. 496. Furthermore, the application of fines to natural and legal persons may undermine the overall dissuasiveness of the sanction regime. Of the 52 convictions, fines were imposed in only 20 cases (applied to 21 natural persons and five legal persons). While the average fine was approximately EUR 1.78 million, this figure is heavily skewed by two exceptionally large fines of approximately EUR 66 million and EUR 33 million. These outliers suggest that most fines imposed were significantly lower. As a result, despite a few high-profile penalties, the limited use of fines—particularly when imposed as the sole sanction—may reduce the deterrent effect of enforcement outcomes overall. 497. Finally, of all the high-risk predicates where there were convictions, fines were only imposed in fraud and corruption cases, with a very small portion associated with “other” predicates. The Assessment Team also notes that in many cases provided by the authorities, many are still proceeding at the prosecutorial stage, and as such, sentencing had not been determined at the time of the on-site. Malaysia attributes these prosecutorial and trial delays to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reallocation of resources to 1MDB investigations and prosecutions. Table 7.5. Fines and imprisonment terms imposed for ML convictions Year ML Convictions Cases # of Natural Persons Convicted # of Legal Persons Convicted Average Imprisonment Terms Fines Imposed (EUR millions) 2019 18 26 5 &lt; 5 years 65.92 2020* 8 8 0 &lt; 10 years 32.69 2021 7 8 0 &lt; 5 years 0.11 2022 3 3 0 &lt; 5 years 1.08 2023 15 16 0 &lt; 5 years 1.51 2024 1 1 0 &lt; 1 year 0.09 2025 (Feb) 0 0 0 n/a n/a Total 52 62 5 Avg. 1 year 8 months 101.4 Note: 2020 figures include the fines related to the SRC case summarised in Box 7.2. 498. For the judiciary, there are no sentencing guidelines for ML, however, they exist for other offences (e.g., wildlife crimes). While the AGC does not propose sentencing recommendations to judges, it does provide data and sentencing trends to aid the judiciary in its sentencing discretion. Thus, presiding judges are supported in exercising their discretion and making the best-informed and consistent decision on each case, based on its common law framework. During the on-site discussions with representatives from the judiciary, it was clear that they understood the complex nature of ML and stressed that there was a limited capacity at the prosecutorial level in terms of the presentation of the ML charges. The judiciary, however, recognised that the AGC is in a transitional process by transferring some ML prosecutorial authorities to the regional level to increase the knowledge and capacity of prosecutors. 499. Overall, Malaysia’s ML sanctions appear neither sufficiently dissuasive nor effective in combating ML, given their low application. Despite the 2014 amendments to the AMLA , which introduced maximum penalties of 15 years in prison and fines up to five times the laundered amount , there has been no corresponding increase in the severity of imposed sanctions . The frequent use of alternative measures, while expedient, further weakens overall deterrent effects. Sanctions would also be expected to increase if Malaysia pursued larger and more complex ML cases . However, as noted in IO.8 , authorities often rely on NCBF, tax recovery or impose criminal and administrative penalties tied to predicate offences instead of securing ML convictions. While some of these measures have a deterrent effect, the overall criminal sanctions regime lacks dissuasiveness." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 546. Malaysia has a sound legal framework for the declaration and identification of cross-border movements of currency and BNIs (CBNIs). As outlined in R.32, residents and non-residents are required to declare incoming and outgoing CBNI exceeding USD 10 000 or its equivalent through a declaration form to RMCD. Notices are placed at all entry and exit points to give warning to travellers of their obligation to make a declaration. In the 2015 MER, it was noted that there was a low number of declarations, seizures, forfeitures and penalties imposed in relation to Malaysia’s CBNI declaration system. 547. Based on a review of the statistics and case studies from 2019-2025, the Assessment Team notes some improvements in Malaysia’s system, such as a comparatively higher number of declaration forms submitted to RMCD as compared to the 2015 MER (e.g., approximately 20 000 vs. 4 000). It should be noted that these activities cover the period of the COVID-19 pandemic when the Government of Malaysia imposed border restrictions for more than two years. However, overall, the Assessment Team finds that Malaysia is not confiscating falsely declared or undeclared cross-border currency and BNI in line with its risk profile. Moreover, the sanctions for violations of these declaration requirements are not effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 548. Malaysia’s 141 ports of entry (POE) vary in terms of legal requirements (71 international POEs are gazetted areas administered by RMCD for the purpose of CBNI declaration), size, risk and traffic volume, including some low-volume or low risk POEs such as minor jetties or rural land crossings. The RMCD is responsible for administering and enforcing customs laws and the CBNI reporting requirements and for investigating predicates and associated ML. In total, the RMCD has 400 officers at all 71 POEs, employs various resources and technologies at Malaysia’s POE and allocates a higher number of enforcement officers to POE with higher traffic (e.g., Kuala Lumpur International Airport 1 and 2, Johor-Singapore land crossings, northern land crossings). All checked luggage and parcels (courier) undergo screening, with random checks based on profiling and indicators as explained in RMCD SOP for Detection of CBNI cases. 549. In late 2024, Malaysia brought into operation legislation to establish the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency, to coordinate the functions of various enforcement agencies currently stationed at POE and to oversee the 141 POE. While it is expected that this new agency will help to improve the confiscation of falsely declared or non-declared CBNI, it was not yet fully operational as of the onsite visit. [81] 550. In May 2016, Malaysia established the NCC Sub-Committee on Implementation and Enforcement of CBNIs (SCBNI), which is composed of key agencies with border enforcement responsibilities, including RMCD, RMP, BNM, Immigration, AGC, and MMEA. The mandate of the SCBNI is to: (i) strengthen operationalisation of the CBNI declaration regime at border points; (ii) ensure effective use of CADS for record keeping and as a data source for profiling and risk assessment; (iii) enhance cooperation and information sharing for effective targeting in the prevention of ML and TF; and (iv) develop appropriate recommendations or measures to mitigate cash smuggling. 551. The establishment of the SCBNI has led to positive improvements to the cross-border coordination and information sharing amongst authorities. Notably, CADS, the system that logs and tracks CBNI declarations is in the process of being integrated with other systems such as FINS and the NFCC’s National Crime Intelligence System, which will improve tracking and identification of ML and TF threats. Nevertheless, as noted under IO.6, LEAs already have direct access to CADS. Authorities also reported that the SCBNI meets twice per year and these meetings take place at POE. The meetings provide an opportunity to conduct an audit of the ports of entry and to ensure compliance with policies and procedures. While this is a positive measure, the Assessment Team finds it insufficient given Malaysia’s numerous POE. A more robust and comprehensive audit function is necessary to effectively monitor and enforce compliance across all entry points. This need is further underscored by Malaysia’s ML/TF/PF risks, particularly due to its cash-intensive economy and strategic regional position, which make it vulnerable to illicit financial flows. 552. Despite the above improvements introduced since Malaysia’s last MER, results related to the confiscation of falsely declared or non-declared CBNIs are not in line with Malaysia’s risk and context. Specifically, Malaysia’s reliance on cash and role as a key regional transit point make it vulnerable to illicit financial flows and criminal activity. It serves as a gateway for smuggling illicit goods, as well as the movement of illicit funds tied to criminal syndicates. 553. Based on the number of cross-border cash declarations reported between 2019 and 2025 (20 439), asset forfeitures are disproportionately low relative to both the volume of declarations and the value involved (see Table 8.7 below). For instance, during this period, EUR 16.58 billion worth of CBNI was declared. However, only EUR 3.84 million (or just 0.023%) was seized, and an even smaller amount—EUR 313 456 (just 0.002%)—was ultimately forfeited. This extremely low forfeiture rate raises concerns about the effectiveness of Malaysia’s border controls and enforcement mechanisms. It suggests that, despite the substantial volume and value of cross-border declarations, very few suspicious or undeclared CBNI are identified, investigated, and subjected to recovery. While authorities indicated during the onsite that the volume of cash declarations can partly be attributed to money changers moving large amounts of cash legitimately across the border, the low number of investigations, seizures and forfeitures indicates a systemic issue. Table 8.7. Cross-border declarations and enforcement action (EUR) Year # of Declarations Value of Declarations (Billion) Cash Seized Cash Forfeited Investigations (Prosecutions) Fines Compounds # of Compound Cases 2019 6 853 5.17 1 969 534 278 930 10 (2) 64 650 6 681 7 2020 1 628 1.64 226 999 34 528 5 (0) - 87 718 3 2021 120 0.65 19 914 - 1 (0) - 7 974 1 2022 2 935 2.94 147 125 - 5 (0) - 48 272 5 2023 5 450 4.16 774 424 - 8 (0) - 45 255 3 2024 5 671 3.07 682 766 - 12 (0) - 63 282 6 2025 (Feb) 784 0.43 21 551 - 1(0) - - 0 Total 23 441 18.06 3 842 313 313 456 42 (2) 64 650 259 182 25 554. As illustrated in the table above, 42 investigations have been initiated since 2019 in response to violations of Malaysia’s CBNI declaration requirements. [82] However, enforcement outcomes have been limited: only one case (from 2019) has resulted in a criminal conviction, involving a EUR 64 650 fine and a one-year prison sentence (related to fraud). In addition, 25 cases have been resolved through the application of compounds totalling EUR 259 182. While this reflects a modest improvement compared to the 2015 MER, the scale of enforcement remains inadequate, particularly when viewed against Malaysia’s elevated risk exposure. The limited number of sanctions, especially the fact that only one criminal fine has been imposed in over five years, suggests that the current system lacks effective deterrence. 555. Malaysia notes that it is working with regional and international partners to share information and improve CBNI declaration results. There are MOUs in place between the FIU and AUSTRAC and the Brunei Darussalam FIU regarding cross-border information sharing. Authorities report that there are ongoing efforts to establish MOUs with other regional partners, including Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. Outside of MOU arrangements, Malaysia shares financial intelligence with Lao PDR, Vietnam and Thailand, including in relation to cross border CBNI. 556. While Malaysia has established the legal and institutional framework necessary to implement a CBNI declaration regime, the actual outcomes in terms of seizures, forfeitures and sanctions remain disproportionately low. This enforcement response does not align with the scale of Malaysia’s cash-based economy, the volume of cross-border movements of people and capital, nor the country’s elevated risk profile as a regional financial centre and transit hub for illicit flows. Although operational coordination and enforcement efforts have shown improvement since the 2015 MER, these gains appear to be incremental rather than transformative, and fundamental improvements are needed with respect to both the investigation of declared and undeclared CBNI. Footnotes [81] Malaysia notes that the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency will be subsuming some resources and mandates from other agencies to achieve full implementation by 2028. [82] Malaysia notes that 10 investigations are still ongoing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 8.3.Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI 546. Malaysia has a sound legal framework for the declaration and identification of cross-border movements of currency and BNIs (CBNIs). As outlined in R.32, residents and non-residents are required to declare incoming and outgoing CBNI exceeding USD 10 000 or its equivalent through a declaration form to RMCD. Notices are placed at all entry and exit points to give warning to travellers of their obligation to make a declaration. In the 2015 MER, it was noted that there was a low number of declarations, seizures, forfeitures and penalties imposed in relation to Malaysia’s CBNI declaration system. 547. Based on a review of the statistics and case studies from 2019-2025, the Assessment Team notes some improvements in Malaysia’s system, such as a comparatively higher number of declaration forms submitted to RMCD as compared to the 2015 MER (e.g., approximately 20 000 vs. 4 000). It should be noted that these activities cover the period of the COVID-19 pandemic when the Government of Malaysia imposed border restrictions for more than two years. However, overall, the Assessment Team finds that Malaysia is not confiscating falsely declared or undeclared cross-border currency and BNI in line with its risk profile. Moreover, the sanctions for violations of these declaration requirements are not effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 548. Malaysia’s 141 ports of entry (POE) vary in terms of legal requirements (71 international POEs are gazetted areas administered by RMCD for the purpose of CBNI declaration), size, risk and traffic volume, including some low-volume or low risk POEs such as minor jetties or rural land crossings. The RMCD is responsible for administering and enforcing customs laws and the CBNI reporting requirements and for investigating predicates and associated ML. In total, the RMCD has 400 officers at all 71 POEs, employs various resources and technologies at Malaysia’s POE and allocates a higher number of enforcement officers to POE with higher traffic (e.g., Kuala Lumpur International Airport 1 and 2, Johor-Singapore land crossings, northern land crossings). All checked luggage and parcels (courier) undergo screening, with random checks based on profiling and indicators as explained in RMCD SOP for Detection of CBNI cases. 549. In late 2024, Malaysia brought into operation legislation to establish the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency, to coordinate the functions of various enforcement agencies currently stationed at POE and to oversee the 141 POE. While it is expected that this new agency will help to improve the confiscation of falsely declared or non-declared CBNI, it was not yet fully operational as of the onsite visit. [81] 550. In May 2016, Malaysia established the NCC Sub-Committee on Implementation and Enforcement of CBNIs (SCBNI), which is composed of key agencies with border enforcement responsibilities, including RMCD, RMP, BNM, Immigration, AGC, and MMEA. The mandate of the SCBNI is to: (i) strengthen operationalisation of the CBNI declaration regime at border points; (ii) ensure effective use of CADS for record keeping and as a data source for profiling and risk assessment; (iii) enhance cooperation and information sharing for effective targeting in the prevention of ML and TF; and (iv) develop appropriate recommendations or measures to mitigate cash smuggling. 551. The establishment of the SCBNI has led to positive improvements to the cross-border coordination and information sharing amongst authorities. Notably, CADS, the system that logs and tracks CBNI declarations is in the process of being integrated with other systems such as FINS and the NFCC’s National Crime Intelligence System, which will improve tracking and identification of ML and TF threats. Nevertheless, as noted under IO.6, LEAs already have direct access to CADS. Authorities also reported that the SCBNI meets twice per year and these meetings take place at POE. The meetings provide an opportunity to conduct an audit of the ports of entry and to ensure compliance with policies and procedures. While this is a positive measure, the Assessment Team finds it insufficient given Malaysia’s numerous POE. A more robust and comprehensive audit function is necessary to effectively monitor and enforce compliance across all entry points. This need is further underscored by Malaysia’s ML/TF/PF risks, particularly due to its cash-intensive economy and strategic regional position, which make it vulnerable to illicit financial flows. 552. Despite the above improvements introduced since Malaysia’s last MER, results related to the confiscation of falsely declared or non-declared CBNIs are not in line with Malaysia’s risk and context. Specifically, Malaysia’s reliance on cash and role as a key regional transit point make it vulnerable to illicit financial flows and criminal activity. It serves as a gateway for smuggling illicit goods, as well as the movement of illicit funds tied to criminal syndicates. 553. Based on the number of cross-border cash declarations reported between 2019 and 2025 (20 439), asset forfeitures are disproportionately low relative to both the volume of declarations and the value involved (see Table 8.7 below). For instance, during this period, EUR 16.58 billion worth of CBNI was declared. However, only EUR 3.84 million (or just 0.023%) was seized, and an even smaller amount—EUR 313 456 (just 0.002%)—was ultimately forfeited. This extremely low forfeiture rate raises concerns about the effectiveness of Malaysia’s border controls and enforcement mechanisms. It suggests that, despite the substantial volume and value of cross-border declarations, very few suspicious or undeclared CBNI are identified, investigated, and subjected to recovery. While authorities indicated during the onsite that the volume of cash declarations can partly be attributed to money changers moving large amounts of cash legitimately across the border, the low number of investigations, seizures and forfeitures indicates a systemic issue. Table 8.7. Cross-border declarations and enforcement action (EUR) Year # of Declarations Value of Declarations (Billion) Cash Seized Cash Forfeited Investigations (Prosecutions) Fines Compounds # of Compound Cases 2019 6 853 5.17 1 969 534 278 930 10 (2) 64 650 6 681 7 2020 1 628 1.64 226 999 34 528 5 (0) - 87 718 3 2021 120 0.65 19 914 - 1 (0) - 7 974 1 2022 2 935 2.94 147 125 - 5 (0) - 48 272 5 2023 5 450 4.16 774 424 - 8 (0) - 45 255 3 2024 5 671 3.07 682 766 - 12 (0) - 63 282 6 2025 (Feb) 784 0.43 21 551 - 1(0) - - 0 Total 23 441 18.06 3 842 313 313 456 42 (2) 64 650 259 182 25 554. As illustrated in the table above, 42 investigations have been initiated since 2019 in response to violations of Malaysia’s CBNI declaration requirements. [82] However, enforcement outcomes have been limited: only one case (from 2019) has resulted in a criminal conviction, involving a EUR 64 650 fine and a one-year prison sentence (related to fraud). In addition, 25 cases have been resolved through the application of compounds totalling EUR 259 182. While this reflects a modest improvement compared to the 2015 MER, the scale of enforcement remains inadequate, particularly when viewed against Malaysia’s elevated risk exposure. The limited number of sanctions, especially the fact that only one criminal fine has been imposed in over five years, suggests that the current system lacks effective deterrence. 555. Malaysia notes that it is working with regional and international partners to share information and improve CBNI declaration results. There are MOUs in place between the FIU and AUSTRAC and the Brunei Darussalam FIU regarding cross-border information sharing. Authorities report that there are ongoing efforts to establish MOUs with other regional partners, including Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. Outside of MOU arrangements, Malaysia shares financial intelligence with Lao PDR, Vietnam and Thailand, including in relation to cross border CBNI. 556. While Malaysia has established the legal and institutional framework necessary to implement a CBNI declaration regime, the actual outcomes in terms of seizures, forfeitures and sanctions remain disproportionately low. This enforcement response does not align with the scale of Malaysia’s cash-based economy, the volume of cross-border movements of people and capital, nor the country’s elevated risk profile as a regional financial centre and transit hub for illicit flows. Although operational coordination and enforcement efforts have shown improvement since the 2015 MER, these gains appear to be incremental rather than transformative, and fundamental improvements are needed with respect to both the investigation of declared and undeclared CBNI. Footnotes [81] Malaysia notes that the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency will be subsuming some resources and mandates from other agencies to achieve full implementation by 2028. [82] Malaysia notes that 10 investigations are still ongoing." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. According to Malaysia’s legal framework, TF is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years, and where the TF-related offences resulted in death, the death penalty may be applied. In addition to sentences of imprisonment, fines may also be applied. These sanctions are assessed as proportionate and dissuasive (see R.5). As a point of comparison, terrorism offences are punishable by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or up to 30 years of imprisonment. However, in practice, Malaysia has provided case studies where terrorism convictions resulted in sentences as short as 10 years. 586. In practice, since 2016, those convicted of TF have received a sentence of imprisonment ranging from less than three years to 10 years. The highest sentence during the assessment period (2019-2025) was applied in 2019, when the individual was sentenced to six years of imprisonment; however, the average sentence was 2.5 years imprisonment. The most recent TF conviction was secured in 2023, when the perpetrator was sentenced to 1.5 years of imprisonment. The below table (9.6) summarises the seven TF sentences secured during the assessment period. Table 9.6. TF Sentences (2019 to February 2025) Individual # Year of Conviction TF Sentences Parallel Terrorism Sentence 1 2019 6 years 10 years 2 2019 3 years 3 2019 1 year 3 years 4 2019 2 years 1 year 5 2021 2 years 6 2021 2 years 7 2023 1 year 6 months Average TF sentence 2.5 years 587. The below case study box (9.2) summarises the facts of five of the TF convictions secured since 2019. Box 9.2. Case Studies of TF Convictions since 2019 [85] 2019 Conviction A former taxi driver was charged and found guilty on three counts of supporting a terrorist group (ISIL). He was charged under subsection 130J(1)(a) of the Penal Code for lending support to ISIL via Telegram and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. He was also charged under subsection 130JB(1) of the Penal Code with possessing 21 video clips and 10 still images relating to a terror group and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The individual was convicted of the TF offence (section 130Q) and sentenced to six-year imprisonment. The individual ultimately served a ten-year imprisonment term for the concurrent sentence with other terrorism-related conviction (i.e. subsection 130J(1)(a)). 2019 and 2021 Convictions In 2018, an individual deposited approximately EUR 42 into a bank account belonging to a Malaysian ISIL member and recruiter based in Syria. Nine STRs were filed on this individual by four banks from 2017 to 2022 based on sharing information as part of the PPP. As a result of the PPP initiative, the SB expanded the network from the remittance transactions and counterparties provided by the MSBs, which had led to further disclosures to foreign counterparts on additional subjects identified. The related foreign accounts were believed to be involved in the distribution of funds for terrorist purposes in a neighbouring country. As part of the PPP, the SB collaborated with the FIU and a bank to profile, locate and arrest the suspect in October 2018. In 2019, the individual was convicted for TF and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for TF. Based on intelligence sharing from Indonesian authorities, it was discovered that three Malaysians transferred approximately EUR 62 to an Indonesian who was arrested for planning to carry out a terrorist attack at a nearby police station. The funds were believed to be used to purchase materials for manufacturing homemade firearms. The information was shared with the FIU to assist in identifying financial links and patterns. In June 2018, the SB arrested the suspect and confirmed the involvement of two other Malaysians in providing financial support to the Indonesian terrorist network. The SB also uncovered that the suspects were committed to carry out terrorist attacks in Indonesia and had travelled to a city in Central Java to conduct reconnaissance on their intended target. The Malaysian suspect was sentenced to two years imprisonment in 2019 under both terrorism and TF charges, while the other two Malaysians were later sentenced to two years imprisonment in 2021. 2023 Conviction The SB received intelligence on a Malaysian who was suspected of sending money to a financial facilitator for ISIL who was based in Country X and listed by the United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Malaysian individual was charged on 7 November 2022, for indirectly facilitating the channelling of funds amounting to approximately EUR 1 099 via a remittance agent to benefit ISIL. Following the collaborative efforts between the SB and United States counterparts, in November 2022, crucial evidence was unveiled regarding the receiver’s history of involvement in TF activities. This information led to the successful conviction in May 2023, when he was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment. 588. As indicated above, six out of the seven sentences imposed for TF convictions secured since 2019 have all been for less than three years. While low, these sanctions appear proportionate to the scale of the TF activity. In determining the sentences, the High Court considered various factors, including the defendants’ level of cooperation (such as whether they pleaded guilty) and the extent of their radicalisation. Malaysia authorities also complement the punishment with de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Three of the TF cases from 2019 also included terrorism charges in addition to TF, and the sentences were served concurrently. 589. Malaysia notes that there has been no intention to appeal any convictions secured since 2019, as the sentencing decisions were considered proportionate to the gravity of the offences, considering their nature, the evidence, and the facts of each case. 590. Nevertheless, the Assessment Team questions the dissuasive nature of TF sentences imposed by the High Court. In particular, the Assessment Team notes three instances (two in 2016 and one in 2018) where the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the prosecution and increased TF sentences from five years to 12 years; three to 15 years; and four to eight years of imprisonment. While the final sentences imposed were substantial, the disparity between initial sentences and the significantly longer sentences imposed by the Court of Appeal suggests a potential underestimation of the severity of TF crimes at the High Court level. This inconsistency may weaken the deterrent effect of TF-related penalties and create uncertainty around judicial sentencing. However, it also reflects the checks and balances within Malaysia’s judicial system, particularly the appellate process, which allows higher courts to overturn lower court decisions. 591. The Court of Appeal’s decisions to substantially increase sentences during appeal indicates a recognition of the serious threat posed by TF and the need for stricter penalties to align with Malaysia’s counterterrorism efforts. This raises concerns about whether the High Court is consistently applying deterrent and proportionate sentencing that reflects the gravity of TF offences. According to Malaysia, the outcomes from the Court of Appeal can set clear sentencing precedents that serves as reference points for future TF cases. 592. To mitigate TF recidivism, the SB regularly conducts awareness programmes and engagement to those who have been convicted of TF and terrorism (as well as to their family members). Some of the rehabilitated individuals are now actively involved in public awareness efforts, sharing real life perspectives from their experiences on the dangers of radicalisation, and offering practical advice to educate and inform the public. For example, one individual convicted of TF in 2019 now participates in CFT outreach activities. Footnotes [85] Malaysia secured an additional conviction in March 2025, after the onsite visit. The convicted person was sentenced to five years in prison on 15 TF charges and three years for a terrorism charge (to be served concurrently for a total of five years)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="585. According to Malaysia’s legal framework, TF is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years, and where the TF-related offences resulted in death, the death penalty may be applied. In addition to sentences of imprisonment, fines may also be applied. These sanctions are assessed as proportionate and dissuasive (see R.5). As a point of comparison, terrorism offences are punishable by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or up to 30 years of imprisonment. However, in practice, Malaysia has provided case studies where terrorism convictions resulted in sentences as short as 10 years. 586. In practice, since 2016, those convicted of TF have received a sentence of imprisonment ranging from less than three years to 10 years. The highest sentence during the assessment period (2019-2025) was applied in 2019, when the individual was sentenced to six years of imprisonment; however, the average sentence was 2.5 years imprisonment. The most recent TF conviction was secured in 2023, when the perpetrator was sentenced to 1.5 years of imprisonment. The below table (9.6) summarises the seven TF sentences secured during the assessment period. Table 9.6. TF Sentences (2019 to February 2025) Individual # Year of Conviction TF Sentences Parallel Terrorism Sentence 1 2019 6 years 10 years 2 2019 3 years 3 2019 1 year 3 years 4 2019 2 years 1 year 5 2021 2 years 6 2021 2 years 7 2023 1 year 6 months Average TF sentence 2.5 years 587. The below case study box (9.2) summarises the facts of five of the TF convictions secured since 2019. Box 9.2. Case Studies of TF Convictions since 2019 [85] 2019 Conviction A former taxi driver was charged and found guilty on three counts of supporting a terrorist group (ISIL). He was charged under subsection 130J(1)(a) of the Penal Code for lending support to ISIL via Telegram and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. He was also charged under subsection 130JB(1) of the Penal Code with possessing 21 video clips and 10 still images relating to a terror group and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The individual was convicted of the TF offence (section 130Q) and sentenced to six-year imprisonment. The individual ultimately served a ten-year imprisonment term for the concurrent sentence with other terrorism-related conviction (i.e. subsection 130J(1)(a)). 2019 and 2021 Convictions In 2018, an individual deposited approximately EUR 42 into a bank account belonging to a Malaysian ISIL member and recruiter based in Syria. Nine STRs were filed on this individual by four banks from 2017 to 2022 based on sharing information as part of the PPP. As a result of the PPP initiative, the SB expanded the network from the remittance transactions and counterparties provided by the MSBs, which had led to further disclosures to foreign counterparts on additional subjects identified. The related foreign accounts were believed to be involved in the distribution of funds for terrorist purposes in a neighbouring country. As part of the PPP, the SB collaborated with the FIU and a bank to profile, locate and arrest the suspect in October 2018. In 2019, the individual was convicted for TF and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for TF. Based on intelligence sharing from Indonesian authorities, it was discovered that three Malaysians transferred approximately EUR 62 to an Indonesian who was arrested for planning to carry out a terrorist attack at a nearby police station. The funds were believed to be used to purchase materials for manufacturing homemade firearms. The information was shared with the FIU to assist in identifying financial links and patterns. In June 2018, the SB arrested the suspect and confirmed the involvement of two other Malaysians in providing financial support to the Indonesian terrorist network. The SB also uncovered that the suspects were committed to carry out terrorist attacks in Indonesia and had travelled to a city in Central Java to conduct reconnaissance on their intended target. The Malaysian suspect was sentenced to two years imprisonment in 2019 under both terrorism and TF charges, while the other two Malaysians were later sentenced to two years imprisonment in 2021. 2023 Conviction The SB received intelligence on a Malaysian who was suspected of sending money to a financial facilitator for ISIL who was based in Country X and listed by the United States’ Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Malaysian individual was charged on 7 November 2022, for indirectly facilitating the channelling of funds amounting to approximately EUR 1 099 via a remittance agent to benefit ISIL. Following the collaborative efforts between the SB and United States counterparts, in November 2022, crucial evidence was unveiled regarding the receiver’s history of involvement in TF activities. This information led to the successful conviction in May 2023, when he was sentenced to one year and six months imprisonment. 588. As indicated above, six out of the seven sentences imposed for TF convictions secured since 2019 have all been for less than three years. While low, these sanctions appear proportionate to the scale of the TF activity. In determining the sentences, the High Court considered various factors, including the defendants’ level of cooperation (such as whether they pleaded guilty) and the extent of their radicalisation. Malaysia authorities also complement the punishment with de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Three of the TF cases from 2019 also included terrorism charges in addition to TF, and the sentences were served concurrently. 589. Malaysia notes that there has been no intention to appeal any convictions secured since 2019, as the sentencing decisions were considered proportionate to the gravity of the offences, considering their nature, the evidence, and the facts of each case. 590. Nevertheless, the Assessment Team questions the dissuasive nature of TF sentences imposed by the High Court. In particular, the Assessment Team notes three instances (two in 2016 and one in 2018) where the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the prosecution and increased TF sentences from five years to 12 years; three to 15 years; and four to eight years of imprisonment. While the final sentences imposed were substantial, the disparity between initial sentences and the significantly longer sentences imposed by the Court of Appeal suggests a potential underestimation of the severity of TF crimes at the High Court level. This inconsistency may weaken the deterrent effect of TF-related penalties and create uncertainty around judicial sentencing. However, it also reflects the checks and balances within Malaysia’s judicial system, particularly the appellate process, which allows higher courts to overturn lower court decisions. 591. The Court of Appeal’s decisions to substantially increase sentences during appeal indicates a recognition of the serious threat posed by TF and the need for stricter penalties to align with Malaysia’s counterterrorism efforts. This raises concerns about whether the High Court is consistently applying deterrent and proportionate sentencing that reflects the gravity of TF offences. According to Malaysia, the outcomes from the Court of Appeal can set clear sentencing precedents that serves as reference points for future TF cases. 592. To mitigate TF recidivism, the SB regularly conducts awareness programmes and engagement to those who have been convicted of TF and terrorism (as well as to their family members). Some of the rehabilitated individuals are now actively involved in public awareness efforts, sharing real life perspectives from their experiences on the dangers of radicalisation, and offering practical advice to educate and inform the public. For example, one individual convicted of TF in 2019 now participates in CFT outreach activities. Footnotes [85] Malaysia secured an additional conviction in March 2025, after the onsite visit. The convicted person was sentenced to five years in prison on 15 TF charges and three years for a terrorism charge (to be served concurrently for a total of five years)." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="624. As of February 2025, Malaysia has approximately 91 000 NPOs registered that meet the FATF’s functional NPO definition. Under the NCC, the Sub Committee on NPOs is the main platform for NPO regulators to discuss issues and share information. Within this framework, Malaysia conducted NPO risk assessments in 2018 and 2024, during which time the number of NPOs doubled. The risk assessment methodology is reasonably sound and leverages quantitative and qualitative information, including input from NPO representatives. Malaysia has produced an executive summary of the 2024 NPO Risk Assessment which was shared with the Assessment Team. 625. There are four NPO regulators in Malaysia with the vast majority of all NPOs (about 88 000; 96%) falling under the Registrar of Societies (ROS). The CCM has around 2 974 NPOs (for companies limited by guarantee – CLBG), while the BHEUU oversee 593 (trust and foundations) and LFSA has 24 NPOs (charitable trusts and foundations located in Labuan). All four regulators were involved in the development of the NPO risk assessment and have developed their own separate internal criteria to identify NPOs most vulnerable to TF misuse, which includes checking adverse reporting from authorities or media. 626. During the assessment period, there were no cases of NPOs being misused for TF. Malaysia’s 2024 NPO Risk Assessment assesses NPO’s inherent risk for TF abuse as low, which is a reduction from the medium level assigned in 2018. Malaysia attributes the lower rating mainly due to a declining risk in terrorism and TF facing the country. Furthermore, Malaysia points to prevention measures by the RMP, as well as regulatory measures and oversight that mitigate TF risk. 627. Within this context, Malaysia acknowledges that certain types of NPOs—specifically those operating in the charity and religious sectors—are more vulnerable to the risk of TF abuse. There are eight other NPO sector types (e.g., professional, trade, recreation, cultural) classified as low risk. Not all NPOs that fall under the charity or religious sectors are considered higher risk for TF abuse. Malaysia focuses on a further subset of NPOs that are cash intensive, have presence or conduct overseas activities and are involved in fundraising or disbursing large donations from/to overseas including higher risk areas. Malaysia has determined that approximately 10 000 NPOs (across all sector types) demonstrate one or more of these risk characteristics. From this pool, each NPO regulator then undertakes a more granular risk assessment. In total, over 4 700 NPOs have been identified as posing a higher risk for TF abuse, as they exhibit multiple inherent at-risk characteristics. 10.3.1. NPO registration 628. All persons setting up NPOs are subject to market entry control measures by the regulators based on their respective legal framework. Malaysia noted that these rigorous onboarding processes help safeguard the sector by ensuring that only legitimate and credible NPOs are established. The standard documentation and application forms for the establishment of any NPO requires a minimum of seven founding members, minimum financial capital, organisational name verification, mission of the organisation, meeting minutes and procedures, amongst others. Verification of the paperwork includes due diligence by the supervisory authorities on screening names against commercial and public databases. The approval for an NPO application can range from five days to as long a month when circumstances include obtaining information from other agencies. For example, there are times where the BHEUU may seek information from the Immigration Department if the trustee is a foreigner or seeks confirmation with the religious body (e.g., Islamic Council) if the NPO serves a religious function. 629. NPO applications are typically subject to additional vetting which varies depending on the regulator and, for most NPOs, the level of risk. [88] Applications to ROS are subject to RMP vetting where the NPO has particular risk characteristics (e.g., category of NPO, foreign office bearers, international presence, etc.). Malaysia has also determined that any NPO application from the Sabah region, which has a history of terrorist attacks, is subject to security vetting by the RMP, regardless of the type of NPO. RMP checks their databases for any criminal records as well as reviewing domestic and financial intelligence and external sources (e.g., sanctions lists). For higher risk situations (e.g., operations in conflict zones or higher-risk countries), more detailed screening can occur. 630. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia received over 94 000 NPO applications and 2 628 were subject to RMP vetting. The examples provided to the Assessment Team show the RMP responding to supervisors’ vetting requests within five days to over a month for more complex requests (e.g., involving many persons). The 646 rejections by RMP vetting include applications that failed security screening, as well as other reasons such as potential misuse of NPO registrations. This includes applications using sensitive or misleading NPO names, or submissions with incomplete information—particularly those with unclear objectives or names that could mislead the public. Overall, the screening and vetting process conducted by NPO regulators and the RMP is generally effective in ensuring the legitimacy of NPO activities. Table 10.2. Number of applications sent for RMP vetting From 2019-February 2025 All regulators No. NPO applications (also undergo basic checks by regulators) 94 020 Sent to RMP for vetting given higher risk (% of total application) 2 628 (2.8%) No. rejected after RMP vetting 646 631. All NPO regulators conduct offsite and onsite inspections focusing on the higher risk NPOs. ROS, which regulates about 96% of NPOs, has refined its internal criteria to consider adverse reporting from authorities or the public, cash intensity, location or geographic area of the NPO’s operation and compliance history. Offsite inspections include conducting a desk-based review of information submitted and annual returns. From 2019 to February 2025, ROS conducted 7 548 onsite inspections with most resources focused on the charitable and religious sectors (see below table). This amounts to inspections of approximately 8% of NPOs monitored by ROS. All but one of the NPOs the Assessment Team engaged with during the onsite visit had been subject to onsite monitoring by ROS. Malaysia advised that the NPO that had not had an onsite inspection had been subjected to offsite monitoring; this decision was based on the NPO’s voluntary internal controls, which were deemed sufficient to mitigate its inherent risks. Noting the large number of inspections, Malaysia could further refine its risk-based oversight activities to ensure they are specifically targeted at mitigating higher TF risks. Table 10.3. Oversight activities on NPOs (by all regulators) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Onsite 1 049 1 062 1 513 1 094 1 252 1 756 235 7961 Charitable 532 535 683 546 439 320 76 3 131 (39%) Religious 267 268 429 272 259 153 35 1 683 (21%) Recreational 220 220 381 203 258 145 30 1 457 (18%) Social 5 5 1 26 259 193 48 537 (7%) Others 25 34 19 47 37 945 46 1 153 (14%) Off-site (all categories) 1 434 283 540 789 785 12 696 922 17 449 632. The regulators have utilised a range of remedial actions against the NPOs from dealing with minor non-compliance through administrative measures to punitive actions for prolonged failures, such as failure to submit audited financial statements. Between 2019 and February 2025, ROS issued approximately 116 000 reminders and notices to encourage submission of annual returns. Most administrative actions imposed by regulators relate to inactive NPOs. [89] 633. Regulators have also considered intelligence shared by the RMP and public complaints to guide both onsite and offsite inspections. The case study below (Box 10.2) demonstrates how the ROS closely monitored and ultimately deregistered NPOs suspected of posing potential TF risks. The Assessment Team highlights this case as an example of administrative action, where the NPO regulator worked in close cooperation with investigative authorities to address a potential TF connection. Box 10.2.NPO deregistration In 2022, three registered NPOs in Sabah were suspected of having links to terrorist groups in a neighbouring country. The RMP and ROS conducted joint onsite inspections to monitor and investigate the NPOs. Although no TF activities were identified, the NPOs were found to be noncompliant with the Societies Act, particularly regarding registration requirements. After being given opportunities to respond, their violations—including failure to submit annual reports and provide requested documentation—led to their deregistration in 2022 and 2023. Individuals who held positions in these deregistered NPOs are now barred from serving in any other NPOs. 634. Regarding outreach activities, awareness raising events and trainings have been conducted for wide audiences of NPO sectors to enhance general compliance and governance including the aspects of TF risk understanding and risk mitigation measures. Malaysian authorities informed that religious and charitable NPOs are prioritised for outreach while representatives from all other NPOs are also considered. Following the adoption of the 2024 NPO risk assessment, a Red Flags and Typologies report on TF prevention for NPOs was developed in February 2025. While this document is too recent for the Assessment Team to adequately assess its effectiveness, Malaysia has undertaken other engagements on risk within the broader NPO sector, which are commendable. In order to apply more targeted and risk-based outreach, Malaysia should further target those NPOs that are most at risk within the high-risk categories of religious and charitable NPOs. Footnotes [88] For applications to CCM, BHEUU and LFSA, the application is subject to mandatory, statutory screening and due diligence on directors/trustees/founders/etc. [89] ROS deems NPOs which have failed to submit annual returns for consecutive number of years and whose office bearers are uncontactable as inactive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="624. As of February 2025, Malaysia has approximately 91 000 NPOs registered that meet the FATF’s functional NPO definition. Under the NCC, the Sub Committee on NPOs is the main platform for NPO regulators to discuss issues and share information. Within this framework, Malaysia conducted NPO risk assessments in 2018 and 2024, during which time the number of NPOs doubled. The risk assessment methodology is reasonably sound and leverages quantitative and qualitative information, including input from NPO representatives. Malaysia has produced an executive summary of the 2024 NPO Risk Assessment which was shared with the Assessment Team. 625. There are four NPO regulators in Malaysia with the vast majority of all NPOs (about 88 000; 96%) falling under the Registrar of Societies (ROS). The CCM has around 2 974 NPOs (for companies limited by guarantee – CLBG), while the BHEUU oversee 593 (trust and foundations) and LFSA has 24 NPOs (charitable trusts and foundations located in Labuan). All four regulators were involved in the development of the NPO risk assessment and have developed their own separate internal criteria to identify NPOs most vulnerable to TF misuse, which includes checking adverse reporting from authorities or media. 626. During the assessment period, there were no cases of NPOs being misused for TF. Malaysia’s 2024 NPO Risk Assessment assesses NPO’s inherent risk for TF abuse as low, which is a reduction from the medium level assigned in 2018. Malaysia attributes the lower rating mainly due to a declining risk in terrorism and TF facing the country. Furthermore, Malaysia points to prevention measures by the RMP, as well as regulatory measures and oversight that mitigate TF risk. 627. Within this context, Malaysia acknowledges that certain types of NPOs—specifically those operating in the charity and religious sectors—are more vulnerable to the risk of TF abuse. There are eight other NPO sector types (e.g., professional, trade, recreation, cultural) classified as low risk. Not all NPOs that fall under the charity or religious sectors are considered higher risk for TF abuse. Malaysia focuses on a further subset of NPOs that are cash intensive, have presence or conduct overseas activities and are involved in fundraising or disbursing large donations from/to overseas including higher risk areas. Malaysia has determined that approximately 10 000 NPOs (across all sector types) demonstrate one or more of these risk characteristics. From this pool, each NPO regulator then undertakes a more granular risk assessment. In total, over 4 700 NPOs have been identified as posing a higher risk for TF abuse, as they exhibit multiple inherent at-risk characteristics. 10.3.1. NPO registration 628. All persons setting up NPOs are subject to market entry control measures by the regulators based on their respective legal framework. Malaysia noted that these rigorous onboarding processes help safeguard the sector by ensuring that only legitimate and credible NPOs are established. The standard documentation and application forms for the establishment of any NPO requires a minimum of seven founding members, minimum financial capital, organisational name verification, mission of the organisation, meeting minutes and procedures, amongst others. Verification of the paperwork includes due diligence by the supervisory authorities on screening names against commercial and public databases. The approval for an NPO application can range from five days to as long a month when circumstances include obtaining information from other agencies. For example, there are times where the BHEUU may seek information from the Immigration Department if the trustee is a foreigner or seeks confirmation with the religious body (e.g., Islamic Council) if the NPO serves a religious function. 629. NPO applications are typically subject to additional vetting which varies depending on the regulator and, for most NPOs, the level of risk. [88] Applications to ROS are subject to RMP vetting where the NPO has particular risk characteristics (e.g., category of NPO, foreign office bearers, international presence, etc.). Malaysia has also determined that any NPO application from the Sabah region, which has a history of terrorist attacks, is subject to security vetting by the RMP, regardless of the type of NPO. RMP checks their databases for any criminal records as well as reviewing domestic and financial intelligence and external sources (e.g., sanctions lists). For higher risk situations (e.g., operations in conflict zones or higher-risk countries), more detailed screening can occur. 630. Between 2019 and February 2025, Malaysia received over 94 000 NPO applications and 2 628 were subject to RMP vetting. The examples provided to the Assessment Team show the RMP responding to supervisors’ vetting requests within five days to over a month for more complex requests (e.g., involving many persons). The 646 rejections by RMP vetting include applications that failed security screening, as well as other reasons such as potential misuse of NPO registrations. This includes applications using sensitive or misleading NPO names, or submissions with incomplete information—particularly those with unclear objectives or names that could mislead the public. Overall, the screening and vetting process conducted by NPO regulators and the RMP is generally effective in ensuring the legitimacy of NPO activities. Table 10.2. Number of applications sent for RMP vetting From 2019-February 2025 All regulators No. NPO applications (also undergo basic checks by regulators) 94 020 Sent to RMP for vetting given higher risk (% of total application) 2 628 (2.8%) No. rejected after RMP vetting 646 631. All NPO regulators conduct offsite and onsite inspections focusing on the higher risk NPOs. ROS, which regulates about 96% of NPOs, has refined its internal criteria to consider adverse reporting from authorities or the public, cash intensity, location or geographic area of the NPO’s operation and compliance history. Offsite inspections include conducting a desk-based review of information submitted and annual returns. From 2019 to February 2025, ROS conducted 7 548 onsite inspections with most resources focused on the charitable and religious sectors (see below table). This amounts to inspections of approximately 8% of NPOs monitored by ROS. All but one of the NPOs the Assessment Team engaged with during the onsite visit had been subject to onsite monitoring by ROS. Malaysia advised that the NPO that had not had an onsite inspection had been subjected to offsite monitoring; this decision was based on the NPO’s voluntary internal controls, which were deemed sufficient to mitigate its inherent risks. Noting the large number of inspections, Malaysia could further refine its risk-based oversight activities to ensure they are specifically targeted at mitigating higher TF risks. Table 10.3. Oversight activities on NPOs (by all regulators) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Onsite 1 049 1 062 1 513 1 094 1 252 1 756 235 7961 Charitable 532 535 683 546 439 320 76 3 131 (39%) Religious 267 268 429 272 259 153 35 1 683 (21%) Recreational 220 220 381 203 258 145 30 1 457 (18%) Social 5 5 1 26 259 193 48 537 (7%) Others 25 34 19 47 37 945 46 1 153 (14%) Off-site (all categories) 1 434 283 540 789 785 12 696 922 17 449 632. The regulators have utilised a range of remedial actions against the NPOs from dealing with minor non-compliance through administrative measures to punitive actions for prolonged failures, such as failure to submit audited financial statements. Between 2019 and February 2025, ROS issued approximately 116 000 reminders and notices to encourage submission of annual returns. Most administrative actions imposed by regulators relate to inactive NPOs. [89] 633. Regulators have also considered intelligence shared by the RMP and public complaints to guide both onsite and offsite inspections. The case study below (Box 10.2) demonstrates how the ROS closely monitored and ultimately deregistered NPOs suspected of posing potential TF risks. The Assessment Team highlights this case as an example of administrative action, where the NPO regulator worked in close cooperation with investigative authorities to address a potential TF connection. Box 10.2.NPO deregistration In 2022, three registered NPOs in Sabah were suspected of having links to terrorist groups in a neighbouring country. The RMP and ROS conducted joint onsite inspections to monitor and investigate the NPOs. Although no TF activities were identified, the NPOs were found to be noncompliant with the Societies Act, particularly regarding registration requirements. After being given opportunities to respond, their violations—including failure to submit annual reports and provide requested documentation—led to their deregistration in 2022 and 2023. Individuals who held positions in these deregistered NPOs are now barred from serving in any other NPOs. 634. Regarding outreach activities, awareness raising events and trainings have been conducted for wide audiences of NPO sectors to enhance general compliance and governance including the aspects of TF risk understanding and risk mitigation measures. Malaysian authorities informed that religious and charitable NPOs are prioritised for outreach while representatives from all other NPOs are also considered. Following the adoption of the 2024 NPO risk assessment, a Red Flags and Typologies report on TF prevention for NPOs was developed in February 2025. While this document is too recent for the Assessment Team to adequately assess its effectiveness, Malaysia has undertaken other engagements on risk within the broader NPO sector, which are commendable. In order to apply more targeted and risk-based outreach, Malaysia should further target those NPOs that are most at risk within the high-risk categories of religious and charitable NPOs. Footnotes [88] For applications to CCM, BHEUU and LFSA, the application is subject to mandatory, statutory screening and due diligence on directors/trustees/founders/etc. [89] ROS deems NPOs which have failed to submit annual returns for consecutive number of years and whose office bearers are uncontactable as inactive." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="670. Similar to the implementation of TF TFS, Malaysia has a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in place for PF TFS. The STA Order, amended in 2016, automatically applies the legal requirements to freeze (and prohibit) upon designation at the UN level. No transposition or additional action is needed for the freeze and prohibition to take immediate effect. The MoHA RSS feed outlined in IO.10 does not provide updates on the PF TFS regime under the UNSCR 1718. Nevertheless, RIs may subscribe to the UN RSS feed. Unfortunately, not all RIs are aware of or take advantage of these mechanisms, with a significant number of smaller DNFBPs still relying on manual checks. 671. PF TFS screening is conducted on potential or new customers at the time of on-boarding and before the provision of any services or undertaking transactions for the customer. On-going screening is conducted on existing customers upon updates to the 1718 list. Most RIs have appropriate screening systems and mechanisms in place. In practice, most FIs, VASPs and larger DNFBPs, use commercial databases for their screening processes. As noted in IO.10, some RIs—including a significant number of smaller DNFBPs that manually check UN websites—appear to face challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are promptly updated. 672. At the time of the on-site visit, Malaysia had not proposed nor co-sponsored any proposals for designation pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. This is consistent with Malaysia’s identified risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="3" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="670. Similar to the implementation of TF TFS, Malaysia has a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in place for PF TFS. The STA Order, amended in 2016, automatically applies the legal requirements to freeze (and prohibit) upon designation at the UN level. No transposition or additional action is needed for the freeze and prohibition to take immediate effect. The MoHA RSS feed outlined in IO.10 does not provide updates on the PF TFS regime under the UNSCR 1718. Nevertheless, RIs may subscribe to the UN RSS feed. Unfortunately, not all RIs are aware of or take advantage of these mechanisms, with a significant number of smaller DNFBPs still relying on manual checks. 671. PF TFS screening is conducted on potential or new customers at the time of on-boarding and before the provision of any services or undertaking transactions for the customer. On-going screening is conducted on existing customers upon updates to the 1718 list. Most RIs have appropriate screening systems and mechanisms in place. In practice, most FIs, VASPs and larger DNFBPs, use commercial databases for their screening processes. As noted in IO.10, some RIs—including a significant number of smaller DNFBPs that manually check UN websites—appear to face challenges in ensuring their sanctions databases are promptly updated. 672. At the time of the on-site visit, Malaysia had not proposed nor co-sponsored any proposals for designation pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. This is consistent with Malaysia’s identified risks." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="144. The risk assessments serve as part of the foundation for the objectives and activities of Malaysia’s competent authorities. Guided by national AML/CFT policies, Malaysian LEAs have expanded existing units or established new units or other bodies to enhance their capacity and capability in addressing ML/TF risks. Additionally, LEAs have intensified their focus on leveraging technology, in line with recommendations from the NRA and other relevant assessments, to tackle the evolving risks of digitised criminal activities. For example, there has been an expansion of digital forensics departments or units focused specifically on digital crime, including cyber-enabled fraud and scams. 145. Based on discussions onsite, it is evident that AML/CFT supervisory authorities consistently realign their focus to ensure compliance with evolving ML/TF risks. The NCC Roadmap, which is based on recommendations from the NRAs, thematic risk assessments and international developments, is translated into each supervisor’s strategic objectives and business plans. For example, BNM has enhanced its supervisory capacity, including through greater adoption of supervision technology, to better address ML/TF risks. Similarly, the LFSA has refined its supervisory focus on higher-risk sectors, guided by the NRA’s findings. All supervisory authorities have implemented an AML/CFT Supervisory Framework, which either operates independently or as part of integrated supervision (i.e., prudential and conduct). Based on emerging risks, supervisory authorities issue typologies and thematic reviews to industry players, highlighting current trends, vulnerabilities, and areas of concern. 146. Malaysia’s risk-based approach includes SRBs. As supervision of DNFBPs transitions to SRBs (see IO.4), the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Bar Council are working with BNM to integrate AML/CFT oversight and risk understanding into their strategic objectives. MIA has conducted joint risk-based examinations with BNM, and similar efforts are expected from the Bar Council as the transition progresses. 147. Malaysia’s FIU also places significant emphasis on the NRAs to guide its operational priorities. High-risk ML crimes and TF are integrated into the triage process of STR screening, ensuring they receive priority attention for analysts’ review (see IO.6 for further details). Additionally, the FIU has produced several intelligence products based on prevailing and emerging ML/TF risks, including: - Thematic analysis on mule account networks (2021). - Advisory on cybercrime (2022). - Report on smuggling networks in East Malaysia (2023). - Red flag indicators for accountants and company secretaries (2024). 148. Overall, Malaysia has demonstrated a consistent and coordinated approach in aligning the objectives and activities of competent authorities and SRBs with evolving AML/CFT policies, ensuring alignment with the NRAs and other risk assessments." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="144. The risk assessments serve as part of the foundation for the objectives and activities of Malaysia’s competent authorities. Guided by national AML/CFT policies, Malaysian LEAs have expanded existing units or established new units or other bodies to enhance their capacity and capability in addressing ML/TF risks. Additionally, LEAs have intensified their focus on leveraging technology, in line with recommendations from the NRA and other relevant assessments, to tackle the evolving risks of digitised criminal activities. For example, there has been an expansion of digital forensics departments or units focused specifically on digital crime, including cyber-enabled fraud and scams. 145. Based on discussions onsite, it is evident that AML/CFT supervisory authorities consistently realign their focus to ensure compliance with evolving ML/TF risks. The NCC Roadmap, which is based on recommendations from the NRAs, thematic risk assessments and international developments, is translated into each supervisor’s strategic objectives and business plans. For example, BNM has enhanced its supervisory capacity, including through greater adoption of supervision technology, to better address ML/TF risks. Similarly, the LFSA has refined its supervisory focus on higher-risk sectors, guided by the NRA’s findings. All supervisory authorities have implemented an AML/CFT Supervisory Framework, which either operates independently or as part of integrated supervision (i.e., prudential and conduct). Based on emerging risks, supervisory authorities issue typologies and thematic reviews to industry players, highlighting current trends, vulnerabilities, and areas of concern. 146. Malaysia’s risk-based approach includes SRBs. As supervision of DNFBPs transitions to SRBs (see IO.4), the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Bar Council are working with BNM to integrate AML/CFT oversight and risk understanding into their strategic objectives. MIA has conducted joint risk-based examinations with BNM, and similar efforts are expected from the Bar Council as the transition progresses. 147. Malaysia’s FIU also places significant emphasis on the NRAs to guide its operational priorities. High-risk ML crimes and TF are integrated into the triage process of STR screening, ensuring they receive priority attention for analysts’ review (see IO.6 for further details). Additionally, the FIU has produced several intelligence products based on prevailing and emerging ML/TF risks, including: - Thematic analysis on mule account networks (2021). - Advisory on cybercrime (2022). - Report on smuggling networks in East Malaysia (2023). - Red flag indicators for accountants and company secretaries (2024). 148. Overall, Malaysia has demonstrated a consistent and coordinated approach in aligning the objectives and activities of competent authorities and SRBs with evolving AML/CFT policies, ensuring alignment with the NRAs and other risk assessments." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 201. Feedback received from the FATF Global Network on the provision of other forms of international cooperation was generally positive. However, several delegations indicated concerns on the delays in responding to requests sent to the FIU and LEAs. 2.4.1. FIU 202. The FIU prioritises incoming requests according to the five high-risk crimes identified in NRA 2023. It also actively participates in many joint operations and intelligence sharing with foreign FIUs and in international/regional forums. For example, in 2023, the FIU engaged in joint analysis of a corruption case with financial flows across three jurisdictions in the region. This was the first joint analysis programme between FICG and the Pacific Financial Intelligence Community and a joint report was issued in October 2024. In addition to responding to requests, the FIU also spontaneously disseminates intelligence to foreign FIUs as appropriate. Table 2.12. Outgoing spontaneous disseminations by the FIU by offence Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 114 25 7 - 1 4 - 151 Terrorism and TF 28 10 - 2 1 2 1 44 ML 6 - - 10 1 12 - 29 PF 2 - - - 2 13 1 18 Tax Evasion 1 - - - - 4 - 5 Smuggling 1 - - 3 - 1 - 5 Drugs Trafficking - - 1 - 1 2 - 4 Human Trafficking - - 1 - - 1 - 2 Corruption and Bribery - - - - 1 1 - 2 Environmental Crime - - - - 1 - - 1 Total 152 35 9 15 8 40 2 261 203. The FIU received 848 incoming requests, including 111 requests on ML and 60 requests on terrorism/TF from foreign FIUs. The FIU’s target response time is within 60 days. At the time of the onsite, the average response time was 67 days. Through system enhancements (see IO.6) and a lessening of COVID-19 restrictions on movement, for requests made since 2024, the response time is now down to 51 days. While some delegations noted delays, feedback received from foreign FIUs is mainly positive with 94% of respondents saying that they are satisfied with the overall cooperation provided. Table 2.13. Incoming requests to the FIU Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 58 63 55 26 32 41 2 277 Corruption 33 22 21 20 14 18 2 130 ML 16 11 15 20 22 24 3 111 Drug trafficking 8 8 15 5 15 14 3 68 Others 12 19 9 6 10 11 - 67 Terrorism/TF 16 12 15 7 4 6 - 60 Tax offences 6 3 6 11 3 8 4 41 Smuggling 4 8 2 2 5 8 1 30 Organised crime 5 4 4 1 4 7 - 25 Illegal remittance 2 - 2 4 3 4 - 15 PF 2 - - 1 - 7 - 10 Environmental crime 1 1 4 - 1 1 1 9 Human trafficking/smuggling - - 2 - 1 2 - 5 Total 163 151 150 103 114 151 16 848 204. Between 2019 and February 2025, the FIU received 528 spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs, including for ML and TF. The FIU cross-checked the disseminations received against its database and where matches were identified, the FIU sought consent from the foreign FIU to forward the dissemination to the appropriate LEA. While Malaysia was not able to provide figures on the number of matches identified or disseminations made, case studies such as the Sabah Water case (see Box 7.3) and Analyst Exchange Programme (see Box 9.1) demonstrate how information exchange between Malaysia’s FIU and other FIUs has assisted domestic and foreign LEAs in their investigations. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 205. Between 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia’s RMP received 30 367 requests relating to ML, predicate offenses (excluding corruption), and terrorism/TF (see Table 2.14). Malaysia prioritises requests by urgency, nature of the case, complexity and sufficiency of information and on average executes requests within one week, with complex requests taking between one week and three months. Terrorism and TF requests average 2-3 weeks, with more complex requests taking 1-2 months. The most common types of requests relate to information such as phone numbers, bank account information, addresses, as well as the production of documents and joint operations. Table 2.14. Incoming requests received by the RMP Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Others 2 880 1 866 1 332 6 541 3 414 8703 1 543 26 279 Fraud 302 109 217 263 70 225 20 1 206 Terrorism &amp; TF 289 138 220 164 161 168 6 1 146 Customs 235 223 175 204 82 84 19 1 022 Drug Trafficking 40 32 50 33 6 42 6 209 Smuggling/Wildlife Trafficking 3 3 32 55 26 74 8 201 ML 59 6 29 21 23 - 6 144 Terrorism (INTERPOL) 4 10 40 33 - - 5 92 Direct requests to NCID Unit 10 - 9 11 11 - - 41 CBT 2 - 4 3 4 10 4 27 Total 3 824 2 387 2 108 7 328 3 797 9 306 1 617 30 367 206. MACC maintains five liaison officers for six designated foreign counterparties in Australia, Singapore, United Kingdom and United States, and appoints officers as contact points for regional and international partners. During the review period, MACC participated in multiple joint operations with foreign counterparts for the purpose of investigations and prosecutions. MACC received 71 incoming requests on corruption and related ML from direct counterparts seeking intelligence information, production of documents and statement records. Requests were fulfilled between two weeks to three months, depending on complexity. 207. PERHILTIAN, MMEA and IDM provide information during joint operations with international partners but do not maintain statistics on requests received, response times or outcomes. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 208. Financial supervisors exchange information with foreign AML/CFT supervisors on the status of FIs’ AML/CTF programmes and participate in supervisory colleges with foreign regulators focusing on the assessment of banking groups including Malaysian subsidiaries. BNM, SC and LFSA responded to all the numerous fit and proper requests (127, 118 and 60 respectively), and exchanged supervisory information at supervisory colleges and bilateral meetings in relation to the sectors under their purview. The BNM and LFSA responded to a small number of other international cooperation requests from foreign counterparts during the reporting period. 209. From 2019 to 2025, the SC received 38 requests for information pursuant to the IOSCO MMOU relating to securities breaches in foreign countries. Information requested included banking transaction and trading records, BO information, contact information or requests for witness statements. All requests were fulfilled, on average between 1.5 and four months. During the same period, the LFSA received 33 requests for financial intelligence. Requests were fulfilled between 14-45 working days, and the one request denied was beyond the LFSA’s jurisdiction. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 210. IRBM introduced a case management system to manage requests in 2019 and has received 314 requests for information or documents relating to tax audits or investigations including 16 requests for BO information. Significantly, IRBM has never declined a request for exchange of information. 211. RMCD received 267 incoming requests from foreign counterparts and 108 requests from regional foreign agencies [51] primarily for smuggling offences relating to cigarettes, drugs and alcohol. Requests are prioritised and since 2024, monitored via a document management system and typically responded to within two weeks. All requests have been fulfilled and were generally responded within an average of two weeks, with complex cases being responses within a period of less than two months. 2.4.5. Other authorities 212. Basic information on legal persons is accessible through the CCM’s online portal for a fee. The CCM’s database contains information on the company name, number, incorporation date, company type, status, registered and business address, share capital, directors/officers, shareholders, charges (if any) and financial information. Corporate information can also be accessed through several authorised online service portals. Between 2019 and 2025, the CCM received and responded to one direct request for information on company records and BO information. Footnotes [51] WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Office, OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office), BASEL Action Network, INTERPOL, UNODC-WCO Programme to Unify and Integrate Training and Education on border control and customs enforcement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 201. Feedback received from the FATF Global Network on the provision of other forms of international cooperation was generally positive. However, several delegations indicated concerns on the delays in responding to requests sent to the FIU and LEAs. 2.4.1. FIU 202. The FIU prioritises incoming requests according to the five high-risk crimes identified in NRA 2023. It also actively participates in many joint operations and intelligence sharing with foreign FIUs and in international/regional forums. For example, in 2023, the FIU engaged in joint analysis of a corruption case with financial flows across three jurisdictions in the region. This was the first joint analysis programme between FICG and the Pacific Financial Intelligence Community and a joint report was issued in October 2024. In addition to responding to requests, the FIU also spontaneously disseminates intelligence to foreign FIUs as appropriate. Table 2.12. Outgoing spontaneous disseminations by the FIU by offence Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 114 25 7 - 1 4 - 151 Terrorism and TF 28 10 - 2 1 2 1 44 ML 6 - - 10 1 12 - 29 PF 2 - - - 2 13 1 18 Tax Evasion 1 - - - - 4 - 5 Smuggling 1 - - 3 - 1 - 5 Drugs Trafficking - - 1 - 1 2 - 4 Human Trafficking - - 1 - - 1 - 2 Corruption and Bribery - - - - 1 1 - 2 Environmental Crime - - - - 1 - - 1 Total 152 35 9 15 8 40 2 261 203. The FIU received 848 incoming requests, including 111 requests on ML and 60 requests on terrorism/TF from foreign FIUs. The FIU’s target response time is within 60 days. At the time of the onsite, the average response time was 67 days. Through system enhancements (see IO.6) and a lessening of COVID-19 restrictions on movement, for requests made since 2024, the response time is now down to 51 days. While some delegations noted delays, feedback received from foreign FIUs is mainly positive with 94% of respondents saying that they are satisfied with the overall cooperation provided. Table 2.13. Incoming requests to the FIU Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Fraud 58 63 55 26 32 41 2 277 Corruption 33 22 21 20 14 18 2 130 ML 16 11 15 20 22 24 3 111 Drug trafficking 8 8 15 5 15 14 3 68 Others 12 19 9 6 10 11 - 67 Terrorism/TF 16 12 15 7 4 6 - 60 Tax offences 6 3 6 11 3 8 4 41 Smuggling 4 8 2 2 5 8 1 30 Organised crime 5 4 4 1 4 7 - 25 Illegal remittance 2 - 2 4 3 4 - 15 PF 2 - - 1 - 7 - 10 Environmental crime 1 1 4 - 1 1 1 9 Human trafficking/smuggling - - 2 - 1 2 - 5 Total 163 151 150 103 114 151 16 848 204. Between 2019 and February 2025, the FIU received 528 spontaneous disseminations from foreign FIUs, including for ML and TF. The FIU cross-checked the disseminations received against its database and where matches were identified, the FIU sought consent from the foreign FIU to forward the dissemination to the appropriate LEA. While Malaysia was not able to provide figures on the number of matches identified or disseminations made, case studies such as the Sabah Water case (see Box 7.3) and Analyst Exchange Programme (see Box 9.1) demonstrate how information exchange between Malaysia’s FIU and other FIUs has assisted domestic and foreign LEAs in their investigations. 2.4.2. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 205. Between 2019 to February 2025, Malaysia’s RMP received 30 367 requests relating to ML, predicate offenses (excluding corruption), and terrorism/TF (see Table 2.14). Malaysia prioritises requests by urgency, nature of the case, complexity and sufficiency of information and on average executes requests within one week, with complex requests taking between one week and three months. Terrorism and TF requests average 2-3 weeks, with more complex requests taking 1-2 months. The most common types of requests relate to information such as phone numbers, bank account information, addresses, as well as the production of documents and joint operations. Table 2.14. Incoming requests received by the RMP Offence 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Others 2 880 1 866 1 332 6 541 3 414 8703 1 543 26 279 Fraud 302 109 217 263 70 225 20 1 206 Terrorism &amp; TF 289 138 220 164 161 168 6 1 146 Customs 235 223 175 204 82 84 19 1 022 Drug Trafficking 40 32 50 33 6 42 6 209 Smuggling/Wildlife Trafficking 3 3 32 55 26 74 8 201 ML 59 6 29 21 23 - 6 144 Terrorism (INTERPOL) 4 10 40 33 - - 5 92 Direct requests to NCID Unit 10 - 9 11 11 - - 41 CBT 2 - 4 3 4 10 4 27 Total 3 824 2 387 2 108 7 328 3 797 9 306 1 617 30 367 206. MACC maintains five liaison officers for six designated foreign counterparties in Australia, Singapore, United Kingdom and United States, and appoints officers as contact points for regional and international partners. During the review period, MACC participated in multiple joint operations with foreign counterparts for the purpose of investigations and prosecutions. MACC received 71 incoming requests on corruption and related ML from direct counterparts seeking intelligence information, production of documents and statement records. Requests were fulfilled between two weeks to three months, depending on complexity. 207. PERHILTIAN, MMEA and IDM provide information during joint operations with international partners but do not maintain statistics on requests received, response times or outcomes. 2.4.3. Supervisors of FIs, VASPs and DNFBPs 208. Financial supervisors exchange information with foreign AML/CFT supervisors on the status of FIs’ AML/CTF programmes and participate in supervisory colleges with foreign regulators focusing on the assessment of banking groups including Malaysian subsidiaries. BNM, SC and LFSA responded to all the numerous fit and proper requests (127, 118 and 60 respectively), and exchanged supervisory information at supervisory colleges and bilateral meetings in relation to the sectors under their purview. The BNM and LFSA responded to a small number of other international cooperation requests from foreign counterparts during the reporting period. 209. From 2019 to 2025, the SC received 38 requests for information pursuant to the IOSCO MMOU relating to securities breaches in foreign countries. Information requested included banking transaction and trading records, BO information, contact information or requests for witness statements. All requests were fulfilled, on average between 1.5 and four months. During the same period, the LFSA received 33 requests for financial intelligence. Requests were fulfilled between 14-45 working days, and the one request denied was beyond the LFSA’s jurisdiction. 2.4.4. Customs and tax authorities 210. IRBM introduced a case management system to manage requests in 2019 and has received 314 requests for information or documents relating to tax audits or investigations including 16 requests for BO information. Significantly, IRBM has never declined a request for exchange of information. 211. RMCD received 267 incoming requests from foreign counterparts and 108 requests from regional foreign agencies [51] primarily for smuggling offences relating to cigarettes, drugs and alcohol. Requests are prioritised and since 2024, monitored via a document management system and typically responded to within two weeks. All requests have been fulfilled and were generally responded within an average of two weeks, with complex cases being responses within a period of less than two months. 2.4.5. Other authorities 212. Basic information on legal persons is accessible through the CCM’s online portal for a fee. The CCM’s database contains information on the company name, number, incorporation date, company type, status, registered and business address, share capital, directors/officers, shareholders, charges (if any) and financial information. Corporate information can also be accessed through several authorised online service portals. Between 2019 and 2025, the CCM received and responded to one direct request for information on company records and BO information. Footnotes [51] WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Office, OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office), BASEL Action Network, INTERPOL, UNODC-WCO Programme to Unify and Integrate Training and Education on border control and customs enforcement." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="244. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite have AML programmes and frameworks that are appropriately designed to mitigate ML/TF risks, have a solid understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and are committed to ensuring the financial system is not used to facilitate financial crime. 245. Risk mitigation measures are generally integrated into day-to-day operations and include a clear risk appetite in robust customer acceptance policies. Some FIs and VASPs indicated that they do not accept certain categories of customers at all. 246. To combat fraud and money mules, which most FIs and VASPs recognise as the most prevalent financial crime risk, FIs and VASPs generally screen potential customers against the mule account list published by the NSRC as part of their CDD. They also assess customer profiles to identify those likely to be money mules and apply additional due diligence to such individuals. Post-onboarding, FIs and VASPs continue to monitor for fraud and mule activity, using specific scenarios designed to detect transactions linked to these typologies. Furthermore, the banking CONG has led to the developments of industry-wide standard operating procedures for handling mule accounts, as well as responding to LEA requests and orders relating to them. 247. Overall, FIs apply risk-based mitigating measures well and continue to ensure they have appropriate measures in place to mitigate their specific risks. In particular, the BNM has observed an increase in the quality of mitigating measures and a gradual shift from rule-based to risk-based measures, particularly in the MSB sector. 3.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 248. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures. Smaller FIs spend significant time and resources in identification of BOs, particularly when complicated corporate structures are involved. This is less the case for larger FIs, which tend to have more advanced systems, resources or contracts with third-party providers specialising in this area. Although supervisors often find shortcomings in CDD measures during onsite examinations, they suggest these are operational, rather than systemic in nature. 249. FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. Malaysia’s national identity card (NRIC) system includes a population register available to government, which provides a strong element of customer verification during CDD processes. The NRIC is issued for all Malaysians and includes key elements of personal identity, such as biometric identification data, date of birth, gender and photo biometric data. An NRIC number is one of the mandatory data points which FIs and VASPs collect as a part of CDD process. FIs, especially banks, have a system to read NRIC holder’s thumbprint and verify customer’s identity, which gives direct access to verify the identity of the individual. While this fingerprint reader function is not available in e-KYC, FIs and VASPs verify NRIC holders by checking live pictures of the card taken from several angles. However, address information registered in NRIC is often not current, so FIs and VASPs generally collect secondary information such as utility bills to verify customers’ addresses. For non-Malaysian customers, FIs and VASPs generally request submission of passport information to verify their identity. 250. For legal persons or legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs generally demonstrated their ability to identify and verify BO using multiple sources of information. These sources include the mandatory provision of statutory customer documents lodged with CCM and LFSA, validation against commercial databases and customer self-declaration. Commercial databases generally provide FIs and VASPs with basic information, such as shareholder list and article of incorporation, which is typically sourced from CCM and LFSA. FIs and VASPs generally do not directly access or refer to the BO registries maintained by CCM and LFSA, primarily due to the associated costs and, possibly, the recent establishment of these registries. While larger FIs met during the onsite visit were able to identify BOs without using the registries—including in cases involving foreign or complex ownership structures—some smaller FIs appeared to face challenges in such cases and tended to rely on the assumption that self-declared BO information was accurate. 251. FIs and VASPs assign risk ratings to their customers based on factors such as connections to high-risk jurisdictions, the products and channels used, customer type, and other relevant indicators. The frequency of customer profile reviews is determined by the assigned risk rating. Typically, high risk customers are subject to annual review, medium risk customers every two-to-three-year review period and low risk customers every three to five years or trigger-based (i.e., when new transactions are performed). Where information is requested by FIs and VASPs as part of ongoing CDD, they place limitations on customers’ accounts, until the information is received. This helps to ensure that customer information is accurate and up to date. 252. There is limited reliance on third parties to conduct CDD in Malaysia. FIs with international operations leverage their group to gather CDD or BO information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD processes themselves. Labuan banks tend to onboard customers only through referral from their group, but still conduct their own CDD, rather than relying on the CDD performed by another entity in their group. 253. Supervisors have observed an increasing shift to FIs retaining CDD documentation in a digital format, which allows comprehensive record retention beyond the six-year Malaysian requirement and allows greater searchability, including for customers the FIs no longer have relationships with. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 254.  Malaysia has a broad definition of PEPs and their associates. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through self-declaration by the customers and checks against commercial databases. This extends to corporate customers whose BOs are PEPs. In addition, larger FIs maintain their own internal PEPs list containing wide range of domestic PEPs, such as judges, chairman of government-related entities, ex-seniors of military or police, etc. Most of the FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and some smaller FIs and VASPs met during the onsite do not accept PEPs as customers. The phrase “once a PEP, always a PEP” was frequently used by private sector participants during the onsite. Malaysia has issued guidelines that provide flexibility for FIs and VASPs to reassess the status of PEPs, but it appears that FIs and VASPs broadly apply a more stringent practice than required by the authorities. Overall, FIs and VASPs apply strong measures for PEPs considering the significant corruption risks in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the authorities should continue to ensure that FIs are assessing customer risk on a case-by-case basis, to ensure there are no incidences of wholesale de-risking, which is contrary to a risk based-approach. 255. Banks in Malaysia have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. Banks generally use questionnaires to conduct due diligence of respondent banks and take enhanced measures if any high-risk factor is identified. In 2022, the AML/CFT Supervision Unit (AMLSUP) of the BNM completed a thematic review to assess the adequacy of control measures to manage correspondent banking relationships, which involved the issuance of survey to the onshore banks and an end-to-end validation review on 10 selected banking institutions. As a result, no major gaps were identified. 256. Many FIs and VASPs have implemented e-KYC, which was accelerated due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. Given the added vulnerability to fraudulent activities from e-KYC, FIs and VASPs generally have enhanced controls in place including increased verification methods. Typically, FIs and VASPs put in place customer acceptance policies which limit the type of customers that can be onboarded via this channel (i.e., higher risk customers are excluded from this process). The BNM, SC and LFSA all explained that they generally discuss ML/TF risk and necessary mitigating measures relating to significant new technology, as part of ongoing supervision. In addition, the BNM conducted a thematic review for implementation of e-KYC measures in banks in 2023. Overall, FIs and VASPs measures for new technology appear to be effective and there was clear engagement with the supervisors prior to this method of identification and verification being introduced. 257. All wire transfers are facilitated through automated systems, with mandatory fields on information required that are consistent with the regulatory requirements. The systems in banks do not process transfers if any mandatory field is incomplete or any fields trigger sanction screening. Most banks do not provide services to occasional customers, so are able to rely on the CDD information obtained at the account opening phase when processing wire transfers. When the ordering customer is an individual, banks regularly conduct additional due diligence on the transfer requests, such as confirmation of transaction purpose and supporting evidence. 258. All the VASPs met during the onsite clarified they will not transfer VAs to exchanges that do not comply with Travel Rule requirements. In addition, Labuan VASPs only allow VAs to be transferred back to the originating wallet owner and not to a third-party wallet. When the VASPs receive VAs without required Travel Rule information, they request the ordering VASP to provide the information before the transaction can be released. If the response is not provided within three days, VASPs generally return the transfer. VASPs in Malaysia generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. Overall, FIs and VASPs generally apply wire and virtual asset transfer rules effectively and are aware of their obligations in this area. 259. FIs and VASPs put in place clear policies for dealing with customers from FATF high risk jurisdictions, including the application of EDD. FIs and VASPs, met during the onsite were able to explain enhanced processes, which included requiring senior management approval to enter commercial relationships with high-risk customers. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 260. Overall, FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team understood their reporting obligations adequately (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector from 2019 to February 2025). However, improvements are needed, especially for non-bank FIs and VASPs, to ensure the measures they have in place enable them to meet their obligations. Onshore banks submit the most STRs, contributing to over 90% of the total, while reporting from other FI sectors, especially CMIs is very low and not in line with the risk profile of these sectors. Between 2019 and 2025, Labuan Money Brokers only submitted 36 STRs in total, which is alarming given the sector’s risk profile. Compliance with reporting obligations appears to be a significant focus for most supervisors, especially for other financial service provider supervisors of the BNM who identify a number of STR shortcomings during their onsite examinations. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done by the authorities to ensure the suspicious transaction reporting, other than by banks, is contributing to intelligence and supporting LEA objectives. 261. Most FIs and VASPs (98% of RIs) have access to the FINS system to facilitate timely STR submission. FIs and VASPs generally submit STRs within 24 hours once suspicion is confirmed; confirmation of suspicion can take up to 30 days from being identified. 262. FIs and VASPs generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities. The number of monitoring scenarios applied by institutions varies significantly. For example, the number of scenarios implemented by the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite ranges from 9 to 52 and the Assessment Team observed some large FIs with relatively few basic scenarios in place. Nevertheless, FIs met during the onsite were able to explain how they verify the effectiveness of the scenarios, and the supervisors have not observed issues arising in FIs and VASPs due to limited scenarios. 263. Supervisors have generally observed many FIs and some VASPs starting to expand scenarios to include anomaly detection based on the sector/industry, as well as customer trend or behavioural analysis. These parameters are updated on an ongoing basis in response to changes in ML/TF risk landscape and exposure. Onshore VASPs and established Labuan VASPs generally subscribe to blockchain analytic tools for on-chain transaction monitoring as well as screening. Smaller Labuan VASPs use public source for information on blacklisted and watchlist address. 264. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations regarding tipping-off and can explain processes to prevent this happening in practice. This understanding is consistent with supervisory findings. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 265. All FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team had a positive AML/CFT compliance culture. All confirmed they have established dedicated AML/CFT compliance functions and larger FIs establish separate teams to oversee overall AML/CFT compliance matters and transaction monitoring. Several private sector representatives felt that the quality and experience of senior AML/CFT staff in banks has increased significantly since the 1MDB scandal, with KRPs being recruited from major institutions in international financial centres. KRPs in VASPs have generally developed AML/CFT experience from working in AML/CFT functions in other FI sectors, such as banks, MSBs and money brokers. 266. The BNM’s onsite examinations often uncover shortcomings for MSB and DPI issuers’ relating to board and senior management oversight. The most common issue is maintaining incomplete records of board meetings. Although there have been some cases where the BNM took enforcement action against banks for boards having insufficient involvement in AML/CFT oversight, this is rare and AML/CFT is a significant item on most executive agendas. 267. FIs and VASPs adopt a range of training initiatives, tailored for different processes and positions, to improve AML/CFT knowledge and awareness of the staff across all levels, including board and senior management. MSBs also have training programmes for their agents on a regular basis. Although training is generally comprehensive, the BNM has found deficiencies in training for some banks, MSBs and DPI issuers. 268. FIs and VASPs put in place independent audit arrangements, either conducted by in-house or external auditors, and submit their audit reports or findings to the supervisory authorities on an annual basis. The CMIs met during the onsite confirmed they conduct AML/CFT specific internal audit annually based on guidance from the SC. Banks determine the frequency of AML/CFT specific internal audit on risk-basis. The fact that BNM often uncovers operational shortcomings in banks, suggests that banks’ internal audit and compliance testing may not be functioning effectively enough to capture and resolve such deficiencies themselves. 269. Some other financial service providers apply less robust compliance programmes, such as less frequent training or internal audit, as permitted by the BNM as part of simplified measures. These simplified measures seem to be well founded on risk understanding and commensurate with the risk of these entities. 270. Several of the large banks are part of global financial groups and follow group policies/standards. These large banks, including Labuan subsidiaries/branches met during the onsite, explained they cannot share STR information with their global group firms due to Malaysia’s confidentiality rules. As a result, they share typologies of STRs instead, which raises awareness across the group of the risks faced by their Malaysian operations. When their group policies/standards conflict with Malaysian regulations, the banks seek approval from their headquarter for applying an exemption and document the details of the exception to comply with Malaysian regulations. The sharing of typologies instead of STRs is an example of this type of exception. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 271. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="244. FIs and VASPs met during the onsite have AML programmes and frameworks that are appropriately designed to mitigate ML/TF risks, have a solid understanding of their AML/CFT obligations and are committed to ensuring the financial system is not used to facilitate financial crime. 245. Risk mitigation measures are generally integrated into day-to-day operations and include a clear risk appetite in robust customer acceptance policies. Some FIs and VASPs indicated that they do not accept certain categories of customers at all. 246. To combat fraud and money mules, which most FIs and VASPs recognise as the most prevalent financial crime risk, FIs and VASPs generally screen potential customers against the mule account list published by the NSRC as part of their CDD. They also assess customer profiles to identify those likely to be money mules and apply additional due diligence to such individuals. Post-onboarding, FIs and VASPs continue to monitor for fraud and mule activity, using specific scenarios designed to detect transactions linked to these typologies. Furthermore, the banking CONG has led to the developments of industry-wide standard operating procedures for handling mule accounts, as well as responding to LEA requests and orders relating to them. 247. Overall, FIs apply risk-based mitigating measures well and continue to ensure they have appropriate measures in place to mitigate their specific risks. In particular, the BNM has observed an increase in the quality of mitigating measures and a gradual shift from rule-based to risk-based measures, particularly in the MSB sector. 3.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 248. FIs and VASPs generally understand their CDD obligations and record keeping requirements and have implemented appropriate measures. Smaller FIs spend significant time and resources in identification of BOs, particularly when complicated corporate structures are involved. This is less the case for larger FIs, which tend to have more advanced systems, resources or contracts with third-party providers specialising in this area. Although supervisors often find shortcomings in CDD measures during onsite examinations, they suggest these are operational, rather than systemic in nature. 249. FIs and VASPs have effective processes in place for onboarding customers and carrying out CDD, including through online channels. Malaysia’s national identity card (NRIC) system includes a population register available to government, which provides a strong element of customer verification during CDD processes. The NRIC is issued for all Malaysians and includes key elements of personal identity, such as biometric identification data, date of birth, gender and photo biometric data. An NRIC number is one of the mandatory data points which FIs and VASPs collect as a part of CDD process. FIs, especially banks, have a system to read NRIC holder’s thumbprint and verify customer’s identity, which gives direct access to verify the identity of the individual. While this fingerprint reader function is not available in e-KYC, FIs and VASPs verify NRIC holders by checking live pictures of the card taken from several angles. However, address information registered in NRIC is often not current, so FIs and VASPs generally collect secondary information such as utility bills to verify customers’ addresses. For non-Malaysian customers, FIs and VASPs generally request submission of passport information to verify their identity. 250. For legal persons or legal arrangements, FIs and VASPs generally demonstrated their ability to identify and verify BO using multiple sources of information. These sources include the mandatory provision of statutory customer documents lodged with CCM and LFSA, validation against commercial databases and customer self-declaration. Commercial databases generally provide FIs and VASPs with basic information, such as shareholder list and article of incorporation, which is typically sourced from CCM and LFSA. FIs and VASPs generally do not directly access or refer to the BO registries maintained by CCM and LFSA, primarily due to the associated costs and, possibly, the recent establishment of these registries. While larger FIs met during the onsite visit were able to identify BOs without using the registries—including in cases involving foreign or complex ownership structures—some smaller FIs appeared to face challenges in such cases and tended to rely on the assumption that self-declared BO information was accurate. 251. FIs and VASPs assign risk ratings to their customers based on factors such as connections to high-risk jurisdictions, the products and channels used, customer type, and other relevant indicators. The frequency of customer profile reviews is determined by the assigned risk rating. Typically, high risk customers are subject to annual review, medium risk customers every two-to-three-year review period and low risk customers every three to five years or trigger-based (i.e., when new transactions are performed). Where information is requested by FIs and VASPs as part of ongoing CDD, they place limitations on customers’ accounts, until the information is received. This helps to ensure that customer information is accurate and up to date. 252. There is limited reliance on third parties to conduct CDD in Malaysia. FIs with international operations leverage their group to gather CDD or BO information for foreign customers but still conduct CDD processes themselves. Labuan banks tend to onboard customers only through referral from their group, but still conduct their own CDD, rather than relying on the CDD performed by another entity in their group. 253. Supervisors have observed an increasing shift to FIs retaining CDD documentation in a digital format, which allows comprehensive record retention beyond the six-year Malaysian requirement and allows greater searchability, including for customers the FIs no longer have relationships with. 3.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 254.  Malaysia has a broad definition of PEPs and their associates. FIs and VASPs identify foreign and domestic PEPs, including their family members and close associates, through self-declaration by the customers and checks against commercial databases. This extends to corporate customers whose BOs are PEPs. In addition, larger FIs maintain their own internal PEPs list containing wide range of domestic PEPs, such as judges, chairman of government-related entities, ex-seniors of military or police, etc. Most of the FIs and VASPs apply EDD measures for PEPs and some smaller FIs and VASPs met during the onsite do not accept PEPs as customers. The phrase “once a PEP, always a PEP” was frequently used by private sector participants during the onsite. Malaysia has issued guidelines that provide flexibility for FIs and VASPs to reassess the status of PEPs, but it appears that FIs and VASPs broadly apply a more stringent practice than required by the authorities. Overall, FIs and VASPs apply strong measures for PEPs considering the significant corruption risks in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the authorities should continue to ensure that FIs are assessing customer risk on a case-by-case basis, to ensure there are no incidences of wholesale de-risking, which is contrary to a risk based-approach. 255. Banks in Malaysia have a good understanding of the risks and mitigating measures related to correspondent banking relationships. Banks generally use questionnaires to conduct due diligence of respondent banks and take enhanced measures if any high-risk factor is identified. In 2022, the AML/CFT Supervision Unit (AMLSUP) of the BNM completed a thematic review to assess the adequacy of control measures to manage correspondent banking relationships, which involved the issuance of survey to the onshore banks and an end-to-end validation review on 10 selected banking institutions. As a result, no major gaps were identified. 256. Many FIs and VASPs have implemented e-KYC, which was accelerated due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. Given the added vulnerability to fraudulent activities from e-KYC, FIs and VASPs generally have enhanced controls in place including increased verification methods. Typically, FIs and VASPs put in place customer acceptance policies which limit the type of customers that can be onboarded via this channel (i.e., higher risk customers are excluded from this process). The BNM, SC and LFSA all explained that they generally discuss ML/TF risk and necessary mitigating measures relating to significant new technology, as part of ongoing supervision. In addition, the BNM conducted a thematic review for implementation of e-KYC measures in banks in 2023. Overall, FIs and VASPs measures for new technology appear to be effective and there was clear engagement with the supervisors prior to this method of identification and verification being introduced. 257. All wire transfers are facilitated through automated systems, with mandatory fields on information required that are consistent with the regulatory requirements. The systems in banks do not process transfers if any mandatory field is incomplete or any fields trigger sanction screening. Most banks do not provide services to occasional customers, so are able to rely on the CDD information obtained at the account opening phase when processing wire transfers. When the ordering customer is an individual, banks regularly conduct additional due diligence on the transfer requests, such as confirmation of transaction purpose and supporting evidence. 258. All the VASPs met during the onsite clarified they will not transfer VAs to exchanges that do not comply with Travel Rule requirements. In addition, Labuan VASPs only allow VAs to be transferred back to the originating wallet owner and not to a third-party wallet. When the VASPs receive VAs without required Travel Rule information, they request the ordering VASP to provide the information before the transaction can be released. If the response is not provided within three days, VASPs generally return the transfer. VASPs in Malaysia generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. Overall, FIs and VASPs generally apply wire and virtual asset transfer rules effectively and are aware of their obligations in this area. 259. FIs and VASPs put in place clear policies for dealing with customers from FATF high risk jurisdictions, including the application of EDD. FIs and VASPs, met during the onsite were able to explain enhanced processes, which included requiring senior management approval to enter commercial relationships with high-risk customers. 3.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 260. Overall, FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team understood their reporting obligations adequately (see IO.6 for the breakdown of STRs per sector from 2019 to February 2025). However, improvements are needed, especially for non-bank FIs and VASPs, to ensure the measures they have in place enable them to meet their obligations. Onshore banks submit the most STRs, contributing to over 90% of the total, while reporting from other FI sectors, especially CMIs is very low and not in line with the risk profile of these sectors. Between 2019 and 2025, Labuan Money Brokers only submitted 36 STRs in total, which is alarming given the sector’s risk profile. Compliance with reporting obligations appears to be a significant focus for most supervisors, especially for other financial service provider supervisors of the BNM who identify a number of STR shortcomings during their onsite examinations. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done by the authorities to ensure the suspicious transaction reporting, other than by banks, is contributing to intelligence and supporting LEA objectives. 261. Most FIs and VASPs (98% of RIs) have access to the FINS system to facilitate timely STR submission. FIs and VASPs generally submit STRs within 24 hours once suspicion is confirmed; confirmation of suspicion can take up to 30 days from being identified. 262. FIs and VASPs generally leverage automated systems to monitor suspicious transactions and activities. The number of monitoring scenarios applied by institutions varies significantly. For example, the number of scenarios implemented by the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite ranges from 9 to 52 and the Assessment Team observed some large FIs with relatively few basic scenarios in place. Nevertheless, FIs met during the onsite were able to explain how they verify the effectiveness of the scenarios, and the supervisors have not observed issues arising in FIs and VASPs due to limited scenarios. 263. Supervisors have generally observed many FIs and some VASPs starting to expand scenarios to include anomaly detection based on the sector/industry, as well as customer trend or behavioural analysis. These parameters are updated on an ongoing basis in response to changes in ML/TF risk landscape and exposure. Onshore VASPs and established Labuan VASPs generally subscribe to blockchain analytic tools for on-chain transaction monitoring as well as screening. Smaller Labuan VASPs use public source for information on blacklisted and watchlist address. 264. FIs and VASPs understand their obligations regarding tipping-off and can explain processes to prevent this happening in practice. This understanding is consistent with supervisory findings. 3.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 265. All FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team had a positive AML/CFT compliance culture. All confirmed they have established dedicated AML/CFT compliance functions and larger FIs establish separate teams to oversee overall AML/CFT compliance matters and transaction monitoring. Several private sector representatives felt that the quality and experience of senior AML/CFT staff in banks has increased significantly since the 1MDB scandal, with KRPs being recruited from major institutions in international financial centres. KRPs in VASPs have generally developed AML/CFT experience from working in AML/CFT functions in other FI sectors, such as banks, MSBs and money brokers. 266. The BNM’s onsite examinations often uncover shortcomings for MSB and DPI issuers’ relating to board and senior management oversight. The most common issue is maintaining incomplete records of board meetings. Although there have been some cases where the BNM took enforcement action against banks for boards having insufficient involvement in AML/CFT oversight, this is rare and AML/CFT is a significant item on most executive agendas. 267. FIs and VASPs adopt a range of training initiatives, tailored for different processes and positions, to improve AML/CFT knowledge and awareness of the staff across all levels, including board and senior management. MSBs also have training programmes for their agents on a regular basis. Although training is generally comprehensive, the BNM has found deficiencies in training for some banks, MSBs and DPI issuers. 268. FIs and VASPs put in place independent audit arrangements, either conducted by in-house or external auditors, and submit their audit reports or findings to the supervisory authorities on an annual basis. The CMIs met during the onsite confirmed they conduct AML/CFT specific internal audit annually based on guidance from the SC. Banks determine the frequency of AML/CFT specific internal audit on risk-basis. The fact that BNM often uncovers operational shortcomings in banks, suggests that banks’ internal audit and compliance testing may not be functioning effectively enough to capture and resolve such deficiencies themselves. 269. Some other financial service providers apply less robust compliance programmes, such as less frequent training or internal audit, as permitted by the BNM as part of simplified measures. These simplified measures seem to be well founded on risk understanding and commensurate with the risk of these entities. 270. Several of the large banks are part of global financial groups and follow group policies/standards. These large banks, including Labuan subsidiaries/branches met during the onsite, explained they cannot share STR information with their global group firms due to Malaysia’s confidentiality rules. As a result, they share typologies of STRs instead, which raises awareness across the group of the risks faced by their Malaysian operations. When their group policies/standards conflict with Malaysian regulations, the banks seek approval from their headquarter for applying an exemption and document the details of the exception to comply with Malaysian regulations. The sharing of typologies instead of STRs is an example of this type of exception. 3.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 271. The Assessment Team did not identify any legal or regulatory requirements impeding implementation of AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures in Malaysia." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 321. Basic CDD requirements are consistently implemented across most DNFBP sectors. RIs met during the onsite indicated that to establish a business relationship, they require the collection of nine data points, as outlined in the BNM guidelines. Most DNFBPs also rely on official identification documents as part of CDD verification, particularly where the national ID number is not available. Nevertheless, supervisors continue to identify numerous cases of non-compliance with CDD requirements across all DNFBP sectors, such as incomplete collection on the nine required datapoints (e.g., occupation type and nature of employment) or other deficiencies in collecting BO information. 322. Most DNFBPs met during the onsite understand their obligations to conduct due diligence and keep records on business relationships and transactions. However, it appears that implementation of these obligations varies in practice, particularly in non-standard situations and relating to BO identification. 323. While most DNFBPs require customers to self-declare their BOs, this is often supplemented by independent checks via external databases or open sources. However, the identification of BO continues to be a challenge, particularly when it involves foreign BOs and complex legal structures. This is supported by supervisory findings. 324. DNFBPs, are encouraged by the authorities to establish manual or electronic systems (or both) for continuous CDD monitoring. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite rely on a combination. Larger DNFBPs have adopted in-house or commercially developed transaction monitoring system, whereas small DNFBPs use manual or basic systems to scrutinise transactions, which is commensurate with their reduced risk. 325. Labuan trust companies follow supervisory guidelines to determine the frequency of conducting of ongoing due diligence. This varies from 1-5 years, depending on the risk profile of the customers. For corporate customers, articles of incorporation and shareholder information is collected, as well as BO information on trusts and other similar legal arrangements. 326. Malaysia’s sole casino introduced additional electronic table games during the COVID-19 pandemic to meet the needs of its customers. This has allowed it to implement better transaction monitoring and quickly identify suspicious activity. This has improved efficiency and allows the casino to conduct better customer risk profiling. 327. Record keeping requirements are long-established and implementation is closely monitored by supervisors as part of ongoing supervision. DNFBPs appear to generally comply with the minimum six-year record keeping requirements and the authorities suggest that competent authorities can access information upon appropriate request. However, supervisory findings during onsite examinations continue to show record-keeping gaps in all DNFBP sectors, except for the casino and trust company sector. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 328. DNFBPs met during the onsite generally collect basic due diligence information (national identity, company incorporation and ownership information and address) for all levels of CDD. EDD is performed for high-risk clients and transactions. This includes requesting additional information (e.g., source of wealth) from clients subject to enhanced scrutiny to satisfy the CDD procedures prior to beginning a business relationship or concluding a transaction. Labuan Trust Companies and some other TCSPs collect and verify BO information at a lower threshold than the required 25% shareholding when applying EDD. Some DNFBPs involved in company formation services face challenges in verifying foreign BO information, but explained the additional measures they take for verification, such as obtaining notarised records or information from foreign authorities. In general, supervisors continuously identify failings in the application of EDD, particularly customer risk profiling, and this appears to be a significant issue, despite the authorities suggesting that the majority of the AML/CFT/CPF deficiencies are minor lapses (see table below). Table 4.1. Number of EDD deficiencies by DNFBPs EDD deficiencies 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 PEP-related (all sectors except Labuan trust companies) - - - - 1 - - Other 138 31 31 19 138 93 - PEP-related (Labuan trust companies) 2 - - - 1 - - Other (Labuan trust companies) - - - - - 3 - Total for all DNFBP sectors 140 31 31 19 140 96 - 329. DNFBPs met during the onsite described the measures in place to identify domestic and foreign PEPs and the EDD measures applied in these cases (including obtaining senior management approval). Large international accounting and law firms in Malaysia have a more developed knowledge of EDD requirements applicable for higher risk situations. Regarding PEPs, these firms tended to adhere to their global policies and procedures and apply EDD once there is a PEP match during CDD onboarding. Larger DNFBPs make use of commercial databases to identify and detect customers who are PEPs, subject to TFS or associated with higher risk jurisdictions identified by the FATF. 330. Most DNFBPs adopt the supervisory guidance as their policy for the identification of PEPs, including the PEP definition. Smaller DNFBPs generally identify PEP associates through self-declaration and their own knowledge of customers. Malaysian DNFBPs generally cater to domestic PEPs and have rarely encountered foreign PEPs as customers. Given the broad definition of PEPs in Malaysia, and the fact that list changes often, some DNFBPs face challenges in ensuring they are compliant with the requirements, particularly for PEPs at local and state levels. 331. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers from higher-risk jurisdictions, such as obtaining source of funds and other necessary information, before entering relationships. Other DNFBPs met indicated that they would automatically reject these customers. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 332. There is significant variation across sectors in filing STRs and DNFBPs in most sectors do not submit reports in line with their risk profile (see IO.6 for a breakdown of STRs filed by the DNFBP sector). The sole licensed casino contributes the highest proportion STRs amongst DNFBPs. This may reflect the intensive supervisory engagement it receives and the nature of its business. Although measures implemented by the authorities have seen some increase in STR reporting by RIs in the other DNFBP sectors in recent years, the number of submissions remains low even in the higher risk sectors, which raises questions on the level of understanding and application of STRs obligations despite these measures. BNM has recently communicated its expectation to shift from providing awareness and training on STR submissions to taking enforcement action for non-submission. This is an important step in ensuring the weak levels of STR reporting are addressed. 333. Labuan Trust Companies are the second highest sector filing STRs in Labuan IBFC and contribute around 32% of the total number of filed reports. LFSA has conducted regular communications with these entities, outlining its expectations in terms of the quality and quantity of suspicious transaction reporting. 334. Most DNFBPs continue to submit STRs to the FIU manually via secure email, although a small number of larger DNFBPs have access to the FINS system, which facilitates more efficient and timelier STR submissions. Despite the difference in STR submission mechanisms, all DNFBPs have processes in place to ensure confidentiality and avoid tipping-off. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 335. Internal controls within DNFBPs vary but are generally well established in larger DNFBPs. These include compliance programmes, appointed compliance officers, ongoing AML/CFT training programmes and internal audit reviews. DNFBPs met during the onsite explained that that they review internal procedures regularly and update periodically to ensure their effectiveness. However, supervisors continue to find significant numbers of AML/CFT/CPF failures to comply with internal control requirements across most DNFBP sectors. 336. Company secretaries, law firms, and accounting firms met during the onsite generally have internal control processes and procedures specifically related to their business activities. Some international law and accounting firms apply group-wide AML/CFT controls, which they note may be more stringent than those required in Malaysia. 337. The inadequacy of internal controls in smaller-sized DNFBPs is a concern, even though they are mainly lower risk entities. Notwithstanding, supervisors’ findings show an increase in the nomination and notification of compliance officers to BNM in recent years, in line with AML/CFT/CPF requirements. This should have a cascading effect on other AML/CFT controls and generally improve compliance across DNFBP sectors, particularly as only appointed and notified compliance officers can access training and information provided by the authorities through an online platform. This electronic platform is an important supervisory tool and has helped increase awareness on AML/CFT obligations. 338. While larger firms may provide regular training, smaller DNFBPs often lack the resources to implement or attend comprehensive training programs. This can lead to inconsistencies in understanding and compliance with AML/CFT/CPF requirements. However, some SRBs have included AML/CFT/CPF accreditation modules as part of the Continuous Professional Development or Continuing Professional Education programmes and supervisors have provided training and resources to help improve understanding of requirements, particularly for lawyers, accountants, and company secretaries. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 339. For the purposes of STR obligations under AMLA, any legal or other restrictions on disclosure, including secrecy laws, are overridden." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="4.4.1. Customer due diligence, record keeping, BO information and ongoing CDD 321. Basic CDD requirements are consistently implemented across most DNFBP sectors. RIs met during the onsite indicated that to establish a business relationship, they require the collection of nine data points, as outlined in the BNM guidelines. Most DNFBPs also rely on official identification documents as part of CDD verification, particularly where the national ID number is not available. Nevertheless, supervisors continue to identify numerous cases of non-compliance with CDD requirements across all DNFBP sectors, such as incomplete collection on the nine required datapoints (e.g., occupation type and nature of employment) or other deficiencies in collecting BO information. 322. Most DNFBPs met during the onsite understand their obligations to conduct due diligence and keep records on business relationships and transactions. However, it appears that implementation of these obligations varies in practice, particularly in non-standard situations and relating to BO identification. 323. While most DNFBPs require customers to self-declare their BOs, this is often supplemented by independent checks via external databases or open sources. However, the identification of BO continues to be a challenge, particularly when it involves foreign BOs and complex legal structures. This is supported by supervisory findings. 324. DNFBPs, are encouraged by the authorities to establish manual or electronic systems (or both) for continuous CDD monitoring. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite rely on a combination. Larger DNFBPs have adopted in-house or commercially developed transaction monitoring system, whereas small DNFBPs use manual or basic systems to scrutinise transactions, which is commensurate with their reduced risk. 325. Labuan trust companies follow supervisory guidelines to determine the frequency of conducting of ongoing due diligence. This varies from 1-5 years, depending on the risk profile of the customers. For corporate customers, articles of incorporation and shareholder information is collected, as well as BO information on trusts and other similar legal arrangements. 326. Malaysia’s sole casino introduced additional electronic table games during the COVID-19 pandemic to meet the needs of its customers. This has allowed it to implement better transaction monitoring and quickly identify suspicious activity. This has improved efficiency and allows the casino to conduct better customer risk profiling. 327. Record keeping requirements are long-established and implementation is closely monitored by supervisors as part of ongoing supervision. DNFBPs appear to generally comply with the minimum six-year record keeping requirements and the authorities suggest that competent authorities can access information upon appropriate request. However, supervisory findings during onsite examinations continue to show record-keeping gaps in all DNFBP sectors, except for the casino and trust company sector. 4.4.2. Enhanced or specific measures 328. DNFBPs met during the onsite generally collect basic due diligence information (national identity, company incorporation and ownership information and address) for all levels of CDD. EDD is performed for high-risk clients and transactions. This includes requesting additional information (e.g., source of wealth) from clients subject to enhanced scrutiny to satisfy the CDD procedures prior to beginning a business relationship or concluding a transaction. Labuan Trust Companies and some other TCSPs collect and verify BO information at a lower threshold than the required 25% shareholding when applying EDD. Some DNFBPs involved in company formation services face challenges in verifying foreign BO information, but explained the additional measures they take for verification, such as obtaining notarised records or information from foreign authorities. In general, supervisors continuously identify failings in the application of EDD, particularly customer risk profiling, and this appears to be a significant issue, despite the authorities suggesting that the majority of the AML/CFT/CPF deficiencies are minor lapses (see table below). Table 4.1. Number of EDD deficiencies by DNFBPs EDD deficiencies 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 PEP-related (all sectors except Labuan trust companies) - - - - 1 - - Other 138 31 31 19 138 93 - PEP-related (Labuan trust companies) 2 - - - 1 - - Other (Labuan trust companies) - - - - - 3 - Total for all DNFBP sectors 140 31 31 19 140 96 - 329. DNFBPs met during the onsite described the measures in place to identify domestic and foreign PEPs and the EDD measures applied in these cases (including obtaining senior management approval). Large international accounting and law firms in Malaysia have a more developed knowledge of EDD requirements applicable for higher risk situations. Regarding PEPs, these firms tended to adhere to their global policies and procedures and apply EDD once there is a PEP match during CDD onboarding. Larger DNFBPs make use of commercial databases to identify and detect customers who are PEPs, subject to TFS or associated with higher risk jurisdictions identified by the FATF. 330. Most DNFBPs adopt the supervisory guidance as their policy for the identification of PEPs, including the PEP definition. Smaller DNFBPs generally identify PEP associates through self-declaration and their own knowledge of customers. Malaysian DNFBPs generally cater to domestic PEPs and have rarely encountered foreign PEPs as customers. Given the broad definition of PEPs in Malaysia, and the fact that list changes often, some DNFBPs face challenges in ensuring they are compliant with the requirements, particularly for PEPs at local and state levels. 331. In general, DNFBPs met during the onsite indicated that they would conduct EDD on customers from higher-risk jurisdictions, such as obtaining source of funds and other necessary information, before entering relationships. Other DNFBPs met indicated that they would automatically reject these customers. 4.4.3. AML/CFT reporting obligations and tipping off 332. There is significant variation across sectors in filing STRs and DNFBPs in most sectors do not submit reports in line with their risk profile (see IO.6 for a breakdown of STRs filed by the DNFBP sector). The sole licensed casino contributes the highest proportion STRs amongst DNFBPs. This may reflect the intensive supervisory engagement it receives and the nature of its business. Although measures implemented by the authorities have seen some increase in STR reporting by RIs in the other DNFBP sectors in recent years, the number of submissions remains low even in the higher risk sectors, which raises questions on the level of understanding and application of STRs obligations despite these measures. BNM has recently communicated its expectation to shift from providing awareness and training on STR submissions to taking enforcement action for non-submission. This is an important step in ensuring the weak levels of STR reporting are addressed. 333. Labuan Trust Companies are the second highest sector filing STRs in Labuan IBFC and contribute around 32% of the total number of filed reports. LFSA has conducted regular communications with these entities, outlining its expectations in terms of the quality and quantity of suspicious transaction reporting. 334. Most DNFBPs continue to submit STRs to the FIU manually via secure email, although a small number of larger DNFBPs have access to the FINS system, which facilitates more efficient and timelier STR submissions. Despite the difference in STR submission mechanisms, all DNFBPs have processes in place to ensure confidentiality and avoid tipping-off. 4.4.4. Internal controls, procedures and audits to ensure compliance 335. Internal controls within DNFBPs vary but are generally well established in larger DNFBPs. These include compliance programmes, appointed compliance officers, ongoing AML/CFT training programmes and internal audit reviews. DNFBPs met during the onsite explained that that they review internal procedures regularly and update periodically to ensure their effectiveness. However, supervisors continue to find significant numbers of AML/CFT/CPF failures to comply with internal control requirements across most DNFBP sectors. 336. Company secretaries, law firms, and accounting firms met during the onsite generally have internal control processes and procedures specifically related to their business activities. Some international law and accounting firms apply group-wide AML/CFT controls, which they note may be more stringent than those required in Malaysia. 337. The inadequacy of internal controls in smaller-sized DNFBPs is a concern, even though they are mainly lower risk entities. Notwithstanding, supervisors’ findings show an increase in the nomination and notification of compliance officers to BNM in recent years, in line with AML/CFT/CPF requirements. This should have a cascading effect on other AML/CFT controls and generally improve compliance across DNFBP sectors, particularly as only appointed and notified compliance officers can access training and information provided by the authorities through an online platform. This electronic platform is an important supervisory tool and has helped increase awareness on AML/CFT obligations. 338. While larger firms may provide regular training, smaller DNFBPs often lack the resources to implement or attend comprehensive training programs. This can lead to inconsistencies in understanding and compliance with AML/CFT/CPF requirements. However, some SRBs have included AML/CFT/CPF accreditation modules as part of the Continuous Professional Development or Continuing Professional Education programmes and supervisors have provided training and resources to help improve understanding of requirements, particularly for lawyers, accountants, and company secretaries. 4.4.5. Legal or regulatory impediments to implementing AML/CFT obligations and mitigating measures 339. For the purposes of STR obligations under AMLA, any legal or other restrictions on disclosure, including secrecy laws, are overridden." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="401. Competent authorities have a timely access to basic and BO information of LAs, but the quality of the information is not sufficiently verified for accuracy. 402. All legal arrangements in Malaysia, including foreign trusts that have income accruing in, derived from or received in Malaysia, are required to have their respective trustees submit annual tax returns to the IRBM. Each return includes the LA’s basic and BO information. Details pertaining to the settlors, protectors, auditors and tax agents are also included in the annual tax returns. However, as of June 2024, there were 10 353 active tax files registered with the IRBM, which is only 86% of the total number of legal arrangements in Malaysia. This suggests there could be a number of legal arrangements the IRBM does not have basic and BO information on. Furthermore, based on interviews with the private sector during the onsite, it is questionable whether all the trustees are aware of the legal requirement to report the BO information of legal arrangements as part of their tax returns. 403. Although IRBM conducts audits on the BOs of legal arrangements by examining financial statements, accounting records, tax returns, and other relevant documents, it does not generally detect any deficiencies in the submitted BO information. This raises questions over the granularity of the audits in terms of verification of the accuracy of BO information submitted. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for legal arrangements to update basic and BO information, except for address, or additional tax payable, outside the annual tax reporting cycle, meaning a significant amount of time can pass before a change is updated in the IRBM records. Malaysia does not consider this as a major gap in its framework as onshore legal arrangements only make up 2.3% of the population of onshore legal persons and arrangements and BO information of Labuan trusts is maintained in the LFSA’s PEARL together with records of Labuan legal persons. Nevertheless, enabling legal arrangements to update their information to IRBM in real time would further enhance the accuracy of BO information available to competent authorities. 404. LEAs can obtain the basic and BO information managed by the IRBM when conducting joint analysis. In 2024, five joint analyses were carried out between relevant LEAs and the IRBM. In addition, the RMP makes frequent information requests for information on legal arrangements to the respective IRBM state offices. 405. Malaysia amended legislation in February 2025, requiring trustees including non-professional trustees to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and up-to-date BO information. However, given the recency of this change, the Assessment Team was not able to assess the effectiveness of these new requirements. 406. RIs hold basic and BO information for the legal arrangements for which they act as a trustee. This includes CDD information on their customers who act as trustees of legal arrangements and information on the assets of the legal arrangements of which they hold or manage on behalf. RIs also conduct ongoing due diligence on their legal arrangement customers to update their CDD information within the risk-based cycles set by themselves. Competent authorities can request this information from RIs via FINS for onshore legal arrangements and via the LFSA for Labuan trusts. However, prior to February 2025, there was no obligation for trustees of legal arrangements to update basic and BO information, meaning that the RIs could only provide the latest CDD information they held, which may have been out of date. 407. Labuan trust companies, acting exclusively as trustees of Labuan trusts, keep basic and BO information of all Labuan trusts in their register and report it to the LFSA. Basic information on Labuan trusts is directly available to competent authorities through the LFSA’s online platform. Between 2020 and 2024, the LFSA inspected 20 Labuan trust companies specifically focussing on their compliance with their trustee obligations. Although supervisory letters were issued for all 20 Labuan trust companies to communicate areas of improvement, none related to BO information requirements. 408. Onshore foundations/incorporated trusts are required to notify any changes to their name, trust deed and trustees to the BHEUU within 14 days from the changes. BHEUU has basic and BO information of onshore foundations/incorporated trusts publicly accessible in their website. Competent authorities can request further information on onshore foundations/incorporated trusts from BHEUU, who generally respond within three business days. Eight requests were made in total between 2020 and 2024. This information led to one prosecution. BHEUU generally conducts onsite inspections on two foundations/incorporated trusts per month to ensure they comply with the BO information requirements. This appears commensurate with the higher risk presented by this type of legal arrangement. 409. The State Islamic Religious Council (SIRC) holds the exclusive mandate to act as the sole trustee for all waqf properties, and all waqf-related activities must be carried out under the auspices of the SIRC. The SIRC facilitates access to basic and BO information, which includes details about the endowed property, the waqif (settlor), the waqf recipient (beneficiary), the waqf administrator (trustee) and other SIRC parties in exercising ultimate effective control over the waqf. The average time taken for the SIRC to respond to information requests from competent authorities is approximately one to two weeks. Requests for information to the SIRC are very limited, in line with the low risk profile of waqfs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="401. Competent authorities have a timely access to basic and BO information of LAs, but the quality of the information is not sufficiently verified for accuracy. 402. All legal arrangements in Malaysia, including foreign trusts that have income accruing in, derived from or received in Malaysia, are required to have their respective trustees submit annual tax returns to the IRBM. Each return includes the LA’s basic and BO information. Details pertaining to the settlors, protectors, auditors and tax agents are also included in the annual tax returns. However, as of June 2024, there were 10 353 active tax files registered with the IRBM, which is only 86% of the total number of legal arrangements in Malaysia. This suggests there could be a number of legal arrangements the IRBM does not have basic and BO information on. Furthermore, based on interviews with the private sector during the onsite, it is questionable whether all the trustees are aware of the legal requirement to report the BO information of legal arrangements as part of their tax returns. 403. Although IRBM conducts audits on the BOs of legal arrangements by examining financial statements, accounting records, tax returns, and other relevant documents, it does not generally detect any deficiencies in the submitted BO information. This raises questions over the granularity of the audits in terms of verification of the accuracy of BO information submitted. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for legal arrangements to update basic and BO information, except for address, or additional tax payable, outside the annual tax reporting cycle, meaning a significant amount of time can pass before a change is updated in the IRBM records. Malaysia does not consider this as a major gap in its framework as onshore legal arrangements only make up 2.3% of the population of onshore legal persons and arrangements and BO information of Labuan trusts is maintained in the LFSA’s PEARL together with records of Labuan legal persons. Nevertheless, enabling legal arrangements to update their information to IRBM in real time would further enhance the accuracy of BO information available to competent authorities. 404. LEAs can obtain the basic and BO information managed by the IRBM when conducting joint analysis. In 2024, five joint analyses were carried out between relevant LEAs and the IRBM. In addition, the RMP makes frequent information requests for information on legal arrangements to the respective IRBM state offices. 405. Malaysia amended legislation in February 2025, requiring trustees including non-professional trustees to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and up-to-date BO information. However, given the recency of this change, the Assessment Team was not able to assess the effectiveness of these new requirements. 406. RIs hold basic and BO information for the legal arrangements for which they act as a trustee. This includes CDD information on their customers who act as trustees of legal arrangements and information on the assets of the legal arrangements of which they hold or manage on behalf. RIs also conduct ongoing due diligence on their legal arrangement customers to update their CDD information within the risk-based cycles set by themselves. Competent authorities can request this information from RIs via FINS for onshore legal arrangements and via the LFSA for Labuan trusts. However, prior to February 2025, there was no obligation for trustees of legal arrangements to update basic and BO information, meaning that the RIs could only provide the latest CDD information they held, which may have been out of date. 407. Labuan trust companies, acting exclusively as trustees of Labuan trusts, keep basic and BO information of all Labuan trusts in their register and report it to the LFSA. Basic information on Labuan trusts is directly available to competent authorities through the LFSA’s online platform. Between 2020 and 2024, the LFSA inspected 20 Labuan trust companies specifically focussing on their compliance with their trustee obligations. Although supervisory letters were issued for all 20 Labuan trust companies to communicate areas of improvement, none related to BO information requirements. 408. Onshore foundations/incorporated trusts are required to notify any changes to their name, trust deed and trustees to the BHEUU within 14 days from the changes. BHEUU has basic and BO information of onshore foundations/incorporated trusts publicly accessible in their website. Competent authorities can request further information on onshore foundations/incorporated trusts from BHEUU, who generally respond within three business days. Eight requests were made in total between 2020 and 2024. This information led to one prosecution. BHEUU generally conducts onsite inspections on two foundations/incorporated trusts per month to ensure they comply with the BO information requirements. This appears commensurate with the higher risk presented by this type of legal arrangement. 409. The State Islamic Religious Council (SIRC) holds the exclusive mandate to act as the sole trustee for all waqf properties, and all waqf-related activities must be carried out under the auspices of the SIRC. The SIRC facilitates access to basic and BO information, which includes details about the endowed property, the waqif (settlor), the waqf recipient (beneficiary), the waqf administrator (trustee) and other SIRC parties in exercising ultimate effective control over the waqf. The average time taken for the SIRC to respond to information requests from competent authorities is approximately one to two weeks. Requests for information to the SIRC are very limited, in line with the low risk profile of waqfs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Use of financial information/intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 452. Malaysia’s LEAs use financial intelligence and other relevant information to investigate ML, associated predicate offences and TF. LEAs have consistently provided positive feedback on the quality of financial intelligence disseminated by the FIU or accessed directly via FINS. Supporting documents, such as bank statements that accompany the FIU’s main disclosure allow LEAs to perform initial analysis to develop an investigation, before obtaining an order to produce documents, records and other information from FIs. Information from FINS has also allowed LEAs to develop profiles of subjects under investigation, including their associates, employer and current location. 453. Between 2019 and February 2025, 894 or 79% of cases that were spontaneously disseminated by the FIU to competent authorities resulted in formal enquiries by the LEAs, also known as Enquiry Papers (EP). [65] . In the context of Malaysia, EPs already involve the use of investigation powers, as practiced by certain agencies such as the MACC. Of these, 368 or 33% of total FIU spontaneous disseminations resulted in the opening of an Investigation Papers, which indicates the start of a formal investigation into a suspected offence. As shown in the below table, the FIU’s disclosures are a significant source of intelligence for both predicate offence and ML investigations. While most investigations triggered by spontaneous disclosures were initiated by RMP, MACC and IRBM have also been utilising spontaneous disclosures to trigger investigations on corruption and tax-related offences, respectively. Table 6.6. Actions taken on spontaneous disclosures No. of disclosures No. EPs % of EP opened/ total disclosures Investigation Paper (IP) % of IP opened/ total disclosures Predicate ML Parallel Total 2019 267 238 89% 53 18 7 78 29% 2020 178 153 86% 33 7 15 55 31% 2021 132 103 78% 30 0 22 52 39% 2022 130 105 81% 38 3 18 59 45% 2023 168 121 72% 47 7 5 59 35% 2024 222 156 70% 32 12 18 62 28% 2025 (Feb) 28 18 64% 0 1 2 3 11% Total 1 125 894 79% 233 48 87 368 33% 454. Financial intelligence plays a central role in the investigation of terrorism/TF activities. Disclosures from the FIU to the SB includes data from MSBs, which enable it to follow the money trail, and further support ongoing investigations. The FIU’s analysis products have also helped to broaden and expand the financial network involved, allowing the SB to identify other individuals linked to the network. This information has had material results, as outlined in IO.9. 6.4.2. Use of financial information/intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 455. LEAs use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds and instrumentalities. FINS is the primary tool for LEAs to issue investigation orders pursuant to the AMLA and DDFOPA to require all FIs, to identify and provide information on accounts or assets belonging to subjects of interest (without court order). Other PPP platforms have been also utilised. For example, when the FIU wants to gather information on criminal proceeds, it shares case information with selected RIs through PPP meetings to request reporting and disclosure of STRs. These mechanisms have enabled identification of illegal proceeds that could be subject to freezing and seizure measures, prior to the formal investigation commencing. The below case study highlights how various competent authorities used information and financial intelligence to assist in tracing criminal proceeds. Box 6.7. Using information/intelligence to trace proceeds in major scam operation In 2019, a syndicate bgan promoting fake investment portfolios through social media and phone calls. It successfully defrauded victims in Australia and the United Kingdom, amassing nearly EUR 40 million. Investigations later revealed that the syndicate was headquartered in Thailand and operated as part of a larger international scam network that had targeted over 69 000 victims across multiple countries. In the ML investigation, various methods and tools were used for operational cooperation. The Intelligence Division of MACC played a central role for intelligence-led investigation. The FIU assisted MACC in information requests from foreign FIUs in addition to network analysis. The case information was shared with selected RIs at a PPP meeting to prompt further reporting and disclosure of STRs, which the FIU subsequently shared with MACC. As a result, a total of 25 STRs were shared. In February 2024, four foreigners were charged with cheating and sentenced in Malaysia to six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 112 070. 74 accounts (comprising 64 individual accounts and 10 companies’ accounts) were frozen, amounting to EUR 2.51 million and multi-denomination cash of RM 2.3 million, USD 35 100 and GBP 940 were seized. Forfeiture proceedings are ongoing. 456. To trace and recover assets in the 1MDB case, Malaysia’s FIU supported LEAs by providing financial analysis on relevant transactions and bank account details, helping to uncover complex misappropriation schemes. Malaysia also presented several other case studies demonstrating how competent authorities use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities. Footnotes [65] An enquiry paper is used at the early stage of an investigation, particularly when authorities are gathering further intelligence or surveillance to assess whether there is sufficient basis to open a formal investigation. If the enquiry leads to sufficient evidence or justification, an Investigation Paper may be initiated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="6.4.1. Use of financial information/intelligence for investigations and developing evidence 452. Malaysia’s LEAs use financial intelligence and other relevant information to investigate ML, associated predicate offences and TF. LEAs have consistently provided positive feedback on the quality of financial intelligence disseminated by the FIU or accessed directly via FINS. Supporting documents, such as bank statements that accompany the FIU’s main disclosure allow LEAs to perform initial analysis to develop an investigation, before obtaining an order to produce documents, records and other information from FIs. Information from FINS has also allowed LEAs to develop profiles of subjects under investigation, including their associates, employer and current location. 453. Between 2019 and February 2025, 894 or 79% of cases that were spontaneously disseminated by the FIU to competent authorities resulted in formal enquiries by the LEAs, also known as Enquiry Papers (EP). [65] . In the context of Malaysia, EPs already involve the use of investigation powers, as practiced by certain agencies such as the MACC. Of these, 368 or 33% of total FIU spontaneous disseminations resulted in the opening of an Investigation Papers, which indicates the start of a formal investigation into a suspected offence. As shown in the below table, the FIU’s disclosures are a significant source of intelligence for both predicate offence and ML investigations. While most investigations triggered by spontaneous disclosures were initiated by RMP, MACC and IRBM have also been utilising spontaneous disclosures to trigger investigations on corruption and tax-related offences, respectively. Table 6.6. Actions taken on spontaneous disclosures No. of disclosures No. EPs % of EP opened/ total disclosures Investigation Paper (IP) % of IP opened/ total disclosures Predicate ML Parallel Total 2019 267 238 89% 53 18 7 78 29% 2020 178 153 86% 33 7 15 55 31% 2021 132 103 78% 30 0 22 52 39% 2022 130 105 81% 38 3 18 59 45% 2023 168 121 72% 47 7 5 59 35% 2024 222 156 70% 32 12 18 62 28% 2025 (Feb) 28 18 64% 0 1 2 3 11% Total 1 125 894 79% 233 48 87 368 33% 454. Financial intelligence plays a central role in the investigation of terrorism/TF activities. Disclosures from the FIU to the SB includes data from MSBs, which enable it to follow the money trail, and further support ongoing investigations. The FIU’s analysis products have also helped to broaden and expand the financial network involved, allowing the SB to identify other individuals linked to the network. This information has had material results, as outlined in IO.9. 6.4.2. Use of financial information/intelligence to assist in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds or instrumentalities 455. LEAs use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds and instrumentalities. FINS is the primary tool for LEAs to issue investigation orders pursuant to the AMLA and DDFOPA to require all FIs, to identify and provide information on accounts or assets belonging to subjects of interest (without court order). Other PPP platforms have been also utilised. For example, when the FIU wants to gather information on criminal proceeds, it shares case information with selected RIs through PPP meetings to request reporting and disclosure of STRs. These mechanisms have enabled identification of illegal proceeds that could be subject to freezing and seizure measures, prior to the formal investigation commencing. The below case study highlights how various competent authorities used information and financial intelligence to assist in tracing criminal proceeds. Box 6.7. Using information/intelligence to trace proceeds in major scam operation In 2019, a syndicate bgan promoting fake investment portfolios through social media and phone calls. It successfully defrauded victims in Australia and the United Kingdom, amassing nearly EUR 40 million. Investigations later revealed that the syndicate was headquartered in Thailand and operated as part of a larger international scam network that had targeted over 69 000 victims across multiple countries. In the ML investigation, various methods and tools were used for operational cooperation. The Intelligence Division of MACC played a central role for intelligence-led investigation. The FIU assisted MACC in information requests from foreign FIUs in addition to network analysis. The case information was shared with selected RIs at a PPP meeting to prompt further reporting and disclosure of STRs, which the FIU subsequently shared with MACC. As a result, a total of 25 STRs were shared. In February 2024, four foreigners were charged with cheating and sentenced in Malaysia to six months imprisonment and a fine of EUR 112 070. 74 accounts (comprising 64 individual accounts and 10 companies’ accounts) were frozen, amounting to EUR 2.51 million and multi-denomination cash of RM 2.3 million, USD 35 100 and GBP 940 were seized. Forfeiture proceedings are ongoing. 456. To trace and recover assets in the 1MDB case, Malaysia’s FIU supported LEAs by providing financial analysis on relevant transactions and bank account details, helping to uncover complex misappropriation schemes. Malaysia also presented several other case studies demonstrating how competent authorities use financial intelligence to identify and trace criminal proceeds or instrumentalities. Footnotes [65] An enquiry paper is used at the early stage of an investigation, particularly when authorities are gathering further intelligence or surveillance to assess whether there is sufficient basis to open a formal investigation. If the enquiry leads to sufficient evidence or justification, an Investigation Paper may be initiated." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="500. Malaysia often applies alternate measures with success; however, the Assessment Team is concerned that these measures are being applied disproportionately and that alternative measures are not only applied in cases where a ML investigation has been pursued but where it was not possible, for justifiable reasons, to secure a ML conviction. According to the FATF Methodology, “alternative measures should not…be a substitute for prosecutions and convictions for ML offences”. However, as outlined below, Malaysia regularly pursues out of court settlements (i.e., application of a compound), NCBF and other administrative penalties. Tax remedies are also heavily pursued as outlined below and in IO.8. Due to the low ML conviction rates and the disproportionate use of alternative measures, this leads the Assessment Team to consider that there are barriers (outlined elsewhere in IO.7) to achieving criminal prosecution, convictions, and sanctions. 501. This leads the Assessment Team to consider that there are systemic barriers to achieving criminal prosecution, convictions and sanctions. As noted above, the decision to prosecute ML lies with the AGC. The AGC, in the presence of an identified predicate offence, can opt to prosecute the underlying offence, despite the suspicion of ML, with appropriate justification. In addition, the AGC can also decide to settle a case out of court. An out of court settlement in the form of a compound establishes certain conditions for the suspect, such as the imposition of a monetary penalty in exchange for the dropping of ML and/or other charges. In discussions with authorities, there were mixed views regarding the use of this out of court settlement power. Some authorities see it as a means to apply an administrative penalty when a criminal penalty cannot be achieved. It is viewed as an efficient method of concluding a case in which some type of monetary penalty is applied. Moreover, since some proceeds are recovered directly to the government, it is seen by authorities as a financial benefit for Malaysia. Even though many compound payments are significant in monetary value, the offender does not receive a formal criminal record, but the outcome of the settlement is made public through the respective LEAs’ websites and press releases. This is done either at the point of initiating an action or upon settlement/payment. 502. Malaysian authorities use compounds (and NCBF, see IO.8) because they are relatively expedient and require a lower burden of proof than criminal prosecution. However, authorities have shown an overreliance on compounds as an alternative to prosecution rather than using them as a complementary tool. This approach is inconsistent with the FATF Standards, as countries are expected to be able to successfully prosecute ML cases and apply proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for those convicted of the offence. Compounds are used extensively across all high-risk predicate offences and typologies, particularly in corruption cases (see table 7.6 below). Since 2019, Malaysia has secured approximately EUR 42 million in compounds related to ML. However, it is notable that no such settlements have been reached in organised crime, drug trafficking or for stand-alone ML cases, or ML cases involving foreign predicate offences. Based on the heavy use of compound in self-laundering cases, relative to the number of investigations and prosecutions, the Assessment Team has a concern that compounds are often used in lieu of criminal sanctions in such cases. Table 7.6. Compound Imposed (EUR millions) ML Risk Type 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Corruption 0 14.70 2.42 6.12 1.49 1.39 0.01 26.13 Fraud 0 0.15 10.82 0.04 0.28 0 0 11.29 Other 0 0.78 0.45 1.86 0.99 0.06 0 4.14 Smuggling 0 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.13 0 0.46 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Organised Crime 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 0 15.79 13.69 8.05 2.89 1.58 0.01 42.01 503. During the assessment period, the IRBM has actively pursued tax recovery by exercising its powers to reclaim lost tax revenue from illicit proceeds. As noted in IO.8, this process has achieved significant results and can be carried out either in parallel with or independently of a criminal prosecution. 504. While the reasons for not pursuing ML cases were not always “justifiable” as required by the FATF Methodology, Malaysia’s use of alternative measures cannot be overlooked, particularly the significant amount collected as compounds. However, the relatively low number of ML prosecutions and convictions, compared to the use of alternative measures and other asset recovery techniques (as outlined in IO.8), indicates that the challenges in converting ML investigations into successful prosecutions and convictions are significant. These challenges point to systemic issues that must be addressed to make Malaysia’s ML regime truly punitive and dissuasive moving forward." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="500. Malaysia often applies alternate measures with success; however, the Assessment Team is concerned that these measures are being applied disproportionately and that alternative measures are not only applied in cases where a ML investigation has been pursued but where it was not possible, for justifiable reasons, to secure a ML conviction. According to the FATF Methodology, “alternative measures should not…be a substitute for prosecutions and convictions for ML offences”. However, as outlined below, Malaysia regularly pursues out of court settlements (i.e., application of a compound), NCBF and other administrative penalties. Tax remedies are also heavily pursued as outlined below and in IO.8. Due to the low ML conviction rates and the disproportionate use of alternative measures, this leads the Assessment Team to consider that there are barriers (outlined elsewhere in IO.7) to achieving criminal prosecution, convictions, and sanctions. 501. This leads the Assessment Team to consider that there are systemic barriers to achieving criminal prosecution, convictions and sanctions. As noted above, the decision to prosecute ML lies with the AGC. The AGC, in the presence of an identified predicate offence, can opt to prosecute the underlying offence, despite the suspicion of ML, with appropriate justification. In addition, the AGC can also decide to settle a case out of court. An out of court settlement in the form of a compound establishes certain conditions for the suspect, such as the imposition of a monetary penalty in exchange for the dropping of ML and/or other charges. In discussions with authorities, there were mixed views regarding the use of this out of court settlement power. Some authorities see it as a means to apply an administrative penalty when a criminal penalty cannot be achieved. It is viewed as an efficient method of concluding a case in which some type of monetary penalty is applied. Moreover, since some proceeds are recovered directly to the government, it is seen by authorities as a financial benefit for Malaysia. Even though many compound payments are significant in monetary value, the offender does not receive a formal criminal record, but the outcome of the settlement is made public through the respective LEAs’ websites and press releases. This is done either at the point of initiating an action or upon settlement/payment. 502. Malaysian authorities use compounds (and NCBF, see IO.8) because they are relatively expedient and require a lower burden of proof than criminal prosecution. However, authorities have shown an overreliance on compounds as an alternative to prosecution rather than using them as a complementary tool. This approach is inconsistent with the FATF Standards, as countries are expected to be able to successfully prosecute ML cases and apply proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for those convicted of the offence. Compounds are used extensively across all high-risk predicate offences and typologies, particularly in corruption cases (see table 7.6 below). Since 2019, Malaysia has secured approximately EUR 42 million in compounds related to ML. However, it is notable that no such settlements have been reached in organised crime, drug trafficking or for stand-alone ML cases, or ML cases involving foreign predicate offences. Based on the heavy use of compound in self-laundering cases, relative to the number of investigations and prosecutions, the Assessment Team has a concern that compounds are often used in lieu of criminal sanctions in such cases. Table 7.6. Compound Imposed (EUR millions) ML Risk Type 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Corruption 0 14.70 2.42 6.12 1.49 1.39 0.01 26.13 Fraud 0 0.15 10.82 0.04 0.28 0 0 11.29 Other 0 0.78 0.45 1.86 0.99 0.06 0 4.14 Smuggling 0 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.13 0 0.46 Drug Trafficking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Organised Crime 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 0 15.79 13.69 8.05 2.89 1.58 0.01 42.01 503. During the assessment period, the IRBM has actively pursued tax recovery by exercising its powers to reclaim lost tax revenue from illicit proceeds. As noted in IO.8, this process has achieved significant results and can be carried out either in parallel with or independently of a criminal prosecution. 504. While the reasons for not pursuing ML cases were not always “justifiable” as required by the FATF Methodology, Malaysia’s use of alternative measures cannot be overlooked, particularly the significant amount collected as compounds. However, the relatively low number of ML prosecutions and convictions, compared to the use of alternative measures and other asset recovery techniques (as outlined in IO.8), indicates that the challenges in converting ML investigations into successful prosecutions and convictions are significant. These challenges point to systemic issues that must be addressed to make Malaysia’s ML regime truly punitive and dissuasive moving forward." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 557. According to NRA 2023, Malaysia identifies fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime as the predicate offenses posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia’s overall recovery results for corruption, fraud and drug trafficking reflect to some extent Malaysia’s risk and context, but for the other high-risk predicate offences, the results indicate room for improvement. This may be due to the overwhelming focus on fraud (including scams), which remains deeply pervasive in the country and the Southeast Asian region. Additionally, Malaysian authorities have been heavily burdened by the 1MDB case and the critical priority of repatriating public funds, which may have diverted limited resources from other areas. 558. Overall, Malaysia has improved its confiscation results since the 2015 MER. The 1MDB case is a remarkable example of the country’s dedication and focus on asset recovery, as well as a positive example of international cooperation to repatriate misappropriated assets. In addition to 1MDB, Malaysia provided several other examples where authorities (i.e., MACC) have successfully recovered corruption-linked assets. Therefore, Malaysia’s asset recovery efforts in relation to corruption is in line with the country’s risk profile. 559. Moreover, Malaysian authorities have effectively targeted fraud, with asset recovery playing a key role in these efforts. The work of the NSRC and NFP in tracing criminal proceeds and recovering stolen assets is noteworthy, especially considering the recent establishment of these initiatives. 560. However, as noted above, forfeiture results for smuggling and organised crime remain low, despite the severity and impact of these crimes. The lack of substantial asset recovery in these areas raises concerns about whether law enforcement efforts are effectively addressing the full spectrum of Malaysia’s ML threats. With respect to organised crime, which Malaysian authorities indicate includes illegal gambling and loan sharking, seizures and forfeitures are executed under AMLA. Between 2019 and February 2025, assets worth EUR 6.85 million were forfeited, of which EUR 6.43 million was successfully recovered by the Malaysian government, averaging approximately EUR 1.2 million per year. Considering that organised crime is one of Malaysia’s highest-risk predicate offences, this amount is relatively low. The figures reflect Malaysia’s predominant focus on corruption and fraud investigations, often at the expense of other high- and medium-high-risk crimes. Furthermore, case examples suggest that enforcement efforts are concentrated on relatively small-scale offences, leading to limited forfeitures and raising concerns that Malaysia is not effectively targeting major organised crime networks. 561. Malaysia has made some progress in confiscating proceeds from drug offences under the DDFOPA. Since 2019, authorities have forfeited approximately EUR 21.85 million in assets linked to drug-related crimes. However, this amount appears low in absolute terms—averaging EUR 3.64 million per year—especially considering Malaysia’s risk profile and proximity to the Golden Triangle region. As previously noted, a significant gap remains between the value of assets seized and the final amount successfully confiscated. 562. Moreover, the Assessment Team has concerns about the disproportionately low levels of asset seizure, forfeiture, and recovery associated with predicate offences assessed as medium-high risk, including tax offences, forgery, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Despite the recognised threat level of these offence types in Malaysia’s NRA, the quantum restrained and ultimately forfeited in connection with these crimes appears statistically insignificant when compared to overall asset recovery figures. This suggests a potential misalignment between risk and operational focus and may point to challenges in the initiation or progression of financial investigations, identification of assets, or the application of available forfeiture tools. 563. Finally, confiscation results for falsely declared or undeclared CBNIs are not aligned with Malaysia’s risk profile. Given Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy, its regional positioning, and the ease of transporting CBNIs across its borders, asset recovery efforts must be significantly strengthened. Each year, billions worth of currencies flow across Malaysia’s borders, and while seizures are substantial, the amount forfeited remains minimal." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. 557. According to NRA 2023, Malaysia identifies fraud, corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling, and organised crime as the predicate offenses posing the highest ML threat. These are followed by tax crimes, forgery, human trafficking/migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Malaysia’s overall recovery results for corruption, fraud and drug trafficking reflect to some extent Malaysia’s risk and context, but for the other high-risk predicate offences, the results indicate room for improvement. This may be due to the overwhelming focus on fraud (including scams), which remains deeply pervasive in the country and the Southeast Asian region. Additionally, Malaysian authorities have been heavily burdened by the 1MDB case and the critical priority of repatriating public funds, which may have diverted limited resources from other areas. 558. Overall, Malaysia has improved its confiscation results since the 2015 MER. The 1MDB case is a remarkable example of the country’s dedication and focus on asset recovery, as well as a positive example of international cooperation to repatriate misappropriated assets. In addition to 1MDB, Malaysia provided several other examples where authorities (i.e., MACC) have successfully recovered corruption-linked assets. Therefore, Malaysia’s asset recovery efforts in relation to corruption is in line with the country’s risk profile. 559. Moreover, Malaysian authorities have effectively targeted fraud, with asset recovery playing a key role in these efforts. The work of the NSRC and NFP in tracing criminal proceeds and recovering stolen assets is noteworthy, especially considering the recent establishment of these initiatives. 560. However, as noted above, forfeiture results for smuggling and organised crime remain low, despite the severity and impact of these crimes. The lack of substantial asset recovery in these areas raises concerns about whether law enforcement efforts are effectively addressing the full spectrum of Malaysia’s ML threats. With respect to organised crime, which Malaysian authorities indicate includes illegal gambling and loan sharking, seizures and forfeitures are executed under AMLA. Between 2019 and February 2025, assets worth EUR 6.85 million were forfeited, of which EUR 6.43 million was successfully recovered by the Malaysian government, averaging approximately EUR 1.2 million per year. Considering that organised crime is one of Malaysia’s highest-risk predicate offences, this amount is relatively low. The figures reflect Malaysia’s predominant focus on corruption and fraud investigations, often at the expense of other high- and medium-high-risk crimes. Furthermore, case examples suggest that enforcement efforts are concentrated on relatively small-scale offences, leading to limited forfeitures and raising concerns that Malaysia is not effectively targeting major organised crime networks. 561. Malaysia has made some progress in confiscating proceeds from drug offences under the DDFOPA. Since 2019, authorities have forfeited approximately EUR 21.85 million in assets linked to drug-related crimes. However, this amount appears low in absolute terms—averaging EUR 3.64 million per year—especially considering Malaysia’s risk profile and proximity to the Golden Triangle region. As previously noted, a significant gap remains between the value of assets seized and the final amount successfully confiscated. 562. Moreover, the Assessment Team has concerns about the disproportionately low levels of asset seizure, forfeiture, and recovery associated with predicate offences assessed as medium-high risk, including tax offences, forgery, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, sexual exploitation, and environmental crime. Despite the recognised threat level of these offence types in Malaysia’s NRA, the quantum restrained and ultimately forfeited in connection with these crimes appears statistically insignificant when compared to overall asset recovery figures. This suggests a potential misalignment between risk and operational focus and may point to challenges in the initiation or progression of financial investigations, identification of assets, or the application of available forfeiture tools. 563. Finally, confiscation results for falsely declared or undeclared CBNIs are not aligned with Malaysia’s risk profile. Given Malaysia’s cash-intensive economy, its regional positioning, and the ease of transporting CBNIs across its borders, asset recovery efforts must be significantly strengthened. Each year, billions worth of currencies flow across Malaysia’s borders, and while seizures are substantial, the amount forfeited remains minimal." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="593. Malaysia’s CFT strategy is integrated with its overall counterterrorism strategy. The counterterrorism measures are intended to counter three main elements of terrorism, namely: i) the terrorist/terrorist organisation (addressed through enforcement and disruption operations underpinned by laws); ii) terrorist ideologies (countered through rehabilitation and de-radicalisation processes, including social media monitoring and counter-narrative efforts); and iii) financial capabilities (including TFS). 594. Malaysia has developed a set of national policies and strategies aimed at addressing terrorism and TF. First, Malaysia’s counter-terrorism strategy is anchored in a broad policy framework established by the National Security Council (NSC), which sets the direction for national security and counterterrorism efforts. The overarching National Security Policy 2021-2025 seeks to address security threats and emphasises a coordinated response across government levels and public engagement. This high-level policy is translated into actionable strategies for LEAs, which includes strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships to bolster international cooperation in countering terrorism and TF. Second, Malaysia has developed a national strategy to address TF through the establishment of the NCC (see IO.1). In August 2024, the NCC endorsed the new NCC Roadmap 2024-2026, which outlines a series of targeted initiatives to address and mitigate specific ML/TF risks, as identified by the NRA. As summarised in IO.1, the NRA is informed by TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions, as well as other information, including regional-level risk assessments. This Roadmap covers several key action plans related to CFT, as follows: Action Plan (AP) Description Enforcement [AP 3] Continue to investigate and prosecute TF in parallel with terrorism offences and preventive actions where practicable, aiming for successful conviction This initiative focuses on continuing and intensifying the enforcement of TF cases through enhancement of end-to-end investigation process, utilization of PPP, early-stage coordination with AGC to enhance prosecution and conviction rates. [AP 6] Continue to strengthen international cooperation in combatting transnational crimes, particularly in making active use of formal international cooperation This initiative seeks to institutionalize the use of formal channels, such as MLA, extradition or backed warrant as a standard practice for TF and other high risk crimes’ investigations. Preventive [AP 15] Continue to strengthen risk-based oversight on NPOs, including sharing of TF risks among regulators, LEAs and FIs leveraging on SCONPO platform This initiative aims to implement and reinforce preventive measures to deter abuse of NPOs for TF activities. It involves expanding the scope of oversight activities to include TF elements, increasing awareness and sharing between NPO regulators and promoting best practices. 595. Third, Malaysia’s Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, covering the period 2024-2028, is a strategic initiative to address the complex and evolving threats of violent extremism. The plan focuses on broader extremism risks and the rise of non-traditional extremism, for example, ethnically or racially motivated terrorism by lone-wolf actors. Details from past cases shape the Plan’s four pillars on prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement. This includes insight on recruitment patterns (e.g., gaming platforms, social media), radicalisation touchpoints and financial conduits used, as well as understanding of what motivates individuals to radicalise or be radicalised. 596. Malaysia also utilises TF intelligence to support multi-agency threat profiling and risk assessment. Intelligence gathered from TF investigations, prosecutions, and convictions—such as fund flows, payment platforms, and transactional anomalies—is shared across relevant agencies. These insights are systematically used to update the NRA, the national counter-terrorism framework, and responses to FTFs. 597. For example, Malaysia’s approach to managing returning FTFs involves a comprehensive strategy that includes assessment, rehabilitation, prosecution, and reintegration. The process aims to address the legal aspects of their actions abroad, and their rehabilitation into Malaysian society. This involves a psychological assessment, de-radicalisation programmes, and ongoing monitoring to prevent recidivism. In terms of repatriation, Malaysia allows citizens who left the country to join ISIL to return, conditional upon compliance with checks, enforcement actions and a requisite prison sentence, followed by requirements to be placed under de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. This policy is informed and tailored by TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions. Since implementation, eight returning Malaysians have been arrested and convicted of terrorism-related offences. 18 Malaysians were repatriated from Syria and Iraq, including five women and 11 children, all of whom have been enrolled in rehabilitation programmes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="593. Malaysia’s CFT strategy is integrated with its overall counterterrorism strategy. The counterterrorism measures are intended to counter three main elements of terrorism, namely: i) the terrorist/terrorist organisation (addressed through enforcement and disruption operations underpinned by laws); ii) terrorist ideologies (countered through rehabilitation and de-radicalisation processes, including social media monitoring and counter-narrative efforts); and iii) financial capabilities (including TFS). 594. Malaysia has developed a set of national policies and strategies aimed at addressing terrorism and TF. First, Malaysia’s counter-terrorism strategy is anchored in a broad policy framework established by the National Security Council (NSC), which sets the direction for national security and counterterrorism efforts. The overarching National Security Policy 2021-2025 seeks to address security threats and emphasises a coordinated response across government levels and public engagement. This high-level policy is translated into actionable strategies for LEAs, which includes strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships to bolster international cooperation in countering terrorism and TF. Second, Malaysia has developed a national strategy to address TF through the establishment of the NCC (see IO.1). In August 2024, the NCC endorsed the new NCC Roadmap 2024-2026, which outlines a series of targeted initiatives to address and mitigate specific ML/TF risks, as identified by the NRA. As summarised in IO.1, the NRA is informed by TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions, as well as other information, including regional-level risk assessments. This Roadmap covers several key action plans related to CFT, as follows: Action Plan (AP) Description Enforcement [AP 3] Continue to investigate and prosecute TF in parallel with terrorism offences and preventive actions where practicable, aiming for successful conviction This initiative focuses on continuing and intensifying the enforcement of TF cases through enhancement of end-to-end investigation process, utilization of PPP, early-stage coordination with AGC to enhance prosecution and conviction rates. [AP 6] Continue to strengthen international cooperation in combatting transnational crimes, particularly in making active use of formal international cooperation This initiative seeks to institutionalize the use of formal channels, such as MLA, extradition or backed warrant as a standard practice for TF and other high risk crimes’ investigations. Preventive [AP 15] Continue to strengthen risk-based oversight on NPOs, including sharing of TF risks among regulators, LEAs and FIs leveraging on SCONPO platform This initiative aims to implement and reinforce preventive measures to deter abuse of NPOs for TF activities. It involves expanding the scope of oversight activities to include TF elements, increasing awareness and sharing between NPO regulators and promoting best practices. 595. Third, Malaysia’s Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, covering the period 2024-2028, is a strategic initiative to address the complex and evolving threats of violent extremism. The plan focuses on broader extremism risks and the rise of non-traditional extremism, for example, ethnically or racially motivated terrorism by lone-wolf actors. Details from past cases shape the Plan’s four pillars on prevention, enforcement, rehabilitation and reinforcement. This includes insight on recruitment patterns (e.g., gaming platforms, social media), radicalisation touchpoints and financial conduits used, as well as understanding of what motivates individuals to radicalise or be radicalised. 596. Malaysia also utilises TF intelligence to support multi-agency threat profiling and risk assessment. Intelligence gathered from TF investigations, prosecutions, and convictions—such as fund flows, payment platforms, and transactional anomalies—is shared across relevant agencies. These insights are systematically used to update the NRA, the national counter-terrorism framework, and responses to FTFs. 597. For example, Malaysia’s approach to managing returning FTFs involves a comprehensive strategy that includes assessment, rehabilitation, prosecution, and reintegration. The process aims to address the legal aspects of their actions abroad, and their rehabilitation into Malaysian society. This involves a psychological assessment, de-radicalisation programmes, and ongoing monitoring to prevent recidivism. In terms of repatriation, Malaysia allows citizens who left the country to join ISIL to return, conditional upon compliance with checks, enforcement actions and a requisite prison sentence, followed by requirements to be placed under de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. This policy is informed and tailored by TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions. Since implementation, eight returning Malaysians have been arrested and convicted of terrorism-related offences. 18 Malaysians were repatriated from Syria and Iraq, including five women and 11 children, all of whom have been enrolled in rehabilitation programmes." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 635. Large and medium sized FIs and VASPs have a sound understanding of their TFS obligations, including their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay (i.e., within 24 hours). Detailed guidance on TFS obligations in the AML/CFT/CPF Guidelines and outreach documents have supported FIs and VASPs’ understanding. In addition, as outlined above, FIs have demonstrated a good level of understanding of TFS obligations that extends to assets owned or controlled by designated entities. Screening against sanctions lists at the onboarding stage and as part of ongoing due diligence is a standard aspect of CDD processes and extends to BOs of legal persons and arrangements. 636. In the context of processing wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions on conducting transactions with designated persons and entities. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems that do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanction screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. Procedures for dealing with positive hits are generally clearly established and FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team during the onsite were able to describe these in detail. 637. As outlined above on the communication of designations, concerns arise in the timely implementation of TFS obligations for FIs and VASPs that do not use commercial databases that automatically update sanctions lists. While this is likely a small minority of FIs and VASPs, the lack of systematic updates can cause delays in TFS compliance. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 638. DNFBPs generally have a less mature understanding of their TF TFS screening obligations. In general, DNFBPs place greater emphasis on detecting positive matches of listed individuals pursuant to the UN and MoHA lists, and less attention to the obligation to detect and freeze assets of those acting on behalf or at their direction of designated persons and entities. This may reflect the lower risks in the DNFBP sectors and the fact that none of the DNFBPs met during the onsite had detected a designated person either at the onboarding stage or as part of ongoing due diligence. Malaysia and the Assessment Team have not identified TF risks associated with specific products or businesses of DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="10.4.1. FIs and VASPs 635. Large and medium sized FIs and VASPs have a sound understanding of their TFS obligations, including their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay (i.e., within 24 hours). Detailed guidance on TFS obligations in the AML/CFT/CPF Guidelines and outreach documents have supported FIs and VASPs’ understanding. In addition, as outlined above, FIs have demonstrated a good level of understanding of TFS obligations that extends to assets owned or controlled by designated entities. Screening against sanctions lists at the onboarding stage and as part of ongoing due diligence is a standard aspect of CDD processes and extends to BOs of legal persons and arrangements. 636. In the context of processing wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions on conducting transactions with designated persons and entities. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems that do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanction screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. Procedures for dealing with positive hits are generally clearly established and FIs and VASPs met by the Assessment Team during the onsite were able to describe these in detail. 637. As outlined above on the communication of designations, concerns arise in the timely implementation of TFS obligations for FIs and VASPs that do not use commercial databases that automatically update sanctions lists. While this is likely a small minority of FIs and VASPs, the lack of systematic updates can cause delays in TFS compliance. 10.4.2. DNFBPs 638. DNFBPs generally have a less mature understanding of their TF TFS screening obligations. In general, DNFBPs place greater emphasis on detecting positive matches of listed individuals pursuant to the UN and MoHA lists, and less attention to the obligation to detect and freeze assets of those acting on behalf or at their direction of designated persons and entities. This may reflect the lower risks in the DNFBP sectors and the fact that none of the DNFBPs met during the onsite had detected a designated person either at the onboarding stage or as part of ongoing due diligence. Malaysia and the Assessment Team have not identified TF risks associated with specific products or businesses of DNFBPs." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="673. All RIs are required to identify funds or assets held by designated individuals/entities as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. This requirement is further outlined in the PF TFS Directive issued by the Strategic Trade Secretariat of the MITI. As of February 2025, RIs have not frozen funds or other assets pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. Malaysia considers that this is consistent with its risks as assessed in its PFRAs. The Assessment Team finds it reasonable that no matches to UNSCR 1718 have resulted in asset or fund freezes by RIs. Given risk profile and context, it is conceivable that Malaysia has assets or funds of persons or entities designated by the UN or indirectly involved in complex PF structures that have not been identified. 674. As highlighted in IO.3 and IO.4, smaller FIs and DNFBPs face challenges in identifying BO, particularly involving complex structures or foreign ownership. This weakens Malaysia’s ability to detect and prevent sanctions evasion schemes, particularly those involving individuals acting on behalf of or exerting indirect control over designated persons or entities. The lack of accurate and up-to-date BO information enables sanctioned actors to exploit opaque corporate structures, such as layered ownership, nominee directors, and front companies, to disguise their involvement in financial transactions. This undermines the overall effectiveness of Malaysia’s CPF measures, particularly given the DPRK’s sophisticated sanctions evasion techniques as outlined in the final UN Panel of Experts Report of March 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="4" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="673. All RIs are required to identify funds or assets held by designated individuals/entities as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. This requirement is further outlined in the PF TFS Directive issued by the Strategic Trade Secretariat of the MITI. As of February 2025, RIs have not frozen funds or other assets pursuant to UNSCR 1718, and its successor resolutions. Malaysia considers that this is consistent with its risks as assessed in its PFRAs. The Assessment Team finds it reasonable that no matches to UNSCR 1718 have resulted in asset or fund freezes by RIs. Given risk profile and context, it is conceivable that Malaysia has assets or funds of persons or entities designated by the UN or indirectly involved in complex PF structures that have not been identified. 674. As highlighted in IO.3 and IO.4, smaller FIs and DNFBPs face challenges in identifying BO, particularly involving complex structures or foreign ownership. This weakens Malaysia’s ability to detect and prevent sanctions evasion schemes, particularly those involving individuals acting on behalf of or exerting indirect control over designated persons or entities. The lack of accurate and up-to-date BO information enables sanctioned actors to exploit opaque corporate structures, such as layered ownership, nominee directors, and front companies, to disguise their involvement in financial transactions. This undermines the overall effectiveness of Malaysia’s CPF measures, particularly given the DPRK’s sophisticated sanctions evasion techniques as outlined in the final UN Panel of Experts Report of March 2024." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="149. A strength of Malaysia’s AML/CFT system is its robust domestic coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels. Since 1999, the NCC is responsible for formulating national policies and initiatives, providing advice and setting strategic directions in relation to AML/CFT. As of February 2025, NCC membership has expanded to include representation from 17 agencies and ministries (as illustrated below). Figure 1.2. NCC composition Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 150. Malaysia’s AML/CFT policies are anchored on domestic cooperation and coordination amongst competent authorities through the NCC and its five sub-committees. [49] Recent key outcomes from these committees include updating the risk assessments, joint supervision exercises, publication of red flag and typology reports and training. 151. Various ministries, agencies, and committees are also involved in counterterrorism and TF strategies outside of the NCC framework. These committees complement the NCC. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) located within the Prime Minister’s Department, coordinates policy implementation for Malaysia’s national security and develops the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (see IO.9). The Committee on TF TFS reviews potential and existing designations under UNSCR 1373 and advises the MoHA accordingly (see IO.10 for details). 152. Cooperation between supervisory authorities, SRBs (e.g., MIA), and industry associations is key to developing and implementing AML/CFT policies for FIs and DNFBPs. BNM and SRBs have held multiple engagements to discuss risks, policy impacts, and implementation issues. These include sharing common gaps, best practices, and enforcement actions. Topics such as control measures, STR expectations, and TFS implementation are regularly addressed. SRBs also play a key role in raising awareness of identified risks and mitigation measures among their members. Footnotes [49] The respective mandate of the NCC Sub-committees includes: a. Financial Intelligence, Law Enforcement &amp; Prosecution: sharing information, addressing legal, policy, and operational issues on intelligence, investigation and prosecution of ML/TF offences. b. Financial Sector Supervision: aligning supervisors’ measures, deepening ML/TF risk understanding, and strengthening supervision/monitoring. c. DNFBPs: identify and address operational and policy issues related to AML/CFT obligations, including sharing of good practices for supervision, facilitate ML/TF risk assessments, capacity building and information sharing d. Legal Person &amp; Legal Arrangement: conduct risk assessments, and review legislation, policy and initiatives in relation to BO transparency e. NPOs: conduct risk assessment, outreach program, and review legislation in relation to AML/CFT." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="149. A strength of Malaysia’s AML/CFT system is its robust domestic coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues at both the policy and operational levels. Since 1999, the NCC is responsible for formulating national policies and initiatives, providing advice and setting strategic directions in relation to AML/CFT. As of February 2025, NCC membership has expanded to include representation from 17 agencies and ministries (as illustrated below). Figure 1.2. NCC composition Figures can't be displayed, please consult the original report. 150. Malaysia’s AML/CFT policies are anchored on domestic cooperation and coordination amongst competent authorities through the NCC and its five sub-committees. [49] Recent key outcomes from these committees include updating the risk assessments, joint supervision exercises, publication of red flag and typology reports and training. 151. Various ministries, agencies, and committees are also involved in counterterrorism and TF strategies outside of the NCC framework. These committees complement the NCC. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) located within the Prime Minister’s Department, coordinates policy implementation for Malaysia’s national security and develops the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (see IO.9). The Committee on TF TFS reviews potential and existing designations under UNSCR 1373 and advises the MoHA accordingly (see IO.10 for details). 152. Cooperation between supervisory authorities, SRBs (e.g., MIA), and industry associations is key to developing and implementing AML/CFT policies for FIs and DNFBPs. BNM and SRBs have held multiple engagements to discuss risks, policy impacts, and implementation issues. These include sharing common gaps, best practices, and enforcement actions. Topics such as control measures, STR expectations, and TFS implementation are regularly addressed. SRBs also play a key role in raising awareness of identified risks and mitigation measures among their members. Footnotes [49] The respective mandate of the NCC Sub-committees includes: a. Financial Intelligence, Law Enforcement &amp; Prosecution: sharing information, addressing legal, policy, and operational issues on intelligence, investigation and prosecution of ML/TF offences. b. Financial Sector Supervision: aligning supervisors’ measures, deepening ML/TF risk understanding, and strengthening supervision/monitoring. c. DNFBPs: identify and address operational and policy issues related to AML/CFT obligations, including sharing of good practices for supervision, facilitate ML/TF risk assessments, capacity building and information sharing d. Legal Person &amp; Legal Arrangement: conduct risk assessments, and review legislation, policy and initiatives in relation to BO transparency e. NPOs: conduct risk assessment, outreach program, and review legislation in relation to AML/CFT." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="272. The BNM, SC and LFSA apply a risk-based approach to supervision respectively following their own supervisory framework. The supervisors produce annual supervision plans, which prioritise the highest risk areas and enable effective allocation of supervisory resources within the authority. 273. Supervision generally consists of a mix of offsite, onsite and thematic inspections, which are well interlinked. Offsite supervision consists of desktop reviews on all FIs and VASPs, including lower-risk institutions, to perform individual FI risk assessments and identify areas of concern. The desktop review is conducted based on information periodically submitted by FIs, which includes quantitative data on risks, qualitative questionnaire on regulatory self-assessment, AML/CFT internal audit reports, etc. Results from offsite supervision are generally fed into onsite inspection plans and used to target specific areas of focus. Onsite supervision focuses on firms’ risk assessments, completion of CDD and record keeping, promptness of STR submissions, robustness of AML/CFT compliance programme, including policies and procedures, as well as effectiveness of customer risk profiling, sanction screening and transaction monitoring. There is a particular focus placed on the design of the firm’s risk control framework and operational implementation, which enables supervisors to obtain a good understanding of the firm’s risk and controls framework. 274. Thematic reviews are carried out by specialist AML/CFT supervisors. They generally include offsite questionnaires to all FIs participating in the reviews and onsite validation for about 10-15 institutions. As a part of annual supervisory plan, the supervisors select themes for the review based on material threats identified from the NRA, emerging threats from recent typologies, and any other material AML/CFT controls. The BNM publishes the outcome of the reviews to enable FIs to benchmark their processes against those identified as best practices in the thematic reviews. This mix of activity (offsite, onsite and thematic reviews) generally enables the supervisors to apply the most appropriate tool based on specific situations, resources available and risk to be addressed. Box 3.4.Thematic review on anti-bribery and corruption In 2020, the NRA identified corruption as one of the top high-risk crimes. In response, the Financial Sector Sub-Committee of the NCC included it in its action plan, requiring all financial sector supervisory authorities to conduct a sector-wide thematic review. This review was carried out in 2023 using two approaches: first, a survey was issued to all institutions under the respective sectors; second, on-site validations were conducted on a selected sample of FIs. Prior to the review, supervisors engaged with the MACC to understand its relevant regulations on FIs, risk assessment methodology and approach, as well as MACC’s general assessment of FIs’ compliance and implementation of control measures. The thematic review led to various actions and communications undertaken, including: - Issuance of supervisory letters to FIs identified with gaps - Issuance of Dear CEO/specification letter (letter to industry) highlighting good practices observed and providing clarity on supervisory expectations - Sharing of outcomes of the overall ABC thematic review within the sector via industry networking platforms or industry associations - Sharing of relevant outcomes and observations of the review with MACC. 275. All FI supervisors conduct ad-hoc onsite examinations to respond to emerging risks that surface through enforcement actions by LEAs, adverse news, referrals or ongoing events affecting the FIs and VASPs. 276. The BNM has 241 general supervisors and 15 dedicated AML supervisors for banks and 81 general supervisors and four dedicated AML supervisors for ITOs. The general supervisors oversee overall control functions of the FIs including prudential requirements. 277. For banks, the general supervisors conduct onsite examinations on all the onshore banks through the year, with different intensity applied according to the risk levels as shown in the below table. Through the year, examinations involve business activity reviews and branch reviews. The business activity reviews cover operational management of AML/CFT measures and internal controls while branch reviews cover the former aspect only. While the general supervisors appear to have sufficient knowledge and resources to examine the implementation of AML/CFT obligations, they do not seem equipped with sufficient expertise to carry out examinations of some technical areas, particularly when they require evaluation against industry benchmarks (e.g., transaction monitoring scenarios, sanction screening system rules, customer risk scoring models, etc). The dedicated AML supervisors hold this knowledge and expertise, but their participation in the onsite examinations is limited, generally to annual risk meetings. Table 3.1. Supervisory Intensity for Onshore Banks Institutional Risk Level High Medium High Medium Business Activity Review (average) 5 per year 4 per year 3 per year Branch Review (minimum) 5 branches every 2 years 2 branches every 2 years 1 branch every 2 years 278. In addition to thematic reviews and ad-hoc onsite examinations, BNM’s general supervisors and dedicated AML supervisors do undertake intensified supervisory monitoring on banks with significant AML/CFT deficiencies through a “higher risk programme” where deep dive reviews, including effectiveness of systems and models, are conducted on specific areas of concern on an annual basis. Nine banking groups have been placed under this programme since 2018, of which, three banking groups have graduated from the programme. The banks met during onsite noted that they had periodically had to challenge some of the findings by general supervisors and raise them with the AML/CFT team. The BNM views it as a valuable control mechanism to ensure supervisory findings are robust and prescribed actions are proportionate. 279. All onshore banks receive onsite examinations at least annually, which is commensurate with the highest risk sector. However, the granularity of onsite inspections for banks, especially those that are not included in the higher-risk programme, should be further improved to ensure they are implementing effective risk-based AML/CFT measures. 280. For ITOs, the frequency of inspections is determined depending on the risk of each institution. Generally, high-risk and medium-high risk institutions are subjected to annual onsite inspections. Nearly all AML/CFT controls are reviewed as part of the annual inspection process over the course of three years. Medium and low risk institutions receive onsite inspections that cover all AML/CFT requirements over three or four-year cycles, but the frequency of the reviews within these cycles is not fixed. The duration of onsite inspections varies but is generally two to three weeks for a team of four to five supervisors. As these inspections could cover all AML/CFT measures during one examination every three to four years, they are inherently less detailed than inspections at higher risk institutions. Nonetheless, the Assessment Team deems this to be appropriate and in line with a risk-based approach, especially when aligned with offsite and other supervisory engagement (e.g., data collection exercises). 281. For MSB and DPI sectors, the BNM has 52 general supervisors without any dedicated AML supervisors. They conduct onsite examinations for high-risk and medium-high risk institutions on a three-to-five-year cycle. As a part of offsite supervision, the BNM relies significantly on technology as an effective way to identify high risk areas and changes in operations that could indicate regulatory issues or heightened risk. The BNM is at an early stage of considering how this technology could be used in other areas and sectors and sees it as an important supervisory approach. 282. For CMIs including VASPs, the SC has 99 general supervisors without any dedicated AML supervisors. Deep dive analysis is conducted onsite for high-risk institutions, where the supervisors examine the specific issues which contributed to the high-risk rating. Often the issues that have raised the risk level are referred to as “gaps” and once addressed, the risk rating is reduced again. The SC conducts AML/CFT specific onsite inspection annually for medium-high risk institutions. For most onshore VASPs, supervision is done offsite, with only seven onsite inspections since 2020 (three of which took place in 2023). This appears to be proportionate given the size of the sector and type of activity conducted by these entities. The SC uses blockchain analytics as part of its supervisory toolkit and monitors compliance with the Travel Rule. 283. The LFSA has 16 general supervisors and four dedicated AML supervisors for Labuan FIs including VASPs. The high-risk institutions are subject to annual onsite inspections and medium-high risk institutions are examined over a three-year timeframe. In addition, pooled resources from both general and AML supervisors conduct cross sector thematic reviews, which are driven by the outcome of the NRA. The number of supervisory inspections grew for the period of 2020 to 2024. Notably, onsite examination for Labuan money brokers increased by 117%, (of which 23% related to VASPs), followed by Labuan fund managers (60%) and Labuan Banks (53%). However, this led to 20 supervisors conducting a total of 74 checklist-based onsite examinations in 2024, suggesting resources could be increased to further support the intensity of supervisory activity. Table 3.2. Number of general and specialist AML/CFT supervisors allocated to each sector Supervisor Registration and licensing team General Supervision Specialist AML Supervision BNM (banks) 35 241 15 BNM (insurance) 15 66 4 BNM (MSBs/DPI issuers) 19 52 - SC (all sectors including VASPs) - 99 - LFSA (all sectors including VASPs) 9 16 4 284. For other financial service providers and NBFIs, supervisory activities are undertaken by DNFBP supervisors of the BNM guided by the DNFBP Risk-Based Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) and are mostly limited to offsite inspections. 285. The supervisory focus and approach were adjusted during the COVID-19 pandemic. The supervisory authorities issued additional guidance on AML/CFT implementation during the pandemic period and conducted thematic reviews in response to rising trend of online scams, fraud, and mule accounts taking advantage of the shift towards non-face-to-face financial services. 286. While risk-based supervision is generally applied across sectors to ensure FIs and VASPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements, it could be enhanced to ensure the highest-risk sectors are receiving the highest level of scrutiny. For example, BNM’s AML/CFT supervision of banks should be notably more intense than for other sectors, given they are the highest risk sector in the NRA. Furthermore, the allocation of supervisory resources between supervisory authorities can be improved to be fully risk-based. For example, Labuan FIs have approximately one sixth of the number of supervisors of the SC despite supervising sectors that share some features in terms of number of entities and risk. In addition, it is unclear why there are specific AML supervisors for offshore VASPs, but not for onshore VASPs and whether risk was considered when determining this approach. Table 3.3. Number of onsite examinations and entities by sectors Sector (no of entities) Net ML Risk (2023 NRA) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 BNM sectors Banks (61) High 60 60 60 59 58 61 ITOs (30) Medium 25 21 27 15 19 30 MSB (258) Medium 77 17 2 22 21 20 DPI (53) Medium 2 1 0 8 18 1 Other financial service providers/NBFI (4292) Low to Medium 31 0 9 10 7 6 SC Sectors CMIs (174) Medium-High 24 21 22 19 33 38 Non-VASPs (162) Medium-High 24 20 20 19 32 35 VASPs (12) Medium-High 0 1 2 0 1 3 LFSA Sectors Labuan Banks (72) Medium 14 14 27 23 20 23 Labuan ITOs (60) Low 9 22 22 17 11 17 Labuan Money Brokers (102) Medium-High 9 12 23 19 25 26 Labuan Fund Managers (49) Medium 6 5 6 1 8 8 Table 3.4. Number of entities covered by onsite examinations Sector Number of entities covered by the onsite examinations between 2019 and 2024 (number of entities as of 2024 [52] ) High ML Risk Medium High ML Risk Medium ML Risk Low ML Risk BNM Sectors Banks 14 (14) 21 (21) 26 (26) 0 (0) ITOs 4 (4) 6 (6) 10 (10) 10 (10) MSB 39 (13) 125 (160) 25 (73) 0 (3) DPI 5 (4) 19 (27) 4 (12) 0 (4) Other financial service providers/NBFIs 1 (1) 2(2) 1 (1) 2(2) SC Sectors CMI 3 (1) 20 (13) 48 (82) 16 (72) LFSA Sectors Labuan Banks 1 (1) 5 (5) 28 (35) 24 (31) Labuan ITOs 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (13) 27 (47) Labuan Money Brokers 2 (2) 8 (8) 30 (35) 46 (57) Labuan fund managers 1 (1) 2 (2) 14 (26) 7 (20) Footnotes" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="272. The BNM, SC and LFSA apply a risk-based approach to supervision respectively following their own supervisory framework. The supervisors produce annual supervision plans, which prioritise the highest risk areas and enable effective allocation of supervisory resources within the authority. 273. Supervision generally consists of a mix of offsite, onsite and thematic inspections, which are well interlinked. Offsite supervision consists of desktop reviews on all FIs and VASPs, including lower-risk institutions, to perform individual FI risk assessments and identify areas of concern. The desktop review is conducted based on information periodically submitted by FIs, which includes quantitative data on risks, qualitative questionnaire on regulatory self-assessment, AML/CFT internal audit reports, etc. Results from offsite supervision are generally fed into onsite inspection plans and used to target specific areas of focus. Onsite supervision focuses on firms’ risk assessments, completion of CDD and record keeping, promptness of STR submissions, robustness of AML/CFT compliance programme, including policies and procedures, as well as effectiveness of customer risk profiling, sanction screening and transaction monitoring. There is a particular focus placed on the design of the firm’s risk control framework and operational implementation, which enables supervisors to obtain a good understanding of the firm’s risk and controls framework. 274. Thematic reviews are carried out by specialist AML/CFT supervisors. They generally include offsite questionnaires to all FIs participating in the reviews and onsite validation for about 10-15 institutions. As a part of annual supervisory plan, the supervisors select themes for the review based on material threats identified from the NRA, emerging threats from recent typologies, and any other material AML/CFT controls. The BNM publishes the outcome of the reviews to enable FIs to benchmark their processes against those identified as best practices in the thematic reviews. This mix of activity (offsite, onsite and thematic reviews) generally enables the supervisors to apply the most appropriate tool based on specific situations, resources available and risk to be addressed. Box 3.4.Thematic review on anti-bribery and corruption In 2020, the NRA identified corruption as one of the top high-risk crimes. In response, the Financial Sector Sub-Committee of the NCC included it in its action plan, requiring all financial sector supervisory authorities to conduct a sector-wide thematic review. This review was carried out in 2023 using two approaches: first, a survey was issued to all institutions under the respective sectors; second, on-site validations were conducted on a selected sample of FIs. Prior to the review, supervisors engaged with the MACC to understand its relevant regulations on FIs, risk assessment methodology and approach, as well as MACC’s general assessment of FIs’ compliance and implementation of control measures. The thematic review led to various actions and communications undertaken, including: - Issuance of supervisory letters to FIs identified with gaps - Issuance of Dear CEO/specification letter (letter to industry) highlighting good practices observed and providing clarity on supervisory expectations - Sharing of outcomes of the overall ABC thematic review within the sector via industry networking platforms or industry associations - Sharing of relevant outcomes and observations of the review with MACC. 275. All FI supervisors conduct ad-hoc onsite examinations to respond to emerging risks that surface through enforcement actions by LEAs, adverse news, referrals or ongoing events affecting the FIs and VASPs. 276. The BNM has 241 general supervisors and 15 dedicated AML supervisors for banks and 81 general supervisors and four dedicated AML supervisors for ITOs. The general supervisors oversee overall control functions of the FIs including prudential requirements. 277. For banks, the general supervisors conduct onsite examinations on all the onshore banks through the year, with different intensity applied according to the risk levels as shown in the below table. Through the year, examinations involve business activity reviews and branch reviews. The business activity reviews cover operational management of AML/CFT measures and internal controls while branch reviews cover the former aspect only. While the general supervisors appear to have sufficient knowledge and resources to examine the implementation of AML/CFT obligations, they do not seem equipped with sufficient expertise to carry out examinations of some technical areas, particularly when they require evaluation against industry benchmarks (e.g., transaction monitoring scenarios, sanction screening system rules, customer risk scoring models, etc). The dedicated AML supervisors hold this knowledge and expertise, but their participation in the onsite examinations is limited, generally to annual risk meetings. Table 3.1. Supervisory Intensity for Onshore Banks Institutional Risk Level High Medium High Medium Business Activity Review (average) 5 per year 4 per year 3 per year Branch Review (minimum) 5 branches every 2 years 2 branches every 2 years 1 branch every 2 years 278. In addition to thematic reviews and ad-hoc onsite examinations, BNM’s general supervisors and dedicated AML supervisors do undertake intensified supervisory monitoring on banks with significant AML/CFT deficiencies through a “higher risk programme” where deep dive reviews, including effectiveness of systems and models, are conducted on specific areas of concern on an annual basis. Nine banking groups have been placed under this programme since 2018, of which, three banking groups have graduated from the programme. The banks met during onsite noted that they had periodically had to challenge some of the findings by general supervisors and raise them with the AML/CFT team. The BNM views it as a valuable control mechanism to ensure supervisory findings are robust and prescribed actions are proportionate. 279. All onshore banks receive onsite examinations at least annually, which is commensurate with the highest risk sector. However, the granularity of onsite inspections for banks, especially those that are not included in the higher-risk programme, should be further improved to ensure they are implementing effective risk-based AML/CFT measures. 280. For ITOs, the frequency of inspections is determined depending on the risk of each institution. Generally, high-risk and medium-high risk institutions are subjected to annual onsite inspections. Nearly all AML/CFT controls are reviewed as part of the annual inspection process over the course of three years. Medium and low risk institutions receive onsite inspections that cover all AML/CFT requirements over three or four-year cycles, but the frequency of the reviews within these cycles is not fixed. The duration of onsite inspections varies but is generally two to three weeks for a team of four to five supervisors. As these inspections could cover all AML/CFT measures during one examination every three to four years, they are inherently less detailed than inspections at higher risk institutions. Nonetheless, the Assessment Team deems this to be appropriate and in line with a risk-based approach, especially when aligned with offsite and other supervisory engagement (e.g., data collection exercises). 281. For MSB and DPI sectors, the BNM has 52 general supervisors without any dedicated AML supervisors. They conduct onsite examinations for high-risk and medium-high risk institutions on a three-to-five-year cycle. As a part of offsite supervision, the BNM relies significantly on technology as an effective way to identify high risk areas and changes in operations that could indicate regulatory issues or heightened risk. The BNM is at an early stage of considering how this technology could be used in other areas and sectors and sees it as an important supervisory approach. 282. For CMIs including VASPs, the SC has 99 general supervisors without any dedicated AML supervisors. Deep dive analysis is conducted onsite for high-risk institutions, where the supervisors examine the specific issues which contributed to the high-risk rating. Often the issues that have raised the risk level are referred to as “gaps” and once addressed, the risk rating is reduced again. The SC conducts AML/CFT specific onsite inspection annually for medium-high risk institutions. For most onshore VASPs, supervision is done offsite, with only seven onsite inspections since 2020 (three of which took place in 2023). This appears to be proportionate given the size of the sector and type of activity conducted by these entities. The SC uses blockchain analytics as part of its supervisory toolkit and monitors compliance with the Travel Rule. 283. The LFSA has 16 general supervisors and four dedicated AML supervisors for Labuan FIs including VASPs. The high-risk institutions are subject to annual onsite inspections and medium-high risk institutions are examined over a three-year timeframe. In addition, pooled resources from both general and AML supervisors conduct cross sector thematic reviews, which are driven by the outcome of the NRA. The number of supervisory inspections grew for the period of 2020 to 2024. Notably, onsite examination for Labuan money brokers increased by 117%, (of which 23% related to VASPs), followed by Labuan fund managers (60%) and Labuan Banks (53%). However, this led to 20 supervisors conducting a total of 74 checklist-based onsite examinations in 2024, suggesting resources could be increased to further support the intensity of supervisory activity. Table 3.2. Number of general and specialist AML/CFT supervisors allocated to each sector Supervisor Registration and licensing team General Supervision Specialist AML Supervision BNM (banks) 35 241 15 BNM (insurance) 15 66 4 BNM (MSBs/DPI issuers) 19 52 - SC (all sectors including VASPs) - 99 - LFSA (all sectors including VASPs) 9 16 4 284. For other financial service providers and NBFIs, supervisory activities are undertaken by DNFBP supervisors of the BNM guided by the DNFBP Risk-Based Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) and are mostly limited to offsite inspections. 285. The supervisory focus and approach were adjusted during the COVID-19 pandemic. The supervisory authorities issued additional guidance on AML/CFT implementation during the pandemic period and conducted thematic reviews in response to rising trend of online scams, fraud, and mule accounts taking advantage of the shift towards non-face-to-face financial services. 286. While risk-based supervision is generally applied across sectors to ensure FIs and VASPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements, it could be enhanced to ensure the highest-risk sectors are receiving the highest level of scrutiny. For example, BNM’s AML/CFT supervision of banks should be notably more intense than for other sectors, given they are the highest risk sector in the NRA. Furthermore, the allocation of supervisory resources between supervisory authorities can be improved to be fully risk-based. For example, Labuan FIs have approximately one sixth of the number of supervisors of the SC despite supervising sectors that share some features in terms of number of entities and risk. In addition, it is unclear why there are specific AML supervisors for offshore VASPs, but not for onshore VASPs and whether risk was considered when determining this approach. Table 3.3. Number of onsite examinations and entities by sectors Sector (no of entities) Net ML Risk (2023 NRA) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 BNM sectors Banks (61) High 60 60 60 59 58 61 ITOs (30) Medium 25 21 27 15 19 30 MSB (258) Medium 77 17 2 22 21 20 DPI (53) Medium 2 1 0 8 18 1 Other financial service providers/NBFI (4292) Low to Medium 31 0 9 10 7 6 SC Sectors CMIs (174) Medium-High 24 21 22 19 33 38 Non-VASPs (162) Medium-High 24 20 20 19 32 35 VASPs (12) Medium-High 0 1 2 0 1 3 LFSA Sectors Labuan Banks (72) Medium 14 14 27 23 20 23 Labuan ITOs (60) Low 9 22 22 17 11 17 Labuan Money Brokers (102) Medium-High 9 12 23 19 25 26 Labuan Fund Managers (49) Medium 6 5 6 1 8 8 Table 3.4. Number of entities covered by onsite examinations Sector Number of entities covered by the onsite examinations between 2019 and 2024 (number of entities as of 2024 [52] ) High ML Risk Medium High ML Risk Medium ML Risk Low ML Risk BNM Sectors Banks 14 (14) 21 (21) 26 (26) 0 (0) ITOs 4 (4) 6 (6) 10 (10) 10 (10) MSB 39 (13) 125 (160) 25 (73) 0 (3) DPI 5 (4) 19 (27) 4 (12) 0 (4) Other financial service providers/NBFIs 1 (1) 2(2) 1 (1) 2(2) SC Sectors CMI 3 (1) 20 (13) 48 (82) 16 (72) LFSA Sectors Labuan Banks 1 (1) 5 (5) 28 (35) 24 (31) Labuan ITOs 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (13) 27 (47) Labuan Money Brokers 2 (2) 8 (8) 30 (35) 46 (57) Labuan fund managers 1 (1) 2 (2) 14 (26) 7 (20) Footnotes" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="340. Malaysia applies a risk-based approach to the supervision of its large DNFBP population. It recognises the importance of supervision technology as a tool to assist in the effective supervision of its approximately 20 000 DNFBPs and has incorporated it into its approach since 2019. For example, when planning for onsite inspections, supervisors use the DNFBP centralised analytics platform (DCAP) to consider the comprehensive profiles of the institutions to be inspected and enables BNM to perform data analytics on a single RI or a particular sector using up-to-date information. The DCAP system is used to produce supervision plans for onsite supervision. DCAP is maintained by BNM and the identification of Higher-Risk Reporting Institutions (HRRI) within each sector for onsite inspections is conducted every two years. Annual supervisory planning determines the entities that will be subject to specific supervisory activity. Plans are developed based on the inherent sectoral and individual ML/TF risk, responses to offsite supervision (DCR and questionnaires), previous supervision findings, complaints and the availability of supervisory resources within BNM and the relevant regulatory/licensing authorities. Higher risk DNFBPs, identified through the DNFBP Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) process, are generally targeted for the most intensive supervision, including onsite inspections. However, the number of firms identified as higher risk is not consistent with the risk of the sectors, or the number of RIs within them (see table below). For example, in 2020 only 7 out of 1 859 DPMS and 45 out of 8 714 lawyers were identified as HRRIs. In addition, in some cases there were more onsite inspections in lower risk sectors with fewer HRRIs than in higher risk sectors with more HRRIs. For example, in 2020 there were 20 onsite inspections in the medium risk Labuan trust company sector, which identified five HRRIs. In the same year, there were 20 onsite inspections across the high-risk legal sector, which had 46 HRRIs. This suggests that resources are not always allocated to the highest risk areas. Box 4.3.Technology solutions for DNFBP supervision “Suptech” plays a pivotal role in the supervision and monitoring the diverse DNFBP sector in Malaysia. The adoption of Suptech in the DNFBP sector began in 2019, guided by a roadmap, and has proven effective in supporting the planning and execution of risk-based supervision. This has enabled more efficient oversight of a large and diverse sector. BNM has continued to integrate enhanced, technology-driven initiatives across various stages of the supervisory process to improve efficiency and strengthen oversight of DNFBPs, as outlined below: (a) DCAP: Acts as a single source-of-truth through the digitalisation of data and consolidation of modular initiatives into a centralised location. The platform offers multiple features including automated monitoring and dynamic dashboards built upon past supervisory activities to provide oversight of the change in industry trends and vulnerabilities. (b) HRRI: Analytic-driven identification of firms from each DNFBP sectors that could be more vulnerable to ML/TF risk and subject to most intensive supervision. (c) DNFBP Portal: An automated portal for DCRs. It contains data analytics, ‘live traffic’ monitoring, policy query chatbot (to respond on common and general AML/CFT policy queries, and direct to supervisors for additional policy queries) and auto-issuance of compliance report card (contains overview of compliance standing and areas to be improved) to the RIs. Data submitted through the sector-specific DCR questionnaire are analysed via an algorithm and used to facilitate supervisors in assessing control measures of the DNFBPs and for HRRI identification. (d) Statistics dashboard: Automated compilation and visualisation of payment statistics to help supervisors monitor trends and patterns of casino (i.e., historical trends of transaction value and volume, trends and profiles of customers, materiality assessment of different products, etc.). (e) Awareness Platform: Centralised platform containing awareness materials and instructional videos on AML/CFT requirements in multiple languages, and sector specific approaches. 341. SRBs do not have access to the DCAP database, but the BNM notifies the MIA and CCM of high-risk RIs within the company secretary and accountant sectors, to plan supervisory activities in a commensurate way. It is not clear how the system will be maintained as more supervision moves to SRBs and whether direct access will be facilitated. Table 4.2. Number of high-risk DNFBPs (and Higher-Risk Reporting Institutions) per population DNFBP population in 2024 Risk 2019 HRRI population (onsites) 2020 HRRI population (onsites) 2021-2023 HRRI population (onsites) 2024-2025 Feb HRRI population (onsites) DPMS (2,390) High 55 (30) 7 (6) 120 (62) 52 (36) Lawyers (9,967) High 143 (24) 46 (20) 137 (127) 56 (75) Company Secretaries (3,652) M-High 0 (0) 2 (0) 11 (25) 68 (11) Accountants (2,517) M-High 4 (0) 1 (0) 8 (11) 3 (31) Registered Estate Agent (1,378) M-High 6 (24) 2 (0) 10 (16) 69 (19) Trust Companies (52) Low 3 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 1 (7) Labuan Trust Companies (67) Medium 4 (12) 5 (20) 17 (44) 7 (36) 342. DCAP is largely informed by the DCR template submitted by DNFBPs through a fully automated platform. This enables real-time data analytics and automatic generation of compliance report cards. This is an important way of collecting required information to inform Malaysia’s risk-based approach and, at the same time, support the areas that need remediation by RIs. Supervisors have sought feedback and focus group sessions to further enhance the DCR template since 2022, resulting in specific sectoral and firm-based questionnaires and a comprehensive information kit to guide the DNFBPs in responding to the questions. Nevertheless, many DNFBPs met during the onsite noted that the template is general and does not take account of sectoral differences. As a result, questions and responses can be interpreted differently, which may impact its usefulness and overall understanding of risk. 343. The supervision of DNFBPs generally falls under the dedicated DNFBP team within BNM, with a total 22 dedicated AML/CFT supervisors, who are specific sector specialists. For the supervision of LFSA, there is a total 20 supervisors, comprising four dedicated AML/CFT supervisors and five supervisors focused on Labuan trust companies. The CCM and MIA have recently assigned dedicated staff for supervision of company secretaries and accountants, in line with the approach to delegate more AML/CFT supervision to SRBs. 344. Onshore company secretaries and trust companies have historically been subject to supervision by the BNM. Since 2017, BNM and CCM carried out 47 joint onsite inspections on these entities. In 2022, the CCM and BNM signed an agreement to strengthen collaboration on oversight of company secretaries and trust companies. Since then, there have been 11 joint examinations, and the CCM has conducted some independent AML/CFT/CPF supervision of entities in these sectors. The CCM is currently in the process of expanding its resource to fully take on this task in the future. BNM has also conducted approximately 21 joint examinations with MIA since 2023, and the MBC is currently in the process of expanding its resource and building its supervisory capabilities to eventually take on AML/CFT for the legal sector. Onsite inspections across these sectors are complemented by offsite supervision, thematic reviews and engagement and training delivered by the SRBs. While delegating or reallocating supervision to SRB supervisors may deliver certain benefits (e.g., SRB understanding of the sector), Malaysia should ensure that the quality, intensity and frequency of supervision is improved and not reduced, especially in higher risk sectors such as lawyers. 345. Based on the SRA conducted in 2020 and 2024, the casino was assessed as Medium-High ML risk. Consequently, BNM has conducted routine AML/CFT onsite assessments every two years. The casino made notable steps to enhance its preventive measures in recent years, particularly enhancing technology to assist with KYC and transaction monitoring. 346. Due to strict measures implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, supervision of the DPMS sector was largely conducted through offsite supervision during this period. Although there was an increase in onsite inspections in 2023 (54), the overall number of onsite inspections across this sector has been low even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and since the lifting of measures. This is a concern given that the net risk has gradually increased from a lower level in 2013 to medium-high, the fact there are weaker market entry controls for the sector and some DPMS in East Malaysia were only invoked as RIs in 2024. The number of onsite inspections in several other sectors (e.g., accountants and trust company sectors) is also very limited and mostly covered by offsite supervision. In addition, it is not clear how intensive the onsite and offsite inspections in some sectors are, given their annual high numbers and the number of supervisors available (e.g., 73 onsite inspections for lawyers in 2023 and 6 227 offsite examinations for lawyers in 2024). The Assessment Team does recognise that Malaysia’s advancements in Suptech have improved the efficiency and quality of supervisory activities, which may help compensate for some of these low numbers. Table 4.3. Number of onsite and offsite inspections 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Onsite Examination Casino 1 - - 1 - 1 - DPMS 30 6 6 3 53 24 12 Lawyer 24 20 22 32 73 75 - Company Secretary [54] - - 10 5 10 11 - Accountant [55] - - 1 - 10 31 - REA 24 - 3 3 13 19 - Trust Company - 1 - - - 7 - Labuan Trust Company 12 20 8 13 23 36 - Offsite Examination Casino [56] 2 2 2 2 2 2 - DPMS - 334 479 727 4 812 - Lawyer - 1 212 3 719 5 540 5 6 227 - Company Secretary - 1 060 1 962 3 039 5 3 316 - Accountant - 740 1 194 2 323 - 2 808 - REA - 419 454 532 - 348 - Trust Company - 33 37 - - - - Labuan Trust Company [57] 305 248 252 256 462 345 67 347. The supervision of Labuan trust companies is part of the overall supervision of Labuan RIs (including FIs) and is a priority for the LFSA. Given the important role of Labuan trust companies in company formation and as gatekeepers to the financial services sectors in Labuan IBFC, these RIs are subjected to more intensive onsite or engagement sessions, including annually. Footnotes [54] Includes joint onsite inspections [55] Includes joint onsite inspections [56] Includes multiple submissions [57] Includes multiple submissions" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="340. Malaysia applies a risk-based approach to the supervision of its large DNFBP population. It recognises the importance of supervision technology as a tool to assist in the effective supervision of its approximately 20 000 DNFBPs and has incorporated it into its approach since 2019. For example, when planning for onsite inspections, supervisors use the DNFBP centralised analytics platform (DCAP) to consider the comprehensive profiles of the institutions to be inspected and enables BNM to perform data analytics on a single RI or a particular sector using up-to-date information. The DCAP system is used to produce supervision plans for onsite supervision. DCAP is maintained by BNM and the identification of Higher-Risk Reporting Institutions (HRRI) within each sector for onsite inspections is conducted every two years. Annual supervisory planning determines the entities that will be subject to specific supervisory activity. Plans are developed based on the inherent sectoral and individual ML/TF risk, responses to offsite supervision (DCR and questionnaires), previous supervision findings, complaints and the availability of supervisory resources within BNM and the relevant regulatory/licensing authorities. Higher risk DNFBPs, identified through the DNFBP Supervisory Framework (D’SuRF) process, are generally targeted for the most intensive supervision, including onsite inspections. However, the number of firms identified as higher risk is not consistent with the risk of the sectors, or the number of RIs within them (see table below). For example, in 2020 only 7 out of 1 859 DPMS and 45 out of 8 714 lawyers were identified as HRRIs. In addition, in some cases there were more onsite inspections in lower risk sectors with fewer HRRIs than in higher risk sectors with more HRRIs. For example, in 2020 there were 20 onsite inspections in the medium risk Labuan trust company sector, which identified five HRRIs. In the same year, there were 20 onsite inspections across the high-risk legal sector, which had 46 HRRIs. This suggests that resources are not always allocated to the highest risk areas. Box 4.3.Technology solutions for DNFBP supervision “Suptech” plays a pivotal role in the supervision and monitoring the diverse DNFBP sector in Malaysia. The adoption of Suptech in the DNFBP sector began in 2019, guided by a roadmap, and has proven effective in supporting the planning and execution of risk-based supervision. This has enabled more efficient oversight of a large and diverse sector. BNM has continued to integrate enhanced, technology-driven initiatives across various stages of the supervisory process to improve efficiency and strengthen oversight of DNFBPs, as outlined below: (a) DCAP: Acts as a single source-of-truth through the digitalisation of data and consolidation of modular initiatives into a centralised location. The platform offers multiple features including automated monitoring and dynamic dashboards built upon past supervisory activities to provide oversight of the change in industry trends and vulnerabilities. (b) HRRI: Analytic-driven identification of firms from each DNFBP sectors that could be more vulnerable to ML/TF risk and subject to most intensive supervision. (c) DNFBP Portal: An automated portal for DCRs. It contains data analytics, ‘live traffic’ monitoring, policy query chatbot (to respond on common and general AML/CFT policy queries, and direct to supervisors for additional policy queries) and auto-issuance of compliance report card (contains overview of compliance standing and areas to be improved) to the RIs. Data submitted through the sector-specific DCR questionnaire are analysed via an algorithm and used to facilitate supervisors in assessing control measures of the DNFBPs and for HRRI identification. (d) Statistics dashboard: Automated compilation and visualisation of payment statistics to help supervisors monitor trends and patterns of casino (i.e., historical trends of transaction value and volume, trends and profiles of customers, materiality assessment of different products, etc.). (e) Awareness Platform: Centralised platform containing awareness materials and instructional videos on AML/CFT requirements in multiple languages, and sector specific approaches. 341. SRBs do not have access to the DCAP database, but the BNM notifies the MIA and CCM of high-risk RIs within the company secretary and accountant sectors, to plan supervisory activities in a commensurate way. It is not clear how the system will be maintained as more supervision moves to SRBs and whether direct access will be facilitated. Table 4.2. Number of high-risk DNFBPs (and Higher-Risk Reporting Institutions) per population DNFBP population in 2024 Risk 2019 HRRI population (onsites) 2020 HRRI population (onsites) 2021-2023 HRRI population (onsites) 2024-2025 Feb HRRI population (onsites) DPMS (2,390) High 55 (30) 7 (6) 120 (62) 52 (36) Lawyers (9,967) High 143 (24) 46 (20) 137 (127) 56 (75) Company Secretaries (3,652) M-High 0 (0) 2 (0) 11 (25) 68 (11) Accountants (2,517) M-High 4 (0) 1 (0) 8 (11) 3 (31) Registered Estate Agent (1,378) M-High 6 (24) 2 (0) 10 (16) 69 (19) Trust Companies (52) Low 3 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 1 (7) Labuan Trust Companies (67) Medium 4 (12) 5 (20) 17 (44) 7 (36) 342. DCAP is largely informed by the DCR template submitted by DNFBPs through a fully automated platform. This enables real-time data analytics and automatic generation of compliance report cards. This is an important way of collecting required information to inform Malaysia’s risk-based approach and, at the same time, support the areas that need remediation by RIs. Supervisors have sought feedback and focus group sessions to further enhance the DCR template since 2022, resulting in specific sectoral and firm-based questionnaires and a comprehensive information kit to guide the DNFBPs in responding to the questions. Nevertheless, many DNFBPs met during the onsite noted that the template is general and does not take account of sectoral differences. As a result, questions and responses can be interpreted differently, which may impact its usefulness and overall understanding of risk. 343. The supervision of DNFBPs generally falls under the dedicated DNFBP team within BNM, with a total 22 dedicated AML/CFT supervisors, who are specific sector specialists. For the supervision of LFSA, there is a total 20 supervisors, comprising four dedicated AML/CFT supervisors and five supervisors focused on Labuan trust companies. The CCM and MIA have recently assigned dedicated staff for supervision of company secretaries and accountants, in line with the approach to delegate more AML/CFT supervision to SRBs. 344. Onshore company secretaries and trust companies have historically been subject to supervision by the BNM. Since 2017, BNM and CCM carried out 47 joint onsite inspections on these entities. In 2022, the CCM and BNM signed an agreement to strengthen collaboration on oversight of company secretaries and trust companies. Since then, there have been 11 joint examinations, and the CCM has conducted some independent AML/CFT/CPF supervision of entities in these sectors. The CCM is currently in the process of expanding its resource to fully take on this task in the future. BNM has also conducted approximately 21 joint examinations with MIA since 2023, and the MBC is currently in the process of expanding its resource and building its supervisory capabilities to eventually take on AML/CFT for the legal sector. Onsite inspections across these sectors are complemented by offsite supervision, thematic reviews and engagement and training delivered by the SRBs. While delegating or reallocating supervision to SRB supervisors may deliver certain benefits (e.g., SRB understanding of the sector), Malaysia should ensure that the quality, intensity and frequency of supervision is improved and not reduced, especially in higher risk sectors such as lawyers. 345. Based on the SRA conducted in 2020 and 2024, the casino was assessed as Medium-High ML risk. Consequently, BNM has conducted routine AML/CFT onsite assessments every two years. The casino made notable steps to enhance its preventive measures in recent years, particularly enhancing technology to assist with KYC and transaction monitoring. 346. Due to strict measures implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic, supervision of the DPMS sector was largely conducted through offsite supervision during this period. Although there was an increase in onsite inspections in 2023 (54), the overall number of onsite inspections across this sector has been low even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and since the lifting of measures. This is a concern given that the net risk has gradually increased from a lower level in 2013 to medium-high, the fact there are weaker market entry controls for the sector and some DPMS in East Malaysia were only invoked as RIs in 2024. The number of onsite inspections in several other sectors (e.g., accountants and trust company sectors) is also very limited and mostly covered by offsite supervision. In addition, it is not clear how intensive the onsite and offsite inspections in some sectors are, given their annual high numbers and the number of supervisors available (e.g., 73 onsite inspections for lawyers in 2023 and 6 227 offsite examinations for lawyers in 2024). The Assessment Team does recognise that Malaysia’s advancements in Suptech have improved the efficiency and quality of supervisory activities, which may help compensate for some of these low numbers. Table 4.3. Number of onsite and offsite inspections 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Onsite Examination Casino 1 - - 1 - 1 - DPMS 30 6 6 3 53 24 12 Lawyer 24 20 22 32 73 75 - Company Secretary [54] - - 10 5 10 11 - Accountant [55] - - 1 - 10 31 - REA 24 - 3 3 13 19 - Trust Company - 1 - - - 7 - Labuan Trust Company 12 20 8 13 23 36 - Offsite Examination Casino [56] 2 2 2 2 2 2 - DPMS - 334 479 727 4 812 - Lawyer - 1 212 3 719 5 540 5 6 227 - Company Secretary - 1 060 1 962 3 039 5 3 316 - Accountant - 740 1 194 2 323 - 2 808 - REA - 419 454 532 - 348 - Trust Company - 33 37 - - - - Labuan Trust Company [57] 305 248 252 256 462 345 67 347. The supervision of Labuan trust companies is part of the overall supervision of Labuan RIs (including FIs) and is a priority for the LFSA. Given the important role of Labuan trust companies in company formation and as gatekeepers to the financial services sectors in Labuan IBFC, these RIs are subjected to more intensive onsite or engagement sessions, including annually. Footnotes [54] Includes joint onsite inspections [55] Includes joint onsite inspections [56] Includes multiple submissions [57] Includes multiple submissions" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="410. The CCM has initiated 38 prosecutions between 2019 and 2024 for giving false information to the registrar, based on complaints received. Most of these cases did not relate to BO information. 19 of these cases led to sentences including fines of up to RM 50 000 (approximately EUR 10 775), while the other 19 cases are ongoing. Nevertheless, most of the sanctions imposed by CCM relate to failure to lodge annual returns (as shown in the table below), for which the CCM and LFSA have imposed compounds or administrative monetary penalties. In cases where the legal persons fail to lodge returns after several consecutive years and meet specific criteria such as no existence of corporate shareholder, the CCM and LFSA strike them off. In 2024, the CCM and LFSA struck off approximately 6 000 dormant legal persons. This contributes to the high submission rate of annual returns (more than 90%). While the substantial number of enforcement actions—particularly the striking off of entities—undertaken by CCM and LFSA for non-compliance with annual return submission requirements reflects a commitment to maintaining the availability of BO information, the Assessment Team assesses that sanctions applied to individuals who fail to comply with BO disclosure obligations, or who submit inaccurate or false information, are not sufficiently effective, proportionate, or dissuasive. Table 5.4. Sanctions imposed for the basic and BO information Type of sanctions No. of sanctions imposed 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 CCM Striking off 31 449 36 091 11 344 30 785 12 356 5 864 Monetary penalty/fine (imposed by Court) for failure to lodge Annual Return 123 187 139 348 87 358 Compound for failure to lodge Annual Return 17 434 4 543 13 465 40 621 13 333 35 075 Prosecution for failure to lodge Annual Return 5 144 4 547 5 825 7 345 6 599 9 129 Warning Letter / Show Cause Letter for failure to lodge Annual Return 12 14 13 12 11 1 Prosecution for providing false information to CCM (out of which convicted) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (0) 6 (0) 9 (7) 8 (3) LFSA Striking off 782 952 997 732 560 568 Monetary penalty / fine (imposed by Court) for late/non-submission of Annual Return 288 321 248 232 529 373 Others IRBM - compound for non-submission of tax return 11 1 1 3 0 1 BHEUU - revocation for failure to rectify the issues 4 19 35 38 22 - 411. The IRBM issued compounds to 17 legal arrangements between 2019 and 2024 for non-submission of tax returns. This figure appears small given there are more than 10 000 legal arrangements required to submit annual tax returns in Malaysia. 412. BHEUU takes a proportionate approach in issuing show cause notices [61] and revoking certificates of incorporation for the onshore foundations/incorporated trusts that do not notify changes in their basic or BO information. From 2019 to 2024, the certificates for 118 onshore foundations/incorporated trusts were revoked, which demonstrates a robust response to non-compliance in this sector. 413. As noted under IO.4, remedial actions have been applied for gatekeepers, such as company secretaries and Labuan trust companies, including for failure in their CDD measures (including identification of BOs). Nevertheless, these are mainly limited to supervisory letters, rather than formal sanctions. Footnotes [61] A show cause notice is a formal legal order requiring an individual or organisation to explain their position. It is sent when an action or incident is deemed unacceptable, violates rules and regulations, or results in a breach of contract." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="410. The CCM has initiated 38 prosecutions between 2019 and 2024 for giving false information to the registrar, based on complaints received. Most of these cases did not relate to BO information. 19 of these cases led to sentences including fines of up to RM 50 000 (approximately EUR 10 775), while the other 19 cases are ongoing. Nevertheless, most of the sanctions imposed by CCM relate to failure to lodge annual returns (as shown in the table below), for which the CCM and LFSA have imposed compounds or administrative monetary penalties. In cases where the legal persons fail to lodge returns after several consecutive years and meet specific criteria such as no existence of corporate shareholder, the CCM and LFSA strike them off. In 2024, the CCM and LFSA struck off approximately 6 000 dormant legal persons. This contributes to the high submission rate of annual returns (more than 90%). While the substantial number of enforcement actions—particularly the striking off of entities—undertaken by CCM and LFSA for non-compliance with annual return submission requirements reflects a commitment to maintaining the availability of BO information, the Assessment Team assesses that sanctions applied to individuals who fail to comply with BO disclosure obligations, or who submit inaccurate or false information, are not sufficiently effective, proportionate, or dissuasive. Table 5.4. Sanctions imposed for the basic and BO information Type of sanctions No. of sanctions imposed 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 CCM Striking off 31 449 36 091 11 344 30 785 12 356 5 864 Monetary penalty/fine (imposed by Court) for failure to lodge Annual Return 123 187 139 348 87 358 Compound for failure to lodge Annual Return 17 434 4 543 13 465 40 621 13 333 35 075 Prosecution for failure to lodge Annual Return 5 144 4 547 5 825 7 345 6 599 9 129 Warning Letter / Show Cause Letter for failure to lodge Annual Return 12 14 13 12 11 1 Prosecution for providing false information to CCM (out of which convicted) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (0) 6 (0) 9 (7) 8 (3) LFSA Striking off 782 952 997 732 560 568 Monetary penalty / fine (imposed by Court) for late/non-submission of Annual Return 288 321 248 232 529 373 Others IRBM - compound for non-submission of tax return 11 1 1 3 0 1 BHEUU - revocation for failure to rectify the issues 4 19 35 38 22 - 411. The IRBM issued compounds to 17 legal arrangements between 2019 and 2024 for non-submission of tax returns. This figure appears small given there are more than 10 000 legal arrangements required to submit annual tax returns in Malaysia. 412. BHEUU takes a proportionate approach in issuing show cause notices [61] and revoking certificates of incorporation for the onshore foundations/incorporated trusts that do not notify changes in their basic or BO information. From 2019 to 2024, the certificates for 118 onshore foundations/incorporated trusts were revoked, which demonstrates a robust response to non-compliance in this sector. 413. As noted under IO.4, remedial actions have been applied for gatekeepers, such as company secretaries and Labuan trust companies, including for failure in their CDD measures (including identification of BOs). Nevertheless, these are mainly limited to supervisory letters, rather than formal sanctions. Footnotes [61] A show cause notice is a formal legal order requiring an individual or organisation to explain their position. It is sent when an action or incident is deemed unacceptable, violates rules and regulations, or results in a breach of contract." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="598. In cases where it is not practicable to secure a TF conviction, LEAs can implement alternative measures to disrupt TF activities. These measures include pursuing prosecutions for other related criminal offences, such as terrorism and firearms-related crimes. Additionally, when TF elements are identified but convictions are unattainable (e.g., difficulty converting intelligence into evidence), the SB can use various preventive measures, including the enforcement of preventive laws, immigration regulations and TFS. 599. Malaysia does not retain statistics on the use of other criminal offences where a TF conviction was not possible. However, the below case studies outline Malaysia’s TF disruption efforts using the terrorism offence and deportations. Box 9.3. Case studies of alternative measures Case Study on Alternative Criminal Offence (Terrorism Charges) An Indonesian financial facilitator (Individual A) was arrested by the SB based on intelligence of his involvement in 2019 church bombing plan. Individual A was believed to have transferred funds to members of IS-affiliated Daulah Islamiyah group in the Philippines via a remittance agent in Malaysia. However, due to a lack of information on the purported fund transfers and missing transaction link between Individual A and the ISIL militant, the SB pursued terrorism charges. The individual was convicted under Section 130JB of Penal Code and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Case Study on Deportations A foreign national based in Malaysia, was investigated for TF by providing funds to an ISIL militant. Malaysian authorities arrested the subject in 2018 and handed him over to his native country in 2019, where he was detained and later charged with TF in 2021. 600. The SB leverages the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) as a preventive law to arrest and detain terrorism and TF offenders with sufficient allegation of facts but insufficient evidence to mount a charge in court. POTA allows for detention without trial for up to two years, and supervisory control over an individual’s liberties for up to five years under specific conditions. These conditions may include travel/movement restriction, limited internet access, mandatory participation in rehabilitation programmes, regular check-ins at a police station, and the requirement to wear an electronic monitoring device. This preventive law is aimed to prevent the commission or support of terrorist acts. Malaysia notes that POTA prescribes the grounds and procedures for detention and there are mechanisms in place to apply for a habeas corpus to the High Court to challenge unlawful detention at the point of arrest. Nonetheless, the Assessment Team notes that aspects of this law (i.e., prolonged detention without a trial) could be used in a manner that is inconsistent with international human rights law. [86] 601. Since 2016, POTA was used for 30 individuals. More recently, since 2019, POTA was used for five individuals who were returning family members of FTFs and underwent de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs. As of February 2025, there are no individuals in detention pursuant to POTA. 602. Malaysia also pursues immigration-related measures (i.e., deportation) for cases involving foreigners involved in terrorism and TF or suspected to be involved. As indicated in the below table, since 2019, 16 individuals were deported from Malaysia who were considered suspects in terrorism and TF cases. All deportations are executed based on the agreement of foreign counterparts and used as a pragmatic disruption measure when the evidentiary threshold for prosecution cannot be met, or the suspect is wanted by the home country for prosecution. Table 9 .7. Statistics on deportation of terrorism suspects 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Individuals deported for Immigration Offences 8 0 0 1 5 2 - 16 603. Finally, as noted under IO.10, Malaysia also actively uses its domestic TFS designation regime pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (i.e., the MoHA list) to swiftly disrupt TF activities, especially when it was not feasible to pursue prosecution. The most recent designation of January 2025 included two Malaysians and one Yemeni national, which were assessed by the SB to be the financial and logistical facilitators of terrorism activities. This tool was also used in 2016 in place of prosecution, as the individual was outside Malaysia. Footnotes [86] Recommendation 5 requires criminalisation of TF consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which contains several provisions relating to fair treatment guarantees, notably Article 17: “Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law.”" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="598. In cases where it is not practicable to secure a TF conviction, LEAs can implement alternative measures to disrupt TF activities. These measures include pursuing prosecutions for other related criminal offences, such as terrorism and firearms-related crimes. Additionally, when TF elements are identified but convictions are unattainable (e.g., difficulty converting intelligence into evidence), the SB can use various preventive measures, including the enforcement of preventive laws, immigration regulations and TFS. 599. Malaysia does not retain statistics on the use of other criminal offences where a TF conviction was not possible. However, the below case studies outline Malaysia’s TF disruption efforts using the terrorism offence and deportations. Box 9.3. Case studies of alternative measures Case Study on Alternative Criminal Offence (Terrorism Charges) An Indonesian financial facilitator (Individual A) was arrested by the SB based on intelligence of his involvement in 2019 church bombing plan. Individual A was believed to have transferred funds to members of IS-affiliated Daulah Islamiyah group in the Philippines via a remittance agent in Malaysia. However, due to a lack of information on the purported fund transfers and missing transaction link between Individual A and the ISIL militant, the SB pursued terrorism charges. The individual was convicted under Section 130JB of Penal Code and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Case Study on Deportations A foreign national based in Malaysia, was investigated for TF by providing funds to an ISIL militant. Malaysian authorities arrested the subject in 2018 and handed him over to his native country in 2019, where he was detained and later charged with TF in 2021. 600. The SB leverages the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) as a preventive law to arrest and detain terrorism and TF offenders with sufficient allegation of facts but insufficient evidence to mount a charge in court. POTA allows for detention without trial for up to two years, and supervisory control over an individual’s liberties for up to five years under specific conditions. These conditions may include travel/movement restriction, limited internet access, mandatory participation in rehabilitation programmes, regular check-ins at a police station, and the requirement to wear an electronic monitoring device. This preventive law is aimed to prevent the commission or support of terrorist acts. Malaysia notes that POTA prescribes the grounds and procedures for detention and there are mechanisms in place to apply for a habeas corpus to the High Court to challenge unlawful detention at the point of arrest. Nonetheless, the Assessment Team notes that aspects of this law (i.e., prolonged detention without a trial) could be used in a manner that is inconsistent with international human rights law. [86] 601. Since 2016, POTA was used for 30 individuals. More recently, since 2019, POTA was used for five individuals who were returning family members of FTFs and underwent de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs. As of February 2025, there are no individuals in detention pursuant to POTA. 602. Malaysia also pursues immigration-related measures (i.e., deportation) for cases involving foreigners involved in terrorism and TF or suspected to be involved. As indicated in the below table, since 2019, 16 individuals were deported from Malaysia who were considered suspects in terrorism and TF cases. All deportations are executed based on the agreement of foreign counterparts and used as a pragmatic disruption measure when the evidentiary threshold for prosecution cannot be met, or the suspect is wanted by the home country for prosecution. Table 9 .7. Statistics on deportation of terrorism suspects 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 (Feb) Total Individuals deported for Immigration Offences 8 0 0 1 5 2 - 16 603. Finally, as noted under IO.10, Malaysia also actively uses its domestic TFS designation regime pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (i.e., the MoHA list) to swiftly disrupt TF activities, especially when it was not feasible to pursue prosecution. The most recent designation of January 2025 included two Malaysians and one Yemeni national, which were assessed by the SB to be the financial and logistical facilitators of terrorism activities. This tool was also used in 2016 in place of prosecution, as the individual was outside Malaysia. Footnotes [86] Recommendation 5 requires criminalisation of TF consistent with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which contains several provisions relating to fair treatment guarantees, notably Article 17: “Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law.”" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="639. Supervisory authorities generally ensure compliance with TF TFS as part of onsite and offsite inspections, including by reviewing data submissions from RIs. Supervisors generally observe that TFS implementation is a key component of the institutional risk assessment of RIs, particularly those that operate cross-border or are subject to specific inherent TFS risk. The general approach of competent authorities’ monitoring for TFS should be considered alongside the analysis of IO.3 and IO.4. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 640. Competent authorities monitor TF TFS obligations of RIs, which includes reviewing sanctions screening, alerts, freezing/blocking requirements, transaction monitoring and reporting of positive matches. Supervisors also conduct sampling tests of sanctioned persons in the RIs’ system to review whether the system can detect sanctioned persons effectively. 641. Supervisory authorities have implemented a range of actions in response to failures in TF TFS compliance. A Supervisory Letter is usually issued communicating all supervisory concerns following an onsite examination of RIs. Between 2019 and 2025, supervisors issued 211 supervisory letters to FIs and VASPs that addressed issues related to TF and/or PF TFS obligations. Malaysian authorities indicated that the most common TF TFS deficiencies highlighted in supervisory letters relate to lapses in the robustness of screening systems and adequacy of sanctions alert management, although several cases involved dealing with sanctioned individuals. 642. In the event of a more severe breach of TFS obligations, elevated enforcement action is applied. Between 2019 and February 2025, BNM and LFSA imposed administrative monetary penalties on 41 entities of which 32 entities were Labuan Bank and Labuan Money Brokers. Amongst these, there were four instances of FIs onboarding TF-related designated entities. These involved three RIs in the MSB/DPI sector and one RI in the insurance sector. The incidences were either self-declared to the supervisor or detected through the RI’s periodic reporting or suspicious transactions reporting, upon identifying a breach. The RIs involved were subject to administrative penalties, the level of which took into account that there was no evidence of TF activities by the sanctioned individuals in these transactions. Box 10.3.Case of enforcement action for failures of TFS obligations On 26 June 2020, upon the determination of a positive name match, Insurer F had reported to BNM that a motorcycle insurance policy had been accidentally issued to a person designated on the MoHA list. This was detected following the sanctions screening conducted by Insurer F one day after the insurance policy was issued on 24 June 2020. Upon detection of the positive name match, Insurer F froze the policy, without making any refunds to the designated person and submitted a STR to the FIU. As the lapse in sanctions screening had resulted in the on-boarding of a designated person, BNM had imposed an administrative monetary penalty of EUR 56 030 on Insurer F. To remediate failures of TFS compliance, Insurer F undertook a comprehensive review of its sanctions screening processes and enhanced its systems to put in place real-time screening to prevent further recurrence. 643. In all cases, when a supervisory authority identifies AML/CFT compliance failures, the RIs are required to provide periodic updates on their progress in rectifying the issues, until the findings are satisfactorily addressed, or an independent auditor is appointed to validate the remedial measures. There is room for improvement in certain sectors, such as insurance, MSB/DPI and Labuan banking/money broker, where a higher number of deficiencies or non-compliance cases have been observed. Smaller RIs, which do not rely on advanced commercial databases for sanctions screening, appear to face challenges in updating their own databases, particularly in relation to the MoHA sanctions list. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 644. Efforts to enhance DNFBP’s understanding of TF TFS obligations have been actively carried out through the NCC’s DNFBP Working Committee and DNFBPs Sub Committee, as well as training sessions and seminars that leverage supervisory guidelines and typology information. In addition, supervisors regularly engage with RIs through their main liaison officers, facilitating communication between RIs and supervisors and helping to clarify regulatory expectations regarding compliance with sanction requirements. 645. Nevertheless, the Assessment Team has concerns regarding the high number of TFS compliance lapses observed in certain DNFBP sectors. As a result of onsite examinations of DNFBPs between 2019 and February 2025, supervisors issued 260 supervisory letters addressing both TF and PF TFS obligations. 646. DPMS and lawyers accounted for around 70% of all TF TFS-related supervisory letters issued to DNFBPs. Between 2020 and February 2025, 19 administrative monetary penalties totalling EUR 51 290 were imposed in the DNFBP sector, all on Labuan trust companies, related to TFS lapses of the late or non-submission of report on sanctions screening reports. Malaysia notes that the deficiencies in the DNFBP sectors are improving (e.g., supervisory findings show shortcomings moving from ‘weak’ to ‘marginal’). However, while these sectors are not identified as high-TF risk in the NRA 2023, the consistent identification of TFS lapses raises concerns about the effectiveness of outreach and remediation actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="639. Supervisory authorities generally ensure compliance with TF TFS as part of onsite and offsite inspections, including by reviewing data submissions from RIs. Supervisors generally observe that TFS implementation is a key component of the institutional risk assessment of RIs, particularly those that operate cross-border or are subject to specific inherent TFS risk. The general approach of competent authorities’ monitoring for TFS should be considered alongside the analysis of IO.3 and IO.4. 10.5.1. FIs and VASPs 640. Competent authorities monitor TF TFS obligations of RIs, which includes reviewing sanctions screening, alerts, freezing/blocking requirements, transaction monitoring and reporting of positive matches. Supervisors also conduct sampling tests of sanctioned persons in the RIs’ system to review whether the system can detect sanctioned persons effectively. 641. Supervisory authorities have implemented a range of actions in response to failures in TF TFS compliance. A Supervisory Letter is usually issued communicating all supervisory concerns following an onsite examination of RIs. Between 2019 and 2025, supervisors issued 211 supervisory letters to FIs and VASPs that addressed issues related to TF and/or PF TFS obligations. Malaysian authorities indicated that the most common TF TFS deficiencies highlighted in supervisory letters relate to lapses in the robustness of screening systems and adequacy of sanctions alert management, although several cases involved dealing with sanctioned individuals. 642. In the event of a more severe breach of TFS obligations, elevated enforcement action is applied. Between 2019 and February 2025, BNM and LFSA imposed administrative monetary penalties on 41 entities of which 32 entities were Labuan Bank and Labuan Money Brokers. Amongst these, there were four instances of FIs onboarding TF-related designated entities. These involved three RIs in the MSB/DPI sector and one RI in the insurance sector. The incidences were either self-declared to the supervisor or detected through the RI’s periodic reporting or suspicious transactions reporting, upon identifying a breach. The RIs involved were subject to administrative penalties, the level of which took into account that there was no evidence of TF activities by the sanctioned individuals in these transactions. Box 10.3.Case of enforcement action for failures of TFS obligations On 26 June 2020, upon the determination of a positive name match, Insurer F had reported to BNM that a motorcycle insurance policy had been accidentally issued to a person designated on the MoHA list. This was detected following the sanctions screening conducted by Insurer F one day after the insurance policy was issued on 24 June 2020. Upon detection of the positive name match, Insurer F froze the policy, without making any refunds to the designated person and submitted a STR to the FIU. As the lapse in sanctions screening had resulted in the on-boarding of a designated person, BNM had imposed an administrative monetary penalty of EUR 56 030 on Insurer F. To remediate failures of TFS compliance, Insurer F undertook a comprehensive review of its sanctions screening processes and enhanced its systems to put in place real-time screening to prevent further recurrence. 643. In all cases, when a supervisory authority identifies AML/CFT compliance failures, the RIs are required to provide periodic updates on their progress in rectifying the issues, until the findings are satisfactorily addressed, or an independent auditor is appointed to validate the remedial measures. There is room for improvement in certain sectors, such as insurance, MSB/DPI and Labuan banking/money broker, where a higher number of deficiencies or non-compliance cases have been observed. Smaller RIs, which do not rely on advanced commercial databases for sanctions screening, appear to face challenges in updating their own databases, particularly in relation to the MoHA sanctions list. 10.5.2. DNFBPs 644. Efforts to enhance DNFBP’s understanding of TF TFS obligations have been actively carried out through the NCC’s DNFBP Working Committee and DNFBPs Sub Committee, as well as training sessions and seminars that leverage supervisory guidelines and typology information. In addition, supervisors regularly engage with RIs through their main liaison officers, facilitating communication between RIs and supervisors and helping to clarify regulatory expectations regarding compliance with sanction requirements. 645. Nevertheless, the Assessment Team has concerns regarding the high number of TFS compliance lapses observed in certain DNFBP sectors. As a result of onsite examinations of DNFBPs between 2019 and February 2025, supervisors issued 260 supervisory letters addressing both TF and PF TFS obligations. 646. DPMS and lawyers accounted for around 70% of all TF TFS-related supervisory letters issued to DNFBPs. Between 2020 and February 2025, 19 administrative monetary penalties totalling EUR 51 290 were imposed in the DNFBP sector, all on Labuan trust companies, related to TFS lapses of the late or non-submission of report on sanctions screening reports. Malaysia notes that the deficiencies in the DNFBP sectors are improving (e.g., supervisory findings show shortcomings moving from ‘weak’ to ‘marginal’). However, while these sectors are not identified as high-TF risk in the NRA 2023, the consistent identification of TFS lapses raises concerns about the effectiveness of outreach and remediation actions." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="675. RIs’ level of understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations are largely the same as that for TF TFS. The Guidance issued by the STAC and supervisory authorities support RIs to understand their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay. Screening against sanctions lists at the onboarding stage and as part of ongoing due diligence is a standard aspect of CDD processes and extends to BOs of legal persons and arrangements. 676. In the context of processing wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with designated persons and entities. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems which do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanction screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. 677. From 2024, RIs were required to conduct an institutional risk assessment on PF. This has enhanced the understanding on PF TFS implementation for those that have complied with this requirement. In these cases, supervisors have noted some enhancements to refine specific PF red flags and/or parameters for transaction monitoring systems. Many smaller FIs and DNFBPs are still in the process of conducting these risk assessments. 678. In addition to publicly available sources (e.g., the executive summary of the 2024 PFRA), supervisory authorities have actively disseminated useful guidance through the PPP platforms, such as the Compliance Officers’ Networking Group. The relevant PPP platforms provide opportunities for compliance officers of different RIs to exchange information about best practices and common challenges, including in relation to PF and PF TFS. 11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 679. FIs and VASPs implement measures to comply with their PF TFS measures in a similar way to TF TFS obligations, particularly in terms of the data infrastructure that supports sanctions screening (see IO.10). Larger FIs that use commercial screening systems have basic PF TFS controls in place, and implementation is generally occurring. There are some breaches identified related to record keeping on screening documentation (Labuan IBFC). For the VASPs that the Assessment Team met, they had subscription software and blockchain analytic tools to pre-screen all VA transactions including for PF TFS. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 680. DNFBPs are aware of their PF TFS screening requirements, although they are generally more aware of the obligation to detect a positive match of listed individuals, rather than obligations related to the detection of those acting on behalf, or at their direction of, designated persons and entities. As discussed in IO.10, a significant number of smaller DNFBPs rely on manual checks of the lists rather than using available notification measures. There is room for improvement for proactive awareness of updates to sanctions lists as the lack of systematic updates can cause failures of compliance of TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="5" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="675. RIs’ level of understanding and compliance with PF TFS obligations are largely the same as that for TF TFS. The Guidance issued by the STAC and supervisory authorities support RIs to understand their obligation to freeze funds and other assets without delay. Screening against sanctions lists at the onboarding stage and as part of ongoing due diligence is a standard aspect of CDD processes and extends to BOs of legal persons and arrangements. 676. In the context of processing wire transfers, FIs and VASPs comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with designated persons and entities. Banks generally facilitate wire transfers through automated systems which do not process transfers if any fields trigger sanction screening hits. VASPs generally use blockchain analytic tools to screen the beneficiary and originator to verify they are not on sanctions lists. 677. From 2024, RIs were required to conduct an institutional risk assessment on PF. This has enhanced the understanding on PF TFS implementation for those that have complied with this requirement. In these cases, supervisors have noted some enhancements to refine specific PF red flags and/or parameters for transaction monitoring systems. Many smaller FIs and DNFBPs are still in the process of conducting these risk assessments. 678. In addition to publicly available sources (e.g., the executive summary of the 2024 PFRA), supervisory authorities have actively disseminated useful guidance through the PPP platforms, such as the Compliance Officers’ Networking Group. The relevant PPP platforms provide opportunities for compliance officers of different RIs to exchange information about best practices and common challenges, including in relation to PF and PF TFS. 11.5.1. FIs and VASPs 679. FIs and VASPs implement measures to comply with their PF TFS measures in a similar way to TF TFS obligations, particularly in terms of the data infrastructure that supports sanctions screening (see IO.10). Larger FIs that use commercial screening systems have basic PF TFS controls in place, and implementation is generally occurring. There are some breaches identified related to record keeping on screening documentation (Labuan IBFC). For the VASPs that the Assessment Team met, they had subscription software and blockchain analytic tools to pre-screen all VA transactions including for PF TFS. 11.5.2. DNFBPs 680. DNFBPs are aware of their PF TFS screening requirements, although they are generally more aware of the obligation to detect a positive match of listed individuals, rather than obligations related to the detection of those acting on behalf, or at their direction of, designated persons and entities. As discussed in IO.10, a significant number of smaller DNFBPs rely on manual checks of the lists rather than using available notification measures. There is room for improvement for proactive awareness of updates to sanctions lists as the lack of systematic updates can cause failures of compliance of TFS obligations." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="153. Malaysia has established strong coordination mechanisms for operational purposes, including PPPs. In 2019, it launched the NFCC under the National Anti-Corruption Plan (2019-2023) to enhance inter-agency collaboration and drive a whole-of-government response to financial crimes. The NFCC coordinates joint operations amongst LEAs, facilitates intelligence sharing, and streamlines enforcement against high-impact cases. Its integrated structure allows agencies to pool expertise, resources, and data analytics for more effective detection, investigation, and prosecution of complex financial crimes. The NFCC also oversees efforts to seize and forfeit assets from major joint operations, including pilot projects toward centralised asset management. 154. In January 2023, the MATF was established to focus on economic crimes and the top five high-risk crimes identified in the NRAs. Chaired by the Attorney General and coordinated by the MACC, the MATF discusses emerging risks, trends, and criminal modus operandi, as well as conducts joint analyses and information-sharing amongst agencies. To date, the MATF coordinated actions resulted in the dismantling of corruption, fraud and smuggling syndicates, coupled with the recovery of proceeds and tax penalties totalling more than EUR 5.6 million. 155. Given the multiple operational coordination and cooperation mechanisms in place in Malaysia, the Assessment Team focused on determining whether any duplication or inefficiencies exist in practice. Regarding potential overlaps in responsibilities between the NFCC and the MATF, Malaysia noted that the NFCC handles high-profile cases, while MATF focuses on cases involving significant crime proceeds or property. Furthermore, Malaysian authorities stated that case allocation between NFCC and MATF is mutually exclusive. To further improve coordination, Malaysia could consider optimising coordination between the NFCC and MATF to prevent any practical overlaps that may arise (e.g., high-profile cases involving substantial illicit proceeds). 156. Malaysia has implemented various other initiatives to enhance operational coordination of the NFCC and MATF in tackling high-risk crimes. Key efforts include: · The National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) - Established in October 2022, the NSRC brings together the NFCC, RMP, BNM, MCMC, FIs, and telecommunications companies. Its goal is to strengthen national efforts in combating scam-related crimes and facilitate the recovery of stolen funds through a coordinated response. · The National Fraud Portal (NFP) - Established in August 2024, the NFP, is an electronic platform that connects NSRC agencies and the private sector to enhance fraud detection and response. Key features of the NFP include: ‒ Automated fund tracing – Expedites the tracing and recovery of stolen funds within minutes, preventing further dissipation. ‒ Data-driven risk assessments – Identifies mule account holders through advanced analytics. ‒ Enhanced transaction data sharing – Facilitates collaboration amongst FIs for faster fraud detection and action. ‒ Additionally, the NFP includes a mule module, allowing FIs to share mule account information, thereby improving preventive and risk mitigation measures. · Public-Private-Partnerships: There are multiple PPP initiatives focused on different crime types, i.e. corruption, smuggling, tax, securities offences, TF and PF. Malaysia established the Malaysia Financial Intelligence Network (MyFINet) in 2017 as a PPP for information sharing on specific cases between FIU, LEAs and specific RIs. MyFINet has organised six thematic working groups focused on these crime types. 157. Malaysian competent authorities also regularly collaborate through bilateral MOUs. These arrangements outline the cooperation for sharing intelligence, joint investigations, and leveraging each agency’s unique capabilities and areas to combat ML/TF and financial crimes. They also cover supervisory coordination. For example, BNM has signed an agreement with CCM and collaborates with MBC and MIA to enhance supervision of company secretaries, lawyers, and accountants . 158. Apart from formal collaboration channels, working level collaboration amongst both law enforcement and supervisors is also enhanced by measures such as secondment of officers. The table below outlines the various secondment arrangements in place. Table 1.4. AML/CFT Secondments between key agencies (2019-2025) Seconding Agency Recipient Agencies No. of Individuals BNM NFCC, MACC, RMCD, ROS, LFSA 22 IRBM, MACC BNM (FIU) 7 IDM, CCM, LFSA, MMEA, KPDN, MACC, RMCD, LHDN, RMP, AGC NFCC 37 RMP SC 4 159. Malaysia also presented case studies demonstrating effective collaboration between the FIU and LEAs in combating ML, TF, and predicate offences. Interviews with authorities reaffirmed that both LEAs and the FIU exhibit strong commitment to inter-agency cooperation, demonstrating a clear understanding of its critical role in financial crime enforcement. Domestic operational coordination and cooperation are key strengths to Malaysia’s AML/CFT efforts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="153. Malaysia has established strong coordination mechanisms for operational purposes, including PPPs. In 2019, it launched the NFCC under the National Anti-Corruption Plan (2019-2023) to enhance inter-agency collaboration and drive a whole-of-government response to financial crimes. The NFCC coordinates joint operations amongst LEAs, facilitates intelligence sharing, and streamlines enforcement against high-impact cases. Its integrated structure allows agencies to pool expertise, resources, and data analytics for more effective detection, investigation, and prosecution of complex financial crimes. The NFCC also oversees efforts to seize and forfeit assets from major joint operations, including pilot projects toward centralised asset management. 154. In January 2023, the MATF was established to focus on economic crimes and the top five high-risk crimes identified in the NRAs. Chaired by the Attorney General and coordinated by the MACC, the MATF discusses emerging risks, trends, and criminal modus operandi, as well as conducts joint analyses and information-sharing amongst agencies. To date, the MATF coordinated actions resulted in the dismantling of corruption, fraud and smuggling syndicates, coupled with the recovery of proceeds and tax penalties totalling more than EUR 5.6 million. 155. Given the multiple operational coordination and cooperation mechanisms in place in Malaysia, the Assessment Team focused on determining whether any duplication or inefficiencies exist in practice. Regarding potential overlaps in responsibilities between the NFCC and the MATF, Malaysia noted that the NFCC handles high-profile cases, while MATF focuses on cases involving significant crime proceeds or property. Furthermore, Malaysian authorities stated that case allocation between NFCC and MATF is mutually exclusive. To further improve coordination, Malaysia could consider optimising coordination between the NFCC and MATF to prevent any practical overlaps that may arise (e.g., high-profile cases involving substantial illicit proceeds). 156. Malaysia has implemented various other initiatives to enhance operational coordination of the NFCC and MATF in tackling high-risk crimes. Key efforts include: · The National Scam Response Centre (NSRC) - Established in October 2022, the NSRC brings together the NFCC, RMP, BNM, MCMC, FIs, and telecommunications companies. Its goal is to strengthen national efforts in combating scam-related crimes and facilitate the recovery of stolen funds through a coordinated response. · The National Fraud Portal (NFP) - Established in August 2024, the NFP, is an electronic platform that connects NSRC agencies and the private sector to enhance fraud detection and response. Key features of the NFP include: ‒ Automated fund tracing – Expedites the tracing and recovery of stolen funds within minutes, preventing further dissipation. ‒ Data-driven risk assessments – Identifies mule account holders through advanced analytics. ‒ Enhanced transaction data sharing – Facilitates collaboration amongst FIs for faster fraud detection and action. ‒ Additionally, the NFP includes a mule module, allowing FIs to share mule account information, thereby improving preventive and risk mitigation measures. · Public-Private-Partnerships: There are multiple PPP initiatives focused on different crime types, i.e. corruption, smuggling, tax, securities offences, TF and PF. Malaysia established the Malaysia Financial Intelligence Network (MyFINet) in 2017 as a PPP for information sharing on specific cases between FIU, LEAs and specific RIs. MyFINet has organised six thematic working groups focused on these crime types. 157. Malaysian competent authorities also regularly collaborate through bilateral MOUs. These arrangements outline the cooperation for sharing intelligence, joint investigations, and leveraging each agency’s unique capabilities and areas to combat ML/TF and financial crimes. They also cover supervisory coordination. For example, BNM has signed an agreement with CCM and collaborates with MBC and MIA to enhance supervision of company secretaries, lawyers, and accountants . 158. Apart from formal collaboration channels, working level collaboration amongst both law enforcement and supervisors is also enhanced by measures such as secondment of officers. The table below outlines the various secondment arrangements in place. Table 1.4. AML/CFT Secondments between key agencies (2019-2025) Seconding Agency Recipient Agencies No. of Individuals BNM NFCC, MACC, RMCD, ROS, LFSA 22 IRBM, MACC BNM (FIU) 7 IDM, CCM, LFSA, MMEA, KPDN, MACC, RMCD, LHDN, RMP, AGC NFCC 37 RMP SC 4 159. Malaysia also presented case studies demonstrating effective collaboration between the FIU and LEAs in combating ML, TF, and predicate offences. Interviews with authorities reaffirmed that both LEAs and the FIU exhibit strong commitment to inter-agency cooperation, demonstrating a clear understanding of its critical role in financial crime enforcement. Domestic operational coordination and cooperation are key strengths to Malaysia’s AML/CFT efforts." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="287. Supervisory authorities widely employ remedial actions where they identify failures in compliance in line with their respective enforcement and penalties framework. Although Malaysia has a mechanism to apply formal measures for serious violations, the number of such cases is limited. The lack of formal measures for serious violations could be a result of an inability to effectively identify serious violations, rather than because of disproportionate or non-dissuasive sanctions. 288. Supervisory authorities can impose several types of formal and informal remedial supervisory actions depending on several factors, including whether the breaches constitute criminality; their severity, the constancy and repetitiveness of violations; the compliance history of the FI or VASP; and impact on market and industry. Informal remedial supervisory actions include supervisory letters; warning letters; and Letters of Undertaking. Formal actions include private reprimands; directive orders; Enforceable Undertakings; Directions of Compliance; and license revocations including prior show cause notices. In addition, supervisory authorities can impose enforcement actions in cases of serious misconduct. These include administrative monetary penalties and compounds. Enforcement actions have a punitive character while remedial supervisory actions are remedial in nature. Formal remedial supervisory actions and enforcement actions are largely preceded by informal remedial supervisory actions. 289. When a supervisory authority finds severe AML/CFT failings, it develops an action plan considering the factors mentioned above and, when necessary, relevant committees within the authority determine the actions to be taken. This approach is consistent across all three FI supervisors. Most proposals include imposition of an enforcement action. 290. Supervisory letters with necessary remedial actions are issued to FIs and VASPs after most onsite examinations regardless of their overall control ratings. The supervisory letters require FIs and VASPs to formulate remedial action plans and to report on progress periodically until satisfactory closure of the issues, which often lasts for more than a year. Remediation is also followed up in subsequent onsite examinations. Some of the FIs met during the onsite were required to employ third parties to assist them in monitoring progress against their remediation plans. 291. Since 2018, Enforceable Undertakings or Letters of Undertaking have been issued for eight banks and subjected them to “higher risk programmes”. The BNM observed significant levels of commitment by the Board and senior management to improve their AML/CFT infrastructure in response to these actions. Actions included systems upgrade, competency expansion, process improvement and capacity building. The latest six banks added to the higher risk programme committed to invest up to EUR 157 million in remediation. Between 2018 and 2023, the BNM revoked six MSB licenses and rejected ten renewals of licenses for those found to co-mingle their business with unauthorised activities. Table 3.5. Supervisory remedial actions and enforcement actions for AML/CFT Types of actions 2019 2020-2022 2023 2024 BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA Supervisory letters 60 18 15 40 74 61 32 202 34 21 28 71 20 46 19 74 Reprimand/ warning letter - 3 4 - 1 3 3 26 1 1 - 1 5 - 3 5 Letter of Undertaking 1 - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - Direction of Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Directive Order - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Enforceable Undertaking - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Show cause for revocation/non-renewal - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - 1 - - Revocation/non-renewal of license - 3 1 - - 8 - 5 - 3 - 1 - 1 - - Compound 3 - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 Administrative Fines/Penalties 9 28 2 - 2 22 3 12 - 5 - 4 4 4 2 35 292. As shown in the table above, administrative fines are the second most applied sanction. The supervisory authorities determine the amount of administrative monetary penalties based on the level of adverse effect, the amount of profit gained, or loss avoided, by the misconduct and the amount of subject matter of the breach. For compounds, the consideration of amount starts from 10% of the maximum penalties stipulated in the relevant laws. The authorities adjust these amounts considering aggravating and mitigating factors, such as degree of culpability, post misconduct behaviour, etc., as well as other factors, such as deterrent effect. The Assessment Team considers this approach to be proportionate. 293. The supervisory authorities publish enforcement actions on their respective websites. The FIs and VASPs met during the onsite confirmed they periodically check the website of the authorities and if there is any new information on enforcement actions, they run a test to assure the same issue is not applicable to them. This implies that the publication of enforcement actions has a dissuasive effect to some extent. However, the number of the cases published is generally limited because of the limited number of formal enforcement actions. 294. The BNM pursues criminal prosecution for the most serious contraventions. In 2020, one of the MSB licensees and its two directors were convicted with a total fine EUR 84 045 for failure to record transactions in their system and conduct CDD. The SC and LFSA have not prosecuted or convicted any legal or natural person for AML/CFT failings. Box 3.5. Enforcement action against a VASP The SC conducted an ad-hoc review on DAX B, triggered based on information received from the NSRC about an individual suspected of being a mule in a scam in DAX B. During the review, the SC identified three individuals, including the suspected account flagged by the NSRC, whose transactions were inconsistent with DAX B’s knowledge of customer profiles, including multiple deposits in Fiat currency, followed by conversions to VA and frequent VA withdrawals to wallet addresses outside of the DAX. The SC also revealed DAX B had failed to submit STRs on those transactions due to deficiencies in its AML/CFT transaction monitoring controls. Further, it highlighted DAX B’s failure to fulfil its ongoing due diligence obligations with the three individuals throughout the business relationship, specifically in reclassifying customer risk profiles in response to changes in transaction patterns. The SC reprimanded and imposed a total penalty of EUR 118 525 against DAX B, which was also published in SC’s website in 2024. 295. The supervisory authorities believe that there have been significant improvements in the AML/CFT compliance and the overall compliance culture of the FIs and VASPs due to enhanced supervisory interventions, particularly follow-up actions conducted. The Assessment Team generally shares this view given the substantial level of FIs and VASPs’ understanding, and implementation of ML/TF risks and mitigating measures as described above. FIs and VASPs generally rectify identified gaps satisfactorily with minimal or no recurrence of non-compliance of similar nature. Onsite examinations find less issues for FIs and VASPs with past enforcement records. However, it is unclear what impact supervisory letters—the measure most employed—have on improvements to FIs and VASPs overall AML/CFT frameworks. Although other remedial and enforcement measures are applied in limited numbers, they appear to have a positive impact on compliance in FIs and VASPs. 296. The supervisory authorities undertake a range of outreach activities which cover regulatory breaches and other issues. These activities include seminars, issuing AML/CFT policy documents, newsletters, and engagement with industry associations through CONG. Through these activities, the authorities share information on their expectations and general outcomes. Each industry establishes its own CONG, such as Digital Asset Business Operators CONG, and participants share their own advanced practices. The authorities participate in CONG as an observer. 297. Most of the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite considered CONG as one of the most helpful supervisory outreach activities. The BNM has also recently started to hold AML Clinics for MSBs and DPI issuers and communicates regulatory expectations through these by providing concrete case studies. Over a hundred compliance officers and CEOs of MSBs and DPI issuers have attended the AML Clinic sessions. FIs and VASPs generally appear to be satisfied with the outreach provided by supervisory authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="287. Supervisory authorities widely employ remedial actions where they identify failures in compliance in line with their respective enforcement and penalties framework. Although Malaysia has a mechanism to apply formal measures for serious violations, the number of such cases is limited. The lack of formal measures for serious violations could be a result of an inability to effectively identify serious violations, rather than because of disproportionate or non-dissuasive sanctions. 288. Supervisory authorities can impose several types of formal and informal remedial supervisory actions depending on several factors, including whether the breaches constitute criminality; their severity, the constancy and repetitiveness of violations; the compliance history of the FI or VASP; and impact on market and industry. Informal remedial supervisory actions include supervisory letters; warning letters; and Letters of Undertaking. Formal actions include private reprimands; directive orders; Enforceable Undertakings; Directions of Compliance; and license revocations including prior show cause notices. In addition, supervisory authorities can impose enforcement actions in cases of serious misconduct. These include administrative monetary penalties and compounds. Enforcement actions have a punitive character while remedial supervisory actions are remedial in nature. Formal remedial supervisory actions and enforcement actions are largely preceded by informal remedial supervisory actions. 289. When a supervisory authority finds severe AML/CFT failings, it develops an action plan considering the factors mentioned above and, when necessary, relevant committees within the authority determine the actions to be taken. This approach is consistent across all three FI supervisors. Most proposals include imposition of an enforcement action. 290. Supervisory letters with necessary remedial actions are issued to FIs and VASPs after most onsite examinations regardless of their overall control ratings. The supervisory letters require FIs and VASPs to formulate remedial action plans and to report on progress periodically until satisfactory closure of the issues, which often lasts for more than a year. Remediation is also followed up in subsequent onsite examinations. Some of the FIs met during the onsite were required to employ third parties to assist them in monitoring progress against their remediation plans. 291. Since 2018, Enforceable Undertakings or Letters of Undertaking have been issued for eight banks and subjected them to “higher risk programmes”. The BNM observed significant levels of commitment by the Board and senior management to improve their AML/CFT infrastructure in response to these actions. Actions included systems upgrade, competency expansion, process improvement and capacity building. The latest six banks added to the higher risk programme committed to invest up to EUR 157 million in remediation. Between 2018 and 2023, the BNM revoked six MSB licenses and rejected ten renewals of licenses for those found to co-mingle their business with unauthorised activities. Table 3.5. Supervisory remedial actions and enforcement actions for AML/CFT Types of actions 2019 2020-2022 2023 2024 BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA BNM Bank/ITO BNM MSB/DPI SC LFSA Supervisory letters 60 18 15 40 74 61 32 202 34 21 28 71 20 46 19 74 Reprimand/ warning letter - 3 4 - 1 3 3 26 1 1 - 1 5 - 3 5 Letter of Undertaking 1 - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - Direction of Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - Directive Order - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - Enforceable Undertaking - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Show cause for revocation/non-renewal - - - - - - - 8 - - - - - 1 - - Revocation/non-renewal of license - 3 1 - - 8 - 5 - 3 - 1 - 1 - - Compound 3 - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 Administrative Fines/Penalties 9 28 2 - 2 22 3 12 - 5 - 4 4 4 2 35 292. As shown in the table above, administrative fines are the second most applied sanction. The supervisory authorities determine the amount of administrative monetary penalties based on the level of adverse effect, the amount of profit gained, or loss avoided, by the misconduct and the amount of subject matter of the breach. For compounds, the consideration of amount starts from 10% of the maximum penalties stipulated in the relevant laws. The authorities adjust these amounts considering aggravating and mitigating factors, such as degree of culpability, post misconduct behaviour, etc., as well as other factors, such as deterrent effect. The Assessment Team considers this approach to be proportionate. 293. The supervisory authorities publish enforcement actions on their respective websites. The FIs and VASPs met during the onsite confirmed they periodically check the website of the authorities and if there is any new information on enforcement actions, they run a test to assure the same issue is not applicable to them. This implies that the publication of enforcement actions has a dissuasive effect to some extent. However, the number of the cases published is generally limited because of the limited number of formal enforcement actions. 294. The BNM pursues criminal prosecution for the most serious contraventions. In 2020, one of the MSB licensees and its two directors were convicted with a total fine EUR 84 045 for failure to record transactions in their system and conduct CDD. The SC and LFSA have not prosecuted or convicted any legal or natural person for AML/CFT failings. Box 3.5. Enforcement action against a VASP The SC conducted an ad-hoc review on DAX B, triggered based on information received from the NSRC about an individual suspected of being a mule in a scam in DAX B. During the review, the SC identified three individuals, including the suspected account flagged by the NSRC, whose transactions were inconsistent with DAX B’s knowledge of customer profiles, including multiple deposits in Fiat currency, followed by conversions to VA and frequent VA withdrawals to wallet addresses outside of the DAX. The SC also revealed DAX B had failed to submit STRs on those transactions due to deficiencies in its AML/CFT transaction monitoring controls. Further, it highlighted DAX B’s failure to fulfil its ongoing due diligence obligations with the three individuals throughout the business relationship, specifically in reclassifying customer risk profiles in response to changes in transaction patterns. The SC reprimanded and imposed a total penalty of EUR 118 525 against DAX B, which was also published in SC’s website in 2024. 295. The supervisory authorities believe that there have been significant improvements in the AML/CFT compliance and the overall compliance culture of the FIs and VASPs due to enhanced supervisory interventions, particularly follow-up actions conducted. The Assessment Team generally shares this view given the substantial level of FIs and VASPs’ understanding, and implementation of ML/TF risks and mitigating measures as described above. FIs and VASPs generally rectify identified gaps satisfactorily with minimal or no recurrence of non-compliance of similar nature. Onsite examinations find less issues for FIs and VASPs with past enforcement records. However, it is unclear what impact supervisory letters—the measure most employed—have on improvements to FIs and VASPs overall AML/CFT frameworks. Although other remedial and enforcement measures are applied in limited numbers, they appear to have a positive impact on compliance in FIs and VASPs. 296. The supervisory authorities undertake a range of outreach activities which cover regulatory breaches and other issues. These activities include seminars, issuing AML/CFT policy documents, newsletters, and engagement with industry associations through CONG. Through these activities, the authorities share information on their expectations and general outcomes. Each industry establishes its own CONG, such as Digital Asset Business Operators CONG, and participants share their own advanced practices. The authorities participate in CONG as an observer. 297. Most of the FIs and VASPs met during the onsite considered CONG as one of the most helpful supervisory outreach activities. The BNM has also recently started to hold AML Clinics for MSBs and DPI issuers and communicates regulatory expectations through these by providing concrete case studies. Over a hundred compliance officers and CEOs of MSBs and DPI issuers have attended the AML Clinic sessions. FIs and VASPs generally appear to be satisfied with the outreach provided by supervisory authorities." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="348. All supervisors have a range of measures to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations and ensure regulatory failures are addressed. Supervisory and enforcement interventions are guided by the respective enforcement penalty frameworks. However, the full range of these measures is not consistently used and there is a heavy reliance on supervisory letters to remedy regulatory AML/CFT deficiencies. Malaysia suggests that this is due to most of the issues identified being minor. 349. Report cards are automatically issued after each off-site examination and approximately 37 000 have been issued since 2019. Although report cards are not a remediation measure, they may contain details of identified basic shortcoming and can be used to raise awareness of AML/CFT/CPF obligations. 350. Supervisory letters, and warning letters are generally used to HRRIs to address minor compliance deficiencies identified during onsite inspections. These often include follow up action plans and once the issues have been rectified the entities are no longer HRRIs. 351. Where non-compliance is identified that has medium impact/severity, a Directive Order specifying detailed remedial actions is issued. Directive Orders are formal sanctions applied in first time offence cases where entities have higher ML/TF vulnerabilities and materially inadequate implementation of AML/CFT requirements, such as those involving incomplete identification of BOs, not maintaining/updating a database of sanctions lists, lack of processes for STRs reporting or employing compliance officers without necessary skills and knowledge. As set out in the table below, there have been eight Directive Orders (mainly in the DPMS sector), 22 reprimand/warning letters and one compound sanction issued since 2019. This compares to more than 600 supervisory letters during the same timeframe, which does not appear in line with the risk and context of DNFBP sector in Malaysia, or some of the deficiencies described by the authorities. 352. Mandatory referrals to BNM or LFSA’s Enforcement Committee take place when failings are found that have: (a) an element of culpability and complicity; (b) the presence of highly irregular transactions; (c) involve repeated AMLA offences; (d) in exceptional circumstances (i.e., the RI refused to be examined, severe non-compliances identified through supervisory or non-supervisory activities); and (e) where there is a failure to comply with Directive Order. 353. Since the approval and adoption of DNFBP Enforcement and Penalty Framework, one DPMS has received a compound of EUR 20 742 in January 2024. At the time of the onsite, other cases were being assessed and potential punitive action considered. 354. Overall, the number of remedial measures imposed shows an upward trajectory with half of all Directive Orders and administrative penalties, plus the only compound, all being issued in 2024. All administrative penalties were imposed by the LFSA. Table 4.4. Number of remedial measures imposed across all DNFBP sectors Action taken 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Supervisory letter 91 47 50 57 182 199 626 Reprimand/warning letter - 3 9 3 1 6 22 Directive Order - - 2 2 - 4 8 Administrative Penalty - - 7 - 9 16 32 Compound - - - - - 1 1 Total 91 50 68 62 192 226 689 355. In Labuan, if trust companies fail to comply with a requirement and have significant weaknesses in compliance with rules and regulations, LFSA issues a show cause notice requiring the RI to rectify the gap within 14 days. LFSA will then take further action by issuing a warning letter or applying an enforcement penalty if failure to comply. 356. While the AMLA guidelines and other relevant legislation prescribe sanctions for non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations, some penalties are neither proportionate nor sufficiently dissuasive. For instance, the maximum fine for general breaches of AMLA is RM 1 million (EUR 215 500) per offence, with the possibility of compounding up to 50% of the sanction’s value. This level of penalty appears low considering the wide range of violations it may cover. Fines are calculated using the Enforcement and Penalty Framework, which provides clear parameters to determine the amount of the penalty imposed. However, there has only been one compound for a DNFBP to date, which was within the maximum penalty amount. Most AML/CFT deficiencies in the DNFBP sector relate to implementation of CDD obligations, processes for identifying and reporting suspicious transactions and internal controls. 357. During the onsite, DNFBPs generally reported having good interaction and communication with their supervisors. Supervisors also noted improvements in AML/CFT compliance and in the overall compliance culture of DNFBPs, attributing this to enhanced supervisory interventions. However, while all supervisors have a policy of publishing enforcement actions, their deterrent effect is uncertain, as only one publication relating to the DNFBP sector has been issued in recent years." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="348. All supervisors have a range of measures to ensure compliance with AML/CFT obligations and ensure regulatory failures are addressed. Supervisory and enforcement interventions are guided by the respective enforcement penalty frameworks. However, the full range of these measures is not consistently used and there is a heavy reliance on supervisory letters to remedy regulatory AML/CFT deficiencies. Malaysia suggests that this is due to most of the issues identified being minor. 349. Report cards are automatically issued after each off-site examination and approximately 37 000 have been issued since 2019. Although report cards are not a remediation measure, they may contain details of identified basic shortcoming and can be used to raise awareness of AML/CFT/CPF obligations. 350. Supervisory letters, and warning letters are generally used to HRRIs to address minor compliance deficiencies identified during onsite inspections. These often include follow up action plans and once the issues have been rectified the entities are no longer HRRIs. 351. Where non-compliance is identified that has medium impact/severity, a Directive Order specifying detailed remedial actions is issued. Directive Orders are formal sanctions applied in first time offence cases where entities have higher ML/TF vulnerabilities and materially inadequate implementation of AML/CFT requirements, such as those involving incomplete identification of BOs, not maintaining/updating a database of sanctions lists, lack of processes for STRs reporting or employing compliance officers without necessary skills and knowledge. As set out in the table below, there have been eight Directive Orders (mainly in the DPMS sector), 22 reprimand/warning letters and one compound sanction issued since 2019. This compares to more than 600 supervisory letters during the same timeframe, which does not appear in line with the risk and context of DNFBP sector in Malaysia, or some of the deficiencies described by the authorities. 352. Mandatory referrals to BNM or LFSA’s Enforcement Committee take place when failings are found that have: (a) an element of culpability and complicity; (b) the presence of highly irregular transactions; (c) involve repeated AMLA offences; (d) in exceptional circumstances (i.e., the RI refused to be examined, severe non-compliances identified through supervisory or non-supervisory activities); and (e) where there is a failure to comply with Directive Order. 353. Since the approval and adoption of DNFBP Enforcement and Penalty Framework, one DPMS has received a compound of EUR 20 742 in January 2024. At the time of the onsite, other cases were being assessed and potential punitive action considered. 354. Overall, the number of remedial measures imposed shows an upward trajectory with half of all Directive Orders and administrative penalties, plus the only compound, all being issued in 2024. All administrative penalties were imposed by the LFSA. Table 4.4. Number of remedial measures imposed across all DNFBP sectors Action taken 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total Supervisory letter 91 47 50 57 182 199 626 Reprimand/warning letter - 3 9 3 1 6 22 Directive Order - - 2 2 - 4 8 Administrative Penalty - - 7 - 9 16 32 Compound - - - - - 1 1 Total 91 50 68 62 192 226 689 355. In Labuan, if trust companies fail to comply with a requirement and have significant weaknesses in compliance with rules and regulations, LFSA issues a show cause notice requiring the RI to rectify the gap within 14 days. LFSA will then take further action by issuing a warning letter or applying an enforcement penalty if failure to comply. 356. While the AMLA guidelines and other relevant legislation prescribe sanctions for non-compliance with AML/CFT obligations, some penalties are neither proportionate nor sufficiently dissuasive. For instance, the maximum fine for general breaches of AMLA is RM 1 million (EUR 215 500) per offence, with the possibility of compounding up to 50% of the sanction’s value. This level of penalty appears low considering the wide range of violations it may cover. Fines are calculated using the Enforcement and Penalty Framework, which provides clear parameters to determine the amount of the penalty imposed. However, there has only been one compound for a DNFBP to date, which was within the maximum penalty amount. Most AML/CFT deficiencies in the DNFBP sector relate to implementation of CDD obligations, processes for identifying and reporting suspicious transactions and internal controls. 357. During the onsite, DNFBPs generally reported having good interaction and communication with their supervisors. Supervisors also noted improvements in AML/CFT compliance and in the overall compliance culture of DNFBPs, attributing this to enhanced supervisory interventions. However, while all supervisors have a policy of publishing enforcement actions, their deterrent effect is uncertain, as only one publication relating to the DNFBP sector has been issued in recent years." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="681. The approach of monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). The review of RIs’ compliance with PF TFS obligations is integrated into the overall scope of supervisory onsite and offsite examinations. Supervisors conducted a thematic review on PF in 2019 involving all banking institutions through questionnaires, followed by on-site reviews of 22 selected banks, and a thematic review in 2024 of TF and PF TFS (although with different scopes for each). These reviews resulted in recommendations on PF-specific issues, including improving due diligence on dual use goods and trade supply chains. PF TFS implementation is also covered in the scope of the institutional risk assessment of RIs. 682. The overall outcomes of supervisory examinations regarding PF TFS compliance are similar to that for TF TFS (see IO.10). Supervisors identified deficiencies in RIs’ CPF measures, including issues with screening policies and procedures, as well as lapses in maintaining sanctions databases. A higher number of issues were observed and elevated enforcement actions (e.g., administrative penalties) were applied in certain FI sectors (e.g., insurance, Labuan banking/money broker) and continued compliance lapses have been identified in some DNFBP sectors (DPMS, lawyers and real estate agents). Supervisors have not yet identified any onboarding of designated individuals or entities as a failure of RIs’ sanctions screening. Nevertheless, the consistently high number of TFS compliance lapses in certain sectors raises concerns about the effectiveness of outreach and remediation actions. 683. Regarding outreach activities, the main platforms for engagement between the RIs and supervisors are the networking groups of compliance officers for the various sectors (such as the Compliance Officers’ Networking Group for banking institutions and the Group of Compliance Officers for MSBs). These PPP platforms provide a useful avenue for wider outreach to RIs to enhance PF risk understanding and PF TFS compliance. Examples of recent materials used at these PPP meetings covered key components related to PF TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="6" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11CI6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="681. The approach of monitoring and ensuring PF TFS compliance mirrors the approach for TF TFS (see IO.10). The review of RIs’ compliance with PF TFS obligations is integrated into the overall scope of supervisory onsite and offsite examinations. Supervisors conducted a thematic review on PF in 2019 involving all banking institutions through questionnaires, followed by on-site reviews of 22 selected banks, and a thematic review in 2024 of TF and PF TFS (although with different scopes for each). These reviews resulted in recommendations on PF-specific issues, including improving due diligence on dual use goods and trade supply chains. PF TFS implementation is also covered in the scope of the institutional risk assessment of RIs. 682. The overall outcomes of supervisory examinations regarding PF TFS compliance are similar to that for TF TFS (see IO.10). Supervisors identified deficiencies in RIs’ CPF measures, including issues with screening policies and procedures, as well as lapses in maintaining sanctions databases. A higher number of issues were observed and elevated enforcement actions (e.g., administrative penalties) were applied in certain FI sectors (e.g., insurance, Labuan banking/money broker) and continued compliance lapses have been identified in some DNFBP sectors (DPMS, lawyers and real estate agents). Supervisors have not yet identified any onboarding of designated individuals or entities as a failure of RIs’ sanctions screening. Nevertheless, the consistently high number of TFS compliance lapses in certain sectors raises concerns about the effectiveness of outreach and remediation actions. 683. Regarding outreach activities, the main platforms for engagement between the RIs and supervisors are the networking groups of compliance officers for the various sectors (such as the Compliance Officers’ Networking Group for banking institutions and the Group of Compliance Officers for MSBs). These PPP platforms provide a useful avenue for wider outreach to RIs to enhance PF risk understanding and PF TFS compliance. Examples of recent materials used at these PPP meetings covered key components related to PF TFS." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="7" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8CI7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="This Immediate Outcome and Core Issues were assessed under the 2013 (4th round) FATF Methodology. Please consult 2013 Methodology for corresponding requirements. No data" /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="Not applicable" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: HE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="HE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: LE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="LE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: SE. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="SE" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="MYS" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF_APG" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-malaysia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SRB" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-serbia-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="LVA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-02" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-latvia-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SVN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/slovenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ARM" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="MONEYVAL" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/armenia-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="BEL" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2025-12" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO1" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO2" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO6" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="AUT" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-austria-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="ITA" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-04" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-italy-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="SGP" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-05" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-singapore-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="CAN" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/canada-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO8" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO11" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO3" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO7" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO4" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO10" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. 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The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER_FUR" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO9" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. The text and the sub-ratings shown originate from the MER." /></generic:Attributes><generic:Obs><generic:ObsDimension id="TIME_PERIOD" value="2026-09" /><generic:ObsValue value="ME" /><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="OBS_STATUS" value="A" /><generic:Value id="OBS_REPORT" value="MER" /><generic:Value id="REPORT_URL" value="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/turkiye-mer-2026.html" /></generic:Attributes></generic:Obs></generic:Series><generic:Series><generic:SeriesKey><generic:Value id="FREQ" value="M" /><generic:Value id="JURISDICTION" value="TUR" /><generic:Value id="ASSESS_BODY" value="FATF" /><generic:Value id="DD_DIM" value="DD" /><generic:Value id="DD_ID" value="0" /><generic:Value id="MEASURE" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="REPORT" value="MER" /></generic:SeriesKey><generic:Attributes><generic:Value id="CRITERIA" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CRITERIA_TEXT" value="_Z" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES" value="IO5" /><generic:Value id="CORE_ISSUES_TEXT" value="MER rating: ME. 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